

Arctic Politics in a Time of Change:
A Study on the Impact of Deteriorating Relations on the Indigenous Peoples' Inclusion in Arctic
Decision-Making Processes

by

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B.Sc., Roskilde University, 2022

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I acknowledge and respect the Lək'wəḡən (Songhees and Esquimalt) Peoples on whose territory the
university stands, and the Lək'wəḡən and W̱SÁNEĆ Peoples whose historical relationships with the
land continue to this day.

Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

This thesis examines how the deterioration of Arctic politics since 2007, led by a changed geopolitical perception of the Arctic region and worsened relations between Russia and the West, has impacted the Indigenous Permanent Participants' abilities to advance their own interests in Arctic governance. Through a textual analysis of research on Arctic politics and security, a discourse analysis of the Saami Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council's response to the Arctic Council's suspension in 2022, and analysis of the Arctic Council's structure and an examination of the Russian-West relations between 2007-2022, I argue that the deterioration in Arctic politics affects the Permanent Participants' abilities to advance their interests in Arctic governance in two ways. First, it has increased state-centric decision-making in the Arctic Council, which largely leaves out the Permanent Participants from the Council's decision-making processes. Second, it has increased the workload in the Council, which has heightened the Permanent Participants' demand for funding in order to participate. I conclude that continued deterioration in Arctic relations will negatively affect Arctic Indigenous peoples, as they continue to remain constrained within their national contexts and other international institutions in regard to advancing their own priorities. Through the theoretical lens of securitization and 'acts of indigeneity', this study contributes to the understanding of how the Arctic Indigenous peoples strategically aim to situate themselves as political beings in the Arctic decision-making processes in response to the current deterioration in Arctic politics.

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Abbreviations

A5	The Arctic littoral states
A7	The Arctic member states of the Arctic Council except for Russia
ACAP	The Arctic Contaminants Action Program
AMAP	The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
BEAC	Barents Euro-Arctic Council
CAFF	The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
EPPR	The Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response
ICC	Inuit Circumpolar Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PAME	The Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
SAO	Senior Arctic Officials
SDWG	The Sustainable Development Working Group
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNPFII	United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues

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Introduction

Indigenous peoples have achieved significant success in asserting their political voice in the Arctic region. Their active engagement is partly the reason why the Arctic has evolved from a region consisting of state peripheries into its own coherent region (Greaves, 2016c: 45; Young, 2005: 9, 10). Transcending national state borders, Arctic Indigenous peoples have established organizations dedicated to enhancing the voices and security concerns of their peoples in order to govern their own traditional territories (Axworthy & Dean, 2013: 40). Among these organizations are the Saami Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council (henceforth ICC), which have contributed to strengthening the status of the region's Indigenous peoples and played a central role in the history of Arctic regional regime building (Cambou & Koivurora, 2020: 321; Fabbi, 2015: 484; Shadian, 2018: 339; Tennberg, 2010: 264).

The ICC and the Saami Council had an influential role in the founding of the Arctic Council, and their efforts led to the establishment of the Permanent Participant status for Arctic Indigenous organizations (Axworthy & Dean, 2013; Cambou & Koivurora, 2020; Fabbi, 2015: 484). With this status, Permanent Participants were given rights to active participation and full consultation within the Council's negotiations and decision-making processes (Arctic Council, 1996: 2). In addition to the ICC and the Saami Council, four other organizations hold the status as Permanent Participants: the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich'in Council International and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (Arctic Council, n.d.a). This formalized role of Indigenous peoples into the Arctic regional governance structures has been deemed a defining feature of post-Cold War Arctic cooperation (Chater, Greaves & Sarson, 2020: 54). As it was impossible to establish a political regime during the Cold War, the inclusion symbolized a shift in the history of Arctic politics, from a region largely characterized by Cold War rivalry to a region with a broader, co-operative agenda (Axworthy & Dean, 2013; Olsen & Shadian, 2017: 127).

While the goal of the Arctic Council was to cooperate on matters of environmental protection and sustainable development, the establishment of the Council appeared at a time when debates about the complexity of security were happening. There was, in general, a political willingness to consider alternative conceptions of security that promoted greater cooperation (Gjørsv & Hodgson, 2019: 219; Koivurova, 2010: 146). Although the mandate of the Arctic Council explicitly excluded matters of military security, the expanded understanding of security made the Council the main forum in the Arctic for addressing security governance, including issues related to environmental- and human security (Chater, Greaves & Sarson, 2020: 54; Zellen, 2022).

Arctic Indigenous peoples articulate conceptions of security that both challenge and contradict those of the Arctic states. Yet, these security claims are often marginalized and excluded from policies of the national governments or subsumed by national security formulations (Chater, Greaves & Sarson, 2020: 54; Greaves, 2018: 109). For the Permanent Participants, who have frequently experienced that the Arctic states prioritize own interests at the expense of Indigenous peoples' human and environmental security, the Arctic Council constitutes a forum from where priorities and security concerns different to those of the Arctic states can be articulated and presented (Koivurova & Heinämäki, 2005: 104).

Within security studies, the post-Cold War developments in the Arctic led the region to be considered an 'exceptional' space. The narrative of 'Arctic exceptionalism' maintained that the region was detached from global political dynamics and therefore unaffected by political events and disagreements outside the region. Instead, the region was characterized as an apolitical space of cooperation and peaceful coexistence (Käpylä & Mikkola, 2015: 4). However, the exceptionalist narrative has become increasingly challenged over the past decade. During the first fifteen years of the Arctic Council, global attention to the region was largely centered on climate science and the region's role in understanding global environmental change (Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 146). Yet,

increased attention towards the economic potential of the Arctic's natural resources has led Arctic states – including non-Arctic states – to revise their Arctic foreign and security policies, as it has increased fears over territory and resource competition. In 2007, a Russian flag was planted on the seabed of the geographical North Pole. This event added to the increased attention on the Arctic region and resulted in a rise in applications from powerful global states to become observers in the Arctic Council (Kankaanpää & Young, 2012: 11; Olsen & Shadian, 2017: 125). The increased attention and desire from states and political entities outside of the Arctic region to be involved in Arctic decision-making processes indicates that the “Arctic Council is in the center of a debate on whom, and in what manner, should govern an area undergoing profound change” (Koivurova & Graczyk, 2014: 441-442).

Concerns over the Arctic's geopolitical importance have also grown as the diplomatic relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated, and especially the 2014 annexation of Crimea accentuated the role of global political dynamics in Arctic regional cooperation. The annexation resulted in disruptions to the cooperation within the Arctic Council between 2014-2015 and the suspension of regional military cooperation (Chater, Greaves & Sarson, 2020: 53; Gjørsv & Hodgson, 2019: 225; Greaves, 2020: 363; Käpylä & Mikkola, 2015: 12). Yet, despite interruptions in the Arctic partnership between Russia and the West, the work of the Arctic Council continued in the following years. In 2021, Russia assumed the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, with hopes to “further strengthen regional cooperation [because] the challenges we face in high latitudes today requires approaches that are truly collective” (Arctic Council, n.d.c).

Ten days prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, one of the Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council – the Arctic Athabaskan Council – called upon the Council's member states to not forget their commitment made to the Arctic Indigenous peoples. They reiterated that “the Arctic Council is the world's only forum where we, as Indigenous People, have inclusion at

a global level” (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2022). Yet, on March 3, 2022, the other seven Arctic Council member states (henceforth A7) suspended their participation in meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies in protest of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Global Affairs Canada, 2022a; Zellen, 2023: 138; Zinets & Vasovic, 2022). While the inclusion of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council is said to be based on the “spirit of meaningful and inclusive participation”, the decision to suspend the Council’s work was made without consultation of the Permanent Participants (Global Affairs Canada, 2022a; Zellen, 2022, 2023).

The decision to suspend the meetings of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies without the involvement of Indigenous peoples is one example of how processes of Arctic decision-making favor Western ideas of sovereignty. According to Graczyk & Koivurova (2015: 311), the Arctic Council was established in a political reality different from today. In fact, while the Arctic Council was established on the premises of involvement and inclusion of Arctic Indigenous peoples, the reality is that heightened attention to the Arctic region’s changed geopolitical and climatic conditions has made the Arctic Council increasingly state-centric in its thinking (Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 147; Olsen & Shadian, 2017: 128). To keep up with the heightened interest from outside states, the Arctic Council has gone to great lengths to ensure that the eight Arctic member states are at the forefront of regional governance. The Permanent Participants, on the other hand, have had little choice but to equally make efforts to expand their own engagement to be part of the increasing number of projects and activities (Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 147). Further, the member states have also started to realign how the Arctic Council has traditionally operated: The turn towards state-centric decision-making in the Arctic Council is exemplified with more meetings among the ‘Arctic Five’ (littoral) states and the creation of legally binding agreements made under the auspices of the Arctic Council. Applicable to both examples are that they both largely exclude the Permanent Participants from being

heard in the decision-making processes (Olsen & Shadian, 2017: 128-129; Pomerants, 2017: 195-196).

When understanding the Arctic Council to be constituting a space from where Arctic Indigenous peoples can articulate their own priorities different from those of the Arctic states, the current developments in Arctic politics become a point of interest. Both the uneven capacities of the Permanent Participants in light of the heightened geopolitical interest and the increased turn to state-centric decision-making – as highlighted with the example of the March 2022 suspension of the Arctic Council – raise the question of how the deterioration in Arctic politics affects the Permanent Participants' ability to influence decision-making processes. This is imperative, as human insecurities facing Arctic Indigenous peoples continue to grow (Hoogensen-Gjørsv, 2021: 200). The main research question guiding this thesis is therefore: How has the recent deterioration in Arctic politics affected the Permanent Participants' abilities to advance their interests within Arctic governance?

I argue the Permanent Participants' abilities to advance their own interests in Arctic governance has decreased since 2007 due to increased state-centric decision-making and increased financial constraints. While the Ottawa Declaration, the Arctic Council's founding document, provides the Permanent Participants with full consultation rights in all decision-making processes, the recent developments in the Council inhibit their ability to advance their own interests. Together with the March 2022 suspension of the Arctic Council, the development of increased state-centric decision-making in the Council places the Permanent Participants directly outside of the decision-making processes.

Further, because the Arctic Council has grown in importance globally since 2007, it has experienced an increase in the number of working group meetings and the establishment of task forces. I argue that while the Permanent Participants have faced financial limitations since the establishment of the Arctic Council, the structure of the Council has enabled the Permanent

Participants to contribute to knowledge creation and agenda setting, and their contributions play an important role in identifying regional governance challenges in the region. The Permanent Participants are considered knowledge-holders and experts on local issues, and their involvement in the decision-making processes provides the Arctic Council with legitimacy and effectiveness. However, the post-2007 development has overstretched the capacities of the Permanent Participants, who already before 2007 faced barriers to their participation mainly due to financial constraints. The lack of secured funding makes it difficult for the Permanent Participants to participate in the workings of the Council and thereby present own interests and advance own constituencies.

Therefore, in response to their constrained ability to participate in the Arctic Council's decision-making processes post-2007, as exemplified by the March 2022 suspension of the Arctic Council, I argue that the Permanent Participants draw on their situatedness in the Arctic region and their collective rights as distinct peoples with the aim of situating themselves as legitimate actors who must be included in the Arctic Council's decision-making processes. This argument is based on an analysis of data from the ICC and the Saami Council, which were selected as the two Permanent Participants with the capacity to provide the most extensive commentary on the current situation in Arctic politics.

Theoretical framework

This study employs the theory of securitization and 'acts of indigeneity' as its theoretical framework. To understand 'acts of indigeneity' as a response to Indigenous peoples' inability to successfully securitize issues, I draw on Aradau (2004) and Behnke's (2000) critique of the exceptional politics of securitization. This provides the context why it is essential to study strategies that aim to democratize the security debate. I argue that Arctic Indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council, though to varying degrees, use 'acts of indigeneity' as a strategy of contestation, with the aim of democratizing the security debate and situating themselves as legitimate, political beings who

must be included in Arctic governance. The ratification of the *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (henceforth UNDRIP) considerably advanced Indigenous peoples' internationalism (Lightfoot, 2016: 4; Stevenson, 2023: 9). In this regard, 'acts of indigeneity' is inherently tied to Indigenous peoples' collective rights under UNDRIP and especially the right to self-determination.

Aradau (2004: 393) and Behnke (2000: 91) argue that the exceptional politics of securitization is a dangerous undertaking for democracy because it shifts issues away from the normal democratic process that exists in the political sphere. Therefore, Huysmans & Guillaume (2013: 18, 19) propose to study the practices that challenge the depoliticization and exclusions produced by securitization. This includes studying how actors, who normally do not have their security claims accepted by an audience with the means to mobilize a response, position themselves as 'on site' rather than outside of the political being (Huysmans & Guillaume, 2013: 22).

Yet, studying the contestations of securitization is underdeveloped and underspecified (Aradau, 2004: 388-389; Hansen, 2012: 527). Huysmans & Guillaume (2013: 22, 23) suggest that citizenship is the vehicle through which such understanding can occur – that actors enact themselves as political subjects through 'acts of citizenship', striving to assert their right to be political by drawing on their rights as citizens. Citizenship is both an institution of domination and alienation, yet it is also a claim for the right to be political. However, Indigenous peoples are not just citizens of their respective states but also peoples with collective rights under UNDRIP (Lightfoot, 2016: 33). This enables Indigenous peoples to position their political claims in international law in order to advance their own priorities. The Indigenous rights regime places moral and political demands on states and forces a rethinking of Indigenous-state relationships, from a hierarchical, colonial relation and toward a fairer and just one (Ibid: 188, 203). Koivurova & Heinämäki (2005: 101) argue that this strategy is often used due to Arctic Indigenous peoples' difficulties in influencing political developments within their respective

states, particularly because the right to self-determination for Indigenous peoples clearly “recognize[s] the right of Indigenous peoples to participate effectively in all decisions that directly affect them” (Heinämäki, 2009: 209).

Therefore, I argue that Arctic Indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council, instead of drawing on their rights as citizens within their respective states, to varying degrees utilize ‘acts of indigeneity’ grounded in their collective rights under UNDRIP and the Indigenous rights regime to assert their right to participate in Arctic governance. Indigeneity, however, is socially constructed and because the understanding of ‘indigeneity’ is not fixed, it encompasses many different understandings. This allows for different Indigenous groups to claim indigeneity strategically in different ways (Gregg, 2019: 824, 827). While indigeneity within the national context serves as an inhibiting factor to successfully securitize issues within their respective state borders, Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations strategically take “advantage of the support of international law [they benefit] from” to circumvent the challenges faced within their respective state-borders (Pelaudeix, 2019: 45-46). This strategy is particularly beneficial in international organizations of soft law, such as the Arctic Council from the outset, as it has the potential to create norms that are politically and morally binding (Koivurova & Heinämäki, 2005: 103, 105).

With the unique governance structure of the Arctic Council, the Permanent Participants hold an advantageous position with powers almost the same as the Arctic states. The Arctic Council can thus be perceived as providing a platform for Indigenous peoples to articulate their concerns outside the boundaries of their respective states. The high level of inclusion in the Arctic Council provides them with a seat at the table from where they can draw on their collective rights under UNDRIP as a strategy to claim their inclusion in matters they deem important.

Research design

This study analyzes the deterioration in Arctic politics since 2007 and its consequences for the Permanent Participants in advancing own priorities. I first conduct a textual analysis of research on the existing literature on Arctic security and Arctic governance and analyze Indigenous peoples' position therein. To exemplify the recent deterioration in Arctic politics, the 2022 suspension of the Arctic Council serves as an illustrative example of the Permanent Participants' reaction to the recent development in Arctic politics.

Utilizing Manner's (2013: 416) understanding of security as a subjective process, the illustrative example enables the understanding of how the Saami Council and the ICC describe, comprehend, and construe the suspension and its effects on their ability to advance own interests within Arctic governance. The data selection has therefore been information oriented (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230), and sampled from the date of the suspension, March 3, 2022, through October 22, 2023, where the Saami Council and the ICC attended the Arctic Circle Assembly in Iceland. The criteria for the sampling involved identifying mentions of the suspension and the consequences of Russia's war against Ukraine, as is it directly tied to the reason of the Council's suspension. The data were retrieved from various search engines and archives, including the websites of the Arctic Council, the Saami Council, and the ICC. I also used Google to identify news articles from various sources by conducting an advanced search where the findings were limited to the sampling interval. The search terms across the archives and search engines included 'Arctic Council' combined with search terms including 'pause', 'pausing', 'suspension', 'suspended' and 'Ukraine'. During the sampling interval, a number of conferences took place with the attendance of the Saami Council and the ICC. These included the Arctic Peoples' Conference (2023), Arctic Frontiers (2023), Arctic Encounter Symposium (2023), and Arctic Circle Assembly (2023). The ICC also held the Inuit Circumpolar Council Delegates Meeting (2023). Many of the talks from these conferences and the ICC Delegates Meeting were

available on YouTube. Whenever a representative from the Saami Council or the ICC addressed the Arctic Council pause or the consequences of Russia's war in Ukraine on Arctic collaboration, the talk was transcribed by me with the aim of being incorporated into the dataset.

This then resulted in 26 data points drawn from different sources, including statements, declarations, annual reports, and transcribed speeches. The body of data represents various types of texts from different social contexts and time periods during the Council's suspension (Balzacq, 2011: 43). The data points are presented in Table 1 in Chapter 4. Appendix A includes all the data points and their source.

As part of this analysis, I examine this data using discourse analysis. Discourse analysis enables the examination of language and how it interacts with world politics (Alejandro et al., 2023: 162). Case studies, according to Howarth (2005: 330), provide ideal means to accomplish such an analysis. While the number of data points is relatively small, the diverse body of data has the benefit of enabling a thick description of how the suspension of the Arctic Council has been experienced by the Saami Council and the ICC (Balzacq, 2011: 41). Yet, discourses do not occur nor operate in a vacuum but are rather contextually enabled and constrained. It is therefore important to situate the discourses in a social and historical context to capture their meaning (Balzacq, 2011: 36; Halperin & Heath, 2020: 369; Hansen, 2006: 74).

While discourse analysis is a common method in qualitative studies, methodological suggestions on how to carry out a discourse analysis are limited and no definite framework exists (Alejandro et al., 2023: 165; Carbó et al., 2016: 369; Dunn & Neumann, 2016: 109). I draw on Alejandro et al.'s (2023) four step discourse analysis. Having identified the relevant sources for the analysis, which constitutes step one, step two includes mapping the context and conducting a preliminary analysis. To interpret the data, the preliminary analysis involves considering the situation

of utterance, the sociohistorical context of the text and the textual context. This step is visualized in Table 1. Step three relates to identifying relevant discourse analysis tools.

While Alejandro et al. (2023) does not elaborate on this step, I draw on Balzacq's (2011: 41, 43) insights on intratextual analysis, where the analytical tools in the document are analyzed. This step enquires into the performative dimension of the text and includes, among others, examining the communicative purposes of the text, the rhetoric and questioning what kind of action the text aims to achieve. With the use of the software NVivo, this step was conducted through coding each of the datapoints of the two respective organizations separately. This initial coding process was inductively driven and resulted in many different codes.

Finally, in step four, the analytical tools and the contextual elements were interpreted and disseminated. To make sense of the codes across the dataset, codes with similar content were structured into larger categories, each coming to constitute a 'discourse'. Three main discourses were gathered from both of the Saami Council and the ICC, each of them elaborated on in Chapter 3. The codes making up each discourse are shown in Appendix B and Appendix C.

A. Positionality

The dataset is based on secondary data gathered from a range of publicly available sources. The decision to solely analyze secondary data was not the initial plan when formulating the research design for this thesis. Initially, the hope was for primary data collection, and I reached out to the ICC, the Saami Council, and their subnational organizations in the early stage of my research to inquire about their thoughts on the suspension of the Arctic Council. However, I only received replies rejecting participation or referring my request to other individuals within the organizations who did not respond.

As I reconsidered my approach to the research design, I became aware of the notion of ‘research fatigue’. Drawing on Brunger & Wall (2016: 1868) and Kater (2022: 109), research fatigue can occur when minority and/or Indigenous groups repeatedly experience researchers approaching them for participation, surveying, questioning and incorporation into research projects. Often, various groups of researchers unintentionally examine the same topic(s) or ask nearly identical questions to potential research participants. Despite the ethical protocols in place at universities, power balances and positive gains throughout the research project often end up being unequal, benefiting the researcher and not the local community of the participating groups. Research fatigue, then, leads participants to feel worn out and discouraged from further research.

With the increase in universities’ ethical guidelines in relation to research with Indigenous peoples, Kovach (2021: 114, 124) highlights how community engagement often becomes the determining factor between socially just and extractive research. While community engagement is considered worthy and desirable, and marks a shift from former less collaborative practices, it can create stress for the parts involved and especially Indigenous peoples (Alcantara, Lalonde & Wilson, 2017; Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2018: 5). Engagement is demanding, often financially under-resourced, and the universities’ ethics protocols create constraints on Indigenous jurisdiction (Kovach, 2021: 125, 127).

While not asserting that the unsuccessful attempt in recruiting research participants is attributed to research fatigue, it warrants consideration of how the initial research design may have contributed to the preexisting stress experienced by these communities, especially in a time where the Arctic region is of interest to many researchers (Biresselioglu et al., 2020; Duc, 2022). Analyzing secondary data thus helps to distance the research from the potential pitfalls associated with community engagement, which can be particularly challenging for graduate students working under time constraints and without research funding (Chambers et al, 2021: 207; Kovach, 2021: 127). Further,

with the data sourced directly from the organizations, it gives agency to their perspectives on the suspension. Unlike interviews, which was initially considered for this research, secondary data enables the examination and analysis of the perspectives that the ICC and the Saami Council wish to disseminate to the public without the interference of the researcher. Given that the ICC and the Saami Council often publish their own documents and disseminate their opinions at various fora, utilizing secondary data allows for the study of their respective strategies over time.

Yet, analyzing publicly available data isn't without implications either. An aspect of the research that stands out is my role as a non-Indigenous researcher conducting research on the international organizations of Arctic Indigenous peoples. Historically, Arctic colonialism has materialized through the means of research, with Euro-American authority over the Arctic extended by Western explorers. As interest in the Arctic region surges across popular and scientific media these years, the region's colonial legacies fade into oblivion (Stuhl, 2016: 3, 14). This, however, does not change the fact that research within Indigenous studies remains entangled in relational and colonial power structures. This highlights the importance of considering the positionality of the researcher to understand how it may influence the research (Mosurska & Ford, 2019: 348; Smith, 2012: 1, 6). As Braun & Clarke (2006: 84) and Sand (2023: 13) argue, every researcher speaks from a position which affects research interests and approach to a field of study. Thus, while the dataset in this thesis has been inductively coded, it is important to note that coding is an act, and therefore does not occur in a vacuum but is ultimately influenced by the researcher's theoretical or epistemological commitments.

Examining the literature on positionality and research involving Indigenous peoples reveals a debate regarding an *insider/outsider* dichotomy of who can conduct valid research. Within this debate, some scholars contend that being Indigenous is a prerequisite for undertaking such research (Sand, 2023; Olsen, 2017). Sand (2023) writes from the position of being a Saami 'inbetween' and, drawing on the Saami scholar Rauna Kuokkanen (2000, 2008, 2010), contends that non-Indigenous

researchers engaging in research involving Indigenous issues must do their homework. As a non-Indigenous researcher, this means recognizing the limits of one's knowledge, actively listening and learning, practicing honesty, and explaining how one has carried out the research. It aligns with Smith's (2021: 193-194) argument that positionality is more than merely description, it also includes honesty regarding the theoretical and methodological choices made in the research and reflection over why these choices are important in order to further research focusing on Indigenous issues. However, while considering the position of the researcher is often ethically important, determining the validity and relevance of the research results is a matter of *how* the research is carried out and not solely the position of the researcher (Sand, 2023: 13).

I therefore build on Sand's (2023) four points to position myself. I grew up in Denmark but have lived and worked in Northern Norway and Greenland on various occasions between 2016 and 2021. These experiences sparked my academic interest in the region. My undergraduate degree allowed me to focus on the historical and ongoing relationship between Greenland and Denmark, and the people I encountered during my time in Greenland taught me a great deal about living with the consequences of my home country's colonial actions. I moved to Canada to study for my master's degree at University of Victoria under Dr. Will Greaves, as it allowed me to further my research interests within the field of Arctic affairs, Indigenous peoples and security studies. As I had previously studied the importance of the Arctic Council for regional politics and Indigenous peoples during my undergraduate degree, the suspension of the Arctic Council in March 2022 played an important role in my choice of research topic for this thesis. However, my personal background and lived experiences do not grant me the authority to speak on behalf of the Inuit or the Saami peoples, nor do I have any intention of assuming such a role. This thesis offers one understanding out of many of the implications for Indigenous peoples of the suspension of the Arctic Council and the deterioration in Arctic politics.

Finally, I recognize that engaging in the research field of Indigenous political issues requires more than recognizing the historical context of unethical research and conducting research that is ethically defensible by traditional ethical codes (Lawrence & Raitio, 2016: 122). The process of decolonization must be a continued activity when carrying out research. It can, among others, take shape in posing critical questions to the underlying principles and impact of research, for example by critically examining the transferability of theories developed in Western contexts or by indigenizing consciousness (Olsen, 2016: 41; Mosurska & Ford, 2019: 348; Smith, 2021: 198). Analyzing the Saami Council and the ICC's perspectives on the suspension of the Arctic Council can be a modest attempt to indigenize the field of Arctic security studies, which traditionally has excluded Indigenous peoples from its focus.

B. Research gap

This study aims to make three contributions to the literature on Indigenous peoples and Arctic governance. First, by centering the case study on the suspension of the Arctic Council, the study contributes to the understanding of a recent event from the perspective of the Saami Council and the ICC. Existing literature on the suspension has largely focused on the importance of maintaining circumpolar dialogue between the Arctic states in the era of increased tensions between Russia and the West (Canova & Pic, 2023; Koivurova & Shibata, 2023; Zellen, 2023), yet fewer have analyzed how the Permanent Participants describe the event and its implications for their ability to advance own priorities in Arctic governance. Secondly, the study contributes to the understanding of Indigenous peoples' security perspectives, which have largely been neglected from the field of security studies (Greaves, 2016a: 461). By studying the Saami Council and the ICC's own articulations of the suspension of the Arctic Council and its effects on their ability to advance own priorities in Arctic governance, the study makes an empirical contribution to the field of security

studies. Finally, by studying ‘acts of indigeneity’ as a conceptual response to Huysmans & Guillaume’s (2013: 22, 23) ‘acts of citizenship’, I aim to contribute with an understanding of how Arctic Indigenous peoples situate themselves as political beings demanding inclusion in Arctic governance.

Chapter outline

To answer the research question, Chapter 1 provides a textual analysis of research on the existing literature on Arctic security, governance, and Indigenous peoples’ position herein. Chapter 2 provides a background on the structure of the Arctic Council, before elaborating on how the increased geopolitical interest in the Arctic region has affected the work of the Council and the Permanent Participants.

In Chapter 3, I elaborate on the 2022 suspension of the Arctic Council as an illustrative case of the increased state-centrism within the Council and the recent deterioration in Arctic politics.

In Chapter 4, I use discourse analysis to analyze the Saami Council and the ICC’s own articulations of the Arctic Council suspension. I find these two organizations articulate versions of the suspension drawing on their collective rights as Indigenous peoples and as right-holders within the Council. Through the theoretical lens of securitization and ‘acts of indigeneity’, addressing the suspension while asserting their rights can be understood as a way to demand a democratization of the decision-making processes and to situate themselves as legitimate actors in Arctic politics.

Finally, in Chapter 5, I analyze the implications of the deterioration in Arctic politics and what it means for the Saami Council and the ICC’s ability to advance own interests in Arctic governance. I argue for three distinct, yet interrelated, implications. First, the increased workload in the Arctic Council impacts the Permanent Participants’ ability to advance their own interests within the Arctic Council. To effectively participate in the increased workload, they rely on funding from the member

states. Yet, ‘colonial agendas’ continue to affect the relations between the Permanent Participants and the member states (Greaves, 2018: 114), and the Saami Council and the ICC therefore run the risk of compromising their own interests and priorities to receive funding. I therefore consider other avenues for funding.

Second, the turn towards state-centric decision-making poses a direct threat to the Permanent Participants’ ability to articulate own interests. I argue that this pose implications for the Inuit and the Saami peoples, because they experience constraints in advancing own interests within their national borders and in other intergovernmental fora. By leaving out the Permanent Participants from the decision-making processes in the Arctic Council, they lose their primary forum where they have a high level of inclusion and from where they can advance interests distinct from their respective states.

Finally, I consider the consequences for the Permanent Participants if the deterioration in Arctic politics continues. I argue that a continued deterioration in Arctic politics will risk the dissolution of the Arctic Council and diminish the conception of the Arctic region as a coherent region bound together by a shared goal of environmental protection and mitigation of human security challenges. This will limit the room further for alternative articulations of security and will pose consequences to the Saami Council and the ICC, who both have member organizations in Russia.

Chapter One: Arctic Security, Governance, and Indigenous peoples

Through a textual analysis, this chapter aims to situate the research topic of the thesis within the broader literature on Arctic security, governance, and Indigenous peoples' position herein.

Arctic Politics - From Cold War to collaboration

'Security' has long had a presence in the Arctic region, yet its meaning has changed over time as values and regional priorities have shifted. The Arctic served as a stage for international geopolitics during the Cold War, and it especially played a role in the way security was understood in the region, reducing Arctic security to be bound within an anarchic international system dominated by two superpowers (Fabbi et al., 2017: 159; Gjørsv, 2014: 58; Gjørsv & Goloviznina, 2014: 2). This made the region subject to a phase of militarization, causing harm to Indigenous communities and their local environment, health, and human rights (Chaturvedi, 2000: 447-448). While the possibility for regional institution-building during these years seemed improbable, moves of collaborative efforts moved Arctic regional politics beyond the trappings of the Cold War geopolitics.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, barriers to cooperation between the East and the West were reduced, and the Arctic states began redefining their relations within the international community and delineating their roles in a developing 'Arctic community'. (Shadian, 2006: 256). In the broader literature on Arctic institutionalization, two significant factors are attributed the shift from Arctic states' confrontation to cooperation. One factor was Mikhail Gorbachev's Murmansk speech from 1987, which has been perceived as a symbolic milestone in the process of Arctic institutionalization. Gorbachev proposed increased cooperation across ideological differences, recognition of Indigenous peoples' rights and for the Arctic states to turn the region into a "genuine zone of peace" (Graczyk & Koivurora, 2015: 299; Olsen & Shadian, 2017: 127; Young, 1998: 32). Another factor was the physical environment, which has also been identified as playing a

pivotal role in the deepening of Arctic regional relations. The agenda formation coincided with a series of events that drew unprecedented attention to threats to the Arctic environment, creating a shared understanding of the Arctic region as a demanding space in need of regional cohesion (Chaturvedi, 2000: 449; Dodds & Hemmings, 2018: 489, 491; Graczyk & Koivurora, 2015: 299).

Drawing on the concept of region-building, Keskitalo (2007: 188) posits that regions' development is based on choices made on specific historical and political grounds. For the post-Cold War Arctic region, regional environmental cooperation came to be perceived as a medium to overcome political divides in an international arena deeply divided, as science and the environment were understood as relatively neutral grounds (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2015: 299; Koivurora & Smieszek, 2017: 3; Nicol & Chater, 2021: 42, 43). This led to the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (henceforth AEPS) in 1991, marking the beginning of cooperation based on agreements in areas of so-called 'low' politics such as environmental protection (Gjørøv & Hodgson, 2019: 219; Heininen, 2014: 42; Nicol & Chater, 2021: 42, 43). Today, Arctic governance structures are often characterized as 'a mosaic' of forums and mechanisms that provide the basis for cooperative dialogue and decision-making. Still, the environment remains a significant focus in many of these forums (Sacks et al., 2021: 3; Wood-Donnelly, 2023: 2; Young, 2005: 11).

Significant agreement across the literature on Arctic institutions refers to the Arctic Council, successor to the AEPS, as the primary institution in the region. While the initial focus was on sustainable development and environmental protection, the forum has evolved into the primary governing body responsible for coordinating agreements on a wide range regional issues (Koivurova & Shibata, 2023: 1; Medby, 2019: 1280; Rottem, 2020: 10; Wood-Donnelly, 2023: 4). In the literature on Arctic institutionalization, the structure of the Arctic Council is often described as 'unique'. This is due to the unprecedented level of inclusion of the region's Indigenous peoples as Permanent Participants, as the Arctic Council is, according to Chater (2019: 152), "the only international

institution in which a non-state actor possesses guaranteed influence” (Alexander & Bloom, 2023; Broek, Olczak & Dellmuth, 2023: 3; Burke, 2019: 312; Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 142-143; Graczyk & Koivurova, 2015: 319; Hossain, 2016: 31).

Arctic Indigenous governance and institutions

The post-Cold War regional institutionalization of relations between the Arctic Indigenous peoples and the states reflected state efforts to reconcile with Indigenous peoples (Greaves, 2016a: 464; Koivurora & Heinämäki, 2005: 101; Tennberg, 2010: 269). While the political inclusion of Indigenous peoples has been considered a strength of the institutional structure of the Arctic Council itself, it has also been identified as one of the defining features of the political order in the post-Cold War Arctic (Greaves, 2016b: 39; Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 154; Hosa, 2023; Hossain, 2016: 31; Zellen, 2023: 141).

Established at a time of widespread optimism for global peace and following years of Arctic Indigenous peoples’ advocacy for a regional platform for cooperation and dialogue, the Arctic states acknowledged the significance of having the region’s Indigenous peoples permanently included in the Council’s governance structure, which the Arctic Indigenous peoples today are considered main architects of (English, 2013: 286). In the decades leading up to the establishment of the Council, there had been a regional tendency of increased decentralization of political authority, transferring power back to the subnational governments in the Arctic to act across territorial borders through increased autonomy and home rule (Nicol & Chater, 2021: 57; Young, 1998: 32). The region also experienced a growth in the number of transnational relations, as Arctic Indigenous peoples began establishing organizations across the region to further their interests among national governments south of the Arctic region and for advancing their own takes on the future of the Arctic region (Fabbi et al., 2017: 160-161; Greaves, 2020: 366; Sejersen, 2015: 18; Young, 1998: 32). Drawing on the larger

Indigenous rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the Indigenous peoples' organizations called for the states to recognize them as right-holders: Not only as individual citizens of the respective states, but also as peoples with a broad set of collective rights (Hossain, 2016: 28; Lightfoot, 2016: 33). For Arctic Indigenous peoples, Indigenous transnationality became a political tool for advancing own interests across various political levels (Morin & d'Anglure, 2003 in Zepeda & Virchez, 2022: 34).

The Saami Council and the ICC stand out in the literature when examining the role of Indigenous peoples' organizations in Arctic governance (Cambou & Koivurova, 2020: 320; Tennberg, 2010: 264; Wilson, 2020: 27). Especially the ICC is recognized for its success in representing and negotiation Inuit public policy, fostering international cooperation and establishing the Inuit as an international actor (Abele & Rodon, 2009; Fabbi, 2015: 482; Shadian, 2015: 169-170; Wilson & Smith, 2011; Zepeda & Virchez, 2022: 35). According to Shadian (2006: 257), while the international community grappled with the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the ICC found itself in a fortunate position to advance its already solidified agenda, as the ICC had already formulated a solid discourse for addressing Arctic development and environment. Due to their accumulated legitimacy, Shadian (2006: 257) argues that the ICC possess the authority for determining the direction on how Arctic development is defined and proceeds. The efforts of both the Saami Council and the ICC have, according to Sejersen (2015: 24), enabled Arctic Indigenous peoples to become visible to the public, a position that other Indigenous communities around the world struggle to gain as the first step towards achieving recognition.

The initial inclusion of Indigenous peoples into the governance structure of the Arctic Council was unprecedented. Still, to this day, Hossain (2016: 31) posits that the institutional development in the region, with respect to the involvement of Indigenous peoples, is the most advanced compared to other regions. Except for in Russia, the Inuit and the Saami peoples enjoy a large degree of political autonomy through various self-government arrangements: The Saami peoples are represented

through the Saami Parliaments in Scandinavia while the Inuit in Greenland approved the Self-Government Act in 2009, establishing new political and legal opportunities for extensive self-governance. In Canada, Inuit and the Canadian state completed negotiations of the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement in 1993, establishing a new institutional framework for governing land and mineral resources (Bernauer, 2015: 5; Kuokkanen, 2019: 62, 92). Inter-governmentally, the Saami peoples are represented within the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (henceforth BEAC), and both organizations are represented internationally within the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (henceforth UNPFII). However, both BEAC and the UNPFII fall short of offering Indigenous peoples the same level of inclusion as the Arctic Council, as they only grant them consultative or NGO status. For example, the UNPFII's does not have decision-making powers which limits its mandate, and further, by giving Indigenous peoples' self-government institutions the status of an NGO neglects the fact that Indigenous peoples, opposite of NGO's, have the right to self-determination (Cambou, 2018: 42; Loukacheva, 2009: 52; Tennberg, 2010: 267).

The establishment of the Arctic Council can therefore be seen as mutually beneficial to the states and the Arctic Indigenous peoples. The creation of the Permanent Participants status is argued to have enhanced the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council's decision-making process and enabled the Council to represent the region with "considerable legitimacy" (Broek, Olczak & Dellmuth, 2023; Cambou & Koivurora, 2020: 326; Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 144; Stenlund, 2001), while also having come to constitute the primary forum for Arctic Indigenous peoples for sharing own perspectives on governance and security in the region (Hosa, 2023; Olsén, 2018: 300). Specifically, Koivurora & Heinämäki (2005: 102) argue that the soft-law approach employed by the Arctic Council offers Indigenous peoples with better opportunities for influential participation compared to the traditional international law methods. This is even though the Permanent Participants since the establishment of the Arctic Council have faced limitations to their financial capacity which

have impacted their level of involvement in the Council (Chater, 2019: 291; Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 149, 152). However, the inclusion of Arctic Indigenous peoples in the Council clarified and enhanced the status of Arctic Indigenous peoples and marked a significant step toward the democratization of international decision-making (Chater, 2019: 150; Koivurova & Heinämäki, 2005: 104).

The construction of security – who can speak security?

While Gjørsv & Goloviznina (2014: 2) argue that the notion of ‘security’ has been present in the Arctic region for long, little agreement exists on how to define it (Peoples & Vaughn-Williams, 2010: 22; Smith, 2005: 27). ‘Security’ does not hold an objective definition, rather normative commitments underly the various definitions of what ‘security’ is, making it an inherently political and contested concept (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 192; Gjørsv & Goloviznina, 2014: 1; Greaves & Lackenbauer, 2021: 4). While there is growing agreement that the traditional conceptions of security were too narrowly defined, a consensus does not exist on how a more broadly constructed understanding of security should look like. For the Arctic region specifically, it is essential to analyze and comprehend security relations outside of state boundaries to fully capture the core essential component of Arctic security relations (Buzan, 2007: 34; Hoogensen, 2005: 273).

The theory of securitization originated from the Copenhagen School whose contributions broadened the understanding of security beyond the field’s previous emphasis on military security (Huysmans, 1998a: 227; Wæver, 1997: 41). Genealogically, the concept of security’s heavy emphasis on military security can be traced back to its connotations to national security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 12; Wæver, 1997: 42). Yet, where national security concerns previously revolved around military threats, the rise in economic and environmental agendas worldwide in the 1970s and 1980s triggered a widening in the understanding of what constituted a threat (Buzan, 2007: 107; Wæver, 1997: 42). For the Copenhagen School, the solution was to maintain flexibility within the security

agenda, allowing it to encompass many different types of threats. By situating politics of existential threat at the core of security studies, the Copenhagen School focused on how a given issue is made a matter of security through the process of securitization (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 4; Palosaari & Tynkkynen, 2015: 87; Wæver, 1995: 52). Securitization therefore offers an approach to examine how issues, when positioned as an existential threat, move politics beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics. By speaking ‘security’, an actor makes a claim to handle the issue with extraordinary means (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 23, 24). Speaking security is therefore, as Huysmans (2011: 373) argues, a decision to create a rupture in a given order with consequences for others as it removes the issue away from the normal bargaining mode of everyday politics.

A central question that arises from the analysis of securitization is: Who holds the power to securitize an issue and for what cause? Three ‘facilitating conditions’ structure the likely success of a securitizing move or speech act, including the use of security language, the relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience whose acceptance the success of the move relies on, and the features of the alleged threat (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 33, 45). Because the likely success of a securitization move depends on the accept by an audience with the means to mobilize a response, not all actors possess equally powerful positions when it comes successfully securitizing issues.

While there is no consensus on the role or significance of identity, Greaves (2018: 107, 111) argues it is a key variable in the securitization process. Within settler-colonial societies, indigeneity acts as an obstacle for Indigenous peoples to successfully securitize their issues within their respective states. Settler-colonialism is fundamentally about land, yet land also underpins Indigenous identities and worldviews. Thus, when Indigenous peoples identify their national governments as the source of their insecurity, their security claims challenge the security of the settler states. While both Saami and Inuit are organized and legitimate political actors, their Indigenous identity serves as an inhibiting condition within the national context, because they need their respective states’ acceptance of their

security claims (Greaves, 2016a: 462; Greaves, 2018: 107, 109). For example, in a case study on Inuit in the Arctic region of Northern Canada, Greaves (2016b: 53) proposes that the dynamics of settler-colonial relations between the presenter of security claims and the audience whose acceptance is required operate as a barrier, inhibiting Inuit's ability to successfully securitize issues. Securitization can thus be understood as an exclusionary practice, as its success is contingent upon the actor's position of power in society. For those holding the power to successfully securitize an issue, their authority legitimates the suspension of the usual democratic process related to politics.

Despite the Copenhagen School's aim to widen the conceptualization of security, it continued to focus on security to the state (Booth, 2005: 271; Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 214; Smith, 2005: 37; Wæver, 1995: 52, 54). This applies even as Buzan & Wæver (2003: 71) revisited the theory to become a more open, analytical framework with the aim of moving away from state-centrism. However, while securitization theory may not be state-centric in its premises, it often appears state-centric in its findings (Booth, 2007: 167, 169; Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 71). Advocates of a more radical expansion of the security concept criticize this and highlight, among others, the theory's Eurocentric focus and its inability to identify whom cannot speak security nor successfully securitize issues (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 215-216).

The Copenhagen School originated within the European security landscape heavily impacted by the end of the Cold War and the challenges of European integration (Bilgin, 2011: 401; Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 188; Emmers, 2016: 174). This has given it what Huysmans (1998b: 480) calls an "explicitly European flavor". Huysmans (1998b: 500) argues the Copenhagen School fixed the logic of security to a rhetorical structure, meaning that for an issue to be a security issue, it must follow to this logic. While fixing the logic of security to a rhetorical structure enabled a widening of the security agenda to different threats and referent objects, it subsequently made the question of what security is no longer an object of research. Especially post-colonial perspectives warn against assuming the

existence of a universal, shared conception of security, arguing that local constructions of security can differ from the commonly assumed Western-centric idea of it, highlighting profound differences in the organization of societies and key political principles, including how governance and legitimacy are perceived (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 202).

Another Eurocentric assumption of the securitization theory is its presupposition of political structures that enable and guarantee free speech (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 216). Hansen (2000) argues that the securitization theory neglects to identify ‘the silent security dilemma’. With the speech act central to the theory and the grounding of the definition of security within it (Guillaume, 2018: 478; Hansen, 2000: 285), the question arises: Who can speak security? The methodological reliance on speech act theory presupposes the ability to speak as well as privileging speech over other means of expression (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 216; Wilkinson, 2017: 12). Greaves (2018: 111) contributes to the understanding of who cannot successfully securitize issues through the term ‘securitization nondominance’. The term refers to social groups who face structural barriers in their ability to successfully speak, write or perform securitization moves. Thus, attempts of securitization by nondominant actors fail as a result of the relationship between the dominant society, state institutions and the non-dominant group that the speaker represents. In the Arctic region, despite their advantageous political positions within their respective states compared to other Indigenous populations, Arctic Indigenous peoples face significant restraints on their ability to successfully securitize their own priorities.

Yet, while constrained within their respective states to successfully securitize issues, Arctic Indigenous peoples’ have successfully established themselves as international political actors detached from the national governments (Fabbi, 2015: 482; Wilson, 2020: 36, 38). As Fabbi (2015: 482) and Tennberg (2010: 267) note, Indigenous peoples’ organizations are effective international actors who contest sovereignty and state rule over Indigenous areas as illegitimate. Thus, the

increased democratization of international decision-making can be understood as constituting a space from where priorities different from those of national governments can be advanced.

Saami and Inuit conceptions of Arctic security

While Arctic regional security prior to the establishment of the Arctic Council mainly focused on securing states' security through military means, Gjørsv & Goloviznina (2014: 2) argue that the understanding of security in the Arctic has broadened its scope to, among others, include human security. Where Arctic state security have been perceived as largely stable at the regional level, such understanding of state security does not transfer equally to the Arctic Indigenous peoples whose insecurities continue to grow (Gjørsv, Oddsdóttir & Wickson, 2020: 407). If invoking the concept of security is a political act (Gjørsv & Goloviznina, 2014: 2), then broadened understanding of security in the Arctic can be understood in relation to the growing recognition of Indigenous peoples' rights and the institutionalization of relations between the Arctic Indigenous peoples' and the states.

Human security developed as a conceptual response to the narrow state-centric interpretation of security in the mid-1990s. The original conceptualization of human security aimed to shift the ontology of security from a focus primarily dedicated to the survival and interests of states, to one concerned for the survival and wellbeing of people, thereby expanding the referent object to include actors below the level of sovereign states (Greaves, 2012: 221; Kaldor, 2007: 182; Liotta & Owen, 2006). According to Kaldor (2007: 185), the distinguishing feature of human security from former state-based approaches is the primacy of human rights, yet the concept of human security encompasses broader issues than just those of human rights.

Despite its normative appeal, human security faces criticism for its theoretical fuzziness and tendency to universalize human experience (Krause, 2013: 76; Newman, 2010: 77; Slowey, 2014: 200). In the Arctic region, the latter often results in un-nuanced assumptions about human insecurities

which fails to recognize the Arctic Indigenous peoples' vastly different experiences. Assuming Arctic human insecurities renders invisible the fact that while the Arctic states rank high on the United Nations' Human Development Index, these numbers change significantly when considering the experiences of the region's Indigenous peoples (Gjørsv, Oddsdóttir & Wickson, 2020: 407; Inuit Quajisarvingat, 2013: 9; Slowey, 2014: 190). It also overlooks the significant variation in human security experiences among the region's Indigenous peoples, for example those of the Canadian Inuit and the Norwegian Saami peoples (Goloviznina & Gjørsv, 2014: 240; Greaves, 2016a: 475).

Understanding human security concerns in the Arctic region thus necessitates an understanding of local, contextual understandings of security and recognizing that no single approach to comprehending Indigenous security in the Arctic is appropriate (Kuokkanen & Sweet, 2020: 82). To do so, Gjørsv (2014: 59) and Heininen (2014: 43) argue for security informed by a 'bottom-up' approach, which roots the understandings of security "within the context from which it is identified and expressed" (Gjørsv, 2014: 59). This is crucial because values, priorities, and identities upon which human security perspectives are based differs across the level of individuals and communities (Gjørsv, Lanteigne & Sam-Aggrey, 2020: 11; Goloviznina & Gjørsv, 2014: 270; Sheehan, 2016: 146).

A 'bottom-up' approach to understanding security in this study would therefore root security perspectives in the articulations of the Saami and the Inuit peoples. However, while there is growing recognition among scholars that Arctic security discussions necessitate the inclusion of Indigenous peoples' perspectives, the field of security studies has not substantially incorporated Indigenous peoples either theoretically or empirically (Gjørsv & Goloviznina, 2014: 6; Greaves, 2016a: 461; Kuokkanen & Sweet, 2020: 82).

Literature on the security of Indigenous peoples largely focuses on threats inherent to the human security framework (Hossain, 2013; Hossain & Petrétei, 2016; Sergunin, Konyshv & Lagutina, 2022; Szpak, 2020), yet fewer studies investigate the specific articulation of these threats. Greaves

(2012, 2016a, 2016b, 2018) has contributed to the understanding of how Arctic Indigenous peoples construct security threats. In one qualitative study, Greaves (2012) identified that Inuit in Canada predominantly employ the language of security when discussing climate change, highlighting the multiple ways in which climate change affects the wellbeing of Inuit and other Arctic Indigenous peoples, including its threat to food security, welfare of caribou herds and Indigenous rights (Greaves, 2016b: 44). Further, Inuit in Canada also emphasize the importance of their political autonomy as a self-determining Indigenous people as vital to their security (Greaves, 2016b: 40).

In another qualitative study, Greaves (2016a: 470, 473) found that the organizations representing Saami in Norway articulate similar, but not identical, conceptions of insecurity. They define security in terms of protecting the environment, Indigenous identity, cultural practices, autonomy, and self-determination. For both Inuit in Canada and Saami in Norway, the environment and its link to Indigenous cultural practices is situated at the center of their understanding of what insecurity means for their homelands. However, drawing on the theory of securitization, Greaves (2016a) found that even though the Saami and the Inuit share similar conceptions of Arctic insecurity, they utilize different language in their articulation of such concerns. Both are legitimate and empowered political actors within their respective national contexts, yet Inuit representatives tend to frame their priorities as security issues and Saami representatives generally do not (Greaves, 2016a: 462, 477).

The reason for this is attributed to different contextual settings of the two peoples: Greaves (2016a: 463, 469) argues that the Saami's non-securitization of their own priorities is attributed to several factors that contrast the experiences of Inuit in Canada, including variations in the impact of climate change, greater social integration of the Saami peoples in the Norwegian society and a more robust national security discourse, which limits the room for alternative securitization moves due to Norway's proximity to Russia. In Canada, while Inuit have utilized the language of security, they

have not been successful in elevating their priorities beyond the sphere of normal politics because their claims have not been accepted by those who hold the power to mobilize a response. The Norwegian Saami, on the other hand, deliberately avoids engaging in the language of security to keep their priorities open to debate and contestation as a strategic move when making political claims (Greaves, 2016a: 462; Hansen, 2012: 528). As ‘security’ in Northern Norway is strongly associated with the privileged national security discourse, which primarily revolves around the potential military threat due to its proximity to Russia, it constrains the conceptual space for alternative, non-state interpretations of what security is (Greaves, 2016a: 476).

These studies therefore contribute to Gjørsv’s (2014) and Heininen’s (2014) call for the recognition of local, contextual understandings of security. As Greaves (2016a) highlights, understanding the contextual setting in which the Inuit and the Saami peoples advance their own priorities is important to understand their differences in articulation. Inuit’s unsuccessful attempts to securitize their priorities within the Canadian public discourse and Saami’s deliberate avoidance of engaging in language of security both highlight that Arctic Indigenous peoples remain constrained in advancing conceptions of insecurity that are different to the privileged interests within their national contexts (Greaves, 2016a: 463).

Both cases therefore raise the question whether existing political structures can effectively translate the concerns of Inuit and the Saami peoples into action. Slowey (2014: 200) posits that Indigenous peoples will not be fully secure until their needs are met and that this can only occur through governance structures that enable a strong voice in all discussions. While both Inuit and the Saami peoples hold self-governing rights within their national states (Greaves, 2016a: 462), the question arises whether their capacity to express themselves translates into meaningful participation in decision-making processes.

In conclusion, with the establishment of the Permanent Participant category, the Arctic Council can be argued to provide the governance structure that enable organizations like the ICC and the Saami Council to advance own priorities outside of their national state boundaries. The Arctic Council's structure can be perceived as one step in the direction of Slowey's (2014: 200) argument, since the Permanent Participants must be fully consulted and involved in the Council's decision-making processes.

Chapter Two: The Arctic Council before and after 2007

This chapter elaborates on the Permanent Participant's role in the Arctic Council's decision-making processes, focusing on the three different levels in the Arctic Council as a place for the Permanent Participants to articulate and advance their own interests. The first part of the chapter elaborates on the Council's institutional structure up until 2007, before outlining the post-2007 changes and their effects on the participation of the Permanent Participants.

The Arctic Council's decision-making structure

Arctic science and policy form the basis for the informed decision-making in the Arctic Council (Knecht, 2020: 33). Informed by Indigenous and Western knowledge, the inherent structure for dialogue between scientists and policy makers has been key to the Council's decision making-making processes. This dialogue is facilitated through the Council's three distinct levels – the Working Group level, the Senior Arctic Officials level, and the Ministerial level – where the principle of consensus prevails. This means that decisions cannot be made unless there is consensus among all member states (Jóhannesson, 2022). At the three different levels, the Permanent Participants contribute to knowledge creation and agenda setting. The Permanent Participants are, as Gamble & Shadian (2017: 143) argue, as diverse as the peoples, regions, and cultures that they represent. Their organizational structure, links to external organizations and motivations vary, thereby contributing to the diversity of constituencies and priorities represented by the Permanent Participants. No matter their background, the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat, an entity within the Arctic Council Secretariat, facilitates and supports the participation of the Permanent Participants (Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat, n.d.)

The Permanent Participants are perceived as being a central component of the Arctic Council. Activities across the three different levels significantly depend on the Permanent Participants to set the agenda and to “provide a rationale for scientific and policy output”, and they are therefore argued

to have the ability to influence decision-making in preferred directions (Coote, 2016: 45). Following the *Ottawa Declaration*, Permanent Participants have full consultation rights regarding negotiations and decision-making processes. Thus, given that they must be fully consulted prior to final decisions made by the Arctic states in consensus, Koivurova & Heinämäki (2006: 267) argue that this gives them close to ‘de facto’ veto powers, should they all reject a proposal (Arctic Council, n.d.a).

A. Working Groups

The Arctic Council is based on a bottom-up principle, meaning that most of the Council’s work takes place in its working groups, where projects and actions are initiated. This level is argued by Graczyk & Koivurova (2015: 309) to be the ‘cornerstone’ of the Arctic Council, as it merges scientific and political cooperation by offering an opportunity to facilitate open discussions among the Permanent Participants, specialists from the Arctic states and the Council’s observers, to produce scientific knowledge while identifying and analyzing the region’s challenges. It is the outcomes of the Working Groups’ efforts that serve as the basis for the Council’s informed decision-making (Arctic Council Secretariat, 2023: 13).

Among others, the working groups undertake a wide range of issues, from monitoring the mercury levels and formulating guidelines on Arctic shipping to conducting studies on regional climate change (Binder, 2016: 164; Rottem, 2021: 1). It is the working groups who execute programs and projects mandated by Arctic Council Ministers and the Senior Arctic Officials (henceforth SAOs), yet, the working groups are also given considerable freedom, as they to a large extent determine the premises of the work (Arctic Council, n.d.b; Conley & Melino, 2016: 6; Rottem, 2021: 1).

The working group level consists of six different working groups¹ with different mandates and structures, for example with CAFF focusing on local projects and PAME in policy measures in relation to the Arctic marine environment (Arctic Council, n.d.*b*; Arctic Council, n.d.*h*; Arctic Council, n.d.*i*; Rottem, 2021: 1). It is because of these working groups that the Council is considered a “cognitive forerunner” in identifying regional governance challenges in the Arctic (Knecht, 2020: 33). According to Brigham et al. (2016: 15-16), the work conducted within the working groups have not only contributed to knowledge within the regional boundaries of the Arctic, it has also played an influential role on the global stage, influencing international organizations in their global decision-making, and shaping of environmental policies. For example, the results from the work of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment – produced by the AMAP, CAFF and the International Arctic Science Committee – have contributed to the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (AMAP Secretariat, n.d.).

Central to the working groups are the Permanent Participants. Brigham et al. (2016: 17) note the Permanent Participants in both the examples of AMAP and CAFF have been involved as “expert participants”. Indigenous peoples are holders of Traditional Ecological Knowledge, a concept which Sidorova (2020: 10) argues has been indigenized in the Arctic Council to be perceived as Indigenous knowledge. This knowledge is strongly connected to Indigenous communities, and is rooted in the local sphere, kept by knowledge holders in own languages and transcends state borders (Ibid: 3, 7). Multiple projects within the six working groups have specifically relied on the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge and community-based monitoring (Ibid: 2). Therefore, understood as knowledge-holders and as experts on local issues, the Permanent Participants possess the ideal foundation for identifying and acknowledging the diverse range of challenges in the region, and the

¹ The Arctic Contaminants Action Program (henceforth ACAP), the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (henceforth AMAP), the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (henceforth CAFF), the Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response (henceforth EPPR), the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (henceforth PAME), and the Sustainable Development Working Group (henceforth SDWG).

working groups provides a platform where the Permanent Participants actively contribute to the development of scientific knowledge on regional challenges by drawing on this knowledge. Indigenous knowledge thus contributes to the indigenization of the development of collective norms and understandings of issues, and it plays a vital role, as the assessments of the working groups are argued to change agendas and objectives (Binder, 2016: 165).

B. Task Forces and Expert Groups

Together with the working groups, the task forces form the base of the organizational structure of the Arctic Council (Rottem, 2021: 8). They are time-limited working groups that work towards a specific goal, and their mandate is predominantly to conduct policy-oriented needs for urgent tasks to be completed between the biennial ministerial meetings (Conley & Melino, 2016: 7; Jóhannesson, 2022; Knecht, 2020: 33). Members of task forces are drawn from within the Council, for example the working groups, or from individuals holding expert knowledge affiliated with either the member states or the Permanent Participants. Together with the work of the working groups, the Council relies on the produced research for informing negotiations and formulating policies (Kuersten, 2016: 436; Nord, 2016: 47).

The SAOs have a stronger influence on the task forces than on the working groups (Conley & Melino, 2016: 7). Yet, Permanent Participants still have the right to participate fully in both working groups and the task force projects. In both settings, the Permanent Participants are supposed to be consulted on the design and execution of projects and have the opportunity for being consulted before an action is undertaken (Coote, 2016: 45-46). Finally, expert groups are the third type of subsidiary body within the Arctic Council. They will occasionally be established to support or advance the work of specific working groups or Council initiatives (Knecht, 2020: 34).

C. Senior Arctic Officials

Above the level of the subsidiary bodies is the SAO level. The Arctic Council Rules of Procedure from 1998 provide that the Council can establish subsidiary bodies to carry out projects and activities under the guidance of the SAO's (Smieszek, 2019: 41). Each of the member states appoint one SAO – often a government representative from the member states' foreign ministries – to manage its interests in the Council, and the SAOs activities are led by a SAO Chair, who is appointed by the Chairmanship. The appointed SAOs and the Permanent Participants meet at least twice a year, and the biannual gatherings are deemed central to the Council's operation (Nord, 2016: 50). It is the SAOs' responsibility to coordinate, direct and monitor the activities of the subsidiary bodies in alignment with the ministerial decisions, and they are therefore considered the link between the working groups and the ministers (Arctic Council, n.d.e; Jóhannesson, 2022; Grazczyk & Koivurova, 2015: 308).

It is the responsibility of the SAO group to discuss the current successes and future challenges of the Council. The SAO group is therefore a forum for the discussion of pressing Arctic concerns, and Permanent Participants and member states can articulate community or national perspectives on these matters. It offers the opportunity to identify areas where special efforts are needed to build future consensus, and it also enables the Permanent Participants to sensitize the SAOs to the human dimension of Arctic challenges (Finkler & Kadas, 2016: 37). For many of the Permanent Participants, the SAO level is considered the place with highest importance of attendance in order to influence the policies, as it brings together observers and national and international key actors that can play a central role in allowing the Permanent Participants to further their interests (Coote, 2016: 52-53).

D. Ministerial meetings

The chief decision-making body in the Arctic Council is the level of the Ministerial Meetings, which by Graczyk & Koivurova (2015: 307) is considered the most important forum of interaction at the political level. Meetings are held biennially at the end of each Chairmanship, and prior to the meetings the working groups and task forces are asked to point out prominent ‘deliverables’ and suggest reports and projects for endorsement or approval by the ministers. The primary goal of the meetings is to assess the accomplishments of the Council throughout the Chairmanship period and to set the future direction of the Council. Attendance is usually high and includes representatives from within the Arctic Council – e.g. member states, Permanent Participants, heads of working groups and task forces – but also from outside of the Arctic Council, including invited guests and the global press. The ministerial meetings are therefore a place where the output and findings from the working groups and task forces can be endorsed by government officials and publicized by the press (Nord, 2016: 51-53).

While the SAO meetings are considered very important to the Permanent Participants, the ministerial meetings – together with the working group level – constitute the space where the primary communication of the Permanent Participants take place (Coote, 2016: 45). The Permanent Participants and other representatives are given the opportunity to comment on and present their own views on the current and future efforts of the Arctic Council. This enables them to have influence on Council’s initiatives and policies, as they can articulate their own interests and concerns, including how they perceive the development of the future cooperation (Nord, 2016: 53, 54). Accordingly, with the global press present at the meetings, the ministerial meetings offer a unique venue for the Permanent Participants to articulate their interests and directions for the region to a broader audience.

Institutional constraints to participation

Having established the role of the Permanent Participants in the three different levels of decision-making in the Council, the following part of the chapter elaborates on the constraints to the Permanent Participants' participation in the Arctic Council. The following part of the chapter will focus on the institutional constraints to participation from the establishment of the Council until 2007. The final part of the chapter elaborates on the post-2007 developments.

A variety of scholars – and Permanent Participants – have identified constraints to the Permanent Participants' participation due to the structure of the Council. In the literature covering the Arctic Council until the 2007-2008, discussions on the capacity of the Permanent Participants emphasize two intersecting aspects of constraints that hampers their full participation in decision-making processes: Financial capacity and the Permanent Participants' differing relationships with the Arctic states in which their membership reside (Burke, 2019: 66; Gamble, 2015; Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 149; Koivurora, 2011). The Arctic Council operates as a forum, which means that there is no established programming budget for the operations nor central or neutral funding mechanisms. Rather, projects and initiatives are sponsored by one or more of the member states. Permanent Participants can also sponsor projects, yet they rely on the member states for financial support. Observers can financially contribute to projects as well, as long as their financial contributions does not exceed the financing from the member states² (Arctic Council, n.d.e; Arctic Council, n.d.f; Chater, 2019: 150; Coote, 2016: 54; Jónsdóttir, 2020: 40). According to Burke & Saramago (2018: 936), the rule that observers are not allowed to finance projects and initiatives that exceeds the member states as in large part in order to “ensure that the Arctic states always remain in direct creative control of the forum's work”.

² The SAOs can decide to make exceptions to this rule.

The absence of secured funding for activities in the Council has impacted the workings of it in various ways since 1996. First, it means that for working groups and their projects, activities are funded on a voluntary *ad hoc* basis, often by the member states or individual experts who advocated for them in the first place (Exner-Pirot et al., 2019). To obtain funding, the working groups must apply for it from a variety of sources. Yet, governments are often selective when it comes to funding, which influences which projects will get funded. According to Graczyk & Rottem (2020: 225) the member states' view of the role of the Council is the real driving force when deciding on funding projects.

Working groups thus spend a significant amount of their time convincing the member states to financially contribute to their research projects and initiatives (Nord, 2019: 66). In a qualitative study with representatives from the Permanent Participants, Coote (2016: 49) discerned that all interviewees shared a sentiment, specifically that Permanent Participants are mostly successful in conveying their views when they are not in conflict with the motives of the Arctic states. This therefore prompts the question of how the need for state funding interacts with the understanding that aligning priorities with the states' is necessary for achieving success.

Second, the Arctic Council's lack of funding mechanisms also means that the participation of the Permanent Participants is not consistently funded. Both Exner-Pirot et al. (2019) and Chater (2019: 150) highlight funding to support the Permanent Participants' capacities and participation has been a continuing source of concern since the Council's establishment. The Permanent Participants have different funding capabilities, and the differing relationships between the Indigenous peoples and their member states lead to disparities in government funding and support (Coote, 2016: 45; Gamble, 2015: 386). Internally, the structural set-up of the Permanent Participants varies. James Stott (in Coote, 2016: 52), the president of ICC Alaska, mentions that one of the privileges of the ICC is that its core operations are funded by themselves, allowing them not to compromise to get funding. Chair of the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gary Harrison (in Coote, 2016: 50), on the other hand,

argues that not all Permanent Participants have the same internal funding abilities as others, highlighting that the Arctic Athabaskan villages that he represents don't "have that kind of money".

Further, Indigenous peoples' support from their state governments differs: For example, the Saami Council experience higher levels of support from the Norwegian government than the levels of support that the Aleut International Association experience from the United States (Gamble, 2015: 386). As the Arctic Council lacks central, regular, and neutral funding mechanisms for the participation of the Permanent Participants, their activities become susceptible to political interference, which complicates the Permanent Participants' ability to formulate and pursue their goals. One example is Russia, which has a history of trying to ensure that the priorities and goals of its non-governmental organizations align with the objectives of the Russian government (Chater, 2015: 289). The member states thus become crucial in deciding whether the operation and political capacity of the Permanent Participants should be supported. The states' allocation of funding to the different groups is by one of the interviewees in Coote's (2016: 50, 54) study considered as reflecting the respective states' national interests.

There are various impacts of the inconsistent and unreliable funding of the Permanent Participants. Chater (2019: 159) highlights how a survey of all SAO reports reveals that, since the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996, there has not been a council meeting without discussion of the financial situation of the Permanent Participants. Between May 1999 and October 2004, Permanent Participants highlighted the issue of inadequate funding eight times at the Council's meetings, and they contributed to only 20% of the Council's projects and initiatives. As a direct consequence of financial limitations, the Permanent Participants have fewer projects that lie within their priority areas and highlight difficulties attending Arctic Council meetings in remote locations (Chater, 2015: 270; Chater, 2019: 150, 159).

The financial limitations also hinder the Permanent Participants' internal work. With limited funding, the Permanent Participants experience difficulties in strategizing, e.g. by representing their constituencies simultaneously at home and in the Arctic Council, or by limiting their outreach while promoting global knowledge of their work at different decision-making levels (Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 152). Therefore, even though the Permanent Participants are considered crucial for the workings of the Council, financial capacities have since the establishment of the Council and until 2007 been considered a major hindrance for their ability to engage and participate in the Council.

Post-2007 and the capacity issues of the Permanent Participants

The fundamentals of circumpolar cooperation within the Arctic Council did not change in the years between its establishment in 1996 and until 2007-2008. Yet, what did change in this decade was the surrounding world's perception of the Arctic region, as it increasingly came to be perceived as a region of geopolitical importance. Among others, states, both within the region and outside of it, increasingly asserted their commitment to the region through the increased adoption of Arctic policies and strategies (Heininen, 2020; Koivurova & Graczyk, 2014: 443).

In August 2007, an expedition led by parliamentarian Arthur Chilingarov planted a Russian titanium flag on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean floor at the geographic North Pole (Greaves, 2019: 161). While the flag-planting was not legally meaningful, it precipitated a series of policy and media-level reactions and sparked a growing concern over potential military conflict in the region (Dodds, 2010: 63; Greaves, 2019: 161; Pincus & Ali, 2016: 88-89). It was in the years following this event that the discourse of a 'scramble for the Arctic' began to appear in media, despite the fact that the Arctic five littoral states (henceforth A5) – Denmark, Canada, Norway, Russia, and the United States – signed the Ilulissat Declaration in May 2008 stating that science and international law shall determine the delineation of the Arctic Ocean (Dodds, 2013: 53; Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017: 15;

Zysk, 2015: 448). Conveying a sense of conflict and urgency regarding Arctic problems, the discourse highlighted how climate change would intensify competition over the region's natural resources and increase militarization (Exner-Pirot, 2019: 73; Pincus & Ali, 2016: 88-89).

According to Smieszek (2019: 40), it was during the years of 2006-2008 that the Arctic Council moved from the peripheries towards the center of international relations. As a consequence of the heightened focus on the region, the workings of the Council were gradually affected (Koivurova & Graczyk, 2014: 443). The Council garnered unprecedented attention from high-level officials, both within and outside of the Arctic region, and at the 2009 ministerial meeting in Tromsø that followed the Russian flag-planting, the Council received an unprecedented number of applications for Observer status by non-Arctic states and organizations, including from India, Japan, Singapore, and China (Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 147; Graczyk, 2011: 582). Thus, the flag-planting played a central role in precipitating international awareness of the Arctic region and subsequent interest in being involved in the region's primary forum, the Arctic Council (Burke, 2020: 117).

Following these events, Gamble & Shadian (2017: 149) argue that the Arctic Council has started to evolve into a major intergovernmental regime. This has necessitated an expansion of domestic departments with e.g. legal and political expertise dedicated to supporting the activities of the Council. In many instances, this expansion has outpaced the ability of Permanent Participants to adapt effectively. In its efforts to keep pace with the heightened interest, the Arctic Council has become increasingly state-centric in its thinking and expanded its workings in several ways, impacting the decision-making processes in the Council (Olsen & Shadian, 2017: 128).

As a result, a common challenge of the Permanent Participants is to represent their constituencies and contribute to the work in the Arctic Council which is continuously expanding in global significance (Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 143). The following part of the chapter elaborates on

the post-2007 changes in the Arctic Council and how it has affected the Permanent Participants' ability to effectively contribute to decision-making processes.

A. Post-2007 effects on Working Groups, Task Forces and Expert Groups

Following 2007, two trends occurred at the level of the Working Groups and Task Forces. First, the working groups experienced an increase in projects, resulting in the fact that today, 'at any given time', the working- and expert groups are involved in nearly 100 projects and initiatives (Arctic Council, n.d.g; Chater, 2019: 159; Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 147). Second, the Arctic Council increasingly began to establish task forces (Rottem, 2020: 8). Together with the surge in working group projects, the intellectual and financial capacities of the Permanent Participants to participate in the work of the Council with the increased workload have been overstretched (Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 147). Thus, to fully engage in the increased activities of the Arctic Council, a constant flow and significant number of resources are needed. This means both financial and human capacity for Permanent Participants to ensure their participation in any Arctic Council discussion that concerns Indigenous communities in the Arctic.

As a consequence of the increase in working group projects and the lack of financial capacities, Permanent Participants must be selective in their choice of project support (Chater, 2019: 158). The Permanent Participants are more likely to support and prioritize local community projects than the member states, yet, due to their limited financial capacity, the Arctic Council's priorities lean towards national environmental priorities, rather than local community priorities. This is because member states sponsor most projects. In a response to the financial capacity concerns, the Permanent Participants, except for the ICC, established the Ålgu Fund in 2016. The goal of the fund was to establish an independent funding mechanism outside of the Arctic Council, allowing for financial contributions from around the world to be distributed to the Permanent Participant (Indigenous

Peoples' Secretariat, 2016). The 2016 fundraising goal was \$30 million, yet, per 2019, the financial goal had not been yet reached (Exner-Pirot et al., 2019).

B. From Working Groups to Binding Treaties

Further, three of the established task forces in the Arctic Council – the Task Force on Search and Rescue, the Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response and the Scientific Cooperation Task Force – have led to the establishment of binding agreements between the eight member states³ post-2007 (Arctic Council, n.d.; Nord, 2016: 46; Rottem, 2020: 8). The agreements are however not Arctic Council agreements – rather, the Arctic Council framework was used for the purposes of negotiation and the agreements were thus established under the auspices of the Council (Conley & Melino, 2016: 7). Except for the discussions leading to the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution and Response in the Arctic (2013), the Permanent Participants were largely excluded from the negotiations of the other two treaties, and as a result of the international law of treaties, none of the Permanent Participants were parties to the treaties (Loukacheva, 2020: 120; Olsen & Shadian, 2017: 129).

The act of entering into binding treaties is both perceived as a way to deal with the region's emerging issues, but also as a state-centric move, indicating that the Arctic states want to determine how Arctic governance should proceed, despite the Arctic Council not having the legal authority to make international law (Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 147; Olsen & Shadian, 2017: 129). As a response, the ICC called for an Inuit review of the consultation process that led to the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation in their 2018 *Utqiagvik Declaration*. Under Article 9 of the Agreement, parties were encouraged to consult and include the knowledge of Indigenous peoples.

³ The Task Forces led to the respective treaties: The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011); the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013); and the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017).

Yet, for the ICC, this inclusion must be in line with the rights affirmed in UNDRIP for it to ensure the “equitable and ethical utilization of Indigenous knowledge and engagement of Inuit communities to provide guidance to international fora” (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2018: 6; Loukacheva, 2020: 120).

C. Increase in meetings among the Arctic littoral states

Another post-2007 trend has been the occurrence of meetings among the A5 states. The geographical location of the A5 states in relation to the Arctic Ocean has caused different political participation in regional politics in four cases. It was following the Russian flag-planting that the A5 states had their first meeting in Greenland in May 2008, leading to the adoption of the *Ilulissat Declaration*. While the gathering was under the auspices of the Arctic Council, the meeting excluded the Permanent Participants from the negotiations, prompting an immediate protest from the ICC (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2008; Østreng, 2017: 195). In 2009, the ICC responded by publishing the *Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic*, in which they highlighted the A5’s failure to reference international instruments promoting and protecting Indigenous Peoples’ rights and their neglect in including Inuit in discussions about sovereignty like in Arctic Council discussions (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2009).

In May 2010, the A5 met again in Ottawa, Canada, to discuss new ways of thinking about the region’s environmental protection and economic development. In response, representatives of Arctic Indigenous peoples enquired whether the A5 were trying to take over leadership in governance of regional affairs (Østreng, 2017: 196). This was not the only critique: The then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also commented on the practice of the A5 meetings, advising the Arctic states that negotiations on Arctic issues must include those with legitimate interests in the region. In February 2014, the A5 met again in Nuuk, Greenland, to discuss measures to prevent unregulated fishing in the

region's oceans without the invitation of the Permanent Participants, and in July 2015, the A5 met in Oslo, Norway, to sign the non-binding *Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean* (Molenaar, 2015: 427; Østreng, 2017: 197).

The four the meetings were part of the larger trend of post-2007 state-centric moves made by the member states of the Arctic Council, which largely excluded the Permanent Participants from being involved, and especially the Ilulissat and the Oslo Declarations by the A5 were criticized by the excluded Council actors for allowing its states "to avoid having to engage the opinions of the Council's additional parties". Critique especially highlighted how the A5 undermined the spirit of cooperation and inclusion of Indigenous peoples' organizations that the Arctic Council has helped foster in the realm of Arctic international relations (Kuersten, 2016: 434, 436).

D. A de facto veto?

A final post-2007 trend, however happening because of factors outside of the Arctic Council, has been a weakening of the Permanent Participants' 'de facto' veto power. While the Permanent Participants have been argued to have a 'de facto' veto over decision-making processes in the Council, the 'de facto' veto is vulnerable to outside pressures on the Permanent Participants, which the last decade has highlighted.

While the Permanent Participants have been argued to have a 'de facto' veto over decision-making processes in the Council, the 'de facto' veto is vulnerable to outside pressures on the Permanent Participants. One example is the Russian government's history of trying to make its non-governmental organizations align with the overall goals of the state. The Russian government has the power to decide which non-governmental organizations can operate as they must register with the government to do so. In November 2012, the Russian Department of Justice deregistered the Russian Permanent Participant RAIPON. The shutdown of RAIPON was largely perceived as being due to

fears over RAIPON's power, opposition to natural resources extraction in areas of Arctic traditional land use, and foreign influence and financial support from the United States, Canada, and other Indigenous peoples' groups. After protests from the other member states and Permanent Participants, RAIPON received registration again in April 2013 following adjustments to their organizational leadership (Chater, 2015: 288-290).

In between November 2012 and April 2013, however, the status and influence of the Permanent Participants was weakened, as Russia unilaterally had the means to block a Permanent Participant from attending the Arctic Council meetings (Chater, 2015: 289). This highlights how the 'de facto' veto power held by the Permanent Participants are susceptible to external factors, such as their respective states' decisions. Specifically for the Indigenous peoples of Russia, their activities have over the past decade been increasingly affected by a shrinking civic space. Since 2012, non-governmental organizations funded by foreign actors can be classified as 'foreign agents', forcing many of them to shut down to reduce their exposure to legal risks (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, n.d.). The case of RAIPON's deregistration in 2012 by the Russian government emphasizes that it only takes one of the Indigenous peoples' organizations to break the 'de facto' veto power from the Permanent Participants.

Summary: Permanent Participants' decision-making powers

This chapter has shown that the Permanent Participants are perceived as central actors within the Arctic Council's structure, and that especially the levels of the Working Group and the Ministerial Meetings provide an avenue for the Permanent Participants to advocate for their priorities. The work of the Council is perceived as considerably dependent on the Permanent Participants' contributions, and the 'de facto' veto power is one avenue that the Permanent Participants can use to advance their own priorities. However, the longstanding issue of financial capacity has been a hindrance to their

effective participation since the establishment of the Council. The outside interest in the Arctic region following 2008 affected the Permanent Participants in two ways: It both meant an increase in the Council's workload, which further stretched the financial and human capacity of the Permanent Participants, and it caused a shift towards more state-centric decision-making that increasingly left out the Permanent Participants from negotiations. Thus, these developments affected the Permanent Participants to participate as effectively in decision-making processes as it originally functioned pre-2008.

Ultimately, while the importance of consulting the Permanent Participants is stated in the Ottawa Declaration (Arctic Council, 1996; Coote, 2016: 30), the pre-2007 spirit of cooperation between the Arctic states and the Permanent Participants started to slip as the Arctic region gained geopolitical importance. The interest from states outside of the Arctic to be involved in the region's decision-making processes placed the Arctic Council in the center of a debate of whom should be involved in regional decision-making processes (Koivurova & Graczyk, 2014: 441-442), resulting in the member states increasingly situating themselves as the legitimate actors in the debate.

Chapter Three: Deterioration of Arctic relations as a result of events outside of the Arctic region

The narrative of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ became increasingly challenged following 2007. Renewed tensions between the Arctic states and Russia highlighted the degree to which Arctic politics and security dynamics are affected by events external to the Arctic region, including decisions made by Arctic states based on non-Arctic interests (Greaves, 2019: 161). The first part of this chapter will elaborate on Western-Russian relations since 2007, highlighting the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine as important events adding to the deterioration of Arctic politics. Especially the invasion of Ukraine added to the perception of a return of geopolitics (Lindgaard in DIISpublish, 2024). The second part of the chapter then elaborates on the 2022 suspension of the Arctic Council, a decision that ruptured the given Arctic political order with consequences for the Permanent Participants.

2014 Annexation of Crimea

Although the 2007 incident with the Russian flag-planting was not legally meaningful and Russia did not make any international claims based on it, it still marked the beginning of renewed tensions between the Russia and the Western states (Dodds, 2013: 53; Greaves, 2019: 161; Zysk, 2015: 448). For many actors, the incident came to be understood as part of Russian post-Cold War revanchism. Subsequently, the circumpolar states began to engage in a significant remilitarization in the Arctic region with reinvestments in military capabilities and infrastructure (Greaves, 2019: 161; Åtland, 2014: 145). Uncertainty over Russia’s intentions was further amplified with the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, as it highlighted Russia’s willingness to employ military power to achieve its political goals (Zysk, 2015: 448). While the invasion was strongly opposed by the United States and

other Arctic countries, cooperation in the Arctic was close to unscathed (Byers, 2017; 384; Østhagen, 2014).

Yet, it was Russia's illegal annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea on March 18, 2014, and the following armed conflict in eastern Ukraine that first and foremost made an unequivocal impact on Arctic politics and strained the diplomatic relations between Russia and the rest of the circumpolar states (Greaves, 2019: 161; Gricius & Fitz, 2022: 1). Ukraine is a partner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (henceforth NATO), the organization which all the Arctic states – except Russia – either were members of, or, at that time, partners of⁴ (Burke, 2020: 5; Government Offices of Sweden, n.d; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020).

The 2014 annexation followed months of political turbulence in Ukraine. Then president Viktor Yanukovich had forged closer economic ties with Russia which sparked violent protests and a U.S. backed coup in February 2014. A peace pact mediated by the European Union allowed the president Yanukovich to stay in power until the new election, yet this agreement fell apart immediately. The new government, led by interim President Olexander Turchynov, favored closer integration with the European Union over Russia. Shortly after, Russian forces seized Crimea from Ukraine and President Putin incorporated it into Russia (Walker, 2023: 10; Mearsheimer, 2014: 80-81). The annexation of Crimea was, as Bertelsen (2020: 64) notes, an example of “competition over spheres of influence between Russia and the EU and NATO”, in similarity to the 2008 Russian war against Georgia.

At the time in 2014, the annexation and the following armed conflict in eastern Ukraine heightened tensions between Russia and the Western states to the highest level since the Cold War (Byers, 2017: 385; Greaves, 2019: 161; Walker, 2023: 15). On the global stage, Western states

⁴ In May 2022, Finland and Sweden, the two final countries of the Arctic Council member states who weren't NATO members, submitted their applications for NATO membership. Finland became NATO's 31st member country on April 4th, 2023. Sweden is currently holding the status of 'Invitee country', while waiting for all NATO countries to ratify Sweden's application (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2023; Government Offices of Sweden, 2023).

responded by imposing economic sanctions on Russian stakeholders. They also increased their military activities in northern Europe, and the Nordic and Baltic states began unprecedented military cooperation (Byers, 2017: 386; Christie, 2015; Greaves, 2019: 161).

However, the effects of the 2014 Ukrainian events also spilled into the circumpolar region, especially on affairs related to military cooperation. Military cooperation between the United States, Russia, and Norway, through the biennial naval exercise ‘Northern Eagle’, was suspended in March 2014, and one month later, cooperation between NATO and Russia was cut back. Further, Russia was excluded from the only Arctic defense forum, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, in 2015 (Byers, 2017: 385; Folland, 2021). As military cooperation between Russia and the rest of the circumpolar states decreased, the size and frequency of military exercises on both sides increased (Byers, 2017: 385).

Yet, the workings of the Arctic Council stayed – except for minor interruptions - intact during the 2014 conflict in Ukraine (Burke, 2020: 5). The most notable effect of the Ukraine conflict in the Arctic Council was the response of Canada, holding the Chairmanship at the time between 2013-2015. Together with the United States, Canada decided to boycott a meeting in the Task Force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane in April 2014 held in Moscow, Russia (Byers, 2017: 387; Zellen, 2023). While the United States did not frame its decision publicly as a ‘political act’ in relation to the Arctic Council, Canada did (Burke, 2020: 95; Exner-Pirot, 2016: 89). However, Canada’s decision to boycott the meeting while chairing the Council was more, as Burke (2020: 17, 89) notes, an example of national politics creeping into Canada’s chairmanship rather than an official Arctic Council stance. Canada did not suggest that the operations of the Council should be suspended: Rather, as they announced the boycott, they stated that Canada would “continue to support the important work of the Arctic Council” (Byers, 2017: 387; Mackrael, 2014).

While none of the non-Russian Arctic Council member states approved of the 2014 Ukraine conflict, Canada's management of the conflict during its Chairmanship led to disappointment among representatives of the Arctic Council. As a forum whose mandate explicitly excludes the discussion of military issues, Canada was understood by other representatives as violating the norms of the Council, creating a clear source of tension herein (Burke, 2020: 94-96; Chater, 2017: 94).

Following the boycott of the meeting in Moscow in 2014, Russia decided not to attend the 2015 Ministerial Meeting in Iqaluit, Canada (Chater, 2017: 94). Yet, despite Canada's national politics slipping into its Chairmanship, Russia still participated in the workings of the Council, as the representatives of the other Arctic states refused to follow Canada's path of national politics slipping into the forum (Burke, 2020: 173). As a result of the other representatives' resistance, Chater (2017: 94) notes that the tensions following the 2014 Ukrainian conflict did not negatively affect the workings of the Council. Except for Canada's own national stance, the Arctic Council continued its work unabated (Exner-Pirot, 2023).

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

From 2014 to 2022, the conflict in Ukraine continued as a low-intensity war in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk territories in the Donbas region of Ukraine. In 2021, Russia assumed the Arctic Council Chairmanship for the period of 2021-2023 (Gricius & Fitz, 2022: 4; Walker, 2023: 5). In the months leading up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Putin presented security demands that could defuse the crisis over Ukraine. Among others, these included that NATO should cease military activity in eastern Europe and Ukraine, and that Russia would be given a legally binding guarantee that Ukraine would never become a member of NATO (Walker, 2023: 27). Yet, NATO reinforced their eastern borders and on February 21, 2022, President Putin proclaimed the

independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk territories, with military troops deployed to these regions to perform ‘peacekeeping duties’. Three days later, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Reuters, 2022). This led to further economic sanctions imposed by the Western states and their NATO allies, and exclusions from many international organizations and fora (Bresnahan et al., 2022; Committee of Ministers, 2022; Davidson & Weaver, 2022; Kolarz, 2022).

Suspension of the Arctic Council

With the winds of war blowing in February 2022, the ICC and other Permanent Participants participated in briefing calls with government representatives to repeat the message that Arctic Indigenous peoples must be involved in any future Arctic Council decision-making processes (Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2023: 7). One of the Permanent Participants – the Arctic Athabaskan Council – called upon state leaders not to forget their commitments to Indigenous peoples ten days prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Referring to the climate changes in the Arctic region and its impacts on Arctic Indigenous peoples’ livelihoods, Chief Bill Erasmus, the Canadian Chair of the Arctic Athabaskan Council, highlighted how the work of the Arctic Council was “already at a critical state”, fearing that many years of efforts aimed at fostering cooperation with Russia would be overthrown if the states’ resistance to finding a solution on the conflict continued. Chief Bill Erasmus emphasized the unique structure of the Arctic Council, stating that the Arctic Council is the only forum that includes Arctic Indigenous peoples at the global level (Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2022).

The invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, spilled over into Arctic regional relations. However, different from the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the workings of the Arctic Council became severely affected by the conflict. On March 3, 2022, the A7 member states published a joint statement condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine, noting the “grave

impediments to international cooperation” that the invasion has caused, including in the Arctic region (Global Affairs Canada, 2022a). The states noted that the fundamental principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity had underpinned the work of the Arctic Council for long, but that the invasion of Ukraine was a flagrant violation of these principles. Since Russia held the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council until May 2023, the Council’s meetings would be held within Russia. Yet, because of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, the A7 declared: “[O]ur states are temporarily pausing participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies, pending consideration of the necessary modalities that can allow us to continue the Council’s important work in view of the current circumstances” (Global Affairs Canada, 2022a).

This was a significant statement considering the Arctic Council had never been paused nor severely impacted by events occurring outside of the region before (Gricius & Fitz, 2022: 4). Russia’s SAO Nikolay Korchunov responded on March 4, 2022, by calling the decision to pause the Arctic Council activities ‘regrettable’, highlighting that no alternative for depoliticized dialogue in the region exists. According to Korchunov, pausing the Council’s activities would “inevitably lead to the accumulation of the risks and challenges to soft security in the region” (Dickie, 2022). On the same day, the Arctic Council announced on their social media platforms that the Council was “pausing all official meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies until further notice” (Arctic Council, 2022a; Arctic Council, 2022b).

While the vital role of the Arctic Council in facilitating circumpolar cooperation between the Arctic states and the Arctic Indigenous peoples was recognized in the March 3rd statement by the A7 member states, the decision to suspend the meetings of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies was made without the involvement of the Permanent Participants. Thus, even though the Permanent Participants must be consulted on every level of the decision-making processes in the Council, the A7 member states did not consult the Permanent Participants prior to their decision (Zellen, 2022).

Considering the post-2007 trend of moving towards more state-centric decision-making, the omission of the Permanent Participants in the decision reflected the larger trends of the Arctic Council.

The suspension of the Arctic Council was only meant to be temporary. Yet, as it became clear that Russia was not de-escalating its aggression in Ukraine, the A7 member states published a joint statement on the limited resumption of Arctic Council cooperation on June 8, 2022, stating that the A7 had “examined modalities to allow a resumption of the work of the Arctic Council” (Global Affairs Canada, 2022*b*).

Based on this examination, the A7 member states decided to implement a limited resumption of the Arctic Council’s work on projects that did not involve the participation of Russia. However, a limited resumption without the involvement of Russia wasn’t uncomplicated. First, Russia was leading the Council’s efforts due to them holding the Chairmanship, and moreover, having almost 53% of the Arctic Ocean coastline, important data from Russia, and thereby half of the Arctic region, would be missing (Arctic Institute, n.d.; Martin & Viksnins, 2023). Referring to the latest SAO Report to Ministers from Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting in 2021, it also is evident that Russia is involved in a substantial number of projects within the different working groups (Arctic Council Secretariat, 2021). Thus, continuing the work without the involvement of Russia would mean that the working groups wouldn’t function at full capacity. According to Bloom (2022), the A7 member states’ decision to implement a limited resumption of work was therefore rather ‘awkward’, considering Russia’s large involvement in the Council.

Despite announcing the limited resumption of work, the Arctic Council went quiet with no media updates in between pausing of the Council’s meetings and subsidiary bodies on March 4, 2022, and until Norway took over the Chairmanship from Russia on May 11, 2023 (Arctic Council, n.d.*j*).

The Arctic Council today: Back to business?

Following more than a year of standstill, the Arctic Council's Chairmanship was handed over to Norway on May 11, 2023, at the 13th Ministerial Meeting. The meeting followed months of negotiations between Russia and Norway through the Arctic Council Secretariat, as efforts were made to have the meeting follow the Council's rules of procedures and the principles of the *Ottawa Declaration*, while keeping cooperation between the A7 member states and Russia to the lowest level possible (Canova & Pic, 2023). Still impacted by Russia's war against Ukraine, the transition of Chairmanship was an orderly but quiet affair, taking place digitally and without any of the states' foreign ministers (Jonassen, 2023; Loon, 2023). The digital transition ended with a statement from the Arctic Council, providing a vague description of future work during the Norwegian Chairmanship. While the statement was carefully written and marked the re-establishment of the Council, the transition of Chairmanships is usually signaled by a declaration. However, the 13th Ministerial Meeting did not end with a signed declaration as, according to Norwegian SAO Morten Høglund, it was impossible. Instead, the Arctic Council issued a statement without any accompanying signatures (Arctic Council, 2023c). To High North News, Høglund reassured that the statement was "just as valid as it replaces the declaration" (Jonassen, 2023).

Since the 13th Ministerial Meeting in May 2023, Norway has under their Chairmanship expended considerable effort on social media to demonstrate to the world that the Arctic Council is existing and functioning again. Yet, the reality of the Council is that it is still facing challenges due to Russia's war against Ukraine. Following the transition in May 2023, Høglund announced that a return to the workings of the Council before the war was not possible 'at this stage', and that coming back to the same level of activity as before the war would 'take time'. Specifically, Høglund referred to the meetings at the political level which wouldn't be "happening anytime soon" (Arctic Council, 2023a; Jonassen, 2023). According to the ICC Canada's (2023: 7) 2022-2023 Annual Report, the

working group projects *without* Russian lead or participation, which constituted a small proportion of the total number of working group projects, would continue outside of the ambit of the Arctic Council. The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chair of the Arctic Council, Annika Huitfeldt, also emphasized the continuing difficulties in cooperation, stating that “[a]s of now, it is not possible for Russia to be included” (Jonassen, 2023).

On August 31, 2023, Høglund announced that the Arctic states, in consultation with the Permanent Participants, had reached consensus “on a first set of modalities for the resumption of work at the Working Group level” (Arctic Council, 2023*b*). Yet, the workings of the Council remain constrained, and in an interview at the Arctic Circle Assembly in October 2023, Høglund noted that the workings of the Council are ‘not business as usual’: “[G]iven the geopolitical situation [...] there are also many practical difficulties in having cooperation between all eight in addition to the political cooperation, so things are definitely not... I’m not trying to say that things are perfect or normal in a way...” (Arctic Circle, 2023: 3:35-3:54). The set of modalities announced in August 2023 symbolized one step in the ‘gradual approach’ back to a normal functioning Arctic Council. Yet, as Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, the prospect for getting the Arctic Council back to pre-2022 operations appear distant. The program developed by Norway for its two-year Chairmanship period is, according to ICC Canada (2023: 7), “unlikely” to be implemented while the war against Ukraine continues.

Chapter Four: The Saami Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council's constructing versions of the Arctic Council suspension

Both the Saami Council and the ICC have expressed their views on the consequences of the war in Ukraine and the suspension of the Arctic Council. Both organizations have also experienced difficulties in collaborating with their Russian member organizations following the war, which is reflected in the discourses from both organizations. The Saami Council put cooperation with the Russian side of the Saami Council on hold on April 10, 2022, meaning that members on the Russian side of the Saami Council would not attend meetings on any level until further notice (Saami Council, 2022a). The ICC has not elaborated on the status of its cooperation with ICC Chukotka, but only stated that the ICC Chukotka's physical attendance in meetings is hampered by the war in Ukraine (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2023).

This chapter elaborates on the findings from the discourse analysis. The data from the Saami Council and the ICC have been analyzed separately, yet there are overlapping discursive themes in the data across the two organizations. Table 1 provides an overview of the sources for the coded data.

Table 1: Saami Council and ICC Texts for Discourse Analysis

File no.	Organization/Author	Type of data	Source and date
1	Saami Council	Statement	Saami Council webpage, March 13, 2022
2	Saami Council	Váhtjer Declaration	22 nd Saami Conference, 11-14 August 2022
3	Saami Council	Annual Report 2022	Annual Report, March 9, 2023
4	Chair Aslak Holmberg, Saami Council	Opening remarks speech	Arctic Peoples' Conference, July 20, 2023
5	Chair Aslak Holmberg, Saami Council	Concluding remarks speech	Arctic Peoples' Conference, July 21, 2023
6	Chair Aslak Holmberg, Saami Council	Statements from news article	CBC News, May 11, 2023

7	Gunn-Britt Retter, Saami Council	Keynote speech	Arctic Peoples' Conference, July 20, 2023
8	Silje Karine Moutka, President Saami Parliament in Norway	Panel discussion	Arctic Frontiers, January 31, 2023
9	Chair Aslak Holmberg, Saami Council Vice-President Åsa Larsson, Saami Council Chair Sara Olsvig, ICC Board Member Sam Alexander, Gwich'in Council International ICC Canada delegate, Charlie Watt Head of Cultural Unit Christina Henriksen, Saami Council Executive Board Member Vivian Korthuis, ICC Alaska	Panel discussion	Arctic Peoples' Conference, July 20, 2023
10	Former ICC Chair Aqqaq Luk Lyng Former ICC Vice-Chair and ICC President Carl Christian Olsen Former Saami Council Chair Márét Sára Former Saami Council Chair Per Mikael Utsi	Armchair conversation	Arctic Peoples' Conference, July 20, 2023
11	ICC Saami Council Gwich'in Council International Arctic Athabaskan Council Aleut International Association	Statement	Arctic Peoples' Conference, July 25, 2023
12	ICC	Press Release	Inuit Circumpolar Council's webpage, March 7, 2022
13	ICC	2022 Inuit Circumpolar Council Declaration	14 th General Assembly of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, 19-21 July, 2022
14	Chair Sara Olsvig, ICC	Panel discussion	Arctic Frontiers, February 1, 2023
15	Chair Sara Olsvig, ICC	Press release	Munich Security Conference, February 19, 2023

16	Chair Sara Olsvig, ICC	Speech	Arctic Circle Assembly, October 20, 2022
17	Chair Sara Olsvig, ICC	Q/A	Arctic Circle Assembly, October 20, 2022
18	Chair Sara Olsvig, ICC	Speech	Inuit Circumpolar Council Delegates Meeting, July 19, 2023
19	Chair Sara Olsvig, ICC	Speech	Inuit Circumpolar Council Delegates Meeting, July 18, 2023
20	Chair Sara Olsvig, ICC	Q/A	Arctic Circle Assembly, October 2023
21	Chair Sara Olsvig, ICC	Speech	Arctic Circle Assembly, October 2023
22	Russian section of the Saami Council	Statement	Saami Council's webpage, February 27, 2022
23	Saami Council	Statement	Saami Council's webpage, April 10, 2022
24	Saami Council	Resolutions from the 22 nd Saami Conference	Saami Council's webpage, October 18, 2022
25	Gunn-Britt Retter, Saami Council Chief Bill Erasmus, Arctic Athabaskan Council	Plenary discussion	Arctic Encounter Symposium, March 29, 2023
26	Gunn-Britt Retter, Saami Council	Statements from news article	High North News, March 31, 2023

The Saami Council

A. Discourse One: The geopolitical situation has severe consequences for the cooperation of the Saami peoples

In the data relating to the suspension of the Arctic Council, the Saami Council refer to the direct consequences of the geopolitical situation as impacting the Saami peoples. The current situation is linked to the geopolitical situation during the Cold War, where contact between the Saami peoples in

Russia and the rest of Sápmi⁵ was reduced to a minimum due to the East/West national borders transcending Sápmi. The consequences of state borders crossing Sápmi are “[o]nce again [...] all too obvious” (Appendix C, 2024: 16), as the new geopolitical situation is understood as severely restricting cooperation with the Russian side of the Saami Council. Consequently, the unity of the Saami peoples is understood as being threatened by national state borders:

Although we are one people, we feel how we our community is divided by borders, kept apart by the states of which we have become citizens. Our cross-border community is not prioritized by these states, and we cannot take anything for granted. Rights we have won can be lost again in a moment if we do not vigilantly defend our gains and interests. This is why coming together is more important now than ever; We must strengthen Sápmi and ensure that the borders will never be closed to the Saami again. (Appendix C, 2024: 15)

Unity is a key theme within the discourse, and the Saami peoples are continuously referred to as ‘one people’, with the Russian side of the organization described in familial terms such as ‘brothers and sisters’ and ‘siblings’ (Appendix C, 2024: 2, 10-14). The consequences of the war are therefore emphasized by invoking the language of unity: “[I]t’s vital for us as peoples to be able to have that connection and also to be able to meet and try to strengthen the Saami culture together, because it is important, and so we feel like we are... We have lost so much on such a short time” (Appendix C, 2024: 4).

The Saami Council express worries over how long the interruption in cooperation will persist (Appendix C, 2024: 5), as cooperation with the Russian members is especially positioned as important for them to strengthen the Saami culture across Sápmi. Therefore, the geopolitical situation and the following break in cooperation concerns the Saami people: “[P]eople are very worried about how the situation affects our people over a long period of time” (Ibid: 18). For the Saami Council, cooperation

⁵ The Saami peoples’ traditional land spanning Russia, Norway, Finland, and Sweden (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, n.d.b)

with the Russian will only be possible once the “situation is clearer” and when it “once again becomes possible to cooperate across state borders” (Ibid: 7).

B. Discourse Two: The Saami Council are vital actors in the Arctic Council, and the Arctic Council is vital for the Saami Council

The second discourse identified in the data establishes an interdependence between the Saami Council and the Arctic Council. The Saami Council both position themselves as a vital actor within the Arctic Council’s governance structure, but they also situate the Arctic Council as a vital forum for them. This framing can be perceived as creating a foundation for the subsequent elaboration of the consequences of the Arctic Council’s suspension.

First, Saami Council position themselves as ‘founding members’ and as an ‘integral part’ in the establishment of the Arctic Council, and they present the establishment of the Arctic Council as a ‘major achievement’ of the Saami Council’s lobbying (Appendix C, 2024: 20, 31, 38). This is due to the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ “long-established cooperation, predating the Arctic Council cooperation” (Ibid: 2). The Saami Council’s role in the establishment of the Arctic Council is often referred back to the 1973 Arctic Peoples’ Conference. As Aslak Holmberg, Chair of the Saami Council mentioned: “[W]e can say that the steps towards what became the Arctic Council was taken then at the 1973 conference” (Ibid: 38). Gunn-Britt Retter further elaborates on how the attendees – the Saami Council included – back then envisioned a circumpolar body of Indigenous peoples, but also how their contributions to the establishment of the Council is often neglected in the narrative of the Council’s establishment: “I think that the Arctic Council is that body with states involved. It’s a circumpolar cooperation that we were wanting or people who were there in ’73 were calling for. But

usually when we hear about the history of the Arctic Council, it starts with Gorbachev's speech in 1987..." (Appendix C, 2024: 37)

Second, the Saami Council also position themselves as an integral part of the Arctic Council governance structure. This is because the Saami Council, along with the other Permanent Participants, are positioned as "the human face of the Council" (Appendix C, 2024: 19, 20): "I think that without the PP's, or the Permanent Participants' involvement in the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council would probably be very heavy on the environmental issues of the polar bear situation, disconnected from the people..." (Appendix C, 2024: 19))

The Saami Council and the other Permanent Participants are thus positioned as contributing with vital knowledge that is connected to the peoples of the Arctic through the status as Permanent Participants. The Permanent Participant status is considered a 'unique construction' because Indigenous peoples are represented at the same table as the states (Appendix C, 2024: 28). In particular, the status as Permanent Participants is often referred to as providing the Saami peoples with a strong position in the Council. It has enabled the Saami Council to add own values to the workings of the Arctic Council and gain recognition of Indigenous knowledge (Ibid: 33). Their position and influence within the Council is described as 'strong' and their contributions to the work as 'important', specifically because it adds the human dimension to the work of the Council.

Finally, for that reason, the Arctic Council is also presented as an important forum for the Saami Council: "I think the Arctic Council is very important for us as Indigenous peoples, because that's the forum where we have a very strong position, and it is about our lands, our food security, our environment, which is the fundamentals for our culture" (Appendix C, 2024: 47-48).

The Arctic Council is described as having ‘tremendous importance’ for the Saami Council (Appendix C, 2024: 46), and the importance of the Council is especially tied to the Saami Council’s ability to incorporate own Indigenous knowledge into the workings of the Council:

[T]he Arctic Council is an important arena to lift and to highlight our Indigenous knowledge. There are projects within the Arctic Council that are at the forefront of actually finding ways to co-produce knowledge and to find ways to enhance the recognition of our Indigenous knowledge. And that is also something that the Arctic Council is an important arena for, and that it something that is not often listened to as an important task, but it is. (Appendix C, 2024: 48)

For them, the Arctic Council is understood as a forum from where important environmental work is undertaken in cooperation with the Indigenous peoples. This environmental work, as president of the Saami Council, Aslak Holmberg, argues, is some that the Saami Council and other Arctic Indigenous peoples “depend upon” (Appendix C, 2024: 46).

C. Discourse Three: The Arctic Council pause and the future of the Council

In the third identified discourse in the data, the Saami Council emphasize the suspension of the Arctic Council, their commitment to the continuation of the work in the Council and future changes to the Permanent Participant status, that the Saami Council envision.

In their official statement on the Arctic Council pause from March 13, 2022, the Saami Council announced their agreement with the A7 member states’ decision to put participation in the Arctic Council on hold. Yet, they also expressed their hopes for a swift resumption of work to protect the Arctic environment and Indigenous peoples:

We hope that the pause will not be too long. Now, more than ever, it is important to continue the Arctic cooperation to cooperation to protect Indigenous peoples’ cultures and the Arctic environment, this includes the scientific cooperation, monitoring, and long-time data sets to better understand the climate and environmental changes in the Arctic. (Appendix C, 2024: 56)

Although the Saami Council agreed with the decision to pause participation, the impact that the new geopolitical situation has had on the Arctic Council was still noted: “[N]ow the Arctic Council is in a critical state, still, and we need to work strategically to maintain this unique body” (Appendix C, 2024: 47). The situation is understood as unprecedented, and cooperation is often described as experiencing ‘rough waters’. Thus, continuing Arctic Council cooperation, especially considering the new geopolitical situation, is a priority for the Saami Council: “This mandate is still important, maybe now more than ever” (Appendix C, 2024: 46, 58, 59).

While the Saami Council announced their agreement with the A7 member states’ decision to suspend the Arctic Council, they also highlight the Arctic Council’s criteria of consensus. This can be perceived as a critique of the A7 member states’ decision, which was made without the Permanent Participants’ involvement. In the statement convened at the Arctic Peoples’ Conference 2023, the Permanent Participants (except for RAIPON) noted: “We, as founding members of the Arctic Council, remind the co-founders that our consensus must be a prerequisite for any decision on all levels of the organization” (Appendix C, 2024: 54). Positioning themselves as the founding members and the ‘human face’ of the Arctic Council, there is an understanding that decisions made without consensus, and thus without the involvement of the Permanent Participants, undermine the purpose and integrity of the Council. While the statement is convened by the other Permanent Participants too, the criteria of consensus is also referred to by the Saami Council.

The principle of consensus is attributed one of the proposals of the Arctic Peoples’ Conference in 1973, however, the new geopolitical situation has exposed the vulnerability of informally being a part of the consensus:

[W]e realized through these rough times that we have been through, that informal part of being part of the consensus is a very vulnerable situation when you get into rough waters. Because then it was easy to leave us out [of the decision to suspend the Arctic Council] because there was no obligation to have us part of the consensus. So, I think

that we, when we, as we evolve, and I might be naïve, hoping we get through these rough waters, that we need to start to discuss how we formalize the informal strong... How we formalize our role, which in fact is considered almost being part of the consensus without being that. (Appendix C, 2024: 59)

Thus, based on the consequences of the suspension, the Saami Council propose to both reaffirm their commitment to the Arctic Council and to spark a debate on how to strengthen the structure of the Arctic Council. The Saami Council “will do what we can to maintain the cooperation” (Appendix C: 56) and contribute to “slowly find ways to get the Arctic Council up and running again” (Ibid: 59). Their commitment is linked to their ‘strong position’ within the Council, as elaborated on in discourse two, and because the Arctic Council is considered as “very important for us as Indigenous peoples” (Ibid: 64). It will allow them to “come back to just being able to do the important work that we are doing on all levels of the Arctic Council” (Ibid: 34).

The Inuit Circumpolar Council

A. Discourse One: The Arctic region is under pressure geopolitically and environmentally

Three discourses have been identified in the data originating from the ICC. As shown, the ICC constructs similar, but not identical, discourses regarding the geopolitical situation and the suspension of the Arctic Council as the Saami Council. The first discourse identified in the data from the ICC relates to the new geopolitical and environmental pressures faced by the Arctic region. This discourse emphasizes three different aspects, including the geopolitical landscape, the human consequences hereof, and climate change impacting the region.

First, the changing geopolitical landscape is often referred to in the data. The new geopolitical situation is recognized as a “situation that we have been through similar times”, yet the current situation today is perceived as “a very, very serious situation for us as peoples” with unprecedented consequences for Inuit (Appendix B, 2024: 4). These consequences are situated as directly and

indirectly impacting Inuit and their human rights, as their livelihoods are based in an Arctic region facing changed security dynamics: “And for us, from others who might think that we only work with non-security related issues or soft-security related issues, that is not the case. Because any hard security development affects us directly and affects our human rights directly” (Appendix B, 2024: 13).

While the ICC situates itself as having been through similar times before, the current geopolitical situation is with “dimensions and consequences, we have not seen before” (Appendix B, 2024: 11-12). Because of this, both Arctic democracy and Inuit are situated as being under pressure (Ibid). There is an understanding that the new geopolitical situation is just one of the ‘severe crisis after another’ (Ibid: 11), and that the situation is not about to change: “[I]t’s not going to be much easier in the coming months, and I don’t think that it’s going to be easier with these coming years” (Ibid: 17).

The human consequences of the geopolitical situation are positioned as ‘heartbreaking’ and severe on an individual basis. The ICC have members residing within Chukotka, Russia, and while the organization was established during the Cold War, it was only 15 years later that the Russian Inuit became full members of the organization (Appendix B, 2024: 19): “[W]e are noticing that our connection is getting further and further away from each other, and that really, really hurts for our Inuit hearts” (Appendix B, 2024: 16). While the importance of remembering the Chukotka Inuit in the ICC’s work is noted, the consequences of the geopolitical situation make personal connection to them challenging: “It is important to keep our personal contacts, but how the [contact] between our organizations continue is impossible to see” (Appendix B, 2024: 14, 39).

Yet, the geopolitical circumstances are not the only perceived threat to the Inuit. The changing Arctic environment also pose a threat to the Arctic region, and the ICC highlight how the Inuit communities are at the forefront of the Arctic climate change with consequences for Inuit livelihoods:

“Today and these years are unprecedented. It’s climate change, that’s directly affecting our livelihoods, our way of transportation across ice, it’s the geopolitical situation that we situation...” (Appendix B, 2024: 24). The region is positioned as being under pressure from preexisting developments, with the effects of climate change severely impacting the Arctic region, e.g. pollution in the Arctic ecosystems and temperature rises four times faster than the global average. The consequences of climate change include impacts related to Inuit human rights, culture, health, and social well-being (Appendix, 2024: 50), and these developments are positioned as direct threats to the livelihoods of Inuit: “A variety of security issues continue to change our livelihoods [...], including our food security and food sovereignty” (Ibid: 5). Thus, positioned as security issues and posing a threat to their survival, the ICC emphasize that these challenges are not just challenges of the Arctic region: “As Inuit and many others have said many times: Protecting the Arctic is to protect the planet” (Ibid: 13). As climate change affects all, they call on collaborative efforts:

“The changing climate, environmental pollution, the biodiversity, flora and fauna, and ecosystems, know nothing of state-borders on a map, and in our efforts to protect our planet from further disaster, we must come together and see beyond state-borders. Yes, that is difficult in times like these, but the level of difficulty does not make it less necessary” (Ibid: 74)

B. Discourse Two: The Arctic Council pause and its consequences for addressing the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ priorities

The second discourse relates to the suspension of the Arctic Council and its consequences for addressing the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ priorities. The ICC published a statement on March 7, 2022, addressing the A7’s decision to pause the workings of the Arctic Council. Like the Saami Council, the ICC agreed with the A7 member states’ decision to temporarily pause the Arctic Council, yet they also explicitly stated their concerns with the new geopolitical situation and the future of the

Arctic Council, highlighting both their past efforts to unite Inuit across the Arctic region and their commitments to “the Arctic remaining a zone of peace” (Appendix B, 2024: 27).

The ICC is “deeply concerned” with the suspension of the Arctic Council and its future, which is referred to as based on peaceful cooperation and mutual respect, and they describe the Arctic democracy as being “under great pressure” (Appendix B, 2024: 56). To maintain and continue collaboration in the Council is of ‘great importance’ for them. As a response to the suspension of the Arctic Council, they situate themselves as integral actors within Arctic governance. They do so by referring to their role as co-founders in the establishment of the Council, emphasizing their importance within these structures: “We pre-date and co-founded the Arctic Council, and the fact that this Arctic roundtable is currently not in function does not make our seats empty” (Appendix B, 2024: 87).

Like the Saami Council, despite their official agreement with the A7 member states’ decision to suspend the Arctic Council, they highlight their right to participation in Arctic decision-making processes. They call for a resolution to the suspension and emphasize that “we must remain an integral part of this regional organization” (Appendix B, 2024: 50). As Sara Olsvig, Chair of the ICC, states: “Well, we see time and time again, that principles of ethical engagement are broken, or that decision-making processes are not including Indigenous peoples in sufficient ways...” (Appendix B, 2024: 59).

The right to participation in decision-making processes are emphasized as crucial to the ICC, as they directly link it to the health and well-being of Inuit: “[D]ecision-making-power and management are required for food security and a healthy environment” (Appendix B, 2024: 69). Therefore, any intergovernmental fora, including the Arctic Council, or any Arctic developments that will impact Inuit communities “must ensure our direct participation in procedural and substantive aspects” (Ibid: 63).

The deep concern related to the suspension of the Arctic Council is because of its importance to the ICC. The Arctic Council is situated as the most important political forum for the organization and as the most important Arctic governance body (Appendix B, 2024: 3, 8). It is considered as a “key arena to further the interests of Inuit” (Ibid: 52) and is considered a very important forum because of the ‘big challenging issues’ facing Inuit, and which must be addressed (Ibid: 54). Thus, the Arctic Council is perceived as key in addressing the challenges facing the region and Inuit.

The Arctic Council provides the Inuit with a seat at the table and a “direct, strong voice” (Appendix B, 2024: 62) from where Inuit can contribute with solutions to the region’s pressing issues. It is important for the Inuit to support the work of the Arctic Council, as it is understood as contributing to the protection of the region (Ibid: 75). The level of inclusion in the Council enables Inuit to incorporate own perspectives and solutions: “Our knowledge, adaption and mitigation strategies and management practices are critical to addressing the challenges [related to climate change]” (Ibid: 50). Their inclusion is therefore of great importance: “I again want to remind how important it is, that we continue to influence and influence greater what goes on in the Arctic Council. Because exactly there, under each of the working groups, numbers and numbers of projects are conducted” (Appendix B, 2024: 53).

C. Discourse Three: There is no ‘Arctic governance’ or ‘cooperation’ without the involvement of Arctic Indigenous peoples

Finally, the third discourse relates to the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ key role in Arctic governance and cooperation. This discourse emphasizes that there is no Arctic cooperation without the involvement of Arctic Indigenous peoples. The ICC construct this discourse based on two components: Inuit as ‘the people of the Arctic’ and Inuit diplomacy.

First, the ICC emphasize that Inuit “are the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic” and that they are the ones “living in the Arctic” (Appendix B, 2024: 91). Together with the other Arctic Indigenous peoples, they are positioned as ‘moral leaders’ and as ‘legitimizing representatives’ of the region (Ibid: 87). Thus, the ICC is not just a Permanent Participant within the Arctic Council, but a representative of the peoples, who have inhabited the region since time immemorial: “First of all, I want to reiterate that Indigenous peoples’ organizations – we are not only Permanent Participants. We represent peoples. Peoples that were here before the states were created, and therefore it is our clear message that any development in the Arctic, we must be at the table” (Appendix B, 2024: 83).

Therefore, Inuit presence in Arctic cooperation is situated as integral: Inuit are the ones living in the region and therefore also the ones directly impacted by the region’s developments. Their existence in the region predating the states’ situates them as legitimate actors who must be included in decision-making processes. It is also integral because Inuit hold knowledge that is directly connected to the land on which they reside: “Arctic Indigenous peoples are the original inhabitants of our region. And we bear with us a deeply rooted spiritual and cultural and all kinds of connection to the nature around us. We have safeguarded our nature, our ways of lives and continue to develop our own futures...” (Appendix B, 2024: 91).

To successfully manage the challenges facing the region, the local knowledge held by Inuit must be leveraged: “To navigate the waters of disastrous winter storms requires a cool and steady hand. But it also requires knowledge of these exact sea routes, coasts and conditions, and of the spirits that tie us, as human beings, together with nature” (Appendix B, 2024: 90-91). Knowledge and world views from Indigenous peoples are thus considered ‘invaluable’ (Appendix B, 2024: 75). As Inuit have survived and thrived since time immemorial, their knowledge is essential for surviving the challenges of today, and it will “once again be the indigeneity our forefathers and mothers demonstrated in surviving and thriving” (Ibid). Therefore, Arctic Indigenous peoples must be listened

to: “Our fight for survival is not only decided by political events, but it may be [...] decided by nature’s own forces with climate and environmental degradation in the world if we don’t listen to the Arctic peoples’ voice” (Ibid: 67).

Secondly, the ICC situates itself as important actors because of their diplomatic practices which predates the Arctic Council. Established during the Cold War, the ICC have experience with collaborating and working towards Arctic priorities despite geopolitical unrest: “[L]et me emphasize that we were created during the time when the Cold War started. So, because of that, we have always kept our focus on working together for the Arctic agenda” (Appendix B, 2024: 84). Inuit diplomacy is positioned as actively striving to enhance Indigenous peoples’ rights, climate action, environmental safety, and health, and as having contributed to a world that “to a greater extent encompasses and recognizes complexity and diversity” (Appendix 2024: 77). Overall, Inuit diplomacy through the ICC is portrayed as entailing two components: It serves as a unifying voice across the Arctic region, and it also aims to further the idea of upholding the Arctic region as a zone of peace. Since 1977, the ICC have been the “united voice of our people” (Ibid: 82), raising awareness and advocating for the right to self-determination “as a prerequisite for the exercise and enjoyment of all human rights” (Ibid: 39). Further, the ICC have made a ‘constant push’ for the Arctic governments to pursue a “peaceful, low-tension, and prosperous Arctic” (Ibid: 85). Inuit diplomacy advocates for peaceful development and respectful partnerships, and because of this, “[t]he values we bring – democracy, integrity, inclusion and good governance – must continue to be the moral compass for all governments” (Ibid: 91).

Therefore, because of their situatedness in the Arctic region and their diplomacy predating the Arctic Council, Inuit must be included in Arctic cooperation as they hold knowledge and values needed to mitigate the region’s issues: “This is Arctic democracy under pressure. But we have the solutions at hand to prevent its complete meltdown” (Appendix B, 2024: 75). Referring to the Arctic democracy, the ICC elaborate on what’s at stake:

As we look around the Arctic, it is this inherently exercised right of self-determination now recognized as an inherent human right, by the states represented in this room, that makes up Arctic democracy as we know it. It is the recognition of Indigenous peoples as equal to all other peoples, and self-governing nations with rights exercised to create organizations, parliaments, and governments, who are all and must be all part of the future Arctic governance. This is the democracy we must protect. (Appendix B, 2024: 64-65)

Therefore, the Arctic Indigenous peoples must be included in the primary governance body of the region, the Arctic Council: “As we have stated before, there is no Arctic Council without Arctic Indigenous peoples” (Appendix B, 2024: 67). Ultimately, the Arctic Council is situated as being illegitimate and undemocratic without the inclusion of Arctic Indigenous peoples:

We cannot reiterate enough that Indigenous peoples must be included at any decision and policy-making in and about the Arctic, on all levels of governance, under or outside the auspices of the Arctic Council. Excellences, the Arctic Council is not the Arctic Council without Indigenous peoples. Arctic governance is not democratic without Indigenous peoples’ participation. (Appendix B, 2024: 64).

The discourses in a broader light

Finally, this section summarizes the discursive findings from the Saami Council and the ICC, before situating them within the theoretical framework.

These six discourses highlight that the Saami Council and the ICC articulate similar, but not identical, versions of the geopolitical situation and the suspension of the Arctic Council. First, the Saami Council articulate that the new geopolitical situation has severe consequences for the unity and cooperation of the Saami peoples. They highlight that Saami peoples transcend national state-borders, and that state-borders once again pose severe consequences for their cooperation across Sápmi. For the Saami Council, unity and cooperation across borders with their Russian members are positioned as essential to strengthen the Saami culture together. The ICC too position the new geopolitical situation as having consequences for them – it impacts their human rights, but also Inuit as peoples,

yet it is not the only challenge facing them today. They also highlight climate change as posing a direct threat to their human rights and food security.

Second, like the ICC, the Saami Council articulate an interdependence between them and the Arctic Council: They are positioned as vital actors in the Arctic Council and the Arctic Council is positioned as being vital for them in advancing their interests in Arctic governance. Both the ICC and the Saami Council position themselves as vital actors within the Arctic Council structure based on their historical legitimacy: Both draw on their lobbying preceding and contribution to the establishment of the Arctic Council as play a key role in the establishment of the Council. The Saami Council emphasize that they, with their Indigenous knowledge, adds the ‘human dimension’ to the Arctic Council: They contribute to an indigenization of the work in the working groups, work which they ‘depend upon’. The ICC position Inuit as the legitimate representatives of the Arctic region, as they have lived in the Arctic since time immemorial. Because of their situatedness in the region, they are the ones experiencing the challenges that the region faces, including the impacts of climate change and new geopolitics. It is also because of the ICC’s situatedness in the region that they hold the solutions needed to mitigate these challenges: They hold knowledge from their ancestors, which previously have enabled them to survive and thrive in rough conditions.

For both the Saami Council and the ICC, the Arctic Council is considered an important governance body because they have a strong position herein. For the Saami Council, the Arctic Council is important because it involves their food security and environment – which is stated as being the foundation for their culture. For the ICC, the Arctic Council is important because it enables the use of Indigenous knowledge which is positioned as critical to addressing the challenges related to climate change. Their participation in the Arctic Council is directly linked to their food security and a healthy environment.

Third, both the Saami Council and the ICC emphasize the importance of maintaining cooperation within the Arctic Council. The Saami Council reaffirm their commitment to the Arctic Council, but they also highlight the importance of continuing to have Arctic Indigenous peoples involved in Arctic decision-making processes when going through ‘rough waters’. Here, the Saami Council emphasize the informal role of the consensus, which in the future must be strengthened to ensure Arctic Indigenous peoples’ full participation in decision-making processes, also when there is geopolitical unrest. While not using the same discursive elements as the ICC, the mentioning of the informal consensus can be perceived as a subtle critique of the A7 member states’ decision to suspend the Arctic Council without the Permanent Participants’ involvement. The ICC, on the other hand, do not explicitly mention the consensus, but they do mention that the ‘principles of ethical engagement’ has been broken. They argue that any Arctic decision-making processes failing to involve Arctic Indigenous peoples are illegitimate. They position Arctic democracy as inherently related to Indigenous peoples’ self-determination and their human rights and argue that Inuit diplomacy serves as a moral compass for governments and is needed to prevent the meltdown of Arctic democracy.

While the Saami Council and the ICC articulate similar discourses around the suspension of the Arctic Council, there are still differences to their articulations. Central is their way of situating themselves as legitimate actors within Arctic politics. Both organizations situate their legitimacy claims in their indigeneity, however they do so differently. The ICC draw more on a rights-based discourse and utilizes the language of securitization. While the Saami Council also situate their claims in their indigeneity, they do not utilize the same language as the ICC. The final part of this chapter will first situate the findings in relation to other academic sources before elaborating on a potential reason for their differences in articulation.

Chater (2021: 12) argues that Arctic Indigenous peoples frequently root their arguments within the framework of human rights, including the human security and well-being of Arctic Indigenous

peoples. Both the ICC and the Saami Council articulate discourses on the suspension of the Arctic Council which grounds their argument for inclusion in their indigeneity and the well-being of their respective peoples. Yet, their way of articulating these arguments differs. The ICC draw more on security- and rights-based arguments, whereas the Saami Council draw more on the well-being of their peoples without explicitly mentioning their position as right-holders. This finding is consistent with Pelaudix's (2019: 38, 44) argument that the ICC especially relies on post-colonial norms of self-determination when making legitimacy claims. For example, because the ICC hold a stronger position in the global arena compared to the regional arena, "one major legitimization avenue is to refer to international law to put pressure on the domestic level" (Pelaudeix, 2019: 36). Thus, as a strategy, the ICC "takes advantage of the support of international law it benefits from (human rights and Indigenous peoples' rights) to [...] advance legitimacy claims" (Pelaudix, 2019: 45-46). When the ICC and the Saami Council situate themselves as knowledge-holders and as peoples who've survived in the Arctic since time immemorial, they construct their political agency and make a legitimacy claim based on what Pelaudix (2019: 38) calls a bottom-up approach of management. This bottom-up approach intends to demonstrate that both organizations can manage transnational issues, the focal point of the Arctic Council's mandate, thereby claiming their inclusion in the Arctic Council.

While the discourses identified in the data reflect a time period of 1.5 years, the Saami Council and the ICC utilize strategies for constructing political agency that are not new. Lindroth & Sinevaara-Niskanen (2013) have studied the agency strategies utilized by the Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council and found that Indigenous knowledge and situatedness in the region is utilized in discourses to construct political agency. Three overlapping and interconnected discursive strategies were utilized in constructing this agency: Indigenous knowledge, their role as stakeholders due to their livelihoods being affected by environmental change and their relationship with nature (Lindroth

& Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2013: 287). As seen in the discourses from the Saami Council and the ICC, Indigenous knowledge is situated as playing a key role in mitigating the region's challenges related to climate change. Knowledge is used as a tool of governance, creating responsibilities that enables and rely on the inclusion Indigenous peoples in governing and mitigating the region's challenges. Similarly, due to their situatedness in the region, the Saami Council and the ICC is stakeholders as their livelihoods are affected by the environmental changes (Lindroth & Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2013: 283). Overall, indigeneity is strategically used as a tool to demand inclusion in the Council's decision-making processes.

Huysmans & Guillaume (2013: 18, 19) proposed to study the practices that position actors as 'on site' rather than outside of the political being. In this regard, the Saami Council and the ICC's discourses can be perceived as strategies aimed at positioning the ICC and the Saami Council as 'on site' rather than outside of the political being. The decision to suspend the Arctic Council in March 2022 placed the Permanent Participants outside of the decision-making processes. By claiming the right to participation through their situatedness in the Arctic region, and in the case of the ICC specifically through their collective rights as Indigenous peoples, the ICC and the Saami Council challenge the exclusion produced by the A7 member states' decision.

According to Plaut (2012: 194), "communication is often the primary currency for pressure and change". Yet, while both the Saami Council and the ICC draw on the logic of indigeneity when asserting their right to be political, their ways of communicating differ, which can possibly be explained by their respective national contexts. The main difference between the Saami Council and the ICC's respective discourses is that the ICC more explicitly draw on a rights-based discourse while simultaneously utilizing the language of securitization, and the Saami Council do not. Pelaudeix (2019: 45-46) posits that the ICC, specifically, takes advantage of their human- and Indigenous peoples' rights as a strategy to advance legitimacy claims but also to circumvent their respective

states' restrictive approach of these rights. By explicitly drawing on the Indigenous rights regime, they put forward their right to self-determination in decision-making processes and place a demand on their respective states to recognize them as rights-holders *beyond* their rights as citizens. For the ICC, the Indigenous rights regime becomes key to their advancement of own priorities because their opportunities for influencing national political developments remain constrained. For example, Inuit have identified the incomplete implementation of self-government as directly affecting Inuit rights and security within the Canadian context (Greaves, 2016a: 468). While the Greenlandic self-government agreement stands out, Inuit in Chukotka have not signed any self-government agreement with Russia, and in Alaska, Inuit "political autonomy has only been recognized in a very limited way" (Pelaudeix, 2012: 71, 76).

However, the national context can also potentially explain why the ICC utilizes the language of securitization when the Saami Council do not. As Greaves (2016: 477) suggests, Saami peoples in Norway have a larger degree of social inclusion within the Norwegian society than Inuit in Canada have, making it superfluous to utilize the language of security when they already are well-incorporated into the Norwegian society. Common to the Nordic countries, and therefore also Sweden and Finland, the two other Scandinavian countries in which the Saami peoples reside, are the ideas of equality and a welfare state that protects its citizens socially and economically (Palmberg, 2009 in Greaves, 2016a: 475). This stands in contrast to the reality of Inuit across Alaska, Canada, and Chukotka, as they face higher degrees of insecurity within their respective states and the Saami peoples within their respective states (except for Russia) do (Greaves, 2016a: 477; International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2014; Sergunin, 2018: 62).

Thus, through the theoretical lens of 'acts of indigeneity', addressing the suspension of the Arctic Council while asserting their rights can be understood as a way for Arctic Indigenous peoples to demand democratization of the decision-making processes and to situate themselves as legitimate

actors in Arctic politics. While it is outside the scope of this thesis to examine the effectiveness of the ICC and the Saami Council's respective discourses, utilizing 'acts of indigeneity' as a strategy to demand democratization may serve as a beneficial strategy to the two organizations. Given the Arctic Council has not upheld the Permanent Participants' rights to full consultation in the Council's decision-making processes, references made to their collective rights as Indigenous peoples under international law serves to remind their respective audiences – including state representatives and Arctic Council officials – that they have the right to be involved in decision-making processes on matters affecting them. This applies even if the Arctic Council does not uphold their right to full consultation within the Council. Consequently, utilizing 'acts of indigeneity' as a strategy can be perceived as a tool to circumvent the Council's exclusion of the Permanent Participants, as the right to self-determination and involvement in decisions affecting them is enshrined in international law.

Chapter Five: The implications of the deterioration in the Arctic

Having elaborated on the deterioration in Arctic politics and the developments in the Arctic Council since 2007, this chapter asks: What are the implications of these developments on the Permanent Participant's ability to advance their own interests in Arctic governance? I propose three different implications for the Permanent Participants: First, the Permanent Participants must secure funding in order to secure their participation in light of the increased workload, and I therefore examine different avenues for funding. Second, the increase in state-centric decision-making leaves the Permanent Participants out of the decision-making processes, yet as I show, Inuit and the Saami peoples face difficulties in advancing own interests within their own national borders and in other institutions. Third, I look to the future of Arctic governance and consider the implications for the Permanent Participants if the deterioration continues.

Increased demand for engagement pressures the Permanent Participants, who already faced financial constraints pre-2007

While the Permanent Participants have faced financial constraints to their participation since the establishment of the Arctic Council, these constraints exacerbated as the Council gained global prominence following 2007. However, neither funding or resources kept pace with the post-2007 increased workload, which outstretched the intellectual and financial capacities of the Permanent Participants (Audla in House of Lords Select Committee on the Arctic, 2015: 67; Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 147).

This trend impacted the Permanent Participants' ability to advance their own interests within the Arctic Council, and especially their contributions at the level of the Working Groups and Task Forces were impacted. The large body of work forced the Permanent Participants to be selective and

decide which projects most effectively match their priorities within their capacity (Coote, 2016: 56). Further, the Permanent Participants faced difficulties in attending the increased number of meetings in the Council. Overall, the increased workload in the Council does not match the Permanent Participants' ability to participate in the activities as they envision, thereby making it harder to have their priorities put on the agenda. The increased workload and lack of adequate funding facilitated the shift from Permanent Participants leading projects and groups, to instead participating in meetings and projects led by others (House of Lords Select Committee on the Arctic, 2015: 67).

Therefore, funding is required to maintain level of the Working Groups and Task Forces as an avenue from where the Permanent Participants can advance own priorities within the Arctic Council – a level which both the ICC and the Saami Council deem important because it enables them to utilize their Indigenous knowledge. This first part of the chapter considers the internal and external avenues for funding in the Arctic Council and the implications for the Permanent Participants.

A. Avenues for funding within the Arctic Council

The Permanent Participants have since the establishment of the Council been dependent on funding from member states. To obtain funding, Permanent Participants need to gain member states' ideological support. Yet, 'colonial agendas' continue to affect the relations between the Permanent Participants and their member states (Greaves, 2018: 114), and in the pursuit of their ideological support, they risk compromising their own interests, especially since Permanent Participants find that they are more successful in advancing their own concerns when they do not conflict with the motives of the member states (Blåhed, 2018: 37; Chater, 2019: 164; Coote, 2016: 56).

Permanent Participants' interests and priorities differ fundamentally from the member states. The Permanent Participants are more likely to support and prioritize local community projects –

focusing on human health, sustainable livelihoods, infrastructure, and economic development – than the member states, who tend to prioritize national environmental priorities related to climate change (Chater, 2019: 156, 158). Because of the Permanent Participants’ already limited financial capacity, the priorities of the Arctic Council skew towards national environmental priorities rather than local community priorities. This is because member states fund most projects in the Council, often in accordance with their own national interests or international obligations (Chater, 2019: 164).

Some Permanent Participants share the environmental priorities related to climate change. For example, the ICC explicitly express their concerns over climate change affecting their livelihoods as identified in their discourses related to the Arctic Council suspension. They also sponsor projects that directly relate to environmental threats. The Saami Council do not, possibly because climate change does not pose as big of an existential threat to the Saami peoples as to Inuit (Chater, 2019: 157; Greaves, 2016a: 477).

For the Saami Council, the Arctic Council is important because it directly links to local community priorities relating to land, food security and the local environment, which are considered the foundation for Saami culture (Appendix C, 2024: 19). From their perspective, the Council would place even greater emphasis on environmental issues disconnected from what they consider the *actual* concerns of the Arctic Indigenous peoples if the Permanent Participants weren’t involved (Ibid: 26). For the ICC, it is their right to participation in decision-making processes that is emphasized as crucial to the health and well-being of Inuit (Appendix B, 2024: 69). Given the findings from the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat, which indicate a shift from Indigenous organizations leading to participating in the projects and task groups, it is conceivable that the pursuit of own priorities become challenged when not in control of the direction of the project, which sufficient capacities otherwise allow for (House of Lords Select Committee on the Arctic, 2015: 67).

Thus, relying on the member states for financial support is not a neutral funding mechanism. It ultimately hinders the Permanent Participants' ability to contribute to work that differs from the member states' priorities. With the post-2007 workload it is evident that the need for financial resources has increased, and that the Permanent Participants become vulnerable to political interference by those they depend upon for financial support. Ultimately, the dependency on funding, specifically from the member states, raises concerns regarding Indigenous independence (Blåhed, 2018: 37).

As Coote (2016: 30) suggests, it is imperative to think that the quality of the Arctic Council's work and results is contingent on the independent and effective involvement of the Permanent Participants. The Arctic Council recognized the importance of consulting with Indigenous peoples in its founding document. Indigenous knowledge and Arctic research were considered important to the collective understanding of the Arctic region, and the *Ottawa Declaration* therefore highlighted the importance of ensuring full consultation and full involvement of the Arctic Indigenous peoples in the Council's activities (Arctic Council, 1996; Coote, 2016: 30). Yet, the lack of neutral funding mechanisms in the Council puts additional pressure on the Permanent Participants and their ability to advance own priorities distinct from the member states.

The establishment of the Ålgu Fund was one step in the direction of creating an independent funding mechanism within the Arctic Council, which would distribute funds annually to the involved Permanent Participants.⁶ Yet, the member states were considered unlikely to support the Permanent Participants through this independent funding mechanism. They prefer to financially support the Indigenous peoples within their borders, continuing the practices that have existed since the establishment of the Council (Gamble, 2015: 388; Gwich'in Council International, n.d.). This way of funding not only maintains Permanent Participants' dependence on member states; it presents

⁶ All Permanent Participants except for the Inuit Circumpolar Council

implications for the Permanent Participants whose peoples they represent reside in multiple Arctic states, because funding can be allocated to only one branch of the organization, thereby restricting who can use the funds and by which means (Burke & Saramago, 2018: 940).

It was therefore no surprise that there was only one member state, in this case Canada, who offered their financial and technical assistance in establishing the Ålgu Fund (Bennet, 2020: 64). Most recent data from 2019 implied that the goal of reaching \$30,000,000 USD had not been reached (Exner-Pirot et al., 2019). In a written response from the Gwich'in Council International on December 11, 2023, the organization stated that the fund was currently not operating (Gwich'in Council International, 2023). The lack of impartial funding from member states raises the question whether the ICC and the Saami Council, when attaching high importance to their priorities, will consider other channels to obtain economic and ideological support from (Coote, 2016: 34).

Another avenue for economic and ideological support is through the Observers, who can propose projects through the member states or the Permanent Participants, if their contribution does not exceed that of the member states (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2015: 319, 320). Despite the Observers varied nature,⁷ all have agreed to follow the same criteria. Among others, these include the “political willingness as well as financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent Participants and other Arctic Indigenous peoples” (Arctic Council, n.d.f).

For the ICC and the Saami Council, the large level of applications for Observer status in the Council post-2007 prompted worries over whether the Permanent Participants would be able to retain their unique status if more observers were admitted (Abdulmuminov, 2021: 129; Graczyk, 2011: 616). Yet, their accession to the Arctic Council may instead serve as an opportunity for multi-stakeholder diplomacy, creating an avenue for funding that does not fully rely on the member states. This avenue

⁷ Observers can be states, intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations or non-governmental organizations (Arctic Council, n.d.f)

would make promoting community interests possible without fully submitting to the member states. Both the Saami Council and the ICC hold a large degree of political legitimacy to actors outside the Arctic region and Arctic Council, and it can therefore be argued that this position serves as an opportunity for funding that omits the relationships influenced by ‘colonial agendas’ within the Council.

The Norwegian branch of the Saami Council’s cooperation with the United Kingdom in 2015 is an example of observer-level Indigenous diplomacy. Meeting with representatives from the United Kingdom, the Saami Council and the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat suggested that capacity building measures at the Permanent Participant level could include supporting issues that concern Indigenous peoples (House of Lords Select Committee on the Arctic, 2015: 65, 68).

Contributing to the capacity enhancement of the Permanent Participants is what Singapore, admitted as an Observer in 2013, has done. In 2013, Singapore established the ‘Singapore-AC Permanent Participants Cooperation Package’ which was described as a “customized technical cooperation package designed to enhance the human resource development and governance capacities of the [Permanent Participants]” (Arctic Council, 2016). The package involved free education opportunities to the Permanent Participants, which, according to Burke & Saramago (2018: 922, 935), is an attractive and beneficial contribution to the strengthening of the Permanent Participants’ organizational competencies. For Singapore, this package was considered a soft power tool to advance their own position in Arctic diplomacy. As a costly and valuable good, especially outside of the European Arctic, free education offers the Permanent Participants an opportunity to develop organizational capacity that’ll benefit them on all levels of the Arctic Council meetings (Ibid: 940).

Neither the Saami Council nor the ICC made use of Singapore’s offer, yet it shows that the Permanent Participants hold a position in the Arctic Council that is favorable to the Observers.

Opposite the Observers, Permanent Participants are – in theory – included in all levels of the Council’s work. They are considered vital political actors in Arctic regional politics and hold a stronger position within the Arctic Council than the observers, because their permanent position within the Council provides them with a degree of security that the observers do not have (Burke & Saramago, 2018: 937).

Among others, Permanent Participants are perceived as providing regional cooperation efforts like the Arctic Council with legitimacy as they contribute to redressing former colonial approaches to Arctic governance. This makes them influential actors in the Council despite not having voting powers. In the case of Singapore, the Permanent Participants are considered vital actors due to political agreements and rights within their respective states, which will likely become increasingly relevant to regional economic development and dispute negotiations (Burke & Saramago, 2018: 937). Such an example is the action of the Inuit community of Clyde River in Nunavut, Canada, who won a court case against the Government of Canada over inadequate consultation in the process to permit offshore seismic testing (Burke & Saramago, 2018: 938; Tasker, 2017). For Singapore, the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ role in regional and national politics is considered vital due to the country’s aspirations for economic opportunities via international shipping in the Arctic. Strong relations with the Permanent Participants are perceived as enabling access to key actors in Arctic politics (Burke & Saramago, 2018: 922, 935, 940).

Because Singapore considers the Permanent Participants as legitimate and highly important actors in Arctic regional politics, there’s reason to think that Singapore potentially would contribute with direct financial contributions to the Permanent Participants, in return for closer ties to the Arctic communities. Indigenous diplomacy thus extends outside of the Arctic region’s borders, presenting an alternative way for funding the Permanent Participants’ participation in the Arctic Council that circumvents the present funding mechanisms within the Council.

However, not all state observers admitted in 2013 have been eager to work with the Permanent Participants. Singapore and South Korea have shown efforts, yet China, Japan and India have not significantly engaged with the Permanent Participants despite it being a set observer criterion. One explanation for their hesitancy towards engagement with the Permanent Participants is their tendency of privileging the sovereign state's primacy in international politics and their own internal tensions with ethnic minorities and Indigenous peoples. These tendencies exemplify the hindrances for Indigenous diplomacy to expand to these observers (Bennet 2020: 56). Yet, as a set criterion, Observers must show political willingness and financial ability to contribute to the workings of the Permanent Participants (Arctic Council, n.d.f). This applies even with deviating national preferences, and therefore prompts the question whether the Arctic Council holds observers accountable for their commitments, or if there is a need for strengthened accountability measures within the Council regarding the Observers.

B. Avenues for funding outside of the Arctic Council

Another avenue for securing funding to the participation of the Permanent Participants could arise from actors external to the Arctic Council, and maybe even from actors with a higher degree of democratic legitimacy than the Permanent Participants, including the ICC and the Saami Council. Permanent Participants rely on a tri-part funding structure: Their own limited budgets, funding from the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, and varying contributions from their own national governments (Abdulmuminov, 2021: 225; Bennet, 2020: 74). To support their own budgets, lobbying other Arctic regional governments may be an additional avenue for funding.

A point of critique that has been raised towards the Arctic Council is that while Indigenous peoples have a high degree of inclusion, no local or regional political institutions are represented

within the Council (Steinveg, 2023: 100). According to Pelaudeix (2019: 36), the ICC holds more democratic legitimacy in the international arena than regionally. Opposite of the local municipalities or the subnational governments that they represent, the ICC does not hold a democratic mandate. Stakeholders often attach the highest importance to the governance levels closest to their interests and everyday life (Heininen, Exner-Pirot & Plouffe, 2015: 14). It is maybe for this reason that other northern regional governments across the Arctic region experience a higher degree of democratic authority from the region's inhabitants than the Permanent Participants do (Exner-Pirot et al., 2019).

Therefore, because subnational and subregional actors do not hold formal association with the Arctic Council, closer collaboration between these actors and the Permanent Participants could constitute another avenue both for funding and strengthened democratic legitimacy regionally (Shadian in The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 2017). Closer collaboration with subnational and subregional actors would enable the utilization of expertise, including knowledge and capacities, from the northern state, territorial and regional governments, while also escaping the trajectory of relying on funding from member states, who tend to fund those projects, that align with their own priorities (Axworthy in Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2012). However, deepening these relations requires human and financial resources too and the subnational and subregional actors must also see the benefit of increasing financial contributions.

In summary, funding opportunities must escape the trajectory that funding from the member states currently follow to maintain the Permanent Participants' independence. With the Saami Council and the ICC's large degree of political legitimacy to actors outside of the Arctic region, opportunities for funding that omit the relationships influenced by 'colonial agendas' within the Council do exist. Local or regional political institutions could enhance the Permanent Participants' democratic legitimacy on the regional level and simultaneously contribute with financial contributions. However,

both opportunities have their own limitations. Thus, to fully secure the Permanent Participants' participation post-2007, stable and impartial funding is necessary.

Increased turn toward state-centric decision-making threatens the Permanent Participants' possibilities for participating in decision-making processes

Another implication for the Permanent Participants and their ability to advance own interests relates to the turn toward state-centric decision-making as it poses a direct threat to their participation in the Council's decision-making processes and thereby their ability to advance own priorities. I propose two implications of this: First, while being politically empowered actors, both the Inuit and the Saami peoples face difficulties in advancing own priorities within their national borders, especially related to environmental governance, because they often situate their respective states as the source of their insecurity. Second, while other regional- and intergovernmental fora exist from where the two organizations can advance interests across borders, none of them present similar circumpolar opportunities as the Arctic Council does.

A. Constraints on advancing interests within own national borders

The Saami Council and the ICC strategically ground their arguments for inclusion in the Arctic Council decision-making processes in their indigeneity and the well-being of their respective peoples. Utilizing their respective discourses as strategies, the Saami Council and the ICC challenge the political exclusion that the decision to suspend the Council in March 2022 was and position themselves as important and *necessary* actors in Arctic politics.

The discourses articulated in relation to the Arctic Council's suspension can be perceived as the Saami Council and the ICC being acutely aware of the consequences of the suspension – and in worst

case the risk of not returning to normal operations. The Council has, with its governance structure and the need for consensus, constituted a space from where the Permanent Participants to a *larger degree* than within their respective states have been able to articulate and elevate issues of importance to them. While they have faced financial challenges in contributing to the work of Council since its establishment, the governance structure – and especially the level of the working groups – has still played an important role for the Permanent Participants in influencing and adding to the scientific knowledge and output of the Council, to the extent that they have been able to contribute.

The turn towards increased state-centric decision-making poses a direct threat to their ability to advance interests in what the Saami Council and the ICC consider a key arena for them, as it places them outside of the decision-making processes. The first implication of this relates to their constraints on advancing own priorities nationally: While being politically empowered actors, and more so than Indigenous peoples in other regions in world, the Inuit and the Saami peoples still face constraints when trying to advance own interests within their national borders.

The Saami peoples hold a relatively good legal and institutional position within the Nordic countries through the Sámi Parliaments. However, despite their relatively strong position within Scandinavia, research has shown that the Saami Parliaments' actual ability to advance own priorities in national decision-making processes remain rather limited (Olsén, 2018: 289, 290). Koivurova & Heinämäki (2006: 101) argue that the reason for their limited ability to influence national decision-making is due to lack of resources and political consultancy on issues related to them. However, another explanation can be tied to their articulation of priorities that directly contrasts those of their respective governments.

Similar to Inuit, Saami peoples articulate priorities of security that conflict with those of their respective national governments. An explanation to the Saami peoples' limited ability to affect

national decision-making processes can be attributed their diverging views on what constitutes a threat. For example, the Saami people in Norway situate the natural environment and its connection to their Saami cultural practices at the center of what insecurity means in Sápmi, yet the Norwegian government continues to favor pro-resource extraction policies because it is in ‘national interest’, while simultaneously working towards international climate mitigating commitments (Gjørsv & Hodgson, 2019: 226; Greaves, 2016a: 469, 470; Normann, 2020: 79). Among others, the Norwegian government is facilitating a large-scale expansion of wind power projects across Norway, which by many Saami peoples across Sápmi is considered a threat to Saami environment and culture, including reindeer herding and pasturelands which “[enables] us to live in Sápmi” (Saami Council, 2022b: 4). While the Saami Council welcomes the transition to green energy, Gun-Britt Retter argues that Saami peoples bear a disproportionate burden of the states’ transition to green energy as it destroys lands which Saami peoples rely on (Retter, 2021; Saami Council, 2022b: 3). A similar trajectory faces the Saami peoples in Sweden and Finland (Lawrence, 2014: 1049; Nilsen, 2018; Normann, 2020: 79, 85).

Canadian Inuit leaders also situate the Government of Canada’s policies as posing a threat to their security (Greaves, 2016a: 467). Inuit have continuously tried to securitize their concerns by articulating these threats as existential, yet the Government of Canada, holding the power to mobilize a response, has not accepted these claims (Greaves, 2016a: 468-469). In Alaska, Inuit believes the state, territorial, and the federal government do not understand what Inuit food security is, and that this is reflected in government policies, regulations and agreements, and yet, in the consultative processes that could contribute the creation of a shared understanding of Inuit food security, Inuit face constraints to their participation in the consultative processes: Either because the process for consultation is undefined and unclear, or because Inuit communities don’t have the resources to attend the consultative meetings (Inuit Circumpolar Council Alaska, 2020: 25, 79, 80). Thus, both the Inuit

and the Saami peoples experience that their respective states privilege own national interests at the expense of their Indigenous rights, and therefore situate their respective states as the source of their insecurity (Greaves, 2016a: 463).

In the Arctic Council, however, the governance structure necessitates the involvement of the Permanent Participants, and despite the financial constraints experienced by them, Permanent Participants make highly influential contributions to the policy outcomes of the Council through the projects they are engaged in (Cambou & Koivurova, 2020: 327). It is also due to this structure that states are naturally involved in research where Indigenous knowledge is utilized due to the Permanent Participants involvement. Indigenous knowledge is therefore contributing to the Council's knowledge generation which leads to recommendations for decision-making in the Arctic region (Saami Council, 2023: 131). Both the ICC and the Saami Council consider Indigenous knowledge as key to their self-determination: The ICC situates Indigenous knowledge as directly connected to Inuit sovereignty, and the Saami Council argues that utilizing Indigenous knowledge is crucial for supporting Indigenous self-determination as it will contribute to robust climate change mitigation and address historical inequality and injustices (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2022: 18; Saami Council, 2023: 31-32).

Yet, while states and the scientific community have increasingly started to recognize the use of Indigenous knowledge in mitigating the effects of climate change, barriers to participation in environmental governance on the national level still exist. Indigenous peoples are increasingly recognized in states' national climate action plans, yet the International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs argue that "sufficient and appropriate mechanisms to operationalize this recognition are not yet in place" (Carmona et al., 2023: 138; International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2022: 19; Saami Council, 2023: 30). For example, while the Swedish government is required to consult the Swedish Saami Parliament on issues of 'special significance', including questions related to land use

and natural resources, Saami Indigenous knowledge differs considerably from the Swedish government's perception of what a green transition should look like in a market economy. Garbis et al. (2023: 15, 16) argue that the interests of Saami peoples thus often are overruled on behalf of the Swedish government's priority to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, emphasizing Greaves' (2016: 463) argument that Indigenous-state relations continue to be structured by the interests of the states.

The lack of sufficient and appropriate mechanisms to operationalize the recognition of Indigenous peoples and their knowledge in national environmental governance can potentially be explained by the inhibiting condition of indigeneity in national contexts. Inuit and the Saami peoples continuously situate their respective states as the source of their insecurity since damage to Indigenous livelihoods is perceived as being caused by their respective states through resource extraction and ecological disruption. The inhibiting condition of indigeneity is especially relevant when it comes to priorities related to damage to the natural environment, as states' and Indigenous peoples' claims to authority over land are fundamentally different: Land underpins Indigenous identities and worldviews, yet settler colonialism is fundamentally about the struggle for land, with resource extraction and ecological disruption normalized herein. Thus, if states were to accept Indigenous peoples' claims to land, they would undermine own economic interests and legitimize Indigenous peoples' critique of states' practices (Greaves, 2018: 107, 118).

Therefore, being acutely aware of their difficulties in advancing own interests nationally, the Saami Council emphasize the need to strengthen the informal part of the Arctic Council's consensus, so their participation is secured in unstable times, and the ICC emphasizes their right to self-determination in Arctic decision-making processes as it ultimately involves them.

B. Constraints to advancing their interests through other subregional and international avenues

While other subregional and international levels of governance exist from where the Saami and the Inuit peoples can advance interests, none of them presents the Arctic Indigenous peoples with the same opportunities as the Arctic Council does. First, because the inclusion of Indigenous peoples into the governance structure of the Council is still considered unprecedented in international politics, and second, because there exists no other forum or organization that focuses their attention solely to circumpolar issues and Indigenous peoples' Arctic homelands, except for conferences. These, however, also hold their own limitations.

While the inclusion of the Arctic Indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council was considered unprecedented during the years of its establishment, still today, no other international level of cooperation exists where Indigenous peoples are given the same amount of inclusion as in the Arctic Council. While acknowledging the challenges facing the Permanent Participants in participating in the Council and representing their own constituencies, what makes the Arctic Council unique is that the governance structure allows for the Permanent Participants to be heard. Even 27 years after the establishment of the Council, this is, according to Rottem (2023), “[a] unique situation in international cooperation otherwise”. Despite larger inclusion of Indigenous peoples in international affairs than in 1996, the international order is still inherently state-centric, and the unique status of the Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council won't easily be accommodated elsewhere (Cambou & Koivurova, 2020: 332).

Yet, while it won't be easily accommodated elsewhere, the inclusion of Indigenous peoples as Permanent Participants into the Arctic Council's governance structure contributed to a larger recognition of Indigenous peoples globally and made it harder for states outside of the region to ignore Indigenous peoples' representatives in other fora (Cambou & Koivurova, 2020: 332). This coincides

with the fact that institutions of global environmental governance have experienced a ‘thickening’ of participation of civil society actors (Witter et al., 2015: 895).

However, while civil society actors have started to engage in institutions of global environmental governance, they “too often remain at the periphery of decision-making processes” (Witter et al., 2015: 895). For example, constraints exist for Indigenous peoples’ participation in other environmental governance forums under the United Nations. Among others, Zurban & Papadopoulus (2021: 91, 92) highlight that global environmental governance forums continue to frame Western knowledge as superior to Indigenous knowledge, and that many of the forums continue to frame Indigenous peoples and their issues heterogeneously, assuming that they share same perspectives on climate change or how to govern it.

Further, while climate change in the Arctic poses environmental, economic, and social implications beyond the region (Arctic Council, n.d.k), no other institution or forum dedicate their attention solely to circumpolar environmental issues and Indigenous peoples’ Arctic homelands. The current opportunities for focusing solely on regional issues fragment the Arctic region into subregions, such as the inter-governmental BEAC, with the implication that circumpolar challenges are only addressed at a subregional level, which hinders the effectiveness of comprehensive solutions to the Arctic’s climatic challenges that do not know of state borders. It neither allows for cross-border cooperation between the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ of the region. Another opportunity for focusing solely on regional issues is within conferences, for example the Arctic Circle Assembly or the Arctic Frontiers, but these lack decision-making authority. Due to the increase in actors seeking engagement in the Arctic region post-2007, the region has experienced a growth in the establishment of conferences focusing on the Arctic region, many of them having developed into becoming sophisticated ‘hybrid’ arenas (Steinveg, 2023: 1-2; Steinveg, 2022: 246).

The Arctic Circle Assembly and Arctic Frontiers provide an opportunity for organizations like the Saami Council and the ICC to present and strengthen their interests at a platform independent of their respective capitals (Steinveg, 2022: 247). As seen in the data from the Saami Council and the ICC, these conferences provide them with a platform from where Inuit and Saami diplomacies can be advanced to a broad audience of actors who consider themselves stakeholders in Arctic regional affairs. The conferences allow for more voices in the debate on the Arctic region than what the Arctic Council does, and Arctic Indigenous diplomacies can therefore, in theory, be advanced way beyond the region. Thus, while the outcomes of such conferences are difficult to measure, the conferences constitute a space where various self-identified stakeholders can interact and engage in dialogue and processes that are beyond the organizers' control (Steinveg, 2022: 252, 253). Yet, due to the nature of the conferences, they are more to be perceived as a forum for advancing own interests through speeches and networking, than it is direct involvement in Arctic decision-making processes.

Thus, while being included in other international levels of environmental governance, none of them provide the Permanent Participants with the same level of inclusion as the Arctic Council does: The Permanent Participant status has enabled the Arctic Indigenous peoples to engage directly and express own priorities to the member states (Smieszek, 2023). Cambou & Koivurova (2020: 332) argue that the reason for this high level of inclusion is because the Council is a forum and not an international organization: The prospects for further inclusion in decision-making processes outside of the Arctic Council is thus inherently limited by the state-centric international order.

The impact of further deterioration on the Arctic Indigenous peoples' ability to advance own interests

Finally, this section elaborates on the broader consequences for the Inuit and Saami peoples in advancing their interests if the deterioration in international and Arctic politics continues. This final section will first elaborate on the current consequences of Russian/Western political deterioration on scientific cooperation in the Arctic, then consider the broader implications of continued deterioration for the future of Arctic governance and Indigenous peoples' ability to advance own interests herein.

A. Circumpolar scientific cooperation

Environmental governance was used as a medium to overcome political differences and diplomatic tensions during the Cold War (Dziatkowiec, 2023: 452). With tensions freezing the relationship between Russia and the Western states again, the reality is that Russia does not participate in the workings of the Arctic Council. At the level of the working groups, scientific projects with Russian involvement have been halted, and other projects relying on data from Russian territory are experiencing difficulties in accessing this data (Heininen et al., 2023: 8; Jonassen, 2023). However, Russia holds 53% of the Arctic Ocean coastline, has two-thirds of the Arctic region's population and 75% of the region's GDP (Arctic Institute, n.d.; Exner-Pirot, 2023). At best, while the Arctic Council operates again, the work and scientific output of the Council has become fragmented, dividing the Arctic Council into an A7, all soon-to-be NATO members, and Russia.

Russia's war against Ukraine is therefore directly impacting the climate change crisis. Of course, climate change in the Arctic does not recede just because of the current geopolitical climate and break in international collaboration. Instead, climate change in the Arctic region has global implications for global health, peace, and stability, and therefore requires coordinated efforts through scientific projects to mitigate it (Dziatkowiec, 2023: 455). Thus, what is at stake is the working

groups' produced output, which has continuously been acclaimed for producing valuable knowledge and insights to Arctic climate research with the contributions of the Permanent Participants (Rottem, 2023). It is exactly this knowledge, based on the incorporation of Western and Indigenous peoples' knowledge, that form the basis for the Arctic Council's decision-making which thus is at risk (Arctic Council, n.d.g).

Naturally, a fragmentation in the data collection, processing and sharing affects the output from the working groups. Russia's territory plays a central role in Arctic science because of its vast presence of permafrost in Siberia and melting sea ice in Russian waters, and the fragmentation therefore impacts the quality of the knowledge production of the working groups (Mortensgaard, 2023). While the working groups without Russian involvement have been able to continue with some of their planned activities, they still face difficulties in making official decisions, regularly meet and involve the Permanent Participants under the guiding principles and rules of procedure (Smieszek, 2023). As the Permanent Participants' ability to advance own priorities within the Arctic Council is directly linked to their participation in the working groups, the current conditions make it difficult for them to contribute to the priorities they consider important. Thus, the fragmentation of circumpolar cooperation poses consequences for the scientific research that is needed to understand Arctic ecosystems and the well-being of Arctic Indigenous peoples (Heininen et al., 2023: 8).

B. The dissolution of the Arctic region as 'one' coherent region

While the fragmentation of circumpolar science cooperation currently affects the working groups and the involvement of Permanent Participants, the question arises how a long-term break in Arctic cooperation will impact the Permanent Participants' ability to advance their own interests in Arctic governance.

The relationship between the West and Russia has continued to worsen since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine: In May 2022, Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO, and in February 2023, Russia published its recent revisions of their Arctic policy, removing the sections about cooperation in the Arctic Council, emphasizing own national interests instead. Further, the A7 states have continued spending substantial financial and military resources in supporting Ukraine (Andreeva, 2023: 116; Exner-Pirot, 2023; Humpert, 2023). With its 27 years of existence, the Arctic Council has deepened and strengthened circumpolar relations, and together with the Arctic Indigenous peoples, it has contributed to the conception of the Arctic region as a single, coherent region bound together by a shared goal of environmental protection and mitigation of human security challenges (Greaves, 2019: 156). Thus, the issues tackled by the Council are important for managing the region's challenges. Yet, the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its effects on Arctic cooperation is unknown, and the future of the Council remains unsettled (Andreeva, 2023: 116; Exner-Pirot, 2023). This final section will elaborate on the consequences for the Arctic Indigenous peoples if the deterioration in circumpolar cooperation continues.

Thomasen (2023: 645, 647) argues that the rules-based order in the Arctic is mainly held together by a well-functioning Arctic Council and the adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (henceforth UNCLOS), which is a comprehensive regime establishing rules regarding uses of the ocean and utilization of resources. UNCLOS also defines the coastal states' continental shelf, which gives coastal states exclusive rights to utilize the resources within the shelf (International Maritime Organization, n.d.; Thomasen, 2023: 645-646). Thus, from this perspective, pausing the workings of the Arctic Council in March 2022 was the first sign of an eroding Arctic rules-based order, yet as elaborated on in this thesis, the deterioration in Arctic relations already started in 2007. One potential outcome of a worsening relationship between Russia and the West is therefore a break-down of the Arctic Council and a further fragmentation of circumpolar relations

into distinct subregions: Russia and Eurasia on one side, and the A7, all soon to be NATO members, on the other side. The consequences of such development will be an Arctic region that is less distinctively ‘Arctic’ than during the decades of cooperation. Instead of being bound by the shared geopolitical interest of climate change mitigation and environmental protection, the subregions will largely be characterized by great power competition between them and by different geopolitical and ecological priorities, with consequences to the political inclusion of Arctic Indigenous peoples (Greaves, 2019: 156, 167; Thomasen, 2023: 646).

Central for Russia and its Eurasian sub-region is the growing role of Asian states, as political and economic connections between Russia and the Asia-Pacific region have deepened over the last decade. Most notable is Russia’s relationship to China as they have established a mutually beneficial partnership in the region. They both stand as prominent non-democratic countries and as the leading non-Western global powers, and their partnership in the Arctic revolves around the security dimensions of major natural resource projects. China’s influence on Arctic security is thus closely related to its relationship with Russia (Greaves, 2019: 165, 166). As the economic relations between Russia and the West has decreased since 2014, a corresponding incentive to strengthen the China-Russia relationship has been created. Economic ties between the two countries have strengthened since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and total trade between them peaked in 2022 (Hong, 2023).

The A7 member states also experience a sub-regionalization. Greaves (2019) argues that security issues within the Arctic, Western states differ, thus resulting in two distinct sub-regions, the North American Arctic and the European Arctic. Yet, what ties them together, and maybe even more so as a direct consequence of Russia’s violation of international law, is the perception of Russia as a threat and the A7 member states’ soon-to-be shared membership of NATO.

If the Arctic Council fails to overcome the current geopolitical challenges, it will ultimately impact the Arctic Indigenous peoples, as their ability to influence Arctic regional decision-making processes and being heard on matters related to the Arctic region will disappear (Rottem, 2023). Instead, a sub-regionalization of the Arctic region will likely further reinforce state-centric behavior in Arctic politics, as already exemplified in the Arctic Council post-2007, ultimately “at the expense of sub-state governments, local decision-making, and self-governing Indigenous institutions” (Greaves, 2019: 167). Even before February 2022, Norway’s proximity to Russia contributed to a more robust national security discourse which limited the room for getting alternative conceptions of security heard (Greaves, 2016a: 463). While Norway’s proximity to Russia has impacted their national security discourse even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, February 2022 contributed to the perception of Russia as a long-term threat to Europe’s peace and security (Lindgaard in DIISpublish, 2024). While Finland and Sweden have maintained military neutrality earlier, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine resulted in their applications for full membership in NATO (Chatterjee, 2023; Lindgaard in DIISpublish, 2024). For the Saami peoples residing in both Sweden and Finland, there’s reason to think that February 2022 elevated Russia as a threat in the two countries’ national security discourses, thereby limiting the room for alternative conceptions of security.

If the security priorities of the Arctic states and the respective sub-regions are to increasingly reduce the Arctic region to a geostrategic space – which the A5’s remilitarization in the Arctic region throughout the last decade could indicate (Bergquist, 2022; Edvardsen, 2022; Gronholt-Pedersen & Fouche, 2022; Åtland, 2014: 153, 155) – the difficulties already experienced by the Arctic Indigenous peoples in advancing alternative conceptions of security will worsen. As seen with the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, when it comes to matters of state-sovereignty in the region, Arctic Indigenous peoples are left out of the negotiations. For the Saami Council and the ICC, tensions between the West and Russia will likely continue to affect their internal cooperation with their member organizations

residing in Russia and limit their possibilities for advancing their priorities as a united people. As seen in the discourses from the Saami Council and the ICC, both organizations emphasize the importance of them working together as one people despite the state-borders that have been imposed on them.

While disputes of sovereignty are agreed to be resolved under UNCLOS, which China and all the Arctic states (except for the US) have ratified, this does not rule out the possibility for future disputes in the region. Russia and China's partnership in the Arctic is currently unlikely to change: Especially China has shown interest in importing oil from Russia following the Western states' sanctions, money which is used to sustain Russian aggression in Ukraine. To sustain its expanding defense budget, Bennett (2024: 25-26) argues that Russia may intensify its Arctic resource extraction, and in trying to advance own commercial interests in the Arctic region, China and other 'newcomer' states may be more inclined to challenge UNCLOS's authority (Thomasen, 2023: 648). Increased resource extraction in the Arctic region will both impact the Arctic environment with human security consequences for the Arctic Indigenous peoples. However, if UNCLOS, the other pillar of the Arctic regional order, is challenged, the Arctic states will likely employ available means to answer this, probably without the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous peoples because it relates to land and sovereignty.

Overall, should the Arctic states become more engaged in competition or conflict, undermining the potential for all Arctic states to resume functional cooperation in the Arctic Council, Arctic Indigenous peoples and the Arctic environment will bear the greatest burden. It will be the loss of the Arctic as a region bound by common environmental and human security challenges and at the expense of cooperation on managing climate change with the Arctic Indigenous peoples at the table. If this happens, damage to the Arctic environment will likely exacerbate because of climate change and this will pose risks to human security in the region which Arctic Indigenous peoples won't be able to

address or help mitigate via their contributions if the Arctic Council does not survive (Greaves, 2019: 156; Thomasen, 2023: 647-648).

C. The prospects: Utilizing the strategy of 'acts of Indigeneity' in a changing Arctic region

I have argued that the Saami Council and the ICC situate themselves as legitimate actors in Arctic decision-making processes by constructing different discourses related to their indigeneity. The strategic use of indigeneity has, according to Lindroth & Sinevaara-Niskanen (2018: 10) and Koivurova & Heinämäki (2005: 101), been politically beneficial for Indigenous peoples, especially because 'indigeneity', as related to the Indigenous rights regime under UNDRIP, forces a rethinking of Indigenous-state relations by recognizing the right to Indigenous self-determination (Lightfoot, 2016: 203; Heinämäki, 2009: 209). As Lightfoot (2016: 203) argues, "[a]t heart, Indigenous rights present settler colonial states with a legitimacy problem." By specifically drawing on their Indigenous rights and the right to be included in decision-making processes that involve them, through their varying discourses, the Saami Council and the ICC make the claim that Arctic governance is not legitimate without their participation and involvement.

However, if the region once again turns into a geopolitical and military theater less bound together by shared environmental- and human security challenges and more prone to competition between the different sub-regions, the question arises to what extent their utilized strategies will successfully translate into effective involvement in future Arctic decision-making processes. This final section will reflect on the effectiveness of employing discourses related to their Indigeneity and collective rights if the Arctic states increasingly are to consider the region as a geostrategic space.

While authors like Lindroth & Sinevaara-Niskanen (2018: 10) and Koivurova & Heinämäki (2005: 101) have argued that the strategy of drawing on indigeneity and collective rights have been

politically beneficial for Indigenous peoples, the changed political reality in global politics may weaken the likelihood of success when employing these strategies. UNDRIP has been considered a historical milestone in the development of Indigenous peoples' collective rights, yet it is not a legally binding document and the states' commitments are therefore less enforceable than if it was a treaty (Hossain, 2013; 520; Lindroth & Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2018: 41, 42).

While Indigenous peoples have their rightful demands, Lindroth & Sinevaara-Niskanen (2018: 128) argue that it is inherently the “the states and global community [that] have the authority to judge which aspirations can and will be pursued and when”, and thus, Arctic Indigenous peoples' inclusion in circumpolar politics is inherently left to the Arctic states to decide. Taking the critical stance, Lindroth & Sinevaara-Niskanen (2018: 129, 130) argue that Indigenous peoples are only deemed important to include in policy debates when it relates to matters that is stereotypically considered Indigenous, for example environmental stewardship and Indigenous peoples' cultures – areas which the Arctic Council largely matched. When it comes to territoriality, politics of security and other ‘hardcore’ political issues, Indigenous peoples are left out of the policy debates because it is ‘presumed’ – however intentionally on the part of the states – that it lays outside of the interest and contributions of Indigenous peoples. It is therefore a constant struggle for Indigenous peoples to break out of the stereotypical ‘Indigenesness’ perception and instead elevate concerns and demands that lay outside of environmental and cultural priorities and onto political agendas.

Thus, from this perspective, there is a risk that drawing on their Indigeneity in relation to the environment and its importance for their culture ultimately serves as a hindrance for them to move beyond this stereotypical perception, especially in a changing Arctic region, that potentially will be less bound by shared environmental goals and instead be prone to more geopolitical competition and differing priorities, if the deterioration continues.

This does not diminish the progress that Arctic Indigenous peoples have made in Arctic politics since the Arctic Council's establishment. The inclusion of Arctic Indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council's governance structure was a significant step in the democratization of international decision-making, and their inclusion in the Council made it difficult for states to ignore Indigenous peoples in other fora (Cambou & Koivurova, 2020: 332; Chater, 2019: 150; Koivurova & Heinamäki, 2005: 104). Therefore, even if Arctic regional cooperation won't be resumed at the same level as before February 2022, the Council still significantly enhanced Indigenous peoples' position in international politics. It is, then, on the basis of this development that the strategy of drawing on their collective rights must be understood. While UNDRIP is not legally-binding, and the Arctic states are not required to involve Indigenous peoples in circumpolar politics, Indigenous peoples' progress made over the duration of the Council's 27 years will be difficult to abstain from.

As a closing remark, it is perhaps exactly this aspect – that Indigenous peoples' progress in circumpolar politics is difficult to abstain from – that can contribute to explaining why the Arctic Council has survived until now. The work of the Council has been severely hampered and the scientific cooperation continues to face severe difficulties, yet the Arctic Council exists. While the deterioration in Arctic politics has impacted the Permanent Participants since 2007, a failure of the Council to survive would simply remove this platform from the Arctic Indigenous peoples and put pressure on their respective states in involving them in Arctic regional affairs through other avenues. The Arctic Council, with its focus on environmental governance and Indigenous peoples' livelihoods, sets the framework for cooperation between the Arctic Indigenous peoples and their respective states in Arctic regional governance, and provide an avenue for the Arctic Indigenous peoples where the right to self-determination, to a high degree, can be practiced without it severely hampering the states.

Conclusion

This chapter has elaborated on the deterioration in Arctic politics and its impact on the Permanent Participants' ability to advance their own interests. I have found that the post-2007 increased workload in the Arctic Council has resulted in an increased demand for funding to secure participation. However, because no neutral funding mechanism exists, the Permanent Participants run the risk of compromising their own interests if relying on funding from the member states. While other funding opportunities exist, i.e. through the observers or closer collaboration with other local or regional institutions, it does not change the fact that to fully secure the Permanent Participants' participation, stable and impartial funding must be secured.

Secondly, the post-2007 turn towards state-centric decision-making poses consequences for their ability to advance their own priorities, as it places them outside the decision-making processes. While the Saami Council and the ICC are politically empowered actors, they face difficulties in advancing their priorities within their own national borders, often because they situate their respective states as the source of their insecurity. On the international level, Indigenous peoples are often placed on the periphery of the decision-making processes in environmental governance institutions, and on the regional level, the institutions do not yield the same opportunities for involvement and focus on the circumpolar challenges, as the Arctic Council has provided the Permanent Participants.

The final section analyzed the impact on the Inuit and Saami peoples' ability to advance their own priorities if Arctic politics further deteriorate. The deterioration in circumpolar cooperation currently poses consequences for the scientific output of the working groups, yet further deterioration may result in the dissolution of the Arctic Council and a further fragmentation of the Arctic from 'one' region and into distinct sub-regions characterized by more geopolitical competition. This will ultimately be with the Arctic environment and the Arctic Indigenous peoples bearing the greatest cost.

Conclusion

This thesis asks how the recent deterioration in Arctic politics has affected the Permanent Participants' abilities to advance their interests within Arctic governance. Through an analysis of the Arctic Council's governance structure, the development in world politics external to the Arctic region and a discourse analysis of the ICC and the Saami Council's articulations regarding the suspension of the Arctic Council, I have found that the post-2007 deterioration in Arctic politics impacts the Permanent Participants' ability to participate in Arctic regional governance in different ways.

The Arctic Council experienced increased attention from states outside of the Arctic region post-2007, and it was in this light that the pre-2007 spirit of cooperation between the Arctic member states and the Permanent Participants began to slip (Gamble & Shadian, 2017: 147; Koivurova & Graczyk, 2014: 441-442; Olsen & Shadian, 2017: 128). To keep up with the increased interest, the Council expanded its workings in multiple directions. This outstretched the human and financial capacities of the Permanent Participants, who even before 2007 experienced difficulties in representing their own constituencies in the Council, and it increased state-centric decision-making, which largely leaves out the Permanent Participants from decision-making processes.

The suspension of the Arctic Council in March 2022 exemplified the latter trend. While having previously been considered a region detached from political developments outside of the region, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine defied the narrative of Arctic exceptionalism and made an unequivocal impact on the Arctic Council.

For the Saami Council and the ICC, who both consider the Arctic Council an important governance body, the suspension of the Arctic Council had implications for their ability to advance own priorities in Arctic regional governance. I found that the Saami Council and the ICC articulated similar, but not identical, versions of the changed geopolitical situation and the suspension of the

Arctic Council. First, both emphasize that the new geopolitical situation has severe consequences for them as peoples. Second, both articulate an interdependence between the Arctic Council and themselves: The Arctic Council is vital for them because of their high level of inclusion, yet they are also vital for the Arctic Council because of their historical legitimacy, situatedness in the region and their contributions made based on their Indigenous knowledge. Third, both emphasize the importance of having Arctic Indigenous peoples included in Arctic decision-making processes and critique, though in different ways, the A7 member states' decision to suspend the Council without the inclusion of them: The Saami Council emphasize the importance of strengthening the informal part of the consensus and the ICC emphasize that a legitimate Arctic democracy is inherently linked to Indigenous peoples' self-determination and their human rights.

Thus, both the ICC and the Saami Council construct their political agency based on 'acts of indigeneity' and what Pelaudix (2019: 45-46) calls 'bottom-up management', which can be perceived as a strategy to situate themselves as legitimate actors who must be included in Arctic decision-making processes. Overall, the agency strategies utilized by the Saami Council and the ICC create the picture that Arctic regional governance is not effective nor legitimate without their inclusion. Their Indigenous knowledge and situatedness in the Arctic region is ultimately needed to mitigate the challenges that the region faces. While they both draw on their indigeneity in constructing these claims, they utilize different language: The ICC draw on a security and rights-based discourse, while the Saami Council do not. This difference is likely explained by their differing national contexts, where the ICC specifically draw on their collective rights as a strategy to circumvent their respective states' restrictive approach to these rights (Greaves, 2016a: 477; Pelaudix, 2012: 71, 76; Pelaudix, 2019: 45-46).

The Arctic Council's two trajectories post-2007 pose consequences for the Permanent Participants' ability to advance their own priorities within Arctic regional governance. I have argued

for three distinct, yet interrelated, implications of this development. First, the increased workload has heightened the demand for funding to secure the Permanent Participants' participation. By relying on the member states for funding, the Permanent Participants risk compromising their own interests, as 'colonial agendas' continue to affect the relations between the Permanent Participants and the member states (Greaves, 2018: 114). I therefore considered two alternative avenues for funding that can omit these relations: Through the observers, because the Saami Council and the ICC hold a large degree of political legitimacy to actors outside of the Arctic region, or through strengthened partnerships with actors outside of the Arctic Council, which could also heighten the democratic legitimacy of the Permanent Participants. However, both options have their limitations, which emphasizes that a stable and impartial funding mechanism is needed in the Council to secure the full participation of the Permanent Participants and thereby their ability to advance their own interests different from the member states.

Second, the increased state-centric decision-making in the Arctic Council places the Permanent Participants outside of the decision-making processes and thereby poses a direct threat to their ability to advance own priorities in Arctic governance. I have argued for two implications of this: First, Inuit and Saami peoples face difficulties in advancing their own priorities, especially in relation to environmental governance, within their respective borders because they often situate their respective states as the source of their insecurity. Second, while the ICC and the Saami Council are represented in other institutions and fora, none of them represent the same opportunities as the Arctic Council does: The Council's structure is still considered *unprecedented* due to its high level of inclusion of Arctic Indigenous peoples, and while environmental change in the Arctic is of concern to all states worldwide, no other intergovernmental forum focuses their attention solely to the region and its environment.

Finally, in light of these developments, I considered the consequences for the Inuit and the Saami peoples in advancing their own priorities in Arctic governance if the deterioration continues. I proposed three different consequences. First, a continued deterioration in Arctic politics with impact the scientific output of the Arctic Council's working groups, as data from Russia will be missing. Second, a continued deterioration in Arctic politics will likely contribute to the dissolution of the Arctic region as 'one' coherent region bound together by shared environmental- and human security goals, and instead contribute to the sub-regionalization marked by geopolitical competition and consequences for the Arctic Indigenous peoples (Greaves, 2019: 156). It will pose a threat to the continued cooperation among the circumpolar states and the region's Indigenous peoples: If the Council does not succeed, difficulties already experienced by the Arctic Indigenous peoples in advancing own priorities will possibly worsen. Third, Inuit and the Saami peoples also risk larger difficulties in advancing their own priorities within their respective borders, as there is reason to think that Russia has been elevated as a threat in national security discourses since February 2022. As a consequence, this limits the room even further for alternative security conceptions.

The three implications highlight that the Inuit and Saami peoples' relations with their respective national governments continue to be structured by the states' interests (Greaves, 2020: 367). In conclusion, while the Arctic Indigenous peoples from the beginning faced financial limitations in the Arctic Council, the governance structure still provided a space from where the Permanent Participants could articulate priorities different from their respective governments and to a larger degree exercise their right as Indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making processes. The deterioration in Arctic politics and the increased tendency to make decisions without the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous peoples therefore threatens their ability to advance own priorities in Arctic governance.

Further research

The findings of this thesis open questions for further research. First, having analyzed the ICC and the Saami Council's respective discursive strategies in relation to the changed geopolitical situation and the suspension of the Arctic Council, it begs the question: How successful are the Saami Council and the ICC in advancing their own interests with these discursive strategies? This thesis has theorized on the outcomes of the deterioration and its consequences for the ICC and the Saami Council, yet further research is required to understand how effective these discourses are in getting accepted by those with the power to mobilize a response. While the dataset gives agency to the Saami Council and the ICC's own perspectives on the Arctic deterioration and suspension of the Arctic Council, it does not reveal the extent to which these discursive strategies were successful in getting the Council to resume parts of its work in June 2022.

Second, as Oran Young (in *Arctic Frontiers*, 2024) argues, and as it has been shown in this thesis, "institutions operate within the larger settings determined by the political context". Thus, if the deterioration in Arctic politics is to continue and the Permanent Participants are to lose their primary forum for advancing own interests in Arctic governance, further research is required to understand how the Saami Council and the ICC adapt to these changes. The state of world politics is continuously evolving, and further research on how the two organizations expand their lobbying into other avenues of influence during these times is needed. Yet, while the Arctic Council's activities have been severely limited after March 2022, the limited resumption of work can be perceived as a small victory for the survival of the Arctic Council. During the years of the establishment of the Council, it was especially the Saami Council and the ICC who through their lobbying advocated for a regional platform for cooperation and dialogue. Though established at a time with optimism for global peace, their role in the Council's establishment was pivotal. Now, the question arises to what extent the Saami Council and the ICC can contribute to confidence- and stability-building in the

Arctic region, when the geopolitical context has changed: In which ways can they contribute to the establishment of common ground among the members of the Arctic Council? While both organizations have paused cooperation with their Russian member organizations, their transnational nature and role as expert participants in the working groups in the Council may potentially contribute to establishing common ground and depoliticize the relationship between Russia and the A7 member states, in a time where tension between Russia and the West is increasing.

Finally, this study did not incorporate data from the other four Permanent Participants. This raises questions about their perspectives on and experiences with the recent deterioration in Arctic politics. Unlike the ICC and the Saami Council, the remaining Permanent Participants have received comparatively less attention within the literature on Arctic governance and Indigenous peoples' inclusion herein. To bridge this research gap, further research could investigate how the recent deterioration in Arctic politics has affected the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich'in Council International and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North. While the ICC and the Saami Council often publish their own statements and disseminate their opinions at various fora, including on the recent deterioration in Arctic politics, this is not the case for the other Permanent Participants. This prompts consideration of the methodological bias of analyzing publicly available texts, but also the question of what role the potential strategic use of silence plays among the Permanent Participants. Thus, extending the study to the other Permanent Participants would require adjusting the research design accordingly.

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Appendix A

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File 1: Saami Council, statement

Title:	The Saami Council's Statement on the Arctic Council Pause
Source:	https://www.saamicouncil.net/news-archive/the-saami-council-statement-on-the-arctic-council-pause
Date:	March 13, 2022
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 2: Saami Council, Váhtjer Declaration

Title:	Váhtjer Declaration
Source:	https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5dfb35a66f00d54ab0729b75/t/6392e3f3069dea6d0deed9638/1670570996486/Va%CC%81htjer+declaration.pdf
Date:	August 11-14, 2022
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 3: Saami Council, Annual Report 2022

Title:	Annual Report 2022
Source:	https://www.saamicouncil.net/documentarchive/annual-report-2022
Date:	March 9, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024
Text excerpt:	The excerpt covers pp. 4-16 out of 28 and includes all references to the Arctic Council suspension and Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

File 4: Saami Council, opening remarks speech

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ajwNwgRPcU
Minute:	51:39-57:10
Speech by:	Saami Council Chair Aslak Holmberg
Location:	Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023
Date:	July 20, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 5: Saami Council, concluding remarks speech

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pt07KIO-Wkg
Minute:	6:21:35-6:24:15
Speech by:	Saami Council Chair Aslak Holmberg

Location:	Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023
Date:	July 21, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 6: Saami Council, statement from news article

Title:	Future of Arctic Council in doubt after end of Russian Chairship
Source:	https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/arctic-council-handover-russia-1.6836000
Date:	May 11, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 7: Saami Council, keynote speech

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ajwNwgRPcU
Minute:	5:45:45-6:03:03
Speech by:	Saami Council Delegate, Gunn-Britt Retter
Location:	Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023
Date:	July 20, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 8: Saami Council, panel discussion

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SCVBQD4tuVA&list=PLpwWVxYVoO1kcVjkedd4-6dvKAZcejVpY&index=2
Minute:	46:01-1:23:11
Participants:	President of the Saami Parliament in Norway, Silje Karine Moutka
Location:	Arctic Frontiers
Date:	January 31, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 9: Saami Council and Inuit Circumpolar Council, panel discussion

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ajwNwgRPcU
Minute:	6:03:11-6:53:35
Participants:	Saami Council Chair, Aslak Holmberg Saami Council Vice-President, Åsa Larsson Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair, Sara Olsvig Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada delegate, Charlie Watt Inuit Circumpolar Council Alaska Executive Board Member, Vivian Korthuis

	Gwich'in Council International Board Member, Sam Alexander Saami Council Head of Cultural Unit, Christina Henriksen Participants from the Permanent Participants' Youth Network
Location:	Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023
Date:	July 20, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 10: Saami Council and Inuit Circumpolar Council, armchair conversation

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ajwNwgRPcU
Minute:	3:00:13-3:16:26
Participants:	Former Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair, Aqqaluk Lyngé Former Inuit Circumpolar Council Vice-Chair and President, Christian Olsen Former Saami Council Chair, Márét Sára Former Saami Council Chair, Per Mikael Utsi
Location:	Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023
Date:	July 20, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 11: Inuit Circumpolar Council, Saami Council, Gwich'in Council International, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Aleut International Association, statement

Title:	Statement of the Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023 – Inuiaat Issittormiut Ataatsimeersuarnerat 2023
Source:	https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/statement-of-the-arctic-peoples-conference-2023-inuiaat-issittormiut-ataatsimeersuarnerat-2023/
Date:	July 25, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 12: Inuit Circumpolar Council, press release

Title:	Statement from the Inuit Circumpolar Council Concerning the Arctic Council
Source:	https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/statement-from-the-inuit-circumpolar-council-concerning-the-arctic-council/
Date:	March 7, 2022
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 13: Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2022 Inuit Circumpolar Council Declaration

Title:	2022 Inuit Circumpolar Council Declaration
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Source:	https://iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/2022ICC-DECLARATION-1.pdf
Date:	July 19-21, 2022
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 14: Inuit Circumpolar Council, panel discussion

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnHvukITy74&list=PLpwWVxYVoO1kcVjke4-6dvKAZcejVpY&index=4
Minute:	07:50-30:00
Participants:	Chair of Inuit Circumpolar Council, Sara Olsvig
Location:	Arctic Frontiers 2023
Date:	February 1, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 15: Inuit Circumpolar Council, press release

Title:	International Chair of Inuit Circumpolar Council attends major security policy conference: “Arctic Cooperation Must Continue”
Source:	https://iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference_Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue_PR_final.pdf
Date:	February 19, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 16: Inuit Circumpolar Council, speech

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PLI0a77tmNMvQ7sPBb_CvYfpg7IubafC1W&time_continue=747&v=JVD0HF1oko8&embeds_euri=https%3A%2F%2Ficcalaska.org%2F&source_ve_path=MzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMzY4NDIsMTM5MTE3LDI4NjYzLDM2ODQyLDI4NjY2&feature=emb_logo
Minute:	00:00-12:34
Participants:	Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair, Sara Olsvig
Location:	Arctic Circle Assembly
Date:	October 20, 2022
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 17: Inuit Circumpolar Council, Q/A

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nP5P1m0VhOc&list=PLI0a77tmNMvQ7sPBb_CvYfpg7IubafC1W&index=23
Minute:	00:00-02:46
Participants:	Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair, Sara Olsvig
Location:	Arctic Circle Assembly
Date:	October 20, 2022
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 18: Inuit Circumpolar Council, speech

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6miNiMAnMI&t=31597s
Minute:	7:37:04-7:47:08
Participants:	Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair, Sara Olsvig
Location:	Inuit Circumpolar Council – Delegates Meeting Ilulissat 2023
Date:	July 19, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 19: Inuit Circumpolar Council, speech

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1sbjsNjnyfo
Minute:	43:30-1:07:43
Participants:	Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair, Sara Olsvig
Location:	Inuit Circumpolar Council – Delegates Meeting Ilulissat 2023
Date:	July 19, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 20: Inuit Circumpolar Council, Q/A

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2PdDiew5eE&list=PLI0a77tmNMvQKmp0CCsxxskXsCkrdBHvc&index=30
Minute:	11:05-14:55
Participants:	Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair, Sara Olsvig
Location:	Arctic Circle Assembly
Date:	October 20, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 21: Inuit Circumpolar Council, speech

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v73usWJKFAA
Minute:	00:00-06:47
Participants:	Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair, Sara Olsvig
Location:	Arctic Circle Assembly
Date:	October 20, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 22: Russian section of the Saami Council, statement

Title:	The Russian section of the Saami Council has issued a statement regarding the current situation in Russia (27.02.2022)
Source:	https://www.saamicouncil.net/news-archive/statement-by-the-russian-side-of-the-saami-council-regarding-the-current-situation-in-russiaa
Date:	February 27, 2022
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 23: Saami Council, statement

Title:	Cooperation with Russian side on hold
Source:	https://www.saamicouncil.net/news-archive/cooperation-with-russian-side-on-hold
Date:	April 10, 2022
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 24: Saami Council, Resolutions from the 22nd Saami Conference

Title:	Resolutions 22nd Saami Conference
Source:	https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5dfb35a66f00d54ab0729b75/t/634f12106139303856bcbeb5/1666126353323/Resolutions+Va%CC%81htjer+ENG.pdf
Date:	August 14, 2022
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 25: Saami Council, plenary discussion

Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCxVUbdSvos
Minute:	23:03-25:30

Participants:	Saami Council Delegate, Gunn-Britt Retter Arctic Athabaskan Council, Chief Bill Erasmus
Location:	Arctic Encounter Symposium
Date:	March 29, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

File 26: Saami Council, statements from news article

Title:	Arctic Indigenous Leaders: We Did Not Shut Down
Source:	https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-indigenous-leaders-we-did-not-shut-down
Date:	March 31, 2023
Last accessed:	January 30, 2024

Appendix B

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Discourse 3: No Arctic governance or cooperation without the involvement of Indigenous peoples	62

Codebook: Inuit Circumpolar Council data

Name	Description	Files	References
<p>Discourse 1: Arctic region under pressure geopolitically and environmentally</p>			
<p>Arctic Council, Russian members</p>	<p><Files\\12 STATEMENT FROM THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL _ Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [17,59% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 17,59% Coverage</p> <p>A founding member of the Arctic Council, ICC is one of six Indigenous Peoples organizations with Permanent Participant status. Inuit in Chukotka, Russia, are members of ICC and two other Permanent Participants have Russian membership as well – the Aleut International Association and the Saami Council. The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) is also a Permanent Participant. ICC emerged from the Cold War as a unifying voice for Inuit across our collective homeland of Inuit Nunaat. We worked hard to ensure that our sisters and brothers from Chukotka were able to join us in 1992. We are concerned about the future of the Arctic Council which is based on peaceful cooperation and mutual respect. Inuit are committed to the Arctic remaining a zone of peace, a phrase coined by former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in a 1987 speech in Murmansk. ICC has repeatedly echoed this message in all of its guiding documents, most recently in the Utqiaġvik Declaration of 2018 in which it was mandated to lay the groundwork to declare the Arctic as a peaceful Zone.</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>3</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Continue PR final > - § 1 reference coded [6,70% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 6,70% Coverage</p> <p>"The heartbreaking human consequences of the conflict also affect Inuit. ICC was established during the Cold War, and it took fifteen years before Russian Inuit were able to become full members of our organization. Today, our cooperation is once again impacted by the geopolitical situation. At the same time, our most important Arctic governance body, the Arctic Council, which includes Indigenous Peoples at the table, have been paused" Olsvig says.</p> <p><Files\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [3,89% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,89% Coverage</p> <p>So, this is the first time that we have the ICC General Assembly where we are not together. We have been together since 1992, and ICC Chukotka has been part of our members, and we have met them ever since, but this is first time they are not among us. And this is very, very challenging, and it's very... And I find it very heartbreaking, that they are not present. We have been working really, really hard for the last year, and we are noticing that our connection is getting further and further away from each other, and that really, really hurts for our Inuit hearts. Me, as a Chair, I find it very important that ICC Chukotka, we should use all of our opportunities to have as close cooperation and collaboration together with the Chukotka's as possible</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
Geopolitical Arctic	<p data-bbox="745 427 1675 459"><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 1 reference coded [0,46% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="745 499 1099 531">Reference 1 - 0,46% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="745 571 1742 675">Recognizing that we emerged in an era of environmental and global insecurity, again the Arctic geopolitical landscape is changing, and ICC is uniquely prepared to assess and address new challenges across Inuit Nunaat,</p> <p data-bbox="745 715 1771 778"><Files\\14 Arctic Frontiers Panel discussion Sara Olsvig> - § 1 reference coded [16,09% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="745 818 1115 850">Reference 1 - 16,09% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="745 890 1776 1313">so thank you so much for hosting us, to the Saami people and the Norwegian people, I think that it's important that we meet and get together and discuss these important issues, and I actually want to just, after listening to the different presentations here, take a minute to remind everyone that for Indigenous peoples, today and these years are unprecedented. It's climate change, that's directly affecting our livelihoods, our way of transportation across ice, it's the geopolitical situation that we have been through similar times, but it is today a very, very serious situation for us as peoples like Saami people, we live across borders of Russia, Canada, Alaska and Greenland, and we are directly impacted by the geopolitical situation of the world.</p>	8	14

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 3 references coded [20,65% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,33% Coverage</p> <p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine and its global impacts in terms of security, energy, and supply policies, have already left its mark on Nordic and Arctic countries. International Chair of Inuit Circumpolar Council, Sara Olsvig: "The geopolitical situation affects us in the Arctic, directly and indirectly. It has changed the security dynamics of our region. Furthermore, the Arctic is under pressure from preexisting developments. The impact of climate change result in temperatures rising three to four times faster than the global average, while pollution from southern parts of the globe end up in our ecosystems. It is important to bring an Arctic voice to Munich and to world leaders".</p> <p>Reference 2 - 6,00% Coverage</p> <p>"A variety of security issues continue to change our livelihoods affecting, including our food security and food sovereignty. The global geopolitical development is serious and adds pressure to our people. We must continue to raise our voices as peoples of the Arctic. Our collaboration and constant push for all Arctic governments to pursue a peaceful, low-tension, and prosperous Arctic must continue".</p> <p>Reference 3 - 4,32% Coverage</p> <p>"The heartbreaking human consequences of the conflict also affect Inuit. ICC was established during the Cold War, and it took fifteen years before Russian Inuit were able to become full members of our organization. Today, our cooperation is once again impacted by the geopolitical situation.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 2 references coded [7,18%</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,36% Coverage</p> <p>In midst of the Cold War, the ICC developed into an internationally recognized organization, bringing a constant inuit voice of concern for the changing climate and environment to the global arena. For decades we have sat side by side with states in the UN and in other international institutions.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 3,82% Coverage</p> <p>Dear Arctic friends and family,</p> <p>Arctic democracy is under great pressure. Conflicts and tensions is rising once again. And this time, with dimensions and consequences, we have not seen before. For the Arctic states represented here today, this is also your test. The ICC is deeply concerned about the paused Arctic Council and its future.</p> <p><Files\\17 Transcript ICC QA October 2022> - § 1 reference coded [47,06% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 47,06% Coverage</p> <p>Rasmus: Thank you very much, Rasmus Berthelsen from [...] in Tromsø. Sara is always very good to listen to you. If the future of the Arctic is basically divided up into the Nordic and the North American Arctic and the Russian Arctic, the Russian Arctic more and more</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>connected with Asia, how does the Permanent Participants see that future for the Arctic in a long term? I mean if there is not Circumpolar Arctic coming back, how do Permanent Participants see such a divided Arctic? Thank you. [1:09]</p> <p>Chair: Give us a brief answer, thank you.</p> <p>ICC Chair: First of all, I want to reiterate that Indigenous peoples' organizations – we are not only Permanent Participants. We represent peoples. Peoples that were here before the states were created, and therefore it is our clear message that any development in the Arctic, we must be at the table. And what also is characteristic of us peoples in the Arctic, Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, is that we live across these borders. And this of course illustrates the difficulty we are living under as peoples in the times we are in right now</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 4 references coded [10,66% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,44% Coverage</p> <p>We are meeting here today on a period of time which is very challenging. There is war going on in the world, and it has unfortunately also an effect on our Arctic life and Inuit Nunaangat. So, this is the first time that we have the ICC General Assembly where we are not together.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 2 - 4,36% Coverage</p> <p>First of all, when we are trying to work together in the Arctic, and our... the space that we are working together in the Arctic, the most important forum is the Arctic Council. And within the last 10... three decades, it's the Arctic Council that is of the greatest importance for our political forum. And due to international crisis, this also is also facing different challenges as well. [51:47] A lot of people are saying that some of the working groups have been put into pause. It has naturally an important consequence for us. But that means that our input of substance to the Arctic Council, is the most important political forum for us, to all the forums that we are working within, within the six fields, all of them, and this is the most important field of forum we have, where we have a direct, strong voice to be at the Arctic Council.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 1,81% Coverage</p> <p>The Arctic Council is so important that we haven't really gotten there yet, but with the coming years will be very, very important, because we are facing very, very big challenging issues that we have to deal with [with the others?] [53:19] and also to find a very good and strong political path in the Arctic. We still have a lot of work ahead of us.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 4 - 3,05% Coverage</p> <p>So, with this coming time, it's not going to be much easier in the coming months, and I don't think that it's going to be easier with these coming years. But let me emphasize that we were created during the time when the Cold War started. So, because of that, we have always kept our focus on working together for the Arctic agenda. So that is so important that we keep that in focus. So, I think that this is one of the ways that we should also work within the Arctic Council, so important that we work together one person to the other, and also helping each other from people to people.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [2,11% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,11% Coverage</p> <p>I want to bring a clear message to this assembly: Times are difficult. Nothing is business as usual.</p> <p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [4,31% Coverage]</p> <p>Unfortunately we are in a very bad political situation around the world, and I haven't seen that situation before. In the 50 years, that kind of conflict is becoming bigger and bigger, the environment degradation, the climate and the weather systems changing so fast that everyone is looking at it,</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>and then the issues about our food, and what we eat, and how much of that is polluted?</p>		
<p>Arctic developments these years threatening Indigenous peoples</p>	<p><Files\\14 Arctic Frontiers Panel discussion Sara Olsvig> - § 1 reference coded [10,58% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,58% Coverage</p> <p>take a minute to remind everyone that for Indigenous peoples, today and these years are unprecedented. It's climate change, that's directly affecting our livelihoods, our way of transportation across ice, it's the geopolitical situation that we have been through similar times, but it is today a very, very serious situation for us as peoples like Saami people, we live across borders of Russia, Canada, Alaska and Greenland, and we are directly impacted by the geopolitical situation of the world.</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [1,86% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,86% Coverage</p> <p>"A variety of security issues continue to change our livelihoods affecting, including our food security and food sovereignty.</p> <p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [4,31% Coverage]</p> <p>Unfortunately we are in a very bad political situation around the world, and I haven't seen that situation before. In the 50 years, that kind of conflict is becoming bigger and bigger, the environment degradation, the climate and the weather systems changing</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>3</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	so fast that everyone is looking at it, and then the issues about our food, and what we eat, and how much of that is polluted?		
Arctic Insecurity	<p data-bbox="745 376 1675 405"><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 1 reference coded [0,46% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="745 448 1099 477">Reference 1 - 0,46% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="745 520 1742 619">Recognizing that we emerged in an era of environmental and global insecurity, again the Arctic geopolitical landscape is changing, and ICC is uniquely prepared to assess and address new challenges across Inuit Nunaat,</p> <p data-bbox="745 662 1682 726"><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 2 references coded [12,17% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="745 769 1115 798">Reference 1 - 10,33% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="745 841 1765 904">The Russian invasion of Ukraine and its global impacts in terms of security, energy, and supply policies, have already left its mark on Nordic and Arctic countries.</p> <p data-bbox="745 914 1451 943">International Chair of Inuit Circumpolar Council, Sara Olsvig:</p> <p data-bbox="745 952 1765 1153">"The geopolitical situation affects us in the Arctic, directly and indirectly. It has changed the security dynamics of our region. Furthermore, the Arctic is under pressure from preexisting developments. The impact of climate change result in temperatures rising three to four times faster than the global average, while pollution from southern parts of the globe end up in our ecosystems. It is important to bring an Arctic voice to Munich and to world leaders".</p> <p data-bbox="745 1197 1099 1225">Reference 2 - 1,84% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="745 1268 1749 1332">A variety of security issues continue to change our livelihoods affecting, including our food security and food sovereignty.</p>	4	8

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p data-bbox="743 288 1693 352"><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 4 references coded [22,40% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="743 395 1099 424">Reference 1 - 3,24% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="743 467 1783 651">I am a proud Inuk standing here today addressing the 2022 Arctic Circle Assembly on behalf of the Inuit Circumpolar Council. Proud of this room full of intellect, vision, of innovative solutions, a desire to learn and listen, a desire to continue amidst one severe crisis after another.</p> <p data-bbox="743 719 1099 748">Reference 2 - 3,82% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="920 791 1783 1038">Dear Arctic friends and family, Arctic democracy is under great pressure. Conflicts and tensions is rising once again. And this time, with dimensions and consequences, we have not seen before. For the Arctic states represented here today, this is also your test. The ICC is deeply concerned about the paused Arctic Council and its future.</p> <p data-bbox="743 1107 1099 1136">Reference 3 - 2,60% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="920 1179 1783 1326">How we collectively respond today will determine the future of Arctic democracy, the future we leave in the hands of our children and grandchildren. To navigate the waters of disastrous winter storms requires a cool and steady hand</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 4 - 12,75% Coverage</p> <p>We, the human species, are the only human beings on this planet, who divide ourselves unimagined lines drawn across land and sea. The changing climate, environmental pollution, the bio-diversity, flora and fauna, and ecosystems, know nothing of state-borders on a map, and in our efforts to protect our planet from further disaster, we must come together and see beyond state borders. Yes, that is difficult in times like these, but the level of difficulty does not make it less necessary. This cannot be put on hold for a decade, not a year, or even a few months. Climate change is no longer a buzzword at niche conferences or a policy that can change with party-political leadership. [8:43] It is real, it is happening, and we, the collective human species, are the only ones who can make the unprecedented and massive efforts to cap global temperature rise. As Inuit and many others have said many times: Protecting the Arctic is to protect the planet. Inuit are an integral part of the science community, not just through academic titles and degrees, also through the knowledge we contribute with though our own knowledge-systems.</p> <p><Files\\17 Transcript ICC QA October 2022> - § 1 reference coded [25,80% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 25,80% Coverage</p> <p>And this of course illustrates the difficulty we are living under as peoples in the times we are in right now. And for us, from others who might think that we only work with non-security related issues or soft-</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>security related issues, that is not the case. Because any hard security development affects us directly and affects our human rights directly. So we live under a very, very difficult time, where we must balance everything that we do, and I can also tell you, that it is what takes up very much of our time in an organization such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council at this, in these months.</p>		
<p>Cooperation with Russian Indigenous peoples affected</p>	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 3 references coded [19,31% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,34% Coverage</p> <p>Now we don't have normal relations to Russia anymore, we, the Inuit and the Saami, are prevented to continue with our cooperation with kinsmen from the Russian Arctic and the many Indigenous peoples of Russia</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,54% Coverage</p> <p>It is important we keep our personal contacts, but how the [contact? contract?] between the organizations continue is impossible to see.</p> <p><Files\\12 STATEMENT FROM THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [4,44% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,44% Coverage</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>9</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Inuit in Chukotka, Russia, are members of ICC and two other Permanent Participants have Russian membership as well – the Aleut International Association and the Saami Council. The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) is also a Permanent Participant.</p> <p><Files\\14 Arctic Frontiers Panel discussion Sara Olsvig> - § 1 reference coded [10,58% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,58% Coverage</p> <p>take a minute to remind everyone that for Indigenous peoples, today and these years are unprecedented. It's climate change, that's directly affecting our livelihoods, our way of transportation across ice, it's the geopolitical situation that we have been through similar times, but it is today a very, very serious situation for us as peoples like Saami people, we live across borders of Russia, Canada, Alaska and Greenland, and we are directly impacted by the geopolitical situation of the world.</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [6,70% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 6,70% Coverage</p> <p>"The heartbreaking human consequences of the conflict also affect Inuit. ICC was established during the Cold War, and it took fifteen years before Russian Inuit were able to become full members of our organization. Today, our cooperation is once again impacted by the geopolitical situation. At the same time, our most important Arctic governance body, the Arctic Council, which includes Indigenous Peoples at the table, have been paused" Olsvig says.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p data-bbox="745 323 1615 352"><Files\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 4 references coded [12,08% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="745 395 1099 424">Reference 1 - 3,89% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="745 467 1765 963">So this is the first time that we have the ICC General Assembly where we are not together. We have been together since 1992, and ICC Chukotka has been part of our members, and we have met them ever since, but this is first time they are not among us. And this is very, very challenging, and it's very... And I find it very heartbreaking, that they are not present. We have been working really, really hard for the last year, and we are noticing that our connection is getting further and further away from each other, and that really, really hurts for our Inuit hearts. Me, as a Chair, I find it very important that ICC Chukotka, we should use all of our opportunities to have as close cooperation and collaboration together with the Chukotka's as possible</p> <p data-bbox="745 1034 1099 1062">Reference 2 - 2,51% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="745 1106 1771 1342">These challenging times do not only affect us in our political world, but it also has an effect on us as individuals. And here, for all of you who are here present, I'd like to share with you that we also here in... for Inuit international [Inuit Circumpolar Council?], it has a great effect on our lives here because of the war. And I hope that all of us who are here present, please include the Chukotkans in</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>everything we do, and also give space for their priorities in our work here.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 3,90% Coverage</p> <p>And we [find/found?] [49:16] it very important that all the four states were coming up with a declaration saying that we find a path, to find a unitedness collaboration within the circumpolar region. And this was then implemented in 1992, and we can see through the documents, that every time we had the meetings, there was always seats that were empty, but we have always kept the seats for them, and over here in the corner, you can see two seats, over there are still also, that's for the ICC Chair, the ICC Vice-Chair, the Chukotka's seats are here, their name tags are here, and the seats are just empty. It is so important that we never forget them in all of our achievements and all of our thrive to work together even though they are not present.</p> <p>Reference 4 - 1,78% Coverage</p> <p>So therefore, it is so important, that it hurts so much in my heart, that our communication, our collaboration, and our unitedness, have been broken with this coming years... with these years. So with this coming time, it's not going to be much easier in the coming months, and I don't think that it's going to be easier with these coming years.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
<p>Indigenous peoples directly impacted by the geopolitical situation</p>	<p><Files\\14 Arctic Frontiers Panel discussion Sara Olsvig> - § 1 reference coded [16,09% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 16,09% Coverage</p> <p>so thank you so much for hosting us, to the Saami people and the Norwegian people, I think that it's important that we meet and get together and discuss these important issues, and I actually want to just, after listening to the different presentations here, take a minute to remind everyone that for Indigenous peoples, today and these years are unprecedented. It's climate change, that's directly affecting our livelihoods, our way of transportation across ice, it's the geopolitical situation that we have been through similar times, but it is today a very, very serious situation for us as peoples like Saami people, we livSae across borders of Russia, Canada, Alaska and Greenland, and we are directly impacted by the geopolitical situation of the world.</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 2 references coded [14,65% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,33% Coverage</p> <p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine and its global impacts in terms of security, energy, and supply policies, have already left its mark on Nordic and Arctic countries. International Chair of Inuit Circumpolar Council, Sara Olsvig: "The geopolitical situation affects us in the Arctic, directly and indirectly. It has changed the security dynamics of our region. Furthermore, the Arctic is under pressure from preexisting developments. The impact of climate change result in temperatures rising three to four times faster than the global average, while pollution from southern parts</p>	6	11

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>of the globe end up in our ecosystems. It is important to bring an Arctic voice to Munich and to world leaders”.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 4,32% Coverage</p> <p>"The heartbreaking human consequences of the conflict also affect Inuit. ICC was established during the Cold War, and it took fifteen years before Russian Inuit were able to become full members of our organization. Today, our cooperation is once again impacted by the geopolitical situation.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 1 reference coded [8,51% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 8,51% Coverage</p> <p>This is part of the pressured Arctic democracy. We cannot reiterate enough that Indigenous peoples must be included at any decision and policy-making in and about the Arctic, on all levels of governance, under or outside the auspices of the Arctic Council. Excellences, the Arctic Council is not the Arctic Council without Indigenous peoples. Arctic governance is not democratic without Indigenous peoples’ participation. [6:51] The values of governance built over decades with Arctic Indigenous peoples and nations as moral leaders and the legitimizing representatives of being the Arctic <i>is</i> under pressure. How we collectively respond today will determine the future of Arctic democracy, the future we leave in the hands of our children and grandchildren.</p> <p><Files\\17 Transcript ICC QA October 2022> - § 1 reference coded [68,20% Coverage]</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 68,20% Coverage</p> <p>Rasmus: Thank you very much, Rasmus Berthelsen from [unclear] in Tromsø. Sara is always very good to listen to you. If the future of the Arctic is basically divided up into the Nordic and the North American Arctic and the Russian Arctic, the Russian Arctic more and more connected with Asia, how does the Permanent Participants see that future for the Arctic in a long term? I mean if there is not Circumpolar Arctic coming back, how do Permanent Participants see such a divided Arctic? Thank you. [1:09]</p> <p>Chair: Give us a brief answer, thank you.</p> <p>ICC Chair: First of all, I want to reiterate that Indigenous peoples' organizations – we are not only Permanent Participants. We represent peoples. Peoples that were here before the states were created, and therefore it is our clear message that any development in the Arctic, we must be at the table. And what also is characteristic of us peoples in the Arctic, Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, is that we live across these borders. And this of course illustrates the difficulty we are living under as peoples in the times we are in right now. And for us, from others who might think that we only work with non-security related issues or soft-security related issues, that is not the case. Because any hard security development affects us directly and affects our human rights directly. So we live under a very, very difficult time, where we must balance everything that we do, and I can also tell you, that it</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>is what takes up very much of our time in an organization such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council at this, in these months.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 5 references coded [13,98% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,44% Coverage</p> <p>We are meeting here today on a period of time which is very challenging. There is war going on in the world, and it has unfortunately also an effect on our Arctic life and Inuit Nunaangat. So this is the first time that we have the ICC General Assembly where we are not together.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 2,51% Coverage</p> <p>These challenging times do not only affect us in our political world, but it also has an effect on us as individuals. And here, for all of you who are here present, I'd like to share with you that we also here in... for Inuit international [Inuit Circumpolar Council?], it has a great effect on our lives here because of the war. And I hope that all of us who are here present, please include the Chukotkans in everything we do, and also give space for their priorities in our work here.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 3,90% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>And we [find/found?] [49:16] it very important that all the four states were coming up with a declaration saying that we find a path, to find a unitedness collaboration within the circumpolar region. And this was then implemented in 1992, and we can see through the documents, that every time we had the meetings, there was always seats that were empty, but we have always kept the seats for them, and over here in the corner, you can see two seats, over there are still also, that's for the ICC Chair, the ICC Vice-Chair, the Chukotka's seats are here, their name tags are here, and the seats are just empty. It is so important that we never forget them in all of our achievements and all of our thrive to work together even though they are not present.</p> <p>Reference 4 - 4,36% Coverage</p> <p>First of all, when we are trying to work together in the Arctic, and our... the space that we are working together in the Arctic, the most important forum is the Arctic Council. And within the last 10... three decades, it's the Arctic Council that is of the greatest importance for our political forum. And due to international crisis, this also is also facing different challenges as well. [51:47] A lot of people are saying that some of the working groups have been put into pause. It has naturally an important consequence for us. But that means that our input of substance to the Arctic Council, is the most important political forum for us, to all the forums that we are working within, within the six fields, all of them, and this is</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>the most important field of forum we have, where we have a direct, strong voice to be at the Arctic Council.</p> <p>Reference 5 - 1,78% Coverage</p> <p>So therefore, it is so important, that it hurts so much in my heart, that our communication, our collaboration, and our unitedness, have been broken with this coming years... with these years. So with this coming time, it's not going to be much easier in the coming months, and I don't think that it's going to be easier with these coming years.</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 2 references coded [1,62% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,83% Coverage</p> <p>Because we have lost a lot now while the Arctic Council cannot work fully, but on the other hand, if we didn't stop up the Council work, we would still have a lot of challenges and problems to resolve. So that's what I wanted to say, thank you.</p>		
Performative tool, cross-border	<p><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 1 reference coded [0,41% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,41% Coverage</p> <p>Recognizing the need to engage with governments to enable our people to move freely across the national borders dividing our people and to establish residence in other regions of our homeland,</p>	5	7

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p><Files\\14 Arctic Frontiers Panel discussion Sara Olsvig> - § 1 reference coded [16,09% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 16,09% Coverage</p> <p>so thank you so much for hosting us, to the Saami people and the Norwegian people, I think that it's important that we meet and get together and discuss these important issues, and I actually want to just, after listening to the different presentations here, take a minute to remind everyone that for Indigenous peoples, today and culture. It's climate change, that's directly affecting our livelihoods, our way of transportation across ice, it's the geopolitical situation that we have been through similar times, but it is today a very, very serious situation for us as peoples like Saami people, we live across borders of Russia, Canada, Alaska and Greenland, and we are directly impacted by the geopolitical situation of the world.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 3 references coded [9,24% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,28% Coverage</p> <p>The Inuit Circumpolar Council represents Inuit from across the Arctic, from Chukotka, Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Since 1977 the Inuit circumpolar council has been the united voice of our people, raising concerns and advocating of our rights internationally, regionally and nationally.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 2 - 1,91% Coverage</p> <p>Based on our unity across borders, dividing very different nation states, Indigenous peoples occupied and owned the lands and seas of the Arctic for thousands of years.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 4,05% Coverage</p> <p>The changing climate, environmental pollution, the bio-diversity, flora and fauna, and ecosystems, know nothing of state-borders on a map, and in our efforts to protect our planet from further disaster, we must come together and see beyond state borders. Yes, that is difficult in times like these, but the level of difficulty does not make it less necessary.</p> <p><Files\\17 Transcript ICC QA October 2022> - § 1 reference coded [47,06% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 47,06% Coverage</p> <p>Rasmus: Thank you very much, Rasmus Berthelsen from [unclear] in Tromsø. Sara is always very good to listen to you. If the future of the Arctic is basically divided up into the Nordic and the North American Arctic and the Russian Arctic, the Russian Arctic more and more connected with Asia, how does the Permanent Participants see that future for the Arctic in a long term? I mean if there is not Circumpolar Arctic coming back, how do Permanent Participants see such a divided Arctic? Thank you. [1:09]</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Chair: Give us a brief answer, thank you.</p> <p>ICC Chair: First of all, I want to reiterate that Indigenous peoples' organizations – we are not only Permanent Participants. We represent peoples. Peoples that were here before the states were created, and therefore it is our clear message that any development in the Arctic, we must be at the table. And what also is characteristic of us peoples in the Arctic, Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, is that we live across these borders. And this of course illustrates the difficulty we are living under as peoples in the times we are in right now</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [2,00% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,00% Coverage</p> <p>Let me emphasize especially that we are the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic, and we are the ones that are living in the Arctic. It is so important that the international society is working with the Arctic, with the state [alliances? Lines?] [53:48] and also borders, but we are always working together with each other, without these borders, we will be thinking in a circumpolar manner.</p>		
Performative tool, the Arctic as a zone of peace	<p><Files\\12 STATEMENT FROM THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [5,81% Coverage]</p>	4	5

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 5,81% Coverage</p> <p>Inuit are committed to the Arctic remaining a zone of peace, a phrase coined by former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in a 1987 speech in Murmansk. ICC has repeatedly echoed this message in all of its guiding documents, most recently in the Utqiagvik Declaration of 2018 in which it was mandated to lay the groundwork to declare the Arctic as a peaceful Zone.</p> <p><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 1 reference coded [0,60% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,60% Coverage</p> <p>Reaffirming ICC Resolution 77-11, recognizing that it is in the interest of all Circumpolar peoples that the Arctic shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful and environmentally safe purposes, and shall not become the scene or object of human conflict or discord,</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [4,13% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,13% Coverage</p> <p>The global geopolitical development is serious and adds pressure to our people. We must continue to raise our voices as peoples of the Arctic. Our collaboration and constant push for all Arctic governments to pursue a peaceful, low-tension, and prosperous Arctic must continue”.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 2 references coded [7,77% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,17% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Inuit continue to carry with us a message of strong and peaceful development, a safe use of our environment, a message of mutually respectful partnerships across the Arctic and across the globe</p> <p>Reference 2 - 5,60% Coverage</p> <p>truly believe that Indigenous Peoples from around the globe hold invaluable knowledge and ways of seeing the world, that will once again be the indigeneity our forefathers and mothers demonstrated in surviving and thriving. By inherently exercising their self-determination, they created the societies and lives we have inherited. They created the foundation and strength of our cultures, so we can build democratic institutions and continuously fight for a peaceful and safe Arctic, for freedom.</p>		
Thoughts on the geopolitical situation	<p><Files\\17 Transcript ICC QA October 2022> - § 1 reference coded [25,80% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 25,80% Coverage</p> <p>And this of course illustrates the difficulty we are living under as peoples in the times we are in right now. And for us, from others who might think that we only work with non-security related issues or soft-security related issues, that is not the case. Because any hard security development affects us directly and affects our human rights directly. So we live under a very, very difficult time, where we must balance everything that we do, and I can also tell you,</p>	3	4

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>that it is what takes up very much of our time in an organization such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council at this, in these months.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 2 references coded [2,05% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,44% Coverage</p> <p>We are meeting here today on a period of time which is very challenging. There is war going on in the world, and it has unfortunately also an effect on our Arctic life and Inuit Nunaangat. So this is the first time that we have the ICC General Assembly where we are not together.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,61% Coverage</p> <p>These challenging times do not only affect us in our political world, but it also has an effect on us as individuals.</p> <p><Files\\27 Plenary discussion Arctic Encounter Symposium 2023> - § 1 reference coded [10,28% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,28% Coverage</p> <p>It's a huge concern because Russia is still the Chair, and with their invasion in the Ukraine, it's caused a huge setback in many ways, but we have to be creative and we have to find ways to make things work, so thank you.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
Performative tool, historical relations	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [0,69% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,69% Coverage</p> <p>The struggle we started 50 years ago has reached another era.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 3 references coded [11,12% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,91% Coverage</p> <p>. Based on our unity across borders, dividing very different nation states, Indigenous peoples occupied and owned the lands and seas of the Arctic for thousands of years.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 3,28% Coverage</p> <p>For decades we have sat side by side with states in the UN and in other international institutions. And together with other Indigenous peoples, we have taken part in negotiations for our rights, for climate action, for environmental safety and health, through Inuit and Indigenous diplomacy.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 5,92% Coverage</p> <p>How we collectively respond today will determine the future of Arctic democracy, the future we leave in the hands of our children</p>	5	8

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>and grandchildren. To navigate the waters of disastrous winter storms requires a cool and steady hand. But it also requires knowledge of these exact sea routes, coasts and conditions, and of the spirits that tie us, as human beings, together with nature. The values we bring – democracy, integrity, inclusion and good governance – must continue to be the moral compass for all Arctic governments.</p> <p><Files\\17 Transcript ICC QA October 2022> - § 1 reference coded [36,69% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 36,69% Coverage</p> <p>Rasmus: Thank you very much, Rasmus Berthelsen from [unclear] in Tromsø. Sara is always very good to listen to you. If the future of the Arctic is basically divided up into the Nordic and the North American Arctic and the Russian Arctic, the Russian Arctic more and more connected with Asia, how does the Permanent Participants see that future for the Arctic in a long term? I mean if there is not Circumpolar Arctic coming back, how do Permanent Participants see such a divided Arctic? Thank you. [1:09]</p> <p>Chair: Give us a brief answer, thank you.</p> <p>ICC Chair: First of all, I want to reiterate that Indigenous peoples' organizations – we are not only Permanent Participants. We represent peoples. Peoples that were here before the states were created, and therefore it is our clear message that any development in the Arctic, we must be at the table.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [3,05% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,05% Coverage</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">So with this coming time, it's not going to be much easier in the coming months, and I don't think that it's going to be easier with these coming years. But let me emphasize that we were created during the time when the Cold War started. So, because of that, we have always kept our focus on working together for the Arctic agenda. So that is so important that we keep that in focus. So, I think that this is one of the ways that we should also work within the Arctic Council, so important that we work together one person to the other, and also helping each other from people to people.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 2 references coded [15,36% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 7,16% Coverage</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Arctic Indigenous peoples are the original inhabitants of our region. And we bear with us a deeply rooted spiritual and cultural and all kinds of connection to the nature around us. We have safeguarded our nature, our ways of lives and continue to develop our own futures through participating on the national, regional and international arena.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 8,19% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Already in 1973, Arctic Indigenous peoples met for the first time and from then, we have stood shoulder by shoulder. In 1973, our representatives called for the establishment of a circumpolar body of collaboration, and the Arctic Council is just one of many examples of how Indigenous, Arctic Indigenous peoples, influence and achieve invaluable milestones through building international relations</p>		
<p>Arctic Indigenous peoples' cooperation</p>	<p><Files\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 3 references coded [4,53% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,69% Coverage</p> <p>The struggle we started 50 years ago has reached another era.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,10% Coverage</p> <p>We cannot accept that the Arctic peoples today are standing where we are like we did 50 years ago.</p> <p><Files\12 STATEMENT FROM THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [3,32% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,32% Coverage</p> <p>ICC emerged from the Cold War as a unifying voice for Inuit across our collective homeland of Inuit Nunaat. We worked hard to ensure that our sisters and brothers from Chukotka were able to join us in 1992.</p>	<p>4</p>	<p>5</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 1 reference coded [8,04% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 8,04% Coverage</p> <p>am proud that I stand here following generations of Inuit leadership, who paved the way for our people, to be a part of the global dialogue. [1:05] Also through hard and difficult times. Who built our Indigenous peoples' organization on democratic principles, on equity and human rights, insisting on every Inuk child, every Inuk youth, adult and elder to be recognized and take direct part in all matters relating to us. The Inuit Circumpolar Council represents Inuit from across the Arctic, from Chukotka, Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Since 1977 the Inuit circumpolar council has been the united voice of our people, raising concerns and advocating of our rights internationally, regionally and nationally.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [3,07% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,07% Coverage</p> <p>Since 1977, as ICC Greenland was created, one of the political decisions that was made, and the Greenland delegation back then, and also Alaskans back then, and Alaskans back then, when they met each other at [...] [49:03] first time ever, and if we look at the documents back then, you can tell already from back then, we, Inuit, we were working really, really hard to feel a unitedness</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>together. And we [find/found?] [49:16] it very important that all the four states were coming up with a declaration saying that we find a path, to find a unitedness collaboration within the circumpolar region</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [9,27% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 9,27% Coverage</p> <p>] Here we celebrated our original foresight and unity. Above all, we re-affirmed our inherent right of self-determination as distinct peoples through a joint statement, highlighting our interdependent, interrelated, interconnected and [...] [3:32] rights, including our right to self-determination, as the prerequisite for the exercise and enjoyment of all human rights. We invite you all to read the 2023 Arctic Peoples' Conference Joint Statement.</p>		
Performative tool, kinship	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [2,34% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,34% Coverage</p> <p>Now we don't have normal relations to Russia anymore, we, the Inuit and the Saami, are prevented to continue with our cooperation with</p>	4	4

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>kinsmen from the Russian Arctic and the many Indigenous peoples of Russia</p> <p><Files\\12 STATEMENT FROM THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL - Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [3,32% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,32% Coverage</p> <p>ICC emerged from the Cold War as a unifying voice for Inuit across our collective homeland of Inuit Nunaat. We worked hard to ensure that our sisters and brothers from Chukotka were able to join us in 1992.</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [6,70% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 6,70% Coverage</p> <p>"The heartbreaking human consequences of the conflict also affect Inuit. ICC was established during the Cold War, and it took fifteen years before Russian Inuit were able to become full members of our organization. Today, our cooperation is once again impacted by the geopolitical situation. At the same time, our most important Arctic governance body, the Arctic Council, which includes Indigenous Peoples at the table, have been paused" Olsvig says.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [3,90% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,90% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>And we [find/found?] [49:16] it very important that all the four states were coming up with a declaration saying that we find a path, to find a unitedness collaboration within the circumpolar region. And this was then implemented in 1992, and we can see through the documents, that every time we had the meetings, there was always seats that were empty, but we have always kept the seats for them, and over here in the corner, you can see two seats, over there are still also, that's for the ICC Chair, the ICC Vice-Chair, the Chukotka's seats are here, their name tags are here, and the seats are just empty. It is so important that we never forget them in all of our achievements and all of our thrive to work together even though they are not present.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, Indigenous peoples' rights movement</p>	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 3 references coded [4,53% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,69% Coverage</p> <p>The struggle we started 50 years ago has reached another era.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,10% Coverage</p> <p>We cannot accept that the Arctic peoples today are standing where we are like we did 50 years ago.</p> <p><Files\\12 STATEMENT FROM THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [3,32% Coverage]</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>6</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 3,32% Coverage</p> <p>ICC emerged from the Cold War as a unifying voice for Inuit across our collective homeland of Inuit Nunaat. We worked hard to ensure that our sisters and brothers from Chukotka were able to join us in 1992.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 1 reference coded [8,04% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 8,04% Coverage</p> <p>am proud that I stand here following generations of Inuit leadership, who paved the way for our people, to be a part of the global dialogue. [1:05] Also through hard and difficult times. Who built our Indigenous peoples' organization on democratic principles, on equity and human rights, insisting on every Inuk child, every Inuk youth, adult and elder to be recognized and take direct part in all matters relating to us. The Inuit Circumpolar Council represents Inuit from across the Arctic, from Chukotka, Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Since 1977 the Inuit circumpolar council has been the united voice of our people, raising concerns and advocating of our rights internationally, regionally and nationally.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [3,07% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,07% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Since 1977, as ICC Greenland was created, one of the political decisions that was made, and the Greenland delegation back then, and also Alaskans back then, and Alaskans back then, when they met each other at [...] [49:03] first time ever, and if we look at the documents back then, you can tell already from back then, we, Inuit, we were working really, really hard to feel a unitedness together. And we [find/found?] [49:16] it very important that all the four states were coming up with a declaration saying that we find a path, to find a unitedness collaboration within the circumpolar region</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [9,27% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 9,27% Coverage</p> <p>] Here we celebrated our original foresight and unity. Above all, we re-affirmed our inherent right of self-determination as distinct peoples through a joint statement, highlighting our interdependent, interrelated, interconnected and [...] [3:32] rights, including our right to self-determination, as the prerequisite for the exercise and enjoyment of all human rights. We invite you all to read the 2023 Arctic Peoples' Conference Joint Statement.</p>		
Performative tool, personal ties	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 2 references coded [5,69% Coverage]</p>	3	5

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 1,54% Coverage</p> <p>It is important we keep our personal contacts, but how the [contact? contract?] between the organizations continue is impossible to see.</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [6,70% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 6,70% Coverage</p> <p>"The heartbreaking human consequences of the conflict also affect Inuit. ICC was established during the Cold War, and it took fifteen years before Russian Inuit were able to become full members of our organization. Today, our cooperation is once again impacted by the geopolitical situation. At the same time, our most important Arctic governance body, the Arctic Council, which includes Indigenous Peoples at the table, have been paused" Olsvig says.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 3 references coded [8,17% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,89% Coverage</p> <p>So this is the first time that we have the ICC General Assembly where we are not together. We have been together since 1992, and ICC Chukotka has been part of our members, and we have met them ever since, but this is first time they are not among us. And this is very, very challenging, and it's very... And I find it very heartbreaking, that they are not present. We have been working</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>really, really hard for the last year, and we are noticing that our connection is getting further and further away from each other, and that really, really hurts for our Inuit hearts. Me, as a Chair, I find it very important that ICC Chukotka, we should use all of our opportunities to have as close cooperation and collaboration together with the Chukotka's as possible</p> <p>Reference 2 - 2,51% Coverage</p> <p>These challenging times do not only affect us in our political world, but it also has an effect on us as individuals. And here, for all of you who are here present, I'd like to share with you that we also here in... for Inuit international [Inuit Circumpolar Council?], it has a great effect on our lives here because of the war. And I hope that all of us who are here present, please include the Chukotkans in everything we do, and also give space for their priorities in our work here.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 1,78% Coverage</p> <p>So therefore, it is so important, that it hurts so much in my heart, that our communication, our collaboration, and our unitedness, have been broken with this coming years... with these years. So with this coming time, it's not going to be much easier in the</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>coming months, and I don't think that it's going to be easier with these coming years.</p>		
<p>Discourse 2: The Arctic Council pause and its consequences for addressing the Arctic Indigenous peoples' priorities</p>			
<p>Arctic Council after May 2023, Norwegian Chairmanship</p>	<p><Files\\22 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 QA> - § 1 reference coded [18,61% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 18,61% Coverage</p> <p>Well, as I said in my remarks, the Arctic Council is intact. This also means that we have had meetings, including the Russian Indigenous peoples' Association, recently in Norway, we met formerly with the Senior Arctic Officials Chair, the Norwegian Chair, and all of the six Indigenous peoples organizations were there. So, this is a testament to the Arctic Council functioning still, and the Indigenous peoples being there, doing the work. [14:55]</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [10,79% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,79% Coverage</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>2</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>As we have stated before, there is no Arctic Council without Arctic Indigenous peoples. I want to bring a clear message to this assembly: Times are difficult. Nothing is business as usual. But the Arctic Council is intact, and it should remain intact. No one has left the table. Following its Rules of Procedures, the Arctic Council is re-activating and I want to command the Norwegian Arctic Council Chairship for steering through the rough waters with the aim of continued people to people and cross-border collaboration.</p>		
Arctic Council consensus	<p><Files\\11 Statement of the Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023 – Inuiaat Issittormiut Ataatsimeersuarnerat 2023 Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [1,13% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,13% Coverage</p> <p>We, as founding members of the Arctic Council, remind the co-founders that our consensus must be a prerequisite for any decision on all levels of the organization and that making decisions without consensus undermines its purpose and integrity.</p> <p><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 1 reference coded [0,60% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,60% Coverage</p> <p>Recalling the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, which calls for Arctic States to work closely and constructively with Inuit to address concerns about international relations and the resolution of international disputes and to chart the future of the Arctic,</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 1 reference coded [2,90% Coverage]</p>	4	6

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 2,90% Coverage</p> <p>This is part of the pressured Arctic democracy. We cannot reiterate enough that Indigenous peoples must be included at any decision and policy-making in and about the Arctic, on all levels of governance, under or outside the auspices of the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 3 references coded [3,79% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,42% Coverage</p> <p>Thank you for that. Arctic Council... You mentioned also a specific thing. The way they make decisions, because they need to agree with each other, they need consensus before they can go into action. That way of deciding things are very specific, but we also have people here who were joining the first World Conference for Arctic People in '73, and that was one of the proposals at that time, because the way you should have consensus before you can go into action, because we know that in the parliaments and in the others, they are only majority that decides what to decide, but I think that if we should believe that consensus is the way ahead, and that's the way we should work upon, that we have to do something about it.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,89% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>The situation today is that the Russians are not joining the work in the Council, and that means that the Council cannot work because we need the consensus before we can go into action, so that's maybe something we should discuss further when the war is over sometime</p> <p>Reference 3 - 0,47% Coverage</p> <p>We want to keep that consensus principle before we can go into action, just like the same way we do it in ICC. No action before no consensus.</p>		
Arctic Council governance structure	<p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 2 references coded [5,84% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,02% Coverage</p> <p>The Arctic Council brings together the eight Arctic states, and six Indigenous peoples organizations in a unique government structure. A governance structure we must protect and further develop.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,82% Coverage</p> <p>As we have stated before, there is no Arctic Council without Arctic Indigenous peoples.</p>	1	2
Arctic Council pause and Indigenous peoples' rights	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [2,96% Coverage]</p>	3	3

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 2,96% Coverage</p> <p>cooperation that has been with us in the Arctic Council among the Indigenous peoples and with the scientists, is gone now. It's now the victim of the same forces, that have prevented the Indigenous peoples of their rights and possibilities to form their own future.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 1 reference coded [5,65% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,65% Coverage</p> <p>As we look around the Arctic, it is this inherently exercised right of self-determination now recognized as an inherent human right, by the states represented in this room, that makes up Arctic democracy as we know it. It is the recognition of Indigenous peoples as equal to all other peoples, and self-governing nations with rights exercised to create organizations, parliaments, and governments, who are all and must be all part of the future Arctic governance. This is the democracy we must protect.</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 2</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,83% Coverage</p> <p>Because we have lost a lot now while the Arctic Council cannot work fully, but on the other hand, if we didn't stop up the Council work, we</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>would still have a lot of challenges and problems to resolve. So that's what I wanted to say, thank you.</p>		
Arctic Council pause consequences	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [2,96% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,96% Coverage</p> <p>cooperation that has been with us in the Arctic Council among the Indigenous peoples and with the scientists, is gone now. It's now the victim of the same forces, that have prevented the Indigenous peoples of their rights and possibilities to form their own future.</p> <p><Files\\11 Statement of the Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023 – Inuiaat Issittormiut Ataatsimeersuarnerat 2023 Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 2 references coded [3,11% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,99% Coverage</p> <p>"The conference proposes to form a Circumpolar Body of Indigenous Peoples to pursue and advance our shared and collective interests. We emphasize that we are profoundly concerned about protecting now the interests of succeeding generations of our peoples. As a consequence this conference has resolved to form a Working Committee consisting of representatives of each group. ..." (Arctic Peoples' Conference 1973 second resolution)</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,13% Coverage</p>	5	7

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>We, as founding members of the Arctic Council, remind the co-founders that our consensus must be a prerequisite for any decision on all levels of the organization and that making decisions without consensus undermines its purpose and integrity.</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [6,70% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 6,70% Coverage</p> <p>"The heartbreaking human consequences of the conflict also affect Inuit. ICC was established during the Cold War, and it took fifteen years before Russian Inuit were able to become full members of our organization. Today, our cooperation is once again impacted by the geopolitical situation. At the same time, our most important Arctic governance body, the Arctic Council, which includes Indigenous Peoples at the table, have been paused" Olsvig says.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 2 references coded [6,40% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,65% Coverage</p> <p>We pre-date and co-founded the Arctic Council, and the fact that this Arctic roundtable is currently not in function does not make our seats empty.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 4,74% Coverage</p> <p>This is part of the pressured Arctic democracy. We cannot reiterate enough that Indigenous peoples must be included at any decision and policy-making in and about the Arctic, on all levels of</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>governance, under or outside the auspices of the Arctic Council. Excellences, the Arctic Council is not the Arctic Council without Indigenous peoples. Arctic governance is not democratic without Indigenous peoples' participation.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [7,19% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 7,19% Coverage</p> <p>First of all, when we are trying to work together in the Arctic, and our... the space that we are working together in the Arctic, the most important forum is the Arctic Council. And within the last 10... three decades, it's the Arctic Council that is of the greatest importance for our political forum. And due to international crisis, this also is also facing different challenges as well. [51:47] A lot of people are saying that some of the working groups have been put into pause. It has naturally an important consequence for us. But that means that our input of substance to the Arctic Council, is the most important political forum for us, to all the forums that we are working within, within the six fields, all of them, and this is the most important field of forum we have, where we have a direct, strong voice to be at the Arctic Council. Me as a Chair-person, but also on the executive council, and ever since we are at the new executive council, we have been working really, really hard for the last year to try to have a strong dialogue together with nations and states, that have an eye... a good eye on the Arctic and also to find partnerships. And I am very happy that May 11th, the Arctic Council had a meeting, on May 11th, where the</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>eight states, the member states, were joining. And the Indigenous populations of six also joined them, and we also, through ICC, were joining them.</p>		
<p>Arctic Council involvement of Indigenous peoples important for integrity and purpose</p>	<p><Files\\11 Statement of the Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023 – Inuiaat Issittormiut Ataatsimeersuarnerat 2023 Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [1,13% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,13% Coverage</p> <p>We, as founding members of the Arctic Council, remind the co-founders that our consensus must be a prerequisite for any decision on all levels of the organization and that making decisions without consensus undermines its purpose and integrity.</p> <p><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 3 references coded [2,06% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,72% Coverage</p> <p>Recognizing that our communities are at the forefront of the rapid changes occurring within the Arctic, we are acutely aware of the diverse human rights, cultural, health and social impacts related to climate change. Our knowledge, adaptation and mitigation strategies and management practices are critical to addressing the challenges,</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,53% Coverage</p> <p>Affirming that the Inuit Circumpolar Council is one of the founding Arctic Council Permanent Participants and we must remain an integral part of this regional organization. We express our deep concern about the current pause and call for a resolution,</p> <p>Reference 3 - 0,81% Coverage</p>	<p>4</p>	<p>6</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Asserting that international instruments, intergovernmental fora, and Arctic specific developments that have or may in the future impact our communities, must ensure our direct participation in procedural and substantive aspects, including the Arctic Council, United Nations' entities and specialized agencies, and all other intergovernmental organizations that we deem relevant,</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 1 reference coded [4,74% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,74% Coverage</p> <p>This is part of the pressured Arctic democracy. We cannot reiterate enough that Indigenous peoples must be included at any decision and policy-making in and about the Arctic, on all levels of governance, under or outside the auspices of the Arctic Council. Excellences, the Arctic Council is not the Arctic Council without Indigenous peoples. Arctic governance is not democratic without Indigenous peoples' participation.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [1,80% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,80% Coverage</p> <p>As we have stated before, there is no Arctic Council without Arctic Indigenous peoples.</p>		
Arctic Council key arena for Permanent Participants	<p><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 1 reference coded [0,51% Coverage]</p>	4	5

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 0,51% Coverage</p> <p>Instruct ICC Executive Council to continue to evaluate and strategize ways to use the Arctic Council as a key arena to further the interests of Inuit and to strengthen the unique role of ICC as a Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [3,51% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,51% Coverage</p> <p>Today, our cooperation is once again impacted by the geopolitical situation. At the same time, our most important Arctic governance body, the Arctic Council, which includes Indigenous Peoples at the table, have been paused" Olsvig says.</p> <p><Files\\18 ICC Sara Olsvig speech July 19> - § 1 reference coded [15,78% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 15,78% Coverage</p> <p>So I hope that we have also reached a more common understanding of what the Inuit Circumpolar Council is doing, because we are doing a lot, we are pushing also these years, nobody mentioned, we should've maybe mentioned ourselves in the Executive Council, the Ethical and Equitable Engagement Protocols, that our delegates mandated us to develop in 2018, we finalized in 2022, and today are actively promoting to be used in any engagement with the Arctic and Inuit Nunaat.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>This also actually connects to the Arctic Council which was not touched upon very much, but I again want to remind, how important it is, that we continue to influence and influence greater what goes on in the Arctic Council. Because exactly there, under each of the working groups, numbers and numbers of projects are conducted. And if we are not the ones, who are there to formulate what research questions should be asked, or how the research project should be designed, other people will do so. The rest of the world is not holding back in engaging and researching in the Arctic. So this is also again a capacity issue. That we actually have the people, the money, the time, to go to these activities and participate.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 2 references coded [6,18% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,37% Coverage</p> <p>. First of all, when we are trying to work together in the Arctic, and our... the space that we are working together in the Arctic, the most important forum is the Arctic Council. And within the last 10... three decades, it's the Arctic Council that is of the greatest importance for our political forum. And due to international crisis, this also is also facing different challenges as well. [51:47] A lot of people are saying that some of the working groups have been put into pause. It has naturally an important consequence for us. But that means that our input of substance</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>to the Arctic Council, is the most important political forum for us, to all the forums that we are working within, within the six fields, all of them, and this is the most important field of forum we have, where we have a direct, strong voice to be at the Arctic Council.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,81% Coverage</p> <p>The Arctic Council is so important that we haven't really gotten there yet, but with the coming years will be very, very important, because we are facing very, very big challenging issues that we have to deal with [with the others?] [53:19] and also to find a very good and strong political path in the Arctic. We still have a lot of work ahead of us.</p>		
Arctic Council, prospects for the future	<p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [3,12% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,12% Coverage</p> <p>"It is of great importance, that the collaboration in the Arctic Council continues. Development in the coming months will be determining for Arctic governance and for Arctic cooperation", Sara Olsvig concludes.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 1 reference coded [2,60% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,60% Coverage</p>	3	4

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>How we collectively respond today will determine the future of Arctic democracy, the future we leave in the hands of our children and grandchildren. To navigate the waters of disastrous winter storms requires a cool and steady hand</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 2 references coded [5,84% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,81% Coverage</p> <p>The Arctic Council is so important that we haven't really gotten there yet, but with the coming years will be very, very important, because we are facing very, very big challenging issues that we have to deal with [with the others?] [53:19] and also to find a very good and strong political path in the Arctic. We still have a lot of work ahead of us.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 4,03% Coverage</p> <p>So therefore, it is so important, that it hurts so much in my heart, that our communication, our collaboration, and our unitedness, have been broken with this coming years... with these years. So with this coming time, it's not going to be much easier in the coming months, and I don't think that it's going to be easier with these coming years. But let me emphasize that we were created during the time when the Cold War started. So, because of that, we have always kept our focus on working together for the Arctic agenda. So that is so important that we keep that in focus. So, I think that this is one of the ways that we should also work within</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>the Arctic Council, so important that we work together one person to the other, and also helping each other from people to people.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, Arctic Council victim of geopolitical forces</p>	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [2,96% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,96% Coverage</p> <p>cooperation that has been with us in the Arctic Council among the Indigenous peoples and with the scientists, is gone now. It's now the victim of the same forces, that have prevented the Indigenous peoples of their rights and possibilities to form their own future.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 1 reference coded [5,63% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,63% Coverage</p> <p>Arctic democracy is under great pressure. Conflicts and tensions is rising once again. And this time, with dimensions and consequences, we have not seen before. For the Arctic states represented here today, this is also your test. The ICC is deeply concerned about the paused Arctic Council and its future. We pre-date and co-founded the Arctic Council, and the fact that this</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>2</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	Arctic roundtable is currently not in function does not make our seats empty. This is part of the pressured Arctic democracy		
Thoughts on the pause	<p><Files\\12 STATEMENT FROM THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL - Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 2 references coded [5,73% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,84% Coverage</p> <p>We are concerned about the future of the Arctic Council which is based on peaceful cooperation and mutual respect.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 3,90% Coverage</p> <p>ICC is monitoring the situation closely and agrees with the SAOs that this temporary pause will allow time to consider "the necessary modalities that can allow us to continue the Council's important work in view of the current circumstances."</p> <p><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 1 reference coded [0,53% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,53% Coverage</p> <p>Affirming that the Inuit Circumpolar Council is one of the founding Arctic Council Permanent Participants and we must remain an integral part of this regional organization. We express our deep concern about the current pause and call for a resolution,</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 4 references coded [13,60% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,82% Coverage</p>	4	8

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p data-bbox="920 323 1312 355">Dear Arctic friends and family,</p> <p data-bbox="920 384 1783 571">Arctic democracy is under great pressure. Conflicts and tensions is rising once again. And this time, with dimensions and consequences, we have not seen before. For the Arctic states represented here today, this is also your test. The ICC is deeply concerned about the paused Arctic Council and its future.</p> <p data-bbox="745 639 1099 667">Reference 2 - 2,90% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="920 711 1783 858">This is part of the pressured Arctic democracy. We cannot reiterate enough that Indigenous peoples must be included at any decision and policy-making in and about the Arctic, on all levels of governance, under or outside the auspices of the Arctic Council.</p> <p data-bbox="745 927 1099 954">Reference 3 - 5,65% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="920 999 1783 1302">As we look around the Arctic, it is this inherently exercised right of self-determination now recognized as an inherent human right, by the states represented in this room, that makes up Arctic democracy as we know it. It is the recognition of Indigenous peoples as equal to all other peoples, and self-governing nations with rights exercised to create organizations, parliaments, and governments, who are all and must be all part of the future Arctic governance. This is the democracy we must protect.</p> <p data-bbox="745 1366 1099 1393">Reference 4 - 1,23% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>This is Arctic democracy under pressure. But we have the solutions at hand to prevent its complete meltdown.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [3,28% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,28% Coverage</p> <p>As we have stated before, there is no Arctic Council without Arctic Indigenous peoples. I want to bring a clear message to this assembly: Times are difficult.</p>		
Arctic Indigenous peoples' inclusion in decision-making processes	<p><Files\\14 Arctic Frontiers Panel discussion Sara Olsvig> - § 1 reference coded [6,04% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 6,04% Coverage</p> <p>Sara O.: Well, we see time and time again, that principles of ethical engagement are broken, or that decision-making processes are not including Indigenous peoples in sufficient ways, so this is also a test to our own states on how to implement democratic principles on our own land.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 3 references coded [23,13% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,36% Coverage</p> <p>In midst of the Cold War, the ICC developed into an internationally recognized organization, bringing a constant inuit voice of concern for the</p>	4	6

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>changing climate and environment to the global arena. For decades we have sat side by side with states in the UN and in other international institutions.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 8,52% Coverage</p> <p>This is part of the pressured Arctic democracy. We cannot reiterate enough that Indigenous peoples must be included at any decision and policy-making in and about the Arctic, on all levels of governance, under or outside the auspices of the Arctic Council. Excellences, the Arctic Council is not the Arctic Council without Indigenous peoples. Arctic governance is not democratic without Indigenous peoples' participation. [6:51] The values of governance built over decades with Arctic Indigenous peoples and nations as moral leaders and the legitimizing representatives of being the Arctic <i>is</i> under pressure. How we collectively respond today will determine the future of Arctic democracy, the future we leave in the hands of our children and grandchildren.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 11,25% Coverage</p> <p>truly believe that Indigenous Peoples from around the globe hold invaluable knowledge and ways of seeing the world, that will once again be the indigeneity our forefathers and mothers demonstrated in surviving and thriving. By inherently exercising their self-determination, they created the societies and lives we have inherited. They created the foundation and strength of our</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>cultures, so we can build democratic institutions and continuously fight for a peaceful and safe Arctic, for freedom. As we look around the Arctic, it is this inherently exercised right of self-determination now recognized as an inherent human right, by the states represented in this room, that makes up Arctic democracy as we know it. It is the recognition of Indigenous peoples as equal to all other peoples, and self-governing nations with rights exercised to create organizations, parliaments, and governments, who are all and must be all part of the future Arctic governance. This is the democracy we must protect.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [4,36% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,36% Coverage</p> <p>First of all, when we are trying to work together in the Arctic, and our... the space that we are working together in the Arctic, the most important forum is the Arctic Council. And within the last 10... three decades, it's the Arctic Council that is of the greatest importance for our political forum. And due to international crisis, this also is also facing different challenges as well. [51:47] A lot of people are saying that some of the working groups have been put into pause. It has naturally an important consequence for us. But that means that our input of substance to the Arctic Council, is the most important political forum for us, to all the forums that we are working within, within the six fields, all of them, and this is</p>		

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	<p>the most important field of forum we have, where we have a direct, strong voice to be at the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [4,02% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,02% Coverage</p> <p>The Arctic Council brings together the eight Arctic states, and six Indigenous peoples organizations in a unique government structure. A governance structure we must protect and further develop.</p>		
<p>Discourse 3: No Arctic governance or cooperation without the involvement of Indigenous peoples</p>			
<p>Arctic Indigenous peoples must be included in Arctic governance</p>	<p><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 4 references coded [2,41% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,60% Coverage</p> <p>Recalling the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, which calls for Arctic States to work closely and constructively with Inuit to address concerns about international relations and the resolution of international disputes and to chart the future of the Arctic,</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,46% Coverage</p> <p>Recognizing that we emerged in an era of environmental and global insecurity, again the Arctic geopolitical landscape is changing, and ICC is uniquely prepared to assess and address new challenges across Inuit Nunaat,</p>	<p>8</p>	<p>14</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 3 - 0,53% Coverage</p> <p>Affirming that the Inuit Circumpolar Council is one of the founding Arctic Council Permanent Participants and we must remain an integral part of this regional organization. We express our deep concern about the current pause and call for a resolution,</p> <p>Reference 4 - 0,81% Coverage</p> <p>Asserting that international instruments, intergovernmental fora, and Arctic specific developments that have or may in the future impact our communities, must ensure our direct participation in procedural and substantive aspects, including the Arctic Council, United Nations' entities and specialized agencies, and all other intergovernmental organizations that we deem relevant,</p> <p><Files\14 Arctic Frontiers Panel discussion Sara Olsvig> - § 1 reference coded [6,04% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 6,04% Coverage</p> <p>Sara O.: Well, we see time and time again, that principles of ethical engagement are broken, or that decision-making processes are not including Indigenous peoples in sufficient ways, so this is also a test to our own states on how to implement democratic principles on our own land.</p> <p><Files\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 4 references coded [18,47% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,12% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>That is why international dialogue and forums like the Arctic Circle assembly are so instrumental and that is why it is of such great importance to have all voices and peoples represented.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 8,52% Coverage</p> <p>This is part of the pressured Arctic democracy. We cannot reiterate enough that Indigenous peoples must be included at any decision and policy-making in and about the Arctic, on all levels of governance, under or outside the auspices of the Arctic Council. Excellences, the Arctic Council is not the Arctic Council without Indigenous peoples. Arctic governance is not democratic without Indigenous peoples' participation. [6:51] The values of governance built over decades with Arctic Indigenous peoples and nations as moral leaders and the legitimizing representatives of being the Arctic <i>is</i> under pressure. How we collectively respond today will determine the future of Arctic democracy, the future we leave in the hands of our children and grandchildren.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 5,65% Coverage</p> <p>As we look around the Arctic, it is this inherently exercised right of self-determination now recognized as an inherent human right, by the states represented in this room, that makes up Arctic democracy as we know it. It is the recognition of Indigenous peoples as equal to all other peoples, and self-governing nations with rights exercised to create organizations, parliaments, and</p>		

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	<p>governments, who are all and must be all part of the future Arctic governance. This is the democracy we must protect.</p> <p>Reference 4 - 2,17% Coverage</p> <p>This is Arctic democracy under pressure. But we have the solutions at hand to prevent its complete meltdown. Just like we have the indigeneity within reach to prevent complete climate disaster.</p> <p><Files\\17 Transcript ICC QA October 2022> - § 1 reference coded [36,69% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 36,69% Coverage</p> <p>Rasmus: Thank you very much, Rasmus Berthelsen from [unclear] in Tromsø. Sara is always very good to listen to you. If the future of the Arctic is basically divided up into the Nordic and the North American Arctic and the Russian Arctic, the Russian Arctic more and more connected with Asia, how does the Permanent Participants see that future for the Arctic in a long term? I mean if there is not Circumpolar Arctic coming back, how do Permanent Participants see such a divided Arctic? Thank you. [1:09]</p> <p>Chair: Give us a brief answer, thank you.</p> <p>ICC Chair: First of all, I want to reiterate that Indigenous peoples' organizations – we are not only Permanent Participants. We represent peoples. Peoples that were here before the states were</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>created, and therefore it is our clear message that any development in the Arctic, we must be at the table.</p> <p><Files\\18 ICC Sara Olsvig speech July 19> - § 1 reference coded [15,78% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 15,78% Coverage</p> <p>So I hope that we have also reached a more common understanding of what the Inuit Circumpolar Council is doing, because we are doing a lot, we are pushing also these years, nobody mentioned, we should've maybe mentioned ourselves in the Executive Council, the Ethical and Equitable Engagement Protocols, that our delegates mandated us to develop in 2018, we finalized in 2022, and today are actively promoting to be used in any engagement with the Arctic and Inuit Nunaat.</p> <p>This also actually connects to the Arctic Council which was not touched upon very much, but I again want to remind, how important it is, that we continue to influence and influence greater what goes on in the Arctic Council. Because exactly there, under each of the working groups, numbers and numbers of projects are conducted. And if we are not the ones, who are there to formulate what research questions should be asked, or how the research project should be designed, other people will do so. The rest of the world is not holding back in engaging and researching in the Arctic. So this is also again a capacity issue. That we actually have the people, the money, the time, to go to these activities and participate.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [2,00% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,00% Coverage</p> <p>Let me emphasize especially that we are the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic, and we are the ones that are living in the Arctic. It is so important that the international society is working with the Arctic, with the state [alliances? Lines?] [53:48] and also borders, but we are always working together with each other, without these borders, we will be thinking in a circumpolar manner.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [1,82% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,82% Coverage</p> <p>As we have stated before, there is no Arctic Council without Arctic Indigenous peoples.</p> <p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> § 1 reference coded [2,48% Coverage]</p> <p>Our fight for survival is not only decided by political events, but it may be... well be decided by nature's own forces with climate and environmental degradation in the world if we don't listen to the Arctic peoples' voice.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
Arctic cooperation important for Indigenous peoples	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [1,54% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,54% Coverage</p> <p>It is important we keep our personal contacts, but how the [contact? contract?] between the organizations continue is impossible to see.</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [3,12% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,12% Coverage</p> <p>"It is of great importance, that the collaboration in the Arctic Council continues. Development in the coming months will be determining for Arctic governance and for Arctic cooperation", Sara Olsvig concludes.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [3,05% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,05% Coverage</p> <p>So with this coming time, it's not going to be much easier in the coming months, and I don't think that it's going to be easier with these coming years. But let me emphasize that we were created during the time when the Cold War started. So, because of that, we have always kept our focus on working together for the Arctic</p>	3	3

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>agenda. So that is so important that we keep that in focus. So, I think that this is one of the ways that we should also work within the Arctic Council, so important that we work together one person to the other, and also helping each other from people to people.</p>		
<p>Arctic developments impact us, we must be included</p>	<p><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 3 references coded [2,34% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,81% Coverage</p> <p>Asserting that international instruments, intergovernmental fora, and Arctic specific developments that have or may in the future impact our communities, must ensure our direct participation in procedural and substantive aspects, including the Arctic Council, United Nations' entities and specialized agencies, and all other intergovernmental organizations that we deem relevant,</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,82% Coverage</p> <p>Accessibility, availability, culture, stability, health and wellness, decision-making-power and management are required for food security and a healthy environment. Our adaptive and holistic management has sustained us and our homelands for thousands of years. Our food sovereignty, our right to define our own policies and approaches, is critical to our existence and food security,</p> <p>Reference 3 - 0,72% Coverage</p> <p>Condemning the threats to our food security, including unprecedented salmon crashes, changes in wildlife health, environmental and industrial impacts, large-scale unsustainable commercial fisheries and asserting the need for Inuit to be at the forefront of management to ensure sustainability of our foods and health of our</p>	<p>6</p>	<p>9</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>environment,</p> <p><Files\\14 Arctic Frontiers Panel discussion Sara Olsvig> - § 1 reference coded [25,83% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 25,83% Coverage</p> <p>We've said that many times Indigenous peoples, nothing about us without us, is a saying that has been repeated many times, also by our governments and I think that is truly, truly key to any policy development about the Arctic. We have seen resource races before, colonization of Greenland was very much driven by the resource race. First it was the whaling, then it was other resources, the seal skins and blubber and all kinds of things, that were used in the South for commodities. So we have been through these waves of race to the North, and it has impacted us in very, very serious ways. In good ways as well. So I think that it's very important that the development that has been driven by Indigenous peoples, together with exactly our states, Norway, Denmark, even the Government of Greenland, Iceland, Finland, all of the Nordic states and U.S. and Canada where we have joined forces in developing new principles for recognition and implementation of the rights of Indigenous peoples, that we then also implement them in our own policies and I think that for Inuit, we are ready to engage and we're ready to provide our input and guide those who come from the South and want to engage with us in the North.</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [10,33% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,33% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine and its global impacts in terms of security, energy, and supply policies, have already left its mark on Nordic and Arctic countries.</p> <p>International Chair of Inuit Circumpolar Council, Sara Olsvig: "The geopolitical situation affects us in the Arctic, directly and indirectly. It has changed the security dynamics of our region. Furthermore, the Arctic is under pressure from preexisting developments. The impact of climate change result in temperatures rising three to four times faster than the global average, while pollution from southern parts of the globe end up in our ecosystems. It is important to bring an Arctic voice to Munich and to world leaders".</p> <p><Files\17 Transcript ICC QA October 2022> - § 2 references coded [57,44% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 31,63% Coverage</p> <p>If the future of the Arctic is basically divided up into the Nordic and the North American Arctic and the Russian Arctic, the Russian Arctic more and more connected with Asia, how does the Permanent Participants see that future for the Arctic in a long term? I mean if there is not Circumpolar Arctic coming back, how do Permanent Participants see such a divided Arctic? Thank you. [1:09]</p> <p>Chair: Give us a brief answer, thank you.</p> <p>ICC Chair: First of all, I want to reiterate that Indigenous peoples' organizations – we are not only Permanent Participants. We represent peoples. Peoples that were here before the states were created, and therefore it is our clear message that any development in the Arctic, we must be at the table.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 2 - 25,80% Coverage</p> <p>And this of course illustrates the difficulty we are living under as peoples in the times we are in right now. And for us, from others who might think that we only work with non-security related issues or soft-security related issues, that is not the case. Because any hard security development affects us directly and affects our human rights directly. So we live under a very, very difficult time, where we must balance everything that we do, and I can also tell you, that it is what takes up very much of our time in an organization such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council at this, in these months.</p> <p><Files\\18 ICC Sara Olsvig speech July 19> - § 1 reference coded [8,13% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 8,13% Coverage</p> <p>So for me hearing all of the things that you said at this very session, it has really, really, confirmed the necessity of continuing our work on the international level. And why is that? Well, that is because decisions are taken about us, without us. Decisions are taken about us, without us, around the world, when these negotiations are done, and if we are not there, our voice is not heard. So we have to continue and we have to find ways to continue strengthening each of our offices, each of our budgets, so we can bring more delegates, we can bring more experts from our own communities, to these negotiations.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [3,81% Coverage]</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 3,81% Coverage</p> <p>The Arctic Council is so important that we haven't really gotten there yet, but with the coming years will be very, very important, because we are facing very, very big challenging issues that we have to deal with [with the others?] [53:19] and also to find a very good and strong political path in the Arctic. We still have a lot of work ahead of us. Let me emphasize especially that we are the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic, and we are the ones that are living in the Arctic. It is so important that the international society is working with the Arctic, with the state [alliances? Lines?] [53:48] and also borders, but we are always working together with each other, without these borders, we will be thinking in a circumpolar manner</p>		
Arctic Indigenous peoples as knowledge holders	<p><Files\\13_2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 2 references coded [1,18% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,72% Coverage</p> <p>Recognizing that our communities are at the forefront of the rapid changes occurring within the Arctic, we are acutely aware of the diverse human rights, cultural, health and social impacts related to climate change. Our knowledge, adaptation and mitigation strategies and management practices are critical to addressing the challenges,</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,46% Coverage</p> <p>Recognizing that we emerged in an era of environmental and global insecurity, again the Arctic geopolitical landscape is changing, and ICC is uniquely prepared to assess and address new challenges across Inuit Nunaat,</p>	3	8

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p data-bbox="745 323 1693 389"><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 4 references coded [22,44% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="745 432 1099 459">Reference 1 - 5,92% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="920 504 1778 847">How we collectively respond today will determine the future of Arctic democracy, the future we leave in the hands of our children and grandchildren. To navigate the waters of disastrous winter storms requires a cool and steady hand. But it also requires knowledge of these exact sea routes, coasts and conditions, and of the spirits that tie us, as human beings, together with nature. The values we bring – democracy, integrity, inclusion and good governance – must continue to be the moral compass for all Arctic governments.</p> <p data-bbox="745 914 1115 941">Reference 2 - 12,75% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="920 986 1778 1366">We, the human species, are the only human beings on this planet, who divide ourselves unimagined lines drawn across land and sea. The changing climate, environmental pollution, the bio-diversity, flora and fauna, and ecosystems, know nothing of state-borders on a map, and in our efforts to protect our planet from further disaster, we must come together and see beyond state borders. Yes, that is difficult in times like these, but the level of difficulty does not make it less necessary. This cannot be put on hold for a decade, not a year, or even a few months. Climate change is no longer a buzzword at niche conferences or a policy that can</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>change with party-political leadership. [8:43] It is real, it is happening, and we, the collective human species, are the only ones who can make the unprecedented and massive efforts to cap global temperature rise. As Inuit and many others have said many times: Protecting the Arctic is to protect the planet. Inuit are an integral part of the science community, not just through academic titles and degrees, also through the knowledge we contribute with though our own knowledge-systems.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 2,54% Coverage</p> <p>I truly believe that Indigenous Peoples from around the globe hold invaluable knowledge and ways of seeing the world, that will once again be the indigeneity our forefathers and mothers demonstrated in surviving and thriving.</p> <p>Reference 4 - 1,23% Coverage</p> <p>This is Arctic democracy under pressure. But we have the solutions at hand to prevent its complete meltdown.</p> <p><Files\\18_ICC Sara Olsvig speech July 19> - § 2 references coded [14,60% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,07% Coverage</p> <p>so we need to find out how to bring the knowledge, the Indigenous knowledge our people have, to the places where</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>negotiations are taking place. Not only just figuring out how to get there, but also to reach an understanding and have a common understanding with other people around us, that that knowledge is as valuable as any other knowledge. [7:40:34] And that's the difficult part.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 9,52% Coverage</p> <p>This also actually connects to the Arctic Council which was not touched upon very much, but I again want to remind, how important it is, that we continue to influence and influence greater what goes on in the Arctic Council. Because exactly there, under each of the working groups, numbers and numbers of projects are conducted. And if we are not the ones, who are there to formulate what research questions should be asked, or how the research project should be designed, other people will do so. The rest of the world is not holding back in engaging and researching in the Arctic. So this is also again a capacity issue. That we actually have the people, the money, the time, to go to these activities and participate.</p>		
Arctic Indigenous peoples' contributions to Arctic governance	<p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 1 reference coded [3,59% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,59% Coverage</p> <p>And together with other Indigenous peoples, we have taken part in negotiations for our rights, for climate action, for environmental</p>	3	3

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>safety and health, through Inuit and Indigenous diplomacy. We have contributed to the development of a world that to a greater extent encompasses and recognizes complexity and diversity.</p> <p><Files\\18 ICC Sara Olsvig speech July 19> - § 1 reference coded [15,78% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 15,78% Coverage</p> <p>So I hope that we have also reached a more common understanding of what the Inuit Circumpolar Council is doing, because we are doing a lot, we are pushing also these years, nobody mentioned, we should've maybe mentioned ourselves in the Executive Council, the Ethical and Equitable Engagement Protocols, that our delegates mandated us to develop in 2018, we finalized in 2022, and today are actively promoting to be used in any engagement with the Arctic and Inuit Nunaat.</p> <p>This also actually connects to the Arctic Council which was not touched upon very much, but I again want to remind, how important it is, that we continue to influence and influence greater what goes on in the Arctic Council. Because exactly there, under each of the working groups, numbers and numbers of projects are conducted. And if we are not the ones, who are there to formulate what research questions should be asked, or how the research project should be designed, other people will do so. The rest of the world is not holding back in engaging and researching in the Arctic. So this is also again a capacity issue.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>That we actually have the people, the money, the time, to go to these activities and participate.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [4,15% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,15% Coverage</p> <p>Not least, it is my great honor to join to esteemed panel of Arctic Indigenous leaders, who like the Inuit Circumpolar Council have influenced and led Arctic governance and policy making for decades.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, the Indigenous peoples' commitment to the Arctic region</p>	<p><Files\\12 STATEMENT FROM THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [5,81% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,81% Coverage</p> <p>Inuit are committed to the Arctic remaining a zone of peace, a phrase coined by former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in a 1987 speech in Murmansk. ICC has repeatedly echoed this message in all of its guiding documents, most recently in the Utqiagvik Declaration of 2018 in which it was mandated to lay the groundwork to declare the Arctic as a peaceful Zone.</p> <p><Files\\18 ICC Sara Olsvig speech July 19> - § 1 reference coded [9,52% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 9,52% Coverage</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>3</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>This also actually connects to the Arctic Council which was not touched upon very much, but I again want to remind, how important it is, that we continue to influence and influence greater what goes on in the Arctic Council. Because exactly there, under each of the working groups, numbers and numbers of projects are conducted. And if we are not the ones, who are there to formulate what research questions should be asked, or how the research project should be designed, other people will do so. The rest of the world is not holding back in engaging and researching in the Arctic. So, this is also again a capacity issue. That we actually have the people, the money, the time, to go to these activities and participate.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [8,24% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 8,24% Coverage</p> <p>Already in 1973, Arctic Indigenous peoples met for the first time and from then, we have stood shoulder by shoulder. In 1973, our representatives called for the establishment of a circumpolar body of collaboration, and the Arctic Council is just one of many examples of how Indigenous, Arctic Indigenous peoples, influence and achieve invaluable milestones through building international relations.</p>		
The Permanent Participant status	<p><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 2 references coded [1,05% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,53% Coverage</p>	2	3

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Affirming that the Inuit Circumpolar Council is one of the founding Arctic Council Permanent Participants and we must remain an integral part of this regional organization. We express our deep concern about the current pause and call for a resolution,</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,51% Coverage</p> <p>Instruct ICC Executive Council to continue to evaluate and strategize ways to use the Arctic Council as a key arena to further the interests of Inuit and to strengthen the unique role of ICC as a Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\\17 Transcript ICC QA October 2022> - § 1 reference coded [36,69% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 36,69% Coverage</p> <p>Rasmus: Thank you very much, Rasmus Berthelsen from [unclear] in Tromsø. Sara is always very good to listen to you. If the future of the Arctic is basically divided up into the Nordic and the North American Arctic and the Russian Arctic, the Russian Arctic more and more connected with Asia, how does the Permanent Participants see that future for the Arctic in a long term? I mean if there is not Circumpolar Arctic coming back, how do Permanent Participants see such a divided Arctic? Thank you. [1:09]</p> <p>Chair: Give us a brief answer, thank you.</p> <p>ICC Chair: First of all, I want to reiterate that Indigenous peoples' organizations – we are not only Permanent Participants. We represent peoples. Peoples that were here before the states were</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>created, and therefore it is our clear message that any development in the Arctic, we must be at the table.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [10,15% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,15% Coverage</p> <p>Not least, it is my great honor to join to esteemed panel of Arctic Indigenous leaders, who like the Inuit Circumpolar Council have influenced and led Arctic governance and policy making for decades. Our organizations are Permanent Participants to the Arctic Council, which we co-founded in 1996. The Arctic Council brings together the eight Arctic states, and six Indigenous peoples organizations in a unique government structure. A governance structure we must protect and further develop.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, related to the ICC</p>	<p><Files\\11 Statement of the Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023 – Inuiaat Issittormiut Ataatsimeersuarnerat 2023 Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [1,13% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,13% Coverage</p> <p>We, as founding members of the Arctic Council, remind the co-founders that our consensus must be a prerequisite for any decision on all levels of the organization and that making decisions without consensus undermines its purpose and integrity.</p> <p><Files\\13 2022ICC-DECLARATION-1> - § 1 reference coded [0,51% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,51% Coverage</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>6</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Instruct ICC Executive Council to continue to evaluate and strategize ways to use the Arctic Council as a key arena to further the interests of Inuit and to strengthen the unique role of ICC as a Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 2 references coded [8,79% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,28% Coverage</p> <p>The Inuit Circumpolar Council represents Inuit from across the Arctic, from Chukotka, Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Since 1977 the Inuit circumpolar council has been the united voice of our people, raising concerns and advocating of our rights internationally, regionally and nationally.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 5,51% Coverage</p> <p>In midst of the Cold War, the ICC developed into an internationally recognized organization, bringing a constant inuit voice of concern for the changing climate and environment to the global arena. For decades we have sat side by side with states in the UN and in other international institutions. And together with other Indigenous peoples, we have taken part in negotiations for our rights, for climate action, for environmental safety and health, through Inuit and Indigenous diplomacy.</p> <p><Files\\17 Transcript ICC QA October 2022> - § 1 reference coded [31,63% Coverage]</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 31,63% Coverage</p> <p>If the future of the Arctic is basically divided up into the Nordic and the North American Arctic and the Russian Arctic, the Russian Arctic more and more connected with Asia, how does the Permanent Participants see that future for the Arctic in a long term? I mean if there is not Circumpolar Arctic coming back, how do Permanent Participants see such a divided Arctic? Thank you. [1:09]</p> <p>Chair: Give us a brief answer, thank you.</p> <p>ICC Chair: First of all, I want to reiterate that Indigenous peoples' organizations – we are not only Permanent Participants. We represent peoples. Peoples that were here before the states were created, and therefore it is our clear message that any development in the Arctic, we must be at the table.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [10,18% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,18% Coverage</p> <p>Not least, it is my great honor to join to esteemed panel of Arctic Indigenous leaders, who like the Inuit Circumpolar Council have influenced and led Arctic governance and policy making for decades. Our organizations are Permanent Participants to the Arctic Council, which we co-founded in 1996. The Arctic Council brings together the eight Arctic states, and six Indigenous peoples organizations in a unique government structure. A governance structure we must protect and further develop.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
Inuit diplomacy	<p data-bbox="745 288 1733 320"><Files\\18 ICC Sara Olsvig speech July 19> - § 1 reference coded [8,17% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="745 360 1099 392">Reference 1 - 8,17% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="920 432 1783 815">It struck me that yes, our states, our governments, we are actually waiting for a new Arctic strategy from the Greenland government, but looking at the states, the different states' Arctic strategies, they are often formulated as <i>their</i> power demonstration. Do they contain a demonstration of their commitment to us? Their commitment to the people that live there, in the Arctic, that they want to strategize about? And this is where we also have some work to do, to making sure that <i>our</i> concerns and <i>our</i> interests are included in the strategies that our states are putting, states and governments, are putting out there.</p> <p data-bbox="745 879 1588 911"><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [3,05% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="745 951 1099 983">Reference 1 - 3,05% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="920 1023 1771 1326">So with this coming time, it's not going to be much easier in the coming months, and I don't think that it's going to be easier with these coming years. But let me emphasize that we were created during the time when the Cold War started. So, because of that, we have always kept our focus on working together for the Arctic agenda. So that is so important that we keep that in focus. So, I think that this is one of the ways that we should also work within the Arctic Council, so important that we work together one</p>	4	4

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>person to the other, and also helping each other from people to people.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [8,19% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 8,19% Coverage</p> <p>Already in 1973, Arctic Indigenous peoples met for the first time and from then, we have stood shoulder by shoulder. In 1973, our representatives called for the establishment of a circumpolar body of collaboration, and the Arctic Council is just one of many examples of how Indigenous, Arctic Indigenous peoples, influence and achieve invaluable milestones through building international relations</p> <p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [4,13% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,13% Coverage</p> <p>The global geopolitical development is serious and adds pressure to our people. We must continue to raise our voices as peoples of the Arctic. Our collaboration and constant push for all Arctic governments to pursue a peaceful, low-tension, and prosperous Arctic must continue”.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, ICC as founding member of the AC</p>	<p><Files\\11 Statement of the Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023 – Inuiaat Issittormiut Ataatsimeersuarnerat 2023 Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [1,13% Coverage]</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>6</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 1,13% Coverage</p> <p>We, as founding members of the Arctic Council, remind the co-founders that our consensus must be a prerequisite for any decision on all levels of the organization and that making decisions without consensus undermines its purpose and integrity.</p> <p><Files\12 STATEMENT FROM THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL - Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [2,01% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,01% Coverage</p> <p>A founding member of the Arctic Council, ICC is one of six Indigenous Peoples organizations with Permanent Participant status</p> <p><Files\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [3,98% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,98% Coverage</p> <p>The Inuit Circumpolar Council is one of six Arctic Indigenous Peoples' Organizations that are Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council. The ICC, together with the Saami Council and the then organization of Russian Indigenous Peoples, co-founded the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 2 references coded [3,68% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,65% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>We pre-date and co-founded the Arctic Council, and the fact that this Arctic roundtable is currently not in function does not make our seats empty.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 2,02% Coverage</p> <p>The values of governance built over decades with Arctic Indigenous peoples and nations as moral leaders and the legitimizing representatives of being the Arctic <i>is</i> under pressure.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [10,18% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,18% Coverage</p> <p>Not least, it is my great honor to join to esteemed panel of Arctic Indigenous leaders, who like the Inuit Circumpolar Council have influenced and led Arctic governance and policy making for decades. Our organizations are Permanent Participants to the Arctic Council, which we co-founded in 1996. The Arctic Council brings together the eight Arctic states, and six Indigenous peoples organizations in a unique government structure. A governance structure we must protect and further develop.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, ICC as unifying voice</p>	<p><Files\\12 STATEMENT FROM THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL - Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [3,32% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,32% Coverage</p>	<p>4</p>	<p>7</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>ICC emerged from the Cold War as a unifying voice for Inuit across our collective homeland of Inuit Nunaat. We worked hard to ensure that our sisters and brothers from Chukotka were able to join us in 1992.</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 3 references coded [8,55% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,28% Coverage</p> <p>The Inuit Circumpolar Council represents Inuit from across the Arctic, from Chukotka, Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Since 1977 the Inuit circumpolar council has been the united voice of our people, raising concerns and advocating of our rights internationally, regionally and nationally.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,91% Coverage</p> <p>. Based on our unity across borders, dividing very different nation states, Indigenous peoples occupied and owned the lands and seas of the Arctic for thousands of years.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 3,36% Coverage</p> <p>In midst of the Cold War, the ICC developed into an internationally recognized organization, bringing a constant inuit voice of concern for the changing climate and environment to the global arena. For decades we have sat side by side with states in the UN and in other international institutions.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 2 references coded [4,40% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,07% Coverage</p> <p>Since 1977, as ICC Greenland was created, one of the political decisions that was made, and the Greenland delegation back then, and also Alaskans back then, and Alaskans back then, when they met each other at [...] [49:03] first time ever, and if we look at the documents back then, you can tell already from back then, we, Inuit, we were working really, really hard to feel a unitedness together. And we [find/found?] [49:16] it very important that all the four states were coming up with a declaration saying that we find a path, to find a unitedness collaboration within the circumpolar region</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,34% Coverage</p> <p>And it is so important that we are working, because we are working as Inuit Nunaat, we are all working under different states. [59:38] Still, we have always felt as one, and we are still thinking as one, here under the ICC. Through ICC, we have a strong voice</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [8,24% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 8,24% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Already in 1973, Arctic Indigenous peoples met for the first time and from then, we have stood shoulder by shoulder. In 1973, our representatives called for the establishment of a circumpolar body of collaboration, and the Arctic Council is just one of many examples of how Indigenous, Arctic Indigenous peoples, influence and achieve invaluable milestones through building international relations.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, we, the people of the Arctic</p>	<p><Files\\15 ICC-Chair-at-Munich-Security-Conference Arctic-Cooperation-Must-Continue PR final> - § 1 reference coded [2,10% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,10% Coverage</p> <p>The global geopolitical development is serious and adds pressure to our people. We must continue to raise our voices as peoples of the Arctic</p> <p><Files\\16 Transcript ICC October 2022 Speech> - § 2 references coded [7,95% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,02% Coverage</p> <p>The values of governance built over decades with Arctic Indigenous peoples and nations as moral leaders and the legitimizing representatives of being the Arctic <i>is</i> under pressure.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 5,92% Coverage</p> <p>How we collectively respond today will determine the future of Arctic democracy, the future we leave in the hands of our children and grandchildren. To navigate the waters of disastrous winter</p>	<p>4</p>	<p>5</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>storms requires a cool and steady hand. But it also requires knowledge of these exact sea routes, coasts and conditions, and of the spirits that tie us, as human beings, together with nature. The values we bring – democracy, integrity, inclusion and good governance – must continue to be the moral compass for all Arctic governments.</p> <p><Files\\19 Sara Olsvig July 18> - § 1 reference coded [2,00% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,00% Coverage</p> <p>Let me emphasize especially that we are the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic, and we are the ones that are living in the Arctic. It is so important that the international society is working with the Arctic, with the state [alliances? Lines?] [53:48] and also borders, but we are always working together with each other, without these borders, we will be thinking in a circumpolar manner.</p> <p><Files\\23 Arctic Circle Assembly 2023 ICC Sara Speech> - § 1 reference coded [7,10% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 7,10% Coverage</p> <p>Arctic Indigenous peoples are the original inhabitants of our region. And we bear with us a deeply rooted spiritual and cultural and all kinds of connection to the nature around us. We have safeguarded our nature, our ways of lives and continue to develop our own futures through participating on the national, regional and international arena.</p>		

Appendix C

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Codebook: Saami Council data

Name	Description	Files	References
Discourse 1: The geopolitical situation has severe consequences for the cooperation of Saami peoples			
Arctic Indigenous peoples' cooperation	<p><Files\\1 The Saami Council's statement on the Arctic Council Pause — Sámiráđđi> - § 3 references coded [11,13% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,09% Coverage</p> <p>Arctic Indigenous Peoples Organisations have a long-established cooperation, predating the Arctic Council cooperation.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 4,23% Coverage</p> <p>The Saami Council will strive to continue cooperation with our Indigenous brothers and sisters in the Arctic, including the ones based in the Russian Federation.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 3,81% Coverage</p> <p>The Saami are one people living in four countries, for us it is essential to keep the ties among us and continue the long-established cooperation.</p> <p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 3 references coded [7,31% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,34% Coverage</p>	5	9

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Now we don't have normal relations to Russia anymore, we, the Inuit and the Saami, are prevented to continue with our cooperation with kinsmen from the Russian Arctic and the many Indigenous peoples of Russia</p> <p>Reference 2 - 2,74% Coverage</p> <p>There is a chance that you are a lot, you are alive when you come back, so this is a very hard time for us to keep contact with Saamis on the Russian side, so the cooperation, we started in the 1980s when the border was opened, it's now closed.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 2,24% Coverage</p> <p>Well, I think I will support Aqqaluk's and Maret's view, we have to try to find ways to cooperate with the Indigenous peoples in Russia and to support the Arctic Council's work to protect our region.</p> <p><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 1 reference coded [8,16% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 8,16% Coverage</p> <p><i>"The conference proposes to form a circumpolar body of Arctic Indigenous peoples to pursue to advance our shared and collective interests. We emphasize that we are profoundly concerned about protecting now the interest of succeeding generations of our peoples".</i> That is how the second resolution started, the one from '73.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>[5:49:31] I would actually claim that, even though it has expanded beyond a circumpolar body of Indigenous peoples, I think that the Arctic Council is that body with states involved. It's a circumpolar cooperation that we were wanting or people who were there in '73 were calling for. But usually when we hear about the history of the Arctic Council, it starts with Gorbachev's speech in 1987, on which Finland, the Rovaniemi initiative or the Rovaniemi process followed up in 1989 by starting to talk about cooperation on environmental protection which ended, not ended, but led to the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991</p> <p><Files\\8 Arctic Frontiers 2023 Panel discussion> - § 1 reference coded [1,83% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,83% Coverage</p> <p>It's at stake, it was... When it was the Cold War, so the contact is very reduced and it's vital for us as peoples to be able to have that connection and also to be able to meet and try to strengthen the Saami culture together, because it is important, and so we feel like we are... We have lost so much on such a short time.</p> <p><Files\\3 Annual+report+2022> - § 1 reference coded [0,39% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,39% Coverage</p> <p>The war led to the Saami Council on 10 April having to decide on a break in cooperation with the member organizations on the Russian side. It also meant that from that date there has been no representation from the Russian side of Sápmi either in the working committee or at the meetings of the Saami Council. This was a very difficult decision for the Saami Council - in the year when we were to celebrate 30 years of Russian participation in</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	the Saami Council. It is still unclear how long this situation will persist. It must first be both practically and politically possible to cooperate.		
Cooperation with Russian Saami members affected	<p data-bbox="763 405 1576 475"><Files\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [15,43% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="763 515 1128 544">Reference 1 - 15,43% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 587 1659 1361">Yes, just to the issue of the Russian part. We, Saami, we have 2000 Saami's living on the Russian side, and we can't see them, or we can't... We could call, but we have to be very... It's very difficult because we can't bring on the Russians, [the Russian's won't like?] [3:11:25] because people then will be arrested for 15 years, and a fact is that we have a war in Sapmi, the Kola Peninsula is a part of Sapmi, our land, and what was happening in Russia now is that they go to the small Saami villages and they ask them to go to Ukraine as soldier and they will get big money paid, they tell, and already know are... in a small village, six Saami boys have been killed in Ukraine, and what happened, they didn't get the money themselves, but they are... the parents are getting paid for their... that they were killed. But also, those who come back, they will be looked as a hero and well, in their society, and they have been out in the war but come back, this is in a way a propaganda for the other small areas... There is a chance that you are a lot, you are alive when you come back, so this is a very</p>	8	11

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>hard time for us to keep contact with Saamis on the Russian side, so the cooperation, we started in the 1980s when the border was opened, it's now closed. And we [have?] [3:13:19] personal contact with some of our people and we can't visit them or help them in any way. Thank you.</p> <p><Files\25 Cooperation with Russian side on hold — Sámiráđđi> - § 3 references coded [22,91% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 7,24% Coverage</p> <p>As of today, 10 April 2022, the Saami Council puts the cooperation with our member organisations in the Russian side on hold, until the next Saami Council meeting. The Saami Council will then further evaluate the situation. The decision was made unanimously by a complete Executive Board.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 11,75% Coverage</p> <p>The Saami Council has been complete for the last 30 years, with member organisations in all four states, in which our people reside. Before 1992, we were separated for too long, due to the actions of the states, and the borders drawn across Sápmi .</p> <p>Again, the action of a state is affecting and threatening the cooperation and unity of the Saami people. The situation is difficult on multiple levels, and the access to information is different in different parts of Sápmi .</p> <p>Reference 3 - 3,93% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>On behalf of the Saami Council, I sincerely hope that we will soon see the day when we can reunite again, to continue our joint efforts for the Sámi people</p> <p><Files\\3 Annual+report+2022> - § 2 references coded [0,83% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,44% Coverage</p> <p>The war led to the Saami Council on 10 April having to decide on a break in cooperation with the member organizations on the Russian side. It also meant that from that date there has been no representation from the Russian side of Sápmi either in the working committee or at the meetings of the Saami Council. This was a very difficult decision for the Saami Council - in the year when we were to celebrate 30 years of Russian participation in the Saami Council. It is still unclear how long this situation will persist. It must first be both practically and politically possible to cooperate. For the Saami Council, it is also important to take individual safety into account.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,39% Coverage</p> <p>Due to the war between Russia and Ukraine, the Saami Council adopted a temporary pause in cooperation with the member organizations on the Russian side. This resulted in the Saami Conference stating the following: "The Saami Conference is following the situation in Russia and regrets that the elected council members on the Russian side may not be able to take a seat in the Saami Council until the situation is clearer and it once again becomes possible to cooperate across state borders." No representatives from the Russian side have taken part in the Saami Council's activities since April 2022.</p> <p><Files\\4 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Chair Aslak Holmberg> - § 1</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>reference coded [5,29% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,29% Coverage</p> <p>We are here, the Saami delegation of 14 people and we are joined by a few observers as well. Unfortunately, we don't have any Saami from the Russian side with us and we are missing there presence here.</p> <p><Files\\5 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Aslak Concluding remarks speech> - § 1 reference coded [10,19% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,19% Coverage</p> <p>And the final point I want to make is also the note that we are missing half of the Arctic, so we cannot forget that. And we are missing our siblings from the Russian side, but they are definitely in our minds.</p> <p><Files\\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 1 reference coded [3,05% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,05% Coverage</p> <p>As we heard in the morning session, we are now in a situation we have never seen before. We are six Permanent Participant organizations, four of us have membership on the Russian side that includes RAIPON, the Aleut, Saami, and Inuit. And the formal participation of Saami on the Russian side is</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>temporary on hold, much due to the concern of their individual security</p> <p><Files\\8 Arctic Frontiers 2023 Panel discussion> - § 1 reference coded [1,83% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,83% Coverage</p> <p>It's at stake, it was... When it was the Cold War, so the contact is very reduced and it's vital for us as people to be able to have that connection and also to be able to meet and try to strengthen the Saami culture together, because it is important, and so we feel like we are... We have lost so much on such a short time.</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [0,89% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,89% Coverage</p> <p>The situation today is that the Russians are not joining the work in the Council, and that means that the Council cannot work because we need the consensus before we can go into action, so that's maybe something we should discuss further when the war is over sometime</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
Saami peoples directly impacted by the geopolitical situation	<p><Files\\2 Váhhtjer+declaration> - § 1 reference coded [0,68% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,68% Coverage</p> <p>This year, we are sorry that our sisters and brothers from the Russian side of the border are prevented by the war from joining us. This is the first time since 1992 that they have not been able to participate in the conference or in our other activities.</p> <p><Files\\25 Cooperation with Russian side on hold — Sámiráđđi> - § 2 references coded [12,49% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 7,24% Coverage</p> <p>As of today, 10 April 2022, the Saami Council puts the cooperation with our member organisations in the Russian side on hold, until the next Saami Council meeting. The Saami Council will then further evaluate the situation. The decision was made unanimously by a complete Executive Board.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 5,25% Coverage</p> <p>It is indeed heartbreaking that, in the year we were to celebrate our 30th anniversary as united in the Saami Council, we might have a Saami Conference without representation from the easternmost part of Sápmi.</p> <p><Files\\26 Resolutions+Váhhtjer+ENG> - § 1 reference coded [3,15% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,15% Coverage</p>	6	7

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Saami Council member organizations have gathered for the 22nd Saami Conference on 11-14 August 2022. This year marks the 30-year anniversary since the Saami people on the Russian side of Sápmi could be formally included as members of the Saami Council. As we gather for this conference, the current geopolitical situation, as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, makes it impossible for our people on the Russian side of the border to participate in this conference.</p> <p><Files\\3 Annual+report+2022> - § 1 reference coded [0,39% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,39% Coverage</p> <p>The war led to the Saami Council on 10 April having to decide on a break in cooperation with the member organizations on the Russian side. It also meant that from that date there has been no representation from the Russian side of Sápmi either in the working committee or at the meetings of the Saami Council. This was a very difficult decision for the Saami Council - in the year when we were to celebrate 30 years of Russian participation in the Saami Council. It is still unclear how long this situation will persist. It must first be both practically and politically possible to cooperate.</p> <p><Files\\4 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Chair Aslak Holmberg> - § 1 reference coded [5,26% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,26% Coverage</p> <p>We are here, the Saami delegation of 14 people and we are joined by a few observers as well. Unfortunately, we don't have any Saami from the Russian side with us and we are missing there presence here</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p><Files\\5 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Aslak Concluding remarks speech> - § 1 reference coded [10,19% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,19% Coverage</p> <p>And the final point I want to make is also the note that we are missing half of the Arctic, so we cannot forget that. And we are missing our siblings from the Russian side, but they are definitely in our minds.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, brothers and sisters</p>	<p><Files\\1 The Saami Council's statement on the Arctic Council Pause — Sámiráđđi> - § 1 reference coded [4,20% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,20% Coverage</p> <p>The Saami Council will strive to continue cooperation with our Indigenous brothers and sisters in the Arctic, including the ones based in the Russian Federation</p> <p><Files\\2 Váhtjer+declaration> - § 1 reference coded [1,24% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,24% Coverage</p> <p>Since the first Saami Conference in Jokkmokk in 1953, the Saami Conferences have brought together organizations and representatives from Sápmi to work together towards a bright future for the Saami people. This year, we are sorry that our sisters and brothers from the Russian side of the border are prevented by the war from joining us. This is the first time since 1992 that they have not been able to participate in the conference or</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>5</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>in our other activities.</p> <p><Files\\4 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Chair Aslak Holmberg> - § 1 reference coded [6,48% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 6,48% Coverage</p> <p>And I value greatly the connections I have made through the years including those to our Inuit siblings. And let us [...] our strengths once again and celebrate the past 50 years and work towards laying a solid foundation for the decades to come.</p> <p><Files\\5 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Aslak Concluding remarks speech> - § 1 reference coded [10,19% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,19% Coverage</p> <p>And the final point I want to make is also the note that we are missing half of the Arctic, so we cannot forget that. And we are missing our siblings from the Russian side, but they are definitely in our minds.</p> <p><Files\\8 Arctic Frontiers 2023 Panel discussion> - § 1 reference coded [3,26% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,26% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>and with regards to the situation on Russia, I must say, for us, we are a people living in four different national states, and we have brothers and sisters, Saami brothers and sisters on the Russian side, and situation with the collaboration now is... It's at stake, it was... When it was the Cold War, so the contact is very reduced and it's vital for us as peoples to be able to have that connection and also to be able to meet and try to strengthen the Saami culture together, because it is important, and so we feel like we are... We have lost so much on such a short time.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, cross-border</p>	<p><Files\\1 The Saami Council's statement on the Arctic Council Pause — Sámiráđđi> - § 1 reference coded [3,81% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,81% Coverage</p> <p>The Saami are one people living in four countries, for us it is essential to keep the ties among us and continue the long-established cooperation.</p> <p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [2,74% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,74% Coverage</p> <p>There is a chance that you are a lot, you are alive when you come back, so this is a very hard time for us to keep contact with Saamis on the Russian side, so the cooperation,</p>	<p>6</p>	<p>7</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>we started in the 1980s when the border was opened, it's now closed.</p> <p><Files\\2 Váhtjer+declaration> - § 1 reference coded [1,35% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,35% Coverage</p> <p>Although we are one people, we feel how we our community is divided by borders, kept apart by the states of which we have become citizens. Our cross-border community is not prioritized by these states, and we cannot take anything for granted. Rights that we have won can be lost again in a moment if we do not vigilantly defend our gains and interests. This is why coming together is more important now than ever; we must strengthen Sápmi and ensure that the borders will never be closed to the Saami again.</p> <p><Files\\25 Cooperation with Russian side on hold — Sámiráđđi> - § 1 reference coded [6,13% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 6,13% Coverage</p> <p>The Saami Council has been complete for the last 30 years, with member organisations in al l four states, in which our people reside. Before 1992, we were separated for too long, due to the actions of the states, and the borders drawn across Sápmi .</p> <p><Files\\26 Resolutions+Váhtjer+ENG> - § 2 references coded [4,33% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,18% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>It is noticeable in all ways, that a part of our Saami community is missing at the conference. Once again, the consequences of state borders crossing Sápmi are all too obvious. Even though the current situation keeps us from having any formal collaboration with our people on the Russian side of Sápmi, we are determined to keep our affinity as a people. We look forward to the day, when we once again can meet face to face and continue our collaborations on all levels.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,16% Coverage</p> <p>The 22nd Saami Conference also reiterates the words of the 13th Saami Conference in Åre 1986: "We Sámi are one people, and the state borders shall not break our peoples'</p> <p><Files\8 Arctic Frontiers 2023 Panel discussion> - § 1 reference coded [3,26% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,26% Coverage</p> <p>and with regards to the situation on Russia, I must say, for us, we are a people living in four different national states, and we have brothers and sisters, Saami brothers and sisters on the Russian side, and situation with the collaboration now is... It's at stake, it was... When it was the Cold War, so the contact is very reduced and it's vital for us as peoples to be able to have that connection and also to be able to meet and try to strengthen the Saami culture together, because it is important, and so we feel like we are... We have lost so much on such a short time.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
Thoughts on the geopolitical situation	<p><Files\\25 Cooperation with Russian side on hold — Sámiráđđi> - § 2 references coded [10,79% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,54% Coverage</p> <p>Again, the action of a state is affecting and threatening the cooperation and unity of the Saami people. The situation is difficult on multiple levels, and the access to information is different in different parts of Sápmi .</p> <p>Reference 2 - 5,25% Coverage</p> <p>It is indeed heartbreaking that, in the year we were to celebrate our 30th anniversary as united in the Saami Council , we might have a Saami Conference without representation from the easternmost part of Sápmi .</p> <p><Files\\26 Resolutions+Váhtjer+ENG> - § 1 reference coded [3,79% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,79% Coverage</p> <p>Saami Council member organizations have gathered for the 22nd Saami Conference on 11-14 August 2022. This year marks the 30-year anniversary since the Saami people on the Russian side of Sápmi could be formally included as members of the Saami Council. As we gather for this conference, the current geopolitical situation, as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, makes it impossible for our people on the Russian side of the border to participate in this conference. It is noticeable in all ways, that a part of our Saami community is missing at the conference.</p> <p><Files\\3 Annual+report+2022> - § 3 references coded [0,57% Coverage]</p>	4	7

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 0,14% Coverage</p> <p>It is still unclear how long this situation will persist. It must first be both practically and politically possible to cooperate. For the Saami Council, it is also important to take individual safety into account</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,22% Coverage</p> <p>There were two factors that particularly characterized the conference. One was the joy of being able to meet again across national borders after a long period of pandemic and closed borders. The second was the sadness that the conference had no participants from the Russian side of Sápmi due to the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 0,21% Coverage</p> <p>Especially this time was that the geopolitical situation in the world, where Russia and Ukraine are at war, meant that Sámi from the Russian side could not participate in the conference. This of course affected the conference, and people are very worried about how the situation affects our people over a long period of time</p> <p><Files\\1 The Saami Council's statement on the Arctic Council Pause — Sámiráđđi> - § 1 reference coded [4,79% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,32% Coverage</p> <p>Now, more than ever, it is important to continue the Arctic cooperation to protect indigenous peoples' cultures and the Arctic environment, this includes the scientific cooperation, monitoring, and long-time data sets to better understand the climate and environmental changes in the Arctic.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
Arctic developments impact us, we must be included	<p data-bbox="763 339 1599 405"><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 3 references coded [10,61% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="763 448 1115 475">Reference 1 - 3,50% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 518 1653 759">newsletter, and then you said that the Indigenous Peoples' give the Arctic Council a human face. And I think that without the PP's, or the Permanent Participants involvement in the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council would probably be very heavy on the environmental issues of the polar bear situation, disconnected from the people, so I think that [...] [5:45:42] is right, that we are the human face of the Arctic Council.</p> <p data-bbox="763 826 1115 853">Reference 2 - 2,77% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 896 1644 1102">I think, and we heard that also many times, we find... So why do we want this to get started? I think the Arctic Council is very important for us as Indigenous peoples, because that's the forum where we have a very strong position, and it is about our lands, our food security, our environment, which is the fundamentals for our culture.</p> <p data-bbox="763 1169 1115 1197">Reference 3 - 4,34% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 1240 1648 1375">So I think that the establishment of the Arctic Council, the Permanent Participants is a unique construction with the states and Indigenous peoples around the same table, it has generated volumes of Arctic knowledge, and we have to remember,</p>	3	5

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>that the Permanent Participants are founding members of the Arctic Council. And that means something. And we will do what we can to maintain the cooperation, also through these rough waters, and at the other end, we need to start to discuss how we continue to strengthen that body</p> <p><Files\\8 Arctic Frontiers 2023 Panel discussion> - § 1 reference coded [5,15% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,15% Coverage</p> <p>I often tend to think: Who is the owner of the problem? If we own the problem together, the solution must be crafted together. But it's important you can't expect the solution from people who are not in position to create those solutions, and then I'm talking about legislative powers or economical powers to build our communities, and we are still in the situation where we have inherited a lot of problems. I, I of course am aware of the problem with Russia, the breach of people's rights and the violation of Ukraine, but problems we have in the region, they have a long history, and the history is not a good history, that's the reason why both Sweden, Finland and Norway have established a Truth and Reconciliation committee to go through the politics that has been carried out towards the Indigenous peoples, and it's those kind of aftermaths we have to cope with when we are crafting solutions.</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [2,15% Coverage]</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 2,15% Coverage</p> <p>and we heard earlier mentioning the saying of [...] [6:34:05] that we are the face of... the human face of the Arctic Council, and there are often mentionings that the Arctic Council is for the people of the Arctic, and I would also like it to be for the peoples of the Arctic. And for that to truly be, then I would also like to what the president of the Saami Parliament from Norway said earlier and mentioned of the [squirrels, and who knows that the squirrel eats] [6:34:35] for it to be truly for the peoples of the Arctic, we need to be able to bring our knowledge and our solutions to the table and for that we need the capacity to do so.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, historical relations</p>	<p><Files\\1 The Saami Council's statement on the Arctic Council Pause — Sámiráđđi> - § 1 reference coded [3,09% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,09% Coverage</p> <p>Arctic Indigenous Peoples Organisations have a long-established cooperation, predating the Arctic Council cooperation.</p> <p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [0,68% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,68% Coverage</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>5</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>The struggle we started 50 years ago has reached another era.</p> <p><Files\\2 Váhtjer+declaration> - § 1 reference coded [1,24% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,24% Coverage</p> <p>Since the first Saami Conference in Jokkmokk in 1953, the Saami Conferences have brought together organizations and representatives from Sápmi to work together towards a bright future for the Saami people. This year, we are sorry that our sisters and brothers from the Russian side of the border are prevented by the war from joining us. This is the first time since 1992 that they have not been able to participate in the conference or in our other activities.</p> <p><Files\\25 Cooperation with Russian side on hold — Sámiráđđi> - § 1 reference coded [6,13% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 6,13% Coverage</p> <p>The Saami Council has been complete for the last 30 years, with member organisations in all four states, in which our people reside. Before 1992, we were separated for too long, due to the actions of the states, and the borders drawn across Sápmi .</p> <p><Files\\8 Arctic Frontiers 2023 Panel discussion> - § 1 reference coded [2,82% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,82% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>I, I of course am aware of the problem with Russia, the breach of people's rights and the violation of Ukraine, but problems we have in the region, they have a long history, and the history is not a good history, that's the reason why both Sweden, Finland and Norway have established a Truth and Reconciliation committee to go through the politics that has been carried out towards the Indigenous peoples, and it's those kind of aftermaths we have to cope with when we are crafting solutions.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, personal relations</p>	<p><Files\\1 The Saami Council's statement on the Arctic Council Pause — Sámiráđđi> - § 1 reference coded [3,81% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,81% Coverage</p> <p>The Saami are one people living in four countries, for us it is essential to keep the ties among us and continue the long-established cooperation.</p> <p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [4,15% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,15% Coverage</p> <p>There is a chance that you are a lot, you are alive when you come back, so this is a very hard time for us to keep contact with Saamis on the Russian side, so the cooperation, we started in the 1980s when the border was opened, it's now closed. And we [have?] [3:13:19] personal</p>	<p>4</p>	<p>4</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>contact with some of our people and we can't visit them or help them in any way. Thank you.</p> <p><Files\5 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Aslak Concluding remarks speech> - § 1 reference coded [10,19% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,19% Coverage</p> <p>And the final point I want to make is also the note that we are missing half of the Arctic, so we cannot forget that. And we are missing our siblings from the Russian side, but they are definitely in our minds.</p> <p><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 1 reference coded [5,53% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,53% Coverage</p> <p>our deliberate about getting it back going slowly again. So, to find ways to how we can get... end the pause and get it to operate. So slowly starting up with working groups and the... How to kind of continue our work. And I think Aqqaluq said something very important in the morning session too, it is about people-to-people cooperation, we need to speak with each other, find ways to speak at the personal level at least. That it at least what we should maintain and build upon I think, to bring it on to a level beyond the pause or to a certain operational level. So I am glad to hear that this is also</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	the Norwegian chairmanship approach, to get it started again.		
Discourse 2: The Saami Council are vital actors in the Arctic Council, and the Arctic Council is vital for the Saami Council			
Arctic Council governance structure	<p><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 8 references coded [32,25% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,05% Coverage</p> <p><i>“Have you seen the last version of the Arctic Declaration? The Ministerial Meeting is going to be on Friday.”</i> So the Saami Council had submitted a proposal with a different text, something we were not happy with, and the SAO Chair calls and says: <i>“Can the Saami Council live with the text as it is? It’s only you now holding back the consensus”</i>. And this was in 2015, and this was about the Declaration that was about to be adopted in Iqaluit a few days after. My keynote here is going to reflect a bit upon how we got to that kind of question and how this kind of question can be formalized in the future.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 2,13% Coverage</p> <p>So, during those two years of negotiations of the Rovaniemi process, the Indigenous people were ready to negotiate a seat in that</p>	3	15

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>cooperation, saying “Hey, this is about our environment, our life, our foundation of the culture, so we need to be at the table</p> <p>Reference 3 - 2,23% Coverage</p> <p>And as we heard a Norwegian Senior Arctic officials say, it’s quite a unique body where Arctic states and Indigenous organizations are sitting at the same table, and Indigenous peoples have a stronger position than the 38 or whatever how many observers there are today.</p> <p>Reference 4 - 3,50% Coverage</p> <p>newsletter, and then you said that the Indigenous Peoples’ give the Arctic Council a human face. And I think that without the PP’s, or the Permanent Participants involvement in the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council would probably be very heavy on the environmental issues of the polar bear situation, disconnected from the people, so I think that [...] [5:45:42] is right, that we are the human face of the Arctic Council.</p> <p>Reference 5 - 6,10% Coverage</p> <p>he always says that this three-party cooperation, this Arctic Council where we have Arctic states and working groups, which is scientists and researchers and the Indigenous peoples promoting the</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Indigenous knowledge together, and I think we see a wealth of reports and knowledge about the Arctic generated through the Arctic Council work, and we also have added our values, our recognition of Indigenous knowledge and oops, it's a very difficult table this to holding the computer including falling down this step too, but, so we have really been able to lift our values and I think achieved quite a lot of recognition and contributed to the assessment as well, but it can always get better, I have to say that, it is not perfect.</p> <p>Reference 6 - 3,44% Coverage</p> <p>De-facto part of the consensus... I started with telling that the SAO, the Canadian SAO Chair called the Saami Council and actually said "you are the one holding back consensus on the Declaration", and he did that even though that we are not part of the consensus according to the rules of procedures, so that, I told this story to demonstrate, that de-facto, we are part of the consensus, but it is not formalized.</p> <p>Reference 7 - 5,45% Coverage</p> <p>we, and we realized through these rough times that we have been through, that informal part of being part of the consensus is a very vulnerable situation when you get into rough waters. Because then it was easy to leave us out because there was no obligation to have us part of the consensus. So I think that we, when we, as we evolve, and I might be naïve,</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>hoping that we get through these rough waters, that we need to start to discuss how we formalize the informal strong... How we formalize our role which in fact is considered almost as being part of the consensus without being that. So that was a very complicated way to say that the simple things...</p> <p>Reference 8 - 4,34% Coverage</p> <p>So I think that the establishment of the Arctic Council, the Permanent Participants is a unique construction with the states and Indigenous peoples around the same table, it has generated volumes of Arctic knowledge, and we have to remember, that the Permanent Participants are founding members of the Arctic Council. And that means something. And we will do what we can to maintain the cooperation, also through these rough waters, and at the other end, we need to start to discuss how we continue to strengthen that body</p> <p><Files\\8 Arctic Frontiers 2023 Panel discussion> - § 1 reference coded [1,40% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,40% Coverage</p> <p>Yes, of course, the Arctic Council has a very good model because the Indigenous peoples are represented at the table, and that's a very, very good example. Of course it can</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>be evolved even more in my opinion, but that is of course another debate</p> <p><Files\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 6 references coded [9,33% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,42% Coverage</p> <p>Thank you for that. Arctic Council... You mentioned also a specific thing. The way they make decisions, because they need to agree with each other, they need consensus before they can go into action. That way of deciding things are very specific, but we also have people here who were joining the first World Conference for Arctic People in '73, and that was one of the proposals at that time, because the way you should have consensus before you can go into action, because we know that in the parliaments and in the others, they are only majority that decides what to decide, but I think that if we should believe that consensus is the way ahead, and that's the way we should work upon, that we have to do something about it.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 0,89% Coverage</p> <p>The situation today is that the Russians are not joining the work in the Council, and that means that the Council cannot</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>work because we need the consensus before we can go into action, so that's maybe something we should discuss further when the war is over sometime</p> <p>Reference 3 - 2,73% Coverage</p> <p>We want to keep that consensus principle before we can go into action, just like the same way we do it in ICC. No action before no consensus. And the other thing I want to mention is when the Arctic Council still worked fully, and Gunn-Britt also said something about it, when it comes to scientific research, there are six working shops. In what way do we [develop? Level up?] [6:19:22] ahead? Because we all know that the people who has a degree from universities are being looked as, has more abilities than others, but we also know that you don't need to be professor or have a university degree to understand and go on working with things, but it shows something about the situation, that if you have a high [level?] [6:20:06] of education, you'll be listened to more extensively, compared to if you don't have</p> <p>Reference 4 - 0,61% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>And we've heard about... How the Arctic Council came about and how the history of us being an integral part of the Arctic Council and how unique forum of the Arctic Council exactly is.</p> <p>Reference 5 - 1,25% Coverage</p> <p>And also, during these difficult times, the last few years with the pandemic, then the pause, and the stress to the system and to the structure of the Arctic Council that we have faced, in the recent years, and I am also been [agreeing?] [6:31:27] what Sara Olsvig said earlier that it's so important that we reaffirm [confirm?] [6:31:33] our commitment to the Arctic Council,</p> <p>Reference 6 - 1,43% Coverage</p> <p>But we also need to recognize that we still have challenges. And we need to still to find ways to enhance also our own capacity to participate in a truly meaningful way in all levels of the Arctic Council, and also to be able to develop our own structures at home and our institutions, to be able to contribute with our knowledge, and the solutions that we can bring to the table, based on our knowledge and our cultural values</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
<p>Arctic Indigenous peoples' contributions to Arctic governance</p>	<p><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 4 references coded [22,39% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 8,46% Coverage</p> <p>No, but the second resolution says: <i>"The conference proposes to form a circumpolar body of Arctic Indigenous peoples to pursue to advance our shared and collective interests. We emphasize that we are profoundly concerned about protecting now the interest of succeeding generations of our peoples"</i>. That is how the second resolution started, the one from '73.</p> <p>[5:49:31] I would actually claim that, even though it has expanded beyond a circumpolar body of Indigenous peoples, I think that the Arctic Council is that body with states involved. It's a circumpolar cooperation that we were wanting or people who were there in '73 were calling for. But usually when we hear about the history of the Arctic Council, it starts with Gorbachev's speech in 1987, on which Finland, the Rovaniemi initiative or the Rovaniemi process followed up in 1989 by starting to talk about cooperation on environmental protection which ended, not ended, but led to the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991</p> <p>Reference 2 - 4,34% Coverage</p> <p>So, I also like to claim that the reason why the representatives, so our organizations, at that time, the ICC and Saami Council as well</p>	2	6

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>as RAIPON, the Russian Association of Indigenous of the North, they were ready to negotiate a strong seat at the table based on the resolutions and the visions developed in 1973 at the Arctic Peoples' Conference. [5:53:11] So we were, if I may say we, we were very prepared. I also see a process, the process and participation since 1973, kind of developed into two paths, or two tracks.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 3,50% Coverage</p> <p>newsletter, and then you said that the Indigenous Peoples' give the Arctic Council a human face. And I think that without the PP's, or the Permanent Participants involvement in the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council would probably be very heavy on the environmental issues of the polar bear situation, disconnected from the people, so I think that [...] [5:45:42] is right, that we are the human face of the Arctic Council.</p> <p>Reference 4 - 6,10% Coverage</p> <p>he always says that this three-party cooperation, this Arctic Council where we have Arctic states and working groups, which is scientists and researchers and the Indigenous peoples promoting the Indigenous knowledge together, and I think we see a wealth of reports and knowledge about the Arctic generated through the Arctic Council work, and we also have added our values, our recognition of Indigenous knowledge and oops, it's a very difficult table this to holding the computer</p>		

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	<p>including falling down this step too, but, so we have really been able to lift our values and I think achieved quite a lot of recognition and contributed to the assessment as well, but it can always get better, I have to say that, it is not perfect.</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 2 references coded [2,82% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,54% Coverage</p> <p>And we've heard about... How the Arctic Council came about and how the history of us being an integral part of the Arctic Council and how unique forum of the Arctic Council exactly is. [6:30:31] And I want as many others to acknowledge the achievement of to create [creating] that. And also, the work that has been done since then, and also the work that is done by our representatives and our Indigenous peoples' representatives in the Arctic Council since then</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,28% Coverage</p> <p>I am also been [agreeing?] [6:31:27] what Sara Olsvig said earlier that it's so important that we reconfirm [confirm?] [6:31:33] our commitment to the Arctic Council, and how important it is that we now slowly find ways to get the Arctic Council up and running again, and find, come</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>back to just being able to do the important work that we are doing on all levels of the Arctic Council.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, Indigenous peoples' rights movement</p>	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 3 references coded [4,52% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,68% Coverage</p> <p>The struggle we started 50 years ago has reached another era.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 1,10% Coverage</p> <p>We cannot accept that the Arctic peoples today are standing where we are like we did 50 years ago.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 2,74% Coverage</p> <p>There is a chance that you are a lot, you are alive when you come back, so this is a very hard time for us to keep contact with Saamis on the Russian side, so the cooperation, we started in the 1980s when the border was opened, it's now closed.</p> <p><Files\\4 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Chair Aslak Holmberg> - § 1 reference coded [14,87% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 14,87% Coverage</p>	<p>4</p>	<p>8</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>years. There are great developments in the Arctic for Indigenous land rights and self-governance, such as the in Greenland home-rule, Nunavut agreement and the establishment of the Saami Parliaments. Indigenous led conservation is recognized in the United Nations Biodiversity Convention, the role of Indigenous peoples and the role as guardians of nature is recognized stronger than ever in a global process. Through our lobbying we've had success in international fora, in the UN but obviously also is a major achievement the establishment of the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 3 references coded [14,85% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,55% Coverage</p> <p>And as we heard, the Arctic Indigenous peoples they gathered already in 1973 and they established a contact and shared joint vision and a path to address the challenges they were facing.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 8,16% Coverage</p> <p><i>"The conference proposes to form a circumpolar body of Arctic Indigenous peoples to pursue to advance our shared and collective interests. We emphasize that we are profoundly concerned about protecting now the interest of succeeding generations</i></p>		

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	<p><i>of our peoples</i>". That is how the second resolution started, the one from '73.</p> <p>[5:49:31] I would actually claim that, even though it has expanded beyond a circumpolar body of Indigenous peoples, I think that the Arctic Council is that body with states involved. It's a circumpolar cooperation that we were wanting or people who were there in '73 were calling for. But usually when we hear about the history of the Arctic Council, it starts with Gorbachev's speech in 1987, on which Finland, the Rovaniemi initiative or the Rovaniemi process followed up in 1989 by starting to talk about cooperation on environmental protection which ended, not ended, but led to the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991</p> <p>Reference 3 - 5,14% Coverage</p> <p>So we were, if I may say we, we were very prepared. I also see a process, the process and participation since 1973, kind of developed into two paths, or two tracks. So one is one the global Indigenous peoples' rights movement, where we got the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and the ILO 169, the United... The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Declaration and the Permanent Forum, and the other track which is on the Arctic track, with more focus on environment and the Environmental Protection Strategy and later the Arctic</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Council, so it was kind of two different kind of people engaged in those different processes.</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [0,61% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,61% Coverage</p> <p>And we've heard about... How the Arctic Council came about and how the history of us being an integral part of the Arctic Council and how unique forum of the Arctic Council exactly is.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, Arctic Council as 'unique' structure</p>	<p><Files\\4 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Chair Aslak Holmberg> - § 1 reference coded [10,69% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,69% Coverage</p> <p>And in 1973 the conference called for a permanent collaborative body for Arctic Indigenous peoples, for us to voice our concerns and work together and address them, so we can say that the steps towards what became the Arctic Council was taken then at the 1973 Conference. And as we know, now the Arctic Council is in a critical state, still, and we need to work strategically to maintain this unique body.</p> <p><Files\\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 3 references coded [7,90% Coverage]</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>5</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 3,02% Coverage</p> <p>And we also heard earlier that at first there were three Permanent Participants, this evolved with the Aleut International in '98, and Gwich'in and Athabaskan joined in 2000. And I consider the role as Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council at the level of eight Arctic states and foreign ministries quite an achievement, that we are able to sit at the table</p> <p>Reference 2 - 2,23% Coverage</p> <p>And as we heard a Norwegian Senior Arctic officials say, it's quite a unique body where Arctic states and Indigenous organizations are sitting at the same table, and Indigenous peoples have a stronger position than the 38 or whatever how many observers there are today.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 2,64% Coverage</p> <p>So I think that the establishment of the Arctic Council, the Permanent Participants is a unique construction with the states and Indigenous peoples around the same table, it has generated volumes of Arctic knowledge, and we have to remember, that the Permanent Participants are founding members of the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion></p>		

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	<p>- § 1 reference coded [0,61% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,61% Coverage</p> <p>And we've heard about... How the Arctic Council came about and how the history of us being an integral part of the Arctic Council and how unique forum of the Arctic Council exactly is.</p>		
The Permanent Participant status	<p><Files\\1 The Saami Council's statement on the Arctic Council Pause — Sámiráđđi> - § 1 reference coded [2,42% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,42% Coverage</p> <p>The Saami Council role as Permanent Participant is our formal status in the Arctic Council .</p> <p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [3,82% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,82% Coverage</p> <p>So this is a difficult question, but because of the Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, we do live in huge areas but we have many common issues and challenges. We have managed to organize ourselves by having Permanent Participant status at the Arctic Council, and ICC in Inuit</p>	6	12

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Circumpolar Council and the Saami Council are strong organizations.</p> <p><Files\\4 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Chair Aslak Holmberg> - § 1 reference coded [14,87% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 14,87% Coverage</p> <p>years. There are great developments in the Arctic for Indigenous land rights and self-governance, such as the in Greenland home-rule, Nunavut agreement and the establishment of the Saami Parliaments. Indigenous led conservation is recognized in the United Nations Biodiversity Convention, the role of Indigenous peoples and the role as guardians of nature is recognized stronger than ever in a global process. Through our lobbying we've had success in international fora, in the UN but obviously also is a major achievement the establishment of the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 7 references coded [27,90% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 5,05% Coverage</p> <p><i>"Have you seen the last version of the Arctic Declaration? The Ministerial Meeting is going to be on Friday."</i> So the Saami Council had submitted a proposal with a different text, something we were not happy with, and the SAO Chair calls and says: <i>"Can</i></p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p><i>the Saami Council live with the text as it is? It's only you now holding back the consensus". And this was in 2015, and this was about the Declaration that was about to be adopted in Iqaluit a few days after. My keynote here is going to reflect a bit upon how we got to that kind of question and how this kind of question can be formalized in the future.</i></p> <p>Reference 2 - 2,23% Coverage</p> <p>And as we heard a Norwegian Senior Arctic officials say, it's quite a unique body where Arctic states and Indigenous organizations are sitting at the same table, and Indigenous peoples have a stronger position than the 38 or whatever how many observers there are today.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 6,10% Coverage</p> <p>he always says that this three-party cooperation, this Arctic Council where we have Arctic states and working groups, which is scientists and researchers and the Indigenous peoples promoting the Indigenous knowledge together, and I think we see a wealth of reports and knowledge about the Arctic generated through the Arctic Council work, and we also have added our values, our recognition of Indigenous knowledge and oops, it's a very difficult table this to holding the computer including falling down this step too, but, so we have really been able to lift our values and I think achieved quite a lot of</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>recognition and contributed to the assessment as well, but it can always get better, I have to say that, it is not perfect.</p> <p>Reference 4 - 2,77% Coverage</p> <p>I think, and we heard that also many times, we find... So why do we want this to get started? I think the Arctic Council is very important for us as Indigenous peoples, because that's the forum where we have a very strong position, and it is about our lands, our food security, our environment, which is the fundamentals for our culture.</p> <p>Reference 5 - 3,66% Coverage</p> <p>And we have established a very strong position, and we have a certain, or quite strong influence on all levels of the Arctic Council, which we have to constantly keep nurturing and [kicking?] [05:59:56] as well, so it is, [and?] [6:00:00] in the governmental body working on the issues that are important to us, which I actually already said so which will bring me to the conclusion. In... How, how, am I on time? Like, 2 minutes? 1 minute?</p> <p>Reference 6 - 5,45% Coverage</p> <p>we, and we realized through these rough times that we have been through, that informal part of being part of the consensus is a very</p>		

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	<p>vulnerable situation when you get into rough waters. Because then it was easy to leave us out because there was no obligation to have us part of the consensus. So I think that we, when we, as we evolve, and I might be naïve, hoping that we get through these rough waters, that we need to start to discuss how we formalize the informal strong... How we formalize our role which in fact is considered almost as being part of the consensus without being that. So that was a very complicated way to say that the simple things...</p> <p>Reference 7 - 2,64% Coverage</p> <p>So I think that the establishment of the Arctic Council, the Permanent Participants is a unique construction with the states and Indigenous peoples around the same table, it has generated volumes of Arctic knowledge, and we have to remember, that the Permanent Participants are founding members of the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\8 Arctic Frontiers 2023 Panel discussion> - § 1 reference coded [1,40% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,40% Coverage</p> <p>Yes, of course, the Arctic Council has a very good model because the Indigenous peoples are represented at the table, and that's a very, very good example. Of course it can</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>be evolved even more in my opinion, but that is of course another debate</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [1,28% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,28% Coverage</p> <p>I am also [agreeing?] [6:31:27] what Sara Olsvig said earlier that it's so important that we reconfirm [confirm?] [6:31:33] our commitment to the Arctic Council, and how important it is that we now slowly find ways to get the Arctic Council up and running again, and find, come back to just being able to do the important work that we are doing on all levels of the Arctic Council.</p>		
Arctic Council's work protects the Arctic region	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [2,24% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,24% Coverage</p> <p>Well, I think I will support Aqqaluk's and Maret's view, we have to try to find ways to cooperate with the Indigenous peoples in Russia and to support the Arctic Council's work to protect our region.</p> <p><Files\\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 1 reference coded [2,77% Coverage]</p>	4	6

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 1 - 2,77% Coverage</p> <p>I think, and we heard that also many times, we find... So why do we want this to get started? I think the Arctic Council is very important for us as Indigenous peoples, because that's the forum where we have a very strong position, and it is about our lands, our food security, our environment, which is the fundamentals for our culture</p> <p><Files\\6 Future of Arctic Council in doubt after end of Russian chairship CBC News> - § 1 reference coded [1,21% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,21% Coverage</p> <p>"The Arctic Council ... is still of tremendous importance for the Saami Council, for the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic and for the environmental work we all depend upon," said Aslaak Holmberg, president of the Saami Council. "This mandate is still important, maybe now more than ever.</p> <p><Files\\1 The Saami Council's statement on the Arctic Council Pause — Sámiráđđi> - § 1 reference coded [4,79% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 – 3,32% Coverage</p> <p>Now, more than ever, it is important to continue the Arctic cooperation to protect indigenous peoples' cultures and the Arctic environment, this includes the scientific cooperation, monitoring, and long-time data sets to better understand the climate and environmental changes in the Arctic.</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
Arctic Council important for the Saami Council	<p><Files\\4 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Chair Aslak Holmberg> - § 1 reference coded [10,69% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,69% Coverage</p> <p>And in 1973 the conference called for a permanent collaborative body for Arctic Indigenous peoples, for us to voice our concerns and work together and address them, so we can say that the steps towards what became the Arctic Council was taken then at the 1973 Conference. And as we know, now the Arctic Council is in a critical state, still, and we need to work strategically to maintain this unique body.</p> <p><Files\\6 Future of Arctic Council in doubt after end of Russian chairship CBC News> - § 1 reference coded [1,21% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,21% Coverage</p> <p>"The Arctic Council ... is still of tremendous importance for the Saami Council, for the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic and for the environmental work we all depend upon," said Aslaak Holmberg, president of the Saami Council. "This mandate is still important, maybe now more than ever.</p> <p><Files\\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 2 references coded [6,43% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,77% Coverage</p> <p>I think, and we heard that also many times, we find... So why do we want this to get started? I think the Arctic Council is very</p>	4	5

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	<p>important for us as Indigenous peoples, because that's the forum where we have a very strong position, and it is about our lands, our food security, our environment, which is the fundamentals for our culture.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 3,66% Coverage</p> <p>And we have established a very strong position, and we have a certain, or quite strong influence on all levels of the Arctic Council, which we have to constantly keep nurturing and [kicking?] [05:59:56] as well, so it is, [and?] [6:00:00] in the governmental body working on the issues that are important to us, which I actually already said so which will bring me to the conclusion. In... How, how, am I on time? Like, 2 minutes? 1 minute?</p> <p><Files\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [2,01% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,01% Coverage</p> <p>And also, to contribute to all the important research and the projects that are being conducted under the Arctic Council. And also, as has been mentioned, the Arctic Council is an important arena to lift and to highlight our Indigenous knowledge. There are projects within the Arctic Council that are at the forefront of actually</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>finding ways to co-produce knowledge and to find ways to enhance the recognition of our Indigenous knowledge. And that is also something that the Arctic Council is an important arena for, and that is something that is not often listened as an important task, but it is.</p>		
<p>Arctic Indigenous peoples as knowledge holders</p>	<p><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 1 reference coded [3,50% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,50% Coverage</p> <p>newsletter, and then you said that the Indigenous Peoples' give the Arctic Council a human face. And I think that without the PP's, or the Permanent Participants involvement in the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council would probably be very heavy on the environmental issues of the polar bear situation, disconnected from the people, so I think that [...] [5:45:42] is right, that we are the human face of the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 2 references coded [5,57% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 2 - 2,01% Coverage</p> <p>And also, to contribute to all the important research and the projects that are being conducted under the Arctic Council. And also, as has been mentioned, the Arctic Council is an important arena to lift and to highlight our Indigenous knowledge. There are projects within the</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>2</p>

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	<p>Arctic Council that are at the forefront of actually finding ways to co-produce knowledge and to find ways to enhance the recognition of our Indigenous knowledge. And that is also something that the Arctic Council is an important arena for, and that is something that is not often listened as an important task, but it is.</p>		
<p>Arctic Indigenous peoples' inclusion in decision-making processes</p>	<p><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 3 references coded [8,82% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 3,50% Coverage</p> <p>newsletter, and then you said that the Indigenous Peoples' give the Arctic Council a human face. And I think that without the PP's, or the Permanent Participants involvement in the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council would probably be very heavy on the environmental issues of the polar bear situation, disconnected from the people, so I think that [...] [5:45:42] is right, that we are the human face of the Arctic Council.</p> <p>Reference 2 - 2,56% Coverage</p> <p>Again, to quote Sara, what she said today in the Indigenous, no, ICC Delegation meeting yesterday, so we contribute with what research question should be asked and what should be studied. If we don't do that, others will do that. So that's why we need to be at the table. So, and then the present situation.</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>3</p>

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	<p>Reference 3 - 2,77% Coverage</p> <p>I think, and we heard that also many times, we find... So why do we want this to get started? I think the Arctic Council is very important for us as Indigenous peoples, because that's the forum where we have a very strong position, and it is about our lands, our food security, our environment, which is the fundamentals for our culture.</p> <p><Files\\8 Arctic Frontiers 2023 Panel discussion> - § 1 reference coded [1,40% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,40% Coverage</p> <p>Yes, of course, the Arctic Council has a very good model because the Indigenous peoples are represented at the table, and that's a very, very good example. Of course it can be evolved even more in my opinion, but that is of course another debate</p>		
<p>Performative tool, Saami Council founding member of the Arctic Council</p>	<p><Files\\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 3 references coded [13,32% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 8,16% Coverage</p> <p><i>"The conference proposes to form a circumpolar body of Arctic Indigenous peoples to pursue to advance our shared and collective interests. We emphasize that we are profoundly concerned about protecting now the interest of succeeding generations</i></p>	<p>2</p>	<p>4</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p><i>of our peoples</i>". That is how the second resolution started, the one from '73.</p> <p>[5:49:31] I would actually claim that, even though it has expanded beyond a circumpolar body of Indigenous peoples, I think that the Arctic Council is that body with states involved. It's a circumpolar cooperation that we were wanting or people who were there in '73 were calling for. But usually when we hear about the history of the Arctic Council, it starts with Gorbachev's speech in 1987, on which Finland, the Rovaniemi initiative or the Rovaniemi process followed up in 1989 by starting to talk about cooperation on environmental protection which ended, not ended, but led to the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991</p> <p>Reference 2 - 2,13% Coverage</p> <p>So, during those two years of negotiations of the Rovaniemi process, the Indigenous people were ready to negotiate a seat in that cooperation, saying "Hey, this is about our environment, our life, our foundation of the culture, so we need to be at the table</p> <p>Reference 3 - 3,02% Coverage</p> <p>And we also heard earlier that at first there were three Permanent Participants, this evolved with the Aleut International in '98, and Gwich'in and Athabaskan joined in 2000. And I consider the role as Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council at</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>the level of eight Arctic states and foreign ministries quite an achievement, that we are able to sit at the table</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [0,85% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,85% Coverage</p> <p>And that is still, we've been with the Arctic Council since the start and also we heard before it even started, but we still need to recognize that that is still a challenge that we have to truly fill our positions and to be able to do so in a good way.</p>		
<p>Performative tool, 'human face' of the Arctic</p>	<p><Files\\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 2 references coded [6,47% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 2 - 3,50% Coverage</p> <p>newsletter, and then you said that the Indigenous Peoples' give the Arctic Council a human face. And I think that without the PP's, or the Permanent Participants involvement in the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council would probably be very heavy on the environmental issues of the polar bear situation, disconnected from the people, so I think that [...] [5:45:42] is right, that we are the human face of the Arctic Council.</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [2,15%</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>2</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,15% Coverage</p> <p>and we heard earlier mentioning the saying of [...] [6:34:05] that we are the face of... the human face of the Arctic Council, and there are often mentionings that the Arctic Council is for the people of the Arctic, and I would also like it to be for the peoples of the Arctic. And for that to truly be, then I would also like to what the president of the Saami Parliament from Norway said earlier and mentioned of the [squirrels, and who knows that the squirrel eats] [6:34:35] for it to be truly for the peoples of the Arctic, we need to be able to bring our knowledge and our solutions to the table and for that we need the capacity to do so.</p>		
<p>Discourse 3: The Arctic Council pause and the future of the Council</p>			
<p>Arctic Council consensus</p>	<p><Files\11_Statement of the Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023 – Inuiaat Issittormiut Ataatsimeersuarnerat 2023 Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada> - § 1 reference coded [1,12% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,12% Coverage</p> <p>We, as founding members of the Arctic Council, remind the co-founders that our consensus must be a prerequisite for any decision on all levels of the organization and that making decisions without consensus undermines its purpose and integrity</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>5</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p data-bbox="763 288 1599 352"><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 3 references coded [15,87% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="763 395 1115 424">Reference 1 - 6,08% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 467 1648 959">When we had the 40 years anniversary of the '73 meeting, the outcome document said that we should strive to have an Indigenous vice-chair at the SAO level in the Arctic Council. We have brought that up now and then but we haven't moved to any decision on that, but I want to round off this keynote with the beginning. De-facto part of the consensus... I started with telling that the SAO, the Canadian SAO Chair called the Saami Council and actually said "you are the one holding back consensus on the Declaration", and he did that even though that we are not part of the consensus according to the rules of procedures, so that, I told this story to demonstrate, that de-facto, we are part of the consensus, but it is not formalized.</p> <p data-bbox="763 1031 1115 1059">Reference 2 - 5,45% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 1102 1659 1361">we, and we realized through these rough times that we have been through, that informal part of being part of the consensus is a very vulnerable situation when you get into rough waters. Because then it was easy to leave us out because there was no obligation to have us part of the consensus. So I think that we, when we, as we evolve, and I might be naïve, hoping that we get through these rough waters, that we</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>need to start to discuss how we formalize the informal strong... How we formalize our role which in fact is considered almost as being part of the consensus without being that. So that was a very complicated way to say that the simple things...</p> <p>Reference 3 - 4,34% Coverage</p> <p>So I think that the establishment of the Arctic Council, the Permanent Participants is a unique construction with the states and Indigenous peoples around the same table, it has generated volumes of Arctic knowledge, and we have to remember, that the Permanent Participants are founding members of the Arctic Council. And that means something. And we will do what we can to maintain the cooperation, also through these rough waters, and at the other end, we need to start to discuss how we continue to strengthen that body</p> <p><Files\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [0,89% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,89% Coverage</p> <p>The situation today is that the Russians are not joining the work in the Council, and that means that the Council cannot work because we need the consensus before we can go</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>into action, so that's maybe something we should discuss further when the war is over sometime</p>		
Thoughts on the pause	<p><Files\\1 The Saami Council's statement on the Arctic Council Pause — Sámiráđđi> - § 1 reference coded [4,79% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,79% Coverage</p> <p>Saami Council representatives will not attend any formal Arctic Council meetings or any of its subsidiary bodies' meetings during this time. We hope the pause will not be too long. Now, more than ever, it is important to continue the Arctic cooperation to protect indigenous peoples' cultures and the Arctic environment, this includes the scientific cooperation, monitoring, and long-time data sets to better understand the climate and environmental changes in the Arctic. The Saami Council role as Permanent Participant is our formal status in the Arctic Council</p> <p><Files\\4 Arctic People's Conference 2023 SC Chair Aslak Holmberg> - § 1 reference coded [10,69% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 10,69% Coverage</p> <p>And in 1973 the conference called for a permanent collaborative body for Arctic Indigenous peoples, for us to voice our concerns and work together and address them, so we can say that the steps towards what became the Arctic Council was taken then at the 1973 Conference. And as we know, now the Arctic Council is in a critical state, still, and we need to work strategically to maintain this unique body.</p>	4	7

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p data-bbox="763 323 1599 389"><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 3 references coded [12,88% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="763 432 1115 459">Reference 1 - 3,05% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 502 1637 746">As we heard in the morning session, we are now in a situation we have never seen before. We are six Permanent Participant organizations, four of us have membership on the Russian side that includes RAIPON, the Aleut, Saami, and Inuit. And the formal participation of Saami on the Russian side is temporary on hold, much due to the concern of their individual security</p> <p data-bbox="763 810 1115 837">Reference 2 - 4,39% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 880 1659 1209">And I hope to also take this opportunity to emphasize that nobody is excluded from the Arctic Council. No one is excluded from the Arctic Council, it is, it has been a pause. It is important to distinguish between being a pause, being on hold, or being excluded. The whole balancing act was or is about nobody being excluded. So, and we have to... This pause was declared early March 2022 and Norway took over the chairmanship as we heard from [...] [5:58:02] 11th of May and our deliberate about getting it back going slowly again.</p> <p data-bbox="763 1273 1115 1300">Reference 3 - 5,45% Coverage</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>we, and we realized through these rough times that we have been through, that informal part of being part of the consensus is a very vulnerable situation when you get into rough waters. Because then it was easy to leave us out because there was no obligation to have us part of the consensus. So I think that we, when we, as we evolve, and I might be naïve, hoping that we get through these rough waters, that we need to start to discuss how we formalize the informal strong... How we formalize our role which in fact is considered almost as being part of the consensus without being that. So that was a very complicated way to say that the simple things...</p> <p><Files\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [1,99% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,99% Coverage</p> <p>And also, during these difficult times, the last few years with the pandemic, then the pause, and the stress to the system and to the structure of the Arctic Council that we have faced, in the recent years, and I am also been [agreeing?] [6:31:27] what Sara Olsvig said earlier that it's so important that we reaffirm [confirm?] [6:31:33] our commitment to the Arctic Council, and how important it is that we now slowly find ways to get the Arctic Council up and running again, and find, come</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
	back to just being able to do the important work that we are doing on all levels of the Arctic Council.		
Arctic Council pause consequences	<p data-bbox="763 403 1576 472"><Files\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [2,96% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="763 512 1115 539">Reference 1 - 2,96% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 584 1637 783">cooperation that has been with us in the Arctic Council among the Indigenous peoples and with the scientists, is gone now. It's now the victim of the same forces, that have prevented the Indigenous peoples of their rights and possibilities to form their own future.</p> <p data-bbox="763 852 1599 920"><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 2 references coded [8,50% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="763 960 1115 987">Reference 1 - 3,05% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 1032 1637 1294">As we heard in the morning session, we are now in a situation we have never seen before. We are six Permanent Participant organizations, four of us have membership on the Russian side that includes RAIPON, the Aleut, Saami, and Inuit. And the formal participation of Saami on the Russian side is temporary on hold, much due to the concern of their individual security</p> <p data-bbox="763 1361 1115 1388">Reference 2 - 5,45% Coverage</p>	3	4

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	<p>we, and we realized through these rough times that we have been through, that informal part of being part of the consensus is a very vulnerable situation when you get into rough waters. Because then it was easy to leave us out because there was no obligation to have us part of the consensus. So I think that we, when we, as we evolve, and I might be naïve, hoping that we get through these rough waters, that we need to start to discuss how we formalize the informal strong... How we formalize our role which in fact is considered almost as being part of the consensus without being that. So that was a very complicated way to say that the simple things...</p> <p><Files\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [1,25% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,25% Coverage</p> <p>And also, during these difficult times, the last few years with the pandemic, then the pause, and the stress to the system and to the structure of the Arctic Council that we have faced, in the recent years, and I am also been [agreeing?] [6:31:27] what Sara Olsvig said earlier that it's so important that we reconfirm [confirm?] [6:31:33] our commitment to the Arctic Council</p>		

Name	Description	Files	References
Arctic Council pause with Russia	<p><Files\\10 Arctic People's Conference Arm Chair conversation> - § 1 reference coded [2,24% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 2,24% Coverage</p> <p>Well, I think I will support Aqqaluk's and Maret's view, we have to try to find ways to cooperate with the Indigenous peoples in Russia and to support the Arctic Council's work to protect our region.</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [0,89% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,89% Coverage</p> <p>The situation today is that the Russians are not joining the work in the Council, and that means that the Council cannot work because we need the consensus before we can go into action, so that's maybe something we should discuss further when the war is over sometime</p>	2	2
Arctic Council workings impacted during pause	<p><Files\\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 1 reference coded [4,39% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 4,39% Coverage</p> <p>And I hope to also take this opportunity to emphasize that nobody is excluded from the Arctic Council. No one is excluded from</p>	2	2

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	<p>the Arctic Council, it is, it has been a pause. It is important to distinguish between being a pause, being on hold, or being excluded. The whole balancing act was or is about nobody being excluded. So, and we have to... This pause was declared early March 2022 and Norway took over the chairmanship as we heard from [...] [5:58:02] 11th of May and are deliberate about getting it back going slowly again.</p> <p><Files\\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [0,89% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 0,89% Coverage</p> <p>The situation today is that the Russians are not joining the work in the Council, and that means that the Council cannot work because we need the consensus before we can go into action, so that's maybe something we should discuss further when the war is over sometime</p>		
<p>Performative tool, the Indigenous peoples' commitment to the Arctic region</p>	<p><Files\\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 3 references coded [7,29% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,55% Coverage</p> <p>And as we heard, the Arctic Indigenous peoples they gathered already in 1973 and they established a contact and shared joint vision and a path to address the challenges they were facing.</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>4</p>

Name	Description	Files	References
	<p>Reference 2 - 2,97% Coverage</p> <p>So, during those two years of negotiations of the Rovaniemi process, the Indigenous people were ready to negotiate a seat in that cooperation, saying “Hey, this is about our environment, our life, our foundation of the culture, so we need to be at the table”. So, they were first recognized as observers and later it evolved to become Permanent Participants.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 2,77% Coverage</p> <p>I think, and we heard that also many times, we find... So why do we want this to get started? I think the Arctic Council is very important for us as Indigenous peoples, because that’s the forum where we have a very strong position, and it is about our lands, our food security, our environment, which is the fundamentals for our culture.</p> <p><Files\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 1 reference coded [1,16% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,16% Coverage</p> <p>] what Sara Olsvig said earlier that it’s so important that we reaffirm [confirm?] [6:31:33] our commitment to the Arctic Council, and how important it is that we now slowly find ways to get the Arctic Council up and running again, and find, come back to just being able to do the</p>		

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	important work that we are doing on all levels of the Arctic Council.		
Thoughts on capacity issues	<p data-bbox="763 411 1599 480"><Files\7 SC Gunn-Britt Retter Keynote Speech> - § 2 references coded [8,07% Coverage]</p> <p data-bbox="763 520 1115 547">Reference 1 - 2,62% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 592 1653 810">When we had the 40 years anniversary of the '73 meeting, the outcome document said that we should strive to have an Indigenous vice-chair at the SAO level in the Arctic Council. We have brought that up now and then but we haven't moved to any decision on that, but I want to round off this keynote with the beginning</p> <p data-bbox="763 882 1115 909">Reference 2 - 5,45% Coverage</p> <p data-bbox="763 954 1659 1327">we, and we realized through these rough times that we have been through, that informal part of being part of the consensus is a very vulnerable situation when you get into rough waters. Because then it was easy to leave us out because there was no obligation to have us part of the consensus. So I think that we, when we, as we evolve, and I might be naïve, hoping that we get through these rough waters, that we need to start to discuss how we formalize the informal strong... How we formalize our role which in fact is considered almost as being part of the consensus without</p>	2	5

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	<p>being that. So that was a very complicated way to say that the simple things...</p> <p><Files\9 Arctic People's conference 2023 Panelist Roundtable Discussion> - § 3 references coded [5,70% Coverage]</p> <p>Reference 1 - 1,43% Coverage</p> <p>But we also need to recognize that we still have challenges. And we need to still to find ways to enhance also our own capacity to participate in a truly meaningful way in all levels of the Arctic Council, and also to be able to develop our own structures at home and our institutions, to be able to contribute with our knowledge, and the solutions that we can bring to the table, based on our knowledge and our cultural values</p> <p>Reference 2 - 3,00% Coverage</p> <p>and we heard earlier mentioning the saying of [...] [6:34:05] that we are the face of... the human face of the Arctic Council, and there are often mentionings that the Arctic Council is for the people of the Arctic, and I would also like it to be for the peoples of the Arctic. And for that to truly be, then I would also like to what the president of the Saami Parliament from Norway said earlier and</p>		

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	<p>mentioned of the [squirrels, and who knows that the squirrel eats] [6:34:35] for it to be truly for the peoples of the Arctic, we need to be able to bring our knowledge and our solutions to the table and for that we need the capacity to do so. And that is still, we've been with the Arctic Council since the start and also we heard before it even started, but we still need to recognize that that is still a challenge that we have to truly fill our positions and to be able to do so in a good way.</p> <p>Reference 3 - 1,27% Coverage</p> <p>And this is also I know, and have been for some time, a discussion within the Arctic Council, on how to strengthen our participation and strengthen the PP's capacity. And I believe that when we now are restarting, or once again taking up the work within the Arctic Council, that is a discussion that we also need to follow up on. So, I will conclude with that for now. Thank you.</p>		