From Bedburg to Blenheim:
The Logistics of Marlborough's 1704 Campaign

by

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ABSTRACT

The campaign which saw a British army march across Germany and ultimately win the Battle of Blenheim (13 August, 1704) astounded contemporary Europe. However, this remarkable feat has not been addressed from the logistical position. From January to September of 1704 serious efforts were made by the British to ensure their army had sufficient money, supplies and medical support. Though there were obstacles, solutions were found which created the conditions for final victory. This thesis examines how those logistical requirements were satisfied.

It must be stressed that the primary sources researched for this paper suffer from factual limitations. The sources were not written nor catalogued with the student of logistics in mind and therefore it has not been possible to present a complete logistical breakdown for the army. This notwithstanding, the following analysis rests on previously overlooked sources and therefore can claim to be the most complete study on the subject to date. As such it will be the first study of the campaign to seriously consider the relationship between the army's logistics and various commercial structures. The march was ultimately successful because careful judgements secured funds which in turn secured supplies, but nevertheless, difficulties presented themselves.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAP. 1 THE ROUTE OF MARCH, MAY-JULY 1704.

MAP. 2 AREA OF OPERATIONS, JULY AND AUGUST 1704

MAP. 3 THE CIRCLES



MAP 4. THE DEVASTATION OF BAVARIA 15-30 JULY



Introduction

'...and you that saved the Empire, by making an unheard of March to the Danube..'
William Pittis, 'Two Campaigns in One Panegyrical essay upon his Grace.' J.B.London 1706. 31.

During the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14) a British army, travelling in several columns, marched across Europe in the early summer of 1704 to challenge a Franco-Bavarian threat to the Austrian Empire. This army of approximately thirty thousand troops under the command of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, took six weeks to march about three hundred miles from Bedburg (modern day Belgium) to Donauworth in Bavaria. After completing its march, Marlborough's army achieved notable success at the battle of Schellenburg (2 July) where the Duke's thirty thousand overwhelmed the ten thousand or so Franco Bavarians in their strongly entrenched positions. Six weeks later, and more spectacularly at the battle of Blenheim, the Allies' reinforced army of fifty-two thousand defeated a Franco-Bavarian force of fifty-six thousand. (13 August) The latter battle especially has received considerable attention from scholars, but understanding the logistics of this campaign remains nascent. Even the foremost publication upon Marlborough does not provide a detailed discussion of logistical matters. (1)

This thesis aims to provide a more erudite analysis of this little studied area by using previously neglected primary sources to consider three key areas in the period from January to September, 1704: finance, supply and welfare. Therefore this paper will cover the logistics

of the campaign during the march, the operations around Bavaria in July-August and the period immediately following the battle of Blenheim. Since this is a logistical analysis, the battles of Donauworth and Blenheim will not be discussed in any great depth.

The current historiography does not adequately cover the logistics of the campaign. This has been noted by many military historians, and as early as 1966 Major R.Scouller wrote:

> There is practically nothing extant on how the Troops (i.e. Marlborough's) were got into battle; how they were fed on the way there; how their ammunition reached them; how they were cared for when wounded; how discipline was imposed to fit them for battle; on all these problems which bulk so large in any commander's planning and execution, little has been written.(2)

Since 1991, greater attention has been given, but there remains a gap because of a reluctance to look beyond those primary sources which are accessible in print.(3) The military historian I.Phelan commented:

> Every book that has as its subject the career of the Duke of Marlborough has made extensive use of the same sources. The references to the ready and even cheerful purveyors of food and forage along the way, the resupply of shoes, the pleasant incident-free passage through the countryside, the incessant rain

for long periods. (4)

This notwithstanding, J.Jones wrote in 1993 that: 'virtually all the essential military and diplomatic correspondence concerned with Marlborough's direction of the war between 1702-11 are now accessible in print.'(5) Though J.Jones is confident, he is wrong. All the essential military and diplomatic correspondence are not accessible in print.

Until now, there has been an over-reliance upon the same material and this has hamstrung historical analysis. The unpublished, primary sources that have been researched for this paper have enabled a greater understanding of the subject. This vindicates the position of I.Phelan when he wrote: 'It is in this unpublished material that Marlborough's genius as a logistician would find further enhancement and it is hoped that that good work will some day be done.'(6) This thesis will not be attempting to undermine the arguments of other historians on this subject. This is because precious little has been written by historians on the logistics of the march. However, before those views are discussed in depth, some possible reasons for the lack of historical analysis should be considered. On this matter, I.Phelan is quite persuasive: 'It is certainly more natural both to an author in his research and his writing and to a reader of what is written to be more interested in the stirring actions of the conflict than to deal with the pedestrian matters of supplies and equipment and transport.'(7)

The logistics of the march to the Danube created the conditions for military success but have

attracted very little in terms of committed scholarship. John Gillingham also provides an insight as to why this is so:

> Things that work well, events which go smoothly are not note-worthy or news-worthy. We all know that students are hard-working, sober, conscientious, responsible and underpaid members of the community, but this is not the impression which records of student life tend to give. (8)

Chapter two will consider the financial affairs of the campaign. A few historians provide only a token discussion of finance because their attention has been directed elsewhere. (9) Consequently the differences between different financial sources have been blurred and confused.

The financing of the army came from a variety of sources. An important feature was the network of creditors and financiers who allowed the vital funds to reach the army. On this matter only D. Green mentions some of the key figures but his discussion is circumspect. (10) Taylor and Churchill give all too brief attention to considering the role played by the city of Frankfurt whilst Montgomery and Nicholson only make passing references to the role of German bankers. (11) Verney mentions that money is forwarded to certain towns but omits to mention which ones. (12) Barnett writes that funds were always 'at the right place at the right time' but offers nothing in answer to the question of how this was achieved. (13)

The procedures under which credit and finance were arranged were a complex matter. D.Jones discusses this at the government level but until now there has been no discussion of this taking place at the army level. (14) The relations between the far-flung army and its bases of financial support required definition, attention and much effort. This contradicts the impression conveyed by Virginia Cowles when she writes: 'The most important aspect of the whole undertaking -the money and credits to pay for it- was causing the least trouble.'(15) As will be shown, Cowles is wrong.

In the course of the campaign, Nurnberg acquired an important role. A modern parallel might be the primacy attached by the British to Ascension island during the Falklands War in 1982.(16) In a similar fashion, Nurnberg suddenly had great logistical importance. Its resources, in this instance its bankers, were to facilitate the flow of credit from Frankfurt. (17) These bankers also brokered their own bilateral credit agreements with the army. (18) However, amongst the secondary sources there is no consideration of this city's role.

At one stage the primary sources refer to coin being physically carried to the army. (19) This was part of a series of efforts by the Duke to gather funds but secondary sources make no effort to differentiate between financial sources. This is in part because financial matters in general have not been properly considered by historians. In the matter of coin transfers, historians have made vacuous references to the Dukes 'war-chest,' which is a misleading term because it suggests that the Duke and his army had huge sums of money with them. (20) In fact, this is exactly what did not happen. The Duke did not find a fortune and then

set off with an army on a tour of Germany. However Lynn suggests exactly this when he says that the Duke had 'a strongbox bulging with gold.'(21) David Green does discuss this matter but it is his belief that this physical transfer of funds solved the army's financial difficulties. (22) As will be shown, it did not.

Uncertainty was an important theme of the march. As the army advanced closer to Bavaria, the procedures under which credit had been brokered began to unravel and this is documented in the records. (23) What was beginning to happen was that the Duke and his staff began making arrangements that were more ad hoc and makeshift in character. (24) But, little reference to this can be found among the secondary sources. The only exception is the brief and inadequate discussion of the inaction of certain army paymasters by Green. (25) There was, in fact, a very real 'sword of Damocles' hanging over the financial affairs of the army but this impression is not conveyed by secondary sources. Serious efforts were made to ward off the threat of financial insolvency. Furthermore, maintaining the army's financial integrity demanded continual attention. Again, these aspects are not considered by the secondary sources.

For bankers and creditors these dealings were a means to make a profit and thus were about business. Finance rests on trust and confidence and these became integral. Therefore, consequences could result from a failure to maintain these abstract notions. Indeed as a result of that trust being undermined, the army's finances very nearly did break down but the secondary sources make no reference to this.

The arrangements by which supplies were gathered will be considered in Chapter three. Some historians provide no insight at all beyond telling the reader that the army was supplied. (26) Van Creveld tells us that the march 'swept the country bare' suggesting that the army simply took what it needed from the surrounding countryside. Such a view would seem logical, but Van Creveld's theory lacks conviction because his interpretation of the evidence is in error. (27) It will be seen that supplies were secured in a manner that did not rest on sweeping the country bare.

There are historians who give varying degrees of attention to the role of supply contractors. (28) John Childs provides some discussion but only for the period of the war of the Grand Alliance. (29) The contractors were businessmen who profited from contracting to supply the army. These people had contacts in the local business community who could provide wagons and basic supplies to the army. On this campaign the army was operating very much beyond its usual bounds because it had left the Netherlands. The contractors were more familiar with the Low Countries but away from their contacts they encountered difficulties. From this, Chandler asserts that the key contractors' Machado and Vanderkaa proved unsatisfactory. (30) This is unfair for both faced great challenges. Furthermore, Machado was singled out for praise by the Duke. (31) This aside, there were problems and the contracts were not fulfilled. This had indirect consequences but has received no attention from historians.

Supplies provided by local places through which the army marched is noted by several

historians. (32) But not they do not grasp that this went beyond buying up local food surpluses. As will be shown, the localities were integrated into the logistical mechanism and supported the army. This meant at times hiring local horses and wagons for a few days at a time. (33) This was not an example of the army stealing local resources, but of utilizing and paying for them.

It has been argued that magazines supplied the army. (34) Generally speaking, the magazines were stocks of supplies housed and protected in specific military structures. For Van Creveld, once the army reached Bavaria it could no longer 'sweep the country bare' looking for supplies. Instead, magazines had to be built because they were the only way the army could be supplied in-theatre.(35) However, this view is faulty because it lacks a detailed appreciation of the issue. Magazines were certainly important but the context within which they were employed has been adequately discussed.

A few historians cite the case of the Circles but it is really just Francis who discusses these at length. (36) The Circles were part of an archaic supply network that supplied magazines to imperial armies. According to Francis, most Circles were no longer in use but those through which the army marched were. These were the Circles of the Upper Rhine, Swabia and Franconia. As it happened, funds were provided by the Allies so that the Circle magazines might supply the army. (37) As the army marched the Duke dispatched letters to the Circles informing them of his army's estimated time of arrival. (38) However, many historians do not link these letters with the Circles. Instead these letters are cited with

reference to the role of local towns. (39) Consequently these letters have been regarded in isolation and this has led many historians to erroneous conclusions. Van Creveld calls the letters evidence of 'protection,' with the Duke threatening to loose his army on a town if the supplies were not provided. Van Creveld's analysis is wrong because it is impaired by insufficient access to primary material. (40) Many other historians believe these same letters denote looting because they sound intimidatory if read in a certain manner. For certain historians the letters seem barely disguised threats and so the conclusion is reached that the Duke and his army bullied the various towns into coughing up supplies. (41) This is a possible interpretation but it is only one interpretation. Moreover, its validity is undermined by the evidence.

The Circles were a valuable resource and were separate in organisation from magazines established by the army within Bavaria. However, as will be examined in Chapter Three, there were serious limitations upon the Circles that compromised their utility. These limitations undermine the assertion that the Duke's lines of communication from Franconia confidently secured his supplies once the army was operating within Bavaria. (42)

A well known feature of the campaign was the devastation of Bavaria. For various reasons the livestock, crops and buildings of perhaps up to four hundred villages were destroyed by Allied flying columns in the few weeks before the battle of Blenheim. This action is a considerable challenge for many historians because of the implicit moral question: was the Duke right to have Bavaria put to fire and sword? Liddell-Hart talks of the 'brutality' of the

action and Churchill and Taylor are eloquent in their condemnation. (43) Fortescue notes that the Duke did not enjoy ordering this policy to be carried out. (44) However, as Churchill writes, 'to lament miseries the will has caused is a cheap salve to a wounded conscience.'(45) Later historians such as McKay, Nicholson, Green and Bromley also condemn the Duke. (46) Other historians provide figures about settlements destroyed to support their condemnation. (47)

A primary source significant to too many historians is 'Mother Ross.' Mother Ross was a woman who, in an attempt to locate her husband, disguised herself as a man and served with a British cavalry regiment in many of Marlborough's campaigns. Mother Ross left an account of her adventures which Daniel Defoe helped compile and which was published in 1740. Of interest is a reference to rampant looting by the soldiery. (48) Due to its availability the relevant section has been almost universally repeated and linked with the devastation of Bavaria. (49)

However, the 'Mother Ross' source has too often been accepted at face value when there are good grounds for only affording it marginal historical usefulness. Firstly, it was dictated by an individual, who, though extraordinary according to the text, was recalling events many years after the fact. It would seem likely that a certain level of confusion intruded and this should place doubts upon its level of accuracy. This is indicated by the order of events in the narrative being out of step: the reference to 'looting' comes several pages after the passage which discusses the devastation of Bavaria. Therefore, the events related by Mother Ross

are out of sequence and disjointed. Finally the quality and beauty of some passages suggest that Daniel Defoe himself may have been the author of certain parts of the work. (50) The Mother Ross source is interesting but it has been allowed to stand as a substitute for researching the letter books of better documented sources.

There are historians who consider the more practical dimensions of the devastation such as the wish to deny resources to the enemy. (51) As Hattendorf notes, the devastation was executed to achieve 'a desired political result.' (52) However, beyond the various moral questions is the logistical bearing of the devastation, which historians have not appreciated. An exception to this can be found in Taylor, Nicholson and Phelan who comment, albeit in passing, that the Allies used Bavarian resources. (53) But at the same time, these historians provide no evidence that this actually took place.

However, the moral question remains. As has been shown above, this is a significant dilemma for historians. 'England's greatest soldier' executed a policy reminiscent of the Thirty Years War. (54) Moral conviction and outrage compels Taylor to write: 'As their (the allied) armies advanced, towns and villages were fired on every hand. The terrified peasantry sought refuge in Munich, where the churches rang with their prayers and lamentations.' (55) McKay does not offer any argument in support of the devastation to balance his condemnation. He does not quote de la Colonie, a French officer, who upon carrying out a reconnoitre found the destruction 'as nothing compared with the reports current through the country.'(56) De la Colonie clearly provides a balancing view and McKay, though aware

of the de la Colonie source, does not quote him here. (57) This points to a slight inconsistency in McKay's suggestion that the morality question is paramount. The morality issue is also paramount for many other historians. Instead of considering why Bavaria was devastated, historians have become preoccupied with whether the action was right or wrong. This has overshadowed analysis of why the action took place at all. There were indeed serious military considerations at work but it would seem that one's view of the problem of the devastation of Bavaria affects one's ideals. To paraphrase the *Canadian Defence Journal*, when wars are fought, ideals must be reconciled with the terrible sacrifice and brutality that war demands. (58)

Historians of the march have given little attention to the troops welfare or to how the Duke sought to preserve his army's combat readiness. Some simply mention that the army was in good condition when it arrived at the Danube. (59) The analysis of the medical service and of the welfare of the army has been cursory. Verney merely notes that the morale of the troops was high despite the long marches. (60) 'The men naturally suffered much' is asserted by another. (61) The march of three hundred miles provokes one historian to assert with breathtaking audacity that the march was: 'fatiguing.' (62) David Chandler's *Robert Parker and the Comte de Merode-Westerloo* made available an excellent primary source for historians to draw upon. This includes an account of the campaign from the point of view of a Captain. (63) Because of its availability, the relevant section regarding the ease of the marching to the Danube is, like the 'Mother Ross' piece, almost universally cited. (64)

As Chapter Four will show, important attempts were made to preserve the army's health. However, Verney tells us at one point that during the march 'no doubt sickness thinned the ranks.'(65) Fosten tells us that 'tired and dispirited men were dropping out and sinking in exhaustion by the roadside.'(66) Again, if this is so, no evidence is cited to prove it. Indeed efforts were made, from the beginning, to prevent the army's combat readiness being compromised by the long march. Serious measures were put into effect to keep the army healthy and some attention is given to this by a few historians. (67) However, it is possible to detail important strategies that helped preserve the army's strength but which have not been considered. These include: the Duke's attention to the pace of march, realistic appraisals of the difficulty of the routes to be taken and the provision of rest stops.

Another matter related to the Duke's effort to keep his army healthy was the provision of boots. This is a widely known matter and most historians refer to it, but there are serious flaws in the way in which it has been discussed. Some historians claim that the boot issue took place in Heidelberg and that each soldier received a fresh pair. (68) As Chapter Four demonstrates, this was not so. Some historians assert that the boot issue can be used as proof that the Duke was a master of deception. (69) This theory stems from the spurious idea that a huge stock of boots had been prepared in advance to support the march to the Danube. Since the French were ignorant of the plan to march to the Danube, it is easy for some historians to infer that the French were also unaware that the British had transformed a German town into a huge shoe outlet. (70) This argument rests essentially on the need for some sort of 'clandestine cobbling conspiracy' and this borders on the ridiculous. It is also

based on very sketchy evidence. As is typical of this entire subject, the primary sources have not been researched. Many historians have felt obligated to accord the boot issue considerable significance because they have little other evidence of the Duke's logistical skill. The boot issue has been greatly overstated and discussed on the basis of incorrect and unsupported assumptions. Furthermore, it detracts from far better examples of the Duke's efforts to preserve his army's combat effectiveness.

An important aspect of this subject is why soldiers might require a medical service arm. Verney and Fosten mention the marching, though their analyses are given to exaggeration. (71) Green records the effects of the inclement weather and the decision to furnish a hospital. (72) However, the original documents show that the medical service arm was in place to help with all contingencies.

From the primary sources it can be seen that the attention focussed upon the treatment of sick soldiers was relatively detailed. Of the secondary sources only Green and Laffin provide a degree of discussion. (73) But the evidence supports a wider discussion; revealing that hospitals were established in friendly towns, a fact which made relations with civilian authorities important. (74) It is likewise possible to see where the personnel for this service arm were drawn from. The primary material also allows discussion of the hospital train's finances and credit arrangements. (75)

The march to the river Danube in 1704 has not been analysed to any great extent from the

point of view of logistics. Even the leading authority in the field does not pay much attention to the logistics of the campaign. (76) Further, too many historians have made their contributions to this subject simple praises to a significant military figure. On the basis of secondary sources one might be left with the distinct impression that the Duke succeeded because he was a genius. (77) This idea has a long tradition. In 1704 political capital was extracted from the battle of Blenheim. This was expressed by leading writers of the day, Defoe included, to praise the Duke and all those associated with the victory. (78) The battle had been won and its significance had to be exploited and communicated for domestic and political benefits.(79)

This praise was the beginning of a tradition of flattery of the Duke which, in a certain way, still continues. Attention is drawn to certain of the Duke's accomplishments while other areas are ignored. The problem with attributing success to 'genius' is that it is a barrier to further enquiry. Too many historians try to find reasons to support the genius argument and their cases frequently rest upon incorrect analyses. The way in which the boot issue is discussed would be the prime example. Defining 'genius' is very difficult in itself and a contention of this paper is that the term does not help our understanding of the march. Indeed, the fact that the Duke was successful can be seen as an actual obstacle. The success ultimately secured is taken for granted. The very real challenges which the Duke struggled with are overlooked by historians. Consequently serious logistical difficulties have been given only a cursory appreciation by historians. The British had a very advanced taxation system but this did not guarantee military success. (80) As Phelan says: 'the money was

available ... but this did not diminish the logistic problem.'(81)

The war of the Spanish Succession had entered a new stage; the fate of the Austrian Empire was in the balance and Bavaria had become the frontline in that struggle. The army of the Duke of Marlborough marched across Europe and countered the Franco-Bavarian thrust for hegemony in Europe. British armies did not usually cross Europe in the early eighteenth century. What the Duke achieved was not easy and success was not as certain as day following night. Serious challenges presented themselves. The following paper will be the first study seriously to consider the logistical ones.

11. F.Taylor, *The Wars of Marlborough, 1702-9,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1921), 159. R.H.W.Churchill, *Marlborough, his Life and Times, 1702-4,* Vol.III., (New York: Scribner's, 1950), 334. Field-Marshal Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of Warfare,* (Collins 1968), 301. Lt-Col. G.Nicholson, *Marlborough and the War of the Spanish Succession,* (Ottawa: Directorate of Military Training. Army Headquarters, 1955), 34.

12. P.Verney, *The Battle of Blenheim*, (London: Batsford, 1976), 46.

13. C.Barnett, *Marlborough*, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), 83.

14. D.Jones, *War and Economy in the Age of Marlborough and William III*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 86.

15. V.Cowles, *The Great Marlborough and his Duchess*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), 205.

16. M.Middlebrook, *Operation Corporate*, (London: Viking, 1985), 90.

17. Adam Cardonnel, to the houses of Neufville and Behagel, L, 11 June, British Library, ADD MSS 61396, London. All dates are given as written in the original material and, unless otherwise referred to, are for the year 1704.

18. Ibid, Adam Cardonnel, to Mr.Sweet, L, 12 July.

19. Ibid.

20. P.Verney, *The Battle of Blenheim,* (London: Batsford, 1976), 46. J.Lynn, *Feeding Mars*, (Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1993), 18, 143. D.Green, *Blenheim*, (Glasgow: Collins, 1974), 36. Lt-Col. G.Nicholson, *Marlborough and the War of the Spanish Succession*, (Ottawa: Directorate of Military Training. Army Headquarters, 1955), 34. R.H..W.Churchill, *Marlborough, his Life and Times, 1702-4*, Vol.IV. (New York: Scribner's, 1950), 34.

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21. J.Lynn, *Feeding Mars*, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993). 143.

22. D.Green, *Blenheim*, (Glasgow: Collins, 1974), 38.

23. Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Sweet, L, 10 June, British Library, ADD MSS 61396, London.

24. Ibid, L, 12 June.

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27. M.Van Creveld, *Supplying War*, 30-31. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 30-31.

28. Maj.R.Scouller, *The Armies of Queen Anne*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 223. Idem, "Marlborough's Administration in the Field", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, (Tavistock: United Services Magazine), (1968), 207, 208. D.Chandler, *Oxford History of the British Army*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 77. R.H. W.Churchill, *Marlborough, his Life and Times, 1702-4*, Vol.IV, ,W.S. (New York: Scribner's, 1950), 17. V.Cowles, *The Great Marlborough and his Duchess*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1983), 204.

29. J.Childs, *The British Army of William III, 1698-1702*, (Manchester: Manchester

University Press, 1987), 250.

30. D.Chandler, *Oxford History of the British Army,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 89.

31. Marlborough, to Machado, L, 26 July, British Library, ADD MSS 61382, London.

32. P.Verney, *The Battle of Blenheim*, (London: Batsford, 1976), 46. Lt-Col. G.Nicholson, *Marlborough and the War of the Spanish Succession*, (Ottawa: Directorate of Military Training, Army Headquarters, 1955), 34. D.Chandler, *Oxford History of the British Army*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 77. Idem, *The Art of Warfare in the age of Marlborough*, (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1994), 16. Maj R.Scouller, *The Armies of Queen Anne*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966.), 223. Idem, "Marlborough's Administration in the Field", *Army Quarterly Defence Journal*, (Tavistock), (1968), 207. D.Fosten, *Blenheim*, (London: Almark, 1975), 8. J.Fortescue, *Marlborough*, (Peter Davies Ltd: Edinburgh, 1932), 60. H.Rogers, *The British Army of the Eighteenth Century*, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1977) 119. M.Van Creveld, *Supplying War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 30.

33. Adam Cardonnel, to Colonel Blood, L, 22 June, British Library, ADD MSS 61396, London.

34. J.Black, *European Warfare, 1660-1815*, (London: University College London Press 1994), 111. M.Van Creveld, *Supplying War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 32. D.Chandler, *Oxford History of the British Army*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 85. D.Green, *Blenheim*, (London: Collins, 1974), 54. C.Barnett, *Marlborough*, (London: Eyre Methuen,1974), 82. K.Macksey, *For Want of a Nail*, (London/Washington:

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37. Marlborough, to Henry Davenant, L, 27 January, British Library, ADD MSS 61154, London.

38. Adam Cardonnel, to the Directors of the Circle of Franconia, L, 31 May, British Library, ADD MSS 61382, London.

39. M.Van Creveld, *Supplying War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 30. A.Archer, *The Art of Warfare in the Western World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 275. I.Phelan, "Marlborough as Logistician", *The Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, (London), (November 1990), 42.

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81. I.Phelan, "Marlborough as Logistician", *The Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, (London), (November 1990), 41.

Chapter Two, Credit

'Honour! which the brave purchase with their dear Blood, and the Base with their dearer Gold;'

William Pittis, 'Two Campaigns in One Panegyrical essay upon his Grace.' J.B.London 1706. 11.

For an army successfully to complete a march without compromising its ability to fight, it must have the ability to support itself. The Duke's army was supported by the English Treasury. The problem facing Marlborough's army was that it might have great financial support but unless it had that money exactly when it needed it, its financial muscle was not of much use. However, if it could rely upon a sophisticated financial network for support, its range of operations were considerably broadened. Indeed one could have an army that could go anywhere and undertake anything, if it had sufficient money. The result was rather like Marlborough's army having the eighteenth century equivalent of a VISA card. Money may well make the world go around, but only credit can quicken its pace.

The following chapter will consider the financial support available to the Duke's army. In pursuit of this, six areas will be highlighted: the network of creditors and guarantors; the procedures by which credit was administered; the importance of Nurnberg; the stage when

coin was physically moved; the seemingly ad hoc nature of some credit arrangements; and the features of business behaviour, such as trust and confidence, which manifested themselves during the campaign.

The source of a large part of the army's money was Her Majesty's Treasury in London.(1) The official receiver of these funds was Benjamin Sweet, an English merchant and banker operating in the Low Countries. He was also paymaster to the British forces. He was usually in Amsterdam, but also frequently in Rotterdam. In theory he would send money to the army, but in practice it was not this simple. This was because the army and the pressures of campaigning moved at a pace faster than most money shipments. Therefore, credit had to be sought and the relevant local currencies had to be obtained. This required the services of many financial agents. The need was especially great because of the time constraints imposed by this unprecedented march. Any brokerage was ultimately dependent upon Sweet because it was he who acted as the guarantor for any loans. The army might win battles but Sweet held the purse-strings. However, one should not become carried away with this image. An important point was that the name of the Duke of Marlborough carried a powerful authority in the business community. Accordingly, the Duke could make his own credit arrangements without reference to Sweet when necessary.(2) In the relationship between Sweet and Marlborough, the Duke was the senior authority. He sometimes overruled Sweet and changed financial arrangements.(3)

The money was sent to Sweet from England but before it arrived a shortfall existed and so

credit was sought. Dong so was probably a standard operating procedure, but this march put a spin on it. The anticipated shortfall would occur while the army was marching through Germany, not when it was in the Low Countries. To deal with this meant utilizing more than one credit house. Since the sum envisioned was too great for any single house the Duke encouraged at least five houses in Rotterdam and Amsterdam collectively to lend to the army and to secure it credit at Frankfurt, a city on the route of the march.(4)

These Dutch interests were the houses of Boomhovor, Clignet, Behagel, Neufville and Roomswickle. The last mentioned was also acting as an intermediary. Although they were nominally working together, each house was given separate bills of exchange, a fact which suggested that this union of credit houses was a temporary condition.(5)

During late May and early June negotiations with the houses focussed on raising money. Interestingly, bills of exchange were to be paid by Sweet at the house of a Mr.Clifford.(6) Clifford was an English merchant and banker in Amsterdam and Rotterdam who was also acting as another intermediary/broker for the army. Clifford, it seems, was not lending money but was some sort of go-between who had contacts in the Dutch business community who could help the army. What will be seen later is that Clifford almost wrecked the campaign by undermining that sense of trust and confidence. However, in early May, Marlborough was only attempting to secure a large sum of money. The sums gathered by 1 June would enable the army to subsist for a month but, the Duke's secretary, Adam Cardonnel, lamented to Sweet that 'afterwards God knows what We shall do.'(7) Much was

clearly in doubt and the outlook was bleak.

The next stage of the army's credit support was in Frankfurt. Here, credit was facilitated by Jean Nicholas Olenslager, a banker and merchant in the town.(8) Olenslager provided credit on the strength of assurances he received from business contacts such as Neufville, Behagel, Clignet, Boomhovor and Roomswickle in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. However, Frankfurt was still a long way from the army's projected theatre of operations in Bavaria. Credit was needed on the spot, not two hundred miles to the rear, and as a result Nurnberg was looked to. Therefore, Olenslager became a link in a chain of credit stretching from Amsterdam to the Danube. Surprisingly Wurzberg was not considered even though it was nearby and similar in size to Nurnberg. The reason for this seems to be that Wurzberg's rulers were not entirely trusted.(9)

Ultimately, credit at Nurnberg was provided by a Monsieur Burette, a Monsieur Casper Paynior/Leyer and a Monsieur Lollicoffre who were all bankers in the town.(10) Again, as in Amsterdam, these houses were called upon collectively because it was only together that they could muster the funds required by the army. At least one enterprising Englishman, a Mr Stratford, recognized the army's need for credit and attempted to make a profit from the march. He finally caught up with the army in August but initially it appeared that he was too late for Marlborough to use him.(11) It was with regret that Marlborough told Stratford on 27 July that: 'I believe if you had come into these parts about six weeks or two months ago and given us timely notice of it we might all have reap'an advantage by is for the Banquers

in this country have made us pay too dear for our money...'(12) Fortunately, for Stratford at least, Blenheim was fought within days of his arrival. Soon after the battle Marlborough found himself in need of additional credit. More than likely, Stratford's stubborn pursuit paid off in the end.

The brokering of credit for this march was without precedent and, therefore, the arrangements were very fluid and reactive. It might perhaps be better to describe them as slightly chaotic, given all the unknowns and uncertainties. The army could not assume that the local bankers had faith in its liquidity. As Cardonnel laboured to explain to Sweet at the end of June:

> You must distinguish between this country and Flanders. There we were in Towns which were in a manner our own, and the Commanding Officers were well known, whereas here We must send a hundred miles to a strange place where they have neither regard for Commanding Officers or Generalls.(13)

Consequently the army could not expect any indulgence from creditors in either Frankfurt or Nurnberg.(14) It was essential that Sweet have money to ensure debts were honoured and due to the attentiveness of Pauncefort, the Lord Treasurer in England, this was arranged.(15) Marlborough informed Sweet that the latter would 'always' find himself 'in cash to answer our bills.'(16) The point here is that it was hard cash in Amsterdam that was really supporting the army's credit. If Sweet did not have funds, there would be no credit for the

army.

A situation involving such large sums of money could not be allowed to remain makeshift. Accordingly by early June procedures began to take shape. This can be seen from the way each regiment received its funds. Estimates were sent in by each individual regiment to the high command.(17) Having received approval, each regiment would then send a representative to collect money from a house of credit.(18) If this rough and ready procedure was not followed, the regiment in question did not receive its money. The experience of several regiments up to 1 June and their efforts to receive funds in Frankfurt can be seen in the following from Cardonnel to Sweet: 'The paymaster of the Horse and Dragoons returned this afternoon from Francfort, where they all received the remainder of their credit except Rofsis, whose paymaster not appearing in person Your Banker refused to pay any on the Brigadiers order...'(19) Furthermore, credit slips like the following were issued and only with these was it possible for the unit to obtain credit:

> En vortu de ce Credit il vous plaira de payer a voue ou a Trois ou Quatre jours de voue al' Ordre de . . . . . la valeur Trente huit mille Trois cent Dix florins Argent courant de Holland prenant la lettre sur moy a' Vingt ou Trent jours de voue. 38310 Prenez la lettre au dos de ce Credit.(20)

This procedure was followed when the army was just south of Mainz on 1 June. Efficiency had been ensured and the potential for fraud avoided. Each paymaster required an authentic

bill of exchange or credit slip before the creditor provided any money. However, perhaps due to the rate of march and the distances concerned, these procedures began to unravel. As the army reached Ulm on 10 June strains began to show and Cardonnel informed Sweet that:

> It seems very strange that you should desire me to acquaint the Commanding Officers to call on people for money without carrying the least Credit or strip of paper with them, I would fain know if a Bavarian or any other stranger should have notice of this way of proceeding of yours, and call on Mr.Burette at Nuremberg pretending to be a Commanding Officer of one of our regiments and take up, and give a Bill on you for five thousand crowns whether you would not be obliged to pay it in your own loss.(21)

The strain was visible but as the following brief from the Duke to Sweet dated 23 June shows, Marlborough and Cardonnel kept a good watch and their vigilance ensured that funds were always available:

> The last I have from you is of the 13th Instant when you were going to Amsterdamn and promised to let me hear from you from thence which I hourly expect, however as the foot have but very little Money left and We not much Mr Looker and Mr Hartwell are gone this morning with a credentiale from my lord Duke to Nuremberg to negotiate sixty thousand CRxdrs. I have given them a letter to Mr Burette from myself and one to him from my

> Correspondant at Francf as also the like upon another Banquer there with Directions however to make use of yours first but as I doubt whether they will be able to gett so much cash at present I have sent Lt-General Ingoldsby credit at Francfort for forty thousand Crowns more which I desire him to bring with him...(22)

What can be seen in the above is Marlborough and Cardonnel having a complete appreciation of the situation. It was not Benjamin Sweet or fickle fortune that was in control, it was Marlborough. This aside, it seemed that much of what was going on was very haphazard as can be perceived in the following from Cardonnel to Sweet on 3 July:

> ...I find all the rest in perfect contradiction of the former wherein you advise me to take up what Moneys I can wherever it may be had and draw bills on you whereas now you write the Direct Contrary in that you tell me you had been mislead by the jealousy of the Merchants in desiring all the Money might be taken up from their Correspondants only, and now you desire by no means I should take up anywhere else, and the reason you give for it seems to be very ill-grounded...(23)

Though subject to such confusion, the army's finances had to be flexible and receptive. The march was without precedent and therefore significant challenges were to be expected. These challenges were overcome because Marlborough retained control of the situation.(24)

Marlborough and Cardonnel brokered deals on the march and passed on the details to Sweet to finalise as is clear from Cardonnel's message of 23 June to Sweet:

> I have sent Lt-General Ingoldsby credit at Francfort for forty thousand Crowns more which I desire him to bring with him, having drawn on you five bills for this money all payable at eight days sight each for twenty thousand gilders Currant money of Holland to the Order of Behagel and Neufville In the payment whereof You will please to be very punctual...(25)

A strict financial plan would not have complemented such an operation. Flexibility was the key and the ability of Marlborough to decide, act, and inform Sweet after the fact, was a great advantage.

The town of Nurnberg was important to the army as the forward financial base. This was because its size made it suitable for administering credit in sufficient quantities and it was close to the projected combat zone. Of interest though is the fact that Nurnberg was not prepared months in advance after Count Wratislaw first ventured the idea of a Danube expedition.(26) This is contrary to what might be expected. It should be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that Nurnberg had been prepared for its new role *in secret*. To be quite clear; there was no advance preparation. However, one imagines that arranging credit and finance requires time. But surprisingly, as Cardonnel wrote to Sweet on 7 June, speed was quite possible in this business:

> I have told you that our next supply must come from Nurenberg and I hope you have already taken some order about it, if not I pray do not loose one minutes time in finding us some credit on that place and let your people give them notice to have the money ready as soon for as I understand specie is scarce in these parts, and the Banquers must have time to get a sume together. The credit may be made payable to me and I shall take Care that none be taken up but where you advise.(27)

Clearly the bankers would have liked more time to ready themselves but it was the military considerations of this expedition which took precedence. As late as 7 June Nurnberg was not ready to provide credit for the army.(28) Money was not in place, contacts had not been made and credit was not yet assured. This suggests that making credit available for the army did not require months of preparation. Instead, with sufficient cajoling the parameters could be manipulated to suit the needs. Nurnberg could be prepared as the forward financial base in spite of the difficulties caused by time constraints.(29) On 11 June the bankers' Behagel and Neufville were requested to send credit to Nurnberg. The town had finally become integrated into the chain of credit that stretched back to Amsterdam.(30) There is however, a further point to be noted; Behagel and Neufville were contacted after the Duke had sent his own aides to find credit in Nurnberg.(31) The civilian business community was essential to the army securing a regular source of floating capital. In short, the army could not do it alone. For the line of credit to extend beyond Frankfurt the credit houses of the civilians Neufville and Behagel had to be involved.

Credit was arranged from Amsterdam to Nurnberg but actual coin transfers were also a component of the Duke's planning.(32) In part this was caused by coin being hard to find in the theatre of operations.(33) To get the army's money to the right place meant physically moving it from one location to another. The documents actually detail how a wagon and a team of horses were arranged.(34) The money came through Olenslager, and was transported hundreds of miles to reach the army. However, the army had to transport it because the civilian bankers were understandably reluctant to move such a precious cargo.(35) Due to the shortage of coin and the urgency of the need, Behagel and Neufville were requested by Marlborough on 15 June to find hard cash in almost any form:

> J'ay receu l'hon'r de votre lettre du 10me du Courant touchant les remisses et les especes pour la paiemont de nos Troupes que j'ay dabord comunique aux payeurs des regiment lequelles je trouve seroiens bien aie d'etre dispence de recevoir des Etats ou Ducatons d'Holland pour la reste soit or ou argent blanc ils en serent conten c'est advie des Excus de France ou D'Allemagne Ducats ou pistolles.(36)

Indeed Lt-General Ingoldsby, only having arrived on the continent in June, was asked by Marlborough on 22 June to find coin as the former hurried to catch up with the army:

> We are like to be in straights for want of money to subsist our Troops . . . you will please . . . bring with you in Ducats, french pistolls or french Crowns, it

> will be a very great relief to us, for tho I have sent to Nuremberg for money, yet I am confident they will not have cash enough to supply us besides we shall still have occaision for this summe pray bring with you all you can get, the more, the more welcome . . .
>
> PS French crowns will be the best Money for us so the more you gett of them the better.(37)

Later, a further shipment of coin came with a contingent of Danish troops.(38) However, coin transfers were only a component of the financial machine that supported the army.

The temporary nature of the financial arrangements in terms of planning and execution can be seen throughout the documentation. It seems that Marlborough continually attempted to force the financial administration, in this case Sweet on 7 June, to speed up to meet his requirements:

> My lord Duke bids me tell you that he has repeated promises by these five long Mailes from my lord Treasurer that you should never fail of a month's subsistence beforehand, and if I can the Troops shall not draw for above Two Thirds of their subsistence at . . . while we are in these parts so that I hope you will always be in cash to answer our bills.(39)

Being absolutely certain at what pace the financial administration actually moved is, of

course, difficult. It is clear, however, that the financial arrangements were still being formulated en route. The letter to Sweet from Cardonnel on 7 June certainly suggests this: 'I have already informed you of what I drew from Frankfurt but know not what Colonel Rowe may have done, he will certainly advise you.'(40) This lack of lengthy preparations can also be seen in this letter to Sweet on 15 June from Cardonnel: 'In the meantime I am expecting credit from you on Nuremberg if the Gentlemen comply readily with what I desire it will putt us in cash again but I am very much afraid by that time the foot joyn us they will be quite out and where or how to supply them God knows.'(41)

This reliance upon the intervention of the Almighty does not imply planning. The arrangements for credit entirely lacked foundation and seemed to rely on faith and good fortune. The following to Sweet from Cardonnel on 12 June shows that money from one unit was taken to cover the shortfall in the accounts of another: 'The Prussians are marcht to the Rhineland since by your writing for their letter of Credit again. Happen you have supplied them otherwise and therefore shall by His Graces Directions make use of that Credit for our troops.'(42)

Notwithstanding the haphazard nature, it worked. By the second week of July the situation had changed and it appeared that all the frenetic credit-arranging activity of May and June had paid off. The army was financially secure at last. This can be seen in a communication to Neufville and Behagel from Cardonnel on 8 July:

> ...we wait for Lt-General Ingoldsby to arrive at Francfort et qu'il aura receu les 100m florins, J'ay aussi trouve 60m Escus a Nuremeberg chez Mons Burette don't j attends meme une partic vers la fin de la semaine, avez ces Deux sommes j'espere que nous porrons bien subsister pour six semaines ou plus...(43)

The belief expressed in this letter is that for the next six weeks or so the army will not require more credit. Indeed the correspondence to Olenslager requests that he begin inquiries into finding the army currency 'en Argent courants D'Hollande' but not to send it 'puisques Je suis pourou pour pons de Six Semaine venir.'(44) Dutch money was possibly sought because it was believed that the army might be shortly returning to the Low Countries. If the money was needed in the Bavarian theatre, French crowns, not Dutch money, would have been better.(45) No more credit was required. This can be further seen from a comment to Sweet on 7 August by Marlborough regarding the tenacious Mr.Stratford: 'Mr Stratford I find is come as far as Nuremberg and designs to come from thence to the camp with Mr.Looker - what he can propose to himself by this journey I don't know . . . '(46)

Stratford hoped to profit by furnishing credit for the army, but it was clearly not required. Indeed, by 12 August money is actually being returned to Olenslager.(47) Again the point must be made that Marlborough's earlier flurry of credit arranging had paid off. However, in this fluid campaign everything could change overnight, and that was exactly what happened; the battle of Blenheim was fought on 13 August.

After the battle the complications of credit began again. Hudson was informed on 23 September that:

> Mons Olenslager writes me he has sent some money for us to Nuremberg, it is at a much cheaper rate than the Banquers there have supplied us. I am hourly expecting a letter from him in whose hands his cash is lodg'd with a letter of credit and assoon as it comes to hand I will immediatly send you a bill of exchange for what you may want. I would not willingly have you take it elsewhere for Buyriette has been too hard with us.(48)

It seems that there had been no anticipation of financial needs after the battle. In a letter sent 12 August to Olenslager Marlborough requested he not send money and emphasized the risk involved.(49) The threat of battle was quite possibly the risk that Marlborough was talking about but there is also a suggestion that credit was not needed.(50) The position can therefore be maintained that Marlborough was not ready for the financial consequences of the battle.(51)

The backbone of credit was trust and confidence. These abstract terms supported the army's floating capital. In short, provided Burette, Neufville and Behagel, Clignet, Boomhovor, Olenslager and Leyer/Paynior were convinced that English funds would honour English loans, all would be well. The keystone was not the word of the Duke of Marlborough but the fact that Sweet paid all debts.(52) References to this role of Sweet's abound in the

documents sent to the creditors.(53) Since there was little long-term planning for credit, it was essential that credit be available when needed. To achieve this, it was essential that creditors had confidence in the finances of Marlborough's army. It is rather stating the obvious, but it is still an important point to grasp: this was purely a business concern for the creditors. They were not motivated by any devotion to the Confederate cause. Sweet was the guarantor. The following instruction to Sweet from Marlborough on 23 June emphasizes the importance of punctually paying the bills:

> I have sent Lt-General Ingoldsby credit at Frankfurt for forty thousand crowns more which I desire him to bring with him, having drawn on you five bills for this money all payable at eight days sight each for twenty thousand gilders currant money of Holland to the order of Behagel and Neufville In the payment whereof you will please to be very punctual . . . (54)

The evidence suggests that final arrangements were made very close to the edge of instancy. Steps were not confirmed until they were taken. But a general air of confidence was generated by the fact that the army could pay its way and this calmed the straits of financial difficulty. The army's financial future was secure because it was punctual in the payment of its bills. The army was trusted because Her Majesty's Treasury kept Sweet, the army paymaster, in funds. Sweet was therefore the guarantor of the army's loans. If that were doubted, dire consequence would follow. That almost happened when the army reached Langenau, just northeast of Ulm on 24 June.(55) A merchant in Holland, a Mr Clifford, had

commented to certain of his acquaintances certain doubts he had about Sweet's reliability. Clifford was privy to sensitive information and he probably used it to his advantage. The result was an undermining of trust which was quickly discovered. On 25 June Cardonnel wrote to Sweet:

> You have likewise herewith the copy of what Mr.Clifford have writ to Mes.Behagel and Neufville on purpose to discredit us making difficulties where there can be none . . . I shall of necessity be obliged to complain to My Lord Duke . . . if We once fall into discredit Our Troops must starve . . . (56)

Thus, the writing of one letter could jeopardise the mission of an army. The cliché about pens and swords and which one is mightier seems applicable here. The letter also shows how precarious the army's floating capital was in the first place and how relatively easy a task it was to destabilize the financial mechanisms. The army was more than three hundred miles from Sweet's money but what connected the one to the other was a line of credit kept alive by letters of reassurance from debtor to creditor. Credit was vital but that line could be cut if that trust were compromised in any way. That was exactly what Clifford's letter had almost done, and, if left unattended to, would almost certainly have done. In spite of the strength of 'Old Acquaintance,' Marlborough told Sweet on 25 June that Behagel and Neufville might lose confidence and 'refuse to meddle with my Bills.'(57) Even Burette in Nurnberg was affected; he gave Mr Looker only part of a payment on 12 July.(58) Clifford's letter had made an already tense situation even more fraught for the Confederates. Whether

Clifford profited from his action is unknown, but as Marlborough informed Sweet on 3 July, Clifford's punishment was to be completely cut out from the army's credit supply network: '...and as for Mons Clifford I shall not be overfond of their Credit or Profit since they have had so little regard to ours, or to endeavour to blemish it all they can, and am glad We are like to have no further occaision for such friends.'(59)

It was with chagrin on 6 July that Marlborough finally wrote to Clifford that:

> ... we shall now go on without any further difficulty tho you must give me leave to observe to you, that I cannot think we are much obliged to you on that score for the letter you writ to Mr.Behagel . . . savour'd too much of your own interest . . . very little regard to Our Credit or the good of the service . . . we should have been in a very ill condition . . . (60)

When the army was dealing with its creditors, confidence was essential. The creditors had to believe that the army could pay its way. Some historians have asserted that this was ensured by Marlborough's strict efforts.(61) It might also be assumed that confidence could be assumed because this army was, indirectly, supported by the efficient taxation practices of England.(62) But this was not so. It was far from certain that credit would always be available because confidence could be undermined. The confidence of the financial sector could not be assumed. As Marlborough informed Sweet on 12 July, the loyalty of one's fellow countrymen could also be another variable: 'I had a letter from Mr.Clifford and

answered them very plainly that they had too much regard to their own personal interests and too little for the publick.'(63) Clifford had played an important role in the Allied credit machine.(64) He had been privy to sensitive information and had probably exploited it. This more than anything should show where the agenda of one creditor lay; in the accumulation of profit and not in the triumph of the Common Cause. The march was not just a matter of war. It was also business.

Financing for the army was a complex matter involving intermediaries and credit bought at a high price. However, in spite of all the obstacles and the late-in-the-day approach, credit was brokered successfully. But always at a price. By encouraging the credit houses of Amsterdam and Nurnberg respectively to band together Marlborough undoubtedly obtained the funds he required. He possibly also fostered a sense of security for the financial houses because they could shoulder the risk together. But, as Marlborough informed Pauncefort on 3 August, Marlborough had also created a monopoly which exploited the allies in an extortionate way: 'the Bankers in this Country make us pay dear for our money.'(65) He also made his mission vulnerable to the avaricious enterprise of men like Clifford.

What has been shown consistently throughout this chapter is that much of the planning and arranging of financing for the army was ad hoc and haphazard. Stratford arrived too late to help, but it was acknowledged by the Duke to Stratford on 27 July that had he been with the army earlier ' . . . we might all have reap' an advantage . . . '(66) Even with this cost paid by the Allies, shortfalls threatened. The only response, as Cardonnel told Sweet on 15 June, was

an appeal to the Almighty; '...that time the foot joyn us they will be quite out and where or how to supply them God knows.'(67) Much was disorganized and chaotic. Contingencies which required time were not afforded it; as a letter from Cardonnel to Sweet on 7 June shows, the position of Nurnberg as a forward credit base was not secured until mid-June. (68)

The high price paid by the Allies for credit was possibly due to a lack of advance credit preparation by Marlborough. But it worked. Furthermore, this price had to be paid. The financial machine needed had to be responsive to a very fluid situation that could and did change overnight. Such a reactive network involved costs. Speed and rapid reaction were expensive, even without Clifford throwing the proverbial spanner into the works.

The situation had to be responsive to events so that at one stage the credit of another contingent was taken to make up a shortfall elsewhere.(69) A few days later, the whole situation was so fraught that it was almost jeopardised by the 'indiscreet' remarks of Clifford. The Duke's arrangement of credit meant sailing very close to the wind. This aside, the Duke did have the option of simply securing as large an amount as possible but he chose not to do it. Where he could, he was frugal, and this can be seen when he returned money to Olenslager.(70) He attempted to cut costs, drawing only a proportion of the total money his army required.(71) It was thrift that led him to decline the offer of credit from Stratford.(72) However, ten days after Blenheim money was again being received from Olenslager and it would seem likely from Stratford too.(73) This is interesting, for it suggests that the Duke

was not expecting to have to fight the battle of Blenheim. This is a logical conclusion but it should be stressed that finding evidence to support such an intriguing notion is difficult and furthermore outside the parameters of this paper. Also it is the wrong point to emphasize: what Marlborough had jury-rigged was a means of credit provision that was so responsive that it enabled him to choose to fight a battle if he so wanted. His credit network did not bind him nor limit his freedom of action. He retained the tactical and strategic initiative in the campaign. Credit was subordinate to that aim because winning the war was the paramount consideration. Marlborough's mission was not to save Her Majesty's Treasury money, but to save an Empire. What is so remarkable is that the Duke tried to do both.

Endnotes.

1. Adam Cardonnel, to Mr.Pauncefort, L, 15 June 1704, BRITISH LIBRARY ADD MSS 61396, London.

2. Ibid, to Mr.Sweet, 12 June.

3. Ibid, to Mr.Sweet, 15 May.

4. Ibid, to Mons Behagel, 29 May.

5. Ibid, to Mr.Sweet, 1 June.

6. Ibid, to Mr.Sweet, 1 June.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid, to Mons Olenslager, 24 June.

9. Henry Davenant, to Marlborough, L, 15 June, BRITISH LIBRARY ADD MSS 61154, London.

10. Adam Cardonnel, to Mons Burette, L, 22 June, to Mons Lollicoffre, L, 15 July, BRITISH LIBRARY ADD MSS 61396, London.

11. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 7 August.

12. Ibid, to Mr Stratford, 27 July.

13. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 29 June.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 12 June.

16. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 7 June.

17. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 12 July.

18. Ibid, to Colonel Rowe, 1 June.

19. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 1 June.

20. Ibid, Mr Sweet, to Mons Jean Nicholas Olenslager, D, 2 June. Ibid, Mr Sweet, to Olenslager and Burette, D, 26 June.

21. Ibid, Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Sweet, L, 10 June.

22. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 23 June. 'CRxdrs' is taken to refer to a form of Dutch credits/currency and is spelt as it is given in the documents.

23. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 3 July.

24. Ibid, to Mons Behagel and Neufville, 21 June.

25. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 23 June.

26. B.Van't Hoff, '*The Correspondence of John Churchill and Anthonie Heinsius*,' Marlborough to Heinsius, L, #168, 103. (Utrecht: Kemink, 1951).

27.Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Sweet, L, 7 June, BRITISH LIBRARY ADD MSS 61396, London.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid, Postscript.

30. Ibid, to Mons Neufville and Behagel, 11 June.

31. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 23 June.

32. Ibid, to Mons Neufville and Behagel, 12 August.

33. Ibid, to Mr Pauncefort, 15 June.

34. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 12 July.

35. Ibid, to Mons Baltwein, 29 July. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 12 July.

36. Ibid, to Mons Behagel and Neufville, 15 June.

37. Ibid, to Lt-General Ingoldsby, 22 June.

38. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 25 June.

39. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 7 June.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 15 June.

42. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 12 June.

43. Ibid, to Mons Behagel and Neufville, 8 July.

44. Ibid, to Mons Olenslager, 27 July.

45. Ibid, to Lt-General Ingoldsby, 22 June.

46. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 7 August.

47. Ibid, to Mons Neufville and Behagel, 12 August.

48. Ibid, to Mr Hudson, 23 September.

49. Ibid, to Mons Olenslager, 12 August.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 24 September.

52. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 12 June.

53. Ibid, to Mons Behagel and Neufville, 21 June.

54. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 23 June.

55. Ibid, to Mons Behagel and Neufville, 24 June.

56. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 25 June.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 12 July.

59. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 3 July.

60. Ibid, to Mr Clifford, 6 July.

61. D.Francis, *Marlboroughs march to the Danube*, (London: Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research, 1972, Volume 50), 95. D.Chandler, *Marlborough as Military Commander*, (London: B.T.Batsford, 1973), 130. I.Phelan, *Marlborough as Logistician*, (London: Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research, November 1990), 117-119.

62. G.Parker, *The Military Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 65.

63. Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Sweet, L, 12 July, BRITISH LIBRARY ADD MSS 61396, London.

64. Ibid, to Mons Behagel and Neufville, 21 June.

65. Ibid, to Mr Pauncefort, 3 August.

66. Ibid, to Mr Stratford, 27 July.

67. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 15 June.

68. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 7 June.

69. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 12 June.

70. Ibid, to Mons Neufville and Behagel, 12 August.

71. Ibid, to Mr Sweet, 7 June.

72. Ibid, to Mr Stratford, 27 July.

73. Ibid, to Mr Hudson, 23 September.

Chapter Three, Supplies

'...to the advantage of the Common Cause, the support of the Empire, and the protection of the House of Austria...'

[Josias Sandby, army chaplain], Journal, BRITISH LIBRARY ADD MSS 61408, London, 78.

The provision of supplies on the march is a subject that still requires the study of primary sources. Van Creveld's mathematical calculations regarding this part of the march are very persuasive, but contradicted by the evidence.(1) A satisfactory analysis can only proceed from a study of the primary sources and these are almost entirely to be found in the British Library. Interestingly, it is in this material that it is possible to appreciate more fully the most controversial aspect of the march: the devastation of Bavaria.

This chapter will discuss how Marlborough's army was supplied. This will be done by dividing the matter of supply into five areas: the role of contractors; the role of the localities through which the army passed; the importance of magazines; the role of the Circles and the logistical significance of the devastation of Bavaria. It is recognised that there will be some overlap. This is the case with the magazines and the Circles which performed similar functions but had separate organisations. Magazines were indeed setup by the army but the

army also used 'established' Circle magazines.

A formal supply organization existed in the form of contractors. Two individuals, Machado and Vanderkaa, undertook to supply wagons and bread to the army. Machado received great praise for his efforts in 'the Common Cause.'(2) It was Machado's task to provide wagons for the army. The supply of these was relatively inelastic. Once the wagons were made available the contractor was only required to provide upkeep and maintenance.(3) For this campaign, Machado also contracted to provide bread, as did Vanderkaa. Acting as Bread Commissary, Vanderkaa accompanied the army.(4) However, Vanderkaa encountered difficulties and there is evidence of Marlborough's dissatisfaction with Vanderkaa as bread shortages became apparent.(5) It is possible that the bread shortage was linked to the credit shortages seen in chapter two, but, whatever the cause, Vanderkaa was on at least one occasion unable to supply the army with bread. Marlborough was aware that this situation was developing and anticipated it with active measures. On 14 July the Duke authorized Vanderkaa's taking grain from a religious storehouse but this failed to provide a permanent solution.(6) It was with exasperation that on 22 July Cardonnel informed the Bread Commissary that: 'tout l'affaire du pain est en desordre.'(7) The matter was very serious. On 22 July the army awaited forty thousand loaves and received only thirteen thousand.(8)

Vanderkaa's management of the bread supply produced shortages again. As late as 17 September the bread supply system was still not running smoothly and the overall situation must have been compounded by the many French and Bavarian prisoners-of-war following

the Duke's victory at Blenheim. Formal supply arrangements with the contractors were inadequate and it was therefore essential that other sources be found.

It was realised that the localities through which the army marched could help support the army's logistics. An example of this can be seen in a letter from Henry Davenant to the Duke where one cavalry Colonel was told to look for spare horses in the said localities. The Colonel in question was instructed to 'find opportunitys.'(9) This line could be read as a subtle allusion simply to take what was needed. However, in spite of its suspicious undertone, this was not an invitation to steal. As he told Colonel Blood, commander of the Artillery, on 4 June, the Duke would '..not allow by any means the forcing of Horses into the service more than for a day or Two's March as the Country are willing to furnish them where you pass . . . '(10) The army was not seizing horses. It was contracting formal business arrangements with the localities where both parties were agreeable to the deal.

Additional wagons were also needed by subsidiary columns such as the Hospital.(11) This was also to be the case for the Artillery.(12) However the point to note is that the localities were paid for the wagons they provided.(13) Nor were the wagons and horses permanently placed with the columns. Local horses and wagons were with the army for only a short period. Instructions were given by Marlborough that resources that had been hired locally were to be returned as and when it was possible. This can be seen in the following communication from the Duke to Hudson, commander of the Hospital train, on 6 June: '..you are to take particular care to burden the Country as little as may be taking up no more

Waggons than shall be absolutely necessary and discharging of them from place to place as often as you can.'(14)

Horses were a valuable resource as draught animals and as remounts for the cavalry and the army's need for horses was very great. Consequently, 'Country Horses' stayed with the army when a locality was prepared to hire out its horses for an extended contract.(15) The localities also performed other services and supplied other needs: doctors and surgeons(16), bridge construction(17), the recapture and return of British deserters(18), boots(19) and even the use of local mills.(20)

It has been demonstrated that local currency was being found by the army's financial agents and bankers.(21) This enabled the army to buy items in the local villages. Interestingly, Marlborough issued an order, as can be seen from an entry to an army chaplain's journal dated 3 June, that 'an exact discipline should be observ'd, to prevent all disorders, and avoid all manner of complaints.'(22) The localities were a resource that was to be utilized, not plundered. The sensitivity and respect for local feeling displayed in such things as hiring local horses and wagons and maintaining discipline in the villages should be kept in mind as it balances how one would otherwise look at the treatment of Bavaria.

The matter of magazines is interesting because much has been made of them. As was asserted in the Introduction to this thesis, magazines were not established because they were the only logical means of holding supplies once the army had reached the Danube. Van

Creveld says Marlborough would only establish magazines when the army halted for a considerable period of time.(23) However, Van Creveld is wrong since once Marlborough's army reached the Danube (2 July), it did not halt for six weeks waiting for the battle of Blenheim (13 August) but moved extensively.

Upon overcoming the enemy positions at Donauworth, Marlborough had his forces begin establishing Allied magazines. Or, to be more accurate, the Allied army 'found' magazines. Once a Bavarian town fell an Allied magazine was established. This happened at Donauworth (24), Nieuberg (25) and Rain (26). Of great interest though is the fact that these Allied magazines were originally Bavarian. These magazines were not established with Allied supplies but were Bavarian magazines captured lot, stock and barrel. On 4 July two thousand sacks of meal were taken at Donauworth.(27) At the town of Rain on 20 July it was reported in a circular that: 'We found in the place a good quantity of Corn, with four brass cannon. We have been these three days removing the Corn and Stores from Nieubourg (sic) and places adjacent to the Town for a Magazine.'(28)

In the sweeping-up operations that followed Blenheim the Allies pushed for Ulm and in a circular dated 17 August the hope was expressed that the enemy could be persuaded 'to decamp from that place which is the last where they have any Magazine in this Country.'(29) The capture of Bavarian magazines was seen as significant to the war effort because it degraded the enemy's fighting capabilities.Allied magazines were not so much established as captured, or made up of captured supplies.

A more apparent reason for the importance of magazines was that Marlborough was in Bavaria, which was, after all, enemy territory. Once the army had crossed the Danube it was most certainly in harm's way. Allied supplies needed to be kept safe and that was best done in a magazine. This role of the magazine seems to be of greater importance than the suggestion that it was the only way to supply an army that had become stationary. As has been established, Marlborough's army was not stationary. These magazines were the product of strategic, not logistical thinking.

Other magazines, separate in organisation from the above, were in existence before the march began. These magazines formed the Circles of the Upper Rhine, Franconia and Swabia. The Circle was an archaic structure used to supply Imperial armies when Imperial authority was greater. The magazines and their administration still existed but their effectiveness and efficiency was not great. On 3 February, before the campaign began, the Duke commented to Henry Davenant that:

> Mr D'Almelo has discovered Magazines of Corn and Oats sufficient almost for the Army. These Magazines were att Francfort and [Mewlby] in the hands of the Emperors committaries who had designed to sell what had already been paid for, but there being no government in this Country offences of this Nature pass unpunished.(30)

Possibly it was believed that a strong Allied presence in the region might do much to reassert

Imperial authority and, by such reasoning, that of the Allies. There was also suspicion that unless something were done the Allied cause might suffer serious setbacks in Germany. Various leading figures of the Circles were not absolutely trusted. As early as 27 January the Duke shared with Henry Davenant his belief that the Duke of Wurtemburg (Circle of Swabia) was probably misappropriating up to half the Anglo-Dutch funds supplied to him and it was further said that he might 'take his party' from the Allied cause. The Bishops of Constance and Wurzburg (Circle of Franconia) were 'thought to play a double-game' and 'might wander' unless 'speedy measures are not taken to encourage them.' The document goes on actually to specify the need for 'an army on the Upper Rhine early in the field next campaign and strong enough to act upon the offensive.'(31) A strong Allied army was seen as a powerful restorative for the flagging resolve of certain Allies.

The structure of the Circles allowed for magazines. Therefore this infrastructure, imperfect as it was, existed. It could supply Marlborough's army as it marched from the Low Countries to the Danube and alleviate, to a degree, the dilemma of how to supply the army on the march. Funds were granted to the Circles in January and February 1704.(32) However, by 21 May these magazines were not prepared.(33) Thereafter the Circles were not to be given funds and asked to supply their respective magazines for the Allies; instead they were informed that a large Allied army was about to march through and told to have the necessary supplies made ready. This can be seen in a communication from the Duke to one of the Circles sent around 25 May:

> Her Majesty....had ordered a body of (her) Army from the Netherlands, under His Grace's Command, to march into the Empire and he saw himself under a majority of marching thro the Electoral Circle of the Upper Rhine, he desired His Highness that he would be pleased to grant him a free passage for the said Troops, and to give his orders, that provisions and magazines might be made ready upon the march, which should be immediately and punctually paid for, and which would be a great ease to the Troops, as well as to the Country, and prevent those disorders, which generally are committed in foraging and marauding.(34)

There are other examples of such requests for assistance.(35) Van Creveld argues that a letter like this would be dispatched to a town *after* a period of looting had been allowed by the Duke. Then the town would, according to Van Creveld, be prepared to accept the Duke's 'protection' and make ready with the requested supplies. (36) However, no evidence exists to suggest that looting took place on the march and before a mental image of bullying and thuggish soldiery becomes too deeply ingrained, it is important to remember who was paying the Circles. Though the British and Dutch had provided the money for the magazines, the moneys had been misappropriated and embezzled by the respective local authorities.(37) In this light, it would seem that the Allies had every right to demand those supplies be made ready because they had been paid for. As Scouller says, Marlborough was 'no innovator.'(38) Marlborough did not need to reform the Circles with innovative ideas; he just needed to make the Circles act properly.

The Circles operated under the jurisdiction of the local Duke or Archbishop who would be requested to offer their assistance to the army.(39) Forage for the animals and food for the troops was found in this way.(40) Helping in all this was a Monsieur Ivoy who acted as a sort of route-master for the army.(41) He was instructed to find the easiest routes with due regard to the animals and men.(42) There was also close supervision from Marlborough in this matter, as can be seen in the following to General Churchill (8 June): 'Enclosed you will receive the names of all the Villages, and their distances that you are to march/pass through which I desire you will communicate to Monsieur Ivoy for his better guidance.'(43)

Clearly there was careful planning with regard to the intended route and the provision of supplies from the Circles. Ivoy was at work here too, in this particular case with regard to coordinating the cooperation offered by the Circles, which can be seen in this entry from Chaplain Sandby (28 May): 'Monsieur Ivoy, the Dutch Quartermaster-General to go before the Army, and regulate the delivery of Forrage with the Officers of those Princes and to see that everything should be ready for the speedy passage of the Troops.'(44)

The Circles were an important part of Marlborough's logistical planning. On the march from the Low Countries to the Danube the Circles of the Rhine, Franconia and Swabia were called upon.(45) Interestingly, once the army reached its objective, the Circles were still looked to. Following the army's first contact at Donauworth, and afterwards on operations in Bavaria, it was still using the Circles. Throughout the campaign the Circles were to contribute to Marlborough's lines of supply.(46) At least, this was the plan.

Marlborough's intention was to establish (or reestablish) the Circle magazines. This would enable him to supply his army from interior lines while he campaigned in Bavaria or along the Bavarian border. This can be seen in the orders given 15 June to the Circle of Franconia to assist the Allied commissaries in buying cheap grain, building magazines and constructing bakehouses.(47) There was also a request to obtain wagons to carry the bread to the army. This order would enable the Allies to be supplied in Bavaria from Franconia. It was anticipated that the Circles would be an integral part of the logistics for the forthcoming campaign.

Supplies were found for Marlborough's army in different ways. What is not certain is whether these were sufficient or if supply deficiencies played a part in the order to devastate Bavaria.

At the battle of Donauworth on 2 July the Franco-Bavarian army was broken and the fortifications protecting the Electorate were breached. Although he had suffered a crushing defeat, the Elector of Bavaria refused to come to terms with the Allies. As a result, Marlborough pursued a devastation policy that has been a cause of great debate among historians, Allied forces were ordered to put the territory to fire and sword. In a circular on 30 July it was reported that:

> The Elector of Bavaria continues obstinately to refuse coming to terms of accomadation with the Allies relying entirely on his succours from France the

> Comte de la Tour Gen'll of the Imperial Horse with the Comte de Oostffrize Lt Gen'll in the States service were sent out Yesterday Morning with a detachment of 30 squadrons of Horse and Dragoons to Burn and Destroy the Country towards Munich which will be likewise executed in other parts to deprive the Enemy as far as we can of any subsistence.(48)

This was done to make the Elector seek terms of peace with the Allies and so end the conflict in the Bavarian theatre, and to deprive the enemy resources and retard future enemy operations in the area. A third reason may have been to furnish the Allies with supplies.

Even though his lands were being devastated, the Elector remained defiant because he knew that Louis XIV was sending an army to help him. For their part, the Allies lacked heavy artillery and could not take the fortifications still occupied by the enemy.(49) This last factor should not be underestimated; as late as 31 July Marlborough wrote to the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Hedges, that if Ingolstadt could be taken the Allies would be 'Masters of the Danube' and force an Allied strategic victory upon the Franco-Bavarians.(50) However, the Allies could not complete their conquest of the Electorate before the French relief army arrived. Furthermore, the arrival of the French army would shift the balance in favour of the Franco-Bavarians.

The morality of the Allied decision to put the country to fire and sword should not really be a cause for debate. In war, people and property are hurt in actions that hindsight upholds or

condemns. What should be debated is whether the Allies' policy of destroying the electorate had a logistical agenda. The evidence suggests that this might have been the case.

It can be seen from a report in Sandby's journal dated 15 June that Marlborough intended to supply his army, at least in part, from magazines and bakehouses established in the Circles of Swabia and Franconia.(51) However there were difficulties in making this policy effective. This was not because of supply shortfalls, but because transport was not available. On 11 July, in letters to the Circles, Marlborough complained of this wagon shortage and said it would make it impossible to supply the army from the Circles. (52) Therefore, the army would face a supply shortage. The supply problem manifested itself on 22 July, as Cardonnel wrote to Vanderkaa: 'My lord Duke m'ordonne aussi de vous marquer que tout l'affaire du pain est en desordre.'(53) A supply shortage existed which demanded attention.

A possible argument would be that the Allies wished to deny the resources of the territory to the enemy. After Donauworth the Allies did not immediately begin a policy of destruction. Instead they advanced as far as possible so that by physically occupying the ground they could deny its resources to the enemy.(54) But the French relief force under Marshal Tallard altered the pace of events. This French army would compromise the Allied position and force an Allied withdrawal from parts of Bavaria. It was in this light that the decision to put Bavaria to fire and the sword was taken. It would appear then that it was the intention of the Allies to prevent the French from deriving any sustenance from the land. Therefore the order was given. On 31 July Marlborough informed a friend in England that

'. . . We find ourselves under the necessity of Burning and destroying . . . ' In a similar letter at the same time to Hedges Marlborough wrote that he felt 'obliged to this resolution.'(55)

However, the above argument falls down on one point; the devastation of Bavaria began before 31 July. As early as 16 July, the First Earl of Godolphin, friend and political ally of the Duke, was informed by Marlborough of the policy.(56) It is of course likely that the apparent contradiction was merely a matter of degrees and that the devastation of Bavaria increased in intensity as the French drew nearer. This, however, would also argue that the French threat, while serious, was not the prime reason for the devastation. The question of whether the policy was executed to serve Allied logistical needs remains.

The events of July must be reexamined closely. After 11 July it was realized that the wagon shortage was undermining the Circles' ability to supply the army.(57) As a result there was likely to be a shortage of bread. Indeed, on 22 July there was a shortfall of twenty-seven thousand loaves.(58) On 24 July came reports that Bavarian mills had been captured by the Allies but that they were damaged. Orders were given to have them repaired, but they were clearly of no immediate utility.(59) Another point is that the forces in Dutch pay were receiving their bread from the British.(60) A later comment indicates that the Dutch commander had made no arrangements to feed his contingent and had been given no money nor orders by his government regarding this matter. The Dutch simply expected the Duke to provide all. As Marlborough told Godolphin on 20 July, this predicament was in 'noe ways helping for the Economy and expense of the Army.'(61) Taken collectively, this

evidence supports the view that the Allies could not supply themselves in July.

Marlborough was aware of the impending crisis and wrote in a foreboding tone to Godolphin on 16 July. The Duke discussed the devastation but noted that the strategy 'may at last doe ourselves hurt for want of what we destroye.'(62) Clearly it was realised that supplies were available in Bavaria. It followed that if they could be destroyed, they could also be taken.

On 21 July there were reports of bread being found in Bavarian villages.(63) Furthermore there were also reports of bread being looked for deliberately.(64) On 28 July there are intriguing references to what was to be found 'dans les Villages de Bavaroise.' Indeed the document talks of making a 'harvest' in the countryside.(65) The memoirs of a private soldier give a further glimpse about what was happening:

> And now the Duke of Marlborough, despairing of any Accomadation with the Elector (it being thought impracticable to attack the Bavarians again in their strong Entrenchments) sent out a body of Horse to destroy the Country between Augsburg and Munick with Fire and Sword; who in a few days, returned to our camp with good store of Cattel and other Booty, on purpose to deprive the Enemy of subsistence, and oblige them to quit their camp.(66)

A 'good store of Cattel and other Booty' seems to confirm that Marlborough's putting of the electorate to fire and sword had a logistical motivation.

Finally there is the case of 'Schoneveld.' On 14 July the bread commissary, Vanderkaa, was instructed to take grain from a religious house within Bavaria and actually received special authorization from Marlborough to do this.(67) Bavaria was to be devastated partly for reasons of strategic necessity. The likely Franco-Bavarian plan to use Bavaria as a springboard for a campaign against Vienna had to be opposed. This notwithstanding, Marlborough was also following a logistical agenda. As has been seen, Bavarian magazines such as Rain were captured by the Allies.(68) Since these Bavarian resources were taken, it is unlikely that supplies outside those magazines were not.

One final comment regarding the devastation should be made: the will utterly to waste Bavaria was very present in the Allied camp. The Duke of Wurtemberg, who was fighting with the Allies, would have relished the opportunity to punish the Bavarians for what they had inflicted upon his Duchy only a few years earlier. On 9 July, in a letter to the Duke of [Somdrseh], it was clearly suggested that the Allies had Bavaria at their mercy; 'We are now gott into Bavaria over too great Rivers without any opposition so that the Elector must soon come to terms or run the risque of having, his whole country ruined . . . '(69) Bavaria could have been totally destroyed but it was not. The Allies did not release a fury upon the Electorate but exercised restraint.

Marlborough's army received its supplies from many sources; localities, magazines established by the army, the Circle magazines and finally, and to an indeterminate degree, from sources within Bavaria itself.

Most surprising is the lack of the kind of fixed supply system one might expect to find. Again it seems that solutions were jury-rigged and put together almost as an afterthought. Yet this was a feature of the time. An unprecedented march could hardly have used organised systems. Any system of supply used by the army had to be one of its own creation. In the main it was money that ensured that supplies were at the right place. Also, having the local currency enabled extra supplies to be purchased from local villages and towns.

The importance of money to the expedition was great but there were other influences. The Circles were only gotten to work because it was made very clear to them what would happen if they did not. The presence of nearly thirty thousand was a stimulus that forced the Circles to begin putting into effect what the Allies had paid them months earlier to provide. Money enables much to happen, but it is doubtful that the Circles would have fulfilled their obligations if the army had not been there to press the Duke's demands. The Circles thought so little of their arrangements with the Allies that they only acted when an entire army arrived in their principalities. It was this that obliged them to take seriously duties they had regarded with only a delinquent attention. Unfortunately, once the army had passed by and was campaigning in Bavaria, the Circles probably neglected their assignments again. Quite simply, the Circles would only respect their commitments if there was a force to make them.

In the case of the devastation of Bavaria it would appear more than likely that Marlborough was obliged to supply his army from the resources of his enemy. His difficulties in supplying his forces were exacerbated by a shortage of wagons, probably by Circle recidivism and by

the inability of his bread commissary, Vanderkaa, to provide sufficient supplies. The focus was to deny Bavarian resources to the enemy, by burning then or taking them to supply his army. Since Bavarian magazines were captured and used it seems illogical that stocks in one area were consumed while in others they were destroyed. The Allies were to have no qualms about using captured French supplies in 1708 and so it would seem likely that this was to be the case here.(70)

That 'Englands greatest soldier' not only permitted but sanctioned an order reminiscent of the Thirty Years War appears to tarnish the reputation of The Duke of Marlborough.(71) Such a conclusion is unfair. This writer would argue, albeit with some hesitation, that to debate the moral worthiness of this action is folly. To do so is to attempt to remove the atrociousness of war and only focus upon such notions as glory and honour. This is wrong. Marlborough was no less of a soldier, commander or logistician because of his part in the devastation of Bavaria. Any moral condemnation is out of place because the order was executed in the conviction that it would help to win a war and ultimately that was what it did.

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Chapter Four, The health and welfare of the army

'...your chearful Soldiers act Things impossible . . . '

William Pittis, *Two Campaigns in One Panegyrical Essay upon his Grace*, (London: J.B.London, 1706), 20.

Scholarly attention has neglected this aspect of the march. 'There is practically nothing extant on how the troops . . . were cared for when wounded . . . '(1) This is unfortunate because the medical train was considerable and transporting and protecting it required great efforts.(2) Furthermore, the Duke's attention to his army's welfare helped it to arrive on the Danube in a battle-ready condition. This chapter will examine medical provisions. It will argue that there was a serious attempt to keep the men in health. It will also look at the reasons the soldiers required hospital attention, analyse how the men were cared for, and discuss the floating capital arrangements made for this service arm.

The army needed to be in good condition to challenge the Franco-Bavarians on the Danube and save the Austrian Empire. Keeping the army fit was therefore important. Marlborough sent General Churchill (his brother and the commander of the infantry) orders specifying which particular roads he was to march (3 June): 'take Your march with the whole directly to Heydelbourg since the route we have taken by Ladenburg will be too difficult for you .

. . '(3) The rate and speed of march was also given due attention (Marlborough to Churchill, 18 June): 'In my last I desired you not to press yor marches so as to prejudice your men or horses for that if you come a day later than the Rout appoints it would not be material.'(4) There was a need for haste but Marlborough would not prejudice his army's combat effectiveness to achieve it.

A feature of the march was that each contingent of the army often moved alone. The Duke was usually at the front of the march with the cavalry and sometimes this put him three days ahead of the infantry and artillery.(5) Therefore the Duke recognised that his officers were better placed to judge how to keep their contingents fit (Marlborough to Churchill,10 June):

> I received this morning yor letter of the 8th Instant giving an acct of your being come that day to Heydelberg and of your design to halt there yesterday desiring that you may have 3 halts between there and Geislingen as necessary for the foot and artillery and therefore leave it to you to do therein as you shall think more proper, and to make those halts att such places as you shall find more for the ease of the Troops . . . (6)

The troops' health was of basic importance and Marlborough required that his subordinate commanders do what they could to preserve it.

The matter of new boots for the troops has been covered often.(7) Indeed it is one of the

march's pleasant little details which is generally well known. However its significance has been exaggerated and misunderstood. The boots in question came from Frankfurt, not Heidelburg. Furthermore, the argument that the entire army received new boots is a myth championed by historians for far too long.(8) The confusion has been due to a reference in one of the more accessible of the primary sources that intimates that a stock of boots existed, that all the infantry received new boots and that this took place at Heidelberg.(9) However, contradicting this is evidence from Cardonnel.(10) On 8 June Marlborough asked Colonel Rowe to find out from: 'the sev'll Commanding Officers what number of Shoes may be wanting for all the foot and thereupon order you to send to Frankfurt to have them made as soon as may be, and hastened after us to Nuremberg.'(11)

Despite claims by some historians to the contrary, this was not a 'preorder' of boots and there was no secret cache at Heidelberg(12) The Duke consulted his brother about boots for the soldiers, asking him to find out from the Commanding Officers of each contingent 'the number they will want' and telling him that those boots were 'to be had at Frankfurt.'(13) Two things are clear: the boot issue was done at short notice, and it was not an issue for the entire army. While the issuance of boots confirms that Marlborough cared for his troop's combat readiness, it does not show a mastermind who coordinated the arrival of an army with the covert provision of new footwear. More accurate praise would focus on the Duke's ability to use situations to his advantage. The army was passing a town, boots were more than likely needed by some of the men and the moment was seized. The boots were made at Frankfurt and then sent to Nurnberg.(14) Meanwhile the infantry presumably marched in

what they had.(15) The boot issue was important but it must not be overstated in inaccurate and unsupported ways.

As the army finally drew near to the Danube on 1 July it began to deploy itself in its battle formations.(16) Deploying from column to line was a complex manoeuver that slowed the rate of advance. One sign of the Duke's ability to keep his army healthy was the army's ability to perform this basic manoeuvre. A greater one was performance in combat. Upon the very day of arrival at Donauworth (2 July) Marlborough ordered an immediate frontal assault against the Franco-Bavarian positions. After a great struggle, the entrenched positions of Donauworth were overwhelmed. During the long march the Duke had indeed kept his army fighting fit. Captain Parker's account, published by David Chandler, provides an eyewitness testimony that; 'never was such a march carried on with . . . less fatigue to both man and horse.'(17)

Despite the efforts to preserve the army's health many soldiers required medical attention at the end of the march. Marlborough wrote the following to Hudson, who was in charge of the hospitals, twelve days after the battle of Donauworth: 'The men sent to Heydenheim were very few of them sick but rather half foundered by the long march.'(18) Simple exhaustion, as well as combat, produced casualties.

As can be appreciated, hospitals and medical provision were required to deal with battlefield injuries. However, they were also provided to help the soldiers cope with the long distances

they had covered. Well-timed marches, properly reconnoitred terrain and attention to footwear were not enough by themselves to maintain the army's combat readiness. As the following from Chaplain Sandby's journal dated 30 May shows, it was not just combat injuries that the medical train was expected to deal with:

> Thus the Troops notwithstanding all their fatigues, and ill weather had hitherto continued to be very healthy, yet his Grace thought it convenient to order an Hospital to be appointed at this place as well as for those which were, and for others which might become sick, and unable to march.(19)

But treating battlefield wounded remained the primary role of the service. The first battle fought at Donauworth resulted in many wounded. A letter to Hudson from Cardonnel (3 July) indicates that while the Allies: 'obtain'd a victory over the Bavarians' (20), the victory '...cost us many a brave officer and soldier. We have abundance of wounded, and therefore My Lord Duke would have you hasten to Nordlingen with the Hospital day and night.'(21)

The mobile hospitals were established as needed along the march,(22) as a communication from Marlborough to Hudson shows.(23) Marlborough's army had to be as responsive as possible to the pace of events and this obliged his hospitals to be equally so. Chaplain Sandby (entry for 2 July) emphasized the focus on swiftness: 'he sent an express to the Commissary of the Hospital to hasten him away to Norlingen, and to march night and day, till he had settled with it there. The express was followed by two more, to hasten the

Apothecaries and Surgeons.'(24)

The above was sent on the day of the battle of Donauworth, when the Duke's army was in great need of medical service. After travelling 'night and day' the hospital established itself within about five days of the above order being sent. In a perfect example of successful, if ad hoc, synchronisation, the wounded reached the hospital just as it was established. Marlborough wrote with satisfaction on 5 July to Mr.Teale, a medical officer, that: 'I am heartily glad to find by your letter just come to hand that you got the Chirgeons and Apothecary's to Nordlingen and that Mr.Hudson will be there . . . and you are now come just as the time as the wounded Men got thither.'(25)

The personnel who made up the medical service were drawn from diverse sources. Nurses were often army widows.(26) Official surgeons were attached to the army proper.(27) However, more were needed in times of emergency. These surgeons were hired locally and funds were allowed specially for this purpose.(28) Regarding hospitals, the preferred method was to try to put a hospital in a town.(29) Sometimes the support of the local political entity was sought. This can be seen in the following from Cardonnel to Mr.Teale on 3 July: 'Prince Louis of Baden has already sent a letter to the Town to afford You all the conveniences they can . . . '(30)

Certainly this was a great help to the army but a regard for local sensitivities was required. The services the localities were obliged to provide were a burden. The town of Nordlingen

sent representatives to protest that they could accommodate no more wounded forcing the Duke to inform Hudson on 8 July that: 'upon this complaint I suppose there will be no bringing of any sick men from Heydenheim to you.'(31) Because of Nordlingen's complaint, Hudson was ordered by the Duke on 8 July to use other habitations: 'His Grace is pleased to Direct that you choose convenient villages next the Town and place such of your wounded men there as are in the best condition and able to march.'(32) An important point can be seen here. The Duke was obliged to respect and act upon the complaint of a small town even to the extent of moving wounded troops. Clearly the wounded were not being moved for medical reasons, but to appease the local inhabitants. Medical and military judgement were subordinate to the need to keep friendly areas content. However, the issue of where hospitals were to be placed remained. In their turn the villages became unhappy and sent their own delegations to complain to the Duke. With a possible note of exasperation, the Duke informed Hudson on 19 July that:

> ...there are some Gentm come to complain of their being overburdened in the villages in your neighbourhood with the wounded soldiers, I comprehend little of the matter, but in General I think it is that the Town to ease themselves, would throw all the burden upon the Villages.(33)

To keep both towns and villages happy was not easy. The Duke's order to Hudson on 19 July was to: 'endeavour to give everybody the best satisfaction.' Later, on 2 August, Lieutenant Blake of the medical arm was said to have been given wagons by the town of

Heydenheim to move wounded troops 'out of a desire to be rid' of those wounded men, a charitable act masking an uncharitable conscience.(34)

How great an imposition the Allied wounded were upon the localities is important to qualify. Efforts were made to alleviate that imposition. Food was supplied to the wounded from the main army. For example, twenty cattle were sent to Nordlingen on 19 July.(35) The local populations were important and they were not asked to bear undue burdens. Remuneration was at hand as medics and their assistants were sent money for their subsistence.(36) The army nurses were not forgotten and were also sent funds.(37) The civilian population was not asked to shoulder the entire expense. This evidence is important for it qualifies the impression that the army simply took what it wanted. Some of the foreign contingents were suspected of exploiting their hosts(38), however, and it was perhaps for this reason that the Duke asked Hudson to ensure that wounded soldiers in English and Dutch pay be attended to first: 'I need not tell you, Charity begins at home.'(39)

The Duke's eye for detail was important. This can be seen from the provision of medicine chests. The Dutch government was responsible for the cost of these but Sweet was intending to charge them too little. On 7 June the Duke wrote to Mr Sweet about this: 'I wish you be not mistaken in the price of the Chests of Medecines . . . they must cost more than 440 Guilders and you charge the States but 220.'(40) At the time intelligence reports were received, detailing the activities of a French army on the left bank of the Rhine, and frenetic attempts were being made to prevent the army's credit machine from breaking down.(41)

Scrutiny of the matter of the Medicine Chests reveals that the Duke could involve himself concurrently in many unrelated matters.

The hospital train was well to the rear during the march, and granting it a measure of independence was therefore necessary. The Duke told Hudson on 19 July to decide for himself where the wounded were to be placed and at the same time to try to keep the locals happy.(42) Independent financing was also made available for the Hospital.(43) Sweet was told on 5 May to 'make such advances as the Service shall require.'(44) This was a *de facto* blank check for the hospital train. At the same time Hudson was sent an advance of five thousand Guilders.(45) Hudson was being given total freedom of action and responsibility for his command.

This financial activity gave the hospital operational independence but the Duke maintained a discreet watch. It was well that he did, for Hudson and his surgeons neglected financial matters more than once. On 7 July the Duke asked Hudson: 'I wonder you say nothing yet of Money however that you may not want I send you enclosed a Credit on Mons Burette of Nuremberg.'(46) This was to prove necessary, for four days later the Duke wrote: 'I am glad the Credit I sent you came so opportunely to your relief.'(47) Clearly Marlborough's attention and consequent impromptu provision of credit was warranted and, as it happened, in the nick of time.

Although the Duke's knowledge of the situation was extraordinary, it was impaired by

distance. The Duke could not be with all his commands and, therefore, had to rely on his subordinates. If the finances of the hospital train were to remain solvent it had to be because it was keeping its accounts in order. The Duke informed Hudson of this on 11 July when he wrote: '...pray let me reccomend to you again for your own sake and safety the making up the accounts of your expenses, and get them signed and vouched once a week by Doctor's Lawrence, and the Chief Officers of the Hospital.'(48)

The Duke could not always dispatch emergency funds on the off-chance that they were required. He reminded the Hospital on 7 July that for money to be available it must act 'without loss of time.'(49) The Duke arranged credit for the Hospital with Burette of Nuremberg.(50) However it was the task of the Hospital to settle the details itself as the Duke urged on Hudson (7 July):

> You must give notice immediately to the Banquers when you would have the money and I am afraid must send for it, tho the amount being small it may be Mr.Burette may be able to send you Bills on Nordlingen or You may find Credit for it there but You must write to him without loss of time.(51)

The emphasis of 'You' (Marlborough's use of capitals) should be noted because it was Hudson's responsibility to attend to this matter. Hudson had to ensure that the hospital had sufficient funds. The letter above was written after the Duke had sent other reminders and the advance of Five thousand Guilders. He wished the hospital to be more independent in

arranging and receiving credit. All these efforts toward making the hospital act independently aside, the Duke's involvement was still required. In late September Hudson complained to the Duke that the hospital was experiencing financial difficulties. Marlborough responded by taking the matter directly to Sweet on 24 September: 'Mr Hudson complains that you have suffered his bills on Acct of the Hospital to be protested which may be of ill consequence considering the great number of poor men he has under his Care and the vast charge he is at.'(52)

One final matter regarding the army's physical health is intriguing. According to a letter from Sir Thomas Erle to the Duke on 24 [May] seven thousand British soldiers were too sick to march with Marlborough to the Danube.(53) This document has significant ramifications. It is possible that the march did not decimate the ranks because only the healthiest soldiers went and because they were no longer exposed to the presence of so many sick. In short the army might very well have been healthier on the march than if it had remained in Holland.

The march to the Danube did not prejudice the fighting effectiveness of the army, this was because measures were taken to ensure it would not. The route of the march was carefully studied with regard to not exhausting the troops. (Marlborough to Churchill, 7 June):

> Coll Cadogan writes to Ivoy and gives him the observations he has made of the Roads to this place that you may the better take your measures in your march today from Wierloch to Lintzheim. We came most part of the way

> uphill so that you must take care beforehand .... and if in the rest of yor rout upon yor sending before to visit the Roads you find any great difficulty in reaching to the place appointed in case it can be done conveniently . . . (54)

The pace of the march was set so as not to exhaust the army. These were important and very obvious measures that helped keep the army in health. However, it was appreciated that the men would require medical attention and measures were taken to provide a medical service to deal with the consequences of battle and continuous marching. The medical service was supplemented by the local infrastructure, which meant local shelter and even local civilian doctors working for the army. However the Duke did all he could to not antagonize the civilian population and displayed great tact when dealing with their complaints. Finally credit was established so as to give the hospital train operational independence and *ceres inter pares,* this arrangement worked.

It was important that all arms of the army had operational independence on the march. This freedom of action allowed them to react to events and use their own judgement without deference to the Duke. Command and responsibility were delegated to Hudson, Blood (commander of the Artillery) and Churchill because the Duke needed his army able to respond to the pace that the war set.

The matter of the boot issue is important for it shows that Marlborough was far more of an opportunist than a master planner. Too many authors would like us to see Marlborough as

'the genius who planned everything,' so that his army experienced no setbacks. (55) This mistaken view also ignores many things which were significant challenges such as the reluctance of local towns and villages to shelter wounded and the Gordian knot of finance.

In this chapter it is possible to see Marlborough keeping many details in his mind: nurse's pay, new boots, keeping local areas happy and the price of medicine chests. All these matters were dealt with, as were the larger issues of the infantry's pace, the route of march and the provision of credit for the hospitals. It is important to recognise that Marlborough struggled and succeeded. Anything else diminishes the great achievement that saw an army march close to three hundred miles and then win a major engagement.

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30. Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Teale, L, 5 July, British Library, ADD MSS 61396, London.

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41. Ibid, Circular, L, 7 June. Ibid, Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Sweet, L, 7 June.

42. Ibid, Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Hudson, L, 19 July.

43. Ibid, Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Sweet, L, 5 May.

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45. Ibid.

46. Ibid, Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Hudson, L, 7 July.

47. Ibid, Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Hudson, L, 11 July.

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49. Ibid, Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Hudson, L, 7 July.

50. Ibid, Adam Cardonnel, to Mons Buriette, L, 14 July.

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52. Ibid, Adam Cardonnel, to Mr Sweet, L, 24 September.

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Conclusion

'It is difficult to speak extravagantly, and impossible to speak proportionably of this Act of Heroicism which after Ages shall believe with Pain.'

William Pittis, *Two Campaigns in One Panegyrical essay upon his Grace*, (London: J.B.London, 1706), 14.

The logistics of the march to the river Danube in 1704 have been generally ignored by historians. While most have asserted that the Duke was a genius, historians do not support their assertions with convincing material. In the secondary sources, little evidence is cited to prove the Duke's genius from the point of view of credit, supply and welfare. (1) Until now, these three areas have not been researched. Ivan Phelan was indeed correct when he wrote that it was in 'unpublished material that Marlborough's genius as a logistician would find further enhancement.' (2) The generalship of the march displayed great genius but it is important to realise that simultaneously, mistakes were made. The campaign was not perfectly executed, but its management meant that the consequence of any oversight was minimal. The parameters of Marlborough's campaign allowed for a measure of miscalculation. Finally from the evidence, it is possible to reevaluate the devastation of Bavaria and recognise it as an action of military necessity. It was not a return to the days of the Thirty Years War and nor was it part of a series of overtly brutal acts inflicted on

civilians by a thuggish army.

The Duke's strategy rested on making his army capable of responding to the war's pace. This was important because the march demanded that the army be transferred from fighting in the Low Countries to war in another theatre. In effect it was a move from the familiar to the unfamiliar as Cardonnel told Sweet on 29 June: 'You must distinguish between this country and Flanders. There we were in Towns which were in a manner our own . . . whereas here We must send . . . to a strange place . . . ' (3)

To respond to this, Marlborough attempted to make the army able to adjust to the conditions of the march. He successfully built a financial network that could support the army with credit but while the need was great, it was not sought aimlessly. Limits were set. (4) Indeed, once those limits were reached, credit was actually turned away. (5) However, after the battle of Blenheim, credit was again sought. (6) The credit network supporting the army was so responsive that it enabled a commander to choose if he would fight a battle or not. This network could be expanded or contracted as to the need and this was a great achievement.

Marlborough sought to make his commanders independent. It was appreciated that the hospital, artillery and infantry commanders were in the better position to judge the rate of march for their respective contingents. Accordingly, they were given the authority to do so. (7) The Hospital was actually instructed to arrange its own finances so that it would decide how it would respond to the demands of the war. (8) On the personal level, the Duke also

revealed an ability to deal with seemingly trivial details at the same time as the big picture. (9) These examples help underline the brilliance that was apparent in the Duke's management of the march to the Danube.

However, human fallibility produced problems that have not been fully appreciated. The desire for the army to move quickly led to the decision to leave the heavy artillery behind in the Low Countries. (10) Consequently, for weeks after Donauworth, when Bavaria was open, the Allies could not effect its conquest. (11) Marlborough had reasoned that his Allies in the area would provide him with heavy guns, but he was mistaken. (12) The shortage of supplies in July was also the product of faulty assessments. The plan was to supply the army from the Circle of Franconia once the war in Bavaria began. (13) However for various reasons, including the lack of transport, this proved impossible. (14)

The expense involved in raising credit was great. (15) Moreover, the bankers and brokers were only interested in making profits. This self-interest, which Marlborough called 'the jealousy of the Merchants,' was another oversight. (16) It is possible to see the same pattern in Clifford's actions when he saw the opportunity to increase his profits. (17) Finally there were great confusions. Marlborough complained to Sweet on 12 June that with regard to financial arrangements, he 'was as great a stranger to the business as if we were at Constantinople.' (18)

Clearly there were flaws in the march which are hard to reconcile with the notion of genius.

In the context of logistics, if we are to call the Duke a 'genius,' it must be seen as a genius that lay in creating a logistical system that enabled his army to cope with the unexpected. The misjudgements outlined above must be seen as costs that allowed victory conditions to be established. Also, it should be noted that none of those oversights proved fatal to the Allied campaign.

The treatment of Bavaria was an action based on military necessity. Bavaria had become the frontline in a war that, if lost, would see Louis XIV of France dominate Europe. Bavaria had become 'the seat of war.' (19) This notwithstanding we must acknowledge that Marlborough could show enormous sensitivity to local areas and populations. Wounded troops were moved around so as not to overburden local villages and towns. (20) Wagons and horses hired locally were to be returned after two days. (21) For the Duke, as he informed Colonel Cadogan on 11 May, the army's good conduct was required because 'the reput of the whole nation' was at stake. (22)

The campaign's logistics were approached from the point of making existing systems work. Marlborough was 'no innovator' but he animated inert advantages and enabled the environment for military success to be achieved (23) There were shortcomings to the campaign but Marlborough achieved something great by manipulating what was available. The campaign of 1704 saw English troops, led by an English commander, accomplish what Europe had not seen an English army do for nearly three centuries.

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