

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN'S MILITARY CAPABILITY  
DURING THE OCCUPATION:  
FROM DISARMAMENT TO REARMAMENT

by

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### ABSTRACT

As a result of its defeat in World War II, Japan was subject to Allied occupation from 1945 to 1952. The Occupation was carried out under the predominant influence of the United States, and the ultimate objective of the Occupation was to "reorient" the Japanese. Under this circumstance, the defeated nation was told by the Americans, first, not to have armed forces and later to have them. American policy on Japan's maintenance of military forces changed diametrically from disarmament to rearmament. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the change in American policy toward Japanese military capability during the Occupation period. For this purpose, diplomatic documents published by the U.S. State Department are used as primary sources.


To trace the change in American policy, I take note of three sets of legal documents although my argument is not strictly restricted to them. The documents are a war-renunciation clause in the Japanese Constitution, a Japanese disarmament treaty, and a Japanese peace treaty. The first was designed to institutionalize the disarmament of Japan domestically, and the other two internationally, at least at the beginning. As the American-Soviet relationship deteriorated, American attitude toward the documents changed, and a Japanese disarmament treaty was dropped. Finally, a Japanese peace treaty did not impose any restrictions on the ex-enemy's armaments, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty urged Japan to rearm. I believe that those documents are useful clues in examining American attitude toward Japan's military strength.

A few points are notable in the change in American policy on Japan's armaments. First, the United States changed its Japan policy from disarmament to rearmament as the cold war intensified. In the process, a relatively large shift occurred twice, that is, in early 1948 and in mid 1950. Those shifts were brought about not simply by the mere intensification of the cold war, but rather by a sort of "shock." Second, while the problem of whether Japan should be disarmed or rearmed was determined in terms of America's own interests, U.S. policy-makers showed consideration for other Allied countries' fears of Japan in working out the way the ex-enemy should be disarmed or rearmed. Third, from the viewpoint of Washington policy-makers, the war-renunciation clause was not so much right as acceptable in 1946. Given the circumstance in which the clause was adopted, to Washington, the incorporation of the no-war article in the Japanese Constitution was not a mistake but an accident.


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## I. INTRODUCTION

In 1953, then Vice-President of the United States Richard M. Nixon publicly said in Tokyo:

There are those who say the United States is taking a very inconsistent position about the rearmament of Japan. They might say: In 1946 who was it that insisted that Japan disarm? It wasn't the Japanese, although they were willing to embark on that program, but it was at the insistence of the United States that Japan disarmed.

Now if disarmament was right in 1946, why is it wrong in 1953? And if it was right in 1946 and wrong in 1953, why doesn't the United States admit for once that it made a mistake? And I'm going to do something that I think perhaps ought to be done more by people in public life. I'm going to admit right here that the United States did make a mistake in 1946.<sup>1</sup>

As Nixon admitted, American policy toward Japanese military strength changed diametrically during the period. Under the Allied occupation from 1945 to 1952, in which the role of the United States was decisive, the Japanese were first told not to have armed forces and then to have them.

When Nixon delivered the speech urging Japan's rearmament, what he had in mind must have been the amendment of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The provision, which is called the war-renunciation clause, was incorporated into the Constitution in 1946 by the specific instruction of Douglas MacArthur, then Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who concurrently occupied the position of the Commander in Chief of the United States Forces in the Far East. The provision reads:

Within several years, however, the American policy of disarmament was reversed. As the cold war intensified, the United States moved away from the idea of an unarmed Japan. In 1951, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty went so far as to say, in the preamble, that the United States expected that "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression ...."<sup>5</sup>

In short, in the deterioration of the Soviet-American relationship, the United States changed its Japan policy from disarmament to rearmament. At the end of the war, the permanent or long-term disarmament of Japan was America's firm policy. Then, the United States proceeded to bring this about. Halfway toward this goal, it reversed the policy because of the intensifying cold war which reached a culmination of the Korean War. After that, the United States urged the rearmament of Japan. Thus, the Occupation period can be divided, though roughly, into four sub-periods: from February 1944 to October 1945--the formulation of disarmament policy; from November 1945 to August 1947--the implementation of disarmament policy; from September 1947 to August 1950--the formulation of rearmament policy; and, from September 1950 on--the implementation of rearmament policy.

Looking back at the Occupation period, it seems to me, the problem was not only whether Japan should be kept disarmed or permitted to rearm, but also how either should be carried out; further, the problem of "how" was more influenced by political considerations than that of "whether" was. Political consideration was more important in the implementation of disarmament policy. It was generally considered in the initial period of the Occupation that Japan should be kept dis-

armed in one way or another. There are, however, several means of disarmament. There was no logical necessity that Japan should be disarmed in the way the United States tried. With regard to the long-term disarmament of Japan, a constitutional ban on military forces, a disarmament treaty, and a peace treaty with military restrictions were proposed, and the first two were motivated not so much by disarmament itself, but rather by other considerations. MacArthur considered it necessary that the Japanese should show their determination to discard militarism so that the retention of the emperor institution might be acceptable to the Allied countries; and James F. Byrnes, who as Secretary of State supported the disarmament treaty, thought that it was necessary to calm the Soviet fear of Japan. They must have thought that if Japan should be disarmed in one way or another, the way the country would be disarmed should serve other policy objectives. In this sense, the implementation of disarmament policy was greatly influenced by political consideration for American allies.

In the first place, an Allied fear of Japan lay behind disarmament. As the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" put it, disarmament was a means to "insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world."<sup>6</sup> Actual disarmament should insure the peace and security of the world. Whether a country constitutes a menace to another country depends on their relations, such as proximity, historical backgrounds, relative strength, etc. Some of the Allied countries were more concerned about the resurgence of a militant Japan than the United States. Second, because immediately after the war Japan was considered as the

only menace to the peace of the Far East and the Pacific, the way Japan would be kept disarmed was of secondary importance to the United States as long as the ex-enemy was effectively kept disarmed. It was not necessary to impose American policy on its allies in this relation. Therefore, MacArthur and Byrnes tried to "implement" the disarmament policy in the way that would be favorable to their other political objectives. Third, the two principals were highly independent in policy formulation in the American government. On the one hand, Byrnes did not rely on the formal organization of the State Department.<sup>7</sup> On the other, though nominally not a policy-maker, MacArthur was in a highly independent position and influenced policy formulation and implementation in a large measure, as George F. Kennan says.<sup>8</sup> As a result of the three factors, the implementation of disarmament policy was susceptible to the political consideration of American allies.

From mid 1947 to mid 1950 American policy drifted from disarmament to rearmament. In the process a relatively large shift occurred twice, that is, in early 1948 and in mid 1950. As Blakeslee put it, to the United States and some of the Allies the Soviet Union replaced Japan as the greatest danger to the peace of the Far East.<sup>9</sup> In other words, the fear of the Soviet Union surpassed that of Japan, though the latter did not disappear completely even in the United States. As mentioned above, what constituted a menace was different from one country to another. Such countries as the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand still feared Japan considerably. Because the ultimate American objective was not to rearm Japan but to have stable, self-sustaining, non-communist, pro-American governments in Asia and the

western Pacific area, the United States needed to rearm Japan in the way that would not disturb the countries concerned, including Japan itself. For this purpose, the United States attempted to establish a Pacific pact, in which framework Japan should be rearmed and supervised. However, since the attempt failed because of disagreement on the membership of the pact, the United States had separate security pacts with the countries concerned in return for their acceptance of the American version of a Japanese peace settlement. In this sense, the implementation of rearmament policy was also influenced by American consideration for its allies.

Whether disarmament or rearmament, the main problem was a fear of Japan. According to the relative strength of its fear of Japan, the United States decided whether Japan should be disarmed or rearmed. When its fear of the Soviet Union surpassed that of Japan, the United States changed the Japan policy from disarmament to rearmament. However, not only did a fear of Japan decide whether the country should be disarmed or rearmed, but it also influenced how Japan should be disarmed or rearmed. Some of the American allies feared Japan more than the United States did, and the latter tried to disarm or rearm Japan in a way which would satisfy its allies. In contrast to the problem of whether Japan should be disarmed or rearmed, the way Japan should be disarmed or rearmed was greatly influenced by political consideration for American allies, i.e. by consideration for those countries' fears of Japan.

In the following pages, I will examine American policy with the foregoing in mind. For this purpose, I will mainly use diplomatic docu-

ments published by the U.S. State Department. It is the American view toward Japan's military capability, especially that of the State Department, that will be discussed below.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Richard M. Nixon, "To the Japanese People," in Jon Livingston, Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfather, eds., The Japan Reader 2, Postwar Japan, 1945 to Present (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973). pp. 263-64.

<sup>2</sup>Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948: Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (republished ed., Grosse Pointe, Mich.: Scholarly Press, 1968), P. 671.

<sup>3</sup>MacArthur in *ibid.*, p. 657. According to the present official interpretation of the Japanese government, Article 9 does not deny Japan's right of self-defense; thus, "[s]o long as this right of self-defense is not denied, the government takes the position that the Constitution does not prohibit maintaining a minimum necessary level of capability of self-defense." See Japanese Defense Agency, "Defense," in The Japan Institute of International Affairs, ed., White Papers of Japan, 1981-1982: Annual Abstract of Official Reports and Statistics of the Japanese Government (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p. 39.

<sup>4</sup>George H. Blakeslee, The Far Eastern Commission: A Study in International Cooperation, 1945 to 1952 (Washington: GPO, 1953), p. 66.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 3, pt. 3, 1952 (Washington: GPO, 1955; reprint ed., New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969), p. 3231.

<sup>6</sup>Political Reorientation, p. 423.

<sup>7</sup>Patricia Dawson Ward, The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945-1946 (Kent, O.: Kent University Press, 1979), p. 20.

<sup>8</sup>George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), pp. 369-72, 392-93.

<sup>9</sup>Blakeslee, p. 66.

<sup>10</sup>NSC 48/5 "United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia," dated 17 May 1951, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. 6: Asia and the Pacific, pt. 2 (Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 35. Books in this series will be referred to as FRUS hereinafter. For example, the book quoted here will be referred to as FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 2.

## II. PERMANENT DISARMAMENT

The United States actually began preparation for the postwar occupation of Japan in summer 1942. Although the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy was set up in the State Department in December 1941, little attention was paid to the Pacific area until the next summer. From summer to fall 1942, Japan specialists such as George H. Blakeslee and Hugh Borton joined the Division of Special Research, which served as secretariat for the Advisory Committee.<sup>1</sup>

In understanding the American presurrender planning for postwar Japan, the importance of these Japan specialists cannot be overlooked. Looking back, Borton says that it is surprising that "the East Asia policy planners had so many of their recommendations accepted despite the continued shifts in policy-making groups." He attributes this achievement to four factors. First, the Japan specialists made efforts to prepare policy recommendations in advance and, thus, they could take the initiative when a problem was raised. Second, they were cautious to avoid interference from the outside. For example, in the spring of 1945 when "United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan" was under consideration, they tried, with success, to evade Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau's intervention, as he had a different view toward Japan. Third, they had a reliable supporter in the highest echelons of the State Department. Former Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew was assigned as Director of Far Eastern Affairs

May 1, 1944 and on December 20 of that year he was promoted to Under Secretary of State. During the year preceding Japan's surrender, Grew supported the Japan specialists' position in the formulation of policy toward postwar Japan. Fourth, their opinions were respected because of the scarcity of Japanese specialists in general.<sup>2</sup>

The Advisory Committee and its Subcommittees considered postwar policy separately from current policy; in other words, the Committee devoted itself strictly to postwar problems.<sup>3</sup> For this reason, this organization was becoming less functional as the actual victory of the Allied countries approached in 1943. The Advisory Committee was suspended in July 1943 and was not resumed thereafter.<sup>4</sup> In the middle of 1943, "[t]he urgency for joint consideration at the expert level by the postwar research staff and by the 'desk officers' in the operating geographic and functional divisions" prompted the creation of the Inter-divisional Country and Area Committees.<sup>5</sup> The Committee on the Far East was established in September 1943 and chaired by Blakeslee. The Committee met most frequently of all such committees, and worked out the basis of postwar policies toward Japan.<sup>6</sup>

Through the reorganization of the State Department in January 1944, the Post-War Program Committee was formed to give the Secretary of State "assistance in formulating postwar policies and in making the appropriate international arrangements for their execution."<sup>7</sup> Composed of ranking officials of the State Department, the Committee was chaired by the Secretary. It met sixty-six times until November 17, 1944.<sup>8</sup> In this Committee, postwar policies toward Japan began to take a concrete and authoritative form.

On February 18, 1944, the War and Navy Departments requested the recommendations and advice of the State Department for consideration in connection with their future planning for the occupation of Japan proper and other areas. The paper which was sent to the State Department by the two Departments enumerated some of the fundamental questions which confronted the War and Navy Departments "in the planning, training and organization for civil affairs administration in Japan Proper, the Mandated Islands, and the countries occupied by Japan."<sup>9</sup> In reply to this request for recommendations, on May 15, 1944, the State Department sent twenty-one papers as answers to most of those questions. The papers were prepared by the Interdivisional Area Committee on the Far East and approved by the Post-War Program Committee. According to Borton, the papers which were already on hand in February 1944 were sent for deliberation to the Post-War Program Committee.<sup>10</sup>

One of these twenty-one papers, PWC-152b entitled "Japan: Abolition of Militarism and Strengthening Democratic Processes," dealt with the future rearmament of Japan. In this paper, the abolition of militarism and enforcement of democratic tendencies in Japan were discussed in terms of the destruction of the military machine, steps to prevent the revival of militarism, the inauguration of basic governmental reforms, and supplementary factors. The paper referred to the destruction of the present military machine in Japan: all the Japanese armed forces would be disarmed, and the military installations throughout Japan would be dismantled. In addition, the paper said with regard to basic governmental reforms:

If, notwithstanding the wide consensus which now exists that Japan should not be permitted in the post-war period to retain an army, navy, or air force, Japan should later be permitted to maintain some form of military establishment, such permission should envisage as an essential condition the elimination of existing statutes and ordinances which stipulate that ministers of war and of the navy shall be high-ranking military and naval officers.... The elimination of these statutes and ordinances, and their replacement by a legal provision stipulating that the posts of minister of war and the minister of the navy shall be held only by civilians, would provide a substantial safeguard against complete domination of the armed forces by the military and contribute toward preventing the military from usurping control over the government.<sup>11</sup>

The paper went on to say, as a supplementary factor, that the abolition of militarism would be impossible unless "adequate security is provided in the Pacific and eastern Asia, presumably by the establishment of an international security system and a world international organization."<sup>12</sup>

This paper was not directed toward any specific question raised by the War and Navy Departments. In the paper prepared by those two Departments, the issue of the future rearmament of Japan was not mentioned. According to Borton who drafted PWC-152b, it was prepared to placate several ranking officials in the State Department.<sup>13</sup> As mentioned above, in response to the request of the War and Navy Departments, papers prepared by Asia specialists in the Far Eastern Area Committee were sent to the Post-War Program Committee for consideration. Some of these papers caused the opposition of some of the members, who had been concentrating largely on European problems, in the Post-War Program Committee. The opposition was leveled against two proposals concerning the implementation of occupation: indirect occupation through the present government and the maintenance of the institution of the emperor. On the one hand, the Japanese specialists

considered that without these arrangements the orderly occupation of Japan would be almost impossible. On the other, it seemed to some members in the Program Committee that the abolition of militarism was impossible without overturning the present government and the institution of the emperor.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the aim of PWC-152b must have been to prove that despite the continuation of the present government and of the institution of the emperor--though with necessary modifications--militarism could be eliminated and democratic tendencies strengthened.

This position of the Japan specialists was strongly supported by Grew,<sup>15</sup> who was appointed as Director of Far Eastern Affairs on May 1, 1944. His thinking explains the logic of the Japan specialists. For example, Grew said at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearing on his appointment as Under Secretary of State in December 1944:

It is argued [in the United States] that it is the existence of this institution [of the emperor] that made possible Japanese militarism and aggression....[However,] the Japanese do not need to have an emperor to be militaristic and aggressive, nor is it the existence of an emperor that makes them militaristic and aggressive. There are conditions more deeply rooted in their social structure and concepts growing out of that social structure which have to be exorcised in one way or another. It will be one of our fundamental objectives to remove those conditions.<sup>16</sup>

He also said elsewhere that "the institution of the Throne in Japan is a cornerstone and a sheet anchor"<sup>17</sup>; "[i]f the Japanese themselves want to keep their emperorship we had better let them do it, while taking very good care that they never be allowed in future the paraphernalia for building the tools of war."<sup>18</sup> This was the presumption which

PWC-152b took. Thus, the paper referred to the nullification of obnoxious laws, the elimination of ultra-nationalistic influences, the creation of internal conditions favorable to the growth of democracy, and the encouragement of liberal forces; some social structures should be exorcised and some should be enforced. As for governmental reforms, PWC-152b envisaged the strengthened power of parliament, disarmament, or rearmament under civilian control, the guarantee of increased civil rights, and the reform of the present judiciary system. Although there were many ways to abolish militarism in Japan, it seemed to the specialists that one of the best ways was to prohibit Japan from having military forces at all. The permanent disarmament of Japan continued to be preferred during the war.

It is worthwhile to glance at what the State Department expected in the future of the Far East during this period. The State Department view is shown in the following memorandum prepared by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in April 1944:

Military victory of the United Nations will not by itself eradicate the roots of future conflicts in the Far East, nor will any balance of power concept, which would inevitably offer an opportunity for the resurgence to power of a militarist Japan, in application serve to maintain peace. Cooperation among the four great powers, all of which have an important stake in the peace and the stability of the Far East, offers a promising approach to the problems of the Far East.<sup>19</sup>

It is hardly surprising that this future program for the Far East was pervaded with the optimism of cooperation among the great powers. Following the Moscow Declaration in October 1943, the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations were held from August to October 1944 for the establishment of a general international organization. In the spring of 1944, the

State Department was working for the preparation of a "Possible Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security."<sup>20</sup> It seems that, within this framework, Japan was to be permanently disarmed and put under the supervision of the great powers.

Consisting of the representatives of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was established in December 1944. Contacts with the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to be arranged as appropriate. While the Committee's jurisdiction was international affairs in general, "it was agreed that for the present the Committee would confine itself to the consideration of questions having politico-military implications, and that it would advise and make recommendations for the approval of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy."<sup>21</sup>

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee established the Subcommittee on the Far East on January 5, 1945. Blakeslee and Borton were members of the Subcommittee, "working on exactly the same problems as heretofore"; "[s]imilarly, the same policies which the PWC [Post-War Program Committee] had approved were presented, with appropriate changes, to SWNCC for its consideration."<sup>22</sup>

In spring 1945, the Subcommittee on the Far East began to work out "United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan." On April 6, 1945, the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department asked for the recommendations of the State Department in relation to the future treatment of Japan, and as early as April 19, a draft of the Initial Post-Defeat Policy was completed. Commenting on that part of

the draft which dealt with the disarmament of Japan, the Office of Naval Operations proposed the following sentence as a modification: "Japan's military and naval forces are to be disarmed and disbanded in such a manner as permanently to prevent their revival or reorganization."<sup>23</sup> As a reason for this change, the Naval Operations Office said, "something more than current or temporary disarmament and demobilization is emphasized."<sup>24</sup>

The SWNCC Subcommittee on the Far East completed its drafting work on June 11, 1945. Document SWNCC 150, entitled "United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan," was sent to SWNCC for its consideration. That part which referred to the disarmament of Japan was further revised, and a preference for permanent disarmament was shown as follows:

Japan's ground, air and naval forces are to be disarmed and disbanded; military and naval matériel, vessels and installations are to be surrendered or destroyed; industries primarily military in character are to be eliminated. All measures taken in this connection shall be designed to accomplish to the extent possible the permanent disarmament and demilitarization of Japan.<sup>25</sup>

Evidently, the Subcommittee wanted to keep Japan disarmed as long as possible. In a Staff meeting consisting of high-ranking officials under the Secretary's chairmanship, the State Department approved this position on June 26, 1945. The document, however, did not have the approval of the other Departments.<sup>26</sup>

In this period, a wish for the longtime disarmament of Japan was still based on the optimistic expectation of great power cooperation in the postwar world. The expectation, however, was not as optimistic as

in 1944. Witnessing developments in areas liberated by the Red Army in Europe, the State Department could not help having a less optimistic view of the future Far East. On June 28, 1945, Grew sent then Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson "a policy paper representing the considered views of the Department of State as a whole."<sup>27</sup> Entitled "An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific at the Close of the War in the Far East and the Objectives and Policies of the United States," the paper revealed a gloomy aspect of the postwar period. While admitting the uncertainty of the occurrence of future American-Soviet conflicts in the region, it pointed out the following possibility:

If the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan, it may cooperate with the Chinese Communists in setting up governments in Manchuria, north China and possibly Korea, under the influence if not complete control of the Soviet Union. Such a unilateral course would be in line with present Russian procedure in Europe....

In view of this possibility the most hopeful course for the United States Government would be to attempt to reach an agreement with the Soviets by which the Soviet Union would promise inter alia to respect the integrity and independence of China and <sup>to</sup><sub>28</sub> refrain from any intervention in China's internal affairs.

The State Department realized the possibility that the Soviet sphere of influence might be extended to north China and Korea. This means that the power vacuum to be created by the defeat of Japan would be filled by the United States and the Soviet Union with Japan proper under the former's influence. The fear of Japan, however, seemed to take precedence over that of the Soviet Union. During this period, the fear of Japan was real while future Soviet behavior was uncertain. Therefore, despite a relatively gloomy prediction, the longtime disarmament of Japan was preferred.

In August, atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, and the Soviet Union declared war against Japan. On August 10, much earlier than expected, the Japanese government informed the United States that it was ready to accept the Potsdam Declaration, which had been published on July 26, 1945, and Japan surrendered on August 14. Because of the unexpectedly early surrender of Japan, it became necessary to make SWNCC 150 of June 11 harmonious with the Potsdam Declaration in haste; accordingly, SWNCC revised SWNCC 150 and prepared SWNCC 150/2 on August 12.<sup>29</sup> The Potsdam Declaration had a provision on disarmament: "The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives." The Declaration also referred to economic disarmament: Japan shall not be permitted to maintain those industries "which would enable her to re-arm for war."<sup>30</sup>

The paragraph which was devoted to the disarmament of Japan in SWNCC 150 remained almost the same. Nevertheless, a preference for the permanent disarmament of Japan became more clearly shown. While SWNCC 150 envisioned "to accomplish to the extent possible the permanent disarmament and demilitarization of Japan," SWNCC 150/2 intended "to accomplish the permanent and complete disarmament and demilitarization of Japan."<sup>31</sup> The permanent disarmament of Japan, which was made explicit first in the Post-War Program Committee in the spring of 1944, continued to be preferred until this date.

SWNCC 150/2 was subject to further revision on August 22 and 31, and the August 31 version, that is, SWNCC 150/4 was approved by President Truman on September 6, 1945. The revision was not so much

modification but rather rewriting, and was carried out in an unusual way. Unsatisfied with SWNCC 150/2, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, a SWNCC member, insisted on the overall rewriting of the document. Without the participation of the SWNCC Subcommittee on the Far East, he made a draft by himself and individually obtained the consent of the representatives of the State and Navy Departments. Thus, the McCloy draft was made SWNCC 150/3, and the Subcommittee on the Far East could not but give its ex post facto consent to the new document. In accordance with the desires of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SWNCC 150/3 was further revised as SWNCC 150/4 on August 31.<sup>32</sup> SWNCC 150/4 prescribed:

Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. Japan's ground, air and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff and all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval matériel, military and naval vessels and military and naval installations, and military, naval and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as required by the Supreme Commander.<sup>33</sup>

SWNCC 150/4 was publicized in late September after slight revision as "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan."

There is a nuance between SWNCC 150/2 and SWNCC 150/4 in terms of attitude toward the disarmament of Japan. While SWNCC 150/2 tried to emphasize something more than current or temporary disarmament and demilitarization, SWNCC 150/4 did not stress the permanence of disarmament. Of course, the latter was also sensitive to the possible military resurgence of Japan. Since May 1944, it was a continued objective of the United States "to insure that Japan will not again become

a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world."<sup>34</sup> For the achievement of this objective, SWNCC 150/4 said that "Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized."<sup>35</sup> In comparison to SWNCC 150/2, however, emphasis on the permanent disarmament of Japan was reduced in SWNCC 150/4.

A possible reason for the "de-emphasis" was a reshuffle of those officials who were charged with Far Eastern affairs in the State Department. Grew submitted his letter of resignation on August 15, and his closest subordinates resigned or were reposted thereafter. The press and public were critical of those people, who were described as follows:

The Grew men--the "Japan crowd"--were obsessed with the idea that Japan would always be the strongest power in east Asia. They were not anti-Chinese, but they could not see in sprawling, floundering China any possible growth of power that would hold Japan in check.<sup>36</sup>

Among the "Japan crowd," Grew and his right-hand man Eugene H. Dooman resigned, and Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs Joseph W. Ballantine was replaced.<sup>37</sup> SWNCC 150/4 was drafted after Grew had resigned, and the SWNCC Subcommittee on the Far East was not consulted for the drafting. To the "Japan crowd" obsessed with the strength of Japan, it must have been imperative that the permanence of disarmament should be emphasized.

The nuance may not have resulted only from different understanding toward Japan between the "Japan crowd" and McCloy. According to Etzold and Gaddis, in the fall of 1945, there was a small gap between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the recognition of the international situation. On September 26, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff submitted document SWNCC 282, entitled "Basis for the Formulation of a U.S. Military Policy," to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. The State Department responded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by document SC-169b of 16 November 1945, entitled "Action on Joint Chiefs of Staff Statement on United States Military Policy." The document criticized the Joint Chiefs of Staff as too pessimistic about the possibility of cooperation among the great powers and reminded them of the importance of enforcing peace terms on Germany and Japan.<sup>38</sup>

In relation to Japan, SWNCC 282 was of course committed to prevent the resurgence of an aggressive Japan. However, the commitment did not seem to be given top priority. Meanwhile, Truman listed the four principal tasks of American foreign policy in his address in October 1945; the first task was to impose the terms of peace on the Axis countries. Therefore, SC-169b pointed out that "[i]n the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement the place assigned the task of enforcing the terms of peace upon Germany and Japan seems to the Department of State to be less prominent than it should be."<sup>39</sup>

The Initial Post-Surrender Policy was later supplemented and elaborated by JCS 1380/15 "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directives to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan," which was forwarded to the Supreme Commander on November 3, 1945, after approval by SWNCC. JCS 1380/15 seems to have returned to the previous position in relation to the disarmament of Japan although the reason why the document was closer to SWNCC 150/2

than to SWNCC 150/4 is not clear. It directed the Supreme Commander as follows:

You will provide for the permanent dissolution of all military and para-military organizations, including the Supreme Military Council, the Board of Field Marshalls and Fleet Admirals, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, the Army, Navy, Civilian Volunteer Corps and Gendarmerie, together with all reservists and other militaristic associations which might serve to keep alive the military tradition in Japan.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, it seems clear that, despite some variations in attitude, the United States at this time continuously preferred the longtime or permanent disarmament of Japan.

During this period, the long-term disarmament of Japan was the firm policy of the United States. There are, however, some means to keep a country disarmed for a long time. Economic control over war potential was considered<sup>41</sup> and, given the precedent that the 1919 Versailles Treaty put restrictions on German armament, policy-makers probably contemplated the disarmament of Japan through a peace treaty. It seems, however, that there had not been a consensus on how to implement the policy of Japanese disarmament. As for a means to keep Japan disarmed, there was room for "discretion."

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Hugh Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (New York: Columbia University, East Asian Institute, 1967), p. 8.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington: GPO, 1949), p. 79.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 163-64, 168.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 176.

<sup>6</sup>Borton, Presurrender Planning, p. 11. Newsweek lists six men as the permanent nucleus of policy formulation toward Japan in this committee. These six men were: Eugene H. Dooman, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary James Dunn; Joseph W. Ballantine, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs; Erle Roy Dickover, Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs; George H. Blakeslee, Special Assistant in Far Eastern affairs; Hugh Borton; Quincy Wright. See "The What-to-Do Men," Newsweek, 27 August 1945, p. 39.

<sup>7</sup>U.S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy, p. 208.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 209.

<sup>9</sup>FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 1190.

<sup>10</sup>Borton, Presurrender Planning, p. 29.

<sup>11</sup>FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 1259.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 1260.

<sup>13</sup>Borton says that the document in question is "The Abolition of Militarism and the Encouragement of Democratic Processes in Japan," which was considered by the Program Committee on May 3, 1944. I identified the document with PWC-152b for the following reasons. First, the titles of the two documents are almost the same. Second, Borton says that the document "pointed out the weaknesses of the prewar governmental structure and how these should be rectified," and this description of the document is fitted to PWC-152b. Third, PWC-152b was drafted by Borton and submitted to the Program Committee on May 4, 1944, as PWC-152a. Fourth, among the twenty-one papers sent to the War and Navy Departments, three were dated on May 4, 1944, and two were the revised editions of documents dated May 4, 1944, but none was dated on May 3, 1944. See Borton, Presurrender Planning, p. 16 and idem., "Preparation for the Occupation of Japan," Journal of Asian Studies 25 (February 1966): 206 and FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, pp. 1257-60.

- <sup>14</sup>Borton, Presurrender Planning, pp. 15-16.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 16.
- <sup>16</sup>Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years. 1904-1945, vol. 2, ed. Walter Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 1417-18.
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 1411.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 1420.
- <sup>19</sup>FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 1232.
- <sup>20</sup>U.S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy, pp. 250-53.
- <sup>21</sup>FRUS, 1944, vol. 1, p. 1469.
- <sup>22</sup>Borton, Presurrender Planning, p. 18.
- <sup>23</sup>FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, p. 537.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 552.
- <sup>26</sup>FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 554-55; Eric H.F. Svensson, "The Military Occupation of Japan: The First Years Planning, Policy Formulation, and Reforms" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Denver, 1966), p. 59.
- <sup>27</sup>FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, p. 556.
- <sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 579. According to Grew, he had a much more pessimistic view on this issue. On May 19, 1945, he wrote in a private memorandum: "Once Russia is in the war against Japan, then Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea will gradually slip into Russia's orbit, to be followed in due course by China and eventually Japan . . ."; "A future war with the Soviet Russia is as certain as anything in the world can be certain"; "The most fatal thing we can do is to place any confidence whatever in Russia's sincerity, knowing without question that she will take every opportunity to profit by our clinging to our own ethical international standards." See Grew, vol. 2, p. 1446.
- <sup>29</sup>Jun Eto, ed., Senryo Shiroku [The Historical Record of the Occupation], vol. 1: Kohukubunsho Choin Keii [All Details of Signature for the Instrument of Surrender] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1981), pp. 353-54.
- <sup>30</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 413.
- <sup>31</sup>FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 552, 610.

<sup>32</sup>Eto, vol. 1, p. 354.

<sup>33</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 424.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 423.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>"The China Crowd," Time, 8 October 1945, p. 18,

<sup>37</sup>Grew, vol. 2, p. 1442.

<sup>38</sup>Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 39, 45.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>40</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 431.

<sup>41</sup>See "Initial Post-Surrender Policy" in *ibid.*, pp. 424-425 and JCS 1380/15 in *ibid.*, p. 434.

### III. WAR-RENUNCIATION ARTICLE

In accordance with the agreement among the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, Douglas MacArthur, then General of the Army, was designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the purpose of enforcing the surrender of Japan on August 12, 1945. Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration on August 14. The surrender ceremony of Japan was held on the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2. The war ended thereby. After presiding over the ceremony, MacArthur broadcast a short address from the Missouri to the American people. He said in part:

Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations . . . . Military alliances, balance of power, Leagues [sic] of Nations all in turn failed leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we do not devise some greater and more equitable system Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advance in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past two thousand years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.

Five months later, MacArthur would proceed along this line when he instructed his staff to incorporate the war-renunciation clause into a draft of a new Japanese constitution.

In mid September 1945, MacArthur established his headquarters, usually known as the General Headquarters (GHQ), in downtown Tokyo.

He began to undertake the "rebuilding of Japan". From the standpoint of the Allied countries, Japan needed drastic reforms. "The basis for governmental reform--constitutional revision--in Japan by the Japanese people, was laid in the Potsdam Declaration, announced by the principal Allied Powers at Potsdam, Germany, in July 1945."<sup>2</sup> The Declaration envisaged the establishment of a peacefully inclined and responsible government in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people. "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" desired that a Japanese government "should conform as closely as may be to the principles of democratic self-government . . . ."<sup>3</sup> The Constitution of the Empire of Japan, or known simply as the Meiji Constitution, was not considered by the Allied countries as satisfying these criteria. The revision of the Constitution was inevitable.

Because the Initial Post-Surrender Policy preferred indirect government as the method of occupation, the constitutional reform was primarily a task of the Japanese government. In September, MacArthur instructed the Higashikuni cabinet "to draft a plan for revision of the constitution of Japan with the view of its democratization to permit development of the type of a government and society required by the Potsdam Declaration."<sup>4</sup> On October 4, the Minister-without-Portfolio Prince Fumimaro Konoye of the Higashikuni cabinet called on MacArthur and was told that the Constitution must be revised.

This was followed by an informal meeting between Konoye and Professor Yasaka Takagi of Tokyo Imperial University, on the one hand, and George Atcheson, Jr., then United States Political Adviser to SCAP, on the other. In this meeting held on October 9, Konoye asked

for advice and suggestions in relation to the revision of the Constitution. Though lacking a directive on this subject, Acheson offered personal, unofficial comment on its general character. He pointed out weaknesses of the Meiji Constitution. One of them was related to the position of the War and Navy Ministers.

There was no provision to regulate and control War, Navy Ministers (if there should be any in future), to make them responsible to the govt [sic] and thus deprive militarists of grip on govt [sic] through powers not acquired by constitutional means such as direct access to throne and power to block formation of Cabinet by refusing to serve; democratic constitution would require such officials to be civilian.

As mentioned above, since Acheson did not give the advice on the basis of directives approved by Washington, he requested instruction on this matter from the State Department.

Giving general concurrence to Acheson's views, the State Department sent a somewhat informal reply on October 16: it was called the summary of attitude of the Departmental officers who had been giving consideration to constitutional reforms in Japan. The summary distinguished between two possible cases according to whether the emperor system was retained. Such reforms as responsible government and the enforced power of parliament were considered necessary, regardless of the retention of the emperor. Some additional measures would be required if the emperor system were maintained. One of them was that "[a]ny ministers for armed forces which may be permitted in future should be civilians and all special privileges of direct access to throne by military should be eliminated."<sup>6</sup> This was the first occasion on which the State Department revealed its stance on the revision of the Constitution.

The formal attitude of the United States toward the revision of the Meiji Constitution was clarified in January 1946. On January 7, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) approved SWNCC 228, entitled "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System," which listed prescriptions for constitutional reforms. This document was on the same line as instructions sent to Acheson by the State Department on October 16, 1945. Regardless of the continuation of the emperor system, SWNCC 228 said, "the Ministers of State or the members of a Cabinet should in all cases be civilians"; in addition, if the institution of the emperor was retained, "[t]he Emperor shall be deprived of all military authority such as that provided in Articles XI, XII, XIII, and XIV of Chapter I of the Constitution."<sup>7</sup> In short, SWNCC 228 intended the establishment of civilian control and the deprivation of the privileges of the military. Needless to say, these arrangements clearly contemplated the existence of provisions for military forces in a new constitution.

Thus, from the time of Acheson's advice of 9 October 1945 to SWNCC 228 of January, 1946, no one proposed a constitutional ban on the maintenance of military forces. Rather, constitutional check on the power of the military by a government was intended. In this context, McNelly concludes:

It appears that SWNCC was not contemplating the perpetual disarmament of Japan. Indeed, the references to the military branch, the military services, and civilian ministers suggest that Japan was expected sooner or later to have some kind of armed forces.<sup>8</sup>

In the preceding chapter, however, I argued that Washington in the initial period of the Occupation preferred the long-term disarmament of

Japan. Did SWNCC really contemplate the rearmament of Japan in the near future? Before answering the question, it is necessary to see development in Japan in 1945-1946.

Meanwhile, MacArthur orally instructed the new Prime Minister, Kijuro Shidehara, on October 11 to prepare for the revision of the Constitution. Two days later the Shidehara cabinet decided to establish the Constitution Problem Investigation Committee. Minister-without-Portfolio Joji Matsumoto was appointed as chairman, and the Committee began its work in late October. The Matsumoto Committee had finished its review of the Meiji Constitution by the end of January 1946.

From November 1945 to January 1946, MacArthur left preparation for constitutional reforms almost completely in the hands of the Japanese government. On February 1, 1946, Mainichi Shimbun revealed the substance of the so-called Matsumoto draft of a new constitution, and the Japanese government informally submitted two documents to the Supreme Commander: "Gist of the Revision of the Constitution" and "General Explanation of the Constitutional Revision Drafted by the Government." The Matsumoto draft was given negative evaluation in the General Headquarters:

The proposals for revision do not go beyond the most moderate of modification in the language of the Meiji Constitution. The basic nature of the Japanese state is left unchanged.

Having decided to reject the Matsumoto draft, MacArthur "finally came to the conclusion that the most effective method of instructing the Japanese Government on the nature and application of these principles he considered basic would be to prepare a draft constitution embodying those principles."<sup>10</sup>

On February 3, MacArthur instructed Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, then Chief of the Government Section of the GHQ, to prepare a draft constitution with a specific instruction that three major points should be incorporated in the draft. They were the establishment of constitutional monarchy as a symbol, the renunciation of war, and the abolition of all forms of feudalism. As for the renunciation of war, the so-called MacArthur notes said:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection.

No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.<sup>11</sup>

The war-renunciation clause was subject to modification in the initial stage of drafting. Drafting members in the Government Section "believed that it was unrealistic for Japan to renounce war 'even for preserving its own security,'"<sup>12</sup> and this phrase was omitted. The war-renunciation clause in the so-called MacArthur draft of a new constitution read:

Article VIII. War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with any other nation.

No army, navy, air force, or other war potential will ever be authorized and no right of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the State.<sup>13</sup>

The draft of a new constitution was given MacArthur's approval on February 12. On the next day, Whitney visited Shigeru Yoshida, then Foreign Minister of the Shidehara cabinet, and informed him that the Matsumoto draft was totally unacceptable. He advised the Japanese side

to give the MacArthur draft full consideration and "proposed that it be used as the guide in renewed efforts to prepare a revised constitution."<sup>14</sup> After some resistance, the Japanese government accepted this "proposal." On March 4, the government submitted a new draft, prepared on the basis of the MacArthur draft, to the GHQ for review. After final adjustment, the draft of a new constitution was published as a Japanese government draft on March 6, 1946. Now, as Article 9, the war-renunciation clause read:

Article IX. War, as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force, is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations.

The maintenance of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be authorized.<sup>15</sup> The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Qualification was attached to the abolition of war. War to be renounced was the one "as a means of settling disputes with other nations."<sup>16</sup>

MacArthur's instruction on the renunciation of war is said to have originated in a meeting between MacArthur and Shidehara on January 24, 1946. In this meeting, according to MacArthur:

He [Shidehara] then proposed that when the new constitution became final that it include the so-called no-war clause. He also wanted it to prohibit any military establishment for Japan--any military establishment whatsoever. Two things would thus be accomplished. The old military party would be deprived of any instrument through which they could someday seize power, and the rest of the world would know that Japan never intended to wage war again. He added that Japan was a poor country and could not really afford to pour money into armaments anyway. Whatever resources<sup>17</sup> the nation had left should go to bolstering the economy.

MacArthur then agreed with Shidehara on the constitutional ban of war. Although Shidehara did not directly admit his "authorship" of the war-

renunciation clause, he himself says that, as the prime minister, he determined the complete democratization of the government, the renunciation of war and the complete abolition of arms.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, who first proposed the war-renunciation clause is an unresolved question. The "Shidehara theory" is questioned on two points. In the first place, Shidehara did not support actively the renunciation of war in the process of preparation for a new constitution. Those people who were engaged in negotiation with the GHQ, such as Yoshida and Matsumoto, were inclined to the view that MacArthur proposed the clause. Second, MacArthur revealed this account in a Senate hearing in May 1951 immediately after he had been relieved by President Truman. Given the existing international situation, especially in the Far East, it was difficult for MacArthur to support the complete disarmament of Japan at that time, still more to say the truth even if he had proposed the war-renunciation clause.<sup>19</sup> Thus, whether MacArthur or Shidehara was the actual "author" of Article 9 is usually treated as an unresolved question, and it is emphasized that the "collaboration" of the two brought about the article.<sup>20</sup> In relation to the American attitude toward Japan's rearmament, it would be sufficient to reconfirm the fact that, while concurrently serving as Commander in Chief of the United States Forces in the Far East, MacArthur wanted the war-renunciation clause to be included in a new constitution.

The next question is why MacArthur advocated the abolition of war. There are several reasons. First of all, the abolition of war and armed forces was closely related to the retention of the emperor system. MacArthur was personally impressed by the emperor, and moreover he

was well aware that, without the emperor, the Allied occupation would face great difficulty. Meanwhile, some of the Allied countries were opposed to the retention of the emperor institution; they feared the resurgence of a militant Japan under the emperor system. Therefore, to MacArthur as well as to the Japanese government, it was necessary to make the retention of the institution palatable to the opponent countries. It is said that the abolition of war was expected to have such an effect and that this was the main objective of Article 9.<sup>21</sup>

In this relation, McNelly says:

Both Shidehara and MacArthur were evidently very conscious of the importance of renouncing war from the standpoint of saving the Japanese Throne. A principal reason for urgency in formulating a pacifist and liberal Japanese Constitution was apparently to forestall attempts by some members of the Far Eastern Commission to abolish the Emperor system.

In his meeting with Shidehara on February 21, 1946, MacArthur reportedly said that if military provisions were preserved in a new constitution, other nations would probably suspect that Japan would try to revive her armament; that "[t]he reactions of other nations must be first borne in mind"; that Japan should assume "moral leadership" by renouncing war as an instrument of national policy; and that "Japan would not lose anything even if she did not find any followers [to the leadership]." <sup>22</sup>

MacArthur must have thought that, judging from the prevailing opinion among the Allied countries, Japan could not but be kept disarmed for a long time, and that if the course was inevitable, the way it would be kept disarmed should have favorable effects on other policy objectives, in this case, the retention of the emperor system.

In addition to this political expediency, MacArthur favored the disarmament of Japan for other reasons. In March 1948, MacArthur had a conversation with William H. Draper, then Under Secretary of the Army, and George F. Kennan, who was the Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. Kennan was engaged in the review of the American occupation and post-occupation policy toward Japan. In the meeting, MacArthur was "unalterably opposed to" organizing a Japanese Force to take over the Occupation forces after a peace treaty. He listed five reasons: first, the rearmament of Japan ran counter to many of America's most solemn international commitments, such as the Potsdam Declaration and some decisions made by the Far Eastern Commission, and would alienate Far Eastern countries; second, rearmament was contrary to those principles which had guided the occupation heretofore and would injure the prestige of the occupation authority; third, if rearmed in the best way, Japan could be "no more than a fifth-rate military power"; fourth, rearmament was harmful to Japan's economic rehabilitation; fifth, the Japanese themselves were no longer willing to support armed forces.<sup>23</sup> Although this statement was made in 1948, most of the reasons for disarmament were equally applicable in 1946. It is likely that MacArthur had those considerations in mind when he endorsed or advocated the war-renunciation clause.

In direct relation to Article 9, MacArthur said:

Not only was I convinced that it was the most moral of ideas, but I knew that it was exactly what the Allies wanted at that time for Japan. They had said so at Potsdam and they had said so afterwards. Indeed my directive read, "Japan is not to have an Army, Navy, Air Force, Secret Police Organization, or civil aviation."<sup>24</sup>

MacArthur's idealistic disposition is often pointed out.<sup>25</sup> As quoted above, MacArthur addressed the American people from the U.S.S. Missouri on September 2, 1945. He emphasized the uselessness of alliances, balance of power, and the League of Nations as instruments for settling international disputes, and thought a spiritual lead was needed. The underlying philosophy of Article 9 was on the same line: as the preamble of the Constitution says, "[w]e, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world."<sup>26</sup> Thus, the concept of the renunciation of war was fitted to MacArthur's favorite line.

As for the consistency between the no-war clause and the Allied, especially American, policy there is a difference of opinion. On the one hand, as mentioned above, MacArthur said that Article 9 was what the Allies wanted. Because the Supreme Commander was not in a position to formulate policies toward a postwar Japan, MacArthur's own account may be a pretext to justify his support of the article. The fact remains, however, that Washington desired a longtime disarmament of Japan in the initial period of occupation. In this sense, MacArthur's advocacy of the war-renunciation clause appeared to be in line with Washington's desire. Edwin M. Martin wrote to this effect in 1948:

There seems to be agreement on the proposition that Japan should never be permitted to have an army, navy or air force. A first step to this end has been taken by the incorporation in the new Japanese Constitution of Article 9.<sup>27</sup>

On the other hand, when the substance of a new draft constitution was known to Washington on March 6, 1946, "the only significant substantive difference of views" between MacArthur and Washington concerned the war-renunciation clause; "[t]his concept did not originate in Washington and was not contained in the basic United States policy paper on constitutional reform (SWNCC 228)."<sup>28</sup> Actually, the State Department was not consulted so far; Robert E. Ward says that even if consulted, the State Department would not have assented to the permanent and constitutional disarmament of Japan.<sup>29</sup> Borton considers that MacArthur "had taken personal interest in" incorporating Article 9, "which incorporated his view," into the Constitution.<sup>30</sup> Given different accounts, it seems fair to say that, while Article 9 did not run counter to the American policy in 1946, the former was not the faithful implementation of the latter. It is necessary to carefully examine Washington's policy toward Japan's military strength.

According to Borton, the instructions to Acheson of 16 October 1945 and SWNCC 228 were both "closely related and developed" from PWC-152b dated 9 May 1944, which was entitled "Japan: Abolition of Militarism and Strengthening Democratic Processes."<sup>31</sup> While the instructions to Acheson and SWNCC 228 presupposed that provisions concerning armed forces would be placed in a new constitution, PWC-152b preferred, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, that Japan should not be allowed to have military forces in the postwar period. Did Washington change its mind in formulating SWNCC 228 or were the provisions which allowed armed forces not contradictory to the long-term disarmament of Japan?

It seems to me that the latter interpretation is appropriate. Washington did not abandon its preference for a disarmed Japan in late 1945 and early 1946. "Initial Directives to Supreme Commander (JCS 1380/15)" envisaged the longtime disarmament of Japan, and the American proposal of a twenty-five year disarmament treaty for Japan was in the same vein. Therefore, it should be considered that it was one thing to let Japan have a constitution which permitted armed forces and it was another to let Japan rearm upon the entry-into-force of the new constitution. This is not as awkward an interpretation as it may seem. Even the Japanese government, whose initial draft of a new constitution had articles on armed forces, understood it this way. Intending that, with necessary modifications, provisions on armed forces should not be precluded in a new constitution, the government said in "General Explanation of the Constitutional Revision Drafted by the Government" in February 1946: "[e]ven if the time should arrive when, upon completion of allied occupation, Japan is permitted to rearm, the armed forces would be of a very limited scope such as are necessary for the maintenance of peace and order in the country."<sup>32</sup> In other words, the Japanese government considered that a new constitution should allow armed forces in preparation for future rearmament, and that until then rearmament would be prohibited by an extra-constitutional means. The government also said that "it is thought if Japan be permitted to join the United Nations Organization, the need for rearmament might actually arise in order that she may fulfill her obligations under its charter."<sup>33</sup> Either the completion of the Occupation or Japan's admission to the United Nations could serve as the occasion to begin rearmament. Thus,

the government itself did not expect that Japan would have armed forces before the end of occupation, and judging from the reference to Japan's admission to the United Nations, it may have thought that Japan would be kept disarmed after the end of occupation. By the same token, if the Allied powers wanted to keep Japan disarmed for a long period, the nation would be kept so while maintaining constitutional provisions for armed forces.

Understanding it this way, I will return to the analysis of SWNCC 228 and other documents. My foregoing argument seems applicable. SWNCC 228 provided that all ministers should be civilians and that the emperor's constitutional authority to command armed forces should be removed. This simply means, however, that SWNCC 228 did not contemplate the constitutional ban of armed forces. It does not mean that the document expected that Japan would rearm in the near future. Moreover, Acheson's advice to Konoye and State Department instructions to Acheson referred not to War and Navy ministers, but to "War, Navy Ministers (if there should be any in future)" or "[a]ny ministers for armed forces which may be permitted in future." This seems to suggest that provisions for armed forces in a new constitution do not necessarily mean actual maintenance of Japanese armed forces, and that a Japanese constitution might have such provisions just for the future. If these policy statements are considered in the context of Washington's preference for the longtime disarmament of Japan, it is more convincing to argue that Japan's rearmament was a matter to be decided somewhere and somehow beyond its constitution. Therefore, it should be understood that Washington intended that the provisions in a

Japanese constitution which permitted military forces would be frozen by international agreements. I think that SWNCC 228 and other documents do not preclude this interpretation. Rather, given all the events concerned, this seems to be the appropriate interpretation.<sup>34</sup>

I argue that SWNCC 228 and other documents did not expect an early rearmament of Japan. Why then was there disagreement on the war-renunciation clause between Washington and MacArthur? As I mentioned above, the effect of the clause was in line with American policy. Some people, however, saw the seeds of future troubles in Article 9. For example, journalist Mark Gayn said on March 6, 1946, when the government draft was publicized:

For no one who has read the morning papers or studied Japanese history can doubt that as soon as the occupation ends the Japanese under one pretext or another will re-create their army. That is as inevitable in Japan as earthquakes. By its very nature, the new constitution thus invites circumvention.<sup>35</sup> No constitution in which fraud is inherent can survive.

In Gayn's account, I think, the point is not in the first sentence but in the last sentence. It is true that the Japanese themselves can revise the Constitution and that the abolition of war in the Constitution is not a reliable guarantee to prevent the resurgence of a militant Japan. This point, however, must not have been as important as it appears because the United States intended to keep Japan disarmed under a disarmament treaty, whether a Japanese constitution permitted it or not. As long as the treaty was effective, whatever a constitution allowed would be useless. Indeed, Borton thought in this way as mentioned later. Further, SWNCC 228 approved of a constitutional provision which permitted the maintenance of armed forces.

Gayn's anxiety was shared by the American Embassy in China, which commented on the new Japanese Constitution in August 1946:

But by the same token, to embody in such a law [i.e. a constitution fully expressive of the political aspirations and democratic beliefs of the people], for whatever reason, a principle which is alien to national traditions, repugnant to common sentiment and in the long run unenforceable, would be a great error. In course of time any such principle is certain to be repudiated and the law expressing that principle is certain to be discredited.<sup>36</sup>

The main point was that the inclusion of the war-renunciation clause in the new Constitution would result in the rejection of the Constitution itself. The problem was not so much the future revision of Article 9 as that of the whole Constitution, which might be seen as the symbol of unreality because of the incorporation of an unrealistic article. It was absurd if the inclusion of the no-war clause, which was unrealistic and unenforceable, put at risk the new Constitution as a whole, which gave a basis to a new democratic Japan as the ultimate objective of the Occupation. At the same time, it was implicitly assumed that a sovereign nation should have armed forces. Although there is no evidence, it is quite likely that, for this reason, Washington disagreed with MacArthur.

Another possible deficiency in constitutional disarmament is that the disarmament does not have any international arrangements in which other countries are obliged to respect the security and neutrality of a disarmed country. It is very unlikely that Washington did not realize the danger of constitutional disarmament without necessary international agreements. During this period, however, the State Department was still committed to cooperation among the great powers. Proposed disar-

mament treaties on Germany and Japan were the manifestation of this commitment. It seems that the Department expected that the necessary international arrangement would follow the no-war clause. Analysis by the Political Adviser's Office in SCAP was in line with the general tendency. In this analysis made in April of 1946, the Office cautioned the future possibility of communist penetration into Japan and the alignment of Japan with the Soviet Union. To prevent such an eventuality, some measures were proposed. Among these was "the maintenance of American armed forces in the western Pacific and elsewhere of adequate strength...to prevent the domination of Japan by another power."<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, the analysis relied on continuing cooperation among the Allies.

American foreign policy today wisely and fortunately is based upon the principles of continuing friendship among the Great Powers and the development of a system of collective security under the UNO. In no circumstances should our Japan policies be of a type to impair the success of these larger aims.<sup>38</sup>

Under this circumstance, constitutional disarmament ahead of international arrangements was not considered dangerous.

Although it was not known to what extent Washington disagreed with MacArthur on Article 9, it seems that Washington approved of or at least "overlooked" the war-renunciation clause. In the process of deliberation in the Diet, Article 9 was not subject to the demand of revision originating in Washington. First, the general direction of Article 9 was consistent with the Initial Post-Surrender Policy, that is, "[t]o insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world,"<sup>39</sup> though the con-

cept of constitutional disarmament had some problems as mentioned above. Second, even if Washington had wanted the article to be revised, MacArthur would have ignored instructions to intervene in deliberation in the Japanese Diet, judging from his "independent" disposition. MacArthur himself instructed the inclusion of the no-war clause and he was too committed to this matter to back down. Third, once the United States or the Supreme Commander had made a precedent of interference with the Diet deliberation of the new Constitution, it evidently would have catalyzed demands for amendments from other member countries in the Far Eastern Commission, which had various demands.

Meanwhile, the draft of a new constitution was submitted to the Imperial Diet on June 20, 1946, by the Yoshida cabinet which succeeded the Shidehara cabinet as a result of a general election in April. On July 29, the so-called Ashida amendment was introduced in a special committee under Hitoshi Ashida's chairmanship in the House of Representatives. The amendment was adopted by the House on August 24. Article 9 now read:

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people, forever, renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, or the threat or use of force, as a means of settling disputes with other nations.

For the above purpose, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.<sup>40</sup>

Ashida later revealed his original intent of the amendment, according to which the new phrase enabled Japan to have self-defense forces "legitimately." The key phrase was "for the above purpose" in the second

paragraph. Ashida interpreted the first paragraph as prohibiting war and the threat or use of force only "as a means of settling disputes with other nations." In other words, only aggressive war was prohibited by the first paragraph. Following this interpretation, the second paragraph qualified with "for the above purpose" prohibited only the maintenance of military forces for aggression. It followed that Japan had no problem in organizing self-defense forces.<sup>41</sup>

The deliberation of the draft constitution in the Diet was monitored by the Supreme Commander and the Far Eastern Commission (FEC). Established in accordance with the agreement of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers among the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain on December 27, 1945, the Far Eastern Commission was responsible for, among other things, the formulation of "the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished."<sup>42</sup> The Commission was composed of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, China--these four countries had a veto--France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines Commonwealth. The Commission sat in Washington and began its activities on February 26, 1946. The supervision of the revision of the Japanese Constitution was one of its first jobs. On July 2, the Commission adopted "Basic Principles for a New Japanese Constitution," which was almost the same as SWNCC 228.<sup>43</sup> The Moscow Conference also created the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ). The Council operated in Tokyo under SCAP's chairmanship and consisted of members from the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Australia.

Because the Council's primary task was to consult and advise SCAP in regard to the implementation of occupation policies,<sup>44</sup> it did not play a part in the constitutional reform.

As for the Ashida amendment, the Supreme Commander and the Far Eastern Commission responded differently. On the one hand, it is said that Whitney approved the amendment though he realized Ashida's ulterior motive.<sup>45</sup> It is not known whether Whitney's approval was in accordance with MacArthur's instruction. MacArthur himself showed a somewhat evasive attitude later. In August, he conveyed to Yoshida the Far Eastern Commission's request that the new Constitution should provide that all cabinet ministers should be civilians. MacArthur withdrew this request when Yoshida replied that the civilian clause was unnecessary because there would be no armed forces under the new Constitution.<sup>46</sup> It seems to me that MacArthur did not consider that the Ashida amendment was so important that it changed the meaning of Article 9.

How MacArthur interpreted Article 9 is another argumentative issue. MacArthur said in 1958:

Nothing in Article 9 prevents any and all necessary steps for the preservation of the safety of the nation. I stated this at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and later recommended a Defense Force be organized of ten divisions with corresponding elements of sea and air forces. The article was aimed at foreign aggression and was intended to give spiritual leadership to the world. It will stand everlastingly as a monument to the foresight, the statesmanship and the wisdom of Prime Minister Shidehara.<sup>47</sup>

From this statement, McNelly considers that "the Supreme Commander believed that self-defense forces and defensive war were possible under

Article 9, but this view was not conveyed to the Japanese Government."<sup>48</sup> Despite MacArthur's own account, I doubt that he interpreted the article as permitting the maintenance of military forces for self-defense. If MacArthur had so interpreted it, he would have insisted on the inclusion of the civilian clause at the outset, or at least in August. Even the preceding quotation itself seems somewhat contradictory. If, as MacArthur said, Article 9 prohibits only aggressive war, it will follow that the clause did what the Kellog-Briand pact had done in 1928; additionally, the 1791 Constitution of France and the 1931 Constitution of Spain had a similar provision.<sup>49</sup> Understood this way, it is a surprise to see MacArthur referring to an everlasting "monument to the foresight, the statesmanship and the wisdom of Prime Minister Shidehara."

Moreover, permanent demilitarization and neutralization were his favorite policies on the security of Japan until the beginning of the Korean War. Kennan says:

in his [MacArthur] view [as late as 1948], the most suitable status for Japan would be one of permanent demilitarization and neutralization under such general protection as might be afforded by the United Nations and by the friendly interest of the United States. He appeared to believe, as did this writer, that if such a status could be arranged with the concurrence of the Soviet Government, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would be minimal; and it was not easy to see from what<sup>50</sup> other quarter Japan could be seriously threatened.

MacArthur seemed to reject the necessity of self-defense forces in Japan. Of course, it is possible that, while he interpreted Article 9 as permitting self-defense forces, he did not admit the actual necessity of the forces. In November 1949, however, MacArthur was reported to be

opposed to the scheme of Japanese self-defense forces partly because of Article 9: in a meeting on a Japanese peace treaty, "General MacArthur's opposition to the establishment of Japanese defense forces is based not only on the above-mentioned Constitutional provision and on his belief that such forces would serve no useful military purpose, but also on the fact that Japan will for some time to come be unable to afford their cost."<sup>51</sup> It is also noted that, despite the Ashida amendment, Article 9 was used by MacArthur as a reason for opposition to the establishment of self-defense forces.

In this relation, MacArthur said in 1950 that Article 9 did not deny Japan's right of self-defense and that the article authorized Japan to muster all of its available human and material resources, in emergency, in support of the security forces committed to its defense.<sup>52</sup> Judging from the foregoing, I do not think that, before the outbreak of the Korean War, he thought Japan could have military forces under Article 9. I will return to this point later.

Turning back to the Ashida amendment, the Far Eastern Commission was more sensitive to the change. Because of the fear of Japan's future rearmament, the Commission insisted on the inclusion of a provision for civilian control in the new Constitution.<sup>53</sup> According to a New Zealand member of the Commission, C. Berendsen:

The Japanese text [of Article 9] was ... received by the Commission on the 19th September .... the Japanese Article was by no means clear, and could definitely be construed by Japanese scholars as authorizing the maintenance of armed forces for purposes other than those mentioned in the first part of Article 9. Consequently, the Committee [No. 3: Constitutional and Legal Reform], with United States and Dutch reservations, reported in favour of the Soviet contention on this point and recommended that the Commission should insist upon the inclusion in the Constitution of a provision that the Ministers should be civilians.<sup>54</sup>

Although the Japanese government had once rejected the civilian clause in August, this time it agreed with its incorporation. Accordingly, on October 6, the House of Peers inserted in Article 66 a second paragraph, which read "[t]he Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians."<sup>55</sup> Occupying the position of the Acting Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs in the State Department, Borton reported deliberation on this subject in the Far Eastern Commission under the heading of "Possible Maintenance of Japanese Land, Sea and Air Forces under Article IX of Japanese Draft Constitution":

at the meeting of the committee [No. 7: Disarmament of Japan] on September 26, the Chinese and Australian representatives both stated that, in view of the expected amendment to the Constitution to provide for civilian Cabinet ministers, further consideration of Article IX might be postponed . . . . It is not likely therefore that Article IX will be discussed again in the immediate future. It would seem that the attitude of the United States should be that the demilitarization and demobilization of Japan depend upon agreement among the Allied Powers rather than the Japanese Constitution, which may be amended by the Japanese themselves. Regardless of the wording of Article IX, determination of Japan's military establishment must be left to the peace treaty and to such international agreements as the proposed 25 year Disarmament Treaty.<sup>56</sup>

It is noted that Borton considered that, regardless of the wording of Article IX, Japan's rearmament was to depend upon international agreements; by logical extension, it would follow that, whether the Japanese Constitution permitted the maintenance of armed forces or not, the problem of rearmament or disarmament was to be decided by a peace treaty or other international agreements. I argued that the underlying assumption of SWNCC 228 was that constitutional permission to have armed forces was one thing and the actual rearmament was another. The above-quoted Borton report is in line with my interpretation of SWNCC 228, which was "largely prepared" by Borton himself.<sup>57</sup>

It was natural that Borton preferred disarmament by international agreements rather than by the Constitution. On the one hand, after 1909, Americans came to feel gradually that amendment of their Constitution was not very hard.<sup>58</sup> Following this American standard, people tended to consider that a constitution could be easily amended and it was not reliable to prevent the resurgence of a militant Japan. On the other hand, there is a precedent that the control of Japan by treaties worked very well. Around the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan concluded the so-called unequal treaties, which granted extra-territoriality and beneficial tariff to several countries. The Meiji government had great difficulty in the revision of the treaties. It was 1894 when Britain approved of the revision, and other powers followed suit. In this process, Japan was "induced" to undertake domestic reforms: for example, "[a]fter the British Minister reminded the Japanese government in 1884 that revision of the treaties was contingent upon the adoption by Japan of Western legal standards, the work of drafting new [civil and criminal] codes by foreign legal experts ... was accelerated."<sup>59</sup> Given this precedent, it is not surprising that in 1945 Grew, Borton and other Japan specialists in the State Department had a scheme for the control of Japan, similar to the British one in which "through exercising 'the positive power of controlling trade and the negative power of withholding treaties, the Allies should be able ... to induce Japan herself to introduce such reforms in her institutions and the working thereof as will justify confidence in her future good behaviour."<sup>60</sup>

While Borton considered that the maintenance of armed forces under the Ashida amendment was "possible," it is not certain to what extent it was possible. As mentioned above, MacArthur did not seem to consider the possibility seriously. By and large, Washington did not agree with Ashida's interpretation after 1946. In 1948, the Department of the Army concluded: "the establishment of even limited Japanese armed forces, other than augmentation of the civilian police and the creation of a coastal police, is not practicable and advisable at this time because such action would require amendment by the Japanese of their new constitution and our abrogation of the Potsdam Declaration."<sup>61</sup> The State Department had a similar opinion.<sup>62</sup> It may be said that the civilian clause was incorporated "just in case," as far as the United States was concerned.

Why did the Far Eastern Commission approve the Ashida amendment? Hata suggests that the Commission thought that the four-power disarmament treaty was more reliable than Article 9, which could be easily amended by the Japanese themselves.<sup>63</sup> I agree with him. I think, however, that more explanation is necessary. Why then did the Commission accept the Ashida amendment in return for the insertion of the civilian clause? It seems more logical, regardless of the four-power pact, to veto the Ashida amendment than to juxtapose the no-war clause with the Ashida amendment and the civilian clause in the Constitution. If the war-renunciation clause could be easily modified, so could the civilian clause.

The Soviet Union, Australia and China led the way in the criticism of the Ashida amendment.<sup>64</sup> According to Rosecrance:

The Australian representative argued ... that the provision for the renunciation of war would not be taken seriously by the Japanese. Moreover, the prohibition on military activity seemed to prevent the inclusion of provisions stripping the Emperor of military <sup>65</sup>power and specifying that all cabinet members be civilians.

I think that the Ashida amendment confronted Australia, and probably other countries, with a dilemma. The Australian view seems to be summarized as follows: first, the no-war clause was so unrealistic that it would never take root in Japan although Australia did not oppose the voluntary renunciation of war by the Japanese; second, some measures for the prevention of the resurgence of a militant Japan, for example, civilian control, would be really accepted by the Japanese themselves; third, the unrealistic provision blocked the inclusion of the realistic provisions; fourth, if the Far Eastern Commission had vetoed the Ashida amendment, it would have appeared as if the Allied countries had imposed an unrealistic constitution on the Japanese, and it would have had bad psychological effects on the defeated nation; fifth, it was better to insert the civilian clause while leaving alone the Ashida amendment, whose actual implications were not certain; and sixth, whether Japan would modify Article 9 to rearm or it would have military forces under the Ashida amendment--it would be inevitable after the expiration of the four-power disarmament pact--the civilian clause, which was realistic and an accepted practice at least from the viewpoints of the Western democracies, was likely to remain intact and would check the resurgence of a militant Japan.

The deliberation of the new Constitution in Japan was completed in October. On November 3, 1946, the Constitution was promulgated as

the amendment of the Meiji Constitution. Prior to the promulgation, on October 17, the Far Eastern Commission made a policy to review the new Constitution. The Commission decided that the new Constitution should be reviewed by the Diet not sooner than one year and not later than two years after its entry-into-force, that the Commission itself could review it within the same period, and that the Commission might require a referendum or some other measures to determine the free will of the Japanese people.<sup>66</sup> On this condition, the Constitution became effective on May 3, 1947. Although the Far Eastern Commission carried out the review in 1949, no measures for amendments were taken.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 737.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., vol. 1, p. 89.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., vol. 2, p. 423.

<sup>4</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 220-21.

<sup>5</sup>FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, p. 739.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 757.

<sup>7</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, p. 100. The Constitution of the Empire of Japan, which was adopted in 1889, contained, among others, the following provisions in Chapter I "The Emperor."

Article XI. The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.

Article XII. The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.

Article XIII. The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties.

Article XIV. The Emperor declares a state of siege.

The conditions and effects of siege shall be determined by law.

For the texts of the Constitution, see Political Reorientation, vol. 2, pp. 586-89. As for the command of armed services, the Japanese government itself said in the document "General Explanation of the Constitutional Revision Drafted by the Government," which was informally submitted to SCAP on February 1, 1946: "[u]nder the old constitution the command of the armed services is not considered part of government affairs, and the armed forces, belonging directly to the Emperor, are placed outside the control of the government. This has led to the disastrous abuses of the past." See *ibid.*, p. 620.

<sup>8</sup>Theodore McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution," Political Science Quarterly 77 (September 1962): 358.

<sup>9</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 1, p. 98.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 102.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>McNelly, p. 365.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 213.

<sup>15</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p 631.

<sup>16</sup>D.C.S. Sissons, "The Pacifist Clause of the Japanese Constitution: Legal and Political Problems of Rearmament," International Affairs 37 (January 1961): 47.

<sup>17</sup>Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 303.

<sup>18</sup>McNelly, p. 360.

<sup>19</sup>Naoki Kobayashi, Kempo Dai Kyu Jo [Article 9 of the Constitution] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), pp. 30-31.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 32; Ikuhiko Hata, Shiroku Nihon Saigunbi [The Historical Record of Japan's Rearmament] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1976), p. 62; McNelly, p. 360.

<sup>21</sup>Kobayashi, pp. 33-34; Hata, pp. 63-67; McNelly, pp. 366-67.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, pp. 708-09.

<sup>24</sup>MacArthur, pp. 303-04. As for the timing of the directive, MacArthur may be confused. If this statement was made before the Shidehara-MacArthur meeting on January 24, 1946, it has to be "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" of September 6, 1945. If the statement was made by the Allied powers, it has to be a decision of the Far Eastern Commission, entitled "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" of June 26, 1947. To justify MacArthur's support of the war-renunciation clause, Whitney cites the Potsdam Declaration and JCS 1380/15 of November 3, 1945, "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directives to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan." See Whitney, p. 259.

<sup>25</sup>Hata, pp. 62-63.

<sup>26</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 671.

<sup>27</sup>Edwin M. Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), p. 39. Martin was the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs in the State Department in 1946.

<sup>28</sup>Hugh Borton, "Preparation for the Occupation of Japan," Journal of Asian Studies 25 (February 1966): 209.

<sup>29</sup>Robert E. Ward, "The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution," American Political Science Review 50 (1956): 1008.

<sup>30</sup>Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1955), p. 411.

<sup>31</sup>Idem., "Preparation", p. 206.

<sup>32</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 620.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 621.

<sup>34</sup>Hata has reached the same conclusion, though without sufficient substantiation. According to him, SWNCC 228 tried to pay respect to the "voluntary" revision of the Constitution by the Japanese government as much as possible; expecting that, as a matter of course, the Japanese government would choose the maintenance of military forces under a new constitution, the United States probably intended to secure the disarmament of Japan through a treaty among the principal Allies. See Hata, p. 56.

<sup>35</sup>Mark Gayn, "Drafting the Japanese Constitution," in Livingston, p. 23.

<sup>36</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, p. 301. The Office of the Political Adviser in Japan reported to the Department in March 1946 that "Article IX ... is termed a provision which must immediately command itself to all forward-looking persons but the beneficial or, not inconceivably, harmful effects of which can be revealed only by future developments." See *ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 423.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 649. As far as the Japanese text of Article 9 was concerned, no amendment was made thereafter. In the English text, however, "For the above purpose" was substituted by "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph," which is much closer to the Japanese text in meaning, in the Constitution promulgated on November 3, 1946. See *ibid.*, p. 671. When Acheson reported to the State Department on November 21 upon amendments to the draft constitution made by both Houses in the Diet, he did not refer to the substitution of the phrase. It may have been a technical change in the translation. See FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 359-64. There are two other minor differences between the two texts.

<sup>41</sup>Kobayashi, p. 27.

<sup>42</sup>U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress (Washington: GPO, n.d.), p. 8.

<sup>43</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 661.

<sup>44</sup>U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Japan, p. 9.

<sup>45</sup>McNelly, p. 371.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 372. According to McNelly, MacArthur told Yoshida that the Commission had requested that the Japanese Constitution should provide that (1) half the Ministers of the Cabinet would be drawn from the Diet and (2) all Ministers of State be civilians. These two points were included in the "Basic Principles for a New Japanese Constitution," adopted by the Commission on July 2. There is, however, some ambiguity about why MacArthur touched on the second point. According to New Zealand member of the Commission, C. Berendsen, until receiving the draft amended on August 24 by the House of Representatives, "a majority of the Constitution Committee [of the Commission] considered that in view of such a provision [Article 9 without the Ashida amendment] it would be inept to state in another part of the Constitution that the Ministers must be civilians." When the Commission sent MacArthur its comment on the draft Constitution on July 26, it referred only to the first point. When another New Zealand official summarized the recent activities of the Commission on August 28, he also referred only to the first point. See FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, p. 277; and N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, Historical Publications Branch, Documents on New Zealand External Relations, vol. 2: The Surrender and Occupation of Japan, ed. Robin Kay (Wellington: P.D. Hasselberg, Government Printer, 1982), pp. 482, 494.

<sup>47</sup>MacArthur's letter to Dr. Kenzo Takayanagi, December 5, 1958, quoted in McNelly, p. 371. Dr. Takayanagi was the chairman of the Commission on the Constitution, established by law in June 1956 with a view to examining problems in the Constitution of Japan.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Nobushige Ukai, Naoki Kobayashi, and Nobuyoshi Ashibe, comps, "Hikaku Kempojobun Shu [The Compilation of Constitutional Articles for Comparison]," in Tadashi Itoda et al., comps., Iwanami Kihon Roppo, 1984 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1983), pp. 157-58.

<sup>50</sup>George F. Kennan, "Japanese Security and American Policy," Foreign Affairs 43 (October 1964): 14.

<sup>51</sup>FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, p. 892.

<sup>52</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 1228.

<sup>53</sup>Theodore McNelly in L.H. Redford and MacArthur Memorial, eds., The Occupation of Japan: Impact of Legal Reform (Norfolk, Va.: MacArthur Memorial, 1977), p. 162.

<sup>54</sup>N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, p. 495. Although the United States made a reservation in Committee No. 3, it does not mean that the American government was not concerned about the Ashida amendment. After the Commission failed to take a formal action on this

matter because of the disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, the former communicated, on its own motion, with MacArthur. On September 25, the Commission received from MacArthur a message to the effect that he had obtained the agreement of the Japanese government on the inclusion of the civilian clause. See *ibid.* and FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, p. 320.

<sup>55</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 674.

<sup>56</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, p. 323.

<sup>57</sup>Borton, "Preparation", p. 207.

<sup>58</sup>Charles K. Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution: Its Origin and Development (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1922), p. 36. Between 1909 and 1922, four amendments were made, and between 1922 and 1946, two amendments were made. From 1946 to 1982, amendment was made five times.

<sup>59</sup>Borton, Modern Century, p. 140.

<sup>60</sup>Akira Iriye, "Continuities in U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1941-49," in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 393.

<sup>61</sup>FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, p. 671.

<sup>62</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1246, 1355n.

<sup>63</sup>Hata, p. 74.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>65</sup>R.N. Rosecrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-1951 (Sydney: Melbourne University Press, 1962), p. 33.

<sup>66</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 668.

#### IV. DISARMAMENT TREATY

The idea that Japan should be kept disarmed under a treaty had been mooted in Washington since the beginning of 1945. Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg delivered an important speech on American foreign policy in the Senate on January 10, 1945. Afraid of Allied behavior which seemingly deviated from the Atlantic Charter, Vandenberg urged the American government to play an active role in contributing to the establishment of international peace and order based on justice. He especially thought that the Soviet Union was making trouble; Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe appeared to be an ominous sign of the coming postwar world. To Vandenberg, "Russia's unilateral plan appears to contemplate the engulfment, directly or indirectly [,] of a surrounding circle of buffer states, contrary to our conception of what we thought we were fighting for in respect to the rights of small nations and a just peace."<sup>1</sup> At the same time, however, it was perfectly understandable to him that the Soviet Union feared the resurgence of German militarism and that it made every effort to prepare for the possible recurrence of German invasion.

In this context, Vandenberg proposed a treaty among the major Allies to disarm Germany and Japan permanently. Vandenberg thought that if the fear of German aggression were the cause of discord, it should be treated by the collective efforts of the Allied countries. He said:

I propose that we meet this problem conclusively and at once. There is no reason to wait.

America has this same self-interest in permanently and conclusively and effectively disarming Germany and Japan. It is simply unthinkable that America, or any other member of the United Nations, would allow this Axis calamity to reproduce itself again . . . . I know of no reason why a hard-and-fast treaty between the major Allies should not be signed today to achieve this dependable end. We need not await the determination of our other post-war relationships.<sup>2</sup>

According to Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., the Senator's speech was "an attempt to establish whether the United Nations were acting in good faith."<sup>3</sup> As James F. Byrnes later pointed out, Vandenberg's proposal was in line with the Moscow Declaration;<sup>4</sup> issued by the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China on November 1, 1943, the "Declaration of Four Nations on General Security" said that "those of them [the four nations] at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy."<sup>5</sup>

The speech attracted public attention. Suggesting that President Roosevelt was surprised by the speech, Vandenberg, Jr. says that the White House's first reaction was a polite welcome; on the day after the speech, Roosevelt had a meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, including Vandenberg.<sup>6</sup> In a cabinet meeting later on that day, Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion James F. Byrnes, who later as Secretary of State proposed disarmament treaties to the great powers, took the occasion to say that he "felt that Vandenberg's speech in the Senate yesterday was a highly statesmanlike speech and a very hopeful sign of intelligent Republican cooperation on foreign affairs."<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile, the State Department had not decided its position on the subject. In a memorandum prepared on January 12, the Department of State believed "that it would be premature at present to attempt to specify the nature of the long-term security controls to be established over Germany beyond the general principles of complete disarmament and control of war potential."<sup>8</sup> However, the Department took note of the Vandenberg proposal in another memorandum written in January.<sup>9</sup> Progress was made in another branch of the government. In February, the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), acting under instructions from the President, had launched a series of studies on methods of controlling the war-making power of Germany.<sup>10</sup> Probably as a part of the task the FEA prepared for a German disarmament treaty. On February 17, Deputy Foreign Administrator Oscar Cox sent the redraft of the "Treaty on the Demilitarization of Germany" to Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, for information.<sup>11</sup> The first draft of the treaty seems to have been prepared at an earlier date. Although the connection between the draft treaty and the Vandenberg speech is not certain, judging from the timing of the drafting, it is likely that the draft treaty originated with the speech. There is no evidence that the draft of a similar treaty for Japan was prepared at the same time.

Expecting to be concluded among the five great powers--the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and France--and other members of the United Nations, the disarmament treaty aimed at the destruction of, and the prevention of the reestablishment of, "Germany's will, power and capacity to make war or disturb the peace of

the world." In addition to military matters, it prescribed the punishment of war criminals and the elimination of the Nazi organizations and influence. For these purposes, the draft treaty intended "the stationing of troops and other representatives on German soil for such time and in such numbers as the United Nations, or any one or more of them, deem necessary or desirable," and the use of the full military forces of the signatories "for a period of at least twenty years." The draft treaty was similar to the Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany proposed by the United States later. It seems, however, that no progress was made on this matter for the next several months.<sup>12</sup>

On June 9 and 15, President Truman requested the State Department views on a German disarmament treaty in preparation for the Potsdam Conference.<sup>13</sup> In a memorandum sent to Acting Secretary of State Grew on June 9, Truman said in part:

I wish you would also let me have the Department's views as to the wisdom of attempting to secure agreement at the forthcoming conference on a 25 year Treaty between the three or four principal powers to demilitarize Germany, to keep her demilitarized by force if necessary, somewhat along the lines suggested by<sup>14</sup> Senator Vandenberg in his speech in the Senate last winter.

Meanwhile, in expectation of becoming the Secretary of State shortly, Byrnes asked Truman on June 11 "to request the views of the State Department on a treaty 'somewhat along the lines suggested by Senator Vandenberg.'"<sup>15</sup> Grew replied on June 30. He saw three advantages in the conclusion of a German disarmament treaty: first, it would calm the Soviet fear of Germany and induce the Soviet Union to adopt a more liberal policy in Eastern Europe; second, it would eliminate the justifica-

tion, i.e. security against a resurgent Germany, under which Great Britain and the Soviet Union might establish spheres of influence on the continent of Europe; third, it would strengthen American influence in European affairs.<sup>16</sup> In addition:

the United States fully expects to participate in the demilitarization of Germany in any event and to keep Germany demilitarized for an indefinite period in the future. If there is advantage to the United States in agreeing to do this in a formal treaty which would remove any Soviet fears that the Western countries might at some time wish to strengthen Germany against the Soviet Union, the treaty could secure this advantage in return for something we expect to do anyway.<sup>17</sup>

It was necessary to first determine whether the treaty would bear the expected fruits. Therefore, it was recommended "that this matter not be raised formally but that the opportunity be taken to sound out the [British] Prime Minister and Stalin on the matter."<sup>18</sup> Truman and Byrnes, who took office as Secretary of State on July 3, went to the Potsdam Conference with the recommendation. It seems, however, that the issue was not raised at the Conference.

On the basis of the Cox draft dated February 17, an analysis was made as to whether the conclusion of the treaty was desirable.<sup>19</sup> It was anticipated that the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France would be the signatories. Consideration was given to the inclusion of China in expectation of the conclusion of a similar treaty for Japan in future. Attention was also paid to the relation between the treaty and the Security Council of the United Nations.<sup>20</sup>

As mentioned above, the State Department contemplated the conclusion of a Japanese disarmament treaty. Deputy Director of the Office

of European Affairs John Hickerson said that he saw "some merit in the idea of proposing a similar treaty in regard to Japan."<sup>21</sup> It is not certain, however, what the merit was and why a Japanese disarmament treaty should be concluded. There is no evidence that any in-depth analysis was made on the subject. If anything, the advocacy of a Japanese disarmament treaty seems to have been intuitive. The Japanese treaty might be expected as another symbol of cooperation among the great powers in the postwar period. At the same time, it would seem unnatural that, while the United States proposed a German disarmament treaty, it did not conclude the Japanese counterpart when the two countries were considered as the common enemy of the United Nations. The State Department itself said that "in the discussions it could be made clear that if we are expecting to sign a treaty to demilitarize Germany we would expect a similar treaty to be concluded in regard to Japan at the appropriate time."<sup>22</sup> From the American viewpoint, Japan should be and should remain disarmed in one way or another. As in the case of the German treaty, Washington was likely to think that even if a Japanese disarmament treaty were concluded, the United States would lose nothing.

Byrnes suggested the idea of a German disarmament treaty in his meeting with French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, who visited Washington in August 1945.<sup>23</sup> Byrnes continued the "reconnaissance work" in the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in London in fall 1945. The matter was raised in the context of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe when the conference was in stalemate partly because of problems concerning that area. It appeared to Byrnes

that the Soviet Union tried to maintain "puppet governments" in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary for the reason of Russian security. Therefore, he thought that "if we could give them assurance on this score perhaps the obstacle blocking the conference could be removed,"<sup>24</sup> and that a German disarmament treaty could be used for this purpose. In a Molotov-Byrnes meeting on September 20, Byrnes tried to sound out V.M. Molotov, Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, on a German disarmament treaty. Byrnes first recounted his conversation with Marshal Stalin at the Yalta Conference.

He [Byrnes] had been particularly impressed with the Marshal's observations that twice in twenty-five years Poland had been a corridor for German attack on Russia, and also his statement that there was always the danger that, as after the last war, the United States might return home and withdraw from European affairs, at which time the danger of a recrudescence of German aggression might become real. He added that, as Mr. Molotov knew, historically the United States was reluctant to enter into political treaties with foreign governments, but he wished to ask Mr. Molotov whether the Soviet Government would consider a treaty between the Four Principal Powers for the demilitarization of Germany to<sup>25</sup> run for twenty or twenty-five years, would be a good thing.

Byrnes had already obtained Truman's concurrence with feeling out the Soviet view on this matter. For his part, Molotov avoided giving Byrnes the definitive view of the Soviet government while he said he personally thought that it was a very interesting idea.<sup>26</sup>

On September 22, Molotov asked for a meeting with Byrnes. This time the former proposed a Japanese disarmament treaty and the establishment of a Control Council for Japan. According to Byrnes:

His [Molotov] government had informed him that it was timely to conclude a treaty directed against [sic] a revival of Japanese aggression, particularly in view of the manner in which terms of surrender were being carried out in Japan. He urged the establishment of a Control Council for Japan.<sup>27</sup>

In relation to the treaty, Byrnes replied that "he would return to Washington and talk the matter over with the President, and that he personally was favorably inclined to this idea." Molotov said that the Soviet government did not expect a quick decision from the American government on this point. Rather, the immediate concern of the Soviet Union was the establishment of Allied control machinery for Japan, and Molotov pressed it on Byrnes for the next several days.<sup>28</sup>

Byrnes was not prepared to discuss a Japanese demilitarization treaty partly because he understood that "Japan was not on the agenda for the London meeting."<sup>29</sup> Another probable reason was that it was premature to think of a long-term control machinery for Japan because Japan had formally surrendered only twenty days before. Moreover, a Japanese disarmament treaty did not have the merit that the German treaty had. The German treaty was proposed largely to induce the Soviet Union to change its East European policy. From the American viewpoint, a Japanese treaty did not have such immediate necessity and effects. At the same time, however, there was no reason why Byrnes should be opposed to a Japanese disarmament treaty when it was proposed by the Soviet Union. Rather, American opposition to the treaty would have had bad effects on the Soviet Union, which was not satisfied with the occupation of Japan under the exclusive influence of the United States and which was suspicious of capitalist countries. The treaty went with the general direction of American policy and probably with public opinion. On October 6, John Foster Dulles, who had accompanied Byrnes to the London conference, said in an address that one of the basic principles of the American delegation had been that

"[a]rmament of our ex-enemies should be limited and subjected to a system of supervision which would prevent secret rearmament as occurred after the last war in the case of Germany."<sup>30</sup> The disarmament and supervision of Japan should be carried out in one way or another. If the conclusion of the disarmament treaty pleased the Soviet Union and there was the possibility that it would have favorable effects somewhere and somehow, the United States would have to conclude it.

For its part, the Soviet Union was sensitive to developments in Japan. American Ambassador to Moscow W. Averell Harriman repeated the importance of the treatment of Japan to the Soviet Union. In relation to the Russian demand that a control commission for Japan should be established, he sent Byrnes a memorandum on September 24.

...we must not minimize the importance of doing everything we can to disarm [the Russians'] unwarranted suspicions. For example, you know how suspicious the Soviets were up to the very end that we were prepared to make a separate peace with the Germans. They are undoubtedly fearful that we are now ready to use Japan against them.<sup>31</sup>

Three days later, Harriman sent a second note.

I am afraid we are arousing unnecessarily their suspicions, which will react ... in other Far Eastern matters, particularly the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria in favor of the Chinese. I believe that to satisfy them it will be necessary to agree to establish at once a control commission for Japan ....<sup>32</sup>

Finally, however, discussion about a control commission for Japan was not raised in the London conference because of Byrnes' reluctance.<sup>33</sup>

In October, Harriman reported that Stalin was irritated by the unilateral American occupation of Japan.<sup>34</sup> Byrnes himself realized the importance of Japanese issues; he said that "[t]he remarkable per-

formance that had led to the breakdown of the London Conference had been stimulated by the Russians' belief that they were not being consulted adequately by our officials in Japan."<sup>35</sup> To Byrnes and Harriman as well as the Soviet Union, the main concern was with control machinery for the occupation of Japan, and this was discussed in the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945. Judging from the fact that Molotov proposed the establishment of a control commission for Japan and the conclusion of a treaty against Japanese aggression at the same time, it was likely that, from the Soviet view, both of them were understood in the same context, i.e. what Harriman called the fear of "Japan against Russia." It was also likely that Byrnes proposed a Japanese disarmament treaty in the Moscow Conference to allay the Soviet fear.

In the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers held among the foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the Soviet insistence on the establishment of a Control Council for Japan bore fruits, however small they were; the Conference decided on the creation of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. The disarmament treaties were not discussed on a formal occasion. Molotov had not responded to Byrnes' proposal for the German treaty since the London conference.<sup>36</sup> Instead, Byrnes approached Stalin at a Christmas Eve dinner. According to Byrnes:

I mentioned to Stalin my proposal for a twenty-year treaty among the four powers to keep Germany demilitarized. Recalling his statement both at Yalta and Potsdam that the Soviet attitude toward neighboring countries was due to their determination to ensure Russian security, I suggested that such a plan should remove all fears . . . . After listening to my explanation, he said it seemed by far the best proposal he had heard on the question, and I told him we would prepare a draft which could be circulated for suggestions.<sup>37</sup>

Though it is not mentioned here, Byrnes referred also to a Japanese disarmament treaty in the conversation.<sup>38</sup>

Upon his return, Byrnes began detailed preparation for negotiation on the treaties with the other great powers. Truman and leading Senators, including Vandenberg, gave general concurrence to Byrnes' idea. Truman enthusiastically supported it and began referring to the treaty as the Byrnes treaty.<sup>39</sup> The Japanese section in the State Department does not seem to have been engaged in analysis and preparation in 1945. Borton says that the Japanese disarmament treaty was drafted at Byrnes' personal request.<sup>40</sup> Thus, preparation for the treaties was attributable to Byrnes' personal diplomacy. It was not certain how much consideration was given to the conclusion of the Japanese treaty. The main concern seems to have been with the German treaty.

The draft of the Japanese disarmament treaty was sent to the other expected signatories--the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China--on February 28, 1946, two weeks after the German draft had been distributed for consideration. The drafts of the two treaties had almost the same provisions. As for the Japanese treaty, the objective was "to ensure that the total disarmament and demilitarization of Japan will be enforced as long as the peace and security of the world may require." Military machinery should be and should remain completely disarmed; the manufacture and importation of military equipment should be prevented; the establishment and utilization of military facilities and military-related factories and laboratories should be prevented; some exceptions for civil police were to be admitted. For this purpose, the

four countries "shall make provision for a system of quadripartite inspection, which shall become operative upon the termination of the Allied occupation of Japan"; the inspection should be carried out through a Commission of Control, in which a majority's opinion was to prevail. Japan's acceptance of the obligation to observe this treaty should be an essential condition to a peace treaty. The treaty should remain in force for twenty-five years with possible extension.<sup>41</sup>

In spring 1946, the Soviet Union had a keen interest in the disarmament of Japan. On March 4, 1946, Soviet chargé N.V. Novikov conveyed especially to Byrnes a Soviet government intention "to be represented in Committee No. 4 [of the Far Eastern Commission], dealing with the demilitarization of Japan."<sup>42</sup> On March 27, moreover, a new committee responsible for disarmament and demilitarization was established in the Commission on the Russian proposal.<sup>43</sup> However, a treaty to institute disarmament was another matter to the Soviet Union. On April 28, a private meeting was held between Byrnes and Molotov, who were in Paris to attend the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

He [Byrnes] said that, frankly, there were many people in the United States who were unable to understand the exact aim of the Soviet Union--whether it was a search for security or expansionism. Such a treaty [for Germany] as had been proposed and also the similar treaty suggested for Japan he had felt would effectively take care of the question of security . . . .

Mr. Molotov said that their objection was that the proposed treaty appeared to postpone the question of German disarmament until after the occupation was over whereas there already was in existence a joint agreement that Germany should be immediately disarmed . . . . He stated definitely, however, that the Soviet Union was in favor of a twenty-five year demilitarization treaty both for Germany and Japan, but emphasized that the most important matter was to carry out the previous agreement for immediate disarmament of Germany.<sup>44</sup>

Next day, Byrnes proposed the twenty-five year disarmament treaty for Germany formally in the Council. Despite Byrnes' assurance that nothing in the treaty meant postponement or delay in the disarmament of Germany, Molotov showed reluctance to commit the Soviet government to the conclusion of the German treaty.<sup>45</sup>

On April 30, Byrnes made public his plan to keep Germany and Japan disarmed under treaties. He recognized that "Russia, which has twice during this century suffered invasions across Poland from Germany and twice been engaged in war with Japan--in addition to German and Japanese participation in foreign intervention during the Bolshevik civil war--has good reason for complexes regarding those two countries."<sup>46</sup> The New York Times listed three advantages of Byrnes' plan: the enhancement of Allied cooperation, the solution of many basic problems of German and Japanese occupation, and the acceleration of the termination of the occupation.<sup>47</sup> On May 16, Byrnes raised the issue again in the Council, but failed to persuade Molotov, who reiterated the importance of the immediate implementation of German disarmament in accordance with agreed plans and pointed out that Stalin's consent had been given not to the proposed drafts but to the principle.<sup>48</sup>

Meanwhile, Britain and China informed the American government of their general concurrence with the proposed Japanese treaty through diplomatic channels in May. China seemed the more interested in the treaty. On May 17, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shie-chieh remarked:

The Chinese Government has given careful consideration to the draft and fully supports the policy embodied therein. It

is felt that only by the complete demilitarization of Japan and the setting up of a strict inspection system as envisaged in the proposed treaty that the possibility of revival of Japanese aggression may be eliminated.<sup>49</sup>

On June 21, the American government publicized the text of the "Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan," with two modifications in comparison to the February 28 draft: first, the production and importation of fissionable materials were specifically banned; and, second, the control machinery for Japan under the treaty was linked, though loosely, to the Security Council of the United Nations.<sup>50</sup> By this time, the Soviet government had not formally responded to the American proposal.<sup>51</sup> However, Molotov revealed the Soviet attitude in his statement, which was published in Moscow newspapers of May 27 in relation to the results of the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.<sup>52</sup> He said, in part, the "draft of the treaty later submitted by Mr. Byrnes does not include the question of mutual assistance against German and Japanese aggression, deals only with disarmament, and for some reason or other ignores the highly important decisions regarding Germany adopted by the Allies in Teheran, Yalta and Berlin, and may lead to a relaxation of inter-Allied control aimed at preventing a resurgence of German aggression . . ."<sup>53</sup> This was the first and last time when Molotov explained the reasons why he was opposed to the proposed draft of a Japanese disarmament treaty. The reason for the Russian opposition was quite ambiguous, however. The meaning of "the question of mutual assistance against . . . Japanese aggression" was not clarified.

On July 9, Byrnes and Molotov exchanged views on the German disarmament treaty in a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Molotov argued that it was much more important to thoroughly implement decisions already reached on the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany; that the treaty should be effective for at least forty years; that the draft was unsatisfactory as a means of ensuring the complete military and economic disarmament of Germany; that the draft disregarded the problem of securing the democratization of the regime in Germany; and that the draft envisaged the termination of occupation without ensuring the fulfilment of reparation deliveries. Accordingly, he concluded, the draft needed radical revision.<sup>54</sup> Although Byrnes agreed with the second point, he thought that most of Molotov's argument was off the point; the treaty did not intend to settle reparation and political matters from the outset. Finally Byrnes came to the conclusion that Molotov "had no idea of discussing the treaty in a serious manner but was simply looking for excuses for delay."<sup>55</sup>

Why the Soviet Union was reluctant to conclude the proposed German treaty is not known. Byrnes says that the elimination of veto power in the Commission of Control might be one reason.<sup>56</sup> Robert Murphy, then United States Political Adviser for Germany, thought that the proposed treaty was not satisfactory to the Russians because "[t]hey sought not only to disarm Germany, but to render that country economically impotent."<sup>57</sup> Some scholars consider the Russian objection as indicative of the deepening cleavage between the West and the East; in other words, the Soviet Union saw something ominous behind the Byrnes proposal.<sup>58</sup> Lucius D. Clay, then Deputy Military Governor for

Germany, thought the Russians were simply not ready for a full-scale German discussion.<sup>59</sup>

The Soviet attitude toward a Japanese disarmament treaty was much more evasive. The conclusion of the treaty was first suggested by the Soviet Union. However, Molotov later opposed the Byrnes draft because it did not include the question of mutual assistance against Japanese aggression--though what "the question of mutual assistance" meant was not clarified at all--and because the draft treaty dealt only with disarmament. From the American standpoint, the Japanese disarmament treaty seemed advantageous to the Soviet Union, for while the Soviet Union was virtually excluded from the control of occupied Japan at that time, the Byrnes draft offered the Russians an opportunity to participate in the future control of Japan. The New York Times pointed out the generosity of the offer in an editorial: "The Russians have hesitated, perhaps because of the provision for action on a majority vote in the control commissions. But our willingness to give up our dominant role in Japan should at least convince them of our sincerity."<sup>60</sup>

The Japanese disarmament treaty was shelved before the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged views on it squarely. Borton says that "[a]s Soviet opposition to a disarmament treaty for Germany also meant that such a treaty would be impossible for Japan, the United States did not press further for the acceptance of her draft treaty . . . ."<sup>61</sup> If anything, it seems that the Japanese disarmament treaty was not concluded so much because it was disadvantageous to the Soviet Union, but rather because the Soviet Union was reluctant to conclude

the German treaty for some reason. Although it is not known whether the Soviet Union was really interested in the Japanese disarmament treaty, it would be impossible to negotiate only on the Japanese treaty even if the Soviet Union were interested in it. If, while rejecting the German treaty, the Soviet Union had concluded a disarmament treaty for Japan, it might have created suspicion about its behavior, and the Soviet government would have been under criticism from "capitalist countries" for inconsistency.

Throughout the development, the two treaties had been linked. Vandenberg suggested the conclusion of the two treaties. When consultation on a German disarmament treaty among the Big Three was considered in preparation for the Potsdam Conference, the State Department raised the possibility of the conclusion of a similar treaty for Japan. When Byrnes proposed a German treaty, Molotov suggested a Japanese treaty in London. Byrnes drafted the two treaties at the same time in the same way. Surprisingly, however, little consideration was given to the Japanese treaty in this process. The main concern was always with the German problem. There was much argument about the merits of a German disarmament treaty, but little about the Japanese counterpart. Finally, the virtual rejection of the German disarmament treaty by the Soviet Union shelved negotiation on the Japanese treaty before it was formally begun.

Another characteristic of the two disarmament treaties is that they were not a German problem and a Japanese problem, but rather a German-Soviet problem and a Japanese-Soviet problem. It may even have been a German-Soviet-Japanese problem. To the United States, of

course, the disarmament of Germany and Japan was important in its own right, but how to implement this policy was quite another matter. The United States advocated the disarmament treaties because it thought that the treaties had some advantages. Among them was to placate the Soviet fear of the resurgence of a militant Germany and Japan, as well as the Soviet suspicions about the so-called "capitalist encirclement"; through the psychological effect, the treaties were expected to induce the Russians to make their foreign policy less offensive to the United States. From the American view, the treaties were useful to the extent that they served the objective, and it seems that Washington considered a German disarmament treaty more advantageous. This understanding partly explains why more emphasis was placed on a German treaty than on a Japanese treaty. On the one hand, from the outset the German disarmament treaty was directed to a specific policy, i.e. to prompt the Soviet Union to change its East European policy, in addition to the promotion of American-Soviet cooperation. On the other hand, it seems that Washington did not see such a specific advantage in a Japanese disarmament treaty although the treaty was expected to calm the Soviet fear of a revived Japan. There was little argument about what would or should be brought about by calming down. Simply, the Japanese disarmament treaty was "attached" to the German treaty as a set. After the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the United States continued to urge the Soviet Union to agree with the proposed German treaty for a while, but not with its Japanese counterpart.<sup>62</sup>

While the Japanese disarmament treaty was ignored, the United States did not abandon it completely. When Washington began to pre-

pare for a Japanese peace treaty in late 1946, the disarmament treaty was related to the peace treaty as will be seen in the next chapter.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Arthur H. Vandenberg, "The Need for Honest Candor: Clarification of Our Foreign Policy," Vital Speeches of the Day 11 (1 February 1945): 228.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 229.

<sup>3</sup>Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, ed. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 136.

<sup>4</sup>Byrnes' report on the First Part of the Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris, in The Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Department of State, eds., A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49 (Originally printed in 1950 by GPO; reprint ed., New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968), p. 76. This book will be referred to as A Decade of American Foreign Policy hereinafter.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>6</sup>Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 139.

<sup>7</sup>James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 24.

<sup>8</sup>FRUS, The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 185.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>10</sup>FRUS, 1945, vol. 3, p. 424.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>For the text of the draft treaty, see ibid., pp. 424-26.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 527.

<sup>14</sup>FRUS, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. 1, p. 163.

<sup>15</sup>Patricia D. Ward, p. 93.

<sup>16</sup>FRUS, Berlin Conference, 1945, vol. 1, p. 450.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 451.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 204.

<sup>19</sup>FRUS, 1945, vol. 3, p. 530.

<sup>20</sup>FRUS, Berlin Conference, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 450-52.

<sup>21</sup>FRUS, 1945, vol. 3, p. 530.

<sup>22</sup>FRUS, Berlin Conference, 1945, vol. 1, p. 451.

<sup>23</sup>Robert H. Ferrell, gen. ed., The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, vol. 14: E.R. Stettinius, Jr., by Richard Walker; James F. Byrnes, by George Curry (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1965), p. 349. See also FRUS, 1945, vol. 4, pp. 719, 724.

<sup>24</sup>James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Bros. Publishers, 1947), p. 100.

<sup>25</sup>FRUS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 268.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 102. The following two points need some explanation: first, whether Byrnes or Molotov proposed a Japanese disarmament treaty first; and, second, what Molotov proposed in the September 22 meeting. As for the first question, Byrnes gave the impression that he proposed the Japanese treaty. He said in the May 16 meeting of the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers:

And that time (last September [i.e. September 1945]) he [Byrnes] had told M. Molotov that he thought the United States would be prepared to do what Wilson had been unable to achieve after the last World War, namely, enter into binding agreements to keep Germany and also Japan disarmed for an indefinite period of time. M. Molotov had said he would have to consult his government but would report this suggestion .... (FRUS, 1946, vol. 2, p. 431.)

Reporting on the Paris session, Byrnes said on May 20, 1946:

At the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers when the Soviet Foreign Secretary seemed greatly concerned about the Soviet security requirements in the Balkans, I suggested a twenty-five year four-power treaty, to keep Germany disarmed as a means of preventing any real threat to Soviet security. I explained that we contemplated a similar joint guarantee of the disarmament of Japan (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 76).

I think, however, it was unlikely that Byrnes proposed a Japanese disarmament treaty to Molotov in London. First, Byrnes understood that Japan was not on the agenda of the London meeting. In the opening session of the conference, he was reported as saying:

that the United States Delegation did not understand that Far Eastern questions would be considered . . . . the United States Delegation was not prepared to raise Far Eastern matters (FRUS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 118n).

It is not likely that even in an informal meeting Byrnes took the lead in raising the Far Eastern matter. Second, if Byrnes proposed the Japanese treaty at all, he would propose it in the September 20 Byrnes-Molotov meeting in which a German disarmament treaty was suggested. However, FRUS did not record any discussion about the Japanese treaty in the meeting (*Ibid.*, pp. 267-69). Third, if Byrnes had proposed a Japanese disarmament treaty before September 22, Molotov would not have suggested "a treaty directed against a revival of Japanese aggression," which in the final analysis would serve the same objective as the disarmament treaty. Fourth, in the September 22 meeting, Byrnes replied to Molotov that he had to talk with the President over the treaty proposed by Molotov. If there had been an agreement in Washington on the future treatment of Japan, whether it was a disarmament treaty or not, Byrnes' response would have been different. It was very likely, however, that, with regard to Japan, Byrnes had in mind something similar to the German treaty while he did not explicitly propose it to Molotov.

As for the second question, Byrnes described the Molotov proposal as "a treaty directed against a revival of Japanese aggression" and "the question of an American-Soviet treaty directed against the revival of Japanese militarism." Although the details of the Molotov proposal are not known, it would not be inappropriate to suggest that he proposed a Japanese disarmament treaty. Byrnes' proposal of the German treaty was not specific either. The objective of the two proposals was to prevent the resurgence of an ex-enemy country in military fields. Judging from the fact that Molotov made the proposal two days after Byrnes suggested the German treaty--though Molotov implied that there was no connection between the two proposals--it was likely that Molotov had in mind something which could be called "a Japanese disarmament treaty" in contrast to the German disarmament treaty. See FRUS, 1945, vol. 2. p. 419; and Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 102.

<sup>28</sup>FRUS, 1945, vol. 2, pp. 418-21. FRUS, 1945, vol. 2, does not have a record of the September 22 Byrnes-Molotov talk concerning Japan. However, in the September 27 Byrnes-Molotov meeting, they summarized the September 22 conversations. In the September 27 meeting, "Mr. Molotov replied [to Byrnes] he was not thinking of the treaty now--that would of course take time--but of the question of the Control Commission which he felt was very urgent and essential."

<sup>29</sup>Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 102.

<sup>30</sup>"Text of Dulles Talk on the London Meeting," New York Times, 7 October 1945, p. 20.

<sup>31</sup>W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 508.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 509.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 512-16.

<sup>35</sup>Quoted in Patricia D. Ward, p. 58.

<sup>36</sup>Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 171.

<sup>37</sup>James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (London: Museum Press Limited, 1960), p. 337.

<sup>38</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 2, p. 431; V.M. Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy: Speeches and Statements, April 1945 - November 1948 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949), p. 46.

<sup>39</sup>Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 172-73.

<sup>40</sup>F.C. Jones, Hugh Borton and B.R. Pearn, The Far East, 1942-46 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 420.

<sup>41</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 152-55.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>43</sup>N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, p. 357.

<sup>44</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 2, pp. 146-47.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 166-69.

<sup>46</sup>C.L. Sulzberger, "U.S. Departure in Diplomacy Puts Russians' Aims to Test," New York Times, 30 April 1946, pp. 1,3.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 2, pp. 431-32.

<sup>49</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, p. 236. For the British response, see *ibid.*, pp. 227-28.

<sup>50</sup>For the June 21 draft, see U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Japan, pp. 85-88.

<sup>51</sup>Bertram D. Hulen, "U.S. Offers 4-Power Control of Japan to Keep Her Disarmed for 25 Years," New York Times, 22 June 1946, p. 1.

<sup>52</sup>American Secretaries, vol. 14, p. 224.

<sup>53</sup>Molotov, p. 46.

<sup>54</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 2, pp. 842-47.

<sup>55</sup>Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 175.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>57</sup>Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (London: Collins, 1964), p. 369.

<sup>58</sup>John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 71.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., pp. 71-72.

<sup>60</sup>"The Draft Treaty on Japan," New York Times, 23 June 1946, Sec. 4, p. 8E.

<sup>61</sup>Borton in Jones, p. 421. There is another view on when the United States virtually shelved the conclusion of the Japanese disarmament treaty. Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett said in October 1948 that the Japanese treaty was allowed to drop "by US in light Soviet disinterest and virtual rejection by Soviets at Moscow in April 1947 of similar treaty for Germany." However, between July 1946 and April 1947, the United States made no concrete efforts to conclude the Japanese treaty. See FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, pp. 862-63.

<sup>62</sup>For negotiation on the German Disarmament treaty, see FRUS, 1946, vol. 2, pp. 1465, 1474, 1509, 1522, 1525-26; and FRUS, 1947, vol. 2, pp. 160-61, 164, 183n, 194-95, 214, 244, 332-33, 334-36, 340, 344, 382, 384, 388. For Soviet response, see also Molotov, pp. 434-50, 601-08.

## V. PUNITIVE PEACE

In fall 1946, negotiation on the Japanese disarmament treaty was in suspension because of Soviet indifference, and the new Constitution with the war-renunciation clause was promulgated. The basic assumption of the disarmament treaty continued to be embraced by Washington while a different opinion was voiced from the outside. American embassies in Moscow and Nanking became inclined toward the idea of the alignment of Japan with the United States against the Soviet Union. The American Embassy in Moscow especially saw the international situation quite differently from Washington. In August 1946, John P. Davies, Jr., then First Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow, sent a recommendation that ran completely contrary to the philosophy of the Japanese disarmament treaty.

In view of the exclusive philosophy of the U.S.S.R. in international affairs--a philosophy which dictates that he that is not with me is against me--it is worse than idle, it is a delusion, to assume that Japan can be reconstructed as a neutral, self-sufficient nation, enjoying friendly relations with both the United States and Soviet Union . . . . If we withdraw from Japan without having assured ourselves of a favored position there, Japan may in all probability sooner or later be captured by the Soviet Union. The tables will have been turned and we shall be confronted with Japan as a "place d'armes" of the only other first-class power.

Although the message did not specifically refer to the rearmament of Japan, it appeared to suggest that course, at least to officials in Washington. John K. Emmerson, then Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs, rebutted the Moscow memorandum in October.

From the signing of the Potsdam Declaration to the issuance of the draft treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, the United States Government has been consistent in advocating the complete destruction of Japan's military potential . . . . Arming Japan as a security measure would not only be contradictory to our enunciated policy but would be of dubious validity and effectiveness. Post-occupation military control in Japan, beyond that necessary for insuring compliance with the terms of a disarmament treaty, would be inconsistent with the principal objectives of the occupation and would destroy all faith of the Japanese in the sincerity of our motives.<sup>2</sup>

Emmerson concluded the memorandum by saying that only through democratization programs, "will Japan become neither a 'place d'armes' for the Soviet Union nor a 'place d'armes' for the United States."<sup>3</sup> This position was approved by ranking officials of the Department, and the Davies memorandum was disregarded.<sup>4</sup> Interestingly enough, one year later, another memorandum by Davies triggered the review of American occupation policy toward Japan. But, Davies' recommendation from Moscow was premature in 1946.

The State Department began to prepare for a Japanese peace treaty in October 1946. A small working group was established for this purpose under the leadership of Hugh Borton, then Acting Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs.<sup>5</sup> This group assumed that the treatment of Japan in the post-occupation period would be restrictive. The purpose of the peace treaty was to ensure that "the Japanese Government and people do carry out and perform the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, the Instrument of Surrender," and the peace treaty itself. Japan was supposed to be put under Allied control similar to the existing Occupation machinery. Under the peace treaty, a new Far Eastern Commission and an Allied Administrator for Japan should be instituted.

Though he should be a civilian, the Allied Administrator would be assisted by military forces. The policy decisions of the old Far Eastern Commission and the directives of the Supreme Commander should remain effective, if appropriate, after the conclusion of the peace treaty. For some time, the American government should represent the interests of the Japanese government in international organizations.<sup>6</sup>

The working group thought that, to prevent Japan's rearmament, particular attention should be paid to the enforcement of disarmament, the regulation of research activities, and limitation on the importation of strategic materials and production capacity.<sup>7</sup> As for disarmament, the following was generally agreed:

To take Article I of the 25-year treaty as basis for provisions in the draft treaty with alterations (1) to make provisions binding upon Japan and (2) to integrate control machinery with other provisions of draft treaty relating to controls.

Article I, which enumerated "dos" for the disarmament of Japan, was the nucleus of the 25-year treaty. Therefore, as far as the disarmament treaty was concerned, nothing changed in principle. The proposed alterations were technical rather than fundamental. The original disarmament treaty was expected to be concluded among the great powers; because Japan was not envisaged as a signatory, the disarmament treaty provided that Japan's acceptance to observe its provisions should be prerequisite to a peace treaty. Now, since the disarmament treaty and a peace treaty were expected to be concluded at the same time, it became necessary that the peace treaty should bind Japan over disarmament provisions. Further, because the peace treaty

intended to control Japan also in non-military fields, it was convenient that the single control machinery was responsible for both military and non-military matters. Although the working group made preparations for a peace treaty on the basis of the disarmament treaty proposed by Secretary Byrnes, the effective period for disarmament had not been decided. The group asked:

Should disarmament provisions be made binding upon Japan in perpetuity (duration of peace treaty) or be synchronized with duration of control machinery, or be subject to modification by agreements?

Judging from the fact that, in July 1946, Byrnes agreed to extend the effective period of the German disarmament treaty from twenty-five to forty years, it was unlikely that the effective period of the Japanese counterpart would be shortened considerably.<sup>10</sup>

By the spring of 1947, the actual demobilization of the Japanese armed forces had been completed, and the military phase of the Occupation had almost finished. The new Constitution entered into force in May. Before that, thinking that the termination of the Occupation might be near at hand, "the Department of State began early in 1947 to compile a first draft of a peace treaty and to inform MacArthur of its contents." With the first rough draft of the peace treaty, Borton was sent to Tokyo for consultation with MacArthur in late February.<sup>11</sup> During this period, not all parts of the treaty had been drafted, and prepared drafts were tentative. MacArthur was shown, in addition to an outline, such parts of the treaty as the Preamble, Chapter I--Territorial Clauses, Chapter II--Clauses relating to Ceded Territories,

Chapter V--Interim Controls, and Chapter VI--Disarmament and Demilitarization, as well as the draft of the disarmament treaty.<sup>12</sup>

On March 21, MacArthur commented on Chapters V and VI, and the disarmament treaty. He thought that, in general, the draft contemplated nothing more than the mere extension, in modified form, of the military controls then existing. Though the details of the draft are not known, their concepts seem to have been similar to what the Borton group had in mind in October 1946, judging from MacArthur's comment. As for the idea of the four-power treaty, he said:

the proposal for a later four power control, to the exclusion of other nations actively engaged in the war against Japan, would be highly offensive to the latter nations and most unwarranted .... It is ... incumbent that the Allied Nations for their part, in the spirit of this constitutional provision [the war-renunciation clause], undertake to guarantee the neutrality of Japan, with the view to the transfer of such undertaking to the stewardship of the United Nations, where the responsibility properly should rest.<sup>13</sup>

On March 17, MacArthur held an exceptional, impromptu press conference in which he urged the early conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty. He further elaborated his desire for an early peace treaty during an interview with Borton in April. "By the early summer of 1947 the United States Government had agreed with MacArthur's view that the advantages of an early peace treaty outweighed the disadvantages of a continued occupation."<sup>14</sup> On July 11, the United States officially proposed "to hold a Japanese peace conference as soon as practicable composed of representatives from the 11 states members of the Far Eastern Commission," with a view to the preliminary drafting of a Japanese peace treaty. It was also proposed that decisions should be

made by a simple two-thirds majority in the conference, in other words, no country should have veto power.<sup>15</sup>

Meanwhile, there was an "incident" originating in Tokyo. In April, a high-level Japanese diplomat called on W. Macmahon Ball, then Head of the Australian Mission in Japan, who also represented Great Britain, New Zealand and India in the Allied Council for Japan, and proposed that Japan should rearm itself with some 100,000-strong military forces after the withdrawal of the Allied forces from Japan. It is reported that he made a similar proposal to Canadian diplomat E.H. Norman.<sup>16</sup> Very sensitive to the rearmament of Japan, the Australian government tried to sound out the State Department on the issue in May. On June 23, the State Department formally replied to the Australian government:

the Australian Government may be assured that the United States Government's position in the matter of Japanese disarmament and demilitarization remains as stated in Article I(a) of the Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan .... If, contrary to this provision [Article 9] of the Japanese Constitution, Japanese officials are indeed preparing proposals for a Japanese army, navy and air force for submission to the peace conference, the [Australian] Embassy may be assured that such proposals will in no way influence the position of the United States in the matter.<sup>17</sup>

For its part, the Far Eastern Commission adopted in June "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," which was almost the same as "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" dated September 6, 1945. In relation to provisions on disarmament, the following paragraph was added, needless to say, with American approval:

The restoration, even in a disguised form, of any anti-democratic and militaristic activity shall be prevented, particularly on the part of former Japanese career military and naval officers, gendarmerie, and former members of dissolved militaristic, <sup>18</sup>ultra-nationalistic and other anti-democratic organizations.

During this period, the American government was still committed to the long-term disarmament of Japan.

Upon his return to Washington from Tokyo, Borton speeded up the drafting work of a Japanese peace treaty. On May 20, he suggested the modification of the concept of the four-power disarmament treaty for Japan: "It is recommended that, in view ... of the suggestions already made by General MacArthur in reference to United Nations control, a broader basis be adopted for the disarmament treaty and consideration be given to tying [sic] the treaty with the Security Council."<sup>19</sup> Thus, the basis of the disarmament treaty was broadened from four-power to eleven-power agreement. To enable consultation in and outside the State Department, Borton distributed on August 6 the draft of a Japanese peace treaty and related documents. He explained the basic assumption of the draft: Chapter IV--Interim Supervision and Assistance--and Chapter V--Disarmament and Demilitarization--were "based on a conception that continued control is necessary over the Japanese war potential and supervision must continue for the development of democratic processes." For this purpose, a Council of Ambassadors with two subordinate organs, i.e. an Executive Staff and a Commission of Inspection, should be established.<sup>20</sup>

Most comments on the August 6 draft, including those from the War and Navy Departments, seem to have approved of the continued, if not permanent, disarmament of Japan as a matter of principle. Although the Navy Department wanted to "provide means of protecting Japanese territory by continuing the military occupation until such time as the United Nations has adequate forces for performing this function,"

it did not make an objection to the disarmament of Japan itself. It suggested, however, that Japan should be able to have armed forces, through the revision of the disarmament treaty, before the country's admission to the United Nations.<sup>21</sup> This was a new trend; the shortening of the twenty-five year disarmament period began to be considered. Until then, not contraction but extension of the disarmament period was envisaged; the original twenty-five year treaty did not have a provision for revision, though it was prescribed that the contracting parties should consult for extension six months before its expiration. For his part, MacArthur took an exception to the twenty-five year disarmament treaty for a very different reason. He did not like the idea that contracting parties of the disarmament treaty should use their military forces, if necessary, to ensure that Japan would be kept disarmed. He said that "[a]part from the fact that, from a physical and material standpoint, Japan is utterly incapable of rearming herself for modern war within the 25-year period prescribed, any possible will or attempt toward such end, in disregard of treaty commitments, can better be controlled by the power and prestige of the member governments [of the Council of Ambassadors] and the moral force of world opinion, than by the overhanging threat of Allied forces."<sup>22</sup>

The Policy Planning Staff disagreed with the basic principles of the August 6 draft. Staff member John P. Davies, Jr. thought that the American objective in relation to Japan and the Pacific area--i.e. a stable, friendly, and dependable Japan--would not be assured by the

draft treaty. He criticized the preoccupation of the draft with drastic disarmament and democratization:

demilitarization is no longer a serious problem in the case of Japan. Even if it so desired, Japan could not in the foreseeable future resurrect itself as a first-class military power. It can only gravitate into the orbit of one or the other of the super powers .... The ease with which a coup could be engineered under the proposed treaty is manifest on cursory examination of Chapter V. Occupation forces having been withdrawn, the Japanese Government would have at its disposal for the maintenance of security<sup>23</sup> and order only a civil police force equipped with small arms.

George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, agreed with Davies' analysis. Therefore, on August 12, Kennan recommended that negotiation on a Japanese peace treaty among the countries concerned should be delayed until the State Department had clarified American objectives with regard to Japan and the Pacific area.<sup>24</sup> His recommendation prevailed and, accordingly, the Policy Planning Staff undertook the study of the problems connected with a Japanese peace treaty.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, p. 286.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 338.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 339.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 339n.

<sup>5</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, p. 326. The group consisted of Borton; Ruth E. Bacon, Office of Far Eastern Affairs; John K. Emmerson, Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs; Warren S. Hunsberger, Division of Research for the Far East; and Edwin M. Martin, Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs. See also FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, p. 459; and Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 58.

<sup>6</sup>FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 326-28. The working group prepared two alternatives, in which the Far Eastern Commission was substituted by a Council of Ambassadors. The details of the alternatives are not known.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 328.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 348.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>For the extended term of validity for the German treaty, see FRUS, 1946, vol. 2, p. 847; and Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 174. In 1947, though after his resignation as Secretary of State, Byrnes said that "[a]t the time of the Peace Conference we should propose a forty-year treaty to insure the demilitarization of Japan, similar to the treaty we proposed for Germany." See *ibid.*, p. 225.

<sup>11</sup>Borton in Jones, p. 421.

<sup>12</sup>FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 452, 454. According to Dunn, the Borton group made three drafts in 1947-48: the March 1947 edition, the August 1947 edition, and the January 1948 edition. See Dunn, p. 58.

<sup>13</sup>FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 454-56.

<sup>14</sup>Borton in Jones, pp. 421-22. I corrected the date of the press conference in accordance with FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 449-53.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 468-69.

<sup>16</sup>"Japanese Considered Rearming Following Allied Occupation: Files," Japan Times Weekly, international ed., 19 May 1984, p. 9; W. Macmahon Ball, Japan: Enemy or Ally?, revised ed. (New York: John Day Co., 1949), pp. 106-107.

<sup>17</sup>FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, p. 237. Article I(a) of the disarmament treaty provided:

The High Contracting Parties Agree that they shall take steps jointly to ensure that:

(a) All Japanese armed forces, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, all para-military forces, such as the Gendarmerie (Kempei Tai), the Garde Mobil (Keipei Tei) and the Special Police (Tokka [ sic ] Ka), and all organizations auxiliary to the foregoing shall be and shall remain completely disarmed, demobilized and disbanded.

For the full text of the said treaty, see U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Japan, pp. 85-88.

<sup>18</sup>A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 655.

<sup>19</sup>FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, p. 459.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 478-79.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 495-96, 503-04. For the comments of the War Department, see *ibid.*, pp. 506-09.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 513-14.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., pp. 485-86.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 486-87.

## VI. TRANSITION

Beginning with its proposal on July 11, 1947, the United States undertook international negotiation on a Japanese peace treaty. The negotiations were, however, soon faced with difficulty because of disagreement on procedural matters. While the United States and Commonwealth countries desired an eleven-country preliminary conference with the understanding that decisions should be made by a simple two-thirds majority, the Soviet Union insisted that a Japanese peace treaty should be considered first at the Council of Foreign Ministers. Though not opposing the concept of an eleven-nation conference, China did not give up its veto power. Negotiations continued during the rest of 1947 and early 1948, but ended without success.<sup>1</sup>

The Policy Planning Staff finished the study of a Japanese peace treaty in mid October 1947. After consulting with the Far Eastern Office, the Army and Navy Departments, and leading outside experts, the Staff prepared PPS 10 "Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement." In relation to the military defense of Japan, PPS 10 said in part:

We are already committed to the demilitarization of Japan. The Staff considers that the idea of a four-power agreement on Japanese demilitarization should be abandoned but that the Treaty should provide for complete Japanese disarmament, with the reservation that Japan should be permitted to maintain a civil police force, including a constabulary and coast guard, at a strength to be defined initially by SCAP. A Council of Ambassadors should be charged with the continued supervision of demilitarization and disarmament.

Admittedly, this leaves the Japanese without means of self-defense against foreign aggression. The Staff sees no means of avoiding this. It feels that in the coming period Japanese military security must rest primarily on the proximity (or in extreme event, the presence in Japan) of adequate U.S. forces, and that it should be accepted as a principle of American defense policy to retain in the Pacific areas sufficient armed strength to make plain our will and determination to prevent any other military<sub>2</sub> power from establishing itself in the Japanese home islands.

It is noted that the Staff recommended the abandonment of the concept of a Japanese disarmament treaty among the countries concerned. In my view, it had several implications. First, heretofore, the disarmament treaty was to be binding upon the great powers or the eleven nations comprising the Far Eastern Commission, and those countries were supposed to ensure that Japan would remain disarmed; demilitarization provisions in the peace treaty were designed to bind Japan to the four- or eleven-power agreement. As far as the disarmament of Japan was concerned, however, it was sufficient that the peace treaty provided that Japan should remain disarmed. The separate provision was redundant.

Second, the basic concept of the disarmament treaty was that military matters could be settled in advance of the entire peace settlement. This notion differed with Kennan's. He saw the close relationship between military and other aspects; as shown below, Kennan said in March 1948 that the post-treaty arrangements for Japanese military security should be formulated "in the light of the prevailing international situation and of the degree of internal stability achieved in Japan."<sup>3</sup> To Kennan, the settlement of military aspects should be considered in the context of the entire peace settlement with Japan. Al-

though negotiation on the disarmament treaty was in abeyance, the proposal had not been formally withdrawn. Therefore, it seemed necessary to decide on an American stance toward the treaty.<sup>4</sup> Third, while Byrnes tried to "please" the Soviet Union by this treaty, the Planning Staff did not see the necessity. Kennan said in winter 1946 that "[f]ew of us have any idea how much perplexity and suspicion has been caused in the Soviet mind by gestures and concessions granted by well-meaning Americans with a view to convincing the Russians of their friendly sentiments."<sup>5</sup> Fourth, as a result of the abandonment of the disarmament treaty, the security of Japan was made dependent on United States forces. It is noted that PPS 10 did not recommend the rearmament of Japan.

The essence of PPS 10 was the recommendation that the Japanese peace settlement should be postponed. The Planning Staff saw Japan as unprepared for "rehabilitation." According to Kennan, "[i]f one was to regard the protection of Japan against Communist pressures as a legitimate concern of the United States government, it was simply madness to think of abandoning Japan to her own devices in the situation then prevailing."<sup>6</sup> At any rate, however, PPS 10 was a tentative recommendation. Because of the lack of information, the Planning Staff could not reach a definitive conclusion. Therefore, Kennan recommended that a ranking official should be sent to Japan to discuss with MacArthur all essential points of the problem at hand. There was a difficulty, however. Although the United States needed time to review the situation in and outside Japan and to work out firm judgement on certain basic problems, it was difficult to retreat outright from its proposal of an

Japan was one of the five regions of the world which Kennan thought were vital to American security; the other four were the United States, Great Britain, the Rhine valley with adjacent industrial areas, and the Soviet Union. Only in these areas, "the sinews of modern military strength could be produced in quantity." Now, only one of them was under Communist control. In this context, he considered that the main task of "containment" was "seeing to it that none of the remaining ones fell under such control." Further, Japan, along with the Philippines, "would eventually constitute the cornerstones of a Pacific security system adequate for the protection of our interests," he thought.<sup>12</sup>

Kennan stayed in Japan for three weeks. Upon his return to Washington, he made a recommendation on new American occupation policy toward Japan. His recommendation met wide and almost complete acceptance, and brought about change in occupation policy. He regarded this task as "the most significant constructive contribution" in his career in the government, second only to his job on the Marshall Plan.<sup>13</sup> Kennan's diagnosis was that, given probable Communist pressures, Japan had not been prepared for independence. Therefore, the American government should not press for a peace treaty at this time. "When the time came for its negotiation the treaty should be brief, general, and nonpunitive." Those problems which would complicate a peace settlement with Japan, but could be solved in advance, should be settled, as much as possible, before peace negotiation; for example, restitution and settlement of the property rights of Japanese external assets would fall into this category. At the same time, "[t]he Japanese should be encouraged to develop independent responsibility." The em-

phasis in occupation policy should shift from reform to economic recovery. The present vulnerability to Communist pressures should be rectified. Accordingly, Kennan suggested change in American occupation policy, especially in the fields of military defense, the maintenance of internal order, occupation cost, economic reforms, the relaxation of purge, and reparations.<sup>14</sup>

As for the defense of Japan, just before his departure for Tokyo, Kennan recommended that the American government should "devise policies toward Japan which would assure the security of that country from Communist penetration and domination as well as from military attack by the Soviet Union...."<sup>15</sup> Accordingly, PPS 28 "Recommendation with Respect to U.S. Policy toward Japan," prepared by Kennan after his return, dealt with the two aspects--internal and external--of security. In terms of the maintenance of internal security, Kennan recommended the reinforcement of the Japanese police establishment and the creation of a strong and effective coast guard, so that Japan could cope with organized violence and prevent infiltration from the Asian continent. With regard to the military security of Japan, he said:

The United States tactical forces should be retained in Japan until the entrance into effect of a peace treaty. A final U.S. position concerning the post-treaty arrangements for Japanese military security should not be formulated until the peace negotiations are upon us. It should then be formulated in the light of the prevailing international situation and of the degree of internal stability achieved in Japan. If Russia has not been extensively weakened and sobered by that time or if Japanese society still seems excessively vulnerable in the political sense, we should either postpone the treaty or insist on a limited re-militarization of Japan, preferably under U.S. guidance and supervision. But if by that time the Russian situation should really have changed for the better and if we are reasonably confident of the internal stability of Japan, we should aim at a complete demilitarization, guaranteed by an international treaty of the most explicit and concrete nature, to which the Russians would be a party.<sup>16</sup>

Taking a step forward from the position of PPS 10 and the January 8 draft, PPS 28 made the disarmament of Japan conditional.

Kennan's advocacy, though under certain circumstances, of Japan's rearmament is notable in relation to "containment," in terms of which he formulated the Japan policy. According to Kennan, the containment of Soviet power is "not the containment by military means of a military threat, but the political containment of a political threat" with the understanding that "political threat" includes domestic violence.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, he "did not suspect the Russians of any intention to launch an outright military attack"; the biggest problem was to maintain internal order with a view to forestalling "intrigue, subversion, and seizure of power by the Japanese Communists"; only in the final stage of internal take-over by communists, "would there be any possibility that Russian forces might play some sort of a supplementary role."<sup>18</sup> As Gellman points out, however, this does not mean that a military means is unnecessary to Kennan,<sup>19</sup> and his advocacy of Japan's rearmament seems to be one example. As for the reasons why he considered the maintenance of armed forces as necessary, Kennan himself said that, under certain circumstances, Japan must be permitted "to re-arm to the extent that it would no longer constitute an open invitation to military aggression."<sup>20</sup> In addition, armed forces could be used to back up the police establishment in the case of internal instability.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, taking Japanese psychology into consideration, the only alternative to the rearmament of Japan, i.e. the stationing of American forces after a peace treaty, would be harmful.<sup>22</sup>

Kennan differed with MacArthur and the State Department on security arrangements for Japan. The State Department had so far considered the demilitarization of Japan essential; as mentioned above, the January 8 draft of a peace treaty still had disarmament provisions. For his part, MacArthur thought that "the only acceptable permanent solution to the problem of Japanese security is complete demilitarization under an effective international guarantee"; he was opposed to the rearmament of Japan, and he preferred the continued stationing of Allied forces after a peace treaty.<sup>23</sup> Kennan disagreed with MacArthur on the following two issues: Russia's sincerity in keeping promises and Japan's vulnerability to communist penetration. While MacArthur was optimistic about the two points, Kennan thought:

I would not trust Russian good faith in the observance of any treaty of demilitarization of Japan, unless Russia were considerably weaker and more restrained in her immediate aims and policies than is the case today . . . . To the Communists, the problem of capturing Japan is not a problem of winning over the favor of the majority of the Japanese people. It is a problem of penetrating Japanese society and seizing its key positions. At present, it looks to me as though Japanese society were decidedly vulnerable to such attacks.<sup>24</sup>

To Kennan, the biggest problem was the reinforcement of Japan's resistance to communist infiltration, without which the demilitarization treaty would be useless. Even if the treaty were concluded, the Soviet Union would feel free to engage in indirect aggression with the possibility that, in the final stage of subversion, it would intervene militarily; on the other hand, the United States would be prohibited, by the treaty, from assisting outright the Japanese government in subduing communist subversive activity as long as it was a domestic problem. Above all,

the treaty would deprive Japan of its capability to cope with such activity. Therefore, the important thing was the reinforcement of the police force. Then, Kennan reintroduced the concept of a disarmament treaty, which in October 1947 he had recommended abandoning. However, the nature of the treaty had changed considerably. The treaty originally envisaged the disarmament of Japan and was expected to calm the Soviet fear of "capitalist encirclement." In PPS 28, Kennan used the treaty as the means of guaranteeing Japan's security and of forestalling Soviet interference with Japanese matters. Although he made a conceptual breakthrough on the issue by abandoning the unconditional disarmament of Japan, he did no more than raise the possibility of Japan's rearmament. He just recommended that the decision on the problem should be postponed. For his part, Kennan seems to have preferred the demilitarization and neutralization of Japan, but if and only if circumstances permitted.<sup>25</sup>

Charles E. Saltzman, then Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, agreed with Kennan: he further said that "[i]n the event we are required to choose between postponing the treaty or permitting Japan to re-arm, the former seems the more practical alternative."<sup>26</sup> While the State Department had not been prepared for the rearmament of Japan, the Army had gone a little farther. In March 1948, Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper said to MacArthur and Kennan that "there is a general trend in recent War Department thinking toward the early establishment of a small defensive force for Japan, to be ready at such time as U.S. occupation forces leave the country."<sup>27</sup> In May, the Department of the Army prepared a memo-

randum, which said that "[s]olely from the military viewpoints, the establishment of Japanese armed forces is desirable as such forces would share the burden of the defense of Japan and thus effect economies in utilization of our own limited man power"; while recognizing the political and economic implications, the memorandum said that "[t]he question should be explored of obtaining an amendment to the Japanese Constitution with a view to permitting eventual Japanese military armaments for defense."<sup>28</sup> It is noted that while Kennan advocated rearmament primarily for a political reason, i.e. the psychological effect on the Japanese of stationed forces, the Army favored it for the reason of military efficiency. It seems that, following this line, the Department of the Army attempted to revise the Kennan report so as to include the reference to the amendment of the war-renunciation clause even though the State Department did not agree with the revision.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the Secretary of the Army had not made up his mind on the issue: commenting on the Army memorandum, he said that "it is doubtful that it will be advisable for a long time to come to permit the establishment of limited Japanese forces."<sup>30</sup>

This was a large shift in Washington's attitude toward Japanese armament. In January 1948, the problem was still how to keep Japan disarmed. From March to May, Washington began to consider the future rearmament of Japan. Without doubt, the shift was partly attributable to the Kennan recommendation. Another possible reason for the shift was the militarization of containment. According to Kennan, a communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 "had ... an effect on the origins of the NATO pact and on that militarization of thinking

about the cold war generally that would overtake official Washington in the coming period."<sup>31</sup> The beginning of the shift from disarmament to rearmament in the Japan policy coincided with the beginning of the militarization of the cold war.

After consultation and revision, PPS 28 was submitted as NSC 13 to the National Security Council. NSC 13 nominally took the same position on security matters as PPS 28 did: the postponement of the decision. NSC 13 said:

United States tactical forces should be retained in Japan until the entrance into effect of a peace treaty. A final U.S. position concerning the post-treaty arrangements for Japanese military security should not be formulated until the peace negotiations are upon us. It should then be formulated in the light of the prevailing international situation and of the degree of internal stability achieved in Japan.<sup>32</sup>

Now, the latter half of Kennan's original recommendation, the part dealing with disarmament, was omitted. Although the omission did not change the conclusion, American commitment to the disarmament of Japan seemed to be weakened; while PPS 28 stipulated future alternatives according to the prevailing international situation, NSC 13 made them an open question. In other words, NSC 13 no longer required that the United States should keep Japan demilitarized even if the Soviet Union were weakened. This position remained intact in NSC 13/2, which obtained Presidential approval on October 9, 1948. Further, NSC 13/3 of May 6, 1949, maintained the same policy.<sup>33</sup> The postponement of the decision on security matters continued to be the official American policy until September 1950.

As for the reinforcement of the police establishment, the Army Department related it to the future rearmament of Japan; an Army memorandum said in May 1948 that "[e]arly increase of the Japanese civilian and coastal police should be effected for local security purposes and to provide a vehicle for the possible organization of Japanese armed forces at a later date."<sup>34</sup> For his part, MacArthur showed reluctance to strengthen the police establishment, in equipment and in size, for the reasons of international repercussion<sup>35</sup> although he did not object to the creation of a Japanese coast guard.<sup>36</sup> It is not certain whether Kennan conceived of the reinforced police as the nucleus of possible Japanese armed forces. Judging from his belief that Soviet military aggression was unlikely as long as internal order was firmly maintained, it seems that, to Kennan, the reinforcement of the police was irrelevant to the rearmament of Japan.

In October 1948, Nationalist China informally urged that "the United States should consider making a treaty with China and some of the British Commonwealth states to guarantee for a long time the disarmament of Japan."<sup>37</sup> This was an attempt to revive the Japanese disarmament treaty, which had been in virtual abeyance for two years. The State Department saw a Soviet shadow behind the Chinese proposal although there was no direct evidence; it considered that "[f]earful over evidences of US shift of emphasis from reform to stability and possible later intention to re-arm Japan in our service, they [the Russians] may be seeking to bind us to our 1946 demilitarization proposal before we can successfully withdraw from it."<sup>38</sup> Moreover, NSC 13/2 had recommended the postponement of the decision on long-term

security arrangements for Japan. Therefore, the State Department did not go along with the Chinese proposal. Evidently, the Soviet Union was sensitive to the possibility of Japan's rearmament. On December 30, the Soviet representative in the Far Eastern Commission requested the American government to clarify the press report "to the effect that General MacArthur has sent to Washington a report in which it is suggested to re-establish the Japanese Army."<sup>39</sup> The allegation was dismissed as groundless by the American government.

The year 1948 was the one of transition. Policy-makers in Washington began to doubt the wisdom of keeping Japan disarmed. The advocacy of a disarmed Japan was not as strong as it had been in preceding years. However, only three years had passed since the defeat of Japan. The fear of Japan was still hanging over people's minds. As the New York Times military correspondent put it in December 1948:

Most observers now agree that the tenets of the Japanese Constitution which would keep Japan an unarmed state in the midst of an armed world are distinctly unrealistic and will have to be modified. On the other hand, many agree that the rearmament of Japan, unless very carefully supervised and strictly curtailed, might be a menace to the peace of the world.<sup>40</sup>

In my view, Washington policy-makers confronted the dilemma between the necessity and the fear of Japan's rearmament until the outbreak of the Korean War.

To MacArthur there was no dilemma. He continued to advocate the disarmament of Japan. In February 1949, he said to a State Department official that "it would be a great mistake if we were to consider the re-arming of the Japanese as an ally."<sup>41</sup> He took the same stance in an interview with a news correspondent in March:

In case of another war "we do not want Japan to fight," he [MacArthur] said.

"Japan's role is<sub>2</sub> to be the Switzerland of the Pacific," MacArthur explained.<sup>42</sup>

Of course, given the fact that Switzerland had armed forces, there is some ambiguity over what MacArthur meant by "the Switzerland of the Pacific" in the context of Japan's self-defense.<sup>43</sup> However, because he said also in July 1949 that "he believed it might be possible to exact a pledge from all the nations concerned, including Soviet Russia, to respect the neutrality of an unarmed Japan,"<sup>44</sup> it is probable that by the phrase he meant a neutral and unarmed Japan.

At the same time, MacArthur continued to show an unwillingness to strengthen the Japanese police establishment. The State and Army Departments considered that NSC 13/2 called for "(a) improving police equipment and training, (b) creation of a mobile reserve for handling disasters and organized violence, (c) establishment of a national investigation bureau, and (d) greater degree of coordination at all times for what we consider to be a currently over-decentralized police system." Despite repeated "directions" from Washington, as of May 1949, MacArthur had only taken unsatisfactory measures for (a) above.<sup>45</sup>

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that the United States should make up its mind on the rearmament of Japan in the light of the evident trend toward world unrest. In NSC 44 "Limited Military armament for Japan," circulated on March 11, 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that NSC 13/2 should be revised. The JCS were of the opinion that:

- a. Plans be made now for the eventual establishment of limited Japanese armed forces to maintain internal security and to assist in local defensive action in event of an emergency;
- .....

c. The strengthening and equipping of Japanese police and coastal patrols be undertaken with the secret ultimate objective in mind of the use of these forces as a basis for the establishment of limited Japanese military forces for the defense of Japan.<sup>46</sup>

Max Bishop, then Chief of the Northeast Asian Affairs Division, responded to NSC 44 in April. While recognizing American commitments to disarm and demilitarize Japan, he agreed that planning should be made secretly for the possible use of limited Japanese armed forces for the defense of Japan. However, he did not see the necessity that, for the planning, NSC 13/2 should be revised. In addition, he regarded the rearmament as the decision the Japanese themselves should make. He said:

my recommendation would be that the United States should allow the Japanese themselves to decide whether or not they will have military forces in the post-treaty period. I believe that it would be wise until we have evidence to the contrary to plan U.S. security in that part of the world on the assumption that Japan will remain to all intents and purposes a military vacuum.<sup>47</sup>

Thus, attitudes in the government were gradually moving away from favoring an unarmed Japan while the official American policy remained unchanged. Revised on May 6, 1949, NSC 13/3 had the same recommendation as NSC 13/2 in relation to the post-treaty security arrangements and the reinforcement of the police establishment.<sup>48</sup>

Since early 1948, the United States had shelved the international negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty. It was the Soviet Union that shook the standstill. In May 1949, the Soviet Union drove the United States into an awkward position by suddenly proposing the negotiation of a Japanese settlement in the Council of Foreign Ministers. The United

States rejected the Soviet proposal because there were some problems to be solved in advance, such as the clarification of American security needs and the propriety of a multilateral peace treaty in terms of achieving the American needs.<sup>49</sup> After the incident, MacArthur intensively urged the early conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty.<sup>50</sup> In addition, according to a State Department analysis, most of the FEC member countries favored an early settlement with Japan.<sup>51</sup> In September, fearing that the negotiation of the peace settlement might proceed at the Russian pace, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin and Secretary of State Dean Acheson agreed that the United States and the Commonwealth countries would cooperate in preliminary preparation for a Japanese peace treaty. They further agreed that the United States would prepare a draft of the treaty in order that Great Britain could use it, as the basis of consultation, at the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference to be held in Ceylon in January 1951.<sup>52</sup> Accordingly, the State Department undertook the preparation.

In August 1949, Acting Political Adviser in Japan, William J. Sebald, warned the Department against the militarization of containment: he said that "undue emphasis is in most cases placed upon the strategic importance of Japan in a military sense, with the result that the political implications of Japan's importance in the anti-communist 'line of containment' are relegated to a minor position if not forgotten altogether." From this position, he recommended the early conclusion of a peace treaty, which would create a friendly Japan with full sovereignty.<sup>53</sup>

The militarization of containment was most evident in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's thinking. NSC 49 "Strategic Evaluation of United

States Security Needs in Japan," prepared in June by the JCS, saw Japan as a keystone in the western Pacific because of its geographical location and its industrial potential. In terms of the Asian situation and the internal and external security of Japan, the JCS considered a Japanese peace settlement as premature. According to their analysis, if peace negotiations were to be undertaken in the near future, several arrangements for Japan would be required. One of them was:

Since there can be no guarantee in the present world situation of the sovereignty of a defenseless Japan, there should be plans, as previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for limited Japanese armed forces for self-defense to be effectuated in war emergency, and, in any case, unless the general situation makes it clearly unnecessary, prior to departure of occupation forces from Japan.<sup>54</sup>

The State Department commented on NSC 49 in October. Opposing the conclusion of NSC 49, the Department recommended the early conclusion of a peace treaty. While it implied that an imminent threat to Japan was not so much external as internal in nature, the Department was "in accord with the JCS conviction . . . that Japan's capacity for self-defense must at the proper time be developed."<sup>55</sup>

The fundamental difference in relation to the peace settlement between the State and Defense Departments remained unsolved until the outbreak of the Korean War. The Defense Department and the JCS put two requirements on a Japanese peace treaty: first, some military arrangements, such as American military bases in Japan and the American control of Okinawa, should be made; and, second, the peace treaty should be signed by the Soviet Union and the de facto government of China.<sup>56</sup> Although the State Department considered the two re-

quirements as mutually exclusive, the Defense Department did not yield to the position of the State Department. As a result, the United States failed to work out its position on a Japanese peace settlement in time for the Commonwealth Conference in Ceylon.<sup>57</sup> With regard to the rearmament of Japan, in a meeting with Acheson on December 24, 1949:

General Bradley [then chairman of the JCS] referred in passing to the fact that it would be necessary at some time to let Japan have armed forces and that it did not make any sense for an independent nation of 80 million people not to have an army to defend itself. He indicated agreement that at the present it was not feasible to permit Japan to rearm.<sup>58</sup>

It seems that, even to the JCS, the rearmament of Japan was not a pressing matter. Of course, it was partly because the Japanese peace settlement was not expected in the immediate future.

MacArthur continued to prefer the neutralization and disarmament of Japan. Meanwhile, his trust in the Soviet Union was waning. In September 1949, he was "inclined to believe that if Soviet Russia would join in an absolute guarantee of non-aggression and neutrality for Japan, such a guarantee would be sufficient, and all troops withdrawn."<sup>59</sup> In November, he fully recognized "that a Soviet guarantee of Japanese neutrality could not be relied upon, and that this will remain the case until the Soviets undergo a basic change of heart." However, he still regarded the disarmed neutrality of Japan as "the optimum long-run solution when world conditions permit." As the second best alternative, he contemplated American naval and air bases to be retained in Japan after a peace treaty. He did not "believe it necessary or advisable to supplement these bases with Japanese defense forces."<sup>60</sup> As shown below, however, MacArthur's attitude toward American base rights in the post-treaty period was not fixed.

Because the United States failed to work out its policy on a Japanese peace treaty by the end of 1949, the Ceylon Conference among the Commonwealth countries was held without information on a clarified American position. One of the conference results was the opinion that "[a]dequate provision should be made in the [peace] treaty to ensure that Japan does not revert to militarism or to a reactionary type of government."<sup>61</sup> During this period, it was reported elsewhere, "of the nations in Asia, only Malaya, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines remained anti-Japanese."<sup>62</sup>

During the first half of 1950, the State and Defense Departments could not formulate a policy on a Japanese settlement which was acceptable to both of them. On the one hand, the State Department favored an early peace treaty for a political reason. The military occupation of Japan had reached its peak in effectiveness, and the Japanese seemed to wish to regain their freedom. If the occupation continued further, it might have a bad effect on pro-American sentiment of the Japanese which was created in the early period of the occupation. On the other hand, the Defense Department was opposed to an early peace treaty, which would require American forces to withdraw from Japan. From the military viewpoint, if the periphery of Pacific islands was to be held on the American side, bases in Japan would be necessary and, as a consequence, Japan should be defended.<sup>63</sup>

To satisfy the two requirements, three alternative arrangements were proposed for a Japanese settlement: first, a peace treaty plus a collective security arrangement with American bases in Japan; second, the restoration of Japan's sovereignty in political and economic fields

with the authority of the present occupation machinery restricted to security matters; and, third, a peace treaty with American forces stationed in Japan on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration.<sup>64</sup> The three arrangements were almost the same, at least in substance. The third arrangement was proposed by MacArthur. He disliked the first choice because it would appear that the American base rights were imposed on Japan. He also disliked the second one because it would scarcely alter the existing situation. According to MacArthur's far-fetched interpretation, the Potsdam Declaration provided that points in Japan should be occupied "until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world"; on the one hand, because irresponsible militarism, now represented by the Communists, had not been driven from the world, the Allied forces could stay in Japan; and, on the other, because the Japanese were not responsible for the present irresponsible militarism, they deserved a peace treaty. However, none of the three alternatives could solve the problem during this period.

The security problem for Japan had two aspects: defense-against-Japan and defense-of-Japan. The position of the State Department, Acheson said in April 1950, was that at the same time as the conclusion of a peace treaty "a security arrangement should be entered into with the FEC countries and Japan which would involve mutual commitments among the FEC powers to defend one another against aggression by Japan and to defend Japan against from any source . . . ." <sup>65</sup> As implied in Acheson's statement, the State Department put more emphasis on the defense-against-Japan problem than on the defense-of-Japan problem. This tendency was more evident

in "Agreement on Security with Respect to Japan" drafted in the Department in April. The six-article agreement, which was expected to be concluded among nine Pacific powers including the United States and Japan, provided for the defense-against-Japan in Article 2 and the defense-of-Japan in Article 3.<sup>66</sup>

Because the defense-against-Japan was still a fearful matter, the rearmament of Japan was not a pressing concern to the State Department. The Department considered that while rearmament might be necessary, Japan should be kept disarmed for some time and that rearmament should be gradually implemented. In a memorandum prepared in March, the Special Assistant to the Secretary, John B. Howard, said:

The peace treaty should not, for political reason, authorize the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. Nevertheless, the peace treaty should not foreclose the possibility of Japanese rearmament at some future time if this course should appear to be in our best interests or in the event Japan should become involved in armed conflict.

Howard listed four reasons against immediate rearmament: first, the American objective under the present conditions of the cold war was "the prevention of the outbreak of war rather than measures of military defense against actual armed attack by the USSR"; second, immediate rearmament would be harmful to the achievement of economic and social progress in Japan; third, rearmament without the expressed will of the Japanese--i.e. the voluntary amendment of the Constitution--would be detrimental to their continued orientation toward the United States; and, fourth, some Allied countries would be opposed to it.<sup>67</sup>

In April, while questioning the possibility and desirability of obtaining American bases in a post-treaty Japan, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs John M. Allison thought:

Japan shall remain disarmed for a substantial period of time at the expiration of which the Japanese Government and the Governments signatory to a Peace Treaty with Japan shall determine whether and to what extent it may be advisable for Japan to resume the burden of her own self-defense.<sup>68</sup>

Thus, the State Department did not consider the immediate rearmament of Japan as necessary or desirable.

The tendency was not changed by John Foster Dulles, at least until he went to Tokyo in June. Dulles, who was considered as a Republican spokesman for foreign affairs, was appointed as Consultant to the Secretary of State in April. In the next month, he was charged with special responsibilities regarding the Japanese peace settlement. While he rejected the neutrality of Japan as meaningless for the Russians, Dulles was cautious about the resurgence of Japanese militarism: he said that in Japan "[t]here is a present emotional tendency to pacifism which, however, could easily shift to a revival of militarism."<sup>69</sup>

In a memorandum prepared on June 6, Dulles contemplated the stationing of the combined forces of the FEC countries as security arrangements for a post-treaty Japan. He recommended that the security agreement should "take note of, but not embody contractually, the military renunciations of the Japanese Constitution."<sup>70</sup> Although the war-renunciation clause was used as "'scenery' in relation to the undertaking to defend Japan against attack,"<sup>71</sup> the reference to Article 9 im-

plied that the United States did not have urgent needs for the rearmament of Japan. Probably underlying this was his understanding, as shown in his memorandum of June 15, that "Russia has never been restrained by agreements, from indirect aggression but probably would not engage in direct attempt to occupy Japan with military force unless and until general war should be determined on by the Politburo."<sup>72</sup>

Dulles visited Japan in late June to consult MacArthur and Japanese leaders about a peace treaty. According to Yoshitsu, on June 22, Dulles concluded that "Japanese rearmament was inevitable" although he "did not then envisage a specific level of Japanese buildup."<sup>73</sup> Thus, he demanded from Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida that Japan rearm. Although he could not get a satisfactory response, Dulles did not further press Yoshida on the matter.<sup>74</sup> It seems that Dulles' position did not differ very much from the position of the State Department--i.e. Japan should rearm, but not in the immediate future.

During this period, as mentioned above, MacArthur proposed the third alternative for Japanese security arrangements--i.e. a peace treaty with American forces stationed in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration. He considered in his June 14 memorandum that the arrangement would be "a secure basis upon which an unarmed Japan's permanent neutrality ultimately might rest." According to his analysis, "such a destiny alone could foster the well-being of the Japanese people and serve the essential interests of all the other nations of the earth."<sup>75</sup>

His attitude toward American bases in Japan was vacillating. In February 1950, he seemed to accept American bases of defensive char-

acter in Japan.<sup>76</sup> In April, he was reported to say that "[v]iewed in the proper perspective . . . bases are unnecessary in Japan and American insistence that the right of bases be granted would only cause an eventual anti-American reaction on the part of the Japanese people."<sup>77</sup> In relation to his third alternative arrangements for Japan's security, he said in June:

it is more essential that Japan be denied to the Soviet [sic] than that she be an active military ally of the United States. Such denial can best be assured through a firm political alignment resting upon the good will and faith of the Japanese people, with our access to military and naval bases and other available facilities adequate to meet the needs of our security operations. This<sup>78</sup> is in complete consonance with the status of neutrality . . .

Although his notion of neutrality is problematic, it seems, at least, that MacArthur was opposed to outright American base rights in Japan, which would be interpreted as a military alliance.

One more thing to be noted is MacArthur's notion of the right of self-defense. He said on June 23:

In any study of the Japanese problem it must be understood that despite Japan's constitutional renunciation of war its right to self defense in case of predatory attack is implicit and inalienable. In such a situation Japan would muster all of its available human and material resources<sup>79</sup> in support of the security forces committed to its defense.

Although his explanation was ambiguous, it does not seem that he then supported the rearmament of Japan, judging from his previous inclination toward the unarmed neutrality of Japan. What he tried to say seems to be that if it were attacked, Japan could constitutionally defend itself by using the police force, merchant ships, civil aircrafts, etc. in

cooperation with international security forces organized preferably under the United Nations Charter. However, "to muster all of its available human and material resources" could include everything, if necessary. This was what happened after the eruption of the Korean War, as far as MacArthur was concerned.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Borton in Jones, pp. 423-26.

<sup>2</sup>FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 540-41. There is an ambiguity as to whether the August 6 draft of the disarmament treaty was an eleven-power or four-power disarmament treaty because PPS 10 referred to "a four-power agreement." Although the text of the treaty is not available, it was likely to be an eleven-power treaty, judging from the fact that, as mentioned above, Borton recommended an eleven-power treaty in May and that MacArthur called the treaty in question "a separate 25-year treaty among the 11 powers to insure the demilitarization and disarmament of Japan" (ibid., p. 513).

<sup>3</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, p. 692.

<sup>4</sup>On October 26, 1947, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-Chieh said to W.J. Sebald, Acting Political Adviser in Japan, "What if Russia were now to accept the proposed security treaty?" See FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, p. 550.

<sup>5</sup>Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 562. This is one of the cautions for dealing with the Stalin regime. Kennan wrote them, reacting against the Byrnes diplomacy in the Moscow Conference held in December 1945. See ibid., pp. 290-91.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 375-76.

<sup>7</sup>FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 536-37.

<sup>8</sup>Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, p. 376.

<sup>9</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, pp. 657-58.

<sup>10</sup>Kennan in Etzold, p. 95.

<sup>11</sup>Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, p. 359.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 381.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 393.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 391-92.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 381.

<sup>16</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, p. 692.

<sup>17</sup>Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, pp. 358, 361.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 393-94.

<sup>19</sup>Barton Gellman, Contending with Kennan: Toward a Philosophy of American Power (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 110.

<sup>20</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, p. 713.

<sup>21</sup>Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, p. 390.

<sup>22</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, p. 712.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., pp. 708, 712. Emphasis in original. It should be noted that when MacArthur referred to the demilitarization of Japan, Okinawa was not included. He was strongly of the opinion that Okinawa should be put under the complete control of the United States. According to his analysis, the American line of defense now passed along the eastern shores of the Asian continent; by adequate air power based on Okinawa, the United States could not only protect Japan from outside attack, but also destroy enemy forces or harbor facilities along the Asian coast from Vladivostock to Singapore. See *ibid.*, p. 709.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 712-13. By and large, the State Department's draft of a peace treaty had thus far been based on the same optimism as MacArthur's. See FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 337-39.

<sup>25</sup>Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, p. 393; *idem*, "Japanese Security", p. 14.

<sup>26</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, p. 728.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 706.

<sup>28</sup>FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, p. 671.

<sup>29</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, p. 743.

<sup>30</sup>FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, p. 671.

<sup>31</sup>Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, p. 379.

<sup>32</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, p. 776.

<sup>33</sup>For NSC 13/2, see *ibid.*, pp. 857-62. For NSC 13/3, see FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, pp. 730-36.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 671.

<sup>35</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, pp. 829, 933. NSC 13/2 said that "[t]he Japanese Police establishment, including the coastal patrol, should be strengthened by the re-enforcing and re-equipping of the present forces, and by expanding the present centrally directed police organization." See *ibid.*, p. 859.

<sup>36</sup>The creation of a Japanese maritime coastal patrol, the Maritime Safety Board, was not directly related to Kennan's recommendation. In October 1947, the Japanese government presented a draft bill for the organization to SCAP for its approval. The final draft was passed by the Diet on April 15, 1948. See James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 53-59.

<sup>37</sup>FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, p, 856.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 864.

<sup>39</sup>Blakeslee, p. 77.

<sup>40</sup>Hanson W. Baldwin, "M'Arthur Warns U.S. on China Trend," New York Times, 12 December 1948, pp. 1, 4.

<sup>41</sup>FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2. p. 657.

<sup>42</sup>G. Ward Price, "MacArthur Believes Russia Incapable of Striking Japan," New York Times, 2 March 1949, pp. 1, 19.

<sup>43</sup>Hata, pp. 76-77.

<sup>44</sup>FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, p. 806.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 725.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 673.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 694.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. 730-32.

<sup>49</sup>FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, pp. 758-60.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., pp. 803, 806, 810, 830.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 820.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., pp. 858-59, 861, 870.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 835.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., pp. 776-77.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 872.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., pp. 922-23.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., pp. 924-30.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 926.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 862.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 891.

<sup>61</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 1132.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., pp. 1175-82.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., pp. 1189-91, 1213-21.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 1176.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 1172-73.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 1148. In a memorandum on Japanese rearmament prepared in May, Assistant Secretary of State W. Walton Butterworth explained this position: "Our thinking is that whereas we do not wish to encourage the Japanese to change their constitutional prohibitions or in any way to stimulate them in the direction of creating an army, navy or air force, we believe it would be most undesirable to perpetuate such prohibitions in a treaty of peace. All experience argues that once written into a peace treaty, they could not be overcome except by unilateral violation . . . . (ibid., pp. 1193-94)." In his book apparently completed before the outbreak of the Korean War, Robert A. Fearey, then in the Office of the Northeast Asian Affairs, said:

Rearming of Japan for self-defense is not an acceptable alternative. Japanese misuse of military power is still too recent; neighboring smaller powers would oppose Japanese rearmament; the Japanese in their new Constitution have renounced war and declared that they will never maintain armed forces; the threat to Japanese is more likely to be internal subversion and uprising than by military attack; Japan cannot afford the cost of a military establishment, particularly one of the very considerable size which would be required to be of value if an attack should occur; and there would always be the possibility that the force if created might fight on the wrong side.

See Robert A. Fearey, The Occupation of Japan: Second Phase, 1948-50 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 185.

<sup>68</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 1169.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., pp. 1161-62, 1208.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 1210.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 1165.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 1223. Emphasis in original.

<sup>73</sup>Michael M. Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 41.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., pp. 41-42; and Gerald L. Curtis, "The Dulles-Yoshida Negotiations on the San Francisco Peace Treaty," in Columbia Essays in International Affairs, volume II: The Dean's Papers, 1966, ed. Andrew W. Cordier (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 43-44.

<sup>75</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 1219.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 1134.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 1170.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., pp. 1219-20.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 1228.

## VII. EXPECTED REARMAMENT

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War began. The outburst of a war in the vicinity of Japan affected American policy toward the Japanese peace settlement and the rearmament of Japan. In relation to a Japanese peace treaty, the war had an accelerating effect. On July 19, Dulles said to Acheson that "[m]y impression is that the Korean attack makes it more important, rather than less important, to act"; he feared that if the United States missed the opportunity, the pro-Western orientation of Japan might disappear.<sup>1</sup> The Defense Department agreed with the undertaking of peace negotiations provided that "the Japanese treaty is not ratified until after favorable resolution of the present military involvement in Korea."<sup>2</sup> Finally, approved by the President on September 8, NSC 60/1 said that "[t]he United States should now proceed with preliminary negotiations for a Japanese Peace Treaty."<sup>3</sup>

With regard to the rearmament of Japan, as Kennan put it:

The Korean War changed the entire aspect of the Japanese security problem quite basically. The dream of a demilitarized and militarily neutralized Japan now faded from sight.<sup>4</sup>

As a result of his inspection of Korean battlefields on June 29, MacArthur considered the possibility to "improvise native forces in Japan sufficient to deter any abortive seizure of that country by an enemy . . . ." <sup>5</sup> On July 8, he "authorized" the expansion of the existing strength of the Maritime Safety Board and the establishment of

a 75,000-man National Police Reserve, which later developed into the Self-Defense Forces. Sebald said in August that "[i]t is believed that the Japanese are fully aware of the military implications already evident in the new Police Reserve."<sup>6</sup>

On September 15, it was reported that MacArthur agreed with the partial rearmament of Japan.<sup>7</sup> As mentioned above, MacArthur's understanding of the right of self-defense was flexible. By expanding the meaning of Japan's inalienable right to "muster all of its human and material resources," he may have reconciled the tension between partial rearmament and the war-renunciation clause. In October, MacArthur reported to the President that "[u]nder the name of Police Reserve, we are organizing four divisions of Japanese troops to secure Japan."<sup>8</sup> As shown below, however, MacArthur's attitude toward rearmament was not straightforward.

Meanwhile, the eruption of the Korean War warned Dulles about the danger of a general war. He wrote on June 29 that "[p]resumably the Soviet policy represented by the attack has its origin in planning of a global nature,"<sup>9</sup> and on July 20 that "[f]rom the standpoint of general war and who wins it, Germany and Japan are of prime importance."<sup>10</sup> Because, as mentioned above, he understood that if the Soviet Union determined on general war, Japan would be exposed to the danger of Soviet military attack, threats to Japan had now been enhanced. Further, Dulles said, "[a]s regards Japan, far distant from us and close to the Soviet Union, the United States would assume an almost impossible burden in attempting its defense without any help

from the Japanese themselves." Accordingly, in July, he began to consider how to rearm Japan. The transformation of the police was one possibility.<sup>11</sup>

Other policy-makers took a similar attitude to Dulles'. The Policy Planning Staff, then headed by Paul H. Nitze, was of the opinion that "[t]he Korean conflict and the deep uncertainties regarding the future now make it imperative . . . that we proceed forthwith to create Japanese forces designed to contribute to the defense of the islands."<sup>12</sup> The Defense Department considered that a Japanese peace treaty must provide that the United States would eventually withdraw its garrison forces as Japan was able to assume the burden of defense against the external threat.<sup>13</sup> While agreeing with the rearmament of Japan, the State Department was opposed to "anything in the Treaty implying the recreation of Japanese military forces" because some friendly countries would resent it.<sup>14</sup> Finally, in NSC 60/1 of September 8, it was agreed that a peace treaty must not contain any prohibition on the rearmament of Japan, that the treaty must give the United States the right to maintain armed forces in Japan, and that the two countries should conclude a supplementary bilateral agreement for the garrison forces. Furthermore:

The Departments of State and Defense agree that provision must be made at an early date for Japan to begin to assume some of the burden of its own defense and in step with the Treaty negotiations the two Departments will consult and agree on measures to be taken to achieve the desired ends in a manner consistent with the overall political interests of the United States.<sup>15</sup>

On the basis of NSC 60/1, Dulles began to undertake international negotiations on a Japanese peace settlement. In relation to security

arrangements for Japan, the United States informed the FEC countries as follows:

The Treaty would contemplate that, pending satisfactory alternative security arrangements such as U.N. assumption of effective responsibility, there would be continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and U.S. and perhaps other forces for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.<sup>16</sup>

Although the American intention to permit Japanese rearmament was kept secret from negotiation partners, it was cunningly implied in the above statement; as a State Department memorandum put it, "the 'other forces' could be Japanese, and . . . one of the 'satisfactory alternative security arrangements' which would permit us to withdraw our forces could be the existence of adequate Japanese defense forces."<sup>17</sup>

After conducting preliminary negotiations, Dulles said on November 15:

Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Burma have all raised objection to the absence of military restrictions. However, I think that Australia and New Zealand will give way if we can find some formula<sup>18</sup> for assuring them of U.S. protection in the event of attack.

The view of those countries is summarized in the following thinking of Percy Spender, then Australian External Affairs Minister: he said that having experienced the nightmare that his country might suffer from Japanese invasion, "Australia could not agree to a treaty which did not safeguard her against aggression from Japan."<sup>19</sup> Because Dulles thought that "if the industrial potential of Japan should fall into Communist hands it would greatly increase the worldwide Communist threat," the main purpose of a Japanese peace settlement was to get Japan's commitment "to align itself with the nations of the free world against Commu-

nist imperialism."<sup>20</sup> For this purpose, it was necessary that the nations of the free world should accept Japan as a member by signing a peace treaty. Dulles must have thought that the United States could not ignore the complaint of the Pacific countries.<sup>21</sup> To satisfy those countries, the State Department envisaged the conclusion of a Pacific pact, in other words, a mutual defense plan among the Pacific countries (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United States and Japan). According to Spender, although the State Department gave consideration to a Pacific pact since 1949, its attitude was halfhearted until the end of September 1950; Spender's talk with Dulles and Dean Rusk, then Assistant Secretary of State, on October 30 "marked a definite turning point" on the issue.<sup>22</sup>

As Director of the Northeast Asian Affairs Office John M. Allison said, the Pacific pact was expected to "have the dual purpose of defending Japan from Communist aggression and assuring our friends that Japan would be on their side and not a menace to them."<sup>23</sup> Further, according to Dulles, the pact "would provide a framework within which a Japanese force, if developed, could have an international status rather than a purely national status and this might ease reconciliation with the present Japanese Constitution."<sup>24</sup> Thus, from the American viewpoint, the scheme of a Pacific pact had three objectives, though slightly contradictory to each other: first, the defense of Japan; second, the defense of the FEC countries and the supervision of Japan; and, third, the promotion of Japanese rearmament.

Allison showed consideration for those countries' fears of Japan in the planning of Japanese rearmament. In December, he recommended that

in the post-treaty period Japan should furnish ground forces and the United States should furnish air and naval forces. According to him, "[t]he fact that Japan would not have air and naval forces would go far . . . toward reassuring our allies that Japan would not be in a position to threaten their interests, and that the arrangement would be one primarily for the defense of Japan and the Japanese area."<sup>25</sup>

For its part, however, the United States was not completely free from fear or precaution against the resurgence of a militant Japan. The early draft of a bilateral security agreement between the United States and Japan provided that the Japanese should be forbidden to establish armed forces without the consent of the United States. According to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk, an advantage of the provision was that "it would enable the U.S. to ensure that reactivated Japanese armed forces were well adapted to Japan's special defense problems but not for offensive purposes . . . ." Although the provision was omitted in the process of drafting, it was not so much because the control of Japanese rearmament was unnecessary, but rather because the provision was offensive to the Japanese and ineffective. Rusk said in December 1950 that "[i]n view of Japan's straitened economic positions and the influence which the United States may expect to continue to exert in Japan after the [peace] treaty, it seems probable that the desired supervision could be exercised without the right being stipulated in the bilateral agreement."<sup>26</sup>

Chinese intervention in the Korean War in late November 1950 further accelerated progress toward a Japanese peace settlement. Dulles said in early December that "[d]elay and inaction may count heavily

against us."<sup>27</sup> While the United States so far had not revealed outright its intention to permit Japan's rearmament, in early December it proposed to Great Britain that the two countries should consult immediately about "the strengthening of Japanese capacity for self-defense."<sup>28</sup> Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hardened its attitude toward the rearmament of Japan; in JCS 2180/2 "United States Policy toward Japan" of December 28, the JCS considered it essential that no negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan should be undertaken until the war-renunciation clause in the Constitution, which would be an obstacle to Japan's increased defense capability, had been changed.<sup>29</sup>

At the same time, the Pacific pact scheme was given shape. On December 1, Acheson told Truman, for information, that the State Department was considering a Pacific pact. On December 13, the State Department asked for the comment of the Defense Department on the pact. Although the Defense Department once showed reluctance toward the pact, it finally agreed with the plan in early January 1951.<sup>30</sup> During this period, Washington envisaged "some sort of joint declaration by the respective members--Japan, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, the United States, and possibly Indonesia--that an armed attack on any of them would be a threat to the peace and security of each and they would then take such action as might be deemed necessary in accordance with their constitutional processes."<sup>31</sup>

On January 10, 1951, Truman designated Dulles as Special Representative of the President with the responsibility for conducting the further negotiations which were necessary to bring a Japanese

peace settlement to a satisfactory conclusion. The Presidential instruction said:

it is the policy of the United States Government that the United States will commit substantial armed force to the defense of the island chain of which Japan forms a part, that it desires that Japan should increasingly acquire the ability to defend itself, and that, in order further to implement this policy, the United States Government is willing to make a mutual assistance arrangement among the Pacific island nations (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, the United States, and perhaps Indonesia) which would have the dual purpose of assuring combined action as between the members to resist aggression from without and also to resist attack by one of the members, e.g. Japan, if Japan should again become aggressive.<sup>32</sup>

Following the Presidential instruction, Dulles made his second visit to Japan in January and February. Japan was now urged to rearm.<sup>33</sup>

Dulles' proposal that Japan should rearm was first met by Premier Yoshida's objection. Yoshida's reluctance to rearm was mainly based on his distrust of the military and on the probable adverse effect of rearmament on economic rehabilitation in the post-treaty period. However, because of American insistence on rearmament, the Japanese side yielded, but not completely. On February 3, the Japanese government submitted "Initial Steps for Rearmament Planning," in which the establishment of a 50,000-man national defense force was proposed.<sup>34</sup> On February 10, the two sides prepared the draft of a security agreement as a tentative output of their negotiations. The draft agreement provided that, as a provisional arrangement, the United States should maintain garrison forces in Japan for defensive purposes. At the same time, the draft took note of Japan's "obligation" to build up its defense capability: it said in the Preamble that the United States

expected that "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for the defense of its own homeland against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security . . . ." <sup>35</sup> The phrase remained the same in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty signed in September 1951.

Yoshida's offer to establish a 50,000-man force was not sufficient from the American view. They felt, however, that it was the last offer that Yoshida would make. <sup>36</sup>

In February 1951, Allison, Dulles, and others apparently decided to postpone pressure for greater buildup. In their view, the conclusion of the peace and security treaties would have to come first. <sup>37</sup>

MacArthur did not play a decisive part in the negotiation although he was inclined to Yoshida's view on rearmament. MacArthur had not objected to the partial rearmament of Japan since September 1950. However, he still felt uneasy over Japanese rearmament. <sup>38</sup>

From Japan, Dulles visited the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand on his way back to Washington. During this period, the Philippines were most concerned about reparations, and the other two countries with security. Dulles was well aware that "the willingness of Australia and New Zealand to accept the United States version of a Japanese Peace Treaty would be conditioned by the degree to which the United States would formalize its security relations to them." <sup>39</sup> Further, Dulles assured the two countries of future safety, by saying that "if Japan is basically committed to the free world and accepts U.S. troops in and about its territories we will have complete control over any re-

armament plans Japan may adopt."<sup>40</sup> On the one hand, the two countries needed more. Because of their lingering fear of Japan, Spender wanted a security pact with the United States and a unilateral or multilateral agreement with Japan on its armament. On the other hand, Dulles saw the problem in a different way.

The thing I worry about in the short term, Ambassador Dulles continued, is that Japan will not recreate adequate armed forces. . . . It would be unwise to take action of the type Mr. Spender proposed which could be used as an excuse by the Japanese for not doing all they can for their own defense. . . . Their tendency is all too likely to be to stay neutral, to seek the continued presence of U.S. forces, and to concentrate on raising their standard of living. It must be a strange thought to you to consider that the problem for the next five to ten years will<sup>41</sup> be to get Japan to create land forces but that is the case.

Meanwhile, the five-power Pacific pact scheme was deadlocked because of disagreement on membership. The United States did not want to be involved in the defense of countries in the Asian continent; Britain was opposed to a Pacific pact itself; Australia and New Zealand did not want to make an alliance with Japan, the ex-enemy, and preferred to exclude the Philippines. Given the situation, Dulles gave up the five-power pact in favor of separate security arrangements with the countries concerned and, in return for a tripartite security pact with the United States, Australia and New Zealand accepted the American version of the Japanese peace settlement which envisioned the future rearmament of Japan.<sup>42</sup> Related to the abandonment of the five-power pact was the reevaluation of the inevitability of the pact in terms of Japanese rearmament. First, Dulles said on February 14 that "Japan could probably get around its Constitution without the benefit of such a

pact."<sup>43</sup> Second, as Acheson thought in April, separate arrangements with the Pacific countries would achieve the same purpose as the five-power pact, i.e. the dual purpose of the defense-of-Japan and the defense-against-Japan.<sup>44</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff showed reluctance to the separate arrangements,<sup>45</sup> but finally agreed. Dated 17 May 1951, NSC 48/5 "United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia" decided that the United States should have three separate arrangements for security: one with Japan, one with the Philippines and the other with Australia and New Zealand.<sup>46</sup>

Once the United States obtained Japan's "pledge" to rearm in the Preamble of the security agreement, there was not much it could do under the occupation machinery.<sup>47</sup> NSC 48/5 recommended that, pending the conclusion of a peace settlement, the United States should continue to "[a]ssist Japan in organizing, training, and equipping the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Safety Patrol in order to facilitate the formation of an effective military establishment."<sup>48</sup>

The United States had already begun to proceed along this line when NSC 48/5 was adopted in May. With a view to the increased defense capability of Japan, three problems were raised in 1951: first, the supply of heavy armaments to the National Police Reserve; second, the arming of the vessels of the Maritime Safety Board; and, third, the de-purging of former Japanese "career officers", who were barred from holding office, in order to provide an immediate source of competent officers for the Police Reserve. Although those matters were specifically regulated by FEC decisions, the military wanted to develop Japan's security potential even by "ignoring" the decision.

The Department of Defense considered that "the possible outbreak of a third world war and the natural limitations on the extent of United States power make it an urgent matter that steps be taken to develop the security potential of a future ally." For its part, the State Department was more concerned about repercussions to "the peace settlement which provides the basic solution to the question of maximum contribution by Japan to its own defense. . . ."49

On the first two issues--i.e. the reinforcement of the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Safety Board--the two Department succeeded, by fall 1951, in working out a compromise which did not apparently violate the related FEC decisions. Agreeing with the compromise, the State Department thought that although it did not involve a violation of the FEC decisions, "it must be discussed first with other governments most concerned, especially in view of the attitudes they have expressed with respect to the rearming of Japan."<sup>50</sup> Accordingly, the United States had discussions with certain friendly members of the Far Eastern Commission in November. While none of them raised any objections to the American proposal itself, Australia reiterated its view that "the rearming of Japan should not proceed rapidly particularly prior to the coming into effect of the Peace Treaty." In response, the United States assured that country that it was fully aware of the Australian view and that at present it had no intention of taking other action.<sup>51</sup> With regard to the de-purging, however, Supreme Commander Matthew B. Ridgway, who had replaced MacArthur, acted on his own authority. The State Department could not help giving its concurrence with the fait accompli.<sup>52</sup>

Despite the relief of MacArthur on April 11, 1951, preparation for the Japanese peace settlement made progress. In the process of drafting, the United States proposed that Great Britain should be a co-author of a Japanese peace treaty. Accordingly, the two governments were jointly engaged in drafting and taking account of comments from other countries. The two governments released the final text of a Japanese peace treaty on August 15. The Peace Conference was convened at San Francisco on September 4. On September 8, 1951, forty-eight countries and Japan signed the treaty. The Soviet Union declined to sign. The treaty did not prohibit nor encourage the rearmament of Japan. Instead, Article 5 of the treaty said in part:

The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.<sup>53</sup>

On the same day, the United States concluded the Security Treaty with Japan.

NSC 48/5 recommended that, following the conclusion of a peace settlement, the United States should "[a]ssist Japan in the development of appropriate military forces."<sup>54</sup> Washington began to take a step in this direction in September 1951. In late September, the State Department considered the dispatch of a high-level State-Defense mission to discuss with Japanese officials their plans for rearmament.<sup>55</sup> On the assumption that the Japanese Constitution would be modified,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated the size of future Japanese defense forces:

The Japanese National Police Reserve will be expanded to a balanced ten-division Japanese national ground force. Initially the United States will provide the necessary air and naval forces for the accomplishment of the mission of both the United States and Japanese forces in the area and will be assisted by the Japanese defense forces, subject to the limitation specified in the Japanese Security Treaty. It is assumed that the Japanese will accept an ever-increasing responsibility for the defense of Japan, to include defensive air and naval arms.<sup>56</sup>

At the same time, the JCS recommended that Japanese military production should be made complementary to that of the United States; they thought that the arrangements would be useful "to prevent Japanese military expansion from getting out of hand."<sup>57</sup> In mid December, however, the Defense Department concluded that because they needed more study to establish a firm position on Japanese rearmament, discussion with the Japanese on the matter was premature.<sup>58</sup>

According to Hata, in early 1952, SCAP tried to obtain a pledge from the Japanese government to increase defense forces. While SCAP's demand that Japan should have a 325,000-man or ten-division ground force was rejected by Yoshida, the both sides finally agreed that Japan would have a 110,000-man force for a while and reinforce it to a 130,000-man force in the following year.<sup>59</sup>

On April 28, 1952, the peace treaty and the security treaty came into force. The Allied Occupation thereby ended, leaving behind American forces and American demand for the rearmament of Japan.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1243-44.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 1280.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 1294.

<sup>4</sup>Kennan, "Japanese Security", pp. 14-15.

<sup>5</sup>MacArthur, p. 333.

<sup>6</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 1305n. In February 1951, a State Department memorandum said that "it is the understanding of the Department that the National Police Reserve is organized and trained along the lines of military organization ...." See FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 890.

<sup>7</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 1305.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., vol. 7, p. 954.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 238.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., vol. 6, p. 1247.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 1247-48.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 1256.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 1281.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 1286.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 1294.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 1297.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 1329n.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 1350. Emphasis in original. Burma joined the Far Eastern Commission in 1949.

<sup>19</sup>Percy Spender, Exercise in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1969), p. 63.

<sup>20</sup>FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, pp. 790-91.

<sup>21</sup>Spender thought in October 1950:

I decided to keep my arguments for a Pacific pact tied as closely as possible to the negotiations of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Australia's concurrence in this Treaty was of consequence to the U.S.A.: we had fought side by side with her in New Guinea and elsewhere. The need, or at least the strong political desirability for the U.S.A. to persuade Australia to accept the type of treaty she was seeking, was the strongest card I had to play.

See Spender, p. 56.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 48, 64.

<sup>23</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 1357.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1364n. On the same subject, Dulles explained in a slightly different way:

such an arrangement [a Pacific pact] would have two main virtues: (1) it would probably make it easier for the Japanese to begin to assume part of the burden of their own defense without the necessity for a complete change in their Constitution, inasmuch as any forces they created would be for an international purpose generally under the terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter and not for purely Japanese purposes; and (2) the fact that such nations as the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand would participate in the arrangement would give them a voice in how Japan's defense forces progressed, so that they could be assured that these forces would not constitute a threat in the future as they had in the past.

See FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 791.

<sup>25</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 1355. In a meeting held in February, 1951, with Spender and New Zealand External Affairs Minister Frederick Doidge, Dulles reportedly said:

that he had in mind Japan being part of a 'screen of power'. It was therefore not necessary for Japan to have full-scale forces to meet air, sea, and land attack upon her. He did not envisage Japan acquiring any sea or air power of real significance.

See Spender, p. 115. With regard to safeguards against Japanese aggression, the British Chiefs of Staff envisaged "Japan's voluntary acceptance of the provision of major naval forces, strategic bombing forces and special weapons by the Allies for her defence and the restrictive influence of those forces in Japan." See FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 920.

<sup>26</sup>FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 1371.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 1359.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., vol. 7, p. 1371.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., vol. 6, p. 1389.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 1354, 1357, 1360-67, 1392; FRUS 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, pp. 132-37.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 791.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 789.

<sup>33</sup>A State Department memorandum of 22 February 1951 said:

In connection with our discussion with the Department of Defense during the past few months leading to the decision to dispatch the Dulles Mission, it was implicitly recognized that among the principal purposes of a treaty were: (1) removing the very restrictive Far Eastern Commission policy decisions regarding Japanese armament; (2) obtaining the widest possible degree of international support for arrangements that would permit Japan to contribute to its own security; (3) securing genuine acceptance by the Japanese of the necessity for at least a degree of rearmament.

See ibid., p. 893.

<sup>34</sup>Yoshitsu, pp. 50-62.

<sup>35</sup>FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 856.

<sup>36</sup>Yoshitsu, p. 65.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 66; and see also Curtis, pp. 54-55. On February 5, Dulles said that "[t]he US cannot press the Japanese to assume military obligations until they have dealt with their Constitutional problem and are in a position formally and publicly to assume such obligations." See FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 857.

<sup>38</sup>Yoshitsu, pp. 55-56. MacArthur's attitude seems to have been ambivalent during this period. On the one hand, he planned to equip the National Police Reserve with relatively heavy armament so as to be "suitable for any eventuality including even the all-out aggression against Japan proper by foreign forces equipped and trained in accordance with Communist tactical doctrine which experience has demonstrated invariably includes the extensive employment of tanks and artillery (FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, pp. 884-85)." On the other hand, when asked if Japan would accept rearmament without his leadership, MacArthur was noncommittal. He said:

It is impossible to predict what, if any, influence personalities might have upon Japan's future course with respect to armament. It is patently clear, however, the degree of such influence on such matters by the United States or any of its representatives is dependent in large measure on the future course of American policy in Asia . . . .

See FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 1384. Further, in 1955 MacArthur delivered a speech on the abolition of war, in which he said:

I recall so vividly this problem when it faced the Japanese in their new Constitution. They are realists; and they are the only ones that know by dread experience the fearful effect of mass annihilation. They realize in their limited geographical area, caught up as a sort of no-man's land between two great ideologies, that to engage in another war, whether on the winning or losing side, would spell the probable doom of their race. And their wise old Prime Minister, Shidehara, came to me and urged that to save themselves they should abolish war as an international instrument. When I agreed, he turned to me and said, "The world will laugh and mock us as impractical visionaries, but a hundred years from now we will be called prophets."

Sooner or later the world, if it is to survive, must reach this decision.

See A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 319.

<sup>39</sup>FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, pp. 901-02.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 160.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 171. Emphasis in original.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., pp. 154-55, 161-63, 168-69. On February 18, 1951, Dulles wrote to Spender and Doidge that "I further recognize that there is an interdependence between the contemplated Japanese peace treaty, which we have also discussed, and the contemplated security treaty in the sense that neither of us would be obliged to accept one without the other." See ibid., p. 175.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 185.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 192-201.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>47</sup>CIA report "Feasibility of Japanese Rearmament in Association with the United States," said in April that while there were reluctance and difficulty to rearm on the Japanese side, "[w]e believe that if Japan were accorded sovereignty under a treaty of peace, and if the US provided military protection and economic support, the Japanese Government would move toward reconstituting its armed forces in strength sufficient to defend Japan and could gain adequate popular support for this program." See *ibid.*, p. 993.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 1211-12.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1361.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1418.

<sup>52</sup>For the supply of heavy armaments, see *ibid.*, pp. 884-85, 888-96, 898-900, 1001-03, 1349-50, 1358-61, 1395-97, 1418-19; for the arming of vessels, see *ibid.*, pp. 1208-15, 1330-31, 1395-97, 1418-19; and for de-purging, see *ibid.*, pp. 1022-23, 1045-49, 1138-41, 1194-95, 1328-29.

<sup>53</sup>U.S. Department of State, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings (Washington: GPO, 1951), p. 315.

<sup>54</sup>FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 38.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1439.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1434.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1435.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 1439-40.

<sup>59</sup>Hata, pp. 196-97.

## VIII. CONCLUSION

The United States changed its Japan policy from disarmament to rearmament as the cold war intensified. In the process, a relatively large shift occurred twice, that is, in early 1948 and in mid 1950. As for the first shift, until January 1948 Washington policy-makers considered how to keep Japan disarmed, but from March to April they began to consider the future rearmament of Japan. In relation to the second case, just before the Korean War the State Department thought that Japan should be kept disarmed for a while, with the understanding that later the country would be permitted to rearm; in July 1950, the Department began to consider how to rearm Japan.

To put the foregoing another way, during the occupation period, the United States first thought that Japan should be kept disarmed for a long time; then thought that the long-term disarmament of Japan might not be a good idea or that Japan's rearmament might be necessary in the future; and finally thought that Japan should rearm. Large shifts occurred in American policy when the United States changed its thinking from the first mode to the second and from the second to the third. Those changes were brought about not simply by the mere intensification of the cold war, but rather by a sort of "shock". The "shock" was the Kennan report coupled with some ominous events in Europe in the first shift, and the Korean War in the second shift. It

seems to me that the "shock" changed the basic assumptions of policy-makers and resulted in a large policy shift.

Thus, American policy changed drastically. While the problem of whether Japan should be disarmed or rearmed was considered almost exclusively in terms of American interests, the problem of how Japan should be disarmed or rearmed was shaped by political consideration for American allies. With regard to the disarmament of Japan, the inclusion of the no-war clause was partly designed to allay the FEC countries' fears of Japan; and the disarmament treaty was motivated by political consideration for the Soviet fear of Japan. When the United States intended to rearm Japan in 1950-51, such countries as Australia and New Zealand were opposed to the plan. Although they could not change the American policy to rearm Japan, they could influence the way the policy was implemented. As a result, the United States attempted to integrate a rearmed Japan into a Pacific pact, which was expected to assure the Pacific countries of their security and to help the Japanese to get around the no-war clause in the Constitution.

Finally, I want to consider the Nixon statement, which was quoted at the very beginning of this paper. He said in 1953 that the disarmament of Japan was right in 1946 and wrong in 1953 and that the United States made a mistake in this relation. The statement was especially important in the context of the no-war clause, which was the biggest obstacle to the rearmament of Japan from the American viewpoint. It seems to me, however, that it was not so much a mistake as an accident. On the one hand, Washington policy-makers contemplated in 1946 that a new Japanese constitution would have a provision on

armament. While Japan's voluntary renunciation of war was acceptable to them, many people were dubious about its reliability and effects. It should be noted that at that time Washington could not but accept the "desire" of the Japanese. In this sense, to Washington, Article 9 was acceptable in 1946 and wrong in 1953. On the other hand, MacArthur thought until the outbreak of the Korean War that the clause was right. Even after the outbreak of the Korean War, he felt uneasy over Japanese rearmament and in 1955 he again praised the no-war clause. To MacArthur, it seems, Article 9 was right in 1946 and in 1953.

Washington and MacArthur disagreed on the renunciation of war. An unfortunate thing for the United States was that the two different lines of thought crossed in 1946. In that year, the war-renunciation clause was acceptable to both MacArthur and Washington. I think that MacArthur might have proposed the same provision even in 1948 and 1949, if necessary. Of course, it would not have been acceptable to Washington. In this sense, Article 9 was not a mistake but an accident from Washington's viewpoint.

The deficiency of the war-renunciation clause was that it lacked the international guarantee of neutrality. The renunciation was a unilateral declaration based, as the Constitution says, on "the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world."<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, there were some occasions on which the necessary international arrangements might have been made. The political climate of the Far East would have been very different if the Soviet Union had agreed to the conclusion of the Japanese disarmament treaty or if the country had agreed to a Japanese peace settlement in 1947. On the one hand, the

United States first sought the long-term disarmament of Japan under the disarmament treaty, but ended up with the security treaty which urged Japan to rearm. On the other, while the Soviet Union must have wanted the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, it virtually rejected the American proposals to this effect and finally found itself faced with Japan being rearmed under an alliance with the United States.

If the deficiency of Article 9 was its being unilateral, its flexibility made up for the shortcoming. Contrary to the expectation of Washington policy-makers, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were established and have been maintained under the article. American policy-makers apprehended in 1946 that the clause would be discarded soon after the end of the Occupation, and they thought in 1951 that it should be discarded soon after the Occupation. Despite the apprehensions and expectations, Article 9 has remained intact while permitting the maintenance of military forces.

NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Political Reorientation, vol. 2, p. 671.

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though negotiation on the disarmament treaty was in abeyance, the proposal had not been formally withdrawn. Therefore, it seemed necessary to decide on an American stance toward the treaty.<sup>4</sup> Third, while Byrnes tried to "please" the Soviet Union by this treaty, the Planning Staff did not see the necessity. Kennan said in winter 1946 that "[f]ew of us have any idea how much perplexity and suspicion has been caused in the Soviet mind by gestures and concessions granted by well-meaning Americans with a view to convincing the Russians of their friendly sentiments."<sup>5</sup> Fourth, as a result of the abandonment of the disarmament treaty, the security of Japan was made dependent on United States forces. It is noted that PPS 10 did not recommend the rearmament of Japan.

The essence of PPS 10 was the recommendation that the Japanese peace settlement should be postponed. The Planning Staff saw Japan as unprepared for "rehabilitation." According to Kennan, "[i]f one was to regard the protection of Japan against Communist pressures as a legitimate concern of the United States government, it was simply madness to think of abandoning Japan to her own devices in the situation then prevailing."<sup>6</sup> At any rate, however, PPS 10 was a tentative recommendation. Because of the lack of information, the Planning Staff could not reach a definitive conclusion. Therefore, Kennan recommended that a ranking official should be sent to Japan to discuss with MacArthur all essential points of the problem at hand. There was a difficulty, however. Although the United States needed time to review the situation in and outside Japan and to work out firm judgement on certain basic problems, it was difficult to retreat outright from its proposal of an

early peace treaty.<sup>7</sup> Fortunately, negotiation on the peace treaty was in stalemate as mentioned above. Kennan thought that "[i]n the refusal of the Russians and Chinese to go along, we had been luckier than we deserved."<sup>8</sup>

In January 1948, the Borton group prepared the third draft of the peace treaty in general along the recommendation of the Policy Planning Staff. The January 8 draft no longer envisaged a separate disarmament treaty. "By incorporating the disarmament provisions in the peace treaty, the obligation to carry out these provisions is placed directly on Japan rather than on the four powers." Allied control over the disarmament provisions was limited to twenty-five years. Borton emphasized that Allied control could be terminated, before the twenty-five year period, through the revision of the treaty. Evidently, the American determination on the long-term disarmament of Japan was softening.<sup>9</sup>

In spring 1948, Kennan himself was sent to Japan for consultation with MacArthur. It is convenient to glance at Kennan's views on Japan and on America policy toward it. In PPS 13 "Resumé of World Situation," dated 6 November 1947, Kennan thought that the present occupation policy did not take into account the possibility of a hostile Russia and the techniques of communist political penetration. He diagnosed that if Japanese society was to withstand communist pressures after the withdrawal of the occupation force, it would require political and economic stability, which would not be produced by the present occupation policy. According to Kennan:

Our task now is to correct that deficiency. Until we do that, we cannot safely release Japan from the occupational regime.<sup>10</sup>

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.<sup>2</sup> The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

At the time of adoption, Article 9 was generally interpreted as prohibiting Japan from having armed forces even for self-defense. When the draft of the new Constitution was made public by the Japanese government in March 1946, MacArthur issued the statement which, in part praising the war-renunciation clause, said that "[b]y this undertaking and commitment Japan surrenders rights inherent in her own sovereignty and renders her future security and very survival subject to the good faith and justice of peace loving peoples of the world."<sup>3</sup>

In 1946, the war-renunciation clause was consistent with the general direction of American policy. In addition to the clause, the United States proposed the Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan, and the Far Eastern Commission, the policy-making organ for the Allied occupation of Japan, made policy decisions for disarmament. As George H. Blakeslee put it:

To keep Japan permanently demilitarized was probably the most strongly held objective of the United States and its Allies at the close of the war .... The determination to disarm Japan and keep it disarmed was expressed in the Allied documents terminating the war, in the early directives of the United States to the Supreme Commander, in the proposed treaty to effect the total disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, in the new Japanese Constitution,<sup>4</sup> and in policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission.


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DURING THE OCCUPATION: FROM DISARMAMENT TO  
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(Signature)

KAZUHIDE KINUGAWA

(Name in block letters)

June 24, 1985

(Date)