Representing Jerusalem: A Critical Geopolitical Analysis of the Role of Orient House in the Constitution of Palestinian National Identity, 1993-1999

by

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ABSTRACT

In the twentieth century, the struggle for political control of Jerusalem arises from historical tensions expressed in contemporary conflicts between two national groups – Israelis and Palestinians – representing three religions – Jewish, Muslim, and Christian. For both Israelis and Palestinians, Jerusalem is the religious, cultural, and political centre of their nation. In this thesis, I take a critical geopolitics approach to analyze media representations of the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians over the political activity at a specific Palestinian site in Jerusalem, Orient House, between 1993-1999. I investigate the construction of national identity and the role of Jerusalem in the constitution of Palestinian national identity. In approaching critical geopolitics, I examine material and discursive activities and argue for the importance of boundaries in the study of national identity. In particular, I examine the strategies used to draw boundaries in order to secure a specific identity.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF MAPS

LIST OF FIGURES

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The path to completing this thesis has been a long and winding one, and I received great deal of assistance and support along the way. I am very fortunate to have a supervisory committee that was not only actively involved in my research, offering me help whenever I came to their respective doorsteps, but was also genuinely interested in my topic. I want to thank Steve Lonergan for encouraging and supporting my interest the critical geopolitics and the Middle East, even when my topic diverged significantly from my original ideas. He always had enthusiasm and support for my research pursuits. My thanks to Pamela Moss, who took me on as a student even though I know she didn't have time, and taught me a great deal about critical geography. Pamela provided me with constant encouragement and laughter, and always had time to help me with any small problem. She continued to the very end to challenge me (even when I didn't want it!) and I know my thesis is better for her involvement. Many thanks also goes to Martin Bunton who acted as my outside member as a favour because of his interest in the subject. The innumerable conversations we had over coffee provided invaluable knowledge and insight into the issues and much support during the difficult months of writing.

My thanks to the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society, who provided funding for the completion of this project, and more importantly provided a friendly and open environment to work in. I also want to thank Ole Heggen in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria, who designed the maps for this thesis. The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) provided the photograph of Orient House. In addition, the many people I met while in Jerusalem made my field season an exceptional experience. My thanks go to those who shared their time and stories to help me learn more about Jerusalem. Also, I thank my friends at the "Norway House" for their generosity and for the fun times we had together.

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NOTES TO THE READER

Note on Terminology

Naming is as political an activity in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians as any other. Many sites within Israel/Palestine have two or three names signifying the contest over that site. An example is the Sea of Galilee; this is the English name, while the Israelis prefer Lake Kinneret and the Palestinians, Lake Tiberias. With the politics of naming in mind, I have made certain decisions about terminology. In most cases, because the focus of this project is on Palestinian national identity, I use terminology either appropriate to the Palestinian community or accepted within the international context. This includes using East Jerusalem as opposed to eastern Jerusalem, Jerusalem as opposed to Yerushalim (the Hebrew name for the city) or Al-Quds (the Arabic name for the city), and the West Bank as opposed to Judea and Samaria (the terms used by many Israelis). As for transliteration of Hebrew and Arabic words and names, I generally have used recognized conventions or the transliteration used in the publication I am using as a source. In the case of Faisal Husseini, while his name is sometimes spelled Faysal al-Husayni (especially in the BBC sources) and I have adhered to the spelling he uses on published papers (Faisal Husseini).

Note on Reference Information

In order to make citations and references to the data set accessible to the reader and less cumbersome in the analysis, I made several changes to the citation and reference style. I shortened the length of citations, particularly in Chapter 6, by abbreviating most of the names of news sources. Following is a list of abbreviations used for certain news sources in citations; sources not mentioned will be listed with their full name. In addition, I include the full date of issue of the news report in the citation; reports are listed in the same fashion in the reference list. Full references for the data set are listed separately from other sources and are separated by source, listed alphabetically. For BBC Monitoring sources, the references within each source are listed chronologically.

Abbreviations of News Sources for In-Text Citations

The Jerusalem Post	JP
Voice of Israel	VI
Voice of Palestine	VP
IDF Radio	IDF
Israel Television Channel 1	Israel TV1
Israel Television Channel 2	Israel TV2
Arutz 7 Website	Arutz 7
Palestinian Television	Palestinian TV
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre Press Service	JMCC

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

In showing photos of the summer I spent in Jerusalem to friends, I often single out an image of a seemingly innocuous highway and point out that it represents a vast cultural divide. On one side of the street, I practiced my Arabic while buying tomatoes from a Palestinian shopkeeper; on the other side, I encountered Hebrew-speaking Israelis in a shop where I stopped to buy a bottle of water. During the three months I spent living on these streets, buying groceries, walking to the Old City, boundaries that are not visible on the maps I studied before arriving became palpable to me. That boundaries, all but invisible to the newcomer, are dispersed throughout the city is not surprising. For example, the media attention to the breakdown of the recent negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians in the summer of 2000 points to Jerusalem as one of the main sources of disagreement in the pursuit for a final peace agreement. Competing claims to sovereignty over Jerusalem demonstrate the centrality of the city to both Israeli and Palestinian national identities and the divides that exist in perceptions and experiences of the city. The boundaries drawn on the map, negotiated in the peace talks, and experienced in the city occur in diverse and complex ways.

In this thesis, I study these boundaries in an attempt to understand how geopolitical practices in Jerusalem construct and contest Palestinian national identity. By examining geopolitical practices reported in the media during the Oslo Accords period, 1993-1999, I look at how one specific place in Jerusalem, Orient House, becomes a site where boundaries are drawn and national identity is constituted. My approach is a critical geopolitical analysis of the activities surrounding Orient House that focuses on identifying multiple strategies both Israelis and Palestinians engage in that demarcate how a specific national identity forms.

Critical geopolitics interrogates the notion that the relationships between state, national identity, and territory are natural or essential. These relationships, constructed

through a process that connects a particular national group to a specific territory, constitutes and specifies national identity as a geopolitical act. As Ó Tuathaíl and Dalby (1998:3) state, this geopolitical act "involves making one national identity out of many, establishing a boundary with an outside and converting diverse places into a unitary internal space." The ensembles of strategies that are employed in the practices of defining national identity demonstrate the constitutive process of boundary drawing and identity construction. As Ó Tuathaíl and Dalby (1998:5) contend:

> in understanding 'the geopolitical' as a broad socio-cultural phenomena [sic] it is important to appreciate both that geopolitics is much more than a specialized knowledge used by practitioners of statecraft and that the different facets of its practices are interconnected in various ways to quotidian constructions of identity, security and danger. Geopolitics saturates the everyday life of states and nations.

Yet, geopolitics is present not only in existing states, but also in on-going struggles by national movements seeking territorial legitimacy. These movements also engage in processes that seek to legitimate specific national identities.

In this thesis, I seek to examine how the articulations of boundaries and identity constitute each other at specific sites and how, in turn, these sites come to play a critical role in both boundary demarcation and identity formation. Specifically, I examine these issues in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as it pertains to the city of Jerusalem, focusing particularly on the impact of geopolitical practices on Palestinian national identity. Jerusalem is a nexus, or convergence point, of two national identities: Israeli and Palestinian. Both regard Jerusalem as a central element of their national identities. It is a unique space where both Israeli and Palestinian national identities are continually produced and reproduced.

For this study, I examine the geopolitics of activities and events at Orient House, as reported in the media, in order to identify strategies that various groups use to contest and constitute national identity. While Israeli national identity is necessarily part of this discussion, I focus primarily on Palestinian national identity and on the role of Jerusalem in the constitution of that identity. Moreover, I limit this study to a specific period during the Oslo Accords, 1993-1999. The Oslo Accords marked an important shift in Palestinian national identity because the Accords put in place the beginnings of a state for

Palestinians. How the territorial boundaries of this new state are drawn affects Palestinian national identity just as the boundaries of Jerusalem are a crucial element in this process. In order to examine the role of Jerusalem in Palestinian national identity, I focus on one place in Jerusalem where the contestation over the boundaries of the city epitomizes the constitution and struggle over national identity. By focusing on Orient House, I can study the ways these boundary-drawing practices articulate and then transform spaces into a site of constitution and struggle.

In this chapter, I set the objectives and rationale of the research project and then discuss the context of the research site, Orient House. I conclude by outlining the organization of the thesis.

A) RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, QUESTIONS, AND RATIONALE

The purpose of this study is to examine certain practices involved in constituting and contesting Palestinian national identity, not to evaluate or make any conclusive statements about the nature of that identity. I argue that the specification of national identity occurs through a variety of boundary-drawing activities. These activities are part of geopolitical processes of identity formation. Because national identity is continually (re)constituting itself, the interplay among these activities as part of these processes have an impact on the geopolitics of Jerusalem. My objective is to examine the strategies used by various actors to draw boundaries and shape identity. Specifically, my research question asks:

> How do geopolitical strategies draw boundaries and constitute national identity in specific places?

In order to address this question, I examine Palestinian national identity in the context of political activities in Jerusalem. Specifically, I am interested in the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians over the activities at Orient House, a building in East Jerusalem containing several offices of Palestinian institutions. My approach is to highlight the various strategies used by both Israelis and Palestinians by analyzing the activities that took place at Orient House between 1993 and 1999, during the Oslo Accords. These activities, as part of wider geopolitical practices, transform places such as Orient House

into representations of the struggle for a legitimate national identity. That is, geopolitics articulates in different ways in different spaces and combines together to form what we come to know as Jerusalem.

In choosing Jerusalem as a case study for examining this process, I chose a site replete with examples of contested boundaries and a space where territory and national identity is constantly in flux. This enhances the study for two reasons. First, boundary-drawing practices are prominent, identifiable, and linked to territorial claims of two competing national identities. Second, critical geopolitics is a relevant theoretical approach because there is a need to rethink conventional geopolitics and sovereignty issues in Jerusalem because of overlapping territorial claims by Israelis and Palestinians. However, as Dodds and Sidaway (1994) note, research within critical geopolitics has yet to devote significant attention to the geopolitics of the local and its connection to state geopolitics (for a recent attempt to address the local in critical geopolitics, see for example Clarke, Doel, and McDonough 1996). By studying Orient House, I am contributing to research attempting to address this gap in critical geopolitics. In addition, as I discuss in the next section, despite a significant amount of media attention, Orient House is still a little studied institution in Jerusalem.

II. RESEARCH SITE: ORIENT HOUSE

The idea of studying Orient House first came up during one of many discussions over coffee with Martin Bunton, one of my committee members. It was the fall of 1998, I had just come back from three months in Jerusalem and we were brainstorming about possible incidents and sites in the city that would be good case studies for my project. Over the next year, we watched as Orient House took on increasing prominence in the regional media and became the site of a fierce political battle between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem in April and May of 1999. At the end of April 1999, I decided that Orient House was clearly a good choice to investigate boundary-drawing practices as a part of demarcating national identity.

While Orient House is the topic of many news reports, it is not the subject of much academic work. In fact, Sami Musallam's (1996) work, *The Struggle for*

Jerusalem: A Programme of Action for Peace, is the only source I located that discusses Orient House in any detail. There are some works that mention the role of Orient House in Jerusalem, in particular articles by Faisal Husseini (1996a, 1996b, 1997) as well as Bishara (1998) and Dumper (1997). In light of the significant media attention since 1993, I found the lack of publications on Orient House among the numerous and diverse group of people who study Jerusalem surprising. Over the seven years since the Oslo Accords were signed, Orient House has steadily risen in prominence as an important Palestinian institution in Jerusalem.

In the remaining part of this section, I first discuss the history of Orient House and its activities. Then, I discuss the role and importance of these activities, focusing on the central issue that initiated the controversy: visits to Orient House by foreign officials, including heads of state in many cases.

A) HISTORY OF ORIENT HOUSE

Orient House is located in East Jerusalem, near the Old City in the American Colony neighbourhood (see Figure 1.1 and Map 1.1). Built in 1897 by Ismail Musa al-Husseini, Orient House was originally known as Husseini House. At the time considered the most elegant building in Jerusalem, it gained honour by hosting foreign dignitaries, including the German emperor Kaiser Wilhelm in 1898 (Klein 1999). Ismail Husseini died in 1945, leaving the house to his son, Ibrahim. Following the 1948 war, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) used the house as its headquarters throughout 1949 and 1950. The Husseini family then transformed the house into a hotel, named the New Orient House Hotel. The hotel operated until 1967 when it closed due to political unrest in the city after the Six Day War. From 1967 to 1983, Orient House was once again a residence; however, the building fell into disrepair and the owners rented out the top floor (Klein 1999). In 1983, the Arab Studies Society, founded by Faisal Husseini in 1979, rented a wing of the building, set up offices, and renovated the building to its former grandeur (Klein 1999). In July 1988, the Israeli military closed the building for four years, for security reasons related to the *Intifada*, the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem – the areas known as the Occupied Territories. With the reemergence of the Middle East peace

process, starting with the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, Faisal Husseini, acting as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) appointed head of the Palestinian delegation, reopened Orient House in 1992 as the headquarters for the PLO negotiating team (Musallam 1996).

Figure 1.1 Orient House

Husseini plays an important role in Palestinian affairs in Jerusalem. Following the first meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Cairo, in October 1993, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat assigned Husseini as the head of the Palestinian side of the joint Israeli-Palestinian committee on the issue of Jerusalem (Musallam 1996:52). In many ways, Palestinian Jerusalemites regard Husseini as their unofficial mayor: he is often described as their leader and Orient House as his official address. Although Husseini denies he is running a "shadow municipality" at Orient House, his intention is for Orient House to serve the needs of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Currently, Husseini is the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) minister of Jerusalem affairs (PNA 2000).



Map 1.1 Location of Orient House

B) THE ROLE OF ORIENT HOUSE

Since its establishment in 1992 as the headquarters for the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace process, Orient House has served both an administrative and a political role. In an administrative capacity, the daily activities at Orient House include providing logistical support to the Palestinian negotiating team in terms of communication facilities, meeting or conference rooms, and documentation. As Mussallam (1996:51-52) describes, Orient House also houses the Technical Committees for the Palestinian negotiating team that prepare the groundwork and drafts on the appropriate issues to be dealt with by the various committees in the negotiations. In addition, Orient House staff operate political desks for various regions of the world and departments that serve the interests of the local Palestinian population. Orient House also houses several separate institutions, such as the Arab Studies Society and the Palestinian Human Rights Information Centre (PHRIC).

Politically, Orient House has served as the official Palestinian address in Jerusalem for foreign dignitaries and government officials. As Husseini explains, Orient House is an important site for Palestinian activities in the peace process:

> Since the beginning of the work at Orient House, and I can say since the [early] 1990s, new principles began to appear. These are that any official visitor to this region should meet the Palestinians. In the past, we used to meet these visitors in our houses or hotels. Since 1992, a new principle was set, which is that the meeting be held at Orient House. These meetings began with the visit of the Portuguese prime minister to Orient House. Orient House means, first, that the political process is continuing; and it is the headquarters of the Palestinian team to the peace conference and the political negotiations. Secondly, it also means that the subject of Jerusalem continues to be an open file, and that it was not decisively ended in the way Israel wants by making East Jerusalem part of the Israeli capital. This is the international position, and because countries adopt such a position, then they have to deal with Orient House within this concept. (as quoted in VP, Dec. 4 1994)

Husseini underscores the importance of Orient House in the Palestinian commitment to the peace process. The importance of Orient House to the Palestinian people increased as

the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians over Orient House intensified (Chapter 6 focuses on the importance of Orient House for Palestinian national identity).

According to Musallam (1996), the political significance of Orient House decreased for Palestinians following Arafat's return to Gaza and the establishment of the PNA in 1994 because Orient House was no longer the only official address of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. In addition, following the Oslo Accords, signed in 1993 as a result of the peace process, the Palestinians are not entitled to run any PNA activities from Orient House (Chapter 5 provides further background on the Oslo Accords). This development led Husseini and his staff to redirect activities at Orient House to the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem. Despite his claim, Musallam (1996:51) acknowledges Orient House's importance as a "symbol of Palestinian presence and vitality in Jerusalem."

The Israeli government's disagreement with the activities of Orient House centres on the question of the character of these activities. Throughout the period of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinians continued the practice of hosting foreign dignitaries at Orient House. Following the Oslo Accords, Israel perceived these visits as constituting PNA activities within Jerusalem, which the Oslo Accords prohibit. Musallam (1996:54) argues that the Israeli government uses Orient House to emphasize its exclusive control of Jerusalem on a local scale. The Israeli government perceives activities at Orient House, specifically PNA activities, as a way to exert Palestinian national identity, which threatens their sovereignty over the city. Israeli maintain that during visits by foreign officials to Orient House issues concerning the PNA are discussed and therefore the meetings constitute national activities. Many of Israel's accusations about these visits revolve around the idea that the Palestinians are attempting to turn Orient House into a de facto foreign ministry. According to the Israeli government, this is a violation of the Oslo Accords and provides sufficient reason to close either the offices conducting national activities or the entire building. At one point, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin went so far as to declare that this violation rendered the Oslo Accords null and void (JP, Aug. 12 1994). Rabin's declaration opens up the space for my interpretation of Orient House as an important issue to the Israeli government and a site where national identity is negotiated.

Orient House symbolizes the struggle for sovereignty in Jerusalem. The Palestinians asserted their national identity through Orient House early on. For example, in December 1994, the new Palestinian radio broadcast *Voice of Palestine* asked Saeb Erekat, a prominent member of the Palestinian negotiating team, if Israeli legal measures to impede activities at Orient House would result in the closure of Orient House. He responded:

> Israel can issue decisions and laws as it likes, but the aspirations, ambitions and struggle of our Palestinian people in Jerusalem are geared towards achieving and entrenching national identity by establishing our independent state with Jerusalem as its capital... . The Palestinian people in Jerusalem have expressed their stance through the struggle which has been going on for 27 years, because Jerusalem is an integral part of the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967. The issue of Jerusalem to us is a political and sovereign issue. Palestinians seek to liberate Jerusalem to make it the capital of the independent Palestinian state. (as quoted in VP, Dec. 26 1994)

Similarly, Palestinian official Ziyad Abu Zayyad stated, "Orient House has been functioning all the time as the offices of the Palestinian delegation, and it will continue to function as such. Despite all the Israeli efforts to prevent the Orient House from doing its *natural role*, it's still continuing to do that" (my emphasis, VI, June 20 1995). The actions of Israelis toward Orient House increase the emphasis Palestinians put on Orient House as representative of Palestinian national identity in Jerusalem.

Throughout the Oslo Accords period the Israeli government claimed that Orient House officials conducted Palestinian national activities that constitute a violation of the Oslo Accords. While the Israeli government knew it had to open up the discussion on the status of Jerusalem in order to progress in peace talks with the Palestinians, Israelis continued to exert strongly their sovereignty in the city. The Israeli government was unwilling to accept any show of Palestinian nationalism, and they perceived the activities at Orient House as being just that. The Palestinians claim that Orient House existed as the headquarters for the PLO delegation to the Middle East peace process before the Oslo Accords were signed. Therefore, Orient House is protected under the so-called Jerusalem Letter, a contentious document attached to the Oslo Accords, that contains a promise by the Israeli government to protect Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem (see Chapter 5 for

more discussion of the importance of the Jerusalem Letter). The Palestinians maintain that Orient House does not conduct national activities and therefore is not in violation of the Oslo Accords. Initially, the issue hinged on whether or not there are PNA activities taking place at Orient House. Over the entire Oslo period there is an ongoing argument about what constitutes "political" or "national" activities and this debate forms the basis of the continuing struggle over Orient House. Towards the end of the Oslo period, the Palestinians increasingly assert their historical and political rights in Jerusalem. Throughout, Orient House symbolizes the Palestinian struggle for sovereignty in Jerusalem. In the analysis of the data set, I investigate the geopolitical practices whereby boundaries are drawn in discursive and material ways to constitute and contest Palestinian national identity.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

This introductory chapter has set the scope, objectives, and rationale for the research project, as well as describing the specific context of the research site: Orient House. The next chapter (Chapter 2) discusses my approach to critical geopolitics as a theoretical framework to research. Chapter 3 details my methodological and analytical approach, the methods used for data collection and coding, and my process of interpreting the data. Following this, I include a short chapter (Chapter 4) describing the results of data coding and give an overview of the content of the articles in the data set. Chapter 5 provides a context to the study of Orient House by first giving a brief history of Jerusalem in the 20th century, focusing on political and boundary changes up to and including the Oslo Accords, and second discussing the emergence and formation of Palestinian national identity. Chapter 6 provides the detailed analysis of the controversy at Orient House during the Oslo Accords period using the articles in the data set. Finally, I conclude the thesis with a discussion of the implications of a critical geopolitics for Jerusalem, reflections on the research, and suggest some directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

In seeking to understand how boundary demarcations at specific sites in Jerusalem affect the constitution of Palestinian national identity, I draw on critical geopolitics as the theoretical framework for this study. Critical geopolitics seeks to unravel the representations and practices that produce spaces of politics. In investigating these representations and practices, three concepts are crucial to my understanding of the spatialities of geopolitics – boundaries, national identity, and place. In this chapter, I first review critical geopolitics as a theoretical approach to research and define my approach. Next, I discuss, in turn, boundaries, national identity, and place as key concepts in my research project.

I. APPROACHING GEOPOLITICS

Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century geopolitics emerged as part of the expansion of the power of the state. This tradition engaged in the growth of European-state power and imperialism, and the caging of social relations and class conflicts within "national" boundaries. The state, its boundaries, and its security frame geopolitics' most basic theories of political organization, development, and cultural diversity. People such as Halford Mackinder, Friedrich Ratzel, and Rudolf Kjellen, among others, form part of the early "geopolitical tradition" that sought to explain the relationship between space and politics from a Euro-centric and state-centric perspective.

In his discussion of the history of geopolitics, Ó Tuathaíl (1996b) explores how conventional geopolitics developed. With roots in the turn of the twentieth century, Cold War practices of surveying, dividing, and organizing global space continued to shape geopolitics. These supposedly neutral spatial practices of politics privileged the state, making the operations of the state natural to the point that they were no longer visible. In this modern territorial discourse, the state is the taken-for-granted unit for analysis (Murphy 1996). As Ó Tuathaíl and Dalby (1994) make clear, this process particularly

involves naturalizing geography, and the accompanying territorial boundaries, and sanctioning a Western, masculinized perspective as the authoritative geopolitics.

Implicit in this conventional view of geopolitics is the denial of the historical struggles that create and maintain states as coherent territories and identities seeking international legitimacy. Agnew and Corbridge (1995) label this denial the territorial trap. Falling into this trap means beginning with identities created and fostered by the state system and operating within an ahistorical model of the state that does not recognize a spatiality other than the idealized territorial state (Ó Tuathaíl 1996b). Geopolitical practices often result in marginalizing groups, identities, and places that fall outside the dominant model.

Critical geopolitics, informed by poststructural, feminist, and postcolonial approaches, among others, questions the practices underpinning Cold War geopolitics and challenges the notion of the state as a dominant and discrete entity. These critical perspectives stem from the idea that the world is socially constructed and hence reflective of and also constitutive of perceptions and experiences. The categories used to construct and understand the world exist because of a complex web of power relations that constitute the actors engaging in these sets of relations. Drawing on these critical approaches, I conceptualize geopolitics as the ensemble of social, cultural, and political practices and institutions that organize global and local space. As both discursive and material, these practices naturalize geopolitical categories such as state, territory, and boundary, and are employed by social groups in order to legitimate their territorial claims.

A) APPROACHES TO CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

Critical perspectives challenge conventional geopolitics and its categories as self-evident, natural, foundational, and eminently knowable realities (Ó Tuathaíl 1996b). As Dalby (1990:14) explains, an analyst taking a critical geopolitical approach "argues from a position that states are not natural entities but politically created practices, and their claims to legitimacy ought to be the subject of critical investigation rather than the point of departure for analysis." Dalby's (Dalby 1990:173) critical approach investigates and

challenges the categorizations and cultural creations of discourses of power and exposes the grand geopolitical schemes, therefore examining what shapes political existence. The usefulness of this approach is that critical geopolitics can be about geopolitical schemes at a global scale, or, as Ó Tuathaíl and Dalby (1994:514) state, "about very specific sites and the tasks of unraveling the political manipulation of their symbolisms."

In their introduction to *Rethinking Geopolitics,* Ó Tuathaíl and Dalby (1998) discuss five main arguments advanced by critical geopolitics research. First, geopolitics is a broader cultural phenomenon than the conventional geopolitical tradition acknowledges. Geopolitics is not only about the spatial practices of statecraft, but also about the cultural mythologies of that state. Critical geopolitics needs to study everyday narratives along with the practices of the state elite. Second, critical geopolitics seeks in particular to examine the boundary-drawing practices that characterize states. The interplay between the boundaries of "inside" and "outside" constructs the state and the way in which these boundaries are constituted is the focus of critical geopolitics. Third, there are many geopolitics; it is not a singularity. The representational practices of the state extend beyond the state elite, to strategic communities, such as research institutions and academia, and popular culture. Critical geopolitics seeks to investigate the sites of production of these different forms of geopolitics. Fourth, studying geopolitical acts is not politically neutral. There is never a "voice from nowhere" (Sharp 2000:362). Rather, researchers engaging in critical geopolitics seek to embody their discussion and recognize the contextual and partial nature of analysis. And fifth, critical geopolitics seeks to theorize the techniques of power used in statecraft; for example, the pursuit of military strategies and technologies for control of territory.

While early research in critical geopolitics focused primarily on formal and practical geopolitical discourses – that is, on the practices of political leaders in the operations of the state – there is increasing attention on the connections between popular geopolitical discourses and formal geopolitics (see for example Routledge 1996; Sharp 1993, 1994; Sparke 1996). In particular, the media's role in shaping geopolitical understanding has gained attention (see in particular Joanne Sharp's work on *Reader's Digest* 1991; also see Dalby 1996; Dodds 1996; Ó Tuathaíl 1996a). These and other

investigations on areas of geopolitics outside the formal, global spaces have created a rich and diverse critique of conventional geopolitics.

Three particular studies inform my approach to critical geopolitics because they push the investigation of popular discourses of geopolitics into new areas: first, Paul Routledge's (1996) study on social movements in South Asia and their resistance to the hegemony of the state; second, Joanne Sharp's (1993, 1994) studies on Cold War representations of American identity and of the Soviet Union as "other" in *Reader's Digest*; and third, Jennifer Hyndman's (2000) work on moving toward a feminist geopolitics.

Routledge (1996) sets out to decentre geopolitics' concern with the state by examining what he terms the "terrains of resistance" of social movements, using specific examples from the Baliapal and Naxalite movements of India and Nepal's Democracy Movement. He argues for a geopolitical analysis at a scale other than the state that expands the notion of the political domain to "include everyday practices and knowledges that are articulated as counter-hegemonic positions" (Routledge 1996:512). In particular, Routledge argues for a critical geopolitics that analyses the cultural expressions of resistance in order to understand social movements through its participants instead of the state. Routledge maintains that the strategic practices of social groups is particularly important to a critical geopolitics. Specifically referring to resistance, Routledge argues that these strategies intersect with class, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality in complex and diverse ways.

Joanne Sharp's (1994:2) analysis of 63 years of *Reader's Digest* seeks to understand the "reproduction of international political and geopolitical relations in the *media-ted* world of the contemporary US" (my emphasis). Sharp's approach to popular geopolitics is particularly useful because of the way she conceives of the process of constructing popular geopolitical knowledge. In addition, her study focuses on using empirical material, in this case a long term study of one popular media source, to work through critical geopolitics as a theory and an analytical approach. In particular, Sharp (1994:20) engages this type of method in order to examine the "patterns of discursive coherence and rupture" that constitute geopolitical processes.

Jennifer Hyndman's (1998, 1999, 2000) research, grounded in transnational studies and particularly issues concerning refugees in East Africa, prioritizes feminist approaches to geopolitics. Hyndman is one of only a few critical geopoliticians that have argued for increased attention to gender and feminist analyses of geopolitics (see also Dalby 1994; Murphy Efrani 1998; Sharp 1996; Sparke 1996). She draws together work in critical geopolitics, feminist approaches to international relations, and transnational feminist studies in order to "stake out a space for a nascent project of feminist geopolitics" (Hyndman 2000:3). The primary aim of a feminist geopolitics, according to Hyndman (2000:2), is to "analyze power at a finer scale than the nation-state, and to trace its political possibilities for redressing violence and injustice." Hyndman argues for a feminist geopolitics accountable to security at the finest scale: the person. "Masculinist approaches to conventional and critical geopolitics have failed to attend to the care of persons at the finest scale. This is the task of feminist geopolitics" (Hyndman 2000:16).

While my project focuses on shaping national identity, it does examine boundaries drawn in spaces other than at the state-level and by groups other than the political elite in an attempt to investigate how national identity is shaped and experienced by different groups in different ways. And, although not at the scale of the person as Hyndman suggests, my analysis still challenges both conventional and critical geopolitical conceptions of worthwhile topics of investigation. My approach is shaped by feminist methodologies and seeks to move toward a feminist geopolitics, which I discuss further in Chapter 3.[1] In the next section, I map out my understanding of critical geopolitics as a framework for my research project.

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[1] Although I incorporate a discussion of feminist geopolitics and feminism as a methodological approach (see Chapter 3), I do not purport to engage a feminist analysis or a gender analysis in this thesis. Despite this, I do include some examples of both women's experiences of Palestinian national identity and examples of the gendering of geopolitical practices (see in particular, in this chapter, Section II. B. National Identity, and in Chapter 6, Section II. C. Militarism). In no way do I intend these comments to be a mere token mention of women's experiences and gender issues. I think that if we are to write women into history and geography, then along with studying women and gender specifically, we need to discuss issues such as national identity as a gendered process. This is my intention when these comments appear.

B) CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH

This project draws on the previously discussed approaches to critical geopolitics and seeks to problematize the material and discursive practices of geopolitics to examine how and why power relations shape the use of geographical reasoning (e.g. boundaries, space, place) in order to legitimate a particular geopolitical narrative. By focusing on geopolitical practices as the subject of critical investigation, I examine how space is made apolitical and ahistorical in politics. My approach to a critical geopolitical analysis is to examine the practices that go into legitimizing particular geopolitical narratives. In particular, I argue that these practices occur both materially and discursively and that they occur at levels other than the state and in sites other than the recognized arenas of politics. At the core of legitimizing a geopolitical narrative, in this case a particular national identity, is a recursive process of demarcating boundaries that constitute and are constituted by specific identities in specific sites.

By examining geopolitical practices involved in the legitimization of national identities, in this case the Palestinian struggle for statehood, I want to call attention to an "economy of abstract binary oppositions that we routinely draw upon and that frame our thinking" (Doty 1996:2). Following Price (2000), I juxtapose apparently disparate geopolitical strategies to highlight the subtle workings of power. Geopolitical practices and narratives operate within structures of discourse and geopolitics itself is a discursive sign. Barnes and Duncan (1992), drawing mainly on the work of Michel Foucault, define discourse as practices of signification that provide a framework for understanding the world. I find their understanding of discourse useful because they view the power inherent in discourse as deriving from both the abstract and material world. Different political actors use various strategies to legitimate their geopolitical narrative as a way to maintain power. These strategies involve mobilizing certain rules, codes, and procedures to naturalize and make culturally intelligible particular organizations of space. Naturalization acts to legitimate a specific geopolitical narrative by giving it more value than those that are not "natural" and therefore designated as illegitimate. This process of naturalization is a primary aspect of any discourse. As Doty (1996:10) argues, naturalization occurs through the classification of binary pairs, such as man/woman,

white/nonwhite, or North/South, the presupposition of the primacy of one term over the other through a statement of "fact," or the substitution of one set of pairs with another to reinforce these oppositions or create new, more forceful oppositions.

The process of creating a nation with a (relatively) fixed identity draws on these discursive practices by specifying how "we" are different from "them." Geopolitical discourses, such as sovereignty over Jerusalem, demarcate and legitimate the limits of this identity. Establishing one identity as legitimate against another "illegitimate" identity involves constructing an "other," often conceived as a threat. For example, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, much Israeli geopolitical discourse depends on the construction of the Arab "other" as a security threat, mainly in the form of terrorism (Mayer 1994b). Palestinian and Israeli geopolitical strategies in Jerusalem attempt to fix the limits of a national identity by drawing on this legitimate/illegitimate dualism and conflating it with others, such as real state/quasi state, autonomous/occupied, peace/war, victor/vanquished, and reality/myth. Identity, then, is not just an allegiance to a territory where the struggle for power occurs, the identity itself is at stake in the struggle (Mouffe 1995:264). That is, the struggle manifests materially at specific sites, for example in Jerusalem, that come to represent the discursive struggle, in this case the struggle for Israeli and/or Palestinian national identities. And while the boundaries demarcated by these identities have material manifestations, such as the construction of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank in order to claim territory, they are also discursive, marking legitimate and illegitimate identities. Indeed, the interaction between discourse and materiality in the articulations of identity happens in different ways in different spaces (Moss and Dyck 1999:377).

In adopting critical geopolitics as a framework for studying the constitution of Palestinian national identity, I focus my analysis around the interaction between boundary-drawing, national identity formation, and specific places. The rest of this chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings of my understanding of these three concepts.

II. BOUNDARIES, IDENTITY, AND PLACE IN CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

Geopolitical practices are constitutive of processes of boundary drawing and identity formation that occur in specific sites. This conceptualization focuses on three key concepts – boundaries, identity, and place – that form the basis of my examination of geopolitical practices used in constructing national identity.

A) BOUNDARIES

In conventional geopolitics, boundaries are a largely taken-for-granted category, despite being explicitly linked to other geopolitical categories such as nation, race, and state (Jackson and Penrose 1993). This conventional, state-centric approach conceptualizes boundaries as fixed and static political demarcations. This view of a boundary located precisely between two states is largely wrapped up in Cold War geopolitics which takes sovereignty, territoriality, and boundaries of states as naturalized categories. The recent turn to critical theory in geopolitics and boundary studies challenges these traditional realist, state-centric approaches to geopolitics and international relations (for example, on boundaries see Falah and Newman 1995; Newman and Paasi 1998; Paasi 1996; Rumley and Minghi 1991; Shapiro and Alker 1996; on postcolonial approaches see Jacobs 1996; McClintock 1994, 1997; on resistance see Pile and Keith 1996; Routledge 1996; Sibley 1995; on critical geopolitical approaches see Campbell 1992; Dalby 1990; Ó Tuathaíl 1996b; Ó Tuathaíl and Dalby 1998). These scholars are reconceptualizing boundaries as dynamic, contested, and socially constructed sites of dominance and resistance in order to uncover the power relations at work between various social groups in the spatial practices of politics.

Critical geopolitics approaches boundaries as sites of investigation into the political, cultural, and social processes of defining identity (Ó Tuathaíl and Dalby 1998:4). Boundary-drawing practices are about more than cartography and state power, they are conceptual, imaginary, and social. I conceive boundaries as *socially constructed* in that they themselves are mediated through social relations that infuse them with meaning; as *symbols* of power relations, in that social groups use boundaries to signify identity; as *material and discursive*, in that boundaries can be drawn through tangible

activities as well as demarcated through language; and as *contested* spaces in that marginalized groups resist dominant boundary demarcations and engage in activities that redefine the boundaries themselves.

First, social groups construct boundaries and infuse them with cultural, historical, and religious, often contested, meaning (Newman and Paasi 1998:187). These meanings are replete with dominant notions and assumptions already shaping colonial, ethnic, religious, race, and gender relations. In this sense, they are a key site in the politics of lived space (Pile 1996). Newman and Paasi (1998:196) state that "boundaries are one part of the *discursive landscape* of social power, control and governance, which extends itself into the whole society and which is produced and reproduced in various social and cultural practices." That is, through these social practices various actors construct boundaries and assign them some culturally intelligible meaning. The struggles over the redefinition of space by various ethnoregional groups are expressions of, as Paasi (1996:6) states, attempts to establish a territorial counterpart for social boundaries. In the case of Jerusalem, while the municipal borders of the city are defined one way by the Israeli government, many Palestinians perceive the limits of the city quite differently. As well, the residents of the city experience these boundaries in very different ways. For example, Palestinians travelling between the West Bank and Jerusalem are stopped at checkpoints and often harassed by Israeli soldiers.

Second, as Newman and Paasi (1998) argue, boundaries constitute lines of separation or contact between power structures that at least partly manifest themselves territorially. In this sense, boundaries are both symbols and manifestations of power relations and social institutions; they both create identities and are created through identity. Boundaries are changing, sometimes blurred, and often inconsistent because of shifting power relations, strategic tactics, or processes such as globalisation (see for example, Dumper (1997) on Jerusalem's blurred boundaries or Mlinar (1992) on globalisation). Boundaries are signifiers of power and as such, they not only separate groups and communities from each other, but also mediate contacts between them. For example, Palestinians living under Israeli occupation are forced to carry identification (ID) cards, which differentiate between Palestinians from Jerusalem, the West Bank, or Gaza, and are often stopped at borders and checkpoints because their ID card does not

allow them to travel through the border. The Israeli government issued these ID cards after the 1967 war when Palestinians in Jerusalem refused the option of Israeli citizenship as a resistance measure. In an effort to exert control over the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation who were not citizens, the Israeli government separated and differentiated Palestinians by identifying them based on their area of residency and the importance of that area to Israeli concerns.

Third, boundaries can be territorially imposed and symbolically represented, that is, they can be both material and discursive. In the creation and maintenance of identity, power holders define, sometimes drawing on popularized symbols, the social and spatial limits of membership and members share cultural codes that help to create an inside and outside. These codes and rules of identity that demarcate boundaries are evident in social and cultural practices that occur both discursively and materially, such as government legislation, public events and demonstrations, films, novels, the news, memorials, ceremonies, school curriculum, maps, etc. The material and discursive elements of boundaries form the context of the "boundary narrative" (Newman and Paasi 1998). For example, from 1949 to 1967, the armistice line separating Israeli armies from Jordanian armies on the West Bank, known as the Green Line, existed as a physical border, imposed through barricades and walls with only one crossing point. After the Six Day War in 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and removed the border. Yet, although the physical border was removed, a noticeable social and psychological boundary remained, thus redrawing Jerusalem's borders materially and discursively (Dumper 1997; Romann and Weingrod 1991).

Fourth, boundaries are used, as Paasi (1996) demonstrates, as a means of securing sociospatial and ethnic homogeneity. Dominant groups construct and imbue boundaries with meaning in an effort to exclude and marginalize other groups (Sibley 1995). Yet, overlapping this process are practices of resistance. The unintended consequence of making space a means of control, Cresswell (1996:163) argues, is to simultaneously make it a site of meaningful resistance. However, spaces of oppression do not confine spaces of resistance because groups and individuals are positioned differently in unequal and multiple power relationships. This is one of Pile and Keith's (1996) key points in their discussion of spaces of resistance: the geographies of dominance and resistance are

linked, but not bound, together. Just as spatial practices of dominance create and are created by boundaries, the spatiality of resistance also constitutes and is constituted by boundaries.

Despite the reconceptualization of boundaries in critical geopolitics, most research remains focused primarily on the boundaries of the state. Researchers in other areas, particularly feminist researchers, are theorizing boundaries as more than state political demarcations (Anzaldúa 1987; Enloe 1989; hooks 1990; Minh-ha 1996; Price 2000). Their work conceives of boundaries as more complex cultural and social separators that expose the struggles between disparate narratives at various scales. The act of defining boundaries in the process of "othering," differentiating someone on the basis of identity, happens not only between states, but also within them at other levels of political activity and in other realms, such as religion, culture, race, gender, class, and sexuality.

As well, research on political boundaries, particularly in geopolitics, makes little attempt to distinguish between and define the concepts of *border* and *boundary*. These words are used interchangeably with the consequence of still privileging the state as a unit of analysis. For the purposes of this study, I distinguish between a border as being a product of the conventional, state-centric geopolitics, and a boundary as a contested, historically contingent construct that acts in social, cultural, political, religious, economic, ethnic, and gendered ways. By making this distinction, I do not suggest that a border is outside a socially constructed world. Borders too are historically contingent demarcations and are often linked to and representative of boundaries. I use the word *border* to refer to the use of a political demarcation by a particular group to legitimate a specific geopolitical discourse. For example, the Israeli government attempts to reinforce a municipal border of Jerusalem in order to contain Jerusalem within Israel, thereby denying it as part of Palestine. For Palestinians, however, the Israeli-imposed definition of Jerusalem serves to set up boundaries that determine their access to Jerusalem.

B) NATIONAL IDENTITY

The focus of identity for this project is on national identity because the struggle for sovereignty in Jerusalem, by both Israelis and Palestinians, is largely a national one. By national identity, I mean the identification of a particular group as members of a particular unit, where this unit, or "nation," is a social, spatial, and gendered construction. By conceiving national identity in this way, I seek to disrupt the conflation of nation and state common in conventional geopolitics. I problematize the notion that a national identity requires a territorial state and that the two co-exist seamlessly in (and out of) space. Conflating these two terms, nation and state, comes as a result of the frequent use of the term "nation-state," which underlies the unquestioning acceptance of the privileged status of the state in geopolitics and international relations (Murphy 1996:104).

The nation is constituted through the identification of a group of people with sets of commonalities, for example, common language, territory, economy, history, or ethnicity. These shared beliefs, along with shared experiences and symbols of identity, create a basis for "imagining" a nation (Anderson 1991). Yuval-Davis (1997) adds the importance of the belief by a nation's members in a common past and a common destiny as part of a national identity. Social groups, whether national or otherwise defined, create, and maintain identity through similar processes of establishing boundaries based on difference. As Paasi (1996:27) states, referring to Bourdieu's work, to "establish and institute something, giving it a social definition or identity, means at the same time the establishment of boundaries" (q.v. Bourdieu 1991). Defining a nation involves a similar identity-formation process of establishing boundaries that set up an "other." In his work *Orientalism*, Edward Said maintains,

> the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another, different and competing alter ego. The construction of identity ... involves the construction of opposites and 'others' whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of their differences from 'us'. (Said 1994:331-32)

Dalby (1991:274) explains this process of dividing space into "ours" and "theirs," with the political function of incorporating and regulating "us" from "them," as the essential geopolitical moment.

This geopolitical moment can also be described through Benedict Anderson's (1991) theory of "imagining" the nation. He defines the nation as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 1991:6). The nation is limited because it has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which other nations lie; it is sovereign because the emblem of a free nation is the sovereign state. Anderson goes on to explain that nationalism is invented and that nations are distinguished by the way in which they are imagined. Nationalism looks both inward, in order to unify the nation and its constituent territory, and outward, to divide one nation and territory from another. Anderson's concept of the imagined community is useful because he is suggesting that in imagining their nation, people are constructing it. These socially constructed national groups create cohesive identities through discourses that invoke common cultural codes and experiences. The element of a common origin or common history is an important part of constructing a nation. Adding to this definition, Yuval-Davis (1997:19) asserts that most definitions of the nation miss the notion of a common destiny. She argues that a feeling of common destiny is part of constructing the nation because it allows for the integration of new members as well as the continuation of a sense of commitment to the nation.

Drawing on Anderson, Paasi (1996) defines nationalism with specific reference to territory. Nationalism, he states, is a "social process by which certain historically contingent forms of territorial identities, symbols and ideologies are instilled into the social and individual consciousness" (Paasi 1996:55). Nationalism, then, is a specific form of territoriality, linked to the process of spatial socialization:

> the process through which individual actors and collectivities are socialized as members of specific territorially bounded spatial entities and through which they more or less actively internalize collective territorial identities and shared traditions. (Paasi 1996:8)

In this sense, people are not passively socialized into different social institutions, but rather they perpetually construct institutions, themselves, and others. Spatial socialization, then, is about establishing spatialized identities. Through the structures of "us" and "them," each notion becomes defined not only in terms of its own, but also in relation to other nations, that is, *difference* is constitutive of national identity.

The process by which national identity is constituted and reconstituted is also a gendered process. Geopolitical discourses involve specific gendered notions in order to construct and legitimate the nation and a particular national identity. Yuval-Davis (1997:1), in her theorization of gender and nation, argues that constructions of nationhood involve specific notions of "manhood" and "womanhood." Women are usually hidden in theories of the nation, despite the fact that women reproduce the nation biologically, culturally, and symbolically (Yuval-Davis 1997:2). Anne McClintock (1997), in her feminist investigation of the nation, argues that nations historically sanction the institutionalization of gender difference. Not only do men and women not have equal access to the rights and resources of the nation/state, nations are also considered on the presupposition of a masculine citizen. Therefore, nationalism is experienced differently by men and women, as well as by different social groups within the nation. Particularly in the Palestinian case, as Tamar Mayer (1994a) highlights in her study of Palestinian nationalism under Israeli occupation, the public/private split affects Palestinian women and men's experiences in different ways. Mayer argues that the Israeli occupation, along with experiences of expulsion and dispossession that Palestinians have experienced in the 20th century, have significantly shaped Palestinian national identity (see Chapter 5 for more on Palestinian national identity). For women, the intrusion of Israeli soldiers into their villages, neighbourhoods, and homes disrupts key aspects of family (e.g. house demolitions by Israelis), motherhood (e.g. protecting children from Israeli soldiers), and sexuality (e.g. women face an increased interaction with men because of the occupation), increasing their anger and reinforcing their commitment to the national cause. In light of these changes in Palestinian women's lives, Mayer argues, their ability and desire to resist the occupation and define their own national identity has, in some cases, been strengthened.

Power can be utilized in different ways to resist oppression and create oppositional discourses. The interaction of space in the resistance of dominant discourses is crucial. Pile (1996), in his theorization of spaces of resistance, discusses various ways that power and space interact to create new spaces where power can be subverted. He suggests,

> In one sense, power is the power to have control over space, to occupy it and guarantee that hegemonic ideas about that space coincide with those which maintain power's authority – and this can best be seen in the coincidence of the nation and national identity. In another sense, power can be mobilised through the reterritorialization – the resymbolization – of space, and this can be as oppressive as it can be subversive. Territories need not necessarily be spaces of exclusion, where people defined as marginal or outside the dominant value are denigrated, abjected and persecuted (see Sibley 1995). Instead, resistance may reterritorialize space in various ways, in order to transform its meanings, undermine territory as a natural source or power, and enable territory to become a space of citizenship, democracy and freedom – within limits. (Pile 1996:30)

Yet, reterritorializing space through resistance is never a total process that can wipe away the history of that space: spaces of resistance are linked to spaces of dominance. In examining how Jerusalem is territorialized and symbolized by Palestinians, Pile's notion of using space as a tool for resistance is important. For example, despite Israel holding the balance of power in Jerusalem, the Palestinians are still engaged in spatial socialization. Critical geopolitics also needs to examine the geopolitics of resistance in constituting national identity.

Natter and Jones (1997) contend that boundaries and space are necessary components in a discussion of identity. The reterritorialization of space through resistance is linked to a process of constructing places. Space must be (re)conceptualized "as *both* materiality and – through the system of signification contingently adhered to it – as representation" (Natter and Jones 1997:151). This conceptualization of space draws on the notion of place, where specific articulations of representations of space are manifested. My conceptualization of place, which I elaborate on below, involves fluid constructions rather than fixed; place is contested rather than static. Along with space and territory, constructions of place help to frame the discussion of national identity.

C) PLACE

Jacobs (1996:36) states that "the politics of identity is undeniably also a politics of place." She argues, as I discussed above, that identities have spatial articulations and that these spaces are as political as the identities they represent. The practices of defining

and contesting identity happens in particular places that are meaningful to a particular social group. Jerusalem's unique situation as the centre of two nations and three religions makes the city a highly contested space. Both metaphorically and physically, each community and place has its own sites of confrontation, spaces of struggle, and arenas of contention (Paasi 1996). In defining place, Pred (1984) states that a sense of place is the result of everyday practices that make up our quality of life. The meaning of places are shaped through a process that both constitutes and is constituted by social practices. Massey (1994) defines place as a manifestation of specificity, that is, a particular articulation in the network of social relations and therefore challenges the assumption that everyone in a place can be characterized in the same way. If identities and boundaries are not fixed and homogeneous, then neither are the places that represent them. Places, as Massey (1994:5) theorizes, are "unfixed, contested and multiple."

Geopolitical practices often essentialize places, seeking to instil them with homogeneous characteristics recognized by a particular group as a means of symbolizing a particular identity. Places become bounded with the identity of those that perceive themselves as part of this group. However, Massey insists that this is a complex process of interactions:

> The particularity of place is, in these terms, constructed not by placing boundaries around it and defining its identity through counter-position to the other which lies beyond, but precisely (in part) through the specificity of the mix of links and interconnections *to* that 'beyond'. Places viewed this way are open and porous. All attempts to institute horizons, to establish boundaries, to secure the identity of place, can in this sense therefore be seen to be *attempts to stabilize the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time*. (Massey 1994:5, emphasis in original)

The attempt to stabilize meaning is never totally successful, then, because a place cannot be defined solely in opposition to the "other," but only through a process of interactions. Natter and Jones' (1997) discussion of non-essentialist identity relates to this process. They state that the constitutive outside is a relational process where the outside of any category, such as place, is actively at work on both sides of the constructed boundary. Therefore, the power to make and maintain difference that is seen to construct place and identity is never unidirectional. And though the boundaries may appear rigid, the differences are never neatly contained; they are only *maintained* (Natter and Jones 1997).

These boundaries are maintained through hegemonic practices. Gramsci conceptualizes hegemony as the power of the dominant group to persuade subordinate groups to accept its values as the natural order (as explained in Jackson 1989). Therefore, resistance to hegemonic practices becomes "less about particular acts, than about the desire to find a place in a power-geography where space is denied, circumscribed and/or totally administered. The implication is that resistance comes from a place outside of the practices of domination" (Pile 1996:15). As Routledge (1996: 519-520) notes,

> a sensitivity to particular places of resistance implies the acknowledgement of the intentionality of historical subjects, the subjective nature of perceptions, imaginations and experiences in dynamic spatial contexts, and how spaces are transformed into places redolent with cultural meaning, memory, and identity.

What Routledge is arguing is that places are material representations of discursive processes and that social groups create these representations. Notions of place draw on boundaries and identity and show the constitutive process between them. By examining specific sites and the geopolitical practices that signify and transform them, I can investigate boundary-drawing practices and identity formation as part of this constitutive, recursive process. Critical geopolitics is as much about global and state level politics as it is about the specific sites where politics is produced, reproduced, and symbolized.

III. SUMMARY

Geopolitical practices seek to legitimate a particular narrative by studying strategies, used materially and discursively, that demarcate boundaries. These boundary-drawing practices shape national identity through activities that occur in specific sites, which in turn come to represent that identity. Key to my approach to a critical geopolitics is the constitutive process between boundaries, identity, and place. While I have discussed these concepts separately in order to explain my understanding of each, I see them as inextricably linked in geopolitical practices. The process of identity formation through boundary demarcation, in this case specifically national identity, is not a sequenced process but a simultaneous one. They occur in tandem, overlap, and intertwine with each other. In the next chapter, I discuss my methodological and

analytical approach to the study of critical geopolitics and my methods of data collection and interpretation.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY, ANALYSIS AND METHODS

Media reports about Orient House during the period of the Oslo Accords, 1993-1999, comprise the empirical material for investigating the arguments of this thesis. The approach to the scrutiny of some of the activities involved in constituting national identity (see Chapter 2) consists of interrogating geopolitical practices as reported in the media. In this chapter, I discuss my methodological and analytical approaches to the research project, the methods I used for data collection and coding, and my process of moving from data to analysis.

I. METHODOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

My methodological approach is informed, in particular, by feminist methodologies and the notion of critical research. My analytical approach involves a deconstructive reading of geopolitical practices as reported in the media. Four aspects of the research process frame these approaches: being critical, positioning myself, analyzing texts, and examining geopolitical practices using media reports. In this section, I discuss each aspect in turn.

A) BEING CRITICAL

The main methodological approach framing my research is the notion of *critical* research. I am adopting Harvey's (1990:4) understanding of critical social research, where critique is an integral part of the process and the aim is to delve beneath the dominant frame (or appearance) and reveal the "underlying practices, their historical specificity and structural manifestations." Various aspects of social theory shape the "critical" in critical geopolitics. My own entry into social theory came through feminism. Feminist research continues to inform my understanding of the critical aspects of research.

For me, feminism is a comprehensive and inclusive theory and methodology that seeks to address the unequal and oppressive power relations that exist between people based on various and multiple differences. In addition, feminism strives for more than just a critique of these processes; feminism is a commitment to action and change to redress injustice. From my perspective, feminism is about more than just gender; feminism acknowledges other bases for oppression such as class, race, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, and other affiliations. Mohanty (1991:10), in her discussion on feminism as practiced by third world women, argues that feminism needs to interrogate the "simultaneity of oppressions" that constitute the experience of social and political marginality. Similarly, Hyndman's (2000:1) call for a feminist geopolitics focuses on affiliations that are "potential bases for exclusion, discrimination, and even violence." A feminist approach to geopolitical research, then, can shift the scale of study to the person or persons signifying "other" and can transform perspectives toward exploring power relations that create oppressive conditions/spaces. In Enloe's (1993:232) discussion of feminism and nationalism, she adopts a similar point of view, stating "feminist analyses reveal that nationalist movements are more suffused with power and evolve more erratically than most nonfeminist accounts suggest." Enloe and Hyndman contend that feminist analyses of geopolitics and nationalism occur through an exploration of "low" politics. In my thesis, the choice of Orient House as a research site along with the focus of my research question on geopolitical strategies circumscribed the arena of politics that I am looking at as "high" politics. Therefore, despite my understanding of, and commitment to, feminism, I do not engage in a feminist analysis in this thesis. Instead, I see my methodological approach, in particular my conception of being critical, as informed by feminism.

A critical approach conceives the world as socially and historically constructed through power relations that position people differently according to various classifications or categories. The interactions and unequal power relations that work together to naturalize the categories we use to understand the world, such as gender, class, race, and nation, and exert a particular way of seeing the world, result in the marginalization and oppression of certain groups of people. The task for a critical researcher, as Butler (1992:7 emphasis in original) states, is not to do away with

foundations (or categories), rather it is to "interrogate what the theoretical move that establishes foundations *authorizes*, and what precisely it excludes or forecloses". This framework aims to understand how different groups use geopolitical practices and strategies to legitimate a specific national identity. My own critical perspective seeks to highlight these practices by investigating the implications of discursive and material activities of both dominant and marginalized groups.

B) POSITIONING MYSELF

Feminist approaches to critical research emphasize the importance of the positioning of the researcher in the research process in order to acknowledge and begin to address the impact of the researcher on the research itself. One important methodological concern in my research is my position in relation to the peoples of the area I am researching and representing. I am not from Jerusalem or the Middle East and I have only limited experience with either Israeli or Palestinian culture. I am neither Israeli nor Palestinian, and I am not Jewish or Muslim, nor do I identify with Christianity, despite living in a society with Judeo-Christian roots. I need to keep all of this in mind as I think through how my biography – as a young, white, Canadian (half French Canadian, half English Canadian, raised mainly in Alberta) woman with a post-graduate education and from a professional, upper-middle class family – affects my interpretations of the texts I analyze. My understanding of Israeli and Palestinian cultures directly affects the research I carry out and the representations of my research findings. For instance, I need to be aware of and examine the stereotypes Western society imposes on Middle Eastern cultures. My placement as an "outsider" affects both my access to information and how I interpret and represent this information and these cultures.

Recent work in geography on feminist methodologies not only suggests that researchers need to acknowledge power dynamics in the research process through their methods and fieldwork, but also through critical reflexivity (q.v. England 1994; Madge et al. 1997; Nast et al. 1994; Wolf 1996). Being self-reflexive in research is one strategy for maintaining a critical edge through the research process. It involves analytical scrutiny by the researcher into her impact on the research (England 1994). In this way, researchers strive to be more flexible and open in their research and to incorporate an

understanding of their interactions with the researched into their process of collecting and analyzing data. Part of being critical in research, then, is reflecting on my positioning with the research process throughout the stages of the research project. As England (1994) concludes, integrating ourselves as researchers into the research process involves exposing the partiality of our perspective. What arises from this partiality is a tension between different aspects of the research. In my thesis, a tension emerges both between the theory of critical geopolitics and specificity of the case of Orient House, and between the data and the source of the data.

England urges us to refocus the goals of our research toward a process that locates ourselves in the research; she states:

> We do not conduct fieldwork on the unmediated world of the researched, but on the world *between* ourselves and the researched. At the same time this 'betweenness' is shaped by the researcher's biography, which filters the 'data' and our perceptions and interpretations of the fieldwork experience. (England 1994:86, emphasis in original)

Regardless of the researcher or project, each researcher is positioned in a particular way in the study and the resulting research will reflect this, whether or not there is recognition of this in the writing up of the research. What is crucial for me is not only to locate myself in the research, but also to recognize that the research is about my interests, interpretations, and reflections on Jerusalem and Palestinian national identity as well as about the geopolitics of Jerusalem for Palestinians and Israelis.

C) ANALYSING TEXTS

In this study, I analyze selected texts using the method of deconstruction. Deconstruction is an analytical technique that calls into question the naturalized, dominant, and authoritative nature of discourses. Deconstructing texts involves interrogating and problematizing the codes and ideas used to make a particular text legitimate.

Following Norris (1991) and Butler (1992), I understand deconstruction, a term particularly associated with the work of Jacques Derrida, as seeking to destabilize truth claims. To deconstruct is not to do away or dismiss these categories, rather it is

> to continue to use them, to repeat them, to repeat them subversively, and to displace them from the contexts in which they have been deployed as instruments of oppressive power... . To call a presupposition into question is not the same as doing away with it; rather, it is to free it up from its metaphysical lodgings. (Butler 1992:17)

Norris' (1991) reading of deconstruction supports Butler's assertion, explaining that we cannot deconstruct categories by simply declaring them obsolete or redundant. As Norris points out, Derrida makes it clear that deconstruction involves no slackening of rigour or suspension of standards, rather, in deconstructing we must remain faithful "to the order of logical necessity which constrains those texts to mean something other than ... [what the author] would manifestly wish them to mean" (Norris 1991:152). My task in analyzing texts is to *challenge* the "logical necessity which constrains those texts"; this is the major task of deconstruction.

The intention of deconstruction, then, is to focus on the relation of particular discourses to power and privilege. As Riggins (1997:2) states, the goal "is to provide a detailed description, explanation, and critique of the textual strategies writers use to 'naturalize' discourses – to make them appear to be commonsense, apolitical statements." I agree with Natter and Jones (1997:147) when they argue that we can deconstruct with "full force the deep structures that construct difference as meaningful and deploy it in hegemonic projects" only through linking the construction of the category and the material effects that produce and reproduce the category. In particular, my analytical approach is to identify strategies that demarcate boundaries and demonstrate how they attribute meaning to Orient House and contribute to constituting Palestinian national identity.

One route to researching these discursive and material geopolitical practices, especially the concrete activities of people associated with Orient House, is to examine them as reported in the media. The media provides a continuous, long term source of data useful for examining geopolitical practices through a critical geopolitical framework.

D) EXAMINING GEOPOLITICS USING MEDIA REPORTS AS DATA

Within the theoretical framework of critical geopolitics, I aim to study geopolitical practices as reported in the media. Sharp (1994:18) notes that critical geopolitical research has in large part ignored substantive empirical material as a means to work through critical geopolitics. Following Sharp's research, this project also seeks to ground critical geopolitics in empirical data in order to promote an understanding of the practices that are involved in drawing boundaries and constituting national identity. However, my thesis does not seek to interrogate media discourses specifically. Nevertheless, there remain two challenges to using the media as a data source: representing Palestinian national identity in the Israeli media, and the differences in the media in Israeli and Palestinian society.

1. Representing Palestinian National Identity in the Israeli Media

A major concern in my study is that, as Table 3.1 shows, the articles in my data set from Israeli sources outnumber those from Palestinian sources more than three to one. The constraints of my study (discussed below), restrict the articles I gathered with respect to access to data. I simply could not access other appropriate, English-language sources from the Palestinian media. This has implications for my ability to examine Palestinian national identity, as I purport to do in this study, specifically because these numbers skew the representation of Israeli versus Palestinian viewpoints on the controversy at Orient House.

To the extent that identity is formed through a "constitutive outside", Israeli media provides this context for Palestinian national identity. And, while the focus of my study is primarily on Palestinian national identity, the controversy at Orient House occurs because of the ongoing struggle between Palestinians and Israelis. I needed to look at both Palestinian and Israeli representations of the struggle in order to explore how geopolitical practices at Orient House constitute Palestinian national identity. The meaning of Orient House emerges through the tension between Israeli and Palestinian sources.

Table 3.1 Number of Articles from Israeli and Palestinian Media Sources

Israeli Sources		Palestinian Sources	
Source	**Number of Articles**	**Source**	**Number of Articles**
The Jerusalem Post	179	Voice of Palestine	92
Voice of Israel	147	'Al-Ayyam	4
IDF Radio	23	Palestinian TV	2
Israel TV Channel 1	20	Al-Quds	2
Israeli TV Channel 2	9	JMCC	1
Ha'aretz	6		
Arutz 7 web site	2		
Hatzofe	1		
Davar Rishon	1		
Total – Israeli sources	**388**	**Total – Palestinian sources**	**101**
Total Articles in Data Set	**489**		

Despite the distribution of articles, I think that I collected sufficient articles from Palestinian sources to get an understanding of Palestinian perspectives on Orient House. As well, many Israeli sources quote Palestinian officials and discuss Palestinian activities. While these need to be analyzed within the context of the author and the audience, both likely Israeli, there is still room to gain an understanding of, and some insight into, Palestinian national identity from these sources. In addition, the conflict at Orient House and in Jerusalem in general is largely a conflict between two national groups seeking to use the same territory to signify their national identity; therefore, Israeli national identity, while not the focus, is an integral part of this study.

2. Differences in the Media between Israeli and Palestinian Society

Another consideration for my study is that the role of the media is different in Israeli society and in Palestinian society. For Palestinians, the development of a national media is connected to the Oslo Accords. For the first time, Palestinians instituted intra-territorial radio and television service. Jayyusi (1998:191) connects this process not only

to nation building, but also state building. In some ways, Palestinians sources may "overstate" stories such as Orient House as a means to establish a "pan-Palestinian" national identity. An independent Palestinian media represents a part of the legitimacy of statehood that the Palestinians seek. Therefore, the communication of the words of the PNA directly to the Palestinian people is a new phenomenon in Palestinian society. Israelis have an established, legitimate state infrastructure that includes a national and international media. Yet, Israeli media is as diverse as Israeli society. There are many different newspapers, magazines, and radio and televisions programs reflecting the diversity of political, religious, and cultural perspectives. Conceptions of national identity within this diversity of Israeli media sources are distinct. The various perceptions of government actions, Palestinian activities, and the public of the controversy at Orient House by the public together make up a constructed and diverse Israeli national identity. Likewise, while Palestinian media is less diverse because it is newer, it also provides a diversity of Palestinian views. I investigate geopolitical practices as they reflect and constitute these contingent, diverse, and contested views of Palestinian national identity.

I considered choosing several other types of data to explore boundary demarcation and identity formation in Jerusalem. For example, government documents, reports by the numerous research and advocacy organizations, or school curriculum are all good sources of information to explore questions of national identity. I rejected these sources and decided on the media, even with these limitations, because the media gave me an opportunity to look, in a detailed chronological fashion, at the actions and reactions of Israelis and Palestinians toward the activities at Orient House over a longer term period of time. In the next section, I discuss my choices in data collection and some of the constraints I faced.

II. Data Collection and Coding

The empirical material for this project is news reports from media sources inside Israel/Palestine. My research design included three phases: fieldwork, data collection, and data analysis. First, I first spent three months in Jerusalem exploring the geopolitics

of Jerusalem. Next, I chose media sources and collected articles. Third, I analyzed the data in the context of discourse and materiality.

A) FIELDWORK IN JERUSALEM

During the summer of 1998, I spent three months in Jerusalem learning about and investigating how boundaries affect the geopolitics of the city. I spoke informally with people in the region to gain a better understanding of Israeli-Palestinian relations, and collected documents that I might otherwise not have access to. Although I chose not to use the material I collected in Jerusalem as data for my project, these documents assisted me in the reading of that data by enhancing my understanding of local perspectives on the struggle for sovereignty in Jerusalem.

I went to Jerusalem excited, pursuing an open-ended research question: how do the social, political, religious, economic, and cultural boundaries in the city affect the political situation and vice versa? My original focus was to learn more about this question and the role of Jerusalem in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to refine my research question, design my project, and collect my data. However, this was not my experience at all. My time in Jerusalem was one of learning and reflecting, not collecting, sorting, or analyzing data. After three months, I returned to Victoria with information and ideas about my research, and a greater understanding of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. But I did not really have a specific project in mind.

I now see that the purpose of my fieldwork in Jerusalem was to explore and experience the city to give myself a context from which to undertake the study. In addition, I needed to gain access to certain documents and organizations not available in Victoria. Without a personal experience and some (however introductory) understanding of the city, my engagement with my research material would have been quite different. My personal experiences in Jerusalem, especially through interactions with Israelis and Palestinians, continue to inform my understanding of the conflict. For instance, I do not think I would have chosen to study Orient House without the personal connection I had to it – I lived in East Jerusalem, two blocks away from Orient House, I walked past it everyday, and went inside the building several times. It was after my summer in

Jerusalem, as I set out to design a specific research project, that I choose to research geopolitical practices at Orient House by using media sources as data.

B) CHOICE OF SOURCES

The empirical material for this project comprises newspaper articles and radio broadcast transcriptions between September 13, 1993 and May 4, 1999. (In fact, the final date of data collection is May 5, 1999. I extended the end date in order to obtain articles and reports about events of the previous day.) These dates represent the original timeline of the Oslo Accords, with May 4, 1999 as the deadline for instituting a final status peace agreement, signaling the end of the negotiation period. While these original dates have been extended by subsequent agreements they remain a logical and convenient start and end date for this study for two reasons. First, this timeline reflects the initial spirit within which the original parties, the PLO and the Rabin administration, negotiated the agreement. May 4, 1999, was not originally a date to declare unilateral statehood as the Palestinians threatened after the breakdown of the peace process, but the date when Palestinian self-determination would be achieved. For this reason, the original timeline acts as a measuring stick (literally and symbolically) for the breakdown of the negotiations that came mid-way through the Oslo Accords timeline. Second, on a more practical note, it was necessary to contain the data collection in some fashion. Because Orient House only became a focus of conflict as a result of the Oslo Accords, September 13, 1993 was an obvious choice. As for the end date, while somewhat arbitrary in terms of activities at Orient House (in fact May 4, 1999, falls in the middle of the biggest threat of closure Orient House faced), it is logical in the larger picture of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the controversy surrounding Orient House did not end when the Oslo Accords expired. In Chapter 7, I address the post-May 4, 1999 situation.

In choosing the media, there were three constraints to the data set: language, frequency of publication, and target audience. A concern at the outset of study was access to English language sources because I do not speak or read either Hebrew or Arabic. The sources I chose are either English language publications or provided in translation. The BBC Monitoring service translates news reports from around the world into English and they are available in electronic format through online full-text databases.

In examining various potential sources, frequency of publication was also a concern. Weekly and monthly publications simply did not provide sufficient information.[2] Also, I am interested in the daily events at Orient House alongside the rhetoric of the political elite and for this I needed daily news coverage. However, despite being limited by language, as it turned out, daily coverage news sources provided far more information than would have been possible for me to examine in any one project. I decided to limit the number of news reports by only examining sources from inside Israel/Palestine. As much as possible, I wanted to use sources that were primarily targeted for the consumption of Israelis and Palestinians.

With these constraints in mind, I used the following sources for my study (see Table 3.1). Israeli media sources include primarily *The Jerusalem Post* newspaper (Jerusalem) and the *Voice of Israel* (Jerusalem), supplemented by *Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Radio* (Tel Aviv), *Israel Television Channel 1* and *2* (Jerusalem), *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv), *Arutz 7* web site, *Hatzofe* (Tel Aviv), and *Davar Rishon* (Tel Aviv). Palestinian media sources included primarily the *Voice of Palestine* (Jericho and Ramallah), supplemented by *'Al-Ayyam* (Ramallah), *Palestinian Television* (Gaza), *Al-Quds* newspaper (Jerusalem), and the *Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre* (Jerusalem) (See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the content of the articles). For all news sources, I obtained electronic copies of coverage between the dates specified from two full-text news databases: Lexis-Nexis and Global NewsBank.

3. The Jerusalem Post

I accessed *The Jerusalem Post* articles through the Middle East section of Lexis-Nexis. There were in excess of 1000 articles that contained the keywords "Orient House" in *The Jerusalem Post* between the dates specified. In order to identify artices that were most useful for the analysis, which also narrowed down the articles to a more manageable number, I utilized a search tool provided by Lexis-Nexis and searched for articles

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[2] Language was also a major concern with weekly and monthly publications, limiting my access because they are not as readily translated. I examined the *Jerusalem Report*, *Middle East International*, *Palestine Report* (JMCC), and the *Jerusalem Quarterly* and decided that weekly and monthly publications would not provide sufficient information for my study.

containing "Orient House" only in the title or first paragraph. I reasoned that if the article were going to be about Orient House, and not just mentioning an official at Orient House while discussing another subject, it would be in the title or first paragraph. While I may have missed some articles, I think this search strategy provided me with a representative sample of *The Jerusalem Post*'s reporting on Orient House.

In large part, language and easy access governed my selection of *The Jerusalem Post* as a data source. *The Jerusalem Post* is an accessible source of information for this project, as well as being a Jerusalem-based daily. However, *The Jerusalem Post* is an interesting choice. This English language daily is widely read by not only English speaking Israelis, Palestinians, and ex-patriots in Israel/Palestine, but also by Jews and others abroad. I attempted to contact *The Jerusalem Post* for information on their circulation in Israel versus international circulation (mainly via the internet) to provide more context; however, I did not receive a response to my inquires. Nevertheless, although *The Jerusalem Post* is partly targeted to an international audience, I think *The Jerusalem Post* wants this audience to feel a part of Israel and to identify with Israeli national identity.

4. BBC Monitoring

I collected all other data through BBC Monitoring (Middle East – Political), which is carried by both Lexis-Nexis and Global NewsBank.[3] BBC Monitoring is a worldwide, continuous news monitoring program that emphasizes information from countries for which other news sources are not readily available (BBC Monitoring 2000). News sources from some 140 countries in 50 languages are monitored and translated in order to "provide fast, reliable coverage of political and economic news" (BBC Monitoring 2000). BBC Monitoring's key publication, from which my sources are drawn, is the Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB). The editorial staff selects reports in the SWB on the basis of content (Innes 2000). Therefore, a report will be published from

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[3] I found the BBC sources on Global NewsBank before realising that Lexis-Nexis also carries the BBC Monitoring publications. I decided to use both because I found that they had some different articles. I do not know the reason for this and I was unable to get a specific answer from the BBC staff.

the source that carries the story first, quite often a news agency, and subsequent sources are used where they contribute added information or a different angle to the story.

The filtering of news stories through editorial selection and translation at BBC Monitoring confounds the politics of using media as a data source. BBC Monitoring is not changing Israeli and Palestinian access to information, but is changing my access to information about Israeli and Palestinian activities in Jerusalem. Therefore, I must consider that the editors at BBC Monitoring influence my study in some way. This means that the news stories considered to have "added value" by the editors in part shapes my interpretation of the controversy around Orient House (Innes 2000). For example, considering that this news service is provided by the BBC, editorial selection of articles may also reflect national interests of the British in the Middle East. At the same time, these sources may, and probably do, reflect Israeli and Palestinian interests in Orient House given their publication and broadcast in Israeli and Palestinian media. I do not claim that these interests cancel each other out; I do claim that there is still some worthwhile information to draw out of this mélange.

In my search for articles on Orient House, while I did reject a small number of reports from news agencies or sources outside Israel/Palestine, the majority of reports on Orient House published in the SWB were from sources inside Israel/Palestine. This means that BBC Monitoring published these news sources because they were the primary reports, and not because the editors thought they only added information. Therefore, I think that these reports are representative of the reports by Israeli and Palestinian media on Orient House during the dates specified. Despite this conclusion, I did attempt to find out from BBC Monitoring which sources they monitored in the region in order to determine the significance reporting on Orient House in the sources I used. The editors at BBC Monitoring would not provide this information.

C) CODING

After collecting all documents, I initially reviewed all the articles, removing duplicates (articles generated by both Global NewsBank and Lexis-Nexis), rejecting articles that were not centrally about Orient House, and giving each article preliminary

subject codes. I developed a detailed coding system in order to categorize both discursive and material events (see Appendix 1 for a list of codes used).

In order to organize and manage the data set, I used the qualitative data analysis program QSR NUD*IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorizing), Version 4. I used NUD*IST for data management and code-and-retrieve features, not for theorizing. Despite the claims that NUD*IST can help the qualitative researcher to build theory, the program does not have the capacity for a critical analysis, merely tools for viewing and organizing the information in ways that might aid this process. I found that once I organized the data through coding and produced reports on each code, I engaged in a critical reading of this information and began to draw themes from these reports. At this point, I did not use NUD*IST for organizing these themes, but instead began writing.

My coding process involved two main steps. First, I read each document closely and coded the following: events, such as visits by foreign officials (coded by country), demonstrations (coded by group), and Israeli government actions against Orient House; statements that indicated how different groups define Orient House, for example as the PLO headquarters in Jerusalem or as a quasi-foreign ministry of the PNA; and events and statements about Israeli or Palestinian homelands. In addition, I noted interesting and different quotes and pertinent background information that might assist in clarifying or elucidating certain points. Second, upon reviewing these codes, I devised a four-category structure around which I organized the analysis: events that represented boundary-demarcation (boundary), definitions of Orient House (place), statements or events that related to Israeli or Palestinian homeland (national identity), and contextual information.

It is important to note that while I analyzed a total of 489 articles, not all of these appear in the analysis as citations. In large part this is because many articles were short, cursory accounts of events at Orient House that did not necessarily reveal something novel about national identity and boundary demarcation except when counted together with other accounts of similar events, as for example the many visit by foreign dignitaries.

III. Moving from Data to Analysis

I next turned to generating reports on each code and examining each code for specific themes. As I identified themes, several organizational structures emerged. Part of the difficulty in choosing a structure for presentation emerged from the tension between analysis of the data and the source of that data (i.e. the media), as well as the tension between the geopolitical theoretical framework and the specificity of Orient House. I eventually decided to present the analysis around material and discursive activities of boundary demarcation, and then to distinguish between formal and informal sites of struggle over national identity within the material activities. While these activities are intertwined, even inextricably linked, the conceptual distinction allows for an in-depth analysis of the various ways boundaries get drawn and identities get constituted.

My analysis developed from a long, (re)iterative process of examining bits of data in many code reports, describing the events to tell the "story" of Orient House, distilling out themes from this description, theorizing about these themes, writing, reflecting, and then rewriting, and then doing the whole process again! This type of analysis involves a long and difficult process that requires sensitivity to the interplay between data, theory, and analyst. While my analysis is grounded in empirical data, my challenge was in not becoming mired down in the data (which happened) and in being able to draw in theory to conceptualize the events of this six-year period more abstractly (which I think eventually happened). As I struggled with this challenge, I often felt a tension: my interest in both critical geopolitics and in the specific story of Orient House was difficult to balance. The analysis took time and only emerged slowly through coding the documents and through writing and rewriting. I often described this struggle as feeling like I was in a dark room slowly searching around the walls for the light switch: if I just kept searching every inch of every wall, I thought, eventually I would find the light switch, which would allow me to figure out the way to express my analytical points. At several stages I thought I was coming to the end of my analysis, only to re-enter the data and find another layer of meaning. In the end, I think I found the "light switch," which is presented in Chapter 6.

IV. SUMMARY

In this chapter, I outlined the methodological and analytical approaches that I used I this research project, as well as describing my methods of collecting, coding, and analyzing the data. This research project consists of an analysis of activities, reported in media sources from Israel/Palestine, in order to investigate the geopolitical practices that shape Palestinian national identity. From a methodological standpoint, feminism informs my approach to critical research. I approached the analysis through a close reading of the data set, engaging in deconstruction. Data collection was guided by constraints in access to data, including language, frequency of publication, and target audience. I used an open process to code, seeking to identify main themes. I refined the coding until the analysis emerged through writing.

The rest of the thesis deals directly with the events that took place at Orient House during the period of the Oslo Accords. In the next chapter, I describe the content of the data set in detail and provide some general statistics on the subject matter of the data set. Chapter 6 presents my analysis of these articles. Following the analysis, I discuss some themes from the analysis in light of the theoretical framework and the current state of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

CHAPTER 4

DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SET

I. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I provide a detailed description of the content of the articles in the data set used in this study. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 show the number of articles by source and year. As discussed in the Chapter 3, I coded articles based on subject matter as well as coding statements that pertained to issues of national identity. The following is a description of subjects that were the most prominent in the set of articles used for this research (see Table 4.2 for summary). Each category includes news reports on events as well as editorials, opinion pieces, and political statements.

A) VISITS BY FOREIGN OFFICIALS

Forty-four percent of articles I examined discuss visits by foreign officials to Orient House, with 22 countries represented along with a visit by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, several visits by the European Union (EU) presidential troika, and several meetings with Jerusalem's Consul-Generals, including the US Consul-General (see Table 4.3). These visits form the basis of the controversy at Orient House because they are a tangible example of the activities of the Palestinians at Orient House and of the international community's perception of Orient House.

Certain countries visited Orient House more frequently than others. More importantly though, certain meetings were reported on more frequently or were more controversial than others. For example, Orient House officials held regular meetings with the Consul-Generals of Jerusalem and these meetings are discussed often. Visits by the EU presidential troika, France, and Turkey are also mentioned frequently.

The level of the visiting minister often played a role in the amount of attention given to a visit. For instance, a prime minister or foreign minister garnered more attention than cabinet minister or deputy minister. Meetings with the EU presidential troika sparked a significant amount of interest, particularly because of the importance

attributed to the EU's recognition of the Palestinian cause. The EU reaffirmed their position through the continuation of visits to Orient House despite Israel's strong objections and went as far as to pass a law obligating the troika to visit Orient House on trips to Israel (VI, Aug. 5 1996).

B) THE THREAT TO CLOSE ORIENT HOUSE

Sixteen per cent of articles focus on the issue of Israeli threats to close Orient House (see Table 4.2). The issue was raised early in the Oslo period, immediately following the signing of the Gaza/Jericho Agreement in May 1994. Once the Palestinians established a base for PNA operations in Jericho and Gaza, the Israeli national and municipal governments began to discuss the closure of Orient House because they suspected Orient House of conducting national activities. Starting in June 1994, Rabin sought legal opinions on the government's ability to close the building (JP, June 10 1994, 117).

The controversy over visits by foreign ministers led in many cases to calls from different sectors of Israeli society to close Orient House. For example, a visit by Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller on November 5, 1994, was particularly controversial. The media highlighted the meeting because it was kept a secret from the Israeli government. Media often used this visit as a reference point for justifying the closure of Orient House (Hutman and Immanuel, JP, Nov. 11 1994; Hutman and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 8 1994; IDF, Mar. 6 1995; Immanuel, JP, June 20 1995; Israel TV1, Nov. 7 1994; Izenberg and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 8 1994; VP, Nov. 8 1994; VP, Dec. 4 1994; Zak, JP, Nov. 16 1994).

C) ACTIONS OF THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

There are a total of five articles relating to the issue of unpaid property taxes by Orient House between February 23, 1994 and June 14, 1994. In *The Jerusalem Post* there were two articles by staff reporter Bill Hutman (Hutman, JP, Mar. 4 1994; Hutman, JP, Apr. 25 1994), one editorial (JP, Feb. 23 1994) and one letter to the editor (Ruden, JP, Mar. 15 1994). In addition, there was one report by Voice of Israel on June 14, 1994 (VI, June 14 1994).

Seven articles discuss an alleged violation of zoning bylaws, all of them in *The Jerusalem Post*. Five of these articles were by staff reporter Bill Hutman (Hutman, JP, June 27 1995; Hutman, JP, June 30 1995; Hutman, JP, July 3 1995; Hutman, JP, July 18 1995; Hutman and Makovsky, JP, June 26 1995), one Associated Press article (JP, July 10 1995), and one editorial (JP, June 26 1995).

There are a total of seven articles on the controversy surrounding construction at Orient House. Four articles in *The Jerusalem Post* (Hutman, JP, May 5 1995; Hutman, JP, May 7 1995; JP, July 10 1995; JP, July 13 1995); two reports by the Voice of Israel (VI, July 2 1995; VI, Aug. 14 1995b); and one report by the Voice of Palestine (VP, May 6 1995).

D) POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AT ORIENT HOUSE

The Palestinian press reported on activities carried out by Orient House officials that both demonstrate Orient House's role in advocating for Palestinians in Jerusalem and represent a Palestinian presence in Jerusalem. Reports on Palestinian political activities included articles on the activities of the Palestinian police and Orient House security guards (Hutman, JP, May 26 1994; Hutman, JP, Aug. 12 1994; Hutman, JP, Sept. 21 1994; Hutman, JP, Apr. 9 1995; Israel TV1, Aug. 10 1994; Israel TV1, Nov. 17 1994; Izenberg, JP, June 9 1994; Izenberg and Immanuel, JP, Dec. 27 1994; VI, Nov. 6 1994b; VI, May 19 1995; VI, July 3 1995a; VI, July 5 1995; VI, Apr. 15 1998; IDF, Aug. 11 1994b), press conferences held by Orient House to discuss various issues (Hutman, JP, Mar. 7 1996; Palestinian TV, Sept. 1 1996; VI, May 30 1994; VP, Aug. 20 1995), and a meeting of the PNA at Orient House (VI, June 19 1994a; VI, June 19 1994b; VI, June 19 1994c; VI, Aug. 12 1994, VI, Aug. 14 1994).

E) DEMONSTRATIONS

Fourteen percent of the articles discuss various demonstrations and protests related to Orient House. These articles include reports on protests held by Israeli groups against Orient House and the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, Israeli groups supporting the Palestinians in Jerusalem, and Palestinians supporting Orient House. In addition, I included in this group reports of individuals incidents of vandalism against Orient House,

property surrounding Orient House, and property of Orient House officials, notably Husseini's home; theft at Orient House; and a bomb incident outside of Orient House.

Early on in the Oslo period, the focus of the articles is on attempts by Israeli police to prevent demonstrations by Israeli extremists for security reasons. Requests for demonstration permits were denied on the basis that the protests would be "a provocation and dangerous" (Hutman, JP, Dec. 28 1993; Hutman, JP, Dec. 29 1993). During this time there were a few protest rallies held by the Israeli right-wing, including settler groups, religious groups, and some Likud Knesset Members (MKs) (Hutman, JP, Dec. 6 1994; Hutman, JP, Feb. 10 1995; Keinon, JP, June 9 1994).

Reports also included several isolated incidents of vandalism, theft, and attempts by extremist groups to infiltrate Orient House. These incidents include one report of settlers attempting a plan to "conquer the Orient House" (Israel TV2, Dec. 2 1993); vandalism around Orient House by Kach, an extremist Israeli group (JP, Jan. 4 1994); the theft of documents on housing issues affecting Palestinians in Jerusalem (Hutman, JP, Dec. 9 1994); attacks against Faisal Husseini's house (Israel TV1, July 26 1995); and a bizarre incident where the Orient House fax number was programmed by an Israeli extremist group to distribute Islamic Jihad movement leaflets in order to make the Israeli government believe the leaflets came from Orient House (VP, Feb. 23 1995).

The number of demonstrations at Orient House increased in 1995, with over a third of articles on demonstrations occurring during this year (see Table 4.2). A protest vigil organized by the Forum for Jerusalem, headed by Jerusalem Deputy Mayor Shmuel Meir, provoked many of the incidents that were reported during the summer of 1995. Tensions between Israeli and Palestinians protesters rose and there were several reports of clashes between protesters, Israeli and Palestinian, and Israeli troops (Hutman, JP, June 25 1995a; Hutman, JP, June 25 1995b; Hutman, JP, Sept. 8 1995; JP, Aug. 20 1995; JP, Sept. 10 1995; VI, June 24 1995; VI, Sept. 6 1995; VI, Sept. 7 1995; VP, June 24 1995a; VP, June 24 1995b; VP, July 30 1995, 433).

F) LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

A total of 31 articles contained information on two pieces of legislation prepared by the Israeli government and the government's opposition. First, 21 articles deal with the "Orient House" Law, passed by the Israeli government in 1994 to stop activities at Orient House (Collins, JP, Feb. 9 1995; Gordon, JP, Feb. 10 1995; Gordon, JP, Mar. 9 1995; Hutman and Honig, JP, Apr. 26 1995; Hutman, Izenberg, and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 7 1994; Hutman and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 8 1994; IDF, July 18 1994a; IDF, July 18 1994b; IDF, Nov. 7 1994; IDF, Dec. 26 1994; IDF, May 22 1995; Izenberg and Immanuel, JP, Dec. 27 1994; Izenberg and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 8 1994; JP, Nov. 15 1994; Makovsky, JP, July 19 1994; Tsur, JP, Dec. 11 1997; VI, Dec. 26 1994; VI, Feb. 19 1996; VP, Dec. 26 1994; VP, Dec. 27 1994; Zak, JP, Feb. 8 1995). Second, 10 articles discuss the bill regarding activities at Orient House proposed by the government's opposition (Collins, JP, Feb. 25 1996; Collins and Hutman, JP, Mar. 8 1996; Hutman and Makovsky, JP, June 26 1995; Israel TV1, Mar. 3 1996; Izenberg, JP, Nov. 16 1994; Makovsky and Collins, JP, Feb. 20 1996; VI, Oct. 7 1995; VP, Mar. 8 1996a; VP, Mar. 8 1996b).

G) THE JERUSALEM LETTER

The Jerusalem Letter was originally attached to the Declaration of Principles (DOP) (1993) as a secret document and contained commitments by the Israeli government to protect Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem (Chapter 5 discusses the Jerusalem Letter in greater detail). Sixteen articles discussed the existence of the Jerusalem Letter, with half of the articles reporting on the discovery of the letter in June of 1994 (JP, July 7 1994; Makovsky, JP, July 19 1994; Sharon, JP, June 10 1994; VI, June 7 1994a; VI, June 7 1994b; VI, June 7 1994c; VP, Dec. 27 1994; Zak, JP, Nov. 16 1994). The other half of the articles about the Jerusalem Letter include references to it in support of Orient House's activities in Jerusalem (Beilin, JP, Sept. 18 1996; Collins, JP, Feb. 9 1995; Harman, Lynfield, and Klein, JP, July 1 1996; Hutman, JP, Feb. 23 1996; JP, Apr, 23 1999; VI, Aug. 28 1995; VP, Aug. 20 1995; VP, Apr. 5 1999).

H) THE PALESTINIAN FLAG

There were 11 articles that specifically mentioned the Palestinian flag in a variety of contexts. Four articles involved demonstrations where certain groups made attempts to take down or burn the flag (Hutman, JP, Dec. 29 1993; Lynfield, Izenberg, and Klein, JP, Apr. 27 1999; VI, Dec. 30 1997; VI, Apr. 26 1999e). The other articles mentioned the flag as a representation of Palestinian nationalism in various contexts (Heilman, JP, Mar. 11 1997; Hutman, JP, Dec. 28 1993; JP, Nov. 15 1994; Kuttab, JP Apr. 29 1999; Kaplan-Sommer, JP, Jan. 21 1994; Lahoud, JP, Sept. 14 1993; VI, Mar. 10 1997).

I) SUMMARY

The preceding sections represent the major categories that emerged from my coding process. In this chapter, I described the data set in detail in order to provide a reference to the content of the media reports used in the analysis in Chapter 6. The next chapter provides a context for this research project by discussing Jerusalem in the 20th century and the emergence of a Palestinian national identity.

Table 4.1 Total Number of Articles by Source and Year

Source/Year	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total	%
Jerusalem Post	6	40	65	44	5	3	16	**179**	**36.6%**
Voice of Israel		31	40	28	8	6	34	**147**	**30.5%**
Voice of Palestine		9	26	17	12	12	16	**92**	**19.1%**
IDF Radio		6	7	3	1	4	2	**23**	**4.8%**
Israel TV 1		6	4	6		2	2	**20**	**4.1%**
Israel TV 2	1	2	1	1		1	3	**9**	**1.9%**
Ha'aretz				4	2			**6**	**1.2%**
Other*				6	1	1	5	**13**	**2.7%**
Total	9	94	143	109	29	29	78	**489**	**100.0%**

* Includes: 'Al Ayyam (4), Palestinian TV (2), Al-Quds (2), Davar Rishon (1), Hatzofe (1), Arutz 7 (2), JMCC (1)



Figure 4.1 Number of Articles by Source and Year

Table 4.2 Number of Articles by Subject Code and Source

Subject/Source	JP	VI	VP	IDF	Israel TV 1	Israel TV 2	Ha'aretz	'Al Ayyam	Other*	Total	% of Total Articles
Visits by Foreign Ministers	80	74	35	10	6	3	3		5	**216**	**44.2%**
Closure	27	39	13	7	3	5	2	2	3	**101**	**20.7%**
Municipal Government	14	4	1							**19**	**3.9%**
Political Activities at Orient House	7	10	1		2				1	**21**	**4.3%**
Demonstrations	33	12	15	2	2	2		1		**67**	**13.7%**
Israeli Law	17	4	4	5	1					**31**	**6.3%**
Jerusalem Letter	9	4	3							**16**	**3.3%**
Flag	8	2								**10**	**2.0%**

* Includes: Al Ayyam (4), Palestinian TV (2), Al-Quds (2), Davar Rishon (1), Hatzofe (1), Arutz 7 (2), JMCC (1)

Table 4.3 Number of Articles on Visits by Foreign Ministers by Country

Country/Source	JP	VI	VP	IDF	Israel TV1	Israel TV2	Ha'aretz	Other*	Total	% of Total
Total articles	179	148	92	24	20	9	6	13	489	
General	15	14	2	1	1			3	36	7.4%
Foreign consuls in Jerusalem	3	15	10	1	1	1			31	6.3%
US Consul-General Visits	1		2						3	0.6%
UN	1		1	1					3	0.6%
Germany	2	1							3	0.6%
Sweden	8	6							14	2.9%
Ireland	11	3	1				1		16	3.3%
UK	6	3	3						12	2.5%
Jordan	2	4	3						9	1.8%
Russia	1	1							2	0.4%
Turkey	9	4	2	1	1				17	3.5%
EU	19	13	2	5	1			1	41	8.4%
Austria	6	1							7	1.4%
France	12	5	5			1		2	25	5.1%
Egypt		1	2						3	0.6%
Canada	2	1	1	1					5	1.0%
South Africa	3	3	1						7	1.4%
Spain	3				1				4	0.8%
US	1								1	0.2%
Greece		2				1		1	4	0.8%
Netherlands	3	2	1		1				7	1.4%
Demark			1						1	0.2%
Czech Republic			1						1	0.2%
Cyprus	1						2		3	0.6%
Belgium		1							1	0.2%
Japan	1								1	0.2%
Italy	3								3	0.6%
Total	79	74	35	9	6	3	3	5	214	43.8%

*Includes: Al Ayyam (4), Palestinian TV (2), Al-Quds (2), Davar Rishon (1), Hatzofe (1), Arutz 7 (2), JMCC (1)

CHAPTER 5

SETTING THE CONTEXT: JERUSALEM IN THE 20TH CENTURY AND PALESTINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

> It is an abiding tragedy that Jerusalem, revered by Jews, Christians, and Muslims as the 'City of Peace,' should so often in its long and complex history have been a city of war – and never more so than today, when it resembles a violent border town rather than a place of pilgrimage.
>
> (Armstrong 1998:5)

The context of modern Jerusalem, framed by Armstrong's words, is one of conflict and strife. In part, this conflict occurs because Jerusalem is at the heart of two national identities: Israeli and Palestinian. A long history of Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Jerusalem underlies this conflict, yet it is specifically the modern struggle of two nations that sets the context for Jerusalem today. The struggle to control Jerusalem can be seen in many locations, both in the Old City and the new, religious sites as well as political sites. Orient House, a Palestinian institution in East Jerusalem, is one of these sites. In order to contextualize the controversy at Orient House, discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 6), this chapter gives a background to both Jerusalem's history and the history of Palestinian national identity formation (see Map 5.1 for regional context).

In the first section, I discuss the importance of Jerusalem to both Israelis and Palestinians and then I review the political history of Jerusalem in the 20th century. Next, I focus on the Oslo Accords and their implication for the governance of Jerusalem. I conclude this section by discussing the ambiguity the Oslo Accords and the Jerusalem Letter, which was attached secretly to the agreement, created for Palestinians in Jerusalem. In the second section, I turn to Palestinian national identity. First, I trace the emergence of Palestinian national identity. Next, I examine the events that led to a more cohesive identity for Palestinians. I conclude by reflecting on the challenges for Palestinian nationalism today.



Map 5.1 Middle East

I. JERUSALEM IN THE 20TH CENTURY

A) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JERUSALEM

> It is certainly not a coincidence that virtually all these narratives about Palestine – religious and secular; Jewish, Christian, and Muslim; Palestinian and Israeli – revolve around the city of Jerusalem, which has long been the geographical, spiritual, political, and administrative centre of Palestine. Indeed, it is in and over Jerusalem, which has such great significance to so many people in so many different ways, that the contrasting narratives regarding Palestine come most bitterly into conflict. It is in Jerusalem as well that one sees the most extreme instances of the various local parties' attempts to assert physical control over the country and to obtain validation of their conflicting claims.
>
> (Khalidi 1996:191-92)

The question of sovereignty over Jerusalem is one of the most contentious issues between Israelis and Palestinians.[4] In the twentieth century, the struggle for political control of Jerusalem arises from historical tensions expressed in contemporary conflicts between two national groups – Israelis and Palestinians – representing three religions – Jewish, Muslim, and Christian. Romann and Weingrod (1991:6) situate Jerusalem's origins as "holy," referring to the religious intentions of the first settlements. The Jews' attachment to the city dates back to the time of King David. It was during the 11th century BCE that King Solomon built the first temple and Jerusalem became the political and spiritual centre of the various Israelite kingdoms (see Map 5.2 for the location of holy sites in the Old City of Jerusalem). The Babylonians destroyed the temple in 586 BCE, after which it was rebuilt in 515 BCE. The Romans destroyed the second temple in the year 70; the Western Wall is the only remaining part of the temple structure. The destruction of the temples affected the centrality of Jerusalem in Judaism and is reflected in Jewish law and prayer. While Jews spent nearly 2000 years exiled from Jerusalem, the importance of the city lived on in memory and ritual. For Christians, Jerusalem's

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[4] There is much literature on the conflict over Jerusalem between Israelis and Palestinians. See for example, Armstrong 1996; Benvenisti 1996; Dumper 1997; Romann and Weingrod 1991.



Map 5.2 Old City of Jerusalem

holiness revolves around the life and death of Jesus. In the fourth century, cathedrals were built at sacred places of Jesus' life and death, including the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at the presumed site of his crucifixion. Jerusalem's religious significance for Muslims derives from Prophet Mohammed's miraculous night voyage from Mecca to Jerusalem, and from there to heaven. According to Muslims, Mohammed visited Jerusalem on his journey to heaven, touching down at the site where the Jewish Temples had been. Following the seventh century conquest of Jerusalem, Muslim rulers built the Dome of the Rock and the *al-Aqsa* Mosque on the *al-Haram al-Sharif*, the Noble Sanctuary; the site known to the Jews as the Temple Mount.

Out of these religious ties and a long history of political, religious, economic, social, and cultural changes, Jerusalem has come to be an anchor of modern identity for both Israelis and Palestinians. Romann and Weingrod (1991:9) contend that while religious beliefs and symbols often become intertwined with conflicting national aspirations, the modern conflict over Jerusalem is primarily about political control and national sovereignty. Khalidi (1997:18) similarly argues that both Palestinian and Israeli national identities attempt to reduce Jerusalem's complexity to a narrower dimension in order to legitimize their particular national identity.

This historical conflict shapes present-day Jerusalem, creating a divided and fragmented city. In fact, Romann and Weingrod (1991) argue that today Israeli West Jerusalem and Palestinian East Jerusalem remain very separate cities. Baskin (1994) asserts that Jerusalem is divided spiritually and politically despite there being no physical border separating the Israeli and Palestinian parts of the city. Siniora (1996:62) describes Jerusalem today as "a city fragmented, with a psychological wall of fear between the two sides." Yet, at the same time as boundaries are recognizable in the city, the government of Israel has attempted to blur boundaries in order to change perceptions of Israeli military and political dominance (Dumper 1997). Dumper contends that by blurring the boundaries between, for example, citizenship and electoral participation, and between Israel and the West Bank, Israel can effect incremental change without provoking overwhelming resistance.

B) JERUSALEM 1917-1993: A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLITICAL CHANGES

The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians continues to make Jerusalem the site of much religious, political, and social struggle as both Israelis and Palestinians claim Jerusalem as the centre of their nations. Over the course of the 20th century, changes in the political rule of Jerusalem mark major shifts in the political and social character of the city. In the following section, I discuss the following major periods and events: the British Mandatory rule from 1917-1948; the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, leading to the partition of Jerusalem from 1948-1967 between Israel in the west and Jordan in the east; the occupation of East Jerusalem by Israel since 1967; the *Intifada* – the uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation – from 1987-1993; and the Oslo Accords, signed in 1993.

1. The British Mandate: 1917-1948

At the end of World War I, the League of Nations sanctioned British mandatory rule over Palestine. Under British administration, Palestine gained the essential features of a modern state, which included designating Jerusalem as its capital (Owen 1992: 13). Jerusalem grew substantially outside the walls of the Old City under British imperial rule and it was also during this period that Jewish immigration soared and the demographic balance of the city shifted toward Jewish majority (Dumper 1997:59-65). Population estimates during the British Mandate are contentious because of the selective inclusion by the British of certain Jewish neighbourhoods outside of the Old City and the exclusion of Palestinian neighbourhoods on the eastern side of the Old City walls. Despite these problems, it is accepted that the city saw a growth in the Jewish population during the Mandate period. During the latter parts of the Mandate period, Jerusalem was divided demographically into de facto Arab and Jewish zones (Dumper 1997:65). Although neighbourhoods were largely homogeneous, many Palestinians, mostly Christians, lived in the west side of the city. In the Old City, the population was predominantly Christian and Muslim (Dumper 1997).

The Mandate period ended with Britain turning responsibility for Palestine over to the newly formed United Nations. In 1947, the UN proposed to partition Mandate

Palestine into two separate countries, one for Israelis and one for Palestinian Arabs. The UN Partition Plan designated Jerusalem as a demilitarized, international enclave – a *corpus separatum* – to be administered by the UN Trusteeship Council. The area of the *corpus separatum* was to include an area significantly larger than the existing municipal borders. The Partition Plan was rejected outright by the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab governments who maintained their right to an Arab state in Palestine. The Zionists accepted the Plan and set out to reinforce their position in order to achieve their goal of statehood in the face of Arab resistance. Civil war ensued. Due to the fighting, the Zionists realized that the UN would be unable to enforce the Partition Plan and instead sought to control the area granted to them. On May 14, 1948, they proclaimed the state of Israel. The fighting continued past May 14, 1948, when Arab states invaded the newly-proclaimed state of Israel. The UN Partition Plan was never implemented and armistice agreements were signed in 1949, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria as well as Israel each controlled a portion of the land allotted to the Palestinian Arabs. However, despite this, the designation of Jerusalem as an international city remains the benchmark for international law and subsequent United Nations' resolutions (Dumper 1997).

2. Divided Jerusalem: 1948-1967

The 1948 war came to an end with armistice agreements signed between Israel and Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. The Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan, signed on April 3, 1949, separated the Israeli and Jordanian armies and demarcated the territory of the West Bank. The armistice line, the border demarcated by the Armistice Agreement, is termed the Green Line. Along with dividing the rest of the West Bank, the Agreement divided Jerusalem into a western section, which became part of Israel, and an eastern section, held by Jordan, that included the Old City (see Map 5.3).

The armistice lines were established by military agreements and constituted the division of Jerusalem, creating a city divided politically and physically. Barricades demarcating the Green Line ran north-south on both sides of a neutral zone, ranging from tens to hundreds of metres wide. There was one border crossing in Jerusalem, the



Map 5.3 Borders of Jerusalem

Mandelbaum Gate, which constituted the only crossing point between Israel and the Jordanian held territory. This physical division of the city from 1949-1967 had a profound impact on the economic, social, and political development of the city (Dumper 1993; Newman 1995). As Dumper states, "for both sides, the border area ran like an open wound through the middle of the city. Barricades and the fear of sniper fire led residents to abandon the heart of the city" (Dumper 1993:3).

While the emergence of the state of Israel saw the end of foreign rule for Jews, Jordan formally annexed the territory of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, thus putting the Palestinian Arabs under Jordanian rule. During the fighting of the 1948 war, approximately 2000 Jews were permanently displaced from the Old City, while tens of thousands of Palestinians were permanently displaced from there homes in West Jerusalem (Dumper 1993). Jordanian rule of the eastern parts of Jerusalem created hardships for the population. The Jordanian government, determined to maintain and build up Amman as their capital, was reluctant to allow autonomous Palestinian activity in Jerusalem. Employment prospects were low, and there were problems with the provision of services, mainly water and electricity. Due to the combination of these problems and the dispersion of Palestinians from the war in 1948, including many Christians who left the city, the population of East Jerusalem did not rise significantly during the 19 years of Jordanian rule.

Along with demographic changes, there were political skirmishes around the border between 1948-1967. For example, despite the division of Jerusalem between Israel and Jordan during this time, the Armistice Agreement included provisions for the autonomy of the Holy Places in the city. The Agreement stated that Jews, Christians, and Muslims would have access to holy sites, despite the sealed border dividing Jerusalem. However, Jordan was unwilling to allow Jewish access to the Western Wall, maintaining that Israel first had to allow the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes in West Jerusalem (Dumper 1997).

The physical division of the city profoundly impacted its planning and development. The sealed border meant that the surrounding area remained largely

undeveloped, despite being in the heart of the city, and separate business districts were developed on both sides of the city. The Israelis expanded Jerusalem westward, a process that included the construction of major government institutions. As a border city and the desired new capital of Israel, Jerusalem held major security considerations for Israelis. In part, West Jerusalem thrived because of these political imperatives. After Israel captured the eastern part of the city during the 1967 war, the Green Line continued to have a profound impact. Despite its formal removal, the Green Line boundary remains imprinted both symbolically and functionally for Israelis and Palestinians (Newman 1995).

3. Occupied/Reunified Jerusalem: 1967 - 1987

The 1967 Six Day War profoundly changed Jerusalem's character. As part of the territorial gains during the 1967 war, Israel occupied East Jerusalem. Immediately following the war, Israel "unified" Jerusalem under Israeli control and enlarged the municipal borders (see Map 5.3). The Israeli government de facto annexed Jordanian East Jerusalem and adjacent parts of the West Bank into the expanded Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem and dissolved the Jordanian East Jerusalem municipality. They passed legislation to enable the expansion, which, while avoiding the term to legitimize the action, constituted annexation. The Israeli government presented this action to the international community as a reunification of the city and an integration of services and administration; however, the international community was not convinced (Dumper 1997: 39). The UN response to the Israeli occupation was unequivocal: the Security Council and the General Assembly immediately passed three resolutions (UN Security Council Resolution 237 (1967), and UN General Assembly Resolution 2253 (ES-V) (1967) and Resolution 2254 (ES-V) (1967) respectively[5]) calling on Israel to

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[5] UN Security Council Resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 [Adopted at 1361st meeting - unanimously]. The Security Council,

Considering the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of the war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings,

Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,

respect the Geneva Conventions on areas under occupation and to rescind measures affecting the status of Jerusalem.

Since 1967, there has been a concerted effort by the Israeli government to represent Jerusalem as the "eternal, undivided capital of Israel" (Benvenisti 1996; Dumper 1997). However, this "reunification" strategy for the city is not recognized by

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Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict,

1. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of the hostilities;
2. *Recommends* to the governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Council.

UN General Assembly Resolution 2253 (ES-V) 4 July 1967, Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem. The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City,

1. *Considers* that these measures are invalid;
2. *Calls upon* Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution not later than one week from its adoption.

UN General Assembly Resolution 2254 (ES-V) 14 July 1967, Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem. The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,
Having received the report submitted by the Secretary-General,
Taking note with the deepest regret and concern of the non-compliance by Israel with resolution 2253 (ES-V);

1. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V);
2. *Reiterates* its call to Israel in that resolution to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report tot he Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution.

Resolutions available from the United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL) at the United Nations web site www.un.org.

Palestinians or the international community, which adheres to the 1947 UN Partition Plan and UN Security Council Resolution 242 as the international standard for Jerusalem.[6]

Dumper (1997:42) notes that the borders of the new Israeli-defined Municipality of Jerusalem reflect demographic, economic, and military concerns. The borders of the new municipality were very carefully drawn by a committee of various Israeli government officials to both maximize the Jewish population while minimizing the Palestinian population, and to exert Israeli control over the city. The desire of the reunification project was to create and maintain Jerusalem as not only the capital of Israel, but also as an integral part of their national identity and as a city with a distinctive Jewish character (Benvenisti 1976; Dumper 1997; Romann and Weingrod 1991).

The Israeli government manipulated the borders in order to control the space and impose its vision on the city. In the eastern part of the city, the expanded border includes underdeveloped areas outside of the former Jordanian Municipality, but excludes

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[6] UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 [Adopted 1382nd meeting - unanimously]. The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
   i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
   ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. *Affirms further* the necessity
   a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
   b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
   c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Resolutions available from the United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL) at the United Nations web site www.un.org.

neighbourhoods that are densely populated with Palestinians, in some cases dividing neighbourhoods. The committee intended to increase the Jewish population of the city with respect to the Palestinian population in order to secure it as an Israeli-Jewish city. In addition, the Israelis wanted to economically separate the annexed areas from the West Bank. Benvenisti (1976) states that certain industries, such as a cigarette factory in Azariyya, were left outside of the municipality in order to be able to serve the West Bank. The considerations around the border also revolved around military needs. The Defense Ministry was concerned with the need for a "defensible border" and so control over strategic hilltops and defensible valleys was taken into account (Benvenisti 1976). The combination of these three considerations for the border of the city – demographic, economic, and military – meant that the city's boundaries were poorly drawn from the perspective of urban development (Benvenisti 1976; Dumper 1997). As Dumper (1997) discusses, it is safe to conclude that political considerations overrode town-planning considerations in the development of Jerusalem.

The expanded municipal borders of Jerusalem became politically and symbolically significant to Israelis as "part of a national myth which could not be questioned" (Benvenisti 1976:114). However, Palestinian Jerusalemites did not accept the new borders. After the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel offered citizenship to the approximately 65,000 Palestinians living within the new municipal borders; most Palestinians refused, with only 1% opting for citizenship (Dumper 1997:48). This large population of non-citizens living within the new state was a problem for the government of Israel. In order to deal with this problem, Israel issued permanent residency status and gave identification (ID) cards to the Palestinians. The imposition of ID cards resulted in increased divisions between Palestinian Jerusalemites and those living in the West Bank. A Jerusalem ID card allows not only residency in the city and the ability to work legally in the city, but it also provides medical, old age, unemployment, and welfare benefits. Palestinians living on the West Bank (and Gaza) do not have these benefits. However, while the ID cards formally distinguish Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem from other Palestinians, it does not by any means constitute equal status between Israelis and Palestinians within Jerusalem (Latendresse 1995).

With the aim of the reunification of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the government and the municipality took other indirect actions to maintain political sovereignty and demographic dominance over the city. These actions had, and continue to have, an impact on the development of the city from an urban planning standpoint (Dumper 1997). Particularly in Jerusalem, Israelis and Palestinians perceive territory more in terms of its national symbolic value and less in terms of urban development or land use (Romann and Weingrod 1991). One prominent example is the construction of Jewish settlements in the eastern part of the city and its West Bank hinterland. The land used for the settlements is often expropriated from Palestinian owners or rezoned from so-called "green areas," where Palestinians were restricted from building. As Dumper (1997) discusses at length, the placement and design of the settlements is strategic, with the aim of dividing Palestinian neighbourhoods, enlarging the Jewish presence in the city, and maintaining control over Jerusalem. Dumper (1997:110) quotes the former director of the Jerusalem District of the Ministry of Housing, Shmaryahu Cohen, stating that Israelis, after the 1967 war,

> regarded the united Jerusalem as a border city and its boundaries of jurisdiction as the border of the state of Israel. It was necessary to give quick answers to military problems such as [the possibility of loss of control over parts of the city].... The answers were clear: army units are easily transferred from one place to another but a housing project inhabited by Jews is quite another story.[7]

In addition to the placement of the settlements for geostrategic reasons, Dumper (1997) states that the provision of services for these new neighbourhoods represent divisions with the intent of control. For example, road and transit systems were constructed to integrate these outlying areas into the core of Jerusalem. However, the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem maintain that these new roads serve also to divide the Palestinian neighbourhoods, making them noncontiguous with each other and the West Bank. In addition, while many Palestinian neighbourhoods suffer from poor services

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[7] See also Romann and Weingrod (1991:54), they argue the same point, stating that "the overall policy [Israel's territorial goals] had as its main axiom the prevention of any possible future attempt to again divide the city."

such as water and electricity, in part because of the lack of investment to improve these services, Jewish settlements are fully serviced.

During these first 20 years of occupation there were attempts by the Palestinians to resist these measures. Latendresse (1995) details the resistance movements of Palestinians in East Jerusalem in two main ways: non-cooperation with the municipality and the Israeli government; and attempts to protect and maintain socioeconomic, religious, and cultural institutions. For example, IDs issued by the Israeli government allowed Palestinian Jerusalemites to vote in municipal elections. However, the majority of Palestinians continually refuse to vote. Palestinian community and political leaders see participation in municipal affairs as conferring legitimacy on Israeli rule of the city (Dumper 1997). The Palestinian boycott of elections has served to intensify the separation of West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem. The Palestinian parts of the city have been subjected to unequal levels of services, including water, electricity, garbage collection, and development for housing and businesses, in part because of a lack of representation at the municipal level (Latendresse 1995). A second example of resistance is the movement that started in 1967 to protest the imposition of an Arab-Israeli curriculum on Palestinian students of East Jerusalem. Latendresse (1995) notes that this protest was both symbolic and practical. Parents realized that if their children continued with this curriculum they would not be able to study at universities in other Arab countries. Students throughout East Jerusalem were taken out of the state schools and enrolled in private, Palestinian-run schools. By 1976, enrollment of Palestinian students in Israeli-run government schools was down to 9% of what it had been in 1967 (Latendresse 1995). This led Israel to allow the integration of the Jordanian curriculum with the Arab-Israeli curriculum.

Twenty years of occupation in East Jerusalem impacted on the Palestinian population in many ways. The city itself saw extensive changes as Israel tried to "reunify" the city. The next period in Jerusalem's history saw a violent resistance against occupation.

4. *Intifada*: 1987-1993

Indirect actions by Israel to manipulate the demographics of Jerusalem, including IDs, poor services, and restrictions on housing development, served to divide the city along functional lines during the first 20 years of occupation. Latendresse (1995) argues that the advent of the *Intifada*, the violent uprising by Palestinians against Israeli occupation, made the divide even more prominent. The *Intifada* began in December 1987 with an incident in a Gaza refugee camp that sparked civil disobedience and demonstrations by Palestinian youth against Israeli military forces across the Occupied Territories. By early 1988, a full uprising of major proportions was underway. The *Intifada* affected Jerusalem by imposing another division into the city, one of fear (Baskin 1994; Dumper 1997; Newman 1995). With increased violence in the Occupied Territories – Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem – boundaries became lines Israelis would not cross for fear of being targets of the violence. Moreover, the Occupied Territories were often under enforced closure by the Israeli military, containing Palestinians within the West Bank and Gaza. Around Jerusalem, the military closure was enforced by checkpoints, controlled by Israeli soldiers, at the main roads into Jerusalem from the West Bank. ID cards were, and continue to be, used as a means of dividing and excluding Palestinians; for example, Palestinians from the West Bank were not allowed into Jerusalem, even if they worked in the city.

While the closures of the West Bank stopped Palestinians from entering Jerusalem, both Israelis and Palestinians within the city were hesitant to cross the old Green Line, reinforcing the divide between East and West Jerusalem. As Latendresse (1995:48) argues, "the civil resistance movement in the city clearly demonstrated the failure to unify Jerusalem and effectively imposed a psychological barrier between the eastern and western parts of the city." The events of the *Intifada* brought into the spotlight the differences between the Jewish and Palestinian parts of the city. As Meron Benvenisti, former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, stated in an interview with *The Jerusalem Post* on February 19, 1988, the *Intifada* shattered the myth of the unification of Jerusalem and the idea that Palestinian Jerusalem was different and separate from the West Bank (as quoted in Latendresse 1995:48). The boundaries created by the *Intifada*

are exemplary of Pile's (1996) and Cresswell's (1996) discussions of the distinct spaces of resistance. That the psychological boundary that emerged as a result of violent encounters between Palestinians and Israeli military ran along the former Green Line, throughout the West Bank as well as Jerusalem, demonstrates the existence and significance of the occupation in these areas, despite attempts to unify and integrate these areas.

C) THE OSLO ACCORDS, 1993-1999

After the Gulf war in 1991, US President George Bush, initially along with the Soviet Union, which collapsed months afterward, convened the Madrid Peace Conference in order to initiate a new Middle East peace process. President Bush stated that the goal of the peace process was to establish a comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours, in particular the Palestinians, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of the exchange of territory for peace. The US invited Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan to participate in the Madrid Conference, which initiated both multilateral negotiations and bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Palestinians were represented only as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Palestinian delegation did not include the PLO because at the time both Israel and the US had banned contact with PLO members. Instead, the PLO selected prominent Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, but not Jerusalem because Israel would not consider negotiating on Jerusalem at the time, to participate.

Although the official negotiations proceeded with little success, Norway sponsored secret negotiations that led to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat signing the Oslo Accords on September 13, 1993. The agreement is based on a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP, Oslo I) that set a framework for an interim negotiation process (see Table 5.1 for a timeline of the Oslo Accords). The DOP established principles and strategies for negotiation and, in order to maximize the possibility of success, the parties decided to leave the most contentious issues to the final stage of the negotiations. These final status issues are, as specified in Article V of the DOP, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli

settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest (DOP 1993: Article V-3). In addition, the DOP states, "jurisdiction of the [Palestinian National Authority (PNA)] Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations" and, "the two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period" (DOP 1993: Article IV and V-4, respectively). In principle, both groups accept these articles to mean that neither side will take unilateral action on final status issues during the interim period.

Table 5.1 Timeline of the Oslo Accords

Agreement	**Date Signed**
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements	September 13, 1993
Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (Gaza/Jericho Agreement)	May 4, 1994
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip	September 28, 1995
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron	January 17, 1997
Wye River Memorandum	October 23, 1998
Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum	September 4, 1999

The interim, or transitional, period was set to begin once the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from the Gaza Strip and Jericho as stipulated in the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (also know as the Gaza/Jericho Agreement, signed on May 4, 1994). The purpose of the interim period was to establish a Palestinian Self-Government Authority (also known as the PNA) and begin the gradual transfer of parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to Palestinian rule. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (also known as Oslo



Map 5.4 Division of the West Bank into Areas A, B and C (Oslo II Agreement)

II, signed September 28, 1995) led to the redeployment of the IDF from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the establishment of Areas A (Palestinian rule), B (Palestinian civilian rule and Israeli military rule), and C (Israeli rule) (see Map 5.4). Following the implementation of this agreement, the Palestinians held their first general elections on January 20, 1996, to elect the Chairman of the PNA (Yasir Arafat) and an 88 member Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).

The Oslo Accords marked a major shift in the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. In particular, the recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people by the Israeli government was a dramatic and revolutionary step (Raz-Krakotzkin 1998). However, this was simultaneously an integral problem of the Accords. The recognition of the State of Israel's right to exist by the Palestinians and the recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians created a fundamentally unequal balance of power in the peace process.

A final peace agreement, including agreements on the final status issues, was to be the final step in the Oslo process (Oslo III, as yet not negotiated). However, the victory of the Likud in the 1996 Israeli elections, held because of the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on November 4, 1995, disrupted the peace process. While Likud stated they would follow the commitments made by the previous government in the Oslo Accords, they did not hold to the same spirit that led to the negotiation of the agreement (Bishara 1998). The loss of good faith in the peace process caused a stall in negotiations. US President Clinton has intervened several times in order to restart the process. In October 1998, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Chairman Arafat signed the Wye Memorandum in order to outline steps to facilitate the implementation of the Interim Agreement of 1995 and to accelerate the final status negotiations in order to reach the May 4, 1999, deadline for a final status peace agreement. However, the Wye Memorandum was not successfully implemented. In the spring of 1999, Israel held elections where Netanyahu lost to the Labour government led by Ehud Barak. The election of Barak gave new hope to the peace process. The Israeli government and the Palestinians negotiated another agreement, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, in order to reaffirm their commitment to previous agreements and resume

permanent status negotiations. However, Barak has been unable to win support from his government for the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum and the peace process continues to break down. In an effort to keep the parties negotiating, US President Clinton held another meeting between Israelis and Palestinians in July 2000 at Camp David. However, the parties have as yet to produce an agreement as a result of these talks.

D) THE IMPLICATION OF THE OSLO ACCORDS FOR JERUSALEM

The question of the future administration of Jerusalem is designated as one of the issues to be negotiated only during the final status negotiations. By recognizing Jerusalem as an issue for final status negotiation, I argue that Israel opened up a legitimate space for the discussion of Palestinian rights in the city. For the interim, the DOP is vague on the nature of Palestinian activities allowed in Jerusalem. It states that the PNA will not have *jurisdiction* over Jerusalem, but it does not specifically state that the PNA cannot operate in the city. The Gaza/Jericho Agreement formally established autonomous Palestinian areas from which the PNA operate and stipulated that all issues pertaining to Palestinian self-rule would be handled from Palestinian autonomous areas only. According to Israel, this negated the need for the PNA to operate in Jerusalem. However, the Oslo Accords do not recognize the needs of the Palestinian population in Jerusalem and their right to Palestinian-run institutional support. Aware of this problem, the Palestinians negotiating the Oslo Accords required Israel to make some assurances on the rights of Palestinians, and their institutions, in Jerusalem. This assurance came in the form of a letter secretly attached to the DOP.

1. The Jerusalem Letter

The Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Norwegian negotiator Johann Jürgen Holst exchanged three letters attached to the DOP. Without all three letters, the parties would not have signed the DOP (Musallam 1996). The first letter, from Arafat to Rabin, included a recognition of Israel's right to peace and security and a commitment that the PLO would renounce the parts of the Palestinian National Charter that denied Israel's right to exist. The second letter, from Rabin to Arafat, recognized the PLO as the

representative of the Palestinian people in the Middle East peace process negotiations (DOP 1993). As a prerequisite to signing, both Israel and the Palestinians required the attachment of these two letters to the DOP. The third letter, from then Foreign Minister Peres to Holst, assured the protection of Palestinians and existing Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem. The Israelis insisted that this letter be kept secret. The text of this letter, referred to as the Jerusalem Letter, is as follows:

> Dear Minister Holst,
>
> I wish to confirm that the Palestinian [sic] institutions of East Jerusalem and the interests and well-being of the Palestinians [sic] of East Jerusalem are of great importance and will be preserved.
>
> Therefore, all the Palestinian [sic] institutions of East Jerusalem, including the economic, social, educational, and cultural, and the holy Christian and Moslem places, are performing an essential task for the Palestinian [sic] population. Needless to say, we will not hamper their activities; on the contrary, the fulfillment of this important mission is to be encouraged.
>
> Shimon Peres, Foreign Minister of Israel
>
> (PASSIA 1996:120)

The Jerusalem Letter became a centre of controversy, for both Israelis and Palestinians, for two reasons: the secrecy surrounding the letter and its ambiguity.

In a speech in South Africa on May 10, 1994, Arafat made public the existence of this letter regarding Jerusalem. Initially, the Israeli government denied its existence; however, by June 6, 1994, the government was forced to make the letter public due to the controversy it evoked from both the government's opposition and the Israeli media. The Israeli opposition perceived the Jerusalem Letter as a legitimization of Palestinian autonomy in East Jerusalem (Sharon, JP, June 10 1994). The PNA welcomed the exposure of the letter's existence because it strengthened their claim, assured by the Oslo Accords, to function in Jerusalem.

The secrecy of the Jerusalem Letter caused confusion on both sides as to its legally binding nature. According to Palestinian officials, the letter is an integral part of the Oslo agreement and the Israeli government has the same responsibility to honour the promises of the letter as they have to the rest of the Oslo Accords. The Palestinians

maintain that the Letter "is one of the reasons for our acceptance to postpone discussion of the status of Jerusalem" (JP, July 1 1996). However, Israeli officials claimed that because the letter is written to Holst, it is not an official document of the DOP and is therefore not a binding legal document (Musallam 1996). Despite this dispute, the letter is clearly an important document because of the sensitive nature of the status of Jerusalem within the peace process, especially in light of the agreement to leave issues pertaining to Jerusalem until the final status talks.

The ambiguity of the letter's legality caused further controversy because Palestinians and Israelis interpret the contents differently. For the PNA, the Jerusalem Letter provided recognition of Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem and provided official confirmation for the continuation of their activities, especially at Orient House. The Israelis claim that because the Oslo Accords do not allow the PNA to operate in Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Letter also excludes any Palestinian institutions acting with national intentions; therefore, allowing Israel to act against these institutions (VI, June 7 1994a).

Another aspect of the letter's ambiguity is the vague nature of the language used. Foreign Minister Peres does not provide specific details defining what institutions in East Jerusalem he was referring to when he wrote the letter. While Peres promises that *all* the Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem would be protected and encouraged, the letter does not specify how this promise relates to the agreement in the Oslo Accords that the jurisdiction of the PNA would not include final status issues, namely Jerusalem.

E) SUMMARY

The secrecy of the Jerusalem Letter and the vague arrangements on Jerusalem in the Oslo Accords set the stage for ambiguity in Palestinian activities in Jerusalem. On the one hand, the Israelis agreed to negotiate on Jerusalem in the future and provided a promise of protection for existing Palestinian institutions. On the other hand, the Israeli government maintained, especially to stay popular with Israelis, that Jerusalem is the eternal, united capital of Israel and that the Palestinians have limited rights in Jerusalem. The Palestinians played on this ambiguity and asserted their own national aspirations

inside Jerusalem through sites such as Orient House. The next chapter (Chapter 6) deals with this particular expression of Palestinian national identity directly. For now, I turn to a discussion of Palestinian national identity as it has emerged and grown in the 20th century in order to contextualize the analysis of the controversy at Orient House.

II. PALESTINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

It is not possible in this section nor is it my goal to give a detailed history of the Palestinians in the twentieth century. My focus is on the themes of Palestinian national identity that are important to understanding both the importance of Jerusalem to the Palestinians and the way in which Palestinian national identity today shapes Jerusalem. Drawing on my definition of national identity as constructed, spatial, and gendered, I point out some important aspects to the formation of Palestinian national identity. First, I briefly discuss the emergence of Palestinian identity. Next, I examine the major factors contributing to the emergence of a more united national identity, and explore the differences that remain in the construction and experience of this national identity. I conclude this section by discussing Palestinian national identity today.

A) EMERGENCE OF A PALESTINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

World War I and the end of the Ottoman Empire signaled profound change for Arab communities and they engaged in a process of developing into modern states. The emergence of a national identity for Palestinians was not unique in the Middle East; however, there were differences between Palestinian national identity and other national identities. In *Palestinian National Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*, Rashid Khalidi (1997) contends that Palestinian national identity has emerged over time and space in uneven and overlapping ways with many contrasting narratives.

The roots of Palestinian national identity today can be traced back to the late-Ottoman period and the British Mandate. Khalidi (1997:10) argues that competing loyalties are a characteristic feature of Palestinian national identity, in part because of the Palestinians' inability to gain independence and power in a Palestinian homeland. For

example, Palestinians at the turn of the twentieth century identified with their religion, the Ottoman Empire, Arabism, their homeland (Palestine), their city or region, and their family. These foci of identity changed significantly over the next 20-30 years as British imperial rule replaced Ottoman rule, modern states replaced pan-Arabist hopes, and the Zionist movement gained strength. Palestinian national identity emerged in opposition to several "others."

Much of the research on Palestinian history emphasizes the role of Zionism in the construction of a Palestinian national identity. Khalidi, and others (e.g. Muslih 1988), challenge the traditional history of Palestinian national identity that stresses the Zionist movement above all else as the only factor against which Palestinian nationalism had to construct itself. Khalidi maintains that the emerging Palestinian national identity was contingent and dependent on circumstances that also affected other national communities at the time, such as the Jordanians, Syrians, and Iraqis. The impact of European colonial powers in the post-World War I Middle East created new national narratives in the context of existing loyalties of many Arab communities. While the sense of national identity of the Zionist movement that challenged the rights of the Palestinians in their homeland was a significant factor in the emergence of a Palestinian national identity, Khalidi argues that other factors were also important, such as the recognition of Palestine as a sacred entity in need of protection, the impact of the British Mandate and the lack of state power for Palestinians.

For example, Palestinian nationalism is rooted in a long-standing concern for Jerusalem and for Palestine as a sacred entity (Khalidi 1996:29-30). Alexander Schölch (1993), in *Palestine in Transformation: 1856-1882*, argues that concern for a sacred space emerged as a response to perceived external threats dating as far back as the Crusades. This identification of a stewardship for a specific territorial space was a forerunner to modern Palestinian nationalism. In part this stewardship came as a result of the attention given to Jerusalem and the scared sites of Palestine in the 19th century. As European colonial interests in the Middle East and the revived interest of the Christian world in Jerusalem came about in the mid-1800s, the Arab residents began to see

themselves as the caretakers of this sacred space (Khalidi 1996; Romann and Weingrod 1991).

British rule in Mandate Palestine impacted significantly on the expression of a distinct Palestinian national identity. Mayer (1994b:3) notes that as with other British colonial projects, the indigenous population of Palestine remained largely invisible to the British, as well as to the Jewish immigrants. However, as Arab opposition increased in the late 1930s, Britain reversed its immigration policy that until then encouraged Jewish immigration. Khalidi (1997:21-25) argues that during the Mandate period, Palestinian national rights were excluded from policies governing the region and, because of the British perception that the Palestinians did not have a determined identity, they turned to favouring Zionism. The Palestinians encountered significant challenges in the face of the Zionist movement. The organization and power of the Zionists both within Palestine and internationally served to increase their own national aspirations and delegitimize those of the Palestinians. Throughout the Mandate period, Palestinians lacked any significant access to formal state structures and were less developed economically, politically, and socially than their Arab neighbours. All of these elements affected the cohesion of Palestinian society and hindered their changes for effective responses to the challenges posed by forces such as Zionism.

B) FORMATION OF A COHESIVE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

Despite these challenges, a cohesive Palestinian identity emerged after the Mandate period. A number of factors contribute to this construction of a strong sense of Palestinian national identity. Specifically, while the roots of Palestinian national identity are evident in the pre-1948 period, *al-Nakba*, the Palestinian name for the events of the 1948 war, is at the core of modern Palestinian national consciousness. While exact numbers are not known, it is estimated that during the spring and summer of 1948 between 600,000 and 700,000 Palestinians were forced to flee or were expelled from their homes (Morris 1987). Many ended up in refugee camps in what the UN had proposed as Arab Palestine but was now controlled by Israel, Jordan, and Egypt; others

dispersed into Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, sometimes also in refugee camps, with lesser numbers going to Egypt and Iraq (Smith 1992:146).

The expulsion and dispersal of Palestinians from their homeland as a result of the 1948 war anchored Palestinian nationalism to a sense of loss (Mayer 1994a). These events had two main impacts on Palestinian national identity. First, the events of 1948 formed the basis for a strong, shared experience that became a "potent source of shared beliefs and values" (Khalidi 1996:22); and second, while Palestinian political activities went into hiatus as a result of these events on the Palestinian population, a reconstituted national identity began to emerge.

The displacement of Palestinians caused by the 1948 war served to sharpen Palestinian national identity. The trauma of these events reinforced the existing elements of identity, therefore sustaining and strengthening Palestinian self-definition (Khalidi 1997:22). Stories about fleeing homes, forced evacuations, and massacres during the war, as part of a shared history, became part of the national myth. Also, the idea of returning to their homes and lands became an essential part of Palestinian national identity. Khalidi (1997:179) notes that dispossession has a strong impact on a social group with strong territorial connections, such as the Palestinians. Between 1949 and the early 1960s, there was little political activity amongst Palestinians, mainly because of their dispersal between five Arab countries. Yet, *al-Nakba* had a universalizing effect on Palestinian national identity: it was a common experience, a common past, and returning to Palestine became a common destiny. This new narrative of Palestinian national identity was picked up and elaborated on by emerging national groups. A cohesive Palestinian identity did not emerge again onto the international scene until the 1950s with the formation of Fatah and the formation of the PLO in 1964. The return to, or liberation of, Palestine became a focal point for a growing expression of Palestinian national identity.

The PLO emerged as a government-in-exile for the Palestinian people, yet did not immediately gain the attention of all Palestinians. Mayer (1994a:65) notes that for many refugees and dispossessed Palestinians their attention remained on dreams of returning

home, therefore nourishing the collective sense of loss. She argues that the occupation of Arab territories by Israel in 1967 became a decisive marker of Palestinian nationalism among all Palestinians. Israel launched attacks against Jordan, Egypt, and Syria and gained control of the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights in June 1967 during what has become known as the Six-Day War. The additional loss of Palestinian land to Israel sharpened the sense of loss, expulsion, and dispossession that have come to define in large part what being a Palestinian means (Mayer 1994a:65).

The territorial losses suffered by Palestinians in 1967 made the Palestinians more politicized and nationally active (Mayer 1994a). The occupation brought oppression, humiliation, and daily harassment to Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. As Mayer (1994a:70) states, being occupied means "being denied rights, being administratively detained, and being punished collectively; living under curfews, with fear and violence; and constant subjection to Israeli military rule." Part of Mayer's argument in her assessment of the heightened Palestinian nationalism under occupation is that the result of Israeli attempts to crush, quell, and suppress expressions of Palestinian national identity has in fact been to intensify their national feelings. The occupation has politicized Palestinians' lives because they experience it everyday. Resistance to the occupation culminated in the Palestinian uprising, or *Intifada*, beginning in 1987. The *Intifada* consisted of both non-violent acts, such as boycotting Israeli goods and refusing to work in Israel or pay taxes, and violent acts, such as throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli soldiers. These resistance measures unified Palestinians and boosted feelings of national identity.

Khalidi (1997:193-194) summarizes the emergence of Palestinian national identity as occurring in three stages. First, prior to World War I a sense of Palestinian identity arose that overlapped with other, competing ties, such as Ottomanism and regional or family loyalities. This new identity was particularly evident among the urban, literate, and educated core. Second, the Mandate period served as a time for strengthening a shared sense of identity against a series of "others," such as Zionism and the British. And third, the events of 1948 and their aftermath were a common experience that erased many of the class or regional differences between Palestinians. Dispossession

was a shared experience among Palestinians and gave them a unified sense of national identity. The shared experiences of defeat, dispossession, and exile reinforced a sense of what it means to be Palestinian.

Despite this shared mythology of Palestinian national identity, there remain differences in experiences of that identity. While dispossession is a largely shared experience and at least a part of shared history, Palestinian refugees under occupation, Palestinian refugees in other Arab countries, Palestinians in the Diaspora, and Palestinians living under Israeli occupation all have different experiences of being Palestinian. As well, the approximately 100,000 Palestinians who remained within the new state of Israel after 1948 became citizens of Israel. Most often referred to as Israeli Arabs, this group has a secondary status in Israel. In addition to these differences, differences of class and gender change experiences of nationalism. For example, after 1948, many middle or upper class Palestinians were able to immigrate to countries such as the United States while poorer Palestinians were forced to remain in refugee camps. Also, experiences of occupation affect men and women differently because of gender roles in Palestinian society. Israeli occupation politicized the home through searches and demolitions, which had a tremendous effect on many Palestinian women traditionally confined to the private sphere (see Mayer 1994a for a detailed account of gendered experiences of occupation).

C) PALESTINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY TODAY

The transition of Palestinian nationalism from experiences of occupation and the *Intifada* toward the recognition of national aspirations of Palestinians through a structured peace process marks another major change for Palestinian national identity. While the daily experience of Israeli occupation remains for many Palestinians, the initial hope of Palestinians for a state added a new dimension. This new reality for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza includes the beginnings of their own government and partial control of a small amount of territory (see Map 5.4), and the international legitimization of their cause. While, on the ground, the territory controlled by the PNA is small and noncontiguous, the symbolic importance of this transition to a territorial state

cannot be underestimated. Palestinian national identity is transformed by the ability to connect even the smallest parcel of land to Palestinian nationalism, claiming it as a quasi "Palestinian state."

However, the problems that arise from the Oslo process result in much dissatisfaction amongst Palestinians. Despite achieving recognition from Israel and responsibility for the main cities and towns in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the PNA is fraught with problems of proper governance and Palestinians are frustrated with both the PNA and the slow progress of the peace process. Self-determination, independence, and statehood have not been conceded by Israel, and the PNA has only limited authority over small bits of land. Palestinian national identity today must come to terms with what "Palestine" as a state/territorial entity and not just a national myth will constitute and how that will impact on a national identity tied to a much larger territory. As Khalidi (1997:205-209) points out, Palestinians must also grapple with more practical questions, such as the changes in economic, political, and cultural centres, the city of Jerusalem, and refugees. Many of these issues are supposed to be dealt with under the final status negotiations of the Oslo Accords, yet Palestinians need to decide on these issues amongst themselves well before then. As a Palestinian state, in some form, becomes more of a reality, Palestinian national identity will continue to be transformed by the events leading up to its creation and afterwards.

D) SUMMARY

These continuing transformations of Palestinian identity exemplify national identity as a constructed entity. While changes resulting from the peace process affect Palestinian national identity, it continues to shift and change through the Oslo Accords period. I now turn to an examination of these changes, specifically by exploring Palestinian national identity through one site in Jerusalem: Orient House.

CHAPTER 6

GEOPOLITICAL PRACTICES AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER ORIENT HOUSE, SEPTEMBER 13, 1993 – MAY 4, 1999

From September 13, 1993, to May 4, 1999, Israelis and Palestinians transformed Orient House from a relatively uncontentious place for Palestinian interactions into a site to contest and constitute Palestinian national identity. My aim in exploring the controversy surrounding Orient House is to investigate the actions taken by different groups seeking to define or deny this national identity and explore how Orient House becomes a symbol of Palestinian national identity. Israelis and Palestinians use various boundary-drawing practices to create a particular narrative of national identity discernible to members and nonmembers alike. The various actors in the struggle surrounding Orient House engage strategies to specify a particular national identity using material activities, such as demonstrations, enforcement of municipal laws, and closure orders, and discursive activities, such as the use of militarist language to describe the controversy at Orient House. I understand these activities as examples of the ways that boundaries get drawn and identities are formed. Each action, whether it is a tangible action or language, represents an attempt by one group to claim particular spaces by drawing a boundary that designates what is legitimate and what is not legitimate. These boundary-drawing practices politicize specific spaces and transform them into places where national identity is constructed and contested. Through the negotiation of boundaries, Palestinians and Israelis shape their definitions of national identity. By analyzing how and why these activities are effective in defining boundaries, I gain insight into the ways that national identity is constructed and contested.

Through my analysis, I identified strategies and activities Israelis and Palestinians used to demarcate boundaries. I frame this chapter around a widely-based analytical category of boundary demarcation. I sorted the specific, concrete activities of the Israelis and Palestinians into two categories, the material and the discursive. In order to draw out how and why these activities shape identity and draw boundaries at and around Orient

House, I make this conceptual distinction between specific activities and discuss their links to national identity. Through pinpointing specific examples, I analyze how people engage in geopolitical practices that draw boundaries and shape identity in specific sites. However, I do not want to reinforce an artificial divide between the material and the discursive and, by doing so, give precedence to one over the other. Rather, I make this distinction in order to illustrate my argument. I maintain that these actions function together, overlap, and work together to constitute a particular geopolitics shaped by everyday events, the political elite, and the media. In turn, the geopolitics of a particular place shapes the strategies and actions used to construct it: discourse is recursive. Because of this recursive relationship, my conceptual distinctions can only be partial; therefore, sometimes examples from one type of activity appear in a different section.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first demonstrate the constitution of national identity, both formally and informally, by interpreting some very specific concrete activities of Israelis and Palestinians concerning Orient House. I then show how the language Israeli and Palestinians use shapes and constitutes national identity. In particular, I consider how the use of specific types of language, such as nationalist, religious or militarist, can draw boundaries that constitute, and subsequently reify, a particular national identity. In examining these activities, I am particularly interested in the strategies both Israelis and Palestinians use to legitimate their specific definition of national identity.

I. BOUNDARY DEMARCATION THROUGH MATERIAL ACTIVITIES

Social groups, such as Israelis and Palestinians, negotiate specific national identities through concrete actions and events that seek to draw boundaries. These activities take place in specific spaces and often at scales other than the state. For example, the actions of Israelis and Palestinians at demonstrations at Orient House or the Jerusalem municipality's actions against Palestinian activities at Orient House are examples of material boundary-drawing practices. Israelis and Palestinians use certain strategies to draw boundaries that exert power and authority over specific places as a way to designate what is and is not legitimate. Israelis and Palestinians use these boundaries to claim sovereignty over Orient House and therefore negotiate their national identity.

Using the events and activities at Orient House to illustrate my argument, I make four points about the strategies used to draw boundaries and define national identity through concrete activities: boundary-drawing activities take place formally and informally; boundaries are socially constructed, dynamic sites; groups imbue spaces with meaning as a strategy to claim territory; and a space of dominance can also be a space of resistance.

First, boundary-drawing practices occur in both formal and informal sites of struggle over national identity. While the conventionally recognized site of geopolitics is the practices of state leaders, geopolitics saturates the everyday life of states and populations. National groups constitute and contest geopolitics both formally and informally. The practices of government and political leaders constitute the formal sites where struggles over national identity occur. Israelis and Palestinians also contest political issues in popular, informal spaces, such as media reports or demonstrations. While conventional geopolitics views these informal sites as nonpolitical and the people that occupy them as unable to influence policy, the geopolitics of everyday events are intertwined with the geopolitics of the state. While I distinguish between the two aspects of geopolitics in my analysis, my intention, following Sharp's (2000) comments, is not to artificially separate formal and informal sites, risking a conventional view of geopolitics that prioritizes formal sites of politics, but to distinguish between them in order to note the importance of critically examining both types of sites.

Second, concrete activities demarcate boundaries that are partial, changing, often fractured, and inconsistent; boundaries are not fixed or static. In Chapter 2, I argued that boundaries are dynamic sites that constitute difference and symbolize power relations between groups. Boundaries shift and blur because of changes in the power dynamics between various actors. A boundary is imbedded in a set of social relations and is negotiated by the various actors involved in drawing the boundary. This negotiation creates fractures and inconsistencies that open up new spaces and change identities. As boundaries change, so do the spaces around them and this happens in complex and mixed ways.

Third, groups draw boundaries around themselves and others by imbuing particular spaces and places with specific meanings. This ascription makes space and place culturally intelligible. Members of a national group can transform spaces into places redolent with cultural meaning as a means to claim these spaces as part of their national identity. They claim spaces by attaching a culturally significant and tangible meaning to it through a variety of mechanisms, such as legal manoeuvres, demonstrations, or education. These actions reinforce the meaning attached to the space and claim it as "ours" instead of "theirs".

And, fourth, Israelis and Palestinians use various strategies involving concrete and specific acts that reinforce dominant constructions of national identity as well as to resist these constructions. Here, I use the phrase "sites of struggle" to also mean "sites of resistance" in a metaphorical sense in the context of how national identity emerges through the search for collective identity. Attempts to demarcate boundaries of national identity can provide sites of resistance for social groups who oppose that identity. For example, the Israeli government's attention to the activities at Orient House as a violation of the Oslo Accords increased the usefulness of Orient House as a site not only for protests specifically related to Orient House, but also for Palestinians protests on many other issues. Moreover, international attention focused on Orient House makes it a more significant site for resistance to Israeli occupation.

The next two sections illustrate these points through the story of events that occurred from 1993 to 1999 surrounding the struggle to close Orient House. First, I examine the formal sites of struggle over national identity by investigating the actions of the Israeli government, under both the Rabin and the Netanyahu administrations, and their official oppositions; the municipal government of Jerusalem; and Palestinian officials at Orient House. Second, I explore two informal sites and look at the negotiation of boundaries of national identity. These sites are the demonstrations that take place at Orient House and the everyday activities at Orient House. Through an examination of events at Orient House, I discuss the activities that the various actors in the peace process use as strategies to claim sovereignty over Orient House. By

employing these strategies, Israelis and Palestinians aim to define the space of Orient House, representing East Jerusalem, as part of a particular national identity.

A) FORMAL SITES OF STRUGGLE OVER NATIONAL IDENTITY

Governments and political leaders use legal practices and political actions to draw boundaries that establish authority over certain spaces. For example, the ability of the Israeli government to pass a law governing the activities at Orient House is a way to establish authority over that space and helps Israelis legitimize their claim to that territory. The Israeli government, the government's opposition, and the Jerusalem municipality all utilized legislation in order to stop or impede activities at Orient House. Where laws were not viable, political manoeuvres provide a similar authority in defining a particular space as part of a distinct national identity.

In understanding the interaction between various actors in the controversy at Orient House, it is important to keep in mind the relationship of the various levels of government in Israel. In particular, because the country is relatively small, there are no provincial or state divisions. Therefore, the link between municipalities and the national government is strong. This is particularly true with Jerusalem because of its significance for Israeli national identity and its role as the capital for both nations (see Chapter 5 for more on the importance of Jerusalem for Israelis and Palestinians). In addition, municipal politics in Israel are partisan. The mayor of Jerusalem is a member of the Knesset. The current mayor, Ehud Olmert, is a Likud party member, whereas the deputy mayor, Shmuel Meir, is a member of the National Religious Party (NRP).

In this section, I discuss the actions of Israeli and Palestinian political leaders toward Orient House during the time of the Oslo Accords. Israelis and Palestinians negotiate boundaries that construct their respective national identities are negotiated through actions that seek to exert authority and establish the legitimacy of a particular identity. Political actions and legal tactics are both ways to exert authority over space and contest that authority. In the formal arenas of politics, the Israeli government, the government's opposition, the Jerusalem municipality, and PNA officials used legal and political manœuvres to exert authority over political activities at Orient House.

1. The Rabin Administration

Immediately following the signing of the Gaza/Jericho Agreement, May 4, 1994, the Israeli government's opposition strongly criticized the government for allowing the continuation of activities at Orient House (e.g. Hutman, Izenberg, and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 7 1994; Izenberg and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 8 1994; VI, Nov. 5 1994; JP, Nov. 15 1994; VI, Feb. 18 1994). In order to quell this criticism, the Israeli government passed a series of legislative amendments in December 1994, enabling the implementation of the Gaza/Jericho Agreement (IDF, Nov. 7 1994). Officially known as the Gaza/Jericho Agreement Implementation Law (Limiting Activities) and informally dubbed the "Orient House" law, it includes three key points relating to Jerusalem: 1) it bars the PNA from opening institutions or holding meetings inside Israel; 2) it gives the government the ability to prevent these actions; and 3) it underscores the right of the police to enforce this law (Izenberg and Immanuel, JP, Dec. 27 1994; Izenberg and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 8 1994). The Orient House law is geared toward legalizing the Israeli government's actions towards Orient House in order to reaffirm their authority over East Jerusalem. In particular, the third key point that reinforces legitimate police activity in East Jerusalem can be read as a declaration that East Jerusalem is within Israel's sovereign territory.

The government passed this law mainly because of the strong criticism the Rabin government received surrounding their inability to control PNA activities in Jerusalem, particularly at Orient House. Specifically, the outrage of the opposition to a secret visit by Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller to Orient House during a visit to Israel on November 5, 1994, spurred the government to push through the bill (Izenberg and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 8 1994; JP, Nov. 15 1994). Prime Minister Rabin claimed that the government needed this legislation in order to take action against Orient House and stop the Palestinians from conducting national business within Israel (Izenberg and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 8 1994). However, despite the Knesset passing the Orient House Law, the Israeli government never implemented the law to close Orient House. Due to the lack of enforcement, the law had little impact on activities at Orient House. Nevertheless, even passing such a law had a powerful symbolic effect because it drew a boundary and marked the space as part of a legitimate Israeli national claim to East Jerusalem. For the Rabin administration, this ambiguity served an important purpose. It

allowed Rabin, on the one hand, to show Israelis that the government was taking action against PNA activities in Jerusalem, and on the other hand, by not actually curbing Orient House activities, Rabin showed Palestinians that the government wanted to continue the peace process. This legislative move by the Rabin administration was in fact an ambiguous boundary that opened further negotiation of the boundaries of national identity and along with it the meaning of this place within that identity.

Rabin's motivation to keep pace with the timeline of the Oslo Accords influenced his actions toward Orient House as much as the pressure by the government's opposition. While the Rabin administration passed legislation to justify the closure of Orient House and appease the critics of the government, they did not enforce the law because Rabin wanted to keep the peace process on track. Rabin was increasingly convinced by Palestinian claims that Orient House played a key role in the peace process and that closing Orient House would mean stalling the process. The Orient House law played an important role as an identifiable action against Orient House that the government could point to when their motivations were questioned, hence drawing a boundary that excluded Jerusalem from Palestinian national identity. Yet, Rabin's actions reflected a different goal, one that attempted to reconstitute Jerusalem as a place of peace. As the boundary became increasingly fractured, Rabin put into effect policies to attempt to keep it intact.

Rabin implemented several policies that allowed Orient House activities to take place without compromising his government's formal position on PNA activities in Jerusalem. For example, he began requesting that either foreign officials visiting Israel not visit Palestinian officials at Orient House or make only "courtesy visits" (Gordon, JP, Feb. 10 1995; Hutman, JP, Feb. 10 1995; JP, Feb. 11 1996; Makovsky and Collins, JP, Feb. 20 1996; VI, Oct. 26 1995, 460; VP, Mar. 14 1995; Zak, JP, Aug. 9 1995). He made it clear that the government would only tolerate short, social calls based on existing protocol because he defined a "courtesy visit" as not involving national activity. Following this request, several foreign officials did characterize their visits this way. However, several months after stating that only "courtesy visits" to Orient House would be permitted, Rabin tightened his restrictions because of increased criticism from the

government's opposition. He declared that he would not meet with foreign officials of ministerial level or above if they visited Orient House, regardless of the character of the meeting (Collins and Makovsky, JP, Nov. 1 1995; VI, Oct. 31 1995). Media reports on this policy actually stated two different things: *The Jerusalem Post* reported that Rabin would not meet with heads of state that visited Orient House, but would meet with ministers; whereas, *Voice of Israel* reported that Rabin would not even meet with ministers that visited Orient House. Despite this confusion, foreign ministers continued to visit Orient House and, more importantly, the government did not resist that strongly. During a visit by French Foreign Minister de Charette, Foreign Minister Peres admitted that he did not think the issue was worth a harsh confrontation with the Palestinians (Collins, JP, Dec. 24 1995). In addition, despite the Israeli government stating that they would allow the meetings because they were only "courtesy visits," the Palestinians made it clear that these were working meetings where the main issues that threatened the peace process were discussed, including Jerusalem (Hutman, JP, Feb. 10 1995). The government's attempts to designate Orient House as a nonpolitical site at the same time that it passed a law and established policies to stop Palestinian activities is an example of how national identity is negotiated through these inconsistencies. By creating a controversy over visits to Orient House, the Israeli government demonstrated the significance of Orient House and provided space for the Palestinians to exert Orient House as a symbol of their national identity.

The "courtesy visit" policy is an example of an attempt by Rabin to demonstrate Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem and designate Orient House as an illegitimate space of the Palestinian National Authority, clearly linked to the constitution of Palestinian national identity. However, for the most part, because the policy allowed foreign officials to continue visiting both the Israeli government and Palestinian officials at Orient House, the boundary between Israeli control in East Jerusalem and Palestinian activities at Orient House remained ambiguous. This ambiguity in the Rabin government's policies toward Orient House shows how boundaries are often inconsistent and how the negotiation of identity happens through these fractures and inconsistencies.

Rabin's political manoeuvring shows an ambiguity in his actions toward Orient House. As boundary-drawing practices, the ambiguous actions of the Rabin administration toward Orient House allowed the government to implement policies making Rabin appear strong in both the peace process and in the government's control of East Jerusalem. In a sense, the Rabin government needed Orient House activities to continue in order to provide opportunities to continue a show of sovereignty over East Jerusalem and legitimate East Jerusalem as part of Israeli national identity. At the same time, by continuing to allow activities at Orient House, the government shaped Jerusalem into a place that is part of the peace process negotiations, and therefore open to Palestinian national identity. This negotiation of boundaries in East Jerusalem created the struggle around Orient House, keeping the media, politicians, and Israeli and Palestinian society focused on Orient House.

2. Opposition to the Government: Likud and the Jerusalem Municipality

The opposition to the Israeli government perceived Rabin's lack of direct action against Orient House as a threat to Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem. The inconsistency of the government's position on Orient House provided room for action from other parts of the government, including the opposition and the Jerusalem municipality, both led by Likud. Fractures in the boundaries of national identity are also spaces for resistance and opposition. For example, frustrated with the government's inability to close Orient House, Likud Knesset Member Yehoshua Matza introduced a bill aimed at closing Orient House in July of 1995 (Hutman and Makovsky, JP, June 26 1995). The so-called "Orient House" bill called for the closure of Palestinian political institutions in Jerusalem and up to 10 years imprisonment for anyone operating from Orient House (Collins, JP, Feb. 25 1996; Collins and Hutman, JP, Mar. 8 1996). According to *The Jerusalem Post*, Matza tabled the bill as a "test of the government's intention to act against violations of the Oslo accords 'and to strengthen our rights in Jerusalem'"(Collins and Hutman, JP, Mar. 8 1996). Likud perceived a dangerous outcome for Israel's sovereignty in Jerusalem because of the government's lack of concern and set out to test the government's intentions by introducing this bill. The bill is an example of the government's opposition testing the extent of the fractures and

ambiguities of the boundary of Israeli national identity imposed by the government. Likud was unwilling to accept any ambiguity in Jerusalem's boundaries, and therefore in Israeli national identity.

Likud managed to pass the first reading of the bill on March 7, 1996, which had an impact beyond the Israeli government, provoking a reaction from the PNA. PNA Chairman Arafat responded that the proposed bill contradicted the Oslo Accords and he reiterated the role of Orient House as the headquarters for the Palestinian negotiating team to the Madrid multilateral peace talks (VP, Mar. 8 1996a; VP, Mar. 8 1996b). Yet, the Palestinians were not particularly concerned about the bill because a second reading would have to wait until after the 1996 elections (Collins and Hutman, JP, Mar. 8 1996). Indeed, the bill was never brought forward to the Knesset for a second reading because Likud came into power as a result of the elections, giving them other avenues to close Orient House. However, for Palestinians, actions such as this bill are part of a larger Israeli strategy to close Orient House and exclude them from Jerusalem.

The Jerusalem municipality also questioned the Israeli government's commitment to maintaining Israel's sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Jerusalem's mayor Ehud Olmert and deputy mayor Shmuel Meir in particular opposed the Labour government's conciliatory approach to the Palestinians and acted out of frustration to the Rabin government's unwillingness to close Orient House or stop their activities. In 1994, the municipality started to use municipal laws to close or impede activities at Orient House. The significance of Jerusalem to both national identities gives the mayor of Jerusalem increased authority over how specific spaces in Jerusalem can be used to exert and resist national identity. With Jerusalem as a central element in both Palestinian and Israeli national identities, Jerusalem's municipal government affected the struggle for sovereignty in the city on a local level by extending the laws of the municipality onto Orient House.

By using municipal laws to exert authority over Orient House, the municipal government also participated in boundary-drawing practices aimed at reinforcing exclusive Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem. The strategy of invoking municipal laws is useful because making activities legal or illegal is part of the process of legitimizing

activities and the places where they occur. Drawing boundaries around what is legitimate, in this case Jerusalem municipal laws, and where it is legitimate, at Orient House, reinforces claims to territory by Israeli national identity. In order to exert control over Orient House, the municipality attempted to impede activities or close Orient House by acting on perceived violations of three different municipal laws: property taxes, zoning laws, and construction permits.

First, in March 1994, the municipality threatened to evict Faisal Husseini from Orient House because of unpaid property taxes, totaling almost NIS 1 million (approximately US$340,000 in March 4, 1994, dollars) (Hutman, JP, Mar. 4 1994). The municipality initially threatened Orient House in March 1994, and a month later put liens on Orient House bank accounts because Palestinian officials had covered only part of their debt (Hutman, JP, Apr. 25 1994). In addition, the municipality planned to freeze the bank accounts of Orient House owners because of unanswered appeals made to the owners to pay off the outstanding debt (VI, June 14 1994). Deputy Mayor Shmuel Meir (NRP), who led attacks against Orient House for operating as a PLO headquarters, led the demand for Orient House to pay its debt to the city because he feared PNA activities in Jerusalem would lead to the redivision of the city (Hutman, JP, Apr. 25 1994). While Meir stated that the demand for Orient House to pay its municipal debts was part of a routine review of all unpaid municipal taxes that he ordered upon taking office, *The Jerusalem Post* reported that a letter from Meir to the director in charge of property taxes indicated that Orient House was to be a top priority (Hutman, JP, Mar. 4 1994). In trying to deny that his focus on Orient House was partisan, Meir maintained, "Orient House is not a consulate or embassy, and must pay [property taxes] to the city like everyone else... I'm going after everyone who owes us money" (as quoted in Hutman, JP, Mar. 4 1994). The municipality's strategy of threatening to evict the Palestinians from Orient House because of unpaid taxes was a way to demonstrate in a concrete way that Orient House is the same as every other office building in Jerusalem. That is, Orient House is within the Israeli borders of Jerusalem and under the control of the Israeli-run municipality. By exerting control over the property, the municipality claimed Orient House as part of Israel.

Similarly, in the summer of 1995, the Jerusalem municipality attempted to close Orient House by enforcing an apparent zoning violation. The municipality's action was clearly a manoeuvre to exert authority in Jerusalem and put pressure on Palestinians. According to the mayor and the municipality's lawyers, the municipality had the authority to shut Orient House because it was zoned for use as a hotel and was never rezoned when Husseini began using it as offices (Hutman and Makovsky, JP, June 26 1995). However, Orient House officials produced letters confirming that Husseini informed the municipality that the hotel was shutting down and reopening as offices (Hutman, JP, July 18 1995).[8] In addition, they produced a letter from the municipality approving the change and stating that property taxes for Orient House would be adjusted. City officials refuted this by claiming that approval from the property tax department does not constitute an approval for a zoning change and told Orient House officials they would have to apply for a zoning change (Hutman, JP, July 18 1995). The confusion over the zoning law regulations suggests that the municipality invoked the law in order to demonstrate sovereignty over Orient House and in East Jerusalem instead of any actual concern for a possible violation. Here again, the municipality attempted to reinforce the boundaries of Jerusalem and of Israeli national identity.

At the same time that the municipality was attempting to enforce the zoning law to close Orient House, a third struggle took place over some construction occurring at Orient House. The municipality alleged that construction at Orient House was illegal because Orient House officials did not obtain a building permit. According to the municipality, the construction involved at least a one-floor, 70-meter addition to the building. The municipality threatened to demolish the work and on May 5, 1995, obtained a work-stoppage order (Hutman, JP, May 5 1995). Orient House officials claimed the construction was only renovations of a building designated as the media

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[8] The article quoted here states that Orient House informed the municipality in 1988 that the use of the building was changing from a hotel to offices. This is inaccurate according to other historical information I have provided. According to other sources (see Section II. A History of Orient House in Chapter 1), Orient House was used as offices from 1983 to 1988, when it was shut down because of the *Intifada* and the offices reopened in 1992. From the information I have, it is difficult to ascertain when the Orient House owners informed the municipality of the change in use of the building. I suspect that *The Jerusalem Post* made an error and they meant to report that these letters were exchanged in 1983.

3. The Netanyahu Administration

The change of government after the 1996 Israeli elections affected the progress of peace negotiations. Despite promises to uphold the letter of the Oslo Accords inherited from the Labour government, the Likud government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, did not share in the spirit in which the Oslo Accords were negotiated. Concerning Jerusalem, Netanyahu often declared his position as unwavering and maintained Jerusalem's status as the exclusive capital of Israel. For example, even in his 1996 election campaign Netanyahu stated that he would close Orient House because "the situation in which [the Palestinians] are setting up a capital within a capital is insufferable" (Israel TV2, Feb. 5 1996). While still ambiguous at times, Netanyahu was more decisive than Rabin in his boundary-drawing activities. The main concrete action of the Netanyahu administration was to issue threats and orders to close Orient House. On three separate occasions during his term in office (1996-1999), Netanyahu issued orders to have the police close down Orient House. The Netanyahu administration's strategy for protecting Jerusalem as central to Israeli national identity was to use power to forcefully close Orient House.

The Likud government was more definitive in their actions against Orient House than the Labour government and used Orient House as a place for demonstrating control over East Jerusalem. Netanyahu used the progress of the peace negotiations as a strategy for claiming Orient House, and through it, East Jerusalem, as a place under Israeli sovereignty. For example, in the summer of 1996 Netanyahu issued threats that there would be no movement in the implementation of the Oslo Accords, including the Hebron redeployment, until PNA offices in Jerusalem were closed (Ha'aretz, Aug. 14 1996). The Netanyahu government issued orders to close Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem and managed to close certain offices that the Palestinians could not deny conducted activities connected to the PNA, including the Geography and Surveying Department and the Youth and Sports Department, both operating from Orient House (VI, Aug. 25 1996a). Netanyahu's strategy to reinforce the boundaries of Israeli national identity at times also displayed inconsistencies. Despite his promise during the elections to close Orient House, the Netanyahu government was only partially successful and instead tried to curb

disputed activities. Immediately after the election, Netanyahu opted to establish a special committee to monitor PNA activities in Jerusalem and instituted a policy of withdrawing invitations to any visiting dignitary that intended to visit Orient House (Hutman, JP, June 30 1996; JP, July 1 1996).

In the case of the Netanyahu government, threats to close Orient House were clearly a strategy to demonstrate sovereignty in a tangible way. Each time the government need to prove that they would not compromise Israel's sovereignty in Jerusalem, they revived the controversy at Orient House. Claiming that the PNA was violating the Oslo Accords by operating at Orient House, attempting to close Orient House, and demonstrating authority and control over this place were all actions that shaped and strengthened the belief of Israelis in Jerusalem as its capital.

In 1997, the Netanyahu government revisited the controversy at Orient House and issued closure orders, with a 96-hour warning period, to four Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem (Ha'aretz, Mar. 6 1997).[9] This time, the announcement came from Netanyahu as he addressed the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and was clearly a political stunt (VI, Mar. 4 1997). *Ha'aretz* reported that afterwards the Prime Minister's office conveyed conciliatory messages to the PNA stating that these closure orders were apparently of a "merely token nature" (Ha'aretz, Mar. 6 1997). The warning expired without the offices being closed because of a government decision to allow the Palestinians to appeal the decision. The Netanyahu administration never

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[9] There is some confusion in the selection of articles used in this analysis as to the institutions cited in the closure orders. In an excerpt from a *Voice of Israel* report, the institutions were reported as the Arab Studies Society's Maps and Cartography Centre, operating out of the Orient House; the Palestinian Small Business Project, operating nearby the Orient House; the Islamic National Committee Against Settlement Activity, operating in the Mufti's office on Temple Mount; and the Palestinian Prisoners' Club, location not specified (VI, Mar. 4 1997). The *Voice of Palestine* reported the institutions as being the Office of the Waqf and Religious Affairs Minister, the office of the Mufti of Jerusalem on Temple Mount, and another office in Orient House (VP, Mar. 6 1997). In an excerpt from *Ha'aretz*, the institutions are listed as the National Institutions Bureau, the National Committee Against Settlement Activity, and the Palestinian Casualties Institution, all located near the Orient House, and the Jerusalem Society for Welfare and Development, managed by Faisal Husseini (Ha'aretz, Mar. 6, 1997). According to this *Ha'aretz* report (Ha'aretz, Mar. 6, 1997), the Maps and Cartography Centre, run by Khalil Tufakji at Orient House, also referred to as the Geography and Surveying Department, reopened following the 1996 closure and was to be included in this closure order. However, plans to close this office were reportedly postponed at the last moment because of international sensitivity connected to closing an office at Orient House.

enforced the closure order because at the time the goal of the closure was not geared toward the Palestinians, but toward the attendees of the conference. Netanyahu issued the orders to appear strong in his defense of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem.

Netanyahu was fairly successful in preventing visits to Orient House by foreign ministers, but there continued to be pressure from parts of the Likud coalition for the Netanyahu government to close Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem. However, the media largely ignored the issue of Orient House in 1997 and 1998. It became prominent again during the 1999 Israeli election campaign when Netanyahu again used Orient House in order to show his commitment not to compromise Jerusalem in the peace negotiations. As the election campaign intensified in the spring of 1999, the renewed attempts by the Israeli government to close Orient House in the spring of 1999 garnered a tremendous amount of attention in the media.[10] In early April 1999, the government again announced its intention to close several Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem on the basis that they were affiliated with the PNA (Lynfield, JP, Apr. 4 1999). By April 22, the cabinet had instructed the Public Security Minister to issue closure orders. The cabinet explained this sudden move by stating that it resulted from a recent series of provocations and violations of the peace agreements (VI, Apr. 22 1999a). Palestinian resistance to the Netanyahu government's actions was more pronounced during this attempt to close Orient House. For example, some of the motivation to issue closure orders came from the Israeli government's dismay over a meeting held at Orient House on Israel's Independence Day between Palestinian officials and Gaza-based Arab ambassadors (Harman, Lynfield, and Klein, JP, Apr. 23 1999; Hatzofe, Apr. 25 1999). The official closure orders, issued April 26, 1999, specified closing three offices in Orient House and not the entire building. The offices are Faisal Husseini's office, the Maps Department, and the Department of Foreign Relations (VP, Apr. 26 1999). The Palestinians vehemently opposed this attempt to close Orient House and cease its activities, stating that this move would result in a breakdown of negotiations as well as a

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[10] There were a total of 41 articles in 1999 (up to May 5) on the issue of closing Orient House .

resurgence of violence ('Al-Ayyam, Apr. 26 1999; Klein and Dudkevitch, JP, Apr. 26 1999).

Both Palestinians and the Israeli opposition accused Netanyahu of issuing closure orders as an election ploy (Harman, Lynfield, and Klein, JP, Apr. 23 1999). One opinion piece in *The Jerusalem Post* claimed that "the recent decision by the Netanyahu government to close down three offices in Orient House looks like a desperate move inspired by a bankrupt politician who is afraid of losing the upcoming elections" (Kuttab, JP, Apr. 29 1999). Despite Netanyahu's insistence on closing Orient House, the Internal Security Minister Kahalani, who was charged with issuing the orders, proceeded to negotiate with Orient House officials (Dudkevitch and Klein, JP, Apr. 28 1999; VI, Apr. 28 1999a). Kahalani extended deadlines for hearings to give Orient House representatives sufficient time to produce relevant documentation. Some reports speculated that this was merely a strategy to give Kahalani time to negotiate a compromise with Orient House officials (VI, Apr. 28 1999a). By acting against Netanyahu's demands to close the building, Kahalani demonstrated that Netanyahu's goal in issuing closure orders was motivated more by his political situation than the activities of the Palestinians.

The 1999 campaign to close Orient House continued past May 4, 1999, the original deadline for the Oslo Accords final status agreement. After negotiations to reach a compromise broke down, the Israeli Supreme Court, on May 11, 1999, diffused the situation by postponing any closure orders for one week, which meant after the Israeli elections. A week later, after the elections, the political situation changed in Israel with Netanyahu losing power to Ehud Barak, leader of the Labour party. The new Prime Minister decided not to follow through with the closure orders and Orient House remained open, despite continuing controversy. I mention this only to show that the controversy over Orient House continued on past May 4, 1999.

Netanyahu's actions against Orient House were blatant attempts to reinforce Israel's control over Jerusalem. Israeli national identity in part depends on Jerusalem as its "eternal, united capital" and therefore Netanyahu's actions to reify those boundaries

play an important role in portraying himself, in order to get reelected, as protector of Jerusalem. However, the actions by the Israeli government provoked responses from the Palestinians and served to make Orient House into an important site for Palestinians to exert their national identity.

4. The Palestinian Position of Contestation

The Palestinians contested both the national government's and the municipality's actions throughout the Oslo Accords. Palestinian officials argued for the continuation of Orient House activities on the basis of the agreements made in the Oslo Accords, especially the Jerusalem Letter. Faisal Husseini and other Palestinian officials attempted to maintain and exert the notion of Orient House as a contested space within the peace negotiations by constantly reminding Israelis and Palestinians of the role of Orient House in the peace process. The Palestinians resisted Israelis' attempts to control East Jerusalem by using Orient House as a space to express Palestinian national identity. They argued that Orient House has been the headquarters of the Palestinian negotiating team for the Madrid peace talks since 1992 and reiterated that Orient House does not conduct PNA activity. In addition, they emphasized the protection of the rights of Palestinians in East Jerusalem as specified in the Jerusalem Letter. According to Husseini, Israel's decision to ban foreign dignitaries' visits to Orient House was wrong, destructive, and conflicted with the terms of the peace process (VP, Feb. 19 1996). Orient House officials argued that Israel has no right to take unilateral action in Jerusalem and any decision to close Orient House or ban meetings would hurt the overall peace process (Hutman and Collins, JP, Jan. 18 1996; VI, Aug. 28 1995; VI, Jan. 17 1996a). Through these arguments, Palestinian officials attempted to resist the boundaries drawn by the Israeli government and draw new boundaries constitutive and reflective of Palestinian national identity.

One Palestinian strategy to contest Israeli political-manoeuvring tactics against Orient House was to frame Israeli actions against Orient House in a certain way. For example, they accused the Israeli government and media, especially the right-wing factions, of attempting to mount a "defamation campaign" and a "large-scale instigation campaign" against Orient House (JP, Aug. 28 1994; VP, May 6 1995). Palestinians

called threats of closure by the state and municipal government part of a "rabid campaign" against Palestinian institutions (VP, May 6 1995; VP, July 13 1998b). Referring to a decision from the Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem to enforce laws to limit Palestinian activities in Jerusalem, an Orient House spokesperson stated,

> the decision... regarding Palestinian organizations in Jerusalem is the culmination of a wave of *belligerent actions* undertaken by right-wing extremists and settlers, aided by the municipality and some Israeli government bodies. (as quoted in Hutman, JP, Aug. 15 1995, my emphasis)

Similarly, an official Orient House statement claimed that Israeli measures against Orient House were "aimed at slandering Orient House and the role it had been playing in boosting the peace process" (VP, Apr. 10 1995). Through the media, Palestinian officials constantly reiterated the Israeli government's position as occupier and their actions as unjustified and belligerent in order to cast Palestinian activities at Orient House and in Jerusalem in a more legitimate light.

Orient House officials also claimed that the media created stories to continue this campaign. For example, in 1994, Bill Hutman of *The Jerusalem Post* reported on a supposed embezzlement scandal at Orient House (Hutman, JP, Aug. 26 1994; JP, Aug. 28 1994). His reports claimed that the PLO was investigating five officials, including Faisal Husseini, and that up to US $5 million had been embezzled. This report by *The Jerusalem Post* demonstrates the impact the media can have on perceptions of Orient House and Palestinians. However, the Palestinians categorically denied the reports, stating that the story was ridiculous, particularly since Orient House does not have such a large budget (JP, Aug. 28 1994). Husseini charged that "certain Israeli communications media are conducting a *smear campaign* against Orient House" (my emphasis, JP, Aug. 28 1994). To counteract Israeli media attempts to delegitimize Orient House, a letter to the editor by a prominent Palestinian, Daoud Kuttab, stated, "bashing Palestinians has become a favorite of the press with the least attention to professional and journalistic ethics" and that "clearly, when the subject is Palestinian, professional judgment is thrown out the window" (Kuttab, JP, Sept. 21 1994). Hutman denied the accusation that his investigation was poorly done and stated that Palestinian sources provided detailed information concerning the embezzlement (Hutman's response in Kuttab, JP, Sept. 21

1994). By attempting to discredit Palestinians at Orient House, Hutman's report impacts Orient House because he called into questions the legitimacy of Palestinian activities. Actions by the Israeli government and media turn Orient House into a contested space that then allows room for Palestinians to resist dominant constructions. Palestinians often stressed their rights in Jerusalem and attempted to portray the Israeli government as purposefully harming Palestinian institutions.

5. Summary

In this section, I examined actions of the state elite that involved Orient House during the Oslo Accords period. In particular, I focused on the Israeli government, the Jerusalem municipality, and Orient House officials in order to explore the impact of concrete activities on boundary demarcation and identity formation. The constant threats by the Israeli government to close Orient House served as strong statements about sovereignty and a powerful example of boundary demarcation. These boundaries are examples of Israeli attempts to control what is allowed and not allowed within Jerusalem. However, the issue was not the activities at Orient House per se, but the Israeli government's need to have a marker of its sovereignty. Each time a strong demonstration of Israeli sovereignty in the city was needed, the controversy at Orient House would be resurrected in some form. While the main concern of the Israeli opposition and the Jerusalem municipality was the government's commitment to East Jerusalem as part of Israel, the government had competing interests and was torn between this issue and the peace process. All of these negotiations between various actors created the struggle over Orient House that transformed it into a space that symbolized the assertion of Palestinian national identity and Israeli resistance to it.

Each of these examples of the actions of various actors in the Oslo Accords represents the ways that boundaries are negotiated in Jerusalem. Drawing boundaries to claim Orient House, as a representative space of East Jerusalem, involves political manoeuvring and resistance. Next, I turn to informal sites where the boundaries of Israeli and Palestinian national identities are negotiated and examine the everyday practices in which material strategies impact on national identities.

B) INFORMAL SITES OF STRUGGLE OVER NATIONAL IDENTITY

Israelis and Palestinians use boundary-drawing practices in informal or popular spaces to constitute and legitimate national identity. These informal sites are the seemingly non-political spaces where identity is negotiated through everyday activities. This negotiation can either reinforce or resist existing representations of national identity. In his discussion of the resistance practices of social movements, Routledge (1996:516) argues for an analysis focusing on what he terms a terrain of resistance, which represents an "interwoven web of specific symbolic meanings, communicative processes, political discourses, religious idioms, cultural practices, social networks, economic relations, physical settings, envisioned desires and hopes." The concept of a terrain of resistance is useful for examining the informal sites of geopolitics because it indicates the spaces of popular geopolitical practices. Routledge argues for expanding the notion of the political domain to include the everyday practices that articulate positions often in opposition to the dominant, formal ones. Therefore, geopolitical practices need to be studied at spatial scales other than the state, in sites of power other than the government, and by groups other than state leaders. Spaces such as the city streets of Jerusalem are rich with examples of Israelis and Palestinians constructing, reinforcing, and contesting national identity. Different groups within these societies employ various strategies to voice opposition to national discourses or reify dominant ones. Geopolitical practices in these informal spaces are continually shaping and constituting national identity.

In this section, I discuss two examples of material activities in informal sites from the controversy surrounding Orient House to demonstrate the actions Israelis and Palestinians take to draw boundaries. First, I explore the spaces of resistance marked by protesters, and second, I examine the continuation of daily activities at Orient House by Palestinians as reported in the media.

1. Demonstrations at Orient House

While Israeli and Palestinian state actors, as I have shown, use formal political spaces to contest Orient House activities, the Israeli and Palestinian people used the city streets surrounding Orient House to resist both the policies of the government and the activities of the Palestinians. Orient House became not only a site of struggle in the

formal political arena, but also a place for demonstrators to disrupt dominant political discourses. Protests at Orient House – Israeli anti-government, anti-Palestinian, and pro-Palestinian – created a space for opposition to government policies and for resistance to the dominant constructions of both Israeli and Palestinian national identities.

From 1993 to 1999, Orient House acted as a site for both reactions from Israeli groups against the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem and shows of solidarity by and for Palestinians. The demonstrations that took place at Orient House by Israeli groups are as much about protesting the spatial articulations of Palestinian national identity as they are about how these groups wanted to define their own identity. These demonstrations affected Palestinian national identity by pointing out the significance of Orient House as a site where sovereignty in Jerusalem is demarcated. All of the demonstrations are as much about contesting definitions of national identity and not about Jerusalem or Orient House per se; the demonstrators use Jerusalem and Orient House to exert specific definitions of national identity because these sites represent the discursive struggle over identity.

Demonstrators articulate their own forms of national identity and often draw on local knowledge or common cultural understandings to articulate their resistance. As Routledge (1996:523) argues, people shape and articulate their struggles through a "reservoir of meanings embedded in the practices of everyday life." In the case of protests at Orient House, groups use slogans and imagery that draw on historical events, such as the Holocaust, racial characterisations, and national symbols, to articulate their position. Drawing on examples from protests by Israeli and Palestinian groups, I discuss how these groups mobilize support for their resistance by drawing on cultural norms and codes to make their cause culturally intelligible.

During the period of the Oslo Accords, many Israeli groups protested the government's actions at Orient House. Israeli anti-government demonstrations focused on expressing displeasure at the Israeli government's action or lack of action. For example, the Council of Jewish Communities in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (CJC) described their demonstration in December of 1993, where a protest permit was denied, as "not meant as a provocation, but to protest the fact the government has allowed the

PLO to have a headquarters in Jerusalem" (Hutman, JP, Dec. 27 1993). Concerned that the government was allowing the Palestinians to conduct national activities, the CJC leader stated, "we are trying to show that this government allows the PLO to have a headquarters, a terror headquarters, in Jerusalem" (Hutman, JP, Dec. 28 1993). The characterisation of the PLO as terrorists draws on a racial stereotype of Palestinians familiar to Israelis and the Western world. By reinforcing the perception of Palestinians as terrorists and attaching this negative image to Orient House, the CJC is designating Palestinian activities at Orient House as insurgent and illegitimate (see section II.C. Militarism for more on the specification of Orient House as a "terror" headquarters).

Other protesters also used common cultural codes to attach a negative meaning to Palestinian activities at Orient House as a way to delegitimize Palestinian claims in Jerusalem. For example, at a 1995 protest, Rabbi Benny Elon of Beit El settlement equated the creation of a Palestinian state with the Holocaust in order draw attention to the government's actions by asking: "What will you say to your son 30 years from now when it will be a fact, when there will be a Palestinian state and he will ask you why you did nothing to prevent this holocaust?" (Immanuel, JP, June 20 1995). Similarly, at a protest with approximately 25 Women in Green protesters outside Orient House carrying signs and shouting slogans against a visit by Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo, Women in Green leader Nadia Matar stated: "'We thought the Dutch were our friends... But apparently they believe Jerusalem belongs to the great murderer (Yasir) Arafat.'" (Hutman and Collins, JP, Jan. 18 1996). Israeli groups characterised Palestinians as terrorists and murderers as a strategy to legitimate their national identity by representing the activities at Orient House differently. The demonstrators attempted to transform the meaning of this space by equating the activities at Orient House with violence against Jews.

Anti-Palestinian demonstrations by right-wing Israeli groups focused more on protesting the presence of Palestinians in Jerusalem. In order to protest Palestinian activities in Jerusalem, demonstrators employed Palestinian national symbols in their protests as a way to emphasize their claim to the space. Anti-Palestinian protesters burned and denigrated Palestinian national symbols at Orient House in order to tangibly

illustrate their denial of Palestinian national identity and claim Orient House as part of Israeli Jerusalem. The flag was a popular symbol, with protests involving such things as burning the Palestinian flag (VI, Dec. 30 1997), attempting to take down the Palestinian flag from Orient House (Lynfield, Izenberg, and Klein, JP, Apr. 27 1999), and attempting to hoist the Israeli flag at Orient House (VI, May 24 1998). Pictures of political leaders were another popular national symbol. For example, at a protest against the Forum for Jerusalem's four month protest vigil in the summer of 1995, headed by Jerusalem deputy mayor Shmuel Meir, right-wing Israeli protesters burned pictures of Arafat (Hutman, JP, Sept. 8 1995). Similarly, right-wing protesters burn posters of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat at another demonstration (Hutman, JP, Dec. 29 1993). During another protest, the Temple Mount Faithful marched with a burning coffin with the words Palestinian Authority on it (VI, May 24 1998). These groups co-opted symbols that are recognized as significant to the Palestinian nation and attempted to challenge their meaning through these destructive actions. By carrying out these activities at Orient House, the concrete action of burning the PLO flag or the "PNA coffin" represents not only a denigration of the Palestinian nation, but also of Orient House itself. This space becomes linked to the destruction of Palestinian national identity.

In light of Israeli attempts to close Orient House, there were several demonstrations and solidarity meetings between Palestinians and Israeli groups that support the Palestinians. Solidarity visits were conducted by Labour MKs and peace activists supporting the Palestinians; the media often noted if the visitors were women (Hutman, JP, Dec. 29 1993; Israel TV1, Apr. 3 1999; Izenberg, JP, Nov. 16 1994; Lahoud, JP, Sept. 14 1993; Lynfield, JP, Apr. 4 1999; JP, Apr. 25 1999). These solidarity demonstrations began immediately at the outset of the Oslo Accords with several MKs visiting Orient House on the evening of the signing of the DOP, September 13, 1993. At the demonstration, Meretz MK Naomi Chazan told the crowd, "In Washington we signed a peace agreement, but in Jerusalem we make peace" (Lahoud, JP, Sept. 14 1993). Palestinians reinforced their national identity through demonstrations of solidarity at Orient House that counteracted the destruction of their national symbols. Palestinian youths wore T-shirts with Yasir Arafat's picture and carried Palestinian flags.

Posters of Yasir Arafat were plastered all over the courtyard. Palestinians held demonstrations and sit-ins at Orient House to protest many of the actions of the Israeli government ('Al-Ayyam, Apr. 26 1999; Klein, JP, May 5 1999; VI, May 4 1999; VP, June 12 1995; VP, Apr. 30 1999). Pro-Palestinian demonstrations often involved chanting nationalistic songs and chants such as "first we will get Gaza and Jericho, and then we will get the rest of Palestine" ('Al-Ayyam, Apr. 26 1999; Hutman, JP, Dec. 29 1993; Lahoud, JP, Sept. 14 1993). Palestinian officials called on Palestinians everywhere to "continue to be alert and vigilant and foil all attempts to explode the situation [against Orient House], harm our institutions and target our national figures" (VP, June 14 1995). By repeating and reinforcing the idea of Palestine as a nation through these demonstrations, Palestinians continually demarcated Orient House as a part of Palestinian national identity.

Palestinians, as well as Israelis, sought out Orient House as a space to resist dominant constructions of identities. Both Israeli and Palestinian demonstrators drew on cultural codes and national symbols to exert specific definitions of national identity. Despite the similarity in the process of contesting identity, the specific cultural, economic, and political characteristics of each national group influences the cultural codes and practices used in the articulation of that identity.

2. Palestinian "Facts on the Ground" as Reported in the Media

The continuation of daily activities at Orient House became the strongest resistance available to the Palestinians. These activities created so-called "facts on the ground": a commonly used phrase referring to the actions taken by both sides to establish a de facto presence despite the Oslo Accords. In particular, "facts on the ground" mean establishing infrastructure that will alter the negotiations because it cannot be easily reversed, akin to a *fait accompli*. For instance, Israel is accused of continuing to build settlements on the West Bank despite their implicit agreement in the Oslo Accords to halt construction. These settlements, once inhabited, cannot be ignored, reversed, or easily dismantled. In the case of Orient House, the Palestinians are accused of using Orient House to establish a political infrastructure in Jerusalem that will enable them to present

East Jerusalem to the world as the de facto Palestinian capital (JP, Aug. 12 1994). The ability to have a government house, that is Orient House, implies other political infrastructure of a state, such as a capital and boundaries. Orient House, as a "fact on the ground," becomes a tangible boundary of Palestinian national identity.

The media portray the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem as resulting from the cunning and underhanded actions of Palestinians. This portrayal characterizes Palestinians as deceitful and implies that their presence in Jerusalem is not legitimate. Rather, the Palestinian "facts on the ground" strategy is seen as part of a deliberate "process of creeping sovereignty" (IDF, July 12 1996a). After a terrorist attack at Netzarim junction in 1994, Moshe Zak reported that the Palestinians:

> aren't just focusing on Orient House.... Their moves, on both the political and terrorist fronts, are aimed at changing the principles of the Oslo Agreement.... The Palestinian leadership, helped by facts on the ground in Jerusalem ... has no real need of negotiations.... Orient House has been turned into the P[N]A's foreign ministry, and a Palestinian university is being set up in Jerusalem. The aim: to establish facts in eastern Jerusalem.... In the struggle for Jerusalem, of which the Orient House affair is just one facet, Husseini has sharpened the choice that confronts our government: he has turned it into a choice between Orient House and Hamas. But Husseini isn't limiting himself to just one building. Orient House is serving as the springboard for a wide-ranging campaign to erode the unity of Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. (Zak, JP, Nov. 16 1994)

Israelis were clearly threatened by what they perceived as fairly successful, if illegitimate, attempts to gain de facto sovereignty in East Jerusalem. Zak's report undermines Palestinian claims to Jerusalem by portraying Palestinian activities as tactical strategies to undermine Israel and linking Husseini to Hamas in order to conjure images of terrorism. Representing Palestinians as extremists is a means to demarcate activities at Orient House as a danger to Israel and therefore Orient House as a Palestinian space becomes an illegitimate space.

The media representation of Palestinians and Orient House as illegitimate resulted from Palestinian "facts on the ground." The Palestinians' ability to continue holding meetings at Orient House with foreign officials despite Israel's ongoing attempts to close the offices legitimized the Palestinians foothold in Jerusalem through international recognition. For example, in 1996, the EU passed legislation requiring its foreign

ministers to visit Orient House when visiting Israel. Referring to the significance of this decision, *The Jerusalem Post* reporter Moshe Zak wrote, "in the struggle for the heart of Jerusalem, Faisal Husseini has won an important political victory" (Zak, JP, Aug. 9 1995). Toward the end of Oslo period, the Palestinians increasingly emphasized their "facts on the ground" as the basis of their legitimate presence in Jerusalem, instead of the emphasizing what the Oslo Accords established. The international recognition of Orient House and the attention given by Israelis, both positive and negative, changed the way Palestinians themselves perceived Orient House and increased the importance of the building for the Palestinian people. As an example, during the 1999 election campaign when Netanyahu focused on closing Orient House, the Palestinians argued that Orient House was an expression of a legitimate Palestinian presence in the city. For instance, Hatim Abd al-Qadir, member of the PLC's Jerusalem and Settlements Committee, stated, "Orient House is a Palestinian area under full Palestinian sovereignty, as acknowledged by the whole world" (VP, Apr. 24 1999). Husseini demonstrated this point most strongly during a meeting with Arab ambassadors at Orient House on Israel's Independence Day, 1999, where he told them they were standing in the capital of Palestine. "Israel rules the city as an occupying force, but has no sovereignty over it," he declared. "Sovereignty belongs to the people who have lived in it for hundreds of years, to the Palestinians" (Hatzofe, Apr. 25 1999).

Continuing the daily operations of Orient House is one of the best strategies Palestinians adopted to exert their presence in Jerusalem. Through continuous and consistent concrete activities in East Jerusalem, Orient House served as a space that reinforced the boundaries of Palestinian national identity. Orient House's role in providing services for Palestinian Jerusalemites and in resisting the Israeli occupation deepened the meaning of this place for Palestinians and transformed it into a national symbol. As Palestinians recognized Orient House as a space for their national identity, they were able to use this place as a strategy to express Palestinian identity. By claiming de facto sovereignty in East Jerusalem and arguing for their historical rights, Palestinians are able to transform Orient House into a site where national identity is shaped by Palestinians and not just in opposition to Israeli activities.

II. Boundary Demarcation Through Discursive Activities

Both Israelis and Palestinians construct their national identity through activities that demarcate the boundaries of that identity. These boundary-drawing practices involve both material activities, as discussed above, and discursive activities, which demarcate one identity as legitimate and the other as illegitimate. While the last section explored this complex and dynamic process through the daily events at Orient House in more detail, in this section I interrogate the language used to shape national identity. By discursive activity, I mean the use of certain language by the media and government officials to attach a culturally relevant meaning to Orient House that impacts on how Orient House represents the struggle over Jerusalem and national identity. I explore three examples of discursive activities and examine how this language impacts on Orient House as a symbol of Palestinian national identity. First, I explore the use of nationalist language and markers of the state in the establishment of boundaries of legitimacy, such as designating Orient House as a Palestinian foreign ministry. Second, I examine the ways that religion is linked to the nation to instill a deeper meaning to a specific national identity. In particular, I highlight the sense of duty both national communities feel toward Jerusalem. And third, I investigate the process of militarizing national identity through military language as a mechanism to transform identity. Each of these examples draws on specific strategies that link together boundaries, identity, and place.

Three strategies for legitimating a geopolitical narrative, that is, a specific national identity, reoccur in the following examples. The first strategy is the use of discursive oppositions where one element in the pair is valued over the other. Israelis and Palestinians mark and claim spaces as part of a legitimate national identity by demarcating discursive boundaries between what is legitimate and what is not legitimate by equating legitimate with "us" as opposed to "them". Second, strategies depend on an interaction between the discursive and the material. Various actors articulate specific forms of national identity by attaching meaning to material spaces that acquire and reveal that meaning. And third, in a similar fashion as material activities, social groups draw on language to make spaces culturally intelligible to members of that group. This is achieved by linking culturally meaningful beliefs or symbols to particular sites. Israelis

and Palestinians come to associate specific places with their national identity because the cultural importance of these sites is reinforced as nationally important.

A) NATIONALISM

> Every house can be the Orient House. ... If the Israelis will forbid it in this house, the first door I knock on, they will let me in, and we will meet there... . Our house is not the building. Our house is the spirit of Jerusalem.
>
> (Faisal Husseini, quoted in Hutman, JP, June 26 1996).

In this powerful statement, Faisal Husseini captured the role of Orient House as symbolic of Palestinian national identity in Jerusalem. The struggle to control activities at Orient House transformed Orient House from a building housing a series of offices related to Palestinian political and social issues into a place with a symbolic character. As Palestinians claim Orient House as a crucial site in the peace process and Israeli nationalistic arguments reinforce the illegitimacy of Palestinian national aspirations, they both juxtapose the material Orient House and the mythical Orient House. The strategies used in this juxtaposition are examples of boundary-drawing practices. While Palestinians demarcate their national identity by emphasizing Orient House as a national symbol, Israelis attempt to emphasize Orient House as a physical space without this mythical element and assert Israel's "real" or legitimate claims to statehood and territory versus illegitimate Palestinian claims. Palestinian national identity emerges through the struggle to define whose claims are legitimate.

Husseini's declarations of Orient House as the "spirit of Jerusalem" and the "house of peace," instill Orient House with meaning beyond its role as a political institution. Associating Orient House with Jerusalem itself and with peace raises the stakes of attempting to stop Palestinian activities there and in East Jerusalem. From the beginning of its use as the headquarters for the PLO, Orient House takes on a symbolic dimension that reinforces the ongoing struggle of Palestinians for their homeland, with Jerusalem at the centre, because of the recognition given to Orient House by its opposition. "Why has Orient House become such a mythical and symbolic institution?"

reporter Rafi Ginat asked of Ahmad al-Tibi, an advisor to Arafat, in a 1995 interview with IDF Radio (IDF, Aug. 14 1995). Al-Tibi responded that Orient House has become a symbol because of the "Israeli right wing and all those whose aim is to shut down Orient House. That is what has made it so symbolic". Once Israelis identified Orient House as a site worth shutting down, it becomes more important for Palestinians to protect Orient House and to make use of it as a Palestinian institution. Al-Tibi named Orient House the "main Palestinian institution in East Jerusalem" and claimed it as the "site that symbolizes Palestinian policy in East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank" (IDF, Aug. 14 1995). The importance of Orient House and East Jerusalem as part of the meaning of Palestinian national identity emerges through the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians to define Orient House as a nationally important place.

Israeli media and political leaders link Palestinian political activities at Orient House to Palestinian encroachment on Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem. For Israelis, the government's ability to control the activities at Orient House is a symbolic measure of their ability to maintain control over Jerusalem itself. Israelis perceive the government's ability to prevent PNA activities at Orient House as a reflection of the government's commitment to Jerusalem. For example, a *Jerusalem Post* editorial argued that the existence of Orient House is a "daily reminder" that the government's pledges to keep Jerusalem united are not going to be fulfilled (JP, June 26 1995). Similarly, Tzomet MK Moshe Peled stated that "the ability to prevent this meeting [of the PNA at Orient House] would be the government's first test of the seriousness of its declarations concerning Jerusalem" (VI, June 19 1994b). The Israeli government encourages these statements by using Orient House to assert their authority in Jerusalem. Recognizing Orient House as an important site makes it a site for defining and contesting national identity. Israelis contribute to Orient House's role as a symbol of Palestinian national identity at the same time as they deny its significance by emphasizing the materiality of the building and its location within Israeli controlled Jerusalem. For example, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres stated, "...this place has no political status and does not enjoy any sort of immunity.... [Orient House] has no formal status, nor will it have such status in the future" (VI, Nov. 6 1994b). Similarly, in an interview the next day with Israeli TV, Peres declared,

> the status of Orient House is clear and explicitly stated. It is a house in Jerusalem, and as such it is open to any visitor. It will not be a political centre for the management of the territories or the conduct of the Gaza and Jericho agreement. It has no political status; it has a status of a house in Jerusalem. (Israel TV1, Nov. 7 1994)

Peres is attempting to portray to Israelis that Orient House is not a state institution and has no power to operate as such. The interaction between Israelis and Palestinians in these attempts to fix the limits of what Orient House means, to demarcate its boundaries, that defines national identity. By measuring Orient House against certain prescribed markers of statehood – immunity, foreign ministry, administrative management – the Israeli government is de-legitimizing Palestinian national claims.

The association and evaluation of Orient House with recognized markers of the state is at the core of the use of a nationalist discourse to contest or construct national aspirations. And while the Israeli government struggled to downplay the importance of Orient House as a Palestinian national symbol, the opposition in Israeli society also emphasized the symbolic nature of Orient House. The Israeli right-wing stressed what they perceived as the danger of increasing Palestinian activity in Jerusalem by using national imagery, associating Orient House with symbols of statehood, that threaten the state of Israel and Israelis claims of sovereignty over Jerusalem, attaching a sense of fear or urgency to descriptions of Orient House, and emphasizing the illegitimate nature of Palestinian activities in Jerusalem. Media reports accused Palestinian officials at Orient House of attempting to establish a Palestinian foreign ministry in Jerusalem, despite the agreement not to have any PNA activities in the city. Examples include Orient House being described as "functioning as the Palestinian Authority's foreign office," as having "the kind of diplomatic immunity only embassies and consulates enjoy" (JP, June 26 1995), and "as a de facto extraterritorial site, akin to a foreign embassy" (JP, Sept. 9 1996). One editorial in *The Jerusalem Post* characterizes Orient House as a "Palestinian government building masquerading as a cultural center" (JP, Mar. 8 1995).

Israelis' fear of losing sovereignty motivated some attacks, such as *The Jerusalem Post* reporter Zak's accusation that Palestinians were attempting to give Orient House the status and function of a foreign office. He warned, "a Palestinian 'foreign ministry' in Jerusalem is tantamount to sinking the stake of Palestinian sovereignty in the city" (Zak,

JP, Nov. 16 1994). But even if Palestinians were achieving some form of sovereignty, Israelis did not view it as legitimate. For example, one report attributed the controversy around Orient House in the early part of 1999 to the "use of the Orient House as a quasi-foreign ministry for the quasi-Palestinian government, with its quasi-official presence in Jerusalem" (Steinberg, JP, Mar. 26 1999). The Israeli government also perceives activities at Orient House as a threat to their sovereignty. Summarizing the government position, an editorial in *The Jerusalem Post* insisted, "Orient House can function as an institution serving local cultural, educational, and welfare needs. It cannot act as an *agency of the [Palestinian National] Authority*, and it certainly must not function as a foreign ministry" (my emphasis, JP, Aug. 12 1994).

International recognition of Orient House plays a significant role in boosting perceptions of Orient House as a national site. A *Jerusalem Post* report warned Israelis that Orient House "operates as the foreign ministry of the Palestinian Authority and is recognized as such throughout the world" (JP, Aug. 15 1995). By continuing their visits to Orient House, the international community, particularly European nations, acknowledges Orient House as an important Palestinian site. For instance, after attempts by Foreign Minister David Levy to persuade the EU presidential troika, composed at the time of Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy, not to visit Orient House, an Irish official was quoted as saying "if it's not the Orient House, there is no point in going" (JP, Sept. 9 1996). Orient House gains legitimacy through this international recognition and therefore Orient House and Palestinians in Jerusalem receive more attention. Israelis are particularly threatened by the international attention given to Orient House. A report in *The Jerusalem Post* made clear that Orient House has "become a symbol of Palestinian [National] Authority presence in Jerusalem" citing as evidence that:

> *Most importantly*, Orient House is a site regularly visited by foreign dignitaries as part of their consultations with PA officials, giving it a status approaching that of a foreign ministry office and signaling international support of the idea of Jerusalem as the future capital of a Palestinian state. (my emphasis, JP, Sept. 9 1996)

International recognition of Orient House quickly becomes equated to support for Jerusalem as a Palestinian capital and Orient House is made into a symbol of the boundary. Similarly, Israelis have also warned that Orient House is considered "the seat

of the Palestinian government" (JP, Feb. 23 1994; VI, July 12 1994; VI, Oct. 5 1995), and that the Palestinians have "turned a visit to Orient House into a visit to the Palestinian Government House" (Beilin, JP, Sept. 18 1996). Many Israelis are particularly threatened by the idea of the Palestinian state being fully autonomous and the image of a Palestinian state operating with Orient House as its centre is used to stir up fear. In a poignant example, a news report declared that "the PLO has already established this Jerusalem building as a seat of government, and unless Israel reverses the process ... Orient House will be recognized as the Palestinian White House by the world community" (JP, Feb. 23 1994). Linking Orient House to the White House, arguably the most influential government house in the world, reveals the amount of power that is being attributed to Orient House's role and that Palestinian resistance to attempts to close or restrict activities at Orient House are having some effect.

Measuring and associating Orient House with symbols of the state to increase the urgency and fear around Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem is one example of the ways that places become imbued with culturally intelligible meaning. Israelis and Palestinians instill this physical space with specific, nationally important meaning through juxtaposing reality versus myth or state sovereignty against illegitimate claims to territory. The interaction between these contrary meanings, defined through actions that draw different boundaries, determines how sites such as Orient House are understood as both materially and discursively significant to national identity. Orient House is transformed into a place where national identity is negotiated when Israelis and Palestinians, those actors involved in this specific set of social relations, designate Orient House as an site of national importance. These transformations occur not only with national symbols, but also through other cultural dimensions. In the next section, I examine the relationship between religion, as an example of a culturally important sphere of nationalism, and national identity.

B) RELIGION

Religion as an aspect of cultural tradition is an important component in the imagination of a national community. Anderson (1991:10) argues that religion is a cultural system that precedes nationalism. Similarly, Yuval-Davis (1997:21) regards

religion as part of the symbolic heritage of a nation. In both Israeli and Palestinian national identities, religion factors into the reasons for Jerusalem's central role. Jerusalem, as the site of the holy places for three religions and the capital for two national groups, is caught in a national territorial dispute that creates an unparalleled connection between religion and the struggle for national identity. For Israelis and Palestinians, the sense of duty to the sacredness of Jerusalem is confounded by its historical and internationally recognized religious importance. In the struggle for control over Jerusalem displayed through contesting activities at Orient House, this sense of duty to protect Jerusalem's religious importance plays unique roles in Israeli and Palestinian geopolitical practices.

The specificity of Jerusalem and the perception of the city as a scared space are at the core of the use of religion to further national arguments. It is precisely because holy sites of the Jews, Christians, and Muslims are in Jerusalem that this national conflict continues. Jerusalem's unique characteristics add meaning and strength to both Palestinian and Israeli national identities. Both Israelis and Palestinians draw on a sense of duty their national community feels to protect Jerusalem as a scared space in specifying their national identities. Linking this sense of duty for Jerusalem as a religious site and for the religious sites themselves to political sites such as Orient House is a way of signifying the physical space with increased meaning. The discursive manoeuvre of linking religious meaning and political independence makes the goal of maintaining or gaining sovereignty increasingly important. The process of signifying political sites with religious meaning and religious sites with political meaning creates a sense of a legitimate presence in the city.

For Israelis, first and foremost in any political discussion of the city, Jerusalem is described as "the eternal, united capital of Israel." The religious connotation of this statement is strong because of its reference to Jerusalem as the centre of the Jewish homeland. Jerusalem is at the centre of the return of the Jewish people to Israel and we are often reminded of this. The Israeli government in particular used this language to underscore its commitment to Jerusalem. Exemplifying this point, Netanyahu stated during a 1998 interview, "Israel, in its activities in Jerusalem, both abides by the agreements and acts in accordance with the historic duty of the Jewish people, because

Jerusalem is the most important issue for us" (VI, June 21 1998). The Rabin government repeatedly stated, "Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel, and that it will stay undivided under Israeli sovereignty" (JP, July 7 1994). During his 1996 election campaign, Netanyahu promised that, "as for Jerusalem, there is no balance. ... I will keep Jerusalem a united city, the exclusive capital of the State of Israel. That is what I will do" (Israel TV2, Feb. 5 1996). Similarly, during his 1999 election campaign, Netanyahu explained,

> There have been incessant attempts in recent years to upgrade the status of Orient House, to make it possible for ambassadors, foreign ministers, and so forth to visit there. Each time, we blocked the attempts and resisted the trend, because the possibility of Orient House resuming its activities as the Palestinian foreign ministry in Jerusalem carries very dangerous symbolism. In practice, it would mean two capitals here. That is why we have again acted in this matter. We had to explain to the Europeans - and not only to them - that we will not tolerate any partition of the city. The Europeans responded the way they did. We cannot countenance a stand perceiving Jerusalem as an extraterritorial entity, one that does not belong to the State of Israel. This is the heart, the heart of hearts of the Jewish people and the heart of hearts of the State of Israel. (as quoted in VI, Mar. 12 1999)

Here, while Netanyahu clearly is imploring Israelis to understand Jerusalem as the "heart", or the centre and most important component, of Israeli national identity, he also is swaying them into believing that he is the key to protecting Jerusalem, and in turn this specification of Israeli national identity. Emphasizing the religiousness of Jerusalem and linking it to the political situation transforms Jerusalem as a culturally important site into one of national importance. The Israeli government is drawing on the sense of duty Israelis feel toward Jerusalem to make the need for sovereignty more important. National identity then encompasses religious symbols by intertwining religious symbols with the nation. Spaces such as Orient House then are transformed into places imbued with this identity.

The Palestinians also refer to Jerusalem as the centre of their nation, linking Jerusalem's religious and political importance. For example, referring to Israeli actions in Jerusalem, a PLO spokesperson at the UN insisted: "It is unrealistic for Israel to believe that it can hold on to all of Jerusalem. Jerusalem is a Palestinian center, not only religiously but politically. Much of the activity of the Palestinian Authority is planned

and executed in Jerusalem" (JP, Mar. 8 1995). The importance of Jerusalem as a sacred space for Palestinians merges with the need for Palestinians to assert their historical presence in Jerusalem. A statement by the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) declared:

> We urge everyone to stand together and protect our presence in Jerusalem. What began in Orient House will definitely end up in the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher [sic]. ... The decision by Netanyahu and his government to close down offices within Orient House is only another blow to the peace process. If peace will strip us of our presence and dignity, then to hell with all the agreements. Accursed is any peace under which Jerusalem is not the theme of our national sovereignty. ('Al-Ayyam, Apr. 26 1999)

Orient House is a space where a political struggle is also a struggle for religious freedom. Orient House, as a national symbol, takes on a more culturally significant meaning because of this association. The meaning of this place changes because Orient House is used to represent the struggle to maintain sovereignty over religious spaces as well as political ones.

Both Palestinian and Israeli national identities depend on the discursive or symbolic use of religion because the practicality of governance of the holy sites is not an overly contested issue between Israelis and Palestinians. In large part, workable solutions for Jerusalem are difficult because Israelis and Palestinians have connected the issues of sovereignty and national identity to religious beliefs. Both sides regard the Old City as a symbol of both national and religious identity, whose components are not discernible. Ironically, in attempts to solve the sovereignty dispute in Jerusalem there is little disagreement among the parties about the solution for the holy places: generally negotiators agree that the status quo should be largely maintained and freedom of access to religious sites is undisputed (see e.g. Benvenisti 1996). Many solutions for governance of the religious sites revolve around an independent council to govern the holy places with representatives from each religion. In this way, the holy sites have become secondary in the broader territorial conflict. Yet, religion and sovereignty are intertwined and Israelis and Palestinians perceive them as inseparable. The holy sites become part of the symbolism of Jerusalem and are at the forefront of the conflict because what is at stake is the building of national identity, not the practice of religion. National identity is

constructed by appealing to people's belief systems to decide who is on whose side. Religious beliefs then become boundaries to construct national identity around.

The Palestinians draw their holy sites into calls of support for the national cause, in this case the struggle to protect Orient House. By equating the struggle at Orient House with the struggle for sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian holy sites, Palestinian leaders are asking Palestinians to include Orient House as a sacred space. Places such as Orient House become important to social groups through practices that attach culturally intelligible meaning to specific sites. The implication of linking religious sites to Orient House is to make Orient House into a national symbol because these holy sites play a important role in Palestinian national identity. Moreover, Orient House becomes a place where national identity not only is shaped, but also contested. For example, a statement issued by Orient House officials against Israeli attempts to close it down stated: "In our defence of the Orient House today, we are fighting the Jerusalem battle - the battle for Al-Aqsa and the Holy Sepulchre. No matter what the cost will be, Jerusalem will remain a proud Palestinian Arab city" (Voice of Palestine 1999).[11] Similarly, a leader of Fatah declared: "For Palestinians there are two important addresses in Jerusalem. Al Aqsa mosque, for religious reasons, and Orient House, for political reasons" (as quoted in Lahoud, JP, July 1 1994). Palestinians also imbue religious spaces with national meaning and claim them as national territory. For example, Arafat reportedly stated in a speech that the PLO's goal is to establish Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state, and "to plant the Palestinian flag on the minarets and churches of Jerusalem" (as quoted in JP, Aug. 15 1995). Claiming religious sites with national symbols, such as the flag, is a strategy to demarcate the boundaries of Palestinian national identity.

For Israelis, specific religious sites are also important in national identity. In particular, the Temple Mount, the *Haram al-Sharif* to the Palestinians, is a focal point of the loss of sovereignty in Jerusalem (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of the importance of

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[11] Note that this statement was issued on May 6, 1999, and is therefore outside of the data set. I included it here because of how strongly it expresses this point. Several times, instances of religious discourse are used together with militarist discourse to evoke a sense of winners and losers in the religious/national contest. See the next section, Militarism, for more on the implications of military language and imagery.

these sites in Jerusalem). Protests and demonstrations at Orient House sometimes centred on regaining the Temple Mount or claiming it as Israeli territory. Different Israeli groups held protest marches where the march would be from Orient House to the Temple Mount or vice versa. For example, an extremist group, the Temple Mount Faithful, conducted marches demonstrating how they viewed the encroachment of Palestinian national activity in Jerusalem through Orient House as a direct threat to their religious sites, and thus to Israeli sovereignty (Hutman, JP, Dec. 6 1994). The threat of the controversy and protests at Orient House spilling over to religious sites concerned Israelis. The Israeli government recognized that a struggle for Jerusalem with religion and political sovereignty intertwined holds much more significance. Reporting on an interview with David Bar-Ilan, Netanyahu's media and policy advisor, IDF Radio political correspondent Udi Segal asserted:

> The battle for Jerusalem starts on Temple Mount, the most problematic site in the city.... If Orient House represents the struggle over political sovereignty, then Temple Mount may symbolize the beginning of an even fiercer battle, with dangerously religious characteristics. (IDF, July 12 1996a)

By infusing forms of national identity with religious symbols, religion is playing a role in the determination of the geopolitics of Jerusalem. That is, using religion to forward national aspirations has an effect on the boundaries of the city by pushing the importance of sovereignty. That religion has been brought into nationalist arguments raises the stakes of the national cause on both sides and raises the importance of Jerusalem in the overall conflict. The result is to make the possibility of resolving sovereignty issues in Jerusalem through the peace process more contentious and difficult. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that nationalism, in other contexts, can draw on other arguments, such as race or language, and that religion does not necessarily have to be linked to national identity in every situation. The reason they are linked here is because of the specificity of this place. At the root of the conflict over Jerusalem lies the deep emotional attachment each community has to the material site of its homeland.

C) MILITARISM

Both Israelis and Palestinians use militarized language and imagery in their descriptions and discussions about the controversy at Orient House. Militarism distinguishes between aggressors and defenders, peace and war, victors and vanquished as a way to reinforce who wins and who loses. The implication, of course, being that the winner is legitimate and their claims to territory and sovereignty are justified. But, militarism is about more than militaries; it is about a set of beliefs and structures that becomes entrenched in society (Enloe 1993:246). Militarist language divides people into neatly defined groups by designating "us" as winners and "them" as losers, conflating "us" with concepts such as peace, and constructing ideas of legitimacy. All of which draw boundaries that shape national identity. The implications of militarism for national identity is to transform the places and boundaries that construct it. In this section, I explore two ramifications of militarism. First, labeling the "other" with specifically defined characteristics, such as the Israelis as aggressors against peace or Palestinians as terrorists, also imposes certain requirements on "us" with implications for national identity. And second, militarizing national identity also genders national identity because masculinity is a privileged component of militarism (Yuval-Davis 1997; Enloe 1993).

Geopolitical practices and discourses around the dispute at Orient House define Jerusalem, literally and figuratively, as a battlefield, assigning one side as the victor, the other, vanquished. Palestinians engaged language that categorized the territorial struggles in Jerusalem as a military contest by coding elements of national identity with military terms. As one Palestinian broadcast announced: "the banner of war over Jerusalem has been raised. Orient House has become the target of attack" (VP, Nov. 8 1994). Similarly, a 1994 PNA statement claimed: "Orient House has been the centre of the offensive" and that "infringing upon Orient House means infringing upon peace" (as reported in Israel TV1, Nov. 8 1994). Israelis use similar language, referring to the "battle over the status of Jerusalem" (VI, July 12 1994) and that "Orient House is merely the symbol of this battle" (IDF, July 12 1996a). Defining the controversy at Orient House as a battlefield where the status of Jerusalem is determined impacts on Israelis and Palestinians involved in this struggle because their national identities are shaped in part by Jerusalem. These statements define Orient House as a critical site in the struggle to

claim this space and therefore alters the meaning of Orient House. When Israelis recognize Orient House as the symbol for the battle of Jerusalem, it becomes an important site for Palestinians to express their national identity.

These depictions of the struggles at Orient House and in Jerusalem occurred together with specific connotations of Palestinians and Israelis. Edward Said and others have written about the ways that geopolitical discourse constructs "Palestinian" to be associated more with "terrorist" than "refugee" or "dispossessed" (Fisk 1990; Said 1979, 1992; Sidaway 1994). Similarly, militarist language reinforces perceptions in Israeli society of Palestinians as terrorists instead of an image of Palestinians as legitimate peace partners. Israeli national identity gains strength by enslaving Palestinians as terrorists because, as Sidaway (1994:364) states, "policy acquires authority and legitimacy when it is justified as a response to terrorism; whatever the wider (strategic and political) motivations and whatever the consequences." Questioning the legitimacy of the Palestinians bolsters Israel as the legitimate nation. Militarized language draws boundaries by reinforcing the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate activities in Jerusalem.

Israeli government officials and the Israeli media describe the nature of the struggle over Orient House through language that alludes to terrorist goals. Orient House is called the centre of terrorism (as mentioned above when the CJC accused the Israeli government of allowing a "terror headquarters" in Jerusalem) and described in military terms:

> [The PLO] has also given Orient House the aura of an armed-forces headquarters, by decorating it with military paraphernalia and posting its own security men around the building. When the newly recruited Palestine Police officers arrived in town, the PLO used the place for a military reception for them. (JP, Feb. 23 1994)

The media sought to remind the Israeli population that despite the peace process, Palestinians are still terrorists by reproducing the militant origins of the PLO and the *Intifada*. Similarly, during the Knesset debates over the Oslo Interim agreement, Netanyahu, as chair of the official opposition, stated "Gaza and Jericho have become just what we believed they would – safe havens for terrorists" (VI, Oct. 5 1995). Again, after

a Knesset Interior Committee meeting visited Orient House to assess PNA activities in Jerusalem, Moledet MK Benny Elon echoed this view by shouting to Orient House officials "you are terrorists" (as quoted in Heilman, JP, Mar. 11 1997). These images portray Palestinians as terrorists, thus delegitimizing Palestinians as legitimate partners in the peace process in the eyes of Israeli society. Naming all Palestinians as terrorists wipes away their other identities and their potential for legitimate national claims. Another dimension to coding Palestinians as terrorists is that this code is gendered. Of course it is assumed that the security personnel will be men, along with the "Palestine Police officers". While the implication here is that all Palestinians are terrorists, it is also implied that all terrorists are men, thus erasing Palestinian women.

The Palestinians used Orient House's role in the peace process to reinforce Israel as aggressors and Palestinians as the defenders of peace. Orient House is posited as the "target of attack" precisely because it symbolizes peace and the peace process for the Palestinians. Once the Oslo Accords were signed and Orient House came under attack, the Palestinians adopted Orient House as a symbol of peace. As a political commentary piece on the *Voice of Palestine* stated,

> Orient House has become the target of attack despite the fact that this house is the ***house of peace***. It was the headquarters of the Palestinian negotiating team before the Oslo agreement. From that house, peace calls and initiatives were made, as Faisal Husseini has said. Therefore, it is a real ***house of peace*** in the eyes of the world, in the eyes of the Palestinian people and in the eyes of several quarters among the Israelis.... closing the ***house of peace*** will indicate to the Palestinians and the Arabs that peace is collapsing. (my emphasis, VP, Nov. 8 1994)

This statement signifies Orient House, and by association the Palestinians, as part of the peace process, therefore implying that Israelis are aggressors against the peace process. Designating Orient House as the house of peace creates a boundary between Palestinians as peaceful and Israelis as against peace. For example, Faisal Husseini reiterated Orient House as a key to the peace process when he declared "closing Orient House means closing the negotiations" (as quoted in Hutman, JP, June 12 1996). But this gives Israelis sole responsibility for the continuation of the peace process and possibilities for peace. By assigning responsibility the Palestinians are also giving power to Israel's position in the peace process. While the image of Palestinians as defenders of peace who are not

responsible for the current state of the peace process benefits Palestinian national identity, the status of Palestinians within the peace negotiations may not benefit because it confirms Palestinians' powerless to effect change in the peace negotiations.

III. SUMMARY

In this chapter, I identified, through a close reading of the data set, the strategies Israelis and Palestinians employed for boundary drawing and identity formation at a specific site in Jerusalem, Orient House. By analyzing activities in both material and discursive practices, I investigated three major themes in this process that correspond to the three key concepts – boundaries, identity, and place – outlined in my theoretical framework in Chapter 2. First, national groups claim authority over territory through drawing boundaries that seek to specify the legitimacy of their national aspirations versus other, illegitimate ones. This distinction between legitimate/illegitimate is at the core of other oppositions exploited in defining national identity. The substitution of one set of oppositions with another, in this case with legitimate/illegitimate, in order to conflate legitimate with a particular national identity is part of the process of naturalizing these concepts (Doty 1996:10). I argue that these boundaries work together toward designating the limits of a legitimate national identity. Second, the articulation of a particular national identity involves activities that are both material and discursive. Specifying national identity occurs through the actions and events that negotiate, in both formal and informal sites, the spatiality of that identity. Likewise, these material acts are linked to the discourses that constitute that identity: dominant discourses are reproduced through linguistic practices. And third, the practices that shape national identity do not occur detached from the spatiality of that identity and space is a key component in constituting identity. National groups draw on shared cultural experiences and meanings to make specific places into symbols of nationalism. Yet, national identity is always partial and never completely fixed. In defining spaces of legitimacy, there are also acts of resistance seeking to reterritorialize spaces with other identities.

By using specific examples of the controversy at Orient House, I showed the strategies involved in constituting national identity and how national groups utilize these strategies. In the next chapter, I explore the interaction of these themes and investigate

the implications of these geopolitical practices for Orient House, Jerusalem, and Palestinian national identity.

CHAPTER 7

TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS OF JERUSALEM

In this chapter, I discuss the usefulness of critical geopolitics as an approach to studying national identity formation through boundary demarcation in Jerusalem. In the first section, I reflect on geopolitical practices at Orient House. Following this discussion, I conclude the study as a whole by first reflecting on my research process and second suggesting future directions for research.

I. UNDERSTANDING GEOPOLITICAL PRACTICES AT ORIENT HOUSE

Critical geopolitics provides an approach to analyzing the practices involved in specifying national identity by disrupting conventional notions of territory, the state, boundaries, and others, as essential, static, and knowable realities. Engaging in critical geopolitics requires a rethinking of these practices through a "multiplicity of perspectives" (Ó Tuathaíl and Dalby 1998:7). Within this perspective, Jerusalem can be understood not only as a city contested by two national groups, but also as a signifier of the struggle to define each of those nations and as a space, transformed by these struggles, where each site links to this struggle. Israelis and Palestinians, through various activities, draw boundaries as a strategy to legitimate their territorial claims.

In this section, I draw together the material and discursive activities that comprise the controversy over Orient House to discuss how geopolitical practices work together to constitute and contest Palestinian national identity. I want to make three interrelated points about the strategies I discussed in the previous chapter. First, while I intentionally distinguished between concrete actions and language to tease out themes that are important in the process of specifying national identity, these actions do not occur in isolation. Second, boundary drawing and identity formation are recursive and constitutive processes that occur in specific places. These practices transform places such as Orient House into sites of struggle for a legitimate national identity. Third, the transformations that occur have repercussions beyond the scope of the original process.

A) INTERRELATED PRACTICES

I intentionally separated the notion of materiality from discourse, as well as formal from informal sites, to make specific analytical points about geopolitical practices; however, I want to reiterate that I do not understand these types of geopolitical practices as taking place separately from each other. Nor do I think they are isolated from other processes. This is one of critical geopolitics' main arguments: there is a recursive relationship between the material and the discursive; discourses do not operate separately from the material world. Reinforcing Mouffe's (1995) discussion of identity, we need to examine both discourses that define identity and the materiality of the practices that define identity. Just as the events and actions surrounding the controversy at Orient House all occurred within a discursive context, that is, media reports, so did processes and events outside of my analytical examples affect the role of Orient House for Israelis and Palestinians. For example, the Israeli elections in 1996 altered the direction of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, impacting on both the activities at Orient House and the perceptions of these activities.

The change in the Israeli government emerged as a significant point in my analysis because it marked a change in state policy toward Orient House between Rabin's government and Netanyahu's. Reflecting on the Oslo process, Bishara (1998) notes that the change of government as a result of these elections brought to light significant problems with the Oslo Accords, such as the fundamental imbalance of power and inequality in the commitments made in the DOP. The Palestinians recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist, while the Israelis only acknowledged the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and made no recognition of Palestinian national aspirations. These inequalities came to the forefront when Likud took power and was bound only to the text of the agreement and not to the spirit in which the Oslo Accords were negotiated. A profound loss of faith in the process on both sides stalled the peace talks. In terms of Orient House, the stalled peace process turned media attention away from Palestinian activities in Jerusalem. The international community, not wanting to further jeopardize the peace talks, visited Orient House less because of pressure from the Netanyahu government. Reduced attention on Orient House also resulted in less protests. As the peace negotiations broke down under the Netanyahu government, Palestinian

strategies shifted increasingly from emphasizing their rights under the Oslo Accords to operate at Orient House and in Jerusalem to an emphasis on their historical, cultural, and political presence in the city. Palestinians fought to defend Orient House because of Orient House's role as a symbol of Palestinian national identity. The changes in the strategies of Israelis in many ways made Orient House a more important site for Palestinians.

B) GEOPOLITICS AS A TRANSFORMATIVE PROCESS

These interrelated geopolitical practices do not just create, define, and negotiate boundaries, identities, and places, they transform them. At first, this may seem intuitive: social groups draw boundaries with the goal of altering a specific space to their advantage. Yet, while different actors use various strategies to demarcate boundaries and transform spaces, these changes are partial, contextual, and often contested. Boundaries serve specific purposes, however, they are constructed in partial and fractured ways because attempts to stabilize meaning are never totally successful. These inconsistencies are used by social groups to serve political purposes or as spaces for resistance. Identity is negotiated through boundary demarcation in these partial, fractured spaces and the impact of this negotiation is to transform identity and the material sites that constitute it.

The ongoing actions of the Rabin and Netanyahu governments' toward Orient House is a good example of these transformations. Despite Israel's obvious advantage over activities in the city and in spite of constant declarations that they would close Orient House, neither Rabin's nor Netanyahu's actions resulted in a complete closure of the building or the termination of Palestinian activities in Jerusalem. Neither Rabin nor Netanyahu closed Orient House in part because they both needed Orient House as a symbol of their commitment to the peace process and as a symbol of Israeli sovereignty in East Jerusalem. If the Israeli government can control activities at Orient House, then they can maintain sovereignty. But, the Palestinians used this to their advantage to give Orient House, and therefore Palestinian national claims in East Jerusalem, an increased profile.

Rabin in particular was highly committed to the continuation of the peace process. The Rabin administration's strong motivation to keep pace with the agreement negotiated led the government to concentrate on appearing to take a hard stance on Orient House, while allowing Orient House to continue its activities relatively unharmed. The Rabin administration clearly had reasons for allowing the meetings to continue despite public pressure to stop them. This pressure led Rabin to employ various strategies to appear as if he was taking a strong stance on Orient House. However, while there were several public statements that the government would not tolerate political meetings, and many attempts made to curb activity, the meetings continued at various rates through the Oslo Accords period. These meetings became an increasingly important way for the Palestinians to exert their identity in Jerusalem. As the Israeli government and the Palestinians struggle to exert sovereignty over Orient House, this negotiation transformed Orient House into a site where expressions of Palestinian national identity emerged. This also happened under the Netanyahu government. During both the 1996 and 1999 election campaigns, Netanyahu made promises to close Orient House and to stop Palestinian national activities in Jerusalem. Yet, during Netanyahu's term in office, he did not follow through on these commitments. As Prime Minister, Netanyahu was successful in preventing the volume of meetings that occurred under the Rabin administration and in closing several PNA offices in the city. However, despite election promises, he did not close Orient House.

As a result of these tactics by Rabin and Netanyahu, Orient House became a site of victory for the Palestinians. Each struggle to close the building, while never successful, impacted on Palestinian perceptions of Orient House: if Orient House is important for Israelis to contain, then it is just as necessary for Palestinians to fight for it. While the Israeli government used Orient House to portray a message of sovereignty in Jerusalem to the Israeli public, the outcome of their actions was to help Orient House become a symbol for Palestinian national identity in East Jerusalem. In this way, each action by Israelis, each boundary drawn to claim territory, had implications for the construction of Orient House as a symbol for Palestinian national identity. The struggle to control Orient House transformed it into a place imbued with meaning for the Palestinians.

C) IMPLICATIONS BEYOND ORIENT HOUSE

The transformation of a place such as Orient House into a politically and symbolically important site to Palestinian national identity and a signifier of Palestinian rights in Jerusalem has significant repercussions beyond the original scope of the controversy over Orient House. While the negotiation of boundaries at Orient House is an ongoing struggle in East Jerusalem, the transformation of Orient House into a symbol of Palestinian national identity has impacted on other aspects of the peace process. For example, the increasing confidence of the expression of national identity in Jerusalem has led to a change in strategy by the Palestinian leadership in the peace process negotiations. The diminishing willingness of Arafat and the PNA to accept less than their demands at the beginning of the Oslo process shows a transformation and increasing strength in Palestinian national identity. This is not to say that the Palestinians will be successful, nor am I attempting to predict the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, but simply to acknowledge that Orient House played a role in reshaping Palestinian national identity. Orient House has come to represent a different Palestinian national identity than the one that existed in 1993. In addition, other aspects of the peace process have had an impact on Orient House and its role in shaping Palestinian national identity, thereby transforming the meaning of Orient House. For example, the tension between Yasir Arafat and Faisal Husseini that emerged when Arafat returned to Gaza in 1994 shifted the collective importance of Orient House and Jerusalem for a Palestinian national identity. The tensions that arise in geopolitical practices impact on Palestinian national identity because it is fluid, fragmented, and continually being reshaped. In a wider sense, this tension also exists between the PLO members who returned from exile, or the "old guard" of the Palestinian leadership, and the Palestinian officials who remained in the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli occupation. These tensions reflect different conceptions of Palestinian national identity. In part, the younger generation of Palestinian leaders, such as Husseini, have increasingly inserted Jerusalem in the agenda of the peace process, through Orient House.

It appears that since mid-1999, Arafat has become more forceful in pushing Jerusalem as a critical part of the final peace agreements and he has been unwilling to accept Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's offers on Jerusalem or West Bank territorial

arrangements to date (as of August 2000). Speculation on the current negotiations suggest that it is possible that Arafat views Jerusalem as the ultimate bargaining chip in the peace talks and is probably willing to accept less than he lets on. However, despite Arafat and the PNA's position on Jerusalem and the state of the peace negotiations to date, I suggest that the Palestinian leadership is responding in some way to an increasing demand by Palestinians to keep Jerusalem as the centre of their nation. The rhetoric around Jerusalem and issues such as Orient House has had an impact on Palestinian society and Palestinian national identity. I do not want to suggest that Jerusalem is *more* important now than it was before the Oslo Accords, rather Jerusalem's importance is different *because* of the events during the Oslo years.

For example, in an unprecedented move in May 2000, Barak transferred power over three significant neighbourhoods adjacent to the Israeli borders of Jerusalem to the PNA (Gilbert, Harris, and Harman 2000). These neighbourhoods, Abu-Dis, Azariyya, and Suwahra, were originally left outside the Jerusalem municipal borders because they have a large Palestinian population. During the initial division of territory in the Oslo interim agreement, these neighbourhoods were kept under Israeli military control (Area B) because Israelis did not want the PNA to have jurisdiction over territory directly bordering Israel (see Map 5.4). This recent transfer, in particular Abu Dis, is extremely significant for the Palestinians because of the location of the new Palestinian parliament on the border of Jerusalem and Abu Dis, as defined by Israel. In fact, the parliament building straddles the border so that the President's office is "officially" inside Jerusalem and, more importantly, so the building is exactly the same distance from the Dome of the Rock as the Israeli Knesset. Barak transferred the territory to the PNA (Area A) as a gesture of his commitment to continue the peace process. The PNA responded that this step was only the beginning and was not a significant move toward resolving the Jerusalem issue. The Palestinians warned that the gesture was more likely a move by Barak to garner international support.

D) A CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS FOR JERUSALEM?

Examining the conflict over the city of Jerusalem between Israelis and Palestinians using a framework of critical geopolitics permits a deeper understanding of

processes that are involved in shaping, signifying, and changing national identity. By focusing on very specific locations within the state, and even within an urban area as with Orient House, critical geopolitics can explore the forgotten spaces of geopolitics. In order to begin to understand the complexity of interactions within Jerusalem and the impact of geopolitical practices on both the city and its people, it is necessary to approach the research from a perspective that allows for investigation at scales other than the state, into areas other than the formal sites of geopolitics, and examines geopolitical practices as dynamic and changing, shifting from place to place. A critical geopolitical perspective on Jerusalem opens up the possibility of research into the experiences of the marginalized and oppressed members of both Israeli and Palestinian society, the various processes that create these experiences, the spaces where these oppressions occur, and the spaces of resistance. It also allows for an opportunity to juxtapose the geopolitics of the state with the geopolitics of two conflicting nations, representing the everyday residents of the city and those for whom it is a national or socio-cultural centre. By juxtaposing these views, I think we gain a richer perspective into the significance of "Jerusalem," both its physical sites and its discursive meanings. In addition, struggles in Jerusalem symbolize the struggles between Israelis and Palestinians in other areas. A critical geopolitics provides a way to understand how this process of symbolization occurs and why it is important within the context of Israeli-Palestinian relations. As Hyndman (2000:3) reminds us, the key question of critical geopolitics is why and how a particular configuration of geopolitics is normalized and accepted.

II. Reflections on the Research Project

A) THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

In this thesis, I presented an example of how boundaries get constructed and contested as a crucial element in the formation of national identity. I argue that this process takes place in material and discursive ways that can be understood by examining specific, concrete activities that occur in particular places. In addition, I argue that national groups draw on culturally intelligible constructions of the nation to imbue spaces with meaning in an effort to continually reinforce the legitimacy of their own identity,

while at the same time de-legitimizing an "other" identity. My focus is on strategies actors engage in, that is how particular material and discursive activities constitute geopolitical practices that draw boundaries and recursively constitute national identity. After discussing a critical geopolitical approach for Jerusalem and the interrelationship of the geopolitical practices I chose to analyze in this project, I turn my attention to the challenges I faced in the research process and, as a result, to the aspects I did not examine in this thesis.

Throughout my research process, I was intrigued by the theory of critical geopolitics and also by the specific story of Orient House. My challenge, then, was to do justice to both the theoretical framework and the specificity of Jerusalem. I often struggled with the tension between the general and the specific. I was always aware of the partiality of research, and I felt sometimes that in exploring these interesting theoretical questions, I lost some of the specificity of the story of Orient House, which I had come to find quite interesting. Because critical geopolitics is a relatively new area and because Orient House has not been explored in academia that much, I could not just use one as a springboard to explore the other. My research process was a constant balancing act to explore the theory but at the same time to assert the specificity of these people, in this place, at this time. In addition, this tension in the research process also occurred between the data set and the sources of that data set. While I used the media as data, I did not specifically investigate media discourses. This tension created another struggle in the research process because my understanding of geopolitical practices and of Palestinian national identity was being filtered through multiple layers of representation.

Negotiating these tensions in the research process mean that I focused on certain areas more than others in the course of my research. For example, while my methodological approach is shaped by feminism, I did not engage in a feminist analysis, nor is gender a major category of analysis in this project. In addition, feminism has a strong praxis, or action, component. While I acknowledge the importance of praxis, or as Hyndman (2000) terms it, the reconstructive commitment of feminism, I also acknowledge that I do not have an action component to this project. Similarly, while I used the media as my source for data to illustrate my argument, I did not explicitly

prioritize the role of the media in shaping geopolitics or specifically engage in an analysis of the gendering of the media.

This study also only looks partially at Palestinian national identity because it examines only an urban site, Orient House, and a political system dominated by educated, upper-class men. It is important to note that while part of this project looks at informal sites of struggle over national identity, my focus is on sites that are in the public, elite, and masculine domain. The constraints of my choice of data make some informal sites inaccessible. For example, mainstream media sources that I had access to are masculinized sites of knowledge (Sharp 1994). My analysis fails to investigate, for example, the public/private divide in national identity or specifically address rural communities. While the popular media does translate geopolitics and national identity to the general population, the private sphere is largely not reported on by the media. My choice of research site, Orient House, and my theoretical framework limited my analysis to sites of "high" politics. This is one of the reasons I did not engage a feminist analysis. A feminist geopolitical approach would enter the research process from a different place by interrogating masculine sites of knowledge and examining "low" politics. Had I talked with Palestinian women or read their diaries, I would have written a different thesis. Women's lifeworlds, excluded in my analysis, would have transformed my way of thinking about Orient House, the Oslo Accords, and Jerusalem in a way that was different than the transformation I underwent through this research project. In addition, in some ways, until recently, the literature on feminist geopolitics has been "invisible": I simply did not have a body of literature on feminist geopolitics to draw on when I started this project. Much of the work I attempted to integrate in my framework became accessible or known to me only after I established my theoretical framework and completed parts of the analysis. If I began the project now, I would centre my research in the literature on feminist geopolitics and on gender and nationalism.

Despite these shortcomings, I maintain that this thesis works toward a critical, feminist geopolitics. Critical geopolitics is a useful approach because it seeks to problematize the practices and discourses of nations and states that attempt to naturalize and legitimate a particular geopolitical narrative and highlights the plays of power in these practices. Feminist geopolitics takes this approach and particularly strives to move

away from the analysis of the geopolitics of the state and toward a geopolitics of the person. While my research focuses on the nation, I have attempted to work out how specific spaces that are important to national groups become signified, in different and changing ways, with the identity of that group of people.

B) ORIENT HOUSE AS A RESEARCH SITE

Even though I see now a great value in this site as an entry point into the research project, it was not my original entry point. My interest in the changing nature of boundaries began the long process toward this thesis. Initially in my investigation into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with special attention to boundary issues, I maintained that I was interested in the interaction between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem. While this is still true, as I came toward the end of the research, I had to acknowledge that my interest is primarily in the Palestinian experience and therefore this thesis centres on Palestinian national identity. My nagging yet unacknowledged feelings of wanting to examine Palestinian national identity influenced some choices about data and analysis in the research. In particular, I collected both Israeli and Palestinian sources because I wanted to examine the struggle between two national identities – instead of examining more closely expressions of one over the other.

At the outset of this research project, I considered including other sites or events in Jerusalem along with Orient House to contrast geopolitical narratives. Specifically, I included *Har Homa/Jabel Abu Ghneim*, the forested hill turned Israeli settlement at the southern edge of Jerusalem that caused significant controversy in 1996, and the opening of the second entrance to the Hasmonean Tunnel by Israel, also in 1996, that resulted in violent protest among Israelis and Palestinians. Each of these sites and the controversy that erupted as a result of particular actions would have made excellent research cases because they are subject to the same geopolitical practices that I have investigated in this thesis. However, while I may not have realized it at the outset of this project, Orient House proved to be an excellent site to examine the interplay between boundaries and national identity in Jerusalem. I was able to gain more than just a glimpse of one moment in the development of Palestinian national identity. In particular, the nuances of the conflict at Orient House over the six year period I studied provided an opportunity to

examine in-depth how Palestinian national identity shifted and changed in order to incorporate Orient House because of the controversy.

Although useful in looking at Orient House, my theoretical framework is not solely rooted here. It could also be applied to other places in Israel or the Occupied Territories; for example, I could examine the Green Line or issues of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. There are also many places around the world where questions of boundaries and national identity are currently being negotiated that would lend themselves to this critical geopolitics approach, such as Ireland and northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, North and South Korea, or, within Canada, in Quebec.

However, in some ways, this framework is unique to the study of Orient House and it cannot be separated from it. I developed it through the exploration of Jerusalem and Orient House and the specificity of that place shaped how critical geopolitics as a theory was applied in my study. The framework of examining national identity, as opposed to exploring other identities, and using the notion of place together with boundaries developed as I learned more about Orient House.

III. Future Directions

Much recent geopolitics research stresses that critical geopolitics is not a fixed and finished project; it is a multiplicity of research paths rather than a set field of research. This is also true of research into Jerusalem and Palestinian national identity. Jerusalem is a complex terrain and there are many other contours to be explored. While there has already been an almost unending amount of research on Jerusalem, part of the challenge is finding research that moves beyond a propagandist perspective and to address the relevant questions. In terms of new areas for research, I suggest four possible avenues ranging from specifics on Orient House to more general questions of theoretical and methodological approaches.

First, in terms of research dealing directly with Orient House, there is much to be explored. For instance, areas that I did not touch on include the conflict between Faisal Husseini and Yasir Arafat, and more generally the conflict between the "old guard" of the Palestinian leadership, those involved with the PLO in exile, and the new, younger

generation of Palestinian leaders, including people from East Jerusalem such as Husseini. Significant divisions exist between Palestinians over the character of leadership and these divisions pose a challenge for Palestinians in the current negotiations and beyond. Many of the new generation are increasingly frustrated with the PNA as issues such as corruption and human rights violations became major causes for concern.

Second, sites such as Orient House need to be investigated using other methods of data collection to gain a better understanding of the links between material sites and Palestinian national identity. In particular, a study of Orient House would be greatly enhanced through interviews with Palestinians about symbols of national identity or their experiences of nationalism at sites in and around Jerusalem including Orient House. Also, more in-depth information about Orient House, today and historically, through interviews with the staff and the Palestinian leadership, including Faisal Husseini, would add depth to the research. In addition, an archival search for information on the Husseini family and Orient House would bring a deeper understanding of the historical importance of this site in Jerusalem.

Third, research on Palestinian national identity also needs to examine other sites where identity is constituted and contested. In particular, spaces less obvious as sites of struggle over identity, such as rural and private spaces, need to be interrogated. Also, in order to understand the contrasting narratives and experiences of Palestinian national identity, studies need to focus on the less public members of society, such as women, lower-classes, and refugees. In terms of studying boundaries in Palestinian society, there are many areas that need to be examined, such as economic issues of working in Israel and crossing borders, social issues such as marriage between Palestinians from Jerusalem and the West Bank or Gaza, cultural changes in Jerusalem because of the separation of the city from the West Bank. These are all boundaries that are affecting Palestinian national identity.

Fourth, linked to the issues of the people and boundaries that affect and constitute national identity, is a need to increasingly incorporate feminist and critical approaches to research (see for example Mayer 1994b and Sharabi 1990). In addition, there is a need to explore ways of moving toward a feminist geopolitics. By approaching research with

more subjective and open processes, researchers can study the various experiences of geopolitical practices, such as boundary drawing and identity formation. Each of the sites of national identity mentioned above are experienced in different ways by different people. By studying these experiences, a richer sense of the processes through which boundaries get drawn and national identity is constituted will emerge.

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II. DATA SET REFERENCES

A) BBC MONITORING REFERENCES

Translations into English provided through BBC Monitoring. An inconsistency exists in the reference information for BBC Monitoring sources due to the combination of Lexis-Nexis and Global NewsBank for obtaining electronic copies of BBC Monitoring sources. While Lexis-Nexis provided information on the language and the time of the broadcast, Global NewsBank only provided the regional section of the broadcast.

1. 'Al-Ayyam

'Al-Ayyam. December 24, 1997. Palestinian official says Israel continuing to revoke Jerusalem IDs. Ramallah, in Arabic.

'Al-Ayyam. May 15, 1998. Palestinian Islamic bodies blame Israeli police for Al-Aqsa Mosque gate attack. Ramallah, in Arabic.

'Al-Ayyam. April 26, 1999. Palestinian official warns against consequences of Orient House closure. Ramallah, Middle East Section, in Arabic.

'Al-Ayyam. May 5, 1999. PLO's Mahmud Abbas sends message of support from hospital. Ramallah, in Arabic.

2. Al-Quds

Al-Quds. August 7, 1996. Interview with Netanyahu on settlements. Jerusalem, Middle East Section, in Arabic.

Al-Quds. September 9, 1996. Arafat's adviser praises EU policy on visits to Orient House. Jerusalem, Middle East Section, in Arabic.

3. Arutz 7 web site

Arutz 7 web site. January 14, 1999. Sharon reportedly warns Palestinians to stop Orient House meetings. Middle East Section, in English.

Arutz 7 radio web site. March 30, 1999. Israel: Arutz 7 interviews Netanyahu on Kosovo, PNA, elections. Middle East Section, in Hebrew.

4. Davar Rishon

Davar Rishon. January 3, 1996. Israel to use police to stop foreign visits to Orient House; UK minister warned. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew.

5. Ha'aretz

Ha'aretz. August 14, 1996. Israeli PM says closure of PNA Jerusalem offices condition for redeployment. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew.

Ha'aretz. October 7, 1996. US, EU role in talks raised by Israel in meetings with Christopher, Spring. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew.

Ha'aretz. December 9, 1996a. Cypriot foreign minister holds talks with Israeli PM, avoids Orient House. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew.

Ha'aretz. December 9, 1996b. Foreign minister meets Israeli premier. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew.

Ha'aretz. March 6, 1997. Israeli paper reports names of four Palestinian offices ordered to close. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew.

Ha'aretz. June 3, 1997. East Jerusalem sources deny PNA ordered building without permits. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew.

6. Hatzofe

Hatzofe. April 25, 1999. Israeli paper reports Palestinian leadership divisions. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew.

7. IDF Radio

IDF Radio. July 18, 1994a. Ashrawi reacts to Israeli ban on political activity. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1300 gmt.

IDF Radio. July 18, 1994b. Israeli justice minister discusses decision banning Palestinian political activity. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1400 gmt.

IDF Radio. August 11, 1994a. Husayni says Orient House meetings to go on; Peres says legality being checked (a). Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1400 gmt.

IDF Radio. August 11, 1994b. Husayni says Orient House meetings to go on; Peres says legality being checked (b). Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1400 gmt.

IDF Radio. November 7, 1994. Knesset approves bill on implementation of Oslo accord at first reading. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

IDF Radio. December 26, 1994. Knesset passes bill restricting PNA activity in Jerusalem. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

IDF Radio. March 6, 1995. Russian parliamentarian allowed, after protest, to tour East Jerusalem unescorted. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1100 gmt.

IDF Radio. May 22, 1995. Suspension of land expropriations: Rabin holds news conference on land expropriation decision. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

IDF Radio. June 22, 1995. Fatah warns Intifadah could resume if prisoners are not freed. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1400 gmt.

IDF Radio. August 14, 1995. Arafat adviser says Orient House closure would prompt bloodshed, end of talks. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1400 gmt.

IDF Radio. August 28, 1995a. Closure of Palestinian offices in Jerusalem: Husayni and Tibi say closure of Jerusalem offices violates Oslo accord. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 0400 gmt.

IDF Radio. August 28, 1995b. Closure of Palestinian offices in Jerusalem: Peres says closure applies to offices established after Oslo accord. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 0400 gmt.

IDF Radio. November 15, 1995. Palestinian National Authority cancels Independence Day reception at Orient House. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 0500 gmt.

IDF Radio. July 12, 1996a. Netanyahu demands closure of PNA offices in Jerusalem. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 0400 gmt.

IDF Radio. July 12, 1996b. Palestinian official Husayni comments on closing of Jerusalem institutions. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 0400 gmt.

IDF Radio. December 4, 1996. Israeli PM in Ireland, comments on Hebron, Jerusalem, permanent arrangement. Tel Aviv, Middle East Section.

IDF Radio. August 19, 1997. Palestinian authorities put up tents in Jerusalem in protest at demolitions. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1000 gmt.

IDF Radio. March 16, 1998. Israel: Nave says "interfering" European policy not balanced. Tel Aviv, Middle East Section.

IDF Radio. March 25, 1998a. Israel: Cabinet Secretary Nave interviewed on Annan's visit, further redeployment. Tel Aviv, Middle East Section.

IDF Radio. March 25, 1998b. Mideast: Annan's plan to meet Faysal al-Husayni "angered" Foreign Ministry officials. Tel Aviv, Middle East Section.

IDF Radio. July 13, 1998. PNA's Faysal al-Husayni says Jewish "extremists" behind explosion. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 0700 gmt.

IDF Radio. February 16, 1999. Israel: Security official reports fall in "terrorist" attack casualties in 1998. Tel Aviv, Middle East Section.

IDF Radio. March 11, 1999. Israel, EU negotiate deal to end Jerusalem status debate. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

8. Israel TV Channel 1

Israel TV Channel 1. August 10, 1994. Illegal interrogations and activities reported at PLO's East Jerusalem headquarters. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. November 7, 1994. Peres discusses talks with Syria, Arafat, status of Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1800 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. November 8, 1994. PNA spokesman issues statement on Orient House. Jerusalem, in Arabic 1700 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. November 10, 1994. Peres interviewed on relations with Jordan, Jerusalem, Arafat and Hamas. Jerusalem, in Arabic 1630 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. November 17, 1994. Orient House denies link with Palestinian security service alleged by Israel. Jerusalem, in Arabic 1700 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. December 12, 1994. Orient House condemns expulsion of Palestinians from Libya. Jerusalem, in Arabic 1700 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. June 12, 1995. Husayni: PNA to re-establish East Jerusalem Council. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. June 25, 1995. Faysal al-Husayni says Olmert's remarks on Orient House weaken peace process. Jerusalem, in Arabic 1600 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. July 26, 1995. Police arrest three suspects for shooting at Husayni's home. Jerusalem, in Arabic 1600 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. September 10, 1995. Spanish prime minister holds talks with Peres, "will not visit Orient House". Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. January 17, 1996. Dutch minister says Orient House meeting was "very fruitful". Jerusalem, in Arabic 1700 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. January 18, 1996a. Disagreement reported between Arafat and Orient House officials on appointment. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Israel TV Channel 1. January 18, 1996b. Palestinian officials deny reports of appointment of Jerusalem governor. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Israel TV Channel 1. March 3, 1996. Likud leader Netanyahu calls for unity, "determined action". Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Israel TV Channel 1. September 2, 1996. Israeli foreign minister says Netanyahu-Arafat meeting may take place this week. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Israel TV Channel 1. September 5, 1996. Israeli PM addresses Likud party session, says no Palestinian state. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Israel TV Channel 1. December 26, 1998. Israel: Netanyahu comments on election campaign, says he will win in every race. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Israel TV Channel 1. December 27, 1998. Israeli Premier Tells Likud He Will Win 1999 Elections. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1735 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. March 19, 1999. Netanyahu defends revocation of three Palestinian officials' VIP cards. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1800 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 1. April 3, 1999. "Left-wing activists" visit Orient House, support creation of Palestinian state. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

9. Israel TV Channel 2

Israel TV Channel 2. December 2, 1993. TV on settlers' plans to "conquer" Jericho if government marks handover date. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1800 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 2. May 28, 1994. Israelis say they "uncovered" PLO plan to use Jerusalem as administrative centre. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 2. June 1, 1994. Israel concerned by French warning regarding Orient House meetings. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 2. September 7, 1995. Jewish group reportedly planning Orient House break-in. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1800 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 2. February 5, 1996. Opposition Likud party leader Netanyahu outlines electoral platform. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Israel TV Channel 2. December 20, 1998. Israel's Netanyahu explains intention to initiate early elections. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Israel TV Channel 2. March 19, 1999. Sharon interviewed on Clinton-Mordekhay meeting, Ashrawi's VIP card revocation. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Israel TV Channel 2. April 4, 1999. Palestinian police escorting Israeli troops on Jerusalem patrols. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

Israel TV Channel 2. May 3, 1999. Israel bans PNA official's meeting with diplomats at Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

10. Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre Press Service

Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre Press Service. September 7, 1996. Husayni tells Palestinian protestors Israeli policy has "severe consequences." Jerusalem, in English 1207 gmt.

11. Palestinian Television

Palestinian Television. July 24, 1996. Arafat, De Charette news conference in Gaza. Gaza, in Arabic 1220 gmt.

Palestinian Television. September 1, 1996. Palestinian official Husayni says unilateral state declaration a possibility. Gaza, in Arabic 1800 gmt.

12. Voice of Israel

Voice of Israel (external service). February 15, 1994. French foreign minister meets Faysal al-Husayni: pledges 60 million francs aid. Jerusalem, in English 1100 gmt.

Voice of Israel (external service). February 18, 1994. Economic talks conclude in Washington; Rabin cited on Palestinian state. Jerusalem, in English 1100 gmt.

Voice of Israel (external service). May 29, 1994a. Minister promises action to preserve status of Jersusalem as Israeli capital. Jerusalem, in English 1900 gmt.

Voice of Israel. May 29, 1994b. Posuvalyuk's talks in Jordan, Israel and Jericho Amman. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel. May 30, 1994. Faysal al-Husayni comments on "battle to end the isolation of Jerusalem". Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1005 gmt.

Voice of Israel. May 31, 1994. Nabil Sha'th's views on financial aid, issue of Jerusalem, contacts with Hamas. Jerusalem, in Arabic 1430 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 7, 1994a. Israeli foreign minister comments on letter on status of Jerusalem. Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 0405 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 7, 1994b. Police minister denies that promises on Jerusalem were made to Faysal al-Husayni (a). Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0405 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 7, 1994c. Police minister denies that promises on Jerusalem were made to Faysal al-Husayni (b). Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0405 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 8, 1994. Yosi Sarid makes first visit by an Israeli minister to Jericho autonomous area. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0900 gmt.

Voice of Israel (external service). June 11, 1994. Arafat receives Peace Now delegation; says East Jerusalem base to be maintained. Jerusalem, in English 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 14, 1994. Israeli Justice Ministry team opposes legislation to prevent PLO activity in East Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in English 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 19, 1994a. Sha'th now reportedly not to visit East Jerusalem on 20th June. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 19, 1994b. Sha'th says PNA Orient House meeting will be a "reception". Jerusalem, in English 0400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 19, 1994c. Sha'th says PNA Orient House meeting will be a "reception". Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0900 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 24, 1994. Likud attacks Rabin on Arafat's right to pray in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel. July 12, 1994. Israel wants an end to Palestinian political activity at Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0405 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 11, 1994. Husayni says King Husayn should not visit Jerusalem while occupation continues. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel (external service). August 12, 1994. Nabil Sha'th visits Jerusalem, notes political significance of his visit. Jerusalem, in English 1900 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 14, 1994. Faysal al-Husayni criticizes Israel's closure of 'Al-Bayan' newspaper. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0900 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 31, 1994. Musa says Egypt will not support an imposed solution on Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel. November 5, 1994. Ciller in Jerusalem and Gaza; Israeli factions protest over Orient House incident. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 2000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. November 6, 1994. Ciller in Jerusalem and Gaza; Israeli factions protest over Orient House incident. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0505 gmt.

Voice of Israel. November 6, 1994. Peres says no negotiations with Iraq, no immediate prospect of talks with Hamas. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0505 gmt.

Voice of Israel. November 7, 1994. Sha'th discusses Mosque of Abraham reopening, possible Israeli talks with Hamas. Jerusalem, in Arabic 1055 gmt.

Voice of Israel. November 8, 1994. Foreign consuls assemble at Orient House; Israeli police minister comments. Jerusalem, in English 1100 gmt.

Voice of Israel. November 14, 1994. Peres blames Syria for postponement of Christopher's Middle East tour. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0900 gmt.

Voice of Israel. December 4, 1994. Orient House says Husayni sought coordination with PNA not Israel. Jerusalem, in Arabic 1057 gmt.

Voice of Israel. December 20, 1994a. Faysal al-Husayni sets conditions for Janin-Bethlehem first plan. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel (external service). December 20, 1994b. Faysal al-Husayni sets conditions for Janin-Bethlehem first plan. Jerusalem, in English 1100 gmt.

Voice of Israel. December 26, 1994. Israeli minister says Palestinian campaigning at Orient House to be stopped. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1300 gmt.

Voice of Israel. February 2, 1995. EU ministers reject Israeli request not to visit Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

Voice of Israel. February 9, 1995. Palestinian-EU talks: Rabin criticizes EU delegation for visit to Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1900 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 6, 1995. UK rejects Israeli request not to hold meetings at Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1600 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 3, 1995. Kozyrev has further talks with Shimon Peres. Jerusalem, in English 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 25, 1995a. Jordanian ambassador to Israel visits Orient House in East Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in English 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 25, 1995b. Jordanian envoy reportedly met PNA officials at Orient House. Jerusalem, in English 0400 gmt.

Voice of Israel (external service). April 28, 1995. Palestinian threat reported of Intifadah in East Jerusalem if land confiscated. Jerusalem, in English 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. May 1, 1995. Meeting with European diplomats discusses Jerusalem land expropriation. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. May 15, 1995a. The Jerusalem issue: Shahal and Husayni discuss Jerusalem; Swedish minister curtails visit. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0405 gmt.

Voice of Israel (external service). May 15, 1995b. Peres denies diplomatic incident with Sweden. Jerusalem, in English 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. May 19, 1995. Shahal may close Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem by force. Jerusalem, in English 0400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 18, 1995a. Peres: legal action if Irish minister's visit to Orient House more than courtesy call. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1005 gmt.

Voice of Israel (external service). June 18, 1995b. Irish foreign minister to meet Palestinians at Orient House despite Israeli "protests". Jerusalem, in English 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 20, 1995. "Right-wing activists" protest against Irish minister's visit to Orient House. Jerusalem, in English 0400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 24, 1995. Jerusalem mayor reportedly contemplating closure of Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1800 gmt.

Voice of Israel. June 25, 1995. Minister Aloni critical of Jerusalem mayor's threat to close Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. July 2, 1995. Jerusalem mayor discusses "illegal" construction in East Jerusalem with Rabin. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1100 gmt.

Voice of Israel. July 3, 1995a. Orient House guards held following attack on "right-wing activist". Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1800 gmt.

Voice of Israel. July 3, 1995b. Rabin says some 3000 Palestinians arrested since Oslo agreement. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. July 5, 1995. Orient House guards released on bail. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1600 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 14, 1995a. Orient House says threatened closure is part of "extremist" Israeli campaign. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 14, 1995b. Rabin permits Jerusalem mayor to act against illegal activities at Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0800 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 14, 1995c. Swedish official to make "courtesy call", not official visit, to Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 16, 1995. Sweden's deputy prime minister postpones visit. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel (external service). August 18, 1995. Police minister to sign orders next week to close Palestinian institutions. Jerusalem, in English 0400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 28, 1995. Closure of Palestinian Offices in Jerusalem: Husayni says Abu Ayyash started organization before Palestinian forces' arrival. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0933 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 30, 1995. Quray said to pledge PNA will not carry out operations in Israel. Jerusalem, in English 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. September 6, 1995. "Right-wing Israelis" clash with Palestinians outside Orient House. Jerusalem, in English 0500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. September 7, 1995. Three injured in "scuffle" near Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel. September 13, 1995a. External relations: Israel and South Africa sign cooperation agreement. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel. September 13, 1995b. Israel and South Africa sign agreement; Peres asks Nzo not to visit Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel. September 16, 1995. South African foreign minister visits Orient House, meets Faysal al-Husayni. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0800 gmt.

Voice of Israel. October 5, 1995. Knesset debates Oslo B Agreement; Opposition leader says agreement with Palestinians poses grave danger to Israel. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1133 gmt.

Voice of Israel. October 7, 1995. Likud plans campaign to boost Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. October 26, 1995. Government calls on foreign officials not to visit Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. October 27, 1995. Israeli PM voices "indignation" to EU troika over planned Orient House visit. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0900 gmt.

Voice of Israel. October 31, 1995. Killing of Jihad leader: Aftermath; Rabin says Damascus has become an unprecedented focus of terrorism. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. December 15, 1995. Israeli opposition and religious parties condemn Arafat's remarks in Nablus, Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel. December 22, 1995. Peres says he will give up the "atom" if peace achieved in Middle East. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. December 23, 1995. French foreign minister visits Orient House despite Israeli protest. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. January 2, 1996. Israeli official says foreign ministers' visits to Orient House to be prevented. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. January 5, 1996. British Minister of State Jeremy Hanley meets Faysal al-Husayni in Orient House. Jerusalem, in English 0500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. January 17, 1996a. Dutch minister's visit to Orient House causes "controversy". Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. January 17, 1996b. Israeli minister comments on Dutch team's visit to Orient House. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. January 21, 1996. Israeli PM rejects Likud criticism of PNC members' return. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. February 7, 1996. Swedish foreign minister discusses security law with Israeli prime minister. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. February 19, 1996. Israeli public security minister bans foreign ministers' visits to Orient House. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. February 20, 1996. Israeli PM says closure on West Bank, Gaza to continue. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. March 6, 1996. Israeli reaction: Israeli internal security minister bans Orient House convention. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 7, 1996a. Coalition MP's absence allows second reading of bill to close PLO's Jerusalem HQ. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. March 7, 1996b. Israel radio: EU not to visit PLO HQ in Jerusalem until after Israeli elections. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. March 9, 1996. Belgian foreign minister visits, avoids Palestinian HQ in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in English 0500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. July 26, 1996. Israeli foreign minister conveys demand for closure of Jerusalem offices to Arafat. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1300 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 5, 1996. EU reportedly changes policy regarding visits to Orient House in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 18, 1996a. European troika ministers' planned talks at Orient House provoke Israeli ban. Jerusalem, in English 0400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 18, 1996b. Israeli foreign minister on reconciliation with PM, meeting Syrian counterpart. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1505 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 20, 1996. Israeli PM on Peres "intervention", Hebron, Syrian Scuds. Jerusalem, in English 1400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. August 25, 1996a. East Jerusalem "deep dissatisfaction" with closure of Palestinian offices. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. August 25, 1996b. Palestinians close several East Jerusalem offices. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0800 gmt.

Voice of Israel. September 1, 1996. Israeli foreign minister expects "breakthrough" in Palestinian talks in "hours". Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1300 gmt.

Voice of Israel. September 4, 1996. Netanyahu appeals for Israeli public's support to continue negotiations. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1705 gmt.

Voice of Israel. September 6, 1996. EU rejects Israeli request not to visit PLO HQ in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in English 0400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. September 12, 1996. Netanyahu tells cabinet there was "truth" in Rabin promise on Golan. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. September 19, 1996. Israeli PM comments on Lebanon clashes, talks with Syria and Palestinians. Jerusalem, in English 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. October 20, 1996. Israeli foreign minister rejects European involvement in negotiations. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. October 31, 1996. EU must not be in competition with USA over Mideast - British foreign secretary. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. December 11, 1996. Israeli official on advisor's Egypt mission, Palestinian activity in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. December 19, 1996. Jordanian minister to visit Orient House on 21st December. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. March 4, 1997. Netanyahu gives order for four PLO offices in Jerusalem to be closed. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1900 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 9, 1997. Palestinians' Jerusalem offices not to be closed when deadline expires. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. March 10, 1997. Israeli Knesset committee visits Orient House; army stops demonstrators. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. March 13, 1997. Reactions continue to shooting incident on Israeli-Jordanian border. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. July 30, 1997. Israel to cease money transfers to PNA, jam Voice of Palestine - Israel radio. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. September 15, 1997. Mideast: Israel's Sharon says Ra's al-Amud of "primary importance". Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. November 20, 1997. PNA hesitant to cooperate with Shin Bet on Jerusalem attack. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0700 gmt.

Voice of Israel. December 30, 1997. Israeli group calls pig's head plan Shin Bet provocation to discredit right wing. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. March 18, 1998. Israel: Deputies urge more constructions at Har Homa in response to Cook's move. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. April 15, 1998. Palestinian authority's Husayni questioned by Israeli police over guard's gun. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. May 24, 1998. Two Palestinians wounded in West Bank; clash in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. June 21, 1998. Israel's Netanyahu dismisses criticism of Jerusalem plan. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. July 13, 1998. Jerusalem Police head blames "nationalistic motives" for Orient House explosion. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0600 gmt.

Voice of Israel. October 15, 1998. Mideast: Israeli activists occupy buiding in East Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel. January 13, 1999. Greek official's Jerusalem meeting with PNA a "violation", Israel says. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

Voice of Israel. January 15, 1999. Israel: Greece apologizes for official's Orient House meeting. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1100 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 8, 1999. Israel's Sharon urges EU states not "to reward" Arafat. Jerusalem, in English 0500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 11, 1999a. Israel not to budge on Jerusalem, says foreign minister. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0705 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 11, 1999b. Sharon says Beilin's visit to Egypt "greatly harms the government". Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 12, 1999. Israeli PM Netanyahu says EU stance on Jerusalem unacceptable. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0505 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 18, 1999a. British Consul, Israeli official on Jerusalem meeting with Palestinians. Jerusalem, in English 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 18, 1999b. Israel's Netanyahu rejects Palestinian capital anywhere. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1505 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 18, 1999c. Israel's Sharon says Jerusalem to remain under "exclusive" Israeli rule. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 18, 1999d. Netanyahu says "nothing new" in EU visit to Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1200 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 18, 1999e. Palestinian, EU officials hold talks in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. March 29, 1999. Israeli government committee to close down Palestinian offices in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1000 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 4, 1999. Israel: Meretz party not to join any government with Netanyahu. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1100 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 8, 1999. Israel: Labour leader Baraq responds to Netanyahu's remarks about Arafat. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. April 21, 1999. Palestinian officials warns Israel intends to "strip" Palestinians of ID cards. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 22, 1999a. Israel orders closure of Palestinian office in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 22, 1999b. Israeli, Russian foreign ministers hold news conference on Middle East, Kosovo. Jerusalem, in English 1400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 22, 1999c. Palestinian official says Netanyahu is "fighting windmills". Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. April 23, 1999a. Israeli PM Netanyahu, Ivanov discuss Middle East peace. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0900 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 23, 1999b. Israeli PM Netanyahu, Russian foreign minister discuss Mideast peace. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. April 26, 1999a. Israeli government lawyer: "No legal infrastructure" for closing Orient House. Jerusalem, in English 0400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 26, 1999b. Israeli minister signs Orient House closure order; legal aide warns government. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. April 26, 1999c. Israeli PM comments on West Bank annexation resolution, Orient House closure. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. April 26, 1999d. Mideast: Closure of Orient House endangers regional situation, Husayni stresses. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0800 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 26, 1999e. Mideast: Police maintain order at Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 26, 1999f. Netanyahu comments on West Bank annexation resolution, Orient House closure. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0405 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 28, 1999a. Israeli minister said to be seeking "compromise" on Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0405 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 28 1999b. Mideast: Ariel Sharon hails Israel's "resolute stance". Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. April 28, 1999c. Netanyahu welcomes Arafat's apparent U-turn on 4th May state declaration. Jerusalem, in English 1400 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 29, 1999a. Palestinian official denies US assurances on Orient House. Jerusalem, in Arabic 0930 gmt.

Voice of Israel. April 29 1999b. Palestinian official says establishing state "a matter of time". Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. April 29, 1999c. USA reportedly reassures Palestinians over Orient House. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0500 gmt.

Voice of Israel. May 4 1999. Mideast: Foreign diplomats reportedly arrive at Orient House uninvited. Jerusalem, Middle East Section.

Voice of Israel. May 5, 1999. Israeli official blames PNA for "building offences" in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, in Hebrew 0405 gmt.

13. Voice of Palestine

Voice of Palestine. July 19, 1994. Orient House statement holds Israel responsible for Erez incidents. Jericho, in Arabic 0730 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. August 30, 1994. Husayni on Egyptian foreign minister's visit to Jerusalem. Jericho, in Arabic 1415 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. September 1, 1994. Palestinian leaders discuss meeting in Jerusalem with Egyptian foreign minister. Jericho, in Arabic 0730 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. September 6, 1994. Israeli forces surround Orient House. Jericho, in Arabic 1515 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. November 8, 1994. Doing harm to Orient House means doing harm to peace. Jericho, in Arabic 1545 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. November 17, 1994. Orient House reacts to Rabin's remarks about "greater Jerusalem". Jericho, in Arabic 1515 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. December 4, 1994. Faysal al-Husayni gives details of his talks in Jordan. Jericho, in Arabic 1545 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. December 26, 1994. Urayqat says law banning Palestinian action in Jerusalem "will have no effect". Jericho, in Arabic 1515 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. December 27, 1994. Orient House statement says political activities in Jerusalem to continue. Jericho, in Arabic 1515 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. February 9, 1995. Palestinian-EU talks: Husayni comments on EU meeting. Jericho, in Arabic 1400 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. February 23, 1995. Orient House says Israeli right tampered with fax machine to send Jihad leaflets. Jericho, in Arabic 1400 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. March 9, 1995. "Senior" British official to visit Orient House on 12th March. Jericho, in Arabic 1830 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. March 14, 1995. British prime minister's tour; Major meets Palestinian delegation, Husayni comments on Orient House. Jericho, in Arabic 1830 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. April 10, 1995. Orient House criticizes Israeli treatment of its employees and visitors. Jericho, in Arabic 1300 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. April 24, 1995. Arafat receives Jordanian representative. Jericho, in Arabic 1730 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. May 6, 1995. Orient House denies construction work taking place. Jericho, in Arabic 1730 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. May 23, 1995. Suspension on land expropriations: Faysal al-Husayni says suspension of land expropriations is insufficient. Jericho, in Arabic 0900 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. June 12, 1995. Husayni meets protesters against Jerusalem housing policy, promises support. Jericho, in Arabic 1300 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. June 13, 1995. Faysal al-Husayni comments on the attack on his Jerusalem home. Jericho, in Arabic 1738 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. June 14, 1995. Palestinian spokesman condemns Jerusalem attacks by Israeli settlers. Jericho, in Arabic 0700 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. June 19, 1995. Faysal al-Husayni holds talks with Irish foreign minister at Orient House. Jericho, in Arabic 1730 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. June 24, 1995a. Fifteen injured in clash outside Palestinian office in East Jerusalem. Jericho, in Arabic 1100 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. June 24, 1995b. Orient House denounces Israeli "storming" operation. Jericho, in Arabic 1730 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. July 24, 1995. Palestinian reaction: Orient House condemns bombing, urges continued peace talks. Jericho, in Arabic 1800 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. July 26, 1995a. Husayni says part of Golan belongs to Palestinians. Jericho, in Arabic 1522 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. July 26, 1995b. Orient House calls for the disarming of Jewish settlers. Jericho, in Arabic 1800 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. July 30, 1995. Settlers attempt to force their way into Orient House. Jericho, in Arabic 0900 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. August 10, 1995. Faysal al-Husayni, US diplomat discuss peace process, US aid. Jericho, in Arabic 1300 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. August 20, 1995. Palestinian Reaction: Settlers storm Al-Aqsa Mosque; Husayni warns of "Israeli campaign". Jericho, in Arabic 1300 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. August 21, 1995. Palestinian reaction: Arafat warns of reaction if Orient House closed. Jericho, in Arabic 0500 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. August 22, 1995. Reaction to Jerusalem bus bomb: Voice of Palestine blames Israeli right wing for Jerusalem bus bomb. Jericho, in Arabic 0515 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. August 23, 1995. Israel to close Orient House; Husayni comments, meets German delegation. Jericho, in Arabic 1300 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. September 16, 1995. South African foreign minister visits Orient House, meets Faysal al-Husayni. Jericho, in Arabic 1400 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. October 25, 1995. Palestinians condemn US embassy move, ask Moroccan king to convene committee. Jericho, in Arabic 1400 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. December 23, 1995. Husayni meets French foreign minister at Orient House. Jericho, in Arabic 1227 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. January 4, 1996. East Jerusalem leader unaware of Israeli move to ban visits to Orient House. Jericho, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. January 8, 1996. Arafat receives French National Assembly speaker. Jericho, in Arabic 0600 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. January 17, 1996. Faysal al-Husayni receives Dutch foreign minister at Orient House. Jericho, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. February 19, 1996. Palestinian official rejects Israeli ban on visits to Orient House. Jericho, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. March 8, 1996a. Arafat says summit is praiseworthy idea, condemns bill to close Orient House. Jericho, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. March 8, 1996b. Sharm al-Shaykh Summit: Arafat, US secretary of state discuss forthcoming summit, peace". Jericho, in Arabic 1746 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. July 23, 1996. Meeting between Arafat and Israeli foreign minister; Palestinian minister questions Israeli foreign minister's mandate to negotiate. Jericho, in Arabic 0426 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. August 29, 1996. Palestinian official asks Israel to act "reasonably" over Friday prayers. Jericho, in Arabic 1800 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. September 5, 1996. Faysal al-Husayni meets British shadow foreign secretary. Jericho, in Arabic 1800 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. September 8, 1996. Israeli Knesset Interior Committee members visit Orient House. Jericho, in Arabic 1300 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. September 24, 1996. Arab Anglican bishop criticizes Jerusalem tunnel opening. Jericho, in Arabic 1900 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. October 21, 1996. Palestinian official receives French delegation at Orient House. Jericho, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. October 22, 1996. Chirac says French foreign minister's Orient House visit should be respected. Jericho, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. November 7, 1996. PNA's Husayni meets Jordanian trade minister. Jericho, in Arabic 1200 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. November 23, 1996. Palestinian security man injured when Israeli troops try to storm Orient House. Jericho, in Arabic 1000 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. December 10, 1996. "Fierce confrontations" between Palestinians and "extremist" Jews in Jerusalem. Jericho, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. December 21, 1996. Jordanian minister visits Orient House, voices support. Jericho, in Arabic 1400 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. January 22, 1997. Palestinian official Faysal al-Husayni meets Canadian minister at Orient House. Jericho, in Arabic 1400 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. March 6, 1997. Isaelis to close Palestinian religious offices in Jerusalem. Jericho, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. March 11, 1997. Faysal al-Husayni discusses peace process with US consul-general. Jericho, in Arabic 1900 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. March 13, 1997. Palestinian official reviews Israeli moves with foreign consuls at Orient House. Jericho, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. June 1, 1997. Israelis withdraw identity cards from 45 people in Jerusalem. Jericho, in Arabic 0500 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. July 30, 1997. Israelis reportedly attack Palestinian workers following Jerusalem blast. Jericho, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. September 7 1997. Mideast: Husayni says Albright tour must take balanced view of security issue. Ramallah, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. September 16, 1997. Palestinians, Israeli peace activists continue sit-in in Ra's al-Amud. Ramallah, in Arabic 1132 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. September 25, 1997. PNA's Husayni warns of violence as a result of new Israeli settlement plans. Ramallah, in Arabic 1400 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. September 29 1997a. Faysal al-Husayni opens new Orient House branch in Ra's al-Amud. Ramallah, in Arabic 1000 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. September 29 1997b. Mideast: Faysal al-Husayni opens new Orient House branch in Ra's al-Amud. Ramallah, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. October 14, 1997. Israeli troops raid Palestinian protest camp in Ra's al-Amud, make arrests. Ramallah, in Arabic 0612 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. March 25, 1998. Palestinian officials say meeting with Annan "positive, fruitful". Ramallah, in Arabic 1900 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. May 4, 1998. PLO's Husayni warns against excluding Jerusalem from political process. Ramallah, in Arabic 1800 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. May 24, 1998. Palestinian radio reports "provocative demonstrations" outside Orient House. Ramallah, in Arabic 0900 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. July 13, 1998a. Orient House holds Israel responsible for explosion. Ramallah, in Arabic 1300 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. July 13, 1998b. Palestinian injured in explosion near Orient House in Jerusalem. Ramallah, in Arabic 0500 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. August 17, 1998. Israel reportedly seeking to build settlements on Jerusalem green land sites. Ramallah, in Arabic 0500 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. August 30, 1998. Jerusalem Awqaf reopens Al-Aqsa to foreign tourists. Ramallah, in Arabic 1300 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. September 25, 1998. Palestinian National Authority collects data on Palestinian property in Jerusalem. Ramallah, in Arabic 1738 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. October 11, 1998. Danish trade delegation visits Orient House. Ramallah, in Arabic 1900 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. October 19, 1998. Palestinian official meets foreign consuls over prisoners; statement issued. Ramallah, in Arabic 1235 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. October 27, 1998. Palestinian official urges West Jerusalem election boycott. Ramallah, in Arabic 1400 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. November 17, 1998. Fatah meeting ends, urges support for Palestinian leadership. Ramallah, in Arabic 1900 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. January 28, 1999. Palestinian wounded by Israeli police dies in hospital. Ramallah, in Arabic 1210 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. February 18, 1999. Palestinian radio reports Faysal al-Husayni's meeting with foreign envoys. Ramallah, in Arabic 1900 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. February 27, 1999. Mideast: Jewish demonstrators demand Orient House closure. Ramallah, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. March 19, 1999. Prominent Palestinians react to Israeli withdrawal of Jerusalem transit permits. Ramallah, in Arabic 1000 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. April 5, 1999. Orient House condemns Israeli measures in Jerusalem. Ramallah, in Arabic 1400 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. April 24, 1999. Mideast: Palestinian legislative group discusses Israeli measures in Jerusalem. Ramallah, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. April 25, 1999a. Mideast: Orient House urges Israel to rescind closure orders. Ramallah, in Arabic 0445 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. April 25, 1999b. UN mission sends message to Annan on Orient House. Ramallah, in Arabic 0440 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. April 26, 1999. Mideast: Orient House offices in Jerusalem closed; Fatah declares emergency. Ramallah, Middle East Section.

Voice of Palestine. April 27, 1999. Palestinians strike in Jerusalem in protest at closure of PLO offices. Ramallah, in Arabic 1300 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. April 28, 1999. Urayqat says time not yet set for Orient House talks. Ramallah, in Arabic 0427 gmt.

Voice of Palestine. April 30, 1999. Mideast: Palestinians says closure of Orient House violates national rights. Ramallah, Middle East Section.

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APPENDIX 1

LIST OF CODES

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
National identity	Flag Palestinian homeland Israeli homeland		
Place	Defining Orient House Clandestine activities Facts on the ground Jerusalem Role of Orient House Elections Symbol Oslo Accords Arafat-Husseini relations		
Boundary	Possible violations of Oslo Accords	Closure of Orient House Construction at Orient House Property taxes Other tax issues Zoning laws	
	Visits by foreign officials	Jerusalem Consul-Generals US Consul-General European Union United Nations Austria Belgium Canada Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Egypt France Germany Greece Ireland Italy	

Boundary (con't)	Visits by foreign officials (con't)	Japan Jordan Netherlands Russia South Africa Spain Sweden Turkey UK United States	
	Actions against Orient House	Israeli laws Israeli government action PLO embezzlement	
	Demonstrations	Israeli	Border guards Extremists Pro-Palestinian Peace Now Gush Shalom Women in Green
		Palestinian	
	Palestinian political activities	Palestinian police activities Press conferences at Orient House PNA meeting	
Quotes	Orient House as symbol General		
Historical Information			

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Bentov, Elizabeth, Andrea Blower, Kathleen Gabelmann, and Denise Pritchard. 1999. Review of "Feminist Geographies: Explorations in Diversity and Difference". *Gender, Place and Culture* 6(2), 187-189.

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Author 

Denise Diane Pritchard

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