# T. D. PATTULLO'S NORTHERN EMPIRE: THE ALASKA HIGHWAY AND THE PROPOSED ANNEXATION OF THE YUKON TERRITORY, 1933-1941

by

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ABSTRACT

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As Premier of British Columbia during the depression, T.D. Pattullo felt acutely a responsibility to get the Province moving again, to inspire in the people the confidence and hope which would be the catalyst for prosperity. He saw the solution to depression in those people and in the resources of British Columbia. After being thwarted by the federal government at Ottawa in his attempts at negotiated financial settlements to meet the demands of hard times, he turned his attention to those twin elements in a grand plan of provincial northern development.

It was the original idea of British Columbia Liberalism, a plank of the Party since the Nelson Convention of 1922. What he proposed was an empire on the west coast, which, properly administered, would satisfy all demands bred of desperate times.

His "Empire" meant an expanded British Columbia, it meant prospects for investment, it meant works programmes through development. And, to establish his Empire of British Columbia, Pattullo proposed to annex the Yukon Territory and to build a highway to it. Pattullo's emphasis on empire allowed him dreams of provincial self sufficiency and historical immortality by affording him complete control

of developments. Provincial growth and prosperity would not depend on Ottawa mandarins who lacked an appreciation of provincial concerns and worried about constitutional niceties while communist propaganda, bred of desperate conditions, was allowed to pollute the minds of British Columbia's youth. That was the course Pattullo chose throughout his political career. He saw British Columbia at a new threshold, and T.D. Pattullo as the architect of its future.

The cause of empire was a judiciously considered vaulted image of a glittering future, a prosperous citizenry, and a benevolent, omniscient and slightly regal premier. It was a plausible alternative to negotiated federal monetary settlements in facing the serious problems of the thirties.

Imagination though could not finance the more secular ramifications of the empire proposal, and Pattullo had to negotiate with the federal government for money, land, and right of way. Ottawa, after all, still controlled the Yukon Territory and was considered the primary and favoured source of funding for the road. However, as the depression was global, it was not coincidental that the federal government faced the same economic realities that set Pattullo's mind afield in the first place.

Confrontation over Pattullo's vision as the proper means of meeting the demands of the depression was inevitable, and for five years provided fuel for political misunderstand-

ing and a vivid portrayal of economic realities, federal-provincial relations and the politics of personalities. Surprisingly the Province and the country weathered the depression, and with it the visions of its leaders. Pattullo never saw his expanded provincial empire. His anticipated motor trip north to Alaska never got past Hazelton, B.C. - the then terminus of the existing "northern road". But neither did Prime Minister Mackenzie King attain his federalist goals - similarly ones of empire - at the expense of provincial governments. Oh?



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What happens to the politician at the end of his career? He is cast off by the people for whom he sacrificed most. Sometimes it is his own fault. Possibly he has ceased to serve faithfully. If he lives long enough he is bound to find himself discarded by the people who at one time cheered his every word. It is not a pleasant picture. We follow the bier of our kings with tears in our eyes and read columns in the newspapers about their virtues. Yet the men who are greatest, the politicians, the real leaders, organizers and workers, the contact men who look over the mass of opinions and efforts in the country and coordinate them into a workable whole, these are the men we should worship and thank for their effort on our behalf. As a rule these men struggle to get a decent living while their activities continue and pass away leaving nothing but more or less unhappy memories for their families. Their every act is open to criticism by the ignorant and the vicious. Time tries to heal their misdeeds while it is left to the historians of some far off day to resurrect their virtues.

"The Work of the Politician," Editorial, The Prince Rupert Daily News, 28 January 1938.

# PREFACE

## T.D. PATTULLO

Tonight Duff Pattullo....tried to defend his position in B.C. I thought he was shockingly egotistical, conceited beyond words and very Bennett-like in his mentality....I greatly fear--and the more so as I saw him drinking cocktails and whiskey tonight--that he will 'blow up' one of these days and lose his head altogether.[1]

He knew more about the background of B.C. and its potential than any other political leader this side of this century.[2]

Thomas Dufferin Pattullo, the second son of a prominent Ontario Liberal newspaper man, George Robson Pattullo, was born January 19, 1873, in Woodstock, Ontario. An impulsive young man who desired independence, he often failed to accept the responsibility that it demanded. Short of perseverance, he drifted for years from endeavour to endeavour.

Pattullo was a man moulded by decades of self-doubt, minor successes, and many failures. Through them he composed for himself a character of independent resolve, discip-

lined self-interest and driving ambition. An insecure adolescence, and early business losses, tempered a resolve to self-betterment. Boundless energy and a gift for imagination helped polish a successful leader of men. B.S.

Apparent failure weighed heavy on Pattullo as a young man. For decades he filled a position as the family's misfit. Elder brother Pat practiced as a very successful lawyer, a K.C., and partner in a prosperous firm. Younger brother George had phenomenal success in the United States as a writer of pulp westerns, made a prudent marriage, amassed a considerable fortune, and cultivated friendships with Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the future General George Marshall. Duff's early years were anything but spectacular. He lived in reflected glory. Letters home suggested a plaintive ambition and a striving search for destiny: "some day I trust, I say I shall be something father or fail in a hard struggle....there are climaxes in the lives of all of us....God helping me I shall yet honor my name."[3]

At an early age Pattullo adopted a life style well beyond his means. He secured a position in a local bank but found the work quite unappealing. Unable to stay ahead of his creditors he packed up, and fled to the Grand Union Hotel in New York City. His letters home showed the tortured feelings of a young man unsure of himself and of his future. "I have long wondered whether I must continue in this life of....mediocrity," he wrote his father, "whether

I may not rise above which hitherto I have been, whether I may not turn aside from the rut in which I seem to have been travelling, and whether I may not be capable of something beyond that which now seems to be my prospect."[4]

By 1897 Duff was back in Woodstock doing newspaper work for his father's Sentinel Review, as well as the Galt Reformer.

Through Liberal connections George Pattullo Sr. was able to secure a position for Duff on the staff of Major J.M. Walsh's Yukon Expedition,[5] then being sent by the Federal Department of the Interior to provide government functions in the booming Klondike gold fields.[6] Pattullo was to receive the sum of seventy-five dollars a month plus expenses. He spent the winter of 1897 under pioneer conditions. The articles he published in eastern newspapers and periodicals described romantic but rugged activities in a true frontier community complete with dogsleds, Indians, and cussing, drinking sourdoughs. In later years he remembered this as the happiest time of his life.

In 1898 Pattullo accepted an appointment to the Yukon Gold Commissioner's staff. After his marriage in 1899 he left the government service to form a partnership with W.G. Radford in a real estate and brokerage business. Business was good and Pattullo and Radford expanded, opening a branch office in Prince Rupert in 1908. Pattullo moved to the new office and Radford stayed in Dawson.

The move to British Columbia was speculative as the partners hoped to make money in the developing boom. Prince Rupert itself seemed a particularly attractive location when the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway chose it as the Pacific Coast terminus of its transcontinental railway. Land was a speculative venture and Pattullo and Radford were ideally situated to take advantage of the boom. European capital joined local money in a flurry of speculative buying. Prices were inflated.

Not satisfied with commissions on sales, Pattullo began his own land speculations in the area. Along with his brother Pat, a close friend J.N. Horne, and a reluctant Radford, he began buying lots in the Prince Rupert townsite. In these transactions he developed the financing methods he was to apply years later in negotiations with Ottawa for funds to cover depression relief costs. In order to meet his share of real estate obligations, he would borrow from wealthier partners and hope to meet that debt later out of capital gains. The wealthiest of the syndicate members, J.N. Horne, an almost illiterate miner-rancher who made money on the Yukon creeks and owned acreage in the United States, often advanced Pattullo's share for the investments. The syndicate members had Pattullo act as broker for the group, wiring for funds as the need arose.

Pattullo was never able to send money to Dawson as little insurance or real-estate commission work was done in

Prince Rupert. Both partners drew identical salaries from the business in spite of the fact that all the paying transactions were done in the Yukon. As Pattullo channeled more and more money into Prince Rupert a rift developed between the partners. Radford found it increasingly difficult to raise money. Dawson, in the early years of the century, was not an economically viable community. The easy gold had been taken from the creeks; the prospectors had moved on to Alaska; and the big dredges of Yukon Consolidated had not yet taken over in a large way. The rapidly accumulating number of lots in Prince Rupert meant a mounting annual property tax bill. In addition, Pattullo got the syndicate into an unprofitable brick-making plant which seemingly always demanded new equipment.

In 1910 Pattullo was elected Prince Rupert city councilman in spite of objections from his partners. His brother felt there was more to be gained in working solely for their business interests in Prince Rupert than in fighting the electorate's battles. Radford saw one advantage in that "we would know just what is going on; but whether we would make as much in the end as if you remained out of the race it is very hard for me to say."[7] In 1913 he won the office of Mayor of Prince Rupert. Radford objected to carrying the business alone with only holdings in Prince Rupert but hoped his partner's position might offer some advantage. In later years it certainly afforded Pattullo a wealth of experience in understanding the potentials, and appreciating the problems, of the northern regions of the province of British Columbia.

By 1913 the real estate and building boom in British Columbia was going sour. Foreign capital withdrew and speculators were left holding lots that were non-productive and costly to keep up. Pattullo wrote his partners almost nightly seeking funds to meet taxes and maintain the holdings. Correspondence became desperate. Radford had no more money as business in Dawson got worse by the month. Horne was back in California. At a safe distance from Pattullo's persuasive oratory he objected to any more loans, purchases, or payments. Brother Pat closed his law practice in Vancouver, entered the service, and eventually went overseas. Pattullo cashed in the surrender value of his insurance policies.

The climax came in 1915. Pattullo owed Horne thirty thousand dollars, an incredible sum in 1915. At first Duff was scared and wrote his brother that he was "reaching the end of the rope."[8] Later, in October, he remarked; "this is a fright Pat. I hope that I can make a landing before I drown."[9] Duff's entire share in the syndicate's joint venture was bought with borrowed money. Radford had nowhere near that amount invested and Pat assumed that Duff had limited his shares to his means. Property values were so low that there was no way the syndicate could get back their investment. They had to hang on, and Pat volunteered to protect Duff's share by some means, but suggested shutting up the business. The business was nothing by this time. Pattullo and Radford represented a few large insurance companies locally, and that was it. The lack of

real-estate transactions meant no commissions. Even the office building was falling down. Correspondence between the partners became formal and terse. They took to addressing each other as Mr. Radford and Mr. Pattullo. In 1915 the partnership was dissolved.

Radford asked that he be allowed to keep the Dawson end and Pattullo take the Rupert office. Duff insisted that he had a right to a share of the Dawson office as he felt it was more valuable than the branch. In truth, Radford's business was falling off so badly he could not maintain his own family. He had been unable to send Pattullo any money in 1914 or 1915 in spite of the latter's demands for his share of the "profits." Radford finally agreed to pay Pattullo twelve hundred dollars over a year to buy him out. He told Pattullo: "I consider that you have done fairly well out of the partnership--that is, if as far as actual results are concerned, getting much and contributing little can be considered doing well."[10] It was a bitter end to their association.

Pattullo continued to maintain appearances but he was broke and in serious financial difficulty. His business was greatly impaired. His property was valueless as he could not sell it. He owed his brother Pat $4,986.63.[11] He owed Horne $38,098.75 without interest.[12] His yearly property tax bill was $1,098.48, and he owed an unspecified amount in back taxes.[13]

Pat advised Duff to leave Prince Rupert and look for some remunerative work in Vancouver or Victoria. His friends in Prince Rupert hoped he would stay and take charge of the newspaper. Pattullo was a respected pioneer citizen, and it is unlikely he seriously comtemplated a move. Many of his similarly indebted friends enlisted and went to the front. When confronted with that possibility Pattullo wrote: "this aspect of patriotism does not appeal to me and should only be resorted to as the final plunge."[14] He was forty-one years old when the war began and such an act would surely have been one of desperation. In addition, his wife was repeatedly ill and required attention.

Politics suggested a possible occupation and he wrote his brother pointing out the advantages: "the redeeming feature of this situation is that the money we are putting up we shall get out all right--with some profit if the Liberals win."[15] By 1915 Pattullo concluded that Richard McBride's government could be beaten, that Liberal prospects looked good. Pattullo arrived at the important realization that if he won a constituency in the election that "the north could fairly reasonably lay claim to a portfolio...the north if it can send a reasonably fit representative to the house would have to be recognized."[16]

Politics was for Pattullo a palatable opportunity to stave off complete financial ruin and to soothe--and later over-fortify--a shaky ego and perception of self.

A legislative seat, and possibly a ministerial position, provided an expedient solution to his severe financial position by promising a lucrative salary and commensurate recognition in an area that had always been a hobby. Yet the decision to enter politics was motivated by abject failure in his first profession - business.

In the election of 1916 Pattullo contested a legislative seat in Prince Rupert, easily beat the "conservative" candidate William Manson, and went to Victoria while his constituents hailed their Prince Rupert member as "a Northman with a Northman's appreciation of, and sympathy with, the problems of the North."[17] Premier Brewster heard their representations and appointed the freshman legislator as his Minister of Lands. Pattullo was sworn in the Liberal cabinet on November 30, 1916.

He served in the cabinets of Harlan Brewster and John Oliver. When Oliver died in August, 1927, he showed himself willing to serve the new leader, J.D. MacLean. His many speaking engagements, public exposure, constant travel throughout British Columbia, and long service, made Pattullo the logical choice as leader after MacLean's government was defeated on July 18, 1928.

In Opposition Pattullo worked tirelessly to prepare and redraft the Liberal party platform which would springboard him to the Premier's office. His influence was so strong, his control so well developed, that Bruce Hutchison,

a political reporter for the Province, remarked: "His power in the Liberal Party is not the power of the glad hand, but of sheer force of character....he has always been boss without question."[18]

Duff Pattullo, the confused adolescent, the stylish entrepreneur, the failed businessman, wanted to become T.D. Pattullo, Premier. It was a role that allowed much confusion and called for considerable business skill and understanding. Pattullo expressed no doubts as to his abilities. In the provincial election of 1933 Pattullo's Liberals won thirty-four of the forty-seven seats in the House and he had his opportunity.

A heady feeling accompanied success in his own right. Pattullo prided himself on his accomplishment. Cousins in the east sent requests for autographed pictures of their famous relative. He regularly appeared in the news. President Roosevelt came to Victoria in 1937. The King and Queen followed two years later. Mackenzie King arrived and stayed at the Pattullo home on Beach Drive. In writing his brother George, Duff dropped names like a freshman legislator. Clothes were purchased from the finest New York haberdashers. Dynamic, aggressive, "the youngest looking sixty-five year old in the Province," Pattullo not only governed, he ruled. When the Toronto Globe and Mail sent R.A. Farquharson to do an article on the Premier he recorded that Pattullo remarked: "Even if it sounds egotistical, I tell you this: what I say goes in this province."[19]

Throughout it all Pattullo never rid himself of the driving, searching, rough-hewn, self-serving ambitiousness, characteristic of the frontier where he spent so much of his life. He spoke for the province and did not hesitate expressing himself anywhere or on any issue. He intruded into social and political areas, where he had no business, like a backwoods logger at a company picnic, or a newly-rich prospector at a church social. When George VI was crowned in London, Pattullo wrote the King direct, and in the first person. In negotiations with the United States over the Alaska highway he flew to Hyde Park to have a personal "chat" with "our mutual friend F.D.R.,"[20] while protocol-conscious Ottawa protested that a provincial premier should be so presumptive. While representing the Dominion at the San Francisco World's Fair he informed the world, on Canada's behalf, and on his own volition, that King George VI was a "little boy grown up," and added: "If anybody whips our little boy we'll whip them."[21] That called for a personal explanation and an apology to the King. At Fairbanks, Alaska, in August, 1939, and again in New York, the following February, he advised the United States to get into the War. The remark prompted considerable criticism of his interference in affairs that were none of his business.[22] That required a restatement and a clarification. Clearly Pattullo thought of himself as much more than a provincial premier.

He thought of himself as a leader of men, moulder of opinion, a professional politician, even a statesman. "Statesmanship is a full time job," he told the editors of the Fairbanks Daily News Miner, "demanding stringent educational experiences and not merely the heartfelt will of an otherwise useful citizen or craftsman who is able to get himself elected to an office on the strength of his untested ideals."[23] Pattullo styled himself a leader and rode a broadening feeling of provincialism inspired by letters that suggested that "history will in due course assign to you the place of central figure in the picture of our return to sane and sensible living."[24] He was even assailed in verse as the "doughty Chieftain of the tribes along the Skeena, and the Bulkley, and the Fraser." Provincial sentiments, roused by friendly local newspapers, decried:

> What a shame it is, Oh! Chieftain,
> That you must go to Ottawa
> To the tribes of the Ottawa
> To get money for your people,
> Where they'll soak you ten per centum
> If they can, Oh doughty Chieftain,
> For their flimsy paper dollars. 25

Though at times ridiculed and labelled audacious, Pattullo appeared neither embarrassed, humbled, nor cowed. A secure personal identification developed with his successes. He took great delight when the newspapers referred to his "Napoleonic territorial ambitions,"[26] spoke of "Reich's Fuehrer Pattullo,"[27] or compared him to Julius Caesar.[28] He enjoyed the company of immortality.

From 1933 until 1941 T.D. Pattullo ran the Province of British Columbia as its premier. Those years from 1933 were depression years and Pattullo was a depression premier. With the war in 1939 came prosperity, and it was prosperity that was Pattullo's undoing. Pattullo's entire philosophy of government and his carefully wrought political base fell apart in good times. His belief that government should exert itself in a paternal way in an effort to find a vehicle to bring relief on a broad social scale no longer had application. His political appeal as a compromise political figure then no longer satisfied enough voters to secure him a majority. Pattullo refused to change his thinking or philosophy, although expediency suggested it. He remained committed to depression politics which seemed rather dated. For years he had done well with his rhetoric and his dreams, his premises and prophecies.

In January, 1941, Pattullo attended the Ottawa conference debating the recommendations of the Rowell-Sirois Commission. That group was appointed by the federal government in 1937 to study the constitutional delegation of various responsibilities and obligations, including relief, and the realignment of sources of revenue, particularly income tax. The meeting was to discuss agreements which could become the basis for constitutional amendments. Pattullo fought Ottawa on almost every issue at the conference. Prime Minister Mackenzie King was forced to abandon the

discussions because of the failure to come to any agreement. This in itself was not really significant as the two levels of government had been agreeing to disagree on those issues for many years. But the political ramifications of that conference were devastating for Pattullo.

He and King may have understood the negotiations in Ottawa and appreciated the finer detail, but to the rest of the country the premier was suddenly simply uncooperative. "There was such an onslaught," Pattullo later observed, "as to make it appear in the minds of a considerable number of people that I was actually traitorous to Canada."[29] For the first time in his career Duff Pattullo had allowed himself to be isolated from popular feelings. The familiar confrontation with Ottawa, reminiscent of so many others, lacked a key ingredient. Pattullo no longer had the support of the people in British Columbia.

Public pressure to accommodate the federal government continued through 1941 and Pattullo thought it necessary to call an election to get "an expression of opinion from the electorate."[30] In that election the C.C.F. and the Conservatives secured a combined opposition of twenty-six members. Pattullo felt he could govern with twenty-one seats in the manner King had done federally in 1926.[31]

R.L. Maitland offered a coalition with his Conservatives for the duration of the war. The solution envisaged by the coalitionists was for the old line parties to unite in a common cause to offset the threat from the

political left. Pattullo refused. His thinking was to change policy not party. He saw a solution in again appealing to the left as he had done successfully in 1937. Coalition would mean a shift to the right, abandonment of radical Liberal thought to a third party, and risked a black and white political duality in the province which would eventually destroy the Tory and Grit parties. Pattullo wrote King:

> Coalition with the Tories would, in my opinion, result in a tremendous deflexion of Liberals to the C.C.F. People are moving to the C.C.F. who are not Socialists, but who look for a broader base of more radical legislation. Once these Liberals start voting for the C.C.F., they will, I think, continue to vote C.C.F. 32

Pattullo desired to meet the House when it convened in early December and to attempt to secure its confidence.

A coalition movement gained momentum and the government's collapse was inevitable. Sitting members worried about fighting another election in the near future. A coalition seemed an easy way to preserve power and influence. Pattullo wrote King: "Some of our Members would like to continue their service in the Legislature, and have no difficulty in reconciling their public duty with personal considerations."33

Powerful Liberals and friends began the process of disassociation from a leader that refused to compromise. Senator J.W. DeB. Farris, who had a distinguished record of support for the premier, wrote Ian Mackenzie:

> Everything he has done has been wrong and indicates a mentality not normal. I think the Provincial Association should be called together so that the Liberal Party may dissociate itself from him as speedily as possible. 34

Farris had seconded Pattullo's nomination at the 1930 Kamloops leadership convention. In 1931 Farris told a Liberal policy convention in Vancouver that "he had never regretted his action," and that "any Liberal who went into the Tolmie (Coalition) Government would not have the respect or the support of the well-thinking people of the Liberal Party."[35] Farris's observations and actions in 1941 indicate the change in the political situation in British Columbia in nine years.

At a party convention, held in ~~Kelowna~~ Vancouver (Province Sun 2, 3, 4 Dec) on December 3, 1941, the British Columbia Liberal party voted for coalition with the provincial Conservatives. Pattullo resigned as party leader. He remained in the legislature until October, 1945, when he lost his Prince Rupert seat in a general election. In his career Pattullo had been a sitting legislator for over twenty-nine years: twelve years as a government cabinet minister; five years in opposition; eight years as premier; thirteen years as leader of the Liberal Party. He retired to his Oak Bay home on Beach Drive, in Victoria.

Pattullo moved off the front pages of newspapers with remarkable rapidity. His resignation in 1941 preceded the attack on Pearl Harbor by only three days and conse-

quently secured only cursory notice. His defeat in 1945 meant the end of an uncomfortable reminder of the depression. And so it happened just as Pattullo always feared it would. He wanted to be remembered for some lasting contribution of some importance. That thought drove him all his life. He was not.

He died on Easter Weekend, March 29, 1956; spared the remarks of later generations: "Who? Pattullo? You mean the one they named the bridge after?" To be remembered that way was not what he had envisioned. Ironically, when speaking at Pattullo's funeral, Reverend Dr. J.L.W. McLean of St. Andrew's Presbyterian Church, remarked that the good done by the premier "will live and be recounted through endless generations."[36]

## PREFACE

## FOOTNOTES

1 William Lyon Mackenzie King, Diary, 25 April 1934. Public Archives of Canada (hereafter cited as PAC).

2 Vancouver Province, 31 March 1956. Provincial Liberal Leader Arthur Laing on the occasion of T.D. Pattullo's death.

3 T.D. Pattullo to George Robson Pattullo, undated, [1895-96.] George Robson Pattullo Papers. Provincial Archives of British Columbia (hereafter cited as PABC). File 1-21.

4 Ibid.

5 His father's Liberal connections were apparently substantial. Duff learned later that there had been 8900 applications for the handful of positions on Walsh's staff.

6 The Walsh expedition was responsible to Clifford Sifton, the federal Minister of the Interior, and its specific duty was to open up the Yukon country.

7 W.G. Radford to Pattullo, 19 April 1910, PABC, Thomas Dufferin Pattullo Papers (hereafter cited as Pattullo Papers), Vol. 4. Except where otherwise stated, all references in this Preface are to the T.D. Pattullo Papers.

8 J.B. Pattullo to T.D. Pattullo, 21 February 1915, quoting a letter from T.D. Pattullo, Vol. 8.

9 T.D. Pattullo to J.B. Pattullo, 15 October 1915, Vol. 8.

10 W.G. Radford to Pattullo, 24 June 1915, Vol. 8.

11 J.B. Pattullo to T.D. Pattullo, 4 April 1916, Vol. 9.

12 T.D. Pattullo to J.K. MacRae, 26 August 1917, Vol. 10.

13 Income Tax return of T.D. Pattullo for the year 1918, Vol. 10.

14 T.D. Pattullo to J.B. Pattullo, 24 February 1915, Vol. 8.

15 T.D. Pattullo to J.B. Pattullo, 2 November 1915, Vol. 8.

16 T.D. Pattullo to J.B. Pattullo, 24 February 1915, Vol. 8.

17 Unsigned letter [Omineca Liberal Association] to Harlan C. Brewster, 6 October 1916, Vol. 8.

18 "Persistence and Luck Aided Pattullo to Triumph," Bruce Hutchison in Vancouver Province, 3 November 1933.

19 R.A. Farquharson, "British Columbia's 'Boss' Determined on Annexation of the Yukon," Toronto Globe and Mail. 18 March 1939. Pattulo Papers, Vol. 82.

20 T.D. Pattullo to George Pattullo, 7 June 1938.

21 Victoria Times, 4 July 1939.

22 Press Statement, 3 February 1940, Vol. 64.

23 Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, 29 August 1939. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 82.

24 H.C. Wrinch to Pattullo, 10 April 1934.

25 The Smithers Interior News, n.d., (April, 1934), copy in the Pattullo Papers.

26 "Editorial," Peace River Block News-Dawson Creek, 31 August 1939. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 82.

27 Vancouver Province, 7 April 1937.

28 Vancouver Province, 18 May 1937. The reference belonged to R.L. Maitland, and the full text read: "There's a parallel between Julius Caesar and Pattullo, but Julius Caesar had a good road policy."

29 Pattullo to King, 23 October 1941, Vol. 70.

30 Typescript of Radio Address over CJVI, 18 October (1941), Vol. 65.

31 The results of the election can be largely attributed to a split of the free enterprise vote, as well as to the appeal of the more left leaning policies of the C.C.F. In 1933 no split had occurred because the Conservatives were in disarray. The electors voted against socialism and supported the only party of stability. Even the Conservative Party Executive was not endorsing a provincial campaign in that election. Then in 1937 the Connell division in the C.C.F. ranks assured Pattullo's continued success. Three healthy parties in 1941 meant disaster for the Liberals. The far-right wing of the Party voted Conservative and the far-left went to the C.C.F.

32 Pattullo to King, 14 November 1941, PAC, King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 313.

33 Ibid.

34 J.W. DeB. Farris to Ian Mackenzie, 17 November 1941, University of British Columbia, Special Collections, J.W. DeB. Farris Papers, Box 4.

35 Minutes of the Convention of the British Columbia Liberal Association held at the Hotel Georgia, Vancouver, B.C., on Monday and Tuesday, October 3rd and 4th, 1932, University of British Columbia, Special Collections, British Columbia Liberal Association Papers, Box 1.

36 Victoria Times, 2 April 1956.

# CHAPTER I

## YUKON ANNEXATION

> The proposition will meet with hot opposition and its author will be accused of entertaining delusions of grandeur. But none of this will deter Mr. Pattullo from trying to fulfill an ambition...that he has cherished for years. It is characteristic of the man that he is seeking new frontiers when others about him are tremulous with fear over the crumbling of old ones. It is a courage that should be rewarded...it is the mark of a man who will not grow old. 1

When he assumed office as premier of British Columbia Pattullo found that circumstances placed him at the head of government at a time when depressed international economics meant that money was in short supply and demands for social services were at unprecedented levels. To administer programmes and to legislate change during the Great Depression required imagination, and Pattullo demonstrated plenty of that.

As a politician, Pattullo had the vision and foresight necessary to recognize that the province's full potential depended on expansion of population, development

of resources, broadening of the tax base and an eventual extension of government services. Pattullo arrived at that understanding through a shrewd assessment of past politicians' desires combined with a keen understanding of present problems.

Pattullo learned the issues first hand in Prince Rupert. He had seen his own land speculations go sour because too few people were going into the hinterland of the province. There were just too many towns with too few people, with too many services and too little money, to be adequately administered, supported and served by the provincial government. Either people had to be displaced and centralized or a plan devised whereby the government could buttress the existing structure before the whole thing collapsed. Pattullo chose the latter.

Settlement in northern British Columbia was first encouraged in the days of the McBride government. To support new communities a network of government services was laid out. The revenues which established the roads, schools and hospitals, however, in no way correlated with tax revenues based on annual earnings in the area. Rather, the services were initiated with capital revenue obtained through the alienation of expendable resources such as timber leases. More people--a broader tax base in the north--would help reduce deficits by giving government services real northern support, rather than draining revenues from other sources.

The advantages of northern development and expansion were immense and could help solve the multitude of provincial problems that negotiations with Ottawa were not solving. Over a period of years Pattullo negotiated with both R.B. Bennett's Conservatives, and W.L. Mackenzie King's Liberals, for the adequate financial resources, and the necessary sources of revenue, to meet the rising demands on his government for funding some adequate government response to the misery of depression. Pattullo developed a wide range of arguments to support his hypothesis that fiscal problems in British Columbia were aggravated by the failure of federal politicians to acknowledge responsibility for the tremendous cost of relief. The provinces, he claimed, were then forced to shoulder that responsibility or face the prospect of social upheaval in the community and infiltration of provincial politics by left-wing philosophies.

It was Pattullo's contention though that relief costs were only the latest in a long list of provincial complaints against the federal treasury that included the latter's failure to cooperate in the areas of sharing income tax, their unwillingness to negotiate better terms of Confederation, and their misunderstanding of the inequality of east-west freight rates. British Columbia felt further burdened by federal tariff policies which served to penalize a province which was dependent on high levels of export trade in resource goods.

Attempts to come to terms with Ottawa on those issues were far from satisfactory. Pattullo advanced theories on refunding the provincial debt at lower rates of

interest, and on returning purchasing power to the population through a massive inflation of the circulating currency. Ottawa was uncooperative, his suggestions were termed "fanciful," and Pattullo came to accept the futility of expecting the federal government to come to his financial assistance. It was at that point that he again looked to his roots and imagined once more prospects in the north that he had seen in the gold rush days, and been a part of in the years that followed.

The new north suggested land scheme possibilities. Trade with the developing territories would triple or quadruple the two million dollars worth of goods shipped from Vancouver in 1936-37.[2] Industry and capital would flock to the coast to supply the north. Mineral deposits that his geologists assured him were there could be developed to end unemployment. The elusive oil he sought would finance any amount of social legislation. Finally, road connections with Yukon offered an unprecedented tourist attraction, and tremendous opportunities in that industry.

Simply put, the plan Pattullo devised was gargantuan. First, by annexing two huge blocks of land, the Yukon Territory and the Mackenzie District, the province would be enlarged by over 400,000 square miles, more than doubling its area. The new British Columbia would reach from the 49th parallel to the Arctic Ocean, from the Pacific to the 120th meridian. Then a road, a grand Trans-provincial Pacific Highway, would push through the length of the new province from Vancouver to Fairbanks, Alaska. Feeder roads up the Liard to the Mackenzie and rail connections to the Peace River district could follow later.

The whole plan must be seen as a package, as a vision for another tomorrow. Restrained from working on the grand design by an opposition he characterized as less than visionary, Pattullo proceeded slowly, piece by piece, on particular parts of the plan. In his mind, however, it existed as a unified whole, his lifelong ambition, to manage the vast frontier, the hinterland, for the good of the people of British Columbia. It remained the encompassing scheme of his life, his gift to the province, his slice of immortality.

Everyone speculated on the Premier's motivation in annexation. Most believed that he wanted the Yukon for purposes of a Pacific Highway right of way. With Ottawa reluctant to build or finance any part of an Alaska highway within its territory, British Columbia needed jurisdiction over the whole projected route in order to deal directly with the American government, or its agencies, for construction funds.[3] As the Conservatives suggested: "Maybe Mr. Pattullo is doing some work for Mackenzie King. Maybe Mr. King wishes Mr. Pattullo to take the responsibility for a war road for the United States to Alaska."[4] Some speculated that British Columbia would then be in a position to trade a portion of the Yukon for the Alaska Panhandle.[5] More outlandish suggestions were that Pattullo hoped to sell it outright to the United States to get the required capital for "work and wages." Or further, that the Dominion, burdened by the cost of administration, made annexation

a rider to one of British Columbia's federal loans.[6] One man wrote the Province advising that annexation would allow British Columbia to give the Yukon to the Americans, as a credit toward Britain's war debt, and "as Canada's contribution to British Empire defenses."[7]

Very rarely did the press, the public, the opposition, or even legislative colleagues guess Pattullo's real driving force. His brother George did. He wrote once: "if you add still another 200,000 square miles to British Columbia, boy, you'll go down in the history of the province as the Empire Builder."[8] On occasion Pattullo confided in friends. "I have some plans in mind which I have been cherishing for nearly twenty years," he told Chief Justice Archer Martin, "and it now looks as if there were reasonable prospect of seeing them brought to successful issue."[9] "I have in mind development schemes of proportions," he confessed to Mrs. Mary Lee Davis, author of a book on the Yukon that Pattullo particularly liked.[10]

The premier was no stranger to the Yukon. As the Victoria Times observed: "if anybody knows anything about the potentialities of prospective revenue from the Yukon, it is the man who occupies the position of Prime Minister of B.C."[11] His early experience in the office of the Yukon Gold Commission had done much to develop his technical thinking on annexation through an understanding of Yukon mining law and northern resource management. He certainly was aware that one Yukon corporation, Yukon Consolidated,

had proven mining claims with gold content valued at over forty million dollars.[12] He knew that since the 1897 gold rush the territory had produced $200,000,000.00 in gold.[13] Some found the figure uncomfortably similar to the province's gross debt. While in the Yukon, Pattullo had learned the intricacies of large-scale, corporate, mineral development. It was a knowledge shared by few of his opposition contemporaries. After the frenzy of the bonanza days, big operations, notably the Yukon Consolidated Gold Corporation, moved out onto the creeks and restaked immense placer holdings. When individual prospectors moved on to newer strikes in Alaska, gold production and development activity depended solely on the ability or inclination of the corporations to work their claims. Yukon mining law allowed grouping of claims, and the demands of representation--the annual amount of work required on a claim to maintain title--were very light. Yukon Consolidated alone controlled 1600 placer claims. Companies argued that it was necessary to maintain large mining blocks to protect their investments on equipment required to work placer holdings.

Pattullo knew the non-progressive nature of the existing mining system in the Yukon, operated solely for the benefit of the corporations. "(The) Yukon Territory appears to be tied up with the mining leases which cover a period of 21 years," wrote D.A. Matheson: "Many of such leases are keys to certain mining operations, the holders thereof should be compelled to operate the leases in groups

at least, otherwise the leases should be cancelled as the existence retards development by keeping others out."[14] Pattullo found placer monopolies anathema. Through the Yukon system the natural resources of the country, which were held in trust by governments, for the people, made only investors rich.

Annexation of the Yukon would bring the territory within the jurisdiction of British Columbia's mining regulations and would open up mining leases for individual prospecting, affording the province a share of the wealth--the people's by right--to finance much needed social legislation. It would give the government an opportunity to develop immense gold holdings that were lying unworked. At the same time, allowing individuals to work the proven creeks of the Yukon would provide employment opportunities. Consideration of the effect of annexation on placer workings, mineral development and opportunities for employment, played a large part in the grand plan for a new north, for provincial development.

Pattullo sought to acquire more than just the Yukon. Discussions with the province's Chief Geographer, G.G. Aitken, convinced Pattullo that the Dominion ran a deficit in administering the Yukon because territorial perimeters imposed a limited economy dependent on the development of one exhaustable resource, gold. Aitken suggested that by including the Mackenzie Basin as well as the Yukon in annexation plans, B.C. would acquire a territory with diverse resources.[15]

The argument significantly influenced Pattullo's thinking on the boundaries of his new province. Twice in 1937 he wrote King expressing an interest in the territory of the Mackenzie Basin.[16]

One resource that was thought to be lacking in northern British Columbia but that likely existed in the territories was oil. Pattullo developed an intense interest in the possibility of striking oil. His Department of Mines kept him informed about the hopes American geologists had in finding oil in Alaska. It seemed logical to Pattullo that similar possibilities presented themselves in the Yukon and Mackenzie Basin.

After repeated representations by Pattullo through various ministers, notably Charles Dunning (Finance), T.A. Crerar (Resources), and Mackenzie King, the federal Cabinet considered Pattullo's plan on March 4, 1937. Annexation was, in fact, "a long standing proposal" of Mackenzie King's.[17] The Territories were never a paying proposition and the premier's arguments as to the benefits to be derived by Yukon in being "efficaciously" administered by Victoria rather than "long distance" or as "a sort of 'side issue'" by the Dominion[18] did have a certain logic. King encouraged the Minister responsible for the territories, T.A. Crerar, to look over the premier's proposals. At the Cabinet meeting the basis for decision was a five-point programme devised by Hart and Pattullo. Four of the proposals, those having to do with federal departments and buildings, Indian reserva-

tions, and boundary delimitation, were either tabled for further discussion or accepted without challenge. Surprisingly there proved to be little disagreement. Ottawa was even enthusiastic.[19] Some negotiation took place over the cash settlement which was to accompany the transfer. The cash grant was to help the province defray administrative costs. The Yukon ran a considerable excess of expenditure over revenue every year and Pattullo made it clear "we could not, of course, afford to take over Yukon at a loss."[20] In 1935-36 a comparative statement of revenue and expenses prepared by Ottawa, showed a deficit of $308,680.74.[21]

Premier Pattullo originally asked for an annual grant of $100,000.00, to be renegotiated after three to five years, on a continuing basis. Crerar countered with an offer of $125,000.00 a year for five years.[22] Ottawa would surrender all the federal buildings in the territory, except those required for federal purposes. King emphasized an unwillingness to commit the federal treasury to indefinite payments to Victoria once control of expenditure belonged to a western premier. Pattullo agreed.

The provincial government disclosed the negotiations to the press on April 26:

> For some time negotiations have been proceeding between the Dominion Government and our government with regard to the Yukon Territory. The Dominion has felt, and our province has felt that the interests of the Yukon might be better served if the territory were under provincial jurisdiction. 23

The announcement followed two weeks after notification of a June 2 provincial election. Reactions in the media, in political circles, and particularly in the Yukon, were hurried, vocal and mixed. The Conservative Vancouver Province referred to the Premier as "the magnificent and innocent annexationist," and in an editorial asked: "What then...is Mr. Pattullo up to, sailing through the air with the greatest of ease, our stunting electioneer on his flying trapeze?"[24] The Liberal Vancouver Sun labelled it "A Progressive Step" and hoped "these negotiations will proceed to a successful consummation because such a merger would be along the best lines of evolutionary government and because we believe it would operate to the mutual advantage of both B.C. and the Yukon."[25] Eastern newspapers were sympathetic.[26]

Opposition politicians thought that Ottawa's easy acquiescence suggested caution. Rev. Robert Connell, the leader of the B.C. Constructive Party,[27] told a partisan gathering: "If the Dominion Government is giving it away, along with $125,000.00 annually, I have my doubts about our move being a wise one.[28] Others worried over particular details of the plan. Ottawa would control the major sources of revenue through its departments and agencies, and through its taxing privileges, while fixed service costs would revert to the province. All opposition party leaders: Dr. Frank Patterson of the Conservatives, Connell of the Constructives, and Dr. Lyle Telford of the C.C.F., opposed the proposal.

The common argument was that British Columbia had enough underdeveloped areas without seeking more.

For those who actually lived in the negotiated territory the issue involved more personal than political considerations. Cold monetary dealings over their future did little to assuage northern citizenry of the opinion that they were being sold to the highest bidder. George Black, former member for the Yukon, former Speaker at Ottawa, and husband of the incumbent M.P., told the press that "if the Dominion Government thinks so little of Yukon as to give British Columbia $125,000.00 for five years to take it off their hands, they might well put it up to public auction as some other province might take it for less."[29] "The citizens resent being sold as chattel slaves, to gain political ends," remarked C. Atherton, member of the Yukon Council for Whitehorse.[30]

The manner of the negotiations incensed Yukon residents. The Dawson Board of Trade claimed "such a move savors more of European Dictatorship than British Democracy."[31] The Territorial Council received no official notification of the suggestions in advance of newspaper releases. Then when they heard the announcement they found Ottawa unapproachable. Almost the entire federal cabinet was in mid-Atlantic, aboard the Empress of Australia, on their way to the Coronation and the subsequent Imperial Conferrence.

In both British Columbia and the Yukon, the protests centered on the provincial debt. Provincial taxpayers did

not want the Yukon because it would add to costs for development and services. J. Butterfield, a columnist in the Vancouver Province, made the point facetiously:

> There are 4000 people, and doubtless each capable of delivering millions in taxation every year. It only costs about thirty-one millions a year to administer the present small province of British Columbia. The new two-fifths should not cost more than $12,000,000.00. This should not be difficult for 4000 wealthy pioneers, a few Eskimos and a flock of Indians. It is scarcely more than $3000 each! 32

Conversely, Yukon did not want any association with British Columbia's gross debt, calculated for argument purposes at the time, as approaching $180,000,000.00. The Yukon had no debt of its own. Mrs. Martha Black, the Member of Parliament for the Yukon, argued that they might be interested in such a proposal "if there was a prospect of annexation by some Province that has made a success of administering its own affairs, but are not interested in merging with one that is head over heels in debt."[33] To Yukoners there existed the threat of double taxes. George Black added: "The taxes Yukoners now pay won't be a drop in the bucket to what they will have to shell out if Yukon becomes a part of British Columbia. Yukon taxpayers will have to pay double income taxes. One to the Federal Government and another to the Government of British Columbia."[34]

In addition to public criticism three factors developed after the announcement of negotiations that seriously threatened the outcome of annexation and Pattullo's whole plan of extended empire. First, annexation threatened to lead both governments

into a confrontation over separate schools. Second, a large company, with vast placer holdings in the Yukon, exerted considerable pressure in Ottawa and Victoria in an attempt to halt the proceedings. And finally, once British Columbia expressed an interest in alienating territory with resource potential, other provinces beseached Ottawa for similar consideration.

The schools question became the major consideration at Ottawa in later negotiations. Surprisingly, no one at either level of government anticipated the confrontation until Yukoners used it to strengthen their case.[35] It then became painfully obvious. At issue was the proposed status of Catholic schools in the territory once incorporation was realized. When the Yukon entered Confederation it retained the right to maintain publicly supported denominational schools as an alternative to public education. British Columbia had no government supported separate schools and expressed no desire of allowing them within its boundaries. When annexation was publicly proposed, the Roman Catholic Bishops in the province told both King and Pattullo that they would protect their rights in the Yukon, and even try to extend those rights throughout British Columbia.[36] In a brief submitted to the Rowell Commission the churchmen observed: "it is not our purpose in this brief to oppose such a plan, but we submit that if, as and when annexation comes to pass, Catholic education ought to be protected and the school rights enjoyed by the Catholic minority in the

Yukon extended to the whole province of British Columbia as then constituted."[37] Protestants were almost unanimously opposed to "such a system being in any way recognized where the Government of British Columbia has administrative jurisdiction."[38]

Many in Ottawa, notably T.A. Crerar--whose department of Mines and Resources was primarily involved--and O.D. Skelton--King's Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs --expressed feelings of déjà vu and alluded to the Manitoba Schools Crisis of the 1890's that brought defeat to the federal Conservative Party in 1896.[39] Neither wanted Yukon annexation to be the catalyst for a corresponding Liberal catastrophe. Crerar told King: "I can see the possibilities of difficulties arising over this, especially with the present feeling which exists in Quebec, since there is, relatively, a considerable French population in the Yukon."[40] Skelton added: "the school question is . . . difficult and may easily raise a row."[41] No one in Ottawa was anxious to make the whole question of state supported schools a public issue. The Vancouver Sun suggested the Catholic Bishops "effectively held up proceedings" on annexation because "Ottawa governments stay away from religious questions like a non-Aryan from a Nazi rally."[42] While there was only one Catholic school in the Yukon, the larger issue over church-state control or provincial rights might produce disastrous political consequences for Mackenzie King. A confidential memorandum on the transfer of territory prepared for the Prime Minister included

a section, "Suggested Reasons for Delay."[43]

The most significant of those reasons dealt with the representations of large Yukon mining operators that an independent third party be appointed to arbitrate the diverse interests involved in the transfer of territory. The Yukon Consolidated Gold Corporation looked on the proposed annexation as a horrible climax to their enjoyable twenty-five year relationship with the Yukon. They worried most about two things: that they would be overburdened with taxes, and that British Columbia's mining regulations would disrupt their delicate holding of placer claim groupings. To present their case, the corporations hired expert and influential legal counsel who had personal access to the heads of government on either side of the proposal. They retained J.W. DeB. Farris to reason with Pattullo. Farris had been John Oliver's Attorney General and Minister of Labour from 1917 to 1922. As such he was one of Pattullo's early cabinet colleagues. In 1937 Mackenzie King summoned him to the Senate. To speak with King and his Cabinet, they acquired the services of J.L. Ralston. Ralston was, then, a close acquaintance of King. Appointed Minister of National Defence in King's Cabinet in 1926 Ralston retired from politics in 1935. He would later accept a position as King's Minister of Finance in 1939, eventually returning to the Defence portfolio in 1940.

The distinction of the Company's solicitors indicated the degree of pressure the firm hoped to exert on the governments to abandon the scheme. They argued it did not seem fair to

expropriate their revenues "to pay for past expenditures by another province and from which the Company had no benefit."[44] Similarly, they were incensed at the possibility of changed mining regulations which would impose new conditions as to groupings and assessments of claims, and which might seriously impair their ability to protect existing titles.[45] They claimed that their huge investment, stated to be $22,000,000.00 and 650 jobs, was predicated on the assayed potential of their placer leases. Losing control of those leases would mean they could no longer justify to their investors the vast amounts required to build gold dredges. Investment would cease.

The exact effects of the Company's political pressure and lobby are uncertain, but they appeared significant in the final conclusions. Their representations did convince one influential minister of the justice of their cause. T.A. Crerar wrote King: "I am inclined to think they are right in their contention."[46] The odds turned against annexation. No one in Ottawa wanted to alienate investment capital.

To complicate the entire proposal, the Prime Minister received requests from other provinces for economic considerations as soon as negotiations with British Columbia became public. The Maritimes were particulary interested in profiting from the plan. They argued that provinces such as British Columbia with contiguous Dominion Territory, had great opportunity for expanding revenues through resource development once land was annexed to them. But, they claimed, such annexable territory came from areas in which all provinces had equal interests.

Since it was impossible for the Maritimes to increase their provincial land area they claimed compensation because of territorial alienation. One New Brunswick newspaper argued: "Recompense in some form is a most natural request on behalf of the Maritimes."[47]

The government at Ottawa soon concluded that annexation was not in the best interest of the Liberal party of Canada. True, Pattullo requested that the annexation proposal be shelved, but it was done involuntarily, under duress, or because of promises of other considerations--perhaps better terms for British Columbia. The official memorandum of the meeting Premier Pattullo had with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, on October 5, 1937, contained the line: "Pattullo to communicate with Mr. Crerar, asking that matter stand in abeyance pending report of Royal Commission on Dominion relations."[48] The next day the Premier complied. He announced the cessation, for the time being, of active pursuance of Yukon annexation.[49]

Outwardly it appeared that Pattullo chose the politically expedient, abandoning an idea that had become inopportune and unpopular once safely through the election of June, 1937. Pattullo's Liberals lost two seats but maintained a comfortable majority. In truth, the premier remained as deeply committed to the annexation scheme in later years as he had been in June, 1937,[50] and charges that it was simply an election issue were unfounded. Ottawa's hesitation on cooperation simply channelled the premier's focus of enthusiasm, early in 1938, toward other aspects of the Empire plan. After being frustrated in his annexation attempts with Ottawa he redirected his efforts to negotiations with the U.S.A. over a Pacific Highway through

British Columbia. Although Pattullo later played down the specific Yukon issue he never abandoned it. As late as 1940 Pattullo remarked in a press release: "We are in agreement with Ottawa regarding the Yukon and when the time is ripe the boundaries of British Columbia will be extended to include that territory."[51]

Where Pattullo made a mistake in the Yukon negotiations was in continually giving the impression that he alone had a monopoly on vision--although at times it seemed possible. Other men of his generation saw the world with blinkers on. The depression affected their ability to look to the future. To them territory was a burden, not a prospect. It meant only an added expense for development. In the years between the worst of the depression and the outbreak of war an inverted mentality existed in many parts of the province and the nation. The protestations seem comic in retrospect, in later days of oil embargoes and hopes of resource self-sufficiency.

At a provincial government luncheon in 1939 King George VI gave dignity to Pattullo's ideas. "You have only touched the fringes of the great North," the King remarked. "There in the North is a field of enterprise for youth which it will take generations to exhaust."[52] But the majority of British Columbians were unconvinced. At the end of February hundreds of them flocked to Vancouver's Capitol theatre, paid thirty-five cents, and saw the new Warner Brothers' movie, "God's Country and the Woman." There they swallowed Hollywood's version of the north: "a vast and virtually impenetrable forest, mysterious and almost enchanted,

stretching back forever into the mists of the Unknown."[53]

With the waning of Pattullo's political fortunes the province lost a splendid chance to secure a new frontier. Great potential lay behind the premier's plan. Even if immediate resource development was too costly, new taxes on large mining corporations could meet yearly administrative deficits, the land held in escrow for the people of the province, developed as opportunity afforded. If British Columbia did not annex while Ottawa seemed willing, Pattullo was certain that in a few years the plan would be impossible. It happened just as he predicted. As prosperity returned, increased dependence on resources for early war production gave Ottawa a greater appreciation of its possessions. "These Dominion Government territories are increasing their production of wealth," noted the Province in 1941, "and represent a potential source of income to a Federal Government which needs every penny, even in prospect."[54] Any pragmatist could then see that which a few years before required great vision.

## CHAPTER I

## FOOTNOTES

1 Gus Sivertz, "Lend Me Your Ears," Vancouver Sun, 23 August 1939.

2 Memorandum . . . Re Value of Goods shipped from British Columbia to Yukon Territory, E.G. Rowebottom to Pattullo, 11 May 1937. Vol. 71.

3 Vancouver Province, 27 April 1937. Also: Vancouver Financial News, 29 April 1938; Vancouver Sun, 9 January 1939.

4 Vancouver Province, 30 April 1937.

5 George Pringle to T.D. Pattullo, 29 April 1937, PABC, Thomas Dufferin Pattullo Papers (hereafter cited as Pattullo Papers), Vol. 72. Except where otherwise stated, all reference in this thesis are to the T.D. Pattullo papers.

6 "Letter-to-the-Editor," Vancouver Province, 11 May 1937.

7 L.O. Hedlund, "Letter-to-the-Editor," Vancouver Province, 14 May 1937.

8 George Pattullo to T.D. Pattullo, 9 October 1939. Vol. 57.

9 Pattullo to Honourable Chief Justice Archer Martin, 31 December 1937. Vol. 32.

10 Pattullo to Mrs. Mary Lee Davis, 24 January 1938. Vol. 32.

11 "Editorial," Victoria Times, 27 April 1937.

12 John A. Agnew, President of Yukon Consolidated Gold Corporation, "Letter-to-the-Editor," London Morning Post, undated, (1937). Pattullo Papers, Vol. 71.

13 Vancouver Province, 26 April 1937.

14 D.A. Matheson to Pattullo, 13 July 1937. Vol. 71.

15 Memo, G.G. Aitken, Chief Geographer, to Pattullo, 26 May 1937. Vol. 71.

16 Pattullo to King, 9 September 1937 and 17 December 1937. Vol. 75.

17 Vancouver Province, 6 October 1937.

18 Pattullo to King, 5 February 1936. Vol. 76.

19 The federal government expected to retain control of those services, obligations and sources of revenue constitutionally within its domain. The Post Office, National Revenue, Justice and Indian Departments would continue to function independent of provincial control. Similarly government buildings required for such purposes would be retained by Ottawa. Consideration of Indian Reservations was left for future consideration and discussion, as was the territorial boundary dividing the Yukon from the Northwest Territory.

20 Pattullo to King, 14 December 1936. Vol. 75.

21 "Comparative Statement of Revenue and Expenditure of the Federal Departments in the Yukon Territory," Crerar to Pattullo, 9 January 1937. Vol. 71.

22 Crerar to Pattullo, 17 April 1937. Vol. 76.

23 Victoria Times, 26 April 1937.

24 "Editorial," Vancouver Province, 29 April 1937.

25 "Editorial," Vancouver Sun, 29 April 1937.

26 See "Editorial," Victoria Colonist, 6 May 1937. The rare occurrence of a western province making a proposition which would save Ottawa money is one explanation.

27 The B.C. Constructive Party grew out of the doctrinal split that occurred in the C.C.F. ranks following the July, 1936, party convention. Rev. Robert Connell, leader of the C.C.F. party, was challenged by more radical socialists such as Dr. Lyle Telford, and Ernest and Harold Winch, who advocated policies more in line with Marxian socialism. Connell was expelled from the C.C.F. He then formed the B.C. Constructive Party. The split in the C.C.F. ranks was viewed as a decisive consideration in the 1937 provincial election as in many ridings it split the vote of the far left.

28 Vancouver Province, 26 April 1937.

29 Vancouver Province, 27 April 1937.

30 Vancouver Province, 30 April 1937.

31 J.N. Spence, President, The Dawson Board of Trade, to William Lyon Mackenzie King, undated (1937). Willian Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 243. PAC.

32 J. Butterfield, "The Common Round," in Vancouver Province, 27 April 1937.

33 Toronto Globe and Mail, 18 August 1939.

34 Vancouver Province, 27 April 1937.

35 Victoria Times, quoting George Black, former Speaker of the Federal House, 28 April 1937.

36 Vancouver Sun, 3 May 1938.

37 Ibid.

38 O.W. Wakelin, Grand Secretary of B.C. Loyal Orange Association, to Pattullo, 8 September 1937. Volume 71. Also: Anglican Bishop Rix of Prince Rupert to Pattullo, 17 November 1938; The Vancouver General Ministerial Association to Pattullo, 20 December 1937. Vol. 71.

39 The Manitoba Schools Crisis evolved around legislation passed in 1890 by the Manitoba government establishing a non-sectarian school system. Roman Catholics took issue with the law citing discrimination against their schools and appealed to the federal government. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decided in favor of the Catholic Church but Manitoba refused to supplement or alter its legislation. A split in Cabinet on religious lines, and on the proper sphere of provincial rights, left the Conservatives uncertain and divided over their course of action. The issues involved greatly influenced the election of 1896 when the Conservatives were defeated and Wilfrid Laurier was elected Prime Minister.

40 T.A. Crerar to King, 27 August 1937. King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 233. PAC.

41 Memo from O.D. Skelton to King, 2 October 1937. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 230. PAC.

42 Vancouver Sun, 3 May 1938.

43 Confidential Memorandum, 7 December 1937, unsigned. King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 233. PAC. Some of the "Suggested reasons for delay:"

--Delimitation of boundaries - In discussions it was suggested east boundary should follow the height of land so that the territory tributary to Mackenzie district would be included in North West Territories. No definite surveys yet made and, therefore, boundaries difficult to define.

--It will take time to determine the lands to be reserved by Indians.

--Appointment of Royal Commission now affords opportunity for that body to consider all the rights of interested parties, including those of minorities.

--Subsequent suggestion by Mr. Pattullo that additional northern lands be included in transfer lying to the north and east of present boundaries."

44 J.L. Ralston to King, 24 September 1937. King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 240. PAC.

45 J.W. DeB. Farris to Pattullo, 12 March 1938. Vol. 71.

46 T.A. Crerar to King, 27 August 1937. King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 233. PAC.

47 The Victoria Colonist, 4 May 1937, commenting on an Editorial in the Fredericton, N.B., Daily Gleaner.

48 "Memorandum of Meeting between Mr. Pattullo, Prime Minister King and the Federal Cabinet on 5 October 1937," 25 November 1937, unsigned, King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 202. PAC.

49 Victoria Times, 6 October 1937.

50 At the height of highway negotiations in 1938 he remarked: "As we are taking over the Yukon we are the proper authorities to deal with this matter of the Alaska highway." (Vancouver Sun, 7 May 1938.) Then in summer, 1939, he made a two week air trip through the north "(in a) serious endeavour . . . to comprehend by personal observation something of the potentials of this vast region." ("Editorial," Prince George Citizen, 27 July 1939. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 82.) Pattullo never abandoned his ambition.

51 Vancouver Province, 29 June 1940.

52 Typescript of "His Majesty's Address at the Provincial Government Luncheon tendered Their Most Gracious King George VI and Queen Elizabeth," 30 May 1939. Vol. 84.

53 Pierre Berton, on movies of that genre, in Hollywood's Canada: The Americanization of Our National Image (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), p.25.

54 Vancouver Province, 21 February 1941.

## CHAPTER II

## A PACIFIC HIGHWAY

Only one man in ten thousand thinks, and only one in ten millions has vision. 1

As a northern resident Pattullo was particularly aware that any plan of empire that included the northern areas of the province and Yukon Territories would be successful only if the areas were accessible. In 1898 he himself made that prophetic observation in an article he sent to the Montreal Herald:

> Just what the policy of the Government will be in regard to this country will of course have to be decided upon by the powers that be, but one thing is certain that the country will never be developed and explored as it should be, as its richness merits, until proper transportation facilities are provided and food cheapened. 2

It was natural then that Pattullo's plan of British Columbia Empire encompassed a plan for transportation. In concert with his annexation plans he thus geared what became his Pacific Highway proposal--a road from Vancouver, B.C. to Fairbanks, Alaska--toward an appeal to the material considerations to be derived by a depression economy from such a public undertaking. As long as someone else paid for it, taking the burden off a province unable to meet even the direct costs of unemployment, the road had apparent possibilities as a grand relief scheme: it would afford employment in its building, open the north for settlement, aid in air

communication, make possible commercial development of natural resources in new areas, attract tourist traffic, and provide an all-Canadian overland route to the Yukon Territory. Additionally, it would facilitate a whole range of more nebulous advantages such as closer relationships between the Canadian and American peoples.

The plan for an Alaska or Pacific Highway was not new. Premier Simon Fraser Tolmie, Pattullo's predecessor, had discussed such a plan as early as 1929. More recently American lobbies expressed intense interest in pushing a road through to their territory in Alaska. When the Premier began championing the cause for his purposes the proposal was well received.

Vancouver newspapers, fueled with statistics supplied by American auto clubs and other western lobbies, daily featured maps of the northern road. Suggested alternate routes through the Peace River or Prince Rupert kept regional politicians actively pursuing the proposal. Pattullo's own Surveyor-General submitted a report on the feasibility of an eastern over a western route within the province.[3] His new Minister of Trade and Industry, W.J. Asseltine, completed a memorandum on the potential resources of northern British Columbia.[4] And northern Liberals repeatedly reminded the premier of the party plank, dating back to the 1922 Convention, recommending a road connection with Peace River.[5]

In the autumn of 1937 President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States made a social visit to British Columbia

and called on Pattullo in Victoria. Roosevelt hoped to complete a highway link to the territory of Alaska as a New Deal project and was a strong advocate of early construction. The visit convinced the premier that his strongest ally for the road was the American government. In October, 1937, Pattullo returned Roosevelt's call by journeying to Hyde Park, New York, to meet the President. He returned to Victoria and told the press: "I look forward to the time when there will be a highway from Alaska to the most southern portion of South America."[6]

In September, 1937, with Pattullo's encouragement, President Roosevelt instructed the American Minister at Ottawa, Norman Armour, to make official and formal representations to the Canadian government expressing the United States' interest in early construction. Armour sent a diplomatic note on September 14, 1937, requesting the initiation of studies through the appointment of a special joint commission.[7]

Ottawa was embarrassed by attempts at negotiations initiated by the Americans or by Pattullo. The Canadian government had no desire, inclination or intention to build north-south roads but was caught in the middle of provincial and international posturings. Officially, O.D. Skelton, Canada's Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, had already concluded "it would be difficult" for Canada even to consider discussion with the Americans when neither federal nor provincial governments were in a financial

position to participate in construction.[8] He argued that constitutionally highways were a provincial responsibility and that British Columbia's existing highway system "of about 22,500 miles" was "already a formidable problem." As for federal intervention he cited "extensive commitments to subsidise a Trans-Canada highway," and stressed that "public opinion would probably regard this east-west undertaking as having priority over a north-south project in one Province."[9] Ottawa emphasized that the Trans-Canada highway was still incomplete in B.C.'s Big Bend region, north-east of Revelstoke, and that no road existed between Hope and Princeton. To Pattullo that was an excuse not an argument. Bruce Hutchison later clearly expressed what Pattullo perceived as Ottawa's motivation: "the Canadian Government . . . would much prefer to spend its money on roads closer to home, in country inhabited by free untrammelled electors, with votes at election time, than in a country inhabited by grizzlies, so far--by some oversight--not enfranchised."[10]

Seeing no opportunity in Ottawa, Pattullo began an unprecedented personal intervention in international negotiations for the highway. He wrote directly to President Roosevelt, outlined route considerations, and touched on the various costs of construction.[11] The Americans were understandably hesitant about how such actions would be received in Ottawa. Roosevelt's non-committal reply to Pattullo contained a rather veiled slight. He wrote: "I note with pleasure that you plan to discuss the whole thing

with Mr. King when you see him in Ottawa next month." Roosevelt then added: "We on our part will be glad to discuss it with him further when he has had an opportunity, after consultation with his colleagues, to reach a decision."[12]

Such subtlety was lost on Pattullo. He went to Washington in April, 1938, where he met Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and other influential men "concerned" about the fate of the road.[13] Over lunch he learned it had become customary for the U.S. to lend money to Central and South American countries, and even to make contributions toward highway projects and improvements. Specific reference was made to the assistance given to the Pan American Highway in Latin America. Pattullo informed King, "the upshot was that I made a suggestion which seemed to be favorably received."[14] That suggestion called for the insertion of a special clause into an American Work Relief Bill authorizing the President to loan or expend a sum of money not exceeding fifteen million dollars to construct the highway.

Skelton heard about the proposal from his own sources almost immediately. He refused to believe the reports and told King:

> Despatches from Washington regarding discussions between Pattullo and Ickes and others contain the suggestion that Congress may be asked to approve a $15,000,000 loan to finance the British Columbia share of the road. This would surely be a high water mark (or a low water mark) in provincial diplomacy. It may be assumed, until proven otherwise, that the statement is incorrect. 15

It was correct and King was livid. He wrote in his diary:

"Pattullo like a fool, has been telling the Americans what to do to get underway with public works in Canada in connection with the Alaska Highway."[16] A hurried Cabinet meeting was held to discuss Pattullo's proposals as well as a memorandum prepared by Skelton.

Pattullo argued that because Dominion aid was not forthcoming and it was impossible for British Columbia to borrow money on the open market and still provide for proper highway maintenance, "the only alternatives were to postpone the development of northern British Columbia indefinitely or to accept the friendly offer of the United States."[17] Skelton worried that by agreeing to Pattullo's "formula" for financing, Canadians would be "mortgaging our independence." The Cabinet agreed and, at a meeting on April 25, 1938, concluded that:

> On grounds of public policy the government of Canada could not countenance any measure in the nature of borrowing by Canada, or any province thereof, from a foreign government. A bill passed by the U.S. Government with a view to loaning money to Canada (or any province thereof) for construction of highways, would be in the nature of financial penetration, if not financial invasion by a foreign power. 18

With Cabinet support, King wrote Pattullo and informed him that Ottawa would voice serious objection to the plans he outlined. He added that "if a project for the construction of a road through Canada was under definite consideration in Washington that Government would communicate with the Canadian Government on the question."[19] Pattullo refused to be deterred and told Skelton that while the government's

attitude "would appear to kill the project," he was going back to Washington to see if some other solution could be worked out.[20]

The information disturbed Skelton. He learned that Pattullo hoped to see Roosevelt again at a meeting arranged by Dr. Ernest Gruening, a high-ranking official of the American Department of the Interior. Pattullo thought of arranging the loan through an international corporation, taking a literal interpretation of King's stated objection about money coming from a foreign "government." Yet, the money was still to come from American government sources, simply channelled through an agency. The only way Ottawa would agree to a corporation scheme was if the money was private capital, raised through commercial ventures, and secured in the normal manner through the purchase of bonds. If the province did not desire to increase its bonded indebtedness Ottawa would consider allowing a private corporation to have particular monopolies on the road, or the right to exact tolls in return for construction funds. Pattullo's plan went well beyond that. Skelton called it a "dummy corporation," objected for the same reasons as before, and told King that "definite word, one way or the other, on the present proposal should be sent to Mr. Pattullo today."[21] King again informed Pattullo that the government was not prepared to allow direct or indirect grants or loans from a foreign government. Privately, he referred to Pattullo as "childlike" and his corporation plans as "something more fanciful than anything I have ever heard."[22]

The negotiations attracted considerable press coverage and Pattullo received rave editorials in the Liberal Vancouver Sun. "Premier T.D. Pattullo is still to be commended for the energy and enterprise he has displayed," they commented on April 25; "his initiative is all the more outstanding when it is placed in contrast with the lethargy and procrastination which seems to have enveloped Ottawa."[23] Editors challenged King's government to match Pattullo's "statesmanship" rather than maintain their "obdurate and discourteous silence."[24]

On May 23 Pattullo received urgent information from Washington. He learned that a possible amendment to a U.S. Emergency Relief Bill would allow twenty million dollars to be transferred to an "administrative agency" for the highway's construction.[25] It was the same plan to which Canada's Cabinet had repeatedly objected. Pattullo left Victoria within hours of receiving the news.

According to American highway lobbyists who were actively encouraging Pattullo, the amendment plan had the administration's support. The 'catch' was that the request for inclusion was made too late to secure the Appropriation Committee's consideration, and therefore did not appear in the Bill itself. Yet success could be achieved through "vigorous effort," meaning a lobby, and a subsequent last minute amendment on the floor of the U.S. Senate. The premier's co-operation in the endeavour was most welcome.

In employing Pattullo's assistance for a U.S. senatorial lobby it seemed unlikely that the Americans were protecting British Columbia's interests. Rather it appeared that Pattullo was being exploited. The premier preferred to believe that promoters on both sides of the border could reconcile each others' interests to everyone's advantage. Ottawa worried that he--and ultimately the nation--might get something more than he had ever considered. Pattullo looked for accommodation while Ottawa was concerned about sovereignty. The premier's interests were in northern B.C. and in a way to connect that area with the rest of his province. He rarely questioned American motives.

After arriving in Washington Pattullo hurried to the White House and tried to see Roosevelt. He carried a copy of House Joint Resolution 679, titled "Work Relief and Public Works Appropriation Act of 1938." He had pencilled in the proposed amendment: "and provided further that the President is authorized in his discretion to transfer to such agency or agencies as he may designate not to exceed $20,000,000 of the amount hereby appropriated, for the construction of a highway to connect the territory of Alaska with the continental United States."[26] He saw the President briefly. Unsure that he had made his case forcefully enough he wrote again later in the afternoon, concluding: "such an amendment would be exceedingly helpful from our end."[27] Pattullo then went to Montreal where he heard that the United States' State Department feared that the "Pattullo Amendment" might offend the Canadian government.[28]

Ottawa, if not yet offended, was certainly embarrassed. Pattullo, for all his avowed and spoken intention to act informally, appeared to be operating well outside his elected authority or within even the most liberal interpretation of provincial constitutional responsibility. Even a British Columbia Conservative M.P., H.J. Barber of Fraser Valley, remarked in the Federal House that he was surprised "that a provincial premier should undertake something international in scope, some agreement with a foreign country, without going through the federal government."[29] Charges from R.B. Bennett, in federal opposition, had King defending the federal government's position in the negotiations. "I gave him no encouragement or authority," the Prime Minister told the House, "nor has he had any from any federal source as far as the Yukon road is concerned."[30]

It was not surprising that when Pattullo went to see King about the negotiations the Prime Minister was too exasperated even to see him. King retired to his estate in the Gatineau Hills where he recorded in his Diary his feelings about Pattullo and the highway scheme:

> These Provincial Premiers first put up impossible propositions; if they are not met, they go away complaining of lack of co-operation. I told the Cabinet that the only thing for us to do was to make up our mind for the Federal Government to do the right thing regardless of consequences provincially, and end this business of trying to meet every demand that was made. 31

King's Justice Minister, Ernest Lapointe, was left to talk to Pattullo. Lapointe explained that while Ottawa was

most anxious to co-operate, there were difficulties of policy and state which the premier would have to appreciate.[32] Pattullo acquiesced. He admitted regret at losing the chance of securing the appropriation from the Americans. But as Lapointe told King, "he added something about carrying the people with hopes of the future."[33]

Because war with Japan seemed inevitable in the late 1930's the Pacific Highway issue repeatedly drifted away from discussion over what was the initial motivation, expansive development, into a morass of other considerations. Highway detractors argued that an International Pacific Highway would be a military road and as such could have serious foreign policy and security implications for Canada. A road through British Columbia linking the southern states with Alaska would be a significant military asset for the United States in defending Alaska from a Japanese invasion across the Behring Strait. If the United States ever lost control of Pacific Coast sea routes, the absence of a highway connection would make Alaska extremely vulnerable and almost indefensible.[34]

Of more concern to Ottawa was consideration of how such a visible expression of Canadian co-operation with American interests would affect Canada's newly-won freedom to respond independently in world affairs. The country had earned the right to dictate its own foreign policy, independent of the British Empire, through a significant contribution

to the 1914-1918 War and the subsequent peace negotiations. Canada hoped to respond independently in the post-war world and had established legations in some world capitals to assist in defining its own course in world affairs.[35] Involvement in a highway scheme could cause Canada to sacrifice national sovereignty and thus provide a threat to Canadian security.

A strategic highway was so much more obvious as an expression of mutual co-operation than a secret treaty or any formal understanding between nations as to a common response to aggression. Would the security of Canada be compromised by inadvertently guaranteeing the nation's involvement in a Pacific War? Perhaps because of Canada's Empire connection, the highway could turn an American Pacific War into another World War.

The Department of National Defence concluded that if Canada remained neutral in a war the dangers in having a strategic highway within her boundaries were so obvious that it "does not appear to require elaboration."[36] Many did elaborate. In Vancouver, members of the Conservative Action Club learned that if the highway were built, B.C. might become a "second Belgium."[37] Others suggested that "it will create a corrider similar to that of Danzig dividing Germany and East-Prussia," implying corresponding international implications for British Columbia.[38] The Vancouver Province expressed the same concern felt by King and his senior advisors: "It will mean the linking of

Canada definitely and irrevocably to the foreign policy of the United States....It may mean a change in our position in the British Empire."[39]

In spite of the premier's repeated assurances that "neither in fact, nor by implication, would the United States have any more claim upon the road than has the ordinary holder of British Columbia bonds upon already existing roads,"[40] those in Ottawa connected with negotiations agreed that Canada could not allow construction with financial assistance from the American government.[41] Skelton, who later became a proponent of construction when Japan's intentions in the Pacific became obvious, repeatedly argued that he objected not to the highway itself but to the obvious implications involved once government accepted American financing and the attendant premise that Canada or British Columbia was a "subdivision" of the United States.[42] It seemed apparent that the United States "was certainly not going to spend money abroad without a very definite quid pro quo." He added,

> that quid pro quo would in large part be an understanding that it would be able to use this British Columbian highway for connection with Alaska in the event of the United States being at war with Japan, even though Canada were not at war. [43]

By summer, 1938, it was useless to pretend that the highway would not be considered primarily as a military one by the Americans. There was too much defence activity in the north to suggest otherwise. The United States government announced that it planned to build an immense military airbase at Fairbanks capable of serving one thousand planes.

It seemed more than coincidental that Fairbanks was the terminus on any suggested American route for the road.[44] Canadian observers noted an increasing incidence of American Naval and Air Force exercises in Alaskan waters. A considerable expansion of commercial airline operations was also obvious.[45] The Vancouver Province stated: "If this highway is built, any time within the next twenty years, let there be no mistake about it, it will be built with American money, for American purposes . . . . as a military highway, with a view to strategical considerations first and last."[46]

Pattullo repeatedly emphasized that Canada's fortunes were tied to the United States anyway, that the U.S. provided the best possible protection to western Canadians feeling uncomfortably geographically distant from Ottawa and London in the face of the approaching Pacific armageddon. As for the highway, Pattullo concluded that, "if it is desirable for defence purposes, that is all the more reason that it should be built. . . .if the use of British Columbia is essential to the adequate defence of Alaska, it is sheer nonsense to talk of Canada being neutral."[47]

War seemed very real and very close to Vancouver in 1938. Popular opinion in the province was therefore decidedly in favour of the road. The Victoria Times estimated "practically 100 per cent of our population" favour it.[48] Pacific coast residents found it much easier to ignore the threat of loss of sovereignty argued in the east than the threat of loss of life if Vancouver and the coastal communities

had to depend on Canadian military strength for protection from the Japanese.

For British Columbia residents, an American military road through Canadian territory implied an incentive for a United States guarantee of assistance rather than a vehicle for foreign intervention. As part of the United States defence system Canada would certainly benefit.[49] The Vancouver News Herald typified west coast thinking: "The base at Alaska defended by a strong United States garrison would be a far more comfortable re-assurance of preparedness in case of attack than the posting of a few guns in Stanley Park or the enlargement of the air depot at Jericho.[50]

Pattullo continued to press the advantage of the road. It was becoming increasingly difficult to discourage him with the same arguments, that although the Dominion could not afford the necessary expense, acceptance of American financing would carry moral and legal commitments that Canada was not prepared to concede. The premier was adept at illustrating the shallowness of the former argument when he discovered the proposed St. Lawrence waterway project would "take scores of millions."[51]

The premier placed King in a difficult position. The prime minister had to reconcile the Americans, make a definite statement of government policy, and pacify Pattullo. King clearly needed more information on which to base a "studied" conclusion on the merits of the road. Some sort of investigative committee would satisfy all concerns, not

least of all the press, whose disparaging comments proved embarrassing. "The least Ottawa can do is to come out frankly and discuss the matter," wrote the Vancouver Sun, "or is it that the Government of Canada has no policies, no intentions or no life at all?"[52] To those ends King sent a memo to Skelton on June 1, 1938, suggesting the formation of an interdepartmental committee with representations from National Defence, Justice, Natural Resources and External Affairs to examine the highway proposal from all angles and to report to Council.[53]

When the Committee reported in August, 1938, they concluded that "construction of the road at the present time would not be justified."[54] Although they did admit there were no insurmountable engineering or technical difficulties in construction, they suggested other east-west road construction projects had priority over a north-south road. The crux of the committee's argument was that B.C. itself was doing relatively little to build roads. The committee produced figures showing that British Columbia already received a considerably greater proportion of its total road expenditures from the federal government than either Alberta or Ontario. Ottawa was paying for close to 20 per cent of the road work being done in British Columbia while the three-province-average was 7.6 per cent.[55] In addition, Ontario was spending twice as much for roads per capita out of provincial revenues than Pattullo's government. The implication was that Ontario was not going to like Ottawa

spending a large sum for "Pattullo's Highway" and the government would have a hard time justifying the expense. Pattullo himself admitted that the project would cost close to fifteen million dollars. To put the matter in perspective the committee observed that the total expenditure on the Trans-Canada Highway by the Dominion, over a five year period, was $15,761,000.00.[56]

To build the northern road also meant consideration of the entire existing road network in British Columbia. The Committee concluded that many other roads such as the Big Bend section of the Trans-Canada, a Peace River road, the Hope-Princeton Mountain Highway, and a road from Finlay Forks to Manson Creek were more urgently required and were "more likely to be self-liquidating than is the case with the Alaska Highway."[57]

Almost as an appendix to their report the Committee members made a strange suggestion which in a sense abrogated most of their conclusions and left them open to a charge of political expediency. They wrote:

> If it is desired to effect a compromise with the proponents of the Alaskan project, the Committee would suggest that the Government consider the national strategic and economic advantages to be derived from the completion of the highway to the coast at Prince Rupert. 58

To finish that short section of road from Prince Rupert to Terrace would require, by the Committee's own admission, an expenditure of four million dollars. The validity of their argument as to the necessity of equalizing Dominion road

dollars thus seemed suspect. Moreover, how could they justify priorities when they recommended a northern road over the Trans-Canada and the Hope-Princeton projects? And finally, the Prince Rupert road was a potential military highway of just as much interest to the Americans as an Alaskan one. Terrace was the northern terminus of B.C. roads in 1938 and the construction of a 70-mile highway down the Skeena to Prince Rupert would allow road connection to a Pacific port four hundred miles north of Vancouver and just south of the protected American waters of the Alaska panhandle. In a wartime situation a Prince Rupert road would facilitate trucking military goods and personnel north, through British Columbia, rather than racing destroyers through open waters between the boundary and the Inside Passage. But such possible use would compromise Canadian neutrality just as much as any direct Pacific Highway.

The Prince Rupert Road suggestion gave cause to suspect Ottawa's stated objections to the Pacific road. Further, the federal government was not thinking of development potential in the north, tourist dollars, north-south expansion, or anything but simply the most politically-saving and diplomatic way of preventing an expenditure of fifteen million dollars. The committee did not explore the possibilities of the highway in any but the most superficial way. Their sole method of examining and determining the possible economic benefits of construction--to offset the capital investment --was to list developments which "will accrue to offset or

minimize the annual charges;" to indicate in one line that they had consulted "competent Canadian authorities" on each point; and without explanation to conclude: "while it is extremely difficult to give any definite figures covering financial advantages . . . the economic benefits to be derived . . . do not appear to justify construction at the present time."[59] Advantages were dealt with in three paragraphs of a thirteen-page report. Yet they gave the whole range of detailed arguments for not spending the money. It came down to a question of how much the highway was going to cost. That was too much.

The Prince Rupert Road was the alternative to complete rejection; to buy Pattullo off thereby making a net saving on investment in British Columbia's northern development of eleven million dollars--the difference in the estimated cost of the two roads. The merit of the Prince Rupert Road was that "it would traverse Mr. Pattullo's own constituency and end in his home city."[60] The plan was a crass example of government basing policy on expediency. King had the sense not to pursue that plan.

While Ottawa devised plans to discourage Pattullo, or at least to redirect his enthusiasm, the Americans continued to press the issue of a 'through' highway. On September 20, 1938, Roosevelt appointed members to an American Highway Commission. Pattullo was in Ottawa within the week seeking appointments to a similar Canadian body. The prime minister, his personal opinion fortified by the findings of the Inter-

departmental Committee, worried about the politics involved. Ontario would object to any heavy American investment and would complain about such a capital expense in a western province, already draining huge amounts of eastern money to meet relief costs. And if Canada tied herself, in any appreciable way, to American affairs--which appeared inevitable--the government risked alienating the isolationists of Quebec.[61]

Pattullo met the federal cabinet on September 26, 1938. All he wanted now was the appointment of an investigative commission. He even said that ideally the road should be built as an exclusive Canadian project supported by all levels of government. The ministers were non-committal so Pattullo drove over to Laurier House where the prime minister privately agreed that the Dominion government would appoint representatives to meet with the Americans.[62]

The prime minister made it clear to Pattullo that the Commission was to be a fact-finding body only and that its appointment in no way implied a commitment as to actual construction on the road. In fact, King told Pattullo flatly that "he could give no undertaking to allow the United States to provide funds, and that no immediate commitment was possible by [the] Dominion Government."[63] Those preconditions certainly defined the scope of the Commission's inquiry, the regard King had for the actual highway proposal, as well as the sympathy any conclusions would receive.

The government wavered in indecision for another three months over the actual appointments, because Ottawa was anxious to define the exact terms of reference so that there would be no question later about the actual commitment. The composition of the American Commission indicated that government's sympathies. All members were highway boosters and, with one exception, all were from the Pacific coast.[64] If the Canadian Committee possessed more than a fact-finding function the government would lose control of independent action on the highway issue.

The concession to a further study was rather academic as the prime minister had no intention of constructing a highway and agreed to a Commission study only to appease Roosevelt and Pattullo. The unfavourable report of the Inter-departmental Committee already decided the issue for King. When the appointments were made in December[65] the prime minister invited delay by appointing a seriously ill chairman. Charles Stewart had been sick for months and was confined to hospital when the selection was made. He had a serious relapse in the first months of 1939 and was completely unable to function until well into July. The prime minister did not even inform his old cabinet colleague of his new job;[66] Stewart learned of his appointment by reading newspaper reports.[67]

By 1939-40 the original idea of a Pacific highway as a key to empire was lost as the world prepared for world war. Economic conditions improved and arguments as to its

benefits as a means of indirect relief lost meaning. More and more the military considerations were emphasized where the original proposal was grounded in ideas much more nebulous.

At times Pattullo's efforts received support. H.H. Stevens, the maverick ex-Conservative M.P. from Vancouver who led the federal Reconstruction party in the election of 1935, remarked that "the Premier's vision of a highway through the province would be a most important development." He expanded on the concept of visions and dreams and admonished his audience: "Don't be afraid of dreaming dreams or seeing visions." Stevens spoke on October 4, 1938. Not one to miss the advantage of the moment he drew an analogy between Pattullo and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain who also "has had a dream--the dream of the nations of Europe settling their differences by negotiations rather than by the force of arms . . . . he has had a dream of them living in neighborly concord."[68] The reference was to the Munich Agreement, signed between Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler four days previous. Historically, the observation proved to be an ominous portent for dreamers and visionaries--Pattullo included.

Where Pattullo needed the most support, in Ottawa, he was disappointed. The disagreement between King and Pattullo was more profound than one over a choice of routes. King found Pattullo irresponsible. He wrote:

> He (Pattullo) has very loose ideas about government. Believes in spending millions instead of thousands because the people do not know the difference. Is

> ready to let everything go to tomorrow in order to keep the people quiet today . . . . Is thinking in turn of what can be spent here and there and of the monument that will be erected to himself some day . . . . It really disheartens one to see this kind of thing going on. 69

King was right about the monument. But it was to be more than a personal one. Pattullo hoped it would commemorate the economic independence of a strong viable west coast province, north and south, no longer dependent on Ottawa in any further crisis of 1930's depression magnitude. Pattullo was a dreamer. But he was a dreamer in a world of practical men.

The Stewart Commission reported its preliminary findings in April 1940. Pattullo's engineers were kept busy supplying them with figures for over eighteen months. In keeping with their instructions the Commission merely investigated a variety of routes and refrained from making a recommendation on construction. That was a political consideration.

In the summer of 1941 the proposal was turned over to the Canadian-United States Permanent Joint Defence Board for consideration. When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in December of that year the member governments saw an advantage in a land route to Alaska. By that time anyone could see that which a few years before required vision. On February 26, 1942, the Joint Board recommended construction. Road crews began work in March, 1942, and the Alaska Highway was opened on November 20, 1942, at Soldier's Summit near Kulane Lake. Almost a year earlier T.D. Pattullo had been rejected as premier.

The Alaska Highway as eventually built was not a Pacific Highway. It was more of an east-west road than a north-south one. Eastern industrial cities of the United States, such as Detroit and Chicago, benefited most as goods were channelled from there, through Alberta, to B.C.'s terminus at Dawson Creek. It did little to link British Columbia's northern and southern regions.

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## CHAPTER II

## FOOTNOTES

1 Sir Donald Mann quoting John Ruskin in Vancouver Bulletin, 9 September 1927. Copy in the T.D. Pattullo Papers, PABC, Vol. 7.

2 Montreal Herald, 19 March 1898.

3 Memorandum from the Surveyor General of British Columbia to Premier Pattullo re: Alaska Highway Routes, 29 January 1938. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 72.

4 W.J. Asseltine to Pattullo, 28 February 1938. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 72.

5 "Peace River Settlement Railway Facilities," Resolutions Passed at Liberal Convention held at Nelson, September, 1922. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 14.

6 "Pattullo, 'F.D.R.' Talk Highway," Vancouver Sun, 15 October 1937.

7 Legation Note Number 564. The Honourable Norman Armour, United States Minister to Canada, to the Right Honourable The Secretary of State for External Affairs, 14 September 1937. King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 231. PAC.

8 O.D. Skelton, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, to Norman Armour, 8 February 1937. Department of National Defence Papers, R.G. 24, Vol. 2448-49. PAC.

9 Ibid. See also: Memorandum from L.C. Christie, Department of External Affairs, to E.A. Pickering, Office of the Prime Minister, 1 October 1937. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171.

10 Bruce Hutchison, "Highway to Alaska," Maclean's Magazine, LII (15 November 1939), 13.

11 Pattullo to Roosevelt, 4 March 1938. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 74.

12 Roosevelt to Pattullo, 25 March 1938. Pattullo Papers, Volume 74. The American State Department went to great lengths to prove to King that nothing of a formal or untoward nature was taking place between the U.S. Government, at any level, and a Canadian provincial premier. They immediately communicated the contents of all corres-

pondence to the Canadian Legation in Washington. The Minister-in-Charge, Sir Herbert Marler, then forwarded the material to King who received it usually before Pattullo's letters of explanation. See: Confidential note No. 391 from the Canadian Legation in Washington, Herbert M. Marler to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 24 March 1938. King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 254.

13 There were many American promoters who were not as concerned with the diplomatic etiquette involved in the negotiations expressed by the official line from the President's office. Their presence explains the active support Pattullo received in his many petitions in spite of the State Department's assurances to Ottawa that negotiations should, must, and would proceed through official channels. They also afforded the President an opportunity to intervene actively, for American interests, in the province's affairs while at the same time maintaining a proper and decorous diplomatic posture in his dealings with King's government. The four most active promoters were Dr. Ernest Gruening of the U.S. Department of the Interior, Donald MacDonald, an engineer with the Alaskan Road Commission, Congressman Warren G. Magnuson and Congressman Anthony Dimond. In 1938 Gruening, MacDonald and Magnuson were all appointed to the United States-Alaska Highway Commission.

14 Pattullo to King, 23 April 1938. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 74.

15 Memorandum from O.D. Skelton for the Prime Minister, 23 April 1938. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171.

16 King Diary, 3 May 1938. PAC.

17 Remarks reported in a Memorandum for the Prime Minister, prepared by O.D. Skelton, 25 April 1938. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171.

18 King's handwritten comment on his copy of the Skelton Memorandum of 25 April 1938. Ibid. The emphasis on the word government is King's own. Pattullo construed this to mean that Ottawa would accept financing through some other agency--perhaps a corporation.

19 King to Pattullo, 28 April 1938. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 74.

20 Memorandum, Skelton to King, 29 April 1938. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171.

21 Memorandum, Skelton to King, 28 April 1938. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171.

22 King Diary, 26 April 1938. PAC

23 "Editorial," Vancouver Sun, 25 April 1938.

24 "Editorial," Vancouver Sun, 6 May 1938.

25 Anthony Dimond, Congressional Delegate from Alaska, to Pattullo, 21 May 1938. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 72.

26 United States of America, Work Relief and Public Works Appropriation Act of 1938, Report No. 1812 in the Senate of the United States, 20 April (Calendar day, May 13), 1938, p.3. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 72.

27 Pattullo to Roosevelt, 24 May 1938. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 74.

28 Dimond to Pattullo, 28 May 1938. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 74.

29 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa: King's Printer, 2 May 1938), p.2451.

30 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1 July 1938), p.4530.

31 King Diary, 3 May 1938. PAC.

32 Confidential Memorandum for the Prime Minister from Ernest Lapointe Re: Interview with Premier Pattullo, 31 May 1938, King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Volume 252. Also: Memorandum from E.A. P[ickering] to the Prime Minister Re: Mr. Pattullo, 31 May 1938. King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 256.

33 Ibid.

34 The counter argument--perhaps popularized to play down the military significance of the road--was that sea routes were all important and that it was absurd to talk of using a land highway for defence purposes if the American Navy could not control Pacific shipping lanes. In that event, the defence of Alaska would no longer be a practical consideration as the United States would be in a death struggle to preserve contiguous continental territory. A highway through B.C. would then be of little practical military use, comprising simply an abundance of superfluous gravel. (Bruce Hutchison in Victoria Times, 31 January 1939. See also: Hutchison, "Highway to Alaska," Ibid.)

35 The issue of Canadian self-determination in world affairs and of the country's proper place in the Empire was a central governmental consideration after the First World War. Sovereignty initiatives expressed at the signing of the

Versailles Treaty in 1919 by Prime Minister Robert Borden were discussed again at Imperial Conferences in 1923 and 1926. The equality of status of the Dominion with the U.K. was proclaimed by the Balfour Report in 1926, and more particularly by the Statute of Westminster in 1931.

Canada chose to exercise her new independent stature by setting up Canadian offices and legations in important world capitals. By 1929 the country was represented by Canadian diplomats in London, Washington, Paris, Geneva and Tokyo.

For a more complete examination of Canada's move away from Empire policy association see: F.H. Soward, The Department of External Affairs and Canadian Autonomy, 1899-1939 (Ottawa: The Canadian Historical Association Booklets, No. 7, 1956); Robert MacGregor Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 3-132; Lester B. Pearson, Memoirs, 1897-1948 (London: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 1 63-71.

36 Major-General C.F. Constantine, for C.G.S., Commodore Percy W. Nelles, C.N.S., and Air Commodore G.M. Croil, S.A.O. to the Minister of National Defence, 5 April 1938. Department of National Defence Papers, R.G. 24, Volume 2448-49. PAC. The General Staff argued that Canadian defence policy was an east-west proposition--to protect West Coast ports and focal areas of trade--and thus a north-south Trans-Provincial road, while compromising the nation's independent position, would offer little direct assistance to the security of the country. In no way would they condone allowing the United States government to assume any of the cost of the highway. Even a Canadian-financed road was a strong inducement to an American nation involved in a Pacific War to ignore their neighbor's neutrality.

37 "Editorial," Vancouver Province, 22 April 1938.

38 "Editorial," Vancouver News-Herald, 25 August 1938. The editors of the News-Herald cited the analogy as prevalent thinking in coastal communities. It did not however reflect the newspaper's opinion. They called such thought "unsound," and remarked instead: "The fleet of the United States is the guardian of our shores against aggressive attack from the west. It would be petty of the Dominion to refuse construction of a highway that would strengthen our own and our neighbor's defences against such an attack." Ibid.

39 "Editorial," Vancouver Province, 27 April 1938.

40 Pattullo to King, 6 June 1938. Pattullo Papers, Volume 74. See also: "Editorial," Vancouver Sun, 27 September 1938.

41 Major-General Constantine, et al, to Minister of National Defence, 5 April 1938. Ibid. See also: Interdepartmental Committee, Report to Council on the Proposal to Construct a Highway Through British Columbia and the Yukon Territory to Alaska, n.d., (August, 1938). Pattullo Papers, Vol. 72. pp.9-11.

42 O.D. Skelton Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 25 April 1938 and 28 April 1938. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171.

43 Ibid. 25 April 1938.

44 Bruce Hutchison in Vancouver Province, 29 April 1938.

45 Major-General Ashton, Chief of the General Staff to O.D. Skelton, 24 August 1935. Cited in Memo from the office of the Minister of National Defence to King, n.d., (2 April 1937). King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171.

46 "Editorial," Vancouver Province, 22 April 1938.

47 Pattullo to King, 17 October 1938. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 74.

48 "Editorial," Victoria Times, 3 May 1938.

49 "Editorial," Vancouver Sun, 25 April 1938.

50 "Editorial," Vancouver News-Herald, 25 August 1938.

51 Pattullo to King, 28 January 1939. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 74.

52 "Editorial," Vancouver Sun, 6 May 1938.

53 Memorandum from King to Skelton, 1 June 1938. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171.

54 Interdepartmental Committee, Report to Council. Ibid., p.13.

55 The figures given in the report were as follows: "During the five years preceding March 31, 1938, the Dominion has spent, or contributed, $3,815,000 for roads in British Columbia. The Province has spent in the same period $15,500,000. During the same time, the corresponding figures for the Province of Alberta are, by the Dominion $279,200, by the Province $10,587,000. For the Province of Ontario during the same period the figures are, by the Dominion $9,000,000, by the Province $132,250,000." (Interdepartmental Committee, Report to Council, Ibid., p.3.)

56 Ibid., p.4.

57 Ibid., p.8.

58 Ibid., p.13.

59 Ibid., p.7.

60 O.D. Skelton Memorandum for the Prime Minister Re: Alaskan Highway Committee, 13 August 1938. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171.

61 Victoria Times, 31 January 1939.

62 H.L. Keenleyside Memorandum for Dr. Skelton, 26 October 1938. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171.

63 Memorandum to File by J.W. Pickersgill "Re: Conference held in the Prime Minister's office on January 10, 1939, between the Prime Minister and several of his Ministers, and the Premier and Minister of Finance of British Columbia," 11 January 1939. King Papers, MG 26 J 4, Vol. 171. See also: King Diary, 10 January 1939. PAC.

64 Dr. Ernest Gruening was from Washington, D.C.

65 The Canadian British Columbian-Yukon-Alaska Highway Commission was appointed by Order-in-Council on December 22, 1938. The members of the Commission included:
Honourable Charles Stewart, Ottawa, Chairman;
Brigadier-General Thomas L. Tremblay, Quebec;
J.M. Wardle, Esquire, Department of Mines and Resources, Ottawa;
Arther Dixon, Esquire, Department of Public Works, Victoria;
J.W. Spencer, Esquire, Vancouver.
(P.C. 3252, E.J. Lemaire, Clerk of the Privy Council, 22 December 1938. Pattullo Papers, Vol. 72.)

66 Charles Stewart's association with King dated to the Twelfth Ministry which formed the federal government on 29 December 1921. Stewart was sworn a member of King's Cabinet and served as Minister of the Interior, Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs and, at times, acting Minister of Immigration and Colonization. Stewart had been Premier of Alberta for four years before entering federal politics. Neatby, in his biography of the Prime Minister, observed that during the Liberal-Progressive crisis of 1926 "King was dubious about the capacities of . . . Charles Stewart." (H. Blair Neatby, The Lonely Heights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), II, 172.)

67 Charles Stewart to King, 5 January 1939. King Papers, MG 26 J 1, Vol. 280.

68 Vancouver News-Herald, 4 October 1938.

69 King Diary, 31 May 1940. PAC.

## CHAPTER III

## THE END OF THE EMPEROR AND OF HIS EMPIRE

He knew more about the background of B.C. and its potential than any other political leader this side of this century. 1

After the early war years brought economic recovery in British Columbia Pattullo was out of his element. Prosperity convinced the provincial Liberal party that they had to sacrifice their leader to change policy and to redefine their appeal. They saw political salvation in moving to the political right thereby offering a clear-cut alternative to the left. Pattullo had always sought support from the centre with as broad a programme as possible--short of socialism.

The dissatisfaction of the populace with the premier, his policies and philosophies, was also expressed in a curious, almost inverse proportion to bettering conditions. Particular groups developed their own interests and there was no longer a place for a politician with such a broad and general appeal. Voters were not satisfied with a party that spoke for labour, business, rich and poor. Pattullo fell a casualty of a redefinition of popular provincial political aspirations, and of party appeal identified by changing economic conditions.

Then too, Canadians saw a bigger Canada. Radio tied it together. The war gave rise to a groundswell need for co-operation to fight a new enemy more menacing than Ottawa--

or so it seemed. Canada was suddenly a nation, having shifted from a depression collection of provincial governments. Pattullo appeared just a little too old and more than a little petty. Pattullo fell a casualty of a newfound federalism and a bullish economy.

At a party convention, held in ~~Kelowna~~ Vancouver on December 3, 1941, the British Columbia Liberal party voted for coalition with the provincial Conservatives. Pattullo resigned as party leader. He remained in the legislature until October, 1945, when he lost his Prince Rupert seat in a general election.

Pattullo's imperial vision was not a mirage, a mere election gimick, a carefully orchestrated front or a placebo for an ailing province. The premier was satisfied that the entire programme was possible and could offer tremendous benefits to the people of British Columbia. He wanted to secure the Yukon for the present as he remained convinced of its future potential. If the union were consummated, British Columbia would alienate northern assets before Ottawa recognized their value. As he told a radio audience in 1938: "sooner or later it (the Yukon) is going to come into development on a much more rapid scale than during the past few years, and now is the time to secure control of it."[2] Because British Columbia had resources was no reason not to seek more.

The prospect of provincial empire served Pattullo's purposes, and, to some lesser degree, those of his electors facing hard times. It satisfied the premier's

ambitions. More important it conveyed an impression that things were not as bad as depression made them seem. After all the government was building roads, digging for oil, encouraging investment, developing new industry, annexing new territory.

Although not much came of Pattullo's empire plans, the drive he exhibited in trying to implement them cannot be overlooked. His victory was a psychological one. In the midst of the depression he refused to allow British Columbia to be depressed. His legacy was that he preserved provincial integrity and public confidence with bluff and bravado until the days got better and things could get done. He was the dreamer, the optimist.

He was a man with a mission. At first glance he seemed an unlikely candidate to be running a depression province. He was a man who could not handle his own finances.[3] But as long as Ottawa refused him the money he wanted, his credentials were impeccable. He had a life-time of experience living on nothing but a smile, a handshake, a dream, his own resources and gall.

Yet he was more than a caretaker premier with visions of grandeur. Pattullo exuded a confidence and a faith in the province when both were uncommon. Throughout his tenure he preserved an ability to look ahead, neither blinded by the prospects for the future or restrained by the failures of the past. The appeals for a belief in the province and its institutions were directed at a wider audience than simply

financial investors. There was a sense of supplication aimed at every citizen to share the premier's vision that there really was a promised land at home in British Columbia.

Pattullo did not achieve that goal of empire in his lifetime, that elusive vision he nurtured. But the dream survived and later premiers, in times of prosperity, built where he laid the plans. It was ironic that the thoughts of empire of a man so often accused of being a petty provincialist suffered from his fervent belief in the Canadian nation, his strong federalist tendencies, and his blind party loyalty. Although a maverick thinker, and often an embarrassment to both nation and party, he always believed that problems and differences had to be resolved within Confederation and by democratically acceptable means. His failure to create a truly expanded British Columbia empire really resulted from his tenacious hold on those old Liberal truths. Had he worried less about arriving at a solution acceptable to all those concerned, and more about what he knew was best for British Columbia, his dream may have been realized. He knew British Columbia could make it on the strength of its own resources but he never seriously considered trying it outside Confederation. His empire was to be an empire within a nation, not a separate entity. A man of politics, he would have made a better king.

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## CHAPTER III

## FOOTNOTES

1 Vancouver Province, 31 March 1956. Provincial Liberal Leader Arthur Laing on the occasion of T.D. Pattullo's death.

2 Typescript of Radio Address, 28 March 1938, Vol. 65.

3 See author's article "T.D. Pattullo's Early Career," in B.C. Historical News, Vol. 13, No. 1, Fall, 1979.

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