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ABSTRACT

In the early history of research into personality two opposing theories were prominent. These were trait theory and situationism. Where trait theory proposed cross-situational consistency of behavior, situationism proposed situational specificity. The debate between these theories resulted in a theory that sought to adjust each to the other by incorporating elements of both. This was interactionism.

As a theory of personality, interactionism proposed that personality was a product of the interaction of trait and situational variables. Since the 1960s interactionism has been solidified into a more complete theory. The ultimate intention of this theory was to recognize the inseparability of person and situation in the study of personality. Interactionism has, however, failed at this. It has not been able to move beyond treating person and situation as separate variables in a mechanistic fashion.

Following a discussion of the various weaknesses of interactionism, a theory that appears to overcome this problem is introduced. Activity theory overcomes the reductionism of interactionism by providing a unit of analysis that successfully bridges the separation of person and situation. This unit is activity. In order to fully grasp present-day human behavior it is necessary to

have an understanding of the phylogenetic development of mind as has been developed by A. N. Leontyev. This sets the stage for an examination of activity theory and the important contribution it has to make in the field of personality.

The field of personality has existed in separation from other pertinent sources of information about personality, such as issues of personality development, the effects of restricted development, the influence of culture and society, and the processes of change. It is concluded that activity theory, by taking these into account, is a more adequate theory of personality.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER	
1 TRAITS VERSUS SITUATIONS.....	3
Introduction.....	3
Individual Personality Theories.....	4
Individual Differences.....	5
Social Personality Theories.....	7
Trait Theory.....	9
Nomothetic and Idiographic Research.....	12
Situationism.....	18
Challenges to Trait Theory.....	21
Situationism Challenged.....	36
2 PERSONALITY AS INTERACTION: THE BEGINNING.....	43
The S-R Inventory.....	44
The S-R Inventory Assessed.....	45
Challenges to Early Interactionism.....	46
3 PERSONALITY AS INTERACTION: THE MATURE THEORY.....	51
Toward a Taxonomy of Situations.....	52
The Actual and the Perceived Situation.....	56

Selection Versus Imposition of Situations..	58
Mediating Systems and Variables.....	59
Behavioral Consistency.....	60
Models of Interaction.....	62
Interactionism as a Model.....	65
The Unit of Analysis.....	66
The Systems Approach.....	68
Interactionism and Development.....	71
Purposive Behavior.....	76
4 PROBLEMS OF MODERN INTERACTIONISM.....	80
The Individual and the Social Approaches...	80
Interactionism's First Premise.....	84
Interactionism's Second Premise.....	85
Interactionism's Third and Fourth Premise..	86
Situational Taxonomies.....	87
Mechanistic Versus Dynamic Interaction.....	91
The Actual Versus the Perceived Environment	95
The Lockean perspective.....	95
The Kantian perspective.....	98
Questions of Philosophy.....	100
Statistical and Theoretical Interaction....	106
Structure Versus Process.....	112

5	PERSONALITY: AN EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATION.....	119
	Introduction.....	119
	Subjects.....	121
	Experiment #1.....	123
	Subjects.....	124
	S-R-C inventory of anxiousness.....	124
	Procedure.....	125
	Results.....	126
	Discussion.....	126
	Experiment #2.....	127
	Subjects.....	127
	S-R-C inventory of affiliativeness.....	127
	Procedure.....	128
	Results.....	128
	Discussion.....	129
	Conclusion.....	129
6	OVERCOMING PROBLEMS: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH.	131
	Species Development.....	131
	Tracing Psychic Evolution.....	133
	Psyche/mind.....	135
	Reflection.....	138
	Irritability.....	140

Sensitivity.....	140
Perception.....	142
Intellect.....	144
Psychic Evolution Summarized.....	149
Learning.....	150
Consciousness.....	153
Consciousness and Labor.....	156
Consciousness and Language.....	160
Meaning and Sense.....	162
Appropriation.....	167
Interactionism Reconsidered.....	171
7 THE ACTIVITY APPROACH: WESTERN CONTRIBUTIONS..	175
Bandura's Reciprocal Determinism.....	176
Dewey's Reflex Arc Concept.....	181
Book on Conscious Development.....	192
Stern's Goal-directed Behavior.....	199
Kantor on Action.....	201
Avelling on Needs and Goals.....	202
Stebbins on Action Orientation.....	204
Pervin on Goals.....	208
8 THE THEORY OF ACTIVITY.....	211
Dynamic Interaction.....	211

L. S. Vygotsky.....	212
Conscious Development.....	213
Internalization.....	214
Mental Development.....	218
Play.....	220
The Zone of Proximal Development.....	221
Problems in Vygotsky.....	223
Activity Unites Subject and Object.....	226
Unit of Analysis.....	229
The Principle of Objectness.....	231
The Situation of Activity.....	235
The Structure of Activity.....	236
Needs and Motives.....	238
Types of Motives.....	245
The Systemic Nature of Activity.....	247
The Non-additivity of Actions.....	251
Action.....	252
Aspirations and Goal-setting.....	258
Orienting, Executing and Control Functions.	260
Action and Operation.....	261
Activity and Consciousness.....	264
Activity is not Unidirectional.....	269

The Plasticity of Activity.....	273
The Genesis of Activity.....	275
Ascending and Descending Development.....	279
The Emergence of New Needs.....	280
Development is not Linear.....	283
Stages of Development.....	283
Challenges to Activity Theory.....	292
9 PERSONALITY AS A PRODUCT OF DEVELOPMENT.....	300
U.S.A. Versus U.S.S.R. Society.....	301
Personality Development: U.S.A.	307
Infancy (0-18 months).....	307
The preschool period (2-6 years).....	309
Middle childhood (6-12 years).....	312
Adolescence (13-17 years).....	317
The adult transition (18-25).....	320
Middle Adulthood.....	322
Personality Development: U.S.S.R.	326
Leading activity.....	327
Stages of development.....	330
Crises in development.....	333
Developing social behavior.....	335
Leontiev's stages.....	336

Infancy (0-1 year).....	337
Early childhood (1-3 years).....	338
Kindergarten age (3-6 years).....	341
Early school age (7-10).....	344
Adolescence (14-17).....	345
Personality Development: Hutterite.....	350
House children (0-3 years).....	352
Kindergarten (3-5 years).....	354
School children (6-15 years).....	355
Casual years (15-baptism).....	357
Baptism.....	359
Adulthood.....	359
Old age and death.....	361
Adolescence in Three Societies.....	361
10 PERSONALITY AND RESTRICTED DEVELOPMENT.....	364
Cultural Deprivation.....	365
Canal boat people.....	365
Isolated mountain children.....	367
Institutional Deprivation.....	370
Skeels and Dye.....	371
Goldfarb.....	375
Spitz.....	377

Provence and Lipton.....	381
Maternal deprivation.....	384
Langmeier.....	387
Social Deprivation.....	394
Anna and Isabelle.....	394
Twins: J. M. and P. M.	398
The wild boy of Aveyron.....	402
Sensory Deprivation.....	413
Summary.....	422
11 PERSONALITY AS A PRODUCT OF CULTURE & SOCIETY.	424
Enculturation Versus Socialization.....	426
Anthropology: A Brief History.....	431
Psychoanalysis in Anthropology.....	435
Culture and Personality: Five Conceptions..	438
Masculinity/femininity.....	445
Economic Function and Personality.....	451
Class and Socialization.....	463
Modernity.....	468
Discussion.....	469
12 PERSONALITY AND CULTURAL CHANGE.....	471
Review.....	471
Preliminary Considerations.....	472

Attitudes and Job Change.....	477
Change in Lebanon.....	481
Change in Yugoslavia.....	485
Change in Soviet Central Asia.....	495
Change: Admiralty Islands.....	504
The old way.....	506
Roots of change.....	511
The new way.....	518
Discussion.....	520
13 CONCLUSION.....	524
REFERENCES.....	542
APPENDIX A.....	612
APPENDIX B.....	619
APPENDIX C.....	622

Introduction

In the early history of research into personality two theories stood out as prominent. These two opposing theories were trait theory and situationism. Whereas trait theory proposed cross-situational consistency of behavior, situationism proposed situational specificity. After discussing these two theories, a theory that sought to adjust each to the other, by incorporating elements of both, was put forward.

As a theory of personality, interactionism proposed that personality was a product of the interaction of personality variables with situational variables. Since it was developed in the 1960's interactionism has been further solidified into a more complete theory. Ultimately this theory of personality hopes to study personality in such a way that person and situation are inseparable. Up to the present interactionism has failed at this task--person and situation are treated as separate variables in a mechanistic fashion. After discussing the various weaknesses of interactionism a better theory is discussed.

Activity theory overcomes the reductionism of interactionism by providing a unit of analysis that does not allow for the separation of person and situation. This unit is activity. In order to grasp present day human behavior fully it is necessary to have an understanding of the phylogenetic development of mind as it has been developed by the creator of activity theory--A. N. Leontiev. This sets the stage for an examination of activity theory and the important contributions it has to make for the field of personality.

The field of personality has developed separately from other areas of psychology which are often important sources of information about personality issues. To paint a fuller picture of the issues of personality its development, the effects of restricted development, the influence of culture and society, and the processes of change are considered. It is concluded that activity theory is a more adequate theory of personality.

Chapter 1

Traits versus situations

Personality. A term used in various senses, both popularly and psychologically, the most comprehensive and satisfactory being the integrated and dynamic organization of the physical, mental, moral, and social qualities of the individual, as that manifests itself to other people, in the give and take of social life; on further analysis it would appear in the main to comprise the natural and acquired impulses, and habits, interests, and complexes, the sentiments and ideals, the opinions and beliefs, as manifested in his relations with his social milieu... (Drever, 1952, p. 208).

Introduction. It is obvious from the above quotation the study of personality in psychology is a broad and all-encompassing field, a field that one could say attempts to explain just what and why a human being is. So broad is the concept, in fact, that a diverse array of views, often conflicting, fill the gamut of personality theories. While there are differences, the common denominator is a desire to account for consistencies in behavior and to determine the causes

of that consistency. Unfortunately, a shared aim does not necessarily yield similar results or conclusions. This has been most apparent in theories of personality. If one were to imagine a continuum of personality theories one would find at one extreme assertions about personal factors with little regard to environmental influence and at the other theories based on environmental determination with little personal influence. This is why Bavelas' (1978) 'metatheoretical' perspective (theory behind the theory) recognized "two different families of theories" (p. 233)--individual theories and social theories. Each of these metatheories have common internal characteristics although the theories they represent may differ widely from their sibling theories. The clearest distinction between the two is that individual theories are concerned with internal determinants, i.e. dispositions, while social theories are concerned with external, determining factors, i.e. stimuli.

Individual personality theories. Individual personality theories emphasize that personality is a property of an individual and one that displays

individual differences across aspects. Being a property of individuals, personality, for individual theorists, is an internal characteristic of people such as drives, needs, or traits, which, for most theorists, are not inherited. This means that these conceptual characteristics are influenced environmentally, i.e. by characteristics external to the person, but this does not mean that the environment is a key notion in the theory. Rather, most individual theorists allow for a vague environmental influence early in life, but these effects, by adulthood, are inconsequential since personality at that stage has formed and crystalized, e.g., Freud. By adulthood one's personality is presumed to be completely formed and is considered to be the paramount influence on behavior. As a result, the immediate, present environment has little effect on what a developed person does. Thus, as a property of the individual, personality characteristics have been hypothesized to be 'cross-situationally consistent' (consistent across varied situations) and stable over time. It must not, however, be assumed that individuals all show similarities if they

possess the same internal determinants. Rather, there are broad individual differences through the spectrum of a characteristic's dimensions. As well, not all people will share the same inner characteristics or qualities. What has been asserted, on the other hand, is that the rank order of individuals for the amount possessed of any quality will remain unchanged across situations. Thus, once personality has formed the person is assumed to be relatively independent of situational influence. This isolation from the situation renders individual theories wholly contrary to those positions that comprise the social theories.

Individual differences. Before discussing the position of the social theorists, brief mention needs to be made of the concept of individual differences since it is pertinent to present and later discussion. As Anastasi (1965) has indicated, an interest in individual differences can be traced back to Darwin's comparative methodology and to interest in the laws of heredity at the turn of the century.

In psychology Galton was the first to study individual differences in a human population as they

were to be discovered in physical and mental traits. Through these studies it became apparent that people showed varied degrees of ability on Galton's measures. In other words, people did not demonstrate ability comparable to all other people--individuals differed in ability. Thus individual differences became a cornerstone for psychological research. Recognizing this, we can see why Nunnally (1984) felt that "the term 'personality' refers to any feature that characterizes individuals and distinguishes them from one another" (p. 221) and why Stagner (1984) said that "all psychologists who use the term 'trait' agree that it is a means of identifying some respect on which individuals differ from one another" (p. 5). Social personality theories. To the social theorists personality is determined by principles that allow an individual to interact with their environment, with the emphasis being on social factors. Individual differences are considered less important in influencing personality. Instead, the differences among people are considered to be due to the differences between the situations that they encounter. The reason for this is that people are

considered open to the environment rather than isolated. This does not mean to say that individual aspects are ignored, but, when they are considered, they are used mostly to indicate how the environment comes to influence behavior. Opposed to the 'cross-situational consistency' of the individual theorists, the social theorists propose situational specificity. They expect change in personality across situations rather than stability. Instead of looking at individuals and their internal characteristics the social theorists are concerned with external situations.

Within the current literature on personality research (e.g., Endler, 1981a; Endler and Magnusson, 1974, 1976) discussion focusses mostly on trait theories (individual) and situationism (social) as the two most prominent historical and contemporary positions that predated and led to interactionism in personality research. Consistent with the foregoing, traits (internal characteristics) are considered to be dimensional in nature and form the basis for comparing individuals and accounting for differences. It was traits that were to have accounted for

behavioral consistency. This does not mean that trait theorists deny environmental influence, but they do expect the rank order of individuals on a trait to remain the same regardless of the situation (all are supposed to be influenced equally).

Situationism, the antithesis of trait theory, regards the changes in situations as leading to behavioral, dispositional change. While individual differences are recognized, they are not considered important in explaining behavior; the rank order of individuals is expected to be inconsistent across situations.

Trait theory. As Mischel (1981) has indicated, trait theories have been around for many years (e.g., Allport, F. H. and Allport, G. W. 1921) and there have been a number of propositions regarding traits introduced. Despite their differences, Mischel has noted five common assumptions and implied strategies of many of these theories. First, traits are generally assumed to be dispositions which account for behavioral consistency. Secondly, traits are classified as general or specific and it is assumed that they produce consistency across varied situations. Third, the main objective is to identify

broad underlying dispositions through the use of standardized tests. Fourth, self-reports and sampled, or tested, behaviors are considered to be indicative of some underlying trait. Finally, psychometric techniques are used in the search for traits.

Representative of the trait approach to personality was G. W. Allport. Allport (1927) argued for the recognition of trait as a 'unit' of personality which probably existed in a hierarchy of traits. Besides forming a hierarchy, Allport (1930-1931) maintained that traits, as they exist in individuals, have only relative independence from each other. Allport (1937) developed this further by maintaining that traits overlap, they do not operate alone, and that a test of a trait may measure more than the intended trait. Further, he argued that "no single trait--nor all traits together--determine behavior all by themselves" (1937, p. 313); Allport was trying to conceive of traits holistically in individuals (a topic to concern us further in discussing idiographic research). Still, the foregoing does not clearly indicate what a trait was

to Allport.

Allport defined a trait as "a generalized and focalized neuropsychic system (peculiar to the individual), with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive behavior" (1937, p. 295). This definition, according to McClelland (1960), breaks down into two components. Traits can render stimuli equivalent and traits can initiate equivalent responses. Thus, McClelland proposed, a trait, as Allport defined it, acts as an intervening variable that unites stimuli and responses. Allport, therefore, "apparently feels that a trait is both an inference the observer finds necessary to explain equivalences . . . and a living reality or force which acts within the individual to produce equivalences" (McClelland, p. 202). McClelland noted a problem with the equivalence of stimuli and the equivalence of responses since the definition tended to be circular (see also Hogan, DeSoto, and Solano, 1977; Mischel, 1981): "But how do we know the responses are similar? Must we answer that they are similar because they are given to

equivalent situations?" (p. 203). The only way to overcome this, according to McClelland, was to establish a standard by which to determine similarity. For McClelland, the answer was to be found in "theoretical convenience" (p. 222), i.e., on rational grounds or phenomenological grounds.

In her discussion of traits, Anastasi (1948) pointed out two areas of disagreement among trait theorists. The first pertained to the question of stability. Some theorists regarded traits as fixed and unchanging through life while other theorists believed that traits underwent a predetermined developmental course. Others considered traits to be the result of many influences working on the individual and, hence, they were regarded as more flexible. The other issue was the question of the universality of traits. Theorists range from regarding traits as being universal, to regarding them as being unique to the individual. The former view implies a nomothetic approach to personality research, while the latter implies an idiographic approach.

Nomothetic and idiographic research. It should be

noted that the arguments to be considered here are within the camp of the trait theorists. Traits are not at issue. The question concerns how traits are to be examined experimentally.

Vernon (1935-1936) pointed out that distinguishing individual traits does not explain the personality of the the whole person since the organized structure of the personality is not examined. The reason for this is that in measuring separate traits in groups of people these traits are abstracted from individuals and evaluated in the abstract. Allport (1937), commenting on this experimental approach, introduced the terms nomothetic and idiographic into personality psychology. In brief, the nomothetic approach examines the personality in terms of a trait as it is to be found in groups of people (also referred to as the American conception of personality--MacKinnon, 1944, or classical science--Luria, 1979). The idiographic approach is one which studies individual cases (also known as the German conception of personality--MacKinnon, 1944; or romantic science--Luria, 1979).

Allport (1937) was convinced that "the common (continuum) trait is not a true trait at all, but is merely a measurable aspect of complex individual traits" (p. 229). It was Allport's view that "only the individual trait is a true trait" (p. 229). This did not mean to say that Allport did not believe that people could not share certain common traits since, in truth, he did. He recognized that "for all their ultimate differences, normal persons within a given culture-area, tend to develop a limited number of roughly comparable modes of adjustment" (pp. 297-298). On the other hand, while Allport allowed for common traits, he also maintained that a common trait would find unique expression in individuals and, besides this, there were more than common traits to be discovered in individuals.

Important to these considerations is Kluckhohn and Murray's (1971) formulation that "every man is in certain respects (a) like all other men, (b) like some other men, (c) like no other man" (p. 53). On this basis Runyan (1983) believed that personality psychology had three goals--to study personality at the level of universals, at the level of within group

similarities, and at the level of individuals. Runyan believed that these levels were 'semi-independent', that the "solution of problems at one level of analysis will not necessarily solve problems at other levels" (p. 418). Allport (1962), however, in reference to Kluckhohn and Murray, argued that "personality does not contain three systems, but only one" (p. 410). To Allport individuals were wholes and were best examined as wholes, as opposed to comparing individuals with respect to traits which they share. He argued that "the die-hard nomothetist feels that in sheer loyalty to science, he must search for nothing but common and basic variables, however great the resulting distortion of the individual structure" (1937, p. 297). Cantor and Mischel (1979) also concluded that the nomothetic approach had failed. "The expectation of nomothetic trait psychology was that all members of a category would display all the critical features across a wide variety of contexts--an expectation that generally proved to be empirically dubious" (p. 43).

The general argument against idiographic research in a nutshell is as follows:

The idiographists may be entirely correct, but if they are, it is a sad day for psychology. Idiography is an antiscience point of view; it discourages the search for general laws and, instead, encourages the description of particular phenomena (people)--Nunnally, 1984, p. 226).

Runyan (1983) gathered the criticisms of the idiographic approach under six basic arguments. First was the complaint that it was difficult to generalize from idiographic studies. Runyan maintained that this was based on the unwarranted assumption that the purpose of personality psychology is to generalize at high levels of abstraction. He referred to Kluckhohn and Murray's three levels to indicate that there is more to personality than the general. A second criticism was that there are no unique traits or elements. Runyan accepted that a trait once established in an individual could be applied to other persons but that this does not mean that it is not fruitful to study whole persons as they exist in their complexity. Third was the criticism that the idiographic approach can generate

but not test hypotheses. Runyan referred the reader to the literature on single case studies to refute this charge. The fourth was a question of economics. To study all individuals idiographically was too great an enterprise. Runyan concurred but did not see this as interfering with the usefulness of idiographic research. This, to me, is a curious criticism since I don't believe anyone really intended for the whole of humanity to be tested (as though generality could not be obtained from representative samples). The fifth criticism agreed that idiographic study is an acceptable approach but maintained that it is not science. Again Runyan referred the reader to single subject research and to the research done by other sciences on particulars. Lastly, there have been arguments that there are not enough methods to carry out idiographic research. Runyan discounted this by providing a broad array of methods by which to conduct such research. (A comparable explanation of these issues has been presented by Pervin, 1984a.)

The division between these two approaches is not as absolute as it may seem. In fact, Allport (1946)

determined that "the psychology of personality . . . should be both nomothetic and idiographic" (p. 133). Beck (1953) also concluded that the idiographic method needs the nomothetic. Although Beck was of the opinion that in studying a single variable the nomothetic approach lost the personality, he also believed that the idiographic approach had to be preceded by the nomothetic in order to determine how a variable exists in the population so that its manifestation in the individual could be better grasped. Pervin (1984), from the other direction, maintained that the idiographic approach supports the search for general laws by leading to hypothesis generation (see also Lamiel, 1981; Falk, 1956). In conclusion it seems that both approaches should be considered valid, scientific, and complementary.

Situationism. Situationism (Bowers, 1973), is a term that refers broadly to behavioral psychologists who, while differing from each other, share a number of common assumptions. Persons identified as situationists by Bowers have been identified by Hall and Lindzey (1970) as stimulus-response (S-R) theorists, i.e., behaviorists. Peake (1984) has

called the term 'situationism' "a complete misnomer" (p. 331) since it collapses important differences into generalities.

To situationists, personality is studied through behavior and not through any internal determinants (Bowers, 1973) or through inferences (Mischel, 1968). It should be noted, however, that situationists differ on the admissibility of intraorganismic variables; there are some who are exclusive regarding cognition and some who are inclusive. When included, cognition is regarded as a response to external stimuli and is not regarded as an initiator of behavior or as explanation of behavior. Situationists also differ regarding the necessity of reinforcement in learning from those who regard it as essential (e.g., Skinner) to those who maintain that learning can occur without reinforcement (e.g., Bandura).

The principal premise of situationism is that behavior is a function of the environment, that behavior is initiated and controlled by the environment (Bowers, 1973). Rather than explaining behavior with internal constructs, it is the

conditions of the environment, which are present during the behavior's duration, that are used to account for behavior (and personality thereby). Thus, as Mischel (1968) said, "behavior depends on the exact stimulus conditions in the evoking situation and on the individual's history with similar stimuli" (p. 191). A situationist understanding of traits is represented by Kantor (1937-1938):

A trait . . . is a specific response to a specific stimulus, which may be expected to occur when that stimulus appears. Since a trait is an action present in an individual's behavior equipment, even though at the moment it is not being performed, it may be called latent. From a strictly psychological standpoint the individual is nothing but a series of such latent actions, each of which may be expected to constitute a definite response in the presence of its appropriate stimulus. The sum of all such traits comprises the individual's behavior equipment or

psychological personality (p. 309).

Situationists also distinguish stimuli from responses and explain the response in terms of the stimulus. Bowers also indicated that there is a tendency to identify the S-R paradigm with the experimental paradigm of independent- dependent variable. With its emphasis on external control of behavior, the situationist position posits the situational specificity of behavior as opposed to the cross-situational consistency of trait theorists (Endler and Magnusson, 1979).

Challenges to trait theory. After an initial period of unquestioned acceptance, trait psychology came under critical examination in the 1960's. The issue that proved to be most problematic was that of cross-situational consistency, i.e., the notion that a trait would manifest itself over a wide array of situations. What makes this criticism most telling is that it came from researchers who had long been involved in studying traits.

Vernon (1964), who had long been associated with trait psychology (e.g., Allport and Vernon, 1930; Vernon, 1933), pointed out that a trait cannot

account for a person's behavior over a wide array of situations. "People vary too widely from one situation to another, depending on their current social roles, moods and intentions, the group or persons they are reacting to, etc., for their position on any trait to be highly predictive" (p. 237). In fact, the broader the trait, the less predictive it could be of behavior in any particular situation. He objected to the conception of personality as a structure of organized traits on the grounds that the trait was hypothetical in nature. He also noted that there was an undue neglect of situational determinants by trait advocates.

The most damaging critique, and the one most widely recognized, was that of Mischel (1968). Mischel, like Vernon, was involved in the field of trait psychology and was forced by the failure of his own work's predictive validity (see Mischel, 1983a, 1984) to adopt a situationist position.

Behavior assessments do not label the individual with generalized trait terms and stereotypes . . . or guess about his private reasons and motives. Instead the

focus is on sampling the individual's cognitions and behaviors. In this sense, behavioral assessment involves an explanation of the unique or idiographic aspects of the single case, perhaps to a greater extent than any other approach (Mischel, 1968, p. 190).

The problem was trait theory's failure to demonstrate cross-situational consistency. Mischel indicated that the evidence in support of the assumption of 'cross-situational consistency' was negative. He concluded that the tests of personality showed the highest consistency for tests of cognitive and intellectual functioning and also when the situations were very similar or when self-reports were used. For the most part, tests of consistency remained at the .30 to .40 correlation level and were far from convincing. Regarding temporal stability the evidence was only slightly better, but equally susceptible to artifact. As a result, Mischel was forced to conclude that behavior is situationally specific. Mischel reviewed a number of studies and determined that the upper limit for consistency was a

correlation of .30 and it was so pervasive that Mischel referred to it as the 'personality coefficient'. This critique has not gone unchallenged by advocates of the trait approach.

Epstein (1979a) maintained that single experiments such as those reviewed by Mischel (1968) are unstable and deal with inadequate samples of behavior, and to correct for this it was necessary to aggregate responses over a number of situations (as Hartshorne and May, 1928, had concluded). (May, 1932, maintained that his notion of traits referred to the classification of habitual behaviors and not personality components.) Although Epstein argued for averaging out the effect of situations, he did not reject situational specificity: "there is no dearth of evidence that behavior varies markedly as a function of stimulus or situational variables" (1979b, p. 1099); Allport, (1962) also acknowledged this. On the other hand, by aggregating and, thereby, averaging out the situational influence, stable dispositions could be demonstrated (see also Epstein, 1980). He argued that aggregating measures allowed enough demonstration of cross-situational

stability to permit statements about personality "without having to specify the eliciting situations" (Epstein, 1979b, p. 1122). Situations became reduced to errors of measurement. In short, Epstein recognized the impact of situations on behavior but he maintained that it was still useful to retain the notion of traits. In line with May's contention, Epstein expected to find stability given enough behavioral measures.

Mischel (1979) argued, on the other hand, that Epstein had really only addressed the issue of temporal stability and measurement reliability but not that of cross-situational stability. Further, Mischel and Peake (1982) made the point that, whereas Epstein had claimed that the consistency issue had been resolved through aggregation, his data really pertained to an issue that had never been seriously raised. They concluded that Epstein had really only highlighted the problems of the consistency debate rather than resolving them.

Epstein (1983a), responding to Mischel and Peake (1982), stated that his views had been distorted (see also Epstein, 1983b). Epstein argued that Mischel

was correct in stating that human behavior displays a high degree of situational specificity but he disagreed with the conclusion that the conception of traits as stable, across situations, is untenable. Epstein maintained that for behavior to be adaptive it had to have some cross-situational consistency:

In the absence of specificity, people could not react discriminatively to their environment. In the absence of cross-situational generality, learning itself would be impossible, as there would be no transfer of experience from one situation to another that differed in even the most inconsequential ways (Epstein, 1983a, p. 183).

Epstein concluded that the confusing debate had been possible because both situationists and trait theorists could muster evidence to support each of their positions and that, because they could support their positions, they assumed the other position must be wrong. Epstein recognized situational specificity; he also recognized cross-situational generality, and proposed that traits are stable even

when specificity can be demonstrated. Thus, according to Epstein (1983a), "social behavior is often far more situationally specific than even situationist suspected, and for this reason aggregation over situations and occasions is frequently necessary for uncovering replicable generalizations" (p. 183).

Mischel (1983a) conceded that areas of convergence were beginning to appear. He agreed that there is coherence and continuity in the lives of individuals and there is both discriminativeness and generality across situations and across time. Funder (1983a) expressed a similar view. Epstein and O'Brien (1985) concluded that traits, as broad dispositions, were very poor predictors of future behavior (as Mischel, 1968, had shown) but that that was not sufficient to reject the utility of traits. They argued that the value of traits was in their ability to predict aggregated behavior, or "behavior in the long haul averaged over many situations, occasions, and responses" (p. 532). The function and importance of traits, as a result, has deviated considerably from Allport's previously mentioned

theoretical stance:

Traits do not explain behavior, but themselves require explaining. They are nevertheless an important first step in understanding an individual's personality, precisely because they identify important regularities that have to be explained (Epstein and O'Brien, 1985, p. 532).

The point Epstein and O'Brien have raised is not a new one. Anastasi (1948) was of a similar opinion:

It is our thesis that this diversity of trait concepts is the result of an underlying methodological limitation which has characterized not only trait studies but many other types of psychological investigations as well. The trait investigator has usually asked: "What is the organization of behavior?" or "What are the traits into which the individual's behavior repertory groups itself?" rather than asking, "How does behavior become organized?" and "How do psychological traits develop?" (p. 128).

The value of predicting from aggregated behavior surely needs to be questioned. Do we not hope to make sense of more specific behavior and to make more specific predictions as a result of having more comprehensive theory? While aggregating can demonstrate a certain amount of generality of the trait in question it fails to take into consideration the effect of situational specificity. Aggregation diffuses situational influence in order to discover trait generality and, thereby, forces its conclusion at the expense of situational impact. By aggregating, it is possible to have a situation to which the trait applies 100% and another to which it applies 0% and the average of 50% is really misleading and not as useful as finer grained analyses and predictions. Would it not be advisable, after demonstrating a trait through aggregation, to see which situations are amenable to an expression of the trait and those that are not?

Monson, Hesley, and Chernick (197?) have concluded that there are some situations where traits may be used as predictors and others where they may not be useful. When situational pressures were

strong traits were not as useful predictors as they were when situational pressures were weak. This sort of finding might explain why even Allport (1966) admitted that it was necessary to make some concessions to the situationist standpoint. He acceded to the fact that variability in personality could be induced by situational factors. So, instead of regarding traits as diffusely present across averaged situations, it may be more productive to see how traits and situations interact, how situation affect traits and how traits affect situations (as interactionism attempts to do--which will be discussed in the following chapters).

As we have seen, Mischel's (1968) book had led to some productive interchange and to some areas of convergence which allowed for the possibility of uniting the trait and situationist positions. This has not been the only area of contention arising from Mischel's challenge.

The second area of debate arising out of Mischel's arguments concerned the 'personality coefficient'. As the foregoing has indicated, the .30 ceiling succumbed to the arguments for

aggregation in defense of traits. A different response to these low correlations came from Hogan et al. (1977) who cautioned that although only nine percent of the variance had been accounted for, this did not mean that 91% of the variance was attributable to the situation. Furthermore, Kenrick and Funder (1988) have discussed the possibility that a correlation of .30 is not as small as people have tended to believe since there are a number of acceptable situational effects in social psychology that are at that level. They also mentioned Rosenthal and Rubin's (1979) point that percentage of variance explained in a correlation study can be deceptive, that a low correlation, while small, may be a correct discrimination and may be more important than had been assumed (see also Abelson, 1985).

With the foregoing in mind, we might reconsider the damage caused by the 'personality coefficient' to trait theory. First of all, the coefficient was applied to traits arrived at through nomothetic studies and it should be remembered, as Allport (1937) argued, that the generalized, abstracted trait is not a true trait. As such, the nomothetically

derived trait, as used to predict the behavior of individuals, could not be commensurate with the trait as it was to be discovered in any particular individual. Furthermore, traits to Allport (1927) formed a hierarchy that had only relative independence from each other (Allport, 1930-1931), that overlap and do not operate in isolation when affecting behavior (Allport, 1937), and individuals can engage in acts unrelated to traits as "the product of the stimulus and of the attitude of the moment" (Allport, 1930-1931, p. 371). It should be no surprise, therefore, that Allport (1937) determined that "the test will not measure one and only one trait. It is rather a rough and approximate device whereby the investigator hopes to tap the trait in question along with he knows not what other variables" (p. 328). With this understood, perhaps it is possible to suggest that the 'personality coefficient' is a stronger indicator of trait presence than has been previously assumed. What needs to be modified is the degree to which the trait is presumed to influence, or be associated with, behavior.

The final issue in the criticisms of trait theory concerns the possibility that traits do not exist in people, that, rather, they are the projections of cognitive consistencies, of observers, onto those being observed. Our purposes here are best served by the summary compiled by Kenrick and Funder (1988).

Four issues that have arisen in the debate regarding traits as cognitive consistencies of observers will be examined. First is the issue of "consensus versus solipsism", i.e., whether judges can agree about the person being observed. This is based on experiments with judges in which the judges have not agreed in their judgements regarding individuals. The question raised concerns whether traits exist in the heads of observers or whether observers can agree on the application of traits to the person observed. It should be noted (as Kendrick and Funder did not) that consensus can still preserve solipsism since agreement between two or more people does not mean that there is any objective referent for their agreement. A second problem that arises from this is "discriminateness versus generality".

This means that agreement between raters is based on shared assumptions about what clusters of words that go together or on broadly applicable judgments (e.g., likes to eat). The third problem is that of "behavior versus labelling". This implies that agreement among raters may be based on shared stereotypes about the person rated, or that raters, through discussion with each other, have arrived at an agreement about the person to be described. Lastly is the issue of "internal versus external locus of causal explanation". The problem here is that raters see target persons in a limited range of situations and that it may be the situation that determines the trait judgment rather than the person judged. As it turns out, according to Kenrick and Funder, these problems have arisen due to studies that were conducted with raters who did not know those to be rated, in other words, strangers rating strangers. As Kenrick and Funder concluded, persons who are acquainted with the people to be rated (i.e., friends, relatives, etc.) arrive at ratings that correlate well with behavior as opposed to those done by strangers. They determined, therefore, that "for

those we know well, at least, trait ratings involve more than just stereotypes based on easily observable categories, and they are based more on behavioral observation than on unfounded gossip" (p.29). This point was also made by Kenrick and Dantchik (1983).

Recently, Cantor and Mischel (1979), Cantor, Mischel, and Schwartz (1982a, 1982b), Mischel (1983, 1984), Mischel and Peake (1983a, 1983b) have attempted to search for consistency in something other than a trait, in what they call prototypicality. Mischel and Peake (1983a) concluded that the behavioral consistency paradox may have been paradoxical because researchers were seeking for consistency in the wrong data.

Instead of seeking high levels of average cross-situational consistency, we may need, instead, to identify distinctive bundles of temporally stable prototypic behaviors, the key features that characterize the person enduringly but not necessarily across many or all possibly relevant situations (pp. 257-258).

A category prototype is a collection of attributes

that people in general agree define a characteristic or category. As was done in cognitive psychology, it is necessary to elucidate the rules that people use in constructing these category prototypes.

This prototype approach to the categorization problem appreciates the reality of individual differences but seeks to reconceptualize the nature of the within-person coherences they reflect in an interactional framework, guided by cognitive theories of the natural categorization of everyday objects (Mischel and Peake, 1983, p. 240).

Situationism challenged. Bowers (1973) criticized situationism as a human model rather than questioning its utility. It was his opinion that "situationism (a) misidentifies an S-R point of view with the experimental method and (b) has adopted a limited and limiting understanding of scientific explanation and causality" (p. 309). He said that while "independent-dependent variable relationships are metaphysically neutral" (p. 309) the same is not true of S-R relations since they "carry a great load of

metaphysical freight" (p. 309). In his opinion the experimental method is insensitive to the organismic (person) variables that the situationists study in justifying their position, "for if independent-dependent relationships cannot readily 'see' the impact of persons on their behavior, perhaps it is because they are of relatively little importance" (p. 310), or so it may seem. Explanation in science, as Bowers indicated, "derives from some kind of theoretical perspective appropriate to the regularities at hand" (p. 310), whereas situationists were grasping at these reliable relations as though they were self-explanatory while denying causality in correlational relations. He argued that "causation derives from a theoretical understanding of empirical relationships, whether these relationships be S-R or R-R in nature" (p. 311). He continued by saying that the simple assumption that antecedents are the cause of consequences is inadequate if causality is reliant upon a theoretical standpoint, regardless of type of relationship (S-R or R-R); one cannot justifiably conclude that consequences are simply the result of antecedent circumstances.

More importantly, Bowers discussed the inability of a situationist position to account for cognitive phenomena. When cognition is presumed to be a response to external factors there is no logical way to account for the phenomena normally considered to be the product of thought. In fact, cognitive psychology must itself be considered an argument against the excesses of situationism (the reader should recall that some situationists do allow cognition to enter their theories (e.g., Mischel, 1976; Bandura, 1978)). Further, argued Bowers, there is a circularity in the situationist position (as there was in trait theory) since the change in environments must be inferred from a change in behavior when a change in behavior is to be explained by the change in environments. In any event, Bowers concluded that the experimental method is prone to discover behavioral change while the correlational method favors behavioral stability.

The reason for Bower's conclusion is that the experimental method manipulates the situation in order to produce differences among different treatments thus inducing changes in response to

stimulus variation. The correlational method, on the other hand, compares two or more different responses and looks to find the degree of overlap or interrelation. In the experimental procedure individual variation attenuates the results whereas situational variance attenuates the results of the correlational method.

Hall and Lindzey (1970), in their review of the situationist position, summarized further critiques of the situationist position. They pointed out that, not only is the concern with simple rather than complex behavior, research is often carried out with animal species which are far along the phylogenetic scale from human beings. When humans are studied the research pertains to very restricted aspects of human endeavor. Since complex behavior is avoided the results have limited application. More important, they maintained that there is inadequate specification of stimuli and responses especially as they occur in the natural environment, as opposed to the laboratory with its restrictive controls. Generalizations to the true environment leads to great difficulty in defining the stimuli and their

consequent responses in that realm.

It has also been maintained that S-R theory, due to its preoccupation with the learning process, is a partial theory since it does not deal with the components (or structure) of personality which pertain to human behavior. On this point Stagner (1984), a defender of trait theory, claimed that "under specificity theory, an individual has no personality, no past, no future ambitions or aspirations; he or she is merely a chameleon changing continually to reflect the changing milieu" (p. 25) and, therefore, did not allow prediction of behavior. In other words, personality cannot be considered wholly determined by the situation, such factors as language and cognition must also be considered. As was noted earlier, however, some situationists do allow for cognition. Mischel (1976) maintained that humans can not be considered to be empty organisms. Mischel argued clearly against the notion that situationists do not allow for cognitive phenomena.

It is time to forego the old cliches about how behaviorally oriented psychologists avoid cognition, affect, and complexity.

In current social behavior research human choices, subjective expectancies, observational and vicarious experiences, cognitions and affect, self-control, and complex interactions--not bar presses and monotonic learning curves for motor responses and twitches in animals--are the phenomena of concern (Mischel, 1976, p. 635).

Furthermore, Mischel (1976, 1977a) argued that people are not merely passive respondents to stimuli; not at all. According to Mischel's situationist position, people are actively involved in the selection and construction of stimulus conditions and that the situations regulate behavior only "insofar as they have acquired meaning for the individual" (Mischel, 1976, p. 638). Mischel (1984) even took the position that thought can transform the way in which the situation is reacted to. Thus, Mischel (1985a), at least, was not rejecting all personality variables and doing an about face from his work on traits prior to 1968, but, as far as situationism goes, he is not representative of the entire field (his later work is

more in line with what is known as interactionism). While the situationist position has provided valuable information about the development of personality it has also offered a rather limited standpoint when taken in the extreme.

Chapter 2

Personality as interaction: The beginning

Endler (1981b) pointed out that the notion of interactionism can be traced back in history at least to Aristotle. In the 1920's Kantor was the first to give theoretical importance to interaction in modern psychology. Other proponents of psychological interaction have been Koffka, Lewin, and Murray in the thirties; Angyal and Murphy in the forties; and in the 50's Rotter and Jenson advanced their theoretical formulations of interaction. In the late 1950's and early 60's interaction began to be treated as an empirical problem as opposed to a merely theoretical one, and it was this that led to the modern form of interactional psychology.

The first empirical study of interaction was that of Raush, Dittman and Taylor (1959a, 1959b) on hyperaggressive children in a treatment setting. They asked: "Which is more important for behavior, the individual personality or the situation?" Their results led them to answer: "The question is a meaningless one. Neither component can be uncoupled

from the other" (p. 373). Instead they . . .
. . . would view traits as a
once-and-for-all- time exclusive property
of the organism irrespective of the
environment but as directional
potentialities under certain environmental
circumstances; similarly, situations would
be viewed as having arousal potential only
for certain traits. The extent of
contribution toward other variables, made
for either trait or situational variations,
will be, in part, a function of the level
of conceptualization within a design. But
we would suggest that it is most useful to
consider neither situational nor trait
variance as predictive error, but rather to
move in the direction of explicit
theoretical and empirical examination of
sources of variance and their interactions
(p. 373).

The S-R Inventory. Endler, Hunt and Rosenstein
(1962) studied a single trait--anxiousness--as it was
influenced by environmental characteristics. They

developed an 'S-R Inventory of Anxiousness' which sampled eleven situations and fourteen responses in order to study the factors that were influencing the trait of anxiousness; situations could range from innocuous to alarming, such as going on a placid automobile trip or crawling on a mountain ledge. Analysis of variance showed the greatest contribution to overall variance to be from modes of response, with situations next; individual differences were third and approximately equal to the interaction of mode of response and situation (see also Endler and Hunt, 1968, 1969). In a reanalysis of the data (Endler and Hunt, 1966; Endler, 1966)) which consisted "of comparing estimated components of variance rather than either mean squares or sums of squares" (p. 338), they found that almost a third of the total variance was due to simple interactions (interactions of two variables as opposed to interactions of three or more variables). They concluded "that the debate over the relative importance of individual differences and of situations is largely a pseudoissue" (p. 336).

The S-R Inventory assessed. Cartwright (1975)

pointed out that the modes of response in the S-R inventory were actually expressions of two emotions rather than one: "there is an anxiousness of anxiety and an anxiousness of pleasurable anticipation" (p. 410). For this reason, the results of the analysis had to be considered spurious and were consequently in need of reinterpretation. A further complaint by Cartwright was that the selection of possible situations and responses was not random. It is possible, therefore, that the inventory had an inherent bias. The most important point to be noted is that the inventory contains a type of emotional response that is a pleasurable anticipation, i.e., "enjoy the challenge", and not a fear based emotion, embedded within the general concept anxiety. Therefore, while the S-R Inventory had the positive effect of stimulating the interactionist debate and initiating empirical research, the results must be treated with caution.

Challenges to early interactionism. By the early 1970's interactionism was firmly established as a theoretical and experimental problem. This does not mean, on the other hand, that interactionism was

accepted without question. Alker (1972) presented arguments against Mischel's criticisms of the trait position while Bem (1972) and Endler (1973) argued against him in favor of Mischel. Endler and Magnusson (1978) indicated that the interactionist position does not dispose of trait theory, that it should be considered a refinement of trait theory (a point raised by Stagner, 1977). Moscovitz (1982) also argued that the interactionist model of behavior requires an adequate understanding of the person component in the interaction. A number of literature reviews appeared supporting the interactionist position (e.g. Argyle and Little, 1972; Bowers, 1973; Ekehammar, 1974; Endler, 1976, 1977; Endler and Magnusson, 1976a, 1976b, 1977; Mischel, 1973).

Sarason, Smith and Diener, (1975), reported an extensive review of personality-social literature, using studies of broad theoretical interest, which revealed "surprisingly low percentages of variance accounted for by all classes of variables investigated: situational, personality, demographic, and interactions among these variables" (p. 203).

Taking a different tack, Golding (1975) argued

that while pursuing the question of how person and situation interact is a laudable approach, analysis of variance "can only provide suggestive hints about interactive models" (p. 287) and that "the existence of interaction terms cannot be uncritically accepted as supportive of the interactionist viewpoint unless they are shown to be nonartifactual, replicable, and meaningfully patterned" (p. 287). Mischel (1977b) concluded that if behavior is due to interacting variables, the focus on a single variable is limited. Cronbach (1975) maintained that studying interactions leads one into a "hall of mirrors" that extends to infinity since other, higher order interactions can be proposed. Nisbett (1977), who advocated research into main effects, declared that interactions are harder to disprove than main effect designs and that the complex designs they require are hard to disentangle. Alker (1977) argued that analysis of variance studies had restricted range in time and that new multivariate techniques were called for. Also, Olweus (1977) held that proportions of relative variance are dependent on the nature of the research design--a point recognized by Endler (1975). Raush

(1972), on the other hand, studied interaction as a sequential process and introduced the Markov model for studying interactions. Raush (1976) also distinguished interaction as a sequential process of change, presupposing variation and constraint and a balance between efficiency and flexibility.

This notion of process was put quite succinctly by Pervin (1977): "In this definition of personality we not only emphasize what is stable and what changes, but the pattern of ways in which the person responds the same or differently to various situations" (p. 372). Peterson (1977), on a related issue, addressed the problem of identifying the beginning of an interaction sequence (see also Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, 1967, on 'punctuation'). He identified five features of social interaction affecting behavior: setting conditions and interpersonal contracts, strategies, tactics, and outcomes.

Although the foregoing survey is not fully comprehensive, it clearly indicates how the field of personality was stirred by the introduction of interactionism. The proliferation of research and

theorizing indicates that the position touched a responsive chord in a number of people and promised as it did a more complete conception of human personality. This work must be viewed then as a ground breaking endeavour in going beyond the more one-sided approaches.

As a result of the differences of opinion, further exchanges among psychologists led to a more complete and stabilized notion of interaction that is the interactionism of the new decade. This is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Personality as interaction: The mature theory

The four main features of modern interactionism were first summarized by Endler and Magnusson (1974) as follows:

- 1) Actual behavior is a function of a continuous process of bidirectional interaction between the individual and the situation he encounters.
- 2) The individual is an intentional, active agent in this interaction process.
- 3) On the person side of the interaction, cognitive factors are the essential determinants of behavior.
- 4) On the situation side, the psychological meaning of the situation to the individual is the important determining factor (p. 19).

Endler and Magnusson (1976a) and Endler (1984) indicated that the two major tasks for interactional psychology are to (1) provide an adequate taxonomy of environments, situations and stimuli and (2) conduct

further analysis of how behavior is determined by the interaction of persons in situations.

Toward a taxonomy of situations. Endler and

Magnusson (1976b) indicated that the environment can be understood in terms of type and level.

Environments can be typified as 'objective' (independent of the perceiver) which are comprised of physical and social components, while 'subjective' environment refers to the interpretation of environments by individuals. Environmental levels may be 'macro' or 'micro' and they can be physical or social. The macro-physical is the whole environment, while the micro-physical consists of specific aspects of the larger context. The macro-social consists of such concepts as laws and common values while micro-social aspects are aspects such as attitudes and habits. The macro-social are common to most people while the micro-social are idiosyncratic.

The preceding referred to the first of the two major tasks for interactional psychology, to provide a taxonomy of situations. Endler and Magnusson were not alone in this taxonomic quest. The physical and social environmental levels identified by Endler and

Magnusson were identified by Feshbach (1978) as the situational and the sociocultural levels of environmental influence.

Rotter (1981) proposed six overlapping methods of determining situational similarity. The first was by expert judgment. Another was to have members of the group in question rate situations as to their degree of similarity. Another approach was to analyze the frequency of specific behaviors in specific situations, and, in a similar manner, one could measure people's expectancies for reinforcement to occur and to base situational similarity on expectancy similarity. A fifth method was to determine the predominant reinforcement that is likely to occur in a situation. The final approach was to study the amount of generalization of changes as reflected in behavior, expectancies, and in reinforcements. Rotter was clearly proposing methods that are consistent with the situationist group of theorists previously mentioned.

Using an approach similar to Rotter's, Klein and Krech (1968) argued that the meaning of a stimulus was not to be found in the stimulus itself but in the

response to the particular stimulus. Mischel (1976) also maintained that environmental conditions can regulate behavior, as a stimulus, only if the environmental conditions have become meaningful to the individual. Pervin (1976), taking a different tack, had four subjects generate lists of situations in their current lives to be used experimentally which indicated considerable variation. Price and Bouffard (1974) had subjects evaluate the appropriateness of 15 behaviors in 15 situations a behavior-situation matrix in an effort to arrive at adequate experimental variables. It was found that the differences between the situations and behaviors that were used accounted for the most variance.

Lewis (1978) asked who should define the taxonomy of situations and answered that more often than not it is the experimenter who defines the situation. Lewis noted that people perceive situations differently and that it was presumptuous of an experimenter to assume that they knew the objective nature of the situation.

Pervin (1981) and Mischel (1981) both maintained that there are many ways to classify a situation and

Mischel (1981) concluded that the quest for any single taxonomy of situations may be futile since situations can be labeled in as many ways as people can be labeled (i.e., as with trait labels). This was affirmed by Cantor, Mischel and Schwartz (1982a):

Given the many ways to slice social experience into categories of situations, any selection of situation categories will be somewhat arbitrary in principle. Therefore, it is important to note from the outset that we are not interested in developing exhaustive taxonomies of all situations (as personologists have attempted to describe all types of people) (p. 48).

It seems to me that Cantor et al. (1982a) have arrived at the correct conclusion. The situations selected have been so selected according to the importance of the person doing the selecting. The importance of the person doing the selecting may not carry over to another person since the situation may not have pertinence to them. There is no reason to

assume that the quest for an adequate taxonomy is a valid enterprise since the situation can be labeled in a multitude of ways. As we will see in chapter six, when discussing 'meaning' and 'sense', people experience life differently and we must find a way to come to grips with this.

The actual and perceived situation. Endler (1984) concluded that "the studies on the psychological significance of situations clearly demonstrate that it is necessary to distinguish between the perception of situations and the reaction to situations" (p. 198). This distinction is pertinent to the question of breaking the objective world into analyzable units. As Endler wrote:

. . . although in theory it is possible to distinguish among environments, situations and stimuli, in practice it is not so simple because the borderline between any two of them is often unclear--stimuli cross over into situations, and situations into environments. What is perceived as a stimulus by one person may be perceived as a situation by another person, and what is

perceived as a situation by one individual
may be perceived as an environment by a
different individual (p. 199).

Accordingly, Endler said it would be necessary to ascertain the subject's interpretation of the environment since it may not be in agreement with the interpretation given to it by the experimenter (a point not accounted for by the S-R Inventory).

The issue of the subjective interpretation or perception of the environment has been taken up by other authors. It has been argued that a person's behavior in a situation was influenced by their definition of the situation (Krause, 1970) or by the person's perception of the environment (Insel and Moos, 1974). Magnusson and Ekehammar (1978) presented the interactionist view that people perceive situations differently, that situational similarity cannot be determined objectively, and that the situation must be defined by the individual perceiving it, and that this affected a person's behavioral consistency:

A basic assumption in an interactional
model of behavior is that individual

behavior is more similar across situations which are perceived and interpreted as similar by the individual than across situations which are perceived as less similar or not similar at all (Magnusson and Ekehammar, p. 41).

This was also the position of Lord (1982). He proposed that behavioral consistency depended on the perceived similarity of situations. Block and Block (1981) carried this thinking to its logical conclusion: "The experience of each human being is unique; we are insulated by solipsism from appreciating the meaning of any person's experience in all its ramifications and richness" (p. 90). This conclusion, and other issues of interactionism, will be critically examined in the next chapter.

Selection versus imposition of situations. Another distinction Endler (1984) made was that situations could usefully be classified in terms of those we encounter through selection versus those encountered through imposition. At the same time, in interactionism, the persons are not simply reactive to the environment; on the contrary, they can modify

what they encounter either wholly or partially.

Rather, Endler and Magnusson (1977) . . .

. . . regard a person and the situation in which behavior can be observed as inextricably interwoven in a continuously ongoing process. This process cannot be meaningfully discussed as a cause and effect relationship with persons and situations as the causal factors and behavior as the effect (p. 21).

Mediating systems and variables. Another issue Magnusson and Endler (1977) identified was that of the distinction between mediating systems and mediating variables as opposed to behavior systems and reaction (behavioral) variables. Whereas reaction variables would include physiological reactions, covert reactions and overt behavior, mediating variables are hypothetical constructs which may be classified as pertaining to structure, content, or motivation, i.e., they are internal to the person. An important distinction made was that mediating systems are not necessarily isomorphic (exactly replicated) with the reactive, behavioral

systems, as was suggested in the distinction between the actual and the perceived situation. In other words, the internal state of the person may not be reflected in his or her behavior. This pertains, especially, to the issue of behavioral consistency since reactive consistency or inconsistency cannot be a basis for drawing conclusions about consistency at the mediating level because they do not have a one to one correspondence of adjustment to change.

Behavioral consistency. Magnusson and Endler (1977) further identified three types of consistency at the behavioral level: absolute consistency, relative consistency, and coherence. Absolute consistency reveals a certain behavior as constant across all situations. Relative consistency implies a stable rank order of persons with regard to a certain behavior across situations. Coherence refers to behavior which is lawful and predictable but not necessarily stable in a relative or absolute sense. Pervin (1976) expressed a similar view on consistency:

What is particularly instructive about the data concerning personality and

person-situation interaction is that each individual has reported a pattern of feeling and behavior which in some ways is constant across all situations, in some ways is generally present except for some situations, and in some ways is almost never present except for a few specific situations (p. 470).

To Magnusson and Endler the consistency of mediating variables means that a person interprets and selects environmental input and understands it in reference to the information store provided by experience and knowledge. As Endler (1984) put it:

Most of us are creatures of habit, and except for unusual events such as vacations, marriages, divorces, and so on, we typically encounter the same kinds of situations from day to day and from weekend to weekend. Much of the consistency in behavior is a function of the fact that we encounter and experience similar situations, both at play and at work, from day to day. Although our environment

influences us, we also influence our environment (p. 196).

Models of interaction. Finally, as regards models of interaction, Overton and Reese (1973) identified two--organismic and mechanistic-- while Endler (1982b) identified three models based on the four types of interaction identified by Olweus (1977).

According to Endler:

Olweus is really describing three kinds of interaction: unidirectional (mechanistic), reciprocal (dynamic), and a third type where one cannot realistically separate persons from situations. Due to our present lack of methodological sophistication, it is not presently feasible to empirically investigate this last type of interaction (1982b, p. 15).

As we will see in chapter 7, the work of Leontiev (also translated as Leontyev or Leont'ev) answers this need by providing a means by which to deal with the third kind of interaction.

The mechanistic model, as explained by Endler (1981a, 1982b, 1984), investigates unidirectional

causality, distinguishes between independent and dependent variables, and assumes that personal and situational factors relate in an additive, linear manner. Interest focuses on the interaction, in a data matrix, of such factors as personal variables, situational variables and the type of response (as in S-R inventories). Endler and Edwards (1978) identified four subcategories of mechanistic interaction: person x response mode, person x situation, situation x response mode, and person x situation x response mode. Endler noted that a variance components strategy (measuring amounts of experimental variance accounted for), while demonstrating interactions, cannot explain them. Endler did not believe that a person by treatment design can allow for prediction, especially when formulated within a theoretical context. Even if this is true, the approach is still mechanistic and inadequate for understanding dynamic interactions. The main point to note is that mechanistic interaction is concerned with the structure of interaction and not the process (as in dynamic). Endler and Edwards (1978) proposed that, even though

it is dynamic interaction that is of interest, it is necessary to start with mechanistic interactions, with the structure of interaction, before proceeding on to studying dynamic interactions.

The organismic (dynamic) model looks at reciprocal causation because the behavior of organisms is not a mere response to environmental consequences, the organism is actively influencing and changing the environment. As a result the usefulness of the distinction between independent and dependent variables is questioned. This view attempts to draw together reaction variables and mediating variables with situations in a process orientation which envisages an interwoven mesh. Since dynamic interaction reduces the process into these variables it is actually another form of mechanistic interaction, only a more complex form. It was claimed that it is not really possible to abstract persons and situations at any particular moment in time since they interact in a continuing process but this, in practice, is what is done. It is much easier to talk about process than to do anything about it and Endler feels that an exclusive

focus on process may be premature.

Interactionism as a model. Endler (1982a, 1983) determined that there are presently, in personality, only models and issues rather than a comprehensive theory. Endler (1983) argued that efforts to formulate a theory of personality have been pretentious in that these efforts were "models pretending to be theories" (p. 155). According to Endler, a model is an imitation, an analogical representation, a copy of a phenomenon, and must be considered less than a theory since it does not have the explanatory value of a theory. As this pertains to interactionism, it was Endler's opinion that interactionism will not be a theory until dynamic interaction has been studied. At the same time, Endler proposed that it was necessary to commence with the study of mechanistic interactions, even though the ultimate goal would be to gain an understanding of dynamic interaction, to understand the 'process of interaction'.

In terms of generality, interactionism is limited in that it has not examined the process of interaction The

explanatory value is limited in that the studies do not enable us to understand the process. We are dealing with static snapshots rather than movies. Unless and until interactionism enables us to explain the process of interaction, it will be a model but not yet a theory (Endler, 1983, p. 192).

The distinction to be made here is that in mechanistic interaction the research conducted uses person variables and situation variables which do not enter the research as a unity whereas the dynamic variable is to be, presumably, a unified person-situation variable. Endler (1982a) stated that, "to date, no one has systematically investigated the person-situation interaction unit" (p. 229).

The unit of analysis. As Mischel (1983a) put it, "'What units shall we use?' remains one of the fields' most compelling questions since Gordon Allport first asked it, and an adequate answer is unlikely to be simplistic" (p. 590). Mischel and Peake (1983b) concluded that a central task in the

psychology of personality was the search for a unit or units that had enough breadth and a relatively stable structure. As it pertains to interactionism, Magnusson and Allen (1983a), in an effort to move beyond the mechanistic approach, determined that the person and their environment could not be viewed as discrete units. Person and environment were "interconnected in a dynamic process of mutual influence and change" (p. 8). Magnusson and Allen (1983b) concluded that . . .

. . . the appropriate unit of analysis should be neither the person (or a particular element within the person) taken alone nor the situation (or elements within it) taken alone; instead, the person-in-the-situation should be considered to be the meaningful unit for use in the description, analysis, and interpretation of various aspects of an individual's psychological functioning (p. 371).

Since the person-in-the-situation unit, to these authors, is an ongoing process extending through time, the beginning and ending points of this unit

could only be defined arbitrarily. The solution, to Magnusson and Allen (1983a, 1983b) and Magnusson (1988) was to take a systems perspective.

The systems approach. Magnusson and Allen (1983a), who took the position that in the interaction process the person and environment were inseparable, proposed that the person-environment interaction should be considered an open system. Being an open system, as opposed to a closed system, meant that the person-environment interaction is engaged in exchanges with that which is beyond its own boundaries and it exists in a hierarchy of systems beyond it and within it.

In sum, then, we conceptualize person-environment interaction as an open system, and as being only one of many systems existing within a hierarchical arrangement of systems that extend from the micro-level (e.g., physiological processes) to the macro-level (society and culture) (Magnusson and Allen, 1983a, p. 9).

Within the person-environment interaction system is the system of the person. The person system is

composed of subsystems which operate at another level of organization. There is the mediating system (largely cognition), the biological-physiological system, and the action-reaction system. Other systems, outside of the person-environment interaction system include such entities as the family, groups, communities, and so on. Another subset, within the person-environment interaction system, identified by Magnusson and Allen, was the person-situation interaction system. As a result of this hierarchy of systems, which is considered characteristic of living systems, Magnusson and Allen (1983b) concluded that when studying a problem from this perspective, it is necessary to determine the degree of penetration of the system of interest with the other systems in the hierarchy. Lower levels are considered to be embedded in higher levels and these higher levels direct their functioning.

Magnusson and Allen (1983b) concluded their discussion of the systems application to personality by asserting that persons are totalities who have a certain perspective on the world and who function as ongoing systems. Their 'person-centred' approach to

research opposed the 'variable-centred' approach by being wholistic and dynamic. This approach conceptualizes the person as an integrated totality as opposed to a summation of variables. The aim, therefore, is to understand psychological continuity and the lawfulness of psychological processes. Due to this, Magnusson (1984) favored using an idiographic approach to research which he (1988) modified by favoring a mixed design which accepts both idiographic and nomothetic approaches.

While the introduction of systems theory into the field of personality might lead the reader to think that this implies a radical movement away from the previously mentioned tenets of modern interactionism, this is not the case. Magnusson has attempted to infuse into interactionism its lacking dynamism but he has not abandoned the basics which are mechanistic. Magnusson (1988) continued to uphold the distinction between the world as it is and the world as it is perceived, while emphasizing the importance of meaning to the subject. Magnusson proposed that "within the frame of each situation, stimuli and events are interpreted by the individual,

and the meaning assigned to the total situation provides the main basis for the interaction with the environment" (p. 27). Magnusson proposed that " the actual situation and the specific situational stimuli, cues, and events are interpreted by the individual, and the meaning assigned to the total situation provides the main basis for the interaction with the environment" (p. 27). Further, enduring individual differences continued to be recognized. Situational effects were still considered and the four main features of interactionism are retained. Ultimately, the systems aspects are simply added in an attempt to move towards dynamic interactionism, not to transcend mechanistic interactionism. A further expansion of interactionism by Magnusson was pursued by the introduction of developmental issues. Interactionism and development. Magnusson (1988) recognized that the way an individual functions in the present is a reflection of her or his developmental history. The environment was assumed to provide information to young persons which allowed them to develop an integrated, mental system which shaped how they functioned and how they engaged their

environment. This point was convincingly presented by Magnusson and Allen (1983a):

To the extent that environments in which we are reared are similar, the main characteristics of our world conceptions will share common characteristics. When the environments in which we develop differ markedly (between cultures, for example) the total mediating systems will differ (p. 23).

As a result of this development the person forms two perceived contingencies: 'situation-outcome contingencies' and 'behavior-outcome contingencies'. Situation-outcome contingencies occur when situational conditions have related, behavioral outcomes. Behavior-outcome contingencies refer to those instances when a person's actions have predictable consequences. These contingencies allow the individual to formulate predictions regarding the external world and to engage in 'predictive control' in that environment. To Magnusson this is the basis of 'goal-directed activity' and meaningfulness. The optimal environment for an individual's development

would therefore be 'consistently patterned' and 'influenceable'. These are necessary for an individual to engage their environment effectively, to behave adequately in current situations, and to form a meaningful environment in which a person can undertake purposive activity.

Curiously, Magnusson (1988) does not consider social environments to have inherent patterns. On the other hand, it is the behavior of other persons that accounts for patterning and environmental consistency by applying rewards and punishments and, from this, a meaningful environment is created. He explains:

Social environments have no inherent patterns. Instead, the developmental process is influenced by the patterning of social environments that is created by other people, particularly those who take care of the children. The extent to which the social environment is meaningfully structured as well as how it is structured, that is, the system of values, norms, rules, and roles, underlying the behavior

of significant persons in the environment, is essential in the development of the child's conceptions of the external world and his/her role in it (p. 30).

Meaning is somehow passed from individual to individual through reinforcement principles and this gives meaning to a social environment that is not inherently patterned.

Parents, siblings, teachers, peers, and others play a crucial role in the development and establishment of the perceptual-cognitive representations and conceptions of the external world, thereby providing a base for interpretation of the information offered in current situations (p. 31).

This, presumably, is what accounts for the differences in world conceptions and mediating systems between cultures, as mentioned earlier. Magnusson thus assigned importance to the meaning obtained from others but not from the environment for successful engagement with the environment. This cognitive determinant of behavior was called by

Magnusson the person's 'mediating system' and it determines the situations the people will seek to engage or avoid, the situational factors attended to, the interpretations made, and how situational information will be acted upon.

The actual environment influences an individual's behavior directly to some extent. However, most of the influence is exerted via the individual's perceptions and interpretations of the environment. It is the environment as it is perceived, interpreted, and given meaning to by the individual, that is, the cognitive representation of the external world, that is acted upon in most cases (Magnussen and Allen, 1983a, p. 16).

Yet, somehow the environment does influence the person's behavior and, therefore, according to Magnusson, a person does not engage a passive environment. On occasion, "the actual, physical environment acts upon the individual in important respects that can be reacted to without an intermediate process of interpretation" (Magnusson,

1988, p. 28). On the other hand, the effect of the environment can be controlled by the interpretations of the individual.

For the most part Magnusson regards the person as an open system but a system which is somehow more open to the influences of other people than to the environment. According to Magnusson (1988) a developing person "is generally stable and insensitive to the influence of external factors, even if they occur frequently and with great strength" (p. 33). Only at certain times, under certain conditions, and if the person is ready to change (due to 'maturational timing effects') can an environment be said to induce change. Given these conditions, a person passes on to a new stage in his or her life. These transitions are considered coherent across time with each state being related to that which precedes it. On the other hand, the relation between states does not mean that a present state can predict a following state.

Purposive behavior. Magnusson and Allen (1983a) have identified two conditions that are required for a person to engage in purposive behavior. The first is

that the person's environment needs to be both patterned and consistent, which "is a prerequisite for the individual's assigning meaning to the environment" (Magnusson and Allen, 1983a, p. 14), and the environment should also allow for optimal stimulation. If these conditions are met the person can make valid predictions about the external world. The person is then in a position to assign meaning to the environment and this allows the individual to formulate conceptions regarding situation-outcome and behavior-outcome contingencies.

The better the environment is patterned in a way that can be perceived by our senses and interpreted in a meaningful way, the more it will function optimally both as a source of stimulation and as a context for behavior during the course of development (Magnusson and Allen, 1983a, p. 14).

The second requirement for purposive behavior is that optimal stimulation from the environment allows the individual to influence the environment and to do so in a predictable manner.

That is, the individual must be able to

exert active control of his or her environment. This is a prerequisite for a satisfactory development of self-identity, of cognitive and social competence, and of feelings of control (p. 14).

Purposive behavior can thus be engaged in only if the environment is patterned, predictable, and controlable. These conditions being met, the person can be considered intentionally active in the person-environment interaction.

It should be noted that the purposive behavior's environment is the physical environment. As the reader will recall, "social environments have no inherent patterns" (Magnusson, 1988, p. 30).

Magnusson has apparently concluded that the physical environment, but not the social environment, is a carrier of information which allows the person to engage in meaningful interactions with the environment. At the same time, as was mentioned, meaning is somehow derived from the reinforcements of other people and these meanings are then associated with the environment.

This perplexing proposal--that the physical

environment carries information while the social environment is not patterned and, apparently, carries little or no information outside of random information, while meaning is assigned through reinforcement from others, which is surely a social encounter--must be considered to be due to the Kantian dualism of Magnusson and Allen:

An old philosophical distinction frequently referred to in analysis of the environment is that between (a) the environment "as it is" (e.g., described in terms of physical and sociocultural properties) and (b) the environment as it is perceived and interpreted by a person experiencing it.

These two conceptions may be designated the actual and the perceived environments (Magnusson and Allen, 1983a, p. 15).

Thus we have the actual environment and the perceived environment. It is really the perceived environment that accounts for what is normally considered to be purposive behavior, and this falls under the control of the created mediating system--the cognitive constructions.

Chapter 4

Problems of modern interactionism

The individual and the social approaches. As mentioned previously, theorists of the individual approach are looking inside a person at the intrapsychic structures that presumably explain human behavior; the environment need not be included or described when regarding the intrapsychic structure of the fully formed adult personality. The environment, at best, enters through inference, on the part of the theorist, once the personality has formed stable, internal characteristics. Social theorists, on the other hand, emphasize the external determinants of behavior with little regard for internal determinants; the major concern is with situational differences. The social theorists, then, are concerned with an individual in environment, not in isolation.

With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that the individual and the social positions are essentially not wrong, but abstractly one-sided, and for the most part mutually exclusive. They are thus

at odds regarding four major points. These are (1) the factor of interest, (2) factor differences considered, (3) temporal variability, and (4) situational considerations. The individual theorists are concerned with internal factors, individual differences, temporal stability and cross-situational consistency; the social theorists consider external factors, situational differences, temporal changes and situational specificity. While the evidence for cross-situational consistency and temporal stability was poor, it did not mean that the other position was necessarily supported. As interactionism has shown both aspects influence the formation of personality and their interaction is a key factor in the outcome. Whereas situationism and individualism were pitted against each other, interactionism has tried to demonstrate that their apparent separation was not as absolute as was theorized. In retrospect one can see that this approach is a definite move ahead from the two previous, partial approaches.

To see more clearly how individual characteristics interact with the environment in order to determine the nature of an overt

manifestation of personality let us examine the example provided by Langmeier, Langmeierova, and Krejcirova (1979). In the review of their work with deprived, institutionalized children, these authors identified two basic types of institutionalized infants identifiable within the first year of life, the hyperactive and the hypoactive. The hyperactive is characterized by excessive restlessness and frequent crying whereas the hypoactive displays indolence and apathy. From the first to the third year, four types of hyperactivity were distinguished: (1) generally hyperactive who are agitated, and need an ever-changing environment; (2) materially hyperactive children are characterized by a lack of interest in people but fascination with things; (3) socially hyperactive children who show indiscriminate need for social interaction; and (4) attachment hyperactives who use provocation to attract attention. Besides the hypoactives, with their low interest in social or physical contact, there were those that were 'relatively adequately adjusted' (as much as institutionalized children could be). Thus, although the environment of these children was the

same for all, there were notable individual differences in response to that environment. Not only that, at later adoption, it was found that the types varied with respect to their success or failure in moving from an institution to an adoptive home. While the socially hyperactive children found favorable results in the institution, they were less successful in the adoptive environment. On the other hand, attachment hyperactives were found to be a great success in adoption as opposed to the nuisances they were when in the institution. This interaction is clearer if we consider the nature of the different environments and the children's activity in them. In an institution a child who gets along and seeks out many others to associate with is seen as generally friendly but not has a constant need for attention (socially hyperactive), and he is not so much a bother to caretakers as is one who engages in disruptive behavior for the sake of gaining attention (attachment hyperactive). In adoption, however, where, presumably, the adopting parents are seeking a child to love and attend to, they would likely be more favorably influenced by a child that demands

their attention, as opposed to one that wants attention but is indifferent regarding where that attention comes from (one is as good as any other, adopting parents or otherwise). Citing an earlier study, therefore, Langmeier et al. (1979) stated "that the personality of a deprived child is not a simple imprint of an environmental situation, but rather an end-product of interaction of the specifically structured dispositions of the child with a specifically structured institutional environment" (p. 294). It can be concluded from this that whereas a uniform environment does not yield a uniform personality, it cannot be determined therefrom that environments do not affect personality; the personality that a person possesses is an interplay of internal determinants and the environment. Individual characteristics are functional or dysfunctional depending on the situation and the resultant personality is a product of the interaction of the two. No one-sided approach can adequately account for the end-product that is personality if the evidence is to be relied upon. Interactionism's first premise. As the preceding has

indicated, the first premise of modern interactionism is substantiable. The behavior of individuals is a continuous process of reciprocal interaction (bi-directional) between a person and the situations that they encounter. Reinforcement techniques have unmistakably demonstrated the influence of the environment, both physical and social, on the behavior of individuals. In social behavior, quite obviously, individuals reinforce each other and are not simply passive recipients of feedback. People, from the other side of the equation, affect the physical environment; science and technology are examples of this. Witness the effect of the discovery of nuclear fission on the natural and international environments. People have the power to create the situations in which they will live and influence thereby the effect of the environment on themselves and their progeny.

Interactionism's second premise. Regarding the second point of modern interactionism, that the individual is intentionally active in the interaction process, evidence can be found in everyday experience. First, however, it needs to be

recognized that this notion is opposed to the extreme situationist position. The history of humankind, it should be noted, is a fine example of this second premise. As a result of discovering the properties of the material world mankind moved from the stone age to the bronze age on through to the nuclear age and as a result has changed the whole nature of this planet and its ecology. On a smaller scale, individuals too have the capacity to change their own environment. One easy way this can be done is by simply moving elsewhere. This, however, is not simply escaping an aversive environment (although it can be) since people who move generally plan where they are moving to. Only in very exceptional circumstances do we flee an environment without any sort of planning, e.g., disasters.

Interactionism's third and fourth premises. The final two features of this position, i.e., that cognitive factors are essential determinants and that psychological meaning is the important determining factor, are not so easily dealt with. While I have no doubt that cognition enters into any concept of personality I think that it needs to be accounted for

and not simply gathered into an eclectic grab-bag. After all, the extreme situationist position denies cognition any place at all and this complaint must be put to rest once and for all. Mere assertion that cognition is an important mediator cannot be enough. For this reason it will be imperative to investigate Leontiev's account of cognition and its development in chapter six.

On the final point, regarding situations, it was stated that the meaning ascribed to the situation is a determinant of importance but the basis of that meaning was not established. Again I will turn, in chapter six to Leontiev to resolve what has been left unresolved. When we understand the development of the mind in its interplay with the environment we will come to understand that meaning truly is an important factor in understanding personality and come to understand how personal meaning is not independent of the environment.

Situational taxonomies. Besides the foregoing, the two tasks of modern interactionism (Endler and Magnusson, 1976a; Endler, 1984) are pertinent to this discussion. One task, naturally, is further analysis

of various interaction's influences on behavior. The second task is the creation of a taxonomy of situations. This unfortunately presents us with a difficult problem. As was indicated previously regarding situations, the meaning an individual assigns to any circumstance is an important factor in determining behavior. This suggests, then, that it is going to be next to impossible to establish any truly objective and ubiquitous classification system due to the subjective nature of meaning. As a result, a number of suggestions were offered to analyze the environment into units which are quite different in method and outcome, suggesting the relativity of this sort of analysis. Sells (1963), for instance, suggested looking at the natural environment, man-made aspects of the environment, setting tasks, and relationship factors, all of which could be, and were, broken down for more microscopic description. Magnusson (1974) drew situations from interpersonal relations, leisure activities, studies, work, and similar aspects, all relating to his population of interest (i.e. students). Frederiksen (1972) believed it best to arrive at situational

categories based on clusters of attributes.

Magnusson (1981a) determined that there were three main kinds of variables: (1) physical-geographical, (2) biological, and (3) sociocultural. Further, Magnusson (1981b) maintained that there were three main problems: (1) units of analysis, (2) time and space considerations, and (3) description and classification. He also mentioned that one must distinguish between the actual and the perceived situation. Moos (1973), from his standpoint, thought situations should be analyzed according to ecological dimensions, behavior settings, organizational structure, inhabitant characteristics, psychosocial characteristics and the functional nature of the environment. Barker (1963) held that the 'stream of behavior' could be divided into 'behavior units' and 'behavior tesserae'. Behavior units were changes which occurred independent of an investigator's manipulations whereas behavior tesserae were segments due to experimental manipulation. While it was possible to separate behavior from the non-behavioral environment, behavior was really coupled with environment. Barker (1968) singled out geographical

locus, temporal locus, population, action patterns, duration and relationships of the inhabitants as important environmental factors but he felt (Barker, 1965) that the environment and behavior were both separate and interdependent, they were "mutually causally related systems" (p. 9). As far as the meaning of the situation is concerned, Barker said that "the same environmental unit provides different inputs to different persons, and different inputs to the same person if his behavior changes" (p. 12) which suggests that not only is environmental input (meaning) different across people, it can also differ within people depending on the circumstances.

With so many classifications one can readily see why Mischel (1981) thought it futile to seek out any basic taxonomy of situations. According to Mischel (1986) "the question of whether individual differences or situations are more important is an empty one that has no general answer" (p. 495). he went on to say that "while some situations may be powerful determinants of behavior, others are trivial". Their effect will depend on the situation sampled, the behavior assessed, the individual

differences that are examined, and the reason for the assessment. Mischel proposed that a more interesting issue was to discover when person factors or environmental factors exerted powerful effects. Lest we throw up our hands in dismay, I think it important that we recognize that we can describe situations as they pertain to specific purposes of investigation. It may not be possible to generalize globally to all research using situational variables and, thereby, build a taxonomy of situations. On the other hand, this lack of a global taxonomy does not mean that situational variables do not serve a purpose. What needs to be addressed is the question of which situational variables are pertinent to the particular problem the researcher is interested in. The futility of a global taxonomy does not render the use of situational variables futile.

Mechanistic versus dynamic interaction. Arriving at situational variables for specific research interests, as in S-R Inventories, may serve certain research interests, but it would appear that if one wants to arrive at a truly dynamic study of interactions it will not be possible to separate

person from situation. Cantor et al (1982a) have questioned whether this dichotomy has pertinence or meaning to anyone other than psychologists.

While the person-situation distinction may have been useful in some studies of social knowledge, it is by no means clear that natural social cognition follows such a dichotomy. Naive knowledge systems may not be organized around such discrete entities as "persons" and "situations." Rather, the richest, most lifelike and useful cognitive-social structures may be compound in nature; amalgams of generalizations about people-in-situations or life-goals-I-have-in-situations or scripts-for-behavior-in-situations apparently, when lay perceivers carve up the social world, they do not always adhere to the traditional person-situation divisions established by psychologists (Cantor et al., 1982a, p. 39).

The unit that we are looking for, in order to study dynamic interaction, is something that deals with

person and situation as a unity. As we will see in chapter eight, a unit which preserves the unity of person and situation is 'activity'. The attempt to understand dynamic interaction, contrary to Endler and Edwards (1978) and Endler (1983), will not be aided by beginning with mechanistic interactions. To begin at this level of abstraction reduces the phenomena of interest to a point where that phenomenon no longer exists. Mechanism, quite simply, is not dynamism and disunity is not unity and we will not arrive at dynamic interaction through the mechanistic model. Besides this, the usefulness of this approach has been challenged on the grounds that, while interactions have been demonstrated, these interactions have not been explained (Endler and Edwards, 1978; Sadava, 1980; Mischel, 1981). If task two is the continued analysis of the effects of the interaction of persons and situations, via mechanistic interaction, one must question whether this is a valid pursuit. We will not arrive at dynamic interaction, if by dynamic process is meant mechanical process.

I would also suggest that mechanistic

interactions have not been explained because the attempt to cognize and understand interactions has been made in terms of dynamism but the mechanistic approach is not amenable to this type of thinking. Whereas psychologists can separate person and situation experimentally, it may be as Cantor et al suggested, that people do not naturally think of people apart from situations; and this may also apply to psychologists. Pervin (1985) has argued that "it is clear that we must go beyond debates concerning persons or situations . . . to consideration of processes involving persons and situations" (p. 92). Certainly Magnusson and Allen (1983b) saw the need for a unit in which person and situation could not be separated.

Whether this is speculation is correct or not, the point to be made is that mechanistic interaction will not and cannot lead to conceptualizations of dynamic interaction if, by dynamic, process is meant. In the discussion of the three types of interaction by Endler (1982) dynamic interaction was discussed as though it were testing a process but, in fact, in practice it was a complex form of mechanism and not a

process in nature or application. What in fact is done is increasing the complexity of the experimental design by adding more variables and performing more complex statistical procedures (e.g., Magnusson, 1988).

The actual versus the perceived environment.

The Lockean perspective. According to Endler and Magnusson (1976b) environments can be classified as objective or subjective. The objective environment is independent of the perceiver while the subjective environment depends on the individual's interpretations. This led Endler (1982b) to state that

. . . an important issue with respect to situations is concerned with whether or not one can define the situation (or stimulus or environment) independently of the perceiver. Since the significance or meaning of a situation is an essential determinant of behavior, it is necessary to examine the perception of situations when investigating the person by situation interaction issue (p. 17).

This progression is reminiscent of the movement to Empiricism in philosophy from John Locke's primary and secondary qualities of perception. Whereas primary qualities were inseparable from the objects perceived, secondary qualities were merely perceptions inspired by, but not of, the object. This eventually led to the denial of any objectively knowable world. It was this that led Bowers (1981) to state that "identifying the situation with a person's perception of it brings us perilously close to a solipsistic position that threatens the very notion of an objective science of psychology" (p. 179). It seems to me that the distinction that Endler wished to draw is between social and individual meanings (what Leontiev, chapter six, calls meaning and sense) which would be determined by the real, material world. The social meaning would be the generally accepted meaning of a situation while the individual meaning would be the more idiosyncratic perception. Consider, for example, someone who goes to the Canadian Arctic as Ottawa's representative for the Minister of Northern Affairs. Should it snow, this person may have a handful of

terms for the snow whereas the local Eskimos who live and work with those elements, have many more names for it. This is not because the snow is different for the Minister's representative and the Eskimos. Only their activities in relation to the snow are different. Had this same representative lived in the north from birth he might have perceived just as many types of snow as the Eskimos had because his personally historical relationship to the snow would have been different. Theoretically, we can see that while an object may possess a general meaning to some people because of their experiences in the world (upon which their subsequent perceptions are based), the object might be seen in a completely different light. In this example, the Eskimo has to rely on very fine distinctions of snow conditions in order to survive. The government representative does not need to make such fine distinctions and may be concerned only with whether to wear boots or not. The important point to note is that the distinction is due to the actual situation as perceived and experienced as objective and not on individual differences of perception in identical situations.

it is essential that we recognize that the environment does exist independently of the perceiver and that perceptions are secondary to that environment.

The Kantian perspective. Developing the Lockean position of Endler and Magnusson (1976b) and Endler (1982b), as it was historically by philosophers, Magnusson and Allen (1983a, 1983b) and Magnusson (1988) have moved on to a modified Kantian position which distinguishes between the world as it is and the world as perceived. The modification to Kant's philosophy is in the contention that the physical environment can be known only partially.

Whereas the Kantian position accounts for the subjective side of experience, i.e., perception, with categories of mind, the position of Magnusson and Allen allows for the development of two forms of control--the patterned environment which can eventually be controlled and the world of meanings derived through the interaction with other people. Present functioning is considered to be the result of a personal, developmental history.

As the reader will recall, purposive behavior,

to these authors, requires that the physical environment be patterned and consistent so that the individual can make valid predictions and assign meaning to the environment. As sensible as this sounds, the reader must recognize that meaning, to Magnusson, does not pertain to the objective, physical environment. Rather, it has its place in the subjective realm of the individual and is only loosely related to the physical environment and not at all to the social environment. Even though the environment is patterned and consistent, the meaning attached to that world is due to "the system of values, norms, rules, and roles, underlying the behavior of significant persons" (Magnusson, 1988, p. 30), such as parents and peers, who determine the rewards and punishments of these people.

What Magnusson actually meant is far from clear. While meaning is derived from other people, who presumably are of the social environment, the social environment has no patterns. As a result, by some coincidence, meaning is gained from interaction with individuals who, as a group, have no shared meanings; were this not so the social environment would have to

be patterned. If social environments have no patterns, it must be assumed that the people who reward and punish us do so randomly and that the world of human meanings has no sound basis in any actual world. To accept Magnusson and Allen's proposal, is to believe that the physical world, which is patterned, does not provide meaning to people and that the social environment, which does provide meaning, is not patterned; meaning is not really pertinent to the physical world and all of the perceived consistency of the world is actually in the head of the perceiver. Yet it is meaning that Magnusson (1988) emphasizes in the control of behavior: a developing person "is generally stable and insensitive to the influence of external factors, even if they occur frequently and with great strength" (p. 53). Rather than explore this further, let us examine the source of the difficulty which is to found in the influence of Kantian philosophy.

Questions of philosophy. The problem that the interactionists are struggling with comes from the empiricist school in philosophy (see Heidbreder, 1933). Briefly, John Locke determined that knowledge

comes from a single source which is experience and it is of two sorts: the observation of objects through sensory impression and through perceptions in the mind. Locke proposed that the perceived qualities of objects were of two sorts--primary qualities and secondary qualities. Primary qualities were inseparable from the object and were aspects of the object, such as its solidity and extension in space. Secondary qualities were not in the object but in the interaction of the object with the perceiver, such as colors and smells, which are contributed by a person's sense organs. Following upon Locke, Bishop Berkeley performed the next logical step in the argument by claiming that all qualities were secondary, mental, and not of the object. To overcome the inherent solipsism of this position, Berkeley invoked the everlasting perceptions of his deity to allow for objective constancy outside of individual humans. David Hume brought the argument to its logical conclusion by stating that the world was an aggregate of disordered ideas impressed upon the mind; there was no order, causation was merely a force of habit and there was nothing in experience

that could guarantee causality. This distressing conclusion was challenged by Kant.

Kant could not accept the disordered world of Hume. Kant could see no way to refute Hume's conclusion that the material world was unknowable and accepted the impossibility of knowing the 'thing-in-itself' or what Magnusson has called the 'actual world'. Unlike Hume, Kant noted that sensations are not isolated and unrelated, rather, as they enter the unified field of consciousness they enter into relation with the ordered whole which is mind. Sensations, to be known, are brought into the unified consciousness which performs an intellectual synthesis. This ordering was done by the mental components which Kant called categories. So what is known is the subjective impression of the world and not the world itself. This, briefly, was Kant's solution.

Magnusson has modified the philosophical position of Kant by allowing for patterns of the physical environment to be known since "the environment essentially serves as a source of information" (Magnusson, 1988, p. 29). The social

environment, on the other hand, which should also be regarded a part of the physical environment, is not meaningful since "social environments have no inherent patterns" (Magnusson, 1988, p. 30). If the social environment is not patterned, it must be that the world of meanings is transmitted from mind to mind since meanings are not a priori (as are categories) because meanings are developed. By some unknown process, meanings are passed between persons in their reinforcement of each other and these meanings somehow correlate with the world as it actually is after being filtered by perception.

The source of Magnusson's proposals can be found in his latest work (1988) where he suggests a profitable unity can be made of the philosophies of Kant and Marx.

The view described in the preceding section can resolve the dispute between Emmanuel Kant's idealtistic idea that our consciousness is not shaped by reality, but reality is shaped by our consciousness and Karl Marx's materialistic standpoint that reality is not shaped by our consciousness,

but our consciousness is shaped by reality. According to the view advocated here, both are right; consciousness is formed in a continuous process of interaction with reality and is then dependent on it; at the same time consciousness defines the reality which forms the basis for individual's purposive dealing with the environment (Magnusson, 1988, p.30).

The difference between Kant and Marx is a basic philosophical difference--the difference between idealism and materialism. Quite simply, idealism asserts that mind accounts for the material world, idea precedes matter. Materialism asserts that matter exists prior to mind, independent of mind, and that matter accounts for mind, not vice versa. These two philosophical positions cannot be united, they are absolutely opposed; either mind accounts for matter or matter accounts for mind, not both. The materialist standpoint does, however, allow for ideas changing the world once mind and consciousness have developed and it is therefore unnecessary, and undesirable, to wed materialism to idealism as

Magnusson has proposed.

Furthermore, Kant argued that we can not know the 'thing-in-itself' whereas Marx clearly recognized that it is the actual world that is known and reflected in consciousness. Here we find the source of Magnusson's view that some of the environment can be known and related somehow to meaning and how the internal world somehow influences what the reality of the world is. This is due to the unwarranted amalgamation of the opposing philosophies of Kant and Marx. Psychologically, Magnusson is on to something, ideas do influence the world (as in inventions) but ideas are derived from interaction with the environment, both physical and social.

Evolutionary theory tells us that man is a late comer to the world scene. This means that if evolutionary theory is correct the mind of man could not be the basis of the world, since that world predates the mind presumed to account for it in the idealist position. What we will see in chapter six and chapter eight is that the materialist stance, by giving a historical account of mind and its development, both phylogenetically and

ontogenetically, can unite the meanings of each individual to the objectively knowable world. The world of meanings is derived from the objective world and not from some unrelated internal sphere of mental activity. By internalizing the world of objective meaning the individual is empowered to deal with that world, to manipulate it, and even change it.

This will be developed more fully later, but for now I suggest that the point to be grasped is that we must first account for mind and cognition and how cognition develops before we can account for an individual's purposive behavior. If we can account for mind and 'mediating systems', as based on the 'actual environment', we can overcome the problems of Magnusson and Allen's position.

Statistical versus theoretical interaction. Another point that is essential to this theoretical look at interactionism is the distinction that needs to be drawn between statistical and theoretical interaction. As the history of interactionism has indicated, interactional psychology had its birth in the statistical, evaluative technique known as analysis of variance. According to Bavelas (1978),

. . . the term interaction has a statistical but not necessarily a psychological or theoretical meaning. There has been a tendency to pick traits and situations for the sake of obtaining data. When the question being asked is formulated almost entirely in statistical terms, it often (but not necessarily) loses any other meaning along the way (p. 246).

Or as Lazarus and Launier (1978) put it: "Although researchers often speak of a statistical interaction between person and environment as an interactive process, they are really looking at static fractions of variance rather than an actual interactive process" (p. 290).

While analysis of variance is a useful technique it is not in itself an adequate basis for a theory and it obscures the true nature of the processes under investigation. On this point Tolman (1979) stated that "the methodological distinction between interaction and main effect cannot be made at the level of theory: main effects are interactions" (p. 1). This was because "all variables have their effects, indeed have existence, only in interaction with other variables" (p. 4). Tolman put

the issue succinctly by stating that. . .

. . . the main effect is also an interaction. In the person-environment context, it should be particularly obvious that a person variable cannot exist in the absence of some kind of environment. And an environment variable, if correctly understood as 'environment-for-the-person', clearly cannot exist as such in the absence of a person. As one presses this kind of reflection further, it becomes clear that no variable can exist, let alone have an effect, except in interaction with other variables.

The important conclusion from this is that while one may meaningfully distinguish main effects and interactions at the level of method, no such distinction can be made at the level of theory: theoretically, there is no such thing as a main effect (p. 3-4).

We see then that main effects are independent only as intellectual abstractions but not as they are found

in the concrete world.

Sanford (1965) cautioned:

If we must abstract parts from wholes let us be fully aware of the fact that we are abstracting, and let us devote as much energy to finding out how special bits of knowledge fit into the larger picture as we do to analyzing wholes in the conventional scientific way (p. 197).

Further, stated Sanford,

. . . if one uses abstract concepts he must, of course, be able to go back to the concrete, showing that a given concept applies in a particular case; or, to take it the other way around, it must be possible to show that a given concrete phenomenon may reasonably be ordered to the abstract concept (p. 198).

Unfortunately, in the vast majority of psychological studies, not only in interactionism, this is not the case.

As an instance of the foregoing, Endler and Magnusson (1976a) claimed that "for the interactional

model the basic unit of analysis is the person-situation interaction. Ideally, one should treat this unit as an entity in itself, independent of person factors and situation factors" (p. 960). While Endler and Magnusson recognized the basic unit of analysis they succumbed to the impress of the scientific demand for statistical analysis and, therefore, forfeited the pursuit of 'person-situation' interaction in favor of the variable-analytical approach. The question to be raised is, is it productive to reduce the phenomenon of interest to a mere abstraction? This is comparable to saying that water can exist independently of hydrogen and oxygen since water is the interaction of these two elements. An interaction apart from the person and the situation is at best an idea, not anything actual. Opposed to this approach is that of Nuttin (1977) who said that . . . personality and environment or world are not to be considered as two autonomously pre-existing units interacting with each other at a given moment, but that both, personality and

world, only function and exist as two interdependent poles of a unitary behavioral process. This behavioral personality-world unit is the basic 'entity' to be studied in psychology; it is functional and not 'substantive' in nature (p. 201-202).

Cornforth (1978) proposed that "in order to understand things so as to change them we must study them, not according to the dictates of any abstract system, but in their real changes and interconnections" (p. 15) rather than "thinking as though what is abstracted could exist in abstraction" (p. 57). We must always bear in mind that the world is one big interaction and that anything outside of that fantastic interactive network is unreal in the concrete sense, including the abstracted concept interaction.

Lawler (1975) quoted and paraphrased Engels by saying that . . .

. . . although analytical abstraction is a necessary 'moment' of the history of thought, by itself it produces 'as a legacy

the habit of observing natural objects and natural processes in their isolation, detached from the whole vast interconnection of things; and therefore not in their motion, but in their repose; not as essentially changing, but as fixed constants; not in their life, but in their death'" (p. 5).

Consequently, if, in abstracting, we do not return our concepts back to the concrete world of things in relation, we will be left with dead ideas that do not represent the essence of the processes they were intended to convey. In summation, Tolman (1981) wrote that "the concrete understanding of a thing is an understanding of it in its interconnections and movements. To extract a thing from its interconnections is to abstract it The abstract individual . . . does not exist in the real, concrete world" (p. 42).

Structure versus process. As just indicated, abstractions from the concrete, interacting network that is our world, which are not returned to that concrete network, have no reality. As a result, it

is now maintained that the distinction made between the structure and process of personality, as established by mechanical interactionism and dynamic interactionism, is unreal since these two are inseparable. Each approach is designed to yield these characteristics but the division of the two exists in the method of analysis and not in the actual person. Personality is a structured process and not a structure and/or a process. The separation between the two is due to method (in the same way that light in physics was found to have both particle and wave properties) but the separation cannot be made at the level of living persons. The structure of personality, when we recall that it has a developmental history, is itself a process. It is only in isolation, in abstraction, that personality's structure is seen as unchanging and stable. Personality is only relatively stable. Over time, as the theory of interactionism would lead us to expect, changing circumstances in the environment will instigate change for better or worse. Personality does have structure and it is engaged in a process of interaction with people and things and this

interaction process directly effects the creation and modification of personality structure. While methodology necessarily leads to their separation as abstractions, life demands that they be understood in their unity.

The systems approach. The incorporation of the systems approach (a method of explaining or describing complex phenomena as wholes) as presented so far by Magnusson and Allen (1983a) must be considered preliminary. This is because the authors did not present any far-reaching proposals but merely introduced some systems-notions into interactionism. For this reason, the cautions urged against systems theory will be introduced so that the reader will be aware of the possible dangers inherent in the theory as it is presently developed.

Buck (1956) determined that a major source of danger with systems theory was the employment of analogies. The analogies that general systems theory engaged in, in its search for a broad theory of behavior, had to do with structural analysis (due to the concentration on systems). Buck argued that almost any functional similarities may be drawn

between two items but the analogies drawn may not have any particular bearing on anything. So many uninteresting analogies have been drawn that Buck responded: "If one is tempted to say 'All right, so they're structurally analogous, so what' my answer is 'So, nothing!'" (p. 225), "for goodness only knows where some sort of functional relationship between two items may not turn up" (p. 226). What Buck advises is that, if analogies are drawn, conclusions should be made; identifying analogies is not enough. If nothing was concluded, Buck wanted to know why the analogy was made, what its purpose was.

Buck was also disturbed by the claim that every system has a subsystem and an environment. As he put it:

. . . we are indeed confronted with limitless vistas of systems. One is unable to think of anything, or any combination of things, which could not be regarded as a system. And, of course, a concept that applies to everything is logically empty" (p. 226).

Shames (unpublished) was concerned that the

notion of boundaries in systems theory was quite arbitrary. "They may be conceptual, natural or social, and may be applied by the investigator in any way for the purposes of analysis" (p. 5). Shames concluded that the arbitrariness was throughout the entire theory. Without theoretical reasons for determining the boundaries of objects, the systems approach generalized natural laws of functioning across systems. Thus there is a tendency to reduce human, social laws to natural laws. According to Shames, "in the area of human affairs, we find that far from enabling us to grasp human processes in their coherence and specificity, systems theory dissolves them entirely" (p. 6).

Lektorsky and Sadosky (1960) saw a shortcoming in general systems theory in its emphasis on description. While these authors found that systems theory was incomplete, they did conclude that there was a need for the development of a systems theory that more thoroughly examined 'forms of behavior' and 'principles of organization' was called for. Thus, "general systems theory, like any scientific theory should develop further and in the process of

development should strive for more adequate reflection of the objects of investigation" (p. 176). On the other hand, Lektorsky and Sadovsky do not believe that general systems theory can serve as a philosophy of science.

Allport (1960) also cautioned against the idea of personality as a steady state (a principle of some systems proposals). His point was that there is a tendency for humans to go beyond the homeostatic in a quest "for an enhancement and elaboration of internal order even at the cost of considerable disequilibrium" (p. 305). Allport also cautioned against biological reductionism (as did Shames). Lastly, Allport challenged the systems theorist to answer this question: "What makes the system cohere in any one person?" (p. 308). Allport maintained that this was a pivotal and neglected problem and that it should be addressed by anyone introducing systems theory into the field of personality.

In conclusion, there are a number of potential difficulties in the application of systems theory that need to be considered before the systems approach can find its place in any comprehensive

theory of personality.

In the next chapter we will examine the issue of the relevance of social information to personality experimentally and, in the following chapter we will examine Leontiev's interactive, developmental theory of mind. As a result we will see that interactionism is fully warranted in laying emphasis on cognitive factors. Also, we will see how large an effect the environment has in the development of mind and human thought.

Chapter 5

Personality: An empirical consideration.

Introduction. As has been indicated earlier, interactionism arose as an attempt to overcome the argument about whether the person or the situation was the prime determinant of personality. Endler et al devised the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness to test the influence of each and of their interaction. The interaction of person and situation was found to account for the greater portion of variance.

In developing their inventory Endler et al. used situations that were quite abstract, e.g., "you are just starting off on an automobile trip", and tended to disregard the influence of social information on the situation. This tendency, to ignore the contextual information, was further developed by Magnusson (1988) to the point where the social environment was said to have no pattern. Only the physical environment was considered patterned. To render such a conclusion was to fail to realize that it is only through social-historical development that humans are able to perceive the physical environment

as patterned and, consequently, meaningful.

According to Leontyev's (1981) activity theory, human consciousness, as distinct from animal psyche, arises from the development of human society. Furthermore, a human infant is only considered to be a candidate for humanity and the candidacy will not be successful if the infant does not grow up in a social environment.

Leontiev considered all human situations to be social. A normally functioning person can never completely separate his or her self from social relations. Even though a person may live in total isolation from other persons he or she will still have some connection to other persons. Even if totally self-sufficient, the knowledge a person uses to survive has been obtained from prior social contacts, at the very least parents. Any and all situations, for a person who has been socialized, are to be considered social to some degree.

. . . in a society a person does not simply find external conditions to which he must adapt his activity, but, rather, these very social conditions bear within themselves

the motives and goals of his activity, its means and modes. In a word, society produces the activity that shapes its individuals (Leontiev. 1974-1975, p. 11).

In order to test the value of activity theory's understanding of personality, a research program was carried out which was an expansion of the S-R design, i.e., aa design which samples both personal and situational factors. By expanding on the S-R design it would be possible to determine which theory better accounted for the data.

The expansion made to the S-R approach transformed the situations into situations that were qualified by the addition of social information or context. The social situation, for ease of presentation, will be referred to as context and denoted as C. The addition of a context to the S-R design can therefore be referred to as an S-R-C design.

Given that the social situation was not included in the S-R Inventory, and discounted by Magnusson (1988), it is presumed that the interactionist would expect the S-R interaction to account for more

variance had social context been considered. The activity understanding, on the other hand, would predict that more variance could be accounted for by including an S-R-C interaction and a C main effect. That is, the error term would be reduced by this expansion.

Two experiments were conducted to test this hypothesis. The first expanded directly on the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness by adding contextual information to the situations used in the original experiments.

The second experiment was based on Schachter's (1959) trait of affiliation. Affiliation, was considered by Schachter to be the desire to be with other people. The intention was not to expand on Schachter's work. The trait of affiliation was used instead to replace the trait of anxiety in a new S-R-C design. The intention was to demonstrate that context could affect more than one trait and allow for more variance to be accounted for.

Subjects. In both experiments, subjects were recruited from a course on the history of psychology at the University of Victoria. On the first day of

class, all students were provided with a form which they were asked to fill out if willing to help with a research project. If willing, the participants responded to the following:

Please circle one answer.

1) I would rather be with other people than be alone.

Never Occassionally Frequently Always

2) I find that I feel anxious.

Never Occassionally Frequently Always

All subjects responded either occassionally or frequently.

Based on their responses to the foregoing, the subjects were grouped into high (responding frequently or always) or low (responding occassionally or never) in affiliation or anxiety. Subjects were phoned aand asked if they would still be willing to participate.

Experiment #1. This was an expansion of the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness in that social context, as a variable, was added. To call context a variable, however, from our perspective, is misleading. It is our contention that person, situation, and context do

not exist in abstraction; they are a unity, as in the third type of interaction. In other words, we will use these in the abstract but do not believe that they have any independent existence.

Subjects. In the occasionally anxious group there were four males, all 20 years old. There were also six females whose mean age was 19.8 and who ranged in age from 18-21. In the frequently anxious group there were four males whose mean age was 23 and who ranged in age from 19-31. There were also six females whose mean age was 22.2 and whose ages ranged from 19-27. Each group totalled 10.

S-R-C Inventory of Anxiousness. This inventory (see Appendix A) used situations from Endler et al (1962) and from Endler and Hunt (1969). To these were added the social/contextual qualifier. Three contexts were used: family, work, or police. Five situations were used, yielding 15 contextually qualified situations:

1. You are just starting off on a long automobile trip with some police officers (family members, work mates).
2. You are getting up to give a speech

before a large group of police officers (family members, work mates).

3. You are going to a counselling bureau to seek help in solving a police (family, work) problem.

4. You are entering a competitive contest before police officers (family members, work mates).

5. You are just sitting down to dinner with some police officers (family members, work mates).

To be consistent with the S-R Inventory, each of these contextually qualified situations appeared at the head of a single sheet of paper, followed by the response format for the S-R Inventory (Endler et al, 1962).

The 15 contextually qualified situations were randomly ordered and a task description, comparable to Endler et al, topped the experimental booklet.

Procedure. The subjects came to the experimenter's office at a time convenient to the subject. They were asked to please read the task description (see Appendix A) and then ask any

questions they might have. They were also told that if they had no questions they could proceed at their own speed to respond to the 15 contextually qualified situations. When completed the subjects were given a debriefing handout (see Appendix B) and any question about the experiment were answered.

Results. In analyzing the data, the responses were summed to arrive at a total anxiety score for each contextually qualified situation. The results of an analysis of variance are presented in Table 1. Statistical significance was obtained for group, situation, and context by situation. The interaction of the person factor and situation (G*S) did not achieve significance as in Endler et al. (1962).

Table 1
Analysis of variance for the S-R-C data:
Anxiety

source	D.F.	F.	P<	% var.
Group (G)	1	20.6	0.000	5.0
Context (C)	2	1.2	0.301	0.6
Situation (S)	4	21.2	0.000	20.6
G*C	2	0.1	0.407	0.4
G*S	4	0.2	0.944	0.2
C*S	8	3.7	0.000	7.2
G*C*S	8	0.2	0.989	0.4

Discussion. While there was no significant difference between the context variables, they did

interact significantly with the situation and this interaction accounted for the next highest amount of variance. Context in this experiment did qualify the situation by rendering the abstract situation more concrete.

Experiment #2. This experiment continues the examination of the influence of context on a person's response to a situation. Where it differs from experiment #1 is that the trait of interest is affiliation rather than anxiety.

Subjects. The subjects in this experiment did not take part in the first experiment. They did however fill out the same request for subjects form upon which they indicated how affiliative they were. Subjects were grouped according to these self reports. In the occasionally affiliative group there were six males whose mean age was 25.7 and whose ages ranged from 19-41. There were also four women whose mean age was 22.8 and ranged from 18-33. In the frequently affiliative group there were two males aged 20 and 22 and eight females whose mean age was 20.5 and who ranged in age from 18-24.

S-R-C Inventory of affiliativeness. In this

experiment four social situations were used: family, school, work, and sports club (see Appendix C). Six situations were used. These were having lunch, watching a movie, visiting someone in hospital, going shopping, working on a project, and exchanging Christmas presents. To add variance, a nonsense variable, day of the week (i.e., tuesday versus thursday) was added. For example: "You are visiting someone from your family in the hospital on a tuesday". Subjects were then asked, "In this instance what do you prefer?" To this question subjects were to pick a response from Schachter's (1959, p.21) response format:

- I very much prefer being alone
- I prefer being alone
- I slightly prefer being alone
- I slightly prefer being together with others
- I prefer being together with others
- I very much prefer being together with others

Procedure. This experiment was conducted in the same manner as Experiment #1.

Results. The results of the analysis of variance performed on the data are presented in Table

2.

Table 2
Anaysis of variance for contextually
qualified situations: Affiliation

Source	D.F.	F	p<	% var.
Group (G)	1	57.3	0.000	4.2
Day (D)	1	0.7	0.794	0.0
Context (C)	3	16.5	0.000	3.7
Situation (S)	5	54.9	0.000	20.3
G*D	1	0.7	0.794	0.0
G*C	3	0.9	0.431	0.2
G*S	3	0.1	0.947	0.0
D*C	5	4.9	0.000	1.8
D*S	5	0.4	0.870	0.1
C*S	15	2.7	0.001	3.0
G*D*C	3	0.9	0.442	0.2
G*D*S	5	0.2	0.967	0.1
G*C*S	15	1.8	0.031	2.0
D*C*S	15	0.3	0.995	0.3
G*C*D*S	15	0.3	0.996	0.3

Statistical significance was obtained for group, context, situation, day by context, context by situation, and group by context by situation. Significance was not obtained for the interactionist's G*S interaction.

Discussion. In this instance the Endler et al interaction was not significant. Social context again interacted with the situation and with the situation and the group. Situation was again qualified by social information.

Conclusion. Contrary to the conclusion drawn by

Magnusson (1988), social information is perceived by subjects as patterned and related to situational information. If the subjects did not perceive the social situation as patterned their responses would likely have been random. This being the case, context and the context by situation interaction should not have demonstrated statistical significance. Context did significantly account for variance in the affiliation study and interacted significantly with the situation in both experiments. The situations were perceived as social situations. The situation and the context should be considered as one and the same in the concrete; situations in the abstract are not human situations. In other words, one does not give a speech, rather, one gives a speech to other people and who these people are makes a difference to how the person responds.

Chapter 6

Overcoming the problems: An evolutionary approach

Species development. Due to their many years of experience in the operant conditioning of animals, Breland and Breland (1961) discussed cases of the "utter failure of conditioning theory" (p. 683) as a result of the intrusion of instinctive behavior.

They thus maintained (1966):

You cannot understand the behavior of the animal in the laboratory unless you understand his behavior in the wild. And you cannot understand his behavior in the wild without understanding evolution The trouble is that the animal does not come into the laboratory as a tabula rasa, a blank slate. He has certain parts, physiological processes, and built in behavior patterns, all of which are the result of his evolutionary history, which exquisitely fit him to live in a particular portion of the environment (his ecological niche) (p. 20).

What is true of animal behavior is likewise true of human behavior even though humans no longer, for the most part, live as animals in the wild. Leontyev (1981), as well, adhered to this standpoint. It was Leontiev's view that an individual's nature is determined by the species to which it belongs and reflects that species level of phylogenetic evolution.

From this standpoint the organism's ontogenic development, which occurs during its inter-relationship with the environment, is nothing other than a realization of its species properties. It is therefore an absolutely invalid abstraction to consider separate organisms' interaction with the environment without regard to their nature; it is very important to stress this point, considering the simplified positions of certain authors. For what the environment is for the organism, and how this environment behaves for it, depend on the nature of the organism concerned; and those changes that

can arise in it ontogenetically, under the influence of the environment, does depend on the nature of the organism. Because of that the succession of generations and movement of phylogenetic development are maintained (p. 287).

It is not, however, only biological evolution that will concern us here; psychic evolution must be considered of paramount importance for humans. We will therefore survey a materialist resolution of the mind-body problem and should, thereby, be in better position to make sense of the human personality and those activities in the real world upon which it depends.

Tracing psychic evolution. In order to arrive at an understanding of the human psyche, as it is manifested in individuals, it is essential that we have a grasp of its historical, developmental progression. The position presented herein is in agreement with that of Kantor (1935) who stated that

. . . the mind of an individual as a member of a species is fundamentally tied up with the evolution of that species. This

process of species or race development constitutes phylogenetic evolution. . . . Generally speaking, this species-evolution involves complex changes resulting from specific interactions of organisms with environmental conditions both external and internal to the organism. This development probably proceeds by the accumulation both of slight modifications and large mutational jumps (p. 459).

Thus we must return to the beginning of life in order to glimpse the first stirrings of psychic activity and trace its evolution thereby. We must go back 2,000 or 3,000 million years (Olsen, 1966) to the start of the evolutionary history of humans.

Olsen determined that "somewhere at some time in the very remote past, there were organisms that were the sole progenitors of all the plants and animals that have since come to be" (p. 265). It is back there in the distant past that we must look for the genesis of psychic activity and it is only by starting there that we can understand psychic activity as it manifests in modern day humans. As

Leontyev put it, "in order to resolve the issue of the origin of the mind, we must begin with an analysis of the conditions and the process of interaction that engender it" (p. 25). It must be remembered, if you will, that this will be an account of psychic evolution, not of biological evolution, as it was formulated by Leontiev. This does not mean that Leontiev considers biology unimportant when considering the psyche for "although these systems are not governed by biological qualities, they depend, for all that, on them" (p. 154). It should be noted that we are not denying the importance of biology but the position to be presented is that human behavior transcends the biological even though it is dependent on it (see Cobb, 1944). What should firstly concern us, then, is the nature of this psyche of which we shall speak.

Psyche/mind. Leontyev (1981) stated that the psyche, which does not exist independent of material reality, is found in higher forms of organic matter but not in all organic matter. As he defined it, "mind is a property of living, highly organized material bodies that consists in their ability to reflect through

their states the reality around them, which exists independently of them" (Leontyev, p. 18). Mind does not exist in some realm apart from matter as some idealist philosophers (e.g., Plato) and psychologists (e.g., Magnusson) would have us believe. Mind is not something added to matter nor is it that which creates the illusion of an existent material world. The material world exists and psychic activity arises from the complex organization of that world. "The psyche and psychic activity thus function for us, not as something added to life, but as a singular form of the manifestation of life that necessarily arises in the course of its evolution" (Leontyev, 1981, p. 48).

In the beginning, therefore, matter existed and only as it became more complex in its interactions and organization did an adaptive need for a psyche manifest, due to the organismic activity Leontiev called 'irritability' becoming transcended by 'sensitivity' (the first indication of psychic activity). This need for psychic development is due to the fact that the irritable organism is active in its interaction with the environment. "Psychic reflection cannot arise without life, without the

subject's activity. It cannot help depending on activity, cannot help being subordinated to the subject's life relations realized by activity" (Leontyev, 1981, p. 225). In its activity, therefore, the organism has the need, albeit unconsciously, to adequately 'reflect' its environment in order to better adapt to that environment. This reflection is due to "a real connection, of a real interaction of a living, highly organized, material subject and the material reality around him. The organs of psychic reflection themselves are at this same time organs of this interaction, organs of vital activity" (p. 225). This is also comparable to Kantor's (1935) standpoint:

Mind is individual. There is no such thing as mind in general. . . . Moreover, mind is essentially a phenomenon pertaining to particular organisms or persons.

Furthermore, mind is not a substance or quality, but action--the ways in which an individual adapts himself to the things and conditions of his milieu (p. 458-459).

In summary: mind has no general existence but is found in individual organisms and arises in the course of evolution. It is not independent of the material reality and comes into existence due to the activity of organisms in an environment. Its function is to reflect the world during active interaction and the reflection is initially inseparable from that interaction while it does, in the higher, human form of mind, achieve relative independence.

Before turning the way psyche evolves from simple sensitivity on through to human consciousness, it is necessary that we first understand the concept of reflection as it exists in Soviet psychology. Reflection. Reflection, from this standpoint, arises when one aspect of the material world reproduces, or mirrors, the characteristics of some other aspect to which it is secondary or from which it derives. A reflection is an imprint of one object on another. Four general types of reflection have been distinguished (Kharin, 1981). These are physical, biological, psychic and socio-historic reflection. In each qualitatively different level of reflection

the reflected property is independent of the reflection but determines the reflection nonetheless. Each level of reflection arises during the developmental stages of matter in motion. Physical reflection refers to the capacity of bodies, when affected by bodies outside, to alter their own states such as, for instance, when a board is deformed by the blow of a hammer. Biological reflection, or what Leontiev called irritability, is the capacity of a living organism to react to the environment in such a way as to maintain its existence. The next two forms of reflection are those which constitute psychological processes.

Psychic reflection emerges when the organism no longer responds simply to those aspects which are only important for its continuance but relates to other properties or influences and thereby helps the organism to orient itself in its environment. Not only objects but relations are reflected. Finally, with the development of human consciousness, the environment is regarded in its separateness, with its own objective, stable properties, apart from subjective reactions to it, as it is presented. As

well, this is the level of the social interaction of humans and the formation of human thought (conscious and socially mediated reflection), all of which will be dealt with more fully when we investigate Leontiev's theory (which is summarized in Zinchenko, 1985).

Irritability. Once the development of matter and its physico-chemical reactions have entered the stage of biological evolution we come to the stage of pre-psychic activity or irritability. Irritability is the quality which distinguishes living organisms from dead things. For life to occur in its simplest form the organism needs to be irritable in relation to those substances which activate it and could allow for the assimilation of energy in order to stay the dissimilation process. The simple organism is thus enabled to respond to the positive and negative influences which govern its life and is essential to metabolism. Built upon these processes of irritability is the first property of truly psychological activity, that of sensitivity.

Sensitivity. Leontiev believed that the first level of the psyche, sensitivity, was due to the transition

of life in a uniform medium to life in a more complex environment of separate objects, or "the transition from unformed sources of life to ones formed as things" (Leontyev, 1981, p. 44). At this stage an organ of connection and coordination, a nervous system, is formed, although most rudimentary in the earliest stage of its development. The development of this specialized organ "is governed by the need adequately to reflect the objective material reality with which the organism is entering into ever more complex relations" (Leontyev, 1981, p. 51). This new sort of organism is irritable in relation to environmental influences which orient it in its relation to other influences. Thus this form of irritability mediates the organism's vital processes in the more complicated environment in which it finds itself. The organism is governed in its movements by affective properties through their relation with other properties.

The activity of animals in the earliest, first stage of the evolution of the psyche is characterized by its corresponding to some one separate affective property (or

aggregate of separate properties) by virtue of the property's essential connection with the influences on which performance of their basic biological functions depends. The reflection of reality connected with the structure of activity correspondingly has the form of sensitivity to separate affective properties (or aggregate of properties), the form of elementary sensation (Leontyev, 1981, p. 160).

In the course of its development sensitivity goes through qualitative changes and new forms of it appear. Eventually, with the further complication of activity and sensitivity there is a progressive change in activity's structure due to the development of organs of perception which allowed the second stage in the historical development of the psyche to be achieved.

Perception. The perceptive psyche, unlike its predecessor, is able to reflect the external reality in the form of things instead of separate elementary sensations evoked by separate properties.

Whereas differentiation of the affective

properties was linked at the stage of the elementary sensory psyche with their simple uniting around the dominant stimulus, the integrating of the affective properties into a single integral image, and their unification as the properties of one and the same thing now arise for the first time. The surrounding reality is now reflected by the animal in the form of more or less separated images of separate things (Leontyev, 1981, p. 176).

Leontiev suggested that this was due to the transition to an existence on land and the resultant development of a cerebral cortex. As a result the animal is able to reflect the environmental conditions in which the object of the creature's activity is embedded. This was in agreement with Olsen (1966) who stated that "the demands of terrestrial life were such that various systems of the body reached higher levels of organization than those which had developed in exclusively aquatic animals" (p. 173). Most mammals and the majority of existing vertebrates were considered by Leontiev to

be at the stage of the perceptive psyche. In these creatures behavior is more varied as it is not entirely dictated by biological necessities. The most highly organized mammals, being more advanced, have risen to the next stage of psychic evolution. Intellect. According to this theory, each new stage in the evolution of the psyche is based upon a transition of environmental conditions and the subsequent complication of physical organization. The psyche at this stage is still governed by the laws of species' biological development. The emergence of this new level of psychic activity, that of the 'intellect', is manifested by a change in the structure of the animal's psycho-physical activity.

The activity previously merged in a single process is now differentiated into two phases, one of preparation and one of accomplishment. The existence of a preparatory phase also constitutes a characteristic feature of intellectual behavior. Intellect arises for the first time, consequently, when preparation of this possibility to perform some operation

or habit commences (Leontyev, 1981, p. 192).

The creature no longer engages in simple trial movements in relation to environmental conditions but engages, instead, in trials of previously developed behaviors or operations. The trials engaged in are not of separate movements but are trials of various modes of activity, patterns of activity. "An animal now generalizes the relations and connections of things. Its generalizations are formed, of course, exactly like the generalized reflection of things, i.e. during the activity itself" (Leontyev, 1981, p. 193). Its activity is governed by the similarity of things and relations to which it is responsive. Due to these similarities habitual behavior is enabled to function in relation to these constancies. The reflection at the level of the intellect is still a function of those organs developed in the process of adaptation which lead to increased orientation to the environment. As Leontiev said, "the evolution of the psyche is governed by animals' need to adapt to the environment, and that psychic reflection is a function of the appropriate organs formed during that

adaptation" (p. 195).

In responding to a change in the conditions of existence, animals' activity alters its structure, its 'anatomy' so to speak. That also creates a need for such a change in the organs and their functions which leads to the emergence of a higher form of psychic reflection. We can express this in brief as follows: whatever the objective structure of an animal's activity, such will also be the form of its reflection of reality.

The evolution of animals' reflection of their environment, however, also, as it were, lags behind the evolution of their activity (Leontyev, 1981, p. 195).

This notion that activity precedes biological development was also put forward by Piaget (1978). Piaget, rather than speaking of activity, spoke of 'behavior'. He advanced the idea that behavior was "teleonomic action aimed at the utilization or transformation of the environment and the preservation or increase of the organism's capacity

to affect this environment" (p. x). An organism's behavior led to an expansion of the environment and the organism's capacity to affect that expanded environment. Piaget, like Leontiev, maintained that

. . . even if the development of the nervous system is not the direct outcome of the development of behavior, there is at any rate a very close interaction between these two evolutions--an interaction such that the initiatives come from behavior despite the fact that the nervous system supplies behavior with its tools (p. 144).

Regarding the whole process of biological evolution, Piaget suggested that "either chance and selection can explain everything or else behavior is the motor of evolution" (p. 147). Finally, he maintained two points, "the first is that there is an organizing evolution as well as a variational one; and the second is that behavior is its motor" (p. 159). Olsen (1966) concurred: "behavior does evolve, and evolution is in part the result of behavior patterns" (p. 236). Concerning the main organ of psychic reflection--the brain--Olsen pointed out that studies

of brain casts had indicated that "the brain seems to be a follower rather than a leader" (p. 238); the same point has been made by Bakker, 1984. This was true of the Australopithecines who were manlike in that they engaged in locomotion and hand use and had the rudiments of culture but had a brain which was less evolved.

The activity which propels the development of the psyche finally passes beyond the stage of the intellect when animal development leads to that complex organism that is the human being. This is the upper limit in the stage of animals' development (apes exemplify this stage of intellect in its most developed form). From this point on a transition occurs which lifts psychic development out of the biological sphere onwards to the stage of its socio-historical development. This is the stage where the psyche liberates itself from the physiological bonds of its development and moves on into the sphere of truly human behavior. From hereon activity will no longer be related to purely biological needs. The environment begins to lose, at first a little and in time more and more of, its hold

on psychic functioning such that biological development remains at a relative standstill while psychic development leaps ahead. Before leaping on ahead ourselves, let me briefly summarize the prehistory of human psychic development.

Psychic evolution summarized. In its initial movements, the psyche develops during biological evolution and is under the domination of that process. At first its medium is fairly uniform, but as the medium becomes more complex, or the creatures actions become more complex, the need for psychic apparatus arises and sensitivity is fashioned by nature. With further transitions to new modes of existence and the resultant complication of biological systems new stages in psychological evolution occur. The movement to a land based existence, for instance, and the consequent development of the cerebral cortex, brought some creatures to the level of the perceptive psyche and the reflection of the wholeness of things. Finally, greater environmental and behavioral complexity called forth more mature and more excellent organs of activity and perception which allowed the reflection

of the relations between things as they exist in situations. Psychic reflection became of paramount importance in animals' struggle for existence and is essential to their environmental orientation. Thus, as the activity of animals is altered in response to changes in modes of existence, their reflection of their environment is also altered. "The evolution of life thus leads to a change in animals' physical organization, to the emergence in them of organs like sense organs, motor organs, and a nervous system, whose function is to reflect the reality around them" (Leontyev, 1981, p. 195). This reflection of nature by animals is always tied to their instinctive, biological relation with their environment. For humans, however, conditions are much different, and it is to this that we now turn.

Learning. Before considering consciousness, it is worth our while to see how Leontiev conceived of the place of learning theory in his theory of psychic development. Leont'ev (1961) did not believe that his theory replaced learning theory, rather it incorporated it.

In speaking of learning in this broad

general meaning of the word, we are thinking of the process whereby the living being acquires its individual behavioral experience. Learning in this wide sense is a universal phenomenon in living organisms. It occurs wherever there is adaption of the individual in the form of change of behavior in response to new conditions. It constitutes an obligatory and constant condition in the lives of both animals and man (Leont'ev, 1961, p. 228)

Leontiev argued that it was necessary to conceive of the ability to learn as something which develops and, as a result of development, undergoes qualitative changes. Initially (phylogenetically), organisms engage in direct and unmediated connections with the environment. Through evolution, organisms develop a relationship to the environment which is indirect and mediated; the organism can react to aspects of the environment which do not have a biological significance for them but do signal the presence of something having biological significance. They help to orient the organism to that which was

hidden from them.

Moving up the evolutionary scale, animals develop new mechanisms which are more complex in nature. At this level, "the general laws governing the conditioned reflex activity of the brain retain their validity completely, of course, but the development of the aggregate effect of these laws is now subordinated to new, more complex laws" (Leont'ev, 1961, p. 234). These new laws, which develop as a result of the complication of activity, are psychological laws. Thus, at the level of human behavior, learning acquires features that reflect the complexity of activity. The reason for this is that humans had developed social behavior and the capacity to reflect the environment in consciousness.

According to Leont'ev (1961), . . .

. . . the behavior of man, like that of animals, depends on the experience which is acquired by him in the course of life. This, however, is not merely individual experience, like that of animals. There is still another kind of experience which does not exist in the case of animals; it is

species experience (or more accurately, socio-historical experience), which is assimilated, however, in the form of individual experience (p. 236).

Humans learn in their environment through assimilation of human, social behavior and social development and this results in the formation of consciousness.

Consciousness. With the development of human beings we enter the next stage of psychological development, that of consciousness, and move from biological development to socio-historical development and its governing laws. To mention consciousness does not mean that we must immediately plunge into modern human psychology; consciousness also underwent development. In the beginning of this evolutionary leap the difference between animal intellect and human consciousness was only slight. The humans to be spoken of first are extremely primitive in comparison to the modern variety and their ability to engage in abstract thought was minimal.

Although the difference between mankind and animals was, on the surface, slight, there was a

qualitatively big difference in the way that the objective world was reflected. The change that humankind underwent, unlike animals, was the ability of the psyche to reflect reality in terms of its stable properties, independent of humans' relations to them. According to Leontiev, to an animal, objects of the environment were inseparable from its hereditary needs. Whereas an animal relates in terms of how its needs were affected, man related to the environment as it was presented. There was awareness; the unconscious psychic reflection was converted into conscious reflection; a store of knowledge was capable of being amassed. This relation to the environment as presented had an enormous effect on what, in the stage of the intellect, Leontiev identified as a 'phase of preparation'.

With an animal the phase of preparation is prior to satisfaction of a need and the activity is still instinctive (an example would be a cat immobile at a mouse hole, waiting to pounce on the attended mouse). Mankind's phase of preparation became liberated from the sole satisfaction of instinctive needs. This liberation allowed for the development of truly human

thought which, initially, was tied to the environment but which also had the capacity to develop into a wholly internal activity.

Consciousness consisted, therefore, in the reflection of reality as it existed in its separateness from human relations to it. This subject-object differentiation also allowed for the possible development of self- observation:

Men's activity is now separated from objects in their consciousness. They begin to be aware of it precisely as their relation. This means, however, that nature itself, too, i.e. the objects of the world around them, is now also differentiated for them and appears in its stable relation with the group's needs and activity. . . . He can consequently differentiate it from other objects of activity not only in practice, in activity itself, and depending on an actual need, but also 'theoretically', i.e. it can be retained in consciousness, can become an 'idea' (Leontyev, 1981, p. 214).

Consciousness, at first, however, was tied to instrumental activity in the environment and only passed into true thought over time. So, conscious reflection eventually became controlled and made a tool for dealing more adequately with the world. The development of thought, to Leontiev, found its basis in instrumental human activity or 'labor'.

Consciousness and labor. According to Leontyev (1981), "labor is the process that links man with nature" (p. 207) or "a process of action on nature linking together its participants, and mediating their contact" (p. 208). Leontiev believed that the emergence of labor and the subsequent formation of society and consciousness were the factors underlying the humanization of man and that labor itself was prepared for by the whole course of evolutionary development. The rise of labor and its eventual improvements led to further changes in brain activity, motor and sense organs, and their further humanization. Leontiev believed that it was possible, however, for labor to emerge only in animals that lived in groups and that had the necessary development of joint activity, even though

elementary; this was one of the basic features of labor. The second feature of labor was that it was a feature mediated by tool activities. Thus labor was a social process mediated by tools.

While human labor is a social activity from the first, this is not true of animals. It is possible to observe animals acting together but we do not notice joint activity among them (the division of one activity into its component parts, with individuals responsible for a single component). This is most obvious in regards to their tool activity, which is not social in nature. A tool for an animal is a tool for it alone; there is no conveyance of information about the tool and its properties to others. Not only this, the tool is not retained; it is collected as needs demand, according to what the situation offers (see White, 1942, and Trigger, 1967, for similar views). Human tools, on the other hand, carry out specific operations. As well, humans specially make their tools to fulfill certain functions (some animals do this but do it on the spot without preplanning); and humans keep their tools and improve upon them. A further difference is that

humans' tools acquire social characteristics in that the meaning of their functions is shared among the members of the group and group members improve upon tools and create new or better ones. In time, as tools improve, humankind begins to become subordinated to tools due to the creation of new operations which were not mere extensions of human physical capacity, i.e. the difference between a club as an extension of a man's arm as opposed to the subordination of the human foot and hands to a potter's wheel. With animals, their tool is incorporated into their system of natural movements and does not reach beyond those natural restrictions. So, whereas human labor is social, animal labor is individual and possesses no shared meanings; further, while human tools have the capacity to create new operations and bring human labor into a larger sphere of control over the environment, animal tools are intimately bound to their natural operations and are subordinated to environmental conditions.

Perhaps the preceding notion of tool usage could be made clearer by way of an example: Chimpanzees when engaging in food procuring behaviors have

engaged in the use tools. They have been known to carry a stick, while searching for a termite mound, in order to fish out the desired dish. When the termites are consumed to satisfaction the stick is dropped. One can find piles of such sticks at termite mounds. Once the biological need is satisfied the stick is just another stick of no significance (see Woolfson, 1982). For the initially conscious human the case would have been different. If they were foraging for termites they might also carry a stick for probing and digging out the delicacy. Upon reaching the desired end, however, the stick would not be dropped nor would it be of no further use. It would be retained for future use and would likely be replaced by sticks better fitted to meeting the requirements of the task. The difference is that where the chimpanzee sees only a stick through which its biological needs are satisfied, the human still sees a stick which has the property of fishing out termites, or, in other words, the property of the stick is not lost to the human upon appeasement of their physiological demands. As well, the properties which remain with the stick can be

improved upon by replacement of the first stick with one more suited to the task at hand, i.e. longer or less crooked.

Consciousness and language. To Leontiev, consciousness and language are inseparably bound. (It should be noted that language at this initial level was extremely basic and quite unlike its modern accomplishments; gestures were the likely precursor to spoken communication.) What distinguishes thought, as mentioned earlier, is the singling out of interactions independent of the person. While these comprehensions are initially fleeting they eventually become embodied in tools. In a sense, the tool becomes the human's memory of the operation it carries (see Leontyev, 1981, on the development of memory). In their interactions with others of their group, it becomes necessary to express what properties their tools carry. For instance, the human who replaced one stick with a better one may draw others to the termite mound and show the benefits of his stick in comparison with the sticks of those in the group. In any event, Leontiev advanced the idea that language found its genesis "only in relation to

the need developing for people in the process of labor to say something to one another" (1981, p. 219).

Language thus functions not only as a means of men's intercourse but also as a means or form of human consciousness and thought, also not yet separated from material production. It became the form, the vector of conscious generalization of reality.

That is why the abstraction of verbal meanings from the real object, which made their existence simply as facts of consciousness possible. i.e. simply as thoughts, simply ideally, happened at the same time as the subsequent separation of language and speech from directly practical activity (Leontyev, 1981, p. 220).

Thus, to Leontiev, consciousness in its initial stages is inseparable from language, both being the product of mans' activity. This is why Leontiev said that "consciousness is the reflection of reality refracted as it were through the prism of socially developed linguistic meaning or concepts" (1981, p.

221). Of course, in time, both consciousness and language become ever more perfected tools, capable of performing even more complex analysis and communication about properties of the world. People begin to test the environment by studying the relations between things and discerning their hidden characteristics. Thinking reaches beyond what is presented to the relations underlying the presentation. The product of all of this is that objects in the world acquire 'meaning' in human consciousness.

Meaning and sense. Meaning is the reflection of an object independent of any subjective reaction to it; it is the socially accepted reflection of an object which can also be passed through generations.

Psychologically, meaning is thus the general reflection of reality developed by humanity and fixed in the form of a concept or knowledge, or even in the form of an ability or skill as a generalized 'mode of action', norm of behavior, etc., that has become accessible to my consciousness (Leontyev, 1981, p. 227).

A personal attitude, or as Leontiev calls it 'sense', to the object does not exist for the individual in the early stages of conscious development; the meaning of a thing is the meaning it has for the group. What leads to the eventual breakup of senses from meaning, according to Leontiev, was the eventual breakdown of the communal system that had previously constituted human social life. This breakdown in the primitive communal system was considered to be due to the development of class divisions in human society.

The condition that prepared the differentiation of senses and meanings was, from the angle of the evolution of consciousness itself, the extension of the range of the conscious to which the development of labor necessarily led, i.e. of its tools and forms, and the work relations of those involved in production (Leontyev, 1981, p. 234).

Therefore, with a change of social conditions the original unity of meaning and sense is dissolved and we can see, thereby, the effect of society on the development of the psyche (this being the

socio-historical stage of psychic determination). This means that with qualitative changes of society consciousness itself undergoes qualitative change.

Psychic and social evolution is seen as a process of qualitative changes which are tied to the evolution of human activity. Once initiated, consciousness drives for greater awareness which leads to more complex forms of social organization. This new form of social organization is the basis of further leaps in production, productive activity, and the rise in consciousness that that entails. As well, social organization undergoes changes that produce alterations in sense. For example, there is a large difference between people's place in life in a communal system, geared about collective activity for the good of the group, and class society where lower classes toil in order to fill the coffers of the priveleged, property owning, class (see Tomasic, 1942, chapter 12, for a discussion of how this occurred in Yugoslavia). Although the production process does not change its meaning, its sense and its relation to persons, it is radically different for the worker than the owner.

Thus, already in the conditions of primitive society, the evolution of material productions and the mutual relations between people built up during it created a need for full extension of the realm of the conscious. As more and more aspects and relations of human affairs begin to be determined socially, i.e. become social in their nature, consciousness more and more acquires the character of the universal form of man's psychic reflection of reality. That does not, of course, mean that all reality now forms part of the realm of the conscious; it only means that everything can enter this sphere (Leontyev, 1981, p. 240).

As a result of the ever greater complication of social organization and the intricate nexus of meanings, the realm of meanings available to people is greater than most need to acquire for either practical or intellectual satisfaction. While people can appropriate all meaning it is usually not the case that many will attempt this in any age. In an

age such as ours it has become impossible for any one human to appropriate all the meanings available to them.

At this point it is worth reflecting on Magnusson's propositions regarding the world as it is and as it is perceived. Mental contents reflect the world, which in itself is knowable, and they would not have any existence were it not for the world which is reflected. The world in its complex diversity can be experienced differently by different people and idiosyncratic experience may consequently deviate somewhat from a shared, objective meaning. The differences are not in people as perceivers but in the world as it confronts the individual. By way of explanation let us consider something most humans have experienced: family. The word family does have an objective referent which has 'meaning' but it may also contain personal 'sense'. The American Heritage Dictionary (Davies, 1976), a manual of shared, objective meanings, defined family as "1. Parents and their children. 2. A group of persons related by blood or marriage" (p. 258). The objective meaning of family is also open to personal sense. Families

can be happy or unhappy, stable or broken, etc., and this will lead individuals to have a different sense of family based on their experience. From this we can see that Magnusson was correct to note that the world can have a different sense to individuals, but this does not mean that the world cannot be known. This brings us to the issue of how the world is appropriated by people.

Appropriation. Into the realm of objectified meaning human beings are born. Birth alone, unfortunately, does not endow a person with all those qualities that are recognized as truly human. It is only in the interactive process of enculturation that the child becomes fully human. As Leontiev put it, "a child, at birth, is a candidate for humanity; it cannot become human in isolation; but has to learn to become a man in contact with other men" (1981, p. 135). In order to account for this, Leontiev spoke of another, very important, socio-historical, law of ontogenetic development, that of 'appropriation'. Leontiev contended that human capacities are not simply contained in the brain; the brain is merely the organ which is able to form those capacities (which does

not mean that these conscious functions are not dependent on it). The child at birth is at the beginning of the process that leads to the mastery of the socially created human environment which will result "in the individual's reproduction of historically formed human capacities and functions" (Leontyev, 1981, p. 296). These capacities are developed as a result of the child's active relations with the real world.

This does not mean that anatomical (physiological) differences between people play no part; it simply means that psychic properties and peculiarities cannot be directly inborn, that they are always formed in the process of the individual's development and education, and that knowledge of the laws of their formation makes possible the conscious direction of this process (Leontyev, 1957, p. 232)

The child must learn all the activities that are necessary to function in its portion of the realm of the socially developed, and historically moulded, human environment.

By its active encounters the child comes against the contrivances of human life, the embodied experience and knowledge of humanity, and assimilates them, thereby raising itself to the formation of logical thought processes as well. According to Brushlinskii (1977), "mental phenomena emerge in the process of interaction of the individual with the external world, an interaction that in early ontogeny begins with inputs from the external world, by which these external stimuli become manifest through the internal" (p. 48). Leontiev believed that "processes of logical thinking cannot form in a person who has lived from early childhood without contact with objective forms embodying human logic, and without intercourse with man" (1981, p. 297) and, as we shall see when the case of Victor, the 'Wild Boy of Aveyron', is examined, this would seem to be the case. This was also in line with Kantor's position:

Before there can be any concrete mind at all the organism must pass through an infinite series of contacts with conditions in order to reach the organic status of a biological individual. Even this is not

enough, for the child does not come into the world with given mental powers. In order to achieve them he must progress through a step-by-step interactional development in what is predominantly a human world" (p. 465).

Talyzina (1981), in her studies on the learning of abstract knowledge, concurred that "because of the social nature of man's psyche men are not born with developed abilities for thinking, remembering, etc. Rather they assimilate these elements during their lifetime by transforming social experiences into their own personal experience" (p. 46). A further point to be noted is that, as a result of appropriating the history of human activities into themselves, the individuals come to a position where they expand the world of experiences and activity (as, for instance, in the sciences and the arts) which, too, can be passed along. It should be noted that human experience can also be embodied in objects, e.g., dictionaries or tools, and is not restricted to being passed by word of mouth. This process, the long history of conscious evolution,

accumulates and expands to the present point of human activity, but, presumably, will continue its march forward through the unknown. Beyond the speculative, however, we are now in a position to reconsider interactionism in light of this theory of the development of the mind and, hence, of human psychology.

Interactionism reconsidered. The first premise of interactionism which regards individual behavior as an interactive process between person and environment is in line with Leontiev's theory. A difference does arise however. Whereas the interactionists speak of the environment in general, Leontiev specifically regards the environment that has been transformed by the long process of human activity-- the social-historical environment--as that which is of supreme importance in determining human behavior.

The notion that the individual is intentionally active in the interactive process is also in line with the aforementioned theory. All creatures are considered intentionally active, with intentions being less bound to biological needs as creatures move up the scale of psychic evolution, until

intention becomes fully conscious, for the most part, at the human level and is freed of biological determination. Obviously, Leontiev too believed that cognition is essential to human behavior as is evident in his theory. On the other hand, Leontiev did not simply take cognition as a given and then try to fit it in with other personality variables. For Leontiev it was absolutely essential that the evolution of the mind, and subsequent consciousness, be accounted for in order for the mental to be correctly understood. Finally, Leontiev also regards psychological meaning (sense to Leontiev) as an important factor, but this subjective meaning is still tied to the experience of real objects which preserve their objective meaning. The fact that persons have idiosyncratic meanings associated with objects does not mean that the object is unknowable. What it does mean is that their experiences with the object were different. As well, the further that the idiosyncratic perception differs from the objective properties of the object the more likely it is that this perception will be forced to align more closely with the object as a result of the further

interaction with it. What determines the perception of an object is the object itself and not some subjective, interpretative mechanism. In any event, this concept of personal sense negates the need for a taxonomy of situations since it is the subjective sense which takes part in the development of personality, which, it will be remembered, is our major topic of concern.

Our next task will be to equate personal sense with actual behavior, so as to render it observable and analyzable. Leontiev's concept of 'activity' serves this purpose wonderfully.

Prior to moving on to the modern day activity theory, I wish to demonstrate the rudimentary development of activity theory as it has been formulated in the West. My reason for doing this is to show that the answer to modern problems in personality had the seeds of their solution planted in the early development of psychology. While fertile in purport, these lucid gleanings went largely unnoticed, but they are deserving of mention for that reason alone but they also serve as an excellent prelude to activity theory. More

importantly, they have something to say to the present from the past. Let us therefore see how activity-like approaches have been formulated so that the problem and its history can be better appreciated.

Chapter 7

The activity approach: Some Western contributions.

As was said earlier, the purpose of this segment is to introduce some western ideas pertaining, some more, some less, to 'activity theory'. Although none of the views to be presented fit exactly with activity theory proper there are strong enough parallels to allow me to suggest that behind the situationist/individualist debate, the person versus the environment, there has been an undercurrent of resolution behind the scenes. In order that the reader can note the relationship of the positions to be discussed here to activity theory I will give a very brief indication of what activity theory purports.

Activity is regarded as a unit that does not separate person from environment or subject from object. Furthermore, the person is regarded as being motivated by the environment; the motive that guides the person is to be found outside of the person in the environment. Human behavior can be motivated by more than one motive-object, though not necessarily concurrently, and these motives form a hierarchical

system. While cursory, for present purposes I think the information provided is sufficient to permit us to proceed.

To begin let us first turn to some recent work by Bandura (1978, 1982, 1983) that can serve as a juncture for moving on towards activity-like theories.

Bandura's reciprocal determinism. It was Bandura's belief that people were not merely the pawns of environmental stimuli. His conception was, instead, that people were self-regulatory and self-directed in influencing their own behavior. It was his considered opinion that cognition played an important role in human behavior which allowed people to not "suffer the consequences of thoughtless action" (1978, p. 345). To him humans had an amazing capacity to use symbols and reflective thought and to plan future activities. At the same time, Bandura did not believe that the environment had no effect on behavior but he did, on the other hand, believe that the interplay would depend on "people's beliefs about action-outcome contingencies" (1978, p. 347). It was therefore necessary to take into account cognitive

processes. This led Bandura to write about interactions, of which he said there were at least three. The first was that of unidirectional interaction in which person and environment combine to produce behavior in a mechanistic fashion. In partially bidirectional interaction behavior is the byproduct, it is an epiphenomenon, of the interdependence of persons and situations. Bandura, however, did not agree with the idea that behavior was merely an epiphenomenon so he presented a third type of interaction called reciprocal determinism or triadic reciprocity. This meant that "psychological functioning involves a continuous reciprocal interaction between behavioral, cognitive, and environmental influences" (1978, p. 345).

To clarify the notion of reciprocal determinism, Bandura said that "the term reciprocal is defined as mutual action between events, and the term determinism signifies the production of effects by events" (1983, p. 166). Contrary to Phillips and Orton's (1983) assertion that his was a wholistic conception, Bandura argued that "the triadic factors do not operate simultaneously as a wholistic entity"

(1983, p. 168). This meant, instead, that the three factors interacted sequentially and not simultaneously. He concluded that person, behavior and environment were interlocking factors which had a relative influence and could vary across situations and individuals. At the same time, in discussing the interactions of two persons, he pointed out that "the same act can be taken as behavior or environment depending arbitrarily on which side of the ongoing exchange one happens to look first in the flow of events" (1982, p. 5).

Before pointing out what, I believe, are the flaws of Bandura's argument, I would first like to quote Bandura because of the similarity of the following point to activity theory.

In the case of habitual routines, people develop their self-knowledge through repeated experience to the point where they no longer need to judge their efficacy on each occasion they perform the same activity. They behave in accordance with what they know they can or cannot do without giving the matter much further

thought. However, significant changes in task demands or situational circumstances prompt efficacy reappraisals as guides for action under altered conditions (1982, p. 25).

To get back to the theme, Bandura pointed out that "it is difficult to conceive of behavior as the offspring of an intimate exchange between a behaviorless person and an environment. Behavior is an interacting determinant, not a detached byproduct that plays no role in the production process" (1983, p. 166). It is unfortunate that Bandura did not carry further this line of reasoning. Perhaps he would have seen that it is also difficult to conceive of personless behavior. Surely behavior is nothing but an empty, conceptual abstraction if it is not necessarily the behavior of a person and, not only that, a person-behaving-in-an-environment. A behaviorless person is, after all, a dead person, and is the subject matter of pathology, not psychology. The subject matter of psychology is the ongoing interaction of persons with their environment. Bandura has slipped into reductionism and has failed

to see that behavior, as it encompasses both person and environment, is what needs to be understood.

According to Talyzina (1981), the Soviet psychologist Vygotsky (ca. 1920) had . . .

. . . emphasized that the psyche should be divided not into the simplest units, but into units that are specific to it, within which all its qualities and properties continue to exist in their simplest form. He noted that a further decomposition into still simpler elements produces a loss of the specific properties of the phenomenon being analyzed, and thus of specific characteristics of that science (p. 34).

This is what happened to Bandura's conceptual understanding of behavior. The controversy between person and environment is not resolved by taking the behavior out of the environment and/or the person. Rather, it is the behavior, the activity, that unites the two and is therefore a more appropriate unit for the investigation of psychological phenomena. Curiously, one of the best resolutions of this problem was provided by Dewey; this was twenty years

or more before the problem arose with John B. Watson's arguments against looking within the person. Dewey's reflex arc concept. Dewey's (1896) solution to this problem was centered around what was known as the reflex arc concept. This revolves about what was known as the 'Meynert scheme' (see James, 1950, p. 24-27). Put simply: In the Meynert scheme a young infant sees a stimulus, a candle, and responds by reaching towards the flame, gets burned (stimulus) and withdraws the hand (response). This was the basis of Dewey's argument. Dewey reasoned that the flame was not the initiator of the supposed arc (stimulus-organism-response); rather, it was all preceded by a 'sensori-motor coordination', a process exemplified by objective activity. For Dewey, this activity did not exist as a chain of stimuli and responses; it was an ongoing flow through subjects and objects. It was only through the person's act of attending that any stimulus became selected, from amongst the large number of potential stimuli in the general field of stimuli, from which it is drawn and 'constituted'. In another paper, Dewey (1895) suggested that when encountering a distant bear in

the woods, the bear . . .

. . . may be a thousand times an individual entity or distant object metaphysically, if you please; you may even suppose, if you will, that the particular wave lengths which deflect from the bear, somehow sort themselves out from the wave lengths coming from all the rest of the environment, and come to the brain as a distinct bundle or package by themselves, but the recognition of just this object out of the multitude of possible objects, of just this bundle of vibrations out of all the other bundles, still remains to be accounted for. The predominating motor response supplies the conditions for its objectification or selection (1895, p. 23-24).

To Dewey, the relation to the stimulus is an interactional process. It is inextricably bound to the person's activity. He believed (1952) that it was necessary "to abandon the assumption of fixity and to recognize that what for it is actually

'universal' is process" (p. 12). Dewey spoke of the process which linked stimulus and response as a 'coordination' which was an indivisible whole and not a disjointed sequence of stimuli and responses. When novel stimuli arose, the coordination of subjective and objective sphere was out of synchrony and was in need of recoordination. This meant that the nature of the new stimulus had to be constituted. It was not until the stimulus had been constituted that the response to that stimulus was also constituted, at one and the same time. Therefore,

. . . sensation as stimulus, is always that phase of activity requiring to be defined in order that a coordination may be completed. What the sensation will be in particular at a given time, therefore, will depend entirely upon the way in which an activity is being used. It has no fixed quality of its own. The search for the stimulus is the search for exact conditions of action; that is, for the state of things which decides how a beginning coordination should be completed (1896, p. 362-369).

Dewey wrote that the coordination, although initially inadequate for complex activity in the social environment, as in infants, was continually being transformed and enlarged upon through experience. As more and more events were encountered at the objective side of the coordination new coordinations were established to meet the new demands (this, of course, being prone to individual differences in adaptability). The new coordinations, lesser in relation to the overall coordination, were subsumed within the overall coordination of the person to those events which were of immediate concern. In actuality, there was, and is, but one large coordination--the ongoing relation between subject and environment. The stimulus and response of the simple coordination (a moment of the large, interactive coordination) have no concrete reality but come into existence through the polarization of a functional relation by human cognition.

What is initially an amorphous world, a buzzing confusion, eventually takes the form of things to be, or not to be, in relation with. Dewey's arc is therefore not an arc but a 'circuit', an abiding

reconstitution, rather than 'a series of jerks' whose origin is in simplified abstraction, not in reality. This means that stimuli are not simply substituted, they are transformed in activity. For Dewey, stimuli were functional phases of the process of interaction between person and environment. He maintained that stimuli and responses were "distinctions of flexible function only, not of fixed existence; that one and the same occurrence plays either or both parts, according to the shift of interest" (1896, p. 364). Stimulus and response are determined by the nature of the activity that encloses the stimulus and the subject of the activity. It is concluded, then, that all experience is an ongoing, continuous flow or motion. There are no palpitations of stimulus and response, the systole and the diastole of the reflex arc, but, rather, only the unity of ongoing activity.

We see from the foregoing that Dewey has successfully met Vygotsky's requirements. His unit of psychological investigation is the coordination which contains both aspects of human functioning without being reduced to one or the other. With his reunited concept of subject and object, Dewey could

later maintain that "the separation once set up between theory and practice no longer exists" (1952, p. 28). Unlike idealistic conceptions of experience, Dewey argued as follows:

Experience becomes an affair primarily of doing The organism acts in accordance with its own structure, simple or complex, upon its surroundings. As a consequence, the changes produced in the environment react upon the organism and its activities. The living creature undergoes, suffers, the consequences of its own behavior (1952, p. 82-83).

This was equally true of humans possessed of ideation:

Although it is surprising how little check the environment actually puts upon the formation of ideas, since no notions are too absurd not to have been accepted by some people, yet the environment does enforce a certain minimum of correctness under penalty of extinction (1952, p. 34-35,).

Therefore:

The true "stuff" of experience is recognized to be adaptive courses of action, habits, active functions, connections of doing and undergoing; sensori-motor co-ordinations. Experience carries principles of connection and organization within itself. These principles are none the worse because they are vital and practical rather than epistemological. Some degree of organization is indispensable to even the lowest grade of life (1952, p. 86).

This 'true stuff' of experience was mostly involved in social interactions. Therefore, Dewey proposed that children would adopt conceptions that were the social vogue long before the child had gained control over its own capacities. As well, people would be influenced by the environment in altering personality; in other words, "when self-hood is perceived to be an active process it is also seen that social modifications are the only means of the creation of changed personalities" (1952, p. 154).

In further progression, the accumulation of the tested coordinations enables the person to learn from past mistakes and to use experience to work towards controlling the future. Experience expands and the environment is better manipulated.

The plans which are formed, the principles which man projects as guides of reconstructive action, are not dogmas. They are hypotheses to be worked out in practice, and to be rejected, corrected and expanded as they fail or succeed in giving our present experience the guidance it requires (1952, p. 89).

Thus, the most adequate human thought, not lost in fanciful speculation, is necessarily bound to active practice and the testing of ideas in practice; of course, this is the aim of true science. Dewey believed that thoughts were tools and that their value was not in their worth as ideas but in their capacity to reflect adequately the world as demonstrated through their consequences. These ideas or theories were always in a state of potential development and in need of being monitored for any

implications of required alterations.

Dewey's coordination theory and his views regarding ontogenetic, psychic development resembles Leontiev's position. In less than a nutshell, since it will be dealt with in depth shortly, Leontiev's theory has three essential components. First is activity, itself, which is governed by its motive and functions to orient the person in the environment; it is a process which is similar in nature to Dewey's coordination. The next, a subunit, is action and it is governed by its goal. For instance, if I were going on a twenty mile hike, I would put on my socks and hiking boots. While the overriding motive is to go for a hike, a submotive or goal is to protect my feet from injury, allowing me, thereby, to continue on towards satisfying the motive of the activity. Finally, Leontiev identified operations which were determined by the conditions imposed upon the action. Again, with the hiking example, if I had a broken hand, when it came time to tie my boots I would be governed by the condition of the broken hand and would be forced into the operation of one-handed boot lacing. Naturally, a different operation--two-handed

boot lacing--arrives at the same goal of the action which is lacing the boots in order to hike.

While he was not as explicit regarding motives and goals, I think that Dewey's hierarchical structure of coordinations resembles Leontiev's hierarchy of activity (dealt with more fully later). In the other direction, Leontiev's contention regarding activity is not dissimilar to the circuitous process that was Dewey's coordination. Perhaps I can allude to Dewey's acceptance of motives and goals by examining the following:

Wherever there is life, there is behavior, activity. In order that life may persist, this activity has to be both continuous and adapted to the environment. This adaptive adjustment, moreover, is not wholly passive; is not a mere matter of the moulding of the organism by the environment (1952, p. 82).

Since activity is "not wholly passive", it must be purposeful and not the victim of environmental whimsy. This is further bolstered by Dewey's (1922) contention that philosophers have made a mistake by

separating inner motives from outer acts. Also Dewey (1961) proposed that "while such words as affection, concern, and motive indicate an attitude of personal preference, they are always attitudes toward objects--toward what is foreseen" (p. 125).

Finally, there is one last point which ties into Leontiev's earlier theory of psychic development (which is not to be considered separate from activity theory). Like Leontiev, Dewey believed that individuality could not be given originally at birth but was in need of creation and development through the auspices of social life. As you may recall, Leontiev's views regarding appropriation were similar in purport. Consider this passage:

Society is the process of associating in such ways that experiences, ideas, emotions, values are transmitted and made common The individual is subordinate because except in and through communication of experience from and to others, he remains dumb, merely sentient, a brute animal. Only in association with fellows does he become a conscious centre

of experience (Dewey, 1952, p. 161).

As well, "Society means association; coming together in joint intercourse and action for the better realization of any form of experience which is augmented and confirmed by being shared" (1952, p. 160). Dewey also saw appropriation of social relations as essential to the process of becoming a fully functional human being. While Dewey's is the closest theory to activity theory that will be offered, the next paper to be considered is an interesting study which demonstrated, experimentally, some aspects of what has been asserted concerning the appropriation and internalization of activities.

Book on conscious development. Book's (1910) study was an excellent example of an aspect of activity theory left, as yet, unmentioned. This concerns the tenet that activity can be turned into action. Consider the example of driving a car. Initially the motive of the driving activity, of getting into the car and all other actions associated with driving, i.e., working the gas pedal or turning the key to the on position, achieve goals subsumed under the motive 'learning-to-drive'. As one becomes proficient the

motive is no longer learning to drive but driving in order to accomplish something. For example, driving a car is an action in the activity of going to a baseball game since it serves to get one from home to the ballpark (with the motive being the presence at the ball game).

Also, there is the assertion that before any thought can arise it must be developed in external activity and only gradually becomes internalized such that the activities become mental activities or ideas. The activity is internalized when it can be carried out in thought. This latter principle was nicely demonstrated by Book although this was not the motive underlying the experiment.

In his task, Book had people learn how to use a typewriter on their own, without any directions regarding methods of appropriating the skill. The two variations in the learning process were that persons could learn by the sight method or the touch method. In the touch method the keyboard was hidden from sight whereas in the sight method it was not. The intention of the study was to answer the question of whether there is imageless thought, with its

existence or non-existence, and determination of the rate of the learning process.

Using trained observers (introspectionists), Book followed the conscious processes involved with the task of learning to type and the eventual transformations thereof. In order to obtain data Book conducted a 'cross-section analysis' so as to chart the conscious processes which either preceded or accompanied the writing, allowing him to obtain an historical record of the learning process. The analysis was done at every stage of the development such that the changes in its formation were noted and correlated with the typewritten end-product. The cross-section analyses were done at regular intervals and the practice session was conducted at regular times each day. Subjects were also free to jot down notes during the session to preserve any pertinent information. The introspective data consisted of the subjects' reports on what they recalled of their conscious experiences after finishing the daily task. The subject was also asked how the day's work had been done and whatever had occurred to facilitate or retard the learning of the skill.

Book's procedure of having subjects report on their introspective discoveries may seem unwarranted and unreliable to some persons. It should be noted that the processes involved are not being broken down into elements, as Titchner and Wundt had demanded, and is not subject, therefore, to the same fallacious findings as their approach. Some people believe that there is something to be gained from a person's experience of themselves and their cognitive processes. Zabrodin, for example, regarding introspection, determined that "many useful and subtle methodological details were developed in this school. Unfortunately, many of them have unjustifiably been forgotten" (1983, p. 23). From another angle, Mischel (1977) proposed that "our subjects are much smarter than many of us thought they were" (p. 7). In fact, Mischel suggested that . . . it would be wise to allow our "subjects" to slip out of their roles as passive "assesseees" or "testees" and to enroll them, at least sometimes, as active colleagues who are the best experts on themselves and are eminantly qualified to

participate in the development of descriptions and predictions--not to mention decisions--about themselves (p. 249).

Sanford (1982) also advocated questioning people about what had occurred. In any event, it does seem that the reports of subjects are worth attending and may be a source of much information. I shall leave the rest of the defense to Book's own report and let the reader judge for himself or herself.

The result of Book's study was that he was able to specify the habits that were acquired in learning to typewrite and to specify the stages that the subjects went through in learning.

A careful examination of the data obtained from these several cross-sectional analyses of the learning consciousness showed that the 'mental adjustments,' 'sets of mind,' 'determining tendencies,' or conscious attitudes which were operative in the more advanced stages of the practice, represented, in fact, were nothing more nor less than the developed forms of the

representative processes or images, operative directing forces in the early stages of the writing. It was clearly determined that all the images appeared in the different stages of the writing to initiate, guide, or direct the movements, were first prominent and distinct, then hazy or vague, giving way, finally, to the mental adjustments, sets of mind, determining tendencies or conscious attitudes which later initiated and controlled the writing movements. The conscious attitudes developed by our subjects in learning to use a typewriter, therefore, represent the developed or automatized forms of certain definite representative processes, made imageless through much practice (p. 387-388).

The thought processes that had been tied, in the early stages of development, to the operations and actions, had been liberated from the mechanical operations and had become internalized.

It was noted by Book that the earlier conscious

processes preceding or accompanying the typewriting proved important in explaining the processes operative in the expert stages of the writing. This meant that "the imageless processes developed in the course of our experiments, represent nothing more nor less than developed forms of representative processes made imageless by practice and use" (p. 395). As a result, it was harder and harder for subjects to observe the conscious processes as they became more vague and incipient, as they became imageless and fully internalized. We see then that Book has answered the imageless thought issue and, without intending to, has supported the Soviet principles of the internalization of external activity.

Book's notion of a hierarchy of attitudes also seems consummate with Dewey's and Leontiev's conceptions. Book said that "in the matter of conscious processes which gave direction and control to the fingers and hands, we, therefore, have the development not merely of an attitude, but of a hierarchy of attitudes" (p. 393). Also, Book discovered that what, initially, were separate actions eventually became operative as a single

action:

The visual fixation of a letter in the copy at once called up the idea of its exact position, a process which came to be followed so closely, in this stage of advancement, by the hand and the finger movements required for making it, that the whole process could be controlled by a single conscious span (p. 390).

Admittedly, of course, Book was not thinking in terms of activity theory and I can make no assertions to that end. I only hope to have demonstrated that his approach had certain similarities to activity theory as it has been developed in more recent times.

Stern's goal-directed behavior. Stern (1934-1935) maintained that people are influenced by the meaningfulness of their activities, that activity is goal-directed. To Stern, a person's character was shaped by the world in which she or he lived. The world gave human action a lasting basis and, thereby, allowed the individual to influence and alter the world. Based on this knowable and influenceable world, the individual developed goals which directed

activity. These goals were considered to form a system of goals or purposes. One goal, which Stern saw as setting humans apart from other animals, was self-improvement, the goal of working on oneself. Thus, Stern regarded humans as purposefully active in their environment.

. . . each individual selects from the world that plays upon him those items which he comes to possess so intimately that they become components of the self and hence factors in his self-organization. This is precisely the way in which an hierarchical structure of goals and norms, the most individual peculiarity of each person, is formed from these intimately possessed interests in other people and in family, in humanity and divinity, in ideals and principles. The stability of the character is consequently evinced not so much in rigid modes of behavior with respect to some particular partial aims as in the ranking, in the advance and retreat of such aims within that total purpose (Stern, p.

280).

Kantor on action. A similar approach was taken by Kantor (1935, 1937-1938). He proposed that "psychological action constitutes not merely the coordinated action of muscles, glands, etc., but a qualitatively specific form of action interrelated with a stimulus of an object. This interactional phenomenon we take to be the essential fact of mind" (1935, p. 464). Besides the foregoing, he said that psychological activities are

. . . the interactions with objects on the basis of the organism's prior contacts with such objects. The specifically psychological activities are intimately connected with what, for want of a better term, we call social phenomena--those essentially human features of an organism's surroundings. The results of such interactions are the building up of concrete performances of speech, feeling, appreciation of the uses and character of objects, the ability to name things, and so forth throughout a large gamut of equipment

(1935, p. 464).

Kantor maintained that the task of the psychologist was to observe behavior which, for him, consisted of the activities that individuals utilize in their interactions with the environment.

In the course of growing up, according to Kantor, in a human society, persons build up sets of actions through the guidance and control of other people; the person is the set of activities that are built up in the course of a life. "Taken in its totality, a person's psychological behavior represents an integration--a sort of structural character. It is precisely this unique coherence of traits, this stabilizing organization of actions, that constitutes personality" (1937-1938). So, for Kantor, a person's activities, their interactive patterns, are the proper subject matter of psychology.

Avelling on needs and goals. Avelling (1938-1939) took a somewhat different approach by tying notions of activity to lower organisms as well as humans. Thus he spoke of unicellular organisms as having needs and goals. Consider the following:

But we are concerned with the "desire," the

need for the performance of a particular set of actions at a definite time, the anticipation of satisfaction (which may never previously have been experienced), the relation between the "desiring" wasp and the goal, the attainment of which satisfies it, and the changing causal, temporal, and spatial relations which must be realized in order that the biological goal should be secured (p. 98).

Of course, at the human level we are dealing with more than biological goals; social goals are of prime importance. Avelling held that human beings have biological goals directing their activities. As well, Avelling maintained that it is only in the system of relations that the goal can be achieved. In reference to personality, he wrote that "there is apparently a logic of behavior and conduct secured by relations and relational systems, and this logic is most frequently exemplified in the ends aimed at and the means employed to secure them that are so highly indicative of character" (p. 102). Finally, he stated that "we judge a person's character by

observing his behavior, discovering the goals at which he appears to aim, and the means to secure them (p. 96). While Avelling does not deal with the question of an adequate unit of analysis it should be clear that he was putting forth a viewpoint that, in small ways, was similar to activity theory.

Stebbins on action orientation. The final paper we will examine during this survey of Western attempts at activity-like approaches is that of Stebbins (1967). While his position also shows similarities to activity theory it also is pertinent to the issue of the possibility or impossibility of providing an adequate taxonomy of situations. Stebbins argued that any situation is fundamentally a mental construction even though the situation has observable characteristics such as social, physiological, and physical aspects (this hearkens back to Leontiev's discussion of sense). He maintained that the subjective presentation of the environment is influenced by what he called 'selective perception', which is a sensitization to certain elements of the environment that are of personal interest. Due to this, "any rigorous effort to define the situation

must inevitably start here, for the vast array of potentially situational elements is greatly reduced by the actor through selective perception" (p. 149). The spatial range of the subjective situation was the extent to which meaningful stimuli could be picked up. Besides this, there could be one or more subjective situations per objective situation, simultaneously or sequentially, with the possibility of change in meaning occurring while the objective situation is in progressive movement.

Related to the issue of the subjective situation, and more closely in alignment with activity theory, is Stebbins' concept of 'action orientation'. Action orientation "refers to any purpose which the actor has as he enters the objective situation" (p. 150), that is, the motive of the activity in that particular situation. Stebbins maintained that situational elements affected action orientations depending on their salience to the person, or the passing in and out of salience of stimuli due to a circumstantial change or the satisfaction of the goal. It was possible, not unexpectedly, to pursue more than one action

orientation at one time, with some being subsidiary and others primary. The relation between action orientations is such that, for the individual, "the situation has changed because his principal action orientation has been realized or dropped and another has taken its place" (p. 152). This means that the situation can last as long as it takes to manipulate the situation to achieve one's pursued ends. "Manipulation is simply getting out of the situation all that one can in relation to one's purpose" (p. 152).

The interrelatedness of all the various factors of the process was noted in this passage:

The personality-cultural factors affecting the definition of the situation may be summarized as an organized set of predispositions which one brings to any situation. Included among these are the individual's predispositions stemming from past definitions of situations, from his former and future plans of action, from his past and present action orientations, from his set of values and attitudes, and from

his set of social and personal identities
(p. 156).

Since there was this interrelatedness, Stebbins saw the transformation of goals as being tied to definitions of situations and changes thereof.

Stebbins' standpoint resembled that of Dewey as concerns the notion of the reconstitution of the coordination:

Between the time the actor enters the objective situation and the time he delineates and defines a subjective version of it , he is likely to behave either in a trial-and-error fashion or engage in little overt action at all. This period is predominantly one of reflection, and until the situation can be defined and a plan of action selected, the individual is in a real sense immobilized; goal-directed action becomes possible only after the situation has been given meaning in terms of the current action orientation (p. 159).

With each new situation a certain amount of

reflection is required; the more nebulous the situation the more reflection will be required although no situation is completely novel in all its facets (save for newborns) but relates in some ways to past experiences. The whole idea of goal directed activity and action orientation establishes a theoretical connection with activity theory through conceptual overlap. Further, while Stebbins does not clearly identify the required unit of analysis, his writings hint of the possibility.

Pervin on goals. To Pervin (1983), people are not bumped from situation to situation, nor do they follow simple paths. On top of this, people are not erratic in their behavior. Rather, to Pervin human behavior is a flowing process which is patterned. This organized, patterned quality of behavior suggested to Pervin that behavior has end-points or goals. Behavior was to be considered motivated and a useful concept to explain behavior was goals.

Behavior is primarily directed toward obtaining goals. The argument made is that much human behavior can only be understood in terms of its role in goal acquisition

and that it is the movement toward goals
that gives behavior its organized,
patterned quality (Pervin, 1983, p. 10;
emphasis in original).

People were considered by Pervin to have more than one goal, thus he conceptualized behavior as a reflection of multiple goals. These multiple goals are related to one another and together form an organized, hierarchical system. Of course these multiple goals do not all function at once, although they are, to Pervin, considered to be present, awaiting activation.

As Pervin conceived it, goals have cognitive, affective, and behavioral, or motor, properties. The cognitive component is the mental image of the goal, the plans made to reach the goal, and the assessment of present situations in relation to goals. The behavioral component consists of the actual physical motions made to reach the end-point. The affective component, according to Pervin, is the feeling toward the goal in terms of approach due to pleasure, withdrawal due to fear, and attack due to anger. The affective component is also considered to be the

basis for acquiring goals as a result of association (as in classical conditioning).

By introducing goal-directed activity in his theory, Pervin has taken a step towards the propositions to be found in activity theory. As we will see, however, the attempt to account for goal acquisition with classical conditioning does not meet the requirements of activity theory concerning the internalization of the objects which are the motives to activity.

This concludes the review of Western positions found in the literature which demonstrate similarities, some more than others, to activity theory. It must not be presumed, however, that all or any of them had any influence on the development of Leontiev's theory. They do, on the other hand, provide some insight into the issues that will concern us next. Therefore let us turn, again, to the work of Leontiev and his colleagues and see what sort of conception they have regarding human psychology.

Chapter 8

The Theory of Activity

In order to preserve continuity with former chapters let us reacquaint ourselves with the problem that activity theory, in my opinion, resolves for interactionism.

Dynamic interaction. As will be remembered, Endler (1982) identified three types of interaction. These were mechanistic, unidirectional interaction, dynamic, reciprocal interaction, and a third which did not allow for the separation of persons from situations. Accordingly, Endler maintained that, "due to our present lack of methodological sophistication, it is not presently feasible to empirically investigate this last type of interaction" (p. 15).

If my assertions about activity theory are correct, we will see that the methodological sophistication that Endler regarded as lacking has been in use by Soviet psychologists for more than fifty years. In order to grasp this theory fully, as it exists in the present, it will be necessary to go back to the 1920's and early 30's in order to

appreciate the historical basis of the theory and the germinal influence of Leontiev's mentor, Vygotsky.

L. S. Vygotsky. In the short decade that Vygotsky worked in psychology he sought continually to overcome dualism in the theoretical pronouncements of that science. The separation of the psyche from behavior led, on the one hand, to a mechanistic conception of behavior, and, on the other, to a subjective idealist approach to the psyche which proved an inadequate account of behavior (see Kharin, 1981, Ilyenkov, 1977, and Ilitskaya, 1976, for the philosophic consideration of this problem). As we shall soon see Vygotsky, too, slipped into idealism which his student Leontiev was later to resolve. Even though not completely successful, Vygotsky did develop some seminal psychological concepts which the members of Vygotsky's group, the Khar'kov School (Zabrodin, 1983), were able to build upon, and which set the stage for the development of activity theory (Davydov and Radzikhovsky, 1986; Asmolov, 1986-1987; Leont'ev, 1989). Let us, then, briefly note Vygotsky's main ideas (as drawn from Vygotsky, 1929, 1962, 1967, 1978; Asmolov, 1981; Bozhovich, 1977,

Davydov, 1981; Rahmani, 1973; Talyzina, 1981; and Zabrodin, 1983).

Conscious development. The primary problem for Vygotsky, in line with his fight against dualism, was to give an adequate conception of the development of consciousness through objective observation. Vygotsky believed that a person's social activity plays a dominant role in his or her mental development and that the origin of the individual lies in the social. Mental development was, and is, considered to follow two lines of development: biological and cultural (since Leontiev's theory, which was built upon Vygotsky's ideas, has been considered on this point previously we will not expand upon this aspect any further). On the cultural side, which was Vygotsky's main concern, human, conscious development, was based on each person's practical relations with the world and which led to the assimilation (appropriation in Leontiev's terminology) of social experience and the subsequent development of consciousness. This assimilation was due to a process of internalization of social experience and its transference and transformation

into mental experience.

Internalization. Vygotsky (1962) studied the internalization of speech from a social act to an inner, mental operation as a transition, or transfer, from interpsychic to intrapsychic experience and activity. He demonstrated that speech, for the child, is first social speech, which has the aim of communicating with another. This social speech, in the course of development, is divided into egocentric speech (vocal speech to oneself) and communicative speech. Vygotsky saw both forms as social speech but also reasoned that they have different functions. Egocentric speech is the mid-point between social speech and inner, unvocalized speech. Egocentric speech is tied to what the child is doing and functions in a controlling capacity; gradually it gains the power of a directing or planning influence in the child's activity. The transitions of egocentric speech Vygotsky likened to the transition found in a similar process:

What happens here is similar to the well-known developmental sequence in the naming of drawings. A small child draws

first, then decides what it is that he has drawn; at a slightly older age, he names his drawing when it is half done; and finally he decides beforehand what he will draw (1962, p. 17)

Finally, speech loses its vocal component and becomes a completely internal process.

Asmolov (1986-1987) wrote that Vygotsky clearly formulated the idea that to regard a process as external was to regard it as social. Thus mental functions could be considered external since, before being internalized, it was originally a social function, a relation between two people. Asmolov pointed out three aspects to be distinguished in internalization. The first was 'individualization' and it concerned the movement from collective, social activity which is interpsychical to the intrapsychical, individual, psychological activity. The second was 'interiorization' which is a transition from understanding in terms of 'we' to understanding in terms of 'I' and it signals the emergence of self-awareness. Third was the formation and production of consciousness. In this regard

Asmolov offered the following caution:

Nevertheless, internalization is sometimes seen as a direct mechanical process of translating the external and material into the internal and ideal. Sometimes such an impression may arise from the stress given in activity theory to the postulate that external and internal activity constitute a structural unity. But, for example, as Vygotsky pointed out more than once, to say that a unity exists between thought and word by no means means that they are identical (p. 95).

The reason for distinguishing between the two is that that which is internalized is an abstract reflection of the object or relation internalized and, hence, is not isomorphic with the external.

This concept of internalization is a central premise of modern Soviet psychology, especially as it applies to education (see Talyzina, 1981, for internalization and education; Neverovich, 1977, on the internalization of motor acts and the transition from involuntary activity to voluntary activity;

Vygotsky, 1967, on the internalization of play activity and the formation of imagination; Gal'perin, 1967, on the internalization of mental functions; Leontiev, 1957, on the stages of internalization). In summary, Zinchenko and Gordon (1981) saw the overall process as follows:

The initial and fundamental form of human activity is external, practical activity. The internal plane of activity, inner mental operations and actions, is formed in the process of internalization During this transition these processes undergo specific changes--they become generalized, verbalized, abbreviated; and most importantly, they become the means for further development that transcends what is possible with external activity (p. 74).

Thus, in a sense, internalization gradually liberates the person from the situation that he or she was initially bound to and allows the person to work upon the environment, so as to change it or conform to it, as a purely mental act. As a general process of human life, internalization is found in predominance

during childhood, but, as any adult who has learned a new skill can tell you, internalization is not limited to childhood. It is this process that accounts, therefore, for the emergence of higher mental functioning. In this internalization of social life the child in turn becomes an individual with all the necessary faculties required to operate successfully in society; the internalization of the social is the origin of what becomes the individual. It should be noted, finally, that without the dominant role of a child's action there would be no mental development. The development of the mental also undergoes change as the child enters a new stage of development. This is another of Vygotsky's premises that has been preserved.

Mental development. In order to understand the mental functioning of the adult Vygotsky believed that it is necessary to study those functions in their development. It was his contention that, at the adult level, the functions are 'fossilized' and there is a danger that they may be treated as given and may thus lead to a failure to note the qualitative changes, occurring in ontogeny, that lead

to the adult level of performance. As a result of his studies, Vygotsky believed that as a child grows its activities bring the child to new conditions of existence which make new demands on the child and which are dependent on the stage of the child's mental development. As the child's mental faculties develop the child acquires new needs that are characteristic of the latest stage entered. Thus, as the child progresses through the stages of development there are central and dominant activities in the child's overall system of exchanges with the environment. Each new stage of mental development carries the child forward into different social relations and practical operations. This means that the child's attachment to former needs, in the previous stage, wanes in favor of the developing needs. Vygotsky (1967) said that "every advance from one age stage to another is connected with an abrupt change in motives and incentives to act" (p. 7) due to a change in social activities. This, at least, was the gist of Vygotsky's research on development. Rather than continue with this, since it will be dealt with in more detail later when we discuss the

formulations of Bozhovich (next chapter), let us look at the emergence of play development since it leads us to another key concept of Vygotsky.

Play. Vygotsky (1967) determined that play for preschool children (preschool stage) was the main source of development. He wrote that "to refuse to approach the problem of play from the standpoint of fulfillment of the child's needs, his incentives to act, and his affective aspirations would result in a terrible intellectualization of play" (p. 6). He believed, therefore, that it would be impossible to understand play unless it were possible to elucidate the motive lying behind it. He concluded that play came about because the child had motive which could not be satisfied at the stage of development and had, therefore, to be realized in fantasy; this does not imply that the child is aware, consciously, of the need that is fulfilled by proxy. Play for the child is wish fulfillment but it is not "isolated wishes but generalized affects" (p. 8).

The presence of such generalized affects in play does not mean that the child himself understands the motives which give rise to

the game or that he does it consciously. He plays without realizing the motives of the play activity. In this, play differs substantially from work and other forms of activity. On the whole, it can be said that motives, actions, and incentives belong to a more abstract sphere and only become accessible to consciousness at the transitional age. Only an adolescent can clearly account to himself the reason for which he does this or that (p. 8).

The zone of proximal development. It was in play that Vygotsky located the genesis of what he called the 'zone of proximal development': "It is the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). He believed that in play this zone arose because "in play a child is always above his average age, above his daily behavior; in play it is as though he were a head taller than himself" (1967,

p. 16). Through this activity the child moves ahead to the stage of school activity.

The zone of proximal development, while originating in play activity, is most important during the formative stages of the intellect. Standard intelligence tests seek to find the level of the child's fossilized behavior with scant attention paid to where the developing tendrils of the child's intellect are moving. Having ascertained the level that the child could operate at without guidance (the fossilized state) Vygotsky also saw how far ahead the child's intellect was reaching. This was determined by ascertaining the level reached after the child had received hints as to how the task was to be accomplished. Whatever level was reached with guidance was the zone of proximal development; this could be quite different depending on the life history and activities of the child. It is worth noting, in closing this point, that Vygotsky defined intelligence as the ability to benefit from instruction.

The foregoing has been intended to convey to the reader a brief synopsis of the groundwork that led to

the work of Leontiev. As a bridge, let us look, finally, at the premises of Vygotsky which were considered false and led, thereby, to activity theory.

Problems in Vygotsky. Vygotsky was interested in human labor activities as characterized by the use of instruments--tools and signs--that mediated between the relations of the person to the conditions of his existence. He believed that this mediation distinguished humans from animals. The mediational components allowed for greater control over the environment and elevated humankind from the unmediated, reactive realm of animals. While they appear, initially, as external forms of behavior they become internalized and psychic. Vygotsky studied concepts and their formation, but he conceived of no difference between concepts and meaningful activity and this led to difficulties. Thus Talyzina (1981) pointed out that

. . . a real danger appeared in Vygotsky's system that emphasis will be placed on communications as a factor determining the development of consciousness together with

a neglect of man's practical relations with reality. For the child became not a subject interacting with the real world but merely a creature engaged in social communication. Such an interpretation of the role of social communication carried the danger of intellectualism and idealism (p. 22).

This was also noted by Leontiev and Luria (1968). They concluded that Vygotsky's theory regarding the evolution of mental processes gave insufficient attention to practical activity in forming consciousness. It was their belief that Vygotsky had too sharply counterpoised naturally-formed versus socially-formed mental processes, although they also acknowledged that Vygotsky's work was an important step forward.

It was the separation of the concept from real activities that led to its overemphasis as a mediating instrument and led to a separation of concepts from activities. Vygotsky studied instruments of labor but not the labor activities that linked the person to the world. Leontiev, on

the other hand, recognized that it was the activities and not the concepts that linked people to their environment and it was activities that determined the overall development of consciousness and psychic functions in individuals. The question to be answered was what it was that mediated between the person and their environment.

Van der Veer and Ijzendoorn (1985) stated that the main criticism of Vygotsky was that he had created an unwarranted dichotomy between higher and lower psychological processes. The second problem that they indicated was that Vygotsky, in his discussion of social interaction, had restricted his analysis to speech alone.

Vygotsky believed that concepts were the mediating agents that linked the person and the environment, but this was seen to be false. Endler and Magnusson also believed that the mediating agents (for them variables) were cognitive, internal constructs, which must also be considered false (from the Soviet perspective) since these, too, exist within the person as subsets and also require mediation. Leontiev, unlike them, reasoned that what

was required was a unit which united subject and object in its mediation and this unit was activity.

Consider this:

If the mind as a phenomenon is not directly observable, and if we reject the introspective method for acquiring objective knowledge about mental phenomena, we must find a replacement for it. This replacement was indeed found in that we began to study an objectively observable reality: objective actions, deeds, words, movements, behavior, and the activity of real people, and taking the principle in a broad sense, the movements and behavior of all organisms possessing a mind (Zabrodin, 1983, p. 24).

Activity unites subject and object. Leontiev, in developing activity theory, was faced with the traditional two part scheme: first an influence on a subject's senses, followed, secondly, by a response. Leontiev believed psychology had two choices. Either retain the two part scheme and its postulate of immediacy (that nothing intercedes between stimulus

and response) or introduce a third component which mediates the other two. He did not, however, advocate using intervening (mediating) variables:

Introducing the concept of intervening variables no doubt enriches the analysis of behavior, but it does not eliminate the postulate of immediacy. Although the variables are intervening, they are so only in the sense of internal states of the subject itself (1974-1975, p.7).

Leontiev proposed that a person's activity was what mediated between the object and the subject. This meant that, rather than making the two part scheme more precise, the activity approach demanded that it be removed (Davydov, 1981). This did not mean that the subject and object were lost, rather they were no longer considered independent. "Activity brings together in a unity such opposing principles as object and subject" (Davydov, Zinchenko, and Talyzina, 1983, p.32).

In the activity approach the subject actively interacts with the object; it "meets" the object with partiality and

selectivity. In other words, to the principles of reactivity is counterposed the principle of the subjects' activeness. This principle makes it possible to surmount an approach to man that sees him merely as a being that adapts to surrounding conditions and to counter this approach with the transforming, creative nature of human activity (Davydov et al, p. 33).

While this is what activity achieved, it has not yet been clear to the reader exactly what activity implies since it is not commensurate with the dictionary definition of it.

Activity is a molar and nonadditive unit of a material subject's life. In a narrower and more psychological sense, activity is a unit of life mediated by mental reflection whose real function is to orient the subject to the world of objects. Activity is thus not a reaction or a totality of reactions, but rather a system possessing structure, inner transformations,

conversions, and development (Leontiev, 1974-1975, p. 10).

As well, "activity becomes an object for psychology not as a special "part" or "element," but as a fundamental, inherent function. It is the function of placing the subject in objective reality and transforming this into a subjective form" (Leontyev, 1981, p. 52-53).

In activity, objects are transformed into their subjective forms, into images, and they are transformed into objective products. There is a process of repeated transition back and forth between the poles of subject and object. At the psychological level this is a unit of life, mediated by mental reflection (image), which orients the human individual in the objective world (Davydov, 1981, p. 12).

Unit of analysis. As a unit of psychological assessment, activity preserves both subject and object in its analysis and thereby meets the requirement of Vygotsky that the unit of analysis not be reduced to elements that lose the nature of the

phenomena of interest (Leontiev and Luria, 1968).

As a unit of analysis of personality structure, Asmolov (1984) identified the following points as criteria for arriving at such a unit: The unit should reflect the dynamicity of personality and the objective content to which the person acts intentionally should be discovered. The level of reflection, whether conscious or unconscious, needs to be considered. Furthermore, the social determination of the structure of personality, and the hierarchical interconnections of the structure needs to be discovered. The intrapersonal dynamics, the development and self-development of personality, should be elucidated. The internal unity of emotion and thought should be reflected in the unit. The unit should contain the properties of the whole and it should be operational. If these criteria are met, it would be possible, according to Asmolov, to reveal how personality functions and develops.

Zinchenko (1986) also offered some requirements, drawn from Vygotsky, that a unit of analysis of mind should have. To Zinchenko the unit must be an integrated structure rather than an assemblage of

elements and it must reflect the characteristic of the whole as a unity. The unit should be able to develop and also include the possibility of self-development and change. It must be a unified system that cannot be further reduced and it should be a 'living part of the whole'.

Every unit must reflect characteristics of cognition, sensation, volition or purpose, intelligence, and activation. Otherwise it may be a unit of physiological or biomechanical analysis, but it is not a unit of psychological analysis (Zinchenko, 1986, p. 100).

As will be seen in further consideration, activity is a unit that meets these requirements. Since activity is a unit that unites subject and object, we will next consider activity in its object orientation.

The principle of objectness. While activity is always activity of a person it is also indissolubly bound to an object. The principle of 'objectness' in activity (attributed by Asmolov, 1981, to Davydov), is considered the nucleus of activity theory.

Object-oriented activity is the starting point in the analysis of personality (Asmolov, 1984). As such, object-oriented activity is a precondition for the development of personality. The social environment as an object of activity is a condition in the development of personality.

Activity is always considered in its object-orientation. The object of activity takes two forms. In its preliminary, first form, it is independent of the subject whose activity is subordinate to it and is transformed by it. Secondly, the object becomes internalized and takes the form of an image that arises only through a person's active engagement with objects (Davydov, 1981, 1985). Consequently, "regulated by the image, the subject's activity is transformed into a 'latent property' of its objective product. In this reification it is transformed into the ideal aspect, the suprasensory property of the things producing it" (Davydov, 1981, p. 13).

Leontiev maintained that every activity has an object; there is no such thing as objectless activity. "Activity may appear to be objectless, but the scientific investigation of activity necessarily

demands the discovery of its object" (Leontiev, 1977, p. 182). Since the object can also be an image, the object need not be available in an objective form in order to guide activity. The object to Leontiev was not understood as a 'thing' that existed in itself, it was, rather, an object to which acts were directed and which was related to as the object of a person's activity (Asmolov, 1986-1987).

Asmolov (1986-1987) pointed out that the phenomenon of object-relatedness was demonstrated most clearly when a contradiction or discrepancy arose between the object's properties as a thing and the actions required to act upon the object in labor upon that object. Asmolov used the example of a box lid which was opened not by lifting but by pressing down to release a spring latch. Another example would be the cooking of food in order to destroy germs rather than eating immediately on contact. The object acted upon entire activity "not as a 'material point in space' or as a stimulus eliciting a response, but as an object that is at the same time an embodiment of sociohistorical experience, defining an object-related action" (Asmolov, 1986-1987, p.

82). When the object is removed from an activity, the object-relatedness vanishes, and the object becomes a thing in itself (more like a stimulus). This principle of object-relatedness, according to Asmolov, eliminated the opposition of stimuli and responses found in behaviorism; in activity they are in unity.

In accordance with the internal logic of the theory, the constituent feature of activity must in fact be its objectiveness. This objectiveness becomes apparent in the process of transformation of activity through subordination . . . to the properties, phenomena, and relations of the objective world independent of that activity. Hence, the conclusion may be warranted that this quality of activity is indeed a marker of its universal plasticity, its capacity to transform itself as it assimilates and absorbs the objective qualities of objects among which and in which the subject must exist and act. Objects themselves control the

transformations of the activity in the process of the subject's practical contacts with them (Davydov, 1985, p. 36).

While the foregoing gives some idea of the nature of activity it is still only preliminary. The next aspect of activity to concern us is the situation of activity.

The situation of activity. Yadov (1986) has indicated that the situation, or circumstances of activity, in which needs are realized, in the form of motives, has a hierarchical structure. The lowest level of the structure is formed by 'material situations' and these are created by the material environment which is both specific and rapidly changing. Thus, in a short time period, people move from material situation to material situation. Yadov also identified, as the next level, that of group communication, a social situation, whose time frame is longer than that of material situations.

Yadov also spoke of what he called 'behavioral readiness' which is related to a particular level of activity. At the lowest level, that of material situations, behavioral readiness takes the form of

'situational behavioral readiness'. In the social situation, behavioral readiness takes the form of a 'behavior plan'. At the highest level, according to Yadov, behavioral readiness is in the form of 'behavioral programs'. Presumably, behavioral program relates to self-directing motives as they exist in the consciousness of the individual.

As a hierarchy, Yadov maintained that regulation of the system was different at different levels. He said that the higher levels control the lower levels. In other words, what has control of behavior is the conscious aim of the individual rather than the immediate social or physical situation.

What Yadov has done is to formulate how motives and activities are in a state of readiness when not activated and hence has indicated a way of conceiving of the relation of motives and their objects when not in relation physically.

The structure of activity. What has been said so far has been about activity in general. In truth, there is no such thing as activity in general in the real world. What we face in reality is the concrete behavior of living persons. Thus, "in reality, we

deal always with specific activities, each of which answers a subject's specific desire, seeks an object of this desire, terminates when the desire is satisfied, and begins anew under perhaps quite different conditions" (Leontiev, 1974-1975, p. 22). The most global structural unit is activity and it is governed by its motive. The next structural unit is that of action which is governed by its goal. Finally, operation is the last reduction of activity that still preserves the nature of the unit of interest and it is determined by the real conditions.

These "units" of human activity form its macrostructure. The analysis by which they are identified is not a process of dismembering living activity into separate elements, but of revealing the relations which characterize that activity. Such systems analysis simultaneously rules out any possibility of a bifurcation of the reality that is being studied, for example, to judge whether we are dealing, in a given case, with action or with operation

(Leontiev, 1977, p. 186).

While the nature of the structural unit does not change, in that it preserves the unity of subject and object, in moving from activity to operation, there is a move from studying the overall, general theme of the behavior down to its specifics.

Before we look more closely at the nature of these structural units we must first understand how motives arise in the human being. To Leontiev this is tied to need.

Needs and motives. Initially a person is considered, by Leontiev, to be a purely biological being driven by organic necessity or need. This primary state of being in itself is not capable of directing activity; while the person is driven, the object of the drive is not known, i.e., there is no motive. This means that "its function is limited to the activation of biological functions and the general stimulation of the motor sphere, which is manifested in undirected search movements" (Leontiev, quoted in Davydov, 1981, p. 14). Without this initial activation of the organism's motor excitability, activity proper could not arrive since it is not an innate capacity. In Leontiev's conception, the primary need

state is not properly psychological; it is only when the need finds an object that fulfills it that a psychological process arises.

In the psychology of desire we must, from the beginning, distinguish between desire as an internal condition, as one of the necessary preconditions for activity, and desire as that which directs and regulates a subject's specific activity in the object-type world. Only in this latter function is a desire also an object of psychological knowledge. In the former case a desire appears only as a state of need that in itself can evoke no specific directed activity: its function is limited to activating the relevant biological functions and generally arousing the motor sphere, which is expressed in hyperkinesis and directionless, searching movements. Only after a desire has "met" an answering object can it begin to direct and regulate activity (Leontiev, 1974-1975, p. 13).

This meeting of desire with an answering object was,

for Leontiev, a most marvellous occurrence:

The meeting of a desire with an object is an extraordinary act, an act of objectifying the desire--of "filling it up" with content drawn from the surrounding world. It is this that carries desire to a properly psychological level (1974-1975, p. 13).

This was an event of great significance:

It is worth noting that only this factor explains the appearance in human beings of new desires, which have no analogues in animals and are "severed" from biological needs, being in this sense "autonomous." The formation of new desires is explained by the fact that in human society, objects of desire are produced, and the desires themselves are therefore also produced (Leontiev, 1974-1975, p.13).

The question of organic necessity, or need, which leads to the initial activation of the person is not completely clear. What is not clear is just what these initial needs are. Leont'ev (1978) spoke

of this as an internal condition which was the precursor to activity (he mentioned hunger) and it is not capable of bringing forth directed activity: "its function is limited to the activation of appropriate biological function and general excitation of the motor sphere apparent in nondirected seeking movements" (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 54). In the same work Leont'ev also referred to these as 'elementary vital needs'. Davydov (1981) referred to them as 'simple need' and also as 'wants' (Davydov, 1985). Yadov (1986) spoke of 'lower level needs' which were vital, psychophysiological needs, and 'higher needs' or 'social needs'.

Langmeier and Matacjek (1975), who are not activity theorists, called them 'primary', biological needs. They gave the need for food, warmth, oxygen, sexual satisfaction, and relief from pain as examples. They also noted 'higher needs' which were derived, and 'secondary needs', which were learned through association to the inherited, biological needs.

Parsons (1971), also not an activity theorist, identified the need to eat and drink, to breath and

act, rest and sleep, elimination and pain avoidance, and the need to be stimulated. Parsons also included the need to communicate and express oneself, to explore, play and create as distinctly human needs. Parsons concluded that a newborn is impelled by a drive to live.

It seems clear that the failure to identify or define these initial needs is a weakness in the theory; doubts as to what they are can therefore arise and the list could prove unlimited if not clearly established.

Mussen, Conger, and Kagan (1974), who are not activity theorists, stated that an infant is born with physiological needs which are basic to survival. These needs are satisfied automatically through organic, self-regulation; these are the need for oxygen, for temperature regulation, for sleep and for elimination. They also identified two other needs, those of hunger and thirst, which are not satisfied automatically and which play an important part in the infant's early learning. Since these needs require another person for their satisfaction they are both biological and social at one and the same time. They

are the starting point for social engagement.

Whereas an elementary vital need could direct activity, once an object met the need that object became a motive for further activity. To this end, "the objects--the means of satisfying needs-- must be recognized as motives, i.e., must enter consciousness as an inner image, as a need, as stimulation, and as objective" (Leontyev, 1981, p. 240). Thus, motives are built upon needs, as a result of their needs becoming objectified. At this point the alteration of need into motive may not necessarily lead to anything that is more than biological demands and their satisfaction. There is nothing distinctly human in this; what renders the human a human is the appropriation of society. The person must find social engagements as necessary, as a need or motive to further activity. In this regard, Fel'dshtein (1983) proposed that "in infancy, a child is first stimulated by an adult to enter into relations, but then activity develops the need for relationships with adults" (p. 23). A person, after all, unless they fail to reach out to their heritage, is born into a society and is, in a sense, spoon fed social

activity until social activity becomes a need or motive which is actively pursued. This in turn engenders new needs or motives to activity. This has been succinctly described by Langmeier and Matcjcek (1975):

We begin with the assumption that the basic developmental tendency of the organism (in addition to the biological drive for survival) is its need for active contact with the environment, which is realized by a constant widening, differentiation, subsequent concentration and repeated integration of this contact. A living organism is, by its very nature, active, and this activity is, in principle, inevitably oriented towards the world and objects in it: it takes possession of things, learns to recognize their relations and meaning, becomes attached to specific objects and ascribes values to them, and, in the middle of the possessed, grasped and evaluated things and persons, eventually meets its own person and defines its status

in the world of things and human beings.
The basic activity develops in the process
of continuous anticipation and fulfilment,
by means of which the organism actively
helps to create and realize itself (p.
305).

Types of motives. While one could rightly say that
all of life is an activity this would, obviously, not
be a very satisfactory approach to build a theory of
human life upon. It must be possible to segment this
ongoing process into meaningful units while
recognizing that, in the concrete person, no such
separation occurs. Leontiev believed that what set
one activity of the life process apart from another
was the motive of the activity which was found in the
object of the motive. He maintained that "the
different activities that realize its diverse vital
relations with the surrounding reality are
essentially determined by their object; we shall
differentiate between different types of activity
according to the differences in their objects" (1981,
p. 37). He proposed that it was impossible to have
an activity without having a motive: "'nonmotivated'

activity is not activity without a motive but activity with a subjectively and objectively hidden motive" (1978, p. 62-63). When the motive is not hidden it can exist as a perception of an object or as an image in the mind.

Lomov (1983) proposed that there were three main types of motives: personal motives, which were purely individual, the motives of the various groups one belongs to, and the motives of the society one lives in. Matyushkin (1983) identified, as the two extreme types of activity, adaptive and productive activity. Adaptive activity led to the formation of 'numerous stereotypes of behavior' such as attitudes and habits. Productive activity led primarily to effecting changes and was characterized by cognitive activity. Fel'dshtein (1983) recognized two aspects of activity which, while different in nature, were inseparable since they had their existence in "the unitary, indivisible process of activity" (p. 20). These aspects were 'object-oriented activity' and 'person-oriented activity' (or subject-subject relations as opposed to subject-object relations). In the practical, object related activity, children

acquire greater knowledge and functional capacity by assimilating human experience. On this note, Lektorskii (1978) remarked that "knowledge cannot exist in pure, unmediated form; it must be mediated by activity" (p. 48). On the other hand, the child, on entering the system of social activity (person-person), acquires the norms of human interchange which are manifest in his or her particular society. The fact that these two aspects were inseparable leads us to another important quality of activity--it is systemic in nature The systemic nature of activity. Since human activity is considered an organic system (Davydov, 1985), Davydov et al. (1983) suggested that an adequate study of it necessitated a systemic approach. Leontiev also maintained this view when he said that "activity is not a reaction and not a totality of reactions but a system" (1978, p. 50), a system which is embedded in social relations. Furthermore, Leontiev said that "the activity of the human individual is a system that obeys the system of relations of society. Outside these relations human activity does not exist" (1977, p. 182). He did not

believe that people merely copied the relations of society. On the contrary, he concluded that "there are some very complex cross-links which rule out any strict reduction of one to the other" (1977, p. 182). Appealing to the systems approach, according to Zinchenko and Gordon (1981), allowed the structure of activity to be seen "as a system of interconnected units and components with potential relationships among them and among types of connections" (p. 99).

Pertinent to the discussion of the systemic nature of activity is Leontiev's conception of the 'loop' (1974-1975) or 'circular structure' (1978) of activity. This meant that an initial stimulation from the external environment led to responsive processes on the part of the person that regulated the contact and, further, this led to "connection and enrichment by means of reverse connection of the original afferent image" (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 53). It is the object itself which yields the original stimulation and only secondarily is this affected by the object's internalized image. This is not merely a stimulus-response, mechanistic interaction with feedback; in point of fact, Leontiev's conception is

more attuned to Dewey's conception of coordination, as evidenced in the following:

The process of life is the totality, more precisely, the system of interchanging activities. In activity an object is transformed into its subjective form or image, while at the same time activity passes into its objective results and products. In this regard activity emerges as a process that effects a reciprocal transformation between the subject-object poles. In production, the personality is objectified; in the personality, the thing is subjectified (1974-1975. p. 9).

Like coordination, "activity appears as a process in which mutual transfers between the poles 'subject-object' are accomplished" (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 50). Finally, Leontiev expressed a similar conceptualization in this statement:

The subject-activity-object transitions form a kind of circular movement, so it may seem unimportant which of its elements or movements is taken as the initial one. But

this is by no means movement in a closed circle. The circle opens, and opens specifically in sensuous practical activity itself. Entering into direct contact with objective reality and submitting to it, activity is modified and enriched; and it is in this enriched form that it is crystalized in the product. Materialized activity is richer, truer than the consciousness that anticipates it (1977, p. 188-189).

The system of activity, as will be developed further when activity's plasticity is considered, does not exhibit the sort of structure that is normally conceived of by systems theorists. Instead of regarding the structure of activity as determined and essentially unchanging, the system in activity theory is one in which the hierarchical arrangement can undergo changes wherein dominating motives can lose their force and move to a lower level in the hierarchy, or even disappear altogether. As a result of development, the system in activity theory undergoes considerable transformation and takes on a

qualitatively new form based on new motives. What remains constant is that the system of activity is always a system which unites person and environment.

Before moving on to discuss the first subunit, action, a brief look at the relation between activity (the unit) and action is necessary.

The non-additivity of actions. Leontiev proposed that human activity could have no existence "except in the form of action or in a chain of actions" (1978, p. 64). This was not, however, an additive process. No action had a separate existence from other actions subsumed by the overall activity nor was it separate from that activity. Activity was absolutely dependent upon actions. "If we were to mentally subtract from activity the actions which realize it there would be nothing left of activity" (Leontiev, 1977, p. 185).

Perhaps, by way of analogy, I can clarify whatever ambiguity is left regarding the non-additivity of separate, yet inseparable, actions. Consider, for instance, history. While it is possible to speak of, say, the history of the stone age and treat it separately from, say, the space age

(because of qualitative differences), it would not mean that there was more than one history of human activity. We would not take the various pieces of history, add them up, and declare that the sum is history. History is nothing but the continuing flow of events passing out of the present into the past and is but a singular stream, not many such streams. Thus, while we can speak of separate actions due to qualitative differences related to goals, we cannot rightly assume that they have independent existence in the ongoing flow of an activity. This is also true of the separation of activities. With this in mind let us now consider actions.

Action. Leontiev (1974-1975) determined that "the actions constituting activity are engendered by the motive, but are directed by the goal" (p. 23). In other words, "an activity is usually realized by a certain set of actions that are subordinate to particular goals, which can be distinguished from the common goal" (Leontiev, 1974-1975, p. 24). Leontiev determined that, historically, the emergence of goal-directed processes (actions) was due to the transition of humans from individual to cooperative,

social life and the subsequent division of labor, or the division of an activity into its parts. To Leontiev, "the separation of the object and motive of individual activity is a result of the exarticulating of the separate operations from a previously complex, polyphase, but single activity" (1981, p. 210-211).

How is it possible for action to arise, i.e. for there to be a division between the object of activity and its motive? It obviously becomes possible in a joint, collective process of acting on nature. The product of the process as a whole, which meets the needs of the group, also leads to satisfaction of the needs of the separate individual as well, although he himself may not perform the final operations (Leontyev, 1981, p.210).

Talyzina (1981) pointed out that this is unlike animals whose actions are always in correspondence with their motives. "The relation of an animal to an object cannot be separated from the object and does not exist by itself" (Talyzina, p. 26-27). This meant that animals had no conscious division of

activities into functional components and did not allow for joint actions in fulfilling a collective activity. Animals engage in activities in an individualistic manner, although there may be other animals present that are engaged in the same activity in tandem, without dividing it up into subactivities (actions).

While the foregoing has indicated the difference of human activities from those of animals, we must now concern ourselves with the question of the adequacy of action as a psychological unit (in the sense of Vygotsky).

Since psychology studies activities their analysis must be carried out in terms of units that retain all specific characteristics of activities. Actions constitute such a unit. They possess the same structure as activities, namely, objectives, motivations and the objects to which they are directed, and a specific set of operations through which operations are carried out, patterns that guide the actions of subjects; and are processes that

relate to his (subject's) life activities. Finally, both actions and activities are subject-related, i.e., belong to the subject and are always activities of specific individuals (Talyzina, 1981, p. 34).

This does not, as yet, clarify just how it is that actions are different from activities. As Leontiev defined it, "an act or action is a process whose motive does not coincide with its object (i.e. with what it is directed to), but lies in the activity of which it forms part" (1981, p. 401). While the object and motive of this process do not coincide, the object or goal is a step on the path to achieving the motive. For instance, while this discussion of activity theory does not yet seem to pertain to the psychology of personality, the underlying motive is to set the stage for handling the issue of personality later. Thus the writing of this chapter is an action whose goal is to prepare the ground for achieving the motive of shedding fresh light on the psychology of personality. Only by regarding each action, i.e. chapter, as it fits into

the overall activity can it be seen how each goal is a path to achieving the motive, i.e. writing a thesis whose topic is the psychology of personality in order to meet degree requirements and, hopefully, make a contribution to the field.

This leads us to a further critical aspect:

For an action to arise it is necessary for its object (direct aim) to be cognized in its relation with the motive of the activity of which it forms part. This is an extremely important point. It follows from it that the aim of one and the same act can be cognized differently, depending on what motive precisely it arises in connection with. The sense of the action thus also changes for the subject

(Leontyev, 1981, p.404).

Consider, for instance, the act of driving a car in order to get to one's place of work. The act involves getting into the car and arriving at the parking lot. The activity is working for a living and the drudgery or inspiration associated with the sense of that activity for the person. Now consider

the same action in relation to the activity of visiting one's former workmates after retirement. For one person the dreariness of the activity may now be a pleasureable experience, or just the opposite for the person who was inspired by their work activities. The goal or purpose (another term used by Leontiev) can, possibly, but not necessarily, have a quite different sense to the person although it is the very same act.

Regarding goals, Kholmogorova, Zaretskii, and Semenov (1982) stated the following:

A goal may be described as the conscious anticipation by the subject of the results of an act. On the one hand, it is a derivative of the needs, motives, and values of the individual person while, on the other, it defines the area within which those needs, motives and values are realized in the particular situation (p. 79).

As the reader will recall, it was stated in the chapter on the development of the mind that only humans have achieved the level of consciousness.

Animals have no conscious anticipations of an act's results and hence have no goal. Regarding goal formation, Kholmogorova et al proposed that there were two aspects of this process--the objective and the personal. The objective aspect manifests in a goal's content "whereas the personal aspect is manifested in those characteristics of a goal that represent the person's relationship to the situation (appropriateness of the goal, level of difficulty, etc.)" (p. 80). We must, therefore, now discuss the level of aspiration as it pertains to goal-setting, as determined by Bratus' (1978).

Aspirations and goal-setting. According to Bratus' there are two opposing tendencies in the shaping of aspiration levels. First, there is the tendency to raise one's self esteem as much as one can as opposed to, secondly, the tendency to avoid failure and subsequent damage to the ego. Bratus' maintained that two functions are fulfilled by clashes between the two tendencies. They regulate the setting of goals and adaptation to environmental changes and, as best they can, protect one's self-esteem. He proposed that, rather than the level of aspiration

arising from success and failure experiences, the level of expectation is due to the conflict of the aforementioned tendencies.

Another distinction that Bratus' has drawn is that between real and ideal goals. He also pointed out that the discrepancy between the two will vary depending upon the nature of the activity. Normally, according to Bratus', people are able to distinguish between the two, but, unfortunately, he also noted that some people are unable to make the separation. "Instead of fashioning particular goals for the moment, they immediately set their sights on some ideal goal, passing over the necessary stages of testing and coordination" (p. 72). This can have debilitating effects on a person's self-esteem since ideal goals are likely to lead to failure more than real goals.

The person's ability to make the distinction between real and ideal aims is a determinant of the maturity of the personality and allows for preservation of self-esteem and the ability to set adequate goals for one's self. Where, on the other hand, the ideal and the real aims are not differentiated serious

consequences may result that impact the general well-being and well-roundedness of the personality.

Asmolov (1984) discussed the personality as a subject of activity when it comes to goal formation. In effecting self-transformation by forming new goals, an individual displays the creative nature of personality. In the situations in which a person displays free choice Asmolov saw the personality manifested with prominence. On the alternative side, Asmolov maintained that the historical development of personality was in evidence in the alternatives rejected during free choice. The whole idea of free choice, of course, means that the person is not passive in regard to the world and that people have the need, and the ability, to develop their personality.

Orienting, executing, and control functions. As a final point of mention, (Talyzina 1981) pointed out that there were three components of action with distinct functions that had to be simultaneously present in order for actions to be carried out. These were the functions of orientation, execution, and control. The orienting component concerns "man's

use of the set of objective conditions that a successful execution of the given action requires" (p.63). The executive aspect is that which brings about the transformation of an action's object, whether ideal or material. Lastly, the control component monitors an action's course and compares the outcome with the desired outcome.

Action and operation. We are now in a position to move on to a consideration of operations. Before we do, however, it is necessary to note the relation of actions to operations. Leontiev, according to Talyzina (1981), "defines operations as methods through which actions are carried out. Operations thus correspond not to motives and not to the objectives of actions but to the specific conditions within which the objective is defined. Operations are made up of actions" (p. 26). Conversely, "all actions include specific aggregates of operations that are carried out in a specified order and in accordance with a particular rule. A consistent execution of operations constitutes a process of action execution" (Talyzina, 1981, p. 61).

The distinction to be made here is not as

readily achieved as in the two preceding units of the structure of activity since, as was just mentioned, "operations are made up of actions". While operations contain actions, one and the same action can be achieved by more than one operation. The goal remains the same but the conditions in which that goal is to be met can be quite different; this is the key distinction to be made. So, by way of example, if my goal were to cross a river (as an action in the activity of going to see a loved one), while the goal can remain constant the conditions by which I achieve that end can vary considerably. If the time of year should be midsummer, I would have to swim across or take a boat. If the time of year were midwinter, I would have to snowshoe or ski or, if the ice were thin, travel along the river until I came to a bridge. So, while the action and its goal are unchanged, the conditions can change drastically and require quite different operations to achieve the same goal. "The differences between actions and operations is especially visible in tool-type actions. A tool is a material object in which are crystalized not actions or goals, but modes and

operations" (Leontiev, 1974-1975, p. 26). On the other hand, "an operation does not in any way constitute any kind of 'separateness,' in relation to action, just as is the case with action in relation to activity" (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 66). Clearly, while an operation can differ from other operations, depending on conditions, it is like other operations and actions since it too is still governed by the goal of the action that is contained within it.

Wertsch (1981) contended that, "in general, one can say that Western psychologists have focussed most of their research on problems that would arise in Soviet psychology at the level of analysis concerned with operations" (p. 18). In light of what I have just discussed, I would argue that operations are necessarily a part of actions and, as Leontiev said, actions cannot be considered separate from activity. I think that what Wertsch meant by his statement was that Western psychologists are concerned with the mechanics and conditions of human behavior, but not with its goals and motives.

A final point to be noted regarding operations is what Merlin (1981-1982) called the 'zone of

operational indeterminacy'. This is in reference to the selection on the part of a person of the most appropriate operation for achieving an action. Thus, in a totally unfamiliar situation there would be a very large zone of operational indeterminacy whereas, in a perfectly familiar situation the zone would be slight if not negligible. Merlin proposed, however, that "there is no activity in which the zone of operational indeterminacy would be zero" (p. 64).

The indeterminacy of operations is only relative, since in every activity there are general, objectively necessary operations determined by the objective requirements of the task There are limits beyond which different operations cannot be applied--thus the term "zone of indeterminacy" (Merlin, p. 64).

So far the discussion has revolved about external activity with objects, but, as has been hinted at, there is also internal activity with images of objects. This will be our next consideration.

Activity and consciousness. As was indicated

earlier, consciousness, the reflection of the objective world by the psyche, does not exist at birth. Only during the internalization of human activity is the plane of consciousness formed and developed.

These successive, strictly regular changes give the process the appearance of a momentary 'psychic action'; it is now difficult to recognize it as the product of the original external actions the child learned to perform. Such 'momentary' actions seem to be the manifestation of a special capacity of the mind for grasping quantitative, spatial and other relations, and for passing directly from primary data to 'awareness' (insight) of the solution. In reality, these actions are nothing but the product of past experience, reflected and transformed in the mind of the individual, i.e. of former actions which have been assimilated. It must be strongly emphasized that these actions are assimilated by each individual, that is,

they are acquired through learning from others; but the actions themselves are created through social practice in the evolution of human society (Leontiev, 1957, p. 231).

Mental, or conscious, activity is therefore the product of objective activity and secondary to it. It is only apparently independent of the overall system of activity. The independence of mental activity from practical activity is by no means absolute. To regard consciousness as wholly independent of practical activity is due to a failure to take into account the historical development of a person's psychic processes and an undue predominance of the temporally immediate and crystalized functions as opposed to the ongoing historical process. "The true structure of mental functions can only be revealed in their genesis; when they are finally formed, their structure becomes undifferentiated and, moreover, 'recedes'; it is screened by a 'phenomenon' totally different in aspect, nature, and structure" (Gal'perin, 1967, p. 29). Besides this, until the internal plane is formed the person is a wholly

social being; the transition to the internal plane of activity is accompanied by a transition of collective activity into that of individual activity. This collective activity, according to Davydov et al. (1983) is composed of 'joint practical activity' and interpersonal communication. In this internalization, "regulated by the image, the subject's activity is transformed into a 'latent property' of its objective product" (Davydov, 1981, p. 13). The principal property of the image is its object orientation. This does not mean, however, that these internal processes do not also have their own development apart from practical activity.

Internalization is that transition by which external processes with external material objects are transformed into processes carried out on the intellectual plane, on the plane of consciousness. When this happens, the processes are subjected to a specific transformation: they are generalized, verbalized, abbreviated, and, most importantly, become susceptible of

further development that exceeds the possibility of external activity (Leontiev, 1974-1975, p. 18).

According to Leontiev, consciousness initially exists as a psychic image which reflects the surrounding world for the subject. Activity continues, therefore, to be practical and external. Further development leads to a change in both activity and consciousness.

At a much later stage activity also becomes a subject of consciousness: Actions of other people are perceived and through them also the actions of the subject himself. Now they are communicated, signified by means of gestures or oral speech. This is a prerequisite for the genesis of internal actions and operations that take place in the mind, on the "plane of consciousness." This consciousness-image becomes also consciousness-activity. It is in just this fullness that consciousness begins to appear to be emancipated from external sensory- practical activity and, more than

that, seems to direct it (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 80).

Activity is not unidirectional. The movement of activity is not unidirectional. While, initially, the movement is from external to internal, with the development of a conscious plane of activity, composed of images, movement can also move from the internal to the external.

Productive activity demonstrates the movement of internal to external. In the recombination of images of object properties new objects are created as, for instance, in the combination of a sparking substance--flint--with fuel carried by a wick, all contained in a vessel, one has a portable fire or lighter. Bearing in mind that internal and external activity are systems, we can see that feedback from the external world allows us to test and modify our mental images to better our objective concerns. The adequacy of knowledge is therefore determined by practice, by objective application, and not by the whimsy or predilections of any one person (as relativists contend).

While there are qualitative differences between

internal and external activity there are also similarities. It is in their similarities that these two processes are capable of interacting. (Please note that in the concrete there is only one process of activity; only in the abstract can we rightly separate the one--internal--from the other--external.)

Constant reciprocal relations exist between external activity and internal activity: both internalization and externalization takes place. These reciprocal movements are possible because both these forms of activity have fundamentally the same structure But we must bear in mind that the fundamental similitude between the structures of external and internal activity, as an organic system, refers primarily, to their similar origins, not really to the fact that there is some formal coincidence in their structure (Davydov et al, p. 34-35).

While the formal coincidence is lacking, due to the abbreviation and generalization of external activity

in internal activity, they do share common features. Leontyev (1981) determined that "inner, ideal activity has the same structure as practical activity. In thinking, too, we should consequently distinguish between activity, acts, and operations proper, and the functions of the brain realizing them" (p. 49).

The common nature of external, practical activity and the inner activity of ideas is not limited simply to the community of their structure. It is also psychologically essential that they both equally, though differently, link man with the world around him, which is consequently reflected in his head, that both the one and the other form of activity is mediated by a mental reflection of reality, and that they are equally intelligent, meaningful processes (Leontyev, 1981, p. 250).

In the final analysis, this means that, "just as practical activity does, thought activity consists of action subordinated to conscious purposes" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 27).

The most thorough account of internal activity available is that of Talyzina (1981). She proposed that "the psyche is not merely an image of the world and a system of representations, but an activity, a sy of actions and operations that are integrated through a common motivation and objective" (p. 32-33). The internalized images are considered the elementary units of the psychic activities of people, similar in nature to external operations that are necessarily united with the actions and activities of internal activity. In the internalization process of an action there are three stages of an action's form; these are material, external speech and mental. The mental form of action is the point at which the action is fully internalized. Besides form, Talyzina also identified an action's degree of generalization (the extent to which the essential object properties of an action are distinguished from unessential properties) and an action's comprehensiveness (the degree to which original operations of an action are still carried out). The number of operations included in an action decrease during the process of action development and the action is subsequently

condensed. The final aspect of this 'stage-by-stage development of mental actions' is the extent to which an action is mastered. Mastery of an action involves the ease of performance, the extent of automation of the action, and the rate of its performance.

The plasticity of activity. Up to this point the components of activity have been dealt with as though they were somewhat static. In actuality, it is only in the abstract that they appear so. The real nature of these components is dynamic rather than static. So flexible are they in their dynamism that there are continuous transformations occurring in activity. In these transformations each component of activity may become part of another component or may incorporate components that had formerly been relatively independent.

There is a particular relation between activity and action. The motive of activity, by being shifted, may pass to the object (goal) of the action, with the result that the action is transformed into an activity. This is an exceptionally important point. This is the way new

activities and new relations with reality arise. This process is precisely the concrete, psychological basis on which changes in the leading activity occur and consequently the transitions from one stage of development to another (Leontyev, 1981, p. 401).

. . . activity represents a process that is characterized by continuously proceeding transformations. Activity may lose the motive that elicited it, whereupon it is converted into an action realizing perhaps an entirely different relation to the world, a different activity; conversely, an action may turn into an independent stimulating force and may become a separate activity; finally, an action may be transformed into a means of achieving a goal, into an operation capable of realizing various actions (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 67).

Davydov (1985) indicated that what he called the 'mobility' of the various components of activity was

demonstrated by the fact that each component could be incorporated as a fraction of another component or units that were independent but could be incorporated.

The reason for these changes, to the best of my knowledge, is due, first, to the changing events of the social (objective) environment and, the corresponding alteration of motives, and, secondly, due to alterations in the image guiding the activity. These changes, however, are not the only ones that occur since activity, itself, develops. To understand this development we must go to the initiation of the process and follow its germination. The genesis of activity. At birth, from the perspective of this theory, the child has no conscious motives, no identifiable objects that will satisfy its undeveloped needs. Both needs and activity are without content. They are indiscriminate. A need is incomplete without its object and it can only discover its object through activity.

. . . needs as an internal force may be realized only in activity. In other words,

need appears in the first place only as a condition, as a prerequisite for activity, but as soon as the subject begins to act, there immediately occurs its transformation, and need stops being that which it was virtually, "in itself" (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 116).

This initial activity of the subject, however, cannot be called activity proper since it is activity without a motive, without its object. What occurs, at first, is an unmotivated assimilation of the environment and its properties, both object and social.

As Davydov et al. said, "need 'impels' the subject to undertake search acts that initially are not directed toward a specific object" (p. 32). In assimilation, the need 'finds' its object. At the moment of discovery of the object by need activity proper begins, since the unifying relation between person and environment has been secured. Bratus' and Lishin (1983) said that this development has traditionally been reduced to two formulas. In the first, need gives rise to activity which satisfies

the need or, in abbreviation, N-A-N. The second looks at activity as the generation of need and further activity, or A-N-A. This is really a matter of punctuation (Watzlawick et al.), or, to put it another way, one arrives at one or the other formula depending on where one stops the process and abstracts a starting point. In the concrete there is no justification for any question of priority or causation between the two, excepting in the case of the initial, undifferentiated need. Developed need, which is really motive (at the point of the object's discovery), is in relation to activity as stimulus and response were in Dewey's treatment of that problem; the motive and the activity are constituted at one and the same time. The two arose together and are mutually conditionable. They might best be regarded as complementary poles of a single process: 'living-person-in-changing-environment'.

Bratus' et al. qualified the above by indicating that at the beginning of the process both need and activity are at a 'zero point'. The movement, then, is from a zero point need leading to undifferentiated movement and then the transformation of the need

state zero into need state one (motive one for Leontiev). Need one is a modified form of the zero point need such that "in the end we shall never find the same need as at the beginning (Bratus' et al., p. 39). In the other paradigm, the movement is from the zero point activity through which a need (motive) is produced and leads to a modified activity. Thus, "a need arising according to the first paradigm . . . requires an activity for its satisfaction, whereas an activity arising in accordance with the second paradigm . . . in turn produces a new, altered need" (Bratus' et al., p. 40). This 'living essence', as Bratus' et al called it, appears as follows:

$N(\text{zero})-A(\text{zero})-N(\text{one})-A(\text{one})-N(\text{two})-A(\text{two}), \text{ etc.},$
 with the understanding that each later activity and need (motive) is somewhat transformed. Over time, an earlier need and activity may be radically different from that into which it develops at a later period. It seems to me that this would be more in line with activity theory (Leontiev's formulations) if it were represented as $NA(\text{zero})-NA(\text{one})-NA(\text{two}), \text{ etc.},$ since the former scheme suggests a mechanical conception of a dynamic process as it does not indicate the

necessary unity of motive and activity. In any event, the foregoing might give the impression that there is one activity process when, in fact, many arise in the overall system of activity. As Bratus' et al wrote:

It should nonetheless be pointed out that the single sequence of transformations of activities and needs we have examined is, of course, an abstraction, since in the real world we must deal not with one, but with a whole series of such modified, sometimes intersecting, sequences, constituting complex structures and hierarchies of needs and activities (p. 41).

Bratus' et al. also identified two basic types and directions of development. These were the normal and ascending and the distorted or descending, and they had, associated with them, crises of development. Ascending and descending development. In ascending development a crisis can arise in two ways. The first involves a changing need which requires ever more operational technicalities to satisfy it such

that, a point may be reached when, the person has not got the necessary skills to move on, thus resulting in some sort of crisis (the degree depending on the sense of the activity to the person facing the crisis). The second variant involves an activity so complex and convoluted that it may outgrow the need which originally engendered it; this can lead to a search for a new motive more in line with the person's wants.

Descending development, on the other hand, is a course of deviancy having, also, two variants. The first is a concern with impoverished needs and a subsequent reorganization of activity (not without its anguish), and the second is impoverished activity and its reorganized (perhaps disorganized) needs or motives.

The emergence of new needs. Another point to be noted is that, in the process of the development of activity and needs, new zero point needs and associated (undifferentiated) activities arise, necessitating a new search for the motive behind the indeterminate urge. This means that "some special state of indeterminacy may arise in which desires, as

it were, lose their object, and one may say that a person desires (sometimes very passionately) something he himself does not know and cannot clearly describe" (Bratus' et al., p. 43). As the world of the individual, for example, expands and the person assimilates more and more of the social environment new potential objects and relationships appear, in blurry form, on the horizon of development and, as Dewey might have said, are in need of constitution. The need eventually finds its object and becomes a motive.

Sooner or later an encounter with, discovery, or active testing action of some object occurs; this object fits the particular need state, which places it in a qualitatively different rank, the rank of an objectified need, i.e., a need that has found its object or motive. Then, through the discovered motive, the need stimulates activity, during the course of which the need is reproduced and . . . is somewhat modified, impelling it on to a new cycle of activity that is different compared with

the previous one, etc., i.e., a sequence of transformations emerges. In turn, the internal logic of the transformation of needs and activities can lead to a new crisis in the development of activity and the emergence of a new need state requiring resolution (Bratus' et al., pp. 42-43).

Lektorskii (1978) pointed out that activity's structure and content have no natural determination, rather, "they change as activity itself develops" (p. 53). In fact, out of the initial forms of activity and need (which form the base of the activity superstructure) a hierarchy of activities develops. The development of a hierarchy does not leave behind the initial forms, due to their being transformed. They play a less and less important controlling function but they do not fade out of existence entirely. There is a dynamic interplay occurring between all levels of an actively living human being.

. . . the developmental construction of certain forms of activity from others not only does not signify the reduction of one

form to the other but in fact implies the interaction of higher levels with the base and the transformation of this base through its inclusion in a more complex and more developed system (Lektorskii, p. 50).

Development is not linear. As presented, so far, it may seem that activity is linear in its development. This, unfortunately, is not the case; the situation is more complex than that. Rather than following the linear path, activity goes through qualitative leaps which involve a major change in the hierarchical structure of activity. In other words, a new motive moves to the top of the hierarchy and this motive becomes the overriding motive of that stage. Let us therefore consider the stages of development of activity.

Stages of development. Anyone who has ever heard of the terrible twos or the crisis of adolescence will not be surprised by the concept of developmental stages. In the theory of activity what distinguishes one stage from another is the 'dominant activity', or 'leading activity', which guides the person's interchanges with the environment; each stage has its

primary and its secondary motives.

The presence of primary motives does not eliminate the need for secondary motives that directly stimulate behavior. Without primary motives, however, the content of the activity is deprived of its personal meaning. It is precisely the primary motive that guarantees the possibility of mediation and the hierarchical organization of motives. The motivational hierarchy is relatively stable and thus provides a relative stability for the whole personality, its interests, attitudes, and values. A change in primary motives means a change in the personality's attitudes, interests, and values (Zeigarnik, 1972-1973, p. 39).

Fel'dshtein (1983) maintained that in understanding the movement of activity it is necessary to study activity "as a complex, multilevel phenomenon that, seen as a system, contains dominant types of activity that are specific to each period of childhood" (p. 19). Thus the dominant activity must

have its characteristics delineated, its interaction with other forms of activity determined, their significance and scope ascertained, etc., in order to understand better the limits of each stage of the process (this will be handled more fully in the next chapter). On this matter, Leontiev had this to say:

Life or activity as a whole is not built up mechanically, however, from separate types of activity. Some types of activity are the leading ones at a given stage and are of greater significance for the individual's subsequent development, and other types are less important. Some play the main role in development and others a subsidiary one. We must therefore speak of the dependence of the psyche's development on the leading activity, and not on activity in general (1981, p. 395).

This meant that in the stages of psychic and personal development the person has definite relations with the world which guide overall activity. The change from one stage to another is due to the change of the leading activity or, to put

it another way, due to the change of the leading relation to the world. This is not to say that the leading activity is independent of the rest of the hierarchical levels of developed and developing activities. On the contrary, "the whole principle on which the interlevel relations depend consists of the fact that the available higher level always becomes dominant, but it cannot be realized except with the help of lower lying levels and is thus dependent on them" (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 142). On a related point, Merlin (1981-1982) concluded that "as in every large system, in integral individuality we must distinguish among the relatively closed subsystems of different hierarchical levels" (p. 54). Since these levels are only relatively closed there is the possibility of interchange among them. With this understanding of the dominant activity within the activity hierarchy we can discuss the stages that have been identified.

Fel'dshtein (1983) determined that there were six types of dominant activity that were developmentally continuous; continuous in that there is only one developmental process with various qualitative aspects across time. The six types of

dominant activity of modern persons in the Soviet union were as follows:

. . . directly emotional contact in the small infant, manipulative activity in the very young child, play activity in the preschool child, learning activity in the young schoolchild, socially useful activity in the adolescent, and, finally, professional learning activity in the senior schoolchild (Fel'dshtein, p. 24-25).

Leont'ev (1978), on the other hand, identified stages on the basis of the crisis which engendered them; he proposed that depending on the circumstances, crises need not occur, and a smooth transition into the next stage was possible.

Actions, becoming ever richer, outgrow the circle of activity that they realize, and enter into a contradiction with the motives that engender them the so-called crises of development, the crisis of three years, seven years, adolescence, and the much less frequently studied crisis of

maturity. As a result there occurs a displacement of motives to goals, a change in their hierarchy, and the engendering of new motives, new kinds of activity; former goals are psychologically discredited and the actions that responded to them either completely cease to exist or are converted into impersonal operations (Leont'ev, p. 128)

Truly, activity is a most complex and dynamic process which is in a constant state of flux and development.

Since the whole notion of stages of development of activity and personality will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter, I will leave this topic sketchy for now. Our next concern, which will also be treated more fully later on, is the implications of the activity approach for understanding personality as developed and developing.

Soviet psychologists tend to agree with Asmolov (1981) that "a child becomes a personality only if, with adult aid, he enters into the stream of activities (not the stream of consciousness!) and assimilates the meanings reified in the human world

by means of the system of activities" (p. 35). Of course, this agrees with Leontiev's position that "the personality of man is in no sense pre-existing in relation to his activity; just as with his consciousness, activity gives rise to personality" (1978, p. 105). Personality is not something that is present at birth:

The concept of personality, just like the concept of the individual, is expressed by the wholeness of the subject's life; personality does not consist of little pieces, it is not a "cluster of polyps"; personality represents a whole formation of a special type. Personality is not a whole, conditioned genotypically: one is not born a personality, one becomes a personality. For this reason we do not speak either of a personality of a new born or of a personality of an infant although traits of individuality appear at early stages of ontogenesis no less sharply than at much later stages of growth.

Personality is a relatively late product of

social-historical and ontogenetic
development of man (Leont'ev, 1978, p.
107).

The premise here is that the activity of the person is what leads to the formation of the personality. As was said before the person assimilates social relations and these relations, once internalized, become the essence of personality. This, then, implies that the individual personality will be undergirded by the system of social relations (of which the person is a member of or party to). The position of the person in society will determine the purposefulness of the personality, the goals and motivations. This means that "men resemble each other or differ from one another first and foremost because they are the products of either similar or different social relations" (Sychev, 1978, p. 28). This is not to say that it is a one-sided relation since, due to their activity, "the individual person participates in one way or another in the creation, development, and alteration of social relations" (Lomov, 1983, p. 33). So, while personality is determined by the relationships that formed it, the

person also has a part in forming social relations.

Of course the formation of the personality presupposes the fact that there is a corresponding development of the goal formation process. From his perspective Leontiev maintained that the . .

. . . investigation of personality must not be limited to an explanation of prerequisites but must proceed from a development of activity, its concrete types and forms and those conditions into which they enter with each other inasmuch as their development radically changes the significance of the prerequisites themselves. Thus the direction of investigation turns not from acquired habits, skills, and knowledge to activity characterized by them but from the content and connections of activities to which and what kind of processes realize them and make them possible (1978, p. 113).

This inclusion of activity in personality means that the personality is not merely guided by past events: "just like the past, the future is also present in

the personality" (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 132). The reason for this, of course, is that present motives and goals are necessarily oriented to event in the future. Leontiev also identified "at least three basic parameters of personality: the extent of the connections of man with the world, the degree to which they are arranged in hierarchies, and their general structure" (1978, p. 136).

As can be noted in the foregoing, an active human being in assimilating social activities assimilates, as well, much of what will become personality but, as was indicated, this will be handled more fully later. One final item needs to be dealt with, however. This concerns problems that have been noted with regard to activity theory and suggestions of direction for further development.

Challenges to activity theory. Zabrodin (1983) argued that "in introducing the category of activity as an explanatory and fundamental category of psychology, we ignore the fact that in itself, by its very nature, it is not a strictly psychological category" (p. 24). He maintained that activity is a socioeconomic category and not a psychological one.

He did, however, believe that "activity, having been introduced into psychology from without, has proved to be an extremely powerful category for psychology precisely because we can relate activity to the mind on the basis of the principles of unity" (p. 26). Zabrodin's main contention was that activity was organized and guided by the mind and that this is often neglected. He proposed that:

If we acknowledge that the behavior of any organism with a mind is organized, controlled, and guided by the mind, then, for just this reason, when we study human activity, we can understand what organizes, guides, and regulates this activity (p. 26).

What he proposed, however, suggests that he had missed the intention of activity theory. Activity theorists by no means deny mind its place of importance. They do, however, deny that the mind should be considered in existence apart from the material world nor should it be viewed as the creator of the material world, as idealist theoreticians would have us believe. Rather, it was deemed

necessary first to find a theory of the development of the mind so that the mind, and particularly the conscious mind, could be accounted for without a dualistic separation of matter and mind, the reduction of one to the other, or some eclectic melange. At the same time, it was necessary to find a unit of analysis that preserved the matter-mind unity, instead of logically separating them. This unit was activity. Leontiev, in formulating activity theory, did not neglect the mind or consider it insignificant. He agreed with Zabrodin that mind controlled behavior as its guide. He also believed, on the other hand, that mind had to be accounted for. If this was not done, i.e., mind was not accounted for, it would have been possible for psychological science to slip back into the relativistic notion that truth, even scientific truth, depends upon the individual or, at the extreme, the solipsistic position that all that could be known was one's self and that even this was an uncertainty. Leontiev, therefore, had to preserve the history of the psyche and he found that the psyche was inseparable from the environment it was intended to reflect. It seems to

me that Zabrodin's complaint is due to his looking at the topic in its crystallized form rather than in its historical development. This leads to the possibility of seeing the mind as independent and as ultimate controller. Only in its development through active participation in life does the mind come into its own and achieve relative, only relative!, independence. Thus, it is suggested that it is always well to bear in mind that everything has its history and that its past has made the present what it is. If Zabrodin were to consider the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of the mind and the relation of the mind to its own history this particular problem might be answered. The rest of the problems are not so lightly to be dealt with; they reach out to the future, the proximal zone of development for activity theory.

In general, Davydov et al (1983) have indicated that more needs to be done regarding the definition of the general structure of activity. Further, the mutability of the components, the transformation of each into the other needs to be fully clarified, as well as the clarification of the laws of

transformation or transition of one activity into another. In their words, "there is an acute need for effective methods for studying the structure of activity and the mutual conversions and transformations of its constituents and for methods for determining their objective content" (p. 37). Of course, this is the natural, developmental, expectation for Leontiev's theory. Davydov's further points (1981) are a somewhat different matter.

While Davydov believed that Leontiev was correct on fundamentals, he contended that it was necessary to determine the concrete laws that governed the transitional movement of cooperative, social activity, onwards, into independent activity and the formation of the consciousness of the individual. Davydov argued that the theory skirts this question.

A further shortcoming of Leontiev's formulations identified by Davydov was that the formation of an image was not adequately explained. What was necessary for an image to become apparent, he maintained, remained unclear and obscure.

"Nonetheless, the theory does indicate how this problem may be approached, since it offers the

concept of active orientation on the part of the subject in objective situations. An important aspect of this process of orientation is exploratory processes" (Davydov, 1981, p. 18).

Another complaint "refers to the differentiation and integration of activity and the images guiding it" (p. 24). Although Leontiev never formulated such a law, Davydov believed that such a law could be found: "We think a formulation is possible of the results of studies in the problems of the relations and connections between successive and simultaneous processes in various types and forms are analyzed" (Davydov, 1981, p. 24).

The last criticism to be noted is that of Kozulin (1986). According to Kozulin, Leontiev's theory has fallen to a warning by Vygotsky that an all embracing theory could succumb to tautology. The caution referred to the use of activity as both an explanatory principle and as the subject of concrete investigation. While this may be a danger, it does not necessarily apply to activity theory.

Asmolov (1986-1987) cautioned against raising activity theory to the level of a postulate rather

than a hypothesis to be tested:

If the principles of analysis of activity are elevated to the rank of postulates, the theory of activity will become a theory worthy of attention of only historians of psychology. All the principles that have been delimited in the theory of object-related activity are no more than premises that determine the general direction of development of contemporary psychology, i.e., its future (p.100).

As a theory, the activity approach can lead to the formulation of hypotheses that can be tested and that do not, therefore end up in tautology. For example, it can be hypothesized that people who have different social relations should demonstrate differences at the plane of consciousness due to internalization of these differing relations. The discussion of Luria's research in Soviet Central Asia, discussed in Chapter 12, demonstrates this.

As a result, I think the issue of tautology is nothing more than a caution, rather than a dangerous flaw, in the application of activity theory.

To continue with the problem of personality, we will next examine issues concerning the development of personality so that we will have a basis from which to understand a developed personality.

Chapter 9

Personality as a product of development

In order to understand fully personality in its more developed form it is necessary to examine the stages a person goes through en route to the fully formed personality in adulthood. As Vygotsky (1978) noted, to study behavior in its fossilized, developed form is to study a behavior whose processes of formation have passed from sight. According to Vygotsky, "in psychology we often meet with processes that have already died away, that is, processes that have gone through a very long stage of historical development and have become fossilized" (p. 63). How a person comes to be who and what they are as a personality will be the focus of this chapter.

The stages of personality, as we shall see, are not uniform across all societies; they have socio-historical determinants. Three distinct societies will be of interest to us in this regard. The first two are the modern societies of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and the third is a subgroup of North American society, the Muttterites.

U.S.A. versus U.S.S.R. society. Bronfenbrenner (1962, 1970, 1974) has pointed out differences between American and Soviet approaches to child upbringing. Bronfenbrenner (1974) identified three differences. First, there is a difference in maternal care between these two cultures. Soviet babies receive more physical handling than do American babies. Second, a difference in solicitousness was noted. Soviet children have more limited mobility and initiative due to concerted efforts to protect them from injury and discomfort. Third, there is greater diffusion of the sources of maternal care in the Soviet Union. The child's relatives, and even complete strangers, are ready to mother the child. Bronfenbrenner (1962) noted another difference between these societies as agents of socialization. In America the emphasis is on the family as the agent of socialization. In the Soviet Union the emphasis is on the collective, on the groups to which the person belongs, i.e., family, school, neighborhood, work, etc.

Bronfenbrenner (1974) in his discussion of the American family as the agent of socialization

indicated that it has undergone considerable change in recent times. Due to social changes, parents and children do not spend as much time together as they used to.

Urbanization, child labor laws, the abolishment of the apprentice system, community, centralized schools, zoning ordinances, the working mother, the expert's advice to be permissive, the seductive power of television for keeping children occupied, the delegation and professionalization of child care--all of these manifestations of progress have operated to decrease opportunity for contact between children and parents, and, for that matter, adults in general (Bronfenbrenner, 1974, p. 99).

The American family has, thus, been losing power as the major socializing agent for children. The vacuum left has been filled by the age-segregated peer group (Bronfenbrenner, 1970). The world of peers and television is replacing parents as the agent of socialization.

In the U.S.S.R. we find a somewhat different situation, although both societies share some common characteristics such as being world leaders and superpowers. In the Soviet Union the socialization of the child and, hence, the development of the child's personality takes place in the collectives, e.g. family, school, club, and work.

While we in North America may not approve of the sort of personalities that the Soviets are developing, we cannot fail to appreciate their attempt to guide personality development, as opposed to the haphazard, whimsical, and fad-oriented influence of the peer group as the agent of socialization in N. America. The Soviet peer group is also an agent of socialization. but the peer group is guided in this regard by the larger society.

The Soviet peer group is given explicit training for exerting desired influence on its members, whereas the American peer group is not. . . . the Soviet peer group is heavily--perhaps too heavily--influenced by the adult society. In contrast, the American peer group is relatively

autonomous, cut off from the adult world--a particularly salient example of segregation by age (Bronfenbrenner, 1974, p. 115).

The impact of this was noted experimentally by Bronfenbrenner (1970). In his study he indicated that American children are more likely to engage in antisocial behavior whereas Soviet children were more likely to adhere to adult-approved behaviors and norms, e.g., not cheating.

While the family in the Soviet Union is the initial source of socialization, the greatest influence comes from the society at large, from the institutions of socialization, primarily the school. It should be noted that, at this stage of historical development of Soviet society, the parents themselves have been socialized in this system and have internalized its values and therefore support them.

In the school children are trained in cooperative and competitive behavior, the emphasis being on developing character, or what is called 'socialist morality'. This is accomplished through group activities that emphasize group and self criticism, as well as through group rewards and

punishments (Bronfenbrenner, 1962, 1974). The teacher, through action and explanation, "seeks to forge a spirit of unity and responsibility" (Bronfenbrenner, 1962, p. 553).

School children in the Soviet Union, by grade two, have their work evaluated by other children, known as monitors, who are taught by the teacher to evaluate. By the third grade the monitors engage in public evaluation and criticism. The other children are also encouraged to compete with the monitors in the act of criticism. The aim of this process is to encourage achievement. This eventually develops into 'socialist competition'. The class breaks up into 'links' which compete with each other and are awarded for excellence. Later classes, then schools, cities and regions enter into the competitive process. At the same time the emphasis is placed on group achievement as opposed to individual achievement. There is also an emphasis on altruistic behavior in which persons and groups at a more advanced level are encouraged to help those who are developed to a lesser degree. There is, thus, considerable emphasis on group orientation, good conduct, cooperative

behavior, and excellence. This is further carried on in the social groups which the child joins outside of the school and is eventually carried on to the work place. Throughout the process the individual is supported, given security, and receives satisfaction.

Bronfenbrenner (1962) clearly recognized the values of the Soviet system, especially as it is brought about by criticism. He was also careful to point out, however, that there were also considerable positive rewards to be gained by Americans.

While this may not be in line with the reader's beliefs about what character development should result in, since Soviet values are not necessarily compatible with North American values, one cannot discount the effectiveness in obtaining desired results. Whether one agrees or not, it is worth considering the outcome of socially controlled development as opposed to development influenced by advertising agencies and peer groups.

All of this suggests that Soviet children of the future will continue to be more conforming than our own. But this also means that they will be less anti-adult,

rebellious, aggressive. and delinquent. .

. . the streets of Moscow and other Soviet cities were reasonably safe for women and children, by night as well as well as by day (Bronfenbrenner, 1974, p. 90).

I leave it to the reader to draw their own conclusions as to the worth of the controlled, as opposed to the laissez faire approaches to upbringing.

Personality development: U.S.A. The information to be presented here is not intended to be fully comprehensive. What is intended is to give a summary of the stages of personality development. The source of this information is Rappoport (1972) and the reader is directed to this work for expansion of the issues.

Infancy (0-18 months). In the first year and a half of its life, the infant is involved in gaining physical control of its body and in satisfying its basic needs through its parents. Through its cries, wops and smiles, the infant communicates its states of being (not purposively), whether of pain or pleasure, hunger or thirst, interest or indifference.

As Rappoport has pointed out, this minimal communication is difficult for a parent to understand. This is made even more difficult since the infant at this stage moves rapidly through different states of being.

In the first stage of its life, the infant is learning through conditioning and reinforcement. Three critical events have been identified: feeding, weaning, and toilet training. Each of these skills requires considerable learning on the part of the infant and problems encountered can have a debilitating influence on the developing personality. Even before this occurs, however, the infant is engaged in a process of developing sensori-motor coordinations so that it may effectively engage its environment.

Based on Piaget (1952), six substages in the development of sensorimotor intelligence have been identified. The infant's first month is the first substage and it involves simple, reflex activity. During the second stage, from one to four months, reflexive activity begins to adapt to the environment although it is groping in nature. The third stage,

from four to eight months, is a substage in which the infant develops new adaptation processes. The infant begins to engage in motor activity with objects and also begins to generalize activity in one context to another context. In the fourth substage, between eight and twelve months, the infant develops intentional behavior, the pursuit of goals. From twelve to eighteen months, the infant explores an object's properties, unlike the earlier mindless repetition of actions. Finally, from eighteen to twenty-four months, the infant is able to perform external, trial and error, coping with the environment, at the internal plane, i.e., cognitively.

The preschool period (2-6 years). This is the period of socialization. The child is trained by the parents in the acquisition of orderly behavior in an organized society. This is also the period when the child acquires language and more sophisticated, perceptual-motor skills.

According to Rappoport, punishment is the most prominent feature of this stage of the child's life. Punishment is considered to be, during infancy, of

little use since the child is too poorly developed to benefit from it. In the preschool period, however, punishment is considered a salient aspect in personality development and socialization.

While language is beginning to develop in the infant stage, it is during the preschool period that the child actually masters language. By the age of one an infant is engaged in using one-word sentences and two-word sentences by the age of two. By age six, five and six-word sentences are used and pronunciation and grammar have improved. Mastering language enables the child to enter developed, human society. Along with the development of language, thinking also emerges, and the two are considered to be closely connected. Having developed thought and speech, the child is able to ponder the world, other people, and her or his own self. Thus, language can be considered the greatest accomplishment of this period.

The physical and perceptual-motor development proceeds at a rapid pace and leads to considerable changes in the body which the child will have to master. This leads to uncertainty in the child and

to the need to test and develop new abilities and to engage in exploratory behavior. During this stage the child is continually confronted by changes that have to be mastered.

Another aspect of development that the child is going through at this time is the emergence of the self-concept. The child begins to gain recognition of itself as an individual and of her or his sexual identity. A rudimentary sense of morality emerges and an orientation toward achievement.

The emergence of the self-concept accompanies language development. This process begins when the child knows its own name. Initial knowledge of one's own name does not imply that the child at that point can use its name or personal pronouns correctly. By the age of three, however, the child recognizes its own self and its individuality. The child then evinces pride in its self by insisting on doing things for itself, unaided. This is also the period at which the child exhibits negativism by saying no as a form of self-assertion. The child's sense of self-esteem is raised somewhat if the parents acquiesce to some degree to these demands for

self-sufficiency in the child.

The child during the preschool period has gone through considerable development in the job of becoming a personality. The child learns to master the environment physically, to communicate with language, and to begin to think. A sense of self emerges, as well as sexual identity, morality and conscience. Indeed, the child by the end of this period is a fully recognizable, human being.

Middle childhood (6-12 years). This period is one of less drastic changes and is a time in which skills acquired in the previous period will be honed and more finely developed. The use of language grows and, by the introduction of schooling, reading and writing develop (ideally, of course). One's peers become an important point of social contact and the ties to the family are beginning to be severed.

In terms of personality, the early roots of personality development are modified, broadened, and strengthened. The child's environment is expanded which allows for the acquisition of new experiences. While the family still influences the child's development, the school, the teacher, the child's

peers also begin to influence personality development.

While peer experiences can begin around the age of four or five, they are qualitatively inferior to those relations which develop among school children. The child demonstrates a desire to please people, even strangers, more than parents. In the peer group the child receives social support in the form of sympathetic understanding. The peer group also provides a model to be imitated, particularly when the child is provided the opportunity to imitate the behaviors of other children. In interaction with peers the child is also afforded the opportunity to try on new social roles. The child visits other homes, takes part in group activities and games, and experiences life activities that were previously unknown. Further, in the peer group the child learns new standards for evaluating her or his self. Whereas the child's self-image had previously been established by family opinion, new sources of evaluation are entering her or his world. Through contact with peers the self-image can be bolstered and expanded or it can even be changed by unfavorable

peer response. Given the opportunity to evaluate the self against peers, the child may be led to compensate for perceived inability by emphasizing and displaying her or his strong points and evading weak points.

As the name of this period suggests, the child during this period is attending school and learning. At the same time the child is expanding his or her self-image in a new way. They are either succeeding or failing in their school work. Since the child spends so much time in school this is regarded as an important factor in personality development; this experience worries the child considerably. Further, the child in school comes in contact with adult authorities other than parents. The teacher is particularly important in this regard since the child's self-image is affected by the teacher's evaluation of his or her scholastic performance and of his or her class behavior. The child's performance in school depends on the child's perception of how well he or she performs and this impression is obtained from the teacher. A danger that has been noted, in this regard, is that

differences of social class can lead to serious difficulties for lower class children. Another problem for children in school is the competition that occurs and the effect of winning or losing on the child. In brief, school is an important factor in the child's evaluation of his or her self outside of the immediate family.

While the foregoing has de-emphasized the impact of the family on personality development it should be noted that this is not necessarily the case. Moving into the larger society outside of the family, the child is in a position to learn that the behaviors her or his parents have encouraged or discouraged are also those that are encouraged or discouraged by her or his society. This, of course, is due to the fact that the parents have also been socialized by the same society. The society socializes the individual to display a 'basic personality' which reflects the values intrinsic to the given society. Besides the family and the school, the basic personality is also influenced by religious affiliation and group association. In brief, the parents are socialized by a given society and these parents pass on the values

of the given society to their children. The difference to be noted is that individual socialization can result in idiosyncratic development due to the many venues of socialization; socialization can be both general and unique.

A qualitative difference between the preschool and the school age child is that, whereas personality is integrated in the preschool age, at the school age level the personality is integrated but considerably more complex. This complexity means that the older child's personality can not be as readily represented in abstract terms; the abstraction does not reflect the greater complexity. In dealing with personality it will be impossible to abstract effectively one aspect from another. Rappoport considers it folly to persist in this kind of abstraction. The six to twelve year old is more fully integrated as a whole and does not appear to be as differentiated in its components as the preschool childhood. The school age child has formed a unity and is not properly understood in terms of isolated components.

The self-image of an adult typically incorporates all these things in such a

tight weave that it may be impossible to make out distinctions. We only see the components spread apart in abnormal situations, where the smooth organization of personality has for some reason broken down. Middle childhood is clearly the period during which serious organization begins, and this can only be grasped in some such terms as elaboration of the self-concept or ego (Rappoport, p. 255).

Adolescence (13-17 years). Adolescence is a period of considerable turmoil. There are physical changes as the body matures and puberty is entered, all of which is accompanied by social-emotional stress. Moving into adolescence, the enthusiasm and zest of middle childhood is changed into pensiveness and withdrawal. At this period, the adolescent begins to realize that he or she maintains a low social status. Furthermore, the adolescent begins to reevaluate his or her parents, religion, and his or her own self. This leads to stress due to their changing views on what was formerly clear. There are marked changes in sexuality, physical and cognitive

growth, personal identity, and potential family disharmony.

Adolescence is the age of puberty, the development of sexuality, which is accompanied by voice change, the growth of bodily hair, and the further development and maturing of the body. The beginning of menstruation and penile erection can be frightening to young people and can lead to anxiousness. As a result of all of these factors, adolescents are keenly aware of how their development differs from others of their age group. To mature early is to have an easier passage than to mature late. The early maturer gains peer respect and may have greater freedom given to she or he by parents and this can lead to a sense of pride and self-confidence. On the other hand, the early maturers may not be prepared to meet the new demands placed on them. They do, however, tend to suffer less in this period than the late maturer who may suffer self-doubt and a sense of inadequacy.

During adolescence, according to Rappoport, the person is in a state of limbo. Parents are more keenly observant and critical of the adolescent's

behavior and parents, in situations of doubt, tend to think the worst (as perceived by adolescents). As a result, the adolescent tends to suffer alienation and can become rebellious. As one may imagine, there is considerable conflict between parent and adolescent.

Due to the adolescent's continuing growth, both cognitively and physically, the adolescent begins to seek greater freedom from parents. In the struggle for independence from parental control, the adolescent is engaged in establishing who he or she is. The adolescent begins to distinguish his or her self as a psychologically separate entity, apart from his or her parents. In the struggle to break parental control, considerable conflict ensues. Throughout adolescence the teenager stretches limits, makes compromises, and sets off to further stretch limits. In some cases, parents relinquish control and thus evade the stress and strains of struggle.

During adolescence the self concept undergoes a process of restructuring since the childhood self can not meet the demands of the growing person. Whereas the child's self was tied to the child's name, by adolescence the teenager may cast off her or his

given name and take on a nickname. Bodily change also influences the changing self image. The parents and teachers are treating the adolescent differently than they did the child and peer relations are intensifying. Out of this reorganization a sense of identity emerges. By the end of adolescence this sense of identity begins to direct the person's life. It affects interests, religious views, morals, and the choices that are made. The adolescent establishes a new world view, and a new sense of self, and this serves as the core of personality.

The adult transition (18-25). Developmentally, in this stage the young adult undergoes a reduction of the confusions that arose during adolescence and is in a position to take on the serious challenge of finding a career and a mate. As the person makes decisions she or he narrows the range of her or his options such that, by age 25, most people have committed themselves to an adult role. This process can result in further reevaluations of the self.

During this period the young adult may become cynical as a result of the actualities of life confronting the ideals of youth. The young adults

are confronted with the need to again reevaluate conceptions of their self and of the world. The disillusionment that occurs may take place all at once or it may come about gradually. Be it sudden or slow, the individual is forced to deal with the world as it is and not as it would be preferred to be.

The choice of a career can lead to new formulations of the self image. Success or failure can shake or bolster one's confidence. Furthermore, the structure of work relations or institutional behavior, e.g., factory work, can affect the nature of the subsequent self image and personality.

The choice of a mate leads the individual into making a commitment to another person. By entering into marriage, the person's social situation is changed in that parents and friends do not have the same impact as they formerly did. On top of this, each partner in the marriage experiences a new level of self-exposure. The intimacy that marriage engenders lays bare one's idiosyncracies and challenges one's acceptability to another.

Rappoport's discussion of the changes that occur in personality in later life was at best pessimistic.

He suggested that people would live without illusions, that they would take on a toughness or insensitivity. He also believed that marriage and domestic life would become disenchanting and restricting. With old age there would be physical and social deterioration as retirement was reached and one's friends began to pass away. It would seem that Rappoport only sees one direction for later life and that is deterioration. This view has been challenged by more recent evidence which will be considered next.

Middle adulthood. Since the publication of Rappoport's text on personality development and change in middle adulthood new information about later growth has been published (Levinson, 1978; Gould, 1978). This work has been tentatively synthesized Erikson's (1963, 1964) stage theory of life span development by Bee and Mitchel (1980). While Bee and Mitchel recognized differences between these authors they believed that what they had in common could be profitably united and act as a guide to understanding later developments in personality.

Unlike the previous aspects of personality

development, in which growth and change had common patterns for most people, the development that occurs in middle adulthood is due to a combination of psychological and social forces that can be extremely variable across individuals. For this reason development cannot be discussed as though people in general will experience the same psych-social conditions and similar changes. Bee and Mitchel have therefore offered a number of propositions regarding potential change in middle adulthood and old age.

Proposition one states that a transition or crisis can occur in personality if there is a sufficient accumulation of external and internal stresses. External stresses can be altered social conditions such as divorce or a new job while internal stresses can include components such as hormonal change or illness. If there are enough of these internal and external stresses accumulating a crisis or transition may occur. According to proposition two not all people will react the same to similar amounts of stress. Individuals differ in terms of the cumulative stress that can be tolerated without entering a crisis.

The third proposition states that for any particular society there are certain ages at which stresses may be expected to accumulate and are likely to lead to change. Within a certain social group a transition will be shared at a certain point in the life cycle, though not necessarily. In North American society, for example, leaving home, getting a job, getting married, etc., occurs at approximately the same period in life for a large portion of the population. Change or crisis can result if the various stresses occur within the same time frame. If they are spread out across time, on the other hand, the person may be able to cope without any significant alterations in personality.

Proposition four proposes that with sufficient accumulated stress a number of possible reactions available to the individual. Some may quit the stressful situation by getting divorced or taking on a new job. Some may experience personal growth by going through the experience. Others may experience physical or mental illness, or resort to alcoholism, or drug abuse, or, at the extreme, commit suicide.

The final proposition suggests that in the

movement from one crisis to the next the person may undergo personal growth. The person may reach a new state of equilibrium, take on new activities, and, if we add activity theory to this, the person will undergo a change in consciousness and personality based on the new activities.

If Bee and Mitchell's propositions prove to be valid it will not be possible to predict any general trends in personality growth that will be true for all persons in a particular society. There are too many factors that can combine in a multitude of ways and may well be beyond prediction. People are, after all, unique and life conditions are quite diverse.

What can be concluded from Bee and Mitchell's propositions is that in middle adulthood and later years the likelihood of people sharing similar experiences and similar accumulations of stress at similar times is not great. As years progress diversity, rather than similarity, is to be expected across the people in a society, particularly a complex society, and the search for general laws of personality change in terms of stages may not be

successful.

Personality development: U.S.S.R. In Soviet psychology it is common to find discussion of the importance of external factors on the development of an individual. This was noted by Vygotsky who maintained that environmental effects on child development should be considered relative, not absolute, in their influence on development. Vygotsky did not advocate environmental determinism, the absolute influence, since it could be demonstrated that children at different stages of development were affected by the environment differently (Bozhovich, 1969). As a result, studying the objective content of the environment is not enough; the important task is to determine the crucial component of the environment which influences the child. The crucial component is that which satisfies the particular need of the child at a particular stage of development.

. . . the formation of a child's personality is determined, first, by the place which the child occupies in his system of human relations, and, second, by

the relation between the requirements imposed upon him by life and those psychological characteristics which he possesses at the particular moment. It is precisely this relation which engenders those needs and desires and goals which, by refracting and mediating the influence of the environment, become the motivational force in the further development of a child's mental properties (Bozhovich, 1969, p. 219).

Through the stages of personality development, therefore, Soviet psychologists identify what they call the 'leading activity' of the particular stage.

Leading activity. According to Mukhina (1984), Leontiev suggested that the leading activity of an age stage or period had three characteristic features. First, in each stage new forms of activity emerge which are qualitatively different from activities of the previous stage. Second, the psychological processes also evolve along with the new activity and they are restructured by that activity. Third, the child's basic personality

undergoes change based on the new activity. As Mukhina put it: "Leading activity is that socially conditioned activity whose development determines the radically new aspects in the psychological processes and characteristics of the child's personality" (p. 21).

Nepomnyashchaya (1984) spoke of identifying, among the changes a child is going through, those changes which are the general and decisive ones, i.e., leading. According to Nepomnyashchaya these will include, "(1) the general characteristics of a child's personal orientation; (2) characteristic features of the psychological structure of a child's activity; and (3) the level of development of mental mechanisms" (p. 30).

Fel'dshtein (1987), who spoke of what he called 'dominant activity', said that while it is possible to identify the dominant activity, this does not mean that the dominant activity occupies a dominant position in terms of time engaged in that activity. In other words, the dominant activity is not the only activity that can be pursued by the child during that stage of development. For example, the leading

activity of preschool children is play and for the school age child it is learning. While school age children have learning as a leading activity they still engage in play. Fel'dshtein further clarified the meaning of 'dominant activity' in the following:

Its dominance lies in the fact that mental processes that prepare the child for a transition to a new and higher stage of development evolve in the course of that activity. Second, the definition of any type of activity as a dominant activity requires it to be correlated with a specific aspect, emerging at that specific age, of the unitary process of activity. Third, the expression dominant type of activity is understood in developmental psychology to refer not to a spontaneously evolving activity, occurring, say, in various types of youthful company, but an activity that is specifically assigned by society through the systems of education, a type that most fully reflects the essential sense of specific, genetically continuous

aspect of the evolving activity of a growing human being' (Fel'dshtein, 1987, p. 50).

Soviet psychologists, thus, identify stages by the leading activities that are crucial to the next level of personality development. In brief, the leading activity leads to cognitive restructuring, and a restructuring of the personality.

Stages of development. Leontiev (1961b) maintained that the contents to be found in the stages of development are dependent on social conditions and are not to be considered unchangeable. The stages of development, due to different levels of social development, can be quite different between societies which are existing at the same time. Kahn and Wright (1980) also noted that adolescence does not exist in all cultures:

In countries or cultures where the technical aspects of living are comparatively simple, puberty signals an abrupt transition from childhood to adult life. The transition may be marked by some initiation ceremony of varying degrees of importance.

There is no in-between period. After the ceremony, the young person has the full privileges and obligations of manhood or womanhood (p. 152).

Differences can also exist in the same society when comparison is made across historical time. In Western society, two hundred years ago, adolescence did not occur between childhood and adulthood since most children moved directly into the labor force without the intermediate learning of present modern societies.

Indeed, the very definition of adolescence, in the cultural sense, derives its meaning from relatively recent change. Whereas pre-industrial societies moved their young rather quickly from childhood to adulthood, we have not only defined the period in between, but have been constantly expanding the age levels we consider to be within the adolescent framework (Fuchs, 1976, p.3(

On this point, Mukhina (1984) indicated that "information on childhood from nations at different levels of social development shows that the lower the

level is, the earlier the growing child starts participating in adult forms of work" (p. 37). We can expect, therefore, that as the demands of functioning in an evermore complex society are increased we can expect changes in stages.

The development of the child is a process in which the growing human acquires social experience (Fel'dshtein, 1987). In assimilating social experience and experience with objects, the child expands its ability to effectively interact. In this process, qualitatively new structures emerge, based on leading activities, and these structures are distinct from each other. To say this however is not to say that the stages are unrelated.

Indeed, every psychological structure characterizing a qualitatively new stage of development is based on previous ones and is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of later ones. To deny this would be to deny mental development as a process of self-movement with its own laws (Bozhovich, 1980-1981, p. 69).

Across stages, leading activities direct and

identify the stage. The identification of a stage depends on how a children relate to the surrounding world, and their needs and interests during that stage (Mukhina, 1984). Fel'dshtein (1983b) identified emotional interaction as the leading activity of infancy, object-manipulation in prekindergarten, role-play in preschool, study during school age, and socially useful activity in adolescence. The leading activity of an early stage is incorporated into the later stage as a basic form of activity, but not as that which guides further growth and development, e.g., school children still play.

Crises in development. In speaking of stages we should note that a transition from one stage to another may not necessarily proceed smoothly. There may be crises in development.

Critical stages, or crises, occur between two stages of development and mark the culmination of the earlier stage and the onset of the next. We should also point out that each systemic new structure emerging in response to the child's needs

includes an affective component and hence bears within it a motivating force (Bozhovich, 1979, p.8).

These crises reflect the child's frustration with the deprivation, or suppression, of an emerging need. In experiencing frustration, children need not be aware of why they feel frustrated.

. . . developmental crises are the result of a failure to meet needs that emerge in a child toward the end of each period together with some new basic personality structure. We should also recall that each developmental stage is distinguished by a unique particular orientation of the child within the system of relationships assumed for a given society. Accordingly, each period of a child's life has its own specific content: specific relationships between the child and the people around him, a dominant kind of activity for each stage of development (play, study, work) etc. (Bozhovich, 1980, p. 36).

According to Mukhina (1984) the transition from

one stage to another is preceded by dissatisfaction in children regarding the position that they maintain socially, and an urge in the child to change it. This does not mean that there is conscious deliberation on the part of the child. The parent, in the meantime, according to Mukhina, should be sensitive to the child's changing needs for new forms of activity and new types of relations, and to assist the child in reaching these. In the event that the parent does do this, the period of crisis will be shortened and less painful.

Developing social behavior. In discussing stages of development, we also must recognize that at each stage the person enters new social relations and acquires new rights that accompany the new stage. Bozhovich (1980) noted that along with the new rights accompanying the new stage there are also new duties that the child is expected to perform. The school age child, for instance, has the duty of learning and attending school, but children also have the right to have their work taken seriously (Bozhovich, 1977b). The rights and duties of the child at each stage are defined by the society and it is important to the

child's overall well-being that these conditions be met. The position in society that a child occupies is not attended to until the age of six to seven is reached. After this age, the child gains a clear desire to take up greater responsibility in life and engage in new activities that were formerly not allowed.

Thus, the assimilation of social experience, which takes place in the course of activity directed toward the development of relations, creates a foundation for the formation of a new social orientation for the growing person as a social being, effecting changes in his relationships, value orientations, motives, and needs (Fel'dshtein, 1987, p. 51).

This development eventuates in the child being liberated from the control of the family and the transition into an adult lifestyle.

Leontiev's stages. The area of personality in Soviet psychology is one in which little work has been done (Bozhovich, 1969). In order to discuss the actual stages of development I will use the stage

demarcation of Leontiev (1961c) and fit what information I have upon that frame. Leontiev's stages are infancy, early childhood, kindergarten age, early school age, adolescence, and adulthood.

Infancy (0-1 years). Bozhovich (1979), drawing from Vygotsky, indicated that this is a stage in which the child's behavior is realized through the mediation of, or the cooperation with, an adult. All of the child's needs are satisfied by an adult, i.e., feeding, cleaning, etc. As Lisina (1985) determined, it is in these early interactions within the family that the child is drawn into social relationships and initiates the emergence of personality.

In this period the infant's consciousness is developing. To begin with, sensory impressions are developing, and needs are beginning to crystalize around objects, e.g., the mother. Objects that have meaning to the child are beginning to be perceived.

Thus, the central, i.e., personal, new structure in the first year of life is the emergence of charged ideas that motivate a child's behavior in spite of external stimuli. We shall call these motivating

ideas (Bozhovich, 1979, p. 14)..70

According to Bozhovich (1979), these motivating ideas transform the child, without the child's awareness, into a subject.

Early childhood (1-3 years). Bozhovich (1979) has proposed that by the beginning of the second year of life the child is not subordinately submissive to an adult. During this period the child's behavior is not only called forth by environmental stimuli but also by images and ideas that have formed in the child's developing consciousness. The reason for this is that, along with the development of consciousness, memory is also beginning to emerge and develop.

These ideas give rise to a desire to act according to internal impulses and cause the child to rebel when his/her activity encounters resistance in the environment. Of course, this rebellion is spontaneous, not intentional: but it is a testimony of the fact that the child has entered upon the path of personality formation and that

he/she is capable of not only reactive but also active forms of behavior (Bozhovich, 1980-1981, p. 77).

The child is liberated from total subservience to external stimuli and is being transformed into a subject, who is not yet aware of his or her subjectivity (Bozhovich, 1979).

Quite early on the child identifies his or her self with his or her name, i.e., he or she responds to it, and this name becomes the base of the child's personality (Mukhina, 1984). Decisive to the formation of personality is the moment when the child recognizes his or her own I, his or her sense of selfhood. To Mukhina this occurs towards the end of the third year.

Bozhovich (1979) argued that children first gain an awareness of their selves as sorts of objects and begin to use their names as a referent to themselves. Bozhovich, also maintained that children replaced their name as a self referent with the pronoun "I" around the end of the second year (unlike Mukhina who proposed that it occurred around the end of the third year). This, to Bozhovich, implied a process of

moving from self-recognition to that of self awareness and the formation of an ego. With the formation of an ego system, the way is opened for other structures to emerge. Two important structures that emerge are self-esteem and, associated with this, the child makes an effort to conform with the requirements of adults. This occurs toward the end of the second year. The self-esteem is not due to the children assessing their own behaviors but is associated, instead, with the approval of adults. To Bozhovich, then, the dominating need of this period is to develop and affirm their ego. The development of the ego and self-awareness affects the subsequent development of personality.

This period also has its crisis aspect--the three-year-old-crisis. This crisis is based on the children's need to affirm their ego (Bozhovich, 1979). The deprivation of this need can lead to difficulties in the child's behavior. This occurs in children who have been overprotected or receive too authoritarian an upbringing. There is suppression of the child's need for independence and self-sufficiency. The child is seeking to satisfy

its own needs and has difficulty with their suppression.

Kindergarten age (3-6 years). Bozhovich (1980) identified two paths of psychological development, in what she called the preschool child, that were important to personality formation. The two lines were moral development and cognitive development. Mukhina (1984) maintained that from birth to going to school the child is engaged in acquiring human knowledge and skills, and the traits that are necessary to function in society. These skills and knowledge were the development of perception, thinking and imagination, the ability to speak, to be oriented in space and time, the ability to use objects, and the formation of human relations. For this period Mukhina identified human interaction, object activity, and play as the leading activities.

Of importance to this period was the initiation of interaction with peers (Mukhina, 1984). Peers influence the development of the child's personality in that the child, in interaction with other children, is confronted with the necessity of practicing standards of conduct and in receiving

feedback on her or his behavior from other children. In peer interaction there is an eventual formation of group opinion which will also influence personality development. Group opinion forms in children between the years of four and five. As a result, children listen to each other and conform to majority opinion.

Fel'dshtein (1987) noted that between three and six the child, now conscious of the self, has learned social actions and tries to reconcile his or her behavior with that of others. By age six, children are oriented to human social functions, behavior norms, and has acquired a sense of their activity. Children, in play, assimilate relations to things and to practical concerns and now is engaged in realizing new abilities in their practical activities. Six year olds, with a broader perspective on social relations, are beginning to evaluate other people.

According to Bozhovich (1980), up to the age of six or seven, children do not attend to their place in life. Any acquisition of new abilities that are not realized in activity leads to conscious resistance and dissatisfaction (although children may not be conscious of this resistance on their part).

Around six or seven children develop clear desires to move into a more adult position both socially and actively. The child develops an awareness of her or his self as a subject in the system of human relations. This is because, by the end of the preschool period, the child has become psychologically stable and integrated and has an awareness of her or his social ego. The child thus enters the seven-year-old-crisis. The child has an awareness, the first realization, of the discrepancy between her or his internal development and her or his external, social position. Children become dissatisfied with the position they hold as preschoolers and lose interest in the activities they had been engaged in. They may even rebel in situations that once gave them satisfaction. The child (the Soviet child) begins to dream about going to school. The desire to go to school is something that will have to be cultivated, but we can note in this that the child is looking ahead to a new situation even though she or he may know nothing of this situation (Bozhovich, 1977b).

Early school age (7-10 years). During this

period, Fel'dshtein (1987) argued that this stage is marked by the emergence in the child of a theoretical relation to the world. The child reflects on his or her own behavior and begins to develop voluntariness by developing internal plans of action. The child needs to be recognized by others and to engage in relations with them. By the age of nine or ten children begin to think of their place in society and to engage in activities that are socially important and appreciated. Children move out of the circle of relations with familiar people and broaden their social relations. This leads also to a crisis in self-evaluation that is filled with self-doubt.

Bozhovich (1977b) discussed the entrance into school as a stage in which the child's life and personality development change abruptly. The child's life is completely restructured with entry into school. There are new, social relations, tasks, problems, and the new activity of study behavior. Learning becomes an end in itself and performance is now being subjected to social evaluation and this evaluation will affect how other people respond to the child. It is important, therefore, for children

now to set themselves goals and organize their activity, around the goal, i.e., the acquisition of knowledge. Study activity is thus the leading activity of this period (Bozhovich, 1980-1981). The child begins to develop theoretical thinking, control of self, a sense of responsibility, and increased personality development.

Between the early school age stage and adolescence, Leontiev (1961) identified the middle childhood stage which was between the ages of 11 and 14. Leontiev did not expand on this, he only identified it, and I am not aware of any other psychologist in the Soviet Union that makes this distinction.

Adolescence (14-17). Bozhovich (1979, 1980-1981) identified two phases of adolescence and associated crises. The first phase was between 12 and 14 (1979) or 12 and 15 (1980-1981). In this phase adolescents develop the capacity to let future goals guide their activity (Bozhovich, 1979). Also during this period, the adolescent's relations to the world and to his or her self is being reorganized. Self-awareness develops further and

self-determination also develops and this leads to the second phase between 15 and 17. As a result of development, young people become aware of their having a position to occupy in the future and they also begin to assume an independent life.

According to Bozhovich (1980-1981), the adolescent crisis is more prolonged and more acute; it involves the transition from childhood to maturity. This is due to the fact that physical and mental development is now proceeding so rapidly that many new needs are emerging which will not be satisfied because of inadequate social maturity. Bozhovich contended that this is difficult to resolve because the synchrony of physical, mental, and social development is lacking. Also, whereas earlier crises were external in nature, in the form of prohibitions, etc., the crises in adolescence are coupled with internal factors like self-prohibitions, the interference of earlier developed, psychological characteristics, e.g., childish habits, and youthful lifestyle. Bozhovich argued that the developmental crisis of this stage is not due solely to sexual maturity. She maintained that no theory of

adolescence could be based on any single factor. She proposed, instead, that the adolescent crisis is tied to the new level of self-awareness that has emerged. There is a need to know themselves as unique individuals who are different from others. Adolescents thus seek to affirm their self and engage in self-expression. In this process the individual may vacillate between self-confidence and self-doubt. Bozhovich indicated that the crisis of this stage can be alleviated if the adolescent can develop an interest in something and pursue it. Individuals can then pursue goals beyond the immediate situation and that will help them through it.

The further development of theoretical thought in this period produces a larger view of the world and, ultimately, leads to reflection, to thought about thought, and also an understanding of their personality and mental processes. The person comes to develop a new level of self-awareness. This self-awareness is further enhanced by adults and friends demanding more of the person. Adolescents are now involved in expressing their views, and expressing their character and capacities, and they

are beginning to observe the moral standards of their group. As a result of this, the adolescent analyzes her or his self against others. This process leads to the development of a system of values.

During the latter phase of adolescence the person forms a self-definition (Bozhovich, 1980-1981). As school years are coming to a close, individuals are faced with the prospect of the future and of the need for resolving what the future will be for them. The self-definition is not completed at this point, however, just as personality is not fully developed. As opposed to phantasies and dreams about the future, the self-definition is based on actual behavior, interests and goals. It is an assessment of actual ability, external circumstances, and is tied to choices regarding profession. The true self-definition does not arise until adulthood has been reached. Individuals develop in this period an understanding of their place in society and a sense of purpose in life.

The leading activity of this period, according to Fel'dshtein (1983b), is socially useful activity. Activities that are socially useful would be work,

study, sports, art, etc., and these lead to new social relations and to the development of the social self. Socially useful activity is a means by which the person develops into a full-fledged member of society. In its developed form, socially useful activity is adult work.

While there can be no doubt that adolescence is not a final stage in the development of the personality, the literature from the Soviet Union , that is presently available, has not addressed development beyond this point.

It is worth closing with the summary remarks of Bozhovich (1980-1981):

All the stages in the development of the child's personality that we have outlined here indicate that the higher the level of development of the personality, the freer the child is, and that the formation of the personality involves not just adaptation of the person to the demands of the environment but also the person's own continuous creative activity directed toward reorganizing and restructuring of

both his/her surroundings and
himself/herself (p. 78).

Personality development: Hutterite. The information to be presented in this section is drawn from Hosteler and Huntington (1968). The information is based on their observations of a colony in the United States and two colonies in Canada, all of which were separated by more than 500 miles. Unlike the foregoing approaches to child development, which fostered growth that would meet the demands of a complex social order, in the Hutterite system upbringing is aimed at developing a person who will fit in with communal life and communal goals, as opposed to individuals goals.

In Hutterite life there is a dualistic view of the world in which there is a spiritual nature and a carnal nature. Human nature is considered to be evil and in disfavor with God. In this system children are regarded as being born in sin, with carnal, as opposed to the preferred spiritual desires. The function of socialization, which is consistent across Hutterite colonies, has two aims: First to prepare the child for adult life and, secondly, to prepare

the adult for death. In this process the immediate family supports the colony and the colony's goals in socialization. Each Hutterite, if socialization is successful, will be subservient to the will and collective goals of the colony. They will be obedient, submissive to colony will, and they will depend on the colony for human support. There is no emphasis on self-development; colony goals subordinate individuality. Furthermore, there is little interaction with the outside world. Colony members identify solely with colony members both ideologically and emotionally.

In the Hutterite system, the stages of development are strictly defined. Rather than basing stage definitions on natural, biological processes, the Hutterites impose a culturally defined set of stages. The life-span of the Hutterite is clearly defined into distinct age groups and they define rights and obligations that go with each demarcation. There is a right order of life that is imposed on each age group in the process of socializing a subservient being.

House children (0-3 years). During the first

four weeks of life, the mother cares for the baby and is devoted to the child's care. After four weeks, the mother returns to work in the colony and, at that time, the child is put on a schedule assigned by the colony. This schedule determines feeding time, play time, time alone, and when sleep shall occur. The mother nurses for around a year, or until the next pregnancy. Also, by three months toilet training may begin and always by the time children are able to sit on their own.

The infant undergoes religious training once solid food begins to be consumed (somewhere between three and twelve weeks). At this point, before and after feeding, the mother clasps the child's hands in hers and prays. Prayers are also recited when the child is put to bed, whether awake or not. While the babies receive love and care, they do not take precedence over the religious activity of the colony. When church service is performed, or when adults eat, the children are left in their cribs. The child alternates between being actively stimulated or being left alone in the crib.

The child is considered good and innocent until

she or he hits back or tries to comb her or his hair. When this occurs, the child's comprehension is considered to be sufficiently developed for discipline to be introduced. From this point on the child is disciplined quickly and often for numerous offences, e.g., for being in an adult's way. This discipline should not be taken to imply that the children are not loved; they are simply having their carnal nature tamed in preparation for the spiritual life.

A major aspect of this period in the child's development is the active effort on the part of family and colony members to socialize the child. For the child, there is a move from dependency on the immediate family to relative independence. The child comes to learn that colony life takes precedence over the life of the individual. The children also learn that their environment is outside of their control and that they can expect unpredictable punishment. Life is an invariable pattern for the child but the child is nonetheless happy to be with others and does not complain when being passed from person to person.

Kindergarten (3-5 years). Moving into the

kindergarten age the child undergoes a considerable change in status. In kindergarten children are required to be more obedient and quieter than they had been previously. They assume a very low status and learn their place in the colony and the family. During this period children are isolated from adults, they are not acknowledged by visitors, their food is of poor quality, and they are banned from social gatherings because they are not sufficiently quiet. The greatest threats are suffered by the child at this age. Threats may take the form of exclusion from the group, which the child is taught is unpleasant, and dangerous.

The children arrive at kindergarten before breakfast and remain there from midafternoon to after dinner (depending on the colony). Prayers are recited before and after meals and eventually can be recited by rote although not necessarily understood.

Play during this period tends to be unsupervised. Misbehavior is punished quickly and obedience is enforced. Punishment, as well as praise and reward, are used to establish correct behavior. The aim of kindergarten training is to break the

child's stubborn will. The child is weaned from the family, and vice versa. They are taught that colony authority is to be respected as well as that of parents and babysitters. The child learns to accept the restricted environment and learns to be passive and docile in response to correction and frustration. This breaking of the child's will is an important step in the climb from the cellar of Hutterite social life, and the child, along with their peer group, learns to make the progression.

School children (6-15 years). Around the age of five children enter German school and then, from six to fifteen, public school. A married man, selected by the church, teaches German school. He helps the children to read and write German, recite hymns and Bible readings, and to teach them to accept, willingly and without resentment, punishment. Ostracization and shaming, along with praise, are the means used to control behavior. In this process the child is not permitted to question what has been learned.

Another function of the German school is to teach the children how to work together--an important

facet of communal living. Since all colony members must work together, work is not used as a punishment; work is not labeled as unpleasant. Children during this period are taught to work efficiently, to learn the ritual of life, the ritual of social interaction, and they are taught to reduce fear of injury and death (as evidenced by their rough and dangerous play).

During school age children come to identify more closely with their peers. Group successes and group failures are praised or punished. Further control of behavior is exercised by peer punishment. The children monitor each others behavior and enforce the values of the colony.

Rather than self-discipline, the school age child learns to obey the traditions and values of the colony and to obey unquestioningly the figures of authority: parents, teachers, and elders. The child passively endures frustration, learns religious teaching by rote, accepts low status, learns to enjoy hard work, and to accept pain and punishment with pleasure. The rigorous training in self-denial comes to an end on the fifteenth birthday at which point

childhood comes to an end.

Casual years (15-baptism). At this point the young people find themselves in a kind of limbo between childhood and adulthood. The person carries out adult work but is not yet old enough to assume an adult position spiritually. The youth still attends Sunday school and continues to learn verse by rote.

Emotionally, as well as socially, the casual years are a period of being in between since the young person's loyalties to the colony are not yet fully established. Thus vacillation is tolerated by the colony but the colony does not tolerate poor work or moodiness. While the colony and family members will put up with some degree of deviance, peers will only tolerate so much before exercising ostracism.

The young person no longer attends German school but is still being taught formal religion. Outside of the influence of the German teacher, the young people, in a sense reacquaint themselves with their family. Children and parents spend more free time together.

Of greatest importance at this period is the peer group. Much of the child's life, both socially

and in labor, is spent with peers. Also, training up to this time has been to bind together these people as a collective body. They are, therefore, a powerful influence on the in-between child. Absolute loyalty is demanded; self-centred individualism can lead to being ostracized. Thus, while youths of this age may test limits they can only go so far. Infrequently a youth male may leave the colony but the majority, by far, stay in the colony or leave briefly and return. Girls, on the other hand, may retire into a secret world of fantasy where they pursue the temporal world in their imagination rather than actually leaving.

In time the socialization process wins out and the young person discovers group identity is more favorable to self-development and that an effective self-image depends on the group. When the time comes that the young people are prepared to take their place in the colony, when their actions indicate that they are emotionally and intellectually not a child, they can request baptism and full membership in the colony. This occurs for girls around age 19 and for boys between 20 and 26.

Baptism. All of a young Hutterite's life is a path to baptism. It is the rite of passage to full community life--passage into the community as a peer group. The only other rite of passage to follow is death. In baptism, the individual voluntarily submits to the church and also accepts responsibility for actions of the colony as a whole. Emphasized in baptism is wrong behavior which is considered sin and the strictures against wrong behavior is exercised by the whole colony. With baptism, the parents and the baptized youth grow closer since the child is then a colony member. Also with baptism, the youths are in a position to marry since they have made the necessary first commitment to God.

Adulthood. Marriage is a somewhat incidental event in comparison to the arduous preparation for baptism. The husband acquires a wife, with parental approval, and, in comparison to the wife, is in a favorable position. The husband maintains colony and family ties whereas the bride may have to move to a new colony. Peers are lost to the bride and the pattern of work before marriage is changed. There is little preparation for marriage.

Adults are expected to set good examples. Individual will is not to be exercised. Decision making is done by consensus at colony meetings.

Younger men engage in onerous physical labor while older men assume leadership roles. Competition is looked on unfavorably in filling leadership positions. Self-assertion is not acceptable behavior. The behavior of individual adults continues to be controlled by fear of rejection.

Having followed this path of socialization, the Hutterite colony has a rather uniform personality profile:

A successfully socialized adult Hutterite gets along well with others, is submissive and obedient to the rules and regulations of the colony, and is a hard-working responsible individual. An adult Hutterite must never display anger nor precipitate quarrels. Intensity and imagination are not admired; rather, quiet willingness coupled with hard work are considered desirable qualities. The constant pruning which adapts each individual to the group

results in minimizing of differences and a muting of emotional expression. The elimination of extremes and the imposition of a strict order enable members to find satisfaction in the "narrow way" that leads to salvation (Hostetler and Huntington, p. 353).

Old age and death. The aged in Hutterite society are respected members of their community. They are considered to be deserving of rest but are not required to give up work. Reduction of work load can occur without any loss of status. Rather, the aged person strongly embodies the colony tradition and is therefore respected. Elders give stability to the colony and represent the successful passage through life as they move on to the last rite of passage--death--on to the spiritual life.

Adolescence in three societies. I propose to summarize this chapter by looking at adolescence as it is differentially exhibited by the three societies discussed. In briefly reviewing this it is hoped that having followed development we can see how the people in each of these societies have developed personality differences.

As Bronfenbrenner (1974) indicated, adolescents in the

U.S.A. are under the developmental influence of their peer group and that this peer group tends to be autonomous from other age groups and from the overall society. The American adolescent was thus more likely to engage in antisocial behavior, contrary to approved adult norms, and may be considered rebellious or nonconforming to approved standards.

In the U.S.S.R., the peer group's formation is strongly influenced by the adult society and its values. As a result, the Soviet adolescent is more likely than the American adolescent to adhere to the approved norms of behavior. The Soviet adolescent is therefore more likely to engage in socially useful activity. As opposed to the relative independence of the American adolescent peer group. The Soviet peer group does not exhibit such autonomy and can be said to be conforming in comparison to American adolescents. At the same time, however, both American and Soviet adolescents are being prepared to function in a highly complex and changing world.

The Hutterite adolescent group, unlike the aforementioned, is not expected to inhabit a complex and changing world. Values and lifestyle are expected to remain unchanged and a high degree of conformity is

expected and created. Also, unlike the other two groups, individual initiative is successfully suppressed.

It is hoped that this review of the influence of development on adolescent personality has indicated why developmental issues are important if we are to have an understanding of how a developed personality is formed and the various influences that bear on that formation.

Chapter 10

Personality and restricted development

In the preceding chapter we considered three approaches to the normal development of personality; normal in the sense that, within the norms of each social group, the development considered was not constrained, hampered, or debilitated by adverse conditions. In this chapter we will consider personality development as it is affected by constraining conditions or 'deprivation'.

The literature to be reviewed falls under four categories: 1) cultural deprivation, 2) institutional deprivation, 3) social deprivation, and 4) severe, sensory deprivation. Cultural deprivation refers to the poor development of a subculture within a larger culture that is more highly developed. Institutional deprivation refers to debilitating effects, on the normal development of an infant, by placement in an institute with less than optimal conditions for development. Social deprivation occurs when a person is deprived of normal social relations and grows in isolation or relative isolation. The last category,

severe sensory deprivation, concerns the development of personality in people who were born, or very early became, deaf-blind.

Cultural deprivation. The research on cultural deprivation (although not so labelled) was conducted during the first half of the twentieth century. For example, a deprived English sub-culture, the canal boat people showed developmental retardation. It should be noted, however, that they were able successfully to satisfy all the demands of their own cultural environment, the canal. Al-Issa and Dennis (1970) suggested that they should be considered underprivileged.

Canal boat people. In England, in 1923, Gordon (1970) studied the canal boat people. As a rule, these people were born on their canal boats, spent their life there, and died on their boats. Their health and general well being was comparable, if not superior to city dwellers of similar social class. While they could not be considered mentally defective, as they grew older they demonstrated a decrease in IQ. Gordon found a negative correlation of 0.755 between intelligence and age. This, Gordon

determined, was due to a lack of formal education. On the average these children spent two to two-and-a-half days a month in school. This was due to the fact that these children had no fixed, stationary abode; canal boat people were always on the move delivering goods from one place to another.

Gordon concluded that these people were not mentally defective due to some hereditary defect. The youngest children had been tested and compared favorably with city dwellers but, as they grew older, they demonstrated less intelligence on standard IQ tests. On the other hand, they were able to function perfectly well in society as a whole. Even though they may not have been able to read or write, they were able to earn a respectable living.

Here, as in the following studies, we should consider the possibility that the values and needs of this particular subculture are not in line with obtaining a school education or skills that elicit high scores on IQ tests. Their life was the canal and the demands placed on them by that specific environment. They were not motivated to live the life of the city dwellers and fully expected to

continue their lives on the canal. In short, it is not possible to internalize and develop something that is not an activity for one. Furthermore, the canal people may have appeared dull intellectually, as determined by the standards of IQ testing, but they may also have been quite clever when it came to surviving the life on the canal.

Isolated mountain children. Sherman and Key (1932) studied the intelligence of children in four Hollows of the Blue Ridge Mountains, around 100 miles west of Washington, D.C. These Hollows were of various levels of social development. The lowest, Colvin, was very much isolated from the outside world; it had no road and was connected only by a trail. Only three of the adults in this Hollow were literate. Needles Hollow could be reached by a rocky road and the children received some schooling. Many of the adults of this Hollow were literate. Oakton Hollow had a passable road, a general store, a post-office, and three or four months of schooling each year. Rigby Hollow, the most developed, had seven months of schooling each year and around 75% of the inhabitants were literate. A nearby

town--Briarsville--was also included in this study for purposes of comparison. It had a surfaced road, a modern school, a general store, telephones, and newspapers.

Sherman and Keys recognized that the tests used were not appropriate for the population and conceded that the poor results did not necessarily indicate an innate intellectual deficiency. They believed that the impoverished environment probably had a depressing influence on developing intelligence. As with the canal boat people, intelligence, as measured on IQ tests, decreased with age. Also, the highest number of persons below average was in the least developed Hollow--Colvin-- and the least number below average was in Briarsville, the most developed community socially; intelligence was found to be related to social development.

As Sherman and Key noted, life in the Hollows did not require high intelligence. There was little need for planning or ingenuity. Performance was best on tests that didn't require speed but, as reported, their environment did not place a high value on quickness. Most of the children in all of the

Hollows could count backwards from 20, understand pictures, and arrange weights. In two Hollows, the children did not know the correct sequence of days of the week but, again, they did not have a need to know this--one day was pretty much like the rest.

These people, as did the canal people, developed only so far as they needed to develop in order to meet the demands of their social environment. As social life became more complex, a need to function at that level of complexity emerged. In other words, where there is a newspaper to be read one might develop a need to read, but no one will develop a need, or find the object that is that need's motive (as in activity theory), if the environment itself does not provide the conditions that will bring forth such a development.

Other studies on isolated mountain children, i.e., Wheeler (1932) and Edwards and Jones (1938), also demonstrated a decrease in IQ with an increase in age. Wheeler (1942) returned to the mountains of East Tennessee a decade later. Whereas this area had been an isolated mountain environment, during the initial study (Wheeler, 1932), and schools were only

just being introduced, over the decade that had passed a new road system to the mountains had been built, there was industrial growth, improved farming methods were introduced, and housing was upgraded. The finding that IQ decreases with age was again upheld but, interestingly, the 1940 group had gained about nine months in average mental age. Increased ability accompanied improved social conditions.

We can see from the foregoing that a person's intellectual development, and therefore the development of mind and cognition, reflects the development of the social conditions in which the person lives. An underdeveloped society leads to an underdeveloped person, relative to the more highly developed conditions of social life. In an underdeveloped environment, needs are underdeveloped and, subsequently, so is personality.

Institutional deprivation. The work to be discussed here began with what Hunt (1984) called the pioneering work of Skeels and Dye (1939). These authors were surprised to notice that two infants who had been placed in an institute for the feeble-minded and had to be transferred, due to a lack of space, to

an institute for moronic women, showed, after a year, a huge increase in their developmental quotient. Following this study there were further studies that began to indicate the debilitating effects of the institutional placement of infants. Aspects of these studies were criticized but, as Hoffman, Paris, Hall, and Schell (1988) noted, it was clear that the institutional environment had harmful effects on the children's development. For our purposes we will look at four main studies and related discussion. These issues are further developed by Langmeier and Matejcek (1975), Hunt (1984), Ainsworth (1962), and Yarrow (1961).

Skeels and Dye. As stated by Skeels and Dye (1939), this study was intended to determine the effect of an extreme change in institutional environment on mental growth; this was a transfer to an environment providing superior stimulation.

Mentally retarded children from an orphanage nursery, aged one to two years of age, were placed, singly or in twos, to wards of brighter girls who resided in an institution for feeble-minded children.

For comparison purposes, a contrast group of

dull-normal children in a nonstimulating orphanage environment, who were of similar ages was selected. The children in the experimental group were considered mentally retarded and were, therefore, also considered unsuitable for adoption. The birth histories of the experimental and comparison group did not show any marked differences and an examination of their social histories showed that they came from homes of equally low economic status.

The experimental group, transferred to wards of older and brighter girls, in comparison to the orphanage, were in an enriched environment that provided superior stimulation. The girls in the wards, in which these children were placed, spent a great deal of time with these children; they taught them to walk, to talk, to play with toys and other objects, as well as other new habits. The girls made the children clothes and even spent their allowance buying things for them. In almost all cases, a strong bond was formed between the child and one of the older people which developed into an intense relationship. The children went on excursions, had verbal contact with others, and, quite simply,

received considerable attention.

The contrast group was not so fortunate. Their environment, which was representative of the average orphanage, was profoundly lacking in mental stimulation or the experiences of young children in an average family. Although they received adequate physical care and medical treatment, they received little contact with adults outside of feeding and cleaning. There were limited play materials and the children were confined to the nursery room.

Upon transfer the mean IQ for the experimental group was 64.3 and for the contrast group it was 86.7. After two years in the institute for the feeble-minded for the experimental group, or two years continued life in the orphanage for the control group, drastic changes occurred. Whereas the experimental group showed an average increase in IQ of 27.5, the control group showed an average decrease of 26.2. The experimental group demonstrated a move from mental retardation to normal intelligence and in some cases they were placed in an adoptive situation. As a result, Skeels and Dye emphasized the importance of an intimate relationship between a child and an

adult for the adequate development of the child. They also cautioned that wards of the state should be given an adequate institutional environment.

Skeels (1966) conducted a follow-up study 30 years later. The patterns that had developed in childhood had carried on into adulthood. The experimental group were either self-supporting or married housewives. Educationally they had a median of grade twelve completed--some going to college and graduate school. They worked in business and professional work as well as in domestic service. Of the thirteen in this group eleven had married.

The control group did not fare as well in their later development. One had died, four were in institutional wards, three were in institutions for the mentally retarded, and one was in mental hospital. Educationally they had a median grade of three completed and those that worked had simple occupations. Two had married but one had subsequently divorced. Skeels concluded the following:

It seems obvious that under present-day conditions there are still countless

infants born with sound biological constitutions and potentialities for development well within the normal range who will become mentally retarded and noncontributing members of society unless appropriate intervention occurs (p. 56).

Goldfarb. The work of Goldfarb followed upon that of Lowrey (1940). Lowrey concluded that infants who are reared in institutions develop an isolation type of personality. They demonstrate unsocial behavior, hostility, lack of affection, an inability to adjust to limitation, and insecurity in environmental adaption. As a result these children are unprepared for placement in a family setting. Lowrey concluded that infants should not be reared in institutions and that if placed in an institution they should be provided with close and intimate contact with a minimum of one adult.

In a series of papers, Goldfarb (1943a, 1943b, 1944a, 1944b, 1947, 1955) discussed the effects of the "cold, isolated, depriving experience during the first months of life" (1947, p. 456) of an infant in an institution that impeded their normal development

(see also Dennis, 1973). Due to this, the personality of the child raised in an institution during infancy was not as differentiated as a child raised in a foster home.

He is more given to simple, unrefined, diffuse, unrelated or perseverative modes of adjustment. In the realm of mental organization, the more infantile the plane of differentiation is reflected in the greater aimlessness of behavior, the greater preponderance of trial and error adjustment, the greater tendency to thoughtless, wasteful, non-reflective, situationally determined response. In the area of emotional organization, it is reflected in poverty of affective response which is characteristic of the child's personal relationships (1943a, p. 126).

Goldfarb (1947) referred to this as "a developmental primitivization of personality" (p. 449). This behavior pattern, that developed in the institution, carried on into life outside of the institution, in the setting of the foster home, and led to difficulty

in adjustment and possible return to the institution.

Goldfarb (1944a) concluded that the absence of a parent-child relationship during infancy made it very difficult, or impossible, to form normal relationships. Also, it was his opinion that the impersonal quality of the institutional environment had a debilitating effect on subsequent personality development. The deviant behavior that resulted in these children was the main reason that they were returned after placement in a foster home situation (Goldfarb, 1944b).

Goldfarb (1947) concluded that the earlier the age at which the infant is placed in an institution, and the greater the duration of this placement, the greater would be the debilitation of the child. It was Goldfarb's opinion, therefore, that, "the basic lesson is one which emphasizes prevention rather than treatment after the personality has been crippled" (1947, p.457).

Spitz. The work of Spitz (1945, 1946a, 1946b, 1949) compared child development in two institutions. These institutions were in different countries in the Western hemisphere (they could not be identified for

reasons of confidentiality). Comparison groups were established by comparing the two institutions to children from the same areas who were still living with their parents. The two institutions were called Nursery and Foundling Home.

Nursery was a penal institute for delinquent girls. Often, on admission the girls were pregnant. After birth the babies were cared for in the nursery of the institute up until their first year of life. The mothers of these children were delinquent minors whose delinquency was considered to be due to either social maladjustment, feeble-mindedness, psychopathology, or criminality. As Spitz put it, "psychic normalcy and adequate social adjustment is almost excluded" (1945, p. 60).

Foundling Home, as the name suggests, was a home for foundlings. The background of some of the children was no better than those of Nursery but a number did come from socially well-adjusted backgrounds. Those of favorable backgrounds were foundling because their mothers were too poor to support them.

Unlike Foundling Home, Nursery children have

contact with their mothers, as Spitz said, to the n-th degree. The mother gave her all to her child in this setting. In Foundling Home the child had no mother and had only one eighth of a nurse to care for them. The children at Nursery, although an institute, did not demonstrate any kind of institutional destruction whereas "institutionalized children practically without exception developed psychiatric disturbance and became asocial, or problem children" (Spitz, 1945, p. 54). Spitz concluded that Nursery children did not suffer these effects, which he termed hospitalism, due to compensation by the intensity of the intact mother-child relationship.

The different effects of these two institutions on infant development were reflected in the mean developmental quotients for children in these institutes when comparing the first and the last four months in the institute. For Nursery the mean for the first four months was 101.5 and 105 for the last four. Foundling Home, on the other hand, went from 124 to 72. Nursery showed slight improvement and Foundling Home showed considerable loss.

Further studies of these institutes led to some rather disturbing results; some of the children developed what Spitz called anaclitic depression. This was a syndrome that developed due to separation from the mother. The symptoms of this syndrome, which were not all present at the same time, included the following: apprehension, sadness, weepiness, lack of control, environmental rejection, withdrawal, developmental retardation, retardation of reaction, movement slowness, dejection, stupor, appetite loss, weight loss, and insomnia. The single factor that was present for children who developed this syndrome was loss of their mother. No children developed this syndrome when their mother was not removed. At the same time, not all children whose mother was removed developed the syndrome to the same degree. Spitz cautioned, however, that while mother separation was necessary, it was not the sufficient cause of the development of anaclitic depression. Depression occurred more frequently when the mother-child interaction was satisfactory whereas, in the case of poor mother-child relations, the syndrome did not develop. The quality of the mothering was a factor

in developing depression. The syndrome showed its most marked effect in Foundling Home where 34 of 91 children observed died of illness, while none of the Nursery children passed away.

Provence and Lipton. Provence and Lipton (1962) observed 75 children in an institution for children aged four days to six years. While these children were adequately cared for they had no opportunity to form any kind of relationship with their caretakers.

The youngest children (four days to eight months) spent most of the day in cribs enclosed by glass-partitioning. Feeding was done with bottles propped on a pillow; there was none of the physical and emotional contact children reared in the home received during feeding. The feeding schedule was fixed by the institution and did not take into account the individual needs of the infants. Dressing, diapering, and bathing took place in a central work area. Diapering occurred four to six times a day and was determined by nursery routine rather than infant comfort. The children received a minimum of touching, handling, cuddling, being talked to or having any sustained personal contact. The

lack of personal contact, according to Provence and Lipton, did not promote normal development.

We believe that the poverty and the infrequency of the personal contact were the outstanding deficits in the experience of the institutionalized babies. It was a quantitative deficit in that there were not enough interchanges to promote development. It was also a qualitative deficit. While the attendants were pleasant to the babies and worked uncomplainingly and conscientiously, there was no relationship between nurse and infant that contained the variety and intensity of feelings a mother has for her own baby. The atmosphere as it appeared to the observer was mainly one of quiet, tranquility, and blandness (p. 47).

Confined to their cribs as much as they were these children were not very active physically. Toys were provided but they were not made interesting to the children by the adults and they tended not to play with them. Visual stimulation was minimal since the institutional environment was consistently

uniform; they did not experience other environments through walks or drives as would home reared children. Talk or noise from the adults was slight and the other children tended to be quiet. Sensory stimulation in the form of sounds physical touch, vision or smells were considerably less than those experienced by a child in the home.

Deviations from normal development began to show around four months of age. Crying, babbling, or cooing tended to be absent. By eight months the children began to lose interest in their environment. Toys did not interest them. When lifted up by an adult they did not mold to the adults body. Their faces were expressionless, bland. The children were withdrawing.

Upon placement in a foster home by age one to one and a half the retarded development began to fade. Their faces became expressive rather than bland. They were lively and active and they began to form relationships with others. Impairments still existed in the ability to form normal relationships with others, in impulse control, in thinking and learning, and in the quality of their play.

As Hoffman et al. (1982) observed, the institutional environment evidenced in the foregoing studies had harmful effects on development. This does not mean that all institutions are necessarily harmful. The findings of Dontas, Maratos, Fafoutis, and Karangelis (1985) challenge such a conclusion. It was observed that at the Mitera Babies Centre in Athens, Greece, children receive consistent mothering from limited caregivers, i.e., one or two nurses. These children formed attachments with their caregivers and did not demonstrate the behavioral deficits usually associated with institutional upbringing: depression, detachment, and the indiscriminate seeking of attention.

Maternal deprivation. Further research in this area led to further conclusions being formulated. Bowlby (1951) collated the studies done up to that time and determined that an infant should develop in an environment of emotional warmth and should have a close tie to a mother or mother surrogate. If such a tie were not formed, according to Bowlby, severe mental complications would result, which may become irreversible if both were severe and long term.

Prugh and Harlow (1962) pointed out that Bowlby has been misinterpreted as suggesting that any separation of a young child from their mother will lead to severe, emotional deprivation. They also pointed out that earlier studies did, in fact, recognize that multiple factors were involved in the development of pathology due to institutionalization. Prugh and Harlow (1962), Ainsworth (1962), and Wooton (1962), all of whom contributed to the investigation of the World Health Organization's inquiry into the effects of maternal deprivation, concluded that separation from the mother can lead to psychological and emotional difficulties for the child, but not necessarily so. H. Lewis (1954), for instance, at the Mersham Reception Centre for children, determined that unless the child is separated from the mother before two years of age and was lasting, that there was no statistical relation between the separation and the child's mental normality on admission.

Clarke and Clarke (1976a), Wooton (1962), and Prugh and Harlow (1962) have indicated that there are other factors that have an influence on the child's development following separation and

institutionalization.

In summary, then, it would seem that early institutionalization or prolonged separation from parents does not necessarily lead to specific effects upon personality in later life, and that these personality patterns, when they are observed, are not always due to a particular set of early experiences (Prugh and Harlow, 1962, p. 13).

A further point raised by Clarke and Clarke (1976a) was that the slogan "a bad home is better than a good institution" (p. 23) is unfounded. Prugh and Harlow (1962) also argued against the notion that children are better off in their own home than in a foster home or an institution. "On the contrary," said Prugh and Harlow, "it is sometimes seen that only when the child is removed from the home is he able to begin to mature and develop" (p. 14). Wootton (1962) and Clarke and Clarke (1976b, 1976c, 1977) have argued that deprivational experiences are not necessarily irreversible--recovery can occur in instances where the child suffers the loss.

Kahn and Wright (1980) discussed the fact that acceptance of Bowlby's thesis was widespread but not universal. They noted that persons other than the mother can act as a primary caregivers (as did Bowlby, 1982, p. 277), e.g., the father, grandparents, professional daycare workers, etc., and that maternal deprivation would not be experienced. What was noted, however, was that the evidence available does not support the hypothesis that early life experiences can have harmful and long-term effects on development. Hoffman et al (1988) maintained that the reversal of the effects of deprivation depends on the age of the child, the child's temperament, the severity of the deprivation, and the nature of the new environment. They believed that improvements in most cases can occur but that complete reversal of the effects was not likely.

Langmeier. The work of Langmeier and Matejcek (1975) is the most comprehensive account of the effects of the various forms of deprivation, including institutional deprivation (see also Langmeier, 1972, and Langmeier et al. 1979).

Langmeier (1972), and Langmeier and Matajcek

(1975) argued that, besides the tendency towards survival, reproduction, and adjustment to environmental conditions, it is necessary to postulate a need for active interaction with the environment.

The trend toward active contact with the world can be seen in four categories of psychological need: a) for stimulation; b) for cognitive structure; c) for object-concentration; and d) for individualization (Langmeier, 1972, p. 331).

Langmeier (1972) proposed that deprivation should be considered the insufficient satisfaction of these basic needs over a prolonged period of time. The conditions for deprivation are deficits of the satisfaction of the four forms of engagement with the environment.

The lack of adequate stimulation prevents the child from developing a higher level of attention which can lead to the child being indolent. Furthermore, the sudden discontinuation of formerly adequate stimulation can lead to anxiety and a feeling of emptiness.

The lack of cognitive structure is a deficiency in the meaningful order of stimuli that the child is exposed to. Adequate structure gives the child the opportunity to discover the laws that govern external events. To satisfy the need to interact with the environment, and to learn the nature of that environment, the environment should be neither too complex nor too stereotyped. This point was also made by Hunt (1984):

Since children profit developmentally neither from encounters with situations offering only demands that they have already mastered nor with situations offering demands beyond their coping capacity, an important factor in fostering their psychological development consists of providing them with situations novel enough to challenge them yet within their coping capacity (Hunt, 1984, p. 537).

Failure to develop coping strategies, according to Langmeier (1972), will lead to increased emotionality on the part of the child. Further, the discontinuity of perceived regularity, the loss of significance or

meaning, can lead to anxiety due to a fear of what is unknown and strange.

The lack of object-concentration or lack of specific attachment refers to the fact that to interact effectively with the environment the child's orientation should not be too broad or scattered. It must be concentrated on a specific object that becomes its centre of interest--this is usually the mother or some other caregiver. The mother is the centre of interest and the source of security and communication. Failure to establish such concentration, or disruption or loss of this relationship, leads to a scattered and ineffectual interaction with the environment. Separation anxiety can occur and it can lead to behaviors that were cited in the section on maternal deprivation.

The lack of individualization refers to the development of a sense of self, of body and ego, as a source of activity. Subsequent development, under normal conditions, leads to a strengthening of this and to its further emancipation as a distinct entity. To achieve this, environmental support, in the form of positive acceptance, appreciation of achievements,

and approval of the roles the child assumes or is assigned, is necessary. Failure to achieve this leads to feelings of frustration and can lead to aggression and recalcitrant behavior. Another possible outcome of denial of individualization is passive or submissive behavior.

Given the foregoing, Langmeier (1972) maintained that even in the first years of life, the personalities of children are quite different and, with further aging, the differentiation increases. Thus, in terms of institutionalized children, simple classification of 'hospitalism' or 'deprivation syndrome' is far too general. Langmeier proposed that it is necessary to regard each child as a unique person with a different history of developmental deprivation and that, to help the child, it is necessary to institute differential measures suited to the needs of the individual child.

Discussing institutionalized children, Langmeier and Matajcek spoke of three general types: the socially proactive type, the inhibitory type, and the relatively well adapted type. The socially proactive type is a child who demands attention from the adults

they know and who are possessive in regard to these adults. The inhibitory type is extremely passive and occasionally apathetic. As a result, these children have been classified by some as feeble-minded, due to their restricted verbal and social contacts. The relatively well adjusted type is one who adapts to the institutional environment. This environment, it should be stated, is less demanding than family life and there is no reason to assume that they will adapt well outside of the institute. Langmeier and Matajcek combined this typological information with the four categories of psychological need for environmental interaction; this allowed for finer discrimination and categorizing and it is possible, thereby, to use this information to establish an adequate approach to treatment.

Treatment of these children could be engaged in with success but the process would not be easy:

Although today the possibility of rehabilitation in cases of severely deprived children is greater, retraining and treatment of these children is still complicated, long-term, and very demanding,

and certain effects seem to persist indefinitely. In these circumstances, a broadly based preventive program is likely to be more effective and economical. In practice, therefore, our primary effort should be directed towards this goal (Langmeier and Matajcek, pp. 363-364).

Given the diversity of the deficits these children suffer, there are different effects of placement for these children in situations outside of the institution (these issues were discussed in chapter 4, Interactionism and theory, wherein Langmeier et al. were used as an example of interactionism).

Langmeier and his colleagues thus recognized deprivation as a problem which is complex in nature and one that is best handled by prevention before the fact, rather than by treatment after the fact. Given that deprivation occurs, Langmeier has provided a means of identifying the nature of the deprivation experience so that a treatment program can be designed to fit the needs of the individual. So from the initial work of Skeels and Dye who identified the problem we have moved to a point where we have a

better understanding of the phenomena involved and of possible routes to take to reverse the effects.

Social deprivation. Up to this point we have noted how a person's development can be restricted, hampered, and possibly retarded by deprivation due to poorly developed culture, or due to placement in an institute in which the conditions for proper development were lacking. We will now review five cases of extreme isolation. The first two are those of Anna and Isabelle as discussed by Davis (1940, 1946-1947). Next will be the twins, J. M. and P. M., reported on by Koluchova (1976a, 1976b). Finally we will examine the case of the Wild Boy of Aveyron--Victor, as presented by Itard (1962).

Anna and Isabelle. In 1938 a girl of more than five years of age was found incarcerated in an upstairs room of a farm house outside a small city in Pennsylvania (Davis, 1940). This girl, Anna, was her mother's second illegitimate child. Since her mother still lived with her parents, she was under their authority. Anna's grandfather was so angered by the second illegitimate child that she was confined to an isolated room.

After discovery, and transfer to a county home, it was noticed that Anna was quite apathetic. She lay supine and limp and was immobile, expressionless, and did not attend anything. At first she was thought to be deaf and maybe blind. In her perpetual confinement to one room, living on milk alone and seeing no sunshine, Anna suffered from malnutrition. She had little contact with her mother who performed only the minimal maternal tasks; Anna was not bathed, caressed, trained, or supervised in any way. As a result of this Anna could not eat solid food upon discovery. Neither did Anna seek attention or express needs, and she was not toilet trained.

After six months out of her home Anna was beginning to improve physically: her legs had developed calves and she enjoyed rough play. Anna also displayed an interest in other people. After nine months Anna was still an unsocialized being. She could still not chew or drink from a glass. By the following month she had learned these two skills and how use a spoon. She could also take a couple of steps, and descend stairs in a sitting position. The reason for this development appeared to be due to her

transfer from the county home, where she was cared for by mentally deficient inmates, to a foster home where she received the sole attention of her foster mother. Anna's new foster mother began to socialize her by unswerving attention and constant correction, rewards and punishment, sympathy, and caring presence. Anna then responded to calls for her, and, as Davis said, she was becoming human. Thirteen months away from her family, Anna was able to walk a little, responded to verbal commands, expressed some understanding of what was expected of her, sought and appreciated attention, used eating utensils, and she would push a doll carriage. Anna eventually learned toilet habits but did not progress, according to Davis, beyond an idiot level of development.

After two years of removal from her home, Anna could walk, respond to simple commands, feed herself, remember people, and display some neatness (Davis, 1946-1947). After four years she began to develop a little speech. He wondered if Anna was not congenitally feeble-minded. Davis would draw no such conclusion, however, until a comparable case could be found in which there was better recovery from social

deprivation. Such a case was found.

At discovery, Isabelle, also an illegitimate child, was around six-and-a-half years old and estimated to be one month younger than Anna. Isabelle had also been isolated because of her illegitimacy. Unlike Anna, Isabelle was in isolation with her mother who was a deaf mute. Isabelle and her mother used gestures to communicate with each other. Eventually, Isabelle's mother escaped with her child and came to the attention of the authorities (Mason, 1942). Isabelle was almost a wild animal and she expressed fear and hostility towards strangers, most particularly men (Davis, 1946-1947).

Isabelle was trained by M. K. Mason in speech development (see Mason, 1942). Mason, noting Isabelle's gestural speech, developed an educational program to develop speech that included "gestures, facial expression, pantomime, dramatization and imitation" (p. 229). In less than two years, by the age of eight, Isabelle made developments in living, hearing, and speech that would take a normal child the first six years of their life (Davis, 1946-1947).

Thus in 1942, Isabelle was as follows:

. . . a child who at six and a half years, bearing the semblance of a mental defective, after two years of changed environment, enriched experience, unremitting instruction, improved physical condition and appearance, is, at eight years, considered a child of normal intelligence (Mason, 1942, p. 304).

By 1946-1947, Isabelle was fourteen years old and she had passed sixth grade in public school and, according to her teachers, she participated at a normal level in school activities.

In two years Isabelle achieved normal mentality whereas Anna was still, at the end of four and a half years, markedly inadequate in her development. While it was possible that this was due to Anna's innate deficiency, Davis (1946-1947) also noted that it was possible that this was due to the expert and unremitting attention that Isabelle received.

Twins: J. M. and P. M. The twins, J. M. and P. M., were born Sept. 4, 1960 (Kulochova, 1976a). Their mother died soon after birth and the boys were

placed in a children's home. Records available on them at that time indicated normal development. After a year and a half, the boys went to live with their father and stepmother. From this point to their discovery in 1967, these children had lived a deprived, isolated, and painful existence.

The boys were kept in a small, unheated closet in the basement of the house. They were not allowed to go in the other rooms of the house or go outside. Their bed was a sheet of plastic on the floor. They had a small table and a few bricks to play with. The boys suffered a lack of adequate food, sunshine, exercise or fresh air. On top of this, the stepmother, who was initially uninterested in them, developed an active hostility towards the boys. The other children in the family were forbidden to play or talk with them, and their father took little interest in them. Excluded from the family life (which was also abnormal), they lacked emotional relationships and had inadequate stimulation.

Upon liberation, the restricted social experience of these boys was demonstrated by their reactions of horror and surprise to commonplace

objects and events. Their speech was poor, repeating one or two words with poor articulation. They used gesture to communicate with each other. Their play was primitive. Physically they were poorly developed-- they could barely walk and, when they had shoes on, they could not walk at all. These seven year old boys were estimated to have a mental age of approximately three years.

After being hospitalized the children were placed in a children's home where they began to make progress. They developed relationships with adults and other children. Their health improved. They developed physically and could walk, run, jump, and ride a scooter, and their fine motor coordination improved.

By the fall of 1968 the boys had achieved the level of readiness for school. Since they still demonstrated retarded speech and poor concentration they were placed in a school for mentally retarded children.

In July of 1969, the boys were placed in a family of two unmarried sisters who were described as being intelligent and having wide interests. There

was also an adopted thirteen year old girl in the family. The boys were able to form deep, emotional bonds with this family and they gradually improved.

The boys soon outstripped their retarded classmates and it was decided to transfer them to a normal school. Thus, by the end of the period of the first report, the boys were functioning normally for children of their age.

Kulochova (1976b) reported that the boys were eventually moved from fourth grade to sixth grade due to their mastery of the subject matter. They were developing self-confidence and enjoyed school. They were planning on going to secondary school after completing the basic requirements. The boys were developing well and they did not demonstrate any kind of pathology associated with their earlier deprivation.

Clarke (1972) took Kulochova's results as a strong indication against theories that place over-riding emphasis on the early years for later development. Clarke and Clarke (1976b, 1976c, 1977) have argued that early adversity of long duration can have debilitating effects but, if alleviated and

treated, these effects can be eliminated and reversed. As Clarke and Clarke (1977) expressed it, "it appears that there is virtually no psycho-social adversity to which some children have not been subjected, yet later recovered, granted a radical change of circumstances" (p. 54).

The wild boy of Aveyron.

This case falls within the class of people known as feral children. Mendelbaum (1943) has concluded that the evidence for such cases is flimsy and unreliable, and Stone (1954) has considered them "woefully undependable". Clarke and Clarke (1976d) also believed that such studies should not be taken seriously. There is one case, however, that is a well detailed and impressive history of two such wolf-children, Amala and Kamala, as reported by Singh and Zingg (1966); this account was so impressive that Langmeier and Matajcek (1975) did not believe that it could be so easily dismissed. The present case of the wild boy of Aveyron, a feral child, has also been well documented and is supported by considerable historical evidence (see Shattuck, 1980). Furthermore, as Clarke and Clarke (1976d) have noted,

"it was the first experimental study of one human being by another, and its place in the history of psychology has been underestimated" (p. 27).

In 1799, in the department of Aveyron, France, a wild boy of approximately 12 years of age was discovered who was mostly unclad, except for the tatters of a shirt (Shattuck, 1980). Itard (1962) estimated that the child, who came to be known as Victor, had been abandoned around the age of four or five and had since lived a solitary life in the wild. Itard indicated that if Victor had been socialized to any degree there was little left in his memory.

Upon his capture the boy was brought to Paris for study. What the Parisians found was a savage creature, who was human in shape alone. He was dirty and scared; he trotted and grunted like a beast, ate refuse, and was insensitive to heat and cold. His only desires were to eat, sleep, and escape the attentions of the strangers gaping at him. The boy's subnormality was attributed, by Itard, to the fact that he had not had contact with other humans and, hence, was not socialized.

While in Paris, Victor was brought before "the

great Pinel" who, upon examination, declared Victor to be an incurable idiot. This conclusion has been challenged by Langmeier and Matajcek (1975) since Victor had enough intelligence to survive on his own in the wild without help from others (and he had scars that could attest to the difficulties of that environment). Itard did not accept the judgement of Pinel either. He believed that given proper physical and social education the boy could be humanized, i.e., civilized.

Cast upon the globe without physical strength or innate ideas, incapable in himself of obeying the fundamental laws of his nature which call him to the supreme place in the universe, it is only in the heart of society that man can attain the preeminent position which is his natural destiny In the most vagrant and barbarous horde as well as in the most civilized nation of Europe, man is only what he is made. Necessarily brought up by his own kind, he has acquired from them his habits and his needs; nor are his ideas any

longer his own (p. xxi).

Itard proposed to humanize this creature, who demonstrated an aversion to society, by way of proper training and education. Victor was put in Itard's care and transferred to the Institute for Deaf-Mutes where Itard was stationed.

In order to transform this wild creature into a human being, Itard set himself five aims. The first aim was to interest Victor in social life by rendering it more pleasing to him than his life in the wild had been. The second aim was to arouse Victor's nervous sensibility through energetic stimulation of that sensibility. Third, Itard aimed to increase Victor's range of ideas by introducing new needs and greater social contacts. The fourth aim was to induce in Victor the use of speech. Lastly, Itard hoped to develop mental operations in the boy and then to educate him.

To make social life more pleasing to Victor, Itard concluded that his simple pleasures, his appreciation of nature, should not be curtailed. Itard allowed Victor's limited behaviors--sleeping, eating, doing nothing, and running--to follow their

natural course, which was, as Itard had hoped, a transformation of these into more socially acceptable patterns of expression.

Concerning Victor's nervous sensibility, Itard agreed with Pinel that it was defective; there was a dullness to his sense organs. Victor was insensitive to heat or cold--reaching for a potatoe in boiling water or sitting naked in snow. His nose was insensitive to snuff being applied, i.e., no sneezing. His hearing was considered the most defective of his senses (something I find unfathomable): Itard fired two pistol shots near Victor; Victor reacted only slightly to the first volley and, to the second, he did not even turn his head. On the other hand, a walnut cracked, or the sound of something else edible that was familiar to the boy never failed to receive his attention. By the end of his second report to the Napoleonic government, Itard referred to the apathy of the sense of hearing. Brown (1958) noted that Victor attended to sounds that were important to survival in the wild but did not attend to the human voice. This seems to me to be the correct conclusion--Victor attended to

what was meaningful to him and not to what was meaningful to others. Of course avoiding pistol shots is essential to survival in the wild or elsewhere, but to take such a position is to presume a previous awareness of the dangers of firearms and, since Victor bore no bullet wounds, there is no reason to suppose that pistol shots were a part of life in the wild for Victor. Whatever defects there were in Victor's hearing lay in the methods used to make social sounds meaningful to Victor and pertinent to his existence and not, I suggest, in his hearing.

To increase his sensitivity in other areas, Itard used hot baths, douches, warm clothes, massages, and other stimulants, in an effort to exercise his senses. As a result, Victor's sensitivity gradually awakened. He grew sensitive to heat and cold, and his senses of taste, smell, and touch were improved. Sight and hearing, according to Itard, did not respond as readily.

To increase his range of ideas, Itard used a game in which a chestnut was placed under one of three cups. The chestnut, being edible, called forth Victor's attention, and he would readily engage in

guessing its location. Eventually the chestnut was replaced by inedible objects. Victor enjoyed this almost as much and it served to provoke attention in him, encourage judgement, and steady his gaze. Itard also took Victor on trips into town to dine. This became a pleasure for Victor. Itard took advantage of this by preceding the expeditions with preparatory signs of the trip. These became a signal to Victor that an outing was to occur. His intellect was awakening.

Itard failed in his efforts to get Victor to speak. On the other hand, Victor naturally (without being trained to do so) conveyed his needs through gesture. He also understood the gestures that others made to him. Thus Victor had a form of communication which was effective in satisfying his need to be understood--he did not need speech. Itard found this astonishing; he needed no lesson and he did not require understanding to send or receive gestural information. Shattuck (1980) wondered, due to Victor's failure to speak, why Itard didn't expand his capacity for gesture by teaching him sign language. This was a curious omission since Itard

was resident physician for approximately 100 deaf-mutes. Also curious was the fact that Itard did not encourage Victor to play with these children.

The fifth aim, to build Victor's mental faculties, met with greater successes (see Boyd, 1917, for an excellent summary). Itard, being a keen observer, noticed that Victor had "a most decided taste for order" (p. 39) and he took advantage of this preference in Victor and built upon it. Itard had noticed that Victor was quick to return objects to the place in which he was accustomed to seeing them. Itard decided, therefore, to fasten some objects to the wall with a nail, along with drawings of those objects. After a while, Itard put the objects and their drawings in disorder; Victor proceeded to put them in their proper places. This was done according to memory as opposed to classification. Itard went beyond Victor's memory by increasing the number of objects and their corresponding drawings. With this alteration, Victor began to compare objects with their related drawings. Itard then took to placing the alphabetical letters, that formed the name of the object with the drawing.

Initially this was unsuccessful.

Itard decided to backtrack and taught Victor how to distinguish shapes and colors. As his discrimination of shape improved Itard was in a position to teach him to distinguish letters. Once Victor could distinguish the letters, Itard again associated words with the objects that they designated. Itard then placed all of the objects in the corner of the room and, using the written word, had Victor fetch objects. At first Victor could not get the object if his eyes were not fixed on the word. He gradually improved to the point where a mere glance at the word was all he needed. Not only was Victor learning to read and distinguish objects, he was also developing his memory. This also suggests that he was internalizing this system of mediating objects by meaning.

The next step was to have Victor fetch two, three, and even four objects at one time. After this procedure, Itard placed the objects in a different room and Victor would set off to fetch them from there. Initially Victor could only perform the task by running from room to room. As his memory

improved, and as he trusted it more, Victor took to his task at a leisurely pace; he would even stop to look out the window before returning to Itard with the required objects.

Without going into detail, it may be noted in summary that Victor was eventually trained in abstraction, the use of adjectives and verbs, and the art of writing. At one point in learning to write, the chalk was too short for Victor, so Itard gave him a pencil holder. A few days later Victor needed a pencil holder but none was available. Much to Itard's pleasure, Victor found a skewer and modified it to serve as a pencil holder--an act of creative imagination.

By the end of five years Victor, besides the developments mentioned so far, had a warm attachment to his governess--with whom he lived till his death at age 40 (Shattuck, 1980). He had a sense of justice--of right and wrong, he could express gratitude, he displayed normal human emotions, and he was a moral being. In short he was a human being and no longer the savage, 'wild boy'. Victor, at the same time, never lost his love of nature. Itard

summarized his development over his period of training as follows:

First, that the improvement of his sight and touch and the new gratification of his sense of taste have, by multiplying the sensations and ideas of our savage, contributed powerfully to the development of his intellectual faculties; secondly, when one considers the full extent of this development, among other real improvements he will be found to have both a knowledge of conventional value of the symbols of thought and the power of applying it by naming objects, their qualities, and their actions. This has led to an extension of the pupil's relations with the people around him, to the faculty of expressing his wants to them, of receiving orders from them, and of effecting a free and continual exchange of thoughts; thirdly, that in spite of his immoderate taste for freedom of open country and his indifference to most of the pleasures of social life,

Victor shows himself sensible of the care taken of him, susceptible to fondling and affection, alive to the pleasure of well-doing, ashamed of his mistakes, and repentant of his outbursts (Itard, p. 101).

Curiously, with all that Itard had accomplished, he had a low opinion of Victor's development due to his failure to speak. Thus Itard reported, "I resigned myself to the necessity of giving up any attempt to produce speech, and abandonned my pupil to incurable dumbness" (p. 86). Victor, however, unlike many of the common people of his day, learned to read and write and, although lacking in some abilities, he was a far cry from the wild beast he had been. Itard effectively developed Victor's social nature and his humanity. There is a clear indication of the correctness of Leontiev's proposition that a child is not able to become fully human without social engagement with others.

Sensory deprivation. The work to be considered at this juncture is drawn from Meshcheryakov (1979) and it is aptly titled "Awakening to life". The book

documents the work of Meshcheryakov with 50 deaf-blind children at the Zaporsk children's home and it "involves the unique task of deliberately shaping a whole human personality" (Meshcheryakov, p. 22).

These children who were held back at an extremely low level of development provided an unparalleled opportunity to examine the conditions that are necessary for the formation of a human personality (Zaporozhets, 1979). As Zaporozhets concluded, the work of Meshcheryakov provides strong evidence to support the theory of activity, that mind and personality are shaped in activity.

Deaf-blindness, as Meshcheryakov indicated, is due, as a rule, to illness. The illnesses that bring on this condition are varied and the course of subsequent development does not follow a common pattern. Also, not all of these children were educable; it was necessary to single out those children whose damage did not prevent them from learning.

Two factors distinguished the deaf-blind child from the normal child. The first is that the

deaf-blind children have to form all of their impressions or ideas about the external world through the sense of touch. Secondly, but more important to Meshcheryakov, is that these children are condemned to a life of isolation unless special efforts are made to reach them and draw them out. Without this their minds are not capable of developing. On their own, even though their brain may be normal, the child can achieve only insignificant development and will be crippled mentally.

The deaf-blind child is shut off from normal human contact, and this isolation is the reason for his mental under-development or degradation. This means that the deaf-blind child is a being as yet bereft of a human mind, while possessing the capacity for full mental development (Meshcheryakov, p. 29)

Without specific tuition the deaf-blind children can spend their life confined to a bed with no real contact with people or everyday objects, simply not developing as they could with adequate training. They have an awareness of only their elementary

physical needs, of pleasure or displeasure associated with satisfaction or dissatisfaction of these needs. They exhibit only stereotyped motor activity. White (1940), speaking about such deaf-blind cases, e.g., Helen Keller, put the matter quite bluntly:

Until they "got the idea" of symbolic communication they were not human beings, but animals, they did not participate in behavior which is peculiar to human beings. They were "in" human society as dogs are, but they were not of human society (White, p. 462).

Since they know nothing, or almost nothing, of the world, they do not have a need to discover the world that, through their lack of senses, they have have been cut off from. It is necessary to engage in the laborious task of helping the child to realize a need to engage the world of which they are unaware.

Meshcheryakov's approach was to start with the basic, organic needs of the children and to humanize them by bringing about the appropriation of social experience, as embodied in tools, e.g. spoons and pillows. The children are trained in using everyday

objects to satisfy their basic human needs. The child as a result begins to form images of objects in the world. In mastering and manipulating household objects the child makes contact with human society and begins to assimilate the accumulated experience of thousands of years of human life.

Meshcheryakov believed that it was essential to begin by teaching the child self care. This was to lay a foundation for subsequent development. Exercises were also considered important for developing sensory ability and motor skills but self-care allows the child to begin to develop independent activity. In the training process the teacher needs to be alert for signs of independent activity and to encourage this since it is easy for the deaf-blind child to grow accustomed to being cared for. This whole process is very slow and meticulous. Strings of small actions are developed in order to arrive at a single continuous behavior, e.g., dressing oneself.

The next step in the children's development is to extend their territory. The child was acquainted with objects in her or his immediate vicinity and

this is then gradually extended. Crucial at this point is that objects not be moved so that the child does not learn that the environment is unstable and therefore is to be feared. When the environment changes, the children may not venture beyond their bed. Only after the child has learned not to fear movement in the environment can objects be moved (this is so that the child learns that the environment can change but that she or he can make their way even with the changes). The outcome of this is that the child develops spatial orientation.

Also following upon self-care, it is essential to develop communication in the child, at first through sign language, and to proceed from this to word-speech. This is done by gradually replacing signs for familiar objects with finger spelling. Then verbal language is trained by learning by heart the dydactic alphabet. Finally the child is taught braille.

Another important aspect of training after the development of self-care is the observance of a timetable. A structured timetable allows the children to order their behaviors and their mental

processes. The external ordering would be interiorized into an inner order. Not seeing the light of day, literally, these children do not naturally have a conception of night and day or a sense of time. With a timetable, time is no longer a monotonous and chaotic flow. The child also develops a sense of a future through temporal structuring.

An invaluable tool for time analysis is the pattern of events in the child's day-to-day existence (sleep, waking, eating, dressing, undressing, walks, washing, etc.). If no strict timetable is observed it is impossible for a deaf-blind child to find its bearings in time. For him a time-table lends time human significance (p. 157).

Through this whole process, the children are beginning to form images and develop their mind. Due to their lack of sight and hearing, the child forms images through tactile and motor analysis. The image is formed through practical activity with objects. The perception of an object, without practical activity, will not allow the person to grasp the essence of the object in question. An important

activity for the development of images of the objective world is tool usage. Tools carry within them the knowledge of humanity gained through practical activity. It is necessary that the tools used should be tied to the needs of the individuals if they are to have any significance.

Only the sum of the above-listed conditions (the need for practical actions, the utilization of social modes of action, the orientation of action to the satisfaction of needs) makes possible the appropriation by the individual of socially evolved knowledge (p. 293).

Eventaully the process leads to learning activity becoming an independent activity, a need to learn evolves.

In the Zagorsk children's home, when developed enough, the children begin to attend school. There the children learn geometry, mathematics, anatomy, geography, etc. They work with a braille typewriter and a teletactor. The teletactor allows the children to engage each other in conversation and lessons. On these machines they type a message which is received

by others and to which responses are received.

The effectiveness of this program is exhibited in the fact that four of the students went on to receive Ph. D.'s in Psychology (their ability is reflected in the work of Suvorov, 1983-1984).

On top of school education, the children are taught trades such as gardening, animal husbandry, sewing, and also learn trades such as machinists and carpentry. Around the home they do gardening, clearing snow, watering flowers, and other such tasks, and they are clearly capable to do so. Work, to Meshcheryakov was an important factor in further personality growth. In work the person gains an awareness of his or her self in the system of human relationships. The children also gain a sense of their own usefulness--they earn money, produce useful products, they purchase desired items with their money, go on holidays--all of which improves their self-esteem.

From the foregoing, Meshcheryakov concluded that "human behavior is shaped entirely in ontogenesis" (p. 303) and is the result of human, social interaction. Without assimilating culture and social

behavior, the individual will not become fully human. Clearly, the unfortunate, deaf-blind who do not receive the training that Meshcheryakov has provided are testimony to that. Without interpersonal interaction, in the form of training, they would not advance beyond the human as an organism, rather than as a social being. The finest testament to this fact comes from one of the psychologists who was drawn into life by Meshcheryakov--Yuri Lerner.

The best demonstration of the soundness of Meshcheryakov's teaching methods and the ideas underlying them is provided by the four of us, four deaf-blind pupils whom he has taken firmly by the hand and led out of the darkness of silence into the world of work, the world of science, making accessible to us real human happiness (Lerner, 1979, p. 323.)

Summary. In the literature on the various forms of human deprivation it is clear that social conditions determine the nature of the personality formed. In cultural deprivation we saw that individuals can only develop a personality that reflects the level of the

social development of their culture. In institutional deprivation we encountered the unfortunate effects on personality development that resulted from inadequate environmental and social influences. Social deprivation, the lack of proper human contact and interaction, also greatly hampered personality development (including cognitive and behavioral development). Lastly, with severe sensory deprivation, it became abundantly clear that without social interaction, and training regarding the historically developed activities of humanity, these people will not appropriate their social heritage. From this it can be concluded that the human personality can be distorted, repressed, arrested, and unformed if the adequate social conditions do not prevail.

Chapter 11

Personality as a product of culture and society

Within the science of psychology, personality investigation has concentrated on the methods of studying personality experimentally. While this is an important endeavor, it is also an approach that leads to rather narrow conceptualizations of personality (as can be seen in the theories discussed in the opening chapters). Most notably, these studies have been primarily concerned with Western people from First World countries. By going outside of our discipline to anthropology and sociology, it is possible to gain information about the development of personalities which are different from Western personalities and which can offer, by comparison, insights into Western issues.

The importance of understanding the relation of culture and society to the formation of personality has been noted by other authors. Segall (1979) concluded that the dictum of Kluckhohn and Murray (1971)--that every person is like all other people, some other people, and like no other people--was the

expression of a need for a social psychology that combined the work of anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists. Cambell and Naroll (1972) argued that, due to the impossibility of experimenting on means of child rearing, and subsequent personality formation, the science of personality was greatly aided by "the 'laboratory' of crosscultural comparison opened up by the anthropologist" (p. 437). Sanford (1982) made the most comprehensive statement in this regard:

But if we need personality theory to understand culture, we also need the concepts of culture and social structure to understand personality. Personality is largely constituted of social elements (from the past or the present). It interacts with the social environment, and even in its deeper structures it is continuously shaped and sustained by society and culture and various other social relationships. This leads to the common, if slightly hyperbolic, idea that all psychology is social psychology (pp.

896-897).

The idea that all of psychology is social psychology is not a new one. Dewey (1917) argued this point in his presidential address to the American Psychological Association. This, as we noted earlier, is an essential premise of Soviet psychology. This is also a view held by anthropologists and sociologists. Bateson (1974), for instance, expressed this by stating that all of human behavior is either learned or transformed by learning in interpersonal exchange. Segall (1979) echoed Bateson and went on to say that "the many forms of behavior that are distinctly human are also fundamentally social" (p. 4). These behaviors, to Segall, involved other people as well as the products of human activity. We also discovered this to be the case when we examined the literature on deprivation in the preceding chapter. As will be seen, the related processes of enculturation and socialization are markedly social processes.

Enculturation versus socialization. Kluckhohn (1949) distinguished between culture and society. Society referred to a group of people who interacted more

with each other than outsiders and who did so to attain ends. Culture referred to the way of life of the society and constituted "a storehouse of pooled learning of the group" (p. 24). To Bradburn (1963), society referred to a pattern of relationships or institutions--economic, religious, political, familial and domestic, and the organization of individuals into ranked groups such as social class. Culture referred to the values of the group as expressed in beliefs, knowledge, language, arts, laws, and customs. Linton (1945) regarded personality as "the total way of life of any society" (p. 30) and not merely those aspects of society that are regarded as desirable, and he noted that every society has a culture. There is thus a close relation between culture and society, as Linton has indicated:

While the culture of any society determines the deeper levels of its member's personalities through the particular techniques of child-rearing to which it subjects them, its influence does not end with this. It goes on to shape the rest of

their personalities by providing models for their specific responses as well. This latter process continues throughout life. As the individual matures and then ages, he constantly has to unlearn patterns of response which have ceased to be effective and to learn new ones more appropriate to his current place in society. At every step in the process, culture serves as a guide (Linton, 1945, pp. 143-144).

The relation of culture and society is also reflected in the process of being socialized or enculturated.

Bierstedt (1974) regarded socialization as a process in which one's original nature becomes transformed into what he called human nature; it was a process in which the individual was made into an acceptable member of their society. Bierstedt also maintained that in this process the person was not passive, he or she actively engaged his or her society. LeVine (1969) identified three types of socialization. Socialization could be regarded as the process by which the individual learns impulse control and suppresses instinctive behavior that is

deemed undesirable in social life. Socialization could also be regarded as role training, in which the child is trained to function in conformity with the norms and rules of society. Lastly, socialization could be regarded as enculturation, a process in which culture is incorporated or internalized, in a sort of absorption. Thus, LeVine, in the third case, actually regards socialization and enculturation as the same process. Inkeles (1969a) also put forward the view that socialization and enculturation were synonymous. To Inkeles, socialization referred to the process whereby the individual was shaped so as to adapt to the physical and sociocultural setting in which he or she lived. In this process people acquired "the knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, needs and motivation, cognitive, affective and conative patterns" (pp. 615-616) that would allow them to perform in their society. Socialization was impinged on by social structure but, according to Inkeles, socialization could also affect social structure. Segall (1979) believed that personality is formed in socialization and enculturation but he also made a distinction between these two process.

Both processes, socialization and enculturation, result in behavioral similarities within societies and behavioral differences across societies. Both processes involve learning from other people how to behave. In the case of socialization, the learning involves teaching. In the case of enculturation, teaching is not a necessary feature but learning is (Segall, 1979, p. 16).

Segall concluded that humans become humans because they have the capacity to learn and that this learning can be deliberate, as in socialization, or less intentional, as in enculturation.

As the preceding has indicated, a proper understanding of personality requires an understanding of the cultural context in which it develops. Bradburn (1963) concluded that a theory of personality, intending to achieve generality, beyond the immediate context in which it was formulated, needed to consider cultural context for three reasons. First, similar behavior patterns may have different meanings to different cultures. Second,

the antecedent conditions that specify personality development in one cultural context may be dependent on other antecedent conditions in that cultural context. Third, the cultural context in which a theory is developed should be considered because observed behavior in one context may have a small range of variation in comparison to other cultures. It would seem that anthropology can help in the formulation of a general theory of personality.

Anthropology: A brief history. The information to be presented on the history of anthropology, as it pertains to the topic of personality, has been drawn from Jahoda (1982) and Singer (1961).

Prior to 1920, anthropology did not concern itself with psychological issues. Between 1929 and 1935 a collaboration between psychologists and anthropologists began (Singer, 1961). A branch of anthropology developed in America during the 1930's which became known as 'culture and personality'. The studies done during this period had two separate roots which later became joined. One group, the students of Boas, attempted to demonstrate that culture shaped human nature, which was considered

extremely plastic, into whatever form the society required. The neo-Freudian group, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of the biological foundations of behavior and they regarded personality differences in cultures as being due the limited variations in common trends of development (Jahoda, 1982). The encounter of anthropology with psychoanalysis led to the emergence of the field of 'culture and personality'.

Considerable field work was conducted during the early period. Boas' students were very active during that period, particularly Mead and Benedict. These two women attempted to demonstrate the dominance of cultural processes over the biological but in so doing "did some violence to the facts by greatly exaggerating the internal homogeneity of cultures" (Jahoda, 1982, p. 82). The theory of the plasticity of human nature did receive acceptance, however, and challenged theories about an 'original human nature' (Singer, 1961).

Also during the early period, other anthropologists (Roheim, Kardiner, Malinowski) were testing the theories of psychoanalysis and finding

support for concepts such as the ego and superego. Jahoda (1982) has indicated that flaws began to emerge in that there was a tendency to identify a 'basic personality' of whole cultures that were sometimes damning and overgeneralized.

Although psychoanalysis was becoming popular with this same group, psychoanalytic theories about the universal Oedipus, the ubiquity of dream symbolism, the stages of personality development, and the differences between male and female psychology, were generally regarded as over-generalizations from a single culture and in need of qualification (Singer, 1961, p. 17).

Psychoanalysis, however, still continued to prosper in anthropological research.

From about 1935 to 1950 there was an emphasis on the relation of a culture to the typical personality of that culture (Singer, 1961). There was discussion of basic personality, configurational personality, and of national and cultural character. These theories contained both similarities and differences.

There was agreement that there was a typical personality produced by a culture. Differences existed, on the other hand, in the types used, the number of types a culture was said to have, how many individuals in the culture displayed the type, how the type was learned, how it was derived, whether it was the culture or the individual that displayed the type, and whether it applied to primitive or modern cultures.

The field of 'culture and personality' in anthropology was renamed 'psychological anthropology' in the early 1960's. While the field was renamed, the predominance of psychoanalytic thought remained (Jahoda, 1982).

This account of the history personality in the field of anthropology has been, admittedly, sketchy. The issue is deserving of greater attention, but to do so would entail a much larger consideration than present intentions necessitate. The interested reader is directed to Singer (1961) and Jahoda (1982) for a more thorough handling of the issues so far presented. Our intent, up to this point, has been to lay a foundation from which to introduce some

pertinent studies that will, it is hoped, indicate to the reader how the field of anthropology can contribute to the psychological study of personality. Before preceding to a consideration of this, however, we need first to consider why psychoanalysis has had an impact on anthropology.

Psychoanalysis in anthropology. Klineberg (1980) indicated that psychoanalysis was important in that it drew attention to the problems that have stimulated cross-cultural research. Jahoda (1982) was of the opinion that psychoanalysis was popular among anthropologists because of what the fieldworkers had experienced. Jahoda distinguished four types of application of psychoanalytic theory in anthropology. The first application concerned attempts to explain the origin of the social institutions encountered. Workers went into the field and came back with psychoanalytic speculation about the mechanisms underlying widespread customs. The second type, related to the first, was the unusual feature of the material encountered in the field. The third type of application, which is still a concern of psychological anthropology was the 'depth'

descriptions of the personalities found in a culture. The last type of application concerned the elucidation of the symbols found in other cultures. Having considered these issues in depth, Jahoda recognized that psychologists would be quick to take exception to the use of psychoanalysis.

Any tough-minded psychologist who has persevered so far is by now likely to have a considerably raised blood pressure, bursting to cry out--"All the same speculation, without a scrap of real hard evidence!" Such a reaction is perfectly understandable, and my own would have been similar at one time. I do not regard myself as a 'Freudian'. I have not had the benefit of an analysis, and I would not argue for the correctness of any of the specific interpretations cited. All I am trying to suggest is that there are extensive and important areas of behavior about which academic personality theory has little if anything to say. This conviction is not just the outcome of abstract

reflection--it was the result of first-hand experience of working in other cultures (Jahoda, 1982, p. 96).

Jahoda went on to indicate that the work done by academic psychologists, such as Eysenck, was, to anthropologists, "flat and two-dimensional" and lacked the dynamics of behavior as it is found in the field. Since anthropologists are not conducting experiments on the dynamic, functioning system of personality as a whole, they are more interested in testing their models in terms of their goodness of fit. Jahoda proposed that "the lesson to be learnt from anthropology is that our present approach to personality, involving a pale abstraction defined mainly in terms of test scores, is inadequate" (p. 98). Anthropologists, therefore, are looking for a theory of personality as it exists in the real world.

Having made his point regarding psychoanalysis, Jahoda went on to point out that he did not believe that psychoanalysis was the answer. Rather, he stated that anthropology was challenging psychology to come up with a theory of personality that could be tested scientifically and, at the same time, would

come to grips with issues and problems that, at present, only psychoanalysis satisfies. He argued that this theory has to treat personality as a system and that this systemic theory would also deal with the issue of the need for food and sex. Thus, while personality psychologists may disagree with the application of psychoanalysis, Jahoda has indicated where it has been applied by anthropologists, where it is inadequate, and he challenges psychology to provide something better.

Culture and personality: five conceptions. In the study of culture and personality LeVine (1973) has identified five conceptions of the relation between culture and personality. These five were the 'anti-culture-personality' position, 'psychological reductionism', the 'personality-is-culture' position, 'personality mediation', and the 'two-systems' approach. Of these five positions, the 'anti-culture-personality' and 'psychological reductionism' are no longer current. Active field investigation is being conducted by researchers taking the 'personality mediation' and the 'two-systems' approach. The 'personality-is-culture'

approach influences contemporary research but is not regarded as a position upon which to base empirical research.

Of the two positions that are no longer current, the 'anti-culture-personality' approach was an argument against culture and personality approaches that were accused of proposing that individuals of a given culture were identical. The discovery that there were individual differences within a given culture was taken as evidence of the falsity of this approach that assumed that individuals in a particular culture were identical. Levine indicated that this was an incorrect accusation but that it did raise the question of whether it was possible to find measureable differences across human populations. Another variant of this was environmental determinism wherein personality was considered to be the product of environmental factors alone. Psychological reductionism, or what has also been referred to as psychological determinism, took the position that psychological factors are independent causes of manifest, socio-cultural behavior. In other words, psychological factors were considered to be the

causes of social behavior and cultural behavior, of institutions and cultural patterns.

The personality-is-culture position, the position of Mead and Benedict, applied a doctrine of cultural relativism to personality phenomena. Noting that culture varied widely as to conceptions of what is good and beautiful, of what is to be valued, indicates that, in cultures different from one's own, it is necessary to study that culture from within in order to appreciate it from the indigenous viewpoint. As opposed to an approach that presumed a universality of child rearing practices, the personality-is-culture camp argued for an understanding of personality, sex-role behavior, and mental disturbance that varied across cultures.

Personality was, in other words, an aspect of culture, the aspect in which the emotional responses and cognitive capacities of the individual were programmed in accordance with the overall design or configuration of his culture (the "cultural patterning of personality"); social relations, religion, politics, art,

and recreation were programmed in accordance with the same design (LeVine, 1973, p. 53).

Culture and personality, as configurations of behavior, were manifest in individuals but were characteristics of their group. These characteristics were sought in all spheres of behavior, communications, and social relations; the underlying patterns were considered to have broad generality. According to LeVine, the historical development of these configurations were either considered briefly or ignored completely. These cultural configurations, as expressed in the behavior of individuals, were acquired through child rearing and social interaction.

LeVine indicated three major criticisms of the personality-is-culture position could be rendered. First, the internal consistency of a culture was exaggerated by focussing exclusively on pervasive patterns of cultural behavior, and, further, subjective methods were used to analyze the cultural material, thus preventing attempts at disproof. Second, assuming an equivalence between culture and

personality, it is impossible to determine how much adjustment occurs between individuals and their cultural norms. LeVine concluded that one is then forced to assume that a good 'fit' may not exist. He further noted that the possibility of the existence of complex relations between the individual and culture was ignored. Third, there is an assumption regarding personality development which is circular in nature and does not attempt to answer the question of what causes the pattern of behavior to develop, and the isolation of separate effects.

While Mead's view of the development of cultural character avoids the obvious fallacy of a universal child-rearing determinism, it obscures the picture of development by raising culture to the state of a general determinant operating simultaneously in so many ways that there is no use attempting to isolate specific causes. We are asked to forfeit the aim of explaining cross-cultural differences in personality in favor of simply appreciating them (LeVine, 1973, p. 55).

In short, the personality-is-culture position reduced personality to a mere reflection of culture.

Before progressing to the other position, I would first like to consider the views expressed by other authors that are pertinent to the personality-is-culture position. Bierstedt (1974), for instance, maintained that a person's performance is also influenced by her or his heredity. Furthermore, Bierstedt argued that culture, itself, is not a uniform pattern that affects all people equally; not everyone is exposed to exactly the same culture, even within the same family. Society is composed of many subcultures and each family can be regarded as a subculture. Also, culture offers many alternatives of action to its members all of which are equally acceptable. Keesing (1976) also argued that societies contain 'reservoirs of diversity' and each individual, as a result, learns a version of her or his culture that is unique. Lastly, Linton (1945) was of the opinion that there are both individual and environmental differences and that these lead to differences in personality within the same culture.

The 'personality mediation' position was

formulated by Kardiner and Linton; Whiting and Child presented a similar view. Essentially, this position divides culture in two, into determinants of personality and expressions of personality. Personality is that which mediates between the two components of culture. Kardiner identified 'primary institutions' which consisted of socioeconomic structures and the practices of child-rearing, that are an aspect of environmental constraint, and, 'secondary institutions' which include facets of culture such as art, religion, and folklore. Whiting and Child divided culture into the 'maintenance system' which includes such factors as economy and sociopolitical structure, and 'child training' (socialization) which functions within the maintenance system and shapes personality in accordance with group needs. In both theories, the practices of child-rearing operate within the constraints of the socioeconomic structure in the formation of personality.

The two-systems position, which was put forward by Inkeles and Levinson and by Spiro, identifies sociocultural institutions and modal personalities,

which are two systems that interact with each other. These two systems are composed of interdependent parts and have different requirements for their maintenance. These two sets of requirements make demands on the behavior of the individual, and influence the satisfaction of psychological needs. Interactional stability of the two systems is achieved when their specific requirements are functionally integrated through the standards of role performance which allow individuals to satisfy their psychological needs and, simultaneously, to meet the demands of the sociocultural environment. This state is called, by Spiro, functional congruence. This state is not presumed to be universal by Inkeles and Levinson; noncongruence is possible due to the fact that each of the dichotomy can undergo change and, thereby, necessitate change in the opposing system.

Masculinity/femininity. The issue of how characteristics of masculinity and femininity come into existence, whether biologically or culturally based, is an issue that has concerned psychological anthropologists since Mead (1963) studied the cultures of the Arapesh, Mundugumor, and Tchambuli in

the 1930's.

In brief, Mead concluded that the characteristic differences between the sexes were not determined by biology exclusively. Among the Arapesh, men and women both displayed a personality pattern that Mead said was maternal in regards to parenting and feminine as it was manifested in sexual behavior. Men and women were trained in cooperative and unaggressive behavior, and to be responsive to the needs and demands of others. Sex did not appear to be a powerful driving force for either of the sexes. The Mundugumor men and women, in contrast to the Arapesh, were ruthless and aggressive, and not very maternal in parenting. In general, Mead said that this overall personality could be compared with an undisciplined and violent male in Western culture.

Neither the Arapesh nor the Mundugumor profit by a contact between the sexes; the Arapesh ideal is the mild, responsive man married to the mild, responsive woman; the Mundugumor ideal is the violent, aggressive man married to the violent, aggressive woman (Mead, 1963, p. 279).

The third tribe, the Tchambuli, demonstrated a reversal of traditional sex-attitudes of Western culture. The woman was dominant and impersonal, and was the managing partner of the relation. The man was not as responsible as the woman and was emotionally dependent.

Based on her findings, Mead claimed that one was faced with the conclusion that, if the characteristics of Western women--such as passivity, responsiveness, and maternal parenting--can appear as masculine traits , in one primitive tribe, and then, in another tribe, not be a pattern for men or women, then it is not possible to regard those characteristics as sex linked. She argued that the traits commonly regarded as masculine or feminine can be considered "as lightly linked to sex as are the clothing, the manners, and the form of head-dress that a society at a given period assigns to either sex" (p. 280). Mead went on to conclude that human nature is extremely malleable and conditioned culturally. Mead succinctly concluded that "to consider such traits as aggressiveness or passivity to be sex-linked is not possible in light of the

facts" (p. 282).

Mead's conclusions were not received without some rancor. This is clear from the quote to be found in Kluckhohn (1949): "The one-line book review by a fellow anthropologist is a sobering corrective: 'Margaret, this is a very brilliant book. But do you really know any cultures in which the men have the babies?'" (p. 204). This review, in light of the fact that Mead was speaking of behavioral characteristics and not biological functions, can only be considered reactionary and, perhaps, chauvinistic. Jahoda (1982), on the other hand, stated that Mead had an axe to grind and her conclusions should be considered cautiously. He stated that in a sphere as complex as culture, personality, and sex, it is possible to select aspects of behavior that will support one's thesis. Jahoda also argued that Mead minimized the biological. While this may be so, I think the preceding review went further than fairness allows. More objectively, Jahoda indicated that in the tribe where the sex role was totally reversed, the Tchambuli, the women still nursed the children,

cooked, and engaged in tasks traditionally considered feminine and that, therefore, the notion of complete reversal was too extreme. This, to me, seems a fair assessment. On the other hand, I also believe that Mead was correct in concluding that some of the characteristics that differentiate between the sexes are a product of culture and enculturation. Jahoda further indicated that Mead, as LeVine (1973) concluded, exaggerated the internal homogeneity of culture.

Barry, Bacon, and Child (1957) conducted a survey of ethnographic reports from 110 cultures in an effort to investigate the extent to which differences in personality, between the sexes, was cultural rather than biological in origin. Barry et al looked at the strength of socialization, as it occurred in the ages of four and five to puberty, in terms of five systems of behavior. These systems were responsibility training, nurturance training, obedience training, self-reliance training, and achievement training. From their survey, Barry et al concluded that in early infancy the differentiation between the sexes is unimportant. In childhood,

however, there is widespread pressure to induce, in girls, nurturance, obedience, and responsibility, and, in boys, there is pressure for self-reliance and achievement striving. They also noted, however, that there are some instances of reversal in the training of sex differences, and many instances where no differentiation is trained. They concluded, therefore, that the results support the cultural, as opposed to the biological, differentiation of the sexes. This, of course, was Mead's point.

The question of sex differences was summarized by Segall (1979). Segall concluded that the sex differences, as determined by anthropologists and cross-cultural psychologists, indicate that males are self-assertive, achieving, and dominant, whereas females tend to be socially responsive, passive, and submissive. Segall also noted that these differences are the product of forces operating within culture in the form of socialization. The degree of differentiation between the sexes differs across cultures. Some distinctions can be considered universal, but even these differences are qualified by cultural values.

Economic function and personality. A somewhat different approach to personality in anthropology was the effort by some researchers to relate the practices of child training to the economic system, and the adult economic role, of the culture. This has been done by comparing hunters, farmers, and herders and looking for personality characteristics that would be useful in each of these professions.

Barry, Child, and Bacon (1959) investigated the relation of child training practices to subsistence economy and later adult role. They proposed that a variable of possible significance was the degree to which food was accumulated and cared for and that child training would be of a kind that would prepare the child to perform well in the adult economy. In the case of animal husbandry, in which animals must be cared for over a period of time, it was hypothesized that the ability to adhere to routine faithfully was desirable. This was also considered to be the case, although with slightly less pressure for routinization, in the case of agriculture. The failure to comply with routine risked the danger of hunger. It was also suggested that the younger

person would be obedient to the older person who had greater knowledge of how to obtain the best results. For hunters and fishermen, on the other hand, there was no provision for the extended storage of the catch; hunting and fishing could be daily tasks depending on the success achieved. Individual initiative and developed skill were at a premium. Innovation in methods was not to be feared as it was with farmers (the wrong innovation could destroy a years crops, whereas a faulty method of hunting could be readily modified--success or failure would be immediately rewarded or punished).

The procedure was that of Barry et al (1957) in which ethnographic reports, from the anthropological literature, were studied for information on socialization practices. The societies reviewed were rated separately for the boys and girls on six aspects of child training. These were obedience training, responsibility training, nurturance training, achievement training, self-reliance training, and general independence training. The ratings were for children around four and five years up to puberty. Ratings were for strength of

socialization, defined by Barry et al (1959) as positive and negative pressure as evidenced by the rewarding of desirable behavior and the punishment for the lack of behavior.

From their findings, Barry et al (1959) determined that societies that were high in accumulation, as opposed to those that were low, demonstrated higher pressure for responsibility and obedience and lower pressure for achievement, self-reliance, and independence. Societies with low accumulation had predominant pressure towards assertion. Nurture training was approximately the same for both types of societies. It was concluded that the findings were consistent with the hypothesis that child training leads to adaptation to the demands of subsistence economy.

Pressure towards obedience and responsibility should tend to make children into the obedient and responsible adults who can best ensure the continuing welfare of a society with a high-accumulation economy, whose food supply must be protected and developed gradually

throughout the year. Pressure toward self-reliance and achievement should shape children into the venturesome, independent adults who can take initiative in wresting food daily from nature, and thus ensure survival in societies with a low-accumulation economy (Barry et al, 1959, pp. 62-630.

These findings have not gone unchallenged.

Whiting and Whiting (1971) indicated that the findings of Barry et al (1959) suffered from a biased sample, since most of the herding societies were from Sub-Saharan Africa and could possibly represent a cultural bias. While Whiting and Whiting believed that Barry et al.'s argument was plausible, they proposed that a more likely explanation was that the relation between responsibility and animal husbandry was a direct consequence of the task of herding. They hypothesized, therefore, that the task of herding leads to responsibility and that herding children will demonstrate more responsibility than children who perform household tasks or go to school.

The task for a herd boy is to manage animals

which are bigger and stronger than the boy is. He must control the animals and not fear them. In order to control the animals the boy must anticipate their moves, so as not to create extra work; the boy needs to be alert and skilled. Failure to perform this duty has serious consequences since the family's well-being depends on him and negligence would result in severe punishment. Being an important task, a job well done can lead to a feeling of competence and pride. The school child, contrariwise, is faced with the task of learning. Punishment received in this case, for a wrong answer, may not seem as reasonable as does punishment to a herd boy--the significance is immediate to the herder. Furthermore, the herd boy knows the importance of his task but, for the school child, there is a reliance on faith that learning is important to the future. Whiting and Whiting also indicated that the schoolboy's sense of accomplishment and completion, at the day's end, is not the same as the herd boy who has the knowledge that his charges are safely shut away for the night. Nor does the schoolboy get the same amount of elder's attention that the herd boy receives; compliance is

not as closely supervised. Lastly, the task of the school boy is focussed on the self, the individual, whereas the task of the herd boy is focussed on the good of the family. Herd boys, thus, are trained to be both responsible , dominant, and obedient, and they are in a better position to identify with an adult role than is the school boy, who is expected to be achievement oriented.

Whiting and Whiting also surveyed ethnographic reports of child rearing practices to support their hypotheses. They determined that herd boys receive more punishment, in the form of beatings and slaps, than non-herd boys, indicating that herd boys are under greater pressure to be obedient. They are also the recipients of more commands and suggestions than are non-herd boys. At the same time, however, herd boys are not necessarily more obedient than non-herders. Whiting and Whiting arrived at a profile of the herd boy as one who receives frequent demands, who ignores commands, and who receives a beating for disobedience. The herd boy is also one who will issue commands and suggestions to peers and siblings. The school boys, in contrast, who were

involved in personal achievement, tended to be arrogant; they boasted and called attention to themselves. It was concluded, therefore, that the chores assigned children influence the development of their personalities.

Bolton, Bolton, Gross, Koel, Michelson, Munroe, and Munroe (1976) studied the effect of pastoralism on personality in the Peruvian Andes. Bolton et al were also critical of Barry et al (1959). They were opposed to the construction of indexes, based on the naturalistic observation of ethnographic research, instead of using direct measures. They preferred, therefore, to conduct a study using direct measures.

In the Bolton et al. study of Andes pastoralism, there was a mixed, subsistence pattern of herding and agriculture. Some children performed herding chores while others were given household and agricultural chores. Eight variables were chosen to examine the influence of herding and agriculture on personality. The variables were independence, aggression, cooperation, quickness of decision, self-reliance, achievement, responsibility, and obedience. Aggression was determined by the number of hits given

to a Bobo doll (after the experimenter hit the doll three times). Self-reliance was tested by determining how much help a child would request in three tasks using construction blocks. Cooperation was measured by using a task that required two people to achieve a desired end. Need for achievement was tested with a ring toss game. To measure responsibility, the child was given the responsibility of keeping a cup filled with water. Independence was calculated by determining the latency between being told they could have some bread and the taking of the first piece. Obedience was determined by having the child put away some blocks that were scattered about and to follow the command not to play with the other toys. Finally, decision making was tested by seeing how long a child would take to choose one of five toys after being told to do so.

The results indicated that herders were independent, and that they were directly and openly expressive of emotion. This conflicted with Barry et al's. finding that herders engaged in responsible tending of herds as lacking independence and being

more compliant and conservative. Bolton et al. suggested that these results for the Andean sample could be due to the fact that the animals tended were llamas and alpacas and that they are more docile than sheep and require less tending. As a result the herding children, alone in the hills, are free to do what they will while herding. The personality these herders displayed was considered by Bolton et al. to have arisen from the specific tasks of pastoralism. At the same time, Bolton et al. pointed out that, while their findings did not confirm the conclusions of Barry et al. (1959) neither did they refute them.

The last study to be examined of personality in its relation to subsistence to be considered here is that of Cone (1979). Cone also surveyed ethnographic data to arrive at her conclusions. Her's was a comparison of pastoralists and mixed farmers who both herd and grow crops. Cone's hypothesis was that pastoralists would receive high ratings on toughness, maturity, and dutifulness, and that they would be lower on submissiveness than mixed farmers. She based this hypothesis on the fact that herding requires stoicism, independent decision making, and

less supervision than farming.

Cone's results supported Barry et al. (1959) in that animal herding was crucial to socialization. Child rearing practices did not differ between pastoralists and farmers. Since mixed farmers, in adulthood, shifted from herding to farming, Cone proposed that the differences found between adult pastoralists and mixed farmers can be linked to the demands of adult life rather than socialization patterns and childhood tasks.

Clearly these results are inconclusive and need further clarification, preferably experimental. As far as the study of personality goes, however, I think that these studies explore some interesting issues: To what degree do child training, economic demands, and adult role affect personality? Before proceeding, a related study will add to the foregoing but will address somewhat different issues.

Berry (1966, 1967) studied the differences in perception (1966) and the differences between independence or conformity (1967) between two societies that contrasted in cultural and ecological characteristics--the Temne of Sierra Leone and the

Eskimo of Baffin Island.

Berry hypothesized that it would be possible to detect differences in visual ability between societies in which their visual environments differ (Segall, 1979, has reviewed the large body of literature on cultural differences in perception and cognition). The Temne environment is covered with bush and vegetation; it is visually stimulating and colorful. The Eskimo environment is bleak in comparison; in the winter it is white and in the summer it is of a uniform, grey-brown tone. To survive in their environment, the Eskimo need to develop some specialized perceptual skills that the Temne do not. The Eskimo needs to isolate fine discriminations in the visual environment in order to hunt effectively, and, in order to travel in this environment, small details need to be organized into a spatial awareness of present location in relation to surrounding objects. Culturally, the Eskimo have more geometric and spatial distinctions as reflected in their language and superior decorative arts and crafts than do the Temne.

A battery of perceptual tests demonstrated that

the Eskimo were more aware of minute details than the Temne were not. Berry concluded that ecological demands (visual environment) and cultural practices, i.e., language and arts, are significantly related to the development of perceptual skills. The uniform environment of the Eskimos requires finer discrimination than does that of the Temne.

Berry (1967) developed the comparison between the Temne and the Eskimo in terms of independence and conformity as it related to their subsistence-level economies. The world of the Eskimo has no edible vegetation and they must rely, therefore, on hunting and fishing. Child training practices display disciplinary leniency and encouragement of individualism. Independence and self-reliant competency are highly valued. The Temne, unlike the Eskimo, are rice farmers who harvest a single crop that must last them through the following years. Child training involved considerable disciplinary severity, strict toilet training, and suppressed individuality. It was hypothesized that, in an experiment comparable to Asch's (1952) study of conformity, conformity the Temne would demonstrate

greater conformity than the individualistic Eskimo.

In the experimental task, a sheet with nine lines was presented to the subjects. They were asked to pick out the line which was similar in length to the top line. To examine conformity, they were told that most people of their culture picked a certain line. Then they were asked to pick the line that was similar. The results indicated that the Temne were highly likely to accept the group norm whereas the Eskimo tended to disregard the suggestion of group preference. Thus, according to Berry, these cultures have developed a degree of conformity that meets the requirements of their local economies. It was concluded that societies that have a low food-accumulation develop individuals who are self-reliant and independent whereas societies high in food-accumulation develop members who are more group dependent.

Class and socialization. The socialization of different practices lead to the development of different characteristics, depending on the social class of the child (Kerckhoff, 1972). These differences affect how other people will treat the

child and the activities that she or he will engage in. Early socialization influences what opportunities are open to the person and what will be available to them in terms of needs, and this will affect their adult personalities.

An exhaustive study of class membership in relation to the valuation of conformity or self-directedness in children was conducted by Kohn (1977). The argument presented by Kohn was that there is a relationship between a person's class and the values that are held. These values were interpreted as resulting from the differences in life conditions and, most particularly, occupational life.

To investigate this possibility, three studies in Washington, D.C., Turin, and across the U.S. (the National study), were conducted. Interviews were conducted with parents in which they were asked to choose three characteristics, from 17 possible ones, that they considered most important for their child. Some examples are: "That he is honest", That he is neat and clean", or "That he is able to play by himself".

In the Washinton study both classes, middle- and

working-class, considered it important that their children would be happy, considerate, honest, dependable and obedient. Where the classes differed was in terms of conformity or self-directedness. Middle-class parents put a premium on self-directed behavior, focussing on internal standards in the control of behavior. Working-class parents emphasized compliance to parental authority which focussed on rules of behavior that were externally imposed. This research when conducted in Turin uncovered similar results with the qualification that obedience was more highly valued in Italy. This led Kohn to conclude that "there is something intrinsic to social stratification that yields similar results in the two countries" (p. 46).

The generality of these findings was determined by using a sample of 1500 fathers of children between the ages of three and 15 who were living at home. The sample was drawn from large and small communities, from families of varied racial, religious, and national background, from different regions of residence, and of different family size. The results were consistent with the two previous

studies--fathers of higher social class valued characteristics that emphasized self-direction and fathers of lower social class valued characteristics that emphasized conformity to standards imposed externally. Kohn was moved by the findings:

The implications are impressive. In this exceptionally diverse society--deeply marked by racial and religious division, highly varied in economy, geography, and even degree of urbanization--social class stands out as more important for men's values than does any other line of social demarcation, unaffected by all the rest of them, and apparently more important than all of them together (Kohn, p. 72).

Kohn further concluded that two dimensions of social stratification that are important are occupation and education. The relation between class and values is interpretable as resulting from class differences in life conditions, and conditions of occupation in particular. The occupational conditions of freedom from close supervision, the complexity of the work, and the non-routinization of

the flow of their work reflects the degree of self-direction that exists in their work. The demands of a person's job, which largely determine the location of the job in the economic structure of society, affects the person's perceptions, values, and thinking.

Members of different social classes, by virtue of enjoying (or suffering) different conditions of life, come to see the world differently--to develop different conceptions of social reality, different aspirations and hopes and fears, different "conceptions of the desirable" (Kohn, p. 7).

Kohn summarized the work by concluding that the more diverse, complexly structured a person's work is, the more she or he will value self-direction. On the other hand, the more the work is simply structured and routine, the more the person will value conformity. Kohn further pointed out that parents impart the lessons derived from the conditions of their lives to their children, thus preparing them for life in a similar class position

and, thereby, perpetuating inequality.

Modernity. The last study to be considered in this chapter concerns the effect of national and economic modernization on a persons values, attitudes, and modes of acting (Inkeles, 1969b, 1977).

Inkeles interviewed 6,000 men from Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria, and East Pakistan. These people had varied work histories. They were cultivators of land, migrants from the countryside, nonindustrial workers (e.g., barbers, carpenters), experienced industrial workers, secondary school students, and university students.

Education was found to be the most significant factor in making a person modern in their outlook. At the same time, occupational experience with large organizations and factories also contributed to the introduction of modern behaviors and attitudes.

The syndrome of modernity is expressed in openness to new experiences, independence from traditional authority, belief in the efficacy of medicine and science, higher occupational and educational goals for themselves and their children, a tendency to make plans in advance, a strong

interest in politics, and in efforts to remain informed about national, and international current events. These attitudes were also expressed in the behaviors of those men sampled.

Inkeles (1977) concluded that school and factory yield the similar result, the syndrome of modernity, and that as people move up the scale of modernity, as judged by behavior and attitude, they become informed and active participants in their society.

Discussion. This chapter has explored the issues of enculturation and socialization. It is not suggested that it is a complete review of complex issues and should be considered a representative sketch of some of the issues outside of psychology that have pertinence to the psychology of personality. It has been an introduction to some interesting ideas and research that stimulate productive thought about the factors that affect personality and of new ways of conceiving of the origin of personality. The whole question of social class, subsistence economies, child training practices, institutions, and cultures, as each affects personality, opens up new vistas for the exploration of the formation of personality and

the subsequent maintenance or modification of personality. Clearly fields outside of psychology can contribute to issues within the field and it is perhaps time to look on anthropology and sociology as sources of information of related interest to psychology.

Chapter 12

Personality and cultural change

The issue to be considered in this chapter will be the nature of personality change as a result of changing social conditions. This is an important consideration for the field of personality since an enduring debate has been whether or not a fully developed personality is stable or whether further change is possible.

Review. Before proceeding on to the main topics of concern in this chapter, I want to make brief mention of the indication of personality change that has already been considered. As the reader will recall, Rappoport (1972) proposed that by age 26 most people have become established in a career and a family life. Presumably this would be considered a mature personality and, if those persons advocating crystalization of personality at maturity are correct, no further major changes should occur. Rappoport, however, was of the view that during the period of maturity (26-50) the adult loses illusions and assumes a toughness. A person can also develop a

dissatisfaction with her or his job and family life. Rappoport argued that a person may dig in her or his heels and take a defensive stance against these pressures, ceasing further development. On the other hand, the person can also question the meaning of her or his life, reevaluate her or his self and, possibly, change. Also, in the period of old age, social-emotional deterioration can occur due to loss of status and physical and social deterioration. Thus from Rappoport's standpoint there is no reason to believe that personality once formed and matured cannot undergo further growth or alteration.

Preliminary consideration. Kagan (1969) was of the opinion that "the murky idea of 'personality' is of no meaning without a commitment to the notion of enduring structure" (p. 987). Kagan proposed that one can speak of enduring structures for infants in their cribs, for preschoolers with their parents, youngsters with their peers, and mothers with their children, but Kagan also allowed for discontinuity due to changes in social structure. This is consistent with the descriptions of Rappoport(1972) who allowed for enduring structure in phases of

development and change across stages. From the perspective of activity theory, we speak of the relative stability of personality and its structure. As a person's activities change an alteration in personality can be expected. If the activities do not undergo major change personality and its structure would be expected to remain relatively stable.

Some authors have theorized the completion of personality by the age of ten but Bloom (1964) has concluded that these notions are inconsistent with longitudinal evidence that indicates changes in interests, attitudes, and other specific characteristics of personality. Kagan (1976) also argued against the notion that infant experiences affect adult behavior--early structures are modifiable. Clarke and Clarke (1972) reached this conclusion:

. . . the facts appear to demand modifications of many dearly held cliches which, for example, stress that the child is father to the man in the sense that early experience dictates a pre-determined

course of development and makes or mars the child. Even education, which from primary school to university is adept at planning the self-fulfilling prophecy, cannot arrange for human development to be necessarily consistent, and if our expectancies do not blind us to the facts, the passage of time provides many surprises, good and bad, about particular individuals (pp. 51-52).

Clarke and Clarke (1972), reviewing published work, concluded that there are aspects of the early measurement of personality that show both continuity and change; there are some people who "show a rock-like consistency" and others who "show dramatic fluctuation" (p. 44). They proposed that statement of average change "conceals wide variation in individual growth rate" (p. 50). They also concluded that the greater the time between measure one and measure two, the greater would be the possibility of finding change. The indication of change was also dependent on the nature of the measure used--the cruder the measure the stronger was the possibility

of finding consistency, and the more sensitive the measure the greater was the chance of discovering change.

McCrae and Costa (1982) observed that there are longitudinal studies that have offered persuasive evidence in favor of the notion of stability, but they also said that the evidence has not conclusively ended the argument. It was their opinion that the experimental evidence opens the door to concern about the methods by which personality has been assessed. Mischel and Peake (1982) and Pervin (1984b) proposed that the debate about consistency or inconsistency, stability or variability, should be replaced by recognition of functional patterns that involve both stability and change.

Neugarten (1964) maintained that the inconsistency of support for stability or change has reflected an oversimplification of the issues by considering them in terms of test-retest studies. It was Neugarten's opinion that the discrepancies in conclusions illustrated the difficulties in generalizing from these studies,. The studies varied in terms of size and the heterogeneity of their

samples, and in the time elapsed between test periods. Neugarten also concluded that some of these problems arose because the measures were either on internal factors or external factors. It was her belief that there are hundreds of studies that indicate change and that there is every reason to support the idea of personality change throughout adulthood. Neugarten concluded that "it is not the conviction that personality change occurs in adulthood, but the methods for measuring these changes, that psychologists are lacking" (p. 185).

Secord and Backman (1961) pointed out that personologists tend to make the assumption that behavioral stability is due to the stability in the personality structure. This is a position that tends to place the emphasis on stability on internal factors. Secord and Backman, however, argued that stability and change are the result of the interaction of the person and the environment, including other people, rather than interpersonal processes, that account for stability or change. Secord and Backman argued in favor of the interpersonal matrix in accounting for behavioral

stability or change.

Moss and Susman (1980) argued that a statement about stability or change is limited in meaning if the socio-psychological conditions that precipitate change are ignored. They favored taking the psychosocial conditions that bring about change into consideration. It is this that will concern us for the remainder of this chapter. We will not only consider the changes effected in individuals but also changes in whole cultures, all of which will indicate that not only changes in attitudes but also in global personality can occur due to changing social conditions. It will also be seen that these changes are not restricted to any age group.

Attitudes and job change. Lieberman (1956) engaged in a longitudinal study, in a field situation, on the effects of role change on attitudes in a "role-differentiated, hierarchical organization" (p. 386). This organization was a medium-sized company in the Midwestern, U.S., that produced home appliances. In this factory there were 2500 workers, of whom 150 were foremen and another 150 were stewards for the union.

To gauge the effects of role change on attitudes, Lieberman conducted an attitude survey in 1951 in which nearly all of the personnel answered a questionnaire on attitudes. There were four general areas of attitudes studied: 1) attitudes towards the management and its officials, 2) attitudes about the union and its officials, 3) attitudes towards the company's incentive system in which workers were paid according to the number of pieces turned out, and 4) attitudes regarding the seniority system, sponsored by the union, in which promotions occurred by seniority. The incentive system and the seniority system were areas of conflict between management and union and these systems were administered by the foremen and the union stewards.

It was hypothesized by Lieberman that people who take on a new role will develop attitudes that are congruent with that role. The new foreman, who represented management, was expected to develop attitudes favorable to management, while new stewards were expected to have attitudes more favorable to the union.

In the year following the initial survey, 1952,

Lieberman returned and administered the same attitude survey to the 23 workers who had become foremen, to the 35 workers who had been elected union stewards, and to a control group of 46 workers who had not experienced any change in role. The control group was matched on demographic, attitudinal, and motivational variables based on the reports made in the initial survey.

It was found that the control group showed no change in attitudes surveyed, or changes that were less marked, from the before (1951) to the after (1952) situation. The experimental groups, the foremen and the stewards, did exhibit attitude changes. The workers who became foremen experienced attitudes that moved in a pro-management direction while the workers who had been elected union stewards tended to move in the direction of being pro-union. These changes in attitudes were more pronounced for the workers who had been made foremen. Lieberman suggested that the difference in the magnitude of the change could possibly be accounted for by the nature of the changes that the foremen and the steward underwent. For the stewards there was an increase in

responsibilities and functions that took a few hours of their time each week; the union members continued to be their reference group. The foremen, on the other hand, underwent greater and more fundamental changes. They took on a permanent, full-time job and had to forfeit their union membership so that they could assume the position of being a surrogate of management. In this process of changing roles "the new foremen became more anti-union but new stewards do not become more anti-management" (p. 393).

Between 1952 and 1954 the U.S. suffered an economic setback. As a result of the poor economic conditions, some of the foremen were returned to non-supervisory roles to fill the vacancies created by layoffs. Lieberman conducted a resurvey to find out what influences these changes had on attitudes. Results indicated that those foremen who returned to the role of worker lost the attitudes they had gained, returning to their attitudes held prior to promotion. Those foremen who had been promoted and retained their supervisory role continued to maintain, or even increase, their favorable attitudes towards management. This study, therefore, suggests

that as one changes role functions and reference groups, changes in attitudes can occur, but, as Lieberman indicated, the study did not address the question of what mechanism was behind the change. Activity theory, discussed earlier, would suggest that the answer is to be found in the change of activities. Taking on a new activity can lead to changes in how one thinks. For the purposes of this chapter it is enough to note that change did occur.

Change in Lebanon. Melikian and De Karaptian (1977) discussed the acculturation of Lebanese Armenians into the Lebanese culture. Accultuaration is the process whereby a person learns a culture which is different from the one in which he or she was born and raised. If acculturation succeeds, the immigrant is assimilated and accepts the dominant group. The process is easier for the second generation and easier still for the third. There are a number of factors which affect this process:

The final outcome, however, depends, upon the similarity between the home and host cultures, the number and age of immigrants, their socioeconomic status and educational

level, their predisposition to change, and the attitude of the new culture towards the foreigner (Melikian and De Karaptian. pp. 185-186).

Of particular importance in this study was the immigrant population's predisposition to change or, from an activity perspective, their need to change.

The Lebanese Armenians that were examined in this study were descendents of refugees from Turkey who sought refuge in the host country between 1918 and 1936. Compared to the Lebanese Arab Christians who had been long-term residents and who were assimilated, the Armenians resisted acculturation. They maintained their own school and their own ethnic organizations. Their resistance to acculturation was tied to their belief that some day they would return to their homeland of Armenia, an Armenia that was independent of Turkey.

Lebanon, after winning its independence in 1946, developed a Lebanese national consciousness and undertook the creation of a uniform educational system that had as a compulsory course the teaching of the official language--Arabic. This meant that

Armenian schools were required to teach Arabic language as well as Arabic history. Along with this change fostered by the host society, the Armenians were experiencing improved economic conditions. Furthermore, many years had passed since the exodus from Armenia and the likelihood of returning was slim. All these factors contributed to the eventual acculturation of the Armenians into Lebanese culture.

The assimilation of the Lebanese Armenians was determined by administering the Edwards Personality Preference Schedule (EPPS) to Armenian students at the University of Beirut in 1956 and 1973. Comparison of the results from these cross-sectional data indicated that the Lebanese Armenians had become more like Lebanese Arab Christians. The Armenians, in the second test as opposed to the first, indicated greater flexibility in their behavior, greater security in interpersonal relationships, and greater openness to the views of others. They were more likely to achieve, endure hard work, and persist under difficult circumstances. They still differed from the ethnic majority on the factors of exhibitionism and dominance on the EPPS.

Melikian and De Karaptian pointed out that political events had also brought about changes, since the revolution of 1958, such that Armenians have been recognized as playing an important role in strengthening the position of Lebanese Arab Christians, and the Lebanese Armenians were becoming represented in the Lebanese parliament. Realizing the unlikelihood of return to Armenia, the Armenians began to take their Lebanese identity with greater seriousness. They were aware of their becoming assimilated and discussed it in their clubs and organizations.

Melikian and De Karaptian also indicated that requiring the Armenians to learn Arabic in their schools and further requiring that they pass examinations in Arabic language, history, and literature, may have influenced their greater openness to assimilation. This point, it seems to me, deserved stronger recognition since the subjects involved were university students and they, presumably, felt a greater need to meet cultural and academic standards. It is not clear whether these findings could have been generalized to

non-university Armenians. In any event the failure to assimilate Armenian university students noted in 1956 was not in evidence in 1973 (except for the two factors mentioned). Unlike 1956 when it was possible to be upwardly mobile, i.e., attend university, in 1973 it was necessary to learn Arabic culture if one wanted to progress in academic endeavours. There was a need to grasp Arabic culture that had not existed in 1956 and the activities engaged in, i.e., reading and studying, appear to have led to some internalization of the values and norms of that culture.

Change in Yugoslavia. The study to be examined now is that of Tomasic (1942). In this instance we will explore the communal life (called zadrugas) of the Croation peasants of Yugoslavia and, afterwards, examine the impact of forced social change on the organization of zadruga life and its effect on the peasant personality.

A zadruga was a self-sufficient community, both economically and emotionally. It was composed of a number of families which numbered between 40 and 50 people. The zadruga members had a common house that

served as residence for all zadruga members during winter. In the summer the zadruga members would spend free time at their cottage, on their individual property, where they worked when the labor of the collective, on the collective land, had been done. Being a feudal society, the lands that the peasants worked were under the control of a feudal lord, a seigneur, but it belonged to the zadruga members. Since large tracts of land were needed to preserve the zadruga's self-sufficiency, the peasants highly valued land. As a consequence of their need for land, the peasants had fought for centuries against the subjugation of feudal organization and had engaged in uprisings against the seigneurs.

The zadruga had arable fields, orchards, vegetable gardens, vineyards, herds of cattle, hogs, goats, sheep, horses, and poultry. Practically all of the necessities of life were provided internally. The only items traded for were salt and iron. Except for the individual plot of each family, the lands and chattel were owned collectively, and equally, by the zadruga members.

Work in the zadruga was done for the common good

of the zadruga. In the common work--working fields, raising livestock, cooking, carpentry, etc.--there was no job that was considered better than any other and there was a tendency to avoid overspecialization. Anyone who excelled at a particular craft would be praised but would not receive any special remuneration. The services of the gifted or skilled were to be used for the good of the zadruga as a whole. Labor was divided according to age and sex. Men plowed, mowed, cut wood, and did carpentry, Women cultivated vegetables, cooked, cleaned, and sewed. Unmarried women and children herded the animals, and the aged did minor house tasks. Neither the aged nor the children were required to work. The zadruga had an organized, cooperative system of labor that provided for the good of all.

In the zadruga system, common property included the land, livestock, farm buildings, and equipment. Whatever the group as a whole needed belonged to the whole. Every individual zadruga member had the right to share the zadruga produce but he or she did not have the right to appropriate any of the collective property. In the zadruga all shared equally; surplus

food was divided equally, and so was the income derived from the sale of surplus wine. This principle of equality of ownership was also used in the dissolution of the zadruga due to overcrowding and the need to establish a new zadruga. Equality in property relations gave the members a sense of security and allowed for the development of self-respect and mutual regard among members. A sense of safety was also maintained by allowing zadruga members to leave the zadruga if they so desired and to return to full privileges and possessions should they come back.

Besides the common property, each family had individual property which consisted of a vineyard, and a wheat or hay field upon which they might have a cabin. This cabin allowed for the entertainment of friends on Sundays or holidays. Work on this property was done only after the collective labor had been done. In other words, the concerns of the individual took second place to that of the community. The individual property was passed on through inheritance and divided equally among the children.

Political control of the zadruga was maintained by the 'druzina'. The druzina was composed of the males and females of the zadruga who were fully taking part in the adult labor. The management of the zadruga was entrusted to an elected man and woman called the 'gospodar' and the 'gospodinja'. These people usually only served a year before stepping down. This function entailed more work and responsibility but no more economic gain; it could even involve some personal loss due to being unable to work one's individual property. There was little competition for the posts.

While the gospodar and gospodinja had managerial control of the zadruga, issues of importance were not decided without the consultation of the druzina. The common home, which served as a recreational centre and common kitchen, also served as a meeting hall for deciding important issues. In all affairs the primary concern of the druzina was the well-being of the zadruga as a whole and self-interest was frowned upon.

While zadruga members emphasized the avoidance of conflict, for general well-being there were

sometimes sanctions imposed on zadruga members who had disturbed the peaceful harmony of the zadruga. The worst punishment could result in temporary or permanent expulsion from the zadruga. Permanent expulsion was rare. The crimes considered the worst were the setting of a fire, murder, physical abuse of parents, and the alteration of border markers on peasant property. In the zadruga homicide was rare, there was a lack of sexual misbehavior, and the most frequent crime was property damage and theft. Conflicts were brought before community judges.

What has been described to this point was the zadruga social system as it had existed prior to unwanted changes (to zadruga members) of the social order of which the zadruga was a component. These changes came as a result of the collapse of the feudal system. In the collapse, an urban class relieved the nobility of its power and set about to reorganize the state in its favor. This group was composed of bureaucrats, priests, lawyers, intellectuals, and some of the former nobility. Their aim was to develop industry, commerce, schools, and communication based on the model of the Western

world. To accomplish this the peasant class, 90% of the society, was put under the burden of heavy taxation. To meet the demands of the heavy taxation the zadrugas were forced to change considerably and, for the first time had a money based economy, rather than barter, introduced into zadruga life. All this wrought profound changes in the zadruga communities.

To meet the burdensome taxes the zadruga were forced to reorganize their self-sufficient economy such that it would work in the service of the market rather than internally for zadruga members. In producing goods of high market value other goods were no longer being produced and now had to be purchased.

After replacing the nobility, the urban class took to dividing the feudal properties among the seigniors and their serfs but the partitioning was unfair. Many zadrugas were left with insufficient land for their needs. Insufficient land and the reorganization of production to meet market demands led to conflict in the zadrugas and ushered in their disintegration. Almost immediately the zadrugas began to divide the common property which produced separate families with individual economies rather

than collective labor and economy. This breakdown also meant that individual families could not maintain the self-sufficiency that they had had in the zadruga. On top of this, many families could not produce enough goods for sale to meet the heavy taxes and they were no longer able to buy what they did not produce. This was further exacerbated by a disparity between the low price of agricultural goods and the higher price of manufactured goods. The standard of life for these peasants was therefore lowered considerably. With the collapse of economic security there was a collapse in emotional security. The old zadruga members could no longer afford the old ceremonies and rituals because they were no longer paid collectively. Marriages were delayed due to lack of funds and people moved away in search of work.

Not all of the zadrugas collapsed immediately; some still had enough land to function as a collective. In those that were hanging on other changes were occurring. Whereas a collectivist spirit had guided individual behavior, private interest began to come to the fore. Whereas the gospodar and

gospodinja had worked for the good of all and forfeited control after a year, they now began to derive personal gain by keeping collective wealth to themselves and bribe other members so that they could retain power. Tension, dissatisfaction, and conflict appeared in the zadrugas as common welfare lost its motivating influence and private interest took over. Stealing became widespread and people began to reap what they could of personal benefit from the communal property. Common work was now quickly performed so that work on individual property could be engaged in or so that work for wages outside of the zadruga could be pursued. Personal gain was becoming all important. Common life was disintegrating.

All these changes led to increased drinking, sexual offences, accusations and fights. Individual families now had to engage in more work to meet ends and children were no longer exempt from labor. Life standards were lowered, dissatisfaction grew, and people started to regret the loss of security that they had found in the zadruga.

Increased conflict and collective separation also resulted in emotional deprivation. Crime was

more prevalent, usury flourished, and begging increased. Also, people began to engage in the new behavior of suing and counter-suing over petty concerns simply for the pleasure of winning.

The values of collective life and the remembrance of the better life were not totally lost. Over a period of a hundred years the peasantry wrested the power away from the urban class. Over time the principles that operated in the zadrugas were applied to larger village communities.

All of this was prior to the Nazi invasion of 1941. Since that time Yugoslavia has become a communist country. It would seem, therefore, that their need for a collective lifestyle has reemerged at a qualitatively higher level of organization, i.e., from zadruga to country.

What we can note in the foregoing is the changes in personalities of the zadruga members due to being forced to succumb to a new social order that was externally imposed. There was considerable transformation of values from collectivist to individual and increased emotional instability as indicated by increased crime and social unrest.

Change in Soviet Central Asia. This research which is reported in Luria (1976), and briefly summarized in Luria (1971), was conducted at the suggestion of L. S. Vygotsky. As was mentioned earlier, Vygotsky had hypothesized that the root of higher psychological processes was to be found in the sociohistorical environment, in the human relations that had developed through the course of social history--the experience of humanity as it was socially formed. In order to test this theory it was necessary to conduct an investigation in an area in which new types of psychological activity were being formed and that were unambiguously of a social nature.

The investigation conducted by Luria was in the remote regions of Uzbekistan and Kirghizia, in Soviet Central Asia, between 1931 and 1932, in the villages and pasturelands of the area. Prior to the Soviet revolution the people of the region existed in a backward economy which was largely based on raising cotton, and was organized, politically, as a feudal system.

With the revolution there was an elimination of

submission and dominance as effected by class relations. The people became free to be responsible for their future. Socioecononmic conditions changed completely, moving from capitalist to communuist organization. Collective agricultural production was introduced as well as some industry. An extensive school network was introduced to the region where peasants had formerly been illiterate.

The people were thus introduced to new areas of human knowledge and to new motives for human activity. These changes in social functioning, under normal conditions, usually took place over a considerably longer period of time, but, in this case, took place over a very short period of time. It was possible, therefore, to test the hypothesis that "as a function of the transition from one historical form to another, not only the contents of consciousness, but the structure of higher mental processes, underlying concrete forms of psychological activity, change " (Luria, 1971, p. 265). Luria was therefore able to "observe the sociohistorical shaping of mental processes" (1976, p.12).

The subjects in this field research composed

five groups. First were the Ichkari women who lived in remote villages and were illiterate, and who had no involvement with any of the newly introduced social activities. Second were the peasants from remote villages who maintained an individualistic economy, who remained illiterate, and who took no part in socialized labor. Third was a group of women who had attended a short-term course at the kindergarten but who had not received formal schooling and who had little training in literacy. Fourth was a group of collective farm workers and young persons who had attended short courses. These people were actively concerned with running the collective farm, planning production, distributing labor, and evaluating work output. There was little school attendance among these people and many had only the barest of literary skills. The final group was composed of women students who had been admitted, after two or three years of study, to a teachers school. Luria pointed out that this group could only be considered low in educational qualifications. According to Luria (1976), it was only the last three groups that had experienced the necessary conditions

that would bring about radical psychological change.

There now existed new motives for action, and also new forms of access to a technological culture and mastery of mechanisms such as literacy and other new forms of knowledge. The transition to a socialist economy brought along new forms of social relations and, with them, new life principles. The first two groups were much less exposed to the conditions for any such fundamental shifts (Luria, 1976, p. 15).

Luria conducted a number of studies that were aimed at discerning whether the subjects could solve the experimental problems that he presented them with. These tests dealt with what Luria called a 'concrete, graphic functional level' in which immediate conditions determined thought, or on an 'abstract, verbal, and logical level' whereby the subjects cognition was liberated from the concrete conditions of the situation.

In one series of tests Luria demonstrated differences in perception in his subjects. The

Ichkari women, for instance, refused to divide skeins of wool or silk into color groups, saying it could not be done because none of them had similarities. In presenting geometrical figures to these women, it was found that they did not use abstract terms. Rather than using the abstract term, i.e., square, triangle, circle, they called them instead by object names, i.e., door, shovel, moon. Luria also tested his subjects on optical illusions and found that the susceptibility to the illusion was linked to the formation of complex psychological organization. Luria was impressed by his results:

The facts thus suggest to us that the conclusions of most current investigations of the perception of color and shape apply in fact only to individuals shaped by cultural and academic influences, that is persons with a system of conceptual codes for which such perceptions is adapted. In other sociohistorical conditions in which life experience is basically determined by practical experience and the shaping influence of school has not yet had an

effect, the encoding process is different because color and shape perception fit into a different system of practical experiences are denoted by a different system of speech terms and are subject to different laws (Luria, 1976, p. 45).

Luria conducted other tests on the ability of his subjects to generalize and abstract. In these tests the illiterate peasants formed groups in terms of concrete thinking which is situationally bound. Luria, for instance, showed pictures of a hammer, a saw, a hatchet, and a log. Rather than group them as tools and a log, the subjects would argue that they were all alike because you need a saw to saw the log, a hatchet to chop the log, and a hammer to pound nails in it. Even when agreeing that it was possible to group the items as tools they still insisted on the need for the log to be present.

Similar findings were found on tasks testing deduction and inference. Illiterate subjects would not make inferences based on syllogisms. For example, Luria told them the following: "Cotton can grow only where it is hot and dry. In England it is

cold and damp. Can cotton grow there?" To this the subjects would reply that they did not know because they had not been to England; they could only speak of their own region consequently. These sorts of findings also held up on tasks of reasoning and problem solving as well as for imagination.

Of pertinence to questions about personality were Luria's investigations into self-awareness and self-analysis. In these tests Luria was trying to find out the degree to which the subjects could treat themselves abstractly and analyze their self in terms of traits and qualities. It was Luria's belief that the ability to engage in self-awareness and self-analysis was also the product of the sociohistorical conditions. The roots of self-awareness were to be found, therefore, in the activities that people engaged in in the social world. Luria's method was to ask the subjects how they evaluated themselves, how they differed from others, and what their shortcomings were. Similar questions were also asked about relatives and acquaintances. The subjects were 20 illiterate peasants, 15 collective farm workers who were

accustomed to collective discussion of farm issues, and 17 technical school students.

This task, according to Luria, proved to be beyond the capacity of many of the subjects. The subjects in the first group could not do the task at all. They either refused to identify positive or negative qualities or answered the question by examining their lives concretely. For instance, one subject said that her shortcoming was that she had only one dress and two robes, while another said her shortcomings were a lack of food, clothing, and everything. They did find it easier to characterize others but not themselves.

The next group, one that Luria called a transitional group, were able to characterize other people more completely. As did the first group, however, the subjects evaluated themselves in terms of their behavior externally, but they also had a greater tendency to analyze themselves in accord with how others had evaluated them. An attempt to evaluate themselves in terms of an ideal self was beginning to emerge in this group. This ability was most pronounced for collective workers who took part

in meetings and who had their behavior evaluated by others. Self-evaluation was taking shape under the influence of social evaluation.

The final group, who had received some education, were involved in the collective social life, which included economic planning, and the evaluation of work problems. They were considered, by Luria, to be in "conditions for fundamental shifts in the analysis of one's own intrinsic qualities" (1976. p. 155). These subjects, unlike the first group, did not refuse to engage in the task. They were able to reflect the world of external reality and social relations, and their own inner world as it was shaped in relation to others. This formation of an inner world was considered by Luria to be a fundamental achievement of this particular level of sociohistorical development. The effect of this on the development of self-evaluation can be seen in the following:

What good traits and what shortcomings do
you know about yourself?

I'm neither good nor bad . . . I'm an
average person, though I'm weak on literacy

and can't write at all; and then I'm very nasty and angry, but still, I don't beat my wife.

. . . I don't want to change anything in my character; if I study, it'll change by itself (Luria, 1976, p. 159).

Luria, in summary, argued that the results are convincing in their demonstration of the fact that the structure of cognitive activity undergoes change as historical development passes through new stages and that major cognitive processes, e.g., perception, reflect the variations in social life. For our purposes, the results are a clear indication that personality can undergo global change with changing social conditions. In terms of activity theory, the results indicate that a person's activities determine his or her cognitive capacity and their personality. Change: Admiralty Islands. This final study, to me, is a profound demonstration of just how much social conditions, and the personalities formed in those social conditions, can undergo change. The people in this study moved from being stoneage headhunters to the present level of social development and have,

thereby, crossed thousands of years of human evolution in a mere seven years (Mead, 1956).

The people in this study came from the Admiralty Islands of the South Pacific and they are a particular tribe known as the Manus. They were first studied by Mead in 1928 and again in 1953. The changes in the people between her first and last visit were summarized by Mead in the following:

It is the story of the particular tribe of the Admiralty Islands--the Manus--whom I saw in 1928, a mere two thousand nearly naked savages, living in pile dwellings in the sea, their earlobes weighed down with shells, their hands still ready to use spears, their anger implemented with magical curses, their morality dependent upon the ghosts of the recently dead. It is the story of a people without history, without any theory of how they came to be, without any belief in a permanent future life, without any knowledge of geography, without writing, without political forms sufficient to unite more than two or three

hundred people. It is the story of a people who had become, when I returned to visit them in 1953, potential members of the modern world, with ideas of boundaries in time and space, responsibility to God, enthusiasm for law, and committed to trying to build a democratic community, educate their children, care for the old and the sick, and erase age-old hostilities between neighbouring tribes (pp. 21-22).

The factor that brought about these changes will be discussed shortly. First we shall consider life for the Manus prior to the conditions that ushered in change.

The old way. The Manus people had two forms of existence. Physically they trusted their bodies; they were active and zestful and they relied on themselves and their skills to wrest a living from the sea. They also relied on their skills to build their huts, their canoes, and the other implements of their life. Counterposed to this self-reliance was the other side of their life. Their social life was ruled by strict customs in which property was

respected out of fear of consequence. Under this social order, with its strict prohibitions, words and gestures were carefully and cautiously weighed, and one had to be guarded about who they shared a laugh with. They also suffered under a burdensome system of economic demands which was enforced by a fear of familial ghosts that controlled the social order by imposing illness and even death; at least, that is what they believed. Sorcery and economic subservience drove them incessantly, with an angry tension and smouldering frustration that was waiting to break out in a quarrel or open conflict. Friendliness and neighborly behavior were frowned upon. All of this was due to the economic system that drove the adults but which did not affect the children.

Unlike the unloving adults, the children of Manus were gay youngsters who were not troubled by the ghosts that their elders were. Both boys and girls were taught to be independent and assertive, and they were schooled in the necessary requirements of shame, e.g., the rules of defecation, and they were taught strict respect for property. There were

also strict rules against touching what belonged to others. They were required to exercise caution in touching their own bodies and in the use of their names and the names of others. The children were reared to live safely in their water world and their play involved water sport. The children were not required to work. In their play the youngsters imitated their elders movements, their postures and gestures, and their dancing. They were happy and carefree and differed considerably from what they would become as adults: "sulky, inwardly rebellious but outwardly conforming" (Mead, 1956, pp. 139-140).

The factors that brought about the transformation of the high-spirited children into sulky adults were economic in nature. In the Manus system it was required that brides be paid for. The youths having no money of their own had to have their future married lives paid for by another. This was regarded by them as shameful and intolerable and it disrupted their sense of autonomy and sunk them in debt.

So young men worked for older men, their uncles and elder cousins, hardly ever their

fathers, in a sort of sullen, driven anger, working to get out from under, to take over the control of their own households, to have houses of their own (Mead, 1956, p. 59).

Under this system the young males could become permanent, economic dependents, or they could take care of their own marriage payments by investment in other marriages, or they could finance their own marriages and withdraw from economic competition. The choice was the individuals: co-operative dependence on entrepreneurs, modest independence from entrepreneurs, or entrepreneurship. Whatever the choice made, it was the demands of adulthood that led to a major transformation of their personality; early childhood development did not determine adult personality.

The Manus village survived on a subsistence economy. Every household engaged in daily and nightly fishing, and in trading for taro, betel nuts and pepper. Money, which was dog's teeth and shell beads, was not an incentive to work; life's requirements were manufactured or traded for. As was

mentioned, sexual needs introduced one to the economic system but it was not this that maintained it. What kept the system going was superstitious belief regarding illness and death. Individuals were expected by the family ghosts--Sir Ghost--to engage in economic effort so that the Sir Ghost would prosper and, so prospering, would protect the household from misfortune. Illness could also be due to sexual laxity, if not sexual then economic laxity and the wrath of the family ghost was the cause. The rich were expected to continue in their entrepreneurial endeavors and the accumulation of wealth or the ghosts would exact retribution; having started an enterprise there was no turning back. Even those who elected not to get involved in this system suffered the anguish of possible retribution from their Sir Ghost. The Manus' was " a complex economic system in which every man was caught in a chain of obligation such that each debt paid plunged him into a new indebtedness" (Mead, 1956, p. 50) and was thus on an 'economic treadmill' that resulted in the anger, tension, compliance, sulkiness, frustration, and potential volatility. So the joy of

childhood was changed by the fear of Ghosts, shame, and loss of independence.

Roots of change. Bruner (1963) has indicated that when one culture comes in contact with another culture, some aspects of the native culture may change more than others but he also indicated that there is little agreement as to why this is so. Bruner contended that whatever segment of culture changes, it will do so only if there is a reason for such change. This was also the view that Doob (1960) held. Doob maintained that a people's proficiency in changing old ways into new ways is increased if they are pursuing a central goal that goes beyond behavior or behaviors that are undergoing change. In reference to Mead's (1956) work, and the changes the Manus underwent, Doob proposed that "less civilized people suddenly learn civilized ways much faster when for some reason they have acquired the central value of wishing to become more civilized" (Doob, 1960, p. 221).

What makes Doob's proposal particularly true of the Manus was the fact that they had had decades of contact with modern cultures but had not been

inspired to change by that contact. As Mead indicated, in 1914 the Manus submitted to German force and complied with their demands rather than suffer the punitive sanctions that would be imposed. Following the Germans, the Australians took control of the Admiralty Islands and governed over the Manus. There was nothing in these culture contacts that created a need to change in the Manus. As Mead put it, "they were in a European controlled world, but distinctly not of it" (1956, p. 75). It was not until World War II, and the arrival of the American army, that any kind of central goal to change arose.

With the advent of the war a million troops came into the area. Miles upon miles of barracks were built with wood hewn in the local bush and cut in the saw mills that had been erected. The Americans also knocked mountains down, smoothed the island for airfields, tore up the bush, and blasted channels. The Manus were most impressed with the machines that allowed the Americans to do so much with so little effort (relative to the painstaking labor that the Manus would have had to expend to accomplish a similar task). Never before had the Manus been

exposed to so many marvellous, labor-saving devices. The Manus concluded that the Americans preferred to let machines do heavy work for them, believing there was no advantage in wearing down the body and entering an early grave. The Manus saw how preferential this would be for them. They developed a great love of machines.

In their observations of American lifestyle, the Manus concluded that the Americans did not maintain any status differences as regared black Americans. This was quite unlike the status differences they had experienced with the Germans and the Australians. From their perspective, the Manus were of the opinion that these black men, men like themselves, originally primitive, had been helped to be "all right", to dress, speak, and act like the rest of the Americans. On top of this, the Americans treated the Manus "like brothers". They made no effort to preserve the caste system that had formerly existed between the Europeans and the Manus. The Manus were greatly impressed by being treated by civilized, white men as though they were people like anyone else. This, of course was the Manus' perception of the Americans;

Mead realized that class differences did exist in American society.

Considering the fact that Manus' interchanges with each other were antagonistic and oppressive, due to their economic system, it is no wonder that the Manus were impressed with the level of cooperative behavior that the Americans displayed. It was apparent to them just how much could be done if people worked cooperatively with each other--there was power in cooperation. They were "such wonderful human beings who believed in getting on with each other without continued recourse to outbursts of righteous anger" (Mead, 1956, p. 173).

To the Americans the Manus, who showed such an intense interest in, and aptitude for, their machines, were physically skilled, zestful, and served as delightful guides during off time. They were not 'boy' or 'nigger' but "good Joes". Even in 1952, with the Americans gone, the Manus still took delight in having been "good Joes". It needs to be noted that, although the Manus were apparently unaware, the Americans needed to maintain good relations with the natives during their presence

there. They needed them to be carriers, guides, dock laborers, and providers of fresh food. Although there was this self-interest on the part of the Americans, I think it is fair to say that they treated the natives as the natives felt they were treated.

Following the war, as workers returned from laboring in the American camps, there was considerable discontent. They had no wish to return to the old way of being and they pushed for change. In each village there was a slightly different emphasis on what should be changed but two themes were predominant. First was a demand for economic reform: abolition of marriage exchanges, no further exploitation of young men, and replacement of native currency which bought only native goods. A second theme was that all men should be regarded as brother and that racial equality be established. Mead has said the source of this push for equality had not yet been traced. It seems to me though, considering how impressed the Manus were with the equality of blacks in the American army and the equality with which they were treated, and their own experiences of equal

treatment were the likely source.

A common occurrence with this sort of culture contact was the 'cargo cult'. This is started by a prophet whose preachings predict that the spirits of the dead will deliver a cargo of the white man's goods which were so desired. Property destruction, seizures, and visions were an accompanying occurrence and, when the cargo didn't arrive, the prophet was killed. For the Manus the cargo cult took the form of 'The Noise'. They did not experience the mystical seizures of the cargo cult but there was a preparation for the arrival of white man's goods. The shell money and dog's teeth, the old costumes and spears, and the old implements of the home were thrown into the lagoon.

As Mead indicated, the Manus' cultural character and the events of the war were the necessary but not sufficient conditions for the development of the New Manus Way" (1956, p. 187). What was required to turn the post war unrest into a political movement was a leader. Such a leader did emerge and his name was Paliau. Prior to Paliau the Manus had no calendar and no history. They now do and they date their

beginning as 1946, the year that Paliau arrived to agitate for modernization.

Mead has referred to Paliau as a man of 'political genius'. Upon his arrival Paliau called meetings and began to outline his plans for the Manus future. There was to be a complete break with the old way of cultural life. Paliau argued for all people of the Admiralty Islands to work together and to break down the old barriers that had kept the tribe apart. The sea-dwelling Manus were to leave the sea and build homes on the shore. Also a treasury was to be set up that would prepare for future economic growth. Although this was Paliau's plan, Mead has said that he had no idea of how to accomplish this. During the period of transition the Administration of the Admiralties put forth plans for cooperatives and councils. After The Noise, the people were well coordinated and set about formulating a new pattern of life that combined Paliau's plans with those of the Administration. Thus the process of change was under way. At the time of Mead's second visit, the new way had been progressing for seven years and, in that short time, they had

made vast changes.

The new way. What first struck Mead on her return to the Manus people was the ubiquitous laughter and joy in the village. People were singing and no longer quarreling with each other. They were also calling each other by name, and the call of a name would be echoed from house to house, in the new, land based village. The old taboos about calling out another's name were gone.

As opposed to the competitiveness of the old ways, cooperation was now expected. Brothers cooperated with each other, without any dominance or exploitation, and work was easier as a result. Fathers and sons, and son-in-laws, formed cooperative units. Also, as opposed to the tension between husband and wife in the old way, husband and wife were now companions whose company was to be enjoyed. Wife beating was forbidden as were quarrelling and brawling.

Today they are friendly where formerly they would have been harshly competitive; they are actively concerned with the prevention of types of behavior which they would

formerly have regarded as natural and desirable; they are relaxed and unworried where they would formerly have been tense (Mead, 1956, p. 362).

The breakdown of the old economic system meant that work once considered appropriate for men alone could be shared by women and children. Adolescent boys also do considerably more work than the minimal amount they had done 25 years previously. The economic breakdown also removed the pressures and debts associated with marriage and started the emancipation of women.

Changes also occurred in the children's way of living. They were no longer contemptuous of the adult's way of life--the day long exchanges of property, the ceremonials and marriage entanglements, war dances and ghostly fears, were no longer the way of life. With socio-cultural changes the adult way of life became much more desirable to the youth and the child. The children now play house and they take part in adult work, adding their small share to the labor of adults. They attend, with enthusiasm, the village council meetings, sitting quietly and being

good. On the whole adult life was now desirable to them.

Other noticeable changes were the introduction of schools and courts of law. Calenders were in use which contrasted to the earlier time when they had no conception of dates or history. Events were grounded in time and space whereas before they were grounded in generalized relationships of debts and ghosts. Political organization was collective in nature, as indicated by the numerous council meetings which the villagers attended, and the entrepreneurial control was gone. In general, whereas the people were submissive to exacting, economic demands, and angered and frustrated by those controls, in 1952 the Manus were happy and were keenly involved in the lives of the Manus community.

It had taken just seven years to turn this little corner of the Admiralties from a remote, sleepy, forgotten bit of territory, which had only itself been put on the map since the war, into a political actor on the world stage (Mead, 1956, p. 212).

Discussion. It will be recalled that Leontiev

had discussed the meeting of a 'need' with its 'object' as being a momentous occasion. It seems to me that this is comparable, at the level of the individual, to what had happened to the Manus at the socio-cultural level. They hated their life and the way in which it was organized but they knew of no other way of being that suited their needs. When the American army arrived with its more preferable economic organization, based on cooperation rather than competition, and its view of men as being equals, the Manus met the object of their needs. New social organization based on equality and cooperation became for them a motive and they engaged in the activity of transforming their society and, in the process, themselves. As conditions changed, they internalized these changes and became freer and happier people in the process.

A corollary point to be made here is most important. It will be recalled that the Manus were regarded as savages, thousands of years behind the modern world in their social development. Such drastic change as they underwent suggests, to me, that notions of racial superiority should finally be

put to rest. What is superior between one race and another are the social conditions that are internalized and that form personality. Even the most backward of humans are capable of achieving the highest standards of behavior; all they need is the opportunity, afforded by the proper social conditions that promote development. Barring physical abnormalities, all humans have equal capacity to attain the highest level of human attainment. They are only incapacitated by the degree of social development that is available for internalization. Given the necessary conditions, even the most primitive of peoples can demonstrate that they are equal in all regards to the most developed of our species.

As Leontiev said, the infant is a candidate for humanity. Any candidate can only aspire to the office available to them. As noted earlier, cultural and social deprivation affects the development of the personality and the personality is a reflection of social conditions. Racial inequality, class division, and prejudice are the product of social conditions and, if we are to overcome the problems of

humanity, if we are to provide all humans the opportunity to achieve their maximal level of development, we must examine social conditions and make the necessary changes. To ignore social conditions is to ignore the source of human behavior.

Chapter 13

Conclusion

At the beginning of this thesis we examined two theories that, historically, have had an impact on the field of personality. Trait theory assumed that there were internal dispositions that accounted for behavioral consistency in the person. These internal determinants were considered to vary from individual to individual but it was assumed that this variation would exhibit stability in rank ordering. These traits were also expected to be cross-situationally consistent. It was found however that the evidence for cross-situational stability was poor. Situationism, in opposition to trait theory, took the position that behavior was a function of the environment and was controlled by it. Rather than considering internal constructs, behavior and personality were controlled by situational conditions. It was argued that this sort of position, even though supported by experimental evidence, failed to account for cognitive phenomena or take it into consideration. Situationism further

failed to deal with complex behavior and personality was considered to be a chameleon that changed from situation to situation and had no past or future. Since each theory could find experimental support, proponents of each position maintained their vested opposition.

Recognizing that each of these theories had a certain amount of validity and that their opposition needed to be overcome, interactionists, e.g., Hunt, Endler, and Magnusson, proposed that personality was a function of both person variables and situation variables as they interacted with each other. In its developed form interactionism proposed that actual behavior was a function of the bi-directional interaction of the situation with an individual. It was proposed that the individual was an intentional being in the interaction process and that cognitive factors were important determinants of the interaction. It was also proposed that on the situation side of the interaction, the psychological meaning of the situation--the perception of the situation-- was important. In a further development of this point it was seen that the perception and

meaning of the situation were considered independent of the actual situation thus rendering the situation theoretically impotent and, philosophically, it was a move towards solipsism.

To overcome the problem of the actual and the perceived situation in interactionism two routes were followed, each of which was derived from Leontiev's theory of the development of mind or psyche. As was indicated, interactionism wound up in a bind because it dealt with conscious phenomena in their 'crystalized' form and could not, therefore, give an adequate account of it other than to say that it existed. Individual differences in the perception of the situation were noted but they were not accounted for. Leontiev's theory of the development of the mind and the development and formation of consciousness was therefore examined. As a result, we arrived at the distinction of 'meaning' and 'sense' which accounted for the problem of the actual and the perceived situation or environment. It was seen that in their activeness in the objectively knowable environment, the world as is known and experienced was internalized and formed the plane of

consciousness. The world as it exists independently of the person is what accounts for 'meaning', i.e., apart from personal sense, and meaning refers to the object as it actually is, as it is experienced by all people. It was also noted that due to the idiosyncracies of experience the object that had meaning also takes on a personal relationship to the individual and this personal relation or understanding was its 'sense' or personal attitude.

Interactionism also made a distinction between three models of interaction: mechanistic interaction, dynamic interaction, and a third in which person and situation could not be separated and this was the interaction that activity theory deals with. Mechanistic interaction investigated unidirectional causality and assumed that personal and situational factors relate in an additive, linear manner. The interest of mechanistic interactionism was the 'structure' of the interaction and not the 'process'. As noted, this position is too abstract to be of any value to the study of dynamic interaction as a process. Dynamic interaction was interested in reciprocal causation in which each of the factors

influences the other and it was an attempt to view interaction as a process. This process, however, was divided into reaction variables, mediating variables (e.g., cognition), and situations and, in effect, was a more complex mechanism and processual in name only. It was noted in the discussion of units of analysis that the phenomena of interest can not be reduced to elements that lose the nature of that phenomena. To arrive at dynamism and the third type of interaction, it was concluded that this reduction of the process into mechanical elements was inadequate and distorted the phenomena of interest.

Interaction as 'activity' is a qualitatively richer understanding and resolution of the problem of how the person interacts with her or his environment. As we saw, in discussing activity theory, the subject (person) and the object (environment) are in unity as poles of a single process. In active engagement with the world, the world is internalized in the form of an image and it is navigated, manipulated, controlled, and even transformed and in this the personality is objectified. As Leontiev said, "in production, the personality is objectified; in the

personality, the thing is subjectified" (1974-1975, p. 9). In her or his activeness the person meets the world with partiality and selectivity. The person is not simply reactive, as mechanistic understanding would lead one to believe; the person is purposefully active. A person's activity leads to the development of her or his mind, the formation of her or his consciousness, and the development of motives of activity based on basic needs. Activity is a system that is both, simultaneously, internal and external in that the motive of an activity is internal to the person as her or his motive but it is external in that it is directed to a thing or a relation external to the person.

Whereas mechanistic interaction deals with the structure of interaction and dynamic interaction is presumed to deal with the process of interaction, 'activity' accounts for both structure and process. As the reader will recall, activity is an organic system which is embedded in social relations and one that obeys the system of relations of society. Activity as a system forms a hierarchy of activities, major and minor, greater and lesser, with their

accompanying motives and it is a hierarchy that is internal and external in nature. This hierarchical structure, in its dynamism, can undergo transformation due to the development of the person or the situation as when leading activities change or social conditions are altered. Being a plastic system, the system of activity does not have the same sort of structure as is proposed in systems theory. Speaking generally, in systems theory the structure is unchanging and determined as opposed to the transformations that the system of activity is open to. In its changes, however, activity is always a unity of person and environment.

In the discussion of systems theory some potential problems were noted but these problems are not a challenge to activity theory. Analogies are not being drawn so the problem of drawing conclusions from analogies does not apply. The arbitrariness of the boundaries of a system also does not apply. The system of activity is bounded by the situation as it motivates the persons activities, in other words the motive and its object are the boundary of the activity, i.e., this motive and that object as they

form a unity. This boundary is plastic in that a person moves from situation to situation and from motive to motive but it is always a subject-object unity. This, therefore, meets Allport's (1960) requirement that a system in personality should not be regarded as a steady state, i.e., fixed. Being predominantly social, the system does not fall prey to the arguments against biological reductionism that have accompanied systems theory. Lastly, in answering Allport's question as to what makes the system cohere, it is the person's needs as they are expressed in motives and their objects that leads to coherence.

Activity also answers a number of requirements that a theory of personality will have to meet. We will now move beyond interactionism and proceed to respond to these demands. The first requirement is Nuttin's (1955):

Personality signifies a specific modality of existence and of activity which is characterized by the fact of involvement in a situation or in the world. The fundamental personality structure is

therefore an ego-world unity, and not an internal organization of an ego. The psychological field itself, more basically, enters into the make-up of personality. Motivation must also be looked at in relation to the fact that men live in a meaningful world. In fact, basic needs are general types of organism-environment and ego-world relationships which actually are required by the functioning of organism and personality (p. 335).

Clearly, activity theory's understanding of personality is one which deals with the person-world unity and not with purely internal factors. Also motivation is a fundamental aspect of the theory. Lastly, the question of the meaningfulness of the world is accounted for by the process of internalization.

Carlson (1971) has asked the crucial question: "Where is the person in personality research" (p.203).

Obviously, no single scientist, no single study, no single research tradition can

possibly deal "scientifically" with anything so complex as a whole person. But the attempt can be made collectively and cumulatively. The present impoverishment of personality research is distressing because it suggests that the goal of studying whole persons has been abandoned. However, the fragmented and limited quality of current research may stem less from myopia or opportunism than from the absence of a conceptual framework for guiding inquiry in personality (p.207).

Since the unit of activity theory is activity, which is not reducible to lesser elements, it does not suffer from the fragmentation and limitation of which Carlson laments. I must admit, however, that I have no evidence of how this problem is resolved by activity theorists. The question of personality is a relatively new one for activity theory and I have no sources to fall back upon. I must therefore base my conclusion on my own understanding of what this should entail. First the nomothetic approach to single traits and single situations has no bearing on

activity research. The presumption that all people have common traits must be considered false. The traits a person has are a reflection of his or her internalization of social conditions and of the motives that he or she has developed. Social conditions are experienced idiosyncratically and they do not motivate all people equally, if at all. To presume, therefore, that it is possible to generalize from random samples for single elements can not be considered appropriate. To do so is to presume common characteristics that have no basis in reality. Also, if traits are of interest it must be recognized that the trait is of the activity, as found in the unity of subject and object, and not an internal characteristic. Traits are therefore motivationally/situationally bound.

I believe that it is first necessary to understand the conditions of upbringing, both culturally and socially, to begin with, in order to understand the social relations and the system of meanings that have been internalized, before we can presume common characteristics. In the chapter on enculturation we clearly saw the effects of

socialization and enculturation on personality. We need to have a greater sensitivity to these forces and take them into account.

Situations cannot be treated as universal in their effects either. Situational components are motives (as understood in the sense of activity theory) for some people but not for others. There is no reason to assume the universality of their influence. Nomothetic research should delineate groups and hypothesize differences based on shared social life, or social motives, shared culture, shared experience, etc. It should not be based on the presumption of common traits or situations for all people. Idiographic research should also be undertaken. It will be of value to study single individuals, their history, the social conditions that they have been exposed to, how these situations have been appropriated or not, etc. These idiographic reports can then be "collectively and cumulatively" compiled in order to arrive at a more complete understanding of personality.

Bradburn (1963) has also set some requirements for anyone wishing to establish a theory of

personality.

A theory of personality should be able to account for three areas of human functioning: (1) the formation and development of personality, (2) personality functioning in the adult, and (3) personality change and consistency during the life cycle (p. 335).

In my opinion, activity theory answers these three requirements. First, as demonstrated in the chapter on development, activity theory does account for the development of personality. Secondly, the functioning of adult personality has as its foundation the development it has gone through. This development led to the establishment of a hierarchy of motives (tied to objects or relations) which is the structure and process of personality and it is this that accounts for the functioning of the adult personality. Change and stability are a function of the plasticity of activity. That is, a person may remain stable throughout adulthood and not be faced with a need to change. On the other hand, as social conditions change, as they did with the Manus, a need

for change may find its motive--with the Manus it was a new ordering of human relations and the acquisition of labor saving devices. Or, as it was with the Uzbekis, social change can lead to engagement in new activities and to changes in consciousness and personality. Or as with the member of the zadruga, social change can have a negative impact and lead to negative development in the personality. In the case of the zadruga change was imposed and personality was reorganized in reaction to the change and the loss of satisfying activities. In any event, the need for change can lead to change in adulthood, as with people who voluntarily enter therapy.

Another requirement for a theory of personality was identified by Peele (1981). According to Peele, "any psychological analysis or treatment which fails to incorporate individual personality and subjective needs or situational and cultural variables is bound to be incomplete" (p. 807). Being that activity theory is of the cultural-historical tradition introduced by Vygotsky, and considering the importance placed on the social situation, these requirements of Peele are met by activity theory.

The influence of culture on personality is accounted for in activity theory by the subject's activeness and the internalization of the socio-cultural relations in the environment in which she or he is located. The question of subjective needs and motives has already been considered.

The final set of requirements for a theory of personality was provided by Jahoda (1982). Jahoda, in discussing the attractiveness of psychoanalysis to anthropologists, challenged psychology to come up with a theory of personality as personality exists in the real world and not in the realm of pale abstraction as defined by test scores. Jahoda argued that a satisfactory theory of personality would treat personality as a system and that this theory would deal with the issue of the need for food and sex. The question of activity theory treating personality as a system has already been answered earlier in this chapter. The question of food and sex is not a problem for activity theory either. As the reader will recall, activity theory starts with the basic needs, e.g., food and sex, and from there it builds social needs and motives. Jahoda's requirements are

therefore met.

Lastly I will review the question of an adequate unit of analysis for personality research since this is the source of much debate. Mischel (1983a) asked what unit should be used and noted that a simplistic answer was likely to be inadequate. Mischel and Peake (1983b) maintained that a central task in the psychology of personality was the search for a unit with enough breadth and a relatively stable structure. Magnusson and Allen (1983a, 1983b) determined that the person and the environment could not be viewed as discrete units and that the appropriate unit should not be either the person or the situation in isolation. They concluded that "the person-in-the-situation should be considered to be the meaningful unit for use in the description, analysis, and interpretation of various aspects of an individual's psychological functioning" (p. 371). This was also the proposition of Cantor et al. (1982a) in discussing 'people-in-situations' and 'life-goals-I-have-in-situations'. It is hoped that this discussion of activity theory fills this need for an adequate unit of analysis.

Based on the foregoing, I suggest that the only theory of personality that can adequately meet the demands of accounting for the complexity of the human personality is that of activity theory. In suggesting this I am not suggesting that activity theory is a fully developed theory of personality. It is, however, a step in the right direction and, to me, the way of the future. I propose, now, to end this thesis as it was begun, with Drever's definition of personality. I include it again since the reader will likely appreciate it better after exploring the issues that are herein contained.

Personality. A term used in various senses, both popularly and psychologically, the most comprehensive and satisfactory being the integrated and dynamic organization of the physical, mental, moral, and social qualities of the individual, as that manifests itself to other people, in the give and take of social life on further analysis it would appear in the main to comprise the natural and acquired impulses, and habits,

interests, and complexes, the sentiments
and ideals, yhe opinions and beliefs, as
manifested in his relations with his social
milieu . . . (1952, p. 208).

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611

APPENDIX A
Personal Reactions Inventory

Personal Reactions Inventory

This inventory represents a means of studying people's reactions to and attitudes towards various types of situations. On the following pages are represented fifteen situations which most people have experienced personally or vicariously through stories, etc. For each of the situations certain common types of personal reactions and feelings are listed. Indicate in the alternatives on the answer sheet, representing the five points on the scale shown in this booklet, the degree to which you would show these reactions and feelings in the situations indicated.

Here is an example:

You are about to go on a roller coaster with a friend.

Heart beats faster	1	2	3	4	5
	not at all		very much		

Please read the following and sign at the bottom if willing to take part.

1) I am aware of the nature of this study as indicated by the preceding example.

2) I understand that I am free to refuse to participate with any specific task or question.

3) I understand that all information and results will be held in strict confidentiality.

4) I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time.

signature: _____ age: _____ sex: _____

You are getting up to give a speech before
a large group of family members.

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------|-----------|
| 1. Heart beats faster | 1 2 3 4 5 | |
| | not at all | very much |
| 2. Get an uneasy feeling | 1 2 3 4 5 | |
| | not at all | very much |
| 3. Emotions disrupt action | 1 2 3 4 5 | |
| | not at all | very much |
| 4. Feel exhilarated | 1 2 3 4 5 | |
| | not at all | very much |
| 5. Want to avoid situation | 1 2 3 4 5 | |
| | not at all | very much |
| 6. Perspire | 1 2 3 4 5 | |
| | not at all | very much |
| 7. Need to urinate frequently | 1 2 3 4 5 | |
| | not at all | very much |
| 8. Enjoy the challenge | 1 2 3 4 5 | |
| | not at all | very much |
| 9. Mouth get dry | 1 2 3 4 5 | |
| | not at all | very much |
| 10. Become immobilized | 1 2 3 4 5 | |
| | not at all | very much |

11. Get full feeling in stomach 1 2 3 4 5
not at all very much
12. Seek experiences like this 1 2 3 4 5
not at all very much
13. Have loose bowels 1 2 3 4 5
not at all very much
14. Experience nausea 1 2 3 4 5
not at all very much

The fourteen other situations that were used with the 14 response possibilities were the following:

1. You are entering a competitive contest before work mates.
2. You are going to a counselling bureau to seek help in solving a family problem.
3. You are just sitting down to dinner with police officers.
4. You are just starting off on a long automobile trip with family members.
5. You are going to a counselling bureau to seek help in solving a work problem.
6. You are just starting off on a long automobile trip with police officers.
7. You are entering a competitive contest before police officers
8. You are getting up to give a speech before a large group of work mates.
9. You are just sitting down to dinner with work mates.
10. You are getting up to give a speech before a large group of police officers.

11. You are entering a competitive contest before family members.
12. You are going to a counselling bureau to seek help in solving a police problem.
13. You are sitting down to dinner with family members.
14. You are just starting off on a long automobile trip with work mates.

APPENDIX B
Debriefing

Anxiety Questionnaire

The questionnaire that you have just completed has been designed to test an issue in the psychology of personality that has been of concern since 1962.

Two main positions in the psychology of personality that were influential in earlier years were trait theory and situationism. Trait theorists maintained that what determined the nature of personality were internal determinants of behavior called traits. These traits were considered to be in effect across all situations and to be stable as to their degree. Situationism, on the other hand, proposed that personality was determined instead by the situation in which a person was in. Environmental pressures, rather than internal determinants, were considered to be the determinant of personality.

Out of this debate a third position emerged and it is known as interactionism. It is a position that derives its name from the statistical results that support it. Simply put, interactionism considers personality to be the result of the interaction of both trait and situation.

To demonstrate interactionism experimentally people were asked to respond to a questionnaire as you were. A number of situations, i.e. you are having, and a number of responses were presented and it was shown by analysis that the two factors interacted to produce the results.

In this study we have added a third variable, social situation, i.e. you are having lunch with your family, in an effort to demonstrate that human behavior is predominantly social in nature.

If you have any questions please feel free to ask.
Thank you for your help.

Affiliation Questionnaire

The questionnaire that you have just completed has been designed to test an issue in the psychology of personality that has been of concern since 1962.

Two main positions in the psychology of personality that were influential in earlier years were trait theory and situationism. Trait theorists maintained that what determined the nature of personality were internal determinants of behavior called traits. These traits were considered to be in effect across all situations and to be stable as to their degree. Situationism, on the other hand, proposed that personality was determined instead by the situation in which a person was in. Environmental pressures, rather than internal determinants, were considered to be the determinant of personality.

Out of this debate a third position emerged and it is known as interactionism. It is a position that derives its name from the statistical results that support it. Simply put, interactionism considers personality to be the result of the interaction of both trait and situation.

To demonstrate interactionism experimentally people were asked to respond to a questionnaire as you were. A number of situations, i.e. you are having, and a number of responses were presented and it was shown by analysis that the two factors interacted to produce the results.

In this study we have added a third variable, social situation, i.e. you are having lunch with your family, in an effort to demonstrate that human behavior is predominantly social in nature.

If you have any questions please feel free to ask.
Thank you for your help.

APPENDIX C
S-R-C Inventory of Affiliation

Consent Form

In this study we are interested in why people may want to be with other people and some of the factors that may influence this. To this end you will be asked some personal information about yourself and then you will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire. The questionnaire presents you with 48 situations to which you are asked to indicate how much you would or would not care to be with other people given that situation. The whole process should not take any more than twenty minutes.

Would you please read the following and if agreeable sign where appropriate to indicate your willingness to participate.

By signing my name at the end of this sheet I indicate that:

- 1) I am aware of the nature of this study as explained in the opening paragraph.
- 2) I understand that I am free to refuse to participate in any specific task or to refuse to answer any specific question.
- 3) I understand that all information and results obtained from me will be strictly confidential and my identity will not be divulged.
- 4) I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time.

Please sign here to indicate that you are willing to participate and that you understand the nature of the research and your rights in that regard.

(signature)

Personal History Questionnaire

In order to better understand the results of this study we need to know a few things about you and your background. This information will be kept strictly confidential.

- 1) My sex is (please circle) female male
- 2) I am _____ years old.
- 3) How many sisters do you have? _____
- 4) How many brothers do you have? _____
- 5) Were you the first born? yes no
- 6) If you were not the first born, what order of birth
were you? _____

Experimental questionnaire

In the following you will be asked to indicate to what degree you would prefer to be alone or with other people in 48 various circumstances. Please check only one preference but feel free to change your mind if you believe there was a better response. Please do not add lines that would suggest another option; choose the best response from those given to you.

It is likely that some of these situations may not be within your realm of experience and is therefore unfamiliar to you. In the event that a situation is unfamiliar to you, would you please try to imagine how you would react if you were to find yourself in such a situation and respond to the best of your ability to that imagined situation.

In some of these situations there is another person in the situation with you. In these instances, when responding it is understood that you are not alone. Your response to these situations will imply being alone or not alone with that other person.

If you have any questions please feel free to ask. Thank you.

1) You are watching a movie at your sports club on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

2) You are having lunch at school on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

3) You are visiting someone from your family in the hospital on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

4) You are shopping for sporting supplies on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

5) You are working on a project at work on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

6) You are having lunch at work on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

7) You are exchanging Christmas gifts with someone at home on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

8) You are exchanging Christmas gifts with someone at school on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

9) You are watching a movie at school on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

10) You are having lunch at your sports club on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

11) You are visiting someone from your sports club in the hospital on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

12) You are having lunch at school on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

13) You are watching a movie at home on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

14) You are shopping for sporting supplies on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

15) You are shopping for school supplies on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

16) You are watching a movie at your sports club on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

17) You are having lunch at home on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

18) You are working on a project at school on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

19) You are working on a project at work on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

20) You are exchanging Christmas gifts with someone at work on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

21) You are shopping for home supplies on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

22) You are shopping for office supplies on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

23) You are visiting someone from work in the hospital on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

24) You are shopping for school supplies on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

25) You are watching a movie at work on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

26) You are visiting someone from your sports club in the hospital on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

27) You are exchanging Christmas gifts with someone at work on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

28) You are having lunch at home on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

29) You are working on a project at your sports club on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

30) You are working on a project at home on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

31) You are visiting someone from school in the hospital on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

32) You are working on a project at home on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

33) You are having lunch at your sports club on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

34) You are shopping for office supplies on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

35) You are visiting someone from your family in the hospital on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

36) You are working on a project at your sports club on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

37) You are having lunch at work on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

38) You are shopping for home supplies on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

39) You are watching a movie at home on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

40) You are working on a project at school on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

41) You are exchanging Christmas gifts with someone at your sports club on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer to be alone
- ☐ I prefer to be alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer to be alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

42) You are watching a movie at school on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

43) You are watching a movie at work on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

44) You are exchanging Christmas gifts with someone at your sports club on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

45) You are visiting someone from school in the hospital on a tuesday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

46) You are exchanging Christmas gifts with someone at home on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

47) You are visiting someone from work in the hospital on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others

48) You are exchanging Christmas gifts with someone at school on a thursday. In this instance what would you prefer?

- ☐ I very much prefer being alone
- ☐ I prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being alone
- ☐ I slightly prefer being together with others
- ☐ I prefer being together with others
- ☐ I very much prefer being together with others