

Otherness in International Relations Theory


by

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Political Science  
Contemporary Social and Political Thought



We accept this thesis as conforming  
to the required standard

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
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### **Abstract**

This thesis is an investigation into how three canonical authors in International Relations create that which they purport to discover: the Other. Each begins their discussion with claims of epistemological relativism and yet each relies upon a position of ontological universalism upon which to found the analysis. It is argued that this particular resolution of the universal and the particular in a construction of anarchy is enabled by the construction of international life posited by the levels-of-analysis typology. Kenneth Waltz, Graham T. Allison and Robert Jervis all construct an object of analysis and participate in an erasure of its construction.

**Examiners:**




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## **Acknowledgements**

I wish to express my thanks to Mike and to Rob for overseeing a very lengthy process. I also wish to thank my father for his indefinite loan of the computer without which this would have taken even longer and to my family for their support, financial and otherwise. Finally, I wish to thank Graham for believing that I really would finish.

## Preface

This thesis examines a crucial contradiction in the work of three influential theorists of international relations, Kenneth Waltz, Graham T. Allison and Robert Jervis. I argue that each represents the Other as a discrete and independently existing object of knowledge while implicitly creating his<sup>1</sup> own object of knowledge. Each begins the text to be analysed here with a statement about the constitutive impact of the knowing subject upon the object of knowledge, yet each ultimately relies upon claims about an allegedly independent object, an Other, on which to found his analysis.

This contradiction is interesting because all three writers explicitly insist that knowledge is not an immediately accessible phenomenon and that knowledge claims about social and political phenomena are inherently problematic. It is even more interesting because all three both assume and reproduce a specific cognitive framework that structures much of contemporary International Relations: the levels-of-analysis classification schema.<sup>2</sup> This schema, I argue, permits, and indeed invites a general resolution of the relationship between claims about universalism and particularism that are at issue in modern theories of international relations. It

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<sup>1</sup>The use of the term 'his' seems odd, however, each of the three authors is male, reflecting the male dominance of the discipline during the time when these texts were originally published.

<sup>2</sup>J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961): 77-92.

is this resolution, I argue, that permits Waltz, Allison and Jervis to invoke an objectivist and universalist account of what international relations is concerned with, while simultaneously stressing a constructivist account of how international relations is to be known.

There are two themes that run through this thesis. The first is that each of the examined authors constructs a position of epistemological relativism, and yet each founds this relativism upon a specific form of ontological pluralism. Secondly, this move is made easier by the levels-of-analysis schema which facilitates the constitution of specific forms of binary oppositions: inside/outside and universal/particular. These two themes reinforce and support one another in a complicated discursive pattern that frames my reading of each of the texts.

The levels-of-analysis framework pervades much, if not most, of the literature in this field. Each of the three authors examined here explicitly responds to the admitted absence of any absolute foundation for the construction of International Relations as a discipline by appealing to it. Yet none of the three is able to avoid founding his analysis on an allegedly occurring independent fact, event or reality. All three writers ascribe to relative truths in an anarchic realm and yet found their claims to knowledge on universally occurring objects of knowledge. This awkward juxtaposition of relative claims to knowledge with universalizing truth statements illustrates how claims about universalism and relativism can be made to work, practically, in mutually constitutive ways no matter how elusive their philosophical relation might be. The tensions and

contradictions in the work of all three texts leads both to questions about the constitutive nature of universality and particularity in the discipline in general and to more specific questions about the epistemological role of the classification of the world into three discrete analytical levels.

To complicate matters further, theories of international relations generally assume the existence of a world characterized by a multitude of sovereign states in a specifically *political* anarchy. Unlike most traditional political theory, which tends to assume the existence of the state as both the source and paradigm of order and value, international relations is usually characterized as some kind of anarchic structure, an anarchy with some kind of order of its own, perhaps, but an order that is generally conceived in contrast with the paradigmatic order associated with states. Within this structure, it is explicitly assumed that there neither is, nor can be, a higher authority or truth. Taking the boundedness of states more or less for granted, much of traditional political theory can be read as a series of attempts to articulate some form of universality with which to understand and unify the particularities that are said to compose the state. Theorists of international relations, by contrast, tend to be more sceptical of all universalizing claims, seeing them as, in principle, expressions of the kind of utopianism that must lead to political disaster. While insisting on the necessities imposed by the anarchical relations among states, however, theorists of international relations have tried hard to resist the implications of claims about anarchy in epistemological matters. In a manner that illustrates much broader

tendencies in the discipline, all three texts examined here make foundational claims about the forms of insecurity that arise from a condition of international anarchy. Paradoxically, the consequence of anarchy in the political realm--supposedly a condition of radical insecurity--is turned into a certain ground from which to articulate strong claims to knowledge about international relations. This object of analysis, I will show, founds Waltz's account of the interstate system, Allison's account of the Cuban Missile crisis and Jervis' account of the manufacture and protection of images.

The levels-of-analysis classification, which plays a crucial role in enabling all three theorists to sustain both their universalistic and their relativistic ambitions without obvious embarrassment, was originally developed to provide a cognitive structure with which to select and filter information about obviously complex phenomena. Different lenses could be used to make sense of what is occurring out there in the realm of international relations. While there is no firm limit to the overall number of levels that could provide the loci around which self-consciously partial and contested knowledge claims are made, almost all writers who work under the influence of this schema refer to one or more of three levels: the individual, the state, or the system of states. For the purposes of this thesis, one text has been chosen as generally representative of analyses that focus on each of these three levels. In each case, and despite the significantly different perspectives that are said to arise from focusing on each level of analysis, an object of knowledge is found outside the political community of the state, and this object of

knowledge then serves as the crucial truth that constitutes the relative truths embodied in each of the sovereign states.

In Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis,<sup>3</sup> Kenneth Waltz initially attempts to construct partial and relative knowledge claims, but he quickly slips into what has become an immensely influential universalizing discourse about the nature of the interstate system as a realm of insecurity, danger and ambiguity. Waltz famously privileges the structure of the interstate system in explaining why wars occur, but he also attempts to separate this found truth from his framework of analysis. This crucial conceptual separation results in the reifying and privileging of a specific object of knowledge. In Waltz's text, the Other is created by assumptions about the primacy of the international system as an explanation for the incidence of war.

At the second level-of-analysis, Graham T. Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis<sup>4</sup> both assumes and reproduces the existence of the state. Allison begins by constructing his claim to knowledge through the rhetoric of partial models and analyses used to make sense of a specific foreign policy event: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. However, he fails to problematize the event which founds his analysis. The Cuban Missile crisis is not a self-evident phenomena but a contested representation. By slipping into the discourses of foreign policy management, Allison effectively reproduces a boundary between

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<sup>3</sup>Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

<sup>4</sup>Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Harper Collins, 1971).

two realms: inside and outside. One is characterized by security, and the other, by political anarchy. Utilizing the lens of the state and of foreign policy, the author 'discovers' the Other as a specific version of insecurity. Allison, as with Waltz, attempts to disconnect his discovery of political anarchy from his models of analysis. This crucial contradiction results in the reification and naturalization of Allison's object of knowledge.

The final level-of-analysis examined here is that of the individual. The selected text used to illustrate how the lens of the individual privileges a specific rendition of the Other is Robert Jervis' The Logic of Images in International Relations.<sup>5</sup> This author's discourse on how images are manufactured, altered and maintained in the interstices between states relies on an implicit theory of perception and assumes the constitutive lens of, specifically, the individual foreign policy maker. As with the other two authors, Jervis slips into a construction of the Other which he claims to discover through his uncoupling of the subject and object of International Relations images. Jervis attempts to decouple his analysis of images from the 'reality' of international politics and slips into the conceptual contradiction facilitated by the levels-of-analysis problematic. Images become sources of ambiguity in the interstate realm, paradoxically manufacturing insecurity in a search for security in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Insecurity translates into a distrust of various images circulating in the discursive economy of international relations. The pursuit of safety and security by the individual

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<sup>5</sup> Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

working through the state in an anarchic international system translates into the Other.

In all three of these texts, the Other is constructed as a corollary of the attempt to hermetically seal the knowing subject from the object of knowledge. The classification of three hierarchical levels both permits and affirms this closure. The gap between statist politics and international relations reified by this classification becomes an aporia that facilitates the onset of the discourse of discovery in the production of specific knowledge claims. The constitutive framework of the levels-of-analysis classification, with its rhetoric of relative, partial and universal truths, relies on a typical construction of the Other to found various analyses. This construction of the Other effectively operates as a foundation for the claims to truth articulated within the framework. Universalizing claims to knowledge become privileged over their relativist counterparts and specific versions of relativity become universalized. Constructions of relative and partial truths in turn construct their opposite: universalizing truths. Discussion of universality becomes necessary once the issue of relativity is raised. One implies the Other.

## Introduction: Otherness and the Third Debate

The discipline of International Relations is allegedly in the midst of its third defining debate.<sup>1</sup> It is a debate that has grown out of a broader movement within the social sciences that has been very loosely termed ‘postmodernism’ or ‘poststructuralism’.<sup>2</sup> The disciplinary self-examination and controversy which imbues much of the recent literature can correspondingly be tied to what Yosef Lapid has called “... the demise of the empiricist-positivist promise for a cumulative behavioral science...”<sup>3</sup> At stake within this discussion<sup>4</sup> are specific assumptions and understandings about science, knowledge and politics. What is being debated is the nature, role and limitations of the study of international politics and the global processes it reproduces. This thesis is an exploration into how crucial categories are constructed, and thus, how they could become denaturalized. What is at stake, in this endeavour, is the legitimacy of some of the

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<sup>1</sup>See “Exchange on the ‘Third Debate’” in International Studies Quarterly, (Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989), pp. 235-280.

<sup>2</sup>See, for example, Pauline Rosenau “Once Again Into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities” in Millennium (Vol. 19, No. 1, 1990), pp. 83-110. It should be noted that there is little, if anything, common to the authors and thinkers lumped together under these labels. For example, Derrida and Foucault had very different projects, deconstruction and genealogy. Derrida has insisted that deconstruction is just an interpretive strategy. Foucault is quoted as asking, “What are we calling post-modernity? I’m not up to date...I do not understand what kind of problem is common to the people we call post-modern or post-structuralist;” in David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 260.

<sup>3</sup>Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era”, International Studies Quarterly, (Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989), p. 236.

<sup>4</sup>The term discussion is used loosely. There is a sense among protagonists or contributors that little, if any, constructive communication is going on among the various and diverse ‘tables’ of political science and, more specifically, International Relations. See an attempt to facilitate conversation by V. Spike Peterson, “Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and International Relations”, Millennium, (Vol. 21, No. 2, 1992), pp. 183-206.

key concepts which allegedly form the building blocks of international relations theory. These concepts include, and devolve from, the levels-of-analysis typology. An investigation into how specific concepts are developed and utilized brings the analyst to a series of knotty epistemological issues.

One of these issues to emerge from this debate is the problem of Otherness in International Relations. In a discipline that is especially motivated by a desire to understand in an 'objective' and non-normative manner why war occurs,<sup>5</sup> an awareness of how the Other is 'discovered' is crucial. Many Realist thinkers seem to assume that they have unproblematically 'discovered' the Other, in much the same way that Christopher Columbus is professed to have discovered America. As considerable literature across many literatures has shown, however, the 'discovery' of the Other is always problematic. For example, William Connolly struggles to adequately articulate a verb able to convey the complicated processes involved in the confrontation between Columbus and, what would become known as, America.<sup>6</sup> Each of the terms analyzed by Connolly underemphasize or understate the ambiguity and confusion that this analyst claims is part of the process of confronting the Other. Concepts interrogated by this thinker are deemed to aspire too much to some pure and "regulative ideal", minimizing the effect of the intersection upon the identities of each of the concerned parties.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). p. 21.

<sup>6</sup>William Connolly, "Identity and Difference in Global Politics", International / Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, (Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 323-25.

<sup>7</sup>Connolly, "Identity and Difference in Global Politics", p. 323.

Part of the ‘Third Debate’ involves the interrogation of key assumptions from a more critical perspective.<sup>8</sup> The role played by a reified Other within Realist thought has especially become something to be questioned and not presumed nor assumed. Some of the recent literature participating in the debate have viewed as problematic specific Realist assumptions about Otherness, including the broader question of its conceptual and rhetorical functions within Realist thought. Touching upon a few of these thinkers illustrates some of the issues and themes emerging from the Third Debate.

David Campbell, for example, argues that the demise of the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has left American foreign policy makers struggling to rearticulate an American identity that previously had been constituted as that which the ‘commies’ were not. Current re-presentations of American identity, he argued, can be understood as “...attempts to replace one enemy with (an)other.”<sup>9</sup> Thus Bush’s ‘War on Drugs’ can be portrayed as an attempt to replace the ‘evil empire’ with evil druglords. Pointing the finger of moral outrage at another target does more than merely justify defence expenditures. Such a conceptual shift also redefines what is important *morally* to the leaders of the United States. This has consequences for aspects of the American ‘character’ and identity. Campbell develops a theory of cold wars, of which the Cold War is only a specific instance, as various re-articulations of American identity.<sup>10</sup> He argues

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<sup>8</sup>Rosenau, “Once Again into the Fray”, pp. 83-85.

<sup>9</sup>Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 8.

<sup>10</sup>Campbell ties in the politics of identity with discourses of danger and security as part of analysis of various ‘cold wars’. Campbell, *Writing Security*.

that an enemy, an Other, is a necessary part of the process of constructing a 'national identity'<sup>11</sup> and the foreign policy which emerges from it. A state is a construct of an "imagined community"<sup>12</sup> that can never completely be finished because a state is only as 'real' as the many and varied processes and practices that go into its creation and affirmation.

Drawing attention to the absence of an ontology independent from the rituals that create such a community would negate the affirmation of the rituals.<sup>13</sup> Thus, part of the continued process of creating a community out of various and discrete rituals, is the erasure of the specific means by which identity formation is effected in what can be thought of as a politics of forgetting. National identities can be viewed as analogous to constitutive myths, their power lies in the forgetting of how the myth came to be. Actually, Campbell takes this argument one step further and develops a theory that foreign policy can be read as a discourse that separates domestic from foreign and self from Other.<sup>14</sup> Thus, an analysis of foreign policy can reveal the mechanisms by which various individuals construct concomitant myths of both danger outside and safety inside the boundaries of the state, protected by those in charge of creating and implementing foreign policy. Foreign policy is a way of looking at the world through a complicated and overlapping pair of reinforcing conceptual lenses: inside and outside, and

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<sup>11</sup>Campbell, *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>12</sup>Campbell, *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>13</sup>Campbell, *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>14</sup>Campbell, *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

community and anarchy. It is this tradition, this invocation of reality, that Campbell seeks to denaturalize.<sup>15</sup>

Michael Shapiro similarly problematizes the uncritical privileging of certain global forces at play in the concept of a nation-state such as 'Guatemala'.<sup>16</sup> Invocation of the concept of Guatemala is a political practice, a representation that reifies and reinscribes prevailing systems of power that, among other things, universalizes a contemporary European definition of political community, i.e. the state. Shapiro argues that to conjure 'Guatemala' is to effect a silencing of the struggles of presentation, of colonialism and domination, that are indivisible from the domestication of the Other.<sup>17</sup> It is to participate in the politics of forgetting, and thus to naturalize a specific version of community. How entities are 'made sense of' reflect specific and contingent conceptual frameworks indivisible from discourses of power. Representation is a political practice that, more often than not, effects its own erasure through the apparently unproblematized presentation of an alleged thing-in-itself.

More generally, the historical context has been altered enough so that heuristic devices are being examined for their relevance in a post-bipolar world. A specific rendition of the Cold War has been reconstituted / dissolved and one of the key animating concerns of Realist thought for, roughly, forty years no longer

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<sup>15</sup>Campbell, *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>16</sup>Michael J. Shapiro, "The Constitution of the Central American Other" in The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), pp. 89-91.

<sup>17</sup>Michael J. Shapiro, "Textualizing Global Politics" in Michael J. Shapiro and James Der Derian, eds., International/ Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings in World Politics, (Lexington, Mass. and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 15.

seems as relevant for understanding global processes. What was once considered a universal truth no longer seems as certain. The Russian peoples have become the recipients of aid; they no longer are portrayed as hatching intricate imperialist plots against the 'free world'. One possible effect of the rapid dissolution of the enemy of the 'First World' is to open up space for questioning previously unexamined 'truths' about the constitution of the enemy and what criteria or characteristics are imputed to the Other.

As answers to previously closed questions become problematized, the possibilities for developing different ways of thinking about social life, including that known as International Relations, expand tremendously. As the erasures by which certain practices and categories become naturalized begin to appear more obvious, the inevitability of certain social phenomena and features becomes less of an imperative to a self-evident 'truth'. Within the confines of this thesis, an interrogation into how a reified Otherness and identity has been constructed is enabled by such an opening up of previously foundational categories of thought within International Relations. Problematization of the conceptual categories upon which the discipline depends, such as a specific construction of Otherness, is crucial because International Relations depends on 'theory'. Discourses of I.R. make sense of a reality, they mediate it and categorize a specific way of perceiving the world, and despite some protestations, an objective reality is not described, rather a subjective reality is created by the discipline. It is significant, for example,

that an issue of International Studies Quarterly dedicated to dissidence in I.R.

should open with the following quote from Michel Foucault:

It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by man's disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think.<sup>18</sup>

However, the lack of certainty has been perceived by some as possibly leading to an "...epistemological anarchy..."<sup>19</sup> which must be guarded against because 'anarchy' is dangerous.<sup>20</sup> It is feared that aspirations of International Relations toward a cumulative, and hence mature, science will be frustrated if the common core of the discipline becomes 'obscured' by those ascribing to various forms of theoretical and methodological relativism.<sup>21</sup> Others have greeted this juncture with what Yosef Lapid has characterized as a celebratory attitude.<sup>22</sup> Jim George

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<sup>18</sup>Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, quoted in Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, "Introduction: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies", International Studies Quarterly, (September 1990, Vol. 34, No. 3), p. 259.

<sup>19</sup>Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era", International Studies Quarterly, (September 1989, Vol. 33, No. 3), p. 249. Lapid was discussing problems with "the notorious pitfalls of post-positivist relativism". Lapid welcomes some aspects of the post-positivist debate, however, his language indicates that an independent or 'objective' standard of theoretical evaluation is required in order to advance the 'theoretical growth' of (the unified entity of) I.R.,

Andrew Linklater sometimes makes a similar move. In a recent article, he claims that the next step for the discipline is to go beyond the stalemate of the Third Debate, which was a necessary discussion to expand and rethink various concepts. However, it is now time to articulate some sort of unifying framework so that the scholarly analysis of International Relations could proceed. It would be a new and improved synthesis (of the positivist thesis and post-positivist antithesis??). Andrew Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, (1992, Vol. 21, No. 1), pp. 77-98.

<sup>20</sup>Andrew Linklater, for example, does not claim explicitly that theoretical proliferation is dangerous.

<sup>21</sup>Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate", p. 249.

<sup>22</sup>Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate", p. 236.

has suggested that, if there is a shared premise or attitude among those lumped together, usually by opponents, as ‘poststructuralists’ or ‘critical theorists’, it is a welcoming of the lack of consensus as the possibility for articulating potentialities outside of what is conventionally understood as “...the ‘art of the possible’ “.<sup>23</sup> What has been thought of as necessary, that is that in international politics, certain realities are inscribed by the inevitability of enemies, has the potential to be denaturalized into a contingent and ambiguous site. An interrogation of the relationship between Otherness and I.R., within the current historical context, could create a thinking space to explore such issues as identity and the nature of the political.

One way to proceed with an investigation of the issue of Otherness and the role that it plays within the discipline is to analyze influential heuristic devices for specific instances of the logics and rhetorics of the forms of representation at play. The problem of dissecting a text cannot be easily dismissed. There are many approaches to the question, the one chosen for this thesis echoes some of the concerns of James Der Derian. His emphasis is on a need to “...deconstruct or denaturalize through detailed interpretation the inherited language, concepts and texts that have constituted privileged discourses in international relations...”.<sup>24</sup> Emphasis lies on disturbing the practices of representation that constitute the subject matter of I.R. studies. Linguistic practices of representation, that make

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<sup>23</sup>Jim George. International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate”, International Studies Quarterly, (September 1989, Vol. 33, No. 3), p. 273.

<sup>24</sup>James Der Derian, “The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations”, Michael J. Shapiro and James Der Derian, eds., International / Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, p. 4.

sense of the world, cannot be separated from the realm of practice. The division of theory and practice into two spheres tends to reify language<sup>25</sup> and to elide its production from the arena of contestation and debate. Linguistic representation can be understood as another form of social practice. Viewing it as such politicizes, and denaturalizes, dominant ways of making sense of the world.

There is no one comprehensive set of tools with which to approach a text. Jacques Derrida resists the implications conveyed by 'method' when deconstructing a text.<sup>26</sup> The interrogation of the texts within this thesis is not a "...mechanistic or ritualistic..."<sup>27</sup> procedure to be applied to every text. The analysis consists more of a critical attitude retained while reading that stays within the specific text. It does not intend to be a hostile reading, but it does intend to appeal:

to a discourse's own terms to show how it undermines, undoes and displaces its own most central and certain voices.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, when interrogating the three chosen texts for the specific mechanisms by which each privileges a self over the Other, analysis must focus on the specific processes constructing the terms and oppositions upon which each text should be addressed.

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<sup>25</sup>Michael Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation*, p. 6.

<sup>26</sup>Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 155-74.

<sup>27</sup>Ruth Edwards Abbey, "Reading Between the Matrices: Conflicting Strategies in *The Strategy of Conflict*", Paper presented at the March 1991 meeting of the International Studies Association in Vancouver, B.C.

<sup>28</sup>Ashley, "Living on Border Lines", pp. 260-64.

The procedure to be followed here, is that the selection of specific texts will be accomplished utilizing the levels-of-analysis classification and construction of the alleged ‘reality’ of international relations. This effectively plays with an issue continuously debated within the discipline. How is one to make sense of international politics, which lens or heuristic device would best facilitate an ‘insightful’ peek into the workings of global politics? There is a realization that, even if theorists ascribe to an objective theory of knowledge, there are far too many variables and phenomena vying for the analyst’s attention for every thing to be given the same simultaneous and analytical attention.<sup>29</sup> The role played by the analytical and conceptual “...organizing device...”<sup>30</sup> has been the subject of much epistemological debate. Does an analytical device make sense of an objectively existing reality or does it construct such a reality for the analyst? This is one of the issues being replayed within the Third Debate and one of the questions being raised within this thesis. Given the emphasis on the evaluation of different organizing devices, frameworks for analysis and levels-of-analysis that pervades the literature within the discipline, this thesis will investigate the question of the constitutive role of various heuristic devices on the knowledge produced by the discipline. A comparison of the claims to knowledge of three different levels within a specific organizing device should result in some interesting questions and insights about the role that analyzing mechanisms have upon the production of

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<sup>29</sup>J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations”, Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System and Theoretical Essays*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-8.

<sup>30</sup>K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 5th ed., (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 13.

knowledge. Thus, one text from each of the three most commonly articulated levels-of-analysis will be selected: the system, the state, and the individual.<sup>31</sup> At the level of the system, Kenneth Waltz's Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis<sup>32</sup> will be interrogated for the strategies by which the Other is constructed and, yet, allegedly 'found' by the author. Graham T. Allison's work on the Cuban missile crisis will be the vehicle through which the construction of the state and its other will be discussed.<sup>33</sup> As a specific instance of the construction of the individual, Robert Jervis' text on perception will be analyzed for insight.<sup>34</sup> In this manner, three commonly articulated sites of identity within Realist discourse will be examined for the processes by which the Other is discovered.

### **Otherness: A General Statement**

Before an interrogation of the specific texts occurs, it would seem necessary to address the issue of what claims of Otherness involve. It will be argued that the thinkers interrogated for their assumptions upon which their claims

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<sup>31</sup>There is little, if any, consensus about the number of levels adequate for a 'comprehensive' look at international politics. However, the individual, the system and the state seem to be an analytical triad that pervades much of the literature.

<sup>32</sup>Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

<sup>33</sup>Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Harper Collins, 1971).

<sup>34</sup>Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, (New York: Columbia university press, 1970).

to knowledge are predicated, utilize a concept of danger, of an enemy, to found their own textual logics. It will be argued that this concept of the Other must take on the appearance of necessity in order for the various analyses to maintain some form of logical coherence. An awareness of the relativity of their own assumptions would undermine the urgency of the various projects of Kenneth Waltz, Graham T. Allison and Robert Jervis. Their claims are posited as truth, and the sense of external danger that permeates the various texts is alleged to exist independently of how reality is constructed by these thinkers. What is at stake in these claims to knowledge is whether or not the object of their analyses has an independent and objective existence. Logical and rhetorical coherence demands that these authors take the position that the danger and insecurity that allegedly gives international studies its status of importance and seriousness will be 'found' outside of the state boundaries. This paper seeks to illustrate that the danger and threat are constructed by the authors in specific ways. If the 'enemy' has more to do with those discovering it than any 'real' danger outside of the state, then the implications for further research into global politics must be dealt with, as the plethora of literature surrounding the Third Debate attests.

Before the implications of the relationship between claims to knowledge in international studies and the Other can be traced out, the general concept of Otherness needs to be unpacked. Construction of the Other has more to do with the knowing subject and the forms of representation utilized to make sense of the world, than with an independently existing entity that is somehow perceived in and

of itself. Claims to knowledge predicated upon a specific sense of danger reveal what is dangerous for the subject making these assertions. An examination of the Other ultimately reveals the subject, not some allegedly independently existing object. Otherness is the result of a specific series of societal practices; it is a byproduct of the construction of a specific identity. Identity formation involves an affirmation and a bounding of specific traits which involves the negation of others. The subject that is being created has as its Other, characteristics that are simultaneously vilified and externalized. One is a negation of the other. This process of identity formation involves the alleged 'discovery' of specific objects that are surreptitiously created by the subjects representing reality. The processes of constructing and naturalizing some form of truth are an intrinsic aspect of maintaining and policing a specific site of identity.<sup>35</sup> What is defined as a site of identity founds the truths uttered by the subject. Relativization of the presented truth, a denaturalization of how the world is made sense of, undermines the subject position of those who claim to know the world in and of itself. The relationship between the Other and the subject constructing it, is a complex intertwining of the relationship between power and knowledge involving the disciplining of ambiguities and the assertion of certainty.

The site of the demarcation between identity and difference is the result of specific social practices. It is not a self-evident and 'naturalized' delineation. Construction of the distinction between what is a valid subject position and that which is objectified as invalid, for example, the distinction made between the

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<sup>35</sup>Michael J. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation, p. 90.

rational and the irrational, is a site of contestation and struggle. Identities are not given by some divine power. What is categorized as distasteful and weak is not something that can be apprehended apart from the conceptual lenses used to make sense of 'reality'. Otherness is not an entity that appears to the observer in an unmediated form, as if from a Archimedean perspective. Neither the subject nor the Other has an independent ontological status. One implies the other; one is utilized to construct the other. The self is established through a process of creation. Not only is a boundary drawn, and what is bounded is claimed, but what is excluded from this bounded entity is created in a category of the Other. Both, allegedly independently existing entities, are derived from the same set of assumptions and reinforce the same version of reality.

Power is a necessary means to be able to speak for the world; to construct and to reinforce a specific claim to knowledge.<sup>36</sup> Power enables construction; it is creative. Logically, construction implies some form of destruction. These two concepts are indivisible. The more naturalized and commonsensical a particular version of the truth seems, the less obvious the relationship between power and knowledge appears. Those who claim to be realists, who build their arguments upon what is reputedly self-evident and self-explanatory, are reinforcing dominant power relations, those who question prevailing practices are challenging the power relations embodied in certain tropes.<sup>37</sup> There is not some channel which allows the spectator unmediated access to the world; what is discovered cannot be

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<sup>36</sup>Colin Gordon, "Afterward" in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, Michel Foucault, ed., Colin Gordon, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 237.

<sup>37</sup>Michael J. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation, pp. 53-54.

separated from those who 'find' it. The relationship between object and subject is intertwined, one position implies the other. There does not exist some form of Archimedean perspective that allows the analyst to apprehend 'truth' directly:

*To the realists:-* You sober people who feel well armed against passion and fantasies and would like to turn your emptiness into a matter of pride and an ornament: you call yourselves realists and hint that the world really is as it appears to you. As if reality stood unveiled before you only, and you yourselves were perhaps the best part of it-  
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Those analysts, including Kenneth Waltz, Robert Jervis and Graham T. Allison, who claim to discover the Other are reproducing a claim to knowledge that is predicated upon the separation between subject and object of study. By claiming that 'truth' can be discerned in an immediate manner these authors are reifying a specific construction of reality. The role that the analyst plays in perception is minimized. The power being exercised by the thinker in constructing a version of the 'truth' is made invisible.

An examination of the role that the construction of subjectivity and truth played in the Spanish conquest and subsequent creation of America allows an interrogation of the role that power plays in constructing forms of knowledge. Tzvetan Todorov, in The Conquest of America traces the change in the Spanish identity resulting from their confrontation of radical difference and subsequent attempts to harness the ambiguity that potentially threatened the certainty of the truth as the Spanish knew it. The explorers were driven to insert the Aztecs into

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<sup>38</sup>Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans., Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage House, 1974), p. 121.

their conceptual framework without being forced to substantially rewrite how they made sense or constructed the Spanish world. At stake in the meeting of the Aztecs and the Spanish was the ability of each of the competing worldviews<sup>39</sup> to be able to make sense of the confrontation and to maintain some form of intellectual certainty. The clashing of these two civilizations did not only involve guns and horses but, it involved the struggle between, at least, two assertions of power about what constituted the world. What emerged from the competition was a hierarchical relationship. The Spanish maintained their conceptual framework, not a static entity but one capable of changing, growing and incorporating new elements within its apparatus. As part of the processes of colonialism the Spaniards made sense of the Aztecs, and the other tribes of what became the Americas, utilizing their own conceptual lenses; the Spanish subjectivity spoke for the Aztecs and utilized the power to frame the Aztecs within Spanish categories for the Aztecs to make sense of themselves. The Aztecs became the Indians, even to themselves.

Crucial to the victory of the Spanish over the Aztec Empire was a loss in the ability of the Aztec conceptual framework to make sense of their world. The gods, who previously had provided the signs by which the Aztecs knew their world, either no longer shared their language with the Aztecs or became silent.<sup>40</sup> The communication with the world that formed the basis of Aztec social order was terminated; the next required step did not manifest itself through divination, as it

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<sup>39</sup>Tzevatan Todorov, *The Conquest of America*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 142.

<sup>40</sup>Todorov, *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

was supposed to do. A specific instance of how power creates knowledge and can fragment or displace worldviews, concerns the concept of war.

To the Aztecs, war was more of a symbolic activity than the 'effectiveness' prized by the Spaniards.<sup>41</sup> The supreme weapon of the Aztecs was an incredible feather armour handed down from father to son.<sup>42</sup> Its appearance during war was supposed to instill abject fear into enemies of the Aztecs causing opposing armies to flee because of the ritual value of the coat. The purpose of war, according to the highly ritualized framework of the Aztecs, was the establishment of a treaty describing the details of the tribute to be awarded to the victor. There was no concept for the type of war that the Spanish conquistadors were waging, one of assimilation.<sup>43</sup> One of the mechanisms by which the Aztec worldview was supplanted was the imposition of a war privileging effectiveness over ritual. The conquistadors changed the meaning of warfare for the Aztecs; the terms and goals of the war being fought were Spanish.

However, it was not only the Aztec worldview that was changed. The Spanish conceptual framework was altered as the conquistadors incorporated the 'Indians' into their version of the world. The Spanish conquerors perceived that the 'Indians' patterns of interaction were framed within the context of the relationship and consequent communication between the human being and the larger world; that individuals were slotted into a "...pre-established order"<sup>44</sup> that

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<sup>41</sup>Todorov, *Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>42</sup>Todorov, *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>43</sup>Todorov, *Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>44</sup>Todorov, *Ibid.*, p. 97.

was determined by the use of signs and prophecies. Conversely the Spanish patterns of social interaction was predicated upon the relationships and communication between humans. Todorov assigns some of the reasons for the Spanish victory over a numerically superior force to the superiority in interpersonal communication of the conquistadors over the Aztecs.<sup>45</sup> However, the price of that victory was a submerging of the discourse linking the human to the cosmos within European heirs of the conquest. One aspect of symbolic activity is suffocated because it becomes identified with the conquered peoples of America. In order to make sense of the radical difference encountered, the Spaniards utilize their own concepts, of superstition and paganism, to define and categorize the Aztecs. This imputes specific Spanish qualities to these peoples which are then devalued. Spanish identity becomes more intertwined with the aspects or traits considered desirable, i.e. those used to explain the victory. The Spanish locus of identity was not untouched by the process of contact and subsequent conquest.

Spanish colonization of the Americas enhanced those elements within the culture of Spain that privileged the individual and improvisation. These traits became associated with the Spanish articulation of 'modernity'. The self-image of the Spaniards was defined against those traits perceived in the Aztecs: weak, infidel or non-modern. What was externalized and defined as non-Spanish were characteristics within the Spanish worldview that were perceived as existing independently of the Spanish perception of the world, but that was actually a part

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<sup>45</sup>Todorov, *Ibid.*, p. 97.

of the universe constructed by Cortes *et al.* Undesirable aspects were written onto the Aztecs as part of the construction and disciplining of what it meant to be Spanish at the time of the conquest. The identity of the Spaniards was redefined. What the various tribes represented for the conquistador was the negation of what constituted the 'modern' and/ or Christian Spaniard.<sup>46</sup> The members of the tribes comprising the Aztec Empire were made sense of by the European conquistadors as an absolute negation of what was meant by Christian and civilized. Perceived differences were used to emphasize the Christian and the 'modern' within their own subjectivity. The objects of the 'Indians' were used to underscore these sites of definition for Spanish subjectivity.

The relationship between the Spanish inscribers and the objects of inscription, the 'Indians', can be understood as an unequal power relationship that can be viewed as a specific instance of colonization. Thus, an examination of a specific instance of colonial practice can be used to trace how knowledge is intertwined with power relations. Not only does power involve distinguishing which truth is the prevailing one, but it structures the subject positions from whence truths are uttered. Specifically, colonialism can be viewed as the process by which 'what' is 'whose' version of reality becomes dominant and how other disparate truths are subjugated to these privileged forms of knowledge and subjectivity. Thus, the Spanish, as the dominant partner in the power relationship characterized as colonization, represented the Aztecs to both the Europeans and

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<sup>46</sup>Todorov claims that the period of conquest is a transitional time for the Spanish because there are elements of both the medieval and the modern found in Spanish motivations and justification. Todorov, *Ibid.*, p. 42.

the Aztecs themselves. Acts of interpretation and creation are undertaken by the dominant party, for both. The Spanish *made sense* of the 'Indians'; they gave meaning to what an 'Indian' was. The form of representation filled a need within those creating and maintaining the dominant version of reality.<sup>47</sup> The Spanish wanted gold and souls; the portrayal of the primitive and heathen 'Indian' justified and supported such an appropriation. Relations of power that result in, and support, the colonial project manufacture meaning and identity for all involved.

These patterns of representation can be understood using grammar as an analogy. Linguistically, the presentation of the Other was characterized by absence; the presentation of the subject necessitated presence. The subject is articulate and rational; the Other is inarticulate and irrational.<sup>48</sup> The allegedly autonomous and sovereign individual speaks of, and for that, which is unable to present itself. The citizen acts in the public realm for his or her dependents. The Other is characterized by a 'dual absence'<sup>49</sup> represented in speech. The Other is relegated to the status of the third person, that of an object of the subject. The Other is an 'it' not a 'thou'. The Other, in the context of colonialism, tends to be portrayed as an *absence* of European-ness, of a lack of modernity, of rational individuality.

Identities created by this interaction of power and knowledge give meaning to both parties. In order to be considered capable of occupying a subject position, a being must be judged to be both rational and intelligible, whatever specific forms

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<sup>47</sup>Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Vintage House, 1987), p. 273.

<sup>48</sup>Todorov, *The Conquest of America*, p. 121.

<sup>49</sup>Todorov, *Ibid.*, p. 157.

these qualities take. If these prerequisites are lacking, then this being will be categorized as a speechless and powerless Other. The cultural relationships that produce meaning also reflect the duality of power and knowledge. The party representing the object of knowledge on its behalf, constructs that which it purports to discover. The subject, in conceptualizing, creates the Other. Whoever manufactures the meaning, and therefore the knowledge, exercises ontological and epistemological control over both the subject and the object. Language and representation accompanies empire.<sup>50</sup> The power of colonization involves the construction of specific claims to truth.

The analogy of subject-object, while a useful heuristic device for tracing how the mechanisms of identity formation operate, fails to emphasize the lack of homogeneity, of unity, that destabilizes identity formation. Attempts to discipline uncertainty and ambiguity characterize social and cultural production of meaning. Destabilizing processes are at work both inside and outside the boundaries of the constructed identity. Uncertainty and insecurity must be kept at bay, i.e. externalized, for the truth intertwined with the constituted subject-position to become naturalized and thus reinforce and reproduce specific power relations. Policing of the allegedly stable and universal site of identity, so that it appears to be stable and universal, is facilitated by the simultaneous creation of the Other. The Other is a category, defined by the dominant subject, which serves as both a threat and an example. The threat is implicit. Otherness is a construction and an attempted banishment of certain unwanted characteristics. Ambiguities and

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<sup>50</sup>Todorov, *Ibid.*, p. p. 221.

uncertainties that threaten the security offered by a specific site of identity may be controlled by suppression, denial or exclusion. The elements attributed to the Other provide examples of what not to be, and thus, what to be. Examination of the Other reveals the subject. The Other provides a dark mirror constructed by the self.

A relationship between power and knowledge, embodied in particular and historically contingent conceptions of discourse, subjectivity and colonialism, results in the privileging of specific ways of making sense of the world, as was seen in Todorov's discussion of the Aztec-Spanish clash. The parties and the paths of interaction available to them, in the instance of an unequal relationship, are defined by the dominant subjects. In order for the dominated to be able to 'legitimately' speak and to be heard, by those structuring specific versions of the world that reinforces their own status, the dominant discourse must be utilized. Thus it was the Aztecs who learned Spanish.<sup>51</sup> In order to be heard, the dominated groups must be perceived as capable of articulation; proof of this ability is usually viewed as the acceptance and reproduction of the dominant conceptual framework and linguistic concepts. Thus, entering into interaction with the colonizers entails an acceptance of the identities provided by the discourse, no matter how temporarily. An attempt to change or to subvert the prevailing forms of representation, and the concomitant pattern of power relations, necessitates an entry into the social practices and institutions creating these versions of reality. In order to speak and be understood within the dominant European discourse of

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<sup>51</sup>Todorov, *Ibid.*, p. 63.

nation-states, one must frame one's political or social stances within the discourses of nationalism, of states, of bounded entities and the rational individuals that comprise these specific forms of political community. The processes of colonization, of domination and representation, determine who has a legitimate voice on the global stage and what the terms of debate will be.

An overview of some of the themes of identity formation involved in some of the colonial practices undertaken by certain European states, allows a rough elaboration of how knowledge and power intersect to create forms of identity and selfhood within International Relations literature. When confronted with the radically unknown, 'western' colonial practice has tended to reproduce the Cartesian tautological opposition of identity and difference.<sup>52</sup> Ambiguity has been tamed by incorporation and inscription into one these two conceptual and constitutive categories. Both of these containers, into which various phenomena are placed, no matter how forced the fit, are derived from the worldview making sense of what has been previously unknown. If the appropriate container for the mysterious entity is deemed to be that of identity, then an apparent representation of equality is created. Elements perceived as being constructive of the party making sense of radical difference are extrapolated onto the object of knowledge. The representation of the Other is understood to be an extension of the self.<sup>53</sup> This is an example of colonization as a form of self-reproduction. The equality between the dominated and the dominating by the inscribers is belied by the power

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<sup>52</sup>Todorov, *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>53</sup>Said, *Orientalism*, p. 219.

held by one party to inscribe for both. If the inscription of radical difference takes the form of non-identity, or of difference, then the object of analysis is perceived as the absolute negation of the knowing subject. There is a denial of commonality. Both define what is unknown in relation to the self, a process that reproduces the security and the certainty promised by specific articulations of subjectivity.

As indicated before, the definition and inscription of specific meanings is linked to the production of knowledge and the concomitant use of power. The process can be characterized as illumination, as bringing light to the question in a constructive manner, which is a matter of the use of power. The subject position, that which is making sense of the phenomena considered relevant, exerts an ontological power over the object of its analysis; it places, defines and controls the incidence of the colonized Other. But, this is not an uncontested power. The privileging of one locus of identity, and thus of Otherness, is a privileging of one historical struggle over another. Confrontation between self and Other is multifaceted. There is a tension between the self and the 'object' of knowledge for control over the mode of representation, for the manner and the terms by which sense is made; this is also a struggle to keep the category of self free from elements of the Other, for the maintenance and policing of the categories. Neither form of identity is unproblematically essentialized or homogeneous. Both are historical and ontologically unstable. Meanings derived from the subject position are therefore also vulnerable and requires continual re-inscription and assertion of certainty. Identity formation is dynamic process; it is not a static foundation.

Returning to the illustration drawn by Todorov, the conquering Spaniards discovered gold and souls in America, but they also created the individual in Spanish subjectivity. This was one of the reasons for their success in conquering the Aztec civilization. Discovery of the individual, allegedly associated with some specific traits of the emerging European worldview, transforms the Spaniards within the realm of the 'modern'.<sup>54</sup> The individual became recognized as the form of life capable of rational and logical speech. In fact one of the tautological prerequisites of citizenship is this ability of speech. Only citizens were to have a voice, i.e. a vote, within the developing European democratic nation-state. Speech, partaking of the dominant discourse, constructs and orders rational truths for allegedly civilized beings, i.e. those who exist within the dominant version of reality. Articulation signifies, and reinforces, a particular version of modernity and the individual.

Meaning and comprehension, as connoted by articulation, can be reduced to the level of the sovereign individual. This has become a primary site of identity within some versions of what is 'modern' political life. As with other constructions of identity predicated upon the logic of self and Other, Otherness is used to define and to police a specific rendition of the individual. The lack of rationality, democracy, or whatever is the specific and constitutive characteristic of the specific subjectivity being articulated, is that which is essentialized in the category of the perceived Other. The Other, explicitly derived from difference,

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<sup>54</sup>David Campbell, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States", *Alternatives*, XV (1990), pp. 263-286, p. 272.

rather than equality, is portrayed as being inferior to the subject because it has not, and will not, develop or attain traits associated with subjectivity. This devaluing of the objects of analysis, leads to justifications of various forms of colonialism. The objects of knowledge are constructed to lack what is deemed necessary for self-governance, whether it be their societies, their economics or their religions, by the subjects in power. The form of representation of the Other is a form of colonialism, a domesticating interpretation, that results in a re-inscription and redefinition of the self. It is an act of domination. Inscription of the object and the subject of knowledge results in the imposition of meaning and a particular version of reality structuring the social processes that constitute a continuing relationship.

Returning, more specifically, to the issue of Otherness/ identity within the discipline of International Relations there is an interrogation into the relationship between the individual and the nation-state. At stake within some contemporary debates, is this interrogation into the constitutive nature of the relationship between the individual and the nation-state. It has been alleged that certain variations of nationalism have been utilized to police and to construct a specific version of the individual. Nationalism takes the form of a specific discourse providing a particular rendition of the relationship between the individual and the state. Production of a nationalist discourse was considered a prerequisite by which those in the 'third world' could realize aspirations of formal

decolonization.<sup>55</sup> Nationalism is reputed to be an individual emotion, a “devotion to one’s nation”.<sup>56</sup>

Its appearance is closely intertwined with the advent of the modern nation-state, and with the discipline of the national citizen: The inmate... would be national man. Because the geographical discourse which justifies frontiers is that of *nationalism*.<sup>57</sup>

Nationalism performs a twofold function. It justifies the geographical and spatial frontiers that developed within the context of western European political culture. It also provides a locus for the individual and his or her identity. The individual is defined as a citizen, as ‘national man’. The margins, national borders, are used to police this individual. For this entity to act in a nonconformist and anti-logical manner is perceived to threaten the version of reality embodied in the state, and by implication, the justification for a specific rendition of inscription of meaning and concomitant social relations. The state is idealized as a collection of individuals, whose tautological basis of commonality *is* this nation-state. Within this discourse sovereign individuals were considered prerequisites of legitimate statehood, e.g. the basis of the Leviathan in Hobbes and other contract theorists.

Competition among various western states for empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to confrontation with radical difference, and to consequent development of national identities and versions of reality

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<sup>55</sup>Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World- A Derivative Discourse, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1986), p. 40.

<sup>56</sup>Victoria Neufeldt, ed., Third College Edition: Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English (New York: Simon and Schuster’s Inc., 1988), p. 903.

<sup>57</sup>Michel Foucault, Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, ed., Colin Gordon. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 73.

intertwined with these subject positions. Military and economic expansion out of a specific Western European context was paralleled and facilitated by conceptual colonialism, which was the inscription of the categories of meaning and identity that evolved in a specific European context, upon what were considered non-modern and non-European peoples. For example, states and territories were created, ad hoc, out of British and French administrative regions based on certain understandings of political community predicated upon the individual and the nation-state.

During the period of political and formal 'de-colonization' the question of post-colonial identity was framed within the discourse of nationalism. In order to achieve political independence, non-Western peoples utilized the constructive category of nationalism to manufacture both the container and the contents of the desired form of polity. Required by the dominant discourse that equated sovereignty with political community, non-European societies were impelled to develop an attachment to the state, which became an ironic symbol of formal independence, the institution that was usually an artifact of European colonial administration. Thus, in order to be perceived as articulate by the dominant subjects in global politics, other entities were required to become individuals with an attachment to a nation aspiring for statehood. The objects of European knowledge accepted the dominant categories of political discourse and the social and political processes that support these claims to knowledge. Statehood, a term derived from the European context, was lobbied for, rather than pre-contact forms

of political community. To begin to be understood, the Other must speak in the 'rational' language of the subject.

This dilemma is dealt with by Partha Chatterjee, in Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse. Chatterjee examines the paradox behind post-colonial nationalism. In order to be considered a rational subject, and thus to be able to speak, an aspiring state must enter into the discourses of nationalism and modernization. Hence, the desire for political autonomy is both created and contradicted, or undermined, by the necessity of prior acceptance of western cultural standards, identities, forms of representation and truths. Non-western forms of identity are rejected and transformed in order to create the national state apparatus that is considered a necessary prerequisite for political sovereignty. Ironically, decolonization can only succeed once the European discourse has been reproduced within other contexts. For conceptual decolonization to occur nationalist aspirations must be transformed.<sup>58</sup>

The inscriptions of nations, nationalism, and nation-states have become hegemonic forms of global political community. One prevailing concept of meaning conveys legitimacy. An example of the dominance of global inscription of Western versions of reality is that the ideal of the autonomous and sovereign individual is universalized through the pursuit and policing of particular renditions of human rights.<sup>59</sup> Likewise, the truths embodied in the nation-state are reiterated by the nature of much interstate communication and global politics. This version

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<sup>58</sup>Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, p. 168.

<sup>59</sup>Campbell, "Global Inscriptions", p. 277.

of statehood does not require that the state take the form of an impermeable black box, as in Realist theory, but the state is perceived to be the legitimate actor in representing and defining 'modern', individual citizens both inside the state and in international relations. This role of re-presenting the citizen both outside and inside reinforces the framework of reality predicated upon sovereign entities, and reinforces the legitimacy of the discourses of statehood. Citizens become articulate through institutions of the state. And the state requires that persons reproduce the reality protected by the borders of the country, to maintain the security of the citizens inside and out. Debate within much of European political theory is concerned with the issue of which entity gives rise to which, and assuming the existence of the concepts rather than unpacking them as adequate expressions of political community. Does the state or the individual come first? Is the state more than an aggregation of the individuals within its borders?

There is a tension between the inscription of the individual and the state. This tension is reflected in the dual role that foreign policy plays in identity formation. The discourse of foreign policy can be viewed as a means of producing a specific form of individual. It can also be viewed as a means of validating and reproducing the existence of a specific nation-state. Policing of liminal groups within the state, in the name of 'national security' is an effective means of establishing and maintaining a specific identity.<sup>60</sup> Danger is posited to exist howling at the borders of the state, and the security and certainty offered within requires certain sacrifices by those who are beneficiaries.

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<sup>60</sup>Campbell, *Ibid.*, p. 272.

The geopolitical displacement of danger outside of the national society is a crucial step in the construction and maintenance of state identity and consequent Otherness. For example, the ambiguity of feminine economic identity during World War II was disciplined immediately after the war and was intertwined with the creation of the Cold War.<sup>61</sup> The communist threat would devour the American Way of Life if the moral fabric was inadequate. Therefore, unless women returned from the factory to the home, the strength of will necessary to fight the perceived threat of the 'red menace' would be insufficient. One favoured set of values was linked to and reinforced by references to a 'discovered' danger outside of the boundaries of the United States. Individuals were policed by reference to the crisis that threatened the way of life, the form of reality, that was apparently antithetically represented by the Other.

The borders of the state concomitantly produced a boundary that defined the appropriate application of moral behaviour. Inside the state, behaviour of individuals was regulated, in part, by reference to various articulations of the Other. Outside of the state, the rules were quite different, as the realm of the Other required action by a different set of rules. Inside, morality was a code of conduct to keep that which threatened the assumptions and truths, upon which a given society was predicated, secure. Outside, security and certainty were not perceived as possible, the Other could not be kept at the margins, but had to be faced directly. Survival required that efficacy, rather than morality, dictated actions in this arena.

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<sup>61</sup>Campbell, *Ibid.*, p. 277.

The Spanish, therefore, could commit atrocities in America that were not as easily permitted within civil society. Constructions of Otherness, and of national identity, reproduce a dualism of inside versus outside of the state. Inside the protection offered by the structure of the state was order, regulation and a general absence of the danger existing in the state of nature. Outside, was a social reality characterized by anarchy and danger; whatever loose hierarchical order perceived to exist was founded on explicit power. In this realm, might makes right. This dichotomy equates all that is good, i.e. truths that appear to be uncontested and thus, more secure, with the interior of the state, and danger, insecurity, and evil lurking at the borders of the state. This form of logic is fairly typical of some Realist articulation of International Relations theory, and it is focused on conceptions of the state and citizenship as a self-referential site of identity for the individual.

### **Levels-of-Analysis: A Preliminary Statement**

Each level articulated by the main typology resolves in a specific manner the tension between self and Other, between the subject and the object of knowledge. The levels-of-analysis framework is an epistemological response to Realist concerns, and it has evolved out of the same tradition and is intertwined with various assumptions that permeate the three analyzed texts. As such, the

conceptual apparatus should be examined more fully.<sup>62</sup> An investigation into this problematic is crucial because it structures and defines the concepts and assumptions through which International Relations theorists have been making sense of, and in a sense creating, international politics. The assumptions and representations which characterize this heuristic device can be traced to the three texts, whose analysis constitutes the substantive chapters of the thesis. Some problems with the pervasive epistemological discourse that can be traced to the resolution embodied in this problematic are touched upon by the literature, and consequently, by the three authors. However, the problem of Otherness has long been ignored within this literature, the relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge is elided by the internecine debates within the discipline. What has been honed by the Third Debate is the realization of the constitutive impact that analytical devices have upon the objects of knowledge that they construct. Most of the epistemological debate surrounding the manner many I.R. theorists make sense of the world relies on an objective theory of knowledge; it has been concerned with attempts to overcome the partial nature of the lenses in a search for a cumulative and more 'mature' body of knowledge. Debate has occurred over which is the most fruitful level from which to view the arena of global politics; the assumptions upon which the long-standing framework are founded have not been examined. An interrogation will proceed into how the

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<sup>62</sup>The levels-of-analysis problematic grew out of the behavioural critique of how best to account for the actions of a state. That is to say, a critique of how state behaviour was explained led to the articulation of different levels of explanation and the corresponding division of international studies. See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 31-32.

authors, deriving much of their analytical position from assumptions derived from the levels-of-analysis framework reproduce, somewhat unthinkingly, many of the epistemological knots that they are explicitly attempting to avoid or to resolve. Failure to take their own concerns about the constitutive role that assumptions and conceptual lenses play in the production of knowledge seriously results in the production of contradictory and awkward claims to knowledge by the concerned thinkers. It is suggestive of how deeply an objective theory of knowledge pervades International relations as a discipline and as a practice.

This “...organizing device...”<sup>63</sup>, of the levels-of-analysis, has been articulated within the realist school as a response to specific epistemological and methodological concerns focused on the tension between unit and system as causal explanations,<sup>64</sup> or alternatively phrased between the particular and the universal. One introductory text constructs the unit-system problematic within international studies in the following manner:

Which level of analysis gives us the most useful perspective from which to explain or understand politics among nations? Each makes a contribution but each fails to account for certain aspects of reality that must be considered. We cannot understand Soviet foreign policy adequately by studying only the attitudes and values of its foreign minister, nor is it sufficient to analyze Soviet social and economic needs. We must have some knowledge, as well, of ideological considerations and of the general configuration of power, influence, domination and subordination throughout the world. The main

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<sup>63</sup>K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 5th ed., (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 13. The use of the quoted term is particularly interesting because it highlights one of the issues at stake within the Third Debate: whether organizing devices make sense of an independently existing ‘objective’ reality, or, if such conceptual devices construct the ‘reality’ for the analyst.

<sup>64</sup>Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, p. 7.

characteristics of the external environment are no less important than those of the state's internal environment. Therefore, all three levels of analysis will be employed at different times, depending upon the type of problem to be analyzed.<sup>65</sup>

Implicit within this formulation is a specific understanding of knowledge and science. Knowledge can be described as cumulative, in a broadly defined and heterogeneous sense. The various levels are thought to offer a more multifaceted understanding of 'reality' than any single level could. Yet, the levels cannot be aggregated together in a simple operation of addition.<sup>66</sup> Each level is embedded with biases that are "...mutually exclusive...".<sup>67</sup> Singer uses the analogy of representing a three dimensional 'oblate spheroid' on a two dimensional map; it entails some distortion (of an objective reality?) and each type of representation chosen has specific and discrete inaccuracies.<sup>68</sup> Thus, the Mercator map distorts in the opposite manner of the polar gnostic; intended use dictates the choice of map. That which is designated as the primary unit for analysis, whether it be the individual, state or the system, will dictate the level chosen to understand and make sense of international phenomena.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>65</sup>K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, p. 14

<sup>66</sup>J. David Singer, "The Levels-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 91.

<sup>67</sup>Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, pp. 203-4.

<sup>68</sup>J. David Singer, "The Levels-of Analysis Problem in International Relations", pp. 78-9.

<sup>69</sup>K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, p. 13.

Knowledge is not homogenous within this account. That is to say, the various levels constitute a different object of comprehension at each of the sites. Comparative foreign policy is not the same intellectual endeavour as international relations analysis. Singer makes the distinction between systemic and sub-systemic analyses.<sup>70</sup> He elaborates the distinction through example: a systemic explanation or generalization would focus on some construction of universality. The given example is when the environment that contextualizes individual states is perceived to be defined as constituted by greatly diffused power. Within this construction stability within the system would be enhanced with the articulation of the “...discernible clustering of well-defined coalitions...”<sup>71</sup> A sub-systemic explanation would focus on the particular unit comprising the larger entity. Singer’s example of a heuristic device derived from the locus of a unit, is when the foreign policy makers within a state are confronted with ambiguity concerning the potential alliances or commitments of other states. In this situation, the state tends to act toward all other states in a ‘uniform and moderate fashion’ making sense of, allegedly, the same information as the analyst whose perception was dictated by the other, systemic, lens. This tension between unit and system is replayed at all of the various levels. The logic at play can be characterized as one of top-down or bottom-up understandings of causality and social phenomena.<sup>72</sup> What is at stake

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<sup>70</sup>J. David Singer, “The Levels-of-Analysis Problem International Relations”, p. 91.

<sup>71</sup>J. David Singer, *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>72</sup>Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, pp.7-12.

in this debate is the issue of whether or not the system is the sum of its parts, or if has a more constitutive impact among the units that comprise it.<sup>73</sup>

Looking more closely at the relationship between the object of ‘discovery’ and the subject who ‘discovers’, within the specific instance of the levels-of-analysis device, it will be noted that Singer allows that representational accuracy is not always possible. According to Singer, when complete ‘accuracy’ cannot be assured, the task of an analytical model becomes one of deciding where inaccuracies are least relevant or least ‘dysfunctional’ and where distortions become crucial. It is to be assumed that this evaluative, and constructive, process relies on the judgment and intuition of the specific analyst. Each level has its own distortions, which allegedly can be juxtaposed to offset the inherent inaccuracies of other levels. Singer’s elaboration of the levels-of-analysis problematic includes an examination of the level of the state and international system for conceptual biases. To summarize Singer’s conclusions, comprehensiveness and manageability of ‘data’ are key advantages of the systemic level, but it tends to homogenize the units and to utilize explanations of systemic determination, to various degrees.<sup>74</sup> In contrast, state level analyses tend to grant more room of maneuver and independence to the various heterogeneous units than is considered ‘accurate’ by Singer. Differences between the units are often overemphasized. It is only at this level that any useful application of decision-making analysis can occur and where perceptions, goals and motivations explicitly become issues.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup>Hollis and Smith, *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

<sup>74</sup>J. David Singer, “The Levels-of-Analysis Problematic”, pp. 80-82.

<sup>75</sup>J. David Singer, *Ibid.*, pp. 82-86.

Within the context of these implications of the levels-of-analysis problematic, another interrogation of the issue of the relationship between how the various constructions of the objects of knowledge are related reveals implications within Singer's text of how the subject and the object of knowledge are intertwined. J. David Singer does hold that translation between levels or sites is possible, implying that the object of analysis has an independent and objective existence. The various frames of reference are not able to be theoretically integrated without a "...prior translation..."<sup>76</sup> between or among various levels, but there are logical corollaries among knowledges articulated at the different levels.<sup>77</sup> The author ends his very influential article calling for the development of some common frame of reference, as yet unarticulated, as the next necessary step in the evolution of the discipline.<sup>78</sup> Without the development of this new intellectual currency, 'systematic' analysis of the phenomena associated with international politics is not possible.<sup>79</sup>

With the advent of this unity, not only will knowledge more readily be accumulated in a manner emulating the natural sciences, but the distortions in each

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<sup>76</sup>J. David Singer, *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>77</sup>J. David Singer, *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>78</sup>J. David Singer, *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

<sup>79</sup>Singer defines systematic in the following manner:

And 'systematic' is used here to indicate the cumulative growth of inductive and deductive generalizations into an impressive array of statements conceptually related to one another and flowing from some common frame of reference.

J. David Singer, *Ibid.*, p. 92.

of the unit-system dualities will be overcome or transcended.<sup>80</sup> There will be one common frame of reference that will provide comprehensive knowledge with all of the wrinkles previously frustrating theorists ironed out. Singer is effectively calling for a currency that would allow the analyst to apprehend the object of her analysis directly, without the distortions of subjectivity and perception interfering.

Inherent in Singer's problematization of the issues of distortion and representational accuracy is the assumption that there is an entity that can be termed International Relations which can be said to exist independently of the conceptual framework, and hence the subject, making sense of that reality or social phenomenon.<sup>81</sup> It is this discourse of IR that gives some sort of cohesion or unity to the various phenomena analyzed at each site of knowledge. The issue of how this entity of international politics can be apprehended except through the conceptual lenses of the analyst, which are viewed as a creative mechanism that is

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<sup>80</sup>In a very interesting footnote, Singer addresses this issue explicitly:

It should be kept in mind that one could conceivably develop a model which successfully embraces both of these levels-of-analysis without sacrificing conceptual clarity and internal consistency. In this writer's view, such has not been done to date, though Kaplan's System and Process in International Politics seems to come very close.

J. David Singer, *Ibid.*, p. 90, note 22.

<sup>81</sup>One of the more recent articulations of the levels-of-analysis framework, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith's, posit the heuristic device as a problem of top-down versus bottom-up explanations. However, their discussion of the device also incorporates a discussion contrasting explanation, i.e. a form of knowledge derived from the natural sciences, to understanding, a more hermeneutic effort. Issues such as whether a social world can exist independently from the actors who comprise that world, and the debate between free will and determinism, are interrogated within the various levels of the framework and within the system-unit logic developed, in part, by Singer. For example, Wittgenstein is interpreted to support a theory of understanding as a process of getting inside the actor's head. But, there is a realization within the philosopher's work that what is inside the container of the subject's head are socially determined rules and expectations. The system has a constructive impact on the unit. Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, pp. 176-181.

flawed as it 'distorts', is not touched on by Singer. As well, the question of how to judge the 'degree' of inaccuracy from within this heuristic schema is similarly unarticulated. It can be premised that Singer is relying implicitly upon some sort of non-situated perspective from which to judge the fit of theory to the independently existing 'fact'.

There is a tension between two perspectives on philosophy of knowledge within Singer's development of the levels-of-analysis framework. On one hand, Singer postulates an understanding of the various levels as incommensurable. Different objects of analysis are constructed at each site. On the other hand, Singer elaborates the principle of knowledge that can be translated from one level to another fairly easily. One object of analysis is viewed through the lens of each of the sites and is somehow known to exist independently of the subject's perception of it. Given the theoretical importance of J. David Singer's text, it would seem likely that this ambivalence has been transmitted to others dealing with philosophy of science in international studies. The emphasis on understanding each level as involving a different intellectual operation<sup>82</sup> juxtaposes uneasily with the stress Singer places on developing a unified or unifying conceptual framework. It would appear that one task would make the other unlikely, if not impossible. One project implies that knowledge is a series of particular knowledges, the other, that knowledge is a universal entity. Singer's ambiguity can be read as a specific instance of the universal-particular dichotomy.

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<sup>82</sup>J. David Singer, "The Levels-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", p. 91.

As an organizational device, the levels-of-analysis mechanism utilizes spatial categories to designate various problematics. Each of the sites signifies a bounded and delineated space. The individual is defined as sovereign rational man.<sup>83</sup> The state is categorized as a sovereign and, generally, unified entity associated with a particular territory. The system, within Realist theories, is the European system of states that has been universalized to become coextensive with the global. At each level, location determines the framework utilized by the analyst. For example, Singer distinguishes between comparative foreign policy as a state, and in this circumstance, as a unit based analysis and international politics, a system based explanation. The two are not identical, but are derived from different locations. The pervasiveness of this dichotomy throughout the discipline is an issue that requires some unpacking, as it accounts for many of the epistemological and ontological knots touched upon within the context of this thesis.

Each site is a different locus for deriving identity and articulating conceptions of sovereignty, and by implication defines what is not, i.e. the other. Each is a different resolution of the tension between the universal and the particular. At the level of the individual, the sovereign entity is a thinking, rational being. Direction of causality is what structures the debate, whether or not

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<sup>83</sup>International Relations has been critiqued for its 'masculinist' ideology. See V. Spike Peterson, "Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and International Relations", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (1992, Vol. 21, No. 2), pp. 183-206. Peterson defines 'masculinist' as the "...ideological privileging of that which is associated with 'maleness' (not limited to men) over that which is associated with 'femaleness' and femininity." *Ibid.*, p. 191.

individuals comprise society, or whether society constructs the individual. Utilizing the terminology of Hollis and Smith, the debate is whether the relationship between the individual and society occurs in a top-down or a bottom-up direction.<sup>84</sup> This debate is repeated with the bureaucratic and other interests within the state and the state filling the roles of unit and system. Is the state acting analogously to a unified black box, or is state action a compromise between various bureaucracies and interests? At the 'highest' level, the tension between bottom-up or top-down explanations again recurs. Is the state autonomously constructed or is it the product of the international system? Is the international system the sum of its constitutive units or does it have a more constitutive role? The debate about causality seems to assume that it is a vertical process, that social life and political life are the resultant of some form of hierarchy. Power or influence as a horizontal dimension is conspicuously absent from discussions of the levels-of-analysis problematic.

Further elaboration of the privileging of the spatial dimension of this conceptual trope of political community, embodied in the levels-of-analysis reveals it is a vertical representation of what could be considered a horizontal problem. At the 'lowest' level of the problematic are numerous individuals existing within the borders of the state. As stated above, debate focuses on which direction of the vertical construction of causality is more accurate.<sup>85</sup> Either state conduct is portrayed as the resultant of the actions and perceptions of the individuals within

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<sup>84</sup>Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, p. 197.

<sup>85</sup>Hollis and Smith, *Ibid.*, p. 196-197.

the state, or the individual's actions are explained as being the effect of various state structures. This hierarchical representation of the relationship between the individual and the state, the object of analysis of one of the levels-of-analysis, is portrayed as the only possible relationship between the individual and the state from the perspective of International Relations. A horizontal depiction of the individual-state problematic cannot be articulated utilizing this heuristic device. Domestic politics are portrayed as necessarily hierarchical. Individuals must work through the auspices of the state, and they must interact with other individuals as members of a state for the study of international relations to remain consistent with the levels-of-analysis device. The same conceptual aporia is repeated in constructing the relationship between the state and the international system. States are vertically related to the international system; there is no possible horizontal relationship. The system is the apex of the hierarchical representation of political life dictated by the levels-of-analysis. States are not portrayed as coexisting and interacting contingently with one another in a nonhierarchical fashion. Rather, the heuristic device implies that states interact with the system rather than with other state(s). What is debated in the relationship is whether or not the international system can be viewed as constructing the behaviour of states, or whether the aggregated actions of individual states constitute the interstate system. The debate focuses on the direction of vertical causality. International politics is not a 'thing' that can be comprehended in and of itself; the heuristic devices utilized construct what is alleged to exist independently of the analyst. In

the case of the levels-of-analysis problematic, political life is portrayed as a series of vertical hierarchies.

## Kenneth Waltz: Systemic Insecurity

This chapter traces the construction of the Other within Kenneth Waltz's text, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis<sup>1</sup>. It will outline the logical connection between how Waltz makes sense, and in fact defines, international relations and his development of the concept of insecurity. Waltz develops his theory of international relations through the heuristic device of three explanatory images: of man, the state and the system. Each image is constructed from certain assumptions and expectations about the nature and relationship of war and peace. Waltz analyzes each image and its presuppositions in his quest for an answer to the question of why war occurs. The logic of this chapter will follow Waltz's readings of various texts used in his construction of each of the images and show the logical connection between his understanding of I.R. and the realm of the Other, of insecurity. The two concepts are mutually constitutive. In short, Waltz purports to discover a realm of anarchy and insecurity, but he in fact creates it as part of the construction of the logical problematic known as international relations through his investigation into the allegedly ahistorical problem of what causes war. Waltz develops a theory of security and how to achieve this political goal by constructing a concurrent realm of insecurity and danger. The Other in Waltz's

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<sup>1</sup>Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

text is the concept of insecurity embodied in the threat of war. It is this assumption that grounds the text in an alleged reality.

This chapter will begin with some preliminary statements about the construction of knowledge claims within Man, the State, and War. Some implications of Waltz's constitutive metaphor, of the three images of international relations, will be explored and the animating tension of his text, of his ambivalence between a situated author and one that is not, will be analyzed. From this analysis of the major themes of the text, the discussion will move to a close examination of each of the three images, tracing each of the themes and their development. This investigation will illustrate the specific mechanisms by which Waltz constructs the realm of insecurity, in which the threat of war is ever present, that of the Other. The discussion will trace how this construction of the Other is intertwined with his own analytical position, although it is presented by Waltz as something discovered, as an object that exists apart from Waltz's own subjectivity and corresponding philosophical assumptions. In effect, this chapter is an interrogation of a specific instance of the levels-of-analysis problematic and how this schema facilitates construction of Otherness.

Each of the three images makes sense of international relations through a different lens. The first image deals with the question of how 'man' contributes to an explanation of the causes of war. The study of international relations and war then becomes an issue of understanding the flaws of human beings. The second image, with how the state in its different forms affects the incidence of war.

Explanations of the onset of war become intertwined with analyses of specific types and forms of states. Thus, for example, states characterized by representative democracy are believed to become less bellicose than states organized in other ways. The third image investigates the relevance of explanations of war framed within the conceptual lens of the inter-state system. Within each image, there is a further division between ‘pessimists’ and ‘optimists’. The distinction flows from different beliefs about whether or not the possibility exists that the, variously ascribed, fatal flaws can be successfully and permanently redressed. The lenses, through which the various analysts gaze, determine what can be found. Waltz states that “...we cannot escape from philosophic assumptions.”<sup>2</sup> and his investigation of the three images is an attempt to link different assumptions about the nature of war to different explanations of what is going on. At one level, Waltz’s project can be understood as an attempt to trace how various philosophical assumptions ground different heuristic devices and, by implication, structure the different ‘realities’ articulated by various analysts. This is a theme that has echoes in the current ‘Third Debate’ within the discipline of International Relations.<sup>3</sup>

Kenneth Waltz’s willingness to chart the constitutive role played by heuristic devices and the “filter”<sup>4</sup> of philosophical assumptions in the work of others does not always translate into an epistemological self-awareness about his own work. His constitutive metaphor of three images of I.R. does not explain

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<sup>2</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, Yosef Lapid, “On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era”, *International Studies Quarterly*, (September 1989), pp. 235-254, especially p. 241.

how the author then proceeds to evaluate the distortion of each image.<sup>5</sup> The problem of the situation of the author is not addressed as it applies to Waltz himself. It will be demonstrated how this aporia is necessary for Waltz's argument to function. Without this conceptual blindness the author would not be able to construct the distinction between permissive and efficient causes of war which is derived from the implicit distinction that Waltz makes between appearance and reality. The author, rather unproblematically, asserts the reality of war and its ever-present threat without dealing with how he ascertains what war is. Waltz does elaborate three conditions that reflect, or construct, his idea of the structure of interstate reality,<sup>6</sup> however, he does not unpack how he comes to the knowledge of this truth. Without the conceptual aporia of war that is intertwined with his understanding of interstate political reality, he would also not be able to construct the realm of security associated with nation-states that is opposed to that realm of danger and insecurity occupying the interstices between polities. The threat of war is an alleged 'reality' for Waltz which provides an analytical yardstick for various accounts and explanations of international relations.

A second preliminary epistemological point flows out of the ambivalence, and perhaps the irony, of Waltz discussing the problem of analytical perceptions and the nature of social reality while seeming to refuse a situation of his own text. The structure of Waltz's text, in part, reinforces the tension between the

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<sup>4</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>5</sup>The language of distortion is implied in Waltz's conclusion that each of the images can only provide a partial and incomplete analysis. *Ibid.*, pp. 229-230. From which perspective is this judgment made? What would be acceptable to Waltz as a complete analysis?

<sup>6</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 160. These conditions will be examined more closely later in the chapter.

author's emphasis on mental filters and his conceptual blindness about his own position. He spends a chapter outlining the constitutive assumptions of each of the three images and linking them to specific explanations of the causes of peace and war. After each of the images of international relations has been constructed, and implications about the relativity of knowledge claims come to the occupy the center of the text, Waltz makes a crucial rhetorical move. The chapter after each of these philosophical definitions ignores the implications for Waltz's own knowledge claims that flow from the author's statement:

The idea(s) we entertain become a filter through which we pass our data.<sup>7</sup>

The chapters that deal with the implications of philosophical assumptions and knowledge claims do so through an examination of whether or not there has been a reduction of interstate violence, i.e. war or the threat of war, as if war were a self-explanatory phenomenon. For example, Waltz iyilizes a series of historical narratives to examine the utility and validity of the first image of international relations without addressing the issue of who writes history and for whom.<sup>8</sup>

History is not a self-evident and 'objective' phenomenon; it is one that is constructed from the same mental filters that Waltz emphasizes in alternating chapters. The evaluation of each of the images is given the appearance of 'common sense' but is in fact imbued with Waltz's assumptions about the existence and nature of interstate violence. The appearance of international relations constructed through the guise of various conceptual lenses is checked

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<sup>7</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 10.

against the historical 'reality' of war as violence, without the author unpacking what these concepts entail.

The tension, or ambivalence, in the text is a matter of alternating emphasis. Both themes pervade Man, the State and War. In fact, it will be shown how the two types of knowledge claims provide the text with an animating tension that is eventually resolved in favour of the self-evident 'truth' located in the structure of the interstate system. Waltz's own knowledge claims about international relations are given as if from an Archimedean perspective. Kenneth Waltz does not relativize his own position, from which each of the images are constructed and analyzed. This contrasts uneasily with the emphasis placed on the subjectivity of the analyst implied by his heuristic metaphor of various images of international politics. Waltz discusses philosophical assumptions as a form of cognitive and perceptive filtration<sup>9</sup> and then he proceeds to evaluate the images in terms of the adequacy of their explanation of international relations. Waltz has a very specific understanding of I.R. that structures his analysis of the adequacy of each of the images: how each can contribute to an adequate explanation of the causes of war. The heuristic devices the author utilizes to understand the 'reality' of I.R. structures the appearance of the reality of international relations: war and the threat of use of force. It will be argued that his understanding of what 'war' entails is founded upon the philosophical assumptions he brings implicitly to the analysis. This link between assumptions and results is in keeping with one of the epistemological themes permeating the text, however, Waltz is not explicit about

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<sup>8</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 180.

the relativity of his own assumptions. They are presented as a truth. Explanations for the occurrence of war define the discipline for Waltz. However, the concept of war is never unpacked, even though it plays a crucial role in the analysis. It will be argued that the allegedly self-evident nature of the phenomenon of what Waltz calls the threat of war provides the lens through which various understandings and perceptions of international politics can be evaluated.

Kenneth Waltz's duality flows from the assumptions of appearance and reality that imbue his knowledge claims. The 'reality' of international relations, i.e. the existence of the possibility of war, can only be adequately explained in terms of the structure of the state system.<sup>10</sup> Utilizing Waltz's terminology, the 'permissive' cause of war is privileged over the epiphenomenal or 'efficient' causes of war. Explanations of war derived from the third image are deemed to be more accurate and less 'partial' and 'misleading'.<sup>11</sup> Waltz, again, seems to make the claim that the images, or appearance, of interstate conflict can be explained using the three different perceptual lenses yet the reality of war and of international relations is self-evident. This epistemological stance is evidenced in the following statement:

As was argued in the introductory chapter, our estimates of the causes of war are determined by our presuppositions as much as by the events of the world around us.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>10</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 231. Waltz states the following:

It (the third image) is a final explanation because it does not hinge on accidental causes- irrationalities in men, defects in states- but upon (Rousseau's) theory of the framework within which *any* accident can bring about a war.

<sup>11</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 230.

<sup>12</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 224-5.

Waltz fails to address the issue of how the 'events' in the world are selected as important phenomena, let alone how they are made sense of. From the logic of the text, one can infer that relevant events are selected through the perceptual framework created to understand the reality of war and its incidence. Yet what Waltz means by war is never elaborated. The concept is not unpacked; it is treated as a self-evident occurrence which seems to need no other explanation.

It can be argued that Waltz's privileging of the third image, of privileging the structure of the interstate system, as a necessary condition for what, according to Waltz, constitutes international relations connotes a specific understanding of what the author lumps under the rubric of war. The following is a sketch of the concepts that the author develops throughout Man, the State, and War; it is intended as a preliminary definition of some key concepts that will be more fully developed later. From the text, it can be inferred that war is that which can occur between sovereign states in a context characterized by no (unifying) higher political power that would offer security and protection.<sup>13</sup> War occurs because there is nothing to prevent it.<sup>14</sup> In Waltz's version of this structure, the nature of state sovereignty means that each state relies upon a principle of self-help<sup>15</sup> to define and achieve goals that Waltz frames within the discourse of interests.<sup>16</sup> Within the logic of the text, force becomes understood as a valid means of pursuing policy given the lack of enforcement of some international

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<sup>13</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 227.

<sup>14</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>15</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

structure/authority to maintain peace. Its use or non-use becomes subject to the dictates only of means-ends calculations about its effectiveness in achieving specific goals.<sup>17</sup> There is an assumption of self-help in Waltz's conception of sovereignty: states can rely only on their own efforts to maintain continued existence in an anarchical structure.<sup>18</sup> Sovereignty becomes linked with security within the state and anarchy, i.e. the lack of a supranational sovereign authority, linked with insecurity and danger outside of the protective authority of the state. Waltz's argument hinges on the assumption that government is a necessary condition for society.<sup>19</sup> His assumptions about the particular and non-universal<sup>20</sup> nature of individual state<sup>21</sup> interests establishes an opposition between international anarchy and "...an automatic harmony of interests...".<sup>22</sup> Society occurs within the state and war, and the constant threat of war, occurs outside the borders of the governmentally regulated society. War and government are mutually exclusive, according to Waltz. And yet, it is only states that involve themselves in war. For Waltz, it is states, not individuals, that declare war on one another.<sup>23</sup>

War becomes a negative philosophical category. Waltz cannot define it because it is the opposite, or the negative, of what he constructs as internally coextensive with the state. Within Waltz's schema, war becomes a conceptual

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<sup>16</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 238.

<sup>17</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>18</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>19</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 227-28.

<sup>20</sup>Use of the term universal carries with it much philosophical baggage. The use of it at this point of the chapter utilizes Waltz's distinction between universal as a harmony of interests and the relative as competing sets of interests. More on this subject will be discussed later.

<sup>21</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 182, 220.

<sup>22</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 186.

<sup>23</sup>Waltz., *Ibid.*, p. 179.

black hole. It is opaque and indecipherable except for a privileged few, who offer pronouncements on its causes and the line that must be crossed in order for peace to become war. War cannot be closely examined from within Waltz's framework. It is something that happens because of the nature of the interstate system. Black holes are alleged to exert a massive gravitational force that helps structure gravitational patterns. Waltz's conceptualization of war anchors his theoretical framework. His development of the war/peace problematic is the necessary lacuna upon which the author's construction of the 'reality' of international relations is grounded. It serves as the aporia that allows Waltz to resolve the epistemological tension of appearance/reality in favour of the third image, the reality of the conditions that structure both sovereignty and war. The political problem of peace and war is invoked throughout the text as if self-sufficiently explanatory, however, it is a concept that Waltz never unpacks. The threat of war grounds the conception of insecurity which necessitates foreign policy and is, in turn, constructed by it.<sup>24</sup> This threat, articulated through depictions of the anarchical state of nature, justify both the state authority and the maintenance of the borders of the state against incursions from what lies outside. The specific role that war plays in Waltz's construction and analysis of the three images of I.R. will be charted in the interrogation of each of the images.

War is for Waltz a residual category which is defined by what is not contained and protected by the boundaries of the state. The community-defining

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<sup>24</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 179. "If we have a state, we have a foreign policy, and in foreign policy the state must on occasion speak with a single voice." The problematic of security creates justification for the authority of the state to speak for what Rousseau called the 'general will'.

border that divides and opposes anarchy to government, conflicts of interests to a harmony of interests, and danger opposed to security is a crucial distinction necessary for the construction of both sovereignty/community and war. War is that which occurs outside of the margins of community. Government within the state serves as a precondition for society. Definitionally, war is what can occur when sovereign individuality becomes multiplied. One sovereign provides harmony; two or more, a situation ready for war. Sovereignty implies anarchy within Waltz's rendition of the interstate system:

One *state* makes war on another *state*.<sup>25</sup>

There is no escape from the threat of war within the interstate system, however, what this translates into other than a sense of danger is not certain. Waltz does claim that the goal of war is to obliterate or alter the existence of the other state.<sup>26</sup> However, the means by which these goals are sought are unspecified. Waltz claims that any means of pursuing these goals is valid.<sup>27</sup> Failure to use any and all means at the disposal of the state could result in the demise of the state, or at the very least, threaten the security/society that the state borders demarcate. Within the logic of Waltz's reasoning does this mean that economic trade could be considered warfare? Could the pursuit of a morality, of the issue of human rights be considered the pursuit of war? What classifies a social phenomenon as peace and not war? What line is passed when peace becomes war? Is there a line? What is the difference between peace and war given that war is associated with

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<sup>25</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 179. Emphasis in the original.

<sup>26</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>27</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 160.

altering the behaviour or non-behaviour of another state? Does not this type of suasion occur during times of peace? Are peace and war mutually exclusive? Waltz does not address these issues. There is a curious lack of explication about a concept that is so important for the entire analysis. What kinds of interstate interactions can be classified under the rubric of war? One can infer that what threatens the existence of the state or attempts to alter it in some fashion becomes warfare. Waltz is constructing a tautology: the avoidance of war between sovereign individuals is one justification that Waltz utilizes for the creation of a unified sovereign state.<sup>28</sup> And yet, war is what occurs because there are sovereign states. The problem of warfare is allegedly moved outside of the borders of society with the formation of the state. Between states, the problems of order and of security are still of paramount concern.

Kenneth Waltz makes the link between sovereignty and war explicit.

There are three conditions that, according to the author, provide the ‘circumstances’ that structure both social phenomena. These are the facts that the author points to in his construction of the ahistorical inevitability of the problem of peace and war. The first condition is that a state will use force to achieve its own goals if these goals are deemed by the individual state as more important than peace.<sup>29</sup> In this rendition, force is thus something that occurs between sovereign bodies. Secondly, the simultaneous construction of both anarchy and sovereignty

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<sup>28</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>29</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 160. Peace is here taken to mean the non-use of force. However, this is again problematic. Is the existence of an army considered the use of force? Are certain economic policies? What marks the distinction between peace and force?

is attributed to the fact that states are the final arbiter of their own causes.<sup>30</sup> States, or sovereign bodies, are the final judge of their own relative best interests and truths. Truth and morality are thus contained within the borders of the state. This is an example of the type of logic that serves as the basis for various claims made about the amorality of interstate politics.<sup>31</sup> Morality cannot exist outside of society, and for Waltz, government is a prerequisite of society. Any means necessary to safeguard the continued existence of a state/society is therefore justified. Waltz's third condition of anarchy/sovereignty follows from this logic. As states are the final and multiple judges of various truths and interests articulated from specific positions, there is no shared consensus about what is just and what is efficacious for the interests of all states. In short, there is not a harmony of interests among the various sovereign states. Any state may see fit to use force to pursue any or all goals. The criterion for Waltz is one of efficacy and not one of morality. Thus, states should always be ready for the use of force by their counterparts. The survival of each sovereign state/society is at stake. According to Waltz's depiction of I.R., these three conditions reflect the underlying and unproblematized reality of the ever-present threat of war that is co-extensive with human life.

Kenneth Waltz's position represents an elaborate philosophical complex of intertwined concepts and assumptions that provide support and points of reference for one another. His concept of war is one of the crucial supports for his text.

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<sup>30</sup>Waltz., *Ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>31</sup>To stay within this text, see Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 207. This is only one example of this type of reasoning. There are many others within the so-called realist paradigm.

The ever-present threat of war and the threatened use of force serve as the 'reality' from which Waltz evaluates and judges the utility of each of the three images. The logical site that Waltz carves for himself, and consequently purports to discover, allows him to make the knowledge claims that he does. It is from these positions that the animating tension of Waltz's text becomes unified. The relative and partial nature of each of the three images of international relations is unified by the threat of war in much the same manner as how the relative truths and moralities of each state are unified and structured by the conditions of insecurity in which they are allegedly formed. The threat of the use of force is the common denominator for each of the states that requires both boundaries and some form of government. His conception of war involves a vague danger and unspecified threat to the existence of the community contained and defined by the borders of the state. The intellectual miasma of danger serves as a foundation from which Waltz resolves some of the tension within the text.

### **The First Image: Man**

The construction of the Other through the lens of the first image centers on the figure of man. Man is the locus of explanation for war when making sense of International Relations in terms of the first image.<sup>32</sup> Understanding what causes war and the resulting prescriptions for minimizing its incidence derive from the

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<sup>32</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 16.

figure of the sovereign masculine bounded individual. Beliefs and assertions about what causes war, i.e. the 'flaws' in individuals or the patterns of interaction between sovereign individuals, can spring from very different flaws within the rational male communicating figure. However, Waltz chooses to group these various theories about what causes war around the allegedly universal figure of the rational individual. Generally, there are two forms of explanation for the causes of war that are categorized by Waltz as first image: those that explain war by reference to some flaw of the individual and those that focus on flaws in the patterns of interaction between sovereign individuals. Each explanation conveys its own prescription. The first is the belief that war can be prevented through the possibility of 'uplifting' or 'enlightening' men. The second, with the potential for the re-engineering or 'readjusting' the psyches of men to better facilitate peaceful interactions.<sup>33</sup> In both cases, these 'flaws' are considered responsible for a perceived lack of security which translates somehow into the incidence of war.

Waltz constructs the genealogy of this perspective as stretching from Confucius to behavioral scientists.<sup>34</sup> Implicit in the construction of the 'first' cause of war are timeless and universal qualities ascribed to the sovereign and rational (male) figure. The logic of this image is predicated upon the belief that men make war, therefore, the cure for the disease of war must focus on men and their interactions. The threat of war has allegedly always existed in all cultures and times, thus explanations centering on the equally universal concept of 'man'

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<sup>33</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>34</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 16.

also has a quality that transcends the limitations of space and time. Sovereign individuals are assumed by Waltz to exist in all times and places. Otherness, that which must be tamed in order to minimize the potential for war, challenges and endangers the sovereign individuality that can be the only hope for security and certainty in a dangerous world. The Other is not war per se, but it is the insecurity that is symbolized by the threat of war in irrationality, immorality, and in failures in communication. The main division within this image derives from different perspectives on whether or not the variously ascribed, fatal flaw can be remedied.<sup>35</sup> Pessimists for Waltz, such as Hans Morgenthau, are defined by their belief that the fatal flaw of sovereign individuals cannot be remedied in and of itself. The disease cannot be cured, but symptomatic relief can be found in thoughtfully and carefully constructed social institutions and channels. Men are not perfect nor can they be expected to be. Optimists, for Waltz's heuristic device of the first image, are categorized by their faith in the possibility of remedying sovereign individuals, of being able to privilege reason over passion, of morality over immorality or in the ideal of perfect communication. The threatening Other can be successfully tamed, the threat of war can be contained with appropriate steps and policies.

The Other for this image stems from the threat of insecurity embodied in the, variously ascribed, 'flaws' that threaten the identity of the sovereign individual. Waltz begins, in the first image, to construct the security dilemma that is the assumption that undergirds his analysis and that serves as the Other that the

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<sup>35</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

author purports to discover but in fact creates. It is this assumption about the nature of insecurity in the absence of government, and therefore of society, which is the unexamined basis from which Waltz discusses issues of the relativity of knowledge claims. It is from this, according to Waltz, 'secure' belief in insecurity from which Kenneth Waltz's judgments and knowledge claims spring forth.

Investigating the pessimists of the first image of international relations, i.e. those who are alleged to believe that the causes of both peace and war spring from the analytical entity known as man, and that these causes cannot be rectified, is the analytical construction of the logical opposition of agent/subject and structure. Given Waltz's eventual privileging of a structural understanding of the causes of war, i.e. his development of the security problematic, Waltz must illustrate the analytical disutility of a specific construction of agency. In effect, the construction of this image has a twofold purpose for Waltz. The first is the construction of a specific version of the binary pair, agent and structure. The second theme that emerges out of this rendition of explanations of the causes of war is the privileging of structure over agency as a useful analytical tool. The construction of the agency-structure problematic that Waltz builds undermines the efficacy of the concomitant subject in Waltz's rendition of various explanations of the occurrence of war. This is a necessary step in the argument that Waltz builds throughout the text. For the logic of the text to appear to flow necessarily toward the Other as the possibility of the war embodied in the 'security problematic', in the structure of the interstate system, considerations of agency must be portrayed as irrelevant

to explanations of the incidence of war. Thus, the author constructs a duality between agency and structure and then proceeds to criticize agency because it cannot account for the causes of war that he equates with structure.

The first logical step for Kenneth Waltz is to undermine the analytical and explanatory utility of conceptions of agency and subjectivity in the subgroup of the first image theorists that makes sense of war by an "...attribution of political ills to a fixed nature of man...".<sup>36</sup> According to Waltz's classification this conceptualization of 'the nature of man' is a finite and inborn potential whether for evil or good that characterizes the analyses of Augustine, Spinoza, Niebuhr and Morgenthau.<sup>37</sup> Waltz disagrees with the utility of human nature as a causal factor for explanations of war. By essentializing human nature so that it explains everything, Waltz seeks to discredit it as an explanatory and analytical tool for understanding the nature of peace and war. Waltz fails to unpack or to examine closely different aspects of so-called human nature. He just accepts the term, reproducing the definition of these first image theorists, and expands it to mean every possible derivation of human and social behaviour, which of course translates into a loss of analytical precision.<sup>38</sup> Waltz constructs a theory of human

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<sup>36</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>37</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>38</sup>An example of Waltz's expansion of the utility of said concept is indicated by the following quote:

To say that man acts in ways contrary to his nature is *prima facie* absurd. The events of world history cannot be divorced from the men who made them. But the importance of human nature as a factor in causal analysis of social events is reduced by the fact that the same nature, however defined, has to explain an infinite variety of social events.

nature as a given and fixed set of “...invariant factors...”<sup>39</sup> which explains everything and nothing.

The author proceeds to criticize this homogenous construction of human nature as being unable to account for differences in social and political forms.<sup>40</sup>

An inability to account for such differences is problematic for Waltz because, for him, explanations are intertwined with conceptions of causality:

...the search for causes is an attempt to account for differences.<sup>41</sup>

Agency, i.e. human nature, is a useful explanation only so far as it is responsible for the allegedly inevitable flaws of all political and social structures.<sup>42</sup> This structuralist account of the agent, i.e. human nature, is one of finite potential. Waltz is setting up the dichotomy in such a way that structure is the dominant analytical concept. It is this distinction that underlies the author’s claim that there is a theory of politics and a theory of psychology, and the two are incommensurable.<sup>43</sup> According to Waltz, these first image theorists cannot support any “...specific political conclusions directly from an assumed nature of man.”<sup>44</sup> Individual behaviour cannot be used to explain the actions of the whole;<sup>45</sup> implicit in this claim is the assumption that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

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Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>39</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>40</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>41</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>42</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>43</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

<sup>44</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p.30.

<sup>45</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 28.

It is this structural construction of agency, of a sovereign and rational, unified, bounded individual that undergirds Waltz's privileging of a structural explanation of the causes of war, and the assumption that only political structures can account for the alternation of periods of war and peace. Thus, Waltz does not crack open the 'billiard ball' model of the rational individual. He does not think that it can provide answers to the questions that he poses. The structural lens by which the author makes sense of the world, and in fact creates it, dictates how he defines and delimits conceptions of agency. The structural bias of his lens ensures that within the constitutive binary opposition of structure and agency, the former will be the dominant consideration. Effectively, this bias prevents any questions of agency from even becoming articulated. The framework for understanding war that Waltz constructs depoliticizes questions of human agency.

An important step in the author's construction of the agent-structure problematic is found in Waltz's reading of Morgenthau's realism. It is at this point that ethical considerations nominally become factored out of considerations of interstate relations. The highest and immutable concern becomes the search for security, i.e. the continued existence of the state and its goals. Subjectivity and/or agency become relegated to the realm within the protective walls of the state; outside the boundaries of society there are only criteria of survival and insecurity. The lack of unifying force, what Thomas Hobbes terms a Leviathan, to impose order upon a series of fragmented sovereign individuals concerned only for their own welfare and security makes for anarchy. This argument is consistent with,

and reinforces, Waltz's claim that society only occurs under the authority of a government; outside there is anarchy.<sup>46</sup> Waltz's reading of Morgenthau is a structural reading in which any reference to human nature is not only unnecessary, but inadequate, once the key assumption is established that competition arises because 'men' want things. This model of 'man' as an unchanging entity reinforces the bias Waltz brings to his analysis about the nature of explanation predicated upon an accounting for differences. Kenneth Waltz's reading of Morgenthau's realism ultimately separates conceptions of agency from interstate competition.

Kenneth Waltz utilizes the ambivalence he finds in Morgenthau's articulation in power to further reinforce the removal of ethical concerns, and by implication considerations of agency, from explanations about the nature of war. Waltz reads Morgenthau's position as an articulation of three conditions which structure the nature of interstate relations: the absence of a higher authority to arbitrate, scarcity and competition arising out of unlimited wants.<sup>47</sup> The ambiguity found in Morgenthau by Waltz centers around the issue of power and agency. Is the desire for power a product of specific circumstances or is it more fundamental, "...the *animus dominandi*, the desire for power"<sup>48</sup> which implies some consideration of ethics and the nature of evil within a model of man. The first position, according to Waltz, reduces power to a circumstantial means necessary for states to pursue other ends. In the second, power becomes a means in and of

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<sup>46</sup>Waltz, Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>47</sup>Waltz, Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>48</sup>Waltz, Ibid., pp. 34-35.

itself because of the nature of humanity and its inborn desire to dominate. As a prelude to Waltz's further construction of his structural reading of interstate relations, he undermines the distinction between power as a means and power as an end in itself by focusing on policy implementation. If power can be viewed as a "necessary means"<sup>49</sup> then the distinction between means, structure, and end, agency, becomes undermined. Power takes upon itself some of the aspects of an end for the purposes of foreign policy implementation.

However, Waltz is not satisfied with this conclusion. Confusion within Morgenthau's texts about the nature of power springs from the same source, according to Waltz, as the confusion between 'realist' and 'idealist'. This lack of analytical precision comes from a confusion of a theory of politics with a theory of 'man', which involves considerations and assumptions about ethics.<sup>50</sup> Realists assert that the highest normative value for the state is the pursuit of power. Idealists do not concur. The dichotomy between the two camps is not a meaningful one for Waltz because a theory of international politics cannot be derived from ethical considerations. Because of the lack of a society between states, according to Waltz due to the structural condition of anarchy, involving ethics in foreign policy leads to a confused "concern with the role of ethics in statecraft without providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical behaviour".<sup>51</sup> Any role that ethics can play in articulating a foreign policy must be placed within the context of the structural determinants, for Waltz, of international

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<sup>49</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>50</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>51</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 37.

politics. Structure dictates whether or not ethics, what is legitimate within the borders of the state, could have any role to play in international politics and behaviour.<sup>52</sup> Subjectivity and ethical concerns are being removed from consideration by Waltz's construction of the realities of inter-state conflict.

Within the international context power then becomes a structural entity. Inside the structure of the state, under the sovereign, ethics and legal and moral precepts do play a role.

Kenneth Waltz's conception of causality is therefore a structural one.

According to the author's reading of this subgroup of first image theorists, human nature cannot be manipulated. Differences in political behaviour are due to differences in political contexts and infrastructures. The only way that Waltz will allow human agency as a 'first' cause of war is that "...if men were somehow different, they would not need political control at all."<sup>53</sup> If agency, the invariant 'cause' that cannot account for differences, is considered but one of the causes then the pursuit of peace becomes a search for the appropriate (structural) conditions.<sup>54</sup> The author's epistemology is found both explicitly and implicitly within these assumptions. For Waltz, explanation is the search for the various causes of political phenomena. This translates into an exploration of the differences in various political structures and forms. Invariant causes are factored out as irrelevant by the simple equation of causation with difference. Because human agency cannot account for any differences in political behaviour, it

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<sup>52</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>53</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>54</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 30.

becomes an invariant cause to be separated from those that can be manipulated in the search for a more peaceful political situation. Implicit within Waltz's claim to knowledge is a structural vision of political and societal progress. Improvement of the human condition occurs with social engineering and adjustment; it does not occur with improvement of human agency. Knowledge of the causes of war leads to control in the form of social engineering and altering existing social structures. His analysis of the various theorists that he groups under this first subgroup does not allow for any other form of epistemology.<sup>55</sup> Again, Waltz fails to relativize his own claims to knowledge while criticizing those he analyzes for doing the same.

This tendency is evident in Waltz's critical analysis of what he terms the two tendencies of first image pessimists, those who do not believe that human nature can be improved.<sup>56</sup> In effect, he criticizes those who make sense of international relations and war through the conceptual lens of 'man' for what amounts to a structural analysis but takes on the rhetoric of making sense of the problems of peace and war through agency. Waltz's own understanding of international relations implicitly becomes the measure by which he analyzes other constructions of interstate relations. The analysis that these theorists nominally engage in, according to Waltz's construction, inevitably becomes transformed into one of two tendencies. The first is that focusing on a model of man to obtain content for a theory of politics fails; resulting in a theory of politics that does not

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<sup>55</sup>When Waltz investigates the next subgroup, to examine more carefully the causes that can be changed, structure will again dictate or preempt any transformation. The author's privileging of structure over agency remains consistent.

<sup>56</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 31.

have what the author terms 'content', the conceptual ability to theorize about how different social and political forms facilitate different behaviours. Secondly, in a search for content these theorists go beyond psychological theories, or theories about the nature of 'mankind', in order to discover content. Given the author's previous emphasis on the relativity of conceptual lenses, on what basis does he judge what 'content' is worthy for a theory of politics, generally, and more specifically for a theory of peace and war? It will be argued that this rhetorical move of Waltz's is a necessary step for his own construction of a structural insecurity that somehow becomes war, i.e. the security dilemma gleaned from Rousseau's stag hunt metaphor.<sup>57</sup> Tensions alluded to earlier in this chapter about Waltz's duality between a situated and an unsituated author, ultimately become resolved by privileging Waltz as an unsituated author with this emphasis on structure. Kenneth Waltz does not relativize his own position but presents it as the only available truth.

Kenneth Waltz's structural bias becomes evident during this analysis. The content that Waltz is searching for is the structural determinant(s) of political behaviour that he so carefully constructed as the only manipulable causes of war. Crucial to the author's analysis, this bias about what constitutes adequate explanatory content illustrates the assumption from which Waltz's theory of international relations is derived. Secondly, this bias about what constitutes the political similarly reveals the aporia about Otherness that cannot be investigated or examined if the analysis is to succeed. Purported to be discovered as an

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<sup>57</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp.167-168.

independent and objectively existing 'fact', despite Waltz's pretensions to be theoretically self-aware, the structural insecurity that will be called the 'other' is the simultaneous creation and result of what the author believes to be constitutive of politics, generally, and international relations, more specifically. As the argument proceeds, it will become obvious how this bias results in a privileging of a specific version of the security problematic gleaned from Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Specifically, this construction of Otherness is the basis for that theoretical lacuna Waltz calls war: war, whatever Waltz means it to be, occurs because there is insecurity.

There are two key assumptions from which Waltz begins the construction of what will ultimately become the security problematic. The first involves his assumptions about causality: "...under different conditions men behave differently."<sup>58</sup> Flowing from his implicit agreement with first image pessimists, who argue that human nature is fixed and not manipulable; structure becomes the determining factor in explaining political behaviour. The second assumption involves what the author believes human nature to be. There is a distinctly Hobbesian tinge to Waltz's construction of what amounts to a pregovernmental, and thus presocietal, state of nature. When men are not forcibly unified by some ultimate authority, or commonwealth, there can only be suspicion and distrust between individuals but "...when they live within a commonwealth they often enjoy at least a modicum of peace and security".<sup>59</sup> Political structure becomes the

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<sup>58</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>59</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 32.

determinant of (in)security. Otherness, that which threatens, is this distrust and lack of forcibly ensured order.

Waltz does not claim that all political authorities are the same. In fact, he criticizes Augustine for failing to have the theoretical apparatus available for discussions of the different strengths and weaknesses of various political and social forms.<sup>60</sup> Waltz, on the other hand, weights heavily the first assumption. If under different conditions, 'men' behave differently, then some political forms foster superior behaviours than others. It becomes, for the author, a case of weighing various remedies in a search for a little more justice, welfare, freedom and welfare, and avoiding those mechanisms that offer a little less, given that perfection is impossible.<sup>61</sup> Social control and change become mechanisms of social engineering and structure. Thus, for Waltz, attempts to minimize or control the incidence of war entails a change in social structure. However, as social conditions cannot be perfected,<sup>62</sup> there is not a perfect arrangement to maximize various sociopolitical goals. Human arrangements are the products of human effort and it is not likely that innately flawed beings will be able to produce perfection in social institutions. According to this logic, insecurity, i.e., the threat of war is a universal given.

Given Kenneth Waltz's construction of the agent-structure problematic and simultaneous privileging of structure over agency, it would seem appropriate to look more closely into Waltz's investigation of the second theme shared by the first image theorists, those that hold the hope that altering the patterns of

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<sup>60</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>61</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp.32-3.

<sup>62</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 33.

interactions between individuals will aid in the pursuit of security from the threat of war. Specifically, Kenneth Waltz investigates the promise held out by 'science' in the immediate post W.W. II era for " '...mastering the sources and mitigating the consequences of human insecurity in our unstable world' ".<sup>63</sup> Effectively, Waltz is investigating the promise of the behavioral sciences to remedy or improve the institutional channels and structures within which 'men' interact. He is attempting to simultaneously strengthen his reading of international politics as an objectively existing reality, with an independent existence from his analysis, while undermining any theories of interstate politics that rely on conceptualizations of subjectivity or normative concerns. After having begun constructing the world of international relations as a primarily structural one, his next task is to reify that structure and to illustrate why it is not easily susceptible to intentional change. He is evaluating a structural solution to what he has described as a structural problem, interstate insecurity. The problem or the threat of war, that never-ending insecurity, must be universalized in order for Waltz's analytical position to remain consistent. The relativity of his claim to knowledge cannot be admitted, lest his Archimedean claims to knowledge outside of the state be undermined and he be placed inside the boundaries of a particular state. If the insecurity that he claims is a necessary constitutive of the anarchic world system cannot be perceived as existing independently of his analysis, then the ever-present threat of war his theoretical position requires becomes more tenuous. If the threat of war somehow can be claimed to exist independently of how various theorists make sense of the

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<sup>63</sup>Harold Laswell, quoted by Kenneth Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 45.

world, then even if some form of institutional tinkering makes the threat less imminent, it cannot remove it. Implicitly, Waltz's rhetoric implies threat would exist independently of perception. . . Somehow, this independently existing threat is accessible to "...an elaborated theory of international politics...",<sup>64</sup> without this appropriate theory the causes and conditions of the incidence of war cannot be understood. In effect, Waltz is interrogating and dismissing one challenge to the necessary 'discovery' of the Other within the interstate system.

In order for the rhetoric within Man, the State and War text to flow logically and consistently towards the conclusion that there is a constant threat to be found outside the protective borders of the state, and that this threat is embodied in the structure of the interstate system, Waltz elaborates a threefold position undermining the potential success of institutional change. Problematizing the possibility of achieving peace through institutional change are: the pace of societal change, how to trigger change within a society and how to achieve change in the context of multiple societies.<sup>65</sup> All three of these considerations reinforce Kenneth Waltz's construction of the security problematic.<sup>66</sup> Waltz's analysis can be read, in part, as an exploration of the promise perceived to be held by the scientific community of the 1950's: Can institutions be improved through science rather than "emotive appeals"<sup>67</sup> to minimize the threat dictating the necessary

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<sup>64</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>65</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>66</sup>A good example of Waltz's constitutive view of structure is the following:

The solution that is rational if substantially everyone follows it  
may be worse than useless if adopted by a minority.

Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>67</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 43.

‘discovery’ of the Other within the interstate system? Given that Waltz’s analysis undermines the viability of the subject to successfully address the problem of insecurity embodied in the Other, it becomes his next task to illustrate that the Other cannot be tamed through institutional change. In order for his discovery of the Other to give the appearance of necessity, the threat of war cannot be minimized through social engineering or scientific ‘progress’. Otherness, insecurity, infinitely complicates social change.

The first reason why institutional change cannot remove the cause of war, instead of just treating the symptoms, according to Waltz, is the issue of the pace of change. Even if the assumption held out by behavioral scientists that science can successfully identify the cause of a specific social ill, war, and the insecurity that stems from it is valid, the issue becomes how much time would be required to successfully remake societies. Waltz makes a crucial distinction between society, which he equates with government, and anarchy. Social change can only occur under the auspices of some higher unifying force, i.e. inside the state. Institutional change cannot occur unless there is some degree of force. Thus alterations in society is a function of two factors: time and force.<sup>68</sup> Thus institutional amendments will not evolve within the current interstate system, some sort of hegemon is required. Social change thus requires government. Without the security and order offered by government, or some mechanism capable of enforcing order, the insecurity of the interstate system will undermine any attempts at tinkering. According to this logic, through which the analyst ‘discovers’ the

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<sup>68</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 58.

other in the realm outside of the state, the time required for implementing mechanical social change would preempt any steps made toward minimizing insecurity. Key to this logic is the assumption that individual interests, including the desire for security, will be put ahead of the collective interest.<sup>69</sup> Force becomes the means by which a collection of individual sovereigns becomes a unity. Otherwise the period of implementation would allow conceptions of Otherness to dictate individual behaviour. Kenneth Waltz has an implied theory of the collective that the system is more than the sum of its parts, and that the difference lies in force.

Further complicating the possibility of intended social structural change to remedy the problem of war, is the issue of how change within a society is to be achieved. This group of behavioral scientists view the problem of war as an internal structural problem. Examples of this logic include viewing war as something foisted on the masses by mentally ill members of the elite and viewing war as a structural problem. People do not want war, yet war occurs. There must be something interfering with the input of not wanting war for war to occur.<sup>70</sup> For Kenneth Waltz two concerns problematize this series of solutions to the question of why war occurs. The first, and least important, is the question of what prescriptions behavioral scientists should offer foreign policy makers. Secondly, there is the question of how to get leaders to follow the proffered solutions to the 'age-old' problem of insecurity.<sup>71</sup> Content of various prescriptions is not

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<sup>69</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>70</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

<sup>71</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 65.

considered important by Kenneth Waltz, not only because the prescriptions are usually “either hopelessly vague or downright impossible to follow”<sup>72</sup>, but because in Waltz’s structural construction of insecurity solutions to the problem of why wars occur cannot work on the psyches of the foreign policy analysts. Wars occur because there is anarchy outside of the allegedly protective realm of the state. There is no guarantee of the continued existence of all that those inside hold dear embodied by the government. Thus any solution to the problem of war must involve all the foreign policy leaders simultaneously. Foreign policy does not work in isolation, but definitionally involves others. For Waltz, the recommendations of the behavioral scientists require that effect precede cause.<sup>73</sup> Cooperation must come before the insecurity that leads to war can be addressed.

This brings the analysis to the third problem of achieving social change through the various recommendations of behavioral scientists: how is change to be achieved within the context of the various foreign policy leaders that comprise the interstate diplomatic scene. Even though the prescriptions of behavioral scientists vary greatly in specifics, what they have in common is that they work on the level of the individual. As before, Waltz problematizes not the specific recommendations of any of the theorists interrogated, what he objects to is the entire foundation upon which their ‘cures’ for the illness of political insecurity rests. Paradoxically, the solutions espoused by various advocates of behavioral science require that the foreign policy makers be rational and willing to cooperate,

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<sup>72</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>73</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 65.

to construct a world guaranteed to be more peaceful when that same required willingness to cooperate is the problem.<sup>74</sup> According to the text's logic agency does not precede structure, structure dictates what sort of subjectivity will be constructed. It is this assumption that underlies Kenneth Waltz's 'discovery' of the other outside of the community bounded by the state. The nature of the interstate system dictates a rationality which leads to the (in)security problematic upon which Waltz founds his analysis of an adequate theory of international relations. Without the locus of force to weld together the various states and thus to form one unity, i.e. both government and society<sup>75</sup>, any plans for minimizing insecurity are doomed, according to Waltz.

Waltz, utilizing the heuristic device of the first image, which emphasizes the relativity of various knowledge claims and how various analytical positions dictate the 'truths' that are created, nevertheless relies on a conception of insecurity from which he measures the adequacy of the first image. Only those analysts which agree with the author about the cause of war in the structure of the interstate system are deemed to have an adequately elaborated analysis of world politics. The first image, relying on various conceptions of 'man', has a conceptual aporia where the interstate system is concerned. The anarchic nature of the system undermines any appeals to morality, to intellectual progress, on behalf of either the general populations or the foreign policy makers. Subjectivity or agency becomes almost epiphenomenal in Waltz's analysis, political structure

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<sup>74</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

<sup>75</sup>For Kenneth Waltz, government is a prerequisite of society; structure dictates content/subjectivity. Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

determines political subjectivity. Solutions to the problems of interstate insecurity focusing on changing the perceptions of those who make foreign policy ignore the allegedly independently existing realities of international relations. The tension between Waltz's attempts to be a situated analyst, given his reliance upon the framework of the levels of analysis, and his implicit narratives reproducing a somehow perceived Truth are resolved in favour of Waltz's Truth, political structure. Waltz brings to his analysis a preconceived notion of what is the primary cause of interstate politics, he then proceeds to use this heuristic device to discount theories which do not conform to his. The only adequate theory of international relations is Kenneth Waltz's which he purports to be a self-evident truth. Given Waltz's claim to be epistemologically relativistic which contrasts uneasily with his implicit reference to the self-evident truth of interstate politics, it will be argued that Waltz brings specific assumptions about the nature of international relations to his analysis and simultaneous construction of these politics. In short, Kenneth Waltz brings a particular and specific reading of politics, one gleaned from the American universities of the 1950's, to his analysis which he then proceeds to discover outside of that context. The Other that Waltz purports to discover, the insecurity, is the result of the intersection of particular social forces which forms such an integral part of his analytical lens that he sees these same conditions wherever and whenever he looks. The Other that Waltz claims to discover outside of his own societal circumstance is actually created by that same set of circumstances.

### **The Second Image: The State**

The second image can be summarized in the statement that the threat of war can be attributed to specific forms of states. Some states are more bellicose than others because of accidents of history, culture, geography and more particularly, forms of government. Thus, to minimize the incidence of war, states must somehow be transformed into more peacefully inclined players within the realm of international relations. Waltz specifically concentrates on explanations for war that are derived from the internal organization of states.<sup>76</sup> Ultimately, he finds that the prescriptions offered by these theorists do not adequately address the issues of international politics that he discerns. In order for his analysis of international relations, and simultaneous construction of the realm of insecurity outside of the state, to maintain its logical coherence, Waltz must undermine the proposition that the internal organization of states is the prime determinant of interstate behaviour. International structure must be the primary factor in explanations of peace and war, otherwise the Other that Waltz discovers in the nature of the interstate system will be revealed as the self, i.e. it may be revealed as the specific assumptions and understanding about politics Waltz brings to the analysis. Without this textual foundation, his construction of the insecurity problematic will seem a less necessary conclusion. In order for his analysis to succeed, that is to say that the Other is 'found' outside of the state, insecurity

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<sup>76</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 81.

must become naturalized. There can be no other explanation available. Insecurity must be considered an essential condition of international relations, and the process by which it is constructed forgotten. The security dilemma that Waltz is so laboriously creating as a constitutive part of international structure cannot be viewed as something created but as the only available answer.

Kenneth Waltz's construction of the second image is the next step in the author's elaboration of the (in)security problematic. In order for the structural phenomenon of insecurity to become a necessity, Waltz must illustrate how individual states respond to and conform with the dictates he finds in the international environment in response to insecurity. Structure is portrayed as dictating subjectivity, in this case, the forms of the individual states and the foreign policies they engage in. During the author's analysis of the first image, to use Waltz's metaphor, the contents of the container were found to be an insufficient analytical device to explain the incidence of war. Explanations utilizing conceptions of human behaviour explain every possible variation of human activity and, therefore, explain nothing. This image differs from the first in that it seeks to explain the social phenomena of war and peace through an analysis of the container that houses individuals, "... the internal organization of states is the key to understanding war and peace."<sup>77</sup> The same rhetorical move is made by Waltz as he constructs the second image of international relations: the individual state is contextualized within the international realm of states. In effect, the state has become something contained by the international environment. Having established

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<sup>77</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 81.

the primacy of structure over agency in his discussion of the first image, Waltz must deal with the question of the direction of causality: does the internal structure of the state determine its foreign policy or is the causal direction reversed? Is there an international socialist party, or are there a series of national socialist parties?<sup>78</sup> For his argument to be consistent, Waltz must illustrate that the constitutive condition of international politics, insecurity, has a formative effect on the structure of states: socialist parties are confined by the stickiness of the state. Insecurity, Otherness, has a formative influence on individual states. It is something found externally. This hypothesis is a crucial one in the construction of the security problematic.

This thesis is the foundation upon which Waltz claims that there are similarities of both "...analyses and prescriptions..."<sup>79</sup> in two schools of thought that have different understandings of the role of the state: nineteenth century liberal thought and early twentieth century socialists. By pointing to the similarities between the foreign policies advocated by these political groups, the author is attempting to highlight the recurring and universal themes of international relations and how these same themes dictate state behaviour. International structure is reified in this step in Kenneth Waltz's argument. The analysis utilizes 'history' to undermine Marxist arguments<sup>80</sup> about a harmony of

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<sup>78</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>79</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 158.

<sup>80</sup>Kenneth Waltz constructs the Marxist argument as follows:

- "1) The capitalist mode of production gives rise to two antagonistic classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
- 2) The capitalist state represents control of the machinery of government in the interest of one of these classes, the bourgeoisie.

proletarian interest that transcends, and in fact undermines, the community bounded by state borders. His evaluation of various socialists' position about the problematic of war and peace falls under the heading of "adjustment of theory to fact",<sup>81</sup> as if fact was a self-evident entity. Waltz must prove that adjustments to the internal structures of states, no matter according to what theories, affect only the particular interests of that state and have no effect on the universal, that is the environment within which states function. Thus his criticisms of liberals and Marxists are the same. Both attempt to substitute reason for force and to construct an international society in an anarchical situation.<sup>82</sup> Waltz's logic dictates that reason can only be utilized politically if there is the security guaranteed by a government with a monopoly on the use of force. Both found their analyses on an alleged harmony of interests, however defined,<sup>83</sup> that Waltz claims does not exist. Finally, both are premised upon the belief in societal progress leading to perfectibility in society.<sup>84</sup> By pointing out the similarities in the flaws of adherents of the second image, Waltz is attempting to undermine the relevance of the content of the container of the state when discussing issues of

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- 3) The capitalist state brings the class struggle under a measure of control without actually ending it.
  - 4) War is the external manifestation of the internal class struggle, which makes the problem of war simultaneous with the existence of capitalist states.
  - 5) Socialism, on the other hand, will abolish war forever.

This last point is Waltz's derivation from his construction of the first four.

Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>81</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 137 and 141.

<sup>82</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 120 and 152.

<sup>83</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 97 and 128, 136.

<sup>84</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 103 and 147.

peace and war. The problem of insecurity is the 'fact' upon which Waltz's analysis is based and which nullifies the importance of the forms of states. The other, the recurring and defining theme of international relations, minimizes the distinction between nineteenth century liberal thought and early twentieth century Marxist ideology within Waltz's discussion.

Although Waltz claims that the theoretical and practical flaws in the application of the second image are as evident in his analysis of Marxist theories of peace and war as in the liberal ones, he more closely charts the mechanisms by which the structure of the international environment impacts and determines individual states' foreign policy when he examines the liberals' positions on issues of war and peace. Therefore, the bulk of this analysis of Waltz's construction of the second image will focus on his construction of liberal ideology and consequent problematization of the assumptions which underlay the belief that "...defects in states cause wars among them."<sup>85</sup> Waltz claims this logic stance leads to the conclusion that if this is the cause of war, and concomitant insecurity among states, then curing defects of individual states will result in a more peaceful international environment. The author problematizes the liberal adherents of this logic around three loci. The first is that Waltz asserts that there is no international community; there is no automatic harmony of interests which could be a basis for such a society. Society is not self-regulating; insecurity prevails in the anarchic realm. Secondly, there is a set of criticisms surrounding the issue of what can be

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<sup>85</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 83.

done. Finally, Waltz undermines the utility of the basic proposition upon which the second image is based, namely, that bad states make war.

Kenneth Waltz must undermine specific assumptions about the existence of an international society, otherwise his constitutive principle of international relations, insecurity, could be called into question. Those that Waltz groups under the category of nineteenth century liberals externalize specific beliefs about internal politics. A key focus of this group is defining the role government should play in domestic politics. Because of the assumption that society is self-regulating primarily through the mechanism of the market<sup>86</sup>, government should play a minimal role in society.<sup>87</sup> Individuals' pursuit of their own goals, because of the doctrine of the harmony of interests, leads to progress in both society and in the individual.<sup>88</sup> This pursuit of individual progress requires that the individual be allowed to do for him- or herself, if possible, rather than have government undertake tasks on their behalf. Freedom from governmental interference is the requirement for this moral and social progress founded upon specific conceptions of responsibility and ownership.<sup>89</sup> Within this representation of society, the role of government is to maintain conditions required for the growth and exercise of individual competition and progress. It is a limited role and as the constitutive units of society improve, and the interactions between the individuals take on a more rational and improved moral stance, the need for the state will become less

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<sup>86</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 88.

<sup>87</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>88</sup>Waktz, *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

<sup>89</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 87.

and less. Reason will come to dictate the behaviour of individuals for its own merits, rather than because it is backed by force.

The liberal view of international relations is predicated upon the same beliefs as those that structure liberal domestic politics. Crucial to their assumption of an international society is the belief that there is "...an objective harmony of interests..."<sup>90</sup> both inside and outside the state. If this harmony of interests can be demonstrated to be flawed within the security of the state, then its application externally should be similarly inadequate. Waltz's main criticism of this doctrine, within the context of the second image, is the assumption of a self-regulating society, whether inside or outside, which is one of the assumptions upon which the belief in a harmony of interests is based, is incorrect. The author criticizes adherents of the idea of the "sterile state"<sup>91</sup> for their 'mistaken' belief that the state serves merely as a container for individuals. There are three variables in their analysis: the individual, society and the state.<sup>92</sup> The individual and society occur independently of the state; because of the independent ontology of the first two, the role of the state is a residual one. Thus, within liberal thought, society exists independently of the state and can exist in a realm of anarchy. Application of this belief to international politics would result in an undermining of the distinction between inside, government, and outside, anarchy, that is so important to Kenneth Waltz's analysis. For the argument that Waltz is constructing, society cannot

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<sup>90</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>91</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>92</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 85.

occur independently of government, "... war is the analogue of government..."<sup>93</sup>; the two are mutually exclusive. War does not exist in the society constructed under a governmental regime, but there is a constant threat of war, outside, in the realm characterized by anarchy.

Kenneth Waltz contrasts his theory of the individual, society and the state to that of the liberals, a group that he constructs as encompassing theorists from Adam Smith to Jeremy Bentham to John Stuart Mill.<sup>94</sup> Waltz notes how the logic of the liberals requires that certain preconditions be satisfied before the laissez-faire state's proscription of state activities could be safely undertaken. If these conditions are not satisfied, then a more active governmental role may be required.<sup>95</sup> Requirements that must be satisfied for a laissez-faire state to be successful, and by implication for the harmony of interests to be realized, are twofold. First, there is an assumption that the competing units, whether individuals or states, be roughly of equal size and to be allowed to compete freely.<sup>96</sup> The flow of logic is that if this condition is realized then efficiency, worth or merit will be the means by which the various goals of the competing units are achieved. Waltz points out that, as this is a market analogy based on an abstract understanding of free competition, it does not allow for prescriptions, except the interference of government, to maintain the equality of the competing units. If the various units, whether firms or states, become substantially larger than the

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<sup>93</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>94</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 85-95.

<sup>95</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>96</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

competition, then there is an “...unnatural inequality...”<sup>97</sup> which leads to the accumulation of power that distorts the harmony of interests. Secondly, the competing units must be of a certain level of evolution, both morally and mentally.<sup>98</sup> If the units, again whether individuals or states, must be judged for their fitness to enter the competition and for the harmony of interests to have a chance of prevailing, the question remains: who is to be the final judge? Within the borders of the state, the state can take on that role. In a context of anarchy, the situation becomes more complicated. States can only judge from within their own boundaries. There is no impartial and universal power to judge from some Archimedean perspective. If these conditions are not fulfilled then societies are not self-regulating, and the doctrine of the harmony of interests cannot account for itself, then some form of state control is required to keep the forum of competition from self-destructing.

Kenneth Waltz’s logic that society can only occur within the auspices of the state is premised on the assertion that reason can be a determinant of behaviour only when backed by force. Reason can not be substituted for force.<sup>99</sup> This is the flaw found in the assumptions of both the liberals and Marxists of Waltz’s analysis. Substitution of reason for force ignores the ‘reality’ of insecurity that Waltz ‘discovers’ to exist outside of the protection of the state. Inside the state, reason can work only if force is constructing and maintaining a forum for equal competition. Externally, a reliance on reason without force results in a faith

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<sup>97</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>98</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>99</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 120.

in the efficacy of such things as public opinion as a check on the activities of democratic states. Thus, Bentham believed that world public opinion was the "...most effective sanction, and in itself perhaps a sufficient condition for peace."<sup>100</sup> Waltz effectively factors out the use of reason from the pursuit of international relations because it does not make sense, according to Waltz, for the individual state to base policy on the assumption that other states will do so, if the other states cannot be guaranteed to do likewise.<sup>101</sup> This logic embodies the construction of insecurity that prevails throughout Man, the State and War. The anarchical structure of the interstate realm problematizes the use of reason for the pursuit of individual states' foreign policies.

If the structure of the interstate environment, based on a particular rendition of anarchy, problematizes the use of reason in the pursuit of foreign policy, then it is likely to undermine any progress that could be made in the interstate realm toward more peaceful interactions between states. Within the liberal worldview, there is a bifurcation of beliefs concerning how the mechanism of change is to be facilitated. Progress can result not only from the unintentional acts of individuals in a cumulative fashion, that is to say the operation of the harmony of interests, but alternatively, it can manifest itself through the application of reason to the irrational. In effect, the mechanism of change can either be intentional or unintentional. Waltz's analysis of both liberal roads to progress in

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<sup>100</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

<sup>101</sup>"In sum, what sense does it make to preach *laissez-faire* in international relations when not all states practice it? Those who do find themselves at the mercy of those who do not." Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 108.

the interstate realm traces two themes. There can be no progress without the anchor of force, i.e. the state, because of the condition of insecurity. Progress in international relations is achievable only by a construction of a world state.

Secondly, Otherness makes the content of the individual states irrelevant.

Insecurity creates a sameness in foreign policy among all states. This constitutive condition of international relations accounts for the similarity in theories about interstate politics that Waltz 'discovers'. Kenneth Waltz ironically universalizes a particular form of polity, the state, and then systematically erases the processes by which this form was created. His understanding of global politics is one of interstate interactions. There is not a conceptual framework to allow for the analysis of any other behaviours. Everything that Waltz constructs heuristically is done through the conceptual lens of the state. Once his theory of international relations is effective, there can be no deviation from the political container embodied in the concept of state sovereignty, the contents of the container become irrelevant. Changes from the current system, as Waltz constructs it, take the form of writing this same concept of sovereignty either larger, a global state, or smaller, more states. Not only are the contents of this specific form of state irrelevant, but so are all other forms of community.

Kenneth Waltz's criticisms of progress, of the issue of what can be done, illuminate more brightly the mechanisms by which the Other, insecurity, constrains variations on state sovereignty and reproduces a particular variant of it. The bifurcation, alluded to earlier, in positions within liberal theorists on how progress

is to be achieved within the interstate realm can be constructed around the issue of how widely conceptions of state security are drawn.<sup>102</sup> Those who ascribe to the doctrine of noninterventionism have a more narrow definition of state security. This is the group Waltz tends to call the optimists; progress can and will occur without any effort by the state. In any case, unless the individual state is threatened, a *laissez-faire* foreign policy is pursued. A broader understanding of state security characterizes the interventionist liberals. Those termed 'messianic' by Waltz actively seek to tinker with the international system, whether altering the balance of power, maintaining the sanctity of state sovereignty or remaining other states in their own democratic image. The concept of state security includes, not only the existence of the state, but the principles upon which its state sovereignty are premised. In both cases, foreign policy is pursued with an eye to minimizing the incidence of war and making states more secure, in short, progress. Kenneth Waltz problematizes the belief that the irrational will succumb to the rational via either mechanism of change. Insecurity makes the international system self-maintaining; little can be done to alter this principle.

For noninterventionist liberals, the optimists, Kenneth Waltz's criticisms of what can be done focus on several points. All of these points derive from the assumption of insecurity Waltz brings to his construction of international relations. At the beginning of his discussion of the noninterventionist liberals, Waltz makes a rhetorical move that structures his discussion of progress in international relations via the internal improvement of the individual state:

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<sup>102</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 106.

...how can the nations improve internally while the international relations of the world remain on the old footing?<sup>103</sup>

In Waltz's perspective, the entire project of the noninterventionist liberals is problematized because of the Other, insecurity. The international political environment translates demands that the advocates of the second image do not perceive an internal matter in isolation from consideration of the behaviour of other states. If one state is attempting to unilaterally abide by more 'advanced' and peaceful foreign policies, what guarantee does that state have, in an anarchic realm, that other states will not maximize their relative position at the cost of the less belligerent state. Waltz would claim that there is no guarantee, that unilateral attempts to create a more peaceful interstate environment make those aspirants less secure. The condition of anarchy, of a lack of a central power to provide security and order for its constituents, and its concomitant principle of self-help, demands a suspicion that motives of all other states that do not foster magnanimous unilateral activities. Internal progress of states is limited by the context of the interstate environment. Textually, this question focuses the reader's attention on the outside politics of the state, and implies that attempts at progress, or even a faith in progress, by any individual state without some form of guarantee antithetical to the nature of interstate politics, as Waltz constructs it, jeopardizes the continued existence of the state. The author's rhetoric leads the reader to the conclusion that structure determines content.

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<sup>103</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 107.

Insecurity, or the Other, as a constitutive element of the interstate system leads Waltz to an interesting analytical position. On the one hand, he applauds the noninterventionist liberals for their awareness of the 'reality' that there is little that can be done by human effort to achieve progress toward a more peaceful international society, faith must be placed in the forces and mechanisms of history.<sup>104</sup> Waltz agrees with the acknowledgment that there is little that can be done, working through the mechanism of the single state, to facilitate an international environment characterized less by insecurity. On the other, he problematizes the belief that history will produce a more secure environment for states to operate within, which would result in fewer incidents of war. What is the cost of waiting passively for the forces of societal and political progress to transform bellicose 'despotic states' into more peacefully inclined democratic states?<sup>105</sup> Even if there is not the necessity of intervention espoused by the interventionist liberals, perhaps there is the desirability of accelerating the process of transformation. Waltz questions the belief in autonomous progress that defines the non-interventionist liberals. Even if there is a linear concept of evolution, which is not an assumption to be made lightly, how can one be assured that they are moving at an appropriately quick manner, or even if they are moving toward the desired outcome. For Waltz, progress must occur under the auspices of government, otherwise insecurity will circumvent any movement to a less conflict ridden international environment. Progress occurs within society and

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<sup>104</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>105</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 108.

society occurs only under the auspices of government. Evolution, revolution or progress towards some ideal society cannot occur in an anarchic realm.

Waltz's criticisms of what can be done by those with a broadly defined understanding of state security further elaborate his thesis that insecurity, the underlying cause of war, cannot be remedied by tinkering with the internal structure of states. His discussion of the 'messianic' liberals, whose assumptions logically lead to an attempt to remake the states of the world in their own image, illustrate how foreign policy can create world views. The connection between self and Other becomes more evident. The author's construction of the insecurity that arises out of the pursuit of a specific foreign policy reveals how the universalization of a particular world view, and a particular form of insecurity, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The attempted construction of an absolute boundary between inside and outside of the state, based on the control of force embodied in the state, is universalized by Waltz as a particular version or understanding of political community that he assumes. His criticisms of the relativity of the vigilante states' perspectives on justice ignores the nonsituated manner with which Waltz makes sense of international politics. He does not situate himself inside a particular state or community and implicitly invokes some form of impossibly omniscient perspective. His relative claim to know the constitutive condition of interstate politics takes on the form of universal claim to knowledge in the same fashion for which he criticizes the interventionist liberals.

It is this drive to remake the world in one's own image that Waltz terms the hubris of liberalism<sup>106</sup> that serves as the focus, for Waltz, of criticisms about what can be done by interventionist liberals to make the interstate realm a more peaceful one. Interventionist liberals require some form of agency to facilitate the evolution of interstate politics.<sup>107</sup> The 'realism' of this branch of liberal theorists is an awareness that the impersonal forces of history cannot be relied upon to lead to a more peaceful international political arena.<sup>108</sup> There must be the construction of the prerequisites of a more harmonious anarchic realm, otherwise conflict and insecurity would be unending. These interventionist liberals are attempting to address the question of context within which states must operate. The noninterventionist stream of liberal thought focused on the internal structure of the state, and they did not deal with the issue of how change within is supposed to be achieved when the external politics of the progressive state repeats the same themes of insecurity and conflict. The messianic liberal stream of thought takes the position that international relations cannot be improved by unilateral and isolated actions of individual states. Insecurity, the Other, requires some constitutive action by the 'advanced' state to help international politics achieve a more advanced dimension by aiding in the evolution of the internal structures of the states that comprise the interstate realm. Otherness requires a more active pursuit of liberal goals outside of the state for a more secure international environment to be achieved.

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<sup>106</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 111.

<sup>107</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>108</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 113.

Kenneth Waltz is aware of the particular and relativistic nature of the ideas of progress derived through the lens of the second image. Implicit in Waltz's claim that the relative nature of the various missions espoused by discrete states for advancements to a more secure interstate realm is the assumption that conceptions of progress, of a particular philosophy of history, occur only within the state. This indicates a need for ideas to occur within the safety and security of state borders. Individuals, and political perspectives, do not manifest themselves in an anarchic realm; in the interstices of the individual states is a realm of intellectual and moral sterility. Without the guarantee of security embodied in the state, without some form of arbiter to mediate between various conceptions of what is the good life and to impose order, i.e. to construct a community, upon these various perspectives, there can be no room for progress or evolution. For Waltz, individuals occur within states. This is a constitutive assumption that is not interrogated. The state is not a sterile container within which individuals pursue various goals,<sup>109</sup> but it is a constructive structure that creates society, and the ideas and history that occur within the context of this society. Individuals occur within society. The author's logic leads him to the analytical position that all that is good about human life can only occur within the protective walls, and under the creative auspices, of the state. The insecurity and conflict, the Other, that Waltz 'discovers' outside of these walls comes to dominate, there is not room for any other concern than survival.

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<sup>109</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 108.

Waltz makes these claims about life in the interstices of sovereign states, ignoring his own epistemologically situated position inside the USA during the 1950s. The issue of how the author came to these conclusions is not addressed. Kenneth Waltz evaluates both streams of liberal thought, the interventionists and the noninterventionists, by comparing how well these groups of theories account for the reality of international life.

His simultaneous applauding of the ‘realism’ of the interventionist liberals for the awareness that there is nothing that can be done to bring about a more peaceful interstate realm and of the interventionist liberals for their awareness that the forces of history cannot be relied upon to bring about some form of utopian interstate interaction.<sup>110</sup> He criticizes the potentially disastrous implications when the partial perspective of states becomes applied outside of the specific context in which it was developed. Logically, it leads to a world of competing ‘messiahs and missions’ each with just as much faith in their own project as the competition has in their own. For Waltz, what is problematic is that there is no final authority to adjudicate between various visions of how the world should be; Waltz ignores how his construction of the problems of interstate life lead to a certain reproduction of that life. Waltz is doing more than describing and maintaining the status quo, he is constructing the threat of a realm of danger and conflict outside of the regulatory apparatus of the state.

Kenneth Waltz effectively constructs a logical dichotomy which obscures his specific epistemological position. He paints a picture of a conflict-ridden realm

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<sup>110</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 113.

in which change through the mechanism of the state is problematic because there is lacking a society, or community, between states. The principles upon which he understands liberal society to be based therefore do not apply outside of the state. A monopoly of force must provide the security necessary to tame the Other which exists outside of the state and subverts any single unit's attempt at transcending the balance of power with a balance of community.<sup>111</sup> Insecurity cannot be overcome with anything but a leviathan. In this realm of danger and anarchy, the application of one view of how international society should be constructed outside of the state would likely result in competing visions. The attempt to remake the international realm according to one state's idea of a just society would more likely lead to increased conflict rather than the opposite:

Wars undertaken on a narrow calculation of state interest are almost certain to be less damaging than wars inspired by a supposedly selfless idealism.<sup>112</sup>

In the absence of some form of central authority, or even society, states can only rely on force to pursue their foreign policy goals. With this assumption, Waltz transfers his own understanding of political community outside of the context in which it was derived. Given the specific rendition of politics that the author brings to his analysis, a world of sovereign states attempting to remake the world in their own image, he externalizes his own perception of foreign policy so that he sees this constitutive form of policy everywhere that he looks. Waltz looks outside of his own state and perceives a world populated by reflections of his own political

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<sup>111</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>112</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 114.

community. He senses the potential of interventionist liberalism of his own community,<sup>113</sup> and then sees it multiplied outside of the context in which it developed. The insecurity and the Otherness that Waltz perceives in the realm of anarchy are aspects of the internal politics of his own community. The analyst merely sees his own political reflection as 'reality' and it is from this measure that Waltz evaluates theories of international relations.

The third locus around which Kenneth Waltz problematizes the second image involves a critical look at the basic premise that bad states make war. In certain superficial respects this proposition is true for the author, those states engaging in war can be classified as 'bad'.<sup>114</sup> However, Waltz problematizes the inverse of this statement. Good states do not necessarily lead to more peaceful or conflict ridden international relations.<sup>115</sup> Waltz cannot agree with this statement because his understanding of causality flows from the external structure to the units composing it. The international environment, not the individual state, is the most important determinant of the foreign policies of the individual components of the system.<sup>116</sup> Conflict arises out of the lack of a central authority. Each state in the system articulates a relative point of view premised on the assumption that, ultimately, there are no guarantees of security and only the individual state can be relied upon to look after itself. The assumption of insecurity breeds suspicion and fosters a particularistic perspective by the states composing the system. Even if

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<sup>113</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>114</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 114.

<sup>115</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>116</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 122.

there existed an aggregate of morally and intellectually improving states the condition of insecurity, Otherness, would undermine the establishment of some other form of dispute mechanism. War may be unpleasant, but according to Waltz, it is the only mechanism capable of equilibrating among the various unit interests'. In a realm of anarchy, the last resort is the use of force.

According to Waltz, security can only be achieved through internal restructuring of the units that comprise the system, only if all the units are perfected. Improvements in the units must lead to a faith and certainty in the irrevocable nature of the progress of the sovereign entities, whether individuals or states, otherwise Otherness will transform the system back to one fraught with danger. The "anarchist ideal"<sup>117</sup> is not a model of perfection in which conflict does not exist, it is premised upon the assumption that conflict will be lessened and that different mechanisms will be used to mediate. What makes this liberal ideal unlikely, according to Waltz, is the reliance on the voluntarism of the parties to resolve the dispute without relying on the use of force. Reason cannot be substituted for force.<sup>118</sup> Belief that it can be requires a faith in the perfectibility of human effort and institutions,<sup>119</sup> not only in the individual units that are developing and progressing from the inside, but in the interactions among the various units. Kenneth Waltz's construction of the liberal position ties the aspirations of constructing an international community through the efforts and development of the individual entities comprising the system to an unlikely requirement in

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<sup>117</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

<sup>118</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 116.

<sup>119</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 119.

perfection. He constructs a dichotomy, with no possible alternative, between a world populated by perfect, and thus secure, states and submitting voluntarily to peer evaluation and a world characterized by insecurity and danger. The 'anarchist ideal' is posited as the only alternative to the international realm that Waltz is elaborating, if the ideal world can be shown not to be valid, then Waltz's logic would lead to the conclusion that the international environment must correspond to his description of it.

The author undermines the liberal ideal by pointing out a discrepancy between the logic applied within and without the boundaries of the state. If the anarchist ideal can be realized, what need is there for the state at all? Liberal theorists' reliance on the state to back up reason with force, to ensure that the prerequisites of a functioning community are maintained, begs the question, for Waltz, why there is a difference in the unit-system logic from individual-state to state-interstate system. It is this inconsistency upon which Waltz continues building his security dilemma through the undermining of any conception of international community. All that can be achieved politically and socially is undermined unless made secure through the knowledge that reason is backed by force. The 'irrational' are unlikely to jeopardize societal gains by fostering insecurity inside the state. The realm of the insecure is effectively transferred out of the state into the international arena. Internal government is strengthened by external anarchy; the role of the state is enhanced by pointing to the need for protection against the danger outside. Kenneth Waltz is constructing a world of

self-referential polar opposites. His ideas of government are externalized and 'found' outside of the state, which in turn justifies the continued existence and role of a specific form of community. What is found inside the boundaries of the state alters Waltz's perception of what is outside. The self is externalized and becomes the Other.

### **The Third Image: The System**

Kenneth Waltz's development and elaboration of his theory of the environment of the international system is the final step in his construction of the security dilemma predicated upon his construction of the Other. In order for the analysis to appear to flow logically from the first to the third images, Waltz must prove that the realm of insecurity he 'discovers' outside of the state exists independently of his analysis. The author develops the hypothesis that insecurity, or Otherness, is a constitutive component of the structure of international relations. However, it will be illustrated how Waltz's assumptions about political life lead him to the conclusion that in the absence of government, there is insecurity. He equates political community with the state. Thus his discovery of the Other outside the boundaries of the sovereign state is almost a tautology. The state is the only form of political community capable of providing security because it has a monopoly on the use of force and is capable of making and, if necessary, enforcing decisions;<sup>120</sup> outside of the state there can only be insecurity, because

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<sup>120</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 190.

force is a potential medium for resolving disputes. The third image of international relations attributes the cause of war to the international environment. War manifests “because there is nothing to prevent it”<sup>121</sup> in a situation characterized by anarchy. Waltz articulates a position, gleaned from his reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, establishing a dichotomy between the particular interests and relative position of each state and the universal interest of the interstate system. It is another rendition of the structure-agency problematic that characterized his analysis of the first two images. Within the third image, the structure of the interstate system is privileged over the agency represented by the constitutive states of the system.

The third image, in its simplest form, states that the threat of war will be constant given a collection of similar units, who are the final judges of what is in their best interests, with no overarching power to enforce alternative forms of dispute resolution than the use of force.<sup>122</sup> Thus, states must be prepared for other states to use force to achieve various goals. This condition of insecurity, according to Kenneth Waltz, leads individual states to a focus on relative gains and positions rather than a perspective that seeks to maximize benefits for the collection of units.<sup>123</sup> It is other states’ positions of power that are perceived to threaten the well-being of any specific state. A powerful state appears to be a threatening one.<sup>124</sup> Anarchy, as a constitutive principle, implies that states must

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<sup>121</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>122</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 238.

<sup>123</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>124</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 199.

rely on a principle of self-help to achieve various goals, including the continued survival of the state. The necessarily particular nature of each state's perspective of the international environment is more likely to translate into competition than cooperation between sovereign entities given the lack of means to construct and, more importantly, to maintain some form of unity of interests.<sup>125</sup> In international relations cooperation may occur because of some coincidental commonality of purpose among various sovereign states, but it cannot be guaranteed. Insecurity, that is the Other, is not banished by alliances, although a search for security, a desire to minimize the Other is often the purpose behind forming an alliance.<sup>126</sup>

Kenneth Waltz articulates a specific version of anarchy that is defined by Otherness, insecurity. State survival requires viewing all other states as possible aggressors. Failure to do so may lead to its demise.<sup>127</sup> Suspicion and latent hostility are two assumptions that Waltz perceives as fostered by anarchy. In an international context, sovereignty implies both a principle of self-help and a lack of guaranteed security. Insecurity is perceived by each state to threaten its continued existence or the pursuit of its goals, the suspicion facilitated within Waltz's rendition of anarchy becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as more states prepare to use force to counter a perceived threat of its use. The three structural conditions postulated by Waltz that are claimed by the author to encapsulate the condition of insecurity, the Other, are 'found' in the interstate system. These conditions have been mentioned in the introduction, but another interrogation of them would be

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<sup>125</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 184.

<sup>126</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 219.

<sup>127</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 221.

efficacious to tracing the connection between self and Other that is an implicit component of Waltz's analysis. It is these constructions of the structure of the interstate realm that both creates a situation in which competition between states tends to be privileged over cooperation and leads Waltz to the conclusion that the policy of one state in a condition of insecurity must take into consideration the foreign policies and power positions of all other states in the system. These conditions of interstate existence establish the context that structure the individual foreign policy of various states. It is this conclusion that Waltz uses as verification of the third image.<sup>128</sup>

The first of the conditions that characterize anarchy, and simultaneously constructs the Other in international relations, deals with the issue of the potential use of force by states to achieve various foreign policy goals. Use of force is predicated upon calculation if a certain goal is likely to be achieved, and if valued more than peace, then using force becomes a rational step.<sup>129</sup> In a manner similar to Waltz's discussion of war, the author fails to unpack what is meant by the use of force. All that is analytically established is that within the state there is a monopoly on its use, and that this monopoly somehow provides security. Waltz's unarticulated and undefined conceptualization of force is intertwined with his conception of war. The threat of the use of force internationally somehow indicates or threatens the incidence of war. It will be recalled that Waltz does not state what is meant by war other than it is a condition that can only exist between

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<sup>128</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 218.

<sup>129</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 160.

sovereign states. Is Waltz making a conceptual equation between force and war? Is the use of force necessarily involve the military or are there other forms of force that are utilized between sovereign states? There is an inconsistency in Waltz's conceptualization of force inside and outside of the state. In anarchy the threatened use of force leads to insecurity. The use of force under a government leads to security. Outside, force is substituted for reason; the discourse of interests is privileged over the discourse of justice.<sup>130</sup> Inside, force is utilized to back reason, i.e. to construct and to maintain a general will out of an aggregation of particular wills.<sup>131</sup> The use of force is justified if a political community is effectively constructed within the boundaries of the state because insecurity is tamed. It is assumed that the sovereign will maintain the principles of sovereignty for the individuals composing the general will. However, what is a general will within the state is a particular will outside within the international context. An attempt by one state to unite its particular form of reason with force externally is the crux of the insecurity problematic constructed by Waltz. Application of the principles of a specific political community outside of the state to construct a general will out of the various particular wills of the sovereign states is the Other that Kenneth Waltz externalizes and 'discovers' in the realm of anarchy. Waltz agrees with Rousseau's analysis of the conditions of the interstate environment, but disagrees with the conclusions about the only form of security being a world state that he discerns in Rousseau's work.<sup>132</sup> The basis of Waltz's disagreement

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<sup>130</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 190.

<sup>131</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>132</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 186.

with Rousseau's conclusion is the alleged reality utilized by Waltz to evaluate various theories of international relations. Rousseau's theory of a federation of states united by the same bonds that unite individuals inside the state is guilty of a "practical weakness"<sup>133</sup> because it fails to deal with the problem of how the federation is going to impose its will upon the constitutive states without waging 'war' upon them and how valid to expect that the proposed federation will always have a monopoly on the preponderance of force.<sup>134</sup>

One possible explanation for Waltz's apparent inconsistency on the validity of constructing a general will inside the (existing) state and constructing a global state through the application of the same principles of political community, so that insecurity could be tamed by some form of a global leviathan, can be found in his discussion of how the general will constructs a unity out of the aggregation of various particular wills. According to Waltz's reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, when the general will has become "actualized", unity of the state has been achieved.<sup>135</sup> The state offers security to the sovereign entities who comprise it in return for submitting to the general will and adding to its strength. State unity is premised upon the offer of security in an insecure world. Foreign policy requires a unity, an embodiment of the general will, or the insecurity that exists outside of the state, anarchy, threatens the existence of the state<sup>136</sup> and the security that it offers

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<sup>133</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 186.

<sup>134</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 186.

<sup>135</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>136</sup>"Some questions become questions of foreign policy; some questions of foreign policy call for single choices; some of these choices must be supported by the state as a whole or the state disappears- and with it the problem of state unity. If we have a state, we have a foreign policy, and in foreign policy the state must on occasion speak with a single voice." Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 178-9.

to those who comprise it. The unity of the state is achieved through invocations of insecurity, the Other, as a mechanism that minimizes dissent and reinforces the strength of the general will. Otherness facilitates the surrender of the use of force, as an option, by the particular wills to the general will. Waltz alleges it is a step required to tame insecurity both inside and outside of the state. If a global state existed, the realm of anarchy and the other, as defined by Waltz would vanish and the unity fostered inside of the state through the invocations of insecurity, i.e. maintenance of the general will, would become more problematic.

The stickiness of the state among a multiple of states as a manifestation of the general will, and hence unity, requires a foreign policy externally directed. If there is no outside there is not the same imperative of insecurity utilized to maintain the general will. It is for these reasons that Waltz objects to Rousseau's proposed solution of a global state and that there is a distinction made by Waltz between force inside and outside of the state. International relations must remain on a footing of the accidental, i.e. a series of particular and competing wills and perspectives. Global unity would preempt the insecurity that Waltz would seem to glean as a necessary component of political life.

The second condition that structures anarchy and affects how the individual foreign policies are manifested, deals specifically with the issue of the lack of a global general will and insecurity. Insecurity characterizes the realm of anarchy because force may be utilized at any time by any of the particular wills comprising the interstate system. Adding to the likelihood of conflict is the

consideration that the states are particular wills in the context of the international system, and as such the "...final judge(s)..."<sup>137</sup> of the needs of their own relative positions. The position held by each state within the structure of the interstate system tends to determine its foreign policy needs, according to Kenneth Waltz.<sup>138</sup> Anarchy is characterized by a collection of particular and relative positions which are more disposed to produce conflict. Harmony can only be ensured through the construction, by some higher authority, of a general perspective devolving from the general will. This perspective seeks to maximize the benefits and the interests of the system;<sup>139</sup> according to Waltz, it tends to be more long term in its outlook<sup>140</sup> rather than the focus on relative positions fostered by particular wills. Waltz's construction of the opposition between the particular wills of the sovereign states comprising the contemporary state system and the nonexistent perspective of the general will, which would embody a perspective of the system, begs the question of how Waltz, working through the lens of a particular state's position within the interstate system is able to claim immediate and unproblematic knowledge of the system as it exists, not only from the perspective of other states, but as it can be viewed through the lens of the system itself.

It is this lack of an interstate or suprastate general will that Kenneth Waltz utilizes to equate anarchy with conflict. He does not claim that cooperation does not exist between and among states; it is accounted for within Waltz's

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<sup>137</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>138</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 204.

<sup>139</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

<sup>140</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 196.

framework.<sup>141</sup> He does claim that such cooperation is transitory and cannot be guaranteed. Reliance upon cooperation for state security leaves the state vulnerable to the expansionist aims of other states. The cost of such trust in anarchy could be the existence of the state itself.<sup>142</sup> It is this possibility that, in the final analysis, privileges structure over agency for Waltz. Failure to take seriously the dictates ‘found’ in the conditions of the international system can lead to the disappearance of the state. Those who fail to follow the rules of the game as perceived by Waltz will be unable to play at all. States can only rely upon themselves to attain the security necessitated by a world of insecurity. According to Waltz it is a mistake to believe that because one state is satisfied with the foreign policy goal of continued survival all states are. To maximize the search for security that appears to characterize Kenneth Waltz’s description of interstate activity, states must assume that there are expansionist states at work in the interstate realm. Insecurity drives all units in the system to seek better power positions relative to one another.<sup>143</sup>

The final condition that structures life in the interstate realm reinforces the insecurity of the system. Devolving from the preceding condition, the structure of the interstate realm requires that states be prepared to “...counter the use of force with force or to pay the cost of weakness.”<sup>144</sup> The cost of weakness is presumably the noncontinuation of the sovereign state as a form of political community. What

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<sup>141</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 206.

<sup>142</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>143</sup>“...because for each state its power in relation to other states is ultimately the key to its survival.” Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 210.

<sup>144</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 160.

is threatened by the structure of interstate anarchy is the demise of the state unless vigilance and suspicion are turned ever outward. It is the price of independence in a world of anarchy. Kenneth Waltz effectively constructs a tautological conceptualization of political community in the world of international relations. According to the author, political community must be articulated within the conditions outlined above. Failure to do so results in the demise of that particular polity, and the society that it is apparently sheltering. The structural dictates of global politics demand a specific form of political community: the state. Forms of political community that do not fit the category become irrelevant for Waltz:

Any 'state' falling outside the terms of the preceding descriptions could no longer be considered a unit for purposes of international political analysis, but, since it would also cease to be a state, this does not complicate our problem.<sup>145</sup>

There are two reasons underlying Kenneth Waltz's dismissal of other forms of political community than the nation-state from consideration of global political analysis. First, because of the dictates of the context within which global politics are practiced, polities not characterized by the following characteristics will perish in the realm of insecurity and Otherness constructed by Waltz. Communities must be unified<sup>146</sup>, with an internal monopoly on the use of force<sup>147</sup>, bounded spatially and temporally, having a population of individuals and possessing of an equality among the constitutive units of the polity to prevent disunifying "...partial

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<sup>145</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>146</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, pp. 178-179.

<sup>147</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 178.

interests...”<sup>148</sup> that threaten the general will of the state. Secondly, Waltz cannot perceive other forms of political community, particularly, in the interstices of states, because he posits the realm of anarchy as one composed of a collection of sovereign states. There is no conceptual framework with which to perceive alternatives. For Waltz, global politics is specifically interstate relations because only states have a monopoly on the use of force.

Kenneth Waltz’s construction of world politics embodies his own understanding of political community. Inside and outside of the state are perceived to be binary opposites. The form of political community that is inside of Kenneth Waltz’s state is predicated upon a discourse of interests. This discourse is extrapolated outside of the borders of the state with a difference. There is a harmony of interests outside because of the mechanism of government, outside, there is a conflict of interests. Inside the protection of the state walls there is security for the individual against the random use of force, outside, there is anarchy and insecurity.

Security emanates from a structural framework enforced by the state to equilibrate potentially disharmonious interests. In effect, Kenneth Waltz has developed a theory of political community within a specific context and has universalized and multiplied its mirror images to construct the world of insecurity that exists outside of the sovereign state. Insecurity found outside of the state is a reflection of the insecurity found inside.

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<sup>148</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 175.

The self becomes the Other and is utilized to discipline and to reproduce a specific form of political community in such a manner that no other form of polity is conceptually possible utilizing the intellectual resources supplied by Kenneth Waltz. Thus, Waltz's ahistorical claims for international relations, the construction of a genealogy stretching from Thucydides to the behavioral scientists, and the dismissal of possible adjustments of the system Waltz constructs, in the name of insecurity, are theoretical lacunae which reveal the constitutive assumption upon which the author's model of world politics is based: insecurity, the Other.

### **Conclusion**

A realization that the threat of war is inescapable, according to Kenneth Waltz's logic, undermines the alleged logic of his project to minimize the incidence of war. This chapter will not argue that more war, whatever that concept entails for Waltz, is better or the same as less of the same, but it argues that given Waltz's lack of explication of the concept and the role that war plays in constructing the theoretical insecurity that even if war were not to occur, the threat of its occurrence would still necessitate the same political behaviours and problems

touched upon by Waltz. Insecurity as a structural phenomenon has very little to do with the actual (non)incidence of war and everything to do with the forms of political community, structure and agency that Waltz assumes are universal.

Otherness has everything to do with the threat of war and very little to do with its actual occurrence. Given this insight, Kenneth Waltz's peculiar lack of investigation into what constitutes war suddenly seems logical. War is less a specific set of behaviours than whatever people, particularly policy makers, fear from other external communities not unified by the same forcible authority. War becomes a negative empty category that is filled with whatever provokes insecurity and fear in the sovereign citizens of a sovereign state. It cannot be posited analytically and universally as a set of specific criterion.

It is the connotations of war that are universalized, not its particular instance or onset. War, and the threat of it, are constructed and reconstructed to act as a container for uncertainty and insecurity. It is this externalizing mechanism that allows any challenging social trends to be channeled outside into the realm beyond society and certainty.

Waltz is forced to construct two forms of causality of war. There is the efficient cause of war, which involves the specific trigger<sup>149</sup>, and can be found through the lens of either the first or the second images, and the permissive cause which is to be understood as the cause which allows war as such to occur.<sup>150</sup> However, the first two images are to be viewed through the perspective of the

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<sup>149</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, P. 232.

<sup>150</sup>Waltz., *Ibid.*, p. 232.

third.<sup>151</sup> It is the third image of international relations that contextualizes and gives meaning to the first two images. Social structure, or the lack of it, is the primary determinant for Kenneth Waltz of the nature of life and the interstices of sovereign states. It is the condition of insecurity that is the privileged permissive cause of war. Failure to view international politics through the lens of the structural insecurity, or the Other, constructed by Waltz results in an alleged 'distortion' in the perspective of international politics.<sup>152</sup> This claim leads the reader to the conclusion that Kenneth Waltz assumes that conflict has an objective existence apart from the perception of the analyst. It is this possibility of conflict embodied in the anarchic structure of the interstate system that allows Waltz to privilege the third image over the others. Conflict is fostered independently of the sometimes trivial causes that trigger war<sup>153</sup> by the structural nature of the interstate system: insecurity. It is from this position that Waltz seeks to unify the various tensions that have animated his text. The Other, the insecurity intertwined in the threat of war in a condition of anarchy, allows Kenneth Waltz to situate himself surreptitiously, as if the insecurity that he discovers provides an Archimedean platform from which to perceive the reality of international life; agency is sublimated by structure, and form by content. It is the nature of the insecurity, the Other, that Waltz cannot interrogate analytically because it provides the unexamined assumption upon which his entire analysis is based.

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<sup>151</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 230.

<sup>152</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 227.

<sup>153</sup>Waltz, *Ibid.*, p. 235.

### Allison's Foreign Policy: Within the State

An interrogation into how the Other is constructed at the second level-of-analysis will be conducted by an epistemological investigation of Graham T. Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison seeks to make sense of a specific foreign policy event through three different models of state action.<sup>1</sup> He creates three different perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, three different accounts of the interior of the role of the government in the state, that could explain such an event. Allison raises the epistemological issue of whether the various lenses utilized to make sense of the crisis create three different objects of analysis, or whether the three models are different perspectives on the same event. Each of the three heuristic devices selects different 'facts' as relevant, each has its own logic and assumptions about the nature of politics and political community, and each carries its own version of what constitutes an adequate explanation.<sup>2</sup> What is at stake in an examination of this issue is whether or not the crisis exists independently of the subject constructing it as an object of knowledge. Does the Cuban Missile Crisis have an independent ontological status? Is it

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<sup>1</sup>Graham T. Allison appears to conflate, at times, government with state, in his development of the three models. It will be argued that his three versions of how government constructs foreign policy are all founded upon the rendition of the state developed in the first model.

<sup>2</sup>Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Harper Collins, 1971), pp. 4-6.

something to be found by the analyst, or is it something constructed by the implicit assumptions of the knowing subject?

This chapter will argue that the event that Graham Allison calls the Cuban Missile Crisis is constructed by assumptions about political identity and Otherness that he brings to the analysis. The 'crisis' is not something that can be immediately apprehended, but must be perceived and constituted through certain categories of knowledge and assumptions about how knowledge is produced. In this analysis of Allison, what is at stake is an implicit understanding of how the knowing subject and the object of knowledge are mutually constructed.

Allison is aware enough of his own assumptions to note the ambivalence animating his text. Are the three models constitutive of three different versions of reality, or are they three takes on the same event?<sup>3</sup> Allison claims that both epistemological claims are at work in different levels within his text. There is an apparent tension between claims to knowledge that rely on an independent object of knowledge, in which case the object of knowledge is claimed to be discovered, and claim that link the subject creating the knowledge with the object created, which translates into an awareness of how the subject creates what becomes known. Allison consciously privileges the first claim that the cognitive model utilized by the analyst creates a discrete object of knowledge, distinct from the result from another set of epistemological assumptions and understandings.<sup>4</sup> At

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<sup>3</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 251.

<sup>4</sup>"Thus while at one level three models produce different explanations of the same happening, at a second level the models produce different explanations of quite different occurrences. And indeed, this is my argument." Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 251.

this explicit level, each of the three models utilized constructs a unique puzzle for the analyst to wade through, with its own discrete set of logics and validities. However, it will be illustrated that, although Allison attempts to link the object created by the three different types of analysis to the different subject positions entailed by that analysis, he relies on a conception of knowledge in which the object is transparent and self-evident for this construction of his own epistemological position. The other that Allison purports to discover, but that he in fact creates, is the insecurity and the threat of war allegedly affirmed by a specific construction of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This assumption of insecurity and irrationality exists beyond the borders of the state in the realm of danger and uncertainty, it is facilitated by the levels-of-analysis typology which implicitly permeates this text. Despite the author's explicit protestations to the contrary, his text's reliance on this typology subverts his hypothesis that three discrete objects of knowledge are created by the three heuristic devices seeking to make sense of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison's exploration into uncertain knowledges is founded upon the 'certainty' that interstate insecurity can facilitate even the unthinkable, nuclear war. According to the author, the potential devastation involved in the use of nuclear weapons, signified by the crisis, makes nuclear war unlikely, but it does not make it impossible.<sup>5</sup> This certainty asserted and represented by Allison is that the realm of danger and insecurity threatens all that exists within the boundaries and protection offered by the state. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a specific instance of such a threat. What the author is evaluating

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<sup>5</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. vii.

is three different propositions about how the (external) threat of war is managed by the state.

The universal truth of insecurity 'founds' the relative truths of his three models in a complicated and powerful set of assumptions enabled by a specific rendition of the levels-of-analysis typology. Graham T. Allison's analytical focus is on how the state manages externally occurring threats, given the specific example of the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the context of this analysis, he reproduces certain assumptions about the nature of international political life garnered from the analytical tensions embodied within this classification. From the analytical level of the state, explanations about the occurrence of insecurity, i.e. the object of knowledge, must involve investigations into the role and the function of the state because it is through the lens of the sovereign state that international relations is, in this instance, constructed. The international environment, the realm in which threats and foreign policy actions occur, is composed of an aggregate of states. The state as a relative unity is universalized. Individuals operate, and perceive the international environment, through the lens of the state. These statements may appear obvious, in part, because of the almost monopolistic analytical hold that they have commanded upon many realist thinkers, but it is important to state the assumptions upon which so many theories of international relations are predicated. This rendition of international life allows the analyst to separate the lens of the state, in investigations into foreign policy and international politics, from the international environment which, allegedly, is both comprised by

the discrete states and, definitionally, accounts for the sovereignty of each of the states. In an analytical sleight of hand, the levels-of-analysis typology allows the theorist to separate out the lens of international environment, i.e. anarchy, from explanations of state behaviour except as an alien and objectified entity while simultaneously reproducing assumptions about political anarchy. International relations becomes a fractured entity with different shards making sense of different aspects of international political life. The role and assumptions that political anarchy play in this analysis can be 'discovered' even as they are reproduced by Allison's focus on the second level-of-analysis. However, the typology is constructed out of a series of assumptions which reinforce and support one another, in an almost tautological fashion. One level depends on another for some form of coherence; Allison's discussion assumes and reproduces many of the same assumptions of Kenneth Waltz and J. David Singer. All are unified by their reliance upon the 'discovery' of insecurity/ anarchy which is held up as the definitive condition of life between states. The Other is created and produced, in part, by the unified fragmentation enabled by the typology. The creation of the discovery can be attributed to the interconnections between the various levels which are simultaneously erased by the claim that each level creates its own discrete version of international relations.

Turning to the first model in a rough sketch of how Allison alleges the state managed a specific external threat, the first impression one has is that it is derived from the unified black box posited by many Realist theorists of

International Relations. According to Rational Actor Model, the state acts as a unified, rational entity that is conceived as analogous to the individual.<sup>6</sup> Actions undertaken by the black box are assumed to reflect some goal of the state. Rationality and choice are assumed to be the criteria of state activity. State boundaries separate community inside from the threat outside. National government is equated with the state. Community is not interrogated or examined, what serves as the focus for these analysts is the "...international strategic marketplace..."<sup>7</sup> defined by threat and insecurity. The focus of the foreign policy maker is to secure and to maintain the borders protecting the community and society inside by managing, and attempting to minimize, external threats. The analyst's perspective is turned outward beyond the walls of the state, in order to keep a very close watch on the threats, insecurity and uncertainty that characterize the international environment. External threats are managed by vigilance.

The second model of how threat is managed by the state fractures the unified entity posited by the first model. The Organizational Process Model views foreign policy outcomes as the result of various organizational outputs and standard operating plans.<sup>8</sup> Implicit in this model is a view of the state as an entity composed of many different organizations, each with its own norms and agendas. Outputs of the state are the aggregate of, often conflicting, norms and patterns of behaviour that constitute the various organizations involved in the decision-

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<sup>6</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 257.

<sup>8</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 6.

making process. There is no assumed unity of the national government.<sup>9</sup> Threat is managed by a series of parochial perspectives and decisions varying according to the differing logics of the organizations. To utilize Allison's metaphor, the black box is constructed out of different gears and mechanisms.<sup>10</sup> What this model seeks to do is to uncover the various parts comprising the governmental entity. In this model Allison's epistemological duality becomes increasingly apparent. On one hand, the external threat is constructed by each organization differently and according to the differing criteria of each organization. What is considered a massive external threat to one, does not necessarily mean that the threat is shared by other organizations. However, organizations are unified by the mandates that are derived from the power of the state. A threat perceived to undermine the existence of the state correspondingly threatens the organizations that comprise it. Organizations comprise the government of the state.<sup>11</sup> State borders are constructed by the distinction between organizational logic, which derives from the authority of the state, and anarchy. Political community is that which is permeated with various forms of governmental organization. Inside the walls of the state is a collection of organizations; outside is insecurity and a lack of the routines and mandates that give meaning to bureaucratic processes.<sup>12</sup> The state, as a constitutive level-of-analysis, reigns, albeit somewhat implicitly.

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<sup>9</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>10</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 256.

<sup>12</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 84.

Finally, the Bureaucratic Politics model is developed by Graham Allison. This model perceives foreign policy output as the political resultant of various internal maneuvers for position; governmental outputs are perceived to be the contingent results of bargaining within and between bureaucracies.<sup>13</sup> The assumed unity of the rational state is fractured along the faults of the individual personalities of the bargainers and the various positions that they occupy<sup>14</sup> rather than along the operational plans and questions of implementation defining the second model. Model III cuts into the state in a different manner than the above model. As with the previous attempt at unpacking what is in the black box, this model makes sense of how any given threat is dealt with internally. Echoing the logics of the two previous models, the lenses derived from the Bureaucratic Politics model do not question the existence of the threat. It is assumed, in part, because of Allison's reliance on the second level-of-analysis and all that it entails. What this conceptual framework emphasizes is how a specific threat is managed by various individuals, given their roles, histories and places in the organization and their future ambitions within the establishment. The focus of this model is an attempt to understand how the externally 'discovered' threat, in this instance the Cuban Missile Crisis, is dealt with by specific resolutions of the outside-inside dichotomy. This model seeks to chart how personality and idiosyncrasies affect that which is being implemented. Bargaining between and among various individuals is perceived to account for the foreign policy output. Again, in this model, the

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<sup>13</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 256.

<sup>14</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 251.

borders between inside and outside is assumed. It will be argued the state structures the power positions available to the various individuals within its organization and founds the power from which the various officials draw. Persons and officials who are the focus of this model operate within the parameters of the state, broadly defined, and the community contained by it.

Allison aspires to develop three different models that view a discrete foreign policy act through different spectacles: the lenses of the rational actor, the organizational process and bureaucratic politics. Each model is utilized to make sense of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Each heuristic device allegedly asks different questions, receives correspondingly different answers and problematizes the event differently, but they all presume the existence of the state, the second level-of-analysis. All three explanations of the Cuban Missile Crisis are predicated upon an assumption that there is a form of political community, the state, constructed by boundaries dividing what is outside from that which is inside. Differences in the three constructions of the state are attributable to what level the lens is focused on: the state as a unit, the organizations within government, or the individuals within the organizations within government within the state.<sup>15</sup> What is assumed tautologically, and provides the universal foundation for all three, is the existence of the threat of state, if not global, annihilation apparently confirmed by representations of the Cuban Missile Crisis. With three such disparate bases from which to make sense, not only of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but the more general application of comprehending what form of political community is embodied

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<sup>15</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 258.

within the borders of the state, the question arises whether or not all three are dealing with the same object of knowledge. More specifically, does the object of knowledge have an independent ontological existence from the subject making sense of it, or is the object of knowledge constructed by the knowing subject? Are the lenses of the three models making sense of the same object; is the Cuban Missile Crisis the same thing, or are three different versions of truth being constructed? It will be argued that a specific rendition of insecurity, the threat of war embodied in the Cuban Missile Crisis, is the unifying assumption upon which Graham Allison founds his analyses. In turn, it will be argued that this Other, this insecurity, is facilitated by a specific rendition of the universal-particular dichotomy created by a reliance on the levels-of-analysis typology. Taking this logic another step, Allison's three models are founded upon a specifically occurring 'threat' signified by the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Despite Allison's introductory and concluding remarks on the issue, his emphasis on constructing a 'general model' out of the three models intimates that Allison slips into conceptualizing an independently existing object of knowledge. The author slides imperceptibly into making the distinction between partial and complete explanations, implying that none of the models can stand alone,<sup>16</sup> each is an inadequate form of explication. The postulated comprehensive model, incorporating features of all three, is premised on a specific understanding of what constitutes adequate explanation for Allison. A valid form of knowledge, for the author, would be based upon a specific rendition of the determinants of foreign

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<sup>16</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 255.

policy behaviours and an explication of how the various determinants are interrelated.<sup>17</sup> If Allison's claim that the three different models construct three different knowledges is taken seriously, then a cumulative knowledge would seem to be problematic. What would unify the three paradigms? It is my contention that Allison relies on an implicit assumption of what occurs outside of the borders of the state: danger. It is this threat, and the uncertainty assumed to correspond with the interstate realm, that founds his claim to knowledge. The focus of his models assumes the prior and independent existence of externally occurring danger, Model II and Model III can be read as attempts by Allison to chart how the threat is managed. The author engages the issue of how different conceptual frameworks construct different knowledges, but he fails to take seriously the implications of this epistemological position for his own claim to knowledge. It is argued that this conceptual slippage can be accounted for by his reliance on the levels-of-analysis typology.

Graham Allison's failure to problematize his own analytical position allows him to chart how the three models are 'complementary'. Reliance upon a 'discovery' of the other, insecurity, as the foundation for certain knowledge prevents Allison from applying his rhetoric to his own position.

It is the creation of insecurity intertwined with his construction of specific knowledges about foreign policy that is the conceptual aporia that cannot be examined by the author. To do so would undermine his position. Certainty would become uncertainty. The foundation upon which Allison is perched would give

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<sup>17</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 255.

way, if examined too closely. A specific rendition of insecurity, and simultaneous erasure of the mechanisms that are involved in the reproductive act, allow Allison to place all three models within a larger unifying framework. The Rational Actor model constructs the arena of community and society, by juxtaposing the community inside the state against the anarchy outside of the borders. Model I, constructs the image of a specific national identity:

Thus we can see how Model I emphasizes, on the one hand, the problem and context that create incentives and pressures for a government to choose a particular course of action, and on the other, the national (or governmental) values and axioms that create propensities to respond in different ways.<sup>18</sup>

Models positing a unified and rational state define what the state is, and is not. Specific states are unified by the pressures and challenges of the interstate realm. Allison's object of knowledge, the threat of danger assumed to exist in anarchy by Allison, is utilized to construct a unity, a community bounded by the need for protection of what is outside. Implicit in Allison's position is an assumption that the specific form taken by this bond characterizes the 'national character' that accounts for differences between specific states. Each nation has its own set of behavioral tendencies<sup>19</sup> and this unique defining quality of each state is perceived by the model with the widest perspective, that of the Rational Actor. This model constructs the realm of danger and uncertainty alleged to exist outside of the borders of the political community. Model I also allows the analyst to compare

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<sup>18</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 257-8.

<sup>19</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 258.

and contrast differences among various articulations of the political communities formed within the international political environment.

Models II, the Organizational Process model, and III, the Bureaucratic Politics model, work within the set of assumptions and conceptual frameworks established by the Rational Actor model, Model I.<sup>20</sup> Model II assumes and reproduces the existence of the Other created by Model I. The insecurity and danger to be 'found' outside of the state becomes more threatening, once the sets of assumptions that the state acts in a rational and unified manner are challenged.<sup>21</sup> What are considered to be irrational foreign policy acts, from the perspective of Model I,<sup>22</sup> become more likely actions given the conceptual lenses of the other two models. The logics of organizational processes and of bureaucratic politics are not portrayed as always negotiating externally occurring threat adequately, i.e. from the perspective of Model I. The Cuban Missile Crisis becomes an example of how ineffective management of externally occurring threats, the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba, can threaten the continued existence of the state. Model II constructs the organizational structure within the state, and illustrates how this structure affects the "...information, alternatives and action..."<sup>23</sup> taken by the state in the interstate realm. Model III, the Bureaucratic Politics model, can be read as further elaboration of how individual idiosyncrasies affect foreign policy. This

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<sup>20</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 258.

<sup>21</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 259.

<sup>22</sup> The rational actor model allegedly evaluates foreign policy activity from the perspective of the unity of the state. What threatens the state should be dealt with in a unified and coherent fashion, failure to do so is considered irrational and a failure to manage the threat effectively.

<sup>23</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 258.

third model assumes not only the Other created by the first model, but it also assumes the existence of organizational structures and procedural logics.<sup>24</sup> Each model can be viewed as derivative, and a further elaboration, of the previous set of assumptions in a complex and self-referential process.

To sum up the introduction, there are several themes that emerge using the analytical focus of the Other. The inter-relation of each of the three models is founded upon a specific construction of the Other. It is this assumption that enables Graham Allison to posit the possibility of commensurability among, not only the three models that he elaborates, but any attempt to explain foreign policy output. Implicit in his claim is that his understanding of foreign policy presumes the existence of insecurity outside the borders of the state. Fitting together different knowledges constructed by the three models, is an exercise in emphasizing what is complementary in the various models and "...unraveling the central propositions implied..."<sup>25</sup> by apparently contradictory explanations. Commensurability of different models, according to a footnote of Allison's, with the resulting emphasis on partial explanations, is to be evaluated according to the compatibility of the *founding propositions* of each model. It will be argued that Graham Allison's three models are commensurable because they are all derivatives of a specific rendition of the Other, of danger and insecurity. Models II and III assume the externally occurring danger postulated by Model I and reproduce it. These models trace how complex institutions, such as the governments of the

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<sup>24</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p 258.

<sup>25</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 329.

United States and the Soviet Union, exacerbate the danger by failing to deal adequately with it. Thus, crisis management needs improvement, according to Allison's perspective on both the Organizational Process model and the Bureaucratic Politics model.<sup>26</sup> The Other is not being managed effectively, in part, because of the 'distortions' of 'reality' involved in the use of these two models.

### **Model I: The Rational Actor**

Graham Allison develops this model as the political site which gives conceptual birth to the other two. This is the conceptual framework that deals with the issues of state survival and territorial integrity. The Rational Actor model is an attempt to understand how the state can best manage the external threats characterizing the international environment. It is Allison's argument that this model forms the implicit discursive foundation constructing the 'reality' of International Relations.<sup>27</sup> This model articulates one method by which the assumed external danger is managed. Explanations of foreign policy events within the framework of Model I treat the state as a unified actor, analogous to an individual. Worldviews are derived from assumptions about the use of calculated strategy<sup>28</sup> designed to minimize 'discovered' danger to the state. Allison's understanding of strategy presumes the existence of the Other in the interstate realm, the insecurity that must be tamed through the mechanism of foreign policy.

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<sup>26</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 259-260.

<sup>27</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>28</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 5.

It is contended that the understanding of strategy utilized by Graham Allison constructs the danger and insecurity that he purports to discover in the anarchic realm. This assumption of insecurity is the paradoxically 'secure' foundation for the knowledge claims in Essence of Decision. 'Reality' as discovered, or constructed, by Allison, is reinforced by a complex and self-referential set of assumptions.

Identity and security are carved out by strategic manipulation and negotiation of the danger and insecurity to be found in the international arena. Strategic negotiation is the framework from which this model is derived. Strategic thinking deals specifically with the existence of the state as a whole, it presumes that the state is a unified and bounded entity. Nations are the actors in strategic thinking.<sup>29</sup> The perspective facilitated by the Rational Actor model is to carve out a niche for the state, as a single unit, within the competitive strategic marketplace.<sup>30</sup> Strategic thinking makes sense of the interstate environment by perceiving the actions of states as "...more or less advantageous moves in a game of interdependent conflict."<sup>31</sup> The world is perceived through these lenses as a potentially hostile place in which everyone is striving to have the largest advantage. An action by one state affects another either by providing an opportunity for gaining on fellow players in the strategic game, or as a blow to a state's competitive status. Competition and potential conflict are assumed to be

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<sup>29</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

<sup>30</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>31</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 15.

the constitutive elements of the interstate realm.<sup>32</sup> Allison utilizes the metaphor of the marketplace to develop his understanding of strategy. Every other actor is considered to be a potential competitor in the international strategic marketplace, and as such every state is a possible enemy. The world is portrayed as a series of opportunities for maximizing the position of the player, the state as unified entity, within the international environment.

The lenses of the Rational Actor model do not only construct the realm of danger, the Other, that is to be managed by strategic maneuvers, but concomitantly produces a unified entity, the state defined as a national government.<sup>33</sup> It is the relative state that is universalized as the subject and, within the second image, the object of analysis.<sup>34</sup> Allison's rendition of the state as a rational actor is one that is unified. It possesses one set of goals, one list of possible options and one specific understanding of the consequences resulting from each of the potential avenues of action for the state in any given situation.<sup>35</sup> Any action taken by the state is assumed to reflect conscious and unified choice and is assumed to be the best solution to achieve the goals of the national

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<sup>32</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

<sup>33</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>34</sup> Graham Allison notes a variation on this model, focusing on specific and particular states rather than on the state as a universal political and social category. This derivative of the Rational Actor model is still derived from the general form of rationality dictated by the international environment; this rationality is modified by narrowing the scope of the general and universal rationality to fit what is likely to be on the spectrum of a specific state's political culture. Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 37. There are, thus, two dimensions of universality and relativity at play within this text. The universality of the system produces the relativity of its homogenous units. In turn, these units provide the 'universal' container into which relative cultures and specifics are placed.

<sup>35</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

government.<sup>36</sup> Foreign policy actions are made sense of as expressions of strategic purpose by the unified state. Foreign policy outputs are assumed to occur within the framework of strategy and maximizing one's own advantage within the international environment. Possible outcomes are assumed to occur in a "...steady-state choice..."<sup>37</sup>; this assumption of a limited pool of possible advantage translates into perceiving gains made by one state as loss for another. Competition is the mechanism for allocating advantage within the strategic marketplace. Model I, by constructing a perspective allegedly from the perspective of the state as a whole, constructs the 'stickiness' of the state borders in the other two models. Models II and III work within the framework of community and security constructed by the Rational Actor model. A specific version of political community is inscribed and reproduced, as in a hall of mirrors, by this model.

The form of subjectivity assumed, by this model, to be necessary within the strategic marketplace is derived from an understanding of a specific form of economic 'man'.<sup>38</sup> Goals derived from the perspective of the state are framed within the language of national interests and national security.<sup>39</sup> Foreign policy actions are impelled by the perception a specific strategic problem, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. Options are assumed to be generated in response to the problem, and the consequences of each of the possible options are evaluated. A choice is made to implement the option that maximizes the strategic position of the

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<sup>36</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>37</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>38</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>39</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 33.

state and its goals, and to minimize the strategic costs. Action is assumed to result from a cost-benefit analysis framed within the strategic marketplace.<sup>40</sup> Allison universalizes a specific form of rationality and logic. It is this logic that founds the political framework within which organizations and bureaucrats allegedly operate. The discourse of strategic costs and benefits is assumed to be the foundation for all states, as a universal phenomenon. A universal and non-situated perspective is alluded to by the adherents of this paradigm, and in an indirect manner, Allison. The author unproblematically assumes the existence of states working within a multiple state system, by framing alleged particularities and idiosyncrasies within this specific framework. There is a universal container called the state which is assumed to exist. Variations can occur only within the universalized structure of the container, the demands of the interstate system do not allow variations of the container's structural composition. Allison universalizes a specific form of political community as the necessary form of political community engaging the strategic marketplace. His theoretical framework, of all three models, does not allow an articulation of other forms of political community, identity or security other than the state and the structures that occur within it. A specific form of subjectivity and meaning is universalized, in part, because of a reliance on a particular rendition of the international environment facilitated by the levels-of-analysis problematic.

Allison is quite explicit about the 'inference pattern' that produces knowledge within this paradigm. The analyst places him or herself in the position

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<sup>40</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

of the object of analysis, assumes the existence of the strategic marketplace and the logic associated with it, and extrapolates from the constructed subject position what specific goals must be held by the object of analysis, given the action.

Consistency of goals and objectives is assumed to be translated into discrete actions.<sup>41</sup> An event is selected and made sense of within the criteria of this logical framework. Schelling's "vicarious problem solving"<sup>42</sup> is an example of how the object of analysis reveals more about the subject than about the phenomenon in and of itself. Allison fails to problematize the model which provides the overarching structure for his other paradigms, even though he is explicit about how knowledge is constructed within the Rational Actor model: the subject creates the object. He fails to problematize his own position vis-à-vis this model. Analysts working within this crucial model of strategic studies, that both create the state as a specific phenomenon and mediate the position of the state within the international environment, put themselves in the position of the acting state in order to create conceptual order out of foreign policy actions. Graham Allison explicitly links the subject to the foreign policy object, and then universalizes that specific form of rationality. He fails to take seriously his own rhetoric about different forms of knowledges. The strategic marketplace and the danger that lurks within it creates, according to Allison's textual logic, a universal and fundamental structure of meaning from which all other form of knowledges are derived. Insecurity, the Other, is the truth and the certainty that translates into

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<sup>41</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>42</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Allison's assumption of the universality of the market metaphor and the logic he traces to it. Allison's epistemological relativism is founded upon a specific ontological universalism, the Other, in a complicated and self-reinforcing set of assumptions and logics.

### **Model II: Organizational Processes**

The ambiguity between Graham Allison's two epistemological claims is reproduced within this model. At one level, Allison makes the claim that the unit of analysis, the organizations which produce foreign policy output, creates a specific form of knowledge of foreign policy and international politics. Different organizational outputs "raise the problem, provide the information, and take the initial steps that colour the face of the issue that is turned to the leaders",<sup>43</sup> in short, they construct the problem to be dealt with. At another level, Allison utilizes 'the problem' as an objective yardstick against which the organization's outputs and policies are to be measured. The problem is somehow apprehended from an Archimedean and universal perspective. Knowledge about danger and the interstate realm is derived from the subject position of the state. Thus, the choices of a specific organization are to be evaluated from what is deemed a problem from

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<sup>43</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 79.

the perspective of the state as a unit. Organizational programs can therefore be evaluated against a specific instance of state or national security without Allison being explicit about how the foreign policy problem is constructed or perceived.<sup>44</sup> From which perspective is a 'program' to be evaluated? Is its effectiveness and success in handling an allegedly independently occurring foreign policy 'event' to be judged from within the specific organizational discourse, or is it evaluated from another perspective than the organization which produced that program. It will be argued that evaluation of how different organizations deal with specific foreign policy events occurs from the perspective of the state implied in the Rational Actor model. The danger and insecurity constructed through the framework of Model I is assumed to exist in the Organizational Process model. Model II is not a radically different and incommensurable paradigm developed by Allison to make sense of International Relations. Rather, it relies on a specific conception of insecurity which also founds the Rational Actor model: the Other. Allison purports to discover danger and insecurity, but he in constructs it, through his invocation of the strategic marketplace, derived from the levels-of-analysis typology. This constitutive metaphor animates subsequent attempts to understand international politics in Essence of Decision. The first model creates insecurity, later models seek to manage the danger 'found' in global politics, but they all reproduce, and are founded upon, assumptions about the existence of insecurity lurking at the borders of the state.

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<sup>44</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 89.

Allison, in this Organizational Processes model, is fracturing the unity of the state that is constructed by the Rational Actor model. He is not tearing down the borders separating inside from outside, but he is differentiating between the various components of government. Government is comprised of the loosely connected and semi-independent organizations<sup>45</sup> that are founded upon the principle of a division of bureaucratic labour. National government, in Allison's second model, is assumed to be a highly complex series of institutions in which no single authority, even the executive, can oversee every decision made.<sup>46</sup> Thus, power and responsibility are broken up into discrete and separate units which become the objects of organizational policy. These various parcels of responsibility become the focus of the bureaucratic routines which permeate the state. Government administers to the state through bureaucratic outputs, in this model. Government occurs within, but is not reducible to the state. Nor is the state reducible to the government, unlike the previous model. The two co-exist in a highly complicated and intertwined fashion, within the boundaries dividing inside from outside. Governments act through the organizations that comprise them within the parameters established by the state.<sup>47</sup> The state is the form of unified political community postulated and assumed by the foreign policy of the Rational Actor model; it is the polity which is threatened by the externally occurring threats that present the objectively occurring problems to the various bureaucracies that must be managed. The 'stickiness' of the border between inside and outside is

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<sup>45</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>46</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

<sup>47</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 67.

reproduced by Graham Allison through his rhetoric of problem-solving, as though 'problems' have an objective and independent ontological status.

Allison's discourse about how various bureaucracies' problem-solving is evaluated stems from the analytical position outlined by the previous model. The author evaluates and constructs threat and insecurity as it affects the state, not the organization within the government within the state, although Allison claims that it is organizational inputs that select and define that which is called a problem<sup>48</sup>. The duality evident in Allison's position on the status of problems, whether or not they occur independently, reflects the ambivalence in his position on whether or not knowledges are constructed or have an independent objective existence. The same resolution of this ambiguity, in favour of the object of knowledge having an independent and objective existence, manifests itself in evaluations of bureaucratic problem-solving. Extremely inept handling is assumed to be a mechanism of change, but Allison fails to describe the subject position from which such judgments are made. One of the triggers for bureaucratic and organizational change is an "...undeniable failure of procedures and repertoires..."<sup>49</sup> of a specific organization, but Allison fails to account from which perspective this judgment is made. All that is claimed by the author is that authorities outside of the specific organization demand change, and in such a time of self-evident failure, personnel within the organization are either more likely to change or face the likelihood of being replaced.<sup>50</sup> These alterations are judged as necessary, in foreign policy

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<sup>48</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>49</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>50</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 85.

circumstances, from the perspective of state security defined by Allison in the Rational Actor model. Borders dividing outside from inside are assumed, and produced, by the invocation of foreign policy. Actions are taken and justified in the name of a specific state. Foreign policy is assumed to exist unproblematically; what is problematized is how it is produced. The state is still the boundary of community within which organizations work. It is argued that the author assumes the Rational Actor paradigm in his discussion of Model II through his continual invocations of the state. Power is portrayed as being distributed differently throughout the political community but it is still assumed to be coextensive with it.<sup>51</sup> It is from the Archimedean perspective of the heterogeneous bounded and rational entity that Allison's evaluations and his constructions of knowledge are derived. Ineptness and success at handling foreign policy crises, specifically that of the Cuban Missile Crisis, is evaluated by Allison from the perspective of the state carved out of the strategic marketplace in the Rational Actor model.

An examination into how Graham Allison's epistemological ambivalence is constructed in Essence of Decision can be traced in his rendition of how foreign policy problems are constituted. On one level, the level at which the organizational subject is understood as creating its object of knowledge, organizations select and create foreign policy problems.<sup>52</sup> However, the text subverts this claim of Allison's and rhetorically constructs foreign policy problems as an independent and self-evident problem. Bureaucratic routines are described

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<sup>51</sup>Power is portrayed as being divided among various organizations, so that government can be more responsive. Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>52</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 79.

as working on a problem oriented basis.<sup>53</sup> Organizational routines respond to problem's, defined as areas of "...atypical discomfort...",<sup>54</sup> perceived and dealt with through existing routines. If these fail, then incremental adjustments to the organizational patterns, reflecting the structure of the concerned organization are made.<sup>55</sup> It seems likely that within this model that success and failure are determined within the organizational discourse, according to the extant criteria. And yet, Allison conversely invokes the language of problems, in this model, as something that occurs independently of the organizational discourses that are alleged to make sense of it. When defining programs, the author invokes a cluster of standard operating procedures that is rarely a good fit for the problem or situation to which it is applied. If a problem was selected and made sense of through the lenses and categories of existing organizational procedures, then how would an evaluation about the appropriateness of these procedures be made? Again, Allison slips into the rhetoric of distorted and partial information "...from each organization about its part of the problem..."<sup>56</sup> as if the problem had an independent and objective existence from the bureaucratic channels that create the problem for the leaders. It is argued that Graham Allison slips into the language of the Rational Actor model, in which the problem is constructed from the perspective of the state, because his own subject position is defined by that model. He assumes the perspective of the state as a single and homogeneous entity, of

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<sup>53</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>54</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>55</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>56</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 94.

which the parochial sub-units represent distortions of the national interest and national security, which are assumed to be the 'reality' of international politics as dictated by the strategic environment.

Thus, the reproduction of the division between inside and outside by Allison manifests itself in a conceptual 'stickiness' of the state. The state is the context into which government and organizations are placed by Allison; it is the frame of reference which structures his claims to knowledge about foreign policy and International Relations. Outside is the realm of the Other, which is perceived to threaten the existence of the state directly, and the organizations within the state indirectly. An entity as complex and as multifaceted as the government of a state alluded to by Allison, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, balances between coordination and responsive action.<sup>57</sup> A need for coordination would imply some form of centralized control. Conversely, responsive organizational behaviour would presume some level of decentralization. Many problems fall into several bureaucratic jurisdictions, presumably because Allison's understanding of problem is defined from a perspective independent of the bureaucratic lenses that allegedly make sense of a specific problem. However, due to the importance of foreign policy to the wellness and continued existence of the state, derived implicitly from the Rational Actor paradigm, governmental leaders become actively involved in framing problems and seeking their solution, i.e. there is a higher level of coordination than in other areas due to the importance of the issues to the state

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<sup>57</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 85.

and the government.<sup>58</sup> Foreign policy, because it deals with the taming of the Other, externally occurring insecurity founded upon assumptions about the state in a condition of anarchy, results in attempts of governmental leaders to coordinate the various bureaucratic regimes. Persistent coordination, analogous to the unified rational actor of the previous model, is problematic because of structural factors within the state.<sup>59</sup> These include the nature of the specific task, the information available to leaders and performance indicators of the various constituents, the system of rewards and punishments which exist in a given organization and the process of allocation of resources among the departments.<sup>60</sup> All of these factors occur within an entity framed by the discourse of the preceding model. All of them presume and reproduce the existence of the state as the context in which meaning is created and power allocated. All four of the criteria operate within the unconsciously reproduced boundaries defining political community. Coordination is a unifying vector within the state; it is derived from the power and authority of the state. The variable of coordination implies some form of centralized authority and power, that, it is argued, reproduces the unified actor that is the state in Model I.

The 'stickiness' of the state is reproduced and represented by the bureaucratic routines which are the units of analysis of this model. Organizations attempt to avoid uncertainty and insecurity through the creation of procedures and

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<sup>58</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 86.

<sup>59</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 86.

<sup>60</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 86.

routines.<sup>61</sup> Security and certainty are created through regularized routines with those with whom the organization interacts.<sup>62</sup> Negotiations structure the environment within which organizations act and structure the terms of communication. This behaviour by organizations can be read as a form of “...uncertainty avoidance...”<sup>63</sup> which would imply a mandate of taming various perceptions of insecurity. Organizational routines and procedures, within this model, by deriving action from a drive to avoid insecurity and uncertainty, reproduce the existence of the Other. Insecurity, or Otherness, is reproduced through the discourses of organizational policies and routines. Those organizations within government that deal with issues of state survival reproduce the specific version of insecurity that is portrayed as threatening the existence of the state. Uncertainty occurring within the government is successfully managed due to the mandate derived from the power of the state. The environment is made more secure through such mechanisms as a clear demarcation of responsibility, a forum for negotiating budgetary divisions and current procedures and practical regularities.<sup>64</sup> Outside of the protective borders of the state, organizations dealing with issues of state security attempt to minimize insecurity through such informal mechanisms as alliances. And between, those who are not allies, regularized practices creates a set of expectations that creates a feeling of certainty between states. Ironically, in the interstate realm the certainty created is one of insecurity.

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<sup>61</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>62</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>63</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>64</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 84.

Foreign policy routines recreate insecurity by the creation of "...standard scenarios..."<sup>65</sup> which make sense, and create, a series of potential bureaucratic 'realities' through the construction of contingency plans for various imagined international situations.<sup>66</sup> Actions in the international realm are, therefore, a series of bureaucratically imagined possibilities that define what is a possible foreign policy act. Allison's example is that the standard scenario for Tactical Air Command assumes that combat between American and enemy aircraft, the training of personnel and the development of aircraft are derived from this assumption. Even though this scenario, in the Viet Nameese theater, is less likely to be realized than other roles for the aircraft,<sup>67</sup> the standard scenario is continually reproduced through the training of troops and the purchase and development of equipment. Insecurity is perceived to exist outside the borders of the state by the organizations that deal with the construction and implementation of foreign policy. Within the context of political anarchy, the lack of authority to allocates resources, define responsibilities and found the power of a discrete organization exacerbates the insecurity felt by the organizations dealing with foreign policy. To tame the uncertainties and ambiguities 'discovered' beyond the safety of government mandate and regulations, organizations categorize possibilities into discrete and manageably defined options to which they articulate specific actions. These options of action in the foreign policy realm structure the bureaucratic reality of

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<sup>65</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>66</sup>This emphasis on repetition as a means of constructing bureaucratic reality has some interesting parallels with some of the issues of the Third Debate which, unfortunately is beyond the scope of this thesis.

<sup>67</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 84.

what is occurring in the interstate arena. Events are filtered through these various scenarios and conceptual categories by the individuals within the organizations. Specific events trigger what has been predetermined as the appropriate response. Bureaucratic actions are based upon and reproduce specific categories of discourse which are derived from 'uncertainty avoidance' and the attempted construction of some form of security and certainty to evade the insecurity, the Other threatening the bureaucratic regimes that animate the state within this model, found particularly in the international arena.

### **Model III: Bureaucratic Politics**

Model III, the Bureaucratic Politics model, works within both paradigms already constructed by Allison. This model seeks to fracture the unity of the state, and the routines that construct a bureaucracy, by focusing on the specific individual and her idiosyncrasies. More discrete knowledge about the inside of the state is required to apply this model than the other two.<sup>68</sup> The analytical lens goes even deeper into the working of government in Model III than Model II. Allison's implicit spatial depiction of the production of the Cuban Missile Crisis is analogous to an onion. Every time you peel it, there is another layer to be interrogated. However, the 'onion' is still a bounded entity that is striving for its

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<sup>68</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 181.

strategic position in the onion field to minimize its perception of insecurity represented by the threat of imminent harvest. The Other is presumed and represented in this model as it is in the two others. As with the case of the previous model, the state is the context from which meaning and security are derived. The security and continued existence of the state are threatened by that which is embodied in the strategic marketplace articulated in Model I. This perception of threat to a specific polity is the Other. Governments are threatened because the state is threatened externally. Organizations within the government, and the individuals comprising these organizations derive their positions from the authority of the government and the state. The context which gives them meaning is the political community enveloped by the state. If that envelope is threatened then the entity which helps to give meaning to both individuals and organizations is threatened by the Other as well. And, if the foundation which gives meaning to Models II and III is undermined, so are the models.

Model III seeks to understand foreign policy outputs as the result of bargaining among specific players with discrete histories.<sup>69</sup> Players engage in various games, portrayed by Allison as analogous to game theory or Wittgenstein,<sup>70</sup> in which players' structural positions combine with their specific individuality and perceptions to colour how foreign policy problems are to be dealt with. Outcomes, foreign policy actions, are not the intended result of any one person involved but are rather the ongoing result of a series of discursive

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<sup>69</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 144.

<sup>70</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

games.<sup>71</sup> There is not just one discrete game that affects any one specific policy output, rather any one outcome is the result of a series of "... intricate, and subtle, simultaneous, overlapping games among players located in positions in government."<sup>72</sup> Government, within this model is understood as the horizontal and vertical arrangement of the players in the various games of power.

Given Allison's perspective that individual perception is a complex mixture of role and personality, it would appear that he is constructing a model based out of the meshing of various personal discourses. And yet, the perspectives of these individuals are apparently unified by the foreign policy object, goal or problem to be achieved. The ambivalence in the text is reproduced within the construction of this model. Allison constructs two different and conflicting epistemological positions. One is explicit and the other subverts the stated position of the author. Allison fails to take seriously his own claims about subjectivity and the production of knowledge in this model. His own analytical position undercuts the explicit model that he is attempting to create. The certainty upon which he founds his analysis, it is argued, is the existence of insecurity embodied in the international strategic marketplace. The discourse of national security, and the 'problems' that stem from assumptions about community and the avoidance of insecurity were created by Model I, which outlines the position of the state in the international realm. His reasoning about the construction of the national security discourse within this model almost becomes tautological:

Individuals become players in the national security policy game

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<sup>71</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>72</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 162.

by occupying a position that is hooked on to the major channels for producing action on national security issues.<sup>73</sup>

Discourses of national security constitute who are the players in the game of national security. The subject, or the players in this series of games, is not an autonomous and discrete entity that articulates its own unique perspective.

Structures, derived from both the Rational Actor and the Organizational Processes models,<sup>74</sup> to a certain extent define who the pertinent individuals and subjects are within this discourse. The relevant persons are defined by the spatial positions carved out by the other two models. Foreign policy may be constructed by a series of bargaining between individuals, but the individuals who enter into the process and the power that each has, can be traced to the larger power structure intimated by the concept of the state.<sup>75</sup> When the author is discussing the positions of the relevant actors, he is invoking the state and the structures that comprise it. The positions that define where a person sits and what that person sees occur within the container and the structures empowered by the state.<sup>76</sup>

Graham Allison's authorial position, the perspective from which he evaluates the Bureaucratic Processes model is that of the Rational Actor. Allison is recreating the distinction between inside and outside, between government and anarchy, between security and insecurity made in Model I, in his elaboration of position and structures that assume the state.

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<sup>73</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>74</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 258-259.

<sup>75</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>76</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 176-178.

Graham T. Allison's elaboration of the Bureaucratic Politics model assumes the framework of the state, described by Model I, and the organizational processes that, at the analytical level of Model II, comprise the state. Textual ambivalence between discrete knowledges that construct incommensurable paradigms, and ones that are describing some externally occurring and unified object of knowledge, is yet again resolved by Allison's slipping surreptitiously into a conceptual framework derived from an understanding of knowledge as something to be discovered rather than created. The author refers to the 'issue' as something that can be perceived from many positions within the state<sup>77</sup> implying that it has an independent existence from those that perceive it. Despite his explicit claim to the contrary, Allison relies upon a conception of insecurity, the Other, upon which his analysis is founded. Foreign policy problems or issues are presented from the perspective of the state in an anarchic world of multiple states. It is the actions and the outputs of the sovereign state that are important<sup>78</sup> within the discourse that the author is constructing. The assumption of insecurity as the circumstance within which the sovereign state must operate raises the stakes of the input of those who construct foreign policy. An inadequate recommendation, one that affects the state in the international realm adversely, "...could mean irreparable damage"<sup>79</sup> to the sovereign state, the government within it, and the organizations and the individuals who comprise it. The Other constructed by Allison in his Rational Actor model is reproduced within the Bureaucratic Politics model; it is

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<sup>77</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 175.

<sup>78</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>79</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 145.

perceived to threaten the integrity and sovereignty of the state. The resolution of this epistemological tension is facilitated by Allison's reliance on the levels-of-analysis typology, which produces a specific understanding of anarchy/insecurity.

Thus, foreign policy issues are presented as something that occurs apart from the subjects that comprise the games of the Bureaucratic Politics model. Problems and issues are defined by Allison from the perspective of the first model of this text, that of the unified entity of the state, although the 'faces' that the problems wear differ from player to player within this paradigm. Allison slips into the rhetoric of partial versus complete perspectives from which to comprehend how a foreign policy action has come into being,<sup>80</sup> leading to the conclusion that the object of analysis has an independent existence from the subject seeking knowledge about it. This perspective is implied by the logic utilized by Allison's claims about misperception, which would imply the possibility of perfect perception between the various positions held by those who affect any particular outcome. Due to the combination of individual personality and different horizontal and vertical positions within the power structure of the state<sup>81</sup> different and varying prescriptions of action are held forth. Perfect perception within the state and government would make any agreement unlikely between various intragovernmental positions because the issue is perceived from subject positions within the state, not from the Archimedean perspective of the unified state within a realm populated by other states that Allison utilizes for his own analysis. If the

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<sup>80</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 275.

<sup>81</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 167.

participants could have the same perspective as Allison, then misperception would be less of a problem. 'Rational' foreign policy would be a more realizable ideal. The author does not situate himself within the state, but he places himself on the boundary between inside and outside of political community defined by his first heuristic device, enabling him to see both foreign policy actions from the perspective of the state and to uncover the mechanisms within the black box. Ambiguity and misunderstanding allows those with divergent views and perspectives to cooperate;<sup>82</sup> each assumes that the other person shares a similar perspective on what action must be undertaken for any specific problem. Perfect perception of a problem and the perspectives that make sense of a problem would necessitate some form of unified and objectively existing entity that could be known. Partial perception, or misperception, implies the existence of some truth that exists apart from those selecting and making sense of a phenomenon. This truth, accessible to Allison, is the conceptual yardstick used to distinguish correct from incorrect perception. Otherness, correspondingly, becomes an epistemological and ontological constant. The discourse of false and true appearances intertwined with this discussion is a specific instance of the appearance-reality binary distinction animating much of Essence of Decision. The 'reality' of a foreign policy problem has an independent existence from the appearances shown to those making sense of it situated within the state.

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<sup>82</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 176.

Allison maintains the same constitutive metaphor of appearance and reality through his discussion of misexpectation, miscommunication<sup>83</sup> and foreign policy 'foul-ups'<sup>84</sup>. Each of the three begs the question of the position from which these claims are made. It is argued that Allison's discourse carves out a subject position for him based on a specific assumption of truth that is derived from security concerns of the state as a single entity. It is this analytical position that enables Allison to articulate a common denominator for his models as a first step in the construction of a comprehensive model of foreign policy explanation. There is a truth signified by a specific foreign policy event; the ramifications of a specific event differ according to bureaucratic position and the peculiar idiosyncrasies of the individual, but the existence of the action is not disputed. The Cuban Missile Crisis is the unifying event, or theme, of the three models. It signifies a particular challenge to the security and sovereignty of the state. All three models seek to explain the occurrence of the crisis, but the 'truth' of its existence apart from those paradigms seeking to explain it, is not interrogated. The problem of the Cuban Missile Crisis is presented as a self-evident and independent truth. Models I, II and III do not describe three different events but trace out three different perspectives on the same unifying theme: insecurity in the international strategic marketplace symbolized by the threat of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Allison's rhetoric of various 'issues' that are perceived in fragments by individuals to construct into foreign policy problems through the processes of

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<sup>83</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>84</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 145.

various bureaucratic games<sup>85</sup> is belied by his metaphor of the collage upon which all of these selected 'events' are chosen by individuals and transformed into issues. One understanding of collage is the juxtaposition of a collection of unrelated things upon a surface.<sup>86</sup> The surface of the discrete 'games' of foreign policy construction is the action referred to by Allison as a foreign policy event. Events are selected by the analyst as relevant to the origination and implementation of a particular foreign policy event. Allison's analytical position, i.e. the surface upon which the discrete positions within the government which is constructed by the analyst, constructs a unity: foreign policy. The surface which gives meaning to the various actions is the implicitly assumed position of the author, the truth of the Other that threatens the existence of the state and which must be policed by various organizations and individuals within the state through the construction of foreign policy. Assumptions of insecurity 'found' by Allison are portrayed as occurring independently from either the artist constructing the collage or the jumble affixed to the surface. Insecurity is the surface which frames Graham T. Allison's collage of the separate and 'unrelated' decisions that produce the political resultant of a foreign policy action, in this case the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Graham Allison's metaphor of the collage assumes the state. His development of the Organizational Processes model works within a specific version of political community that serves as the arena within which various political bargains and games take place. Foreign policy actions are made sense of

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<sup>85</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>86</sup>Victoria Neufeldt, Webster's New World Dictionary of American English, 3rd college ed., (New York: Webster's New World Dictionary, 1988), pp. 273-274.

as “...intranational political resultants...”<sup>87</sup>; Allison unpacks what is meant by the terms political and resultant, but he fails to unpack the implications of ‘intranational’ for his analysis. The parameters of the ‘game’ of political bargaining, that is from the pulling and hauling of various officials with different perspectives, positions and possession of power and influence on any given issue, occur within the vertical and horizontal arrangements of the players. The positions of these players demarcate the government for this model<sup>88</sup> but the relationship between government, state and nation is not articulated by Allison. It can be deduced that Allison creates a model of the state within which, and in behalf of which, the government acts. However, the role that ‘nation’ plays in constructing the political community of the United States is not clear. Graham T. Allison discusses a specific foreign policy event through the assumed lens of a particular political community but he fails to adequately unpack what is meant by his invocation of the United States, or the Soviet Union. The ‘national government’ is portrayed as an entity which exists with little internal logic, except the positions of various individuals framed by a specific box.<sup>89</sup> The collage which unifies the various actors is the representation of the state signified by the box within which the various bureaucratic processes work.

The state’s analytical stickiness is reinforced by four concepts within Essence of Decision. The first is the unexamined assumption of the intranational environment within which the various processes operate, which was touched on

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<sup>87</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>88</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>89</sup> Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 256.

above. Secondly, politics is considered by Allison to be the mechanism by which one foreign policy option is favoured over another. Politics is portrayed as the “...mechanism of choice...”<sup>90</sup> because of the loose coordination of the various overlapping judgments of the individuals dealing with any specific ‘event’. Power is that which equilibrates the political game.<sup>91</sup> Allison defines power as three components, within this model, all of which are derived from the larger entity of the state.<sup>92</sup> Bargaining advantages are derived from formal positions, responsibility and control over resources, and more informal and less legislated criteria such as personal charm, individual expertise on the given issue and so on. All of these advantages are given meaning by the government, and indirectly, the state. It is a governmental forum which empowers the various individuals in the construction of foreign policy actions. The skill in using the framework cannot be legislated but it assumes and works through a specific form of political community. It can be argued that the less formal idiosyncrasies are no less a part of government than the rules and regulations within which bureaucrats act. This formal structure, at a certain level, is activated or realized by discrete individuals. The second element which reinforces the existence of the state is the ‘skill and will’ of those concerned to utilize the bargaining advantages they possess. Again, the skill and will factor occurs within the assumption of the political community embodied by the state. The last factor in the author’s conception of power again

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<sup>90</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>91</sup>Power is defined as “...effective influence on government decision and actions.” Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 168.

<sup>92</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 168-9.

assumes the environment of the government and the state. It is the perception of other players in the bureaucratic politics game of the possession of how any given individual will utilize the first two factors.

Thirdly, the author's reproduction of the state as the primary actor in International Relations is his conceptualization of action-channels which presume the existence of players in positions within the environment of the state. An action channel is defined by Allison as "...a regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue."<sup>93</sup> Action channels can be viewed as the discursive formation of various issues. They are the routines that select the various bureaucratic subjects involved in any foreign policy decision and the discursive practices also distribute the bargaining strengths and weaknesses in the 'game'.<sup>94</sup> These channels also assume the existence of the government and the state border in the construction of foreign policy. The regularized routines and selected players exist within the state and its infrastructure. Third, the rules of the game not only presuppose the existence of the state but help to create the dispersion of power within the state. Rules are not just the explicit legislated regulations but are also more implicit involving cultural predispositions and taboos.<sup>95</sup> The rules of the game establish the power of each position, the action-channel and the various strengths and weaknesses of each player's position on any given issue.<sup>96</sup> Rules also limit the possible range of choices on the issue. They

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<sup>93</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>94</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>95</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, pp. 170-1.

<sup>96</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 170.

structure what options are on the political agenda. Finally, the rules establish the morality and legitimacy of some actions or choices while doing the converse for others.<sup>97</sup>

There is a recurring theme which connects all of these four points: it is the existence of the 'given' foreign policy issue. How this issue is given is not elaborated by Allison. Some of his rhetoric points to the analytical position that perspective determines what is seen, but the points just outlined all invoke the 'issue' as if it were a self-defining and obviously existing entity. It is argued that his assumption of the existence of the state creates the need for an objectively existing foreign policy 'problem'. The two assumptions reinforce one another and define the analytical position that the author continuously slips into.

Allison fails to be explicit about how the various discrete discourses and perspectives which comprise the perspectives of the individuals are constructed into the more or less unified narrative of Model III. In short he fails to account for his own claim to knowledge. According to the author, it is an 'art' to transfer and to reconstruct from various texts, the positions of the bargainers, and the various games played that created a specific output.<sup>98</sup> He alludes to it as a mysterious phenomenon that needs to be made explicit so that others can utilize the appropriate methods. It is my contention that Allison's creation of a unified and certain narrative results from his implicit position that there is a Truth and it can be found out there.

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<sup>97</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>98</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 181.

He seeks the truth about what happened among allegations of faulty memories, the lack of documentary evidence about the various games played, and claims of misperception and miscommunication. Allison again slips into the discourse that constructs a specific and unambiguous reality, even when the subject material of his model would seem to lead him to the conclusion that “where you stand is where you sit”.<sup>99</sup> He seeks one truth among a variety of conflictual perspectives and positions. He is constructing and imposing a Truth derived from his assumption of insecurity both constructed and evidenced in the foreign policy of a rational and unified state.

To sum up, Graham Allison’s argument is subverted by the four themes touched on above. First, Allison’s rhetoric slips easily into discourse that constructs an object of knowledge, insecurity, that is independent of the knowing subject. Secondly, the border between inside and outside that is predicated upon the Other, insecurity, is reproduced within this model and accounts for the unexamined ‘stickiness’ of the state within bureaucratic political games. Third, Allison never unpacks how knowledge is constructed. The position of the author is never elaborated, nor is the explication of the ‘art’ that allows the hermeneutic transfer of the various perspectives and positions of the players to the text of the analyst. Finally, the foreign policy action is the unifying mechanism which is assumed unproblematically by Graham Allison. He never questions the Cuban Missile Crisis as an ‘event’ in the international realm, nor does he interrogate what is meant by the crisis. He speaks of it as if it were a self-evident phenomenon

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<sup>99</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 256.

found outside of the state that must be explained, rather than as something constructed by his analysis.

### **Conclusion**

Ultimately, Graham Allison's models are derived from assumptions about insecurity and attempts to manage the Other. The Other is claimed to exist independently from the analysis 'discovering' it. Allison's final statement on philosophy of science slips into the discourse of partial analyses, which implies that the object of analysis has an independent and objective existence from the knowing subject, both produced by, and discoverable by a 'complete' analysis. Each model manipulates one set of variables, holding others to be constant.<sup>100</sup> The author problematizes the search for a general model, and yet proceeds to do so. The ambivalence in his claims to knowledge are elided by the conception of (in)security bounded by the political community embodied by the state. It is this perspective that allows Graham Allison to unproblematically invoke foreign policy actions and problems as if they occurred and were perceived apart from those that made sense of them.

The logics and assumptions at work within the levels-of-analysis typology are implicitly brought by Graham T. Allison to his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The three models articulated and developed by the author echo, almost

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<sup>100</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 275.

unsettlingly, the triad outlined by various theorists of the typology.<sup>101</sup> The Rational Actor model provides the environment within which the other two models operate. It is the enabling and “permissive cause”<sup>102</sup> of foreign policy outputs, which is privileged in much the same manner as Waltz privileges the international system. Without the state, there would be no foreign policy. Maintenance and policing of the boundaries that separate outside from inside *is* foreign policy. The Bureaucratic Process model can be perceived as analogous to Waltz’s second level-of-analysis, i.e. the state. The various bureaucracies work within the environment established by the ‘black box’ of the unified and sovereign state under investigation. Positions, and the resources, commanded by any single organization are structured by the larger environment, in much the same manner that Waltz’s international system establishes the relative positions of the constituent states. It is the relative positions of the bureaucracies that matter. Within this model, as within the second level, it is the organizations, or the states, that are the explanans of foreign policy outputs, or international relations. The boundaries of the Rational Actor are assumed throughout Allison’s development of his second model, in the same manner that the international system is presumed and reproduced in state-centric explanations of why war occurs in Man, the State, and War. The Organizational Processes model corresponds with the logic of the first level of analysis, the individual. Explanations of foreign policy centering on

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<sup>101</sup> See Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954). J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations”, Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System and Theoretical Essays, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 76-92.

<sup>102</sup> Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p. 234.

the individual are contextualized by assumptions of the bureaucracy or organization within which that individual works, as well as within the parameters of the state within which the organizations operate. Thus, explanations of international relations, as defined by Waltz, that focus on the individual, must take into account the larger circles of first, the state, and second, the interstate system. Allison's focus on the individual in his third model, assumes the borders of the state. Foreign policy becomes, for Allison, a meaningless concept without the borders separating domestic from foreign.

Production of Otherness in Essence of Decision is facilitated by the conceptual division of the object of analysis, i.e. selected threats that trigger foreign policy outputs, from the analytical subject. Foreign policy decisions are predicated upon certain constructions of threat, and of borders. The construction and reproduction of state boundaries, via the discourses of foreign policy, separate not only domestic and foreign, but in a complicated set of logics, also separates the object from the subject of analysis. Simultaneously producing and erasing the division between inside and outside, separates the foreign policy analyst from the threats viewed outside in a fashion eliding the manner in which the pursuit of foreign policy creates that threat. This conceptual move is facilitated by the levels-of-analysis' fragmentation of international 'reality' which is unified, surreptitiously, by a claim to Truth about the threat which is simultaneously constructed. In this instance, the threat embodied by the Cuban Missile Crisis is given an independent ontological status, which provides a universal foundation for the models which the

author articulates. The production of a specific object of knowledge, i.e. the perception and management of a 'threat', occurs within certain assumptions that the author makes about the role that the state plays within the larger system. Allison reproduces assumptions gleaned from the levels-of-analysis typology about the nature of the individual, the state, and the international system. How the individual operates within, and reproduces, the bounded and sovereign entity of the state is unpacked within the text because of the 'lens' of the state utilized by the author. However, what is unarticulated is the assumption about the nature of life between states and is reproduced. The conceptual 'blindness' of the second level prevents, allegedly, the analyst from making claims about the nature of interstate life. Crucially, the second level is derived from the same set of assumptions of anarchy and danger that exist outside of the protective boundaries of the state, and that are simultaneously constructed by the analyst, in a fashion that elides the common foundation which is shared by the two levels: insecurity, in this circumstance, validated by the event known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is the production of this insecurity that is the production of Otherness.

Allison's language about partial models<sup>103</sup> implies that these various paradigms are making sense of something that has an independent existence from the frameworks that make sense and give meaning to various actions and select phenomenon. It is the contention of this chapter that this apparent inconsistency or ambivalence within the text is attributable to Allison's implicit subject position. He makes sense of foreign policy, in fact he assumes it, through the creation of a

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<sup>103</sup>Allison, *Ibid.*, p. 275.

border between inside and outside. All of these models are perceived through the lens of foreign policy. Foreign policy is the phenomenon which has an apparently objective existence that Allison implicitly reproduces. He fails to take seriously his claim that different forms of knowledge construct different objects of knowledge, but he instead proceeds rhetorically, as if the different forms of knowledge were just different windows on the Truth of international insecurity implied in the pursuit of foreign policy. Graham Allison creates and assumes the Other that he purports to discover. His subject position is derived from a specific understanding of the state which necessitates his conceptual blindness about how various foreign policy threats are constructed. In order to maintain the foundation of his analytical position, Allison must reproduce the assumptions about the existence of the state and its borders which are managed by foreign policy discourses. The analytical self of Graham T. Allison becomes the Other that he purports to discover. Allison assumes the universality of the inside of the state in Model I, of specific organizations in Model II and certain forms of individuality in Model III. These are universalized as the mechanism by which all foreign policy actions are created.

## **Decoupling Subject From Object: Robert Jervis and Ambiguity**

An exploration into the category of the individual is the last entry into this interrogation of the levels-of-analysis problematic. Construction of the individual and its Other will be examined specifically through The Logic of Images in International Relations.<sup>1</sup> Robert Jervis creates the Other through his epistemological inquiry into how manipulation and construction of images in international politics is achieved. Jervis traces the construction and maintenance of images by individual states and foreign policy makers working through, and within, the unproblematically reproduced bounded community of the state. He traces how representations are constructed, altered and safeguarded through the manipulation of a variety of techniques which are effectively means of altering the relationship between a signifier and its referent. As with the other two authors, Jervis' thesis is predicated upon a specific understanding of how knowledge claims are produced, about the conventions that structure meaning and interpretations of the various 'signals' and 'indices' occurring in the interstate realm. Within The Logic of Images, the author is explicit about the lack of an 'objective' meaning of the signals and indices; these 'events' must be interpreted by the receiver for their meanings and implications, dictated by various conventions and (pre)understandings.<sup>2</sup> As with both Waltz and Allison, Jervis' explicit

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<sup>1</sup>Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

<sup>2</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

epistemological position is surreptitiously undercut by his own narrative, founded with intentional irony upon the certainty of uncertainty. Jervis' argument can be viewed as a hermeneutic exercise grounded in this assumption, facilitating the belief in a correct and 'true' meaning out 'there' below the images populating the discourse of international communication. The subject of knowledge becomes 'decoupled' from its object. Jervis seems to describe an anarchic realm where images float, disembodied, in the interstices between sovereign states. It becomes the task of the foreign policy actor to accurately uncover the 'real' meaning underneath the surface of the signal and the 'accurate' interpretation and prediction indicated by an index.<sup>3</sup> Rhetoric dealing with how specific images and representations of states are constructed become evaluations of 'true' or 'false' despite Jervis' emphasis on a lack of objective meaning for the individual actors. It would seem that the 'appearance' of varied images obscures the 'reality' discoverable from Jervis' analytical position.

Similarly to Graham T. Allison and Kenneth Waltz, the conceptual slippage of Jervis can be traced to a specific resolution of the universal and the particular embodied in the levels-of-analysis typology. All three enter into the same epistemological dance which leads to the alienation of the subject from the object of analysis. This slippage is particularly disturbing because the explicit focus of Jervis' investigation is the mechanism by which images become decoupled from selected subjects of international politics. Effectively, the author describes a specific form of knowledge production as a form of manipulation and international

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<sup>3</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

power, yet, he fails to apply this insight to his own analytical position. It will be argued that a specific narrative at work in the text prevents Jervis from applying his own insight concerning how the subject and object of knowledge are intertwined to his own analysis. On one hand, Jervis alludes to the various images, i.e. the contexts which give meaning to international relations for the individual actors, as if they occurred apart from his analysis. On the other, the individual subject of foreign policy is portrayed as playing a more constructive role in the production of images in the global scene. There are two, inconsistent, relationships between specific subjects and their objects of knowledge in The Logic of Images, one for Robert Jervis and one for the individual situated within the levels-of analysis classification utilized by Jervis to construct his rendition of global life and political anarchy. The inconsistency can be attributed to two narratives at work within the text. Explicitly, Jervis is constructing an analysis of how images are manipulated in a situation of political anarchy. Implicitly, he is constructing that anarchy, partly, because of his reliance on a specific comprehension of politics and identity that frames his analysis: that of the levels-of-analysis. His reliance on this constructive typology allows him to both discuss the non-immediacy of knowledge, yet, ultimately to rely on a universalist and objectivist position to found his own claims to knowledge.

Potential for epistemological awareness is highlighted by a parallel between Jervis and Michael J. Shapiro, the lack of application of this insight to his own position attests to the conceptual power and persuasiveness of the levels-of-

analysis typology. Jervis' discursus focuses on how specific images and conceptual frameworks are constitutive of actors' interpretations and selections of various phenomena as discrete foreign policy 'events', and how this consequently frames an actor's response to such interpretations by 'grounding' various foreign policy actions, that can be seen as dealing with some of the same themes that pervades Michael Shapiro's work on the politics of representation.<sup>4</sup> According to Jervis, the ability to manipulate images within the international arena is able to be perceived as a substantive dimension of politics.<sup>5</sup> Shapiro, likewise, holds that the representation of certain 'events' reflect specific images held by the interpreter, or by those construing meaning out of a selected phenomenon.<sup>6</sup> Both concur, to a certain extent, that events are not self-evident but require some form of interpretation in order to make some sense or meaning out of whatever phenomenon catches the eye of the international relations analyst or foreign policy maker. The crucial difference between the two thinkers is that Shapiro tends to apply his insights about the relationship between subject and object of analysis to his own position whereas Jervis does not. However, for Jervis and Shapiro and Kenneth Waltz and Graham T. Allison, the subject matter of international relations appears to facilitate a certain degree of hesitancy about the assertion of truth in an allegedly anarchic realm devoid of the Truth carefully manufactured and inscribed

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<sup>4</sup>Michael J. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

<sup>5</sup>Jervis, The Logic of Images, p. xix and pp. 3-4.

<sup>6</sup>Shapiro, "The Problem of Ideology: Locating The Political Analyst/Writer" in The Politics of Representation, pp. 3-54.

within the boundaries of the sovereign state. The lack of certainty and epistemological security to be 'discovered' outside of the boundaries of the state becomes almost a truism, which paradoxically becomes its own truth through the search for security described by Jervis which becomes the manufacture of ambiguity and insecurity in other actors via the image. It is through this process that the anarchic Other is created by Robert Jervis as an allegedly 'discovered' characteristic of international political life. The resolution of the dilemma between epistemological relativism and ontological pluralism offered by the levels-of-analysis typology is founded upon this creation and subsequent discovery of uncertainty alleged to characterize life between states. A specific version of anarchy is reproduced unselfconsciously by Jervis and allows the author to present his findings with the authority of discovered Truth. International political life provides the context, or the framework, of danger and insecurity within which various states must operate. Individuals charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the boundaries of the state against the darkness and evil lurking predatorily outside, work within the parameters of the specific state. It is this series of assumptions that are implicitly reproduced by Jervis. In The Logic of Images, the role that images and conceptions in the pursuit of safety by various foreign policy makers provides the author with the subject material for his explicit narrative. The creation of danger and insecurity which necessitates the hermeneutic excavation of specific images, through an analysis of signals and indices, results from this ontological foundation of insecurity.

Jervis' implicit creation and subsequent 'discovery' of this version of interstate life is enabled by the construction, and resolution, of the universal and the particular within international political life. Construction of this dichotomy is both enabled and facilitated by the implicit utilization of the levels-of-analysis typology. Unification of this typology is predicated upon the universalized ontology of insecurity and danger that a specific lens, peering upon the international political environment, constructs as the Other. It is this manufacture of Otherness, being the sign and the proof of anarchy, that is the self-referential Truth of a specific version of International Relations. Anarchy, i.e. Otherness, systematically is portrayed as the self-referential truth of International Relations. This Truth unifies, and constructs, the particularities of the constructive typology shared by many Realist thinkers. A specific foundation is constructed in opposition to the Otherness lurking outside of the borders of the state.

Jervis' discussion of how various images are produced involves assertions of the lack of a self-evident truth in The Logic of Images through a process constructing a complicated series of epistemological mirrors. This hall of mirrors emphasizes the tension in Jervis' text between epistemological self-awareness and the invocation of a self-evident object of knowledge as a necessary ritual in the manufacture of Truth. The textual possibilities of Jervis maintaining an explicit relationship between the knowing subject and its object of knowledge are undercut by a search for certainty, even if it leads to a manufacture of the truth of uncertainty, the Other, that results from the decoupling of Jervis' subject of

knowledge from its object. This separation leads Jervis to confront what he has created as something both alien and peculiarly reassuring in its intransigence. There is a foundation upon which Robert Jervis can place his knowledge claims. Creating such an Other allows the author to establish the certainty of his text. The ambiguity and uncertainty which are alleged to characterize the interstate arena can be contained in one conceptual category: the Other. Specifically, the Other in Jervis' text takes on the form of insecurity embodied in the anarchic realm. It is this allegedly discovered object that confronts Robert Jervis as an alien and self-evident entity, which is created by the author.

At first glance, it might appear that the epistemology at work in The Logic of Images does not devolve from a specific assumption about the nature of individuality in International Relations. However, when the author's discussion of image production and interpretation in I.R. is viewed as a discursus on representation of specific loci of meaning, then the self-referential deferral from assumptions about individuals to state behaviour to international relations becomes more apparent. The three deferrals made by Jervis reproduce and reinforce the levels-of-analysis classification insidiously. His category of the individual can slide into a certain understanding of the state, and the international realm is characterized by an absence of *both* circumscribed entities. Jervis' continued conflation of the acting subject as state/individual is enabled by the constitutive assumptions derived from the levels-of-analysis and founded upon the conceptual

insecurity and Otherness indicated by the various and contradictory images populating the interstate realm.

Individuality is the lens through which an analysis and simultaneous construction of the state, and the system, is effected because of the peculiar role played by the foreign policy maker in the levels-of-analysis typology. This person both represents the state outside and inside of its boundaries. There is an implicit assumption, within Jervis' text, that the foreign policy maker acts in a unified manner, for a unified entity, thus enabling Bismarck and Germany to become conceptually intertwined.<sup>7</sup> Both 'sovereign' entities are unified, in part, by references to external danger and insecurity that exist beyond the boundaries of the state within the realm of Otherness. It is the role of the individual foreign policy maker, for Jervis, to decipher and to make sense of the various complicated and disparate signals and images and indices existing in the, allegedly, epistemologically relativistic realm of interstate politics. Individuals standing on, and creating, the border, between inside and outside present the external realm to those inside the state by making sense of it for their fellow citizens. Additionally, these individuals also present the realm of the inside of the state to the anarchic realm outside, in fact attempting to create a specific image, in fact to invent, a presence for the individual state outside of its borders in the games of international politics. These individuals effectively create and invoke the boundary between inside and outside upon which international relations is predicated. From a certain

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<sup>7</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 126.

perspective they can be said to create that which defines the state, and makes it meaningful: reliance upon a specific ontological universalism.

This preamble has introduced the general themes of representation, meaning and subjectivity which will be analyzed in the specific context of how Robert Jervis' production of knowledge claims at the level of the individual, results in the manufacture of the Other. The first theme of this chapter is concerned with the contrast between epistemological relativism and ontological universalism which animates the text, and is arguably traceable to the levels-of-analysis typology. The Logic of Images is characterized by two narratives. One explicitly demonstrates the lack of Truth underneath the images found in the realm between states. The second implicitly creates the Truth upon which this text is founded: the Truth of insecurity and the subsequent danger that this entails. Secondly, it will be argued that the binary opposition, between universalism and relativism, which animates the text is facilitated by the levels-of-analysis typology and its creation of a specific form of individuality. Specifically, it will be shown how Jervis creates what he purports to discover. Jervis' discussion of the means of manufacturing and protecting various images within the international arena, involves a concomitant manufacture of ambiguity and uncertainty about the content of various messages being sent and how they are to be interpreted. This manufacture of ambiguity results in the creation of a specific version of the insecurity problematic which the manipulation of images was designed to offset. Paradoxically, Jervis creates insecurity in his search for security.

### **Coupling and Decoupling: Pursuit of Image**

Robert Jervis' argument is explicitly centered around how various images are created, manipulated and sustained within the international arena. According to Jervis, international images are fed by two streams. The first are the 'indices', or the allegedly nonmanipulable signifiers, which are selected by the interpreting actor for the purposes of ascertaining more reliable information about the other state.<sup>8</sup> Such information is believed by the perceiver to be so intertwined with the other "...actor's capabilities or intentions"<sup>9</sup> that prediction about the other's behaviour can be derived from the allegedly obvious interpretation facilitated by the index. Behaviour is chosen by the interpreter as an index because it is believed beyond the control of the observed actor. Examples of indices include a baseball pitcher indicating the next pitch to the batter by her mannerisms just before releasing the ball<sup>10</sup> or a lie-detector test in which the subject is not able to control his or her response.<sup>11</sup> Indices considered to be under the control of the actor, yet serving as reliable sources of information and prediction about the monitored actor, are interpreted through the conceptual framework of a cost-benefit analysis. Incurring a cost, by undertaking a certain action that would overwhelm any

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<sup>8</sup>Jervis, The Logic of Images, pp. 18-19.

<sup>9</sup>Jervis, Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>10</sup>Jervis, Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>11</sup>Jervis, Ibid., p. 27.

possible gains to be achieved, would be accepted as an index because Jervis assumes that actors' actions are predicated upon a desire to maximize benefits and minimize costs. Examples of this type of index include a state engaging in a costly war to reinforce the image that the state possesses a stern resolve or a suicide from a politician charged with corruption.<sup>12</sup> Effectively indices are selected because they are believed, by the actor, to access the 'reality' of other actors' positions. In the rendition of anarchy constructed by Jervis, indices are considered the only potentially secure signifiers in this arena of danger, Otherness.

Signals are the second stream of information which feed the construction of images according to Robert Jervis' theory of meaning and representation. Signals, unlike indices, are viewed as intrinsically manipulable. That which is interpreted from various signals is determined by existing conventions and expectations held by the parties concerned. A signal can take the form of either a specific action or a verbal message.<sup>13</sup> Signals are sent in an attempt to alter, modify or create an image for the recipient's perception of the sender.<sup>14</sup> Robert Jervis conveys two important assumptions in his explication and development of the 'signal' concept. Firstly, in an allegedly pluralistic and politically anarchic system, the 'truth' value of the representations being manufactured by various states is not assumed. Given Jervis' assumption and reproduction of the distinction between government inside the state, and anarchy outside of its protective walls, there is no guarantee that given signals reflect 'truth' in a realm

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<sup>12</sup>Jervis, Ibid., pp. 28-29.

<sup>13</sup>Jervis, Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>14</sup>Jervis, Ibid., p. 18.

characterized by a lack of enforcement.<sup>15</sup> The author makes the unconscious leap that statements can more likely be relied upon as truth when uttered within the protective walls of the state. Signals issued in an anarchic realm must be interpreted differently because of the construction of insecurity reproduced by Jervis. Secondly, Jervis assumes that there is a truth underlying the image, and it is part of the receiver's task to do a hermeneutic excavation of the signal in an effort to discover the 'accurate' image of the signaling state. Jervis' quest for certainties in the interstate realm is pursued despite the assumption Jervis makes about the over-riding characteristic of international life, that of anarchy and a peculiar form of epistemological relativism paralleling the levels-of-analysis typology. In such a realm there is no basis upon which to anchor truth statements, rather, there is a series of multiple perspectives that has not been, nor cannot be, contained within a larger unifying category of truth and identity. These various truths are contested and quite often contradictory, however, in the allegedly anarchic realm the criteria from which to evaluate such multiple truths remains elusive. Tension between Jervis' two forms of epistemological claims can be traced, in part, to the author's search for such a foundation upon which to anchor his text while attempting to describe and analyze how various perspectives compete for validity in the interstices within states. This ambivalence can be traced to the specific construction of international political life engendered by the levels-of-analysis construction of international life.

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<sup>15</sup>"Signals, then, can be thought of as promissory notes. They do not contain inherent credibility. They do not, in the absence of some sort of enforcement system, provide their own evidence that the actor will live up to them." Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 18.

The tension within The Logic of Images between two different frameworks for articulating knowledge claims can be illustrated through Jervis' discussion of how different phenomena are selected as signals and indices. Signals are interpreted at two discrete levels,<sup>16</sup> neither level or dimension of interpretation is self-evident. First, the receiver of the perceived signal has to decide what is being signified by the selected phenomenon. Secondly, the truthfulness or accuracy of the signal is evaluated for foreign policy purposes. Cognitive frameworks and the international conventions surrounding the discourses of representation and meaning between states structure how an 'event' is selected as a signal. Signals occur within specific cognitive structures; they do not occur in a vacuum and are not self-evident. The explicitness of the first interpretive move can be perceived as supporting the self-conscious epistemology advocated by Shapiro. The creation of both the knowing subject and the object of knowledge is made evident through the acknowledgment of the specific discourses which structure meaning. It is the second hermeneutic move, which undercuts the potential of avoiding the crucial conceptual separation between subject and object, that reproduces discourses of absolute truth and verity through its constitutive metaphor of surface and depth. It is also this discourse which Jervis explicitly ties to the manufacture of foreign policy because it provides a clue as to how another state will act.<sup>17</sup> Expectations of other states' behaviours becomes a foundation for articulating foreign policy possibilities. Within Jervis' narrative, foreign policy agendas can be seen as

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<sup>16</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 24-5 and p. 119.

<sup>17</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 25.

evolving from judgments about what representations populating the international realm are true, reflecting the underlying reality, and false, where appearance and reality do not coincide. Again, the surface-depth metaphor can be traced to the levels-of analysis analysis of Singer and Waltz. Each 'level' allegedly offers a discrete window upon, or construction of, International Relations, yet they are all founded upon a specific assumption of insecurity, the Other. Despite Jervis' explicit lip-service to a self-conscious epistemology, his assumptions about the certainty of uncertainty undercut his narrative.

As with signals, the selection and interpretation of indices is a contentious procedure. There is no obvious category of meaning to automatically be linked with an index. Interpretation of indices is a contested process that can be viewed as a complex intertwining of the selection of the phenomenon and attaching meaning to it. An index is chosen because it is believed to be an accurate gauge of an other actor's intentions and capabilities<sup>18</sup> thus providing a mechanism for predictions to be made about the actor's future behaviour.<sup>19</sup> Indices are selected because they are either beyond the control of the actor being scrutinized, or else because the actor seems unaware that the selected phenomenon is being observed.<sup>20</sup> Effectively, an index is believed to signal foreign policy 'reality'. Two considerations problematize faith in an index's access of the certainty sought by the foreign policy maker on behalf of the state. First, what is considered to be an

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<sup>18</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>19</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>20</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 27.

index is not immutable.<sup>21</sup> It can change because the monitored actors discover an aspect of his or her behaviour is being utilized as a source of information or because the discourses dictating meaning alter. As with signals, meaning attached to a specific index is not self-evident, rather it is selected by whatever conceptual framework is utilized to perceive and to make sense of the phenomenon. From this consideration arises the second complicating factor: evaluation of specific behaviours via an index is not a constant because the way behaviours are manifested change.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the selection and interpretation of indices is a tangled textual process in which the selection of the index and what it means cannot easily be conceptually separated. Choice of an index is inextricably intertwined with evaluations about how certain behaviours are expected to be manifested within the international arena. The selection and interpretation of indices is a practice that is not divisible. Jervis is drawn into understating the interconnection between referent and meaning. His explicit narrative, that links meaning, phenomena and interpretation, in what can be read as a constructive discourse for the foreign policy actor, is belied by the implicit assertion of certainty and ontological universalism founding his own analytical position.

Within Jervis' version of International Relations, representation becomes an important factor in both selecting and making sense of 'events'. To a certain extent, conceptual frameworks become politicized within The Logic of Images, in a fashion echoing some of the themes in Michael Shapiro's work. Articulations of

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<sup>21</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>22</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 42.

'reality' are not unquestioningly accepted because of the ambiguity surrounding the question of what various indices *mean*, for Jervis, within the context of epistemological relativism in a condition of political anarchy. What Jervis refers to as the protection and maintenance of images can be viewed as a specific instance of Shapiro's project "...to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking"<sup>23</sup> and the representations facilitated by specific ways of making sense of the world. Categories of thought enable certain actions and preclude others from being articulated as a possibility.<sup>24</sup> The self-conscious construction and protection of images by foreign policy actors discussed by Robert Jervis brings into play issues of power and representation providing some of the animating tension in Jervis' text. Jervis does not claim that there is a direct relationship between images and actions, but investigates the possibility that images have a constitutive impact on policy formulation.<sup>25</sup> Thus, an ability to alter or to construct specific images in order to achieve certain policy goals can be viewed as another dimension of international power which would seem to undercut the utility of his distinction between signals and indices.<sup>26</sup>

Before proceeding, a few remarks further unpacking what is meant by the animating epistemological tension of The Logic of Images should be made for clarity's sake. The two, apparently contradictory, types of claims to knowledge

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<sup>23</sup>Michael Shapiro, "Representing World Politics: The Sport/War Intertext" in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, eds., International / Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, (Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 71.

<sup>24</sup>Shapiro, *Ibid.*, pp. 71-2.

<sup>25</sup>Jervis, The Logic of Images, p. 11.

<sup>26</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 3.

are not weighted equally. Preeminence is given to the hermeneutic search for Truth assumed to be underlying the appearances of the multiple and contested images, rather than taking more seriously implications of the author's own knowledge claims which undercut and destabilize much of the substance of his explicit argument:

The subject of this book is a little-discussed aspect of international politics, the ways states can affect the images others have of them and thereby exercise influence without paying the high cost of altering their own major policies.<sup>27</sup>

At one level, Jervis' discussion of the manufacture of images as a foreign policy tool implies that the representations of the state and its foreign policy makers is a mask covering a deeper 'reality' of the various actors' beliefs, perceptions and goals. Correspondingly, much of the text engages in this narrative. However, the 'explicit' narrative is problematized by the subversive tension outlined above. Much of the constitutive metaphors utilized by Waltz in his discussions of how various and multiple images are manipulated and created, emphasize the ontological connection between subject and object. Although Jervis does privilege a hermeneutics of discovery over an analysis of the production of multiple truths, part of this text's analytical interest lies with investigating the awkwardness of the juxtaposition of the two epistemologies and tracing it to two different analytical dynamics. The hermeneutics of discovery, the search for the 'correct' truth underlying the appearance of the constructed images, frames Jervis' narrative

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<sup>27</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 3.

constructing the terms of comprehension between interstate actors. Jervis' hermeneutic move can be read as an attempt to contain and to minimize such potentially subversive dynamics and to assert a universal truth upon which would found his text. The Logic of Images can be read as a specific example of International Relations as a discipline. And, it can be interpreted as a cut into a body of literature which is animated by such awkward and contradictory interconnections devolving from the attempt to analyze, simultaneously, politics both inside and outside the borders of the state utilizing the lens of the individual foreign policy maker structured by the assumptions and expectations of the levels-of-analysis typology.

A specific example of such an awkward pairing of the two epistemological streams animating The Logic of Images, can be located in Robert Jervis' discussion of signals. The hermeneutics of discovery, which 'founds' what emerges as the dominant epistemological narrative, frames Jervis' more subversive subtext that deals with how various conventions of meaning are constructed and reproduced in a manner that can be read as an attempt to control the implications of how images are constructed and controlled. A reading of the possibilities of comprehension within the international arena illustrates how the two different types of claims to knowledge are intertwined in Jervis' discourse. One deals with power, representation and implies a form of epistemological relativity of the images and perspectives created in the international realm, and the other reproduces the separation of subject and object, creating the Other that is allegedly

‘discovered’ through the hermeneutics of discovery and an ontological universalism. The first stream constructs its assumption of relativity out of two key statements. One is that the realm of the conventions and cognitive frameworks are “...one of those cases where what actors believe to be true is true.”<sup>28</sup> The second key statement constructing the second epistemological dynamic reinforces the importance of relativity in the beliefs of the actors. Given that common interpretations of signals and indices require some form of commonality, some mutually defined truth, the condition of anarchy does not translate into a situation in which this common bonding can occur. The international environment is not allegedly conducive to constructing such a common bond that transcends the particularity of each actors’ perspective. Reasons for this are given by Jervis as the lack of central authority, i.e. anarchy, only a few “...lasting traditions...”<sup>29</sup> and not a great many shared experiences. It shall be argued in this chapter, however, that the one constitutive experience or tradition that both characterizes the international arena and the conventions which frame interpretations and selections of both signals and indices is the Other created by Jervis. This Other is the condition of insecurity and uncertainty produced by the various actors producing images and framing indices in a condition of anarchy. No actor can be sure of another actor, not even what is being signaled or interpreted as an index. It is this truth that founds the author’s hermeneutics of discovery, and it is this truth that he paradoxically creates while attempting to

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<sup>28</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 139.

<sup>29</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 140.

'discover' it. Jervis' main textual argument is allegedly that images can be read as a form of power utilized by actors to disguise their intentions and to protect their positions of power and reputation within the international realm, thus reproducing the primary hermeneutic epistemology. However, the means by which Jervis attempts to describe a specific version of symbolic anarchy creates his object of knowledge. The signals are alleged to be either true or false representations of the reality that lies underneath their politicized narrative. By attempting, rather unsuccessfully, to decouple the conventions for how meanings are constructed between the various foreign policy actors from the 'reality' of international politics below, the author creates his anarchic Other. Robert Jervis creates this object of knowledge by decoupling the signals from the signifier, by attempting to confine the relativistic subtext within the hermeneutics of discovery, so the signal becomes transformed, in a specifically constructed condition of anarchy, into an alien Other that becomes this particular form of anarchy. It is this tension between the two epistemological narratives, and the attempted resolution of them, that results in Otherness: the truth which founds Jervis' analysis of images, their creation and international politics.

Structures enabling the construction of signals, and that correspondingly affect the representations of the images in the international environment, belie Jervis' claim that in an anarchic realm there is a lack of enforcement of the 'truth' of signals issued.<sup>30</sup> What is comprehended by the receiver, i.e. how a signal is made sense of, is dictated by certain discourses of understanding and

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<sup>30</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 21.

comprehension that *do* exist in the allegedly ‘anarchic’ arena of international politics. Signals are not issued in a conceptual vacuum, to do so would be to invite absolute noncomprehension. Conceptual frameworks and specific contexts give meaning to signifiers.<sup>31</sup> Nor do signals act as unproblematic signifiers for an ‘obvious’ referent. There is not a one-to-one correspondence between signal and meaning. Signals are interpreted and contested entities.<sup>32</sup> Again, this narrative at work in The Logic of Images destabilizes the foundation, the anarchy and insecurity created by Jervis, through his hermeneutic excavation and simultaneous creation of the Other.

Jervis’ articulation of the manufacture of specific images can be read as an attempt to alter representations. Manipulation of images, whether by coupling or decoupling them, can be perceived as an attempt to interfere with the economy of signifiers. This realm of image/appearance is portrayed as floating ‘above’ the reality of various actor’s intentions, politics and capabilities. In a complicated knot of philosophical concepts and assumptions, Robert Jervis’ narratives attempt to control the subversive potential of his articulation and analysis of the construction and maintenance of various images by actors in the international arena. His attempt to discipline the rhetoric which destabilizes and calls into question some of his constitutive assumptions is an attempt to frame the narrative concerning the construction of images within the binary distinction of appearance and reality. The production of images is elided into the realm of ‘appearance’

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<sup>31</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 20-1.

<sup>32</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 115.

which covers and obscures the ‘reality’ of what is *actually* intended, thought and believed by various foreign policy actors.

Jervis’ argument assumes and, rather unproblematically, reproduces, a constitutive distinction between what is true and what is not. There is no other alternative. Jervis reproduces a rhetorical move analogous to Michel Foucault’s ‘blackmail of the enlightenment’.<sup>33</sup> The ‘truth’ which serves as the foundation for Robert Jervis’ text, the lack of security, the danger, which threatens each and every state from the international environment, is framed in such a manner that leads the reader to the absolute rejection or acceptance of the premise that the realm between sovereign states is characterized by anarchy. Jervis’ dominant narrative purports to ‘discover’ an anarchic situation within which one of the only certainties is uncertainty and fear.

Robert Jervis’ blackmail, which attempts to force the reader into ascribing into the realm either of image or of the ‘reality’ hidden by various representations and assertions by foreign policy actors in the international political realm, is destabilized by his second epistemological current. The apparently absolute dichotomy of anarchy/insecurity and state/security is fractured by the other level of discourse within The Logic of Images. By linking image, appearance, to actions, the reality of foreign politics in an ambiguous and somewhat confusing manner, Jervis unwittingly opens space for other possibilities to be articulated. The interconnection between image and foreign policy action is not a direct and linear

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<sup>33</sup>Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds., Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look, (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 167-8.

relationship.<sup>34</sup> According to Jervis, images have an impact on foreign policy production. An important part of the “psychological environment”<sup>35</sup> is the framework of preconceptions and expectations<sup>36</sup> that constructs and enables one actor to signal to another foreign policy actor, and establishes the framework in which indices are interpreted and foreign policy actions undertaken. Components of this constitutive discourse can be inferred from what Jervis describes as restraints on lying. In the anarchic arena invoked by Jervis, restraints are not imposed by some higher authority but are structured by the dictates of survival in an anarchic realm. Nevertheless, what is entailed by anarchy is a contested concept within his text. Reliance upon certain discourse for communication and ‘restraints on lying’ imply that there is a community outside of the boundaries defined by each state.

The description and creation of this psychological community by Robert Jervis destabilizes the absoluteness of the dichotomy between anarchy and sovereignty that, in part, structures his text. This is achieved by creating some linkages and continuities between life within and without the borders of the state. The line created between the two becomes blurry rather than an absolute. It is an attempt to control this potentially destabilizing narrative that leads Robert Jervis to ascribe to a rigid dichotomy between truth and falsehood, and between sovereignty and anarchy. As the binary distinction is shored up by the author, the

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<sup>34</sup>Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, p. 9.

<sup>35</sup>Jervis defines the psychological environment as “...beliefs about the world and other actors.” Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>36</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 222-3.

category of the Other appears more and more alien and foreboding. The attempt to privilege the hermeneutics of discovery and to suppress his rhetoric about how connections are constructed and formed, which challenge his constitutive conceptualization of truth, not only creates an Other but also jeopardizes his own logical connections. What Jervis attempts to minimize as an aside, or as unimportant, becomes crucial for his text to maintain a certain logic. He requires assumptions about conventions and conceptual frameworks, otherwise the entire concept of interstate communication becomes an almost impossible task.

Communication between interstate actors would likely be close to impossible if there were no shared understandings. Structures of the 'community' existing in the realm between sovereign states include many factors. All of the restraints placed upon various actors from issuing lies in the emission of specific signals can be read as an indication of a trans-state community which exists in the realm of anarchy, insecurity and danger.<sup>37</sup> According to the author, these restraints or pressures act upon various actors so that signals do more likely indicate future behaviour.<sup>38</sup> Also, these discourses discipline communication within the international realm and are touched upon by Jervis within the framework of truth and nontruth as an anchor between the realm of image and the realm of reality.

An alternative reading of these constructive discourses traces how these international societal dynamics construct Jervis' anarchy. The dichotomy between

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<sup>37</sup>Classifications of these restraints include moral restraints, having an interest in the current status quo of the system, an interest in changing the international environment, domestic or internal restraints, and the impetus to maintain a certain reputation for intentionally issuing inaccurate signals. Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 70-82.

<sup>38</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 70.

universalism and relativism is a peculiar one, because a statement of relativism is, in fact a universalist position. This is the position embodied within the typology of the levels-of-analysis recreated surreptitiously by Jervis. He is not explicit about some assumptions he makes, perhaps because they have become so naturalized as to appear self-evident. The condition of relativism and apparent lack of shared meaning and goals perceived by Robert Jervis, is the danger and threat that he constructs at the border of the state; in this instance it is the individual foreign policy maker who is guarding the gate of assured meaning and attempting to decipher for her fellow citizens. 'Reality' can only be viewed within the borders of the state, because competing images in the interstate realm obscure rather than reveal. The role of the foreign policy maker is twofold. It is one of (re)presentation, both inside and outside of the state, and it is one of hermeneutic excavation.

To repeat some key themes, Robert Jervis attempts to discipline the problematizing impact that the narrative of image production could have upon the hermeneutics of discovery, which provides the foundation of his textual analysis, and subsequent creation of the Other, by containing the narrative of image production within the dichotomy of appearance and reality. This rhetorical move is accomplished by evaluating images within the framework of truth and falsehood. He argues, at this level, that images are smoke and mirrors utilized in a search for security within the international environment, which apparently has a limited impact upon the 'reality' of international politics because the two are discretely

separated. In this vein, he attempts to evaluate the veracity of specific images.<sup>39</sup> However, Jervis' textual epistemological inconsistencies are manifested when, the author also makes the claim of relevance for his work based on an assumption that images and foreign policy 'realities' do have a constitutive connection.<sup>40</sup> This claim reflects the second, epistemological, narrative that destabilizes the dichotomy into which Jervis attempts to frame it. Images can be viewed as the concepts by which phenomena are transformed into international politics,<sup>41</sup> in a complicated dynamic in which, what Kant called the 'noumenal' is transformed into the phenomenal,<sup>42</sup> or what is comprehended by the actors.

To unpack the epistemological ambivalence that streams through The Logic of Images requires an examination of some of the implications of his textual maneuvers. At one level, Jervis reads the discourses of image production as an attempt by the individual foreign policy actor to minimize insecurity in order to make the state's position within the international environment more secure. Given the implied assumption by Jervis that the only certainty in the international arena is uncertainty about what is being signaled,<sup>43</sup> states can never be assured of the intentions and potential threats posed by other states and actors. Therefore, signals must be treated with a healthy skepticism and distrust<sup>44</sup>, and indices carefully interpreted in an attempt to avoid deception of the perceiver. The

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<sup>39</sup>Jervis, "Signals and Lies", *Ibid.*, pp. 66-85, especially, pp. 66-70.

<sup>40</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>41</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>42</sup>Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans., J.M.D. Meiklejohn, (London: Everyman's Library, 1988).

<sup>43</sup>Jervis, The Logic of Images, p. xviii.

<sup>44</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 140.

dynamics of this investigation can be read as an alteration of the relationship between a signal and its signifier: a process that Jervis calls coupling and decoupling. This discourse can be viewed as an attempt by the emitter to maximize the ambiguity about various actors' intentions in an attempt to increase their bargaining power relative to other international actors as an attempt to increase state power and security. Alternatively, it can be viewed as an attempt to minimize insecurity by the sender as an attempt to maximize their security in the realm of anarchy.

Robert Jervis' discussion of the technique separating signals from their referents and reattaching them to other meanings<sup>45</sup> is enabled by the discontinuity between the two narrative streams which characterize his text and facilitated by the resolution of these streams in the levels-of-analysis typology. Objectification of various conceptual frameworks, and the attempt to manipulate them in a conscious and highly politicized effort, leads Jervis inevitably down the path of universal ontology to the Other. The rationale for the relative ease of redefining signals within an anarchic realm is that, rather than the discourse within which interstate actors engage in be characterized as a great degree of "...common experience, traditions, or prominence..."<sup>46</sup>, it is regarded as a relatively superficial arrangement or agreement *found* among a relatively small number of relevant actors.<sup>47</sup> Logically, there should be less inertia, or inflexibility in the international system of communication. However, the author fails to make the link the

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<sup>45</sup> Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 139-173.

<sup>46</sup> Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>47</sup> Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 140-1.

constitutive effect of the relationship between the subjects and their objects of communication they engage. Jervis' failure to conceptualize the discourses which give rise to both the subjectivity of the sovereign individual and the networks of meaning within which they are enmeshed allows him to confront the images produced by the individuals acting on the borders of the states as an object to be tinkered with, as one purely in the realm of image with minimal, if any, relevance to international politics except as a smokescreen. Allegedly, in anarchy there is no agency to enforce a specific frame of interpretation upon the constituent units of the international system.<sup>48</sup> Nor, is there to be assumed a common unifying interest which could provide an allegedly necessary foundation for group cohesion. However, Jervis' logic points to another unifying characteristic, one which he creates but that confronts his actors as an alien and awful entity: the Other. Insecurity is the common shared experience of those in an alleged condition of anarchy. The greater the emphasis that Jervis places upon the lack of shared perspectives, the relativity of knowledge claims within the international arena, the more he relies on a specific conception of anarchy upon which to found his claims. The more he tries to minimize a lack of shared tradition, the more that lack of shared tradition or perspective becomes assigned to all of the actors in the international environment, and the more it becomes a defining feature of that environment. The more Jervis emphasizes epistemological relativism, the more his position becomes founded upon its defining Other: ontological universalism.

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<sup>48</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 3.

It is this theoretical maneuvering that leads Jervis to proceed from two conflicting epistemological narratives to a discussion of how foreign policy actors, because of the condition of anarchy, have the "...freedom to establish the meaning of signals..."<sup>49</sup> achieved in one of two ways. The first is the coupling of a signifier to a new meaning, i.e. creating a new convention. Examples of this would include actor A making clear to state B, that a specific action would be interpreted as a hostile move. State A effectively, leaves B with only two choices. Either B can proceed with the behaviors and be considered hostile by A, and risk resulting repercussions, or B can abandon that action.<sup>50</sup> Coupling is the issuing of a signal which results in getting a specific action intertwined with a previously unrelated meaning. Decoupling is defined as the converse of the above. It is the emission of a signal so that a previously assigned meaning is divided from its referent. An example of decoupling could be convincing others that the conditions under which a certain obligation is owed, have not been fulfilled.<sup>51</sup> The crucial advantage of this strategy, if it is successful, is that an actor would be able to remove itself from various agreements without incurring the reputation as a shirker.<sup>52</sup>

Coupling and decoupling indices are predicated upon the same epistemologically relative logic stated above, although the techniques are slightly different. Indices are, by definition, not as manipulable as signals. Their appeal lies in the belief Jervis alleges to exist among international actors that indices are

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<sup>49</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>50</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 144.

<sup>51</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>52</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 158-9.

indices because they are believed to be beyond the realm of manipulation.<sup>53</sup> An analysis of Jervis' discussion of indices reveals the same two epistemological currents that permeate the rest of his text. At one level, Jervis discusses how indices must be framed and interpreted in order to be made sense of: they are not self-evident concepts.<sup>54</sup> The process of interpretation involves both the selection and the simultaneous interpretation of the selected phenomenon. An index cannot be chosen without reference to its intrinsic value as a yardstick for developing expectations about other states behaviour. An attempt to alter the implications derived from the index involves an attempt to reframe it or to recontextualize it by offering alternate explanations.<sup>55</sup> Decoupling an index would involve an attempt to explain why the usual implications of a specific event, word, or action does not apply in this special circumstance. Coupling an index to a new referent would involve the plausible contextualization of why a specific behaviour now has these consequences. Manipulation of indices is the 'decoupling' of the signal from the referent or the attachment of a signal to a 'new' referent; this process is derived from Robert Jervis' attempt to suppress the implications of his narrative about the relativity of truths and images by containing it within the privileged epistemology of appearance and reality facilitated by his ontological universalism. As appearance, it matters less what signals are paired with which referent, than the 'reality' which underlies the economy of signifiers. It would appear that the only

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<sup>53</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 27-8.

<sup>54</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 174 and p. 224.

<sup>55</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 174-5.

concern is the truth and danger of insecurity that characterizes the 'reality' of international politics.

Ambiguity is created by Robert Jervis as the result of the same peculiar epistemological dynamic which facilitates some of the oscillating epistemologies that can be said to characterize his claims to knowledge. Ambiguity can be claimed to be a result of the search for security, necessitated by the alleged condition of anarchy and insecurity said to prevail in that dangerous realm between the boundaries of states. If signals or indices are framed in an ambiguous manner, or uttered in a similar vein, then the emitting state is better able to confuse and mystify its competitors with smoke and mirrors. It is also to better carve out more options because it is less likely to be amenable to predictions.<sup>56</sup> If the receiver is unsure of what has been signaled or communicated, then, the signaling actor has thwarted the forming of certain expectations and the assignment of certain connotations to various activities of the actor. According to Jervis, pursuit of ambiguity aids in the taming of the insecurity found outside the state borders, by encouraging actors to issue semantically ambiguous statements. The response would dictate how the originating actor could respond, and thus help the actor to gain more control in certain situations.<sup>57</sup>

Within Jervis' text the creation of ambiguity is alleged to be confined within the realm of appearance, with little impact on the 'realities' of international politics. An attempt to protect one actor's image would result in the illusion of

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<sup>56</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>57</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 125.

power which may or may not translate into 'actual' international political power. And, yet, this attempt to confine the 'reality' of politics into something that occurs 'below' the exchange of images ignores the constitutive effect of various cognitive conventions of how states perceive and respond to various stimuli. Effectively, the author's ultimate reliance upon the ontological position embodied in his rendition of the levels-of-analysis typology, conceptually blinds him to the manner in which he undercuts his own logic. Within Jervis' discussion of ambiguity, the two epistemological narratives are at work in this often contradictory fashion. Jervis' reliance on the protection of an international actor's image as an important component in international political power<sup>58</sup> would seem to transcend the dichotomy between appearance and reality. If an image structures other competing actors' perceptions of one's strength, capabilities, and resolve, a tenet that Jervis would seem to agree to,<sup>59</sup> then, protecting one's image can be viewed as an investment in international political power. Jervis slips into this assumption of the relationship between image and power because of the tactical utility of ambiguous statements in a 'noisy' communicative environment. Jervis seems to equate a lack of commitment and maximizing of one's flexibility until the other actor's intentions are made more clear as an important survival skill in an anarchical situation.<sup>60</sup>

However, Jervis seems to overlook the connection that he described between images and international politics. If everyone perceived that one of the

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<sup>58</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>59</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>60</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 118-9.

few successful mechanisms for survival in a realm characterized by insecurity and danger was taking more often than not, an ambiguous position both semantically, and with respect to what the understood message was meant to accomplish politically, then ambiguity and uncertainty of what was communicated and intended by the other actors within the environment would lead to the expectation of an uncertain realm. Insecurity about what could be the bases of others' intentions might lead to a situation in which fear and uncertainty becomes the working 'image' of the international political arena. If expectations become reality in the construction and interpretation of signals<sup>61</sup>, then the expectation of insecurity and uncertainty because one would never be sure of the intentions of others, could lead to an expectation that anarchy was characterized by insecurity and danger. Images become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Construction of this Other: this image of anarchy, the environment in which all sovereign states operate, is facilitated by the epistemological ambivalence which is at play throughout The Logic of Images in International Relations and the levels-of-analysis classification which can be argued as the source of this confusion. By simultaneously affirming and denying the constitutive impact of conceptual framework of the 'real' politics of state survival and security, Jervis constructs a conceptual aporia within which the Other, insecurity, can be placed and forgotten. He can then enter into a politics of forgetting, in this case the conventional nature of both truth and language is discarded in the search for a secure foundation upon which to anchor his text. Jervis creates the Other by an epistemological sleight-of-hand involving

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<sup>61</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 139.

the separation of the author's position from the object of knowledge and simultaneous denial of the relationship between the two.

There are other conceptual aporias about the role that images play within international politics that should be briefly raised. Are images a unified constructed phenomena, or are they multifaceted or alleged to be consistent? Jervis never unpacks specifically what an image is, other than the articulation of some form of conceptual framework involved in a contested relationship to the realities of international politics. Similarly, Jervis fails to unpack what is meant by the various international actors he so freely invokes. Who constructs the images? Whom are they constructed for? Who interprets the indices? And again, who decides what qualifies as an index? Robert Jervis fails to unpack who is the acting subject in his version of international politics. It will next be argued that the individual is the acting subject within The Logic of Images in International Relation, although the issue is never explicitly unpacked by Jervis.

### **Individuality and Sovereignty**

Jervis' use of 'the actor' as a concept that implies some form of subjectivity appears to oscillate between two allegedly sovereign entities: the individual and the state. Both entities are predicated upon the foundation of anarchy which is portrayed as the over-riding condition of international life.

Jervis' invocations of the actor fluctuate between the units, the individuals, and the system into which they are placed, the state. Given the context of the levels-of-analysis problematic, which attempts to make sense of international relations through an oscillation between the system and the subsystem at different levels,<sup>62</sup> Jervis' text would seem a particularly fruitful example of how to investigate the dynamics of the heuristic device and an investigation into how the micro and the macro are mutually constitutive. It will be illustrated that although the individual is the privileged actor within Robert Jervis' theory of international politics, and that an understanding of the individual is crucial to the textual construction of images and perception, the peculiar qualities ascribed to the individual of this analysis, the foreign policy maker, construct both the state and anarchy through the discourse of creating the boundary between inside and outside. The state is assumed by Jervis as the context within which individuals act; it is not an explicitly examined or investigated concept. The author deals with the perceptions of individuals and, at times, surreptitiously conflates the individual foreign policy maker or analyst with the state because of the twofold task of representation charged to the select group of individuals within the realist framework. It can be also argued that, at a certain level, the concept of the individual is the constitutive metaphor for Jervis' understanding of the state. Jervis makes the same claims about each type of actor seeking to minimize international insecurity, and it is this conceptual move that allows him to conflate both the individual and the state

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<sup>62</sup>J. David Singer, "The Levels-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-78.

under the category of the 'actor' who seeking to maximize its security in an allegedly anarchic realm.

Furthermore, it will be argued that the ease with which Robert Jervis slips between articulations of the individual and state, as the prime subject in international politics, is partly due, to the author's reproduction of the assumption of a specific fundamental and constitutive role of the state in defining and articulating theories of International Relations. The levels-of-analysis schema which produces the I.R. discourse analyzed within this thesis, requires a specific theory of the state. The state is reproduced, within Jervis' analysis, as an entity within, and on whose behalf, individuals act. From a certain perspective, as alluded to above, given assumptions about the state acting in a realm of danger and Otherness, Jervis' individual is enabled to act both on behalf of the unified community, and simultaneously reproducing it: the state and the individual constitute each other on the shared foundation of the 'discovery' of the Other. Foreign policy makers, the focus of Jervis' analysis, can be read as reproducing and reaffirming a specific politics of exclusion that separates the inside of the state, the realm of community, from the outside, the realm of anarchy. Reading Jervis through the organizing device of the levels-of-analysis, reveals how each of the three levels support and help to construct the other two.

Specifically, the oscillation by Jervis between the conceptual levels of the individual and the state reflects the mutual construction of these concepts within a specific rendition of global politics. Jervis' articulation and development of the

individual within I.R. discourse requires a theory of the state, and the system within which the state operates, to be meaningful. Without the division between inside and outside accomplished by this rendition of the state, international relations would mean something different than that which constructs and attempts to account for the relations between states. To analyze the individual in international affairs, as Jervis does, the state must be created. The individual is given meaning through the discourses of security and insecurity which construct the two other levels of the typology examined within this thesis. All three levels reinforce and presume the existence of one another. Thus, an examination of one level leads to certain conclusions being reached about the other two. Although the individual is the privileged lens through which Jervis attempts to make sense of global politics via theories of perception, certain assumptions permeate all of the levels, and the framework of the levels-of-analysis schema relies upon a specific version of truth: the insecurity that threatens beyond the boundaries of the state. Allegedly, it is the individual foreign policy maker's task to constrain and to seek to tame the danger which threatens the state, and consequently, the individual. And, it is this assertion of truth which both unifies the heuristic device and founds the certainty of the claims to knowledge made by Robert Jervis.

A discussion of some examples of the specific oscillations in Jervis' text, between uses of the term 'actor' to refer to the state and the individual, can be used to reveal how the logic and the assumptions of the levels-of-analysis permeate The Logic of Images and its simultaneous construction of both the

individual and the Other. The state is a necessary condition to make the foreign policy maker a meaningful concept. The individual relevant to Jervis' analysis acts on the border between the inside and the outside. Therefore, Jervis slips almost imperceptibly between discussing an actor as an individual and as a state. It will be argued that this slippage results from the unquestioned allegiance that Jervis gives to the credo that foreign policy makers act for and through the state. A discussion of one without, at least, an implied discussion of the other would be inconsistent with the levels-of-analysis schema founding Jervis' claims to knowledge.

Therefore, when explicating the use of signals and lies in manipulating the decoupled images in an attempt to alter other states' and foreign policy makers' cognitive frameworks, Robert Jervis' discussion of how signals become debased through overuse becomes involved in a complicated series of assumptions and interconnections between the individual and the state. The People's Republic of China extensively utilized street demonstrations as a form of protest against various foreign states.<sup>63</sup> These demonstrations reproduced the boundaries between states, and as such, they can be viewed as a specific instance of the redrawing of the "...imagined political community..."<sup>64</sup> of the P.R.C. in a manner that simultaneously erases the processes of representation which affirm the existence of the state as a self-evident entity. This representation is accepted and reproduced by the British diplomat who discounted, i.e. debased, the message

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<sup>63</sup>Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, pp. 106-7.

<sup>64</sup>David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 11.

from the Chinese government that he believed was being issued as a signal through these protests. The diplomat claimed that there was no uneasiness in the British Foreign Office resulting from the varied and multiple protests because China had protested similarly against other states, i.e. the representations of states known as embassies within the boundaries of the P.R.C., and in his opinion, the signals would not translate into armed conflict because China did not have the military resources to engage in every one of her targets.<sup>65</sup>

The epistemological connections between the individual and the state can be traced through a reading of the above example. It is the role of the individual, within Jervis' cut into the level-of-analysis framework, to select and to decipher events.<sup>66</sup> From such a categorization, derived from a specific discourse of representation, the individual simultaneously affirms the existence of the object that the diplomat is creating and elides the process by which he recreates it. On one hand, foreign policy makers affirm and reproduce specific boundaries between states that are assumed to exist, and because the conventions which structure the individual's preconceptions about the nature of international politics become its own version of truth.<sup>67</sup> And, alternatively, the foreign policy maker is determined by the role that he plays within the assumptions about the nature of political community and identity derived, in part, from the levels-of-analysis problematic. He, reproduces through his actions and expectations, the truth that international anarchy translates into insecurity. One must analyze actions by other, allegedly,

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<sup>65</sup>Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, p. 106.

<sup>66</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>67</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 139.

ontologically independent states, through the assumptions of ever-present potential threat. It is the role of the individual foreign policy maker to perceive and to minimize the danger assumed to exist externally. Thus, the two lenses, of the levels-of-analysis typology, utilized to select, define and interpret an event, effectively reinforces and stabilizes the claims to knowledge derived through each. An epistemological closure is effected through the self-referential framework of the main typology. Questions raised by one level are deferred to another in a continuous and complicated play of self-referral. The individual affirms and reproduces the existence of the state, the state structures and recreates the individual as a foreign policy maker. And, ultimately, the underlying 'truth' of international relations, the Other as insecurity, provides the grounding for the entire edifice.

Interrogation of another example reveals the same logics at work within Jervis' text around the issues of signals and ambiguity. Given that the international arena is characterized as a realm of insecurity and uncertainty due, in part, to the condition of anarchy that is alleged to exist in the arena carved out between the discursive boundaries of political communities,<sup>68</sup> ambiguity is alleged to be a 'truth' of interstate existence.<sup>69</sup> This discovery is reinforced by the specific version of anarchy which underlies and supports the various subject positions and conceptual categories derived from the frameworks of the levels-of-analysis. The two different epistemological streams outlined above characterize Jervis' text and

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<sup>68</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>69</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 123.

indicate the tension between inscription and erasure devolving from the author's attempt to be both epistemologically self-aware and, yet, still to work within the conceptual tradition carved out by the levels-of-analysis problematic. A reading of how ambiguity can be used to both create insecurity, for others, and to minimize one's own insecurity reveals the simultaneous tension and reaffirmation of the individual and the state as a primary actor in Jervis' text.

According to Jervis, the creation of ambiguity in International Relations allows the various actors, in this example, Bismarck,<sup>70</sup> to seek to both maximize their own room for maneuver through the placement of feelers in order to better predict what the reaction would be, and to short-circuit this process by eliminating the most certain extremes of communications, potentially raising the price of commitment to a certain position indicated by a method of communication. This would lead to the other party effectively being coerced into revealing their intentions and expectations into an uncertain and allegedly insecure environment, risking the uncovering of the image used to mediate the tension between insecurity and security, between inside and outside. By forbidding a specific German diplomat, Werder to reveal Bismarck's, and Germany's, intentions about a possible conflict in the Balkans during 1878, the foreign policy maker raised the stakes attached to an inquiry of what Germany's possible response would be. This policy effectively discouraged the Russians from inquiring into German foreign policy directives because an inquiry would almost be tantamount to a declaration of their own position. Such a declaration, in a realm of insecurity and Otherness,

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<sup>70</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 126.

removes the protective ambiguity, from the intentions of foreign policy makers and the states that they represent and reproduce. In a realm believed to be characterized by anarchy, danger and insecurity, the protection of a state's image by foreign policy makers is an attempt to decrease the insecurity threatening one state and to increase the insecurity perceived by other foreign policy makers. Bismarck assumes the existence of the state, and effectively reaffirms and reproduces the discourses of its existence via the manipulation of images and representations that he engages in. An absolute dichotomy of inside and outside is reproduced, between the domestic and the foreign. The individual is placed and confined within the conceptual discipline of the state, on whose behalf that he is an actor, in the realm of insecurity and danger outside. As with the previous example the levels of the typology reinforce and refer to one another in an almost tautological process. The invocation of one leads to the creation of the others. These three levels are thoroughly intertwined in Jervis' text.

### **Conclusion**

Despite the intertwining of the conceptual category of individual with state with system, the individual is ultimately privileged by Jervis' discourse because of two factors. First, Jervis' text deals with the logic of images and with the implications of perception for the pursuit of foreign policy goals. It is the charge

of the foreign policy maker, and through the subsequent lens of the individual, that the reiteration of the Other via the levels-of-analysis typology is undertaken.

Secondly, Jervis' invocation of the individual actor fractures the state more than not by allowing for the presentation of the state inside as well as outside. The relevant actor is acting and (re)presenting the state, but the actor is analyzed through the lens of the individual looking both in and out of the boundaries being inscribed. The oscillations between individual and state can be alluded to these processes of representation and presentation that are involved with the creation and recreation of certain forms of 'imagined communities'. Jervis' logic assumes a (unified) subject perceiving the Truth of insecurity through a complicated series of assumptions. By framing the individual in a specific manner, Jervis participates in the uncritical privileging of certain versions of political reality and certain forms of community to a position of dominance within discourses of global politics and international relations.

His utilization of the state to define the individual relevant to international political life, i.e. the foreign policy maker, and simultaneous understanding of the state as the entity on whose behalf the individual actor avoids the Other accounts for the seeming and practiced ease of the oscillation. This naturalized narrative facilitates the elaboration of a specific rendition of international political life. Jervis rarely addresses the issue of *why* there exists insecurity in anarchy: he equates the two. He fails to interrogate the community equated with, and bounded by, the state: his logic reproduces it. He never defines or problematizes

the individual or the discourse of perception which devolves from it: he assumes both.

Robert Jervis' attempt to articulate theories of perception through the conceptual framework inherited from J. David Singer results in his privileging of the individual as an explanation for the importance of image in international politics. Personal characteristics can be interpreted as either signal or as an index.<sup>71</sup> They are perceived by foreign policy makers representing and reinforcing the political community embodied within the state, as potentially indicative of future actions by those acting on behalf of, and reproducing, the state. Perceptions of Bismarck,<sup>72</sup> of Khrushchev,<sup>73</sup> and other foreign policy advisors are the focus of Jervis' discussion on the nature of the political within the international arena.

It is the tension between the two strains, which are resolved in a specific version of the Other, of the insecurity and threat to be found outside of the boundaries of the state, which leads to this peculiar epistemological tension within Jervis' work. At one level, he wants to reiterate the subjective dimension of international politics because of the contested nature of communications between states. And yet, at another level, he seeks to derive legitimacy for his assertions from the version of anarchy as insecurity that founds the levels-of-analysis problematic. Jervis seeks to resolve this tension and epistemological ambivalence by effectively objectifying perception and turning it into an object of knowledge.

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<sup>71</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>72</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>73</sup>Jervis, *Ibid.*, pp. 175-6.

His discussions of how to manipulate, in a technical and almost mechanistic fashion, the relationship between referent and meaning, as if they could be abstracted from the discourses and rituals of power which gave rise to them, lead him to further elaborate an arena of insecurity and anarchy within the realm of perception. By slipping into the same epistemological position as the other two authors, through the division of the subject from the object of knowledge, Robert Jervis creates an Other that is a reflection of his concern with the individual and perception. The Other in Jervis' text is the perceptual anarchy and confusion that is simultaneously created and elided by the objectification of images and perception from the subject. Robert Jervis' anarchy is a realm of disembodied images simultaneously obscuring and affirming the realities of global politics.

The interesting dimensions of The Logic of Images involve more what is left unsaid than what is explicitly stated. Robert Jervis' almost unconscious narrative constructs specific forms of political life and international politics that are mutually constitutive. His analysis never mentions the levels-of-analysis typology which can be seen permeating the constructive assumptions and the logic of the text. The heuristic device elaborated by many realist theorists posit the universal ontological foundation of the Other: anarchy is insecurity. Jervis' implicit adoption and reiteration of the classification schemes undercuts his narrative concerning epistemological relativism. Specifically, it has been argued that Jervis' universal ontology provides the foundation from which he creates his analysis of

epistemological relativism, specifically images in I.R. and attests to the power of the typology upon the conceptualization of international and national political life.

### **Conclusion: Epistemology and Otherness**

The discipline of International Relations is in the midst of its third defining debate and, once, again, the issues concerning how claims to knowledge are being made are at the center. The texts interrogated here all raise the problem of the relativity of knowledge and chart how plausible arguments about how knowledge is a socially situated and specific phenomenon. And yet, the rhetoric used by these authors effectively undercuts some of the problems that they are attempting to resolve. Kenneth Waltz, Graham T. Allison and Robert Jervis all slip easily into making assertions about the insecurity allegedly characterizing the international arena and realm. It is suggested that the conceptual slippage, and the resulting epistemological tensions that characterize all three texts can be attributed to the framework of analysis of which each is an example. Indeed, it is argued that the 'discovery' of the insecurity, of the Other, is a necessary step taken by all three of the authors in the construction of the all-knowing subject position which characterizes all three of the texts. The levels-of-analysis problematic provides a specific conceptual structure which more easily leads thinkers to separate their subject positions from the object that they discover in the anarchic realm. What is striking about the common themes that pervade each of the interrogated texts is that each author's analytical position begins with a statement about the constitutive role played by assumptions upon the object of knowledge. And yet, each fails to take seriously these claims, or qualifiers, for their own texts. Ultimately, each of the texts relies upon a discovered and apparently irrefutable assertion about the nature of political life between sovereign states: Insecurity is the

over-riding condition in an anarchic environment. It is this assumption which serves as a foundation for all authors, and which, grounds the levels-of-analysis as alleged Truth.

Specifically, the explicit analytical position of all three of the thinkers is threatened by an interrogation into how a specific version of Otherness results from a particular epistemological dance. In this dance, the knowing subject creates an object of knowledge and then produces an erasure of the processes of production, effectively engaging in a politics of forgetting. After this erasure, the object, the allegedly autonomous Other, is discovered by the knowing subject and held up as a source of proof of a specific claim to knowledge. All three of the contributors interrogated participated in a variation of this dance, ultimately utilizing what they had created as objective proof of the validity of their own analytical positions.

Kenneth Waltz, in an attempt to posit three different understandings of the causes of war, privileges one: the nature of the international system. All three conceptual loci for Waltz, man, the state, and the system, make sense of war in allegedly different ways and utilize different conceptual lenses to construct different explanations for the occurrence of war. And yet, despite this epistemological framework which would seem to facilitate some form of self-conscious claims to knowledge, Waltz appears to slip unthinkingly into discussing the object discovered by his own lens as something that is perceived from an Archimedean and certain perspective. Waltz shifts from a discussion of contested and relative truths to the assertion of the one reality which, in his opinion, can explain the incidence of war.

Graham T. Allison enters the epistemological dance on a similar note. He attempts to make sense of the Cuban Missile Crisis utilizing three different conceptual models to investigate how such an event occurred. Three different explanations were proffered and three different perspectives were explored. As with Kenneth Waltz, Allison begins his discussion with an attempt to engage in a self-conscious form of knowledge construction, in which the discovery of some objective truth was not the goal. Rather, Allison's analytical purpose can be viewed, on a certain level, as an attempt to chart how different conceptual models result in different explanations and objects of knowledge. Working within an assumption about the reality of the state, the Rational Actor model, the Bureaucratic Politics model and the Organizational Processes model all, allegedly, articulate different explanations for the occurrence of a specific event. And yet, each version of how the state can be unpacked relied on a specific truth to unify its analysis and its authorial position: the unproblematized and allegedly autonomous occurrence of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The crisis was analyzed from a perspective which unified all three of the conceptual models, and which indicates the assumptions which Allison unconsciously brings to his allegedly unified position as a knower of knowledge and writer of texts. It was assumed that the specific foreign policy event was proof of the insecurity that characterized the anarchic realm. How the event was constructed, and what filters were used to perceive it was not unpacked. Allison, as with Waltz, relied in a specific construction of insecurity discovered as Truth to anchor the main arguments of his text.

Robert Jervis also entered into the dance structured by the levels-of-analysis problematic after an introduction dealing with the importance of perceptions and cognitive

universes in constructing both social universes and the knowledge claims that can be made about them. Jervis' work is analyzed as an example of how the levels-of-analysis problematic finds discoveries about International Relations through the lens of the individual. His work involves an analysis of images and perceptions, and the constitutive role played by these factors in international politics. Jervis links images and cognitive frameworks to the construction of the social world, through the constitutive impact that expectations and assumptions of the individual have on that individual's actions, and then he fails to take seriously his own claims by slipping into the discourse of appearance and reality, a dichotomy that results in a specific instance of a hermeneutics of discovery. This hermeneutics is enabled, indeed, it is derived from an unconscious erasure of the role played by perception in Jervis about his own subject position. He effects a politics of forgetting of one of the epistemological themes of his text by asserting the truth of the insecurity and uncertainty, which affects the individual, that are found and affirmed to exist in the anarchic realm beyond the safe boundaries of the state.

In all three examples of the levels-of-analysis framework, the discourses invoking an objective truth are so seductive that all of the authors engage in a conceptual shift from truth as perception to truth as assertion. None of the authors is able to engage in the debate framed by this conceptual framework and to avoid separating the found object of knowledge from the subject position that produced it. It is suggested that the insecurity to be found, ultimately as the anchoring truth in every text, results from the epistemological dynamics established by the levels-of-analysis problematic. These thinkers are trapped inside a dichotomy of two types of claims to truth: the universal and the particular. Each

articulates a relative truth which helps to explain international politics, and yet each version of these truths relies upon a universally valid and objective Truth: anarchy is insecurity and it occurs outside the protective walls of the state.

The relative and the universal versions of truth are mutually constitutive. By invoking a relative truth, one is making a universal statement about the relativity of truth. This evaluation necessitates some universal perspective to enable such a judgment. Alternatively, by focusing on the relative, the universal is implied. The relative is only meaningful in conjunction with a certain unity. One cannot make a statement about relativity without implying something that is larger or more comprehensive than that which is invoked.

The found truth of insecurity is the unifying foundation for the levels-of-analysis schema. It is this constitutive assumption that structures the blackmail of the security dilemma. The analytical power and seductiveness of the assumptions that derive from such a rendition of global politics characterize each of the three texts analyzed within the confines of this thesis. The universal foundational truth of insecurity to be found outside the state is reproduced as a universal truth which enables each of the analysts to engage in a specific version of international politics utilizing the lens of the particular. One cannot adequately understand the schema, as it has been used by Jervis, Allison and Waltz, and the assumptions which intertwine, permeate and reinforce every level of the typology without a discussion of how one alleged truth founds the various partial truths in a manner that maintains and recreates epistemological certainty and confidence that a cumulative theory of knowledge is possible, and even a desirable goal. It is this foundation which

accounts for the similarity of themes, and structures the epistemological dance which all three analysts engage in. Construction of the three levels-of-analysis devolves from this assertion and reproduction of the reality of International Relations which is played at every level of the typology. The levels-of-analysis schema is a unified and powerful epistemological device structuring the claims to knowledge of three disparate texts. Each level reinforces the others because each is grounded in the simultaneous production and erasure of Otherness.

Thus, as the discipline of International Relations is permeated by a particular resolution of the universal and particular knowledge claims, the levels-of-analysis problematic, the epistemological tensions will be continuously reproduced. One of the important themes to emerge from the Third Debate is the creation of a space, or an opportunity, to destabilize the rigidity of some of the oppositions that found various texts within the discipline. An investigation into how the Other is constructed, as an apparently independently existing entity confronting its creators as an alienated concept, illustrates how the reification of a particular version of anarchy / community subverts the intentions of three authors who attempt to be epistemologically self-aware. How the Other is created by various analysts is not a new theme, however, an investigation into how the Other is reified, and then allegedly discovered by thinkers articulating their claims to knowledge within the levels-of-analysis problematic effectively destabilizes the certainty of the oppositions between security and insecurity, and community and anarchy which inform many texts within the discipline. The Other created by Robert Jervis, Graham T. Allison and Kenneth Waltz results from the epistemological discourses emanating from the levels-

of-analysis typology utilized as a specific version of an organizing device. Such heuristic devices are not neutral but play a constitutive role in the object of knowledge that they create. This tendency is pronounced particularly if the creative impetus of such devices is elided.

If the constitutive nature of one of the main organizing devices of the discipline is continuously erased by its practitioners, then questions arise about how the ‘discoveries’ of International Relations are due to the narrative of the levels-of-analysis articulated by Singer. How does the articulation of individual, state and system as the primary loci through which the space of International Relations is perceived as an object of knowledge create corresponding categories of anarchy, danger and insecurity. These issues are raised by the subject material of this thesis, however, a systematic investigation into these issues is beyond its scope. Nevertheless, the permeation of an organizing device which potentially claims to represent the ‘reality’ of international politics in a comprehensive and potentially cumulative manner in a discipline that, at a certain level, can be viewed as interrogating how various identities and boundaries are constructed, raises questions about the logical and ethical utility of postulating an allegedly comprehensive typology which can expand exponentially to include as many other ‘levels’ deemed necessary by the analyst. Much debate focuses on the question of which level is most relevant; more importantly the nature of a (perhaps universal) framework of analysis needs to be investigated. Minimally, the constructive effect of the selected heuristic device needs to be taken seriously and applied to the author’s own position as a knowing subject.

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Title of Thesis:

Otherness in International Relations Theory

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October 3, 1996