MAN, RELIGION, AND POLITICS
IN THE WORKS OF JEREMY TAYLOR

by

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this thesis is: firstly, to examine the work of the Anglican divine, Jeremy Taylor (1613-1667), and show how it illuminates various aspects of the intellectual and political history of his time; secondly, to demonstrate that Taylor was one of the progenitors of the natural religion and secularized society of the eighteenth century.

The thesis basically is organized around four main aspects of Taylor's thought: his theories concerning moral activism, epistemology, Nature, and politics. Chapter One serves as an introduction by placing Taylor within the seventeenth century theological context. It adumbrates the themes of the thesis, and provides a summary biography drawn from secondary sources. Chapter Two is concerned with Taylor's bias towards moral activism, while Chapter Three, building upon this foundation, considers Taylor's epistemology. Chapter Four is a transitional chapter calculated to summarize the conclusions of the two preceding chapters by showing how they apply to social and religious conduct. In its examination of Taylor's concept of Nature, this chapter also erects the teleological framework for Chapters Five and Six which are expositions of Taylor's political theory. Chapter Seven

concludes the thesis by briefly estimating Taylor's influence upon philosophy, religion, and society after his death. In addition it gives a summary view of his work pointing out inconsistencies and weaknesses, and noticing several criticisms levelled either directly at Taylor or at the type of thought which he represented by adherents of an alternative tradition.



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I

TAYLOR REDIVIVUS

Taylor's opinions must be seen in the context of sixteen hundred years of debate concerning matters which often, for a moment, seemed indisputably determined by council, creed, or authoritative exposition, but which always arose once more to unsettle Christian consciences. It is easy, like Gibbon, to be contemptuous of the seeming triviality of some of these debates, their repetitiveness, rancour, and scandal; but frequently principles were at stake of great significance to the immediate, material world, even when argument was being carried on at an abstruse, theological level. Contentions over the exact nature of original sin, over free-will and Christian epistemology always imply disagreement about the way in which men should live and think, and what means they should use to achieve what end.

Taylor, like so many other theologians before him and since, devoted his life to the task of re-defining and re-affirming what he conceived to be orthodox dogma. With all the skill of a mind naturally inclined to casuistry, he handled those mysterious paradoxes of Christianity which have always proved to be so resistant to the manipulations of an empirically based reasoning. Taylor had to try and reconcile, for

example, the two natures of Christ. He had to try to resolve the paradoxes that God is transcendent, eternal, limitless, ultimately indefinable; yet He is knowable in some degree; He created man ". . . out of the slime of the earth. . ."[1] in His own image, and condescends to associate with the creatures of bread and wine. God also, by attribute, is necessarily just, but Taylor had to cope with the paradox that many of His actions may seem unjust in the eyes of the world. Lastly, Taylor had to consider man, one of the strangest paradoxes of all in Christianity, for through man sin entered creation, and yet God bestowed upon him the very "free-will" which He knew beforehand would cause the exile from Eden.

Before examining Taylor's opinions in detail, it might be helpful to sketch roughly the background of seventeenth century English theology and indicate where Taylor stood. The attempt might be foolhardy, but in order to understand Taylor fully it is necessary to know what choices were offered to him and his opponents. Basically, they could choose various combinations of three systems of thought. The first derived from St. Augustine, whose latent Neo-Platonic Manichaeism, with its suspicion of matter, its distrust of free-will and concomitant emphasis upon predestination, and its intensely individualistic fideism was one of the motivating forces behind Luther, Calvin, and English reformers like Cranmer and Jewel. From among divines with an Augustinian bias came most of Taylor's theological and political opponents. They made him virtually a catacomb priest between 1647 and

1660; and in the guise of "Scotch spiders," as he called them, they poisoned the pleasure of his last years in Ireland after the Restoration. But Taylor's opponents were not to be found only among Puritan non-conformists. As we will see when examining Taylor's doctrine of original sin, a powerful element in the Anglican church was itself similarly inspired by Augustinian tenets in the mid-seventeenth century.

A second source from which English theology of the period derived was from St. Thomas Aquinas. The Thomist synthesis had, of course, been partly constructed out of Augustinianism, but St. Thomas gave greater play to human reason than Augustinianism encouraged. The delineation in Thomism of an hierarchical chain stretching from the domain of pure spirit to that of matter, linking man to man within a static, orderly structure of church and state, held a sort of aesthetic satisfaction for the disciplined, logical minds of the seventeenth century. Many of the Protestant reformers, however, looked askance at the Thomist synthesis, not only because of the areas concerning free-will and human reason where their fideism led to disagreement, but also because Thomism was the official theology of the Roman Catholic church. On the other hand, some Protestants, like Grotius and Arminius, readily adopted Thomist principles of free-will and reason and extrapolated from them to a degree which no doubt Aquinas would have disowned. Taylor belonged to this party; it is most significant to note that at one point he called Erasmus and Grotius ". . . amongst the greatest and the best expositors

of scripture that any age since the apostles and their immediate successors hath brought forth. . . ."[2]

But there is one further name which it is impossible to omit when discussing the influence of Aquinas upon English theology: Hooker basically was a Thomist, although his position with regard to justification by faith was Calvinistic. The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity contains all of the Thomist principles of natural law, the chain of being, and the value of human reason expatiated upon with such leisure and humanity, in a style in which canny peasant, holy priest, subtle politician, and learned doctrinaire make their several entrances so smoothly to drop cameo adages for pirate political theorists and groundling politicians, that it is easy for a careless reader to miss the book's inherent contradictions and impracticalities. When the utterances of individuals as diverse as Laud, Cromwell, Ireton, Lilburne, Taylor and Locke can be paralleled by passages from Hooker, then one is justified in regarding with suspicion the claim sometimes made that Hooker's theories offer a viable tradition of English conservatism.[3]

The group of divines, poets, scholars, and nascent statesmen who gathered around Lucius Cary, Lord Falkland, at Tew during the 1630's should also be mentioned here in connection with Hooker. It was the fate of some of these men, among whom were Sheldon and Clarendon, to re-state in theory or attempt to put into practice some of the Hookerian principles of theology and politics.[4] Intellectually, probably the most important of them was Chillingworth, whose The Religion

of Protestants, published in 1637, was a key book in the development of a school of English theological rationalism. It is possible that Taylor may have known Chillingworth personally;[5] but even if he did not, Taylor's work must in many respects be regarded as having been deeply influenced by Chillingworth's thought.

Thus far we have mentioned two sources from which English theology of the seventeenth century derived: St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. The third source was more evanescent. It was that complex pattern of mystical thought which had been woven into the fabric of Christianity by generations of saints, recluses, mystical theologians, visionaries and alchemists. Western mystical theology, insofar as it shows the influence of any single, coherent school, can be traced to that of the abbey of St. Victor, which co-ordinated methods of biblical criticism derived chiefly from Origen, and the Neo-Platonism of Boethius and Dionysius the Areopagite, together with elements of Augustinian fideism. This Victorine theology was one of the key-stones in the system of St. Thomas Aquinas and, to a lesser extent, in that of Hooker. But in both systems, especially in Hooker's, there was a tendency for the living spirit of mysticism to be larded with rationalizing, logical accretions. Motivated against this tendency, the Franciscan Nominalists attacked the ideational system of Thomism.

What could be more ironic than the use by Duns Scotus and Ockham of Aristotelian scholastic logic, the cement of Thomism,

to destroy a system positing the sort of Christian teleological universe in which mysticism could survive without slipping into individualistic pantheism or millenial activism? Yet perhaps this was not more ironic than Puritan attacks upon the Roman Catholic elements in Anglican theology and upon Laud's policy of attempting to regain for the church the economic and social power it had lost through the Reformation. The Puritans used the Hookerian concepts of Natural and Positive Law to bring down men who might have postponed the secular society which they abhorred. And this they did, like the Franciscan Nominalists, and like Luther, in the name of an individualistic fideism with mystical undercurrents. One cannot help feeling, indeed, that it was the absence of a balanced system of mystical theology, working within and justifying the Anglican church, which partly accounted for some of the political events of the century. The following speculations are offered tentatively, but it is possible that this study of Jeremy Taylor may lend support to them, although it is by no means dependent upon their validity for its own.

Consequent upon the closure of the monasteries and thus the virtual destruction of the traditional methods of coenobitic contemplation, the Anglican church did not possess the capacity to absorb and direct a strong, remaining undercurrent of popular fideism. This fideism, therefore, which was a heritage of late medieval Nominalism intensified by the re-statement of Augustinian individualistic piety made by the Reformers, had to develop outside the church establishment. But the

Anglican church was Erastian; it was, as Hooker maintained, identifiable with and under the jurisdiction of the state. The Erastian knot of church and state, church policy being a branch of political policy, made it impossible for popular fideism to exist unmolested. Gradually, but very logically, especially when one remembers the loss of moral authority by court and crown in the early seventeenth century, popular fideism was led to capture the state.

The individualism inherent in Puritan fideism, which had never been tempered by institutionalization in England, although it had been in Scotland, helped to exacerbate the anarchical tendencies logically inherent in extreme political activism. This condition of latent anarchy, with the Presbyterians attempting to capture control of the Erastian knot, and the sectaries and indifferents trying to cut it, existed with an ever increasing tendency to become actual until inevitably a group appeared, Cromwell and the army, which was prepared to conciliate over religious principles by reducing them to the lowest common denominator and possessed means of force and willingness to use it, thus filling the power vacuum.

Taylor's positions as a theologian and churchman upon the subjects of fideism and mysticism are among the most fascinating of his aspects for a modern reader. In no way did he run counter to the gathering trend of religion and society after the mid century towards rationalism and religious restraint. To call Taylor a mystic, as some of his admirers have tried to do, is to invite a comparison with the

Tridentine saints which few English figures of this period can bear. Taylor, like many of the most distinguished literary men of his century, was a manipulator, always charming, often moving, of the Neo-Platonic mystical conventions which entered England in force during the Renaissance.

Renaissance Neo-Platonism had great appeal for the artistically and aesthetically orientated mind. But in its syncretical form, apt only for the understanding of polymaths, it made no popular appeal. It had the advantage of being individualistic, which made it attractive to some thinkers, especially Protestant ones already saturated in Augustinianism. Unlike Augustinianism, however, Neo-Platonic mysticism was favourable to some of the chief elements in Thomism. We have touched upon such mingling of Neo-Platonism, Protestantism, and Thomism already, for Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity was a book produced in just such an atmosphere.

Many names offer themselves as falling within the specifically Neo-Platonic stream of English thought, for example, Sir Philip Sidney, Spenser, Drayton, Daniel, Habington, and Lord Edward Herbert. But for the purpose of this thesis, one must draw attention to three men in particular: Thomas Traherne, Henry Vaughan, and Henry More. With these men Jeremy Taylor had points of relation which we will have occasion to examine in passing a little later in the thesis.

The purpose of this introductory chapter until now has been twofold. Firstly, we have tried to set Jeremy Taylor within the context of the theological thought of his own time

and briefly mention some of the writers who will appear in the following pages. The other purpose has been more implicit: to indicate how the study of theology may add depth to the historian's quest for causation.

Rejection of this claim for theological causation would not entirely invalidate, although it would admittedly injure, the approach of this thesis. It must, however, be remembered that the seventeenth century was an intensely theological age.[6] The preacher was ubiquitous, the preaching virtually endless. By bulk, books about divinity and about politics treated from a theological standpoint overwhelm the relatively small quantity of books of poetry and plays which possesses such importance for us now. One has only to read the army debates at Putney and Whitehall during the late 1640's to realize that articulate men were thinking and talking at a level of abstraction where theology, logic, politics, and supposed immediate divine inspiration were mingled in a very complex way.

Some of the most important of Jeremy Taylor's books partake of this mixed character. In 1647, for example, he published the book for which he is most frequently remembered, A Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying, which was a reasoned explication of the grounds and limits of religious toleration. The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living, 1650, and The Rule and Exercises of Holy Dying, 1651, although both predominantly devotional, meditative handbooks, contained directions as to social obligations. A Discourse of the Nature and Offices of

Friendship, 1657, again falls within the purview of social history. But the book which above all makes Taylor prey for the historian, even if he is suspicious of the causal effect of theology, is the massive guide to moral casuistry which Taylor published in 1660, Ductor Dubitantium, or The Rule of Conscience in all her general measures; serving as a great instrument for the determination of Cases of Conscience. The fourth edition, printed in 1696, contained a little over eight hundred folio pages. In them, Taylor discussed the relationship of conscience to society, and the nature of Divine, Natural, and Positive Law, by arguing from postulates and discussing actual or contrived cases. It is an exhaustive and exhausting production, the last attempt by an Englishman to produce a Summa of the medieval type. It is a mine of social and political attitudes, prejudices, incoherencies, and self-contradictions, an exasperating, thoroughly fascinating book, which has never been adequately studied.

But of course, not all Taylor wrote can be fitted so easily into the more well-worn slots of social and intellectual history. He was a divine, and naturally he wrote theology, preached sermons, wrote meditations, liturgies, prayers, and treatises upon internal church government. Material from such areas will be used in the following chapters in an attempt to demonstrate Taylor's attitudes on reason, free-will, and liberty. Into this category of Taylor's writing fall such books as Of the Sacred Order and Offices of Episcopacy, published in 1642; The Great Exemplar, 1653, a very popular

life of Christ, interspersed by meditations; the various sermons preached at Golden Grove which were ultimately collected into a folio in 1667 and published as A Course of Sermons for All the Sundays of the Year; the very important polemical works on original sin, Unum Necessarium, 1655, and Deus Justificatus, 1656, which brought a storm of protest down upon Taylor's head, from both Puritan and Anglican divines; and finally, one should mention the two parts of A Dissuasive from Popery, written in Ireland and published in 1664 and 1667 respectively.

It is difficult to convey to anyone biased towards secularism in philosophy and politics just how important theological books like Taylor's were in the intellectual context of their time. S. T. Coleridge, who made it a main part of his life's work to revive a philosophy based upon spirit, not matter, knew well enough. Speaking of the schoolmen, he wrote in his Constitution of Church and State:

> . . . the theologians took the lead because the science of theology was the root and trunk of the knowledges that civilized man, because it gave unity and the circulating sap of life to all other sciences, by virtue of which alone they could be contemplated as forming, collectively, the living tree of knowledge. It had the precedency because, under the name theology, were comprised all the main aids, instruments, and materials of national education, the nisus formativus of the body politic. . . Not without celestial observations can even terrestial charts be accurately constructed. 7

Perhaps when he wrote this, Coleridge had in mind a passage from one of Taylor's Restoration sermons, ". . . without the influence of celestial bodies all natural actions are

ineffective: and so it is in the operations of the soul."[8] But even if he did not, the parallel between the words of the two writers is a peculiarly apt one, because Taylor had, despite his faults, the same type of all-embracing mind as a great medieval schoolman. In many ways, one is tempted to feel, he was the last schoolman in England, not the least reason being that after his death came a rapid acceleration of the process of disassociation between science, politics, and religion which had been occurring throughout his life.

Taylor was born in Cambridge, probably in 1613, as the fourth child of a barber. After receiving a local education, in 1626 he entered Caius College, Cambridge as a sizar. By 1633, he had become a Master of Arts and was in holy orders. Archbishop Laud heard Taylor preach one day in St. Paul's as a substitute lecturer and was so impressed that he decided to become Taylor's sponsor. Through Laud's good offices, Taylor was made a fellow of All Souls in Oxford and also became one of Laud's chaplains. The fellowship at All Souls was not handled without incurring some acrimony. Sheldon, at that time warden of the college, resisted the appointment upon statutory grounds. This was the first of several unpleasant encounters which Taylor had with the future Restoration Archbishop.

By 1638, Taylor was rector of Uppingham, in Rutlandshire. He married, had children, and was a quiet country parson. But in 1642 Parliament expelled Taylor from his living, and the course of his life for a while becomes very

conjectural. He published a defence of the episcopacy at Oxford, his first notable production, and was made a Doctor of Divinity, with a horde of loyal others, by Charles I. Taylor seems to have been briefly a prisoner of Parliament in 1644. There is also reason to believe he was a chaplain for a while with the Royalist army.

By 1647, he was ensconced in a Welsh retreat and running a small school with two other ejected Anglican clergymen. His first wife had died, and Taylor re-married, possibly to the natural daughter of Charles I. This period in Wales, which stretched for approximately the next eleven years, with periodic short visits to London to put books through the press, see friends, and act as priest and confessor to beleaguered Anglicans, was the period of Taylor's finest writing. He found a patron in Richard Vaughan, Earl of Carbery, whose estate, Golden Grove, gave Taylor the title for one of his books.

The Golden Grove, an expansion of the catechism, contained a preface which upset the Independents, and from May, 1655 to March, 1656 Taylor was imprisoned. Two years later, it is interesting to notice, Taylor published A Discourse of the Nature and Offices of Friendship, dedicated to the poetess Mrs. Katherine Philips, the matchless Orinda, whose cult of a circle of friendship included both Taylor and the poet Henry Vaughan. Taylor was again momentarily gaoled in 1658 because Royston, his publisher, had prefixed Taylor's Collection of Offices with a picture of Christ in prayer which offended the

Puritan iconoclasts.

Later in the same year, Taylor left for Ireland with his family, having been given a position at Lisburn by his new patron, Edward, Earl of Conway. This patronage had been partly mediated through the diarist, translator, pamphleteer, member of the Royal Society, artistic connoisseur, botanist, amateur gardener, fervent Royalist, and altogether typical late seventeenth century virtuous virtuoso, John Evelyn. Taylor became Evelyn's confessor and spiritual adviser, "my Ghostly Father & C" according to Evelyn's Diary, in 1655. Their relationship can be traced through the Diary, in a series of letters, and by parallel comparisons of their work.

Edward, Earl of Conway, Jeremy Taylor's new patron, was married to Lady Anne Conway, the Platonic Idea of the Cambridge Platonist Henry More, who was also a friend of Taylor's. Anne Conway belonged to that remarkable group of seventeenth century women--Lucy, Countess of Bedford; Magdelen Herbert; and Mary Godolphin, John Evelyn's spiritual daughter--who were able to attract poets, philosophers, divines, and courtiers by being incarnations of beauty, virtue, and intelligence. Her spiritual odyssey into Quakerism, like Mary Godolphin's saintly passage through the lascivious court of Charles II, was one of the most interesting of seventeenth century religious case histories.

In Ireland, Taylor carried out pastoral duties at Lisburn and preached to a small Royalist congregation in the church of Ballinderry. A man called Tandy, another appointee of

Conway's, informed against Taylor for using the sign of the cross in a baptism, and in 1659 Taylor had to make a wearisome journey to Dublin to suffer examination by the Irish Privy Council.

With the Restoration, Taylor inevitably received the honours to which his suffering, loyalty, pen, and high connections entitled him. He became Bishop of Down and Connor, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dublin, and a member of the re-organized Irish Privy Council. All these honours seem then to have turned sour. The man who had written The Liberty of Prophesying suffered nemesis in a way frequently reserved for those who make theoretic claims for toleration when in opposition, and then come later to exercise executive power. Within his diocese Taylor encountered terrifying hostility from the Presbyterians. Taylor was called an Arminian, a Socinian, a papist, a half-papist. His life was threatened. The Presbyterians took a solemn covenant never even to speak to him, and claimed the intention of culling a list of heresies from his books to be sent to Taylor's superiors. Of this there was hardly any need: Taylor's superiors were only too aware of his doctrinal eccentricities.

Sheldon, the former warden of All Souls, was by now Archbishop of Canterbury. Although he had helped Taylor with money during the Commonwealth, another shadow had fallen over their relationship during the controversies over Taylor's doctrine of original sin. Now he refused Taylor's wish to be removed to an English bishopric.[9] Taylor pleaded ill-health,

but it is obvious that the determined resistance of the Presbyterians, whom Taylor had deprived of their livings, was as much the cause of Taylor's sickness as any weakness of physical constitution.

One more minor character must be introduced. George Rust was sent to Taylor when he asked Henry More for some "learned and ingenious man" to serve as a dean in his diocese. Rust was certainly learned and ingenious. Displaying more practical artfulness than Taylor ever did, Rust was the very anonymous author of a pamphlet Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen and the Chief of His Opinions, published in 1661. He was also preacher of the sermon at Taylor's obsequies on September 3, 1667. When Rust, having in the meanwhile been elevated to the episcopacy, died a few years later, his body was buried with that of Taylor in the cathedral at Lisburn. It is strangely pleasant to think that two men, whom many of their contemporaries viewed as suspect divines, now companionably couch in the dust.[10]

Not a great deal is known about Taylor's life. We know it but fitfully and can only regret that no more has come down to us regarding Taylor's letters and conversation. Like a minor Hakluyt hero, Taylor exists best now as seen through the prism of his own leisurely, sometimes subtle, or moving style. But despite the poverty of information about his life, the contents of Taylor's voluminous works more than adequately justify choosing him as the subject of an investigation such as the present one. As one of the most articulate Anglicans

of his century, and the one who, perhaps even more than Hooker, continued to exercise influence over readers for the next two centuries through the constant re-publication of his devotional handbooks, Taylor deserves to be examined for whatever light his opinions can throw upon the political and intellectual currents of his own and subsequent times.

Firstly, therefore, the intent of this thesis is to examine Taylor's position upon such matters as reason, free-will, moral activism, contemplation and political liberty. Secondly, at the same time as this examination, in order to add argumentative spice, the attempt will be made to show that Taylor's opinions and modes of demonstration made him one of the progenitors of the secularizing ethos of the eighteenth century.

Taylor is important not because he was a very profound thinker. He was a curious mixture of poet, rhetorician, casuist, and innovating divine who never quite managed to balance and co-ordinate all his talents. He was a writer concerning whom it may frequently be said with justice that "Precocities of heart outran/The immaturities of brain."[11] This vulnerable, impressionable side of his personality makes him interesting to the historian. Intellectually, Taylor was diffuse and contradictory, but his contradictions and ambiguities were symptomatic of the profound changes occurring in English society and thought during his lifetime. In some respects Taylor is a better subject for examination from this point of view than a more consistent thinker would be.

A writer like Hobbes, for example, often interposes his own strong personality and systematic logic between the historian and the past.

Taylor, on the other hand, preserved for us to observe now an image of our present society before its features formed and hardened. To use a symbolism dear to his century, although outmoded during the course of it, Taylor was a microcosm mirroring not a theocentric, teleological macrocosm, but an amorphous cloud in whose shifting mass one can discern the vague lineaments of a world which is recognizably the modern one in its confused adolescence. To know Taylor is, therefore, in many ways, like knowing the origins of oneself. Perhaps, even after a few thousand years the Delphic adage still retains its meaning for the reader. If it does, then the approach and the subject of this thesis should require no further justification.

I

FOOTNOTES: TAYLOR REDIVIVUS

Note: The standard set of Jeremy Taylor's books is The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, ed. Rev. Reginald Heber, revised and corrected by Rev. Charles Page Eden. 10 Vols. (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green. . . etc., 1864). Hereafter, this set will be designated by the word, Works, followed by the appropriate volume number, title, and page reference. Please see Section A of the Bibliography for the key to abbreviated titles.

1 Works, Vol. 7, The Golden Grove, p. 594.

2 Ibid., p. 526.

3 Typical of such an attempt is George Grant's Lament for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 63.

4 For accounts of the Tew circle see Brian H. G. Wormald, Clarendon; Politics, History & Religion, 1640-1660 (Cambridge [Eng.] : University Press, 1951).

5 P. Des Maiseaux, An Historical and Critical Account of the Life of William Chillingworth (London, 1725), p. 50, cited a letter of Chillingworth's in which a "Mr. Taylor" was characterized as a man who ". . . wants much of the ethical part of a discourser and slights too many times the arguments of those he discourses with. . ." The relevant passages of this letter were quoted by Charles James Stranks, The Life and Writings of Jeremy Taylor (London: S.P.C.K., 1952), p. 44, to indicate the probability that Taylor knew Chillingworth. Robert R. Orr, Reason and Authority, The Thought of William Chillingworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 170, had no hesitation in identifying "Mr. Taylor" with Jeremy Taylor.

6 See Godfrey Davies, "English Political Sermons, 1603-1640," The Huntington Library Quarterly, III (October 1939), pp. 1-22.

7 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Complete Works, ed. Shedd. 7 vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1868), VII, The Constitution of Church and State, pp. 54-55.

8 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 376.

9 A significant passage occurs in a letter which Taylor wrote to Sheldon on May 25, 1664:

> I have been informed from a good hand in England, that your grace was pleased once to say, that I myself was the only hindrance to myself of being removed to an English bishopric. If it be by any fault of mine (of which I cannot so much as make a conjecture) I will certainly make amends when I know it, and in the mean time I beg of your grace to pardon it; but if it be only my unworthiness, it is true, I do confess and deplore that; but I know your grace can either find me worthy, or make me so.

Quoted from Rev. Reginald Heber, Life of Bishop Taylor, in Taylor's Works, Vol. 1, p. CXIX.

10 All the foregoing biographical details were culled from secondary sources. The two best books are Rev. Reginald Heber's Life of Bishop Taylor, printed in Vol. 1 of Taylor's Works, and Charles James Stranks' The Life and Writings of Jeremy Taylor (London, S.P.C.K., 1952). See also Marjorie Hope Nicolson (ed.), Conway Letters, the Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and Their Friends, 1662-1684 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).

11 Herman Melville, Clarel, ed. W. E. Bezanson (New York: Hendricks House, 1960), II, 4, lines 52-53.

II

NESCITIS HORAM

On the copper case which Taylor had made to protect a watch which he is said to have received from Charles I, is the motto, Nescitis horam: "You do not know the hour."[1] These words succinctly express a theme which runs constantly through Taylor's considerations of the state of man and his duty to his fellows, to God, and to supreme civil power. For Taylor, Hell, damnation, and the Last Judgement all had terrifying reality:

> . . . when this Lion of the tribe of Judah shall appear upon His own mountain, the mountain of the Lord, in His natural dress of majesty, and . . . justice shall have her chain and golden fetters taken off, then justice shall strike, and mercy shall not hold her hands; she shall strike sore strokes, and pity shall not break the blow; and God shall account with us by minutes, and for words, and for thoughts: and then He shall be severe to mark what is done amiss. . . [2]

Taylor, unlike George Rust, never treated with favourable circumspection Origen's theory that the torment of Hell might conceivably have a term owing to the mercy of God:[3] ". . . God's justice in hell rules alone, without the allays and sweeter abatements of mercy, they [the damned] shall have pure and unmingled misery. . ."[4]

If a man has no premonition when exactly he will be called to render an exact account before an omnipotent, infallible

judge, then, logically, he should try to live each moment of his life with all the virtue of act and thought which he can muster. Such was Taylor's opinion; such indeed had always been orthodox Christian opinion. What makes Taylor's doctrine particularly significant, however, is that it motivated a demanding moral activism. Broadly speaking, Taylor was moved to formulate such an activist ethic partly because of his rejection of what he considered to be the Roman Catholic doctrines of the efficacy of death-bed repentance and priestly absolution and the equally repellent doctrine of extreme predestination held by the Presbyterians, partly because of his desire to vindicate the mercy of God and provide a secure foundation for salvation in a time of bewildering controversies, and finally because of his own concept of the nature of man. Let us consider each of these influences and their implication with regard to what Taylor thought to be man's legitimate and necessary limits of activity.

With obsessive frequency and vehemence, Taylor expressed opposition to the Roman Catholic opinion that it was sufficient for a man to declare repentance for a misspent life when in the actual act of dying. Later on in this chapter we shall consider the details of Taylor's doctrine of repentance more closely after having examined what he thought were the powers and duties of man. At the moment, it is sufficient to state that for Taylor legitimate repentance could only be a continuous process, carried on throughout the sinner's life, having its effect by stimulating overt acts of virtue. "Repentance

is the institution of a philosophical and severe life, an utter extirpation of all unreasonableness and impiety, and an address to, and a final passing through, all the parts of holy living."[5] With repentance, the sinner enters a covenant with God to live an holy life, becomes a new creature characterized by a faith which expresses itself by charity and adherence to the commandments of God.[6] Neither, in Taylor's opinion, are the conditions of this covenant so difficult as not to be met but by extraordinary virtue; the conditions are easy, equable, even profitable. There is no extravagant harshness in them which might exculpate a procrastinated repentance.

> . . . when God requires nothing of us but to live soberly, justly and godly, which very things of themselves to man are a very great felicity and necessary to his present well-being, shall we think this to be a load and an insufferable burden, and that heaven is so little a purchase at that price, that God in mere justice will take a death-bed sigh or groan, and a few unprofitable tears and promises, in exchange for all our duty? [7]

For similar reasons, and with the same consequences, Taylor rejected what he considered to be the Roman Catholic perversion of confession and priestly absolution. Here, one needs to explain that he regarded priestly absolution as itself rigidly dependent upon God's pardons and by no means binding God's pardon to the sinner.[8] Roman Catholic practice, Taylor thought, endowed the sinner with ". . . a false confidence. . . it is a nurse of carelessness. . . gives boldness to imperfect penitents, and makes them to slacken their own piety. . ."[9] In one of his last works, Taylor broke out into

the following sarcasm against confession:

> . . . all the world observes how loosely the Italians, Spaniards, and French do live in their carnivals; giving to themselves all liberty and licence to do the vilest things at that time, not only because they are for a while to take their leave of them, but because they are (as they suppose) to be so soon eased of their crimes by confession, and the circular and never-failing hand of the priest. . . 10

Yet another element giving momentum to Jeremy Taylor's system of activist virtue was his rejection of predestination. His rejection was mainly based upon two grounds. Firstly, he thought that the logical consequence of predestination would be to deprive men of any wish or hope to make themselves worthy of Heaven by their own efforts. If God, in his omniscience, had determined before a man's birth if he were to be damned or to be one of the elect, what motive could he have to struggle in a battle whose outcome no act of his own could in the slightest way alter? The illogicality of such reasoning moved Taylor to scorn:

> We are taught to believe that the events of things do not depend upon our crucifying our evil and corrupt affections, but upon eternal and unalterable counsels; that the promises [of God] are not the rewards of obedience, but graces pertaining only to a few predestinates, and yet men are saints for all that; and that the laws of God are of the race of the giants, not to be observed by any grace or by any industry. This is the catechism of the ignorant and profane. . . 11

In contradiction, he maintained that although God had certainly designated some as his elect, they were few and were only fitfully aware of their blessed condition.[12] As always, when he sought a touchstone of certainty, Taylor resorted to

mundanity, ". . . the performance of our duty is the best consignation to eternity, and the only testimony God gives us of our election. . ."[13]

The second ground upon which Taylor based his rejection of predestination was his desire to vindicate the goodness of God. "To be God, and to be essentially and infinitely good, is the same thing; and therefore, to deny either is to be reckoned among the greatest crimes in the world."[14] God, in Taylor's eyes, could not be good if He decreed men to be born in an hopeless state of sin, predestined to Hell. If He did, He would be injust, for what justice would there be in damning a man for what he could not help, for what God Himself did. Never could God so contradict His wisdom as to inflict what would be so patently unjust.[15] If such propositions as the foregoing were false, then ". . . the greatest part of mankind would be tempted to think they have reason not to love God; and all the other part that have not apprehended a reason to hate Him, would have very much reason to suspect His severity and their own condition."[16]

Thus far, we have seen how Taylor was biased towards the formulation of an activist ethic by his rejection of what he considered to be the Roman Catholic doctrines of death-bed repentance and priestly absolution, by his rejection of predestination and a desire to defend the conventional attribution to God of justice. Another element also, rather paradoxical in a man with his type of reputation, must be considered, that is, Taylor's dislike of controversy. In

the dedication of his Life of Christ to Lord Hatton, for example, Taylor wrote:

> . . . I am most certain, that by living in the religion and fear of God, in obedience to the king, in the charities and duties of communion with my spiritual guides, in justice and love with all the world in their several proportions, I shall not fail at that end which is perfective of humane nature, and which will never be obtained by disputing. 17

This is a theme which we shall encounter again, from a different point of view, when in the next chapter we examine Taylor's theories of cognition. It accounts for the character of a large portion of Taylor's work--The Life of Christ, the sermons, Holy Living and Holy Dying--which are indeed, as Taylor says specifically of The Life of Christ, eminently "practical,"[18] rather than speculative. Writing of the facility with which men banned Heaven's gates to those who disagreed with them doctrinally, Taylor said, ironically in his most controversial book, "Thence came hatred, variance, emulation and strifes; and the wars of christendom which have been kindled by disputers, and the evil lives which were occasioned and encouraged by those proceedings, are the best confutation in the world of all such disputations."[19] Obsessed by the need for order, in a century when disorder in church, state, and individual morals seemed universal to him and to most of his contemporaries, Taylor would have subscribed to Phineas Fletcher's description of Dichostasis--Sedition or Schism:

> Two heads, oft three, he in one body had,
> Nor with the body, nor themselves agreeing:

What this commanded, the other soon forbad;
As different in rule, as nature being:
  The body to them both, and neither prone,
  Was like a double-hearted dealer grown;
Endeavouring to please both parties, pleasing none.

As when the powerfull winde and adverse tide
Strive which should most command the subject main;
The scornfull waves, swelling with angrie pride,
Yeelding to neither, all their force disdain:
  Mean time the shaken vessel doubtfull playes,
  And on the stagg'ring billow trembling stayes,
And would obey them both, and none of both obeyes. 20

But Taylor did not consider man, "the shaken vessel" of Fletcher's stanza, to be totally at the mercy of wind, tide, and wave. Although, superficially at least, he was too canny and cautious a divine to leave man limitless sea-room, Taylor did, at a theoretical level, consider man's faculties, subject to an infusion of divine grace, adequate to bring him into an healthy harbouring.

Taylor, like many a writer before him and since, regarded man as a mercurial combination of the bestial and the divine. On the one hand, ". . . his body is but rottenness and infirmity covered with a fair mantle, a dunghill overcast with snow. . .";[21] ". . . by nature he is the child of wrath, and by his manners he is the child of the devil. . .";[22] ". . . in all the forest the ape is the handsomest beast so long as he shows nothing but his hand; but when the enquiring and envious beasts looked round about him, they quickly espied a foul deformity."[23] A fair summary of Taylor's opinion of the least favourable characteristics of man appears in the following paraphrase he made from Apuleius:

> The spirit of a man is light and troublesome; his body is brutish and sickly; he is constant in his folly and error, and inconstant in his manners and good purposes; his labours are vain, intricate, and endless; his fortune is changeable, but seldom pleasing, never perfect; his wisdom comes not till he be ready to die, that is, till he be past using it; his death is certain. . . [24]

On the other hand, Taylor could consider man, without contradicting himself, as a vehicle of the divine. "Let us remember that God is in us, and that we are in Him: we are His workmanship, let us not deface it; we are in His presence, let us not pollute it by unholy and impure actions."[25] ". . . God hath exalted human nature, and made it in the person of Jesus Christ to sit above the highest seat of angels, and the angels are made ministering spirits, ever since their Lord became our brother. . ."[26]

But there is no contradiction between Taylor's two conceptions of man, because he conceives of the one, the bestial, being transfigured by the other, the divine. The function of man is to worship God, and this function redeems the body. ". . . God is to be worshipped. It is the maine buisinesse of our life, the end of our creation, the perfection of the Creature. . ."[27] By taking this position, Taylor differed somewhat with his Puritan antagonists who could see nothing in the servilities of ritualism but idolatry, whereas Taylor saw in them the functional, bodily enactment of an owed service. "How shall all the workes of God praise him, if our bodyes which are God's workmanship doe not in their manner this worke of God, that is to worship, and praise him?"[28]

The key to the apparent contradiction, therefore, lies in the distinction between man before revelation and grace conscript him for God's service, and after, when he is capable of fulfilling the divine implications of his creation.

> . . . a man that is guided only by natural reason, without the revelations of the gospel. . . An animal man, that is, a philosopher, or a rational man, such as were the Greek and Roman philosophers, upon the stock and account of the learning of their schools could never discern the excellencies of the gospel mysteries; as of God incarnate, Christ dying, resurrection of the body, and the like. [29]

So a man ". . . relying upon natural principles without revelation. . ." is, in Taylor's opinion, opposed to the "State of grace" and cannot be saved.[30] And yet, a curious ambiguity supervenes and forbids one to make too sharp the distinction in Taylor's mind and in his writings between "animal man" and spiritual man. The ambiguity occurs in Taylor's work when he attempts to apply the comparatively orthodox type of a redeemed man, animated by grace, which he constructed while arguing against the Calvinistic view of original sin to the conditions of covenant theology, which his interests in casuistry led him to apply to all aspects of human behaviour.

It is very difficult to summarize Taylor's doctrine of will adequately because he was compelled to plot such a subtle course, where deviations to either side would have meant his shipwreck on the shoals of the predestinational logic which he despised, or upon those of Pelagianism and the Roman Catholic doctrine of works. Under such conditions, Taylor was forced to use a cautious method of statement, qualification,

reservation, and anticipatory rebuttal which makes the book where his doctrine is most fully expounded, Unum Necessarium, cohere like a dry-stone wall. For the curious to attempt to detach one piece from such a structure for closer inspection invariably results in but a jagged fragment, and may raze all to confusion. Nevertheless, such an inspection must be attempted, although the reader is warned that the only adequate statements of Taylor's doctrine are those he made himself in Unum Necessarium, and in a more concise and popular form in Deus Justificatus.

According to Taylor, Adam's sin neither made man an heir of damnation or "naturally and necessarily vicious."[31] It made ". . . no sin inherent in us,"[32] although it did bring in such evils upon humanity as dying, sorrow, and concupiscence. But it did not destroy man's ability to work out his own salvation by resisting sin.[33] His understanding suffered no "decrement or diminution," nor could his "reasonable soul," which is by nature transcendant, immortal, and constant.[34]

The Fall, therefore, entailed suffering--which is an important point to remember when we come to explain Taylor's political theories--". . . even whatsoever the anger of God is pleased to inflict; sickness and dishonour, poverty and shame, a caitiff spirit and a guilty conscience, famine and war, plague and pestilence. . .",[35] but it did not impair the ability of Adam's successors to choose good ". . . and as naturally love good as evil, and in some instances more."[36]

The Fall did not entail upon man a constant predisposition towards evil and an oblivion to good.

Taylor gave the following reasons for his doctrine. Firstly, he argued from the necessary attribute to God of justice, an argument which we have noticed already as having been used to deny the validity of extreme predestination.

> To be born, was a thing wholly involuntary and unchosen, and therefore it could in no sense be chosen that we were born so, that is, born guilty of Adam's sin, which we knew not of; which was done so many thousand years before we were born; which we had never heard of if God had not been pleased by a supernatural way to reveal to us; which the greatest part of mankind to this day have never heard of; at which we were displeased as soon as we knew of it; which has caused much trouble to us, but never tempted us with any pleasure. 37

Taylor lays it down as axiomatic that no man can be condemned by God for something of which he was not guilty; and no guilt or responsibility can be imputed where there is not consent or an act of will depending upon a prior act of understanding, neither of which could be justly said to inhere by proxy in Adam on the behalf of his descendants.[38]

Granting the applicability of such a legalistic mode of argumentation to the relationship of the finite to the infinite, Taylor's objection is unanswerable. But it is very dangerous ground for an avowedly Christian apologist to be standing upon. It can provide, and historically has provided, a defensible perimeter for both Deist and atheist. It also delineates a doctrine of consent which although couched in theological terms offers itself very readily for use in an

analogical political context in a manner destructive of some of Taylor's most cunningly devised structures for government. But more of the latter point will be made in a later chapter.

A second reason which Taylor advanced for not regarding Adam's sin as having deprived man of his original freedom to choose good revolves around the nature of death, and by extension, although Taylor does not explicitly mention them in this context, presumably other evils such as sickness, dishonour, famine, and plague, which have already been mentioned as consequent of the Fall. Death he considers to be part of the natural condition of man, a condition which God withheld originally from Adam by a supernatural favour which could legitimately and without injustice be imposed again as part of the necessary nature of creation. Death, according to this view, is ". . . not primarily evil; but if not good, yet at least indifferent. . ."[39] Taylor can even consider death to possess an amicable character. "If we follow Christ, death is our friend: if we imitate the prevarication of Adam, then death becomes an evil; the condition of our nature becomes the punishment of our own sin, not of Adam's. For although his sin brought death in, yet it is only our sin that makes death to be evil."[40]

Once again, granting the implied structure of belief of which this mode of argument is a product, Taylor's reasoning is unexceptionable. But it is dangerous ground for an orthodox divine to adopt if, as we shall see Taylor does, he makes such acceptable suffering the support of an hierarchical

society and a doctrine of providence which ensures that society's continuance. But, of course, for Taylor, as we have already seen when examining the concepts of "animal" and spiritual man, the possibility a man being able by his unassisted natural reason to lay claim to salvation did not exist. God closed the breach between "animal" and spiritual man by revelation and covenants, and the nature of these covenants was itself sufficient proof to Taylor that his defence of man's ability to choose good and work out his own salvation was correct.

> . . . it is not to be supposed that God did inflict any necessity of sinning upon Adam or his posterity, because from that time ever unto this, He by new laws hath required innocence of life, or repentance and holiness. . . of this employing us in His service there can be no greater evidence than the giving to us new laws. . . if man could not obey, it is not consistent with the wisdom of God to require of man what He knows man cannot do, nor with His justice to punish that in man which He knows man cannot avoid. [41]

Not the least interesting and significant aspect of this reasoning is that it can logically imply the overshadowing of Natural law by Revelation, rather than the co-operative link between the two which had been outlined by thinkers before Taylor, notably Hooker. Using such an interpretation, history unfolds as a series of covenants, beginning with a covenant of works, which was broken by Adam,[42] continuing with a covenant of works under the Mosaic Law,[43] coupled with faith in the coming of the Messias,[44] culminating in the appearance of Christ, who dismissed the Jewish covenant and imposed a new covenant of faith and works.

> . . . Christ hath died for mankind, and in so doing is become our Redeemer and representative; and therefore this sin of Adam cannot call us back from that state of good things into which we are put by the mercies of God in our Lord Jesus; and therefore now no infant or idiot, or man or woman shall for this [Adam's sin] alone be condemned to an eternal banishment from the sweetest presence of God. 45

As a result of his doctrine of the Fall and the reasons he framed to support such a doctrine, Taylor was able to make a schematic, psychological analysis of man which underpins all his practical exhortations to right-conduct and his excursions into political theory.

Man, according to Taylor in one all too brief passage, is a tripartite creature, whose virtuous conduct depends upon an equable balance of three laws: firstly, "the law of members"; secondly, "the law of the mind"; thirdly, "the law of the spirit." 46 The law of members is synonymous with sin, ". . . the wisdom, the relish, the gust and savour of the flesh. . . ." 47 A man subjugated to this law was in Taylor's opinion in a state of damnable bestiality. The law of the mind is a condition in which there is consciousness of the difference between good and evil, but there is an incapacity to resist sin consistently owing to the infirmity of flesh and the disadvantages of the created world. The law of the spirit is synonymous with the grace of Christ; it frees man from the captivity of sin and flesh.

According to which one of these three laws the creature serves, such will his character correspondingly be. The impious and profane, conscious of no struggle between good

and evil, surrender to the law of members. The animal, or merely moral man attempts to avoid evil and choose good, but he is not "sanctified by the Spirit. . .",[48] and his passions frequently overcome his reason. The third category, the regenerate, are subject to the same conflict between reason and passion as the moral man, but reason with them operates under the law of the spirit. Spirit becomes man's confederate and enables him, if he co-operates with it, to prevail in his choice of good over evil.

Taylor's delineation of the regenerate as being necessarily subject to the operation of spirit, of grace, is crucial to his defense against charges that he was a Pelagian or that he was violating the meaning of the Ninth of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England:

> . . . my way of explicating this question does most of all destroy the Pelagian heresy, since although I am desirous to acquit the dispensation of God and His justice from any imputation or suspicion of wrong, and am loath to put our sins upon the account of another, yet I impute all our evils to the imperfections of our nature and the malice of our choice which does most of all demonstrate not only the necessity of grace, but also of infant baptism. . . [49]

On a theoretical level at least, Taylor consistently maintained that the unassisted operation of man's nature alone could not bring him to God; His grace and the regeneration effected by the Spirit could alone translate man to Heaven. This position was, Taylor insisted, citing the support of Zwingli, Erasmus, and Grotius,[50] completely orthodox. He never retracted it, despite the horror of Duppa, Bishop of

Salisbury, or the controversial letters he exchanged with Warner, Bishop of Rochester, or the tears (if he ever heard of them) which were shed by Robert Sanderson, the famous Anglican casuist, who deplored Taylor's doctrine.[51]

But even if Taylor's doctrine was orthodox at a theoretical level, being modified by careful qualifications, his work as a practical moralist, as a casuist, and as a polemicist against Antinomianism and Roman Catholicism all operate to negate the distinction Taylor made between animal, or moral man and regenerate man. Certainly he circumvents the danger of ascribing overmuch dignity to unassisted reason in Unum Necessarium and Deus Justificatus, but as we shall see in what follows further, there is an overwhelming tendency for Taylor in his other books, motivated by polemical, providential, political, and epistemological reasons, to circumscribe grace, to make it in effect a function, not of God, but of a certain type of society. There is also another tendency, to some extent contradicting the static, societal conception of grace just mentioned, a dynamic, individualistic one, which appears because of Taylor's emphasis upon the covenant between God and man and the necessity for man's active consent to this covenant as a condition for his salvation.

This second tendency is the one which will occupy our attention in the remainder of this chapter. There is, in effect, an implication in Taylor's doctrine that grace may be almost "forced" to inhere in an individual when he has fulfilled the articles of covenant. Such a statement would,

no doubt, have horrified Taylor, who always wrote contemptuously about the sins of the Pharisees and the rigid externality of their adherence to Mosaic Law, but the bias in his books of practical and case divinity towards emphasizing such external, activist moralism is strikingly apparent.

First of all, as we have already seen, in order to combat the doctrine of predestination Taylor took the position that it was impossible for whoever had been designated one of the elect by God, whoever had received the quality of inhering grace, to be aware of his condition with firm certainty, ". . . all the interval between our losing baptismal grace and the day of our death, we walk in a cloud, having lost the certain knowledge of our present condition by our prevarications."[52] However, one of the things of which a Christian could be sure was that he had sinned and that he must repent ". . . and never be at peace with the first sins of his youth; and the sorrows of the first day must be the duty of every day. . ."[53] "Our duty is to 'make our calling and election sure,' which certainly cannot be done but by a timely and effective repentance."[54]

But this repentance, according to Taylor, must be expressed in a holy life, which ". . . is the only perfection of repentance, and the firm ground upon which we can cast the anchor of hope in the mercies of God through Jesus Christ. . .",[55] a "firm ground" to which even the scriptures attest, which ". . . place the duties of mankind in practice and holiness of living, and removes it far from a confidence of

notion and speculation."[56]

For Taylor, repentance and the eradication of sin are a long, hard grind. Many sins form themselves into habit and cannot be dismissed by a single act of volition; something more is commanded ". . . than the moral retraction of it [sin] by a single act of sorrow or contrition. . ."[57] The habit of sin must be broken and a contrary habit of virtue established. Taylor demands that the sinner, having repented, oppose an act of virtue to his former act of sin:

> . . . as to an act of gluttony, let him oppose an act of abstinence; to an act of uncleanness, an act of purity and chastity; to anger and fierce contentions, let him oppose charity and silence . . . [58]

The difficulties of execution involved in this method--one irresistably thinks of a metaphorical bout of moral pugilism, blow and counter-blow--were to Taylor in themselves laudable as being productive of virtue.[59] This life, for him, was anything but a state for peaceful contemplation: ". . . we are here in the state of labour and contention, of pilgrimage and progression. . ."[60]

> Suppose every day to be a day of business: for your whole life is a race, and a battle; a merchandise, and a journey. Every day propound to yourself a rosary or a chaplet of good works, to present to God at night. [61]

Emanating from an Anglican, such a statement could fairly enough lay Taylor open to the charge that he was guilty of over-emphasizing works at the expense of faith. But Taylor thought faith and works were not opposites. In his opinion, the solution to any apparent opposition between them was in

the nature of the covenant of the New Testament.[62] Yet it would be difficult not to agree with such an accusation. Again and again, Taylor returns to the basic proposition that ". . . upon faith a good life is built. . ."[63] He seems to have been obsessed by the necessity of works, of moral action, an obsession which, as we shall see, probably stems in part from the unsettled political and ecclesiastical affairs of his century as well as the more narrowly doctrinal causes which have been the subject of this chapter. Because of his obsession with works, Taylor became the most formidable, in terms of bulk at least, of all English casuists. A good example of the motive which drove him to write so much in the field of case-divinity occurs in the Preface to Ductor Dubitantium:

> . . . obedience is the love of God, and to do well is the life of religion, and the end of faith is the death of sin and the life of righteousness; nothing is more necessary than that we be rightly informed in all moral notices: because in these things an error leads to evil actions, to the choice of sin, and the express displeasure of God. . . [64]

As a puddle may mirror the whole sky, so does this last quotation reflect nearly all the elements which this chapter has tried to analyze in Taylor's work. One may see implicit in it a rejection of the Roman Catholic doctrines of death-bed repentance and priestly absolution following confession by the emphasis placed upon "the life of righteousness" and the direct relationship posited between the individual sinner and God. Predestination and a ruinous state of reason

resulting from the Fall are also implicitly denied by the stress the quotation places upon man's capability of choice between good and evil while in a state of probation subject to the approval or displeasure of God. Not the least significant is the omission of any reference to the necessity of the state of grace in man and the substitution for it of right information in "moral notices." Man, upon the evidence of this quotation, would seem to be well on the way towards regression into that state of being merely a moral animal whom Taylor distinguished in Unum Necessarium as being subject to the "law of the mind," not the "law of the spirit" necessary for regeneration.

The feeling that a ". . . sentence is given at doomsday . . ."[65] pervades the quotation ominously, but one has an irresistible suspicion that for Taylor at least the reading of Ductor Dubitantium and a careful adherence to the code of morality which it presents would sufficiently justify a sinner in place of the more direct operation of sanctifying grace. In effect, Taylor's attempt to save his conception of man from the charge of Pelagianism breaks down under the load of moral obligation and consenting virtue which he demands man to shoulder as part of the covenant. Under such a burden Taylor's man becomes a punctilious, acute, persistent legalist, with a very pragmatic and individualistic approach to salvation and the world.

II

FOOTNOTES: NESCITIS HORAM

1 Works, Vol. 1, Heber's Life, p. cccll.

2 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 23.

3 Ibid., PP. 44-45 and Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium,

4 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 565.

5 Ibid., p. 396. Sermons V and VI, pages 381-407, are both concerned in detail with Taylor's doctrine of repentance.

6 Ibid., p. 401.

7 Ibid., p. 403.

8 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 445.

9 Ibid., p. 459.

10 Works, Vol. 6, Dissuasive from Popery, Pt. 1, pp. 230-231.

11 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 269.

12 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 555.

13 Ibid., p. 549.

14 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 111.

15 Works, Vol. 7, Deus Justificatus, p. 521.

16 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, pp. 91-92.

17 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 2.

18 Ibid., loc. cit.

19 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 8.

20 Phineas Fletcher, The Purple Island (1633), Canto VII, Stanzas 63-64, p. 100, in Giles and Phineas Fletcher, Poetical Works, ed. F. S. Boas. 2 vols. (Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1909).

21 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 630.

22 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 35.

23 Works, Vol. 8, The Worthy Communicant, pp. 81-82.

24 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, pp. 69-70.

25 Ibid., p. 27.

26 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 28.

27 Works, Vol. 5, On the Reverence Due to the Altar, p. 317.

28 Ibid., p. 318.

29 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 268.

30 Ibid., p. 269.

31 Ibid., p. 252.

32 Ibid., p. 312.

33 Ibid., pp. 312-313.

34 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, pp. 248-249.

35 Ibid., p. 100.

36 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 275.

37 Ibid., p. 254.

38 The emotional treatment to which such an argument was susceptible is well exemplified by the following extract from Taylor's dedicatory epistle to the Countess Dowager of Devonshire in Deus Justificatus:

> Now madam consider, could you have found in your heart when the nurse and midwives had bound up the heads of any of your children, when you had borne them with pain and joy upon your knees, could you have been tempted to give command that murderers should be brought to flay them alive, to put them to exquisite-tortures, and then in the midst of their saddest groans, throw any one of them into the flames of a fierce fire, for no

> other reason but because he was born at London, or upon a Friday, when the moon was in her prime. . . Could you desire to be thought good, and yet have delighted in such cruelty?. . . God loves mankind better than we can love one another, and He is essentially just, and He is infinitely merciful, and He is all goodness, and therefore though we might possibly do evil things, yet He cannot. . .

Cited from Works, Vol. 7, Deus Justificatus, p. 504. It may have had an important influence upon Taylor's theology that he lost several children in infancy.

39 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 361.

40 Ibid., loc. cit.

41 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 260.

42 Ibid., p. 24.

43 Ibid., p. 247.

44 Ibid., p. 26.

45 Ibid., p. 253.

46 Ibid., p. 360.

47 Ibid., loc. cit.

48 Ibid., p. 362.

49 Ibid., p. 18.

50 Ibid., p. 330.

51 Works, Vol. 1, Heber's Life, pp. xlii - xliii. Taylor's exchange with Bishop Warner is printed in Works, Vol. 7.

52 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 550. The whole question is discussed pp. 548-552.

53 Works, Vol. 8, The Worthy Communicant, p. 81.

54 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 20.

55 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 210.

56 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 73.

57 Ibid., p. 184.

58 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 143.

59 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 552.

60 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 37.

61 Works, Vol. 7, Golden Grove, p. 611.

62 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 47.

63 Works, Vol. 5, The Liberty of Prophesying, p. 604.

64 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. Xl.

65 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 139.

III

DEGREES AND METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE

Taylor's emphasis upon the necessity of a Christian's fulfilling the moral obligations of God's covenant had a predictable effect upon his theories of epistemology. Unfortunately, despite the fact that Taylor was handling subjects where the prior definition of terminology is essential, he was content for the most part to allow terms such as "reason," "understanding," "conscience," and "will" to be defined vaguely by their context or to be given whatever meaning his contemporary readers were accustomed to assume. These circumstances make Taylor's epistemology rather difficult to examine, although a drift towards empiricism, away from the doctrine of innate ideas and transcendent intuition, is readily evident, as this chapter will show. But to chart this drift, it is impossible merely to limit our examination to an abstract, semantic consideration of what Taylor actually meant by the terms listed above. Rather we must, in addition, examine several specific areas of controversy where such terms frequently appear, or where a stratum of assumptions about them can be discerned beneath the surface of what Taylor wrote, even though he may not have been using the terms explicitly.

One other introductory explanation must be made. The

reader may be one who owes allegiance to some system of sensory cognition. If he does, he will perhaps be inclined to regard Taylor's epistemology with so much favour as to find it difficult to understand how any reasonable man could think otherwise. Whether such a position is "reasonable" or not, is not here in question. What is at issue is whether Taylor's epistemology constituted a break with a system of metaphysics, using the latter word in its most transcendent sense, which can account for and to some extent control direct, personal communication at an intuitive level between man and God, and which also, by accepting the phenomenon of sainthood, makes apparent the radical difference between purely secular and spiritual values.

First, let us at once summarize and give new direction to some of the conclusions reached in the previous chapter. We have seen how Taylor, for various reasons, was intent upon binding men to a moral law which they have liberty to reject, though at the cost of damnation, or accept, with the reward of Heaven. However much Taylor may have insisted upon the necessity of an interior, vivifying grace, such a position bears within it the seed of an externalized, Pharisaical moral code, unless it be balanced by willingness to accept the more whimsical and wayward aspects of Divinity, which Henry Adams described so acutely in Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres as being characteristic of the medieval conception of the Virgin. This is a willingness of which Taylor was incapable. In part, his reluctance stemmed from political reasons: as an

established churchman, he had to defend the validity of a monolithic, national church, with an authorized, set liturgy, against the attacks of antinomian sectarians who believed in continuous revelation. But his reluctance also stemmed from Taylor's system of covenant theology. Hence one may account for the values implicit in a quotation such as the following, taken from a visitation sermon Taylor preached to the clergy of his diocese after the Restoration:

> Teach them [the congregation] to fear God and honour the king, to keep the commandments of God, and the king's commands because of the oath of God; learn them to be sober and temperate, to be just and to pay their debts, to speak well of their neighbours and to think meanly of themselves; teach them charity, and learn them to be zealous of good works. 1

Reading such words, one is already into the "virtuous," but bland, dull, worldly, self-righteous atmosphere of so much eighteenth century Anglicanism, a world where virtue was as much a political as a religious necessity, aptly symbolized by the royal coats of arms which were painted upon the chancel walls, or arch, or even apse of so many parish churches during the period. Taylor was one of the creators of such an atmosphere, for he, least of all, was about to allow any epistemological theories favourable towards the stimulation of a prophetic impulse in some obscure man's breast to escape from his pen: ". . . faith. . ." wrote Taylor in Unum Necessarium, "though it be the gift of God, yet it is seated in the understanding, which operates by way of discourse and

not by intuition: the believer understands as a man, not as an angel. . ."[2]

One of the instruments by which Taylor thought man could be perfected was by the judicious exercise of his reason. The first question which such a statement raises, however, is what exactly Taylor meant by reason. Unhappily, in order to answer it, we must become involved at least for a little while in one of those painful, labyrinthine discussions of terminology which are so familiar to those who have read commentators upon Burke and Coleridge.

Taylor was in a difficult position. On the one hand, he had to assert the utility of man's reason against the antinomian sectaries and the Roman Catholics and Presbyterians, the first of whom were bent upon elevating the direct operation of God's grace above all other rational or prudential motives, and the latter two of whom were equally interested in circumscribing individual reason in favour of an absolute authority. On the other hand, Taylor had to guard against falling into an extreme rationalism which would logically end in denying the paradoxes and mysteries of Christianity, a form of Socinianism, which would give aid and comfort to skepticism and Pyrrhonism.[3] Taylor, cruising among these currents, was, like the Anglican church as a whole, never able to thread anything but an erratic course.

Nowhere in Taylor's work can one find such an ecstatic and transcendental conception of reason as the following, taken from Henry More's Enthusiasmus Triumphatus (1662)--

although, on balance, More's attitude towards antinomianism was the same as Taylor's.

> . . . that Spirit of illumination which resides in the Souls of the faithful, is a Principle of the purest Reason that is communicable to the humane Nature. And what this Spirit has, he has from Christ. . . who is. . . the all-comprehending Wisdome and Reason of God, wherein he sees through the Natures and Ideas of all things, with all their respects of Dependency and Independency, Congruity and Incongruity, or whatever Habitude they have one to another, with one continued glance at once. [4]

The sources of such an outburst lie in Neo-Platonism, for which the less poetic and more practical Taylor did not have a great deal of sympathy as we shall see, although his writing, in its more lyrical moments, is based upon structures of metaphor and analogy which derive from Neo-Platonic principles. There is, however, a superficial similarity between what More wrote and what Taylor seems at times to have conceived to be the nature of reason. Taylor does, for example, occasionally, although in a comparatively tepid way, talk of reason as being subject to illumination by God. "It is a weak and a trifling principle," he wrote in Ductor Dubitantium, "which supposes faith and reason to be opposite: for faith is but one way, by which our reason is instructed, an acquires the proper notices of things. . ." [5] Such a mingling of faith and reason Taylor thought to be characteristic of a state of grace and the antechamber of salvation. [6] But before we too rashly ascribe a transcendent conception of reason to Taylor, notice that in the words just quoted he wrote, ". . . faith is but one way by which our reason is

instructed. . ." He continued:

> For our reason or understanding apprehends things three several ways. The first is the first notices of things abstract, of principles. . . such as are, the whole is greater than the half of the whole; good is to be chosen; God is to be loved; nothing can be or not be at the same time; for these are objects of the simple understanding, congenite notice, concreated with the understanding. The second is called. . . 'discourse,' that is, such consequents and emanations which the understanding draws from her first principles. And the third is. . . such things which the understanding assents to upon the report, testimony, and affirmation of others. . . 7

Faith and reason mingle in Taylor's system in the third way, from ". . . report, testimony, and affirmation of others. . ." They combine as man's reason, or understanding, accepts revelation as being true, and he consequently adheres to the covenant. The first way of apprehension, ". . . the first notices of things abstract, of principles. . .," corresponds to an innate reason apprehending the law of nature. But this apprehension, miraculous though it may seem to those reared in an atmosphere of environmentalism, had nothing transcendent about it for Taylor; he was far from adumbrating William Blake's divine, innate imagination. For Taylor, the law of nature corresponds to the expressed laws of revelation, but that man has a rational ability to arrive at the transcendent merely by following what he conceived to be the law of nature without seeking verification and designation by Christian revelation would have been a quite unacceptable proposition. True it was for Taylor that ". . . the law of nature is nothing but the law of God given to mankind for the conservation of his nature and the promotion of his perfective end:

a law of which a man sees a reason and feels a necessity. . ." But the law of nature was not binding until revealed, ". . . revelation and express declaring it was the first publication and emission of it. . ."[8] Man's reason, for Taylor, is but a broken twig, unless grafted to the trunk of the universal covenant between God and man, revealed locally, in England, as Anglicanism:

> . . . reason is not the natural law, but reason when it is rightly taught, well ordered, truly instructed, perfectly commanded; the law is it that binds us to operate according to right reason. . . And it will be to no purpose to say that not every man's reason, but right reason shall be the law. For every man thinks his own reason right, and whole nations differ in the assignation and opinions of right reason; and who shall be judge of all but God? and He that is the judge must also be the lawgiver. [9]

At work in these words is a type of rationalizing skepticism, but it is a qualified skepticism, operating cautiously behind a set of cunningly disposed and highly portable barriers made out of the beams and planks of circumstance, prudence, tradition, and probability. A detailed examination as to how Taylor manipulated these barriers in his political theory must await a later chapter. For the moment, we are concerned only with his use of them to define and attempt to contain a system of self-contradictory, but fundamentally empirical cognition, strongly and dangerously laced with volatile skepticism.

One of the constant, but by no means unself-contradicted themes in Jeremy Taylor's work is the uncertainty of reason and knowledge. We have already noticed his rather paradoxical

dislike of controversy in the second chapter. Partly this originated from recognition that an overly active reasoning gives evidence that the reasoner suspects the ultimate benevolence of God's providence. "No man carries his bed into his field to watch how his corn grows, but believes upon the general order of providence and nature; and at harvest finds himself not deceived."[10] Another basis for Taylor's reasoning against over-rationalization was his conception of the nature of God and revelation. "Right reason (meaning our right reason, or human reason) is not the affirmative or positive measure of things divine, or of articles and mysteries of faith. . ."[11] because of the nature of faith and its necessity, and the mysterious ways of Divinity. Christianity's huddle of paradoxes and propositions was repugnant to discursive reason Taylor admitted,[12] sometimes, when it suited an oratorical flourish, or the defence of an Anglican dogma:

> For if thou canst not understand the reciprocations and pulses of thy own arteries, the motion of thy blood, the seat of thy memory, the rule of thy dreams, the manner of digestion, the disease of thy bowels, and the distempers of thy spleen. . . it is not to be expected that thou shouldest understand the secrets of God, the causes of His will, the impulses of His grace, the manner of His sacraments, and the economy of His spirit. 13

And this Taylor thought to be as it should be, for faith would not be faith; there could be no separation of sheep and wolves; the liberty of man's will would be inoperable, if there were not uncertainty, at the level of purely humane reason, as to the veracity of revelation.[14]

How consistent Taylor was to any of these principles,

that hyper-active reason slanders providence and contradicts the nature of God, revelation, and faith, we have had some foretaste already by tracing a few of Taylor's controversies. It is as a traitor to them that Taylor is remembered, when he is remembered at all by posterity, for he is commonly known as the exponent of a radical skepticism, culminating in principles of religious toleration, set out in the Liberty of Prophesying.[15]

Whether the common estimate of this book is true is most doubtful. The fact that the overwhelming weight of the rest of Taylor's work, which one suspects very few people who allude to the Liberty of Prophesying have read, falls on the side of dogma and authority in church and state would lead to a strong suspicion that it is false.

Certain aspects of the Liberty of Prophesying must await a later chapter where we will examine Taylor's position on toleration and state prudence. At the moment, we are only concerned with the use Taylor makes of reason to support the aim of his book which, it must be emphasized, was to persuade the dominant Presbyterians of the moment to tolerate the operation of the Anglican church alongside their own.

One of the basic things Taylor did in this book was to turn upside down the orthodox Anglican notion of adiaphora, ecclesiastical matters which are not explicitly specified by scripture, but which are subject to worldly governance, and apply it against the Presbyterianism which sat now in the formerly Anglican saddle. Originally, it had been argued by

Anglicans, most notably by Hooker, that since these matters were indifferent, they could legitimately be imposed since they did not violate the letter of scripture and did continue the traditions and add to the reverence, beauty, and communality of worship. Now, Taylor argued in the reverse direction: since adiaphorous matters were not forbidden by scripture, upon which the Presbyterians declared they framed their own structure of self-government, then these matters were permissible to Anglicans, even in a state controlled by Presbyterians. Therefore, far from intending to expound a radical skepticism, Taylor was, beneath the cover of an apparent skepticism, designed purposefully to shake all certainty and thus render the Anglican scheme as probable as all others, trying to ensure the continuance of a set of dogmatic Laudian principles which circumstance and prudence alone prevented him then, as they did not after the Restoration, from openly advocating and helping to enforce.

> There are diversity of persuasions in matters adiaphorus, as meats, and drinks, and holy days, & C, and both parties, the affirmative and the negative, affirm and deny with innocence enough; for the observer, and he that observes not, intend both to God; and God is our common Master, we are all fellow servants, and not the judge of each other in matters of conscience or doubtful disputation. . . 16

Taylor fell back upon the Chillingworthian rationalistic principle that it was possible to define a core of belief upon which all Christians could agree, and whatever other sectarian peculiarities which accreted around this core, Taylor maintained, could be tolerated as indifferent, as long

as they did not violate certain canons of decency and order. This core of belief he defined as being the Apostles' Creed ". . . and the practical rules of piety, which are most plain and easy, and without controversy, set down in the gospels and writings of the apostles."[17]

The scope left for the exercise of reason in such a system, at first glance, would seem to be very limited. Taylor wished, for example, that judgment as to heresy be made ". . . by estimate and proportion of the opinion to a good or a bad life respectively. . ."[18] Judgment was not to be made in speculative matters, where Taylor set himself the task of showing how determinations had, historically, been notoriously fallible and contradictory.

This last proposition laid the foundation for the exercise of a radical, skeptical rationality,[19] which to some extent contradicts the anti-rational moralism, what could be even called the fideistic moralism, which Taylor claimed, quite rightly, to be the logical consequence of the acceptance of his historically based epistemology.

Hence he cited examples of contradictions and heresies in the early fathers and the medieval schoolmen; he compared contemporary writers to them and questioned the excessive loyalty which his fellows were willing to accord to disputed opinions; he pointed out the false ascriptions, the interpolations and losses which had made old written authority so dubious.[20] He emphasized how difficult it was to find truth after sixteen hundred years had produced such an huge

body of theology which had been made newly impenetrable by the ". . . obscurity of some questions, the nicety of some articles, the intricacy of some revelations, the variety of human understandings, the windings of logic, the tricks of adversaries, the subtilty of sophisters. . ."[21] He rejected the authority of tradition, alluding to Clement of Alexandria and Papias as early fabricators of it, and citing the lack of survival of early writers and liturgical practices, the contradictions in the traditions of various churches and the abeyance of certain incontrovertibly apostolic practices.[22] Taylor also rejected the decisions of general councils as being binding, unless accepted as such by each particular church.[23] Finally, and predictably, Taylor dismissed all claim by the Pope to be arbiter of Christianity, on either scriptural or historical grounds.[24]

Many of these positions were very dubious ones for an avowedly Royalist, Erastian priest like Taylor to take. Reportedly, they were not received with any great enthusiasm by Charles I.[25] He is said to have asked Henry Hammond to refute Taylor's devil's advocate's arguments in favour of adult baptism which had been put into the latter part of the Liberty of Prophesying to show that good and wise men could reasonably hold such an opinion. Hammond responded with a Letter of Resolution to Six Queries of Present Use with the Church of England.[26] As a result, Taylor added to the second edition of the Liberty of Prophesying, published in 1657, a confutation of his own reasoning which runs to approximately

thirty octavo pages. He excused himself for having pled the Anabaptist cause too well, arguing ". . . I could not intend to discourage the right side, or to make either a mutiny or defection in the armies of Israel."[27] He defended the tenure of his book on the prudential grounds which we shall examine later.

But the Liberty of Prophesying hung, metaphorically, like the rotting carcase of an albatross from Taylor's neck for the rest of his life. One may well credit the story that when he became a bishop Taylor sent his chaplain over to England to buy all the copies of it which could be found, that these were brought to Dromore and that a day was set apart for fasting and prayer upon the evening of which all the copies were burnt in a fire kindled in Taylor's courtyard.[28]

It is difficult not to sympathize with the feeling of dismay so apparent in Taylor's later apologies for the Liberty of Prophesying as he began to realize how much he had undermined the foundation of his own church and how difficult it is to retract or confute un livre d'occasion, written in dogmatic, universal terms, when the circumstances which led to its conception have passed. He had, as he must have realized, given far too much justification to an individualistic skepticism which was destructive of the traditional, hierarchical, state structure of Anglicanism, which, paradoxically, owes its unique character so much to the attributes which it itself posits as indifferent.

A careful reading of the book does, indeed, reveal certain,

basic Anglican tenets being upheld. For example, Taylor wrote at one point, ". . . there is a duty owing to every parish priest, and to every diocesan bishop; these are appointed over us, and to answer for our souls. . .," but he immediately gravely undercut such hierarchical authority by continuing in the same sentence that authority ". . . must guide us as reasonable creatures are to be guided, that is, by reason and discourse. . .," not by "imperiousness and absoluteness" which are due only to beasts or justifiable only in divine, infallible authority.[29] Similarly, Taylor maintained that in indeterminate or ambiguous matters presumption lay on behalf of the hierarchy, ". . . for we do nothing for authority if we suffer it not weigh that part down of an indifferency and a question which she chooses. . .," but again he undercut his proposition by continuing that in the case of an error manifestus, or if the church government be fragment into sects, then a man may choose his own guides and follow them ". . . so long as that reason remains for which we first chose them."[30]

Inevitably, his co-religionists and adversaries claimed that Taylor had destroyed the authority of an earlier book, his Discourse of Episcopacy, because the Liberty of Prophesying rejected the authority of fathers and councils upon which the former book had been built. Taylor replied to his critics in the dedication to a collection of his works published in 1657 which contained the second, revised edition of the Liberty of Prophesying:

> . . . episcopacy relies, not upon the authority of fathers and councils, but upon scripture, upon the institution of Christ or the institution of the apostles, upon an universal tradition and an universal practice, not upon the words and opinions of the doctors. . . 31

The fine distinction between "universal tradition and. . . practice" and ". . . the words and opinions of the doctors. . ." one can only leave to be drawn adequately in Taylor's words, with Taylor's feline skill; certainly it escapes a less subtle student. It is most significant to note too that Taylor, by making episcopacy to be based upon scripture and therefore beyond question, contradicted Hooker, who held episcopacy to be adiaphorous. The solution to what motivated Taylor's opinion may perhaps be found in the fact that he recognized the inadequacy of the notion of adiaphora to resist rationalistic enquiry.

In the works he published following the Restoration, Taylor held to his opinion, the only possible one for a late seventeenth century Anglican prelate, that the essentials of the Anglican church could be derived from a scriptural core and the two universalities of tradition and practice. In a visitation sermon preached to his Irish clergy he told them, ". . . let the consent of the catholic church be your measure . . . it can be instanced but in three things, in the creed, in ecclesiastical government, and in external forms of worship and liturgy."[32] Or, again, in Ductor Dubitantium, Taylor cited the Easter feast, weekly sabbath, episcopacy, and the priestly function as all being of apostolic tradition and verifiable

by scripture.[33]

Such, therefore, was the nature of Taylor's celebrated skepticism--a very prudential, circumstantial method, allowed full leash once, in the Liberty of Prophesying, under peculiar conditions, and then qualified and retracted subsequently; the full consequences of its implications for the Anglican structure of church and state not to be completely admitted by its master, who exercised all his ingenuity to place what he believed true within the noli me tangere of scripture, and providence, and prudence, while he laid waste all else about him with Pyrrhonic efficiency. Taylor's rationalism reminds one very much of the clumsy prototype of some awesome, destructive machine, quite as dangerous to the manipulator as to the intended victim. However much Taylor tried subsequently to adjust his aim, the destruction of what he hoped to defend could not be repaired. The Liberty of Prophesying is symptomatic of the inner erosion which acceptance of the weapons of rationalism--biblical criticism, historicism, politicization, sacramentalism--even when utilized by the church in self-defence, inevitably worked within the mystical body of seventeenth and eighteenth century Anglicanism.

Confirmation of this diagnosis comes when one examines the opposition Taylor made to the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. Whether the nature of the principles which animated his opposition were a direct causative influence upon the formulation of late seventeenth century empiricism would be impossible now to say, but the parallels

between Taylor's principles and those of Locke are remarkable.

What Taylor had to defend was the conventional Anglican doctrine of the eucharist which attempts to define a spiritual, not a carnal presence of Christ in the elements, yet avoid the flaw of making the eucharist merely a symbolic remembrance of Christ. A subtle doctrine, such as this is, was inevitably expressed by Taylor the orator in paradoxical terms. For him, Christ's body is present in the elements incorporeally; the presence is more than figurative, but not natural.[34] He wrote: ". . . the symbols, becoming nutriment, are turned into the substance of our bodies; so Christ, being the food of our souls, should assimilate us, making us partakers of the divine nature."[35]

As Taylor admitted, such a doctrine is mysterious, in the deepest meaning of the word: ". . . let us search as far into it as we are guided by the light of God," he wrote in The Worthy Communicant, "and where we are forbidden by the thicker part of the cloud, step back and worship."[36] This mystery is not, however, in Taylor's opinion, inaccessible to ordinary intelligence; rather it is ". . . that which the good and the plain, the easy and the simple man can understand. . ."[37]

But although, as Taylor said, the Anglican doctrine of the eucharist is obscured by divine cumulus, Taylor had no intention of allowing Roman Catholics to plead an equally fortuitous condensation. He attacked scornfully; he attacked constantly--except for a momentary politic equivocation in

the Liberty of Prophesying[38] --and he attacked on the grounds of reason:

> Whatsoever is against right reason, that no faith can oblige us to believe. For although reason is not the positive and affirmative measures of our faith, and God can do more than we can understand, and our faith ought to be larger than our reason, and take something into her heart that reason can never take into her eye; yet in all our creed there can be nothing against reason. [39]

Torn out of its context, a quotation such as this might conceivably be read as signifying reason of a more transcendent type than the mere humane. Such is not the case. Taylor, when he wrote, was referring to the reason which operates from sensual notices. "It cannot be the duty of faith to believe any thing against our sense; what we see and taste to be bread, what we see and taste and smell to be wine, no faith can engage us to believe the contrary."[40]

According to Taylor, ". . . sense is the evidence of the simple and the confirmation of the wise. . ." It is the final judge in disputed matters and makes what is merely opinion to be knowledge; ". . . no demonstration in the world can be greater than the evidence of sense. Our senses are the great arguments of virtue and vice. . ."[41] To have heard, to have seen,[42] and especially to have touched--Taylor quotes as proof Aristotle's dictum, "The touch can never be deceived"[43] --constitute in Taylor's opinion ". . . the firmest pillars upon which all human notices, and upon which all christian religion does rely. . ." and cannot be shaken, for if they are, ". . . all science and all religion must be in danger."[44]

The consequence of these propositions is that the Roman Catholic church, by asking men to believe against the evidence of their senses and their reason that Christ is carnally present in the eucharist was in Taylor's opinion asking the unnatural, the impossible, the wrong.[45] Fortified obviously by a sublime confidence in the unchallengeable basis of his reasoning, Taylor gave loose rein to his sarcasm and produced some of the most unpleasant polemic of his career. Was the body of Christ still carnally present, he enquired, after the host had been ejected from the mouth or defecated?[46] How could the real body of Christ be at once in Heaven and in the sacrament, not just in one sacrament, but in a thousand or more, all over the world? How could even God make a substance infinitely extendible and divisible?[47] In the Last Supper, how could Christ, who had not yet been crucified, be present at the same time in person and in the sacrament he offered to the disciples?[48] How could there be a carnal presence of Christ in the sacrament, but that sacrament not nourish all communicants alike in a spiritual manner, leaving some still as unworthy as they were before communion?[49] If bread becomes Christ's body, does this not exalt bread above the angels; should not bread ". . . reign for ever, and be king of all the world. . ."?[50] The only possible answer to the last question in Taylor's mind was affirmative, and therefore he convicted the Roman Catholic church of idolatry.[51]

Impatiently he brushed aside Bellarmine's distinction between inward substances and outward accidents, the latter

alone being subject to sense. Taylor claimed that no such separation could be made. Accidents signified substance in his mind:

> . . . that which is felt is the substance, and the means by which it is felt is the accidents: as the shape, the colour, the bigness, the motion of man, are manifestative and declarative of a human substance. . . [52]

Equally brusquely he answered the Roman Catholic literal interpretation of Christ's words at the Last Supper, Hoc est corpus meum, on the grounds that the words were meant not literally, but figuratively. We will examine Taylor's principles of scriptural interpretation in a moment. Basically, his objection to a literal interpretation of Christ's words was that they would have required a miracle to be literally true when spoken where no miracle was explicitly affirmed. Without this explicit affirmation on Christ's part, Taylor thought no literal interpretation could be allowed to offend against the evidence of sense and reason.[53]

After making such attacks, Taylor felt justified in claiming for the Anglican church the title of being the true defender of the real, the spiritual presence of Christ in the eucharist.[54] However, even if such were the case, and we are not here concerned about which side, in purely theological terms, was correct, he certainly justified the Anglican definition in an obtuse manner, for no more may the doctrine of spiritual presence be verified on sensual grounds than the doctrine of carnal presence. Furthermore, by using an epistemology based upon only sensory notices in the

controversy, and generalizing, as he invariably did in all his polemic, so broadly as to make his principles seem universal and absolute, Taylor surrendered the conceptions of transcendent reason and innate ideas which are such necessary methods for the defence of the areas of Christian paradox and the Christian conception of the nature of man, part spirit, part animal. One more parenthetic comment may perhaps be suggestive: given the general tendency in Europe at the time towards pragmatism in politics, in religion, in science, the Roman Catholic doctrine of carnal presence gave the vast majority who were, as a result, becoming progressively less adept at metaphysical abstraction, a grip upon some sort of spiritual reality which the Anglican doctrine could not provide. The reserved sacrament remains to the present day, regardless of whether the doctrine of carnal presence be theologically orthodox or not, and speaking solely in terms of observable fact, a focal point for Roman Catholics which one immediately notices to be lacking an exact counterpart in Anglican churches outside the set hours of worship, or even at times within them.

But Taylor's insistence upon the sensual basis of reason was not just limited to the course of his controversies against transubstantiation. It permeated his thought so thoroughly that one is hardly surprised (though from an argumentative scholar's point of view, unexpectedly delighted) to come across such reasoning, taken from the final pages of Holy Dying, where Taylor considered whether the dead retain

memory of the living and have any knowledge of what still passes on earth.

> . . . men a long time live the life of sense before they use their reason; and till they have furnished their head with experiments and notices of many things, they cannot at all discourse of any thing: but when they come to use their reason, all their knowledge is nothing but remembrance 55 ; and we know by proportions, by similitudes and dissimilitudes, by relations and oppositions, by causes and effects, by comparing things with things; all which are nothing but operations of understanding upon the stock of former notices. . . 56

Coming across such a passage, one has the feeling that an integral and higher form of cognition has been carved away by Taylor. After all, even shrewd Hooker wrote:

> The soul of man. . . being capable of a more divine perfection, hath (besides the faculties of growing unto sensible knowledge which is common unto us with beasts) a further ability, whereof in them there is no show at all, the ability of reaching higher than unto sensible things. 57

In fact, there is ample evidence to support the contention that Taylor was, on balance, hostile to all forms of cognition and conduct based directly upon individual, intuitive, supra-rational, immaterialistic notices. This, indeed, is logically enough what Taylor's conception of an almost entirely materialistic basis for human reason, examined in this chapter, and the activism consequent upon his use of covenant theology, examined in the previous chapter, would lead one to predict. But even despite its predictability, Taylor's distaste for all symbolic modes of discourse, for mysticism, sainthood,

passive contemplation and heroic asceticism, Taylor's anticipation of so many of the aspects of the eighteenth century's fear of "enthusiasm," strike one with rather a shock, embalmed as they are in a prose which gives frequent, but no constant evidence of the operation of an artistic, fastidious temperament, highly adept at communicating spiritual realities.

For example, Taylor had no apparent hesitation in using improprieties in the Greek grammar of the gospels and epistles as proof that they were not wholly dictated by the Holy Ghost, that they were, partly at least, the product of some human industry.[58] Presumably he thought the Holy Ghost was a grammarian. He possibly also momentarily forgot the necessity, by his own reasoning, for an unimpeachable scriptural core to support the Anglican church.

Citation of the corruptions in the text of the bible was also used by Taylor in the Liberty of Prophesying to prove that principles drawn from such corrupt texts were not binding, because ". . . God hath not obliged Himself so punctually to preserve. . ." a consistent reading, from which certainty could be legitimately inferred.[59]

Such comments as these, whether they be actually true or not, are significant evidence of an attitude dangerously close to secularized detachment. They introduce an element of relativity; they admit uncertainty in an area where men had formerly been convinced that the bible was, every word of it, direct revelation. Presumably Taylor was too intent upon

the defence of Anglicanism against the attacks of visionary Independents and scripture quoting Presbyterians to be fully aware of how much he was compromising the authority of God.

Taylor did have a clear understanding of the traditional methods of biblical interpretation: the literal mode, with its two subdivisions of the natural and the figurative; and the spiritual mode, with its subdivisions of the allegorical and anagogical.[60] But in practice, he severely restricted the operation of the spiritual mode. He admitted there were many places in the bible of great mystery, but saw these as having been decreed by God as an evidence of His unfathomable depths and for the occasion of giving man reason to exercise charity, toleration, and humility.[61] The path to God, thought Taylor, lies not through puzzling over obscure passages, but in accepting the "plain and easy" directives, susceptible to literal interpretation.[62]

He admitted that certain matters such as the mystical figuration of Christ and the Church by Adam and Eve, or the prefiguration of Baptism by the Flood, were legitimate subjects for spiritual interpretation. But he had nothing but contempt for Quakers and Familialists who expounded the gospels ". . . as if they had no meaning by the letter, but were only an hieroglyphic or a pythagorean scheme. . ."[63] For Taylor, the literal interpretation was, whenever possible, to be preferred before the spiritual, except where the literal violated "common sense and a vulgar reason."[64] From this proposition derived his attacks upon transubstantiation.

Hoc est corpus meum had only a grammatical and figurative meaning for Taylor; the literal interpretation ". . . is against sense, and reason, and experience, and scripture, and tradition, and the common interpretation of things, and public peace and utility, and every thing by which mankind ought to be governed and determined."[65]

Such a torrent of empirically orientated testimony is a long way from the complex esotericism professed by the Italian Renaissance Platonists, or the following words, taken from one of their main sources, Dionysius the Areopagite: "All those who are wise in divine matters and are interpreters of the mystical revelations prefer incongruous symbols for holy things, so that divine things may not be easily accessible."[66] In contrast, Taylor thought that figures and symbols were only tolerable in the Old Testament, but easy and open manifestations characterized the New:

> . . . the Egyptians indeed did teach religion by symbolical figures. . . and in the schools of Plato and Pythagoras they taught their scholars by numbers and figures; and Diodorus of Tarsus and Origen brought in an allegorical way of expounding. . . and. . . too much, left the literal and simple way. . . and so do the perfectionists and some others at this day: but we. . . have an easier way of teaching. . . and are not therefore to return to the elements and rituals of Jews and pagan schools.[67]

Such eupeptic rationalism, however, could not carry Taylor everywhere. His misgivings about anything which was not readily apprehensible at a discursive level led him to betray a rather comic uneasiness with the Athanasian Creed.[68] He obviously was by temperament, training, and lack of

spiritual intuition bewildered by the subtle paradoxes and qualifications which define the Trinity in the Creed in terms such as: "One altogether; not by confusion of Substance: but by unity of Person/For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man: so God and Man is one Christ." Into definitions like these, a rationalism such as that which Taylor attempted to make an almost universal measure simply cannot penetrate.

It is tantalizing to wonder what Taylor, wrapped up in such opinions, would have thought if he had known the details of the curious friendship between Margaret Blagge, later Mrs. Godolphin, and his spiritual son, John Evelyn--a friendship symbolized by the altar which Evelyn drew, under which Margaret wrote, "Be this the Symboll of Inviolable Friendship. . .," and about which Evelyn wrote: ". . . the title that has consecrated this Alter is the Marriage of Souls, and the Golden thread that tyes the hearts of all the world. . ."[69] One suspects Taylor's attitude would have been hostile. Just as he was suspicious of spiritual interpretations of scripture and symbolic communication, so also does he seem to have been suspicious of the spiritual idealization of love and friendship. Platonic love, in Taylor's opinion, was "Platonic fooleries."[70] His view of human intercourse was earthy, prudent, and pragmatic. Platonic love and friendship were both for him ". . . but tinsel dressings, which will show bravely by candle-light and do excellently in a mask, but are not fit for conversation, and the material

intercourses of our life."[71]

Just as he was suspicious of the spiritualization of earthly affections, so also was Taylor suspicious of the affective or cognitive idealization of the communication between God and man. It is true that one may cull a little evidence from Taylor's writings to suggest that such was not the case. There are, for example, two letters to Evelyn, written from Ireland just before the Restoration. In the first, Taylor wrote that the new sect of Perfectionists understood Jakob Boehme ". . . as nurses doe their children's imperfect language; something by use, and much by fancy," which would seem to argue that Taylor was familiar enough with the mystic to know when he was being misused. The second letter in question informed Evelyn that Taylor was "contending" for some "height of love and union with God."[72] One could infer from these words that Taylor was involved to some extent in unitive contemplation. The last pieces of evidence are some passages in Taylor's famous funeral sermon for Lady Frances, Countess of Carberry, notably the following in which he states that ". . . ecstasies, visions, raptures, intuitive knowledge, and consideration of its self, acts of volition, and reflex acts of understanding, are proper to the soul."[73]

But not enough can be made from such evidence, and this is all that there is, to support a case for Taylor as a spiritual adept, seriously aware of legitimate methods of cognition other than those based upon material notices, in

the face of the overwhelming weight of evidence as to his usual hostility to such methods.

For example, he betrayed a complete misapprehension of sainthood. No doubt one cannot place too much emphasis upon Taylor's reference to Charles I as a "glorious saint and martyr"; such praise was common enough among Anglican divines and perhaps understandable considering the circumstances. What is more difficult to explain away, assuming Taylor to have had some knowledge of what he was talking about beyond the merely superficial, and even making allowance for the fashionable hyperbole expected by patrons, is the following passage in Taylor's dedication of The Worthy Communicant to Princess Mary:

> . . . we no more envy to Hungary the great name of S. Elizabeth, to Scotland the glorious memory of S. Margaret, to France the triumph of the piety of S. Genovese, nor S. Katherine to Italy, since in your royal person we have so great an example of our own, one of the family of saints, a daughter to such a glorious saint and martyr. . . 74

One suspects that if Taylor had actually ever met a real saint, he would have been disgusted. His rationality would have been baffled. He despised ". . . those books from whence the clouds arise, especially the books of ineffective and fantastic notion, such as are legends of saints. . ." because they were "invented," impractical, filled with "dreams and false propositions," like the books of mystical theology ". . . which have in them the most high, the most troublesome, and the most mysterious nothings in the world. . . the

effluxes of a religious madness."[75]

Taylor's God is ". . . a God of order. . ."; He does not favour "raptures and extravagant expectations. . . illiterate phantasms and ignorant discourses,"[76] nor does He even exact, as we shall see in the next chapter, heroic acts of piety. Taylor's God, in fact, sounds suspiciously like a gentleman, and we all know who is a great gentleman. . . . Taylor's God demanded not acts of intuition or contemplation, but obedience to the covenant, to the commandments.[77]

Man's love for God, therefore, according to Taylor, must be prudent, patient, and realistic:[78] ". . . let no man be hasty to eat of the fruits of paradise before his time."[79] Man must be an activist, not a contemplative relying upon some doctrine of miraculous "infused habits" which would take away the necessity of an holy life and the duty of man to struggle for his reward.[80]

For Taylor, faith was firmly seated in the understanding and takes the same shape and hue; therefore, man, even as a believer, understands by discourse, not by intuition; ". . . the believer understands as a man, not as an angel. . ."[81] His understanding is bound to the covenant:

> A regenerate person is convinced of the goodness of the law, and meditates in it day and night. His delight is in God's law, not only with his mind approving, but with his will choosing the duties and significations of the law. 82

And so our examination of Taylor's theories of cognition has brought us back full circle to where we started, back to man and the covenant, back to consent and the moral law. We

have seen how Taylor's epistemology is almost totally based upon empirical notices. Even the infusion of faith in the believer is constrained by the humane conditions of sensory perception upon which alone Taylor conceived understanding or reason could operate. We have traced Taylor's wayward excursions into skepticism in the Liberty of Prophesying and indicated how conditional and self-contradictory it was and how dangerous generally to revealed religion and particularly to Anglicanism. Similar dangers and self-contradictions were revealed when we considered the empirical basis of the rationality which Taylor exercised against transubstantiation. Lastly in this chapter, we saw how Taylor logically extended empirically based rationality to call in question the validity of revelation, symbolic discourse and spiritual intuition.

Upon the basis of this evidence, it is apparent that Taylor was a perhaps rather surprising percursor to Locke and the empirical skepticism of David Hume. He was a bridge, linking seventeenth century theology to the empirically based, secular moralism characteristic of the eighteenth century.

III

FOOTNOTES: DEGREES AND METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE

1 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 532.

2 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 190.

3 Taylor was fully aware of these dangers. He examined them in Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, pp. 57-59.

4 Henry More, Enthusiasmus Triumphatus 1662, intro. M. V. De Porte (Los Angeles: University of California, 1966), sect. LIV, p. 39.

5 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 59.

6 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 498.

7 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 59. The reader will perhaps realize the difficulties which Taylor's writings offer to the obtaining of adequate evidence for a semantic examination of his concept of reason if one points out that this passage is the clearest and longest exposition in all Taylor's work as to its sources and nature. Incidentally, the distinctions outlines in this quotation correspond to those between animal, moral, and regenerate man explained in the previous chapter.

8 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 296.

9 Ibid., p. 592.

10 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 149.

11 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 62.

12 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, pp. 331-332.

13 Works, Vol. 8, The Worthy Communicant, p. 107. A similar theme is pursued in Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, pp. 62-64.

14 Works, Vol. 8, The Worthy Communicant, p. 98.

15 Many are the passing references one finds to Taylor in general surveys which treat him in this fashion, making him an enthusiastic anticipator of toleration and free-enquiry. See, for example, the allusion to Taylor in the first chapter of Ruthven Todd, Tracks in the Snow (London: The Grey Walls Press, 1946). Margaret Wiley devoted a chapter of her book The Subtle Knot (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952) to Taylor, biased in the same way.

16 Works, Vol. 5, Liberty of Prophesying, p. 344.

17 Ibid., p. 533.

18 Ibid., p. 532.

19 Interesting parallels could be drawn between Montaigne's essay, the "Apology for Raimond Sebond," and Taylor's Liberty of Prophesying. There is evidence that Taylor read Montaigne; he quoted him in Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 272, and in Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 141.

20 Works, Vol. 5, Liberty of Prophesying, pp. 486-487.

21 Ibid., p. 516.

22 Ibid., pp. 429-436.

23 Ibid., p. 460.

24 Ibid., pp. 462-483.

25 In one of the notes he added to Heber's Life, when his revised edition of Taylor was issued in 1864, Eden quoted from Sir Philip Warwick's Memoirs: ". . . Nor had he [Charles I] given that countenance unto Dr. Taylor's Liberty of Prophesying, which some believed he had. . ." etc. See Works, Vol. 1, Heber's Life, p. cclxii.

26 Charles James Stranks, The Life and Writings of Jeremy Taylor (London: S.P.C.K., 1952), p. 86.

27 Works, Vol. 5, Liberty of Prophesying, p. 559.

28 Works, Vol. 1, Eden's note added to Heber's Life, pp. xxxii-xxxiii. The story can be read in its full original form and context in John Nichols, Illustrations of the Literary History of the Eighteenth Century (London: Nichols, son, and Bentley, 1817-1858), Vol. VII, p. 464. It appeared there in a letter from Dr. Lort to Bishop Percy, dated March 26, 1784. The chaplain who collected the copies of the Liberty of Prophesying was even named. But Dr. Lort told Bishop Percy the anecdote could not be verified, and such still remains the case.

29 Works, Vol. 5, Liberty of Prophesying, p. 460.

30 Ibid., p. 493.

31 Works, Vol. 5, Dedication to Hatton of the collection Taylor entitled Certain Select Polemical Discourses, 1657, p. 4.

32 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 530.

33 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 616.

34 Works, Vol. 8, The Worthy Communicant, p. 107. See also Works, Vol. 6, Real Presence, p. 81 where Taylor cited Origen as being of his opinion.

35 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 641.

36 Works, Vol. 8, The Worthy Communicant, p. 18.

37 Ibid., p. 107.

38 Works, Vol. 5, Liberty of Prophesying, pp. 598-599.

39 Works, Vol. 8, The Worthy Communicant, p. 106.

40 Ibid., p. 104.

41 Ibid., p. 105.

42 Works, Vol. 6, Real Presence, p. 85.

43 Ibid., p. 91. The quotation is from De Anima, lib iii, c. 3.

44 Ibid., p. 85.

45 Works, Vol. 8, The Worthy Communicant, p. 106. See also Vol. 6, Real Presence, p. 98.

46 Works, Vol. 6, Real Presence, p. 78.

47 Ibid., pp. 105-107.

48 Ibid., pp. 68-69.

49 Ibid., p. 33.

50 Ibid., p. 126.

51 Ibid., p. 162.

52 Ibid., p. 86.

53 Works, Vol. 6, Real Presence, p. 102.

54 Ibid., p. 15.

55 Taylor's use of the word "remembrance" calls to mind Plato's doctrine of the pre-existence of souls and the recollection of divine knowledge. But Taylor's "remembrance" operates from "physics," Plato's conception is metaphysical.

56 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Dying, p. 454.

57 Richard Hooker, The Works of Richard Hooker, arranged by John Keble (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1865), I, p. 217.

58 Works, Vol. 5, Apology for Authorized and Set Forms, p. 270.

59 Works, Vol. 5, Liberty of Prophesying, p. 413.

60 Ibid., p. 414.

61 Ibid., p. 410.

62 Works, Vol. 6, Dissuasive from Popery, Pt. 2, p. 404.

63 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, pp. 524-525.

64 Ibid., p. 522.

65 Ibid., p. 523.

66 Edgar Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance (London: Faber & Faber, 1958), p. 20.

67 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 409.

68 Works, Vol. 5, Liberty of Prophesying, p. 406.

69 John Evelyn, The Life of Mrs. Godolphin, ed. E. W. Harcourt (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1888), pp. 37-38.

70 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 248.

71 Works, Vol. 1, A Discourse of the Nature and Offices of Friendship, p. 81.

72 The two letters appear in Works, Vol. 1, Heber's Life, pages lxxxiv and lxxxvii respectively.

73 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 440.

74 Works, Vol. 8, The Worthy Communicant, p. 4.

75 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 275.

76 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 376.

77 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 196.

78 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 159.

79 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 143.

80 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 190.

81 Ibid., p. 190.

82 Ibid., p. 370.

IV

MARY AND MARTHA

Coleridge once said that all men are born natural Platonists or Aristotelians. A similar apposition occurs in the gospel according to St. Luke:

> Now it came to pass, as they went, that he entered into a certain village: and a certain woman named Martha received him into her house.
>
> And she had a sister called Mary, which also sat at Jesus' feet, and heard his word.
>
> But Martha was cumbered about much serving, and came to him, and said, Lord, dost thou not care that my sister hath left me to serve alone? bid her therefore that she help me.
>
> And Jesus answered and said unto her, Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things:
>
> But one thing is needful: and Mary hath chosen that good part, which shall not be taken away from her. 1

Traditionally, the two figures of Martha and Mary have been used respectively by commentators to symbolize the two contrasted but complementary vocations of the active and contemplative life. Accepting completely, as many of us now do, either a secular or Protestant system of values, it is difficult to take an imaginative step into an ethos which considers the life of contemplation to be of equal or even superior importance to the active life. As proof that such

can be the case, here are the words of St. Basil, the fourth century Archbishop of Caesarea, one of the Four Great Doctors of the Eastern church:

> . . . we see the two states placed before us by means of the two women; the lower [Martha], choosing to serve Him in corporeal ministrations which also is most profitable, and that [Mary's way] which, ascending to the contemplation of the sacred mysteries, is the more spiritual. 2

One notices immediately that St. Basil assigned an higher degree of spirituality to the way of Mary than to that of Martha. He did not, however, disapprove of Martha's way. In the sermon from which we have just quoted, St. Basil continued by leaving it up to each individual in the congregation which way he should choose, although the Archbishop stipulated that choice of Martha's way entailed the exercise of most heroic charity, always in the name of Christ. But St. Basil did make clear that he considered Mary's way to be superior, and that the one who chooses it must make a radical break with the world. He must put ". . . aside the service of bodily need," ascend "to the contemplation of the divine glories. . . Leave the body, leave the tilling of the earth, and the preparation of what is eaten with bread. . . For to contemplate that which Christ teaches is a work above the service of corporal need."

How much Taylor agreed with these principles any reader of the former two chapters may accurately predict. He never tried, it is true, to deny the conditional validity of the way of Mary; after all, to have done so in the light of

Christ's words granting Mary favour would have been very brazen. What Taylor did, though, was to disparage Mary's way subtly by emphasizing the dangers and "selfishness" of a contemplative life in contrast to the safe, immediate, obvious, and practical benefits of active charity. Such tendencies are at work, for example, in the following passage, whose effect differs very widely from that of the words just quoted from St. Basil: ". . . although Mary was commended for choosing the better part, yet Mary had done worse if she had been at the foot of her Master when she should have relieved a perishing brother. . ."[3] There were no such humanitarian considerations in St. Basil; his words ruthlessly cut Mary from worldly affairs. Taylor's words, on the other hand, help to make her another Martha. Although he might seem to permit Mary's way under certain conditions, he is in practice impeding her from it, for hardly at any time are there not miserable men in the world in need of help.

Taylor's empiricism made him intensely suspicious of the intuitionism and the spiritual phenomena which have characterized historically, the deepest forms of contemplation. Of course, Taylor's Holy Living and Holy Dying and The Golden Grove both preached the desirability of retired meditation. But discursive meditation, within the bounds of covenant theology, and intuitional contemplation are distinctly different matters. If the latter be slighted, then there is grave risk of debasing religion by turning it from concernment with grace and spirit to the practice of a rigid, externalized

morality. This was, in effect, what Taylor did.

He never appears to have been willing or able to conceive constant prayer and contemplation as being acts of charity, perhaps quite as efficacious to society as the pragmatic, externalized charity which alone he considered safe and practical.

> Contemplation is an excellent part of the divine service; but charitable actions are more useful . . . Ecstasies and raptures and conversing with blessed spirits are certainly actions and passions respectively of greater eminency than dressing the sores of poor boys in hospitals: and yet he that does this serves Christ and does good, while he that follows after the others may fall into the delusions of the devil. [4]

Again, as is so often the case when reading Taylor, one is reminded by such a passage (tinctured as it is by considerable irony) of the threat he and Anglicanism faced from politically turbulent antinomians and Roman Catholics. Under such conditions, Taylor was apparently hardly in a position to appreciate the indirect function which solitary contemplatives may fulfil in the state, contemplatives who, to use the words of Julien Benda, ". . . maintiennent l'idéal dans son absolu, hors des altérations qu'il doit nécessairement subir pour passer dans le reél."[5]

This disparagement of the way of Mary, anti-intellectual and egalitarian in its consequences, is yet another proof of Taylor's hostility towards non-discursive modes of thought and his predilection for the inculcation of moral activism. But it is also, from a slightly different point of view, symptomatic of Taylor's shift from a theocentric to a

naturalized universe. For if Mary be denied her contemplation, then no other link exists between man and God in the system of Anglican Erastianism except the one between Martha and providence, working co-operatively through the jurisdiction of the church-state nexus.[6]

The manners of Mary and Martha also concerned Taylor. He was, after all, a fastidious man; a moralist, dominated by notions of the Aristotelian mean; a pragmatic rationalist to whom excess was repugnant and dangerous. Not only did he regard the passive, unitive way of Mary with suspicion, he also suspected the validity of all acts of heroic purgation and piety, even if they were connected with Martha's way. According to Taylor, the conditions of a good life demanded by the gospel were binding, but not excessively strict or severe. Severity between God and man had been diminished by the mercy of Christ and the exemplary civility of His life on earth. Logically enough, Taylor's emphasis upon Christ's mercy and Christian mediocrity spurred him to sentimentalize Christ and create of Him a figure whose humane attributes received disproportionate attention in comparison to the divine ones:

> For now we need not, with Adam to fly from the presence of the Lord. . . for He, from whom our sins made us once to fly, now weeps, and is an infant in His mother's arms. . . hath forgotten all His anger, and is swallowed up with love, and encircled with irradiations of amorous affections and good will: and the effects of this good will are not referred only to persons of heroical and eminent graces and operations, of vast and expensive charities, of prodigious abstinencies, of eremetical retirements, of

> ascetical diet, of perfect religion, and canonized persons; but to all 'men of good will,' whose souls are hallowed with holy purposes and pious desires. . . [7]

In addition to designation Christ as the fount of vast mercy, Taylor made Him the pattern, the Great Exemplar,[8] for Christians to emulate. Needless to say, Christ, the Taylorian exemplar, had nothing in common with Christ, the revolutionary, as popularized by some twentieth century artists and socialists.[9] Taylor's Christ was a very prudent gentleman, ". . . constant, unblameable, complying with civil society, without affrightment of precedent, or prodigious instances of actions greater than the imitation of men." His life was very holy, but "ordinary"--a position which Taylor maintained explicitly against the "ecclesiastical writings of certain beatified persons, whose life is told rather to amaze us and to create scruples, than to lead us in the evenness and serenity of a holy conscience."[10]

Taylor cited Christ's submission to baptism as proof that ". . . a life common and ordinary, without affectation or singularity, is the most prudent and safe."[11] He did not think the pattern of Christ's life sanctioned "ecstasies in prayer, and abstractions of senses, and immaterial transportations, and fastings to the examination of spirits, and disabling all animal operations. . .," but rather a life of justice, temperance, chastity, piety, and charity," such a life, without which human society cannot be conserved. . ."[12]

Taylor even wobbled dangerously near the edge of the pit

of Arianism by arguing that Christ was in a state of pilgrimage in His world, like every ordinary Christian, during which He progressed from a state of lesser to one of greater perfection. The method by which Taylor reached such a position was supple and vague. He admitted, as he did quite frequently, the truth of the paradoxical mystery that Christ is both human and divine.[13] But he maintained that Christ's two natures retained their distinct properties unmingled: for example, Christ as God could not suffer; but the divine nature could not ease the suffering of Christ's humane nature. Conversely, the humane nature of Christ could not partake of his divine qualities. Therefore, Christ's humane nature during His earthly life was in a ". . . state of merit and work." It was imperfect, and Christ's glory and immortality proceeded from the volitive lifting by Christ, acting in a humane manner, of his humane nature to a state of perfection. His glory and immortality were not ". . . a necessary consequence and. . . natural efflux of the personal union of the Godhead with the humanity."[14]

Taylor's humanization of Christ was guarded and by no means thorough-going. He did not, for instance, attempt to offer rational, naturalistic explanations of Christ's miracles.[15] But the strong current of humanization sweeping through the Life of Christ is inescapably obvious, nowhere more so than in Taylor's frequent lapses into sentimentality, such as that evidenced in a description of Christ bearing the cross to Calvary, and fainting because the weight was ". . . grievous

and intolerable to His tender, virginal, and weakened body. . . ."[16] or in the rather comic prudery of the following quotation describing the Crucifixion:

> For the sun hid his head from beholding such a prodigy of sin and sadness, and provided a veil for the nakedness of Jesus, that the women might be present, and Himself die, with modesty. [17]

Taylor's Christ was, in fact, a blood relative to the Christ of Unitarians and Deists. He was very close to being merely a just man, fit to become an earthly sage in one of those jumbles, so often cited by nineteenth and twentieth century writers, which consist of names such as Socrates, Buddha, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Bacon, and Whitman, supposed to signify the high potentialities of natural intellect. The bitter and complex controversy over the nature of the Trinity which broke out before the end of the seventeenth century, producing during its long course the polemic of Bull, Sherlock, Clarke, and Waterland, to mention only the more important, is a significant indication as to the fertile seeds which ambiguous doctrines like this one of Taylor's must have sown beforehand in men's minds.

It would be foolish to state the matter too dogmatically, especially in an historical essay where statements should be empirically verifiable, but one cannot help but sense a profound connection between such apparently abstract matters as the definition of the exact nature of Christ and the supposedly more direct, tangible matters which perhaps more immediately occupy the attention of the majority of us.

Certainly, in Taylor's case, it is possible to trace a striking parallel between his conception of a rather earthbound Christ, in whom mingles a passivity towards the civil with an activism towards the narrowly moral, uncontemplative life, and Taylor's statements as to how men should raise their children, work, marry, worship, and take pleasure. The parallels occur because, even after selecting Martha as a model and repudiating Mary, Taylor still needed a more elaborate norm to which he could refer almost every aspect of human behaviour for praise or blame. He found this norm by levelling Christ down to Martha and then grafting His life upon her safe type of mind: Christ's life could bear a much heavier crop of political and social notions than Martha's. The resulting figure, not a true theophanic Christ, Taylor exhibited to men as their Great Exemplar.

To comfort and stimulate men in their emulation, Taylor made Nature a comfortable greenhouse. For the most part, he considered Nature to be orderly and good, since it was created by God, is a proof of His existence, a reflection of His attributes, and a place for the exercise of His providence and man's devotion. Taylor wrote some of his best prose to explain such matters, much of it dating from during the period of his stay in Wales at Golden Grove, where it is tempting to see the influence both of the Welsh countryside and the Neo-Platonism active in the literary circle of Katherine Phillips, of which, along with Henry Vaughan, Taylor was a member.

Examples of Neo-Platonic thought, expressive of a

delight in the spiritual aspect of Nature as a way to God, while not abounding through all Taylor's work, are sufficiently present for a delightful but, on balance, misleading picture of the general bias of his mind to be drawn. The picture would be misleading because it would convey the impression that Taylor was an intuitive, ecstatic mystic similar to, let us say, Traherne, whose work abounds with perceptions of the heavenly Eternal beneath the flux of temporalities. Taylor, as we have seen, was anything but sympathetic towards intuition, ecstasy, and mysticism. One can only conclude that Taylor's delight in natural beauty and order operated purely at the discursive level; was based upon no consciously formulated and therefore extendible intuitional principles; it was, perhaps, only an adept mimicry of certain literary fashions.

Taylor used the old argument from design, a favourite with Deists and rationalizing churchmen in an age steadily more affected by science, to prove the existence of a Designer, and by doing so lifted the natural world to the seductive dignity of logic.

> Can any thing in this world be more foolish than to think that all this rare fabric of heaven and earth can come by chance, when all the skill of art is not able to make an oyster? To see rare effects, and no cause; an excellent government and no prince; a motion without an immovable; a circle without a centre; a time without eternity; a second without a first. . . these things are so against philosophy and natural reason, that he must needs be a beast in his understanding that does not assent to them. 18

Nature was not in Taylor the creation of a Cartesian God. The world had not been set going like a great machine of

interlocking parts animated by physical laws invariably operating in chains of cause and effect from which God withdrew his immediate attention after creation. Like Hooker, who wrote, "Those things which nature is said to do, are by divine art performed, using nature as an instrument; nor is there any such art or knowledge divine in nature herself working, but in the Guide of nature's work,"[19] Taylor thought God to be constantly intervening to maintain the balance and proportions of visible matter.

> God is every where present by His power. He rolls the orbs of heaven with His hand; He fixes the earth with His foot; He guides all the creatures with His eye. . . He it is that assists at the numerous productions of fishes; and there is not one hollowness in the bottom of the sea but He shews Himself to be Lord of it. . . in the wilderness, the bittern and the stork, the dragon and the satyr, the unicorn and the elk, live upon His provisions, and revere His power, and feel the force of His almightiness. [20]

Taylor's Nature, therefore, at the explicit level anyway, was quite theocentric: God supports it, orders events by His providence,[21] and uses various instruments[22] to see that man is governed by divine law.

From such postulates it follows readily enough that Nature both reflects certain qualities of God and also has a beneficent, "sacramental" aspect. "In the face of the sun," wrote Taylor in Holy Living, "you may see God's beauty; in the fire you may feel His heat warming; in the water, His gentleness to refresh you. . ."[23] Nature could also, when considered in such an holy light, furnish Taylor with images and metaphors to explain or even verify the divine mysteries.

Thus, for example, he compared the Resurrection to:

> Night and day, the sun returning to the same point of east, every change of species in the same matter, generation and corruption, the eagle renewing her youth, and the snake her skin, the silk-worm and the swallows. . . winter and summer, the fall and spring. . . 24

Here is another passage of the same type, this time illustrating the effect of Godly speech upon a sorrowful man, a passage which also implies, incidentally, Taylor's frequently expressed belief that Christianity is "natural," is a profitable, harmonious part of the material world.

> But so have I seen the sun kiss the frozen earth which was bound up with the images of death and the colder breath of the north; and then the waters break from their enclosures, and melt with joy, and run in useful channels; and the flies do rise again from their little graves in walls, and dance awhile in the air to tell that there is joy within, and that the great mother of creatures will open the stock of her new refreshment. 25

Since Nature was, according to Taylor, at once a reflection, a metaphor, and a mode of God's action, it is not surprising that he also considered Nature to be orderly. How else, indeed, could the God of a covenant theologian, who thought habitually in legalistic terms, be expected to create? Nor was Taylor, of course, alone in such a position. It was a commonplace of seventeenth century writers in their more euphoric, pious, or complacent moods, not just the covenant theologians, but also those affected by Neo-Platonism, and those mystics like Traherne and Henry Vaughan for whom truth and beauty were synonymous with order.

Order in the seventeenth century was conceived of in

terms of interdependent elements threaded together by obligations of subordination and service. It hardly seems necessary to examine in detail this conception of the Great Chain of Being by offering supportive quotations from Taylor's near predecessors or contemporaries, because it has become such a commonplace in modern studies of seventeenth century English literature. Taylor accepted the structure willingly. He took obvious delight in using his rhetorical power to embellish it.

> . . . God in the creation of the world first produced a mass of matter, having nothing in it but an obedientiall capacity and passivity; which God separating into classes of division, gave to every part a congruity to their respective forms, which in their distinct orbs and stations they did receive in order. . . and out of these He appointed some for servants, and some for government; and some to eat, and some to be eaten. . . [26]

Since order naturally emanated from God, Taylor drew the conclusion that hierarchy and obedience were natural. For example, in a long prayer, written for the reader of Holy Living, Taylor asked God ". . . who hast constituted all things in a wonderful order, making all the creatures subject to man, and one man to another, and all to Thee, the last link of this admirable chain being fastened to the foot of Thy throne. . .," to teach men reverence and submission to the "lawful commands"[27] of those whom He had set over them, ". . . lest the spirit of pride and mutiny, of murmer and disorder enter. . ."[28]

This natural necessity of hierarchy and obedience was

the grim side of Taylor's conception of Nature. It was the side which furnished key-stones for Taylor's doctrines of church and state. The brighter side to Taylor's conception, a side which, however, he did not greatly develop himself because it counteracted the combination of covenant theology, empirical cognition and Erastianism which was more characteristic of Taylor's thought, stemmed from the sacerdotal, intermediary function which man, as crown of creation, might logically assume in an hierarchical conception of Nature. Expressing such an opinion, Taylor wrote passages like the following, which would have been really more characteristic of Traherne or Norris of Bemerton:

> For if God is glorified in the sun and moon, in the rare fabric of the honeycombs, in the discipline of bees, in the economy of pismires. . . God being pleased to delight in those little images and reflexes of Himself from those pretty mirrors. . . much rather shall God be pleased to behold Himself in the glasses of our obedience, in the emissions of our will and understanding; these being rational and apt instruments to express Him, far better than the natural, as being nearer communications of Himself. 29

Similarly, Taylor could write that although ". . . the deeps and the snows, the hail and the rain, the birds of the air and the fishes of the sea. . ." glorify and praise God in their ways, yet because man has speech, reason, "excellent organs of perception," and soul, he may "join in concert with the morning-star. . . to sing hallelujah to the great Father of men and angels."[30]

But despite their apparently transcendent import, intensified by their being torn out of context, these rhetorical

visions of Taylor's really bolster what amounts to a very worldly form of epicureanism. It is true that saints and mystics of a certain type, those practising the "affirmative" way, have often tended to formulate systems characterized by what one could term "epicureanism" because they intuitively understand that everything has its place within the order of God's providence, any apparent present suffering being transcended by the faith of the sufferer and redressed by eternity. But there is a great difference between such intuitively based mystical epicureanism, which is anti-empirical, and which re-affirms the boundaries between heaven and earth, allowing to earth none of the transcendent attributes proper only to heaven, and the carnal, empirically-based epicureanism, which pulls heaven down to earth. The difference could be well symbolized, for example, by two superficially similar epicureans: Henry Vaughan and Emerson. One suspects that Emerson may even have been influenced by reading Vaughan. But Vaughan's delight in the natural world was mystically epicurean, and he kept tight hold of the orthodox framework of Christianity which is so difficult to dilute into pantheism. Emerson, as a lapsed Unitarian, living in an atmosphere saturated with scientific empiricism, was a carnal epicurean because his intuitionism drifted into a modernized pantheism, and his work inevitably offered a complacent means of justifying the deification and manipulation of matter within a progressivist ethic.

Taylor, as we have already seen, had no sympathy with

or real understanding of mysticism. He was an empiricist. His Christ, as we have also seen, would not greatly offend a Unitarian. As a result, Taylor's epicureanism, which he probably absorbed like Emerson from the interbred Platonic or Neo-Platonic sources so readily available in seventeenth century literature and philosophy, was of the carnal variety and was, like Emerson's, inherently sympathetic to the pragmatic, activist mentality of a society whose orientation was changing in so many areas from the religious to the worldly. Not the least of the attractions of Taylor's work to his own time and to posterity, until the beginning of the twentieth century, may well have been the use Taylor made of a still superficially orthodox, theologically-based methodology to sanction the mingling of those antique oppositions, heaven and earth. He gave the illusion of orthodoxy without the substance.

Taylor was not alone in spreading this type of epicureanism. It was very common in Renaissance thought, having had such influential progenitors as Ficino, Thomas More, Erasmus, and Montaigne.[31] Erasmus, for example, wrote in his colloquy The Epicurean, ". . . if they are Epicureans that live pleasantly, none are more truly Epicureans than those that live holily and religiously."[32] This was a theme which Taylor often elaborated:

> . . . He [God] hath given us an easy religion, and hath established our future felicity upon natural and pleasant conditions, and we are to be happy hereafter if we suffer God to make us happy here; and things are so ordered, that a

> man must take more pains to perish than to be happy. . . 33

One could fill several pages with similar quotations from Taylor's books, particularly from Holy Living, the Sermons, and the Life of Christ. Here is a passage from the latter:

> But besides that God hath made His yoke easy by exterior supports, more than ever was in any other religion; christianity is of itself, according to human estimate, a religion more easy and desirable by our natural and reasonable appetites, than sin, in the midst of all its pleasures and imaginary felicities. Virtue hath more pleasure in it than sin, and hath all satisfactions to every desire of man, in order to human and prudent ends. . . to live according to the laws of Jesus is, in some things, most natural. . . it conduces infinitely to the content of our lives and natural and political satisfactions. . . it is a means to preserve our temporal lives long and healthy. . . it is most reasonable, and he only is prudent that does so, and he a fool that does not. And all this, besides the considerations of a glorious and happy eternity. 34

As one reads these words, and many others of identical burden in Taylor's work, it is difficult not to feel that Taylor is implanting a latent seed of natural religion into the minds of his audience. The cross has disappeared into the background to be replaced by an equable identification of worldly with spiritual happiness. All the virtues of religion--humility, chastity, temperance, piety, sobriety--became for Taylor in his epicurean moods, the means to an often grossly expressed worldly felicity: ". . . we cannot be happy unless we be pious, and the religion of a Christian is the greatest security, and the most certain instrument of making a man rich, and pleased, and healthful, and wise, and beloved, in the whole world. . ."[35] Religion, according to

Taylor, makes men rich by curbing intemperance, lust, litigiousness, ambition, bribery, and gaming. It makes men healthful by requiring temperance in food and drink, thus preventing the "drunken surfeits" from which come "dissolution of members, headaches, apoplexies, dangerous falls, fracture of bones, drenchings and dilution of the brain, inflammation of the liver, crudities of the stomach. . ."[36] It makes men beloved by reason of the virtue they practice which gives them fair reputation; it also instills praiseworthy humility, and "Do not all the world hate a proud man?"[37] Religion, in Taylor's words, is "neither so peevish as to disturb our health, nor so sad as to discompose our just and modest cheerfulness, nor so prodigal as to force us to needs and ignoble trades. . ."; rather it "fills us full of serenities and complacencies. . ." and "promotes our temporal interests, by the gains and increases of the rewards of charities, and by securing God's providence over us. . ."[38]

Taylor, in effect, was perilously close to preaching the religion of success. At one point, it is only fair to mention, he did object that men living before Christ's descent tried to gauge human virtue by worldly prosperity and misfortune.[39] But despite this reservation, it is difficult to see how, in the light of the preceding evidence, Taylor's writings can escape the charge of having given license and stimulation to Christians to do the same, for it is a tempting and easy inversion to make profit and pleasure signify virtue if virtue be conceived as profitable and pleasurable.

Taylor's orderly, beneficent Nature, taken together with his rejection of the way of Mary, his humanization of Christ and the practical, genial view he took of Christian religion, all combined to make much of Taylor's work comfortable clothing for a moralistic cult of Becoming rather than a spiritual religion of Being. At the explicit level, certainly, Taylor does give his theories theocentricity--the rewards of riches, honour, and pleasure come from God, and are to be treated as means, not independent ends, God being the only proper end for man's desires.[40] But the theocentricity of such qualifications was eroded by Taylor's own eloquence elsewhere. He could, for example, speak very often as if Nature were heaven, or still Eden:

> Is not all the earth our orchard and our granary, our vineyard and our garden of pleasure? and the face of the sea is our traffic, and the bowels of the sea is our vivarium, a place for fish to feed us. . . and all the face of heaven is a repository for influences and breath, fruitful showers and fair refreshments. [41]

Taylor advised men to delight in temperate pleasure and epicurean self-forgetfulness; he upbraided the "hypochondriacal devotion which some friars have invented, and attributed to S. Gertrude. . ." of consecrating every word and action to Christ.[42] He took rather obvious comfort from his own wives and children and told the world that when a man loves his wife her ". . . eyes are fair as the light of heaven, she is a fountain sealed, and he can quench his thirst. . ." A married man may return home, said Taylor, ". . . as to his sanctuary and refectory, and his gardens of

sweetness and chaste refreshments," and the "pretty conversation. . . little angers. . . innocence. . . imperfections . . . necessities. . ." of his children may become for him ". . . emanations of joy and comfort. . ."[43]

Taylor's attitude towards celibacy is of great interest because it is yet another indication of his pragmatic, anti-contemplative approach to religion and his eupeptic regard for the natural. He did not explicitly condemn celibacy, but he disparaged it, somewhat the same way as he disparaged Mary's way, on the grounds of prudence and its limited effectiveness. The celibate was to Taylor, ". . . like the fly in the heart of an apple, [one who] dwells in a perpetual sweetness, but sits alone, and is confined and dies in singularity. . ."[44] The celibate treads a dangerous path which often leads to sin because of the difficulty of constant abstinence, and he makes only a solitary, selfish journey: ". . . the virgin sends prayers to God, but she carries but one soul to Him; but the state of marriage fills up the numbers of the elect. . ."[45] Confronted with the fact that the apostles and early fathers spoke of the advantages of celibacy, Taylor fell back upon the defense provided by a prudential historicism, saying that God had inspired them with the spirit of celibacy because of their unique necessities of travel, flight, poverty, and martyrdom in the infancy of Christianity.[46]

Taylor had far fewer qualms about marriage. Granted, he said, it may be motivated by concupiscence, but this is

"naturally no sin: for the natural desire was put into us by God, and therefore could not be evil."[47] God gave woman to man as a blessing; He made and blessed the first marriage and inspired "very many descending ages" with the desire for marriage and an antipathy to childlessness.[48] Marriage for Taylor was both a divine mystery and a natural social advantage.[49]

In his opinions on marriage, Taylor was quite orthodox. His opinions on celibacy, however, were not, if one compares them to an earlier time in Christianity. Even Queen Elizabeth had an antipathy to married clergy. Just as he did when promoting Martha's way above Mary's, the active above the contemplative life, so did Taylor lift weight from the spiritual side of a set of scales whose other pan held the world when he discouraged celibacy. One feels that the virgins of Little Gidding would have received scant sympathy from Taylor. Can one conceive him agreeing with the "Register," Nicholas Ferrar, who told them that, "The stamp of virginitie, wch hath sett you apart for Gods peculiar, hath exempted you from all worldly services"?[50] Rather one would expect Taylor to support his friend Evelyn's persuasive pleading to Margaret Blagge that she marry because, as Evelyn put it:

> . . . the Heroick tymes were now antiquated, and people proceeded by gentler and more compendious methods; and the decencyes of her sex, and custome of the nation, and the honour of the condition, and the want of Monasteryes and pyous Recesses obliged her to marry. 51

The civic, civilized benefits which Evelyn found in marriage

he may well have drawn from Taylor, for the same willingness to accept nature, society, and prudence as virtually synonymous touchstones of virtuous activity runs through the following characteristic quotation from Taylor's famous and popular sermon "The Marriage Ring."

> . . . but marriage, like the useful bee, builds a house and gathers sweetness from every flower, and labours and unites into societies and republics, and sends out colonies, and feeds the world with delicacies, and obeys their king, and keeps order, and exercises many virtues, and promotes the interest of mankind, and is that state of good things to which God hath designed the present constitution of the world. 52

Taylor's positions on marriage, Nature, society, and pleasure are classic examples of the way in which a thinker working from premises themselves derived from a methodology radically opposed to his own may arrive at conclusions which satisfy him as proof of the validity of his own sympathies. Taylor began from a Neo-Platonic structure of order and hierarchy in the natural world, based originally largely upon the spiritual intuitions of writers like Dionysius the Areopagite that matter and spirit constitute a delicately pitched harmony. Taylor cut away the spiritual intuition because it could only be nurtured by methods of cognition and contemplation which were alien to his epistemology, his moral activism and social theory. Taylor made earth heavenly, kept it rational, and used the resultant structure to justify an activist, non-contemplative, self-confident ethic which was one of the forerunners of modern pragmatism.

But systems of pragmatism are likely to be very turbulent,

individualistic ones. Taylor was an Erastian absolutist. To solve this latent antinomy, Taylor evaded the label of being a consistent epicurean, or "lapsed" Neo-Platonist by frequently falling back upon a system of stoically based ethics which he elaborated partly at least to sustain certain opinions about man and society which a system of epicurean ethics would not entirely have justified.

Perhaps more than calculation stimulated Taylor's stoicism. There were several influences which probably infiltrated his work: the seventeenth century cult of memento mori and vanitatem mundi; meditation upon Christ's suffering and death and upon the nescitis horam of every man in an age when life for many was short and commonly bedevilled by sick torments like gout, stone, or pox. Nor perhaps did Taylor escape the longing of his century, typical of rapidly urbanizing societies with changing class structures, for agrarian values and pastoral simplicities.

The finest work Taylor did in the mode of Christian stoicism was Holy Dying, especially the first two sections, which are probably stylistically the best pages he ever wrote:

> . . . every where we may be shipwrecked. A valiant general, when he is to reap the harvest of his crowns and triumphs, fights unprosperously; or falls into a fever with joy and wine, and changes his laurel into cypress, his triumphal chariot to a hearse, dying the night before he was appointed to perish in the drunkenness of his festival joys. 53

The pretty structure of beneficent Nature which Taylor built in epicurean moods he could quite destroy in the mordant

gloom of this countervailing stoicism:

> Here is no place to sit down in, but you must rise as soon as you are set, for we have gnats in our chambers, and worms in our gardens, and spiders and flies in the palaces of the greatest kings. . . Perfumes make our heads ache, roses prick our fingers, and in our very blood, where our life dwells, is the scene under which nature acts many sharp fevers and heavy sicknesses. [54]

Heroism, hope of honour, fortune, and power, Taylor dismissed as ephemeral, like fruits which present a fair surface but whose flesh is but "bitterness and the malignity of coloquintida."[55] Wealth could merely lead a man to purchase opportunity for viciousness,[56] and love of the world lead to an emulation of its vanities.[57]

Voicing strictures like these, it was almost inevitable that Taylor should arrive at the praise of simplicity and retirement as panaceas. When he did so, he had in effect turned full circle: having begun in a mood of cynical gloom about all the delights of society and the flesh, he slowly turned epicurean once more in the contemplation of pastoral felicities. Indeed, it is difficult not to see in Taylor at times the lustily sprouting seeds of a naturalistic romanticism akin to that of Wordsworth's, in whom is something of the same dichotomy between Christian stoicism and Neo-Platonic epicureanism.

> If men did but know what felicity dwells in the cottage of a virtuous poor man, how sound his sleeps, how quiet his breast, how composed his mind, how free from care, how easy his provision, how healthful his morning, how sober his night, how moist his mouth, how joyful his heart, they would never admire the noises and the diseases, the throng of passions and the violence of

> unnatural appetites, that fill the houses of the luxurious and the heart of the ambitious. 58

Such passages are very seductive. In them, Nature becomes once more what she was at the start in Taylor's epicurean moods, orderly, "sacramental," opulent, England's Virgin, the soft Magna Mater, and her waters of crystal are turned to communion wine:

> . . . indeed no men sleep so soundly as they that lay their head upon nature's lap; for a single dish, and a clean chalice lifted from the springs, can cure my hunger and thirst; but the meat of Ahasuerus's feast cannot satisfy my ambition and pride. 59

The road to such idylls may have been different, according to whether Taylor travelled with epicurean acceptance or stoical rejection, but the destination was the same in either case. But by using the stoical road Taylor could on the way pry loose stones to defend certain of his political and social opinions which would have been hard to come by on the bland macadam of epicureanism. It is not here suggested that Taylor constructed an ethical system of rather contradictory tendencies with deliberate, calculated, intellectual dishonesty. One suspects that Taylor often wrote somewhat as a man in the bush might build a cabin, spiking together words and arguments like scrounged planks of various hue and substance until the construction stood four-square against the worst of the wind and the rain.

Armed with stoicism, Taylor could, for example, placate the Christian poor. He was not unsympathetic towards them--he inveighed bitterly against the stupidity and savagery of

imprisoning insolvent debtors.[60] But, on the other hand, he accepted poverty as something inevitable, something to be endured. "It is no evil," he wrote, "to be poor, but to be vicious and impatient."[61] To call poverty unjust, Taylor pointed out, was to be ignorant of the dangers of wealth in this imperfect world: ". . . a great fortune is a great vanity, and riches is nothing but danger, trouble, and temptation. . . But poverty is the sister of good mind, the parent of sober counsels, and the nurse of all virtue."[62] Taylor also placed great emphasis upon the necessity for men to endure and rely upon the mercy and justice of God's providence:

> . . . he is scarce a Christian, whose faith is so little as to be jealous of God, and suspicious concerning meat and clothes: that man hath nothing in him of the nobleness or confidence of charity. Does not God provide for all the birds, and beasts, and fishes? [63]

While on this subject of providence and poverty, Taylor could sound the depths of a deep, well-fed confidence which one suspects must often have disgusted any poor men who through the years may have come perhaps to Taylor's books for comfort.

> Are not all the men and the women of the world provided for, and fed, and clothed, till they die? . . . And that a man is starved to death is a violence and a rare contingency, happening almost as seldom as for a man to have but one eye. . . [64]

The source of such unpleasant simplicities is found mainly in the fact that Taylor is mingling two ethical systems. On the one hand he demands a stoical acceptance of hardship in an imperfect world. On the other he holds out for solace and

hope the epicurean vision of Nature, the great cornucopia of God's providence.

This cornucopia, in Taylor's system, was administered by the rich, who dispensed their wealth, as God's stewards, in charity, and might rest easy in the knowledge of Taylor's assertion that, "When faith fails, and chastity is useless, and temperance shall be no more, then charity shall bear you upon wings of cherubims to the eternal mountain of the Lord."[65] [66] To sum up, Taylor used Christian stoicism to comfort the poor into an acceptance of their poverty, and an epicureanism, based upon Neo-Platonism, to give them hope of subsistence from a beneficent, orderly Nature channeled through their superiors in the Great Chain of Being.

At first glance, it may seem a long way from such matters to the question with which we started, whether Taylor chose the pattern of Mary or Martha for men to emulate. But, as we have seen, underlying both subjects is Taylor's conception of what constitutes the norms and limits of human behaviour and his concomitant opinions upon the structure of Nature. We saw how Taylor, biased beforehand in favour of moral activism and empirical cognition, disparaged the contemplative way of Mary. For similar reasons, Taylor modified the figure of Christ, moulding Him, the Great Exemplar, into the shape of a Martha, humble, diligent, human, and rational. To suit fortunate Marthas, we saw how Taylor constructed an orderly, rational world out of the hierarchical elements and aesthetic delights of Neo-Platonism, a world of epicurean benevolence,

lying luxuriously ready for human manipulation. Finally, to help defend this conception of Nature and to constrain the inevitable rancour of any unfortunate Marthas who happened to be poor, and who might not perhaps be naturally epicurean since they chanced to inhabit the lower links of the Great Chain of Being, we saw how Taylor admitted a tincture of Christian stoicism into his basically optimistic ethical theory.

The symbolic key to the preceding sequence is Taylor's interpretation of the story of Mary and Martha. Had he followed the example of St. Basil and asserted the spiritual primacy of contemplation and the necessity it entailed of detachment from the material world, Taylor would have been bound to maintain that purely exterior, moralistic activity such as Martha's was only of tentative, transitory value. Seeing through Mary's eyes, Taylor would probably have constructed a Nature no less beautiful than the one he constructed for Martha, but it would have been a Nature of veils and shadows, severed materially from heaven, revealing lost Eden only in glimpses to the initiated, not a static, structured paradise usurping qualities proper only to immateriality. Taylor saw man as a moral activist, working the stuff of paradise with his hands, not in the pejorative sense of God's words to Adam: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread . . .," but working as Adam in Eden before the Fall. Out of this fallen world, Taylor constructed a new Eden for man's profit and delight. We shall see in the next chapters what

god Taylor chose to walk in this garden in the cool of the day.

IV

FOOTNOTES: MARY AND MARTHA

1 Authorized Version, St. Luke, Chapt. 10, Verses 38-42.

2 The Sunday Sermons of the Great Fathers, trans. & ed. M. F. Toal (London: Longmans, Green, 1964), II, p. 378.

3 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 164.

4 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 227. It is interesting to note that in 1667 John Evelyn published a pamphlet entitled, Public Employment and An Active Life, With All Its Appanages, Such as Fame, Command, Riches, Conversation, &c. Prefer'd to Solitude in which the following passage occurs:

> The commendation of a true Christian consists in doing, not in meditating only; and it were doubtless an admirable compendium of all our notional disputes in religion, if less were believed and more were practised. Tis true, Mary's sitting at the feet of our Saviour, and hearkening to his instructions, was preferr'd before busie Martha's employment, but the man who laid up his master's talent, and actively improv'd it not, did worse (Luke xlx 20, Matt xxv 26.30); she was gently reprov'd, he severely condemn'd.

Cited from John Evelyn, Miscellaneous Writings, coll. & annotated by W. Upcott (London: H. Colburn, 1825), p. 529.

5 Julien Benda, La Jeunesse d'un Clerc (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p. 259.

6 Parallel situations suggest themselves: (1) The westernization of the Russian Orthodox Church and the consequent schism of the Old Believers; (2) The creation of the Gallican Church and the treatment meted out to Fénelon.

7 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 88. The sentimentalizing of Christ was, of course, a commonplace in Taylor's time, one of the constant themes of Baroque art, in both painting and poetry. Taylor's position, however, is particularly interesting because of the epistemological, social,

and political doctrines for which his sentimentalized, humanized Christ became partial justification.

8 The full title of the Life of Christ is The Great Exemplar of Sanctity and Holy Life According to the Christian Institution; Described in the History of the Life and Death of the Ever-Blessed Jesus Christ, The Saviour of the World.

9 See David Gascoyne's poem "Ecce Homo" in Collected Poems, ed. R. Skelton (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 46, where Christ has become the "Christ of Revolution and of Poetry."

10 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 41. Taylor cited St. Simeon Stylites, the Nitrian hermits, and "later saints" as examples of the effect of immoderate religious frenzy. In another place, he put St. Teresa in the same category: Ibid., p. 417.

11 Ibid., p. 195.

12 Ibid., p. 42.

13 Ibid., p. 666.

14 Ibid., pp. 704-705.

15 Ibid., pp. 492-493.

16 Ibid., p. 614.

17 Ibid., p. 616.

18 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 249.

19 Richard Hooker, The Works of Richard Hooker, arranged by John Keble (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1865), I, pp. 209-210.

20 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 23.

21 See Chapter Three on the notices by which human reason operated in Taylor's epistemology.

22 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 3.

23 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 26.

24 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 403.

25 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 314.

26 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 499.

27 What Taylor meant by "lawful commands" is considered in Chapters Five and Six.

28 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 139.

29 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 382.

30 Ibid., p. 473.

31 Edgar Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance (London: Faber & Faber, 1958), p. 70.

32 Ibid., loc. cit.

33 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 28.

34 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 516.

35 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 649.

36 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 535.

37 Ibid., p. 527.

38 Ibid., p. 59.

39 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 431.

40 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 651.

41 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 646.

42 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 647.

43 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 224.

44 Ibid., p. 211.

45 Ibid., loc. cit.

46 Ibid., p. 208.

47 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 277.

48 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 207.

49 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 292.

50 Nicholas Ferrar, The Ferrar Papers, ed. B. Blackstone (Cambridge: University Press, 1938), pp. 133-134.

51 John Evelyn, The Life of Mrs. Godolphin, ed. E. W. Harcourt (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1888), p. 81.

52 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 211.

53 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Dying, p. 269.

54 Ibid., pp. 284-285.

55 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 293.

56 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 479.

57 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 21.

58 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 185.

59 Ibid., p. 184.

60 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 462.

61 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 95.

62 Ibid., p. 101.

63 Ibid., p. 104.

64 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 647.

65 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 472.

66 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Dying, p. 304.

V

LEVIATHAN

Nowhere did Taylor apply himself to a systematic exposition of political theory within the covers of one book. Unlike Hooker or Hobbes, for example, he did not in any single place lay down a prior, carefully articulated substructure of abstract principles concerning the nature and limits of law, of custom, of authority and consent upon which he could safely erect an elaborate super-structure of polity. The substructure is present in Taylor's work, but discovering its outlines is like carrying out an archaeological excavation: one must piece together fragments, reconstruct from faint contours and subtle deposits, after having worked down carefully through superfluous strata. The closest Taylor ever came to constructing a systematic polity was in Ductor Dubitantium, but even this book, examined in isolation, will not serve our purpose, because in it Taylor was primarily concerned with the justice of specific acts carried out by individuals living in an hierarchical, Erastian state, the legitimacy of which Taylor rather assumed than attempted to prove in detail. He was in this book, as he said, "not writing politics, but cases and rules of conscience. . ."[1]

It is well to remember also that for the best part of

his literary career Taylor was writing subject to the threats of censorship and reprisal, threats which must naturally have made it unlikely that he, whose principles were in so many ways anathema to Presbyterians and Independents alike, would think it prudent to publish political self-vindication. Instead, what he seems to have chosen to do was to write books against which no political exception could be taken. He wrote practical books of piety which mainly only implied royalist, Erastian values, but which were more overtly calculated to enable individuals deprived of exterior supports to adhere to a continuing Anglican tradition through their reading. During the Commonwealth, Taylor's books must have fulfilled much the same purpose as Roman Catholic recusant devotional handbooks did during the seventeenth century. Like these, Taylor's productions were aimed at individuals and small households worshipping in an atmosphere of capricious semi-proscription, veering at times towards persecution.[2]

However, despite these limitations, one may cull out of the body of Taylor's work, predominantly from Episcopacy Asserted, The Liberty of Prophesying, the Sermons, Supplementary Sermons, and Ductor Dubitantium, a fairly coherent account as to how Taylor believed kings should rule and subjects obey. There are gaps and tenuous links in the account; one wonders sometimes if Taylor were not guilty of the undergraduate fault of substituting information for thought. One also wishes that Taylor had made some of his positions more certain by elaborating them, by confirming them and referring back to them

as established points of orientation. As it is, they have an ad hoc, tentative air, like the improvisations of an overly facile virtuoso.

Typical are the two brief pages of Ductor Dubitantium into which Taylor compresses all that he ever wrote about the origin of civil society. He categorized governments into those of "right" derivation and those of "wrong." The "right" Taylor considered to be "by divine appointment, or by the multiplication of the posterity of a patriarch. . .",[3] this way being established upon "natural reason, and a divine commandment." The "wrong" way for civil society to originate he thought to be, in a manner reminiscent of Hobbes[4] and anticipatory of Locke, from civil confusion, or from civil war and violence, when there is no head of state and anarchy prevails. In such a situation, expediency and experience eventually persuade men of the necessity of order,[5] but order is inherently tainted by the disorder which preceded it. Taylor instanced the Roman state as an example of a wrongly originated polity, for its citizens kept "the legislative power in their own hands, made kings and consuls and officers at their pleasure. . ." and gave or withheld consent to the laws by which they were ruled. Such "licence" Taylor viewed with distaste, and he lamented the example which Roman greatness made to other nations whose subjects were thus stimulated to exercise their "libido regnandi" at the expense of gentle princes. "This fantastic liberty," wrote Taylor, "the people would seldom be without; and they must have what they were

resolved on; for when they please they are all kings."[6]

Taylor nowhere explicitly considered whether English government had been established the "right" or the "wrong" way. Had he attempted to do so, he would obviously have got into great difficulties--one is tempted to think his best ploy might have been to try and make England the home of the lost tribe. Implicitly, however, Taylor always assumed that principles applicable to divinely ordained patriarchy were justification enough for Stuart polity. The fact that historical and legal knowledge, even in the seventeenth century, more than amply supported the view that English government had been established the wrong way, and that therefore the "fantastic liberty" of some of his contemporaries might legitimately be considered quite natural, if it ever occurred to Taylor has certainly left no trace in his writings.

But whether they emanated the "right" or the "wrong" way, Taylor was explicit about the necessity of order and hierarchy in all polities. He was of the same mind as Hooker who had written: "Without order there is no living in public society, because the want thereof is the mother of confusion, whereupon division of necessity followeth, and out of division, inevitable destruction."[7] Not the least of Taylor's enthusiasm for his own version of Christianity stemmed from the high opinion he had of its effectiveness in bolstering order. Christianity, he pointed out, has as one of its "main excellencies. . . that it advances the state and well-being of monarchies and bodies politic. . ."[8]

Against the extreme Anabaptist sects, he wrote:

> For the religion of Jesus Christ is the best establisher of the felicity of private persons and of public communities: it is a religion that is prudent and innocent, humane and reasonable, and brought infinite advantages to mankind, but no inconvenience, nothing that is unnatural, or unsociable, or unjust. And if it be certain that this world cannot be governed without laws, and laws without a compulsory signify nothing; then it is certain that it is no good religion that teaches doctrine whose consequents will destroy all government. . . 9

To settle matters, Taylor cited the fact that Christ and the Apostles had complied with ". . . the most absolute government and the most imperial that was then in the world. . ."[10] as proof conclusive that Christianity affirmed rather than destroyed civil society.

Nor, as a Christian, did Taylor flinch from justifying the high charity of civil coercion. No scrupulous cheek-turning by superiors in their civil capacity, he thought, could preserve an orderly government. Law, after all, was not made for the good who naturally operate by proper principles, but for the "vicious and the tyrants, oppressors and the impudent" who despise such principles and must needs be subject to the "civil power [which] hath taken a sword to transfix the criminal and to kill the crime."[11] Although Taylor nowhere advances the celebrated paradox of Joseph de Maistre that social order rests in the hands of the citizen whom society despises, the executioner, he doubtless would have consented to it:

> . . . without a coercitive power there can be no government, and without government there can

> be no communities of men; a herd of wolves is quieter and more at one than so many men, unless they all had one reason in them or have one power over them. 12

For Taylor, then, there could be no law, and therefore no order, without force being invested in superiors. The logic was elementary, and the consequence of rejecting it was absurd: if there be no coercitive power, then legislators may only ". . . petition the subject to obey, and must be content he shall do it when he hath a mind to it."[13]

Taylor's coercitive power is intended to enforce law, so the next problem which naturally presents itself for examination is what limits, if any, he placed upon legislators. Unfortunately, the great hiatus in Taylor's writings on politics from the point of view of a modern reader is any detailed consideration of the actual machinery of voluntary consent and mutual obligation in English society. Doubtless, as has already been explained, circumstance and the character of his books make the omission explicable. But judging from the general allusions Taylor made to the nature of law, justice, authority, liberty, and obedience, it is perhaps not presumptuous to ascribe the omission also to his distaste for the interest shown by even some of the more moderate of his fellow-countrymen in contractual theories of government.[14]

The system of divine, natural, and positive law which Taylor contrived has considerable historical significance because it is clearly symptomatic of the modification towards utilitarianism which the former easy universality of old

natural law theory, as expounded, for example, by Hooker, suffered at the hands of supporters of an hierarchical society who found their opponents were drawing weapons of self-justification from its magazine. Just such a situation is illustrated by what Ireton faced during the Putney Debates in 1647 when a Leveller argued that Natural Law justified an equitable redistribution of the land. Ireton countered by saying that such appeals to Natural Law would dissolve society because of the impetus they gave to the anarchical satisfaction of individual desires by force, and that the only reasonable basis upon which to preserve civil society was customary contract: ". . . we are under a contract, we are under an agreement, and that agreement is what a man has for matter of land that he hath received by a traduction from his ancestors, which according to the law does fall upon him to be his right."[15]

Taylor, even more than Ireton, was in a difficult position. Ireton, at least, had the advantage of having cut himself off almost completely from association with a monarchy of ambiguous origin and occasionally scandalous and incompetent conduct. Taylor chose to defend the monarchy; somehow he had to effect a delicate balance between absolute and relative values. The Puritans could be more logically attractive because, like nearly all revolutionaries, they were determined to ignore the relative as much as possible and operate in the absolute. Mutations of form through time had, therefore, little value for them; they lacked conspicuously,

in a century when it was only just beginning to be developed, a real historical sense. Their appeals to history in both politics and religion were to incarnations of static, absolute values, not relative ones. Taylor, however, although as an Anglican he was partially committed to the Protestant search for pristine, absolute values, was as an Erastian royalist also forced to use prudential, providential, relativistic arguments. Basically, his dilemma in jurisprudence could be summarized as follows: if he were to place too much emphasis upon Natural Law and Divine Law, he would play into the hands of revolutionaries of the absolute. If he placed too little emphasis upon them, he would compromise both monarchy and Anglicanism by surrendering them to the eroding flux of the relative.

In Chapter Two, it has already been pointed out that Taylor's conception of regenerate man relied in part upon the principle that Natural Law had been clarified and confirmed by the showing forth of Divine Law in revelation.[16] In addition, Taylor used a radical skepticism to undercut the independent existence of Natural Law. He pointed out, for example, that it was absurd to attempt to find it by codifying similarities in the behaviour of men and beasts. Displaying perhaps the influence of recent European familiarity with other cultures, he said that neither was any attempt to use the "consent of nations" possible because of the incoherencies effected by barbarism, unique custom, and degeneration. Nor could he sanction as reliable appeals to "right reason" because

of the variability of opinion among the learned and ancient philosophers.[17]

To clarify such turbid uncertainty, Taylor offered Divine Law, as given in revelation, ". . . the Christian law being for the substance of it nothing but the restitution and perfection of the law of nature."[18]

> But as for the particular laws of nature (which only are properly to be called laws) we are to look for no other system or collective body of them, but the express declared laws of God which concern morality, that is, all that are given to all mankind without relation to any one period: such is the moral law of the Jews, and such is the religion of the Christians; that less perfect, this more perfect and entire; for these in their several proportions are such which are generally for all mankind. . . [19]

Having thus submerged Natural Law into the Divine Law, Taylor proceeded to contrive what one might be allowed the paradox of calling a "relatively absolute" system of legislation. Rather like a Platonic Idea, Natural Law, as defined by Divine Law,[20] in Taylor's scheme suffers the inevitable modifications wrought upon absolute logic by relative, awkward matter, which is subject to exigencies of time and space inexistent in the empyrean. Such is the situation he outlined in the following quotation:

> . . . although as long as this world lasts and men in it, the law of nature cannot be abrogated, because it is the law which is framed proportionable to man's nature; yet it may be derogated, that is, lessened or enlarged in instances, changed in the integrity of many of its particulars, made relative to several states and new necessities; and this is that which in true speaking does affirm that the laws of nature may be changed. For although there are some propositions and decrees so general, that they are in their nature applicable to all variety of things, and therefore cannot be

> changed; yet they are rather the foundation of laws than laws themselves: because a law must be mixed with a material part. . . 21

By qualifying the absolute with contingency, Taylor could justify and extend the power of the relative. In effect, he raised civil law to the dignity of Divine Law and Natural Law by allowing the latter two only a qualified operation in the world, in contrast to the virtually absolute character he granted civil positive law. It is true that Taylor maintained positive law was dependent for its validity upon the condition that it not violate Divine Law. It is true that he stated that positive law could be modified by equitable, charitable interpretation or nullified because of the cessation of the original reason for its promulgation and the appearance of a weighty, contrary reason. Positive law could also, according to Taylor, be retracted, dispensed with, commuted, or abrogated by a competent authority. But despite all these circumstantial, relativistic qualifications, Taylor in effect made positive law absolute by consigning the sole liberty of promulgating, guiding and changing it to God and a single human authority who was answerable only to God. To all other men subject to positive law, Taylor granted only a passive capacity.[22]

Just how thorough was Taylor's identification of his combination of Natural Law and Divine Law with positive law is amply demonstrated by the fact that he even thrust an identification of the two into the conscience of a subject. One of the basic principles in Taylor's polity was that

man-made law was just as binding upon a subject's conscience, just as demanding of obedience, as a directly God-given law. For it to be less binding, wrote Taylor, would be for it to be no law at all: to break it would be no sin and to keep it no duty. Obedience under such conditions would be only at the subject's pleasure, not the superior's command, and society would tumble into anarchy.[23] Nor would Taylor allow the subject recourse of appeal to custom (a favourite refuge, legitimate or fanciful, for constitutional lawyers, theorists, and rebels in the seventeenth century). Taylor elevated positive law above custom, just as he had made it nearly synonymous with Divine Law, by making positive law custom's interpreter. If this position were not true, argued Taylor, then custom and the people arguing on the basis of custom would overturn any legislative power not democratically chosen and make government impossible.[24]

To a certain extent, it is possible to make a pretty pattern of consent, co-operation, and contractual society out of a few quotations from Taylor's books. For example, he cautioned civil power to make no laws in indifferent matters likely to provoke the subject or "against that public disposition which is in the spirits of men, and will certainly cause perpetual irregularities and schisms."[25] Human laws, he said at one point, are imposed upon the people, but are "imposed. . . commonly by their consent, explicit or implicit, formal or interpretative."

> For the civil government is not absolute, and mere and supreme; but in some senses, and to some purposes, and in some degrees, limited, conditional, precarious and mixed, full of need, and supported by them also who are to be ruled, who therefore are to be regarded. 26

Operating from such premises, Taylor could praise Sir George Dalstone in a panegyrical funeral sermon for having believed the truth of the old analogy between a man's body and civil society. Sir George, said Taylor, had understood that the interests of courts and parliaments were like the balance of humours, ". . . if you increase one beyond its limit, that destroys all the rest, and itself at last; and when they look upon themselves as enemies. . . the prevailing part is abated in the conflict, and the vanquished part is destroyed. . . they are for allay of each other's exorbitances and excesses . . ."[27] But these quotations are not characteristic of the main tendency of Taylor's thought. When it came to the question of where power should lie in a society, Taylor answered as a disciple of Filmer and the patriarchal polity, rather than as an exponent of Hooker's predominantly organic polity. Given the choice between limiting the power of superiors or that of subjects, Taylor always chose to do the latter and trusted Heaven would redress any incidental earthly injustices.

The most encompassing way by which Taylor controlled the subject in his political theory was by making hierarchy the emanation and channel of God's providence. These "anti-democratic" opinions of Taylor are not, of course, very

unusual coming as they do from an educated seventeenth century man. An almost universal belief that the validity of an opinion could be settled by the appeal to sheer weight of numbers was still nearly two centuries away, and as Coleridge observed long ago, even republicans like Milton and Algernon Sydney were what would now be called "elitists." Doubtless both these men, and Coleridge too, would have subscribed to Taylor's scorn of "the popular noises and the voices of the people, who are not to teach us, but to be taught by us. . ."[28] But Milton and Sydney would have parted company with Taylor in disagreement over the trappings of divinity with which hierarchy was invested by Taylor's pen:

> . . . the lawful superiors are God's viceregents appointed over us in things pertaining to God, so as to be executioners of the divine laws; and besides this, to make laws in things indifferent and pertaining to men;. . . all contempt done to them is done to God;. . . it is scandalous to refuse obedience to them;. . . he is a proud man who says he is wiser than his superiors; and he is intolerable that prefers his private folly before the public wisdom. . . [29]

King and bishop Taylor considered to be God's deputies: ". . . His power they exercise, by His power they rule, and to His kingdom they minister." Contempt and rebellion against these "princes of the people," even if it be only in the conscience, in thought not in an overt act, would be punished for eternity by God.[30]

For king and bishop were the apex of a pyramid of "distributive" justice which Taylor considered their due. Basing himself upon two scriptural texts, Taylor divided

justice into the "distributive" and the "commutative." The "commutative" he derived from the words: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, even so do to them." (Rom. xiii.7) This type of justice, Taylor stipulated, operated between persons of equality. A king might treat a king, or a peasant another peasant commutatively, but peasant and king could not treat each other so. "Distributive" justice, Taylor derived from the words: "Render to all their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour: owe no man any thing, but to love one another." (1 Pet. iv.10) He made this type of justice operative between subject and king, between spiritual son and spiritual guide, and between children and parents--all these being cases of hierarchy and consequently imperative submission of the will of the lower party to the commands of the higher.[31]

Although in some places Taylor mingled king and clergy indiscriminantly at the apex of hierarchy, there was never any hesitation in Taylor's mind but that the pyramid's uttermost tip was regal. William Blake annotated his copy of Bacon's Essays with the comment: "King James was Bacon's primum mobile."[32] Any careful reader of Taylor's works must often be moved to make a similar accusation against him. How else could one react to Taylor's comment, for example, that ". . . the marks of Jesus, are imprinted in signal and eminent authority; such as are principally the king, and then the bishops. . ."?[33] Stigmata, even metaphorical ones, cannot

often have been granted so lightly to hierarchy as customary insignia.

Taylor found biblical justification for the primacy of monarchy in various places. One of the main ones was the Fifth Commandment--"Honour thy father and thy mother; that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee."[34] Taylor thought duty to parents "the very firmament and band of commonwealths," for it united the extended kinships from which cities and societies were built, and those who came to govern succeeded "in the power and authority of fathers, and became so, in estimate of law and true divinity, to all their people."[35]

Taylor also thought that ". . . God gives to kings, who are His viceregents, a peculiar Spirit."[36] What exactly this "Spirit" was, he did not specify, except that it seems to have been very much like the Holy Ghost: ". . . the spirit of the king is a divine eminency, and is as the Spirit of the most high God."[37] Possibly Taylor was implying by those words that kings are like God's prophets since they are inspired by a divine afflatus. Certainly he regarded kings as persons of sacred designation, for in a visitation sermon preached to his clergy after the Restoration Taylor said that both "kings and priests have a glory conveyed to them, of which the people partake but in minority, and allegory, and improper communication. . ."[38] Profound and obscure traditional feelings are at work in such expressions; there is evident in Taylor when speaking about kingship a quality of mythopoiec

sensitivity which is singularly lacking elsewhere in his work. One is reminded as one reads him when in this mood of some passages in Shakespeare, of Richard II's words to Northumberland, for example:

> . . . show us the hand of God
> That hath dismiss'd us from our stewardship;
> For well we know, no hand of blood and bone
> Can gripe the sacred handle of our sceptre,
> Unless he do profane, steal, or usurp. 39

Taylor himself thought not otherwise about those who would violate God's providence by disobedience to His anointed. Secure in the ebullience which all men must feel when they are sure that unseen powers confirm their own principles, he dedicated Ductor Dubitantium to the returned Charles II with the words:

> . . . God hath sent your majesty amongst us, that we may feel the pleasures of obedience, and reap the fruits of that government which God loves and uses, which He hath constituted and adorned, which He hath restored to us by a conjugation of miracles, by the work of His hand and the light of His countenance, by changing the hearts of men, and scattering the people that delight in war. . . 40

For Taylor, the lesson of the Restoration was plain; God had restored His people: "He himself hath wrought amongst us by Himself alone, and therefore will bless and will never interrupt," but the subjects of the apotheosized Stuarts ". . . must be careful never to provoke Him any more by . . . unthankfulness and infidel apostacy."[41]

Taylor's royalist absolutism may seem to be somewhat softened by the legal and moral strictures which he places upon the conduct of kings. He would probably have agreed

with the words attributed to Hooker in that dubious eighth book of his Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: "Where the king doth guide the state, and the law the king, that commonwealth is like an harp or melodious instrument, the strings whereof are tuned and handled all by one, following as laws the rules and canons of musical science."[42] Taylor did not think the supreme civil power should be arbitrary; kings should govern by God's laws.[43] They should defend property, encourage labour, safeguard persons, determine controversies justly, reward virtue, make laws which ". . . have regard to the public disposition. . ." and which do not tempt subjects to disobedience. Kings should not multiply public oaths excessively, impose great or unnecessary taxes, oppress widows and orphans, sell justice, break their word, or overturn without good reason the acts of their predecessors.[44] Finally, and more specifically, Taylor was of the opinion that if a king, before he is admitted to the throne, swears to uphold one of the "great laws" of a kingdom, such as the Golden Bull of the Holy Roman Empire, the Salic Law and Pragmatical Sanction of France, or Magna Charta and the Petition of Right in England, then he should keep his word.[45]

Doubtless Taylor was very sincere in setting forth these ideals. They are obviously very sensible ones, and if the Stuarts had only observed them they might still be kings. But Taylor's scheme had a fatal flaw. He was utterly unwilling to admit any worldly coercitive power upon the king of a polity which had originated the "right" way, a state untainted

by democracy, a state such as Taylor deemed England to be. The only superior to the king Taylor would admit was God. If a king swears to uphold "great laws" like Magna Charta, he is bound, according to Taylor, not by law, for the king is above laws, but by his oath. If he breaks his oath, he sins and is answerable to God, but not to the law or his subjects: ". . . if a king swears to his people to make no law without their consent, he is bound to perform his word; but if he does not, God, and not they, are to punish the perjury."[46] If this were not so, then the alternative would be to shift supreme power from the king to someone else. Taylor's logical mind could not conceive a divided, interdependent sovereignty: ". . . in every commonwealth there is supreme power somewhere . . ."[47] There must be a final, decisive authority somewhere in the state, he thought, otherwise it could not survive and anarchy would be the inevitable consequent.[48]

It is true that Taylor encumbered the royal conscience with all the dictates of a scrupulous moral activism which he bestowed upon the rest of humanity. Indeed, he quoted from the bible, "mighty men shall be mightily tormented" (Wisd. vi. 6) and warned kings that a greater duty was enjoined upon them by God than upon ordinary men, and a greater punishment reserved for their delinquencies.[49] But the fact remains that Taylor gave kings the liberty to do evil or good in this world as if they were the unanswerable instruments of God's providence. He allowed them a latitude of action, operating from private judgement, which he never even remotely approached

allowing anyone else, whether Lords, Commons, judges, or churchmen.

If a king commanded "fond things, being abused by flatterers, or misinformation" yet his commandment became law for Taylor because it "issues from a just authority."[50] Taylor's king was licensed to deceive his subjects "as we use children" in matters which he thought they could not understand" and yet ought to obey."[51] Since whatever ". . . is absolutely necessary is certainly lawful; and since Christ has nowhere forbidden kings to defend themselves and their people against violence," then, by "right of nature" Taylor wrote, a king could resort to force in his own self-defence.[52] Such wars Taylor thought just, and the kings who waged them to be ". . . in the place of God who strikes whole nations and towns and villages; and war is the rod of God in the hands of princes. . ."[53] As we shall see in more detail in the following chapter, Taylor did not extend this natural right of self-defence to subjects fighting their king. Subjects were to live passively under the injunction of two convenient texts: "Obey them that have the rule over you" (Heb. xiii.17), and "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king, as supreme; Or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well." (1 Pet. ii.13)[54] Bearing all these principles in mind, one can well understand how the weightiest matter on Charles I's conscience was the signing of Strafford's

death warrant.

It is conceivable that a man with the close Laudian affiliations of Taylor's early career might have been tempted to restrain regal power by the church. Of course, in a sense, Laud was very much one of the supporters of royal absolutism; but surely his activities, had they been more successful and been prolonged by successors without interruption after Laud's death, would have created a strong counter-force to the monarchy. But Taylor was completely true to the Stuarts and adhered to Article XXXVII of the Thirty-Nine. He stoutly asserted the sweeping generalization that ". . . the church of England. . . excommunicates those who deny the supreme civil power to have the same authority in causes ecclesiastical which the pious kings of the Hebrews had over the synagogue."[55]

Religion, for Taylor, was far too important a matter to be left independent of state jurisdiction. If it were left so, then kings would be ". . . but half kings at best. . ."[56]

> The care of religion must needs belong to the supreme magistrate, because religion is the great instrument of political happiness. . . and unless he hath power to manage and conduct it, and to take care it be rightly ordered, the supreme power hath not sufficient to defend his charges. [57]

Justice, charity, temperance, chastity, doing good and not doing evil are all parts of religion, Taylor pointed out, but they are also essential for the survival of a commonwealth. They endear obedience to subjects and are "a security for princes in closets and retirements, and his best guard against

treasons." Religion stimulates the common people to carry out "any great or good or evil design." Consequently, the prince cannot rule without controlling it; if he attempt to do so, ". . . he is but the shadow of a king, and the servant of his priests; and if they rule religion, they may rule him also" by deposing him, absolving his subjects of their allegiance, teaching them to lie to magistrates, and by reducing all to equality and making presbyters omnipotent.[58]

Taylor appealed to experience and history to support his principles. Even Numa Pompilius, he pointed out, had imposed law "with a face of religious solemnity," and if a ruler did not similarly visage his commands, his people, lacking awe for them, would quickly " 'jumble heaven and earth into a miscellany'."[59] Taylor found further justification in the old theory of the sword and the keys. All power, he said, was derived from Christ, who is king, priest, and prophet. Christ's regal power devolves upon every Christian king, and this power extends even over the church, except in matters of a very narrowly interpreted priestly concernment like the actual ministration of the sacraments.[60] Purely spiritual functions the king may not carry out, although he has the "external compulsory and jurisdiction" of them. To bishops, on the other hand, Christ leaves his power of priest and prophet, the power of the keys, which by the time Taylor finished granting nearly everything to the king amounted to very little more than the administration of the sacraments, ordination, and the everyday details of ecclesiastical

bureaucracy.[61]

The bishops could not by themselves impose a new article of religion. That, according to Taylor, could be done only by God or by the king. The king might even decree a false article, but it must stand as law until the king be persuaded "by the doctrines of the wiser ecclesiastics" he may serve truth in a better way.[62] Nor could bishops encroach without permission upon the rights of civil power. But civil power might legitimately invade church rights, both positive and even, in a certain sense, divine. If the rights be founded on positive law, then Taylor argued they could lawfully be rescinded by positive power: ". . . therefore if a king makes a law against the rights of the church, and the bishop protests against that law, the king and not the bishop must prevail. . ."[63] If the king invade the Jure Divino rights of the church, then the bishop may protest, but cum conditione crucis. He must protest humbly, peaceably, gently; he must procrastinate until he is sure that "to forbear longer is to neglect. . . duty, and to displease God."[64] Then he must passively await the king's pleasure and ". . . the worst that can come is the crown of martyrdom, which whosoever gets will be no loser."[65]

Despite the church, therefore, Taylor's kings remained obstinately answerable only to God.[66] The business of priests, Taylor thought, was to concern themselves wholly with religion and "support kingdoms and serve the interest of kings, by the prayer of a daily sacrifice. . ."[67] Spiritual men must

be humble, and take it not upon themselves to be superior to those holding temporal dignities. Granted, said Taylor, spiritual men belong to the kingdom of heaven, but they live presently in the kingdom of this world and ". . . it would be unreasonable that the lower of the higher kind should be preferred before the most perfect and excellent in a lower order of things."[68] Taylor enthusiastically manipulated the resources of a rationalistic epicureanism to undercut his own priestly office:

> . . . for temporal things are properly in order to the felicity of man in his proper and present constitution; and it is by a supernatural grace that now they are thrust forward to a higher end of grace and glory; and therefore temporal things, and persons, and callings, have properly the chiefest temporal regard; and Christ took nothing of this away from them, but put them higher, by sanctifying and ennobling them. But then the higher calling can no more suppose the higher man, than the richest trade can suppose the richest man.[69]

Having curbed the pretensions of bishops and priests thus far, it was logical for Taylor to determine that the king had complete jurisdiction over the church's power of excommunication. To support this determination Taylor partly resorted to a prudential historicism and stated that while in the time of the Apostles excommunications were merely a delivery of the sinner into Satan's hands, in the present, excommunication had secular repercussions which made it a matter of civil concern. To excommunicate a prince could be to deliver him to the mercy of a foreign enemy or the people's fury. It could spoil the allegiance of subjects and give aid to factions and rebels.[70] Excommunication also, Taylor

pointed out, customarily carried with it the penalty of social ostracism: what could be more absurd than that the king, the source of an ordered polity, should be forbidden intercourse with what he regulates and creates?[71]

As a substitute, Taylor suggested that the clergy use admonition, cautions, exhortations, and counsels, but never harsh reproofs or commands "to princes of a scandalous and evil life. . ."[72]:

> The vices of a king are not to be opened publicly, and princes must not be reprehended as a man reproves his servant; but by categorical propositions, by abstracted declamations, by reprehensions of a crime in its single nature, in private, with humility and arts of insinuation. . . [73]

Taylor could hardly, therefore, be expected to condone prophetical denunciations of the vices of superiors. The Old Testament prophets may have used them, but they, in Taylor's opinion, had extraordinary, miraculous authority, whereas contemporary clergy were of "precarious" authority; their behaviour must be "allayed with Christian grace and duties of humility" and their conduct circumscribed by "public necessities and private circumstances."[74] One suspects the real reason for all this caution in Taylor to be revealed when in words of a rather uncharacteristic pithiness, reminiscent of Hooker's style, he commented: ". . . if the bishop calls a spade a spade, it is very possible the people may do so too, for they are soon taught to despise their rulers."[75]

If he suffered political oppression, therefore, a subject could look for little more than the solace of sacraments

from Taylor's church, and perhaps not even that much. It was a thoroughly Erastian, almost completely servile institution, appropriated by the civil power to make subjects dutiful. The more important functions of Taylor's church were to add a veneer of religiosity to the acts of secular hierarchy and channel dangerous popular fervours. Her clergy were largely puppets, denied temporal dignity or power, stripped even of jurisdiction over their most precious sacrament.[76] Taylor succumbed to the vice of his century and chained the chalice with politics.

Nor could the subject of Taylor's polity hope for relief from any other source. Everywhere supreme civil power stood in his way. Taylor granted Stuart power complete ubiquity. No justice, under his scheme, could exist in England but Stuart justice, licensed to modify the Divine Law which Taylor had used like a pair of shears to clip the untidy strands of Natural Law. The oppressed subject could make no appeal to positive law because the king was above the law, cloaked in an inviolable garment of grace. Redress for a subject was impossible, unless he could successfully play upon the Stuart conscience, for no other coercitive authority on earth existed in Taylor's polity but the king. If the king's conscience remained unmoved, the oppressed subject had left for his comfort only the liberty of suffering.

V

FOOTNOTES: LEVIATHAN

1 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 144.

2 Might not one of the reasons for the doctrinal latitude which has characterized Anglicanism be this breakdown of structure during the Commonwealth? The church was thrown back upon lay-patrons who, therefore, were open to the corresponding temptation of imposing their own doctrinal eccentricities upon local parishes. One thinks of Addison's good knight, Sir Roger de Coverley.

3 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 56.

4 Although Hobbes' work must have been available to Taylor (Leviathan was published in 1651, about ten years before Ductor Dubitantium), there are no references to him in Taylor.

5 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 56.

6 Ibid., p. 57.

7 Richard Hooker, Works, arranged by Keble (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1865), III, p. 341. Following a similar train of thought, Taylor wrote: "By obedience we are made a society. . . and distinguished from herds of beasts, and heaps of flies. . ." Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 120.

8 Works, Vol. 5, Episcopacy Asserted, p. 10.

9 Works, Vol. 5, Liberty of Prophesying, p. 590.

10 Ibid., loc. cit.

11 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 311.

12 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 64.

13 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 573.

14 The self-contradiction between Taylor's theology and his politics is examined in Chapter Seven.

15 A. S. P. Woodhouse (ed.), Puritanism and Liberty (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1965), p. 26.

16 See page 33.

17 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, pp. 284-294.

18 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 6.

19 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 299.

20 For more proof of this definition of Natural Law by Divine Law see Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 6; Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 296; Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 43.

21 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 305.

22 The reasoning of this paragraph is based upon the whole of Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, pp. 501-544.

23 Ibid., p. 10.

24 Ibid., p. 540.

25 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 582. What exactly Taylor meant by the "public disposition. . ." etc., he did not specify.

26 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 30.

27 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 565.

28 Works, Vol. 7, Deus Justificatus, p. 519.

29 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 144.

30 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 19.

31 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, pp. 115-119.

32 William Blake, The Poetry and Prose of William Blake, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (London: The Nonesuch Press, 1961), p. 769.

33 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 405.

34 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Dying, pp. 389-390.

35 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 433.

36 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 350.

37 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 351.

38 Ibid., p. 504.

39 Richard II, III, iii, 77-81 in William Shakespeare, Complete Works, ed. W. J. Craig (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 397.

40 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, pp. i-ii.

41 Ibid., p. ii.

42 Richard Hooker, Works, arranged by Keble (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1865), III, p. 342.

43 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 175.

44 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, pp. 123-125.

45 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 177.

46 Ibid., p. 178.

47 Ibid., p. 161.

48 Ibid., p. 169.

49 Ibid., p. 174.

50 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 36.

51 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 629.

52 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 482.

53 Ibid., p. 256.

54 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 58.

55 Ibid., p. 216.

56 Ibid., p. 203.

57 Ibid., p. 204.

58 Ibid., pp. 205-208.

59 Works, Vol. 5, Episcopacy Asserted, p. 214.

60 This is Anglican dogma. See Article XXXVII.

61 Works, Vol. 5, Episcopacy Asserted, pp. 148-149. Ibid., p. 144, gives a list of matters pertaining to church jurisdiction.

62 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 259.

63 Ibid., p. 240.

64 Ibid., p. 243.

65 Ibid., p. 244.

66 Ibid., p. 216.

67 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 655.

68 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 165.

69 Ibid., loc. cit.

70 Works, Vol. 5, Episcopacy Asserted, p. 150.

71 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 300.

72 Ibid., p. 303.

73 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 589.

74 Ibid., loc. cit.

75 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 306.

76 Taylor also stated that supreme civil authority could command the church to offer the eucharist to any excommunicate. He made the reservation that the communicant in such a case would sin, unless he had repented the crime for which the excommunication was originally imposed. See Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 315.

VI

THE LIBERTY OF SUFFERING

Any man who sets out to discuss human freedom will inevitably find himself dealing with a series of interrelated, fairly specific questions. Does, for example, independent, individual judgement take precedence over the customary, comparatively static values of an old society, permeated with religion? Is liberty synonymous with amorality? Is it careless of law, hostile to punishments, and contemptuous of obedience? Is the free citizen one who does not suffer? At various times in his work, Taylor encountered all these questions and answered each one negatively.

Basically, his answers stemmed from two *a priori* postulates, both quite logical offshoots of an ethical system incorporating theocentric elements: firstly, liberty may be metaphysical as well as physical; and secondly, given a choice between the two, the metaphysical is of more importance than the merely physical liberty. But to phrase the two postulates thusly, in simplified, modern language, is to reduce them to a starkness which only partially conveys the connotations which they have in Taylor's phraseology. He chose to express himself by using the traditional distinction between *voluntas* and *libertas*.

Taylor regarded *libertas* as a state of instability, an imperfect state produced by inadequate apprehension of the good: ". . . in moral things liberty is a direct imperfection, a state of weakness, and supposes weakness of reason and weakness of love; the imperfection of the agent, or the unworthiness of the object."[1] *Voluntas*, on the other hand, Taylor conceived of as a stable state of determination fixed upon a good which has been perfectly apprehended. *Voluntas* is a state found in its highest perfection in God and the "saints in heaven," who "cannot will evil, because to do so is imperfection, and contrary to felicity."[2] But, according to Taylor, it also must characterize, insofar as they are humanly capable, those who strive for the prize of beatitude:

> Such in our proportions is the liberty of the sons of God; it is a holy and amiable captivity to the Spirit: the will of man is in love with those chains which draw us to God. . . we are free as princes within the circles of their diadem, and our chains are bracelets, and the law is a law of liberty, and 'His service is perfect freedom'. . . . [3]

The political implications of this distinction are of great importance because it substitutes what one could term a "liberty of the absolute" for a "liberty of the relative." Legitimate liberty, the "liberty of the absolute," Taylor's *voluntas*, may only be found in a state of obedience. While it is true that Taylor specifically used *voluntas* to help animate the machinery of his covenant theology, the concept carried over into his political theory because Taylor's covenant extended beyond statically conceived injunctions of creed and bible. Since positive law and undivided, supreme,

legitimate civil authority, as we have seen, tended to usurp Divine Law in Taylor's political theory, it was only natural that he apply covenant theory to the relationships of authority, law, and subject. Hence, Taylor used *voluntas* to link the subject to the "continuous revelation" of God's providence revealed in the acts of supreme civil authority. For the subject governed by a legitimate authority, the struggle for liberty, therefore, becomes purely an interior affair, a struggle between soul and body. Taylor never sanctioned the exteriorization of such a struggle into one for earthly power.

When considering the political obligations of subjects it was dogma with Taylor that ". . . spiritual men are not designed to reign upon earth, but to reign over their lusts and sottish appetites."[4] Subjects, therefore, who control their members and mind by the "law of the spirit" have no desire for earthly dominion; instead, they use their providentially low station in the Great Chain of Being as a blessing designed to provide opportunity for grace:

> Obedience is a complicated act of virtue, and many graces are exercised in one act of obedience. It is an act of humility, of mortification and self-denial, of charity to God, of care of the public, of order and charity to ourselves and all our society, and a great instance of a victory over the most refractory and unruly passions. 5

A signal distinguishing mark of Taylor's obedient citizen is the Christian virtue of *humilitas*. The subject has no political will in a modern "democratic" sense at all. He has *voluntas*, which submerges itself in the overseeing will

of the supreme civil power. He does not criticize commands, nor is he "inquisitive into the reasonableness of indifferent and innocent commands. . .," having left the determination of indifferent matters wholly to his superiors. He accepts the customs prevailing in his society "without any affectation or singularity," and he complies meekly with any civil suffering which may be his lot.[6] He agrees with Taylor that the supreme civil authority, when legitimate, as were the Stuarts, is a "parhelius, or a representation of His [God's] own glory, though in great distances and imperfection. . .,"[7] and that merely to obey a prudent, wise, excellent governor and yet withhold obedience from "the impositions of a looser head, is to worship Christ only upon the mount Tabor and in the glories of His transfiguration, and to despise Him upon mount Calvary and in the clouds of His inglorious and humble passion."[8]

Such principles amounted very nearly to a divinization of legitimate authority, whether it be good or evil. The divinization was incomplete at an abstract level because Taylor, as a Christian, still had to recognize that even high civil authority was like an image stamped upon base metal--authority was human.[9] At one point, Taylor very briefly considered the possibility that disobedience to legitimate authority was a direct disobedience to God. Had he answered that it was, Taylor probably realized, he would have laid himself open to the accusation of divinizing authority. Taylor avoided the danger by making God's grace dependent

upon humility, charity, and obedience to providence, all of which, he stated, were invariably dissipated by a subject rebelling against civil authority.[10] Reasoning like this is subtle and rather slippery. It would seem to assume an artificial distinction between punishment of motive by God and punishment of act by civil authority. But it does prevent one from making the unqualified statement that Taylor identified God and the legitimate supreme civil power. Rather one must say that, while at an abstract level Taylor made no such identification, he did make God and civil authority synonymous at the level of practice. Doubtless, in theory, he maintained independence between the punishments meted out by civil power and by God, but always, in the case of rebellion against legitimate authority, he wrote as if God were a Stuart.

Although he circumscribed their right to act upon it, Taylor never denied the capacity of individuals as subjects to judge between right and wrong in civil matters. Ductor Dubitantium was, after all, founded upon an assumption of the primacy of individual conscience and the binding necessity of its decisions. It might seem that "conscience" is a dangerous concept for an absolutist like Taylor to place much emphasis upon. By it, however, he designated not the individualistic instrument, operating largely through intuition and feeling, which the word customarily designates in common, modern usage, but a severely rational faculty, operating like a court of law from many extraneous notices which have been reduced to the most absolute possible objectivity, which

judges by the code of Divine Law: ". . . without dispute God is to be obeyed rather than man; and although we must obey man for God, we must never obey man against God. . ."[11]

What Taylor's Divine Law consisted of, and its necessary modifications in a finite world, we have already examined in detail in the previous chapter.[12] Suffice it to say in the present context that Taylor straitly hedged a subject's right to subjective interpretation. He must enquire most diligently, for example, into all the particulars of a case, ruthlessly quelling any self-interested bias. He must always enquire with great patience and prudence,[13] and is wise if "he does not walk alone. . ." but lets "a spiritual man" be his guide,[14] just as, one supposes, John Evelyn did Taylor.

Always in a doubtful case, wrote Taylor, presumption must be for obedience to the dictates of the supreme, legitimate civil power: ". . . the presumption is on behalf of the law, because ordinarily that is the greatest interest and the greatest reason."[15] And while he admitted that indifferent matters, ones not explicitly required by Divine Law, did not bind the conscience before their admission into positive law, Taylor did make indifferent matters binding when promulgated by "a just authority" because "God hath subjected it [conscience], and commanded it to obey"[16] such just authority:

> It will be rarely contingent that a man in a christian commonwealth shall be tied to disobey, to avoid sin; and certain it is, if such a case should happen, yet. . . nothing of our present question [concerning matters indifferent] is so like a sin, as when we refuse to obey the laws. To stand in a clean vestment is not so ill a

> sight as to see men stand in separation; and to kneel at the communion is not so like idolatry as 'rebellion' is to 'witchcraft' 17 . . . what scandal is greater than that which scandalizes the laws? and who is so carefully to be observed lest he be offended, as the king? 18

In operation, therefore, despite his insistence that conscience judge on the basis of Divine Law, Taylor's doctrine of conscience has the same strikingly relativistic, prudential, earthly characteristics as his doctrine of legitimate liberty or voluntas. Both notions are limited by the bonds of positive law and the commands of legitimate authority. Admittedly, as long as there is even the most tenuous relationship between conscience and liberty, on the one hand, and an abstract system of values, like Divine Law, on the other, in a political philosophy, then there is always a latent resource to be drawn upon to legitimate disobedience to supreme civil power. Taylor anticipated this disobedience, however, and sanctioned only its most passive form; he emphatically rejected armed resistance to legitimate power under any circumstances.

One of the classic utterances of the doctrine of active obedience to a possibly erring supreme civil power, one which is often quoted, occurs in Shakespeare's Henry V:

> King Henry: . . .Methinks I could not die any where so contented as in the king's company, his cause being just and his quarrel honourable.
> Williams: That's more than we know.
> Bates: Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough if we know we are the king's subjects. If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us. 19

Taylor was clearly of a mind with John Bates. In the Life of

Christ, for example, he wrote: ". . . an action may be a sin in the prince commanding it, and yet innocent in the person executing: as in the case of unjust wars, in which the subject, who cannot, ought not to be a judge, yet must be a minister. . ."[20] It would be difficult to find a more extreme case, where, if anywhere, one might expect Divine Law to have some immediate practical bearing. Taylor denies its application, though, simply by disassociating act and conscience, a feat of mental gymnastics which subjects in Taylor's polity were frequently called upon to exercise.

Similarly, Taylor licensed legitimate supreme civil authority with the de facto right to suspend an innocent individual's natural right of self-defence. In this position, of course, he differed strikingly with Puritans of all shades of opinion, except extreme quietists. Rainborough, for example, stood forth boldly in the Putney Debates in 1647 to say:

> For my part, it may be thought that I am against the King; I am against him or any power that would destroy God's people, and I will never be destroyed till I cannot help myself. Is it not an argument, if a pilot run his ship upon a rock, or [if] a general mount his cannon against his army, he is to be resisted? 21

Taylor would have replied that Rainborough's arguments were invalid. In the Life of Christ, published six years after Putney, Taylor made the direct personal application that if "my lawful prince" attempted to take his life either in rage or "with the abused solemnities of law," the sacredness of the king's person and the reverence due to authority would,

in either case, "bind my hands, that I must not life them up, but to heaven, for my own defence and his pardon."[22]

For a modern reader, one of the most difficult things to stomach in Taylor is this unqualified, constantly reiterated dogma that no subject, even one operating irrefutably by the light of Divine Law, must offer active resistance to legitimate supreme civil power. In such circumstances, the only succedaneum Taylor offered was an unavoidable liberty of suffering. He offered a liberty of *voluntas*, a necessary liberty, without the acceptance of which no man could be saved. If a persecutor orders Taylor's Christian to disobey God, the Christian has little choice. He may, as we shall see, postpone the evil event by prudence, but ultimately he can only escape into the *voluntas* of suffering: ". . . for we can be secure against him [the persecutor] by suffering what he pleases, and therefore disobedience to a law of Christ cannot be made necessary by any external violence."[23]

If the legitimate ruler be evil, unjust, cruel, unreasonable, ". . . let him be what he will, if he be the supreme, he is superior to me, and I having nothing to do, but something to suffer: let God take care; if He please, I shall be quickly remedied; till then I must do as well as I can."[24] If the ruler be a tyrant, "a violent injurious prince," still the subject "must not strike princes for justice," "hurt the Lord's anointed, nor revile the ruler of the people."[25] Arguing upon such premises, with the addition of historical evidence and prudential considerations, Taylor could even

glibly contrive apologetics for three of the rather less pleasant Roman emperors:

> Whom can we suppose worse than Julian, than Domitian, than Nero? and yet these princes were obeyed. . . nay Nero, as bad as he was, yet when he was killed, was quickly missed; for in a few months three princes succeeded him, and there was more blood of the citizens spilt in those few months than in Nero's fourteen years. And who please both for their pleasure and their instruction to read the ecomium of Nero. . . by . . . Cardan, shall find that the worst of princes do much more good than they do harm. 26

Doubtless Taylor thought such considerations would be a comforting remembrance to Christians whom God's providence had designated to illuminate some future Caesar's gardens with the fire of their flesh. To solace them further, Taylor abandoned the literary graces of the rationalistic epicureanism which we have seen him manipulating so well to discourage men trying unitive contemplation, celibacy and heroic piety. Instead he flourished a Christian stoicism of the same type he used for the benefit of the poor.

Texts, stories, and analogies came to his fingers like tame trout. Taylor cited: "Obey your masters, not only the good and gentle, but the morose and harsh." (1 Pet. ii.18) "By Me kings reign, and the lawgivers decree justice." (Prov. VIII.15) "There is no power but from God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." (Rom. xiii.1,2) 27 There was a supportive injunction to be found in the story of St. Peter's cutting off the ear of the servant of the high priest, for Taylor interpreted Jesus' command, "Put up again

thy sword into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword," to constitute "putting a bridle upon the illegal inflictions and expresses of anger or revenge from an incompetent authority. . ."[28] Taylor also considered Christ's words to Pilate, "Thou shouldest have no power over Me unless it were given thee from above," a plain indication that "Caesar's power, whose deputy Pilate was, was derived from God, and consequently that, except God, none is greater upon earth than Caesar. . ."[29] The martyrdoms of the early church, notably those of Clement, Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and Cyprian,[30] and the deaths of the Apostles,[31] were also cited by Taylor to prove that Christians had passively suffered themselves to be killed, despite the most extreme provocations. Finally, Taylor thought his position irrefutably verified by the circumstances of Christ's passion.[32]

The consequences of all this evidence to Taylor were obvious; the subject whom God ". . . loves most He afflicts most, and [He] does this with a design of the greatest mercy in the world."[33] But the subject who "fights for temporals,"[34] resists the Lord's anointed, and abuses providence forfeits God's love. Only a blessed state of Christian obedience will save a man. He must embrace the Christian liberty of suffering; he must practice a sublime <u>voluntas</u> which considers ". . . all our daggers gilt, and our pavements strewed with roses, and our halters silken, and the rack an instrument of pleasure. . ."[35] He must die in the transcendent delights

of earthly injustice.

It is difficult, after reading logic like this, not to avoid accusing Taylor of vilifying God's justice. However much he may have explained in Unum Necessarium and other places his noble intention of vindicating God by refuting extreme predestination and imputed original sin, Taylor's anxiety to construct a scheme which would support political absolutism led him to create a God almost as implacable and cruel as any ever devised by a rigid Calvinist. Taylor's politicized God broods over English society like the shadowy Fate which tosses the characters of Thomas Hardy's novels into ironic combinations. "God is the master of the scenes; we must not choose which part we shall act; it concerns us only to be careful that we do it well. . . ."[36]

If the subject be a Christian, he does, of course, have the consolatory knowledge in Taylor's system that Heaven will amply compensate for a short, painful life in this world, and that even mundane events are being guided by God towards an ultimate, pre-ordained harmony. It was, indeed, highly necessary, since he was a Royalist, for Taylor to emphasize both these points when he was viewing life from the point of view of a depressed Stuart supporter, not a triumphant one. By doing so, in addition to laying down principles which would ensure the continuance of Stuart absolutism, despite its past and future constitutional eccentricities and incompetencies, Taylor could also explain away the apparent success of the Puritans and the failures and sufferings of his own

party. According to Taylor, therefore, God may permit temporal prosperity; evil may apparently flourish as it did in the Great Rebellion; but retribution will eventually fall: "Every prosperous thriving sinner is in the same condition; within these twenty years he shall be thrown into the portion of devils, but shall never come out hence in twenty millions of years."[37] It was a "strange infidelity," in Taylor's opinion, for a man to think, in the face of so many explicit biblical texts, "that a rebellion against the ordinance of God can be sanctified by success and prevalency of them that destroy the authority, and the person, and the law, and the religion."[38] Rather Taylor would have all good Royalists think:

> . . . the afflictions happening to good men are alleviated by the support of God's good Spirit, and enduring them here are but consignations to an honourable amends hereafter; so the succeeding prosperities of fortunate impiety, when they meet with punishment in the next, or in the third age, or in the deletion of a people five ages after, are the greatest arguments of God's providence, who keeps wrath in store. . . 39

In the matter of obedience, Taylor's Royalism placed him in a rather dangerous situation. On the one hand, he had to justify continued resistance against the Puritans, whom God with punitive irony had saddled upon England. On the other hand, Taylor had to be sure not to overstate the case for resistance and lay down broad principles which would justify resistance against all wicked supreme civil authority, among whom, in the future, might presumably be the occasional tyrranical Stuart sent by God to chastize the nation and open the gates of Heaven to a sudden influx of martyrs. Unfortunately,

it is almost impossible to reconstruct from his books exactly what Taylor thought in his own mind or counselled in his conversation concerning this problem. It is obvious that if he had overtly spurred men to resist the Puritans in print, he would not long have remained unpunished. Indeed, he was imprisoned several times as it was for offences so minor or ambiguous that it is difficult to determine what exactly they were. Had he done more, he would certainly have suffered heavily. Instead of invoking resistance directly, therefore, Taylor seems to have chosen to justify it indirectly by using the doctrine of voluntas, by narrowly defining legitimate authority, by separating conscience and act and demanding active obedience, by preaching the liberty of suffering, and by constructing a theory of providence in ways which all very clearly nullified the pretensions of the Commonwealth to monopolize men's loyalties. He also, as we shall now see, elaborated a sometimes equivocal doctrine of prudence.

The closest Taylor ever came to demanding actual, overt disobedience to the Puritans occurs in a passage in Unum Necessarium (1655) where he stated the axiom:

> He that complies with an usurper [i.e. the Puritans] out of fear and interest in actions prejudicial to the lawful prince, and tells the honest party [i.e. the Royalists] that he is right in his heart, though he be forced to comply, helps the other with an argument to convince him that he is a false man. . . a guilty person, a man whom interest and not conscience governs. Better it is not to know at all, than not to pursue the good we know. 40

But this passage, with its rather cloudy implications that a

good Royalist should actively disobey, has no other more explicit counterparts in Taylor's writings. Instead, one finds many passages outlining a doctrine of prudence, a grudging compliance with reality tempered by canny manoeuvring designed to vitiate and confuse an unlawful supreme civil authority, or temper and perhaps postpone the blows of a legitimate tyranny. This doctrine of prudence probably held several attractions for Taylor. Firstly, it could be adjusted to apply with only minor modifications to both a lawful authority and a usurpation. Taylor needed only, in each case respectively, to narrow or broaden the sphere within which he allowed men to temporize before kneeling at the block. Under the Stuarts, for example, he could narrow the sphere by making prudence rigidly virtuous. Under the Puritans, however the sphere broadened, and prudence, as we shall see, could become morally ambiguous. This leads to the second reason why the doctrine may have been attractive--it was realistic. It must have suited many a heartfelt Royalist who was, nevertheless, reluctant to sacrifice himself against impossible odds once Charles I was dead and the monarchy had gone into exile. England was full of such men who had virtually withdrawn from general society into the company of friends and practised an habitual civil sullenness which must have been most exasperating to the Commonwealth authorities. Thirdly, the doctrine suited Taylor's talents and disposition admirably. Perhaps the comment is invidious, but Taylor, in spite of his several imprisonments, was obviously not interested in provoking a

climacteric personal martyrdom. He was too much involved in exercising his polemical talents to refute and confuse the Puritans, too busy writing practical divinity and devotional handbooks designed to prolong a communal habit of Anglicanism, too involved with uxorious delights, high households, and literary friendships to become a martyr. Finally, the fourth reason why Taylor might have been attracted to teach prudence so frequently was because, unlike the Christian stoicism and suffering voluntas, it fitted quite neatly into Taylor's scheme of a rational universe, benevolent Nature, and confident, self-determined man.

In Taylor's Sermons, for example, one comes across the following passage designed to prove that Christianity is not incompatible with "good husbandry" and the securing of the interests of the body: "It is an office of prudence to serve God so that we may at the same time preserve our lives and our estates, our interest and reputation, for ourselves and our relatives, so far as they can consist together."[41] A few pages further, and Taylor extended these principles in an explicit application to circumstances prevailing under the Commonwealth (". . . we are fallen into times that are troublesome, dangerous, persecuting, and afflictive. . ."), and he advised his auditory:

> . . . purchase as much respite as you can; buy or 'redeem the time' by all honest arts, by humility, by fair carriage and sweetnesses of society, by civility and a peaceful conversation, by good words and all honest offices, by praying for your persecutors, by patient sufferance of what is unavoidable.[42]

Only if "these guards and retirements" failed to placate, and dishonesty or the omission of "an act of obligation" were demanded did Taylor revert to the dogma of the liberty of suffering and command subjects to ". . . come forth into the theatre and lay your necks down to the hangman's axe. . ."[43]

Taylor's doctrine of prudence could be fittingly symbolized by combining a snake and a dove in an emblematic design like those upon which Wither, Quarles, and Bunyan exercised their ingenuity. Beneath such an emblem, perhaps, could be written a piece of moralistic doggerel:

> Behold, gripped by the peaceful dove,
> A wily serpent tamed by Love,
> Together, each the other's guide,
> They spurn Diabolus aside:
> When innocence and cunning meet,
> They animate once errant feet.

"A zealous man runs up a sandy hill. . ." wrote Taylor, no doubt with a good many Presbyterians in mind. A properly prudent man, on the contrary, acts very circumspectly, influenced by considerations of his "natural inclinations," his friends, dependencies, necessities, and hopes.[44] He is careful not to invite persecution "by his own follies or the indiscretions of an unsignificant and impertinent zeal. . ."[45] He weds prudence to innocence: "For he that is innocent is safe against all the rods and the axes of all the consuls of the world, if they rule by justice; and he that is prudent will also escape from many rudenesses and irregular violences that can come by injustice. . ."[46]

But Taylor seems to have forgotten that the snake and

the dove can also be dangerous companions. Let it be remembered that in various incidents, the most notorious being the equivocation and double-dealing of Charles I after his capture, these two helped to destroy the moral authority of the Royalists. They affected Taylor's reputation deeply also, for they were the hidden, tutelary spirits of the Liberty of Prophesying.

Taylor explicitly defended this book twice in subsequent publications: firstly, in the dedication to Hatton of a collection of his polemical discourses published in 1657; secondly, in Part Two of the Dissuasive from Popery, published posthumously in 1667. Both times he based his defence upon the doctrine of prudence. In 1657, he replied to the criticism that the Liberty of Prophesying "had made the roof of the sanctuary so wide that more might be sheltered under it than they [his critics] had a mind should be saved harmless. . ." Taylor answered that he had written during a time of persecution, that Anglicanism was the only true religion admittedly, but it had been subjugated by those ". . . who looked upon us as men in mispersuasion and error. . ." Necessarily, therefore, Taylor said, in order to permit some measure of Anglican worship "in liberty and impunity," he had been forced to argue that even if Anglicanism were false, it still had a right to be practised. The consequence of this mode of argument was that he had had to argue for a similar freedom to be given erroneous sects, or else he would have been accused of unreasonableness, inconsistency, and injustice. In addition,

Taylor pointed out that he had prudently "placed such guards and restraints" in his book "as might keep out all unreasonable pretenders," men who repudiated the Apostles' Creed, or "weakened the hands of government, or were enemies to good life."[47] A self-righteous disgust with critics who were apparently too willing to forget the circumstances under which his book was written gave the peroration of Taylor's 1657 preface a harsh cadence which time has not softened: ". . . when the loins of the presbytery did lie heavy upon us, and were like to crush us into flatness and death, I ought not to have been reproached for standing under the ruin, and endeavouring to defend my brethren. . ."[48]

Taylor returned to this theme just before his death. As an Anglican bishop in Ireland and as the author of a recently published Dissuasive from Popery (Part One), he was challenged with the taunt that in the Liberty of Prophesying he had argued for the toleration of Roman Catholicism. Taylor replied by calling the taunt "unkindly done." He had written, he said, to save Roman Catholics "from the iron hands of a tyrant and unreasonable power." Now, far from being grateful, they turned Taylor's kindnesses upon himself. But such ingratitude was harmless, wrote Taylor, for the arguments of the Liberty of Prophesying were really just ". . . tinsel and pretence, imagery and whipt cream. . .,"[49] intended to prove not that Roman Catholicism was true, but, and this is a very fine distinction, probably true, and hence a folly which even the pious and the wise in other matters than

religion might adhere to without criminal conscience.

The slipperiness evident in these two defences of the Liberty of Prophesying is an excellent example of the sort of moral ambiguity to which the entry of a carelessly defined doctrine of prudence into an ethical and political system can lead. Ends tend to justify means. How, one wonders, would Taylor have reacted to an opponent who in practice made use of a prudence so generously applied that it licensed its practitioner to plead for what he believed to be false in religion so that what he believed to be true would be tolerated? Rather than let such a wily serpent thrive, one suspects Taylor would have crushed him with arguments drawn from a rather different source than prudence, with arguments drawn from the arsenal of voluntas.

In fact, Taylor's difficulties with the Liberty of Prophesying were not just those which its self-destructive Pyrrhonism, examined in Chapter Three, evoked. They were also the result of an equally double-edged doctrine of prudence which Taylor devised to suit his own talents and the circumstances of the time. The trouble with most prudentially motivated actions or arguments, particularly political or religious ones, is, as Taylor found out, that to be effective they must never be suspected to be merely prudent. Their advocate must successfully dissimulate his true motivation; if he does not, then he is unmasked, his arguments rejected, and his person probably subjected to the injury or indignity which he sought to avoid. If the dissimulation is effective,

however, the dissimulator will be held to sanction what he does not believe, and if circumstances suddenly change, he may find himself wishing he had been more honest, and died sooner.

Prudence and the liberty of suffering were manipulated in varying degrees by Taylor according to which system of government his ethical attention was directed. Perhaps this manipulation was itself an offshoot of Taylor's prudential considerations. A lawful tyranny or the virtuous monarchy stimulated Taylor to stern rhetoric on the primacy of metaphysical liberty, the necessity of hierarchy, and the practice of an exacting, self-effacing voluntas. Prudence and a closely related doctrine of the probability of traditional, majority opinion were also used quite freely in these cases by Taylor, but he did not expend so much rhetorical energy upon them. For Royalists living under the Commonwealth, however, Taylor preached prudence; and the liberty of suffering, although kept in reserve as a last resort and alluded to in the form of Taylor's doctrine of providence, rather tended to fade into the background.

Examining such evidence, one reaches a conclusion which may perhaps seem rather paradoxical to make about a writer of Taylor's sympathies, unless it be borne in mind that according to the doctrine of voluntas true liberty lies in the restriction, not the proliferation of choice. The conclusion is that Taylor's principles led him to concede more political and religious freedom of the modern kind to men living under

the Commonwealth, which he despised, than he could grant to subjects under the Stuarts, whom he loved.

Libertas, voluntas, and prudence are the keys, in fact, to a mystery which no commentator upon Taylor has as yet fully explained. How could the same pen which wrote the Liberty of Prophesying write all of the other dogmatic, Erastian, absolutist books which Taylor's career produced? How could the fluent liberal theologian turn into a very orthodox Anglican bishop in Ireland and turn non-conformists out of their livings? The answer is that prudence led Taylor to advocate the lesser good of libertas when the greater good of voluntas could not prevail. Except for the Liberty of Prophesying, Taylor never for a moment wavered in his advocacy of a liberty which excluded as much as possible the choice of error.

So well known and so easy to read is the Liberty of Prophesying that it would be needlessly redundant to examine the doctrine of toleration which it advances in any great detail here. Noble disjecta membra extracted from it, like the following one, must frequently have been encountered by anyone familiar with seventeenth century studies:

> . . . if the persons be Christians in their lives and Christians in their profession, if they acknowledge the eternal Son of God for their Master and their Lord, and live in all relations as becomes persons making such professions, why then should I hate such persons whom God loves. . . because their understandings have not been brought up like mine, have not had the same masters, they have not met with the same books nor the same company, or have not the same interest, or are not so wise, or else are wiser. . .? 50

Taylor's anticipation of modern, liberal attitudes towards the interplay of differing opinions has frequently attracted favourable comment. What could be more "enlightened," for example, than his insistence that it is "unnatural" to persecute opinions because human understanding, "being a thing wholly spiritual, cannot be restrained, and therefore neither punished, by corporal afflictions. . ."?[51] Taylor's realization that toleration would bring an end to the circle of persecution and counter-persecution practised by antagonistic sects as power changed from one side to the other,[52] and his comment that persecution created pseudo-martyrs, justifying heresy by suffering,[53] are also striking premonitions of modern realpolitik. Lastly, let us mention Taylor's criticism of censorship and book-burning, especially his dismissal of a society which practises them as being in the condition where ". . . we either distrust God for the maintenance of His truth, or. . . we distrust the cause, or distrust ourselves and our abilities."[54] If the story of Taylor's burning all the copies he could find of the Liberty of Prophesying when he was an Irish bishop be true, this last quotation gains a special piquancy.

But one simply cannot take such references to indicate the real state of Taylor's opinions, even when he was actually writing them down as if he believed them. Firstly to be considered is Taylor's subsequent insistence that his book was motivated by prudence: it was a stopgap attempt in a desperate situation. Conceivably, it might be argued that Taylor's

later defences were a cunning betrayal of the Liberty of Prophesying, a deliberate obfuscation of principles which at one time he had sincerely held, but later dare not outrightly disavow for fear of damaging his reputation. Yet had this been the case, surely he would simply have allowed the book to fall into oblivion, not be republished in 1657, as if it were a jeu d'esprit, with the addition of arguments against the practice of adult baptism which he had defended as an advocatus diaboli in the first edition. The fact is too that Taylor's explanation of the prudential motives producing the book logically coincides with the interpretation one is forced to make from all of Taylor's other books and his acts both prior and subsequent to the publication of the Liberty of Prophesying. Taylor was, after all, an Anglican, and he was an exponent of the most absolute Erastianism. Toleration, by setting up countervailing powers to the supreme civil authority, would have violated his insistence upon the necessity of an undivided, single sovereignty. Every word he wrote must be read with this in mind; otherwise a careless reader, intent upon finding justification for his own modern values in Taylor's work, will be led astray. Let, for example, a sentence like, "By the parable of tares permitted to grow amongst the wheat, He [Christ] intimated the toleration of dissenting opinions not destructive of piety or civil societies,"[55] taken from the Life of Christ, be read with Taylor's Erastianism in mind, especially the closing words, and it becomes not the justification of a multi-sectarian society

it seems to be at first glance, but rather the foreshadowing of the High, Low, and Broad church aspects of future Anglicanism.

Throughout the Commonwealth period, in fact, Taylor consistently criticized individualism and sectarianism. He rarely extended to others the charity he had tried to solicit for Anglicanism in the Liberty of Prophesying. Certainly one may find passages where he disparages "a severe literal and rigorous exacting of laws," but they are commonly followed, as in this case, by words like:

> But when stubbornness, or a contentious spirit, when rebellion and pride, when secular interest, or ease and licentiousness, set men up against the laws, the laws then are upon the defensive, and ought not to give place; it is ill to cure particular disobedience by removing a constitution decreed by public wisdom for a general good. 56

Never did Taylor waver in his belief that the only legitimate society was hierarchical and authoritarian. No taint of contemporary congregationalism would he allow to enter his church. Bishops must command, and the laity must obey:

> A prelate must rather fortify and encourage obedience and strengthen discipline, than by remissness toward refractory spirits, and a desire not to seem severe, weaken the hands of conscientious persons by taking away the marks of idfference between them that obey and them that obey not. . . 57

For Anglicans to mingle in prayer with "communions of heretical persons and in schismatical conventicles. . ." was for Taylor as if they consented to pray with "Corah and his company, that rebelled against Moses their prince; and Dathan and Abiram, that made a schism in religion against Aaron the

priest. . ."[58] God, said Taylor, would never accept the offerings of such mongrel congregations, nor did He show His operations in the "fantastic and hypochondriacal religion or . . . [the] secret ambition," of any individuals proclaiming new revelations.[59]

The Restoration gave Bishop Taylor, especially as he was living among the Roman Catholic Irish, freedom and even more motive to discredit opinions hostile to his own and to insist upon the necessity of monolithic Erastianism. In one of his sermons, for example, Taylor devoted several pages to the opinion of some "good men" that toleration would induce the world to be at peace. He contradicted them, pointing out that some men will always be evil and turbulent, and "very many men," specifically the Roman Catholics and Calvinists, were not satisfied with the mere toleration of their opinions but had as one of their principles the dogma that their way alone was true and that everyone must conform to them. Toleration was therefore intolerable to them.[60] Taylor continued by pointing out that toleration is far better in theory than it proves to be in practice:

> . . . for reckon all that is got by it when you come to handle it, and it can never satisfy for the infinite disorders happening in the government; the scandal to religion, the secret dangers to public societies, the growth of heresy, the nursing up of parties to a grandeur so considerable as to be able in their own time to change the laws and the government. So that if the question be whether mere opinions are to be persecuted, it is certainly true, they ought not. But if it be considered how by opinions men rifle the affairs of kingdoms, it is also as certain, they ought not to be made public and permitted. [61]

Such words are a long way from the brotherhood of Christ which Taylor preached in the Liberty of Prophesying (for the Presbyterians to practice). But these words, and the others which have been paraphrased or quoted in the last few pages are thoroughly consistent with Taylor's explanation that in the Liberty of Prophesying he was practising a delicate piece of prudential dissimulation.

The Liberty of Prophesying stands as the only apparent exception to Taylor's otherwise dogmatic scheme of Erastian royalism. Once it is accepted that the book was the outcome of prudence, as the evidence seems to show it must be, then all Taylor's writings on politics taken together constitute an extraordinarily consistent scheme of absolutism. We have seen in this chapter how Taylor, starting with the postulated primacy of metaphysical liberty, applied the logical consequent notion of voluntas to the state. Supreme civil authority, regardless of whether it be evil and unjust, as long as it be legitimate, Taylor made an irresistible arm of God's providence. He gave subjects the right to exercise prudence; they might postpone martyrdom as long as it was possible to do so without betraying the Divine Law, but under no circumstances would Taylor sanction active disobedience or resistance to legitimate civil authority. However, his attitude towards resistance of unlawful supreme power, such as that of the Commonwealth, was more equivocal.

Here he allowed prudence, as was well demonstrated in his own work, to approach close to dishonesty. He practised

a latitude of dissimulation which subsequently caused him great embarrassment and made confusion and inaccuracy of interpretation inevitable in many of his later readers and commentators. His real opinions on toleration were as uncompromising as his insistence that suffering and death at the behest of lawful civil authority were acts of liberty, while rebellion and disobedience to the Stuarts were acts of enslavement.

VI

FOOTNOTES: THE LIBERTY OF SUFFERING

1 Works, Vol. 7, Deus Justificatus, p. 506.

2 Ibid., loc. cit.

3 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 335.

4 Ibid., p. 339.

5 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 120.

6 Ibid., p. 78.

7 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 115.

8 Ibid., p. 116.

9 Ibid., p. 115.

10 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 25.

11 Ibid., p. 29.

12 See Chapter Five, passim.

13 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, pp. 37-40.

14 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 118. See also Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 395.

15 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 44.

16 Ibid., p. 20.

17 Taylor was referring to a passage in I Sam. XV.23: "For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry."

18 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 337.

19 Henry V, IV, i, 132-140, in William Shakespeare, Complete Works, ed. W. J. Craig (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 488.

20 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 120.

21 A. S. P. Woodhouse (ed.), Puritanism and Liberty (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1965), p. 33.

22 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 450.

23 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 558.

24 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 195.

25 Works, Vol. 9, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 492.

26 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 196.

27 Ibid., pp. 6-9.

28 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 609.

29 Works, Vol. 10, Ductor Dubitantium, p. 187.

30 Ibid., pp. 189-190.

31 Ibid., p. 185.

32 Ibid., p. 198.

33 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 434.

34 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 399.

35 Ibid., p. 620.

36 Works, Vol. 3, Holy Living, p. 85.

37 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 453.

38 Ibid., p. 451.

39 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 150.

40 Works, Vol. 7, Unum Necessarium, p. 359.

41 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 581.

42 Ibid., loc. cit.

43 Ibid., loc. cit.

44 Ibid., p. 178.

45 Ibid., p. 580.

46 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, p. 574.

47 Works, Vol. 5, 1657 dedication to Select Polemical Discourses, p. 3.

48 Ibid., p. 4.

49 Works, Vol. 6, Dissuasive from Popery, Pt. 2, p. 319.

50 Works, Vol. 5, Liberty of Prophesying, p. 346.

51 Ibid., p. 522.

52 Ibid., pp. 517-518.

53 Ibid., pp. 521-522.

54 Ibid., p. 358.

55 Works, Vol. 2, Life of Christ, p. 513.

56 Ibid., p. 583.

57 Ibid., p. 581.

58 Works, Vol. 4, Sermons, pp. 68-69.

59 Ibid., p. 346.

60 Works, Vol. 8, Supplementary Sermons, p. 366.

61 Ibid., p. 367.

VII

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, we cannot examine in detail here the ways in which Taylor's work demonstratively or probably influenced society and thought in the years following his death. To do so adequately would take many pages and require a knowledge of English intellectual history which could only be had after several years' concentrated study, often in areas which even yet are excessively obscure.

It would be insufficient to limit attention merely to the comparatively well-known exponents of rationalistic empiricism who, in view of the preceding analysis, must be accounted to be, sometimes unwittingly, heirs direct or indirect of Taylor. One would also have to investigate the countervailing English traditions of theocentric, intuitional anti-empiricism and patriarchal politics which have been rather neglected by historians, perhaps because of the empirical bias of their own epistemology and the fact that anti-empirical and patriarchal schools of thought appear superficially to have been social, intellectual, and political cul-de-sacs. One would need, for example, to study the writings of that first generation of Non-jurors--Sancroft, Kettlewell, Charles Leslie, and others--and the usages of

their Jacobite church, which were the final sad havens in the seventeenth century of Laud's beauty of holiness and the doctrines of extreme obedience preached by Taylor. Also, since thought may be stimulated by reaction as well as by sympathetic extrapolation, it would be necessary to examine the scarce pamphlets and books of late seventeenth century mystical writers like John Pordage, Francis Lee, Jane Lead, and Richard Roach, who, as percursors or founders of the Philadelphian Society (1697-1703), figure indistinctly in the brief entries of the Dictionary of National Biography, and who were linked, through Francis Lee, to several of the most prominent Non-jurors. Finally, any serious attempt to estimate the effect of Taylor's work would have to include consideration of William Law, himself one of the second generation of Non-jurors, who after starting his literary career by preaching a Taylorian sort of externalized moral activism, gradually shifted into an anti-empirical mysticism based upon the books of Jakob Boehme. More than any other theologian trained nominally in the Anglican tradition before Newman, Law was the antithesis to Taylor. Faced with all these prospects, the best that can be done in this last remaining chapter is to indicate only the most obvious evidence of Taylor's influence and his popularity in the last two centuries, leaving subtler shadows to be explored perhaps at another place and time.

Overt references to Taylor in a purely intellectual context are not plentiful. Locke mentioned him only once in

a footnote to Book IV, Chapter XVI of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.[1] There, Taylor was quoted from his nemesis, the Liberty of Prophesying, as an exponent of peace and charity to cure the mischief of unavoidable, insuppressible diversities of human opinion. Nowhere else did Locke pay explicit attention to Taylor's work. It was not even mentioned in Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study, For a Gentleman, although Tillotson, Chillingworth, and Algernon Sydney, all writers who, despite varying religious and political sympathies, can be classified with Taylor as leaning towards empirical rationalism, received Locke's favourable notice. Ductor Dubitantium was never alluded to by Locke; presumably he, like many other men, both before and since, found Taylor in the guise of an exponent of toleration more palatable than Taylor the dogmatic, patriarchal absolutist. Politically, of course, Locke and Taylor were at odds, save for that ambiguous exception of the Liberty of Prophesying. Hence it does not seem as though it would be very promising for us to enter the most accessible portion of Locke's work, his political tracts, hoping for the discovery of illuminating comparisons between the two writers. Locke's theological works, on the other hand, might yield a richer harvest; but anyone who has looked them over will realize the futility of attempting to write about them without undertaking a most painstaking investigation, necessitated mainly by Locke's ambiguous phraseology and diffuseness, which are fully as demanding as Taylor's. Fortunately, however, two important

eighteenth century writers, both working from Lockean premises, can be linked to Taylor without our having to enter their work in the prohibitive detail which a comparison with Locke would require.

An important reference to Taylor occurs in Shaftesbury's Characteristicks published in 1714. In his 1864 revision of Heber's edition of Taylor, Eden added a footnote drawing attention to Shaftesbury's comments.[2] Eden's footnote contained the following quotation, given here directly from the Characteristicks:

> They [Taylor's books] maintain the principal Place in the study of almost every elegant and high Divine. They stand in Folio's and other Volumes, adorn'd with variety of Pictures, Gildings, and other Decorations, on the advanc'd Shelves or Glass-Cupboards of the Lady's Closets. They are in use at all Seasons, and for all Places, as well for Church-Service as Closet-Preparation; and, in short, may vie with any devotional Books in British Christendom. [3]

Not the least interesting circumstance attached to these words is that Eden failed to indicate their context. They appeared at the end of ten pages of exposition in which Shaftesbury pretended to transcribe verbatim the reply of "a Gentleman of some Rank (one who was generally esteem'd to carry a sufficient Caution and Reserve in religious Subjects of Discourse, as well as an apparent Deference to Religion, and in particular to the national and establish'd Church)" to "an impertinent Attack of a certain violent bigotted Party."[4] Shaftesbury's "Gentleman" proceeded to quote, at first without open acknowledgement, perfectly memorized pages of the Liberty of

Prophesying to prove that diverse interpretation of scripture was inevitable, and a forced universal compliance to one static dogma impossible. He pointed out that appeals to the inviolable authority of scripture were untenable because of the corruption of texts; the self-interested falsifications of opposing doctrines and antagonistic sects; and the " 'great Mysterys [of revelation] . . . so wrap'd in Clouds, or hid in Umbrages, so heighten'd with Expressions, or so covered with Allegorys and Garments of Rhetorick'."[5] At the end of this peroration, Shaftesbury had the adversaries of his "Gentleman" accuse him of being ". . . a Preacher of pernicious Doctrines, one who attack'd Religion in form, and carry'd his Lessons or Lectures about with him, to repeat by rote, at any time, to the Ignorant and Vulgar, in order to seduce them."[6] In reply, the "Gentleman," aided by Shaftesbury in an elaborate footnote quoting further from the 1657 edition of the Liberty of Prophesying, let fall the lightning bolt that he had indeed been talking by rote, but that his arguments were taken from Taylor, ". . . one of the Episcopal Order, a celebrated Churchman, and one of the highest sort. . ."[7] The "Gentleman" then ended his counter-offensive with the long panegyric upon Taylor, which alone Eden deemed worthy of copying.

One hardly knows what is more interesting: Shaftesbury's sly insinuations and his obvious delight at being able to confound enemies out of an accredited, orthodox mouth, or Eden's naivety, so common in many of Taylor's admirers, in apparently being unable to see how many curious questions

were raised by the context of Shaftesbury's praise. It is interesting too that Taylor was used by Shaftesbury in quite the same way as by Locke in order to justify toleration. Although Shaftesbury referred to Taylor explicitly only in two other places, both of no immediate relevance for our purposes,[8] one can safely say that there were many points of sympathy between the two writers. Certain aspects of Taylor's thought, his individualistic rationalism, his distrust of "enthusiasm," his emphasis upon an externalized code of morality, and especially the highly developed, naturalistic, epicurean side of his Christianity must have all been quite attractive to Shaftesbury, for all received a further development in the Characteristicks.[9]

David Hume did not mention Taylor anywhere, but epistemological parallels can easily be traced in their thought. It is not here implied that for this reason Hume must have been directly influenced by Taylor and neglected to record his indebtedness. It is more likely that the parallels were the result of two men writing with a similar acceptance of principles basic to rationalistic empiricism. Also, it seems reasonable to suggest that Hume received some of the principles of Taylorian empiricism at second hand. A perfect example of this can be cited from the very beginning of Hume's notorious essay, "Of Miracles," where he paraphrased an argument of Tillotson's against the Roman Catholic doctrine of the real presence. Tillotson, wrote Hume, argued that scriptural authority and the "divine mission" of Christ were

proven true by the empirical evidence which presented itself to the senses of the Apostles. Hume's paraphrase of Tillotson continued:

> Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in Scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. 10

Every proposition in this quotation could be matched by one drawn from the empirically based attack by Taylor against transubstantiation which was examined in Chapter Three. Just how dangerous such empiricism is to revealed Christianity Hume plainly revealed in the rest of his essay, as he went on to extend its use, from an attack upon transubstantiation, to an attack upon purported miracles:

> It is experience only which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but to subtract the one from the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained [the extreme probability that transmitted testimony is false] this subtraction with regard to all popular religions amounts to an utter annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle . . . 11

Almost in the last lines of his essay, Hume suddenly changed his attention from non-scriptural miracles to those recorded by revelation. The result was one of those chains

of logic, ending in self-annihilation, so inescapable in all modes of Pyrrhonian thought.[12] Stated as clearly as possible, Hume's reasoning ran thusly:

1. Miracles cannot rationally be accepted as proven, against the weight of empirical evidence, by the evidence of human testimony.

2. But revelation is full of miracles recorded by human testimony.

3. Therefore, revelation is not rationally acceptable upon empirical evidence.

4. Therefore, revelation can be accepted only by irrational faith.

5. For faith is a miracle which, in Hume's words, "subverts all the principles of. . . understanding, and gives. . . a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience."

6. But, empirical evidence is the true measure of the validity of a miracle. See 1.

7. Both Christianity and faith are miracles. See 3 and 5.

8. Therefore, they <u>are</u> verifiable by empirical evidence. See 1.

9. But they <u>are not</u> verifiable by empirical evidence. See 4 and 5.

Even if Hume were a skeptical fideist, as it is often maintained,[13] destructive reasoning like this readily makes it understandable why he has been accused of covert atheism. From our point of view, Hume's position was noteworthy because it patently demonstrated the dangers in Taylor's epistemology. No doubt he would have protested against Hume's sharp distinction between faith and reason. For Taylor, faith was reasonable: miracles he regarded as either Roman Catholic forgeries or extraordinary interventions by God

which ceased immediately at the end of the apostolic age.[14] But in Taylor, as we have seen, there were the beginnings of that detached, dispassionate attitude towards revelation and that hostility towards symbolic discourse which signified that a disassociation between faith and reason, with more emphasis being placed upon the latter, was taking place in his mind.

Nevertheless, luckily for Taylor's reputation, most of his readers have apparently been oblivious to the dust and ashes which, from a mythopoiec point of view, are the ultimate destination of his epistemology. Indeed, with the natural instinct of a born popularizer, Shaftesbury in the Characteristicks used the one seventeenth century divine whom the educated middle and lower middle classes consistently read for nearly the next two hundred years when he chose Taylor to sanction toleration. The truth of Shaftesbury's allusion to the books of Taylor "adorn'd with variety of Pictures. . . on the advanc'd Shelves or Glass-Cupboards of the Lady's Closets" is borne out by quoting lines from one of Pope's Moral Essays, published in 1735:

> Narcissa's nature, tolerably mild,
> To make a wash would hardly stew a child;
> Has ev'n been prov'd to grant a lover's prayer,
> And paid a tradesman once to make him stare;
> Gave alms at Easter in a Christian trim,
> And made a widow happy for a whim.
> Now deep in Taylor and the Book of Martyrs
> Now drinking citron with His Grace and Chartres:
> A very heathen in the carnal part,
> Yet still a sad good Christian at her heart. 15

Pope, as a Roman Catholic, was probably indulging a little

malice at the expense of two representative Protestant writers, both of whom had written venomous anti-papal propaganda, by designating Taylor and Foxe as occasional companions for the charming Narcissa. But because of this there is no reason not to accept the description as an accurate indication of Taylor's popularity in Pope's day. One continually comes across references to Taylor, often in rather odd circumstances, throughout the eighteenth and well on into the nineteenth centuries.

We know, for example, that following a quarrel, the Duchess of Malborough gave Queen Anne a discourse on the duty of forgiveness--and a copy of Holy Living and Holy Dying, with some pages dog-eared to denote relevant passages.[16] Almost a hundred years later, we find John Keats describing his friend Bailey, the curate, courting a young lady who, to use Keats' words, ". . . liked Bailey as a Brother--but not as a Husband--especially as he used to woo her with the Bible and Jeremy Taylor under his arm. . ."[17]

Taylor seems to have been a particular favourite with the "Romantic" school of writers who became prominent in the first half of the nineteenth century. For instance, in Thomas Love Peacock's novel, Headlong Hall, published in 1816, one of the characters, who argues, interestingly for the student of Taylor, against the fatuity of regarding "the decay of the world with satisfaction," quotes with sarcasm Taylor's advice that the Christian must be persuaded " 'to be in love with tortures, and to think charitably of the

rack'."[18] Altogether, there are about half a dozen references to Taylor scattered throughout Peacock's books.

Thomas De Quincey was also a careful reader of Taylor, as indeed stylistic similarities between the two writers would tempt one to predict. There is an extended consideration of Taylor in De Quincey's essay entitled "Rhetoric," published in 1828; and long quotes from Taylor's Life of Christ were used to embellish a few pages of De Quincey's essay "Judas Iscariot," published in 1857.[19]

A few years later, Coventry Patmore's first wife died, and a biographer of the poet has described how Patmore, ". . . re-read her letters. . . studied her portrait, and kept beside him small intimate reminders of her--a pair of gloves, her favourite book (Jeremy Taylor's Holy Living and Holy Dying) which he read, trying to find comfort."[20] Since Patmore ultimately evaded the tradition of Anglicanism and Jeremy Taylor by becoming a Roman Catholic, it is fitting that Newman's relationship with Taylor should be mentioned here also.

Newman slowly came around to the realization that the attempt which he and his fellow tractarians had been making to re-establish the Anglican church upon the "Catholic" Anglican writers of the seventeenth century was one which was based upon false premises. By 1843, Newman was, as he wrote in Apologia Pro Vita Sua:

> . . . angry with the Anglican divines. I thought they had taken me in; I had read the Fathers with their eyes; I had sometimes trusted their quotations or their reasonings; and from reliance on

> them, I had used words or made statements, which by right I ought rigidly to have examined myself . . . the fact was, unpleasant as it was to avow, that I had leaned too much upon the assertions of Ussher, Jeremy Taylor, or Barrow, and had been deceived by them. 21

The bulk of Newman's other references to Taylor in the Apologia Pro Vita Sua appeared in a most interesting context. Newman used passages in Taylor's Ductor Dubitantium to reply to attacks that he had illegitimately sanctioned and used a doctrine of equivocation and mental reservation, in plain words a doctrine justifying lying. Bearing the Liberty of Prophesying in mind, Newman's difficulties make a fascinating parallel to those of Taylor.

But evidence as to the popularity of Taylor in the nineteenth century is not limited only to England. In Chapter Four, it was pointed out that certain aspects of Taylor's theology could be used to stimulate and defend an activist ethic in rather the same way as elements of Emerson's thought. Therefore, it is all the more worth noticing that in 1832 Emerson, then twenty-eight years old, wrote an advisory letter to Miss Elizabeth Tucker about her reading and recommended that she obtain, among other books, Taylor's Holy Dying.[22] In 1837, Emerson's close friend and co-founder of the Transcendental movement, Bronson Alcott, lamented having to sell his Taylor, together with the rest of his library, in order to pay off debts.[23]

Two important religious leaders have left record of having been personally attracted by Taylor's writings. The

first was John Wesley, who wrote that a reading of Holy Living and Holy Dying in 1725, when he was twenty-three, "exceedingly affected" him:

> Instantly I resolved to dedicate all my life to God, all my thoughts, and words and actions; being thoroughly convinced, that there was no medium, but that every part of my life (not some only) must be either a sacrifice to God, or myself, that is, in effect, to the devil. 24

The second was John Keble, one of the leading lights of the Tractarian movement. Although his reaction was apparently not quite the soul-stirring one which Wesley experienced, Keble still left impressive and graceful testimony, in a letter to J. T. Coleridge in 1817, as to the esteem with which Taylor has often been regarded. Concerning Holy Living and Holy Dying, Keble wrote:

> . . . I cannot tell you the delight it has given me; surely that book is enough to convert any infidel, so gentle in heart, and so high in mind, so fervent in zeal, and so charitable in judgement, that I confess I do not know any author, except perhaps Hooker (whose subjects are so different that they will hardly bear comparison), worthy to be likened to him. Spenser I think comes nearest to his spirit in all respects. Milton is like him in richness and depth, but in morality seems to me as far below him as pride is below humility. 25

But the writer above all others whose deep intimacy with Taylor's books can be proven is Samuel Taylor Coleridge. His interest was of a threefold manner: stylistic, moral, and theological. It was also, unfortunately, expressed in typically Coleridgean fashion mainly by a rather disjointed, rambling series of annotations, fairly casual obiter dicta, which are sometimes difficult to follow, and yet which are

also often so percipient that they remain even now the necessary introduction to all serious study of Taylor's work.

Probably the best known reference in Coleridge to Taylor occurs in the long defensive preface to "Fire, Famine, and Slaughter, A War Eclogue," where Coleridge gave both Taylor and Milton as examples of the way in which charitable and loving writers may use their talents to arouse fear and condemn sin and yet remain tolerant, moral, and gentle at heart. The preface is interesting for our present purpose because of the extended comparisons Coleridge made between the careers of Milton and Taylor. He exonerated Taylor, with how much justice the reader of this thesis may judge, of party hatred; praised him and Milton for having advocated toleration at nearly the same moment in time; but made the accusation, which he repeated several times elsewhere, that Taylor in his later work approached too closely the spirit of Roman Catholicism by positing that the right of scriptural interpretation must be limited to one privileged, authorized body of clerics.[26]

The second, and far more interesting and extensive consideration of Taylor by Coleridge was published in 1838, posthumously, in the third volume of The Literary Remains, collected by H. N. Coleridge. It consists of nearly two hundred octavo pages of annotations and summary comments transcribed from the margins and endsheets of Coleridge's own copies of several of Taylor's books. This is not now the place,

however, for an elaborate exposition of Coleridge's opinions on Taylor. To make one, would involve entanglement in all the complexity of Coleridgean metaphysics, for Coleridge's criticism went very deeply indeed. At the root of it was the fact that Taylor's rational, empirical approach to religion was what Coleridge himself was trying to exorcize from the philosophical orthodoxies of his own time. Coleridge's strictures on Taylor could, indeed, be cited as a perfect instance of what happens when two conflicting epistemologies collide.

Basic to his position was Coleridge's distinction between reason and understanding. Upon Unum Necessarium he commented, "What Taylor calls reason I call understanding, and give the name reason to that which Taylor would have called spirit."[27] For Coleridge, this confusion of reason and understanding, and the circumscription of "spirit" were the source of all the grave defects in Taylor's theology. Annotating a phrase in the Liberty of Prophesying, Coleridge wrote:

> It is a lamentable misuse of the term, reason,--thus to call by that name the mere faculty of guessing and babbling. The making reason a faculty, instead of a light, and using the term as a mere synonyme of the understanding, and the consequent ignorance of the true nature of ideas, and that none but ideas are objects of faith--are the grounds of all Jeremy Taylor's important errors. [28]

Conceptual logic, ". . . deriving all its material from the senses, and borrowing its forms from the sense," being therefore ". . . necessarily inapplicable to spiritual mysteries. . .,"[29] Coleridge pronounced to have led Taylor badly astray.

When Taylor quoted Aristotle's words, "The touch can never be deceived,"[30] in order to prove the error of transubstantiation, Coleridge testily commented:

> Every common juggler falsifies this assertion when he makes the pressure from a shilling seem the shilling itself. "Are you sure you feel it?" "Yes." "Then open your hand. Presto! 'Tis gone." From this I gather that neither Taylor nor Aristotle ever had the nightmare. [31]

The repercussions of Taylor's conception of reason were clear to Coleridge. By restricting reason within ". . . the forms of time and space. . .," Taylor tended to divinize matter and free-will: "Now the necessary consequence of Taylor's scheme is a conscience-worrying, casuistical, monkish work-holiness."[32] Reinforcing this tendency, Coleridge pointed out, was Taylor's ambiguity concerning the necessity of the Passion:[33]

> My objection to Taylor is, that he seems to reduce the death of Christ almost to a cypher; a contrivance rather to reconcile the attributes of God [i.e., His justice], than an act of infinite love to save sinners. But the truth is, that this is the peccant part of Arminianism, and Tillotson is yet more open than Taylor. [34]

Therefore, Taylor, in Coleridge's opinion, believed in moralism, not Christianity. He was basically a Pelagian, who believed that by merely exercising free will and natural understanding man would obtain beatitude; but ". . . this he [Taylor] did not dare say out, probably not even to himself; and hence it is that he flounders backward and forward, now upping and now downing."[35] Coleridge, of course, when he said such things was being a little more blunt than the

evidence we have examined really warrants. But, nevertheless, one must agree with his summary of the general drift and ultimate consequence of Taylor's theology:

> . . . it makes the whole Scheme of Redemption a theatrical scenery. Just restore our bodies and corporal passions to a perfect equilibrium and fortunate instinct, and, there being no guilt or defect in the soul, the Son of God, the Logos, and Supreme Reason, might have remained unincarnate uncrucified. In short, Socianism is as inevitable a deduction from Taylor's scheme as Deism or Atheism is from Socinianism. 36

Here Coleridge touched the heart of the matter. Taylor, despite the fact that his intention was to construct a theocentric system, really gave direct or indirect comfort to those whose thought tended in varying degrees to apotheosize man. The influence he had upon Wesley and Keble cannot be permitted to outweigh Taylor's close intellectual relationship with Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hume; nor must the criticism of Newman and Coleridge be treated as mere eccentricity. Indeed, it would be possible to make an analysis of Wesleyan Methodism and Keble's type of Tractarianism,[37] and show that both demonstrated weaknesses similar to those which Coleridge perceived in Taylor. In effect, Taylor's sort of theology led, as Coleridge indicated, directly to modern humanism.

What Coleridge did not, however, notice was the fundamental contradiction in Taylor's work between his doctrines of free-will and original sin on the one hand, and on the other, his rigid, inescapable system of monarchical absolutism. For once it is maintained that a man has the duty to be morally active within the very wide range which Taylor expected,

and that a life of passive contemplation is incompatible with God's covenant, then a very static, hierarchic society of the type which Taylor tried to justify becomes most difficult to create. Moral activism and empirical reason, even when restrained within a political context by covenant theology, as Taylor attempted, are basically incompatible with the Taylorian voluntas of metaphysical liberty, active, uncritical obedience, and passive suffering. Indeed, what the theological side of Taylor's thought did was to help provide the basis of modern, secularized polities in which the conscience of subjects and their acts are presumed to be synonymous, and where men, as subjects, are granted the right to choose among contradictory political possibilities, even if they choose the morally wrong ones.

Ironically enough, the very system of monarchical absolutism which Taylor intended to stifle individualistic political agitation probably had quite the opposite effect. In some respects, it is true, Taylor's absolutism was a respectable attempt to surround civil power with that atmosphere of sanctity without which no political authority can survive. This aspect of Taylor's thought was an interesting and rather isolated exception to the generally rationalistic bias of his other opinions. One could even set up an illuminating "myth versus reason" comparison between Taylor's politics and his theology. Yet on balance, even Taylor's politics were heavily saturated with rationalism. Two points must be kept in mind: firstly, Taylor's doctrine of free-will

and original sin licensed hierarchy just as much as subjects to exercise an activism, untempered by subtleties concerning human corruption and transcendent reason. Secondly, Taylor's extreme Erastianism made the church--the traditional countervailing force in Christian polities--so subordinate to the crown that the effect was to leave supreme civil power a virtually unimpeded ability to operate solely according to worldly motives. Together, both these factors co-operated to secularize the state and make unquestioning acceptance of a creed of passive suffering and active obedience by subjects even more unlikely. Far from inducing a servile dependence upon the mysterious workings of God's providence and the conscience of the ruler when a Nero, or the Stuarts, were bestowed upon the world, Taylor's "anthropocentric theology" and his Erastianism, when combined together had a tendency to politicize society from top to bottom, snap the Great Chain of Being, and make an empirically motivated activism at one and the same time the means and the end of all men.

For no homilies upon God's providence can preserve a static hierarchy which is itself not theocentrically orientated. Since the Reformation, the English crown had tried to maintain within itself a theocentric balance of sacred and secular without recourse to the creation of an externalized, independent church power. Until Charles I, the crown had largely succeeded in keeping control because it was considered by Protestant subjects as necessarily theocentric, almost by attribute, because it was anti-Roman Catholic. When Laud and

the king, however, seemed to be intent upon imposing a Catholic counter-reformation, the theocentricity of the crown became regarded by many as a sham and hierarchy was inevitably attacked.

The same latent imbalance of sacred and secular and the consequent surrendering of moral authority which helped cause the civil war also characterized Taylor's system of polity. He seems to have had little realistic conception as to what can and cannot be expected of men in the way of martyrdom; in effect, Taylor asked men to be willing to die at the behest of a devil if needs be, and most Englishmen proved unwilling to do as much for James II. The civil war taught Taylor nothing about politics except that he must make subjects utterly servile and kings omnipotent, but not necessarily moral, conditions which Protestant rationalism made quite incompatible. Seen in such a light, the liturgical emphasis upon symbolism and sacraments in the Jacobite church; the mystical tendencies apparent in some of the first generation of Non-jurors, and their further development in the books of the second generation Non-juror, William Law, all have an unmistakeably close relationship with politics and the liberty of suffering. It is interesting to remember, incidentally, that William Penn was a Jacobite.

How far Taylor's absolutist politics extended down into the actual details of how men might be expected to work is difficult to say. We have seen, however, that he regarded poverty in the conventional seventeenth century fashion as

an unavoidable fate for people to endure in a quiet, trusting Christian way. Certainly this attitude was the same as that which motivated the bleakest side of nineteenth century religion. What would Taylor's reaction have been, one wonders, had he been able to read by anticipatory vision the letter which a Lancashire cotton operative sent to John Ruskin in 1873 to be inserted in Fors Clavigera? The letter is particularly relevant here because it contains an appeal to Divine Law against providence which is one of the harshest, critical footnotes upon Taylor's political doctrines that could ever be found. The operator described the working conditions which new machines had introduced in these words:

> . . . in our improved condation condition we had to turn out some 100 weght per day and we went as if the Devel was After us for 10 houers per day and. . . the feemals have ofton Been carred out fainting. . . and those that could not keep up mst go and make room for a nother and all this is Done in Christian England and then we are tould to Be content in the station of Life in wich the Lord as places us But I say the Lord never Did place us there so we have no Right to Be content. . . Right and not might [is] . . . the Law. 38

Of course, Taylor can hardly be expected to have been able to predict the horrors of the Industrial Revolution. But, although it may be invidious, it is also reasonable to ascribe some of Taylor's continuous popularity with the middle classes throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in part to the arguments which could be drawn from his books to suppress any impertinent questioning of God's providence. Despite all the preaching of charity and interdependence which Taylor did in

his practical devotional handbooks, it seems probable that they, being conceived within the framework of a pre-industrial society which was characterized by static social patterns of extended kinship and large, domestic, agrarian households, may have had some retarding effect upon efforts in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to improve the conditions of work and urban poverty.

Unfortunately, it has not been found possible to discover a contemporaneous equivalent for Coleridge's criticism of Taylor's theology in the area of Taylor's political and social theory. The closest one can come is to use a lampoon written by William Blake upon the fly-leaf of Dr. Thornton's New Translation of the Lord's Prayer. Possibly, the analogy between Thornton and Taylor may not be regarded as satisfactory because Thronton's book was not printed until 1827, one hundred and sixty years after Taylor's death. But Blake's reaction to it perfectly echoes the cumulative effect which Taylor's polity must have upon any reader who is not an impenitent Jacobite, and Thornton's book was so obviously conceived in the same vein as Taylor's political principles, a vein which the passage of years and change of dynasty between the two clerics had still kept accessible, that perhaps the substitution of Thornton for Taylor may be forgiven. What Blake did was to write a splenetic parody of the Lord's Prayer:

> Our Father Augustus Caesar, who art in these thy
> Substantial Astronomical Telescopic Heavens,
> Holiness to thy Name or Title. . . Thy kingship

> come upon Earth first & then in Heaven. Give us day by day our Real Taxed Substantial Money bought Bread; deliver from the Holy Ghost whatever cannot be Taxed; for all is debts & Taxes between Caesar & us & one another. . . For thine is the Kingship, or Allegoric Godship, & the Power, or War, & the Glory, or Law, Ages after Ages in thy descendants; for God is only an Allegory of Kings & nothing Else. Amen. 39

It is fittingly ironic to end with words of Blake, for he, more than any other great English writer, thought upon a plane of theocentricity which was alien to Taylor. Blake's hatred of externalized moralism; his belief in the absolute reality of immediate divine immanence; his spiritual independence; his rejection of discursive reasoning in favour of symbolic discourse and orphic, paradoxical utterance; his divinization of art and imagination; and his reversion to contemplative values are all a necessary reminder to the intellectual historian that men's thoughts do not invariably clasp one another like the rings of a chronological chain whose last links are our own. A subtler metaphor must sometimes be conceived to explain men like Blake. Imagine our bodies clipped to run freely on a wire shaped in the form of a conical spiral, whose tip reaches the heavens and whose outermost circumference is this earth. There, some few turns above the base, Taylor hangs, waiting motionless, while below him are many of us, travelling downward in a widening gyre with dog Diogenes.

VII

FOOTNOTES: CONCLUSION

1 John Locke, The Works of John Locke, ed. J. A. St. John (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969) II, p. 273.

2 Works, Vol. 1, p. ccl.

3 Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristicks (London: J. Darby, 1714) III, p. 328.

4 Ibid., pp. 317-318.

5 Ibid., p. 322.

6 Ibid., p. 325.

7 Ibid., p. 326.

8 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 99-100, where Shaftesbury quoted Taylor on friendship and Vol. III, pp. 40-41, where a story to ridicule misguided martyrdom is quoted from Taylor.

9 See in particular Ibid., Vol. I, Part IV, pp. 128-150.

10 David Hume, Essays Moral, Political and Literary (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 519.

11 Ibid., pp. 540-541.

12 The following is abstracted from Ibid., pp. 543-544.

13 It would seem questionable whether skeptical fideism, if it is deeply felt and rigorously applied, as it was in the case of Pascal, is compatible with epicureanism of the sort which Hume often displayed.

14 Works, Vol. 5, Episcopacy Asserted, pp. 19-20. Ibid., Vol. 6, Dissuasive from Popery Pt. 2, p. 463.

15 Alexander Pope, Complete Poetical Works, ed. H. W. Boynton (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931), Moral Essays, Epistle II, lines 53-68, pp. 161-162. Six lines have been omitted.

16 C. J. Stranks, The Life and Writings of Jeremy Taylor, (London: S.P.C.K., 1952), p. 115.

17 John Keats, Letters of John Keats, selected by F. Page (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 240. The letter is one to George and Georgiana Keats, dated February 14 to May 3, 1819.

18 Thomas Love Peacock, The Works of Thomas Love Peacock, ed. H. F. B. Brett-Smith & C. E. Jones (New York: AMS Press, 1967), I, p. 147.

19 Thomas De Quincey, The Collected Writings of Thomas De Quincey, ed. David Masson (Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black, 1889), X and VIII respectively.

20 Derek Patmore, The Life and Times of Coventry Patmore (London: Constable, 1949), p. 107.

21 John Henry Cardinal Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, ed. M. J. Svaglic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 184-185.

22 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson (Boston & New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1904), VII, p. 401.

23 Bronson Alcott, The Journals of Bronson Alcott, sel. & ed. Odell Shepard (Boston: Little, Brown, 1938), p. 99.

24 John Wesley, The Works of John Wesley (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishing House, N.D.), XI, p. 366.

25 Sir John Taylor Coleridge, A Memoir of the Rev. John Keble (Oxford: J. Parker, 1870), p. 68.

26 S. T. Coleridge, The Poems of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Derwent & Sara Coleridge (London: Edward Moxon, 1852), pp. 175-187.

27 S. T. Coleridge, The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, coll. & ed. H. N. Coleridge (London: William Pickering, 1838), III, p. 318.

28 Ibid., p. 272.

29 Ibid., p. 314. Coleridge's comment applied specifically to Unum Necessarium.

30 This quote from Aristotle is examined in context in Chapter Three, page 62.

31 S. T. Coleridge, The Literary Remains, III, p. 350.

32 Ibid., p. 320.

33 S. T. Coleridge, The Literary Remains, III, p. 297.

34 Ibid., p. 304.

35 Ibid., p. 328.

36 Ibid., pp. 331-332.

37 Keble's embarrassment with Hooker's Calvinistic position on original sin is apparent in the preface to his edition of The Works of Richard Hooker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1865), page cii and following.

38 John Ruskin, The Artists Edition of the Complete Writings of John Ruskin (New York: Merrill & Baker, N.D.), II, p. 180.

39 William Blake, Poetry and Prose of William Blake, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (London: Nonesuch Press, 1961), p. 827. The spelling of the first "Caesar" has been corrected from "Ceasar."

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5. *Rules and Advices to the Clergy of the Diocese of Down and Connor*.
6. Heber, Reginald, *Life of Bishop Taylor* (Referred to as *Life* in footnotes and text).
7. *Bishop Rust's Funeral Sermon on Bishop Taylor*.

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