# THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'NATIONAL POLICY' IN CANADIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

by

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## Abstract

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In English-Canadian historical writing, the term "national policy" has often meant specific governmental policies; that is, the policies of protective tariffs, railway development and western settlement. It is a concept which has no parallel in either British or American scholarship which traditionally provided the models for the Canadian discipline. This study investigates the process by which the concept evolved and the general term gained such specialized meanings.

The first use of the term seems to be that recorded in the House of Commons Debates in 1869. Here it meant a new economic policy for Canada necessitated by the American failure to renew the Reciprocity Treaty. During the next decade of debate and use by politicians, the term achieved a generally recognized meaning in capitalized form as a policy of protective tariffs.

The earliest historians tended to define "National Policy" much as did the politicians. A significant exception, however, was J. C. Hopkins who, in defending the "National Policy" from its critics near the end of the century, argued that it should be judged as including not

only the tariff but other policies such as the building of railways and the encouragement of settlement in the North-west. Hopkins' broader definition of the term did not become popular until the 1930's when the scholars writing for the Rowell-Sirois Commission outlined a tripartite "national policy" as a central theme in Canadian economic development. Donald Creighton employed the capitalized term in describing these policies and associating their origin with his hero, Sir John A. Macdonald.

In examining the advantages and defects of the "National Policy" for Canada, historians have tended toward an ever-broadening usage of the term. Economic historians, such as V. C. Fowke, have tended to see an economically determined "national policy" evolving well before Confederation and providing the most important factor in Canadian economic development. Even the severest critics of "National Policy" such as J. H. Dales, who questioned its ultimate benefit for Canadian development, accepted the existence and importance of a tripartite "National Policy".

Some historians have been inclined to identify "National Policy" with nationalism. Soon after World War I, O. D. Skelton associated the "National Policy" of protection with the attainment of unity and autonomy. Nationalistic historians such as D. G. Creighton and J. M. S. Careless revised and enlarged Skelton's version by adopting the concept of a tripartite "National Policy" and commended it for promoting

the political development of Canada. R. C. Brown presented perhaps the broadest use of the term in associating the 'spirit' of the "National Policy" with Canadian nationalism. Indeed, it is exceptional to find a historian such as Peter Waite treating the concept only in the sense used by the contemporaries of the period.

In determining the meaning of "National Policy", historians' points of view seem to have been more influential than historical facts. Canadian historians enlarged the meaning of the term, for instance, in defending political parties or in urging the need for positive governmental policies in a period of depression. But the main theme which they seem to have pursued in common was a belief in the necessity of nation-building; implying the validity of a nationalism which they sought to express through the question-begging term of "National Policy".

E. R. Forbes.

Robert M. Craig

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# I. The Origin of the Term "National Policy"

Since its first recorded use in 1869, Canadian politicians have employed the term "national policy" in a variety of ways. First, it meant nothing more than an economic policy proposed to stimulate recovery after the abolition of reciprocity with the United States. In the second stage, the term came to mean protection on natural products of Canada. In this sense capitalized "National Policy" was employed to mean the tariff revision of 1870. Thirdly, manufacturers demanded a "national policy" of protection for their interests. By 1878, serious discussions of the meaning of "National Policy" seemed to come to an end, with both sides of the House using the term for the protection of Canadian industries, especially, agriculture and manufacturing.

. . . .

The first recorded use of the term "national policy" would seem to be on May 7, 1869 in the presentation of the third budget by Finance Minister, John Rose, in the House of Commons.[1] Rose employed the term in expressing resentment

[1]John Rose offered his budget speeches on December 7, 1867 and April 28, 1868. Only the summary of these speeches was left in the record and he did not mention the term "national policy" on either occasion, according to the record. Canada, Commons Debates, 1867-1869 (microfilm), pp. 76-77, pp. 198-199. According to O. D. Skelton's wellknown reference, Rose devised the phrase and this was his first

against the United States for its failure to lower the barriers it had imposed on Canadian exports after the termination of Reciprocity in 1866. Canada had given trade advantages to the United States without securing similar privileges in return:

> This state of things...has gone on for three or four years, but you must understand it cannot continue. (Hear, hear.) The time may soon come when we may require to have a national policy of our own, no matter whether that national policy may sin against this or that theory of political economy.(Hear, hear.) For we must be guided chiefly, if not solely, by considerations affecting ourselves, and we may have to consult our self-interest without consideration for others. (loud cheers.)[2]

On that occasion, Rose did not suggest any specific measures but only indicated that the "national policy" would consider Canadian self-interest and ignore any theories of political economy. But his proposal clearly pointed towards retaliation against the United States. It was an obvious hint of protection on Canadian products to come.

Although Charles Tupper considered himself as the originator of the phrase "national policy",[3] his usage of the term was a revival and echo of Rose's sentiment. In

use of it in the House. O. D. Skelton, General Economic History, 1867-1912, vol. IX of Canada and Its Provinces, ed. Adam Shortt & Arthur G. Doughty (23 vols., Toronto: The Publisher's Association of Canada, 1913), p. 146.

[2]Speech on the Budget by the Honourable John Rose (Ottawa: Hunter, Rose and Co., 1869), p. 33.

[3]Charles Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years in Canada (London: Cassell, 1914), p. 153.

February, 1870, Tupper used the term "national policy" in another oblique call for protection. He said he had favoured the reciprocal interchange of natural products between Canada and the United States and he did not think a retaliatory measure was the best means of obtaining a renewal of the treaty. Nevertheless, he strongly advocated some devices to protect interests of Canada:

> Whilst the Provinces had been suffering from the restrictive policy of the Americans...we had been allowing our neighbours to send in their products free, or at a nominal duty, and giving them reason to suppose that we could not, or dare not, act in a different spirit towards them. Was that a policy to be supported by any free man in British America? Should we allow the best interests of the country to be sacrificed or uphold a bold national policy (cheers) which would promote the best interest of all classes and fill our treasury?[4]

Like Rose, Tupper failed to follow up his statements with any specific proposals.

Behind such references to "national policy" lay a developing agitation and argument over the protection of Canadian industry. In 1868, a Nova Scotian lawyer, R. G. Haliburton published a pamphlet, Intercolonial Trade, which advocated a duty on American coal. Although he was chiefly interested in protection for the Nova Scotia coal industry to ease the dissatisfaction caused by the abolition of reciprocity, he pointed out that the imposition of a duty was necessary, "in order to unite the people of the Dominion

[4] Dominion of Canada, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 1 1870, p. 107. (Cited hereafter, Parliamentary Debates.)

by the only bond that can endure--that of common interests and commercial sympathy".[5]

The argument for protection was expounded in the House first by Liberal members who represented farmers' interests in Ontario. In February, 1870, M. C. Cameron (Huron South) presented a number of petitions from the farmers of Huron and Bruce counties, asking for protection of Canadian products.[6] A month later, Thomas Oliver (Oxford North) requested the imposition of an import duty on wheat, flour, Indian corn, hops, coarse and fine salt and coal to secure for Canadian people the Canadian markets and to add to Canada's revenue.[7] Another Liberal, E. B. Wood (Brant South), supported Oliver by saying that "no measure would give greater satisfaction to Western Canada, particularly to the agricultural portion,--than a revision of the tariff with a view to the protection of Canadian interests".[8] He insisted that a revision of the tariff had been a deep interest for the farmers in his section for the last two years.

In the discussion which followed Oliver's motion, several

[5]Robert Grant Haliburton, Intercolonial Trade: Our Only Safeguard against Disunion (Ottawa: G. E. Desbarats, 1868), p. 35.

[6]Parliamentary Debates, vol. 1 (1870), p. 206.

[7]Ibid., p. 272.

[8]Ibid., p. 278.

members of Parliament used the term "Canadian policy" for the encouragement of Canadian economic interests. J. H. Pope (Conservative, Compton, P. Q.) emphasized a "Canadian policy" without reference to theories of free trade or protection. W. H. Webb, another Conservative from Quebec, used the same term "Canadian policy" meaning an alternative policy to reciprocity with the United States. Charles Magill (Liberal, Hamilton) said that Canadians should build up a home market by a policy which encouraged Canadian domestic industry.[9]

About the same time John A. Macdonald first mentioned the term "Canadian policy" but did not say anything of its substance. He told Jacob Hespeler that "I think that the Government will establish Canadian policy which will be generally satisfactory of the country. The moment I have a little leisure I will write you in full".[10] But he did not seem to fulfil his promise.

As a response to these discussions, the Committee of Ways and Means proposed that the government would impose duties on some natural products which were produced in Canada commercially. Duties on coal and coke, wheat and wheat flour were to be high enough to make a domestic market for

[9] Parliamentary Debates, vol. 1 (1870), pp. 280-281.

[10] Public Archives of Canada, Macdonald Papers, Letter Book, 14, 104, John A. Macdonald to Jacob Hespeler, 28 March, 1870. (Cited hereafter, Macdonald Papers, LB.)

Ontario farmers and Nova Scotia coal owners respectively.[11] Francis Hincks, who succeeded Rose in the previous year, however, moved an amendment to remove the duties on coal and wheat. Although his motion was abandoned later the same day, several members questioned whether the original resolution on duties was worthy of being called a "national policy". When Willam Ross (Liberal, Victoria, Nova Scotia) exhibited a copy of the resolution and said that he held in his hand the great "national policy", he was greeted with loud laughter. Nevertheless, Thomas Oliver continued to use the term in urging the retention of the original resolution. "One of the great objects of this national policy", he stated, "was to create a trade between the two extremities of the Dominion; but that object would be completely destroyed by the removal of duty from coal and wheat".[12] The capitalized term "National Policy" suddenly appeared for the first time in these debates

[11]The tariff schedule proposed was as follows:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| cigars | per lb. | $0.45 |
| coal and coke | per ton | 0.50 |
| salt | per bushel of 56 lbs. | 0.05 |
| hops | per lb. | 0.05 |
| vinegar and acetic acid | per lb. | 0.10 |
| rice | per lb. | 0.01 |
| wheat | per bushel | 0.04 |
| grain (except wheat) | per bushel | 0.03 |
| flour (wheat and rye) | per barrel | 0.25 |
| flour (except wheat and rye) | per barrel | 0.15 |

Journal of the House of Commons of Canada, vol. III (Ottawa: I. B. Taylor, 1870), p. 168.

[12]Parliamentary Debates, vol. 1 (1870), April 26, pp. 1194-1195.

as meaning the tariff, but the reporter later returned to the use of lower case letters.[13]

Among Liberal members of Parliament, there was a strong opposition to calling the tariff revision a "national policy". James Young, a former journalist and a Liberal from Waterloo, expressed his disapproval on the grounds that it would increase the cost of living. He said that what was called a "national policy" was in fact a scheme to increase the profits of a small number of millers and salt dealers at the expense of the majority of the inhabitants of the country. It was both dangerous and injudious because it would seem to be a retaliatory policy against the people of the United States and would place a heavy burden on Canadians.[14]

The Liberal leader of the opposition, Alexander Mackenzie in particular was opposed to giving special meaning to the term "national policy". Although a free trader in principle, he did not deny the importance of the protective tariff. For him, however, the 'incidental' protection primarily meant the revenue raised from the imposition of the duties on all articles imported to the country. He attacked Francis Hincks' characterization of retaliatory tariffs as a "national policy". He said that they had always had a "national policy":

[13] Parliamentary Debates, vol. 1 (1870), p. 1213.

[14] Ibid., p. 1212.

> The policy of every Government had been a national one, because it had been intended to supply national wants in conformity to the national opinion of the country; but if the honorable gentleman by a national policy meant a policy which should be merely one of irritation to their neighbours, injury to their trade, and unjust favouritism of one party of the country by imposing taxes upon another portion, that policy was not justified by anything that he had advanced in defence of this so-called national policy...(A national policy meant something that would promote the prosperity of the country to a greater degree than the policy which preceded it).[15]

In spite of Mackenzie's strong denial, Malcolm Cameron, a Liberal from rural Ontario, could not help saying that both sides of the House favoured a "national policy" and protection of a native industry.[16]

The main desire of Canadians had been to secure reciprocity with the United States. Having failed to do so they were seeking an alternative which still might lead in that direction. John A. Macdonald treated the matter of protection vaguely, but he endorsed the adoption of a "national policy" which he said had been called for in petitions from all parts of the country. Interpreting "national policy" as the policy replacing reciprocity with the United States, he said that;

> We must have one general policy--one general system--we must have a Canadian policy, or have no Canadian policy. Now, the Government would contend for, and insist upon, one general Canadian policy....the Minister of Finance, had announced that the Government were anxious to carry out that policy, and the Government

[15] Parliamentary Debates, vol. 1 (1870), p. 1227.

[16] Ibid., p. 1222.

> believed that the resolutions carried through Committee would embody the Canadian policy. The Government had abandoned, with great regret, the duties on coal and wheat...but they were now determined to carry out a Canadian policy....interests were concerned in having a national policy; and that national policy was far less adverse to the United States than their policy had been with regard to Canada,...we should decide upon and carry out a policy of our own.[17]

His clear statement was that Canada should have "Canadian policy" which would aim at independence from the economy of the United States. M. P. Ryan (Conservative, Montreal West) still interpreted "national policy" as a device to bring about reciprocity.[18] Similarly, Adams George Archibald (Conservative, Nova Scotia) argued that "national policy" was not simply a question of a duty on coal but of a whole "national policy" that would open the markets of the United States.[19] Charles Tupper (Conservative, Cumberland, Nova Scotia) consistently repeated his argument that limited protection was the only way to obtain reciprocity and a Liberal, E. B. Wood, from Brant South, Ontario, sarcastically referred to the tax on coal as a "great national policy that was to bring the people of the United States to their knees".[20]

Opponents of the scheme argued that it would lessen

[17] Parliamentary Debates, vol. 1 (1870), pp. 1202-1203.

[18] Ibid., p. 1236.

[19] Ibid., p. 1249.

[20] Ibid., p. 1248.

rather than increase chances for reciprocity. For example, Thomas Workman (Liberal, Montreal Centre) specifically denied that a "national policy" would give the Canadians reciprocity; on the contrary, it would stir up ill-feeling among the American people.[21]

After a lengthy debate, which revealed considerable uncertainty on the part of members of both parties, the House passed the legislation without making any fundamental changes. This first "National Policy", however, was not of long duration. The duties on coal and flour were repealed after one year, apparently as a result of opposition from the manufacturers.

Before the end of 1871, John A. Macdonald was proposing a new "National Policy" to appeal to its erstwhile opponents. On the 2nd of December, he wrote to Adam Brown suggesting a "National Policy" to protect the Canadian manufacturers:

> The protection of Manufactures is a delicate thing to handle; but it can be dealt with, I think, so as to weigh heavily against the Grit opposition.
>
> Brown, Mackenzie etc. are pledged to a Free Trade policy. They are worshippers of Cobden and that school.
>
> I think that a cry for a readjustment for revenue purposes, but affording incidental protection to our manufactures & products, would go down well.
>
> It would be a National Policy which the Grits pooh-poohed last session and which they may feel at the next elections.[22]

[21] Parliamentary Debates, vol. 1 (1870), p. 1258.

[22] Macdonald Papers, LB 16, 555-556, Macdonald to A. Brown, 2 December, 1871.

He explained the background of his "National Policy";

> ...I quite agree with Patteson that our policy is to coquet with the protectionists. The word protection itself must be tabooed, but we can ring the changes on a National Policy, paying the United States in their own coin, incidental protection.[23]

Macdonald's motive was clearly the desire to win support in the general election of 1872. His anxiety about the coming election was obvious when he told F. H. Mackenzie;

> On the subject of protection, you must talk to the mechanics and manufacturers of Hamilton and show them that Brown, Blake, Mackenzie, or others are rabid Free Traders and that the only hope for them is through the Conservative party. Everything connected with that subject will depend upon the next election.[24]

Publishing a daily Conservative newspaper to attract the mechanics and manufacturers and to compete with Brown's Globe was one of his devices.[25] On March 30th, the first Toronto Mail appeared. In outlining the programme for the new journal, Macdonald wrote;

> I should like to see the new paper issued by the 15th March at the latest, so as to have a month's full swing before our House meets....
>
> The paper must go in for a National Policy in tariff matters and while avoiding the word 'protection' must

[23] Macdonald Papers, LB 17, 192-193, Macdonald to D. L. Macpherson, 20 February, 1872.

[24] Ibid., LB 17, 388, Macdonald to F. H. Mackenzie, 13 March, 1872.

[25] Ibid., LB 17, 564-567, Macdonald to J. Rose, 17 April, 1872.

> advocate a readjustment of the Tariff in such a manner as incidently to aid our manufacturing and industrial interests.[26]

Macdonald was not alone in proposing a protective policy for the manufacturers. Behind his proposal, there had been a strong demand from Hamilton interests for protection on manufactured goods. As early as in 1860, Isaac Buchanan, who organized the Association for the Protection of Canadian Industries in 1858 and represented Hamilton in the Legislative Assembly of Canada, wrote;

> I should not advise immigration of either [of capital or of people], unless a moderately protective policy is adopted; and it is already abundantly evident that neither capital nor money will come to the Province under our present absence of a permanent policy.[27]

He advocated the imposition of duties on both natural and manufactured products which competed with Canadian ones. The revised duties of 1870 tentatively satisfied producers of natural goods, but the manufacturers increasingly requested similar protection for their products. It is not difficult to suppose that this tendency must have been very strong in Hamilton, a city later referred to as the "Pittsburgh" or "Birmingham" of Canada. For instance, Charles Magill[28] proposed a policy;

[26]Macdonald Papers, LB 17, 265-266, Macdonald to T. C. Patteson, 27 February, 1872.

[27]Ibid., 136160, Memorandum by Mr. Buchanan (1860).

[28]Magill's name was misspelled as McGill in the Parliamentary Debates.

> The policy which...was not, by any means, a sectional one. It was one which in its effects would be beneficially felt from Halifax to Sarnia. Even Manitoba would feel its effects, and it would go a long way in strengthening the loyalty of the people, in affording full employment for all. In his opinion, to make people happy and contented under our constitution, manufactures must be protected. ...He repeated that he wanted such a policy pursued as would not only bring skilled labor hither, but would find employment for it. He wanted a home market for our own people.[29]

Magill did not mention the word "national policy". His argument, nevertheless, is important for the examination of the "national policy", as he recommended the inauguration of a policy which would encourage the formation of a nation-wide domestic market and its expansion through immigration.

Macdonald pointed out that an important side-effect of the "national policy" would be to help making up deficits incurred in the building of railways and canals. In a letter to D. McInnes, Macdonald explained his idea of "National Policy" more clearly than before. Concerned about the result of the election in Hamilton, he wrote;

> Now our taking the duties off tea and coffee, ought to be a sufficient proof to the manufactures that the present government will adopt a principle of incidental protection. With our increasing engagements for the enlargement of the canals, and the construction of the Pacific Railway, the deficiency in the revenue caused by taking the duties off tea and coffee must be made up in some way, and this can only be done by a duty on manufactured goods. Our policy in the future as in the past will be to grant incidental protection.

[29] Dominion of Canada, Parliamentary Debates, vol. III (1872), pp. 45-46.

Perhaps his major innovation at this time was in urging the importance of manufacturers' cooperating with farmers in supporting a tariff of benefit to both. Magill's failure to support tariffs on cereals, coal and other natural products was in his opinion "a stupid blunder".

> The manufacturers cannot carry protection in Parliament unless by the votes of the agricultural representatives. In order to carry out a National Policy as to manufacturers, the manufacturers must agree to duties being imposed on Foreign agricultural productions. If the farmers and manufacturers act together, we can carry a tariff that will be permanent for a great many years.[30]

The fall of Macdonald government was brought about in 1873 by the so-called "Pacific scandal". After resigning from office, John A. Macdonald was no longer responsible for developing any governmental policies, "national" or not. Moreover, the financial depression caused mainly by disturbances in world trade occurred almost simultaneously with Mackenzie's formation of the new Liberal government. In his first budget, the Liberal Finance Minister, Richard Cartwright, proposed raising customs duries from 15 to 17.5 per cent. to meet deficiencies in revenue. The economic stagnation seemed to prevent the government from adopting ambitious policies.

The next chance to discuss "national policy" in the House, therefore, was offered in 1876 after the intensification of the economic crisis increased the deficiencies

[30]Macdonald Papers, LB 17, 672-675, Macdonald to D. McInnes, 17 June, 1872.

in the treasury. In criticizing the budget speech of 1876, Charles Tupper used the term "national policy" in rather vague fashion:

> I do not intend to go into the question of free trade or protection....I am neither a Free-trader nor Protectionist. I say to discuss free-trade or protection as abstract principles in a country of four millions,...is simply nonsense. I say what Canada wants is a national policy--a policy that shall be in the interest of Canada, apart from the principles of free trade, apart from the principles of protection.[31]

This statement was a bit deceptive, because obviously by that time Tupper was a believer in the principle of protection. His belief was shown in the latter part of the same speech. But as Macdonald had warned before, the word "protection" was still taboo in the British Empire. Since its advocacy by Adam Smith in 1776, the principle of free trade has been pursued in Great Britain; the abolition of the Corn Law in 1846 symbolozed its over-all victory. Until the early twentieth century when Joseph Chamberlain proposed a return to protectionism, Britain seemed to have a firm belief in the principle of free trade and it was not difficult to imagine that this trend exercised a great influence upon Canadians.

Following Tupper's mention of a "national policy" several members of Parliament discussed the meaning of the term "national policy". Some Liberals appeared to define the "National Policy" as the revised duties of 1870 and the

[31] Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, vol. 2 (1876), pp. 282-283. (Cited hereafter, Debates.)

capitalized term was used to record such statements. Thomas Workman said that one of the items of the "grand system known as the National Policy" was "the imposition of a tax of fifty cents per ton on coal"[32] and he showed his disfavour toward the plan. Adam Gordon (Liberal, Ontario North) supported this stand. "Under the national policy", he said, "the duty on wheat was 4 cents per bushel and the profit to the miller on every barrel of flour was eight cents".[33]

On the other hand, several Liberals tried to equate the term with a policy of free trade. James Young continued to assert that the only way to encourage Canadian manufacturing was to keep Canada one of the cheapest countries in the world in which to live and thus attract immigrants. He recommended 'protection' for the manufacturers by giving them raw materials at the lowest possible cost. This was, he said, "the only true national policy for Canada".[34] Similarly A. H. Dymond, a Liberal and an editor of Globe, defined "national policy" as "a policy formed in the interest not of one part or of another section, but of the whole Dominion to be instrumental in welding us together as one nation, breaking down and not establishing sectional

[32] Debates, vol. 2 (1876), p. 318.

[33] Ibid., p. 332.

[34] Ibid., p. 375.

differences and barriers".[35] The first request made by the champions of a "national policy", he complained, was to impose a bread tax on the people of the Maritime Provinces. Therefore, he concluded, "we are the party of free trade....We have on the present occasion adopted that principle as our policy".[36]

Nevertheless, some of the strongest support for the protection of manufacturing in 1876 came from Liberals. Aemiluis Irving (Liberal, Hamilton) was not satisfied with Tupper's statement because it did not go for enough in providing relief to the manufacturing class. Although Tupper spoke in general terms of a "national policy", Irving suggested that it really meant that "a rate of not less than ten per cent. should be added to the existing importation tariff"[37] on foreign manufactured goods. Bernard Devlin (Liberal, Montreal Centre) supported "a true national policy" which was a policy of protection for manufacturing industries.[38] As a representative of a leading manufacturing constituency, he stated that his constitutents fully favoured the adoption of a "national policy".

From the Opposition, Conservatives started to discuss the

[35] Debates, vol. 2 (1876), p. 382.

[36] Ibid., p. 387.

[37] Ibid., p. 312.

[38] Ibid., p. 319.

value of protection for both manufacturing and agriculture. In March, 1876, John A. Macdonald delivered a speech which was sometimes regarded as "the first form in which was presented to the House the famous National Policy of the Conservative party".[39] After he expressed his support of a policy affording some relief to the manufacturers of Canada and giving some alternations in the tariff, he moved a resolution:

> That this House regrets that His Excellency the Governor-General had not been advised to recommend to Parliament a measure for the re-adjustment of the tariff, which will not only tend to alleviate the stagnation of business, deplored in the speech from the Throne, but also afford encouragement and protection to the struggling manufacturers, and industries as well as the agricultural productions of the country.[40]

Almost four years before, Macdonald had favoured a tariff re-adjustment in the combined interest of both manufacturers and farmers. In 1876, Macdonald declared for protection in certain industries. It was in keeping, he argued, with recognized principles of political economy. John Stuart Mill, for example, justified protection for the purpose of encouraging infant manufacturing industry. Macdonald did not use the term "national policy" when he mentioned Mill, but he used the term with reference to Canada's policy since 1854:

He (Alexander Galt) laid down for us the principle of a

[39] William Buckinghm and Hon. G. W. Ross, The Hon. Alexander Mackenzie: His Life and Times ( fifth edition; New York: Greenwood Press, 1969. First published in 1892), p. 422.

[40] Debates, vol. 2 (1876), pp. 489-490.

> national policy that we should consider our own interests only, and that in an adjustment of the tariff we should endeavor to foster all these various industries of which I have spoken....We were forced at one time to reduce the tariff to a considerable extent; at another time, not very long ago, we took up the national policy, which has been made a matter of ridicule, and carried it, certainly not by a large vote. With a very short sighted policy on the part of the manufacturers of Canada that national policy was opposed by them.[41]

In the latter part of the above speech, Macdonald seemed to mean by "national policy" the tariff revision of 1870.

Macdonald's view point was sustained by L. F. R. Masson (Conservative, Terrebonne, P. Q.). Representing a rural constituency, he asked for a protective tariff for both the manufacturers and the agricultural interests. Farmers would be more successful, he said, if they had manufacturing towns and villages scattered through the country to create a market for their products. In seeking to show that the Liberals of his province had supported protection, he invoked the policy of the Parti Nationale in 1872 and quoted its leader Henri-Gustave Joly de Lotbinière:

> 'I (Joly) will tell you the reason why we have chosen that name. You must have seen in the House, and in the papers, that to attract a considerable immigration, an immigration advantageous to the country, it is necessary to encourage industry by all means possible. Everybody understands that our young men would not leave the country if they found here sufficient, not to indulge in luxuries, but to provide for their food and clothing'.[42]

[41] Debates, vol. 2 (1876), p. 492.

[42] Ibid., p. 584.

Among "all means possible", Masson said, they chose a policy which was called "a branch of the National Policy". It implied not political, but commercial independence from England, a zollverein with the United States, followed by stringent protection against Great Britain. Another Conservative from Quebec, C. C. Colby, later, an eager defender of the "National Policy" of protection, asked for a policy which was not so much to encourage foreign trade as to foster agricultural industries and build up a home market. He said;

> We wanted a vigorous policy, we wanted a positive policy, an objective policy, a national policy, the tendency of which would be to unlock the wealth of our mines, stimulate our industries, and develop our resources and defend us from unfair and injurious foreign competition.[43]

As previously noted, a popular argument against protection was its adverse effect on immigration through increasing the cost of living. But J. B. Plumb (Conservative, Niagara) who had had a long experience in business in New York, argued, on the contrary, that by encouraging the growth of manufacturing, protection would prevent emigration from the country:

> Now, if the manufacturing interest was in the prosperous condition it might be, there would be no necessity for four hundred thousand young Canadians seeking work and wages in the neighboring Republic. Canada would have been in a very different position to-day if the native industries had been properly fostered....What they wanted really was a national policy.[44]

[43] Debates, vol. 2(1876), p. 644.

[44] Ibid., p. 659.

He also deprecated the Pacific Railway policy of the Liberal government and suggested the two might have been advantageously associated by using protected Canadian iron for the construction of the railway.

Among the Conservatives, members from Nova Scotia were divided. Adams G. Archibald condemned the members of Parliament for urging "national policy". He said that they utterly ignored the consumer who was regarded as having no rights at all: the seller alone counted. He did not believe in "national policy" if it prevented the flow of imports which was a source of wealth.[45] William McDonald from Cape Breton, on the other hand, endorsed the resolution, saying that only "a revenue and national policy combined" would protect and develop such resources as the coal of Nova Scotia and obtain reciprocity in trade from the United States.[46] Tupper, while still showing his zeal to get reciprocity with the United States, supported Macdonald's resolution. He said that the resolution was "just the policy Canada required--a broad, comprehensive, national policy", and would bring reciprocity:

> Individual members might be opposed to reciprocity, but both political parties were favorable to such a treaty, which meant free-trade to a certain extent with the United States; and it could only be attained by one

[45] Debates, vol. 2 (1876), p. 645.

[46] Ibid., p. 648.

> means--by adopting a defensive policy....everyone who believed in reciprocal free trade with the United States was bound to support the resolution before the House.[47]

Alexander Mackenzie, the Prime Minister, was still reluctant to concede any special association between protection and "national policy". In replying to Macdonald's resolution he pointed out that every Canadian advocated a "national policy": "Every Government has advocated a national policy. We have expected in this country that a revenue tariff was a desirable financial policy".[48] Moreover, Mackenzie argued, if it were desired to increase Canada's revenue from the duties on foreign goods, the principle of protection should not be introduced, because it would close the gate way to foreign trade. Macdonald's resolution was finally rejected by a majority of 46, although several Liberals from indstrial areas supported it.[49]

In 1877, Tupper made a profound change in defining the content of a "national policy". He stated clearly that it was the policy of the late government to give all possible protection to the manufacturing interests of Canada both by

[47] Debates, vol. 2 (1876), p. 666.

[48] Ibid., p. 497.

[49] Ibid., pp. 684-685. Liberals like Devlin (Montreal Centre), Irving (Hamilton), Wood (Brant South) and Workman (Montreal Centre) supported it, while a Conservative Archibald from Nova Scotia voted against it.

imposing the duties on articles from abroad which competed with Canadian manufactures, and by placing on the free list the raw materials which manufacturers were obliged to import. He mentioned protection on manufactures, especially on the shipbuiding industry in the Matitimes, the imposition of a duty upon articles like coal, flour and salt, the construction of public works and the promotion of immigration as policies of the preceding Conservative government:

> We therefore took up the Pacific Railway as a means by which we could extend and continue a policy having for its object the prosecution of public works, which has been found to be successful in our country, and a scheme was propounded by means of which a hundred millions of foreign capital would have been drawn into Canada, and hundreds of thousands of immigrants would have been annually brought into the country, which would have developed its trade and business as nothing else would develop it.[50]

He did not use the term "national policy", but called the above policy the only policy by which Canada could hope to attain any position of importance in the world. He associated the construction of public works with immigration by providing employment, but he did not consider the protective policy in relation to railways or immigration.

It was C. C. Colby who developed Tupper's interpretation. Using the term "national policy" as the equivalent of the protective policy,[51] he urged the relief of distressed

[50] Debates of the House of Commons, vol. 3 (1877), p. 150.

[51] Ibid., p. 516.

manufacturers by the protective policy while emphasizing that the fiscal policy should be made to harmonize with and supplement the policy of public works. A fiscal policy "should utilize those public works and make them as valuable as they possibly could be made to the country".[52] Encouragement of manufacturing by protection would be effective only if they could build up towns and cities together with it. Otherwise, Colby warned, the wealth which might be kept by home industries would flow out to enrich the United States.

Generally throughout the debates of the House that year, the term "National Policy" was used with specific application. Alexander Mackenzie did admit that "the policy which was initiated in 1870" was "called the National Policy, by which we imposed a duty of fifty cents per ton on coal",[53] and John A. Macdonald referred to the tariff revision of that year as the "National Policy Act".[54] But the name was also becoming firmly associated with the Conservative's proposed tariff readjustment of 1877. On March 2nd, Macdonald moved the resolution seconded by Tupper:

> That this House regrets that the financial policy submitted by the Government increases the burden of taxation on the people, without any compensating advantage to Canadian industries and further, that this House is of opinion that the deficiency in the Revenue should be met by a diminution of expenditure aided by such a

[52] Debates, vol. 3 (1877), p. 515.

[53] Ibid., p. 171.

[54] Ibid., p. 179.

> readjustment of the tariff as will benefit and foster the agricultural, mining and manufacturing interests of the Dominion.[55]

Even in damning it, the Liberal speakers tended to refer to Conservative tariff policy as the "National Policy". William Paterson sarcastically suggested, for instance, that the above resolution composed the grand "National Policy" of the Conservative party.[56] Wilfrid Laurier also derisively spoke of the "National Policy" as applied to Quebec:

> They [Conservatives] had no policy. They had a high-sounding name, which they called the "National Policy". If the motion were to carry..., the very moment they attempted to carry out their National Policy, there would be a confusion worse than that at the Tower of Babel.... They had the name of a National Policy, but not the substance. The resolution of the right hon. member for Kingston [Macdonald] proposed protection for three interests--the manufacturing, agricultural and mining. ...but in Quebec the National Policy was held to be a mockery and a farce; it was an inhuman policy, in that it would make fuel and food dearer.[57]

Again, the proposed policy was defeated by a large majority.

In choosing the Conservative's policy for the general election in 1878, the "National Policy" seemed to occupy Macdonald's mind. He produced a 57-page memorandum on the "National Policy" dated in 1878. The exact date of making this memorandum is not clear but it seems likely,from its contents, that he wrote it before the 7th of February. On page twenty-two, he clearly showed his idea of the "National

[55] Debates, vol. 3 (1877), p. 405.

[56] Ibid., p. 744.

[57] Ibid., p. 922.

Policy".[58] He enumerated the items which were necessary to develop his plan of proceedings. According to it, he meant by the "National Policy" a policy of protective tariffs for Canada and not unlike that which was followed by the United States. It was to be adopted first to meet the deficit in revenues and was expected to stimulate manufacturing as well as agriculture by expanding the market to the North West and the Pacific coast. He was a little worried about the effect of the policy towards England. And finally he expressed his desire to get reciprocity in trade with the United States.

The year 1878 is usually noted for the introduction of the "National Policy" by John A. Macdonald. By that time, however, "National Policy" was itself a well-worn term. Macdonald's resolution of that year was in fact a synthesis of the various arguments in favour of protection developed during discussions in the House over the previous near-decade. On the 7th of March, 1878, he proposed;

> That this House is of the opinion that the welfare of Canada requires the adoption of a National Policy, which, by a judicious readjustment of the Tariff, will benefit and foster the agricultural, the mining, the manufacturing and other interests of the Dominion; that such a policy will retain in Canada thousands of our fellow countrymen now obliged to expatriate themselves in search of the employment denied them at home, will restore prosperity to our struggling industries, now so sadly depressed, will prevent Canada from being made a sacrifice market, will encourage and develop an active inter-provincial trade, and moving (as it ought to do) in the direction

[58] Macdonald Papers, 26336-26339.

> of a reciprocity of tariffs with our neighbors, so far as the varied interests of Canada may demand, will greatly tend to procure for this country, eventually, a reciprocity of trade.[59]

In defining his "National Policy" further, Macdonald stated clearly that it meant protection:

> If we had a protective system in this country, if we had a developed capital, we could, by giving our manufacturers a reasonable hold on our home trade, attain a higher position among the nations. If our factories were fenced round to a certain extent with protection...[we imposed] a tariff such as the necessities of Canada may demand, our national prosperity would be enhanced.[60]

Macdonald's "National Policy" would, as far as shown in the resolution and the following address, consist of a judicious readjustment of the tariff which would, to a certain extent, increase duties upon certain articles that were able to be produced and manufactured in Canada. In other words, it meant a moderate tariff. The main aim of this re-adjustment was to create a diversified national economy and establish an inter-provincial trade in order to prevent a population flow from Canada to the United States and finally to achieve a great, self-sufficient nation. He explained that reciprocity with the United States was not contradictory to protection, but if it was in Canada's interest, the only way to get it was to close the door and cut the United States out of Canadian markets. The important feature of his proposal was

[59] Debates, vol. 4 (1878), p. 854.

[60] Ibid., p. 857.

shown in his statement that "there must be a mixture of industries to bring out the national mind and the national strength and to form a national character".[61] Previously, many arguments were presented by the various defenders of agriculture, lumbering, mining and manufacturing, but Macdonald pointed out the importance of diversified economy for the nation, without putting emphasis on any specific industry.

Generally speaking, during the period between 1869 and 1878, there had been four groups in the House as identified by their attitude to "national policy". The first group insisted upon adopting Canada's own "national policy" mainly as retaliation against the United States. Rose proposed it for the first time and the Conservative members supported his argument. They seemed reluctant to define the content, probably to avoid counter-measures from the United States. The main aim of this group was still to get reciprocity. The second group appeared to be more concerned with the policy's effect on Canada. They argued that the introduction of protection on agricultural products would be Canada's "national policy" for it would make a domestic market for the Canadian farmers. They were chiefly Liberal members who represented farmers' interest. The third group originated

[61] Debates, vol. 4 (1878), p. 858.

among Liberal members from the industrial areas of Canada. Magill and Irving from Hamilton, and Devlin from Montreal Centre strongly stated that protection for manufacturers was to be Canada's "national policy". This argument later attracted Conservative members like Plumb and Colby. Moreover, Magill, Plumb and Colby argued that the protection of Canadian manufacturing should be considered in association with public works which, at the same time, provided the market for manufacturing and the job opportunity for immigrants. But they never called their scheme the "national policy". The fourth group opposed any protection and seemed to call free trade the "national policy" of Canada. Its position was sustained by Liberals and by one Conservative member from Nova Scotia. Within this group, the leader, Alexander Mackenzie, disliked giving a special meaning to the term "national policy". Therefore, the discussion that free trade would be Canada's "national policy" did not become prominent in the House.

Gradually, the "National Policy", not the "national policy", became the consensus. The content was a mixture of the opinions shown by the second and third groups. Although he might propose it to win votes in the election, Macdonald realized the necessity of cooperation of farmers and manufacturers as early as 1872. In 1876, the "National Policy" definitely came to mean the protective tariff on manufactured goods as well as on agricultural products and

became the slogan of the Conservatives. The protective tariff was expected to raise the revenue necessary for the construction of public works such as the Canadian Pacific Railway, and to get reciprocity with the United States. Such promises were urgently required to meet the aspirations of a people in a depression. Among the members of Parliament who used the term "national policy", the Liberal members from industrial areas agreed with the conclusion that moderate protection would be Canada's "National Policy".

Finally by 1878, the Conservative party expected more of the "National Policy". The party leader, John A. Macdonald, anticipated that the protective tariff would encourage all Canadian industries including manufacturing, lumbering, mining, fishing and agriculture. He hoped that "National Policy" would create a domestic market throughout the country, prevent emigration from Canada, and attract new immigrants. The Conservative party, at last, eagerly insisted that Canada could compete in the World with an independent economy which was to be attained only by adopting the "National Policy".

## II. Early Historians and the "National Policy"

For the half century between 1878 and 1939, Canadian historians and politicians understood the term "National Policy" to mean protection. The large majority defined it narrowly as the introduction of the protective tariffs by the Conservative party in 1879 and estimated the effect on Canadian development mainly in terms of economics. There were a few notable exceptions. J. C. Hopkins, a popular journalist at the turn of the century, suggested that the "National Policy" included not only tariff protection, but also the construction of the railways and canals, settlement in the North West and the extension of ocean communications. Moreover, he attempted for the first time to relate the "National Policy" to the evolution of Canadian nationalism. O. D. Skelton, also, tended to enlarge the contribution of the "National Policy" tariff by associating it with the development of both national unity and Canadian autonomy. After the First World War, H. A. Innis developed another theme, which Hopkins had suggested, in connecting "National Policy" with his thesis of the emergence of a separate nation upon the northern half of the continent as a result of east-west lines of communication. He concluded that the "National Policy" of tariff protection was designed to complete the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. His interpretation was

adopted by later historians.

. . . .

The term "National Policy" was clearly identified with the Conservative proposal for a protective tariff in the 1870's. In March, 1878, C. C. Colby, a Conservative member of Parliament, published a pamphlet in support of the Conservatives entitled Canada's National Policy[1] in which he treated Macdonald's resolution of the 12th of March as the "National Policy". The Dominion Annual Register and Review, 1880-1881[2] even put the term in the mouth of opposition leader Alexander Mackenzie in his attack on the government's fiscal policy which was presented in the House of Commons on February 13, 1880. The inference was quite incorrect as Mackenzie had carefully avoided associating such a question-begging term with his opponents, employing instead "the policy of the government" or "the policy of hon. gentlemen opposite".[3] But to the Register's reporter they were apparently identical and he reported Mackenzie's speech as follows:

> He denied that the National Policy had furnished more employment for labour, and contended that there was 'a much larger degree of distress than there was at the

[1]Canada's National Policy, Mr. C. C. Colby's speech on Tariff Revision (Ottawa: C. H. Mackintosh, 1878), a reprint of the speech in Parliament.

[2]H. J. Morgan ed. Dominion Annual Register and Review, 1880-1881 (Montreal: John Lovell & Son, 1882), pp. 36-38.

[3]The Debates of the House of Commons of Canada, 1880, pp. 15-23.

> time the late administration went out of office'. He pointed out that the failures in 1878 had only been $23,908,000, while those of 1879 aggregated $29,347,000, and held that 'at least half the manufacturers in the country' had been seriously injured by the National Policy....It had been declared by supporters of the Government that the National Policy was intended to be retaliatory against the United States;[4]

Other Liberals such as Richard Cartwright were not so careful as their leader and accepted the term "National Policy" for the protective tariffs introduced by Leonard Tilley in March, 1879. By 1891 it was firmly established in the political terminology of both political parties as applying to the system of protective tariffs introduced by the Conservatives and was used in this sense by both party leaders that year in their opening addresses to the electorate.[5]

The historical accounts of the period treated the "National Policy" much as did the politicians. Probably the first description of the "National Policy" in historical literature is found in Dent's The Last Forty Years.[6] John Charles Dent, a prominent journalist, resigned from the Globe in May 1880 and thereafter until his death in 1888,

[4]Morgan, Ibid., p. 37.

[5]John A. Macdonald, "To the Electors of Canada" (Ottawa: Feb. 7, 1891), Wilfrid Laurier, "To the Electors of Canada" (Quebec: Feb. 12, 1891) in Canada, An Encyclopaedia of the Country, vol. 1, ed. by John Castell Hopkins (Toronto: Linscott Pub. Co., 1898),pp. 398-404.

[6]John Charles Dent, The Last Forty Years: Canada since the Union of 1841. 2 vols. (Toronto: George Virtue, 1881).

devoted himself to the completion and publication of several history books and biographies. He explained the "National Policy" largely in terms of Macdonald's speech in the House of Commons on the 10th of March, 1876 pointing out that the advocates of the "National Policy" carefully abstained from any strict definition of its terms. Nevertheless, he defined it as "the adoption of a strongly protective tariff, whereby increased duties were imposed upon nearly all articles of commerce".[7] Revenue was a secondary consideration. Though he noticed the wide diversity of opinion on the estimation of the "National Policy", Dent admitted that there was a strong popular demand for an increased tariff to which the Liberal government had been forced to accede. Under the Conservative administration, which the "National Policy" greatly contributed to elect, business of all kind was vigorous, money was plentiful and obtainable, poverty was comparatively unknown and the outlook was decidedly hopeful. He also implied that the adoption of the "National Policy" would contribute to the modification of relations existing between Canada and Great Britain: that is, the establishment of greater Canadian independence.

In the 1880's, because of successive Conservative victories at general elections, historians readily admitted

[7] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 550.

the success of the "National Policy" at least in the winning of popular support. J. E. Collins, in his Life and Times of the Right Honourable Sir John A. Macdonald,[8] estimated the effect of the "National Policy", as "a thorough reorganization of the tariff",[9] which produced sufficient revenue for the current expenses of the country, stimulated and protected home industry, enticed capital to the country, and kept Canadian artisans employed at home. The "National Policy" raised revenue and brought the appearance of an era of prosperity to Canada. "By its legislation it has done... an enormous amount of good",[10] he concluded.

But after the death of John A. Macdonald in 1891 and with the end of the brief period of prosperity in the 1880's, the historians' tone gradually changed. They became less profuse in their admiration for the "National Policy". J. G. Bourinot,[11] J. N. McIlwraith,[12] A. P. Cockburn,[13] F. B.

[8]Joseph Edmund Collins, Life and Times of the Right Honourable Sir John A. Macdonald (Toronto: Rose Publishing Co., 1883).

[9]Ibid., p. 419.

[10]Ibid., p. 422.

[11]John George Bourinot, Canada (London: T. F. Unwin, 1897), Canada under British Rule, 1760-1900 (Toronto: Copp, Clark, 1901).

[12]Jean Newton McIlwraith, Canada (Toronto: W. Briggs, 1899).

[13]Alexander Peter Cockburn, Political Annals of Canada; 1608-1905 (Toronto: Musson Book, 1905).

Tracy[14] and C. G. D. Roberts[15] who wrote general histories of Canada about the turn of the century did not pay much attention to the "National Policy" but they all regarded it as the protective policy. Even Joseph Pope, who, for ten years, had been a private secretary to Macdonald, did not give a high evaluation of the "National Policy" in his works on Sir John A. Macdonald.[16] He defined the "National Policy" as "a system of modified protection which it was hoped would both stimulate the industries of the country and provide a sufficient revenue".[17] He implied that after the institution of the "National Policy", Macdonald felt free to revert to the transcontinental railway and the policy of developing the North West.

The first major expansion of the meaning of the term "National Policy" appears in work of J. Castell Hopkins, for some years in the service of the Imperial Bank and author of

[14] Frank Basil Tracy, The Tercentenary History of Canada, from Champlain to Laurier (New York: P. F. Collier, 1908), 3 vols.

[15] Charles George Douglas Roberts, A History of Canada (Toronto: Morang Educational Co. 1909).

[16] Joseph Pope, Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald, G. C. B., First Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada (Toronto: Musson Book Co. 1894), The Day of Sir John Macdonald vol. 29: Chronicles of Canada (Toronto: Glasgow, Brook & Co., 1915), Correspondence; Selections from the correspondence of the Right Hon. Sir John Alexander Macdonald: first prime minister of Canada (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1921).

[17] The Day of Sir John Macdonald, p. 112-3; Correspondence, p. 243.

an excellent fiscal history of Canada as a part of his five volume, Canada, An Encyclopaedia of the Country.[18] Hopkins found the origin of the "National Policy" in the depressed state of the Canadian economy in the 1870's caused by pressure from the United States, the unfair relationship between the two countries and Canada's powerless position in world fiscal markets.

He expanded the then traditional meaning of the term in attempting to defend it from its critics. Proposing that the "National Policy" should not be judged only in the context of the protective tariff but in its "entirety", he stated;

> ...without any expression of personal opinion, I propose to let these [the official figures of the Dominion] tell the tale, merely premising that the National Policy, so-called, should be judged in its entirety, and as including the building of the Canadian Railway, the development of the canals, the practical creation of the North-West, and the extension of ocean communications, as well as in the attempted promotion of industrial and commercial activity by means of new fiscal regulations.[19]

He was prepared to admit the partial failure of the "National Policy". The population of Canada had not increased as anticipated and the emigration of Canadians to the United States continued. Monopolies which were produced by the

[18] John Castell Hopkins, "Section IV, Trade and Tariffs; The Fiscal History of Canada", vol. I: Canada, An Encyclopaedia of the Country, ed. by J. C. Hopkins (Toronto: Linscott Pub. Co., 1898), pp. 285-294.

[19] Ibid., p. 291.

tariff caused much political corruption. The national debt had risen. Nevertheless, with the aid of his new definition, Hopkins was able to conclude that the "National Policy" was "so far as the general comforts of a people, the development of a new country, and the support of the public may be proofs, distinctly beneficial".[20]

In his next work on Canadian history, The Story of the Dominion, Hopkins provided one chapter called "The National Policy of Protection".[21] His discussion on the "National Policy" was almost the same as in his previous work. However, he added one more important meaning to it; that is, the institution of "National Policy" tariff was a response to the underlying movement of growing Canadian nationalism. Here again, he deplored that the policy was generally considerd as limited in popular conception to the increased duties in 1879 from 17.5 to an average of about 30 per cent. "It had, in reality, a far wider range", he said. "The National Policy covered a very wide field--one far beyond the conception of it as being a mere matter of increased fiscal duties".[22] The encouragement of industrial develop-

[20] Ibid., p. 294.

[21] John Castell Hopkins, The Story of the Dominion: Four Hundred Years in the Annals of Half a Continent (n.p.: 1904), pp. 418-429.

[22] Ibid., p. 427.

ment by the duties, the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, the avoidance of isolation of the North West and British Columbia, the development of ocean communication with the Orient and inter-provincial trade could not have been actualized without the "National Policy", he claimed.

J. S. Willison, well known for his Liberal interpretation of Canadian politics, developed the criticism of the "National Policy" as a protective tariff, in his work, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party.[23] He clearly drew a line between a protective tariff and a revenue tariff in which incidental protection was necessarily included. "It is just as rational to argue that a protective tariff may not fall below 50 per cent. as to contend that a revenue tariff may not rise above 17.5 per cent."[24] He enumerated several bad influences of protection on the country, such as the drawing away from Great Britain, the sacrifice of the interests of the masses for the benefit of the favoured class, political corruption and the creation of an unfavourable climate for securing reciprocity with the United States. According to Willison, "no fiscal measure of more far-reaching significance was ever framed by a Canadian Ministry",[25]

[23] J. S. Willison, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party: A Political History, 2 vols. (Toronto: George N. Morang and Co., 1903).

[24] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 216.

[25] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 290.

than the new tariff measure by the Liberals in 1897 which, he claimed, abolished the "National Policy".

Thereafter, until the appearance of Skelton's works, Canadian history books offered almost the same picture of the "National Policy". It meant a protective tariff which brought economic prosperity to the country. Even its expression differed little among authors such as W. B. Munro,[26] G. R. Parkin,[27] George Bryce,[28] and John Lewis.[29] There seemed to be no attempt to employ Hopkins' broad interpretation. Of these historians, George Parkin gave the "National Policy"

[26]W. Bennett Munro, Canada and British North America, vol. IX: The History of North America (Philadelphia: George Barrie & Sons, 1905). He said that the adoption of a protective tariff was henceforth known as the "National Policy" and the industrial and commercial revival seemed to justify it. Ibid., pp. 448-450.

[27]G. R. Parkin, Sir John A. Macdonald, vol. 9: The Makers of Canada (Toronto: Morang, 1911), pp. 217-230.

[28]George Bryce, A Short History of the Canadian People (London, 1914). He wrote that Sir John Macdonald called an incidental protection, the "National Policy", and admired him for having shown skill in his "National Policy" of protection in trade while Great Britain kept free trade and in the United States and Australia the Liberals not the Conservatives took to protection. Ibid., p. 410, 489.

[29]John Lewis, The Dominion Political Development, part I, vol. 6: Canada and Its Provinces: A history of the Canadian people and their institutions by one hundred associates, ed. by Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty (Toronto: The Publisher's Association of Canada Ltd., 1913). "In the session of 1878, the last held before the general election, Macdonald moved the resolution which is regarded as representing most clearly the idea of the National Policy....In any case the country was satisfied, and the government received the full benefit of its satisfaction". Ibid., pp. 81-82, p. 88.

the highest praise. According to his version, the "National Policy", in providing protection to native industries, followed the line of the country's true interest and "went far to create in Canada a higher and more confident national spirit".[30] Parkin also stated that "Protection to native industries--the so-called National Policy--was adopted in all its main features by the Liberal party on its accession to power in 1896".[31] He seemed to be the first historian who defined Liberal party's fiscal policy of 1896 as the continuation of the "National Policy".

For the most part, the reminiscences and early biographies of prominent politicians applied the term "National Policy" strictly to the tariff. Leonald Tilley's biographer James Hannay quotes Tilley as saying that by "National Policy" he meant "the protection of the industries of the country".[32] Richard Cartwright, Minister of Finance in the Mackenzie cabinet, freely damned the "National Policy" in his Reminiscences.[33] He argued that if the Reciprocity Treaty had been accepted at that time, the so-called "National Policy" would not have

[30]Parkin, Ibid., p. 230.

[31]Ibid., p. 262.

[32]James Hannay, The Life and Times of Sir Leonard Tilley being a Political History of New Brunswick for the Past Seventy Years (St. John: 1897), p. 362.

[33]Richard Cartwright, Reminiscences (Toronto: William Briggs, 1912).

appeared. He quoted Dalton McCarthy's statement that the "National Policy" was adopted by the Conservative party by accident.[34] Refusing to recognize that the general election of 1878 was a victory of the "National Policy", he claimed that the main reason for the Liberals' defeat was the determined hostility of the Orange Order. He insisted, as a United Empire Loyalist, that the Conservatives' "National Policy" might endanger the British connection. He also contended that the Conservatives used a false census return to prove that the "National Policy" had called a great number of new industires into existence.

Charles Tupper, writing in 1914, gave a somewhat broader interpretation of "National Policy". Though he was not the first politician to use the term "National Policy" and his attitude toward protection had been rather ambiguous before 1877, Tupper was regarded as the real founder of the "National Policy" by historians such as Parkin or Saunders,[35] and above all, by Tupper himself. "The policy is known today, as it was then, as the 'National Policy'", Tupper stated, "a name which I coined in the heat of a prolonged debate in the

[34]D. McCarthy's speech was made on Oct. 22nd, 1893 at St. Mary's. His speech was also quoted by J. S. Willison as a proof of Conservatives' opportunism.

[35]Parkin, Ibid., p. 218. E. M. Saunders ed., The Life and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Tupper, Bart., K. C. M. G. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1916), P.265.

House of Commons in February of 1870".[36] Tupper defended the policy by citing its wide and happy effects on the country:

> Our fiscal policy gave Canadians a new sense of independence, preserved their home markets to a certain degree, developed our manufacturing industries, protected our farmers, and, by giving employment to our people at home, provided us with the revenue to carry out a vigorous railway policy. It stopped the exodus of our young people to the United States, led to the settlement of the North-West, and the development of an enormous interprovincial trade made possible by the existence of railways as well as the great canal system perfected from year to year.[37]

He especially emphasized its effect upon the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. "I have always maintained, and still fervently believe", he said, "that the construction of the Canadian Pacific would have been an impossibility without the inauguration of the National Policy of the Conservative party".[38] But it is important to note that while Tupper claimed the building of the railway and the development of the west as results of "National Policy", he did not, as did Hopkins earlier, include them as part of the policy itself. The politicians who were involved in the institution of the

[36] Charles Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years in Canada (London: Cassell, 1914), p. 153. See also, W. A. Harkin ed., Political Reminiscences of the Right Honourable Sir Charles Tupper, Bart (London: Constable & Co., 1914), p. 120. Harkin wrote that "Future historians will not fail to give Sir Charles credit for having been the pioneer advocate of a distinctively national policy of protection". Ibid., p. 141.

[37] Tupper, Ibid., p. 151. See also Ibid., p. 171.

[38] Ibid., p. 151.

"National Policy" were much more careful in attributing meaning and intent to the policy than were later historians.

Oscar Douglas Skelton could be called one of the earliest professional historians in Canada. Before becoming an Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1925, he devoted himself to historical writing for almost ten years. Through all his works, the "National Policy" consistently meant the adoption of the protective tariff. In most of his books, General Economic History, 1867-1912, The Day of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, The Canadian Dominion and Life and Times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt,[39] Skelton highly evaluated the "National Policy" in terms of the political and economic development of Canada. He insisted that the "National Policy" was a Canadian policy which did not belong to either political party. The "National Policy" was expected to preserve the home market, to open the American market by forcing the United States into reciprocity with Canada, to provide revenue, to develop trade among the Provinces, to stimulate industrial life by extending employment opportunity and finally to

[39]Oscar Douglas Skelton, General Economic History, 1867-1912, vol. IX: Canada and Its Provinces: A history of the Canadian people and their institutions by one hundred associates, ed. by Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty (Toronto: The Publisher's Association of Canada, 1913). The Day of Sir Wilfred Laurier: A Chronicle of Our Own Times, vol. 30: Chronicles of Canada, ed. by George Wrong and H. H. Langton (Toronto: Glasgow, Brook & Co., 1916). The Canadian Dominion: A Chronicle of Our Northern Neighbor, vol. 49: Chronicles of America, ed. by Allen Johnson (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1919). Life and Times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt (Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1920).

secure national self-sufficiency. In short, according to Skelton, the "National Policy" was of fundamental importance in Canadian economic life in the late nineteenth century. He praised the effect of the "National Policy" in making the Canadian economy healthier as well as changing the deficits into surplus by providing a larger revenue. He specifically noted that, "There was a notable revival in manufacturing activity in 1879, thanks to the improvement in United States conditions and the adoption of the National Policy".[40]

Skelton also recognized the political effect of the "National Policy". "The demand for a higher tariff", he said, "was not based solely on economic ground".[41] The "National Policy" was directed towards the same object as the movement for Canada First. Patriotism was reflected in the "National Policy" both positively in love of one's own country and negatively in dislike of other lands, such as Great Britain and the United States. As a result, "all responsible parties were in favour of maintaining at least the existing measure of protection...there was...no party ready to put in force a free trade policy".[42]

In The Canadian Dominion which was published shortly after the First World War, he added one more important role for the "National Policy" in saying that it had contributed

[40] General Economic History, pp. 186-187.

[41] Ibid., p. 145.

[42] Ibid., p. 146.

to the growth of Canadian self-government in matters of trade and tariffs. Macdonald in 1879 "had carried still further the policy of levying duties upon English as well as foreign goods".[43] In emphasizing the "National Policy"'s contibution to Canadian autonomy, Skelton was revealing what proved to be a major preoccupation both as a historian and later as Under-Secretary in the Department of External Affaris.

It was apparent, however, that Skelton's version of the "National Policy" in Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier[44] changed in comparison with those given in the previous works. He defined it as a Conservative policy which was a compromise between tariffs for revenue and incidental protection designed to gain public favour and he questioned the result. After quoting Laurier's statement in 1887 that Confederation failed to attain national unity, Skelton inquired: "If Confederation had not brought national unity,...had the National Policy given the economic benefits its sponsors had promised? The trial had been shorter, but the evidence of failure was almost equally strong".[45] Skelton accepted Laurier's state-

[43] The Canadian Dominion, p. 191.

[44] O. D. Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 2 vols. (Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1921).

[45] Life and Letters, vol. I, p. 356.

ment that the "National Policy" had failed to force reciprocity with the United States, to create inter-provincial trade and to develop the promised home market. Nevertheless, he could not avoid the comment that "The tariff had been reduced [in 1897 by Laurier's administration] :...it had been made more distinctly a tariff for revenue,...but it remained a national-policy tariff still".[46]

Skelton's attitude toward the "National Policy" illustrates his basic interpretation of Canadian history as a Canadian nationalist. It is obvious that he favoured economic independence from Great Britain and from the United States as well as political independence. Protection was of much assistance in Canada's development into nationhood. When he mentioned the victory of the "National Policy" in 1878, he said that "nationalism proved stronger than imperialism".[47] He, after all, did not seem to depart from this feeling. The trouble is to find the reason why he could not maintain his interpretation of the "National Policy" consistently. Probably the closer his connection with the Liberal party became, especially his friendly personal relationship with Laurier, the more he tended to support the Liberal argument

[46] Life and Letters, vol. II, p. 355. Here, Skelton used the term "national policy" in small letters for the first time.

[47] General Economic History, p. 146.

against a policy with which he, himself, seemed to agree in principle.

D. G. Creighton has suggested that the historians who did most of their work after World War I were regarded as the second generation of professional Canadian historians. "The group included Duncan MacArthur, R. G. Trotter, and H. A. Innis; its senior member was Chester Martin".[48] Chester Bailey Martin is a unique historian in the historiography of "National Policy" since he did not mention the term at all in his works. Moreover, he seems to have avoided using the term deliberately. His refusal to employ the term is itself significant. His primary concern as shown in his Empire and Commonwealth[49] of 1929 was the achievement of responsible government in Canada which he recognized as the most dynamic attainment of Canadian history. He developed the same idea further in his last work, Foundations of Canadian Nationhood.[50] The establishment of responsible government and its expansion in range from sea to sea was the most distinctive feature of Canadian nationhood.

[48] D. G. Creighton, "Professor Emericus Chester Martin, 1882-1958", Proceedings of Royal Society of Canada, 1958, p. 93.

[49] Chester Bailey Martin, Empire and Commonwealth; Studies in Governance and Self-government in Canada (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929).

[50] C. B. Martin, Foundations of Canadian Nationhood (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1955).

For him, the policy which contributed to the achievement of Canadian nationhood, in other words, what spread autonomy from sea to sea, was his "national policy". Sometimes he used the term "Canadian policy" for a policy of land settlement in the West. But it is obvious that Martin avoided the use of the word "national policy", because he regarded Canadian nationhood as being a political, rather than an economic achievement to which the "National Policy" hardly contributed.

If Martin emphasized politics, his equally famous contemporary, Harold Adams Innis, went even further in an assertion of geographic and economic determinism to explain Canadian national development in terms of east-west lines of communication. Innis argued that the unique characteristic of Canadian nationhood was established in very early stage of development by the 'staple' trade and the relationships which developed between the St. Lawrence and the metropolitan areas in Europe and the United States. Thus, the development of manufacturing in Canada and the related "National Policy" never occupied a central theme in his studies. Government policy like "National Policy" only assisted Canada's development toward a separate nation on the North American continent but did not play a primary role. Within this limitation, he occasionally did refer to the "National Policy", not in the narrow sense of the tariff alone but in the broader sense of its relation to the Canadian economy.

Innis did not mention the term at all in his first work, A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway.[51] But when he did consider the "National Policy", it was largely to demonstrate its encouragement of east-west systems of transportation. In his article "Transportation as a factor in Canadian economic history",[52] Innis stated that the first aim of the fiscal policy of Canada was directly linked to improvement of transportation by providing funds. The second aim was to develop manufactures, trade and traffic for the growth of centers of large population. The "National Policy" of tariff protection, he suggested, encouraged both:

> ...the National Policy, which provided a gurantee of earnings on traffic carried within Canadian territory in case of success in keeping out goods and protecting the manufacturer, and a gurantee of revenue in case of failure to keep our goods with which to pay the deficit due to loss of traffic. The double-barrelled effectiveness of the policy was enhanced by recovery from the depression and the energetic construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway.[53]

For Innis, the protective tariff of "National Policy" was most important in increasing the traffic of manufactured goods

[51] Harold Adams Innis, A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1923).

[52] H. A. Innis, "Transportation as a Factor in Canadian Economic History" (1931) in Essays in Canadian Economic History (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1956), pp. 62-77.

[53] Ibid., p. 72.

with the result of decreased freight costs to the producers of raw materials. In other words, it was the railways which needed protection in 1878. "The National Policy was designed not only to increase revenue from customs from the standpoint of the waterways but also to increase revenue from traffic from the standpoint of railways".[54]

In 1933, Innis contributed a new analysis of the intent of the "National Policy". Examining the result of the "National Policy" on Canadian industry in Part II of Select Documents in Canadian Economic History, 1783-1885,[55] he defined the "national policy" tariff as follows;

> The national policy brought higher tariffs designed to check dumping, to increase revenue, and to hasten the importation of capital essential to the prosecution of railroads....Moreover, it was designed to increase trade with Great Britain and stimulate traffic on the St. Lawrence....The national policy increased duties to a large extent on American products and to a less extent on British products.[56]

He concluded that the "national policy" encouraged Canadian manufactures like woolens, cotton, boots and shoes, tobacco, door sash and blind industries but damaged the manufactures of the Maritimes. One wonders how many, if any, of the politicians responsible for the introduction of the "National

[54] Ibid., p. 76.

[55] H. A. Innis ed., Select Documents in Canadian Economic History, 1783-1885 (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1933), Part II.

[56] Ibid., pp. 820-821.

Policy" were aware of the intricate mosaic of intention which Innis attributed to them.

In a study, complementary to the Report of the Royal Commission Provincial Economic Inquiry[57] of Nova Scotia in 1934, Innis gave his only detailed analysis of the "national policy"[58] in explaining its impact on that province. As a matter of course, he began his argument with the water transportation which was the key to the development of the St. Lawrence region and the Maritimes. Since water transportation and the predominance of the Precambrian geological formation had formed the bases of Canadian economy, the Maritimes too were tied to the metropolitan economy of Europe or the United States and the production of raw materials. The decline of one staple was always accompanied by the rise of others. Wheat, for example, became essential to the Canadian economy and necessitated the building of canals and railways. "In direct line of descent came the national policy which included an increase in the tariff, increase in traffic over canals and railways and the extension of a railway to the Pacific".[59] The "national policy" was designed to ease the problem of

[57]Province of Nova Scotia, Report of the Royal Commission Provincial Economic Inquiry (Halifax: 1934), pp. 131-230.

[58]He seemed not to make a clear distinction between the terms "national policy" in small letters and "National Policy" in capitalized letters through this work.

[59]Ibid., p. 133.

debt, to stimulate traffic and trade with the Maritimes by the railway and the St. Lawrence ship channel and to increase the demand for coal and to stimulate its production in the Maritimes.

The main part of Innis' report was devoted to the examination of the effect of the "national policy" on the economy of Nova Scotia. "The National Policy undoubtedly hastened the change and contributed to the disruption of economic life in Nova Scotia",[60] he stated. Nova Scotians had been worried that the tariff under the "national policy" might prevent the export of coal, iron and steel products. But in relation to this point the "national policy" had a beneficial influence on Nova Scotia. "In so far as the national policy contributed to the opening up of Western Canada, it exercised a far more powerful influence on the growth of iron and steel and coal industries of Nova Scotia".[61] Contrary to the other historians, Innis relegated the influence of the "national policy" on manufacturing to second place. "The National Policy had its effects not only on railroads and related industries, but also on other industries....The growth of sheltered industries such as oil refining, textiles, sugar

[60] Ibid., p. 135. Except a few cases, Innis usually used the term in lowercase letters.

[61] Ibid., p. 137.

and chocolate, was a further result".[62]

The results of his concentration on the Maritimes were apparent in a later definition of the term. He still meant the protective tariff in using the term "national policy", but the aims of the tariff were extended in his mind and he almost included the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railways as a part of it:

> A 'National Policy' designed to check imports of American goods dumped into the Canadian market during the depression of the seventies, to increase traffic over the Intercolonial to the Maritimes, to increase consumption of Nova Scotia coal, and to complete the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway was initiated in 1878.[63]

Furthermore, in "The Canadian Mining Industry", he asserted that Charles Tupper supported both the "national policy" and the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, because he was a former premier of Nova Scotia who effectively represented the coal interests of the province.[64] Although he did not clearly state it, he seemed, finally, to include both tariff and railway policies in the "national policy" before the appearance of the Rowell-Sirois Report.

The assessment of the "National Policy" was influenced by the political biases of the historians as had been the case with politicians in the House. For instance, J. S.

[62] Ibid., pp. 140-141.

[63] H. A. Innis, "An Introduction to Canadian Economic Studies", in The Dairy Industry in Canada ed. by Innis (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937), pp. xiii-xiv.

[64] H. A. Innis, "The Canadian Mining Industry" (1941) in Essays, p. 313.

Willison's most unfavorable estimation of it can be attributed to his Liberal bias, while Parkin gave a pro-Conservative interpretation of the "National Policy". Most early historians discussed the "National Policy" mainly in terms of the economic development of Canada.

Although J. C. Hopkins had pioneered a major expansion of the concept of "national Policy" before the end of the nineteenth century, his interpretation apparently had slight immediate impact. It remained for other historians to extend the term in a more gradual fashion. O. D. Skelton raised the term to prominence as a theme in Canadian political development by associating it with the achievement of Canadian autonomy and national unity. H. A. Innis enlarged its content in a slightly different direction with his emphasis on railways. By the early 1930's most of the factors which would be treated by later scholars as essential ingredients of "National Policy" had at least been touched upon.

## III. Emergence of "national policies"

The Rowell-Sirois Report and the background studies which accompanied it were major contributors in establishing the term "National Policy" as a central theme in post-Confederation history. Of these, W. A. Mackintosh's work was of primary importance. It distinguished between "National Policy" and "national policy" and asserted for the latter what would become the classic interpretation of the term as a tripartite design for national development, including tariffs, railways and western settlement. This interpretation became a central thesis in the Report itself. The Commission's scholars, who were interested in their own plans for positive governmental action in combatting the depression and developing the country, were strongly attracted to a concept which implied the existence during the previous half-century of a coherent and effective blueprint for nation-building; one which portrayed the central government as its primary agent.

. . . .

The Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (or Rowell-Sirois Commission as it was more commonly known) was appointed in 1937 to recommend solutions to economic and constitutional problems in federal-provincial relations which had seemed to paralyze the various government's ability to deal effectively with the Great Depression. The Commissioners

recruited many leading scholars of the country to prepare studies on specialized aspects of the problem. W. A. Mackintosh, head of the Department of Political Economy of Queens University, was entrusted with one of the most important of these. His study, which was published in 1939 under the title The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations,[1] became one of the cornerstones in the historiography of "national policy".

Mackintosh used the term in capitalized letters when referring specifically to the protective tariffs adopted by Tilley in 1879. At the same time, he appeared to expand the meaning of the term "national policy" remarkably, by suggesting that every policy which could promote Canadian development and integration within a national economy could be regarded as a "national policy". Therefore, Canada's national policy had existed even before Confederation. Between 1857 and 1869, Canada was eager to acquire the British territory of the great central plain to follow the North American type of development to which the great frontier would contribute. As a result, the settlement in the West and the creation of transportation systems through the new territory became

[1] W. A. Mackintosh, The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations, appendix III of the Royal Commission Report on Dominion-Provincial Relation, Carleton Library, No. 13 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964. First published in 1939.).

"national policy" by the time of Confederation. In 1879, the "National Policy" of tariff protection which, unlike the other two, had not preceded Confederation was added to the "national policy". It was "a definite decision" which "was taken for the promotion of industrialization within Canada through the means of protective customs duties".[2] The alternative national policy would be the restoration of reciprocity with the United States, because "the protective tariff as an instrument for industrialization was only a second best to unrestricted reciprocity".[3] But Mackintosh did not examine the suitability of reciprocity--which was never realized--for the national economic integration of Canada. The "national policy" of tariff protection was firmly established in Canada by 1887 and the Canadian tariff remained comparatively stable until 1930. The protective tariff was definitely related to settlement and transportation policies. It was to be a means by which new markets would be opened in the west and elsewhere and east-west traffic would be promoted.

These were the factors in directing the course of national development during the period between 1896 and 1920. Thus, despite a very broad definition at the beginning of

[2] Ibid., p. 25.

[3] Ibid., p. 30.

discussion, Mackintosh gradually narrowed his focus to the issue associated with the term --settlement, railways and tariffs--as Hopkins did for the early decades of the twentieth century. He saw these as units of a single policy; "Western settlement, all-Canadian transportation, and industrialization by the protective tariff made up a three-fold policy of which the determining lines were set before 1890".[4]

Though the "national policy" had produced some regional conflicts, the aim of the policy, namely Canada's integration within a national economy, was almost attained by 1929, due mainly to world circumstances favourable to the Canadian economy. As a proof of the attainment, the Dominion government returned the remaining public lands to the prairie provinces in 1929. Mackintosh concluded that, since the crisis of 1929, another national policy, the use of a monetary device to maintain the value of the Canadian dollar had replaced western settlement as the third part of the national policy.

The Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations followed closely the path outlined by Mackintosh. It also distinguished between "National Policy" and "national policies":

> The expression 'national policies' as used throughout

[4] Ibid., p. 140.

> this Report refers to federal economic policies such as western settlement, all-Canadian transportation and protective tariffs. In the capitalized singular form the 'National Policy' refers solely to the policy of protection adopted in 1879.[5]

Chronologically, according to the Report, the "national policies" were adopted gradually between the time of Confederation and 1879, acquired some modifications by 1896 and achieved their expectations by 1921. The "national policies" were expected to fill the empty spaces of the North-west with people, to bring about economic expansion and integration and, finally, by fostering a new sense of nationhood with a transcontinental economy, to achieve political unity. These formed the programme for achieving Canadian nationhood, the first steps of which were to link the isolated regions with railways, to create a basis for internal trade and to promote the development of the unsettled West. The two "national policies", transportation and tariffs, were very closely related. Only a transcontinental transportation system could encourage direct intercourse between the separate regions. It would promote the settlement of the North-west and insure that settlement would provide a basis for expansion. On the other hand, the protective tariff would develop the East-west

[5] Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I, Canada: 1867-1939 (Ottawa: 1940), p. 50, Notes 9. In spite of its definition of "national policies", the Report devoted little attention to the settlement policy of the Canadian government.

traffic in the protected goods.

The "National Policy" was adopted in 1879, because it was considered the only large-scale remedy of the great depression which had affected Canada after 1873. At that time, as all efforts to renew the reciprocity treaty had been in vain, the old agitation for a policy of protection to domestic industries revived. It "would be a powerful instrument for promoting domestic production in a wide range of articles and for diverting trade from international into interprovincial channels".[6] The "National Policy" of 1879 was expected to be the panacea for the depression; moreover, it was to foster a Canadian national spirit by industrialization at the same time. The protective tariff system in Canada was established by 1887 and has never afterwards seriously altered.

Nevertheless, the Report admitted that the "national policies" initially failed to achieve their aims. "Yet for thirty years Canada was a land of emigration helping to people the frontier and cities of the United States".[7] The government had to retreat from its former railway policies and to lower the tariff, during the early nineties. It seemed also to fail in its political objectives. The inter-provincial conference of 1887 in Quebec challenged the view

[6] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

[7] Ibid., p. 53.

of a highly centralized and dominant government at Ottawa which, according to the Report, was the aim of the "national policies" since Confederation.

The magic of wheat which "brought a flood of settlers into the West" and "precipitated a new era of railway development and spurred on the industrialization of Central Canada"[8] made a vast and sudden transformation of the situation. Wheat linked the interests of the different regions and realized a new integrated economic life in Canada. Moreover, it fostered a new sense of nationhood. The main purposes of the "national policies" were suddenly achieved within a few years with the favourable conjuncture of world events after 1896.

The Report argued that the "national policies" had attained their ends. Firstly, the settlement of the Northwest was largely accomplished by 1913. Without these "national policies", an economically loose transcontinental area could not have been transformed into an integrated national economy. Secondly, the industrial expansion of Canada after 1896 was remarkable and in this point, the "national policies" contributed directly. By 1913, the country was equipped with major industrial facilities, about half of which were financed from abroad. Thirdly, the defeat of reciprocity in 1911 showed one instance of the achievement of Canadian nationhood to which the "national policies" contributed.

In the few years between 1896 and 1913, the Report

[8] Ibid., p. 66.

declared, the structure of the Canadian economy was basically changed. A highly specialized, predominantly industrial economy was established. Increasing prosperity fortified the political structure of Confederation and produced a national spirit such as had never existed before. Canada, not only overcame the threat of annexation to the United States, but also established a concrete, positive nation. But how specifically these developments were affected by the "national policies" the Report did not say. Laurier's wellknown remark that "the twentieth century belongs to Canada" was to be realized by wheat within the general framework of the "national policies".

According to the Report, the year 1921 was an important watershed for the "national policies". At the general election of 1921, the Progressives won 65 seats and this phenomenon was regarded as a revolt against the old "national policies". Though the "national policies" were continued without any significant changes in the 1920's, their influence was limited, and the growing diversity of regional interests became apparent. In the 1930's, however, the "national policies" intensified the disastrous condition caused by the Great Depression. Unfortunately, the policies "could not be sharply reversed, since the economic,...and the political unity of the country was still basically dependent upon them".[9] The Report, finally, advocated that in order

[9] Ibid., p. 185.

to preserve the national unity and welfare, "new policies should be inaugurated and developed to stimulate and give dynamic direction to new national expansion".[10] Some fields like social welfare (e.g. unemployment relief and old age pensions) or the federal policies of taxation (e.g. National Adjustment Grants), and monetary policy were mentioned as potential new national policies.

The importance of the Report in the historiography of "national policy" cannot be questioned. The main contribution of the Report was not only in the definition of the term, but in a full-scale discussion of the content. The Report described immigration, railways and protective tariffs as a tripartite "national policy" of Canada and examined its role in Canadian development. Later historians added only a few items to the "national policy". On the other hand, a weak point of the Report is its inconsistency in stressing the importance of "national policies" in developing the country while attributing their success to other causes. The Report stated that without the wheat boom and a favourable conjunction of the world market, the "national policies" would have been themselves largely ineffective.

After the publication of the Report, historians' version

[10] Ibid., p. 201.

of "national policy" was more or less influenced by the conclusions of the Report. J. B. Brebner, a Canadian who spent most of his professional career in the United States, however, is an exception. As a continentalist historian emphasizing the interrelation of Canada and the United States, he did not see the "national policy" as such an important theme in Canada's development. Though he discussed the necessity of raising the revenue from protective tariffs to construct an effective transportation system to make Canada separate from the United States and referred to the patriotic aspects of Canadian protection, he did not use the term "national policy" in his best-known work, North Atlantic Triangle.[11] In his last Book, Canada: A Modern History,[12] Brebner gave a very short description of "National Policy". He restricted his use of the term solely to Macdonald's election slogan in 1878 and explained it as a response to growing Canadian nationalism and material-minded considerations which emerged and were blended in the late 1860's. According to Brebner, Macdonald designed the slogan as protectionism which drew upon the interest aroused by the Canada Firsters.

[11]John Bartlet Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, The United States and Great Britain (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1945).

[12]J. B. Brebner, Canada: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1960).

For A. R. M. Lower, as well as Brebner, the "national policy" did not become the main theme in Canada's development. He confused the usage of the terms "national policy" and "National Policy" in his major work, Colony to Nation.[13] Usually, when he employed the term in capital letters, it was clear from the context that he was referring to the protective tariff of 1879. But sometimes "national policy" in small letters stood for the protective tariff (e. g. "the national policy and the railway policy of the Conservative".[14]). On other occasions, he used the term "National Policies" in capitalized, plural form for the general policies of the Conservatives (e. g. "The atmosphere of religious hatred prevailing in Canada of the 1870's and 1880's accounted for political changes to a greater degree than did National Policies".[15]).

Lower favoured protection which was one instance of the conscious and successful efforts to build a metropolitan Canada, although he estimated the political effect of the protective tariffs as more advantageous than the economic. On the basis that political and economic freedom was indivisible,

[13] A. R. M. Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1946).

[14] Ibid., p. 380.

[15] Ibid., p. 367.

the application of the protective policy implied the occasion for a considerable extension of Canadian autonomy. Moreover, he said that Canada had needed "a nation building policy". In this way "the Dominion of Canada represented a planned society: Canada was never the negative, laissez-faire state of the individualist doctrinaires but a positive state from the beginning, a semi-socialistic state, the top layer of whose society was the beneficiary, rather than the bottom".[16] But in the economic sphere, Lower pointed to several disastrous failures. The protective tariff promoted emigration from Canada to the United States by 1896, mainly because of the better economic conditions in the American states. Emigrants would gain "the cheaper prices of manufactured goods and their better quality compared with those made in Canada behind a tariff".[17] Later, he said, the Rowell-Sirois Report showed clearly that "Canada consisted in "have" and "have not" provinces...the "have" provinces benefited materially from national policies, especially the protective tariff".[18] He did not define clearly what the "national policies" were, but probably, he inherited the interpretation of the Report. He only hinted that Macdonald's tariffs

[16] Ibid., p. 373.

[17] Ibid., p. 419.

[18] Ibid., p. 523.

dignified by the name of "National Policy" and the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway were "parts of a national policy in a wider sense".[19] The "national policy" put up a fiscal fence around the railway, he said. He hardly put settlement into the "national policies", because he believed that the settlement of the Canadian West was an aspect of the "westward movement" of North America.

According to Lower, Macdonald's "National Policy" had a serious shortcoming. It led to the tendency of many financial institutions to become associated with Conservatism and as a result, brought a kind of capitalistic socialism in Canada. Lower attacked Macdonald's policies, characteristics and his personality, most severely, but was less than consistent in commenting favourably on Laurier's policies which were essentially similar to Sir John's. According to Lower, Laurier's programme was "a national policy, not called such, of moderate protection, railway building, immigration".[20]

In a later essay, Lower's stand on "national policy" became clearer and was accompanied by a higher estimation of Macdonald. He recognized the Conservatives' contribution in establishing the tariff, in bringing the Northwest and British Columbia into the Dominion and in constructing the

[19] Ibid., p. 373.

[20] Ibid., p. 433.

Canadian Pacific Railway: that is, in building a new state. "It could almost be said that it was Macdonald who did these things". Macdonald called the platform of protection the "National Policy". "But his whole program from the accomplishment of Confederation to the completion of the Canadian Pacific (including, in another sphere, the maintenance of unity between the races) can properly be called a national policy".[21] Here, he considered "national policy" the process of building a new country and declared Macdonald to be the chief actor. It could be called, he said, the creation of a theory, a dream, a vision. Macdonald's "national policy" was admitted as a theory of Canadian federalism by Lower, at last and he stressed the empirical nature of it.

Among the Canadian historians who pursued the conservative approach toward Canadian history, Donald G. Creighton is distinguished for his most favourable evaluation of the "National Policy" and the "national policies". In his first book, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence,[22] Creighton used the term "national policy" in small letters.

[21] A. R. M. Lower, "Theories of Canadian Federalism --Yesterday and Today", Evolving Canadian Federalism, ed. by F. R. Scott et al. (Durham: Duke Univ., 1958), p. 26.

[22] Donald Grant Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937).

As the book dealt with the period before Confederation, he merely suggested that the "national policy" was one of the new devices which came after the final downfall of the second commercial empire of the St. Lawrence in 1849. What he meant by using the term seemed to be a general policy of creating a distinctly Canadian economy in North America.[23]

Seven years later, in Dominion of the North,[24] Creighton's interpretation of the "National Policy" and "national policies" were more fully developed. He claimed the "National Policy" had its origin in the period before 1870. However, it was an empty but resounding phrase until linked with "a slight but definite increase in the tariff" in 1870. On the other hand as to the "national policies", Creighton said that Macdonald who laid the basis of Confederation at the Quebec and London conferences, deliberately considered the "national policies" of Canada for a few years following Confederation, but was still vague about them in 1873. They would be designed to unite the Dominion both politically and economically. Canada, in Macdonald's mind, should have a diversified, partly industrialized national economy which was entirely dependent neither on Great Britain nor the United States.

[23] Ibid., p. 384.

[24] D. G. Creighton, Dominion of the North, A History of Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1944).

During the Mackenzie administration, the "national policies" remained in obscurity.

Creighton seemed to suggest that the three interrelated "national policies" of western settlement, transcontinental railways and protective tariffs were consciously related in Macdonald's mind. Macdonald, he stated, "had settled upon his policies" by September, 1878. At that time, the tariff deserved the term "National Policy", because it "was an instrument of vast emotional significance as well as of great political value;...the tariff significantly was the only one which ever came to be dignified by the title of the "National Policy" in capitals".[25] He concluded that the "National Policy" of protection was "a vital element in the tripartite Conservative programme of western settlement, transcontinental railway, and protected industry; but the tariff was the last of the trio, the most unequal in its effects, and the most vulnerable politically".[26]

Creighton's interpretation of "national policies" in Dominion of the North tended to confirm the tripartite use of the term and to associate it closely with the Conservative party. The Eastern manufacturers protected by the tariff, and the Western settlement which was essential for the

[25] Ibid., p. 346.

[26] Ibid., p. 366.

formation of the Dominion from sea to sea were linked physically by the transcontinental railway and together created a national market. This idea of Canadian development was beyond the difference between the Conservatives and the Liberals, but it was definitely the Conservatives who initiated the third "national policy" of protection and it was also they who presided over the launching of the "national policies" of the protective tariff and the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway.

Despite opposition which reached its peak in 1887, "national policies" were maintained intact until the depression in the early 1930's. And again, in the midst of the depression, R. B. Bennett reshaped and restated "the ancient Conservative national policies in response to the new economic and social demands"[27] in 1935. The tripartite "national policy" of Canada had survived for seventy years and played a vital role in creating a Canadian nation!

Creighton's portrayal of the "national policy" as a grand design for Canada's development as an united nation, pursued consistently by Sir John A. Macdonald and the Conservative party from Confederation largely through the consciously interrelated policies of tariffs, railways and western settlement, provided a major theme of his writing

[27] Ibid., p. 496.

from 1944 to 1970. In his biography of Sir John A. Macdonald and The Story of Canada,[28] he suggested that after Confederation, the Canadian government was intent on finding major economic and developmental policies which were to be the design for the future transcontinental Canada. The task of building a separate and distinctive nation on the northern half of the North American Continent was the purpose of the "national policies" and was pursued by both political parties. Two "national policies" of western settlement and transcontinental railways were obviously interrelated and accepted. But the third policy was in dispute. The Conservatives and the Liberals were sharply opposed on the question of protection versus reciprocity with the United States. With the disappearance of the Reciprocity Treaty from practical politics, Macdonald showed his skill by calling for "readjustment of the tariff", instead of demanding "protective duties", to reconcile the logically contradictory ideas of revenue and protection. With the "national policy" of protection, Macdonald avenged the Pacific scandal and overcame Mackenzie at the general election of 1878. He proved that "the protective tariff was not merely a depression measure or a

[28] D. G. Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain (Toronto: Macmillan, 1955), The Story of Canada (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1960).

second best alternative to reciprocity. It was also a nationalist cause".[29]

Though the "national policy" was often threatened by emergencies such as the repeated depressions, the Northwest rebellion, the revolt against a centralized Canada or the ideas of commercial union with the United States and imperial federation with Great Britain both of which were utterly opposed to the basic principles of the "national policy" in character, Creighton declared that Macdonald skillfully survived all such crises and avoided fundamental alterations in the "national policy" until his death in 1891. Laurier, after having followed the "national policy" of protection for a few years, tried a departure from the "national policy" of the past by negotiating the reciprocity agreement with the United States which would weaken the economic and possibly the political defences of Canadian autonomy. But Canadian people rejected this departure. "In the last fifteen years the design of a transcontinental Dominion had magnificently succeeded; and in the eyes of most Canadians the national policies of development had unquestionably been the main factors in that success".[30]

[29] The Story of Canada, p. 169.

[30] Ibid., p. 204.

In an interview with Professor Paul Fox of the University of Toronto,[31] Creighton summarized his estimation of "national policy" very clearly in his own words. He stated that the aim of Sir John's "national policy" was to produce a diversified, stable, varigated economy and has been the aim of every succeeding Canadian government. "I think the national policy is a tripartite thing,...the great idea of the Northwest...in its modern form the development of the North", "the idea of strengthening the east-west axis with ...the railway" and "the idea of the diversification of the whole economy by the building up of a powerful industrial machine in the east".[32] Here, Creighton emphasized the current importance of the "national policy".

Recently, Creighton slightly shifted his interpretation of the "national policy". In his latest work, Canada's First Century,[33] he rarely used the capitalized term "National Policy" and seemed to restrict the meaning of the "national policies". He mentioned only the economic effect of the "national policies". To build a transcontinental Canadian economy and to strengthen it by a better balance of

[31] Creighton, A Long View of Canadian History: CBC Television script (Toronto: CBC Publications Branch, 1959).

[32] Ibid., p. 3.

[33] D. G. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 1867-1967 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970).

economic diversifications were the two great aims of the Fathers of Confederation and were pursued through the "national policies". Moreover, in this book, the Liberals were described as the consistent opponents of the "national policies" at least during the nineteenth century.

The first, most fundamental policy was large-scale immigration and Western settlement. "The Fathers of Confederation decided that the management of the great new western domain should remain with the nation in order that it might work out an integrated series of national policies for immigration, settlement, and transcontinental transport".[34] The second was the construction of the Pacific railway. The Conservatives started the project which was inherited by the Liberals. The third and last "national policy" was the protective tariff. In 1879, with the victory of the Conservatives in the election, the long debate over Canada's "national policies" had finally ended, but the opposition to the idea of a strongly centralized nation caused further trouble in the 1880's and the depression gave impetus to this trend. Nevertheless, Creighton insisted "the protective tariff had enlarged the Canadian economy and reduced the net loss of population through emigration to the United States".[35]

[34] Ibid., pp. 25-26.

[35] Ibid., p. 76.

Borden's victory in 1911 on the issue of reciprocity proved the final acknowledgement of the success of the "national policies". Borden continued to carry them on, and in 1917, he "was convinced that such a momentous national policy as conscription could best be undertaken".[36] Though the "national policies" survived in the 1920's their roles were accomplished by 1929, Creighton said.

> It was as if the Dominion, having done its part to fight and win the war, had completed the last of its great undertakings, and found no further purpose or meaning in continued political existence. No new national enterprises were launched; and the historic national policies of Macdonald's day were wound up or simply allowed to continue of their own momentum. Despite all the post-war clamour, no substantial changes were made in the tariff. Western lands and natural resources, which the federal government had controlled in order to carry out its great plans for immigration and western settlement, were now returned to the jurisdiction of the prairie provinces; and the transference clearly implied that the first object of Confederation had been attained and that there was no further need of federal leadership.[37]

To Creighton certain "national policies" were essential to Canada's growth as a nation and their abandonment doomed the country to disintegration and absorption into the United States.

Creighton's contribution to the high evaluation of the historical role of "national policies" is rather amazing. Though he was greatly influenced by the conclusion of the

[36] Ibid., p. 146.

[37] Ibid., p. 193.

Rowell-Sirois Report, he overestimated the unique importance of the "national policy". He gave Macdonald the highest position in the history of Canada's "national policy" as the great planner of the scheme of Canada. He paid little attention to the role of the wheat boom for the attainment of the purposes of "national policy". Creighton seemed to suggest that the historic "national policies" attained their purposes by themselves without any help from foreign markets and showed their greatness by doing so. Because of his partiality for Canada, he appeared to declare the greatness of the idea of "national policy" without showing the proof. Macdonald, surely, must have had an idea of Western settlement which would be promoted by the transcontinental railroad, while at the same time he did not call the scheme the "national policy". But Creighton suggested that the Canadian government represented by Macdonald had a scheme worthy of being called the tripartite "national policy" in the 1870's and it was supported constantly by Canadian people. His argument lacked persuasive power because he did not question strictly what Macdonald had in his mind as a "National Policy".

V. C. Fowke was an economist who made an another important contribution to the historiography of the "national policy" in two points; that is, firstly, he traced the rise of the "national policy" back to 1825; stating that "the economic objective of the first national policy was the creation of a new frontier of investment opportunities for

the commercial and financial interests of the St. Lawrence area".[38] Thus, he determined the framework of Canada's "national policy" solely in terms of economic development of Canada. Secondly, he, for the first time, examined the settlement aspect of a tripartite "national policy" which was neglected in other studies. The wheat economy which formed a main characteristic of Canadian economic development emerged within the framework of Canada's "national policy".

In his dissertation, Canadian Agricultural Policy,[39] he primarily discussed the "National Policy" of tariff protection as a part of the "'national' policy" of Canada. Confederation grew out of the "'national' policy" in 1867; the transfer of the natural resources from the Dominion to the Provinces symbolized the end of it. In the meantime, the "National Policy" was one of the instruments to lay the groundwork for the eventual fulfilment of hopes for large scale immigration in order to secure 'the purpose of the Dominion'. Though it tended to transfer the benefits of economic development from the Western prairies to the central regions, Canadian farmers were inclined to favour Macdonald's tariff policy in the beginning. Agrarian

[38] Vernon C. Fowke, "The National Policy--Old and New" (1952) Approaches to Canadian Economic History, ed. by W. T. Easterbrook and M. H. Watkins, Carleton Library No. 31 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), p. 243.

[39] V. C. Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy: The historical pattern (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1946).

opposition to the "National Policy" only gradually appeared and reached the peak from 1907 to 1911. The aim of the "National Policy", the establishment on the prairies of a new agricultural frontier along with the Pacific railroad and federal immigration and land policies, was finally achieved with the help of the wheat boom; in 1930, the steeply increased tariff to avert depresseion indicated that the old "National Policy" itself also came to an end. According to Fowke, this change was an emergency measure rather than a new "National Policy".

On the other hand, he discussed mainly the "national policy" without capitals in his wellknown works, "The National Policy--Old and New"[40] and The National Policy and the Wheat Economy.[41] The "national policy", Fowke stated, meant simply the policy of a national government related to fundamental and persistent governmental aims. In other words, Canada's "national policy" was "the design of creating a national political and economic unit in the British North America of a century ago"[42] and "comprises collectively that group of policies and instruments which were designed to

[40] V. C. Fowke, "The National Policy--Old and New" (1952), Approaches to Canadian Economic History, pp. 237-258.

[41] V. C. Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1957).

[42] "The National Policy--Old and New", p. 239.

transform the British North American territories of the mid-nineteenth century into a political and economic unit".[43] The creation of a constitution, the British North America Act of 1867, the removal of the tariff barriers between the provinces and the completion of an intercolonial railway were "national policies" prior to Confederation. Afterward, Confederation, western lands and settlement, the Pacific railway design, the system of protective tariffs and so forth became the instruments of the "national policy". The main lines of the policy were fully formed prior to the creation of a national government and "no one of these policies, but all of them together, merit the title 'national policy'".[44]

In The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, Fowke developed a more searching explanation. The economic purposes of the "national policy" were commercial and had been pursued initially in the fur and timber trades along the east-west trade routes of the St. Lawrence. Wheat appeared as the third great staple product based on immigration and agricultural settlement. "The twentieth-century grain trade is the modern success to the fur trade".[45] This argument

[43] The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, p. 8.

[44] "The National Policy--Old and New", p. 242.

[45] The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, p. 87.

combined the unique character of Canadian economy developed by scholars like Innis and the application of Canada's "national policy". Nevertheless, at the same time, it seems to show one instance of Fowke's jumps of logic, because though he repeated that the establishement of wheat economy was not anticipated at the beginning of the "national policy", yet the "national policy" was but an empty dream without the wheat boom. "Although by no means clearly forseen in the early decades of the national policy, effective occupation of the central plains as required for the preservation of Pacific frontage and a doorway to the Orient eventuated in the establishment of the wheat economy".[46]

Fowke did not insist on the consistency of the various segments of the "national policy" since they "were formulated and brought to maturity concurrently and interdependently". "It is difficult to determine the best sequence of analysis".[47] But the railroads and protective tariffs were more interrelated in the "national policy" than were any of the other elements. "Together, railways and tariffs would integrate the expanding area of economic activity. Tariffs would ease the burden of improvements in transportation by providing railway traffic and a more diversified economy as a source of tax revenues".[48]

[46] Ibid., p. 282.

[47] Ibid., p. 56.

[48] Ibid., p. 64.

Fowke regarded the century between 1825 to 1930 as the era of the first Canadian "national policy". After 1930 Canadian governments had to seek for a new set of "national policies" required by the Depression, and the Second World War. Fowke also suggested that public welfare, agricultural policy and monetary arrangements would become the main outlines of Canada's new "national policies". For instance, he said that R. B. Bennett's so-called New Deal legislation had implications for "national policy" in the field of social welfare because it was supported by both parties and showed a widespread conviction that the federal government must assume increasing responsibility for economic and social conditions in the Dominion.

In the period after the Depression, the term "National Policy" emerged as a clearly established concept in Canadian historiography. From the time of its use by the scholars of the Rowell-Sirois Commission, its existence seemed to be widely accepted as a broad tripartite policy or design which had been of fundamental importance in the development of the nation. Yet the scholars who used it in this period apparently failed to see any necessity of producing evidence that the politicians who were supposed to have implemented the "National Policy" were consciously aware that they were following an interrelated design. By suggesting that such a design had existed and by arguing that it had been good for the country, the scholars of the post-depression era were

clearly serving more contemporary needs. Having established the policy in the past, it was then easy to propose a few changes to meet the changing conditions in the present or to imply, as for example, Creighton did, the necessity of a 'return' to the policy which had once worked so successfully.

## IV. Recent Historiography of "National Policy"

After World War II, the historiography of "National Policy" was extensively expanded. There have been many different interpretations of the term and it has been studied from a variety of perspectives. Perhaps this phenomenon may indicate the maturity of Canadian historical studies. The scholars of the "National Policy" in this period could be divided roughly into two major groups. The first group kept the traditional interpretation of the "National Policy" represented by D. G. Creighton and their attitude tended to be more consciously nationalistic than that of previous writers. The second group developed their theory based on the traditional interpretation of the "National Policy", but courageously tried to challenge the myth of the "National Policy" or to reveal its weak points. Besides those two groups, some scholars took their interpretation of the term "national policy" far beyond traditional usage in applying it to such diverse issues as agricultural policy and technical education.

. . . .

In the 1940's, a different effect of the "National Policy" was revealed by W. L. Morton in a paper at the annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association and which he developed

in more detail in The Progressive Party in Canada.[1] According to Morton, the "National Policy" was a complex system of land settlement, railway construction, and moderate tariff protection aimed at national development. Of the various elements of "National Policy", the tariff was the most distinctive politically, as well as economically. "The National Policy, that brilliant improvisation of Sir John A. Macdonald, had become a veritable Canadian system Henry Clay might have envied".[2] It anticipated the settlement and enrichment of the West. But at the same time, it was to use the power of the government to foster Canadian manufacturing at the expense of agricultural population and the consumer. The "National Policy" was to achieve, Morton stated, "a metropolitan economy designed, by the control of tariffs, railways, and credit, to draw wealth from the hinterlands and the countryside into the commercial and industrial centres of central Canada".[3] Both parties from 1896 on were the practically indistinguishable supporters of the "National Policy".

From Morton's interpretation of the "National Policy",

[1]William Lewis Morton, "The Western Progressive Movement, 1919-1921", Canadian Historical Association Report (1946), pp. 44-55. The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1950).

[2]"The Western Progressive Movement", p. 41.

[3]The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 288.

it is obvious that the western farmer suffered both as a producer and a consumer:

> Not only was he compelled to a great extent to buy the services of the Canadian banks, railways, and grain trade at the seller's price, but he was compelled by the protective tariff to buy the necessities of life and much of the supplies and equipment for his farm at prices which were competitive only to a degree.[4]

As Canadian grain growers gradually realized the unfair effect of the "National Policy" and demanded the lowering of the tariff, they also came under the influence of the populist movement in the United States and the socialist movement of Great Britain. As a result, a challenge to the "National Policy" was born as the "New National Policy" of the Canadian Council of Agriculture in 1917. The programme of the "New National Policy" proposed a complete reversal of the old "National Policy". It requested immediate reciprocity with the United States and the introduction of free trade with Great Britain within five years. In December 1920, the Canadian Council of Agriculture accepted the Progressive parliamentary group as the representatives of the farmers' political movement.

Morton's theory of the success of the Western Progressive movement in the election of 1921 was very clear; that is, it was both a phase of agrarian (both class and sectional) protest against the "National Policy" (or the "national

[4] Ibid., p. 7.

policies"[5]) and an attempt to destroy the two old political parties which were equally committed to maintaining the "National Policy". Though the Progressive movement which marked the achievement of political maturity by the West became a substantial political power after the general election of 1921, it almost came to an end with the election of 1926. Morton indicated many causes of this decline of the Progressive party, but few had any connection with the fate of the "National Policy". Among the causes, Morton noted that the remedies for Western grievances and the admission of the West to its due place in making "National Policy" was attained only by federal action. Sectionalism was a limitation on the Progressive movement. The Western Progressive movement was born because of "National Policy", but its destiny had nothing to do with Canada's "National Policy". At any rate, the old polemic by Edward Porritt[6] against "National Policy" as the protective tariff got more sophisticated support from Morton's analysis.

In 1963, however, Morton developed a drastically different

[5]In "The Western Progressive Movement", Morton used the term "National Policy", ibid., p. 41, but in The Progressive Party, he used the term in plural, small letters in the introduction, but in the text used the capitalized term. Ibid., p. xi.

[6]Edward Porritt, Sixty Years of Protection in Canada, 1846-1912; Where industry leans on the politician (Winnipeg: The Grain Growers' Guide, 1913).

estimation of the "National Policy" in The Kingdom of Canada.[7] His outlook on Canadian history became more nationalistic and metropolitan minded than when writing from the perspective of the Progressives. This tendency was already obvious in an earlier work, The Canadian Identity.[8] Though these four lectures in The Canadian Identity were delivered before an American audience, the strong nationalistic tone is most apparent. He stated in the preface that Canada "must achieve a self-definition of greater clarity and more ringing tone than it has yet done....It is to this task,...that Canadian writers, historians, artists, and scientists, in the exacting pursuit of their own crafts and callings, may contribute indirectly, but decisively".[9] The "National Policy" of tariff protection, in this book, was placed in the context of Canadian nation-building as necessary to gurantee the material strength essential for the development of autonomous nationhood.

In The Kingdom of Canada, Morton defined the "National Policy" as the policy of industrialization, east-west railway traffic, and western settlement. Macdonald, Morton said,

[7]W. L. Morton, The Kingdom of Canada: A general history from earliest times (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963).

[8]W. L. Morton, The Canadian Identity (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1961).

[9]Ibid., p. vii.

used the term in order to give a national setting to Canadian manufacturers and to lead their selfish ambitions to serve a larger purpose. It was a necessary economic policy to create a nation on the northern half of the continent or "the great attempts to realize economically and politically the geographic and natural unity of Canada".[10] "National development, national autonomy, national unity, were still the aim of policy....The Conservatives were able in consequence to return to power with a "National Policy" of economic development which added tariff protection of manufacturing to railway construction and the export of staples".[11] In this point of view, the Conservative victories at the general elections of 1887 and 1891 were considered the most decisive events in Canadian history. This, Morton stated, was because "more than a national policy of material development was required" for such victories to be lasting[12] and they, therefore, were more than a mere policy of material development.

According to Morton,the "National Policy" eased the hardship of the depression after 1891. The Liberal victory in 1896 was to mean the further elaboration of the "National

[10] The Kingdom of Canada, p. 377.

[11] Ibid., p. 347.

[12] Ibid.

Policy" to meet the needs of national economy. In fact, the Liberals' adoption of the "National Policy" and the subsequent prosperity allowed the development of a sentiment of nationhood, Morton explained. By 1897, "the conditions necessary for the realization of the National Policy of industrialization, east-west railway traffic, and western settlement had at long last come into being".[13] By giving the economy of central Canada the strength to bear the cost of constructing the railway and of holding the West, "the national policy of protection"[14] was to strengthen the national economy.

Morton mentioned the birth of the Western Progressive movement as the revolt against the old political parties and the old "National Policy". Nevertheless, his high evaluation of the "National Policy" in the course of creating Canadian nationhood almost overwhelmed the shortcomings which Morton had attacked very severely in his previous works. Morton, also, had arrived at the traditional interpretation of the "National Policy".

Prior to Morton's The Kingdom of Canada, J. M. S. Careless developed his support to "National Policy" in associating it with his metropolitan interpretation of Canadian history.

[13] Ibid., p. 392.

[14] Ibid., p. 359. In The Kingdom of Canada, Morton used the terms "National Policy" and "national policy" rather reversely to the traditional convention.

He is one outstanding historian who has largely succeeded to the Innis-Creighton interpretation of Canadian history. In one of the most popular Canadian history texts, Canada: A Story of Challenge,[15] he placed a very patriotic construction upon "National Policy". The terms "National Policy", "national policy" and "national policies" were used rather capriciously.[16] His main idea was, however, that the "national policies" or "National Policy" whichever he chose to call it, was the plan to build a national market in the Dominion and to create a Canadian nation. It was "really a three cornered scheme of nation-buliding, dependent on railways and settlement as well as the tariff for its full success".[17] Since the aim of the "national policies" was a well-balanced, prosperous nation, all three worked together; the tariff supplied manufactured goods to the settlers, the settlers provided food for the Eastern market and the transcontinental railway promoted the traffic of both goods and settlers. In other words, he said that "Macdonald's national plans had required a Pacific railway and western settlement as well as the protective tariff".[18]

[15]James Maurice Stockford Careless, Canada: A Story of Challenge (Toronto: Macmillan, 1953).

[16]He meant by "National Policy" mainly the protective tariff of 1879, but there are exceptions like "the National Policy of Macdonald, which the Liberals now took over as their own", and here he meant the tripartite policy. Ibid., p. 312.

[17]Ibid., p. 278.

[18]Ibid., p. 313.

Sometimes he parenthesized critical expressions against the "national policies" such as "it was not a wholly sound idea"[19] or "a protective tariff plainly meant that goods would cost more to buy in Canada".[20] But his main criticism was found in only one point; that is, Macdonald's nation-building policies were expensive for the young nation like Canada.

Otherwise, Careless's estimation of the "national policies" was as high as Donald Creighton's. Though he admitted the temporary failure of the "national policies" in the nineteen-eighties by indicating the occurence of sectionalism and the miscarriage of western settlement, he stated that, after the death of John A. Macdonald, "Liberal rule under Laurier did not begin a new era but maintained and built on the basic national policies of Macdonald; the protective tariff, the transcontinental railway, and the opening of the West. Macdonald nationalism had not failed. It was the age that had failed, the long lean years of depression".[21] He concluded that "the purposes of the national policy had been achieved. Canada at last had a balanced economic system, a unity based on trade".[22] In spite of his higher evaluation

[19] Ibid., p. 269.

[20] Ibid., p. 277.

[21] Ibid., p. 295.

[22] Ibid., p. 313.

of the "national policies", Careless scarcely showed the proof that they were responsible for the attainment of their aims.

The main theme of Canada was that the emergence of a Canadian nation was a response "to the challenge of the vast Canadian land and the forces that have played on its inhabitants".[23] Thus "national policies" fitted neatly as "another response to the challenge of the land, to the forces that divided the country into separate regions".[24] Another important theme for Careless was his metropolitan interpretation of Canadian history which he published in 1954 under the title "Frontierism, Metropolitianism, and Canadian History".[25] In this article he noted that "the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway so far ahead of settlement, and Macdonald's policies of economic nationalism in general, were plain manifestations of the power of metropolitan influences in Canadian politics".[26] In Canada he also displayed his metropolitanism; "By constructing the Canadian Pacific, Montreal renewed its old commercial links with the far west,

[23] Ibid., p. v.

[24] Ibid., p. 314.

[25] J. M. S. Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History", Canadian Historical Review, XXXV (1954), reprinted in Approaches to Canadian History (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 63-83.

[26] Ibid., p. 83.

lost since fur trade days. A new commercial empire of the St. Lawrence sprang up, based on railway lines".[27] As far as Careless adhered to the metropolitan and the 'challenge' theory of Canadian history, he would employ the traditional concept of "National Policy" as the essential premises in his argument.

It is perhaps surprising that Careless chose as one of his heroes George Brown, who was the powerful rival of Sir John Macdonald and whose ideal of Canada was utterly opposed to at least one of the traditional pillars of "National Policy". In Brown of the Globe[28] he used the term "National Policy" to mean only the protective tariff. Though he succeeded in drawing George Brown in an attractive and affectionate way, Careless did not seem to show much sympathy with the British Cobdenite principle of free trade and economic liberalism to which his hero subscribed. According to Careless when Macdonald and the Conservatives took up the issue of the protective tariff, "the significance of Brownism was decreasing. ...there would be a rising demand hereafter for policies of economic nationalism, for the fostering of national development by the American plan of protective tariffs".[29] "Conservative talk of a "National Policy" and prosperity achieved through unspecified "adjustment" of the tariff sounded

[27] Canada., p. 280.

[28] J. M. S. Careless, Brown of the Globe, 2 vols. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1959).

[29] Ibid., vol. II, p. 337.

far more positive and hopeful".[30]

After his study of George Brown, Careless did not change his attitude toward "national policies". For example, when he wrote an article for Nationalism in Canada[31] he outlined the inseparable development of metropolitanism and nationalism in Canada, both of which thrived under the "National Policy". His most recent work, The Union of the Canadas,[32] though dealing with the history of Canada before Confederation, mentions the "National Policy" as a policy which sought to build a transcontinental economy based on a protective tariff and an east-west rail system. According to Careless, the link between government fiscal policy and the transportation system was established in the 1850's by the united provincial government of Canada. "Accordingly, the Province of Canada really laid foundations for the National Policy of the Canadian federal union after 1867".[33]

In a standard text book on Canadian economic history,[34]

[30] Ibid., p. 352.

[31] J. M. S. Careless, "Metropolitanism and Nationalism", Nationalism in Canada, ed. by P. Russell (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 271-283.

[32] J. M. S. Careless, The Union of the Canadas, The Growth of Canadian Institutions, 1841-1857 (Toronto: McClleland & Stewart, 1967).

[33] Ibid., p. 146.

[34] W. T. Easterbrook and H. G. J. Aitken, Canadian Economic History (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956).

W. T. Easterbrook and H. G. J. Aitken tended to confirm V. C. Fowke's interpretation of the "National Policy" as having an existence above and beyond individual governments. According to their examination, the "policy" which pointed the way toward Confederation and transcontinental expansion was devised as an alternative to annexation or reciprocity in maintaining the Canadian position in the international economy. That was the origin of the "National Policy". By 1879, "the year in which the National Policy was formulated",[35] the detailed programme behind the design which aimed at the creation of a strong continental unity appeared; that is, "a transcontinental railway, protective tariffs, land settlement policy, the promotion of immigration".[36] The protective tariff was to become most identified with the term "National Policy", and more broadly to lead to the formulation of a policy best described as economic nationalism, because only the high protective tariff could improve both the prospect for an east-west traffic and the revenues which were essential to meet railway deficits. The agricultural development of the west was considered basic from the beginning and, in this manner, the establishment of the wheat economy was the keystone in the arch of Canada's "National Policy", the authors

[35] Ibid., p. 383.

[36] Ibid.

asserted. They said that the importance of wheat in the economy of central Canada was recognized after 1850 and no sharp departure from past policies was revealed in the reliance on wheat as a factor of the nation's growth. This interpretation of the role of wheat was a novel one, for most historians who estimated the role of wheat in the attainment of "National Policy" insisted that the wheat boom was unforeseen at the beginning.

The authors were reluctant to define the "National Policy" in exact terms. Nevertheless, they gave the main ingredients as;

> the central place of the St. Lawrence area as the basis for continental expansion, the reliance on transportation improvements to provide the backbone of this expansion, the emphasis on a few staple products for export to European markets, the encouragement of developments in finance and secondary industries to support this structure, and finally the slow shift to tariffs to round out this broadly conceived policy of economic growth.[37]

The benefits to the nation of such a policy were inescapable; "the declaration of independence in the National Policy of 1879 brought greater strength and a greater unity of purpose",[38] "as the vision of a commercial empire of the St. Lawrence faded, a large vision took its place. This has come to bear the label " National Policy"",[39] and "the sense of "manifest

[37] Ibid., p. 388.

[38] Ibid., p. 381.

[39] Ibid., p. 388.

destiny"" was by no means absent "in the national policy formulations of 1879".[40] At any rate, the "National Policy" or "national policy", they did not make a clear distinction between these phrases[41] had attained its objectives. The consequences of the policy were a strong economic and political unity, a better balanced and diversified though vulnerable transcontinental economy and a rise to a "middle power" role in world affairs. They mentioned the farmers' attack on protective tariffs, but they said that since railways, wheat and tariffs were inseparably linked, "it was the farmer's misfortune that his demands for freer trade brought him so directly into conflict with National Policy objectives".[42] Therefore, they concluded that "whatever the incidence of benefits and burdens of this aspect of National Policy may be, it served the purposes of the nation-builders for the time being".[43]

The authors directed attention to the appearance of pressures for a new "national policy" which was designed to improve Canada's position. They did not indicate what these

[40] Ibid., p. 393.

[41] They also used the term "national policies"; "this period of depression...left a deep and lasting mark on national policies". Ibid., p. 393.

[42] Ibid., p. 504.

[43] Ibid., p. 485.

concrete policies were. Instead they suggested that the new "national policy" would have similarities with and differences from the old "national policy". The main similarity would be the necessity of erecting defences against the United States and of strengthening economic connections with Europe. The differences would be that the new policy would hasten Canada's development into an advanced industrial economy and that the world economic situation would be led by the United States rather than Great Britain. "Because of these differences, the new policy...promises to be a more complex and arduous enterprise than that formulated in the 1870's".[44]

Although the authors wrote an economic history of Canada, they could not help admiring the political attainment of the "National Policy" besides the economic effects. Not only Sir John A. Macdonald and the Conservatives, but also the Canadian people had eagerly wanted the "National Policy" since the 1840's and finally they achieved their objectives by 1930. This plain and high estimation of the "National Policy" seems to put an end to one aspect of the historiography of "National Policy". Probably it would be difficult to give a more eulogistic appraisal to the "National Policy" than Easterbrook and Aitken did in this book.

R. C. Brown, a student of D. G. Creighton, also belongs

[44] Ibid., p. 580.

in this school in his nationalistic interpretation of the "National Policy"; however, he takes a slightly different approach from that of Creighton, Careless, and Easterbrook and Aitken. He attempted to place the "National Policy" in the evolution of Canadian nationalism. The spirit of "National Policy" became his main focus in Canada's National Policy.[45] Brown used the term in capital letters to mean "a domestic policy of economic nationalism based on railway building, immigration and settlement, and protective tariffs"[46] adopted by the Canadian Government of Sir John Macdonald after the election of 1878. The theme of this book was the indivisibility of the spirit of "National Policy" and negotiations of the problems which entangled the relationship between Canada and the United States during the period 1883-1900. In short, he concluded that in order to negotiate each of the four problems, the North Atlantic fisheries dispute, the Behring Sea difficulties, the problem of Canadian-American trade relations and Alaska Boundary controversy, the Canadian government applied the one underlying principle; that is, the spirit of the "National Policy".

[45]Robert Craig Brown, Canada's National Policy; 1883-1900: A Study in Canadian-American Relations (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964).

[46]Ibid., p. 11.

What was the spirit of the "National Policy"? According to Brown, the premise of the "National Policy" had been that Canada's economic survival was inseparably tied to political survival in North America and that for this reason Canadian nationalism was to a very large degree expressed as "British Empire nationalism". Brown himself seemed to agree with this supposition. Therefore, the "National Policy" was to show "the will to build and maintain a separate Canadian nation on the North American continent".[47] This was a continuation and an elaboration of the fundamental doctrine of Confederation since 1865. Even Liberals had to give up their continentalism in 1897 which meant, for Brown, a vindication of the "National Policy". By 1900, Canadians had renewed their faith in the achievement of 1867 and in the "National Policy". "Canada existed as a separate nation on the North American continent and expected to be treated as a separate nation".[48]

Brown pointed out another important aspect of the "National Policy". "The National Policy claimed to look outward from the North American continent, to favor participation in the commerce of the world rather than withdrawal into a self-contained continentalism".[49] Thus Brown insisted that

[47] Ibid., pp. 11-12.

[48] Ibid., pp. 409-410.

[49] Ibid., p. 172.

the "National Policy" was the powerful instrument for the development of Canadian nationalism both externally and internally, although admitting the danger of excessive self-interest and economic isolation.

In the context of the main theme of this work, Brown stated that even in the limited domestic sense, the "National Policy" affected Canadian-American relations because of the huge volume of trade. Moreover, as the spirit of the "National Policy" went much deeper than railways, immigrants and the tariff, it controlled the negotiations decisively. For instance, this aspect of the "National Policy" became the primary consideration of the Canadian government in the Alaska boundary disputes after the discovery of gold in the Yukon.

He repeated his thesis of "National Policy" in Nationalism in Canada,[50] when suggesting that the "National Policy" was a manifestation of Canadian national sentiment. As "a transcontinental railway, immigration and opening of the Northwest added to the tariff as items in the National Policy",[51] it was very attractive not only economically, but also politically. It could appeal to voters as well as investors

[50] R. C. Brown, "The Nationalism of the National Policy", Nationalism in Canada, pp. 155-163.

[51] Ibid., p. 156.

because these items also meant an important step toward independent nationhood in the Empire and North America. Brown explained the peculiar situation of Canada in that the national sentiment could only take the form of economic nationalism. Since appeals to common linguistic, cultural or religious tradition were impossible for Canadians, political nationalism was expressed in terms of railways and tariffs.

Brown's assumption is bold, interesting and persuasive. His attempt to find a place for the "National Policy" in the evolution of Canadian nationalism yielded the conclusion that the terms, "National Policy", "national policies" and nationalism were practically synonymous.

A second group of scholars tried to destroy some of the myths surrounding Canada's "National Policy". Though they sometimes accepted the traditional interpretation of the term, they emphasized the negative effects of the "National Policy" in the development of Canada.

One of first assaults on the myth of the "National Policy" was undertaken in 1943 by a McGill economist, B. S. Keirstead. In his article titled "National Policy",[52] he used the term mostly in small letters but meant mainly the protective policy of the Canadian government. The philosophy formulated

[52] B. S. Keirstead, "National Policy", chapter 1 of Canada after the War; Studies in Political and Economic Policies for Post-war Canada, ed. by Alexander Brady and F. R. Scott (Toronto: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 1-30.

in the "national policy" of 1879 was, he said, inherited from Galt; that is, some measures of protection for manufacturing industry with the idea that the raw produce of the West would pay for capital imports incurred in railway development. Though the "national policy" made the British North American colonies, for the first time, a single state with a national consciousness and a sense of unity, it gradually brought disappointment in Quebec and the western provinces. However, the "national policy" was never seriously challenged politically even by the Liberals. Keirstead argued that "national policy" led to geographic concentrations as well as ownership concentrations giving businessman an interest which was definitely contrary to that of the community as a whole, and to redistributing the national income in favour of a very few families to the detriment of the masses.

For Keirstead, the critique of "national policy" provided a means of attacking the abuses of capitalism in Canada. National consciousness, unity of purpose, community of interest, which had been regarded the objects of the "national policy", were "states of being, not economic policies, and of course are not to be attained by economic action".[53] The Canadian experiment with the capitalist state was not unique and Canada had suffered every evil of the capitalist system.

[53] Ibid., p. 18.

The "national policy" rather promoted this tendency by having protected the producer. Therefore, he stated;

> We must conclude, then, that our present economic institutions are such as to preclude the possibility of any harmony of interest in the nation as a whole. The notion of a common national interest, and thus the notion of national policy conceived for the benefit of the great mass of Canadians will require structural changes in our economic institutions. These changes are essential before we can begin to talk of a "national" policy after the war, essential for security either of our individual lives, of our regional cultures or of our nationhood.[54]

The "national policy" proposed by Keirstead seems very difficult to realize. On the assumption that Canadian people should set the limit of freedom of choice, like the acceptance of government control over private industry, and seek the common national interest which unites the interests of producers and consumers and the interests of labour and capital, he advocated social control over the system of privately owned and freely operating trusts. "In a federal community we cannot develop a national policy in the national interest without necesarily...requiring a lower level of welfare",[55] he stated. He concluded that a true "national (economic) policy" for Canada should be directed towards the maximization of income and to a certain extent its redistribution in order to give all a common interest in production. Thus, a unity of interests in Canada could be attained.

[54] Ibid., p. 21.

[55] Ibid., p. 29.

J. H. Dales ultimately acceded to this criticism of the "National Policy" although arriving at a different solution from that of Keirstead. At the beginning of his career as an economic historian, he had accepted the traditional interpretation of the "National Policy". In his Engineering and Society,[56] he made several references to the term, as "the national policy of railway building",[57] "the federal policies of railway construction, land settlement, and the tariff",[58] and "the great National Policies of railway construction and free homestead".[59] In other words, he did not pay much attention to the usage of the terms. Moreover, he followed the classic explanation and praise of "national policies", which he would later criticize:

> To help pay for the railroads the federal government in 1879 adopted a protective tariff policy which has never since been reversed. The tariff was an attempt to stimulate Canadian manufacturing and promote trade between different parts of Canada....It was thus a policy designed to increase east-west trade in the Dominion and to create revenue-producing freight for Canadian railways.[60]

He concluded here that the construction of a transcontinental railway system, an energetic settlement policy and the tariff

[56] John Harkness Dales, Engineering and Society with Special Reference to Canada (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1947), Part II.

[57] Ibid., p. 199.

[58] Ibid., p. 340.

[59] Ibid., p. 343.

[60] Ibid., p. 201.

of 1879 proved effective in the period of prosperity which began towards the end of the nineteenth century.[61]

But his viewpoint drastically changed before he published, seventeen years later, the wellknown article entitled "Some Historical and Theoretical Comments on Canada's National Policies".[62] His major point of criticism was very clear; that is, the "national policy" had enlarged the population of Canada and contributed to the growth rate of Gross National Production, but as far as the income per person was concerned, the "national policy" had lowered the standard of living in Canada and, therefore, brought disgrace upon the nation's pride. Dales followed the traditional convention of using "National Policy" for the protective tariff and the "national policy" for the trinity of Canadian nation-building policies. He tried to prove that the "national policy" was a dismal failure. The land settlement scheme had failed before 1900. Manufacturing had been developed well in Canada before the tariff of 1879 and the effect of the tariff was rather negative. The railways could have been financed more efficiently by subsidy than tariff. Moreover, he insisted the tariff could not at the same time maximize both protection and revenue. The great Canadian boom in the early twentieth

[61] Ibid., p. 406.

[62] J. H. Dales, "Some Historical and Theoretical Comments on Canada's National Policies", Queen's Quarterly, LXXX (1964), included as "Canada's National Policies" in The Protective Tariff in Canada's Development (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1966), pp. 143-158.

century happened only as the results of a number of world events and developments and "none of these factors owed anything to the national policy".[63]

Dales deplored the two main features of the historians' stereotype of the "national policy". Firstly, they put too much emphasis on the consistency of the three pillars of the programme, while they ignored inconsistencies. Secondly, they over-estimated the benefits of the "national policy" throughout Canadian history. "To its defenders the national policy was both a well-designed and a powerful engine of nation-building".[64]

He concluded that the more important policy for Canada should have been aimed at intensive economic growth. In other words, the primary aim should have been placed on the concern with G.N.P. per capita growth rate rather than G.N.P. alone. "Our national economic policies today are substantially those of 1900--more factories, more people, more cities, more GNP. Is it not a time to consider whether these are appropriate policies for a country...?" he warned.[65]

Therefore, it was natural that Dales made the sharpest contrast with Brown in evaluating the "National Policy" in

[63] Ibid., p. 153.

[64] Ibid., p. 149.

[65] Ibid., p. 158.

Nationalism in Canada.[66] He attacked severely a policy for a "Big Canada". According to Dales' definition, nationalism was the pride that the citizens of a country took in all aspects of life--social, political, cultural, technological and economic. But a "Big Canada" which had been pursued by Canada's historical "national policies" of protection and immigration increased "the "quantity" of our economic life (the size of the National Income) at the expense of its "quality" (the level of the National Income per person)."[67] The so-called "national policies" brought the reduction of Canada's standard of living, a low level of social capital and a complicated political process. "I do not believe that growth policies can create a nation," he concluded, "I am prepared to believe that the existence of Canada may be explained on the basis of geography, political decisions, military events, or historical evolution--on almost any basis, indeed, except economic policy".[68]

In a more recent work, Dales revealed a distrust of the capitalist system and governmental policy in general. Here he linked the problem of pollution to "National Policy"

[66] J. H. Dales, "Protection, Immigration and Canadian Nationalism", Nationalism in Canada, pp. 164-177.

[67] Ibid., p. 173.

[68] Ibid., p. 165.

and its excessive concentration on G.N.P. "We have been ridiculously 'oversold'", he stated "on the virtues of growth in the gross national product; such a goal, in my opinion, is absurd and not worthy of free men. But I think we still have time to make our environment livable without going to extremes".[69]

Dales' criticism of "national policy" is worthy of consideration, in sp ite of some defects. He wrote that "the national policy originally consisted of government support for three main ventures; railway building, Western settlement, and manufacturing development....What was at first difficult for historians to discover was the consistency between Macdonald's tariff policy and the other two prongs of his national policy".[70] For a critic of the "National Policy" he seems to go further than necessary in accepting the tripartite nature of the policy while ignoring the historians who have carefully avoided it. Moreover, Dales' actual use of the term differs surprisingly little from those whom he criticizes. Although he attacked the materialism implied in the philosophy of the "national policy", he himself is not free from materialism. His aim for a new "national policy"

[69]J. H. Dales, Pollution, Property & Prices; An Essay in Policy-making and Economics (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 108.

[70]Dales, The Protective Tariff in Canada's Development, pp. 144-145.

is to increase per capita income in Canada.

Another effect of the "National Policy" was revealed by F. W. Watt. He carried Morton's earlier remark about the "National Policy" back to the late nineteenth century.[71] He defined it as "a generally acceptable programme of economic nationalism--east-west expansion, large scale immigration, and state-encouraged 'free enterprise'".[72] In 1879, all opposition to the "National Policy" ceased and industrial urbanism grew with the encouragement of the "National Policy", accompanied by the rise in numbers, strength, and organization of the working class. Since the labour power was sufficiently developed in Canada by 1872, Watt said, "an increasingly self-conscious and aggressive proletariat was seen to have been growing up, fostered (paradoxically) by the National Policy of which one great aim was national unity".[73] For instance, he cited the Report of the Royal Commission on the relations of labor and capital of 1889 which showed labourers' fundamental challenge to the "National Policy". Watt concluded that by the time of the Great Depression, the material and political aims of the "National Policy"

[71] F. W. Watt, "The National Policy, the Workingman and Proletarian Ideas in Victorian Canada", Canadian Historical Review, XL (1959), pp. 1-20.

[72] Ibid., p. 1.

[73] Ibid., p. 8..

had been fulfilled. But at the same time, the "National Policy" not only failed to solve the problems of the workingman, but also fostered a powerful proletarian class which entered into the national political debate.

Watt suggested many possible proofs to support his argument. But, because he defined the "National Policy" in the broadest sense of the term, it is not clear what aspect of the "National Policy" the workingman in Victorian Canada resisted. Did they protest against the course of Canadian nation-building and economic nationalism itself, or did they just develop a universal workingman's ideal of "collectivism"?

A socialistic approach toward the term "National Policy" also seemed to be shown by Kenneth McNaught, but he contributed little to the historiography of "National Policy". In his biography of J. S. Woodsworth, A Prophet in Politics,[74] which included a chapter entitled "Assessing 'National Policies'",[75] he did not mention the term at all. Probably he meant that the government's financial devices like tariffs and indirect taxes were the "National Policies".

Woodsworth's assessment of "National Policies" was shown in his reaction against both protection and free trade.

[74]Kenneth William Kirkpatrick McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J. S. Woodsworth (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1959).

[75]Ibid., pp. 182-192.

For Canada, "the desirable path to follow now", Woodsworth asserted, "was that of increasing collective action which would find at least a focal point in the central government".[76] McNaught noticed that Conservatives and Western Progressives had the curious similarity that "they implied a recognition of two apparent facts; that the welfare of the individual could be advanced through collective action guided by political authority, and that the circumstances of Canadian geography and population dictated collective action".[77] Moreover, Woodsworth believed that democracy must be broadened out from the political to the economic field. It seemed that democratic planning and control of the economy could be the alternative of the "National Policies" for both Woodsworth and McNaught, but the latter did not say so clearly.

In The History of Canada,[78] McNaught defined the "National Policy" as "judicious increases in the customs tariff, full steam ahead with the western railway, a new drive for immigrants to fill up the prairie west, and a generous approach to investors of any kind"[79] and said that there was clearly

[76] Ibid., p. 186.

[77] Ibid.

[78] K. McNaught, The History of Canada (Toronto: Bellhaven House, 1970), a reissue of the Pelican History of Canada (1969).

[79] Ibid., p. 166.

majority of opinion in favour in 1878.

P. B. Waite can be considered the latest critic of the "National Policy" in his recent work.[80] He has persisted in using the term only in its narrowest sense and used the term in capitalized letters exclusively for the protective tariff of 1879. Describing the origin of the term, Waite said that Macdonald picked up the term from Rose or Hincks or Tupper and announced it for the first time in 1872. Macdonald, who was looking for a policy for the Conservative party, instinctively absorbed something from both the sentiment of Canada First and the movement for protection among the manufacturers. "From Macdonald's point of view the provenance of the name "National Policy" was nearly irrelevant",[81] but it became an articulate policy in 1876.

Though he admired Macdonald's political skill in including farmers as well as manufacrurers under protection, Waite threw out a serious question; "Was there a real case for protection?"[82] His answer was largely negative. He admitted the useful effect of the tariff in a young country in the short run. But in the long term, "there can be no doubt that the tariff was abused. It raised prices for the consumer to

[80] P. B. Waite, Canada 1874-1896: Ardous Destiny (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1971).

[81] Ibid., p. 82.

[82] Ibid.

the benefit of industry and its workers and to the disadvantage of the rest of society and continued after it had ceased to be of significant value to the industries it had once fostered".[83] He concluded that protection by tariffs was easy for industry to get used to but had proved very difficult to abandon with the result that the standard of living in Canada had suffered.

Several scholars have taken the "national policy" far beyond the traditional interpretation of the term. Two examples will suffice to show how flexible the term has become.[84]

As an agricultural economist, W. J. Anderson used the term "national policy" in small letters to mean the general policy of the Canadian government in an economic field. From the time of Confederation until 1930, he said, the theme of the "national policy" was expansion with the development of industries and growth in population and capital. Agriculture contributed as an instrument to this theme forming the internal market for the manufacturing industry, providing the staple crops for the external market and supplying food for

[83] Ibid.

[84] W. J. Anderson, Agricultural Policy in Perspective, Publication No. 12 (Agricultural Economics Research Council of Canada, 1967). Robert M. Stamp, "Technical Education, the National Policy and Federal-Provincial Relations in Canadian Education, 1899-1919", Canadian Historical Review, vol. LII (1971), 404-423.

the rest of the country. It assisted manufacturing and service industries to develop. In the post-war period, however, Canada's "national policy" has been changed to have five goals; i) full employment, ii) a high rate of economic growth, iii) reasonable stability in prices, iv) maintaining a viable balance of payments, v) an equitable distribution of rising incomes.[85] Though the theme of the "national policy" was thus diversified, agriculture has still contributed to attain these goals, Anderson concluded.

On the other hand, Robert Stamp, a historian of education, suggested the possibility of enlarging the meaning of the historical term "National Policy" to include the campaign for federal support of technical education. He said that "the National Policy meant more than protective tariffs, transcontinental railways, and western settlement to a growing group of industrialists and educators in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Canada".[86] It was urgent for young Canada to provide skilled industrial workers by 1896 and it became an important issue in Canadian politics. He showed several documents from a campaign to make technical education a part of the "national industrial policy". As a result, the Technical Education Act was introduced in the House of Commons in 1913. None the less, he admitted that

[85]Anderson, Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[86]Stamp, Ibid., p. 404.

"there was...little eloquent oratory linking it to the National Policy or to the improvement of industrial working conditions".[87]

Recent historiography of "National Policy" shows clearly that historians' interpretations of the term "National Policy" have been influenced by their individual perspectives. A good example was provided by W. L. Morton. When he adopted the standpoint of Western Canadians, he enumerated only the negative effects of "National Policy" for Canadian development. According to him, the Western progressive movement had its origin in the protest against the tripartite "National Policy" and was quite justified. But after thirteen years, when he stood for the central Canada's view, he developed a higher estimation of "National Policy" in the course of creating Canadian nationhood. Historians, who took the stand for metropolitan Canada, such as J. M. S. Careless, could praise the contribution of "National Policy" by arguing that the "National Policy" promoted both the metropolitan development and the realization of Canadian nationhood from sea to sea.

A similar trend was apparent among the critics of the "National Policy". It is not surprising that the historians with socialist leanings such as Keirstead, Watt and McNaught

[87] Ibid., p. 422.

should be critical of what they believed was a design to encourage the development of a capitalist society in Canada. But as believers in a planned economy themselves, their criticism tended to imply the need for the replacement of one design with another. Dales and Waite were exceptional in appearing to return to what was basically a more sophisticated version of the old nineteenth century Liberal's argument that tariff raised the cost of living and was therefore bad for the country.

## Conclusion

The term "National Policy" emerged as a policy of a protective tariffs in the debates of Canadian politicians in the late 1870's. It was used in this sense by nineteenth century journalists and historians. But historians of the twentieth century tended to treat it as a great blueprint for nation-building. Building on J. C. Hopkins' interpretation of the "National Policy" which included in addition to the tariff, the construction of a communication system and the settlement of the Northwest, later historians created a fixed concept of a tripartite "national policy". They readily assumed a direct inter-relationship among the three pillars of protective tariffs, transcontinental railways and Western settlement. Nevertheless, they did not demonstrate a conscious awareness of this inter-relationship in the intentions of the politicians of the period. Political historians, writing general surveys of Canadian political history, were the staunchest advocates of the idea that the "National Policy" had a tripartite nature. For economic historians such as V. C. Fowke, a consciousness of policy on the part of politician was hardly necessary since the nature of the country seemed to dictate certain policies which no government could successfully avoid.

Looking at the changing and enlarging concept of "Na-

tional Policy", as it evolved in the twentieth century, three features of Canadian historiography are obvious. The first is a basic tendency by Canadian historians to believe that nation-building was a worthy goal for a people. Second is the idea that their nation has been built artificially with the government's guidance. Indeed, the necessity of governmental policies in the course of nation-building is taken for granted. Finally historians have shown a tendency to 'beg the question' on the assumption that a collection of policies which they favoured has indeed served to develop the country by designating it the "National Policy".

Committment to political parties and historical theory often was apparent in the evolution of the term. Liberal bias contributed to J. S. Willison's most unfavourable estimation of it while G. R. Parkin developed a clearly pro-Conservative interpretation. H. A. Innis and D. G. Creighton both shared a geographically deterministic interpretation of Canadian history which easily leant itself to an emphasis on "National Policy" as complementing the line of communication initiated by the St. Lawrence. So too did the emphasis of J. M. S. Careless on metropolitanism and of V. C. Fowke on prairie settlement.

Interpretation of "National Policy" has also been affected by the circumstances of the time in which the historians were writing. Skelton's evaluation of the "National Policy" in attaining economic independence reflected the preoccupation

of Canadians of the post World War I period with autonomy. In their emphasis on past "national policies", W. A. Mackintosh and the scholars of the Rowell-Sirois Commission reflected the desire, after the dark period of the depression, for the government to pursue a more direct role of leadership in the economy. It may be also that historians such as D. G. Creighton, J. M. S. Careless, W. L. Morton and R. C. Brown have been happy to express their patriotism in economic terms while playing down the problem of cultural differences between English and French Canadians which have become more apparent to English Canadians since the 'quiet revolution' of the early 1960's. J. H. Dales' criticism of the "National Policy" in the 1960's was suggestive both of the affluence of the period and a growing disillusionment with the 'branch plant' economy developed by massive American investment after the war.

Every Canadian historian who used the term expressed his ideal of Canada as a nation in his judgement of "National Policy". For O. D. Skelton, Canada's autonomy from Great Britain was a goal of Canadian nationalism. Creighton was more concerned with independence from the United States. For Dales, the object of Canadian development was a high standard of living.

Canada has not been the only country in which an economic slogan of nation-building has been given an important role in national development. Japan, for instance, had a slogan at

the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 which roughly translates as "National Prosperity and Military Strength" and Japanese historians have considered it as a national intention of the country. In Canada, by emphasizing a term which was originally connected with economic development, historians have tended to explain the evolution of a political nation within an economic framework.

It is important that the scholar using the term "National Policy" should make its meaning clear from the context in which it is used and not suggest a consciousness of overall policy among statesmen which may not have been there. It is important for any historian to examine critically the terms which he employs. This is especially true of a highly emotive term like "National Policy".

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