

Observations About, Around and Beside
Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music

by

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We accept this dissertation as conforming
to the required standard

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ABSTRACT

Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music is a composition in two movements written by Martin Arnold in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Music at the University of Victoria. Both movements are made up of recorded acoustic sounds and are intended only to be listened to as recordings. Also, they are intended only to be heard through home-stereo equipment in one's own home (or in an equally comfortable and intimate space). There is no live/concert performance of this composition available. The first movement consists of 68 minutes of modal counterpoint. It is scored for: traverso; melodica; sopranino, alto, and bass recorders; Casio D[igital]H[orn]-100; alto and baritone saxophones; trumpet; trombone; electronic panpipes; as well as electric organ and string bass gated through an envelope follower-v.c.a.. Each instrument was recorded using radically different methods in a variety of locations. The particular sound qualities of these recording methods, along with the resonances and extraneous noises peculiar to the recording locations, take part as further contrapuntal layers within the musical texture. These recordings are coordinated and overdubbed four at a time. The second movement involves two whistlers and one hummer whistling and humming along with a midi-piano realization of the notated material of the first movement; transposed and sped-up so as to last for 42 minutes. Along with the whistling and humming, the midi-piano is also faintly audible as well as two layers of cassette recordings played through two different home-stereo units. These recordings are of the performance location without any human activity taking place within it. There are twelve different tapes each typified by having had the microphone placed in a different resonant chamber (for example, a cardboard tube, a pressure cooker, a brandy snifter, etc.). The movement was recorded in a single take, with the sound of the cassettes being exchanged by hand, in real time, existing as part of the sound world of the movement.

“Observations About, Around and Beside *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*” addresses the relationship of the composition to the praxis of recording through comparisons with a variety of experimental film and video but particularly through contact with the ideas of filmmaker, Trinh T. Minh-ha. The intimate, non-demonstrative nature of the piece is considered in the light of musics that are identified as “private musick” (an invocation of Elizabethan consort music) and as “musics that are not intended to be listened to” (such as: amateur consort music; practicing, or mindlessly noodling; whistling to oneself; background “cocktail music”). The rest of the document suggests some of what is aesthetically and politically at stake in these observations by placing them in contact with a far-reaching array of theoretical speculation including: Norman Bryson’s idea of “the body of labour” as well as his observations regarding the relationship of still life painting to narrative; Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s idea of “faciality”; and, T. W. Adorno’s critiques of Igor Stravinsky’s music.

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INTRODUCTION

This document examines my dissertation composition *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*. While a traditionally notated score was required to produce this composition, the piece itself exists only as a recording. I think of the notated score as preliminary material that can be treated in any imaginable way; in regard to tempo, transposition, or fragmentation, for example. And so, while it is possible to use the score to produce other distinct compositions, there is no other rendition that would be *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*. In the case of the dissertation composition the entire score is used twice (the second time transposed and at a different tempo) to create two related but methodologically very distinct movements. These movements also embody a huge range of concrete compositional strategies that belong specifically to the recording process in all of its aspects.

Chapter 1 presents all of the methodologies involved in making *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*.

The first section, "Instrumentation and Recording", examines the various recording techniques used and their relationship to the variety of instrumental textures heard within the piece. It also introduces some of my aesthetic concerns regarding bringing the recording process into the compositional process. Comparisons are made with a diverse selection of experimental film and video all of which creatively deal with a variety of the technical apparatus involved in the production and consumption of film and video. Of particular importance to this study are the ideas of filmmaker Trinh T. Minh-ha.

The second section, "Pitch, Rhythm, and Form", deals with those parameters as they are manifested in the notated score. However, it also presents these aspects as they relate to the improvised component of the music and as they relate to indeterminate occurrences of pitch and rhythm that arise by chance from the processes that produce the piece.

The conclusion to Chapter 1 takes up the aesthetic ideas which have accompanied the previous technical explanations and develops them. This development focuses on the intimacy of the music and what has been identified as its non-demonstrative, non-definitive quality. It is considered

in the light of musics that are ascribed (somewhat metaphorically) as being “musics not intended to be listened to”. These include: the “private musick” of Elizabethan amateur consort music; practicing, or mindlessly noodling on an instrument; whistling or humming to oneself; and, background cocktail music.

Chapter 2 speculates on what is at stake when one listens to “musics not intended to be listened to”. It does this primarily through contact with Norman Bryson’s ideas surrounding still life painting and narrative, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s concept of faciality, and T. W. Adorno’s critiques of Igor Stravinsky’s music in which its intrinsic ephemerality is exposed.

This document remains an accompaniment to *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*. The cultural theory presented is not intended as an explanation of the piece. Rather it suggests issues, areas of speculation, that spill out from working in a certain way. Likewise, the ideas of these various theorists are introduced to show some of the range of thought which informs my compositional sensibility. The most complicated radiation of their impact on me can be heard on the recording, *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*.

CHAPTER 1

MAKING *BURROW OUT*; *BURROW IN*; *BURROW MUSIC*

I. Instrumentation and Recording

1. Movement I

The preliminary score used for *Burrow Out*; *Burrow In*; *Burrow Music* consists of 1513 measures in duple time. It always consists of three lines of continuous melodic counterpoint and two braced lines of punctuating material. In the first movement each line of the score was recorded separately and overdubbed. This was done using a 4-track cassette deck with a built in 8-channel mixer, a Fostex Multitracker 280. One channel contained a computerized click-track playing at a quarter-note=44.5. A second channel contained the computer playing lines 4 and 5 through a midi hook-up with a Yamaha TG-33 synthesizer module producing a panpipe-like sound. Lines 1 and 2 were recorded onto the remaining two channels and then line 3 was recorded over the click-track, the player monitoring and reading along with line 1 for synchronization. This section takes sixty-eight minutes to listen to in full.

Besides the synthesized panpipes, twelve other instruments are involved. They are: traverso (a wooden flute in use during the Baroque era); two different melodicas with distinct reed timbres; bass recorder; alto recorder; soprano recorder; Casio DH-100 (a small saxophone-shaped electronic wind instrument with a built-in speaker); trombone with plunger mute; baritone saxophone; alto saxophone; trumpet with Hannon mute; electric organ (Korg's electronic copy of a Hammond B-3).

As implied above, there is a great deal to be heard in this first movement that is not notated in the score.

i. Recording

Each instrument is recorded in a different acoustic environment using extremely varied recording strategies and techniques (these will be specified below).

For the most part, these environments consisted of a variety of domestic settings each of which offered specific arrays of ambient sound; for example, distinct street noise or other tenants making sound in other parts

of the building (including sounds which inform an impression of the location of the performance – that is, if the sound of a ceiling being walked on is audible the recording must be taking place in some kind of 'downstairs'). Not only was no attempt made to suppress the inclusion of these sounds in the recording, but even occasionally they were allowed to be accentuated by a specific recording technique.

ii. Performance

The character of each player's performance – dynamics, phrasing, articulation, colouration, etcetera – was worked out with each individual. Each was asked, among more specific demands, to apply their specific musical backgrounds to the interpretation of their part. For example the traverso and recorder players have a background in Baroque and Renaissance musics, the trumpet and saxophone players in jazz. Significantly these are traditions which use notation for basic pitch and rhythm (though often just a shorthand which implies more complicated rhythmic possibilities) and leave interpretation and elaboration to the performer to be executed within stylistic conventions. And thus, through the licence given to these players, these conventions are allowed in some measure to infiltrate and inform *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*.

I am interested in extreme detail; I am interested in music traditions in which there is as much creative focus put on how one plays each note as on what the notes are. This piece embodies that interest.

iii. Mixer Regulated Dynamics

The shifting dynamic balances between instruments, as heard in the recording, would be impossible in a live situation. It is the result of a lot of manipulation of the volume controls for each of the four channels while they were being mixed into stereo (two channels).

Moreover, the mixer allowed the instrumentalists' played dynamics to be brought together as timbral characteristics (the various sound qualities of an instrument when played at different volumes) as opposed to a mixing of louder or softer voices. For example, the trombone player was asked to play as quietly as possible with his horn predominantly closed by a plunger mute (with just a bit of wah-wah encouraged). Recording and the mixing board allowed this frail, almost choked sound to be heard on equal footing with a baritone saxophone blowing at a comfortable forte (and for both brass instruments to co-exist with the rarefied nuance of the traverso).

iv. The Gated Tape

There is another, even more substantial unnotated element in this section. The computer operated synthesized 'panpipes' play throughout the movement and always play the bottom two punctuating lines. By running their channel through an envelope follower-voltage controlled amplifier (vca) set-up (specifically, in an Arp 2600) the 'panpipes' were able to gate another tape of music that was running parallel to the overdubbed notated part of the piece. I recorded separately languid, slightly apathetic, improvisations on the Korg B-3 copy and pizzicato string bass.¹ These improvisations use the same range of pitch material that is heard in the counterpoint that it is running parallel to. I think of these improvisations as invoking (slightly deranged) lounge-jazz-ballad comping (i.e. accompanying conventions). During the mixdown this tape was running constantly into the board but, because of the envelope follower-vca, was only audible on the master when the synthetic panpipes played. In other words, the final product sounds as if someone is turning a radio on and off in the rhythm of the 'panpipes', that just happens to be broadcasting a sixty-eight minute, stripped-down lounge jazz ballad (which lacks a melody line and that just happens to be harmonically related to the modal counterpoint playing).

The recording strategies for each instrumental part are as follows (in the order in which the instruments enter on the recording).

i. The synthesized panpipes were recorded direct into the board using the reverb setting on the Yamaha TG-33.

ii. The traverso was recorded with an AKG C-1000S condenser microphone set up directly in front of the player's mouth. This, of course, picked up the sound of the player breathing. Also, the traverso has an even chiffer attack than the modern flute, chiffer being the complex, transient noise produced prior to the establishment of a focused edge-tone as the air hits the mouth-hole. The C-1000S picks up a great deal of detail, and given

¹ There is also a sruti box (an Indian drone instrument that is essentially a 1 to 4 pitch keyless accordion) droning a C and a G throughout all of the gated tapes. It is quite soft in the mix and is usually indistinguishable from the organ. However, it has a harmonic significance that will be dealt with later (p. 31 below).

the close proximity and positioning of the microphone during the recording, both this attack noise and the player breathing, are far more audible than they would be in a concert situation as neither of those noises projects to the degree that the instrument's pitched sounds do. The chuff was further accentuated by electronically boosting the upper-midrange and high-treble frequencies of the recording emphasizing frequencies from the transient burst that do not occur with much energy in the tone which follows.

iii. The melodica was played into a Shure SM57 dynamic cardioid microphone that was routed through a Yamaha SPX 50D reverb unit, on way to being amplified by my stereo. The player sat between the speakers which were pointing behind him. He was facing the microphone stand. The C-1000S was about fifteen feet in front of this arrangement pointing 180 degrees away from it. The reverb-enhanced signal being played through the stereo was amplified to be the same volume as the acoustic, unamplified melodica. For the final stereo mixdown this tape channel was taken from the pre-fader output of the Fostex 280, sent through a Boss SE-70 digital reverb unit and brought back into another mixer channel on the Fostex. During the mixdown the balance between the two melodica channels – pre-and-post Boss reverb – were constantly, but subtly, being altered (one of the combinations gave rise to a high, buzzing feedback, due to some anomalous crosstalk between the pre-fader output and the mixer channels – a sound that, to my ear, just added more richness to the mix). The reverb setting on the Yamaha was a modification of one of the "large hall" presets and the setting on the Boss was also a "hall" preset but with different parameters than the Yamaha.

It is important to point out that there is no duplication in reverb settings throughout all of the recordings – different presets with different added programmable modifications were used. The Yamaha and Boss units are not particularly sophisticated. Certain general timbral qualities remain consistently audible regardless of the setting or how the setting is altered. (Though fortunately, these general sound qualities differ somewhat between the Yamaha and the Boss.) Despite this, and apart from all of the physical manoeuvring in the recording process, differences between the electronic reverb characteristics produced by the various settings and

alterations are nonetheless audible and are a significant, if unassuming, part of the composition.

iv. The bass recorder was recorded in a rectangular unfinished basement with a concrete floor and an extremely low ceiling (slightly less than 6 feet high).² The C-1000S was approximately twenty-five feet away from the recorder, pointing 180 degrees away from the instrument, just in front of the wall furthest from it. Because of the parallel symmetry of the walls, the smooth surfaces, and the abnormally low ceilings, the resonances (reinforced, energized frequencies) of the room are particularly audible.³ That is, when the recorder plays pitches within these formant frequency

² I am only going to mention specific characteristics of the space I am recording in when, as with this basement, it was chosen especially for the sounding qualities of these characteristics (in this case, its concrete floor, its low ceiling, and its greater length compared to other available domestic spaces). This is not because I think that the specifications of the various living rooms, kitchens, hallways, and bathrooms I recorded in matter less. Rather, I think these specifications entirely matter: all the dimensions of the room (including sills; ledges; outcroppings; trim; smooth or angled corners); all the materials involved in the walls (plaster/stipple/paper/kind of paint); the amount of furnishing (for example, I am very aware of the difference in the sound of the recordings made in the front room of my first apartment when it was empty due to my being in mid-move) and the placement, shapes, and material make-up of the furnishing; the floor surface and covering; the number of windows, the number of curtains, and the number of curtains drawn or not; the difference between the street noise from the third floor, the second floor, and the ground floor. I am sure this list could continue. The point is that I decided to use a variety of locations because I believed that these kind of fine differences would be latently audible in the final product – i.e. any location would be special and audibly distinct from any other one. When I mention particular aspects of the recording environment, then, it is not because they are necessarily more important to the final sound than any other aspect of the environment, but rather because they were more particularly defined within my compositional process.

For a fascinatingly detailed analysis of living room acoustics, including the influence of windows, furnishing, etc., see F. Alton Everest, *Acoustic Techniques for Home and Studio* (Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania: Tab Books, 1973), pp. 112-127.

³ see *ibid.*, pp. 52-57 and Donald E. Hall, *Musical Acoustics* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 345-346.

ranges, the pitches sound louder. This gives the recorded line yet another kind of subtle dynamic variety not notatable in the score.

v. Half-way through bar 223 the Casio DH-100 enters replacing the bass recorder. As stated above, it has a small built in speaker. The volume is adjustable and, for this recording, it was turned down so as to be just barely audible from a few feet away. It was recorded in a living room with the C-1000S about twelve feet in front of it. Of course, the level of the microphone was turned up extremely high to allow the volume of the Casio to match that of the other instruments. This gives the recording a strange and disorienting balance between the sound of the instrument and the heightened presence of what would have been otherwise incidental, unobtrusive sounds: the boosted level brings the clattering of the flimsy plastic key mechanism into prominence in the mix; although the ringing of specific frequency bands is not apparent, the ambient resonant character of the room is emphasized – it is as if the 'air-pressure' of the recording changes when the Casio is edited in; the breathing of the player is, as with the traverso, unusually audible. However, there is a distinct difference between the character of the air-noise heard in the traverso and Casio tracks. The close-miking of the traverso gives a dry, isolated, analytic quality to the noise, heard 'forward' in the mix, whereas the Casio player's air-noise is heard as just a part of the peculiar tele-auricular (or micro-auricular, depending on how one wants to think of it) picture given by the boosted microphone level. This is a good example of the kind of peripheral phenomenal distinctions that give rise to a kind of weird counterpoint between the ambient, marginal characteristics of the recordings.

Halfway through bar 579 the melodica is replaced by a trombone and the Casio DH-100 is replaced by an alto recorder.

vi. The trombone was recorded with two microphones, the C-1000S and a Realistic PZM (made for Radio Shack by Crown, the inventors of PZM technology). The C-1000S was put into a cardboard cylinder 2.5 feet long and 2 inches in diameter. This filters the signal coming into the microphone, with the resonant frequencies of the cylinder accentuated. The PZM is a highly non-directional microphone that is designed to mimic

the workings of the ear. It consists of a small microphone pointing down onto a 5.5 inch square metal plate, from about a millimetre above it. As the technology involves the picking up of reflected sound, the metal plate is intended to be secured to a wall or a larger board on the floor to get the truest fidelity. In the case of the trombone recording, however, it was placed in a glass mixing bowl resting on its corners up the sides of the bowl. Not only did this severely alter and limit the frequency response of the microphone but it added the filtering of the bowl to the mix. The microphones were four feet away from the trombone in opposite directions. The C-1000S was mixed considerably behind the PZM, as its more dramatically modified sound was intended as a kind of seasoning to the more general low-fi sound of the PZM.

vii. The alto recorder part was performed in a bathroom playing into the Shure which again was routed through a reverb unit – in this case the Boss with a "room" preset – once again being heard through my stereo in the living room about 20 feet from the bathroom. Adjoining the hallway which connects the bathroom and the living room is a staircase which goes up to the third floor. About ten steps up from the hallway is a landing, which was where the C-1000S was positioned pointing straight up towards the third floor ceiling. The result is a more-or-less even mix of the acoustic sound of the recorder, as projected by the resonant enclosure of the bathroom, and the electronically reverb-enhanced, living room resounded signal with both sources recorded resonating together in the acoustic environment of the stairwell in which the microphone is placed.

viii. At bar 713 the alto recorder is replaced by a baritone saxophone. It was recorded in a large, empty warehouse space: two 1500 square foot rooms with 25 foot ceilings separated by a wall with a 10 foot wide door in it. The C-1000S and the saxophone were thirty feet away from each other but in separate rooms and pointing in opposite directions. This accounts for the particular and considerable reverb on the recording. The Shure SM 57 was also set-up directly under the player's right hand. Its signal was equalized to roll off all of the bass and low midrange frequencies and to boost the high end, thus limiting the amount of pitch that was picked up (the part is written for the low range of the baritone saxophone). Very little of this signal was mixed into the recording; however, it does add a bit of the soft clicking of the key machinery into the mix and also gives the

recording a slightly fizzy top end that makes the instrument sound more like a bowed bass or 'cello at times than a wind instrument. This is not intended as any kind of illusionism. Rather, as with all the eccentricities of the recording set-ups used, it exists to call attention to, and disorient the perception of, the intrusion/inclusion of the recording process as an integral component of the music.

Half way through bar 935 the traverso is replaced by an alto saxophone, the trombone is replaced by a sopranino recorder, and the baritone saxophone is replaced by the Casio DH-100.

ix. The alto saxophone was recorded in a small domestic office space with the C-1000S about 5 feet from the saxophone but pointing away from it, directly in front of an open window. The office is on a quiet street and the window looks out onto a backyard, so the effect of the window being open has more to do with the acoustic character of the recording than with the addition of extraneous noise.

x. The recording set-up used for the sopranino recorder, on the other hand, added a great deal of environmental sound to the piece. The sopranino was played in the same bathroom in which the alto recorder performed. In this case, the C-1000S was placed in the living room 20 feet away, which looks out onto a busy street (that is also a streetcar route). This is the recording which most dramatically exhibits the added reverberation and resonance of the empty, mid-move front room mentioned in footnote 2. It is quite a large room with 15 foot ceilings. Not only did it give the recorder a particular reverb characteristic but it also reinforced the street noise.⁴

xi. The Casio DH-100 was recorded using the PZM in a large kitchen (hard floors with no padded surfaces). The PZM was used in its conventional manner: taped to the floor in the corner of the room. During the mixdown this recording was processed using a different "large hall" preset on the Yamaha SPX 50D. (This track is novel in that it is the only one which uses a reverb unit in a standard way; adding the effect

⁴ see Everest, *ibid.*, p. 90. He discusses the striking amplification of outside noise through room resonance.

during the mixing, using the auxiliary send and return channels on the Fostex.)

xii. Half way through bar 1024 the Casio is replaced by a melodica; a different melodica, with brighter reeds than the first one used. It was played in a small kitchen adjoining a small living room with an open, standard sized doorway between them. The sound of the melodica was picked up by an Electrovoice PL5 omni microphone, set up directly above the keyboard, and by the PZM placed in the corner of the kitchen. The feed from the Electrovoice was sounded through a Traynor TS-60 guitar amplifier with its built-in spring reverb turned up full. The amplifier was placed, on its back on a chair, in the opposite corner of the kitchen from where the PZM was situated. The feed from the PZM was run through a Boss "plate" reverb preset into its own mixer channel. In another channel was the signal from the C-1000S, which was set up in the middle of the adjoining living room. It picked up the combination of the acoustic sound of the melodica and the guitar amp-spring reverb processed sound coming from the kitchen. The balance between this channel and the PZM-Boss-"plate"-reverb channel was slightly tinkered with throughout the recording process.

At bar 1158 the sopranino recorder is replaced by a bass recorder and the melodica is replaced by a trumpet.

xiii. The bass recorder was played in a small, empty, rectangular bedroom with hardwood floors. Once again the resonances of the room and the dynamic shifts which result from them are audible. The door of the bedroom was open and the C-1000S was recording down the hallway, about 15 feet away. During the mixdown the same set-up was used as that described in regard to the first melodica track (the one which begins the piece; described in section iii. above, p. 6). In this case the pre-fader output was sent through one of the Yamaha's "room" presets. And again, the balance between the before-and-after-electronic-reverb channels was manipulated during the mix.

xiv. The trumpet was played with a Harmon mute with stem removed producing the classic Miles Davis sound. The player sat in the hallway of the apartment used for, among others, the alto recorder track, and played

into the Shure which again went through the Boss reverb unit (using yet another modified large hall setting) and was amplified by the stereo in the living room. The C-1000S was set up in that room to pick up the processed sound. But also, the Electrovoice omni microphone was placed as close as was possible to the side of the trumpeter's mouth. This added into the mix the sound of the player breathing (I enjoy the difference between the drawing through the nose and the quick sucking through the side of the mouth) as well as the sound of the pursing and smacking of the embouchure into the mix; heard as isolated and 'forward'.

xv. Halfway through bar 1380 the trumpet is replaced by an electric organ; the same organ that is used on the gate tapes but with a slightly different drawbar arrangement. It was played through the Yamaha reverb unit using an altered "plate" preset and then amplified by a Peavey Minx 110 (a small bass amp.). This was then recorded using the Shure SM57 placed directly in front of the amplifier.

I recognize that the differences produced by many of the sound modifying processes described above are very subtle and might not seem demonstrably exceptional given the contortions of some of the recording procedures. Moreover, I know that the clarity the of detail and the ability to identify how it is produced is obscured by the layering of different sound modifying processes within a single track, and further by the overdubbing of these tracks. On the other hand, I do not think that this music sounds like anything else available for one to listen to. And although it might be insidious, the heterophonous instability of the sound world of this music is both audible and potent. The piece is not intended to be demonstrative but rather placidly elusive; it is not meant to sound recognizably innovative but rather disorientingly (but quietly and good-naturedly) perverse. I think that this music has a wonderfully amorphous, non-definitive quality to it; but it is nonetheless particular in its presentation of this quality. And much of this particularity is ascribable to the depth and specificity of the work-intensity (or maybe more correctly, play-intensity) involved in the recording of the piece.

Each four-track cassette contained one of the eight instrumental combinations except for the traverso-melodica-Casio DH-100 grouping,

which was broken up into two parts. The four-tracks with the gated monophonic tapes were mixed down onto stereo DAT and then compile-edited together in a digital post-production studio⁵ using Digidesign's Sound Designer software.

2. Movement II

The second movement embodies a much more unorthodox relationship to the score. The score was notated using *Encore*, a computer notation program that allows the score to be read as a midi-file. This allows it to be played automatically by any electronic instrument capable of this. Using the Yamaha TG-33's piano sound, a midi generated rendition of each line of the score was recorded onto separate cassettes, with both punctuating lines recorded together. The music was transposed and sped up in accordance with a harmonic scheme and a formal plan that will be presented later in this document.⁶ It takes forty-two minutes to listen to this movement.

Three performers were given one each of the three separate midi-piano recordings of the top three (in the score) melodic lines. Each performer had their own Professional Walkman with which they could listen to the line they were assigned through headphones. The principal task of the movement was for two of the performers to whistle along with one each of the top two, more active lines and the other performer to hum along with the third, less active line. However, it was important that the performers were in no-way accomplished in the production of these sounds. This movement celebrates the non-expert pastime of humming and whistling-along and all the sonic anomalies that go with this activity. It is an activity that is usually personal, in that it is not intended for others' apprehension, and peripheral, in that it often comes about as an unself-conscious by-product of a listener's attention to some other music heard or remembered. Moreover, in this movement sonic anomalies were further precipitated by the sheer duration of the task. Unlike the first movement which is the

⁵ Hexagon Studio in Calgary, Alberta, Mark Ellestad and John Abram, engineers.

⁶ The transposition between harmonic areas is presented on p. 31 below. The establishment of tempo resulting from the formal scheme of the piece is presented on p. 44 below.

result of shorter sections edited together, the second was recorded in one continuous take. At forty-two minutes, given the inexorable quality of the contrapuntal lines, this was an extremely taxing experience, particularly for the whistlers.

This activity triggered another layer of sound by using the envelope follower-vca. The line output from each Walkman was plugged into a channel of the mixing board and the composite monophonic mix of the three lines was patched into the sounding end of the envelope follower-vca set-up. Likewise, each performer had a microphone to whistle or hum into which were mixed together and sent to the modulating end of the envelope follower-vca. The sound of the midi-piano mix being gated by the whistling-humming mix was played through the speakers that are built into the Arp 2600. Thus, while each performer was whistling/humming along with the piano melody in their headphones, this whistling/humming was allowing the piano music to be heard (very softly) as three-part counterpoint, by gating it through the Arp.

The recording of the midi-piano playing the punctuating material was played through an old-model Walkman that has a tiny built-in speaker. This produces a sound quality reminiscent of an inexpensive transistor radio.

The movement starts with each performer starting their own cassette players. This was synchronized with a visual cue. One of the performers also starts the Walkman containing the punctuating material cassette on this cue.

The point of splitting up and reassembling the recorded source material was to avoid a simple dichotomy between the imprecisions of the whistling/humming and what would have been the coherent, synchronized 'correctness' of the midi recording. Even with the three performers doing their best to start the cassette players together, it is impossible for the separate tracks to be synchronized (because of some combination of slight differences in the length of leader tape in any given cassette, between the motor speeds of the Walkmen, and between the reaction times of the start mechanisms of the Walkmen). Thus, breaking up the 'piano' voices achieves a wobbly, askew rhythmic disjunction that supplement the fluctuating indeterminacies of the whistling/humming.

Yet, it is also important to me that the source music is heard on a 'piano'. As the historically quintessential solo instrument its sound gives a kind of authority to the illusory perception that this wobbly music is emanating from a single performer. This is another slight but insidious source of disorientation that, like so many of the compositional strategies which infest this piece, if perceived, might pull the listener out of the flow of the piece and call into question the nature of the sound being produced (i.e. 'how can one person be playing this music?', or maybe even, 'how can one mind be thinking this music?').

The piano sound is also important given this piece's preoccupation with sound environment and location, in particular the domestic listening space. Although I recognize the progressively anachronistic quality of this historical reference, many listeners will still remember the piano as the pervasive household instrument. Given the low volume of the piano sound in this movement, there will hopefully be some spillage into memories of hearing a piano played in another room of a house, or in another unit of an apartment building, and the kind of strange voyeurism which accompanies covertly listening in on another's domestic activity.

There is another layer (or combination of layers) to this movement which formally corresponds to the changing and overlapping of instruments in the first movement. Instead of instruments being changed, cassettes, containing variously executed recordings of the ambient sound of the performance space, were changed. The cassettes contain recordings of my apartment made with the C-1000S placed in a variety of small resonant chambers which colour the sound. The recording levels were high so as to get the full effect of these chambers rescounding from the influence of even the most passive ambient noise (as a result, very loud street noise causes distortion in some of the recordings – a sonic intruder that I was happy to have complicate the piece).

There are three synchronous levels of instrument turnover in the first movement which correspond to the three melodic lines of the contrapuntal texture: the playing of the top line involves the alto saxophone taking over from the traverso; the playing of the third, least active line entails the movement from melodica 1 to the trombone to the sopranino recorder to the bass recorder; the playing of the middle line involves the movement from the bass recorder to the Casio DH-100 to the the alto recorder to the

baritone saxophone to the Casio DH-100 to melodica 2 to the trumpet to the electric organ. Unlike the instrumental turnover, however, the cassette changes were made by the performers during the recording of the movement; they were not overdubbed or edited in later. One of the whistlers was responsible for the level involving eight cassettes being changed and the hummer was responsible for the level involving four cassettes being changed. Both were responsible for the opening of designated windows in the apartment during the performance, at the point in the music which corresponds to measure 935, page 53 of the score, the only place in the first movement where all three instruments change (traverso to alto saxophone in the top line, trombone to sopranino recorder in the third line, and baritone saxophone to Casio DH-100 in the second line).

The eight tapes which were changed by the whistler were played on a regular Walkman-style stereo cassette player (in fact a model made by Panasonic) and heard through small but good quality speakers containing built-in amplification. This set-up was placed on the desk directly behind where the performers were sitting (and next to the Walkman with the tiny built-in speaker which played the punctuating chords). The hummer had to get up and cross the room to change his cassettes on the deck that is part of my stereo system. The speakers of this system were pointed at the performers.

The sounds produced by these tasks are important, intentional components of the material which makes up this composition: the clattering of the cassettes; the sound of the performers moving; the sound of the cassette players' mechanisms (including the beep of the Panasonic starting and stopping); the opening of the windows.⁷

The four cassettes changed by the hummer were all made with the C-1000S placed in the following resonating chambers.

i. Hummer-cassette 1 was made with the microphone placed in a cardboard tube 3.5 feet long and 4 inches in diameter.

⁷ A subtle but notable side-effect that occurs when both cassettes are being changed results from the third whistler being the only one gating the mixed 'piano' lines: in that situation the 'piano' cuts in and out disjointedly with the startings and stoppings of that performer.

ii. Hummer-cassette 2 was made with the microphone placed in the cavity of a clay dumbek (an hourglass shaped drum) 13.5 inches tall with a 7.5 inch head.

iii. Hummer-cassette 3 was made with the microphone placed in a stainless steel pressure cooker 9 inches tall with a 7 inch mouth;

iv. Hummer-cassette 4 was made with the microphone placed in a glass pitcher capable of holding a quart, with a body which tapers out from a narrow neck.

The eight cassettes changed by the whistler were made with the C-1000S placed in the following resonating chambers.

i. Whistler-cassette 1 was made with the microphone placed in a Tupperware plastic container 12 inches long, 8 inches wide, and 3 inches tall. The lid was partly on, just pulled up at the end where the microphone entered.

ii. Whistler-cassette 2 was made with the microphone placed in a crystal brandy snifter.

iii. Whistler-cassette 3 was made with the microphone placed in a tea chest made of light wood lined with tinfoil, 20 inches long, 16 inches wide, and 2 feet tall.

iv. Whistler-cassette 4 was made with the microphone placed in a cardboard tube 2.5 feet long and 2 inches in diameter.

v. Whistler-cassette 5 was made with the microphone placed in an arborite (covering half-inch thick particle board) shelf enclosure (i.e. with a back, sides, and a shelf above), 22 inches wide, 5.5 inches tall, and 10.5 inches deep. A large rectangular tinfoil plate had a hole cut in its middle to form a collar around the cannon of the C-1000S to close a part of the front of the shelf enclosure.

vi. Whistler-cassette 6 was made with the microphone placed in a homemade styrofoam tunnel 3 inches square and 3 feet long. The styrofoam walls were a half-inch thick. A window in the apartment was open during this recording.

vii. Whistler-cassette 7 was made with the microphone placed in the body of a steelstring, flat-top acoustic guitar.

viii. Whistler-cassette 8 was made with the microphone placed in a large cardboard box lined with cushions and covered with a cushion. A window in the apartment was open during this recording.

Movement II was recorded with two Realistic PZM microphones routed into a portable DAT recorder. The microphones were placed in the corners at the far end of the living room away from the performers, 2 feet behind the backs of the stereo speakers.

The only editing done at Hexagon Studio was trimming the beginning, so that the recording starts right on the first 'piano' attack (the first two ambient recording cassettes were already playing before the performers started their midi-piano tapes), and a five second fade-out at the end.

3. Artistic Concerns Surrounding Recording

Part of the motivation to compose *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* came from a realization that my fundamental experience of listening to music was through recordings. This is increasingly true for many, if not most, listeners. For me, recordings are not momentos or reminders of the 'authentic' experience of hearing the music performed live – my relationship to recordings preceded such experiences. I also realized that there is nothing neutral about the recording process. Not only does an instrument played live in a hall sound palpably different from hearing a recording of it, the array of production techniques inherent to each recording varies greatly. These production techniques are significant, distinct, and active contributors to the resultant recorded music. This is not only an issue of colouration (i.e. whether the sound is bright or muddy, wet or dry) but also of what is actually audible. How a piece is recorded is part of the music, as much as all the other aspects of interpretation – dynamics, phrasing, articulation, rubato, etc.

An especially vivid example of this can be heard in the effect of the pervasive close-miking used in harpsichord recordings, where the pitch sustains to a degree inaudible from even a short distance away, and where the balance between the clatter of the key mechanisms and the audible pitches is shifted, through microphone placement, to emphasize the pitches. This not only effects the perception of the melodic and harmonic character of the piece being played, but changes the instrument it is being played on, homogenizing the harpsichord somewhat into a more generic plucked-string sound and diminishing its highly particular percussiveness.

Another extreme, but contrasting example can be found on recordings made by Nimbus Records.⁸ (I am not referring here to the historical recordings which that company re-releases.) These are typified by a peculiarly distant sound. This presumably is the result of placing the microphone at a distance that they feel will replicate for the listener the experience of listening to the instrument in the hall in which it is playing. What one gets instead is a document of the resonances of that hall. When the recording is played back, these resonances are not perceived as ambient but rather as present, distinct sound added to that of the instrument and somewhat obscuring and muddling it. The resonances of the room one inhabits are latent as part of the listener's environment; when recorded and located in a speaker, these resonances are sounds entering the listener's environment.

This observation has to be related to the aural expectations surrounding the music being played. The distance and resonance of a Nimbus recording only obscures and muddles if the listener perceives it as extraneous; that is, if the listener is not able to coalesce all that they are hearing out of the speaker into something that is perceived solely as 'the music' (and Nimbus has its supporters). For example, the recorded sound of Medieval chant is the sound of chant reverberating in a Gothic cathedral. Indeed, if this music was recorded close and dry, i.e. without added resonance, the production values would become obvious, active and potentially distracting. Another example is the ECM recordings of the Art Ensemble of Chicago. When fans of ECM listen to an Art Ensemble of Chicago recording they would maintain that they are listening to the Art Ensemble of Chicago. For detractors of the label, however, they are listening to the Art Ensemble of Chicago plus the extreme reverb and ethereal finish that producer Manfred Eicher brings to all of his projects.

Besides these specific examples, the kind of ensemble texture described above in regard to the trombone-baritone saxophone-traverso section is, of course, not at all innovative. The ability to combine and blend the sound of instruments extremely diverse in amplitude (both played and intrinsic to the instrument) has been a distinguishing characteristic of recorded music since its onset. Popular music arrangements by Nelson Riddle, George

⁸ Nimbus Records Limited, Wyastone Leys, Monmouth, England, U.K.

Martin, Lalo Schifrin, Ennio Morricone, Fred Frith, Steve Beresford-David Toop, or Pascal Comelade show that any instruments can be combined through recording.

Along with these realizations about recording, I also recognized that whenever I composed, the projected sound I had in mind was that of the potential piece heard through my stereo. *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* is in many ways a result of bringing particular speculations and possibilities that arise from this recognition into the compositional process.

My interest in manipulating recording techniques and activating the listener's awareness of them was inspired by a great number of experimental films and videos. The works I am thinking of embody a highly diverse array of compositional strategies that are given rise to by an equally diverse and often opposed set of artistic agendas. What they have in common, however, is that they all take on some kind of investigation into various aspects of various kinds of apparatus set in motion for the production and consumption of film or video. These apparatus include not only the mechanisms involving the camera and the film-stock, but also the institutions and culturalized conventions that are in place for the reception of what the camera has to offer. Examples would include:

i. Michael Snow's *La Region Centrale* (1970-71), is a film shot in the wilds of Northern Quebec, consisting of 190 minutes of camera pans, at different speeds and directions, facilitated by a special, custom built camera mounting that "permitted multiple kinds of movement simultaneously, [including] figure-8s, arcs, scallops, sweeps, zig-zags, horizontal shifts, Mobius strips, tipping and rocking of the image within the frame, along with a shaking effect and angling or tilting of the image in the frame."⁹

ii. Ernie Gehr's *Side/Walk/Shuttle* (1991) is a 40 minute film which was shot from an active outdoor glass elevator for, as the artist has said, "the visual, spatial and gravitational possibilities it presented me with."¹⁰

⁹ from Regina Cornwell's detailed discussion of the film in *Snow Seen* (Toronto: PMA Books, 1980), p. 110

¹⁰ from the catalogue, *Films of Ernie Gehr* (San Francisco: San Francisco Cinematheque, 1993), p. 20.

iii. Gehr's *This Side of Paradise* (1991) a film which was shot in a Berlin flea market but shows it largely through disjunct reflections offered by a variety of muddy puddles of rainwater.

iv. Malcolm LeGrice's *Yes No Maybe Maybe Not* (1967) is a film which includes footage of the Battersea power station printed in both positive and negative, and physically superimposed. The positive and negative prints are threaded overlapped, but lined-up in terms of the image, and re-shot while being projected. During this re-shooting, as an indeterminate result of the sprocket mechanism not being able to handle two films, the image is allowed to go through a variety of phases of out-of-sync.

v. Peter Gidal's *Room Film 1973*, is a film of a bedroom. Deke Dusinberre writes:

The camera movement is erratic, might almost be said to be aggravating; [...] The objects remain hard to identify, and sometimes the screen offers no coherent image at all. The inability to grasp those images is the result of several techniques: the extreme close-up of many shots, the instability of the images (due to the instability of the camera), the poor illumination and the loss of the edges of the frame (both due to manipulation in the printing process), the graininess of the images, the ubiquitous green tinge [...] The film is almost relentless in its denial of tangible images (that is, images which are easily identifiable and spatially locatable). It appears, instead, as periods of green and grey punctuated by instances of light – light not only as the camera studies the ceiling light (at about 8 minutes into the film) and a lamp on the mantel (at 44 minutes), but also light from the projector during the flare-outs at (roughly) 200-foot intervals throughout the film.¹¹

¹¹ Deke Dusinberre, "The Ascetic Task: Peter Gidal's *Room Film 1973*" in *Structural Film Anthology*, edited by Peter Gidal (London: British Film Institute, 1976), p. 109. I brought Snow and Gidal together as examples to give a further example of how deeply opposed the operating politics of these artists can be. See Gidal's harsh criticisms of North American experimental film in: *Structural Film Anthology*, *ibid.*; Peter Gidal, *Materialist Film* (London: Routledge, 1989); *The Cinematic Apparatus*, ed. Teresa de Lauretis and Stephen Heath (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).

vi. On the other end of the technical spectrum from *La Region Centrale* in regard to calling attention to camera positioning, Bruce Nauman's videos, *Pacing Upside Down* and *Revolving Upside Down* (both from 1969) in which the artist tapes himself pacing and revolving for, in both cases, an hour, with the camera in a fixed position, but mounted upside down.

vii. Nancy Holt's *Underscan* (1974) is a video:

Certain monitors have an 'underscan' button, a device which compresses the images so that the edges can be clearly seen. Use of this device provides three image options – normal image, compression of only the sides, and compression of the entire image. Holt uses this framework to display photographs of her aunt's house as she reads from letters written by her aunt. Most of the photographs are seen three times but they look different each time, having been transformed by the underscanning.¹²

viii. Joan Jonas' *Vertical Roll* (1972) is a video which involves the 'mis'-setting of the vertical hold of a video monitor – which is displaying a live feed within the artist's studio – causing the image to 'roll'. The camera feeding this monitor then picks up the action of the artist reacting to what she is seeing – for example the image of a spoon beating against a metal cabinet in time with the periodicity of the vertical roll. The final tape results from the monitor being videoed by another camera, with a further layer of reflexive activity occurring when the artist places herself between the vertical-roll monitor and the recording camera – controlling her placement within the frame by referring to a second monitor connected to the recording camera. I also think of *Vertical Roll* as relating to the second movement of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* in the way that the final result is produced as the amalgam of source material, rendered on the same technological medium as that which will carry the final result, and a performer reacting to this source material in a kind of reflexive loop (one can imagine, for example, a further reflexive activity of a listener recording her/himself whistling along with my recording of

¹² JoAnn Hanley, *The First Generation: Women and Video, 1970-75* (New York: Independent Curators Incorporated, 1993), p. 65

the second movement, and so on). Another important antecedent for me in regard to reflexive loops is Richard Serra's video *Boomerang* (1974): the head of Nancy Holt is seen wearing headphones and talking into a microphone. The microphone signal is being run into a reel-to-reel tape deck and the headphones are monitoring the playback-head of the tape deck. Thus, Holt hears in her headphones what she is saying into the microphone but in quick-delay, caused by the distance between the record-head and the playback-head. What she is saying into the microphone are her reactions to hearing her words in delay; but the miracle of this work is that this process cross-circuits Holt's ability to form coherent sentences – she cannot hear what she is saying in her head to control its organization, due to the interference of the delay. I do not pretend to match, or even aspire to, the elegant closure of Serra's self-generative loop. Yet it is important to me that the performers in my second movement – like Holt in *Boomerang* – are not free agents performing against the source material. But rather, their part of the final result is a by-product of an attempt to carry out a task in relationship to the source material: the whistlers-hummer do not care what they sound like nor can they hear what they are doing very well due to the volume of the piano in their headphones.

Another artist investigating the production and reception of the recorded image is Trinh T. Minh-ha. Her work (including her writing) has been especially inspirational to me and can be related productively to this consideration of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*. Trinh ostensibly makes documentaries. *Reassemblage* (1982) and *Naked Spaces – Living is Round* (1985) draw on Africa; *Surname Viet Given Name Nam* (1989) draws on the experience of living in Vietnam and expatriating to the United States; *Shoot for the Contents* (1991) draws on China. I use the word "draw" because these films are not "about" these places or experiences. The genre of ethnographic documentary is typified by various attempts to represent an Other. By having her work butt-up against the conventions of this milieu, Trinh is able to unsettle, problematize, and unravel some of the assumptions inherent in these representations, opening up the images and sounds of her films to be experienced differently. When asked why she "wanted to merge experimental with documentary filmmaking" Trinh replied:

I have never thought of them as being separated. "Experimental" for me is not a genre nor an approach to filmmaking. It is, in a way, the process of unmasking readymades, or more commonly put, of making visible what remains invisible (ideologically, cinematically) to many, including oneself; what does not correspond to the established codes and is not always known in advance to the spectators as well as to the filmmaker. If "experimental" is a constant questioning of the relationship between the filmmaker and the filmmaking, then it cannot be separated from the material, whether one chooses to call this material documentary or fiction.¹³

And an observation Trinh makes further along suggests in part why documentary practice is a field in which one might productively enact this questioning:

I am thinking here of numerous films that claim (in their tone and in the way that they offer information more than in any explicit statement) to give us a scientific view of the "natives." What is considered "scientific" or "objective" is often no more than the adaptation of a number of film codes and of an established approach in documenting, in other words, a question of ideology.¹⁴

Trinh talks about some specific aspects of her approach to "unmask[ing] readymades" in regard to her film *Reassemblage* :

The use, for example, of unfinished pans, of jump cuts and of distance itself as "readings" – that is shots, as you have noticed, that travel without departure or arrival points, shots that are too short, too close or too far for the viewer to take full possession of the content of the image – may be viewed as an attempt to balance content and context, and are therefore aimed at unsettling our habit of seeing through the documentary "object-oriented" camera eye. Recurrent jump

¹³ from an interview by Harriet Hirshorn, "Questioning Truth and Fact", in Trinh T. Minh-ha, *Framer Framed* (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 183

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 186

cuts within a single event may indicate a hesitation in selecting the "best" framing. They may also serve as rhythmical devices that disrupt spatial and temporal continuity, and suggest a grasping of things in their instantaneousness, in their fragility. Extreme close-ups remind us of the filmmaker's voyeurism; at the same time they lead right into the image, into the texture of things instead of giving us just an image or focusing of the object filmed (the end-point). Similar strategies are found in the way I cut the music and use everyday language as music.¹⁵

And further, in another interview, Rob Stephenson makes the observation: "For me, *Reassemblage* is much more disjunctive and more confronting. *Naked Spaces* seems to be smoother."¹⁶ Part of Trinh's response is:

Yes, the disjunctive aspect of the first film is evident; [...] It's my first film and the difference you refer to has to be brought out in a more obvious way. In the second film, I think the confrontation and the challenge come precisely from the fact that the work does not *appear* disjunctive even though it may be said to be profoundly and extensively so. It becomes clear in *Naked Spaces* that "disjunctive" is also "conjunctive." One does not exclude the other, and de-centering (a subjectivity) is not a simple matter of disjoining. There is a sense of continuity throughout the film, but not the type of linearly closed continuity that leads you from a starting point to an ending point.¹⁷

Aspects of these quotes point to a number of areas of concern that spill beyond the consideration at hand, which is the presentation of other works which inform my approach to the recording of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*. This excess can serve as an introduction to Trinh's thought which shall be returned to throughout this document. It is introduced here, however, to address a difference I see between her project and that of some

¹⁵ from an interview by Constance Penley and Andrew Ross, "When I Project it is Silent", from *ibid.*, p. 226

¹⁶ from an interview by Rob Stephenson, "Professional Censorship", in *ibid.*, p. 214

¹⁷ *ibid.*

of the other filmmakers mentioned and which very much addresses my relationship to recording.

Snow, Gehr, and Gidal are all involved in "unsettling" various conventions and preconditionings of "seeing through the [...] 'object-oriented' camera eye" (Trinh, footnote 15). But for them (without diminishing the differences and oppositions between their points-of-view) this "unsettling" becomes the subject of the work. That is, their creative strategies and artistic innovations in regard to the manipulations of the camera become far more the centre of attention than whatever the camera is being pointed at. The films are demonstrative and exemplary in their methodology and, as such, offer clear indices to aspects of the artists' intentions. (This is not to say that there is not a rogue wonder that can arise from viewing these films or that this would not be desirable to the filmmakers.)

With Trinh's work it is harder to know what is going on. The strangeness of the Other – of the villages of Mali or Senegal or the dances of China – is very strange indeed, and engaging, in the way that she presents it. The images have an impact that any documentary would covet.¹⁸ *Naked Spaces* does not seem to be a film about film, its construction and apprehension. It seems to be about West Africa; but because of the subversions inherent in her presentation, this semblance is troubled in that the film displays no omniscient authority and does not offer the comfort of imparting a sense of truth or understanding. Yet the subversions are not lucid enough or consistent enough or pervasive enough or dramatic enough to take on another authority, that of being an artist's individual vision (or, as Gidal seems to aspire to, that of a cogent political agenda). This is particularly true of *Naked Spaces* which is even less exemplary and demonstrative than Trinh's other films; where "the confrontation and the challenge come precisely from the fact that the work does not *appear* disjunctive even though it may be said to be profoundly and extensively so" (Trinh, footnote 17). The unsettling comes from "an attempt to balance content and context" (Trinh, footnote 15).

¹⁸ Or maybe the images have too much impact for a traditional documentary, given the cliché of 'the cold truth'. Trinh's shots could easily be represented as being 'beautiful' or 'poetic' and thus smack of aestheticized fiction.

This is where the connection exists with *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*. My piece is not *about* recording or the subversion of recording techniques. I am concerned with the pitches, rhythms, textures, and sonorities involved in the piece (and their histories outside of the piece) – especially in the first movement – as surely as Trinh is concerned with her images of West Africa. I am concerned with the material of the piece, and the sounds of the recordings (including the environmental sounds they add) are a part of this material. I think that the perceptual possibilities that arise from my close-miking, or using an unusually hot level – with the effect of bringing out the player's breathing or hearing the key mechanism at work – could be thought of as analogous in effect as indicated in Trinh's statement that: "Extreme close-ups remind us of the filmmaker's voyeurism; at the same time they lead right into the image, into the texture of things instead of giving us just an image or focusing of the object filmed (the end-point)" (Trinh, footnote 15). I am interested in the "texture" of a sounding gesture, not just its performative refinement or placement and function within a compositional or conceptual structure.

I suppose it is not so much a "balance [of] content and context" that I am looking for as a condition where the dialectic line that can be cut between the two disappears and they become unknowable as categories (a condition that, for me, does occur with Trinh's films). I want the array of elements that make up my hybrid material to be as capable of being (mis)apprehended as all context as all content. Especially with the first movement, I want a situation in which any given element at any given moment might seem familiar (and maybe beautiful or sentimental or comfortable) but in which there is no real sense of what is going on; no solid indication or even implication of what my agenda or intent as a composer might be. And *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*, with its inexorable meandering, has "a sense of continuity, [...] but not the type of linearly closed continuity that leads you from a starting point to an ending point"; it embraces the idea that "'disjunctive' is also 'conjunctive'" (Trinh, footnote 17).

I think my piece can be effectively related to a number of the following observations that Trinh makes about her own work:

I would say my film is not just about transgression. Breaking rules is not my main concern since this still refers to rules. I do think that some of my shots and editing are very conventional. [...] The objects and subjects filmed are purposeless; they are not governed by any single rationale. [...] I would say that gratuitous images form an important part of the film, and, in order to convey a multiplicity of readings, much of the film should be that which I do not fully control.¹⁹

A closer appreciation of what is at stake when material is sometimes purposeless, gratuitous, and not fully controlled – as it is in *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* – is very much a part of chapter two. I bring it in here, however, because I want to stress that my recording strategies – as well as my treatments of every other aspect of the material – are in the service of "convey[ing] a multiplicity" of listenings. They are not intended to be merely transgressive in their peculiarity. As stated above, I want the piece to be non-definitive; not demonstrative or innovative.

I am not pretending, however, that my work has the same scope or overt political stakes as Trinh's. In some ways it might be better compared to the Nauman videos mentioned above, that remain myopic observations of pacing and revolving – joining his upside-right observations of bouncing balls or "walking in an exaggerated manner" in other videos – but where the apprehension of these observations is unsettled and altered by them being upside-down; or Holt's *Underscan* where the images continue to operate as reflections on her aunt's house even though these reflections are unsettled by the underscanning process.

The non-neutrality of the recording process in the first movement is not only reified through the eccentric techniques applied. It also comes from the overdubbing of them. The music is coherently harmonious and rhythmically coordinated – there is no sense of collage or random simultaneity about it – and yet the performances clearly belong to different locations and thus different times. And so it is not just the four voices of music that are in counterpoint but also the sounds of the environments that they are being recorded in. In this way these environmental sounds – by which I do not mean just the extraneous noises, but also the resonance and

¹⁹ from the interview by Penley and Ross, op. cit., p. 230

reverb characteristics of the locations – become active rather than ambient. Moreover, the disjunction of location and time within an otherwise cohesive music is further complicated by the cutting in-and-out of the gated lounge-jazz. It seems to be dropped in, not from just another place but from another milieu. And especially given how disjointed the cutting in-and-out is, one would think that it could be readily apprehended as collaged. But again, I do not think that even the gated part of the piece is perceived as an overlay or juxtaposition because of the overriding, culturalized cohesive strength given to coherent pitch organization. It is synthesized into the whole as harmonious.

This can be related to a particular difference between the status-quo documentary, and Trinh's treatment of it, and the status-quo music recording and my strategies concerning it. The documentary pretends that the viewer is actually encountering the situation that has been documented via the neutral, objective medium of film or video – that the viewer has been taken back to the time and location of the recording. Trinh reminds the viewer that they are in fact encountering a film in a theatre – a present-tense event – made from particular points-of-view. The music recording pretends to be offering a present-tense, ideal transubstantiation of a musical vision. I hope to remind the listener that they are hearing a document, a recording of particular people, with bodies that initiate sound by putting a variety of substances into vibration, in particular locations (rooms/houses/cities) at particular times that are part of particular personal histories all of which are different from the identity, location, and personal history of the listener. What these strategies have in common, however, is that they do not exist to admonish the viewer/listener as to the folly of an illusion. Rather, they assume that these illusions are culturally intact and are, in a sense, immutable. And so the strategies are not presuming to negate them but rather to (positively) complicate and problematize an experience by placing these illusions into a heterophonous babble with other points-of-view – a babble that includes everything that the viewer/listener brings to the experience.

The guise of an "ideal transubstantiation" is further troubled in the second movement which throws into flux what the listener will call 'the music' and where they will locate it. Is 'the music' the piano, with the

whistling and humming being an overlaid physical gesture, significant more for its viscerality than for its sound? Or is 'the music' a strange microtonal heterophony/polyphony made up of the piano plus the humming-whistling, performed against the environmental (not-musical) backdrop of some kind of science-fiction sound effects – i.e. the acoustically altered ambient noise recordings? Or are these sounds part of the musical counterpoint, operating like a pitchless *Klangfarbenmelodie* – a listening that would be given credence by the fact that the tapes of these sounds are physically being played; that they are being layered and changed according to a part and the performance of this part is audible? And is the clack and clatter and beeps of the cassettes and cassette players an extraneous sonic artifact left in the document of this performance, that, hypothetically, would be edited out if a more 'ideal' recording of 'the music' was made? And, indeed, the movement seems to be a document of a kind of theatrical performance; it suggests that the 'real' work of art being referred to was located elsewhere at a previous time. And yet, its only medium of presentation is audio, not video, and it is put forward as the second movement of a piece, the first movement of which clearly indicates that what is being heard cannot and will not correspond to a live performance. And so the clack and clatter and beeps are then the intentional sounds of strange percussion instruments. All this suggests, finally, that everything heard is 'the music'; and yet this interpretation is unlikely to stabilize given the duration and incessancy of the movement and all the space which that creates for the mind to slip and slide between the various potential apprehensions.

II. Pitch, Rhythm, and Form

Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music is modal music. The first movement has eight continuous sections which correspond to the change of instruments, as described above. Each section is also typified by one of eight transpositions of a nine-note mode. This mode, if one starts with C, would be spelled: C, C-sharp, D, E, F, F-sharp, G, A, B. I think of this scale as being the combination of two intervallically identical pentachords, one being transposed up a fifth from the other. In this case C, D, E, F, F-sharp is combined with G, A, B, C, C-sharp (with one note, the 'tonic' of the resulting nine-note mode, being common to both pentachords).

In the first movement this mode is successively transposed seven times in a circle of fifths. It starts with G-flat as the tonic.²⁰ Thus the pitches in the first section are G-flat, A-flat, B-flat, B, C, D-flat, E-flat, F, G and the pitches in the second section are D-flat, E-flat, F, G-flat, G, A-flat, B-flat C, D. Note that the second pentachord of the first scale becomes the first pentachord of the second scale. Also, only one pitch changes with each modulation so the harmonic shifts from section to section are very subtle.

The eight manifestations of the mode in this movement constitute all transpositions that contain both C and G: G-flat, A-flat, B-flat, B, C, D-flat, E-flat, F, G to G, A, B, C, C-sharp, D, E, F-sharp, G-sharp. This is the harmonic significance of the gated sruti box drone mentioned in footnote 1.

The score realized by the computer driven midi-piano for the second movement is transposed to continue this series of modulations; thus starting with D, E, F-sharp, G, G-sharp, A, B, C-sharp, D-sharp.

Other qualities of the mode include that it contains three major scales (again, spelling it with C as the tonic): C, G, and D (and all of the Church modes that go with these scales); as well as two four-note chromatic cells: G, F-sharp, F, E and D, C-sharp, C, B. The play between a familiar diatonicism and an unpredictable, subtly insidious chromaticism is a distinguishing characteristic of this music. This relationship also

²⁰ The piece actually begins with a six bar introduction that does not adhere to the mode. The rationale surrounding this will be presented later.

significantly bears on the workings of the harmonic system to be described below.

In most regards, the manipulation of these pitches within the notated part of the piece, as well as its rhythmic content and formal proportions, are the result of a number of interlocking systems, rules and procedures that, once set in motion, operate with a minimum of interference from myself in the generation of the bulk of the material which makes up the composition. It is important to me, however, prior to a description of these technical procedures, to address somewhat my relationship to this way of working.

A passage from William Brooks' 1982 essay, "Choice and Chance in Cage's Recent Music", touches on an essential aspect of that sensibility which precedes my adoption of any particular compositional methodology. Brooks' article considers Cage's music-making systems; it refutes the view of Cage doctrinairely adhering to pure chance and the systematic removal of any subjective intention in the creation of a piece. Particularly telling is Brooks' observation that:

By a kind of self referential logic, procedures designed to accept changing procedures must themselves be subject to change; and by the same logic, if that which is accepted includes intention, it must be possible for these changes to be intentional. If taste is admissible, it must be admissible at all levels; yet, paradoxically, procedures which strictly exclude taste must also be admissible. In effect, the compositional universe must be open to all compositional techniques, from the most arbitrary to the most artful, with no particular technique preferred. And, indeed, Cage's most recent period manifests exactly this openness, with works ranging from the abstraction of *Renga* to the precision of the *Cheap Imitations*. The world of music, with all its conventions, is returned to itself, together with all that was gathered on the way; only the values formerly attached to that world have been removed. (the underlining is mine).²¹

²¹ William Brooks, "Choice and Chance in Cage's Recent Music." in *A John Cage Reader*, edited by Jonathan Brent and Peter Gena (New York: Peters, 1982), p.95

What I am interested in is precisely this "openness" and this exploding (as opposed to negation) of "values". And the systems I use are merely tools to facilitate experiments in musical possibilities that may arise from such ruptures. In a sense I am not particularly interested in the empirical technical/ formal/ structural properties of the systems I employ in and of themselves. Giving oneself over to material-generating procedures does not constitute a rupture in values in and of itself, and the adoption or not of such methods is not what is at stake.

1. Linear Pitch

The treatment of the nine-note mode in *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* initially stems from the application of two systems, the second being controlled by the first. I discovered the first system in the work of the Danish composer, Per Norgaard (particularly, *Voyage into the Golden Screen* and the *Second Symphony*), and it involves the generation of what he has called an "infinity series". One starts with a basic cell of two or more pitches – for example, G and A-flat. To get the next note in the series one takes the first interval of the series (in this case there is only one), a semitone up, inverts it and applies it to the first pitch of the series to get an F-sharp, a semitone down from G. The interval is then re-inverted to a semitone up and applied to the next pitch, in this case resulting in an A. These two new notes, F-sharp and A, constitute the second cell. One now takes the next interval (either between the second and third notes of the original cell if it has more than two notes, or, as in this example, between the last note of the first cell and the first note of the second cell), being a major second down, A-flat to F-sharp, and applies it to the pitches of the second cell: first the inverse, a major second up from F-sharp is A-flat, and then the re-inversion, a major second down from A is G. The third interval that occurs along the row is a minor third up, F-sharp to A. This is applied to the third cell to get the fourth: a minor third down from A-flat is F, a minor third up from G is B-flat. This process continues with the fourth interval in the row being applied to the fourth cell to give rise to the fifth cell, the fifth interval to the fifth cell to get the sixth cell, etcetera. (The first fourteen cells of this series can be found as Example 1 in Appendix 1 at the end of this document.)

A significant characteristic of the series which results from this process, and the aspect for which these results were named "infinity series", is that, while cells will reoccur, they will never recur in the same order. That is, the series never reaches a point where it will repeat itself as a whole.

My basic cell is nine notes long – each of the pitches of the nine-note mode described above with C as its tonic. The cell is F, G, F-sharp, A, E, B, D, C, D-flat. The second cell then is, starting with the application of the inversion of the first interval: E-flat (a major second down from F); A (a major second up from G); E (a major second down from F-sharp); B (a major second up from A); D (a major second down from E); C-sharp (a major second up from B); C (a major second down from D); D (a major second up from C); B (a major second down from D-flat). Example 2 (again, in Appendix 1) shows the first twelve cells of this infinity series.

To form the polyphony of the piece two infinity series are used. With a nod to serialism I decided that the second generative cell would be the retrograde of the first, thus: D-flat, C, D, B, E, A, F-sharp, G, F. Moreover, the specific ordering of the nine notes of the mode to form the original cell was arrived at to facilitate a particular harmonization between it and its retrograde. I wanted it to be as consonant as possible, avoiding the tritone and the semitone. The resulting intervals are a major third, a perfect fifth, a major third, a minor seventh, a unison, and then the inverse of the first four intervals in retrograde, a major ninth, a minor sixth, a perfect fourth, and a minor sixth.²² This is presented in the six bar

²² As an aside, I originally aspired to having the row mirror itself from its centre note and still harmonize itself in retrograde in a relatively consonant manner. The closest I came was (given the mode with a tonic of C) starting on A as the middle pitch, that is the fifth note in the series: the sixth note is a perfect fifth up, an E, the fourth note a perfect fifth down, a D; the seventh note is a minor third up from the sixth, a G, the third note is a minor third down from the fourth, a B; the eighth note is a major second down from the seventh, an F, the second note is a major second up from the third, a C-sharp; the ninth note is a minor second up from the eighth, an F-sharp, the first note is a minor second down from the second, a C; resulting in the row: C, C-sharp, B, D, A, E, G, F, F-sharp. This was promising harmonically. Played against its retrograde, it has the unison in the middle flanked by the expanded major seconds, then minor sixths and major thirds in the seventh, second, third and eighth positions. But I was left with a tritone at the start and finish. I

introduction with the original cell in the top voice and the retrograde in the second voice.

The top line of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* uses 450 cells generated with the aid of a computer program written by Stephen Parkinson. And after its initial presentation in the second voice during the introduction, the third voice takes over the 260 cells used from the series generated by the retrograde-original cell.

At bar seven the piece takes on the mode throughout all the voices. As can be seen in Example 2, the infinity row, as generated, is chromatic. To make it adhere to the mode I simply added or subtracted accidentals to a given pitch to make it fit. Thus the A and D in the second cell, which do not occur in the first transposition of the mode, become A-flat and D-flat. I always use the accidental that belongs to the spelling that I have chosen for the mode. That is, although the pitch A-sharp also occurs in the first transposition, all A's will be changed to A-flat because the mode is expressed in flats instead of sharps.

Cell 2 also gives an example of how this process alters the melodic contour of the row. The fifth pitch of the cell, D, becomes D-flat, and the sixth pitch, C-sharp, is enharmonically re-written as D-flat, giving repeated pitches where there was previously stepwise motion.

decided that keeping the texture consonant was more important than the elegant consistency and integrity of any serial methodology. The compromise was to start with the middle note being E. I could then keep some of the character of a mirror row with only the positioning of the tones and semitones in the first, second, eighth and ninth places altered; i.e. tone then semitone in the original, semitone then tone in the retrograde.

I bring all this up because I want to establish from the outset that this piece includes numerous potential examples of this kind of artisanal concern for craft. My interest in the culturalized harmonic conventions latent in the mode, the use of modulation within a formal strategy, my treatment of traditional consonances, and any local application of serial techniques are just a few occurrences of me implementing my training, with myopic delight, whenever other compositional predeterminations so allow - "The world of music, with all its conventions, is returned to itself, together with all that was gathered on the way; only the *values* formerly attached to that world have been removed".

Another aspect of this modalizing process stems from the fact that the program used to generate the row only uses one of the two possible spellings of any pitch with an accidental. These are: B-flat; E-flat; A-flat; C-sharp; F-sharp. Thus, in the third transposition of the mode (with an A-flat 'tonic'), which does not include an F-sharp-G-flat but does have both an F and a G, the occurrence of an F-sharp-G-flat in the row will always be notated as an F because the computer never spells this pitch as a G-flat. This is harmonically significant in that it creates an increased statistical propensity to the sounding of the pitch F.

A significant aspect of the linear character of the piece is that although the pitches are given by the system, the octave in which they are played is not. This allowed for a significant amount of decision making in regard to how smooth or jagged a line should be; whether the reoccurrence of a certain set of intervals should be treated the same way or varied; whether the reoccurrence of a given pitch within an array of notes should be treated as a pedal, staying in the same octave even as the melody expands away from it; etcetera. These kind of choices were copious and specific. It was interesting to me, however, that my interest in the manipulation of the contour of the line was unprecedentedly academic and craft-oriented, working within the limitations of predetermined pitches; another instance of "the world of music, with all its conventions, [being] returned to itself" (Brooks, footnote 21).

2. Rhythm

Before presenting the vertical harmonic treatment of the rows it is necessary to explain how the rhythm of the counterpoint was arrived at. From bar 7 on, the rhythm of the top three lines comes from an infinity series shuffling of the 96 bars that make up Willi Apel's transcription of a turn-of-the-15th century three part ballade by Matteo da Perugia.²³ This ballade, *Le greygnour bien*, is a characteristic example of the late medieval compositional style now generally referred to as *ars subtilior* ("more

²³ Willi Apel, *French Secular Music of the Late Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1950), pp. 1*-3*

subtle art").²⁴ This music is typified by extreme rhythmic intricacy, both in terms of the make-up of an individual line as well as the relationships between lines. However, it is important to make clear that what I actually appropriated was Apel's transcription and not *Le greygnour bien* itself.

The original was written using a very complex mensural notation that is completely different from modern musical notation. Most significantly in terms of my purposes this notation does not involve the use of barlines. Moreover, the nature of the original, barless notation stressed the loose ametrical quality of the original lines. They do not give the impression of syncopation so much as a drifting, swaying rubato; the counterpoint sounds more like a kind of free heterophony than a complicated interlocking polyphony. Given this, the *ars subtilior* strategy can be heard as a notated loosening and relaxing of the Machaut style rather than as a complex, hyper-technical intensification of the earlier style's methodologies. It is extremely lyrical (if rhetorical) music, the voices moving melismatically to the resting places of cadential pauses.

I bring this up because I want to stress that it is not the intent of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* to merely emulate and prolong the melodic/contrapuntal qualities of *Le greygnour bien* (even beyond pointing out the profound difference in characters that a rhythmic figure can take on when different sets of pitches, and the melodic and harmonic implications they bring with them, are applied to it). While I think the extreme rubato and heterophonic quality are retained, due to the fragmentation engendered by the infinity series procedure, the lyrical, linear aspect of the source material is seriously subverted. With *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*, melodic phrases are apprehended as short, unpredictable moments that slip in and out of relief from the amorphous (but hopefully pleasant) soup of languid, meandering counterpoint; directionless in that it offers no sense of moving towards a climax or resolution. My desire was for a music of extreme detail. But not detail that would be presented spotlighted as a precious little invention. I wanted detail that would have to be extracted by the listener with an attention as obsessive and myopic as that of the composer or the performers (another

²⁴ first coined by German musicologist, Ursula Gunther, in her article: "Das Ende der *Ars Nova*," *Die Musikforschung*, 16 (1963), pp. 105-120.

level of counterpoint). Or not. I wanted music that could just as happily slide away from acute perception and flow (or maybe stagger) along as a continuum. I wanted a music that had no substantial middleground – just foreground and background.

In this respect *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* is more inspired by my listening of English Elizabethan consort music than of medieval music. I am thinking of the fantasias rather than the dance based pieces. Thomas Morley defined the fantasia in his book *A plaine and Easie Introduction to Practicall Musicke* (published in 1597):

The chiefest kind of musicke which is made without a ditty is the fantasie that is when a musician taketh a point at his pleasure, and wresteth and turneth it as he list, making either much or little of it as shall seeme best in his own conceit.²⁵

Like the fantasia, *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* is about the arbitrary "wrest"ing and "turn"ing of myopically local interactions; about the make-up of "a point" (although the arbitrariness of my "list"ing "pleasure" and "conceit" is largely given over to the arbitrariness of the inter-related systems).

I bring up English consort music because other observations surrounding it form an interesting entrance into my thinking about my composition. However, before considering these, the rest of the systems at work in the piece should be introduced.

My application of the infinity series to the *Le greygnour bien* transcription starts with the numbering of its bars and the rewriting of my original pitch cell into numbers. If one numbers the twelve pitches of the

²⁵ in Michel Bernstein's liner notes to the recording, *Lawdes Deo. Consort Musicke set for Viols by Christopher Tye*. (Astree E 8708, 1989, p. 8). It is quoted in the context of the following helpful background information: "The consort of viols uses essentially two kinds of forms: those which derive from the dance and abstract pieces which spring from the composers' imagination. The dances (allemande, courante, pavane, galliard, gigue), generally of a homophonic character, refer to popular themes, but they are stylized, that is to say they are not really intended to be danced. The abstract pieces are polyphonic and take the form of the *In Nomine* and of the fantasia or *fancy*."

chromatic scale starting on G²⁶, the generating cell could be re-written as 11, 1, 12, 3, 10, 5, 8, 6, 7. Thus, after the six bar introduction, the rhythm of the top three voices of the next nine bars of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* are identical to bars 11, 1, 12, etc., of the *Le greygnour bien* transcription. The rest of the series is generated from this number cell as follows: one takes the number of integers between 11 and 1, being minus 10, inverts it to plus 10 and applies it to the cell in the same manner as with the pitch series. 11 plus 10 is 21; (I treated the 96 bars of the transcription as being cyclical, therefore:) 1 minus 10 is 87; 12 plus 10 is 22; 3 minus 10 is 89; and so on. The first six cells of this infinity series are shown below:

Example 3:

11, 1, 12, 3, 10, 5, 8, 6, 7
21, 87, 22, 89, 20, 91, 18, 92, 17
10, 2, 11, 4, 9, 6, 7, 7, 6
19, 89, 20, 91, 18, 93, 16, 94, 15
12, 96, 13, 2, 11, 4, 9, 5, 8
17, 91, 18, 93, 16, 95, 14, 96, 13

If a bar starts with a tied note this note will remain tied whether the last note of the bar which precedes it in the infinity series was tied in the source material or not. And likewise, if the first note of a bar is untied it remains untied regardless.

3. Harmony

It is the coming together of the prescribed pitches of lines one and two, and the prescribed rhythms of lines one, two, and three, that control the operations of the harmonic system implemented in *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*. I conceived of the mode as being written as a succession of fifths. Thus the first transposition of the mode to be used in the piece would be spelled: B, G-flat, D-flat, A-flat, E-flat, B-flat, F, C,

²⁶ I chose G because, although I conceived of the mode of the cell as being generated from C, G seems to my ear to be more traditionally tonicized because of the lack of the semitone above it occurring within the mode. Thought of in this way, the mode has a more diatonic spelling as a major scale with a lydian fourth and a mixolydian seventh added in.

G. I decided that at any given instance in the composition every fifth that occurs in this spelling, between the two prescribed pitches of the first and third voices, must also be sounding. For example, in bar 7²⁷, a D-flat occurs in the third voice and an E-flat in the first. Therefore, according to my pre-determination, an A-flat must also be played. In this case, this can be handled by the second voice, the rhythm of which is prescribed but for which I choose pitches to most efficiently adhere to my harmonic scheme. With the move to a B by the third voice on beat two, more pitches, a G-flat and a D-flat, are required to fill in the fifths. This is how the bottom two voices are created.

The harmonic system also dictates that the filling-in-the-fifths principle also applies on the linear/melodic level. For example, if a melody in the above transposition went from B to C, somewhere concurrent, or in between the articulation of those two pitches, G-flat, D-flat, A-flat, E-flat, B-flat, and F would also have to sound. This gives rise to instances such as bars 273-274 where the top three voices are playing a C and a G at the end of bar 273 moving to a G-flat and a D-flat at bar 274. To make this shift adhere to the system the bottom two voices briefly play F, B-flat, E-flat, and A-flat before the entrance of the D-flat-G-flat. This is also an example of one the rare situations that occur in which the bottom two voices become rhythmically separate from the top three.

In general, my goal was to have the fewest notes possible sounding; in other words, to implement the system as efficiently as possible. This aspect of the compositional process took on the character of a problem-solving game or a puzzle; especially in regard to making choices around the potentials and limitations of the prescribed rhythm of the second voice, and in trying to come up with the most economical interactions between the vertical and linear aspects of the system. Every bar is a specific example of this decision making process since the contingencies set in motion make every beat unique.

The nature of these choices join those regarding the contour of the melodies as, again, attributes of a music fixated on detail, on the "wrest"ing and "turn"ing of "a point" (Morley, footnote 25).

²⁷ The six bar introduction deviates from the system somewhat in a way that will be presented later.

The six-bar introduction differs from the rest of the piece in that the execution of the harmonic scheme does not fall within a nine-note mode. I wanted to present the two generative cells at their original pitch without abutting the mode built on C so abruptly with the one built on G-flat. My solution was to not establish a mode and rather use the fewest number of intermediate fifths possible from the whole circle of fifths. So instead of filling in D-flat-F with C, G, D, A, E, B, F-sharp (G-flat) as I would if I were adhering to the mode based on C, I only use A-flat, E-flat, B-flat, going the other direction on the circle of fifths.

The rhythm of the introduction is free, loosely based on different voices found in the first four bars of the rhythm infinity series.

There is a quality of the harmony which arises from this system that is worth pointing out. These harmonies have a life in contemporary American popular culture, specifically in the arena of lush pop-jazz. I am thinking of Harold Arlen, George Shearing, Errol Garner, Johnny Mandel, Burt Bacharach, post-*Blue* Joni Mitchell, Steely Dan, a lot of Soul music from the last twenty-five years, and anyone doing Acid Jazz – along with countless others. And in experimental music, this sound is a reservoir from which Gavin Bryars, Robert Ashley, and "Blue" Gene Tyranny have drawn many times.²⁸ As the fifths build up, harmonies reminiscent of this kind of music emerge. Three fifths produces the implied minor 7th chord with an added fourth; four fifths produces the major 6-9 chord, one of the most popular cadential arrivals in lounge jazz; five fifths add the sweet major 7th to the previous chord; six fifths produces the major 13-sharp11 chord, a staple of Bill Evans and "Tell Me a Bedtime Story"-vintage Herbie Hancock. It is not until the addition of the seventh and eighth fifths that one arrives at dissonances with less currency in popular music (although, even in these occurrences, the pop harmonies contained within the more complex texture can be reinforced through voicing; for example, the chord arrived at by piling seven fifths is often expressed throughout the piece as two major 7th chords a major 9th apart). The pop-jazz harmonies occur

²⁸ Bryars' *1, 2, 1-2-3-4* and *My First Hommage*, Ashley's *Perfect Lives (Private Parts)*, and Tyranny's *Nocturne With and Without Memory* for example.

with the addition of notes in the bottom two voices, those played by the synthesized panpipes which gate the quasi-lounge-jazz organ-bass improvisations. This accounts for the comfortable, if somewhat psychedelic, blend between the polyphony and the improvisations. This seemingly absent-minded slipping between open fourths and fifths and lush upper-function harmonies is, for me, one of the most distinctive characteristics of the piece.

4. Inadvertent Pitch

There is one other aspect of the pitch heard in the piece which needs presentation. This has to do with the incongruities in tuning between the instrumental parts. These were knowingly built into the piece. The computerized click-track played the root and fifth of the mode that the instrumentalist was playing in and they were asked to tune to this. However they were not allowed to monitor other performance tracks so as to adjust their pitch to them. As a result, parts that sound in some kind of 'in-tune' with the click-track can be considerably out of tune with each other. This is particularly potent on held written unisons which, unlike a live performance where even an ensemble with intonation problems will adjust, here are held in all their microtonal beauty (the 'close enough for jazz' tuning adage was certainly in play between the alto saxophone and the trumpet). Further, the traverso player was instructed to stay with the mean-tone tuning most compatible to the instrument and Baroque performance practice; the trombone player, in being asked to play as quietly as possible, was told to not worry about maintaining enough support to keep the pitch consistent; the recorder player was asked to use the simplest fingerings possible regardless of the temperament that arises from this (the tuning of recorders is notoriously flaky); the melodicas, which are not precision instruments and go out of tune over time, were exhibiting some uncontrollable pitch anomalies.

I have been intoxicated for some time with tuning eccentricities heard in some jazz and some traditional folk music. I am thinking of how, in many ways, irregular intonation defines the sounds of Archie Shepp and Jemeel

Moondoc²⁹ or of the kind of rogue microtonality that results when Irish bagpipers and button accordionists play together. I am far more attracted to this kind of aural situation than that which arises in some contemporary music with the implementation of a microtonal system – quarter-tone, harmonic series just, Pythagorian, etcetera. Unlike these systems, which point to the master plan of an individual composer, 'out-of-tune'ness points to the phenomenal, visceral sounding of an instrument by a player – and not the playing of the instrument in general, but a specific instrument being sounded by a specific player. Again, this is a theme that will be picked-up in the next section of this document.

5. Formal Layout

A diagram of the form of the piece is given as Appendix 2. It approximates layers of Golden Sections using Fibonacci numbers to measure the segments. In this case the Fibonacci series starts on 2 (i.e. 2, 2, 4, 6, 10, 16, 26, 42, 68...). The choice of using quasi-Golden Section proportions did not have much to do with their hierarchical, architectural potentials and nothing to do with the quasi-mystical speculations some put forward about the transcendent aesthetic properties of the Fibonacci series or the Golden Section (for example, H.E. Huntley, *The Divine Proportion: A Study in Mathematical Beauty*). I was interested in the staggered variations in the layerings of instruments, and in the incessant continuation of material for rather extreme durations, that the preset form would force me to execute. I wanted to be told the job I had do – as in, 'make a table that works'; no matter how fanciful the embellishment, it will need to be a stable, level surface insisting on structural givens. My main reason for choosing quasi-Golden proportions in the predetermining of my sections was that I wanted the non-symmetrical relationships it provides. I wanted the different instruments and recording sounds to be of various lengths, to complicate the relations of the weight of each one's presence in the listener's memory. (Apart from the fact that things go on for a long time,

²⁹ This aspect is wonderfully, knowingly taken-on in the Jemeel Moondoc Quintet's recording *Nostalgia in Times Square* where the guitarist, Bern Nix, tunes his instrument slightly out with the piano giving Moondoc's intonation eccentricities an equally eccentric pitch base to move through.

for me, any other particular potency that the form of this piece might have – in its listening – is related more to reflection than to expectation.)

My decision to use the series starting on 2 was largely based on recording formats. Had I started the series on 1 the two movements would either have to be 55 and 34 minutes, both of which seemed too short to me, or 89 and 55 minutes. Given the latter, the entire piece would last 144 minutes which would not fit onto a DAT or hi-fi video (recorded using the highest quality speed); the second movement would not fit onto a single side of a cassette tape; the first movement would not fit onto a single compact disc (a double c.d. set is the format that eventually the piece, hopefully, will be released in).

How this was arrived at, and with it the setting of the tempo at a quarter note=44.5, further exemplifies the thoroughly un-numinous nature of the processes which established the mathematical skeleton of the composition: Because of the format issue mentioned above, I had uneasily reconciled myself to the unsatisfactorily shortened durations of 55 and 34 minutes. The score was composed with the idea of the the first movement being played at a quarter note=55 and the second at a quarter note=89 giving rise to a score of 1513 bars. I was also unsatisfied, however, with the tempo 55 for the first section, finding it too quick, and too close to the obligatory pulse of the second (quarter note=60; half the tempo of a march), to be as fully languid as I wanted. Still relating ideas to Fibonacci numbers, I tried tempo 44.5, half of 89 and liked it. This caused the score to be played in 68 minutes, the longer duration I was wanting while still fitting within recording format restrictions. And it followed that it was a Fibonacci number in the series starting on 2 (with tempo 89 taking 34 minutes, half the tempo takes twice the time). And it meant that the midi realization for the second movement was played at a quarter note=72, half of 144, the next Fibonacci number up from 89, to give a duration of 42 minutes, the Fibonacci number which precedes 68.³⁰

³⁰ There is some approximation at work here since the Fibonacci series does not produce exactly equal proportions between its elements; i.e. 55 is to 89 not exactly as 89 is to 144. Likewise 68 is to 42 not exactly as 44.5 is to 72. For the 1513 bars to take exactly 42 minutes to play the tempo would have to be 72.048. I think that my lack of concern for this kind of mathematical fineness must be evident by now.

III. Conclusion to Chapter 1

Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music is chamber music and can embrace that definition from a number of different positions.

First of all, as suggested above, it alludes to the body of work which has been called the first chamber music, Elizabethan English consort music:

There was one essential difference between English music and that written on the continent: in Italy, as in Spain, works which were not intended for a solo instrument were composed for outdoor ensembles, for courts or for churches; they were never intended to be played by a small group as a dialogue between a few partners who got together for the performance of the piece. That is why what we still today call chamber music can be said to have taken root in England.³¹

However, as might be implied by the typification of the music as "a dialogue between a few partners who got together", the performance of this chamber music occupied a much more casual social space than that of the highly competitive, professional, recital hall performances of today. It was "'private musick' to be performed [...] in the congenial atmosphere of a home."³²

The identification of the chamber intended for that chamber music as being "a home" has an obvious connection to the nature of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*. One of the main motivations of this project was the recognition that, for me, all music was fundamentally "chamber music" – that, as I presented earlier, my primary relationship to any music was formed through listening to recordings in the "congenial atmosphere of a home." As I said, "for me, recordings are not momentos or reminders

³¹ Bernstein, op. cit. Ernst H. Meyer concurs throughout his seminal study, *Early English Chamber Music* (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., new and completely revised edition, 1982. First published as *English Chamber Music*, 1946), p. 91, for example.

³² from Ludwig Finscher's liner notes for the Bruggea Consort's recording *English Music for Recorders and Consort of Viols in the 16th and 17th Centuries* (Das Alte Werk, SAWT 9511-B ex, 1967)

of the 'authentic' experience of hearing the music performed live – my relationship to recordings preceded such experiences." And, again as has been considered above, given the non-neutral, determinative participation of the conventions that inhabit and surround the process of recording, it is a way of hearing music that has a character of its own. A recording of symphonic music is chamber music. It is produced and refined to sound a certain way through a stereo in a home. It is intimate. It does not sound like symphonic music played by an orchestra in a large hall filled with people (both in an empirical acoustic sense as well as in terms of the way that social/historical/cultural influences shape public listening).

There are other, more particular connections that can be made between my piece and English consort music, given its identification as being a "private musick". Consort music was "largely composed for amateurs who appreciate music where every one has an equal part to play."³³ It was

³³ from Francis Baines' liner notes to Fretwork's recording *Cries and Fancies* (Virgin, VC7 90849, 1989); Ernst Meyer also talks about consort music as being played "in private houses for recreation" (Meyer, op. cit., p. 94). It should be said, however, that Peter Holman for one has suggested that there is more evidence to suggest that consort music was initially created to be "used largely for teaching purposes in choir schools" rather than to be played recreationally by amateurs (Peter Holman, liner notes for Hesperion XX's recording *John Jenkins Consort Music for Viols*, Astree E 8724, 1991). Even given this, however, it would not negate the observations which follow, considering Elizabethan consort music as a form that did not exist primarily to be performed for the edification of reflective listeners.

I have been using the term "Elizabethan" in regard to this consort music because, through the reign of James I, the form became more declamatory and performative, culminating in the works for consort by John Jenkins and William Lawes. This was not a sudden break. Meyer traces the evolution of this more demonstrably expressive aesthetic through the history of consort music. However, it is his description of the sensibility that pervaded the musical world at the time of the earliest, Elizabethan consort music, that suggests most directly the character which *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* seeks to emulate:

[...] a state of complexity and turgidity, many highly ornamental voices winding around each other in slow-moving counterpoint. The psychological effects of this weaving of continuous close tissues of

music that was written for the joy of being played; not to be an expressive object consummately presented in such a way as to most fully impact an audience. There was no intended listener with the distance to regard and reflect upon it; to evaluate its coherence as a unified statement. The field of interaction was between the players; it was "a dialogue between a few partners who got together". This is surely related to the preoccupation of this music with the "wrest"ing and "turn"ing of "a point". The invention of the moment – the local shifts in sonority, the physicality demanded by a gesture – and negotiating the continuous meandering of that invention, was what was available to be enjoyed by the player. In this sense, it was not music primarily intended to be listened to.

Indeed *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* embraces other musics not intended to be listened to; other "private musick[s]". This has already been presented in regard to the 'whistling-along' and 'humming-along' of the second movement; and also in regard to the intended reference in that movement to the 'covert' apprehension of someone playing the piano in their own domestic space. (Indeed this implied eavesdropping is layered with the listener 'clandestinely' taking in someone whistling or humming to themselves who are in turn 'clandestinely' whistling and humming along with the other private sound of someone practicing the piano in their home.)

The idea of music not intended to be listened to also applies to the "languid, slightly apathetic" lounge-jazz improvisations of the gated recording. By "lounge-jazz" I mean background music (as opposed to jazz

independent parts, impossible to disentangle from each other and from the whole, was one of neutrality and lack of definition. (Meyer, op. cit., pp.114-115)

Indeed, it is not until the generation after Morley (Jenkins, et. al.), that Meyer is able to identify "the introduction of *variety* into the fantasia form." (ibid., p. 155) And it is not until late Jacobean times that Meyer is able to ascribe to musical evolution the new motivating force of composers wanting to "*communicate* their individual problems and ideas to the world." (ibid., p. 169, and continuing through p. 170.) The implications of this observation will become more resonant as this document continues and what was discarded in the wake of this motivating force is considered.

intended to attract and entertain an audience and which may happen to be performed in a lounge); music intended to pad the experience of people drinking cocktails and talking to each other and which should in no way intrude on these activities. Like wallpaper, it can be incidentally noticed but it should not call attention to itself.

For a couple of years in the late 1970's my job was being a lounge-jazz bassist. The group I played with was not very accomplished. It was a quartet – sax., piano, bass and drums – but on slow nights (i.e. most nights) the saxophone player would not play the last set. This left the pianist, who was an especially inexperienced improviser and, by professional standards, a weak technician, to take charge of the tunes. He was not really capable of improvising a flowing melodic solo and still keep track of, let alone play, the chord changes. The music that resulted was an unpredictable, arbitrary, seemingly aimless and directionless collection of accompanying harmonic gestures and obligato fragments flickering in the void created by the removal of the focus and linear momentum of a concentrated solo. This was not a problem, however, because, especially by this time, no one was listening – except for me. Bass playing duties in this situation were not at all demanding (the owner insisted that the bass be kept extremely quiet – essentially inaudible) which allowed me to be aware of what was going on around me with some reflective comprehension. This kind of playing became a source of wonder for me as I allowed evaluations of competence to slip away. The pianist's concentration often seemed to me to be completely removed from any sense of context or progression: exploring and wallowing in the lushness of a sonority; or incessantly (though languidly and subtly so as not to intrude on the clientele) repeating a gesture either to technically perfect it or out of wanting to prolong the joy of the physicality of the gesture. I think he also presumed that no one was listening. Likewise, the drummer, who was a fine musician (but who I assume thought that, with the lack of a recognizable solo going on, there was nothing to react to), would become increasingly internal in his concentration on his playing. He would become preoccupied with the sound of a certain drum or with the 'feel' of a certain stroke, playing with arm position and pressure, or with the physical mechanism of executing certain figures on his kit, experimenting with hand alternations, stick crossings, and the order in which the drums were played (although, again,

very subtly). Moreover, musical relationships would occur between the pianist's and drummer's playing that were unprecedented and extraordinary – extraordinary, I think, as a result of the two players being essentially unconscious of each other. They were unconcerned with trying to sound 'good' – that is, recognizably competent – to impress a potentially evaluating audience who could measure their offerings against the standard set by the 'greats'. My organ and bass playing on the gated recordings aspires to emulate the sensibility of that music-making both in terms of the myopic (yet lymphatic) focus of the individual parts as well as the rogue relationships that arise from combining the parts (I did not do any retakes and the second part was always played without me monitoring the previous one – on some tapes the bass was recorded first on others the organ).

I realized while listening to my colleagues' late-night playing that terms (and at this point in my musical life, pejorative terms) like 'senseless' and 'mindless' should apply to this music. However, I remained fascinated. This experience was formative to an ongoing belief that the conventions surrounding the apprehension of music were not based on understanding – that is, hypothetically responding to the clarity and coherence (or lack there of) of a musical statement – but rather on recognition. I no longer think of any music as 'making sense' but rather as being more-or-less familiar.³⁴

Rather than taking on a critique of the entire field of musical semiotics I would offer this quote from Trinh Minh-ha:

³⁴ I do not think that what is familiar is defined by adding up describable attributes. It is not a question of novelty - a composer may come up with a sonority that I have never heard the like of before but its contextual role within the composition seems familiar. Nor is it solely a question of expectations and the surprise of expectations being stymied - the surprise might seem familiar as a dramatic ploy, a heightening of tension for a listener who hears music as a playing out of virtual destiny. It is not a question of methodology. Again it has to do with William Brooks' statement: "The world of music, with all its conventions, is returned to itself, together with all that was gathered on the way; only the values formerly attached to that world have been removed." It is the removal of these "values" that makes music unfamiliar; stops listeners from recognizing "the music" of sounding gestures, even ones that they have heard before.

As the philosopher Gilles Deleuze remarks, our civilization is not one of the image, but rather, a civilization of the cliché. We often read images on the level of metaphors and perceive meaning as something there, already existing. What seems more difficult is to see an image as image, without metaphors, with its excess, its radical or unjustifiable character.³⁵

I believe that this observation is absolutely applicable to music; to the aural "images" ascribed to musical materials and gestures. (I am also not going to take on, at this point, the psychoanalysis of what a "musical image" might be.) And it points out that a semiotic debate is not really very relevant to my consideration of musical apprehension. That is, it does not matter so much that Julia Kristeva can put forward (it seems to me, justifiably) that music is "a language that doesn't mean anything"³⁶ because a communicated meaning is nonetheless assumed, it is "something there, already existing." As such, this leaves the listener the task of recognizing, identifying and organizing the "cliché(s)" being transmitted. If this task is somehow stymied it can be perceived that the music is 'senseless' or 'mindless' – the result of an incoherent musician lacking in communication skills. Deleuze-via-Trinh's idea of the cliché-as-metaphor is important because it implies that, in regard to music, when one talks about a cliché one is not talking about any actual succession of pitches, harmony, texture, sonority, or performance gesture but rather a stereotyping of these

³⁵ Trinh T. Minh-ha, *When the Moon Waxes Red* (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 110-111.

³⁶ Julia Kristeva, *Language, the Unknown*, translated by Anne M. Menke (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). *Le langage, cet inconnu*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1981), p. 309: "While the fundamental function of language is the *communicative* function, and while it transmits a *meaning*, music is a departure from this principle of communication. [...] It is a combinatory of different elements, [...] If the addressee hears this combinatory as a sentimental, emotive, patriotic, etc., message, that is a cultural system rather than a result of a 'meaning' implicit in the 'message.' For while music is a system of *differences*, it is not a system of *signs*. Its constitutive elements do not have a signified. Referent/signified/signifier here seem to melt into a single mark that combines with others in a language that doesn't mean anything."

'images'. That is, the possibility does exist of apprehending in Beethoven's music (and maybe in spite of Beethoven, whoever he really was) the sounding-gesture as sounding-gesture "without metaphors, with its excess, its radical or unjustifiable character" but it is indeed massively difficult given the historical, cultural standardization of its metaphorical value.

And my interest in this "excess", this "radical or unjustifiable character" is addressed in my strategy of bringing "private musick(s)" into the political, discursive world of the reflective listener. Private musics are not intended to be listened to in the sense that they are not assumed to be meaningful or communicative. Of course, Lounge jazz and English consort music are appreciated by many who hear them, but I think, broadly speaking, this appreciation typically takes the form of sensation – the music should be pleasant/ soothing/ sweet/ sonorous/ relaxing/ luxurious/ etcetera – and the music (and the craft that goes into composing it or playing it) is listened to as being in the service of facilitating this sensation.³⁷ It enters and is integrated into the listener's (and for that matter, the player's) world to fulfil a function; it does not pretend to create its own virtual, self-contained world – a numinously meaningful formation reifying an artist's creative impulses. Thus whether it is heard as mindless by-product (whistling or humming to oneself), the radiation of the personal joy or challenge of playing an instrument (the person practicing or noodling aimlessly; or the amateur consort), or functional background (lounge jazz), private music is not metaphorical, it is not standing for a "meaning [that is] something there, already existing."

³⁷ Given this condition, the music takes on an anonymous, almost generic quality. I think, for example, that even an avid listener would concede that it would be a much harder task, in a random starting-point listening test, to identify, or learn to identify, a given section of a Christopher Tye (c. 1500-1572) *In Nomine* (or even which *In Nomine* it is, or even that it is in fact Christopher Tye) than to make such an identification in regard to a Beethoven string quartet given the same amount of exposure. In consort music, there are no easily definable themes, first and second subjects, to follow through stages of development. There is no Schenkerian middleground because there is nothing about the music to indicate what is more or less important in the foreground; no more firmly recognizable and coherent musical argument to be extracted from the decorative elaborations of the less significant foreground material that is jettisoned to formulate the middleground.

And yet it still involves people making gestures that produce sounds and sounds that come together to produce gestures. Thus, if one's goal is to put out work that is "not just about transgression", where "breaking rules is not [the] main concern since this still refers to rules" (Trinh, footnote 19), but which hopes to offer a situation more conducive to hearing a "[sounding gesture] as [sounding gesture], without metaphors, with its excess, its radical or unjustifiable character"³⁸, then private music offers a productive space in which to experiment; it offers a path-of-least-resistance. That is, although private musics are surrounded by conventions – habits of apprehension which need unsettling – these conventions do not carry the same weight as those which prop up music-that-is-meant-to-be-listened-to as a language for "representing the emotions" or as a "sounding mathematics"³⁹; the transgressions do not need to be so aggressive or so overt to render the codes, which integrate private music into culturalized daily life, unintelligible.⁴⁰ For me, there were no confrontations required:

³⁸ Or, as the sentences which directly follow this quote from *When the Moon Waxes Red* state: "To find again, to restore all that one does not see in the image [or sounding gesture] is not simply to parody the cliché or to correct it. Rather it implies disturbing the comfort and security of stable meaning that leads to a different conception [...] in which the notions of time and of movement are redefined, while no single reading can exhaust the dimensions of the image." (Trinh, 1991, op. cit., pp. 110-111)

³⁹ Georgina BOYD, "Music, Modernism and Signification", in *Thinking Art*, ed. Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne (London: Institute of Contemporary Arts, 1991), p. 167: "Throughout history there have been two recurring kinds of universalising theory of musical meaning: that music represents the emotions, and that music is, as Dahlhaus puts it, 'sounding mathematics'. In both cases, these properties are read as immanent to music."

⁴⁰ I think that this also relates to Trinh's relationship to documentary film practice. Documentaries tend to aspire to the conceit that the maker can and should be anonymous within the viewers' experience of the film. They want to show the viewer situations 'just the way they are'. It is not a genre which carries the clichés which require the work to display its maker's individuality, creativity, and imagination; in fact it discourages such perceptions. It is not a genre for self-expressive Artists. Thus, it is also a kind of path-of-least-resistance and little energy needs to be spent in undermining 'visionary-Art' clichés as

some quasi-private musics just needed to be heard together, and heard together with some of the private sounds that accompany their production (breathing, finger-mechanisms clicking), and with the heightened environments and resonances of the private spaces in which they play⁴¹; and all to be heard together within a private space (in the home, through a home stereo – though even here, there is a suggestion in the music of more than one of these spaces being brought together: the gating of the quasi-lounge jazz comping evokes a kind of home-appliance occurrence: in another place a radio, which the listener has no control over, is cutting in out, or someone is fiddling with it).

And this non-confrontational sensibility also governs the strategies that put the "quasi" in "quasi-private musics" – that is, my manipulation of pitch in rhythm. This sensibility also gives rise to an unthreatening background continuity but with a foreground infested with a strange symbiosis of little cultural organisms. And these organisms include the pitch and rhythm formations: an open consonance; a plagal harmonic progression; a fat, upper-function chord; a rhythmic cadential figure, with its held resolution; a memorable fragment of sweet, diatonic melody coming out from an amorphous, seemingly texture-motivated line; all familiar gestures, but in an unfamiliar music. However, there is no static, visual paradigm at work here⁴² – no juxtaposition, no collaging or montaging of distinct or

Trinh conducts her experiments in multiple voices, multiple readings, non-aggressive disorientation, etcetera.

⁴¹ This addresses one of the main reasons I chose to do so much air-microphone re-recording of electronically reverberated tracks, running the processed signals through my stereo and guitar amp; often mixing it with a dry, unprocessed input, either live or in the mixdown; and it addresses why, in general, the reverb sounds so low-tech. It seemed necessary to take on and call attention to studio-produced electronic reverb, one of the most obligatory intrusions of the status-quo music recording process; however, in keeping with the affirmative, chamber-music aspect of this project, I decided to do it in such a way as to overtly celebrate (while still subverting standard procedures) signal-processing as it exists for 'garage-bands' or in basement/bedroom studios (which, of course, was the level of technology I was working with anyway).

⁴² I am thinking here of Morton Feldman's comparisons of his work to Middle-Eastern carpets or Philip Guston's paintings; or Louis Andriessen's idea of "montage form."

disparate elements, collected together for successive consideration and comparison. *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* is music that moves, but it staggers in a meander rather than flows in a line. "There is a sense of continuity throughout [...], but not the type of linearly closed continuity that leads you from a starting point to an ending point" (Trinh, footnote 17). For me, there is more wonder in the ability of these organisms to be symbiotic (even the gated music is not really separate: there is no melody, just comping; that is, it really is just accompanying the counterpoint). The "'disjunctive' is also 'conjunctive.'"

And I would like to return to another one of the Trinh Minh-ha quotes:

Recurrent jump cuts within a single event may [...] suggest a grasping of things in their instantaneousness, in their fragility. Extreme close-ups remind us of the filmmaker's voyeurism; at the same time they lead right into the image, into the texture of things instead of giving us just an image or focusing of the object filmed (the end-point). [footnote 15]

That "end-point" belongs to the public, performative space of declaration: it does not matter if the "object" adheres to the rules or breaks the rules (it "still refers to rules"; Trinh, footnote 19), it is "image[d]" (i.e. represented and presented) in the "focus" that will most emphatically and coherently make its point. However, "grasping [at] things in their instantaneousness, in their fragility" or burrowing "right into the image [or sounding gesture], into the texture of things" belongs to an intimate space; it belongs to the chamber.

I am going to introduce one other way in which *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* can be thought of as "chamber music". This is in relation to Alvin Lucier's composition, *Chambers* (1968). The score instructs the performer to "Collect or make large and small resonant environments", and a wide assortment of these are listed. Next: "Find a way to make them sound"; and again, there is a list of possibilities. And then:

Sounds of portable resonant environments such as sea shells and cupped hands may be carried out into the streets, countrysides, parks, campuses, through buildings and houses, until outer limits are reached where minimum audio contact can be maintained by a player with at least one other player.

Sounds of the outer environment encompassed by the players may be heard with reference to the sounds of the portable resonant environments carried by the players. Sounds of determinate pitch in the outer environment may be heard in simple or complex relationships to the pitches of the portable resonant environments. Sounds of indeterminate pitch in the outer environment may be heard to take on the pitch, timbral, dynamic, and durational characteristics of the sounds of the portable environments.

Sounds of fixed resonant environments such as cisterns and tunnels may be made portable by means of recordings, or radio or telephone transmissions, and carried into inner or outer environments. When carried into inner environments, such as theatres into beds, the sounds of the now-portable resonant environments may either mingle with or take over the sounds of the inner environment. When carried to outer environments, such as boilers into parks, the sounds of the now-portable resonant environments may be treated as original portable environments.

Mixtures of these materials and procedures may be used.

Increasing and lessening of any characteristics of any sounds may be brought about.⁴³

I present this both to gratefully acknowledge the obvious influence of this particular piece on specific strategies employed in *Burrow Out*; *Burrow In*; *Burrow Music*, and also to call attention to certain relevant aspects of Lucier's work in general. (For those unfamiliar with his work, I would direct them to the book from which this score is quoted.) For me, Lucier, more than any other composer, creates the potential for anything that can be heard to be part of a musical experience. However, he does not do this through any blunt polemic of the 'any sound can be music' sort, leading to the 'listen to the sounds around you' kind of piece. I think latent

⁴³ Alvin Lucier, *Chambers*, a score collected in the book, *Chambers*, by Alvin Lucier and Douglas Simon (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1980), pp. 3-6

in his work is the realization that music is not about sound per se, but the sounding gesture; it is about substances being played to make sounds. For Lucier any room, any resonant chamber, is a bell to be rung; but even more radically, because the entire gesture exists as the field of artistic experimentation, what is ringing the 'bell', the physical, mechanical, operational nature of the 'beater' becomes open to compositional speculation and seminal to the sound of the resultant music. (*Music for Solo Performer, Music on a Long Thin Wire, I Am Sitting In A Room, Vespers, and Quasimodo the Great Lover* ⁴⁴ can be referred to as examples.) In this light, any musical instrument and every possible aspect of its playing becomes an intrinsic (and really amazing) element of the music itself, not just a carrier of 'the music' – the phenomenal vessel for the numinous Idea. This includes a range of "texture" and "fragility" that a great deal of composition tries to hide so as not to disturb the "image or focusing of the [presented musical idea] (the end-point)" (Trinh, footnote 15). Thus Lucier has been a key for me, not only to open the way for resonances and peripheral sounds to be heightened and treated as active parts within a heterophony (as opposed to a surrounding environment), but for the intricate viscerality of playing an instrument, with all of its temporal modulations, to become a voice as well.

It might be obvious by now that this conclusion is becoming more of an introduction. Much of the preceding touches on areas that will be considered in a broader context in the next chapter. And keeping this in mind, I would like to relate some of the above to some observations made by Norman Bryson. He starts the epilogue of his book, *Vision and Painting*, with a description of a scene of a film made of Matisse executing

⁴⁴ With *Quasimodo*, even though it is a traditional instrument (a string bass is suggested) that "rings" the first room/hallway/etc., it is the bass plus the resonant character of that space which (transmitted by a microphone, an amplifier and a speaker) "rings" the next space, which has its own resonant character (and which is empty of any other sound producing elements), and then it is the amalgam of those sounds, transmitted in the same manner, that "rings" the next, and so on, before the complex and wonderful combination of all the resonant chambers activated finally reaches the speakers in the chamber in which the audience is sitting.

a painting within his studio. Part of this film was shot in slow motion and Bryson describes how this displayed the physicality of the brush bristles flexing, the sticking of the paint to the canvas, the posture of the artist's fingers and wrist and elbow, and all the smooth and jerky, large and tiny, intentional and unconscious motions that energized these elements. He then continues:

Looking at the Chu Jan scroll in Cleveland, I can imagine all of these gestures; no film is necessary for me to locate these movements, for the silk is itself a film that has recorded them already; I cannot conceive of the image except as the trace of a performance. In part the performance has been fully advertent, directed to the gaze of the spectator in the same way that a dancer projects his movements through the four sides of the proscenium to the audience beyond; the four sides of the scroll contain a spectacular space, where everything exists for consumption by the gaze [...] But in part, the performance is inadvertent, for although the strokes are so displayed that from the interlocking structure I can visualize a scene, a monastery in stream and mountain landscape, the strokes also exist in *another space* apart from the space of the spectacle, a space not so much convergent with the silk (though the silk intersects with it, it is a *section* of that other space) as with the body of the painter; it is *his* space, and in a sense it is blind; the movements executed there will, as they touch the silk, leave marks I can construct as a *scaena*, a spectacle, but these marks are also simply *taches*, traces left behind in the wake of certain gestures, but remaining below the surface of intelligibility (recognition), blind marks which support, eventually, the sigils from which I can construct the landscape scenically, but which are also independent of the sigils they bear; [...] in the Chu Jan, it is also this choreographic space, behind the proscenium surface, which also we look into, studio space seen from the *excluded* angle of the picture gallery. It is this other space of the studio, of the body of labour, which Western painting negates.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Norman Bryson, *Vision and Painting* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 163-164

Western music also negates the "space of the studio, of the body of labour" whether it is through the polish and theatricalized emotiveness of the professional performance or the idealized virtual reality of the commercial recording, both spectacular spaces. *Burrow Out, Burrow In, Burrow Music* celebrates the "inadvertent" sounding gestures; the sounds of the "space of the studio, of the body of labour" (the sounds that Lucier, more than anyone else, rediscovers); the "blind", intimate sounds of "his [and her] space", that is, the "chamber".

CHAPTER 2 CRITICAL CONTEXTS

Another of Norman Bryson's writings offers a useful starting point to further pursue some of the themes suggested in the first chapter. What follows comes from the chapter "Rhopography" found in Bryson's book, *Looking at the Overlooked: Four Essays on Still Life Painting*:

Still life negates the whole process of constructing and asserting human beings as the primary focus of depiction. Opposing the anthropocentrism of the 'higher' genres, it assaults the centrality, value and prestige of the human subject. Physical exclusion is only the first in a series of negations of the kinds of human-centred dignity we are used to finding in the other genres. Removal of the human body is the founding move of still life, but this foundation would be precarious if all that were needed to destroy it were the body's physical return: the disappearance of the human subject might represent only a provisional state of affairs if the body is just around the corner, and likely to re-enter the field of vision at any moment. Human presence is not only expelled physically: still life also expels the values which human presence imposes on the world.

While history painting is constructed around narrative, still life is the world minus its narratives or, better, the world minus its capacity for generating narrative interest. To narrate is to name what is unique: the singular actions of individual persons. And narrative works hard to explain why any particular story is worth narrating – because the actions in the story are heroic or wonderful, or frightening or ignoble, or cautionary or instructive. The whole principle of storytelling is jeopardised or paralysed by the hearer's objection: 'so what?' But still life loves the 'so what?' It exactly breaks with narrative's scale of human importance. The law of narrative is one of change: characters move from episode to episode, from ignorance to knowledge, from high estate to low or from low to high. Its generative principle is one of discontinuity: where states are continuous, homeostatic, narrative is helpless. But still life pitches itself at a level of material existence where nothing exceptional occurs: there is wholesale eviction of the Event. At this level of routine existence, centred on food and eating, uniqueness of

personality becomes an irrelevance. Anonymity replaces narrative's pursuit of the unique life and its adventures. What is abolished in still life is the subject's access to *distinction*. The subject is not only exiled physically: the scale of values on which narrative is based is erased also.

Perhaps one may draw on the distinction made by Charles Sterling between 'megalography' and 'rhopography'. [footnote 2, chapter 2 in Bryson's book (pp.182-183); from Charles Sterling, *Still Life Painting: From Antiquity to the Twentieth Century* (2nd edition, New York: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 27.] Megalography is the depiction of those things in the world which are great – the legends of the gods, the battles of heroes, the crises of history. Rhopography (from *rhopos*, trivial objects, small wares, trifles) is the depiction of those things which lack importance, the unassuming material base of life that 'importance' constantly overlooks. The categories of megalography and rhopography are intertwined. The concept of importance can arise only by separating itself from what it declares to be trivial and insignificant; 'importance' generates 'waste', what is sometimes called the preterite, that which is excluded or passed over. Still life takes on the exploration of what 'importance' tramples underfoot. It attends to the world ignored by the human impulse to create greatness.⁴⁶

The connections between the above and much of what was touched on in the first chapter are initially easily apprehendable. Clearly, *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* aspires to being a kind of aural "rhopography"; it attempts to stymie the application of quasi-narrative stereotypes and engages in an "exploration of what 'importance' tramples underfoot". The celebration of whistling-along and humming-along and out-of-tune playing and 'absent-minded' noodling; a counterpoint of room resonances and a counterpoint of 'extraneous' noises which infiltrate these rooms – all of these would indicate a neatly ascribable rhopology ("rhopology" rather than "rhopography" given my extrapolation of it into the aural).

However, there is much more available from the above than making local correlations between the quote and "trivial" musics explored in *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*. To get at these potentials I am

⁴⁶ Norman Bryson, *Looking at the Overlooked: Four Essays on Still Life Painting* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 60-61

going to consider another way of thinking about Bryson's suggested "founding move of still life", the "removal of the human body".

In this regard I would like to introduce Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's idea of "faciality", expressed in their book *A Thousand Plateaus*, specifically in the chapter "Year Zero: Faciality". It begins:

Earlier we discovered two axes, signifiante^[47] and subjectification. We saw that they were two very different semiotic systems, or even two strata. Signifiante is never without a white wall upon which it inscribes its signs and redundancies. Subjectification is never without a black hole in which it lodges its consciousness, passion, and redundancies. Since all semiotics are mixed and strata come at least in twos, it should come as no surprise that a very special mechanism is situated at their intersection. Oddly enough, it is a face: the *white wall/black hole* system. A broad face with white cheeks, a chalk face with eyes cut in for a black hole. [...] The face is not an envelope exterior to the person who speaks, thinks, or feels. The form of the signifier in language, even its units, would remain indeterminate if the potential listener did not use the face of the speaker to guide his or her choices ("Hey, he seems angry..."; "He couldn't say it..."; "You see my face when I'm talking to you..." [like, "Look at me when I'm talking to you", I assume]; "look at me carefully..."). A child, woman, mother, man, father, boss, teacher, police officer, does not speak a general language but one whose signifying traits are indexed to specific faciality traits. Faces are not basically individual; they define zones of frequency and probability, delimit a field that neutralizes in advance any

⁴⁷ Translator, Brian Massumi states: 'I have followed the increasingly common practice of importing *signifiante* and *interpretance* into English without modification. In Deleuze and Guattari these terms refer respectively to the syntagmatic and paradigmatic processes of language as a "signifying regime of signs." They are borrowed from Benveniste ("signifying capacity" and "interpretive" are the English translations used in Benveniste's work).' Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. *Mille plateaux, v. 2 de Capitalisme et schizophrénie*. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1980), p. xviii.

expressions or connections unamenable to the appropriate significations. Similarly, the form of subjectivity, whether consciousness or passion, would remain absolutely empty if faces did not take the form of loci of resonance that select the sensed or mental reality and make it conform in advance to a dominant reality. The face itself is redundancy. It is itself in redundancy with the redundancies of signifi-ance or frequency, and those of resonance or subjectivity. The face constructs the wall that the signifier needs in order to bounce off of; it constitutes the wall of the signifier, the frame or screen. The face digs the hole that subjectification needs in order to break through; it constitutes the black hole of subjectivity as consciousness or passion, the camera, the third eye. [...]

We can now propose the following distinction: the face is part of a surface-holes, holey-surface, system. This system should under no circumstances be confused with the volume-cavity system proper to the (proprioceptive) body. The head is included in the body, but the face is not. The face is a surface: facial traits, lines, wrinkles; long face, square face, triangular face; the face is a map, even when it is applied to and wraps a volume, even when it surrounds and borders cavities that are now no more than holes. The head, even the human head, is not necessarily a face. The face is produced only when the head ceases to be part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code – when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be *overcoded* by something we shall call the Face.⁴⁸

Deleuze and Guattari continue with poetic thrusts to consider the "facialization" of the body; how hands and spine and genitals disappear as visceral entities as surely as the mouth and eyes did, turning into gestures and postures that extend from the face, to prop-up and delimit intended, communicative meanings. Moreover, throughout the chapter Deleuze and Guattari assert that facialization is a cultural-historical convention. As Ronald Bogue puts it:

Deleuze and Guattari, however, do not agree with most analysts of facial signs that facial expressions constitute a

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 167-168, 170.

universal semiotics; rather, they contend that the face functions differently in various regimes of signs. In despotic regimes, "the signifier is always face-ified", tied implicitly to the approving or disapproving face, the benignant smile or the hostile frown, of the centralized social authority and its *mots d'ordre*. Primitives, by contrast, do not relate all signs to the face, but to various body parts, to animals, to plants, places, or things. Among primitives, "even masks assure the appurtenance of the head to the body rather than raising it to the level of a face".⁴⁹

The Face is a product of our civilization and it can usefully be considered in the light of Trinh's observation, quoted earlier, that, "As the philosopher Gilles Deleuze remarks, our civilization is not one of the image, but rather, a civilization of the cliché" (footnote 35) The Face is the site of the "cliché". Its "holey-surface" is where we "perceive meaning as something there, already existing." Trinh's statement that, "What seems more difficult is to see an image as image, without metaphors, with its excess, its radical or unjustifiable character", can be enriched to express the difficulty of perceiving the nose as nose, the eye (not even 'eyes') as eye, the mouth as mouth. The Face is the pervasive system which defines what is "excess", "radical", and "unjustifiable" (Trinh, *ibid.*) – that is, "multidimensional" and "polyvocal" – and expels it. Again: "The face is produced only when the head ceases to be part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code."

To reopen existence to the multidimensional and the polyvocal is a cause for Deleuze and Guattari and they take it up in regard to faciality:

To the point that if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine, not by returning to animality, nor even by returning to the head, but [...] by strange true becomings that get past the wall and get out of the black holes, that make *faciality traits* themselves finally elude the organization of the face – freckles dashing toward the horizon, hair carried off by the wind, eyes you traverse

⁴⁹ Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 140.

instead of seeing yourself in or gazing into in those glum face-to-face encounters between signifying subjectivities. [...] Yes the face has a great future, but only if it is destroyed, dismantled. On the road to the asignifying and asubjective.⁵⁰

And so leaving aside, at least for now, the swarm of implications suggested by the above, we can return to Norman Bryson and rhopography: It is not really the human body that the rhopography of still life excludes, as formulated by Bryson, but rather, the Face, "the centrality, value and prestige of the human subject" (Bryson, footnote 46; I have added the emphasis). The Face is the source of narration. Narration – being "to name what is unique", to assert "importance" – involves value judgements. "Unique" does not mean "different". "Different" can be unfamiliar, unknown, strange, and open – the incomprehensible is different than the comprehensible. "Unique" is closed and familiar; it means "different from everything". Its conceit is a profound understanding of whatever is being considered to take on that title within an understanding of "everything", by which its singularity can be evaluated and asserted through comparison with "everything". Likewise, "importance" must also be familiar; it is a statement of the value of an element within a system relative to other elements within the system, and is entirely predicated on an understanding of all the elements and the system which relate them, and thus can place them in a hierarchy.⁵¹ The "unique" and the "important" require the "loci of resonance that select the sensed or mental reality and make it conform in advance to a dominant reality". And given that "narrative works hard to explain why any particular story is worth narrating – because the actions in the story are heroic or wonderful, or frightening or ignoble, or cautionary or instructive" (Bryson, footnote 46) – that is, it wants understanding and agreement -- it requires "define[d]

⁵⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 171.

⁵¹ I am reminded of a statement made by Barbara Kruger: "I think of Trinh Minh-ha and her persistence in questioning the notion of conflict, the concept of challenge, the idea of hierarchical address - in really encouraging the idea of plenitude and open enquiry. [...] *How can we encourage work which is not exemplary but merely different?*" From *Dia Art Foundation: Discussions in Contemporary Culture, Number One*, edited by Hal Foster (Seattle: Bay Press, 1987), p. 107. The italics are mine.

zones of frequency and probability, [to] delimit a field that neutralizes in advance any expressions or connections unamenable to the appropriate significations" (Deleuze and Guattari, footnote 48).

Narration, the Face that asserts importance (whether it be through "the benignant smile or the hostile frown"), is an issue of presentation. It is the felt presence of the visionary composer's Face and/or the transcendently expressive performer's Face that moves music into the public and away from the private; places it in the performative space that "works hard to explain why any particular story is worth narrating" and away from insidiously rogue everyday life of the chamber (for I do believe that it is a sense of a kind of quiet wildness that energizes the rhopological enterprise, the examination of the proclaimed trivial, if one gives themselves over to it). The Face is the surface that the performer wants an audience to see, communicative and convincing, but the body includes all the inadvertent actions, "inadvertent" in the sense that Bryson presented in regard to the Chu Jan scroll:

[T]he strokes also exist in *another space* apart from the space of the spectacle, a space not so much convergent with the silk (though the silk intersects with it, it is a *section* of that other space) as with the body of the painter; it is *his* space, and in a sense it is blind; the movements executed there will, as they touch the silk, leave marks I can construct as a *scaena*, a spectacle, but these marks are also simply *taches*, traces left behind in the wake of certain gestures, but remaining below the surface of intelligibility (recognition), blind marks which support, eventually, the sigils from which I can construct the landscape scenically, but which are also independent of the sigils they bear. [footnote 45]

The "*scaena*" is an expression of the Face, the "taches" are a product of the body. And the "inadvertent" radiation of the "blindness" of the space of "the body of the painter", the gestures of the body "remaining below the surface of intelligibility (recognition)", gives a hint of Deleuze and Guattari's hoped-for destiny that wants humans "to become imperceptible, to become clandestine".

The distinction that it is the Face and not the body that is excluded from rhopography is significant in that it enriches Bryson's observation that

"The concept of importance can arise only by separating itself from what it declares to be trivial and insignificant; 'importance' generates 'waste', what is sometimes called the preterite, that which is excluded or passed over." In other words, there is not a real dialectic at work here; it is not a case of megalography as opposed to rhopography. Rhopography does not exist on its own. It is a category created by megalography. When the idea of importance is allowed to recede there is no waste. Eye and mouth (that is, "*faciality traits* themselves" as long as they "elude the organization of the face – freckles dashing toward the horizon, hair carried off by the wind, eyes you traverse instead of seeing yourself in or gazing into") can be thought in proximity of the teacup and turnip without any dialectic ensuing. To invoke Barbara Kruger, the elements would not be "exemplary but merely different" (footnote 51). This is getting to the heart of what is at stake in William Brooks' statement that, for Cage, "In effect, the compositional universe must be open to all compositional techniques, from the most arbitrary to the most artful, with no particular technique preferred. [...] The world of music, with all its conventions, is returned to itself, together with all that was gathered on the way; only the *values* formerly attached to that world have been removed." Rhopology is not limited or defined in terms of materials or methodologies. It does not exclude anything except the importance of anything; it only excludes the *values* invested in anything.

Likewise, the enterprise of rhopology is not guaranteed by any given content or methodology. Indeed Bryson, in his chapter, "Rhopography", continues to uncover other kinds of narrative within the practice of still life:

He starts with the work of the Spaniards, Juan Sanchez Cotan (1561-1627) and Francisco de Zurbaran (1598-1664), then moves to a consideration of a still life by the Italian, Caravaggio (1573-1610), *Basket of Fruit*, followed by an examination of a work by Cezanne, *Still Life with Apples* (1895-8), and one by the Cubist, Juan Gris, *Breakfast* (1914). Bringing together his critiques of the Caravaggio, the Cezanne, and the Gris, Bryson concludes:

The problem concerns the relation which the still life proposes between the viewer and the everyday world, the world

trampled underfoot to make way for what is of importance – whether in life or art. The works by Caravaggio, Cezanne and Juan Gris indicate one way in which rhopography can actually avoid the challenge which low-plane or quotidean reality poses for painting. Caravaggio and Cezanne, in very different ways, are fully prepared to sacrifice the actuality of what they portray in order to show something else, the power of art to ennoble and elevate even a humble basket of fruit, or the capacity of art to embody and dramatize the detailed workings of the aesthetic consciousness. In the case of Juan Gris, everyday reality is reduced to a glyphic outline in order to support and stabilise a metaphysical *jeu d'esprit* which takes mundane reality only as its starting point. What is shown is art itself, as something which in the presence of an everyday world grows *impatient*; it is not content to be subservient to that prior world, and seeks autonomy and escape. And though what is painted remains humble and commonplace, in its state of restlessness and self-assertion, there is only one place rhopography can go – *megalography*. The Caravaggio still life structures itself as though it were an heroic history painting: the rhythms and ratios of its forms have the same amplitude and breadth as a major composition, and though physically small (47 X 67.5 cm), it feels monumental in scale. Similarly with the Cezanne there is less interest in the actual colours of fruit than in the clashes which pigment can produce between acid green and ochre; less curiosity about the actual shape of lemons than about volumetric rhymes they can be persuaded to yield if they are treated as variations on a sphere. The goal, to make great painting ('From Giotto to Cezanne'), enormously exceeds the depicted subject.⁵²

Bryson then returns to the work of Cotan and Zurbaran. He had previously located in their work a kind of Jesuit negation of ego and human self-pride: they share "the same Ignatian mission of reproofing and refining worldly vision through a transfiguration of the mundane."⁵³ In both painters Bryson identifies a giving-over of artistic enterprise to different applications of mathematics. Regarding the arcs and hyperbola formed by the placement of pantry objects in Cotan, he writes: "The mathematical

⁵² Bryson, 1990, op. cit., p. 86.

⁵³ *ibid.*, p. 70.

engagement of these forms shows every sign of exact calculation, as though the scene were being viewed with scientific, but not with creaturely, interest. Geometric space replaces creatural space [...]; down to its last details the painting must be presented as the result of discovery, not invention".⁵⁴ And regarding the work of Zurbaran, Bryson presents the masterfully executed object-ness of the vessels and fruits depicted; they seem concretely tactile. However, "Tactile space is generally in constant movement: things are moved about, jammed together, lifted and carried informally, and the concept of motionless composition is entirely alien to it. But that motionlessness is precisely what Zurbaran's objects insist on. Their placement has been calculated, in the words of Martin Soria, with hair-fine draughtsmanship; the least alteration would upset the harmonic ratios between the forms and ruin their perfect alignment."⁵⁵ Thus, in comparison to Caravaggio, Cezanne, and Gris, Bryson asserts:

In Cotan and Zurbaran megalographic ambitions are of course singularly absent, and everyday life is confronted without evasion. Their sense of painting as a spiritual discipline, bound up with self-negation and the reduction of ego, leads them to still life as a branch of art particularly suited to a vocation of humility. [...] In its quality of attention, still life possesses a delicate and ambiguous instrument. Its whole project forces the subject, both painter and viewer, to attend closely to the preterite objects in the world which, exactly because they are so familiar, elude normal attention. Since still life needs to look at the *over* looked, it has to bring into view objects which perception normally screens out. The difficulty is that by bringing into consciousness and into visibility things that perception normally overlooks, the visual field can come to appear radically *un* familiar and estranged. [...] Defamiliarisation confers on these things [the objects depicted in Cotan's paintings] a dramatic objecthood, but the intensity of the perception at work makes for such an excess of brilliance and focus that the image and its objects seem not quite of this world.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p. 87.

Further along, Bryson also ascribes this dramatic, hyper-intense, hyper-real focus to the work of Caravaggio and Cezanne and eventually summarizes the problem as he sees it:

Because rhopography is committed to looking closely at what is usually disregarded, it can experience extraordinary difficulty in registering the everydayness of the everyday – what it is actually like to inhabit 'low-plane reality', without departing from that into a re-assertion of painting's own powers and ambitions, or into an overfocused and obsessional vision that ends by making everyday life seem unreal and hyper-real at the same time. The central issue is how to enter into the life of material reality as a full participant, rather than as a voyeur, and how to defamiliarise the look of the everyday without precisely losing its qualities of the unexceptional and unassuming.⁵⁷

There is much of the above that defies easy cross-over to a consideration of music. The difficulty would hinge on Bryson's concentration on the various relationships of various still life paintings to the "low-level reality" which they depict and the political questions involving social/historical/cultural station that surround these relationships. This would seem to beg for some reconcilliation between the representational project of still life painting and the essentially non-representational nature of music (in the semiotic/symbolic sense). Because of its representational capabilities, still life is able to start from a place of symbolically coherent, essentially linguistic, argument: 'Because even remarkable people on their most remarkable day get hungry and have to eat along with unremarkable people on their least remarkable day, an exploration of the unremarkable can start in the kitchen or at the dinner table.' I think there is temptation for the music-thinker to want to jetison such concrete meanings and attempt to formulate material equivalencies: 'can a given incident of an unadorned melodic fragment or of a major third sustained in relief be effectively thought of as relating to a given depiction of a bunch of grapes or a water jug?' Or even if one is not willing to

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

remove Bryson's observations from the social/cultural domain, questions are begged such as, 'Is there music that is already, intrinsically a real part of (not a representation of) low-level reality?' And, if so, 'Is there another music that addresses this music in the way that the still life addresses the pantry?' It is not that either of these comparative endeavors would be intrinsically uninteresting. However, engaged on this level, they evade the broader potential ramifications of Bryson's study already hinted at with the introduction of Deleuze and Guattari's ideas.

What seems to me to be more initially crucial to extrapolate from Bryson's assertions is that the Face of the composer can dictate the impact of a work even if it eschews "important" sounding material and avoids dramatic, destiny-driven forms. Material that could be considered minimal or miniature or reduced, ways of working that could be considered myopic or microscopic, do not necessarily indicate rhopology.⁵⁸ It is always possible to infuse any work with the narrative of that other story, the story of "great art" and the "great artist"; the "uniqueness", "singularity" and "importance" of the composer's presentation of the material if not of the material itself. Moreover, the methodology of presentation can be absolutely transparent and technically unassuming but still be radiant in its presentation of the Vision that recognized the "greatness" inherent in its simplicity. "[I]n its state of restlessness and self-assertion, there is only one place rhopo[logy] can go – *megalo[-ology]*" (Bryson, footnote 52).

This brings us to the next pertinent observation to be gleaned from Bryson, involving the comparison between Cotan and Zurbaran and the "megalographic" still life painters; being that even non-megalologic work, true rhopology, can nonetheless clearly present a Face. It seems to me that

⁵⁸ I am reminded of the textbook musico-historical take on Anton Webern's music (which, given its pointilistic leanness and extreme brevity, might seem at first to perhaps qualify as some kind of musical rhopology). As Joseph Machlis' *Introduction to Contemporary Music* puts it: "[Webern's] *Six Bagatelles for String Quartet*, Opus 9, have been well characterized as "melodies in one breath." Arnold Schoenberg wrote of them: "Think of the concision which expression in such brief forms demands! Every glance is a poem, every sigh a novel. But to achieve such concentration - to express a novel in a single gesture, a great joy in a single breath [...]." [Joseph Machlis, *Introduction to Contemporary Music* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979), p. 272.]

this is what is involved in Bryson's assertions regarding the presentation of objects in Cotan's paintings, that: "Defamiliarisation confers on these things a dramatic objecthood, but the intensity of the perception at work makes for such an excess of brilliance and focus that the image and its objects seem not quite of this world." Bryson has already linked this quality to Cotan's "Ignatian mission". Thus, there is still a Face apparent that seeks to ground and limit the viewer's reading of the images (that threatens to take away the "image-as-image"; Trinh, footnote 35) and guide an apprehension of the importance of the painter's enterprise, even in this case which attempts to embody the ideological negation of the importance of human creativity and the human ego.

It must be emphasised that, in both of the above observations, "the Face" – as Deleuze and Guattari formulate it – is more than just the conscious, particular performative intentions and aims of an individual artist. It is a cultural-historical construct that limits and regulates the communicated meanings of any expression within a civilization. It precedes the emergence of a human organism into their civilization and guides that emergence. It is not an ideology that one has the choice to adhere to or not. It is pervasive and obligatory and does not need to be consciously summoned-up.

I am stressing all of this because it is important to me that this document does not simplify into an assertion on my part of a set of concrete strategies which address a compositional agenda. Some specific strategies surrounding *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* will be discussed, but I feel that they need to be presented within the context of the constant questioning involved in the experimental sensibility that gives rise to them (I would paraphrase Trinh in suggesting that, "'experimental' is a constant questioning of the relationship between the [music]maker and the [music]making").⁵⁹ So far it has been mostly apparent how work that

⁵⁹ As an aside, given the progression of this document towards an application of the theory being presented to my composition, I would like to invoke for myself another quote from Trinh Minh-ha. In the interview with Constance Penley and Andrew Ross, quoted from in the last chapter, she is questioned about the relationship of her theoretical pursuits to her filmmaking. She responds: "I think it has to do with my rationalizing the film after it was done. [...] The truth of reason is not necessarily a lived truth. So that if it is a question of

either only seems to be eschewing narrative conceits or work that is more truly identifiable as rhopological is nonetheless facialized. Bryson's view of still life as being "the world minus its capacity for generating narrative interest" might seem (if one were to ascribe an implied cause to his writing) a kind of Utopian overstatement – humans seem unable to avoid extracting a narrative from any situation. It is important to find instances in which cracks in the Face appear. In regard to music composition, one of the most dynamic forums in which to undertake such an investigation can be found in Theodor W. Adorno's attack on Stravinsky found in *The Philosophy of Modern Music*⁶⁰ and his return to the subject fifteen years later in the essay, "Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait", collected in *Quasi una Fantasia*.⁶¹

A presentation of this work within this context will have to amount to gross simplification. Adorno authored a body of work that is authentically complex. As Martin Jay says in the introduction to his book, *Adorno* :

Adorno would have had a principled objection to any attempt to render his thought painlessly accessible to a wide audience. True philosophy, he was fond of insisting, is the type of thinking that resists paraphrase. When his friend Siegfried Kracauer once complained of feeling a sense of dizziness produced by reading one of Adorno's works, he was testily told that only by absorbing all of them could the meaning of any one be genuinely grasped. Like the music of Arnold

intentions, then every event in the film can be given an intention. But any prior motivation for my film - what you call the need to be consciously political and polemical - simply did not enter into the working process." (Trinh, op. cit., 1992, pp 235, 237) While having critical (political) concerns profoundly (if obliquely) impacts and infuses the nature of any production, none-the-less, the working process has a lived economy that cannot be distilled to any explicit agenda. That is, the work does not exist to be a mere example of some discursive theoretical project and its creation is not approached with one in mind.

⁶⁰ Theodor Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, translated by Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster, New York: Seabury Press, 1973 (first published as *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 1949).

⁶¹ Theodor Adorno, *Quasi una Fantasia*, translated by Rodney Livingstone, London: Verso, 1992 (first published as *Quasi una Fantasia*, 1963).

Schoenberg, which, so Adorno approvingly claimed, demanded of the listener 'not mere contemplation but praxis', his own writing was deliberately designed to thwart an effortless reception by passive readers.⁶²

Adorno defied popularism and the related fetish of commodification and his fierce criticisms of commodity-culture, engaged on so many fronts, remain powerful and pertinent. Accompanying his criticism was a loyalty to a philosophical outlook that took on, what at least on the surface, appears to be a strangely fatalistic character in the wake of his observations about contemporary society. Placed within a musical context, Rose Rosengard Subotnik typifies this philosophical outlook:

From Adorno's perspective, the great achievement of human history took place during the bourgeois era, which in music dates back approximately to Monteverdi. This was the crystallization of reason and self-consciousness into the concept of the free individual, a self-conscious human being with the freedom to determine his or her own destiny, above all as Kant defined freedom, through the exercise of moral choice. From Adorno's Kantian-Hegelian viewpoint, this highest of all possible conceptions of the human could become a reality only through the coinciding of individual and social interests in a condition of human wholeness or integrity; and the latter came close to realization at one unique moment in history, represented in music by Beethoven's second-period style.

Beethoven's late works [...] signify for Adorno the irreversible bypassing of individual freedom as a possibility in concrete historical reality [...] And Schoenberg's music represents merely the inevitable last stages of a process that first became manifest in Beethoven's late style: the severing of subjective freedom from objective reality.⁶³

⁶² Martin Jay, *Adorno* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 11.

⁶³ Rose Rosengard Subotnik, "Adorno's Diagnosis of Beethoven's Late Style: Early Symptom of a Fatal Condition", chapter 2 of *Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 17.

I will not pursue all of Subotnik's movements through Adorno's Beethoven-criticism (and its ramifications for current music criticism) but to lay a basis for what is to come I would offer the following quotes in summary:

According to Adorno's formulation of the relationship between art and society, the style of Beethoven's second period corresponds to an external reality that appeared exceptionally favorable to the possibility of dialectical synthesis. In other words, historical conditions provided Beethoven with a basis for thinking of musical structure as a totality that could accommodate a concept (eg., subject, individual, or freedom) and its opposite (object, society, or form) in a resolution that preserved the essence of each. [...]

The general principle of form through which Beethoven's second-period subject asserts its freedom is what Adorno, borrowing a term from Schoenberg, calls "developing variation." By this is meant a process whereby a musical element subjects itself to logical dynamic change while simultaneously retaining its original identity, thus overcoming the contradiction between identity and nonidentity. The most obvious embodiment of this principle occurs in the development and recapitulation of the sonata allegro, the structure Adorno considers essentially synonymous with the second-period style.⁶⁴

It should be noted that Adorno never asserts that dialectical synthesis was in fact achieved by society in Beethoven's lifetime (or any other time). What he does contend is that the possibility of such a synthesis was a reality at this time, at least enough of a reality to suggest its own conceptual categories of form to the artist's imagination. To the extent that Beethoven's second-period work attains an actual synthesis, it is utopian, ahead of its time, and more nearly whole than contemporaneous society.⁶⁵

In reality, however, at least in Adorno's judgement, the synthesis prefigured in Beethoven's second-period style turned out to be an impossibility. The third-period style, according to Adorno, clearly acknowledges this ultimate reality and is,

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p. 20.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

for this reason, the most realistic of Beethoven's styles. By the last period, as Adorno understands it, Beethoven "sees through the classical [i.e., with its promise of synthesis] as the classicistic [i.e., with its illusion that such a promise could ever be kept]." Adorno interprets the third-period style as a critique of the second-period one.

Adorno does not believe that the beginnings of this critique appeared only in the late style. Rather, he holds the dialectical belief that any historical concept contains within itself the foundations of its own negation. He asserts that Beethoven was already questioning the principle of synthesis from within the second-period style, and thereby raising the possibility that this principle was illusory at the very moment when it appeared most real.⁶⁶

What Beethoven is beginning to sense in the second-period style, according to Adorno's analysis, is that individual freedom is an illusion, or at least a problem. Even Beethoven's second-period subject cannot completely establish as an objective reality its power to derive the objective principle of formal organization from itself. Up to a point it may appear to do so. But the principle of reprise, for example, arises from no logical necessity within the subject; and overemphasizing the return of the subject to itself only calls attention to the contingency of reconciliation, indeed of destiny itself, and to the ultimate heteronomy of the subject, that is, its dependence on externally imposed authority.⁶⁷

This inability for authentic reconciliation between the musical subject and its other is an instance of what Adorno called a "negative dialectic". Lambert Zuidervaart defines it as follows: "Adorno's arguments are dialectical in the sense that they highlight unavoidable tensions between polar opposites whose opposition constitutes their unity and generates historical change. The dialectic is negative in the sense that it refuses to affirm any underlying identity or final synthesis of polar opposites [...]"⁶⁸ However, it has to be understood that within this formulation, despite the

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p. 22.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

⁶⁸ Lambert Zuidervaart, *Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion* (Cambridge, Ma.: The MIT Press, 1991), pp. 48-49.

impossibility of dialectical synthesis, the "polar opposites" do not exist as distinct entities authentically separate from each other; their existence as ideas is entirely predicated on the opposition between them. As Frederic Jameson puts it:

So it is, at the very outset, with the idea of the dialectic itself, which had in Hegel "as its foundation and its result the primacy of the subject, or, in the well-known language of the introductory remarks to the *Logic*, the identity of identity and nonidentity." [Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), p.17.] But the very mark of the modern experience of the world itself is that precisely such identity is impossible, and that the primacy of the subject is an illusion, that subject and outside world can never find such ultimate identity or atonement under present historical circumstances. Yet if that ultimate synthesis toward which dialectical thought moves turns out to be unattainable it must not be thought that either of the terms of that synthesis, either of the conceptual opposites which are subject and object, are any more satisfactory in their own right. The object considered in itself, the world taken as directly accessible content, results in the illusions of simple empirical positivism [69], or in an academic thinking which mistakes its own conceptual categories for solid parts and pieces of the real world itself. In the same way, the exclusive refuge in the subject results in what is for Adorno the subjective idealism of Heideggerian existentialism, a kind of ahistorical historicity, a mystique of anxiety, death, and individual destiny without any

⁶⁹ Or as Martin Jay puts it: "The scorn which Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt School often expressed for positivism in all its varieties resulted largely from what they saw as its inadequate treatment of this issue [being, " how subjects relate to objects in the present world and how they might relate to them in a possible future one"]. To put the familiar argument in capsule form, positivism failed to recognize the active, constitutive power of subjectivity in creating the world(or more precisely, that part of it which we call history, culture and society), and thus was complicitous with a passive, contemplative politics which accepted the world as a finished reality, a 'second nature'." Jay, op. cit., p. 58.

genuine content.⁷⁰ Thus a negative dialectic has no choice but to affirm the notion and value of an ultimate synthesis, while negating its possibility and reality in every concrete case that comes before it.⁷¹

Viewed in this light, Adorno's defence of this complex formulation of the individual subject can be seen as political. Despite the pessimism shown towards real freedom being achieved within a dialectical framework the defence of the possibility of the subject – the dialectically constituted subject – was nonetheless crucial for Adorno, because, for him, the crisis of the times in which he lived (in which we live) was the denegation of the idea of individual identity (and thus individual freedom) through the elevation of the idea of the collective consciousness, a corporate identity culturally (and within its own conceits, historically) constituted, in other words, fascisms, both overtly ideological, as in Naziism, or economic, as in late-capitalism. If the world symbolized in Schoenberg's music is desperate and hopeless (the fatal condition" of which late Beethoven was an "early symptom"; Subotnik, footnote 63), then at least the reification of it is "realistic". And if there is a glimmer of hope barely perceivable in

⁷⁰ It should be mentioned in this regard that Adorno was absolutely set against any kind of conception of a numinous artistic vision situated in the individual artist that was somehow mystically apart from the social history into which the artist was born. For Adorno art was intrinsically social and historical; see the section titled "Art as Social Labor" from Lambert Zuidervart's book (op. cit., pp. 93-122) and in particular the sub-section, "The Artist as Worker" (pp. 109-122). Indeed, even in regard to Schoenberg whom he so fiercely championed, Adorno writes: "Schoenberg, who resisted all conventions within the sphere of music, accepted the role assigned to him by the social division of labor [...] He thus took his place among the 'great composers', as though this notion was eternal. [...] That the category of the great composer was susceptible to historical variation did not occur to him any more than the doubt that his own work would be established as a classic when the time came. Against his will, that which crystallized in his work embodied immanent musical opposition to such socially naive conceptions." Theodor Adorno, "Arnold Schoenberg, 1874-1951", collected in *Prisms*, translated by Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1981), pp. 170-171.

⁷¹ Frederic Jameson, *Marxism and Form* (Pinceton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 55-56.

Adorno's writing, it is the hint that there might be a redemptive impact inherent in taking on the "praxis" demanded by Schoenberg's work (Jay, footnote 62).

It is in this light that Adorno focuses his attack on Stravinsky. As Martin Jay puts it:

[Stravinsky], Adorno claimed, had revelled in the sacrifice of subjectivity whose pain Schoenberg had registered and resisted. The regressive sado-masochism of Stravinsky's restoration of archaic, neo-classical form, expressed a latent identification with the authoritarianism of late bourgeois society that surpassed even that of Wagner. For all his modernist intentions, Stravinsky was objectively in accord with *volkisch* or neo-fascist tendencies.⁷²

By way of getting into a somewhat closer examination of Adorno's consideration of Stravinsky, I would like to join to the above another summary of Adorno's Stravinsky criticism, this time from Frederic Jameson:

The value and direction of Stravinsky's artistic practice may be judged ultimately by the long series of neo-classical pastiches which succeed the Russian period. For here the bias toward musical objectivity may be openly observed at work in the way in which the composer renounces his own voice, abdicating that personal style which has become problematical in modern times and speaking through the fossilized subjectivity of dead composers, in a kind of witty stylistic masquerade reviving ghostly forms from a past when musical composition was still relatively free of internal contradictions. Thus Stravinsky's "way" ends in sterile imitation, in the writing of music about music [...]⁷³

The above *should* express what Adorno says in the "Stravinsky and Restoration" section of *Philosophy of Modern Music* : Stravinsky's music as a glib celebration of cultural styles – styles that are of no threat to the

⁷² Jay, op. cit., p. 41.

⁷³ Jameson, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

various authoritarianisms of modern times – and a denial of the complications of the individual idea (indeed, for Adorno no "style" could be radical, only an "idea"); Stravinsky's music as easy to approach and acquiescent, Schoenberg as difficult and resistant. This would fit Jameson's conclusion as to the significance of *Philosophy of Modern Music*:

At this point, then, we begin to glimpse what is the profound vocation of the work of art in a commodity society: *not* to be a commodity, *not* to be consumed, to be *unpleasurable* in the commodity sense. And we may now return to Adorno's musical analyses as perhaps the most fully worked out application of this principle, which constitutes, indeed, the most genuinely Marxist part of his work, in contrast to an otherwise relatively Hegelian practice. For in the present context, it becomes clear that the history of musical development which Adorno has given us, and which serves as the framework and vital situation for the twin dramas of Schoenberg and Stravinsky, is none other than the struggle between music and the commodity form itself. That new and quickened evolutionary logic which enters music history around the time of the French Revolution is but an emanation of capitalism itself – yet capitalism not as some parallel evolution on the level of the economic system, not as homology, but rather at work *within* the musical material, as the intrinsic distortion of it by the commodity form, which draws the various musical elements, theme, instrumentation, harmony, indeed the length of development and the overall form itself, into its orbit. This is what explains the simplified, prepackaged, and easily consumed leitmotifs of Wagner, what accounts for the prodigious energy with which Schoenberg attempted to stem the dissolution of the work into easy melody and to restore some of the earlier total organization of the work, with its henceforth intolerable demands on the attention and powers of concentration of the consumer; this is what accounts for the innovations of Stravinsky as well, who, remaining within the commodity universe, evolves the newest production techniques to restore a little of the emotional shock for his easily jaded public, with its increasingly rapid exhaustion of new products.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 395-396.

This (as well as the previous quote) strikes me as the kind of simplification of Adorno's thinking on Stravinsky and Schoenberg that, as Martin Jay suggested above, Adorno would have objected to. However, I do agree with Jameson's assertion that fundamental to Adorno's attack on Stravinsky in 1947 was his belief that Stravinsky's music represented the compliant submission of music to being bought and sold as an impotent novelty to titillate, but not trouble, late-capitalist culture. In one sense then, this generative concern of Adorno's critique can be evaluated on the basis of how successful Stravinsky's music actually was and is as a commodity. Adorno himself gives some indication of this in his 1962 essay. It is probably best summed up in the introduction:

But the neo-Classicism which generally prevailed between the wars has now all but vanished. It can scarcely be found anywhere except among the belated converts in the music academies. This means that anyone who wished to criticize Stravinsky's claims to authenticity and validity as a model would find the ground cut from beneath him. When the tide turns against someone as powerfully as in his case, it is tempting to leap to his defence.⁷⁵

Adorno is not about to proceed with any kind of retraction of the 1947 study. However, he is able to examine some of the complexities of his view of Stravinsky's music, complexities which exist within "Stravinsky and Restoration", in a more even-handed manner, no longer needing to couch them in a ferocious polemic, fighting for the soul of modern compositional practice. Adorno continues then in his "Dialectical Portrait" to suggest Stravinsky's relationship to the trends which took over the early 1960's (especially in Europe):

Employing backward-looking and in many ways intentionally conventional material, whose very traditionalism gave it a certain similarity to language, he dreamed of a

⁷⁵ Adorno, 1992, op. cit., p. 145.

'distaniciated'[⁷⁶] sort of music that might have given that similarity to language the slip. Such music could only have been created in a material wholly divested of language [...] In his aspirations, then, Stravinsky may have come closer to the spirit of the most recent music than Schoenberg from whom it more visibly derives. [...] Stravinsky touches a raw nerve in the younger generation because they detect a like-minded spirit, but are ashamed of the stigma of that complicity with the past which he so assiduously put on display and which raises the doubts about their own modernity. Moreover, a mistrust of their in many cases all too simple need for objectivity may be projected on to Stravinsky. Since his objectivity now appears to be merely contrived, they secretly fear that the same fate might one day befall their most recent, rather more tangible version, namely the belief in sound in itself and its pure qualities. [...] If [Stravinsky's] works owe their authority to their objective gestural language, they have also done objectivity the honour of disavowing the gesture and unmasking its authority as a fiction. The man who has the whole of moderate modernism on his conscience was a radical in his thinking. Of this his affirmative works, with their damaged sound sequences and their montages of dead material, provide ominous testimony.⁷⁷

Adorno had already obliquely recognized this "radicalism", this difference between Stravinsky and those who claimed to emulate his goals, in 1947:

Stravinsky's imitators remained far behind their model, because they did not possess his power of renunciation, that perverse joy in self-denial. The modern aspect in Stravinsky is that element which he himself can no longer bear: his aversion, actually, to the total syntax of music. All of his

⁷⁶ The translator's note here reads: "Adorno uses the word *verfremdet* - alienated, distanced - which Brecht employed to describe his innovative theatrical effects. These 'alienation-effects' are designed to foreground the artificiality and theatrical nature of the events on the stage."

⁷⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 146-147.

followers – with the possible exception of Edgar Varese – are completely void of this sensitivity.⁷⁸

Even with, or actually, especially with the so-called "neo-Classical" works, Adorno rejects the idea that Stravinsky has somehow given up his "renunciation" of musical syntax by giving into a more familiar and effortlessly consumable organization of material: "The reproach that Stravinsky – in the manner of a German classicist – had developed from a revolutionary into a reactionary cannot be validated. All compositional elements of the neo-classic phase are not only implicitly contained in what preceded this phase, but in both cases they define the entire compositional inventory [these shall be considered shortly]"⁷⁹ Further along Adorno gives an example:

Therefore, his earlier neo-classic compositions sound as though they were dangling on strings and many of them – such as the dissolute *Concerto for Piano and Winds* – insult the culturally responsible ear far more fundamentally than did dissonances previously. This they do particularly with consonances which are twisted at their very joints. Compositions of this type – in A minor – are incomprehensible; common sense, which labeled such works atonal chaos, was fond of hurtling this reproach at Stravinsky. The flourishes which he exorcises are not organized into a unity of musical-logical structure which constitutes musical meaning; they present, rather, the inexorable denial of any such meaning.⁸⁰

In regard to the consumer of modern music, Adorno does point out, concerning the "neo-Classical" compositions, correctly I think, that: "The work is, of course, lightly colored by speculation upon those listeners who wish their music to be familiar, but at the same time labeled modern."⁸¹ However, Adorno goes on to recognize, given the extremity to which Stravinsky reduces and removes the traditional dramatic ploys of the

⁷⁸ Adorno, 1973, op. cit., p. 153.

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, p. 206.

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p. 208.

⁸¹ *ibid.*, p. 203.

"syntax of music", the degree to which he has "renounced everything astonishing"⁸², that:

Of course, it is not long before such simplification extinguishes even the interest in domesticated sensation, and those who like the easy life so well make it still easier for themselves and run to the camp of Stravinsky's follower's – the modest pranksters or youthful fossils [i.e. "the whole of moderate modernism"].⁸³

All of the above – Stravinsky's "radicalism", his music's "incomprehensib[ility]", the eventual unlikeability of his "self-denial" and the uneasiness his extreme "simplification" – imply a very different potential reading than the polemically simplified Stravinsky-as-"*volkisch*" interpretation of Jay or Jameson's essentially inaccurate paraphrase that Stravinsky was writing "pastiche" as part of a "witty stylistic masquerades". And indeed, by 1962, Adorno was able to make the following admission about his previous treatment of Stravinsky:

A not implausible objection to my argument would maintain that I had analysed the ideology which developed out of Stravinsky and which has since evaporated, rather than his actual *oeuvre*. Subjectivity, I assert in the *The Philosophy of Modern Music*, assumes the character of the victim in Stravinsky – but is that not the fate of subjectivity? The thesis on which the entire dispute hinges, namely that his music identifies not with the victims, but with the agents of destruction, is one that I have at the very least not worked out in any detail.⁸⁴

Within the terms of Jameson's consideration then, it seems evident that Stravinsky's music, despite its lack of a patently "difficult" exterior (as was ascribed to Schoenberg), is not only a very *un* successful commodity but has no real affiliations with commodity culture; that is, to extend Jameson's metaphor, there is actually no apparent gravitational force exerted by the

⁸² *ibid.*, p. 205.

⁸³ *ibid.*

⁸⁴ Adorno, 1992, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

"commodity form" "at work *within* the musical material" (and I would re-emphasize the word *within*).⁸⁵ And indeed, given the inability to establish an intrinsic connection to commodity culture, Adorno's apprehension of the core characteristics of Stravinsky's production, in fact, suggests a music that is highly resistant to commodification although, significantly, without the kind of aggressive, heroic "demands" made by Schoenberg. At last this approaches the reason for bringing Adorno and Adorno's Stravinsky into this dissertation.

Woven through the forceful argument of both works (for the 1962 essay, though less of a 'fight-to-win' attack than the 1947 work, is nonetheless a vigorously and complexly contended defence of a point of view) is the richest observation of what makes Stravinsky radical that I am aware of; this despite Adorno's fierce animosity towards the contents of this observation. What is at the crux of this observation, from my standpoint, has already been suggested in one of the above quotes: "If [Stravinsky's] works owe their authority to their objective gestural language, they have also done objectivity the honour of disavowing the gesture and unmasking its authority as a fiction" (footnote 77).

Firstly, this points to the appeal of asserting a kind of objectification of musical material within a Stravinsky appreciation: blocks of time made static through directionless, near-repetitions of fragments or through slow, protracted successions of near-uniform texture; harmonies stripped of their functional character (that is, their culturalized identity of tending to want

⁸⁵ However, I think that even in a more common sociological, as opposed to intrinsically musical, sense it would be absolutely plausible to conjecture that a lot of Stravinsky's actual popularity, after leaving behind the more obviously appealing overt sensuality and shock-quality of *The Rite of Spring*, was more a case of people not wanting the caustic dissonance of Schoenberg than wanting what Stravinsky had to offer. The support of "listeners who wish their music to be familiar, but at the same time labeled modern" does not suggest a deep involvement in the music but rather an issue of fashion - and, although relegated to, in Adorno's words, "grand old man" status, Stravinsky did become unfashionable. This would also support the implication of some of what is quoted above that a more authentic popularity could be ascribed to the "moderate modernism" of the "easier", less radical composers who invoked Stravinsky as a mentor so as to accredit their work as "modern".

to move towards other harmonies, away from and back to resolution), available to be appreciated for the material qualities of their vertical sonority rather than for the horizontal (i.e. linear, forward looking), quasi-grammatical tendencies of 'functional harmony'; and with the asserted creation of 'blocks' or 'verticalized' material, the potential, to arrange, montage, these elements as objects within a spatialized view of time – music composition as architecture.

However, Adorno's statement also suggests the contention that to entertain such a model of musical experience is a "fiction". This idea is further developed in the section titled "The Deception of Objectivism" from "Stravinsky and Restoration":

The illusory appearance [of an "*a priori*" objectivity within Stravinsky's music] is produced by a small number of tested measures [...] All becoming is eliminated, as though it were the contamination of the object itself. The object is now excluded from any intervening treatment; in this position it pretends to have been liberated from all elaboration and to have achieved self-contained monumentality. Every complex is restricted to a basic material which resembles something photographed from changing perspectives, but essentially untouched in its harmonic-melodic nucleus. The resulting lack of meaningful musical forms lends the entire object an aspect of the intransitory: the omission feigns eternity [...] The objectivism in this case is a facade, because there is nothing to objectify – because, further, this objectivism is therefore nothing but an illusory facade of power and security. It proves itself all the more ineffective because the basic material – statically atrophied and emasculated from the very beginning – dispenses with its own substance, thereby gaining life within the context of function. Stravinsky's style resists precisely such a context. Instead his music offers, with great aplomb, something totally ephemeral which gives the impression that it is of the essence.⁸⁶

To keep his polemic working, Adorno needs to posit the pro-Stravinsky listener as the willing victim of an "illusion", having apprehended Stravinsky's music as giving a sense of "power and security" or of being

⁸⁶ Adorno, 1973, op. cit., pp. 201-203.

"of the essence". Given the link between objectification and commodification, such receptions would affirm the music's use-value as a conservational force for late-capitalism. However, I would agree with Adorno that any assertion of "objectiveness" for this music would be a fiction. Indeed, it is the very intangibility of Stravinsky's music, that quality about it that opens it to being apprehended as "ephemeral", that quality which Adorno so unrelentingly presents, that I would celebrate (and, to me, there is nothing *within* this music that tries to mask this quality with any kind of illusionism). I am amazed by the way that Stravinsky's music, despite the clarity and insistence of the material, always seems to avoid being held within a firm mental grasp, always seems to be in a state of slipping-away within the imagination. This take on the music is reaffirmed by Louis Andriessen and Elmer Schonberger's observations presented in the "Ordeals of the Memory" chapter from their book *The Apollonian Clockwork: On Stravinsky*. Their writing is full of unsubstantiated speculation and anecdote; however, the speculations remain resonant:

A thirteen-year-old is capable, while lying in bed ready for sleep, of playing the Schumann Piano Concerto (in A minor) on the record player of his memory. During the second movement he will probably fall asleep. If, ten years later, in another bedroom, he tries the same thing with the Stravinsky *Concerto for Piano and Wind Instruments* ('in A minor'), he will, at the very most, if he even gets that far, get stuck at the cadenza of the first movement; or worse, get trapped in a vicious circle of dove-tailing rhythms and snake-like motifs biting at their own tails. There is not much he can do: just get up and either look through the score or play the record for the umpteenth time. The fate of the musical sleeper says something about the difference between Stravinsky and Schumann, and, more generally, about the difference between Stravinsky and all composers who write music destined for an exact memory. Stravinsky behaves as if he were one of those composers; but the listener who believes him and takes him to

task will start biting his nails. The music of Stravinsky is at odds with the memory.⁸⁷

When speaking of musical memory, one thinks first of melody. Recollection begins when a melody can easily be sung after being heard. Such melodies appear seldom in Stravinsky's music. [...] [T]ypical of Stravinsky is Parasha's aria in *Mavra*. In this aria, the gap between the apparently easy to remember and the reality of cul-de-sacs in the labyrinth of the memory is at its greatest. The listener remembers the aria – almost. Much (especially twentieth-century) music places higher demands on the memory's capabilities than Stravinsky's music does. But what is most difficult to remember is what is 'almost easy to remember'. The melodies of Stravinsky are almost easy to remember.⁸⁸

And in regard to remembering the form of Stravinsky's compositions, Andriessen and Schonberger quote Robert Craft's statement that the first movement of the *Symphony in Three Movements* "was composed sectionally, and in complete units". They give Craft's recollection as to the order in which Stravinsky composed these units; seven distinct sections composed with no relationship to the eventual order of the movement, the beginning being the second-last unit written (which, Craft claims, "explains the non-development of the opening figure, so puzzling to commentators"). Andriessen and Schonberger then claim that "this principle of form [an additive, disjunct collection of units: "and then...and then...and then..."] explains why it is sometimes difficult, if we remember a fragment of [Stravinsky's] music out of context, to find it quickly in the score."⁸⁹

In the 1962 essay, Adorno offers what he considers a plausible potential criticism a defender of Stravinsky could make against "Stravinsky and Restoration": "By opposing the static ideal of Stravinsky's music, its immanent timelessness, and by confronting it with a dynamic, emphatically temporal, intrinsically developing music, I arbitrarily applied to him an

⁸⁷ Louis Andriessen and Elmer Schonberger, *The Apollonian Clockwork: On Stravinsky*, translated by Jeff Hamburg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 39.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p. 42.

external norm, a norm which he rejected."⁹⁰ In light of the above, however, Stravinsky's music does not fit a conception that would deem it "static" or "timeless". Rather, it is radically temporal. It is quasi-"ephemeral": a succession of polyvalent moments form bonds in the imagination which dissolve and form new bonds only to dissolve again. It is time as a web of connections (as Andriessen and Schonberger conclude: "The oeuvre of Stravinsky is labyrinthine"⁹¹) but which escape being taken over by the spatial imagination in their transitoriness. This view of musical temporality from which it differs is Adorno's, the time of the subject developing, evolving towards its destiny; the subject which Adorno locates in Beethoven's music. Indeed, the temporality from which Stravinsky's music differs is the temporality of the narrative, the time of story-telling.

And the story that Adorno hears being told by (what was for him) the most hope-inspiring music, is one of the Great stories: the individual travels through its other, its world, and is beset and transformed by it and yet retains its own identity thus being reconciled to the fullness of its existence. Or it should; except, as has been suggested above, this happy ending, in Adorno's final, and very thorough, analysis (throughout his prodigious body of work), is unavailable.

Stravinsky's music is rhopological. Its evacuation of distinct characters, which the listener can recognize interacting throughout a piece, absolutely opens his music up to the query "so what?" (this was certainly Adorno's assessment of its common apprehension in 1962). Stravinsky's music seems "almost easy to remember" because the parts of its 'body' are familiar or near-familiar; but it has no Face.

It is worth recalling that Deleuze and Guattari's idea of the "Face" does not correspond to the "subject". Rather, it is the historically and culturally constructed junction between an existing civilization and the singular biological human that enters into it (a junction in which the two categories become inverted as "subject-object"): "Significance is never without a white wall upon which it inscribes its signs and redundancies. Subjectification is never without a black hole in which it lodges its consciousness, passion, and

⁹⁰ Adorno, 1992, op. cit., p. 150.

⁹¹ Andriessen and Schonberger, op. cit., p.44.

redundancies. Since all semiotics are mixed and strata come at least in twos, it should come as no surprise that a very special mechanism is situated at their intersection. Oddly enough, it is a face" (Deleuze and Guattari, footnote 48). As Subotnik suggested, Adorno's analysis of the subject-object dialectic concurs that it is a cultural construct; one which reached its fruition in the Enlightenment. And, as Jameson contended, the terms of this dialectic are only meaningful in relationship to each other. Stravinsky's music is an example of this. With coherent characters, intentional subjects nowhere to be found within the movement of the sounding gestures, it is not "objects" that are left in the absence; but rather something that Adorno called, above, in regard to the *Concerto for Piano and Wind Instruments*, "incomprehensible" and musically meaningless. It is not the world of the Landscape or Seacape, the Romantic 'others' of the human individual (or the Cityscape would work today, given its increasingly pervasive character of Naturalized 'otherness'), but rather that conceived by Bryson in regard to the still life: it is not just the "world minus its narratives" but rather "the world minus its capacity for generating narrative interest" (Bryson, footnote 46, I have added the emphasis). It is the head minus the Face.

One would assume from an encounter with his work that Adorno would want music to have a Face: serious, firm-jawed resolve mixed with a flash of optimism in the eyes, for Beethoven's second-period; a pained grimace, and weary but resolute eyes for Schoenberg's atonal pieces. It would seem that Adorno hoped that if the narrative was powerful enough, Enlightened enough in its portrayal of the just and good "exercise of moral choice" (Subotnik, footnote 63), it could potentially effect positive change in society. Or, given Adorno's pessimism about the historical actuality of anything arising from that hope, a great narrative could at least powerfully critique and chasten its society. If his vision for a human Utopia is intrinsically doomed to defeat and pessimism, I think it has something to do with Jameson's observations about the art commodity. Given some agreement that "the profound vocation of the work of art in a commodity society [is] *not* to be a commodity, *not* to be consumed, to be *unpleasurable* in the commodity sense", the problem arises that Adorno's powerful narratives of becoming (or of the agony of being denied this destiny) are still narratives – and big stories at that – and thus adhere to the

"scale of values on which narrative is based": "narrative works hard to explain why any particular story is worth narrating – because the actions in the story are heroic or wonderful, or frightening or ignoble, or cautionary or instructive". The point is, narrative, any narrative by definition, has "worth", it has value and thus it is open to commodification. It is only when something displays no value (for example is 'ephemeral' or 'incomprehensible' or 'meaningless'; that is, "declare[d] to be trivial and insignificant" to recall Bryson) that it can slip away from commodification. I think this is what is at stake for Bryson in his speculating how one could go about "defamiliaris[ing] the look of the everyday without precisely losing its qualities of the unexceptional and unassuming (Bryson, footnote 57, I have added the emphasis). (Again, I would clarify that the commodification I am talking about is the one invoked by Jameson. It is based on the traditional social values ascribed to the invention at work "*within*" the music. Of course, the most insidiously radical of Stravinsky's pieces can be commodified; but if so, its worth would have to be established from the grafting-on of another narrative from 'outside', imported from another experiential space to surround the music. My belief remains, however – and I recognize that I am displaying a bit of Adorno-like zealous speculation – that a careful listener, having given her/himself over to the piece, would find her/himself not recognizing, not knowing what she/he had 'bought' – the nature of Stravinsky's music is resistant to our culture's modes of narrative apprehension.⁹²)

⁹² It is worth pointing out again, however, that there is no authentic dialectic between the rhopological work of Stravinsky and the seemingly megalologic work of Beethoven for example. I believe that Adorno's quasi-allegorical listening is genuinely available from Beethoven's music (and I would say that, although it might be too literal for those who represent music to themselves as an indescribable, unsayable language of the soul, the difference is a matter of degree: the dramatic progression of the spirit towards transcendental resolution exists in both representations); however, it is not the only listening available. Georgina Born points out: "because of music's transparency as a form of signification, it offers little resistance to discursive invasion." (Born, op. cit., p. 167). But, likewise, it is not fully contained by these invasions. As I said in the first chapter: "the possibility does exist of apprehending in Beethoven's music (and maybe in spite of Beethoven, whoever he really was) the sounding-gesture as sounding-gesture 'without

Alice Jardine has written an extremely cogent summary of Gilles Deleuze's confrontation with these principles inherent in dialectic thinking: the immutable shackling together of the two opposed terms, terms which only display a sense of meaningfulness through the context of their opposition; which force the dialectical imagination, according to Adorno, into the limited critical stance of the negative dialectic:

Deleuze and Guattari's work, especially Deleuze's early work is of particular importance to us [..] because theirs is an uncompromising "philosophy of questions" [...] And further, Deleuze's, most insistent problem-question has always been: How and why does the "binary machine" work?

"It is false [to say that] the binary machine exists only for reasons of convenience. [...] But in reality the binary machine is an important piece of the apparatus of power. As many dichotomies as necessary will be established in order to stick everyone to the wall, to push everyone in a hole [...] Binary machines of social classes, of sexes, man-woman, of ages, child-adult, of races, black-white, of sectors, public-private, of subjectifications, among our own kind-not our kind." [Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (Paris: Flammarion, 1977), pp. 29, 155-156.]

For Deleuze, [...], the binary machine is at the foundations of the dialectic and its representations. For him, representation is also the form of Western philosophy, that form which, above all, presupposes a *cogitatio natura universalis*: the subject that authorizes itself with the statement, "but everyone knows...": "*Everybody knows, no one can deny [it]*, that's the form of representation and the discourse of representing." [Deleuze, *Difference et repetition* (Paris: PUF, 1969), p. 170.] The *cogito* is only one of several "transcendental illusions" of representation described by Deleuze. Inseparable from it are also the ways in which "difference" has been violently subordinated to resemblance through negativity and the

metaphors, with its excess, its radical or unjustifiable character' but it is indeed massively difficult given the historical, cultural standardization of its metaphorical value." And again rhopology only exists as the "waste" produced by a megalologic enterprise; "The concept of importance can arise only by separating itself from what it declares to be trivial and insignificant". But "the human impulse to create greatness" can also be exercised in the act of listening or be allowed to drain away in the act of listening. It is just that Stravinsky's music is a more open drain.

analogies of judgement; that is, through the movement of the dialectic – and, most particularly, the dialectic of the master and slave. What is crucial for Deleuze is Nietzsche's observation that neither the master nor the slave has ever been able to take difference into account; that the dialectic renders everyone a slave. For him, opposition in the place of difference is negative, reactive; the subject of the dialectic is a sad man, against life, avid to judge, measure, limit it rather than to live it. For him, dialectics is "the thinking of the slave, expressing the reactive life in itself and the becoming reactive of the universe." [Deleuze, "Le surhomme: Contre la dialectique," in *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), p. 224.]

Deleuze wants to develop, rather, a *philosophie du oui*, a philosophy of affirmation that is not dependent on two negations; an affirmation that *differs* from negation without opposing it. Taking difference out of contradiction with opposition is Deleuze's most extensive strategy-with-Nietzsche against representation; a question of finally moving difference into difference-with-itself. Deleuze's *differenciant de la difference*, the differentiating of difference, affirmative beyond contradiction, is a difference *without concept*, without place, without mediation, and always in movement. It is an intensively different kind of difference that Deleuze wants to bring to the surface of life, a difference distinguished from itself without distinguishing itself.⁹³

What seems most crucial about imagining this "differentiating of difference" is the idea that it is "always in movement". Opposition requires its elements to be stabilized and secured, to be extracted from the world and evaluated, thereby allowing the values ascribed to be opposed. Opposition can tolerate any degree of subdivision or amalgamation of terms once perceived as elemental as long as stability can be asserted so as to oppose the new elements. The "intensively different kind of difference that Deleuze wants to bring to the surface of life" undoubtedly emits a Utopian aura; however a hint of the kind flux he is celebrating has already been suggested by the proposed "ephemerality" of Stravinsky's music.

⁹³ Alice Jardine, *Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 134-135.

Andriessen's observations regarding the interminable instability of the music within the memory implies a "difference-with-itself": it is not just that the piece evades being unified into a coherent whole but that this evasion is ungraspable as, and unaccountable to, a set of constant, identifiable oppositions and antagonisms within the piece; "Stravinsky behaves as if he were one of those composers", i.e. "composers who write music destined for an exact memory" – again, Stravinsky's music seems "almost easy to remember". These distinctions can be usefully informed by an anecdote of French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard involving John Cage:

In Milwaukee, I remember, there was a meeting on performance in postmodern culture organized by Michel Benamou. Raymond Federman had made his contribution, which was an audio-visual montage of eleven texts, each marked by the suspension of meaning, deported, orphaned, refugee, stateless [titled "Voices Within Voices" and collected in *Performance and Postmodern Culture*, edited by Michel Benamou and C. Caramello (Milwaukee and Madison: Center for Twentieth Century Studies and Coda Press, 1977), pp. 159-198]. John Cage, who was with us there, with uncharacteristic vehemence, withdrew his support of the work, protesting that, despite its clever deconstructive apparatus, it remained dedicated to expressing the lack of meaning for a subject. In short it was [...] romantic.⁹⁴

Even "voices within voices" do not constitute a "differentiating of difference" if they can be caught, held, and put on display as a negation.

Another application of a lot of what Jardine has presented above can be found in Stan Douglas' essay "Goodbye Pork-pie Hat" to be found in the publication which accompanied the Vancouver Art Gallery's presentation of Samuel Beckett's teleplays.⁹⁵ Douglas' essay presents a highly distilled,

⁹⁴ Jean-Francois Lyotard, "Philosophy and Painting in the Age of Their Experimentation: Contribution to an Idea of Postmodernity", from *The Lyotard Reader*, edited by Andrew Benjamin (Oxford: Basil Blackwood Ltd., 1989), p. 192.

⁹⁵ Stan Douglas, "Goodbye Pork-pie Hat", from *Samual Beckett: Teleplays*, a catalogue for the exhibition of the same name curated by Stan Douglas (Vancouver: Vancouver Art Gallery, 1988), pp. 11-19.

tightly-woven argument (which I would refer the reader to); however, the following extractions still give a sense of how it bears on the consideration at hand:

"For why or? Why in another dark or in the same? And Whose voice is asking this? And answers, His soever that divides it all. In the same dark as his creature or in another. For company. Who asks in the end, Who asks? And in the end answers as above? And adds long after to himself, Unless another still. Nowhere to be found. Nowhere to be sought. The unthinkable last of all. Unnamable. Last person. I. Quick leave him."
[Samuel Beckett, *Company* (New York: Grove, 1981), p. 24.]

The work of Samuel Beckett has, for more than fifty years, set itself the task of reimagining a still 'unnamable last person I' by questioning all that would lend it value a. coherent unity. Characters and voices in extreme situations of solitude seem to await silence or death but in fact seldom come to rest and even more rarely stop talking; persistent in their desire for something not yet said or not yet done. Superficially, Beckett's work resembles that variety of modernism, initiated by de Sade, which exacts from its culture extreme instances of rational form in order to parody tacit contradictions. But unlike the Sadean libertine who in self-satisfied egoism is content to catalogue the limits of his world, Beckett admits the limits of culture are not the limits of possibility. An unfortunate consequence of the Sadean method is that it is often capable of replicating, in inverted form, the authority that it had intended to criticize – maintaining as it does a theological notion of centre or hierarchy which appropriates certainty for its blasphemy and authority for the blasphemous subject. [I think that this is in a sense related to Trinh's statement that: "Breaking rules is not my main concern since this still refers to rules."] The difference of Beckett is that in place of this closed world (which has been invented in order to be mastered) he imagines an uncertain one: the residence of an even less certain subjectivity. [...]

In contrast to Beckett's persistently insufficient first persons, the philosophical existentialists and the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School [including Adorno] often claimed for themselves a rhetorical self through which they could speak as the last instance of a subjectivity soon to be extinct. An *ideal* self. A victim of history who speaks with a tacit nostalgia for some presumed wholeness, describing, in minute detail, all that

the historical moment refuses him – ignoring the way in which that history persists in himself, and ignoring as well all that has been left out of his dialectic. I don't want to argue that Beckett isn't ever prone to similar self-indulgences – only that, when most successful, he is able to recognize and write against this pathetic heroism.

[I]n persistent distrust of discreet self-identity, and the potentially authoritarian subject that lies behind any such identification, [Beckett] has been able to delineate (or at least allow others to imagine) the shape of an activity of meaning which, for our culture and its institutions, is still dismissed or marginalized as non-meaning.⁹⁶

What strikes me as most important about the above is Douglas' contention that Beckett "has been able to delineate (or at least allow others to imagine) the shape of an activity of meaning which, for our culture and its institutions, is still dismissed or marginalized as non-meaning." In the wake of a pervasive reading that would attribute a fundamental pessimism and negativity to Beckett's work (which includes Adorno's reading), Douglas discovers in its openness a "*philosophie du oui*". This imagined "shape of an activity" is "an affirmation that *differs* from negation without opposing it"; it is the rhopological "waste" leftover in the wake of more idealized expressions of "pathetic heroism". It is not "anti-meaning"; it is what is discarded as "non-meaning" by what Culture narrates as meaningful. It is related to Beckett's statement: "[James Joyce is] tending toward omniscience and omnipotence as an artist. I'm working with impotence, ignorance. [...] My little exploration is that whole zone of being that has always been set aside by artists as something unuseable – as something by definition incompatible with art."⁹⁷ This "zone of being" is not the opposing term in a dialectic with "omniscience and omnipotence"; rather, it is "all that has been left out of his [i.e. the "ideal" "rhetorical self"] dialectic" (Douglas, footnote 96).

I think that Bryson's formulation of rhopography is another kind of imagining of "an activity of meaning which, for our culture and its

⁹⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 11, 12, 17-18.

⁹⁷ From an interview with Samuel Beckett by Israel Shenker in the *New York Times*, May 5th, 1956, section II, p. 1.

institutions, is still dismissed or marginalized as non-meaning". Still life painting is the trigger which sets off this imagining but, as we have seen, Bryson's rhopography is not about still life per se. Indeed, when we left his analysis, Bryson had presented still life paintings that were megalographic (Caravaggio and Cezanne) and others that were contained and limited by what we can now define as the "binary machine" of their dialectical opposition to megalography (Cotan and Zurbaran; set against the glorification of the human ego). And it is at that point that I will take up Bryson's observations again (repeating the last extract quoted and continuing with what follows in the book):

Because rhopography is committed to looking closely at what is usually disregarded, it can experience extraordinary difficulty in registering the everydayness of the everyday – what it is actually like to inhabit 'low-plane reality', without departing from that into a re-assertion of painting's own powers and ambitions, or into an overfocused and obsessional vision that ends by making everyday life seem unreal and hyper-real at the same time. The central issue is how to enter into the life of material reality as a full participant, rather than as a voyeur, and how to defamiliarise the look of the everyday without precisely losing its qualities of the unexceptional and unassuming. It is here that one can place the significance of [Jean-Baptiste-Simeon] Chardin (1699-1779). Chardin's solution to the problem of defamiliarisation is to cultivate a studied informality of attention, which looks at nothing in particular. He shows no signs of wanting to tighten up the loose world of the interiors he presents. [...] [I]n Chardin, compositions of this self-conscious kind [Zurbaran and Lubin Baugin have been the examples] are avoided. He does not, of course, neglect the arrangement of the motif (quite the reverse), but he works hard to remove the feeling of a proscenic barrier or of spectacular distance between the viewer and what is seen. [...] For this reason his canvases tend to avoid priorities. Even blank background – which, for example, in Caravaggio is left uniform and eventless – is filled with incident, with mysterious flickers and sparks of colour that can be as engaging to the eye as any of the presented objects. No single square inch of the painting has been declared unimportant, and the objects are not intrinsically more significant than the areas between them. This is an

extraordinarily difficult technique, since it involves activating and energising areas of a scene which vision is normally quick to pass over, and what is impressive is that this investment in blank or empty areas of the canvas does not end by overcharging the scene with interest – the problem, again, of estrangement and alienation. The canvas is treated as uniformly eventful, as though to suggest otherwise would upset the evenness of regard (Chardin's, and then the viewer's) as it moves with equal interest and equal engagement across the entire visual field. Chardin undoes the hierarchy between zones of the canvas which the whole idea of composition traditionally aims for – the regulating and directing of the gaze from what in a painting is of primary to what is of secondary or tertiary importance. He gives everything the same degree of attention – or inattention; so that the details, as they merge, are striking only because of the gentle pressures bearing down on them from the rest of the painting.⁹⁸

I find much of the above directly applicable to my thinking in regard to *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*. However, before pursuing this, I feel it would be useful to consider two musical examples in such a way as to follow Bryson's theoretical progression.

It seems to me that the most difficult creative space to occupy is the one typified above by the difference struck between Cotan/Zurbaran and Chardin. That is, once someone has found themselves disinclined to pursue the important narratives of megalologic enterprise, how does one break out of the terms of the dialectic, break away from merely opposing, or for that matter, being perceived as merely opposing, the rejected enterprise? Or, in other words, how does one remove their Face from their work (or at least undermine its presence/effect)? I think a comparison of two pieces by John Cage helps address this quandry.

The first piece is 4' 33" , the original 'silent' version of 1952. The operations of 4' 33" are, of course, well known: a performer equipped with a stopwatch and referring to a manuscript, enacts three movements, totaling four minutes and thirty-three seconds, each of which consist of the performer producing no audible sound whatsoever for their duration. In this rarefied concert setting, listeners who care to listen (as opposed to

⁹⁸ Bryson, 1990, op. cit., pp. 90-92.

being preoccupied with their own amusement or indignation, for example) are able to focus on the rich, multi-faceted, indeterminate reservoir of ambient sound that is the music of 4' 33". It would seem to be the ultimately rhopological piece of music. Cage is calling attention to a world of sound which is exactly that which is excluded – dismissed and denigrated – from music in general. It is not just that it is a world of 'noises' that is being presented; it is unorganized, discrete noises, caught by the attentive ear in a chance formation that can never be repeated (and, in this respect, it is authentically ephemeral music). However, to start, 4' 33" severely suffers from the condition described by Bryson in regard to Cotan and Zurbaran: "The difficulty is that by bringing into consciousness [...] things that perception normally overlooks, the visual field can come to appear radically *un* familiar and estranged. [...] Defamiliarisation confers on these things a dramatic objecthood, but the intensity of the perception at work makes for such an excess of brilliance and focus that the image and its objects seem not quite of this world" (Bryson, footnote 56). And with this intensity comes the perception of this music's very-present Face (a magnanimously benign Face, but a Face nonetheless). This relates to my emphasis in the first chapter that the recognition of music involves a sounding gesture, and in the case of 4' 33", the gesture is Paganini-like, not just in its overt virtuoso (conceptual) innovation, but in its simple, straight forward cogency. The sound formations of the piece might be indeterminate but their apprehension is highly determined by the clarity of the Face which delimits how the gesture which gave rise to the perception of these sounds is understood. In a completely untroubled manner this gesture points directly to John Cage, his creative intentions and the polemic involved with these intentions. 4' 33" is an absolutely coherent and demonstrative opposing term in a dialectic.

But, in this regard, 4' 33" is atypical of much of Cage's output. His piece *Cheap Imitation*, for instance, has been extremely important to me in helping me imagine ways in which music can slip away from cultural facializations.

The original, solo piano, version of *Cheap Imitation* was written in 1969. It resulted from choreographer and dancer Merce Cunningham wanting to create a piece that would include Erik Satie's composition *Socrate*, in the version for small orchestra and voice. However, the high

price of obtaining the parts made this impossible and so John Cage (a long-time collaborator of Cunningham) offered to write a two piano arrangement. This solution was also stymied by the refusal of the French publisher who owned the rights for *Socrate* to give Cage permission to make this arrangement. And so Cage decided to make a "cheap imitation" of the piece. He retained the rhythmic contour of the original, its barring, note durations and phrasing. However the decision was made to limit the new piece, *Cheap Imitation*, to a single melodic line (and so, most of the time, the contour of the voice part was retained and very occasionally, that of the accompaniment part). The pitches that accompany these rhythms were arrived at through chance procedures involving the Taoist oracle, the *I Ching*. Cage describes aspects of this process:

The *I Ching* (64 related to 7, to 12, etc.) was used to answer the following questions for each phrase (with respect to the melodic line and sometimes the line of accompaniment) of Erik Satie's *Socrate* :

1. Which of the seven "white note" modes is to be used?

2. Beginning on which of the twelve chromatic notes?

Then in [movement] I (for each note excepting repeated notes):

3. Which note of given transposition is to be used?

In II and III original interval relations were kept for one-half measure, sometimes (opening measures and subsequent appearances) for one measure.⁹⁹

The simplicity and transparency of the resulting music was further reinforced by a generalized reduction in dynamics.

The *Cheap Imitation* is wonderfully peculiar music: for 30-35 minutes a continuous diatonic melody meanders aimlessly – a long time for this kind of music. It has an innocuous, generalized familiarity because of its diatonic ("white note mode") nature and yet, specifically, it is unknowable. There is absolutely no sense given of what should come next – largely a result of the chance procedures which generated it (Cage has removed his personal-historical preconditionings regarding diatonic melodies from effecting the compositional process) – and yet because of its sweet, friendly

⁹⁹ From John Cage's liner notes for Paul Zukofsky's recording, *John Cage: Violin Music* (Musical Observations, Inc., 1991, CP[Squared]103).

melodicism it does not adhere to any recognizable archetype for 'randomness'. And not only is there no way of guessing what comes next, because there is no recognizable tension within the piece, it supplies no motivation for one to wonder such a thing; it is completely without suspense. And yet there is nothing meditative or mantra-like about it – it has a shifting rhythmic contour that sounds like it could belong to music that involved a use of contrast (and, of course, it used to in Satie's original); and yet this contour is denied a traditional 'coherence' through the lack of quasi-syntactical pitch arrangements and quasi-rhetorical dynamic shifts. (It is worth noting that while Stravinsky's music achieves its radical instability in the context of a kind of fragmentation, both within a texture – the lack of clear melodies for example – and between sections of contrasting texture, *Cheap Imitation*, and for that matter *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*, achieve it in the context of extreme continuation. Again, rhopology is not a methodology.)

Invoking Andriessen, it "almost" sounds like music one should "understand". It opens itself to being perceived as nonsense but not anti-sense. That is, it opens itself to boredom, to the question "so what?". What it offers, if one puts aside such reactions, is the quiet wonder that something that is "almost" so familiar is in fact so strange – that something so unexotic could have the impact of seeming so unknowable. It is its very innocuousness – that is, its radical *un* narrativeness – that makes the strangeness of its existence so disorienting. It is an imagining of "the shape of an activity of meaning which, for our culture and its institutions, is still dismissed or marginalized as non-meaning" (Douglas, footnote 95). And as such it cannot, and does not, give a clear glimpse at the Face of its creator. There is no indication given, through listening to the work, of how *Cheap Imitation* was composed or, even more significantly, why it was composed. Indeed, given its lack of formal tension, the focus shifts to the creative locus of the performer; there is a quality of improvisation about its localized myopia. And yet no improviser could maintain that kind of flat continuity, that lack of dynamic variation; or the kind of absent-mindedness that would be required to come up with such irregular and non-repeating pitch choices could not maintain the focus to improvise the variety of reoccurrences within the rhythmic contour. And so again a sense of intention cannot rest with the performer. The piece – again, as

listened to – is non-demonstrative of any clear strategy; and I stress the listening because, of course the description of how the piece was made is as clearly political and polemical as *4' 33"*; but this is where, among other aspects (the slipping back-and-forth between the seductive familiarity of the pitch material and the disorienting distancing of its contextual arrangement, for example), its duration is important: it lasts just over a half-hour, not four minutes and thirty-three seconds, and some other kind awareness would have to evolve for someone, who thought they were just going to hear an example, a demonstration, of a conceptual compositional conceit, not to dismiss it with "so what?" after maybe five minutes. The shifts of apprehension that occur when trying to encapsulate *Cheap Imitation* are "always in movement" allowing the work to, at least, leave a trace of a "differentiating of difference, affirmative beyond contradiction, [...] a difference *without concept*, without place, without mediation" (Jardine, footnote 93).

I think it is possible to conceive of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* as an expansion of the gestural sound world of *Cheap Imitation* – into counterpoint and vertical harmonic structures and timbral manipulations (i.e. orchestration) and even the ambient-noise world of *4' 33"* and the gesturally-extended exploration of that world, inspired by Alvin Lucier – while maintaining its insidiously disorienting instability. Or rather than "expansion", the word "proliferation" might be more useful. "Expansion" seems to me to imply a systematic, methodical, generalized growth. "Proliferation", for me, carries a connotation of wildness; a rogue spreading from any point of the generative body.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ This distinction relates to the theoretical thinking that inspired the title for *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*; yet another non-hierarchical model formulated by Deleuze and Guattari: the rhizome; also presented in *A Thousand Plateaus*. The rhizome is literally "a thick horizontal underground stem of plants such as mint and iris whose buds develop into new plants" (*Collins English Dictionary*, 1984, p. 1251). The botanical metaphor of the weed is presented as slipping away from the limits set by the more familiar trope of the tree/root metaphor – that applied to evolutionary schemas that trace lines from the least differentiated elements to the most differentiated; governmental, corporate, or military hierarchies; Chomsky's linguistic model; and most relevantly, Schenker's arborous

elaboration of all tonal compositions from the root of the *Ursatz*. Deleuze and Guattari contrast these structures to the following attributes of the rhizome:

[A]ny point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order. [Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, op. cit., p. 7.]

Multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent pseudomultiplicities for what they are. There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject. There is not even the unity to abort in the object or "return" in the subject. A multiplicity has neither subject or object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows). [...] There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines. [...] Unity always operates in an empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding) [the "idealized" dimension of the dialectic, and the conceptual unity of its sough-after synthesis; a dimension extracted from the system which includes all that the dialectic excludes to synthesize its unity]. The point is that a rhizome or multiplicity never allows itself to be overcoded, never has available a supplementary dimension over and above the multiplicity of numbers attached to its lines. All multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a *plane of consistency* of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of this "plane" increase with the number of connections that are made on it [that is, even though the "dimensions" of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* might be greater than the *Cheap Imitation*, the Cage should not be thought of as being more "basic" or "simple"; *Cheap Imitation* "fill[s] and occup[ies] all of [its] dimensions" – the rhizome is quantitative not qualitative]. Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities. [ibid., pp. 8-9.]

The tree and root inspire a sad image of thought that is forever imitating the multiple on the basis of a centered or segmented higher unity. [ibid., p. 16.]

A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines. [...] Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees. There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back to one another. That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy [...] [ibid., p. 9, I have added the underlining.]

The rhizome is altogether different, *a map and not a tracing* [By tracing they mean the transferred design implied by a term they have used earlier in this section "decalcomania": "1. the art or process of transferring a design from prepared paper onto another surface... 2. a design so transferred" (*Collins English Dictionary*, op. cit., p. 384). In other words, the tracing is the reproducible design, the organizing principle, pre-existing in an arborous structure that can then be transferred onto a rhizome to delimit and organize it – to trace over it a guise of an arborous structure that is outside of it,

My method for achieving this kind of proliferation of the perceptual world of the continuous, unknowable melodic line (in my case generated by the modally altered infinity series instead of Cage's modally oriented questioning of the *I Ching*), this layering, can be related to Bryson's observations about Chardin. The combination of sound materials in *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* clearly wants to "avoid priorities" (Bryson, footnote 98). And there is certainly an attempt to undo "the hierarchy between [the local presentation of sounds (between pitched sounds and noise, for example), as well as formal movement] which the whole idea of composition traditionally aims for" (ibid.). It is easy to work an analogy between Bryson's assertion that in Chardin's painting: "Even blank background [...] is filled with incident, with mysterious flickers and sparks of colour that can be as engaging to the eye as any of the presented objects" (ibid.) and the amount of creative work that was put into "activating and energising" the ambient character of the recordings (indeed the point was to present this sound world as not being 'ambient') as well as the recording process itself; two areas of sound production that are usually intended to be inaudible in the presentation of music, at least in the sense that the listener should be totally unaware of them.

What seems most crucial though is the two suggestions of sensibility which bracket Bryson's consideration: "Chardin's solution to the problem of defamiliarisation is to cultivate a studied informality of attention, which looks at nothing in particular" and "He gives everything the same degree of attention – or inattention" (I have added the emphasis). This speaks to my insistence in the first chapter, when discussing the lack of clarity in

supplementary to it.] [...] What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields [...] It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by any individual, group, or social formation. [...] Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways; in this sense, the burrow is an animal rhizome, and sometimes maintains a clear distinction between the line of flight as passageway and storage or living strata. A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back "to the same." [ibid., p. 12, I have added the underlining.]

showing-off the recording procedures, that *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* should seem undemonstrative and un-definitive; and also in my declared aspiration, further along, that no aspect of my work should seem "exemplary but merely different" (Kruger, footnote 51). However, what is really at the crux of imparting a sense of "inattention" is to find a way to undermine for the listener the feeling of being guided in their listening by the creative control of the composer (whether the construction of the piece works against "the hierarch[ies] [...] which the whole idea of composition traditionally aims for" or not). That is, one has to find a way to undermine for the listener the feeling of being led (and thus limited) in the understanding of a meaning that is already assumed to exist (the "cliche"; Trinh, footnote 35) by the guise of the composer's Face, or maybe better, the composer's culture's Face. The piece cannot be demonstrably 'inattentive'. Rather there has to be a real sense that the composer has relinquished attention to creative aspects of the work in a way that is not perceived as strategic. (As I have suggested, the obvious giving up of control over the sounds of 4' 33" is so perceived.)

In *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* this sense spreads out from the nature of the instrumental performances asked for. This is the absolutely critical significance of the amount and depth of sounding material in this piece that is not represented in the score. It starts with the detail of the interpretive traditions that are brought to the score, traditions that are dependent on the performer not the composer – Early music and jazz. But from there the proliferation of this kind of musical awareness, due to the various recording procedures, moves into the radiation of the physicality and particularity of playing the instruments: not only the heightened breathing of the players and the clicking of key mechanisms but also the irregularities in tuning, discrete assertions of where a pitch should belong given the idiosyncrasies of the ear, or the physics of an instrument, or the fatigue of the embouchure, etcetera.

And it is not a case of the Face of the composer being suppressed in deference to the Face of the performers, because their Faces are also suppressed: it is not their performative bodies, their facialized bodies, that are being primarily presented but rather the body of "inadvertent" actions put forward by Bryson in regard to the Chu Jan scroll: "the strokes also exist in *another space* apart from the space of the spectacle, a space not so

much convergent with the silk (though the silk intersects with it, it is a *section* of that other space) as with the body of the painter".

Moreover, I think that the success which *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* has in uncovering that body is also tied into the treatment of pitch and rhythm. Because of the inexorable, unrelenting quality of the contrapuntal lines, the unknowable irregularity of the pitches (due to the infinity series), and the myopic concentration which their staggering rhythms require, it is truly the performers' "body of labour" (Bryson, footnote 45) that is revealed. Despite the amazing detail of their playing, the performers are not allowed to become story-tellers; again, the music slips away from narrative. [I also think that disorientation which arises from the combination of friendly familiarity with disorienting strangeness inherent in linear and harmonic characteristics of the piece (due to the various arbitrary systems, and in way already investigated in regard to the *Cheap Imitation*) engages the listener (who has not settled on asking "so what?") in an equally myopic task of concentration which implicates them in the "body of labour" rather than allowing them to remain comfortable voyeurs. That is, as with the Cage, I think there is no sense of the music leading the listener's apprehension along. One has to take part in the work of it to form their own relationship with the piece (or, of course, it can stay radically anonymous – a condition still well within keeping of the philosophy of this music – and be allowed to wash over the listener as a latent environment).]

I also think that it is the empathy of the listener with the performers' "inadvertent" bodies that stops the layering of the accentuated and/or altered ambient noises and resonances from being limited to seeming like special effects imported by the composer/producer, completely separate from the execution of the pitch material. These sounds, even when altered, remain related to the private space in which each player's non-performative labour took place; and this empathy further activates the perception of the resonant environment in which the listener is conducting her/his labour.

But lest this "body of labour" be stabilized as the final 'meaning' of the piece, it co-exists with the equally non-performative, private, 'body of play', inherent in the 'mindless' noodling of the organ-bass quasi-lounge-jazz comping – there is no discipline of labour implied, but on the other

hand it adds to the mix a hint of the self-absorbed, self-reflexive, 'dumb' sensuality of playing an instrument. Moreover, it enters the counterpoint through an equally 'dumb' gesture reminiscent of channel-surfing, i.e. the cutting in-and-out caused by the gating. And this kind of gratuitousness finds a supplement in the more overt and pop-culture-hackneyed electronic sound manipulations; I am thinking of some of the extreme, obviously synthetic, reverb treatments and the occasional wanton panning. This seems too happily 'stupid' in its sensuality (a kind of good-natured, uncritical, 'quick-embrace' of kitsch) to be misconstrued as an attempt at earnest expressiveness. Also, significantly, in its adoption of a kind of 'low-brow', garage/rumpus-room superfluousness, it relinquishes its aspirations towards narrative greatness; that is, high-end commodifiable value.

This slipping away of an artistic experience from the locus of the creator's Face is, in a sense, what is at stake in Trinh's comment, quoted earlier:

The objects and subjects filmed are purposeless; they are not governed by any single rationale [...] I would say that gratuitous images form an important part of the film, and, in order to convey a multiplicity of readings, much of the film should be that which I do not fully control. (Trinh, footnote 19)

In the midst of these assertions it is important to recognize that *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* does not somehow miraculously escape the world constituted by the culturally constructed praxis of subject-and-object. In its dispersal of focus to an array of immanent and personal-historical (on the part of the listener) creative fronts, it, at best, embraces the kind of sensibility suggested by Trinh Minh-ha in regard to her own work:

When you realize that subjectivity is endless in its ramifications, you also realize that you can also practice what has been called "the science of the subject" or, as I prefer it, "the trial of the subject" – a trial that is not limited to

particular statements but which infiltrates every word, every image, every cut of one's work.¹⁰¹

Further along in this interview Trinh discusses an evolution in her approach to making utterance in her work. She states that in her early work she tried to remove her subjectivity through a distanced, anonymous, third-person presentation of a collection of others' ideas. In her newer work, however, "there is a fragmenting and weaving of a multiplicity of I's, none of which truly dominates – a subject on trial."¹⁰² I feel I have something in common with this latter sensibility. The various materials of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* should not sound collected and collaged. Collage might seem like a heterophonous, rhizomatic activity but it always reflects back to the omniscient choices of the collector. Rather, what I attempt to do in my piece is to have the materials apprehended as working together but unsettle perceptions of what that work might be; that is, present no single point of view of what the creative motivations and intentions of the piece are – an infestation of a "multiplicity of I's" in that the listener cannot ascribe a single voice to the composer. There is no system that can remove the Face from any cultural production, but the Face can lose the consistency and control of its demeanor, be infested by ticks and sniffles and absent-minded hands playing-with/rubbing/scatching its bits – inadvertent indications of its multiple bodyparts rather than its singular faciality. It can become a site of experimentation; take on a "science of the subject". It is part of the "experimental" attitude that involves "a constant questioning of the relationship between the [artist] and the [artmaking]" (Trinh, footnote 13). Not a questioning that is "limited to particular statements", exemplarily displayed as the surface content of the work, but which "infiltrates" the guts of its process. It is not a questioning motivated by arriving at, settling on, answers. It is part of the aspiration to keep every aspect of the work "always in movement", felt with all the richness of implication which Deleuze-via-Jardine brought to that phrase.

Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music attempts to bring together a number of private musics, redolent with the intimacy of their private

¹⁰¹ from the interview by Penley and Ross, op. cit., p. 231.

¹⁰² *ibid.*, p. 237.

gestures, but in a context devoid of contrast (without "contradiction" or "mediation"). If it is at all successful it is because the very privacy of its parts has been maintained; but with that, the discovery that privacies can be together, be shared (without having to be reconciled and forced to form a public or synthesized into the social).

I want to be careful to avoid a resounding conclusion. The theory presented does not constitute the agenda from which the piece was generated. And the models that have been used, Bryson's rhopography for example, are just a few entrances among many into the burrow. (For an extremely long time I was sure that this document would revolve around Deleuze and Guattari's idea of a "minor literature"¹⁰³ and various theories of the avant garde, an enterprise that I am still convinced could have been fruitful in a very different way.)

And so to end, I am going to take up where the footnote presenting Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the rhizome left off: "in this sense, the burrow is an animal rhizome". I imagine burrows as these rogue, irrational networks proliferating under the ground, escaping the surface, without centres, sources, starts and finishes; the myopic work of little animals that are not Kings of Beasts or Friends of Man. Elsewhere in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari say: "Rats are rhizomes. Burrows are too, in all their functions of shelter, supply, movement, evasion, and breakout".¹⁰⁴ The *Burrow* of my title is both a verb and a noun. As a verb, *Burrow Out; Burrow In*, it maps those movements shared by the sounding gestures of the piece and the listener (they are both parts of this rhizome): with a "line of flight" away from the rhizome/burrow ("burrowing out"), the "dimensions" of the burrow increase, leaving room in this enlarged dimension to burrow back in. As a noun, the *Burrow* is the metaphorical chamber best suited for listening to this chamber music I have written. It is *Burrow Music*.

¹⁰³ a theory largely put forward in their book, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, translated by Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. A translation of *Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure*. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1975).

¹⁰⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, op. cit., p.7.

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Appendix 1

Example 1:

Musical notation for Example 1, consisting of two staves. The first staff contains notes numbered 1 through 7, and the second staff contains notes numbered 8 through 14. The notes are written in a treble clef with a key signature of one flat (B-flat). The rhythm consists of quarter notes and eighth notes.

Example 2:

Musical notation for Example 2, consisting of four staves. The notes are numbered 1 through 12. The notation is more complex than Example 1, featuring sixteenth notes and eighth notes. The key signature is one flat (B-flat) and the time signature is 4/4. The first staff contains notes 1-3, the second 4-6, the third 7-9, and the fourth 10-12.

Appendix 2

The formal plan of *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music* :

10 min (Bass Rec.)	16 min (Casio)	6 min (Alto Rec.)	10 min (Bari Sax)	4 min (Casio)	6 min (Melodica 2)	10 min (Trumpet)	10 min (Elec. Org.)
26 min (Melodica 1)		16 min (Trombone)		10 min (Sopranino Rec.)		16 min (Bass Rec.)	
42 min (Traverso)				26 min (Alto Sax)			
68 min							

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<i>Press your eyelids with your fingertips; Breathe through your nose</i> , was commissioned by Hemispheres, with the assistance of the Ontario Arts Council	1991
<i>Horn and Hardart</i> , was commissioned by Sound Pressure, with the assistance of the Canada Council	1990

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Title of Dissertation:

Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music [recorded music]

Observations About, Around, and Beside *Burrow Out; Burrow In; Burrow Music*
[supporting document]

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