SIMON FRASER TOLMIE AND THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CONSERVATIVE PARTY 1916 - 1933

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THESIS ABSTRACT

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This thesis explains the collapse of the last Conservative ministry of British Columbia under the leadership of S. F. Tolmie. Coming to office with thirty-five of forty-seven seats in the Legislative Assembly in 1928, after the 1933 election the Tolmie administration had only one supporter.

To explain the causes of such a complete electoral reversal, it has been necessary to survey certain aspects of the formation of the provincial Conservative party and its early success under Richard McBride and to portray, in more detail, the party's internal struggles after 1916, culminating in the selection of Tolmie as provincial party leader in 1926. Following an analysis of the election victory of 1928 and the government's first year in office, the thesis explains the effect of the Depression on the British Columbia government, the increasing party dissent and Tolmie's attempt to solve both problems by means of a non-party Union government. The thesis concludes with an account of the final year of the Tolmie administration and Tolmie's futile efforts to avoid party and government col-

lapse.

This thesis argues that the disintegration of the British Columbia Conservative party under Tolmie was caused primarily by the basic lack of unity within the party itself. It is true that the Depression presented the administration with a crisis which they were unequipped to resolve. Tolmie's leadership was not sufficiently positive and his mistakes, primarily of ommission, did nothing to relieve the situation. Nevertheless, the Conservative party's chronic inability to unite on a policy or a particular leader was the basic cause of the party collapse. United only by its desire for electoral victory, the party was unable to resolve its internal conflicts in the face of economic crisis. Tolmie with his limitations of intellect was not the man to restructure the party or remedy its inherent deficiencies. It is possible that no man under the prevailing conditions could have averted the disintegration of such a divisive coalition.

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CHAPTER I

THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CONSERVATIVE PARTY

In 1928 a reunited British Columbia Conservative party, under the leadership of Simon Fraser Tolmie, swept to an overwhelming electoral victory, winning 35 of the 48 seats in the Legislative Assembly. Contemporary political observers predicted an extended period of Conservative rule, and, more hopefully, a return of the "McBride prosperity". By 1932 the party and government had split into three rival factions and, not surprisingly, the Conservative party was almost obliterated in the general election of 1933. The Liberals formed the government and the newly organized Cooperative Commonwealth Federation became the official Opposition. During the next thirty five years, while the Conservatives were, for a time, the Opposition and then a minor partner in a coalition government, the party never again threatened to replace the Liberals in government and, since 1956, has not elected a single member to the Legislative Assembly. Thus it would appear that the period of 1928-33 was a critical one for the party and the electoral defeat of 1933 marks a collapse, the extent of which has become increasingly obvious over the years.

Historical comment on the Conservative disintegration has laid great stress on the inability of the Tolmie administration to deal effectively with the Great Depression. The leadership of Tolmie and his Cabinet, in contrast to that of Thomas Dufferin Pattullo, has been particularly denigrated.[1] Economic crisis and uninspired leadership did play a role in the defeat of the government but it is doubtful that these factors were sufficient to account for both the completeness of that defeat or its long lasting effect. Even a cursory glance at the history of the British Columbia Conservative party indicates that it had never been a cohesive organization. In times of economic prosperity its pragmatism enabled it to govern effectively, but provided no bonds with which the party could face any divisive situation. The enormity of the economic crisis of the 1930's has obscured the fact that the Tolmie administration, despite its legislative majority, was based on an inherently unstable foundation. Reflecting the lack of any tradition of fixed party loyalties or deference to formal leadership in British Columbia, the fate of the Tolmie government and the Conservative party reveals much about the non-party politics of the provincial electorate.

The introduction of party affiliations in British Columbia was a comparatively recent development. Federally, prior to 1896, candidates were ministerialists, not party

loyalists.[2] To some extent, this was also true of provincial politics although personal allegiances and private interests too exerted an influence. Broadly speaking, the idea of supporting a particular party without regard to its leadership or its immediate policy was an alien viewpoint in British Columbia.

Nevertheless, by 1902, all of the major political groups in the province, the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Provincial Progressives, a temporary farmer-labour alliance, were meeting in convention with the declared objective of contesting the next provincial election on a party basis. The primary motive for this movement was the desire to achieve political and economic stability after the province had five administrations within four years.[3] In addition there was pressure from the Lieutenant-Governor, an ex-federal cabinet minister.[4] Suffering from chronic budget deficits and constantly erratic administration, the provincial politicians saw in the introduction of party ties a means of overcoming their problems.

Despite the logic of the situation and the approval of the Conservative convention at Revelstoke in 1902, the formation of a provincial Conservative party was not a simple matter. The party's "old guard", which included Premier E. G. Prior and ex-Premiers J. Dunsmuir and C. A. Semlin, were not prepared to select, for personal reasons, the logical choice, Richard McBride, who was Leader of the Oppo-

sition and was supported by the new federal leader, R. L. Borden. Instead, the convention, attempting to placate "many strong elements in the party" and "avoid serious dissension and tempestuous controversy"[5] chose C. E. Wilson, a prominent Vancouver lawyer, though not a political figure, to lead the party.

Equally important, the convention failed to enunciate any coherent policies or political principle which would indicate a permanent distinction between it and the Liberals at the provincial level. Because of this omission, it is quite accurate to state that:

> An examination of party platforms, resolutions of local and provincial Associations, speeches from the Throne, debates in the legislature real almost complete agreement between Liberals and Conservatives both in theory and in policies.[6]

In neither leadership nor policy did the founding convention of the provincial Conservative party establish a firm foundation on which a stable basis of popular support could be built, distinct from the Liberal party. The result was that party loyalty became a matter of immediate policies, patronage or personal loyalty to a leader, all which were subject to frequent internal dissension. Since no man could claim to represent traditional doctrines or legitimate authority, the leader became the man who could either gather sufficient followers or avoid offending the party's power brokers. Once having attained power, the leader must ceaselessly maintain it, an impossible task.

Inevitably, he offended some or was unable to reward others as they deemed their worth and supporters became opponents and, frequently, challangers.

This was the situation in the British Columbia Conservative party from its beginning. As Leader of the Opposition, McBride was able to build the power base that the old guard had tried to deny him. Because of his position, the Lieutenant-Governor called on McBride, not Wilson, in 1903 to form a new government. Prodded by the Lieutenant-Governor[7] and by his own circumstances, McBride announced that he would form a party administration and would almost immediately seek election as head of a purely Conservative government.

Although McBride appointed Wilson Attorney-General in an attempt to conciliate the old guard, the election results indicated the lack of party unity. On Vancouver Island, where Dunsmuir and Prior remained hostile, McBride was able to win only two seats, neither of which was in Victoria. The refusal of the federal party to supply any campaign funds, a factor McBride considered responsible for his failure to win an overall majority, also appears to have resulted from the opposition of these same individuals.[8]

In subsequent elections, McBride, by a judicious use of patronage, prosperity and personality, built an increasingly efficient political machine which won 29 seats

in 1907, 34 in 1909 and 40 in 1912 in a 42 seat Legislative Assembly. His success and the passage of time eliminated the internal conflict with the old guard but new contestants for the leadership continued to appear. The most important challanges to McBride's position came from Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper and William John Bowser. Though originally rooted in policy differences, the attacks of these men illustrate the ease with which party dissent can become open rebellion in a party which has no clear-cut political principle other than pragmatism. Also, the fact that both of these men, though not allies, represented urban Vancouver suggests that part of British Columbia' political conflicts have their roots in the still unresolved problem of metropolitan-rural balance.[9]

Any discussion of British Columbia politics from 1900 to 1928 must deal with the influence of Sir C. H. Tupper, even though the materials for a complete assessment are unavailable. The son of the doyen of the federal Conservative party, Tupper had been a member of the federal cabinets of Mackenzie Bowell and Sir Charles Tupper. In some Conservative circles, he had been the logical choice for federal leader after the retirement of his father but, for a variety of reasons, perhaps the most important being his name,[10] he was passed over in favour of Borden. While remaining on friendly terms with Borden, Tupper left political life, moving to Vancouver to practise law. From 1902

to 1905 he supported McBride until they clashed over the provincial government's policy of administering coal leases.[11] While the following assessment is largely supposition, it is a reasonable statement of the cause of the rupture.

> The difference of opinion between the two men is of considerable more importance than the merits of the issue. Tupper believed he should occupy a special position, a sort of elder father to the McBride government, who would consult him and make use of his experience. He may have had leadership ambitions and some of McBride's followers thought his opposition to McBride stemmed from jealousy at being passed over. Probably Tupper regarded McBride as an inexperienced stripling and it was inevitable that Tupper's rather implacable personality would clash with McBride.[12]

By 1908, when the provincial Conservative party moved to deny Tupper a federal nomination in Vancouver, Tupper moved to open opposition to the "McBride-Bowser-Green machine".[13] In the provincial general elections of 1909, 1912 and 1916, Tupper campaigned strenuously against the Conservative government and in support of the Liberals. That such a prominent Conservative could take such a stand, as well as helping found a third party in 1922, made Tupper a focus and an example for disgruntled party members. Whatever his motives in refusing to accept the official party leadership, he provided a moral approbation for similar actions on the part of younger, less illustrious rebels. Cumulatively, Tupper's contribution to the British Columbia party may well have been to confirm the idea that pro-

vincial party ties were less binding more violable than those at the federal level.

A stronger but more conventional challenger to McBride's leadership was W. J. Bowser.[14] An aggressive member from Vancouver with a firm control of the party organization in that area, Bowser forced McBride to include him in the cabinet by threatening to create a party split. From 1906 on, Bowser gradually assumed the position of second in command, handling much of the administrative detail of the government and making the unpopular decisions which McBride avoided. As long as the province remained prosperous and McBride popular, Bowser was a loyal but contentious supporter but, by 1915, with the government obviously weakening, he played a prominent role in forcing McBride's resignation and his own elevation to Premier.

Despite its massive majority, the Conservative government was on the verge of collapse at the beginning of the 1915 Legislative session. Bowser was attacked over the failure of the Dominion Trust Company; W. R. Ross, Minister of Lands and a Bowser intimate, was criticized for the sale of Crown lands to speculators; Thomas Taylor and Price Ellison, Ministers of Public Works and Finance respectively, were publicly chastised by a Conservative backbencher for misuse of public funds. While guilty of no more than an indiscretion, Ellison was forced to resign

by McBride, and Bowser became Minister of Finance. The government appeared to be slowly collapsing because of internal weakness.

This impression was emphasized when reports appeared of a caucus revolt. Apparently on March 2, Bowser and some fifteen Conservative M. L. A.'s flatly refused to back McBride's proposal to increase government loans to the Pacific Great Eastern Railway. The dissidents threatened to run in the forthcoming election as Independents, thus splitting the vote. Despite McBride's public announcement that an election would be called to settle the issue, the party rebels refused to back down. McBride was forced to cancel the bill to aid the railway and the election.[15] After a flurry of activity during which he failed to shake Bowser's supporters, McBride went on an extended tour to the United States.

In his absence, public disapproval and party disarray spread. The government was under constant attack for its failure to deal with the economic recession. Reformers demanding prohibition and female suffrage were enraged at the administration's refusal to implement their proposals. Bowser's powers and ambitions were growing and he began to hint he would soon "be in a position to decide the government's policy."[16] Despite the weakness of the government, most British Columbians were surprised by the December 15, 1915 announcement of McBride's resignation as Premier, his

acceptance of the position of British Columbia's Agent-General in London and his recommendation that Bowser be asked to form the government.

In retrospect, McBride's action can be justified.

> Signs of political trouble were written in every strike agitation or anti-alien demonstration, in every bankrupt real-estate company, in every railroad worker out of a job. Reform movements clamouring for the prohibition of liquor and the female vote had become unbearable. There was still the quarrel with Bowser and the wounds of the March caucus which he felt had challenged his leadership. There was still a bleak program of retrenchment ahead. These factors when added to Sir Richard's personal reasons and his failing health afford strong indications of why he chose to resign.[17]

But, at the time, both the manner and timing of McBride's resignation gravely weakened the Conservative party. Bowser was extremely unpopular with the reformers and labour in particular,[18] and the public and the party in general. As one of McBride's correspondents accurately commented,

> Without you at the head of the government, Dick, Bowser would have as much chance as a snowball in Hell. He it is who has raised the temper of the people to the breaking strain, and it is not too much to say that they are willing to take any chance on anybody so that they could get through with him.[19]

To this distrust was added the suspicion, voiced frequently by Tupper, that McBride's resignation was the result of a <u>coup d'etat</u> by Bowser and the Vancouver machine.

> What about Sir Richard McBride and the Judas Iscariot who sold him? Who is this little Kaiser who attempted to read out of the party Conservatives who dare to have opinions of their own?

While few Conservatives followed Tupper, who supported H. C. Brewster and the Liberal party, many party members were critical of Bowser's assumption of power without having called a leadership convention. Already unpopular with the general public, Bowser, faced with mounting party dissatisfaction, was in an unenviable position.

> From the start he knew time and events were against him. He was being blamed for all of Sir Richard's mistakes and given credit for none of Sir Richard's charm, the scapegoat for everything from the depression to patronage. People felt he was hanging on to power and an election was long overdue. The large majority still enjoyed by the Conservatives was believed to be but a mask for the party's real demise.[21]

In a desperate effort to revive the flagging party position, Bowser attempted to re-organize the Cabinet to strengthen the administration. Retaining Taylor and Ross, two of the ministers who had been attacked in the last session, he brought in three outsiders, A. C. Flumerfelt of Victoria as Minister of Finance; C. E. Tisdall of Vancouver, Public Works; and L. A. Campbell of Rossland, Mines, while promoting only one backbencher. While the three new Ministers were well respected, [22] their appointments proved to be a tactical error. Not only had Bowser indicated a distrust in the capabilities of the Conservative backbenchers but he had exposed the government to three by-elections before the opening of the Legislative Assembly. He had provided a forum for public criticism of the government and for the very real risk that any defeat would be considered

a repudiation of the government.

Clearly the Liberals and Tupper were aware of the possibilities. Campaigning with fervor, Tupper asked all true Conservatives,

> to drive from power this Government which has disgraced the Province and which has been the servile tool of adventurers.[23]

The election results were disastrous. Both Tisdall and Flumerfelt were defeated by the Liberals. Campbell won by the unconvincing margin of nine votes. The Liberals now had a voice in the House with which to harass the government and were able to argue that the government had lost the confidence of the province's most populous areas, Victoria and Vancouver.

The 1916 Legislative session saw the administration increasingly discredited, the Conservative party more disorganized and the Liberals more confident. Bowser's government suffered constant attacks on the questions of illegal voting in the recent by-elections and unauthorized payments to the P. G. E. The Lieutenant-Governor, E. G. Prior, was convinced the Conservatives would be defeated in the coming election.[25]

By the beginning of the election campaign in July, "the councils of the Conservative party were inseparably divided."[26] Over the entire province were candidates running in opposition to Bowser under the labels of Imperial Conservatives, Independent Conservatives and McBride Con-

servatives. The Conservative candidates in Victoria were declared opponents of Bowser and, in Vancouver, a group of Young Conservatives attempted to block the nomination of Bowser and his official slate. When the election results were announced, only eight Conservatives were elected and Bowser just barely retained his own seat. The Liberals won thirty-five seats to form their first administration.

The 1916 defeat of the Bowser government bears a remarkable similarity to that of Tolmie in 1933. In both cases, the party had a solid legislative majority, but, faced with economic crisis, was torn by internal dissent. Seemingly unable to agree on policies, the Conservatives attacked their leader and, by doing so, destroyed their popular image as a stable government. In a province more concerned with the maintenance of economic prosperity than party ties, the Conservatives lost the support of the non-partisan voter who pragmatically sought stable and efficient government. Leadership, while apparently the major issue, was not the cause of defeat. McBride, Bowser and Tolmie, all very different, were condemned when the provincial economy became depressed. Only in time of economic prosperity were they or the party capable of governing.

CHAPTER II

THE PROVINCIAL PARTY

The result of the 1916 provincial election demonstrated that the electorate had only partially accepted the idea of political partisanship. As in other areas of Western Canada, the consistent party vote for either the Conservatives or Liberals was insufficient to elect a government unless the opposition was fragmented. To win a legislative majority, the party had to gain the support of the uncommitted voter who seems to have been chiefly concerned with the maintenance of economic and political stability. As illustrated by the fate of the Provincial Party, this non-partisan vote was not strong enough to elect a third party but it could and did ensure political victory to the major party which attracted its votes.

McBride, aided by a period of economic expansion, had been able to retain the support of these political mavericks. After his party's defeat, Bowser's task was to regain this position. As an administrator he had been decisive and efficient, but this task called for abilities of tact, conciliation and persuasion, none of which were Bowser's forte. His inability to take advantage of the Lib-

eral unpopularity over the next eight years increased party dissent. The Conservative party split led to the formation of the Provincial Party and, indirectly, to the selection of Tolmie as the leader of a fatally disunited organization. To assess Tolmie's Premiership, it is first necessary to outline the party conflicts prior to his election as Conservative leader.

Squabbling among the Conservatives temporarily ceased after the 1916 debacle. Many dissidents left the party, either dropping out of politics or supporting the Liberals, as did Tupper. No doubt, some Conservatives, not willing to weaken the party in the face of overwhelming Liberal dominance, supported Bowser unenthusiastically. In addition, the over-riding importance of World War I, the formation of the Union Government and the introduction of conscription focused attention away from provincial party politics.

The convention of the British Columbia Conservative Association, held in Vancouver at the end of September, 1919, was clearly a meeting of the faithful without the clash of enthusiasms. Bowser was elected party leader by acclamation and his thirty point platform was accepted without debate. As the Victoria Colonist suggested, the convention's purpose was to ratify the existing leadership and begin the reorganization of the party in preparation for a provincial general election.[1] In this respect, the convention was

not a conspicuous success. In the 1920 election the Conservatives increased their representation to fourteen but did not improve their popular vote.[2] The election results showed a growing disillusionment with the Liberals and a continued repudiation of the Conservative party and its leader. As a result, demands for party reform, though muted at first, began to mount.

By the beginning of 1922, internal dissent became public. The Victoria Colonist, acting in its self-appointed role as the conscience of the Conservative party, attacked the party's lack of program and organization.[3] A number of constituency associations quickly turned this into a direct attack on the leadership. The Vancouver Young Conservatives narrowly defeated a motion calling for Bowser's resignation and struck a committee to discuss their complaints with the leader.[4] The Kamloops Conservatives, soon after, demanded Bowser be replaced.[5] After hearing the report of their committee, the Vancouver Young Conservatives echoed this demand.

> Resolved that this meeting go on record as being dissatisfied with Mr. W. J. Bowser's reply to the Young Conservatives in which he set forth his view with regard to the leadership of the Conservative party; and that also be it resolved that this association take immediate steps to further organize the Conservative party on such lines as may attract to it all sections of the public which may be opposed to the present Liberal administration.[6]

In actual fact, the latter part of the resolution was a compromise substituted for a much stronger resolu-

tion calling for the organization of all electors throughout the province who could support neither the Liberals under Oliver nor Bowser. The idea was to rally sufficient support at the coming Conservative annual convention to depose Bowser and take control of the party machinery rather than to organize a new party.[7]

Bowser summarily rejected these demands, arguing that only a provincial convention could request his resignation. By a scarcely fortuitous coincidence, the edition of the Colonist which carried Bowser's reply also editorially attacked the "drift, delay and hesitancy" in the party and called for "rejuvenation, new policies and a new platform."[8] Although a number of other Conservative associations voiced support for Bowser, it was obvious that the August convention would see a leadership contest.

The dissidents' problem was to find an alternative leader who could satisfy the demand for change without completely alienating the regular party supporters. The most frequently mentioned possibilities were two British Columbia Conservative Members of Parliament, Simon Fraser Tolmie[9] and Henry Herbert Stevens.[10] Tolmie, however, refused to stand; Stevens hesitated until the last moment, then accepted unenthusiastically. He told the convention:

> Up to last night I had steadily refused to allow my name to go down for the nomination. Several delegations have repeatedly asked me to accept the nomination. Last night, however, a very representative delegation composed of men from all parts of the province

> begged me to become a candidate. In face of their insistence, I could not very well refuse. I informed the delegation that, if nominated, I would allow my name to stand.[11]

Bowser's position, already powerful because of his control of the party organization, was further strengthened by the victory of the Conservative candidate in the Cranbrook by-election on August 20. Despite the rumblings of discontent, Bowser still retained considerable support, if not affection.

> Pledged years ago to lend their support to Bowser, many delegates, convinced in their own minds that a change of leadership alone would save the party from crumbling into a complete wreck, found themselves in a dilemma from which there was no escape. Despite their better judgement, they discovered no way to evade promises made long ago.[12]

In an attempt to overcome the machine's power, C. M. Woodworth[13] and John Nelson[14] introduced resolutions demanding that 60 or 70% of the convention vote be required to confirm the position of the leader. Nelson, a long-time critic of Bowser, argued that "the man who is elected as leader of the party will not want to think he has a bare 51% behind him."[15] It was no use. The resolutions were defeated and Bowser was re-elected party leader with 252 votes, 51.8% of the total. Stevens had 201 and S. L. Howe[16] had 33. Defeated over the leadership, the dissident Conservatives did gain control of the provincial association. R. L. "Pat" Maitland,[17] one of the Vancouver Young Conservatives, was elected president and Nelson, vice-president. Although these victories meant little in

themselves, when combined with the narrow margin of Bowser's victory, they demonstrated that many party members were restless and dissatisfied.

In the opinion of some observers, the frustration of the anti-Bowser Conservatives at the 1922 convention led directly to the formation of the Provincial Party.[17] The organization of this third party, however, was equally dependent on the movement of the United Farmers of British Columbia into the field of direct political action. It is to the union of these two groups and the ensuing activities of the Provincial Party that attention must now be turned.

The UFBC had existed since 1917 as an apolitical organization to represent the interests of the farmers. While individual locals had unofficially supported Progressive and Farmer candidates in federal and provincial elections, many members agreed with the advice of Henry Wise Wood that to enter politics directly would destroy the existing farm movements.[18] But, a vocal minority, headed by R. A. Copland, UFBC president in 1922, and supported by the two most influential farm journals, The Farm and Home published by R. J. Cromie of the Vancouver Sun and The United Farmer edited by John Nelson,[19] contended that farmers could not improve their position economically as long as they were forced to vote for business dominated parties such as the Conservatives and Liberals.[20]

Despite the efforts of this minority, the UFBC annual

convention in January, 1922 decided that the central organization would not engage in political activity but would form a committee of the provincial executive to encourage locals to support suitable candidates. This committee, greatly exceeding its powers, issued a proposed platform for a new party on April 15 and, on June 20, Copland and John Redman[21] announced that a Farmer-Progressive party would be organized to implement the suggested platform.[22] No further action seems to have been taken until November 30, when a "group of fourteen insurgents"[23] met and appointed a chairman and a party organizer.

The contact between the anti-Bowser Conservatives and the farmer advocates of political action appears to have been Nelson.[24] Although formally a Conservative, he decried the importance of party ties in British Columbia, contending that the

> introduction of party lines in provincial politics was a matter more of expediency than of conviction. ... Partisanship in British Columbia today is an exotic.[25]

As editor of the official UFBC journal, The United Farmer, he had supported the idea of independent political action. At the Conservative convention he had been a vehement opponent of Bowser and one of the leaders of the movement to depose him. Whatever the exact sequence of events, by December Nelson was closely associated with Major-General Alexander Duncan McRae[26] in planning to form a new provin-

cial political party.

As a preparatory step, McRae hosted a select dinner in Vancouver on December 22 where he revealed to a group of prominent men a plan to unite the farmers and rebellious Conservatives into a single party. By the end of the evening, the meeting selected six delegates to meet with the farmers to propose a unified effort. The delegation, consisting of McRae, Nelson, Percy Bengough[27] and three Vancouver businessmen, John Nixon, G. H. Senkler and J. R. V. Dunlop, travelled to Vernon the following month.

After meeting with the Vancouver delegation, the political committee of the UFBC voted itself out of existence and agreed to join a provisional executive, containing eight farmers and six businessmen, to begin the organization of a third provincial political party.[28] This new executive immediately presented a tentative manifesto to the UFBC convention but were unable to gain official support. Although some members were in favour of the new party and its ideas of political reform, there was much opposition. In part, this stemmed from those who already had political ties or did not believe the organization should enter politics at all. Equally important was the suspicion, shared by many British Columbians, that the new party was merely a means of gaining power for a few of its leaders.

Most of this suspicion was directed against McRae and Nelson and was assiduously cultivated by their oppo-

nents. McRae was accused by Liberals and Conservatives of hoping to buy his way to success in politics by supplying most of the funds for the new party. According to the Farm and Home, a competitor, Nelson was not satisfied with having his journal adopted as the UFBC organ but had also hoped it would become the official Conservative paper. When the 1922 Conservative convention failed to accept his proposal, he left the party and sought an alternative.[29] How just these criticisms were is now impossible to ascertain. While personal ambitions played a part, as they do in any political activity, the formation of the Provincial Party also reflected an increasing disillusionment with the other political parties and did attract considerable support of which part appears to be disinterested.[30]

In spite of the set-back at the UFBC convention, the new party quickly began to build support. Under the chairmanship of McRae, the executive held a banquet at the Hotel Vancouver at which the proposed platform was explained to a group of six hundred prominent businessmen, labour leaders and farmers.[31] By and large, the platform called for reform and the elimination of party machine politics. Speaker after speaker argued that British Columbi's financial problems were the result of the cynical bargaining for votes inherent in the party system. The solution lay in the organization of a non-party union which would concentrate on the eficient management of the provincial gov-

ernment, remaining aloof from federal politics. So successful was the appeal of the speakers that the meeting formed an advisory Committee of One Hundred to build a province-wide organization.

During the next few months, McRae and his associates addressed meetings throughout British Columbia, encountering "varying degrees of enthusiasm". [32] While it is impossible to assess the actual effect of this tour, it gave the new party a great deal of publicity. For example, McRae's challenge to Premier John Oliver to debate the question of the excessive provincial debt and Oliver's indignant rejection of the proposal made headlines in the major provincial newspapers. There is little doubt that the chief objective of the tour was to publicize the views of the Provincial Party and the personality of its leader. In this respect, it was a success.

Even the defection of J. A. Armishaw, a prominent advocate of political action by the farmers and one of the original executive of the Provincial Party, did not seem to hinder the organizational drive. Announcing his resignation, Armishaw declared that:

> The new party is a direct abuse of the confidence it sought from the farmers and is a gigantic attempt to exploit not only the farmers but the whole Province as well.... This is no people's movement.[33]

He failed to take any large number of farmers with him and the warning he tried to give was soon drowned by a

sustained and extraordinarily professional publicity campaign.

This campaign began with the publication of a laudatory article on General McRae and the Provincial Party in Maclean's Magazine.[34] While it contained little of substance, contenting itself with attacking the extravagance of the "old-line" parties in contrast to the efficiency demonstrated in McRae's career, it did cause some apprehension among party politicians in British Columbia. National publicity of this nature indicated the new group was not just an aggregation of amateurs as had been the Farm and Labour party in 1920. The Provincial Party obviously had the support of knowledgeable political figures and publicists.[35]

This impression was confirmed with the appearance, in the same month, of a newspaper-style broadsheet, The Searchlight. A thoroughly professional publication, it featured attention-grabbing headlines and cleverly written articles coupled with effectively presented charts, diagrams and quotations. Its sole purpose, and one to which it rigidly adhered, was to present the views of the Provincial Party. While it is impossible to verify The Searchlight's claim to have equalled the circulation of the Vancouver Province, it is not entirely unlikely. By extensive use of addressograph machines and free distribution, McRae was able to direct The Searchlight to a wide and responsive audience.[36]

The contents of The Searchlight were well and carefully coordinated to present a case for electing a reform-minded non-partisan group. Basing its attack on the financial mismanagement of provincial affairs with particular emphasis on the construction of the Pacific Great Eastern Railway, the publication sought to damn both the Liberals and the Conservatives under the slogan "Put Oliver out and don't let Bowser in." In every issue the message was pressed home that British Columbia politics were in the hands of power-hungry men who were only dedicated to remaining in office and who, by their financial extravagance, had brought the province to the brink of collapse.

The first issue served as an introduction by presenting, in general terms, the attack on the two major parties, the objectives of the Provincial Party and a defense of McRae's career. Issues too, three and four carried the attack into the enemies' camp with the accusation that:

> This junta--railway builders, government leaders and opposition chiefs--have managed, so far, to block judicial investigation, to forestall or stifle protest and to maintain a camouflage of opposition to one another by shadow boxing on the public platform. They have piled up half the debt of the province, loading every man, woman and child in it with $84 of obligations.[37]

> Does any country in the Empire offer such a travesty upon all that is involved in proper party government? Need anything more striking be cited to prove that party government, as it should be understood and practiced, has ceased to exist in British Columbia? The Provincial Party is organized to restore party government. The provincial Liberal and Conservative machines have joined forces to maintain, not party government, but partisan misrule; to maintain a disgraceful partnership whereby they are tricking their loyal sup-

> porters in the two parties; and by their united efforts to prevent disclosures and reform at the hands of the citizen organization, the Provincial Party.[38]

In support of this indictment, The Searchlight presented a slashing criticism of such government projects as the South Okanagan Irrigation scheme, the Land Settlement Board and the Sumas Dyking project. Most of the emphasis, however, was on the building of the P. G. E. and its related townsites. In vivid and impassioned prose, the newspaper created a picture of governmental stupidity, mismanagement, impropriety and suggested scandal beginning under McBride and continuing to 1920. Rumour and fable were artfully combined with fact to demonstrate the alleged results of partisan misrule in British Columbia.

This material was not only calculated to arouse public opinion but also used to prove the Provincial Party's contention that the Conservative and Liberal parties in the province were in a conspiracy to delude the electorate. Quoting extensively from newspaper reports and Legislative Journals, The Searchlight argued that Bowser and Oliver had consistently misled the voters by refusing to make public the actual costs of these projects and by needlessly increasing the provincial debt. By the use of carefully selected material, the newspaper "proved" that the two party leaders had combined over the years to stifle debate, regardless of the party affiliation of the questioner. On the basis of this evidence, The Searchlight triumphantly con-

cluded that elections were sham battles, that there was no difference between the Conservative and Liberal parties and that there could be no improvement in the conduct of public business until both parties were turned out. Thus the election of the Provincial Party was a necessity.

The material contained in the first four issues was merely a distillation of information which had been made public over the preceding years. Its republication at this time was to create interest and background for revelations to come. Issue number five began the new attack by presenting an affidavit, supported by photostats of vouchers, from E. J. Rossiter, an ex-government auditor. Rossiter stated in the affidavit that the provincial government under Premier Oliver had failed to exercise proper financial control over the expenditures of the Northern Construction Company when it was building a section of the P. G. E. line in 1919 and 1920. According to Rossiter, Northern Construction consistently inflated costs and claimed numerous unjustified and irregular expenses. Despite his protests, the government paid these claims, acting on the direct instructions of Premier Oliver. Samples of the company's vochers for these irregular expenses were reproduced in The Searchlight as was a letter from the Premier refusing to investigate these charges.

Commenting on the affidavit, The Searchlight contended that Oliver's action was

> capable of but one construction--that he is using this enterprise, so disastrous from the standpoint of the ratepayer-- to entrench himself in office, while withholding information from Parliament, lest the facts would endanger his political fortunes. . . . The common involvement of the leader of the Opposition and himself in a sinister attempt to keep the most important facts from the people . . . is again evident and lends piquancy to their protest that the Provincial Party is not needed.[39]

Obviously this was the issue on which the Provincial Party was resting its hopes for political gains. It had judged the effect accurately. With great fanfare, this fifth issue was reprinted seven times. While this figure in itself means little, there was an increased demand for copies of The Searchlight as well as extensive comment in other newspapers.

Issue number six was devoted to a full account of a mass meeting held in Vancouver on October 29, 1923. Presided over by Birt Showler[40] and addressed by Tupper, McRae and E. P. Davie[41], the meeting unanimously resolved:

> That this mass meeting of electors assembled in Vancouver demands the issuance of a Royal Commission to an impartial Commissioner or Commissioners for the investigation of the charges contained on pages 40 and 41 of Searchlight no. 5, issued by the Provincial Party of B. C.[42]

Prior to this meeting, Premier Oliver had consistently refused to take any action on the accusations of The Searchlight, dismissing the Provincial Party and its leaders as political adventurers.[43] But, in early November, he announced reluctantly that there would be an official audit of the P. G. E. 's books. This did not satisfy the Provin-

cial Party and the next issue of The Searchlight featured another affidavit from P. J. Finnerty, a sub-contractor for Northern Construction. He claimed that the government had paid Northern Construction 454,000 on a cribbing contract when he had done the work for less than half of that amount.

The Provincial Party's agitation took on new strength with the opening of its first annual convention in Vancouver in December. There the convention's three hundred delegates formally adopted the platform put forward by McRae in January. Reflecting the influence of the Progressive and Non-Partisan movements on the Prairies and in Oregon, an attempt was made to have the party adopt a system of legislative recall.[44] This motion was defeated but another resolution from the floor requiring all candidates to swear they would enter no coalition with any other party, either before or after the election, was adopted. While this motion too seems to have owed its inspiration to the Progressive movement, its immediate purpose was to convince the electorate that there would be no fusion with the Conservatives.

Two events generated considerable publicity for the convention. Without prior public indication, McRae announced that, since he had contributed $39,897.33 of the total party expenses of $47,548.25, he would not stand for election as the party's leader. While this came as a sur-

prise to the public and the convention, one may well question whether his decision was as surprising to the party executive or the solution as much a matter of sudden inspiration as they suggested at the time. McRae was elected President of the General Association and the question of a party leader was left to be decided by the legislative caucus after the election.[45]

The convention also adopted a petition which the party proposed to submit to the Lieutenant-Governor. The petition repeated the charges of The Searchlight and added the specific accusation that Bowser and William Sloan, the Liberal Minister of Mines, had accepted bribes from persons associated with the construction of the P. G. E. It went on to state that:

> As a result of these two payments, the promoters of the P.G.E. Railway Co. were assured of protection in any event of the ensuing general election and as a result of such contributions protection and favourable treatment have been fully accorded.[46]

From the standpoint of its participants, the convention was a success. Because of McRae and the petition, the convention received front page coverage in all the metropolitan newspapers. The party had shown that it had supporters in almost every area of the province and that there was substantial agreement on the party's policies. While McRae's refusal of the leadership did not eliminate the wide-spread belief that he controlled the party, the convention had not been openly dominated by the leadership;

debate had been free and frank. Most important, the accusation leveled at Bowser and Sloan, backed by the publicity of the convention, forced Premier Oliver to appoint Mr. Justice W. A. Galliher as a Royal Commissioner to investigate the finances of the P. G. E.

The Royal Commission hearings, held during February and March, accomplished little although they did provide a constant stream of publicity for the Provincial Party. Intent on keeping the inquiry within narrow judicial limits, Justice Galliher consistently refused to permit the introduction of the Provincial Party's evidence on the alleged bribery. Despite the aggressive of efforts of Tupper, hearsay was rigorously excluded. As a result, the testimony consisted of a series of contentions and denials which inflamed rather than satisfied public curiosity. While not called as witnesses and therefore not subject to cross-examination, Oliver, Bowser and Sloan appeared to make public denials of the charges. The verdict of the Royal Commissioner that there was

> nothing in the evidence in this enquiry to warrent the imputation that there was anything dishonest, or any dereliction in duty, or disregard of the public's interests, or waste, or extravagance or incompetence in the carrying out of this work by the Government.[47]

was not unexpected.

On the grounds that his party's record had been cleared of all suspicion, Oliver announced a provincial election for June 20, 1924. But obviously the Galliher

Report had not accomplished its function. Issue number eight of The Searchlight devoted itself to a detailed criticism of the Royal Commission and argued that, because of the Commissioner's refusal to admit their evidence, the charges of the Provincial Party had been neither disproven nor refuted. Highlighting the fact that Northern Construction could not produce its ledgers for the critical year of 1920, The Searchlight implied there was a conspiracy to withhold information from the public. Emphasizing the Premier's failure to explain the marked divergence between the estimated and the actual costs of construction, the newspaper cast still more doubt on the Commissioner's conclusions. By dint of constant repetition in speeches and advertising, by the end of May,

> the third party, despite the findings of the Galliher Commission, had been successful in planting in the minds of the people a strong suspicion that beneath the findings lay trouble which had been skillfully, and deliberately, covered up.[48]

The successful career of The Searchlight came to an end with the publication of an election special during the last week of the campaign. Significantly, although there was a complete recapitulation of the misdeeds of the Conservative and Liberal parties, the charges of bribery were not mentioned. As in the past, The Searchlight concentrated on presenting the case for the repudiation of Oliver, Bowser and their followers. For the first time, it also attempted to demonstrate that this was politically

feasible. An editorial, possibly written by Nelson, claimed the Provincial Party would attract all the votes which had been cast in 1920 for Soldier and Farm candidates as well as the various Independents. With the votes of Labour and disenchanted Conservatives and Liberals added to this base, the Provincial Party could obtain between 30 and 35% of the total vote or enough to elect a government. While this calculation was clearly aimed at convincing the voters that ballots for third party candidates would not be wasted, the whole tone of the article indicated a belief that the party was rapidly gaining public support.[49]

And, indeed, by the final week of the campaign, it did seem possible that the Provincial Party would shatter the two party dominance which had existed in British Columbia provincial politics since 1903. The Searchlight had proven to be a powerful means of providing publicity and focusing attention on the proposals of the new party. McRae's speaking tours, organizational abilities and financial support were also important factors.[50] But the party's great success lay in its organization of local associations. By election day, the Provincial Party had nominated 41 candidates, most of whom were respected citizens untouched by party machine connections and supported by active local committees. However one might question the motives of the party leaders, and certainly the other parties exhausted much of their invective on this line of at-

tack, the commitment of the "rank and file" must be accepted as authentic. The ability to attract strong local candidates and the wave of enthusiasm at the constituency level, exemplified by the extensive person-to-person canvass carried on during the last week of the campaign, impressed observers and led some to predict startling changes in the political structure of the province.[51]

While the results of the provincial general election did not even approximate the exaggerated predictions of the optimistic, the Provincial Party did score a limited but discernible success. Premier Oliver and the Conservative leader, Bowser, were personally defeated, largely due to the presence of the third party candidates. Three Provincial Party candidates--D. A. Stoddart, Cariboo; G. A. Walkem, Point Grey; A. McC. Creery, Vancouver--were elected. McRae was narrowly defeated in Vancouver only after the advance poll was counted. The party gained 24.2% of the popular vote and was generally credited with being the deciding factor in 33 of the 48 seats.[52] Although with 23 seats the Liberals did not have an overall majority, they were able to retain the government as the Conservatives had won only 16 seats. Because of the election of Labour-Socialists and Independents, the Provincial Party members-elect were not even in a position to hold the balance of power. The most obvious election result was to prevent the Conservatives from replacing the Liberals; the Provincial

Party candidates had split the anti-Oliver vote.

For the Conservative party, the election results pointed to the urgent necessity of replacing Bowser as the leader of the party. After the third consecutive rejection of his leadership by the electorate, his personal defeat and his role in causing the formation of the Provincial Party, his position was untenable. Less than a week after the election, at the suggestion of a majority of the Conservative caucus, J. H. Schofield wrote privately to Tolmie, appealing to him "to come to our assistance and accept the leadership."[53] Tolmie refused. Nevertheless, Bowser informed the caucus, after some initial hesitation, that he was retiring. After a three hour meeting, the caucus announced its choice of Robert Henry Pooley[54] as temporary House leader until a convention could select a new head. So great was the suspicion of Bowser that the Vancouver Star quite seriously suggested that this decision was a maneuver to permit Bowser to return to the leadership at a later date.[55]

While it is true that Bowser did attempt to regain the leadership in 1926, the caucus decision was an acknowledgement of political realities, not a subtle scheme. Most of the caucus members were practical politicians who had been in opposition too long. Their appeal to Tolmie shows their recognition of the need to replace Bowser, preferably by introducing a respected political figure who had not

been involved in the party dissension. Tolmie met these specifications better than Stevens who had become unacceptable by letting his name stand at the 1922 convention. Tolmie, however, resisted pressure from both the federal and provincial Conservatives.[56] All alternative candidates, such as Pooley, S. L. Howe or R. L. Maitland or James W. Jones, either lacked the willingness to stand or the political reputation and skill to defeat Oliver. Quite reasonably, the caucus opted for a period of delay.

Their strategy was very quickly proven wise. As early as August, there were signs that the Provincial Party would soon disintegrate. At that time McRae circulated a questionaire to the Provincial Party's local associations. The key questions were:

> Would you favour consolidation with any other party which adopted the Provincial Party platform?
> In the event of such consolidation, what percentage of the present Provincial Party vote could we count on holding?[57]

The public break-up of the Provincial Party occurred in Victoria in December. According to the report of the Victoria Colonist, a number of members angrily withdrew from the local association meeting because of the party's M. L. A.'s support of the Oliver government and McRae's failure to attend that or previous meetings. Captain H. S. Thain[58] voiced the sentiments of the insurgents when he stated that:

I am satisfied now that the Provincial Party movement

> was a mistake. I realize that as a political factor the party is dead and never will be resurrected. . . . But this is no time for silence on the part of those who worked to put Mr. Oliver out and find the result of their labour has been to keep him in. . . . The only thing for us to do now is get behind Mr. Pooley and continue to fight Oliverism, even if in doing so we oppose the men we helped to elect.[59]

During the next years, McRae's withdrawal from the Provincial Party became complete. In 1926, he was elected Conservative Member of Parliament for North Vancouver and the following year became Dominion organizer for that party, practicing the skills of publicity used to build the Provincial Party.

In the Legislature, the three Provincial Party M. L. A.'s voted more as individuals than members of the same party. By the beginning of the 1928 Legislative session, the party's executive formally acknowledged the obvious by stating the party would not nominate candidates in the coming general election. By publicly releasing the elected representatives from any ties, the executive completely dissolved the Provincial Party. Walkem formally joined the Conservatives while Stoddart and Creery finished out the term and retired from politics.

Thus the Provincial Party faded ingloriously from the British Columbia scene. Despite the opinion of Tupper that the party had scored a great moral victory,[60] it is difficult to see that the third party accomplished any fundamental political alteration. It is true that Oliver was personally defeated and the Liberal majority reduced.

But the Premier was re-elected in a by-election in Nelson and, with the support of the Labour members, continued to govern. Bowser was defeated and forced to resign the Conservative leadership but, as will be demonstrated, his political career was not ended nor was the party freed from his influence. The problems against which the Provincial Party had crusaded did not vanish. Patronage and machine politics continued, the provincial debt rose and the P. G. E. remained the province's "white elephant."

Part of the cause of the failure of the party can be seen in an examination of its popular vote. Although some craft union leaders, particularly Showler and Bengough supported it, the Provincial Party failed to attract the Labour-Socialist vote which came largely from the industrial unions.[61] At the same time, the expected mass defection of disenchanted Liberals and Conservatives failed to materialize. The Liberal vote dropped by 6% while the Conservative vote went down only 2%.[62] In addition, despite the publicity and the participation of many individuals, the total vote in 1928 dropped by 10,000.[63] The Provincial Party failed to attract non-voters or any other organized interest while crystallizing the scattered independents, an unstable base on which to build a solid party organization.

The factional character of the party's support led to its disintegration. The McRae-Nelson groups were primar-

ily interested in defeating Bowser to force a Conservative leadership change. Another faction, represented by H. S. Thain, was concerned with defeating Oliver and obtaining patronage. The farm element was seeking government aid in reducing their debts and expanding their markets. The business supporters sought more economical, in terms of lower taxes, government. Other individuals had other objectives, among which self-interest and personal pride held an obvious position. While all these disparate groups could unite on a general platform of "throw the rascals out," the practical problems of converting agitation and ideals into political realities proved overwhelming. Electoral defeat accelerated this process.

Yet the Provincial Party, ephemeral and unsuccessful as it proved to be, was an important political manifestation. It demonstrated that, even during a time of comparative economic and social stability, a substantial minority of the voters were dissatisfied with the two existing political parties and the very system of party politics in the province. These voters were prepared to work and support a totally new party, not only because of the weaknesses in the Conservative and Liberal parties, but because the Provincial Party promised government by men unrestricted by party ties. The appeal of the non-partisan political party in British Columbia was demonstrated in the 1924 election. Its ability to draw the support of the un-

committed maverick voter was to prove critical to the political developments during the economic crisis of the 1930's.

CHAPTER III

THE SELECTION OF SIMON FRASER TOLMIE AS PROVINCIAL CONSERVATIVE LEADER

The result of the 1924 provincial election demonstrated exlicitly the importance of the maverick vote in British Columbia politics. The Conservatives had lost this vote in 1916 and Bowser had been unable to recapture it. The emergence of the Provincial Party showed that Oliver and the Liberals were also losing it. With the resignation of Bowser, an opportunity presented itself to the Conservative party. Their new leader, if chosen shrewdly, could gain office if he could appeal to this floating vote without alienating Bowser's followers. The search for such an individual culminated in the election of S. F. Tolmie as Conservative leader in 1926.

During 1925 and 1926 there was little activity or interest in provincial politics. These were the years of great federal issues and elections. In 1925 the Liberals became a minority government; in the following year Canadian interest was focused on the Customs Scandal and the King-Byng Crisis. Stimulated by the likelihood of success and unencumbered by administrative responsibilities, the

British Columbia Conservatives united. During the federal campaigns, Bowser, McRae, Stevens and Tolmie spoke repeatedly from the same platforms. As a measure of what unity could achieve, British Columbia was the only province to increase its Conservative representation in the House of Commons, carrying 12 of 14 seats in the 1926 election.[1] This feat supported the contention of the anti-Bowser group that the province was fundamentally Conservative and that the failures in the provincial field were the result of faulty leadership. Consequently, the provincial organization began to press for a convention to convert federal support into provincial victory.

After Bowser's retirement in 1924, the Conservative party had been led competently, but not brilliantly, by Pooley. Originally he had been chosen to hold the position only until a convention could be called. Faced with constant federal activity, the party had been forced to postpone a leadership contest for two years. In the meantime, concern over the leadership vacuum had revived support for Bowser, encouraged by him. Resistance to him had also increased partly because of the collapse of the Provincial Party. Convinced of the impossibility of organizing a successful third party, yet aware of their own political power, the dissident Conservatives returned to the party intent on gaining control. Delay was no longer possible and, once again, the conflict revolved around the contro-

versial figure of Bowser.[2]

Immediately following the federal election in September, R. L. Maitland, president of the British Columbia Conservative Association, announced plans for a convention to select a new leader. Unlike the two previous conventions which were held in Vancouver and had confirmed Bowser's leadership, this one was to be held in Kamloops. Since it was in the interior of the province that some of the most strenuous opposition to Bowser existed, the choice of Kamloops may well have been deliberate.

As had been the case in 1922, the anti-Bowser groups faced the problem of finding an appealing alternate. Pleading their recent election responsibilities and the precarious position of the federal Conservative party, Stevens, Tolmie and McRae refused to consider a nomination.[3] Pooley and Maitland had repeatedly stated since 1924 that they were not prepared to stand for the position. Then, at the end of October, it became common newspaper rumour that Leon J. Ladner was planning to opposed Bowser.

Ladner, while not as well-known politically as the other suggested federal candidates, was an acceptable compromise. A Member of Parliament since 1921, he had been returned in both 1925 and 1926 in South Vancouver with increased majorities. The son of a pioneer family and a well-known Vancouver lawyer, he was acquainted with most of the Provincial Party's leaders but had managed to remain neu-

tral during the McRae-Bowser struggle. He was thus in a position to reunite the party factions. Most importantly, Pooley and a majority of the Conservative caucus had offered him their support.[4]

After making one final effort to convince Tolmie to stand,[5] Ladner announced that:

> In view of the definite announcement from Victoria to the effect that the Hon. S. F. Tolmie, M. P. will not be a candidate for the leadership of the Liberal-Conservatives in British Columbia and in view of the statement of Mr. R. H. Pooley, M. L. A., the present leader, that he does not intend to seek a continuance in that office, thus leaving the leadership of the party to be decided by the elected delegates in convention. . . and in response to a large number of requests from all sections of the Province, including members of the Legislature, business, labour, and professional men, farmers and in fact men and women in all walks of life, I have decided to consent to my name being placed in nomination for the high office of party leadership.[6]

Shortly after this, at a meeting of the Vancouver Conservative Association, Bowser formally announced he too would be a candidate. His statement, which merely made official a campaign that had been in progress for some weeks, was unaccompanied by any press release.[7]

Ladner's candidacy polarized the various elements in the party. He was supported by a majority of the Conservative M. L. A.'s, the leaders of the Provincial Party, represented on his campaign committee by McRae, the Young Conservatives and an undeterminable number of party members who believed Bowser could not win a provincial election. Bowser, on the other hand, was supported by local executive

members who had long associations with the machine, party loyalists who had obligations or ties of loyalty to Bowser personally and a not inconsiderable number who considered Ladner to be an intruder. It is not clear which candidate was supported by the federal wing of the party[8] but it was obvious that both men had substantial strength and the contest would be hard-fought and bitter.

Both candidates immediately began an intensive campaign for the support of individual delegates. Throughout November the newspapers speculated on the preferences of the various constituency associations and reported rumours of packing attempts by both sides.[9] As the convention drew near, there was some indication that, in addition to other factors, the candidate's support was partially regional. Twelve interior ridings, mostly in the Okanagan and Kootenay regions, instructed their delegates to vote for Mr. Ladner and "in the event of his withdrawal, for any candidate opposing Mr. Bowser."[10] A majority of the Vancouver and Vancouver Island delegates were considered to be Bowser supporters, although Esquimalt and South Vancouver were committed to Ladner.[11]

By the eve of the convention, it became apparent that neither candidate had a clear majority and few delegates were uncommitted. Under these circumstances, the danger of another secession of dissident Conservatives became an immediate possibility. The Vancouver Star

reported that:

> The inner Conservative circles are faced with a major problem, the factors of which appear irreconcilable. Noses have been counted and the Convention is almost evenly divided between Bowser and Ladner supporters. It is further admitted that the real problem is not the election of any individual but how to bring together the pro-Bowser and anti-Bowser groups in co-operation. Both are composed of determined men and so strong is each, neither would give full support to any candidate elected by the support of the other.[12]

Yet, despite newspaper rumours of compromise candidates, there was no evidence of concrete efforts to avoid deadlock. Part of the problem was the scarcity of mutually acceptable alternatives. In addition, it appears that, because of the intensity of the contest and the emotions it had aroused, neither candidate felt he could consider any alternative without fatally weakening his own position. In fact, the convention seems to have begun in a mood of rigid determination to fight the contest through to the end, whatever that might be.

The convention opened on Tuesday November 23, 1926 at Kamloops with 548 voting delegates present, representing the local associations, elected and defeated federal and provincial Conservative candidates, five senators and one Privy Councillor, Sir C. H. Tupper.[13]

The first two days were anti-climactic. The convention was left to discuss, somewhat half-heartedly, a number of policy resolutions while the Credentials Committee tried to resolve the problem of disputed delegations. Finally, at

the Wednesday afternoon session, the chairman, H. L. Edmonds, announced the committee was unable to agree as to which set of Saanich delegates should be accredited. A majority of the committee recommended seating the Bowser delegation; the minority, led by Pooley, would neither accept the majority report nor an offer to split the seats. In a vote that seemed to test the relative strengths of the candidates, Pooley's motion for acceptance of the minority report was defeated 232 to 194.[14] The Bowser forces were successful.

Immediately following this vote, Bowser asked if he could make a statement. Before the tension-filled hall, he withdrew from the leadership contest. Suggesting that he could win if he ran, Bowser declared he would place the interests of the party before his personal ambition. Concerned that so much friction might damage the party, he would not accept a nomination.[15]

Without access to Bowser's papers, it is impossible to know the exact basis for his decision. The reports of two newspapers suggest that the decision was made hours before the afternoon session.[16] Certainly the promptitude of his speech indicates that the decision was not made on the basis of the vote on the Saanich delegation. But, if Bowser's withdrawal was not a surprise, it is difficult to understand why the Ladner forces persisted in taking the Saanich dispute to the floor of the convention where their

defeat intensified the possibility of deadlock. Of course, this may simply have been the result of a miscalculation. They may have thought they would win the vote, demonstrating their candidate's strength. On the other hand, because of their distrust of Bowser, they may have refused to believe he would actually withdraw. A group of men conditioned to view Bowser as a devious and successful manipulator could, in the heat of a convention, react in this manner.

Bowser's motives in withdrawing were obviously more complex than his speech to the convention stated. Undoubtedly he was sincere in realizing that the friction over his candidature was destroying the party. Although not a determining factor, the vote on the Saanich delegation proved that, even if he were to win, the opposition was too powerful and well-organized for him to maintain control. His election might well lead to a more permanent split than the one which had created the Provincial Party.

By removing himself from the contest and swinging his support elsewhere, a number of possibilities opened up. Much of Ladner's strength was based on personal opposition to Bowser. Another candidate might split the Ladner forces and, if elected, would be much indebted to Bowser. Withdrawal might also ensure a deadlock in the leadership balloting and, in that case, the convention could possibly turn to Bowser in desperation. Whatever his reasoning,

Bowser's refusal to run placed him in a more flexible position than he could have had by remaining in the contest.

During the evening session, S. M. Carson, a Bowser supporter, proposed and the convention accepted a resolution stating that voting should continue until one candidate obtained 60% of the total vote and that no candidate be allowed to withdraw.[17] This was almost the same motion that Bowser had scornfully rejected at the 1922 convention and, under the circumstances, could only have been intended to ensure a prolonged stalemate. In part, the resolution could be defended and accepted, as it was by the Ladner forces,[18] as necessary for party unity, but it also reflected an increasing determination to block their opponent's chance of victory.

When the nominations were completed the following morning, the battle lines were clearly drawn. The pro-Bowser Conservatives nominated Senator J. D. Taylor, the publisher of the Columbian and a veteran of both the Boer War and World War I. The anti-Bowser forces nominated Ladner. Two other candidates were added, C. F. Davie[19] and Nelson Spencer.[20] With a minimum of delay, the balloting began.

To win the leadership, one candidate had to receive 323 votes. After six ballots, no one had the required total. Ladner led throughout, reaching his high point on the third ballot with a total of 317. In the following votes, his total declined slightly and he remained about 20 votes short

of a majority.[21] Surprisingly, since it was obvious after the fourth ballot that stalemate had been reached, there was no marked shift to either of the two minor candidates. This is an indication either of their limited appeal or to the intensity of feeling among the supporters of the two leaders.

By evening, it was obvious that something had to be done if the party wished to survive. According to Ladner,

> Because of the deadlock, when the dinner adjournment came, I got together my committee composed in part of Major-General McRae; Mr. Loutit (sic), Mayor of North Vancouver; Mr. W. C. Shelly, later Minister of Finance, and some others. In the interests of the unity of the party, knowing that the Hon. S. F. Tolmie was popular although he would not enter the contest, I asked my committee to allow me to ask the convention to unamiously offer the leadership to Dr. Tolmie, who was sitting nearby. He knew absolutely nothing about what I was going to do. I made the proposal and there was a tremendous outburst of enthusiasm with one exception, the Honourable W. J. Bowser.[22]

Senator Taylor immediately seconded the motion but Tolmie adamantly refused, pointing out that he had not permitted his name to be entered in the contest and had publicly vowed he did not want the position. He then suggested that the convention recess temporarily and that, during the interval, a committee of the federal and provincial executives and the elected representatives meet to find a suitable compromise. Faced with the prospect of renewed deadlock, the convention, after some debate, accepted Tolmie's proposal.

Before discussing this meeting, it is appropriate

to review the personal background of the Honourable Dr. Simon Fraser Tolmie, M. P. For, while a man's past does not predetermine his future, Tolmie's career suggests some of the factors explaining his refusal of the position, his ultimate acceptance and his successes and failures as leader of the British Columbia Conservatives.

If any group in British Columbia could be considered a native aristocracy, S. F. Tolmie would be one of its most prominent members. On his mother's side he was the grandson of John Work, a Hudson's Bay Company factor, a member of the Executive Council of the Crown Colony of Vancouver Island and a pioneer farmer.[24] Simon Fraser's father, William Fraser Tolmie, had also been a Hudson's Bay Company factor, a director of the Puget's Sound Agricultural Company, a member of the Legislative Council of Vancouver Island and the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and a prominent farmer and cattle breeder.[25] Thus the Tolmie family was clearly part of the "Family-Company-Compact" which exerted such an important influence on Vancouver Island, and ultimately British Columbia, during its formative years.

The youngest of twelve children, Simon Fraser was born on January 25, 1867 in Victoria. After graduating from the Ontario Veterinary College in 1891, he returned to his native city as cattle inspector for the city of Victoria. Until 1917 he held a series of civil service positions in-

specting livestock for the provincial and federal governments. After his father's death, he took over the family farm, Cloverdale, and continued to raise prize Holsteins, an interest he never abandoned. Although as a civil servant, he could not be politically active, he attained local prominence as a livestock judge at local farm fairs.

Tolmie entered political life largely as a matter of duty rather than of personal ambition. Victorians enthusiastically supported the formation of the Union government in 1917. The organizers of the local Union movement sought a respected candidate without previous party affiliations. Tolmie had been approached to stand but had declined and was, in fact, out of town when the nomination convention endorsed him unanimously.[26] In the ensuing election, he easily defeated a Labour candidate and a dissident Liberal. For the next two years, he sat as a backbencher, personally popular but otherwise undistinguished.[27]

In 1919, T. A. Crerar, the Union Minister of Agriculture, resigned from the Cabinet, soon to re-appear as the leader of the National Progressive Party. Since the Union administration had few other better qualified members, Tolmie succeeded Crerar as minister. As contemporaries recognized,

> His appointment hasn't a world of political significance. He is one of that eminently respectable family of farmers who earn their bread by the sweat of the hired man's brow. He is a dweller in cities and repsents Victoria but he owns broad acres in the out-

> lying parts of the sunny slope province. He is said to be a good stockman and even some grain growers from the Prairies admit he will fill the job acceptably.[28]

While the grain growers' organizations made no comment, his appointment was popular in Victoria and Tolmie easily won the necessary by-election.[29]

As a cabinet minister, Tolmie was not outstanding. His major administrative accomplishment was to eliminate a thirty year old cattle mange problem and gain admission of Canadian beef to the British market. He occupied himself chiefly with acting as the public relations man of the Department of Agriculture while leaving the administrative detail to his deputy. Most of his activity consisted of opening fairs, judging livestock and making bucolic speeches and this was the part of the position he enjoyed most.

With the accession of Arthur R. Meighen to the Prime Ministership, Tolmie retained his office and officially joined the Conservative party to which by personal background he was inclined. Despite his acceptance of a party label, Tolmie was never a blatant partisan. He was noted throughout his federal career for his lack of political dogmatism and friendships across party lines. According to Leslie Roberts, an Ottawa journalist, Tolmie,

> both as a private commoner and as a member of Meighen's short-lived governments, . . . would have taken first prize in any contest seeking the House's most popular deputy. Friendliness and something verging on geniality marked his appearance in debate. Joviality stamped its hall mark on his bearing in the lobbies while his

> office in the Commons was the meeting place of men of good will and high spirits, regardless of political stripe.[31]

At the same time, Tolmie was a completely loyal follower of his party's leader. After the defeat of the Meighen government in 1921, he accepted his move to the Opposition benches with equanimity and conspicuously avoided involvement in the various schemes to depose Meighen.[32] It was probably these two qualities, loyalty and affability, which induced Meighen to appoint Tolmie as Dominion organizer for the federal Conservative party in 1923. This position, a particular preogative of the party leader,[33] had little formal authority and called for qualities of tact in creating a harmonious coordination of the autonomous provincial organizations. By selecting Tolmie, Meighen appears to have been seeking a counterpoise for his own personality.[34]

The initial public reaction to the appointment stressed these qualities of Tolmie. The Canadian Forum, a journal of left-wing intellectual comment, remarked that:

> It is, all things considered, a good appointment. Tolmie may not be a political Foch but he is far above the average politician with a mind by no means circumscribed by the narrow limits of partizanship, and with the unusual distinction(for this present Parliament) of being able to discuss political issues with good humour, detachment and dignity. His selection may not commend itself to those Tories who still regard Mr. Robert Rogers as the magician of elections but it has the cordial approbation of all who desire the placing of political combat on a higher plane than in the past.[35]

Since this journal was normally critical of the

Conservative party, it is not surprising to find it attacking Tolmie for his alleged failures in its next issue.[36] But a similar ambiguity is also evident in other assessments of Tolmie's activities as party organizer. To cite only a few examples, Tolmie is barely mentioned in Roger Graham's three volume biography of Meighen and three academic studies of Conservative party organization of the period dismiss Tolmie's efforts with cursory comments.[37] Yet, he did travel extensively during 1924-26, accompanying Meighen, speaking to Conservative groups across Canada and was popular with the members of the party.[38] The party's success in the 1925 election, while due to a multiplicity of factors, does indicate that Tolmie's appointment was not a totally disastrous act.

There are a number of possible reasons for the lack of appreciation of Tolmie's efforts. The lack of records prior to 1927 in the Conservative national headquarters[39] and the defeat of the party in the 1926 federal election obscured Tolmie's minor successes. Significant too is the lack of a clear understanding of the role of the Dominion organizer at that time. Given the autonomous nature of the provincial Conservative organizations and the lack of direct powers assigned to the federal organizer under the constitution of the party, the position did not require or offer any scope for strong administrative action. Nor does it seem likely that Meighen expected such activity. Tolmie's

job was to create a voluntary cooperation between the powerful provincial bodies and the federal party to ensure that federal candidates were supported during an election campaign.[40] To this end, loyalty and geniality were more to be prized than executive abilities and, since Meighen retained Tolmie in this position until his retirement and included him in the 1926 cabinet, he, at least, seemed to satisfied with Tolmie's efforts.

In all likelihood, however, Tolmie would have been replaced as Dominion organizer by 1927. The new Conservative leader, Richard Bedford Bennett, had little respect for Tolmie's abilities.[41] Consequently, the British Columbia Conservative convention came at just the right time. Tolmie was a nationally prominent figure in the process of adjusting to a new and less important role on the federal scene. Whether Tolmie saw it in this light or not, the opportunity to move into the provincial field at the top came at a propitious time.

To recapitulate, Tolmie had been a successful politician though his experience was not relevant to the position of a party leader or provincial premier. He had little administrative experience and scant enthusiasm for more. In fact he showed little political ambition of any kind. His entry into politics had been largely accidental and, while he had been a competent representative for his constituency and a loyal supporter of his party, he displayed interest

only in matters concerning the breeding of livestock, the Conservative party and Victoria. He admitted implicitly he was uninformed and uninterested in the details of provincial administration.[42] Since he would offend no one, Tolmie was a logical choice to rally a disunited party. As an appealing platform performer, he could appeal to the electorate while the party healed its internal wounds. But he was neither suited for nor interested in becoming premier of the province. Unfortunately for him and the Conservative party, in the stress of the deadlocked convention, his inadequacies were obscured by the needs of the moment.

Under the circumstances, the committee meeting during the recess of the 1926 Kamloops convention to find a means of ending the leadership stalemate became the scene of an intensified campaign to force Tolmie to accept the leadership. On the grounds that no one else could avert the breakup of the provincial Conservative party and the subsequent continuance in office of the Liberals, Pooley, McRae and Maitland appealed to Tolmie to save the province which had given his family so much.[43]

For over an hour, Tolmie strenuously resisted these pleas. He explained that for "personal reasons" he could not accept; he had just been reelected and thus had an obligation to serve the people of Victoria; he knew little of the problems of provincial administration; he did not wish to leave the congenial life at Ottawa for the more burden-

some position of premier. Apparently he also expressed some concern for the health of his wife who was a semi-invalid.[44] Clearly Tolmie was not certain of his ability to be a premier of the province although he did not seem to question that the Conservative party could win the next election. Promises of expert help and arguments about the imperative need to revive the party persuaded him to reconsider.

Tolmie's concern for his financial problems was also overcome. He was not a rich man and had always found it necessary to supplement the income from the farm with a salaried position. His stipend as a Member of Parliament was adequate for this purpose. By moving to the provincial field, he would lose this amount while his leadership duties would greatly reduce the time he could devote to managing the farm. In addition Tolmie believed, quite rightly as the year 1933 was to demonstrate, that he would be unable to support the expenses of a full provincial campaign. Apparently, promises of financial aid were made, perhaps by McRae on behalf of the federal party or himself,[45] although according to Tolmie, these promises were not kept after ~~1919~~ 1929.[46]

Thus Tolmie's arguments were rapidly eliminated and, despite his very real reluctance, he was placed in a position where he could not refuse the demand for his leadership. Given the circumstances and the character of the man, such a refusal was impossible even if he had been gifted

with the power of foreknowledge. The announcement of his acceptance to the waiting convention produced a massive demonstration of approval, with the single exception of Bowser who remained seated.[47]

Tolmie's acceptance speech was a model of reconciliation. He asked that the members of the excluded Saanich delegation return to the hall, noting they were from his home municipality and that he desired the support of all Conservatives concerned with the welfare of the province. He then explained that he had accepted the position of leader because it was his duty as a loyal British Columbian. His one request was for unity within the party and that criticism of his actions be open and to his face. He concluded by declaring:

> I have always endeavoured to remember I am the servant of the people of the country and I try to give them equal service whether they be Conservatives, Liberals, Socialists, Holy Rollers or any other political or religious faith. I try and serve equally all of the citizens— and such I will continue to do.[48]

With this, the convention thankfully adjourned, convinced as were all of the province's newspapers, that the Conservatives had finally solved their internal problems and were capable of defeating the Liberal government.[49] Except for a small group of Bowser loyalists, the provincial Conservatives were prepared to back Tolmie in the belief that he could lead them to an electoral victory.

CHAPTER IV

ELECTORAL VICTORY

Aided by economic prosperity and a weakened political opposition, the Conservative party, despite some internal friction, swept into office in the 1928 provincial election under Tolmie's leadership. Winning a total of 35 seats and 53.3% of the popular vote[1] while reducing the Liberals to 12 and Labour to 1 seat, Tolmie won the greatest majority since 1916. Setting out with a generally acclaimed program and cabinet, the new administration dealt adequately with the affairs of the province. But its public support was declining by the end of 1929 because of the actions of certain Cabinet ministers, the persistence of patronage and the weakening economic situation. At the same time the tenuous party unity so recently established began to fray as a result of a resurgence of internal dissent. Facing a period of acute economic crisis, the Tolmie government was already weakened.

Immediately following his selection as provincial leader, Tolmie returned to Ottawa, remaining there as the Member for Victoria until the beginning of the election campaign almost two years later. Although he returned to

aid candidates in by-elections in New Westminister, North Okanagan and Nelson, all of which were won by the Liberals, Tolmie was no more active than before the convention. He consulted the legislative caucus but, other than while campaigning, offered little comment on provincial affairs. Despite the attacks of the Vancouver Star, the Vancouver Sun and the Victoria Times, all Liberal papers, he remained an absentee leader and the Opposition continued to be led by Pooley.[2]

In many respects, his decision was eminently logical. Tolmie was under no necessity to build a public image since he was already favourably known throughout the province. Because of his recent election to the federal House, he could justifiably claim that he owed the voters his services as long as possible. Since T. G. Coventry, Conservative M. L. A. for Saanich, had promised to retire to provide Tolmie with a safe seat in his home riding in the next general election, it would be the height of folly to risk defeat in any by-election and the loss of his indemnity. Finally, there seemed to be no necessity to expend great effort to rebuild the Conservative organization. While a few of Bowser's supporters were not completely reconciled,[3] the party was enthusiastic and, with high hopes of an election victory, maintained a united front.

Equally, no one suggested that there was any need to prepare Tolmie for provincial politics or the Conserva-

tive party for office. Ignoring the possibility that the strains and antagonisms of the past ten years would not be healed overnight, Tolmie made no recorded attempt to establish his ascendency over the legislative caucus, assess the capabilities of potential cabinet ministers or create a personal loyalty to himself to replace the old pro- and anti-Bowser ties. As a result Tolmie came to office with little understanding of provincial and party problems, of the abilities of his supporters and without the backing of a personal following which would support him in a crisis.[4] United chiefly by its desire for office, the Conservative party lacked cohesion but was, nevertheless, stronger than its opponents.

The opposition, on the other hand, had fallen into disarray. The Provincial Party had passed from the scene when Walkem formally joined the Conservatives.[5] The Labour-Socialist group, weakened by its poor showing in the federal elections of 1925 and 1926, was locked in a factional dispute between its Communist and anti-Communist wings.[6] It was, therefore, able to field only a few candidates in the provincial election.

Although the Liberals too had a new leader in Dr. John Duncan MacLean, who had been chosen by Oliver before his death by cancer in August, 1927, the party had not been revitalized. In part MacLean was hampered by past events, particularly Oliver's stubborn refusal to grant Vancouver

any Cabinet representation, scandals over the administration of the Liquor Control Board and the failure of the federal Liberals in British Columbia in the 1926 election. Even Oliver's well-publicized conversion to "reform and progress"[8] at the 1927 Liberal convention made little impression since his choice of MacLean indicated there would be little change in the direction of Liberal policies.

Much of the failure to improve the Liberal's public image must be attributed to the character and actions of the new Premier. J. D. MacLean, a Prince Edward Island Scot, had succeeded through diligence and administrative ability while lacking many of the traditional gifts of a politician. The principal of the Rossland school, he had returned to McGill University and graduated in medicine, returning to practice in Rossland in 1907. Elected in 1916, MacLean had held the positions of Provincial Secretary, Minister of Education, Railways and Finance. Nicknamed "Velvet Vest"[9] by his colleagues, he was, despite his years in politics, pompous and pedantic in public and overly confident of his own ability to run the province without error. By his own statement,

> Our policy for the future will not be an entirely new one. It will be based on the policy of the past as I have already outlined. It will be to continue the present policies but to avoid the mistakes that have been made in the past.[10]

Newspaper reaction to his selection was restrained and without enthusiasm.

> J. D. MacLean has more brilliant colleagues but not one enjoys a greater measure of public confidence. He is a sound man, not one to act without careful enquiry and investigation. . . . The caucus could have done something spectacular but this is seldom safe.[11]

His actions during the period before the general election were ample verification of his "safe" character. The Oliver cabinet remained unchanged despite the fact it consisted of only five men, four of whom had been in office for twelve years. Endlessly repeating the accomplishments of the Oliver regime, MacLean offered no new departures in legislation. By implication he rejected the promises of the 1927 Liberal convention. In his only Legislative session, one of the longest on record, there was little of significance. Mixed in with a number of administrative changes were the standard pre-election promises of tax reduction, relief for farmers from irrigation charges, an extension of the P. G. E. and increased funds for highways and public works. In addition, MacLean announced that negotiations for the return of the Peace River and railway lands had begun with the federal government and that Vancouver would be given cabinet representation before the election.

Unfortunately for the Liberals, these measures aroused little enthusiasm. MacLean's efforts were successfully attacked by the aggressive Conservatives as too little, too late and beneficial only to special interests. The federal government delayed the negotiations and the

Cabinet reorganization was too long delayed and poorly executed to improve the Liberals' politicial prestige. In contrast to the vigour of the Conservatives, the Liberals under MacLean projected a picture of an uninspired, fragmented party.

Nowhere was this more obvious than in MacLean's attempt to grant cabinet representation to Vancouver. In the 1924 election, the Liberals won all five Vancouver seats for the first time. Four of the Vancouver M. L. A.'s had claims to cabinet appointments by virtue of their prominence.[12] For unexplained reasons, Oliver refused to include any Vancouver members in the cabinet. By 1926, the senior M. L. A., Charles Woodward, had ceased to attend the caucus. He and V. W. Odlum openly criticized the administration. With the accession of MacLean, the time seemed auspicious for healing the split. But, in his new cabinet, MacLean ignored all but Ian Mackenzie, who was given the unimportant position of Provincial Secretary, and made Donald Donaghy[13] Minister of Finance, although he was not a M. L. A. When the election was called, Woodward and Odlum called for the defeat of the Liberals and Donaghy was left to run on a slate consisting of an alderman and three party faithfuls.[14]

In contrast the Conservatives were able to field a strong Vancouver slate. From seventeen nominees, a carefully balanced group of well-known candidates was chosen.

The inclusion of Walkem, the ex-Provincial Party M. L. A., and William Curtis Shelly[15] signified the return of the mavericks to the Conservative fold. The choice of Maitland, Nelson Spencer and William Dick demonstrated that the animosities of the leadership convention had been forgotten. While Vancouver elected only five members to the provincial Legislature, it was the most populous area of the province and the most publicized. All parties avidly sought electoral strength there to illustrate their provincial power. In two respects, the Conservatives had been more successful than the Liberals. Their slate had reconciled the divergent groups; the Liberals had accentuated their division. The Conservatives had a wide choice of new appealing candidates; the Liberals had lost their best vote getters.

Tolmie resigned his federal seat and returned to British Columbia immediately after MacLean called a provincial election. Within ten days the Conservatives completed their nominations for all seats and issued a manifesto promising the voters a government which would be

> a live, wide-awake organization, filled with enthusiasm and confidence in our future, and having one of its main reasons for existence the power it can wield in bringing about bigger and better business for British Columbia.[16]

In the economic climate of that year, this was an appeal well calculated to attract widespread support. British Columbia was prosperous and there seemed just cause for optimism. As P. W. Fowler, president of the

Victoria Chamber of Commerce stated:

> The year 1928 is one of the most prosperous in the history of British Columbia. This prosperity is not a balloon growth but is fundamental, based on increased production in two primary industries, agriculture and mining.[17]

Mining, agriculture, fisheries, lumbering and manufacturing production and gross value all showed increases.[18] The Department of Labour announced that unemployment in the month of July was only 2.8% of the work force and, over the entire year, there was a record high in the number of employed persons and total wages paid. The average industrial wage was steadily increasing and little time was lost in labour disputes.[19] While neither the Okanagan nor the Kootenays had solved their marketing problems, their immediate situation had been improved by the general prosperity.[20] Vancouver and Victoria were booming, each in her own peculiar way. Vancouver's bank clearings had reached the billion dollar mark and she was in the process of extending her boundaries to include the surrounding municipalities.[21] Victoria was busy retiring her debt.[22]

Under the circumstances, British Columbians showed no great enthusiasm in the provincial election. With only two parties in the field and both committed to maintaining prosperity through similar policies, major issues were few. The Conservatives were able to attack the government's use of patronage and its failure to reduce the excessive provincial debt while promising further tax reduction by

increasing governmental efficiency. The Liberals ran on their record.

In such a contest it was inevitable that the election concentrated on the personalities within each party. In this respect the Conservatives were much the stronger. Not only was MacLean leading a party associated in the public mind with debt, unproven scandal and arrogance but he was not an appealing platform personality. In his public speeches he was ever the pedant, reciting the statistics of past successes. He could offer no solution to the problems of the P. G. E. except the hope it might be sold nor could he announce any success in dealing with the return of federal lands to the province. Of new policies he said nothing. While acknowledging he was sincere and honest, the public held MacLean and the Liberal party responsible for the economic fluctuations of the past ten years.[23]

On the other hand, the Conservatives had candidates with records of business success and a leader whose public popularity grew throughout the campaign. Covering the entire province in an extended tour by car and train, Tolmie proved himself to be an accomplished and entertaining speaker with a suitably bucolic wit. While his statements were seldom of great intellectual merit, his speeches radiated warmth and sincerity, attractively embellished with a fund of humourous anecdotes.[24] In sum, Tolmie had the political presence that MacLean so clearly lacked,

backed by a record of success in the federal field. By election day, even the Liberal papers were conceding victory to Tolmie and speculating on the composition of his cabinet.

The result was an overwhelming victory for the Conservatives, reminiscent of the days of McBride. Sweeping Victoria and Vancouver, the party took 35 seats with 53.3% of the popular vote. All regions of British Columbia except the Kootenays returned a majority of Conservatives. MacLean was defeated in Victoria and the Liberals were reduced to 12 seats and 40% of the vote. The major factor in this decisive win lay in the fact that only 22 ridings had multi-candidate contests and only 6% of the vote was given to candidates of other than the Conservative and Liberal parties, a very marked reduction from previous elections.[25]

The election victory was a personal triumph for Tolmie. He had proven he could unite his party and, in the campaign, had gained the confidence of the electorate, two achievements which Bowser had been unable to accomplish. Yet the voters had also supported continued prosperity, tax reduction and the elimination of patronage. Tolmie's personal popularity would not create lasting support. It would be contigent on his ability to achieve these objectives. His choice of cabinet ministers was the first indication of Tolmie's ability to govern efficiently.

Unfortunately political pressure, not administrative competence, governed his selection.

One month after the election, the Tolmie cabinet was sworn into office.[26] Generally, newspaper opinion was favourable, although there were comments that, because of the inexperience of the ministers, the cabinet must be regarded as tentative.[27] The major criticism was in respect to the size of the cabinet. With eleven members, it was the largest in recent times and seemed to contradict the Conservative's promise to economize.[28] Tolmie adeptly responded that:

> There was a time when a cabinet of 4 or 5 was able to handle the affairs of British Columbia, but with the growth of various industries such as lumbering, agriculture, mining, fisheries and manufactures, it is no longer possible. It will be found that efficiency in administration is always true economy in the end. In government as in business, concentration pays. I think it will prove to be sound policy not to encumber any minister with too many or too diversified areas of administration. I want each to give his best to his particular portfolio.[29]

Tolmie's statement was a trifle ingenuous. In a letter written privately at a later date, he commented:

> Many of the members of the caucus expected to be invited into the Cabinet, but I am quite sure that Solomon himself could not have got more than 8 men into 8 seats.[30]

Considering the conflicting pressures with which Tolmie had to contend, the cabinet was a good compromise. Traditionally, British Columbia cabinets had been drawn up with an eye to areas of governmental electoral support and important geographic regions rather than selecting

capable individual administrators. In this respect it is similar to the federal cabinet. In the campaign, Tolmie committed himself to greater representation for Vancouver and a more business-like administration. Now Victoria and Vancouver business and public had supported the Conservatives so heavily in the election, Tolmie had to satisfy their claims.

He also had to reconcile claims within the party. Pro- and anti-Bowser sentiment still existed and dominance in the cabinet of one group would alienate the other and reopen the still unhealed split. As well, he had to adjudicate the claims of the new members as opposed to those of the experienced M. L. A.'s. The old guard had long and faithful service as well as, in some cases, considerable legislative expertise. The new members could contend that they had been a major factor in rebuilding the party and winning the election. As will be demonstrated, Tolmie was never able to find a completely acceptable balance.

Tolmie himself took the Railway portfolio because of the financial importance of the P. G. E. For the most part, he saw his function as being chairman of the board, remaining free of direct administrative responsibilities.[31] The selection of S. L. Howe as Provincial Secretary served a number of purposes. As a successful businessman, he would be able to improve the administration of the various health and welfare services within the department. As ex-

presidents of the British Columbia Conservative Association, he, Maitland and Lougheed would provide contact with the party members and, in fact, Howe acted as financial controller of party funds.[32] As the member for Richmond-Point Grey, he gave additional representation to Vancouver.

The choice of Pooley and Joshua Hinchliffe as Attorney-General and Minister of Education respectively was not surprising. Both men, as strong members of the Conservative opposition, had acted as critics of these departments. Unlike most of the other members of the front bench, they were experienced and forceful debaters in the House. If for no other reason, Pooley's service as Conservative house leader and his support of Ladner gave him a definite claim to a major portfolio. In view of Pattullo's comment that the cabinet was dominated by Vancouver business interests,[33] it must be noted that these two appointments gave Victoria equality in both numbers and importance in the cabinet with Vancouver.

The most difficult position to fill was that of Finance Minister. J. W. Jones[34] had been a highly regarded financial critic while in opposition and a possibility for house leader in 1924. However, W. C. Shelly also had a strong claim to the position. As a successful businessman, it was thought he would inspire confidence in the policies of the new administration. Because he had led the poll in

Vancouver, he was an obvious choice to represent the city in the cabinet.[35] Finally, as an active participant in both the Provincial Party and Ladner's campaign, his inclusion was a necessary demonstration that Tolmie would not follow Bowser's example. Jones had to be temporarily satisfied with being Speaker of the House.

The remainder of the appointments were unexceptional. R. L. Maitland and N. S. Lougheed, as well as having strong party connections, were popular in their geographical regions. R. W. Bruhn had several virtues. He was a Scandinavian in an all English-Canadian group, had made a fortune through his own efforts and was well-known in the interior of the province. W. A. Mackenzie had been a prominent anti-Bowserite while F. P. Burden and William Atkinson were included to achieve a geographical balance. All in all, the cabinet was not markedly different, though somewhat stronger than previous administrations, and particular approval was given to the choice of Shelly and Howe.[36]

However, from the standpoint of the party, the cabinet was not as successful. Whether consciously or not, Tolmie had selected a cabinet in which the most prominent members had been closely associated with the anti-Bowser wing. No prominent Bowser supporter, such as W. Dick or J. W. Berry,[37] was included. While it is true that the pro-Bowser element was only a small percentage of the caucus and they were not men of outstanding qualities,

they had considerable influence within the party organization. Tolmie's failure to win them over was to provide the impetus for the return of Bowser in 1932 and the final party split.

But this was all in the future. At the moment Tolmie's administration was generally well though of, particularly in Vancouver.[38] Over the next year this approval diminished but, certainly, G. G. McGeer's contention that the government was discredited by the end of 1929 was a grossly exaggerated view.[39] There was little contemporary criticism of the three week postponement of the Legislative session, the length of the session or the non-controversial nature of the legislation.[40] The Star even commended the government.[41]

In fact, the Tolmie administration had a number of distinct successes during its first year of office. In December, 1928, D. B. Plunkett retained Tolmie's federal seat in Victoria for the Conservatives by defeating J. D. MacLean. As Plunkett was closely associated with Tolmie and was, in fact, largely guided by him,[42] this victory was considered a vote of confidence in the provincial party. At the same time the by-election ended MacLean's political career. Just prior to the opening of the Legislative session, the Liberal caucus elected T. D. Pattullo,[43] the party's house leader.

Later the same month, Premier Tolmie was able to

announce a definite commitment from the federal government to return to the province the unalienated part of the Canadian Pacific Railway land grant. The land involved included approximately 5,000,000 acres along the C. P. R.'s main line and a 3,500,000 acre block in the Peace River area.[44] Negotiations for the transfer had been begun by Oliver and continued by MacLean but nothing definite had been settled. The federal government's willingness to grant to a Conservative government that which it had delayed giving a Liberal regime may have been a reflection of Prime Minister W. L. M. King's personal attitude that "the fact that the province has become Conservative is not necessarily a bad thing for a federal Liberal party."[45]

In February, Tolmie was also able to announce the achievement of another long-sought objective. He informed the House that the provincial government, the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Canadian National Railway had agreed on a joint survey of the natural resources of the territory served by the P. G. E.[46] Such a survey had long been mooted as a necessary first step in convincing either of the transcontinental railways to take over the provincially owned line. Tolmie's success in these two matters, which had been long discussed but not consumated, greatly enhanced his personal prestige.

Nevertheless, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the administrative capabilities of the new government.

As their first year in office drew to a close, the government was beset by a mounting wave of criticism over the attitudes and actions of some of the cabinet. There were numerous complaints of specific acts of inefficiency and arrogance by some ministers and, despite campaign pledges to the contrary, of increased use of political patronage.

Part of the problem was attributed to Tolmie himself. As early as October, 1928, the Vancouver Star suggested that Tolmie was not exercising sufficiently firm control over the cabinet[47] and this became a common complaint during and after the first legislative session. During the same period of time, it became apparent that Tolmie enjoyed neither his position nor the atmosphere of the Legislative Assembly. Bruce Hutchison, the most perceptive of the legislative reporters of the period, commented that:

> It was only when Doctor Tolmie reached Agriculture that he lapsed momentarily. When he gets on to that, you never know where he will go or when he will return. . . . That part of the speech was an evident pleasure to him. He turned to the P. G. E. and other things as a man opens his desk for the grind of daily toil.[48]

Tolmie himself wrote

April 29

> We had a rather long session for this neck of the woods and the most surprising part to me was the contrast to Ottawa. In Ottawa, the Speaker is respected and calls to order are promptly listened to. They have not learned that here yet and it will take a great deal of schooling to get them straightened away. In fact, an entirely new atmosphere will have to be created. There is little real debate, the opposition confining itself to petty scolding and fault-finding.[49]

Unfortunately, the legislature never did improve its behaviour and Tolmie never did reconcile himself to the situation.[50]

A result, at least in part, of Tolmie's attitude was a series of unpolitic and unpopular actions by some ministers. Mackenzie, Minister of Mines and Labour, was severely criticized for an alleged involvement in certain mining companies under government inspection and for publishing normally confidential reports of departmental engineers. Hinchliffe, an Anglican canon, reawakened concern expressed at the time of his appointment of the dangers of a clergyman being put in charge of a public school system. Despite the repeated objections of the British Columbia School Trustees and the Teachers' Federation, he began a campaign to introduce prayer and Bible readings into the school system. Even Howe, who did little else of note, caused unfavourable publicity by refusing Pattullo the customary Opposition leader's privilege of examining all Orders-in-Council.

The chief offender was the Minister of Finance, Shelly. On assuming office, he had requested a complete audit of the provincial finances, a standard procedure. However, it is impossible not to agree with Pattullo's contention that the Interim Audit Report presented to the House was primarily a political document condemning the previous government.[51] Basing his decision on this report,

Shelly announced there could be no general tax reduction because of the necessity for the government to replace trust funds wrongfully used by the Liberals to avoid deficits. Already under attack for selling government bonds through a private syndicate rather than publicly, Shelly demonstrated his political maladroitness by lowering succession duties, a measure which only benifited the well-to-do, while attacking the principle of "parental legislation", under which title he classified expenditures on hospitals, charities, education and pensions.[52] While he made no reductions in government spending on these items, his budget speech inferred that reductions would be made in the future, another unpopular idea. 1929

While such incidents as these created much unfavourable publicity for the government, the question of patronage aroused the greater storm. Soon after the election, it became obvious and even notorious that the government was succumbing to the pressure of its members to provide employment for the faithful. The Vancouver Star observed that:

> No government has managed to acquire so quickly a reputation for the remorseless elimination from government posts of men of the opposite political faith. It may be said, however, that as far as the higher ranks are concerned, the Government probably will be able to give a very good account of itself. On the other hand, up and down the country, there have been many minor dismissals of magistrates, road foremen and constables.[53]

Some appointment raised little public controversy

although they were clearly a matter of political expediency. There was virtually no comment when the president of the Saanich Conservative Association was appointed Sergeant-at-Arms or when B. A. McKelvie, journalist and son of the late Conservative Member of Parliament, was given the newly created post of Director-General of the British Columbia Bureau of Public Relations.[54] The appointment of T. G. Coventry, who had given up his Saanich seat for Tolmie, as Marketing Representative for British Columbia in Great Britain and of T. A. Wallinger, the only Conservative to lose his seat in the 1928 election, as government agent in Cranbrook were subjects of sly but muted comment.[55]

But three dismissals and subsequent appointments created a storm of adverse publicity and severely tarnished the government's image. The dismissal of H. L. McPherson from his position as administrator of the University Endowment Lands, while probably justified, was criticized because he was replaced by the man who had drawn up the report on which the dismissal was based.[56] The resignation of A. H. Cox, the head of the Provincial Civil Service Commission, and the subsequent appointment of Col. Ross Napier to reclassify and investigate the provincial Civil Service precipitated a violent attack by Pattullo who argued that the government was undertaking a wholesale "housecleaning of capable officials to make way

for political friends."[57]

This attack was mild compared to the furor aroused by the dismissal of Judge Helen Gregory MacGill of the Vancouver Juvenile Court and her replacement by Miss E. Patterson, a prominent Conservative worker. Mrs. MacGill, a judge for twelve years, was highly regarded for her efforts with female juvenile offenders. Prior to her appointment she had been an active advocate of woman's suffrage. She had retained some connection with Mrs. M. E. Smith, the former Liberal M. L. A., although no longer politically active in any real sense.[58] Tolmie explained privately that:

> Politics had nothing to do with the dismissal of Mrs. MacGill-- her work had been very unsatisfactory. She was guided apparently by laws of her own.[59]

The public outcry was tremendous. Even the Vancouver Province, a relatively consistent supporter of the Tolmie administration, opposed her removal by declaring:

> In the absence of any government statement, the replacement of Judge MacGill will be regarded as a piece of political jugglery. This paper is not criticizing the appointment of Miss Patterson. She may make a good judge and it is possible her services to the Conservative party have been such as to call for a reward. But the public is very tired of political machines, patronage and pork barrels. It was largely to get rid of this that it threw the MacLean government into the discard. The Tolmie government came to office with the promise of better things. It must be warned. It can not be clean and efficient unless it is also strong. It will inevitably lose public confidence and esteem just like its predecessor.[60]

The government's attempt to justify its action

only made the matter worse. Pooley introduced a motion of censure against the newspapers on the grounds that:

> In the opinion of this House, it is very regretable that inquiries are not addressed to the officials in charge of Government records in order to obtain correct information regarding Government actions before statements in regard to such actions are made.[61]

He went on to state that Mrs. MacGill had been dismissed "because she had refused to carry out the law and had declined to commit delinquent girls to the Industrial School."[62] So violent was the House's reaction that Pooley withdrew the motion seven days later.

The agitation did not end with the official explanation. While Mrs. MacGill took no action, a non-political women's committee, headed by Mrs. Rex Eaton and supported by a number of women's organizations, began circulating a petition demanding her reinstatement. By September, the committee had 150 members and over 3000 signatures.[63] While they interviewed Tolmie, they were unable to accomplish any change in the government's attitude and gradually faded from public notice. However, the publicity the committee had generated did erode public confidence in the Tolmie administration. Added to the other actions of the new government, the dismissal of Mrs. MacGill confirmed the impression that the Conservatives were still an unreformed, patronage-ridden party despite their change of leadership.

How culpable Tolmie was with respect to his mini-

ster's patronage appointments is difficult to establish. Certainly, many Conservatives felt that not enough patronage was available and that Tolmie should be more ruthless. J. W. Cornett, the South Vancouver M. L. A., warned that:

> Many members realize that time is going on and many of the positions held by persons appointed by the former government should be immediately opened and filled by people in sympathy with the present government and who would carry out Conservative policies better than a Liberal. Present conditions are creating a feeling of uneasiness among our members and they consider that, after their efforts on behalf of the party, this condition should be reversed.[64]

Tolmie, however, seems to have genuinely believed that he was successful in limiting the demands for patronage and he may well have done so. He explained to Senator Smeaton White:

> Naturally after the election, there was a tremendous fight for patronage control and it was demanded of me that I should discharge all Liberals in the civil service. This I absolutely refused to do, contending that everyone was entitled to a fair trial and as long as a man filled his position satisfactorily, and did not take part in politics and was not filling a position that was unnecessary, he would not be interfered with. Naturally, this did not bring satisfaction to that group of men, to be seen after an election, who are interested in politics only for the revenue to be derived therefrom.[65]

Tolmie's statement is broad enough to be stretched to cover most of the criticized appointments and dismissals. It is only fair to point out as well that there was little Tolmie could do after these dismissals occurred without disavowing a cabinet colleague and risking party dissension.[66] He faced the usual problem of a party too long in

opposition, namely that his supporters were hungry for office and not sufficiently alert to avoid public criticism. By the political standards of the day, the actions of the cabinet were unnecessarily blatant and impolitic, not immoral or dishonest. Tolmie's responsibility lay in the fact that he had appointed the cabinet and, as an experienced politician, should have supervised their actions with greater care. If he really had wished to restrict patronage, he should have exerted his authority as Premier but, unfortunately, his chronic unwillingness to do so was his greatest failing.

Actually the government's loss of popular support during its first years of office was neither exceptional nor necessarily critical. Under normal circumstances as the government continued in office, its earlier offenses would be forgotten while its legislative record would rebuild its prestige. But for the Tolmie government, circumstances were not normal and, beset by economic crisis, it had no opportunity to recreate a favourable image. Perhaps nothing could have saved the Tolmie government but its early disillusionment of the hopes of reform increased its problems.

CHAPTER V

DEPRESSION, DISSENT AND THE UNIONIST MOVEMENT

In the latter part of 1929, the Tolmie administration reached its peak. With a prosperous economy, the government's over-whelming legislative majority seemed unshakable. Within two years, the administration's strength had vanished. The provincial economy had declined alarmingly. Hundreds were on relief. Unable to deal effectively with the economic crisis, the provincial Conservative party was intellectually bankrupt, internally fragmented and, in the eyes of the electorate, discredited. As with so many other governments during this period,[1] the Tolmie administration could not withstand the pressures of the Great Depression.

It is essential to stress that the failures of the political leadership to recognize and counteract the economic change are obvious only in retrospect. The leaders knew little more than did their followers and, to the majority of Canadians, the collapse of the New York stock market in October, 1929, was of interest, but not concern. Few were speculating on any stock market[2] and fewer still saw any relationship between the stock market and their

own prosperity. Prime Minister King's comment at the end of October reflected the Canadian mood accurately:

> Economic conditions in Canada have never been sounder nor the faith in the development of the Dominion greater. The hectic conditions which have prevailed might have some adverse effect on Canadian stocks but the confidence shown by foreign investors should itself be a factor in assuring confidence.[3]

In British Columbia, a similar mood prevailed. In his yearly summary, Mayor W. H. Malkin, a wholesale grocer, took great pride in noting that Vancouver's budget was almost as large as that of the provincial government and in listing an impressive number of completed and planned projects to expand the city.[4] The voters shared his optimism. Having supported one referendum for $5,850,000 in May, they approved another for $4,200,000 in December, 1929.[5] No one expressed concern about the fact that there was a steady increase in the number of unemployed, necessitating an additional city grant of $51,000 for relief[6] and causing a series of protest marches by the unemployed throughout the month of December.[7]

The province, as a whole, was more prosperous than in previous years. Bank clearings and the number of employed reached a record high.[8] The average industrial wage had risen to $29.20 a week; the total value of production in agriculture and mining set new records while other industries remained at the high level of the previous year.[10] Tolmie's enthusiastic advocacy of a highway to tap the Alaskan market was symptomatic of the belief in Brit-

ish Columbia's continuing expansion.

The legislative session of 1930 reflected the still bouyant provincial mood. The government offered only measures to expand the province's export markets and to make the government administration more efficient. So noncontroversial was the Throne speech that, at the suggestion of the Leader of the Opposition, Pattullo, the customary debate ended the same day it began. Instead, the Liberals, continuing their attack of the previous session, filed over 200 questions, designed to demonstrate that the government was using its powers to dismiss loyal civil servants and appoint their own supporters.[11] There was only one question at all related to the problem of unemployment.[12]

There was so little awareness of the economic decline that Shelly's 1930 budget was attacked for its failure to lower taxes as the Conservative election manifesto had promised. Shelly's attempt to justify tax increases to balance the budget and reduce the provincial deficit was unpopular even within his own party. Few Conservatimes defended the budget in the House and even the progovernment Colonist was unenthusiastic.[13] In view of the criticism directed at Shelly's suggested limitation on the costs of social services, he would have gained no support for any policy of determined retrenchment.

Nor was there any awareness of an economic recession voiced throughout the remainder of the session. The

Minister of Labour declared that only two requests for assistance with the cost of unemployment relief had been received.[14] The government took no action on these requests, implying that the increased program of highway construction would alleviate the problem. Despite warnings of widespread unemployment in primary industries[15] and a significant decline in provincial tax revenues,[16] Tolmie, on the eve of the federal election, informed R. B. Bennett that British Columbia's situation was "not yet critical."[17] Apparently Tolmie believed that the unemployment situation was still essentially a local problem and did not call for federal or provincial intervention.

By the end of the summer, Tolmie was forced to reassess his view. As Shelly had predicted,[18] unemployment figures rose steadily as seasonal labour ended. Declines in export markets for lumber, minerals and salmon products indicated the economic stituation would be worse than the previous year. Municipal funds for relief had been drained during the spring. As the provincial economy shrank, so did provincial tax revenues, thus limiting the provincial resources. Under these circumstances, the victory of Bennett and the federal Conservatives took on an immediate importance.[19] The Tolmie government welcomed the new administration's willingness to assist the provinces with unemployment relief and the specific allocation of $900,000 to British Columbia for

> the relief of unemployment in constructing, extending or improving public works and undertakings, railways, highways, etc. that will assist in providing useful and suitable work for the unemployed.[20]

Despite this aid, the economic situation in the province continued to deteriorate. As early as March, 1930, Tolmie had become concerned about the government's expenditures. He told the cabinet:

> It is very important that no major commitment should be made by any member of the Cabinet of expenditures of substantial sums of money without referring the same to the Treasury Board. I would be very pleased if you would observe this closely in the future.[21]

Despite repeated similar requests, no great reduction occurred. In October, Tolmie reorganized his cabinet. Impelled partly by public and party criticism[22] but, more importantly, by the need to enforce more stringent financial control, Tolmie replaced Shelly as Finance Minister with J. W. Jones, the Speaker of the House, a more forceful and experienced politician. At the same time, he moved two much criticized ministers to less onerous duties and promoted R. W. Bruhn to the increasingly important portfolio of Labour and Public Works.[23] Typically, no minister was summarily demoted.

Publicly, Tolmie remained optimistic, telling the Conservative Annual convention:

> 1930 has been a very trying year on account of adverse business conditions and lack of employment for men; however, the Right Hon. R. B. Bennett has taken hold of the problem in a whole-hearted way without making any excuses or even attempting to dodge the issue. The government of British Columbia has been glad to cooperate and has been joined whole-heartedly by the

> municipalities. As a matter of fact, the municipalities have the first responsibility and only under extreme conditions is the Provincial Government needed to come to their assistance. I think, in the long run, the situation will be handled satisfactorily.[24]

Privately, he was less confident and with good reason. During November and December, an estimated 7,000 men were on relief in Vancouver. Hundreds more were coming in "on the rods." In a single breadline outside a Vancouver church, an observer counted 1,252 men.[25] The year-end statistics for 1930 showed declines in the total value of production in all industries,[26] in the number of employed persons and the total provincial payroll.[27] Tolmie could see no hope of improvement in the unemployment situation.[28]

By the time the 1931 Legislative session opened, the twin problems of unemployment and relief costs dominated the discussions of the House. The Throne speech offered little in the way of solutions. Announcing the completion of the Dominion-Provincial land transfer of railway lands[29] and plans for surveys to explore new export markets, the government merely expressed the hope that new areas of production would revitalize the provincial economy. However, the budget speech demonstrated that the administration was preparing for a year of financial stringency. Announcing another deficit, Jones explained that 86% of the yearly provincial revenue was already committed and, consequently, unavailable to meet the increasing costs of relief. Having lived beyond its means for years, the

province now had to balance revenue and expenditure to meet its financial obligations and maintain its ability to borrow. To compensate for the reduced revenues from taxation and the lack of long-term loan money, Jones increased the provincial income tax by 1% on virtually all classes of income.[30]

Besides being unpopular, particularly within the Conservative party,[31] the tax increase was not sufficient to meet the needs of the following months. Unlike previous years, seasonal employment did not markedly reduced unemployment. So rapidly did the numbers of unemployed increase that the government was unable to plan ahead. In July, the Minister of Labour and Public Works announced a registration of all unemployed in the province to enable the government to plan an adequate program of public works.[32] At that time, he estimated there were approximately 24,000 unemployed in the province.[33] By August 31, when the registration was completed, the total was 35,842 individuals, not including families.[34]

In an attempt to deal with the problem, the provincial government signed an agreement with the federal administration to share the cost of relief for certain classes of unemployed.[35] This did not included relief for single and transient unemployed. For this group, the provincial government, adopting a plan tried in Vancouver in 1922,[36] set up a series of work camps, mostly in remote

areas of the interior. The cost of creating these camps--$413,249--did not include the payment of the wages of the inhabitants at a minimum of $2.00 per day.[37] The total cost of unemployment relief of all kinds, from October, 1930 to August, 1931, exceeded $4,000,000, far above the government's estimates.[38]

By the middle of October, 1931, the financial position of the provincial government was causing the cabinet great concern. Adding urgency were warnings being made to Jones from local bankers,[39] Eastern investment dealers[40] and the federal government.[41] In each case, the gist of the warning was that the province would have great difficulty obtaining any type of loan unless it were able to balance the budget and demonstrate an ability to reduce expenditures. The situation became critical when Bennett preemptorily rejected the province's estimated financial requirements, stating that the federal government was unable to meet such exorbitant demands and the province must economize by concentrating on direct relief rather than work projects.[42]

Apparently confident that the federal aprty would not permit the British Columbia Conservatives to be hamstrung by federal restriction,[43] Tolmie sent Jones to Ottawa to negotiate an acceptable compromise. He was speedily disabused. After an interview with Bennett, Jones wired Victoria urging severe reduction in the provincial relief

program and the immediate closure of all work camps.[44]

Immediately after, Jones received another staggering blow from the Canadian Bank of Commerce. S.H. Logan, the general manager of the bank, informed Jones that it would make no further loans or advances for relief work or the refunding of outstanding treasury bills.[45] In a letter written later to confirm the bank's position, Logan applied even more specific conditions to ensure payment of the province's current debt. These conditions were rigid enough to be considered an implicit attempt to dictate the government's financial policy over the next years.[46]

The bank's position was deceptively simple. The British Columbia government was over-extended. As a debtor, the province had to demonstrate its capacity to repay its original debts by meeting the bank's conditions. Then, and only then, could they discuss further loans. There is no indication that the bank considered it was infringing on the provincial government's constitutional powers by demanding the right to determine its financial policies. They were merely being businesslike and, in doing so, were exercising exactly the type of rigid financial control to which western Canadians had always been sensitive.

As a result of these pressures, Tolmie, for almost the only time during his Premiership, lost his natural optimism and wired a despairing appraisal and plea to the Dominion government:

> Expected both governments share direct relief for municipalities. We are unable to finance our share. General unemployment situation throughout Province daily growing worse. Our financial situation precludes any further actions with respect to relief of any kind. Social conditions already showing signs of unrest. Would respectfully urge your government to make every effort to provide financial arrangements by way of loan and contribution to enable us to give some measure of relief.[47]

Just what effect Tolmie's appeal had is difficult to ascertain. The federal government continued to insist that the provincial budget be balanced, expenditures be reduced and federal contributions be used only for approved projects.[48] Over the next four months, the acrimonious debate over the total amount of federal aid to be given to British Columbia and the method of its payment contined between Ottawa and Victoria. Stevens and Ladner were drawn into the dispute. Stevens travelled to Vancouver in December to seek a compromise;[49] Ladner argued the province's case with Bennett in Ottawa.[50] Despite their efforts, the telegrams became more and more petulant, as Bennett complained:

> Do you think it serves any useful purpose to send telegrams to us merely for the purpose of being able to show them to municipalities and others therefore endeavouring to establish that responsibility for existing conditions in the Province is attributable to the Federal, not the Provincial administration? We have forwarded you $2,300,000, of which $500,000 was an open advance and the remainder being secured by Treasury bills, for Provincial and Municipal expenditures on authorized relief work. Apparently you have used these funds in whole or in part for Provincial purposes at the expense of amounts due to Municipalities. . . . You have been paid the full amount to which you are entitled.[51]

The root of the federal-provincial dispute lay in the commitment of both governments to the traditional orthodoxy of the day, a balanced budget. With the continued contraction of the economy and the subsequent decline of governmental revenues, the accepted solution was to reduce expenditures. However, both Bennett and Tolmie faced an increasing demand for financial aid for the relief of the unemployed, encouraged by Bennett's promises during the federal campaign. The two ideas of a balanced budget and unemployment relief were irreconcilable and attempts to achieve a satisfactory compromise produced constant frustration. This hampered all negotiations.[52]

Both governments faced particular difficulties. The provincial administration had a constant influx of transients, skyrocketing relief costs and rapidly declining revenues. The action of the Bank of Commerce and the general weakness of the financial market made it impossible for Jones to obtain additional loans. British Columbia was forced to rely on the Dominion government for the necessary funds. Unable to plan ahead, the provincial cabinet worked in a state of perpetual crisis. The federal government faced similar problems with greater resources but equally larger obligations. Under pressure from all provincial governments, unable to see an end to the economic crisis, Bennett was forced to adjudicate the various claims without accurate knowledge of the immediate situa-

tion. Bombarded by rumours of British Columbia's extravagance and inefficiency,[53] he could only preach economy while restricting the flow of federal grants until satisfactory evidence of provincial necessity was produced.[54] The relations between Victoria and Ottawa were thus further aggravated.[55]

By February, 1932, the worst of the controversy had abated. British Columbia submitted the proper forms; federal grants flowed more regularly. As Tolmie explained to a friend in the federal House:

> Unemployment has created quite a lot of controversy between the Dominion and Provincial governments as a result of "too many cooks." Ministers came here from Ottawa at different times and agreed to our proposals, both in organized and unorganized territory and in the municipalities. They laid down certain plans we later discovered could not be carried out due to a change in financial conditions. . . . However, we feel, in the long run, work in British Columbia was well done. The establishment of the camps was a heavy undertaking, carried out in a short time, provided employment for an army of unemployed, 11,000 of whom were transients. We found on analysis to compare very favourably with that of any other province.[56]

With federal aid, the immediate financial crisis was eased; it was not resolved. Any hope for an economic revival in 1932 had vanished. The value of all industrial production in the province had declined from the lows of the previous year, heralding more unemployment and additional relief costs.[57] According to the federal government, there were 39,152 individuals and families receiving some form of relief as of June, 1932, at a total cost of $2,990,985.[58] From September, 1931 to April, 1932, the

provincial government's cost for relief totalled $8,762,000.[59] In the 1932 budget, Jones increased taxes, reduced Departmental and Civil Service appropriations and shifted the cost of social services to the already overburdened municipalities.[60] It was not enough. The economic and financial position of the province steadily declined. Tolmie's one hope was that the Imperial Economic Conference to be held in July in Ottawa would open new markets for provincial industries.[61] By August, this hope too proved to be unrealistic.[62]

Facing continued economic stringency for which he had no solution and increasing popular disfavour, Tolmie was also threatened by dissent within the Conservative party. This party conflict was caused only in part by the economic situation. Its origins stretched back to the party split of 1924 and the leadership contest of 1926 as wounds that had never healed were reopened. The tenuous unity established under Tolmie began to shred over the problems of patronage and political recognition. As the government continued in office, its decisions, both economic and political, alienated various groups, damaging the relationship between the federal and provincial wings, causing an incipient revolt by the Vancouver organization, reviving the ambitions of Bowser and creating a renewed agitation for non-party administration in the province. In the Conservative party's internal conflict, as much as in

the economic situation, lay the causes of the ultimate collapse of the Tolmie government.

The election of the Tolmie administration in 1928 had not ended the struggle for the control of the party organization. Because of Tolmie's inactivity prior to the election, the party machinery remained in the control of the old guard who supported the new leader out of hopes for victory, not personal loyalty. The electoral success of the anti-Bowser candidates and their subsequent dominance of the cabinet led inevitably to an internal conflict for control of the Conservative Associations. In 1929, Shelly, Pooley and Howe, backed by Tolmie, successfully placed men loyal to the new leadership in control.[63] As Tolmie explained to an ex-colleague in the federal House,

> Conditions here are vastly improved. At the last annual meeting in Victoria we succeeded in cleaning up a bad situation which had existed in the party for several years and elected a ticket which was unanimously supporting the government. The same clean-up took place in Saanich. There was also a big fight at the annual general meeting in Vancouver which lasted until 4:00 a.m. and there too we succeeded in electing our solid ticket with majorities of 2 and 3 to 1.[64]

Unfortunately, this purge created new problems. The first action of the new executive was to replace J. E. Merryfield, the provincial organizer appointed by Bowser in 1924, with W. H. Blair.[65] Merryfield's removal completely alienated the remaining Bowser supporters in the party. More importantly, Stevens took violent exception to

How? Stevens was an anti-Bennett

the change, contending it would make it impossible for him to work in close cooperation with the provincial organization.[66] Finally, Blair proved to be unsuccessful in his new position. Over the following year, he succeeded in antagonizing many of the provincial and federal Conservatives.[67] Already concerned by the public repercussions from the MacGill and Norman Watt cases,[68] the federal party members, including Bennett, McRae, Stevens and several other British Columbia M. P.'s, became convinced that the Tolmie administration was not giving them their full support.[69]

From Tolmie's point of view, such accusations were unjust but difficult to refute. Tolmie's cordial relations with the Liberal Prime Minister, King,[70] and his lack of intimate contacts with Bennett made it impossible for Tolmie to counteract Steven's attitude. Only a decisive victory for the Conservative party in British Columbia in the 1930 federal election would dispel suspicions of Tolmie's loyalty. This was unlikely to occur. As a former Dominion organizer, Tolmie must have realized it would be difficult to improve on the party's showing in 1926 when the Conservatives had won 12 of the 14 British Columbia seats. In view of Bennett's unpopular denunciation of the Australian trade treaty, it would be difficult even to retain all of these seats.[71] Yet any decline in the Conservative vote would be blamed on the provincial administration.

Nevertheless, as a loyal party man, Tolmie worked for the election of the federal Conservative candidates.[72] Ignoring party criticism of Bennett's leadership,[73] his condescending attitude and his interference in the Vancouver organization,[74] Tolmie reiterated his support of the federal party and committed the provincial organization to its cause.[75] The British Columbia Conservatives collected "some $82,000" for the federal campaign[76] and provincial cabinet ministers spoke for federal candidates. Despite these efforts, the Conservatives retained only 7 seats, losing 5 to the Liberals. Though their popular vote declined by only 5%,[77] the British Columbia result was considered a defeat, particularly since the two strongest cabinet possibilities, Stevens and McRae, lost their seats.[78]

Tolmie, quite correctly, assumed that the federal party's decline in the province was blamed on him personally.[79] He repudiated this, pointing out that between the general election and January, 1931, the provincial Conservatives had won all four by-elections, including the traditionally Liberal riding of North Vancouver.[80] He told the editor of the Ottawa Citizen:

> I am just giving you these figures because they clearly vindicate us and entirely disprove that damnable propaganda which was scattered after the last federal election to the effect we were to blame for the defeat of candidates in British Columbia. Naturally I am very pleased because I have always felt that criticism at that time was very unjust and unfair.[81]

Yet, despite his disclaimers, Tolmie did rearrange his cabinet shortly after the federal election. Although the primary motive for this act was a desire to control governmental finances,[82] it was also a response to political pressures. F. P. Burden, Minister of Lands, had become unpopular both generally and in his own riding,[83] and thus his appointment as Agent-General for British Columbia in London removed one source of weakness from the provincial cabinet. His resignation then permitted Tolmie to move his less successful ministers to minor portfolios.

The most significant change was the relegation of Shelly from the major post of Finance Minister to President of the Council. Officially, the reason for the move was that Shelly could not continue to make the financial sacrifices entailed in retaining the position and had wished to have fewer administrative responsibilities.[84] However, the Liberals' suggestion that he was moved because of party and public pressure is more reasonable.[85] Shelly had proven to be a very poor politician. While his objective of balancing the provincial budget by increasing taxation was a worthy one, he had damaged his case by simultaneously lowering succession duties on large estates and attacking the costs of pensions, education and hospitals. He succeeded in casting himself as a defender of the rich and a reactionary.[86]

In addition, Shelly was under violent attack

within the party. Through a lack of tact, he had a number of personal disputes with Conservative M. L. A.'s.[87] His selection and support of Blair as party organizer had antagonized many others. His handling of the Norman Watt case had, in the opinion of one federal M. P., cost the party the election in Prince Rupert.[88] As a sign of Shelly's lack of party popularity, the inquiry which exonerated Watt had been set up at the suggestion of two Conservative backbenchers.[89] His replacement by Jones, a much more popular man, seems to have been an attempt to improve party unity.

Unfortunately, as with so many moves Tolmie made, the cabinet shuffle produced an even greater problem. With the introduction of the 1% income tax increase in Jones' first budget in 1930, a rash of criticism and pro-Bowser sentiment arose from the members of the Vancouver Conservative Associations. The day after the budget speech, the Central Executive of the Vancouver Conservative Association condemned the tax increase and demanded the resignations of the Vancouver M. L. A.'s. Newspaper reports of the meeting indicated that the tax increase was merely a final aggravation. The real point at issue was the government's failure to provide sufficient patronage.[90] During the remainder of the month, meetings of the individual Vancouver Ward Associations demanded the return of Bowser[91] and an immediate leadership convention.[92] There was even

a speculative story that Tolmie would become Lieutenant-Governor, permitting Bowser to take over as party leader.[93]

Beneath the usual political froth lay a serious problem of internal conflict within the Conservative party. The results of the party purge, the federal election, Shelly's demotion and the economic stringency which had resulted in a loss of patronage and the tax increases had brought discontent in Vancouver with the administration to a head.[94] Appeals to unity and threats from Tolmie seemed to increase dissent.[95] Walkem, the ex-Provincial Party M. L. A., privately told Tolmie:

> The newspaper reports of your utterances the last two days in Victoria have compelled me to do what I have been planning to do for some time. Your theme was "loyalty" which reminded me that after the Kamloops convention I wrote you pledging my loyalty in support of you as leader of the party.
>
> The events of the last three years have caused me to change my views quite drastically and I am by no means so loyal or enthusiastic as when I wrote. You can only be loyal to those who are loyal to you and there were too many things your government did that I could not approve of that my loyalty just dried up and vanished. . . . I want therefore to rescue my former letter and be free to do exactly as I please.
>
> I am not going to vote against my party. You need have no fear of that. Neither do I wish to add to your troubles in any way, but I feel it would not be fair to you unless I told you exactly how I feel.[96]

Over the next few months, the extent of the Vancouver revolt revealed itself more explicitly. William Dick began publicly criticizing the government of which he was a member.[97] Then Tolmie received two letters, one from the four Vancouver backbenchers[98] and the other from Maitland,[99] demanding changes in the cabinet to give Vancouver its

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rightful voice in the provincial administration. Specifically, the Vancouver members wanted two portfolios, rather than the non-administrative positions held by Shelly and Maitland. They went so far as to offer to resign so that Tolmie could select other, more acceptable, Vancouver representatives.

Tolmie saw this as a maneuver to force him to offer a cabinet post to Bowser.[100] His suspicions could only have been confirmed as a result of an anti-administration meeting held at the same time in Victoria. Chaired by H. S. Thain and addressed by C. M. Woodworth of Vancouver,[101] the meeting's avowed purpose was to start a province-wide agitation for a cabinet reorganization and a leadership convention. Ladner considered it serious enough to warn Tolmie to use his influence to stop any radio broadcast of the meeting.[102] As Ladner suspected, the meeting devoted itself to an attack on the administration's failure to reward loyal Conservatives and Woodworth specifically praised Bowser:

> I know Bowser is honest. I know he is capable and he can deliver a fine public speech. I know he would make a great public administrator. . . . Put Tolmie out and don't let Pattullo in.[103]

Confirmed in his suspicions and concerned that furthur cabinet changes would alarm eastern financial circles, Tolmie's refusal of the Vancouver members' demand was firm and carefully buttressed by an explanation of his position:

> It would be well at this stage to give attention to just how the orginal cabinet created after the General election of 1928 was formed. . . . You will remember that Mr. Shelly allowed his name to be placed on the ticket after being urged by prominent leaders of the Conservative party. He accepted the nomination and was elected at the head of the poll. This necessitated his recognition when the cabinet was created and partly because of the fact that he was at the head of the poll in the most important city in British Columbia, he was given the important portfolio of Minister of Finance. Vancouver was also represented by Mr. Maitland and Mr. Howe, who, as the member for Point Grey-Richmond, was considered a Vancouver member.
>
> On Mr. Shelly retiring from the position of Finance Minister, he was made President of the Council, considered a very important position. . . . It must be remembered that cabinet members, whether they are with or without portfolio, have full debating privileges and full voting power in Council and, when it come to the decisions in Council, their voice and vote are equal to that of any Minister with portfolio.
>
> We are willing to make our arrangements on the request of any of these ministers and to have our discussions on certain subjects in which they are especially interested fixed to meet their convenience. . . . So it is quite easy for the Ministers in Vancouver to attend if they so desire. . . . Thus it is quite evident Vancouver has not suffered under the present arrangement but really she has secured more monies under this government than she did in her history. . . . After careful consideration of the fitness of each of the four members, I can not see where the interests of the province would be benefited by substituting them for those now occupying cabinet positions and possessing some years of experience. . . .
>
> It has not been made clear by your correspondence that Vancouver is suffering from any loss in either cabinet representation or financially as a result of the present arrangement and I regret therefore I can not accede to your request at the present time.[104]

As might be expected, this reply did not resolve the problem. Maitland returned to the attack later that month, hinting that the Vancouver members might vote against the government unless their demands were met.[105] Tolmie, acting through Ladner, attempted to discover whether

the move had the support of any of the federal leaders.[106] Then he publicly warned the Conservatives of the dangers of internal dissension:

> Some people have not been as well satisfied as they might have been, others have been carrying on a brisk agitation within the party, not doing the party the least bit of good, but really playing into the hands of the Liberals. We should remember that agitators kicked out Sir Richard McBride. Shortly after this, there were three elections--1916, 1920, 1924--the Liberals won them all and for twelve years the Liberals ruled this province and they stayed in until the ressurection of 1928. The defeat in 1924 was due to a split in the party and not to the strength of the Liberals.[107]

For the time being, the matter ended there. The Conservative Annual Convention voted down a Vancouver resolution calling for a leadership contest; the Vancouver M. L. A.'s remained in the party. Nevertheless, as Tolmie recognized,[108] the discontent in Vancouver represented a serious problem for his government.

One of the persistent problems of Canadian politics has been the difficulty of reconciling the requirements of large urban metropolises in a political system dominated numerically by rural communities. Vancouver, with only six members, could seldom make or defeat any provincial government. At the same time, it could not be ignored. As the financial center of the province, Vancouver's economic situation ultimately affected, to some degree, all of the outlying areas. As the provincial transportation and communication center, Vancouver's attitudes exercised a persuasive, though certainly not dominant, influence. In effect,

Vancouver was the provincial bellwether, warning of increasing public discontent with the provincial government.

Within the Conservative party, the situation was even more acute. While the loss of the six Vancouver votes would not destroy Tolmie's legislative majority, the withdrawal of the Vancouver Conservative organization's support would deprive the party of much of its organizational skills and financial backing. Tolmie knew dissension in Vancouver had defeated the McBride and MacLean governments and, by spawning the Provincial Party, had deprived Bowser of victory in 1924. His own election as Premier had been the result of his ability to gain the united support of the Vancouver machine. Failure to conciliate it would increase the danger of electoral defeat in a future general election but, because of the financial crisis, Tolmie was unable to act.[109]

Thus at the start of the 1932 Legislative session, the Conservative government was in a perilous position. The government's policy of retrenchment as outlined in the budget could not allay party and public confidence. The Vancouver members were still unsatisfied and, ominously, six Lower Mainland M. L. A.'s abstained from the vote on the budget.[110] As Lindley Crease reported to Tolmie, even the executive of the British Columbia Conservative Association was critical of the government:

I said that if we went to the polls tomorrow we would

> win. The meeting was obviously sceptical. It is hard to analyse the present temper of the electorate. It seems sullen and resentful. Not knowing who to blame. Not knowing what to do. Turn out the government they say but "what then?" They resent the taxation and don't believe the government is economizing to the extent a business house would be.[111]

One response to the political and economic pressure was a revival of agitation in favour of non-party government for British Columbia. In part, this idea owed its popularity to the success of the May Commission and the National government in Great Britain. It was also a reappearance of the ideals of the Provincial Party. Whatever its origins, the idea of eliminating party politics from provincial administration was assiduously promoted by the president of the Vancouver Board of Trade, Harold Brown, and the Vancouver Province since the beginning of 1932. The Province argued editorially that:

> We have reached the point in British Columbia where the thing called politics has become an incubus. We created it, or winked at its creation. Now we can not control it. It is slowly smothering us under a load of debt and extravagance and both government and opposition appear to be helpless in the face of it. If we had great and fundamental problems or deep and lasting divisions, we might have some need of party. But we have neither. Our problems are simple business problems. . . . A small board of capable, responsible directors is all we need for the carrying out of our business. We can't afford the larger system and it is no use to us.[112]

Other individuals were presenting similar arguments. The editor of the Nelson Daily News suggested that Jones make himself the "financial dictator of British Columbia".[113] While Pattullo was being warned that prominent Liberals

favoured a non-party government,[114] L. W. Makovski, one of the organizers of the Provincial Party and a confidant of Jones, outlined in great detail a program for a cabinet of Conservatives and Liberals, governmental reorganization and reduced expenditures which Tolmie should be forced to implement immediately. He argued that:

> It must be kept in mind that the people as a whole are not interested in politics right now, but are intensely interested in economics. Therefore, precisely the same opportunity is offered to others as is offered to Tolmie. . . . He is the leader of the government and thus it is his responsibility to lead. If he thinks such a move is unwise others will undoubtedly seize the opportunity.[115]

Although some of the cabinet ministers favoured the idea of Union government, Tolmie remained undecided until the failure of the Imperial Economic Conference.[116] Further pressure for political change appeared with the publication of the Kidd Report.

In April, 1932, the provincial government had been confronted with a demand from twenty-two Vancouver organizations, under the leadership of H. R. MacMillan, the lumber baron, that they be permitted to set up a committee to investigate the finances of the province along similar lines to the May Commission in Great Britain.[117] With strong, though unexpressed, reservations, Tolmie appointed a five member committee under the chairmanship of George Kidd, the retired president of the British Columbia Electric Company.[118] By July, the report was in the govern-

ment's hands. So critical was it that Jones considered it "disastrous to our finances to publish in its present form."[119] But, because of pressure from the committee, the government released the report on August 20 after appending 30 pages of corrections and explanations.

In actual fact, the Report's recommendations were too extreme to be taken seriously by politicians. It suggested the shutting down of the P.G.E., the elimination of the University's appropriation, the reduction of the period of free public education, the reduction of the size of the Legislature, the cabinet and the Civil Service, the restriction of social services and no further increases in taxation or borrowings for any purpose. The committee believed:

> That the total annual expenditures of the province must be reduced by at least $6,000,000 and we hope that our recommendations will serve as a useful guide to attaining this end.[120]

While the publication of the Kidd Report caused some concern in eastern financial circles,[121] its effect within the province was more sensational than practical. When attacked in public debate to defend the report, Kidd modified his position as Professor H. F. Angus reported to Jones:

> When Mr. Kidd himself spoke at the close of the lecture he practically receded from the position taken in the report. He said he did not mind what economies were made as long as some were made; that he was not hostile to education if they could afford it and he agreed there would have to be new taxation. He said the main

> difference between us was that I thought more of taxation and he, of economies. These statements seem to me to leave the matter exactly where it was before the Kidd Committee was appointed.[122]

The significance of the Kidd Report was not in its demand for drastic economy. This was readily shown to be impractical and was espoused by no political party. It was the report's severe condemnation of party politics as the major cause of British Columbia's financial problems that was less easily refuted. As the committee stated in the report:

> Although excuses are, as always, futile, and while the responsibility of our present difficulties must rest with the community as a whole, which also must pay the bill, the party system has been the instrument by means of which these difficulties have been created. That system has been so long in existence and is so prevalent in all legislative assemblies that we are inclined to forget that while it originated in legitimate differences of opinion on great questions of public policy, it is today largely a struggle between one party to retain and the other to recapture the benefits of office.
> IS IT AN EXAGGERATION IN OUR OWN CASE TO SAY THAT A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT HAS NO GREATER SIGNIFICANCE THAN THAT THE PATRONAGE LIST OF THE PARTY IN POWER IS REPLACED BY THAT OF THEIR OPPONENTS?
>
> PATRONAGE AND SELF-INTEREST HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CONTROL THE AFFAIRS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC PURSE HAS BEEN REGARDED AS AN INEXHAUSTIBLE BOOTY UPON WHICH ALL MAY PREY. OUR LEGISLATORS AND THEIR LEADERS HAVE LIVED SO LONG IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONCESSION, COMPROMISE AND DEBT THAT IT IS DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR THEM TO REALIZE THE ENTIRELY NEW CONDITIONS WITH WHICH THEY ARE CONFRONTED.[123]

Though naive, the arguments in the Kidd Report were so demonstratably true of British Columbia politics at the time that they could neither be rejected or refuted. It had been the failure of party governments to control

patronage and expenditures which had motivated many of the supporters of the Provincial Party and similar independent groups. The distrust of party politics was, in 1932, providing support for a non-party government. As an indication of public disenchantment with the provincial political parties, the Kidd Report was an undoubted factor in Tolmie's decision to form a Union government.

Immediately after his return from the Imperial Economic Conference, Tolmie began to sound out the members of the Conservative caucus as to their views on a Union government. All of the cabinet supported the idea as did a majority of the backbenchers.[124] Having gained "the assurance of the support of the Vancouver Province,"[125] Tolmie announced that:

> Realizing the trend of thought throughout the world today is that government should include those men who, regardless of other consideration, appear to be able to render the best service to the state, I have, after careful consideration and discussion with many responsible citizens of the province, decided to accept this principle.[126]

Accordingly Tolmie offered Bowser and Pattullo positions in a cabinet under his leadership. Their rejections were immediate and unmistakable.[127] Nevertheless, Tolmie formally announced his plans for a Union government, outlining the reasons for such a move:

> In addition to consulting all of the members of my party in the Legislature, and many other responsible citizens on the question of union government, I have already had experience in such government in the House of Commons, both as a member of the floor and

> as a member of the Cabinet. . . . Its operation was very successful and it was the general opinion that many things were accomplished by the union which could not have been possible under a party administration. . . .
>
> While in Ottawa during the recent Imperial Economic Conference, I took occasion to consult many prominent Britishers with regard to what was being accomplished by the present National government in Great Britain. They were all of the same opinion--that it was the only way of meeting the conditions that prevail. . . .
>
> I strongly believe that union government could render very useful service in British Columbia at this time in coping with the additional burdens brought on by the world-wide depression and which still must be faced by the government. . . .
>
> Realizing the seriousness of the present economic situation, I am prepared to agree to the leadership being determined by the newly elected members should the proposed Union government be successful in in the election.[128]

Despite the immediate attack of some Conservative groups,[129] Tolmie began the task of organization. J. A. Clark, a prominent Vancouver Conservative,[130] began to gather a committee to support Union government, although with some reservations;[131] A. J. Helmcken of Victoria offered the backing of a group of young businessmen in the province;[132] Leon Ladner offered moral support.[133] Tolmie also solicited and received the names of individuals outside the Conservative party who could be approached to stand as Union candidates.[134]

This list of suggested candidates clearly demonstrates the failure to recognize hard political realities which pervades the entire Unionist movement. Some of the suggestions are not surprising. Donald Donaghy, G. S.

Pearson and A. Wells Grey were all respected Liberals without strong partisan attitudes; Dr. G. M. Weir and Professor Paul Boving of the University of British Columbia were respected academics; P. Bengough and Justice A. D. MacFarland had been active in the Provincial Party; thus all could, with some logic, be considered suitable and willing to join a non-party government.

The remainder of the list, however, indicates either complete confusion or desperation. It included Tom Reid, a violently partisan federal Liberal who had attacked the Tolmie government's administration of the relief camps;[135] G. Kidd whose committee report had been scathing in its denunciation of the government's financial policies; Dr. G. A. B. Hall who was soon to appear as Bowser's organizer for Vancouver Island; and a Mrs. A. Townley whose claim to recognition was her presidency of the British Columbia Author's Association. The remaining names are notable only for their obscurity. Only MacFarland and Mrs. Townley had indicated any desire to support the Premier and, of all the suggested candidates, only the latter actually ran in the election as a Unionist.

The obvious weakness of his position may have been a factor in Tolmie's decision not to hold an immediate election although he also stated:

> I have been urged by many to spring the Union idea and rush it through in a theatrical style, in other words,

> get the people all excited and when they are in that state have an election. I adopted the other course which you will see explained in my statement, since I have no desire to sneak up on the people of British Columbia under any conditions. I have placed my cards clearly on the table, giving the people a chance to think about the new proposal for non-party government and, when they are in full possession of the facts, let them decide for themselves in a election.[136]

Tolmie's hopes for a Union government were seriously crippled at the Conservative Annual convention in November. The Association's executive had conditionally supported the Premier's proposal.[137] But the convention, despite a rousing speech and plea by Tolmie, refused to take any action, referring the question to the local associations for individual decisions. More alarmingly, the government-supported slate for the executive of the Association was defeated and the convention decided to transfer the Association's offices from Victoria to Vancouver, the hot-bed of anti-Union, pro-Bowser sentiment.[138] Tolmie's hopes of carrying most of the Conservative vote and organization with him to form the nucleus of the Union party were stillborn as a result.

While the Conservative party was disintegrating, the provincial Liberal party was becoming stronger. Since his election as houseleader in 1929, Pattullo had spent much of his time and money rebuilding that party.[139] A skilled debater and radio speaker, he had travelled extensively throughout the province, building a formidable political reputation. Relying on the services of the

devoted and realistic party organizer, Major J. S. Woodie, and on his own efforts, Pattullo revived the local Liberal associations until he had created an organization capable of producing acceptable candidates and the votes to elect them. Unlike the Conservatives, the Liberal convention in 1932 had shown rare unity, supporting its leader and accepting the politically appealing promise that:

> No person in British Columbia shall be allowed to want for food, clothing and shelter through inability to obtain employment and it expresses the opinion that in looking after the needs of those unable to obtain employment in private endeavour, needed and useful public works should be undertaken at reasonable wages.[140]

It is probable that few Liberals, with the exception of G. G. McGeer,[141] understood the full implications of the "Work and Wages" plank. Pattullo's economic views are more clearly revealed in a comment he made to McGeer:

> In the old national game of poker. . . when one man got all the chips, the game stopped unless there was a redistribution of chips or a new medium was substituted. I have seen the boys play for beans. In this great economic poker game, both currency and credit have gravitated to limited sources, and the people have lost purchasing power. The game will necessarily be a slow one until purchasing power is put back into the hands of the people.[142]

But "Work and Wages" was a catchy political slogan that stood in marked contrast to the negative policy of retrenchment and budget balancing offered by the Tolmie government. The Liberals' strength served to highlight the predicament facing Tolmie. Beset by massive unemployment, municipal bankruptcy, financial stringency and party dis-

sent, the Premier was committed to a policy which his political opponents and his own party were not prepared to support. He had nothing new to offer to offset his public unpopularity. While he never gave way to despair, he must have recognized his precarious position. If not, the following year was to make it abundantly clear.

CHAPTER VI

FINAL COLLAPSE AND DEFEAT

For Simon Fraser Tolmie, the final year of his Premiership must have been agonizing. A proud British Columbian, he presided over a province mired in economic depression and moving closer to financial bankruptcy. A former federal cabinet minister, he was forced to act as suppliant to a man he had known as an arrogant backbencher. A hitherto popular personality, he was subjected to public criticism and the slights of political opponents. A successful politician, he watched his colleagues at the provincial and federal level desert him, the party split into three factions and suffer virtual extinction in the election. Through all of it, he laboured, ineffectually but uncomplainingly and without bitterness, attempting to act in the best interests of the province as he saw them.

Economically, there were only marginal improvements in British Columbia during 1932-33. The total value of production in all categories increased slightly but did not make any real difference in the unemployment situation.[1] The total industrial payroll for the province dropped to its lowest figure since 1921.[2] The federal Employment Ser-

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vice reported 137,730 applications for work and only 37,542 placements.[3] Each month an average of 41,131 individuals and families received unemployment relief from the provincial government at a yearly cost of $6,956,046.[4] Vancouver's relief bill was $2,390,000; the municipality of Burnaby and the district of North Vancouver had gone into bankruptcy and were under the control of commissions.[5] At the same time, the provincial government's finances had again reached a crisis situation.

As early as July, 1932, Jones warned the local manager of the Bank of Commerce of a provincial deficit which could not be covered by grants from the Dominion government and suggested that the bank's aid would be necessary.[6] In November, Jones informed Tolmie that the deficit would exceed $7,000,000 and confessed he could offer no solution:

> I have already informed you of the representations made to me by our financial Syndicates in the East, also of the attitude of the Bank of Commerce which insists on a balanced budget not only for this fiscal year but the ensuing fiscal year. . . . It is almost impossible to suggest any means by which revenue can be increased. Practically every form of taxation was imposed by the previous government. There are no fresh sources which we can tap. Moreover, the necessity of cutting expenditures to the bone is quite evident.[7]

Despite rigorous restrictions on expenditures, including those for relief,[8] the government's financial position did not improve. As in 1931, the Bank of Commerce threatened to refuse further loans to cover the deficit.

But this time, hardened by adversity and perhaps considering he had little to lose, Jones demanded support and got it:

> I do not propose to carry on any longer unless your Bank is prepared to see the province through this crisis along the lines I have indicated. . . . Unless I have definite assurances from you that you are going to be in a position to assist me before the end of the month I will go no further with the budget and will take into consideration handing my resignation as Minister of Finance to the Premier at the earliest moment. To me, the failure of the Bank to assist me in this matter shows a lack of confidence in my ability to meet the situation. Therefore it is impossible for me to continue.[9]

For the remainder of the government's term of office, the Bank of Commerce made no more threats but the same tactic could not be used against Prime Minister Bennett. At the same time as the bank, Bennett was demanding that the Tolmie government meet his stringent, and in the circumstances, unrealistic condition or accept a federally appointed financial controller.[10] The tone and terms of his demand clearly indicated his belief that the British Columbia government was incapable of managing its own finances.[11] That the demand was not summarily rejected by Tolmie as a gross violation of provincial rights suggests the seriousness of British Columbia's predicament. Once again, Tolmie was forced to humble himself and plead for help from the federal government, acknowledging the province's inability to deal with the problem of unemployment relief:

> By the use of sinking funds it is anticipated that the budget will be balanced with the exception of unemployment relief which is not included in the estimates. In common with the Dominion government and all other Provincial governments. . . the necessary expenditures for unemployment relief will have to be borrowed. As the state of our public debt does not warrant any further increases, we have come to the point where it is necessary to ask the Dominion government to assume the whole burden of unemployment relief costs. . . .
>
> I am satisfied the Minister of Finance has exercised every control over expenditures but, as you are possibly aware, the government has no control over the financial conditions which have resulted in such an unprecedented drop in revenues, together with the provisions for unemployment relief as already outlined, that have been responsible for the Government's present position and not that the estimated expenditures have been exceeded.[12]

The budget speech to the 1933 Legislative session conveyed the same message. After listing reductions in all governmental expenditures, including unemployment relief and aid to municipalities, Jones warned that additional taxes would be imposed to avoid further deficits.[13] As the Vancouver Sun rightly commented,

> the outstanding feature of the Jones' budget is that it marks the final confession that the policy of retrenchment and economizing has failed.[14]

Under a Dominion-Provincial agreement which came into force on June 1, 1933, the federal government took over the provincial work camps. Since the federal government simultaneously reduced its contributions to the municipalities for relief, the agreement did not greatly relieve the provincial finances.[15] Even though expenditures were consistently lower than estimated, the provincial government, by the end of 1933, had a deficit of $2,116,846,

almost entirely due to the cost of relief.[16] Bennett's praise of Jones[17] must have rung hollow in his ears but, at least, he and Tolmie were spared further demands from the Dominion government and the Bank of Commerce.

It is against this background of financial crisis that the political chaos of the year must be judged. Committed to a policy of Union governmnet, Tolmie had been unable to secure the support of Pattullo, Bowser or the Conservative organization. He had also failed to gain the support of the Conservative M. L. A.'s. At the beginning of the session, despite their previous support of the Union idea,[18] the Conservative caucus agreed to retain party lines only until Tolmie clarified his intentions. At that time, each Conservative M. L. A. would be free to determine his own course of action. Despite the action of Walkem, who crossed the floor to sit as an Independent,[19] this policy remained in effect. Unaccountably, Tolmie made no attempt to gain the support of the caucus nor did he reveal what progress, if any, he ahd made toward forming a genuine Union government. Left in ignorance, the Conservative M. L. A.'s looked elsewhere for political support.

The most obvious alternative for these members was to join the newly formed Non-Partisan group. Under the leadership of Bowser, it had the public support of Donald Donaghy, Charles Woodward, Harold Brown, William Dick and Captain MacGregor MacIntosh, M. L. A. for the Islands.[20]

It had the covert backing of Conservative M. L. A.'s G. Walkem, Vancouver; J. Rutledge, Burnaby; J. Loutet, North Vancouver; J. M. Berry, Delta, and House Speaker C. F. Davie.[21] Dr. Frank Patterson, vice-president of the British Columbia Conservative Association, was actively supporting the new group and J. A. Merryfield,[22] at the time an official in the federal Department of Trade and Commerce under H. H. Stevens, had become provincial organizer for the Non-Partisans.[23] A number of local Conservative Associations were ready to back Bowser.[24]

Beset by the provincial financial crisis, his own ill-health[25] and the death of his wife, Tolmie appeared unwilling or unable to react to Bowser's challenge. As Bruce Hutchison, Legislative correspondent for the Vancouver Province so accurately commented:

> Premier Tolmie delivered to the Legislature yesterday an apologia and valedictory for a government hovering on the awful brink of reorganization. . . . The Premier's speech was indeed unique for the unquestioning simplicity of it, unique for its evident sincerity and rustic flavour, unique for what it contained but utterly unique for what it left out. . . . Not one word on the Union government, not one word of reduction of the Cabinet, not one glance at the glorious spectacle of current Provincial politics, not a hint of policy, not a whisper of comfort to his followers or the hint of trouble for his enemies. He stood there in the House, a massive figure seeming to be in better health than ever, bright and jolly under a heavy load of official and private misfortune--a plain old-fashioned man who is doing his best, according to the methods of a world that keeps tumbling down about his ears. . . . What would he do with this Treasury empty, his government on the eve of an election, his majority milling like Chilcotin steers, the machine politicians interested only in hanging on to office to the last moment, his

> potential vote split by the new third party. . . . For him, there is no economic magic, no new theory of government, no new world. There is a little nostalgia for the good old days when things were so much better and simpler and the hope that they may soon return, for civilisation close to the good earth as Tolmie knew it. A great-hearted man, a human being whose humanity can not be hidden under the pall of this House.[26]

It was not until his cabinet ministers began to apply pressure that Tolmie took further steps toward the formation of a Union administration. Bruhn spoke in favour of Union government in the House; Shelly publicly stated the government did not deserve to be reelected and implied Tolmie should resign immediately.[27] Tolmie reacted by issuing a statement to the Conservative caucus, defending his plan for a Union government as essential to avoid the election of "Communistic and radical" groups.[28] At the same time, he again asked Pattullo to join a Union government to ensure the election of a stable government with a working majority.[29]

Despite the sanctimonious and partisan tone of Pattullo's refusal,[30] his letter was an essentially accurate summation of the political situation. Tolmie did not have any new ideas or measures and, despite the often self-proclaimed superiority of his cabinet, nothing was presented to him. For the resurgent Liberal party to tie itself to a discredited government would have been an act of political naivety and, whatever else Pattullo was, he was not a naive politician.

After Pattullo's refusal there was another period of inaction on Tolmie's part. He made no effort to convince the Conservative caucus that he had a practical plan for creating a Union government which could win in an election and the caucus was allowed to drift away from Victoria without having agreed on a plan of action.[31] E. C. Carson promptly repudiated Tolmie's leadership and joined the Non-Partisans.[32] Despite a personal appeal by Tolmie, the executive of the British Columbia Conservative Association proclaimed its neutrality in the coming provincial election and dismissed the idea of a Conservative convention. As the President, W. W. Foster, explained:

> Each local can do as it sees fit. It can nominate a Conservative if it so desires or it can support a Union candidate pledged to non-party government.[33]

Tolmie's response was unusually decisive. He wrote to each Conservative M. L. A. in a belated attempt to gain their support:

> A campaign committee has been selected and a manifesto, largely based on the statement made by me will be prepared but suggestions from members and others will be welcome for the consideration of the committee. It is the intention of the government and the Conservative Unionist party to carry on a vigorous campaign with the best possible support in every riding. . . . The Government is anxious that as many as possible of the old members should be renominated and I shall be glad to hear from you if you plan to place your name before the convention when it is called.
>
> There was a little criticism at the Vancouver meeting because I had not completed the reorganization of the Cabinet at that time. It will be obvious to anyone with any previous experience in politics it is not always wise to place all one's cards on the table at once. I will undertake to make further changes in the Cabinet in due course. If the party is successful,

> further changes may be made from the members elected to further strengthen the Cabinet.[34]

The first response to this appeal was a letter of resignation from the Speaker of the House, C. F. Davie.[35] Nevertheless, Tolmie and H. D. Twigg,[36] the provincial Conservative organizer, persisted in their attempts to obtain Unionist candidates. Their major problem was that few candidates wished to be publicly associated with the Unionist party, although they were ready to cooperate if elected. As Twigg commented after speaking to one such possible candidate:

> I have just had a long talk with H. W. M. Rolston of Stewart. . . . He tells me it would be useless to run as a Tolmie or Bowser Union candidate in Atlin, but that the best chance would be to run as an absolute independent, with liberty to say what you please about both parties. I think he would like to run himself, and, if elected, he would be a good friend of yours.[37]

Through J. O. Dunford,[38] Tolmie was put in touch with W. M. Dennies, the President of the National Labour Council of Vancouver of the All-Canadian Congress of Labour. While he wished to attract labour support for the Unionist government, Tolmie was also aware he knew little about the British Columbia labour movement. Thus he went to the unusual extreme of having the Provincial Police report on Dennies' union's political activities.[39] Having received a favourable report and having interviewed Dennies in Vancouver, Tolmie offered him the position of Minister of Labour.[40] Possibly misled by Dunford's enthusiasm, Tolmie stated publicly and privately that this appointment meant

the Unionist party would gain much of the labour vote.[41] He seems to have ignored the fact, clearly stated in the police report, that Dennies' union only had a membership of 5,000 and was one of the least impressive labour groups in the province. Even without the emergence of the C. C. F., Tolmie's hopes of gaining labour support at this stage and in this manner were completely illusionary.

Still there was some slight cause for optimism among the Unionists. Bowser's tour of the Interior was not successful. There were frequent comments on the extent to which Bowser had aged.[44] As Harry Pullen wrote to Pattullo,

> I happened to run across Mr. Bowser this morning for the first time in some weeks and was greatly shocked. He is only a shadow of his former self. I certainly hope he tours the North in order that his supporters will be disillusioned. Those who vote in expectation of voting for the old Bowser will find they are merely supporting a shadow.[43]

Tolmie continued his efforts to reorganize the cabinet. Having added Dennies, he requested and obtained the resignations of Shelly, Atkinson and Lougheed.[44] Unexpectedly, W. A. Mackenzie also resigned because he did not agree with the government's decision to write off debts owed by Okanagan Irrigation Districts.[45] This further evidence of the administration's weakness was causing loss of support for the Union movement, as one of Jones' informants explained:

> Apparently a genuine Union party would appeal to the majority of level-headed people in the province. The problem there is to produce a Union that will appear to the public to be a real union. A Union party to go

> down with the public, must either consist of outstanding men of the non-political type or of well-known politicians of both old parties. The second type of Union government now seems to be impossible. If we went to an election today, I am convinced we would get a tremendous licking.[46]

Nothing Tolmie did could improve the situation. Despite his efforts to present the Unionist party manifesto as a significant document, it was singularly lacking in appeal. The manifesto contained little that had not already been stated in Tolmie's speeches or the platforms of the other parties.[47] Having failed to gain the support of David Whiteside,[48] Tolmie added William Savage to the cabinet.[49] But, as Dunford had suggested earlier,[50] the time for the unionist party to have any effect on the political scene had passed.

Over the next few months, the Unionist party suffered a series of shattering blows which totally destroyed any possibility of electoral success. Bruhn unexpectedly resigned from the cabinet on the grounds that Tolmie had not formed a "real union nor do I see any prospect of your being able to do so."[51] Several weeks later, Bruhn led a number of Independents, mostly ex-Conservative M. L. A.'s who might have supported Tolmie, into an alliance with the Non-Partisans.[52]

During the month of July, Tolmie was forced to request dissolution of the Legislature.[53] As his five year term of office was soon to expire, an election could not be long delayed, no matter how unready Tolmie was.

Then Jones announced that he would stand in the election as an Independent, not a Unionist, although he would remain in the cabinet as Finance Minister until that time.[54] Jones, who had accepted the advice of his local supporters, believed that such an action would be in the best interests of the province and would ensure his own re-election.[55] But the public and Tolmie, quite rightly, saw his declaration as a repudiation of the Unionist party.[56]

Most critical of all, however, was the lack of financial support for the Unionist party. As Dunford frequently complained, the lack of money was destroying any chance the party had of organizing an effective election campaign.[57] The party could collect little money in British Columbia and Tolmie blamed this on the fact that he had resisted demands for patronage:

> When some of our friends went around trying to gather sufficient campaign funds to keep the machine re-oiled, they were met with the statement that "the Government was too damn righteous". . . . I don't think the country is ready for the elimination of patronage or clean-cut and honest administration. They want an administration under the name of an honest one but with sufficient elasticity to prevent it from being anything of the kind.[58]

Tolmie's comment was just. One of the major causes of party discontent had been the lack of patronage available to party supporters, although this was the result of economic stringency as much as Tolmie's convictions. From the letters in Tolmie's files, it appears that only those who did not get the benefits of patronage wanted to have

it abolished. Yet, this was not the only reason for the inability of the Unionists to gain financial support. Few people contribute large sums of money to a government which is obviously collapsing.

This was the attitude of Bennett. When approached on behalf of the Unionist party by C. H. Dickie, Conservative M. P. for Esquimalt, Bennett refused his support. Dickie reported to Tolmie:

> R. B. is very sore and in various talks with him and his ministers, I was forced to conclude that without sound backing from him, it would be futile for me to approach the bankers or railways for assistance.
>
> It is freely stated that, with our party as it is and the C. C. F. message as serious as I have set forth, it might be the part of wisdom to vote the Liberal party in.[59]

However logical Bennett's attitude may have been, it was the source of great bitterness to Tolmie. Serious as his refusal to help financially was, the federal leader's suggestion that the Conservatives back the Liberals was more damaging in terms of votes and personally offensive to Tolmie who complained:

> Everything looked first rate until towards the end of September when the wave was started from Ottawa, calling for the support of the Liberals to defeat the C. C. F. The British Columbia Conservatives fell right into line with the result that what Pattullo refused to do when I asked him to cooperate with the Conservative party and prevent the chaos that was bound to come and did come, was really accomplished by the voters--with the Conservative voters combining with the Liberals to defeat the C. C. F. The idea was ours in September, 1932; it was rather hard to have it used against us on November 2.[60]

Nevertheless, Tolmie laboured on, even attempting

to sound optimistic in private as in public:

> With the exception of one or two ridings, we have the province completely organized. Mr. Cameron of Rossland is in charge of the entire Kootenay country; Mr. Matt Hassen is in charge of the North Okanagan; Dr. Banford has been looking after the north and when funds are available, I'll put him in charge of the four Northern constituencies. Mr. Winkel, as you know, is looking after the Island; Mr. E. C. Carson and Rod Mackenzie are looking after their own campaigns; Mr. Pinchbeck has the Kamloops situation well in hand; in Vancouver, there is Danford West and George Weston.[61]

Deserted by the federal party and much of the provincial Conservative membership, Tolmie was supported by only two of the original cabinet, Pooley and Hinchliffe, and a group of unknown candidates and organizers. His previous reputation gone, with insufficient campaign funds, Tolmie refused to admit defeat. It was not until after the election that he admitted he had no chance of winning but believed he could not honourably withdraw.[62]

The announcement of the election date, November 2, 1933, increased the provincial political activity. By the close of nominations, there was a total of 219 candidates, running under the labels of six major groups as well as a melange of assorted independents.[63]

The most united party was the Pattullo-led Liberals. Benefitting from Pattullo's efforts over the past years, they were well-organized, financially well supported and extremely confident.[64] Having adopted a program similar to the Roosevelt "New Deal", the Liberals offered "Work and Wages" from every platform, a popular but poten-

tially difficult promise to implement.[65] Pattullo, having covertly ensured the nomination of strong candidates, such as John Hart and Dr. G. M. Weir, had constructed a powerful party which, as Bennett had suggested, was most likely to win a majority.

The Liberals' principal opponents were not either of the Conservative fragments but an entirely new party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. Originating from the Calgary Western Labour Conference in 1932, the Regina Convention of 1933 and a British Columbia convention in September, 1933, the new party was an unwieldy and frequently strife-torn amalgamation of the British Columbia Socialist Party, the Reconstruction Party and the unaffiliated C. C. F. clubs organized by Dr. Lyle Telford of Vancouver. Militantly emphasizing the importance of social planning and the public ownership of industry, the C. C. F. offered a radical solution to the problems of the depression within the parliamentary system. In a province which had seen the failure of strong business government to control economic collpase and where party politics had been partly discredited, the C. C. F. had considerable appeal, although few voters seemed to understand precisely the implications of their program.[66] Support at the grass-roots level blossomed as did condemnation from the traditional power groups. The older politicians failed to understand its attraction while fearing its power and, as Jones

typically commented after the election:

> I was surprised in one or two of my districts where the English vote was heavy, going C.C.F. I can only explain it by saying people's minds are so befuddled by their losses in fruit growing and the continual knocking of the Press, it practically upset their minds. I never realized how fanatic some of these C.C.F. adherents can become. The fruit growers of the Okanagan are disturbed and will not listen to any sound argment. They are determined to have changes of some kind, they know not what-- and there you are.[67]

Even more violently anti-capitalistic, though much less important electorally, was the British Columbia Workers and Farmers United Front for Bread, Jobs and Freedom, more simply known as the United Front. Invariably labelled a Communist party, which it probably was, it advocated abolition of the "military slave camps", recognition of Soviet Russia, full and free state welfare, legalization of the Communist party, decent wages and vocational training.[68] While the party ran between fourteen and twenty candidates[69] and had little organization or financial support, they did manage to nominate candidates, not only in the industrial and mining areas of the province, but also in Salmon Arm and Peace River. They also provided the C. C. F. with an example of true radicalism to contrast with their more moderate platform.

In addition to these two groups, the Labour-Socialist movement threw up a scattering of other candidates. There were four Labour candidates, including Tom Uphill of Fernie, four Socialists who differed with the C. C. F. on the grounds of doctrinal purity, eight Inde-

pendent C. C. F. who failed to gain official nominations and two Independent Labour.

In 1928 the Liberal party had been opposed by a united Conservative party. In 1933 the Conservative party officially ran no candidates and its supporters were split. Led by Tolmie, one group of Conservatives ran as Unionists. At the close of nominations, only thirteen candidates bore this designation officially.[69] With Tolmie were only four of his cabinet ministers and none of the Conservative M. L. A.'s elected in 1928. Hampered by lack of financial support, public disfavour and the certainty of political defeat, Tolmie made no tour of the province. He confined his efforts to Lower Vancouver Island, making only one speech in Vancouver. The party's lack of financial and organization support is clearly shown in its campaign broadsheet, The Unionist, written and printed by the editor of the Enderby Miner. Cheaply produced, its contents were unsophisticated, to say the least. A typical comment was the note:

> One thing about British Columbia's Premier that baffles his political enemies is that he is a native son of the soil, born of premier, pioneer parents and still lives in the Saanich home of his childhood.[71]

While his campaign was undoubtedly weak, it was not entirely without merit. Tolmie pointed out accurately that his government's actions, while uninspiring, had maintained the province's economy as well as possible, and

that no party in the election seemed capable of continuing to do so. Tolmie argued that:

> Chasing rainbows will not get us anywhere. Those who depend on artificial prosperity by the borrowing of huge sums of money, thus increasing our obligations, will eventually come down to earth to learn that stringent economy and vigorous retrenchment are essential to a lasting recovery. . . .
>
> The government which has administered the affairs of British Columbia for the past five years, of which I have had the honour of being head, gave the people clean, honest administration. It is the only group in the field which has administrative experience during this time of financial stress. It has demonstrated its ability to economize by effecting a saving of $7,420,518 in the cost of administration in the past two years. We have demonstrated too that we have the full realization of the necessity of rigid economy on the return of normal conditions.[72]

In the light of the development of the Liberal government under Pattullo over the next eight years, Tolmie's comment is not unreasonable. Yet such conservative principles had failed to improve the economic condition of the province or, more particularly, the economic position of the individual voter. While few people blamed Tolmie personally for the government's failure to solve the economic crisis or questioned his sincerity, his campaign stamped him as a man whose time had passed.

The other major group of Conservatives was the Non-Partisan group and they too seemed a voice from the past. With thirty-three candidates in the field, the party advocated a "courageous adjustment of the existing economic system rather than by experiments with other unknown systems."[73] Their platform emphasized economy, tax reduction

and unemployment and health insurance, in that order, but their chief emphasis lay on the claim that:

> Party politics and the rule of party machines having brought the government in British Columbia to its present intolerable state. . . each candidate will be free to vote in the Legislature according to his own best judgement, untrammeled by allegiance to any party, leader, or caucus.[74]

The similarities between the Non-Partisans and the Provincial Party are worthy of note. Both groups denounced the evils of patronage and the immensity of the provincial debt. Demanding strong government, they proclaimed their own independence and were officially pledged to no leader though dominated by one man whose motives were suspect. Both groups, aparently organized spontaneously, showed signs of careful organization, ample financial support and intimate ties to the Vancouver business community. Even their electoral results were similar.[75] Yet there was a significant difference. The Provincial Party brought forward candidates who had not previously been allied with any party; the Non-Partisans were largely disaffected Conservatives who had deserted Tolmie.[76] The Provincial Party could logically present itself as a party of reform; the Non-Partisans appeared to be merely an attempt to reelect a group of discredited politicians.[77]

In the 1933 election, there was one other classification of candidate which must be discussed. These were the thirty independent Independents. Ranging across the political spectrum from the most experienced politicians,

such as J. W. Jones, to visionary unknowns, such as H. G. E. Savage, they further confused the contest and fragmented the vote. Some were disgruntled Liberals who did not get a party nomination.[78] Some were eccentrics running for publicity, revenge or as one man movements of reform.[79] Still others were sympathetic to the idea of non-party government but were not willing to support either the Unionist or the Non-Partisans openly.[80] What their course of action would have been if elected is impossible to say, although they seemed to agree with Jones who stated he would support any government which could keep the province financially safe.[81] At any rate, only Herbert Anscomb, Victoria, and H. G. E. Savage, Cowichan-Newcastle, were elected. Anscomb later rejoined the Conservative party and ultimately became its leader.

In this confused election, there was one final ironic incident. On October 25, W. J. Bowser died of a heart attack, forcing the postponement of the voting in Victoria and Vancouver Center where he was a candidate. The comment he had made during the campaign came literally true:

> I am going back to the same city which elected me for twenty years and rejected me when I retired from public life. . . . I am going to accept a nomination in Vancouver Center and, at the end of the election, I will either be resurrected or buried forever.[82]

Bowser's death may have cost the Non-Partisans a few marginal seats[83] and it did cause an amalgamation of

the Unionist and Non-Partisans in the two ridings as well as the withdrawal of J. Hinchliffe.[84] More importantly the delay in voting until the Liberal victory was known influenced the results. However, it is unlikely that Bowser's demise significantly altered the party standings.

The result of the general election was a disaster for the British Columbia Conservatives, no matter what position they had assumed during the campaign. The Liberals won 34 seats with 41.7% of the popular vote; the C. C. F. became the official Opposition with 7 seats and 31.5% of the vote; the Unionists, who elected only R. H. Pooley, polled only 3.3%; the Non-Partisans won 2 seats with 8.9%. Two Independents and Tom Uphill were also elected.

One of the persistent Liberal myths during the campaign had been that, by running under different labels, sufficient Conservatives would be elected to permit Tolmie to remain in office. The election results demonstrated that such an idea,even if it had been seriously considered, could not have succeeded. Adding the popular vote of the Unionists, the Non-Partisans and Independents of Conservative sympathies, the combined total was 19.1% of the popular vote.[86] Had the split not occurred, the result may have been different in degree. The results, however, indicate that the Conservative party was decisively rejected, no matter what its particular label, by the voters for whatever reasons voters select representatives.

At the same time, the election did not show a significant shift to the Liberals, except in total seats. Their popular vote increased by only 1% over that of the 1928 election and 58.3% of the electors voted against them. They had won, not because of the appeal of "Work and Wages", but because of the fragmentation of the political opposition. Pattullo's great achievement was to maintain the unity of his organization and the result was remarkably similar to 1916 and 1924. The C. C. F., which had faced violent opposition, misrepresentation, internal conclicts and shortages of time and money, had gained almost one-third of the popular vote to become the Opposition. Yet they too had profited largely by the collapse of the Conservatives. Over the next decades, although the C. C. F. gained more seats, they failed to improve significantly their popular vote.[87]

Tolmie's reaction to the election results was a combination of resignation and resentment at his betrayal by his friends. He noted:

> I have no prejudices against the Liberals. They fought as they should fight to get elected. I feel that in addition to being starved for normal expenses by the higher-ups of the Conservative party who pleaded with me in 1926 to enter the field, the rank and file have not shown in this election an appreciation of the badly needed help given them in 1926 at great personal sacrifice. I am of the opinion that, had the Conservatives stood by the party, realizing we only made the Union move because it best suited the conditions of the country at the time and had they stood by during the fight, we would have won the election hands down. Once it was won, I care not what happened to the leadership. If they had anyone else they felt would fill

> the bill better, I was quite willing to relinquish the position. . . . My experience with the old party is that it has degenerated to a group of men whose only interest in success is for the patronage and the revenue they can secure from it.[88]

In personal letters, Tolmie clarified his accusation of lack of support.

> You will remember I was not only pressed by R.B. but many of the other leaders to come to British Columbia and then in 1933 we find they are recommending the support of the Liberal party. The motive, in my opinion, at the bottom of their hearts was that they were thinking of the coming federal election.[89]

> No one likes to say anything disparaging about a man who has passed away but certainly Mr. Bowser and his followers never ceased to work against me since the day we left Kamloops. . . . Mr. Bowser and his group just kept our party split from end to end and the final touch was when our supporters insisted on running as Independents.[90]

Yet there is little bitterness in Tolmie's letters except in reference to the debts with which he was left as a result of his Premiership and the election campaign:

> I sometimes have even been tempted to ask myself if this is the great C. . . party, what the H. . . was it like before it was great. If you knew the particulars you would hardly blame me. I am still paying campaign debts as a result of the last election.[91]

> My experience in British Columbia politics has been a very expensive one. Many who sought to have me take hold here in 1926 were loud in their promises I would not be stuck. As I explained to them at the time, the salary was not sufficient to run the show. Well, the usual thing happened and I am now determined to place myself on velvet as quickly as I can.[92]

By careful economy, sub-division of his Cloverdale farm and the sale of some of his cherished cattle, Tolmie managed to clear his indebtedness. Even during this time of anxiety, he retained his interest in political life,

though with his defeat, the provincial Conservatives disregarded him.[93] He scrupulously refrained from public criticism of the Liberal government, but warned his former federal colleagues of the dangers of aiding Pattullo:

> You sized conditions up when you described him on his first visit to Ottawa as simply bluff. He is a peculiar make-up, charged with self-esteem in his ability as a statesman, which no one else I know of has ever noticed. . . . We sincerely hope, above all else, that in any help Mr. Bennett gives him, he will be keenly alive to the necessity of protecting the Conservative party in view of the approaching election. This man won't hesitate to get money from the federal government and use it in a roundabout way to defeat them. He is a Grit through and through. This Pattullo won't hesitate to steal your thunder if he get the chance and consider it smart if he succeeds.[94]

Tolmie was keenly interested in the federal general election of 1935 but, because of his health, did no campaigning for the party.[95] In its results, he saw a justification for his own actions in 1933. He argued:

> The result in British Columbia clearly indicated the danger we saw when we tried to make a combination with the other two leaders to head off the socialists as represented by the C.C.F. We were just three years ahead of the times. I got R.B. to admit during his visit here that Bowser had split the party from end to end. It was just too bad these easterners could not have seen the picture as it actually was at the time. But there is no use squealing.[96]

In 1936, with the death of D. B. Plunkett, Tolmie was nominated and reelected Conservative Member of Parliament for the city of Victoria.[97] His return to his first great love, the Canadian House of Commons, by the voters who had rejected his government so resoundingly in 1933 must have been a source of great satisfaction. His return

to public favour came just in time. Only six months later, on October 13, 1936, Simon Fraser Tolmie died, representing the province he loved so well in the position for which he was best suited and enjoyed so much.

With his death, a political era ended. His federal seat was taken by a Liberal, R. W. Mayhew, one of the members of the Kidd Committee, and remained Liberal for almost twenty years. The provincial Conservative party had, since 1933, returned to the position it had occupied under Bowser. Led by Dr. F. Patterson, a Bowserite loyalist, it regained a popular vote which hovered about 30% but never won enough seats to form a government.[98] In 1941, the Conservatives, under R. L. Maitland and then H. Anscomb, became the junior partners in a Liberal dominated coalition, withering away until virtually superceded by the Social Credit party in 1952. With no members in the Legislative Assembly since 1956, the Conservatives, running only their new leader, polled a total of 1,054 votes in the 1969 provincial general election.[99]

Thus the Premiership of Tolmie marks the last time when the provincial Conservative party held a legislative majority in British Columbia. Thus the disintegration of the Tolmie administration marks a major step in the extinction of the provincial Conservatives and, if for no other reason, is a subject worthy of study. The collapse of the last Conservative ministry of British Columbia was

caused by three inter-related factors: the Depression, the nature of the Conservative party and the leadership of Tolmie.

Specific statements on the actual effects of the 1930's Depression on British Columbia must await more detailed studies of particular regions and industries. Economically, the Great Depression retarded the growth of industries and metropolitan centers while increasing the provincial debt but it is not clear whether it had a fundamental long-term effect. Studies of the Okanagan and Kootenay regions indicate that these areas had been depressed virtually since the collapse of the 1903-12 boom and that the 1930's saw only a worsening of an already depressed economy.[100] If this is so elsewhere, outside the metropolitan areas, it may account for the fact that the Depression produced no revolutionary movement, either economic, social or political, in British Columbia.[101]

Generally, comment on the effect of the Depression emphasizes the sufferings it caused on the individuals involved. Truly, the fears of losing one's job, the desperation of being unemployed for months or years, the ignomies of depending on public welfare and relief scarred the minds and emotions of at least two generations of British Columbians. For years after, men clung to jobs they hated rather than risk unemployment and their children were taught to seek security above all else. Yet, without dis-

counting the importance of such experiences, it is difficult to see how the Depression altered existing political traditions. Despite the suggestion that the election of 1933 represented a "swing to the left",[102] it is arguable that it, more exactly, was an intensification of pre-existing political attitudes.

Neither the emergence of the C. C. F. nor the election of the Liberals represent any fundamental alteration of existing political traidtions in the province. It is true that the C. C. F. made great progress, considering the shortness of time they had to organize, but they were neither an alien nor revolutionary group in British Columbia. A tradition of Labour-Socialism had long existed in the province, appearing during the early settlement among the English miners brought to Nanaimo.[103] While it had remained a minority, it had consistently had representation in the Legislative Assembly and polled between 10 and 20% of the popular vote.[104] The efforts of the Provincial Party in 1923 and Tolmie in 1933 to attract labour support demonstrates that politicians recognized its importance.

Under the conditions of economic crisis existing in 1933, the Labour-Socialist tradition, already accepted as a normal part of provincial politics, was in a position to expand. With the collapse of the Conservative party and the emergence of a moderate parliamentary socialistic coalition, the C. C. F., the voters opposed to the Liberals

had a constructive alternative. In a province where Liberal and Conservative governments had introduced old age pensions and mother's allowances, aided the P. G. E., drained the Sumas lands and enacted extensive labour and social legislation, the program of the C. C. F. was not revolutionary. While difficult to document, the steady reorientation of the C. C.F.-N. D. P. party since 1933 to a party committed to material prosperity rather than socialism suggests its supporters were not, by and large, socialists.

Equally, the massive legislative victory of the Liberals was not the result of a significant alteration of the voter's preferences. As has been noted, their popular vote in 1933 increased only 1% over that of the 1928 election. In view of such a minute change, it can hardly be argued that "Work and Wages", which differed only in emphasis to the platforms of the Unionist and Non-Partisan groups, was a major factor in the election. As in 1916 and 1924, the Liberals formed the government because their opposition was fragmented while they remained united. Pattullo's reorganization of the Liberals placed it in the fortunate position of being the only party clearly capable of providing stable government.

The election results were thus determined by the disintegration of the Conservative party. The Conservative break-up was not caused by the Great Depression. The

Depression was a catalyst, accelerating a process of decay which had been under way for years. As this thesis demonstrates, the Conservative party in British Columbia lacked internal cohesion. It was bound together by no common ideology, purpose or loyalties. In times of prosperity and stability, the party could concentrate on immediate policies and govern successfully. But, in opposition or in crisis, it was rent by savage internal disputes which left it unable to formulate or pursue long-term plans. This was not entirely a matter of the leadership. The same conflicts had taken place under McBride, Bowser and Tolmie. In the provincial Conservative party, it was always true that "success breeds respect; failure brings out the wolves."[105]

It is against this background that Simon Fraser Tolmie must be judged. From his letters and in the memories of those who knew him, Tolmie appears as an amiable, pleasant personality with a large circle of acquaintances but few close friends. While he had few pretensions to great intellectual powers, he was a jovial and popular man. As a politician at the federal level, he was a capable representative of his constituency and a worthy, though not outstanding, Member of Parliament.

Tolmie's major flaw was that he was not a political leader either by inclination or ability. As W. A. C. Bennett, the present Premier of British Columbia who knew Dr. Tolmie, has said:

> He was one of the nicest men you could meet, but he never should have been premier. He was jolly, but not tough enough, and a premier must be able to say no to friend and foe. At times when everybody else is saying yes, at times a premier must say no.[106]

The comment is just but incomplete. Tolmie was also a poor administrator. In theory, the Premier can assume the position of a chairman of the board but, in practice, he must actively control his cabinet ministers' actions to ensure policy is effectively carried out. This is particularly necessary in times of economic crisis. Except for occasional suggestions, Tolmie did not do this. Whatever his reasons, Tolmie's failure after 1930 to take decisive action to control or reshape his cabinet contributed to his ultimate defeat.

Tolmie's failure was one of intellect, not of temperament or personality. He lacked the imagination and intellectual capabilities to rise above the immediate situation and resolutely strike out in new directions. Had he opted for Union government earlier and carried out a bold and immediate reorganization, he might have staved off the collapse. If he had even stood resolutely by the party, he might have salvaged something from the election. Like the rest of the Conservative party, he had no solid objectives other than to be elected. Confused and bewildered by a situation beyond his comprehension, he could only stagger from crisis to crisis. His commitment to the idea of Union government was half-hearted and incomplete and

his indecision completed the alienation of his followers. Optimistic and expansionistic as had been Oliver and McBride, Tolmie was faced with an economic situation for which he was totally unprepared. The party he led, fragmented and incapable of unity as it was, did nothing to make up for Tolmie's deficiencies. Deserted, unable to adapt, Tolmie was the wrong man for that position and that time.

The Tolmie government was doomed to failure at the time of its election. Faced with destruction from within, the British Columbia Conservative party sought in Tolmie a saviour and elected a man of human failings. The intensity of the crisis which destroyed the administration has obscured the fact that the Conservative party was a fragile coalition of disparate interests and Tolmie was not the man to strengthen it.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

[1] Margaret A. Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 441-453. Cited herafter as British Columbia.

[2] E. M. Reid, "The Rise of National Parties in Canada," Party Politics in Canada, ed. H. G. Thorburn (2d ed. rev; Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 21.

[3] R. B. D. Smith, "Sir Richard McBride" (unpublished Master's thesis, Queen's University, 1959), pp. 20-21.

[4] J. T. Saywell, The Office of the Lieutenant-Governor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), p. 143.

[5] R. H. Borden (ed.), Robert Laird Borden: His Memiors (Toronto: Macmillan, 1938) I, p. 90.

[6] Edith Dobie, "Party History of British Columbia, 1903-1933," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, XXVII (April, 1936) p. 154.

[7] Saywell, The Office of the Lieutenant-Governor, p. 143.

[8] Smith, "Sir Richard McBride", p. 36.

[9] Infra, p. 105.

[10] Heath MacQuarrie, The Conservative Party (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1962), p. 61.

[11] Vancouver Sun, March 10, 1912.

[12] Smith, "Sir Richard McBride", p. 44.

[13] Ibid, p. 315.

[14] William John Bowser, educated at Dalhousie as were Richard McBride and R. B. Bennett; lawyer, Vancouver; elected M. L. A., 1903; Attorney-General, 1907; Premier, 1915-16; Leader of the Opposition, 1916-24; Leader of the Non-Partisan group, 1933; died Oct. 25, 1933.

[15] Smith,"Sir Richard McBride", p. 208.

[16] J. Castell Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1916 (Toronto: The Annual Review Publishing Co. Ltd., 1917), p. 721. Cited hereafter as C.A.R.

[17] Smith, "Sir Richard McBride", p. 315.

[18] William Bennett, Builders of British Columbia (n.p., 1937), p. 75.

[19] Smith, "Sir Richard McBride", p. 311.

[20] C.A.R. 1916, p. 757

[21] Smith, "Sir Richard McBride", p. 316.

[22] Victoria Colonist, Dec. 19, 1915.

[23] C.A.R. 1916, p. 757.

[24] Victoria Colonist, March 3, 1916.

[25] Saywell, The Office of the Lieutenant-Governor, p. 56.

[26] Smith, "Sir Richard McBride", p. 319.

Chapter II

[1] Victoria Colonist, Sept. 30, 1919.

[2] H. A. Scarrow, Canada Votes (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1962), p. 224. The Conservative increase in seats was apparently due to the presence of Farm and Labour candidates splitting the vote.

[3] Victoria Colonist, Jan. 9, 1922.

[4] Vancouver Province, March 9, 1922.

[5] Vancouver Province, April 11, 1922.

[6] Victoria Colonist, April 14, 1922.

[7] Victoria Colonist, April 14, 1922.

[8] Victoria Colonist, April 22, 1922.

[9] Infra, p. 51.

[10] Henry Herbert Stevens, broker and accountant, Vancouver; elected Member of Parliament, Vancouver, 1911, 1917, 1921, 1925, 1926; Minister of Trade and Commerce, 1921; Minister of Customs and Excise, 1926.

[11] Vancouver Sun, Aug. 22, 1922.

[12] Ibid.

[13] C. M. Woodworth, lawyer, Vancouver; a perpetually disaffected Conservative; opposed Bowser in 1922; criticized Vancouver party organization to Tolmie, 1928; organized Chain Conservative Association, 1931 (Infra, p. 103).

[14] John Nelson, journalist and editor; associated in turn with the Victoria Times, Vancouver News-Advertiser, Vancouver World and the United Farmer; active Prohibitionist; vice-president of British Columbia Conservative Association, 1922; executive member of Provincial Party, 1923-24; probably editor of The Searchlight.

[15] Vancouver Sun, Aug. 23, 1922.

[16] Samuel L. Howe, Real Estate and Financial broker, Vancouver; President of the British Columbia Conservative Association, 1919-20; M. L. A., Richmond-Point Grey, Provincial Secretary, 1928-33; retired from politics, 1933.

[17] R. L."Pat" Maitland, lawyer, Vancouver; President of British Columbia Conservative Association, 1922-24; candidate for M. L. A., Vancouver, 1924; elected M. L. A., Vancouver, 1928-33; Minister without Portfolio, 1928-33; did not stand for re-election, 1933.

[18] Memorandum on the Provincial Party, undated, in T. D. Pattullo Papers (Public Archives of British Columbia, Victoria). Cited hereafter as Pattullo Papers.

[19] W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1950), p. 39. Henry Wise Wood was not only the president and dominant personality in the United Farmers of Alberta but the leading advocate of economic cooperation among farmers. His influence was great among the various farm organizations and he was frequently in contact with the British Columbia organization.

[20] The fact that these farm journals are published in Vancouver by people who were not farmers is an indication of the complexity of the metropolitan-rural relationship in British Columbia.

[21] Margaret A. Ormsby, "The United Farmers of British Columbia," British Columbia Historical Quarterly, XVII (1953), p. 66. Cited hereafter as "United Farmers".

[22] John Redman, farmer, Kamloops; Chairman, Farmer-Progressive Party, 1922; Vice-president, Provincial Party of British Columbia, 1923-24.

[23] Memorandum on the Provincial Party, Pattullo Papers.

[24] Ormsby, "United Farmers," p. 67.

[25] John Nelson, The Canadian Provinces (Toronto: Musson Book Co., 1924), p. 177. Interestingly, the introduction to the book is written by Arthur R. Meighen, the federal leader of the Conservative party. Apparently Nelson's attack on the provincial leadership did not affect his federal ties.

[26] Alexander Duncan McRae, retired millionaire; had been active in colonization projects, lumber and fishing; former Quarter-Master General of the Overseas Canadian Forces; Director of Organization of the Ministry of Information, Great Britain, 1917-18; Major-General, retired; Leader of the Provincial Party, 1923-24; Conservative Member of Parliament, North Vancouver, 1926-30; Dominion Organizer of Conservative party, 1927-30; appointed Senator, 1930.

[27] Percy Bengough, Secretary of Trades and Labour Congress, Vancouver; considered by Tolmie and Pattullo as a candidate in 1933.

[28] Ormsby, "United Farmers," p. 69.

[29] Ibid, p. 68.

[30] George Kidd, manager of B. C. Electric Railway, Vancouver, to J. Davidson, secretary, B. C. E. R., London, Jan. 22, 1923, British Columbia Electric Railway Papers (Special Collections, University of British Columbia Library), Box 65.

31 Vancouver Star, Jan. 30, 1923. The Star listed the entire membership of the Committee of One Hundred and some of the prominent people who attended.

32 C.A.R. 1923, p. 175.

33 Farm and Home, Feb. 8, 1923, quoted in Ormsby, "United Farmers," p. 70.

34 John Nelson, "The Third Party," Maclean's Magazine XXXVI, (May 4, 1923).

35 Memorandum on the Provincial Party, Pattullo Papers.

36 A. R. Ford, As the World Wags On (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1950), p. 146. There is no direct evidence as to the methods of distribution used by the Provincial Party. However, McRae's use of addressograph machines in the 1930 federal campaign suggests he had used similar methods before.

37 The Searchlight, no. 2, p. 2. None of the various issues of this publication were dated, although their contents indicate the approximate time of issue. Thus they are identified by issue number.

38 Ibid, p. 5.

39 The Searchlight, no. 5, p. 39.

40 Birt Showler, an officer in the Teamster's Union, Vancouver; both he and Bengough were craft-union officials and were not active in Labour-Socialist political activity.

41 E. P. Davie, Vancouver lawyer; his father and his uncle had both been Premiers of British Columbia; not active in politics after 1924.

42 The Searchlight, no. 6, p. 26.

43 James Morton, Honest John Oliver (London: Dent, 1933), p. 182.

44 Legislative recall originated in Oregon as a means of assuring electors that their representatives would voice their views. If a specified number or percentage of the voters signed a petition, the elected representative was to resign his seat and stand for reelection. In Canada, the idea was used in some ridings by the National Progressive Party and, for a short time, by Social Credit in Alberta.

45 The Searchlight, no. 8, p. 19. This gambit was also used by the Non-Partisan group in 1933.

46 The Searchlight, no. 8, pp. 23-24. W. Sloan brought a slander suit against McRae who was unable to support the accusation. Nevertheless, the specific nature of the allegation suggests that the Provincial Party really thought they had discovered the truth.

47 C.A.R. 1924-25, p. 447.

48 Bruce Ramsey, The PGE (Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1962), p. 190.

49 The Searchlight, no. 9, p. 11.

50 Ford, As the World Wags on, p. 147. It would appear McRae's major contribution was organizational ability, rather than just financial support. His later efforts for the federal Conservative party are greatly praised for this quality.

51 Vancouver Sun, June 21, 1924.

52 Victoria Colonist, Aug. 3, 1924.

53 J. H. Schofield to S. F. Tolmie, Ottawa, June 27, 1924, in S. F. Tolmie Papers (Special Collections, University of British Columbia Library). Cited hereafter as Tolmie Papers.

54 Robert Henry Pooley, lawyer, Victoria; M. L. A. for Esquimalt, 1912-33; Attorney-General, 1928-33; reelected as the sole Unionist M. L. A., 1933.

55 Vancouver Star, Aug. 9, 1924.

56 Interview with Leon J. Ladner, April 15, 1969.

57 Victoria Colonist, Aug. 3, 1924.

58 Captain H. S. Thain, civil engineer, Victoria; a British Columbia maverick; a worker for the Provincial Party in 1924 and the Conservative party in 1928; (Supra, p. 84).

59 Victoria Colonist, Dec. 4, 1924.

60 Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 423.

61 Paul Phillips, No Power Greater (Vancouver: B.C. Federation of Labour, 1967), p. 95.

62 E. J. Chambers, Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1924 (Ottawa: Mortimer Co. Ltd., 1925), p. 495 ff. Cited hereafter as CPG.

63 Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 224.

Chapter III

1 Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 72.

2 Vancouver Sun, Oct. 5, 1926.

3 Vancouver Sun, Oct. 9, 1926; Victoria Colonist, Nov. 7, 1926.

4 Letter from Leon J. Ladner, Feb. 5, 1969.

5 Interview with Leon J. Ladner, April 15, 1969.

6 Vancouver Sun, Nov. 3, 1926.

7 Victoria Colonist, Nov. 8, 1926.

8 E. R. Black, "The Progressive Conservative Party in British Columbia" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of British Columbia, 1960), p. 25. Black states that Bowser was supported by the federal party. C. F. M. Planta, a journalist and member of the Conservative party supporting Bowser at the time, disagrees. It is probable that it was a matter of individual decision on the part of each federal member involved.

9 Vancouver Star had particularly thorough coverage of these rumours. Published by V. W. Odlum, ex-Liberal M. L. A. for Vancouver, it gave great emphasis to provincial political events. While frequently speculative, its reports are, at times, very perceptive.

10 Vancouver Star, Nov. 11, 1926.

11 Victoria Colonist, Nov. 19, 1926.

12 Vancouver Star, Oct. 30, 1926.

13 The Report of the British Columbia Conservative Convention at Kamloops, 1926 (The Conservative Party, 1927, British Columbia Provincial Library, Victoria), p. 3. Cited hereafter as Conservative Convention, 1926.

14 Ibid, p. 22.

[15] Ibid, p. 24.

[16] Both the Vancouver Star and the New Westminister Columbian published reports of Bowser's withdrawal in their Wednesday afternoon editions. The Star's correspondent reported the withdrawal decision had been made at noon that day.

[17] Conservative Convention, 1926, p. 28.

[18] Interview with Leon J. Ladner, April 15, 1969.

[19] C. F. Davie, lawyer, Duncan; M. L. A., Cowichan-Newcastle, 1924-33; Speaker of the House, 1930-33.

[20] Nelson Spencer, lumber exporter, Vancouver; M. L. A., Vancouver, 1928-33.

[21] Conservative Convention, 1926, p. 33. The vote totals were:

1st vote: Ladner, 284; Taylor, 220; Davie, 13; Spencer, 26
2nd vote: Ladner, 307; Taylor, 213; Davie, 10; Spencer, 15
3rd vote: Ladner, 317; Taylor, 201; Davie, 11; Spencer, 8
4th vote: Ladner, 316; Taylor, 208; Davie, 11; Spencer, 7
5th vote: Ladner, 310; Taylor, 217; Davie, 10; Spencer, 5
6th vote: Ladner, 300; Taylor, 218; Davie, 10; Spencer, 14

[22] Letter from Leon J. Ladner, Feb. 5, 1969.

[23] Conservative Convention, 1926, p. 34. Before the adoption of the motion to recess, Bowser declined an invitation to join the committee and a move by Loutet and Shelly to hold one more vote was rejected.

[24] J. B. Kerr, Biographical Dictionary of Well-Known British Columbians (Vancouver: Kerr and Begg, 1910), p. 362.

[25] Joan Mitchell (ed.), The Journals of William Fraser Tolmie (Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1963), p. 385.

[26] Percy Sangster to S. F. Tolmie, Nov. 22, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

[27] B. A. McKelvie, "British Columbia's New Premier," Maclean's Magazine, XL (October, 1928), p. 9.

[28] J. K. Munro, "Turmoil in Ottawa," Maclean's Magazine, XXXII (October, 1919), p. 16.

29 Victoria Colonist, Aug. 5, 1919.

30 James Morton, "Celebrities I Have Met," Victoria Colonist Islander, July 13, 1954.

31 Leslie Roberts, These Be Your Gods (Toronto: Musson Book Co., 1929), p. 60.

32 Ibid, p. 61.

33 John Lederle, "The National Organization of the Liberal and Conservative Parties in Canada" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1942), p. 40. Cited hereafter as "Liberal and Conservative Parties."

34 A. R. Meighen to J. J. Garland, Portage La Prairie, Aug. 28, 1923, in A. R, Meighen Papers (Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa), vol. 135, file 173. Cited hereafter as Meighen Papers.

35 Canadian Forum, III (July, 1923), p. 294.

36 Canadian Forum, III (August, 1923), p. 327.

37 Lederle, " Liberal and Conservative Parties," p. 42 ff: R. M. Bell, "Conservative National Conventions 1927-56" (unpublished Master's thesis, Carelton University, 1965), p. 8ff.: J. R. Williams, The Conservative Party of Canada (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1956) p. 6ff.

38 J. J. Garland to A. R. Meighen, Aug. 25, 1923, Meighen Papers.

39 Bell, "Conservative National Conventions 1927-56," p. 10.

40 Lederle, "Liberal and Conservative Parties", p.40.

41 Interview with Leon J. Ladner, April 15, 1969.

42 S. F. Tolmie, Personal memorandum on the 1933 election, Nov. 7, 1933, Tolmie Papers. Cited hereafter as Memorandum on 1933 election; Victoria Colonist, Nov. 7, 1926.

43 Interview with Leon J. Ladner, April 15, 1969.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 S. F. Tolmie to By Howard, Nov. 14, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

47 Interview with Leon J. Ladner, April 15, 1969.

48 Conservative Convention, 1926, p. 42.

49 Vancouver Star, Nov. 29, 1926.

Chapter IV

1 Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 224.

2 Vancouver Sun, Aug. 27, 1927.

3 R. B. Bennett to W. J. Bowser, Nov. 22, 1927, R. B. Bennett Papers (Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa), vol. 37; Vancouver Sun, Dec. 12, 1926, July 15, 1927.

4 C. M. Woodworth to S. F. Tolmie, June 5, 1928, Tolmie Papers.

5 Supra, p. 37.

6 Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 99.

7 V. W. Odlum, "Personal Column," Vancouver Star, July 12, 1928.

8 Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 430.

9 Ibid, p. 431.

10 C.A.R. 1927-28, p. 545.

11 Vancouver Star, July 19, 1927.

12 Mrs. M. E. Smith, the widow of a popular Liberal politician and an active supporter of women's rights, had been a member of the Oliver cabinet for a brief time in 1921; Charles Woodward, a successful Vancouver merchant, led the poll and, by virtue of his outspoken independence, was publicly popular: Brigadier-General V. W. Odlum, as publisher of the Vancouver Star, was prominent; Captain Ian Mackenzie was considered one of the most promising young Liberals elected.

13 Donald Donaghy, lawyer, Vancouver; M. P., Vancouver North, 1921-25; Minister of Finance, appointed June 5, 1928, defeated July 18, 1928.

[14] Vancouver Province, July 21, 1928. Ian Mackenzie ran in North Vancouver; Mrs. Smith ran in Esquimalt.

[15] William Curtis Shelly, founder of Shelly's Bakeries, Vancouver; was active in the Provincial Party; was part of Ladner's campaign committee in 1926; M. L. A., Vancouver, 1928-33; Minister of Finance, 1928-30; President of the Council, 1930-33.

[16] Conservative Party, British Columbia's Next Premier (n.p., n.d.) Provincial Library of British Columbia, Victoria, p. 3. Cited hereafter as PLBC.

[17] Victoria Colonist, Dec. 30, 1928.

[18] Research Department, Economic Council of British Columbia, Statistics of Industry in British Columbia Victoria: n.p., 1935), p. 7. Cited hereafter as Appendix A.

[19] C.A.R. 1928-29, p. 529, p. 535.

[20] M. A. Ormsby, "A Study of the Okanagan Valley of British Columbia" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of British Columbia, 1931), pp. 109-10; W. A. Sloan, "The Crowsnest Pass During the Depression 1918-39" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Victoria, 1968), p. 15-43.

[21] Alan Morley, Vancouver (Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1961), p. 170.

[22] Victoria Colonist, Dec. 30, 1928.

[23] Neil Sutherland, "T. D. Pattullo as a Party Leader" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of British Columbia, 1960), p. 9.

[24] McKelvie, "British Columbia's New Premier," p. 10.

[25] Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 224.

[26] British Columbia Gazette, Sept. 6, 1928, p. 3151

Premier and Minister of Railways.... S.F. Tolmie (Saanich)
Provincial Secretary..... S.L. Howe (Richmond-Point Grey)
Attorney-General..... R.H. Pooley (Esquimalt)
Minister of Lands..... F.P. Burden (Fort George)
Minister of Finance and Industry.... W.C. Shelly (Vancouver)
Minister of Agriculture..... W. Atkinson (Chilliwak)

Minister of Mines and Labour..... W.A. Mackenzie (Simil-Kameen)
Minister of Public Works..... N.S. Lougheed (Dewdney)
Minister of Education..... J. Hinchliffe (Victoria)
President of the Executive Council.. R.W. Bruhn (Salmon Arm)
Minister without Portfolio..... R.L. Maitland (Vancouver)

27 Victoria Times, Aug. 22, 1928.

28 Ibid.

29 Victoria Colonist, Aug. 25, 1928.

30 S. F. Tolmie to Senator S. J. Crowe, Oct. 27, 1930, Tolmie Papers.

31 McKelvie,"British Columbia's New Premier", p. 10.

32 Interview with C. F. M. Planta, Sept. 14, 1969.

33 Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 441.

34 James William Jones, merchant, Kelowna; M. L. A., South Okanagan, 1920-33; Speaker of the House, 1928-30; Minister of Finance, 1930-33.

35 Supra, p. 104.

36 Vancouver Sun, Aug. 23, 1928.

37 William Dick, businessman, Vancouver; campaign manager for Bowser's leadership race in 1926; M. L. A., Vancouver, 1928-33: J. W. Berry, dairy farmer, Delta; M. L. A., Delta, 1928-33; passed over by Tolmie for Minister of Agriculture.

38 Vancouver Star, Oct. 25, 1928.

39 G. G. McGeer to W. L. M. King, Dec. 9, 1930, G. G. McGeer Papers (Public Archives of British Columbia, Victoria). Cited hereafter as McGeer Papers. McGeer did not hold any elective office during Tolmie's administration. He was involved after 1930 in Pattullo's efforts to rebuild the Liberal party. He later had a distinguished career as an M. L. A., Mayor of Vancouver, M. P. and Senator.

40 Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 441 states that the session was unproductive and disappointing but the newspaper reports do not give this impression.

41 Vancouver Star, March 21, 1929.

42 S. F. Tolmie to R. B. Bennett, Nov. 8, 1928, Tolmie Papers. There was an attempt to have Bowser run for the Conservatives but either Tolmie or Bowser blocked it.

43 M. A. Ormsby, "T. Dufferin Pattullo and the Little New Deal," Politics of Discontent, ed. Ramsay Cook (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 28 ff. Cited hereafter as "T. Dufferin Pattullo."

44 C.A.R. 1928-29, p. 521.

45 H. B. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King: The Lonely Heights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 263. King had resented Oliver's demands for lower freight rates and feared MacLean would make similar demands.

46 C.A.R. 1928-29, p. 512.

47 Vancouver Star, Oct. 22, 1928; Nov. 12, 1928.

48 Bruce Hutchison, "Across the Bay," Victoria Times, Feb. 5, 1929.

49 S. F. Tolmie to Grote Stirling, M. P., April 2, 1929, Tolmie Papers.

50 S. F. Tolmie to W. A. Black, May 4, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

51 Victoria Times, Feb. 7, 1929.

52 Victoria Colonist, Feb. 21, 1929.

53 Vancouver Star, Jan. 6, 1929.

54 Victoria Colonist, June 25, 1929. This appointment was apparently not a success. McKelvie resigned within the year to become editor of the Victoria Colonist. He remained on friendly terms with Tolmie.

55 Victoria Times, Jan. 14, 1928; June 29, 1929.

56 Vancouver Province, June 27, 1929.

57 Vancouver Star, March 23, 1929.

58 E. G. MacGill, My Mother the Judge (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1955), p. 200 ff.

59 S. F. Tolmie to J. A. Clark, March 1, 1929, Tolmie Papers.

60 Vancouver Province, Feb. 28, 1929.

61 British Columbia, Journals of the Legislative Assembly, 1929, LVIII (Victoria, King's Printers, 1929), p. 64. Cited hereafter as Journals.

62 C.A.R. 1928-29, p. 520.

63 MacGill, My Mother the Judge, p. 204.

64 J. W. Cornett, M. L. A., South Vancouver, to S. F. Tolmie, Nov. 23, 1929, Tolmie Papers.

65 S. F. Tolmie to Senator Smeaton White, Dec. 17, 1929, Tolmie Papers.

66 S. F. Tolmie to Dr. W. G. Black, Nov. 10, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

Chapter V

1 The most obvious parallels in the effect of the Depression on party unity are with the Hoover administration in the United States and the Anderson government in Saskatchewan.

2 J. K. Galbraith, The Great Crash (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p. 83, suggests that fewer than a million persons were speculating on the U. S. A. stock markets out of a population of 120,000,000. It may be inferred that a smaller percentage of Canadians were speculating and directly affected by the market collapse.

3 Vancouver Star, Oct. 30, 1929.

4 Vancouver Sun, Jan. 2, 1930.

5 Morley, Vancouver, p. 177.

6 Vancouver Star, Nov. 15, 1929.

7 Vancouver Sun, Dec. 6, 17, 29, 1929.

8 C.A.R. 1929-30, p. 514.

9 Ibid, p. 530.

10 Appendix A.

[11] Journals LIX (1930). Almost all questions dealt with dismissals, appointments and ministerial expenses. In most cases, the Liberal accusations were not proven.

[12] Ibid, p. 188.

[13] Victoria Colonist, March 28, 1930.

[14] Victoria Colonist, Jan. 23, 1930. These came from Vancouver and Burnaby.

[15] J. C. Brady to S. F. Tolmie, Nov. 16, 1929, Tolmie Papers.

[16] W. C. Shelly to S. F. Tolmie, May 20, 1930, Tolmie Papers.

[17] S. F. Tolmie to R. B. Bennett, July 19, 1930, Tolmie Papers.

[18] W. C. Shelly to S. F. Tolmie, May 20, 1930, Tolmie Papers.

[19] Infra, p. 98.

[20] C.A.R. 1930-31, p. 33. The money was granted to the provincial governments which were to make their own arrangements with the municipalities.

[21] Memorandum to all Cabinet officials, March 26, 1930, Tolmie Papers. There were a number of similar memos over the remainder of the year.

[22] Infra, p. 100.

[23] F. P. Burden, Minister of Lands became Agent-General for British Columbia in London; N. S. Lougheed moved from Public Works to Lands; W. C. Shelly became President of the Executive Council.

[24] Report of the Annual Convention of the British Columbia Conservative Association, Penticton, Nov. 23, 1930 (n.p., n.d.) PLBC, p. 8.

[25] Reverend A. Roddan, God in the Jungles (n.p., n.d.), pp. 40, 52.

[26] Appendix A.

[27] C.A.R. 1930-31, pp. 302, 439.

28 S. F. Tolmie to J. W. Jones, Feb. 13, 1931, Tolmie Papers.

29 C.A.R. 1928-29, p. 521.

30 Budget Address, March 5, 1931 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1931), p. 32, in J. W. Jones Papers (Public Archives of British Columbia, Victoria). Cited hereafter as Jones Papers. Exemptions were for those who were receiving old age or disability pensions, mother's allowances and those whose income did not exceed $12.00 per week or was derived from farming.

31 Infra, p. 101.

32 Victoria Colonist, July 11, 1931.

33 Victoria Colonist, July 12, 1931.

34 C.A.R. 1932, p. 303.

35 Ibid.

36 Morley, Vancouver, p. 167.

37 S. F. Tolmie to D. B. Plunkett, Feb. 12, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

38 S. F. Tolmie to G. Black, M. P., Oct. 1, 1931, Tolmie Papers.

39 P. B. Fowler, Manager of Bank of Commerce, Victoria, to J. W. Jones, Oct. 14, 1931, Jones Papers.

40 Ames Company, Investments, Toronto, to J. W. Jones, Oct. 23, 1931, Jones Papers. This company marketed the provincial government's bonds.

41 R. B. Bennett to J. W. Jones, Oct. 14, 1931, Jones Papers.

42 R. B. Bennett to J. W. Jones, Oct. 16, 1931, Jones Papers.

43 S. F. Tolmie to J. W. Jones, Oct. 27, 1931, Jones Papers. This is not stated explicitly but does account for the optimistic tone of Tolmie's instructions.

44 S. F. Tolmie to J. W. Jones, Oct. 31, 1931, Jones Papers. The text of Jones'telegram cannot be found; its contents are clearly indicated in Tolmie's reply the same day.

[45] S. H. Logan to J. W. Jones, Nov. 3, 1931, Jones Papers.

[46] Appendix E.

[47] S. F. Tolmie to Senator G. D. Robertson, Nov. 3, 1931, Jones Papers. With the exception of the first sentence, the telegram was in cipher, sent care of Jones. His working notes and a clear copy are in the Jones files.

[48] E. N. Rhodes, Acting Minister of Finance, to S. F. Tolmie, Nov. 16, 1931, Jones Papers.

[49] R. H. Pooley to H. H. Stevens, Feb. 10, 1932, Jones Papers. Pooley refers to this meeting in which he states Stevens agreed to recommend the Dominion government advance British Columbia $1,000,000 per month.

[50] L. J. Ladner to S. F. Tolmie, Jan. 12, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

[51] R. B. Bennett to J. W. Jones, Dec. 29, 1931, Jones Papers.

[52] R. H. Pooley to H. H. Stevens, Feb. 10, 1932, Jones Papers.

[53] C.A.R. 1932, p. 309 ff.

[54] R. B. Bennett to J. W. Jones, Dec. 29, 1931, Jones Papers.

[55] R. H. Pooley to H. H. Stevens, Feb. 11, 1932, Jones Papers.

[56] S. F. Tolmie to S. Charters, M. P., March 14, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

[57] Appendix A; C.A.R. 1932, p. 312 ff.

[58] C.A.R. 1932, p. 404-5.

[59] Appendix B.

[60] C.A.R. 1932, p. 307.

[61] Victoria Colonist, July 30, 1932. Tolmie travelled to Ottawa to present British Columbia's case and remained to the end of the conference.

[62] Victoria Colonist, Aug. 20, 1932.

63 Interview with C. F. M. Planta, Sept. 9, 1969.

64 S. F. Tolmie to J. D. Chaplain, M. P., Nov. 29, 1929, Tolmie Papers.

65 Vancouver Star, Nov. 8, 1929.

66 H. H. Stevens to S. F. Tolmie, Nov. 20, 1929, Tolmie Papers. Apparently there was a personal conflict between Blair and Stevens.

67 G. Greenwood to C. F. M. Planta, Dec. 6, 1930, Personal Papers of C. F. M. Planta in his possession. Cited hereafter as Planta Papers.

68 Victoria Colonist, Feb. 10, 1930; Feb. 11, 1931. Shelly suspended Norman Watt, government agent for Prince Rupert and ex-secretary to Pattullo, for alleged political activity in the 1928 provincial election. After a debate in the House where Shelly was unable to justify his action, two Conservative backbenchers suggested an enquiry be set up. Tolmie agreed. As a result, Watt was exonerated and reinstated.

69 L. J. Ladner to A. D. McRae, Nov. 28, 1929, Tolmie Papers.

70 Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, p. 295.

71 J. M. Beck, Pendulum of Power (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 191 ff.

72 S. F. Tolmie to H. H. Stevens, Nov. 17, 1929, Tolmie Papers.

73 L. J. Ladner to S. F. Tolmie, June 7, 1929; Senator Smeaton White to S. F. Tolmie, Dec. 21, 1929, Tolmie Papers.

74 R. B. Bennett to S. F. Tolmie, Jan. 6, 1930, Tolmie Papers.

75 S. F. Tolmie to R. B. Bennett, July 9, 1930, Tolmie Papers.

76 Memorandum on the 1933 election, Nov. 7, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

77 Beck, Pendulum of Power, p. 198.

78 Ford, As the World Wags On, p. 146. After a dispute with Bennett, McRae accepted a Senate appointment and became politically inactive. Stevens was elected in a by-election in Kootenay East but remained suspect in Ottawa and disenchanted with Victoria. He was Minister of Trade and Commerce until 1934 when he broke with Bennett and formed the Reconstruction Party.

79 S. F. Tolmie to L. J. Ladner, May 30, 1930, Tolmie Papers.

80 Ian Mackenzie had resigned the North Vancouver provincial seat to join the King cabinet just before the election. As Tolmie pointed out, this was the second government to be defeated as soon as Mackenzie joined its ranks. The first was the MacLean administration.

81 S. F. Tolmie to R. F. Brindley, Jan. 30, 1931, Tolmie Papers.

82 Supra, p. 88.

83 C. F. M. Planta to F. P. Burden, Aug. 2, 1930, Planta Papers.

84 Victoria Colonist, Oct. 28, 1930.

85 Victoria Times, Oct. 29, 1930.

86 Vancouver Sun, March 26, 1930.

87 S. F. Tolmie to H. D. Twigg, Sept. 19, 1928; R. Mackenzie to S. F. Tolmie, Aug. 2, 1929, Tolmie Papers.

88 G. Black to S. F. Tolmie, July 30, 1930, Tolmie Papers.

89 Victoria Colonist, Feb. 11, 1930. Few Conservatives supported Shelly in the debate. Cy Peck and Nelson Spencer proposed the enquiry.

90 Vancouver Province, March 5, 1931.

91 Vancouver Province, March 13, 1931.

92 Vancouver Province, March 26, 1931.

93 Vancouver Province, March 16, 1931.

94 A. M. Sanford to R. H. Pooley, May 1, 1931, Tolmie Papers; Victoria Colonist, Oct. 28, 1930. Pattullo's comments pinpointed part of the problem.

95 S. F. Tolmie to J. D. Chaplain, June 16, 1931, Tolmie Papers.

96 G. A. Walkem to S. F. Tolmie, June 5, 1931, Tolmie Papers.

97 Appendix D. E

98 Appendix C.

99 Appendix D.

100 S. F. Tolmie to L. J. Ladner, Oct. 16, 1931, Tolmie Papers.

101 Supra, pp. 18. 36.

102 L. J. Ladner to S. F. Tolmie, Sept. 27, 1931, Tolmie Papers. Tolmie followed Ladner's advice. The meeting was not broadcast although it had been scheduled and Tolmie sent a stenographer to the meeting to make a complete record.

103 H. Langely, Court Stenographer, Transcription of the Chain Conservative Association Meeting, Victoria, Sept. 28, 1931, Tolmie Papers. The similarity between the final sentence of the quotation and the slogan of the Provincial Party is too obvious to require comment.

104 S. F. Tolmie to Nelson Spencer, Oct. 9, 1931, Tolmie Papers. This reply shows considerably more political subtlety that is obvious in Tolmie's career. He disarmed the Vancouver members by responding only to their specific complaints, ignoring the fact that, because they did not have specific departments, Shelly and Maitland did not have any control of patronage. Since they were not in constant touch, the Vancouver cabinet ministers did not direct the day-to-day activities of the government and thus, were ineffective in exerting influence.

105 R. L. Maitland to S. F. Tolmie, Oct. 26, 1931, Tolmie Papers.

106 L. J. Ladner to S. F. Tolmie, Nov. 12, 1931, Tolmie Papers. Stevens told Ladner that he and McRae had been approached but had remained loyal to Tolmie. He suggested that Nelson Spencer and the "Vancouver Club crowd" were backing Bowser.

107 File copy of speech to Conservative Annual Convention, Nanaimo, Nov. 27, 1931, Tolmie Papers.

108 S. F. Tolmie to A. N. Middleton, Dec. 8, 1931, Tolmie Papers.

109 Supra, p. 91.

110 Journals LX (1932), p. 23.

111 Lindley Crease to S. F. Tolmie, May 24, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

112 Vancouver Province, March 11, 17, 1932.

113 F. F. Payne to J. W. Jones, June 15, 1932, Jones Papers.

114 J. B. Clearihue to T. D. Pattullo, Dec. 12, 1932, Pattullo Papers.

115 L. M. Makovski to J. W. Jones, July 26, Aug. 14, 1932, Jones Papers.

116 Supra, p. 96.

117 British Columbia, Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government to Investigate the Finances of British Columbia (Victoria, King's Printer, 1932), p. 5, Jones Papers. Cited hereafter as Kidd Report.

118 The members of the Kidd Committee were George Kidd, Vancouver, chartered accountant; W. L. Mackin, Fraser Valley, finance and real estate; Austin Taylor, Vancouver, financier; A. H. Douglas, Vancouver, lawyer; R. W. Mayhew, Victoria, manufacturer.

119 J. W. Jones to R. H. Pooley, July 27, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

120 Kidd Report, p. 54.

121 J. G. Weir, President, Investment Bankers Association of Canada, to J. W. Jones, Oct. 19, 1932, Jones Papers.

122 Professor H. F. Angus to J. W. Jones, Oct. 17, 1932, Jones Papers. Angus was referring to a public debate held in Vancouver on Oct. 14, 1932.

123 Kidd Report, p. 16, 54. Capitalization in the original.

124 Memorandum of Union Government, Sept. 1932, Tolmie Papers. The four Vancouver backbenchers opposed union and demanded Bowser be given a cabinet post. Berry, Borden, Heggie and Rutledge objected to cooperating with the Liberals. Haywood was undecided.

125 Memorandum on the 1933 election, Nov. 7, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

126 Press Release on Union Government, Sept. 8, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

127 W. J. Bowser to S. F. Tolmie, Sept. 9, 1932; T. D. Pattullo to S. F. Tolmie, Sept. 13, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

128 Statement to the Press on Union Government, Sept. 17, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

129 C. F. M. Planta to J. Paul, Pouce Coupe, Sept. 17, 1932, Planta Papers: Vancouver Province, Sept. 18, 1932.

130 J. A. Clark, lawyer, Vancouver; Conservative M. P., Vancouver-Burrard, 1921-30.

131 J. A. Clark to S. F. Tolmie, Oct. 22, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

132 A. J. Helmcken to S. F. Tolmie, Oct. 25, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

133 L. J. Ladner to S. F. Tolmie, Dec. 26, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

134 Memorandum of Suggested Unionist Candidates, Sept.-Oct., 1932, Tolmie Papers.

135 C.A.R. 1932, p. 309.

136 S. F. Tolmie to J. E. May, Dec. 19, 1932, Tolmie Papers.

137 Victoria Colonist, Oct. 2, 1932.

138 Victoria Colonist, Nov. 27, 1932.

139 J. S. Moodie to A. M. Manson, Jan. 22, 1932, Pattullo Papers. Moodie states that Pattullo had spent about $6,000 a year of his own money on organizational activities for the Liberal party.

140 Resolutions passed by the Convention of the British Columbia Liberal Association, held in Vancouver, Oct. 3 and 4, 1932, McGeer Papers.

141 Ormsby, "T. Dufferin Pattullo," p. 28.

142 T. D. Pattullo to G.G. McGeer, Nov. 28, 1932, Pattullo Papers.

Chapter VI

1 Appendix A.

2 C.A.R. 1933, p. 304.

3 Ibid.

4 Appendix B.

5 Morley, Vancouver, p. 179.

6 J. W. Jones to P. B. Fowler, July 27, 1932, Jones Papers

7 J. W. Jones to S. F. Tolmie, Nov. 3, 1932, Jones Papers.

8 Appendix G. There is little sign that these instruction greatly reduced relief costs. Undoubtedly they did make the relief officer's task more demanding, the recipients more resentful and the government even more unpopular.

9 J. W. Jones to P. G. Fowler, March 8, 1933, Jones Papers. The Bank offered no further criticism but repeated the threat after the Liberals took office.

10 Appendix H. Pattullo violently rejected a similar suggestion from Bennett in 1934 but he was newly elected with firm control over his party and , as a Liberal, prepared to make political capital out of such federal intervention. Tolmie had none of these advantages.

11 Ibid.

12 S. F. Tolmie to R. B. Bennett, March 17, 1933, Pattullo Papers. Underlining done in red, possibly by Pattullo.

13 Budget Address, March 15, 1933 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1933), Jones Papers. So great was the criticism over the reduction of municipal grants that the government was forced to set up a Commission to investigate the whole problem of provincial-municipal finances.

14 Vancouver Sun, March 16, 1933.

15 Approved Minute of the Privy Council, copy, May 5, 1933, Pattullo Papers. This seems to have been sent to Pattullo by Ian Mackenzie.

16 C.A.R. 1934, p. 301.

17 Grote Stirling to J. W. Jones, March 28, 1933, Jones Papers.

18 Supra, p. 111.

19 Vancouver Province, Feb. 25, 1933.

20 The distinction between the Non-Partisan and the Unionist groups was largely a matter of leadership and emphasis. Their platforms were quite similar.

21 J. O. Dunford to S. F. Tolmie, Feb. 28, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

22 Supra, p. 97.

23 Vancouver Sun, March 13, 1933. There is no evidence that Stevens favoured either the Non-Partisans or the Unionists although he was concerned over the split.

24 J. Paul to C. F. M. Planta, Feb. 6, 1933, Planta Papers. This letter mentions that the Dominion organization was behind the Non-Partisans. While such statements are voiced by both Tolmie and Bowser supporters, proof is not available.

25 S. F. Tolmie to W. J. Blake-Wilson, Jan. 29, 1932, Tolmie Papers. Tolmie was troubled during the period of his Premiership by severe nose-bleeds which could only be stopped by minor surgery and left him weakened for days. This was the cause of his absence for a week in 1932 and for much of March, 1933. His indisposition may account for his failure to address the caucus before the end of the session.

26 Vancouver Province, March 11, 1933. The comment shows considerable insight as to the political realities. At the same time, Dunford was telling Tolmie that "the electors are clamouring for action from you." (J. O. Dunford to S. F. Tolmie, March 4, 1933, Tolmie Papers).

27 Victoria Colonist, March 18, 1933. Both were still members of the cabinet at the time.

28 Note on Union Government, March 25, 1933, Tolmie Papers. This, of course, was not the point. The caucus needed to know how union could be achieved politically.

29 S. F. Tolmie to T. D. Pattullo, March 27, 1933, Pattullo Papers.

30 Appendix I.

31 Vancouver Province, April 6, 1933.

32 E. C. Carson to S. F. Tolmie, April 17, 1933, Tolmie Papers. Jones also began to draft a statement indicating he would not run as an Unionist but it was not completed or issued, Jones Papers.

33 Victoria Colonist, April 23, 1933. Tolmie blamed this decision on the influence of Bowser but the statement indicates the federal party was attempting to keep the organization intact for the federal election.

34 S. F. Tolmie to each Conservative M. L. A., April 28, 1933, Tolmie Papers. It was not sent to Dick, Walkem or Carson.

35 C. F. Davie to S. F. Tolmie, May 8, 1933, Tolmie Papers. Davie's reason was that Tolmie had asked N. Lougheed to resign from the cabinet. Either Davie was not told Lougheed was to act as Unionist party organizer or he wanted an excuse to join the Non-Partisans.

36 H. D. Twigg, lawyer, Victoria: M. L. A., Victoria, 1928-33; became provincial Conservative organizer in 1931; worked for the Unionist party until the Conservative party executive decided to sit out the election.

37 H. D. Twigg to S. F. Tolmie, April 25, 1933, Tolmie Papers. Ralston did run as an Independent and was defeated.

38 J. O. Dunford, land investment dealer, Vancouver; began to write to Tolmie for the first time in February, 1933, offering his services as an organizer in Vancouver; suggested Dennies and Savage as possible additions to the cabinet and his assessments of the political scene, though frequently over-confident, were often perceptive.

39 J. H. McMillan, Office of the Commissioner, Provincial Police, to S. F. Tolmie, April 26, 1933. Tolmie wanted to know whether the union had been involved with communists or unemployment demonstrations.

40 S. F. Tolmie to W. M. Dennies, May 11, 1933, Tolmie Papers. Shelly and Maitland were not informed of the offer until after Dennies had accepted. (S. F. Tolmie to W. C. Shelly, May 16, 1933, Tolmie Papers).

41 File copy of statement to the Press, May 17, 1933; Memorandum on the 1933 election, Nov. 7, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

42 Vernon News, May 5, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

43 H. Pullen to T. D. Pattullo, May 25, 1933, Pattullo Papers.

44 Vancouver Province, June 1, 1933. These had been planned in advance and were generally anticipated.

45 W. A. Mackenzie to S. F. Tolmie, June 1, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

46 F. F. Payne to J. W. Jones, June 6, 1933, Jones Papers.

47 Victoria Colonist, June 7, 1933; Candidate's Handbook of the Unionist Party, Jones Papers.

48 David Whiteside, lawyer, New Westminister; ex-Liberal M. L. A., 1920-24; declined to enter Tolmie's union cabinet but ran as an Independent and lost. (S. F. Tolmie to D. Whiteside, July 1, 1933, Tolmie Papers).

49 Victoria Colonist, Sept. 15, 1933; Victoria Times, Sept. 16, 1933; William Savage, lawyer, Vancouver; leader of Prohibitionists, a nominal Liberal; Minister of Public Works, 1933.

50 J. O. Dunford to S. F. Tolmie, March 4, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

51 R. W. Bruhn to S. F. Tolmie, June 29, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

52 N. S. Lougheed to S. F. Tolmie, June 29, 1933, Tolmie Papers. According to Lougheed, the union was an attempt to replace Bowser with Donaghy or Bruhn and was supported by the Vancouver Province but the plot failed. Bowser remained the unofficial leader and they all adopted his platform.

53 Saywell, The Office of the Lieutenant-Governor, p. 149. The Lieutenant-Governor had taken the unusual step of preparing an order of dissolution before Tolmie requested it and was prepared to force Tolmie to issue it.

54 Victoria Colonist, Sept. 15, 1933.

55 J. W. Jones to Mayor D. K. Gorden, Nov. 15, 1933, Jones Papers.

56 Memorandum on the 1933 election, Nov. 7, 1933, Tolmie Papers; Vancouver Province, Sept. 16, 1933.

57 J. O. Dunford to S. F. Tolmie, Aug. 11, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

58 S. F. Tolmie to Dr. W. G. Black, Nov. 10, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

59 C. H. Dickie to S. F. Tolmie, Sept. 18, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

60 S. F. Tolmie to R. L. Maitland, Nov. 6, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

61 S. F. Tolmie to J. Hinchliffe, Sept. 19, 1933, Tolmie Papers. Dr. Bamford and Matt Hassen ran in the election but are incorrectly indentified as Non-Partisans. (CPG 1934, p. 377).

62 Memorandum on the 1933 election, Nov. 7, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

63 Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 224. This total was not surpassed until 1952.

64 G.G. McGeer to T. D. Pattullo, Aug. 31, 1933, Pattullo Papers.

65 Ormsby, "T. Dufferin Pattullo," p. 34 ff.

66 This is obviously a summary treatment of a complex subject. While a number of academic studies have been consulted, the most useful account is D. G. Steeves, The Compassionate Rebel (Vancouver: Evergreen Press, 1960).

67 J. W. Jones to H. H. Stevens, Nov. 7, 1933, Jones Papers.

68 Campaign Pamphlet of the United Front (n.p., n.d.) PLBC.

69 Under the provincial election rules, only candidates in Victoria and Vancouver had to specify their political affiliations. Thus many candidates were simply listed as Independent and it is sometimes difficult to ascertain who they were independent for.

70 S. L. Howe and R. L. Maitland did not run.

71 The Unionist, no. 5, Oct. 20, 1933, Tolmie Papers

72 Campaign Pamphlet for S. F. Tolmie, "The Man of the People," (n.p., n.d.) PLBC.

73 "The Aims of the Candidates who represent the Non-Partisan Group" (n.p., n.d.) PLBC.

74 Ibid, p. 2.

75 Supra, pp. 32-35.

76 CPG 1934, p. 374 ff. Many of the Non-Partisans had been Conservative M. L. A.'s such as Bruhn, Mackenzie, Davie, Carson, Fitzsimmons, Loutet and Walkem. Others had been candidates before, such as F. Lister, P. G. Sinnott, G. A. B. Hall and D. Donaghy.

77 The Liberal Outlook, campaign issue (n.p., n.d.) McGeer Papers.

78 B. Kergin, Atlin; S. Mussalem, Dewdney; J. M. Bryan, North Vancouver.

79 C. R. North, Victoria, was a perpetual candidate for public office; Mayor L. D. Taylor of Vancouver ran in Omenica because of a personal conflict with A. M. Manson; Dr. C. Davies, Victoria, ran as a Christian moralist; H.G.E. Savage, Cowichan-Newcastle, ran as a supporter of the Oxford Movement.

[80] The most obvious examples of this group were H. Anscomb, Victoria; J. W. Jones, South Okanagan; H. W. M. Rolston, Atlin; T. W. Falconer, Atlin; E. R. Tarling, Comox; R. M. Grauer, Delta; W. W. Forster, Islands; D. Whiteside, New Westminister.

[81] Jones, J. W., "Experience, Not Experiment," (Kelowna, Kelowna Press, 1933), PLBC.

[82] Victoria Colonist, Aug. 11, 1933.

[83] CPG 1934, p. 374 ff. There were four seats where the Non-Partisan candidate ran a close second.

[84] Victoria Colonist, Nov. 8, 1933.

[85] Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 224; CPG 1934, p. 374. Tolmie was defeated by a Liberal: R. W. Bruhn and C. F. M. Planta were the elected Non-Partisans.

[86] Ibid. Even if speculation is carried to an extreme and it is assumed that the various Conservatives had amalgamated, an impossibility at the time, only two seats could have been affected.

[87] Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 224.

[88] Memorandum on the 1933 election, Nov. 7, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

[89] S. F. Tolmie to By Howard, Nov. 13, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

[90] S. F. Tolmie to F. P. Burden, Nov. 2, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

[91] S. F. Tolmie to Miss E. Monhan, Aug. 25, 1934, Tolmie Papers.

[92] S. F. Tolmie to J. P. Northy, June 27, 1934, Tolmie Papers. At this time, Tolmie was facing a lawsuit over the payment of Union party campaign expenses which was finally settled out of court.

[93] J. Loutet to J. W. Jones, Nov. 13, 1933, Jones Papers.

[94] S. F. Tolmie to S. Charters, June 9, 1934, Tolmie Papers.

[95] Dr. A. Fraser to S. F. Tolmie, Sept. 25, 1935, Tolmie Papers.

[96] S. F. Tolmie to Miss M. Dennison, Oct. 25, 1935, Tolmie Papers.

[97] Victoria Colonist, June 9, 1936.

[98] Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 224.

[99] Victoria Times, Aug. 28, 1969.

[100] Ormsby, "A Study of the Okanagan Valley of British Columbia," and Sloan, "The Crowsnest Pass During the Depression," suggest that, in these two areas, there had been economic depression since 1916. Certainly, during Oliver's regime,the provincial economy had not been uniformly prosperous. To assume there was a marked deterioration of economic conditions after 1929 all over the province may well be inaccurate.

[101] Roddan, God in the Jungles, frequently notes that there was little revolutionary fervor among the unemployed and that most of the people seemed to accept the Depression of 1929-31 as just another period of hard times, rather than a significant change.

[102] Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 453. In politics in British Columbia, it might well be that the terms "left" and "right" have little application.

[103] Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 3-49 puts forth the concept that political traditions are introduced into colonial societies with the settlers, rather than evolved anew. With considerable modification and restriction, this theory may well apply to British Columbia's poltical traditions and help to explain the relative strength of Labour-Socialsim in the province.

[104] Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 224. An explanation of the minority position of the Labour-Socialists may be that suggested in S. M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. xxiv. Lipset argues that, in frontier areas, workers tend to identify politically with the entrepreneur rather than other worker's groups. The Depression undoubtedly convinced some of the ambitious workers that the ideal of the equal opportunity of the frontier no longer applied and they were then prepared to accept the implications of class voting. Nevertheless, these voters retained sufficient hope to force the C. C. F. to abandon gradually most of its socialistic programs.

[105] Lederle, "Liberal and Conservative Parties," p. 198.

106 Paddy Sherman, Bennett (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1966), p. 23.

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Sutherland, J. N. "T. D. Pattullo as a Party Leader." Unpublished Master's thesis, University of British Columbia, 1960.
A very useful account of the successful rebuilding efforts of Pattullo and the Liberal opposition.

VI. OTHER SOURCES

A. Party Publications

All of the following material is to be found in the Provincial Library of British Columbia, Victoria. These, for the most part, consist of election material relating to various individuals and groups during the period covered by this thesis. Only the most important have been commented upon.

"The aims of the candidates who represent the Non-Partisan group who are offering theselves for election to the Provincial Legislature on Thursday, Nov. 2, 1933." n.p., 1933.

Bowser, W. J. "An Address to the electors of British Columbia." n.p., Dec. 18, 1915.

British Columbia Conservative Party. "B. C.'s Next Premier, the Hon. S. F. Tolmie." n.p., 1928.

British Columbia Conservative Party. Reports of the Conservative Association Annual Convention. n.p., 1926, 1929, 1930, 1931.
The most useful and complete of these is the report of the 1926 convention when Tolmie was chosen leader.

British Columbia Liberal Association. "How they Voted, 1929 Session." n.p., 1929.

British Columbia Liberal Party. "Resolutions Passed by the Convention held in Vancouver, Oct. 3 & 4, 1932." n.p., 1932.

"How British Columbia has been misgoverned by the Oliver Administration from 1916 to 1921." n.p., n.d.

Jones, J. W. "Experience, not Experiment." Kelowna, Kelowna Press, 1933.

Ladner, L. J. "The Progressive Conservative Party." n.p., n.d.

McGeer, G. G. "The Conquest of Poverty." Vancouver: B.C. Federation of Labour, 1933.

The Ministerial Union of the Lower Mainland of B.C. "The Crisis in British Columbia." Vancouver: Saturday Sunset Press, 1915.

Winch, H. E. "The Politics of a Derelict." Vancouver: Clarion, n.d.

B. Manuscript Sources

British Columbia Electric Railway Papers, Box 65. Special Collections, University of British Columbia Library.

A specific assessment of the Provincial Party from a non-political contemporary source.

R. B. Bennett Papers, vol. 37. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.

A copy of a single letter obtained by writing the PAC.

J. W. Jones Papers, Public Archives of British Columbia, Victoria.

An unclassified collection mostly concerning Jones' activities as Finance Minister. Taken in conjunction with other papers, it provides much information on financial problems and some political comment.

G. G. McGeer Papers, Public Archives of British Columbia, Victoria.

An ill-assorted collection of clippings and letters covering various periods of McGeer's career. Most of it was of little value except for files of letters to W. L. M. King and T. D. Pattullo.

J. D. MacLean Papers, Public Archives of British Columbia, Victoria.
A single looseleaf folder of no value.

A. R. Meighen Papers, vol. 135, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.
Copies of two letters concerning Tolmie as Dominion organizer, obtained by writing the PAC.

T. D. Pattullo Papers, Public Archives of British Columbia, Victoria.
Papers used were those prior to 1933. The bulk of the collection was saw surveyed but not used.

C. F. M. Planta Papers, in his personal possession, Victoria.
These consist largely of clippings dealing with the period after 1933 or the election of 1933. Several folders of letters deal with internal Conservative conflicts from 1929.

S. F. Tolmie Papers, Special Collections, University of British Columbia Library.
The most fundamental source for this thesis. Carefully organized and indexed, largely dealing with the period of 1928-33.

Sir C. H. Tupper Papers, Special Collections, University of British Columbia Library.
A scattered collection already well covered in other sources.

C. Interviews

Leon J. Ladner, interview, April 15, 1969.
An important source of personal reminiscences on the 1926 convention and the Tolmie administration as well as personal impressions of the various individuals.

C. F. M. Planta, interview, Sept. 14, 1969.
Mr. Planta was a journalist with the Vancouver Province and an active Conservative worker from 1928. By 1931, he was disillusioned with the Tolmie government. In 1933, he ran and won as a Non-Partisan in Peace River. As an opponent of Tolmie and a supporter of Bowser, his views provide interesting contrasts to most of the other sources.

APPENDIX A

TOTAL VALUE OF PRODUCTION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
(In dollars)[1]

YEAR	AGRICULTURE Value of Products to the Farmer	FISHERIES Value of Commercial Fish Caught	FORESTRY	MINING Value of Mineral Products
1915	Figures	14,538,320	27,400,000	28,689,425
1916	not	14,637,346	33,878,000	39,969,962
1917	Comparable	21,518,595	45,884,589	36,141,926
1918	with	27,282,223	52,472,713	42,935,333
1919	later	25,301,607	78,565,094	34,865,427
1920	years	22,329,161	90,048,807	39,411,728
1921	43,527,586	13,953,670	62,936,000	33,230,460
1922	41,408,566	18,849,658	57,477,000	39,423,962
1923	44,496,600	20,795,914	84,674,000	43,757,388
1924	45,066,788	21,257,567	78,602,000	52,298,533
1925	48,951,514	22,414,618	79,841,000	64,485,242
1926	52,883,770	27,367,109	82,702,000	65,622,976
1927	53,265,915	22,890,913	80,987,000	60,801,170
1928	58,644,243	26,562,727	91,587,000	64,496,351
1929	62,632,890	23,930,692	91,201,000	68,162,878
1930	55,957,734	23,103,302	67,350,000	54,953,320
1931	40,107,635	11,108,872	43,097,000	35,337,756
1932	34,373,926	9,909,116	34,143,000	26,767,522
1933	36,647,007	12,001,471	37,955,000	30,794,504
1934	39,826,141	15,334,335	44,141,000	42,226,962

YEAR	MANUFACTURING Net Value of Production (Cost of Materials Excluded	ESTIMATED GROSS PRIMARY PRODUCTION	ESTIMATED GROSS TOTAL PRODUCTION
1915			
1916			
1917	74,978,844		
1918	102,038,534		
1919			
1920	111,692,821		
1921		153,647,716	
1922	71,313,880	157,159,186	228,473,066
1923		173,723,902	
1924		197,224,888	
1925		215,692,374	
1926	111,773,090	228,575,855	340,348,945
1927	120,676,215	217,944,998	338,621,213
1928	133,665,857	241,290,321	374,956,178
1929	132,286,208	245,927,460	378,213,668
1930	117,990,663	201,364,356	319,355,019
1931	93,800,922	129,651,264	223,452,186
1932	74,577,448	105,193,564	179,771,012
1933	75,193,257	117,397,982	192,591,239
1934		141,518,438	

[1] British Columbia, Statistics of Industry in British Columbia 1920-34 (Victoria; Economic Council of British Columbia, 1937)

APPENDIX B

RELIEF EXPENDITURES AND NUMBERS ASSISTED

Years 1930-1933[1]

PERIOD	TOTAL EXPENDITURES	NUMBERS ASSISTED		
		Families	Single	Total
1930 Act Numbers receiving assistance (on a cumulative basis) and costs as from Oct. 1/30 to Aug. 31/31 (each family and each individual being counted once only for this period):				
Direct Relief...	$ 781,480	---	---	29,152
Works Program...	$3,440,764	---	---	34,514
GRAND TOTAL	$4,222,244			63,666
1931 Act Numbers receiving assistance (on a monthly average) and costs as from Sept. 1/31 to April 30/32:		Monthly Average		
Direct Relief...	$1,867,626	---	---	17,638
Camps.....	848,492	---	---	4,882
Works Program...	5,999,971	---	---	8,860
Health....!!....	45,904	---	---	---
GRAND TOTAL	8,761,993	---	---	31,380

1932 Act Numbers receiving assitance (on a monthly average) and costs as from May 1/32 to March 31/33:		Monthly Average		
Direct Relief...	$5,234,146	18,327	10,825	29,152
Hostels.....	92,225	---	1,298	1,298
Urban Centres...	473,869	---	4,540	4,540
Farms.....	3,635	---	10	10
Camps.....	1,068,679	---	6,131	6,131
Health.....	83,492	---	---	---
GRAND TOTAL	$6,956,046	18,327	22,804	41,131

1933 Act Numbers receiving assistance (on a monthly average) and costs as from April 1/33 to March 31/31:		Monthly Average		
Direct Relief...	$6,904,080	21,063	15,564	36,627
Works Program...	4,812	29	---	29
Hostels.....	147,146	---	2,125	2,125
Farms.....	125	---	2	2
Provincial Camps	362,447	---	1,964	1,964
National Camps..	---	---	4,783	4,783
Health.....	118,172	---	---	---
GRAND TOTAL	$7,536,782	21,092	24,438	45,530

NOTE: Numbers show grand total for 1930 Act (no figures available on monthly basis for 1930); for balance numbers are shown on a monthly average. No costs included for National Camps. No administration costs included (except Health costs).

[1] British Columbia, A Narrative History of Unemployment Relief 1931-37 (Victoria, Department of Labour, mimeo, 1937), PLBC.

APPENDIX C

CONTRIBUTIONS FOR RELIEF EXPENDITURES

Years 1930-1933[1]

PERIOD	MUNICIPAL %	PROVINCIAL %	FEDERAL %
1930 Act (to Sept. 30/31)			
MUNICIPAL:			
Direct Relief	33-1/3	33-1/3	33-1/3
Works (Labour only)	50	25	25
UNORGANIZED:			
Direct Relief	---	50	50
Works (Labour only)			
Provincial Works	---	50	50
Classified highways	---	60	40
1931 Act (to Apr. 30/32)			
MUNICIPAL:			
Direct Relief-- Families	33-1/3	33-1/3	33-1/3
Transients and Single Men (from June 19/31)	---	50	50
Works--Labour	25	25	50
Materials	50	---	50
UNORGANIZED:			
Direct Relief	---	50	50
Works (Labour and Materials	---	50	50
Camps (Work-test from Feb./32 of $7.50 cash allowance per month plus board up to 40¢ per man per day	---	50	50

1932 Act (to March 31/33)			
MUNICIPAL:			
Direct Relief			
Municipal families	33-1/3	33-1/3	33-1/3
Transient families	---	50	50
Single Municipal (special contribution to Vancouver)			
up to Jan./33	---	50	50
from Jan./33	33-1/3	33-1/3	33-1/3
Single Homeless (to Nov./32	---	50	50
UNORGANIZED:			
Direct Relief	---	50	50
Camps (Work-test up to Nov./32 of $7.50 cash allowance per month and $10.00 for forest-fire work plus board up to 40¢ per man per day; special allowance for foremen, etc.	---	50	50
COMMISSION (up to 40¢ per case per day)			
Single Homeless Men (from Nov. 1932)			
Hostels	---	---	100
Urban Centres	---	---	100
Camps	---	---	100
Farm Placements	---	---	100
Single Homeless Women (Nov. & Dec./32	---	---	100
1933 Act (up to March 31/34)			
MUNICIPAL:			
Direct Relief			
Municipal Residents	33-1/3	33-1/3	33-1/3
Special Contributions for:			
Burnaby-from Aug./33	---	50	50
Fernie-from June/33	---	50	50
Merritt-from June/33	10	45	45
N. Vancouver-from Aug./33	---	50	50
P. Rupert-from Oct./33	---	50	50
Enderby-from April/32	---	50	50
Ladysmith-from Apr./32	---	50	50
Vancouver-from Apr./33	16-2/3	50	33-1/3

Transient Families	---	50	50
Single Homeless Women (up to 40¢ per case per day)			
up to Aug./33	33-1/3	33-1/3	33-1/3
from Aug./33	---	50	50
Single Homeless Men (up to 40¢ per man per day)			
Unfit-up to Aug./33	33-1/3	33-1/3	33-1/3
Fit & Unfit-from Aug./33	---	50	50
Works (Labour only)-from Aug./33	33-1/3	33-1/3	33-1/3
COMMISSION:(up to 40¢ per man per day)			
Single Homeless Men			
Hostels	---	---	100
Urban Centres	---	---	100
Camps	---	---	100
Farm Placements	---	---	100
UNORGANIZED:			
Direct Relief	---	50	50
Homesteaders (up to 40¢ per man per day)			
Aug. & Sept./33 only	---	---	100
Provincial Camps (upto 40¢ per man per day)			
from Aug./33	---	50	50
National Defense Camps (board and clothing and cash allowance 20¢ per man per day)			
Progressively from June 1/33	---	---	100

APPENDIX D

VANCOUVER MEMBERS' DISSENSION[1]

Subsequent to numerous complaints received from residents of Vancouver, who contribute heavily through taxation to the provincial exchequer, that the tremendous expenditures which are being made by the government are unnecessarily jeopardizing the credit of the Province and also running up the taxation to the point that business will be so heavily saddled with taxation that it will be impossible to compete with Canadian and foreign markets, and that the city of Vancouver, represented by the six members en bloc, is without representation in the Cabinet in the shape of portfolios, the six members met yesterday to give the whole situation consideration.

We reviewed carefully the whole program, platform and promises of the party since you were called to the leadership and subsequently to the Premiership, but more particularly as affecting the city which we represent.

First, let us state that from the time of the Kamloops convention up to the time of the election in July, 1928, strong condemnation was made by the leaders of the Conservative party in this province of the late Liberal regime for carrying on a government in the province of British Columbia in which Vancouver was not represented and consequently had no say in the government policy and administration and this campaign, as you are well aware, resulted in the election of a solid block of Conservatives from the city of Vancouver by substantial majorities. You then formed your cabinet and had Vancouver represented therein by appointing one of the six members as Minister of Finance and another of the members as Minister without Portfolio. There was some criticism at that time that promises that had been made frequently in the city that there were to be two members of the government from the city of Vancouver were hardly lived up to, meaning by these criticisms that a man appointed as Minister without Portfolio did not really assume any responsibilities and could not be held responsible for the acts of the administration, which we feel were in the main justified.

Since that time you carried out a reorganization of your cabinet. The member from Vancouver representing

the portfolio of Finance was relieved of his position and appointed a minister of the cabinet without portfolio. This leaves Vancouver without representation in the cabinet in as much as there was no portfolio allotted, as a consequence it is quite impossible for the two ministers that are in the cabinet without portfolio to keep in touch and have any say in the affairs of the administration.

Taking into consideration the commercial importance of this city in the affairs of the Province, we feel it is not in the best interests of the Province or of the government that a city of the magnitude and importance of Vancouver, which is levied upon and through which half of the finances to carry out the functions of government in this province is collected, should have no voice or say in the government of the province. We feel this is wrong, that no Premier can justify himself to the people of this city and Province by allowing this condition to exist.

We would therefore respectfully draw this matter to your attention and ask you to correct this condition as quickly as possible. We are particularly concerned now with the tremendous program of expenditure which is being entered upon by your government, consequent to unemployment. According to the statistics, about 50% of the unemployed have congregated in the city. This, coupled with the fact that the tremendous expenditure which is entailed by the program laid down recently by the committee from the cabinet, set apart to handle unemployment, which expenditure runs into millions of dollars, leaves Vancouver with no say in the matter although half of the men requiring relief are congregated here and half the costs involved must be collected through the city of Vancouver. I think it is not putting it too strongly to say that there has been no parallel to this state of affairs, outside of British Columbia, in the British Empire in the last century. We claim no government can exist which allows such an injustice to be placed on the chief business center of the province.

We are not insisting that any two members of the six be selected by you to administer portfolios in your government. What we do contend is that two members from Vancouver should be given portfolios in your government. If, in your judgement, no two members of those now holding seats are satisfactory to you as cabinet representatives, we might state that during the course of our meeting yesterday it was stated by one member that he was quite ready and willing to resign his seat so as to make way for someone from the city of Vancouver who, in your opinion, could satisfactorily handle the cabinet position. Another member at the same time expressed the same sentiments.

Taking into consideration the present heavy expenditures and heavy taxation involved which is so important

to the life of this city and the fact that half of the unemployed in the province are congregated here, the six members concur in the opinion that in justice to all, portfolios should be granted to the city's representatives without delay. This decision was arrived at after looking at the matter from every angle and at the same time with only feelings of kindness and sympathy towards you and your administration during this very heavy and nerve-wracking task now devolving upon you.

[1] N. Spencer, W. Dick, G. Walkem and W. Kirk to S. F. Tolmie, Nov. 18, 1931, Tolmie Papers.

APPENDIX E

VANCOUVER CABINET REPRESENTATION[1]

The Vancouver members had a meeting with Mr. Shelly and myself on Thursday last and several matters were discussed. The major discussion, however, was the question of cabinet representation for the city of Vancouver. I need hardly say this was somewhat embarassing to both Mr. Shelly and myself as we did not feel that we, being members of the cabinet, could very well address a letter to you as head of the government to which we belong, asking for a change in this respect.

We did, however, agree to communicate to you personally, and I must say quite frankly I am quite in agreement with the reasonableness and fairness of the request made by the Vancouver members. Looking back over the speeches of Mr. Pooley, the then leader of the Opposition, the editorials, the statements made by yourself, the cartoons used by our party in the campaign, all point, at least, to a promise on the part of the Conservative party that, if they were elected, to deal fairly and honestly with the city of Vancouver as far as cabinet representation was concerned. The only question which arose in my mind when the matter was discussed was not whether the question of Vancouver representation was fair or not, it was a question of what representation should be made to you and how it should be made at this trying moment.

Because of these conditions, I could not agree to the rather drastic actions contemplated by the Vancouver members, with the result they decided to follow the course which they followed, and I have no hesitation in saying that they have the feeling of the people of Vancouver and the feeling which I think is based on the most just and equitable demands.

I still think Vancouver controls the political situation in this province as it has done for the past twenty-five years and, if the present government goes to the polls in the next election under the present conditions, the situation will be as hopeless as the setting sun.

I further think Mr. Pattullo is showing political wisdom in refraining from discussing this subject until the time is too late to remedy it.

The other discussion was that of party loyalty of all Conservative members, in which I administered a severe lacing to William Dick. The other five members agreed with me that Mr. Dick's duty as a member of the Conservative party was to support the Conservative party at all times, that he had a right to protest in caucus but he had no right to issue any protest beyond this. I further informed him if he did not like to support the government, his only course was to resign and, in our opinion, this would be a far better thing than to have him continue in his attacks on the administration while still a member.

[1] R. L. Maitland to S. F. Tolmie, Sept. Nov. 19, 1931, Tolmie Papers. (See Tolmie Papers, UBC, box 5, file 17)

APPENDIX F

RESTRICTIONS ON PROVINCIAL CREDIT[1]

In the opinion of the Bank, the financial position of the Province is extremely serious and prompt effective measures must be taken.

Capital expenditures must stop until the present unfunded debt is cleared up.

In particular, the contemplated expenditure of $2,000,000 on the P. G. E. must not be started until the money is in hand or definitely guaranteed by the Federal government.

The budget must be balanced for the coming year and must include provision against optimistic calculations as to revenue, which we think should be not less than 10% of the expected receipts.

Firm effective measures of treasury control of expenditures must be established at once, in order to insure budgeted expenses will not be exceeded by any department or minister.

The Bank can not see any way at present to authorize a credit larger than the $9,625,000 now being approved. New advances in the future will be made only against accuring revenues and to be repaid from that source. In other words, the Bank will not advance money to meet deficits and measures to be taken to guard against deficits must, therefore, be effective.

Faling a balanced budget, there will be no furthur loans.

There must be no borrowings outside the Bank for current expenditures or other purposes without the Bank's full knowledge and approval in advance.

[1] S. M. Logan, General Manager, Canadian Bank of Commerce, to J. W. Jones, Nov. 12, 1931, Jones Papers.

APPENDIX G

RELIEF INSTRUCTIONS[1]

Owing to the fact that it is imperative to keep within the amount authorized for direct relief for the balance of the fiscal year, it is absolutely necessary we obtain the full co-operation of every official handling disbursements of relief monies, with a view to reducing cost wherever possible without creating undue hardship on the recipients. . . .

In the endeavour to keep within the budget, it has been decided to set a maximum for the food allowance but it does not follow such a maximum should be paid to everyone applying for such relief. Strict investigation of each applicant will be necessary to ensure that only those without means of any kind receive the maximum payment.

For food, this amount may be paid in cash either monthly or semi-monthly. The maximum amount payable is $9.00 for the head of a family, $3.50 for a second adult and $2.50 for each dependent under 12 years of age. If in the opinion of the disbursing officer, it is not advisable to pay this amount in cash, he may issue an order on a merchant to be nominated by the recipient.

For clothing, it is not practicable to set a maximum under this heading. It is desired that you co-operate with the charitable organizations in your territory with a view to filling the requirements of the destitute from this source. . . .

For your general guidance with respect to the provision of clothing, shelter, fuel etc. in no case should the cost of these exceed 40% of the cost of food per family. . . . It is felt that by strict investigation of each case, the cost can be reduced considerably.

[1] W. A. Mackenzie to all Government Agents and other disbursing officers, Nov. 16, 1932, Pattullo Papers.

APPENDIX H

FEDERAL PROVINCIAL RELATIONS[1]

It becomes my absolute duty to say to you in the plainest terms and I do so with the greatest respect, that, in case you anticipate making further requests for aid either by loan or by guarantee or in any other form, favourable consideration can not be given to any such request unless your government is prepared to pledge itself to present a balanced budget by further reduction of proposed expenditures, by increasing taxation, or by both, or if convincing evidence is adduced that under the existing conditions a balanced budget is impossible. Then your government must adopt a definite prescribed plan whereby the maximum estimated deficit in your proposed budget will be well under $1,000,000. Should your government be unwilling or unable to comply with the above requirements, any alternative which may be accepted must be one which meets with the imperative necessities. Again with every respect, I must say that the only alternative I can propose is that the finances of your province be supervised by a financial controller who may be nominated by your province but must be satisfactory to the government of Canada.

It will become the duty of such a controller, and to this end he must be empowered, to supervise all proposed expenditures and thus insure no expenditure can be made or no engagements undertaken without his approval. It would also be the controller's duty to make certain all possible efforts are being made by your government and by the Legislature to raise sufficient revenue to meet your obligations.

The necessary legislative action will have to be taken by the province to give the controller the necessary powers, to continue them as long as your loans to the Dominion remain unpaid or until the Dominion government indicates the services of the controller are no longer required. . . . It is with regret I found myself obliged to write you in these terms but the fact is we have made heavy advances to the four provinces west of the Great Lakes. Obviously some limit must be placed on their borrowings.

---

[1] R. B. Bennett to S. F. Tolmie, March 8, 1933, Jones Papers.

APPENDIX I

REJECTION OF UNION GOVERNMENT[1]

The proposals in your letter do not convey in full the suggestions made to me by Mr. Pooley and Mr. Howe. They suggested an appeal should be made to the electorate, conjointly by yourself and myself under your leadership, that following the election, you and I should conjointly select a cabinet. I informed your representatives that I could not consider such a proposal and expressed the further opinion that such a union would ensure and deserve defeat.

In your letter and repeatedly in public, you have enjoined everyone to forget partisanship and selfish interests and to act solely for the welfare of the province. In view of the fact that you have twice asked me to join your government, I assume you believe me capable of disinterested action.

At your time of life and in your condition of health I do not like to speak harshly, yet it seems this is a time one should speak bluntly and frankly.

During nearly five years of office you have had in your government men of experience in public affairs and men who have been looked upon as leading businessmen. You have also had a three to one majority in the House. Your supporters in the House were looked on as leading citizens in their districts, yet you must now go afield looking for other leading men to join you in government.

I stated in the House a few days ago that, if you had any proposals, having to do either with administration or public policy which you desire to put into effect, the Opposition would support you, if these measures were in the public interest, without any Union. The House is now in session and, if you have any such measures, the opportunity is there to present them.

Instead of dealing with the immediate present, you appear to be mostly concerned as to the possible outcome of the approaching election. I do not share your alarm. In any event, it is the business of the people to express their wishes.

I am not questioning the sincerity of your intentions when I tell you frankly that the man in the street looks upon your proposals as a means to hang on to office.

There are groups and individuals who agree with neither you nor me, and I do not think it would be in the public interest for you and me to join in an attempt to exclude legitimate and minority interests from having representation in the Legislature.

British Columbia financially is in a perilous position, as you must know--more perilous than one cares to state publicly.

I respectfully suggest to you the best service you can render this Province at the present time is to immediately call a general election, and have the issue settled.

[1] T. D. Pattullo to S. F. Tolmie, March 28, 1933, Tolmie Papers.

Surname: PARKER Given Names: IAN DONALD

Place of Birth: VICTORIA, B.C. Date of Birth: MARCH 25, 1935

Educational Institutions Attended, with Dates of Entering and Leaving:

VICTORIA COLLEGE, VICTORIA, B.C.	1952 to 1954
UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, VANCOUVER	1954 to 1956

Degrees, Diplomas, Etc., Awarded, with Dates and Names of Institutions:

B.A.	1956	University of British Columbia

Honors and Awards:

Publications:

2146 Windsor St.
Victoria, B.C.
Jan. 23, 1972

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[redacted]

Ian D. Parker

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