

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PART
PLAYED BY PRINCIPLE IN THE MORAL
DECISIONS OF GRADE SEVEN PUPILS

by


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ABSTRACT

The study was designed to measure the extent to which Grade Seven pupils, in their decision-making, employ principle as opposed to self-interest, and to determine whether or not significant differences in this measure would appear when the means of three different types of school (public, private secular, and private religious) were compared.

Two parallel forms of a moral dilemma questionnaire were devised, each containing twenty items. Ss were required, on each item, to read a brief account of a dilemma situation, and then to make two choices--the first indicating which of two given mutually exclusive courses of action they would select in the circumstances outlined; and the second indicating which of four given reasons was closest to their own main reason for so selecting. For each pupil, then, two scores were obtained--a score on first choices ("apparently principled" choice of action), and a score on second choices ("principled motivations").

The instrument was administered to a sample consisting of 241 Grade Seven pupils from the Greater Victoria area. Verbal and non-verbal I.Q. ratings were obtained for the 80 public school Ss, and information on which SES ratings^s could be based was obtained from all Ss.

Statistical treatment of the data included an analysis of variance with scores on the instrument as dependent variables and type

of school and sex as independent variables; calculation of correlation coefficients between I.Q. and SES ratings on one hand, and the dependent variables on the other; and an analysis of co-variance with SES ratings as the covariate.

The only differences which reached statistical significance at the .01 level were those between the means of girls and the means of boys, with girls' scores exceeding boys' scores on all measures of the dependent variables.

It was found that mean scores of Type 1 (public) schools regularly exceeded those of Type 2 (private secular) schools, which, in turn, were consistently higher than those of Type 3 (private religious) schools. It was felt that the consistency of this trend, and the fact that it reached statistical significance at the .05 level on one variable, justified further research to determine whether or not causal relationships exist between these differences in means and differences in procedures within the schools themselves.




TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Introduction	1
II.	Review of the Relevant Literature	4
	A. Components of Morality	4
	B. The Effect of Sex	6
	C. Type of Training	8
	D. Socioeconomic Status	10
	E. Intelligence	11
	References	13
III.	The Empirical Study	15
	A. Sample	15
	B. The Instrument	17
	(1) Form	17
	(2) Content	21
	(3) Reliability	21
	(4) Validity	25
	C. Experimental Materials	25
	D. Experimental Procedure	26
	E. Validation of Approved Responses	27
	F. Design	28
	G. Hypotheses	29
	References	30
IV.	Results	30
V.	Discussion	38
	A. Raw Scores	38
	B. The Effect of Sex	40
	C. Type of School	41
	Bibliography	44
	Appendix - The Instrument	46

TABLE OF TABLES

I.	Schools involved in the investigation	16
II.	Analysis of Instrument by Question Sub-Groups, Forms, and Questions	17
III.	Correlations between Scores on Form I and Form II of Instrument	22
IV.	Correlations between Form Totals and Grand Totals for each Dependent Variable	22
V.	Analysis of Scores by Sex and School Types Form I - 1st Choice Totals	32
VI.	Analysis of Scores by Sex and School Types Form II - 1st Choice Totals	32
VII.	Analysis of Scores by Sex and School Types Form I - 2nd Choice Totals	33
VIII.	Analysis of Scores by Sex and School Types Form II - 2nd Choice Totals	33
IX.	Analysis of Scores by Sex and School Types Forms I and II (Grand Total) 1st Choice	34
X.	Analysis of Scores by Sex and School Types Forms I and II (Grand Total) 2nd Choice	34
XI.	Correlations between SES and the Dependent Variables	36
XII.	Correlations between I.Q. Ratings and the Dependent Variables	37
XIII.	Analysis of Covariance	40

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I. INTRODUCTION

The stated objectives of schools and school systems have traditionally included the development of personal qualities, frequently grouped under such comprehensive headings as "character", "citizenship", and "the highest morality". In the public schools of British Columbia, little organized and overt attention is generally given to methods by which students can be helped to achieve these goals; and while in some private schools such methods may be stressed, attempts at empirical evaluation of the students' success are rare. This investigation was an attempt to make such an evaluation in both public and private schools in the Greater Victoria area.

The investigation clearly falls within the area loosely identified by the term "morality"; since, however, no general agreement as to any precise connotation of this term is apparent in the literature, the terms "principled choice" (of a course of action), and "principled motivation" will be used throughout. "Principle" is here defined as a ruling or guiding belief by which the rights and interests of others are given a force at least equal to those of self-protection and self-gratification. An action will be

termed "apparently principled" if it coincides in fact with one motivated by such a principle. The term "motivation" is restricted to the non-technical sense of a consciously recognized reason for action; and a motivation will be described as "principled" if it arises from a principle as herein defined. Thus an action may be apparently principled even though it springs from purely pragmatic considerations, and has no basis in principle. While the study concerns itself with all the apparently principled choices of action made by the Ss, principled motivations are much more directly relevant to its central purpose, which is, essentially, to determine the extent to which such principles do, in fact, direct the actions of students at the Grade Seven level. Accordingly, an attempt was made to determine, first, the number of "apparently principled" decisions that might be expected of the pupils in a series of imaginary test situations presented to them; and, second, the number of those decisions that might be attributed to "principled" motivations.

In addition, an attempt was made to ascertain whether or not differences with respect to the degree of application of such principles might be found to correlate significantly with level of intelligence, with sex, and with type of school (public, private secular, and private religious). It is realized, of course, that differing levels of achievement of individual students in this area are attributable in part to the influence of the school, in part to that of home environment, and in part to a wide variety of almost immeasurable variables, each of which forms part of the student's total environment. The study, therefore, aims solely at making empirical observations concerning outcomes, and in no sense attempts

to establish direct causal relationships between such outcomes and specific processes within either the school or the home, considered separately. It is apparent, on the other hand, that school and home each form part of a single complex variable, in that certain major factors of the home environment help to determine the selection of type of school. The findings, therefore, insofar as they are able to be generalized at all, refer not to the separate influence of types of school, but rather to the combined influence of each type of school and of the type of home background most typical of its students.

The study is felt to make two contributions to the general body of knowledge in its field: the provision of an instrument which may subsequently be developed and improved; and the establishment of certain findings, albeit tentative and provisional, which might also provide a useful base for further research in this area.

The instrument itself, while in some respects similar to others already in use, makes use of an approach to motivation, which, as far as is known to the investigator, has not previously been employed, and which, with modifications suggested by its use in the present study, might well offer a flexible and adaptable means of measuring such variables as peer-group pressure and adult influence simultaneously.

The intrinsic value of the findings may well be somewhat limited by the comparative smallness of the individual sub-sections of the sample; yet the consistency shown by the results obtained suggests that they are, in fact, indicative of general patterns existing within the Greater Victoria area, at least.

II. REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

Much of the literature on measurement in the area of morality takes as its immediate concern the validation of some specific theory of moral development, whether cognitive-developmental, maturational, or psycho-analytical. Since the present study deals only with measurement at a single point in time, it is concerned only indirectly with longitudinal aspects of moral development. That is to say, questions such as the existence or non-existence of Kohlberg's "invariant stages", or the validity or non-validity of Piaget's postulated development from concepts characterized by fear to those based on contractual or co-operative considerations, or the question of cultural influence upon the rate or nature of moral development--such questions as these are not of primary concern, although they may well have to be considered in any interpretation of the findings.

Of much more direct concern, however, are questions of what may in fact be legitimately considered as moral components, on the one hand, and the relationships existing between these components and the variables of sex, type of training, socioeconomic status, and intelligence, on the other. These aspects will be considered separately.

A Components of morality

In the absence of any simple and widespread agreement concerning the nature of morality, and in view of much of the literature's apparent identification of moral behaviour with socialized behaviour, it seemed advisable to select a number of aspects of behaviour concerning which a reasonable degree of agreement might be expected among both the followers of traditional Christian teachings, and the supporters of more strictly humanistic socialization theories. Thus, the four areas of stealing, cheating, disobedience to lawful authority, and lying, were selected; and a fifth was added, dealing largely with vandalism and grudge-bearing.

Difference of opinion, of course was to be expected even here. Maccoby (1968, p.256) for instance, deals with the difficulty of teaching a child "that he must not lie unless to tell the truth would do such injury to another person that the child would be justified in lying in order to spare the person that injury..." The teaching of many religious groups, on the other hand, utterly rejects the idea that an end, however desirable in itself, can justify improper means, and regards any denial of truth as wrong per se. Neither view, however, appears to offer any support whatsoever for lying, cheating, stealing, etc., for purely personal gains, or even for the personal pleasure that may be derived from helping others. It was with this consideration in mind that both situations and motivations for the questionnaire were selected--that is to say, situations were chosen in which the ends proposed were unlikely to be generally considered as justification for the suggested means; and of the motivations offered, only one was given which was likely to be considered selfless or altruistic.

While direct support for these categories is not easy to find

in the literature, indirect support is plentiful. Thus it is quite possible to regard them as, in a sense, sub-divisions of Wilson's (1967, p. 192) PHIL and EMP (respectively "the degree to which one can identify with other people, in the sense of being such that other people's feelings and interests actually count or weigh with one, or are accepted as of equal validity to one's own", and "awareness or insight into one's own and other people's feelings").

It should be noted, moreover, that although Bronfenbrenner (1962) did not specifically concentrate on these aspects of behaviour, a considerable number of his moral dilemmas do, in fact, fit well into the chosen categories; and that when Paton and Beloff (1969) replicated his study in Scotland, they found it advisable to add a section dealing with "shop-lifting, cheating in a Duke of Edinburgh Award Endeavour, and embezzling parents' money."

Since it was not thought advisable to follow Bronfenbrenner's method, by which "the scoring key for the items is based on a priori interpretation of the morally acceptable answer" (Paton and Beloff, 1969) a judging-panel technique was employed. This will be more fully described in a later section.

B The effect of sex

While findings relating sex with moral development are plentiful enough, consensus here is hard to find. In the early study of Hartshorne and May (1928), girls consistently exceeded boys in their apparent moral knowledge and sensitivity to social and conventional standards of behaviour. This, however, being based on a largely cognitive measure, does not positively

indicate that girls have a higher level of moral development than boys of the same age; "the cognitive and behavioral aspects of morality," according to Maccoby (1968, p. 230), "appear not to follow the same developmental paths, nor to predict one another reliably."

More significant, perhaps, is a study by Sears, Maccoby, and Levin (1957), which reports a significantly higher proportion of girls among the group distinguished by evidence of "highly developed conscience"; or the fact that Porteus and Johnson (1965), in a study which used "cognitive (c) and affective (A) measures of moral judgement", concluded that "girls Ss showed greater moral maturity..... than did boys on both C and A measures." Indeed, they report that "the only variable which had a significant effect on the A measure with a $p < .01$ was the sex of the Ss."

Kohlberg (1963) refers to Terman and Tyler (1946) as indicating that "girls have a lower rate of delinquency, (and) have fewer school and home behaviour problems leading to clinical referral." On the other hand, he reports

that few sex differences in resistance to temptation have been found. When differences in honesty appear, they tend to favour the boys; when differences appear in "service", they tend to favour the girls. Other studies of cheating have found no sex difference.

Similarly, Boehm and Nass (1961) reported no significant sex differences in their findings, and interpreted this as contradicting previous studies which suggested "that girls show a more advanced development than do boys on an overall basis." Kellmer Pringle and Edwards (1964) likewise, report that on the basis of their "Moral Incidents" test, "the majority of children came down on the side of honesty and truthfulness, and there was little difference between boys and girls."

Such references to conflicting findings could readily be

multiplied; their significance for the present study, however, is already clear. No consensus exists that would justify a clear directional prediction concerning the scores of boys and girls on the measuring instrument.

C Type of training

The essential difference in the types of training involved lies in the fact that private schools, especially religious ones, presumably devote a significantly greater amount of time and energy to both cognitive and affective aspects of character or moral training than do public schools. While no attempt can be made here to measure home influence, it is assumed that parents who freely choose one form of education in preference to another, are in substantial agreement with the methods employed in that form of education, and are likely, on the whole, to lend their support to such methods in the home.

Hartshorne and May (1928), cited by Kohlberg (1963, p. 279), "found no relation between honesty or 'service' behavior tests and exposure to moral training in Sunday school, Boy Scouts, or character-education classes."

In another context, Kohlberg (1967, p. 180), states that "in fact we find remarkably little use of religion in American children's responses to moral dilemmas, regardless of denomination"; and that "no differences in moral development due to religious belief have yet been found..." He concludes that "religion is not a necessary or highly important condition for the development of moral judgement and conduct..." This conclusion is perhaps supported by Bronfenbrenner's findings that the strictly secular Russian approach, based on adult manipulation of peer-group pressures, resulted in scores of his moral dilemmas which were very significantly higher than those obtained in either the United States or Great Britain--countries where,

presumably, religion is still a major force.

The same view is presented by Berkowitz (1964, p. 64) who writes, "there is little evidence that the church member's religious training has influenced his moral behavior." His general conclusion, after examining the available evidence, is that "religion, as it is currently practised, may promote asceticism, at least in some cases, but it does not in itself reduce the incidence of stealing, cheating, or aggression."

Finally, Hirschi and Stark (1969), in a discussion of religious training, conclude that "those variables affected by church attendance...are unrelated to the commission of delinquent acts, while the variables strongly related to delinquency are unaffected by church attendance."

It is apparent that these views are not shared by the supporters of private schools in general, and of religious schools in particular; yet no significant evidence can be adduced to support the opposing view. Nor--and this point will be considered later--do such views constitute a reason for rejecting religious education; Kohlberg (1967, p. 181) suggests that "the primary purpose of religious education in our society is not to develop moral character, but rather to develop religious beliefs and sentiments;" and Berkowitz (1964, p. 66) similarly, suggests that

we may still want to give our young people religious training, but that would be for other reasons. We cannot expect religious training, as it is ordinarily provided, to lessen anti-social immorality.

In this area, at least, while again there is no consensus, the

empirical evidence suggests only one conclusion relevant to the present investigation--that no significant differences should be expected between types of school--at least on the basis of the actual training their students are likely to receive either at school or at home.

D Socioeconomic status

While Kohlberg believes that children pass through "invariant stages" of moral development, he maintains that the rate at which an individual progresses through the stages to complete internalization of a society's values is influenced by a number of factors; thus peer-group participation and membership in a higher social class tend to encourage more rapid development. On the assumption that the nature of the private secular school encourages peer-group participation, and that, on the whole, the socioeconomic status of its average student is likely to be significantly higher than the corresponding means in the other types of school, it might seem reasonable to predict somewhat higher levels of moral development among Ss from Type 2 (private secular) schools.

Nor does this conclusion depend entirely upon acceptance of Kohlberg's developmental theory; in a comparison of this view with those of social-learning theorists, Maccoby (1968, p. 262) states that "for both theoretical points of view, high social status is a factor which should promote adult-like and pro-social development, but the implied mechanisms differ."

Support for this view is also to be found in Harrower's (1935) replication of part of Piaget's 1932 study, in which "at the higher social level....younger children from the very beginning gave high percentages of mature responses;..."

It should be noted, however, that this study was conducted over thirty years ago, and that Bronfenbrenner (1962, p. 5) suggests "from a survey of class differences in childrearing over a twenty-five year period, that the gap between the social classes appears to be narrowing."

In the light of this evidence, then, some differences in scores favouring the private secular schools might be expected on the basis of socioeconomic status, although there is no indication in the literature that these differences are likely to achieve statistical significance.

E Intelligence

Maccoby (1968, p. 258) maintains that "a reasonable degree of cognitive maturity would appear to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for certain levels of overt, mature moral behavior." The implication is that increased cognitive maturity, with concomitant increase in the understanding of the consequences of actions, may well contribute to an increase in moral, or pro-social activity, but may equally contribute to the ability to engage in immoral or anti-social activity. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the former is the more common situation. Kohlberg (1964, p. 392) has shown that older children, in experimental situations, tend to cheat and steal as much as, but apparently no more than, younger children. Somewhat more positively, McFarlane (1954) reports that "the frequency of lying (as reported by parents) declines with age through the age range six through eight"; while Pringle and Edwards (1964, p. 213) find that "more advanced stages of moral development are reached earlier by more intelligent children" and that the view is thus confirmed that "the moral concepts and judgments of duller children tend to be less mature, less clear and more limited than those of their brighter contemporaries."

It appears reasonable, then, in view of these findings, to predict that correlations between I.Q. ratings and scores on the moral dilemma questionnaire should be at least positive, although probably too low to be of any practical significance.

In summary, the literature reviewed suggests that few definite and directional hypotheses can be framed in relation to the present study. Differences in type of school cannot, apparently, be expected to produce significant mean differences in either "apparently principled" choices or "principled motivations" of the students. Neither, indeed, can significant differences between the means of boys and those of girls be expected on these variables; and while both SES and intelligence may well be expected to correlate positively with both dependent variables, it appears likely that the correlations should be relatively low. Finally, since Bronfenbrenner's findings appear to be generally applicable to the Victoria area *, all actual mean scores on both dependent variables are likely to be rather low.

The support or rejection of hypotheses based on the theory reviewed should provide some guidance in relation to two basic questions:

1. To what extent do Grade Seven pupils employ "principle", as here defined, in their decision-making processes?
2. Are pupils from schools which are apparently more directly concerned with character development (i.e. private schools) more likely to employ "principle" than those from the public schools?

* Mason (1970, in press), in a nine-classroom experiment, showed that a random sample of the Victoria public schools yielded results very close to those of the Edinburgh sample.

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III. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

A. Sample

The sample consisted of 241 Grade Seven students drawn more or less equally from public, private secular, and private religious (Catholic) schools in the Greater Victoria area. (Details are given in Table 1 on page 16).

To ensure as representative as possible a selection of public school children, a stratified random sampling method was used. The city was divided into four geographical areas (N.W., N.E., S.W., and S.E.), and two schools were randomly selected from each area. Students were then drawn randomly from the Grade Seven class lists of these schools, the total from each school varying roughly in proportion to the Grade Seven population of that school. Verbal and Non-verbal I.Q. ratings (Lorge-Thorndike) were obtained for these students from existing records before testing began, and were recorded in coded form on the response sheets.

The Catholic school students consisted of the entire available Grade Seven population of three large Catholic elementary schools, and certainly contained the majority of the Grade Seven Catholic school students of the area.

Similarly the entire Grade Seven population of four major private secular schools was used, giving again the majority of such students in the Greater Victoria area. Unfortunately, suitable I.Q. ratings were not available for the private school students, with the result that the portion of the investigation dealing with intelligence had to be restricted to Type 1. (public) schools.

TABLE I

SCHOOLS INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION

TYPE 1 SCHOOLS (Public)

	<u>NUMBER OF SUBJECTS</u>	
	M	F
1.	5	5
2.	5	5
3.	4	4
4.	6	6
5.	4	4
6.	6	6
7.	4	4
8.	6	6
	<u>TYPE 1 TOTAL</u>	<u>40</u>

TYPE 2 SCHOOLS (Private secular)

9.	-	15
10.	-	18
11.	21	-
12.	22	-
	<u>TYPE 2 TOTAL</u>	<u>33</u>

TYPE 3 SCHOOLS (Private religious)

13.	15	4
14.	9	14
15.	18	25
	<u>TYPE 3 TOTAL</u>	<u>43</u>

B. The Instrument

The form of the test itself was suggested by Bronfenbrenner's (1967) moral dilemma test, although certain fairly major changes were introduced in both form and content.

(1) Form

For each form of the test, twenty questions were used, each based on a dilemma situation, and each offering a forced choice between mutually exclusive courses of action. Following Bronfenbrenner's example, the questions were grouped into sub-sections, each designed to measure a specific variable; and questions from all sections were randomly mixed to give the final form of the test. Details of the subgroups in each form are shown in Table 2 below.

TABLE 2

ANALYSIS OF INSTRUMENT BY QUESTION

SUB-GROUPS, FORMS, AND QUESTIONS

<u>Question Groups</u>		<u>Questions</u>
Stealing -----	Form 1	1, 2, 13, 19
	Form 2	40, 39, 28, 23
Cheating -----	Form 1	3, 12, 15, 16
	Form 2	38, 29, 26, 25
Disobedience -----	Form 1	4, 5, 14, 17
	Form 2	37, 33, 27, 21
Lying -----	Form 1	6, 10, 18,
	Form 2	34, 31, 22
Others -----	Form 1	7, 8, 9, 11, 20
	Form 2	24, 36, 32, 30, 35

Here, perhaps, the similarity ends.

In place of Bronfenbrenner's selection of a Likerttype scale with assigned weights for varying degrees of certainty of response, it was decided to utilize a possibly simpler method by which each "correct" course of action scored one point on the first of two measures. This

first choice, as in Bronfenbrenner's instrument, deals purely and simply with the actual action which the subject believes he would take in the given circumstances, and ignores completely the wide variety of possible reasons which might underlie that action. Thus, for example, Bronfenbrenner, in a dilemma headed "The Halloween Prank", presents the following problem:

"Suppose your friends decided to soap a few windows.

What would you really do?

GO ALONG WITH MY FRIENDS

REFUSE TO GO ALONG WITH MY FRIENDS

:_____	:_____	:_____	:_____	:_____	:_____
Absolutely certain	Fairly certain	I guess so	Absolutely certain	Fairly certain	I guess so"

Presumably a pupil who is "absolutely certain" that he would refuse is considered to be acting in a moral manner; yet his decision might be due to the fact that he would be very much afraid of the consequences of discovery--or that he simply does not consider soaping windows to be much fun--or even, in an extreme case, that he would much prefer to break them, and would exert all his efforts to persuade his friends not to waste their time with soap.

It was this lack of consideration of the underlying reasons for actions that dictated the provision, after each pair of possible actions, of a group of four probable motives for each. Thus, for example, Question No. 13 presents the following problem:

"In a large department store the clerk becomes confused, and asks you whether you gave her a \$5 bill or a \$10 bill. You know that it was a \$5 bill, but feel that if you say \$10, she will believe you.

What would you really do?

A. Say \$5, because:

B. Say \$10, because:

1. the store might make her pay the \$5 difference,

1. she deserved to lose \$5 for her carelessness,

- | | |
|---|---|
| 2. it really was a \$5 bill, | 2. the store could easily afford to lose \$5, |
| 3. it's not worth the risk of being found out for only \$5, | 3. you don't often get the chance of gaining \$5 so easily, |
| 4. she might be trying to test you. | 4. she could never prove that it wasn't a \$10 bill." |

Pupils who select action "A" are acting in what appears to be a principled manner; whether or not their action is truly principled, however, is not made immediately clear by the mere selection of a course of action. They may, for example, be giving up the chance of gaining \$5 merely because they feel that this is the honest course of action (reason 2); or they may be impelled to do so through fear of being found out if they answer dishonestly (reason 4); or possibly they may feel that while stealing from an individual is wrong, it is morally acceptable to steal from a store, especially if it is a large one (reason 1); or, finally, stealing may appear to them to be worthwhile only if the reward is considerably higher than \$5 (reason 3). Of these responses, only No. 2 was considered to be truly "principled"; and only the selection of No. 2, accordingly, would score a point on the second measure. Thus each student who selected response "A" scored a point on the "apparently principled choice" measure, and those who followed this up by marking reason No. 2 scored one point on the "principled motivation" measure.

Similarly, in Question 16, the pupils are given the following situation to consider:

"You have been trying very hard to raise your grade in arithmetic. The teacher lets you add up the marks on your own test papers, and

you find that if you add just two marks to your actual score, you will get the letter-grade you wanted. What would you really do?

A. Leave your mark as it is, because:

1. you would rather tell the truth than raise your grade,
2. your teacher might check the totals later,
3. it would be too hard to keep up the standard later on,
4. it wouldn't be worth the risk to change it.

B. Add the two marks, because:

1. you would really like a higher grade,
2. a change of two marks is not very much,
3. you had really been trying very hard in arithmetic,
4. it doesn't seem fair to miss a whole letter-grade for just two marks."

Students who decide to cheat by adding the two extra marks are given a variety of rationalizations to select from to justify their decision--the unfairness of the grading system, their desire for a higher letter-grade, the smallness of the actual change, and the fact that they had really been trying hard. Neither the actual choice of action nor any of these rationalizations, however, can be considered to be even "apparently principled".

On the other hand, those who deny themselves the additional marks are asked to indicate whether this "apparently principled" choice of action is based on fear of discovery (reason 2), fear of possible punishment if discovered (reason 4), the practical difficulty of subsequently maintaining the deception (reason 3), or a genuine preference for the truth for its own sake, even at the expense of their own letter-grade. Only the last choice was considered to be a "principled motivation".

(2) Content

Whereas all six of Bronfenbrenner's variables, as well as the method of administering the test itself, involve measures of peer-group and adult influence on the Ss' actions, the variables selected for this test were all considered to be components of moral behaviour relevant to the age-group for whom it was designed (See page 5); and peer-group influence and the desire to be well-thought-of by adults were included only incidentally in the lists of suggested motivations. No measure of the influence of either peers or adults was aimed at, although the effects of such influences were allowed for in almost every question.

The 12-13 age-group was selected for two main reasons: it was felt that children of this age were generally less likely than older students to have developed the "sophisticated" type of outlook which might have resulted in deliberate falsification of responses; and it seemed likely that it would be comparatively easy to devise moral dilemmas that were relevant to the problems of 12-13-year-olds--and to obtain a reasonable consensus concerning the "approved" responses. In this connection, Bronfenbrenner's difficulties with the group of items headed "Whether to yield to adult pressure to inform on peers" were seen as a sound reason for avoiding this particular type of dilemma altogether. Where there is no consensus there is no valid basis for scoring the students' responses.

(3) Reliability

Tables 3 and 4 (Page²²) indicate that correlations obtained between Form 1 and Form 2 totals are, with one notable exception,

TABLE 3

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCORES ON FORM 1 AND FORM 2 OF INSTRUMENT

Form I - Form II Sub-Group Correlations

School Group	Sex	Choice	<u>Question Sub-Groups</u>					TOTAL
			1	2	3	4	5	
1	M	1	.464	.649	.525	.715	.620	.817
1	M	2	.616	.736	.742	.624	.721	.873
1	F	1	.531	.634	.739	.572	.610	.789
1	F	2	.441	.565	.441	.576	.607	.731
2	M	1	.114	.297	.064	.428	.527	.369
2	M	2	.555	.420	.082	.388	.750	.755
2	F	1	.629	.647	.507	.550	.423	.730
2	F	2	.644	.640	.615	.585	.601	.825
3	M	1	.600	.540	.405	.546	.760	.819
3	M	2	.512	.453	.617	.257	.523	.729
3	F	1	.394	.511	.493	.492	.496	.779
3	F	2	.692	.405	.580	.599	.763	.885
Total	M&F	1	.492	.555	.498	.562	.633	.768
Total	M&F	2	.607	.575	.577	.552	.672	.826

TABLE 4

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FORM TOTALS AND GRAND TOTALS FOR EACH DEPENDENT VARIABLE
1st choice correlations ("Apparently principled" actions)

Form I total and Grand Total .925
 Form II total and Grand Total .948

2nd choice correlations ("Principled Motivations")

Form I total and Grand Total .946
 Form II total and Grand Total .958

acceptably high, ranging from 0.729 to 0.885. The exception is the 0.369 correlation for 1st choice scores made by boys of Type 2 schools: and for this low correlation two possible reasons may be examined. In the first place, it was unfortunately necessary to administer the questionnaire to these pupils in the final week--and in one case on the final day--of the summer term. The consequent probable reduction in concentration might well have led to some degree of random answering at least in the first choice required in each item. Nevertheless, it appears that greater consistency was shown in second choices, yielding an overall correlation of 0.755. This would be hard to explain if conditions of administration of the test were taken as the reason for the apparent inconsistency of first choices. An alternative reason may be found in the actual nature of some of the test items, considered in conjunction with the significantly higher SES of the pupils concerned. Most of the questions were deliberately restricted to transgressions which, while not necessarily minor in themselves, nevertheless involved, for example, theft of a comparatively small amount, or cheating of a comparatively minor nature. It seems possible, therefore, that a doctor's or lawyer's son, accustomed to a high standard of living, might be less willing to take seriously a question dealing with, say, purloining twenty-five cents from his parents, than would a child from a poorer family, to whom twenty-five cents would be a correspondingly more significant amount. This is not to say that he would, in reality, be more willing to steal it, but rather that he might be less willing to consider seriously whether or not he would. This attitude might well lead to a certain amount of random selection of first choice responses; having made this choice, however, the pupil would be then faced with the task

of justifying it by selecting the most logical reason--and since the triviality or immensity of the supposed offence is no longer relevant, the second choices would tend to show a higher degree of consistency.

The consistency of the positioning of this group's mean scores in relation to those of other groups suggests that even if this is the case, comparatively few students were guilty of random choices; under the circumstances, a relatively small number of pupils might well seriously affect the correlation coefficient, although their scores, being partly random, would tend to scatter round the mean, affecting it comparatively little.

Correlations between the two forms of the test were 0.768 for First Choice scores, and 0.826 for Second Choice scores; and while these are too low to permit the use of a single form when the purpose is measurement of individuals, they indicate an adequately high reliability for the present study, which is concerned only with the comparison of group means. If the test is regarded as containing all forty questions, and each form is considered to be, therefore, only half of one combined whole, then the Spearman-Brown Prophecy Formula, applied to the split-half correlations of 0.768 and 0.826, yields over-all test reliabilities of 0.868 and 0.904 respectively.

(4) Validity

Insofar as the instrument concentrates on certain reasonably well defined areas of behaviour, and is restricted to certain reasonably widely-accepted components of morality, it may be considered to have a considerable measure of content validity as a general measure of moral development. A major limitation in this respect, however, is the fact that it is, indeed, restricted to five, or at most six, such areas. Nevertheless, these are, in all probability, those most relevant to the moral development of children of the age-level for which it was designed.

The use of a judging panel of teachers, moreover, to determine the "approved" or "correct" responses is held to support the test's validity in relation to its immediate objective--i.e. to measure the Ss' progress towards a set of presumably specific behavioural goals set by those represented by the panel members.

C. Experimental materials

The materials used consisted of a 40-item multiple-choice questionnaire, separate response sheets, and a tape recording of all the items on the questionnaire.

The instrument itself, constructed for the investigation, consisted of two parallel forms, each containing 20 questions, subdivided into five groups or from three to five questions each. Each question consisted of a brief story designed to present a moral dilemma, to which two mutually exclusive responses were provided. Having selected a response, each subject was then required to choose,

from four listed motivations, the one which most closely resembled his own. Since the first choice indicates only the selection of a course of action, and makes no reference to its motivation, scores on this choice will be referred to as "apparently principled choice" scores; since the second choice indicates the motivation for the selected course of action, scores on this choice will be referred as "principled motivation" scores.

D. Experimental procedure

Each of the fifteen schools was visited in turn, and the students whose names had been randomly selected were released from their regular classes for the period of approximately an hour that was required to complete the questionnaire. Each student was given a copy of the questionnaire and a separate response sheet. To ensure uniformity of presentation, and to concentrate attention on each problem in turn, the tape-recording of the test was played to the group, question by question, with a brief but adequate delay for the indication of each response. All groups were given very firm reassurances concerning the complete anonymity of their responses, and were specifically told that neither their parents nor their teachers would receive any indication of individual scores. It was pointed out to them that, in view of this, they had absolutely nothing to gain by falsification of responses, and nothing to lose by strict honesty.

Following the administration of the questionnaire, information concerning the occupation of the male head of each family was obtained from students in all three groups. This information was subsequently

used in conjunction with Blishen's Occupational Class Scale (1958) to provide SES ratings for all 241 subjects.

E. Validation of approved responses

The mere act of constructing a moral dilemma test implies some prejudgement of the approved or "correct" responses. In spite, therefore, of the efforts, previously described, to ensure that none of the anticipated responses would prove controversial, it was considered advisable not to rely on the unsupported opinion of the investigator, but to refer the matter to a panel of judges. Since the reference to "the highest morality" in section 167 of the B.C. Public Schools Act was, in a sense, one starting point for this investigation, and since teachers are apparently entrusted, without benefit of further official guidance on the point, with the task of determining what is, in fact, "the highest morality", it appeared reasonable to allow teachers to decide what the "approved" responses to the questionnaire items would be. Accordingly, 21 teachers, some randomly chosen from the schools visited, and others forming a graduate class in Education at the University of Victoria, were taken as a judging panel. Given the same response sheets as those used by the students, they were asked to indicate those responses which they felt should be marked by "a pupil for whom school, home, and the entire environment had succeeded in inculcating 'the highest morality'."

While a small amount of disagreement was apparent, none of the anticipated responses received fewer than 17 choices, and unanimity was attained in 22 cases. Over-all agreement was in the region of 95%, and much of the remaining 5% was accounted for by three response

sheets, some of whose answers suggested a misreading of either the questions or the instructions, since they could not reasonably be considered "moral" on either Christian or humanistic grounds.

The originally intended "approved" responses were accordingly taken as having been upheld by the judging panel, and as representing, in the given situations, the panel's interpretation of "the highest morality."

F. Design

Scores (both "apparently principled choice" and "principled motivation" were obtained for both forms of the test, for the entire test, and for each subsection of each form. These totals, together with the SES ratings, and, in the case of Type 1 schools, Verbal and Non-verbal I.Q. ratings, constituted the data for analysis.

A two-way analysis of variance was employed, with "apparently principled choice" scores and "principled motivation" scores as the dependent variables, and sex and type of school as independent variables. In addition, Pearson product moment correlation coefficients were calculated between I.Q. ratings (where available), SES ratings (in all cases), and the dependent variables.

Finally, since SES ratings presented an unexpected and comparatively high mean difference between sexes, an analysis of covariance was applied, with SES ratings as the covariate.

G. Hypotheses

Hypotheses derived from the theory discussed in Section 2 can be formulated in statistically testable form as follows:

1. There will be no significant difference between the proportion of "apparently principled" choices made by pupils of the three types of school.
2. There will be no significant difference between the proportion of "principled" motivations selected by pupils of the three types of school.
3. There will be no significant difference between the proportions of "apparently principled" choices made by boys and the proportion of "apparently principled" choices made by girls.
4. There will be no significant difference between the proportion of "principled" motivations selected by boys and the proportion of "principled" motivations selected by girls.
5. There will be no significant degree of correlation between the number of "apparently principled" choices made and ratings on Blishen's Occupational Class Scale (1958).
6. There will be no significant degree of correlation between the number of "principled" motivations selected and ratings on Blishen's Occupational Class Scale.
7. There will be no significant degree of correlation between the number of "apparently principled" choices made and either Verbal or Non-verbal I.Q. ratings based on the Lorge-Thorndike Aptitude Tests.

8. There will be no significant degree of correlation between the number of "principled" motivations selected and either Verbal or Non-verbal I.Q. ratings based on the Lorge-Thorndike Aptitude Tests.

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IV RESULTS

On the basis of the analysis of variance and the correlation matrix, the following conclusions were arrived at with reference to the hypotheses. For convenience, each hypothesis will be restated, with the relevant conclusions immediately following.

H1 and H2

1. There will be no significant difference between the proportions of "apparently principled" choices made by pupils from the three types of school.
2. There will be no significant difference between the proportions of "principled" motivations selected by pupils from the three types of school.

Tables 5 through 10 on pages 32, 33, and 34 show that a very clear trend emerged with reference to differentiation between types of school. On all six variables, the mean for School Type 1 exceeded that for School Type 2, which, in turn, was consistently higher than that for School Type 3. This difference reached statistical significance at the .05 level on First Choice totals for Form I (Table 5), and approached it ($p = 0.0602$) on Table 9 (the "apparently principled" choices for the combined forms).

Since, however, H1 and H2 must be considered only on the basis of total scores (i.e. scores on both forms taken together), and since these scores failed to reach significance at the .05 level, these two null hypotheses cannot be rejected. The trend, however, is clear and consistent enough to merit further discussion, and, indeed, appears to justify further research.

TABLE 5

ANALYSIS OF SCORES BY SEX AND SCHOOL TYPES

FORM I--1st. CHOICE TOTALS

School Group	1	2	3	\bar{X}	N
	14.075	12.953	12.381	13.12	125
M	N= 40	N= 43	N= 42		
	15.300	15.605	14.256	14.99	116
F	N= 40	N= 33	N= 43		
\bar{X}	14.69	14.104	13.33	14.02	241
	N= 80	N= 76	N= 85		

TABLE 6

ANALYSIS OF SCORES BY SEX AND SCHOOL TYPES

FORM II--1st. CHOICE TOTALS

School Group	1	2	3	\bar{X}	N
	13.700	12.000	11.571	12.40	125
M	N= 40	N= 43	N= 42		
	14.900	15.121	14.233	14.72	116
F	N= 40	N= 33	N= 43		
\bar{X}	14.3	13.35	12.92	13.515	241
	N= 80	N= 76	N= 85		

TABLE 7

ANALYSIS OF SCORES BY SEX AND SCHOOL TYPES

FORM I--2nd CHOICE TOTALS

School Group	1	2	3	\bar{X}	N
M	4.800 N = 40	3.558 N = 43	4.119 N = 42	4.144	125
F	6.50 N = 40	6.121 N = 33	5.140 N = 33	5.888	116
\bar{X}	5.65 N = 80	4.671 N = 76	4.635 N = 85	4.983	241

TABLE 8

ANALYSES OF SCORES BY SEX AND SCHOOL TYPES

FORM II--2nd CHOICE TOTALS

School Group	1	2	3	\bar{X}	N
M	4.600 N = 40	3.651 N = 43	3.500 N = 42	3.904	125
F	6.175 N = 40	6.000 N = 33	4.721 N = 43	5.586	116
\bar{X}	5.387 N = 80	4.671 N = 76	4.117 N = 85	4.714	241

TABLE 9

ANALYSES OF SCORES BY SEX AND SCHOOL TYPES

FORMS I and II (GRANT TOTAL) 1st. CHOICE

School Group	1	2	3	\bar{X}	N
M	27.775 N = 40	24.953 N = 43	23.952 N = 42	25.52	125
F	30.200 N = 40	30.727 N = 33	28.488 N = 43	29.720	116
\bar{X}	28.990 N = 80	27.460 N = 76	26.25 N = 85	27.539	241

TABLE 10

ANALYSES OF SCORES BY SEX AND SCHOOL TYPES

FORMS I AND II (GRANT TOTAL) 2nd. CHOICE

School Group	1	2	3	\bar{X}	N
M	9.400 N = 40	7.209 N = 43	7.619 N = 42	8.05	125
F	12.675 N = 40	12.121 N = 33	9.860 N = 43	11.47	116
\bar{X}	11.03 N = 80	9.34 N = 76	8.76 N = 85	9.697	241

H 3 and H 4

3. There will be no significant difference between the proportions of "apparently principled" choices made by boys, and the proportion of "apparently principled" choices made by girls.
4. There will be no significant difference between the proportion of "principled" motivations selected by boys and the proportion of "principled" motivations selected by girls.

Tables 5 through 10 show that the total scores for girls exceed those for boys in all six variables. The probabilities associated with these differences are 0.00007, 0.00006, 0.00135, 0.00632, 0.00003, and 0.002 respectively. H3 and H4 are, accordingly, rejected.

H 5 and H 6

5. There will be no significant degree of correlation between the number of "apparently principled" choices made and ratings on Blishen's Occupational Class Scale.
6. There will be no significant degree of correlation between the number of "principled" motivations selected and ratings on Blishen's Occupational Class Scale.

A very wide range of SES was found to exist, both between school types ($p = 0.000001$) and, rather surprisingly, between sexes ($p = 0.066539$).

Nevertheless, correlations between SES and the two dependent variables were, in general, very low, the highest being 0.504, and the majority being considerably lower (see Table 13). Negative correlations ranging from -0.00008 to 0.298 occurred. H 5 and H 6, therefore, cannot be rejected, although it should be noted that the trend suggested by the literature was not observed.

TABLE 11
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SES AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Form 1	Form 2	Total
SES and 1st. choice ("Apparently principled actions")	0.061	0.023	0.043
SES and 2nd. choice ("Principled Motivations")	0.014	0.056	0.038

H 7 and H 8

7. There will be no significant degree of correlation between the number of "apparently principled" choices made and either Verbal or Non-verbal I.Q. ratings based on the Lorge-Thorndike Aptitude Tests.
8. There will be no significant degree of correlation between the number of "principled" motivations selected and either Verbal or Non-verbal I.Q. ratings based on the Lorge-Thorndike Aptitude Tests.

These hypotheses were tested in relation to only Type 1 schools (n = 80). Here again, all correlations were extremely

low, with small negative correlations outnumbering positive ones. (see Table 12). No evidence was found which would justify rejection of H 7 or H 8.

TABLE 12

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN I.Q. RATINGS AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Sex		Choice	Form 1	Form 2	Total
M	Verbal I.Q.	1st	-0.109	-0.009	-0.057
M	Verbal I.Q.	2nd.	-0.026	0.079	0.030
M	Nonverbal I.Q.	1st.	-0.169	0.041	-0.057
M	Nonverbal I.Q.	2nd.	-0.104	-0.011	-0.057
F	Verbal I.Q.	1st.	0.135	0.016	0.073
F	Verbal I.Q.	2nd.	0.119	-0.108	-0.006
F	Nonverbal I.Q.	1st.	0.004	-0.084	-0.046
F	Nonverbal I.Q.	2nd.	-0.203	-0.361	-0.310

V. DISCUSSION

A. Raw Scores

The raw score means for all 241 Ss for First Choice ("apparently principled" action), and for Second Choice ("principled motivation") were 27.775 and 9.400 respectively. When it is remembered that scoring was done on the basis of teachers' judgement of responses to be expected of a perfectly moral student, and that such a student would have scored 40 on each choice, one is at once aware of a very wide gap between the ideal and the actual.

It is important, however, not to confuse this gap with any gap that might be presupposed to exist between generations represented by teachers on the one hand, and students on the other. Teachers were asked for what was, in effect, a purely cognitive response--pupils for a combination of cognitive and affective. In other words, no indication was either sought or given of whether the teachers themselves, in similar dilemma situations, would actually have done what they expected of the students; or of whether the students themselves, had they been asked, might have demonstrated as much knowledge of the expected answers as did the teachers.

There does, however, seem to be a clear indication, in the obtained mean scores, of the failure of the present generations of adults (at least in the geographical area involved in the investigation) to pass on to children those standards which the judging panel's choices indicated they would like to see transmitted. For, while the score of 27.775 for "apparently principled" actions may appear to be reasonably high, it is apparent that only a fraction over one in three of these actions is based upon principle. One must ask how dependable or consistent is a system of "moral" action based largely upon the chance operation of a variety of self-centered and pragmatic motivations; and the conclusion seems inescapable that both home and school are currently failing to "inculcate the highest morality"--at any rate on the basis of their own interpretation of the term as illustrated by the adult judging panel's choices.

If this fact is accepted, the question must be asked--whether this is simply a failure, due to faulty communication techniques, or whether there is perhaps some indication of a genuine intergenerational change of accepted moral standards and values. According to Maccoby (1, pp.263-4), Reiss (19) * believes that "in a modern, complex society, the maintenance and transmission of values is a fairly specialized function that is

* Unfortunately the reference to Reiss must be a secondary one, since the work referred to is unpublished, and, at the moment, unavailable. The basic idea, however, is clearly enough explained by Maccoby, and is used here because of its obvious relevance.

concentrated in a set of social institutions (the courts of law, the police, and to some extent the schools)", and that "the family is not a particularly significant element in mediating change." If this is true--and it will be suggested later that the present study lends some support to this view--then the failure is perhaps inevitable. Nevertheless, a recognition of the failure is surely a necessary preliminary to any attempt to deal with the problem of moral education in the schools.

B. The effect of sex

The superiority of girls' scores to those of boys is carried consistently through all six tables on pages 32, 33 and 34 and, indeed, is shown in every school group on every variable. A possibly confounding variable emerged from the data analysis in the form of an unexpectedly high difference in SES means, favouring the boys. ($p = 0.066$) Nevertheless, in an analysis of covariance in which the effect of SES was controlled, F ratios obtained for the effect of sex gave high statistical significance on all six variables. (See Table 13). This is taken as a clear indication that the difference in scores is related only to the sex of the Ss, and not to their SES or school type. It seems clear that girl Ss in this investigation expressed a significantly higher degree of moral development than the boy Ss.

TABLE 13

Analysis Of Covariance - Covariate SES
Source of Variance - Sex

<u>Choice</u>	<u>Form</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Probability</u>
1st	1	17.62	0.00004
1st	2	17.24	0.00005
1st	Total	19.87	0.00001
2nd	1	10.98	0.00107
2nd	2	8.26	0.00442
2nd	Total	10.40	0.00144

(c) Type of School

The consistency with which Type 1 school scores exceeded those of Type 2 schools, and with which these, in turn, exceeded those of Type 3 has already been noted. The only variations in this general pattern show that on the 1st choice ("apparently principled" choice of action) girls of Type 2 schools regularly obtained the highest scores, while for Form 1 2nd choice scores ("principled" motivation), Type 2 boys scored lowest. Since the N for boys in this group is the highest, and that for girls the lowest, it is apparent that the relative position of Type 2 schools is somewhat lower than it would have been had all Ns been equal. Nevertheless, a calculation based on the means actually obtained indicates that the increase in scores that might have been expected would not have been appreciable, and would certainly not have changed the relative positions of the three types of school.

One possibly relevant factor to account for the lower scores of the private schools is the suggestion that parents frequently consider such schools to have considerable advantages over the public schools in their ability to work with "problem" children--children whose failure to adapt to the requirements of their social environment has hindered their educational progress. Thus, it might be suggested, a random sampling of their population would be likely to contain a sufficient number of such students to produce noticeably lower scores on the measuring instrument, despite the normal or high scores of the others. This argument, of course, implies that a genuinely random selection of private school students would be, in effect, a sampling of

two distinct populations, and implies that a much wider scatter should be found in the scores of Type 2 and Type 3 schools than in those for Type 1. Examination of the relevant standard deviations, however, reveals that, in general, the reverse is true. (See Table 7) Type 2 and 3 schools show not only consistently lower means, but generally smaller standard deviations, indicating more, rather than less homogeneity of population. The explanation of the lower scores must be sought elsewhere.

The effect of the SES variable is perhaps best considered in relation to the question of school types, since the two are so closely related. A clear distinction between SES means for the three types of school appears, showing statistical significance well beyond the .001 level. Three reasons may be advanced, however, for suggesting that SES in itself had no significant influence on the outcome. In the first place, Type 2 schools have the highest SES mean, followed, in order, by Type 1 and Type 3--an order which does not coincide with that based on mean scores on the moral dilemmas. In the second place, correlations between SES and dependent variable scores were all very low, ranging from 0.132 to -0.059; and, finally, the analysis of covariance, in which the effect of SES was controlled, produced no change in the ordering of the school types on the dependent variables.

If, then, SES can be interpreted as a reasonably consistent and trustworthy general indicator of home influence, and if, as appears to be the case, this influence has no consistent relationship with the degree to which children apply principle to behaviour, then we have perhaps some support for the theory of Reiss, noted above (p.39).

More significantly, in the absence of any apparent link between scores and home background, the differences in means of the school types would appear to be related to some as-yet-undetermined aspects of the schools themselves. As previously stated, however, the attempt to establish and identify causal relationships between outcomes and processes within the schools is beyond the intent and scope of the present inquiry. The implication is hard to resist, however, that such relationships may well exist; and if this should prove to be so, further research to establish their nature would appear to be essential to the success of any attempt at moral education in the schools.

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APPENDIX

THE INSTRUMENT

Below are some little stories describing situations in which you might possibly find yourself some day. You are to imagine that you are really in each situation, and to decide which of the two suggested things you would be more likely to do. (These are marked "A" and "B"). Please do not mark what you think somebody else might do, or what you think you ought to do, but what you think you really would do. When you have decided on this, (either "A" or "B"), look carefully at the four reasons suggested under the one you have chosen. (You may ignore the four listed under the other letter.) You may well find that more than one of these appears reasonable to you, but you are to choose the one which seems most important to you -- the one which is closest to your own reason for choosing in the way you did. Remember, then: for each situation choose either "A" or "B", and then choose the one reason which seems to be closest to your own reason.

1. You badly want to go to a particular movie, but are twenty-five cents short. Your parents refuse to give it to you. You know that your mother keeps several dollars in small change in a can in the kitchen, and that she never seems to know exactly how much should be there. What would you really do?

A. Take a quarter from the can, because:

1. she would never miss it,
2. she should have given it to you anyway,
3. you couldn't go without it,
4. she should be more careful with her money.

B. Decide to miss the movie, because:

1. she might catch you taking it,
2. you shouldn't take what is not yours,
3. she just might know how much should be in the can,
4. it would be hard to explain later how you had managed to go to the movie.

2. One day when you have forgotten to bring a ball-point pen to school, you find an obviously expensive one lying in the school yard. You use it that day, because it's the only one you have, and nobody even notices it. The idea comes to you that you could keep it. What would you really do?

A. Keep it, because:

1. its original owner didn't seem to miss it,
2. it was a much better one than your own,
3. its owner didn't deserve it back if he was so careless,
4. nobody could prove that it wasn't yours.

B. Hand it in (to a teacher or to the lost-and-found), because:

1. it wasn't really yours,
2. the teacher would like you better for being honest,
3. you might just be found out if you kept it,
4. there might be a reward.

3. A very good friend of yours who is in another class finds arithmetic very hard. After school his (her) teachers asks you to help to staple together the pages of an arithmetic test which your friend will have to write the next day. You could easily take a copy of the test and give it to him (her) that night, What would you really do?

A. Take a copy of the test, because:

1. a teacher shouldn't be so careless with tests,
2. you might help your friend to pass the test,
3. there's nothing wrong in taking just a couple of sheets of paper,
4. you wouldn't be doing it for yourself.

B. Do nothing, because:

1. You might just get caught,
2. passing the test wouldn't really help your friend,
3. if the test was the next day he wouldn't have much time to study for it anyway,
4. it's as dishonest to cheat for someone else as it is to cheat for yourself.

4. Your class is taught by a student teacher for three weeks. On her last day in the school she gets very annoyed with you, and gives you two detentions, to be taken that day and the day after. Next day, what would you really do?

A. Serve the second detention because:

1. she would probably have told your regular teacher,
2. somebody else in the class might tell him about it,
3. she had as much right to give you detentions as your regular teacher,
4. it wouldn't do you any harm anyway.

B. Forget about the detention, because:

1. she wasn't your regular teacher,
2. she shouldn't have given you two detentions,
3. she wouldn't know whether you served it or not,
4. your own teacher wouldn't have given you the detention.

5. As a punishment, your parents have forbidden you to go to the fair. One night when they are out visiting friends, and have told you that they will not be back before midnight, a friend calls and asks you to go to the fair. You very much want to go. What would you really do?

A. Go to the fair, because:

1. your parents would never know,
2. it was an unfair punishment anyway,
3. you wouldn't like to admit to your friend that you weren't allowed to go,
4. you want to go.

B. Refuse to go, because:

1. you don't want to disobey your parents,
2. someone might tell your parents later,
3. you'd be afraid to take the chance,
4. your parents just might come home earlier than they said.

6. Suppose that your friend finally persuaded you to go to the fair anyway. The next day your parents ask you directly, "Did you go to the fair last night?" What would you really do?

A. Admit it, because:

1. they probably wouldn't do much about it,
2. they might just have seen you there,
3. you wouldn't want to tell a lie,
4. your friend might give you away later.

B. Deny it, because:

1. they'd be very angry if they knew,
2. telling a lie would be no worse than disobeying them in the first place,
3. they shouldn't expect you to give yourself away,
4. they'd punish you severely if they knew.

7. Two friends you really like ask you to come with them one evening for some real fun. You find out that the "real fun" means going into a house whose owner is away on holiday, turning on the water in the bathroom, and watching it flood the house. What would you really do?

A. Join them, because:

1. you don't want them to think you're scared,
2. lot of kids do things like that,
3. nobody would know who did it,
4. it sounds like fun.

B. Refuse to go, because:

1. you might get caught,
2. you don't even know whose house it is,
3. it doesn't really sound like much fun,
4. you should respect other people's property.

8. One day you try to play a trick on your teacher, but it is spoiled by another pupil who gives you away. As a result you are given a lecture and kept late after school. Some time later you are about to throw away a sandwich from your lunch because you don't like the filling, when the same pupil says: "Don't put that in the garbage -- I forgot my lunch and I'm starving!" What would you really do?

A. Give it to the other pupil, because:

1. you didn't want it anyway,
2. bearing a grudge would make you as bad as him,
3. you might get something in exchange,
4. it would make the others think you were much nicer than he was.

B. Throw it in the garbage, because:

1. he didn't deserve it,
2. you would like to teach him a lesson,
3. you don't have to help anyone else,
4. he shouldn't have told the teacher about you before.

9. A teacher you just can't get along with keeps you in late one day. This causes you to miss an important softball game, and your team loses. Next day, in class, you notice an open ink bottle balanced just above a wall display that the teacher has spent hours making. You could easily knock it over, ruin the display and make it look like an accident. What would you really do?

A. Knock it over, because:

1. revenge is sweet,
2. he couldn't prove you did it on purpose,
3. he deserved it for keeping you in late,
4. it would teach him a lesson.

B. Do nothing, because:

1. he might punish you anyway,
2. you would be too scared even to try,
3. it wouldn't do you any good,
4. it's better for everyone if you don't bear grudges.

10. A very strict rule of your school is that you must never boo visiting sports teams. In one soccer game you feel that the visiting team is trying to kick your team instead of the ball. You get so mad that you boo very loudly. A few minutes later a teacher asks you: "Was that you making that noise?" What would you really do?

A. Admit it, because:

1. he had probably seen you anyway,
2. he might let you off if you were honest,
3. you want to give a truthful answer,
4. he would just go on asking until he found out anyway.

B. Deny it, because:

1. you might be punished,
2. it's none of his business,
3. he couldn't possibly prove that it was you,
4. the school has no right to make rules like that.

11. One night you are walking past a school with your best friend, when he suggests that you both walk round the back out of sight and throw rocks at the windows. He says that he's done it often and never been caught. What would you really do?

A. Agree to do so, because:

1. throwing rocks is always fun,
2. you couldn't possibly hurt anybody,
3. you wouldn't want your best friend to think you were scared,
4. it sounds exciting.

B. Refuse to do so, because:

1. you might just get caught this time,
2. you ought not to damage things just for fun,
3. it doesn't really sound like much fun anyway,
4. you'd rather be the one who suggests things to do.

12. Your parents "help" you so much with a homework assignment that you hardly do any of it yourself. You hand it in, and the teacher is so pleased with it that she gives you a special award for outstanding work. What would you really do?

A. Admit the truth, because:

1. it would be hard to keep up the pretence later,
2. she might find out anyway,
3. it would be much worse for you if she found out later,
4. you should always tell the truth.

B. Take the award and say nothing, because:

1. it makes no difference to her who wrote the assignment,
2. all the other kids probably got help too,
3. it would improve the teacher's opinion of you,
4. you might be punished if you admitted the truth.

13. In a large department store, the clerk becomes confused, and asks you whether you gave her a \$5 or a \$10 bill. You know that it was a \$5 bill, but feel that if you say \$10 she will believe you. What would you really do?

A. Say \$5, because:

1. the store might make her pay the \$5 difference,
2. it really was a \$5 bill
3. it's not worth the risk of being found out for only \$5,
4. she might be trying to test you.

B. Say \$10, because:

1. she deserved to lose \$5 for her carelessness,
2. the store could easily afford to lose \$5,
3. you don't often get the chance of gaining \$5 so easily,
4. she could never prove that it wasn't a \$10 bill.

14. Your parents have strictly forbidden you to have anything to do with a neighbour who has recently been in trouble with the police. One day you pass his house and see him playing with a tiny pup that you find most appealing. He calls to you and tells you to come over to see it. What would you really do?

A. Accept his offer, because:

1. you find the pup so attractive,
2. your parents shouldn't have been so strict,
3. you know how to look after yourself,
4. it would be the pup you were going to see, not the neighbour.

B. Say "No thanks," because:

1. You would be afraid that your parents might find out,
2. you would be afraid of the neighbour,
3. you feel that you ought not disobey your parents,
4. if you told your parents that you had refused, they would think well of you.

15. A very good friend who happens to be very lazy tells you that he is going to be in serious trouble with his science teacher, because he has not made up an assigned list of definitions. You could easily let him copy your definitions during recess. What would you really do?

A. Offer him your list, because:

1. you wouldn't want him to get into trouble,
2. you would lose nothing yourself,
3. the teacher would never know,
4. it would be fun to fool the teacher.

B. Do nothing because:

1. you object to cheating,
2. you don't see why he should get the benefit of your work,
3. you think it might even do him good to get into trouble,
4. the teacher might find out, and you'd both be in trouble.

16. You have been trying very hard to raise your grade in arithmetic. The teacher lets you add up the marks on your own test papers, and you find that if you add just two marks to your actual score, you will get the letter-grade you wanted. What would you really do?

A. Leave your mark as it is, because:

1. you would rather tell the truth than raise your grade,
2. your teacher might check the totals later,
3. it would be too hard to keep up the standard later on,
4. it wouldn't be worth the risk to change it.

B. Add the two marks, because:

1. you would really like a higher grade,
2. a change of two marks is not very much,
3. you had really been trying very hard in arithmetic,
4. it doesn't seem fair to miss a whole letter-grade for just two marks.

17. Your parents have told your teen-age sister Betty that she must stay at home one evening, and must do a lot of housework. When your parents go out to visit friends, Betty offers you two dollars to do the work and let her go out. What would you really do?

A. Agree to let her go, because:

1. you'd really like the two dollars,
2. what she does is her own business and your parents shouldn't interfere,
3. you'd like to help your sister,
4. it seems like a fair bargain.

B. Refuse because:

1. it would be worth a lot more than two dollars to do all the work,
2. you hate housework,
3. you wouldn't want to get into trouble for someone else's sake,
4. you wouldn't want to help her to be disobedient.

18. Suppose that your sister has been very persuasive, and you have finally agreed to do the housework and let her go out. The next day your parents ask you directly: "Did Betty go out last night? What would you really do?

A. Admit it, because:

1. it's best to tell the truth,
2. she deserved to be in trouble anyway,
3. they might really know the truth and be testing you,
4. she would be in trouble, not you.

B. Say "No", because:

1. she had paid you two dollars,
2. you wouldn't want to get her into real trouble,
3. they shouldn't expect you to "squeal" on your own sister,
4. it's none of their business.

19. You are in a store one evening, and are looking at a game you would like to have, but can't afford. Suddenly there is a power failure, and all the lights go out. You could easily put the game under your arm and walk out in the dark. What would you really do?

A. Take the game, because:

1. you really want it,
2. you couldn't get it any other way,
3. lots of other people would take things anyway, and a game isn't very important,
4. the power failure makes it look almost as if fate is helping you.

B. Put it back on the counter, because:

1. you wouldn't want to become a thief,
2. the store detective might be waiting at the door,
3. you wouldn't want to become a thief for anything so unimportant as a game,
4. you could really do without it.

20. You overheard a conversation between two other people. What they say suggests that one of your friends, is a thoroughly bad character. Later that day, a group of your class-mates are talking together, and someone asks you if you have heard anything about that particular friend. What would you really do?

A. Repeat what you'd heard, because:

1. it's always fun to gossip about other people,
2. your friend deserved to be talked about,
3. your friend would never know that you had spread the stories,
4. you wouldn't really be hurting anybody.

B. Refuse to repeat what you'd heard, because:

1. you might get yourself into trouble if the stories weren't true,
2. you shouldn't say things like that about a person who isn't there to defend himself,
3. you wouldn't want to get involved,
4. you wouldn't want your friends to think that you listened to gossip.

21. When your parents go away for a weekend, they tell your older brother Bill that he must not use the family car, which they are leaving at home. On the Saturday evening, Bill offers to drive you to a movie that you would very much like to see if you will agree not to tell that he used the car. What would you really do?

A. Refuse to agree, because:

1. he'd need to give you more than just a movie,
2. he might get into an accident,
3. you don't see why you should get into trouble for his sake,
4. you wouldn't want to be partly to blame for his disobedience.

B. Agree, because:

1. you don't see why he shouldn't be allowed to use it,
2. you would like to see the movie,
3. it wouldn't do anybody any harm,
4. it seems like a fair arrangement.

22. Suppose that Bill has actually persuaded you to go along with his suggestion about the car. When your parents return, they ask you directly, "Did Bill drive the car?" What would you really do?

A. Admit it, because:

1. it's best to tell the truth,
2. he really deserved trouble anyway,
3. they might know what really happened, and be testing you,
4. he would be the one in trouble, not you.

B. Say "No", because:

1. he had taken you to a movie,
2. you wouldn't want him to get into real trouble,
3. they shouldn't expect you to "squeal" on your own brother,
4. it's none of their business.

23. You are in Woolco with a group of friends that you really admire. One of them suggests that each of you should try to pick up a pen or pencil and walk out without paying for it. He says that this is really just a kind of game. What would you really do?

A. Refuse to do so, because:

1. you don't really need a pen or a pencil,
2. no pen or pencil is worth the risk,
3. it's wrong to steal,
4. you'd be afraid even to try.

B. Agree to do so, because:

1. you don't want them to call you "chicken",
2. you are sure that you won't be caught,
3. you don't want to be different from your friends,
4. it sounds exciting.

24. Your best friends are members of a little group who seem to have a lot of fun together. You would like to be one of them, but they tell you that before you can join you must slash a tire on a car in a nearby parking lot, or do something else like that. What would you really do?

A. Agree to do so, because:

1. you really want to join,
2. lots of kids do things like that,
3. nobody could prove it was you,
4. you wouldn't want the others to think you were scared.

B. Refuse to do so, because:

1. you might get caught,
2. you wouldn't even know whose tire it was,
3. you'd be too scared,
4. you should respect other people's property.

25: Your parents have promised you something you very much want if your report card has no grade lower than C. In one subject you score C-. A friend suggests that you should change the C- into C+ by simply making one short line on the card.

What would you really do?

A. Leave the mark as it is, because:

1. it's always best to be honest,
2. your parents might find out from your teacher,
3. your friend might tell other people,
4. the teacher might notice when you handed the card back.

B. Change the mark, because:

1. you would really like the reward,
2. it's only a very small change,
3. you did your best in that subject anyway,
4. you feel that you really deserve the reward.

26. A friend's younger brother is entering an art competition, and shows you the picture he is sending in. You are very good at art, and see at once that in five minutes you could improve his picture a great deal. He asks you to do so.

What would you really do?

A. Improve the picture, because:

1. nobody else would know,
2. you would really like him to win the contest,
3. probably all the other contestants would get help too,
4. it wouldn't do anybody any harm.

B. Refuse to help him, because:

1. you would gain nothing yourself,
2. you might be embarrassed if you helped him and he still didn't win,
3. he might give you away,
4. you would both be cheating.

27. Your parents have absolutely forbidden you to go around at all with a certain friend who has recently been in a lot of trouble with the police. One hot Saturday afternoon you meet him accidentally, and he invites you to his house, where, he says there is a swimming pool.

What would you really do?

A. Go with him, because:

1. you really want to go,
2. your parents ought not to have forbidden you,
3. you wouldn't want him to think that you had to do just what your parents said,
4. you couldn't really get into serious trouble at his house.

B. Refuse his offer, because:

1. you would be afraid to disobey your parents,
2. your parents might find out,
3. you feel that you should obey your parents.
4. if you told your parents that you had refused, they might give you something to make up for it.

28. Your mother sends you to the local store to buy some groceries. On your way home you realize that you have not checked the change. When you do, you find that you have been given a dollar too much. What would you really do?

A. Keep the dollar, because:

1. it doesn't belong to your mother,
2. it was given to you,
3. your mother doesn't need it as much as you do,
4. you didn't do anything dishonest to get it.

B. Give it to your mother and explain, because:

1. the store clerk might come and ask for it, and you could get into trouble,
2. your mother might let you keep it anyway,
3. you would have no right to keep it,
4. you wouldn't want to be dishonest for just a dollar.

29. You have not done your homework for a couple of weeks, and the teacher has threatened to punish you severely if you do not complete a certain assignment. You do not complete it, but just before class a friend, who is a good student, offers to give you his assignment to hand in as your own. What would you really do?

A. Refuse his offer, because:

1. he might just get into trouble.
2. it would be cheating,
3. if you were found out, the punishment would be much worse.
4. it wouldn't really help your work at all.

B. Accept his offer, because:

1. you wouldn't want to be punished,
2. your friend wouldn't get into trouble anyway,
3. you feel that pupils ought not to be punished for not doing homework,
4. your teacher would think better of you if you handed it in.

30. You are staying overnight at a friend's house, and nearby some houses are being built. He suggests that you should go along with him and have some fun throwing rocks at the windows. He says that you'd be quite safe, because the caretaker is away sick. What would you really do?

A. Go along with him, because:

1. it would be exciting,
2. your parents would never know, because you are at your friend's house,
3. you wouldn't be hurting anybody,
4. if you refused, he might think you were scared.

B. Refuse to go, because:

1. you might be caught,
2. you ought not to damage things just for fun,
3. it doesn't sound like much fun anyway,
4. your friend's parents might find out and tell yours.

31. Your teacher is very angry one day because too many pupils have been making a noise. She demands absolute silence, and threatens to punish severely anyone who talks again. Without thinking, you turn and say something to another pupil. The teacher asks you directly: "Was it you who spoke just now?" What would you really do?

A. Admit it, because:

1. she might let you off if you owned up,
2. she probably knew it was you anyway,
3. it really was you who spoke,
4. she might punish the whole class if you didn't admit it.

B. Deny it, because:

1. you wouldn't want to be punished,
2. you don't really believe that you deserve to be punished,
3. she couldn't prove it was you,
4. she shouldn't have got so angry over such a little thing.

32. A teacher you don't like at all makes you stay in late to write out some work five times. You feel that this is unfair, and took too long to complete. As you leave you notice some official-looking forms that the teacher has been working on for hours, lying on a ledge near the door. You could easily dump them in the janitor's garbage container which he is about to take down to the incinerator.

What would you really do?

A. Leave them alone, because:

1. somebody might see you,
2. you'd get a much worse punishment if you were caught,
3. the teacher would probably have copies of them anyway,
4. it's a bad thing to bear a grudge against anybody.

B. Dump them in, because:

1. it would really teach the teacher a lesson,
2. the teacher had wasted your time, so you'd like to waste the teacher's time,
3. revenge is sweet,
4. nobody could prove that you had done it.

33. Because your school work has not been good, your parents have forbidden you to watch T.V. for a whole week. One night they go out visiting, and there is a program on that you very much want to see. Before they go you ask for permission to watch it, but they refuse. What would you really do?

A. Watch it, because:

1. they would never know,
2. it wouldn't do anybody any harm,
3. the punishment doesn't seem fair,
4. they probably wouldn't even ask you afterwards.

B. Leave the T.V. turned off, because:

1. they might come home early and catch you,
2. you ought to do as your parents say,
3. you probably wouldn't be missing much anyway,
4. you'd be afraid to take the chance.

34. Suppose that you find the attraction of the T.V. so strong that you finally decide to watch the program anyway. When your parents come home, they ask you directly, "Did you watch T.V.?" What would you really do?

A. Admit it, because:

1. they probably wouldn't punish you if you were honest about it,
2. they might have noticed that the T.V. set was still warm,
3. you wouldn't want to add lying to disobedience,
4. you might forget later, and give yourself away.

B. Deny it, because:

1. you might be severely punished,
2. you might not be allowed to watch T.V. for two weeks,
3. it's not fair to expect you to give yourself away,
4. they probably wouldn't trust you again if you admitted it.

35. A friend tells you a lot of very unpleasant things about a teacher you both know. If half the things are true, the teacher should be in jail. The next day, four or five other friends ask you to repeat all the stories for them to hear. What would you really do?

A. Tell them, because:

1. it's always fun to gossip about other people,
2. the teacher deserved to be talked about,
3. he wouldn't know that you had spread the stories,
4. you wouldn't really be hurting anybody.

B. Refuse to tell them, because:

1. you might get yourself into trouble,
2. you shouldn't say things like that about a person who isn't there to defend himself,
3. you wouldn't want to get involved,
4. you wouldn't want your friends to think that you listened to gossip.

36. The boy in the next seat to you is never very nice to you, and often calls you names that you don't like. One day you are about to tear up a magazine picture which you no longer need, when he says, "Don't tear that up! It's just what I need for my social studies assignment!" What would you really do?

A. Tear it up, because:

1. he didn't deserve it,
2. it would teach him a lesson,
3. you don't have to help anybody else,
4. he should have been nicer to you before.

B. Give it to him, because:

1. if you bear a grudge, you're as bad as he is,
2. it's no good to you anyway,
3. he might give you something in exchange,
4. it would make other people think you were much nicer than he was.

37. Your teacher is away at a one-day meeting, and a substitute teacher takes the class for that day only. She gets annoyed with you, and gives you an extra assignment that you don't feel you deserve. She tells you to bring it to class the next day.

What would you really do?

A. Do it and bring it the next day, because:

1. she might tell your regular teacher about it,
2. somebody else in the class might tell about it,
3. you should obey her just as much as you obey your regular teacher,
4. it wouldn't do you any harm anyway.

B. Forget all about it, because:

1. she isn't your regular teacher,
2. you don't think you deserve it,
3. she wouldn't be there the next day,
4. your own teacher wouldn't have given you the assignment.

38. All Grade Seven pupils are being given the same SocialStudies test, your class on Monday, and the others on Tuesday. Some of the questions are taken from the text-book, and you can remember which they were. A good friend phones you on Monday night and asks you to tell him. What would you really do?

A. Tell him, because:

1. it would be the teacher's fault for arranging the test so badly,
2. you would like your friend to do well in the test,
3. everybody cheats anyway,
4. it's not wrong to help somebody else.

B. Refuse to tell him, because:

1. you feel that this would be cheating,
2. he might get a better mark than you,
3. he probably wouldn't know the answers anyway,
4. somebody might find out later.

39. There is a boy at school whose parents are rich, and seem to give him just about everything he wants. He has a beautiful catcher's mitt that you would love to have. One day he loses it on the way to school, and you find it. You could either keep it or return it. What would you really do?

A. Give it back to him, because:

1. he might give you a reward,
2. someone might have seen you finding it,
3. he might recognize it later,
4. it really belonged to him.

B. Keep it, because:

1. his parents would buy him another one,
2. you'd never get one like it any other way,
3. he should have taken better care of it,
4. nobody would ever know who had found it.

40. You very much want to buy a 25¢ ticket for a school concert, but you have no money, and your parents won't give you any. When your Dad sends you to the local store, he tells you to get money from his jacket pocket in another room. You find the pocket full of assorted change -- quarters, nickels, and dimes. What would you really do?

A. Take only the money for the store, because:

1. he might catch you,
2. you wouldn't want to steal,
3. he might know how much he had in the pocket,
4. he would wonder how you managed to buy a ticket.

B. Take an extra quarter, because:

1. he would never know,
2. he was mean to refuse you in the first place,
3. you would have to miss the concert otherwise,
4. he deserved to lose it because of the careless way he kept his money.

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