

MAITLAND AND THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CONSERVATIVE PARTY:
THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SURVIVAL

by

John Gordon Terpenning
M.A. (Political Science), University of Victoria, 1982

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

History

ACCEPTED
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
[REDACTED]
DATE Sept 14, 1988 DEAN

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

[REDACTED]

Dr. Patricia E. Roy

[REDACTED]

Dr. Kenneth S. Coates

[REDACTED]

Dr. J. Terence Morley

[REDACTED]

© JOHN GORDON TERPENNING, 1988

University of Victoria

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced
in whole or in part, by mimeograph or other means,
without permission of the author.

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-46504-2

Supervisor: Dr. Patricia E. Roy

ABSTRACT

Royal Lethington Maitland was a brilliant lawyer and a life-long member of the British Columbia Conservative party. He was prominent in the party from 1922 when he was elected president of the provincial association until his premature death in 1946 when he was attorney general in the Coalition government. This study focuses on Maitland's political actions, motives and thoughts, principally during those years. However, to understand Maitland's actions and his role in the party it has been necessary to describe and explain the evolution of certain situations prior to 1922.

The analysis of Maitland's political career provides an understanding of his party's erratic performance during a generation that spanned the great prosperity of the 1920s, the economic, social and political chaos and challenges of the 1930s, and the trauma and sacrifices of a six-year war. But the party's problems were due to more than a volatile external environment. Plagued by weakly-supported leaders and strong factions, the party leadership was unable to take an unequivocal stand on virtually any issue. It was hampered by leaders that represented only urban interests and concerns. The party practised "issue" as compared to reform politics; that is, rather than pledging new policies, it responded to other parties' policies by simply condemning them, or promising it would do a better job of implementing those policies. And it failed to recognize a new constituency, namely, Liberals who would not follow Premier Pattullo as

he moved his party to the Left.

The party was in fact committed to a struggle not just to maintain its identity, that is, its political uniqueness compared to the other parties, but simply to survive. It lost the 1924 election because of internal division, and after a brief spell of unity under Premier Simon Fraser Tolmie, disintegrated completely in 1932 and 1933. As a result the Conservative party was unrepresented in the Legislature from 1933 to 1937 for the only time since the formation of party government in 1903, and the CCF became the first Socialist official Opposition in the history of Canada.

The party appeared to be on the road back after the 1937 election. Led by a new leader, F. P. Patterson, it displaced the CCF as the official Opposition by a margin of one seat. But in the 1941 election the party, led by weakly-supported Maitland since 1938, came in third behind the second place CCF. And the first place Liberals finished in a minority position.

Maitland tried unsuccessfully for six weeks following the October election to promote a three-party Union government, which he preferred as the best way for his party to maintain its identity, but finally joined the Liberals in a Coalition government. The CCF refused to join because such a union would have caused it irreparable ideological and political harm. Faced with a party and caucus revolt if he opted to support a Liberal minority government, Maitland coalesced with the Liberals under John Hart in exchange for three Cabinet posts, Mines, Public Works and the attorney general portfolio for himself.

Over the next four years Maitland persistently tried to build

his party's image by attacking the CCF. Although initially unsuccessful, the strategy worked in the 1945 election as the Conservatives captured seven former CCF seats and increased their strength, within Coalition, to 17 seats from 11 at dissolution.

During the 1946 Legislative Session, Maitland began laying the groundwork for some old-fashioned "fed bashing" in anticipation of the next provincial election. He had campaigned hard against the Pattullo government in the 1941 contest because of its refusal to cooperate with the federal government. To Maitland, such cooperation meant acquiescing with virtually every federal request for access to provincial tax sources. But by 1946 he had concluded that federal-provincial co-operation meant only provincial cooperation, and that any provincial rights, once ceded to Ottawa, would never be restored, something Pattullo had maintained for years. Maitland, only days from death, but alert for ways to strengthen the party's image and perhaps foreseeing an end to Coalition, had identified an issue that previous provincial governments had used with great political success.

Study sources include the personal papers of R. L. Maitland and his contemporaries, interviews and correspondence with individuals who were acquainted with Maitland, newspapers of the time, theses and dissertations, journals and monographs.



Dr. Patricia E. Roy



Dr. Kenneth S. Coates



Dr. J. Terence Morley



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ABSTRACT	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
LIST OF APPENDICES	viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	x
DEDICATION	xi
CHAPTER I: MAITLAND THE MAN, 1889 TO 1946: STUDY PARAMETERS AND CONCERNS	1
CHAPTER II: LAW AND POLITICS, APPRENTICE TO JOURNEYMAN, 1908 TO 1922	20
CHAPTER III: PROVINCIAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENT TO ELECTORAL OFFICE, 1922 TO 1928: MAITLAND AND HIS SPLIT PARTY LOSE IN 1924; MAITLAND BRINGS UNANIMITY TO A DEADLOCKED LEADERSHIP CONVENTION IN 1926; MAITLAND PERSONALLY SHARES IN THE 1928 VICTORY	41
CHAPTER IV: MAITLAND IN THE TOLMIE GOVERNMENT, 1928 TO 1933: MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO AND PRINCIPLED PARTY MAN, FROM TEMPORARY UNITY AND VICTORY TO A NON-PARTY IN 1933	72

CHAPTER V:	POLITICAL OBLIVION, THE ROAD BACK, AND DISAPPOINTMENT, 1933 TO 21 OCTOBER 1941: MAITLAND AND HIS PARTY RESTORED TO OFFICIAL OPPOSITION BY 1937; MAITLAND BECOMES A 51.5 PERCENT LEADER IN 1938; MAITLAND LEADS HIS PARTY TO THIRD PARTY STATUS ON 21 OCTOBER	116
CHAPTER VI:	THE COALITION CRISIS AND RESOLUTION, 22 OCTOBER TO 10 DECEMBER 1941: MAITLAND RATIONALIZES WARTIME ABANDONMENT OF PARTY POLITICS AND THE DRIVE FOR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE	157
CHAPTER VII:	MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE COALITION GOVERNMENT, 1941 TO 1946: MAITLAND'S STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN CONSERVATIVE PARTY UNITY AND IDENTITY WHILE STILL A COALITION PARTNER	178
CHAPTER VIII:	MAITLAND, 1908 TO 1946, POLITICIAN BY INCLINATION, LAWYER BY VOCATION: MORE ISSUE POLITICS; SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	231
AFTERWORD		244
BIBLIOGRAPHY		247

LIST OF APPENDICES

	<u>Page</u>
APPENDIX 1: British Columbia Provincial Election Results, 1903 to 1949	249
APPENDIX 2: British Columbia Government Estimated Expenditures and Estimated Revenue, 1920-46, by Fiscal Year (1 April to 31 March)	250

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	<u>Page</u>
A. CARTOONS ¹	
1. The Press Gallery Rebels at Work, Saturday morning, 1930	81
2. The Finance Minister's Budget in the Pre-Keynesian Era, 1931	85
3. A United Cabinet Facing a Grave Crisis, 1933	99
4. Farewell to the 17th Legislature, 1933	102
B. PHOTOGRAPHS	
1. R. L. Maitland as a Young Lawyer	xii
2. R. L. Maitland, K.C., Attorney General in the Coalition Government	xiii

¹Found in Maitland's Legislative log books, apparently sketched by Legislative press gallery reporter Bruce Hutchison, and donated to Maitland.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to many people for helping me with this thesis. Mrs. Elizabeth Maitland-King, daughter of R. L. Maitland, volunteered information about her father and gave me permission to read his private papers which are stored in the provincial archives in Victoria. Archival and Special Collections staff at the Universities of British Columbia, Simon Fraser and Victoria, at the Vancouver City Archives, and at the provincial archives, especially Ms. F. Gundry and Brian Young were always helpful. Mrs. June Bull, with all her experience, guided me around and over the hurdles involved in producing a thesis, and cheerfully put up with my long-winded drafts that preceded this final version. I am indebted to Professor Brian Dippie and my colleagues in the 1986-87 History 500 class for teaching me so much about writing history. And finally I want to thank my committee, Professors K. Coates and T. Morley for their many helpful suggestions, and especially my supervisor, Dr. Patricia Roy, for her patient encouragement and many hours of instructive editing.

DEDICATION

"R. L. Maitland Makes Brilliant Appeal for Life of Man Convicted of Murder of Archibald"¹


"The sword of his oratory was bright,
its edge keen . . ."²

Maitland "did not say much, but it was not so much
what he said as his manner that counted."³

¹Maitland, in his first major case, argues for the life of a man convicted of murdering a Vancouver policeman, Vancouver Sun, 9 January 1914, p. 1.

²Legislative press gallery reporter John Shaw, overwhelmed by Maitland's first speech as leader of the Conservative party, "Maitland Pleads for Planned Government of B.C. Affairs," Vancouver Province, 28 October 1938, p. 1.

³Legislative press gallery reporter, James Dyer, impressed not by substance but by style, "Opposition in House Develops New Vigor," Vancouver Sun, 9 November 1937, p. 2.



R. L. Maitland as a Young Lawyer

Source: Maitland Papers, PABC, Photo Section, file HP97985.



R. L. Maitland, K.C., Attorney General in the Coalition Government,
1941 to 1946

Source: Maitland Papers, PABC, Photo Section, file HP97986.

CHAPTER I

MAITLAND, THE MAN, 1889 TO 1946

This study focuses on Royal Lethington¹ Maitland's political career, mainly from 1922 when he was elected president of the British Columbia Conservative Party association, to his death in 1946 when he was leader of the party and attorney general in the Coalition government. The provincial party was relatively unsuccessful during the Maitland years, apparently because its leadership failed to adapt to external and internal challenges. Maitland was a significant presence in the Conservative party for at least a generation. A study of his political life, that is, of his thoughts, motives and actions--and of his professional life to a certain extent--may provide a better understanding of his party's erratic and sometimes bizarre progress during a generation of great change.

Maitland's election as party leader in 1922 culminated many years of service for the party as a constituency association officer and as a campaign worker. His political apprenticeship began when he campaigned for a federal Conservative candidate in 1908, which, incidentally, was the same year he began his five-year "reading law" program with a Vancouver law firm. For the next 37 years he participated in almost every federal and provincial election campaign, yet at the same time managed to build a reputation as a lawyer who was

very skilled, and successful, in both civil and criminal law. His political peers and contemporary journalists regarded him as an accomplished politician and a strong, dedicated party member. Those who heard him in the Legislature and on the campaign trail described him as a "golden-voiced" orator who was a "genuine master of the craft" of public speaking, and "one of the best stump speakers" in British Columbia. Through two World Wars and almost four decades of economic, political, and social change and turbulence, Maitland rose slowly but steadily in the political hierarchy: president of the provincial association from 1922 to 1926, Minister Without Portfolio from 1928 to 1933, Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) from 1937, party leader from 1938, and attorney general in the Coalition government from 1941 to 1946.²

When he was called to the Bar in June 1913, Maitland joined his father's law firm, and in 1921 took over the family company after his father's death. He was appointed King's Counsel in 1928 and was elected a Bencher of the British Columbia Law Society in 1935, a position he held until 1944 (Benchers were the executive and administrative arm of the Law Society). He was president of the Vancouver Bar association from 1938 to 1939, of the Canadian Bar from 1943 to 1944, and as an honorary vice president represented his province in the national association from 1936 to 1945. He was on very good terms with the Washington State Bar and American Bar association and was made a lifetime honorary member in both, in 1939 and 1940 respectively.³

Although he considered himself a Vancouver pioneer, "Pat" Maitland, a surviving twin, was born in Ingersoll, Ontario on 9 January 1889. In June 1890 he came to Vancouver with his parents, two sisters and a brother when his father, Reverend Robert Reade Maitland, was transferred to the Homer street Methodist church. In 1897, Pat's 42 year old father resigned from the ministry to read law for about 17 months, then went into private business, and was finally called to the Bar in July 1911.⁴

Young Maitland lived in Vancouver for the rest of his life. After he completed grade eight in 1904 at Dawson school, a private institution in those days, he worked as a clerk and meter reader for two or three years with the British Columbia Electric Railway, followed by a year in Northern Securities which was his father's company, and from 1908 to 1913 read law with two Vancouver law firms. In January 1914 about six months after he was called to the Bar, he married 27-year old Ruth Hildred Mills, daughter of John C. Mills, former Nova Scotia lawyer and Member of Parliament (MP), who had arrived in Vancouver with his family in 1903. Maitland and his wife lived in the West End for about nine years, and then moved to the north Kerrisdale area where his four children, two sons and two daughters, grew up.⁵

His first son, Robert Reid (Bob) completed one year of law school in Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia before enlisting in the Navy in 1940. He was invalided out of the service in 1944 after extensive treatment and operations for cancer. After discharge he resumed his law career, and practised law in Vancouver until his death

in 1976. William John (Bill) also enlisted in 1940 and was called up by the Air Force shortly after starting second year at the University of British Columbia. He was decorated for bravery in 1942, something his father was very proud of, and in December 1943 while on a flight to Berlin, was shot down and killed over Belgium. Maitland's two daughters, Elizabeth Ruth and Norah Kathleen, both currently live in the Vancouver area. Ruth, Maitland's wife, survived her husband by just over 21 years.⁶

Maitland came from a relatively poor family and was himself never wealthy. Before 1941 he and his family travelled extensively but he had to cut corners to do so. In 1937, for example, business was very good and he thought he would be able to carry through the winter without any worry. But in 1940 he was strapped for funds. In January, he wrote to a Powell River store to confirm a credit of \$8.20 only to be advised it was \$7.90. In May he wrote to Ottawa for a \$2.00 refund as he had paid \$3.00 for radio licenses and later learned the assessment was only \$1.00 per house, not per radio. In 1940 and again in 1944 he requested refunds of insurance premiums because one of his two cars--mid 1930s models, a Nash and a Dodge--had been on blocks for part of the year. Public service had a cost, he found, particularly after December 1941 when, as a Cabinet member with a fully staffed office, he was required in Victoria almost continuously. At his death his estate included the house in Vancouver, and his summer cottage and property in Lang Bay near Powell River which he had purchased around 1920.⁷

Maitland was a devoted family man, very affectionate toward his wife and children. When on business trips he would write to everyone at home, and when the children were older he often took one of them along. When he worked at home he liked to have the family around him, not at all distracted by the surrounding hubbub.⁸

He was a very likeable, friendly, person with a great sense of humour. For example, in April 1933 when the Sexual Sterilization Act for the insane was introduced in the Legislature Maitland looked at the Liberal Opposition and his self destructed party and commented that the Act was much too late. Politically, he was very partisan but always debated above personalities. His political attacks were aggressive, but he never attacked the person, only the policies or principles that the person represented or espoused. He always claimed he had friends on both sides of the House. One particularly thoughtful practise that he began on becoming attorney general was to send condolences to civil servants in his department who had lost relatives in the war. It was good politicking to be sure, but later on, recipients of such letters knew that Maitland understood what it meant to lose a family member.⁹

He had several interests outside of politics and law. He was a member of St. Andrews-Wesley United church and St. John's church and, being a good politician, contributed to Knights of Columbus charities. He belonged to the Gyro club, the Imperial Loyal Orange lodge, and was a Mason from 1917. He was a member of the Vancouver Pioneers Society and served as honorary secretary from 1913 to 1924; this organization included such well-known people as W. J. Bowser, attorney general in

the Richard McBride government and later leader of the provincial Conservative party, and R. E. Gosnell, one-time editor of the Colonist and secretary to Dunsmuir and other premiers. Toward the end of his career he was a Vancouver city archives trustee with whom archivist J. S. Matthews frequently corresponded on archival affairs. He listed his recreations as tennis and fishing, but he was also deeply interested in team activities. He played several sports in school including lacrosse, which he played and refereed in later years. In his graduating year in 1904 he was goaltender for the champion Dawson school team which won every game that season. In 1934, the British Columbia Senior Lacrosse association established the R. L. Maitland Senior Lacrosse trophy which was awarded annually to the most sportsman-like, and most valuable player in the league. That same year he became a member of the Lacrosse Commission, a position he held until 1946, and for part of that time he served as chairman. He was a good bridge player, read a lot outside his field, and even wrote a 39 chapter, 311 page unpublished novel entitled "Biggs." Mr. Biggs, an English councillor blessed with a very domineering wife, was a "peace loving man [who] always showed a keen interest" whenever Mrs. Biggs spoke.¹⁰

Although Maitland was an extroverted and cheerful man, he seemed to be burdened with an unusual number of personal and family tragedies. In 1907 he was almost drowned in a sailing boat accident off Prospect Point. He was involved in three car accidents, the first in December 1917 in which he was only shaken up. In January 1930,

while travelling with Ruth, he was involved in another, this one more serious as he received facial cuts and broken ribs, and Ruth, strained muscles. In July 1939, while politicking in the Interior, he rolled the car over east of Merritt and suffered cracked ribs, and a year later he was still being treated for a bad knee. Son Bill who had accompanied him was uninjured. On a hot, dry evening in July 1922 a huge forest fire at Lang Bay destroyed every building and drove the Maitlands and their neighbours down to a nearby beach where they spent the night awaiting rescue by a boat from Powell River. In September 1936 his two boys were involved in a dangerous boating accident while under tow in their sailing boat from Lang Bay to Vancouver. The next year his brother Ronald died at only age 50. And during the war Bill was killed while Bob was treated for cancer.¹¹

Maitland was also burdened with frequent illnesses, a condition exacerbated by the demands of public office. Very thin most of his life and about six feet tall, he was physically active but was never a strong person. In 1933 after the Legislative Session and the disintegration of his party, he weighed only 145 pounds and intended to see a specialist about his "nervousness." In April 1940 while campaigning for the federal party in Ontario, he collapsed from exhaustion, and did the same again in Vancouver during a radio broadcast near the end of the campaign. The next month he revealed to his mother-in-law the tension he was under. "I am nearly nuts leading the Party in this Province. It is a very heavy strain, and interferes terribly with my law practise." In December 1941 after the Liberals

and the Conservatives had formed a Coalition government he told friends that the month preceding Coalition was the most difficult period he had ever experienced; and in the following March he was bedridden for a few weeks. In early October 1943 he had a severe nervous breakdown that brought on a heart condition. By December he had pretty well recovered but suffered a setback when he learned of Bill's death; as a result he still had not fully recovered by May 1944. After a May 1945 by-election in New Westminster and the June federal election he spent over a month in bed. Following an exhausting fall and early spring schedule that included three federal/provincial conferences and the general provincial election in October, he was tired when the 1946 Legislative Session commenced on 21 February. On 14 March he was hospitalized with severe influenza and heart complications and about a week later seemed to be recovering. Cheerful as always, he even promised he would soon make a statement about the troublesome liquor control system, but on 28 March he died at the relatively young age of 57.¹²

During that segment of Maitland's life and times on which this study largely concentrates, British Columbia experienced great change: the economic boom of the 1920s; the social economic and political shock of the Great Depression; the economic and human costs of a six-year war that went badly for a long time; and the beginning of post-war economic recovery. Population almost doubled, from 524,000 in 1921 to about 1.0 million in 1946, while the provincial government's annual budget over

the same period rose from \$21.1 million to about \$42.1 million¹³ (see appendix 2).

The Conservative party's electoral record from 1924 to 1945 epitomized an organization that was not adapting to a changing and volatile, economic, political and social environment. In that time the provincial party contested six elections, if one includes its performance in 1933 and the Coalition campaign in 1945. It won only once in that period, an overwhelming victory in 1928. Furthermore, its popular vote in the 1924, 1937 and 1941 elections remained virtually the same (see appendix 1), although the party made a strong recovery in 1937 and improved its Legislative strength by a further 50 percent in 1941. To what extent did the party suffer as the result of external circumstances, for example, the Depression and the rise of both liberalism and socialism? Or was the party unable to adapt to a changing environment because of internal circumstances such as party dissension, poor organization, and the failure to either solicit or listen to signals from the constituencies?¹⁴

In Professor J. T. Morley's words, "political parties survive by integrating . . . with the external world." Like a biological organism, a political organization must recognize and adapt to change in order not only to progress but even to survive. As biologist Julian Huxley observed, "Extinction is a commoner fate than continuance." And organizational analysts have maintained for a long time that organizations which do not adapt to change will simply die. Arguably, the Conservative party survived through the generation covered by this

study, but because it failed to meet its supporters' expectations, it was, in an evolutionary sense, overtaken by higher, more adaptable forms, in this case by other political parties.¹⁵

To understand the party's performance, it will be useful to examine the party establishment and to question Maitland's role in it. Although Maitland himself stated that "we must recognize that as people and times advance the Party must advance also," did he in fact apply this philosophy in responding to new social, economic, and political trends? Did he attempt to lead, to arbitrarily impose his own views, or did he first try, as federal Liberal leader Edward Blake suggested a politician must do, "to catch the current . . . of the public opinion of the day" and recognize like Hegel's "great historical men . . . the requirements of the time [that were] ripe for development"? Did he accept, like Hunt Anderson in Tom Wicker's Facing the Lions, that the "first thing a leader has to do is to get other folks to follow" before he could bring about changes?¹⁶

To answer these and other questions, the following hypotheses, all leadership related, are suggested.¹⁷

Party leaders rarely had strong support because of the presence of strong factions.¹⁸ Leaders consistently represented urban ridings, yet the majority of MLAs and constituency organizations were rural-based. The party practised "issue" as compared to reform politics. Finally, the party failed to recognize a new constituency, a political vacuum, as Pattullo moved the Liberal party to the Left.

Party leaders, opposed by strong factions, could not risk a

strong, unequivocal stand on issues and policies without risking a public split or open controversy. A leader in this position would be a chronic compromiser, in effect a chairman, not a pace setter. Because leaders were from urban areas they tended to interpret rural aspirations and concerns in terms of their own urban values and perceptions. Party leadership was inclined to ignore expressions of grass roots concerns and needs from the majority of the province. In effect, leaders led; they did not respond to, or reflect, the wishes of the majority of the province. In practising issue politics, the party challenged other parties' policy positions either by promising to do a better job, or by simply condemning the policy or program; in reform politics a party would offer a radically revised policy or one entirely new. Finally, everyone except the Conservatives seemed to recognize that the Liberal party's leftward drift was creating political opportunities for the Conservative party.¹⁹

Methodologically, these hypotheses will serve as the bases of investigation and analysis of events and circumstances over the general 1922 to 1946 period. However, it will be necessary to describe and interpret events which took place before 1922 to show the evolution of particular factions and political issues, and the political, professional, and personal background of Maitland himself.

Although other researchers have studied particular aspects of this story, for example, the rise and fall of the Provincial Party, the 1926 Conservative leadership convention, the 1928 to 1933 Tolmie administration, the establishment of the Kidd Committee, and the formation

of the Liberal-Conservative Coalition government in 1941, these events will be re-examined when necessary to describe and explain Maitland's perspective and involvement, to develop background, and to reinterpret them in the light of new evidence.

Study sources include personal papers of Maitland and many of his contemporaries including W. A. C. Bennett, interviews and correspondence with individuals who were personally acquainted with Maitland, contemporary newspapers, theses and dissertations, journals, and monographs.

Footnotes

¹The name "Lethington" is part of the title of Maitland's aristocratic ancestors and refers to Scottish lands granted to Sir Robert Maitland probably early in the fourteenth century. The family has a clear lineage from the eleventh century. The first Maitland, originally spelled Matulant or Matalon, came to England with William the Conqueror, and the first Maitland of record in Scotland was Thomas de Matulant in the twelfth century. Sir John, descendent of Sir Robert, was elevated to the peerage in 1590, the first Baron Maitland, and in 1616 he became the first Earl of Lauderdale, a title that has continued down to the contemporary seventeenth Earl--see Peter Townsend, ed., Burke's Peerage and Baronetage (London: Burke's Peerage Limited, 1978), pp. 1546-51; and Anonymous, The Scottish Nation (London: A. Fullerton, undated), volume 7, pp. 73-83.

²For his election, see "Delegates Name New President," The Vancouver Sun, 24 August 1922, p. 14; for one report of his death, see "Influenza Causes Death of Attorney General," Victoria Daily Times, 28 March 1946, p. 1; for a report that Maitland spoke in support of federal Conservative candidate George H. Cowan in 1908, see Maitland Papers, Provincial Archives of British Columbia [PABC], Add/MSS 781 (hereafter Maitland 781), Box 14, p. 5, "Conservatives at Collingwood," a newspaper clipping, no name nor page number, hand dated 7 October 1908 (Box 14 is a large ledger in which clippings are held, some pasted to pages, others loose; the identity of the newspaper is frequently omitted as are the page numbers and sometimes the dates although many of the latter are handwritten; where identity is lacking the page of the ledger holding the clipping will be cited); Maitland was accepted in July 1908 as "Student-at-Law and Articled Clerk" first with Vancouver C. N. Haney, then with Burns and Walkem; for acceptance with the two law firms, see PABC, Law Society, Add/MSS 948 (hereafter Law Society 948), Box 62, file 309; and for the qualifying subjects, see Alfred Watts, History of the Law Society of British Columbia 1869-1973 (Vancouver: Watts and the B.C. Law Society, 1973), p. 28; for comments about his legal ability and his law specialties, Interview with Howard Green, Vancouver, 28 July 1987; and Green, personal letter to author, 16 August 1987; Green, retired lawyer and former MP, said Maitland was very active in the party, campaigning for elections, speaking around the province between elections, and was always considered a key party man in British Columbia; Green also noted that Maitland did all this party work despite being rather a frail person; retired Vancouver lawyer Alfred Watts described Maitland as a "very sound lawyer and good counsel" in a taped Interview, Vancouver 4 August 1987 (tape was sent by mail to the author in response to written questions); Legislative press gallery reporter, and later journalist, Hutchison described Maitland as very partisan, see Interview with Bruce Hutchison, Victoria, 29 September 1987; in a eulogy he was described as a strong party man, see "Pat Maitland," Province, 28 March 1946; for his golden

voice, see Paddy Sherman, Bennett (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1966), p. 31; and for the following two quotations, respectively, see "Log of the House," Province, 9 November 1937, p. 4; and "Log of the House," The Vancouver Daily Province, 8 February 1929, p. 18.

³For Maitland's call to the Bar, see Law Society 948, Box 5, entry for 7 July 1913, however he wrote his final examinations earlier in the year, see entry for 7 April 1913; for the death of his father, see "R. R. Maitland Passes Away," Province, 11 April 1921, p. 1; head of firm, see Anonymous, Wrigley's British Columbia Directory, 1923 (Vancouver: Wrigley Directories Limited, not dated) [hereafter B.C. Directory which lists the firm as Maitland and Maitland; for his K.C. appointment, see British Columbia, British Columbia Gazette, 68 (13 September 1928):3233, but the Order in Council is dated 11 September (actually the title was "His Majesty's Counsel," as in the King's Counsel Act); for his Bencher appointment, see Watts, History of the Law Society, p. 122; for Benchers' duties and responsibilities, see British Columbia, Legal Professions Act (Revised Statutes of British Columbia, 1911) (hereafter R.S.B.C.) (Victoria: King's Printer, 1911); for president of the two associations, see "Influenza Causes Death of Attorney General," Times, 28 March 1946, p. 1; for honorary vice president, see B. M. Greene, ed., Who's Who in Canada, 1940-41 (Toronto: International Press Limited, 1941), p. 618; for his honorary memberships in the two American Bar associations, see, respectively, Maitland, Add/MSS 11 [hereafter Maitland 11], Box 3, file 5, Morris to Maitland, 14 June 1940; and *ibid.*, Ricker to Maitland, 8 June 1940.

⁴Mrs. Elizabeth Maitland-King (R. L. Maitland's daughter), Interview of North Vancouver, 16 August 1986, and 6 October 1987, provided the information about a surviving twin; for birth statistics and arrival in Vancouver, see Greene, Who's Who in Canada, 1940-41, p. 618; for more on his father's transfers to Vancouver, Nanaimo and back to Vancouver, see United Church of Canada, personal letter to author, 27 May 1987; for more on Reverend Maitland's arrival in Vancouver see "Welcome to Reverend Maitland," The Daily World, 12 July 1890, p. 4; the adjoining Chinese school, described as the "Methodist Chinese School," is referred to in B.C. Directory, 1895, p. 229; for Maitland's application to acceptance in 1896 as a "Student-at-Law" and "Articled Clerk" see Law Society 948, Box 62, file 308; this same file and B.C. Directory 1900 and 1901 shows Maitland's middle name as "Reade," but when he re-applied for admission in 1911 he listed his Christian names as "Robert Reid"; for his call to the Bar, 3 July 1911, see file 308.

⁵For his graduation, see British Columbia, Department of Education, Public Schools Annual Report, 1904-1905 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1905), p. Acviii, which shows he completed high school entrance in a private school, a fact verified in Maitland 781, Box 32, file 1, in his high school entrance certificate; also in Maitland 781, Box 2, file 61, C. R. Messinger, principal of Dawson school, to

Maitland 26 May 1943, invites Maitland, one of the "old boys," to a banquet held annually for the Grade eight graduating class; for his employment, Interview with Maitland King; for more on his BCER employment see B.C. Directory 1904-1906, which lists him as an office boy, and B.C. Directory 1907-1908, shows him as an employee of Northern Securities, which was part of his father's company; for his wedding on 28 January 1914, see Maitland 781, Box 32, file 3, the wedding certificate; for Ruth's birth date, see Maitland 781, Box 33, file 18, her passport; for her background, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 224, The Annapolis Spectator, 1 September 1927, and *ibid.*, p. 225 "Obituary," Annapolis Spectator, 1 January 1914, her father's death notice which includes biographical material; for Maitland's residence see B.C. Directory 1914 to 1924; for Robert's birth, 12 September 1917, see Maitland 781, Box 34, file 1, baptismal certificate; for Elizabeth, 5 April 1919, see Maitland 781, Box 34, file 1; for Bill, 29 November 1921, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 5, and for Norah's birth, 6 July 1926, see "Births," Province, 6 July 1926, p. 13.

⁶For Bob's law school progress before enlistment, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 5, and *ibid.*, file 4; for his enlistment, and invalidated out, see Maitland 781, Box 1, file 56, DesBrisay to Maitland, 11 April 1944; for further reference to cancer treatment, see, for example, Maitland 781, Box 2, file 29, telegrams and letters, November, December 1942; and Maitland 781, Box 4, file 6, Maitland to Loftus MacInnis, 7 April 1943; for Bill's enlistment, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 5, Maitland to . MacInnis, 19 August 1940, although he was not called for service until a few months later; for Bill's decoration, see Maitland 781, Box 1, file 64, Royal Canadian Air Force to Maitland, 16 June 1942; and for his death, see "PO 'Bill' Maitland Missing Overseas," Sun, 20 December 1943, p. 3; but the last entry in his log book was for 16 December, "Ops, Berlin"; for Ruth's death, see Province, 4 April 1967, p. 23.

⁷Maitland's daughter (Maitland-King) referred to her father's family as poor; also R. L. Maitland worked part-time for his father, without pay, while he (Pat) was attending law school; for the reference to business in 1937, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 21, Maitland to Betty, 19 July 1937; for his credit standing, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 3, Maitland to Powell River Company department store and reply January 1940; for the radio license, *ibid.*, file 4, Maitland to Department of Transport, 10 May 1940; for his insurance refunds, see, respectively, *ibid.*, Macaulay, Nicolls, Maitland and Company Ltd., to Maitland, 14 May 1940; and Maitland 781, Box 2, file 30, Maitland to Macaulay et al., 22 January 1944.

⁸Maitland-King, Interviews described how close her father was to the family; in a eulogy the Sun described him as a man who "had few possessions beyond his family."

⁹For his friendliness, see "Mr. Maitland's Taste," The

Province, 26 September 1938, p. 4, where he was described as a "most likeable man" and "Day in the House," The Vancouver News-Herald, 29 March 1946, p. 3, where he was referred to as a "friendly soul"; for his humour, see Maitland 781, Box 8 (which contains his Legislature, that is, House, logs), file 5 (1933 log), 6 April 1933; and Interviews, Maitland-King, who recalled her father's sense of humour; for his vigorous but impersonal attacks see, for example "Log of the House," Province, 9 November 1937, p. 4; and "Opposition in House Develops New Vigour," Sun, 9 November 1937, p. 2, where Maitland says he intends no personal reflection on those in government that he attacks; in Maitland 781, Box 4, file 14, spring 1946, p. 1, an undelivered speech, he refers to friendships across party lines; Hutchison described Maitland's "genuine love of clean fighting without personalities," in "Log of the House," Province, 9 November 1937, p. 4; for condolences, see, for example, Maitland 781, Box 2, file 19.

¹⁰For his church and K. of C. interests see, respectively, Maitland 11, Box 3, file 15; *ibid.*, file 1; and *ibid.*, file 2b; for the Gyro, Orange and Masonic organizations, see, respectively, Maitland 781, Box 13, red book as well as Maitland 781, Box 16, file 14, Maitland to Ruth, 5 October 1944; Maitland 11, Box 2, file 5c, Orange Lodge to Maitland, 20 June 1940; and the Masons, see, for example, Maitland 781, Box 32, file 4, 1917 to 1936 resume; for the Pioneers, see "The Old Timers," Province, 18 May 1937; for his archives connection, see Maitland 781, Box 2, file 58, correspondence January 1943 to December 1945; for reference to his school lacrosse, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 220, "Presentation to Champions"; and for grass hockey in school, *ibid.*, p. 220, clipping, no name; for post-school sports, *ibid.*, p. 220, clippings; for his see Maitland-King Interviews; and for his commission connection, see "B.C.s Pat Maitland Passes Suddenly at 57," Province, 28 March 1946, p. 1; for his bridge and reading pastimes, Maitland-King; for his book, see Maitland 781, Box 28, file 8--P. J. Mackay, Court House, Vancouver is shown as Maitland's agent; the book is undated, but the paper quality suggests the book was written long ago, perhaps in the 1920s or 1930s.

¹¹For his sailing accident, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 220, "Pat Maitland Overboard in Bad Rip Tide Yesterday," hand dated, 1907; for his 1917 accident, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 81; for his 1939 accident, see "Maitland Suffers Fractured Rib," Times, 29 July 1939, p. 1; for the Lang Bay fire, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 77, "Boat Saves Lives," The World, 8 July 1922; and "Bush Fires Still Rage on Island," Sun, 8 July 1922, p. 1; for the boys' accident see "Two Sons of R. L. Maitland in All-Night Fight with Death," Sun, 2 September 1936, p. 1; for Ron's death, see Sun, 16 April 1937, p. 5.

¹²Regarding his frail physical condition, Interviews with Maitland-King; Interview with Hutchison; and Interview with Green; for his 1933 condition, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 6, Maitland to Ruth, 5 June 1933; for his collapse in Ontario, see Maitland 11, Box 3,

file 4, Maitland to L. MacInnis, 2 April 1940; and for his radio station collapse, see "R. L. Maitland Defines Issue," Province, 25 March 1940, p. 8; for the strain of office, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 4, Maitland to Mills, 16 May 1940; for the strain preceding coalition, see, for example, Maitland 11, Box 3, file 9, Maitland to W. K. Esling, 13 December 1941; for his condition in March 1942, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 11, Maitland to C. G. MacNeil, 6 March 1942; for his nervous breakdown and heart condition, see, respectively, Maitland 781, Box 4, file 6, Maitland to Norman, 8 December 1943; *ibid.*, file 8, Maitland to Mills, 18 December 1943; and *ibid.*, Maitland to Warren, 7 February 1944; and still not well in May 1944, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 13, L. MacInnis to Maitland, 12 May 1944; for his 1945 illness, see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 10, Maitland to Alward, 7 July 1945, in which Maitland says he has been ordered to take a complete rest prior to a federal/provincial conference in August; for the New Westminster by-election see British Columbia, Statement of Votes, 1941 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1941); and for the federal election in June and the provincial election in 1941, see A. L. Normandin, ed., Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1942 (Ottawa: Syndica D'Oeuvres Societes Limitee, 1942) [hereafter Parliamentary Guide]; for his August federal/provincial conference, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 23, Maitland to Norah, 12 August 1945; for the November-December conference, *ibid.*; Maitland to Betty and Norah, 25 November 1945; and for the January-February conference, *ibid.*, file 16, Maitland to Ruth, 30 January 1946; and in March while he was explaining a Bill for Second Reading, the premier sent him a note saying he was dealing with the wrong Bill, "I was tired," Maitland admitted, see Maitland 781, Box 8, file 12 (1946 log), entry for 11 March; for his admission to hospital and the diagnosis, see "Oxygen Tent Aids Maitland in Beating Flu," Sun, 21 March 1946, p. 1; for reference to heart complications see Maitland 781, Box 33, file 13, Ruth to Betty, telegram 22 March 1946; for his death see, for example, "Influenza Causes Death of Attorney General," Times, 28 March 1946, p. 1.

¹³For the economic boom, see Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1958), pp. 438-39 where she describes Vancouver, the focus of the provincial economy, as enjoying the "greatest boom" the city had ever known, in the early part of 1929; Ormsby, pp. 442-65 describes the social, economic and political effects of the Depression; Ian Donald Parker, "Simon Fraser Tolmie and the British Columbia Conservative Party 1916-1933" (M.A. thesis, University of Victoria, 1970), p. 1; and Dorothy June Roberts, "Doctrine and Disunity in the British Columbia Section of the CCF, 1932-1956" (M.A. thesis, University of Victoria, 1972), p. 2, also comment about the economic, social and political chaos caused by the Depression; for population, see Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Canada Year Book, 1947 (Ottawa: King's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1947); for the government's budget, see British Columbia, Estimates of Revenues and Expenditures, 1922-23 to 1945-46 (Victoria: King's Printer).

¹⁴Parliamentary Guide, 1925, 1929, 1934, 1938, 1942 and 1946.

¹⁵For Morley's observation, see J. T. Morley, Secular Socialists: The CCF/NDP in Ontario (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), p. xii; for the extinction quotation, see Julian Huxley, "The Evolutionary Process," in Evolution as a Process, eds. Julian Huxley et al. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1954), p. 8; for discussions and points of view about the necessity for organizations to adapt to changing environments, see Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 10-11; Peter Drucker, The Effective Executive (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), pp. 56-57; Michael I. Kami, "Business Planning as Business Opportunity," in Preparing Tomorrow's Business Leaders Today, p. 103. Edited by Peter F. Drucker (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969); Raymond To Miles, Theories of Management (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1975), pp. 11-12; Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 114; James D. Thompson, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process," in Organizations and Beyond, p. 123, edited by William A. Rushing and Mayer N. Zald (Toronto: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976); and James Q. Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory," in Approaches to Organizational Design, p. 195, edited by James D. Thompson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966).

¹⁶For Maitland's statement, see Maitland 11, Box 2, file 1, notes for a speech to the Chilliwack Conservative association, p. 34, date not certain, but context indicates between 1937 and 1942; for the Blake quotation, see Oscar Douglas Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1921), vol. 1, p. 176; G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (London: George Bell and Sons, 1890), p. 31; Tom Wicker, Facing the Lions (New York: Hearst Corporation, 1973), p. 193.

¹⁷The notion of using multiple hypotheses in scientific research was suggested in 1889 by geologist T. C. Chamberlin, "The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses," Science 148 (7 May 1965):754-59; historian Frederick Jackson Turner soon afterward adopted the method for historical research, see Merle Curti, Probing Our Past (Gloucester: Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 36; for more discussion on the use of a hypothesis, and multiple hypotheses in history, see John Tosh, The Pursuit of History (London, Longman Group Limited, 1984), pp. 114-15, 128; and Wilbur R. Jacobs, "Turner's Methodology: Multiple Working Hypotheses or Ruling Theory," Journal of American History 55 (March 1968):853-63.

¹⁸A faction is defined as a group within a political party which has its own leader, responds to and has interests different than the main body, and does not feel bound by caucus discipline.

¹⁹For example, Donald K. Alper, "From Rule to Ruin: The Conservative Party of British Columbia, 1928-1954," Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1975; and Robin Fisher, a Public Lecture, University of Victoria, 25 February 1988, both commented on the Conservatives' failure to exploit a new constituency.

CHAPTER II

LAW AND POLITICS, APPRENTICE TO
JOURNEYMAN, 1908 TO 1922

Although Maitland's profession was law, he also had a lifelong consuming interest in both constituency organization affairs and electoral politics. He began his "apprenticeship" in both the same year, 1908, and during his five years' law studies served as a riding association officer, and campaign speaker in three elections. A few months after being called to the Bar in 1913, he was appointed Defense counsel, by the Court, in a murder case that was widely publicized, and, due to his able conduct in that case, earned further appointments. The publicity arising from his court cases and his great speaking ability helped to boost his political stock. In early 1916 he was offered a nomination in Vancouver, and in December he was elected vice president of the Vancouver constituency association. His law practise grew as his political star rose and in 1915 he was appointed Vancouver city prosecutor, a position he held until 31 March 1919. He campaigned for the Conservative party in the 1909, 1916 and 1920 provincial elections, as well as in two federal elections, and in 1922 was elected president of the provincial Conservative association, the highest office in constituency organization affairs. Maitland's professional career and his political life were mutually reinforcing--accomplishment in one field benefited the other.

Maitland had some difficulty getting past the qualifying hurdle for articling as a law student but once that was behind him he did very well, considering his various extracurricular activities. He wrote the preliminary examination required of all applicants without high school matriculation, once in April 1908, and again in June when he was successful. In July he was accepted as a Student-at-Law and Articled clerk and read law, first with Vancouver lawyer C. N. Haney, later with Burns and Walkem. He spent his days learning law, and in off hours worked for his father's company, without salary, as business was very slow that year.¹

He wrote three sets of examinations during his student days, the first intermediate in April 1910, the second intermediate in April 1912 and the final two, for call and for admission to the Bar, a year later. When the Bencher secretary informed Maitland of his final marks, Attorney General Bowser had included a note, "Congratulations old man, guess you will be getting married too." Bowser, one of the five Conservative MLAs who represented Vancouver and who knew Maitland through the constituency association and campaign work, would, as an ex-officio Bencher, rule on applications for admission to the Bar.²

Besides his political involvement and his articling work, Maitland was an active participant in the Vancouver Law Students' Society and was elected president in 1911. He was the inspiration behind the publication of the first edition of the school journal, The

Vancouver Law Students Annual, 1911, which included lectures delivered the year before by various justices, as well as school highlights. He promoted another petition among the 100 students, calling for the establishment of a law school--the first such petition had been raised in 1907, the year the Law Students' Society was formed--which was to be located at the new university that the McBride government had promised to build at Point Grey. He was leader of the debating team, and although it lost in a competition with McGill University students, the Annual referred glowingly to Maitland as "our dauntless President . . . [who had] the most magnetic manner of all the speakers on the platform [and] shone as an orator." One of the editors H. G. Lockwood, commenting on the 1911 "Maitland Administration," effusively praised him as an inspiration to the executive and the society; "it must be said in justice to Mr. Maitland that the present high standing of the society is due entirely to his energy and aggressiveness."³

In 1912 he served as editor of the Annual and was elected vice president of the Society. He was again debate leader on a two-man team, that beat out Victoria which took the pro position on a resolution that "labour unions are as great a menace to society as the trusts." In his final year he was on the debate team that won all three competitions. He was also Alumni editor of the Annual and contributed a nostalgic farewell to his long apprenticeship entitled "Rambling Reminiscences of a Past President. He was no longer a novice, but was not yet a journeyman in either law or politics."⁴

Maitland began his lifelong commitment to politics, which

eventually came to dominate his professional life, in 1908. In January he won his first constituency association office when he was elected secretary in Ward One, a subdivision of the parent Vancouver Conservative Party association. He retained this post for the next four years, and shortly after he was re-elected for a fifth term in January 1912, he ran successfully for the same position in the much larger Vancouver association and was returned to this post for the next three years.⁵

His election in the senior organization was not due entirely to chance or luck. Although he was a full time law student he had worked hard for the party during the preceding four years, campaigning in the October 1908 and September 1911 federal elections, and in the general provincial election in November 1909. He and his father had also represented Ward One at the annual convention in New Westminster in November 1911.⁶

In the 1908 federal campaign he made his maiden political speech in the Collingwood district in Vancouver in support of George M. Cowan who was running in Vancouver City against a Liberal incumbent. On that occasion Cowan attacked Asiatic immigration policy, a common election issue in British Columbia, and criticized Laurier for ignoring the wishes of the West. Chinese entry to Canada was restricted through a \$500 head tax but Japanese immigrants were still being accepted under a Gentleman's Agreement between Canada and Japan, an arrangement that British Columbia Conservatives wanted cancelled. On another issue, Cowan praised provincial Premier Richard McBride for his attempts to

get "Better Terms"--an expression used by Prime Minister John A. Macdonald over 40 years before when Nova Scotia was seeking better terms for staying in Confederation--and said he knew what British Columbia was "entitled to, I know I'm right in this matter and I know I'll get justice for B.C. before I go out of public life." The Conservative platform appealed to the voters who gave five of the seven previously Liberal seats to the Conservatives; and Cowan won easily in a riding that had gone Liberal for the preceding three elections. Attacking the federal government, especially over its Asian policy and Confederation terms, made for successful politicking in British Columbia. And Maitland had backed a winner in his first involvement in electoral politics.⁷

In the 1909 provincial contest, Maitland and his father campaigned in the Interior ridings of Lillooet and Yale and helped challengers A. McDonald and Premier Richard McBride beat out the Liberal incumbents in a victory that was almost a sweep for the Conservatives who took 38 of 42 seats.⁸ For the remainder of his life Maitland assisted Up country candidates and between elections visited party members in those areas. Rural ridings were large, roads were uniformly bad (and still were in Maitland's final election), and candidates found it difficult and time-consuming to cover their ridings in a campaign. Although the party paid travel expenses, campaigning in the Interior and Up Island meant a real sacrifice for Maitland as his office and most of his practise was in the city. Of course, those he helped appreciated and understood this and expected that someday they

might be called on to return the favour. In time, as Maitland honed his speaking skills, he no longer had to volunteer his help, as candidates from all over the province sought his platform assistance.

In 1911, just as he was beginning his fourth year law studies, he campaigned for federal candidates in the New Westminster, Ladner, Squamish, and Powell River areas. The main issue was reciprocity, that is, a proposed free trade agreement similar to the treaty which existed between Canada and the United States from 1855 to 1866. In his speeches, Maitland ridiculed the suggestion that British Columbians would be able to sell goods for higher prices and buy for less. He maintained the Americans were after Canadian resources, and praised the East-West economic connection, the old national policy of Conservative Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, as a policy that would enhance growth of Canadian industry. Following what was described as a comparatively quiet campaign, the Conservatives swept all seven seats in the province and were returned to power nationally after 11 years in Opposition.⁹

A few days after the election, Bowser thanked Maitland for the "excellent work" during the campaign. It was a great victory, he said, and the younger members contributed a great deal to it. In January 1912, after he had already been re-elected in Ward One, Maitland was elected in the parent Vancouver association, obviously with Bowser's approval. Ward One members were very disappointed when he resigned but said they would not press him to stay on as he was going to a higher office.¹⁰

At that point Maitland had about 15 months remaining in his

studies. However, he had been acquiring a certain amount of practical experience since January 1911 when the British Columbia Supreme Court had granted him authority to take affidavits, and by mid 1912 was arguing cases as Defense counsel. For example, he successfully defended a woman accused of robbing her employer at gun point. In March 1913, he won acquittal for a man accused of murdering his son by proving that the death was accidental.¹¹

He missed the 1913 Spring Assizes because of the timing of his call to the Bar but was busy in the Fall Assizes in both New Westminster and Vancouver. In the former city, he defended a Chinese client charged with murder and got the charge reduced to manslaughter. In the latter he won acquittal for two Chinese men charged with attempting to bribe two policemen.¹²

Certainly he was pleased with these cases but he got his big break, professionally and politically, as the Vancouver Assizes were nearing an end. In late October 1913, about a week before the trial began in Vancouver, he was appointed Defense counsel in a widely publicized and reported murder case. Two men, Frank Davis and Herman Clark, were accused of murdering Vancouver constable James Archibald on 27 May 1913; Maitland defended Davis in a three day trial that commenced on 4 November. Both men, each represented by separate counsel, were sentenced to be hanged 15 January 1914 but Maitland decided to appeal the verdict.¹³

In what appeared to be a case of presuming on his political friendship with the attorney general, Maitland, who had been a lawyer

less than six months, requested funds to cover appeal expenses. He told Bowser the \$50.00 honorarium was quite inadequate, considering the amount of work required for the trial, but there were "many grounds" for appeal, and if the Crown would pay his actual expenses he would proceed. In a reply that either reflected the attitude of the times, or the attorney general's personal concept of justice, or was in fact a deliberate put-down of a presumptuous young lawyer, Bowser refused further funds on the grounds that the

Crown does not think it wise to encourage criminal appeals in the Province; and when any man is found "guilty" by a jury and sentenced to death after he has had a fair trial and had the advantage of a proper defense it does not appear to me that there is any further responsibility cast upon the Crown to proceed further by way of encouraging the appeal.¹⁴

However, Maitland launched the appeal process after Frank's father, C. Davis, paid \$400.00 for a transcript of the evidence required by the British Columbia Appeal Court. In the January hearing the Court voted against him, despite a presentation that the Sun called "brilliant," but the vote was split: three confirmed the original verdict, one voted for a new trial, and one requested that the matter be referred back to the trial judge to restate the case. Maitland then appealed to the Minister of Justice for a new trial or commutation of the death sentence. This request was refused but Maitland persisted and eventually the Minister arranged for a hearing on 5 May before the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court upheld the original verdict, unanimously this time, and the execution was confirmed for 15 May 1914. On 14 May Maitland was advised that the Minister of Justice had refused

clemency, and the next day the two men were executed, both claiming to the end, as they had throughout the trial, that the other man had been the murderer.¹⁵ Maitland received the honorarium of \$50.00 and the transcription cost but never any professional fees for his services. When he had written to Mr. Davis in March, he said he had a "strong personal feeling in the case" and would charge only \$500 to represent his son in Ottawa. He suggested Mr. Davis would find this a very reasonable fee if he checked with other lawyers in the Ottawa area. Mr. Davis then agreed to pay costs for the Supreme Court appeal but subsequently refused to pay anything. However, Maitland was just starting his career, and although fees for such a lengthy case would probably have run to several thousand dollars, he was undoubtedly aware of the professional benefits which accrued to him personally as well as to his law firm from all the publicity associated with the trial and subsequent appeals.¹⁶

That was the year Canada went to war, and on 6 August, two days after England had declared war on Germany, Maitland wrote to Ruth at their summer camp describing the intense excitement in Vancouver. German warships were rumoured to be off the west coast and Ronald, Maitland's amateur sailor brother and a member of the Royal Vancouver Yacht club, had sailed off with a yacht fleet in search of the German phantoms. Business in all law offices, Maitland said, was absolutely dead.¹⁷

That fall, Maitland, who had "distinguished himself as counsel for the defense of Franklin Davis" was appointed Crown counsel for the

Clinton fall assizes, "probably the youngest counsel ever honored" with such an appointment in the province. One case was discharged, but he won convictions in the other nine including one for murder. A year later he was appointed Defense counsel at the Vernon Fall Assizes.¹⁸ In July 1915 he was appointed temporary city prosecutor in Vancouver to replace the lawyer who had enlisted in the Army, and in November 1916 was appointed permanently after the incumbent was killed in France.¹⁹ Maitland continued to practise law both as Defense and Crown counsel in Interior towns such as Ashcroft, Clinton, Lillooet and Vernon, and in the Lower Mainland. Types of cases included abortions, bootlegging, divorces, murders, shootings, swindling and theft; clients included Chinese, gypsies, native Indians, and whites.²⁰ In another widely publicized case in February 1918, Maitland agreed to defend a former Burnaby councillor who was charged with robbing a bank and assaulting the manager. Maitland found 12 witnesses who testified they saw the accused elsewhere at the time of the robbery and the man was subsequently cleared of any complicity in the crime.²¹

Soldiers were returning home in early 1919, among them former lawyers, and on 31 March Maitland resigned as city prosecutor. In April 1921, after his father died, he took over the firm which his father had established 10 years earlier. Maitland's law practise had progressed since he was called to the Bar in 1913, and so, too, had his political commitments, although not without problems.²²

In March 1915, supporters of Bowser and H. H. Stevens, MP for Vancouver, got into a noisy and bitter row over the amount of patronage

which the Maitland firm was receiving. Patronage, which included jobs, appointments, and work such as advertising and legal cases, went with the government in power. To ensure harmony the constituency executive would distribute patronage as equitably as possible among its supporters. The argument started over two provincial legislative seats that would become available, one through the resignation of H. H. Watson, and one through redistribution which would create a new riding, South Vancouver. When the two Maitlands, supported by Stevens, expressed an interest in the two seats Bowserites complained bitterly about the amount of Dominion government "patronage" being directed to the Maitlands while other "loyal" law firms, for example, Bowser, Reid and Wallbridge, got little. Besides, in 1914 Bowser had given the Clinton fall assizes job to the Maitlands; how much more did they want? The Bowserites then proposed two other men who were "very prominent and well thought of members of the Orange Lodge," but the Stevens' faction strenuously objected to this suggestion. The "old timers" were particularly against young Maitland who "has a keen tongue, a good head for organization work and has the young Conservatives behind him to a man." The meeting ended as it had started, divided, each group determined to prevail. However, Bowser who had actually attended the meeting, did not seem unduly disturbed, or perhaps he wanted to ensure the support of the Maitlands and thereby split the Stevens faction, because later that year he awarded young Maitland the Vernon assizes.²³

As the year drew to a close, Premier McBride suddenly resigned and on the same day, 15 December, the Lieutenant-Governor called on

Bowser to form a government. After eight years as attorney-general, he had become the seventeenth premier of British Columbia. The Bowser government had only a few months in which to consolidate its position and prepare for the next election. Its mandate would expire in March, a termination date that was subsequently extended until 1 June; an election in 1916 was therefore a foregone conclusion.²⁴

Maitland was not re-elected to the Vancouver association executive for 1916, and for the first time in eight years did not hold a constituency association office. However, early in the spring he was elected secretary, pro tem, of the newly-formed Young Conservatives Association. He urged the new members to speak out, in private, and not to go over to the Liberals and "sling mud." This was a reference, no doubt, to Conservative and ex MP Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper who had frequently criticized Premier McBride and was particularly critical, publicly, of the new premier who he characterized as the "Kaiser of provincial politics."²⁵

Shortly after he joined the Young Conservatives Maitland got his first opportunity to run for public office. In April 1916, a delegation from the new riding of South Vancouver offered to support him at a nominating convention. This was an unusual offer to extend to a 27 year-old and an obvious indication of the high regard some of the constituency members had for Maitland. However, he turned down the chance because he knew the campaign would be a very tough fight; it would take a lot of time, energy and money; he was relatively unknown in the riding; and, finally, he was just getting established in his law

practise. These were understandable and persuasive reasons but inconsistent with his attitude a year earlier when he had expressed a definite interest in a nomination. Perhaps the real reason he changed his mind was that he doubted, as others did, that Bowser could lead the party to victory.²⁶

Nevertheless, he campaigned for the party in the fall election in the Chilliwack area, and, with his father, in North Vancouver, unsuccessfully in both cases. On 15 September 1916, the morning after, the Conservatives found themselves with only nine seats, compared to 40 they had taken in 1912. They lost South Vancouver and in Vancouver City where they had held all five seats, only Bowser retained his seat.²⁷

Despite the downturn in the party's fortunes, Maitland continued to fare well both professionally and politically. In November 1916 his city prosecutor's job was made permanent, and in December he made a big jump in constituency affairs when he was elected vice president of the Vancouver association. In terms of population and the number of MLAs, this was the largest riding in the province.²⁸

In September 1919, the party held its first convention since 1914. Over 500 delegates, including both Maitlands, gathered in the Hotel Vancouver, primarily to elect a leader. The leadership question was quickly settled as Bowser, who had been chosen leader in 1915 by the sitting MLAs, was returned by acclamation.²⁹

A little over a year later Maitland was once more out stumping for the party in the December 1920 provincial election. He was more

successful than in 1916 as the candidates he supported in Merritt and Nelson were both elected, and the party increased its strength from the nine seats it won in 1916, to 14 in 1920. Bowser was re-elected in Vancouver City, but he was again the lone Conservative in the five-member riding.³⁰

In November 1921 Maitland was on the road again, this time for a candidate in the federal riding of East Kootenay where he was described on election posters as the "ablest speaker in B.C." However, his presence and platform manner were not enough as the incumbent, an easy winner in the 1917 sweep, lost to a Liberal by a slim margin, perhaps the result of a strong showing by a Progressive candidate. (This was the year that the maverick Progressive party cut deeply into the other two parties and won 64 seats across Canada, two in British Columbia.) The Conservatives had won 12 of British Columbia's 13 seats in 1917 under Borden's Union government but in 1921 took only seven while the Liberals captured three and an Independent took the remaining seat.³¹

The fortunes of both the provincial and federal Conservative parties had been ebbing since 1916 and 1917 respectively and in August 1922 about 500 delegates met, as they had three years earlier, in the Hotel Vancouver for their annual convention. However, this particular gathering was regarded as "one of the most important provincial conventions in the history of the party" because a new leader and a new association president would be elected. Furthermore, delegates would be asked to approve a revised constitution, designed to heal the breach

between federal and provincial organizations caused by the partial Liberal-Conservative joint campaign for the Unionist party in 1917.³²

The convention also grudgingly approved a new name, "Liberal-Conservative" for the party. The argument that it would somehow strengthen the appeal of the Conservative party across Canada by identifying it with the successful John A. Macdonald government did not carry much weight, at least not in British Columbia where it may have appeared the federal party, and national leader Arthur Meighen, were in fact seeking a restoration of the English Conservative-French Liberal coalition of Confederation days.³³

The draft constitution, which had been prepared by Vancouver MP and lawyer Leon Ladner, was tentatively approved subject to certain changes. British Columbia membership would include as ex-officio members privy councillors, senators, MPs and MLAs, federal and provincial candidates, and past presidents. For convention representation, each riding would be permitted to elect ten delegates.³⁴

The leadership question was settled late on 22 August but only after "one of the stormiest political gatherings ever held in the history of the province." Nominees included Bowser, H. H. Stevens, MP, and current provincial association president S. L. Howe. Meighen had urged Stevens to stay out of the leadership contest, not only because he (Stevens) was an important British Columbia MP, but also because his presence exacerbated party division.³⁵

Tension had been high throughout the meeting, and during intermissions the Bowser and Stevens factions argued and exchanged

insults. The Stevens supporters were particularly bitter and rancorous because they were convinced Bowser would cause the party's defeat. Before voting began, C. M. Woodworth, a former president of the provincial association and an angry anti-Bowserite participant at the March 1915 meeting, moved that the winner must have 70 percent of the total votes. After a noisy and prolonged debate this motion failed, but John Nelson, a Vancouver association officer, then moved that the successful nominee would need 60 percent. This, too, failed, and eventually the delegates agreed that the first man to receive 51 percent would win; otherwise, the third man would drop off and further balloting would take place. On the first ballot Bowser received 252 votes, just over 52 percent, Stevens 201, and Howe 27. Bowser was reaffirmed as leader and Stevens, in the traditional appeal for unity, called on delegates to give Bowser their unanimous support. But the bitterness and division which had prevailed before and during the convention could not be forgotten that easily and was to haunt the party for years.³⁶

The next day when the nominating committee, in a spirit of compromise and unity, recommended Stevens supporter John Nelson for provincial association president, a Bowserite promptly nominated Maitland, an indication, perhaps, of Maitland's role in Bowser's victory. In a flash of anger, Nelson promptly withdrew, and only after considerable coaxing did he agree to accept a nomination for vice president. Bowser, ever conscious of possible future political alliances, aware that Maitland might be a very ambitious man who

perceived the critical need of power bases, had once more come through for the young lawyer.³⁷

Maitland had reached the highest organizational office in the provincial party, fourteen years after he had won his first minor constituency post. His many sacrifices had not been totally unrewarding. Certainly his career benefited from his party work, although he was a very capable lawyer who would probably have done well regardless of any political connections. The Sun, in reporting his election, described him as "one of the most popular men in town . . . young in years, [already] a veteran in politics." His "oratorical abilities are a great asset . . . in his profession as well as in "politics on the hustings." He had reached the pinnacle of power and influence in one area of provincial politics. From that "base" he could seek national association office, or turn to federal or provincial electoral politics. On the other hand, after he had completed his term of office, he could concentrate on his profession, and as an elder statesman, offer to the party his skill, knowledge and experience in association affairs and campaigning.³⁸

Footnotes

¹For his two examinations, see Law Society, 948, Box 5, entries dated 6 April and 6 July; subjects included Latin, Vergil's first two books, Aeneid or the odes of Horace, two books at the option of the candidate, English history or modern geography, and Euclid, first three books, see Alfred Watts, History of the Law Society, p. 28; for his acceptance as a law student by two firms--he transferred part way through the program--see Law Society 948, Box 62, file 309; Maitland required permission of the Law Society to help his father, off-hours only, see Law Society 948, Box 62, file 309, Maitland to Benchers, 22 July 1908, their reply and conditions 12 October.

²For his exam results, see Law Society 948, Box 5, respectively, 11 April 1910 (he ranked third of eight), 1 April 1912 (second of nine), and 7 April 1913 (third of six for Call, third of seven for Admission); for the Bencher letter, see Maitland 781, Box 2, file 26, E. C. Senkler to Maitland, 9 April 1913; for Bowser's ex-officio position, see British Columbia Legal Professions Act.

³For president, 1911, see Law Society, MSS 948, Box 23, file 2, p. 13 (file 2 is the 1911 Annual); for founding of the Annual, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 181, a clipping, hand dated 14 July; for the petition, see *ibid.*, p. 183, "Lawyer's School for Vancouver"; founding of the Law Students Society, see Watts, History of the Law Society, p. 33; for promise of a new university, see Ormsby, A History, p. 361; for the debate with McGill, and the included quotation, see, respectively, Law Society 948, Box 23, file 2, pp. 26-27; and *ibid.*, p. 27; for Lockwood's praise, see *ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴For editor of the Annual, see *ibid.*, file 3, p. 11; and for vice president, *ibid.*, p. 15; for the debate, *ibid.*, pp. 19-20; for his final year debates, *ibid.*, file 4, pp. 24-29; alumnae editor and his article, see *ibid.*, pp. 19-21.

⁵For his 1908 election, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 1; for his 1909, 1910, 1911 elections, *ibid.*; for his election in 1912, in Ward One, and his election in the parent organization, *ibid.*, p. 3, "No Relaxation of Laws Against Hindus" which is a report of the annual meeting of Ward One; for his 1913 re-election, see *ibid.*, p. 2, News Advertiser, 29 January; for 1914, "This is not the Time to Press for Payment," Province, 30 January 1914, p. 3; and for 1915, Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 4.

⁶For the convention, see Maitland, *ibid.*, p. 1; the convention was held 24-25 March.

⁷For Cowan's meeting, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 5, "Conservatives at Collingwood," 7 October 1908; for election results

see Parliamentary Guide, 1897 to 1909.

⁸For the Interior campaigning, see Maitland 748, Box 14, p. 102, "The Political Pot"; for the election results, see Parliamentary Guide, 1910.

⁹For Maitland's campaigning, the main issue, *ibid.*, pp. 18-20; for McBride's criticism, see "Tremendous Ovation Tendered the Premier," Province, 20 September 1911, p. 8; for a relevant discussion of reciprocity, see D. C. Masters, Reciprocity, 1845-1911 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1961), p. 8; for the reference to a quiet campaign, see "Record Vote Being Polled Here Today," Province, 21 September 1911, p. 1; for the election results, see Parliamentary Guide, 1912.

¹⁰For Bowser's thanks and comments, see Maitland 781, Box 1, file 29, Bowser to Maitland, 27 September 1911; for Ward One members' disappointment, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 3, "No Relaxation of Laws Against Hindus," hand dated 1912.

¹¹For the affidavit authority, see Maitland 781, Box 32, file 2; and for his case, see *ibid.*, Box 14, p. 123, "Charge of Hold-Up is Withdrawn Today"; for the acquittal, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 123, "Magistrate Asserts Contempt of Court Has Been Committed," 9 March 1913.

¹²Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 78.

¹³For details of the case, see "Trial Again Put off of Davis and Clark," Sun, 30 October 1913, p. 4; "Crowd on Hand for Trial Today," Province, 4 November 1913, p. 23; and "Sentence of Death is Passed by Court on Two Murderers," Sun, 7 November 1913, p. 1.

¹⁴For the exchange of correspondence, see Maitland 11, Box 4, file 4, Maitland to Bowser, 8 November 1913, and Bowser to Maitland, 10 November 1913.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Maitland to Davis, 9 December 1913, acknowledged receipt of \$400.00; for the "brilliant" hearing, see "Judgement Reserved In Appeal Court On Conviction of Davis," Sun, 9 January 1914, p. 1; for the appeal vote and commutation, see Maitland, *ibid.*, file 5, Maitland to the Minister of Justice, 27 January 1914; for the 5 May hearing, and for notice that the execution was deferred until 15 May, see Maitland, *ibid.*, Maitland to C. Davis, 25 March 1914; for the Supreme Court verdict, see Maitland, *ibid.*, file 6, Maitland to Frank Davis, 13 May 1914, advises Davis of the failed appeal; refusal of clemency, Maitland, *ibid.*, Lewis and Smellie, Ottawa (lawyers representing Maitland) telegram to Maitland, 14 May 1914; for insistence that the other man was guilty, see Maitland, *ibid.*, letters, Frank Davis to Maitland, 15 May 1914, and Clark to Davis, undated.

¹⁶Maitland, MSS 11, file 5, Maitland to Davis, 25 March 1914; Davis refused to pay, see Maitland, *ibid.*, file 7, Gibson and Gibson, Toronto (lawyers representing Maitland) to Maitland, 5 December 1916, advised they had located Davis but he refused to pay anything.

¹⁷Maitland 781, Box 6, file 2, Maitland to Ruth, 6 August 1914; his brother's sailing experience was described in an obituary column, Sun, 16 April 1937, p. 5; Ormsby, p. 378, also reported the rumour about German warships off the West coast.

¹⁸For the Clinton appointment, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 127, "Honor for Young Barrister"; for the Vernon appointment, see *ibid.*, p. 180, "City Prosecutor Leaves Position."

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 180 which reports that Maitland was appointed in a temporary capacity 15 July 1915; for his permanent appointment, see "Named Permanent Prosecutor," Province, 7 November 1916, p. 22, which states Maitland was "formally chosen" on 6 November.

²⁰For a resume of his career to this point, see Maitland 781, Box 32, file 22 which includes summaries of many of Maitland's cases from 1913 to 1917.

²¹"Alibi Clears Lomas of all Suspicion," Province, 27 February 1918, p. 4.

²²For his resignation, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 180, "City Prosecutor Leaves Position," resignation effective 1 April 1919; and Maitland 781, Box 32, file 22, p. 58.

²³For details of the argument, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 162, "Tor Martin's Journal," 8 March 1915 (shown on reverse side of article).

²⁴For the call on Bowser, Parliamentary Guide 1916; for an explanation of the mandate, see J. Castell Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1917 (hereafter CAR) (Toronto: Annual Review Publishing Co., 1918), p. 767.

²⁵For the Young Conservatives, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 170, "Young Conservatives Form Association"; regarding Tupper's criticism, see Phyllis Veazey, "John Hendry and the Vancouver, Westminster and Yukon Railway," BC Studies (Autumn 1983), p. 50; for the quotation comparing the Kaiser and Bowser, see Ormsby, A History, p. 392.

²⁶For the nomination offer, see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 1, Maitland to the "Delegation from the Ward 3 Conservative Ass'n," 15 April 1916; for doubt about Bowser's electability, see Ormsby, A

History, p. 391--many Conservatives wanted a leadership convention after McBride resigned, while others felt as early as mid-1915 that the party would lose an election under Bowser.

²⁷For the campaigning, see Maitland 781, Box 14, pp. 105 and 167 respectively; for the election results, see Parliamentary Guide, 1917.

²⁸For election to vice president, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 42, News Advertiser, 9 December 1916.

²⁹For references to the convention, see "No Franchise to Orientals," Province, 30 September 1919, p. 19; "Conservatives End Convention," Colonist, 1 October 1919, p. 3; "Kamloops Next Meeting Place," Sun, 1 October 1919, p. 6; and "A Resolution on Natural Resources," Times, 30 September 1919, p. 11.

³⁰For his campaigning, see Maitland 781, Box 14, pp. 175 and 171 respectively; for election results, see Parliamentary Guide, 1921.

³¹For his speaking ability and campaigning, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 176; for the election, see Parliamentary Guide, 1922.

³²For reports of this convention, see "Federal Leader May Seek Unity In B.C. Conservative Ranks," Sun, 21 August 1922, p. 14--this article makes reference to the importance of the gathering; for a review of the partial Unionist coalition in British Columbia, see CAR, 1917, especially pp. 578-79, p. 617, and pp. 640-3.

³³For approval of a new party name, see "Bowser Machine Said to be Again in Working Order," Sun, 22 August 1922, p. 11.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵For the nominations, see "Bowser Wins Convention by 51 Votes," Sun, 23 August 1922, p. 1; Meighen wants Stevens out, see "Federal Leader May Seek Unity," Sun, 21 August 1922, p. 14.

³⁶For the tension, see "Bowser Machine . . .," note 33; for the debate and the vote, see "Bowser Wins . . .," note 35.

³⁷"By-Election in Vancouver is Still Distant," Sun, 24 August 1922, p. 14.

³⁸"Delegates Name New President," Sun, 24 August 1922, p. 14.

CHAPTER III

PROVINCIAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENT TO
ELECTORAL OFFICE, 1922 TO 1928

The strong division that had been apparent at the 1922 Conservative leadership convention was more than just high spirited and aggressive support for the leadership contenders. By early 1923, a dissenting faction, made up largely of Conservatives who were opposed to the Bowser leadership, had formed a new political group, the Provincial Party. The Provincials ran candidates in nearly all ridings and probably as a result the Conservative party, including Maitland in his first try for public office, lost the election. Although the Provincial Party had faded away by 1926 when a leadership convention was held, delegates deadlocked into Bower and anti-Bowser factions and eventually drafted Dr. S. F. Tolmie, MP, to break the impasse. In the 1928 general election, the party was united for the first time in many years, and after 12 years in Opposition ranks the Conservatives, including Maitland, were swept into power with a large majority.

In party politics the victor rewards his supporters yet realizes he must placate the losers in his own party. Bowser had rewarded Maitland and attempted to mollify the losers by supporting Nelson for the vice presidency. But Nelson could not be co-opted that easily. Deeply disappointed at Stevens' loss and only temporarily

assuaged by the vice presidency, he and Vancouver business man General A. D. McRae co-hosted a dinner at the Grosvenor hotel on 21 December to discuss a union of dissident Conservatives with the United Farmers of British Columbia (UFBC). Six delegates, who were selected at this meeting, attended a UFBC convention at Vernon on 13 January 1923, and two days later, the Provincial Party was established and millionaire McRae was selected as its chairman.¹

In March, Bowser addressed a meeting of the Young Conservatives who he believed had supported the move to defeat him at the leadership convention the preceding August. In early 1916 Maitland had been one of the principal movers in founding that group, the purpose of which, at least in part, was to corral or institutionalize dissent (and dissenters), where controversy and problems could be freely discussed, away from the press, and kept within the Conservative "family." For some reason things had not worked out that way, and Maitland, obviously in the Bowser camp, had probably withdrawn from the group when he was elected vice president of the Vancouver association in December 1916, after being out of constituency affairs for almost a year.²

The purpose of the meeting, reportedly amicable but very candid, was to try to establish peace with the dissidents. Bowser used the occasion to attack the existence of a third party. Without naming the Provincials, he said a new party could not win but could be very disruptive if it won, say, four or five seats, and held the Legislature hostage to its wishes. This would set the province back 20 years to the unstable administrations which existed in British Columbia before the establishment of political parties in 1903. If you want better

government, he argued, send better representatives to the Legislature.³

This was an interesting analysis on the effects of a partially successful third party but one that totally ignored the reasons for its formation. The explanation for the rise of a third party in a two party system is far from simple, as Maurice Pinard et al. found in studies of the rise of the federal Social Credit party in Quebec in 1962. However, there are similarities between the Quebec (federal) situation and the rise of the Provincial Party in British Columbia in 1923. The provincial Liberal party in British Columbia had been dominant, but only for seven years, not 22 as in Quebec. Similarly, the political climate was unstable as both Conservative and Liberal supporters were defecting to the Provincial Party. And certainly those who turned to the new party were politically alienated. Further, as in Quebec, the typical supporter was the so-called common man, small entrepreneurs and farmers, although in British Columbia Provincial Party leader millionaire General McRae was obviously an exception. The Provincial Party supporters, with their own political agenda, had turned away from the Conservative party because they did not believe it would ever be returned to power under Bowser. Moreover, the Conservative party establishment had shut out the dissenters from any leadership participation and ignored their political aspirations.⁴

Six months later, after it was becoming apparent that the Provincial Party was indeed drawing supporters from both the Liberal and Conservative parties, the Conservative association appointed J. E. Merryfield provincial organizer. He was an experienced campaigner having served as provincial campaign manager in 1920 when

the party increased its strength to 14 seats, from nine in the previous election. He had also managed several by-elections and had obviously impressed Bowser and association president Maitland.⁵

The next election was not constitutionally required until 1925, but there were indications the Oliver government would not wait that long. It had, for example, updated the voters list in the spring of 1923, and failing an election by June 1924, the process would have to be repeated. Although it did not announce an election during the fall Session, the implication was clear enough as the redistribution legislation, which added one seat and made certain boundary changes, was given Royal Assent on 21 December 1923, the last day of the Session.⁶

During the spring Maitland was on the road even before an election was announced. In April he gave a speech in support of New Westminster nominee A. M. Sanford and, in an indirect appeal for party unity, noted that the Provincials had nominated a few Liberals but "not a single former Conservative." (This subtle reminder about party discipline and loyalty had some effect as none of the Provincials' nominees were Conservatives who had been nominated in the preceding two elections.) The next month he toured the South Okanagan riding speaking in support of incumbent J. W. Jones. However, he was back in town on 10 May when the Oliver government announced dissolution of the Legislature and an election for 20 June.⁷

Three days later Maitland, as association president, released a brief statement on the party's platform. He agreed that the Provincial Party under General McRae had, for the past year, every advantage that money could buy, but it had failed to catch the people's imagination.

He had just returned from a tour through the southern Interior where, he said, the Provincials had little support. Its abusive attacks against Bowser, without foundation had, he believed, turned people against the new party.⁸

Since its establishment in January 1923 the Provincial Party had been persistently attacking both the Bowser and Oliver governments over the Pacific Great Eastern railway (PGE) and accused them of fraud, and conflict of interest, and incompetence during railway construction. During a hearing chaired by Justice Galliher, the lone Royal Commissioner investigating these allegations, Bowser, Sloan, and Premier Oliver voluntarily testified in their own defense. When Galliher delivered his report on 6 May he completely cleared the Oliver government, and Bowser, and found nothing

to warrant the imputation that there was anything dishonest, or any dereliction in duty, or disregard of the public interests, or waste, extravagance or incompetence in the carrying out of this work by the Government.

This report did not end the controversy as the PGE was a hot issue until election day.⁹

Continuing with his statement, which was really an abbreviated manifesto, Maitland listed several policies and programs that the Conservative party would implement or improve if elected in June. The manifesto planks, all of which Bowser had mentioned in speeches¹⁰ in 1923, included retrenchment, as expenditures had exceeded revenue for several years (see appendix 2), the lifting of mineral reserves to encourage the mining industry, continuation of the systematic road building program started under the previous Conservative government, an

agricultural program that would include low interest loans to farmers, funding for irrigation projects, and marketing assistance, a promise of a workable soldiers' settlement land scheme which Maitland called a miserable failure under the Liberal government, and an end to "patronage of a most devilish kind."

The Conservative and Provincial Party manifestos actually had more similarities than differences, as one might expect, given the similar political backgrounds of the two factions. The Provincials' election platform, with the exception of the PGE operation, had all been referred to by Bowser in his 1923 speeches. The manifesto included a call for fiscal responsibility, financial aid to agriculture, and to mining and industry through the creation of investment incentives, an improved provincial road system, an end to the freight rate discrimination against British Columbia, and an investigation of all aspects of PGE operations. The Provincials also promised to abolish party discipline in the Legislature, to create conflict of interest guidelines for MLAs, to publish a list of campaign contributions and contributors, to establish a non-partisan civil service, and to end all patronage.¹¹

The Liberals stated that Justice Galliher had cleared the air over the PGE and promised to resolve the discriminatory freight rates issue. Otherwise they would stand on their record of good administration and progressive social legislation such as the Mothers Pension Act and the Equal Guardianship of Infants Act (originally referred to as the "Equal Guardianship of Women's Bill").¹²

On 23 May with the election less than a month away, Maitland,

at long last, won a nomination. He had been rebuked in 1915 and felt bound to refuse an offer in 1916. Nevertheless, he had campaigned for both the provincial and federal parties in elections since then and had been campaigning all spring in anticipation of an election in 1924. Now, he shared a platform in the six-member Vancouver riding with Bowser, S. L. Howe, T. H. Kirk, P. D. Roe and a woman, Emma Scott.¹³

In a purple acceptance speech Maitland accused Premier Oliver of "treason to the people of British Columbia" over the freight rates problem,¹³ which all British Columbians wanted resolved. The Premier was simply trying to cloud the real issue, the inept performance of the Liberal government. Maitland said it was time for the people to decide whether they wanted four more years of "pawnshop rule," or an administration that would re-establish provincial credit. It was also time, he went on, to end the innuendos and insinuations against party leader Bowser. Maitland was practising straight "issue" politics, that is, accepting the political agenda set by the principal adversary party, in this case the Oliver government, and then promising that his party would do a better job than the incumbent administration.

On election day, 20 June, the weather was fine and warm on the coast, hot in the interior--84° at Kamloops and summer barely started--cool and showery in the Cariboo, but all bad for the three leaders. Bowser and Provincial Party leader McRae both lost in Vancouver and Premier Oliver in Victoria; the voters had decided against giving them an opportunity either to initiate or complete any programs or policies they had planned for the people of British Columbia. Party standings were, Liberals 23 seats, down three from 1920; Conservatives 17, up

three; the Provincial Party three seats; and Labour and Independents, five seats (see appendix 1).

Maitland, in his first attempt in electoral politics, ran eleventh but led his running mates, the closest of whom was Bowser who had carried Vancouver in every election since 1898. Bowser, who had been the lone Conservative in 1920, ran thirteenth in a field of 27 and trailed five of the six Provincial candidates. The Liberals held the five seats they had captured in 1920, while the sixth was taken by a Provincial candidate. General McRae missed the last seat by just 65 votes.¹⁵

The election was also Maitland's first big test as president of the association, and although a leader must ultimately bear the responsibility for losing an election, the president, as head of the constituency organizations which get out the vote, must also carry much of the blame. Maitland took over organizational leadership of a party already deeply divided and in two years had been unable to bring the warring factions together.

The Provincial Party, only modestly successful at the polls, had thoroughly destabilized political affairs. Maitland had tried to rally his party in April, but his indirect appeal to party loyalty was no substitute for the reforms promised by the Provincials. The party had nominated 41 candidates, influenced the results in 33 of 48 seats, and earned 24.2 percent of the popular vote. It had forced the Liberals into a minority government, and helped defeat the premier. It had probably cost the Conservatives the election, and perhaps more significantly, had contributed to the defeat of Bowser, the focus of

much of the Provincials' discontent.¹⁶

The Conservatives had lost three elections under Bowser and had no intention of permitting their leader to forget his 1923 promise that he would retire "after the next election." Before month end, J. H. Schofield, member-elect for Rossland-Trail, acting on behalf of the Conservative caucus, offered the leadership to S. F. Tolmie, MP (Victoria). He declined the offer, and after Bowser finally resigned in August, R. H. Pooley, MLA for Esquimalt, agreed to serve as leader until a leadership convention was held.¹⁷

Later that month, Pooley, accompanied by General McRae, campaigned for Conservative W. H. Houston in the Nelson by-election held after K. Campbell, Liberal MLA, had resigned in order to make a seat available for Oliver. On 23 August, Oliver won easily and once again had a seat in the Legislature.¹⁸

General McRae's presence in Nelson was the first public sign of the disintegration of the Provincial Party and the return to the Conservative fold of the dissenting members. Then, in November 1924 when Meighen was visiting Victoria two former Provincials, a Mr. Boggs and H. S. Thain joined him on the speakers platform. In December, at a general meeting of the Provincial Party in Victoria, the chairman ruled out of order a resolution condemning the three sitting MLAs for consistently voting or siding with the Liberals. At this point a large number of delegates left, undoubtedly already in short temper because McRae, who they knew was in Victoria, had not attended the meeting. Perhaps Thain was speaking for many in the Provincial Party when he stated "that as a political factor the party is dead and never will be

resurrected."¹⁹

However, recognition of failure is one thing; acceptance is quite another. In early 1925, Leon Ladner, a Vancouver lawyer and MP who had been elected in 1921, was deeply concerned about the apathy and self-destructive bent in certain sections of the provincial Conservative party. A federal election could be announced at any time and Ladner was convinced that a healthy provincial party provided the organizational base essential to a successful federal campaign and that only a leader acceptable to the various factions could unify and strengthen the party. In Ladner's mind, Tolmie was the only person who could fill this role. Because Ladner had steered clear of the Provincial Party imbroglio he was viewed by all concerned as an intelligent, perceptive intermediary, a neutral who was promoting Tolmie, and had been for some time, only for the good of the party.²⁰

During the spring and early summer Ladner had explored various ways of improving party unity and in July informed national leader Meighen of his progress. His plan, he said, was to try to bring the party together under Tolmie's leadership, even though he might not want to leave federal policies permanently. He was trying to promote a convention, but McRae and some of his principal followers, for example, George Harrison, John Nelson, and Frank Rounsefel supported only Tolmie, and would not agree to a meeting until the leadership candidates had been identified. They were very suspicious and worried about a scheme to return Bowser as leader. In fact, Ladner said, he was sure Bowser would contest the leadership if Tolmie declined to run. On the other hand, Bowser had lost some of his supporters, for example,

Maitland, Pooley, and Senator R. F. Green.²¹

Others had leadership aspirations, Ladner continued, Maitland who was "young and inexperienced but bright and popular," Pooley, present House leader, and McRae. Ladner agreed with Stevens, a fellow MP, that McRae could probably capture the leadership but neither believed he was electable. Moreover, as leader, he would face very strong opposition from the Vancouver association and certain powerful lumber interests.²²

At a luncheon meeting with Maitland and Pooley, Ladner told them Meighen supported his view that the provincial Conservatives must be united in order to strengthen the federal party's presence. When Ladner proposed Tolmie as leader, both men heartily endorsed the idea and suggested a convention should be arranged as soon as possible.²³

Ladner's plans to choose a new leader were interrupted by the federal elections in 1925 and 1926, both of which resulted in minority Liberal governments. However, in British Columbia, despite Ladner's pessimism, Conservatives did very well and actually increased their strength in 1926.²⁴

Very soon after the 1926 federal election, Maitland and his executive began planning for a provincial leadership convention. Eventually, on 19 October, at an executive meeting that included 12 MLAs--all 14 had been invited--they set the date for 23 November at Kamloops. Maitland announced at the same time that he would not be contesting the leadership. There was newspaper speculation that the choice of Kamloops was deliberate, a ploy to ensure full attendance of the Interior delegates who were said to be anti-Bowser and who could

get to Kamloops more easily than to, say, Vancouver. On the other hand, the 1922 leadership convention had been in Vancouver, yet Bowser had barely won.²⁵

Over the next few weeks several Conservative MLAs told Ladner they would support him for leader if Tolmie did not run (McRae had offered his backing to Ladner weeks earlier). Ladner had been trying for months to get Tolmie to commit himself one way or the other. Finally, in late October, Tolmie declared he was definitely out of the running, and on 3 November Ladner announced his candidacy. A week later, with the convention just 13 days away, Bowser made it official that he was in the race, although he had been campaigning for weeks.²⁶

The 1926 Conservative leadership convention was a public demonstration of the civil war within the party and paradoxically, of the enthusiastic unanimity with which the party finally rallied behind a popular leader. Maitland, in his last official act as retiring president of the provincial association, chaired the tension-filled three-day gathering of over 500 delegates. The event, widely publicized at the time, was recently described as a "very strange affair" by journalist and author, Bruce Hutchison, who reported the proceedings for the Province. Strange, highly dramatic, confusing to participants and reporters alike as well as to historians, the convention was memorable because of the hostile dispute over the Saanich delegation, the totally unexpected withdrawal of Bowser the day before nominations, and the breaking of the convention deadlock after the seventh ballot by Dr. Tolmie's acceptance of the leadership.²⁷

The dispute in Saanich between the Bowser and anti-Bowser

factions was a microcosm of the division within the whole provincial Conservative party. The split was very public, very bitter, even hostile and vicious, and neither faction would yield an inch to the other's position.

On 3 August 1925 in Saanich, a new executive including president W. Stubbs and other pro tem officers was elected following the resignation in July of president W. O. Wallace, treasurer J. Richardson and secretary J. Tate. On 19 February 1926 most of the same officers were returned by acclamation while Wallace was elected as third vice president. The secretary, J. M. Paterson, also returned by acclamation, reported that the previous secretary, who claimed he had not resigned in July, refused to turn over party funds in the amount of \$100 and the constituency's books. On 4 November the association met in Lake Hill hall and chose 10 Ladner supporters as delegates. The next day many members protested that the selection was illegal because: there was improper notice of the meeting, fewer than 50 were present, the constitution was ignored, and the night was foggy which made travel almost impossible. The protesters then petitioned president Maitland to order a re-election of delegates. A few days later president Stubbs wrote to the newspaper and denied all this (except the foggy weather), claiming Bowserites, including Wallace, were in a hopeless minority at the meeting. He also stated he would brook no interference from Maitland, probably because he thought Maitland was a Bowser supporter, but would accept direction from the whole provincial executive.²⁸

Subsequently, the provincial executive instructed the Saanich

executive to elect new delegates and a special meeting was called for the evening of 19 November, a cold, blustery, moonlit night. Approximately 300 people showed up, impatient to enter the hall, but were delayed as the executive would admit only paid-up members, estimated to be about 100. When those waiting outside forced their way into the hall, president Stubbs cancelled the meeting because the majority were obviously not members. Thus began the "Battle of Lake Hill."²⁹

After his announcement, Stubbs and his supporters, all of whom were paid up members, left the hall, and on the street outside the hall under a streetlight, re-elected the original 10 delegates. Meanwhile, in the hall third vice president Wallace took the chair. He ruled that anyone could vote for delegates providing he or she owned property in Saanich, regardless of the constitutional requirement that a person could be a member of the association only if he had paid dues of one dollar per year. Ten new delegates, including Wallace, secretary Paterson and treasurer J. P. Hibben, both of whom had remained in the hall, were elected to replace those elected on 4 November. The press reported that those outside stood at the doorway and cheered for Ladner, while those inside responded with rousing cheers for Bowser. Wallace's decision near the end of the meeting that the group would go to Kamloops "uninstructed" about how to vote therefore seemed somewhat deceptive.³⁰

The following week both the Stubbs and Wallace delegations proceeded to Kamloops and each claimed to represent Saanich. Although it seems clear the Stubbs delegation was at least more legitimate, the

credentials committee, in a majority report, recommended that the Wallace delegation be seated. Pooley and several others who were on the committee insisted, in a minority report, that the wrong delegates had been recognized. Pooley eventually moved a compromise amendment that five from each delegation be seated. Before the vote on the amendment, two members on the credentials committee defended the legitimacy of the two groups, Pooley for the Stubbs delegation and E. B. Andros (a member of the Victoria delegation) for the Wallace group. Andros ridiculed Pooley's explanation that the Wallace delegation was elected unconstitutionally and asked the convention to ignore "this Bolshevik talk." Meanwhile, Pooley supporters repeatedly and loudly demanded that Stubbs be allowed to state his case. When Stubbs finally entered a near riotous assembly, he was "greeted with bellows of applause from his friends." In a very acrimonious two hour debate, marked by "deafening heckling" and insults to the speakers, the bitter division in the Saanich constituency spread to the convention floor. "Amid noisy and uproarious scenes" Pooley's amendment was defeated, 232 to 194 on a standing vote, an outcome the losers said was the result of an improper count. Regardless, the Wallace delegation was finally recognized as the legal representative of Saanich.³¹

This episode was not clearly reported by the media. However, the evidence seems very clear that the Bowser forces won. The convention minutes, the newspaper reports on the Saanich constituency from August 1925 to November 1926, the fact that Pooley, a bitter and unrelenting enemy of Bowser, challenged the credentials committee, all show that the Bowser delegation, led by Wallace, was seated. This

circumstance made Bowser's withdrawal from the leadership role even more puzzling.³²

Bowser withdrew from the race Wednesday afternoon immediately after the Saanich delegation had been seated, and the day before nominations. It was not an impulsive act as both the Sun and the Victoria Times had reported that Bowser would retire that afternoon. The Times also included a statement from Senator J. D. Taylor that he would definitely be a candidate now. Certainly Bowser spoke like a person giving a farewell speech, "It is in the best interests of the Party . . . it is better for the unity of the Party," and concluded:

For thirty-five years I have mingled in political turmoil. I am now disappearing out of the picture, but you cannot rob me of the strong personal friendships I have made, and which I will always treasure. I have many political enemies, but I hope, none of a personal nature. In saying "good-bye" to you, I will always remember these relationships, which I hope will go on uninterrupted for many long years. I will never forget the loyalty of those friends. I will always remember them until time shall be no more.

Maitland, for once almost at a loss for words, commended Bowser for putting aside "his great personal love for politics in the interests of the Conservative party."³³

But he must have wondered about their supposed "arrangement" when he first learned of Bowser's intentions. Hutchison, who had frequent, informal chats with the Conservative leader in Victoria, said Bowser told him before the convention that Maitland had promised to support Bowser for leadership if he would recommend Maitland for the attorney general's portfolio, should the Conservatives win the next election. Sixty-one years later Hutchison was incredulous when he

learned of the Ladner correspondence and Maitland's support for Tolmie and concluded that "Maitland was playing games . . . I think Pat was secretly supporting Bowser in that convention" since there was no reason, he went on, why Bowser would mislead him in a non-attributable conversation. On the other hand, he knew Ladner as an honourable man who would not mislead or deceive Meighen.³⁴

Actually, there was nothing surprising about Maitland agreeing to support Bowser since he had been in the Bowser camp for years, aside from the occasional falling out, as in 1916 when Maitland did not hold office in the Vancouver constituency association. Maitland had endorsed Tolmie in 1925 but Tolmie had given no firm indication he was interested in the leadership. If Maitland desired a portfolio he would obviously deal with a candidate who had a chance of winning the leadership of the party, and Bowser fit on both counts.

The press described Bowser's retirement as good for the party and none of the newspapers questioned his sincerity. The Sun, however, thought that Bowser was the "greatest asset the Liberal party in British Columbia ever had." No one challenged his statement that he believed he could carry the convention, but Hutchison said it was nonsense, Bowser knew he could not win.³⁵

But late Wednesday night delegates unanimously approved a motion that indicated Bowser was plotting a comeback as a draft choice by a deadlocked convention. The motion required that the winner would need 60 percent of the votes cast, and no candidate would be allowed to drop out. The anti-Bowser forces could hardly vote against the motion because they themselves had put forth a similar motion during the 1922

leadership convention. Moreover, a majority of this magnitude would surely indicate much greater party unity than a simple majority as in 1922. That was the theory, but Ladner, Hutchison, and certainly the Bowser camp, saw it in practise as a means of blocking Ladner and deadlocking the convention. Everyone knew who the delegates were and could easily determine a fairly accurate voting picture. The vote on the Saanich delegation was also a very good indication of the relative strengths of the two main camps. Tolmie had declared himself definitely out of the contest as had dark horses Pooley and Maitland. A deadlocked assembly was a real possibility and the delegates, in desperation, might give 59 year old Bowser one more chance. He would have had no avenue of appeal if he lost to Ladner but now he could stand on the sidelines and await a call.³⁶

Nominations were completed Thursday morning and included C. F. Davie, 46 year old MLA from Duncan; Leon J. Ladner, 42 year old lawyer and MP from Vancouver; Colonel Nelson Spencer, 50 year old Vancouver businessman; and Senator J. D. Taylor, 63 years old, first World War veteran and manager of the Daily Columbian newspaper in New Westminster who Hutchison said was a "stalking horse" for Bowser. On the six ballots (a seventh was disallowed because the total vote exceeded the number of delegates), Davie and Spencer were never in the running; the highest numbers for both were 13 and 28 respectively on the first ballot. Two ballots were completed Thursday morning, on 25 November, and five in the afternoon before adjournment to 8:15 that evening. On the third ballot Ladner polled 59.03 percent, six votes short and following this he dropped to 55.2 percent, 26 votes short, on

the seventh and last ballot. Ladner was popular with anti-Bowserites who had remained loyal to the Conservative party but was not universally appealing to former Provincial Party supporters.³⁷

Shortly after the meeting convened Thursday evening Ladner suddenly stood up and moved that the convention "unanimously" offer the leadership to 59 year old Dr. Tolmie, a motion quickly seconded by Taylor. The fate of Bowser's strategy rested on the refusal or unacceptability of other possible candidates. When Tolmie came on stage to respond, initially to refuse, Russell Walker, a reporter, said the "tension was beyond belief. Pat Maitland stood on the platform with unchecked tears streaming down his face, and handkerchiefs appeared all over the hall mopping up salt water that didn't come from the sea . . . The president, who was close to being a teetotaler, was poured a stiff shot in the press room, which did much to restore his equilibrium." Tense and emotional he might have been, but Hutchison, reflecting later about Maitland's platform ability, recalled how he had handled the "great Conservative convention at Kamloops, keeping his head when nearly all about him had lost theirs, and something like a riot appeared imminent." Maitland chaired a committee--Bowser was invited but declined--formed immediately after Tolmie's refusal, that met privately for about an hour to resolve the impasse. The announcement that Tolmie had accepted the leadership "produced a massive demonstration of approval, with the single exception of Bowser who remained seated." After the excluded Saanich delegation had been invited in at his request, Tolmie delivered a low key but conciliatory speech calling for unity and the support of the whole party. It is our

duty, he said, to serve everyone regardless of party, race or religion. There is too great a disposition in both Ottawa and Victoria "to rule people rather than to serve them." Following a few resolutions of appreciation and the election of officers, the convention was finally over and the new leader quietly went off to his room for the night.³⁸

But Hutchison and some of the reporters had other ideas. During the hectic proceedings they had been unable to take a break and after everything was over decided to have a late meal. They also wanted to talk to the new chief and eventually persuaded a grumbling Tolmie to get out of bed and join them. Sixty-one years later Hutchison still had a big laugh describing the occasion. After thanking them for their hospitality, Tolmie, a huge man and a "great gentleman, a lovely guy," said he was not hungry but would have a light snack, which turned out to be a large T-bone steak, fried potatoes, toast, and two pieces of pie.³⁹

Maitland, no longer president, of course, but an ex-officio provincial association member, was out of an official role in constituency affairs for just the second time in 18 years (he was not directly involved in constituency organizational work for most of 1916), and appeared to have impaired his political opportunities by backing the wrong man at Kamloops. Yet by mid-1927 he was being touted as British Columbia's next attorney general if the Conservative party won the next election.⁴⁰

After the election date had been set for 18 July 1928, the Vancouver Conservative association nominated Maitland and five well-known businessmen, W. Dick, T. Kirk, W. C. Shelly, Nelson Spencer, and

G. Walkem. Described in the press as six millionaires, only Dick denied it, while Maitland, perhaps flattered, could not even be described as well-off. In his acceptance speech, Maitland dramatically declared the election was going to be the most important in British Columbia since Confederation. The Liberals, he said, were again promising to settle the PGE issue, this time by selling it, but in 1916, 1920 and 1924 they had made promises which they never fulfilled. (He did not, however, refer to the genesis of the PGE problem under Premier McBride's Conservative government.) Now, he went on, they are backing off on the freight rate issue that they promised to pursue after the 1924 election. How can anyone believe their promises anymore?, he concluded. For their part, Dick, Kirk and Walkem pledged to support a "straightforward honest administration [run] on business lines."⁴¹ In fact, the policies of the two major parties had been described by the Province during the New Westminster by-election in August 1927 as being so close there was "not very much to choose between them."⁴²

Premier J. D. MacLean, who had succeeded to the premiership after Oliver's death in August 1927, promised to extend the PGE to Prince George, to ratify the federal provincial agreement which would return railway lands and the Peace river block to British Columbia, to encourage capital investment, to reduce both general and school taxes, and to investigate a health insurance scheme.⁴³

Tolmie's manifesto was virtually the same with the exception of the health scheme and a plank that reflected his own farmer background, that is, to assist agriculture through marketing assistance, low

interest loans, and an improved road system.⁴⁴

Neither leader referred to the freight rate issue which Maitland had raised in June. In February 1928 he had asked Attorney General A. M. Manson if the government would question the Board of Railway Commissioners' decision of 27 August 1927 that set rates to Vancouver which, according to G. G. McGeer, counsel for the British Columbia government, were still very discriminatory when compared to shipping rates from the Prairies to the East. Maitland had regarded the problem as a non-issue in the 1924 campaign, and in fact, he regarded Premier Oliver as treasonous for trying to politicize freight rates during that election. But, in 1928, he was searching for some way to differentiate the two parties, and later in the campaign again drew attention to the subject.⁴⁵

Maitland enjoyed politics but he ran to win, not come second, and in the same speech he provided another example of his "hardball" approach to politics when he accused the Liberals of cheating in the 1924 election. He alleged they tampered with the "sanctity of the ballot box" in the election of Mary Ellen Smith who ran behind in every polling division in Vancouver City, yet led at all absentee polls "by some miraculous act." Without those returns she would have been hopelessly defeated, he said. Both the Sun and the Province reported this speech but only the latter, a Conservative paper, reported the election fraud statement.⁴⁶

But as election day neared the PGE became the central issue. MacLean claimed that because he was friendly with the federal Liberal government he was in a better position than Tolmie to resolve the

problem with Ottawa. The Conservative response was similar to their strategy in the 1924 campaign over the freight rate issue; they attacked MacLean for trying to politicize what should be a straight business proposition. Each party was trying to convince the electorate that it could, and would, solve the PGE morass. In an increasingly healthy economy the other manifesto articles faded away, yet the Liberals had won easily in the New Westminster by-election a year before on a record of improved social legislation, for example, the Mothers' Pension Act and the Old Age Pension Act; a comprehensive road building program; and generally good financial administration.⁴⁷

Maitland was unable to raise the freight rates and ballot box stuffing issues to the provincial level and may even have harmed his own cause by raising the Smith case. Although he picked up 8,000 votes over 1924, he was better known than the other candidates, of whom only Walkem had run previously in Vancouver, and he trailed the Conservative slate. Mrs. Smith, who ran fifth in the 1924 election (and led the polls in 1920), was eighth, but still gained 3,000 votes over 1924. She may even have profited by Maitland's allegation, but meaningful analysis of the results in this riding is difficult because the Provincial Party, which polled approximately 50,000 votes in Vancouver City in 1924, no longer existed.⁴⁸

The Conservative Party had nominated candidates in every riding [including Fernie where Tom Uphill (Labour) won easily]; the Liberals in all except Fernie, and Cowichan-Newcastle where the Conservatives easily won; Labour in 10; and the Independents nominated 14. The final results showed 35 Conservatives elected with a popular vote of 53.3

percent, the second highest ever recorded in a provincial election (in 1912 they captured 60.8 percent and 40 of 42 seats). The Liberals took only 12 seats, yet had 40.0 percent of the vote, whereas in 1924 they had won in 17 ridings with only 29.4 percent of the popular vote (see appendix 1).⁴⁹

The Liberals' loss could be attributed to MacLean who took over the leadership after Oliver died in late August 1927, but on the other hand their popular vote had been declining since 1916, and they had been in a minority position for four years. They had a good record but needed an election issue more exciting than an exchange of views with the opposition about who was best suited to deal off a white elephant. More significantly, the anti-Bowser movement, always present according to Hutchison, was virtually absent and the "Other" popular vote stood at 6.7 percent, the lowest recorded since the advent of party government in 1903. In the preceding three elections this category had been 12.2, 31.6 and 39.3 percent respectively (see appendix 1).⁵⁰

Maitland had been elected president of the provincial association at a time when the party was becoming increasingly factionalized. In fact, both his election and the re-election of Bowser as leader hastened both the end of the Conservative party as it existed at that time, and the formation in 1923 of the Provincial Party, which included a membership made up largely of disillusioned Conservatives. In 1924 the Provincials elected only three members but made an impressive showing that probably cost the Conservatives, and Maitland personally,

the opportunity to form the government. By the time of the 1926 Conservative leadership convention the Provincial Party had disappeared, only to be replaced by the original Bowser and anti-Bowser factions. The Conservative party seemed bound for certain death in a deadlocked convention, but when Tolmie accepted a leadership draft, the party enthusiastically united behind a popular leader. Two years later, the spirit of harmony and unity still prevailed, and the party won a strong mandate. After 12 years in Opposition the Conservatives would once again form the government. And 20 years after he was first elected to a constituency office, Maitland had finally reached public office.

Footnotes

¹For the purpose of the dinner meeting, see "Conservative Ranks Split," Sun, 21 December 1922, p. 1; and "Revolt in Ranks of Bowser Party Has Its Odd Side," Sun, 22 December 1922, p. 3; the formation, rise and fall of the Provincial Party has been thoroughly covered by Ian Parker, "The Provincial Party," BC Studies (Winter 1970-71):17-28; Pattullo Papers, PABC, Add/MSS 3 (hereafter Pattullo 3), Box 17, file 5, contains a history of the Provincial Party from 16 January 1923 to June 1924 which names the six delegates; Martin Robin, The Rush for Spoils (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1972), pp. 195-210, and Ormsby, A History, pp. 420-44 also discuss the Provincials at length.

²For Bowser's meeting with the Young Conservatives, see "Bowser Hits Third Party," Province, 15 March 1923, p. 22; for details of the Young Conservatives association, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 170, "Young Conservatives Form Association"; see also CAR, 1923, p. 773.

³For a history of party government in British Columbia, see Edith Dobie, "Party History in British Columbia, 1903-1933," The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 27 (April 1936):153-66.

⁴For explanations of the rise of third parties, see Andre Blais, "Third Parties in Canadian Provincial Politics," Canadian Journal of Political Science (CJPS) 6 (September 1973):428-38; Maurice Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975), pp. 248-50; Graham White, "One-Party Dominance and Third Parties: The Pinard Theory Reconsidered" CJPS 6 (September 1973):399-421; and Pinard, "Third Parties in Canada Revisited: A Rejoinder and Elaboration of the Theory of One-Party Dominance," CJPS 6 (September 1973):439-60.

⁵For comments on erosion of Liberal and Conservative support, see Ian Parker, "The Provincial Party," BC Studies (Winter 1970-71):21, 24; for the Merryfield appointment, see "Merryfield as New Organizer," Province, 13 October 1923, p. 7.

⁶For the length of an election mandate, see British Columbia, Constitution Act Amendment Act, 1916 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1916); for election signs, see "Independents Not Nibbling," Sun, 18 September 1923, p. 3; for the redistribution legislation, see British Columbia, Constitution Amendment Act, 1923 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1923).

⁷For the New Westminster campaigning, see "A. M. Sanford Party Choice," Province, 26 April 1924; the information about Provincial vs. Conservative nominees was gleaned from Parliamentary Guide, 1917, 1921; for the Okanagan tour, see Maitland 781, Box 16, Book 1, The Kelowna Courier, 8 May 1924; for dissolution and the election, see "Election Is Set for June 20," Province, 10 May 1924, p. 1.

⁸"Why We Must Win--Election," Province, 13 May 1924, p. 11.

⁹For the charges and testimony of Bowser et al., see CAR, 1924-25, p. 446; for release of the report and its findings, see "Government is Given Clear Slate," Province, 6 May 1924, p. 1; for reference to continuing PGE controversy, see CAR, 1924-25, p. 447.

¹⁰For Bowser's speeches in Vancouver and Victoria, see "Three Former Ministers Heard on Rule of B.C.," Province, 18 January 1923, p. 3; "Bowser Hits third Party," Province, 15 March 1923, p. 22; "Charges Waste and Blundering," Colonist, 21 January 1923, p. 1; and "Would Abolish Tax on Personal Property," Colonist, 24 October 1923, p. 1.

¹¹For the Provincials' manifesto, see "Why We Must Win--Election," Province, 13 May 1924, p. 11; for an explanation of the freight rates issue, see CAR, 1924-25, p. 100; CAR, 1925-26, pp. 196-97, and CAR, 1927-28, pp. 208-9.

¹²For the Liberals' manifesto, and reference to the PGE, see "Why We Must Win--Election," Province, 13 May 1924, p. 11.

¹³For the nominations, see "Strong Line-Up Is Selected by Conservatives," Province, 23 May 1924, p. 16; and "Bowser Heads His Party Ticket," ibid., p. 5; for the other parties' nominees in Vancouver, that also included women, see Parliamentary Guide, 1925.

¹⁴For an explanation of the freight rates issue, see note 10; for Maitland's acceptance speech see "Bowser Heads His Party Ticket," Province, 23 May 1924, p. 5.

¹⁵For election results, see Parliamentary Guide, 1921; for Bowser's political career, see Parliamentary Guide, 1921.

¹⁶Parker, Provincial Party, p. 17.

¹⁷For his promise to retire, see "Mr. Bowser Retires After Next Contest," Colonist, 6 January 1923, p. 1; for Schofield's request and Pooley's appointment, see Parker, "Tolmie," p. 35; and CAR, 1924-25, p. 444.

¹⁸For Pooley and McRae in Nelson, see James Morton, Honest John Oliver (Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1933), p. 187; for the August election results see Parliamentary Guide, 1925.

¹⁹For Meighen's visit to Victoria and the December meeting see Donald Keith Alper, "From Rule to Ruin: The Conservative Party of British Columbia, 1928-1954," (Ph.D dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1975), p. 20; for Thain's comment, see Parker, "Tolmie,"

pp. 36-37.

²⁰For Ladner's views, see Ladner Papers, Vancouver City Archives (hereafter VCA), MSS 641 (hereafter Ladner 641), Box 7, file 44, Ladner to Meighen, 30 July 1925; for more on Ladner's views, and comments on his neutrality, see Alper "From Rule to Ruin," p. 23; for more on the positive relationships between a provincial and a federal party, see Joseph Wearing, The L Shaped Party: Liberal Party 1958-1980 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1981), pp. 13-15.

²¹For Ladner's report to Meighen, see Ladner Papers, VCA, 641, Box 7, file 44, Ladner to Meighen, 30 July 1925.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Parliamentary Guide, 1926, 1927.

²⁵For the announcement and the controversy about the location of the meeting site, see "Tories Meet November 23 at Kamloops," Province, 19 October 1926, p. 1; Parker, "Tolmie," p. 43 comments on the plans for a meeting, and choice of Kamloops; for Maitland's statement that he would not be a candidate, see "B.C. Conservative Party Parley Date Is Set," Colonist, 19 October 1926, p. 1.

²⁶For MLAs' support for Ladner, see Parker "Tolmie," p. 44; Ladner Papers, VCA, 641, Box 20, file 293, Bruhn to Ladner, 25 October 1926; and Ladner Papers, *ibid.*, Cochrane to Ladner, 4 November 1926; for McRae's backing see Ladner Papers, *ibid.*, Box 7, file 45, Ladner to McRae, 10 June 1926; for Ladner's efforts to persuade Tolmie to accept the leadership, see the Ladner to McRae letter, preceding; for Ladner's candidacy declaration and reference to Tolmie's decision that he would not run, see "Ladner Out for Leader," Sun, 3 November 1926, p. 3; for Bowser announcement, see "Bowser Will Be Candidate," Colonist, 10 November 1926, p. 1, and Parker, Tolmie, p. 44.

²⁷For proceedings of the convention, see British Columbia Conservative Association, "Minutes of the Proceedings of the British Columbia Conservative Party convention, Kamloops, 23-25 November 1926 (Victoria: Legislative Library), hereafter called "Conservative Convention, 1926"; for Hutchison reference, Interview, 29 September 1987; for the quotation, see "Log of the House," Province, 8 February 1929, p. 18.

²⁸For the August election, see "Stubbs Elected Head of Saanich Conservatives," Times, 4 August 1925, p. 2; for the February elections, see "Conservatives of Saanich Strive to End Troubles," Times, 20 February 1926, p. 18; for the first delegates' selection and the protest, see "Saanich conservatives Ask for New Delegates," Times,

6 November 1926, p. 1; for Stubbs' letter see "Letters to the Editor," Times, 9 November 1926, p. 4.

²⁹For the re-nominations, see "Two Delegations are Nominated by Saanich Conservative Factions," Colonist, 20 November 1926, p. 1; "Tory Row Here to Break Out at Kamloops as Delegates of Three Places are Protested," Times, 20 November 1926, p. 1; and "Conservative Notes," *ibid.*, p. 9; for the reference to the battle, see "Lake Hill Battle at Kamloops Was a Lengthy Affair," Times, 25 November 1926, p. 14.

³⁰*Ibid.*; in a telephone conversation on 17 December 1987, Hutchison said he recalls very clearly the "Battle of Lake Hill" and Stubbs' meeting outside the hall.

³¹For the story of the floor fight, see "Lake Hill Battle at Kamloops Was a Lengthy Affair," Times, 25 November 1926, p. 14; and "Conservative Convention, 1926."

³²The newspaper reports about the Saanich delegations were conflicting and misleading. For example, "More Doubts Arise Over Credentials," Province, 24 November 1926, p. 1, reports the Bowser delegation was seated in the morning, when in fact it was seated in the afternoon, and makes no reference to the procedural wrangle; in "Tories Will Be Glad When It's All Over," Province, 25 November 1926, p. 2, the article refers to the "Battle of Lake Hill" and the seating of 10 pro-Bowser and 10 Ladner delegates; Alper, "Rule to Ruin," p. 23, says the Bowser delegation was not seated, Parker, "Tolmie," p. 47, says it was, and both authors used the same source, "Conservative Convention, 1926"; telephone conversation, Bruce Hutchison, Victoria, 17 December 1987, Hutchison commented on the bitterness between Bowser and Pooley; Bowser's withdrawal, "Conservative Convention, 1926," pp. 22-24.

³³For announcements that Bowser would retire, see "Kamloops Clash Sharp: Delegates Scorn Compromise," Sun, 24 November 1926, p. 1; and "Bowser Drops Out of Tory Contest," Times, 24 November 1926, p. 1; for Bowser's farewell speech, see "Conservative Convention, 1926," pp. 22-24; for Maitland's difficulty in expressing his feelings, *ibid.*, p. 24.

³⁴Interview, Hutchison, 29 September 1987.

³⁵For the Sun quotation, see "Bowser Retires," 25 November 1926, p. 6; for Hutchison's comment, Interview, 29 September 1987.

³⁶For the Wednesday night motion and details, see "Conservative Convention, 1926," p. 34; for the motive behind the motion, see Parker, "Tolmie," p. 49; and Interview, Hutchison.

³⁷For the nomination procedure, see "Conservative convention, 1926," pp. 35-36; for personal statistics about Davie, Ladner and

Spencer respectively, see Parliamentary Guide, 1925, 1927 and 1929, and for Taylor, Greene, Who's Who in Canada, 1928-29, p. 1382; for balloting, "Conservative Convention," 1926, pp. 36-40; for Ladner's popularity, Interview Hutchison who recalled that some Provincials were not too keen on Ladner.

³⁸Hutchison thought MLA Rolf Bruhn made the motion but the minutes, p. 41, show that it was Ladner; for Walker's comments, see Russell Walker, Politician of a Pioneering Province (Vancouver: Mitchell Press Limited, 1969), pp. 201-2; for Hutchison's comment about Maitland's platform ability, see "Log of the House," Province, 8 February 1929, p. 18; for the formation of the committee, see "Conservative Convention, 1926," p. 41; Bowser remained seated after the Tolmie announcement, see Parker, "Tolmie," p. 59; for Tolmie's invitation to the Saanich delegation and his speech, see "Conservative Convention, 1926," pp. 42-43; and Parker, "Tolmie," p. 59.

³⁹Interview, Hutchison, 29 September 1987.

⁴⁰For Maitland as attorney general, see "Attorney Gen'l," Sun, 28 July 1927, p. 7.

⁴¹For nominations, see "Shelly Is Named to Head Conservative List in Vancouver," Province, 20 June 1928, p. 1; six millionaires, see Robin, Spoils, p. 229 which refers to an article "Public Wants Big Expenditures," Sun, 5 July 1928, p. 1; for Dick's denials, see "Charges Machine Regime," Sun, 6 July 1928, p. 1; for Maitland's acceptance speech, and the pledge of Dick, Kirk, and Walkem, "Shelly is Named"

⁴²"Issues at New Westminster," Province, 13 August 1927, p. 6.

⁴³For MacLean's manifesto, see CAR, 1927-28, p. 555.

⁴⁴For Tolmie's manifesto, *ibid.*, p. 556.

⁴⁵For Maitland's question to Manson, see "Shelly Is Named to Head Conservative List in Vancouver," Province, 20 June 1928, p. 1; for the Board's decision, see CAR, 1928-29, pp. 208-9; for Maitland's later reference to freight rates, "Charges Machine Regime," Sun, 6 July 1928, p. 1.

⁴⁶For the ballot box allegation, see "No Business Failures in Tory Slate," Province, 6 July 1928, p. 11.

⁴⁷For the central issue, MacLean's claim and the Conservative response, see CAR, 1927-28, pp. 556-57; for reference to a healthy economy, see Robert Groves, "Business Government: Party Politics and the British Columbia Community, 1928-1933" (M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1976), p. 11; and Ormsby, A History, p. 426 who

described 1926 as the most prosperous year in the province's history; for the New Westminster by-election, see "Issues at New Westminster," Province, 13 August 1927, p. 6.

⁴⁸Parliamentary Guide, 1921, 1925, and 1929.

⁴⁹Parliamentary Guide, 1925, 1929; British Columbia; Statement of Votes, 1903 to 1928.

⁵⁰For Hutchison's comment, Interview, 29 September 1987.

CHAPTER IV

MAITLAND IN THE TOLMIE GOVERNMENT, 1928 TO 1933

Maitland was a Minister Without Portfolio in the Tolmie administration from 1928 to 1933. During this period, the greatest economic expansion in the history of the province ended and was replaced by the Great Depression that crippled the country and affected everyone. The Conservative party, divided first over Tolmie's patronage distribution policy, then over ways to address Depression-related problems, slowly disintegrated into several factions, primarily Unionists led by Tolmie, Independent Non-Partisans led by Bowser, and Independents with no leader. Maitland did not seek a nomination in 1933 but led a strong, and eventually public, fight against all proposals for non-partisan government, that is, a government not identified with an established party. However, during his last speech in the 1933 Session in which he sounded more like the party leader than Tolmie himself, he informed the Conservative MLAs they could run under whatever banner they chose in the next election. Then, in a parting shot at previous Conservative policy, and perhaps a prediction of things to come, he reminded the House that government must accept responsibility for the less fortunate in society; "those with wealth [must] carry those without."¹ Against the disorganized Conservative factions, the Liberals under Duff Pattullo won easily in the 1933 election, and for the first time in the history of the province a Socialist party, the Cooperative Commonwealth

Federation (CCF), formed the official Opposition. Also for the first time, the Conservative party did not send a single person to the Legislative Assembly.

Maitland was a much better lawyer, and would have been a far more capable attorney general than Pooley. But when Tolmie appointed his eleven-man Cabinet on 21 August 1928 he made Maitland a Minister Without Portfolio. Maitland was bitterly disappointed but Pooley had made personal sacrifices for the party such as mortgaging his home, and had been interim party leader from 1924 after Bowser resigned, until the leadership convention in 1926. Moreover, Tolmie did not want any Bowserites in his Cabinet and made a partial exception for Maitland in recognition of his support in the Vancouver and many other constituency organizations.²

But regardless of Maitland's low Cabinet status, the premier soon began calling on Maitland to represent him in the Vancouver area at various ceremonial and political affairs, certain that Maitland, with his penchant for publicity would welcome the opportunities. That fall Maitland represented the premier at a Vancouver celebration in honour of Colonel Mary Booth of the Salvation Army, at a luncheon in Blaine, at a Memorial service for polar explorer Roald Amundsen, and at a reception in North Vancouver hosted by General McRae, formerly leader of the Provincial Party, now an MP. Two years later Maitland was still standing in for the premier and represented him at the funeral of

Senator Crowe, a former Conservative MP and Vancouver businessman.³

Tolmie expected more of Maitland on these occasions than a mute presence and would ask him to state government policies on certain issues if the opportunity arose. At the McRae reception, for example, he asked Maitland to repeat the government's policy concerning the PGE, that if it could not sell the railway to Canadian National Railways or some other company then it would "complete the P.G.E. from Vancouver to Prince George [according to] the policy of the Conservative party, as laid down in 1912 . . . Under a Conservative administration this would have been done long ago."⁴

But those were easy tasks, uncontroversial, with little at stake except to make a good and memorable impression, nothing like the increasingly rancorous party quarrels over patronage distribution that Maitland got involved in. Patronage distribution, that is the practise of arbitrarily awarding various government works such as printing and advertising, legal work, the purchasing of supplies and awarding of contracts not necessarily to the lowest bidder, and the hiring and appointing of people known for their political loyalties rather than for their suitability to a particular job, was a fact of political life. Quite simply, the spoils went to the victor. But patronage, like beauty, is perceived through the eye of the beholder; to the excluded it is political favoritism; to the beneficiary it is a just and expected reward for party work.

A few days after taking office Maitland received a request from former MLA Harry Parsons of Golden for government advertising in his

area. Parsons, supported by Colonel W. W. Foster of Vancouver and a former resident of Golden, published the only newspaper in town but the executive of the Golden constituency association insisted that under no circumstances should any government work be awarded to Parsons. In this instance Maitland recommended that Parsons be awarded government work in the district but left the final decision up to Tolmie who replied that he would be pleased to discuss the matter with Maitland.⁵

The eventual resolution of this dispute could not be determined but certainly in Tolmie's mind it was not a question of refusing patronage, but only to whom it would be awarded. During the election campaign Tolmie had ruled out vicious patronage, by which he meant wholesale firing of Liberal appointees regardless of their competence, to make way for friends of the new government. At their annual meeting in November 1929, Maitland, speaking in support of his leader, cautioned delegates that "No government that was the implement of vicious patronage would ever prosper in British Columbia."⁶

But neither Maitland, who appeared to be patronage coordinator in the province, nor Tolmie rejected all patronage. Tolmie told Maitland his stand had always been

that everything pertaining to a district should go through the local Member or through the defeated candidate. This is the plan followed everywhere [my underlining]. It is therefore the responsibility of the organization to keep in close touch with their respective representative in connection with matters affecting their districts.

Three years after the election Maitland denied that Conservatives practiced "ruthless vicious patronage" typical of the Oliver government

but stated that "Anyone who says he is going to eliminate patronage is a hypocrite." He rationalized that there was nothing wrong about carrying on public business by dealing with people one knows and trusts." However, Maitland's understanding of patronage did not extend to road construction and maintenance which he insisted to Tolmie must go to the lowest bidder, unless Cabinet as a whole approved a higher tender. In June 1929 Maitland had been on a tour through the Interior and learned that a large road project had not been awarded to the lowest bidder.⁷

The Vancouver association was the first to go public with its complaints about patronage. Initially, the executive, led by president J. E. Merryfield, blamed all six MLAs but later the president singled out Maitland who, he said, had refused to consult the association about patronage work and appointments. At a special meeting in October 1929 the exasperated executive tried to get approval for a revised constitution that would have excluded MLAs and MPs from ex-officio membership. Maitland was booed and heckled but eventually persuaded the members, about a thousand strong and said to be packed with Merryfield supporters, to agree to circulate the revisions to all members, prior to further discussion of the issue at the regular meeting, scheduled for sometime in November. By that time the Maitland forces were organized and voted out the whole executive including a very bitter Merryfield who accused the MLAs of plotting to oust him.⁸

Tolmie blamed the trouble in Vancouver on the "Bowser faction who have raised 'Hell' ever since Kamloops" [that is, since the 1926

leadership convention], some of whom "would like to turn the success of the Conservatives . . . into a mad orgy of patronage." Nevertheless, he said, those who remain loyal to the party would be "recognized in a definite manner when and wherever possible."⁹ Clearly, his understanding of loyalty did not allow for Bowser supporters. Tolmie was grateful to Maitland for his timely action at the October meeting and warmly thanked him

for the excellent work done at the meeting last night; you certainly had a heavy undertaking, and you did well. If the various wards are gone after now properly, with energy and tact, I think you will be in good shape before the annual meeting is held . . . I fully appreciate your difficulties in Vancouver and am glad that you and your associates are handling the situation in such a capable way.¹⁰

But Vancouver City was not the only constituency in an uproar over patronage in 1929. The Comox constituency complained that Liberal patronage appointees were still in place, and Alberni, Cranbrook, Hope and Terrace made similar complaints. Sometime during the year a Vancouver Conservative wrote to General McRae, national organizer and MP for North Vancouver, to protest that the provincial practise in respect to patronage would hurt the party in the next federal election. Not only had the provincial Conservatives left Liberals in place, they had hired more; "Did you ever hear of such folly?" asked the writer. Obviously McRae had not, and he advised the British Columbia Conservatives MPs that the situation should be corrected.¹¹

Probably the most troublesome patronage case in 1929, to Maitland personally, and to the Conservative party, was the firing of

Norman Watts. This man, a partially disabled war veteran and former secretary to Prince Rupert's Liberal MLA, T. D. Pattullo, had been appointed government agent in that city in 1924. On 16 or 17 May Finance Minister Shelly and his deputy minister E. D. Johnson personally fired Watts in Prince Rupert for political activity. The accusation was based on a personal letter, leaked to the Conservative party, that Watts had written to Pattullo about two months before the election in 1928. Watts recommended the dismissal of three men and "unfortunately added a phrase suggesting that these three men were Conservatives and should be fired." Regardless of the fact that the Conservatives had released these men before firing Watts--one was afterwards sent to jail and the other two were fired for incompetence--Watts was released from the civil service.¹²

Maitland privately wished that the topic would never come up again but on 11 February, he had to defend the government's decision to fire Watts. As Legislative press gallery reporter Bruce Hutchison said, Maitland was frequently called on, because of his exceptional speaking ability, to defend and explain government policies. But in this debate, which Maitland thought was totally unnecessary, he obviously had no intention of bailing Shelly out of his predicament. Frequently called to order by the Speaker for wandering off the topic, Maitland said afterward it was one of the "hardest debates I was ever in but I think I held Duff at bay and maybe embarrassed him." He may have embarrassed him but he held neither Liberal leader Pattullo nor the Liberals at bay. After a judicial inquiry that was approved by a

resolution in the Legislature, Watts was fully reinstated to his former position on 5 February 1931 by the new Minister of Finance J. W. Jones, who had replaced Shelly in a Cabinet shuffle in October 1930. The Liberals knew they had a good issue, but had it not been for the support of sympathetic Conservatives in the House, the Legislature probably would not have agreed to a formal inquiry.¹³

As the Depression intensified and jobs became increasingly scarce the patronage dispute had the effect, in the Conservative party, of rallying and strengthening the old Bowser faction, and in reaction an anti Bowser or Tolmie faction. But Tolmie supporters themselves began to divide over ways to tackle Depression-related problems such as unemployment, failing industries, and falling government revenue. However, during the final Legislative Session in the spring of 1929 the Conservative caucus was generally satisfied and the country was still enjoying unprecedented prosperity.¹⁴

Maitland, who described that first Legislative Session as very friendly and without interruptions, had an unusually active role for a Minister Without Portfolio. He gave at least one major speech in each of the five Sessions and with the exception of 1929, explained and defended the budget. Why Tolmie called on him to do this was, as Bruce Hutchison said, "one of those deep secrets of state reserved even from the faithful caucus." One of the reasons, Maitland explained years later, was that he did not believe anyone in the House, with the exception of the Minister of Finance, understood the budget and his purpose was as much to clarify as to defend it.¹⁵

Although Hutchison thought Maitland's speeches did not have much substance nor make one think too much, he was a great admirer of his eloquence and delivery, and described him as one of the "best stump speakers" in British Columbia. Referring to Maitland's maiden speech in 1929, he described him as a speaker with

an extraordinary gift for words . . . a master of satire, a wit of note and a proponent of gentle persiflage without equal [who] has no peer on the government side in the gentle art of kindly punishment . . . as a parliamentarian Mr. Maitland surprised even his friends [and is] a thoroughly accomplished debater . . . Indeed, as he stands gestureless, looking into space and thinking aloud, he reminds you somewhat of Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen, both in his manner and his utter detachment.

Another Legislative reporter, Norman Senior of the Sun, fully reported Maitland's address but simply described it as a "most forceful speech."¹⁶

With the exception of 1933, Maitland devoted part of every major speech to lecturing the Liberals, a level of debate that Tolmie complained about to a federal colleague. Comparing the federal and provincial parliaments, Tolmie said there was little real debate in Victoria and he blamed the Opposition for its scolding and petty fault-finding. But in a province where there was a virtual consensus on the issues, both sides lectured and scolded the other in the Legislature about the most effective ways to implement policies.¹⁷

During his speech on the shortcomings of previous Liberal administrations, Maitland used sarcasm "so biting that no one but a hard-boiled opposition, which can now stand anything, could have remained to listen to it." Referring to the ongoing negotiations

The Doctor is up with the 2nd reading of
Return of Land Bill.

The Worm Turns



Spring Session 1930
The Members were also enraged about the Saturday Sitting.

between the province and Ottawa for the return of the Peace River and railway lands, he said the matter was certainly not political, and then, in a neat bit of politicking, stated the real question was "whether the Federal Government [Liberal] wishes to serve the party [Liberal] or the best interests of the people of the Dominion of Canada." The PGE, he said, had been under construction in 1916 when the Liberals came into power and since then the contract had been cancelled and the work stopped. The PGE, he observed, "has developed into a thing used for political manipulation and election promises . . ." The Liberals had squandered money trying to develop and reclaim land for returned soldiers and other settlers at Creston, Merville, the South Okanagan, and Sumas but had done nothing about broadening the industrial base of the province. British Columbia, he continued, had depended too long on the basic industries of fishing, lumbering and mining. A price drop in any of these fields meant job losses; industries must be developed and agricultural production expanded, Maitland concluded.¹⁸

In the 1930 Session, the first after the October 1929 market crash and the beginning of the Depression, Maitland gave the first of four budget speeches which, with the exception of his 1933 address, would all follow the same pattern of combining an explanation and defense of the budget, with an attack on the Liberals. In his first speech he defended an unpopular budget brought down by an unpopular man. Finance Minister W. C. Shelly was a rich man who had threatened to reduce expenditure on pensions, education and hospitals; he had

already reduced succession duties on large estates. Obviously Cabinet had agreed Maitland could more effectively defend the budget than Shelly, particularly against an opposition member as knowledgeable about government administration as Pattullo. After Maitland had finished his almost two-hour speech, Pattullo sent him a note saying he had "made the best of a bad job," a tribute from one professional to another. Hutchison described the speech as "quite the best of his career, which is saying a good deal," outstanding not for the "facts in it so much as their arrangement, their clarity, the way they were grouped and assembled in points that were driven home to the hilt." Others could have presented the same facts, he said, but Maitland brought them to life.¹⁹

That was Shelly's last budget, because in October Tolmie made several Cabinet changes. Shelly, replaced by J. W. Jones (South Okanagan), was appointed president of the Executive Council while Maitland's status remained unchanged. For Vancouver, the effect was the loss of a departmental portfolio, although S. L. Howe (Richmond-Point Grey) still retained the Provincial Secretary's position. The Liberals were pleased with the new Speaker, C. F. Davie (Cowichan-Newcastle), as they had worried that Deputy Speaker H. D. Twigg (Victoria) might be promoted. Maitland, who also sounded pleased, said Twigg had "restrained misgivings" about everything the Conservatives did and was so dignified that if "dignity was a marketable commodity" he would be a very rich man.²⁰

In 1931 Maitland was again asked to justify a budget that even

the Conservative caucus found objectionable. When Jones presented his first budget to a full House and crowded galleries, Maitland said it threw a chill over everyone in the Legislature. All incomes over a certain level, personal and corporate, would be taxed, 1.0 percent on personal and one quarter of one percent on corporate incomes; this would include weekly income over \$12.00 (later changed to \$15.00) for single persons, and over \$25.00 for married people (with certain exceptions). The main purpose of an income tax was to generate revenues, estimated to be about \$1.0 million, which would cover expenditures on several social programs, including mental institutions, juvenile homes, Old Age Pensions, and Mothers Pensions. Maitland's pessimism about the budget was shared by the Liberals, but from a different perspective, of course, and Pattullo, who fully appreciated the opportunity, led off the budget debate on 6 March with a three-hour speech, which Maitland admitted, was "the best I ever heard him make." Maitland himself spoke for one and a half hours--he said it "seemed like a year and a half"--but was not pleased with the performance perhaps because brother Ronald and son Robert were in the gallery. However, Hutchison thought the "red-headed young man" (now 42!) did a very good job of defending his government in general and the Minister of Finance in particular. Maitland, he said, "makes a speech extremely easy to listen to . . . and [even] his enemies agree with this" regardless of their reservations about the content of his speeches. His "eloquent denunciations and genteel, icy sarcasms . . . don't mean much but they have clamorous and goodly sounds." And he learned long

PORTRAIT OF A FINANCE MINISTER BRINGING DOWN A BUDGET



Spring Session, 1931

Minister of Finance, J. W. Jones, proposed a 1 percent tax on weekly earnings over \$12.00 for single men and \$25.00 for family men, a proposal that threw a "chill over everyone."

Source: Maitland Papers, Add/MSS 781, Box 8, file 3.

before to finish a speech before his audience got tired listening to him.²¹

The budget that Maitland found difficult to defend was in fact almost identical to the 1930/31 budget (see appendix 2). The Tolmie Cabinet was determined to balance the budget, again, but anticipated revenues were down because of failing industries and growing unemployment. Therefore, rather than reduce estimated expenditures, only slightly higher than 1930/31 but still the highest on record, the government opted for new revenue sources which included a tax on earnings of all the working people in the province.²²

In 1932/33 Jones brought down another balanced budget, but about 12.5 percent lower than the preceding year. Economic conditions had further deteriorated and the number of unemployed was estimated to be over 73,000. In 1933/34 estimated expenditures were once more reduced but there was a \$2.2 million shortfall in anticipated revenue.²³

As the economy worsened, so, too, did the internal strife in the Conservative party. Just before the 1931 Session ended, provincial association president Lindley Crease, obviously very concerned about unrest and dissent in the party, told Tolmie that every MLA should meet his constituency organization and tour his riding as soon as possible after the Session. Party supporters at all levels must be fully briefed about the "favourable aspects of the various measures passed this Session [because they] are not really getting the essential facts from the Press. The public mind seems to be more or less in a state of

confusion . . .," and Conservative party workers and supporters must "have clear-cut answers to give to critics." Although the premier dutifully forwarded a copy of Crease's letter to every MLA he expressed no particular concern and merely commented that the president's suggestions were "well worthy of consideration." Anyway, he added, members of Cabinet would be visiting several constituencies during the summer.²⁴

Perhaps Tolmie was satisfied with the internal party situation throughout the province in general and preferred to ignore the noisy factions in Vancouver and Victoria. But these factions were not fading away, as he had earlier assured Prime Minister R. B. Bennett, and instead were becoming increasingly outspoken about the actions of the organizational and political establishment. The Bowser faction supporters had been somewhat chastened following the 1926 leadership convention but had found new focuses of discontent and protest, first, through being cut out of or bypassed on patronage distribution after the 1928 election, and subsequently through organizational tactics such as those that ousted the Merryfield slate.²⁵

In January 1931, Division Three of the Vancouver Conservative Association demanded that all six city MLAs resign. The members claimed they had done nothing for them and had even left Liberal appointees in place. In 1916 the new Liberal government had fired all Conservative appointees, now the new administration should fire all Liberal appointees. In March Division Eight demanded a leadership convention and condemned the Tolmie government for reckless expendi-

tures, heavy borrowing and increased taxation. It, too, demanded the resignation of the local MLAs, not because of their failings, but to protest government actions. In the Victoria area insurgents formed "constitutional clubs" and other groups outside the regular, that is to say, Tolmie-dominated constituency organizations. They also were dissatisfied with the local MLAs and demanded their resignation.²⁶

In June, Tolmie blamed a partisan Liberal press and party malcontents, particularly in Vancouver, who had been hostile to him since the 1926 convention. He delivered a public ultimatum to party rebels, "get in and help or step out and keep out for good." He claimed the negative criticism harmed public business and threatened his prestige as "head of the British Columbia government." However, a few days later his leadership was unanimously confirmed in Victoria and Vancouver association meetings.²⁷

At the Vancouver meeting, Maitland delivered a "stirring speech" in which he emphasized the value and contribution of party government at the provincial level, expressed support for government programs and policies, and praised the premier's leadership. These are hard times, he said, and that is when those who are "really loyal" get behind the party.²⁸

Shortly after Tolmie's attack on party dissenters, unpredictable G. A. Walkem, MLA for Vancouver and one of three Provincial Party candidates elected in 1924, informed Tolmie he could no longer be loyal to him because of his "utterances of the last two days [and] the events of the last three years . . . [my] loyalty just

dried up and vanished."²⁹

Liberal leader Pattullo was not at all sympathetic with the Conservatives' predicament and attributed their problems to a "policy of ballyhoo, bluster and bluff . . . Now they complain of criticism. They will get no sympathy from me. . . . When Dr. Tolmie was made Conservative leader at Kamloops, I feared the Liberals were going to have a hard time. He was popular, he had everything in his favour, he was an estimable gentleman and still is personally. I believe one of the principal factors which put the Conservative in power was the personality of Dr. Tolmie." The Conservatives, he said, were given a strong mandate in 1928 but they bungled the opportunity. Pattullo's observations undoubtedly reflected the sentiments of many Conservatives and despite the Premier's blast at party dissidents, party discord persisted.³⁰

Maitland, always a strong party man publicly, was also having problems with the premier, although his initial differences centred more on Tolmie's political priorities rather than on questions of loyalty. In mid-September 1931 four of the six Vancouver MLAs, W. Dick, T. H. Kirk, N. Spencer and Walkem, privately protested to the Premier about inadequate Cabinet representation for Vancouver. In the 1924 election campaign, and at the 1926 leadership convention Maitland had attacked the Oliver government for excluding Vancouver representatives from Cabinet, and now he fully agreed "with the reasonableness and fairness of the request made by the Vancouver members." He had reviewed speeches by former leader Pooley, and

editorials and statements attributed to the premier and concluded that the Conservative Party intended to "deal fairly and honestly with the City of Vancouver." He claimed the people of Vancouver wanted more representation and in a second letter, written in much stronger but almost melodramatic language, he and Shelly condemned the "grave discrimination against the City in relation to Cabinet representation." Maitland argued that "Vancouver controls the political situation in this Province, as it had done for the past twenty-five years . . ." and if no changes were made before the next election, the Conservative government would surely be defeated.³¹

In his reply to Spencer in October, the imperturbable Dr. Tolmie pointed out that current Vancouver Cabinet representation was one more than at any time since 1895, in either Liberal or Conservative governments. He did not indicate, however, whether previous Vancouver Cabinet representatives had departmental responsibilities, that is, if they had portfolios. Regardless, he did not make any Cabinet changes, a decision that was almost certainly determined by how the party fared in five by-elections since May 1930. Three previous Conservative seats--Fort George, the Islands and North Okanagan--were returned by acclamation; the only suburban riding, North Vancouver, was taken from the Liberals; and Columbia, in a December 1931 contest, remained in Liberal hands, for a net gain of one seat.³²

As the 1932 Session got underway in February, Maitland reflected pessimistically that it could be the last for his government. He was worried about the significance of the Columbia by-election

results, the economy, about dissension both in the party and caucus, and particularly about demands from party members including MLAs, and the media, for a non-partisan administration, or a business government as one newspaper described it.³³

He had worked hard in Columbia but to no avail. The riding had been Liberal since 1916 but in 1928 the Conservatives had lost out by only 32 votes (an Independent candidate received only 26 votes), and a victory in 1931 would have proved to the British Columbia electorate that the party was still in good political shape. However, in the two-party contest voters turned out in unprecedented numbers--a bad sign for the governing party--and the Liberals won by an incredible 305 votes. Maitland had been campaigning for candidates for almost a quarter of a century yet he may have been a liability in that campaign, despite all his platform ability. He was a minister from far-away Victoria and presented an opportunity for the voters to punish the Tolmie administration for its failure to do anything that would improve the economy.³⁴

Some of the most visible manifestations of the depressed economy were the parades, demonstrations, and protests by the unemployed. Their demands and concerns as well as the response by certain members of the community provide contrasting views of the unemployment problem. A week after the Session began about 1,000 unemployed, some singing the "Red Flag," others carrying hammer and sickle flags, marched from Victoria city hall to the Legislature. The demonstrators, Victorians and a few from Vancouver and Up-Island areas,

waited in the chilly, blustery, 40 degree weather while six delegates met first with Minister of Public Works Rolf Bruhn and later with the Conservative caucus to present their demands. These included:

Noncontributory unemployment insurance; \$4 a day for married men for four days a week, or its equivalent in direct relief; more open-handed treatment for single men; protection against eviction for unpaid rent, water, light, and other household bills; \$12 weekly for all unemployed between sixteen and eighteen years of age; repeal of the criminal code section dealing with unlawful assembly; provision of free education and vocational training; and immediate release of "class war prisoners."

Although the six delegates agreed that the provincial and municipal governments were only partly to blame for what was really a federal matter, they were nevertheless dissatisfied with the government's response that their demands would receive "every consideration" and vowed to remain in Victoria until something concrete was done. Three days later, in pouring rain, the unemployed again demonstrated in front of the Legislature and demanded that debts and other financial obligations of all unemployed be suspended.³⁵

Maitland could not agree with those particular demands, but he did not share the view of Conservative member Major Harold Brown, president of the Vancouver Board of Trade, that direct unemployment relief lacked "moral value" and was a "malignant growth of pointless expenditures which degrade the human character." Brown later recommended to a Legislative committee, formed on 24 February 1932 to study the problem, that relief be paid only for work and that land should be made easily available to the unemployed, especially family

men, who wished to work the land. Cities, he concluded, could not absorb the mass of unemployed. In its report released in April, the unemployment committee accepted Brown's suggestions in principle but stated direct relief was unavoidable because government simply did not have funds for large-scale public works; and land settlement schemes could only accommodate those who were "land-minded and suited to such a life." Partly as a result of the committee's findings, the administration approved the Unemployment Relief Act, 1932, just before prorogation on 13 April, which authorized government to borrow and dispense funds for relief of unemployment.³⁶

At the same time, the government also approved two other important Bills, the Constitution Act Amendment Act, 1932 and the Provincial Elections Act Amendment Act, 1932. Maitland was very cynical about these Bills which were essentially economizing measures and forms of fiscal retrenchment that the Provincial Party and Tupper had called for in the 1924 election campaign. Conservative Members agreed that it would be a fine move, in the interests of economy, to reduce the number of ridings, providing it was not theirs, of course. When the necessary legislation was introduced on 24 February it provided for a net reduction of one seat and a 10 percent reduction in MLAs salaries, from \$2,000 to \$1,800. The Vancouver area was allocated 9 seats. Alberni and Nanaimo (both Liberal seats) were merged and the Liberals lost A. L. Hannah, formerly MLA for Alberni (the Bills have their good points, commented Maitland, who thoroughly disliked the man), Peace River became a new riding, and Revelstoke and Cranbrook

(both Liberal ridings) were merged, which wiped out Columbia and the newest MLA, a very angry Thomas King. Salaries and the rearrangement of electoral districts would be effective when the current Legislature was dissolved. Changes under the Elections Act would be effective 1 May 1932.³⁷

Although Maitland was himself skeptical about the motives of his colleagues, he resented attacks on party government by those "high brows in Vancouver who would eliminate all parties" because parties are made up of "grafting, self-seeking, low life individuals." He hit back, at some political cost, he feared, but did so "with a sincere feeling of righteous indignation." He said if parties go under he, and Pattullo (for whom he had a great personal respect), would go with them.³⁸

Maitland was particularly concerned and depressed over demands from some of his own colleagues and the press for non-partisan administration, or business government. The newspapers, particularly the Province, had continually criticized political parties who, they said, defended the party system yet were unable to "stand together for something that really matters--the good, for instance, of British Columbia." If each party had a "definite and differentiated programme the case would be different. But they haven't. And the province suffers." The Province insisted that "businessmen are not necessarily adapted to public life or useful in it [but] every businessman and every newspaper and every ratepayer in the province knows there is something wrong." Neither Maitland nor Tolmie went along with the

newspapers' obsession, as the premier referred to it, but nevertheless two days after prorogation Tolmie, in a straight political move, appointed six businessmen, known as the Kidd Committee, to study government administration and to make recommendations for more economical management of government affairs. In its self-proclaimed terms of reference the committee intimated it would also be recommending a non-partisan administration as a way to achieve financial stability.³⁹

Maitland was opposed to any form of non-party administration. He had been committed to party government for almost a quarter of a century and was convinced it was superior to any other form of government. However, Tolmie who had seemed opposed to the idea in the spring, had changed his mind by the summer of 1932 and sounded out his caucus on Union government, an idea he had often discussed with Hutchison. By Union, he meant an administration that would include in Cabinet members of both parties as well as "representatives of other groups" [underlining is Tolmie's]. He did not visualize a coalition, a blending of parties that would effectively result in one party but only that "party politics should be set aside for the present and all our energies concentrated for the best interests of the Province." He maintained British Columbia was in a crisis situation just as Canada had been in 1917 when he had served on Prime Minister Borden's Union government. Currently, he said, Manitoba had such a government and Saskatchewan was considering Union. In August 1931 Great Britain had set up an all-party Cabinet, known as the National government, to deal

with the economic crisis. Maitland and Shelly were the only two ministers who opposed Union, while nine MLAs, the majority of whom represented the greater Vancouver area, were also opposed. Those who supported Union did so, however, only on the condition that Pattullo would not be invited to participate, a qualification that Tolmie subsequently ignored. Interestingly, Jack Loutet, Member for the relatively urban North Vancouver riding, who supported Union, said Hutchison told him people seemed to want a coalition government.⁴⁰

In a 7 September press release Tolmie announced he had decided to implement Union government, similar to Great Britain's National government, and believed that those who were invited to "cooperate in this movement will be prepared to throw aside personal ambition [and] make some personal sacrifices" for British Columbia. A few days later both Bowser and Pattullo declined his invitation to participate in a Union government. Undaunted, he issued a more detailed statement on 17 September and proposed an eight-man Cabinet, one without portfolio, instead of the current eleven-man executive which included Maitland and Shelley without departmental responsibilities. He also stated he intended to introduce legislation at the next Session to reduce the House size. And in an appeal to the business community he said the Kidd Committee report, which had called for a drastic reduction in annual government expenditures, would be very carefully considered.⁴¹

In November, Maitland again opposed Tolmie on Union government. In October the provincial executive had enthusiastically approved the premier's stand on Union government, but at a regular annual meeting in

November Maitland persuaded delegates to repudiate that decision. He argued that a provincial convention created the party and its constitution, and only a convention could change that. The whole question, he insisted, should be referred to every constituency and district for discussion, and then decided at a convention before the next election. Maitland's motion carried and Tolmie agreed to a convention before the election in 1933. In a thorough house-cleaning, the convention also replaced the executive which had supported Union government at the October meeting, and approved moving the provincial association office from Victoria back to Vancouver. In a divided state reminiscent of 1924 the Conservative government prepared for its fifth and last Session of its five-year mandate.⁴²


The 1933 Session was still over two weeks off when Maitland, no doubt seeking support for his stand, advised Prime Minister Bennett that he opposed Union government, and was determined to maintain the identity of the Conservative party and intended to make every effort to "keep alive the strength, effectiveness and necessity of Party Lines." Bowser, he claimed without explanation, had refused every fair offer and was contemplating formation of a new party, supported by "malcontents and groundlings whose ideals are limited to the trough." Maitland said he had been fighting these elements for five years and preferred defeat to relying on them for support. According to Hutchison, Maitland was not the only powerful Conservative who would rather risk electoral disaster than enter a Union government. To resolve the problem Maitland suggested that Bennett appoint

F. P. Burden, former Minister of Lands who had been made Agent General in British Columbia House in London in 1930, to a position in Ottawa. If that happened, Maitland hinted, Tolmie could be appointed to London which would certainly go a long way toward solving the party's problems in British Columbia.⁴³

Bennett's reply was very ambiguous but he did not reject Union government out of hand, as he was undoubtedly aware of the Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Great Britain crises arrangements that Tolmie referred to. He seemed to suggest that as long as the Liberals stayed clear of Union government, the Conservative party should do likewise.⁴⁴

Maitland had planned on maintaining a very low profile during the Session but that was impossible given his long commitment to the Conservative Party and his fundamental disagreement with Tolmie and the Unionists on one hand, and Bowser and his supporters on the other. A week before the beginning of the Session, for example, Maitland challenged the premier's statement that he looked forward to the support of Conservative Members during the Session. Maitland said this implied to him and the other Vancouver Members, Walkem particularly, that the governing party would not be representative of the Conservative Party, a view with which he wholly disagreed. He would participate in the Legislature only as a member of the Conservative Party. The Conservative caucus agreed at its pre-Session meeting to support this stand, but on 25 February, two days after the House opened, Walkem finally left the party.⁴⁵

The public disintegration continued and on 2 March Minister of



Spring Session, March 1933

As an organization the Conservative party had pretty well disintegrated by this time. Minister Without Portfolio Maitland, Premier Tolmie and Minister of Public Works, R. Bruhn, each advocated a different way to solve the crises.

Source: Maitland Papers, Add/MSS 781, Box 8, file 5.

Public Works Bruhn gave a "fine speech and a bold speech" to a silent House on the advantages of Union over party government. He even appealed to Pattullo to reconsider the premier's invitation to participate in a non-partisan government, an appeal smilingly declined by the Opposition leader, but, Hutchison thought, "together Mr. Pattullo and other good men could do much which was impossible under either party."⁴⁶

The next day Bowser announced his support of a non-partisan organization and a week later accepted leadership of the "coalition group" which had the support of prominent Conservatives and Liberals such as Conservatives Major Brown, W. Dick (MLA, Vancouver) and McGregor MacIntosh (MLA, the Islands), former Liberal MLAs D. Donaghy, G. A. B. Hall and C. Woodward, and of prominent, but unidentified, labour men.⁴⁷

On the same day that Bowser accepted leadership of the "new party," the Province warned Maitland that he should stop obstructing Tolmie in his drive to form a Union government since people were very sick of party politics, and members of both parties were publicly supporting Tolmie. Maitland later claimed in the House that he was defending party government, which had an honorable tradition in Canada, not trying to block Tolmie's Union plans. Specifically, he argued that under the Conservative party constitution, party representatives from all parts of the province should decide the Union question at a convention, something he had called for at the annual meeting last November, he reminded the Legislature.⁴⁸

However, during the same speech, which was the occasion of his traditional budget address, Maitland completely divorced himself, and any party member who wished to follow him, from Tolmie and Union government. In a statement that was remarkable for a Cabinet member, he informed Conservative members they would be released from all party pledges after prorogation to support for the "present time" any form of government they thought would best serve British Columbia. He made this statement even though he had been "advised" it would be "safer" not to do so, but said he would be "neither stampeded, dragooned nor frightened into silence upon a question of this kind which should be clearly and definitely put before the public."⁴⁹

About a month later the provincial executive also released constituency organizations from any obligations to the Conservative party during the anticipated 1933 campaign. The executive made this decision in defiance of Tolmie, who the day before had appealed to "every British Columbian to meet the situation in a united form, Conservatives, Liberals, Labour, becoming a united body of British Columbians; let 'British Columbia First, Last and all the Time' be the slogan, our battle cry, the motto on our flag." The Conservative party was dead, at least for the time being, but the executive had only made official what Maitland had announced in his budget address on 20 March.⁵⁰

Maitland also used that occasion to criticize Conservative social policy, although he did so in a rather convoluted way. There was no way, he maintained, that the province could find revenue to pay



Spring Session Prorogued, April 1933
The Depression was at its worst, the Conservative party had collapsed,
and an election was due later in the year.

Source: Maitland Papers, Add/MSS 781, Box 8, file 5.

relief for 120,000 unemployed. Regardless, "unemployment relief and social legislation are tremendous problems" which government must recognize and accept." He claimed that

Society has come in this century to realize a statutory obligation upon those with wealth to help carry those without. In Christian countries there will be no turning back from this attitude and no relief to taxpayers in this respect . . . Every government has to decide what course it will take. I believe, and I think that the Members of this House believe that in the march of civilization mankind has decided that in times of distress he is his brother's keeper.⁵¹

Perhaps Cabinet agreed with him because before the Session was over, his government approved more unemployment legislation. The Unemployment Relief Act, 1933 authorized Cabinet to borrow money from the federal government and enter into agreements regarding relief measures with municipalities. By way of underscoring the problem, three days before this Act was given Royal Assent, on a clear, mild beautiful spring day, about 350 unemployed, one third of them women, paraded under police escort around the Legislative buildings, while a nine-person delegation that included two women, presented their grievances to Minister of Labour W. A. McKenzie and Minister of Public Works, R. Bruhn.⁵²

Maitland did not seek a nomination in the November contest. In fact, he said he had made up his mind that he could not "succeed at both Politics and Law--and I love the Law." Nevertheless, he had several offers. Unionists asked him to accept a nomination, despite

his strong public rejection of that form of government. Two former MLAs asked him to join them in trying for the three-man Vancouver-Point Grey nomination. And supporters in the federal Burrard riding urged him to try for the nomination in that area.⁵³

In the end, he campaigned briefly in Kelowna, in a strange political about-face, for former Finance Minister Jones, for whom he had campaigned successfully in 1924. Maitland had criticized Jones for disloyalty when he publicly renounced party government during the spring Session, but now dramatically claimed that Jones, who was running as an Independent, was the "most able and courageous minister of finance the British Columbia has ever known." He asked the electorate to vote, not for a party, but for brains and experience. In the same speech, he blasted the CCF, who were also running a candidate in the riding, as wreckers of the province. They were against God, in favour of companionate marriage, and intended to establish Russian communism. He suggested the Liberals could not possibly form a majority government. The returns on election day for the Liberal, Independent and CCF candidates were, respectively, 1,636, 1,445, and 1,382 votes. In a very Conservative area, Maitland may not have helped Jones but he may indeed have helped the Liberals attract potential CCF support.⁵⁴

Although dissolution was announced on 1 August and the 2 November election date on 18 August, the main contestants, Bowser's Non-Partisans, the Independents, CCF, Liberals, and the Tolmie Unionists had not released their election manifestos until the fall.

Bowser's platform was the briefest, a \$20.0 million budget (down \$2.0 million from the 1933 budget), a balanced budget, lower taxes, a review of provincial-municipal financing arrangements, and a big reduction in Cabinet strength. Apart from the CCF's plans to "socialize" means of production, financial institutions and natural resources, the other three platforms, including that of the CCF, were mainly concerned with the province's finances, relief programmes, agricultural production and marketing, export markets, health and unemployment insurance, and resource development. Independents, like Jones, were running on their records.⁵⁵

On nomination day, 219 candidates entered the field for 48 seats. Over eleven different political groups were represented, the more important of which were Tolmie's Unionists (13), Liberals (47), Independent Non-Partisan (Bowserites) (38), Independents (Conservatives) (35), and the CCF (46).⁵⁶

The Liberals won easily against a splintered opposition and captured 34 seats. The CCF won seven seats and became the first Socialist Opposition party in Canada. The Unionists took one (incumbent Pooley in Esquimalt), the Independents got one (Herbert Anscomb in Oak Bay), and the Independent Non-Partisans, probably disorganized and shaken by Bowser's death the week before, won only two (C. M. Planta in Peace River, and Bruhn in Salmon Arm).⁵⁷

In a post-election analysis, Tolmie told Maitland, in a very friendly letter in which he predicted a great political future for him, that he believed his Unionists and the Independent Conservatives were

running ahead and had a good chance of winning until mid-fall. He thought

Everything looked first rate until towards the end of September when the wave was started from Ottawa, calling for the support of the Liberal Party to defeat the C.C.F., and B.C. Conservatives fell right in line, with the result that what Pattullo refused to do, when I asked him to co-operate with the Conservative Party and prevent the chaos that was bound to come and did come, was really accomplished by the voters--the Conservative voters combining with the Liberals to defeat the C.C.F. The idea was ours in September 1932 and it was rather tough to have it used against us on Nov. 2nd. However I have no complaints.⁵⁸

Unfortunately, Bennett and others in the party establishment had decided during the summer of 1933 that the British Columbia party was so factionalized, it could no longer be considered a force in the 1933 election campaign. More significantly, Bennett did not think the Liberals could win against the CCF without Conservative support, cognizant no doubt of the Liberals who were publicly supporting Bowser and aware that more might defect. Hutchison had reported during the summer that some Liberals and "sincere" Conservatives really believed they should unite to defeat the CCF. In fact, five of the seven seats that the CCF took were captured as the result of a vote split among the CCF's opponents.⁵⁹

Regardless, the CCF was now the official Opposition and in Angus MacInnis' view the campaign had pitted capitalism against socialism and had "proved the identity of interest of the two old parties." Both "old" parties seemed aware of this but both had remained engrossed, perhaps trapped, by the same issues. The Conserva-

tive Party which had been a powerful factor in provincial politics since 1903, was no longer significant, to all appearances wiped out as the result of years of acrimonious and unrelenting infighting and lack of strongly supported and popular leadership.⁶⁰

Maitland was philosophical about the election results. He congratulated Pattullo, the new premier of British Columbia, on his "splendid victory" and told him he deserved to win, "having been consistent and loyal to your Party principles . . . You have a very hard and difficult task before you, a good majority and I am sure the good-will behind you." It may seem curious," he concluded, "but in the result I have been vindicated as well," an obvious reference to the failure of Union government which he had refused to support. He had put up a strong defense of party government against the press and many of his party colleagues and no doubt felt righteous about the election outcome.⁶¹

The Conservative party, united for the first time in 12 years behind a popular leader won a great victory in 1928, capturing 35 of 48 seats. Maitland, in his second bid for public office, was elected in Vancouver and joined Tolmie's Cabinet as a Minister Without Portfolio, not Attorney General as he had hoped. The euphoria of victory soon dissipated, however, as party workers, originally in Vancouver, later in constituencies around the province, complained about Tolmie's patronage policy. As the Depression intensified and people became

desperate for jobs, the patronage issue became a rallying point ground which former Bowser supporters reunited. By 1932 the government was split over ways to address Depression-related problems, especially unemployment. Tolmie proposed Union government as the only type of administration that could save the country, and about 75 percent of his caucus supported the idea. Maitland and 10 others would not, and at the fall annual general meeting delegates supported Maitland's stand. During the 1933 Session Maitland never directly attacked Union government or his leader, but he strongly defended party government as the most suitable form of administration. A few days after the Session prorogued, Tolmie announced that he would be stumping for a Union government in the coming election. But long before the November election the party had split into three main groups, Unionists, Bowser and his Independent Non-Partisans, and Independent Conservatives. Maitland did not seek renomination but of the approximately 90 Conservatives who ran under other banners, only four were elected. The Liberals under new leader Pattullo won easily, and for the first time since the formation of party government in 1903, the Conservative party was not represented in the Legislature. And the CCF with seven seats formed the official Opposition, the first Socialist party to do so in British Columbia.

Footnotes

¹For Maitland's last speech in 1933, see "Sessions' End to Break Bond of Allegiance," Province, 21 March 1933, p. 2.

²For Maitland's ability compared to Pooley, Interview, Hutchison, 29 September 1987; for Maitland's bitter disappointment, see "R. L. Maitland, K.C. Named Head of Conservative Party, Province, 26 September 1938, p. 3; for Tolmie's Cabinet, see British Columbia, British Columbia Gazette (6 September 1928):3156-57; for Pooley's sacrifices, Hutchison, *ibid.*; for Maitland's disappointment, *ibid.*; for Tolmie's exclusion of Bowserites, see Parker, "Tolmie," pp. 73-74.

³For the Salvation Army affair, the Blaine meeting, the memorial service, and the McRae reception, see Tolmie Papers, UBC, Box 8, file 2, letters respectively, Tolmie to Maitland, 27 September 1928; Morton to Maitland, 5 December 1928; Tolmie to Maitland, 12 December 1928; and Tolmie to Maitland, 7 December 1928; for Crowe's funeral see *ibid.*, Tolmie to Maitland, 5 August 1931.

⁴Tolmie Papers, *ibid.*, Tolmie to Maitland, 7 December 1928.

⁵For the Parsons' affair, Tolmie Papers, *ibid.*, Maitland to Tolmie, 30 August 1928, and Tolmie's reply, 4 September 1928.

⁶Parker, "Tolmie," pp. 67, 78-83 comments on the Conservative attack on Liberal patronage; for Maitland's caution about patronage, see "Conservatives of Province Acclaim Policies of Party," Colonist, 26 November 1929, p. 3.

⁷Tolmie Papers, Box 8, file 1, Tolmie to Maitland, 28 November 1930; for Maitland's explanation of patronage, see "Patronage not Crime, Says Maitland," Province, 28 May 1931, p. 20; Maitland had found out Dawson Wade Contracting had bid \$5,000 less than General Construction which was awarded the contract; he reminded Tolmie he (Maitland) had promised in his 1928 campaign speeches that such contracts would be awarded to the lowest bidder, something he had accused the Liberals of not doing, and now Pattullo was making political capital of the affair.

⁸For Merryfield's criticism of the six MLAs, see "Tory MLAs Arouse Ire of Rank and File," Sun, 18 February 1929, p. 18; for the October meeting, see "Gavel Badly Worn Before Tories Vote Constitution Hoist," Sun, 10 October 1929, p. 1; for the November meeting, see "Conservatives of Vancouver Change Chiefs," Colonist, 14 November 1929, p. 3.

⁹Tolmie was replying to national party leader R. B. Bennett who blamed Tolmie for party unrest in British Columbia, Bennett to Tolmie, 29 August 1929, and Tolmie's reply, 28 October 1929, where Tolmie

blames the Bowser faction for raising hell and maintaining that party loyalists will be rewarded.

¹⁰For Tolmie's thanks to Maitland, see Tolmie Papers, Box 3, file 1, Tolmie to Maitland, 10 October 1929.

¹¹For Comox, see Tolmie Papers, Box 3, file 1, McLeod to Tolmie, 12 June 1929; for Alberni see *ibid.*, Box 1, file 2, Griffiths to Tolmie, 19 March 1931; for Cranbrook, *ibid.*, file 22, Dezall to Tolmie, 12 November 1929; for Hope, *ibid.*, file 18, Barry to Crease, 12 March 1932; and for Terrace, see *ibid.*, file 19, Robinson to Blair, 3 February 1931; for the information to McRae, Ladner Papers, VCA, Box 7, file 45, Broadfoot to McRae, 1929.

¹²For Watts' firing--it is not clear exactly when he was fired--see "Dismissal of Disabled Veteran Brings Storm of Protest on Shelly," Times, 17 May 1929, p. 15; the alleged reason for the firing is described in the Pattullo Papers 3, Box 3, file 35, Manson to Pattullo, 13 June 1929.

¹³Maitland's thoughts and comments on the Watts' debate are in Maitland 781, Box 8, 1930 log, 7 and 11 February; for Hutchison observation that Maitland was frequently called on, Interview, Hutchison, 29 September 1987; for his ineffective speech, see "Mr. Maitland Sidesteps," Times, 12 February 1930, p. 4; the judicial inquiry is briefly referred to in Pattullo Papers, MSS 3, Box 37, file 19, Pattullo to Tolmie, 5 June 1930, and the judicial report by Justice W. A. Macdonald, *ibid.*, Box 42, file 15; Watts reinstated, *ibid.*, Jones to Watts, 5 February 1931.

¹⁴For reference to the economic boom, see Ormsby, p. 438, who said that "During the first months of 1929, almost all previous records for economic endeavours were broken."

¹⁵For reference to a friendly House, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1929 log; for Hutchison's reference to deep secrets, see "Log of the House," Province, 8 March 1930, p. 3; for Maitland's explanation, as he reflected on 12 March 1946 budget day, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1946 log.

¹⁶For Hutchison's comments about no substance, and not too much thought, see respectively, "House Hears Pat Turn Over a New Leaf," Sun, 28 October 1938, p. 1; and "Maitland Speech Rated One of Session's Three Best," Province, 21 March 1933, p. 12; for the best stump speaker, "Log of the House," Province, 8 February 1929, p. 18; for Hutchison's description of Maitland's speaking ability, "Log of the House," Province, 8 February 1929, p. 18; for Senior's comment, see "Tories Take Credit for B.C. Prosperity," Sun, 8 February 1929, p. 14.

¹⁷For Tolmie's complaint about the level of debate, see Parker,

"Tolmie," p. 76.

¹⁸For Maitland's sarcasm, see "Log of the House," Province, 8 February 1929, p. 18; for more details of his speech, see "Maiden Speech of Maitland Applauded," Province, 8 February 1929, p. 3; and the full text of the speech, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1929 log.

¹⁹For Shelly's unpopularity, see Parker, "Tolmie," p. 100, although many in the Conservative caucus were upset over Shelly's handling of the Watts' case; for Pattullo's note, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1930 log, 7 March; for Hutchison's comments, see "Log of the House," Province, 8 March 1930, p. 3.

²⁰For Tolmie's Cabinet changes, see CAR, 1930-31, p. 287; for the Liberals' worry over Twigg, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1931 log, 11 February.

²¹For the Conservative caucus budget objections, see Maitland, *ibid.*, 5-6 March; for the new tax details, see "Wage Supertax Goes into Effect on April 1; More Levies Added," Sun, 26 March 1931; for Pattullo's budget speech, see CAR, 1930-31, pp. 289-90; for Maitland's comment about Pattullo's speech, see Maitland, *ibid.*, 6 March; for Maitland's comment about his own speech, see Maitland, *ibid.*, 13 March; for Hutchison's comments, see "Across the Bay," Times, 14 March 1931, p. 4.

²²For a discussion of the new tax and the government's determination to balance the budget, see "Tories Grow Panicky as Tax Vote Nears," Sun, 16 March 1931, p. 5.

²³For the unemployed estimate, see CAR, 1932, p. 303.

²⁴For Crease's concern, see Tolmie Papers, Box 1, file 19, Crease to Tolmie, 31 March 1931; and Tolmie to the MLAs, *ibid.*, April 1931.

²⁵For Tolmie's assurances to R. B. Bennett, see Tolmie to Bennett, 28 October 1929.

²⁶For Division Three, see Tolmie Papers, Box 8, file 1, Maitland to Tolmie, 16 January 1931; and for Division Eight, see "Tories Demand Convention to Choose Leader," Sun, 26 March 1931, p. 16; for the Victoria rebels, see "Their 'Civil' War," Times, 14 March 1931, p. 4.

²⁷For Tolmie's attack on the rebels, see "Tolmie Aroused Carries Battle to Party Ranks," Times, 29 May 1931, p. 1; for the ultimatum, see "Get in and Help or Step out and Keep out for Good," Sun, 2 June 1931, p. 20; for the effect of negative criticism, see "Premier Raps Malcontents Who Hurt Business," Colonist, 29 May 1931,

p. 1; for his leadership confirmed, see "Conservatives Affirm Faith in, and Loyalty to Premier," Colonist, 4 June 1931, p. 1; and "Tolmie Will Continue to Serve People," Province, 5 June 1931, p. 3.

²⁸For Maitland's speech, Province, *ibid.*

²⁹For Maitland's comment on Walkem's independence, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1929 log; for the quotation, Parker, "Tolmie," p. 102.

³⁰"Pattullo Offers No Sympathy to Tolmie in Prestige Lament," Times, 30 May 1931, p. 1.

³¹The four MLAs protest, Tolmie Papers, Box 5, file 17, Maitland to Tolmie, 19 September 1931, and *ibid.*, Maitland to Tolmie, letter number 04503, 19 September 1931 (Maitland wrote two letters on 19 September); Maitland's 1924 and 1926 references to no Cabinet representation, see, respectively, "Why We Must Win--Election," Province, 13 May 1924, p. 11 and "Conservative Convention, 1926," p. 10; for the quotations and comments from "reasonableness" to and including Maitland's claim that Vancouver residents wanted more representation, see Tolmie, *ibid.*, letter 04503; for "grave discrimination," see Tolmie, *ibid.*, Maitland to Tolmie, 19 September 1931 (but not 04503); regarding Vancouver control of the political situation, Tolmie, *ibid.*, letter 04503.

³²For the reply to Spencer, see Tolmie Papers, *ibid.*, Tolmie to Spencer, 9 October 1931; by-elections Parliamentary Guide, 1933, and "Tories 'Given' Islands Seat," Sun, 17 January 1931, p. 1 (P.G. does not show the Islands by-election).

³³For his reflections, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1932 log, 17 February; for concern about the Columbia loss, see "Belligerent Tories in Caucus at Victoria," Sun, 15 February 1932, p. 1; for party discussion, see "Belligerent Tories . . ."; "City Members Ignore Caucus," Sun, 16 February 1932, p. 11; and "B.C. Tory Executive Faces Row," Sun, 10 February 1932, p. 1; for his comments about party government, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1932 log, 11-12 April.

³⁴For the voting history in Columbia, see Parliamentary Guide, 1917, 1929, 1932.

³⁵For reports of the unemployed demonstrations, see "Log of the House," Province, 24 February 1932, p. 2; and "Unemployed Stage Orderly Parade to B.C. Legislature," Colonist, 24 February 1932, p. 2; for the quotation and the delegates' decision, see "Unemployed Stage. . . ."

³⁶For the second demonstration and Maitland's reaction, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1932 log, 26 February; for Brown's comments about "moral value," see "Shameless Evasion at Victoria Probe," Sun,

9 April 1932, p. 15; for the formation and mandate of the Unemployment committee, see CAR, 1932, p. 309; for the committee's findings and inclusion of Brown's recommendations, see CAR, 1932, p. 310; for the new statute, see British Columbia Unemployment Rebel Act, 1932 (Victoria: King's Printer 1932).

³⁷For the two statutes, see respectively British Columbia Constitution and Amendment Act, 1932; and Provincial Elections and Amendment Act, 1932 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1932); for his remarks about redistribution, Maitland 781, Box 8, 1932 log, 12 April; and for MLAs self interest in their seats, see "B.C. Tories Split on Redistribution," Sun, 24 February 1932, p. 3; for details of the legislation, see the two previously cited statutes; for his comments about Hannah, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1932 log, 4 March and 12 April; an angry King, *ibid.*, 11 April.

³⁸For his comments about "high brows" and party government, Maitland, *ibid.*, 11-12 April.

³⁹For the quotation about the parties standing together, see "The Parties in B.C.," Province, 13 April 1932, p. 6; and for "differentiated programmes," see "The Common Round," Province, 13 April 1932, p. 6; for the reference to businessmen in public office, see "The Parties in B.C.," *ibid.*; for Tolmie's reference to the newspapers' obsession with business government, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1932 log, 23 March; for the Kidd Committee appointment and its own terms of reference, see Tolmie Papers, Box 47, file 19, two letters, Tolmie to H. R. MacMillan, and the Vancouver Board of Trade to Tolmie, both dated 15 April 1932; for Tolmie's motive in appointing the committee see Tolmie Papers, Box 8, file 1, Tolmie to Maitland, 16 April 1932, in which Tolmie states that "from a political standpoint, this move on our part will be very useful"; for a full explanation of the Kidd Committee, see H. F. Angus, "The Kidd Report in British Columbia," Canadian Forum 13 (November 1932):47-49; Parker, "Tolmie," pp. 108-11; and Robin, Spoils, pp. 239-43.

⁴⁰For Tolmie's discussions with Hutchison, see Interview, 29 September 1987; for Tolmie's definition of Union, see Tolmie Papers, Box 5, file 7, a statement dated 17 September 1932; Union government is also discussed in Ormsby, A History, pp. 448-53; Parker, "Tolmie," pp. 111-14 and 122-31; and Robin, Spoils, pp. 245-55; for Maitland et al response to the Union question, see Tolmie Papers, Box 1, file 13, summary dated 29 August 1932; see also *ibid.*, Box 22, file 12; for the exclusion condition regarding Pattullo, see Tolmie Papers, Box 1, file 13; for Loutet's information, *ibid.*, Box 5, file 7, Loutet to Tolmie, late August.

⁴¹For Tolmie's 7 September press release, see Pattullo Papers 3, Box 47, file 19; for Pattullo's refusal, see *ibid.*, Pattullo to Tolmie, 13 September 1932; for Bowser's refusal, see "Tories Move to

Save Party," Sun, 26 November 1932, p. 1; for the 17 September statement, see Tolmie Papers, Box 5, file 7; CAR, 1933, p. 297, states the Kidd committee report was delivered to the government on 12 July 1932; for the full report, see George Kidd et al., Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government to Investigate Finances of British Columbia (hereafter Kidd Report) (Victoria: King's Printer, 1932).

⁴²For the executive decision in October, see "Premier's Stand on Union Policy Formally Approved," Colonist, 2 October 1932, p. 1; for Maitland's November motion, see "Lunch Delays Tory Decision on Convention," Province, 26 November 1932, p. 1; and "Union Plan Will Go to Convention," Province, 27 November 1932, p. 1; for the new officers, *ibid.*

⁴³For Maitland's letter, see R. B. Bennett Papers, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter PAC), Reel 281, documents 352847 to 352851, Maitland to Bennett, 7 February 1933; for Hutchison's views, see "Log of the House," Province, 12 February 1933.

⁴⁴For Bennett's reply see Bennett Papers, PAC, *ibid.*, Bennett to Maitland, 13 February 1933.

⁴⁵For Maitland's challenge to the premier, see Tolmie Papers, Box 8, file 1, Maitland to Tolmie, 17 February 1933; caucus supports Maitland's stand, Parker, "Tolmie," p. 122; Walkem left, "Walkem Leads Bolt From Party," Times, 25 February 1933, p. 1.

⁴⁶For Bruhn's speech, see "B.C. Party Men Uneasy While Bruhn Speaks," Province, 2 March 1932, p. 3; for Hutchison's comment, see Province, *ibid.*

⁴⁷For Bowser's announcement, see "Bowser Cheered as He Launches His New Party," Province, 3 March 1933, p. 1; for his supporters, see "Bowser Accepts Leadership of Coalition Group," Province, 11 March 1933, p. 1.

⁴⁸For the warning to Maitland, see "Let Them Take Notice," Province, 11 March 1933, p. 6; for his explanation to the House, which was given during his budget speech on 20 March, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1933 log, 20 March.

⁴⁹Maitland, *ibid.*

⁵⁰For the executive decision, see "Tories to Stay Out of Next Election as Provincial Party," Province, 23 April 1933, p. 1; and CAR, 1934, p. 328; for Tolmie's statement, see Tolmie Papers, Box 34, file 5, "Premier's Address . . ."

⁵¹For Maitland's comments about paying relief to the unemployed, and the quotation, see budget speech, note 48.

⁵²For the new statute, see British Columbia, Unemployment Relief Act, 1933 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1933); for the demonstration, see "Release From Camps Sought," Times, 5 April 1933, p. 9.

⁵³For his love of the law, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 6, Maitland to Ruth, 25 June 1933; for the Unionist invitation, see *ibid.*, Maitland to Ruth, 14 August 1933; for Point Grey and Burrard offers, see "Maitland Cautious," Sun, 12 August 1933, p. 4; and "Log of the Capital," Province, 26 August 1933, p. 2.

⁵⁴For his Kelowna campaign, see "Maitland Slams CCF as Sure Wreckers of B.C.," Province, 30 October 1933, p. 18; for the election returns, Parliamentary Guide, 1934; for 1924 campaigning, see Maitland 781, Box 16, Kelowna Courier, a clipping, 8 May 1924.

⁵⁵For the Bowser, Liberal, and Unionist manifestos, see CAR, 1933, p. 295; for the CCF's, see A. C. Cairns and K. McCarter, "Primary Documents concerning British Columbia Provincial Elections, 1903-1975," (Victoria: University of Victoria, Special Collections) (hereafter Cairns, "Primary Documents . . ."); for the Independent Conservatives' manifesto, see CAR, 1934, p. 329.

⁵⁶CAR, 1934, p. 328.

⁵⁷Parliamentary Guide, 1934.

⁵⁸Tolmie Papers, Box 35, file 4, Tolmie to Maitland, 6 November 1933.

⁵⁹For Bennett's opinion of the Conservative election chances, see Parker, "Tolmie," p. 130; for Hutchison's report, see "Log of the Capital," Province, 26 August 1933, p. 2.

⁶⁰For MacInnis's views, see "More About the British Columbia Election," Canadian Forum 14 (February 1934):169-70.

⁶¹For congratulations to Pattullo, see Pattullo Papers 3, Box 51, file 8, Maitland to Pattullo, 4 November 1933.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL OBLIVION, THE ROAD BACK, AND DISAPPOINTMENT,

1933 TO 21 OCTOBER 1941

The election results in 1933 seemed to confirm what had been obvious for months, namely that the provincial Conservative party was no longer a force in British Columbia politics. But before year's end the party held a harmonious and well-attended meeting and elected a new president, Dr. F. P. Patterson, a medical doctor, who had been nominated by Maitland. In the 1937 general election, Patterson led his revived party back into the Legislature as official Opposition with eight seats, one more than the CCF. Just over a year later Maitland was elected party leader after Patterson's death in February 1938. In the 1941 election campaign, which was dominated by charges that the Liberal government's commitment to the war effort was too casual, the Liberals took only 21 seats and found themselves in a minority position, the CCF with 14 were once again the official Opposition, while Maitland and his party managed to win only 12 seats. Maitland had been elected party leader in 1938 after Patterson's death, but in his first contest as leader, had been unable to build on and sustain the rather dramatic comeback in 1937. Although his party increased its House strength by 50 percent it was still only good enough for a third place finish.

Strange indeed, but about a month after the Conservative party appeared to have finally self-destructed, it held a very up-beat meeting in which all speakers, including Maitland, emphasized the need to forget the past and get on with reorganizing the party. The constitution was amended, effective immediately, in order that the association could accept as members all candidates in the 1928 election, those who ran in by-elections since then, and all candidates of known Conservative leanings in the 1933 election, provisions that would include Bowserites, Independents and Unionists. A very congenial Tolmie, still leader until the next leadership convention, received tremendous applause when he too urged the party to turn its back on the past and prepare for the future.¹

Maitland was nominated for president and although pressed to accept, he instead nominated Patterson who was elected by acclamation. In a letter to Bennett about the meeting, Maitland gave clear indication that he was back in politics, apparently to stay, despite his earlier declaration that he would henceforth concentrate on his law career. But obviously still bitter over past events and resentful about Bennett's well-intended advice, he informed the Prime Minister that he could easily have taken the presidency because he had the support of Up-Island, Interior, and the majority of Vancouver delegates. But out of deference to Bennett's wish and in the interest of party unity he had declined to run against Patterson who, he said, was backed by Merryfield and that old "wrecking crew" of former Bowserites.²

The Prime Minister had consistently sympathized with anti-

Tolmie forces and despite the fact that he had finally agreed with Tolmie that "Bowser had split the party from end to end," he was again backing the same forces, and by implication, opposing Maitland and his supporters. The national party was faced with an election campaign, success of which in British Columbia would be heavily dependent on a united party in the province. This state of affairs would turn to a large degree on the relationship between the new president, and the Maitland camp.³

Maitland and others in the party had agreed to forget the past and get on with rebuilding the party, but a declaration of harmony at the top did not automatically restore unity to the shattered constituency organizations. For example, in North Vancouver the CCF won the seat in 1933 as a result of a vote split among Conservative factions; in a 1934 by-election the Conservatives had not even nominated a candidate. Political wounds haemorrhage for a long time.⁴

A leadership convention, delayed partly because the provincial executive wished to hold off until the federal election in 1935 was over, and partly because Patterson was rebuilding the party organization, was finally held on 29-30 June 1936 in Vancouver. Four candidates were nominated, Herbert Anscomb, MLA for Oak Bay, Bruhn MLA for Salmon Arm, Maitland, and Patterson, but Bruhn withdrew before voting began. Maitland gave no indication why he decided to contest the leadership, after declining three times to run against Patterson for the president's office. Perhaps he thought he could win, or maybe he wanted to stop Anscomb. Perhaps he simply wanted to demonstrate to the other candidates how much support he had in the party. Regardless,

Patterson won on the first ballot, 266 of 389, just over 68 percent. With the exception of the Tolmie leadership convention this was the best support since 1922 when Bowser was reaffirmed as leader with a majority of just over 52 percent. The votes of the other two were never revealed although one source reported Maitland ran somewhat ahead of Anscomb. After the losers moved unanimous support of their new leader, delegates enthusiastically "cheered Dr. Patterson to the echo."⁵

Bruhn had withdrawn because he was soundly booed and heckled when he declared he still supported Union government. But others in the hall including Vancouver Island delegates and C. M. Planta, MLA for Peace River, also voiced their support for a Conservative/Liberal alliance. Planta called for a "blending of the old political parties" as in Great Britain. Failing this he "urged elimination of the abuses which had prevailed in the Conservative Party" including Vancouver control of the party. He said that people who were falling away from the old parties were doing so to "protest the lack of policies based upon new standards in keeping with changing needs." He agreed entirely with the Maitland's resolution that the party "recognize the unity of Canada under Confederation and that her future lies within the British Empire," but said the resolution was just a smokescreen to cloud the real issue the party must face, that is, how to change in order to meet and cope with new social expectations. In any event, Planta was simply ignored, although one source suggested he and his supporters were backing Anscomb.⁶

Two months later Maitland was campaigning for Patterson in the

Vancouver-Burrard by-election, made necessary by the resignation of Liberal Gerry McGeer, a contest the Conservatives were certain newly-elected CCF president Dr. Lyle Telford would win. Nevertheless, in an all out attempt on the last night of the campaign to salvage a victory, Maitland, assisted by Anscomb and Howard Green, delivered a "blistering attack" on CCF and Liberal policies and declared melodramatically that the by-election was of "national significance." The CCF candidate had maintained throughout the campaign that the first act of a CCF provincial government would be to establish control of the distribution of essential goods. Pattullo, who had been elected almost three years before on a platform of "work and wages," promised more of the same through public works programs. In the end, the electorate showed it still liked Pattullo, and the Liberals held the seat. The CCF ran a close second, while Patterson, a distant third, would have to wait for another day to get a seat in the Legislature.⁷

Less than nine months later, the Liberals decided to go to the people and announced a general election for 1 June 1937. Circumstances seemed propitious as the economy had improved, employment was on the rise and the number of relief recipients had been dropping since the beginning of the year. Politically, the CCF was split along ideological lines and its seven members, elected in 1933, sat as two separate parties. The Conservative Party was still recovering from its breakup in 1933 and its leader had done poorly in the by-election. Pattullo's assessment of the Conservatives' state of readiness was close to the mark. In a post-mortem of the election, one of the Conservative strategists thought the party did very well considering

that constituency associations were not properly organized until early in 1937.⁸

Regardless of the state of the constituency organizations, the Conservatives still managed to nominate candidates in 43 of 48 ridings. The B.C. Constructive Party, which was the four-man rebel group under former CCF leader Robert Connell, contested only 10 ridings, the CCF ran candidates everywhere except Fernie where Tom Uphill, the Labour MLA, was unbeatable; the Liberals contested every riding; Social Credit tried in 13, and "Others" put up candidates in 14 constituencies. Indicative of wider political participation, in terms of individual parties, less than half, about 49 percent, of the 186 candidates represented the "old parties," whereas in 1933 about 60 percent of the 219 candidates were philosophically either Liberals or Conservatives.⁹

The election manifestos of the three main parties were very similar, apart from the CCF plan to establish an economic planning board and nationalize all natural resource development. All promised a sound financial policy that included relief aid; a highway commission and systematic road development; a public utilities commission; cooperation with the Dominion government toward a federal-provincial agreement on cost sharing and other matters; a provincial-municipal cost sharing and taxation agreement; improved social legislation that included health insurance, improved education opportunities, and improved labour legislation; and increased aid toward agricultural production and marketing. The Conservatives and Liberals promised to stimulate development of natural resources. The Liberals said they would establish a department to search for new export markets abroad.

And the CCF promised to build an outlet (either road or rail) from Peace River to the coast.¹⁰

The weather was nearly perfect all over the province on election day, clear and warm on the coast, pleasantly hot across the southern Interior, partly cloudy and cool in the Cariboo. The Liberals, who had 33 Members at dissolution on 15 April, won with 31 members but their proportion of the popular vote, compared to 1933, dropped from 42 to 37 percent. The CCF took seven seats, the same as in 1933 (the rebel group was wiped out) but dropped in popularity from 31 to 28 percent. The Conservatives gained at the expense of the other two parties, and with a popular vote almost identical to the CCFs, returned eight Members to become once again the official Opposition¹¹ (see appendix 1).

Maitland and Pattullo exchanged congratulatory notes, bantering and slightly insulting, but mutually respectful. Maitland regretted the Liberal victory but if it had to be he was glad for Pattullo because of the "mutual regard we have always had for one another." Pattullo replied in kind and said he was pleased Maitland would be back in the Legislature. During the Session Maitland and the premier had many "sharp exchanges," especially over funds Maitland accused the Liberals of spending on road work just before the election. Nevertheless, in his final log entry for the Session, Maitland gave the premier top marks for his performance, "He really knows his stuff--a mile ahead of any other Liberal."¹²

Both Maitland and Patterson had been nominated in ridings that were new to them. Patterson beat out the incumbent Liberal in Dewdney,

while Maitland, and running mate Alex Paton, took two seats from incumbent Liberals in Vancouver-Point Grey; incumbent Liberal G. M. Weir captured the third seat in the three member riding. And Planta, the Bowserite who won in Peace River in 1933 and called for a change in Conservative policies at the 1936 leadership convention, ran again as an Independent but finished last behind the Conservative, CCF, and victorious Liberal candidate.¹³

For the next four years, 1937 to 1940 inclusively, Pattullo chose to hold Legislative Sessions in the fall, rather than in the early spring as had been the traditional practice. Why he chose to do this is not clear because it made budget preparation difficult, for one thing. The fiscal year ran from 1 April to 31 March the following year and by preparing a budget in mid-fiscal year rather than in early spring, the Minister of Finance would not have the experience of almost a full year's expenditures and revenue. Nevertheless, the fall Session had advantages. Travelling conditions in rural areas, bad in even good weather, would be much better in the fall for Up country residents who wished to do business with government during the Session. Similarly, it would be much easier for MLAs to meet with their constituents before leaving for Victoria. In any event, the fall Session in 1937 ran from 26 October to 10 December.¹⁴

Minister of Finance John Hart brought down the budget on 10 November 1937. Four years after the Conservatives had grappled with

the problem of balancing the budget, Hart anticipated sufficient revenue to balance a budget that included relief costs. The estimated expenditures, for fiscal year 1938-39, were \$27.9 million while revenue was expected to be slightly higher. By comparison, estimated expenditures in the worst year of the Depression, 1933-34, was \$22.7 million which was \$2.2 million more than estimated revenue (see appendix 2). Relief recipients in 1933 were estimated to be at least 120,000 while in December 1937 only about 62,000 were on relief. Unemployment was still a problem but it no longer overwhelmed every other issue as it did for the Conservatives during their last two years in office.¹⁵

Maitland was passed over in the budget debate, but in the Throne speech debate which preceded it he delivered a major address that included an attack on Liberal financial policies. His criticism was so effective that the Premier sent for Hart who offered a "few corrections to Mr. Maitland, who, by the way, had got some of his financial figures a little inflated--and unnecessarily, because they are quite bad enough for his purposes without the least exaggeration. It was all very exciting."¹⁶

Hutchison was glad to see Maitland back in the Legislature as he recalled the dark days of the Tolmie government when Maitland was a "master of rear-guard action" who gave us our "most purple passages." The present House, which had not "seen this spectacle before listened with the innocent delight of a child." Maitland "no longer young," was as good as ever. His "high sense of outrage, his instinct for moral indignation, his capacity for turning a pretty platitude" was quite

unmatched. But, Hutchison believed Maitland relied too much on his oratorical skills. "He skims the surface brilliantly [and] does not probe very far." Nevertheless, Hutchison concluded, in this House of "dull, incompetent and often pointless speeches . . . we shall need all his wit, all his swordmanship, all his genuine love of clean fighting without personalities."¹⁷ Some of Hutchison's Legislative gallery colleagues were also impressed with Maitland's performance. James Dyer of the Sun, for example, said that despite the "high moral fervour . . . that one would expect from one trained in the law courts," he enjoyed listening to Maitland after days of boring speeches. He did not say much, Dyer continued, "but it was not so much what he said as his manner that counted."

During the debate, Maitland, in his typical wide ranging style, used the opportunity to blast CCF supporters for waving the Communist flag and singing the "Internationale" during demonstrations. He also gave a lecture on the role of the Opposition, perhaps intended as much to explain his own philosophy as to instruct others in the House, for example, ministers and new MLAs. First, he believed an Opposition member could only be effective if he had strong backing and respect in his own community. Secondly, the Opposition played a positive role, monitoring government programs and policies, offering justifiable and objective criticism as necessary. Finally, an Opposition criticism of a program or policy implied no personal reflection in the honesty of the minister or official responsible.¹⁸

Maitland was not called on to deliver a major speech in the budget debate, as he had been in the Tolmie administration because

Patterson had decided he and Anscomb, a professional accountant, would perform that role. In an obvious reference to division in caucus, Maitland commented on Patterson's "rather pronounced jealousy" of him that had been evident since the leadership convention, and his obvious tendency to favour Anscomb. This did not bother Maitland, however, since he considered himself in a "key position" and was "getting a great deal of enjoyment out of cooperating with" the Patterson-Anscomb faction. Still, his differences with those two did not blind him to their speaking ability, both of whom were very effective in the Legislature and on the campaign trail.¹⁹

The first by-election for the new government was held in Dewdney, Patterson's riding, on 20 May 1938. He had been ill during the fall Session and in February died at the relatively young age of 61. Within days, Hutchison was speculating about Liberal intentions for the vacant riding. They needed to win, he argued, because governments usually win by-elections to prove they are not losing popular support. They were also aware that the Conservatives party was on the rise and a Liberal victory would blunt its comeback. In fact, all three parties brought in their heavyweights to campaign. Maitland, assisted by Anscomb and others spoke on behalf of W. A. Jones, reeve of Agassiz, Pattullo and several members of his Cabinet supported D. W. Strachan who Patterson had defeated in 1937, and for the CCF, Harold Winch and MLAs L. A. Shepherd, Dr. L. Telford and D. G. Steeves campaigned for Mildred Osterhout.²⁰

In by-elections, parties usually concentrate on matters of local interest but in Dewdney all three parties, or at least their

principal speakers, pursued agendas that subordinated local issues. Maitland, no doubt looking ahead to a leadership contest, indulged in colorful and extravagant rhetoric to attack the government's financial management and the premier's plan to build an Alaska-Yukon highway when the province needed roads so badly. The Liberals were "spendthrifts," he declared, who thrived on "despotism." It was the duty of every citizen to "stop the mad career [of a] government drunk with power whose ambition is to serve its party and friends before the people." Anscomb, another leadership candidate, also attacked Liberal "extravagances." Pattullo defended his government's record and his proposal to build an Alaska-Yukon highway, although the more pragmatic Strachan stressed the need of local roads. The CCF campaigners ridiculed Pattullo's Alaska-Yukon proposal and declared that neither of the other parties had a single constructive idea of how to tackle current problems.²¹

In a campaign that concluded with the largest voter turnout ever recorded in the riding, the Liberals recaptured the seat they had lost in 1937. The proportion of popular support for the three parties, compared to 1937, was revealing. Both the Liberals and CCF gained at the expense of the Conservatives who received only 58 more votes than in 1937. More significantly for both the CCF and the leaderless Conservatives, each party now had seven seats in the Legislature.²²

With the by-election out of the way the Conservative party turned to the task of selecting a new leader and held a three-day convention, 22-24 September, in Kamloops. This was the scene of the great deadlocked convention in 1926 where despairing and almost

hysterical delegates had finally appealed to an unwilling Dr. Tolmie, and with a great roar of unanimous enthusiasm had drafted him as their leader; and seven years later the party rejected him with at least as much unanimity, if not vindictive enthusiasm.

Maitland and Anscomb were the only leadership candidates.

Maitland was said to be strong in the Interior where he had campaigned for local candidates for 30 years. He also had some support in Anscomb territory in the greater Victoria area, but had less than expected in Vancouver because delegates were chosen at large rather than by electoral district. Anscomb was strong in Vancouver and probably picked up support during his Up country tour in the summer.²³

In his nomination speech Maitland said he wanted the party to move "forward with a full knowledge of the necessities of humanity," an oblique reminder of his call for more social legislation during the last Session of the Tolmie government in 1933. Earlier in the convention proceedings, delegates added two pro-labour planks to the Patterson manifesto used in the 1937 election, one that called for youth training centres and a public works program as methods of solving the unemployment problem, and another that called for legislation which would both ensure that employees could join a union of their own choice, and provide means of settling industrial disputes. Both candidates expressed similar principles and policies; they stressed the necessity of reorganizing the party associations in preparation for the next election; both said the party must change to meet changing industrial and economic conditions; and both agreed a highway construction program would create jobs, promote tourism, and foster

provincial development.²⁴

In the only ballot cast, Maitland won by only 16 votes, 269 to 253, a 51.5 percent majority. Thirty years after he made his commitment to the Conservative party, he had become its leader, "comparatively young [he was 49], vigorous, ambitious, gifted with powers of oratory, and a most likeable man." He apparently saw nothing ominous about his narrow victory (Bowser got only a 52.5 percent majority against Stevens in the 1922 leadership convention, while Patterson won with 68.4 percent in 1936) and stated the close contest would "only serve to increase the strength of the party and make us more united than ever."²⁵

Maitland delivered his first speech as leader three days after the full Session began. He had persuaded Independent Bruhn to rejoin his party, thereby giving the Conservatives one more seat than the CCF. Predictably, he attacked government policies and programs, although in general terms, and promised that the Conservative Party would ensure stability in government, finance and legislation, establish a highway commission, provide more aid to farmers, provide a record of all government expenditures, let contracts only by public tender, restore financial grants to municipalities, and use relief workers on meaningful public works projects.²⁶

The press enjoyed his speech but saw nothing new in his proposals. The "sword of his oratory was bright, its edge keen," and he was wonderfully earnest, but his aspirations were described as either old hat or financially impossible. He promised nothing new, only better government.²⁷

In his budget debate speech about three weeks later, Maitland reiterated his proposals but his real purpose, in "one of the best speeches he has ever delivered under this roof," was to try to convince everyone--the electorate, politicians including some in his own party, newspaper journalists--that he was the leader of the real Opposition party in British Columbia. His goal was to draw a clear distinction between Liberal and Conservative policies in order to deflate the CCF claim that it was the de facto Opposition because the other parties were essentially the same. (Two years later he was still trying to establish a "clear-cut line of difference" between them.)²⁸

Maitland then offered a novel explanation of CCF support in the 1937 election. In fact, he said, that party had misled its supporters who thought they were voting for good government, industrial, social and agricultural development, careful expenditure of public funds, a planned road construction policy, fair treatment to employers and employees as a means to enhance provincial development, and gainful employment for relief recipients. However, he implied, the CCF would not adopt such a platform but Conservatives could and would because that is what the people wanted. And incidentally it was almost identical to the Conservative platform he had described in the Throne speech debate about three weeks earlier!²⁹

Maitland was enjoying his role in a Session highlighted by approval of a Public Utilities Act which empowered the government to control and regulate the development and production of energy. A few days before prorogation he reflected in his log on the

great compensations in the life of Leading the Opposition . . .

Your party, thousands of them, look [sic] to you. If you respond to the opportunity the reward is great. They are one group--your own party--who want you to succeed . . . who cheer you on and work for you and with you. . . . I am doing my best, sometimes 12, sometimes 15 hours, but it is made easy by its self reward if you follow it through with a serious interest, a desire to serve and a desire to build.³⁰

But the euphoria had evaporated by the end of the 1939 Session, and he found the leadership a "considerable hardship" that interfered "terribly" with his practise. In March 1940, when he was campaigning in Ontario for the federal party he collapsed from exhaustion, but continued his speaking tour out West where he collapsed again while giving a radio speech in Vancouver. Following the election he retired to Lang Bay for a brief recuperation and holiday, but expected that would be his last respite that year as his "old political show" must go on. Later in the spring he was "nearly nuts leading the Party in this Province," and again began to think about leaving politics. He worried about his lack of press coverage and complained that both Maclean's and Saturday Night had ignored him since he became leader. He said his political fortunes had never been good and accepting the leadership in 1938 had been the "worst possible luck." The day he was made leader, he continued, events at Munich dominated the news and he "got about half a column." In 1940 when he was trying to establish marked differences between his party and the Liberals, Chamberlain resigned in favour of Churchill and once again news of world events pushed aside local political happenings. On the other hand, when he toured the Cariboo in the summer of 1940 promoting war bonds he received good press coverage.³¹

Two days before war was declared, Maitland promised that his

party would fully cooperate with the Liberal government in the event of a war. He reiterated this pledge at the annual meeting, and again in the short fall Session that commenced 31 October 1939. He declared his party would offer only constructive criticism, provided the government pressed on with war-related matters, practised economy on the home front, and abolished patronage. He also promised that his party would refrain from contesting by-elections. Getting on with the war, he declared, was a higher duty "than consolidating political advantage." Nevertheless, he reminded the House as he returned to political reality, the Conservative Party still stood for, and would seek, aid to agriculture, a highway construction program, a lessening of government intrusion in business, better employer-employee relations to facilitate production, and increased capital for industrial development.³²

He was highly critical of the CCF in those speeches and accused it of near subversion and lacking in patriotism because of its opposition to the war, its involvement with communism in the Popular Front days, and its declared intention to carry on business as usual in the Legislature. He contended that those who voted CCF in 1937 were in no way identified with its anti-war views. He was particularly offended by CCF MLA Steeves' anti-war and anti-British Empire speech. The premier also was upset about Mrs. Steeves' speech and threatened, promised rather, that if he heard any more such disloyal utterances, he would report them to Ottawa. Their sense of outrage was undoubtedly heightened by federal CCF leader J. S. Woodworth's refusal to vote for a declaration of war, a stand, incidentally, totally rejected by other CCF MPs such as Angus MacInnis who fully supported the war. Of the

seven CCF Members in the British Columbia Legislature, only Colin Cameron agreed with Mrs. Steeves' anti-war views. In fact, both were a source of embarrassment to the CCF throughout the war.³³

The CCF responded to the Liberal and Conservative attacks by affirming that it was indeed loyal to the people of Canada but would not sit by, as the real Opposition, if the government used the war as an excuse to ignore existing social problems. In fact, the CCF interpreted Maitland's call for Legislative harmony as an appeal for union government which, its members maintained, "would destroy free criticism and add to the secrecy surrounding war profits." Maitland recorded in his log that Harold Winch "screamed" at him, and "made a very clever cunning speech." Winch, in a later reply, said he and his party could have wrapped themselves in the flag but instead stated the facts about the war as they saw them. He challenged the government to call an election to test public opinion. Maitland, again impressed by the speaker but not by the message, discussed Winch's speech as a tirade by a "clever demagogue."³⁴

Although Anscomb agreed with Maitland about the CCF, he publicly disagreed with him about strategy in the Legislature and on the hustings. Anscomb believed that the Conservatives should also carry on business as usual and aggressively criticize the government at every opportunity. Referring to Maitland's decision to forego by-elections, including Cranbrook in October which the Liberals won, Anscomb believed that was being a "little too loyal." It was a form of political suicide because, he said, the CCF would appear to be the only Opposition party, as it frequently claimed. In their respective

positions on by-elections both men were apparently standing on principle, but in the case of Cranbrook they were indulging in a little political hyperbole. In that riding the Conservatives had won only once since 1912, and had nominated no one in 1933, under any banner, or in the 1937 general election.³⁵

In any event, in early 1940 Maitland was about to end the political truce because of the Liberals' extravagance, patronage, lack of planning and illegal tampering with the liquor laws. Maitland had received province-wide publicity for his "statesmanlike" announcement that his party would refrain from partisan politics provided the government prosecuted the war to the fullest possible extent. His simultaneous condemnation of the CCF's anti-war stand had also heightened public perception of his stature as leader of the official Opposition party. But faced with dissent in his own party and the reality of party politics, Maitland had come full circle, back to his pre-war approach to electoral politics.³⁶

Maitland's first political loyalty was to the provincial party but he also worked for the federal party, particularly during election campaigns. In January 1940 he began a three-month marathon, driving himself to the limit that took him across southern British Columbia, to the Prairies and Ontario, and back to his home province for the final week of the campaign in March. In this first election of the war, the Liberal government ran on its record and promised no conscription for overseas service. The Conservatives promised a National government, similar to 1917, and conscription only for service in Canada. And the CCF, against conscription for any reason, supported material aid to

Great Britain during the war.³⁷

In his first campaign speech, Maitland declared that the CCF would never again be a serious contender in Canadian politics, because the people "of this country will not allow it." His qualified prediction proved to be correct as, nationally, that party gained only one seat, from seven to eight. The CCF did poorly in British Columbia, however, and lost two of its three seats, the direct result, Maitland claimed, of his attacks in the Legislature, "because the Government didn't have the guts to do it;--but I got no credit for it."

Maitland's attacks may have contributed to the CCF losses in British Columbia, but it is more likely that anti-war statements by Steeves, Cameron, and to a lesser extent MLA Samuel Guthrie, were the real cause of the decline in support.³⁸

Maitland was discouraged about the election results which he saw as "very disappointing to anyone who is really British" (perhaps not an unusual comment for a British Columbian in a wartime context, despite the fact Maitland's family had been in Canada for at least a century), and he anticipated rough sledding for his party in the next provincial election. Nationally, the party did not improve on the 40 seats it took in 1935, while in British Columbia it dropped from five to four seats but actually increased its popular vote by about 20 percent. Although the party ran on a conscription-for-Canada-only plank, many in the party, including Maitland, favoured unqualified conscription. The party lost, he thought, because national leader Robert Manion insisted on running under a "National government" banner and "mothers did not want conscription."³⁹

Maitland had barely recuperated from his exhausting schedule when Premier Pattullo suddenly announced that a special Legislative Session would commence on 8 May 1940. Because oil companies had refused to reduce their gas prices by three cents per gallon in April, as ordered by the government under authority of the Coal and Petroleum Products Control Board Act (1937) and had simply stopped providing gas after inventory supplies had run out, Pattullo had decided to extend control over the petroleum industry within British Columbia. Both sides had compromised at two cents a gallon on 2 May but, regardless, the government proceeded with its plans to seek Legislative approval both of an amendment to the preceding statute and entirely new legislation, the Petroleum Sales Act. Maitland recognized the issue as a long-awaited opportunity to establish a clear policy difference between the two old parties.⁴⁰

He did not agree with the CCF who argued that the industry should be socialized, that is, nationalized, rather than threatened with legislation that would be used if the industry did not behave. Maitland, a member of the party that had produced a "National Policy" in 1878 to restrain outside competition and encourage Canadian industry, now found himself in the curious position of being an advocate for "foreign" companies. He concurred with government that the companies should be punished if they had formed a "price-fixing monopoly to kill competition and to enhance the price of gasoline to the consumers of British Columbia." But, he argued, federal legislation, particularly the Combines Investigation Act (1933) was devised to end such conspiracies, and this particular statute had been

used successfully several times.⁴¹

On that basis alone, Maitland maintained that the new legislation was unnecessary. Furthermore, it would frighten off current and future investment and thereby reduce employment opportunities. It would also increase the possibilities of political corruption. These new statutes, he alleged, were more evidence of the Liberal government's continuing desire to circumvent Parliament. In 1934, the government had approved the Special Powers Act, in 1937 the Coal and Petroleum Products Control Board Act, and in 1938 the Public Utilities Act, all of which concentrated control in Cabinet either through Orders in Council or through the establishment of Boards and Commissions which were responsible to Cabinet. He was particularly critical of the new Petroleum Sales Act under which government could spend up to \$20 million dollars without reference to the Legislature.⁴²

Maitland's argument apparently won some converts, as for the first time a few Liberals publicly broke ranks with their leader. On 10 May, the last day of the special Session, and that historic day when Churchill became prime minister of Great Britain and the Germans had started moving West through eastern Belgium, the premier reassured the House that he was not anti-business. He had acted in the public interest, he said, and would do so again toward any company or industry that acted contrary to the people's welfare. However, his caucus was not satisfied and when the Bills came to a vote four Liberals, including the caucus chairman, voted against the government.⁴³

During the summer, Maitland, very concerned about the progress

of the war, and with two sons about to enlist, volunteered to do some war work. When federal Minister of Finance J. L. Ralston invited him to serve as an ex-officio member of the provincial War Savings Committee he gladly accepted and shortly after made a successful war bond promotion trip across the Central Interior.⁴⁴

Not long after that trip, Maitland accompanied by Ruth, began campaigning for the Mackenzie by-election. It had been pending since the death of the sitting member early in the year, and was finally set for 26 September. Maitland still felt by-elections were unnecessary, especially if the outcome would make little difference to the Liberal majority, but he was assuming, of course, that the Liberals would win. If the CCF won, they would once again be equal in House strength to the Conservatives. However, his party could not find a suitable candidate and his campaigning had served no immediate purpose. In the end, the Liberals won easily with an increased majority over 1937.⁴⁵

About a month later the 1940 fall Session of the Legislature got underway and five weeks later quietly, almost gloomily, prorogued. Maitland, speculating that everyone was preoccupied with the war, said he had never seen a "less vigorous finish." The government had introduced no significant legislation, although in a speech that both the press and Maitland said had election overtones, Frank Putnam, mover of the Throne speech, had reviewed the Liberal government's record including its social legislation for the preceding seven years, and hinted at a revival of the "moribund" Health Insurance Act and a new highway construction program. Nothing came of either, perhaps as a result of intense and sometimes personal criticism about Finance

Minister Hart's inflated 1941-42 budget.⁴⁶

During the budget debate, Maitland supported by Anscomb and Bruhn tore into both Hart and Pattullo. At \$29.9 million, estimated expenditures were \$700,000 higher than in 1940-42, and a revenue surplus of \$2.6 million was predicted. Anscomb moralized about the "shameful and wicked" budget that reflected no wartime economy measures. A few days later the Sun asked why British Columbia could not reduce all non-war related expenditures by 15 percent as the federal government had done. The next day, Maitland and Bruhn, no doubt sensing a good issue for an election anticipated in 1941, moved that the budget should be replaced with a "streamlined" war model.⁴⁷

In a furious and insulting exchange, Winch, and Pattullo who was defending Hart, repeatedly challenged Maitland to say where he would make budget cuts, perhaps trying to trap him into saying he would cut social costs. Calling Maitland's speech a "frenzied patriotic oratorical outburst," Winch accused Maitland of simply playing politics because he could not offer a single constructive suggestion. Pattullo who had earlier denied to Maitland that an election was in the offing, then made a slip that indicated he was indeed thinking going to the people before the next Session. Greatly exasperated, he shouted at Maitland that he would never be back anyway, regardless of all the newspapers, a sarcastic dig at Maitland's bent for getting local newspaper publicity. Maitland, angry for perhaps the first time in the Legislature, was about to reply, when Pattullo quickly defused the exchange by turning to the House and saying "Look, he's mad--whom the Gods would destroy they first make mad!" Maitland finally said he

would make cuts in every department as the Tolmie government had done in the Depression.⁴⁸

The premier then turned on Bruhn, who had annoyed him earlier in the Session when he had demanded a Coalition government, and accused him of not once spending within his budget when he was Minister of Public Works in the Tolmie government. Finally, in the first division of the Session, Pattullo rallied his caucus by stating the Conservative motion was in effect a vote of confidence and, with the CCF, defeated the motion 35 to 6. Maitland believed some of the Liberals were also dissatisfied with Hart's budget and had hoped to persuade at least a few to be out of the House, but every available Liberal in Victoria was present for the vote.⁴⁹

During the Session Maitland brought up the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, otherwise known as the Rowell-Sirois Commission. This was the first time the subject had been raised in the House, over two and a half years after the Pattullo government had submitted its brief to the Commission hearings in Victoria in March 1938. Maitland later confided to R. B. Bennett that he had found a real issue in the "Sirois Report."⁵⁰

The Commission, established in 1937, largely in response to, or as a reaction to the provincial and national chaos of the 1930s, delivered its report and recommendations in May 1940. Broadly speaking, its purpose was to study federal/provincial relations and ways of redistributing sources of revenue and responsibility for social and economic assistance. In its findings the Commission recommended shifting more economic controls to Ottawa as well as responsibility for

social services such as welfare assistance, and unemployment insurance. But the cost to a provincial government involved the surrender of federal subsidies, and of personal and corporation taxes, and succession duties. In return, the report recommended that the federal government assume responsibility for the provinces' accumulated debts. Pattullo was totally opposed to the Commission's findings, primarily because he was convinced that implementation of them would mean a serious intrusion into provincial rights.⁵¹

Maitland suggested the Pattullo administration did not wish to accept, or even acknowledge, the Commission's recommendations made public on 15 May, and demanded to know, "loudly and insistently" what the government intended to do about the Rowell-Sirois report. At first the premier chided him. Had the leader of the Opposition forgotten, he asked, his remarks in Vancouver on 8 February 1939 when he said the Commission was of "no value to the people of Canada," that the Commission "has buried our 'better terms' case which up to then had been recognized and which is now lost in the quagmire of Dominion-wide demands"? Now, the Honourable Member was acting as though the Commission's report was the greatest document since the BNA Act. After these needling preliminaries, the premier outlined his government's position which was to cooperate fully with the Commission but without surrendering rights, under the pretext of a war emergency, that would be lost to the Dominion for all time. He did not intend to do any begging at the federal-provincial conference in January 1941, but would cooperate in the interests of the province and the Dominion. Further, anything he agreed to would be submitted to the Legislature for ratification.⁵²

Although the journalist who reported Maitland's speech had directly quoted the above remarks, Maitland implied that he had never condemned the Commission but if he did, he said, he was glad that he had been wrong. He perceived the report as the ground work for a future economic foundation for Canada and, in principle, strongly favoured the recommendations. He deplored what he interpreted as Pattullo's belligerent attitude toward the forthcoming negotiation and had a "very great misgiving about the outcome" if the premier approached the conference in that frame of mind. This was a particularly clairvoyant statement in view of the failure of the January conference after Premiers Aberhart of Alberta, Hepburn of Ontario, and Pattullo decided in Ottawa to boycott the proceedings.⁵³

As the second fall Session of the war years concluded, Maitland made his final log notes but revealed nothing of the acrimony that had marked his exchanges with the Premier and others in the House. He described Anscomb as "quick on the trigger," Bruhn as "not well but still sound," and Pattullo as the "whole Cabinet," a negative reflection on the other ministers. Maitland had changed his mind about Steeves, who had so offended him the year before with her disdain for the British Empire, and decided she "had turned around." Finally, aware of an impending election, he wondered as he took a last look around the Legislature, how many members would be back.⁵⁴

As Maitland had anticipated, the Premier announced on 22 July 1941 that a general election would be held in late October. Although the government's mandate would not expire until June 1942 Pattullo said the voters should have an opportunity to express their wishes on

important new legislation that would be needed to cede to Ottawa, for the duration of the war, the right to collect income and certain other taxes on behalf of the province. A new Liberal administration would maximize the war effort yet still try to maintain essential services; it would also develop plans for the post-war period.⁵⁵

The day after the premier's announcement on 22 July, Maitland issued his party's manifesto, which was refined at his nomination in Point Grey in September to a "15-Point Election Platform." A Province editorial agreed with Maitland's charges that the government was extravagant and not curtailing non-war related expenditures, that it was hindering the war effort by not cooperating with the federal government, and that it was still practising patronage. Nevertheless, the article continued, the Conservative party was missing an opportunity to challenge the Pattullo government with some new reform programs and policies that would appeal to voters who were all "a little weary of threshing over the barren straw of party advantage." This was a familiar complaint, one that the press, members of both parties, and the general public had been making since at least 1923 when the Provincial Party was established.⁵⁶

Actually, all three parties had similar manifestos which, as they had been in 1937, differed only in their emphasis on particular issues. All three parties were committed to an all-out war strategy which to the CCF meant conscripting wealth and public ownership of war industries, and a progressive tax directly on income; to the other two this meant economizing in non-war related services and programs, and encouraging maximum production in war industries. All three placed

great importance on developing plans for post-war recovery as soon as possible. All agreed that the province must fully cooperate with the federal government during the war, especially in making tax sources available to Ottawa; and all pledged to improve social and labour legislation. The CCF, to a lesser degree the Liberals, considered the last plank more important than the Conservatives did. Each party would provide aid to agriculture, mainly in the form of marketing assistance, and each would encourage development of natural resources, in the long range as well as during the war period. The Conservatives again emphasized that a highway commission was the only means to ensure systematic road development. The Liberals' road strategy involved specific projects, both within the province, and through the province, for example a B.C.-Yukon-Alaska highway. The CCF would include road development in its overall economic development plan.⁵⁷

Pattullo's reasons for calling an election did not appear very convincing. As Maitland pointed out, his party and the press had been calling for a greater war effort, and both the Conservatives and the CCF argued that the province must fully cooperate with the federal government during the war period. Historians still debate his reasons. Martin Robin suggested Pattullo was worried about the CCF closing in on the Liberals from the left with its demands for social and labour legislation and about the Conservatives capturing Liberal support in the business community. Neil Sutherland believed Pattullo did not want an election in winter because travel conditions would be bad and voter turnout low, whereas if he held it in late spring 1942, he would not have time to recover politically should an unpopular issue arise in the

last few months of the government's mandate. Furthermore, he had criticized Tolmie for permitting his administration to complete its five-year mandate. Regardless, Pattullo was certain he could win in the fall. Times were good, the Conservatives had nothing new to offer and were once again led by an unpopular leader. And the CCF did not worry him.⁵⁸

In his first campaign speech, Maitland ridiculed the premier's reasons for calling an election. Speaking on 8 August at a meeting in Prince Rupert, where Pattullo had prevailed since the 1916 general election, he said he could not understand the premier's call for an all-out war effort after the "Sirois fiasco" in January. Furthermore, he insisted the people of the province, through the press and through the Conservative Opposition in the Legislature, had, in fact, been demanding a war economy for two years. He then accused the Liberal administration of budgeting for surplus revenue which would be used for election expenses, and reminded his audience that the Liberal machine would be hiring "one thousand" enumerators, all of whom would be Liberal supporters.⁵⁹

Maitland and his party had nominating problems in two ridings, Prince Rupert and North Vancouver, although the former may have been more than just a constituency organization quarrel. In his first campaign trip, accompanied by Ruth and his two daughters, he toured the Central Interior and on his arrival at Prince Rupert agreed that W. J. O'Neill would be a good candidate to oppose Pattullo. However, the next evening when Maitland attended a business dinner hosted by the Prince Rupert Conservative association, delegates nominated

W. R. McFee. Subsequently the party did not field a candidate and Pattullo won by only 118 votes over his CCF opponent. If the Conservatives had put up a candidate Pattullo would almost certainly have lost. This may have been simply a situation where the party could not find a suitable candidate, or it may have been a tradeoff whereby the Conservatives stood aside in exchange for Liberal assistance in another riding. In the other situation, Maitland would not accept North Vancouver nominee Joshua Hinchliffe because he stated Maitland's highway commission plank was not the way to ensure good roads in the province. As a result of the quarrel two Conservative candidates ran, and the CCF won an easy victory.⁶⁰

Maitland made an exhausting trip during the last month of the campaign. In late September he toured Vancouver island, and in Courtenay he again raised the old saw about how his party had decided to stay out of the Cranbrook and Mackenzie elections, "in a spirit of cooperation and in an attempt to save money." Obviously he presumed that his audience would not know that his party had won in Cranbrook only once since 1912, and had not even nominated a candidate in the 1933 or 1937 general elections. In Mackenzie, established in 1924, his party's record was better, but it still had not won since 1928, and as mentioned above, could not find a suitable candidate in 1940. He then travelled across southern British Columbia and in addition to many platform speeches made three radio broadcasts. Two days before the election he told a Victoria audience that the issue was "whether British Columbia is going to rise above petty politics and to take its rightful place in the federal union and the nation's war effort."

Never before in the history of the country, he declared, had there been a "clearer need of statesmanship to meet the urgent demands of war and the tremendous problem" of post-war recovery. Obviously, Maitland believed that only he and his party could meet those challenges.⁶¹

At the beginning of the campaign, the Conservatives pledged a "15-Point" manifesto, but as the campaign wound down, Maitland concentrated on only two, a war economy which included federal-provincial cooperation, and post-war planning. The premier, on the other hand, stressed his original reason for calling the election, the importance of a tax agreement between the provinces and Ottawa. The CCF promised full support for the war and post-war planning but not to the exclusion of its other concerns.⁶²

Election day, 21 October 1941, was a pleasant, late autumn day, fair and mild over most of the province, frosty in the morning in the Okanagan and the Kootenays, cool and raining in Prince Rupert. That night the Conservatives and Liberals got the bad news. The next day newspaper editors across the province downgraded part of the daily flood of war news in order to provide front page coverage for the election results. Every newspaper carried the same message of gloom for Maitland and Pattullo, for example, "C.C.F. Wins 14 Seats; Coalition Gov't Forecast." The Conservatives won only 12 seats, up four from the previous standing, the Liberals won 21, down 10, and the CCF had doubled its previous strength (see appendix 1). In terms of percent of the popular vote the CCF led, for the first time, with 33.36, followed by the Liberals and Conservatives with 32.94 and 30.91 respectively. Voter turnout was relatively heavy but compared to 1937

was only slightly higher at 72.7 percent of registered voters.⁶³

Maitland and his two running mates won easily in Vancouver-Point Grey over their CCF and Liberal opponents. He had led his party back to the Legislature with 12 seats, a 50 percent increase over 1937. But it was not enough. His party did not even hold the balance of power, which, failing victory, Maitland had apparently anticipated. True, he could keep a minority government in office, if his caucus would support him, but in reality his party's destiny, and even his political future, was in other hands.⁶⁴

In 1933 Maitland had pretty well decided to abandon electoral politics, as opposed to organizational work, in favour of law. He had not sought a nomination in the fall election but continued to be active in the provincial association. For the next four years, as the province was slowly recovering from the Depression, he helped to rebuild the party. In 1937 he accepted a nomination in Point Grey and was returned to the Legislature with seven others as the official Opposition. After he was elected party leader by a narrow margin in 1938 he persuaded his party to adopt social and labour legislation planks. However, in the 1941 general election campaign, he repeatedly stressed two policies that a new government must adopt, an all-out war economy in full cooperation with Ottawa, and immediate post-war planning. But the voters were not impressed, nor were they captivated by pledges of the other two parties. The Liberals had suffered the most damage, the CCF had done wonderfully well, while the Conservatives under Maitland,

buoyed by great expectations, had finished a dismal third. Maitland's political future, as in 1933, was once again in doubt.

Footnotes

¹For reports of the meeting, see "Re-United Party to Start Fresh with Troubles Forgotten," Colonist, 10 December 1933, p. 1; "Conservatives Decide to Hold Rally in 1934," Province, 9 December 1933, p. 2; and "Dr. Patterson Heads Tories," Sun, 9 December 1933, p. 9.

²For the nominations, see "Dr. Patterson Heads Tories," *ibid.*; for his letter to Bennett, see Bennett Papers, PAC, MG26K, reel 472, document 600601, Maitland to Bennett, 21 December 1933.

³Bennett agrees with Tolmie, Parker, "Tolmie," p. 141.

⁴Parliamentary Guide, 1934, 1937.

⁵"Dr. F. P. Patterson Chosen Conservative Leader," Colonist, 1 July 1930, p. 1; for Maitland may have run second, see "Patterson New Leader of B.C. Tories," Sun, 2 July 1936, p. 3.

⁶For Bruhn's views and withdrawal, "Dr. F. P. Patterson Chosen . . .," *ibid.*; for Planta's comments, see "Conservatives in Two Groups," Times, 30 June 1936, p. 1; and "Patterson May be Leader of Conservatives," Province, 30 June 1936, p. 1; for Maitland's resolution, and Planta et al backing Anscomb, see "Conservatives in Two Groups."

⁷For Maitland et al. campaigning, and his attack on CCF and Liberal policies, see "Tumult in Burrard to Close Tonight: Voters to Cast Ballots Tomorrow," Province, 1 September 1936, p. 3; for Conservatives certain Telford would win, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 29, Maitland to his mother, 2 September 1936; for the CCF and Liberal promise, see "Tumult in Burrard . . .," *ibid.*; for the results, Parliamentary Guide, 1937.

⁸For an assessment of the election climate, see Sutherland, "Pattullo," pp. 86-87; for the election post-mortem, see McKelvie Papers, PABC, Add/MSS 1, Box 9, file 4, "A Scheme for Organization."

⁹For candidates in ridings, see Parliamentary Guide, 1938; for the breakdown of candidates, see CAR, 1937-38, p. 495, and CAR, 1934, pp. 328-29.

¹⁰For the manifestos, see "Provincial Party Policies," Colonist, 30 May 1937, p. 1, magazine section.

¹¹For the weather, Province, 31 May 1937, p. 2; for the election results, British Columbia, Statement of Votes, 1937.

¹²For the exchange of notes, Pattullo Papers 3, Box 63, file 14a, Maitland to Pattullo, 5 June 1937, and Pattullo to Maitland,

12 June 1937; for the sharp exchanges, see "Premier Annoyed by Road Queries," Maitland 781, Box 6, file 29; for his rating of the premier, Maitland 781, Box 8, 1937 log, 9 December.

¹³For nominations and voting results, see Parliamentary Guide, 1938.

¹⁴For the Legislative Session schedule, see Parliamentary Guide, 1943.

¹⁵For the budget presentation, see CAR, 1937-38, p. 501; for the relief statistics, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1933 log, budget speech, p.7; and CAR, 1937-38, p. 509.

¹⁶"Log of the House," Province, 9 November 1937, p. 4.

¹⁷Ibid; for Dyer, see "Opposition in House Develops New Vigour," Sun, 9 November 1937, p. 2.

¹⁸Dyer also reported Maitland's concept of the Opposition's role; for his blast at the CCF, "Maitland Scores Pattullo for Broken Promises," Sun, 9 November 1937, p. 2.

¹⁹For Patterson and Anscomb in the budget debate, see CAR, 1937-38, p. 502; for his comments about Patterson's jealousy, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 29, Maitland to his mother, 30 October 1937; for his comment about Patterson's and Anscomb's speaking ability, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1937 log, 29 October and 16 November, respectively.

²⁰For the by-election, candidates and votes, see British Columbia, Statement of Votes, 1937; for Patterson ill, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 29, Maitland to his mother, 5 November 1937; for Hutchison speculating see "Log of the Capital," Province, 19 February 1938, p. 4; for the Conservative heavyweights, see "Government Spending Scored by Maitland," Sun, 18 May 1938, p. 4; "Flays Liberal Extravagances," Province, 117 May 1938, p. 12; and "Maitland Charges Reckless Expenditures by Government," Province, 18 May 1938, p. 5; for the Liberals, "Premier Asserts Alaska Road Would be Asset in Wartime," Province, 17 May 1938, p. 1; and "Dewdney Voters Hear Appeals," Times, 19 May 1938, p. 1; and for the CCF, "Oriental Vote Not an Issue," Province, 19 May 1938, p. 2; and "Strachan Wins in Dewdney," Sun, 21 May 1938, p. 1.

²¹For Maitland's charges, see "Government Spending Scored . . .," note 20; for Anscomb's attack, see "Flays Liberal Extravagances," note 20; for the CCF speeches, see "Oriental Vote . . .," note 20.

²²For the record turnout and CCF ecstasy, see "Strachan Wins . . .," note 20; for the voting statistics see British Columbia, Statement of Votes, 1937.

²³For the convention and strengths of the two candidates, see "R. L. Maitland, K.C. Named Head of Conservative Party," Province, 26 September 1938, p. 3; for Anscomb's tour, see "Conservatives Taking Ballot on Leadership," Province, 24 September 1938, p. 1.

²⁴For the candidates' positions, see "'Pat' Maitland Elected Leader Amid Uproar of Cheering," Sun, 26 September 1938, p. 3.

²⁵For the election results, see "R. L. Maitland, K.C. Named . . .," note 23; for "comparatively young," etc., see "Mr. Maitland's Task," Province, 26 September 1938, p. 4; for the close contest ensures unity, see "R. L. Maitland, K.C. Named . . ."

²⁶For his criticism and program, see "Maitland Demands End of Gov't Experiments," Sun, 28 October 1938, p. 5.

²⁷For his "sword," see "Maitland Pleads for Planned Government of B.C. Affairs"; for his aspirations, see "Mr. Maitland's Aspirations," Sun, 28 October 1938, p. 8.

²⁸For his budget speech, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1938 log, 21 November; for his "best speech," see "Tied Up in Cottonwool was the Bombshell," Sun, 22 November 1938, p. 1; for his "clear cut line of differences," see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 4, Maitland to L. MacInnis, 11 May 1940.

²⁹Budget speech, see note 28.

³⁰Maitland 781, Box 8, 1938 log, 28 November.

³¹For the leadership "hardships," see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 3, Maitland to Mills, 10 January 1940; for the Ontario campaign, see *ibid.*, file 4, Maitland to L. MacInnis, 2 April 1940; and for his collapse in Vancouver, "R. L. Maitland Defines Issue," Province, 25 March 1940, p. 8; campaigning in Saskatchewan, Alberta and B.C., *ibid.*, Maitland to Nora Elvidge (his sister), 12 April 1940; his rest at Lang Bay, *ibid.*, Maitland to Dorothy, 8 April 1940; "nearly nuts," *ibid.*, Maitland to Mills, 16 May 1940; leaving politics, *ibid.*, file 4, letters to MacInnes and Mills, 2 April 1940 and 16 May 1940, respectively; lack of magazine press coverage, *ibid.*, Maitland to L. MacInnes, 2 April 1940; political fortunes and luck, *ibid.*, file 5, Maitland to Elvidge, 7 June 1940; Munich and Chamberlain, *ibid.*, Maitland to L. MacInnes, 11 May 1940; for war bonds, see *ibid.*, file 5, Maitland to Chris Spencer, 8 August 1940.

³²Maitland's pledges, respectively, "Maitland Pledges Pattullo Support if War Comes," Times, 31 August 1939, p. 13; "Conservatives Promise Complete Co-operation in Prosecution of War," Colonist, 29 October 1939, p. 1; and "Maitland Flays C.C.F. War Stand," Province, 3 November 1939, p. 9; for the higher duty, and the Conservative's platform, *ibid.*

³³For Maitland's opinion that CCF supporters were pro war, see "Maitland Bitterly Assails C.C.F. Wartime Policies," Sun, 8 November 1939, p. 30; for Steeves' speech, "C.C.F. Denounced for War Criticisms-Premier Warns Against Future Attacks," Times, 4 November 1939, p. 13; Pattullo warns CCF, "C.C.F. Denounced . . .," Wordsworth's refusal and Angus MacInnes' support of the war, Angus MacInnis Papers, UBC, Box 54a, file 11, MacInnis to Richmond (Saanich District C.C.F. Council), 4 October 1939; for relevant comments on Steeves and Cameron, see Roberts, "Doctrine and Disunity," pp. 54-57.

³⁴For the CCF loyalty, see "C.C.F. Answer Hits Maitland," Province, 31 October 1939, p. 5; won't sit by, as the real Opposition, see "B.C. Will Back War to Limit," Sun, 31 October 1939, p. 1; the CCF sees union government, "C.C.F. Dislikes Union Government," Times, 29 February 1940, p. 11; Winch's speech, Maitland 781, Box 8, 1939 log, 3 November; Winch's later reply and Maitland's summary, *ibid.*

³⁵For Anscomb's view, see "Conservative Promise Complete Co-operation in Prosecution of War," Colonist, 29 October 1939, p. 1; for "too loyal" and political suicide, see "Anscomb Says Conservatives Should Fight By-Elections," Province, 30 October 1939, p. 5; for Cranbrook election results, see Parliamentary Guide, 1913 to 1938.

³⁶Truce ending, "Maitland Nears End of Political Truce," Sun, 25 January 1940, p. 17; Maitland's publicity, Maitland 11, Box 4, file 8, includes transcripts from Grand Forks Gazette, 9 November 1939; Colonist, 4 November 1939; Prince George Citizen, 9 November 1939; Province, 30 October 1939; and Sun, 3 November 1939; the G. F. Gazette and the P. G. Citizen both refer to his statemanship; the preceding editorials refer to his loyalty and his anti-CCF stance.

³⁷For an itinerary, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 4, Maitland to Elvidge, 12 April 1940; and *ibid.*, file 3, Maitland to Dorothy, 24 February 1940; for the federal party platforms, see D. Owen Carrigan, Canadian Party Platforms 1867-1968 (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1968), pp. 116-41); and J. Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1968), pp. 206-40.

³⁸For his first speech, see "Conservative Leader Declares C.C.F. Will Never Again be a Serious Contender," Province, 17 January 1940, p. 11; for election statistics see Beck, Pendulum, pp. 220-21 and 238-39; for the reference to his attack in the Legislature, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 4, Maitland to MacInnis, 2 April 1940; for reference to CCF anti-war statements, see Roberts, "Doctrine and Disunity in the CCF," pp. 58-59.

³⁹For the Conservatives' standings, see Beck, Pendulum, pp. 238-39; Maitland's reasons for the loss, Maitland 11, Box 3, file 4; his disappointment at the loss, *ibid.*, Maitland to Elvidge, 12 April 1940.

⁴⁰For the special Session announcement, see "Having a Wildcat

by the Tail," Sun, 1 May 1940, p. 1; for the purpose of the Session, see "Government Asks Power to Enter Oil Business, and Compel Sales," Sun, 9 May 1940, p. 17; regarding the gas "strike" and the price compromise, see "New Gas Order Will Stand, Says Premier," Province, 3 May 1940, p. 1; for Maitland's "long-awaited opportunity," see "Would Guard Public Rights," Province, 10 May 1940, p. 13.

⁴¹For the CCF argument, see "CCF Urges Socialization," Province, 20 May 1940, p. 13; for the introduction of the National Policy by conservative Prime Minister John A. Macdonald in 1878, see Carrigan, Canadian Party Platforms, p. 15; for Maitland's argument in this paragraph, see Maitland 11, Box 1, file 18; Hutchison comments on Maitland's defense of foreign companies in "A Ghostly Session is Opened but It Casts Some Shadows Ahead," Sun, 9 May 1940, p. 17.

⁴²For his points, see Maitland 11, Box 1, file 18.

⁴³For the wartime news, see "Churchill New Premier; Chamberlain in Cabinet," Province, 10 May 1940, p. 1; for Pattullo's reassurances, see "Would Guard Public Rights," Province, 10 May 1940, p. 13; for the vote, see "Members of Liberal Party Bolt in Vote on New Gasoline Bill," Province, 10 May 1940, p. 13.

⁴⁴For his concern about the war, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 5, Maitland to Morris, 17 June 1940, where he says he was "broken-hearted over the war news"; for acceptance of Ralston's offer, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 5, Maitland to Ralston, 27 May 1940; for his war bond itinerary, see *ibid.*

⁴⁵For his campaign itinerary, his reservations about by-elections, and his bad luck, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 5, Maitland to L. MacInnis, 19 August 1940; for the election results, see Parliamentary Guide, 1942.

⁴⁶For his assessment of the mood of the Legislature, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1940 log, 5 December; for a complete list of 1940 legislation, see British Columbia, Statutes of British Columbia (Victoria: King's Printer, 1940); for election indications see Maitland, *ibid.*, 30 October; and, for example, "B.C. Budget Reveals No Cut in Tax," Sun, 15 November 1940, p. 1; for the mover's comments in the Throne debate, see Maitland, *ibid.*, 30 October; and "House Hears Appeal for Better Roads," Sun, 31 October 1940, p. 25.

⁴⁷For the 1941-42 budget and revenue figures, see British Columbia, Estimates, 1940; for Anscomb's "best" speech and Hart's shameful budget, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1940 log, 18 November; for the budget's lack of wartime economy, see "'More Government Gets, More It Spends' Anscomb Charges," Sun, 19 November 1940, p. 13; for the Sun's demand, "This Budget Should Be Withdrawn," Sun, 22 November 1940, p. 1; for Maitland's and Bruhn's motion, see "CCF Opposes Maitland's Cut in B.C. Budget," Sun, 23 November 1940, p. 3.

⁴⁸For the insulting exchanges, see "CCF Opposes Maitland's Cut in B.C. Budget," Sun, 22 November 1940, p. 3; Pattullo denies election coming, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1940 log, a note from Pattullo to Maitland; for Pattullo's election slip, his further exchanges with Maitland and Bruhn, see "CCF Opposes Maitland's Cut . . ."

⁴⁹For Bruhn's coalition proposal, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1940 log, 4 November; for Pattullo's call for a confidence vote and Maitland's hope for Liberal support, see "CCF Opposes Maitland's Cut . . .," *ibid.*

⁵⁰For Maitland's discussion of the Rowell-Sirois Commission, see Maitland 781, Box 9, file 5, his speech, 22 November 1940, pp. 3-4; for the Pattullo brief submitted to the Commission in 1938, see British Columbia, British Columbia in the Canadian Confederation (Victoria: King's Printer, 1938); for Maitland's confidence to R. B. Bennett, see Bennett Papers, PAC, Reel 472, documents 600620-600621, Maitland to Bennett, 20 June 1941.

⁵¹For the Commission's appointment, terms of reference, and recommendations, see Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940); for further discussion on the Commission including Pattullo's opposition, see Mitchell, W. A. C. Bennett, pp. 62-63; and Ormsby, 470-71.

⁵²For Maitland's suggestion and his loud demand, see "Notes and Gossip From Victoria House," Sun, 1 November 1940, p. 2; for the premier's chiding, and the direct quotes of Maitland, see respectively, "Premier Tells House He Will Refuse to Appoint Highway Commission," Province, 15 November 1940, p. 19; and "Liberals Disgusted, C.C.F. Disappointed, Says Maitland," Province, 8 February 1939, p. 5; for the premier's position on the Rowell-Sirois Commission, see, for example, "Premier Tells House . . .," *ibid.*; and "Pattullo Resents Budget Criticism," Sun, 22 November 1940, p. 3.

⁵³For his denial and his misgivings, see Maitland 781, Box 9, file 5, Maitland's speech, 22 November 1940, p. 3; for the breakdown of the conference, see, for example, John Kendle, John Bracken: A Political Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 177-80; and Ormsby, A History, pp. 470-71.

⁵⁴Maitland 781, Box 8, 1940 log, 5 December.

⁵⁵"Pattullo's Three-Point Program," Sun, 22 July 1941, p. 1.

⁵⁶For Maitland's 22 July statement, and his 15 point platform, see respectively, "Conservative Leader Issues Manifesto," Province, 23 July 1941, p. 5; and "B.C. Conservatives Proclaim 15-Point Election Platform," Sun, 13 September 1941, p. 19; for the editorial, see "Mr. Maitland's Manifesto," Province, 23 July 1941, p. 4; similarly, an article, "Economy? Not for British Columbians," Sun, 3 September 1941, p. 4, said the "two old parties are so identical that there hardly

seems any reason to go to the trouble of changing them."

⁵⁷For the CCF manifesto, see Carter and Cairns, "Party Platforms," 1941; and the Liberal manifesto, Pattullo Papers 3, Box 61, file 2.

⁵⁸For the reasons for Pattullo's announcement, see Martin Robin, Pillars of Profit (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973), pp. 41-43; and Sutherland, "Pattullo," pp. 117-18; for Pattullo's confidence that he would win easily, see "Economy? Not for British Columbians," Sun, 3 September 1941, p. 4.

⁵⁹"Maitland Declares Pattullo's Reasons for Poll Ridiculous," Province, 9 August 1941, p. 3; for a charge that the British Columbia Government was still running a peacetime economy, see "Economy? Not for British Columbians," Sun, 3 September 1941, p. 4.

⁶⁰For the reference to his Interior tour and O'Neill, see "O'Neill Is Candidate," Daily News, 8 August 1941, p. 1; for McFee, see "Conservative Leader Presents His Keynote Speech in Prince Rupert," *ibid.*, 9 August 1941, p. 1; for Pattullo's margin of victory and North Vancouver returns, Parliamentary Guide, 1942; for the North Vancouver quarrel, see "Maitland Refuses to Change Mind," Sun, 27 September 1941, p. 8.

⁶¹For Maitland's Courtenay speech, see "Maitland Hits Extravagance of Liberals," Province, 29 September 1941, p. 2; for a few examples of his tour, see "Maitland Mocks Liberal Unity," Province, 30 September 1941, p. 6, a speech in Nelson; and "Maitland Asks Aid for Mines," Province, 11 October 1941, p. 20, a speech in Revelstoke; for reference to radio speeches, see Maitland 781, Box 1, file 16, Orr to Maitland, 27 September 1941; for his Victoria speech, see "War Effort Prime Issue in Election," Province, 20 October 1941, p. 8.

⁶²For the two issues, see "War, Post-War Only B.C. Issues," Province, 25 September 1941, p. 11; for the premier's emphasis on tax legislation, see Robin, Pillars, p. 50.

⁶³For the weather report, see the Sun, 21 October 1941, p. 18; for the one headline, see "C.C.F. Win 14 Seats; Coalition Gov't Forecast," Sun, 22 October 1941, p. 1; for the election results, see British Columbia, Statement of Votes, 1937 and 1941.

⁶⁴For the election results, see Parliamentary Guide, 1942; for a report that Maitland expected to win at least the balance of power, see "Economy? Not for British Columbians," Sun, 3 September 1941, p. 4.

CHAPTER VI

THE COALITION CRISIS AND RESOLUTION,

22 OCTOBER TO 10 DECEMBER 1941

The Coalition crisis that followed the election on 21 October lasted six weeks. While Pattullo vacillated and carried on as though he was secure in office, his caucus formed a cabal; Maitland, with only third power status, tried desperately to influence events; and CCF leader Harold Winch waited patiently for the unfolding of the inevitable Liberal-Conservative alliance. Before the crisis was over Pattullo was replaced by Hart who favoured Coalition, Maitland abandoned his years' long stand against non-partisan government and led his caucus into Coalition with the Liberals, and the CCF became the official Opposition as it had anticipated from the beginning of the crisis.

The series of events from the election until the Liberal-Conservative Coalition Cabinet was sworn in have been reconstructed by several historians.¹ However, they do not fully explain either the circumstances that preceded Maitland's decision to take his party into a Coalition government, or the consequences of his third place finish.

Two days after the election, 23 October, Maitland issued a public statement in which he said it was his duty to call for a Union

government. During the election campaign, he stated, each party had committed itself to a maximum war effort and now they had an opportunity to accomplish this by supporting a tri-party war Cabinet as in Great Britain. Pattullo refused Maitland's offer that same day, and the next day, Winch, who promised full cooperation in all war measures, also rejected the idea of Union government. Nevertheless, Maitland did not entirely drop the idea until after the opening session of the new Legislature on 4 December.²

The day after Maitland's statement, the Sun published an unusually frank and revealing assessment of the Conservative position, based on an interview with an anonymous "leading Conservative." According to this insider, the CCF would lose a lot of its identity, that is, its political uniqueness, after a few years in Union government because it would have to compromise its socialistic principles. On the other hand, a Liberal/Conservative Coalition would actually enhance the CCF's position as the official Opposition party in British Columbia, which it had always claimed to be, whereas the Conservatives would be gradually submerged in such an arrangement. Maitland, the source said, could never forget the party's standpoint, which was victory in the Legislature, even if this was "playing politics with the situation." In the meantime, the party should support the Pattullo government and let the Liberals and the CCF "do the fighting and finally destroy each other at the polls."³

This was an interesting and logical analysis but at a meeting with his caucus on 6 November there was not even a hint of such an

appreciation either in Maitland's speech, his summary of the meeting, or in his notes on each person's response to his question regarding Union or Coalition government. At that meeting Maitland met in Vancouver with 26, that is, 60 percent, of the 43 elected and defeated candidates, a gathering that included only eight of the twelve who were elected. Anscomb, who was on a business trip, sent two telegrams when he learned of the meeting, saying he had informed everyone of his itinerary in order not to miss any important meetings; he insisted he would not be bound by any decisions they might make. Maitland wished to determine the candidates' feelings about Union or Coalition government and the conditions they would expect before agreeing to either form. By Union he meant each party would be represented in Cabinet but ministers would not be bound by Cabinet decisions which were not supported by the respective caucuses. Party organizations, at both the provincial executive and constituency levels, would be completely independent of each other, as at present. Union government would be a cooperative, and temporary, administration. Coalition government, on the other hand, would operate almost like party government. Ministers would be bound by Cabinet decisions and the respective party associations would work together. The arrangement would be temporary but more formal and binding than Union government. In Coalition, the weak partner(s) would almost certainly be dominated by the strongest party.⁴

Maitland, practically but cynically, explained to the meeting that conditions for cooperating in either form of administration should

be resolved as soon as possible. If "we are approached to form a Coalition government, we must be prepared to act without giving time for the public to think we are playing poker," that is, for them to think that Maitland and the Conservatives were negotiating for the best possible conditions. He also suggested that a Cabinet "comprised of 4 Liberals, 4 Conservatives and a Liberal Premier, would be a fair start at coalition."⁵

All 26 favoured Union government and failing that, 23 would agree to a Liberal-Conservative Coalition if Pattullo was not premier. Newly-elected W. A. C. Bennett favoured either Union or Coalition, whereas Bruhn voted for Coalition which he said he had been demanding for eight years. Candidates who voted for a Liberal-Conservative Coalition suggested a nine-man Cabinet that would include four Conservatives, as well as implementation of Conservative pledges in respect to federal-provincial cooperation, a wartime economy budget, a highway commission, and banning of all patronage. The second member for Point Grey, Alex Paton, who Maitland thought was most able to sense the winds of change, said he could not give a firm opinion because he had not talked to enough people.⁶

Maitland did not discuss other alternatives with his caucus, for example, offering support to a Liberal minority government. Paton may have had something like this in mind when he declined to offer a definite opinion, and W. A. C. Bennett said subsequently that Pattullo should have proceeded and if defeated after "a few constructive moves" probably would have been returned with a majority. However, Maitland

may have been constrained from raising this particular point because Anscomb, who had a big following in the party, was convinced immediately after the election that a Coalition under Hart as premier would be the best course for the Conservative party. Maitland may not have felt, despite his great personal regard for Pattullo as a leader and a person, that supporting a Pattullo-led minority government was one of his options. Maitland was a great party loyalist, although that did not stop him from going his own principled way in 1933, and was aware that he would probably have split the party if he insisted on supporting premier Pattullo. But the logic of the Sun's article above is persuasive; Maitland had only two choices that would in the end benefit the Conservative party, either support a minority Liberal administration, or a Union government.⁷

The next day, 7 November, Maitland again appealed to Winch to bring his party into Union government as the party had done in "Manitoba where the C.C.F. Party had cabinet representation and the government is not embarrassed with class struggle and division." (In Manitoba, the CCF, which held six of 55 seats, had one portfolio in a 12-man Cabinet.) In contrast to his strong stand and outright rejection of either Coalition or Union government in 1932 and 1933, and his ideological support of party government, Maitland rationalized that a cooperative, three party government would reflect "all shades of political opinion." This would ensure a united all-out war effort and avoid "a sort of class war . . . that your party proposes to set up." In a complete about face, he argued that partisan politics would mean

the government stood "for one class of people and the Opposition, represented by the C.C.F. [would] stand for another class division," a situation that would "only result in a divided instead of a united people in the province." This was really a most astounding statement by a man who was still a member and supporter of the federal Conservative party which was an active partner in party government.⁸

A week after his 6 November meeting Maitland sought advice from Howard Green. He had had a good discussion with his caucus, he said, but "very few of them had definite opinions one way or the other," although the majority would support a Liberal-Conservative coalition. In his view, Maitland explained, Pattullo intended to lead a minority government with support from the CCF who would maintain that the "patriotic thing to do is to avoid an election at this time." Maitland implied cynical motives by the CCF, but he too wanted to avoid an election and had reminded his caucus that this could be accomplished through either Union or Coalition government. He told Green he had no doubt that the voters had repudiated the premier and "expect us to introduce a want of confidence motion." In a reply which carefully avoided any mention of Coalition, Green implied that his colleagues in Ottawa thought "such a step would be asking for trouble and might very well force an election, which would be resented by the people." In 1987, when Winch was queried about Maitland's proposal, he said it would have been irresponsible to move no confidence in the government except for a specific reason, such as an objection to particular legislation. The CCF, he said, would have given a minority Liberal

administration an opportunity to carry out public business. From this statement it is clear that a Conservative want of confidence motion, as proposed by Maitland, would have failed.⁹

Two weeks later, Maitland, still undecided, asked R. B. Bennett, who was retired in England, about both the non-confidence motion, and terms of Coalition. Influenced by Green's opinion, Maitland worried that the party might be wiped out in an ensuing general election. Therefore, he had pretty well made up his mind, he said, that a Coalition was the only alternative, but he wanted to negotiate terms that would preserve the party's identity. In a rather confusing reply, Bennett never directly addressed Maitland's reference to Coalition terms. He did not agree that the party would be destroyed in a new election as, in his opinion, Liberals would support Conservatives to block the CCF. (In 1933 he had advised provincial Conservatives to support the Liberals, for the same reason!) He was not keen about Union government but believed Premier Bracken of Manitoba had shown such an arrangement was workable. Coalition government, that is, of Conservatives and Liberals, on the other hand, could cause great (but undefined) difficulties when the emergency was over. But, he suggested, if it was a great success it could be used as an example to end party politics at the provincial level. There never was "any justification for the adoption of political parties in the Provinces on a Dominion basis." A non-partisan, strictly business, administration would be the most suitable form of government in the province. (Yet in 1937 he contradicted a British Columbia Conservative

who held the same view and stated that "on balance, there is a great deal to be said for the Party system.")¹⁰

During the first three weeks of the Coalition crisis, while Maitland, limited in his political options by division in his party, was frantically trying to influence events, Pattullo remained serenely aloof from the furor over his party's minority standing, convinced of the security and correctness of his position. He was completely opposed to a Liberal-Conservative Coalition because he believed, first, that the Liberal party stood halfway between a socialist and a reactionary party. He was convinced a Coalition would help the Conservatives, who were a dying party, and aid the CCF because liberal-minded people would not support a Liberal-Conservative alliance. Therefore he proceeded with plans to sign a tax agreement in Ottawa. Throughout the election campaign he had said repeatedly he would not complete tax negotiations until he had the voters' approval, but at best he had a weak mandate. Nevertheless, he left for Ottawa on 25 October and was away until 8 November.¹¹

Unfortunately for Pattullo, and perhaps for British Columbia, his remaining days as premier of British Columbia were numbered. He had been a great and colourful leader through tumultuous times, but his political sense had deserted him in the most serious crisis of his political career. Many of his colleagues, ministers and backbenchers, deserted him in favour of a Liberal-Conservative Coalition. Some of

them did not want another election during the war and others were fearful the CCF would win if an election was held. Over Pattullo's objections, a convention was set for 2 December. The first order of business was a resolution calling for a Liberal-Conservative Coalition, and when this was approved, not overwhelmingly by any means, 477 to 312, Pattullo promptly left the convention. Hart, who had resigned on 17 November because of differences with Pattullo over Coalition, was then acclaimed the new leader.¹²

On 4 December, when the 1941-42 Legislative Session got underway, Maitland still had not decided what course to take, even though he had discussed Coalition on 6 November as almost a foregone conclusion, subject to acceptable terms, and reiterated this view in his letter to Bennett on 26 November. Sometime during opening day (one source states it was in the morning, another in early evening) Hart had informed both Maitland and Winch that the Liberal Party favoured "a Coalition Government in the present emergency," and formally solicited their "co-operation in forming such an administration [which] public sentiment is overwhelmingly in favour of." Finally, he suggested they have a conference to finalize the matter.¹³

During the brief afternoon Session, following the Lieutenant Governor's Throne speech, and after Pattullo's farewell and Harold Winch's tribute to him, Maitland "barged in with an appeal--with all the strength and power I had--for a three way government [out of] a sense of duty." (Maitland literally intruded on House business. He was not scheduled to speak on "Orders of the Day," nor was his speech

mentioned in "Votes and Proceedings.") It was a very strange address, because it was, again, a strong indictment of party politics which he had so often defended. This country, he began, in fact "our whole Empire is in grave danger." He recalled his 23 October statement that the parties would now have an opportunity to put into practise their campaign pledges to do everything possible to further the war effort. Because no one party had a clear mandate, Coalition was the obvious answer. There could be no unity, he maintained, if one party went its own way, attacking and criticizing the administration. Instead "you force party warfare upon the government" which would lead to "class warfare [and] party propaganda." Our Fathers of Confederation, he said, were Grits and Tories who sunk their political differences and joined together to form Confederation. Manitoba and Great Britain have Union governments and have lost nothing by it. Russia and Great Britain have two completely different systems of government, yet they have joined together against a common enemy. He suggested that anyone who did not want Coalition was intent on division, not unity. Any other course "means party manoeuvring, class against class, party against party." He concluded by appealing to "those who have spoken against union to reconsider." British Columbia must have a strong government that would get on with the war. Everyone must face the "responsibility of making sacrifices in an all out war effort." Premier-designate Hart did not add to this further condemnation of party government but simply replied that Maitland's remarks encouraged him to believe a three-way government was possible.¹⁴

Although the press fully reported opening day proceedings, which included Pattullo's last official act as premier, it gave only spotty coverage to Maitland's address. The Times made no reference whatever, whereas the Colonist referred to Maitland's "challenging call for the union of all three parties." The Province in a few brief references said the House was "electrified by Mr. Maitland's stirring plea for unity," and in a short editorial a few days later described his address as "one of the most eloquent and moving speeches the Legislature has heard in many a day." However the Province saw no chance of Union government, given Winch's refusal the day before, but believed Maitland had gained stature among fellow British Columbians. Of the Sun's three reports only Hutchison's included any analysis. Always an admirer of Maitland's eloquence and great platform ability but little impressed by these qualities, Hutchison interpreted the unscheduled speech as one last attempt to avoid a two-party Coalition and submergence of the Conservative party. Mr. Maitland, he reported, "grows hoarse with emotion when he comes to the war and the need of winning it and the desire for complete Coalition of all parties--on a temporary basis, [and] thus pounding his desk pleads hoarsely with Mr. Winch to reconsider . . . to end the class war and all party strife." What really haunted Maitland, in Hutchison's opinion (which sounded remarkably like the Sun's interview with a "leading Conservative" on 24 October), was the fear that a Liberal-Conservative Coalition would result in the Conservative party slowly losing its identity because of the similarity of the two parties, whereas a three party Coalition with

the "unassimiable Socialists" would eventually break into three distinct fragments and each party could resume its position in the political stratum. Moreover, Hutchison thought, Maitland was ignoring certain obvious facts, for example, Winch's intelligence, and the unbridgeable differences regarding the country's war industries, which the CCF would "socialize." Further, the CCF would outrank the Conservatives in terms of the number of seats.¹⁵

Two days after the Province's article on Maitland's eloquence, Hart's and Maitland's correspondence, made public by this time, provoked several responses, predictably by Harold Winch. Obviously piqued by Maitland's statement that the CCF was "committed to a policy of class warfare and economic strife, and has placed its political welfare before a united war effort," Winch said he was "greatly surprised to see Mr. Maitland descending to straight political bargaining so soon after his lofty sentiments as expounded in the Legislature last Thursday" [that is, 4 December--JGT]. "Such an approach can hardly create a climate of harmony so necessary for the formation of stable government." In this same press release Winch promised that the CCF would continue to maintain its "constructive attitude." The Times also commented on the Province's article under the title, "Not Bargaining?" It criticized Maitland because he knew full well that the CCF would not join a Union government, and it considered his demand for half the Cabinet posts unreasonable. The Times also felt the Province had lost its sense of proportion because the article implied that Maitland and the Conservatives had a monopoly on

patriotism. The Sun scolded Maitland because he had ignored Hart's invitation to a conference and instead submitted a list of conditions for Coalition. Of course, the Times and Sun were both Liberal party supporters, and were perhaps a little biased against the Conservatives.¹⁶

While the Conservatives were still pondering Hart's invitation, the CCF immediately declined, but assured Hart that it shared the "general desire to devote the maximum effort to achieve victory in the war." Winch reasoned that in a Union government the CCF would be slowly overwhelmed by the other two parties. Moreover, the CCF ministers would have great problems keeping their caucus in line. He believed, as everyone including many Conservatives seemed to, that in a Liberal-Conservative Coalition the latter would suffer when the arrangement ended, and in a Union government, the CCF would lose out politically on break-up. Apart from those difficulties, he anticipated real problems with Maitland who, in his opinion, was pushing Union government only for public effect and to please certain members in his own party. As he recalled recently of Maitland, "he didn't like us."¹⁷

On 5 December, the Conservative caucus and the party was reported split on Hart's invitation, hardly surprising since provincial association organizer Russell Walker, for example, totally opposed Coalition which he insisted could be decided only at a full-scale provincial convention. On the other hand, Anscomb, as well as most of those who attended the 6 November caucus, favoured Coalition. After further consultation with members of the Vancouver organization,

who worried that Coalition would severely reduce their control over the party as a whole, on 6 December Maitland sent Hart his "conditions" for joining Coalition in the "present emergency," "not in the spirit of bargaining but . . . after very careful deliberation by myself and the Conservative members." He stated that a Coalition government must administer a war economy in full cooperation with Ottawa. It must also establish a highway commission, reconsider the Rowell-Sirois recommendations, cut government overhead costs and eliminate patronage, establish a purchasing commission, and immediately begin to develop plans for post-war recovery. These were all planks in the Conservative manifesto. In conclusion he suggested that his letter be released to the Press. His terms for Coalition were almost identical to those which he had discussed on 6 November when he said the party should have conditions prepared so that it could respond quickly to a Coalition offer without appearing to be "playing poker." In his letter Maitland carefully refrained from requesting a specific number of portfolios, (but before the election Pattullo had a nine-man Cabinet which included the premier) only "equal representation in the Cabinet, leaving to your Party, in addition the Premiership."¹⁸

The two men exchanged further letters over the (Pearl Harbor) weekend. Hart offered the Conservatives four Cabinet posts, but one without portfolio, in a nine-man Cabinet that included the premier. He would not accept Maitland's conditions, although he was not unsympathetic to them. In a brief reply on 8 December, Maitland rejected the Cabinet offer but compromised on his conditions. Sometime within this

24 hour period, either the afternoon of 8 December or the morning of the ninth, Maitland apparently called personally on Hart and again insisted on four portfolios.¹⁹

Hart, in a quandary because he had publicly stated that he would announce his Cabinet on 9 December, and because the Session was scheduled to resume on 8 January, then called Harold Winch down to his office and explained his dilemma. To Winch the answer to the problem was very simple. "Pat Maitland," he said, "has two ambitions, one is to be premier, the other is to be attorney general. So tell him to go to hell! Tell him I said we will support you as a minority Liberal government . . . we will decide how long you stay in office." This would mean, he continued, that "Pat Maitland won't be premier, or attorney general or leader of the Opposition." An hour later Hart phoned Winch that "everything was okay."²⁰

At this same meeting Winch said Hart invited the CCF into Coalition and if they accepted he would leave the Conservatives out. He offered Winch any post except premier or finance. It was a very clever move, but Winch quickly saw the danger and declined. Anyway, he said, he was sure Maitland would accept Hart's ultimatum, which turned out to be three portfolios only, Anscomb, Minister of Mines, Bruhn to Public Works, and Maitland as Attorney General, in an eight-man Cabinet that included the premier. He also said, as Pattullo had said of the Liberals, that the Conservatives "finished themselves when they went into Coalition."²¹

Events moved quickly after the two men had reached agreement.

Hart was sworn in on 9 December as Minister of Finance and President of the Council and the other seven ministers were sworn in at 4:30 the next day including Maitland who became attorney general. His first two letters from his new office were to sons Bob and Bill, both overseas on combat duty. He wrote that he anticipated "very hard work during the present emergency."²²

In the short space of six weeks, the political face of British Columbia underwent a radical and dramatic change. The two old, free enterprise parties, Liberal and Conservative, that had been political adversaries since party government was established in 1903, joined forces to prevent another wartime election which they feared the strong and growing CCF would win. But the Conservative party may have been motivated more by a collective need to share in governing than by any apprehension about the CCF party. Certainly the party had governed as recently as 1933, yet from 1916, and even through the Tolmie administration, it had been split by public bickering among factions. In the "most Conservative Province in Canada," as federal Conservative leader R. B. Bennett had referred to British Columbia in 1929, the unity essential for a winning party was an elusive goal, and the Conservatives, in despair of ever again winning and holding power, may have perceived Coalition government as an opportunity to be at least a partner in government.²³

Maitland, desperately trying to influence events, underwent an

ideological and political metamorphosis. He condemned and repudiated party government which he had advocated and defended for 33 years. His appeals to the CCF seemed irrational. Because the CCF wished to retain its integrity as a party rather than join in a coalition, Maitland accused it of fomenting class warfare (and, indeed, one or two CCF MLAs may have been inclined to do just that), when his own federal party, supported by British Columbia Conservatives, was an active participant in party government. Why he chose to attack party politics in government so strongly is incomprehensible, especially when Liberal leader Hart simply stated that he favoured Coalition government. Perhaps Maitland wanted to sway anti-Coalitionists in his own party, but the risk was that he would offend all those who supported the federal Conservatives. Possibly he was trying to provide publicity for national leader Meighen who would open his personal by-election campaign in Ontario on 10 January 1942 with an appeal for National, that is, Coalition government, and conscription. (In a two party contest the CCF won easily.) Regardless, the CCF stood fast, the Liberals and Conservatives formed the government, and Maitland realized one of his lifelong ambitions.²⁴

Footnotes

¹See, for example, G. M. Abbott, "The Formation of the Liberal-Conservative Coalition in 1941" (M.A. thesis, University of Victoria, 1978); Donald Alper, "The Effects of Coalition Government on Party Structure: The Case of the Conservative Party in B.C.," BC Studies (Spring 1977):40-49; Donald Alper, "From Rule to Ruin"; Mitchell, W. A. C. Bennett, pp. 65-71; Ormsby, A History, pp. 473-78; Robin, Pillars, pp. 51-62; Sherman, Bennett, pp. 38-42; Sutherland, "Pattullo," pp. 117-18; Walker, Politicians, pp. 214-17; and Worley, Wonderful World, pp. 36-38.

²For Maitland's statement, see "Maitland Calls for Union Gov't in B.C.," Sun, 23 October 1941, p. 1; for Pattullo's response, see "Pattullo Holds On; Cold Shoulder to Coalition," Sun, *ibid.*; for Winch's refusal, see "Maitland Proposal for Tri-Party Union Rejected by Winch," Colonist, 24 October 1941, p. 1.

³"Is CCF Real Target of Tories," Sun, 24 October 1941, p. 21.

⁴For details of the meeting, see Maitland 781, Box 32, file 10, and Maitland 11, Box 3, file 6; for his speech, that day, undated, but contextually compatible with the purpose of the meeting, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 7; for Anscomb's telegrams, see Maitland, *ibid.*, file 6.

⁵Maitland 781, Box 32, file 10, and Maitland 11, Box 3, file 6.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷In his papers for the 6 November 1941 caucus meeting, cited in note 4, Maitland made no reference or hint to supporting a Liberal minority government; for Bennett's view, see Paddy Sherman, Bennett, p. 40; Anscomb told Hutchison of his belief for Coalition when they met while on the trip referred to in Anscomb's telegrams of 4 and 5 November (see note 4), see Hutchison, Interview, 29 September 1987.

⁸Maitland 11, Box 3, file 6, Maitland to Winch, 7 November 1941.

⁹For the Green correspondence, see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 3, Maitland to Green, 13 November 1941; and Maitland 781, Box 1, file 76, Green to Maitland, 15 November 1941; for Winch's comment, Interview, 13 August 1987.

¹⁰For the Bennett correspondence, Bennett Papers, PAC, MG26K, Reel 472, documents 600618-600619, Maitland to Bennett, 26 November 1941; and Bennett, *ibid.*, documents 600622-600623, Bennett to Maitland, 6 January 1942; for the 1937 view, see McKelvie Papers, PABC, MSS 1,

Box 4, file (c), Bennett to McKelvie, 10 April 1937.

¹¹For reference to Pattullo's Ottawa trip, see Sutherland, "Pattullo," pp. 124-28; and Robin, Pillars, p. 58; for Pattullo's opposition to coalition, see Robin, *ibid.*, pp. 58-60, and Sutherland, "Pattullo," pp. 136-37; for his decision to go to Ottawa, see "Facts that Face Mr. Pattullo," Sun, 24 October 1941, p. 6; and Sutherland, "Pattullo," pp. 125-28.

¹²For details of defections, the convention and the vote for coalition, see Sutherland, "Pattullo," pp. 129-40; and Robin, pp. 59-62; for Hart's resignation, see "Pattullo," p. 130. Abbott, "Coalition," pp. 8-9 discusses why Liberals and Conservatives favoured coalition.

¹³For the two sources regarding delivery of Hart's letter, morning or evening, see, respectively, "Premier Pattullo's Ghost Gov't Fades Into History," Sun, 5 December 1941, p. 25; and "C.C.F. Says 'No'; Tories Split on Issue," Sun, 5 December 1941, p. 1; Hart's letter, see Maitland 781, Box 2, file 9.

¹⁴For the references to Pattullo and Winch, see "Premier Pattullo's Ghost Gov't Fades Into History," Sun, 5 December 1941, p. 25; for his log remarks, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1941/42 log, 4 December; for his speech see Maitland 781, Box 9, file 6; there is no reference to Maitland's impromptu address in British Columbia, Journals of the Legislative Assembly, 1941-42 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1942), 4 December 1941; the speech cited by Abbott in "Coalition," p. 63 is in Maitland 11, Box 3, file 7 --I believe a comparison of the two will show that the latter may have been delivered on 6 November to Maitland's caucus meeting but certainly not on 4 December to the Legislature--the contexts are quite different; for Hart's brief comments, see "Hart and Maitland Plead With the C.C.F.," Province, 5 December 1941, p. 13; and "Premier to Retire from Party Tuesday," Colonist, 5 December 1941, p. 1.

¹⁵In articles on the fourth and fifth of December, the Times made no reference to Maitland's speech; for the "challenging call," see "Premier to Retire from Post Tuesday," Colonist, 5 December 1941, p. 1; for Maitland's "stirring plea for unity," see "Hart and Maitland Plead With CCF," Province, 5 December 1941, p. 13; and for Maitland's eloquent speech, see "An Eloquent Plea," Province, 6 December 1941, p. 4; for Hutchison's report, see "Premier Pattullo's Ghost Government Fades into History," Sun, 5 December 1941, p. 25; Abbott, "Coalition," p. 8, points out that the Conservatives, in coalition, would be dominated by the numerically dominant Liberals.

¹⁶For Winch's pique, see "Winch Scores Maitland Note," Province, 8 December 1941, p. 13; for the Times' piece, see "Not Bargaining?," Times, 8 December 1941, p. 4; for the Sun's scolding, see

"One Cabinet Job Delays Coalition," Sun, 8 December 1941, p. 1.

¹⁷For Winch's reply, see Johnson Papers, University of Victoria, Special Collections, Box 1, file 6, Winch to Hart, a letter marked "Copy," dated only "December, 1941"; for Winch's reasoning about the damaging political effects to the CCF of Union government, and to the Conservatives in a Coalition government, see Winch, Interview, 13 August 1987; for Maitland's appeal to the CCF was straight opportunism, and his dislike of the CCF, see Winch, *ibid.*

¹⁸For the Conservative split and the Vancouver consultation, see "C.C.F. Says 'No'; Tories Split on Issue," Sun, 5 December 1941, p. 1; Walker's opposition, Walker, Pioneering, p. 216; for Maitland's terms, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 6 and 781, Box 4, file 2, Maitland to Hart, 6 December 1941.

¹⁹For the Hart and Maitland letters, see respectively, Maitland 781, Box 3, file 6, Hart to Maitland, 7 December 1941, and *ibid.*, Maitland to Hart, 8 December 1941; according to Winch, Interview 13 August 1987, Maitland called on Hart shortly before the latter invited Winch down to his office to discuss the situation.

²⁰For Winch's description of the events, from Hart's quandary, see Interview, 13 August 1987 (Sherman in Bennett, pp. 40-42 provides a somewhat different version of the Hart-Winch exchange); according to Walker, Pioneering, p. 216, Maitland had never made any secret of his two political ambitions.

²¹For Hart's invitation to the CCF, see Winch, Interview, 13 August 1987; for the Cabinet size, see "New 8-Man B.C. Cabinet Announcement," Sun, 9 December 1941, p. 1; for his opinion that the Conservatives were finished, see Winch, *ibid.*

²²For Order in Council naming the new ministers, see British Columbia, The British Columbia Gazette (Victoria: King's Printer), 18 December 1941, p. 1714; for the swearing in date, see "New 8-Man B.C. Cabinet Announcement," Sun, 9 December 1941, p. 1; for the reference to the letters to his sons, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 25, Maitland to Bill, 10 December 1941.

²³For Bennett's comment, see Tolmie Papers, Box 1, file 1, Bennett to Tolmie, 19 August 1929; the British Columbia Conservative party exhibited a few characteristics typical of a party resigned to remaining in Opposition, as discussed by George C. Perlin in the Tory Syndrome (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980) especially pp. 198-200, and may have seen Coalition as a way out of its morass. Similarities in behaviour between the two parties included chronic, and public, infighting with little or no regard for who the real enemy was, weakly supported leaders, and little commitment to new and/or long term policies.

²⁴For Meighen's campaign, see "Meighen Urges National Gov't, Conscription," Sun, 10 January 1942, p. 16.

CHAPTER VII

MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE COALITION GOVERNMENT,

1941-1946

Maitland was Conservative party leader and Attorney General from 10 December 1941 to 28 March 1946. He was appointed in the darkest days of the war. Germany was still advancing in Russia and the Japanese had just begun attacking American and British possessions in the western Pacific and south-east Asia. During this period he helped effect federal-provincial cooperation, a provincial war economy, and post-war recovery legislation. And with millions of people around the world he welcomed peace in Europe and Asia in 1945.

Understandably, Coalition government and the attorney general's portfolio¹ posed certain challenges and problems. Maitland had a heavy portfolio that included, for example, Companies Branch, Securities Branch, provincial police, jails, administration of justice and land registry offices. Coalition itself gave rise to problems. Despite all his assurances of a harmonious relationship with the premier, Maitland and Hart soon disagreed over Cabinet appointments. Some Conservatives blamed Maitland for the party's third place finish, and others wanted no part of Coalition. Maitland urged his party to support Coalition yet expected them to keep their constituency organizations in good shape as a means of ensuring party identity. He himself constantly attacked the CCF, mainly as a method of differentiating the Conserva-

tives from the Liberals, a strategy that failed miserably until 1945.

Maitland's public office and personal business schedule was exhausting and in the end, fatal. As a Cabinet member he had an office and full-time staff in Victoria. He travelled to Ottawa several times. He campaigned in three by-elections and two general elections. In addition to that work load, he tried to maintain his law practise in Vancouver. He was frequently under the weather, seriously ill three times, and failed to recover from his last illness.

As attorney general, Maitland's first challenge was actually expected to come from disgruntled party members. The party executive had announced an annual meeting for 10 January, the first such gathering since early in 1941. After his appointment friends had congratulated him, some with reservations. For example, a fellow lawyer and member of the Nelson constituency association said the district executive commended him as "high minded and courageous," whereas a political colleague from nearby Rossland, W. K. Esling, MP, wished Maitland well but regretted that he had gone into Coalition instead of Union government. In an exchange of correspondence Paton warned W. A. C. Bennett, both of whom supported Maitland, that the meeting might "take a violent turn and may develop into an attack against Pat" because the "loss of the election through the country is laid on his shoulders." He had made "few friends since his appointment [as leader]" and the Vancouver Centre association members were particularly disenchanted with him. He

was even "more or less at outs in his own riding," Paton continued, yet the Point Grey association delegates had been a strong factor in Maitland's leadership victory in 1938.²

Maitland's campaigning in the 1941 election had been relatively unsuccessful. On his swing through southern B.C., he had spurned the advice of long time political advisor and fellow lawyer, A. C. Desbri-say, to ignore the CCF. Of the 13 constituencies covered in that tour the party captured only four seats. In Victoria and downtown Vancouver the party did not win any seats.³

At any other time Maitland would have had a real battle on his hands, and perhaps faced a leadership convention. But for once his luck was good. Delegates at the meeting were so concerned about the presence of Japanese residents on the coast that they approved Maitland's actions without discussion. Maitland promptly sent off a telegram to Hart that the convention had endorsed his [Maitland's] stand on coalition by a "unanimous standing vote."⁴

At this same meeting Maitland urged everyone, Liberal and Con-servative, to put aside all thoughts of political advantage so that British Columbia could cope with its greatest emergency in history. Howard Green, newly-elected president of the provincial association and no lover of Coalition, tried to bring everyone down to earth, Maitland particularly, by suggesting that the Conservative party "could best serve the interests of the country by keeping up its strength--even in coalition." Premier Hart had declared a few days earlier that "possible former differences of opinion" among Liberal and Conservative

Cabinet members were insignificant in view of the war emergency.⁵

By September 1942 Maitland's courtship with Coalition had ended and he had decided to resign over differences with the premier about Cabinet appointments. In January he had described how he and the premier worked "together without a thought of party politics," but in August was abruptly reminded that a harmonious working relationship with a majority Coalition partner does not imply shared decision-making about important matters. The disagreement arose over who would be the new Minister of Public Works. Minister of Public Works R. Bruhn, who had been in hospital when appointed in December 1941, died in late August and a few days later Maitland, Pearson and Hart discussed his Conservative replacement. When Maitland disagreed with Hart's suggestion of Anscomb, then Minister of Mines, the Premier conceded that the final choice was up to Maitland.

Maitland had good, practical political reasons for insisting that the Public Works portfolio should go to a man of his choice. That department was responsible for all roads and public buildings and served every community in the province in distinctively marked vehicles. It had a full time staff which was augmented seasonally and the patronage opportunities were obvious. Harold Winch believed the Minister of Public Works had the "most powerful job in government."⁷

A week after their first discussion Hart again insisted on Anscomb and denied Maitland's understanding of the first meeting. When Pearson, who had privately confirmed Maitland's recollection of the first discussion, supported the Premier's version, Maitland was so

enraged with Hart, a "typical Mark," that he decided to resign from Cabinet and leave Coalition, even though he grudgingly admitted that it was the premier's prerogative to appoint whichever Conservative he wanted. Nevertheless, he knew his supporters would blame him personally for the appointment. When he told Bennett of his intentions, Bennett convinced him that he should have a much stronger reason for resigning, and that leaving under those circumstances would appear to be just "sour grapes." According to Worley, Maitland offered the position to Bennett, who declined a Cabinet post for the second time in nine months because of his business commitments. Maitland then recommended E. C. Carson but the Premier bluntly replied that he would decide who got which portfolio. Subsequently, he appointed Anscomb to Public Works, and Carson took over the Mines portfolio.⁸

If Maitland had been euphoric about Coalition government, this incident would serve to bring him back to political reality. Working with the premier in future would be a political duty, not a quasi social occasion as he had earlier implied. From now on, he said, he would be "on guard for evermore." For a "hard ball player" like Maitland, in a profession where upmanship was an automatic reflex, his anger was surprising, and perhaps an indication that he really believed it was possible for him and the Premier to work "together without a thought of party politics." In Harold Winch's opinion, Hart had decided months before that if anything should happen to Bruhn, he wanted Anscomb for that post. Both Bruhn and Anscomb were very strong on Coalition, but Bruhn was a Maitland supporter whereas Anscomb was

his rival.⁹

But Maitland's own department was not without many patronage opportunities. He was responsible for maintaining the court system, for the establishment and operation of the provincial police force (which included the Motor Vehicle Branch), the Game Branch (which included game wardens), and the Liquor Control Board. None were covered by the Civil Service Act in respect to hiring staff, but in any event, Labour Minister Pearson admitted in 1942 that this Act never had been "really operative" in British Columbia, that departments, that is, ministers, did their own recruiting and hiring. In late 1945 the police service, the Game Branch, and the Liquor Board were still not covered by the Civil Service Act. Patronage opportunities, or in the vernacular, the advantage of having "pull," was obvious. For example, Maitland appointed two Justices of the Peace in the Okanagan on Bennett's request. Both the Liquor Board and the Motor Vehicle Branch had seasonal rushes. In the latter, where all licenses fell due on the same day, extra staff would be hired for a short time. In the case of New Westminster Motor Vehicle Branch in 1946, for instance, the attorney general's secretary advised local MLA Byron Johnson that Superintendent of Motor Vehicles, G. A. Hood, would need 14 temporary staff--the "usual slip as to desired qualifications" was enclosed--and the appointments would "go 50-50 with both Parties." Johnson, who had won a by-election in May 1945 with Maitland's assistance, promptly submitted 21 names to the attorney general's office. The provincial police force, the Game Commission with its game wardens, and to a

lesser extent the Liquor Control Board and the Motor Vehicle Branch were, like Public Works, present in every part of the province. Their performance reflected on government, the attorney general, and incidentally on the Conservative party itself.¹⁰

But on 8 January 1942, the first day of the reconvened 1941-42 Legislative Session and just over a month since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, British Columbia politicians, preoccupied with intensifying the war effort, moved that the federal government mobilize immediately all the country's resources, both human and material, for war purposes. Maitland spoke on the motions, at first glance quite unnecessarily.

Actually, two similar notices of motion were introduced, one by Conservative member Alex Paton and one by Liberal member E. T. Kenny. The next day Harold Winch in a "masterly" effort in parliamentary strategy, moved an eight-point amendment to the Throne speech, incorporating the ideas of Paton and Kenny but also providing for an excess profits tax, compulsory interest-free loans by the wealthy to government for war purposes, a steeply progressive income tax rate, compulsory service in civilian protection work such as the ARP, and "selective service for war industry and active [military] service."¹¹

Maitland responded to Winch's speech cynically as he referred to "this young fellow" (then 35 years old, the same age as Maitland when he first ran for provincial public office) who was "developing feeling and hate under the cloak of patriotism." Maitland apparently did not know that Winch was in the Vancouver Irish Fusiliers regiment

(where he eventually served for three years, and rose through the ranks to become a commissioned officer). Neither did he realize that several of the CCF MLAs had served in the First World War. Winch was "obviously an actor" who had the "art of speaking with authority" on subjects he knew nothing about. What he was really proposing in his speech was socialism, Maitland concluded. Neither Bruce McKelvie, a former Conservative candidate who wrote for the Province, nor Hutchison of the Sun saw anything socialistic or unpatriotic about Winch's speech. Indeed, Hutchison marvelled at the complete change from 1939 in the CCF's approach to the war and described Winch's speech as "constructive [and] absolutely free from partisanship," and suggested that the Canadian government would probably implement all the amendment points before the war was over. (At the Conservatives' annual meeting the next day Maitland sarcastically reported that the "CCF party was frothing over their loyalty and war effort.")¹²

Although Premier Hart refused to allow debate on the amendment since two similar motions were already on the order paper, Maitland nevertheless informed the House that he could not vote for it because conscription, which the people wanted and which he personally supported, was not specifically mentioned in the amendment. Winch and the newspapers in fact had assumed the obvious, that "Selective service for war industry and active [military] service" also meant conscription for overseas military service. The whole government side of the House voted against the amendment, so it was unnecessary for Maitland to volunteer such a transparently partisan and weak objection. But he may

have been motivated by more than simple anti-CCF bias and used the Legislature as a forum, where all British Columbia's major newspapers were represented, to put on the public record, his strong support of unrestricted manpower conscription. He would almost certainly have been informed by his friends in Ottawa about the rumour circulating in early January that the King government would be announcing a plebiscite, the purpose of which would be to determine if Canadians would support conscription for overseas service. After the rumour was confirmed and the plebiscite set for 27 April 1942, Maitland participated in the bi-partisan campaign urging British Columbians to vote yes, which they did, overwhelmingly.¹³

Three weeks after the Session had reconvened, Maitland delivered his maiden speech which in effect was a report of government progress since Cabinet was sworn in on 10 December 1941. He dealt with several matters including the Air Raid Precautions (ARP) organization, very briefly with the tax agreement he and Hart had signed in Ottawa, in some detail with postwar planning, and with the presence of Japanese residents on the Coast. Each raised certain administrative and political questions.¹⁴

The ARP, for which the attorney general was responsible, was an administrative headache and the source of political embarrassment to Maitland. Described as "a mess indeed" by the Sun, the organization had been practically ignored by both the federal and provincial governments because, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, no one anticipated air raids in British Columbia. The media had been critical

of the organization, and the day before Maitland's speech Harold Winch had demanded information, though not military secrets, about the state of readiness of the ARP and other defense forces in British Columbia. When Maitland accused him of just seeking publicity, Winch replied that if they were scandal mongers they could have made headlines across the country by voicing their suspicions to the press about the lack of military defense in the area. Maitland had no way of knowing, of course, that Howard Green would make headlines that same day with charges in the Commons that British Columbia was unprepared for a Japanese attack. Therefore, Maitland backtracked the next day and reminded the House that the ARP was a federal responsibility and Easterners, at least 3,000 miles from a war zone, did not appreciate the danger of an unprotected West coast. The attorney general stated citizens of British Columbia, especially in coastal cities, should be prepared to participate in ARP work just as Londoners had during the Battle of Britain.¹⁵

Although the three parties had campaigned hard on federal-provincial cooperation, Maitland only briefly touched on the matter in his report to the House. He and the premier had signed tax agreements with Ottawa under which the federal government would recover about \$6 million annually from various former provincial tax sources. In his speech to the Conservatives' annual meeting on 10 January he reported that he and Hart "gave Ottawa everything they wanted from us."¹⁶

Of the issues that Maitland reviewed, the proposal to establish a permanent postwar planning committee struck a responsive chord with

every MLA. Even Dorothy Steeves, who had herself mentioned the postwar world in the speech that had offended so many in the House over two years before, was delighted. She thought Maitland's address "was one of the best" he had ever made in the Legislature, and commented that his speeches were similar to Harold Winch's--both were always "dramatic and full of incident." The idea of postwar planning seems to have been raised first by Howard Green at a provincial Conservative annual meeting in October 1939. A few days later in the Legislature, both Maitland and Winch had urged the Liberal government to plan for the postwar period. In the 1941 election campaign all three parties had promised to set up a postwar reconstruction program and the day the Session resumed, Pattullo had recommended to the Premier that a House committee should be set up to consider postwar problems. In his speech Maitland assured the House that legislation would be introduced as soon as possible, and indeed, within two weeks the Post-War Rehabilitation Act received Royal Assent. This statute provided for a 12-person Council and in March seven MLAs were appointed, three Liberals of whom one was chairman, two Conservatives and two CCF Members. In July 1942, one woman from each party was added.¹⁷

In February 1943, Premier Hart tabled the Council's interim report, described by chairman H. T. Perry as neither "capitalistic or socialistic." Nevertheless, Council's six major recommendations were based on government participation. Council recommended establishment of a steel industry and extension of the PGE railway to the Peace river country, both by government if necessary. The province should encour-

age greater exploitation of natural resources, and the development of new industries. The province should also help agriculture improve the production and marketing methods. Finally, and most importantly, Council recommended that government establish a hydroelectric authority to provide cheap power throughout the province.¹⁸

The hydroelectric recommendation, which was included in the final report in 1944, caused the most controversy. Both Winch and Bennett urged the government to move immediately on the interim report, and Bennett reminded the House that it was a Tory government that gave public hydroelectricity to Ontario. Finally, in 1945 when government established a Power Commission to supply power to rural areas, Winch protested that Council had never intended that only rural areas be serviced with public power. Rather frivolously, Maitland then argued that government should not be in the "retail business dealing either with light or transportation." Socialist public power, he said, was different than free enterprise public power. "The CCF wants to operate at a profit for government, but the Coalition plans to distribute power at cost." By 1946 Maitland conceded that there were "certain things to which public ownership should be applied, and this is evidenced by the fact that every Province in Canada and every State in the Union has Public Utilities Commissions." Furthermore, he continued, the "Ontario ownership of Hydro-electric power has done more for industry in that Province than any other thing."¹⁹

Although postwar planning was important and both sides of the House made a strong and lasting commitment to it during that first

Session in 1942, most of the MLAs, like thousands of other British Columbians, were also very concerned about Japanese residents on the Coast. Maitland told the Legislature that he had heard from people from all parts of the province who, like him, did not "feel safe with Japs on this coast." He had urged Ottawa authorities, who were responsible for military security, to do something as soon as possible. In March, following a bout of influenza, Maitland visited his counterpart in California, Attorney General Earl Warren, to exchange views about the "Japanese problem." By that time, the federal government had already decided to remove all Japanese from the Coast.²⁰

Even though the Session had been demanding Maitland was enjoying his role in government after being in Opposition for eight years. But, like any portfolio it was not problem-free, as he soon learned. For example, he found "very distressing" the "large doses of applications for jobs and the like," which reached his desk, many of which would involve patronage distribution. He had another patronage problem for which he was directly responsible. He needed an experienced Crown prosecutor in Vancouver and decided to appoint S. J. Remnant, his long-time law partner and fellow member of the Vancouver-Point Grey Conservative association. He expected some personal flak for appointing Remnant and, not surprisingly, the CCF raised the matter during the 1943 Session. He inadvertently uncovered a scandal in his own department. Early in 1942 he instigated an innocent inquiry into police stores procedure which led to a formal investigation and criminal charges against certain members in his

department. He was surprised and angry that something had not been done before. He found so many rotten things that he thought half his department would be in jail when the investigation was completed. But, he argued, there was only one recourse in "public life when you find dishonesty, and that is to put the light full on it . . . It is not a pleasant business but it has to be done."²¹

Maitland tried to maintain his law contacts in Vancouver, but as a minister he did not have the freedom of a backbencher or even as a leader of the Opposition to pursue his career. It was an honour to serve as attorney general but it meant a financial loss and without his "business-getting" ability he doubted that his law partners could keep the firm going. Nevertheless, as attorney general, he could argue provincial and federal Appeal Court cases which he intended to do "as often as possible to keep [his] hand in, and the old practise going." In May 1942, for example, he argued an income tax case in the Appeal Court of Canada. He had Bencher duties as well and in July 1942 was elected treasurer, after serving on the discipline committee for a few years. He was also co-chairman of the provincial Committee on War Work, a committee that had been established in every province by the Canadian Bar Association to provide legal aid to members of the armed forces. However, public office duties and politics dominated his personal business and took priority over everything else.²²

Maitland was back on the campaign trail for the November 1942 Salmon Arm by-election to replace Bruhn, and again in June 1943 to replace the Liberal in Revelstoke who had died earlier in the year.

For some reason, the Coalition partners had decided the contests were important and both Maitland and Hart campaigned in each. Although Desbrisay had cautioned Maitland in the 1941 election against CCF "bashing" in the area, Maitland and Hart nevertheless decided that was the best strategy in both by-elections. The CCF, well-organized as usual, took both seats. Salmon Arm had been strongly Conservative since the riding was created in 1924 and Revelstoke had elected Liberals in the two preceding elections. In post-mortems, Maitland and Bennett believed the voters were venting their displeasure with the King government on the provincial party; that is, on the Liberals in British Columbia. However, Maitland also accused the CCF in the Revelstoke election of "going all through the country pressing their false doctrines, and undoubtedly making headway. The whole matter is a very serious problem."²³

Harold Winch had a completely different explanation for these two losses. Basically, he said, both Salmon Arm and Revelstoke were working men's towns. Moreover, his party put up good candidates. But where the Coalitionists made a great mistake, he believed, was the way they carried on as though loss of the two seats to the CCF presaged expropriation of businesses and industry. Waving the red flag in a general election might be effective, he thought, but not in by-elections, the result of which would mean virtually nothing to the governing party. As Martin Robin said about those two by-elections, the voters "had become immunized . . . to hysterical propaganda . . . and wished for more than windy rhetoric."²⁴

A few days after the Salmon Arm by-election Maitland was off to Winnipeg for a national Conservative party leadership convention. He had considered entering the race himself, but in the end said he was glad he had "stayed out . . . It's not a pleasant affair and . . . many hates will live long after this is over." His principal role was to second Howard Green's nomination, and with the British Columbia contingent, to support him on the first and, for Green, the only ballot.²⁵

By February 1943, when the Coalition government started its second year in office, the war news was less worrisome. The Japanese war was no longer spreading and the Germans had started their long retreat from Russia. Nevertheless, the war still dominated everyday life because of the daily headlines, the war economy, and the memories of friends and relatives in the Armed Forces.

The 1943 Session, and in fact the year itself, was marked by several events. The coalition government after a year in office, had made a definite political shift to the Left. Both parties revealed, probably, the first anti-Coalition government dissension, and some members even urged formation of a new party. And Maitland, mainly, continued CCF "bashing" mindful, no doubt, of the pending Revelstoke by-election.

During the Throne speech debate, Maitland reviewed social legislation that Right wing governments, that is, the old parties, in British Columbia had enacted during the preceding 25 years, and "scorned the claim of the CCF to have inspired and goaded governments

into social reforms." He recalled the Workmen's Compensation Act, then under extensive revision, the Hours of Work, Minimum Wage, and Family Court Acts, and referred to new welfare and labour legislation which was described by labour people as the "most advanced in Canada." Despite all the evidence to the contrary, Maitland reflected in his House log that people would still say that the present government had merely co-opted CCF ideas.²⁶

Both Liberal and Conservative members began to show their dissatisfaction with Coalition government during the Session. For example, Liberal MLAs caucused separately on the final day, although they said Maitland knew in advance about their meeting. About the same time, N. Nye, an executive member of the Kamloops Conservative Association, privately complained to Maitland that Victoria was the only place Coalition was in effect. Liberal associations in his part of the Interior, that is, Kamloops, Revelstoke and Salmon Arm, regarded the Conservative associations as "interlopers trying to muscle in on private preserves." Moreover, the Liberal organization had been nominating unpopular candidates, as in Salmon Arm, for instance. Nye worried that a Liberal nominee in Revelstoke would lose the by-election (which, in fact, happened), and was convinced that the Liberal incumbent in Kamloops would lose if he was renominated. Nye knew Conservatives in Salmon Arm and Kamloops who would vote CCF before they would vote Liberal. Nye recalled that Maitland had instructed each Conservative association to "preserve [its] entity" and to function as a partner in constituency affairs. This was impossible, Nye claimed,

when the Liberal organization simply rejected the partnership concept. To remedy the situation Nye suggested all provincial associations drop the provincial constitution and join the federal associations which were unencumbered with Coalition. These augmented federal associations would then assume responsibility for any provincial Conservative affairs. In his reply Maitland rejected Nye's suggestion and, without explanation, stated that he wanted both federal and provincial associations to retain their separate identities and roles "during this present period."²⁷

At the provincial Conservatives' annual meeting in April, Maitland made a long defence of Coalition government, partly to allay concerns such as those expressed by Nye. He also believed, along with Anscomb, that they could strengthen the party while in government and in a few years would be in a position to strike out on their own against the other two parties. He again rationalized Coalition by referring to the Liberal-Conservative partnership that had led to and sealed Confederation, the wartime Union government of 1917 under Conservative Prime Minister Robert Borden, and the current National government in Great Britain led by Churchill. He reminded his audience how he had "avoided Party strife, avoided distracting the Government charged with the carrying out of the war, by bitter attack and political controversy." Maitland had been indulging in such rhetoric for 18 months and apparently perceived no risk of alienating party members by demanding a dichotomous loyalty. Members could hardly forget that the federal Conservative party was currently performing the

traditional role of an Opposition party, criticizing constructively, and sometimes not so constructively, motivated by the desire for better government and the vision of forming the next administration.²⁸

Others, dissatisfied with Coalition government, urged formation of an entirely new party. These people, MLAs and association members, in both parties, were concerned that a temporary coalition was not the answer to a growing socialistic trend. What was needed, they argued, was a permanent alliance of the two parties. They had been shocked by the Salmon Arm loss and worried about the impending Revelstoke by-election. Presaging a movement that grew in 1943, Liberal MLA C. S. Leary spoke in the 1943 Throne debate, and after accusing the CCF of disloyalty to the Crown and other failings, urged the Coalition government partners to forget their differences and join permanently in the "United Provincial Party." The next day, 19 February, Maitland gave one of the "finest oratorical efforts" in his career, and aside from the expected attack on the CCF, hinted at support for Leary's proposal.²⁹

Shortly after the Revelstoke by-election loss to the CCF, Provincial Conservative association president A. E. Jukes told Maitland it was "impossible to fight a by-election with two parties who are really in opposition to each other" federally. The only solution, he suggested, was to form a "Coalition Party" supported by its own organization. In an editorial, the Sun made a similar proposal and urged Hart to hold a leadership convention after a new party had been formed. The publisher of the Vancouver News-Herald, Clayton Delbridge, wrote

Senator Farris that something had to be done to stop the CCF but worried that factions would be created by new party members who participated in federal politics.³⁰

Bennett was undoubtedly the strongest and most persistent advocate of a new party and was still pushing the idea in 1946. In an exchange of correspondence with Maitland in early September 1943, shortly after Maitland had been elected president of the Canadian Bar Association, Bennett told Maitland he was "at last convinced that we cannot postpone till after the Federal election the setting up of a provincial-wide organization to support the present Coalition Government." The CCF was well organized and making headway and unless something was done immediately, the CCF would sweep the province in the next federal election, he said. Bennett urged Maitland to arrange at once a Liberal-Conservative caucus, the purpose of which would be to approve a new party which he suggested should be called the "United Progressive Party of British Columbia," a slightly different name than Leary had proposed several months earlier. Maitland has been reported in at least one source as cold to the idea of a new party but a note in the Bennett papers does not wholly support that notion. In a handwritten "strictly private and confidential" note sent just as he was leaving for a few days' rest after a trip across the province, Maitland informed Bennett that a committee that included "not officials of either party but prominent business men" was working on a plan to set up an "non-partizan organization" which would field non-party, that is, neither Liberal nor Conservative candidates for the next election.

Maitland said that Hart, who was apparently interested in the idea, was cooled off by the Vancouver Liberals. Airing a complaint that was a mirror image of Nye's concern, those Liberals said the Conservatives in Vancouver were more concerned about building their own organization than participating in Coalition. In respect to Bennett's conviction that a new party must be formed before a federal election, Maitland said everyone he talked to on his recent trip preferred to do nothing until after the federal election was over. Some were impressed by the party's victory in Ontario over the Liberals and CCF in June 1943, and wanted to go it alone, but, he said, "this is not my view."³¹

Toward the end of October, two or three weeks after Maitland had been hospitalized for a bad nervous breakdown and a related heart problem, a member of the Vancouver-Burrard Conservative Association advised Bennett that many in his constituency favoured a United Progressive Party because it was the only way to beat the CCF. He predicted that because Maitland would not make a decision in the matter (apparently only a few realized at that time the seriousness of his condition), Howard Green would become provincial leader. (If Maitland had not fully recovered, perhaps Howard Green would have become leader, but he was less than enthusiastic about Coalition and would not likely have supported either Coalition government, at least not for long, or the proposal for a new party.) In correspondence the next month with the president of the South Okanagan association, and Paton of Vancouver-Point Grey, Bennett said the public and the newspapers favoured a new party and he was "not rushing things too quickly . . .

but waiting for the seed to germinate." In his letter to Paton he also said he had learned Maitland was far from well. In fact, their leader was on the road to recovery in December, but when Bill was reported missing on a flight to Berlin he suffered a setback and had still not fully recovered in May.³²

Maitland apparently lost interest in the United Progressive Party, perhaps because Hart dropped out, or because he was personally opposed to the idea. At a provincial Conservative Association executive meeting in July 1945 he claimed he was opposed to a new party, and during the 1946 Legislative Session he criticized Bennett for botching a good speech with a "crazy reference" to a Coalition party.³³

While certain Conservatives and Liberals perceived a new party as the answer to the CCF challenge, others saw neither that approach nor Coalition as the solution. These people believed they would do at least as well in their respective party roles, but as the memories of the 1942 and 1943 by-election defeats faded, so too did dissatisfaction with Coalition government. Nevertheless, during the 1945 Legislative Session Maitland again praised Coalition and claimed social legislation in British Columbia, for example, the Old Age Pension, Social Allowance and Mothers Allowance Acts, were all superior to those in CCF Saskatchewan. It was clear to him, he said, that British Columbians wanted more Coalition government. But he was defending a beleaguered position, the point man for Hart and the government, as he once was for the Tolmie government.³⁴

In January, provincial Conservative Association president, Dr. J. W. Alward, reminded all members that the principal objective of the association was "to establish, maintain and expand the organization by creating and reviving local associations in every riding . . . to make the general public familiar with the principles and policy [sic] of the Progressive Conservative Party." Two months later, the other Coalition partner also showed signs of rebellion. In his log, Maitland recorded that the Vancouver-Point Grey Liberals had broken "out in a rash about Coalition" and as a result "it's a weary worried people we are."³⁵

Alward's organizational steps may have been made in anticipation of a federal election, which was in fact held on 11 June, but in July it became clear Alward and his executive were planning on taking the party out of Coalition. In late June or early July, Alward scheduled an executive meeting for 14 July. On 7 July, Maitland sent his regrets from Lang Bay where he was taking a complete rest, on doctor's orders, prior to a federal-provincial conference in August. Obviously anticipating at least one agenda item, he said the party should stay in Coalition for the following reasons: both partners agreed Coalition would be in effect during the war, which was not over yet; the public liked and wanted more Coalition government; Cabinet and the Coalition caucus were unified and had produced a very progressive plan to deal with postwar problems; and finally, only a Coalition could defeat the CCF. Regardless, he went on, continuation of Coalition "should not be decided by the leader nor the members" [presumably he meant MLAs] but by the "Party as a whole" [my underlining], and con-

cluded with a suggestion that the whole question should be referred to the annual meeting in October. Subsequently, the executive ignored Maitland, and Alward advised all members that the "Executive, after a consultation with our Leader, will call a convention at the earliest possible moment." In the same circular Alward said an emergency executive meeting would be held on 28 July "to arrange" convention details with Maitland.³⁶

On 3 July, about the same time that Alward was arranging his executive meeting, Premier Hart, possibly aware of Alward's plans, summoned Coalition MLAs to a 11 July meeting. On 19 July he advised Maitland, still at Lang Bay, that the caucus had unanimously approved Coalition "for the next election." He proposed a nominating formula whereby incumbent members would not be opposed, and in Vancouver dual ridings, one member from each party would be nominated. In other ridings, that is, those not held by either Liberal or Conservative members, nominating conventions, made up of equal numbers of delegates from each party, would select candidates who "must pledge support to the Coalition Government." In closing Hart referred to "our previous discussions" about the formula [indicating Maitland probably knew of the tentative election plans on 7 July when he had urged Alward and the executive to put off the Coalition question until October] and asked Maitland to seek his party's endorsement immediately.³⁷

A few days after the caucus meeting, Anscomb informed Maitland that Conservative Members had met after the meeting and approved several actions including the continuation of Coalition, an early

election, the establishment of an election committee made up of three from each party, and, perhaps ominously for Maitland, an early convention. Anscomb had a large following in the Conservative party and was perhaps trying to exploit unrest under Maitland to bring about a leadership convention. Regardless, Maitland was, in a manner of speaking, "between a rock and a hard place" at a time when he was recovering from exhaustion. He was faced with the Anscomb-led Coalitionists on one side, and Alward and the anti-Coalitionists on the other.³⁸

Meanwhile, Hart had been having trouble with his Liberals and scheduled an executive meeting for 27 July. The day before this meeting, the press reported that some of the executive members intended to demand an end to Coalition. They believed that Liberal, that is Coalition, support for certain Conservative "reactionary policies," would drive a lot of Liberal support to the CCF. Premier Hart, who said he would not resign even if the executive refused to support Coalition, presented the 160 delegates with the same nominating formula he had sent to Maitland, but only after what was described as a day-long battle did they approve a continuation of Coalition.³⁹

Therefore, when Maitland met his provincial executive the next day, everyone knew their Liberal partners had agreed to more Coalition. But Maitland, unlike Hart, implied he would resign if the executive voted for a general convention, the purpose of which would be to decide the future of Coalition. He had obviously changed his mind since 7 July when he said only a party convention could decide the Coalition

issue. In a review of party affairs, he again recalled that the Conservatives had not contested one by-election between the declaration of war and the October 1941 general election, a true statement but totally misleading. Following the election, he continued, he had met with the "elected and defeated members--48 in all--[who] unanimously approved of the course I was about to take." [He was referring to the 6 November 1941 meeting, discussed above, where he met only 26 of the 43, not 48, who were nominated across the province.] He also stated he had been against the "formation of a new Party . . . I was careful indeed to preserve the identity of the Conservative Party." But to defeat socialism, he said, the two parties must stay together. He was sure the great majority of the party were against a convention but even if they approved one, federal government wartime travel restrictions prohibited "conventions of more than 50, where the delegates came by train or bus." Presumably gasoline rationing also prevented travel by private automobile. He noted that on 11 July all the elected members had voted for Coalition, and he believed that was the proper decision. Nevertheless, he continued, he wanted the advice of the delegates as they knew the feeling in the ridings and knew what people wanted. In conclusion, he declared that once again the country must come first, and a vote for a convention would put the "Party back for 20 years." He was, of course, making it very difficult for the executive to go against him. Anscomb and the MLAs had approved Coalition government and Maitland realized that a convention would almost certainly split the party along pro and anti Coalition lines, perhaps as destructively

as in 1923 when the Provincial Party was formed, or in 1933 when the party broke into three main factions.⁴⁰

The newspaper reports of the Conservative meeting are worth comparing. The Province reported that the gathering was "notable for its unanimity," and the Sun reported the Conservatives were unanimous for coalition. The News Herald, on the other hand, ran a column under the heading "Angry Saanich Tories to run Ind. Candidate." The second vice president of the provincial Association who was also president of the Nanaimo Association, Frank H. Davey, insisted that the meeting had been called to fix a convention date, not to discuss Coalition policy. Davey said he had supported Alward in his bid to end Coalition, and claimed the vote for more Coalition did not reflect the wishes of the rank and file, particularly outside of Vancouver. Speaking for himself and other Conservatives, he vowed they would nominate an Independent candidate in Saanich rather than campaign for Liberal incumbent N. W. Whittaker.⁴¹

Even the big Coalition victory in October 1945 did not bring harmony to the Conservative camp. The Peace River Association, for example, had been simmering for a long while over the Coalition partnership but events came to a head in late 1945. The secretary treasurer, W. S. Simpson, who had been a strong supporter of Coalition, complained that government was not doing enough for the riding and the Liberals, including the president of their association and even the patronage appointees, were publicly blaming Maitland. Moreover, he continued, Liberals helped the CCF win over the Coalition candidate.

Maitland's reply totally discouraged Simpson who in his letter of resignation insisted Maitland had no idea how bad things were in the district in respect to appointments and the relationship between the Coalition partners. In Enderby the association secretary affirmed his belief in Coalition but complained that the Liberals wanted all the patronage. In the Liberal North Okanagan riding, a by-election was scheduled for 12 December and according to the nominating formula, a Liberal candidate should be chosen. The proposed nominee was unacceptable to the local Conservatives and they demanded that Maitland arrange a "straight, open convention." However, the electorate were satisfied and the Liberal-Coalitionist easily defeated the CCF candidate.⁴²

When Premier Hart summoned the Coalition MLAs to the 11 July 1945 meeting he was aware that elections for the preceding 33 years had been held every four years, with the exception of the 1928-1933 period when the Tolmie government held office for the full five years as provided for in the provincial Constitution Act. Although the Coalition caucus was not held for the purpose of announcing an election, Hart obviously wanted to be assured of the MLAs' support for continuing Coalition before he (and Maitland) later sought, and obtained, approval of their respective executives for both Coalition and nominating procedures. A month later the Legislature was dissolved and Hart scheduled a general election for 21 October.

There were several reasons, most of them favourable, why Hart decided to seek a new mandate. Obviously looking ahead, he and Maitland had unveiled an election "platform" in the 1945 Legislative

Session. Premier and Minister of Finance Hart's budget, a "big money session" one reporter called it, reflected the rising government revenues from a booming war economy. His budget provided funds for a major public works program that included extensive highway construction and a large expansion of facilities at the University of British Columbia. A hydroelectric system would be constructed under the Electric Power Act which authorized the establishment of a Power Commission that would be responsible for a rural electrification program. Land clearing machinery would be provided to farmers, and a salary increase would be granted to rural area school teachers. All these commitments had been recommended in 1943 when the interim report of the Postwar Rehabilitation Council had been tabled in the Legislature.⁴³

Other events that augured well for the Coalitionists included Johnson's easy victory in the 10 May by-election in New Westminster to replace the deceased former Liberal Minister of Lands W. A. Gray. In the 4 June Ontario election the incumbent minority Conservative government captured 66 of 90 seats and the Liberals replaced the CCF as the official Opposition. Maitland thought the victory meant the end of the CCF as a political force and presaged a decline of socialism in British Columbia. In the 11 June federal election the CCF in British Columbia did not take all 16 seats as Bennett had gloomily predicted back in 1943. The Conservatives actually gained strength as they won five seats, up from four, the Liberals won five, down from ten, and the CCF won four, up from one, but its share of the popular vote was up only

one percentage point. By 31 August, dissolution day, both the European and Japanese wars were over and the government might expect to profit from postwar euphoria.⁴⁴

But there were negative factors that lent some urgency to the necessity of holding an election in 1945. The postwar period, though planned for, would be a time of major economic disruptions and unemployment because of the sudden cessation of war industries. Politically, the improved fortunes of Right wing parties in Ontario and British Columbia convinced many Liberals and Conservatives that they could beat the CCF outside of Coalition.

Hart, on the other hand, appeared to be irrevocably committed to Coalition, if his defiance of the provincial executive on 17 July was an indication. Maitland, who unlike Hart frequently almost eulogized Coalition, perhaps more to keep his anti-coalitionists in line than as an expression of his own feelings, probably harboured "separatist" sentiments. But in the end he opted for appeasement of the strong Anscomb-led Coalitionist forces rather than risk an almost certain public split by siding with the anti-Coalitionist faction.

On the late fall election day, the weather was unseasonably bad over most of the province. Instead of the usual autumn weather of smoky, still days and frosty nights, it was raining heavily on the coast, snowing across the Southern Interior, and clear and cold in the Cariboo. As a result, voter turnout was down 10 percentage points compared to 1941, a circumstance that was due either to the poor weather or the lack of interest in the campaign or a combination of

both.⁴⁵

Regardless, the Coalition government, which at dissolution had 30 seats (11 Conservative and 19 Liberals, excluding Independent Liberal Pattullo) compared to the CCF's 15, was returned with 37 seats compared to 10 for the CCF. Paradoxically, government popular support slipped about eight percentage points, while the CCF gained over four points. The remarkable aspect of the contest was the Conservative gain in seats. The Liberals exchanged a few seats with the CCF, but in the end won 20. The Conservatives, on the other hand, won seven former CCF seats and ended with 17 seats. At dissolution in 1945, the CCF had 15 members in 12 ridings, of which three were dual members, and the Rossland-Trail riding remained vacant after CCF member, H. Herridge, resigned in May. In the dual ridings, where one Conservative and one Liberal were nominated in each, the Conservatives won two seats. In the other 10 (including the vacant seat), the Conservatives won five of the six ridings in which they were nominated. Maitland's CCF bashing had finally paid off.⁴⁶

Both the Coalitionists and the CCF had published long election manifestos but early in the campaign the respective platforms had been generalized to one main issue, that is, a free enterprise government with a proven record versus a government based on socialistic principles. The Hart and Maitland campaigns were, in some respects, quite different although both stressed programs prominent during the 1945 Legislative Session. Hart, however, rarely attacked either the CCF or its elected members and apparently would not allow supporting

speakers to make highly partisan statements. Nevertheless, at a big rally in Victoria a week before the election, he told his audience they would have a choice between a sound business administration or a socialistic gamble. Whittaker, who was running in nearby Saanich, was also on the platform that night and in a more partisan vein told the audience CCF policy would mean the death of private initiative and free enterprise. Maitland also spoke but only of the great public support for the Coalition government and plans the government had prepared to meet postwar challenges.⁴⁷

Maitland's "personal" election platform in the campaign consisted of two general planks, a recitation of the government's program commitments made in the 1945 Legislative Session, and a continuation of his crusade against the CCF. In his administration plank, he particularly stressed the extensive public works program, the establishment of the Power Commission, and especially emphasized the output of social legislation that preceded the advent of the CCF party.⁴⁸

Maitland's anti-CCF plank can be traced back to 7 November 1941 when he again invited Harold Winch to join a three-party coalition to avoid "class war and class division" which he suggested the CCF was abetting by refusing to consider coalition. When Maitland interrupted opening day formalities during the 1941-42 Legislative Session on 4 December with still another appeal "to those who have spoken against union," he stated that an Opposition party during the war would foster disunity by "criticizing, attacking and obstructing the administration . . . and force party warfare" on the government. Lack of unity, he

continued, generated "controversy, class warfare, party propaganda [and] unrest that comes from breeding dissatisfaction among the people." From 1942 to the end of the war he particularly exploited the anti-war and anti-British Empire views of certain members of the CCF, and recalled events and statements back to the Popular Front days in 1936 when the CCF was friendly with the Canadian Communist Party. In the 1942 and 1943 by-elections in Salmon Arm and Revelstoke respectively, he had attacked the CCF, against the advice of his political advisor, and the Coalition government lost both seats. Undeterred, Maitland continued his criticism and in the 1945 New Westminster by-election condemned the CCF for its anti-war stand, its refusal to enter Coalition, and its policy of "tearing down and never building--a policy of putting class against class."⁴⁹

In the general election campaign in October, months after both the European and Japanese wars were over, he dropped the war references. He said a CCF government would mean a dictatorship and loss of 120,000 jobs. He cited the CCF's constitution to support his claim that elected members were controlled by the provincial executive, and, for example, could introduce new policies only if they had been approved by their executive. He named former member Robert Connell, Lyle Telford and H. Herridge as examples of those who had defied their provincial association. Connell had been expelled from the party in 1936 when he refused to accept the party's pro-Marxist policies (as he saw them), Telford had resigned in 1938 when he differed with the party about his leadership role, and Herridge had been expelled in May 1945

after he accepted a federal nomination, while still sitting as a provincial member, which the CCF executive said was contrary to an agreement between the CCF party (that is, the executive) and the CCF caucus. Maitland had apparently opened up an issue that was very unpopular with many CCF supporters.⁵⁰

In Revelstoke, the day after Winch attacked him because those servicemen who returned to the province after the 17 September voter registration cutoff date would be unable to vote, Maitland criticized Winch as "this ill-informed youngster." (At that time, Winch was 39, Maitland 56). He said Winch had not suggested amending the Election Act in the 1945 Session, and besides, he added, the war had ended so quickly (the European war ended on 8 May and the Japanese war on 14 August) that the government had been unable to provide the necessary regulations. However, he said he had found a way to remedy the situation, and shortly after, the government issued new regulations that allowed servicemen to vote, regardless of their return date. If Maitland was quoted correctly, his excuses were very misleading. The fact that regulations were issued, which required an Order in Council, meant that the Elections Act needed no amending, as Maitland suggested, to provide for such a contingency. Moreover, the time to prepare and get approval for an Order in Council is measured in days, not in weeks or months.⁵¹

Maitland's long-term strategy, that is, since late 1941 or early 1942, was more than just an anti-CCF crusade, although that was an important part of it. It was obvious that the voters in future

elections would believe they had only two choices, Coalition government or CCF, and his concern was how to establish in their minds the idea that they had a third choice. The Liberals in Coalition had shown no interest in an unremitting attack on the CCF and this reluctance, he reasoned, could work to his advantage. He would present the Conservatives as the anti-CCF party in British Columbia. The critical part of the whole strategy had depended on getting those nominations for Conservative Coalitionists in CCF-held ridings. But Maitland's strategy was based on more than political acumen and instincts.⁵²

He did not like the CCF and referred to its adherents as "rabble," "have-nots," and "radicals." Winch could not recall that Maitland had ever spoken or nodded to him. Maitland was passionately convinced that the CCF was an alien presence on the British Columbia political scene. During the 1942 Legislative Session as he had listened to Winch argue for conscription of all resources--material, financial, and manpower--he had seethed because he believed Winch was in fact arguing for socialism under the "cloak of patriotism." He considered the CCF philosophy subversive and after his speech in the 1943 Session, had recorded in his log that there "is an idea abroad that the subversive nature of the CCF propaganda should be allowed to grow, and no one should expose, answer, or show it in its naked and awful truth." Driven by political and personal considerations he had been determined to expose the "awful truth," and based on the 1945 general election results had been largely successful.⁵³

After being blamed for the Conservatives' poor showing in the

1941 general election, Maitland had brought the party back a long way, but he had almost killed himself in the process. Even after the 1945 election he continued working at the same exhausting pace. In May 1944 he still had not fully recovered from the breakdown and heart ailment he had suffered in October 1943. In 1945 he was again hospitalized and had to interrupt his convalescences to cope with an anti-coalitionist-led rebellion in his own party. At the federal-provincial conference in August that same year he was forbidden to climb stairs. In October when he was on his Interior campaign trip he had to rest frequently and took daughter Nora along to assist him in various ways including keeping his schedule down to a "survivable" level. During the year, while attending to his Cabinet duties, various political tasks, and his personal business, he had attended a federal-provincial conference in Ottawa in August, again in November and early December, and his latest in late January and early February.⁵⁴

On his latest journey, Maitland was in Ottawa to participate in the ongoing federal-provincial economic and social conference, and to represent British Columbia at the Supreme Court hearing on the validity of three Orders in Council under which certain Japanese residents would be deported from Canada.

Interviewed about the conference after his return, Maitland said progress was necessarily very slow because "different provinces had different ideas," all of which required a great deal of thought before a consensus was possible. Privately, he explained more reasons for the slow going. Quebec's Premier Maurice Duplessis felt very

strongly about provincial rights and interrupted and argued with federal Cabinet members including the Prime Minister himself. When King explained that the federal government had put forward very clear proposals, Duplessis interrupted with "Yes, very clear, you want everything." Later, when Duplessis told Louis St. Laurent, then Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada that the provinces make the Dominion, not the other way around, he started an argument that got personal, and in the midst of the conference the two stood shouting at one another. They started again after adjournment and when it appeared they were going to get physical, Hart shouted at them to quit and got between them. Maitland seemed impressed by Duplessis' lack of deference toward federal ministers including the Prime Minister, and described him as the "most amazing" man he knew who "just cracks out" at anybody in the federal Cabinet. But he thought Hart had restored peace only momentarily and expected the "show might blow up before the day is out."⁵⁵

His second reason for being in Ottawa on that particular occasion was to explain to the Supreme Court why British Columbia supported the deportation Orders in Council that had been issued by the federal Cabinet. He based his argument on three main points. The Canadian Japanese had been loyal to Japan during the war, there was still "a very great degree of emergency regarding the Japanese" because, for example, Japanese explosive-laden balloons were still landing in British Columbia, and the province wanted the Japanese out for future security reasons. He did not apparently remind the Court

that the Pattullo government in its submission to the Rowell Sirois Commission in 1938 had also demanded the repatriation of "as many Orientals as possible." He was informed on 20 February, one day before the opening of the 1946 Legislature, that the Court, in a split four/three decision had ruled in favour of the deportation orders. Three weeks later he was advised that the "Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians" was appealing the Court decision to the Privy Council in London.⁵⁶

As the 1946 Legislative Session began, Maitland commented on the many missing faces, all safe at one time. The CCF contingent had been reduced by several members, gone "with the wind they themselves created." But he stated he would be less than honest if he said he missed some of those "Apostles of Gloom." In a speech never delivered, he criticized the CCF for various reasons, including the inability of elected members to act independently of their provincial executive, and again ridiculed their contention that the CCF in British Columbia and the Labour government in Great Britain were basically the same. He, of course, knew Labour was socialist but rationalized that Labour Members were, and had been, pro-British Empire, while the provincial CCF was anti-Empire.⁵⁷

In the same speech he paid a rare tribute to Harold Winch. "I must congratulate the Leader of the Opposition. He is one of the veteran Members of this House now and he comes back almost the sole survivor of a galaxy of brilliant Opposition debaters. We have disagreed for 8 years now--probably always will--but I must say that in

debate he has always been fair and above personalities." When this was read to Winch in 1987, who incidentally had not volunteered any personal criticism of Maitland during the interview, he simply responded with, "Of course I never heard that."⁵⁸

Maitland commented on the "strength and the vigour and the force" with which the CCF had waged the recent campaign. The party had recruited a horde of assistants from Saskatchewan, including Premier Douglas and Cabinet ministers, all to no avail; "They came, they saw, then on October 26th they read the results." He said the CCF could speculate about the popular vote anomaly if it wished, but in the meantime "we'll take the seats."⁵⁹

In this same undelivered speech he praised the establishment of the United Nations organization as a concrete step toward the prevention of future wars. He had himself delivered two addresses dedicated to a lasting peace, one to the Canadian Bar Association convention, and another to the American Bar Association convention, both in 1944.⁶⁰

Sounding very much like he was staking out a future campaign platform, Maitland thoroughly reviewed the progress of the ongoing federal-provincial conferences, particularly in relation to provincial rights. His speech was prepared for delivery to the Legislature, and would therefore be public, but he gave the impression that Duplessis was not far off the mark when he accused King of wanting "everything." The federal government had invaded certain tax fields in 1917 and had never withdrawn. Therefore, in 1946, the provinces were concerned that

any tax agreements would benefit them as well as the federal government as the economy grew and tax revenues rose. A related major concern of the provinces, in respect to any federal-provincial agreement, was that they would "retain their independence and autonomy." Maitland, who had so strongly and persistently criticized Pattullo for his anti-federal bias, said he was "against centralization." Provincial governments are near to the people, he maintained, and Ottawa is still 3,000 miles away. It was proved during the war that the "stronger the centralization in Ottawa, the weaker the authority and the voice of the province." He claimed it was nonsense to say governments were not subject to influences and pressure. In 1941, Ontario and Quebec combined had a population of about 7 million people; British Columbia had 817,000. The combined Ontario and Quebec industrial production was \$5.0 billion, and in British Columbia it was \$431.0 million. "There has always been a lack of influence as far as [some] provinces are concerned in comparison with the eastern areas." Sounding remarkably like Pattullo, but with no acknowledgment that the man may have, after all, had a legitimate concern about federal intrusions on provincial rights, he repeatedly emphasized that he was a provincialist and against centralization. Premier McBride had profited politically from federal bashing, Pattullo very little, and now Maitland appeared to believe he had a popular issue.⁶¹

In 1942, in his first address to the Legislature as attorney general, Maitland had given a resume of the new Coalition government's progress up to that point. In 1946 he had obviously intended to do the

same, but this time, four years later, he was exhausted. On his way home from a conference in Ottawa, about three weeks before the Session started, he wrote a sad, tired-sounding letter to Elizabeth saying how much he looked forward to the rest on the train trip as he was booked up until May. On 5 March he was allowed to withdraw a Bill after apologizing to the House for introducing it incorrectly. On 11 March while he was explaining a Bill in second reading, Hart sent a note saying he was explaining the wrong Bill. "I was tired," he said, and that was on a Monday when he should have been rested. A week later he was admitted to hospital, and on 22 March his doctor said because of complications associated with influenza, Maitland would not likely return to the Legislature. On Thursday, 28 March, he died at the relatively young age of 57.⁶²

Maitland drove himself at an exhausting pace. As columnist James Nesbitt said, the amount of travelling he did would have killed most men. His friends had implored him three years before to take it easy. Anscomb, Hart and Winch gave brief eulogies in the House. Fernie MLA Thomas Uphill said he "always had a patient hearing with Pat Maitland and he went out of his way to do something for me." The Sun described him as "essentially a simple man; fervent, logical, relentless in his idealism [and] devoted to his family." Maitland had been active in politics for 38 years and prominent in the Conservative party at least since 1922 when he was elected president of the provincial Conservative association. Nesbitt questioned what the House would do without him. But life goes on; the day after his death the

press was speculating on his successor.⁶³

Maitland, as an important member of the Coalition government, supported an all-out war effort which specifically called for a provincial budget that excluded, or reduced, all non war-related items, and full cooperation with the federal government. The latter condition resulted in the province turning over to Ottawa, former provincial tax sources that provided about \$6 million in 1942 and considerably more by 1945 when provincial revenues alone had risen over 23 percent (see appendix 2). During these war years, Maitland ran a large department, campaigned in several by-elections, and two general elections, and strived constantly to increase public awareness of the Conservative party.

Throughout this period Maitland grappled with the two-fold problem of keeping his members loyal to Coalition government, and maintaining his party's identity while a subordinate coalition partner. He repeatedly urged members to support Coalition, not to work for "political advantage," yet simultaneously expected them to keep their organizations strong and to support the federal party. His aim was to create a high party profile in the public mind, among newspaper people, and in the minds of party members themselves. He solved this dilemma by setting up the Conservatives as an anti-CCF party. During the war he attacked the CCF as disloyal, anti-war and anti-British Empire. As a strategy it failed miserably in by-elections in 1942 and 1943 but in

May 1945, just as the European war was ending, it helped a Liberal-Coalitionist win easily over the CCF candidate. In the general election in October 1945 he attacked the CCF for being undemocratic in their own organization and for their nationalization plans which, he said, would create great loss of jobs. The Coalition government won easily, but more significantly, the Conservatives among the Coalitionists picked up seven former CCF seats. Maitland's anti-CCF crusade had finally paid off.

Following the election he participated in more federal-provincial negotiations and by the 1946 Legislative Session had reached the conclusion, as Pattullo had many years before, that the federal government had little regard for provincial rights. Maitland had made a great campaign issue out of Pattullo's refusal in January 1941 to negotiate with Ottawa. By 1946 he had gone full circle and was setting up the Conservatives as a party that would lead the fight against Liberal-imposed centralization. In 1942 he had boasted about how he and the premier had given Ottawa everything it asked for. Now, he realized, what the province had given away it would never get back. He would lead the party in a fight with Ottawa to prevent any further erosion of provincial rights and power.

Notes

¹For the duties and powers of an attorney general, see British Columbia, Attorney General Act, R.S.B.C., 1936 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1936); and British Columbia, Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, pp. U18-U31 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1940).

²For the annual meeting, see "Conservatives Urge Removing of Enemies East of the Rockies," Colonist, 11 January 1942, p. 3; for the "high-minded" reference see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 9, Garland to Maitland, 10 December 1941; for Esling's reservations, see Maitland, *ibid.*, Esling to Maitland, 10 December 1941. For the Paton/Bennett correspondence, see Bennett Papers, Simon Fraser University Special Collections (hereafter SFU), MG1/2, Box 1, file 2, Paton to Bennett, 15 December 1941, and Bennett to Paton, 16 December 1941.

³For Desbrisay, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 11, Maitland to Ruth, 12 October 1941; for the election returns see Parliamentary Guide, 1942.

⁴For the telegram, see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 2, Maitland to Hart, 10 January 1942; for concern about the Japanese, see "Conservatives Demand Japs be Removed East of Rockies," Sun, 12 January 1942, p. 11.

⁵For Maitland's praise of coalition, see "Conservatives Urge Removing of Enemies East of Rockies," Colonist, 11 January 1942, p. 3; for Green's election and comment, see "Howard Green Leads B.C. Conservatives," Province, 12 January 1942, p. 9; for Hart's comment, see "War Tension Evident as House Opens," Sun, 9 January 1942, p. 17.

⁶For Maitland's statement about working with the premier, see "Conservatives Urge Removing of Enemies East of the Rockies," Colonist, 11 January 1942, p. 3.

⁷For Winch's opinion, see Interview 1987.

⁸For his version of the two discussions with the Premier, see Maitland 781, Box 11, green coloured diary book, entries for 4, 10, 11, and 21 September 1942; for his "Mick" reference and blame for the Anscomb appointment, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 12, Maitland to Ruth, 10 September 1942; for his discussion with Bennett about resigning, see Maitland, green diary, 21 September 1942; and Worley, Wonderful World, pp. 39-40; for the offer to Bennett and Carson and the final appointment, see *ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

⁹For "on guard," see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 12, Maitland to Ruth, 10 September 1942; for Winch's opinion, see Interview 1987.

¹⁰For employees not covered by the C.S. Act, see "More Employees to come Under Civil Service Act," Times, 23 November 1945, p. 13; for Pearson's admission, see "Civil Service Act Never Really Operative in British Columbia, Admits Minister," Province, 7 February 1942, p. 8; for police force, etc. still not covered by the C.S. Act, see "More Employees . . .," Times, *ibid.*; for the justices of the peace correspondence, see Bennett Papers, SFU, MG1/2, Box 10, file 13, Bennett to Maitland, 14 March 1944, and Maitland to Bennett, 18 March 1944; for the Johnson correspondence, see Johnson Papers, UVIC Special Collections, Box 3, file 1, Farquharson (Attorney General's secretary) to Johnson, 4 January 1946, and Johnson to Farquharson, 12 January 1946; for campaigning for Johnson, see Maitland 781, Box 10, file 6, a radio transcript speech, dated 4 May 1945; for the results of the by-election, see British Columbia, Statement of Votes, 1941.

¹¹For the notices of motion, see "War Tension Evident as House Opens," Sun, 9 January 1942, p. 17; for Winch's amendment, see "C.C.F. Strategy Steal Thunder," Province, 10 January 1942, p. 8 (by McKelvie) for the "masterly strategy"; for Winch's eight points, see "C.C.F. Urges Drastic New War Policy," Sun, 10 January 1942, p. 3.

¹²For Maitland's cynicism, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1941/42 log, 9 January; for Winch's military service, see H. E. Winch, PABC, Accession 148, tape 3, track number one, 9 March 1973, transcript p. 4; for military service of MLAs, see "Winch Threatens to Ask Closed Sitting if A.R.P. Questions Are Not Answered," Province, 30 January 1942, p. 30; for McKelvie, see "C.C.F. Strategy Steals Thunder," Province, 10 January 1942, p. 8; and for Hutchison, see "C.C.F. Bares Its Grand Strategy," Sun, 10 January 1942, p. 3; and for similar press comments, see "C.C.F. Urges Drastic New War Policy," Sun, 10 January 1942, p. 3, which fully reports Winch's eight-point speech; for the CCF "frothing," see "Conservatives Urge Removing of Enemies East of the Rockies," Colonist, 11 January 1942, p. 3.

¹³For Hart restricts debate and Maitland's explanation, see "Attorney General Says Conscription Wanted by People," Colonist, 13 January 1942, p. 11; for the selective service quotation, see "C.C.F. Urges Drastic New War Policy," Sun, 10 January 1942, p. 3; for the plebiscite, see "War Service Referendum More Likely," Sun, 15 January 1942, p. 1; for the announcement, see "Plebiscite on Conscription Announced," Sun, 22 January 1942, p. 1; for Maitland's radio address, for example, see Maitland 781, Box 10, file 4, transcript dated 22 April 1942; for another radio address by Liberal lawyer and former MLA, Senator J. W. deb. Farris, see Farris Papers, University of British Columbia, Special Collections, Box 39, file 6; for the plebiscite results (B.C. voted 80 percent in favour), see "Canada Votes 2-1 to Free Gov't of Pledges; Ayes Sweep Vancouver," Sun, 28 April 1942, p. 1.

¹⁴For his discussion of the ARP, see "Main Responsibility of

A.R.P. Still Rests in Ottawa, Attorney General Tells House," Province, 31 January 1942; for discussion of the tax agreement and post-war planning, see "B.C. Government to Create Permanent Postwar Committee," Colonist, 31 January 1942, p. 2; for Hutchison's speculation, see "B.C.'s Women M.L.A.s Go Into Action on Political Front," Sun, 9 January 1942, p. 8.

¹⁵For a "mess," see "A Mess Indeed," Sun, 9 January 1942, p. 6; for Winch's demand for the state of readiness of the ARP, see "Winch Threatens to Ask Closed Sitting if A.R.P. Questions Are Not Answered," Province, 30 January 1942, p. 30; for Maitland's accusation regarding publicity, see "Winch Threatens . . .," *ibid.*; for Green's headline, see "Howard Green Charges Coast Unprepared to Meet Japanese Attack," Sun, 30 January 1942, p. 1; for Maitland's comments about Easterners, and B.C. citizens must participate in ARP work, see "Main Responsibility of A.R.P. . . .," note 14.

¹⁶For Maitland's explanation of the \$6 million in taxes, see "B.C. Government to Create Permanent Postwar Committee," Colonist, 31 January 1942, p. 2; for speech to the annual meeting and full cooperation with Ottawa, see "Maitland Urges 'Push War, Forget Politics,'" Province, 10 January 1942, p. 9.

¹⁷For Steeves' reaction, see Steeves' Papers, University of British Columbia, Special Collections, Box 3, file 1A; for Green's call for postwar planning, see "Conservatives Promise Complete Cooperation in Prosecution of War," Colonist, 29 October 1939, p. 1; for Maitland's reference to postwar, see Maitland 781, Box 9, file 1, 2 November 1939, Throne speech; and for Winch's reference to postwar, see "C.C.F. Denounced for War Criticism," Times, 4 November 1939, p. 13; for Pattullo's recommendation, see "B.C. Women M.L.A.s Go into Action on Political Front," Sun, 9 January 1942, p. 8; for Maitland's assurances about postwar legislation, see "Set Up Post-War Planning Board," Province, 31 January 1942, p. 8; for the statute, see British Columbia, Post-War Rehabilitation Act (Victoria: King's Printer, 1942); for the Orders in Council appointing the council, see British Columbia, B.C. Gazette 82 (26 March 1942):374, and (6 August 1942):918--the Act provided for up to 12 council members; the first OIC appointed Minister of Education H. G. Perry (Chairman); Liberals E. T. Kenney and W. T. Straith; Conservatives W. A. C. Bennett and J. A. Paton; and CCFers Harold Winch and C. G. MacNeil. The second OIC appointed Liberal Nancy Hodges, Conservative Tilly Rolston and CCFer Dorothy Steeves.

¹⁸For tabling the interim report, see Mitchell, WAC Bennett, p. 74; and "CCF Asks Action Now on Industrial and Social Plans," Sun, 5 February 1943, p. 10; for the quotation (i.e. neither "capitalistic . . .") and recommendations, see Sherman, Bennett, p. 45; and Mitchell, WAC Bennett, p. 74.

¹⁹For Winch urging action, see "CCF Asks Action Now on Industrial and Social Plans," Sun, 5 February 1943, p. 10; and Bennett, Mitchell, WAC Bennett, p. 74, which also refers to release of the final report; for Bennett's reference to Ontario, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1943 log, 9 February; for the Power Commission legislation, see British Columbia, Electric Power Act (Victoria: King's Printer, 1945); for Winch's protest, see Sherman, Bennett, pp. 49-50; for Maitland's lecture to Winch, *ibid.*, p. 50; for his new attitude about hydro, see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 11, Maitland to Greaves, 6 March 1946.

²⁰For the MLAs concerned about Japanese on the Coast, see, for example, "Bruce Hutchison," Sun, 8 January 1942, p. 4, who suggested most favoured removing Japanese men away from the Coast; for letters from concerned citizens, see "Set Up Post-War Planning Board," Province, 31 January 1942, p. 8; for his illness and trip to California, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 26, Maitland to Bill, 7 March 1942; re the reference to moving the Japanese, *ibid.*

²¹For his enjoyment and "distressing," see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 26, Maitland to Bob, 17 February 1942; for his Remnant appointment, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 25, Maitland to Bob, 19 March 1942; for Remnant's Vancouver-Point Grey connection, see "B.C. Conservatives Proclaim 15-Point Election Program," Sun, 13 September 1941, p. 19; for the CCF flack, see "CCF Attacks Appointment by Maitland," Sun, 13 February 1943; for the police stores scandal, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 25, two letters, Maitland to Bob, 14 April and 19 March 1942 (quotation from the latter).

²²For his comments about financial loss and his business-getting, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 25, Maitland to Bob, 19 March 1942; for his intention to argue Appeals, see Maitland, *ibid.*, Maitland to Bob, 29 May 1942; for his Ottawa appeal, see Maitland, *ibid.*, Maitland to Bob, 18 May 1942, and Maitland, *ibid.*, file 23, Maitland to daughters Betty and Nora, 12 May 1942; elected treasurer, see Maitland 781, Box 30, file 24, 6 July annual meeting of Law Society; Committee on War Work, see Maitland 781, Box 29, Minutes, Canadian Bar Association 1943, refer to establishment of committee, 1942.

²³For the reference to campaigning with Hart, and DesBrisay's warning, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 12, Maitland to Ruth, 22 October 1942; Robin, Pillars, refers to the anti CCF strategy in 1942 and 1943; for Maitland's part in the Revelstoke campaign, see Robin, Pillars, p. 75; and for Hart's participation, Bennett Papers, Simon Fraser University, Special Collections, MG1/2, Box 1, file 13, J. Fitzimmons to E. C. Carson, 22 June 1943; for the election results and earlier voting patterns, see Parliamentary Guide, 1925 to 1944; for post-mortems, Salmon Arm, see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 6, Maitland to Morrison, 1 February 1943; and Bennett Papers, SFU, MG1/2, Box 10, file 12, Maitland to Bennett, 26 November 1942; for the Revelstoke loss, Bennett Papers, SFU, MG1/2, Box 1, file 13, Fitzimmons to

E. C. Carson, 22 June 1943; for Maitland's charge of "false doctrines," see Bennett Papers, SFU, MG1/2, Box 10, file 12, Maitland to Bennett, 17 June 1943.

²⁴For Winch's opinion, Interview, 1987; Robin, Pillars, p. 75.

²⁵For the leadership convention, see "Five Appeal for Leadership," Province, 11 December 1942; and John Kendle, John Bracken: A Political Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 192-95; for Maitland's description and role, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 12, Maitland to Ruth, 8 December 1942.

²⁶For Maitland's speech, see "Maitland Denounces C.C.F. 'Kiss of Death,'" Sun, 19 February 1943, p. 9; for the most advanced legislation, see Robin, Pillars, p. 77; for organized labours comment, see Maitland 781, Box 32, file 5, a one-page message to Cabinet, 19 December 1944; for his reflections, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1943 log, 15 March; see also his remarks in "Maitland Foreshadows Permanent Coalition," Sun, 20 February 1943, p. 13.

²⁷For the Liberal caucus, see "House Gathers Uneasily Under Shadow of Uncertain Events," Sun, 3 February 1943, p. 15; for Nye's letter, see Maitland 781, Box 3, file 4, Nye to Maitland, 17 March 1943; and for Maitland's reply, see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 6, Maitland to Nye, 1 April 1943.

²⁸For his defence of coalition (the quotation is on p. 8), see Maitland 781, Box 10, file 15, 24 April 1943; for his and Anscomb's belief, see E. R. Black, "The Progressive Conservative Party in British Columbia," (M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1960), p. 37.

²⁹For concern over Salmon Arm and Revelstoke, see "House Gathers Uneasily Under Shadow of Uncertain Events," Sun, 3 February 1943, p. 15; for Leary's reference to a new party, see "House Sees Hint of New Provincial Party," Sun, 19 February 1943, p. 8; for Maitland's speech, see "Maitland Foreshadows Permanent Coalition," Sun, 20 February 1943, p. 13.

³⁰For Jukes' comments, see Maitland 781, Box 1, file 16, Jukes to Maitland, 16 June 1943; for the editorial, see "Let the People into Our Politics," Sun, 22 June 1943, p. 4; for the News-Herald reference, see Farris Papers, UBC, Box 8, file 2, Delbridge to Farris, 22 June 1943; and 23 June 1943 (two letters).

³¹For Bennett's call to form a new party immediately, see Bennett Papers, MG1/2, Box 10, file 12, Bennett to Maitland, 4 September 1943; for Maitland's alleged coldness to a new party, see Mitchell, WAC Bennett, p. 76; for Maitland's note, see Bennett Papers, MG1/2, Box 10, file 12, Maitland to Bennett, 6 September 1943; for Hart's initial interest and change of mind, see also Sherman, Bennett,

pp. 50-51; and Mitchell, WAC Bennett, p. 76; for the Ontario election results, see Parliamentary Guide, 1944.

³²For reference to his illness, see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 6, Maitland to H. G. Norman, 8 December 1943; *ibid.*, file 8, Maitland to Mills, 18 December 1943; and *ibid.*, Maitland to Warren, 7 February 1944; for the Vancouver-Burrard letter to Bennett, see Bennett Papers, MG1/2, Box 1, file 14, F. M. Garland to Bennett, 23 October 1943; for the correspondence with the president, see Bennett Papers, *ibid.*, file 15, Bennett to E. C. Weddell, 20 November 1943; and correspondence with Paton, which includes the quotation, *ibid.*, Bennett to Paton, 13 November 1943; for Maitland's setback in convalescing and reference to Bill, see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 8, Maitland to Warren, 7 February 1944, where he says Bill's death caused a relapse, and he appeared to be still under great strain in May, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 13, L. MacInnis to Maitland, 12 May 1944; for Bill missing, see Maitland 781, Box 3, file 20, Air Force to Maitland, 18 December 1943; and "PO 'Bill' Maitland Missing Overseas," Sun, 20 December 1943, p. 3.

³³For his loss of interest in a new party, see Maitland 781, Box 10, file 9, a speech, 28 July 1945; for his criticism of Bennett, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1946 log, 4 March.

³⁴For his praise of coalition, Maitland 781, Box 9, file 12, speech in Throne debate, 23 February 1945.

³⁵For Alward's organizational circular, see Bennett Papers, MG1/1, Box 6, file 14, circular letter, 15 January 1945; for his log entry, see Maitland 781, Box 8, file 12, 7 March 1945.

³⁶For reference to the 14 July meeting, see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 10, Maitland to Alward, 7 July 1945, in which Maitland regrets he cannot attend the 14 July executive meeting, and gives his comments on the upcoming gathering; for Alward's announcement of an emergency meeting, see Maitland 781, Box 1, file 16, Alward to Conservative members, 18 July 1945.

³⁷For Hart's summons, see Johnson Papers, Box 1, file 6, Hart to Johnson, a telegram, 3 July 1945; for the 19 July letter, which includes the quotations, see Maitland 781, Box 2, file 9, Hart to Maitland, 19 July 1945.

³⁸For Anscomb's letter, see Maitland 781, Box 1, file 9; for unrest over Maitland, see Farris Papers, Box 8, file 2, Delbridge to Farris, 25 February 1944, who attributed the weakness of coalition and a feeling of disunity to Maitland.

³⁹For reference to Hart's trouble and the 27 July meeting, see "Liberal Fight on Coalition Looms Here," Province, 26 July 1945, p. 1; for his refusal to resign, see "Hart Won't Resign Over Coalition,"

Province, 27 July 1945, p. 1; for the day-long battle, see "Liberals, Conservatives Both Pledged to Keep Coalition," Sun, 28 July 1945, p. 1.

⁴⁰For his address to the executive, see Maitland 781, Box 10, file 9, a speech, 28 July 1945.

⁴¹For the "notable unanimity," see "Conservatives, Liberals Vote to Maintain Coalition," Province, 28 July 1945, p. 1; for the Sun report, see "Liberals, Conservatives Both Pledged to Keep Coalition," Sun, 28 July 1945, p. 1; for Davey's reaction, see "Angry Saanich Tories to Run Ind. Candidate," Vancouver News Herald, 31 July 1945.

⁴²For the Peace River correspondence, see Maitland 781, Box 3, file 14, Maitland to Simpson, 28 August 1945, and Simpson to Maitland, 22 December 1945; for Enderby, see Maitland 781, Box 3, file 35, Stephens to Maitland, 10 January 1946; for North Okanagan, see Maitland 781, Box 3, file 53, Watkin to Maitland, 1 December 1945; for the by-election results, Parliamentary Guide, 1946.

⁴³For Hart's budget, see "Rural Expansion Education Highlight B.C. Legislative Program," Province, 6 February 1945, p. 2; "Hart Budgets His [sic] 51 Millions," Province, 26 February 1945, p. 1; and Robin, Pillars, p. 80 refers to the "big money session"; for the major legislation, see British Columbia, Electric Power Act (Victoria: King's Printer, 1945).

⁴⁴For Johnson's victory, see Johnson Papers, Box 1, file 3, "Statement of Poll," 10 May 1945; and British Columbia, Statement of Votes, (Parliamentary Guide has no record of this by-election); for the Ontario election, see Parliamentary Guide, 1946; for his writeoff of the CCF, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 15, Maitland to Ruth, 4 June 1945; for the federal election results, see Beck, Pendulum, pp. 238-39, and 256-57; for dissolution, see Parliamentary Guide, 1946.

⁴⁵For the weather details, see "Rain, Snow Slow Ballot Casting in B.C. Election," Times, 25 October 1941, p. 1; for the voter statistics, see British Columbia, Statement of Votes, 1945.

⁴⁶For the party standings at dissolution, 31 August 1945, see Parliamentary Guide, 1946, p. 441; for the 1945 election returns, see Statement of Votes, 1945; biographical sketches in Parliamentary Guide preceding 1947 (after that date most Coalition members listed their party identification simply as "Coalitionist"), and Statement of Votes 1937 and 1941 were used to identify Conservatives and Liberals in the new 1945 government; the Conservatives actually had 10, not 11, non CCF seats going into the election, as a Liberal got the nomination in Esquimalt, which was a Conservative seat at dissolution; the seven CCF seats taken by Conservative/Coalitionists were Delta, North Vancouver (Cates was assumed to be a Conservative), Revelstoke, Salmon Arm, Similkameen, Vancouver-Burrard, and Vancouver Centre (the last two were

dual ridings); Black, in "The Progressive Conservative Party . . .," p. 39, states that the Liberals added five seats to their original 21, the Conservatives dropped one from their original 12, and the CCF lost four to end with 10 seats.

⁴⁷For the Coalition government's manifesto, see John Hart, PABC, 324.711B/A12C652/1945H; for the CCF manifesto, see Cairns and McCarter, "Election Manifestos," CCF, 1945; for the Hart rally, see "Premier Hart Appeals for Mandate for Administration of High Standards," Times, 19 October 1945, p. 10.

⁴⁸For some of Maitland's references to government programs and legislation, see "CCF Challenged to Find Flaw in Hart Program," Sun, 4 October 1945, p. 6; "Coalition Guns Ranged on CCF," Sun, 10 October 1945, p. 22; "Premier John Hart Appeals for Mandate for Administration of High Standards," Times, 14 October 1945, p. 10; and "Charges CCF Policies Lead to Dictatorship," Province, 10 October 1945, p. 15.

⁴⁹For the November 1941 letter, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 6, Maitland to Winch, 7 November 1941; for his 4 December speech, see Maitland 781, Box 9, file 6, speech dated 4 December 1941; for an example of his recollections, see Maitland 781, Box 9, file 9, attachments to a speech dated 19 February 1943, summaries of articles in the Federationist (1939), News-Herald (1936, 1939), Nelson News (1939), Province (1939), and the Trail Times (1939); for the 1945 by-election, see Maitland 781, Box 10, file 6, a speech, 4 May 1945, p. 6 for the quotation.

⁵⁰For the dictatorship and job loss reference, see note 48, "Charges CCF Policies . . ."; for Maitland's reference to the CCF constitution, see note 48, "Coalition Guns Ranged . . ."; for reference to the Connell difficulties, see Roberts, "Doctrine and Disunity [in the] CCF," pp. 48-52; for the Telford problems, see Robin, Pillars, pp. 42-43; and for Herridge, see "C.C.F. Provincial Executive Formally Expels Herridge," Province, 12 May 1945, p. 1; for more on the Herridge situation, see "Bruce Hutchison," Times, 18 and 21 May 1945, both articles on p. 4, who described Herridge's expulsion as nothing but machine politics; the Vancouver executive, he said, had not approved Herridge's federal nomination by his own constituents, and expelled him when he refused to withdraw; the provincial executive then arranged another nomination. Herridge resigned from his provincial seat, and as an Independent CCF, easily beat out the other candidates including a CCF nominee in the federal election in June 1945. In the October 1945 provincial election, the Liberal-Coalitionist swamped the CCF candidate.

⁵¹For the Revelstoke speech, see "Attorney General Launches Fiery Attack on CCF Leader," Province, 12 October 1945, p. 7; for the new voting regulation, see "B.C. Grants Vote to All Services," Province, 10 October 1945, p. 1, which Maitland said were not prepared

to satisfy the CCF; for the Order in Council dated 9 October, see British Columbia, The B.C. Gazette 85 (18 October 1945):2107-8.

⁵²For his reference to the voters having only two choices, and his concern about being linked too closely to coalition, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1943 log, 5 February; the nominating formula that Hart described in his 19 July letter to Maitland included a procedure for nominating candidates in CCF-held single and dual ridings.

⁵³For his "rabble" comment, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1943 log, 2 February, where he refers to the "rabble" which faces a "damn good government"; for the "have-nots" and "radicals," see Maitland 781, Box 4, file 6, Maitland to Elvidge, 19 August 1943; for Winch's recollection, Interview, 13 August 1987; for his reference to the "cloak of patriotism," see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1941/42 log, 9 January; for the subversive nature of the CCF, see *ibid.*, 1943 log, 19 February.

⁵⁴For a comment about his health in 1944, see Maitland 11, Box 3, file 13, L. MacInnes to Maitland, 12 May 1944, where MacInnes commented on the "great strain" he was obviously under; for his state of health in August 1945, see Maitland 781, Box 3, file 12, Parsons to Draper, 31 July 1945; for reference to Norah accompanying her father, and his health, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 15, Maitland to Ruth, 13 October 1945; for reference to his August trip, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 23, Maitland to Norah, a postcard, 12 August 1945; for the November-December conference, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 23, Maitland to Betty and Norah, 25 November 1945; for reference to his January-February conference, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 16, Maitland to Ruth, 30 January 1946.

⁵⁵For his comment about slow progress, see "Maitland Back from Ottawa," Sun, 7 February 1946, p. 5; for a description of the Duplessis incident, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 16, Maitland to Ruth, 30 January 1946; the argument got more intense and personal after Duplessis reminded St. Laurent of a previous by-election campaign in which Duplessis had raised the matter of provincial rights. When St. Laurent denied being involved in the campaign, Duplessis then stated that not only was he there but his (St. Laurent's) brother-in-law had lost his deposit. At that point, "St. Laurent started shouting--Dupplisse started shouting and there was a hell of a scene." Right after adjournment they started again and finally "Hart came between them and said you two Frenchmen quit it--It takes an Irishman to keep you apart."

⁵⁶For his Supreme Court arguments, see "Maitland States Japs Still a Menace," Sun, 26 January 1946, p. 2; regarding the Pattullo government's submission, see British Columbia, British Columbia in the Canadian Confederation (Victoria: King's Printer, 1938), p. 353, article 20; for more on the Supreme Court decision, see Ken Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976),

pp. 308-9; for the appeal, see "Jap Deportation to Privy Council," Times, 13 March 1946, p. 1.

⁵⁷For his comment on the missing faces and those gone with the wind, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1946 log, 22 February 1946; for his less than honest statement, see Maitland 781, Box 9, file 14, an undelivered speech, dated "18/3/," p. 2; for his remark on CCF executive control of elected members, *ibid.*, p. 3; for his comments on the CCF/Labour differences, *ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

⁵⁸For the quotation, *ibid.*, pp. 1-2; for Winch's comment, Interview 1987.

⁵⁹For the "strength" of the CCF campaign, see Maitland 781, Box 9, file 14, an undelivered speech (see note 57), p. 8; for the Saskatchewan assistance, see *ibid.*, p. 8, and for "they came . . .," *ibid.*, p. 9; for the reference to the vote anomaly, *ibid.*, p. 7.

⁶⁰For his CBA speech, see Maitland 781, Box 30, file 13, "Peace--And Afterwards"; for the ABA speech, see Maitland 781, Box 10, file 27, "Not for Today Alone."

⁶¹For his report on the federal-provincial conferences, see Maitland 781, Box 9, file 14, an undelivered speech, dated "18/3," pp. 12-28.

⁶²For his anticipation of a rest on the train, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 23, Maitland to Betty, 3 February 1946; for his 5 March mistake, see "Maitland Admits He Made a Mistake," Province, 5 March 1946, p. 3; for his 11 March mistake, see Maitland 781, Box 8, 1946 log, 11 March; for the doctor's prognosis, see "Unlikely Maitland to Attend Session," Colonist, 22 March 1946, p. 1; for his death, see "Influenza Causes Death of Attorney General," Times, 28 March 1946, p. 1.

⁶³For Nesbitt's comment about Maitland's travelling, see "Day in the House," News Herald, 29 March 1946, p. 3; for the eulogies by Anscomb, Hart, Uphill and Winch, *ibid.*; for the Sun's description, see "Hushed House Pays Tribute to maitland," Sun, 29 March 1946, p. 26; for Nesbitt's questions, "Day in the House"; for press speculation, see "Green Suggested for B.C. Cabinet," Sun, 29 March 1946, p. 8.

CHAPTER VIII

MAITLAND 1908 TO 1946, POLITICIAN BY INCLINATION,
LAWYER BY VOCATION

Royal Maitland's political life, his thought motives and actions provide an insight into and an understanding of the Conservative party's fortunes during a changing and turbulent period. Maitland was a gifted lawyer who specialized in criminal and civil law and was a dedicated Conservative for almost two generations. He was prominent in the party from 1922 when he was elected president of the provincial association. He was an unsuccessful candidate in the 1924 general provincial election, a Minister Without Portfolio in the Tolmie government and an MLA continuously from 1937 to 1946. He was elected party leader in 1938 and from December 1941 until March 1946 served as attorney general in the Coalition government. His party, in the "most Conservative Province in Canada,"¹ formed the government only once between 1916 and 1946, but as a third party had a subordinate role in the Liberal-Conservative Coalition government from 1941 to 1952.

The reasons for the party's poor record seemed to be the result of its failure to recognize and adapt to a rapidly changing environment, and its inability to resolve various organizational problems. In fact, it appears the party could not cope with external challenges because of its unresolved internal difficulties. Pattullo had suggested it would be years before the Conservative party got over the attacks by insurgents in the 1920s, and Maitland in 1937 thought it

would take a generation for the party to recover from its fratricidal breakup in 1933. But even after 1937 the party was still factionalized.

Because of the existence of divisive factions, the party never elected a widely supported and popular leader, aside from Tolmie who was in any event an aberration "forced" on the party by a desperate convention. The leadership could not take a determined and unequivocal stand on issues or policies without risking either a party split or public controversy.

When Maitland was elected provincial association president in August 1922, the anti-Bowser faction was already a strong force, but regardless, the same convention narrowly reaffirmed Bowser as leader. The embittered losers then established the Provincial Party. Although this party won only three seats in the 1924 general election, it ran candidates in all but three ridings, and probably cost the Conservatives the election. Delegates at the 1926 leadership convention were completely deadlocked along Bowser and anti-Bowser lines, and finally resolved the impasse by drafting S. F. Tolmie. But peace was short-lived, and Tolmie although elected premier, had to battle rebellious Bowser forces and eventually lost. Even after harmony was apparently restored in late 1933 when Dr. F. P. Patterson was appointed pro tem leader, Maitland complained that Patterson was a member of the Bowser wrecking crew. However, with the exception of the overwhelming support for Tolmie in 1926, Patterson's majority of 68 percent in the 1936 convention was the best since 1922 when Bowser got a majority of just

over 52 percent. Perhaps unfortunately for the party, he died about 18 months after taking office. In the 1938 convention Maitland won over Anscomb with only a 51.5 percent majority, and thereafter had to contend with a powerful Anscomb-led faction. In 1939, for example, Anscomb publicly rebuked Maitland over his decision not to contest by-elections during the war. He also quickly made his views known on Coalition in November 1941. In July 1945 Anscomb delivered what was practically an ultimatum to Maitland over continuation of Coalition. A leader in this situation becomes a chronic compromiser in order to hold the factions together. In effect he is not a leader, only a chairman who holds office at the pleasure of his committee.²

Conservative leaders consistently represented urban areas, yet the majority of MLAs and constituency organizations were rural-based. During the Maitland years, the Conservatives never elected an Up country leader. Rural British Columbians, compared to Vancouver area citizens had different concerns, even different values, yet Vancouver from 1920 to 1945, with less than 20 percent of the MLAs, had a disproportionate influence in the Conservative party. Bowser, Tolmie before he was abandoned in 1933, Patterson, and Maitland all had strong Vancouver backing. In fact, Maitland himself said in 1931 that "Vancouver controls the political situation in this Province." To Up country delegates this was a familiar refrain as they frequently protested that Vancouver simply brushed aside their interests. Even as late as July 1945, for example, when Maitland demanded that the provincial executive approve continuation of Coalition, Saanich

delegates complained bitterly that only Vancouver wanted Coalition. The Vancouver/Up country, or Interior, rivalry, of course, was not new. Pattullo and his Liberals seemed to recognize that the interests of the whole province must be served, but the Conservative leadership including Tolmie, leaned to Vancouver rather than to hinterland interests. In effect, Conservative leaders tended to lead rather than respond to the majority of the province.³

The Conservative party practised issue, rather than reform politics, that is, it challenged a political adversary's position, not by proposing anything new, but simply by offering to do a better job, or by condemning whatever the other party proposed. From 1927 on, the press and at least one brave delegate at the 1936 leadership convention challenged the Conservative party to produce new policies. The Conservatives did not propose any real policy alternatives to those proposed by the Liberals, and later by the CCF. Maitland stated on more than one occasion that the party had to adapt to changing times, to respond to people's perception of a government's responsibilities. In a speech in the 1933 Legislature, he stated society must assume responsibility for the less fortunate, and again in 1940 during the gas boycott debate, he tried to differentiate between Conservative and Liberal policies and maintained that the Conservative party stood for less government and more democracy. These were basically only general statements of Conservative philosophy, perhaps his own, not concrete new policy proposals. After Coalition in 1941 he and others in both parties, not to mention the CCF, frequently commented on the similarity

of Liberal and Conservative policies.⁴

Finally, the Conservatives failed to recognize a new constituency, a political vacuum, created as Pattullo moved his party to the Left. As the philosophical differences between the two parties increased, particularly after the election of the Pattullo government in 1933, the Conservatives were presented with an opportunity to exploit a new source of support. These potential recruits were former Liberals, stranded in what Robin Fisher described as the "abandoned middle ground" because they were disinclined to follow Pattullo and the Liberals to the Left. The Conservatives under Tolmie and later under Patterson and Maitland did not perceive this new opportunity. Indeed, in the 1941 general election campaign, Maitland offered nothing new, only a promise that Conservatives would do better. As the Sun questioned in an editorial on Maitland's manifesto, why did he not challenge the Pattullo government with some new reforms that would appeal to voters who were tired of "threshing over the barren straw of party advantage"? But as already explained Maitland was weakly supported and was obliged to produce an election platform that would first satisfy his own camp, and secondly, one that would at least placate the most strongly led faction. He, and perhaps his closest advisors, may have been fully aware of the political dynamics but were unable to seize the opportunity. On the other hand, this may have been another example of what Professor Jack Granatstein described as a party characteristic, namely that the "gift of properly appraising political realities has never been a Conservative strongpoint."⁵

When Maitland became president of the provincial organization in 1922, his party was already burdened with a weakly supported leader and a strong faction. This political scenario did not change appreciably for the remainder of Maitland's political career. It was a world he never made,⁶ he just became part of a situation that basically remained the same. Like a train passenger whose trip is guided by the track, Maitland was carried along, able to exert little effect or control on the Conservative party's journey. As party president, he was unable to defuse the Provincial Party rebellion in 1923, he could not arrest the party's deterioration during the Tolmie administration, and after 1938 was unable to establish himself as a strong leader. Why was this so? Why was he not able to exert more influence over the party?

In 1922, Maitland was elected president with the support of the Bowser camp. John Nelson, who had been promised the nomination and who incidentally had supported Stevens' bid for the party leadership, subsequently became one of the principal movers in founding the Provincial Party. As a mediator between the factions, Maitland would have been inhibited by his apparently strong identity with the Bowser group.

During the Tolmie administration, Maitland was only a Minister Without Portfolio, yet he appeared to be a strong force in the government. He carried House debates on difficult or controversial subjects, he explained the budget although he was not the Minister of Finance,

and he kept the Vancouver MLAs placated. But by 1931 he was swinging his support to his riding colleagues who were becoming increasingly disenchanted with Tolmie. When the premier began pushing Union government, Maitland argued publicly in support of partisan government, but could not rally the anti Tolmie forces around his position. In the spring 1933 Session he took the unusual step, speaking as though he was the party leader, of informing Conservative MLAs that in the next election they could run under whatever banner they chose. By the time of the election in November 1933 the party was completely decimated and Maitland appeared to be out of politics.

But after 25 years, Maitland, like an old fire horse, could not drop politics that easily, and five years later was elected leader with a bare majority over Anscomb. For the remainder of his leadership Maitland's hold over the party was tenuous, yet he literally dedicated his life to the party. Although he recognized that the party had to adapt to changing social, economic, and political circumstances, he worked within the political system, practising issue politics, and based his appeal on a pledge that he and his party could, and would, provide better government. Maitland was an unusually gifted speaker and in a province where parties differed little on what the issues were, personal appeal was essential. In his first speech to the Legislature in 1938 after his election as leader, he gave an excellent speech, "shiny and full of import" but on closer inspection it was found to be "rather airy" and without much substance. No one in British Columbia, journalist Hutchison wrote, could "put so much

passion into a platitude." He inflated his claims, he exaggerated, even to his own executive, but he was, after all, in an Opposition party trying to attract enough votes to put his party in government. Like many orators, he relied on the sound of his voice rather than the text of his speeches to win support.⁷

As a law student he had demonstrated his debating skills and platform ability. As a politician he was described as "golden-voiced" and one of the "greatest stump speakers" in British Columbia. In "issue" politics, charisma and effective oratory could carry a party to victory. But in a divided and troubled party (Pattullo called it a dying party in 1941), faced with economic and social challenges in the 1930s and early 1940s, charisma, brilliant oratory, and platform ability were not enough to unite a party, much less lead it to victory.⁸

In his political style and his platform manner, Maitland may have been trying to emulate Premier Richard McBride, a "distinguished" person endowed with "boundless optimism and great natural charm." When McBride retired in 1915 after 12 years of great success, Maitland had been active in the party for seven years, and it would have been surprising if he had not been influenced by the personable McBride. Maitland, like McBride, enjoyed travelling around the province on speaking tours. Similarly, Maitland relied on his platform style, his presence and great oratory, for electoral success. But the Maitland Conservatives were under chronic siege from divisive factions, whereas McBride was a popularly-supported leader for most of his political

life.⁹

By nature Maitland was inclined to lead the electorate, despite his claims to the contrary, yet he was an opportunist, quick to co-opt an issue that showed political appeal, the Rowell/Sirois Royal Commission report, for example. Initially negative about the Commission, he attacked the Liberal government with great tenacity after Pattullo in January 1941 had brought about the collapse of the federal/provincial conference called to review the Commission's findings. But in 1946 he realized provincial cooperation with the federal government meant loss of provincial independence and again was set to lead the electorate, years before Bennett successfully used "federal bashing" to his own political advantage.

Personally a very likeable man, Maitland was not a popular leader but none of the leaders, with the exception of Tolmie for awhile, had been strongly supported. Who would have done better? If Anscomb had won the party leadership in 1938, he would probably have been burdened with a Maitland faction. Maitland thought highly of W. A. C. Bennett who, like Anscomb, had leadership aspirations, but Bennett did not enter the political picture until the 1941 election. Winch believed the political evolution would have been more or less the same, with support flowing from the Right wing parties to the CCF. He suggested the tide of events was such that it would not have mattered who led the Conservative Party in the 1930s and early 1940s.

With all his commitment and dedication to partisan politics, Maitland had little influence on a party continually burdened with

leadership problems. Party leadership, preoccupied with internal battles, could not properly address external challenges created by the Depression, the rise of socialism, World War II, and the changing public perception of a government's social and economic role. Out of regard for party solidarity Maitland made the decision in late 1941 to abandon party politics temporarily in favour of Coalition government. On the other hand, the decision may have been pressed on him by a party that was yearning for a piece of the action, after years of destructive conflict and fighting the wrong enemy.

Maitland regarded public office as the highest form of community service, an ideal he cherished through 38 years of dedication to his party. Although his political work certainly benefited his law practise to some degree, he made many sacrifices for his party. He was a devoted family man, yet spent much time out of town campaigning and doing organizational work. These trips had a professional cost as well, because his law office and most of his practise was in Vancouver. Never a strong person, he was burdened by illness brought on by overwork and nervous tension.

Proust allegedly said that in life people usually end up doing whatever they are second best at. Maitland was an exceptionally skilled lawyer according to his professional colleagues. Just a few months after being called to the Bar in 1913, he established himself as a very able Defense counsel in a murder case. The following year he was appointed Crown counsel for the Fall Assizes at Clinton, "probably

the youngest counsel ever honored" with such an appointment in British Columbia. Subsequently he again acted for the Crown but his specialty was Defense counsel in criminal law cases, and later, in civil law. In 1933 he said he could not "succeed at both Politics and Law," yet in 1937 decided to again seek public office. This was a decision that circumscribed his future law career, particularly after he joined the Coalition government. From that time on law became secondary to politics. His love of law, his true calling, had finally been pushed aside by an elusive goal he had been pursuing for much of his political life. Maitland had many of the attributes of a successful politician, but as a lawyer he had that indispensable quality called vocation. He gave his life to politics; but law probably would have given him life.¹⁰

Notes

¹Tolmie Papers, Box 3, R. B. Bennett to Tolmie, 29 August 1929--Bennett's opinion of British Columbia.

²For examples of the problems faced by weakly supported leaders, see J. L. Granatstein, The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1935-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967).

³For a discussion of a successful leader's qualities, see, for example, John C. Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada (Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada Limited, 1973), chapter 6; for leadership problems arising from a narrow support base, see Granatstein, The Politics of Survival; for his statement about Vancouver political control, see Tolmie Papers, Box 5, file 17, Maitland to Tolmie, 19 September 1931; for Saanich's complaint about the Vancouver machine, see "B.C. Conservative Executive Votes to Continue Coalition," Times, 30 July 1945, p. 2; for her reference to Vancouver vs. Interior rivalry and Pattullo's understanding, see Ormsby, A History, pp. 439-41; for Pattullo's recognition that rural areas were important to the Liberal party, see Sutherland, "Pattullo," especially pp. 26-28.

⁴In a 1927 by-election, "Issues at New Westminster," Province, 13 August 1927, p. 6, the newspaper said there was little to choose between the two parties; for the brave delegate's (MLA C. F. M. Planta) comments, see "Conservatives in Two Groups," Times, 30 June 1936, p. 1; and "Patterson May Be Leader of Conservatives," Province, 30 June 1936, p. 1; for a later comment about the failure of the Conservatives to develop new policies, see "Mr. Maitland's Manifesto," Province, 23 July 1941, p. 4; for his comment in 1940, see "Maitland Charges Democratic Principles Repudiated by Act," Province, 10 May 1940, p. 13.

⁵For Fisher's comments, a Public Lecture, University of Victoria, 25 February 1988; Alper, "Rule to Ruin" also comments on the Conservative's failure to exploit a new constituency; for the editorial comment, see "Mr. Maitland's Manifesto," note 5; for Granatstein, see J. L. Granatstein, "The Conservative Party and Conscription in the Second World War," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1967, p. 148.

⁶The allusion to the world Maitland never made is based on a James T. Farrell title, A World I Never Made (New York: Vanguard Press, Inc., 1936).

⁷For the "shiny" and "platitude" references, see "House Hears Pat Turn Over New Leaf," Sun, 28 October 1938, p. 1.

⁸For the golden voice, see Sherman, Bennett, p. 31; for the stump speaker, see "Log of the House," Province, 8 February 1929, p. 18; for Pattullo's reference to a dying party, see Sutherland, "Pattullo," p. 137; for discussions of charismatic political leaders, see Robert Craig Brown, "Fishwives, Plutocrats, Sirens and Other Curious Creatures," in Entering the Eighties, pp. 149-60, edited by R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1980); and Roger Graham, "Charisma and Canadian Politics," in Character and Circumstance, pp. 22-36, edited by John S. Moir (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1970).

⁹For the McBride references, see Brian R. D. Smith, "Sir Richard McBride: A Study in the Conservative Party of British Columbia, 1903-1916" (M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1959), p. 1; for McBride's love of hinterland stumping, see *ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

¹⁰For the Proust aphorism, see John Le Carre, A Perfect Spy (Markham: Penguin Books Canada Limited, 1986), p. 417; for the Clinton appointment, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 127, "Honor for Young Barrister," for either politics or law, see Maitland 781, Box 6, file 6, Maitland to Ruth, 25 June 1933.

AFTERWORD

On the evening of 17 January 1946, Gordon Sloan, chief justice of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, officially opened the Law Faculty at the University of British Columbia, six months after classes had actually begun. Attorney General Maitland, one of several prominent jurists who participated in the opening ceremony, described the occasion as "one of the most important events in the history of the province." Certainly it was a memorable occasion for Maitland who, in 1911, had presented a petition, on behalf of his fellow law students, to the Law Society calling for establishment of a law school at the new university which the McBride government had promised at Point Grey.¹

Maitland said that law training would no longer be the "hit and miss proposition as before" and henceforth graduates would be a "finished product." But when the attorney general, who was himself a good advertisement for the previous system, learned that there would be no grandfather clause to cover law students who were currently studying in law offices around the province, he insisted that the Law Society must allow such students to complete their programs under the old system.²

Following Maitland's death, the Primrose Club in Vancouver established a scholarship in his name for the University of British Columbia law students. Called the "Honourable R. L. Maitland Memorial Scholarship," it has been awarded annually since 1947 to a student with the highest standing in second year law.³

Notes

¹For reports of the official opening, see "Farris Lauds Creation of World Law," Province, 18 January 1946, p. 6; and "War Trials Good Omen for Peace," Sun, 18 January 1946, p. 13; for his 1911 petition, see Maitland 781, Box 14, p. 183, a clipping, "Lawyers' School for Vancouver"; for promise of a new university, see Ormsby, A History, p. 361.

²For Maitland's comments, see Sun, note 1; for his insistence on a grandfather clause, Watts, Taped Interview, 4 August 1987.

³For conditions of the award, see UBC, Awards Office, personal correspondence with the author, 30 July 1987; and Maitland 781, box 33, file 7 which includes a clipping and a photo of Mr. G. B. McIntosh (still practising in Vancouver), the first recipient and a member of the 1945 class, and a letter from McIntosh to Ruth Maitland, 10 June 1947. In 1947 the \$150 scholarship amounted to about 65 percent of the \$230 annual fees, but by 1988 the \$800 award was worth only about 41 percent of law school fees. Obviously the scholarship has not kept pace with inflation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND APPENDICES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Published Materials:A. Government Publications:

- British Columbia. Attorney General Act. Revised Statutes, 1936, chapter 18. Victoria: King's Printer, 1936.
- . British Columbia Gazette 68 (13 September 1928).
- . British Columbia Gazette 81 (18 December 1941).
- . British Columbia in the Canadian Confederation. Victoria: King's Printer, 1938.
- . Coal and Petroleum Products Control Board Act, 1937. Victoria: King's Printer, 1937.
- . Constitution Act Amendment Act, 1916. Victoria: King's Printer, 1916.
- . Constitution Act Amendment Act, 1923. Victoria: King's Printer, 1924.
- . Constitution Act Amendment Act, 1932. Victoria: King's Printer, 1932.
- . Estimates of Revenue and Expenditures, 1920-21 to 1945-46. Victoria: King's Printer, .
- . Legal Professions Act. Revised Statutes, 1911, Chapter 136. Victoria: King's Printer, 1911.
- . Petroleum Sales Act. Victoria: King's Printer, 1940.
- . Post-war Rehabilitation Act. Victoria: King's Printer, 1942.
- . Provincial Elections Act Amendment Act, 1932. Victoria: King's Printer, 1932.
- . Public Schools Annual Report, 1904-1905. Victoria: King's Printer, 1905.
- . Sexual Sterilization Act. Victoria: King's Printer, 1933.
- . Statement of Votes, 1920 to 1941. Victoria: King's Printer.

----- . Unemployment Relief Act, 1932. Victoria: King's Printer, 1932.

----- . Unemployment Relief Act, 1933. Victoria: King's Printer, 1933.

Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. The Canada Year Book, 1947. Ottawa: King's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1947.

----- . Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940.

B. Articles:

Alper, Donald. "The Effects of Coalition Government on Party Structure: The Case of the Conservative Party in B.C." BC Studies (Spring 1977):40-49.

Andrews, Margaret W. "The Course of Medical Opinion on State Health Insurance, 1919-1939." Social History 16 (May 1983):131-43.

Angus, H. F. "The Kidd Report in British Columbia." Canadian Forum 13 (November 1932):47-49.

Berger, Carl. "Donald Creighton and the Artistry of History." In The Writing of Canadian History, pp. 208-27. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Blais, Andr . "Third Parties in Canadian Provincial Politics." Canadian Journal of Political Science 6 (1973):422-38.

Bowen, Catherine Drinker. "The Biographer's Relationship with His Hero." In Biography as High Adventure, pp. 65-69. Edited by Stephen B. Oates. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986.

British Columbia Conservative Party Association. "Minutes of the Proceedings of the British Columbia Conservative Party Convention, Kamloops, 23-25 November 1926." Victoria: Legislative Library.

Brown, Robert Craig. "The Historian as Biographer." The Canadian Forum 60 (September 1980):9-10.

----- . "Fishwives, Plutocrats, Sirens and Other Curious Creatures: Some Questions About Political Leadership in Canada." In Entering the Eighties, pp. 149-60. Edited by R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1980.

- Cairns, A. C., and K. McCarter. "Primary Documents concerning British Columbia Provincial Elections 1903-1975." Victoria: University of Victoria, Special Collections.
- Chamberlin, T. C. "The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses." Science 148 (7 May 1965):754-59.
- De Voto, Bernard. "The Skeptical Biographer." In Forays and Rebuttals, pp. 179-203. Edited by B. De Voto. New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1936.
- Dobie, Edith. "Party History in British Columbia, 1903-1933." The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 27 (April 1936):153-66.
- English, John. "The Second Time Around: Political Scientists Writing History." In Contemporary Approaches to Canadian History, pp. 245-57. Edited by Carl Berger. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1987.
- Fisher, Robin. "Public Address on Premier T. D. Pattullo," University of Victoria, 25 February 1988.
- Graham, Ronald. "Charisma and Canadian Politics." In Character and Circumstance, pp. 22-36. Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1970.
- Granatstein, J. L. "The Conservative Party and Conscription in the Second World War." Canadian Historical Association Annual Report (1967):130-48.
- Gray, J. M. "Biography as History." In Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1965, pp. 144-53. Toronto: Canadian Historical Review, 1965.
- Hutchison, Bruce. "Revolt Beyond the Rockies." Maclean's (15 July 1934):16, 26.
- "Old Splits and Convenient Alliances." Vancouver Sun, 21 June 1986, p. B4.
- Huxley, Julian. "The Evolutionary Process." In Evolution as a Process, pp. 1-23. Edited by Julian Huxley, A. C. Hardy and E. B. Ford. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1954.
- Jacobs, Wilbur R. "Turner's Methodology: Multiple Working Hypotheses or Ruling Theory." Journal of American History 55 (March 1968):853-63.
- Kami, Michael I. "Business Planning as Business Opportunity." In Preparing Tomorrow's Business Leaders Today, pp. 103-11.

- Edited by Peter F. Drucker. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969.
- Lockyer, Roger. "Writing History." History Today (November 1934):46-49.
- Longford, Elizabeth. "The Riddle of Queen Victoria's Stocking and Other Reflections of a Biographer." The New York Times Book Review (3 August 1986):3.
- MacInnis, Angus. "More About the British Columbia Election." The Canadian Forum 14 (February 1934):169-70.
- "More About the British Columbia Election." The Canadian Forum 14 (February 1934):169-70.
- McDonald, Robert A. J. "Working Class Vancouver, 1886-1914: Urbanism and Class in British Columbia." BC Studies (Spring-Summer 1986):33-69.
- Ormsby, Margaret A. "T. Dufferin Pattullo and the Little New Deal." In British Columbia: Historical Readings, pp. 533-54. Edited by W. Peter Ward and Robert A. J. McDonald. Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre Ltd., 1981.
- Parker, Ian. "The Provincial Party." BC Studies (Winter 1970-71):17-28.
- Pinard, Maurice. "Third Parties in Canada Revisited: A Rejoinder and Elaboration of the Theory of One-Party Dominance." Canadian Journal of Political Science 6 (1973):439-60.
- Robin, Martin. "British Columbia: The Company Province." In Canadian Provincial Politics, pp. 28-60. Edited by Martin Robin. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1978.
- Soward, F. H. "British Columbia Goes Liberal." The Canadian Forum 14 (December 1933):86-88.
- Steeves, Dorothy G. "British Columbia Moves Leftward." The Canadian Forum 21 (December 1941):266-68.
- Thompson, James D. "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal-Setting as an Interaction Process." In Organizations and Beyond, pp. 115-27. Edited by William A. Rushing and Mayer N. Zald. Toronto: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976.
- Veazey, Phyllis. "John Hendry and the Vancouver, Westminster and Yukon Railway: It Would Put Us on Easy Street." BC Studies (Autumn 1983):44-63.

White, Graham. "One-Party Dominance and Third Parties: The Pinard Theory Reconsidered." Canadian Journal of Political Science 6 (1973):399-421.

Wilson, James Q. "Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory." In Approaches to Organizational Design, pp. 193-218. Edited by James D. Thompson. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966.

B. Books:

Adachi, Ken. The Enemy That Never Was. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976.

Anonymous. British Columbia Directory. Victoria: Williams B.C. Directory Co. Ltd., 1894 to 1930 (authors, publishers, vary, or are not given. Provincial Archives of British Columbia microfilms generally show only the year and the name of the publication.)

Anonymous. The Scottish Nation. Volume 7. London: A. Fullerton, undated.

Barman, Jean. Growing Up British. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984.

Beck, J. Murray. Pendulum of Power. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1968.

Bowen, Catherine Drinker. Biography: The Craft and the Calling. Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1968.

Braudel, Fernand. On History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

British Columbia Directory, 1890-1925. Victoria: Provincial Archives of British Columbia.

Browne, Eric C., and John Dreijmanis, eds. Government Coalitions in Western Democracies. London: Longman Inc., 1982.

Butler, David. Governing Without a Majority. London: The Macmilland Press Ltd., 1986.

Carrigan, D. Owen. Canadian Party Platforms 1867-1968. Canada: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1968.

Carter, Maurice, ed. Who's Who in British Columbia, 1940-41.

- Vancouver: Carter Publishing Company, 1941.
- Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of History. London: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Courtney, John C. The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1973.
- Creighton, Donald. John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1952.
- . John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain. The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1955.
- Curti, Merle. Probing Our Past. Gloucester: Harper and Brothers, 1955.
- Downs, Anthony. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967.
- Drucker, Peter F. The Effective Executive. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967.
- Elton, G. R. The Practice of History. London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1969.
- Graham, Roger. Arthur Meighen. Vol. 1. Toronto: Clark, Irwin and Company Limited, 1963, volume 2.
- Granatstein, J. L. The Politics of Survival. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967.
- Greene, B. M., ed. Who's Who and Why, 1919 to 1944. Toronto: International Press.
- Harris, Louis. The Anguish of Change. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1973.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Lectures on the Philosophy of History. London: George Bell and Sons, 1890.
- Hopkins, J. Castell. The Canadian Annual Review, 1909-1938. Toronto: The Annual Review Publishing Company.
- Humphries, Charles W. 'Honest Enough to Be Bold': The Life and Times of Sir James Pliny Whitney. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.
- Jackman, S. W. Portraits of the Premiers. Sidney: Gray's Publishing Ltd., 1969.

- Kelley, Robert. The Transatlantic Persuasion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.
- . The Cultural Pattern in American Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.
- Kendle, John. John Bracken: A Political Biography. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.
- Kidd, George, et al. Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government to Investigate Finances of British Columbia. Victoria: King's Printer, 1932.
- Lemieux, Rodolphe, et al., eds. The Canadian Annual Review, 1916-1938. Toronto: Canadian Annual Review Company Ltd.
- Leroy Ladurie, Emmanuel. The Territory of the Historian. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
- . The Mind and Method of the Historian. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
- Maitland, Frederick Lewis. Narrative of the Surrender of Buonaparte. London: Henry Colburn, 1826.
- Masters, D. C. Reciprocity, 1846-1911. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1961.
- McKenty, Neil. Mitch Hepburn. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1967.
- Miles, Raymond E. Theories of Management. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975.
- Mitchell, David J. W. A. C. Bennett and the Rise of British Columbia. Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre Ltd., 1983.
- Moir, John S., ed. Character and Circumstance. Toronto: Macmilland Company of Canada Limited, 1970.
- Morley, J. T. Secular Socialists: The CCF/NDP in Ontario. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984.
- Morton, James. Honest John Oliver. Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1933.
- Nevins, Allan. The Gateway to History. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1938.

- Normandin, A. L., et al., eds. Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1900-1950. Ottawa and Hull.
- Oliver, Peter. G. Howard Ferguson: Ontario Tory. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
- Ormsby, Margaret A. British Columbia: A History. Vancouver: The MacMillan Company of Canada Limited, 1958.
- Perlin, George C. The Tory Syndrome. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980.
- , ed. Party Democracy in Canada. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1988.
- Pinard, Maurice. The Rise of a Third Party. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975.
- Robin, Martin. The Rush for Spoils: The Company Province, 1871-1933. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1972.
- , ed. Pillars of Profit: The Company Province 1934-1972. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973.
- Scarrow, Howard A. Canada Votes. New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1962.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Cycles of American History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986.
- Sherman, Paddy. Bennett. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1966.
- Simon, Herbert A. Administrative Behaviour. New York: The Free Press, 1976.
- Skelton, Oscar Douglas. Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1921.
- Steeves, Dorothy G. The Compassionate Rebel. Vancouver: Evergreen Press Limited, 1960.
- Stegner, Wallace, ed. Four Portraits and One Subject: Bernard De Voto. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963.
- Stevens, Geoffrey. Stanfield. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973.
- Tosh, John. The Pursuit of History. London: Longman Group Limited, 1984.

- Townsend, Peter. Burke's Peerage and Baronetage. London: Burke's Peerage Limited, 1978.
- Tyre, Robert. Douglas in Saskatchewan. Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1962.
- Tuchman, Barbara W. Practising History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1981.
- Walker, Russell R. Politicians of a Pioneering Province. Vancouver: Mitchell Press Limited, 1969.
- Watts, Alfred. History of the Law Society of British Columbia, 1869-1973. Vancouver: Watts and British Columbia Law Society, 1973.
- Wearing, Joseph. The L Shaped Party: Liberal Party of Canada 1958-1980. Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson Limited, 1981.
- Wicker, Tom. Facing the Lions. New York: Hearst Corporation, 1973.
- Wilbur, Richard. H. H. Stevens, 1878-1973. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
- Williams, John R. The Conservative Party of Canada: 1920-1949. North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1956.
- Worley, Ronald B. The Wonderful World of W. A. C. Bennett. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971.

C. Newspapers:

- Annapolis Spectator, 1914, 1927.
- Daily News (Prince Rupert), 1941.
- Daily World (Vancouver), 1890, 1922.
- Grand Forks Gazette, 1939.
- Kelowna Courier, 1924.
- News Advertiser, 1916.
- Prince George Citizen, 1939.
- Vancouver News-Herald, 1946.
- Vancouver Province, 1911-1946.

Vancouver Sun, 1913-1946.

Vancouver Tribune, 1917.

Victoria Daily Colonist, 1919-1946.

Victoria Daily Times, 1919-1946.

II. Unpublished Material.

A. Manuscript Collections:

- Bennett, R. B. Personal Papers, MG26K. National Archives of Canada, Ottawa.
- Bennett, W. A. C., Personal Papers. Vancouver: Simon Fraser University, Special Collections.
- Farris, J. W. de B. Personal Papers. Vancouver: University of British Columbia.
- Johnson, Byron. Personal Papers. Victoria: University of Victoria, Special Collections.
- Ladner, Leon J. Personal Papers, Add/MSS 641. Vancouver City Archives.
- Law Society. Add/MSS 948, Bencher Files of R. L. and R. R. (Senior) Maitland. Victoria: Provincial Archives of British Columbia.
- MacInnis, Angus. Personal Papers. Vancouver: University of British Columbia, Special Collections.
- Maitland Family Photographs. File 97912-22. Victoria: Provincial Archives of British Columbia.
- Maitland, R. L. Personal Papers. Add/MSS 11 and 781. Victoria: Provincial Archives of British Columbia.
- McKelvie, Bruce. Personal Papers. Add/MSS 1. Victoria: Provincial Archives of British Columbia.
- Pattullo, T. Dufferin. Personal Papers, Add/MSS 3. Victoria: Provincial Archives of British Columbia.
- Steeves, Dorothy. Personal Papers. Vancouver: University of British Columbia, Special Collections.
- Tolmie, Simon Fraser. Personal Papers. Vancouver: University of

British Columbia, Special Collections.

Winch, Harold. Tape 3, Accession 148, track number one, 9 March 1973.
Victoria: Provincial Archives of British Columbia.

B. Theses and Dissertations:

Abbott, George Malcolm. "The Formation of the Liberal-Conservative Coalition in 1941." M.A. thesis, University of Victoria, 1975.

Alper, Donald Keith. "From Rule to Ruin: The Conservative Party of British Columbia, 1928-1954." Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1975.

Black, Edwin Robert. "The Progressive Conservative Party in British Columbia: Some Aspects of Organization." M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1960.

Dailyde, Victor Kastytis. "The Administration of W. J. Bowser, Premier of British Columbia 1915-1916." M.A. thesis, University of Victoria, 1976.

Grant, Daniel John. "T. D. Pattullo's Northern Empire: The Alaska Highway and the Proposed Annexation of the Yukon Territory, 1933-1941." M.A. thesis, University of Victoria, 1980.

Groves, Robert Edmund. "Business Government: Party Politics and the British Columbia Community, 1928-1933." M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1976.

Parker, Ian Donald. "Simon Fraser Tolmie and the British Columbia Conservative Party 1916-1933." M.A. thesis, University of Victoria, 1970.

Roberts, Dorothy June. "Doctrine and Disunity in the British Columbia Section of the CCF, 1932-1956." M.A. thesis, University of Victoria, 1972.

Smith, Brian R. D. "Sir Richard McBride: A Study in the Conservative Party of British Columbia, 1903-1916." M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1959.

Sutherland, John Neil. "T. D. Pattullo as a Party Leader." M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1960.

Ward, Judith Barbara. "Federal-Provincial Relations within the Liberal Party of British Columbia." M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1966.

C. Personal Correspondence and Interviews:

Canadian Lacrosse Hall of Fame, New Westminster. Personal Correspondence with the Author, 21 November 1987.

Green, Howard. Vancouver. Interview. 28 July 1987.

----- Personal Correspondence with the Author, 16 August 1987.

Hutchison, Bruce. Victoria. Interview. 29 September 1987.

Maitland-King, Elizabeth. North Vancouver. Interviews, 16 August 1986, and 6 October 1987.

United Church of Canada, Vancouver. Personal Correspondence with the Author, 27 May 1987.

University of British Columbia, Awards Office. Personal Correspondence with the Author, 30 July 1987.

Watts, Alfred. West Vancouver, British Columbia. Taped Interview (in response to written questions), 4 August 1987.

Winch, Harold. White Rock, British Columbia. Interview, 13 August 1987.

APPENDIX 1

BRITISH COLUMBIA PROVINCIAL ELECTION RESULTS,¹ 1909-1949

<u>Year</u>		<u>Conser- vatives</u>	<u>Liber- als</u>	<u>Coali- tion</u>	<u>CCF</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total Seats</u>
1909	Seats	38	2			2	42
	% vote	51.7	36.3			12.0	
1912	Seats	40	0			2	42
	% vote	60.8	25.2			14.0	
1916	Seats	9	37			1	47
	% vote	37.5	50.3			12.2	
1920	Seats	14	26			7	47
	% vote	29.4	39.0			31.6	
1924	Seats	17	23			8 ²	48
	% vote	29.4	31.3			39.3	
1928	Seats	35	12			1	48
	% vote	53.3	40.0			6.7	
1933	Seats		34		7	6	47
	% vote		41.7		31.5	26.8	
1937	Seats	8	31		7	2	48
	% vote	28.6	37.3		28.57	5.5	
1941	Seats	12	21		14	1	48
	% vote	30.9	32.9		33.4	2.8	
1945	Seats(17 Cons., 20 Libs.)			37	10	1	48
	% vote			55.8	37.6	6.6	
1949	Seats			39	7	2	48
	% vote			61.4	35.1	3.5	

¹British Columbia, Statement of Votes, 1909-1949 (Victoria: King's/Queen's Printer).

²The Provincial Party won three seats with 24.2 percent of the vote.

APPENDIX 2

BRITISH COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES AND
 ANTICIPATED REVENUE, 1920-46, BY FISCAL YEAR
 (1 APRIL TO 31 MARCH)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Expenditures</u> (Millions)	<u>Revenue</u> (Millions)
1920/21	\$17.41	\$13.98
1921/22	19.93	17.61
1922/23	21.13	19.04
1923/24	19.97	18.77
1924/25	19.29	18.36
1925/26	18.19	18.34
1926/27	18.25	18.56
1927/28	19.76	19.50
1928/29	20.82	20.83
1929/30	25.28	25.29
1930/31	28.07	28.12
1931/32	28.08	28.09
1932/33	24.69	24.84
1933/34	22.73	20.50
1934/35	21.61	19.49
1935/36	22.38	22.49
1936/37	24.19	24.31
1937/38	26.39	26.47
1938/39	27.98	28.06
1939/40	28.76	28.82
1940/41	29.27	29.30
1941/42	29.95	31.96
1942/43	33.09	33.16
1943/44	31.79	31.99
1944/45	34.50	34.60
1945/46	37.20	37.27
1946/47	42.09	42.15

VITA

Surname: TERPENNING Given Names: JOHN GORDON

Place of Birth: Murrayville, B.C. Date of Birth: 18 April 1922

Educational Institutions:

University of Victoria 1975-1988

Degrees:

M.P.A. 1978 University of Victoria

M.A. 1982 University of Victoria

Honours and Awards:

Publications:

PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant the right to lend my thesis or dissertation (the title of which is shown below) to users of the University of Victoria Library, and to make single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the Library of any other university, or similar institution, on its behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or a member of the University designated by me. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis

MAITLAND AND THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CONSERVATIVE PARTY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SURVIVAL

Author_



JOHN GORDON TERPENNING

14 Sept /88

(Date)