INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY: REALISM, IDEALISM AND IDEOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

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ABSTRACT

The concept of security within mainstream Anglo-American international relations theory is associated with the defense and maintenance of the state unit in a plural and competitive states-system. This focus on 'national security' has recently come under renewed critique by proponents of a different perspective. They claim that the state is a source of insecurity and that effective security can be attained only by replacing the competitive plural states-system with cooperative and universalist arrangements - with a system of world government or at minimum, some form of federal association. These views are obviously contradictory, yet they can also be understood as part of the same discourse of 'liberal' international relations theory. They are representative of the central fracture in that discourse - the 'great debate' between Realism and Idealism.

The vigour of recent attacks on mainstream conceptions of national security has generated new critical interest in the concept. Barry Buzan in particular has stressed the connection between the dualisms central to liberal international relations theory and the contradictory claims embedded within the concept of security. However, the historical, theoretical, ideological and philosophical issues that lie behind the division into Realism and Idealism, have remained relatively unexplored.

This thesis explores the historical context through which security has become associated with deeper contradictions arising from the modern theory of the state, and more deeply still, with opposed conceptions of time and change. The purpose of this analysis is to uncover the way in which the ambiguous nature of the concept of security is tied to the incorporation (and reification) of historically specific resolutions of complex political and philosophical problems. The clarification of the central historical debates surrounding security, particularly in relation to the state and to whether the individual's primary obligations should be to the state or to humanity, will be useful in understanding contemporary debates about the possibilities of more effective forms of security in a world of rapid structural transformation.

The conclusions that follow from this investigation are of necessity tentative and suggestive. They point to the anachronistic nature of the types of questions posed by both the Realists and the Idealists. These questions are part of an earlier debate that developed in reaction to the emergence of the modern plural states-system into a world largely understood in terms of a medieval universalist cosmology. To clarify the anachronic nature of such questions is to underline the importance of an alternative set of questions: 'whose security is served by this or that conception of security?'; or, 'is it possible to use conceptions such as

national security or world government without first grasping what is meant by the concept of the state?' These suggestions are not as important as the critique that points to the essentially closed nature of the present discourse, its inability to deal with the issues modernity places before it, and therefore the urgent need to open up debate and to pose questions pertinent to the present crises and insecurities faced by us all.

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Dedication

To Victoria, Natalie, and John

Introduction

Security as a concept has long been tied up with images of military defence, high level secret meetings, and the nefarious but somehow necessary activities of secret state organizations. The picture is one of military might, behind the scenes murder and mayhem, and momentous decisions made in the cloistered offices of the world's political elites. It is a vision with overtly undemocratic and amoral overtones.

This image is coming under increasing criticism. There are a growing number of commentators who claim that security must be conceived in more holistic terms, taking into account a broad array of global problems and potential catastrophes beyond the competence of even the most powerful state. These problems are described in universalist terms, and solutions to them are posed in the context of international accommodation and global cooperation. Against the depiction of international politics as an endless seeking of 'power after power' this other voice calls for the creation of a universal or cosmopolitan society as the only way to survive in a 'shrinking' and increasingly interdependent world.

These two positions present contradictory - indeed, mutually exclusive - conceptions of security. On the one hand, an image of a constant struggle for power in a plural

sphere of competitive states where morality and fairplay are treated as weaknesses. On the other hand, an argument that claims that it is this very pluralism that is the source of insecurity and that meaningful security can only emerge from a world without a system of competitive states. This polarity has long been the most striking feature of modern liberal international relations theory.

Given this polarized form of debate, the inclination is to uncover which side is right or to attempt to synthesize both into a unified theoretical concept. There are numerous commentaries on the relative merits of both perspectives as there are, and have been, several attempts to synthesize them. Yet in spite of, (perhaps because of) these varied attempts to affirm one position or the other, or to synthesize them in some way, the central feature of international relations theory remains the 'great debate' between Realism and Idealism, between those who affirm the reality of pluralism and those who insist on the need for universalism.

This thesis was initially conceived as a critical evaluation of the most important recent attempt to treat 'security' as a serious concept of political analysis. Yet it quickly became apparent that this attempt by Barry Buzan in _People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations_ -was crucially flawed by a

failure to examine the historical emergence of the dualism between Realism and Idealism. Buzan's analysis has an atemporal quality and fails to penetrate the underlying theoretical, ideological and philosophical issues that are obscured by the 'great debate'.

Consequently, this thesis is concerned to explore this wider context. It examines the way in which the concept of 'security', as it is used in the contemporary literature in strategic studies and liberal[1] international relations theory, embodies some persistent and unresolved themes that emerged with the modern state system itself. Far from being an unambiguous concept it incorporates - and reifies - some historically specific resolutions of complex political and philosophical problems.

The most important of these problems has been the continued search for a theoretical claim on the part of the state for the undivided loyalty of its citizens. This search has taken the form of a continued debate between those who have defended the state as the highest form of political association humanity can expect to develop, and those who claim the states-system's particularistic and competitive structure make it an obstacle to humanity's progression towards a unified global society. While this debate can be traced back at least as far as the Greek city states, it is with the emergence of the modern states-system that it begins

to take on its peculiarly modern form.

This modern formulation begins with Hobbes' claim that the state represented a garrison inside which the individual was relatively safe, and outside of which the individual faced the anarchy and chaos of constant war. Given this formulation, the state could lay sole claim to each citizen's obligations because of its role in the provision of security. Yet, Hobbes's equating of the state with security was challenged in the eighteenth century by rationalist Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau and Kant.

They argued that the state decreased security and that it did so by dividing humanity into particular and competitive groups. Obligations, to the Enlightenment thinkers, had to be owed to humanity and its potential for developing into a cosmopolitan society. These challenges were essentially silenced by the emergence of particular forms of statist historicism in the nineteenth century.

Historicists like Heinrich von Treitschke argued that the state performed the function of defending and nurturing the world's cultures. Each individual owed his or her identity to the culture they were raised in. Obligations in this formulation had to be owed solely to the state which defended one's culture and therefore one's identity.

Historicism was itself subject to critique in the early twentieth century particularly after the 'war to end

all wars' and a universalist critique again emerged. This critique collapsed for a time in the face of World War II and the period of U.S. hegemony that followed. It eventually re-emerged in the light of the coming together of certain strands of industrialism which began to increasingly appear in the form of impending and absolute global catastrophes. These new threats again called into question the ability of the state to provide security and reopened long standing debates regarding the proper focus of human obligations. Security once again pushed itself to the front of political and theoretical agendas.

When considering contemporary discussions of the concept of security, two things become immediately apparent. First, there is a lack of historical perspective. The history of international relations theory often appears to be a continuous and inconclusive dance around the same set of issues. Without some critical historical understanding it is difficult to imagine how the discourse will ever escape from the view that history is little more than a pendulum.

Second, the conceptual image associated with security as being the domain of political and military elites remains dominant. Considering the centrality and unresolved nature of the debate surrounding the proper focus of obligations, and considering the growing urgency and plausibility of arguments which claim the state to be a source of insecurity,

the robustness of so undemocratic a vision of the necessities of security is surprising. It is surprising because it is a vision that claims to be able to face unblinkingly, the changing world around it without recourse to ideological justification or the need to hold onto outdated theories. Yet, Realism refuses to adequately answer a challenge presented in the context of a world in which change is claimed to have rendered old forms of explanation inadequate. Realism's answer to this challenge is not to face it squarely but rather to hide from it, to pull ideological covers over eyes which are supposed to have the ability to stare unblinkingly at reality. The challenge remains to open up debate on the meaning of 'security' in the contemporary context.

This analysis will be concerned with uncovering how such an ahistorical and closed conception of security came to be so influential. To do this an historical excavation of the concept is required in order to discover how it has emerged out of the broader debate regarding the proper focus of an individual's obligations. It is in the context of this debate that we can understand both the claim that states are the sole arbiter of the concept of security and also the alternative argument that the state is a source of insecurity which cannot be allowed such a determinant position.

The issues which will emerge from this analysis are

complex and interdependent. They range from philosophical debates surrounding the possibility of escaping change to the ideological justifications of certain forms of imperialist universalism. This thesis is not concerned to point to a right or wrong 'side' of this broader discourse. It is concerned only to examine the terrain of this debate and to uncover some of its inconsistencies and contradictions. This process will not lead us to the 'true' conception of security but it will allow us to locate and understand the various meanings, implications, and political symbols which are at play in contemporary debates about security.

Chapter I will lay out the broad dimensions of the debate within liberal international relations theory. It will discuss the position of the contemporary 'mainstream' and briefly go over some of the arguments now coming forward to challenge this perspective. Chapter II will examine the historical context from which the contemporary debate emerged. It will draw out the main dualist themes of citizen versus species obligations and of pluralism and universalism. This will provide the basis for relating the contemporary debate back to its roots in the emergence of the modern states-system.

Chapters III and IV will examine the most influential tradition in international relations theory - Realism. In Chapter III Realism will be related back to its historical

roots in Enlightenment and Romantic philosophy. The ambiguities and contradictions that emerge from Realism's uncritical embrace of elements of opposed philosophical traditions will be drawn out. In Chapter IV these internal contradictions will be related specifically to Realist attempts to develop a concept of security. This chapter will point out the tension within Realism concerning the role of the state in the provision of citizen security and consequently Realism's ambivalence towards the focus of obligations.

Chapter V will examine contemporary liberal voices of dissent to mainstream positions. It is particularly concerned with the way in which even these voices of dissent reflect the underlying presuppositions that guide mainstream positions. Whether in Buzan's attempt to synthesize the universalist and pluralist positions, or in recent attempts to resurrect Kantian themes, the debate remains centered on the proper focus of the individual's obligations. That is, the debate is only superficially about the concept of security. At a deeper level it is really about the legitimacy of the modern state.

This is the issue raised at the end of Chapter V by Rajni Kothari. He argues that the problem has never been simply one of universalism or pluralism, of whether as citizens of individual states we can also be members

of humanity. Kothari believes the entire debate has really been an extended discussion on the best ideological platform from which to wield and expand Western power. It is in this sense that the analysis will return to its initial question regarding why we have given up the right to define what our security requires.

We are left asking different questions of the present system than did Hobbes. We do not ask how to achieve security. We ask instead, whose security does the present situation defend? We do not ask whether our allegiance should be to our state or to humanity as a whole. Instead we ask how we can all participate in a process of building security in an environment in which threats and dangers stretch across a vast terrain from individual, to region, to state, and to the globe.

Footnotes

[1]This focus on liberal international relations theory should not be construed as a denial of the existence of other voices concerned with, or having something to say about, world politics. It reflects instead the reality that international relations theory (in both its Realist and Idealist variants) is essentially a liberal construct (see 'a' below) and that because of this it is only within the liberal discourse that one finds theoretical discussion of the concept of security.

This is not to say that the theoretical perspectives of say, dependency theory or historical materialism do not have useful things to say about world politics. Indeed it has been claimed that international relations theory could benefit immensely from the critical theoretical heritage of Marxism (though not, it should be noted, an unreconstructed Marxism) (see 'b' below). Indirectly, no doubt, these other voices have important things to say about the manner in which liberal international relations theory uses the concept of security.

However, two limiting factors impose themselves at this juncture. The first is that liberal international relations theory is a large and complex discourse in and of itself. So too, are the discourses of Marxism and dependencia. A decision had to be made regarding the reasonable limitations of this analysis. It seemed then (and does still) that a fairly thorough critical discussion of one particularly troublesome and illuminating concept in liberal international theory was a large enough project without adding to it a similar discussion of other theoretical perspectives in which security played only a peripheral role.

The second limiting factor is probably the more contentious, and the more important. It is the peripheral nature of discourses that attempt to focus on global political economy.(see 'c' below) This is not to say that they are irrelevant or that what they have to say is unimportant in terms of understanding the processes of global politics. What it refers to is rather, that the disciplinary categories of liberal international relations theory push such discourses outside of the realm of 'legitimate' discussion within the mainstream. Because of this, and the fact that discussion of the concept of security goes on almost solely within the confines of liberal discourse, the critical focus of historical materialism or the distinctive formulations of dependency theory have had little or no effect on the theoretical understanding of the concept of security.

Nevertheless, one of the central focusses of this

analysis will be to examine how and why liberal international relations theory has been able to remain so insular and to uncover within the discourse itself, fractures that may point to some weakening of this insularity. Through the critical examination of the concept of security it becomes possible to understand at once: the hegemonic position of liberal international theory; the internal contradictions and crises which that theory now faces; and the basis of its ability to peripheralize a number of perspectives that might otherwise challenge its dominance. It will be up to others to critically assess those 'other' discourses which may seek to fill the space opened up by the uncovering of the contradictions and the silences of liberal international relations theory surrounding the concept of security.

a. R.B.J.Walker,"Discourse and Insecurity: The Case of Political Realism", Paper prepared for the session on "Thought and Action in World Politics," Twenty-Eighth Convention for the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 1987.

b. Andrew Linklater,"Realism, Marxism, and critical international theory", Review of International Studies, Vol.12, No. 4, October, 1986, pp. 301-312. In this review of Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism and V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations, Linklater notes that historical materialism has been held outside the mainstream or Realist discourse on international relations because of its traditional emphasis on production and class struggle as determining factors denying the importance and relative autonomy of the states-system.

On the Idealist side of the liberal discourse there is a rejection of Marxism's traditional insistence that capitalism remains the dominant, even determinant, logic in world politics. This insistence is seen to lead towards the claim that the revolutionary proletariat - the single privileged historical subject - will be the source of human emancipation and the collapse of bourgeois politics which are in turn the source of our present insecurities. This claim forces Marxism outside of a number of important areas of emerging criticism of Realist theory and leaves such areas as, the relation of industrialism to modern ecological movements or the relation between the use and the means of force in the international sphere and the emergence of modern peace movements, with no theoretical support other than liberal Idealism.

In both the above instances, historical materialism pushes against its own conceptual limits in terms of explaining, or as Linklater puts it, describing modernity.

Unless it is reconstructed in a way which allows it to explain some of these features of modernity (as in the work of Perry Anderson on the origins of the absolutist state) it will continue to be susceptible to criticisms which maintain its position on the periphery of international relations theory. It will also be unable to offer a concept of security that reflects the insecurities of our present historical juncture. But that is another problem outside of the analysis before us.

c. R.B.J.Walker,"Contemporary Militarism and the Discourse of Dissent", in Culture, Ideology and World Order, ed. Walker, Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1984.

Chapter 1

World Politics and the Dilemmas of Security

Security and the State

The centrality of the concept of security for thinking about politics was firmly established by Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. For Hobbes, the universal egoism of "men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind"[1] led inexorably to a state of war, to the familiar "life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."[2] This underlying condition of equality and competition generated mistrust and insecurity. Mistrust and insecurity then became the motivating elements for the creation of a social contract that had as its goal the maintenance of at least tolerable levels of individual security within the sovereign state.

Since that time, the concept of security has played a surprisingly minor role in Western political thought. With the establishment of the state as the primary political formation, a concern for security was pushed to the margins - not to the competition between individuals within society as in Hobbes, but to the competition between states and the search for 'national security'. Nevertheless, Hobbes' ghost still wanders. For many of the most eminent writers on contemporary international relations, competition between states is

still understood to be analogous with Hobbes' world of egoistic individuals. Raymond Aron for example, writes that:

> political units, proud of their independence, jealous of the capacity to make major decisions on their own, are rivals by the very fact that they are autonomous. Each, in the last analysis can count only on itself...[3]

Similarly, John Herz's view of international politics is informed by a view of human behaviour as a competitive struggle arising from the individual's "urge to safeguard, protect, and prolong his life."[4] Hedley Bull makes the reference to Hobbes quite explicit when he says that "all of what Hobbes says about the life of individual men in the state of nature, may be read as a description of the condition of states in relation to one another."[5]

Yet the most interesting point about the Hobbesian view of security is not its description of egoistic behaviour but rather its analysis of the processes set in motion by the very search for security. In brief, Hobbes argues that the pusuit of security itself necessarily brings insecurity:

> So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.[6]

This idea has also been picked up by analysts of international relations. It is essentially what Herz means

by the 'security dilemma', which he defines as:

> a social constellation in which units of power (such as states or nations in international relations) find themselves whenever they exist side by side without higher authority that might impose standards of behavior upon them and thus protect them from attacking each other. In such a condition, a feeling of insecurity, deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear, compels these units to compete for ever more power in order to find more security, an effort which proves self-defeating because complete security remains ultimately unattainable.[7]

Similarly Aron refers to the same idea while discussing the reasons he finds important in explaining the failure of states to disarm:

> States are in essence sovereign....Sovereign states are automatically rivals. Not that all are by nature dedicated to indefinite expansion....At any given period certain States would have preferred tranquillity to adventure, the status quo to the risk of conflict. But States which refuse to submit to common laws cannot but regard one another with suspicion....Would it not be contradictory for States to agree to disarm if they reserved the right to take the law into their own hands?[8]

This dilemma has long been at the heart of thinking about security in international relations theory. It has resulted in two quite different approaches to understanding the concept of security at the international level. The mainstream approach, usually labelled as "Realism"[9] follows Hobbes in that it accepts the dilemma which security presents but argues that the state affords the only reasonable possibility of security. The second approach views the problem quite differently. Rooting itself more in the

philosophical perspectives of Immannel Kant than in Hobbes, this approach views insecurity as a result of humanity being divided into particularistic states. The state itself is viewed as the source of insecurity. These two positions define a central unresolved fracture in international relations theory between those who have defended the modern state since its emergence in the 17th. century and those who have attacked it as a force of division and conflict. The success of the state as the dominant political force of our time provides some indication as to which side of this debate has had the upper hand. However, those who criticize the state and view it as a major source of insecurity have once again come forward with some compelling arguments.

The renewed attack on the state as the central institution for the provision of security has come from a variety of emerging voices. These voices are raised at the level of academic analysis and also at the level of mass social movements. In the West, movements such as the anti-nuclear movement are indicative of the way people are questioning national defense strategies which require threatening the whole of human civilization with oblivion. Other voices have begun to warn of a variety of threats to our security ranging from the possibility of global economic collapse to the destruction of the environment. All of these are different aspects of an emerging discourse focusing on

the inability of the state to deal with universal problems. They have sprung from a growing awareness that it is insecurity not security which has become the dominant condition of modern life. And yet, for all this, discussion of security has not moved much beyond the formulation of Hobbes.

This thesis is concerned with exploring the career of the concept of security in the contemporary literature on international relations. It will attempt to assess the overall coherence of a concept which is widely used, seldom defined, and often taken for granted. It will explore the extent to which the Hobbesian formulation remains influential and the extent to which it has been challenged by new formulations.

Buzan's Challenge

The most important recent attempt to examine the concept of security in international relations is that of Barry Buzan.[10] Buzan examines the 'theoretical immaturity' of the concept of security through an analysis of its relationship with the concepts of power and peace. Buzan views power and peace as the core concepts for most of modern international relations theory regarding what he calls the 'national security problem'. In Buzan's analysis each of these two concepts is central to a particular approach to national

security.

Power is stressed by the traditional Realist school of international relations pioneered by scholars like E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau.[11] It is a concept which Buzan tells us is useful in identifying "the basic pattern of capabilities in the international system" and also the "prime motive for the behaviour of actors."[12] While this prime motive - the seeking of power - may at times be associated with a flaw in human nature, usually it is identified with levels of fear and mistrust in the international 'anarchy' which lead to a competition for power. Power is seen to enhance a nation's security in an uncertain international environment. The important thing to note at this juncture is that those who accept power as a core concept tend to view security as a product of power. Generally, this means that by measuring a state's power in relation to that of other surrounding states, one can to some extent estimate the amount of security that a state has. However, Buzan notes that the acceptance of so direct a correlation between power and security tends to militate against theoretical work on the concept of security independent from that on the concept of power.

Peace, on the other hand, has become the central organizing concept of what has been called the 'Idealist school'. To refer to the broad range of thought which has

been categorized as 'Idealist' as a 'school' of thought in the same sense as the Realists is probably a misnomer. However, the label has been applied by the Realists to identify their critics,[13] and in essence refers to a broad range of intellectual traditions that focus on humanity as a whole, rather than on states. These traditions are usually linked to writings of Kant. In spite of the obvious difficulties of such a sweeping categorization, Buzan distinguishes the Idealists through their use of peace as the core concept for conceptualizing the 'national security problem'. The use of peace tends to place the issue of national security in a more holistic context, "as opposed to the necessarily fragmented view of the Realists."[14] It tends to view the problem of national security in terms of war. The eradication of war becomes the central goal of international relations. Again we find that security plays a subsidiary role. It becomes a product of peace. To the extent that one achieves peace, one achieves security.

Buzan points out that these perspectives, peace/power and Idealism/Realism, have dominated thinking about national security for decades. They are presented most often as incompatible and opposite views of the world. Given this universe of debate, the concept of security has played a subsidiary role. As Buzan explains,

it "tends to be seen either as a derivative of power, in the sense that an actor with enough power to reach a dominating position will acquire security as a result, or as a consequence of peace, in the sense that a lasting peace would provide security for all."[15]

However, there is a more complex heritage here than Buzan's analysis brings out. The essence of this opposition between peace and power lies in the tension between people's obligations to people as such and their obligations as citizens of particular states. The emphasis on either peace or power as a core concept arises from contrasting understandings of the relation between universal and particular obligations.

The power perspective emphasizes the obligations of citizens and treats security as a derivative of national power. It ends up focusing almost entirely on the state, its policies, and its inter-relations with other states, and their policies. Humanity is treated as if it were naturally fragmented and the underlying assumption regarding security seems to be that it can be achieved by the actions of single actors. On the other hand, the peace perspective tends to stress the obligations of people to the rest of humanity. In Buzan's terms it emphasizes:

> both the international system as a whole, and individuals as its ultimate building block, at the

> expense of states, and emphasizes the dynamic of harmony at the expense of that of conflict. Its principle focus is on a possible universal condition.[16]

The Idealist then, relates the individual to humanity, while the Realist ignores or denies the possibility of global harmony and focuses instead on the state. This creates the problem for the Idealist of not paying proper attention to the limiting factors which the state and states-system place on their universal aspirations. The Realist, however, has narrowly defined a space in which the state becomes the only real focus of attention. For Buzan, this leads to a devaluation of the structure of the states-system as a whole in favour of emphasizing the role of its parts. It also leads to problems created by ignoring the relation between national security policy and the individual.

In the most extensive recent discussion of this theme, Andrew Linklater explains the consequent difficulties in the following way:

> Any political theory which ignores the problems created by our double existence as men and citizens is no longer adequate to the conditions of modern political life; for it fails to attempt to harmonize all aspects of modern moral and political experience. A political theory acquainted with the problem of men and citizens should proceed to construct a vision of an integrated social and political life within a theory of the international system. On the other hand, a theory of international relations which overlooks the fact that modern citizens possess concepts of humanity fails by offering only a mechanistic interpretation of the states-system.[17]

Some indication of the significance of this dilemma is to be found in Kenneth Waltz's now classic text, Man the State and War. Waltz's main concern is to determine the factors which permit war to occur. That is, what tools does humanity have at hand to deter warfare between states? Waltz argues that there are three fundamental explanations of the origins of war arising from three inter-related "images of international relations."[18] The first of these concerns human nature. The second concerns the structure of belligerent states. The third concerns the international anarchy defined by the lack of a global authority. Generally speaking, Waltz considers that it is the lack of a global authority which provides the most adequate 'image' for analysis because it situates conflict within the framework of a general competition for power:

> Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy. A foreign policy based on this image of international relations is neither moral nor immoral, but embodies merely a reasoned response to the world about us. The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.[19]

This analysis views war as a product of the competitive international anarchy which is mediated via state

structures and human nature. Ultimately though, it is the international anarchy which is deemed to provide the greatest opportunity for 'permitting' war, and therefore, also the most effective area in which to control its occurrence. Waltz is led to a prescriptive conclusion which largely ignores the first two images and demands instead that the only workable limiting factor on war is the anarchic environment of states. Any state using force to pursue its own interests will naturally incur a similar and hostile reaction from other states that find such action threatening to their interests. Consequently, Waltz's overall prescription is the maintenance of a balance of power system. This conclusion has subsequently been extended into a general theory of international politics.[20]

Waltz's conclusion depends on the uncritical acceptance of the ethical basis of the state as a limited moral community. It is easy to view the narrow self-interested actions and parochial attitudes which follow from the division of humanity into separate sovereign states as important sources of modern international conflict. But it seems a major oversight for Waltz to assume that this self-interested and autonomous character of the state can be simply accepted as given. Yet Waltz's position depends on the demand that the state be viewed as a

natural and indeed eternal feature on the human landscape.

This element of Waltz's argument has been noted in a number of recent analyses and there is no need to go over these in any detail at this point.[21] The basic thrust of these critiques has been to note the way in which Waltz universalizes or even reifies the state, treats all states as though they were the same, and also treats what is quite clearly a specific historical phenomenon - the modern states-system - as though it were eternal. While such a position offers an excellent platform for the defence of balance of power theories of international relations, as a theory of explanation regarding war, it has sharp limits. These limits arise because it offers no adequate theory of its central protagonist, the state. Indeed, John Ruggie has noted that this leaves Waltz unable "to account for, or even to describe the most important contextual change in international politics in this millenium: the shift from the medieval to the modern international system."[22] Similarly R.B.J. Walker argues that Waltz defines the state in primarily economic rather than political terms. He "offers merely something like a theory of the structures of oligopolistic competition in which states become 'units' and units become synomomous with firms operating within some kind of market".[23]

Waltz's theoretical understanding of the state is

clearly limited in its capacity to explain the state in historical or political terms. The relation between the state and its citizens (obviously one which has changed dramatically and more than once since the medieval period)[24] is ignored. The relation between citizens and humanity as such is also excluded from Waltz's position. The denial of this tension between two fundamental levels of obligation leaves Waltz with a mechanistic theory of international relations which isolates the state from its role as an interface between its citizens and people beyond state borders.

Waltz represents one side of an underlying problem which Buzan attempts to explain by opposing the concepts of power and peace. The issue is one of a tension emerging from a world in which humanity is divided into groups of citizens. Security as a concept is torn between these two fundamental and at present opposed levels of collectivity. There are the Realists like Waltz, who understand the concept of security only in relation to citizens. However, the use of a concept like 'citizens' should be qualified here, for as we have seen in Waltz's position, a number of theoretical moves are carried out which reduce the concept of citizens to the narrower notion of the state understood as an abstracted Hobbesian individual. Waltz's conception of security refers quite

specifically to the state understood as a unit with some kind of 'capability'.

As Buzan indicates, this Realist rendition of national security is opposed by the Idealists who understand the concept of security in relation to humanity in general. The state comes to be viewed as a particularistic grouping that threatens the security of the whole through its self-interested and parochial nature. Thus the concept of security is torn between a focus on the security of states or the security of people. Linklater points to the necessity of this contradiction given a world in which each individual is both citizen and human being. To ignore one side or the other of the contradiction merely undermines the explanatory power and theoretical coherence of modern international relations theory. Buzan adopts much the same position as Linklater in noting the inadequacy of peace or power as concepts for understanding international relations. He points to the contradiction they embody and also to the manner in which modern international relations theory has divided itself along one or the other side of the dichotomy and pushed the problematic to the margins of debate.

Buzan's formulation does not stand as an entirely new project. It has been the concern of a variety of modern international relations theorists discussed in later

chapters.[25] Nevertheless, Buzan's challenge is timely. The issue of security is once again a focus of widespread attention. Thus, while the Realists have enjoyed a period of relative pre-eminence in the realm of international relations theory, a number of dissenting voices have recently emerged which challenge the Realist association of security with the state. These recent attempts to develop a universalist rather than particularist conception of security have brought back into focus a problem which has been central (if often ignored) since the emergence of the modern state.

National Security and the Revival of Global Perspectives

The importance of coming to terms with contradictions posed by the concept of security has become more critical recently in view of increasingly dire, and increasingly plausible warnings of catastrophe. These warnings come in a variety of forms. Some point to the ability of humanity to exterminate both itself and much of the rest of the biomass of the planet through nuclear war. Others are concerned with the environmental degradation caused by modern industrial societies. Still others see the misallocation of resources and the growing disparity between rich and poor as major problems which must be dealt with given the 'shrinking' size of the planet. There are

of course many more problems, and commentaries on them. A growing number of these point out the inter-connectedness of all such impending dangers. A brief discussion of recent commentaries on the character of insecurity in the modern world will indicate just how unsatisfactory the traditional state oriented view of security has become.

Interestingly the first of these commentaries uses Hobbes to attack the ability of the states-system to provide security in the modern world. David P. Gautier's treatise on Hobbes ends with an appendix dealing with what Hobbes' reaction might have been to an international system of states which had nuclear weapons at their disposal.[26]

Gautier argues that the development of nuclear devices has created a situation for nations similar to that for individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature. The possession of such devices by states has, he believes, nullified what has been referred to as their 'impenetrability'. That is, the fundamental equality between individuals which Hobbes found so dangerous in the state of nature - "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest"[27] - can now be said to be evolving at the state level. The continued expansion of nuclear capable states has created a growing level of insecurity in that each of these states has the power to literally

'kill' its opponents. This nuclear proliferation raises the spectre of what Gautier calls a 'horrible equality'.

Following Hobbesian logic, Gautier believes that this equality provides the same motivation for states to escape the anarchy which so totally threatens them, as Hobbes presumed the war of all against all motivated the individual to escape the state of nature. As with the state of nature scenario, the logical (though by no means guaranteed) course of action for the state is to relinquish subjective and self-interested freedom to a common authority, which alone can provide a tolerable level of security. This should be done with an eye to the dangers other states represent and to the general distrust endemic in the states-system. However, it is exactly these elements of mistrust and potential aggression which, when coupled with nuclear capability, form the basis of the motivation towards centralized global authority. Gautier informs us that we should have no illusions about this new common authority and even mentions that it may well come in the form of "a world tyranny".[28] However, as the existence of individual, self-interested, competitive and nuclear capable states presents an intolerable level of insecurity, and Gautier tells us that "the alternative to an intolerable situation is never an ideal situation, but rather a barely tolerable situation,"[29] then even the

spectre of a global tyranny becomes an acceptable price to pay for escaping the risk of nuclear extermination.

'National' security for Gautier is another way of saying individual freedom. In the Hobbesian sense in which he means it, it is the inherent urge in human beings to pursue each appetite and avoid every aversion. Thus, to cling to a category such as national security in the face of evidence that it is contributing to an intolerably high level of insecurity, is to commit the ultimate Hobbesian sin of denying the necessary connection between freedom and order. So far as Gautier is concerned, 'national' freedom (read state sovereignty) now presents an intolerable threat to security in terms of basic survival. National security in this context becomes a contradiction in terms. The Hobbesian presentation of the state as a tolerable ordering institution can (given Gautier's analysis) no longer be assumed. Nuclear technology can be said to have thrust a common interest upon the world, which makes movement beyond the state of nations necessary (though not inevitable) for the maintenance of a tolerable level of security.

Richard Barnet has argued along similar lines although his theoretical underpinnings are not Hobbesian. His primary concern has been the effect of a military bias in the United States' national security policy. He

argues that "no national security problem can ultimately be solved except within the context of planetary security."[30]

Barnet contends that U.S. security policy is based on three classic threats. The first of these is the firm belief in the likelihood of nuclear attack on the United States. This belief has led the U.S. towards a policy based too much on flexible response and too much on the insistence that nuclear devices be useable. Barnet claims that,

> there is no objective, including the survival of the United States as a political entity, that merits destroying millions or jeopardizing the future of man. The pretense that it is legitimate to threaten nuclear war for political ends creates an international climate of fear in which Americans will have less security, not more.[31]

Secondly, Barnet believes that the U.S. has defined its security in terms of being 'strong', in a world full of aggressive enemies bent on world conquest. Each struggle around the globe tends to be seen as a battle between the forces of liberal-democracy (or their allies) and communism. The 'free world' is pitted against the 'new' (that is communist as opposed to fascist) form of totalitarianism. This view, usually associated with a belief in Soviet expansionism, is in Barnet's eyes, ill founded. It leads, he tells us to an imperialist security policy in which U.S. security is tied to "the official belief...that the

United States cannot be safe in the world [without] running as much of it as possible."[32]

Finally, Barnet sees this belief in Soviet expansionism as culminating in the misrepresentation of liberation movements around the world as mere dominoes in the East-West game.[33] Such a reductionist position obscures a broad range of problems and realities in the world. It is an intrinsically imperialist view in that its goal is to maintain the U.S. as the world's 'Number-One-Nation'. At a superficial level this goal is to be attained by exporting American values around the world. A central feature of many such American values is the promise that the Western model of industrialized consumer oriented societies is an attainable goal for all. As Barnet notes, however, even this rhetorical justification becomes a security problem for the U.S. because there is growing evidence to demonstrate that the finite planet we inhabit is simply not capable of supporting billions of people at anything like U.S. levels of consumption. The reduction of liberation movements to pawns in an East-West game results, for Barnet, in obscuring much larger and much deeper security questions, such as those arising from industrialism itself.

Barnet notes, "the object of national security is to protect people and to make them feel secure."[34] But

humanity now faces a number of risks which are global in scope and require global solutions: "the overshadowing risk to mankind is the destruction of the earth through nuclear war or the collapse of life support systems as a consequence of pollution and maldistribution of resources."[35] Security in this light demands a global focus and a cooperative rather than competitive basis to resolve these large problems which cannot be dealt with by any one nation, even one as powerful as the United States.

Richard H. Ullman has also pointed to the problematic nature of the United States' emphasis on the military in its security policies. This emphasis has resulted in the downplaying of other important security issues involving the maintenance of social services, the quality of the environment, and the global distribution of wealth and resources. As Ullman notes the emphasis on military solutions to national security problems "conveys a profoundly false image of reality."[36] An image which causes states to concentrate on military threats to the exclusion of other and perhaps more serious ones and also an image which is contributing "to a pervasive militarization of international relations that in the long run can only increase global insecurity."[37] It is an image which Ullman believes should be changed quickly for as he tells us, "while political will and energy are focused

predominantly on military solutions to the problems of national security, the nonmilitary tasks are likely to grow ever more difficult to accomplish and dangerous to neglect."[38]

Lester R. Brown takes a similar though less specifically U.S. oriented position to warn of the dangers inherent both in an overly military definition of national security, and in the lack of reaction to serious problems of global resource allocation and environmental degradation:

> Many political leaders perceive the new threats to security dimly, if at all. Intelligence agencies are organized to alert political leaders to potential military threats, but there is no counter-part network for warning of the collapse of a biological system. Military analysts understand the nature of military threats. Energy analysts understand the need to shift from oil to alternative energy sources, and ecologists understand the need to arrest ecological deterioration. But few individuals are trained or able to weigh and evaluate such a diversity of threats and then to translate such an assessment into the allocation of public resources that provides the greatest national security.[39]

However, Brown goes considerably farther to argue that: "in a world that is not only ecologically interdependent but economically and politically interdependent as well, the concept of 'national' security is no longer adequate."[40] Indeed, Brown concludes his paper by noting that:

> A forceful argument can now be made that considerations are meaningful only when the global threats to security are taken into account. Neither individual security nor national security

> can be sensibly considered in isolation. In effect, the traditional military concept of "national security" is growing ever less adequate as non-military threats grow more formidable.[41]

In all of these writers we find a clear indication of the continuing vitality of the old tension between the claims of humanity and the claims of citizens of states. However, its most recent manifestation comes at a time when many are beginning to perceive a new and urgent set of imperatives for the species as a whole which the states-system in its present form is inadequate to handle. These imperatives have, as we have seen, been raised in terms of the dangers of a nuclear armed anarchy, the increasing inequalities and inefficiencies of policies seeking to maintain an imperialist status-quo, or the life-boat ethics proposed by those who have some knowledge of the accumulation of environmental degradation. Each of these perspectives question the adequacy of the notion of national security to encompass problems which involve at once, individuals, states, and the globe.

If Gautier is right, security can only be qualified with the term tolerable. If 'national' security is also 'tolerable' security, then there is no problem with its use. However, once national security fails this essential condition then it becomes problematic. Security lies in

the reasonable assumption of survival. For Gautier this assumption cannot be taken for granted in a nuclear capable world.

Barnet tells us that national security at present is little more than a cloak to cover the more sinister aspects of crude power politics. This emphasis on power rather than security results in global competition, forcing states into an arena of struggle ranging from basic survival at one end to global imperialism at the other. Such a situation creates insecurity rather than security, for it threatens everyone. Thus, Barnet believes that we require a 'mature' national security policy which has a global perspective emphasizing cooperation, equitable resource allocation, and the breaking down of what Barnet calls the emerging global class system. Such a 'mature' policy stretches our present understandings of the adjective 'national' to such a degree that its very use may be inappropriate.

Ullman, while not willing to go as far as Barnet in condemning the present order, has pointed out the growing complexity of the environment within which states must exist. This environment is imposing its own set of imperatives on states and these imperatives demand that traditional conceptions of national security be expanded to include a whole range of nonmilitary but highly

dangerous threats.

If we turn to Brown we find a complete rejection of the term 'national' security. So far as Brown is concerned, to continue to use such a term in the face of our existing awareness of the effect of industrialized humanity on the environment, is to perpetuate a contradiction in terms. The 'lifeboat' or 'spaceship' earth analogy he uses points out the delicate and limited nature of the planet that humanity shares. Brown emphasizes the need for proper global management and warns that if we fail to see security as a product of cooperation and the overcoming of world rather than national problems, we will find ourselves continually less secure, if not extinct.

Against this litany of catastrophe stands the mainstream of modern international relations theory. Even those in this group who listen to the warnings of the 'new globalists' with sympathy, believe that the 'anarchical society' formed by self-interested states remains the intractable limiting factor on these otherwise eminently logical though practically utopian calls for cooperation and global transformation. For them, the states-system is likely to be here for the foreseeable future and simply denying its ability to overcome various problems is not helpful. As Hedley Bull once said:

> The story is sometimes told of the man who was lost somewhere in Scotland, and asked a

> farmer if he could tell him which was the way to Edinburgh. 'Oh sir', the farmer replied, 'If I were you, I shouldn't start from here!' The doctrine that the states-system does not provide the best starting-point for the pursuit of world order has something of this quality. The fact is that the form of universal political organization which actually prevails in the world is that of the states-system, and it is within this system that the search for consensus has to begin.?[42]

The disagreement remains over the focus of obligations in relation to security. Can we continue to trust in our states to provide us with security and therefore grant them our primary obligations, or have circumstances emerged which demand that we re-evaluate our relationships as citizens and as humans and grant to the planet and species our primary obligations? These questions are not new. They stretch back through Western philosophy and form an ancient dualism between those associated with universalist aspirations, such as the Hellenists, the Stoics, the Christians, or the Kantian rationalists, and those who, like the defenders of the Greek city state or the proponents of Romantic nationalism, have argued that loyalty and obligation must be situated in specific and particularistic groups. However, our age seems to throw up this question of security like no other before it. It can be plausibly argued that a central distinguishing feature of modern life is constant insecurity. Whether formulated in terms of nuclear,

economic, or ecological catastrophy, insecurity is a theme which haunts the writings of most commentaries on modern international relations.

Conclusion

What this overview of the present theoretical understanding of the concept of security should have made clear is that the terrain across which we find its trace is both uneven and varied. In some (indeed most) areas the concept is obscured by and confused with other concepts upon which it is deemed to be dependent. Across those areas which Buzan has identified as emphasizing the concepts of either power or peace (the areas usually identified with the labels 'Realism' and 'Idealism') there is a silence about the concept of security. A silence which is the result of obscuring security's central position in international political theory by making it contingent on other theoretical concepts.

However, as Buzan, Gautier, Barnet, Ullman, and Brown all serve to point out, this continued marginalization of the concept of security is now a serious problem for international relations theory. It is serious because increasingly, the gravest threats to our security cannot be resolved at the level of the state. When Hobbes first noted that the search for security presented itself as a dilemma resolvable only within the sovereign state, it seems

that mainstream international relations theory considered the problem relatively unimportant even though it was not completely resolved. Security would never be absolute but within the confines of the sovereign state it could at least be maintained at tolerable levels. However, we are now increasingly faced with the theme of insecurity and the re-emergence of a plausible critique of the states' ability to continue to generate a tolerable field of security for its citizenry. This situation has pointed out the importance of breaking through the silence which Hobbes' ghost seems to have left shrouded over the concept of security in mainstream international relations theory.

The aim of what follows will be to once again open up discussion on the concept of security. The method will be to examine Buzan's 'challenge' in the context of the overall development of the concept. This will be done by first, examining the theoretical problems underlying the concept of security as we know it and situating it within a larger historical and philosophical discourse. Secondly, these underlying problems will be excavated from the margins of what is modern mainstream international relations theory so that we may expose the tensions and contradictions which have hitherto been obscured. Once this groundwork is laid some classic texts from mainstream (Realist) international relations theory will be reviewed so as to

clarify the consequences of the underlying problematics as they pertain to security. Finally, some recent and non-mainstream attempts to think about security will be considered to determine the extent to which they reproduce or show promise of escaping from, the traditional dilemmas in which the concept of security has been embedded.

Footnotes

[1]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Hamondsworth : Penquin, 1968), Chapter 13, p. 183.

[2]Ibid., p. 186.

[3]Raymond Aron, Peace and War A Theory of International Relations, trans. by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York : Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), p. 72.

[4]John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism : A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 4.

[5]Hedley Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy," Social Research, 48:4 (Winter 1981), p 721.

[6]Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 11, p. 161.

[7]John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York:Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 231.

[8]Raymond Aron, On War: Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy. Trans. Terence Kilmartin. (London:Secker and Warburg, 1958), p. 15.

[9]Realism in this work will be used to designate a specific and highly influential category of international relations theory formulated initially in the classic texts of E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau and somewhat more arguably John Herz. It should not be mistaken for the more general epistemological realism represented in the work of say R.N. Berki.

[10]Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear : The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 1. See also Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 21, no. 2 (1984), pp.109-125.

[11]E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London : Macmillan Press, 1946) and Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed. (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).

[12]Buzan, People, States, and Fear, p. 2.

[13]This inappropriate categorization has been referred to in John Herz's, "Political Realism Revisted," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, no. 2 (June, 1981), pp. 182-197.

[14]Buzan, People, States, and Fear, p.2.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security", p. 110.

[17]Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations (London : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), p.36.

[18]Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State, and War : A Theoretical Analysis (New York : Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 12.

[19]Ibid, p. 238.

[20]Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 1979).

[21]For critiques of Waltz and the particular brand of structuralist thinking he represents see, John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity : Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," World Politics 35:2, January 1983, pp. 261-285; Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," International Organization 38:2, Spring 1984, pp. 225-286; and R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change and International Political Theory," International Studies Quarterly. 31:1, March 1987, pp. 65-86.

[22]Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," p. 273.

[23]R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change and International Political Theory," p. 78.

[24]See for instance Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London:New Left Books, 1974).

[25]This concern for overcoming contradictions and dichotomies in international relations theory can be found in the works of E.H. Carr, John Herz, and Friedrich Meinecke to be discussed in later chapters of the thesis.

[26]David P. Gautier, The Logic of Leviathan : The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 207-212.

[27]Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 13, p. 183.

[28]Gautier, The Logic of Leviathan, p. 211.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Richard J. Barnet, "The Illusion of Security," in Peace and War, eds. Charles R. Beitz and Theodore Herman (San Francisco : W.H.Freeman and Co., 1973), p. 287.

[31]Ibid., p. 276.

[32]Ibid., p. 280.

[33]This problem is also dealt with in the larger context of liberalism by Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1978) see especially pp. 115-135.

[34]Richard J. Barnet, Real Security : Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1981) p. 117.

[35]Barnet, "The Illusion of Security", p. 287.

[36]Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer, 1983), p. 129.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid, p. 153.

[39]Lester R. Brown, Redefining National Security, Worldwatch Paper 14, October, 1977 (Washington, D.C. : Worldwatch Institute, 1977), p.38.

[40]Ibid., p. 40.

[41]Ibid., p. 41.

[42]Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics (New York : Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 295-296. Bull's argument that the states-system itself is a universalizing force places him somewhere between our initial definition of Realism and

Idealism. However, his position is ultimately one which defends the division of humanity into separate and ultimately competitive collectivities and gives priority to states rather than humanity as such.

Chapter II

Security, Citizenship and Universality

> With the emergence of an external account of obligation, the modern citizen's uncritical acceptance of the unqualified rights of the sovereign state, the division between a public and private ethic, and a pragmatic conception of interaction with outsiders becomes problematic.[1]

In this quotation, Andrew Linklater captures a central ambivalence within European political thought about the proper relationship between the individual and the state. It refers to whether an individual's allegiance should lie primarily with the state, or whether there might not be a wider range of obligations extending beyond the state and compelling the individual to a divided loyalty.

In terms of the concept of political security, this ambivalence becomes evident in two central, though opposed arguments about the nature of the state. The first of these takes the state to be the highest (if imperfect) source of security. Taking as its starting point an international setting in which states compete in a decentralized and pluralistic system, this position maintains that there is no possibility of international harmony or even lasting accommodation between states. Security in this sense requires that there be no ambiguity in the individual citizen's loyalty to his or her state. The second position

defines security in relation to historical progress towards some form of global harmony. This harmony may be understood as an enhanced accommodation and cooperation between states. More significantly, it may also be understood as the development of some kind of community between human beings as human beings. In this more ambitious version the state appears as an obstacle to this progress.

From Polis to Modernity : The Spontaneous Citizen and the Self-interested Individual

Andrew Linklater provides a useful sketch of the transformations of what he calls 'international theory' since the disintegration of the Greek polis.[2] The importance of this disintegration for political theory lies in what Linklater sees as the modern political theorist's "frequent recourse to a contrast between the fragmented nature of modern political life and the allegedly more communitarian character of the Greek polis."[3] The opposition between modern fragmentation and classic civic harmony was based on the notion that citizens of the polis identified freely and spontaneously with their public institutions. This ancient ideal of community has been contrasted with the modern citizen's drive to promote individual interests and private conceptions of the good, even at the expense of the community.

However, as Linklater notes, this loss was not without compensation:

> History had not been an unmitigated fall...If the modern world had lost the spontaneous form of community enjoyed by the ancients, it had surpassed that world in its understanding and expression of freedom.[4]

The juxtaposition of the apparently opposed ideals, community and freedom, resulted in a central problem for modern political thought regarding how to make a good citizen out of an individual no longer spontaneously so. This is, for instance, a central project of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.[5] If we take this problem from the state level where Hegel situated it, and translate it to the inter-state level, an important transformation occurs. At this higher level of analysis the question becomes that of coming to terms with the distinction between humanity as such and citizens.

The spontaneous identification of the Greek with the city-state and the concomitant acceptance of the citizen's role and responsibilities towards the state were a product of the attributes of citizenship. Only a citizen could be considered properly human and of equal stature. By being a citizen the Greek also partook of a social and political system which provided the framework for developing each citizen's human potential to the fullest extent. These privileges prompted the citizen to identify more closely with the community. However, there was a tension in Greek society

between the decentralized form of city-state allegiance and the idea that all Greek citizens, regardless of their birth place, were in some sense equal. Certainly any Greek could be held superior to a barbarian; as Socrates says to Glaucon: "I assert the Greek stock is with respect to itself its own and akin, with respect to the barbaric, foreign and alien."[6] This same idea was represented in the Greeks' refusal to take other Greeks as slaves.

Yet the notion of complete identification with one's community had its ambiguities. The idea of Greek going to war with Greek was in Plato's mind an indication that "Greece is sick and factious."[7] There was clearly a tension between the Greek as citizen of a particular city-state and the Greek as member of a wider community. But the Greeks were never able to unite their civilization. This should be viewed in part as a product of the attraction citizenship held for the Greek:

> the view that the polis was the highest association in which humans could develop their capacities, or that citizenship was the most prized human possession, accounts for the Greeks inability to establish longlasting international associations or seriously reconsider their division into separate city states.[8]

But it was also a product of the Greeks' adherence to equality between citizens and their belief that the city-state was the optimum size for realizing this equality. Of

course, the other side of this fragmentation was an increased vulnerability. As Adda B. Bozeman has noted:

> the Greeks did not succeed in finding a working relationship between the principles of equality and security as long as they professed to retain the political system of multiple independent states.[9]

With the emergence of Hellenism and later Stoic-Christian philosophy, this primacy of the citizen began to break down. Hellenism came to be seen not as an attribute of birth but rather as an individual achievement of intellect. However, it was Stoicism that represented the radical break to a true dualism where the individual and intellectual virtues became more important than those of the citizen. Reason was seen as a universal possessed by all 'men'. As George Sabine put it:

> There are for every man two laws: the laws of his city and the law of the world-city; the law of custom and the law of reason. Of the two, the second must have the greater authority, and must provide a norm to which the statutes and customs of cities should conform.[10]

This universalist breakthrough amounted to the discovery of a new moral consciousness, and became embodied in the Stoic-Christian belief in the unity of humankind. It made it possible to speak of belonging to two societies: that of one's birth and that of the community of humanity. It also provided a standard with which to criticize the actions of the state. A citizen could be loyal to a particular community only to the extent that that community did not

violate principles of universal reason.

This premiss created the problem of how to reconcile the diversity of political communities with universal principles of reason. This was also connected to the already noted problem of how to recreate the community of the polis given the fragmentation stemming from the individual's new ability to criticize the state on the grounds of reason and freedom. Reason provided a framework for a possible reconciliation, but freedom provided the basis for the pursuit of self-interest.

With the rise of the modern states-system in the early modern period, this same problem came to be rephrased in terms of a dualism between universalism and pluralism. The question was posed as to whether the state is a permanent fixture of the human landscape, given the necessity of cultural and political pluralism, or whether the state stands as an obstacle to the realization of the universal ties which bind humanity. Among later writers, Hegel is particularly interesting as a theorist of the state who sought to reconcile these emergent contradictions. He understood the state to be the realm in which particular interests (individual, family, corporate, etc.) become moments of the universal. The universal in these terms should be considered as the state and its participation in the unfolding dialectic of world history. In this sense, the state represents far

more than the sum of its parts, for it is the vehicle through which participation in history becomes possible. Yet, the state itself becomes a particular interest when viewed in relation to other states. However, by allowing that the dialectic unfolding of history is led by that state representing history's most advanced formulation at any particular historical period, Hegel suggests a framework in which to reconcile the particular state with the universal nature of history. In Hegel's terms:

> The nation to which is ascribed a moment of the Idea in the form of a natural principle is entrusted with giving complete effect to it in the advance of the self-developing self-consciousness of the world mind. This nation is dominant in world history during this one epoch, and it is only once that it can make its hour strike. In contrast with this its absolute right of being the vehicle of this present stage of the world mind's development, the minds of other nations are without rights, and they, along with those whose hour has struck already, count no longer in world history.[11]

Thus, the state forms its internal pluralism into a moment of the universal and then stands on the stage of world history waiting for its moment to add to the dialectic unfolding of the world mind, or Geist. The particular finds meaning only through its participation in the development of the universal.

In the polis, the citizens's obligations ultimately took precedence over any wider set of obligations to humanity. In the subsequent Stoic-Christian period universal obligations

became of primary importance, whether because of reason or humanity's relation to God. Hegel points out that with the emergence of the states-system the problem of 'men' and citizens is posed in a manner that makes it impossible to emphasize one dimension over another. The sovereign state requires the absolute allegiance of each citizen, but it also requires a basis for this allegiance which is universal. If the 'free and rational' individual of the modern states-system is to accept the responsibilities of citizenship, that individual can do so only in so far as the state provides a context in which wider obligations are also pursued. It is in this sense that the problematic of reconciling obligations owed humanity with those of the citizen becomes fundamental.

The Early Defense of the State : Contractarian Contradictions

The breakdown of the Thomistic cosmology coincided with the emergence of the modern secular state. The medieval formulation of transcendent universal obligations to the 'City of God' came under attack. Theoretically, the question again emerged as to where an individual's primary obligations lay. The secular state could not simply continue to make the claim of the feudal King to 'divine right'. Indeed, the loss of Thomist universalism required a new theoretical grounding for the state, one which would provide a basis for the resolution of the problem of obligations in light of the new

ideas of reason and freedom. Two of the first thinkers to take up this challenge were Samuel von Pufendorf and Emmerick de Vattel.

Pufendorf argues strongly for the primacy of universal obligations in his criticism of the ancient Greeks:

> most men had so completely forgotten the principle of the natural law, namely, that all men are related to each other by nature, and that it is wrong, therefore, for one to do violence to another except for some preceding offence, that it was generally believed the duties of humanity should be exercised only towards one's fellow citizens, and that foreigners were no better than enemies, whom we could injure whenever it appeared to be to our advantage.[12]

This position would appear to provide a basis from which to criticize the supposed evils of pluralism. It represents an attack on 'vertical' obligations and proposes that 'horizontal' obligations based on 'the duties of humanity', spelled out in natural law, must be primary. However, Pufendorf did not rely on 'man's' natural inclinations to be a moral being. He argued that universal obligations were prior to all other obligations, but they were achievable only through the social contract and its establishment of legal authority.

In much the same vein as Hobbes, Pufendorf saw fear and insecurity as the motivating forces behind the acceptance of the social contract:

> the complaint of the masses about the burdens and drawbacks of civil states could be met in no better way than by picturing to their eyes the

> drawbacks of a state of nature. These are properly understood by those who have accepted as a proverb the saying: were there no courts of justice, every man would devour his neighbour.[13]

Of central importance to Pufendorf was the formation of a sovereign authority, because while he accepted the primacy of universal obligations stemming from the law of nature and relating all people to each other, he could discern no natural mechanism for enforcing this morality. It was the contract that would transform natural but unenforceable obligations into legal and enforceable ones.

Given the prior nature of horizontal obligations, and the necessity of their legal enforcement, one might still think Pufendorf is developing an argument for a universal contract that would allow law and morality to be equated for all humanity. After all, it was the pluralism of the Greeks that set them against the 'natural' universal ties that bind all human beings. However, Pufendorf does not argue in this direction. Rather, he provides a defense of the states-system based on the claim that the social contract, which forms the state, breaks down the natural universal bonds of people:

> the numbers of the human race and the infinite multitude of transactions have not allowed men to unite into one body, for as much as that one body, in such huge dimensions, would be threatened through internal disturbances by the same inconveniences as those which exercise the human race, and almost greater ones, divided, as the race is, into a large number of smaller governments.[14]

This illustrates the unresolved tension in Pufendorf's position between humanity as such and citizens. If we accept Pufendorf's argument for the primacy of universal horizontal ties, then his defense of the vertical ties of the state becomes incoherent and vice versa. As Linklater puts it:

> The tension between Hobbesian [contractarian] and Grotian [natural law] components of Pufendorf's thought is ultimately a tension between two incompatible visions of world order...Pufendorf succeeds in showing that one of these visions of world order cannot take the form of a cosmopolitan community. But what his premises forbid him to argue is that a world of separate political systems must therefore be a world of self-interested sovereign states. Since these political systems are supposedly superimposed upon a pre-existing moral community, the single most fundamental deficiency of Pufendorf's theory is its failure to construct a philosophy of world political organization which seeks to give institutional expression to man's horizontal ties...And thereby the theory presupposes what it requires to establish, the legitimacy of the sovereign association and the rationality of the division of mankind into separate sovereign states.[15]

Vattel's position begins much like Pufendorf's. He argues from the 'state of nature' perspective and grants the state a utilitarian legitimacy based on its necessity to the individual. Vattel also accepts the notion of a common set of moral obligations for the entire human race, and, like Pufendorf, does not grant this universal morality the same force of necessity as the compact that establishes the state. Thus, Vattel sets up the same tensions between particular and universal obligations as does Pufendorf. However, Vattel

provides a different and at least partially more successful theoretical basis for mediating these 'opposed' loyalties.

Vattel begins to break with Pufendorf through his refusal to elevate the notion of sovereignty above "the principle of a natural society of free and independent states which each community is obliged to preserve and enhance."[16] Whereas Pufendorf saw sovereignty as creating the possibility of purely self-interested state action, Vattel assumed that the principle of state autonomy could only be maintained by mutual respect of obligations between states. Thus, while each state was to be free to determine its own conduct, it was also to be constrained by its obligation to itself and other states to maintain the states-system.

While this may not read like a dictate of higher moral reason, Vattel did believe that states were capable of, and had a moral obligation to, promote one another's welfare as much as possible. However, while these obligations were both real and universal, they were also imperfect. This imperfection was the result of freedom:

> Our obligation is always imperfect with respect to other people, while we possess the liberty of judging how we are to act: and we retain that liberty on all occasions where we ought to be free.[17]

Thus, Vattel equivocates regarding the primacy of moral obligations, and this allows him to strengthen his commitment to a plural states-system:

> Since then a nation is obliged to preserve itself, it has a right to everything necessary for its preservation. For the Law of Nature gives us a right to every thing, without which we cannot fulfill our obligation; otherwise it would oblige us to do impossibilities, or rather would contradict itself in prescribing us a duty, and at the same time debarring us of the only means of fulfilling it.[18]

This emphasis on the state's right of self-preservation is an aspect of Vattel's notion of individual rights based on 'personal security'. As E.B.F. Midgley (a modern Thomist writer) puts it:

> This right of personal security is envisaged as a right not only to self-defense but also to the exercise of deterrent or reformatory punishment specifically against those who attempt to inflict some injury upon him. Vattel then argues that the state as a moral person has a similar right of personal security. This right of the state is supposed to arise because, in uniting civil society, men are supposed to have renounced in favour of the state their own rights to punish.[19]

This position amounts to a denial of the possibility of enforcing universal morality. It demonstrates Vattel's scepticism as to the possibility of anything approaching a moral consensus, and a fear that a single and self-interested morality might be imposed by one state upon others. The liberty of the state becomes "a consequence of an absence of consensus about international ethical standards."[20]

The charge of moral relativism, which Linklater has applied to Vattel, is a result of Vattel's raising of the liberty of the state to the level of a natural law:

> ...each nation should be left in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty which she inherits from nature...No nation is willing to renounce her liberty...As a consequence of that liberty and independence it exclusively belongs to each nation to form her own judgement of what her conscience prescribes to her...no other nation can compel her to act in such or such particular manner : for any attempt at such compulsion would be an infringement on the liberty of nations.[21]

This is an attempt by Vattel to claim that the very principle of freedom for states defines certain obligations and limitations for state action. Unfortunately, the granting of natural law status to state liberty works to undermine Vattel's attempt to reconcile the vertical and horizontal notions of obligation found in the duality of humanity held distinct from citizens. As Linklater notes:

> Vattel is committed to arguing that, as members of the natural society of the human race, states have the duty of not enforcing those horizontal moral ties which had preceded their establishment; and they must not comply rigorously with those natural duties because to do so would jeopardize the more substantial principle of social and political freedom. Duties among citizens are ultimately more important than duties among men.[22]

Vattel argues from universal to pluralist grounds, and, as Midgley describes it: "there is an absolutist tendency pervading his notions of sovereignty and national autonomy which cannot ultimately be reconciled with any serious doctrine of natural law."[23]

This tendency to give primacy to citizen obligations, to sovereignty, and to state autonomy makes Vattel an important thinker for modern mainstream international theory. By

taking the position he does, he distinguishes inter-state from intra-state politics. Morality is consigned to the level of domestic politics, and, while it remains an ideal to be followed if possible at the inter-state level, it is only a secondary consideration behind the necessity of national preservation. This leads Vattel towards a description of the international realm in terms of balance of power considerations. It is in this sense that Hedley Bull places Vattel among those who contributed to the establishment of a framework for the pluralist conception of twentieth century international politics.[24]

Yet, it must be remembered that this position is a result of Vattel's failure to accomplish the reconciliation of civic and universal duties. By presupposing "the absolute rationality of the state and the finality of the states-system"[25], Vattel creates a contradiction between the state and the underlying universal morality supposedly embodied in the human race. While both Vattel and Pufendorf had attempted to reconcile the contradiction between humanity as such and citizens that had been implicit in the polis and later the Stoic-Christian tradition, neither succeeded. Instead, both can be identified as early defenders of the state, who did so at the expense of the logical consistency of important elements of their theoretical positions. Thus, in spite of the fact that the emerging states-system

represented a radical challenge to Thomistic morality, indeed to the whole edifice of medieval cosmology, both Vattel and Pufendorf avoided a decisive confrontation with the issue.

Rousseau and Kant : Attack on the State and the Origins of Realist Pessimism

> The patriotic spirit is an exclusive one, which makes us regard all men other than our co-citizens as strangers, almost as enemies. Such was the spirit of Sparta and Rome. The Spirit of Christianity, by contrast, makes us regard all men as our brothers...does not allow us to make odious distinctions between compatriots and strangers;...its ardent zeal embraces all the human race without distinction.[26]

The above quotation might be read as an ode to a passing goodness in humankind. While Rousseau was no great admirer of Christianity, he was even less an admirer of competition and exclusivity. Thus, Sparta and Rome are chastized for their patriotism and the 'Spirit of Christianity' is held against this as a force pointing towards a less competitive and less violent community of human beings. This 'spirit', however, was by Rousseau's account, unable to withstand the divisive nature of the emerging secular and pluralist states-system. Rousseau was not about to bemoan the decline of Christianity's power in the affairs of human beings, but neither was he able to simply subsume the idea of universal obligations under the guise of an absolutely rational state as Vattel had done. The notion that humanity shared a common moral base was deeply held by Rousseau. It is because of

this that he refused to apologize for the state and instead portrayed it as an obstacle to the performance of wider ethical obligations:

> each one of us being in the civil state as regards our fellow-citizens, but in the state of nature as regards the rest of the world, we have taken all kinds of precautions against private wars only to kindle national wars a thousand times more terrible; and...in joining a particular group of men, we have really declared ourselves the enemy of the whole race.[27]

Unlike thinkers such as Vattel, Rousseau did not believe that wars between European states were an acceptable last resort in the resolution of international disagreements. Nor did he accept arguments that war could be mediated by undermining the idea of the 'just' war in favour of a more rational system of conflict mediation. If Vattel saw war as "an inescapable fact and tool of political life, but one which governments should be persuaded to use with ever greater moderation, ever more rarely, although not in the credulous hope that it could be entirely dispensed with;"[28] Rousseau saw war as an ever increasing evil leading to greater and greater levels of carnage. War, for Rousseau, was a central feature in humanity's increasing division into violently competitive groups, and stood in the way of not only the performance of the ethical obligations of humankind, but also of progressive domestic reform. Rousseau stood both Pufendorf and Vattel on their heads to argue that the states-

system reflects a trend towards greater irrationality and not the embodiment of perfectable reason.

For Rousseau, the emerging states-system threatened to reduce political obligations to the level of the preservation of the state at any cost. Reason demanded that such a situation be avoided. Rousseau rejected the single state or empire alternative as too tyrannical. The position he favoured was a federation of states. Yet, as W.B. Gallie points out, Rousseau "tempered this conclusion by admitting that he saw no possibility of the different European states submitting to effective federal rule; so that in effect, he abandoned the international problem as insoluble."[29] This pessimism lies in the identification of the state as a source of escalating violence that reason demands be reformed. However, for Rousseau, such reform appeared to be an impossibility. Therefore, he was forced to conclude that people do not act with reason, and that at the international level, no state will surrender short-term for long-term interests. As he put it so eloquently:

> If in spite of all this, the project remains unrealized, that is not because it is utopian; it is because men are crazy, and because to be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness.[30]

Rousseau pointed out the impossibility of trust in a world of competitive states. He delineated the transformation which occurred in the political environment

with the emergence of the modern states-system. He noted the uselessness of seeking security based on cooperation in the context of international relations. It is on this basis that Ian Clark has recently suggested that Rousseau's pessimism was the beginning of a tradition of despair in international thought, which has culminated today in the modern 'Realist' school. Clark relates this despair to the tradition of real politik in which the states-system is viewed as both dangerous and irrational, but impossible to move beyond.

However, Clark's analysis ignores one important dimension of Rousseau's analysis: the possibility of moving towards a situation where to be a member of a particular social group did not have to result in 'declaring war on the rest of the race'. Rousseau did despair about the possibility of achieving such a situation but he nevertheless dealt with the problem explicitly. As we shall see later, if the 'Realist' school echoes Rousseau's pessimism it has done so without remembering the basis of this despair, which did not lie in the inability of people to trust one another but rather in the failure of the state to act as a vehicle to overcome the dichotomy between universal and particular obligations.

Clark treats Rousseau as a theorist of conservatism and even reaction. The higher goals of humanity are viewed as laudable but unattainable, and therefore any attempts to

achieve them are treated as both utopian and doomed to failure. Thus, to Clark, Rousseau becomes the precursor of modern 'Realism' in international politics. But Rousseau can also be viewed as the initiator of an attack on the state based on rational grounds and having as its fundamental goal the integration of humanity's wrongly divided obligations. The radical nature of Rousseau's critique of the states-system stands (in spite of its pessimism) as a call for change and not as a call for the defense of such a system. In fact, Rousseau's position has much in common with that of Immanuel Kant, who Clark treats as the exact opposite of Rousseau.

Kant, like Rousseau, considered war to be a central problem emerging from the division of humankind into states. He also concluded that war was an escalating problem, growing in intensity, and therefore not a legitimate method of inter-state problem solving. In Perpetual Peace Kant suggested that in order to reverse the war fighting tendencies of the plural states-system, it was necessary to develop a European Federation. Again, this was very like Rousseau. However, Kant also agreed with Vattel in so far as he considered war to be too deep seated a phenomenon to be immediately dispensed with. For the immediate future, Kant felt war would have to be lived with. Where he disagreed with Vattel was in the right of states to go to war to secure their self-defined

interests. Kant instead proposed a goal of perpetual peace, a rational ideal to which rational states must work towards.

Kant felt progress towards perpetual peace lay in an adherence to four main principles.[31] To begin with, Kant was not a pacifist. If war was to be overcome it would not be through the simple rejection of its legitimacy, or the hope that if one state rejected it others might follow suit. Rather, the eradication of war as a form of political resolution of conflict was to be accomplished through the slow and difficult construction of an edifice of international law. Secondly, while Kant accepted the necessity of coercion in the maintenance of domestic order, he felt it was an absurdity to apply it to the international realm:

> An international order could be initiated only when certain governments freely abjured their right to make war on each other; and it would expand only as other governments, observing the benefits (in the way of greater economy and security) which accrued from this initiative, sought membership within the bond (foedus) of mutual non-aggression.[32]

The third feature maintained that this international order had to be confined to keeping the peace between states who had become signatories to the bond of non-aggression. Once a state became a member no interference was to be allowed with that state's internal affairs. This position of absolute internal sovereignty made Kant "one of the most steadfast of 'statists' in the history of political thought."[33] The final

feature of Kant's international theory was its large time scale. He foresaw that the building of an international order along the lines proposed above, would have to be done over a long historical period, and would naturally involve both setbacks and advances. These four points suggest solutions to the problems inherent in both Vattel and Rousseau. They offer a theory of how it is possible to exist in a states-system without being forced to abdicate duties and obligations which extend beyond one's state.

As pacifism was not an aspect of Kant's position, the defense of the state from foreign aggression was legitimate. This is also, and paradoxically, legitimated because coercion at the international level is <u>not</u> legitimate. Thus, the problem posed by the earlier Thomistic formulation of the 'just' war, is removed by making all aggressive acts illegitimate. This is further supported by Kant's advocacy of absolute state sovereignty. A state's religion, political organization, and so on, cannot be treated as legitimate reasons to coerce it to change. Finally, the long-term progressivist nature of Kant's project overcomes Rousseau's pessimism by viewing it as a product of too great an emphasis on the urgency of change. Rousseau was right in pointing out the dangerous and divisive nature of international violence but wrong to say it could never be overcome because it could not be done immediately.

Kant's position provides a theoretical basis for resolving the problematic relationship between the individual and the state. A Kantian citizen could be assured of remaining true to species wide obligations so long as his or her state was working towards the goal of perpetual peace. If it was not, their duty lay in forcing it to do so. This primacy of universal obligations is related back to the realities of the states-system in its awareness of the possibility of setbacks, failures, and wrong turns, and also the problem of dealing with states which refuse to act 'progressively'.

But we must ask what Kant saw as the motivation towards this 'progressive' action. In other words, what did Kant see in the international realm which Rousseau did not?

Kant believed that "the same unsociableness which forced men into (a Commonwealth) becomes again the cause of each Commonwealth assuming the attitude of uncontrolled freedom in its external relations."[34] Linklater notes how this created a situation in which citizenship provided people with security whereby a kingdom of ends emerged within states, but it threatened the possibility of a kingdom of ends between them.[35] Clearly, Kant was focusing on the political problem that arose as contract theory attempted to come to terms with its Stoic-Christian predecessor. The problem for Kant stemmed from the ambiguous marriage of vertical (state) and

horizontal (universal) obligations.

If Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel were, in Kant's words, 'miserable comforters', it was because they had not "paid the Stoic-Christian ideal of the unity of mankind the supreme compliment of taking its political consequences seriously."[36] They had accepted the universal suppositions of Stoic-Christian philosophy but had failed to properly theorize the consequences of pairing this position with the pluralist vertical obligations inherent in their defence of the state. Theoretically this resulted in playing down and implicitly ignoring the importance of horizontal ties and undermining the coherence of their theoretical positions.

Rousseau, on the other hand, had faced the problem squarely by admitting the failure of the contractarian solution. He treated the contract as a degenerative step that increased the quality and quantity of violence and rendered impossible the achievement of international harmony. Kant, however, could not accept Rousseau's pessimism. In his rejection of the contractarian solution, Kant's belief in progressive history allowed him to accept the failures of the present in light of an evolving and changing historical process. The international 'state of nature' did not represent an atemporal truth to Kant. Nor was Rousseau's impassioned plea for the immediate and radical reconstruction of the entire states-system an aspect of Kant's position.

The notion of progressive history allowed Kant to examine the states-system not only in terms of its immediate failings but also in terms of those institutions which contained within them the seeds of future improvements.

To Kant, the problem for international theory was the apparent failure of the state to provide a rational basis for the fulfillment of horizontal obligations. Because of this, the humanity/citizen dichotomy stood at the centre of his international theory. A citizen's primary obligations must be to humanity, but as the states-system represented an imperfect first attempt to achieve this type of moral unity, the citizen also owed conditional obligations to the state. Provided the state was working towards the rational goal of perpetual peace to the best of its ability (allowing for the imperfect international situation it found itself in) the individual's obligations should not be in conflict. The acceptance of vertical obligations stood as an immediate reality, the perfection of universal ties lay in the future. Kant's reconciliation is found in the progressive move from the former to the latter. A central element of this position is that the primacy of universal ties creates the theoretical necessity of individuals acting against their own state to force it, if need be, along the progressive path which Kant had uncovered.

In the short term, Kant accepted the necessity of the

state due to the fragmented nature of humanity into cultures, linguistic groups, and so on, but he also believed in the eventual emergence of a true cosmopolitan and universal culture rooted in universal reason. Once this occurred, humanity would have before it a universal kingdom of ends, and with it a "progress towards anarchy, towards a condition in which coercion by law gradually receded to be replaced in time by a form of self-constraint engendered by reverence for freedom and morality alone."[37]

The Counter-Enlightenment: A Return to the State as the Defender of Diversity

> What is real is individual, that is, is what it is in virtue of its uniqueness, its differences from other things, events, thoughts, and not in virtue of what it has in common with them...[38]

A radical shift in thought occurred with the romanticism of the Counter-Enlightenment and the emergence of the historicist critique of rationalism.[39] If Kant had offered a promising new theoretical basis for a rationalist theory of international politics, the historicists sought to undermine the very foundations of rationalist thought, to provide a new critique of contractarianism, and to offer a new defense of the state. They did so by denying the existence or at minimum the importance of universals to human nature. This reformulation led to the further denial of the existence of timeless moral principles on which a rationalist account of

human nature had to be based. In terms of international relations theory, the problem of mediating the contradiction between the individual and the state was circumvented by denying the existence of universal obligations and attacking the idea put forward by the contractarians, that political associations grew out of pre-social needs.

The historicists argued that the social contract as such simply did not exist. Human arrangements were the product of historical evolution. It made little sense to talk about the formation of modern societies from a primordial state of nature. To do so was to transfer modern forms of rationality onto historic periods which embodied different understandings of reason. To the historicist, reason was the product of culture, of the realities of particular historical periods. Because of this, it was not unified nor was it in any way atemporal. To speak of some past age in which the rational foundations of the modern state were created in a social contract was simply incoherent. The historicists also felt that once the idea of universal rationality was denied, Kant's claim to have overcome the problems of contract theory through the historical emergence of a cosmopolitan society founded on universal reason had also been undercut.

The new position emerging in the Counter-Enlightenment was one in which humanity was to be understood in terms of its environment. It was this environment that determined the

individual's moral capabilities and obligations. Further, humanity as such was divided into a plurality of cultural modes. In any given historical period there would be a large number of different social environments which would each reflect a different form of morality and a different variant of reason. If there was any primordial truth about the human species it was its plurality not its universality. As Isaiah Berlin notes in a discussion of Vico:

> the ideal of some of the thinkers of the Enlightenment, the notion of even the abstract possibility of a perfect society, is necessarily an attempt to weld together incompatible attributes -characteristics, ideals, gifts, properties, values that belong to different patterns of thought, action, life, and therefore cannot be sewn together into one garment...there is a conceptual clash between, let us say, what gives splendour to Achilles and what causes Socrates or Michelangelo or Spinoza or Mozart or the Buddha to be admired; and since this applies to the respective cultures, in the context of which alone men's achievements can be understood and judged, this fact alone makes this particular dream of the Enlightenment incoherent.[40]

In opposition to rationalist universalism then, the historicists saw individuals not as undifferentiated members of a humanity striving for political and moral unification, but rather as participants in diverse communities which are developing in history. States emerged not to satisfy pre-social needs depicted by the contractarians and deduced from a mythical universal state of nature, but rather to protect and enhance the cultures for which they were responsible. The division of the world into states became the natural

product of the primodial fact of pluralism.

Humanity, having no underlying universal nature could only be seen holistically as the sum total of its cultural configurations. Each of these cultures stood as a unique representation of human expression and no one culture could presume to be the best or to put itself forward as the universal model for others to follow. States played the central role of preserving this diversity and allowing it to unfold historically in a plurality of developing human capacities. As Heinrich von Treitschke clearly puts it:

> Undoubtedly even at present a man feels himself primarily a German or a Frenchman first and only in the second place as a man in the wider sense...It is then both historically and physiologically untrue that human beings enter upon existence first as men, and afterwards as compatriots...In the actual circumstances of their lives they are thoroughly unlike...If we pursue this thought further it works like a deadly poison upon the theory of Radicals who speak of the natural equality of men. ...it is quite inaccurate to call the State a necessary evil. We have to deal with it as a lofty necessity.[41]

Treitschke then goes on to note how this difference is not only necessary but morally imperative:

> the ideal of a State co-extensive with humanity is no ideal at all. In a single state the whole range of culture could never be fully spawned; no single people could write the virtues of aristocracy and democracy. All nations, like all individuals, have their limitations, but it is exactly in the abundance of these limited qualities that the genius of humanity is exhibited. The rays of Divine light are manifested, broken by countless facets among the separate peoples, each are exhibiting another

picture and another idea of the whole.[42]

In this light, the state was not only necessary to the defense of its culture, but it was also a moral necessity in that it created the space for the cultural diversity that was the measure of richness in the development of human capacities. A state that failed in this role of protecting its unique but necessarily limited expression of these capacities reduced the richness of the world by "another idea of the divinity."[43] A citizen's obligation, given the above, must be undividedly to the state. Further, this undivided loyalty to the state also fulfilled the citizen's obligation to humanity because humanity was the expression of a plurality of cultures, ideals, realities, and so on, which could be maintained only through each culture defending its particular manifestation of the many. The obligation to humanity was no longer one of attempted unification but one of maintaining diversity. To consider it otherwise would be to attempt to apply an ethno-and historico-centricity to the world which was morally reprehensible and so far out of touch with the reality of human diversity as to be utopian in terms of the possibility of practical realization. This reworking of the problem posed by the distinction between people as such and citizens resulted in a return to the belief in the state as the pinnacle of political achievement and also in the theoretical resurrection of pragmatic politics at the

international level. The maintenance of the states-system became primary and the defense of domestic institutions and cultural expressions became the raison d'etre of the state.

Historicism had pointed out a serious flaw in the rationalist perspective. It demonstrated that to abstract humanity from its social and historical environment created a theoretical approach which tended to ignore a central side of human experience in terms of 'being' in the world. There were obvious differences between historical periods and existing cultural forms. These could not be ignored by merely emphasizing sameness at the expense of difference. However, historicism can also be faulted on several counts, with the most pertinent here being that it tended to simply reverse the rationalist mistake by concentrating too much on diversity and pluralism. Linklater examines some of the difficulties of the historicist position for international politics with an example using two hypothetical cultures.[44] He begins by assuming both cultures to be founded on mutually exclusive principles of international relations. The first culture accepts the historicist argument that cultural diversity is fundamental to the full manifestation of human capacities. It deals with other states along these lines. The second culture believes its manifestation of capacities is a superior one and refuses to accept any obligation to any state other than those that share in its own 'superior'

cultural form. This gives us an expression of the possibility of humanity developing along contradictory cultural paths.

This example raises a number of serious problems for historicism. The historicist culture cannot claim its right to be a state on the grounds of the necessity of diversity because the non-historicist culture will not accept this claim. Further, the historicist culture cannot deny the right of the non-historicist state to order its own culture along the lines it chooses because each culture is equally valid. A dilemma arises for historicism because at this point it is forced to choose between the principle of the equal validity of cultures on the one hand or the principle that all cultures should treat each other as moral equals on the other. If equal validity is chosen then the states-system cannot be defended as it provides a structure in which the non-historicist state can deny and undermine the principle. To choose the principle of moral equality is to argue that the states-system is necessary because the principle of equal validity cannot be upheld. It is only because the non-historicist state denies the validity of the historicist state that the states-system becomes necessary to defend cultural plurality. As we noted in Treitschke's comments, the historicists opted for moral equality, and by so doing have been put in the position of advocating equal

treatment of cultures based on their equal validity as expressions of 'the divine spark', while also claiming that such equal treatment does not occur. Because it does not occur, the necessity of the state emerges to defend one cultural form from another. As Linklater describes it: "they resurrect a division between a concrete culture and a moral principle, which transcends it."[45] In this sense historicism becomes guilty of the same type of abstraction of which they accused the rationalists.

Historicism as an answer to rationalism raises interesting questions about the overall viability of the rationalist position. However, it does not succeed in resolving the tension between particular and universal obligations without bogging down in its own mire of contradictions. If the rationalists had abstracted individuals from historically evolving cultures, historicists had merely reversed this by abstracting particular cultural forms from wider aspects of human experience (especially humanity's social interaction with nature).[46]

The legacy of the rationalist tradition from Pufendorf to Kant has been the provision of a coherent framework for a rationalist theory of political obligations. This theory demonstrated that obligations extend beyond the state, that the state did not represent the ultimate form of political association, and that, therefore, there was a tension between

citizen and universal obligations which could only be worked out through a historical process.

The historicist critique undercut this position by attacking its universalist foundations. The goal of cosmopolitanism was not only the product of misreading what is fundamental in human nature but also was morally reprehensible. Yet, the historicist position failed to supply an adequate alternative basis for a theory of international society. It could not propose a method by which cultural plurality could be maintained without each culture standing as a threat to every other. Cultural plurality was necessary, the historicists said, because it was the expression of humankind's many sided nature. However, one of these natures was the search for a truly cosmopolitan society. This search threatened pluralism; hence, this aspect of human nature - this expression of the 'divine spark' - had to be forcefully condemned. Plurality was seen as necessary because it represented human nature, and because of this, it had to be defended even though this defense was against one of the expressions of human nature. Any 'divine sparks' that had universalizing goals became illegitimate because to the historicist tradition, pluralism represented a transcendent value. In this sense historicism seems to base its plural vision of the world on a tautology.

Conclusion

The tensions between natural law and contractarianism, universalist rationalism and historicist pluralism continue to structure discussions of international politics. The tension between universalism and pluralism is particularly strong. There is an awareness that obligations extend beyond the state but these are usually considered to be subsidiary to the pluralist depiction of global anarchy in which each citizen must ultimately look to the state as the only true source of security.

In connection with the possibility of developing an adequate conceptualization of security, these two positions play themselves out in terms of a division between those who view the state and states-system as the only ultimate source of security and those who view the state and the states-system as a primary source of insecurity. Less crudely put, it is a division between those who view the state as a historical construct which can and should be superceded or radically reformed, and those who deny the historical transience of the state, claiming instead, that for good or ill, it is the final product of human political development in a global sense.

The rationalists had moved from the contractarian, largely ahistorical, defense of the state, to Kant's position regarding the historical development of the species up to and

beyond the state. The historicists, who would not accept Kant's notion of universal reason as a progressive force, opted instead for the notion of plural cultural development resulting in the eventual creation of the modern state. It is perhaps paradoxical, that the tradition of historicism which denied the existence of atemporal universals should claim exactly that for the states-system, while Kant took the notion of universal reason to indicate the temporal nature of the state and to argue for its being overthrown in time by other forms of political association. A historicist like Treistchke argued for the end of international history while Kant argued that we stood at its beginning. It is this dispute that lies behind the emergence of the modern form of "Realism" in international politics.

Footnotes

[1]Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations (London : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), p. 59.

[2]Ibid, pp. 17-37. see also Linklater, "Men and Citizens in International Relations", Review of International Studies, no. 7 (1981), pp. 23-37.

[3]Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 23.

[4]Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[5]G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosopy of Right, trans. by T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1967) pp. 160 - 162. esp. "In whatever way an individual may fulfill his duty, he must at the same time find his account therein and attain his personal interest and satisfaction. Out of his position in the state, a right must accrue to him whereby public affairs shall be his own particular affair. Particular interests should in fact not be set aside or completely suppressed; instead they should be put in correspondence with the universal, and thereby both they and the universal are upheld." see also Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge, 1975), chs. 14-15 and R. Plant, Hegel (London, 1973), Ch. 1

[6]Plato, The Republic, trans. by Allan Bloom (New York, 1968), p. 150.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 21.

[9]Adda B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton, 1960) p. 81.

[10]George Sabine, A History of Political Theory (London, 1961) pp. 150 - 151 quoted in Linklater,Men and Citizens, p. 22.

[11]Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, pp. 217-218.

[12]Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations : Eight Books, Classics of International Law (Oxford, 1934), p. 1330 quoted in Linklater, Men and Citizens p.63.

[13]Ibid., pp. 157-158. quoted in Linklater, Men and Citizens p.65.

[14]Ibid,, p. 169. quoted in Linklater,Men and Ctizens p.66.

[15]Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 77.

[16]Ibid., p. 83.

[17]Emmerick de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature (London : W. Clarke and Sons, 1811), p. lxiii.

[18]Ibid., p. 6.

[19]E.B.F. Midgley, The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations (London: Elek Books Ltd. 1975), p. 185.

[20]Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 88.

[21]Vattel, p. lxii.

[22]Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 89.

[23]Midgley, pp. 191 - 192.

[24]Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society," in Diplomatic Investigations : Essays in the Theory of International Politics, eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 69.

[25]Linklater, "Men and Citizens in International Relations", p. 28.

[26]Rousseau, quoted in Linklater, Men and Citizens, p.17.

[27]Rousseau, extract from "Abstract of the Abbe de Saint Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace" in M.G. Forsyth, H.M.A. Keens-Soper, and P. Savigear, eds. The Theory of International Relations : Selected Texts From Gentili to Treitschke (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970), p. 132.

[28]W. B. Gallie, "Kant on Perpetual Peace," in Philosophers of Peace and War (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 19.

[29]Ibid., P. 18. See also F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Chapter 3, (Cambridge University Press, 1963) for an account of Rousseau's rejection of the

possibility of an international theory.

[30]Ian Clark, Reform and Resistance in the International Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 64.

[31]A useful discussion of Kant's international theory is to be found in Gallie, "Kant on Perpetual Peace", pp. 8-36.

[32]Ibid., p. 20.

[33]Ibid., p. 21.

[34]Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmo-Political Point of View" in Forsyth et. al. eds., p. 183.

[35]Linklater "Men and Citizens in International Relations", p. 25.

[36]Gallie, "Kant on Perpetual Peace", p. 33.

[37]Linklater, Men and Citizens p. 114.

[38]Isaiah Berlin, "The Counter-Enlightenment" in Against the Current : Essays in the History of Ideas (Penguin Books, 1982), p. 8

[39]Linklater, Men and Citizens p. 218, note 13. Historicism has accumulated a wide range of meanings in twentieth century social and political thought, some of them are extremely controversial. Linklater defines historicism broadly as "that approach which sought to grasp the individual pattern of historical humanity." This is generally the same position accepted here.

[40]Berlin, "Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment" p. 129.

[41]Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, abridged version ed. Hans Kohn, (Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1963), pp. 6-7.

[42]Ibid., p. 12.

[43]Raymond Aron, Peace and War : A Theory of International Relations, Trans. by R. Howard and A. Baker Fox (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), p. 587.

[44]Linklater, Men and Citizens pp. 130-131; see also Linklater, "Men and Citizens in International Relations".

[45]Linklater, "Men and Citizens in International Relations", p. 30.

[46]Linklater, Men and Citizens p. 132. This pertains to the production of material life and to the possibility of building a hierarchy of cultures based on the success of this interaction with nature.

Chapter III

Security and the Dilemmas of International Realism

The modern form of "Realism" in international politics has developed in the context of two world wars, the emergence of the superpowers and their blocs, and the crisis of historicism in the early twentieth century. This crisis grew out of the first World War and the rise of a particular formulation of historicist ideas in which some 'sparks' came to be seen as more divine than others. This is not the place to go into the complex history of the crisis of historicist thought during this period. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the development of aggressive and expansionist nationalist movements in Europe resulted in a serious rupture within the historicist tradition. What emerged from this was, on the one hand, a reinvigorated universalist argument based on the belief that a plural system was unable to regulate itself in a manner which avoided periodic catastrophic collapses into war. On the other hand was a reorganized defense of the plural state system based on the notions of power, balance of power, and the unchallenged dominance of two opposed superpowers. Yet this updated pluralist formulation did not emerge untouched by the military and philosophical upheavals of the first half of the twentieth century. It reacted to historicism's inability to offer a solution to the problem of periodic war,

by reintroducing the Kantian notion that morality was essential at the international level. This attempt was, however, and as we shall see later, a little like mixing oil and water.

This new defense of the plural states-system took for itself the name 'Realism' and was initially championed by the theorists E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and John Herz in the United States, and by European theorists like Friedrich Meinecke who took similar positions but remained much closer to their historicist heritage. Even the French theorist Raymond Aron can be associated with this reorganized defense of international pluralism. However, it was the 'American' thinkers who became the driving force behind the construction of the theory of international relations which has become the mainstream of modern thinking about the international sphere. It is to the theoretical assumptions and internal contradictions of this particular 'Realism' which this chapter will address itself.

Universalism, Pluralism, Security

The modern Realist tradition of international relations theory provides us with an image of the world in which states are sovereign independent units locked in a continual struggle for survival. In Aron's formulation:

> Since states have not renounced taking the law into their own hands and remaining sole judges of

> what their honor requires, the survival of political units depends, in the final analysis, on the balance of forces, and it is the duty of statesmen to be concerned, first of all, with the nation whose destiny is entrusted to them. The necessity of national egoism derives logically from what philosophers called the state of nature which rules among states.[1]

This struggle for survival is usually explained as a competition for power. Power is seen as the only dependable defense against the fear which arises from not being able to trust in the actions of other states. This fear must be treated, "not in the sense of an unreasoning emotion, but rather in the sense of the rational apprehension of future insecurity."[2] Fear, in the guise of 'reasoned' mistrust, becomes the motivating dynamic for the maintenance of the competitive states-system and the continual accumulation of 'power after power'. Fear, mistrust, and the competition for power are treated as permanent aspects of international relations. Power is separated from ethics. Survival is paramount, cooperation is at best ephemeral, and mistrust is a constant companion. State action in this environment must be calculated, self-interested, and 'unbiased' by moral beliefs.

This formulation presents the individual with an unambiguous focus of obligation. The human race exists as a collection of different, self-interested groups in competition with each other. The individual is forced by the nature of the species to seek security in the confines of his

or her own state.

As Chapter II indicates this Realist image of international politics rests upon a number of more complex theoretical and philosophical positions. Within the Realist literature, these complexities are usually found in terms of two related distinctions. To begin with, international politics is understood to be a distinct and somewhat marginal branch of the larger discourse surrounding political theory and philosophy. Unlike the rich theoretical heritage found in the realm of domestic or 'low' politics, international or 'high' politics presents us with an inheritance which is 'scattered' and 'unsystematic'.[3] The British theorist, Martin Wight notes that there is "a kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being theorized about."[4] This recalcitrance, he believes, stems largely from our inability to provide a language suitable to 'high' politics. 'Low' politics after all, represents the search for the good life, and it does so within the more or less predictable social field of the state. 'High' politics, on the other hand, is "the theory of survival,"[5] and as such, presents a completely different set of imperatives. These imperatives are aspects of the international 'anarchy' - the realm in which states struggle with one another for survival or as Wight puts it, the realm which "involves the ultimate experience of life and death, national existence and national extinction."[6] There

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is no room in this 'state of nature' for the moral niceties of 'low' politics. Wight emphasizes that morality must always come after questions of survival.

Theory, we are told, has not developed at the international level because this level is not really 'political'. It is rather a process which seeks to maintain territorial spaces in which politics may occur. This separation between domestic and international politics is a central element of the Realist position.

A second distinction is between Idealism and Realism. Although related to the dichotomy between 'high' and 'low' politics, this second distinction presents a more complex theoretical formulation in that it is often referred to in terms of despair at the seeming irreconcilability of its opposing sides. This despair can be seen with particular clarity in the works of Carr, Meinecke, and Herz.

Carr viewed international history as though it were a great pendulum which swung back and forth between the poles of Idealism and Realism. He used Idealism to designate an adherence to universal notions of morality and the unity of humanity, while Realism referred to the belief that power and the struggle for survival were the only realities which existed at the international level. Carr felt that neither position offered an adequate basis on which to found a theory of international politics. He sought a way to reconcile the

two. This can be seen, at least in part, as an attempt to overcome the distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics - to bring together the moral goals of domestic politics with the necessities of survival at the international level. Carr, however, despaired. He could not find a method for reconciling Idealist morality and Realist necessity. His conclusion was that humanity was doomed to swing back and forth between the two poles in an eternal and impossible search for a balance.[7]

Meinecke, along with Carr a major source of modern historicist Realism, struggled all his life to reconcile the 'necessity' of self-interested and utilitarian statecraft with the ethics he felt must also be represented in the state. He was concerned that the values a state held internally should be reflected in its external behaviour. Raison d'etate was to Meinecke a dangerous elevation of utilitarian over moral goals:

> In politics state interest comes before morality. Morality is not denied but...it is removed to the realm of secondary [concerns]...this is the great, terribly dangerous and demonic doctrine which Machiavelli preached to the modern state.[8]

Once the morality of Idealism was removed from the necessities of international statecraft then a permanent split was created between 'high' and 'low' politics. The danger that Meinecke believed would emerge out of this was that it would allow the international realm to become a

sphere of unrestrained competition where the state was by necessity made Janus-faced. Where Carr had despaired at finding a middle road between Idealism and Realism, Meinecke despaired that the 'necessary' division of the world into self-interested states led to the divorce of politics and morality. Both men, in essence despaired at the Realist image of international politics and yet could find no way around it.

Herz also pointed out the distinction between Idealism and Realism but attempted to pose this distinction in a manner which avoided polarization. Reminiscent of Kant's position in 'Perpetual Peace', Herz tried;

> to take over from Political Idealism its basic ethical assumption as the yardstick and criterion of what 'should be', i.e., as the guiding criterion of political aims and action...[and] to utilize, without compromise or euphemism, any and all knowledge and insight which Political Realism possesses.[9]

Herz argued for cooperation towards such goals as "social reform, education toward freedom and tolerance, and the advocacy of diffusion of power..."[10] Like Kant, Herz was attempting to create a goal towards which people could struggle while taking account of their existing situation. However, unlike Kant, Herz was faced with the dilemma of the Realist distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics. Against the backdrop of the Realist depiction of international anarchy and its resultant power struggle, Herz

was unable to convincingly maintain his position. It would be many years before he would take his argument beyond the somewhat rhetorical statement

> that mankind stands at the parting of the ways. One of these ways leads into a state of humanity in which freedom is no longer a paradox.[11]

However, behind both the division of 'high' and 'low' politics and the related unsuccessful search for a method to reconcile Idealism and Realism, lies the deeper philosophical problem regarding the relation of universalism to pluralism. Wight's depiction of international politics is one in which political theory is split in terms of a search for universal goals at the level of 'low' politics and a struggle with eternal pluralism and relativism at the level of 'high' politics. Equally, the Realist distinction between Idealism and Realism is based on the association of universal goals, ethics, or morality with Idealism and the opposed pluralist 'realities' of struggle, fear, and mistrust with Realism. The failure of Carr, Meinecke, and Herz to find a theoretical means to reconcile Idealism and Realism is due largely to the implicit acceptance of pluralism as the central feature of international politics.

Indeed, the very projects each of these men engaged in serves to demonstrate their considerable misgivings at the kind of interpretation of the states-system which an adherence to international pluralism seems to require. The

delineation of such Realist 'necessities' as national egoism results in what Linklater has described as "a mechanistic reading of the international system which denies that necessity can be removed from a world of separate sovereign states."[12] This 'mechanical' adherence to the self-interested state and the system it generates forms the central area of what we might call Realist self-doubt. Such self-doubt or ambivalence towards the state is an aspect of Realism's inability to reconcile the disjuncture between universalism and pluralism at the level of international theory.

By accepting an image of international politics as eternally and unalterably plural, Realism was theoretically forced to reject universalist solutions to its underlying dilemmas. Equally, the Realist distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics is part of the same problematic. As Walker has noted, it is a distinction which maintains that principles of universalism are the primary focus of domestic politics but that it is pluralism which remains the unmediated necessity of international politics.[13] Such a position necessarily relegates international theory to the mechanical role of teaching survival skills to the state. The despair of Realists at their failure to reconcile pluralism and universalism harkens back to the debates between rationalism and historicism.

There remains within Realism an ambivalence between the rationalist vision of a world in which diversity is reconciled with the need for cooperation, justice, equality and the like, and the starkness of the historicist world of contradictory moral communities locked in a perpetual struggle for power. This ambivalence points to the existence of two different tendencies within Realism, tendencies that parallel the contradiction between Realism and Idealism. These two tendencies emerge from a tension between the historicist defense of the state on pluralist grounds and the rationalist attack on the state as an obstacle to more universal aspirations.

Each of these tendencies results in a quite different conceptualization of security. The pluralist or historicist sees security as lying ultimately, and to an extent hopelessly, in the continual struggle for and expansion of power in an uncertain, dynamic and largely unknowable world. The universalist or rationalist finds security in the escape from particular interests and the move towards the realization that, at some level, security depends on the acceptance of obligations extending beyond the individual state and the formation of strong universally accepted ethical foundations of the conduct of world politics. It is the presence of both of these traditions, that adds a poignant tone to many of the most influential Realist works.

To understand the consequences of this debate between the rationalists and historicists as it is reflected within Realism it will be necessary to examine Realism's heritage more closely. This will be done by, first, looking at the inter-war theory of Collective Security to uncover the basis of the Realist understanding of Idealism. Secondly, a close examination of the two theorists most often associated with Realism - Machiavelli and Hobbes - will be undertaken to point out how deep seated the tension between historicism and rationalism is in Realist theory. Finally the chapter will point out the effects of all this on the Realist conceptualization of security in light of Machiavelli's and Hobbes' opposed positions regarding the nature of conflict and change.

From Collective Security to Realism

Modern Realism in the theory of international relations began as a reaction to the Idealism of the 1920's and 30's, and in conjunction with the experience of World War II and the Cold War.[14] This 'Idealism' was associated with the Wilsonian vision of Collective Security. Wilson was deemed to be a universalist in that he accepted the idea of a single moral code of behaviour which could be invoked to constrain the violent activities of states. He argued that the old balance of power system had failed, and in failing had

precipitated World War I. This failure had been the result of a number of factors but a central one had been the increased efficiency of war due to the advancement of industrial technologies. If, so the argument went, it had ever been reasonable to view war as the extension of politics by other means, it was no longer so. The old balance of power system, which had depended on the legitimacy of war as the ultimate form of arbitration between states, was deemed anachronistic. Following Kant and Rousseau, advocates of Collective Security held that the escalation of war's destructive potential had undermined its political purpose. To the inter-war Idealists, the primary goal of international politics was no longer to be the control of conflict, but rather its elimination.

Responsibility for war was placed on the sovereignty of states and their ability to make secret pacts and alliances. Michael Howard notes the distinction the Idealists drew between the old balance of power system and their 'new' idea of Collective Security:

> On the one hand was the old system of governments pursuing their self-interest, engaging in secret diplomacy, forming alliances, piling up armaments, manipulating a balance of power, leading their peoples through exploitation of their patriotic sentiments into a succession of increasingly destructive wars. On the other was a community of like-minded nations, their governments responsive to public opinion, co-operating for their mutual benefit, scaling down their armaments, settling their differences like reasonable men, enjoying peace under a law, which if need be, they would

pool their resources to enforce.[15]

To this end the League of Nations was formed. As Inis Claude has pointed out, there were serious flaws in the technical aspects of the League's covenant and more importantly, serious reservations among participating states about the desirability of the whole project.[16] With the collapse of the League and the coming of World War II, many came to see the 'misguided Idealism' of the inter-war period as a major cause of the war. Collective Security was assumed to have failed because the international realm did not lend itself to long term cooperation or to trust. Those who came to call themselves Realists (in opposition to those they called Idealists) felt that Collective Security had not been so much an attempt to rebuild the world in a form more amenable to the realities of the twentieth century, as it had been a utopian exercise in avoiding the inescapable realities of international politics.

Collective Security represented an attack on state sovereignty and a call for radical reform of the states-system. Though flawed in its approach and perhaps utopian in the faith it placed on an institution such as the League, Collective Security represented a return to some of the elements of the earlier rationalist position. It incorporated a belief in universal reason as the foundation for global cooperation and also the notion that obligations between

citizen and state had to be weighed against a wider array of obligations. Realism, on the other hand, represented a pluralist and state-centric reaction to the Idealist's universalism reminiscent of the nineteenth century historicist reaction to rationalism. While the universalist sentiments embodied in Collective Security continued beyond World War II, most notably in popular images of the United Nations, they took a back seat to the re-emergence of a state-centric pluralism in a world of cold war, ideological polarization, and the unprecedented expansion of the states-system in the Third World.

This tension between Realism and Collective Security clearly incorporates the underlying theoretical and philosophical problematic of universalism and pluralism. Beyond this, it clarifies what it is that Realism refers to when using the term Idealism: a specific brand of international theory that emerged in reaction to the first World War. The universalism which Realism defines itself against is not directly associated with its full historical heritage. Consequently, the deeper philosophical problems concerning universalism and pluralism are largely obscured. It appears instead as though the central debate is between Realism and Wilsonian universalism. When a longer historical view is taken, however, it becomes apparent that the most interesting issue is the manner in which the broader debate

between the rationalists and the historicists can be identified within Realism itself, and more specifically, the way this tension relates to Realism's ability to conceptualize security.

Realism does not form a single position but embodies its own version of the tension between universalism and pluralism. In terms of modern theoretical terminology this internal tension takes the form of the encompassment of both historicist (plural) and structuralist (universal) assumptions. The internalisation of these contradictory positions has important consequences for the Realist's understanding of security. Indeed, it can be said to undermine the ability of Realism to develop a coherent conceptualization of security. This internal problematic can be explained through an examination of Realism's treatment of two men considered by the discourse as archetypal 'Realists' - Machiavelli and Hobbes.

Machiavelli and Hobbes

Realism has looked to Machiavelli and Hobbes as the centerpieces of its theoretical heritage. Machiavelli has provided the notion of realpolitik on the one hand, while Hobbes has provided the notion of an international state of nature which makes realpolitik necessary on the other.

This conflation of two otherwise dissimilar philosophical positions is, as Cornelia Navari has

suggested,[17] symbolized in an influential series of lectures given by Wight in the 1950's under the title 'International Theory'. Wight divided theorists along what he called theological lines according to the degree of achievable goodness that a theory assumed humanity could expect to attain. "Since both Hobbes and Machiavelli rank fairly low on such a scale, he placed them in the same camp, which he somewhat inappropriately termed the 'Realist School'."[18] While Wight's categorization may have been extremely crude, the notion that Hobbes and Machiavelli are complementary thinkers is deeply entrenched. This conflation obscures some fundamental ambiguities in the Realist position.

Machiavelli stood at the threshold of modern thought. He offered a challenge to the universalist assumptions of the medieval period. His project was to break from the Thomistic Christian belief in transcendent morality and to create in its place a truly human politics. He wished to free politics from the constraints of abstract morality so that humanity would be able to deal more effectively with the realities of a constantly changing political situation. A central element of Machiavelli's thought was its pluralism. To Machiavelli, the world was a place of constant flux and change and politics was the method human beings used to create temporary shelters from this world. As Walker has noted, Machiavelli sought:

> maxims about how to cope with time, change, and illusions as the distillation of political knowledge. Even where he appeals to the possibility of fixing political life within a spatial form - lo stato - it is a spatial form with its own temporal contingency. At best, he appeals to the possibility of establishing a temporary home for man, one which even the greatest efforts of republican virtu are unable to insulate from inevitable decay over time. [19]

The idea of founding permanent orders had no place in Machiavelli's political theory. The only permanent aspect of the world was the constant shifting of forces, the rise and fall of states, and the continual struggle for power. Wight repeats this idea when he tells us that international politics is the "realm of recurrence and repetition."[20] Politics at the international level becomes a realm of repeated struggle where the application of anything but a 'theory of survival' is a mistake because "what for political theory is the extreme case (as revolution or war) is for international theory the regular case."[21]

If we refer back to the discussion of historicism in Chapter Two, we find that there is a clear parallel between the historicist's line of international discourse and Machiavelli, one which is drawn explicitly in Isaiah Berlin's celebrated essay on Machiavelli:

> Machiavelli's cardinal achievement is...his uncovering of an insoluble dilemma...It stems from his defacto recognition that ends equally ultimate, equally sacred, may contradict each other, that entire systems of value may come into

> collision without possibility of rational arbitration, and that not merely in exceptional circumstances, as a result of abnormality or error, but...as part of the normal human situation... If what Machiavelli believed is true, this undermines one major assumption of human thought: namely that somewhere in the past or the future, in this world or the next, in the church or laboratory, in the speculations of the metaphysician or the findings of the social scientist, or in the uncorrupted heart of the simple good man, there is to be found the final solution of the question of how men should live. If this is false...the idea of the sole true, objective, universal ideal crumbles. The very search for it becomes not merely Utopian in practice, but conceptually incoherent.[22]

In this sense, Machiavelli is a pluralist who, like Treistchke, saw the world as a clash of contradictions, between for example, such things as aristocracy and democracy. This belief in irreconcilable differences as a primary fact of life, has important consequences for politics.

Within the arena of modern international Realism, politics becomes the constant recurrence of struggle between irreconcilable moralities, forms of social organization, economics, and so on. Each state is forced by this environment into certain patterns of action in order to survive. Occasionally these may be co-operative, as in the ratification of treaties or the opening of borders. But underlying the entire enterprise are contradiction and mistrust, which force the state ultimately to predicate its survival on its own ability to defend itself. This situation

is considered permanent and offers no escape. To believe otherwise, as the rationalists did with their belief in universals on which the foundations for overcoming contradictions could be laid, was considered both utopian and dangerous.

How then, we must ask, did a legal contract theorist and a rationalist such as Hobbes come to be conflated with Machiavelli? It has been noted that Hobbes did not spend a great deal of time considering the implications of his theory for inter-state relations. However, there is a 'Hobbesian Tradition' within international theory and it is firmly grounded in Chapters 11 and 13 of Leviathan. Its fundamental premiss is that the depiction Hobbes offers, in Chapter 13 particularly, of the individual in a state of nature, can be extended to include the sovereign in an international state of nature.

This analogy is generally formulated by treating the state as though it were an individual: "When men enter into a state, they become one 'artificial body' represented by the Sovereign."[23] Secondly, each state is granted equality with all other states: "International society is largely made up of...individual sovereigns, all equally sovereign."[24] As the sovereign is likened to an individual and each of these collective 'individuals' is equal in terms of sovereignty, and there is no higher authority over them, then their

relations are deemed to be similar to those depicted by Hobbes between individuals. Because, for Hobbes, it was the lack of a higher authority which created a state of nature between individuals, it could also be assumed that if sovereigns were like individuals, and had no higher authority over them, they too must exist in a state of nature.

Hedley Bull begins his defence of this position by citing Hobbes himself:

> But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war, one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, their eyes fixed on one another; that is their forts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of their Kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war.[25]

He goes on to say (in a quote used at the beginning of this work but well worth repeating) that: "from this...we are entitled to infer that all of what Hobbes says about the life of individual men in the state of nature, may be read as a description of the condition of states in relation to one another."[26] The international arena is described as a battlefield of sovereign gladiators each acting independently, each vulnerable, and therefore incapable of trusting any other, and each in competition for survival against all the rest. Such a depiction serves the Realist position well, but we must ask how well it serves Hobbes, or

whether it indicates - as Navari has suggested - 'loose talk' about states of nature.

To begin with, if we add the sentence which Bull excluded from the above quote from Leviathan, we find that the international state of nature is different from that between individuals, because at the international level war is not as threatening : "because they [sovereigns] uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it [war], that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men."[27] This is because states are not as vulnerable as individuals. They do not have to sleep, and as the twentieth century has made abundantly clear, they can withstand catastrophic levels of destruction and even defeat, while continuing to survive as states. Further, it has been noted that the state of war can have 'beneficial' effects on the economy of a state, and thereby strengthen it internally, "whereas, the state of nature among individuals prevents the establishment of any kind of industry."[28]

It should also be noted that an essential element of Hobbes' state of nature was the equality of individuals. Outside of the highly superficial legal notion of equal sovereignty, there is no such element of equality in the states-system. Without equality however, assumptions about equal vulnerability and equal levels of fear in the system tend to break down, as do portrayals of states as independent

and autonomous actors. As Walker notes: "the central assumptions of Hobbes' state of nature concern autonomy and equality of the individuals in it, an assumption which makes little sense in the international context where inequality and hegemony, in the form of the prerogatives and obligations of 'great powers' can itself become a principle of order."[29] A final distinction can be made here in terms of the possibility of creating order at the two levels of supposed state of nature. John Vincent points this out when he says: "If it is always possible for a vanquished state to live to fight another day, and if there is always the threat that it can bring force to bear to defend its interests, then other states cannot simply dispatch it in the manner of an outlaw gunning down the marshall in the old west."[30] The picture beginning to form through these distinctions, is one of relatively invulnerable states, which create an inter-state logic far more conducive to the production of order than the vision of international anarchy would suggest. As Navari explains, Hobbes, "shared the idea with both Vattel and Rousseau, which was the central organizing concept in all their works, that the state was an artificial, not a natural body, and that its instituting made an essential difference to law, nature, war, and experience..."[31] Once the contract leading to the state had been established, the state of nature depicted in Chapter 13 of Leviathan no longer existed.

The helpless individual unable to accomplish anything other than a precarious self-preservation lived under the strictures of Hobbes' rights of nature. These consisted of little else than using any means to defend his or her life and interests. Might made right, and no notion of justice could be allowed to get in the way of survival. However, the optimistic side of this for Hobbes, was that people also had reason, and even in a state of nature, certain precepts guided them. These precepts Hobbes called laws of nature, and they formed the basis of motivation towards entering the contract. These were briefly: that in a state of nature each person should attempt to find peace, and such peace should be found on the basis of "this one Sentence, approved by all the world, Do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe."[32] To claim the same status for the international state of nature as the individual state of nature given Hobbes' notions of Rights and Laws of nature, would surely be to place him among those the Realists portray as 'Idealists'. That is, it would be to claim that Hobbes saw in the global anarchy the seeds of a world state or the foundations of a 'Perpetual Peace' based on his 'prudentialism'. While this position may in some ways be defendable, it is certainly not so from the Realist perspective.

As Navari explains,

> The fact is that the famous 'Hobbesian tradition' in international theory,...is not really Hobbesian. The writers and theorists put into this category, have quite different views of the structure of political life and radically different views of political necessity from those of Hobbes...[33]

This distinction is central, for as Navari goes on to point out, "if Realism leads us to the comparison of forces, Hobbes leads us to the comparison of structures."[34] While some may take issue with Navari on the use of 'Realism' above where 'Machiavelli' may be more appropriate, the important distinction to note here is that between historicism and structuralism.[35]

The comparison of forces, or historicism, is a method for taking account of shifting political situations, of noting the political forces arrayed around you and manipulating them to your advantage through the use of political acumen. Here lies the Machiavellian idea of the Prince or the Realist's notion of the statesman. This is the center of politics. It is the idea of the wise leader manipulating the twin forces of necessity and <u>fortuna</u> via acquired political skills. For the Machiavellian, the world is not one of structures because the leader, in order to ply his or her trade, must escape from constraints on his or her freedom. This is an idea which is deeply embedded in

Realism's treatment of politics at the international level:

> In Realist literature, there appears the Hero--the potentially free individual inextricably involved in, or attempting to better comprehend the necessities of his age. But in this activity he is constantly being hampered, and those requirements constantly being concealed, by misguided ideas as to right and wrong...The Realist's purpose is to expose these ideas as either sham or inappropriate, and, in so doing, free his Hero for action more appropriate to the actual requirements of his age, and its true configuration.[36]

As a pluralist, Machiavelli saw the world as a place of recurrence and repetition, of constant struggle based on power. This was a situation which he felt had to be lived with. There was no alternative. As a rationalist, Hobbes was also a universalist. His vision of a state of nature was the foundation on which he constructed a rational escape from the 'horror' of pluralism. If, for Machiavelli, the only reaction to pluralism was to accept that it meant constant uncertainty and political adjustment, for Hobbes, pluralism created the impetus to build structures with which to escape those uncertainties.

Is security then, the proper management of, and adaptation to, change? Or is it the escape from change? If we accept Machiavelli and the historicist position then it must be the former. If Hobbes and structuralism are one's preference, then it is the latter. Realism encompasses both positions. The next section will explore this tension in terms of the relation of security to change and conflict.

This should demonstrate the basis for modern international Realism's ambivalence towards the state. This ambivalence should be seen in the light of Realism's inability to move beyond Hobbes' original formulation of security as a dilemma. So long as security is understood in these Hobbesian terms then the role of the state in the provision of security for the individual or for humanity as such, remains necessarily obscure. Given the state-centric position of modern international Realism, this ambivalence towards the state makes it impossible to locate a coherent Realist conceptualization of security.

Security, Change, and Conflict

To accept the Machiavellian metaphysics regarding the origin of conflict in change and time, is to view security as a highly contingent good. This is apparent when we consider the manner in which historicism viewed the international realm as the sphere in which cultures clashed because they were capable of defining themselves in contradictory and historically changing ways. What follows from this is fear and mistrust because of the impossibility of overcoming this plural 'anarchy'.

The state, in this depiction becomes the only source of citizen security. Further, the state's security lies in its ability to manipulate external forces as they arise, and in

ways beneficial to individual state interests. This creates the need for a broad area of freedom in which the Prince or 'statesman' can act, leading to the modern Realist divorce of 'high' and 'low' politics. Moral life, the seeking of private virtu, is fine for the private citizen, but an impediment to those who have chosen public life. The Prince must have a public virtu which keeps as its goal the preservation of lo stato. At this level one must be ruthless and capable of freeing oneself from the morality of one's upbringing.

Meinecke emphasizes this by paraphrasing Machiavelli: "A prince must also learn how not to be good; this is the demand of necessity which rules the whole of human life."[37] To import the morality one learned in the domestic sphere to the international sphere is dangerous. The 'Prince' must learn to overcome the natural inclinations he or she has towards obeying the moral dictates of his or her culture and upbringing, in order to act successfully in the realm of necessity and fortuna. It is, after all, the ability of the 'Prince' to follow this stark public virtu on which depends the maintenance of lo stato, and with it the sphere in which his or her fellow citizens may follow the morality of private virtu. Obligations then, become owed to the state as the admittedly transient shield against the realm of 'repetition and recurrence'. As Meinecke once put it:

> Where the very safety of the fatherland is at stake, there should be no question of reflecting whether a thing is just or unjust, humane or cruel, praiseworthy or shameful. Setting aside every other consideration, one must take only that course of action which will secure the country's life and liberty.[38]

This leads to the separation of the state's actions (especially external actions) from notions of private morality. The state's moral environment is seen as one of "crude power, pragmatic custom, and unstable cooperation."[39] Such an environment is not conducive to the guidance offered by private moral obligations however worthwhile and commendable these may be at the domestic level. Given this, the citizen is placed in the situation of being asked to accept that the state should be the primary focus of his or her obligations while being denied a moral basis from which to criticise the state in terms of its external conduct. Indeed, the only criterion remaining to judge a state's external relations is the short term success or failure of specific policies.

Security, in this light, becomes a product of loyalty to the state, of the realization among the citizenry that their leaders cannot be judged on moral grounds, and that they must accept the fact that they will never know whether their security is being defended or not until it is too late. Until, that is, the wrongness of state policies becomes evident in their failure. The natural hedge in this crude

power game then becomes accumulating as much power as possible and then maintaining or increasing it. State power and security are deemed to be synonymous, and state power is usually viewed in economic and military terms with the emphasis on the latter.

Given the Machiavellian notion of the Hero freed from moral constraints, the 'success' of international state policy depends to a great degree on the wisdom of leaders. However, a surplus of power provides the state with a certain amount of resilience against the occasional incompetent leader, and thus, we find in this position a tendency towards viewing the concept of security as being directly related to measurable levels of military and economic power with the emphasis on the former.

Hobbes, on the other hand, is a legal theorist who finds pluralism itself to be the greatest danger. Pluralism exists in the state of nature between individuals, and it is escaped by those individuals coming together in a legal entity called the state. Hobbes seeks to create order through the imposition of structures that constrain freedom, generate predictability, and at a deeper level, allow humanity to escape from history. These structures of law and sovereignty (the power to enforce law) are necessary to control the passions or irrational elements that Hobbes believed to dominate human reason, and to form what Hobbes called Rights

of Nature. These 'Rights', as we noted earlier, amount to the following of any course of action which might aid an individual's attempts at survival. They represent a foundation of statistical randomness which acts in conjunction with the Hobbesian 'golden rule' (or rationality in its most primitive sense) to necessitate the founding of the state.

While this may be as Navari claims, in the way of a Hobbesian joke, it demonstrates the universalist underpinnings of Hobbes' theory. From the universal human attributes of the individual's self-interested search for the fulfillment of appetites, grows the equally universal necessity to seek an ordered alternative to the state of nature. This alternative is clearly spelled out by Hobbes. It is not, in its general form, culturally specific. The formation of this order grows out of universal structures of law and authority based on reason deduced from the necessities implied by the state of nature. Once the state of nature is overcome, everything changes. If Rousseau stands Hobbes on his head regarding the merits of this transformation, the basic idea is the same - once the state is formed, the state of nature disappears.

In a superficial sense, Chapter 13 of Leviathan may provide a version of the random plurality which Machiavelli understood to be the central element of history. However,

one need not scratch far below the surface of either man's thought, to find they make uneasy bedfellows. To Hobbes, the state of nature created the necessity of escape. This was the individual's motivation towards order. The creation of states generated an international situation quite different, and far more bearable, than what the individual state of nature represented. Elements of predictability and order within the state, coupled with the greater resilience of the state to aggression, meant that the state of nature in Chapter 13 was not reproduced in the international realm. Indeed, it has been argued that the expansion of the state as the central political structure of the modern world has served to increase order:

> ...if we were to inquire into the origins of the order existing between states, we would discover that its principal ordering elements emerged as a function of the process of establishing the state, and that it spread as a result of the proliferation of state forms. It was the area of the state that created, in an efficient sense, the international order...It is a fallacy to maintain that sovereignty disordered the relations between political authorities. On the contrary, it helped to order these relations...[40]

This provides the basis for a global political theory and an understanding of security quite radically opposed to Realism, in which the state becomes a basis for expanding order and rationalization. The state in this light, is seen to be a universalising structure which is imposing a specific form of uniformity on the world, while maintaining a limited space

for cultural autonomy and diversity.

At this point, however, we should recall the work of David P. Gautier, in which he argued that the advent of nuclear weapons and the threat of their proliferation had created a situation whereby the international state of nature was no longer tolerable.[41] It was not tolerable, Gauthier argued, because a state armed with nuclear weapons had the power to literally kill other states. This 'dreadful equality' brings the arguments Hobbes used against the state of nature among individuals to bear on the plural states-system. Nuclear technologies of destruction make the competitive international system too dangerous and too insecure. The state can no longer provide a tolerable level of security in a pluralist environment. And as Gautier informs us; "we must replace presently intolerable risks by tolerable ones."[42] In other words, the states-system must move in the direction of centralized authority.

These two opposed interpretations are based on the same Hobbesian understanding of security defined as order and predictability. To the extent that the states-system, as a form of political organization, is seen to be a universalizing influence that facilitates the reduction of pluralism and conflict generated by change, it remains a tolerable source of security. If, on the other hand, the states-system is seen to be a source of increasing pluralism

and decreasing predictability, the Hobbesian reaction is towards centralizaton of authority. If not global Leviathan, then something very like it.

Regardless of which of these interpretations of present tendencies in the states-system is accepted, the adoption of a Hobbesian perspective on security involves a move towards order and the strengthening of universalizing structures. The states-system is understood in terms of its relation to the creation of order. It is the outcome of a number of social contracts which created states seen as equal units in competition, but more or less internally the same and reacting to each other in increasingly predictable ways. To the extent that this kind of linear progress can be pointed to, the Hobbesian can be considered to be reasonably content with the 'anarchical society'. To the extent that the states-system is tending towards anarchy or breakdown, the Hobbesian will call for an expansion of the social contract in the form of greater centralized authority or even global Leviathan.

All of this seems a far cry from Realist pluralism and the international realm of repetition and recurrence. It is not, however, a far cry from Realism as a discourse. There is a Hobbesian 'tradition' in Realism. It forms an element of that side of Realism which seeks to approach change in a conservative fashion. It looks for signs of order, of

universalizing factors, and shrinks from tendencies towards pluralism and change. The Hobbesian tradition can be said to form an important element of the despair that lies in so many Realist works, for it runs up against, and is undermined by, the modern Realist's international belief in the necessity of pluralism in 'high' politics.

These internal tensions between two opposite reactions to change in the world have undercut Realism's ability to provide a theoretically coherent concept of security. Security is related on the one hand to the wise manipulation of change within the context of a constant struggle for power in a realm which is repetitious yet unknowable. On the other hand, security is presented as the product of the building of universal legal and bureaucratic structures that render change predictable and orderly. Change in the Machiavellian sense denies the possibility of the Hobbesian notion of order based on universal structures. Change in the Hobbesian sense, denies the possibility of a world of 'repetition and recurrence' other than in the despair of anarchy, where life is 'nasty, brutish, and short', and security is non-existent. The presence of such contradictions regarding the relation of change and order to the world of politics renders a coherent theoretical concept of security impossible. The deeper tensions must be resolved first.

In terms of the relation between the citizen, the state,

and security, there are even greater ambiguities. The Machiavellian element within the modern international Realist discourse depends on the political hero or leader who skillfully manipulates the forces of change. The citizen seeking the security required to follow his or her private virtu should ally with the forces or hero most likely to maintain lo stato. As lo stato itself is a temporal set of relations it cannot claim a citizen's obligations over time. Its claim must rest on its leadership and skill in dealing with change and adapting to it.

However, a problem emerges at this point as the citizen and the state are treated in a fashion that ignores the state's temporal nature. The state may or may not be permanent. But the citizen must treat it as such because without it he or she is exposed to the full force of conflict generated by change.

This involves a subtle shift in the citizen's obligations to the state. Instead of relating obligations to the abilities of the state or its leadership to skillfully maintain a temporary sphere of security for the pursuit of private virtu, now the state becomes in essence, 'the only game in town'. The relation between citizen, state, and security is transformed. The idea that the citizen's security is related to the abilities of his or her leaders or rather those who have chosen the path of public rather than

private virtu, becomes instead, an argument for the claim of the state to eternal loyalty and self-maintenance. That is, the citizen is required to relinquish any demands on the leader or hero and to replace them with an adherence to a structure (the state) as if it were eternal. This relating of security to the state as structure, rather than a shifting relation of forces, is a denial of Machiavelli's underlying assumptions of change and history. Again we are confronted with a Realism that contradicts itself internally. Security can be seen as the result of creating temporary shelters by manipulating forces in constant flux, or it can be seen as the construction of permanent structures which hold these forces at bay. To see it both ways is a confusion resulting from conflating two distinct options within a single discourse.

We can also see such confusion when we look at the Hobbesian understanding of security. Hobbes is the theorist who called for absolute allegiance to the state based on its ability to supply relative security in a world where the alternative was no security. Yet, as we have noted, security in the Hobbesian sense depends on the maintenance or expansion of order. Order is the result of the expansion of universalizing structures. One can take Navari's position here and view this in terms of the expansion of the state as a universal rationalizing force; or, one can accept Gautier's

argument that the states-system is now tending towards anarchy, rather than society, and it is time to rewrite the social contract and further centralize global authority. However, whether by maintaining the present states-system or moving towards the creation of a single state, the state is a source of security because of its ability to transcend pluralism. For Hobbes, security depended not on the maintenance of plurality but on its reduction and control.

Given this reading of Hobbes, a citizen's security cannot be tied to the maintenance of the plural states-system. Indeed, there is no unambiguous Hobbesian formulation of the relation of the state and citizen to security. Obligations may be owed to the state as a general structure, but this obligation is contingent on the tolerability of the situation (as in Gautier's view) or on the progress of the state in breaking down global diversity. The citizen's relation to the state is ambivalent. One Hobbesian analysis would have the citizen increase her or his security by dissolving the states-system into a global Leviathan, while another sees citizen security lying in the continued expansion of the state as a universalizing legal and bureaucratic structure and the consequent reduction of pluralism. In either sense, security is related to the continual reduction of pluralism and both of these formulations of the concept contradict the Machiavellain

elements within modern international Realism.

Conclusion

By distinguishing between Machiavellian and Hobbesian lines of thought within Realism, some important ambiguities have surfaced regarding the concept of security. That the Realist tradition is deeply committed to a view of the world which begins from the metatheoretical assumption of a plural competitive states-system is clear. In terms of the concept of security however, this commitment is maintained only through considerable equivocation. Lying at the heart of the discourse is an ambivalence towards the role of the state in terms of the provision of citizen security. To maintain a state-centric focus for citizen security requires the denial of central aspects of the positions of both Machiavelli and Hobbes. Further, such a formulation requires that we ignore the important debate between historicism and structuralism which is reflected within Realism. The presence of opposing views regarding change, conflict, and history poses a series of problems that extend well beyond the difficulty of developing a coherent concept of security.

In terms of the concept of security and its relation to the citizen and the state, it is safe to acknowledge that these tensions have created an ambivalence towards the state as the ultimate source of citizen security. This ambivalence

is a continuation of the basic premisses of the rationalist/historicist debate.

The historicist sees all of reality as flux and change. For Machiavelli change was contingent and such contingency could be overcome temporarily by the hero prince. For modern international Realism there is a move from historicism's vision of flux and change to the building of temporary structures in the form of the modern state which are guided by 'statesmen'. The rationalist (or to use the modern term, structuralist) sees a world of 'ordered conflict'. This vision of the world maintains Hobbes' central problematic that it is the very search for security which renders security unattainable. Conflict is said to be 'ordered' because of the structure of the international anarchy. Security becomes possible because structural relations are organized from above. This can be understood as Hobbes meant it in terms of a 'society of sovereign states' (ie as distinguished from a state of nature). Or as Gautier would have it in terms of a global Leviathan.

The presence of all this within modern international Realism results in its being caught in a series of ambivalences. In terms of the causes of conflict there is an ambivalence between Machiavelli's position which understands conflict as naturally emerging from change and Hobbes' position in which conflict emerges from the security dilemma.

In terms of the state, the ambivalence is both more profound and more complex.

In their different ways, both Machiavelli and Hobbes understood the state to be a location for both the solution and the creation of conflict. However, for Machiavelli the condition was temporary and grew out of the shifting relations of forces which were the state's environment. For Hobbes, conflict was permanent and emerged from the dilemma created in the search for security. Thus, for Machiavelli security was contingent on the changing forces which surrounded the state. While it was possible to temporarily achieve it and therefore useful to strive for it, it would always be an ephemeral accomplishment.

Hobbes, on the other hand, believed that security would always be a relative good acquired only at the expense of another's insecurity. The state was a structure which created the possibility to 'order a conflict' in such a way as to make the necessary balancing act between security and insecurity, tolerable. However, this notion of tolerability raises an ambiguity within Hobbesian theory itself as to whether the security purchased through the formation of multiple sovereign units can still be considered tolerable or whether sovereignty should be in the form of a single unit or global Leviathan.

The basic tension is between security seen as coping

with pluralism and security seen as the provision of universalism. If seen as the ability to cope with pluralism then security in the Machiavellian sense becomes dependent on the 'prince'. In the Hobbesian sense however,security becomes the ability to deal with the wars which will inevitably emerge due to the security dilemma. If, on the other hand, security is seen as the provision of universalist structures we are left with Hobbes' image of the state as a source of authority and order whether in the guise of a society of states or the global Leviathan.

The tensions present in modern international Realism reflect its being caught between Hobbes' depiction of the state coupled with Machiavelli's hero (or in Realist terms the 'statesman') and Hobbes' depiction of the state coupled with the idea of the security dilemma. On the one hand is the historicist hero trapped in the constraints of a structuralist (and therefore permanent state) while on the other hand is the vision of a permanent states-system locked in an eternal and self-defeating struggle for security.

Trapped at this juncture, modern international Realism struggles to move beyond it. However, these attempts at progress have been hampered by the 'hidden' nature of these underlying problems. It is the obscuring of the historical heritage of the debates which create the tensions in Realism which have in turn buried the real nature of the problems

faced by the discourse. The next chapter will look at how all this works itself out in actual attempts by Realists to develop a coherent theoretical conceptualization of security.

Footnotes

[1]Raymond Aron, Peace and War : A Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York : Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), p. 580.

[2]Hedley Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy," Social Research, 48:4 (Winter 1981), p. 721.

[3]Martin Wight, "Why is there No International Theory?" in Diplomatic Investigations, eds. Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), p.20.

[4]Ibid., p.33.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London : Macmillan, 1946), p. 93.

[8]Friedrich Meinecke, Introduction to Machiavellis Der Fuerst (Volume 8 of the series entitled Klassiker der Politik Edited and with an Introduction by Friedrich Meinecke), (Berlin, 1923), p. 6 as quoted in Richard W. Sterling, Ethics in a World of Power : The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke, (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 133.

[9]John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 133.

[10]Ibid., p. 251.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., (1982), pp. 17-18.

[13]R.B.J. Walker, "World Politics and Western Reason : Universalism, Pluralism, Hegemony," in Culture, Ideology, and World Order, ed. R.B.J. Walker (Boulder : Westview Press, Inc., 1984), pp. 185-189.

[14]The best critical assessments of collective security for a realist perspective are : E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London : Macmillan, 1946). Innis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York : Random House Inc., 1962). Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).

[15]Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (Rutgers University Press, 1978), p. 91.

[16]Claude, Power and International Relations, pp. 151-155.

[17]Cornelia Navari, "Hobbes and the 'Hobbesian Tradition' in International Thought", Millenium : Journal of International Studies, Vol. I, No. 3 (Autumn 1982). see esp. 206-207.

[18]Ibid, p. 207.

[19]R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory," 31:1, March 1987, pp. 65-86.

[20]Wight, "Why is There No International Theory?" p. 26.

[21]Ibid., p. 33.

[22]Isaiah Berlin, "The Originality of Machiavelli," in Against the Current, ed. Henry Hardy (Penguin Books, 1982), pp. 74-76.

[23]Narvari, "Hobbes and the 'Hobbesian Tradition' in International Thought", p. 203.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Chapter 13, as quoted in, Hedley Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy". p. 720.

[26]Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy". pp. 720-721.

[27]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Hamondsworth : Penguin, 1968), Chapter 13, p. 188.

[28]R. John Vincent, "The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International Thought," Millenium : Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, (Summer, 1981), p. 94.

[29] Walker, "Realism, Change and International Political Theory", p. 73.

[30]Vincent, "The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International Thought", p. 95.

[31]Narvari, "Hobbes and the 'Hobbesian Tradition' in International Thought", p. 206.

[32]Leviathan, Chapter 26, p. 318.

[33]Navari, "Hobbes and the 'Hobbesian Tradition' in International Thought", p. 206.

[34]Ibid, p. 212.

[35]Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory".

[36]Navari, "Hobbes and the 'Hobbesian Tradition' in International Thought", p. 209.

[37]Meinecke, quoted in Sterling, Ethnics in a World of Power: The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke p. 235.

[38]Ibid., p. 232.

[39]Walker, "World Politics and Western Reason : Universalism, Pluralism, Hegemony", p. 187.

[40]Navari, "Hobbes and the 'Hobbesian Tradition' in International Thought", pp. 220-221.

[41]David P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan : The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 207-212.

[42]Ibid., p. 211.

Chapter IV

Realist Security : Is the 'Statesman' Enough?

The discourse of the seventeenth century continues to echo in the present. Whether between Machiavelli and Hobbes, or between historicism and structuralism, the debate continues both inside and outside of the theoretical traditions identified as Realism. This chapter will explore the effects of this discourse on the capacity of those working within the traditions of political Realism to develop a coherent concept of security. To do this, the chapter will examine the work of the three Realists who have struggled systematically with the theoretical difficulties the concept of security presents for Realism - Bernard Brodie, Arnold Wolfers, and John Herz.[1]

Several areas of conceptual difficulty will emerge as we wend our way through these theorists' work. To begin with, there is the general problem of uncovering what is meant by the term 'national security' and also what such a terms' referent objects should be. This line of enquiry will very quickly present us with a field of contradictory possibilities and historically changing emphases. The second problem area we will encounter is that of agreeing on the appropriate means for seeking security. While there is considerable agreement amongst Realists regarding the means of security (military power), it quickly becomes clear that

this basis of agreement is only a common beginning from which to diverge. Accepting that military power is the basis of security, Realists also present a range of opinions regarding the proper role of such power, its relation to other possible means such as diplomacy, and the effects to its utility caused by the continuing evolution of technologies of destruction. On this last point some Realists have even begun to question the underlying acceptance of military power as the basis of security, claiming that military force has become too destructive and unstable to be used conclusively in a great many modern conflict situations.[2]

Another problem concerns the disagreement between those who support the states-system and those who are ambivalent towards it. Wolfers and Brodie understand security in terms of the necessities of the plural states-system and the separation of high and low politics. They see security in terms of the military defense of the state. They do not question the role of the state as the only truly important international actor nor do they accept that there is any other institution which might conceivably take over this role. Both men implicitly accept a vision of the world which is plural and competitive. They are in some senses inheritors of the Machiavellian tradition that places a great deal of trust in the leadership abilities of expert diplomats or 'statesmen'.

This reliance on 'experts' grows out of their underlying acceptance of historicism. Security for them depends on reacting to changing circumstances quickly and expertly. Because of this, however, they face a problem regarding the possibility of democracy at the level of high politics. Indeed, as we shall see later, they are openly suspicious of democracy at this level. And yet, both Wolfers and Brodie are concerned that the problems involved in operationalizing the concept of security also present the danger of its being misused as a rhetorical device. This leaves the 'Machiavellian' side of the Realist tradition in considerable difficulties. It argues that the concept of security, if left undefined, is little more than a political formula easily turned to the service of any number of particular interests. The argument goes further, however, to point out that the attempt to uncover a workable universal definition for security is likely to prove fruitless. Because of this, the 'statesman' or Machiavellian hero is looked to as the only way to deal with the constantly changing forces which threaten security. Yet, how are these 'statesmen' to go about their jobs when, as Brodie and Wolfers note, security has no intrinsic meaning or referent object? And why should the citizen relinquish the power to define these aspects of the concept given the high potential for the abuse of such power?

John Herz has attempted to come to terms with these issues from a perspective which owes more to Hobbes than Machiavelli. Herz goes right back to Hobbes' conception of security as an eternal dilemma for humanity. Herz looked to the way in which security was conceived by Hobbes as the central motivating force behind politics. According to this conception, once insecurity reaches an intolerable level, human beings are motivated to seek new forms of political association. Unlike Hobbes however, Herz attempted to reconcile his position with the flux of history. For Herz, security had a history that one could trace and which had periods of both stability and crisis. This analysis allowed Herz to point out that while it may have been correct for Hobbes to consider the state to be an adequate source of security during the seventeenth century, and though it has served quite well during much of the ensuing period, it may now be time to move beyond the state in some way or other. Consequently, Herz is led to search for a new politics capable of providing acceptable levels of security.

Herz came at the problem of security from a different perspective than Wolfers or Brodie. For Herz, the issue became important because the Hobbesian resolution of the security dilemma in the creation of the state no longer seemed to be working adequately. Because of this different initial perspective Herz's attitude towards the state was

considerably less assured than that of Wolfers and Brodie. Further, because he considered the security dilemma to be a force pushing towards new forms of politics, he was also compelled to take seriously, criticisms of Realist attitudes regarding the possibility of democracy at the level of 'high' politics. However, it should be noted that Herz's questioning of Realist positions on these issues has caused some people to question his credentials as a Realist. It has been suggested that he might even have slipped over into that amorphous group the Realists call Idealists. Herz, for his part, denies that his position has changed greatly and that he is as much a Realist in the 1980's as he was in the 1950's. Regardless of the merits of these arguments the one thing that will become clear is that Realism provides no adequate theoretical conceptualization of security. Its attempts at accomplishing this have merely raised more questions and ambiguities. If Herz actually does find himself forced outside of the confines of the discourse while grappling with these issues, then perhaps this is evidence of Realism's growing inability to rise to the challenges presented by changing historical circumstances. At any rate, in our search for some meaning to one of the central organizing concepts in international relations we shall find that the Realist discourse presents us only with questions, ambiguities, and contradictions.

Defining Security I : Brodie and Wolfers

Brodie's approach to the concept of security focused on its relation to the United States. Brodie attempted to uncover what happened to the United State's definition of its national security as it grew in power, wealth, and international prestige. He did so by examining what he viewed as the central focus of national security policies - the protection of vital interests.

Brodie asked two basic questions about vital interests: What are they and who says so?[3] In relation to the first question Brodie notes that vital (as opposed to merely important) interests are customarily identified by asking the further question, would the United States go to war to defend them? As Brodie puts it, for "them [vital interests] in other words, we are prepared to take or threaten some kind of military action..."[4] This tautology clearly does not provide a good basis from which to derive a definition. To simply say that an interest is vital because a war was fought or threatened over it and <u>vice versa</u> takes us nowhere.

This difficulty leads Brodie into a brief discussion about the subjectivity of vital interests. He points out that the United States will have, at any given time, a set of explicitly designated vital interests and corresponding strategic policies to protect these interests. Beyond this

will be a further set of interests not specifically identified but likely to be considered vital if challenged. He also notes how casually these 'vital interests' are referred to by people who seldom know the details of what they are referring to or why such interests have come to be seen as vital. Such 'glib' talk, as Brodie calls it, seems to imply that there is some common basis for identifying such interests. As Brodie explains, this is a serious misconception:

> ...they [vital interests] are not fixed by nature nor identifiable by an accepted standard of objective criteria. They are instead the products of fallible human judgment, on matters concerning which agreement within the nation is usually less than universal.[5]

Indeed, he goes on to note that prevailing "conceptions of American vital interest, which are effectively those held by the administration in power, have obviously changed drastically with time, especially since we entered World War II."[6]

According to Brodie's analysis, the designation of a 'vital interest' seems to be an arbitrary process. Yet, Brodie is not willing to discard the concept as 'mere gossamer'. Some things are obviously of vital interest to the United States (a direct military attack is the clearest example) while other candidates for the title are more controversial. Nevertheless, Brodie maintains that the

debate surrounding such a controversial designation will be carried out on the basis "that it will concern convictions that may be wrong but which everyone would regard as deeply worthy of attention if correct."[7] Having said this, Brodie is able to answer his initial question regarding what vital interests are about: "They concern those issues in our foreign affairs that are thought to affect the survival or security of the nation, meaning specifically security against military attack."[8]

Brodie asked what vital interests were and found them to be those things which if threatened or attacked might affect the survival or security of the nation. This is not an answer which goes far towards achieving theoretical clarity. Indeed, it does not go much beyond the initial assertion that vital interests are those over which wars are fought. However, Brodie has introduced the concept we are interested in and has done so in a way which gives some indication of its ambiguity and the particularly narrow meaning it is often given.

Issues that effect the survival of a state from military attack on its territory are relatively simple. Issues that effect the security of a state from military 'threats' to its 'interests' are considerably more complex and difficult to ascertain. For example, Brodie notes how a distinction can be made between the national security concerns of a small

nation as opposed to a superpower. The small nation is forced to content itself with securing its territorial integrity against direct attack while superpowers "will often be concerned with what they deem threats to their security that are more distant in space, time, and even conception than simply direct attack on their own territories."[9] Brodie's example points out how the concept of security expands in relation to the capabilities of different states. It expands because a more powerful state has greater material resources to allocate to its security and can therefore attempt to head off future threats before they grow to threaten home territories. Yet it expands in another sense also - that of conception. As Brodie explains:

> In some situations viewed as distantly menacing or disturbing, a superpower in considering its appropriate response, allows itself the luxury (or burden) of thinking in terms of national <u>responsibility</u> rather than simply of national peril. In so doing it will not usually acknowledge that it is departing from the criterion of self-interest fixed on security; it merely finds it convenient to broaden its terminology as it broadens its conception.[10]

Brodie is pointing to the conceptual flexibility of the term security. He notes that the United States expanded its conception of what its own security entailed at the end of World War II when it emerged as the undisputed leading power in the world. As he explains the transformation : "Though we [Americans] will not insist that the world around us be entirely to our liking, neither are we inclined to accept

anything considerably worse than need be if our efforts can prevent it."[11] This expansion was in Brodie's words 'fatefully important' and considerably enlarged the conceptual domain which the United States considered to lie within the purview of its national security interests. While this expansion is often justified by invoking the notion that ultimately the purpose of national security policy is the survival of the United States, Brodie notes that it does not depend on this appeal nor can it always be defended on such grounds.

He tells us that foreign military policy is always justified in terms of national security but that this justification must be considered in the light of the conceptual expansion of security. This expansion brings with it choice, and choice brings with it both responsibility and conceptual ambiguity. As Brodie explains:

> We find in effect that the power of the United States, as well as its geographical location, gives the leaders of our country an opportunity of choice not available to lesser powers. Others would put it that its power confers upon the United States a large measure of responsibility, but responsibility is itself a matter of decision, hence of choice.[12]

Thus, while the United States' involvement in Vietnam was explained at the time as essential to national security - essential in terms of grand theories of global struggle on which the ultimate survival of America depended - it is clear

that it was in fact a matter of choice involving much more than the survival of the U.S.

Brodie offers two factors limiting the conceptual expansion of security. The first is based on a model of competing interest groups within each state. Security is seen as one good competing for scarce state resources with other goods. As it is associated primarily with military power it is generally an expensive item on the state budget and will have to vie with other goods such as social programs, education and the like. Beyond this, the capacity of even a superpower to influence events is far from unlimited. Mistakes can be made, such as the United States' involvement in Vietnam, where costs so heavily exceeded gains and the outcome became military humiliation because of the limitations imposed on military strategy by the domestic politics of both the U.S. and Vietnam. Security as a national goal then, has costs and risks attached to it which mean that it can never be absolute. Thus, the expansibility of the concept security is bounded by the material resources of each state and also by the internal relations of political forces that determine the allocations of those resources amongst a variety of possible goals. Further, the element of chance, or to use a Machiavellian term, <u>fortuna</u>, acts to make any security goal, relative.

No state can achieve perfect security, no matter how

much of its resources it allocates to such a goal. The security goal will always be a balance of risk or levels of insecurity against those other goals a state may wish to pursue. While it is true that security must always be seen as only partially achievable and constrained by material considerations, such as resource allocation, and political considerations, such as the alignment of political forces at particular times, it is also true that such observations do not take us very far in terms of delimiting the conceptual terrain of the concept.

And yet, despite these ambiguities, costs, and uncertainties, Brodie maintains that there is still a basic concept here that is necessary to the conduct of international politics. Some interests he maintains <u>are</u> vital. The following is Brodie's reiteration of the problem and also his solution:

> The perennial problem for the leaders of a superpower like the United States is to determine the outer boundaries of what is truly vital, and...what kinds of threat indicate what kinds of response. To be able to make these decisions even reasonably well - the proof being in the outcome - is to display statesmanship in foreign and strategic affairs.[13]

Brodie offers us the Machiavellian 'hero', or in his words the 'statesman', as the only solution to the problem of determining the boundaries of a state's national security interests. But who are these 'heroes' on whose shoulders rests so much decision making power?

They are the leaders of nations. In the United States Brodie believes most of this power rests in the office of the President and his or her administration.[14] However, Brodie's leaders are not the Machiavellian 'Princes' who ruled in detached splendor rising above the sentimentalities of their subjects and their private moral beliefs. They are instead human beings who "function within and derive their basic ideas from a climate of American opinion concerning the state of the world and the general conduct appropriate to the United States."[15] They will base their decisions on what they perceive to be the 'mood' of the whole population and do their best to stay within the bounds of what that 'mood' indicates to be politically possible. The United States' involvement in Vietnam, for example, continues to constrain and influence present day U.S. security policy in Central America. These decisions are made by a very small minority which has, Brodie tells us, other influences on them than the general mood and opinion of the American public:

> The ideas that spark top policy decisions stem also from the total upbringing of the persons who make them, and especially from their appreciation of those slogans that have helped to mold their conceptions of the foreign policies appropriate to the United States. There are bound to be marked individual variations in conceptual flexibility or rigidity, but we must nevertheless recognize that the high office holder is a mature man who comes to his post with a seasoning of experience and with some fairly firm convictions.[15]

Brodie is here referring specifically to the 'generation

gap' of the 1960's in relation to the Vietnam war. However, he raises some pertinent issues regarding the possibility of these leaders developing security policies that can in any way be considered objective or even 'national'. Firstly, Brodie informs us that each person will bring particular viewpoints on various issues, and these will have been formed largely through the individual's upbringing. We must assume here that these differences will depend on such things as the education, geographic location, economic and social position of each individual. Further, Brodie tells us that these ideas will also be sparked by 'slogans' to which they have been exposed while living within the American culture. It is reasonable to assume that a different upbringing will result in variations in the 'slogans' each individual finds appropriate to his or her world view, and that the 'slogans' which appeal to a Teddy Kennedy will not be those which strike a chord with a Ronald Reagan or a Jesse Jackson.

This is an important point, for it demonstrates the great variation of possible positions regarding national security. To take one example, we can look at the influence of Brodie's 'slogans' on American security policy regarding its military strength and force structure. Ronald Reagan has taken to heart those 'slogans' which depict the Soviet Union as implacable, aggressively expansionist, and completely untrustworthy, while the United States stands as the only

real force capable of defending the 'free' world against the threat of communism. The acceptance of these 'slogans' leads to a reluctance to trust the Soviets and therefore a reluctance to enter into serious arms control agreements. It has reinforced the drive for a massive arms build up by the United States.

Teddy Kennedy has been influenced by 'slogans' regarding American strength and prestige and the need for it to have a very large military force to uphold this position, but he also has accepted that a continued nuclear arms race is destabilizing and dangerous. This leads him to support a somewhat smaller buildup of American conventional military strength while opposing any nuclear build up. Kennedy becomes a much stronger supporter of arms control and also someone whose view of the Soviet Union must be construed to be slightly less dogmatic then his conservative opponent.

The Reverend Jesse Jackson on the other hand has been greatly influenced by 'slogans' which tend to be opposed to high American military spending on the grounds that it diverts national resources away from progressive domestic programs and creates the wherewithall for American adventurism abroad. Further, he does not view the Soviet Union as the greatest threat faced by the United States. Because of this Jackson sees American security lying in arms control and a reduced military budget.

While the above is not meant to be more than a thumbnail sketch of very broad differences between three American leaders and does not purport to cover the broad spectrum of political, personal, and cultural influences which have gone into these positions, it does point out how such ideological differences can result in quite different interpretations of what national security demands. Each of them could be, and is, defended with great passion and not nearly as much cynicism as their respective opponents usually insinuate. This ideological component has serious consequences for the conceptual clarity of security. This is especially true given the lack of consensus regarding what it is that a state should be concerned to secure. Not only is the referent object of security in doubt according to Brodie, but the process through which security policy is formulated also presents us with a variety of perspectives often in complete contradiction to one another. To go back to Brodie's initial questions about what vital interests are and who determines them, we find that vital interests are those interests a states' power allows it to consider vital, and that this "consideration" is undertaken by small groups of leaders representing specific ideological perspectives and making decisions regarding national security on that basis.

If we turn now to Wolfers we find that he shared Brodie's concern with the ambiguity of the concept of

security for international relations theory.[16] He also felt national security had to be concerned with 'interests', though he focused on 'national interests' rather than 'vital' interests. He notes how important and widely used the term 'national interest' (or rather 'national security interest') is for "statesmen, publicists, and scholars who wish to be considered Realists."[17] Indeed, it was precisely this widespread usage coupled with the term's ambiguity that attracted Wolfers' attention. Without a clear definition, Wolfers warned that terms like national security or national security interest would become little more than political formulas. And, as Wolfers explains:

> When political formulas such as 'national interest' or 'national security' gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus, they may be permitting everyone to label what ever policy he [sic] favours with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.[18]

There is however, a general though vague sense of meaning to the term 'national interest' in that it refers to an interest which is not that of an individual or sub-national group on the one hand or that of humanity as a whole on the other. Beyond this though, the term has little substantive meaning. Indeed, Wolfers points out how even the most general understanding of what we are referring to when

discussing the 'national interest' is subject to change. He notes how pre-World War II U.S. policy regarding issues of the 'national interest' focused on economic questions. This focus grew out of the capitalist crisis of the 1930's, and was concerned with the promotion of all citizen's economic welfare as opposed to policies deemed to help some at the expense of others. The basic thrust was to ensure that national policy be focused as much as possible on the more inclusive economic needs of the whole society.

Wolfers notes that after World War II a different set of historical necessities gave rise to a radically different set of priorities for foreign policy. If the depression had dictated an emphasis on economic policies that would not benefit unduly some economic groups in the society at the expense of others, the new, post-World War II emphasis grew out of an expanding economy in a period of 'Cold War'. It focused on external military threats to the society. It was a 'nationalist' focus in that the enemy of the 'national interest' was no longer internal but was now external. As such, defense from this threat was simplified because it did not involve the nuances and complexities of domestic or 'low' politics. It focused primarily on the building of a military shield behind which a naturally expanding economy and already defined and 'accepted' idea of the 'good life' could be pursued. The only remaining threat from within became those

who would sacrifice the 'national' interest to the ideal of a human interest extending beyond the borders of individual states. As Wolfers notes, the issue was no longer one "of transcending narrow group selfishness...but rather one of according more exclusive devotion to the narrower cause of the national self."[19]

Thus, the 'national interest' took on a new set of priorities. This new focus was a part of what Wolfers refers to as the increasing presence of a 'security' factor in discussions of the 'national interest'. As the 'national interest' threw off its economic priorities for military ones it was reformulated into what Wolfers termed the 'national security interest'. Thus, after World War II there was a "change from a welfare to a security interpretation of the symbol 'national interest'."[20] It is this shift in interpretation which has led to the political formulas of 'national interest' and 'national security' becoming essentially synonymous.

Given this, and remembering that 'national interest' has been described by both Wolfers and Brodie to be at best, a vague indicator of good intentions and, at worst, a cloak to mask self-interest or dangerous idealism, the question becomes whether the formula 'national security' promises more precision. On the surface Wolfers believes that its meaning is generally clear enough and fairly well established in the

tradition of international relations. In a general sense we all know what is being referred to when someone complains that their government is neglecting or over-emphasizing national security. Those who demand high levels of national security are usually fearful that their state is underestimating external dangers or is being diverted down an idealistic path which does not give enough credence to such dangers. In this sense 'national security' as a symbol suggests that security is directly related to power. It appears, Wolfers tells us, more often in "the speech of those who believe in reliance on national power than of those who place their confidence in model behaviour...to carry their country through the tempests of international conflict."[21] In this sense though, the concept becomes useful only in the limited aspect of its being a crude indicator of broad ideological differences between policy actors. Wolfers notes that this means that "the term 'security' covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security."[22]

Wolfers attempts to determine why, given the high degree of ambiguity associated with the term 'national security', it is used so unquestioningly by many commentators on international relations. He begins by asking Brodie's question about what it is that states are trying to secure? What, in other words, is the referent object of a national

security policy? Following Walter Lippman, Wolfers defines states as being collections of social values. Lippman had defined security as the extent to which a nation "is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."[23] However, like Brodie, who felt uneasy with the term 'vital interests', Wolfers saw great difficulty in uncovering what might be a 'core value'.

Wolfers noted how Lippman's usage of the term security corresponded to what might be called its 'common sense' meaning. Security was treated as a value which a nation or state could have more or less of. In this sense it was somewhat like wealth or power. However, Wolfers differentiated these terms from security. He claimed that "while wealth measures the amount of a nation's material possessions, and power, its ability to control the actions of others, security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."[24]

While we may not agree with the unproblematic nature which Wolfers seems to bestow on the concepts power and wealth, the description of security as having both an objective and subjective side to it is important. Wolfers is pointing out the breadth of terrain to which the concept can refer, for it is not necessarily associated with threats of a

strictly empirical nature. That is to say, threats can be both real and perceived. Their 'uncovering' may be the result of an accurate assessment of forces around the state or could also represent the fears, apprehensions, or delusions of those in control of state apparatuses. This means that "a nation's security can run a wide gamut from almost complete insecurity or sense of insecurity at one end, to almost complete security or absence of fear at the other."[25] This subjective side to security is a central element of any determination of security policy if only because such policy looks to the prediction of future events, as well as the determination of existing threats.

Security then is not necessarily associated with a real threat from 'out there' to a real value or set of values 'in here'. Indeed, the threat is often only perceived and assumed to lie in the future. Thus, for instance, it is not necessarily that the Soviet Union is actually planning to launch a nuclear attack against the United States, but rather, that they might in the future if certain things are not done today. The threat being avoided exists in part in the imagination.

To examine this 'subjective' side to security from a different angle we can also recall how difficult it is to determine what values a nation might actually encompass, and further how such values are to be priorized so as to

determine 'core' values from merely important 'values'. Wolfers assumes that security itself is a core value. However, it is not usually considered core because of its relation to questions of actual survival, but rather because of its relation to other less ultimate values. Security is depicted by Wolfers as one value in a field of competing values. In this depiction the acquisition of increments of security is often associated with military power. Such power has a cost. The cost which Wolfers emphasizes is the sacrifice of other values a state may wish to achieve or expand. Thus, more tanks may mean fewer schools. In this sense, debate within a state concerning an increment of 'national security' may not be one of security at all but rather may be debated in terms of costs measured as the loss of other values. Security becomes only one value amongst many, and its priority within this field is determined by forces within each state. The outcome of such processes of priorization are unlikely to be predictable from state to state.

Wolfers provides us with a schema for this process in which he assumes that a rational state will tend to minimize its efforts towards security. That is, it will try to find the level at which 'adequate' security is maintained without exacting too high a cost in terms of other values. He believes this level is found through a process of interest

group bargaining, whereby "together with the extent of the external threats [real or perceived], numerous domestic factors such as national character, tradition, preferences, and prejudices will influence the level of security that a nation chooses to make its target."[26] This bargaining, however, moves security away from ultimate issues such as survival, which is only rarely an issue in domestic discussions surrounding security increments. Indeed, it is the concern with values other than survival which most often generates security concerns. Somewhat paradoxically, the values security policies are designed to protect themselves tend to reduce the 'amount' of security which can be sought. Thus, there is a point at which further increments of military security are foregone because of their cost in terms of domestic goods such as education, health care, social services and the like.

However, the range over which these values extend is large enough to pose a serious problem to any theorist of security. At one extreme they may involve little more than national independence defined as the maintenance of territorial integrity. Yet, as we have already noted, such limited concerns quickly expand with the power of the state. As Wolfers explains:

> It is a well known and portentious phenomenon that bases, security zones, and the like may be demanded and acquired for the purpose of protecting values acquired earlier; and they then

> become new national values requiring protection themselves. Pushed to its logical conclusion, such a spatial extension of the range of values does not stop short of world domination.[27]

A 'national security interest' it seems, can be defined as covering everything from the maintenance of a state unit's territory to the need for global empire. And these are only values defined in the simple terms of territorial integrity. There are also other values more ambiguous in themselves and also, therefore, in terms of their relation to what might constitute security.

If the values or referent objects of national security provided little in the way of clarifying what the term signified, perhaps, Wolfers suggested, some clue could be found in the means through which states have attempted to acquire security. On the surface there appears to be a range of possibilities here. Certainly some states have sought security behind armaments and military alliances while others have done so through strict neutrality and careful adherence to non-threatening postures towards other states. These means appear at first glance to be mutually exclusive. However, whether a state is neutral or part of a military alliance, Wolfers tells us that when national policy makers refer to security policies, they "take for granted that they will be understood to mean a security policy based on power, and on military power at that."[28]

This assumption clearly points towards the notion that

military means lie at the base of all security policies; that coercive power is the only real goal of any security seeking state. Even a neutral state will rely on a strong defensive military force to deter those who may not respect their neutrality. Wolfers, however, does not believe that such an assumption carries one very far. Indeed, he notes how "the choice in every instance will depend on a multitude of variables, including ideological and moral convictions, expectations concerning the psychological and political developments in the camp of the opponent, and inclinations of individual policy makers."[29]

The conclusion Wolfers comes to regarding security's conceptual development is that in every important respect it remains ambiguous and ill defined. He agrees with Brodie that it is values or interests which are being secured and that security itself is one of these values. Like Brodie, Wolfers also points out that values are difficult to locate, define, or even priorize. Even a 'core' value such as territorial integrity is not necessarily given primary importance. Further, the idea of security is inextricably bound up in the idea of threat. Wolfers notes how threats can exist as much in the imagination as in the 'real' world. Thus, Wolfers notes that any security policy will ostensibly be designed to defend the interests of an entire nation. However, that policy will in essence be the result of a

particular (and seldom consensual) target for levels of military power designed to protect values (which are defined and priorized through a process of interest group competition, changing political power relationships, and individual biases of decision makers) against threats which may or may not exist in any empirical sense (i.e., which may also be the product of individual ideological prejudices, or delusions or just plain mistakes).

In other words, Wolfers reiterates his initial worry that security can be a dangerous and misleading rhetorical formula used to give legitimacy to an almost limitless range of goals. It is its lack of real substantive meaning, coupled to its association with the protection of cherished values or interests, which provides it with such strong rhetorical power. The only defense against the abuse of the term, Wolfers tells us, is to make it clear that it is highly ambiguous, and to demand that those who claim to be increasing a state's security provide specific details as to the goals and means of their proposals. Only by such specification can the rhetorical dangers of the 'concept' or symbol as Wolfers calls it, be avoided.

Both Brodie and Wolfers asked themselves whether a uniform definition could be found for security. Only with such a definition could Wolfer's call for specification of goals and means make any sense. If there was no yardstick

with which to measure or weigh one proposal against another in relation to the improvement of security, then specification of the details of different policy proposals merely makes the rhetoric more complex. Equally, the proposal put forward by both men regarding the role of the 'statesman' depends on the existence of objective criteria upon which these actors may base their decisions.

The basis of the arguments of both theorists about the ambiguity of security rested on the claim of the fundamentally plural nature of the world. They pointed out a vast arena of differences in interest, ideology, morality, and the like. Within this arena they searched for the idea of a uniform and common meaning for the term national security. Given the plural nature of the arena, however, their conclusions were largely pre-ordained. There could be no such uniformity. Indeed, even when Wolfers dropped the necessarily plural adjective, 'national', security remained a term tied to the vagaries of ideological preferences regarding military expenditures. Both used their insights into the unexplored and dangerous ambiguities of terms which have powerful political potential for rhetorical abuse to demonstrate that Idealism (read universalism) is the real danger.

It may be that their comments on the ambiguity of security as a concept are subsidiary to this more fundamental

animosity towards Idealism. In this sense Buzan is wrong to suggest that Wolfers' work provides a starting point for "developing security as a major approach to understanding international relations."[30] It is probably closer to the truth to view Wolfer's work more as a defense of pluralism and the Machiavellian side of the Realist tradition against those who seek order through a search for commonality or universal meaning. This failure to provide a clear definition is consistent with his pluralist starting point. Brodie's rather pessimistic view that security had to be defined by professionals and world leaders depends on a similar commitment.

Both men argued that as the world we live in is plural in nature, it is determined in flux in relation to changing history, beliefs, and even fortuna. As such, the idea of security could not be raised above the level of a general yearning for some escape from the chaos of historical anarchy until it was granted substance by being embedded in the temporary reality of its own concrete sphere of historical contingency. Thus, security could have no meaning unless, as Wolfers tells us, it was specifically given meaning by relating it directly to specific threats or values through the application of targets, and also through a continual review of this substantive meaning in terms of changing historical conditions. Even at this, both Wolfers and Brodie

warn us of the likelihood of different interpretations of historical conditions, the possibility of mistakes in target setting, and dangers arising from the always relative nature of perceiving future necessities. It seems clear, therefore, that neither was attempting to generate interest in the further conceptual development of security, but rather was saying that apart from some basic 'rules of thumb' to avoid the most serious rhetorical pitfalls, it was pointless to even attempt such a project. Like other pluralists before them, both base their positions on a conception of the unchanging and eternal existence of the plural states-system. This is not to say that they deny change within the system, but rather that they accept that the division of humanity into particular and competitive groupings is the essential fact of international relations. This has certain consequences for the theoretical work of both men. Once their arguments regarding the eternal maintenance of what (in terms of their own theoretical positions) should be a historically specific model of human organization, we are again given an example of theorists presupposing that which should first be demonstrated. This presupposition leads to important ambiguities in both Wolfers' and Brodies' grasp of the concept of security.

Firstly, the idea that the world is of necessity divided and competitive requires that the citizen give up the notion

that obligations exist beyond the state, except perhaps in the sphere of private virtu. As Wolfers' explains in a passage highly reminiscent of Machiavelli:

> Many men of sensitive conscience are disturbed to see their country either entertaining cordial relations with nations, regimes. and individual rulers whom they condemn for unethical behavior or engaging in a war with people for whom they feel no hatred. Yet, if the nation's interests dispassionately perceived shall guide statesmen, it is necessary that they be able to disassociate themselves from their own private feelings and from those of the public when as statesmen they shape the relationships of their country with other countries. It would be disastrous if they sought instead to build on the quicksands of emotion, especially today when emotions are at the mercy of mass media of communication and of high-powered propaganda.[31]

Following from this is the belief that citizens must realize that experts are required to manage the changing circumstances of the international realm. Wolfers goes so far as to warn us that these experts must be in a position of relative autonomy from what might be called democratic control "because the pendulum of public opinion swings so easily...".[32] The intimation here is clearly designed to point us towards the professional diplomat or 'statesman' as a kind of modern day 'prince'. Such people have already been disabused of their tendencies to export the methods of domestic or low politics to the plural realm of high politics. Thus, the citizen relinquishes control over inter-state relations to experts trained to maintain the plural

states-system by defending only the interests of their own state unit. Obligations are forced into the state-centric mold by denying the legitimacy of those who might claim such a mold is too restricting.

The deepest ambiguity in both Wolfer's and Brodie's positions however, remains how the dangerous potential for abuse stemming from the rhetorical power and ambiguous nature of security is to be overcome. They suggest that the citizen should have faith in his or her leaders and accept that the international realm is too complex an arena for the average citizen to make decisions about. And yet, both take great pains to point out the 'essentially contested' nature of the concept security. Both note how security decisions are coloured by ideology, personal biases, imperfect information and a host of other things not the least of which is simple chance. Given this, and their warnings that there is great potential for abuse in the concept's emotional association with a deep human longing, one is left wondering at their call for faith in the domestically unregulated decisions of small groups of individuals. After pointing out the dangers of the conceptual inadequacies of security, both Wolfers and Brodie tell us that there is nothing we can do other than place our destinies, our lives, and our security in the hands of experts. Democracy becomes a private <u>virtu</u> which has no place in the international arena. And yet without it, one

has difficulty sharing the belilef that faith in our leaders will be a sufficient action to resolve the dangers inherent in the concept's ambiguities.

In the final analysis, neither Wolfers nor Brodie have much confidence in their solution either. Both lack the conviction required to truly face the consequences of their position.

They maintain that pluralism results in multiple possible formulations of the concept security and that this very multiplicity helps to generate the fear and uncertainty which maintains the competitive states-system. However, like many other Realists they lack the unblinking courage of their pluralist convictions. Perhaps, as Wolfers notes, "there may be plenty of opportunity even now to justify the belief that a wise interpretation and responsible pursuit of the national interest will be found to conform with the principles of morality, reasonably applied, and in the broader interests of mankind."[33] In other words, and in keeping with Wolfers' own heavy use of qualifiers, perhaps, even now, there exists an opportunity to reach beyond the narrow focus of citizen obligations towards some possible formulation of the interests of humanity as a whole. This represents the final and most poignant problem for both men. Each had come up hard against the plural vision of the Realist's world, and while continuing to claim the validity of this vision, could

not quite give up the hope offered by the contradictory vision of the rationalists.

Defining Security II: Herz

Herz's contributions towards the theoretical development of the concept of security for Realilsm, are part of his well known work on the 'security dilemma'. Herz believed that the seeking of security was a natural human goal. This natural goal became a dilemma however, whenever "a plurality of otherwise interconnected groups constitute ultimate units of political life, that is, where groups live alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity."[34] Herz called this 'plurality' an 'anarchic society' which he believed to have been the historical norm for most periods of known history. The 'security dilemma' emerged out of this condition (or social constellation as Herz called it) of anarchy because:

> Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.[35]

Fear in relation to the possible actions of others became the central motivation for this social condition.

Herz believed that the security dilemma functioned at all levels of society from the individual to the state. However, he noted that there was also a somewhat paradoxical twist to the urge for security in that human beings born into "more or less 'natural' relationships with others: family, clan, class, state, nation, etc."[36] have overcome or suppressed their fear within these co-operative relationships. Indeed, the very search for security results in the formation of group loyalties as a cushion against the threats of the world to the individual. However, this co-operation is overshadowed by the conflict inherent in the security dilemma. As Herz explains:

> families and tribes may overcome the power game in their internal relations in order to face other families or tribes; larger groups may overcome it to face other classes unitedly; entire nations may compose their internal conflicts in order to face other nations. But ultimately, somewhere conflicts caused by the security dilemma are bound to emerge among political units of power.[37]

In this sense Herz is pointing out that both co-operation and the 'power game' function at all levels of human political organization. However, his main concern is with the impact of the security dilemma in areas where no higher authority exists to mediate it, and where cooperation is not an important factor. Thus, Herz focuses on international relations because, as he says,

> this is the realm where the ultimate power units have faced, and are still facing each other as

> 'monades' irreducible to any further, higher ruling or co-ordinating power, the vicious circle of the power and security dilemma works here with more drastic force than in any other field. Power relationships and the development of the means of exercising power in the brutal form of force have dominated the field here to the almost complete exclusion of the more refined 'governmental' relationships which prevail in 'internal' politics.[38]

Given this depiction of a plurality of 'monades' facing each other in a realm of gladiatorial combat and suspicion, it is quite obvious that Herz's position displays a certain Hobbesian flavour. Indeed, Herz explicitly relates his position to Hobbes by noting the similarities between his notion of a security dilemma and Herbert Butterfield's 'predicament of Hobbesian fear'.[39] Herz accepts Butterfield's general position regarding the motivating force of fear and mistrust in the international arena and the effect this has on any state's ability to generate security for itself in any other fashion than through the accumulation of power. However, when Butterfield refers to it as an 'absolute predicament' and an 'irreducible dilemma', Herz tempers the argument by noting that:

> If mutual suspicion and the security dilemma thus constitute the basic underlying condition in a system of separate, independent power units, one would assume that history must consist of one continual race for power and armaments, an unadulterated rush into unending wars, indeed, a chain of 'preventive wars'. This obviously has not been the case.[40]

Herz argues that the security dilemma can be mitigated

by a number of factors. Instead of a steadily increasing progression towards a constant state of war between all states, Herz offers a historical analysis in which the security dilemma fluctuates depending on the condition of the time. "Thus, while it [the security dilemma] has confronted units of international politics throughout history, it has done so in various degrees of acuity, depending on the circumstances."[41] Here, Herz points out that the security dilemma is mitigated by the conditions in which international units find themselves, and also states his basic assumption regarding the universal nature of the plurality of global politics. The pluralism Herz is referring to here, however, is not the static one of a permanent modern states-system which we have noted before in historicist and Realist thought. Herz instead emphasizes the changing nature of this pluralism.

He does so by looking at the structure of these 'units of international politics' at different times to discover why some periods of history seem to be marked by less concern over security than others. Before examining the role which security, as a more or less intense goal, has played since the emergence of the modern state however, Herz also takes some time to explain the difficulties of understanding what he terms "the changing meaning and role of 'security' in the history of modern international affairs."[42]

He begins by noting that security is in some ways a 'felt condition' and as such, is a highly elusive concept. He next, and not unfamiliarly, notes how it has often been associated with an even more illusive and broadly defined concept, the 'national interest'. We need not go into all of Herz's arguments here for they are much the same as those offered by Wolfers. Suffice it to say that Herz, recognized that there could be no such thing as a single national interest but rather that each nation had interests, and that this very plurality rendered the concept more ambiguous and indeterminate. As Herz explains in a passage reminiscent of Brodie and Wolfers; "the definition of a country's national interests, beyond the bare security minimum [which Herz reminds us is a historically changing level] may indeed range all the way from interest in maintaining and defending what it has (territorially and otherwise) to extreme economic and political 'imperialism', and that the interests can be, and usually are, the expression of a great variety of party-political, personal, group, or 'ideological' viewpoints and the composite result of many group's attitudes."[43]

Given the elusive and variable nature of this associate concept, Herz asks how it might be possible to assign meaning to the basic or minimum level of 'security' necessary to protect such nebulous interests. He tells us that even 'security' as an interest is not unequivocal. However, these

problems do not force Herz to the conclusion that the concept is unworkable. He offers instead, a definition in which he believes "one gets to the bedrock of minimum security requirements by correlating them with the protective functions of territoriality."[44]

It is this correlation of security and territoriality which is the mode for the fluctuating historical levels of the security dilemma. Herz points back to a time when the modern states-system was young and the 'sovereign units' which made it up were exclusively European and largely impermeable. That is, they were relatively small units, self-sufficient, easily defended and not easily attacked. They had in Herz's words, 'hard shells'.

Given this, and such other technical limitations of the time as existed in military capabilities, communication, and transportation, each unit's security interests did not extend far beyond its immediate neighbours, or, in the case of a major European power, the overall continental balance of power. Even a colonial power of this period, Herz notes, could still point to a specific set of overseas holdings, sea lanes, and strategic military points which were 'essential' to its basic security. This latter point, however, is subsidiary to the first regarding the 'impermeability' of the state itself, for even in the event of the loss of overseas territory, the state's actual 'home territorial' security was

seldom threatened. What was of highest importance was the maintenance of a reasonably well balanced status-quo.

Thus, if France lost its holdings in the New World or England had to relinquish its claim to some of its American colonies, what became of greater importance than the actual loss, was that the overall balance not change too dramatically between the European powers concerned. This balancing was accomplished through a shifting array of alliances which worked to offset the ambitions of would-be hegemonic powers. In spite of the appearance given by the 'Machiavellian' nature of diplomacy and the rather high incidence of warfare, this system was, for the most part marked by its conservatism. It was a time when as Herz notes, it was relatively easy to feel secure: "it all amounted to a system with such 'conservative' features that its members could feel relatively secure once certain minimum requirements of security - generally modest ones - had been satisfied."[45]

This period eventually came to a close as the security dilemma's mitigating factors receded. Herz points out how, during the nineteenth century "the impermeability of territorial state units lessened."[46] This happened in conjunction with an expansion of what Herz calls the 'security area' of the state. This 'security area' is "the area in which whatever happened concerned the security

interest of the nation in question."[47] Both of these factors are related to the growing interdependence of states. The core states came to depend for their continued prosperity on overseas holdings, shipping lanes, and increasingly, trade within the very states they were in competition with. Impermeability declined with the expansion of the economies of core states so that they were no longer self-sufficient. As this self-sufficiency could no longer be relied on as the last ditch of defense, then the 'security area' had to be expanded to include those regions on which the functioning of the new expanded economy depended. Beyond these economic imperatives there were also those of national prestige which required maintaining or improving the state's position in the hierarchy of nations. These things combined to expand the security interests of all states far beyond what they had been. Indeed, as Herz points out, the security interests of the major European powers expanded to include the entire globe. The European balance had to be transformed into a global balance.

It is at this point of transformation into a global balance of power but prior to its bipolar concentration, that Herz believes international politics were poised for a time between the traditional ideas of national security and the newer ideas of collective security. However, Herz tells us, the traditional ideas won out and states turned to face the

new global security problems as individual units. As Herz describes the new situation;

> they perservered in the traditional approach: trying to supply themselves with security individually, which meant that the security dilemma now confronted them naked and unmitigated. Security considerations and security motivations became all encompassing. Whatever contributed (or was suspected of contributing) to the strengthening of any one power anywhere in the world was considered an immediate security concern to the others, who therefore would try to oppose it or make up for it by their own increase in power or influence.[48]

This heightened security dilemma created an atmosphere of fear, distrust, and foreign policies built on worst case scenarios. It was an atmosphere which, Herz believes, aided the consolidation of state power into its present bi-polar formation. And it is bi-polarity which, Herz tells us, drives the security dilemma to its most fervent pitch. Within this bi-polar realm neither its Eastern nor its Western component has been able to find a means to mitigate a spiraling intensification of the security dilemma. All territory is now considered by these components to be within the 'sphere of influence' of either the one or the other or else represents a potential area of struggle between the two. As Herz explains some of the factors which work to block mitigating influences on the security dilemma:

> Competition for power is chiefly between two instead of many. Values held in common have given way to ideological conflict, aggravating mutual distrust. The blocs touch each other everywhere, with few ways out into neutral or unoccupied

> ground. Whatever the security interest of one side seems to require increases the insecurity of the other side, and hardly any line can be drawn which would separate 'defensive' measures and security policies from 'offensive' 'expansionist', and 'beyond-security' action. Where previous alignments of powers occurred in order to protect the security of individual territorial state-units, today's alignments protect 'areas' which, despite intended geographical delimitation, tend to circle half the globe and to encircle the other half. Developments have reached a pass where almost everything in national and bloc policies resolves itself into security policies.[49]

This quotation is no less indicative of East-West relations today than it was at its writing nearly thirty years ago.

Such a security dilemma would traditionally have presented a simple feasible solution: the victory of one of the blocs over the other. But it is here, Herz tells us, that we run up against the final irony and the ultimate dilemma of our present situation - the possibility of creating a single world empire or of defeating the other bloc at an 'acceptable' cost no longer exists. The reasons for this final blockage lie in the continued evolution of weapons technology.

The evolutionary direction of weapons technology has resulted for Herz in two related factors which contribute to the 'vicious circle of the security dilemma'. The first is that the destructive potential of modern weapons has reaached a point where any prolonged direct military confrontation between the two blocs would certainly destroy both of them, if not the entire planet. Because of this, the cost of such

a conflict has reached a point where the political goal of militarily removing the central threat to either bloc's security interest is simply too high. The second factor is that specific advances in the field of military technology (especially in the nuclear and rocketry sphere but also in the realm of bacteriology and chemistry) have acted to elevate levels of fear and mistrust to unprecedented levels. The political blunder which might have resulted in the loss of some territory during earlier periods might today result in an unprecedented catastrophe rendering one's state uninhabitable for generations if not millennia. This raising of the stakes has obviously had a sobering effect and there are those who contend that it is only through the absolute nature of this risk that we have purchased the level of fear required to maintain a degree of stability between the blocs. The nuclear armed ICBM has been pointed to as the single most important factor in avoiding the third and most calamitous world war of the twentieth century.

There is about this type of argument an almost mystic belief in the possibility of freezing time in a particular period and space in a particular shape. The vision here is presumably one of an American empire facing a Russian empire in perpetuity. The undesirability and improbability of such a 'millennium' has already been noted by Herz in his discussion of the manner in which bi-polarity creates a

situation of spiraling competition and insecurity. We might also recall Wolfers' warning that any move towards global empire merely internalizes the conflicts which are at present external. Thus, even if the United States and the Soviet Union were to expand the Yalta agreement around the globe, they would not reduce security threats to themselves so much as they would internalize them. Further, such threats would be compounded by new struggles against the two empires, for as Raymond Aron has noted:

> Men and states have always feared the hegemony of a single power. Would the hegemony of two be much better?[50]

As Herz points out the largely military conceptualization given security in the period since World War II has resulted in the two major powers becoming blocked by their own security policies, and not being able to react to changing security requirements.

It is at this point that Herz breaks ranks with Wolfers and Brodie. Both Wolfers and Brodie felt that security remained in essence tied to the power required to maintain national values. Regardless of the problems both men saw in terms of determining what these values were, how to defend, and how to priorize them, neither ever raised the question that the plural states-system itself may be a serious security risk. Such an acceptance of the competitive plural states-system was (and is) a major component of the Realist

cosmology, and it represented the outer regions of thought in terms of the concept of security for Wolfers and Brodie. It also represented the contradiction on which their failures to come to terms with the concept rested. Herz, on the other hand, was not adverse to examining the changing dynamics of the states-system itself. When he did, he found that factors were at work within it which had undermined traditional modes of attaining security. He began to see that shifts in the distribution of global power had combined with increases in military destructive potentials to render obsolete traditional notions of security as emerging naturally from the competitive struggles of states. Indeed, by 1959, Herz was beginning to move beyond Realism's adherence to the eternal nature of the plural states-system and equally importantly, beyond its belief that the acquisition of security was the sole domain of each individual state unit. It is significant to note that while Wolfers and Brodie rested their hopes on 'good statesmanship' in an aggressive and comnpetitive world, Herz called instead for 'mutual accommodation'.

In 1959 this idea of accommodation, referred only to the problems of a bi-polar world locked in an unresolvable military confrontation. However, the insistence that security demanded co-operative actions in this new epoch intimated that something more fundamental than a new military

strategy was required. The whole edifice of traditional military theory was certainly rendered suspect in so far as it remained trapped in the security dilemma's 'vicious circle'. But Herz was not merely calling for a new military strategy to deal with the new technology. He was calling instead for a complete re-examination of what it meant to be secure. He had broken through the traditional vision of state units supplying themselves with security, and argued that this formulation had become unworkable by the time the European balance of power could no longer be kept within the territorial bounds of Europe, but had spilled over across the entire globe. The fact that the traditional view still held when the reality of the situation had changed rendered the existing security systems on the planet (especially those of the major powers) anachronistic. At base, Herz's position challenged the very foundations of existing Realist thought.

By the 1980's, Herz had further expanded his position on the defining characteristics of security in the present epoch. His intellectual development over this period had led him away from the discussion of essentially military security problems to a much broader array of threats to state units encountered in the modern industrialized(ing) world. This did not lead him away from his earlier rejection of the possibility of individual state unit security, but rather built on this premiss. Herz still called himself a Realist,

though he became a rather different kind of 'Realist'; one that asked to be aligned with Richard Falk and Richard Barnet and to be seen as recognizing "the outdatedness of many traditional interpretations of power or national interest."[51] He argued that many of the basic concepts of Realism are really only metaphors for given situations and perceptions which are held at particular times. He used the concept of power to explain what this meant by noting how France between the World Wars was perceived to be more powerful than the events of 1940 would come to demonstrate. However, until the advent of war France was able to 'act' more powerfully in the realm of European politics. Equally the Soviet Union was perceived to be weaker than the events of the 1940's would indicate and, hence; had to act in relation to this perception.

Turning to security, Herz noted that it "is an even more elusive concept then power, based on feelings and perceptions."[52] He noted how:

> In a nuclear age, where all have become penetrable, we have a security - or better, a war - system out of control. Nuclear powers expect security from a system of mutual deterrence with second-strike capability; but any sense of relative security thus obtained is forever clouded by fears of possible inferiority, even where, with overkill capacities, this fear is irrational. But the chance that the bluff may be called is real. Nonnuclear nations, on the other hand, are dependent on nuclear umbrellas, that is, on the respective superpower's determination to protect them, a determination which may or may not be in

> doubt. This way, everybody's security is constantly insecure.[53]

Beyond this military security dilemma however, Herz noted there were other emerging global threats to the survival of humanity. These threats - an exploding world population, finite supplies of resources, and continuing environmental degradation - could not be dealt with in the traditional sense of each state looking after its own interests. They required a genuinely collective response which involved transcending many of the parochial structures and preceptions of the present global system.

Richard Ashley's remarks on these seemingly 'un-Realistic' comments of Herz's refer to the deeply ingrained Hobbesian imagery of Realism. Ashley describes the rich images of Realism as portraying:

> a politically fragmented world of pervasive insecurity, recurring violence, generalized expectations of war, and self-animating strategic logic against strategic logic. So deeply ingrained is the associated Hobbesian imagery, in fact, that one need not <u>ask</u> how a realist will respond to recent writings that resurrect Kantian themes of emergent holistic imperatives in a world becoming 'one'. One <u>knows</u> the answer. Realists will decry as idealistic, dangerous, or dangerously idealistic those programs and practices, as advocated by 'ecological holists' and others, that would transcend the fragmented world of power politics. It is therefore something of a surprise to read the words of John Herz, who proclaims that he is a Realist, on the one hand, and who warmly embraces themes more Kantian than Hobbesian, on the other.[54]

While Ashley has captured the essence of Herz's position, I will take issue with him regarding the necessary relation of

'Hobbesian imagery' to a 'fragmented world of power politics' and also the distance he suggests to lie between Hobbes and Kant (who, I have already suggested, can be seen as participants in a historically evolving rationalist discourse).

Herz's position grows out of Hobbesian considerations regarding the relation of order to human collectivities. His discussions of the security dilemma noted how people came together into families, clans, corporations, and eventually states so that they could collectively mitigate the worst effects of the mistrust and fear extant in the world. These collectivities sought to maintain sufficient levels of security so that the other facets of life could be pursued. In other words, spheres of relative order were created to stave off the horrors of pluralism. Given this Hobbesian basis, Herz's tendency in terms of re-examining Realist concepts and the Realist conception of the world is to determine first, how applicable the Realist model remains and second, to what extent Realism is contributing to order in the world. Herz does both with quite admirable honesty but it is the second of these that most genuinely motivates the more radical shifts in his 'Realism'.

Herz returned to the original insights of Hobbes regarding the importance of the search for security in motivating humanity towards new political forms. By

reintroducing the Hobbesian formulation in the form of the security dilemma and at the level of international rather than domestic politics, Herz reintroduces the possibility of a force capable of pushing beyond the existing states-system towards a new international politics. When Herz makes suggestions as to how a broadened conception of security might be realized in actual practice however, his answer is both Hobbesian and Kantian. After describing the 'economic-demographic-ecological' (and one should add military) predicament the world is in, Herz goes on to suggest a general 'realistic' approach which includes 'radical systems change' in a variety of areas from global income distribution to revised plans for 'rational growth' given the finite nature of global resources.[55] His method for implementing this program is to suggest that: "Increased authority must be bestowed on supranational agencies by states yeilding portions of their cherished soveriegnty."[56] Herz is not, however, resigned to the global tyranny which Gauthier had suggested. He does agree with Gauthier that the competitive states-system is breaking down as a structure which expands order. He also agrees with him that this breakdown requires some centralization of authority to compensate for the destabilizing effects of the fragmented world system. In all of this Herz stays within traditional Hobbesian imagery. However, Herz is also quite explicit about distancing himself

from Hobbes when he suggests ways of overcoming the security dilemma.

This 'distancing' comes in the form of what Herz refers to as 'Realist liberalism'. It is the 'liberalism' which is the basis for Herz calling for more than the mere maintenance of order in the move towards a new international politics. Herz follows a path very similar to that taken by the rationalists before him and believes that global or bi-polar tyranny is unlikely for reasons we have already mentioned but that some form of higher authority above the state is necessary. His solution therefore is Kantian in that it points towards the increasing dangers of fragmentation as the source of an impetus towards mutual accommodation. Herz notes how his position

> presupposes changes of world views, of perceptions that must encompass what is universalist, internationalist, functionalist in the new approach....we must become aware of the worldwide givens...which have a way of imposing themselves even upon the seemingly richest and safest...[This] implies a radical change in the traditional approach to the problems of armaments and security...and transformation of an international order that is still characterized by a desperate clinging to national sovereignties.[57]

Whatever may be said about the merits of Herz's position, he defines security in a way which directly attacks the positions of Brodie and Wolfers while maintaining that he is still a Realist. Such disagreements emphatically underline the theoretical disarray surrounding the concept of security

within the Realist discourse.

Conclusion

In examining these three Realist attempts at developing a coherent concept of security we have uncovered a deeper fracture within the discourse. The dividing line along which this fracture extends is related to a variety of themes in the tradition of international relations theory. Most significant is the uncritical conflation of Hobbes and Machiavelli which has obscured an essential contradiction within the discourse - namely a contradictory attitude towards history and plurality. We have seen how Brodie and Wolfers examined security in the light of a radical pluralism which rendered security so intangible a concept that its definition must be the domain of experts and that such definition be entirely contingent on historical specifics. Entirely contingent that is, in everything except the states-system, which was eternal, and consequently also except in the sacrosanct necessity of each state unit determining its own security policies. Like the historicists before them, Brodie and Wolfers spent a great deal of time denying the validity of transcendent values, only to lose courage at the last minute and claim such a status for the plural states-system. Yet, also like the historicists, their conclusions regarding the ambiguity of security, its intimate relation to

the autonomous state, and its developmental location among experts or 'statesmen', depended on their demonstration that the states-system was representative of some eternal structure which governed the highest level of humanity's inter-relations and which re-enforced the pluralism which historicists like Treitshke so romanticized. Their failure to demonstrate the transcendental nature of the plural states-system leaves them begging the question.

Both Wolfers and Brodie provide interesting insights into the difficulties posed by the concept of security and its potential for abuse. However, the limitation imposed on them by their vision of a world permanently fragmented into competitive units frustrated their attempts to impose meaning on a concept which increasingly demanded what Herz called 'mutual accommodation'. It was this realization that their philosophical position allowed them no answer to the questions posed by emergent universal problems that formed the basis for their wishful odes to a brighter future.

Herz's position suffers from less confusion and less intellectual angst because his philosophical position was essentially rationalist. That is, when it became apparent to Herz that the states-system was providing an inadequate level of security he took the next logical step (in terms of the rationalist tradition) and broke out of the traditional Realist model of the plural states-system. He called instead

for a kind of federation of states in which limitations on state sovereignty were accepted in exchange for security from the worst dangers of the global anarchy. In this sense Herz's position is reminiscent of both Rousseau and Kant. Thus while Brodie and Wolfers remained caught in the obscuring conflation of rationalism and historicism, Herz gained some clarity by following the rationalist discourse to an emphasis on universal rather than parochial interests, and a renewed attack on the state as an improper vehicle to carry out this new emphasis. To Herz the difficulty in attaining a theoretically coherent conception of security lay not so much in its being 'essentially contested' as Wolfers had intimated, but rather in its association with other concepts tied to an uncritical and increasingly anachronistic body of Realist theory. The real problems with defining security for Herz were tied to affiliated Realist conceptions such as competition, pluralism, state autonomy, and national interest.

Realism, then, reflects through the concept of security a genuine ambivalence towards the state as a provider of citizen security. Whether this ambivalence is demonstrated through the abnegation of citizen responsibility for security by creating spheres of high and low politics or in Machiavelli's terms public and private <u>virtu</u>, or the more radical notion of centralizing world authority, the fact

remains that Realism has not been able to formulate a meaningful theoretical understanding of security which encompasses our dual nature as human beings and as citizens. The fractured terrain of Realist discourse regarding this question provides us with the same two answers already uncovered in earlier debates. That is, we find some Realists telling us the issue is dead because there is no such thing as humanity per se, only pluralism and the urge to empire (which must be avoided), while other Realists warn us of emerging global problems which demand that we lift our heads from the 'parochial sands' in which the states-system has thrust them.

However, there is something of promise in Herz's position. He is, after all, not so much discarding the mantle of Realism, as demanding that it do some fundamental re-examinations of itself in light of new events and the shadows they cast across old concepts. Herz, in essence, is challenging Realism to live up to its much vaunted ability to stare unblinkingly at the world and to see it for what it is without the need for intellectual sleight of hand or ideologically coloured glasses. It remains to be seen whether Ashley is right regarding the potential of Herz's challenge.

However, we cannot complete this analysis without examining the conceptual development of security within the

emergent universalist discourse. If we sense some positive element in Herz's new alliance with people such as Richard Barnet we must do so with caution. For it should be recalled that the rationalists had the same tendency to transcendence on the part of 'cosmopolitan' humanity as did the historicists on the part of 'fragmented' humanity. If the 'new universalists' are merely repeating the old rationalist mistakes, then they will get no further than did Wolfers and Brodie, who repeated the mistakes of the historicists. Beyond this, there is the realization that this emergent discourse might be outside the terrain of Realism and could well offer a parallel concept of security which further adds to the conceptual disarray already uncovered. It is to this dissenting discourse which we now turn.

Footnotes

[1]The central works of these writers are, Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York : The Macmillan Press, 1973) esp. Chapter 8, pp. 341-374. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration : Essays on International Politics (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962) John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and athe Security Dilemma", World Politics, No. 2, January 1950. International Politics in the Atomic Age, (New York : Columbia University Press, 1959). Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1951) and "Political Realism Revisited," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2 (June 1981).

[2]Herz, "Pllitical Realism Revisted".

[3]Brodie, War and Politics, pp. 341-374.

[4]Ibid., p. 342.

[5]Ibid., p. 343.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid., p. 344.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid., pp. 344-345.

[11]Ibid., p. 347.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid., p. 358.

[14]Ibid., pp. 358-359.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Wolfers, Discord and Coillaboration: Essays on International Politics, see especially, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," pp. 147-165.

[17]Ibid., p. 147.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid., p. 148.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid., p. 149.

[22]Ibid., p. 150.

[23]Walter Lippman, U.S. Foreign Policy : Shield of the Republic (Boston : Little, Brown and Co., 1943), p. 51, c.f. Arnold Wolfers, (1962), p. 150.

[24]Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration : Essays on Internaqtional Politics, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," p. 150.

[25]Ibid., emphasis added.

[26]Ibid, p. 153.

[27]Ibid, p. 154.

[28]Ibid., p. 155.

[29]Ibid., p. 156.

[30]Buzan, People, States, and Fear : The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p.4.

[31]Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration : Essay on International Politics, "Amity and Enmity Among Nations", p. 35.

[32]Ibid., "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", p. 165.

[33]Ibid., "Political Theory and International Relations", p. 251.

[34]Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", p. 157.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 11.

[37]Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", p. 158.

[38]Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 233.

[39] see Herbert Butterfield's, Christianity and History (New York, 1950); History and Human Relations (New York, 1952) and his essay "The Tragic Element in Modern International Conflict," Review of Politics, 12:147 ff. (1950).

[40]Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Agae, p. 235. It is also useful to note footnote 4 on p. 234 in which Herz denies the ultimate Hobbesian character of his own work, claiming instead a liberal philosophical heritage. It will become clear as we go along, that in terms of the Hobbes which this paper has tried to excavate from international Realist theory (that is, the Hobbes who was part of a universalist tension within Realism) Herz remains easily within the Hobbesian, if not so clearly the Realist tradition.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Ibid., p. 236.

[43]Ibid., p. 237.

[44]Ibid., p. 238.

[45]Ibid., p. 239.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ibid., p. 240.

[49]Ibid., p. 241.

[50]Raymond Aron, On War : Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy. trans. Terence Kilmartin (London : Secker and Warburg, 1958) p. 42.

[51]Herz, "Political Realism Revisited" p. 184.

[52]Ibid., p. 188.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," International Studies Quarterly, volume 25, number 2 (June, 1981), p. 205.

[55]Herz, "Political Realism Revisisted" p. 195.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Ibid., pp. 195-196.

Chapter V

Emerging Forms of Dissent

The failure of modern international Realism to provide a theoretical framework capable of generating a concept of security adequate to the present world situation has resulted in the emergence of a number of dissenting voices. In a general sense, these voices can be divided into three distinct and influential formulations.

The first of these is a renewed attempt on the part of some writers to offer a synthesis between Realism and Idealism. The most detailed and developed argument along this line is that offered by Buzan who argues (as noted in Chapter One) that it is the concept of security itself which will provide the bridge capable of undermining the dualism in international relations theory. The second formulation is an attempt to reassert the universalizing themes of rationalism and to use these to challenge Realist assumptions regarding the nature of the plural states-system. This 'voice' can be heard most clearly by examining it on the basis of: (1) its reassertion of the existence of a universal ethic or morality; and (2) its reassertion of socio-economic arguments for the necessity of a universalist alternative to plural competition at the international level. The final approach to the concept of security is most often identified with non-Western (though still liberal) theorists and asserts that

international relations theory must be understood in terms of its relationship to the present distribution of world power. It claims that so long as the West retains its underlying imperialist and competitive dispositions not only in the realm of international relations but, more deeply, towards nature itself, security is an unattainable goal. This chapter will concern itself with an examination of these emerging voices in order to place them within the historical context of the ongoing debates already analyzed and also to critically take stock of their potential for overcoming the theoretical deadlock that has resulted in today's division of liberal international relations theory into Idealism and Realism.

The Terrain of Dissent I : The Failure of Buzan's Synthesis

It is time now to recall the challenge with which this work began. That is, the challenge which Barry Buzan threw down when he claimed that the concept of security could be 'habilitated' in such a way as to move beyond the great dualisms that we have traced in this thesis.[1] Confronted with this problem, Carr and Meinecke gave up in despair. Herz claimed to have found a solution in his notion of 'Realist liberalism' but wound up labelled by his fellow Realists as a 'liberal utopian'.[2] Buzan claims to have found

a solution that all these people have missed, and a way to synthesize the insights of Realism and Idealism; to bring into harmony the obligations of the citizen and the member of the human race; and finally to overcome the tension between pluralism and universalism. The solution, Buzan claims, lies in the universality of our search for security.

Returning to Hobbes' insight regarding insecurity as the source of all politics, Buzan takes the position that despite this centrality, the concept of security tends to be defined by the means used to acquire it rather than by the actual condition of being secure. As was noted in Chapter I, Buzan believes that the two great means to security in international relations theory have always been power on the one hand and peace on the other. Power, Buzan tells us, is the means to security in, and the central organizing concept of, Realism, while peace plays the same role for Idealism. The problem with both perspectives, for Buzan, is that neither of them grants security its proper pride of place. Indeed, both tend to treat security as a consequence of either having power or attaining peace.

Buzan credits both the Realist and the Idealist positions with providing a partial understanding of international relations. The Realist or power based position emphasizes "the parts of the international system [states] at the expense of the whole, and the dynamic of conflict at the

expense of that of harmony."[3] On the other hand, the Idealist or peace based position emphasizes "both the international system as a whole, and individuals as its ultimate building bloc, at the expense of states, and...the dynamic of harmony at the expense of that of conflict."[4] Buzan goes on to note that the peace perspective focuses primarily on the possibility of a universal basis for politics while the power perspective emphasizes the eternal nature of international pluralism.

What emerges out of this fracture is a barrier to what Buzan calls 'progressive thinking'. As he explains:

> In part, this barrier arises from the antagonism generated between those Realists and Idealists who take strong stands on either side of the divide. More subtly it arises by locking patterns of thought in the unhelpful structure of an apparently unresolvable dilemma...Up to a point, opposition between basic concepts is fruitful. Each serves to stimulate the other by providing a contrast, and criticism creates incentives to sharpen and deepen thinking. Beyond that point, however, the process declines into diminishing and eventually negative returns. Opposition becomes institutionalized and politicised, and creative thinking is either overridden by the rituals of intellectual entrenchment, or stifled by the lack of creative room within the tight contradictory confines of the peace/power dilemma. It is my view that this is the situation in which we now find ourselves.[5]

In other words, international relations theory requires a new approach and perspective that will embrace the best of both Realism and Idealism while breaking out of the dilemma that is blocking progressive and creative thinking.

Buzan believes the concept of security will:

> lead us to a prime motive for behaviour which is different from, but no less useful than that provided by power, and to a holistic perspective which is likewise different from, but no less useful than that provided by peace...a more fully developed concept of security can be seen to lie between the extremes of power and peace, and to enrich both of them. It provides many ideas which link the established conventions of the other two schools and help to bridge the gulf which normally, and to their mutual detriment, separates them. We shall argue that security is more usefully viewed as a companion to, rather than a derivative of, power, and that it is more usefully viewed as a prior condition of peace than a consequence of it.[6]

Buzan claims to have developed a concept with which to overturn the old dualities that have plagued Western thought about international relations since the emergence of the modern states-system. Nevertheless his synthesis is more appropriately understood as a neo-Realist formulation of the problem that remains state-centric and ultimately party to the ambiguities and internal contradictions of Realist thought generally. Given this, Buzan is unable to provide a concept of security which breaks free of the difficulties already noted in Realist theory on the concept.

One of Buzan's basic premises is that the historicists were right to defend the underlying plurality of humanity in terms of its cultural, political, and economic variations. This natural diversity creates naturally, an international political order that is necessarily fragmented. It forms what Buzan calls an anarchy. As he explains:

> The rationale of anarchy is the political primacy of the parts over the whole. Anarchy is not chaos but a decentralized form of political order...An international anarchy expresses not only the historical and political variety of humanity, but also the profound absence of even a basis for universal agreement on an organizing ideology for the planet as a whole. Anarchy emphasizes the values of independence, self-determination, and cultural identity, and the stability of the system lies in the resilience of the units which compose it.[7]

Like the historicists of the Romantic period, Buzan points to the obvious plurality of human societies and warns that attempts to constrain this abundance under a single organizing ideology will only result in cultural imperialism or resistance and instability.

However, like the historicists before him, Buzan's commitment to pluralism at the international level leads him into a fairly traditional defense of the state and the states system. He begins this defense by noting that the fear of insecurity has motivated human beings to come together in organized collectivities. These organizations range from cooperatives and insurance companies to political parties and states. Buzan argues that the "modern state is the highest form of such organization so far achieved."[8] He then relates the state to the states-system in a traditional formulation of the impact of the legal notion of state sovereignty on the system:

> Sovereignty and anarchy represent the opposite ends of the same political phenomenon: the claim of sovereignty by the actors in the system

> automatically defines relations among them as anarchic...It describes the basic organizing principle of the international system which, so long as states continue to define themselves as sovereign, is not affected by the level of interaction or interdependence among the units concerned.[9]

This argument gives Buzan a plausible explanation for the states-system based on the work of Kenneth Waltz.[10] Buzan's next point is also predictable given his adherence to the historicist tradition up to this point; he argues that the states-system is permanent. He believes the evidence for this is both theoretical and empirical. On the theoretical side he believes an 'invisible hand' operates in the system to maintain the self-interested struggle of each state unit as it seeks its own preservation:

> This 'invisible hand' mechanism means that the uncoordinated and unconscious behaviour of the units continuously regenerates the character of the system in which they are all embedded. The units and the system are thus linked in a mutually reinforcing relationship which is extraordinarily difficult to break.[11]

On the empirical side Buzan points to the robustness of a system that has lasted more than three centuries and which has, in the last three decades, "tripled its membership and expanded to encompass virtually the whole of humankind within the framework of modern states."[12] Buzan claims that this universalization of the state form has resulted in the most extensive political fragmentation in human history.

He goes on to note that this expansion of the state

form has occurred at the same time as a host of other developments that were often used to herald the impending collapse of the states-system. Such revolutions in human affairs as the emergence of a global economy, the exponential growth of the destructive potential of military technologies, and two twentieth century attempts to construct universal political organizations have not, Buzan tells us, stemmed the move towards the creation of more and more sovereign units. Buzan believes that:

> No compelling evidence suggests that any of the new revolutions now beginning to impinge on human affairs will have any better fortune in breaking the grip of anarchy. Neither global communications nor environmental interdependence, for example, look at all likely to provide greater leverage than the economic and military developments that have already failed to shift the deeply institutionalized structure of human political relations at the international level.[13]

Seeing no forces at work that have the potential to undermine the states-system, Buzan argues that any practical approach to the problem of insecurity must treat the anarchic states-system as highly durable and indeed as being "essentially fixed."[14] Buzan begins with a defense of pluralism on historicist grounds and, like the other historicists we have examined, ends by arguing that the states-system is the ultimate and permanent form of human organization, at least within the context of any reasonable human time frame.

In a manner reminiscent of Waltz, Buzan notes that the ultimate cause of war is the states-system itself and that

therefore differences within units in the system are secondary:

> This focus on the anarchy...discounts factors arising within states as a cause of war, such as the difference between democratic and totalitarian governments. The argument here is that such differences make only a secondary contribution to the problem of war. The historical record does not conspicuously identify any type of state as peaceful, and ideological analysis is highly divided as to the merits of different forms of political-economy in relation to the questions of aggressiveness.[15]

Also like Waltz, Buzan relies on a schema of three possible "levels of analysis" - the individual, the state, and the states-system or anarchy. As individuals are incapable of doing much to overcome their insecurity as individuals, they only become politically important actors in the search for security when they come together in organizations. The highest form of organization by individuals seeking security is the state and Buzan has already made it clear that what goes on at the sub-state level is not important in terms of how the state functions in the competitive states-system.[16] The states-system in turn is made up of individual states each with 'some kind of capacity' and each facing one another as autonomous units.

Like Waltz again, Buzan also offers a highly mechanistic interpretation of the states-system. His argument that individuals are important only in so far as they are the building blocks of states, and that states are

more or less undifferentiated units functioning within the 'laws' of a larger system, causes Buzan to look for solutions to the problem of conflict at the system level. Buzan is led to a prescriptive solution to the problem based on balance of power politics among units.

The characterization of international politics as anarchical refers to the lack of an overarching political authority. Within the confines of this limitation, Buzan asks us to "imagine a spectrum of anarchies ranging from very primitive at one end to highly developed at the other."[17] A primitive anarchy for Buzan, is one in which the state units are internally unstable and refuse to acknowledge one another's legitimacy. Within such a system, Buzan believes something like Hobbes' state of nature would exist where each state stared out from behind its battlements at the others with its security resting only on its own and unstable coercive capabilities. This end of the spectrum portrays a vision approximating chaos.

At the other end of this spectrum is a highly developed anarchy. This form of anarchy retains the sovereignty of units within it but adds to this sovereignty the feature of mutual recognition and respect among the constituent units. This recognition would be based on the acceptance of one another's right to sovereignty and the belief that each state is the political equal of the others. As Buzan explains:

> Units would accord each other recognition as political equals, and boundaries amongst them would be fixed according to some set of common principles derived from factors such as race or nationality or geography. Ideological differences in the domestic organization of units might be quite profound, but there would be agreement on political non-interference in each other's affairs.[18]

Buzan places our present situation somewhere between these two poles and offers us the hope that the states-system can and indeed should, move to the highly developed end of the spectrum. However, if we pause to consider the sketchy example Buzan offers us of one possible formulation of a developed anarchy, the underlying difficulties of his position become clear.

When describing that happy world of mutual respect noted above, Buzan offers us the following possible scenario:

> Such a system might be organized around a number of very large units, each relatively self-reliant in economic terms, and each capable of mounting a credible military deterrent. The units themselves would also have to be internally cohesive and stable in order for the system as a whole to be stable.[19]

This depiction of a developed anarchy presents us with a world in which relatively few very powerful and more or less self-sufficient states face each in a mutual standoff. Each of Buzan's large units is capable of decoupling itself from the international economy, if necessary, and so has no need to fear the economic power of other states or to feel an economic need for expansion. Each unit forms at least a

possible, closed economic system. Beyond this removal of economic causes of conflict, Buzan also maintains that each unit must have a believable military deterrent. A mature anarchy based on these requirements does not seem to be one in which mutual respect has played much of a role.

Indeed, it seems that Buzan wants to reintroduce the classic Realist notion of the impenetrable state as the solution to the problem of maintaining security in a plural and competitive world. He ends up with a mechanistic interpretation of the states-system which prescribes a balance of power solution because: 1) it lacks a theory of the state and therefore treats states as though they were objects colliding in a Newtonian universe and subject to similar laws; and 2) because he assumes the states-system to be a fixed feature of international relations and therefore ends up treating a historical phenomenon as though it were eternal, concrete (the problem of reification of the state), and universal in form. Ultimately, Buzan's position is no more capable of accounting for the shift from the medieval to the modern international system than was Waltz's. Buzan falls into the trap that has haunted historicist depictions of the international realm since their inception. He argues against the peace perspective because of its use of universalism to transcend the plurality of the world only to

impose his own transcendent form on the world - the states-system.

Buzan's depiction of a mature anarchy also points towards his theoretical ties to the tensions and contradictions of modern international Realism. Firstly, Buzan's belief that a mature anarchy should be made up of units which are more or less economically self-sufficient and militarily equal in power, indicates that he believes the growing interdependence of the world's economy and its fragmentation into units of varied power, is a block to the progressive shift towards maturity:

> A trend towards a system composed of relatively large units (super-states) in relatively small numbers, might well facilitate the development of a more mature anarchy. Such units would be better able to provide the internal strength and stability which is necessary for a harmonious anarchy, and would aggregate international interests more efficiently than is possible under the current degree of fragmentation...Aggregation into super-states might then help to compensate for the differences in economic and industrial strength which appear likely to persist in the international system.[20]

Buzan emphasizes this position again when discussing the virtues of an international economy based on Robert Gilpin's principles of 'benign mercantilism'. Buzan tells us that under such a regime, super-states "would provide both the internal economic scale, and the multipolar military stand-off, necessary to contain the dynamic of expansion."[21]

By arguing in this direction Buzan demonstrates that

while his assumptions regarding pluralism are based on ideas such as self-determination and autonomy among cultures, they are ideas which conflict with his vision of a mature anarchy. Buzan's portrayal of the necessity for large self-sufficient units tends to indicate that pluralism is a relative concept for him. It would seem that in order to maintain pluralism, Buzan is willing to forego a considerable amount of self-determination and autonomy. His mature anarchy of super-states would not represent as many reflections of the 'divine spark' as would his primitive anarchy. This indicates that, for Buzan, it is the maintenance of the plural system itself which is more important than the principles of pluralism.

It also indicates that the primary goal in all of this is the very Hobbesian one of maintaining order. Buzan's commitment to the plural states-system does not allow him to go as far as Gauthier did and claim that order demands the formation of a world state. Buzan opts instead for a middle ground of fewer and larger states. Buzan is searching for a means to bring order to a plural system. His position is one in which pluralism is morally prior to universalism, but order is prior to morality. Buzan has not escaped the central features of modern Realism or the elements of its despair.

Let us briefly review the Realist assumptions we have uncovered in Buzan's work. First, there is the hierarchy of

priorities. This hierarchy leads to the assumption that the states-system is for all intents and purposes, eternal, and that the modern state is its necessary and central protagonist. This focus on the state and states-system is decoupled from the internal organization of the states within the system by claiming that the system itself imposes laws of behaviour on state's interactions which are not domestically affected. Thus, the separation of 'high' and 'low' politics and the avoidance of the need for a theory of the state. Most important, however, is the belief underlying all of the above, that in essence international relations is not about politics but rather is about fear and insecurity and is resolvable in the final analysis only through some form of deterrence. Hence, Buzan's claim to have uncovered a new perspective from which to view international relations collapses into an argument for an 'efficient' pluralism made up of impenetrable states which nevertheless remain in tension 'having their weapons pointing, their eyes fixed on one another'.

Given all this, it is not surprising that Buzan's attempted 'habilitation' of the concept of security does not take us very far. The citizen still has to look to the state as the primary source of security. The tension between obligations at the levels of citizen and member of the human species are ignored at the cost of reproducing a mechanistic

interpretation of international politics. Buzan does pay greater attention to the need for cooperation than some of his predecessors but notes that cooperation can only be the result of security founded on the self-sufficiency and military capability of each state unit. While claiming to offer us a unified theory of international relations, Buzan, in reality, provides us with a fairly traditional Realist understanding of world politics and does not take us much beyond where we were when Hobbes first suggested the relationship between insecurity and the modern states-system.

The Terrain of Dissent II : Neo-Kantianism, the Individual and Democracy

Against such attempts to overcome the dualism in international relations theory, there have emerged voices critical of the plural states-system. These voices come form a variety of sources. The World Order Models Project for instance, has been created out of a felt need for some form of discourse to begin between these varied sources. One of the projects' voices seems particularly pertinent at this juncture. The voice is that of Lynn H. Miller whose pertinence lies in the universalist perspective he takes in developing a counter argument to the vision of competitive pluralism offered by the mechanistic theories of writers such as Waltz and Buzan. Miller is important because he

reintroduces the discourse between rationalism and historicism in the context of the late twentieth century. Specifically he asks us to pay Kant the privilege of taking his theoretical position seriously. To see, in other words, if the concept of security might not be better understood if it were based on the idea of individual responsibility and universal obligation. He does this by questioning the potential of existing structures for change and raising the issue of democracy at the level of international relations. These two questions importantly reintroduce the problem of the tension which exists between the obligations of a citizen and the obligations of a member of humanity as such.

In Miller we can find both a frustration with the existing situation of competitive fragmentation and the belief that this very situation creates the opportunity to move beyond it. He tells us that, "the possibilities for creating a globally integrated civilization seem to be within the grasp of those of us living today."[22]

However, Miller's 'global civilization' is not the world tyranny of Gautier or even the technically efficient bureaucracy of Lester Brown. Miller focuses his optimism, not on the overarching structures of modernity, but on the collective actions of individuals. So far as Miller is concerned it is patently ridiculous to look for radical change from within structures which would in essence be

destroying themselves by seeking such change. The type of change Miller believes to be necessary today must be the result of individuals coming together to force their will on established and resistant structures:

> Few of us individually possess the kind of power that determines substantial social change and, what is worse, we must conclude that most of the politically powerful individuals in the world have, precisely because they hold it, the greatest stake in the established order and therefore resistance to change. But each of us can try to act in accordance with Kant's categorical imperative, namely, as if we wished and expected our individual actions to become universal laws.[23]

For Miller, reason demands that individuals must collectively break the hold of the states-system from below. The individuals who control these structures have a stake in their maintenance, therefore it is the majority of people who must show the way by the power of their example and action.

Miller calls for harmony with nature, for an end to the process of militarization, for the development of a global society based on social justice, and on an equitable global system for distributing wealth. The possibilities for accomplishing this are at hand he believes, because the danger of not doing so is so great, and also because we have the technology to provide what he calls, the best 'social order', one which would allow for "local control and autonomy in policy making, but link us in a global network of social solidarity."[24] This is not based on a model of technological determinism, but on the belief in an underlying community of

humankind that can assert itself through the application of reason in neo-Kantian terms. As Miller explains:

> although no single actor can control the behavior of others, each can behave as it wills others to behave and thereby lead the way to a more just world order through the force of its example...for it is men and women motivated by a vision of greater justice who have the power to improve the world.[25]

This stress on the individual once again raises the problem of obligation. Given the lack of security provided by the state, the individual should not be obligated to that structure in its present form. Indeed the individual should expect that the state should change or wither away as it finds itself incapable of fulfilling its basic function of providing security to its members. Yet, as Miller points out, states will obviously resist such changes. We arrive at the paradoxical position in which a structure that is in part legitimized by the claim to provide security for its citizens can no longer fulfill this function and so reacts by pursuing its own security even when such a pursuit reduces the security of its citizens. For Miller, this fundamental contradiction provides a way for individuals to force the transformation of anachronistic and recalcitrant structures. In essence he is seeking a way to recover democracy.

Miller's democratic vision owes a great deal to Kantian ethics and is not simply a technical argument for survival or a renewed attempt to restore order (as we uncovered in the

works of Brown and Gautier earlier). Miller shares with Brown and Gauthier, the view that the existing system of autonomous self-interested states is a dangerous anachronism given the emerging problems in contemporary world politics. Each argues that a statist understanding of security is no longer adequate to reality. Security must be conceived as it relates to a variety of threats which are no longer exclusively military or capable of being dealt with through the actions of a single actor. The only solution to this situation, they agree, is a universalist attempt to cooperate in transforming the states-system so that the species may survive.

But security to Brown is related to the application of technical solutions to technical problems. Whatever stands in the way of the application of technical and bureaucratically rational solutions is dangerous and contributes to insecurity. Brown argues from this perspective that to base a measurement of security on factors such as comparative military power or gross national product is to ignore the growing and scientifically demonstrable threats from other sectors. Thus, a security policy that spends billions of dollars building missiles but ignores the threat of acid rain is technically incoherent to Brown. Equally, Brown extends his analysis to include a variety of other 'technical' problems such as global food production,

population growth, and resource allocation and extraction. He argues that security must include reference to more than 'threats of a traditional military nature' and must extend to those of an ecological and economic nature as well.[26] Further, such reference must take into account the global nature of these threats and it must be realized that dealing with these threats requires cooperation not competition. This transition must come through a change at the top levels of our societies and in the building of new structures designed to deal with these new forces through the application of technical means.

Gautier's perception of the problem of growing insecurity by contrast, relates less to the technical aspect of specific solutions than to the origins of the problem in human nature. For Gautier, humanity has always attempted to escape insecurity by coming together in organized groups. First the family, then the tribe or clan, then the state with its subsidiary groupings of corporations, etc. The level of insecurity now represented by the 'bomb' has become so high, as to force humankind into what Gautier considers to be the next logical and probably final form of social contract, the global state. The plural system does not work, so a unitary system is the only solution. Security, to Gautier, is perceived in relatively narrow military categories but nevertheless involves a rejection of the states-system and a

call for some form of world government.

Thus both for Brown and for Gautier alike, the problem of modern insecurity is properly resolved at the level of supra-state agencies that will make the necessary and appropriate changes and then impose them on the planet's population. This is not to say that Brown, for instance, is recommending or even pointing towards the collapse of democratic forms but that both Brown and Gauthier see the possibility for change coming only from the top levels of state and international organizations and then 'trickling' down to the individual. As individuals, we are asked to accept that our security is dependent on decisions made at the level of overarching structures. Miller points out that this must be a vain hope given that these very overarching structures are responsible for the crisis of security which we now face. In fact, Miller captures some of the suspicion of "top down" solutions to problems of security that emanate from many contemporary social movements.

For Miller, the dynamic involved in a shift in power structures is most likely to come from outside those structures. His basic theme is that the central problem with existing structures is their failure to provide adequate security from threats of a global nature. While these threats impinge on structures as well as individuals, it is only the individuals who can be expected to call for any

radical transformation of the structures.

Given this, security once again becomes a question of the relation between the citizen and the state. The questions Miller asks revolve around the role of the citizen in a situation where the state stands as an essential generator of insecurity to itself, to the individual, and also to humanity. Once again the citizen is torn between obligations to the state and an awareness that such obligations are in contradiction with those owed humankind and, within the modern vernacular of absolute threats, also in contradiction with the obligations owed oneself and one's family. The old argument is reborn in a dramatically new sense. The citizen is asked to consider the security environment provided by the state and to compare the short term benefits it may offer against the long term series of absolute catastrophes it portends.

So far as Miller is concerned the citizen can only conclude that if the state cannot adjust itself to allow for both sets of obligations to be in harmony then the state abnegates its role as a provider of citizen security and cannot claim citizen obligations. Security then becomes a concept bound up with the citizen's ability to control his or her relationship with the state in terms of overarching obligations owed to humanity as such. As Miller notes, no nation-state's members should forget "that others are

composed of the same species as themselves, motivated by the same biological and spiritual needs."[27]

Security here is indivisible. It does not require the creation of a new set of institutions at the inter-state level to handle specifically inter-state questions. This solution merely denies the origin of the problem in the separation of citizen and species obligations in the first place. Security lies in bringing these levels back into harmony. Global threats must be seen as threats also to individuals. Each individual is responsible for making sure that obligations between these levels are more or less consistent. Security, for Miller, lies in a balance between particular and universal needs and obligations, with universal ones remaining primary. As he understands the particular needs of the state to be in contradiction with the universal needs of humankind, he conceives security to lie in the ability of individuals to demand that the state change or be transcended so that their obligations are once again in balance.

Brown and Gautier point out that we must rethink our ideas about state sovereignty and the traditional methods we have used to resolve conflicts. A radical shift is required for us to think in the categories of domestic politics when we turn to the international sphere. They are not optimistic about this change but believe it is necessary if we are to

regain a modicum of security. Miller is more radical in the shift he requires in that it involves not only overcoming the traditional split between 'high' and 'low' politics but goes further to point out the necessity of overcoming pluralism to create 'a globally integrated civilization'. That is, to see ourselves not as members of specific groups - racial, linguistic, geographic or otherwise - but to realize our participation in these subgroups is secondary to our participation in the species group. Beyond this however, Miller's position requires that the present crisis of security can only be overcome by individuals demanding the right to participate in the political process at all levels and not to be frozen out by existing structures at the state and inter-state level. There is certainly no place in this universal moral argument for the Machiavellian 'Prince' or the Realist's 'statesman'.

Terrain of Dissent II - 1 : Perpetual Peace Revisted?

Rationalist themes have also been revived in a more empirical context than Miller's call for 'a globally integrated' and democratic civilization. The increasing destructive potential of war has again been raised as an argument for an end to war and also to military conceptions of security. The socioeconomic costs to an international system which views war as a legitimate means of conflict

'resolution' are also once again being pointed to as indicators of the 'rational' necessity for change. All of this is placed in the context of a world 'becoming one'.

A good example of these themes can be found in the recent work: Common Security: A Programme for Disarmanent under the Chairmanship of the late Olaf Palme.[28] Taken as a whole, The Palme Commission's call for a conceptualization of security based on mutual accommodation and social and economic justice should be seen in light of its relation to earlier manifestations of rationalist critiques of international relations theory. In relation, that is, to Rousseau, Kant, and Wilsarian Idealism. The Palme Commission has taken these themes and reintroduced them in the context of the late twentieth century under the rubric of Common Security. This section will be concerned with making Common Security's heritage explicit and also with determining whether this heritage is an obstacle to its overcoming the dualism which has haunted international relations theory.

The two most important themes that 'Common Security' shares with its rationalist predecessors are, first, that technological change in the military sphere has rendered war useless as a form of international conflict resolution, and second, that the concept of sovereignty is no longer applicable to the modern states-system. However, it is important not to confuse this most recent attack on the

plural states-system with the earlier idea of Collective Security. There are important distinctions to be noted.

One distinction that stands out immediately is the greater sophistication of analysis that Common Security promises in coming to terms with modern political, cultural, and economic forms of interdependence. Another is the awareness of the dual role that armaments are increasingly playing as "both weapons and commodities." While neither of these areas is followed up by the Commission, its role is to suggest necessary areas of study and to provide, through the idea of Common Security, a goal towards which humanity can move.

The Commission devotes a large portion of its report to the political and economic distortions generated by continuous high levels of military spending. It notes a number of ways in which such distortions come about. One fairly obvious form of distortion is the diversion to the military of government spending from areas such as health, education or assistance programs for the poor (some of the things Rousseau pointed out as the progressive casualties of militarization). This type of policy decision regarding government spending falls unevenly on the citizens of the world's states. The developed industrial states have been able, for the most part, to compensate for high military spending through economic expansion. However, since the oil

price increases of the early 1970's the Commission noted that economic expansion became less dependable and much more industrially specific. It is no longer possible to count on a larger economic pie from which to cut the military's ever growing piece.[30] Because of this slower and more erratic form of expansion, the costs of increased military spending around the world are falling on social services and often, the Commission points out, on those least able to afford it. This last point can be seen in the way in which weapons systems have been used as commodities by the West and sold abroad to improve its balance of payments.

The majority of these sales have gone to the Third World where military expenditures have also been going up dramatically.[31] Developing nations however, do not have the wherewithal to cushion the effects of high military spending from their citizens. As the Commission notes, "in a developing nation the decision to add a battalion or buy a warship constitutes more than a mere budgetary choice, it often results in increased human deprivation of the poorer members of that society."[32] In circumstances such as the above, one has to begin to ask who's security is being increased or maintained. The malnourished, unmedicated, and impoverished citizens of such a state will no doubt be confused as to what they have which requires so much sacrifice to protect. Yet even in industrialized nations the

growth of military spending is becoming an increasingly burdensome cost threatening a variety of other social sectors. Here we come across one of the ironies which the Commission points out with regard to military spending: "the more we strive for security from external threats by building up armed forces, the more vulnerable we become to the internal threats of economic failure and social disruption."[33]

These types of economic and political distortions are only the surface of the problem. The Commission points out that the military sector of a state's economy is not very efficient in terms of producing jobs, socially productive and useful products, or the base for future economic well being. Indeed, not only are the civilian public and private sectors better at all three of the above economic criteria for national prosperity, but the military sector, if it grows too big, is counter-productive in each instance.[34] There are a number of reasons for this.

First, the high levels of sophistication and complexity in military technology often mean that it is too expensive to be of use in the commercial sector, where cost and ease of production are important. The development and production of these technologies requires a large number of highly skilled workers in the fields of engineering, physics, computer science, and the machinist trades. This becomes a problem

for the civilian sector as more and more of these people go to work for the military. For poorer nations this trend in military technology means that such technologies must be imported and at high cost. The same problem exists for them in terms of service and replacement parts which must be purchased from the producing state. This is having the effect of dramatically increasing military expenditures in the Third World and in some cases creating dependences between 'client' states and the state on which they depend for their arms.

Second, military research and development is often shrouded in secrecy. The tendency to 'classify' the innovations of military research and development further reduces the chances of 'spin-offs' to the civilian sector and also the long run benefits of military spending in terms of economic growth. The political side of this issue of secrecy is the detrimental effect it can have on the scientific communities that are increasingly drawn into military research. As the Commission explains:

> Military science requires qualities - secrecy and the isolation of scientists - which are not necessarily favourable to civilian research, or to civilian diffussion of discoveries. The most spectacular applications of American research in military electronics have come not in the U.S. but in a country - Japan - with a different and impeccably civilian organization of science, technology, and commercial innovation; whose military industry is about the size of its toy industry; and which, with an economy over half the size of the U.S. spends less than one hundreth as

much public money on military research.[35]

This problem of secrecy takes on a more sinister connotation in the Third World where it is occasionally expressed in the extreme form of state 'liquidation' of dissidents and intellectuals. Even in this extreme variant however, the underlying principle is the same - the free - flow of information and the exchange of ideas is, to varying degrees, viewed as a threat to state security.

The Commission argues that the lack of democratic structures at the international level has allowed the trend towards militarization to go more or less unchallenged. This failure of democracy, it suggests, has resulted in the growing size and influence of socio-economic forces that have generated serious economic and cultural distortions and expanded the role of weapons as an international commodity.

In terms of examining the overall stability of the present structure of world military forces, the Commission points to a number of destabilizing trends. The first of these is an aspect of what has been called the self-perpetuating momentum of military science in which the innovations and directions of research are determined more by what is possible than what is strategically required.[36] Second, the trend of this innovation is towards greater complexity and destructiveness. This trend means that wars, when they occur, tend to be more costly in terms of lives,

destruction of economic resources, and in terms of the actual cost of war materials themselves. As most wars occur outside of the superpower blocs this increased cost is born largely in the Third World. However, the destabilization of entire regions within the 'Third World' such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East increases the risk of war between the superpowers. This escalation in the possibility of global warfare is further increased by the superpowers and their alliances' continual arms racing whereby the acquisition of ever more weapons (whether they be conventional or nuclear) is viewed by the Commission as reducing the world's overall security.[37]

The fundamental point of all of this is that in a variety of ways - economic, political, social, and cultural - a narrow emphasis on the military as the fundamental source of security is ultimately self-defeating.

This presents a more complex picture of the interconnected nature of the world than was presented in the concept of Collective Security. As the Commission explains:

> National boundaries are no longer, if they ever were, impervious shields, the penetration of which could be prevented by military forces. Populations cannot huddle behind national borders, build up armed forces, and cut themselves off from the rest of the world in order to live securely. In part, this is because of the great economic interdependence of the international community and the ways that modern communications and transportation are binding us together as a global audience to all events. More pointedly our interdependence reflects the crucial technological

> fact of the contemporary age: there are no effective defences against missiles armed with nuclear warheads; none exist now and none are likely to be developed in the foreseeable future.[38]

Thus, the emphasis of advocates of Collective Security on the dangers posed by armaments industries and self-interested governments are still part of the rationale for the idea of Common Security, but they are now less conspiratorial than institutional, less an evil to be met with goodness than a series of connected, entrenched and out-dated interests to be saved from themselves. The central point of distinction between the notion of Collective Security and that of Common Security however, remains the revolution in military strategy brought on by the advent of nuclear devices. In spite of this, the 'principles' of Common Security are remarkably similar to previous rationalist plans for peace.

Common Security as an idea has emerged in reaction to a growing feeling that we face a unique crisis of security - a crisis which was impending when Kant wrote on 'Perpetual Peace', dangerously close and much more serious when Wilson spoke of 'Collective Security', and now, because of nuclear weapons, is upon us demanding immediate attention. The Commission makes this point by emphasizing that the state is no longer impermeable. Further, the modern situation in which states find themselves threatened by nuclear armed missiles is qualitatively different from anything previously

experienced. It is a type of permeability that challenges traditional conceptions of security in that it requires the realization that security cannot be attained through the actions of single actors. As the Commission explains; "no matter what unilateral choices a nation makes in pursuit of security, it will remain vulnerable to nuclear attack and thus ultimately insecure."[39]

Like Kant and Rousseau before them, those proposing Common Security do so out of a conviction that war has become too costly and too destructive to remain an element of human politics. And like the previous rationalist proposals to end war, they offer us a set of guiding principles to direct us from where we are now towards a world of cooperation: a world where states realize they "cannot achieve security at each other's expense".[40] Whether the goal is Perpetual Peace, Collective Security, or Common Security, the idea is to present the concept as a goal to which reason demands we move.

If, for instance, we think back to the four principles that Kant felt were essential for attaining the state of perpetual peace, we find that the principles behind Common Security's programme are for all intents and purposes, identical. Kant felt that overcoming international conflict would require the slow construction of an 'edifice of international law'. The Commission proposes, 'a return to

the vision of the U.N. Charter', and offers a series of proposals for strengthening the United Nations as a legal arbiter between nations.[41] Kant declared that all coercive action at the international level was illegitimate except where a state was defending itself from an act of aggression. The Commission also calls for the renunciation of force except in the case of self-defense.[42] Kant insisted that once a state joined others in the 'bond of non-aggression' there could be no interference with that state's internal affairs. The Commission expresses the belief that a "secure existence, free from physical and psychological threats...is a right shared by all - regardless of where they live, regardless of their ideological or political convictions."[43] Finally, Kant's program is to be implemented over a considerable historical period. The Commission also proposes a programme to be implemented in stages and in the full knowledge that there will be gains and set backs.[44]

The Commission attacks the plural states-system and its competitive and militaristic nature. Holding up the goal of a better future to move towards, it offers the possibility of building a world where vertical and horizontal obligations are again in balance. The progression which the Commission points to can be described as the reassertion of some of the principles of Kantian rationalism as an answer to Realist pluralism in its more recent structuralist incarnation.

The idea of Common Security moves from basic arguments about strategy to a call for a change of human consciousness in order to realize something like Kant's dream of a cosmopolitan society. However, such a position is vulnerable to the same kind of criticism which pluralist arguments had leveled against universalist ones: namely, that the universalist commitment to some form of cosmopolitan society emphasizes horizontal obligations at the expense of vertical ones and further emphasizes a future dream of global unity at the expense of properly understanding a present reality of global fragmentation. Indeed, the critique often goes so far as to deny the possibility of any lasting form of global unity. In the case of an idea like Common Security this type of critique can be devastating because the entire project depends on the ability to move from the more immediate goal of stability to the more distant one of generating a cooperative world order based on universally accepted legal norms. If the possibility of the ultimate goal is rejected, then the basis for expecting any major or long lasting changes from the intermediate stages is also undermined. That is, if, as we previously noted, the transition to a military situation of minimum deterrence is to be successful over the long run, then the social and economic structures which work to generate arms build up and military conceptions of security must also change. If these major internal

transitions are to occur within states, then the vision of a cooperative global order must also be a likely possibility. However, as soon as this vision is rejected - as it is by the historicists and the Realists - then the whole project collapses because none of its stages can be successful in isolation from the others.

It seems that Hedley Bull's point about starting from where one is, rather than where one would like to be, remains pertinent. Equally, Buzan's insight into the unsatisfactory nature of the fracture between Idealism and Realism in international relations theory, is still applicable. If Buzan failed in his attempt at synthesizing the concepts of peace and power through the concept of security, Miller and the Palme Commission have not even gone so far as to give the 'pluralists' the compliment of being treated seriously. Because of this, the debate remains locked in its traditional form of opposition between universalism and pluralism. The one side demanding that obstacles to the creation of a cosmopolitan society be swept away. The other side believing the obstacles are permanent and necessary and attempts to undermine them to reach a 'mythical' utopia can only bring chaos and suffering.

Yet the claims made by Miller and the Palme Commission regarding the problems of plural competition, increasing militarization, deterioration of democratic forms, and most

importantly, the need to come to grips with the growing tension between obligations owed at the citizen and species levels, cannot be rejected out of hand. The crisis is genuine and the failure of existing models of international relations theory to offer a conception of security which reflects both the crisis and the present realities should not force us to ignore the dangers it poses. If present discussion tends to bog down in ideological defenses of the existing states-system on the one hand, and attacks on that system on the other, it is because of the underlying fracture in the discourse that has its roots in the emergence of the states-system itself. Common Security is incapable of adding much to the present impasse in international relations theory because it has not understood the underlying contradictions of its historical heritage.

The Terrain of Dissent III : Western Parochialism

The issue traced throughout this thesis has been the fracture within liberal international relations theory between universalism and pluralism. This fracture has been depicted in a number of guises: rationalism and historicism, structuralism and historicism, and Idealism and Realism. Many of the commentators on this problem have tried to resolve it through synthesis or direct denial of the opposed position's validity. None have succeeded. Nevertheless, the issue continues to arise and with very plausible arguments as

to the urgency of its resolution.

Because of this impasse within the Western liberal discourse on international relations it is appropriate to step outside of the geographical region and cultural forms in which international relations theory was born and to look at it through the eyes of a non-Western liberal. The most appropriate thinker to use in this exercise is Rajni Kothari. The reasons for this choice are first, and only partly, that he is among the most highly regarded commentators on international relations outside of the West and yet he remains within the liberal tradition. Second however, and more important, is Kothari's internal criticism of liberal theories of international relations based on their underlying dualism and their inability to overcome the blockages that such fractures create. This section will examine Kothari's work to uncover any insights it may have into the concept of security as seen from 'outside' the central geographic and cultural regions of liberal international relations theory and yet 'inside' the discourse itself.

Kothari's position has been developed in opposition to the dominance of the West in international relations. However, it has not so much sought an alternative theoretical formulation with which to oppose the formulations of the West, as it has attempted to point out how parochial Western liberal traditions are when viewed in a global context.

Kothari believes that the central Western theoretical perspectives in international relations - rationalism and historicism - are incapable of overcoming this difficulty, and because of this, are unable to grasp the true source of many modern problems and dislocations.

The 'true' source of the problems of security facing the world today lie, for Kothari, in the universal (and Kothari would say imperialistic) application of what are fairly specific and internally contradictory traditions of liberal international thought. Kothari argues that solutions to the crises now facing humanity are located within the transformation of human consciousness along with the changing of social and economic structures. He differs from the rationalist positions, however, by denying the possibility of separating pluralism and universalism, calling the entire discourse 'a trick of Western philosophy'.

Kothari's perspective is fundamentally historical. The crisis which the contemporary world faces is the result of a number of weaknesses in Occidental and Oriental societies which began to take on their present form around the period of the Enlightenment. This was a time in which the old Christian conception of nature being at the service of 'man' (God created the garden of Eden for Adam) became secularized and associated with science. Science in turn became associated with the idea of knowledge as power. As Kothari

explains the strength and the danger of this new innovation:

> The Occidental worldview had the great merit of infinite intellectual curiosity that sought to discover regularities ('laws of nature') underlying a seeming flux. But, unfortunately, this accent on the intellect gradually shifted from being valued for its own sake (the true essence of science as a search after truth) to something that man used in his conquest of the environment and in fulfilling his own acquisitive and dominating instincts (the essence of technology, or rather, of a science based technology which is a product of the peculiarly Western approach to knowledge).[45]

From this Western emphasis on the control and manipulation of nature, came the work of such thinkers as Hobbes who sought to first discover the 'laws' of human nature and then to devise "a law-governed social order whose commands are binding on man and whose role is to liberate man from his natural condition of isolation, want and misery".[46] This was the foundation for a drive in the West to uncover the way to the 'good society'. If Hobbes sought to insulate humanity from its 'evil' side and the vagaries of nature, so did Hegel and Marx through their attempts to uncover the laws governing history. Out of this emerged the idea of progress, that is, of a linear progression towards the good life.

Out of this also grew the idea that if the world was created for human use and humanity's central purpose was to tame this world in a progressive evolution towards utopia or at least reasonable comfort and predictability, then those civilizations which had moved furthest down this path (the

distance being measured with a Western yardstick) must be more 'advanced' than the others. The whole idea of science and progress had, since at least the time of Francis Bacon, Kothari tells us, been intimately connected with knowledge conceived of as power.[47] Thus, the West came to define humanity as the centre of creation and then the West as the centre of humanity. This formulation is important in a number of ways.

First, by placing the West - or rather Europe - at the pinnacle of human evolution the basis was laid for colonial expansion as a form of universalism in which the basic drive was quite different from the earlier Greek or Hellenist form. As Kothari explains it:

> Colonialism entailed a new conception of universalism. The old universalistic conceptions found in China, India, ancient Greece and Turkey in the thinking of the Buddha and Zoroastrian teachers - despite their considerable diversities postulated the transcendence of the immediate, the local, and the temporal through the cultivation of the mind and a search for meaning in an admittedly mysterious and complex reality, which fostered moderation and containment of selfish and expansionist drives in the human personality. By contrast, the modernist conception of universalism that emerged in the West fed the drive for expansion of a local civilization and its dominance over the rest of the world, legitimized by a belief in manifest destiny that was an outgrowth of the dominant thrust of Judeo-Christian religiosity in the post-medieval age.[48]

Secondly, the tremendous success of the application of science to nature gave the West a dramatically different and

very powerful technology as opposed not only to the East but to the entire globe. During the colonial period the most important form of this technology in terms of Western expansion was military. This superiority in both the technology and the technique of warfare created the possibility for extending the frontiers of Western civilization around the world. Once military superiority was achieved the normative framework of the West was more easily imposed.

Finally, Kothari points to the relationship between the aggressive, ethnocentric (if not racist) culture which developed in Europe with the Enlightenment and Romantic periods and the 'efflorescence of modern technology' within this particular culture. The two elements combined to create a situation where the lack of cultural traditions of moderation and restraint coupled with the enormous potential of modern technology for exponential growth, to transform technology into a virtual 'Frankenstein'. As Kothari explains:

> In sum, then, largely because of the location and efflorescence of modern technology in a particular culture - a culture that was basically aggressive and in which there was not enough moderation and self-control - technology has become a Frankenstein....Today, the affluent world itself... is beginning to see the excesses to which modern technology has brought it - witness the current worldwide concern with the environmental crisis. In fact, however, the environmental crisis is only a symptom of a very basic change in relationships: from man's reliance on nature to man's dependence

> on machinery. The domination of man by the machine - and his dependence on it for his sustenance - means not just the constant and continuous need for energy and raw materials...it also entails less and less need for human beings... Paradoxical though it may sound, the system that modern man has produced is one in which the most dispensable element is man himself.[49]

These elements - aggression, expansion, and technology - Kothari believes form a juncture which is beginning to clarify a spectrum of critical issues at the level of basic survival. As he defines it:

> The crisis that faces modern man is a crisis wrought by science and technology taking a particular direction under the impact of the age of positivism. The full consequences of this are seen in our time as it envelopes all the particular crises to which men of science and philosophy have drawn our attention: the threat of total war, the threat of extreme deprivation coexisting with overabundance, the threat of the collapse of the biosphere. As we realize this, we must also realize that nothing short of fundamental rethinking about the human enterprise will redeem man from these crises...[50]

The change of consciousness Kothari calls for is one which is directed at a West understood by many in the Third World to be imperialist, self-interested, in the throws of a self-destructive crisis, and most importantly blind to its own faults. The change Kothari believes to be necessary demands that the West do considerable soul searching but acknowledges it is not likely to do so without extensive external prodding. However, like other liberal thinkers we have considered, Kothari finds a considerable impetus to

rethinking our situation lying in the very facts of that situation. Whether or not this rethinking will be in time or sufficiently powerful to overturn the status-quo is an open question. Without it, Kothari paints a grim picture - a vision of a world becoming something like Lebanon, a vision which nevertheless presents us with a series of choices and many connected fields of action. As Kothari explains: "The point is to grasp the phenomena of disintegration and violence in their various dimensions and, at the same time, to develop a new paradigm that would encompass the wide-ranging alternative forms of action"[51]

Kothari's position is one born of a deep suspicion of Western universalist doctrines. As he says:

> I do not subscribe to any universal theory of human behaviour or to globalism based on such a universalist view. It is rather the structure of inter-relationships and linkages permeating the individual and social condition that interests me.[52]

Indeed, Kothari is made nervous by calls for the building of a single edifice of laws or the creation of a cosmopolitan society because he sees in them the echo of Western imperialism. He points to this when he notes how "modern European imperialism represented the first major effort at unifying the entire globe under the dominion of a single regional center."[53]

Yet, Kothari does not replace a transcendent universal ethic with a pluralist one. The side of crisis which offers

opportunity to the world is one which requires cooperation amongst a diverse group of cultures facing a diverse set of problems. Some of these problems are universal and some are particular to individual cultures. Any move towards transformation from our present crisis towards a future of greater security requires the acceptance that as a group human beings are both the composite of their diverse and legitimate cultures and also one, in that they live today in an interconnected world which demands that they cooperate. The problems which are faced by humanity today arise on the one hand out of a struggle between a universalizing West and a Third World fighting to maintain its various cultural identities. On the other hand there is the problem of emerging universal problems such as ecological deterioration and global militarization which require cooperation to resolve. The blockage in dealing with these issues does not arise from the plural nature of humanity's cultural configurations. It arises, so far as Kothari is concerned, from the imperialism of the West.

This imperialism can be cloaked in an ideological depiction of the world where the plural states-system is eternal or where this system is doomed to collapse in the face of its own inadequacies to be replaced by some form of world government. So far as Kothari is concerned, both of these depictions are opposite sides of the same coin. One

attempts to freeze the status-quo so that the states-system remains in its present Western dominated configuration. The other attempts to overcome the failings of the plural system with a more unitary one and does this at the expense of the least powerful cultures. Either way, Western forms of culture, politics, economics, and importantly the specifically Western mode of relating to nature are forced on the rest of the world.

For Kothari the problem is one generated not from human nature but from the political confrontation of a very powerful and self-destructive culture with other less powerful but increasingly resistant cultures. The competition which emerges out of this is the result of politics not nature. Indeed, the ideology which claims the necessity of competition amongst cultures is one which can only be expected to emerge from a dominant culture. The fact that there is pluralism in the world does not indicate to Kothari that there can be no cooperation. For Kothari the lessons learned by the less powerful at the hands of a universalizing and dominant culture point towards the necessity of cooperation and the accommodation of difference if the vision of Lebanon or worse is to be avoided.

How then does Kothari conceive security? He does so "in the context of a struggle for survival at every level...and the accompanying sense of insecurity that

pervades all these levels".[54] For Kothari the various crises which face the world generate uncertainty and insecurity within a broad range of existing structural and social contexts. He looks at how these insecurities are increasingly understood in terms of survival. Survival in a number of spheres ranging from the struggle of millions for physical survival, the struggle of others to maintain achieved living standards and life styles, the struggle of states to preserve themselves in the face of economic and social dislocations, the struggle of power structures to maintain themselves in the changing environment they find themselves in, right up to the struggle of the superpowers to maintain a states-system in which they can retain their hegemonic position. All of these struggles represent realms of resistance and opposition. Some are positive in relation to overcoming our crises, others compound the difficulties. As Kothari explains:

> The crux of the foregoing overview of specificities of the emerging global problematique can be stated more simply: the twin basic dimensions of human prospects are survival and transformation or, to put it in conventional language, peace and development, and these two dimensions are inextricably intertwined. The contemporary human condition is characterized by recession on both dimensions, and the vision of an integral and unified human future based on bonds of solidarity and shared destiny is dimmer than ever.[55]

The concept of security which emerges from this is

best described in terms of 'multidimensionality'. The 'global problematique' presents crises of security (or rather insecurity) on a variety of fronts at a variety of levels. Each of these crises presents its own specificities and must in part, be dealt with in terms of its unique context. Yet each is also interrelated and emerges from the particular logic of the present situation of Western hegemony. Kothari's project however, is not to overturn this hegemony so much as to transform it, to overcome the blockages within it and to move towards a new global formulation in which the failure of the Western philosophical position towards nature and other cultures is understood and laid to rest. For Kothari, the entire edifice of Western liberal international relations theory has been locked in an obfuscating debate over a false dichotomy. The outcome of this has been to blind the Western discourse to its own ideological limitations and to provide a theoretical justification for the West's continued attempts to dominate the peoples of the world. The result of this has been the generation of resistance and insecurity to the point where the whole of human creation is at risk.

Conclusion

Buzan pointed out the theoretical disarray of the concept of security and partially located the source of this disarray in the opposition between Realism and Idealism. He failed, however, in his goal of synthesis by taking a

position similar to Waltz's and thereby reinforcing that which he sought to overcome. His position is one that upholds pluralism against universalism and the obligations of the citizen against the obligations of the member of humanity as such. He therefore falls into the same problems which so many of his predecessors had done by accepting uncritically, the role of the state as the only legitimate provider of security. Buzan is unable to provide a theory of the state which would answer why the division of humanity into particular and competitive moral communities is necessary. Like Waltz, he merely notes that this is how the world seems to be now and has been for some time and from this, makes a leap of faith to conclude that it will be forever more (relative to human time frames). This does not constitute a theoretical basis on which to develop an argument for the primacy of the modern state or a justification for the state's claim to be the central theoretical focus for the concept of security.

Miller, specifically takes up this point by noting that the universal nature of many modern security threats challenges the traditional position of the state in international relations theory as the source of security in the world. Miller points out that the state is, to a large degree, legitimized through its apparent role as the source of its citizen's security and will therefore resist any

suggestion that it is incapable of fulfilling this role. By questioning what Buzan takes for granted Miller opens up a far broader terrain on which to develop a concept of security.

The issue of the tension arising from the division of humankind into particularistic moral communities is again brought forward. The role of the state in the provision of citizen security is once again opened to debate and the issues dealt with take on a universalist perspective. The state becomes a field of political relations rather than a unit with some kind of capability. That is, the idea of 'national security' is made ridiculous by pointing out the internal pluralism of the state. In this sense, a writer like Miller turns the traditional 'mainstream' arguments of international relations on their head. He denies that the state forms a universal or unitary society in search of its own culturally specific 'good life' against a plural outside world which is dangerous and Other. Instead, Miller argues that within the state a variety of formulations of the 'good life' contend and that ideas such as 'national security' are merely tools used by powerful state groups to maintain their privileged positions behind the mystique of a supposed universally accepted 'good life'. Miller notes how this myth of internal consensus is connected to the vision of a dangerous and plural 'outside'. This depiction of the Other

reinforces the arguments for the necessity of a 'national' concept of security while also hiding from the citizen her or his relationship to the species as a whole.

These ideas are laid out in a concrete fashion by the Palme Commission which points out the increasing inability of the state to control its environment either externally or internally. That is, it looks at issues such as environmental degradation, the growing interdependence of the world economy, and the increasingly unjust allocation of global resources as factors pointing to the impossibility of developing a theoretically coherent concept of security which is defined narrowly as 'national'. Any concept of security that is to be theoretically useful must be capable of dealing with threats to security both 'above' and 'below' the level of the state.

These arguments represent a response to genuine problems now facing the people of this planet and cannot be dismissed by merely denying the possibility of conceiving of security at anything other than the state level. Their urgency and their potential for generating catastrophe are familiar themes throughout the discourse of international relations.

When Miller and the Palme Commission raise these issues they do so in the light of their assumptions regarding the possibility of a cosmopolitan society. These assumptions

draw on themes which have been traced in this analysis. They are themes which have been called rationalist, Idealist, or universalist. They uphold the primacy of obligations to humanity over obligations to the state. They also accept that a universal society is both possible and necessary to the survival of the species. They deny the claim that the individual state is either physically capable of providing security for its citizens or that it represents the highest form of political association to which humankind may aspire. They argue that the plural states-system is an obstacle to the fulfillment of the natural progression towards a truly cosmopolitan society.

In sum, the terrain of dissent, in its Western formulation, repeats the contradictions and polarities that have haunted international relations theory since Machiavelli first heralded the collapse of the medieval Christian cosmology. On the one hand, the defense of the state, on the other, the attack on the state. One claims the primacy of universalism, the other of pluralism. The impasse remains. And yet, the urgency and the sense of crisis is real. It seems more important than ever to break through the blockage in order to creatively deal with the issues confronting the world.

Kothari is useful here because of the somewhat different perspective he brings to the problem. For him the

issue is not one of determining the primacy of one side or the other but rather of critically understanding how both the Realist and the Idealist positions work to maintain Western dominance over the world. To Kothari the entire enterprise remains so uncritical, so unaware of its historical heritage, because it does not represent a scientific inquiry (defined by Kothari as the genuine search for truth) but rather is a form of ideology used to maintain and wield power.

Seen from this perspective the inability of international relations theory to develop a coherent concept of security stems from its unwillingness to confront the true object of its existence - the maintenance of Western hegemony. To begin asking such questions as 'whose security' is, for Kothari, to begin to unmask a global politics of hegemony and resistance. A politics that does not occur simply between states but goes on simultaneously across and through a variety of human structures and systems. That is, for Kothari there is no clear distinction to be made between the struggle of say, an impoverished citizen for a just economic system and the struggle of Third World states for a new international economic order.

The attempt to conceive of security as a product of national power is more restrictive and has less explanatory potential than to conceive of it as a product of cooperation under a universally accepted set of priorities and legal

structures. To conceive of security in relation to the way it is used as an ideological tool for the maintenance of certain structures and power relationships opens up a quite different and far broader set of conceptual concerns and practices.

It is this expansion of the terrain of liberal inquiry which makes Kothari so interesting and points to the possibility of making sense of the theoretical inadequacy of the central traditions in liberal international relations theory. The central issue becomes not whether as citizens we should deny our obligations as human beings but how, as individuals, we are affected by existing ideologies of security, be they pluralist or universalist. And further, what structures perpetuate these relationships and for what reasons? The important question is not why there is no theoretically coherent concept of security but rather what purpose is served by such a state of affairs?

Kothari remains within the liberal tradition he is criticizing but stands outside of many of the central geographic and cultural focusses of its hegemony. Because of this Kothari pushes the liberal construct of international relations theory to the outer reaches of its conceptual boundaries. He challenges it to open up its discursive practices and to provide a place for dissenting voices within the realm of <u>legitimate</u> discussion about international

relations.

Footnotes

[1]Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear : The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 2.

[2]John Herz, "Political Realism Revisted," International Studies Quarterly, Volume 24, Number 2 (June 1981), p. 196. Herz is referring to a review of his work by Kenneth Thompson called, "Review : The Nation State and the Crisis of World Politics," in the American Political Science Review (September, 1979), pp. 941-942.

[3]Buzan, "Peace, Power and Security : Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations," Journal of Peace Research, Volume 21, Number 2, (1984), p. 110.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., pp. 109-110.

[6]Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 2.

[7]Buzan, "Peace, Power and Security," p. 116.

[8]Ibid., p. 111.

[9]Ibid, p. 113, emphasis is Buzan's.

[10]Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Rending Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 1979), see especially chapters 5 and 6. Buzan specifically notes his debt to Waltz in Buzan, (1984), p. 113.

[11]Buzan, "Peace, Power and Security," p. 113.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 112.

[15]Ibid., p. 125, note 3.

[16]This is not to say Buzan discounts the role of domestic politics in terms of the success of a state unit within the realm of international politics. A state which failed to gain reasonable consensus amongst its citizens regarding its authority would be unable to deal with the states-system as well because of its divided attention in terms of security threats from within and without. Equally, a state which attempted to deny the reality of the competitive plural nature of the states-system would find itself at the mercy of that system. Each state, by necessity, acts within the prescribed bounds of the system regardless of its domestic political and social specificities.

[17]Ibid., p. 121.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 120.

[21]Ibid., p. 141.

[22]Lynn H. Miller, Global Order : Values and Power in International Politics (Boulder : Westview Press, 1985), p. 205.

[23]Ibid., pp. 205-206.

[24]Ibid., p. 214.

[25]Ibid., p. 206.

[26]Lester R. Brown, "Redefining Security," State of the World : 1986 A World-watch Institute Report on Progress Towards a Sustainable Society Lister Linda Starke ed. (New York : W.W. Norton and Company, 1986), p. 210. this is an updated and in some places substantially rewritten version of a paper Brown did for the Worldwatch Institute in 1977 and which I referred to in my first chapter.

[27]Miller, Global Order, p. 216.

[28]Common Security : A Programme for Disarmament, The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme (London : Pan Books Ltd., 1982). Hereafter referred to as the Palme Commission.

[29]R.B.J. Walker, "Contemporary Militarism and the Discourse of Dissent", in Culture, Ideology, and World Order, R.B.J. Walker ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.306.

[30]Palme Commission. See table pp. 97-99.

[31]Ibid., pp. 88-89.

[32]Ibid., p. 3.

[33]Ibid., p. 5.

[34]cf., Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (London: Abacus, 1981); Ann Markusen, "Military Spending and the U.S. Economy", World Policy Journal, Volume III, No. 3, Summer 86, pp. 495-516; Yoshi Tsurumi, "The U.S. Trade Deficit With Japan", World Policy Journal, Volume IV, No. 2, Spring 1987, pp. 207-230.

[35]Palme Commission. p. 86.

[36]Ibid., p. 87.

[37]Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[38]Ibid., p. 5.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid., p. 6.

[41]Ibid., p. 160-167.

[42]Ibid., p. 8-9.

[43]Ibid., p. 8.

[44]Ibid., see for instance the section entitled 'A programme of action', pp. 177-181. However, the entire report is based on its proposals being implemented over an extended period of time, so this theme is present throughout the work.

[45]Rajni Kothari, Footsteps into the Future : Diagnosis of the Present World and a Design for an Alternative (New York : The Free Press, 1974), p. 23.

[46]Ibid., p. 26.

[47]For a brief but clear outline of Kothari's position regarding the relation of power and knowledge, see Kothari, Footsteps into the Future, pp. 20-48.

[48]Kothari, "Peace in an Age of Transformation," in Culture, Ideology, and World Order, op. cit., note 26 pp. 334-335.

[49]Ibid., pp. 335-336.

[50]Ibid., p. 336.

[51]Ibid., p. 360.

[52]Ibid., p. 341.

[53]Ibid., p. 335.

[54]Ibid., p. 337.

[55]Ibid., p. 341.

Chapter VI

Whose Security?

The concept of security has, in this analysis, been presented in three different formulations. First, it appears as an argument for the legitimacy of the state. Second, it is used as the basis to argue for the necessity of a world state or a cosmopolitan society. Finally it is defined as a form of ideology that gains meaning only in the context of the power relationships it defends. It is incumbent on these few closing pages to say something about each of these understandings of the concept of security and to relate them back to some of the questions raised in the introduction, such as: their relevance to the contemporary situation; the pertinence of the questions they pose; their ability to answer questions regarding the possibility of democracy in the determination of the concept's content; and why most of the discourse displays a distinct lack of critical historical perspective. The answers to these questions provide an indication of each formulation's usefulness in theoretically explaining the security issues which confront the modern world.

The first formulation regarding the concept of security is historically connected to the defense of the state. Its heritage can be traced back to such early defenders of the

states-system as Vattel. It is intimately bound up with those theoretical positions that attempted to legitimize the emerging state form of political organization by appropriating for the state, the role of absolute provider of citizen security.

This heritage and the inability of Realism to move beyond it, has left Realism unable to effectively come to terms with extra-state security issues. Its conception of security has instead focussed narrowly on the state defined as a unitary object that attains security through the military defense of its territory. In essence, the formulation remains that of Hobbes.

To conceive of security in this fashion undermines its explanatory power in a number of ways. The focus on military power and on issues which can be controlled by the state has resulted in a tendency to ignore non-military or extra-state threats. The method for doing this is generally to define threats from economic, ecological, or technological sources as outside the realm of national security concerns. While this method allows the discourse to neatly define its field of inquiry it does not allow it to explain threats to security that impinge from outside the theoretical space it has defined for itself.

Another difficulty with the Realist formulation is its lack of historical understanding and its tendency to view the

states-system in ahistorical terms. This difficulty has resulted in a continuous replay of the same arguments and a distinct lack of sensitivity to the historically specific nature of many of them. The 'problem of national security' tends to be treated as though it was the same for Athens and Sparta as it is for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Such an ahistorical perspective can only serve to marginalize the important distinctions between historical periods and obscure new and emerging threats.

Realism also maintains an attachment to a highly undemocratic vision of the necessities of security. Continuing to cling to its own inaccurate depictions of Hobbes and Machiavelli, Realism is led to maintaining that the essence of the state's ability to provide its citizens with security is its reliance on professional 'statesmen'. These 'professionals' became so by being schooled in the beliefs of Realism. That is, in the permanence of the competitive states-system and their role in that system as advocates of specific units. Not only is the citizen expected to relinquish democratic control over these 'advocates' but the advocates gain their authority as 'statesmen' by first accepting the Realist conception of security.

Basically, the Realist formulation of the concept of security continues to react to and pose questions which

emerged from the defense of a new form of political organization - the state - against an established universalist cosmology - medieval Christianity. The relation of these questions to the present is at best marginal. Continuing to pose them pushes Realism farther and farther away from an ability to explain or deal with the issues which the contemporary world continues to throw up against its increasingly battered conceptual walls.

The second formulation of the concept of security has been called universalist. It has called for the need to conceive of security in a far broader sense than the narrowly military and national concept offered by Realism. It has questioned the undemocratic or non-participatory nature of Realist conceptions of security claiming that they are merely cloaks to hide the reality of small, state elites protecting their privileges. Its historical roots are traceable back to the early struggles to defend the universal morality which had been reflected (poorly in Rousseau's opinion) in the medieval Christian cosmology. It therefore defined itself against the emerging new political form - the state. This historical opposition is maintained today. It has resulted in a conception of security which works well as part of a theoretical attack on the state though not so well in providing an alternate conception of security in a world without states.

Universalism or Idealism and Realism have grown out of, and are defined by, their own opposition. Buzan's categorization of them is correct. Yet, universalism is able to point much more clearly to problems posed by interdependence, industrialism, a narrow military definition of security, and the problematic nature of the competitive states-system for overcoming these issues. At a certain level it deals more effectively with the present than does Realism. However, it remains crashingly silent about two issues.

The first is how to move beyond the present situation? In other words, it is not enough to bemoan the failings of the circumstances of the present historical conjuncture. Nor is it enough to point towards a possible future utopia and expect the calamities of the present to motivate the entire planet's population towards a single vision. The plural states-system is a reality of the present which will not go away because it is problematic. Much of the Idealistic discourse has accepted that there is some causal connection between the problems posed by the states-system and its eventual eradication. This is a view which is rightly condemned by the Realists, and an area of considerable weakness in the universalist perspective.

The second issue is the lack of a clear grasp within

the discourse of the relationship between itself, the defense of certain aspects of the medieval cosmology, and the attack on the state form of political organization. This problem presents itself as a lack of understanding of its own historical genealogy.

Like the Realists, the Idealists defined themselves on the basis of an opposition. Yet it is an opposition based on the debates of 300 years ago. Furthermore, the central issues of this debate are no longer understood within the universalist discourse. Because of this the opposition becomes 'knee-jerk' rather than informed. The merits or salient points of Realism are lost or ignored. Most critically here are the points made regarding the existence of a dynamic plural states-system and the considerable resistance to the notion of a progression towards a unitary global society.

The universalists raise some very pertinent questions regarding a variety of global dangers now facing humankind. However, they ignore or avoid confronting contradictory trends such as the continued expansion of the state form around the world. They also remain rather reticent on the subject of how their universalism or cosmopolitan society will relate to the cultural, political, social, and economic differences which exist in the world. This last silence is pointed to by those who worry about the imperialist nature of

positions calling for the formation of 'one world'.

The third formulation, by viewing concepts of security as ideologies used to defend specific power relationships, is the most radical. By getting closest to the root of the debate over the concept of security it offers the potential to provide the most powerful voice of explanation. It suggests a framework capable of placing Realist and universalist concepts of security in historical context by pointing out the way they have been used to defend various subjects at specific historical periods. Because of this the question it poses in terms of the central dualism in international relations theory - that between Realism and Idealism - is neither how to overcome the dualism nor how to live with it. Rather, it is what purpose has been served by the maintenance of such a fracture?

This shift in the underlying question promises to overcome some of the failings of the other formulations. To begin with it is a question that embraces the central concerns of both Realism and Idealism. That is, it does not begin with the assumption that it is impossible to resolve universal problems such as environmental degradation or economic inequality in the context of global political pluralism. Instead it treats both universal problems and political pluralism as present realities and insists that to treat them as mutually exclusive is to impose a false

theoretical dualism on the world. To claim that universal problems require the end of pluralism to be solved or that the existence of pluralism demands that universal problems be pushed out of the sphere of legitimate international relations discourse, becomes a form of intellectual chicanery. It artificially imposes limits on what is legitimate for one side or the other to discuss and requires that both sides remain trapped within a self-perpetuating opposition.

Again the question arises as to what purpose this may serve. To answer this requires an understanding of the history of international relations theory. The roots of the opposition must be got at so that its persistence may be explained. This action of historical excavation has the potential to open up a critical discussion of the history of the discourse and to further clarify its genealogy. It offers the promise of improving the capacity of international relations theory for critical self-analysis. It also exposes the source of the present debate in the early stages of the development of the modern states-system. Pointing out the source of the fracture inevitably makes it easier to unravel what is pertinent to the present historical conjuncture and what is anachronic.

The question still arises, however, what is the purpose of maintaining the fracture? The points just made are not

new. They have been brought up by others, both Realist and Idealist. Herz dealt with them and so did Miller. Why have these questions not sparked a critical investigation of the role of the concept of security in international relations theory? Why, where such an investigation has been carried out (as in the work of Buzan) has it failed to overcome the basic duality in the discourse? The answer to these questions is suggested in the central question asked by those who understand concepts of security as ideologies - whose security is served by each conception?

To ask this question is to place the entire discourse between the Realists and the Idealists in the context of a rather dated debate over the legitimacy of the state. That is not to say that emerging issues do not challenge the precepts behind the modern international system of political organization. What is meant is that the oppositional structure of the debate grows out of the earlier opposition (the genuinely contradictory opposition) between the medieval and the modern cosmologies. It is this source which provides the initial basis for the polarity in the debates' structure. It is also this source which has centered the discussion around opposition between the plural states-system and the universal or cosmopolitan society.

Yet to understand the source of the debate is not to understand how it has changed to reflect the historical

contexts of specific periods. It is here where the type of interpretation put forward by Kothari[1] becomes important. Something that Kothari makes clear is that the ideological nature of conceptions of security force the theorist to be aware of the ideological baggage carried by particular perspectives. In this sense, while it is probably true that Buzan and Miller have no imperialist intentions in their work (as opposed to say, Wolfers, whose mission was to maintain U.S. hegemony) their positions remain suspect to many outside of the Western world. Buzan can be perceived to be arguing for the consolidation of the West's position through the restructuring of the plural states-system while Miller might be presented as arguing for the collapse of weaker cultural forms under a universalizing Western culture. Both writers would no doubt deny these charges but so long as the discourse remains tied to the hegemonic centre it is open to this charge.

This leads to the final area in which the third formulation offers the promise of expanded explanatory power - that of democracy or increased participation in determining the terrain across which the concept of security should extend and also the content of security practices. The simple question - whose security? - opens debate far beyond that of either Realism or Idealism. It points out the fallacy of considering the state as some kind of unit. It

points to the relationship between concepts of security and particular state and economic elites. It also points to the way concepts of security are tied to broader ideological structures such as particular forms of relating to nature.

It emphasizes the continuous, though historically changing, ideological content of the concept of security. This very emphasis demands that the concept be under constant review and that it be critically scrutinized. Without the participation of people at all levels and on an ongoing basis the conception of security adopted is likely to be one which benefits those in elite positions more than others. If the poor, the Third World, the civilian, the female, the person of colour, and so on are to be included in determining what their security requires there must be democracy in the process.

Given the three broad liberal theoretical perspectives presented in this thesis, the final one offers the greatest potential for opening the discourse of international relations theory enough to allow it to move beyond the unsatisfactory stalemate between Realism and Idealism. By taking a historical perspective and relating the concept of security to specific power relationships it becomes possible to suggest why the impasse developed and why it has remained. It also provides the rudimentary beginnings of an explanation as to the purpose served within the first two perspectives of

avoiding any indepth historical analysis. Finally, it offers some insight into the purpose and effect of maintaining an undemocratic conception of the necessities of security. Taken together these suggest a theoretical opening in which to begin constructing a critical history of the concept of security: a history that avoids the incorporation of false dichotomies and orients itself towards the excavation of historical meaning rather than the construction of apologies for Western modernity.

Footnotes

[1]It should be emphasized that the content of Kothari's historical analysis in the works presented is schematic and contentious. The point being made here does not depend on the details of his analysis but rather on its suggestiveness. It suggests that the concept of security is defined in relation to power and that such definitions should be understood in the context of the interests they serve. While Kothari himself remains a liberal it is this suggested direction of inquiry which stands as the basis for placing him in the third formulation of liberal international relations theory. This formulation is important not because of the pronouncements of its practitioners so much as its potential for moving beyond liberal concepts that have held back the development of a truly critical perspective on world politics.

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