

Challenging Boundaries
Moravcsik, Diez, and the Limits of Contemporary European Integration Theory

By

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Abstract

This thesis is centred around one specific question. To what extent do the works of Thomas Diez and Andrew Moravcsik challenge the boundaries of existing European integration theory? Engaging with this question necessitates some sustained discussion of both Diez's and Moravcsik's contributions to contemporary European integration theory, as well as some discussion of what the boundaries of contemporary European integration theory are, and why these boundaries need to be challenged. European integration theory has been at its core, in some way or another, concerned with "sovereignty". The decision for European states to integrate suggests, at the very least, some rearticulation of sovereignty. The literature on European integration largely poses these problems in an almost "zero-sum" manner, where integration, or what is at times described as disintegration is characterised by the withering away or rejuvenation of the sovereign state. Through my analysis of Diez and Moravcsik, I hope to problematise this version of integration, and suggest that more complex readings of sovereignty – ergo, integration and European governance – are required if one hopes to gain something positive from the integration experience, and come to terms with the contemporary challenges of Eastern enlargement and institutional reform faced by the European integration process.

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GLOSSARY

Concentric Circles: This was a vision of the integration project provided most explicitly by Jacques Delors, although earlier accounts of integration seem to present a similar conceptual frame for integration. Delors' vision is comprised of a series of "concentric circles", suggesting that the European integration project must have a strong central core that is fully integrated, and less and less integration taking place at the varying outer rings

Constructivism A theoretical approach that rejects positivistic assertions of a single reality, and believes that the political world is a constructed set of social relations rather than material "realities". In European integration theory, constructivist approaches are often posed as "middle ground" between rationalist and reflectivist or post-structuralist approaches (see Christiansen et al 1999)

Discourse: This connotes the importance of language in policy formation, decision making and the political more generally. "Discourse" often refers to the contested nature of language and terminology, and the extent to which ignoring such concerns and treating phrases or terms such as "Europe", "integration", and so on as easily definable and uncontested is a depoliticising process.

Epistemic Communities These are primarily transnational groups that possess some shared set of ideals and principles. The "epistemic communities approach" examines the role of such transnational actors and stresses the role of such actors' knowledge and expertise in the policy process

Functionalism: An approach most commonly associated with the post-war idealist work of David Mitrany. Mitrany's approach perceives the sovereign territorial state as a threat to human security, and as such, advocates "functional" agencies that serve specific individual functions.

Globalisation: There is little agreement about what the precise definition of this term is. For the purposes of this paper, it is defined as a set of complicated political practices such as transnational labour movements – legal and otherwise – global financial transactions, and regional integration projects, to name just a few. These practices directly challenge existing dominant articulations and conceptualisations of political authority, community, sovereignty and democracy – suggesting that "globalisation" is a complicated web of practices that demands some rethinking of these categories.

High – Low Politics: This is a powerful metaphor that has dominated much of integration theory throughout its history right up until the present. The "high-low" politics distinction suggests that integration is much more likely to occur at the level of low politics (i.e. economic policy, labour policy, transportation policy) than in the area of high politics (i.e. security and defence policy, foreign policy). While **neofunctionalism** has been criticised for conceptualising integration in this way, most theories of European integration depend in some way on this metaphor

Intergovernmentalism: In the course of this paper, the term intergovernmentalism is referring specifically to Andrew Moravcsik's "liberal intergovernmentalist" approach. Moravcsik conceives of Europe as a series of intergovernmental bargains where sovereign territorial states continue to control whether or not integration progresses or stagnates. He argues that national governments act in a two-level game – forwarding their interests on both the national and supranational levels in order to serve their own interests and preserve national sovereignty.

Multi-level Governance: A theoretical approach to European integration that conceives of the EU governance structure on more than one level. Rather than argue that political authority is concentrated in any specific area or site, such as the sovereign state, this approach argues that authority is dispersed throughout various government structures or levels. In short, this approach in an almost redundant way, contends that the EU is ruled by regional, national and supranational authorities.

Neofunctionalism: This is perhaps one of the most influential theories of European integration – in fact, integration theory is often equated with neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalist's contend that integration progresses through modest steps in economic integration. These steps towards further integration pressure other policy areas into integrating as well, leading to a process of what neofunctionalist's refer to as functional spill-over – functional because the spill-over seems to be unintentional. This means that after integrating policies in the area of steel manufacturing, for example, labour policy in steel manufacturing might also necessarily integrate. However, political spill-over is also possible, which is spill-over that is intended or what one might call integration through the back door. In this case, integration is pushed in one policy area in hopes that it will force integration in another area that would not have initially happened.

Network Governance. This term is most closely associated with the work of Beate Kohler-Koch. She contends that EU governance should not be conceived of through a metaphor of levels, but rather, as a network. This metaphor implies a certain amount of overlapping authority and memberships within various functional groups or structures. Thomas Diez, a student of Kohler-Koch advocates a "Network Horizons" approach to European governance that is basically a more radical version of the Network Governance model. The metaphor of the network opens up the idea of citizenship, political community and political authority to overlap and simultaneity rather than the either-or relationship that most metaphors of the EU imply.

Post-structuralist IR: These approaches to international relations (IR) theory are sometimes called post-modern, post-positivist, reflectivist, and critical IR theories. The broad number of approaches that fall under this term are often self-reflexive in their approach, that is, they are critically aware of the politics of their own theory. Reading IR as a text is an equally important element of these approaches. They are interested in suggesting the extent to which theories of IR provide various "readings" of world politics. These readings can be read in different ways and they cannot be ranked in relation to any "real" meaning. Such approaches problematise readings of IR that present

themselves as neutral in their modernist discursive practice that both objectifies the text and distances themselves from it (see George 1994).

Reification To materialise that which is not real. That is, from the perspective of post-structuralist IR, all theories of IR are guilty of reification – since there is no one essential or correct story, theories of IR, or in this case theories of integration impose a certain reading of reality on the world/Europe.

Preface

Before enlightenment
chopping wood
carrying water

After enlightenment
chopping wood
carrying water

Zen Proverb

The discussion which follows is one grappling with a number of difficult problems relating to the limits of integration theory, and the challenges faced by the European integration project. The ubiquitous discussions about the enlargement of the European Union (EU), the need for institutional reform, and the desperate attempts at reforming long standing but nonetheless problematic policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) seem to be pushing the integration process to the brink. At a recent conference of the European Community Studies Association Canada in Quebec City (July 30 – August 1 2000), the struggle with coming to terms with the inadequacies of existing theories of integration, and the need to provide some sort of alternative visions to help cope with enlargement and institutional reform appeared obvious themes. In a speech given by a Member of the European Parliament, Louisewies van der Laan attempted to problematise the entire enlargement and institutional reform “project”, suggesting that the issues at stake were much more complicated than most observers assume. In concert with this point, she argued that there is an increasing need for “visions” for the future of Europe. It is in response to this that I engage with the issues I do in the pages that follow.

A caveat: I do not intend to provide this alternative vision. Although it would be more satisfying to pursue a project that is focused on providing an answer, unfortunately

this thesis might be perceived by some to provide more questions than answers. However, I endeavour to highlight the relevance of some questions, and the need to problematise the existing character of European integration theory. Presently, integration theory is for the most part about describing and explaining the reason states have decided to integrate, and who or what the primary forces in this story are. This has been the primary focus of integration theory for the last fifty years, with some exceptions, yet the integration process has changed dramatically in only the past 20 years. Questions about integrated security, a “Europe” that is all inclusive and comprised of nations that were for so long behind the iron curtain raise very different questions than those considered when creating a customs union among six Western European nations. In short, what it means to speak about European integration has changed.

In the pages that follow, I focus on two primary figures in integration theory: Andrew Moravcsik and Thomas Diez. Aside from examining their contributions to debates about “Europe”, I also explore some contributions made by those in the policy world, namely Joschka Fischer’s May 2000 speech. Fischer’s speech indicates that attempting to take integration theory in the direction of creating alternative visions is not misplaced, in fact, it is requested by policy actors such as Fischer. Some observers have not lost the original goal of the European integration project, to create an “ever closer union” and spread “peace and prosperity” throughout Europe. In both cases, the intent is to re-imagine politics in a way outside of or beyond the limits of sovereignty. If there is one thing that the following pages hope to impart, it is that this latent potential of the European integration project to re-think or re-work politics in some innovative way that is inclusive and peaceful, should not be lost.

1 (DIS)LOCATING “EUROPE”: CRITICALLY RETHINKING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY

“Europe” became a codeword, a word that all agreed to refer to. Russians, French, Germans, everybody acted in the name of Europe, for Europe. But just beneath the surface one could see that the commentators were not talking about the same Europe. These “Europes” had different boundaries to West as well as East, different organising principles and different “European” values. As a political space, “Europe” increasingly opened up, and the political struggle of competing Europes became more and more central.

(Wæver et al. 1993: 64)

1.1 ONE EUROPE/MANY EUROPES

What is “Europe”?

Contemporary discussions about “Europe” are increasingly raising questions that make much of European integration theory, and wider integration studies uncomfortable, confused, and even disillusioned. A February 2000 issue of *The Economist* poses the fashionable but unpopular question: What is Europe? While *The Economist* rightly begins with the suggestion that viable answers to this question should not begin with geography, contrary to what we might think, there is little new here. Recently, continental European thinker Jacques Derrida posed this problem in the following way: “Something unique is afoot in Europe, in what is still called Europe even if we no longer know very well *what* or *who* goes by this name. Indeed, to what concept, to what real individual, to what singular entity should this name be assigned today? Who will draw its borders?” (Derrida 1992: 5). Still earlier, in 1550, Sebastian Muntzer’s *Cosmography* presented a depiction of Europe as *Regina Europa*. Here, as one Polish poet suggests, “Europe is a nymph,” where – not surprisingly coming from a Pole – “Warsaw is the heart” (Davies 1996: 1). In 1965, Denis de Rougemont begins his discussion *The Meaning of Europe* by defining Europe as “an adventure of decisive significance for the whole of mankind” (Rougemont 1965: 11).

Rather than some dead, fixed, undialectical and immobile entity, Europe was/is life, richness and fecundity.¹ Admittedly, de Rougemont's presentation of Europe as "creator of the world" ignores the destructive tendencies of colonial empires and the legacies of devastation in imperial hinterlands. But regardless of historical epoch, these authors were/are struggling with a question that continues to present a viable starting point for research, namely, what is Europe?

It should be noted that in the course of this thesis I do not intend to define "Europe". However, I believe that acknowledging the contested nature of "Europe", in particular the "Europe" of the EU, is important to any project that hopes to at the very least challenge the boundaries of existing integration theory. This is not to suggest that one could not just as easily, and with some relevance, ask where or what is Canada, or even Victoria. Asking such questions takes into account the extent to which sites of authority and the location of the political has become increasingly contestable. When Victoria becomes a suburb of New York in part of an international human trafficking ring originating in a small province in Northeast China, asking "where" a seemingly stable "locality" is should be anything but puzzling. Similarly, raising concerns about the definition and location of "Europe", given the increased mobility of capital, information, and labour – legal or otherwise – across what is in fact the Asiatic peninsula suggests that questions regarding the definition and location of "Europe" are more relevant and less esoteric than one might first assume. However, this is only one background element that drives the discussion presented here.

The important question for this thesis focuses on the work of two notable figures in contemporary integration theory: Thomas Diez and Andrew Moravcsik. *My primary concern is to what extent these authors challenge the boundaries of European integration theory.* Those

¹ Here I borrow from Michel Foucault's (1976) discussion of space and time in "Questions on Geography"

with even a limited knowledge of Moravcsik's and Diez's contributions will no doubt be puzzled by my decision to explore these figures together. However, in the course of this introductory chapter, I hope to make the rationale for my decision clear. Of course, this is only the primary overarching question that guides my research, and says nothing of the many subsidiary questions that lurk in the background of much of my discussion.

In this chapter, I begin by raising a number of important questions that led me to pursue this research project. Such questions not only illuminate the developmental stages of this argument, but they act as a good foundation from which the remainder of this discussion can be launched. In addition to this, I endeavour to answer why I have chosen to explore the work of Diez and Moravcsik in the way that I have, and give some indication of what allows me to speak about contemporary European integration theory, while only exploring these two figures in detail. Finally, I provide a brief introduction to integration theory more generally, and my own understanding of what I take to be the most pressing questions to integration theory. To this end, I draw extensively on Ben Rosamond's recent insightful survey of European integration theory. Before embarking on the remainder of this thesis, I trace out the structure of my argument and review the primary questions at the core of my research.

Why integration theory; why now?

The history of European integration theory is characterised by one fundamental question. To what extent do certain integration theories adequately explain the integration process, elucidating the primary actors/mechanisms responsible for forwarding, hindering and stalling integration? Unfortunately, this question has a very limited number of possible answers – the integration theory in question is either better or worse than other integration theories. Challenging state sovereignty, strengthening supranational authority, increasing transnational

flows, and creating a “multi-level Europe,” are all elements of a complete answer. However, dominant notions of state sovereignty and political authority, unsophisticated definitions of supranationalism, and prosaic accounts of transnational flows, remain for the most part, uncontested. Similar to the increasingly burgeoning literature on globalisation, which more often than not conceptualises globalisation as some external force “out there” forcing limits on national politics (Held *et al.* 1999), European integration was (and *is*) perceived as an unknown beast – merely classify, label and confine for further study (see Risse-Kappen 1996). Recent scholarship in European integration theory, however, has begun to chip away at the banal liturgy of policy and governance in European studies, raising questions about the role of discourses (Diez 1999b), identities (Risse 1998, Wæver *et al.* 1993) and critical versions of “globalisation” (Rosamond 1995, 1999). European integration theorists no longer acceptably bandy about supranational governance, domestic policy preferences, and transnational cooperation without any regard for their meanings. But what does this mean for the future of European integration studies? Do the increasingly divergent interests within European integration studies suggest that a future crisis is inevitable, or is this the harbinger of a major step in the development of European integration theory?

Some recent exchanges in the literature suggest, as Thomas Risse and Antje Wiener point out, that staunch rationalists and radical reflectivists within the sub-field of European integration theory may “have little to say to each other, because the common ground for a meaningful exchange of views is small” (Risse and Wiener 1999).² The recent exchange in *Millennium* between Thomas Diez and Andrew Moravcsik is a paradigmatic example of this growing schism in European integration theory – and the decreased possibility for meaningful exchange (Diez

² The Risse and Wiener (1999) article was itself an “unofficial exchange” with Moravcsik’s article in the preceding issue of *Journal of European Public Policy*, (Moravcsik 1999c).

1999a, Moravcsik 1999c) This heated exchange – which may be indicative of a looming crisis in European integration studies – begs a number of important questions about the present status of integration theory, and future direction(s) of this study. It also raises an important concern for the discussion I present here, considering the fact that I explore Diez's and Moravcsik's work, and claim that they have much to offer challenging critiques of European integration theory both separately and in concert

What is the relationship between European integration, and theories of European integration? Rather than “force limits on national politics,” does the inability to conceptualise “Europe” place limits on politics more generally? Moreover, does the fact that the almost fifty year oscillation between neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist accounts of European integration yielded little in the way of any richer understandings of the complex phenomena going on *in* “Europe”? The recent Diez-Moravcsik exchange, and the increasing prevalence of constructivist/reflectivist critiques of European integration (theory) challenge the boundaries of existing dominant European integration theories. The primary focus of this critique must concentrate on where possibilities for re-articulating the central research questions that have motivated much of European integration studies might come from.

The preoccupation with the superiority of particular theories over others must be pushed aside in favour of an approach that first acknowledges the intimate relationship between the process of European integration and European integration theory. Secondly, the contingency of notions of “Europe,” supranationalism, sovereignty, authority and a host of other issues must be interrogated, rather than ignored. Thirdly, the complicated network of political practices which underlies much of these phenomena – the struggle between varying claims to knowledge, the role sovereignty plays or has played in structuring relations of inside and outside, inclusion and

exclusion, identity and difference, us and them, Europe and Non-Europe, and authentic and inauthentic must be a part of any theory which attempts to enhance existing understandings of Europe, the process of integration. As Diez suggests, theorists of European integration must be open to notions of many Europes, rather than one Europe (Diez 1999a). So where does this lead European integration theory? I spend much of this thesis exploring where contemporary European integration theory finds itself, and how contemporary scholarship, if at all, challenges the boundaries of existing analyses, allowing it to come to terms with the many problematiques that face both the integration process and the accompanying body of theory. However, given that my core concern is with the limits of existing integration theory, one might be surprised to find a lengthy discussion of one of integration theory's leading writers. Andrew Moravcsik

I confess that there is certainly an increasing amount of scholarship that falls under the broad heading of European studies, that is attempting in various ways to come to terms with the problems I raise here. Most notably, the burgeoning literature on "European Citizenship" grapples with questions about the limits of political community, the dislocation of political authority and the extent to which problems of inclusion and exclusion are no longer the singular competence of the territorial sovereign state.³ This begs the question, why not discuss this literature if one is concerned with questions relating to altered states of political authority, sovereignty, political community and identity? The simple answer is, I am interested in these issues in the context of European integration theory. That is, I believe that these are important concerns that contemporary theories of European integration should come to terms with. The reason European integration and its accompanying theory has come to a critical moment. The

³ For useful discussions of European citizenship that are both aware of the legal elements of such a discourse, as well as concerns of identity, see: Cesarani and Fullbrook 1996, Koslowski 1999a, Lehning 1999, Linklater 1998a, 1999b, Meehan 1993, 1996, Nentwich 1996, Preuß 1996, 1998, Soysal 1994, 1996, Wiener 1998. For discussions that expose the connection between ideas of citizenship, transnationality and the construction of the sovereign subject, see: Hutchings and Dennreuther 1999, Miller 1993, Roche 1995, Walker 1999b.

notion of a critical moment is developed in chapter two, but for the time being, suffice it to say that this is not the first nor the last critical moment, but as the phrase suggests – it is critical. The pressures of enlargement and the necessary institutional reform required to make enlargement feasible are pushing and pulling discussions of European integration all over the map. This strain on the EU has prompted a renaissance of “visions for Europe,” most notably, Joschka Fischer’s “Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration.” Fischer’s speech speaks to the contemporary context of European integration, prompting me to embark on this discussion.

First, discussions about “Europe” by academics and policy actors alike seem to be proliferating as of late, and rarely are they guided by anything other than concerns about EU enlargement and institutional reform. Since January of 1999, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has largely been a reality, and in 2002, the hard currency will be released. However, the War in Kosovo sparked increasing interest in a European Foreign and Security Policy, and a European Defence Plan, the dreadful turn out in the last European parliamentary elections have focused increasing attention on the need for institutional reform and some remedy for EU governance’s legitimacy crisis, and finally, like a nasty complicated web laid over all these concerns, looming enlargement of the EU adds many more dimensions to questions about institutional and policy reform. Given this complicated set of dilemmas that provides the context for contemporary European integration, idealistic ruminations such as Fischer’s are not surprising. These discussions give one a sense of the desperation among policy actors and decision makers to find some new “vision of/for Europe” that can make the integration process continue, and not crumble under the enormous pressures it faces. Therefore, I believe it is the role of integration theory to provide alternative visions, to reconceptualise what it means to speak

about European governance by attempting to come to terms with the proliferation of political authority, the rearticulation of political community, and the dramatic alterations to sovereignty

Questions about where political authority is, how political community is defined, and whether or not sovereignty is still relevant – or has it only refigured itself in some unfamiliar guise – are important concerns that theories of European integration should be coming to terms with. It is in this spirit, that I explore Diez's and Moravcsik's contributions to contemporary European integration theory. Up until now this discussion has been primarily concerned with rationalising my decision to pursue this exploration into the status of contemporary European integration theory. Thus, before progressing any further, I believe some discussion of European integration theory more generally is in order that will further highlight my decision to explore Moravcsik, in particular, as well as Diez and raise the types of questions I have.

1.2 MAPPING THE EUROPEAN CONDITION: REFLECTIONS ON THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY

Positivism and politics

If, in fact, discussions about European integration and approaches to the integration process are as positivistic as they initially appear, and if this thesis is at its core, attempting to challenge the boundaries of these approaches, a definition of positivism is certainly in order. According to Jan Aart Scholte, positivist assumptions in international relations can be boiled down to four core propositions:

- i) the singularity of reality, (ii) the possibility of constructing a social theory that grasps this single truth, (iii) the reliability of empirical observation as a means of securing absolute knowledge, and (iv) the necessity and feasibility of expunging values from theory in order to obtain viable social explanation (Scholte 1993: 133).

To say the least, Scholte is not wholly satisfied with positivist approaches, but he remains less critical than others.⁴ Positivism's faith in its own ability to draw a line between the logical and the mythological, the real and the unreal, the possible and the impossible, and so on, certainly seems to be the accepted approach for most theories of European integration. As the contemporary apostle of positivist approaches to European integration, Andrew Moravcsik embraces the assertions outlined by Scholte.⁵ Unfortunately, perhaps more than others, these accounts of integration fall prey to the dominant question(s) driving much of integration theory. These questions that ask what the engine of integration is, and *what* is responsible for the progress, or the lack thereof in the integration process depend on a singular definition for "Europe" and "integration". Whether we find theories of multi-level governance, or liberal intergovernmentalism, or neofunctionalism (in various guises), or epistemic communities, or even an amalgam of each to be more favourable, each depends on an already assumed version of *what* Europe is, *where* it is, and what it means to speak about integration. Suggestions that there are "many Europes", or that "Europe" is a process rather than an achieved condition appear nonsensical in the least, and at their worst (or best, depending on one's intentions), crippling to further theorisations of European integration. This is, however, crippling only insofar as accounts of EMU, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Eastern Enlargement, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), and so on, depend on "one Europe". If, in contrast, such accounts of phenomena happening "in Europe" are open to the plethora of political phenomena that may in fact occupy these spaces, and remain sceptical towards their own knowledge claims, and ability to "know Europe", then approaches that

⁴ See Der Derian and Shapiro 1989, Der Derian 1995, Diez 1999a, George 1994, Smith, Booth and Zaleski 1996, Smith 1999, Walker 1993. Contrast with Moravcsik 1999c, 1999d.

⁵ To this end, see the exchange in *Millennium* between Thomas Diez (1999a) and Andrew Moravcsik (1999b). This exchange and the implications of it are discussed in detail later in this paper.

question positivism's privileged position/standpoint, should allow for more enriched

understandings of European integration. Like integration theory, international relations theory shares this largely positivistic core, which suggests that these theories have more in common than many would have us believe. For all its faults, this is where Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist approach has the most to offer. He is more than willing to take integration theory out of its insular context and into broader international relations theory. I return to Moravcsik later, for now, I turn to Rosamond who echoes Moravcsik's hopefulness for integration theory's exposure to international relations theory – admittedly, Rosamond's intentions and personal epistemology differ greatly from Moravcsik's. However, before taking the discussion further, I wish to present a brief and general introduction of integration theory – highlighting the primary figures and questions, before embarking on Rosamond's critical (re)introduction of theories of European integration.

A critical (re)introduction to integration theory

Since its inception, theories of European integration have asked the complicated, but obvious question: why have European nations decided to integrate? Initially, theorists of European integration focused on how the integration process developed and progressed. These theories of integration were heavily influenced by idealist inspired theories of international relations (Mitrany 1975). Drawing on earlier functionalist theories of integration, Haas and others went on to suggest that once integration had occurred in one area, such as agricultural policy, for example, it would “spill-over” into other policy areas (Haas 1958, 1964). Although the earlier work focused on some rather obscure case studies, such as Haas's analysis of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in his 1964 book, *Beyond the Nation State*, the intention was to suggest that through somewhat less overtly political means, the integration process could

be encouraged. Already in this early phase of integration theory, the split between what Stanley Hoffmann later referred to as “high” and “low” politics is evident (see Hoffmann 1966). In this earlier phase of integration theory, the process itself was given much more attention than the ends. And, although neofunctionalist spill-over did imply some logic, for the most part, these early accounts of integration suggested that integration progressed in an unplanned, almost accidental fashion. However, Hoffmann’s contributions, and later so-called intergovernmentalist theories of European integration questioned the almost “anti-political” vision of (neo)functionalism.

Hoffmann’s 1966 article, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-state and the Case for Western Europe,” heralded a new era in the development of European integration theory. Drawing on the earlier theories of integration, and his own belief in the supremacy of state sovereignty, Hoffmann developed further the idea of “high” and “low” politics. It was Hoffmann’s belief that integration primarily occurred at the level of low politics – primarily economic, bureaucratic, and/or technocratic concerns – rather than in high politics such as foreign and security policy (Hoffmann 1966, see Hoffmann 1982). Although contemporary theorists largely acknowledge the shortcomings of the high-low politics distinction (see Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998, Verdun 2000), the influence it had, and continues to have on European integration theory should not be underestimated. Even today, theorists invoke this terminology in order to illuminate the integration process.⁶ Neofunctionalism was largely discredited by intergovernmentalists because the type of integration that neofunctionalism described through technocratic linkages was only possible at the level of “low” politics. This

⁶ The Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998) collection spends much of its time problematising the high-low distinction.

intergovernmentalist version of integration foreshadowed Andrew Moravcsik's "liberal intergovernmentalism", and much of contemporary integration theory

Although European integration theory continues to be dominated by the same core questions regarding how and why states decide to integrate, the character of integration theory has changed, or perhaps more aptly, it has proliferated. Approaches to integration theory now include versions that cope with the affects of "transnational forces" (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998), approaches that are cognisant of the role of international elites (Verdun 1999b, Verdun 2000), and approaches that acknowledge the role "globalisation" plays in the integration process (Rosamond 1995, 1999). However, recent developments in European integration theory of the constructivist/reflectivist nature have altered the direction of integration theory. These approaches, in particular the approach advocated by Diez, begins in a somewhat similar fashion as the early idealists that started integration theory. Diez reads "Europe" as a site where politics might in fact be re-imagined in a way other than by the terms given by sovereignty – truly, beyond the nation-state (Diez 1997). Unfortunately, the contemporary move in integration theory towards intergovernmentalist approaches have forced the nation-state's agenda back to the foreground. Diez's approach, among a few others (Koslowski 1999, Shaw 1999, Walker 2000), looks at Europe acknowledging the latent potential for a new form of politics that is present there, and examine the possibilities for re-imagining politics while constantly taking a critical reflexive look at one's approach, re-evaluating the questions one asks, and where such questions might lead.

This brief introduction to integration theory creates a good segue into a more recent, well done survey of European integration theory by Ben Rosamond. In the course of his survey, Rosamond hopes to elucidate four major points: a) European integration theory has been a fertile

site for theoretical development and innovation, b) the identification of “integration theory” as a sub-field is untenable, c) close attention to “sociology of knowledge issues” is critical for avoiding oversimplifications and mis-readings of integration theory and the character of the debate, d) finally, questions about whether EU studies is a part of international relations or comparative politics relies on a false dichotomy, ergo, it is a “non-problem” (Rosamond 2000 196). In the course of my discussion, I do not intend to completely explore and re-evaluate Rosamond’s argument, however I believe entertaining some of the points he raises in conjunction with my own discussion of integration is important if one hopes to gain a better understanding of integration theory as a “discipline” – if one can call it this – as well as come to terms with why critical reflexive projects are necessary for the future survival of integration theory, and the integration process itself

For a number of years, critical international relations theory has been concerned with the limits of existing theoretical approaches. Globalisation, transnational movements of capital and labour (people), and unprecedented advances in telecommunications technology raise a number of important questions about the ritualised and imposed narratives/boundaries of sovereignty. Initially – given the increased pervasiveness of the Internet and other mediums of telecommunications technology – one might be attracted to claims made by David Harvey (1990, 1996) and others, that we are witnessing an annihilation of space through time. This explanation may seem sufficient, it is, however, dangerously misleading.

In the context of European integration, technological advances have undoubtedly had an impact on the everyday lives of many Europeans and the (im)possibility of “European” governance specifically, yet there are important issues overlooked by these accounts. Most importantly, geopolitical discourses and the territorial expression of sovereignty have not been

annihilated in this so-called “postmodern” rearticulation of space and time. As Moravcsik’s approach exemplifies, questions of sovereignty and geopolitics are of continued importance in the context of European integration. Unfortunately, these debates are often expressed in pedantic and un(der)-problematised discussions. The question is not where are expressions of sovereign power still exemplified in the context of a “supranational Europe”? But rather, in some oversimplified zero-sum relationship between sovereignty’s triumph and the withering away of the state. integration or sovereignty. In part, this essay is focused on problematising certain discussions of sovereignty and integration within European integration theory, and voice the need for at the very least attempts at re-reading sovereignty in more complicated ways. However, my ability to discuss sovereignty in the way I propose depends on a prior commitment to European integration theory, and its inability to exist as a (sub)field independent of broader international relations theory.

In attempting to problematise claims that European integration is wholly independent of both wider international relations theory and comparative politics, Rosamond’s (2000) analysis most closely parallels my own commitments. Arguing that existing theories of European integration are useless is both incorrect and not at all useful. However, one may have some reservations regarding the extent to which these theories assume a definition and location for “Europe” as well as some assumed understanding of what goes on (t)here. In fact, like Rosamond, my intention here is not to condemn existing theories for being wrong or less than ingenious. Rather, I hope to put some light on the status of contemporary theories of European integration, and question to what extent these theories are rising to the challenges of the integration project. Amalgamation of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism in this regard is less than revolutionary. One may in fact agree that our understanding the CAP, negotiations

with Central and East European Countries (CEECs) regarding enlargement, and increasing defence cooperation on a “European level” benefits from existing discussions/analysis by various theories of European integration. There are, however, experiences, issues, and concerns that these approaches fail to provide more than superficial insight, if any. Herein lies my central concern that drives my interrogation of Moravcsik and Diez, and my own allegiance to Rosamond’s approach.

The historical development of European integration theory, as presented by Rosamond (2000) and others, suggests anything but “narrow mindedness”, which is partially responsible for the tension within Rosamond’s discussion. On the one hand, a central tenet for Rosamond is the belief that European integration theory has bared witness to a good deal of innovation, yet he simultaneously argues that integration theory has become somewhat narrow-minded, and responsible for reifying the unnecessary line between theories of European integration, international relations and comparative politics (Rosamond 2000: 196, *passim*). The lineage from strains of idealism in post-war international relations theory to the Mitrany style functionalism and subsequent neofunctional analysis championed by Ernst Haas is a less than complex family tree. However, the intellectual context out of which these theories grew and/or were inspired is often ignored in contemporary accounts.⁷ Like the ahistorical stick-man depiction of sovereignty that haunts the bulk of political analysis, these often banal (mis)readings of integration theory’s birthplace frequently go unchallenged. For Rosamond (and myself), accepting the importance of the intellectual context, forces a realisation on the part of the analyst that suggests theories of European integration are intimately linked with international relations theory and comparative politics.

⁷ See for example, Caporaso 1998.

Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold's (1971) edited collection on regional integration – which began its life as a special issue in the journal *International Organisation* – is one of the clearest examples of the importance of intellectual context. The influence of David Easton's "Black Box" model is overwhelming in this collection. Not surprisingly, Haasian style neofunctionalism is bent completely out of shape in an attempt to salvage it from the rampage of behaviouralism, the political upheaval of 1968, and the Gaullist episode(s) in Europe. The Empty Chair Crisis in 1965 and the subsequent Luxembourg Compromise in 1966 were uniquely European phenomena, and called into question the usefulness of neofunctionalism's commitment to the concept of spill over. The contributions in the Lindberg and Scheingold collection were grasping at straws to deal with this, and shore up the lost ground ceded to Stanley Hoffmann (1966, 1971), whose own reactionary state-centric approach was a direct response to the Gaullist episodes (Rosamond 2000: 75). This brief account only furthers Rosamond's own belief in the importance of understanding the intellectual context of integration theory. In this case, the historical context is important, but the intellectual struggle and reactionary impulses of the academic participants in this dialogue, if ignored, can only lead to at best, an incomplete reading of the development of integration theory. The Lindberg and Scheingold (1971) collection is also an important site that highlights the extent to which debates within European integration theory have often been shaped by interdisciplinary and intercontinental academic squabbles. In this case, the extent to which integration theory – and even area or regional studies – were for the most part occupied by American political science. Given this, what one might refer to as sociology of knowledge questions, or issues related to the politics of academic investigation are of critical importance. Ignoring this may inevitably lead to some anachronistic reading of the historical development of integration theory. In chapter two I will discuss further Fischer's

speech, suggesting that Fischer believes providing alternative visions for European governance is not, as Moravcsik believes, an endeavour solely confined to the imaginary realm of professors and philosophers. Integration theory is more relevant than that.

1.3 STRUCTURES AND QUESTIONS

Before laying out the structure of this argument, I believe some review of the central questions and core thrust of this thesis is in order. Much of the discussion thus far has been intended to provide a context, and illuminate the intellectual milieu from which this discussion comes, although chapter two will endeavour to clarify this further. In the course of this introduction, however, I have attempted to lay a foundation from which the rest of the discussion can launch itself. Therefore, without further hesitation, I will briefly review the central questions that drive this discussion, and then lay out the structure of the argument that follows.

This thesis is concerned with examining the work of two dominant figures⁸ from contemporary European integration theory, in order to accomplish the following task. First, the work of Moravcsik and Diez provides a good overview of contemporary theories of European integration. Moravcsik, who is often credited with reawakening the field of integration theory, is a pivotal figure, and deserves attention since the influence of his work is found throughout integration theory. Diez, on the other hand, comes from a very different context – namely, the recent constructivist/reflectivist move in integration theory. As Thomas Risse and Antje

⁸ I admit that for most readers familiar with contemporary European integration theory, Moravcsik is certainly commonly referred to as a dominant figure, if not the dominant figure of integration theory. However, to make a similar claim in regards to Diez might be puzzling. Although I admit that the reach of Diez's analysis is certainly not comparable to Moravcsik's, Diez does represent a distinctively different approach to European integration, different even from other so-called "constructivists" (see Smith 1999). Given this, I suggest that he is dominant or major insofar as he is to some extent the progenitor of an alternative reading of "Europe" and the integration process. Undoubtedly the decision by the editors of the journal *Millennium* to publish an exchange between Diez and Moravcsik was not an accident.

Wiener's recent article suggests (1999), a few publications lately indicate that constructivism is now regarded as a serious approach to European integration. For me, the most hope of challenging the boundaries of integration theory lies here. However, as my discussion of Rosamond in particular suggests, I am also concerned with looking at European integration as a series of complicated phenomena occurring throughout the world, not as some *sui generis* phenomena only for the purview of integration theory. In short, I find little use in reifying the boundaries between international relations theory and comparative politics, and asking the extent to which integration theory is closer to one or the other. As both Diez's and Moravcsik's approaches suggest, understanding "Europe" necessitates understanding a series of phenomena that international relations theory, international political economy, and political theory are all grappling with. Thus, I begin from the assumption that critical theories of international relations are not asking questions that are irrelevant to European integration.

Secondly, while I do endeavour to provide a picture of contemporary integration theory, by way of an analysis of Diez and Moravcsik, I also examine these figures in relation to contemporary challenges to the integration process. That is, to what extent do these approaches to European integration attempt to come to terms with the changes to existing notions of political authority, sovereignty, political community and legitimacy that are so prevalent in the integration process? In short, I do not propose to provide a new alternative theory of European integration, but rather examine these two crucial figures in order to understand whether they provide some place to begin re-thinking integration in a different way.

Chapter two of this thesis focuses on "Vicious Circles and Critical Moments" of European integration. In the course of this discussion I develop further the notion of critical moments, and suggest that we are now in the grips of such a moment. In order to illustrate this

point, I draw on the theoretical work of Rob Walker and some exploration of Joschka Fischer's recent speech on "the finality of integration." Walker's theoretical work in concert with Fischer's speech exemplifies the extent to which conceptualisations of European integration have changed very little over the last fifty years, suggesting the need for alternative visions of integration. Fischer's speech also speaks to the extent to which alternative visions of integration are seen as relevant even outside the imaginary realm of professors and philosophers. This leads to Chapter three and Moravcsik.

In chapter three, I focus specifically on the work of Andrew Moravcsik, and in chapter four, follow the same procedure with Diez. In both cases I explore why I have chosen to engage with these figures, discuss what their essential arguments are, and to what extent their discussions provide promise for helping the integration process through the recent dilemmas that I have stated here. For the most part, the discussion I present in chapter three and four is largely concerned with exploring the approaches of these two authors, leaving the more critical discussion to the concluding chapter.

Chapter five follows closely on chapters three and four, and in some sense can be read in direct dialogue with chapter two. Chapter three and four serve primarily as descriptions of Moravcsik's and Diez's approaches, leaving the critical discussion concerned with the extent to which these approaches point to a starting point from which alternative visions of European governance might be constructed to chapter five. Here, I return to Diez and Moravcsik, and critically (re)assess how these approaches might challenge the boundaries of contemporary European integration theory, and more importantly, come to terms with what they offer in the way of alternative visions. This chapter then follows a line of brief speculation into how these alternative visions might help to re-imagine politics beyond sovereignty, and better come to

terms with the present challenges faced by the integration project. Finally, this chapter ends with a brief conclusion and summation of the argument. Now, on to vicious circles and critical moments.

2 VICIOUS CIRCLES AND CRITICAL MOMENTS⁹

Round and round the circle
 Completing the charm
 So the knot be unknotted
 The cross be uncrossed
 The crooked be made straight
 And the curse be ended

T S. Eliot *The Family Reunion* (1939)

2.1 VISION(ARIES) OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

In May of 2000, Joschka Fischer presented a speech at Humboldt University in Berlin¹⁰, that seemed to symbolise an increasing amount of helplessness among European decision-makers in the face of challenges to the integration project. His speech also seemed to suggest that theoretical work on European integration was not accomplishing its task by failing to provide “visions for Europe” I pointed out in chapter one, that for the most part, integration theory has not been concerned with creating any visions. For the most part, it has endeavoured to fully understand why integration has occurred, and what forces have been responsible for the increased or decreased integration. Yet Fischer’s speech can be read as a call from the wilderness, begging for some visions of Europe that might enable the existing EU to come to terms with Eastern enlargement and the necessary precondition for this project: institutional and policy reform. Following Fischer’s speech, some figures applauded it, and even echoed his sentiment, while others chastised him publicly for many of the ideas proposed in the course of his speech. Here I hope to investigate why there has been such a diverse array of responses to

⁹ Much of this chapter was presented at the Fourth Biennial Conference of ECSA-C in Quebec City, QC July 30 – August 1, 2000. It was presented in collaboration with Konrad A. Cedro – who deserves much credit for this argument – under the title: “Integration Theory, Enlargement, and “Europe”: Why is Joschka Fischer Wrong?”

¹⁰ See Appendix 1

Fischer's speech, from those who labelled him a Nazi,¹¹ to those who echoed his sentiment in major speeches,¹² and the extent to which Fischer, and most of us for that matter, are trapped

Joschka Fischer's much talked about speech of May 2000 at Humboldt University is problematic for much more than its ethnocentric overtones, such zealotry is rarely out of earshot in discourses surrounding Europe. In fact, some would even go so far as to say that the disastrous socio-political experiments of the twentieth century were often ugly, but not surprising attempts at constructing a true Europe – one that took its own self-righteousness and civilizational superiority seriously (Mazower 2000). Given this, Fischer might be granted a place in Europe's long history that portrays itself as “an adventure of decisive significance for the whole of mankind” (Rougemont 1965: 11). Surely late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century sensibilities shy away from such accounts of “Europe”, guilty of wiping away awkward Euro-centric beliefs. However, the uneasiness surrounding Fischer following his May speech goes much deeper than distaste towards some perceived contemporary incarnation of Euro-centrism. Viler was what he was willing to express in a public forum, as a public official attempting to shed the mantle of his political responsibilities – a *vision for Europe*. However corrupt or less than imaginative, Fischer argued – vociferously in fact – that in order for “Europe” to progress and the integration process to continue, a vision is necessary. Unfortunately, what Fischer deemed the necessary vision was not well received by many Europeans.

With almost wild abandonment, Fischer makes important statements that deserve attention – not least of which, his commitment to “Enlargement as quickly as possible” and the “finality of European integration”. These issues, among others, occupy my attention later in this

¹¹ The French Interior Minister publicly referred to Fischer as a “Nazi” following Fischer's Humboldt University speech.

¹² President Jacques Chirac gave a speech at the German Parliament that re-stated many of the proposals made by Fischer.

chapter, as an avenue into what I believe is a critical moment in the history of European integration. Most importantly, what Fischer's speech and the subsequent reactions to it suggest is that discourse, or what Diez calls "speaking Europe" (Diez 1999b), does in fact affect the process of integration and the construction of "Europe". Therefore, the role of theorist should not be taken lightly, nor should the capacity one has as a theorist – or one who "speaks Europe" – to provide alternative visions for "Europe" be underestimated. It is this responsibility, or possibility if you will, that drives much of the discussion in this chapter. As a result, my interrogation of Fischer is focused on a number of key elements that I believe his speech symbolizes.

Fischer's speech provides a vision of/for "Europe", and regardless of how correct or palatable this vision may or may not be, the importance of a vision is a critical point contained in Fischer's speech. Similarly, the fact that Fischer deemed it necessary to articulate this vision publicly also offers up some important considerations, namely, the assumption that the actions and proclamations of decision-makers, academics, bureaucrats and so on (the discourse) has some relevance to "the political". As William Connolly made clear in an article written in the early 1980s, attempts to ignore language, and expunge the contestability of terms for political inquiry – or what one might term "discourse" – can only be read as an attempt to escape politics (Connolly 1983). Unfortunately, much of European integration theory has been remiss in this respect, and for much of the time can be read as little more than an elaborate attempt to escape politics. Fischer's head-on collision with politics, and the subsequent reactionary responses from French Interior Minister Chevenement and others might indicate that many actors have already assumed that politics has been locked away elsewhere – the appeal of "Europe" being its non-politics. This is the crucial point where Fischer's speech, and my own commitments to

challenging the limits of contemporary integration theory, and more broadly, the limits of the political imagination, intersects

In sum, I take this brief look at Fischer's controversial speech in the context of this discussion about the limits of integration theory for a number of reasons. First, Fischer is a policy maker and political figure – not a member of what Andrew Moravcsik refers to as the “imaginary world of professors and philosophers” (Moravcsik 1999c: 373)¹³. Or is he? Part of what is appealing about Fischer is the extent to which he seems to be making an attempt at (re)imagining politics, suggesting that such endeavours are not confined to academic spaces. Secondly, Fischer's speech demonstrates how little “visions of Europe” have changed. From the Monnet method, to Delors' concentric circles vision, one can trace what Konrad A. Cedro and I have referred to as “Vicious Circles of European Integration” (Cedro and Muller, 2000). Unlike the passage from T. S. Eliot with which this chapter begins, it appears that the curse of *circles* has not been broken. Thus, Fischer is also useful in that he acts as an indicator to see how much (or how little) visions of European integration have developed. Finally, Fischer's speech illustrates the (im)possibility of advocating a pro-European stance – that is a standpoint that believes “Europe” can be more than merely the site of well-developed intergovernmental bargaining – without advocating a Federal Europe. The extent to which this is clear in the so-called “Constructivist Turn” in European integration theory will be expanded here. What is important now is this: Fischer expresses a vision for Europe, a noble deed and important indicator of how far conceptualisations of “Europe” have come. Unfortunately, because his vision is tied up in the vicious circles of integration theory, Fischer's speech is limiting, rather than emancipatory as it was intended.

¹³ This statement was made by Moravcsik when referring to Diez's critique of Moravcsik's book, *The Choice for Europe*. I discuss this in greater detail in chapter three and four.

I begin this discussion by providing an intellectual context for my examination of Fischer, drawing on the work of influential figures such as Rob Walker, and recent constructivist/reflectivist scholarship on European integration theory. Following this, I pursue Fischer with greater fervour, and in the context of his speech, I also develop the idea of “critical moments”. What does Fischer’s speech tell us about dominant (mis)understandings about “Europe”? Why do I believe Fischer’s vision is wrong? How does this examination of Fischer’s speech relate to the overall argument regarding the limitations of contemporary theories of European integration? These are all critically important questions, and hopefully the discussion of these issues will make my decision to examine Fischer’s speech in the context of this thesis clear. If anything, the reader will notice that this chapter is closely linked to the final chapter, more closely than it is to chapters three and four. It is this chapter and the concluding chapter that frame my discussion of the two pivotal figures in contemporary integration theory: Andrew Moravcsik and Thomas Diez.

2.2 CONSTRUCTIVISM AND POST-STRUCTURALIST IR: WALKER, SOVEREIGNTY AND “EUROPE”

For the better part of its existence, European integration theory has followed much of the precepts of policy analysis, asking questions about who gets what, where, when and how. The central concern has been with sovereignty – why have states decided to relinquish it to some form of supranational authority? This will become particularly clear in the next chapter that deals with Moravcsik’s research – in fact, Moravcsik uses a variation on this question as his central concern, which given his influence on EU scholarship, the significance of this question can hardly be denied. However, a recent special issue in the *Journal of European Public Policy* suggests that an increasing number of scholars are interested in examining “Europe” with some

different questions in mind (Christiansen, Jørgensen, and Wiener 1999). The contributions in this special issue range from more nuanced articulations of federalism in Europe (Koslowski 1999b), to Wittgensteinian notions of constitutionalism in the context of the EU (Shaw 1999), and even the role of language in constructing “Europe” (Diez 1999b). Many observers have pointed out that for varying reasons, parcelling these discussions together under a single heading is almost impossible (see Smith 1999, Moravcsik 1999c). However, what seems common to these approaches is their dissatisfaction with existing research on “Europe”, and their insistence on examining “Europe” as a site where a number of interesting phenomena play out in interesting ways – rather than some *sui generis* phenomenon needing its own compartmentalised descriptions and explanations. Diez is a pivotal figure among this recent “turn” in theoretical work on “Europe” – but given the fact that chapter four is completely devoted to Diez, I will not explore his work here. However, since Rob Walker is better known as a post-structuralist International Relations theorist, or a theorist of the limits of the political imagination (Matthews 2000), rather than an integration theorist, this is an apt place to introduce some of his more influential ideas on “Europe”.

A recent article on Europe by Walker titled, “Europe is Not Where it is Supposed to Be” raises a number of important issues that question how integration theorists handle “Europe”. Walker rarely strays far from an interrogation of sovereignty. Not the sovereignty of simple cartography and colourful maps, but sovereignty as a convincingly powerful practice that negotiates the relation between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion, subject and object, and universal and particular.¹⁴ In his recent article, Walker suggests that part of the problem in contemporary integration theory is the extent to which analysis of “Europe” depend on

¹⁴ For an elaborated version of this argument, see Walker 1993; Walker *forthcoming*

unchallenged assumptions about where, and therefore what Europe is (Walker 2000b). The sovereigntist inspired vision of politics remains in check, leaving debates about “Europe” little alternative but the well rehearsed narratives in favour of integration – that are only read as threats to the sovereign authority of the state – and thus the opposing visions suggest “Europe” can be little more than a site of intergovernmental cooperation. Both aforementioned accounts of “Europe” are predicated on fictional accounts of sovereignty that portray it as fixed and immobile. That is, sovereignty in the Westphalian sense – nothing more, nothing less.

To some extent, Walker’s analysis in this article and elsewhere¹⁵ forces one to come to terms with the Schmittean moment¹⁶ – a point at which the location/authority of sovereignty is less in question. In this regard, the argument surrounding Fischer’s speech, and many other discussions of European integration that demonstrate concern over the “loss” of sovereignty at the domestic/national level are based on comfortable mythology. One need only look at the Schengen accords,¹⁷ or even more explicit, the small communities on the northern coast of Morocco, which are in fact Spain, and thus “Europe”. These “colonies” – Ceuta and Melilla – represent camps more than communities, and are clear manifestations of the sovereign power of “Europe”. Barriers have been constructed to ward-off sub-Saharan asylum seekers, in a conscious effort to make “fortress Europe” more than just a clichéd phrase in academia (see Harding 2000). In short, by drawing our attention to more complicated conceptualisations of sovereignty, Walker’s analysis helps to demystify the either-or debates surrounding sovereignty that are more than prevalent in integrationist discourse.

¹⁵ Walker 1993, 1997, *forthcoming*. For a good discussion of sovereign power in the contemporary context, see the recent special issue of *Alternatives* 2000. See also Agamben 1998, in which the argument that sovereign power is best exemplified in the camp – the camp as *nomos*.

¹⁶ Walker has begun to grapple with the work of Carl Schmitt most explicitly in some recent work, such as Walker *forthcoming*, Walker and Edkins 2000. See also Schmitt 1996 [1932].

¹⁷ For discussions about Schengen and related security concerns, see Den Boer 1996, Lutz 1997, Mandel 1994, McSweeney 1998, Meijers et al. 1992).

In *Inside/outside International Relations as Political Theory* (1993), Walker develops what he calls, the *Theme of Gulliver*. This seemingly simple but nonetheless powerful metaphor is both a good summation of Walker's work, and a concept well suited to explain the extent to which Fischer (and most of us for that matter) seems unable to imagine politics beyond sovereignty. Admittedly, this version of the political like all others depends on a number of assumptions and particular readings of early modern and modern political thought.¹⁸ The extent to which Walker's account of the political – and here I am reading the *Theme of Gulliver* as a summation of his argument in *Inside/outside*¹⁹ – depends on a belief that sovereignty has and continues to have a central if not principal role in constructing the limits of the political imagination. As I pointed out in the introduction, much scholarship on “Europe” grappling with how various political practices of citizenship, community and so on, play out in the context of an integrated and integrating Europe are some of the most fruitful and theoretical sophisticated accounts of Europe and the integration process that exist. Much of Walker's analysis is concerned with first indicating the extent to which our understanding(s) of these practices – by practices I mean how community, citizenship, democracy, authority and so on are articulated and conceptualised – are limited by their ascendancy to sovereignty.

Rather than reading sovereignty merely in terms of the nation-states level of self-determination, Walker draws our attention to Schmittean notions of sovereignty – a concept of sovereignty that even in a so-called globalised age seems ubiquitous. One need only look at the recent protests in Seattle and elsewhere during meetings of the World Trade Organisation

¹⁸ For the most cogent example of Walker's reading of the history of early modern and modern political thought and its impact on theories of international relations, see Walker 1993.

¹⁹ The notion of reading Walker's *Theme of Gulliver* as a summary of his overall project is well documented in Ian Matthews' account of Walker's research, Matthews 2000.

(WTO)²⁰ The WTO speaks to the dislocation of authority, specific challenges to national sovereignty in the areas of agriculture and manufacturing to name just two, and yet on the streets outside, sovereignty seems to be anything but challenged – to suggest it has been rearticulated even seems misplaced in the context of the “Seattle street fights” many of us witnessed in the media. The paradoxical claims made by those discussing sovereignty do not seem confined to Walker’s analysis alone. In sum, Walker’s analysis prompts us to read sovereignty in many ways simultaneously. Organisations such as the WTO might indicate that sovereignty is being cast into the dustbin of history, yet the war in Kosovo, the creation of a “Fortress Europe” by Schengen, and even on the streets outside many recent WTO meetings suggest that sovereignty will not be found in any dustbins. Why is this relevant to the discussion presented here?

To some extent, this question cannot be answered in full at this point in the thesis. A closer look at Moravcsik’s and Diez’s discussions of integration will create a better context in which questions of sovereignty and European integration can be addressed. As I mentioned earlier, Moravcsik’s entire project is driven by the question, why have national governments chosen – in some instances – to give up sovereignty to supranational authorities? Although his approach is different, Diez is also concerned with problems of sovereignty and integration, and how politics (and sovereignty) can be (re)articulated and (re)conceptualised in the context of an integrated “Europe”. Thus, the introduction of Walker’s analysis – particularly his discussions of sovereignty – in this context should be anything but surprising. What it means to speak about sovereignty in “Europe”, and elsewhere given the increased telecommunications technology and interconnectedness that suggests an overall rearticulation of space and time requires a broader

²⁰ The WTO summit in Seattle in late November early December 1999 was the site of massive protests, arrests, and rioting. This summit was followed by another WTO meeting in Washington, DC, at which time the city (state) of Washington became one many referred to as an “armed camp” which made the type of street violence and police chases that were witnessed in Seattle almost impossible.

reading of sovereignty than the strictly Westphalian sense. Reading sovereignty in this more complicated way, through the metaphor of *Gulliver*, stops us from being easily seduced into believing in Fischer's speech, and the more deeply rooted assertion that the only possibility for the European project to continue is via federalism – ergo, sovereignty. At this point, it is important to develop the notion of “critical moments” in order to set a context for Fischer's speech, and my contention that contemporary integration theory should be more involved in reconceptualising “Europe” by challenging the boundaries of existing European integration theory.

2.3 “FISCHING” FOR CRITICAL MOMENTS

By now, it should be obvious that when employing the term “Europe” I, and discourses surrounding Europe more generally, are referring to anything but a static geographical entity. As *The Economist* recently pointed out (Feb. 12th-18th 2000), the answer to the question “What is Europe?” does not begin with geography. “Europe” has come to be almost synonymous – at the very least a reference to – a complicated network of relations and practices, commercial interaction, trade, policy integration, cultural reconfiguration, identity (re)construction, and so on. In a sense, “Europe” has come to a similar end as “Globalisation”: something that is both everywhere and nowhere (see Walker, *forthcoming*). Like globalisation, Europe is located in discourse – it is enlarging from here to (t)here. Complications arise when one realizes that “(t)here” suddenly becomes here, in this process that is often read as some *sui generis* peaceful ongoing annexation of territory. Soon EU-rope will equal Europe. Some understanding of how I employ, or at the very least problematise the often-uncontested notion of “Europe” is important if

anything is to come of this discussion “Europe” that is more than geography and the dyadic logic of sovereignty is a “Europe” I believe worth examining

In this section, I discuss Fischer’s speech in more detail, which also leads me to briefly point to previous “visions of/for Europe” such as Jacques Delors’ concentric circles. However, before progressing it is necessary to provide some understanding of what the phrase “critical moment” is referring to. Although it is to some extent little more than precisely that – a critical moment – I rely on this concept to contextualise Fischer’s speech as an exemplar as far as “visions of Europe” are concerned.

“Critical moments” is one way to organize a historical reading of European integration. Not unlike some recent attempts at surveying the historical development of European integration theory (Rosamond 2000)²¹, dividing the development of integration theory into critical moments does not completely alter the familiar history of integration theory. The Gaullist moment(s) – comprised of empty chairs and old ideas – gave rise to the realist/liberal inspired approach of Stanley Hoffmann (1966, 1982). Whether “obstinate or obsolete”, Hoffmann’s work marks a critical moment in the development of integration theory. So too, Haas’s self-critical articles in the early 1970s (1971, 1976) suggested that most scholars of European integration were seduced by the image of Europe as an emerging state – bigger and higher than the states that comprise it (Haas 1971).²² Not surprisingly, like the timing of Hoffmann’s approach that seemed to be a reaction to the Gaullist episodes, Haas was undoubtedly responding to the late 1960s and early 1970s, at which time the world seemed upside down to some. A pattern of critical moments, to which theories of European integration react, seems to be anything but a groundbreaking

²¹ Rosamond’s discussion of the historical development of European integration is good, but not revolutionary. However, chapter 8 of his recent text deserves particular attention, since it examines some more pressing questions in contemporary integration theory and its relationship/situation with(in) the social sciences. Compare with Caporaso 1998, Moravcsik 1999c, Wæver 1998.

²² This theme is also explored further in Walker 2000.

assertion. The extent to which theories of European integration seem to mirror or at least attempt at reflecting the changes and shifts in the decision-making/policy-making arena(s) is what deserves attention here. The intent here is to suggest that a) we have reached another critical moment in the development of European integration (and theory), and (b) rather than merely reflect the changes in integration, new theory, or at the very least innovations among existing theories should attempt to provide a “vision for Europe”, rather than embark on the familiar exercise of reification which seems to have dominated much of the history of European integration theory. Fischer’s speech, in this sense, seems to be a symptomatic example of the critical moment in both the integration process, and the accompanying theories of European integration.

Fischer and Gulliver

In his speech at Humboldt University, Fischer argued that the future of “Europe”, as always depends decisively on France and Germany – here is the core or “centre of gravity” of Fischer’s “Europe”. Fischer’s speech can be characterized by a number of themes, one being the strong need for a Franco-German “centre of gravity” at the heart of “Europe” in order to ensure the stability and viability of the integration process. Already the potential for re-imagining politics in “Europe” seems lost. Fischer wastes no time re-constructing the understanding of political community given by sovereignty, and re-instating the hierarchal structure of this community. This follows on another of Fischer’s themes: enlargement. Like Walker’s depiction of how the European integration process is read by most observers (Walker 2000b), Fischer’s vision appears to hold some hope for a more “European Europe”. So much so, in fact, that Fischer often refers to “the finality of integration”, and combined with his belief in “enlargement as quickly as possible” the picture seems clear. Fischer wants the Europe of the EU to equal

some mythological primordial Europe. He suggests that “Europe” was never exclusive, “but was always open to other European states, and so it should remain until finality has been achieved”. As I have already alluded, conceptualising “Europe” with some type of “finality” in mind is problematic, to the extent that it appears to inevitably lead to some notion of a “bigger” and “better” polity – something Ernst Haas warned about already in the early 1970s (Haas 1971). As Martin Wight pointed out in his seminal paper “Why There is No International Theory”:

Practical problems of international politics are often described in terms of building a bigger and better state – a European Union or an Atlantic Community or an Arab Union, without seeing that such an achievement would leave the problems of inter-state politics precisely where they were (Wight 1966: 20)

Bigger certainly does not always mean better, although given some lamentations over the “Balkanisation” of the globe, it is easy to see the appeal of such discussions.²³ But there is more to Fischer’s speech than these seemingly superficial concerns – namely his unspoken allegiance to the *Theme of Gulliver*.

Fischer is obviously excited about the potential that the integration process holds for spreading peace and prosperity throughout “Europe”. The timing of Fischer’s enthusiasm is not surprising, given the ongoing challenges to peace that seem to persist on the margins of the EU. The Balkans seem anything but stable, and the recent so-called “Kosovo Crisis”²⁴ that depending on one’s political allegiance was an act of aggression or intervention sparked increased enthusiasm for a “European” Foreign and Security Policy. This renewed interest in the second and third pillars of the Maastricht Treaty – CFSP and JHA – compounded with increasing

²³ Many of these discussions are framed in terms of globalisation, that is, tribalism or Balkanisation as by-products of the loosely bound set of phenomena referred to as globalisation. For less than inspirational versions of this story, that deserve recognition merely because of the influence they have had, see Barber 1995, Friedman 1999, Kaplan 1995. For a good account of these forces that perceives such issues in a more positive light and address such issues in a very tactile way, see Smith and Naim 2000.

²⁴ Where the “Kosovo Crisis” begins or ends (if ever) is a particularly difficult call to make. However, for the purpose of this discussion, I refer primarily to the period leading up to and including the NATO bombing raids on Serbian targets in the former Yugoslavia for 78 days from March to June 1999. For an insightful discussion of many of the issues that also arose in Kosovo but in a slightly different context, see Campbell 1998.

pressure to enlarge the union in the wake of appalling voter turnout for European parliamentary elections, the dismissal of the Commission and overall institutional crisis makes for an interesting context for Fischer. This less than rosy picture of the EU that prompted Fischer, among others,²⁵ to voice a more positive vision for the future of “Europe”. To put it simply, a critical moment has been reached. Unfortunately, Fischer appears to be unable (like most) to remove the shackles of sovereignty. Whether or not he was able to shed the mantle of German Foreign Minister is not the question for this discussion, but he certainly seemed unable to provide a truly “visionary vision”. Even great shipwrecks could not jar Gulliver into worlds that differed in anything more than scale, so perhaps expecting Fischer to re-imagine politics “beyond sovereignty” is also too much to ask.

Fischer’s belief in “enlargement as quickly as possible” and “the finality of integration” are not surprising claims, and although one might have a number of reservations about such arguments, they are by no means the most problematic elements of his speech. Reinstating a core or what Fischer refers to as a “centre of gravity” is problematic, in that it precludes the possibility to re-imagine politics in a way other than the structure given by sovereignty. However, perhaps most problematic is his insistence on a “Federal Europe”. Again, it seems impossible to advocate the integration project without running against some intergovernmental reading of the union and advocating some form of federalism. I find this most problematic about Fischer’s speech, and the status of contemporary debates among theories of European integration. Although this point will become clearer later in this thesis, particularly in chapter four on Diez, I believe that although the EU does not represent a wholly *sui generis*

²⁵ Following Fischer’s speech in May 2000, Mr. Fabius made an important speech advocating the powerful role of the Euro in creating a stronger European identity. In July, French President Jacques Chirac made a speech at the German parliament advocating many of Fischer’s proposals, particularly his Franco-German “centre of gravity”. Some observers pointed out that Chirac was both bolder and vaguer than Fischer in his speech. See *The Economist*, (June 3rd – 9th 2000, July 1st – 7th 2000).

phenomenon, it is important to recognize the latent potential in the European project, the potential to imagine politics in an entirely new way. This theme is recurring throughout the thesis, but it is most explicitly dealt with in the final chapter. Examining Moravcsik's research, and more importantly in this regard, Diez's, allows for one to more clearly perceive the limitations of European integration theory. Limited to the extent that theories of European integration seems trapped into competing for the best explanation of why the Maastricht Treaty looks the way that it does, or who was most instrumental in the construction of the European Central Bank (ECB) and why, or even what will the outcome of Nice be, and why²⁶. By focusing on these issues alone, integration theory has lost its tie to political theory – if you will, a search for something better. Rather than provide alternative visions for politics, in the context of “Europe”, integration theory has become almost inhospitable to such projects, which is in part why such a discussion is so difficult in this context. To those who would suggest that such a project is in the imaginary world of professors and philosophers, and out of touch with reality, I would ask them to think again. However vague it might sound, something interesting is going on in “Europe” and in “the world” for that matter, something that challenges the boundaries of contemporary modes of understanding.

Although Warren Magnusson has suggested that imagining a politics beyond the limits of sovereignty is almost inconceivable,²⁷ it should not be ignored. “Europe” and the integration process are not completely *sui generis* phenomena in many ways. The increased “trans-national” character of many phenomena call into question dominant notions of inclusion and exclusion.

²⁶ Here I am referring to the possible construction of the Nice Treaty, in December 2000.

²⁷ This is from a conference presentation given by Warren Magnusson at York University on “Governance and the Politics of Scale: Democracy, Capitalism and Power in a Global Age.” It was later published in the online publication “The JetLagged News” [ISSN 1492-5834] <http://www.jetlaggednews.com>. This paper in a slightly altered version will appear in an upcoming volume: *The Third Way and the Quest for Social Justice: The Normative Claims and Policy Initiatives of the New Social-Democratic Left at the End of the 20th Century*, Oliver Schmidtke, (ed.).

given by sovereignty. The territorial sovereign state is no longer the only, or arguably even the most important force that distinguishes between the included and the excluded. Even the recent G8 summit in July 2000 spoke of crossing the “technological divide”. In short, inclusion and exclusion has gone beyond the limits of sovereignty, and is no longer politically relevant only in the context of being inside or outside a territorial (or culturally/ethnically defined) political community. What makes the study of “Europe” unique is the extent to which these phenomena seem to have proliferated. Whereas globalisation (however defined) is certainly an attempt at labelling something that seems to be reconfiguring and rearticulating how political community is defined, and thus, how “politics” functions, European integration seems to be expediting some of these phenomena. Given this, speaking about “Europe” in the way that Fischer and others have is problematic. We need to rethink and reconceptualise how political community is defined, and perhaps more importantly how and where we locate politics or political authority. Pursuing some alternative vision(s) is difficult, not only because it is attempting to give some shape to a highly complicated set of relations and practices that make up “Europe”, but because sovereignty has been so successful in articulating an elegant relation between the included and the excluded. While this discussion from its outset can undoubtedly be read as an exercise in advocating the need for moving “beyond”, even Magnusson is sceptical, but nonetheless hopeful of such a project.

A Politics beyond sovereignty defies description in advance of its formation. It is literally inconceivable. And yet, it is a kind of politics we have long practiced. It is certainly the only alternative to a politics of nostalgia (Magnusson 2000).

What Magnusson’s statement tells us is of the utmost importance to the discussion here.

Namely, many of the points I raise in the course of this thesis, at times in somewhat complicated terms, is exceedingly simple – perhaps so obvious that it is often missed. The so-called

rearticulation of space and time, the dislocation of authority and thus, politics, challenges to existing notions of political community, citizenship and so on are all phenomena that we confront on a daily basis when we interact on the internet, fly here and (t)here, support some indigenous cause in India or Australia, have two passports, lose one's job to overseas workers and so on (see Iyer 2000) What often sound vague and esoteric, are in fact concrete practices that are very real for the participants, and it is this "reality" that integration theory seems to pass over.

The next two chapters will discuss some of the many issues I have raised here in the context of two central figures in European integration theory: Andrew Moravcsik and Thomas Diez. For the most part my discussion of these figures poses some relatively simple but logical questions regarding why I have chosen to explore these figures, what they tell us about the status of contemporary theories of European integration, and what elements of their approaches challenge the boundaries of existing integration theory. Many of the concerns raised in this chapter are reawakened in the concluding chapter, after discussing Moravcsik's and Diez's contribution to contemporary integration theory. However, this is not to say that my own belief in providing alternative visions for the integration process through theoretical work on "Europe" is absent. Questions about the need for a more complicated reading of sovereignty, an articulation of political authority that is conscious of the increasing dislocation of authority, and more complicated definitions of political community and citizenship able to conceptualise multiple identities, simultaneous authorities, and permeable political communities are concerns never too far in the background. The inability of contemporary theories of European integration to come to terms with these challenges is constantly lurking in the background of my examination of Moravcsik and Diez, but it resurfaces most noticeably in the concluding chapter.

3 MORAVCSIKIAN MOMENTS: A CHOICE FOR EUROPE?

The functional process was used in order to “make Europe”, once Europe began being made, the process collided with the question “making Europe what for?” The process is like a grinding action that can only work if someone keeps giving it something to grind. When the users start quarrelling and stop providing, the machine stops (Hoffmann 1966: 886).

3.1 MORAVCSIK: THE NOBLEST OF FAILURES?

Why Moravcsik?

In an email exchange with Amy Verdun, Andrew Moravcsik provided what is both an apt summation of his own scholarship, and what is for me, the attractive element of his work. In this exchange, Moravcsik argues that his most notable publication thus far, *The Choice for Europe*, is not a polemic against neofunctionalism because he is attempting to avoid the discipline of integration theory altogether, for Moravcsik, integration theory is “an area of study simultaneously under-theorised and over-theorised”²⁸. Applause! Obviously, Moravcsik’s own commitments to a neorealist/neoliberal project do not sit well with my own analysis, yet, Moravcsik’s aspirations are noble nonetheless. Part of what is appealing, is Moravcsik’s argument that favours reading “Europe” in terms of broader international relations theory, rather than reifying integration theory as a distinct sub-discipline. Furthermore, Moravcsik rejects the prevalent belief that European integration is *sui generis*, and as a result, in need of a distinct theoretical approach. Unfortunately, while Moravcsik demonstrates an acute awareness of integration theory’s flaws, his own attempt to re-think integration theory is unsuccessful. In sum, I have chosen to read Moravcsik’s contribution to European integration theory as the most noble

²⁸ Quoted from an email exchange between Amy Verdun and Andrew Moravcsik that was a dialogue about a review of Moravcsik’s *The Choice for Europe*, written by Verdun. See Verdun 1999a.

and great of aspirations, and simultaneously, the greatest failure. Thus, I will argue that

Moravcsik's project is a "noble failure".

To argue that Moravcsik is not right on the mark when it comes to explaining/understanding European integration theory is nothing new. Many have provided critical discussions of Moravcsik (see Caporaso 1999; Diez 1999a, Muller 1999, Scharpf 1999, Verdun 1999b, Wallace 1999) yet he continues to receive much respect and avoids being maligned in much of the literature. So why discuss Moravcsik? Two reasons. First, Moravcsik is often credited with reawakening debates surrounding European integration, making discussions of contemporary integration theory void of Moravcsik incomplete to say the least. Secondly, Moravcsik is one of the few scholars who has been treated as a major figure among European integration theorists, while simultaneously calling for an end to the insular and often self-congratulatory scholarship that occupies much of European integration theory. Moravcsik (and Diez, whom I discuss later) is a prominent figure in the integration literature, and yet like Diez, he is attempting to put an end to European integration theory's elaborate masquerade as a discipline and/or political theory.

I begin my discussion of Moravcsik by tracing his work, in order to create a foundation from which a more critical discussion of his contribution(s) might be launched. Obviously his 1991 article and later 1993 article – which are often held responsible for the rebirth of integration theory – are logical starting points. However, Moravcsik's origins are still evident in his more recent work of a decade later. Most importantly, his long awaited book, *The Choice for Europe*, draws on much of his earlier research,²⁹ and thus, much of my discussion here will be in conversation with *The Choice for Europe*. I focus on the points of interest within Moravcsik's

²⁹ Some have argued that Moravcsik's book has strategically left out some of his more controversial work, particularly his 1994 contribution. See Scharpf 1998.

work that have driven this discussion thus far. Namely, what are the problems with contemporary European integration theory? How does Moravcsik challenge the “status-quo” as it were, in contemporary integration theory? The relationship between the “policy world” and the world of integration theory, as well as the viability or (im)possibility of European integration theory, are two mildly related points to which Moravcsik has much to contribute. After completing the discussion about Moravcsik, I conclude by drawing together the analyses on Moravcsik and Diez, before embarking on a more sustained examination of Diez in the next chapter.

From whence he came . . .

Any discussion of Moravcsik’s early work would be remiss if it ignored the intellectual influences on him – namely his PhD supervisors Stanley Hoffmann and Robert Keohane. Stanley Hoffmann’s articles are particularly notable in this respect. As I alluded earlier in this thesis, it is my contention that the history of European integration (and integration theory) can be read as a series of critical moments. Hoffmann’s articles are clear examples of how theories of European integration attempt to cope with these so-called critical moments. The Gaullist moment(s), which involved the empty chair crisis, and the subsequent Luxembourg Compromise in 1966 called neofunctionalism into question. The “revolutions” in 1968, the OPEC crisis in the early 1970s and the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system combined to create a feeling that “the world” was no longer amenable with the idealist inspired neofunctionalist vision. In response, Hoffmann, among others, began to theorise about Europe in a way that gave priority to the sovereign state.³⁰ This period saw Ernst Haas – the father of neofunctionalism – critique the method he had advocated for so long (Haas 1971, 1976). When Haas spoke of the “Joy and

³⁰ For a particularly convincing argument that situates Hoffmann’s theoretical contributions within the historical development of the integration process in Europe, see Rosamond 2000: particularly 74-81.

Anguish” of integration theory at the beginning of Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold’s

volume, *Regional Integration*, one gets the feeling that the anguish outweighed the joy (Haas 1971). Haas’s believed that although theories of European integration seemed methodologically and theoretically sound, most scholars were all too easily seduced by the imagery of Europe as a bigger and better version of the states incorporated into it (Haas 1971).³¹ And later, Haas claimed that although integration theorists could undoubtedly come up with better explanations of integration, “the effort is probably not worth while” (Haas 1976: 174). This is the context from which Hoffmann emerged critical of neofunctionalist arguments, and from a background in international relations theory, not the increasingly burgeoning field of European integration theory that believed strongly in its own *sui generis*. It is on the heels of these transitions, or responses to critical moments in the history of integration theory that Moravcsik emerges.

Much like Hoffmann, Moravcsik’s contribution to European integration theory began at a critical moment. After a period of what many analysts refer to as “Eurosclerosis” or “disintegration”, the 1980s saw a revival in the integration process. This thesis does not intend to contribute to debates about who or what was responsible for sparking this revival in the integration project, merely to say that this revival constitutes another critical moment in the development of European integration (theory). Like Hoffmann’s contributions that seem to have been responses to, among other things, the Gaullist experience, Moravcsik’s early work is in response to the renewal of European integration. Most notably, the Single European Act (SEA) – which Moravcsik’s first major article addresses – seems to have sparked a revival of both integration, and theories of European integration. Although I suggested that much of Moravcsik’s approach is adequately presented within his long awaited volume, *The Choice for*

³¹ See Walker’s discussion of this in Walker 2000

Europe, his 1991 article on the SEA is almost like tea leaves for a fortune-teller. Admittedly, hindsight makes fortune telling somewhat easier. But nevertheless, the leaves left in the bottom of Moravcsik's cup deserve attention – even though the tea has long since been consumed.

Prior to Moravcsik's 1991 article, little theorising had taken place since the halcyon days of integration theory. Paul Taylor's less than revolutionary "gradualist approach" in 1983 that followed closely on the heels of Hoffmann's "Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe" in 1982 comprised the bulk of what integration theory had to offer in the 1980s³². Therefore, the impact of Moravcsik's early article should not be underestimated; in it, Moravcsik pays homage to his intellectual heritage – namely, the "modified structural realist" approach of Robert Keohane. Given the amount of collaboration between Hoffmann and Keohane, such admittance on Moravcsik's part is telling, but not surprising. Like Hoffmann, Moravcsik became the new progenitor in integration theory³³. Moravcsik focuses on what he believes to be the primary factors in the integration process: European Community (EC) institutions, lobbying transnational business elites, and the European Commission's political entrepreneurship (Moravcsik 1991: 21). The subsequent revival of institutional analysis, in various guises such as Historical Institutionalism (Pierson 1996), the focus on transnational business elites has manifested in the so-called "epistemic communities" approach (Haas 1992),³⁴ and the focus on the Commission seems ubiquitous – although not surprisingly – throughout European integration theory. In short, Moravcsik's early article can be seen as a map for the future direction(s) of

³² It should be noted that Taylor and Hoffmann were not the only figures to contribute to European integration theory in the 1980s, but their contributions have stood the test of time to a greater extent than others. For other contributions during this period, see Bulmer 1983, and various works throughout the 1980s by Alan Milward and Charles Pentland. For a good discussion that addresses some historical moments less focused here, see Rosamond 2000.

³³ See Keohane and Hoffmann 1991 for a particular insight into the intellectual milieu existing at the time of Moravcsik's "SEA" paper in 1991.

³⁴ For a particularly good example of the epistemic communities approach being applied, see Verdun 1999b.

integration theory. Admittedly, simultaneous to the publication of Moravcsik's article on the SEA was Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen's article on whether or not neofunctionalism was "Obstinate or Obsolete" (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). However, although neofunctionalist approaches also saw a revival – in varying interesting and at times awkward guises (see Corbey 1995) – for the argument here, and certainly in the eyes of most analysts (Rosamond 2000), Moravcsik's contribution had a much more noticeable impact on the development of European integration theory.

The factors Moravcsik believed were crucial elements in the integration process, and the extent to which these factors laid the groundwork for later developments in European integration theory, is not the only lasting aspect of this article. Most importantly, Moravcsik's reading of the relationship between the sovereign nation state, and the supranational institutions of the then EC leads directly to what some have termed "multi-level governance" (Marks, Hooghe, Blank 1996). For Moravcsik, such an approach is intuitive to the point of being redundant. European institutions are certainly "above" those of the state, but in the same breath, Moravcsik argues that the preservation of state sovereignty is paramount (Moravcsik 1991: 22, 24, 49)³⁵ Moravcsik's depiction of "Europe" as a bigger (although not better) polity suggests he too has fallen victim to what Haas warned of in the early 1970s. Unfortunately, Moravcsik seems to have been seduced by this vision of Europe as some "higher and bigger" polity – although with some reservations considering his strong allegiance to the sovereign state. Then, while it is clear that Moravcsik's early article on the SEA and European integration had a major impact on the development of theories of European integration, the extent to which he avoided the Haasian criticism of the past

³⁵ I discussed this in more detail in chapter two.

is less clear. Before this argument can be pursued with greater fervour, some reflection on

Moravcsik's more recent work is necessary.

3.2 A CHOICE FOR EUROPE?³⁶

Re-reading a canonical contribution

Reminiscent of Ernst B. Haas's *The Uniting of Europe*, Andrew Moravcsik's *The Choice for Europe* is an exceptional contribution to European integration literature. Like many students of European integration theory, Moravcsik is interested in explaining, "why sovereign governments in Europe have chosen repeatedly to coordinate their core economic policies and surrender sovereign prerogatives within an international institution" (Moravcsik 1998: 1). On the surface, such a statement seems anything but strange or notable within the context of European integration theory. However, there are a number of important questions that arise here, and elsewhere in Moravcsik's discussion that suggest there is "no choice" for Europe.

Moravcsik's discussion in *The Choice for Europe*, is, as I have already said, a good summation of much of his earlier work. Although somewhat better developed, the argument presented in this large volume rarely strays far from the dominant concerns in his 1991 article. Trends in technology, flows of transnational capital, entrepreneurial political actions of primary EU institutions (the Commission), and the role of domestic and transnational elites continue to occupy much of the focus of Moravcsik's more recent discussion(s). *The Choice for Europe*, focuses attention on a series of "grand bargains" involving the major domestic powers in Europe (Germany, France, and Britain), and the actions of the major supranational institutions – always at the behest of the domestic powers, however. Remedying criticism of his earlier paper,

³⁶ A portion of this discussion appeared in Muller 1999.

“Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist

Approach” (1993), Moravcsik spends much of his discussion in *The Choice for Europe*, exploring how preferences of national policy-makers/decision-makers are developed.³⁷ While the approach Moravcsik has decided to pursue has much to tell us about integration, at the same time, there are a number of silences in his discussion. Before embarking on the major elements of Moravcsik’s work that are of interest to me here, some discussion of his argument at a more general, and less theoretically complex level is in order first.

Moravcsik’s decision to present the history of European integration as a series of grand bargains, and his argument concerning the centrality of commercial interests in national preference formation, raises a number of questions. Do variations among domestic institutions affect the outcomes of interstate bargaining? Are differences among public policy traditions, because of varying cultural and historical influences, relevant to the integration process? And, are influences other than state actors worth addressing when considering the formation of national preferences and the outcomes of bargaining that result from the interplay of these national preferences? These concerns are not at the heart of my discussion here, and as such, constitute a different project than the one I have proposed. However, these “silences” within Moravcsik’s discussion, which are in part a result of his decision to portray integration as a series of largely static bargains, cannot be argued away by simply lamenting over editorial pressures.³⁸ Grand bargains are not wholly responsible for the downfall of Moravcsik’s argument, but they allow him to avoid, or at the very least challenge much of existing European integration theory. In chapter three, Moravcsik takes on the dominant account of integration that depends on a

³⁷ For a critical discussion of how “national preferences” are treated by Moravcsik, see Van Esch 2000.

³⁸ See Moravcsik’s response to the reviews in Moravcsik 1999b.

distinction between “high” and “low” politics³⁹ For him, bargaining depended and depends on the political entrepreneurship of supranational actors, the pooling of sovereignty by domestic actors, and, the delegation of power by these domestic actors, to supranational bodies such as the Commission (Moravcsik 1989: 160). For the remainder of the discussion, Moravcsik challenges the “conventional wisdom” of integration theory. After frolicking outside the cave, like some Platonic figure, Moravcsik tells us we are just looking at shadows of integration, and not the *real* location of power and authority, for this, one must emerge from the cave as Moravcsik has done. Of course, chained in front of the fire, happy with the images we see in front of us, we discount these wild claims.

Up until now, I have presented a relatively familiar discussion of Moravcsik, it is at times, bordering on innocuous. Before taking the foray into Moravcsik’s work that I plan to, in order to provide sufficient foundation for my further argument, some familiarity with his work, and how it is read in a less theoretical complex manner is important. For Moravcsik, integration is about addressing the central questions that have driven and continue to drive the better part of European integration theory. Why have sovereign governments decided to cede some authority to supranational decision makers? Who and/or what are the central forces responsible for increased or decreased amounts of integration? These questions inevitably lead to the type of bifurcated discussions that dominate integration theory. For Moravcsik, the state is merely pooling sovereignty, but not ceding it to supranational bodies. As a result, although Moravcsik is willing to examine the role of transnational corporate actors, and political entrepreneurship by some European institutions, the sovereign state remains paramount to his analysis. For the

³⁹ Some recent discussions of integration theory suggest that “high” and “low” politics are not only a necessity to certain theories of European integration, but are critical to the way in which integration is itself conceptualised. For this see Walker 2000, and to a lesser extent Diez 1997.

remainder of my this chapter, I intend to leave the generally accepted line of argument, which engages with the central questions I have just mentioned, and examine Moravcsik in a slightly different way. I examine a few major but often less renowned issues in Moravcsik's discussion.

Challenging boundaries, Moravcsik style

I began this chapter with an important statement that I return to here, that is, Moravcsik's claim that his discussion is not an argument against or even with neofunctionalism. Secondly, I critically reassess Moravcsik's central argument regarding the continued centrality of the nation state in his analysis, and the extent to which the preservation of national sovereignty is often at the core of intergovernmental bargaining as Moravcsik claims. Finally, I address the question I posed at the outset of this discussion in the context of Moravcsik. Since this thesis is concerned with the limits of contemporary theories of European integration, how does Moravcsik challenge these limits? And to reiterate an earlier point, why is it that Moravcsik's discussion constitutes "no choice"?

One of Moravcsik's central points in *The Choice for Europe*, which often raises the most eyebrows among integration theorists, is his claim that his argument for a liberal intergovernmentalist approach, as he calls it, is not an argument against neofunctional accounts of European integration.⁴⁰ In fact, Moravcsik argues that, "this book is not yet another confrontation with neofunctionalism, but an acknowledgement and response to the style of grand theory neofunctionalism represents" (Moravcsik 1998: 14). On the surface, this is a puzzling statement. Moravcsik has made his name as the progenitor of the liberal intergovernmentalist approach, which following in the steps of Hoffmann's earlier work on the nation-state, is often

⁴⁰ While my own review of Moravcsik's book pointed out this argument, and the extent to which it is difficult within the contemporary intellectual context, to read *The Choice for Europe* in this way, I was less vociferous on this point than others. See Verdun 1999a.

read as a counter-argument to neofunctionalism. However, coming from an international relations background, Moravcsik is hostile to the claims of *sui generis* made by neofunctionalists, as well as its idealist roots that seem misplaced in the context of this new world (dis)order. This is the point at which Moravcsik's project and my own are closest. While I have not framed this discussion in a way as to discredit Moravcsik's discussion on its own ground – that is, I do not believe that Moravcsik does not explain with some precision the intergovernmental bargaining that has a major role to play in the integration process – what is problematic is Moravcsik's treatment of sovereignty, and his initial claim that begins *The Choice for Europe*. There, Moravcsik suggests that

The construction of the European Community (EC) ranks among the most extraordinary achievements in modern world politics, yet there is little agreement about its causes (Moravcsik 1998: 1)

Disagreements about the causes of integration have led to the long, and often unproductive debates within integration theory. Unfortunately, the extent to which the construction/definition of "Europe" and "integration" are treated as given – as Moravcsik suggests here – has led to little productive theorising about the future of "Europe" in terms of culture, identity, and various socio-political concerns. In this sense, Moravcsik's argument is not problematic in and of itself, but the implicit (or at times explicit) suggestion that this is a description of integration and Europe is certainly problematic. Can the "Europe" of the EU really be little more than a series of grand bargains? Unfortunately, Moravcsik like many others continues to cling to what I referred to in the first chapter as the "customs union Europe". I return to this in detail later. This is an apt moment to explore the second concern I have with Moravcsik's work: his treatment of sovereignty.

For Moravcsik, although European integration has occurred, states are never far out of the picture. In fact, according to Moravcsik, the preservation of sovereignty is always paramount in

any bargaining or decision-making processes. Moravcsik's earlier article on "Preferences and Power" (1993) explicitly describes the almost "two-level games" that states play, in order to advocate integration when advantageous to their own interests. The state remains the crucial actor both domestically and supranationally. Rather than argue contra Moravcsik on specific bargains that he poses, and question the extent to which his approach is correct or incorrect (since I believe this would be neither productive, nor very satisfying), I examine Moravcsik's treatment of sovereignty within a broader context.

Since even the earliest of Moravcsik's articles was written in the 1990s, exploring his arguments in the context of contemporary re-articulations of space and time, in what is often referred to as "globalisation" will not impose some anachronistic reading on his discussion. The central question that I pose to Moravcsik, given his central claim that intergovernmental bargains are more often than not characterised by the state's struggle to preserve sovereignty, is the following: Is there any sovereignty to preserve? Admittedly, this statement sounds like the musings of some hyperglobaliser.⁴¹ But before dismissing it as some over-zealous reading of globalisation, I ask for some space to develop my argument here.

The argument against Moravcsik's treatment of sovereignty I present here is simple. Given the increasing number of claims by those on the left and others, that the nation-state is no longer sufficiently sovereign over its own political-economic concerns, is it feasible to suggest that the preservation of sovereignty is of paramount concern to nations in intergovernmental bargains? As the example of Joschka Fischer's speech suggested in chapter two, the myth of

⁴¹ For a good discussion of various "forms" or "types" of globalisation, see Held et al. 1999. Some recent discussions on globalisation, while not particularly good, have had an enormous impact and seem to advocate this type of "hyperglobalisation" vision. See particularly T. Friedman 1999, and in a similar vein, Barber 1995; Huntington 1993, Kaplan 1995.

sovereignty is a powerful one.⁴² Fischer's speech seemed to challenge the sovereignty of the state – but sovereignty itself was not challenged. Similarly, although Moravcsik appears to read European integration as a challenge to sovereignty, it is only challenging a particular understanding of state sovereignty – an understanding that in many ways has been lost for some time. Moreover, Moravcsik's argument seems almost incommensurable with the many discussions surrounding integration and globalisation, and the extent to which integration is a response to or product of globalisation – however globalisation is defined.⁴³ Given the broad and increasingly broadening discussions of globalisation, one is forced to question whether or not such an understanding of sovereignty can cohabitate with dislocated sovereignties, rearticulated sovereignties, challenged sovereignties and so on. Certainly one would be foolish to adopt some “hyperglobalisation” stance and critique Moravcsik for not sufficiently realising that sovereignty is a figment of only the imagination – for such accounts of globalisation and the world around us are surely floating free of their instances, high above us in some imaginary world, where the

⁴² The literature focused on questions about sovereignty is very broad, and many discussions implicitly grapple with issues associated with sovereignty such as globalisation, political authority, etc. Therefore, I will not attempt to provide a list of references that is by any means exhaustive. For discussions that attempt to de-mystify or deconstruct sovereignty, see Agamben 1998, Bartelson 1995, and Walker 1990, 1993. For an analysis of sovereignty with a social constructivist influence, see Bierstecker and Weber 1996. For an introductory discussion of the sovereignty problematique in the context of “globalisation” see Camilleri and Falk 1992. A good overview of discussions related to sovereignty, globalisation and the limits of modernity, see Shapiro and Alker 1996. There are also a wide array of literature that examines questions regarding sovereignty and the relation to what is broadly referred to as “security”. See Campbell 1998, Campbell and Shapiro 1999, Falk 1998, Krause and Williams 1997, Shapiro 1997, Wæver et al. 1993, Wæver 1995, Walker 1997.

⁴³ There is a massive literature regarding this topic. Most notably, Ben Rosamond has been a dominant figure in this literature on a more theoretical level, and less (pre)occupied by a narrow liberal version of international political economy. See Rosamond 1995, 1999. Although globalisation means various different things to different people, much of the literature on globalisation (and in some cases the relationship with integration) are dominated by international political economy. For discussions with a European focus, see Dyson, Featherstone and Michalopoulos 1995, Gill 1996, 1998, Verdun 2000. However, increasingly there are attempts within this literature to move away from a specifically liberal articulation of political economy. See Agnew and Corbridge 1995, Cerny 1999, Featherstone, Lash and Robertson 1995, Goldblatt et al. 1997, Held et al. 1999, Rosow, Inayatullah, and Rupert 1994, Strange 1996. There are of course a number of other discussions of globalisation that seem to have subverted political economy's stranglehold over discussions of globalisation in a variety of ways, raising questions about sovereignty, authority and the limits of modernity in the context of globalisation. See Appadurai 1996, Camilleri and Falk 1992, Linklater 1998b, Magnusson 1996, Shapiro 1989, 1997, Shapiro and Alker 1996, Walker 1990, 1993, 2000a.

WTO is one among the few politically salient actors. In this respect, Moravcsik's account of power and authority in Europe is noble, since it refuses to be seduced by many contemporary accounts of the world. As some recent discussions have suggested, sovereign power is not dead – it is just that a different way of reading sovereignty is required (see Agamben 1998)⁴⁴ This brings the discussion back to the original contention that Moravcsik's argument constitutes a “noble failure”. I will spend some time clarifying this idea here

To be labelled a “noble failure” might seem condescending, but as I made clear at the beginning of this thesis, it is not my intention to provide the usual “whipping boy” depiction of Moravcsik, and simply label his analysis as wrong. Instead, I wish to cast Moravcsik in a slightly more favourable light where the merits, possibilities and influential nature of his discussion are not lost by merely saying another wrong realist.⁴⁵ Moravcsik is certainly a major figure in the development of European integration theory. Unfortunately, like Fischer whom I discussed in some detail in Chapter two, while the intentions may certainly be good ones, the outcome may be disappointing. In the introduction, I argued that although Moravcsik and Diez are drastically different figures with very different methodological and theoretical approaches – a point that is made particularly clear in their exchange – both are interested in examining “Europe” and the process of integration as an interesting phenomena from which broader lessons can be taken. Rather than the neofunctionalist approach that in its various guises suggests that European integration is a wholly *sui generis* process, and as such, requires a unique theory, these authors believe that European integration is a phenomenon, or set of phenomena that are not wholly unique to “Europe”. Moravcsik believes that intergovernmental bargaining between major powers in a constant dilemma between the ongoing struggle to preserve sovereignty and

⁴⁴ For further discussion of these issues, see the special issue in *Alternatives* 25, 1, Jan-Mar 2000

⁴⁵ See Pollack 2000. However, it should be noted that Pollack's PhD supervisor was Moravcsik.

simultaneously benefit from the “booty” of globalisation marks much of contemporary politics

– not just “Europe” or more precisely, the Europe of the EU. In order to expand on this, and

Diez’s attempt to examine “Europe” beyond the framework set by integration theory, I examine

the exchange between these two figures in a recent edition of the journal *Millennium*

3.2 CONCLUSION: EXCHANGING OR RECYCLING IDEAS

In the recent exchange in *Millennium* between Moravcsik and Diez, the schism that lies between them is made particularly obvious when in response to Diez’s critique of *The Choice for Europe*, Moravcsik suggests that Diez wishes to take theories of European integration to the “imaginary realm of professors and philosophers” (Moravcsik 1999c: 373). This comment seems particularly hard to take from a tenured *professor* at Harvard who seems more than comfortable to exist in this “imaginary realm” – no doubt with an imaginary salary. Moravcsik’s rebuttal to Diez seems almost self-destructive at times. He argues that, “one is hard-pressed to think of a single moment in the half century of European integration where a social scientist had any appreciable impact on policy at all” (Moravcsik 1999c: 385). Moravcsik is, as Diez would say “speaking Europe”. The fact that much of the past fifty years of integration theory has been relatively prosaic, and almost anti-political in its technocratic and economic focus, which is identical to the integration project over the same period is obviously lost on Moravcsik. Diez is not critiquing Moravcsik’s theory of integration as such, but rather the motives of the theory. As with any discussion dependent on assumptions about history or structure – of which most are – reification seems to be the inevitable outcome.⁴⁶ Rather than merely provide a *better* theory of

⁴⁶ See Walker 1993, particularly 81-103. For a good discussion of this problem in the specific context of European integration theory, see Rosamond 2000. Rosamond will also be presenting a similar argument in a paper at the

integration, Diez is attempting to reconceptualise the way we conceptualise Moravcsik is willing to argue over who the main actors are in the European integration process, which mechanisms are most important, and which policies are more or less likely to be passed on to the level of supranational authorities. But rather than a problem of policy analysis, where the central questions are traditionally Lasswellian concerns over who gets what, where, when and how, Diez is attempting to reconceptualise “Europe”. I explore Diez further in the next chapter. What is important here is the extent to which Moravcsik seems unable to come to terms with Diez’s critique of *The Choice for Europe*.

Although the exchange between Moravcsik and Diez is entertaining, it is simultaneously very disappointing, that is, disappointing insofar as Moravcsik seems to miss the entire thrust of Diez’s critique. As I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the inability of these two prominent figures in European integration theory to speak to each other draws me towards them. Moravcsik seems wholly unaware of the extent to which Diez’s critique is a critique of meta-narratives and the underlying assumptions that drive the liberal intergovernmentalist approach – not its empirical findings. At many points in his rebuttal, Moravcsik out of frustration claims that Diez “fails to counter the preponderant evidence I present that commercial motivations were indeed causally preponderant” (Moravcsik 1999c: 373). For Moravcsik, Diez’s insistence that the reflectivist approach is not about explanation, but about providing alternative vistas for international politics is particularly distasteful, so much so in fact, that Moravcsik cites the same passage from Diez twice.

Reflectivist approaches are not about explanation in the first place, but about the uncovering of alternative vistas for international politics, and European integration in particular (Diez 1999a: 359. Cited by Moravcsik 1999c: 383, 390)

Finally, Moravcsik falls prey to the usual unsophisticated critique of reflectivist and/or post-

structuralist approaches – pointing to some Nietzschean inspired nihilist flaw

Herein, I believe, lies the real reason why Diez's empirical critique of my rational materialist argument seems half-hearted. Wouldn't it be better, he seems to be hinting, if we just concede a significant role for both theories and get on with the chronicling and cultivation of the political imagination? Let's not criticise one another, let's criticise the world! (Moravcsik 1999c: 390)

Obviously asking Moravcsik to re-imagine would be a bit too much to ask. Certainly one must confront the so-called "real world". Unfortunately, Moravcsik still seems to be left cold by constructivist inspired theories of international relations that have now become almost innocuous and banal. Most importantly, beliefs that humans have a limited cognitive capacity, and as such can never "know" all of social reality. As a result, the object of much of social interaction is used to categorise, stereotype, limit, and so on, in order that through these limited, categorised stereotypical constructed realities one can make knowledge claims. That is, knowledge of these "real" worlds.⁴⁷ To believe that there is no "world politics" because there is no "world" to know from some objective standpoint is a consequence of this constructivist reasoning. Although banal by this point in time, after reviewing Moravcsik's rebuttal to Diez, one wonders whether he would agree. But where does this bring the discussion of Moravcsik?

I began the final section of this chapter on Moravcsik with the title exchanging or recycling. There has undoubtedly been a healthy exchange of ideas – in fact, Rosamond's recent summation of integration theory applauds the theoretical innovation and development of ideas among theories of European integration (Rosamond 2000). The discussion of Moravcsik here has for the most part been a sympathetic one. The explanative purchase of Moravcsik's approach for certain aspects of the integration process should not be maligned – nor would I say could it be. Commercial interests, trends in transnational capital flows, the actions of domestic and

⁴⁷ See Wendt 1999. For a good summation of the seminal ideas of social constructivism, see Marcussen 2000, particularly 1-25

supranational policy actors, and the role of technology are all important elements in the integration process. Furthermore, it is not pointless to ask the question: why have states decided to cede some sovereignty to supranational authorities and integrate certain policy areas? Unfortunately, by clinging to this question Moravcsik clings to the “customs union” vision of Europe, and presents political authority as much more solid and stable than many contemporary accounts suggest. Moravcsik is right to criticise the literature within integration theory that argues in favour of the *sui generis* nature of European integration. There are interesting phenomena occurring in/around “Europe”, but these phenomena are not unique to the integration process, and as a result, theories from international relations deserve attention. Unfortunately, much of international relations theory continues to be seduced by a sovereigntist vision of politics – that is, it is almost impossible to imagine a politics that is beyond sovereignty. Yet, there are innumerable political practices we are familiar with and practice daily – not only in the context of an integrated Europe – and these practices question dominant notions of political authority and sovereignty in particular. Moravcsik also clings to these versions of authority and sovereignty as my recount of his work has suggested. This of course begs the question, what might a different “vision” look like?

It is not my intention in the course of this thesis to suggest that Diez is “right” or possesses the answer to the challenges that theories of European integration face. However, some sustained discussion of his approach, and conceptualisation of “Europe” aids both in coming to terms with the limits of contemporary integration theory, as well as providing a possible point of departure for re-imagining “Europe”. Diez is acutely aware of the extent to which theories of integration seem forced into either advocating a two-level game approach in some form or another – like Moravcsik – or a vision of federal Europe – like Fischer. In his

approach, Diez hopes to escape this either-or construction of discussions about “Europe”.

Thus, I will spend the next chapter discussing Diez’s approach before returning to my critical comments on Moravcsik in the conclusion.

4 DIEZ AND “CRITICAL” INTEGRATION THEORY

In the world of eternal return the weight of unbearable responsibility lies heavy on every move we make. That is why Nietzsche called the idea of eternal return the heaviest of burdens (*das schwerste Gewicht*). ... *Einmal ist keinmal*. What happens but once might as well not have happened at all.

(Kundera, 1984: 5, 223)

4.1 TRANSFORMING A “DISCIPLINE”? DIEZ AND THE CONSTRUCTIVIST/REFLECTIVIST MOVE

Einmal ist keinmal...

In 1997, Thomas Diez published an article on European integration that differed dramatically from the examinations one was used to within the field of European integration theory. Diez’s paper, “International Ethics and European Integration: Federal State or Network Horizon?” (1997), raises some important questions about how “Europe” and discussions of integration have heretofore been framed, and proposes a more radical direction for integration theory. Not surprisingly this article appeared in the journal *Alternatives*, a publication run by R B J. Walker and supported by a number of others involved in various projects and research institutes, the most notable one being the World Order Models Project (WOMP). While this may seem an odd way to introduce a chapter devoted to the work of Thomas Diez, it is important to acknowledge the intellectual milieu from which he has developed. In much the same way as Moravcsik’s lineage that includes Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann has much to tell us about his own approach, Diez’s intellectual heritage is equally telling. The influence of Walker’s work on Diez is obvious, as is his involvement in research on Network Governance in Mannheim under the teaching of Beate Kohler-Koch, and the last few years spent at the Peace Research Institute in Copenhagen. However, this brief foray into Diez’s intellectual heritage has more relevance to this discussion than mere context – it suggests that the idealist driven theoretical work of Mitrany

and Haas, that sparked European integration theory into existence has not been lost in a wash of American rationalism.

This chapter begins with a passage from Milan Kundera's infamous book, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, at the point where he refers to Nietzsche's notion of "Eternal Return". I do not intend to suggest that Diez is Mitrany on some journey of eternal return. However, the notion that what happens once is easily forgotten, and to return implies weightiness is less esoteric in this context than one might first assume. Diez's approach to European integration will become clearer in the course of this chapter, but rather than start by laying out his argument and contribution to the field of integration studies, I have chosen to begin with a rebuttal. Anticipating the usual claims that arguments such as Diez's – and my own for that matter – are latent with idealism, I draw on the origins of integration theory to suggest that this should not be perceived as the exception.

There should be no doubt in the reader's mind at this point, that the argument presented here is not an attempt at "exhuming" functionalism.⁴⁸ However, the arguments one often encounters against approaches such as Diez's, and the perspective advocated here, suggest that the work of Mitrany may as well not have occurred. To make a concise and seemingly obvious point. Mitrany, who is often credited with initiating work that later developed into "European integration theory", was an *idealist*.⁴⁹ Ergo, one should not be surprised to find a certain amount

⁴⁸ For a very convincing account of the merits of revisiting functionalist theory in the context of European integration theory, see Warleigh 2000.

⁴⁹ One of the primary ways of characterizing the discipline of international relations has been through a series of "great debates". The first debate was between the idealists and realists. In this case, I employ *idealism* in this specific sense, that is, a movement that began with the post-World War I plans of Woodrow Wilson and others. Realism arose in response to the perceived naïve idealism of the post-war period, of which David Mitrany's functionalist ideas were a part. The entire European integration project finds its genesis in this "idealist milieu", as a result of the ongoing wars in Europe, largely between France and Germany. Ergo, not surprisingly, the Franco-German alliance became the centrepiece of the integration project. For a historical account of international relations theory that discusses the early debates, as well as more recent debates, see Der Derian 1995; George 1995; Keohane 1986.

of idealism within accounts of European integration. Unfortunately, the derailment of neofunctionalist theory and the rise of intergovernmentalist approaches seems to have dramatically altered the impetus behind European integration theory. Recently, however, there seems to be a revival of idealism within integration theory. Not the strict idealism one finds in textbooks on international relations theory, but an idealism that harkens back to the initial beliefs responsible for pushing the integration project forward – peace and prosperity in Europe. Although there is no contemporary Marshall Plan to help push this endeavour along, it seems as though the collapse of the Soviet Union, the break-up of the Eastern Bloc and the crisis in the Balkans has brought these concerns, or this idealism if you will, back to the foreground. However, it appears that approaches to European integration such as Moravcsik's have lost this sense of commitment. Instead, European integration theory, responding to the overarching concerns of the 1980s and 1990s – namely economic and monetary integration – have left theoretical work that proposes alternative articulations and conceptualisations of politics to someone else. Yet, when someone else engages with integration on this level it is often dismissed as void of any explanative power, as if this were the intention to begin with.

This discussion of the “fall of idealism” and the seeming historical amnesia among integration theorists leads nicely into Diez's work. Diez highlights the increasing bifurcation of integration theory into pro or anti-EU discussions that end up predetermining the dominant conceptualisation of the political in Europe. Diez's exchange with Moravcsik clearly indicates the extent to which he believes it is the role of the theorist to propose alternative visions. Diez even goes so far as to say that all questions of legitimacy, and thus the future of European governance are ethical questions (Diez 1997: 294). These are a few of the main elements of Diez's discussion that I examine here. Following my summation of Diez's work, I raise the

similar questions that I raised in the context of Moravcsik's approach. Why discuss Diez?

What elements of Diez's discussion challenge the boundaries of existing theories of European integration? Finally, I briefly discuss the relationship between Diez and Moravcsik, and what relationship their discussions have to one another.

Diez: theorising (at) the horizon

Thomas Diez's approach to European integration theory begins by questioning the extent to which the discipline itself – if one can refer to it as such – is constructed in such a way as to preclude (re)imagining politics in “Europe” in some alternative way. It is this initial commitment to questioning the construction of integration theory itself before engaging in what can be called a constructivist analysis of European integration that differentiates Diez from other “constructivists” in European integration theory, leading some observers to classify him as a reflectivist.⁵⁰ Diez's vision of Europe or “alternative vista” as he refers to it, conceptualises “Europe” as a network horizon. In this sense, one can read Diez as both a theorist of the horizon, and a theorist at the horizon of European integration theory. Thus, before going any further in this discussion, Diez's notion of the “network horizon” deserves some attention.

To begin with, Diez's “network horizon” version of integration and EU governance presents a very fluid, poly-centric depiction of “Europe”. Rather than looking at the creation of a bigger (and better) state as a challenge to sovereignty in and of itself, Diez advocates reconceptualising European governance as a network – a poly-centric site of politics that is not tied to a geographical definition, but might also be defined functionally, culturally, socially, and so on. Diez reads “Europe” in a way that is conscious of the integration project's potential to

⁵⁰ This point is particularly clear in the special issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, 4. See especially Smith 1999, from the same collection.

breaking down boundaries, and rearticulating the distinction between inside and outside. As

Diez points out:

If, however, one sees integration as a means to get rid of state borders, one might well argue that Schengen itself was not a good solution to the problem, since it established a new stronger external border (Diez 1997: 293).

Diez avoids being seduced by the euphoric notion of a “borderless Europe” that accompanied some accounts of Schengen. For Diez, a more fitting way of looking at Europe is as “a hardly soluble grid of close cooperation between units, functionally as well as territorially defined, with overlapping membership” (Diez 1997: 296) – the network horizon. Diez shows an acute awareness for the need for a new language in discourses about Europe, one dedicated to simultaneity, cooperation in networks, and multiple overlapping memberships. Rather than fall prey to the type of reasoning present in Joschka Fischer’s speech, and elsewhere in discourses about “Europe”, Diez’s vision refuses the seductive claim that a bigger state – namely a federal state – equals a better state. In such an example, as the “Fischer vision” exemplifies in chapter two, the differentiation between inside and outside, us and them, inclusion and exclusion is transferred or transported, but to reconceptualised. Questions of legitimacy are also of specific importance to Diez’s (re)vision of “Europe”

The literature on legitimacy and democracy in Europe, and specifically how these issues play out in an integrated Europe has been the subject of much scholarship.⁵¹ However, Diez takes a different approach to legitimacy problems in Europe. First, he begins from the assumption that questions of legitimacy in Europe are by definition ethical questions, since they are closely linked to the “prevailing normative codes of a society” (Diez 1997: 194). Diez is acutely aware

⁵¹ For discussions of legitimacy and democracy that are particularly insightful and reflect concerns similar to those raised by Diez, see Curtin 1997, Hansen and Williams 1999, Jachtenfuchs 1997a, 1997b, Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 1998. There are a number of other seminal works on this topic that include: Anderson 1995, Bellamy and Castiglione 1998, Chryssochoou 1996, Featherstone 1994, Føllesdal 1999, Lodge 1994, Newman 1996, Verdun and Christiansen 1999, Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995, Williams 1991.

of the extent to which notions of democracy seem inevitably tied to dominant readings of sovereignty, and thus imagining democracy beyond the sovereign world seems almost impossible.⁵² Furthermore, questions of legitimacy are linked to questions of citizenship, since it is often believed that polities void of a *demos* cannot possess a democracy and thus, no legitimate governance (Chrysochoou 1996, Koslowski 1999a, Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995). This begins to get at another important concern at the heart of Diez's discussion that is imbricated in discussions of democracy and legitimate governance: identity. Diez believes that the integration project in Europe has the potential for creating a polity or form of governance that rearticulates identity and identity relations. However, before progressing further into questions of identity raised by Diez, some further exploration of governance and legitimacy and Diez's approach to these issues is in order here.

Diez's belief in the problematic character of integration theory that has bifurcated discussions into an either-or debate takes issue with how questions about legitimacy and the like are dealt with by theories of European integration. On the one hand, approaches to European integration advocate reading "Europe" as an intergovernmental polity where domestic actors to varying degrees act in two-level games, promoting their domestic interests, preserving sovereignty, and promoting supranational interests insofar as they benefit the actors' state. In contrast, approaches that are more idealist, for lack of a better term, advocate a federalist vision of/for Europe, where actors put on the mantle of Europe – but of course, the sovereign state remains intact. Diez suggests that such a bifurcation of discussions constricts the space for questions about legitimacy and democracy to be taken seriously within European integration theory. For intergovernmentalism, legitimacy is a problem only insofar as domestic actors are

⁵² For a particular good discussion of this in the context of European integration, see Curtin 1997. Walker also deals with the extent to which notions of democracy are limited by sovereignty in Walker 1993: 141-158.

acting outside their competency when dealing with “European” problems, but on the whole, supranational issues are controlled by domestic actors, so there is not much of a legitimacy problem. For supranationalists, or those advocating a Federal Europe, legitimacy is more pressing, since the EU institutions are subordinate to the Commission, which is appointed and not elected. The hierarchy of “levels” remains, and thus, legitimacy remains questionable at the best of times, since Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) at the level of the Council of Ministers does not allow any state to be “forced” into any policy decision. Framed in this way, it appears questions about legitimacy and democracy cannot progress very far, which is where Diez has much to offer.

Diez suggests that the network horizon vision of “Europe”, and its commitment to multiple centres of authority in motion and overlapping memberships, allows questions of legitimacy to be less easily dismissed than they are by some theories of integration. By breaking out of the “multi-level” vision of Europe that seems to necessitate some hierarchy of authority, and as such, frames questions about legitimacy in somewhat unproductive ways, Diez’s vision draws legitimacy into a very different light. In the case of a Federal entity – which by definition implies multi-levels – legitimacy is bound up in the representation of the self. That is, only when those who govern belong to the primary identity of the polity is the rule considered legitimate (Diez 1997: 295). And Diez is quick to point out, that although subidentities defined regionally or functionally may exist, they are subject to the overarching national identity (1997: 295). In contrast, the network Europe perceives legitimate governance as governance that allows far-reaching participation that does not subject multiple identities negotiated through membership in various functional and regional groups, but rather celebrates multiple identities (Diez 1997: 296). Diez himself admits that such a vision of Europe does come close to the so-called “Europe of the

Regions”, which suggests such a vision of/for “Europe” is less esoteric and imaginary than many might believe. While the federal state and the network both focus on identity and participation as central to legitimacy, the network celebrates multiple overlapping memberships or subidentities, rather than subjecting these to some overarching “general will” or what Diez calls a “hegemonic vista” (Diez 1997: 298-299). In sum, Diez’s “network Europe” seems to come to terms with questions of simultaneity, multiplicity, and polycentricity, in a variety of ways, that as Diez and I will begin to suggest, is much closer to contemporary debates on “Europe” than many sceptics believe.

4.2 DIEZ AND THE AM-TRACK: DERAILING A DISCOURSE

A “new Europe”? Diez’s network and contemporary discourse(s)

In the exchange between Diez and Moravcsik in *Millennium* that I made some reference to in chapter three, the extent to which Moravcsik believes Diez’s approach is “airy-fairy” to be colloquial but concise seems obvious. Moravcsik laments over Diez’s attempts to “take us to the imaginary world of professors and philosophers” and present alternative vistas, without ever confronting the empirical evidence in Moravcsik’s own analysis. However, Moravcsik appears to be somewhat out of touch with recent developments in scholarship on European integration. Questions about subsidiarity, flexibility, and simultaneity within the union are ubiquitous in many contemporary accounts of European integration. The extent to which integration might be simultaneously read as both a response to and product of globalisation are creeping up in the literature,⁵³ concerns about identity within the context of enlargement are making their way onto the agenda (Neuman 1998), questions directly concerned with notions of flexibility are discussed

⁵³ See footnote number 45 in chapter three

(Wind 2000), and issues regarding the dislocation of “Europe” and the extent to which authority and power are being refigured in interesting and often misunderstood ways in Europe are also being addressed with increasing frequency (Walker 2000). Given this, it is difficult to see how Moravcsik hopes to so easily dismiss Diez for operating on the level of the imagination – and here Moravcsik employs imagination in the most pejorative sense

Both Helen Wallace and Beate Kohler-Koch, who many regard as established figures in European integration theory, are advocating readings of “Europe” that are conscious of proliferated political authority, multiple simultaneous claims to power, and overlapping identities – particularly in light of the contemporary challenges of institutional reform and enlargement. In fact, their accounts of Europe seem to take the underdeveloped ideas of “Europe a la carte” and “multi-speed Europe” to a more sophisticated level that in some senses mirror the type of vision Diez advocates.⁵⁴ Regardless of how problematic one might find Fischer’s call for a European “centre of gravity” it certainly speaks to the consciousness among decision-makers that an enlarging and reforming “Europe” necessitates something other than the two-level game approach provided by Moravcsik. Which begs another question. Is Moravcsik speaking about an “Old Europe” and Diez about a “New Europe”? Further discussion of this question gets at the relationship between Diez’s and Moravcsik’s account of Europe and the integration process, and illuminates what these two figures bring to discussions about the limits of contemporary European integration theory.

⁵⁴ These arguments forwarded by Kohler-Koch and Wallace were made at the ECSA-C Conference in Quebec City, QC, July 31, 2000 during a plenary session. Kohler-Koch “Network Governance Within and Beyond an Enlarging EU,” and Wallace “Can a Reformed European Union Bear the Weight of Enlargement?”

*Riding the AM-track to the horizon*⁵⁵

At the very outset of this thesis, I suggested that to those even mildly familiar with the work of Thomas Diez and Andrew Moravcsik, the outcome of a discussion that draws on both of them would seem a foregone conclusion. Depending on one's own political perspective, one of these theorists would come out a victor, and the other look as though his analysis was either some broken down trip to the recycling depot, or some unreal trip to the realm of the imagination – beyond “real” politics. And, while it is no doubt obvious where my own allegiances rest, I have endeavoured to suggest that although these figures come from dramatically different backgrounds and advocate opposing perspectives, they nevertheless both have much to tell us about the status of contemporary theories of European integration, and possible ways to challenge the boundaries of debates about “Europe”. In the course of this section, that will conclude this chapter, I hope to draw out some questions that begin to get at the relationship between Moravcsik and Diez, and explicitly point to how these figures in concert help to challenge the boundaries of contemporary European integration theory and come to terms with the many challenges that have been iterated and reiterated throughout this thesis. However, the questions posed at the end of this chapter will be entertained fully in the final chapter of this thesis.

The challenges posed to contemporary theories of European integration exist in two spheres, which are closely related but more easily manageable for the purpose of discussion when separated. The first sphere is comprised of the very tactile challenges that the contemporary direction of European integration poses to integration theory. These include the

⁵⁵ The idea for “riding the AM-track” comes from Diez 1999a.

rising problems associated with institutional reform that among other things, includes the so-called legitimacy crisis, democratic deficit, and accountability crisis. In addition to this, questions about enlargement that are not wholly separate from concerns of institutional reform, since European policies such as the CAP, among others, will be severely challenged in the enlargement process. How do the approaches explored here deal with these challenges? Are they able to suggest ways of dealing with these “crises”? And, most simply, can these approaches even conceive of such problems in a way that begins to come to terms with their complexity?

The second sphere is on the level of the political imagination, but the concerns are anything but imaginary. Fischer’s speech that was discussed in chapter two suggests that decision-makers and policy actors are searching for “visions” of Europe. To what extent do Diez’s and/or Moravcsik’s approaches suggest the possibility of alternative visions for “Europe”? Are these approaches able to come to terms with the dislocation and proliferation of political authority beyond the confines of sovereignty and the territorially bound political community? Is Moravcsik or Diez able to provide a vision of integration as it is that illuminates the integration process as it is, and at the same time, is conscious of its potential to reconceptualise politics in a very different way than the terms given by sovereignty. Obviously this second sphere is more theoretically complex and to some esoteric than the first, but together they provide a relatively clear picture of how these approaches to integration help us understand the present challenges of integration, and how to negotiate them, as well as how negotiating these challenges might possibly lead to a rearticulated/reconceptualised vision of the political in “Europe”.

Although these issues will be dealt with in some detail in the final chapter, some discussion is worthwhile here. First, it is important to note – if it is not already exceedingly obvious – that Moravcsik’s and Diez’s projects differ dramatically. For Moravcsik, we know

what Europe is, where it is, and what integration is all about, the question worth asking is why have these sovereign governments decided to cede sovereignty in certain policy areas to some amorphous supranational authority? It would be foolish to flatly suggest that such a question is unimportant – although its underlying assumptions may be as important or even more important than the question itself – but there is certainly more to “Europe” and the integration project than this. However, Moravcsik’s insistence that he is engaging in international relations and not European integration theory, suggests that he is well aware of the extent to which the issues and phenomena that illicit so much attention in European integration studies are not unique to Europe. Increasing consolidation or cooperation beyond the nation state in certain policy areas is for Moravcsik not by definition “European”

Diez shares this belief that “Europe” is only one interesting site where questions about political authority, identity, political community, and legitimacy are played out in ways that challenge existing interpretive tools. Like Moravcsik, Diez engages with international relations theory far more than European integration theory. As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, both Diez and Moravcsik share a belief in the limits of integration theory, and yet they are both included in the context of European integration theory. This speaks to the two distinct spheres that I introduced earlier. On the one hand, one can examine these theorists for how they explore the European integration process: how well do they cope with challenges posed to integration by enlargement and institutional reform, are they able to speak of European integration in relation to globalisation and vice versa, and so on and so forth. On the other hand, one can ask to what extent these theorists challenge the boundaries of European integration theory itself, and cope with its precarious position as a (sub)discipline. It is almost arrogant to suggest that Moravcsik, and Diez for that matter, cannot address European integration without engaging in a debate of

some form or another with neofunctionalism, historical institutionalism, multi-level

governance, and the host of other theories of European integration. To reiterate a point I have made in this chapter, and throughout this thesis, Moravcsik's and Diez's decision to explore "Europe" and the interesting phenomena playing out (t)here without entering existing debates between theories of European integration – or at the very least attempting to stay outside of these debates – that initially drew me to their approaches in hopes of challenging the boundaries of existing scholarship on Europe

In the final chapter which follows, I explore the two spheres of questions that I have raised in this chapter. I do not intend to claim victory for one or the other theorist, but rather, uncover what Moravcsik's and Diez's approach, separately and in concert are able to provide a project that wishes to challenge the limits of integration theory in the ways I have suggested throughout the course of this thesis.

5 (RE)READING “EUROPE”: CONCLUDING REMARKS ON MORAVCSIK, DIEZ AND CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY

As ever, issues of geography disguise arguments about politics, religion and culture, and those who are keen to establish Europe’s unity will find agnosticism deeply unsatisfying. The “Europe” of the European Union may be a promise or a delusion, but it is not a reality. Taking the divisions and uncertainties of this continent seriously – as I have tried to do here – implies abandoning metaphysics, renouncing the mysterious search for some essential “Europe”, and exploring instead the constant contest to define what it should mean (Mazower 2000: xiv).

5.1 (RE)READING “EUROPE”: THE LIMITS OF THE IMAGINATION

The sentiment expressed by Mark Mazower in the passage above is a telling one. Similar to *The Economist’s* recent claim that when answering the question “what is Europe?” one should not begin with geography, Mazower alludes to the constructed and discursive character of “Europe”. Most important is Mazower’s suggestion that whether or not we believe the “Europe” of the EU is a promise or a delusion one thing is sure: it is not a reality. This is a powerful and destabilising statement. Mazower suggests that this “Europe” of the EU is not real, and at the same time he suggests that one must renounce the “mysterious search for some essential “Europe”. Finally, Mazower finishes the statement by suggesting that the place to focus is the “constant contest to define what [Europe] should mean”. But how might one do this, and to what extent do contemporary theories of European integration limit our ability to do this?

In the previous chapter I highlighted “two spheres” of concerns that speak to the limits of contemporary theories of European integration. The first sphere raises questions about the extent to which Moravcsik’s and/or Diez’s approaches aid in understanding the challenges to the integration project such as enlargement and institutional reform. The second and more complicated sphere asks questions about the limits of integration theory, and asks how Moravcsik and Diez cope with these limits, that is, do they provide alternatives or challenges to

these boundaries, or is this beyond the scope of their projects? Mazower gives a voice to these kind of concerns, suggesting that simply put, discussions about “Europe” should endeavour to go beyond geography. As promised in chapter four, I will now explore how Diez and Moravcsik provide useful tools for both understanding contemporary challenges to the integration process, and challenging the boundaries of existing integration theories by re-imagining the political in “Europe”.

If one accepts that questions of legitimacy, identity, democracy, political community and authority are critical issues, at the heart of contemporary debates about enlargement and institutional reform in Europe, then one would expect contemporary theorists to have something to say about these issues. As I have maintained from the beginning of this thesis – for reasons that I will not revisit here – Diez and Moravcsik provide a good overview of the contemporary status of European integration theory. Obviously some specialised theories of European integration are better suited to explain certain aspects of the process, and an overview of all these approaches would be well beyond the scope of this project. Nevertheless, much can be ascertained about contemporary integration theory, and its limitations by applying Diez’s and Moravcsik’s approaches to the two spheres of questions I mentioned earlier.

To begin with, it is clear that both Diez and Moravcsik are aware of the complexity of the integration process and the challenges it poses to existing understandings of political authority. Whether one wishes to refer to the dislocation, fragmentation, rearticulation, or proliferation of authority, the question “Who Governs?” is certainly much more difficult than many analysts believe. Here, Moravcsik and Diez are both apt at coping with this problem. For Diez, it means reconceptualising Europe as a network where authority is fluid – constantly shifting from regions to functional associations, which leads to the conscious construction of multiple identities.

Moravcsik, on the other hand, begins by misreading this problem as the loss of sovereignty on the part of the nation-state. Sovereignty is much more amorphous than Moravcsik appears to believe. While Moravcsik's account of integration does illuminate the role of lobbying transnational business elites – suggesting he is aware of the role of non-state actors in the integration process, his treatment of sovereignty is oversimplified. The two-level games approach that Moravcsik advocates – explicitly in his 1993 article – suggests that there are in fact two levels: domestic and supranational. However, closer examination of the EU suggests there are varying sites of political authority resting with functional organisations, supranational institutions, epistemic communities, domestic lobbyists, and so on. In this regard, Diez's approach is much more helpful.

Diez's approach offers much more in the way of "conceptualising" Europe rather than merely explaining the rationale for various intergovernmental bargains in the past. While we may initially agree with Moravcsik's suggestion that sovereign domestic powers control the integration process, since it is not easy to imagine some altruistic state going out on a limb to drive integration further. However, perhaps in this case it is Moravcsik who is functioning in the "imaginary world of professors and philosophers".

5.2 THE IMAGINARY WORLD OF PROFESSORS AND PHILOSOPHERS

While this stinging criticism was launched by Moravcsik at Diez, I believe that it may be Moravcsik's most damaging self-criticism. Unfortunately, accounts such as Diez's, and those inspired by post-structuralist international relations theory are often chastised for existing in some imaginary realm beyond or away from "reality". It is this belief that drives Moravcsik to criticise Diez with such vehemence. Moravcsik is at times frustrated in the exchange with Diez

in *Millennium*. However, can one argue that Moravcsik's account of integration is more suited to this imaginary realm? This answer gets at the two spheres I spoke about earlier – the one being the sphere comprised of concerns springing from tangible challenges faced by the integration process, but the second sphere gets at more complicated theoretical concerns. Moravcsik is in the imaginary realm in both cases.

To begin with, Moravcsik's account of European integration is in the imaginary realm – and here I am using this phrase in the pejorative sense as Moravcsik intended – in the sphere of the integration process. Moravcsik's account develops some mythical notion of sovereignty that if it has ever existed, has not been around for some time. On the one hand, Moravcsik is well aware of the challenges of transnational capital, and actors who can also be referred to as transnational, yet despite this realisation, he continues to advocate a reading of sovereignty that places it square in the lap of the territorial nation state. Political authority is under the states' control, and only at its behest does authority get “pooled” at the supranational level in order to forward certain objectives, advantageous to the domestic actors and the sovereign state. What of the WTO, transnational migrants, hypermobile capital in the form of internet stock trading and currency markets, and so on? Moravcsik's decision to pass over these concerns – as his depiction of sovereignty implies – suggests that he is comfortable to exist in his own imaginary realm. However, the second sphere concerns, as I have referred to them, suggest that one can also read this notion of an “imaginary realm” very differently.

If one accepts a reading of Rob Walker, who was explored in some detail in chapter two of this thesis, as a theorist of the political imagination, one might read the “imaginary realm of professors and philosophers” less pejoratively. Here, Moravcsik and Diez are both part of this imaginary realm – although Moravcsik would undoubtedly disagree with this suggestion. Given

the beliefs fostered by constructivist and reflectivist accounts of politics, it is clear that one cannot “know” the world, Europe, America, and so on, making discussions of European politics or world politics, little more than “imagined” Once one accepts this argument, or at the very least, allows it to play out, the possibility to re-imagine politics becomes clear Therefore, rather than merely attempting at reproducing “reality” through one’s accounts of in this case, European integration, one might endeavour to provide a different reading that is emancipatory and enabling To provide a simple metaphor to understand this, let us look at a table We might in fact say we “know” what a table is, because the characteristics that it has which allows us to classify it as a table such as legs, a top and so on However, can we truly claim to “know” the table? While these physical characteristics may suggest that this is the case, yet the table is also a bound up set of commodity relations, perhaps an example of globalised capital, third world forestry practices, and so on and so forth Is one willing to say that either of these accounts are more apt at describing the table? Probably the most common response would be, the deeper relations and practices that the table symbolizes – or in fact is a product of – are less relevant to our everyday use of the object However, in the case of European integration, would one be willing to say the same? It has been the object of this discussion to answer this question negatively That is, to suggest that although Moravcsik’s account of integration no doubt poses important challenges to much of existing integration theory, and gives us a useful picture of certain parts of the integration process This leads directly to the final conclusion, and summation of this thesis

5.3 CONCLUSION. WHERE ARE WE, AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The object of this thesis has been to examine two major figures in contemporary European integration theory with a number of intentions. First, the work of Diez and Moravcsik provide a clear picture of many of the major questions in contemporary European integration theory, and an overall “cartography” of the discipline as it exists. Secondly, I have suggested that the integration process is facing a number of challenges such as future Eastern enlargement and the necessary institutional reform to make such an endeavour possible. Thus, I question to what extent Diez’s and/or Moravcsik’s approaches provide some way of dealing with these challenges. Thirdly, I argue that the search for “alternative visions” that challenge existing accounts of European integration are more than an academic exercise – the one notable example being Fischer’s speech and the reactions to it. The underlying, for the most part unstated argument has been that theory can affect practice. However, this is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible to prove. More important here is the suggestion that theory and practice are more interrelated than is often acknowledged. That is, the power of reification is often underestimated.

Although this thesis began, and reiterated the point that I did not intend to present one theorist as “better” than the other, my own allegiance to the type of approach forwarded by Diez is no doubt obvious. Moravcsik’s account is important for the role it played, and continues to play, in sparking further debate and theorising about European integration. Certainly the experiences of people in Europe may not be reflected in Moravcsik’s approach, it nevertheless possesses some explanatory purchase. However, as far as hope for the future, Diez’s account is much more helpful. The challenges posed by Eastern enlargement will almost certainly force the EU to integrate at various speeds, in various areas, at various times – making Diez’s “network Europe” a particularly apt metaphor. Already the decision by some countries to remain out of

EMU has led to a new category of included and excluded.⁵⁶ Approaches that do not embrace some fluid vision of political authority, as the “network Europe” approach does, will inevitably forgo re-imagining political community, and instead engage in the further hierarchicalisation of political community (see Walker 1999a). Similarly, accounts unwilling to accept the amorphous character of a “European polity” that is comprised of overlapping memberships that are functionally, culturally, ethnically, and even economically defined, might inevitably scramble to “keep ‘Europe’ afloat” by advocating a Federal Europe. While there are certainly worse constructions, the latent potential within the integration project, that from its outset in the post-war period was about reconstructing a polity on different principles will be lost.

The account presented here can undoubtedly be read as a nostalgic attempt to recapture the initial fervour of the integration project. However, I assure the reader it is more than that. Certainly, the possibility to (re)imagine politics in terms other than those given by sovereignty seems to be the most promising in the context of an integrated “Europe”. However, there are more practical concerns that lay at the heart of this project. Namely, a response, or even a dialogue with Fischer’s speech, that demonstrates the extent to which not only might the latent potential to re-imagine politics be lost, but the integration project as a whole might be pushed to the brink. The economic side of integration has been pursued to such an extent that it is difficult to imagine how this might crumble – in short, it would take longer to remove it than keep it. However, if the idea of an “Ever Closer Union” still holds any water, than economics will not be enough. Unfortunately, the neofunctionalist notion of spill over has been implicitly followed – economic integration and then spill over to political integration. On the brink of Eastern

⁵⁶ Observers familiar with the EU policy structure and treaty process will be aware of the fact that throughout the process there are many “opt out” clauses where states are able, and have removed themselves from certain policies or commitments. However, because EMU became such a centrepiece of the integration process, this was the most noticeable case where the European public was aware of the “insiders” and the “outsiders”.

enlargement and institutional and policy reform, it seems that the spill over is more like a massive waterfall. Suddenly the European agenda is packed with highly contestable political concerns raising questions about the construction of European identity, the financial capacity to maintain a “wider and deeper Europe”, the problems associated with creating a European standing army and common foreign and security policy and so on. Fischer’s speech appears to be a cry from the wilderness, asking for “visions” in order to prevent the EU, and all its potential to buckle under these pressures, and become a relic of history rather than a hope for the future. One way of helping to prevent such a loss to occur is providing theoretical approaches that can cope with the increasing complexity of “Europe” without presenting much of the oddities of the integration project as “problems”. This is not wholly accomplished by Diez, but his approach that conceives of “Europe” as a network, and is conscious of the dislocation of political authority and the proliferation of identity provides a fertile starting point from which questions about what and where Europe is can lead to discussions other than the often unproductive ones we have become familiar with.

CONCLUSION

This thesis began with a some discussion of the relevance of the questions “where” and “what” is “Europe”. Throughout the analysis of Moravcsik and Diez presented here, these questions have been ubiquitous. I did not intend to suggest that asking where or what is “Europe” should be the object of intensive study or the driving force behind any serious discussions of European integration. However, such questions are important starting points, and deserve consideration. The intention is not to arrive at some definitive answer that “locates” Europe. Instead, asking such a question necessitates some admission on the part of the researcher that the location and definition of “Europe” are not given, or uncontested. This is not to say that such questions could not and should not be asked of other polities such as NATO, the WTO, the United States or even Victoria. Globalisation, and the European integration process as somewhat of a microcosm of globalisation, raises questions about the nature and location of political authority, the definition of political community, and the subsequent understanding of citizenship and identity. In order to come to terms with these phenomena, I have suggested that one must attempt to re-imagine politics, outside of or beyond the confines of sovereignty. The difficulty, or almost inability to do this, and the need for theories to attempt to challenge these boundaries has been the central core of this project.

Moravcsik and Diez both advocate approaches that examine “Europe” not from the perspective of European integration theory, but international relations theory. “Europe” as treated as an interesting combination of complex phenomena that are playing out in various ways and in various places throughout the world. Transnational cooperation, trade liberalisation, and even some level of transnational security cooperation are not phenomena wholly unique to

“Europe” Therefore, as both Diez and Moravcsik suggest, it is important to examine “Europe” from an international relations perspective, rather than some *sui generis* theorising as has occurred in the “field” of European integration theory for some years. However, Moravcsik and Diez do not agree on what the focus or direction of approaches to European integration should be. For Moravcsik, the traditional concern with why integration has happened – a question based on an assumption that states wish to preserve sovereignty at all costs, which is premised on the belief that sovereignty and authority have not already been eroded and dislocated by forces of globalisation/integration – and what or who are the primary actors in the integration process. In contrast, Diez believes that approaches to European integration should be aware of latent potential within the integration project. That potential being the ongoing belief by many that the European integration process was started with the intention of spreading “peace and prosperity” throughout Europe, and re-imagining politics in a way other than the realist vision of adversarial sovereign states. In some sense, this re-vision of politics is not some possible architecture for the future of politics, but merely coming to terms with the dramatic changes to authority, community, and identity in contemporary politics. Here is where Fischer’s speech has much to offer.

Joschka Fischer’s speech, regardless of how it was received, suggests that at least some decision-makers in “Europe” are interested in obliterating what Paul Taylor referred to in the early 1980s as the primary characteristic of the European integration process: teleological ambiguity (Taylor 1983). For Fischer, there is a definite direction that “Europe” should be moving. In the context of his speech, Fischer believes that a Federal polity is the model for “Europe”. However, the extent to which, as I suggested in chapter two, that this is a product of his and our inability to re-imagine politics beyond or outside sovereignty is a question that

remains unanswered. For the purpose of this discussion, Fischer's speech highlights the extent to which the role of "theorist" is less esoteric and part of some "imaginary world" than one might think. In the course of his speech, Fischer becomes a theorist, dissatisfied with the lack of "vision" brought about by various theories of European integration. Which alludes the final point of the conclusion, and the primary question driving this paper: to what extent do Diez's and Moravcsik's theories challenge the boundaries of European integration theory?

I have already stated the extent to which both Diez and Moravcsik challenge the disciplinary boundaries of integration theory, by insisting on approaching Europe from an international relations perspective. However, as it has been made quite obvious throughout the course of this thesis, Moravcsik's approach may have much to tell us about the existing character of integration, it does little in the way of challenging dominant understandings of politics and providing alternative visions. Moravcsik does not claim to do this, so one should not be surprised when he does not engage in such a project. In this sense, Moravcsik stands as an exemplar of the limits or boundaries themselves, the extent to which integration theory has for the last fifty years changed in only minor ways. Diez, on the other hand, takes it as a given that the role of the theorist is to provide alternative visions and re-imagine politics. While this certainly has a place in wider theorising about international relations and "world politics", but it seems somehow more relevant in the European context. Reflecting on the genesis of the European integration process quickly uncovers the fact that the integration project was driven by a longing to construct politics in a way other than the sovereign state structure, and although Hoffmann pointed out that in the late 1960s sovereignty seemed to be a great ideal that many

nations strived for (1966),⁵⁷ this ideal lives on. Diez's approach that in one sense, comes to terms with the challenges to existing understandings of political authority, sovereignty, community and identity brought on by what for lack of a better term is referred to as "globalisation". Simultaneously, however, Diez's approach suggests that attempting to re-imagine politics and conceive of "Europe", in this case, as a network, returns to the original intentions behind the integration project. Whether or not one finds Diez's approach convincing is secondary. Most important is Diez's seeming return to the integrationist sentiment expressed by Mitrany, and to a lesser extent Haas. In both cases, the "end" of integration was not discussed, it was both assumed and unknown. Assumed in that the integration process was about expanding peace and prosperity in "Europe" and creating an "Ever Closer Union", unknown to the extent that the actual form or structure of this polity was rarely theorised beyond some "federal" vision similar to Fischer's.

The EU is entering trying times. The possibility of enlargement to Eastern Europe, and the necessary institutional reforms that must accompany such a project are far from easy. This does not mean that theories of integration that help us to understand what and who the primary forces/actors are is not important. However, attempts such as Diez's that attempt to re-imagine politics and rise to the challenge implicitly posed by Fischer for "visions" is no less important. Such approaches allow the latent potential for "Europe" to become a window to a re-imagine politics, better able to cope with the changing architecture of politics in the contemporary epoch.

⁵⁷ Hoffmann makes specific reference to the movement in Africa and the Indian subcontinent towards attaining the status of "sovereign" state, the rise of UN membership as the number of "sovereign states" increased and so on.

Appendix 1

"From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European integration" **Speech by Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000**

(Translation of advance text)

Fifty years ago almost to the day, Robert Schuman presented his vision of a "European Federation" for the preservation of peace. This heralded a completely new era in the history of Europe. European integration was the response to centuries of a precarious balance of powers on this continent which again and again resulted in terrible hegemonic wars culminating in the two World Wars between 1914 and 1945. The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions.

Fifty years on, Europe, the process of European integration, is probably the biggest political challenge facing the states and peoples involved, because its success or failure, indeed even just the stagnation of this process of integration, will be of crucial importance to the future of each and every one of us, but especially to the future of the young generation. And it is this process of European integration that is now being called into question by many people, it is viewed as a bureaucratic affair run by a faceless, soulless Eurocracy in Brussels - at best boring, at worst dangerous.

Not least for this reason I should like to thank you for the opportunity to mull over in public a few more fundamental and conceptual thoughts on the future shape of Europe. Allow me, if you will, to cast aside for the duration of this speech the mantle of German Foreign Minister and member of the Government - a mantle which is occasionally rather restricting when it comes to reflecting on things in public - although I know it is not really possible to do so. But what I want to talk to you about today is not the operative challenges facing European policy over the next few months, not the current intergovernmental conference, the EU's enlargement to the east or all those other important issues we have to resolve today and tomorrow, but rather the possible strategic prospects for European integration far beyond the coming decade and the intergovernmental conference.

So let's be clear: this is not a declaration of the Federal Government's position, but a contribution to a discussion long begun in the public arena about the "finality" of European integration, and I am making it simply as a staunch European and German parliamentarian. I am all the more pleased, therefore, that, on the initiative of the Portuguese presidency, the last informal EU Foreign Ministers' Meeting in the Azores held a long, detailed and extremely productive discussion on this very topic, the finality of European integration, a discussion that will surely have consequences.

Ten years after the end of the cold war and right at the start of the age of globalization one can literally almost feel that the problems and challenges facing Europe have wound themselves into a knot which will be very hard to undo within the existing framework: the introduction of the single currency, the EU's incipient eastern enlargement, the crisis of the last EU Commission, the poor acceptance of the European Parliament and low turn-outs for European elections, the wars in the Balkans and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy not only define what has been achieved but also determine the challenges still to be overcome.

Quo vadis Europa? is the question posed once again by the history of our continent. And for many reasons the answer Europeans will have to give, if they want to do well by themselves and their children, can only be this: onwards to the completion of European integration. A step backwards, even just standstill or contentment with what has been achieved, would demand a fatal price of all EU member states and of all those who want to become

members, it would demand a fatal price above all of our people. This is particularly true for Germany and the Germans.

The task ahead of us will be anything but easy and will require all our strength, in the coming decade we will have to enlarge the EU to the east and south-east, and this will in the end mean a doubling in the number of members. And at the same time, if we are to be able to meet this historic challenge and integrate the new member states without substantially denting the EU's capacity for action, we must put into place the last brick in the building of European integration, namely political integration.

The need to organize these two processes in parallel is undoubtedly the biggest challenge the Union has faced since its creation. But no generation can choose the challenges it is tossed by history, and this is the case here too. Nothing less than the end of the cold war and of the forced division of Europe is facing the EU and thus us with this task, and so today we need the same visionary energy and pragmatic ability to assert ourselves as was shown by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman after the end of the Second World War. And like then, after the end of this last great European war, which was - as almost always - also a Franco-German war, this latest stage of European Union, namely eastern enlargement and the completion of political integration, will depend decisively on France and Germany.

Two historic decisions in the middle of last century fundamentally altered Europe's fate for the better: firstly, the USA's decision to stay in Europe, and secondly France's and Germany's commitment to the principle of integration, beginning with economic links.

The idea of European integration and its implementation not only gave rise to an entirely new order in Europe - to be more exact, in Western Europe - but European history underwent a fundamental about-turn. Just compare the history of Europe in the first half of the 20th century with that in the second half and you will immediately understand what I mean. Germany's perspective in particular teaches a host of lessons, because it makes clear what our country really owes to the concept and implementation of European integration.

This new principle of the European system of states, which could almost be called revolutionary, emanated from France and her two great statesmen Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet. Every stage of its gradual realization, from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community to the creation of the single market and the introduction of the single currency, depended essentially on the alliance of Franco-German interests. This was never exclusive, however, but always open to other European states, and so it should remain until finality has been achieved.

European integration has proved phenomenally successful. The whole thing had just one decisive shortcoming, forced upon it by history: it was not the whole of Europe, but merely its free part in the West. For fifty years the division of Europe cut right through Germany and Berlin, and on the eastern side of the Wall and barbed wire an indispensable part of Europe, without which European integration could never be completed, waited for its chance to take part in the European unification process. That chance came with the end of the division of Europe and Germany in 1989/90.

Robert Schuman saw this quite clearly back in 1963: "We must build the united Europe not only in the interest of the free nations, but also in order to be able to admit the peoples of Eastern Europe into this community if, freed from the constraints under which they live, they want to join and seek our moral support. We owe them the example of a unified, fraternal Europe. Every step we take along this road will mean a new opportunity for them. They need our help with the transformation they have to achieve. It is our duty to be prepared."

Following the collapse of the Soviet empire the EU had to open up to the east, otherwise the very idea of European integration would have undermined itself and eventually self-destructed. Why? A glance at the former Yugoslavia shows us the consequences, even if they would not always and everywhere have been so extreme. An EU restricted to Western Europe would forever have had to deal with a divided system in Europe: in Western Europe integration, in Eastern Europe the old system of balance with its continued national orientation, constraints of coalition, traditional interest-led politics and the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations. A divided system of states in Europe without an overarching order would in the long term make Europe a continent of uncertainty, and in the medium term these traditional lines of conflict would shift from Eastern Europe into the EU.

again. If that happened Germany in particular would be the big loser. The geopolitical reality after 1989 left no serious alternative to the eastward enlargement of the European institutions, and this has never been truer than now in the age of globalization.

In response to this truly historic turnaround the EU consistently embarked upon a far-reaching process of reform:

- In Maastricht one of the three essential sovereign rights of the modern nation-state
- Currency, internal security and external security - was for the first time transferred to the sole responsibility of a European institution. The introduction of the euro was not only the crowning-point of economic integration, it was also a profoundly political act, because a currency is not just another economic factor but also symbolizes the power of the sovereign who guarantees it. A tension has emerged between the communitarization of economy and currency on the one hand and the lack of political and democratic structures on the other, a tension which might lead to crises within the EU if we do not take productive steps to make good the shortfall in political integration and democracy, thus completing the process of integration.

The European Council in Tampere marked the beginning of a new far-reaching integration project, namely the development of a common area of justice and internal security, making the Europe of the citizens a tangible reality. But there is even more to this new integration project: common laws can be a highly integrative force.

It was not least the war in Kosovo that prompted the European states to take further steps to strengthen their joint capacity for action on foreign policy, agreeing in Cologne and Helsinki on a new goal: the development of a Common Security and Defence Policy. With this the Union has taken the next step following the euro. For how in the long term can it be justified that countries inextricably linked by monetary union and by economic and political realities do not also face up together to external threats and together maintain their security?

Agreement was also reached in Helsinki on a concrete plan for the enlargement of the EU. With these agreements the external borders of the future EU are already emerging. It is foreseeable that the European Union will have 27, 30 or even more members at the end of the enlargement process, almost as many as the CSCE at its inception.

Thus we in Europe are currently facing the enormously difficult task of organizing two major projects in parallel:

1. Enlargement as quickly as possible. This poses difficult problems of adaptation both for the acceding states and for the EU itself. It also triggers fear and anxiety in our citizens: are their jobs at risk? Will enlargement make Europe even less transparent and comprehensible for its citizens? As seriously as we must tackle these questions, we must never lose sight of the historic dimension of eastern enlargement. For this is a unique opportunity to unite our continent, wracked by war for centuries, in peace, security, democracy and prosperity.

Enlargement is a supreme national interest, especially for Germany. It will be possible to lastingly overcome the risks and temptations objectively inherent in Germany's dimensions and central situation through the enlargement and simultaneous deepening of the EU. Moreover, enlargement considers the EU's enlargement to the south - is a pan-European programme for growth. Enlargement will bring tremendous benefits for German companies and for employment. Germany must therefore continue its advocacy of rapid eastern enlargement. At the same time, enlargement must be effected carefully and in accordance with the Helsinki decision.

2. Europe's capacity to act. The institutions of the EU were created for six member states. They just about still function with fifteen. While the first step towards reform, to be taken at the upcoming intergovernmental conference and introducing increased majority voting, is important, it will not in the long term be sufficient for integration as a whole. The danger will then be that enlargement to include 27 or 30 members will hopelessly overload the EU's ability to absorb, with its old institutions and mechanisms, even with increased use of majority decisions, and that it could lead to severe crises. But this danger, it goes without saying, is no reason not to push on with enlargement as quickly as possible, rather it shows the need for decisive, appropriate institutional reform so that the Union's capacity to act is maintained even after enlargement. The consequence of the irrefutable enlargement of the EU is therefore erosion or integration.

Fulfilling these two tasks is at the heart of the current intergovernmental conference. The EU has pledged to be able to admit new members by 1 January 2003. Following the conclusion of Agenda 2000, the aim now is to put in place the institutional preconditions for the next round of enlargement. Resolving the three key questions - the composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council and particularly the extension of majority decisions - is indispensable for the smooth continuation of the process of enlargement. As the next practical step these three questions now have absolute priority.

Crucial as the intergovernmental conference is as the next step for the future of the EU, we must, given Europe's situation, already begin to think beyond the enlargement process and consider how a future "large" EU can function as it ought to function and what shape it must therefore take. And that's what I want to do now.

Permit me therefore to remove my Foreign Minister's hat altogether in order to suggest a few ideas both on the nature of this so-called finality of Europe and on how we can approach and eventually achieve this goal. And all the Eurosceptics on this and the other side of the Channel would be well advised not to immediately produce the big headlines again, because firstly this is a personal vision of a solution to the European problems. And, secondly, we are talking here about the long term, far beyond the current intergovernmental conference. So no one need be afraid of these ideas.

Enlargement will render imperative a fundamental reform of the European institutions. Just what would a European Council with thirty heads of state and government be like? Thirty presidencies? How long will Council meetings actually last? Days, maybe even weeks? How, with the system of institutions that exists today, are thirty states supposed to balance interests, take decisions and then actually act? How can one prevent the EU from becoming utterly intransparent, compromises from becoming stranger and more incomprehensible, and the citizens' acceptance of the EU from eventually hitting rock bottom?

Question upon question, but there is a very simple answer: the transition from a union of states to full parliamentarization as a European Federation, something Robert Schuman demanded 50 years ago. And that means nothing less than a European Parliament and a European government which really do exercise legislative and executive power within the Federation. This Federation will have to be based on a constituent treaty.

I am well aware of the procedural and substantive problems that will have to be resolved before this goal can be attained. For me, however, it is entirely clear that Europe will only be able to play its due role in global economic and political competition if we move forward courageously. The problems of the 21st century cannot be solved with the fears and formulae of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Of course, this simple solution is immediately criticized as being utterly unworkable. Europe is not a new continent, so the criticism goes, but full of different peoples, cultures, languages and histories. The nation-states are realities that cannot simply be erased, and the more globalization and Europeanization create superstructures and anonymous actors remote from the citizens, the more the people will cling on to the nation-states that give them comfort and security.

Now I share all these objections, because they are correct. That is why it would be an irreparable mistake in the construction of Europe if one were to try to complete political integration against the existing national institutions and traditions rather than by involving them. Any such endeavour would be doomed to failure by the historical and cultural environment in Europe. Only if European integration takes the nation-states along with it into such a Federation, only if their institutions are not devalued or even made to disappear, will such a project be workable despite all the huge difficulties. In other words: the existing concept of a federal European state replacing the old nation-states and their democracies as the new sovereign power shows itself to be an artificial construct which ignores the established realities in Europe. The completion of European integration can only be successfully conceived if it is done on the basis of a division of sovereignty between Europe and the nation-state. Precisely this is the idea underlying the concept of "subsidiarity", a subject that is currently being discussed by everyone and understood by virtually no one.

So what must one understand by the term “division of sovereignty”? As I said, Europe will not emerge in a political vacuum, and so a further fact in our European reality is therefore the different national political cultures and their democratic publics, separated in addition by linguistic boundaries. A European Parliament must therefore always represent two things: a Europe of the nation-states and a Europe of the citizens. This will only be possible if this European Parliament actually brings together the different national political elites and then also the different national publics.

In my opinion, this can be done if the European parliament has two chambers. One will be for elected members who are also members of their national parliaments. Thus there will be no clash between national parliaments and the European parliament, between the nation-state and Europe. For the second chamber a decision will have to be made between the Senate model, with directly-elected senators from the member states, and a chamber of states along the lines of Germany’s Bundesrat. In the United States, every state elects two senators, in our Bundesrat, in contrast, there are different numbers of votes.

Similarly, there are two options for the European executive, or government. Either one can decide in favour of developing the European Council into a European government, i.e. the European government is formed from the national governments, or - taking the existing Commission structure as a starting-point - one can opt for the direct election of a president with far-reaching executive powers. But there are also various other possibilities between these two poles.

Now objections will be raised that Europe is already much too complicated and much too intransparent for the citizen, and here we are wanting to make it even more complicated. But the intention is quite the opposite. The division of sovereignty between the Union and the nation-states requires a constituent treaty which lays down what is to be regulated at European level and what has still to be regulated at national level. The majority of regulations at EU level are in part the result of inductive communitarization as per the “Monnet method” and an expression of inter-state compromise within today’s EU. There should be a clear definition of the competences of the Union and the nation-states respectively in a European constituent treaty, with core sovereignties and matters which absolutely have to be regulated at European level being the domain of the Federation, whereas everything else would remain the responsibility of the nation-states. This would be a lean European Federation, but one capable of action, fully sovereign yet based on self-confident nation-states, and it would also be a Union which the citizens could understand, because it would have made good its shortfall on democracy.

However, all this will not mean the abolition of the nation-state. Because even for the finalized Federation the nation-state, with its cultural and democratic traditions, will be irreplaceable in ensuring the legitimation of a union of citizens and states that is wholly accepted by the people. I say this not least with an eye to our friends in the United Kingdom, because I know that the term “federation” irritates many Britons. But to date I have been unable to come up with another word. We do not wish to irritate anyone.

Even when European finality is attained, we will still be British or German, French or Polish. The nation-states will continue to exist and at European level they will retain a much larger role than the Länder have in Germany. And in such a Federation the principle of subsidiarity will be constitutionally enshrined.

These three reforms - the solution of the democracy problem and the need for fundamental reordering of competences both horizontally, i.e. among the European institutions, and vertically, i.e. between Europe, the nation state and the regions - will only be able to succeed if Europe is established anew with a constitution. In other words through the realization of the project of a European constitution centred around basic, human and civil rights, an equal division of powers between the European institutions and a precise delineation between European and nation-state level. The main axis for such a European constitution will be the relationship between the Federation and the nation-state. Let me not be misunderstood: this has nothing whatsoever to do with a return to renationalisation, quite the contrary.

The question which is becoming more and more urgent today is this: can this vision of a Federation be achieved through the existing method of integration, or must this method itself, the central element of the integration process to date, be cast into doubt?

In the past, European integration was based on the "Monnet method" with its communitarization approach in European institutions and policy. This gradual process of integration, with no blueprint for the final state, was conceived in the 1950s for the economic integration of a small group of countries. Successful as it was in that scenario, this approach has proved to be of only limited use for the political integration and democratization of Europe. Where it was not possible for all EU members to move ahead, smaller groups of countries of varying composition took the lead, as was the case with Economic and Monetary Union and with Schengen.

Does the answer to the twin challenge of enlargement and deepening, then, lie in such a differentiation, an enhanced cooperation in some areas? Precisely in an enlarged and thus necessarily more heterogeneous Union, further differentiation will be inevitable. To facilitate this process is thus one of the priorities of the intergovernmental conference.

However, increasing differentiation will also entail new problems: a loss of European identity, of internal coherence, as well as the danger of an internal erosion of the EU, should ever larger areas of intergovernmental cooperation loosen the nexus of integration. Even today a crisis of the Monnet method can no longer be overlooked, a crisis that cannot be solved according to the method's own logic.

That is why Jacques Delors, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing have recently tried to find new answers to this dilemma. Delors' idea is that a "federation of nation-states", comprising the six founding states of the European Community, should conclude a "treaty within the treaty" with a view to making far-reaching reforms in the European institutions. Schmidt and Giscard's ideas are in a similar vein, though they place the Euro-11 states at the centre, rather than just the six founding states. As early as 1994 Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble proposed the creation of a "core Europe", but it was stillborn, as it were, because it presupposed an exclusive, closed "core", even omitting the founding state Italy, rather than a magnet of integration open to all.

So if the alternative for the EU in the face of the irrefutable challenge posed by eastern enlargement is indeed either erosion or integration, and if clinging to a federation of states would mean standstill with all its negative repercussions, then, under pressure from the conditions and the crises provoked by them, the EU will at some time within the next ten years be confronted with this alternative: will a majority of member states take the leap into full integration and agree on a European constitution? Or, if that doesn't happen, will a smaller group of member states take this route as an *avant-garde*, i.e. will a centre of gravity emerge comprising a few member states which are staunchly committed to the European ideal and are in a position to push ahead with political integration? The question then would simply be: when will be the right time? Who will be involved? And will this centre of gravity emerge within or outside the framework provided by the treaties? One thing at least is certain: no European project will succeed in future either without the closest Franco-German cooperation.

Given this situation, one could imagine Europe's further development far beyond the coming decade in two or three stages:

First the expansion of reinforced cooperation between those states which want to cooperate more closely than others, as is already the case with Economic and Monetary Union and Schengen. We can make progress in this way in many areas: on the further development of Euro-11 to a politico-economic union, on environmental protection, the fight against crime, the development of common immigration and asylum policies and of course on the foreign and security policy. In this context it is of paramount importance that closer cooperation should not be misunderstood as the end of integration.

One possible interim step on the road to completing political integration could then later be the formation of a centre of gravity. Such a group of states would conclude a new European framework treaty, the nucleus of a constitution of the Federation. On the basis of this treaty, the Federation would develop its own institutions, establish a government which within the EU should speak with one voice on behalf of the members of the group on as many issues as possible, a strong parliament and a directly elected president. Such a centre of gravity would have to be the *avant-garde*, the driving force for the completion of political integration and should from the start comprise all the elements of the future federation.

I am certainly aware of the institutional problems with regard to the current EU that such a centre of gravity would entail. That is why it would be critically important to ensure that the EU acquis is not jeopardized, that the union is not divided and the bond holding it together are not damaged, either in political or in legal terms. Mechanisms would have to be developed which permit the members of the centre of gravity to cooperate smoothly with others in the larger EU.

The question of which countries will take part in such a project, the EU founding members, the Euro-11 members or another group, is impossible to answer today. One thing must be clear when considering the option of forming a centre of gravity: this avant-garde must never be exclusive but must be open to all member states and candidate countries, should they desire to participate at a certain point in time. For those who wish to participate but do not fulfil the requirements, there must be a possibility to be drawn closer in. Transparency and the opportunity for all EU member states to participate would be essential factors governing the acceptance and feasibility of the project. This must be true in particular with regard to the candidate countries. For it would be historically absurd and utterly stupid if Europe, at the very time when it is at long last reunited, were to be divided once again.

Such a centre of gravity must also have an active interest in enlargement and it must be attractive to the other members. If one follows Hans-Dietrich Genscher's tenet that no member state can be forced to go farther than it is able or willing to go, but that those who do not want to go any farther cannot prevent others from doing so, then the centre of gravity will emerge within the treaties. Otherwise it will emerge outside them.

The last step will then be completion of integration in a European Federation. Let's not misunderstand each other: closer cooperation does not automatically lead to full integration, either by the centre of gravity or straight away by the majority of members. Initially, enhanced cooperation means nothing more than increased intergovernmentalization under pressure from the facts and the shortcomings of the "Monnet Method". The steps towards a constituent treaty - and exactly that will be the precondition for full integration - require a deliberate political act to reestablish Europe.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is my personal vision for the future: from closer cooperation towards a European constituent treaty and the completion of Robert Schuman's great idea of a European Federation. This could be the way ahead!

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
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