

Exposing the Limits of EU-Russia “Autonomous Cooperation”: The Potential of
Bakhtin’s Dialogic Imagination

by

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of the Requirements for the Degree of

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University of Victoria

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ABSTRACT

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The promising agenda of the EU-Russia strategic partnership has resulted in mutual frustration manifested in continuous crises between the partners. This study explores possibilities for political transformation in the EU-Russia relationship. In search of the key to understanding this complex relationship, I develop a three-fold argument. First, an ongoing crisis in EU-Russia cooperation cannot be understood without revealing the underlying problem of tension between the subjects' autonomy and their ability to cooperate. Second, this problem produces a paradoxical form of "autonomous cooperation," imposing limits on the prospects for political transformation in the EU-Russia relationship. Third, Bakhtin's dialogism holds a significant potential to re-imagine the contradictions of autonomous cooperation in an alternative *relational* way. Despite the existence of a considerable body of literature on EU-Russia cooperation, little work has been done to investigate the connection between the intricacies of political discourse and problems in EU-Russia cooperation. By drawing on Bakhtin's account of a "dialogic imagination," I develop a model, which exposes the processes of mutual constitution of the Self and the Other. This dialogic model reveals that in their political statements, both the EU and Russia privilege the pattern of autonomy or cooperation. The partners produce prevalent discursive practices that reinforce these contradictory patterns of autonomy and cooperation, systematically inflicting crises in the EU-Russia relationship. By establishing dialogic connections between the chosen political statements, the model demonstrates that Russia and the EU co-create perceived differences between each other, isolate each other or try to form an autonomous, self-sufficient Self through imposition, self-exclusion, resistance or dominance. This model, I argue, permits an alternative vision of contemporary trends and possible futures for the EU-Russia relationship as an

exemplar of an international relationship viewed through a dialogic lens. My study is also relevant under the conditions of ongoing conflicts in EU-Russia cooperation, which expose the inability of the partners to cooperate effectively. I conclude with practical implications for the partners to overcome the current stalemate. In Bakhtin's words: "When dialogue ends, everything ends. Thus dialogue, by its very essence, cannot and must not come to an end."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE	ii
ABSTRACT iii	
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	ix
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Problematizing the EU-Russia relationship.....	1
1.2. The context of the EU-Russia relationship.....	3
1.3. Autonomous cooperation: Three directions of research.....	5
1.4. Contribution to the existing scholarship	10
1.5. Avenues for political transformation, structure, sources	16
CHAPTER 2 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	21
2.1. Introduction	21
2.2. Scholarly landscape.....	23
2.3. “Superhighways” in EU-Russia studies	28
2.4. Constructivism and performativity of language.....	38
2.5. Potential of Bakhtin’s dialogism	48
2.6. Conclusion	57
CHAPTER 3 - MODEL, METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES	61
3.1. Introduction	61
3.2. Dialogic model for understanding the EU-Russia dialogue.....	62
3.3. In search of dialogic continuity	70
3.4. Structure of the empirical analysis	83
3.5. Conclusion	86
CHAPTER 4 - DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF EU-RUSSIA DISCOURSE I	89
4.1. Introduction	89
4.2. Joint Political Declaration on Partnership and Cooperation, 1993	91
4.3. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1997.....	92
4.4. Conclusion	99
CHAPTER 5 - DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF EU-RUSSIA DISCOURSE II.....	102
5.1. Introduction	102
5.2. Common Strategy of European Union on Russia, 1999.....	104
5.3. Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy Towards the European Union, 1999.	111
5.4. Supplementary statements adopted jointly by the EU and Russia.....	119
5.5. Supplementary statements adopted by the EU.....	122
5.6. Supplementary Statements adopted by Russia.....	131
5.7. Conclusion	136
CHAPTER 6 - DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF EU-RUSSIA DISCOURSE III	141
6.1. Introduction	141
6.2. In the wake of the Road Maps.....	143

6.3. Road Maps of Four EU-Russia Common Spaces	145
6.4. Supplementary Statements adopted jointly by the EU and Russia	154
6.5. Supplementary statements adopted by Russia	161
6.6. Supplementary statements adopted by the EU.....	168
6.7. Conclusion	173
CHAPTER 7 - DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF EU-RUSSIA DISCOURSE IV	177
7.1. Introduction	177
7.2. Silence Vacuum in EU-Russia Relations	178
7.3. Partnership for Modernization	183
7.4. Anticipating Agreement or deepening impasse	188
7.5. Conclusion	192
CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSION	197
8.1. Summary	197
8.2. A cooperative vision	206
BIBLIOGRAPHY	215
APPENDIX 1 – LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED	225

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BRICS	Association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the European Union)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
G8	Group of Eight
INTERREG	European Regional Development Fund
IR	International Relations
MID	Ministry of International (Foreign) Affairs in Russia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PPC	Permanent Partnership Council
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States Program
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problematizing the EU-Russia relationship

“It is entirely your phrase, and not mine. Your own, and not just the sequel of our conversation. ‘Our’ conversation didn’t take place at all...” (Shatov in Dostoyevsky’s *The Devils*.)¹ Throughout history, the relationship between Russia and its European neighbour has become increasingly complex. Discovering its own “Europeanness,” Russia seldom fulfilled its desire of having a genuine conversation with Europe. Europe never satisfied its thirst to project its own image on Russia, to bring Russia closer to its own Self. To this day, “their” conversation has not taken place at all... This study explores possibilities for political transformation in cooperation between Russia and the European Union (EU).

How can we explain continuous conflicts in relations between the EU and Russia? What images of each other do the partners produce within the framework of their strategic partnership? How do the representations of one another affect the dynamics of their relationship? What is the key to understanding the complexity of EU-Russia relations? These questions are important for a better understanding of the EU-Russia relationship. The questions are especially relevant under the conditions of ongoing conflicts in EU-Russia cooperation, which further expose the inability of the EU and Russia to cooperate effectively.

My study addresses these questions and asks: what is the underlying problem in the relationship between the EU and Russia? My answer is simple: there is an inherent

¹ Shatov in Dostoyevsky’s *The Devils: Translated and Introduced by D. Magarshack* (Penguin, 1953), 253.

tension between the autonomy of these collective subjects and their ability to cooperate. This tension is perpetual and currently unsolvable.

In support of this answer, and with the focus on the specific relationship between Russia and the EU, I develop a three-fold argument. First, the ongoing crisis in EU-Russia cooperation cannot be understood, explained or resolved without revealing the underlying problem of tension between the subjects' autonomy and their ability to cooperate. The study demonstrates that the EU and Russia privilege patterns of autonomy or cooperation at different times in their relationship. Second, the problem of tension between these two patterns produces a specific form of international relations – a paradoxical “autonomous cooperation.” My study defines and conceptualizes this form of cooperation by means of theoretical and empirical analyses. I further argue that the partners' current experience of this form of cooperation imposes limits on the possibilities of political transformation in the EU-Russia relationship. Third, Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogism² holds a significant potential to re-imagine the constraints and contradictions of the EU-Russia partnership in an alternative *relational* way. It is from Bakhtin's work that this research takes its direction.

I develop an argument through a balanced combination of theoretical and empirical analyses that scrutinize the paradoxes of EU-Russia cooperation. This argument offers a new, original understanding of an uneasy EU-Russia relationship by demonstrating how political statements in the EU-Russia discourse systematically reproduce conflicts between the partners. The implications of this study hold a significant potential to advance the policy development process in the EU-Russia relationship and to overcome the current stalemate.

² Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* (University of Texas Press, 1984).

1.2. The context of the EU-Russia relationship

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Russia and the European Union has transformed from being exclusively bilateral, that is, between individual European states and the Soviet Union, to a new political reality: an officially declared partnership between Russia and the EU – inconceivable during the Cold War period.

For Russia, especially since the realm of Peter the Great, the European West as a “collective Other” has been historically identified as a superior civilization. It is in juxtaposition with its European neighbours that post-Soviet Russia has been trying to define its way of living, either pro-European or non-European, or, even more so, its own unique “Eurasian” way. Whichever choice Russia has made throughout its history of engagement with Europeans, the country has always recognised Europe as its significant Other.

In 1994, the adoption of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia proclaimed an “ever closer” cooperation between Russia and its powerful European neighbour.³ The Agreement was one more example of perpetual attempts throughout the long history of the neighbours’ interactions to establish a sustainable relationship at a critical time of massive geo-political and socio-economic shifts. At that time, both the revived Russia and the newly established EU were in an active search of their own niche in the international realm. Today we often overlook the fact that this example of cooperation between two subjects – the Russian state and the multiplicity of states acting as a single Union – was unique in the sense that it created a

³ “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation,” *Official Journal of the European Communities* L327 (November 28, 1997), <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=643>. The Agreement was ratified in 1997.

new challenge for the international system to overcome its state-centrism.⁴ An old relationship between Europe and Russia suddenly acquired a new impetus to confront the practices of what has been considered to be international relations. Simply by relocating the sovereign power beyond the borders of states, the EU and Russia provided new insights into possibilities of international cooperation.

The expectations that the collapse of the communist regime in Russia and the creation of the EU would usher in a new kind of cooperation between Russia and the EU were largely unfulfilled. Paradoxically, the early promise of EU-Russia cooperation once again resulted in mutual frustration already experienced by Russia and its European neighbour in their former interactions.

At the present time, the impressive record of numerous summits, strategies and official dialogues does not hide recurring problems and the stalemate in EU-Russia relations. The way the partners have been practicing and sustaining their cooperation tends to generate critical junctures at the point at which the self-sufficient “selfhood” of both partners appears to be threatened. It is precisely at the critical junctures of their cooperation that conflicts and tensions rise, halting the very possibility of mutual and genuine rapprochement between Russia and the EU.

The most notable recent examples of these junctures include the Russia-Georgia conflict, “gas wars” between Russia and Ukraine, unresolved questions on visa regimes between the EU and Russia, debates over anti-ballistic missile system in Europe, ratification of the European Energy Charter, most recent Russia-Ukraine conflict over Crimea. These are all items on the menu for reciprocal frustration between Russia and the

⁴ Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics* (Routledge, 2005); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Norton, 2001).

EU.

The frustration has become systemic, culminating in the most recent Ukrainian conflict. As Arkady Moshes emphasizes, “the situation in which we are now is indeed a failure, and the current failure to engage is systemic. I will argue further that it started before Ukraine, well before the Ukrainian crisis.”⁵ This crisis is “the symptom, and not the reason”⁶ for the most recent stalemate in EU-Russia relations.

At the critical juncture of the current Ukrainian conflict, this study is important; we need to think not only about whether and if so when the partners will cooperate, but also what form their cooperation will assume. The EU emphasizes the need for Russia to decide whether and if so when cooperation will re-occur.⁷ This study is of particular importance to today’s Russia, where a growing anti-Western sentiment and a virulent “we” versus “them” rhetoric prevails. The question remains: can both partners continue to co-exist in their *autonomous cooperation*?

1.3. Autonomous cooperation: Three directions of research

Following William Doll, I conceptualize autonomous cooperation as a form of an international relationship that is “systemic, networked and patterned.”⁸ It is *systemic* because it is neither precisely determined nor absolutely random. The systemic character of tensions allows us to approximate future possibilities. However, any precise prediction of the future dynamics of this form of cooperation is impossible.

Autonomous cooperation is *networked* because it is connected with and

⁵ Arkady Moshes, interview by Anastasia Chebakova, April 13, 2015.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Anonymous. European External Action Service, interview by Anastasia Chebakova, April 13, 2015.

⁸ William E. Doll, *Pragmatism, Postmodernism, and Complexity Theory: The “Fascinating Imaginative Realm” of William E. Doll, Jr* (Routledge, 2012), 175.

vulnerable to the influences of other relations, actors, events. Many would agree that an adoption of the European Neighbourhood Policy, or the launch of the Eurasian Economic Union, or the most recent Russia-Ukraine disputes over Crimea have all had an immediate impact on the EU-Russia relationship.

Above all, I argue that the autonomous cooperation is *patterned* – it privileges the abstract patterns of autonomy and cooperation. My empirical analysis of EU-Russia discourse demonstrates that these two patterns contradict each other and generate continuous tensions between Russia and the EU.

Cooperation implies an ability of parties to cooperate. This ability is crucial for adapting to the pressures of an increasingly complex international environment. The *pattern of cooperation* entails partial or full acceptance of the terms of cooperation, as well as the partners' willingness to undergo the necessary transitions and transformations. The pattern of cooperation also reflects the partners' perceptions of cooperation and, often times, their desire to shape a cooperative space according to their own view of cooperation.

In general, autonomy has a meaning of self-law, the right for self-determination, or self-rule. In the context of EU-Russia cooperation, the partners perceive themselves to be autonomous if they can perform their functions independently, without the intervention of the other partner. Tensions rise when the *pattern of autonomy* appears to contradict the choice of cooperation. The pattern of autonomy is privileged when the partners feel pressured, or they attempt to assert equality or they desire to be in the lead.

The key concept of autonomous cooperation offers a conceptual ground to reveal the tension between autonomy and cooperation in the specific case of EU-Russia

relations. My study of EU-Russia discourse determines that the nature of autonomous cooperation is conflictual: it is characterized by the continuous ravel of the two contradictory patterns of autonomy and cooperation. Autonomous cooperation is also paradoxical. Instead of doing what the partners are supposed to do – to cooperate – they often privilege their own autonomy over cooperation. My analysis demonstrates that the way the partners currently privilege autonomy over cooperation creates mistrust, distance and continuous stalemates in their cooperation.

The autonomous cooperation currently involves particular acts known in the literature on identity construction as the acts of “othering of the other.”⁹ Through these acts Russia and the EU co-create perceived differences between themselves, isolate each other in their cooperation or try to form an autonomous, self-sufficient Self through imposition, disengagement, resistance or dominance. I therefore ask how the image of the Self is formed through interaction and constant exchange with the Other in the framework of the EU-Russia discourse.

Unraveling the main argument, I examine the privileged patterns of EU-Russia autonomous cooperation, revealing that they are re-produced and reinforced by a set of prevalent “discursive practices.”¹⁰ In the EU-Russia discourse, the EU and Russia articulate these practices in their official political statements. I identify these discursive practices and explore their influence on identity formation and the overall dynamics of EU-Russia relationship. I also examine how these practices reinforce the pattern of autonomy or cooperation and how they systematically reproduce the paradoxical form of

⁹ See more on this issue, in David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Revised edition (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1998); Xavier Guillaume, *International Relations and Identity: A Dialogical Approach* (Taylor & Francis US, 2010).

¹⁰ Timothy J. Reiss, *The Discourse of Modernism* (Cornell University Press, 1982), 11.

autonomous cooperation in EU-Russia relations.

To summarize the discussion of autonomous cooperation, I conclude by suggesting its definition that is further explored in theoretical and empirical chapters of this study. *Autonomous cooperation* is a paradoxical form of international relations that is conflictual in its nature because it relies on the partners' ability to cooperate, which is systematically questioned by the partners' attempts to guard their autonomy through imposition, (self) exclusion, dominance or resistance.

The primary problem of tension between partners' autonomy and cooperation drives the research in three directions that I follow in the subsequent chapters. First, the study requires placing the discussion of relationship between two collective subjects, the EU and Russia, into the theoretical world of international relations. I examine what understandings (if any) International Relations (IR) studies have to offer in addressing the main problem of this study. As Chapter Two illustrates, the literature on EU-Russia cooperation from comparative politics and foreign policy studies provides insights into the role of either Russia or the EU in the relationship between the two. However, scholars writing on EU-Russia cooperation do not tend to place the EU-Russia relationship into the broader theoretical context of the international world in order to conceptualize the uniqueness of this cooperation and its consequences for the current international system. As a result, the existing academic literature overlooks the need to conceptualize the constitution of EU-Russia cooperation as an instance of an *international relationship*. My study addresses the existing gap offering a theoretically inclined, relational account of EU-Russia cooperation.

Second, in my aspiration to expose the limits of EU-Russia *autonomous*

cooperation, I offer a new understanding of this relationship viewed through a dialogic lens. A significant tension between the two contradictory patterns of autonomy and cooperation becomes visible to our observations only through this dialogic lens. In Chapter Two, I employ the dialogic approach of the Russian philosopher of language, Mikhail Bakhtin.¹¹ Blending this approach with Nicholas Onuf's constructivist account of speech acts,¹² I pursue the goal of understanding cooperation between the EU and Russia on a more *relational* basis. This innovative direction of applying Bakhtin's dialogism to EU-Russia cooperation allows us to identify and to question the principles of identity and alterity construction between Russia and the EU in favour of revealing a mutual formation of the Self and the Other.

Third, the study addresses a methodological and empirical task of investigating the privileged patterns and dominant discursive practices in the EU-Russia political dialogue. "Bakhtin's ontological approach is highly instrumental for international politics, which is generally 'a politics of alterity' about 'making an other.'"¹³ Bakhtin's view of dialogue is open to methodological improvisation. Therefore, by drawing on Bakhtin's account of a "dialogic imagination,"¹⁴ I develop a dialogic model for examining the discourse between the EU and Russia (Chapter Three). This interpretive model allows us to witness the processes of mutual identity and alterity construction and the subsequent quests for autonomy or cooperation conveyed in the inter-textual space of the EU-Russia political discourse. I apply the model to the analysis of the texts of selected political statements in the empirical chapters in order to demonstrate how the

¹¹ Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*.

¹² Nicholas G. Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

¹³ Tekin, *Representations and Othering in Discourse*, 13.

¹⁴ Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*.

patterns and discursive practices co-emerge in the EU-Russia dialogue; how they structure seemingly pre-given realities of the EU-Russia relationship, and how the partners experience tensions and contradictions of their autonomous cooperation.

1.4. Contribution to the existing scholarship

One of the goals of this study is to expand the horizons of existing academic scholarship. The increasing complexity of contemporary forms of international relations seems to confuse politicians and scholars alike. Both wonder what is the key to their relationship. Politicians emphasize the need to take decisions and act upon problems in an increasingly complex environment. Scholars find it more difficult to identify what the framework should be for these actions and how we can understand better the growing complexity of international relations so that we can make informed choices.

In this vein, the existing scholarly analysis of EU-Russia cooperation in Russia and in the West recognizes a re-occurring cycle of problems, emphasizing that EU-Russia relations “are still in a state of protracted crisis”¹⁵: legacies of the Cold War era and mistrust between the partners endure; ambiguity of strategic goals in cooperation keeps resurfacing; and economic asymmetry continues to exist.¹⁶ However, it remains unclear

¹⁵ Nadezhda Arbatova, *Rossiiia I Evropeiskiii Soiuz: Ot Krisiza K Novomy Dogovoru* (Moscow: Komitet “Rossiiia v Ob’edinennoi Evrope,” 2005).

¹⁶ T. Aleseeva, “Rossiiia v Prostranstve Globalnogo Vospriiatiiia,” *Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy* 5 (2007), <http://www.intertrends.ru/fourteen/005.htm>; Nadezhda Arbatova, *Rossiiia I Evropeiskiii Soiuz: Ot Krisiza K Novomy Dogovoru* (Moscow: Komitet “Rossiiia v Ob’edinennoi Evrope,” 2005); Joan DeBardeleben, ed., *The Boundaries of EU Enlargement: Finding a Place for Neighbours*, Studies in Central and Eastern Europe (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Joan DeBardeleben, “Applying Constructivism to Understanding EU–Russian Relations,” *International Politics* 49, no. 4 (March 30, 2012): 418–33, doi:10.1057/ip.2012.8; Kjell Engelbrekt and Bertil Nygren, eds., *Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010); S. Medvedev, “The Crisis in EU-Russia Relations: Between ‘Sovereignty’ and ‘Europeanization’” (Moscow: Moscow State Univeristy, Higher School of Economics, 2007); Sergei Prozorov, *Understanding Conflict between Russia and the EU: The Limits of Integration*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies (Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

from current political and academic debates what the solutions are to reoccurring continuous tensions in their cooperation.

Scholars are puzzled by the diverging nature of the two partners and frequently view the difference in their interests, norms, values, strategic policy views or governance patterns as a source for the perpetual conflicts.¹⁷ Indeed, EU-Russia cooperation requires that two partners – having different natures, mindsets and world-views – establish sustainable relations with each other. Scholars describe Russia with its “political system as a managed or directed democracy... a modern state... with a strong trend towards defederalization and central authority,”¹⁸ which emphasizes “hard” instruments in dealing with international problems. According to Yana Strel'tsova, political leaders in Russia are prone to building the feeling of patriotism based on the image of Russia as an independent, sovereign nation-state, a great power on the international arena, which is sometimes hostile towards the West.¹⁹ Sergey Prozorov supports these arguments, emphasizing the conflict between the “sovereign logic” of Russia and the “integrationist logic” of the pluralistic EU.²⁰

¹⁷ Derek Averre, “Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?,” *European Security* 14, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 175–202, doi:10.1080/09662830500336060; Joan DeBardeleben, “Applying Constructivism to Understanding EU–Russian Relations,” *International Politics* 49, no. 4 (March 30, 2012): 418–33, doi:10.1057/ip.2012.8; *The Boundaries of EU Enlargement: Finding a Place for Neighbours*, Studies in Central and Eastern Europe (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, eds., *EU External Governance: Projecting EU Rules beyond Membership*, 1 edition (London: Routledge, 2012); Fyodor Lukyanov, “Russia–EU: The Partnership That Went Astray,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 6 (July 18, 2008): 1107–19, doi:10.1080/09668130802181007; T. Romanova, “The Theory and Practice of Reciprocity in EU-Russia Relations,” in *Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches*, ed. Kjell Engelbrekt and Bertil Nygren (Routledge, 2014).

¹⁸ Stefan Gänzle, “The EU’s Policy towards Russia: Extending Governance beyond Borders,” in *The Boundaries of EU Enlargement: Finding a Place for Neighbours*, ed. Joan DeBardeleben, Studies in Central and Eastern Europe (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 54.

¹⁹ Yana Strel'tsova, “Evropeiskii Vzgliad Na Vneshnuiu Politiku Rossii,” *Polis* 6 (2008): 169–79.

²⁰ Sergei Prozorov, *Understanding Conflict between Russia and the EU: The Limits of Integration, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies* (Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

These assertions lead scholars to argue that “the demarcation line between Russia and Europe lies along the modern versus postmodern paradigm.”²¹ According to Ivan Krastev “the heart of the current crisis is not the clash between democracy and authoritarianism [...], but the clash between the postmodern state embodied by the EU and the traditional modern state embodied by Russia.”²² While “modern” Russia guards the principles of sovereignty with hard borders and the state’s independence in decision-making, the “postmodern” European Union aspires to supersede the borders of the traditional international system of states. Specifically, the Union establishes multiple policy regimes, such as the Economic and Monetary Union, CFSP and ESDP, the European Neighbourhood Policy and much more.

As Hiski Haukkala rightly observes, the presence of such differences becomes problematic only if the initial prerequisite for the EU-Russia relationship is cooperation that results in normative convergence, compatibility and a growing similarity between the EU and Russia.²³ In the EU-Russia partnership, this similarity or “commonality”²⁴ between two different partners is to be achieved through Russia’s unidirectional transition towards a superior Western European model of state, rather than through a mutual rapprochement of both the EU and Russia.²⁵

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, political and academic debates surrounding EU-Russia cooperation resembled this scenario of rapprochement for quite

²¹ B. Mezhev, “Modern Russia and Postmodern Europe,” *Russia in Global Affairs* 1 (2008), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_10362.

²² Also in Gänzle, “The EU’s Policy towards Russia: Extending Governance beyond Borders.”

²³ Hiski Haukkala, *The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership: The Limits of Post-Sovereignty in International Relations*, 1 edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 2.

²⁴ Anastasia Chebakova, “Rethinking a Problematic Relationship: Toward a Hybrid Strategic Vision of EU-Russia Cooperation,” in *Divided States: Strategic Divisions in EU-Russia Relations*, ed. Romaniuk, S. N. and Marlin, M. (Hamburg, Germany: Disserta Verlag, 2012), 41–49.

²⁵ Haukkala, *The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership*, 2.

some time. According to Vyatcheslav Morozov,²⁶ “assertions of Russia being part of European civilisation [became] commonplace in the Russian debates.” The asymmetry between partners was assumed to be the major obstacle for the partnership’s success.

More recently, it has become obvious that Russia has fully reclaimed its status of a unique and self-sufficient “post-empire,”²⁷ demonstrating an assertive way of interaction with others, or in some cases a complete disengagement. With special attention to EU-Russia cooperation, my study addresses these dynamics by counteracting the attempts to blame one partner or the other. Instead, the study aims to utilize differences between the partners in order to illuminate certain historical processes of identity and alterity construction in EU-Russia relations and to reveal systemic problems as a product of the relationship between these two partners.

The main argument and the definition of the underlying problem question existing explanations for numerous stalemates in EU-Russia cooperation. As Prozorov observes:

Russia’s policy towards the EU has been marked by the contradiction between the drive for greater integration ...and the reassertion of sovereignty and a consequent withdrawal or self-exclusion from integrative processes.... This [tendency] is arguably owing to the constitutive role of Europe for Russia’s identity, which historically was formed in the persistent ‘struggle for recognition’ of Russia’s own Europeanness. For this reason, notwithstanding practical problems in relations with Europe, the ‘European dimension’ of foreign policy remains a priority, even if only in the symbolic sense.²⁸

Following Prozorov’s observations, delving into the problem of tension between autonomy and cooperation holds a significant potential for a better understanding of contemporary trends and the future prospects for EU-Russia cooperation. The tension

²⁶ Viatcheslav Morozov, “In Search of Europe: Russian Political Discourse and the Outside World,” *Eurozine*, February 18, 2004, <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-02-18-morozov-en.html>.

²⁷ Dmitry Trenin, *Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story* (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011).

²⁸ Sergei Prozorov, interview by Anastasia Chebakova, September 2012.

between securing autonomy of both partners in their relations with each other and, simultaneously, the partners' ability to cooperate has not been subjected to substantive theoretical or empirical scrutiny. With a few notable exceptions, the existing scholarly work on EU-Russia cooperation perceives the demands for autonomy or cooperation as self-evident truisms. The literature often implies that the patterns of cooperation and, especially, of autonomy in the actions of the EU or Russia naturally occur: they emerge as a result of a long history of relations between Russia and Europe,²⁹ or due to deviances in the behaviour of one partner or the other,³⁰ or due to the EU or Russian attempts to establish dominance in cooperation and hegemony in the contested European region.³¹ Although these explanations provide much-needed analyses of EU-Russia cooperation, I contend that they offer unsatisfactory answers to problems of the relationship between Russia and the EU. The existing scholarly work predominantly targets the symptoms or the consequences of the problem rather than the underlying problem itself. This study contends that addressing the underlying problem of tension between partners' autonomy and their ability to cooperate can provide new insights into the prospects for EU-Russia partnership.

As the literature overview in Chapter Two demonstrates, the scholarship on EU-Russia relations mostly focuses on how the relationship works or does not work from the

²⁹ Dmitry Trenin, *Integratsiia i Identichnost': Rossiia kak "Novyi Zapad"*: (Moskva: Evropa, 2006); Dmitry Trenin, "The Lonely Power: Russian Security Policy and the West," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, accessed March 19, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22683&zoom_highlight=boris&reload_flag=1; Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, *Russia and Europe in the Twenty-First Century: An Uneasy Partnership*, ed. Jackie Gower and Graham Timmins, 1 edition (London; New York: Anthem Pr, 2009).

³⁰ Prozorov, *Understanding Conflict between Russia and the EU*.

³¹ Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*, Second Edition (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011); Willerton and Beznosov, in *The CIS, the EU and Russia: The Challenges of Integration*, Studies in Central and Eastern Europe (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

EU or Russian perspective. However, with a few notable exceptions described in the literature overview, the existing examples of scholarly work do not explain how political discourse influences the dynamics of the EU-Russia relationship or how the partners mutually create crisis-prone situations. Scholars continue to overlook the effect that the language of interactions between the EU and Russia has on the overall dynamics of cooperation between Russia and the EU. This study focuses on analyzing the process of construction of perceptions, images and identities of actors by examining the EU-Russia political dialogue.

Scholarly work on EU-Russia cooperation, or any other kind of international cooperation as an instance of a *dialogic* relationship, hardly exists. This study makes a contribution to this gap in scholarship. I build on scarce examples of academic literature on political discourse and Bakhtin's dialogism that already exists and provide a unique, relational reading of EU-Russia cooperation.

The examples of political discourse analyzed in this study are specific to the EU-Russia case. However, the problem of negotiating between autonomy and an ability to cooperate is not exclusive to the particular instance of EU-Russia cooperation: the tensions are hidden in the existing international system and are pertinent to relations between many other global actors. Therefore, the findings of this study can be applicable to similar forms of international cooperation currently existing all over the world (for instance, the EU-Canada partnership, the EU-US partnership, Russia-US relations.) The study's results can also be transferred to other cases of currently existing strategic partnerships, especially the ones of asymmetrical nature with partners from so-called

developing countries or semi-authoritarian regimes.³² I now turn to a brief summary of practical implications of the findings. The conclusion of the study provides more detailed discussion of these implications.

1.5. Avenues for political transformation, structure, sources

This study pays special attention to experiences and difficulties of negotiating between contradictory patterns of autonomy and cooperation. Having engaged with theoretical and conceptual roots of this problem in EU-Russia relations, I simultaneously aspire to draw practical implications from this study to explore possibilities for political transformation in the EU-Russia partnership. These implications are relevant for the current situation and the future of the EU-Russia relationship.

I define political transformation in the EU-Russia relationship as a transformative change towards a constructive and productive relationship based on mutual obligation to cooperate on equal terms, to learn from each other and to build trust together. The practical implications of this study include but are not limited to the following avenues of cooperation: provision of a supportive environment by the partners with both committing to cooperate and to build mutual trust; prioritization of the pattern of cooperation with simultaneous recognition and respect for the subject's autonomy; creation of opportunities to learn about the other partner as a "positive Other"; re-interpretation of the existing discursive practices towards a more cooperative vision. These avenues, discussed in more details in the concluding chapter, ponder over implications of this study for the

³² The EU currently established ten strategic partnerships. For the most recent definition of these strategic partnerships, see the European Strategic Partnerships Observatory "Database | ESPO – European Strategic Partnerships Observatory," accessed May 5, 2015, <http://strategicpartnerships.eu/database/>.

future of EU-Russia strategic partnership. The avenues are inclusive of – but not limited to – immediate solutions in the EU-Russia partnership.

The specificity of this study's theoretical, methodological and empirical agenda presents a challenge of engaging with several disciplines and areas of study. Due to its inter-disciplinary perspective, this research work addresses IR studies and theory, the studies of EU and Russian foreign policies and European and Russian area studies in Comparative Politics.

My study seeks to make a contribution to the research on conflict resolution by addressing the struggles for conflict transformation in crisis-prone relationships. The study also seeks to contribute to a varied research on communication, discourse and the role of language, as well as the research on political psychology. I tackle an uneasy task of placing myself at the crossroads of these areas of study. The goal is to provide a meaningful account of an *international relationship* between two cooperators by learning and borrowing from these areas of research. It is not the intention of this study to provide an exhaustive overview of all existing scholarly work by well-established experts from these diverse fields and areas of study. This study is problem-driven, empirically oriented and theoretically inclined. I do not try to come to one single conclusion, or to provide one single generalizable solution to the underlying problem.

“The body” of EU-Russia cooperation is its legal and institutional framework established by both partners. In this study, I examine “the face” of the EU-Russia partnership and the expressions it gains in the process of dialogic interaction. I do not wish to overload the reader with new facts about the partnership. The goal is to engage closely with political statements as the carriers of the EU-Russia conversation that

construct the reality of EU-Russia cooperation. Therefore, this study focuses on the dialogue between two conversants – the EU and Russia. I recognize the fact that there are many Others listening, and the messages by the EU or Russia may indirectly be voiced for multiple listeners. However, for the purpose of model construction and in consideration of the size limits of this study, I focus on two voices of the EU-Russia duet.

As further explained in the methodological chapter, I concentrate on political and security discourse of EU-Russia cooperation, sidestepping a detailed analysis of economic, energy and other matters. The objective of this study is to demonstrate the formation of a specific form of cooperation, rather than to provide a policy analysis of the most critical areas of partnership. The political and security cooperation reflected in the selected empirical examples of the EU-Russia dialogue provides sufficient empirical material to achieve the study's objective.

To demonstrate formation and discursive continuity of the dialogue between the EU and Russia, this study examines carefully selected examples of political elite discourse. I analyze only the texts that carry sufficient amount of information for the proposed analytical model. Among them are the major official agreements and strategies adopted by both partners in the last two decades of their cooperation: these agreements and strategies symbolize the key milestones, the incremental steps in EU-Russia cooperation, uncovering the overall dynamics of the EU-Russia dialogue. I examine all four key milestones in EU-Russia cooperation: the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,³³ the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia³⁴ together with the

³³ “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation.”

Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy Towards the European Union³⁵ and the Road Maps for Four EU-Russia Common Spaces.³⁶

The study accompanies the in-depth analysis of milestones with an analysis of other examples of the EU-Russia dialogue immediately surrounding the adoption of major political statements. These examples supplement, further discuss or question the findings from the analysis of the milestones, producing a continuous and dynamic reinterpretation of EU-Russia relations. My goal is neither to cover the entirety of the EU-Russia dialogue, nor to provide the findings that are “objective.” The goal is to create a *coherent narrative* of relationship as an instance of international cooperation – an interpretation that could bring in an alternative light to problems in the EU-Russia partnership. Finally, the study’s analysis is complemented by interviews allowing me to gain unique information about the partnership. The interviews are the complimentary source of information, serving as a correction mechanism for the assertions of this study.

The overall goal of uncovering the intricacies of the EU-Russia dialogue is to witness the formation of tensions in the EU-Russia official discourse. In order to do so, I demonstrate how the texts of all selected political statements are interconnected in their responsive logic. Acting as a listener, not the knower, I let the text unravel itself, by decoding and interpreting the messages conveyed in the text. As a result, my textual analysis of selected statements in the EU-Russia dialogue opens up the complexity of the

³⁴ “Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia,” June 4, 1999, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/8199en.htm.

³⁵ “The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000 - 2010),” October 1999, <http://eulaw.edu.ru/english/legislation/docum/rustr.htm>.

³⁶ “Road Maps for EU-Russia Four Common Spaces” (Moscow, Russia, May 10, 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/russia_eu_four_common_spaces-%20roadmap_en.pdf.

relationship, demonstrating the way in which the EU and Russia practice their cooperation and relate to each other.

The overall structure of this study insures a balance between theoretical and empirical analyses. Chapter Two of the study addresses various debates in academic literature seeking to formulate possibilities for change in EU-Russia cooperation. This theoretical chapter also explores the potential of Onuf's constructivist accounts and Bakhtin's dialogic analysis in addressing the underlying problem tackled by this study. Chapter Three introduces a dialogic model of analyzing the EU-Russia discourse. It provides methodological solutions for managing complex intertextual analysis of multiple political statements.

The empirical part of the study addresses the paradox of EU-Russia autonomous cooperation. Four empirical chapters apply theoretical and methodological findings to the analysis of selected political statements. These chapters examine: (a) prevailing discursive practices and patterns of autonomy or cooperation that constitute the EU-Russia dialogue and (b) the reproductive logic of the EU-Russia current political discourse that reinforces tensions in a chain of integrally interrelated political standpoints. I guide the reader through a complex inter-textual analysis of the EU-Russia dialogue with summaries and concluding remarks at each stage of my empirical examination. The final chapter extracts principal lessons from applying Bakhtinian thought to the EU-Russia political discourse in order to portray the insights developed in this study for a broader universe of international relations. This concluding chapter ponders over possible implications of the study for an emergence of constructive cooperation between Russia and the EU.

CHAPTER 2 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

As highlighted in the previous chapter, the second direction of this study aims to expose the partners' privileged principles of practicing autonomous cooperation. This chapter addresses the task by providing a general literature overview of existing scholarly landscape. I investigate the ways this literature answers the key question: how can the problem of mediation between the autonomy of the modern collective subject and the subject's ability to cooperate be addressed in the particular case of the EU-Russia relationship?

The chapter continues to tackle this question by offering an alternative theoretical view. This view is alternative because it is focused on the *relationship* between two partners and thus is moving beyond predominantly EU or Russia centered approaches that currently proliferate in political and academic discourse on EU-Russia relations. This view is based on a unique blend of Onuf's constructivist accounts of speech acts and Bakhtin's dialogic approach. The resulted approach allows us to study the dynamics of EU-Russia dialogue through examples of political discourse as a source of empirical information.

The ultimate goal of the chapter is to create a theoretical framework for understanding cooperation between the EU and Russia on a more *relational* basis. This framework questions the current understanding of identity and alterity construction in the

EU-Russia relationship. The framework also provides a formidable theoretical ground to reveal mutual formation of the Self and the Other and to challenge EU-Russia autonomous cooperation.

Including the introduction and conclusion, the theoretical chapter is divided into six sections. Following the introductory section, the second section provides a general overview of the current scholarly landscape on EU-Russia relations. In the third section, I continue on by identifying and discussing specific limits of dominant theoretical paradigms that are relevant to the case of EU-Russia relations. Paraphrasing Doll, my ultimate goal of creating a theoretical blend for this study is to “[utilize] disparate trends—paradoxes, anomalies, indeterminacies”³⁷ in the specific case of the EU-Russia relationship. Focusing on this goal, I keep the discussion of the limits of dominant paradigms rather short, providing extensive references to an already existing scholarly critique. As a result of the analysis of these two sections, I argue that with several notable exceptions, the lack of theoretical imagination in academic discourse on EU-Russia cooperation creates limitations for a scholarly understanding of the cooperation and its possible futures. In section four, I move on to a brief discussion of the constructivist contribution in IR studies, focusing on Onuf’s specific account for speech acts and performativity of language employed to investigate the underlying problem of this study. Section five addresses Bakhtin’s thought as a fruitful theoretical and methodological instrument in embracing and utilizing paradoxes of the EU-Russia relationship. Section six provides concluding remarks.

³⁷ William E. Doll, *A Post-Modern Perspective on Curriculum* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), 128.

2.2. Scholarly landscape

The EU-Russia relationship falls under commonly studied topics within the framework of Comparative Politics, Russian, Eurasian and European area studies. The literature in IR studies focusing on the Russian foreign policy provides additional insights into the relationship between the EU and Russia. Chapter One identified some of the gaps in the existing scholarly work on EU-Russia relations. I now turn to a brief overview of this work by dividing it into three tentative strands: first, the Euro-centric focus of understanding EU-Russia cooperation as an example of regional cooperation; second, strategic and policy-oriented studies of EU-Russia relations as part of Russia centered foreign policy solutions; and, third, the scholarly attempts to understand the tension in the relations between the two through the study of identity, perceptions and discourse.

The existing academic literature in European studies tends to treat the EU-Russia partnership as one of the examples of EU regional cooperation in the European neighbourhood.³⁸ This strand of literature is centered on the EU, which means that it overlooks the novel feature of the EU-Russia partnership as a form of an *international relationship*. There is a lack in conceptualization of the EU-Russia partnership and its consequences for the existing network of international relations. Scholars focusing on studying the EU do not tend to embark on the task of placing its relationship with Russia into a broader context of the international world.

There are two plausible explanations: first, this strand of literature almost exclusively focuses on the EU politics of conditionality and multi-governmentality and

³⁸ For example, see Derek Averre, “‘Sovereign Democracy’ and Russia’s Relations with the European Union,” *Demokratizatsiya* 15, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 173–90; *Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations*, Europe and the Nation State 7 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2005).

on the resolution of numerous problems that this politics produces in EU cooperation with many different Others.³⁹ The emphasis is on modes of governance and its efficiency, questions of democracy and political economy from the EU-centered perspective. This Euro-centric focus provides numerous inspirational insights into our understanding of the complexity of the EU as a unique polity. However, the EU centered approach overshadows the significance of *relational* component of the EU-Russia partnership and overlooks how this relationship is understood from a Russian perspective.⁴⁰

Second, the literature on the EU as a global actor and its relations with many different Others is at the relatively early stage of development, both theoretically and empirically. The EU is a new global actor, which continues to suffer from the lack of internal coherence.⁴¹ The Union therefore requires facing the challenge of a better understanding of its partners and doing more work for a sound articulation of its external image.⁴² This study draws special attention to the images that the partners co-produce of each other within the framework of the EU-Russia strategic partnership and the influence their representations of one another have on the dynamics of cooperation.

Scholarly examples of literature on Russia's foreign policy and Russia's relations with the EU prioritize historically oriented explanations of a Russian sense of belonging to the East or to the West. Scholars focusing their research on Russia (both in Russia and

³⁹ H. Hubel, "The EU's Three-Level Game in Dealing with Neighbours," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 9, no. 3 (2004): 347–62; Gänzle, "The EU's Policy towards Russia: Extending Governance beyond Borders."; Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, eds., *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), <http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doi/10.1057/9780230292284>.

⁴⁰ see more on this problem in A. Chebakova et al., "Russia and EU Cooperation in Energy Policy – Sending and Receiving Messages?," *CEP*, no. Special Issue (forthcoming), 2.

⁴¹ For instance, critique of the EU as a global actor, in Mario Telò, *European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013). John Vogler and Charlotte Bretherton, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 2 edition (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006).

⁴² Natalia Chaban, Michele Knodt, and Amy Verdun, "External Images of the EU-Energy Power Across the Globe," *Comparative European Politics*, no. Introduction to the Special Issue (forthcoming).

in the West) seek to understand difficulties and evaluate the consequences that Russia faces in building its relations with the West.⁴³

They also notice tensions in Russia's self-identification. The crisis of the Russian self-image combines "traditional nihilism of Russians towards their own country and traditional anti-Russian pessimism of the West."⁴⁴ This "split personality" creates constant fluctuations in the Russian identity. On the one hand, Russia actively builds its image based on the sovereign characteristics of an autonomous self-ruled nation-state. On the other hand, Russia emphasizes the importance to act in line with the rules of the international community and considers itself to be an integral part of it. For instance, in famous Shleifer's and Treisman's analysis, this country aspires to be perceived as a "normal country,"⁴⁵ who wishes to enjoy a certain level of freedom in the sphere of global politics and at the same time to cooperate with the existing international institutions.

Unable to find a compromise between these contradictions, scholars often face two choices: They propose policy-oriented strategic solutions in addressing the continuous problems between Russia and the EU.⁴⁶ Due to the fact that these solutions overlook the main problem of tensions between autonomy and cooperation, they often face the dead-end.

Alternatively, scholars proclaim that "Russian authorities gave up the European dreams and returned to the familiar road of great-power policy...the country is an

⁴³ Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*, Second Edition edition (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011); Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).

⁴⁴ T. Aleseeva, "Rossiia v Prostranstve Globalnogo Vospriiatiiia," *Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy* 5 (2007), <http://www.intertrends.ru/fourteen/005.htm>.

⁴⁵ Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, "A Normal Country: Russia after Communism," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 151–74.

⁴⁶ For instance, N. Noonan, in *The Boundaries of EU Enlargement*.

independent power center with its own system of organization, belonging neither to the East nor to the West and acting exclusively in its own interests.”⁴⁷ This so-called “strategic traditionalism”⁴⁸ searches for explanations within Russia and concludes that “...most of Russia's ruling class continued to think of their country as destined by history and geography to be one of the principal guardians of world order.”⁴⁹

The traditionalist thinking explains well Russia’s desired centrality to both the so-called “shared” European neighbourhood and to the rest of the world. This strand of studies also builds fair connections between the internal domestic political landscape in Russia and its external “outward” actions and policies.

However, scholars’ attempts to rethink the conflict between sovereignty and integration,⁵⁰ cooperation and independence, once again face the dead end. In Dmitry Trenin’s words, a “lonely great power”⁵¹ solution creates ambiguity of vectors in Russian foreign policy and will continue to lead to re-occurring problems and tensions with the EU, especially in the shared neighbourhood. My study exposes and problematizes contradictory patterns of autonomy and cooperation, focusing on both the EU and Russia as contributors to producing tensions of autonomous cooperation. I also seek to understand and further question both the EU’s and Russia’s current ways of practicing its autonomy in relations with the EU.

The scholars representing an alternative third strand of literature move away from the focus of the other two strands towards unpacking of tensions in EU-Russia relations

⁴⁷ Trenin, “The Lonely Power,” 177.

⁴⁸ See more about this phenomenon in Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013); Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy*.

⁴⁹ Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy*.

⁵⁰ Vadim Kononenko, “Boundaries of Sovereignty, Frontiers of Integration: Rethinking ‘Conflict’ between Russia and the EU,” in *Russia’s European Choice*, ed. Ted Hopf, 1st ed (New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 187–213, <http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doi/10.1057/9780230612587>.

⁵¹ Trenin, “The Lonely Power.”

through the analysis of identity formation and discourse dynamics. Specifically, such attempts have been made in Prozorov's conflict theory of sovereignist versus integrationist logic in EU-Russia cooperation,⁵² Andrey Makarychev's and Morozov's relational investigations of Russia's formation of the Self and Others,⁵³ dialogical struggles of Iver Neumann.⁵⁴ A discursive turn has been increasingly gaining weight in the studies on specific energy relations between the EU and Russia. These studies build on detailed examinations of political and media discourse and come up with creative accounts for understanding identity formation, partners' perceptions of each other as well as the co-production of images in their energy relations.⁵⁵ Overall, the alternative strand of literature is more equipped to witness conflictual dispositions in the EU-Russia relationship, to problematize the logic of independency versus integration/rapprochement and to pay special attention to the role of discourse and identity formation in relations between Russia and the European West.

As a result, the scholarly work produces a peculiar mix of either Euro-centric or Russia-centric focus in conceptualizing the relationship between the two partners. There are notable scholarly attempts to challenge this mix and provide a more interpretive, discourse oriented understanding of the EU-Russia relationship. In the theoretical and methodological

⁵² Prozorov, *Understanding Conflict between Russia and the EU*.

⁵³ Andrey Makarychev and Viatcheslav Morozov, "Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond: A Menu of Russia's Policy Strategies," *Global Governance* 17 (2011): 353; Morozov, "In Search of Europe: Russian Political Discourse and the Outside World."

⁵⁴ Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe a Study in Identity and International Relations*, New International Relations (London ; New York: Routledge, 1996), <http://www.myilibrary.com?id=32056>; Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation*, Borderlines, v. 9 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

⁵⁵ Chaban, Knodt, and Verdun, "External Images of the EU-Energy Power Across the Globe"; Chebakova et al., "Russia and EU Cooperation in Energy Policy – Sending and Receiving Messages?"; Lukáš Tichý and Petr Kratochvíl, "The EU-Russia Energy Relations under the Prism of the Political Discourse," *Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs* 22, no. 1 (January 2014): 5–32; Sergey Tumanov, Alexander Gasparishvili, and Ekaterina Romanova, "Russia–EU Relations, or How the Russians Really View the EU," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 27, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 120–41, doi:10.1080/13523279.2011.544387.

chapters of the study, I contribute to these attempts by developing a theoretical and methodological framework for a relational understanding of EU-Russia cooperation. Next section reviews specific limitations of traditional realist and liberal theoretical approaches that currently proliferate in the studies of EU-Russia relations.

2.3. “Superhighways” in EU-Russia studies

In “Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time,” philosopher Michel Serres provides an excellent commentary to the problem of “belonging” to certain theoretical approaches, “the superhighways”⁵⁶ as he names them. He says: “I am driven by a strong disinclination to ‘belong’ to any group, because it has always seemed to require excluding and killing those who don’t belong to the sect.”⁵⁷ Indeed, “there are a variety of ways of studying the social world with none of them able to veto the others as illegitimate on scholarly grounds.”⁵⁸ Following Serres’s sincere commentary, “[I go where I can]”⁵⁹ in theoretical explorations of this study and follow only partially the disciplinary demand for a discussion of the limitations of the existing dominant paradigms.

I agree with Doll that it is important to challenge the status quo, to destabilize accepted knowledge.⁶⁰ However, while initial attempts to provide a strong critique to the rules and norms of already existing theoretical paradigms are indispensable, the ongoing scholarly efforts to produce new knowledge through critique may prove to be unproductive. We do not necessarily open up new ways for a transformative knowledge

⁵⁶ Michel Serres, *Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time: Michel Serres with Bruno Latour*, trans. Roxanne Lapidus (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 20.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Gunther Hellmann, “Are Dialogue and Synthesis Possible in International Relations?,” *International Studies Review* 5, no. 1 (2003): 143.

⁵⁹ Serres, *Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time*, 21.

⁶⁰ Doll’s chapter on Ilya Prigogine’s work, in Doll, *A Post-Modern Perspective on Curriculum*.

or a better understanding of socio-political phenomenon by deconstructing and critiquing the existing dominant thought. There is a real danger and tendency for the critique itself to turn into fixed and complex rules and norms, which are inflexible and insensitive to transformative learning and knowing.

Following these reflections, an extensive body of literature in IR studies – especially the readings under the label of constructivism and poststructuralism – is dedicated to the task of critique. This literature identifies most if not all of the existing limitations of the mainstream approaches and aims to destabilize accepted knowledge. In order to keep my analytical focus, I only name a few of the limitations that are crucial for the specific case of EU-Russia relations. I then move on to a problem-oriented application of the theoretical approaches that are chosen for this study.

There are notable examples of scholarly work, which seeks to provide an alternative to the mainstream paradigms. Most prominent examples include but are not limited to Onuf's disagreements with positivist, empiricist and realist thought, where he challenges the assumptions of the mainstream approaches with exemplary theoretical and analytical preciseness.⁶¹ Other examples are Alexander Wendt's questioning of anarchy and objectivity of pre-given national interests as central explanatory concepts in IR studies, famous meta-theoretical critique of realist and neorealist theories that is often labeled as poststructuralism in IR,⁶² as well as in-depth methodological debates.⁶³ All

⁶¹ Onuf, *World of Our Making*, 38–40 as well as discussion of theoretical paradigms in his Introduction.

⁶² Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, "Introduction: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (September 1, 1990): 259–68, doi:10.2307/2600569; James Der Derian, *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, ed. Michael J. Shapiro Professor of Political Science, 1st Edition edition (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1998).

⁶³ See the Chapters by Checkel and by Neumann *Qualitative Methods in International Relations a Pluralist Guide*, Research Methods Series (Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), <http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doi/10.1057/9780230584129>; Gunther Hellmann, "Are Dialogue

these scholarly actions or reactions to the dominant approaches aspire to draw our attention to the social construction of the world around us, to neglected questions of identity formation and the importance of discourse.

In general terms, these alternative approaches bring into question our ability to understand the way to social and political transformations, and ultimately, to create an inclusive account of relationships, social, national, international, which considers the influences and perspectives of all parties involved.

For our specific study, this critique of the mainstream paradigms is important. The discussion of what is missing in established interpretations of EU-Russia relations allows us to set aside interest-based EU or Russia centered explanations of tensions in EU-Russia cooperation and to draw our attention to the role of interactions, language, identity formation and image production. Finally, this critique of the mainstream paradigms prepares a formidable ground for us to provide a complex interpretation of EU-Russia problems through an alternative study of discourse, the study of dialogue.

In this section, I reveal several limitations of viewing the case of EU-Russia relations through traditional realist and liberal approaches (and their neoclassical versions). First and foremost, there is a state-centrism of realist and liberal mainstream paradigms, which produces dichotomy of national-international as two oppositions sustained through the notion of the state sovereignty.⁶⁴ This limitation forces realists and

and Synthesis Possible in International Relations?," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 1 (2003): 123–123; Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (June 1, 1999): 225–54, doi:10.1177/1354066199005002003; Paul Sullivan, *Qualitative Data Analysis Using a Dialogical Approach* (SAGE, 2011), <http://srmo.sagepub.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/view/qual-data-analysis-using-a-dialogical-approach/n1.xml?rskey=rNTKL5>.

⁶⁴ More on this problem, see Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, "Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (September 1, 1990): 367–416, doi:10.2307/2600576.

liberalists to view the EU and its interactions with others from the perspective of interstate cooperation, through an “off the shelf” concept of the “Westphalian state.”⁶⁵

The realist approach focuses on a maximization of the EU member-states’ relative gains, whereas liberalism grounds its arguments on the acceptance of absolute gains in intergovernmental cooperation of singular states. Within the realm of these traditional approaches “foreign policy [can] only be understood as a subject of state activity directed towards the outside world.”⁶⁶ Thus, the very notion of EU global actorness, the EU’s ability to use its internal capabilities to meet the demands external to its borders becomes very problematic for the mainstream agenda.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the EU politics of conditionality, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership initiatives are examples of how the European Union as a qualitatively new source of non-state or above-the-state power is acting as a collective subject and framing the regional set up in its “near abroad.”⁶⁸ These are the examples of the EU exercising autonomous rule-making that usually belongs exclusively to the states as the main actors in the international system.

⁶⁵ In more details on the discussion of this concept, see the following Chapter and the book: Nicholas G. Onuf, “Intervention for the Common Good,” in *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, ed. M. Lyons and M. Mastanduno (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1995), 34–58.

⁶⁶ Ben Tonra, “Conceptualizing the European Union’s Global Role,” in *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies*, ed. Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 121, <http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doi/10.1057/9780230522671>.

⁶⁷ John Vogler and Charlotte Bretherton, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 2 edition (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006); Telò, *European Union and New Regionalism*.

⁶⁸ Elena Korosteleva, “The Eastern Partnership Initiative: A New Opportunity for Neighbours?,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 27, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 1–21, doi:10.1080/13523279.2011.544381; Oliver Schmidtke and Constantin Chira-Pascanut, “Contested Neighbourhood: Toward the ‘Europeanization’ of Moldova?,” *Comparative European Politics* 9, no. 4 (September 2011): 467–85, doi:10.1057/cep.2011.12; Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, eds., *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective Context, Implementation and Impact*, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), <http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doi/10.1057/9780230292284>.

The “global inevitability” of the EU is a central component and the main symbolic element in the EU Security Strategy.⁶⁹ In fact, the EU demonstrates a strong trend to go beyond the “modern” state-based international environment: it is increasingly considered as a post-modern actor that is mandated to act on behalf of its members. The EU as a “multi-perspectival non-traditional entity”⁷⁰ symbolizes the emergence of a new “extra-national,” “post-sovereign” foreign policy,⁷¹ which requires novice theoretical and conceptual tools.

However, the ambiguous features of the EU, or the characteristics of “betweenness”⁷² sometimes lead to conclusions that the EU is not (or not yet) an influential global actor⁷³; it is in “the process of becoming”⁷⁴ and its identity is in constant flux. These features also exemplify difficulties that the EU as a non-traditional political entity experiences in its relations with its traditional “Westphalian” surrounding of sovereign nation-states.⁷⁵ Our case of EU-Russia cooperation specifically looks at one of the examples of such difficulties.

With regard to the EU unique nature, the case of EU-Russia cooperation presents a scholarly challenge to understand the relationship between two very different partners. The existing scholarly literature views this challenge as a problem rather than an

⁶⁹ “A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy” (Brussel, Belgium, December 12, 2003), 1, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

⁷⁰ John Ruggie, “Territoriality and beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations,” *International Organization* 47, no. 1 (1993): 171–172.

⁷¹ Michael Smith, “The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Post-Modern Policy Framework?,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 10, no. 4 (January 1, 2003): 556, 558, doi:10.1080/1350176032000101253.

⁷² Brigid Laffan, Rory O’Donnell, and Michael Smith, *Europe’s Experimental Union: Rethinking Integration* (Psychology Press, 2000), 193.

⁷³ Vogler and Bretherton, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 12.

⁷⁴ Laffan, O’Donnell, and Smith, *Europe’s Experimental Union*, 193.

⁷⁵ see more on this issue in Anastasia Chebakova, “In Search of a Dialogic Relationship: Perspectives on a Possibility for Political Transformation in the Contested European Neighbourhood,” *Ukrainian Journal of European Studies* 1(7) (n.d.): 82–94; Schmidtke and Chira-Pascanut, “Contested Neighbourhood”; Korosteleva, “The Eastern Partnership Initiative.”

opportunity for theoretical imagination. It demands that the two actors having a different nature reconcile their differences in order to cooperate and to achieve further rapprochement.⁷⁶ My study seeks to understand the partners' perceptions of differences and the role they play in the dynamics of the EU-Russia relationship. Moreover, utilizing difference into a working engagement between two diverse partners is one of the research questions of this study.

Second, over-determination of (anarchic) structure in neorealist and neoliberal theory with states as the main rational and autonomous actors has produced a narrow view of international relations, creating limits to our imagination of opportunities available to collective subjects in the supposedly anarchical international world.⁷⁷ As a result, scholars often overlook the distinctive role of such instances of international cooperation as the EU-Russia partnership. This partnership structurally relocates the sovereign power beyond the borders of EU member-states and questions their singular sovereign authority and, most importantly, their autonomy in international matters. Safeguarded by dominant paradigms, the new forms of cooperation between an autonomous state (Russia) and a non-state (the EU) in the realm of the international world remain unsusceptible to our political imagination. The study provides an alternative to this mainstream view and treats both co-operators as legitimate conversants who struggle with tensions between autonomy and cooperation.

⁷⁶ Tanya Radchuk, "Contested Neighbourhood, or How to Reconcile the Differences," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 27, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 22–49, doi:10.1080/13523279.2011.544382; also. in Engelbrekt and Nygren, *Russia and Europe* Especially the book section by T. Romanova.

⁷⁷ John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35, no. 2 (January 1, 1983): 261–85, doi:10.2307/2010273; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (April 1, 1992): 391–425; Vogler and Bretherton, *The European Union as a Global Actor*.

Third, an assertion “that actors are unitary and rational”⁷⁸ and [power derives from the pursuit of individual material interest]⁷⁹ that is exogenously given⁸⁰ represents the central theoretical construct not only for the mainstream IR literature – especially for realist paradigm and its neorealist extension – but also for the scholarly work on EU-Russia relations. For instance, the geopolitical version of realism has acquired substantial weight in the literature on the EU-Russia relationship due to the formation of a post-soviet space with countries clinging towards either Russia or the EU or both. This geopolitical realism portrays Russia as a mature power that, in its quest for an autonomous independent Self, has reclaimed its geopolitical dominance in the post-Soviet space.⁸¹ In its exercise of autonomy, Russia produces forceful strategies to defend and pursue its national interests. It competes or cooperates with others on very pragmatic rational terms, creating “limits to integration” with the EU.⁸² This traditional view completely overlooks the contradictory and complex interplay of Russia’s autonomy and its desire to cooperate, providing overly simplistic accounts for Russia’s relations with its neighbours.

I now illustrate the assertions through the lens of the dominant paradigms that are echoed in examples of literature on EU-Russia relations thereby determining our understanding of the EU-Russia relationship. Specifically, the academic discourse in Russia and in the West predominantly focuses on either “conflicts of interests”, especially on the

⁷⁸ Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3.

⁷⁹ Tonra, “Conceptualising the European Union’s Global Role,” 122.

⁸⁰ Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 391.

⁸¹ Oscar B. Pardo Sierra, “No Man’s Land? A Comparative Analysis of the EU and Russia’s Influence in the Southern Caucasus,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 44, no. 3 (September 2011): 233–43, doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2011.07.007; *Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations*.

⁸² See more in Heikki Eskelinen, Ilkka Liikanen, and James Wesley Scott, eds., *The EU-Russia Borderland: New Contexts for Regional Cooperation*, BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies 84 (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2013).

post-soviet space,⁸³ or irreconcilability of individual values, norms and political cultures as an obstacle to a constructive EU-Russia partnership.⁸⁴ It is only a strategy of cooperation based on common values and norms, common liberal (European) democratic principles, common interests or common position on foreign and security policy issues that would give a chance to build an EU-Russia “constructive partnership”⁸⁵ or, as the advocates of realist approach would put it, a desirable and agreeable equilibrium.

Difficulties in the relationship are explained through either a neorealist or neoliberal narrative of what is wrong with Russia or the EU. However, a seemingly clear-cut picture of the EU-Russia partnership and its dynamics does not reveal the complexity of relations between the European West and Russia. Instead, the interest-based dominant approaches continue to generate and sustain well-known stereotypes and perceptions of counterbalancing, West-East divide, great power “real” politics. These approaches color the partners’ characteristics in EU-Russia relations with dichotomous overtones of “strong” and “weak,” “democratic/undemocratic,” and, therefore, “civilized” and “uncivilized” or somewhat “civilizing.”⁸⁶

⁸³ Arbatova, *Rossia I Evropeiskii Soiuz: Ot Krisiza K Novomy Dogovoru*; T Bordachev, “Strategy and Strategies,” in *Rethinking the Respective Strategies of Russia and the European Union*, ed. A Moshes (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 31–62; Irina Busygina and Rossiiskii sovet po mezhdunarodnym delam, *Rossia-Evropeiskii Sojuz: Vozmozhnosti partnerstva* (Moskva: RSMD, 2013); Michael Emerson, “EU-Russia – Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 71, 1 May 2005,” Policy Paper, (May 2005), <http://aei.pitt.edu/6615/>; Trenin, “The Lonely Power.”

⁸⁴ Haukkala, *The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership*.

⁸⁵ Arbatova, *Rossia I Evropeiskii Soiuz: Ot Krisiza K Novomy Dogovoru*; Averde, “‘Sovereign Democracy’ and Russia’s Relations with the European Union”; Introduction, in Engelbrekt and Nygren, *Russia and Europe*; Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin’s Russia*, revised and expanded edition (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 105.

⁸⁶ See more on “civilizing democracies” in C. Hobson, “Democracy as Civilization,” *Global Society* 22, 1 (2008).

Qualitatively new theoretical or policy-oriented solutions can hardly arise from echoing well-heard-of truisms of “friend/enemy” divisions, or “realpolitik” reductive explanations of complex relations in the region. Such a representation of collective subjects (both states and non-states) as singular rational units separated from many Others and unaffected by relations with Others does not allow scholars to witness the mutual production of “same/different” categories in their identity formation; it does not allow scholars to unfold how the partners’ individual interests are co-produced and how they become interrelated and juxtaposed in their interactions with each other.

The mainstream logic effectively produces one more influential assertion that has had a significant impact on the scholarly debate about EU-Russia relations. In its explanations for tensions in EU-Russia relations, both political and academic discourses have developed the notion of *commonality*⁸⁷ as a prerequisite seemingly required for EU-Russia constructive cooperation. As already mentioned in the introductory chapter, the lack of *common* interests, values, norms has become an explicit or implicit explanation for tensions in EU-Russia cooperation. As a result, problems between the partners occur until a greater degree of commonality, or sameness is achieved between cooperators. The notion of commonality is a powerful, inherent assumption widely employed in the language of the EU-Russia relationship, matching the EU and Russia in terms of “more or less the same,” “more or less different,” whereby creating endless possibilities for tensions between the partners. When interests, norms or values differ, a constructive cooperation becomes almost impossible.

⁸⁷ According to Oxford English Dictionary, commonality is “the sharing of features of attributes.” For interpreters, “a common category” is the category that has the same linguistic information in all the languages in which it is used. The characteristic of “sameness” plays an important role in finding commonalities between different units of analysis.

The very idea of commonality inspired scholars to wish Russia the best, and the best means no less than a European liberal-democratic order. Currently disillusioned in its hopes and expectations, Russia has completely abandoned the idea to join this liberal-democratic order, treating the unavoidable interdependency with the EU in purely pragmatic and often uncooperative terms.

In scholarly battles for a solution to the lack of commonality in the EU-Russia relationship, current academic discourse provides paradigmatic answers on what the EU, Russia and their relationship *must* become – a “strategic union” must be established,⁸⁸ rapprochement must be achieved⁸⁹ and an equilibrium of interests must be attained.⁹⁰ As a result of these attempts to resolve the normative question of what the EU-Russia relationship ought to become, the scholars tend to overlook the actual dynamics and mutual formation of tensions in relations between the EU and Russia.

This section provided brief discussion of limitations of the mainstream approaches in EU-Russia studies that are relevant to our specific study of EU-Russia cooperation. These limitations include the mainstream concepts of state-centrism, anarchic character of international world and the pursuit of individual interests. The limitations do not allow us to grasp the EU unique nature as a global actor, or to view partners’ abilities to construct relations with a very different partner without necessarily meeting the prerequisites of common interests, values and norms. Most importantly, the dominant approaches in EU-Russia relations overlook the struggles that both partners have between their autonomy and

⁸⁸ T. Bordachev and D. Suslov, eds., “Konzeptzia Novogo Politiko-Pravovogo Formata Otnoshenii Rossii I Evropeiskogo Soiuzza” (Centr Prikladnyh Issledovani, 2007).

⁸⁹ T. Romanova, “The Theory and Practice of Reciprocity in EU-Russia Relations.” In *Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches*.

⁹⁰ Nadezhda Arbatova, “Obshchee Prostranstvo Bezopasnosti Mezhdru Rossiei I ES: Imperativy I Priipiatstvaia,” *Indeks Bezopasnosti* 3, no. 86/14 (2008): 63–76.

their ability to cooperate with each other. Therefore, the dominant approaches have very little insight to offer for our examination of tensions of autonomous cooperation. Is there an alternative way to co-exist alongside the Other, a way of being with one another in the EU-Russia relationship?

2.4. Constructivism and performativity of language

The move toward constructivism

The discussed dominant paradigms are indifferent to the question how the EU and Russia relate to each other in their interactions and how they converse with each other. In order to understand how interests, values, identities become mutually constitutive in EU-Russia interaction, I now turn to a constructivist account of international relations.

During the last three decades or so, IR studies have witnessed a growth of interest in identity and discourse formation. Significant number of scholars working in the realm of IR studies increasingly pay attention to the Self/Other nexus in analyzing formulation of foreign policy. The power and effects of political discourse is well studied within the constructivist and post-structuralist frameworks. Some examples include but not limited to Pouliot's⁹¹ methodological insights for constructivist scholarly work and his recent study on Russia-NATO political practices⁹²; Hansen's⁹³ reading of Bosnia's discourse; Campbell's⁹⁴ work on national deconstruction, Constantinou's alternative ways of being with and relating

⁹¹ Vincent Pouliot, "‘Subjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology," *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 359–84, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00455.x.

⁹² Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁹³ Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, 1 edition (New York: Routledge, 2006).

⁹⁴ Campbell, *Writing Security*.

to Others; Nitoju's and Tomic's narrative approach to the discursive construction of the European Union as a political actor.⁹⁵

Scholars writing in the alternative constructivist vein have made notable contributions to European and Russian studies. Among other examples are Gomart's insights on identity crisis in the EU-Russia discourse; Zehfuss's⁹⁶ application of "different constructivisms" to German military involvement abroad; Haukkala's⁹⁷ application of constructivist accounts of norms and ideas to EU-Russia cooperation; Tonra's⁹⁸ insights for the development of the European Foreign and Security Policy; Clunan's⁹⁹ adaptations from social psychology in his application of "aspirational constructivism" to the analysis of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy; Neumann's¹⁰⁰ attempts to theorize the nexus of European and Russian identity within IR and his relational reconceptualization of "international society," as well as Makarychev's¹⁰¹ and Hashimoto's¹⁰² (2011) reaffirmation of Bull's concept of international society in the study of identity formation in the EU-Russia political discourse; Debardeleben's¹⁰³ applications of constructivist view to EU-Russia relations. All these scholars deserve recognition in their attempts to establish an intersubjective constructivist understanding in EU-Russia studies. My study contributes to this body of literature. Most

⁹⁵ Cristian Nitoiu and Nikola Tomic, *Europe, Discourse, and Institutions: Challenging the Mainstream in European Studies* (Routledge, 2014).

⁹⁶ Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations*.

⁹⁷ Haukkala, *The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership*.

⁹⁸ Tonra, "Conceptualising the European Union's Global Role."

⁹⁹ Anne L. Clunan, *The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests* (Baltimore: Hopkins Fulfilment Service, 2009).

¹⁰⁰ Iver B. Neumann, *Governing the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010); Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe a Study in Identity and International Relations*.

¹⁰¹ Andrey S Makarychev, "Conceptualising Neighbourhood: Russia vs Its 'others,'" *Journal of International Relations and Development* 13, no. 2 (June 2010): 194–207, doi:10.1057/jird.2009.30.

¹⁰² Tom Hashimoto, "Introduction: EU-Russia Relations and the International Society Theory," *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 7, no. 2 (November 8, 2011): 155–58.

¹⁰³ DeBardeleben, "Applying Constructivism to Understanding EU–Russian Relations."

importantly, it attempts to address the methodological and empirical vagueness¹⁰⁴ of this approach by providing a well-developed methodology and applying it to empirical examination of EU-Russia political discourse.

“Interpreting meaning and grasping the influence of changing practice...become central [for constructivism].”¹⁰⁵ Most importantly, in its attempts to challenge rationalistic accounts of the dominant theoretical approaches, constructivism “[emphasizes] the processes of interaction.”¹⁰⁶ The attractiveness of constructivism for this particular study is obvious: interpreting the processes of interaction between the EU and Russia is central for answering the research questions on identity formation and perpetuation of tensions between the partners.

There is a lack of agreement, however, on the meaning and substance of constructivism in scholarly literature.¹⁰⁷ Some authors define at least “three constructivisms.”¹⁰⁸ For instance, Jeffrey Checkel offers a distinction among conventional, interpretative and critical (radical) variants.¹⁰⁹ Others suggest a dichotomous division into “conventional” and “consistent” constructivism: “the former [accepts] the existence of an objective world, while the latter [emphasizes] ‘merely’ language.”¹¹⁰ Vendulka Kubálková offers yet another variant of “soft” versus “hard” constructivism.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴ For critique of constructivism in IR, see Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

¹⁰⁵ Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations*, 4.

¹⁰⁶ K. Fierke on Constructivism in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 168.

¹⁰⁷ Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations*, 9.

¹⁰⁸ Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics: A Review Essay,” *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 02 (April 2004): 229–44, doi:10.1017/S0260210504006023; Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations*.

¹⁰⁹ Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics,” 3.

¹¹⁰ K. Fierke on Constructivism in Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories*, 194.

¹¹¹ V. Kubálková, *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World* (M.E. Sharpe, 2001).

To complicate matters further, the constructivists in IR studies also prioritize different key issues. For instance, in response to over-determination of structure in the neorealist and neoliberal theories, Wendt¹¹² places an emphasis on the relationship and tension between agency and structure. He questions the determinant logic of anarchy as an objectively existing, pre-given international reality. He also opposes the exogenously given character of interests pursued by individual states.¹¹³ Wendt claims that identities and interests of states as an agency are changeable in the process of interaction rather than pre-given or fixed. He offers to look at identity formation and introduces “the possibility of agency”¹¹⁴ in the construction of the international world order. For John Ruggie, constructivism becomes important because it offers an equal ontological emphasis on the ideational and material nature of “the building blocks of international reality.”¹¹⁵ He contends that “ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual, but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place.”¹¹⁶ Friedrich Kratochwil emphasizes intersubjectivity of knowledge and the intersubjectivity of meanings, or intersubjective context in his attempts to understand the existing state of affairs in the world of global politics.¹¹⁷ Constructivists also claim to understand better a process of identity formation, as well as the constitutive effect of norms, rules and values on political

¹¹² Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.”

¹¹³ Ibid., 391.

¹¹⁴ Fierke on constructivism Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, *International Relations Theories*, 168.

¹¹⁵ John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 879.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, 1 edition (Cambridge Cambridgeshire; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

realities.¹¹⁸ Perhaps the only unifying factor is a sincere desire by these scholars to free themselves from the shackles of realism, liberalism and its hybrid neo-forms and to grasp “in-between,” “inter,” “multi” and “mutual” in a socio-political phenomenon.

I argue that it would not be fair to simplify the arguments and assertions of many authors and place them under one monolithic theoretical umbrella – constructivism in IR. Wendt, Kratochwil or Ruggie have all played their roles in introducing constructivist accounts to IR studies. It would be more rewarding to consider their specific arguments separately from each other and in great detail instead of making judgments about applicability or inapplicability, “betterness” or “worseness” of one, single constructivist meta-theory. Therefore, following this general discussion of constructivism, I now proceed to apply theoretical assumptions of one constructivist author.

In this study, I employ the constructivist approach and the speech act theory offered by Onuf¹¹⁹ with the goal to reveal a connection between the official political statements and reoccurring crises in the EU-Russia relationship. I have chosen to reflect on Onuf’s work in my study because in my opinion Onuf’s understanding of speech acts offers one of the best examples of a specific mode of thinking: his focus at the perceptions level, where the importance of interactions, identity formation, the influence of language and the co-construction of meanings become prioritized. Moreover, Onuf’s theoretical accounts are appropriate as a starting point of my analysis insofar as his theory and classification of speech acts¹²⁰ allows us to focus on performative effects of political statements. I start with

¹¹⁸ For instance Ruggie, “Territoriality and beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations.”

¹¹⁹ The word “constructivism” was initially introduced to the IR by Onuf in 1989¹¹⁹ with his book “World of Our Making”.

¹²⁰ Onuf, *World of Our Making*.

the question: what insights can be gained in understanding EU-Russia relations when viewed through Onuf's lens?

Onuf 's "performativity of language"

In contrast to the existing mode of explanation for problems in EU-Russia cooperation, the EU-Russia relationship can be re-imagined through the concept of "speech acts."¹²¹ Human beings, according to Onuf, construct reality through speech acts, which in turn may, through repetition, be institutionalized into rules and norms, reproduce or change realities and provide the meaning for action.

Onuf's constructivist view "denies that world and words are independent: it sees them as mutually constitutive."¹²² Onuf's work notices a peculiar relationship between material and discursive worlds: "Agents make the material world a social reality for themselves as human beings."¹²³ For Onuf, constructivists "[do] not grant sovereignty to either the material or the social by defining the Other out of existence."¹²⁴ In other words, everything is related to both the social and the "natural reality."¹²⁵ Therefore, an informative relationship between the two worlds needs and has a chance to occur through, for instance, the study of a linguistic activity, the study of discourse.

¹²¹ John R. Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge University Press, 1969); see also, Onuf, *World of Our Making*.

¹²² As cited by M. Zehfuss in Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen, *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation* (M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 62.

¹²³ Nicholas Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations* (Routledge, 2013), 8.

¹²⁴ Onuf, *World of Our Making*, 40.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

In his interpretation of social and political realities, Onuf is concerned with rules that “tell us how to carry on . . . in a socially constructed world.”¹²⁶ People, as well as states, become agents in society through rules. Rules define agents in terms of structure, and structures in terms of agents.¹²⁷ Moreover, agents act within an institutional and social context, but at the same time they act in this context through deeds. They may consist of words or physical actions.¹²⁸ In his effort to “reconstruct International Relations as a contribution to social theory,”¹²⁹ Onuf addresses the philosophical question of “beginning,” as well as the philosophy of language and sociology claiming that “constructivism begins with deeds. Deeds done, acts taken, words spoken – these are all that facts are.”¹³⁰ Deeds make the world, provide interaction between agents and contribute to the mutual constitution between agents and structure. A speech act as a deed is the “act of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act.”¹³¹ Therefore, for Onuf, “the point of a speech act is to have an effect on some state of affairs.”¹³²

Language in a speech act becomes *representative* and *performative*: it can be used to perform deeds constituting a social reality and its rules.¹³³ Consequently, an agent can “make” the world not only through its physical actions but also through its speech acts. Consequently, Onuf’s speech acts follow the pattern: “I (you, etc.) hereby assert (demand, promise) to anyone hearing me that some state of affairs exists or can be achieved.”¹³⁴

¹²⁶ Ibid., 51.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 64.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 36.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid., 66.

¹³² Ibid., 98.

¹³³ Ibid., 82.

¹³⁴ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 10.

Onuf's pattern simultaneously leads in two directions: first, the message sent by the agent needs to be heard by the receiver. As a confirmation, the receiver needs to produce a response back to the agent. Otherwise, any effect of the speech act is questionable. Second, in order to be understood, a speech act needs to be situated in a specific context. Third, Onuf contends that observers can never step outside of the world of constructions and be neutral observers: "We can represent the world, including our place in it, through language."¹³⁵ However, "we are always within our constructions, even as we choose to stand apart from them, condemn them, reconstruct them."¹³⁶

In my textual analysis of the milestones in the EU-Russia partnership, I employ the classification of speech acts offered by Onuf. According to Onuf's classification, assertives are "speech acts stating a belief . . . with the intention] that the hearer accepts this belief";¹³⁷ directives contain an action the speaker wishes the hearer to perform (regulative intent); and commissives consist of the declaration of the speaker's commitment to a stated course of action. Therefore, commissives produce rules for the speaker, whereas assertives and directives try to impose rules on the hearer.¹³⁸ The goal of this classification's application is to characterize the nature of the chosen speech acts in the EU-Russia dialogue according to Onuf's theory of speech acts and to provide insights for analyzing the dynamics of EU-Russia autonomous cooperation.

From Onuf's monologue to Bakhtin's dialogue

¹³⁵ Onuf, *World of Our Making*, 43.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 87.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 87–88.

Onuf's work considers the speech acts as individual units of analysis. Onuf's speech acts demonstrate well how their owner performs deeds through rules, speaking, discourse, actions – all with the purpose to call a receiver into action. Onuf's deeds provide possibilities for interaction and have a performative effect on a phenomenon. For Onuf, agents prescribe the meaning or make sense of political and social reality through their own consciousness. They construct the reality themselves, through the power of their deeds. By means of individually constructed and pronounced speech acts, the agents “make the material world a social reality for themselves as human beings.”¹³⁹ This is an influential performative effect of Onuf's speech acts. However, Onuf's conceptualization of speech acts is lacking the effects of human interaction: his speech acts are not affected by Others talking. It is the action that is the focus in Onuf's performativity of language. The effect of reaction, interaction and human relationship is missing.

As Kubáľková states “different disciplines and subdisciplines develop in blissful ignorance of each other's concerns and achievement. Scholars of one discipline or field do not read, as a rule, much outside their own field of study.”¹⁴⁰ This quote inspired me to look further for a more relational understanding of language performativity and of the speech acts. As a result, I discovered Bakhtin's dialogic thinking and chose to blend Bakhtin's dialogism¹⁴¹ with Onuf's constructivist interpretation of language.

The novelty of Bakhtin's work has gained recognition in several examples of work within IR. Specifically, James Der Derian,¹⁴² Richard Ashley as well as Michael Shapiro in

¹³⁹ Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, 8.

¹⁴⁰ Kubáľková, *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, 101.

¹⁴¹ Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*.

¹⁴² James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford, OX, UK ; New York, NY, USA: Blackwell Pub, 1987).

Der Derian's edition¹⁴³ extended Bakhtin's concepts of dialogue, monologue and heteroglossia to the IR studies, continuing with Adam Hodges's dialogic study of "truth,"¹⁴⁴ Neumann's¹⁴⁵ relational investigations of "otherness" and now including Xavier Guillaume¹⁴⁶ with his dialogic theoretical perspective on international relations. However, theoretical applications of Bakhtin's approach in IR field remain very abstract and insufficiently operationalized, for instance, through textual analysis or analysis of actions. Of course, there are Tekin's applications of Bakhtinian thought to the construction of Turkey in the EU context¹⁴⁷ and Guillaume's work on a collective Japanese identity.¹⁴⁸ However, these exceptional examples of empirical application provide a static understanding of a phenomenon focused predominantly on the Self/Other nexus, friend/enemy construction, or intrinsic and extrinsic properties of identity formation. I also apply the insights of dialogic imagination to EU-Russia relations in order to understand the construction of the Self and Other. Apart from this, I trace the processes of change in EU-Russia interactions, as well as connect partners' numerous messages as parts of one EU-Russia dialogue in order to create a unique flexible understanding of autonomous cooperation and its tensions.

For both Onuf and Bakhtin, there is no "sharp distinction between material and social realities – the material and social contaminate each other."¹⁴⁹ For Onuf, there is an

¹⁴³ Derian, *International/Intertextual Relations*.

¹⁴⁴ Adam Hodges, "The Dialogic Emergence of 'Truth' in Politics: Reproduction and Subversion of the 'War on Terror' Discourse," *Colorado Research in Linguistics* 21 (2008), <http://works.bepress.com/adamhodges/5/>.

¹⁴⁵ Neumann, *Uses of the Other*.

¹⁴⁶ Guillaume, *International Relations and Identity*.

¹⁴⁷ Tekin, *Representations and Othering in Discourse*.

¹⁴⁸ Guillaume, *International Relations and Identity*.

¹⁴⁹ Onuf, *World of Our Making*, 40.

“independent, ‘natural’ reality of individuals as materially situated biological beings.”¹⁵⁰ For Bakhtin this “natural” reality, a material world exists in strong connection to dialogic relations, which exist everywhere, penetrate everything. Without dialogism, there would be no deed. Therefore, Bakhtin’s unique conception of dialogue offers a fruitful theoretical and methodological insight to this study.

Another strong connection between Bakhtin’s and Onuf’s constructivist accounts is that both look at the meaning formation and performativity of language reflected in speech acts. For Onuf, discourse is a “language in action,”¹⁵¹ having the performative effect delivered by the speaker. Same as Onuf, Bakhtin identifies the act of speech as a performative action that requires the speaker to take a stance. “Logical and semantically referential relationships, in order to become dialogic, must be embodied, that is, they must enter another sphere of existence: they must become *discourse*, that is, an utterance, and receive an *author*, that is a creator of the given utterance whose position it expresses.”¹⁵² I now turn to the discussion of Bakhtin’s dialogic approach.

2.5. Potential of Bakhtin’s dialogism

Bakhtin pays attention to addressivity, or responsiveness (“obraschennost,” “adresovannost”)¹⁵³ in a speech act that is embedded in a discourse. The speaker “in its every aspect ...is turned outward, intensely addressing itself, another, a third person. Outside this living addressivity toward itself and toward the Other it does not exist, even for

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Gee, 2005, as cited in Sullivan, *Qualitative Data Analysis Using a Dialogical Approach*.

¹⁵² Bakhtin, 1984, as cited in *ibid*.

¹⁵³ Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics)* (Moscow, 1979), 275.

itself.”¹⁵⁴ Is it possible to grasp Bakhtin’s addressivity in the analysis of the EU-Russia discourse?

Discourse for Bakhtin consists of the chain of utterances – a unit of meaning that is formed in addressing the Other. “An essential (constitutive) marker of the utterance is its quality of being directed to someone, its *addressivity* ...”¹⁵⁵ “Any understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently responsive...Any utterance is a link in the chain of communication.”¹⁵⁶ Bakhtin specifically emphasizes that “utterance implies others talking”¹⁵⁷: from the very beginning it is constructed in consideration of a response and it is “deeply dialogic”¹⁵⁸:

The expression of an utterance always responds to a greater or lesser degree, that is, it expresses the speaker’s attitude toward others’ utterances and not just his attitude toward the object of his utterance...The utterance is filled with dialogic overtones, and they must be taken into account in order to understand fully the style of the utterance.¹⁵⁹

As it follows, any utterance is essentially a response to other utterances: it is filled with both the speaker’s action in anticipation of a response from the addressee and the speaker’s reaction to preceding utterances within a particular discourse. My specific analysis of the EU-Russia discourse examines different utterances as the main units of analysis in the EU-Russia dialogue: the ambition is to understand their specific goal and to link them to the previous and anticipated future messages and responses. This way I uncover the addressivity (responsiveness) and interrelatedness of all the chosen statements in conversation between the EU and Russia.

¹⁵⁴ Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 251–252.

¹⁵⁵ Mikhail Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (University of Texas Press, 2010), 95.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 68, see also 84, 94.

¹⁵⁷ Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostojevsky’s Poetics)*, 250.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 275.

¹⁵⁹ Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 92.

Bakhtin does not isolate or separate one speaker from the other, social or political reality from material world; instead, he looks at the responsive logic¹⁶⁰, at co-emerging *actions, reactions and interactions* reflected in the speech acts within one dialogue. “After all, our thought itself – philosophical, scientific, artistic – is born and shaped in the process of interaction and struggle with others' thought.”¹⁶¹ The following methodological and empirical chapters of this study demonstrate how Bakhtin’s thought sheds a different light on the process of interaction between the EU and Russia as two very different conversants operating within one political discourse. For Bakhtin, discourse “has a meaning, which requires a responsive understanding”¹⁶². The very language of the speech act in Bakhtin’s discourse:

...lies on the borderline between oneself and the other... The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes one's 'own' only when the speaker populates it with his own intentions, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language... but rather it exists in other people's mouths, in other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions; it is from there that one must take the word, and make it one's own.¹⁶³

It is in my search for a responsive understanding of the EU-Russia relationship that I now turn to the discussion of the characteristics of Bakhtin’s dialogism relevant to this study’s discursive analysis.

On dialogue and dialogism

¹⁶⁰ See in more details on Bakhtin’s reactive and responsive logic in J. Shotter, “In Conversation: Joint Action, Shared Intentionality and Ethics,” *Theory & Psychology* 5, no. 1 (February 1, 1995): 49, doi:10.1177/0959354395051003.

¹⁶¹ Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 92.

¹⁶² Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics)*, 305.

¹⁶³ Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 294.

Thinking in Bakhtin's and Onuf's terms, I treat the EU-Russia dialogue as a "social phenomenon."¹⁶⁴ Each political statement in this dialogue represents a complete utterance – the unit of analysis in the EU-Russia dialogue with a specific goal in a particular sphere of communication. Along with the act of speech and its performative effects, Bakhtin emphasizes the necessity to talk *with* someone versus to talk *to* someone: he [the main hero] talked with the world, not to the world."¹⁶⁵ Hence, political statements within the EU-Russia dialogue can be understood as part of a conversation that reflects *dialogic relations* ("dialogicheskie otnosheniia").¹⁶⁶

The speaker is "oriented precisely toward ...an actively responsive understanding. He does not expect passive understanding that, so to speak, only duplicates his or her own idea in someone else's mind... Rather, the speaker talks with an expectation of a response, agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth."¹⁶⁷

When political statements are analyzed in the literature on EU-Russia cooperation, they are examined as individual units of analysis that are free from the influence of the dialogue between the EU and Russia. For example, the EU Common Strategy towards Russia (1999)¹⁶⁸ or the EU Country Strategy Paper (2007)¹⁶⁹ are considered to be an individual EU action, expressing EU intentions and goals in its cooperation with Russia. These political statements are viewed in the literature as the "EU speech," rather than part of the EU-Russia dialogue. The same logic applies in the analysis of Russia's political

¹⁶⁴ Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 81; Onuf, *World of Our Making*, 31.

¹⁶⁵ Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics)*, 275.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 292, 304.

¹⁶⁷ Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 69.

¹⁶⁸ "Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia."

¹⁶⁹ "Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013: Russian Federation" (European Commission, Brussel, Belgium, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/docs/2007-2013_en.pdf.

standpoints towards the EU. Bakhtin's dialogic analysis gives an opportunity to see the responsive logic of statements. Instead of analyzing the EU's and Russia's speech acts as mechanical statements articulated by partners separately from each other, this study grasps the *dialogic relationship* that emerges in the EU-Russia discourse. The product of this relationship is discursive practices adopted by each partner and certain patterns of cooperation privileged by one or the other or both conversants.

Heteroglossia

In order to uncover the internal dialogic overtones of the examined speeches, I turn to Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia. This concept holds the most innovative potential for the empirical and methodological applications of Bakhtin's work in this study.

Heteroglossia, ... is another's speech in another's language... Such speech constitutes a special type of double-voiced discourse. It serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author. In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings and two expressions. And all the while there two voices are dialogically interrelated, they-as it were-know about each other; it is as if they actually hold a conversation with each other. Double-voiced discourse is always internally dialogized.¹⁷⁰

Bakhtin talks about a polyphony of voices, focusing on "the passing of a theme through many and various voices, its rigorous and, so to speak, irrevocable multi-voicedness and vari-voicedness."¹⁷¹ "Everywhere there is an intersection, consonance, or interruption of rejoinders in the open dialogue by rejoinders in the heroes' internal dialogue. Everywhere a specific sum total of ideas, thoughts, and words is passed through several unmerged voices,

¹⁷⁰ M. Bakhtin as cited in Dmitrii Vladimirovich Nikulin, *On Dialogue* (Lexington Books, 2006), 31.

¹⁷¹ Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 265.

sounding differently in each.”¹⁷² Following Bakhtin’s logic, in the EU-Russia discourse there are two meanings, two expressions and two dialogically interrelated voices that hold a conversation with each other. Therefore, in empirical part of this study, I search for this polyphonic conversation, for a “double voice” (or “double-voicedness”)¹⁷³ in each selected speech act of the EU-Russia discourse.

Echoing Bakhtin’s thought, EU-Russia cooperation exemplifies a “mutual interaction”¹⁷⁴ of two voices recorded in the texts of political statements and official documents. This interaction is “constant and continuous.”¹⁷⁵ Each political statement in this interaction undergoes a “process of assimilation – more or less creative – of others’ words...”¹⁷⁶ For Bakhtin, “our speech...is filled with others’ words, varying degrees of otherness or varying degrees of ‘our-own-ness’These words of others carry with them their own expression, their own evaluative tone, which we assimilate, rework, and re-accentuate.”¹⁷⁷ Therefore, each political statement in EU-Russia cooperation is not a monologue; rather, it is a part and a result of the EU-Russia dialogue. Analysis of the statements helps us understand dialogic relations between the EU and Russia. In particular, information the partners send in their messages to each other, their view about each other and about cooperation.

Most importantly, Bakhtin’s dialogue does not necessarily imply consensus-building. Nor does it imply that the dialogue and disagreement can be delimited to one true meaning or view, resolving or transcending the difference of voices. The voices and their speakers in

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 108, 110.

¹⁷⁴ Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 4.

¹⁷⁵ Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 89.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

Bakhtin's dialogism are treated equally, meaning that they can provide different perspective, can disagree and contest each other's utterances. What is important for Bakhtin is to capture the engagement between different speakers, to connect different standpoints in a particular sphere of communication, rather than to resolve contestation between them.

This point of view about the dialogue is of particular significance to our research project, which deals with an example of international relations/cooperation. As Neumann eloquently puts it:

In IR, dialogue tends to be treated teleologically as an instrument for reaching decision. [Bakhtin's dialogue] first,... stresses the crucial importance of language for politics; it privileges language as a creative force rather than as an empty vehicle for consensus-building. Second, it insists that cognition and meaning formation as such are intersubjective and perpetual. Third, it stresses that everybody every member of the polity has a voice, not only the decision makers and those who have their ear.¹⁷⁸

Performativity and creativity of language, intersubjectivity and continuous re-interpretation of meaning, as well as multiplicity of voices are all the features of Bakhtin's dialogic imagination that are explored in this study. The overall goal of my exploration is to find a different answer to possibilities for change and transformation in the EU-Russia relationship rather than to provide a final end to perhaps unresolvable drama of diversity and disagreement between two very different partners.

Diversity, unity and continuity of dialogue

As the next theoretical move, I demonstrate the special unity of dialogue through its specific feature – an incompleteness, a continuity. In his conceptualization of the dialogue, Bakhtin demonstrates the distinct unity of the dialogue. The unity inherent in monological utterance

¹⁷⁸ Neumann, in Hellmann, "Are Dialogue and Synthesis Possible in International Relations?," 2003, 137.

is not obvious from the first sight in a dialogic interaction. However, “if we turn dialogue into one monological text, i.e., erase division into subject’s voices...then the deepest eternal sense [of the dialogue] will disappear.”¹⁷⁹ Therefore, the deep sense and unity of the dialogue is in its continuity. This continuity permits a process-oriented reading of any relationship and is most visible in interaction between two subjects.

In particular, Bakhtin’s accounts of unity and continuity of the dialogue permit us to move away from focusing on cooperation’s ends toward the process of interaction between two partners. “Only in contact with the other do we see ‘the light’ that shines backward and onward.”¹⁸⁰ Only in contact with the Other can we narrate the story of relationship and witness the process of identity formation in multiplicity of its forms. It is “a dialogic contact between utterances,” not “a mechanistic contact between oppositions”¹⁸¹ that can offer a more relational understanding of the past and contemporary trends, as well as possible futures for the EU-Russia relationship. “Nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is still in the future and will always be in the future.”¹⁸²

As a final step, I draw insights from Bakhtin’s standpoint on questions of identity and alterity construction. Neumann contends that “without the other, the subject cannot know either itself or the world because meaning is created in discourse where consciousnesses meet.”¹⁸³ This study explores the meeting of two consciousnesses and witness the partners’ relating to the Self and to the Other through a dialogic lens. As Bakhtin

¹⁷⁹ Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics)*, 364.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics* — University of Minnesota Press, n.d., 166.

¹⁸³ Neumann, *Uses of the Other*, 13.

writes: “One can speak of a human being’s absolute need for the other, for the other’s seeing, remembering, gathering, and unifying self-activity – the only self-activity capable of producing his outwardly finished personality.”¹⁸⁴

I offer to address the issue of asymmetry in the EU-Russia relationship, which is widely discussed in relevant literature. I ask difficult questions about difference, diversity and inequality between the Self and the Other in the EU-Russia dialogue. All these questions come down to the problem of alienation in Bakhtinian thought since “overcoming alienation of ‘the other’ without attempting to turn ‘the other’ into ‘self’ (through different kinds of replacements, modernization, non-acknowledgement of ‘the other’) is one of the tasks of social sciences.”¹⁸⁵

In his work, Bakhtin “elevates diversity on a higher level, considering it to be a fundamental fact of human existence rather than a temporary and superficial phenomenon.”¹⁸⁶ Bakhtin’s interpretation of diversity can help to witness differences between the EU and Russia rather than to eliminate them as a temporary and undesirable phenomenon.

In this relation, instead of reducing relations to what the two have in common, I attempt to explore partners’ differences and to utilize the complexity of their interactions. Fulfilling this task enables a better understanding of how the international cooperation works, why it does not work, or how it may work. Utilizing differences between the partners and moving the relationship away from an unproductive goal of achieving commonality

¹⁸⁴ Mikhail Bakhtin, *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays* (University of Texas Press, 2011).

¹⁸⁵ Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics)*, 371.

¹⁸⁶ Alexander Sidorkin, “Lyotard and Bakhtin: Engaged Diversity in Education,” *Interchange* 33, no. 1 (March 1, 2002): 85, doi:10.1023/A:1016308228583.

toward an active and working engagement between two diverse partners is one of the central research questions of methodological and empirical parts of this study.

Does one have a power to enrich or complete the Other? Is perceived equality or inequality between conversants shaping, hindering or enriching partners' dialogue? Finally, does one anticipate to turn the Other into the Self in the process of interaction? These complex questions about identity formation through the Self's relations with the Other reflect an ethical side of the dialogue and provide the study with a better understanding of the particular relationship between the EU and Russia.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter explored how the current academic literature addresses the EU-Russia relationship. The literature overview demonstrates that despite the existence of a considerable body of literature (in both English and Russian) on EU-Russia cooperation, insufficient work has been done in the area of European and Russian studies and in IR studies to investigate the process of identity formation, co-creation of tensions and the dynamics of discourse in EU-Russia cooperation. Scholars predominantly focus on either the EU or Russia in explaining EU-Russia cooperation and create a peculiar mix of scholarly literature. Moreover, this literature consciously or unconsciously relies on the main assumptions of dominant realist and liberal IR paradigms. As a result, the literature on EU-Russia relations overlooks the problem of mediation between autonomy and cooperation in EU-Russia interactions. The existing literature often faces the dead-end in its attempts to generate policy-oriented strategic solutions to problems in EU-Russia cooperation.

It remains unclear from the current academic debate how one is to conceive of cooperation between the EU and Russia and how one is to understand the underlying problem of negotiation between autonomy and cooperation in their relationship. Currently, there is a lack of theoretical imagination, which would provide a solid conceptualization of the EU-Russia partnership as one of the examples of international cooperation. The scholars tend to grasp many symptoms of the problem but not the underlying problem of inherent tensions between partners' autonomy and their ability to cooperate. A solid understanding of cooperation's relational component is missing.

There are, however, notable scholarly attempts to understand the tensions in the EU-Russia relationship through a study of identity and discourse formation in EU-Russia cooperation. In search for an alternative, I investigated these unconventional accounts of EU-Russia cooperation and concluded that only scarce amount of literature attempts to view the EU-Russia relationship through alternative lens. Chapter 2 contributes to these attempts by developing a theoretical framework for a more relational dialogic understanding of cooperation between the EU and Russia.

The EU-Russia case presents a broader theoretical challenge of understanding and conceptualising international cooperation between the two and, most importantly, capturing a mutual constitution of the character and dynamics of cooperation. In my attempts to overcome the limitations of dominant theoretical approaches, I address the challenge by blending Onuf's constructivist work with Bakhtin's dialogic analysis.

Theoretical accounts of Onuf allow us to focus on performative effects of political statements and to study a linguistic activity through discourse. In Onuf's speech act, language is *representative* and *performative*: an agent can "make" the world not only

through its physical actions but also through its speech acts. Onuf's theory of speech acts permits us to witness the performative effect of the messages sent and the responses received between partners in a specific context of their cooperation. Therefore, Onuf's theory of speech acts is relevant to our specific analysis because it opens up possibilities for examining the performative effect of speech on the specific phenomenon of EU-Russia cooperation.

However, Onuf's conceptualization is lacking the effects of human interaction: his speech acts are not affected by Others talking. In this vein, this study is well-informed but not driven by Onuf's work. His approach creates a path that leads to Bakhtin's dialogism. Onuf's theory of speech acts does not reflect on a performative effect of relationship and interaction between the two: Bakhtin's dialogism accomplishes this task.

This chapter examined the relevance of Bakhtin's work to the specific case of EU-Russia cooperation. Bakhtinian thought can find an equally constructive and insightful use in the European and Russian studies as well as in IR studies, especially in the context of relationality tradition. Applying Bakhtin's dialogism to EU-Russia cooperation allows us to identify and to question the principles of identity and alterity construction in the relationship between Russia and the EU in favour of revealing mutual formation of the Self and the Other in EU-Russia interactions. Dialogic analysis allows us to grasp specific patterns privileged by cooperators and prevalent discursive practices that both express and constitute this relationship. It addresses a complex problem of asymmetry, equality and difference in the EU-Russia relationship. Finally, Bakhtin's dialogism permits us to move away from focusing on cooperation's ends toward a more flexible process-oriented conceptualization of the EU-Russia relationship.

The following methodological chapter proposes to examine the chosen political statements as part of the EU-Russia conversation that reflects *dialogic relations*. I explore Bakhtin's polyphonic doublevoicedness as a potent concept for analyzing selected speech acts of the EU-Russia discourse. Bakhtin's thought also allows us to uncover the intimate links between the chosen statements and to witness co-emerging actions, reactions and interactions in conversation between the EU and Russia.

There is always an orientation towards the future in Bakhtin's dialogue. The dialogue itself is always incomplete, has a potential for further chains of responses. It is undecidable, continuous, and unstable. The fixation on producing one true decision, the choice of one true meaning, one true strategy and one true agreement brings monologism, inequality and mortality to the word of dialogue. Therefore, in order to uncover and explore the transformative potential of the dialogue, its ability to renew itself in the present and in the future, we need to invest into a continuous re-interpretation of relationship.

CHAPTER 3 - MODEL, METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

3.1. Introduction

The previous chapter covered the second direction of this study, providing the theoretical backbone for further methodological explorations. This chapter follows the third direction, which investigates specific methodological instruments in order to demonstrate how to apply Bakhtin's dialogic imagination to the case of EU-Russia relations.

The overall objective of this chapter is to demonstrate how scrutinizing the EU-Russia dialogue as a double-voiced political discourse can be used to unravel the formation and continuation of tensions in EU-Russia cooperation. My goal is to blend the explanatory power of Onuf's constructivism and the conceptual-methodological novelty of Bakhtin's dialogic imagination in order to develop a dialogic model of the EU-Russia relationship. This model is aimed to provide a novel understanding of re-occurring crises in EU-Russia cooperation. I anticipate that it reveals the internal meanings, reasons and beliefs that mediate cooperators' actions. The model allows us to capture and interpret the messages that the partners send to each other, their view about each other and about their cooperation. It also examines the performative effects of political statements on the process of identity construction and creation of tensions in the EU-Russia relationship.

In this chapter, I explain methodological and conceptual foundations for the empirical analysis of the chosen political statements. I comment on the process of data collection and sample selection, the choice of political discourse and the time period, the difficulties I encountered, as well as the solutions found. The chapter asks the following

methodological and conceptual questions: how can we demonstrate that the texts of selected speech acts carry on the EU-Russia dialogue and are deeply interrelated? How to reveal the continuity of the dialogue between the EU and Russia? Is it possible to create a novel interpretation of the EU-Russia relationship through the lens of Bakhtin's dialogism? How do Russia and the EU practice their relationship discursively and do they co-produce frustration, distance and tensions?

The chapter is divided into five sections: the first section is the introduction, followed by the second section, which presents an analytical model for a dialogic understanding of the EU-Russia discourse. The third section answers the question how we can study interrelatedness and intertextuality of the EU-Russia dialogue. It also extensively comments on the process of selection of political statements. The fourth section provides details on the structure of empirical analysis. The fifth section briefly summarizes proposed methodological solutions.

3.2. Dialogic model for understanding the EU-Russia dialogue

This section develops an analytical model for understanding the EU-Russia discourse on the basis of Bakhtin's and Onuf's accounts of speech acts. Bakhtin's theory of language and Onuf's concept of speech acts provide us with instruments for constructing new mental models. The model developed in this section offers one possible way of reflecting on the uneasy EU-Russia relationship.

Agency in Bakhtin's thought is always directed towards the Other, and the Self/Other relationship is always of dialogical nature. I employ the idea of modeling as a

way to discover this dialogic relation, and to make problems in EU-Russia cooperation discursively visible. This model of the EU-Russia dialogue also allows us to address the critique of Bakhtinian thought. Specifically, that he is neglectful to empirical explorations, especially when applied to the social sciences:

“Bakhtin’s conceptualization of discourse is an ethically pleasing and stimulating one, but it has nothing to say on the role of power for politics and for the social. Like Habermas (1987), who goes in for what he refers to as an ideal speech situation in the full knowledge that such a thing is an impossibility, or like Levinas (1989), who urges us to care about the other, Bakhtin has little or nothing to say about the implications of multiple forms for dialogue. It is a poor social scientist who neglects the empirical study of how dialogues actually proceed, how they interact with other practices, and how they are suffused with power relations.”¹⁸⁷

Therefore, a solid empirical research is critical for understanding complex issues and the dynamics of our specific case of the EU-Russia dialogue.

The proposed model is in essence dialogic. The following quote provides an exemplary explanation: “Any understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently responsive... Any understanding is imbued with response and necessarily elicits it in one form or another: the listener becomes the speaker...”¹⁸⁸ First and foremost, through its analytical components, the proposed model allows me to demonstrate a continuous dialogue of one speech act with another within the EU-Russia discourse. In other words, it establishes communication, a conversation between multiple statements in the EU-Russia discursive space and demonstrates how one speech act always exists in response to the statements put forward before, as well as in anticipation of the future responses. Second, the model allows us to view the cycles of interaction between the EU and Russia as two dialogically interrelated voices, through the lens of Bakhtin’s concept of the

¹⁸⁷ Hellmann, “Are Dialogue and Synthesis Possible in International Relations?,” 2003, 140.

¹⁸⁸ Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 68.

multiplicity of voices, a “double-voice” or a “multi-voice,”¹⁸⁹ discussed in more details in the previous Chapter. It is in this double-voiced polyphonic dialogue that I witness the moment of the listener becoming a speaker.

The main purpose of my analytical model application is to uncover the potential of Bakhtin’s dialogic imagination in understanding the specific case of EU-Russia autonomous cooperation. I explore the following research question: What do the official political statements articulated in the EU-Russia political discourse reveal about cooperation between the EU and Russia? By constructing a dialogic model of relationship between the two and applying it to the EU-Russia discourse, I aim to reveal the tensions of autonomous cooperation between Russia and the EU.

I am not trying to resolve all problems in EU-Russia relations through Bakhtin’s approach because “Bakhtin – is not a philosopher of ‘ideal speech situation’ he is not a philosopher of agreement.”¹⁹⁰ Bakhtin’s dialogism is highly relevant for a better understanding of identity and alterity construction in a specific empirical study of the EU-Russia dialogue. His relational view is relevant to understanding how the tensions of autonomous cooperation are co-produced by both partners.

In the literature on the EU-Russia relationship, the Self and the Other are often mutually exclusive categories dichotomized by an “absolute negativity.”¹⁹¹ The empirical analysis of political statements on the basis of the proposed dialogic model will demonstrate that the identities of both partners in the EU-Russia dialogue are mutually

¹⁸⁹ Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics)*, for example, 6.

¹⁹⁰ Wall, in David Shepherd, *The Contexts of Bakhtin: Philosophy, Authorship, Aesthetics* (Routledge, 2012), 205.

¹⁹¹ Beyza Ç. Tekin, *Representations and Othering in Discourse: The Construction of Turkey in the EU Context* (John Benjamins Publishing, 2010), 14.

constructed and present “a continuum from negative to positive – from conceiving the Other as anathema to the Self to conceiving it as an extension of the Self.”¹⁹² It is only through relating themselves with each other that both partners are capable of defining their own self-image and their roles in cooperation.

I further the analysis in the conclusion of the study by questioning limitations of autonomous cooperation and exploring possibilities for a productive engagement between the two partners. My study further suggests that the proposed analytical model for analyzing a relationship between two actors can be transferable beyond the borders of EU-Russia cooperation to similar examples of relationships currently existing all over the world.


Schematic illustration of the model

In this section, I offer a schematic illustration of the analytical model. This illustration addresses the following questions: How is the EU-Russia dialogue produced? What is the relationship between the sender of a political statement and the receiver of the message? An agent in the dialogue is either the EU or Russia, each of which manifests its own world-views, its perception of the partner and its view of cooperation in the selected speech act.

The preliminary structure of the relationship in the speech act between the speaker (one’s Self) and the receiver of the speaker’s message (Other) can be portrayed as follows:¹⁹³

¹⁹² Wendt in Tekin, *Representations and Othering in Discourse*. 14.

¹⁹³ The model is initially developed in my article Anastasia Chebakova, “Cooperation and Isolation: Understanding EU-Russia Dialogue,” *Review of European and Russian Affairs* 6, no. 1 (2011).



Line One in the diagram “manifestation by Agent”¹⁹⁴ indicates that the agent makes a speech act by sending a message to the receiver (Other), calling the receiver to become a conversant and to provide a response. According to Onuf, in its message, the agent manifests its view on the current or desired state of affairs, calling its conversant into action. The agent’s message also has a strong orientation towards an answer: “The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the answer's direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word.”¹⁹⁵

Line Two, “latent message,” shows that there is some information in the Agent’s message that is sent to the receiver, but it remains latent. For instance, these would be the

¹⁹⁴ I employ the term “Agent” instead of Bakhtin’s “Author” because agent and agency is more applicable terminology for the field of International Relations

¹⁹⁵ Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 279–280.

presumptions implied by the agent as a self-evident truth and, therefore, are not problematized in the agent's message. The response by the receiver may or may not question the latent message sent along with the agent's message. The agent's speech act is aimed at successfully indoctrinating the agent's view. Therefore, the success of the agent's speech act depends not only upon receiving a response back from the conversant, but also on the consenting or non-consenting character of this response. There is always a room for debate in Bakhtin's dialogic imagination. My empirical analysis examines the character of the agent's messages and of the receiver's responses: what information did the receiver question and what information did the receiver accept in the agent's message and why?

Lines Three and Four of the diagram illustrate the response by the receiver: the receiver sends its manifest speech act together with their latent message back to the agent. "Present absence" in the diagram is a non-articulated position or view strategically suppressed by both the speaker and the receiver in their manifest speech acts. The idea of the "unsaid" is difficult to grasp, theoretically, conceptually and methodologically. However, I envision that the silence plays an important role in the formation of the dynamics of the dialogue. Therefore, I pay special attention to the role of "the unsaid" in the dynamics of the EU-Russia dialogue.

I examine where the tension in cooperation occurs. One of my preliminary assumptions is that tensions and conflicts in EU-Russia cooperation occur during the process of production of the response by the Other and the subsequent acceptance or refusal of this response by the agent. Even if the agent's message is received successfully, it may create a split in the receiver's personality: the receiver has to accept the agent's

view, which means producing a response alienated from the receiver's Self. The following empirical chapters demonstrate how scrutinizing the EU-Russia discourse according to this model helps to understand re-occurring crises in EU-Russia cooperation.

In addition, the sender enters into the relationship with the receiver while producing its message. Therefore, the process of creating and sending the message is not only proactive, but also deeply relational in its character. The relational feature of Bakhtin's utterances does not automatically mean that they lose proactive characteristics described by Onuf; instead, speech acts continue to affect proactively a specific situation, simultaneously having a relational effect, as contended by Bakhtin. Onuf emphasizes a social *action* in his theory of speech acts, Bakhtin – a social *interaction* in the process of communication, because the defining principle of Bakhtin's dialogism (“dialogichnost,” dialogicheskaja aktivnost”) is a dialogic interaction (“dialogicheskoe obschenie”¹⁹⁶) with the addressee versus the influence on the receiver of the message. Therefore, by examining both the action and interaction I create a vigorous and flexible empirical-methodological ground for understanding the complexities of EU-Russia relations.

Guidelines for textual discourse analysis

In order to apply the proposed model to an extensive selection of texts and to reveal how these texts are interrelated in their dialogic continuity, I developed a scheme of specific criteria for my analysis, which is accompanied with questions. This scheme serves as a guide for analyzing selected political statements. I have developed the proposed criteria through my engagement with multiple examples of constructivist literature on identity and alterity construction discussed in details in Chapter 2 of this study. The criteria has

¹⁹⁶ Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics)*, 80.

been revised to reflect the preliminary results of empirical analysis. Above all, the proposed criteria allows us to pursue the main task of establishing intertextual connections between seemingly disconnected statements of EU-Russia discourse.

- *Representation of the Self and the Other.* What perceptions and representations of the Self and the Other emerge in the EU-Russia dialogue? Is there any contradiction in partners' perceptions of each other? Indeed, the way the EU and Russia perceive each other is indicative of their own worldviews and political thought. Therefore, in order to understand the partners' perceptions of themselves (their self-image) and their views of the Other (their partners' image), I scrutinize information that Russia and the EU communicate about each other in their speech acts.

- *Expectations and goals.* What do the EU and Russia expect to happen as a result of their cooperation? What do the EU and Russia aim for in their cooperation?

- *Latent message.* What do the partners perceive to be a self-evident truth in the texts of political statements and, therefore, do not problematize in their messages to each other? Doll contends that “in dealing with interpretation rigorously, one needs to be aware all valuations depend on (often hidden) assumptions.”¹⁹⁷ To open a way to transformative dialogue, we need to reveal these assumptions and understand the Other better.

- *Present absence.* What goes unsaid in the EU and Russian messages to each other? I am looking for a discussion of important topics, themes or issues, which are visibly absent in the texts of partners' statements. I undertake the task of elaborating on the idea of the “unsaid” by searching for the most visible “absences” in the selected texts and interpreting their role in the overall dynamics of the EU-Russia relationship. These

¹⁹⁷ Doll, *A Post-Modern Perspective on Curriculum*, 183.

absences contain information about partners' cooperation that is strategically suppressed, and then inferred in partners' dialogue. These absences, I believe, are covert channels that limit opportunities for a constructive cooperation between the EU and Russia.

- *Outcome and the concept of cooperation.* What outcomes and what view of cooperation do both partners produce as a result of their dialogic relations?

- *Significant Third.* Is the relationship between the two partners affected by the Third? Do the EU and Russia engage another actor, or perhaps actors or an abstract community in their speech acts towards each other? The analysis of dialogic interactions between the EU and Russia aims to reveal if there is "a third invisible agent, another voice, created by the dialogue or conversation *itself*, [that] emerges from within the background between the dialogue partners, to decree the options open to them or the limitations upon them, that is, as if to set momentary rules between them."¹⁹⁸ The dialogic analysis explores the role of the significant Third in the EU-Russia relationship.

3.3. In search of dialogic continuity

Interrelatedness, intertextuality and continuity in the EU-Russia dialogue

"Texts could carry on the dialogue with one another across time and space."¹⁹⁹ The starting point of my analysis is that "all actions by human beings involved with others in a social group are, as Bakhtin (1986) claims, dialogically and responsively linked in some way, both to the previous already executed actions, and to anticipated next possible actions."²⁰⁰ The textual analysis of selected political statements echoes that of Bakhtin's: each text of a political statement in the proposed research is treated as the starting point

¹⁹⁸ Shotter, "In Conversation," 50.

¹⁹⁹ Neumann, *Uses of the Other*, 14.

²⁰⁰ John Shotter, "In Conversation Joint Action, Shared Intentionality and Ethics," *Theory & Psychology* 5, no. 1 (February 1, 1995): 49, doi:10.1177/0959354395051003.

not only to move to the past (reference to the previous statements) but to also move forward, in anticipation of a new political statement. Following this logic, the political statements adopted at different times are interrelated within the framework of conversation between Russia and the EU. It means that they are not a matter of an individual speech act or an individual intention; rather, they are representations of a conversational, dialogic activity.

In political and academic discourse, this interrelatedness of political statements in the EU-Russia dialogue is currently overshadowed by the central focus on the partners' individual interests and intentions. However, without capturing the interrelatedness of the statements, we cannot witness the intimate connections between different elements of each statement, the dynamics of conversation between the cooperators, the formation of ongoing tensions, and, ultimately, the very continuity of the EU-Russia dialogue.

This continuity is most visible when the Self comes in contact with the Other. This study observes this contact through the analysis of the texts of messages sent by Russia and the EU to each other in their political statements. Only in contact with the Other do we see “the light that shines backward and onward.”²⁰¹ Only in contact with the Other can we narrate the story of a relationship and witness the process of identity formation in multiplicity of its forms. It is “a dialogic contact between utterances,” not “a mechanistic contact between oppositions”²⁰² that can offer a more relational understanding of the past and contemporary trends. The proposed scheme of analysis may also serve as an example for understanding possible future events in EU-Russia cooperation, whether it is a new Russian strategy towards the EU or the adoption of a

²⁰¹ Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics)*, 364.

²⁰² Ibid.

new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Therefore, along with careful attention given to each selected political statement, I simultaneously employ intertextual analysis with the aim to witness the text's move to the past and its move forward. By connecting the selected texts within the EU-Russia conversation, I reveal the continuity and incompleteness of the EU-Russia dialogue, stimulating dialogic imagination as the mode of thinking.

Similar to Hodges, I examine the EU-Russia discourse as “a dialogic process through a framework that draws upon the Bakhtinian-inspired idea of intertextuality. Political actors do not create utterances completely from scratch, but rather construct their utterances out of a reservoir of prior discourse.”²⁰³ The methodological tool of intertextuality is of great importance to the empirical part of my dialogic investigation.

One may say that interpreting the discourse and understanding the dynamics of the dialogue between conversants allows us to know very little about a very limited part of reality. According to Bakhtin, any text, in essence, is already intertextual: it reflects other texts within a particular theme.²⁰⁴ Therefore, the texts of political statements can only be understood in correlation with other texts, rather than in reference to a supposedly objective, facts-based reality. It does not mean that the surrounding context of EU-Russia cooperation does not matter for my analysis. After all, EU-Russia cooperation does not exist in a discursive void, and the proposed analysis is, indeed, sensitive to the surrounding context of events in the EU-Russia partnership, as well as the domestic internal situation in Russia and in the EU. For the proposed research, the reference to an

²⁰³ Hodges, “The Dialogic Emergence of ‘Truth’ in Politics,” 2.

²⁰⁴ Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics)*, 2–3.

objective reality (that is often perceived as a self-evident truth) has a limited explanatory power because it does not reveal the underlying problems or sufficiently explains the dynamics of the relationship. Moreover, the goal of this research is not to put forward a claim for one and the only true explanation of problems in EU-Russia relations. Instead, the goal is to create a coherent narrative that provides an alternative explanation to the problems in the relationship between two very different international actors.

Another important characteristic of the proposed analysis is the attention I pay to tracing the dynamics of the dialogue on a step-by-step basis, overseeing how the dialogue evolves in time and space. Following Bakhtin's principle of continuity, I examine how each statement in the EU-Russia dialogue contains reference to the future and to the past. This idea of continuity is not strictly linear, allowing us to witness the emergence and the development of patterns in EU-Russia relations. Therefore, overseeing the dynamics of EU-Russia dialogue on a step-by-step basis provides one more methodological tool to demonstrate the continuity of the EU-Russia dialogue. By allowing this flexible reading of the dialogic process, I understand better how the later political statements relate to the earlier ones as part of one continuous dialogue rather than as individual speech acts adopted by partners outside of the dialogue.

Examining the statements chronologically also allows us to structure the analysis in a chronological order thereby demonstrating how EU-Russia cooperation “was brought about, or made possible”²⁰⁵ and providing clear analytical structure of the study's analysis. Moreover, the continues step-by-step discovery of EU-Russia discourse makes the study more susceptible to the incremental emergence of new elements and new

²⁰⁵ Pouliot, “Subjectivism,” 367.

questions aimed to enrich the research. Continuous discovering of new elements and new questions has a danger of altering the initial assumptions and expectations and bringing a high level of uncertainty about the final results of the analysis. With the commitment of this study to capture what the selected political statements reveal about the EU-Russia relationship, the orientation on the process is indispensable. It provides the reader with a unique chance to witness the evolvment and questioning of the study's assumptions, as well as the emergence of new elements in the proposed analysis.

Data collection and the choice of political statements

In order to demonstrate the formation and continuity of the EU-Russia dialogue, I have chosen the political elite discourse as an empirical source for my study. Selected examples of the political elite discourse already reflect the internal negotiations and “basic discourses [about things] that are considered to be viable, desirable and necessary”²⁰⁶; they are representative of an internal, domestic dialogue between the EU and Russia. The primary goal of this study is to examine the official “external” dialogue between the EU and Russia. The internal domestic dialogue in Russia or the EU is out of the scope of this study and represents the challenge for the future research. The domestic dialogue is important to understand how the external official voices of Russia and the EU are influenced by domestic forces. However, the official statements represent most interest for this study because they not only provide the formal legal context of cooperation, but they also construct the political environment for the EU-Russia relationship, create new structural conditions, alter or reproduce images of the partners about each other and about their cooperation.

²⁰⁶ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 51–2.

My analysis of discourse is focused on several key stages of the EU-Russia dialogue representing the key temporal moments in the discourse. The chosen political statements indicate the partners' strategic choices and articulate their views about each other and about their cooperation. In my analysis, I demonstrate that the political statements, or speech acts create conditions for a responsive dialogue and form a set of prevalent discursive practices produced by both partners. I expect that these prevalent practices reproduce and reinforce certain patterns in EU-Russia autonomous cooperation – the pattern of autonomy and the pattern of cooperation. It can also be true that these patterns become privileged by one partner or the other, or both and are employed to reinforce their dominant discursive practices. The relationship between the prevalent discursive practices and privileged patterns remains to be discovered by my analysis.

There is an array of sources, which carry the EU-Russia political and security discourse: political posters and textbooks, academic papers and media coverage, newspapers and speeches of politicians. The main sources for data collection are the EU official online archives on EU-Russia cooperation, Russia's archives available on governmental websites, as well as articles and interviews by representatives of political elite published in newspapers. The only difficulty I encountered while collecting the data was the researching of the early 1990s in both the EU and Russian archives. The data for this period is either non-existent or not available. There are two reasons for it: first, the intensification of cooperation between the EU and Russia started with the period of the first Putin's presidency, in 1999. The second reason for a limited coverage of the period of 1994 through to 1999 is certain technical confines in data collection. The archive sources on transcriptions of the speeches were organized and institutionalized into the

online data collections starting with 1998-2000, which also coincides with mentioned-above intensification of the EU-Russia dialogue.

As already mentioned in the introductory chapter, the first set of data employed in the analysis is the key official legal documents on EU-Russia cooperation representing critical milestones in the relationship between the EU and Russia. The second set of data is the analysis of the statements surrounding the adoption of these milestones, such as the speeches by politicians, EU-Russia summit statements, the minutes from the meetings of the EU-Russia Interparliamentary Committee and the most relevant statements and documents from the parliaments of the EU and Russia. The final set of data is the semi-structured complimentary interviews with representatives comprising politicians, academics and other professionals.

The study is not aimed at providing an all-inclusive account of the EU-Russia discourse by covering all possible examples of political elite discourse within the framework of the EU-Russia conversation. Instead, I have chosen the statements following the criteria of relevance to the EU-Russia dialogue. Specifically, some of the statements formally represent a direct dialogue between two conversants, for instance, jointly adopted declarations, PCA etc. Other chosen statements represent an indirect dialogue – they either contain reflections on the EU-Russia relationship by the EU or Russia, or they are adopted in anticipation of partner's response. The goal was to keep the sample manageable. Therefore, I choose the most relevant and resourceful examples of the EU-Russia dialogue, simultaneously demonstrating their dialogic continuity.

The key official statements are the most relevant sources, which provide a legal framework for EU-Russia cooperation and hold a declarative meaning as the major

landmarks in EU-Russia relations. These milestones are indicative of certain stages in EU-Russia cooperation: they initiate new waves of development, each of them with a different speed and different dynamics. My analysis incorporates all of the key legal official statements within the framework of the EU-Russia dialogue.

The analysis of political statements adopted immediately before or soon after the major milestones makes the examination of the EU-Russia dialogue more susceptible to a specific historical and situational context surrounding the adoption of the milestones. More importantly, these statements supplement analysis of the milestones with multiple questions to trace continuity and provide better connection between different parts of the EU-Russia dialogue. The statements serve as a correction mechanism to reconfirm or add significantly to my interpretation of the milestones. I employ the term “supplementary” to indicate that the role of these statements is to supplement and to enrich the analysis of the milestones. Asking continuous questions in the analysis of supplementary statements produces an endless process of a flexible, dynamic and *relational reinterpretation* of EU-Russia relations. The supplementary political statements also allow us to capture the emergence of new elements in the proposed analytical model. In contrast to an all-encompassing character of the milestones, the supplementary political statements are selective: they were chosen from an array of sources for their relevance and importance to the dynamics of the dialogue.

While the key official statements are the main focus of my empirical analysis embracing all components of my analytical model, the supplementary statements touch upon only some parts of the model because their formal-legal importance and impact on the dialogue is limited. Due to our focus on relations between the EU and Russia, the

analysis covers only the parts of the documents that specifically address and witness the formation of relations. These parts are the closest to the idea of direct dialogue between conversants.

I triangulated supplementary statements in order to keep a balance between the sources produced by Russia, the statements adopted by the EU and jointly agreed political statements. This triangulation allows one to elucidate different aspects of the underlying problem in EU-Russia relations. As a result, the proposed analysis of the chosen supplementary documents consists of the joint statements adopted by both the EU and Russia and the speech acts adopted by either the EU or Russia in relation to the EU-Russia cooperation.

The existing scholarly literature has already offered an examination of some of the chosen key and supplementary statements.²⁰⁷ However, these statements have been treated as mere examples of the individual stance of either Russia or the EU, rather than interconnected parts of the EU-Russia dialogue. My study adds to the existing scholarly work by providing a novel dialogic perspective on the analysis of these statements.

I have conducted semi-structured interviews with selected representatives of political elite and academics in September-October, 2012 and in the year 2015 (see appendix one.) In my interviews, I followed Amy Verdun's methodology based on a semi-structured list of questions.²⁰⁸ I have structured general topics of conversation in a way that embraced the main aspects of my analytical model. I have employed the

²⁰⁷ For instance, Haukkala, *The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership*; Bordachev, "Strategy and Strategies."

²⁰⁸ Verdun, *European Responses to Globalization and Financial Market Integration* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2000).

following examples of questions to follow the main themes of the study: the interviewee's definition and views of Europe, Russia, EU-Russia cooperation; the interviewee's opinion of the partners' needs in their cooperation and reasons for tensions in EU-Russia relations; the interviewee's opinion about the future of the EU-Russia partnership and much more.

The interviews are not the leading source of data for this study. They are employed as a complimentary source to enrich and support the findings of my study. In other words, they serve as sources of correction and information, which could create a better picture for understanding the stalemate in the EU-Russia relationship. The lack of openness and unresponsiveness of interviewees in Russia have been one of the impediments in the process of scheduling of interviews. Another difficulty I experienced was that some interviewees struggled to provide the answers to purposefully broad questions and preferred to address specific issues of visa regime, trade, or economic cooperation in Russia.

I encountered several difficulties while performing the data collection and selection of the most relevant political statements. For instance, EU or Russian Foreign Policy Concepts and Strategies were eventually excluded from my analysis. My goal was to witness the identity and perception formation in examples of "direct" dialogue between the EU and Russia or informative examples of indirect dialogue that ponders over the relationship between the EU and Russia. These strategic documents present valuable examples of monological self-reflection on the role of either the EU or Russia in the world. "Monologue is finalized and deaf to the other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge it in any decisive force. Monologue manages without the Other.

...it closes down the represented world and represented persons.’’²⁰⁹

Undoubtedly, these statements represent a useful source of interest or political identity formation of either Russia or the EU. However, “monological utterances tend to subvert the other, and do not allow it a proper conscience that is reflexively identical to them. Within a monological figuration, the other becomes an object of the self’s own conscience, which can be interpreted and modified at will as a function of the self’s own needs as an identity.’’²¹⁰ These important statements are not very informative from the dialogic relational point of view and have very little to say about the dynamics of conversation between the EU and Russia. There are multiple examples of literature that provide an in-depth analysis of these major foreign policy doctrines.²¹¹ However, these statements do not meet the criteria for our *dialogical* analysis.

I initially chose multiple examples of the minutes of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee adopted by both partners,²¹² which in the course of my analysis proved to be very technical documents. They represented little to no information that would enrich the examination of the milestones of the dynamics of the debate. Therefore, only a few examples of this supplementary source were employed in my study as instances of joint statements.

²⁰⁹ Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics*, ed. Caryl Emerson (University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 292–293.

²¹⁰ Xavier Guillaume, “Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity: A Dialogical Understanding of International Relations,” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 31, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 9, doi:10.1177/03058298020310010201.

²¹¹ For example, Alyson J. K. Bailes, “EU and US Strategic Concepts: A Mirror for Partnership and Difference?,” *The International Spectator* 39, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 19–33, doi:10.1080/03932720408457058; Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy*, 11–16; L. Selezneva, “Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: Between Doctrine and Pragmatism,” in *Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy*, by Rick Fawn (Psychology Press, 2003).

²¹² For example, “EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, 10th Meeting” (European Parliament, 2004), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/pv/587/587050/587050en.pdf.

Another example of the sources that was eventually excluded from my analysis is the collection of minutes from the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC), which replaced Cooperation Council in 2003.²¹³ This collection is available only for the later stage of the dialogue and is not included as part of supplementary statements because the content of the minutes does not significantly add to the analysis of the dialogue. I also did not include numerous reports available on the progress of different aspects of the EU-Russia partnership, especially during the period after the adoption of the Partnership for Modernization in 2010.²¹⁴ Time and again, these progress reports are very technical and results-oriented in their nature and therefore do not significantly add to the analysis of relational components of EU-Russia cooperation.

On the contrary, the collection of texts from the meetings of the Committee on International Affairs of the Federation Council of Russia²¹⁵ were initially excluded from my data sample because they did not exactly fit the criteria of explicitly representing the dialogue between Russia and the EU. However, parts of this data collection reflecting on cooperation between Russia and the EU proved to be very informative. Moreover, these texts demonstrated a unique Russian perspective on its cooperation with the EU and an internal debate on how this cooperation should proceed. For all these reasons, I closely engaged with these texts and provided translation from Russian to English to elucidate certain aspects of the Russian perspective on cooperation.

²¹³ “EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council,” n.d., <http://www.russianmission.eu/en/permanent-partnership-council>.

²¹⁴ “Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation” (Council of the European Union, 2010), http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/tech_financial_cooperation/partnership_modernisation_facility/index_en.htm.

²¹⁵ For instance, “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam” (Sovet Federatsii, Russia, 2002), <http://www.council.gov.ru/files/journalsf/number/20061011130647.pdf>.

The goal of examining the texts of selected political statements was to discover what the texts have to show about the nature of relations and the dynamics of the EU-Russia dialogue. I was searching for patterns and prevalent practices, perception of the Self and the Other, rather than for the specific problems in EU-Russia relations, such as visa regime, energy relations, Russia's admission to WTO and much more. There are numerous examples of scholarly work that thoroughly addresses these problems.²¹⁶

I extensively employed original sources in Russian language because they offer a unique perspective on Russia's view of the Self and the Other in its cooperation with the EU. I encountered the difficulty of conveying the exact meaning of statements while translating the selected texts from Russian to English language. In order to preserve the clarity of the texts in an interlingual translation, I prioritized a so-called "formal equivalence,"²¹⁷ which aims to convey as much meaning and structure of the original text as possible when translating from one language to another. It is impossible to achieve a fully exact translation (or equivalence), and there is always a possibility of misinterpretation in the act of translation. However, with formal equivalence, I aimed to establish a strong correspondence between the original and translated texts and to lose as little as possible in my interpretations from one language to another. The danger of my choices is that a certain level of clarity of translated text would have to be sacrificed in order to preserve the initial structure and content of the original language.

²¹⁶ Hongchan Chun, "Russia's Energy Diplomacy toward Europe and Northeast Asia: A Comparative Study," *Asia Europe Journal* 7, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 327–43, doi:10.1007/s10308-008-0206-y; Nicolai N. Petro and Oleksandr V. Kovriga, "Russia's Solution to the Global Financial Crisis," *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 12 (2011): 27; Chebakova et al., "Russia and EU Cooperation in Energy Policy – Sending and Receiving Messages?"

²¹⁷ Lawrence Venuti, *The Translation Studies Reader* (Routledge, 2012); Susan Bassnett, *Translation Studies* (Psychology Press, 2002).

3.4. Structure of the empirical analysis

The in-depth empirical analysis of the EU-Russia dialogue incorporates 50 texts of political statements. In order to be able to navigate through such an extensive analysis and to keep clarity in the application of the proposed analytical model, I break down the analysis of the texts into four chapters reflecting hypothetical stages of EU-Russia cooperation. The empirical analysis contains introductions, concluding remarks with questions and detailed conclusions at each step in EU-Russia cooperation in order to ensure better structure and understanding of the most significant findings.

In my textual analysis of the milestones in the EU-Russia partnership, I employ the classification of speech acts offered by Onuf and described in details in Chapter Two (section 2.4.) I employ Onuf's classification²¹⁸ of assertives, directives and commissives to characterize the nature of the chosen speech acts and to provide insights for the analysis of the dynamics of EU-Russia autonomous cooperation.

The choice of political and security areas of analysis

Selected examples of political elite discourse cover numerous areas of cooperation, such as economics, politics, security, social, legal and criminal matters and much more. However, due to the size limits of this study, I concentrate my analysis on two areas, political and security cooperation. There are several reasons to explain my choice: first, the broad political and security areas provide endless insights into the underlying problem addressed in this study and therefore have more potential to uncover the dynamics of the EU-Russia relationship. The goal of this study was to create an overarching umbrella of

²¹⁸ Onuf, *World of Our Making*, 87.

EU-Russia discourse that would reflect the overall dynamics of the EU-Russia relationship. Political cooperation is recorded in multiple sources of data readily available for our research. An all-encompassing area of political cooperation has a tendency to reflect the dynamics of the relationship better than other more specialised and often overly technical areas of energy, environment, drug and crime or space cooperation. I believe, however, that the findings of this study can potentially be applied to researching these other areas of cooperation, provided there are sufficient sources available that would reflect the dynamics of dialogic relations between the partners.

Second, politics often goes hand in hand with security matters. From a geopolitical point of view, the EU and Russia are close to each other, which means that security questions are constant on their political radar. Military capabilities become increasingly important in the external activities of the EU, interfering with the purely civilian character of EU actions and the EU faithfulness to a “soft approach.”²¹⁹ However, in the world of politics Russia often positions itself as a militarized sovereign state, emphasizing “hard” instruments in its relations with others.

Third, the choice of political and security areas of cooperation for my analysis often reflects the overall structure of the EU-Russia dialogue. For instance, the Road Maps as one of the milestones in EU-Russia cooperation introduces both political and security aspects of cooperation in the third Road Map for the Common Space of External Security,²²⁰ whereas economics is incorporated into a separate Road Map on the Common Economic Space in EU-Russia cooperation. Other areas of cooperation, for

²¹⁹ F. Petiteville, “Exploring Values? EU External Cooperation as a ‘soft Diplomacy,’” in *Understanding the European Union’s External Relations*, ed. M. Knodt and S. Princ (New York: Routledge, 2003), 135.

²²⁰ “Road Maps for EU-Russia Four Common Spaces.”

instance, economics, would require a separate research project and a whole set of new research questions.

Time period

This research project covers the period starting with the launch of EU-Russia cooperation in the beginning of 1990s up until the Ukrainian political crisis in 2013. I do not cover the Ukrainian conflict because it is a complex crisis that would require a separate study.

Moreover, the study considers the Ukrainian conflict to be a culmination point, a symptom of the problem in the relationship dynamics, which brings both sides into the protracted crisis. Although the Ukrainian crisis is symptomatic of the latest relationship dynamics, for this project I am less interested in the events in Ukraine and more interested in the underlying factors that caused tensions in EU-Russia relations.

Units of analysis and dimensions of the research

Direct participation of collective subjects other than states in regional and international affairs is a well-recognized characteristic of an increasingly globalizing and integrating world. These political subjects affect decision-making and set agendas, symbolizing a non-state source of accumulation and administration of power. Responding in advance to possible critique that the units or subjects of my analysis are problematic due to their differing nature, I exemplify the arguments by other scholars that the proliferation of political units leads to the situation when “the state shares its role as a unit of analysis with others – other states and other non-state authorities. It can affect outcomes...but it

can no longer claim to determine them, even within its own territorial borders.”²²¹ This study examines an example of international cooperation, where the EU represents a non-traditional polity, and Russia becomes fixed on a traditional Westphalian construct of the nation-state. Both the EU and Russia are treated as legitimate conversants in the dialogue; their personified voices, rather than their political form are the focus of the research.

In addition, I emphasize the necessity to speak about an international dimension of the research insofar as the EU-Russia relationship is recognized as one of the examples of international relations currently existing all over the world. I also recognize the fact that the EU or Russian messages may also address an “absent Other.”²²² In other words, the message can be indirectly voiced for the multiplicity of listeners, for instance, other neighbouring countries. I recognize the fact that there are many others listening and may even be responding, but for the purpose of my model construction, I focus solely on the dialogue between the EU and Russia. Although there are conceptual-methodological approaches that are capable of incorporating “absent Other” into the analysis of the dialogue,²²³ the size limits of this study do not allow us to incorporate the anticipated responses from “absent Others” into the analysis. These responses would require a separate study.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has explained methodological and conceptual framework for the empirical analysis of the EU-Russia discourse. Blending Onuf’s and Bakhtin’s accounts, I have

²²¹ Ken Booth and Steve Smith, *International Relations Theory Today* (Penn State Press, 1995), 161.

²²² Sullivan, *Qualitative Data Analysis Using a Dialogical Approach*.

²²³ For instance, Sullivan builds a methodological approach of incorporating absent others into his model of “creative dialogue”. Ibid.

developed a dialogic model for studying interactions between the EU and Russia in their relationship. This model allows me to scrutinize the EU-Russia dialogue as a double-voiced political discourse. The model captures and interprets the messages that the partners send to each other, their views about each other and about their cooperation. Ultimately, the model is aimed to demonstrate how Russia and the EU practice their relationship discursively and how they co-produce frustration, distance and tensions.

I have also commented on the process of data collection and sample selection, the choice of discourse and the time period, the difficulties I encountered, as well as the solutions found. I choose the most relevant and resourceful examples of the EU-Russia dialogue, simultaneously demonstrating their dialogic continuity. In my subsequent analysis, I employ the key official legal documents on EU-Russia cooperation representing critical milestones in the relationship between the EU and Russia, as well as the statements surrounding the adoption of these milestones and interviews to correct or support the findings of discourse analysis. I have explained in the chapter why it is important to study interrelatedness and intertextuality of the EU-Russia dialogue. By connecting the selected texts within the EU-Russia conversation through the Bakhtinian-inspired idea of intertextuality, I seek to reveal the continuity and incompleteness of the EU-Russia dialogue, stimulating dialogic imagination as the mode of thinking.

I have described the instruments used in this study to provide a novel interpretation of the EU-Russia relationship through the lens of Bakhtin's dialogism. The proposed scheme of analysis may also serve as an example for understanding possible future events in EU-Russia cooperation, whether it is a new Russian strategy towards the EU or the adoption of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. I emphasize that it

is important to trace the dynamics of the dialogue as a process, on a step-by-step basis, overseeing how the dialogue evolves in time and space. Moreover, asking continuous questions during the analysis allows me to achieve a flexible, dynamic and relational reinterpretation of EU-Russia relations. The analysis of the following empirical chapters accomplishes these tasks.

CHAPTER 4 - DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF EU-RUSSIA

DISCOURSE I

4.1. Introduction

Following the third direction of this study, the next four chapters provide an in-depth empirical examination of the EU-Russia discourse by scrutinizing the interplay of the main components of the proposed analytical model. With this model, I examine the EU-Russia discourse as a dialogue. My goal is to witness identity and alterity construction, to demonstrate the interrelatedness of the EU and Russian speech acts, and finally, to reveal the prevalent discursive practices and patterns privileged by partners in their cooperation. The resulted analysis exposes the formation and the dynamics of *autonomous cooperation* in the specific context of the EU-Russia partnership.

In each empirical chapter, I analyse the EU-Russia interaction recorded in major official declarative statements. Not only do these official standpoints provide a formal legal context of cooperation, but they also serve as the focal points of the EU-Russia relationship. They construct the political environment for the EU-Russia relationship during the period of over twenty years. They create new structural and institutional conditions, alter or reproduce perceptions of the partners about each other and about their cooperation.

Examination of supplementary documents enriches the analysis of the milestones

and substantiates its preliminary assumptions. Supplementary documents also discover unique and often paradoxical features of the EU-Russia dialogue. In my aspiration to uncover the tensions produced in the EU-Russia dialogue, I accompany the analysis of the milestones and supplementary statements with open-ended questions: the goal is to enhance this analysis, to provoke the reader with the inquiry into the prevalent practices and privileged patterns of *autonomous cooperation*. In order to navigate through the complex analysis of the EU-Russia discourse, I provide detailed conclusions as summaries to the textual analysis of milestones and supplementary statements. These conclusions offer more clarity to the analysis, demonstrate the evolving logic of the dialogue and connect the findings of my analysis.

In the summary of the milestones, I refer to the classification of speech acts offered by Onuf, specifically, *assertives*, *directives* and *commissives*. As already mentioned in Chapter Two, *commissives* produce rules for the speaker, whereas *assertives* and *directives* try to impose rules on the hearer.²²⁴ The goal of employing this classification in my analysis is to capture the nature of the chosen speech acts and to draw larger comparisons across the chosen statements. It is important to emphasize that I do not apply Onuf's classification to the supplementary statements because their primary role in the analysis is to expand and enrich the findings of the milestones. The comparison of the milestones is sufficient to demonstrate the proactive nature of partners' messages and the performative effect of their speech acts.

²²⁴ See more detailed description of Onuf's classification in Chapter Two of this study.

The following two sections of this empirical chapter examine the Joint Declaration and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement²²⁵ followed by the concluding section. The Agreement is the key milestone, which provides the legal and political framework for EU-Russia relations. The adoption of the PCA opens up a new EU-Russia dialogic space, symbolizing the beginning of their cycles of interaction. I understand this joint statement through the lens of above-mentioned Bakhtin's concept of the multiplicity of voices, a "double-voice" or a "multi-voice."²²⁶ The Agreement in Bakhtin's terminology presents a unique case of a single utterance where there is more than one voice – it is a double-voiced discourse. The two independent voices are faintly or strongly distinct from each other in this double-voiced joint statement. These two voices are dialogically interrelated: they hold a conversation with each other, demonstrating two different intentions. Their messages become a subject to each other's interpretation and evaluation. Thus, in order to analyze this double-voiced conversation between the EU and Russia, I apply the proposed discursive interaction model.

4.2. Joint Political Declaration on Partnership and Cooperation, 1993

The growing speed of European integration and the establishment of the EU in 1993²²⁷ with its powerful economy, wider responsibilities and growing political weight made it necessary for a resurgent Russia to institutionalize cooperation with its influential Western European neighbour. "The Joint Political Declaration on Partnership and

²²⁵ "Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation."

²²⁶ Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics)*, for example, 6. For further discussion, see Chapter Two of this study.

²²⁷ The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, entered into force on 1 November 1993. More information: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm

Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union”²²⁸ is a supplementary statement that serves as an early example of the formation of the EU-Russia dialogue. This statement is of interest to my analysis because it immediately precedes the adoption of the major foundational milestone in EU-Russia cooperation, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

The language of the Joint Declaration is replete with statements of mutuality, solidarity and celebration of consolidation of Europe through the EU-Russia partnership. The EU openly invites Russia “to join European nations sharing common democratic, cultural and social values”²²⁹ through “deepening and expanding mutual relations” creating “mutually favourable conditions for business and investments” and “mutual support in international organizations.”²³⁰ EU-Russia cooperation in the Joint Declaration represents an opportunity for Russia as a country in transition to join the ‘European family’. The Statement emphasizes that Russia’s transformation and modernization is “fostered by cooperation,” an “open environment” of cooperation, “a closer political dialogue” and “a deeper understanding between [the] peoples.”²³¹ The Declaration’s overall language of mutuality, desire for closeness and deeper understanding sets up a positive tone for the adoption of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

4.3. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1997

²²⁸ “Joint Political Declaration on Partnership and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union” (European Commission, Brussel, Belgium, September 12, 1993), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-93-1102_en.htm.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (the Agreement, PCA) was signed in 1994 and adopted in 1997 for the period of ten years.²³² The Agreement forms a legal basis for EU-Russia relations and creates structural-institutional conditions for EU-Russia cooperation. The Agreement serves as the crucial point of departure for the EU-Russia official partnership. It also provides a historical context and is used as a formidable reference by both partners later on in their cooperation; indeed, multiple examples of communication that occur between the EU and Russia in the last two decades directly refer to the PCA. As the starting point of EU-Russia cooperation, the Agreement is an influential speech act that connects all other political statements within one dialogic space and provides a unique integrity to the EU-Russia dialogue.

More recently, numerous EU-Russia summits and official statements have confirmed the intention by the partners to replace the old Agreement with a new up-to-date legally binding treaty. The aspiration of both partners to create a new agreement inevitably leads them to go back into the history of their relationship in order to re-address and re-think the old PCA. This unique position and role of the PCA in the EU-Russia dialogue allows us to witness the interconnection between the present and the past. The PCA in a way serves as a historical context of the EU-Russia relationship and an overarching umbrella that allows us to understand the current dynamics of cooperation better.

Early representations of the Self and the Other

How do the EU and Russia present themselves in the Agreement? The EU's self-representation in the Agreement is ambiguous: it is either "the commitment of the

²³² "Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation."

Community and its Member States acting in the framework of the European Union,²³³ or the will of the member-states, or even the actions of the Community alone. Throughout the document, the EU does not refer to itself as the EU, indicating the ambiguity of its self-identification. Such an ambiguity in the EU identity is understandable, if we look at the historical context of internal dynamics in Europe at the beginning of 1990s, specifically, the adoption of the Treaty establishing the European Union, debates over the establishment of the Monetary Union and the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.²³⁴ The novelty of EU position as a new actor searching for its own identity in the world of the global politics can serve as a plausible explanation of ambiguous self-representation that we witness in the Agreement.

The text of the document is replete with articles based on principal-agent relations: the EU represents itself as an *invisible principal* whose mission is to spread its democratic and liberal economic rules on the territory of Russia. The EU is seeking “to support Russian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market economy.”²³⁵ Russia plays the role of a *silent agent in the PCA*,²³⁶ who abides by EU directions. In the text of the Agreement, Russia’s political and economic reforms become a clear prerequisite for EU-Russia cooperation, whereas Russia’s one-sided transformation is an essential requirement for the success of the EU-Russia partnership.²³⁷

²³³ Ibid., Preamble.

²³⁴ See more in Vogler and Bretherton, *The European Union as a Global Actor*.

²³⁵ “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation,” Article 1.

²³⁶ Due to the nature of this Agreement, there is no clear indication “who says what”. However, it becomes obvious from the logic of the document and the semantic meaning of the sentences that certain messages belong to one or the other partner. Therefore, I use the term “invisible” and “silent”.

²³⁷ “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation,” Article 6.

The political context of the beginning of 1990s serves as a helpful explanation to why Russia accepts this role of a silent agent. At the time of negotiation of the Agreement, Russia was going through the period of painful socio-economic and political transition. The new Russia was eager to establish a relationship with its powerful European neighbour, which held plenty of potential for Russia's economic and political modernization.²³⁸ Perhaps driven by the fear of being disconnected from Europe and the rest of the world, Russia intentionally occupied the position of a silent agent, agreeing to act as a receiver of EU directions. As a result, the mutually produced Agreement allowed one to witness the emergence of the EU dominant position in cooperation with Russia, which was recognized and accepted by the newly emerging Russian state.

Present absence: What remains unsaid

Paradoxically, in the preceding Joint Declaration, the European Union is solidly presented as a unified actor, a partner in EU-Russia cooperation. Why does the EU present itself in a unified manner in one document and consequently retreats to the ambiguous representation of the Self in the PCA? Why do the ongoing transformations in the EU political identity remain *unsaid* in the text of the Agreement? Can the EU address its vulnerability to speak with desired "one voice" in its external relations with Russia? The dialogic analysis of the subsequent political statements in EU-Russia cooperation are to address these question and to reveal the changes, if any, in the EU ambiguous

²³⁸ The EU's assistance is later rendered through such programs as: TACIS, INTERREG I, II, III, ENPI etc.. However, according to some scholarly research, the amount of such assistance from the EU's side is not sufficient. For instance, I Pashkovskaia, "Deiatel'nost' Evropeiskogo Soiuzu v Rossii Po Programme TACIS (Actions of the European Union in Russia under the TACIS Program)," *World Economy and International Relations* 8 (2007): 42–51.

representation of the Self and the way the EU addresses the formation of its external identity.

Latent message of normative dominance

The EU requirements towards Russia appear very early in the Preamble of the Agreement: “the full implementation of partnership presupposes the continuation and accomplishment of Russia's political and economic reforms.”²³⁹ Transformation or change within the framework of the EU-Russia partnership becomes an exclusive burden for Russia with the EU playing the role of an experienced observer and a resourceful leader. Both roles of invisible principal and a silent agent become even more apparent in similar messages, constantly sent by the partners throughout the text of the Agreement.

The paradox of this type of relationship is that it remains unclear how the EU and Russia are planning to achieve “more intense political relations,”²⁴⁰ a “gradual rapprochement,”²⁴¹ or even more so, a “gradual integration”²⁴² with each other, provided that one partner is silenced by the requirement to change under the guidance of the other.

As a result of the principal-agent dynamics, the Agreement sets up the basis for the EU normative dominance in its cooperation with Russia. The EU acts as an experienced observer who gives “a paramount importance”²⁴³ to the rule of law and respect for human rights, free and democratic elections and economic liberalization of Russia (market economy).²⁴⁴ However, the partners also proclaim the principles of

²³⁹ “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation,” Preamble.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 6.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Preamble; Article 6.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, Article 1.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, Preamble.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Preamble; Article 1, 2, 6.

“mutual advantage, mutual responsibility and mutual support,”²⁴⁵ thereby privileging the pattern of cooperation. Therefore, the normative dominance of the EU is not problematized in the first Agreement between the Russia and the EU, constituting the meaning of *the PCA’s latent message*, which is sent along with sound proclamations of mutual interests and mutual support.

Goals and expectations, outcomes of cooperation

In regards with the partners’ *main goal* and *expectations* voiced in the Agreement, Russia and the EU anticipate that cooperation will deepen and widen relations established between them in the past: it will lead to strengthening political and economic freedoms²⁴⁶ and to increasing stability and security.²⁴⁷ In the text of the Agreement, partners express their belief that by developing a regular political dialogue and intensifying political relations,²⁴⁸ increasing convergence on international issues²⁴⁹ and developing economic cooperation,²⁵⁰ a gradual rapprochement between Russia and Europe as *the main goal* of cooperation can be reached.²⁵¹ In facilitating rapprochement, the partners intend to improve conditions affecting business and investment²⁵²; they seek to prevent money laundering and drug demand, illegal immigration and other illegal activities.²⁵³ Thus, along with the EU normative expectations of one-sided transformation of Russia within the framework of EU-Russia cooperation, the partners create a long list of expectations in

²⁴⁵ Ibid., Article 1.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., Preamble; Article 1.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., Article 6.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., Preamble; Article 1, 6.

²⁴⁹ “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation” Article 6.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., Preamble; Article 1.

²⁵¹ Ibid., Preamble.

²⁵² Ibid., Preamble; Article 1.

²⁵³ Ibid., Article 81, 82, 83, 84.

achieving the main goal of their rapprochement. The empirical analysis in the consequent chapters traces if there are any changes in the partners' understanding of how exactly the rapprochement should be achieved.

In the preceding Joint Declaration, Russia recognizes that it is “no longer a state trading country, but an economy in transition.”²⁵⁴ Despite the claims for mutuality in EU-Russia cooperation manifested in the texts of both the Joint Declaration and the PCA, Russia is silent about its own views or concerns in both speech acts. The PCA and Joint Declaration make it difficult to identify what kind of Russia co-emerges at this early stage of the EU-Russia dialogue.

As an *outcome* of cooperation, the partners expect closer integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe, as well as “the future establishment of a free trade area between the Community and Russia.”²⁵⁵ The partners expect to achieve such a result by establishing new institutional practices, such as the Cooperation Council²⁵⁶ or Parliamentary Cooperation Committee.²⁵⁷ Will the partners get closer to their expected outcome of integration in the course of their relationship?

Influence of the Third

As stated in the Joint Declaration, “the Parties proceed from the fact that imparting the new quality to their relations entirely meets the interests of the international community, and is based on the fundamental provisions of the UN Charter, as well as the documents

²⁵⁴ “Joint Political Declaration on Partnership and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union.”

²⁵⁵ “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation,” Article 1.

²⁵⁶ “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation” Article 88, 90-93, 101.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.* Article 9, 95-97.

of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.”²⁵⁸ The PCA echoes this message from the Declaration; the partners consent to “[promote] regional cooperation”²⁵⁹ and they commit to collaborate in the framework of the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other fora.²⁶⁰

The image of the Third – the international community and the closest neighbours – is very neutral and positive in the texts of the Joint Declaration and the PCA. Through their cooperation, the EU and Russia intend to connect not only with each other, but also with the rest of the international community. In other words, cooperation becomes an instrument for connecting the EU and Russian Self with many different Others, whereby creating a concord of shared values and norms in their double-voiced dialogue. In the course of my dialogic analysis, I trace whether this harmonious form of connection, an *interrelatedness* established in the foundations of the PCA between the EU, Russia and the rest of the international community undergoes any changes.

4.4. Conclusion

The major milestone in the history of EU-Russia cooperation, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement accompanied by the Joint Declaration express a strong need for connection between the partners. In Onuf’s classification, the PCA represents the type of *commissives* consisted of declaration by the partners to cooperate in order to achieve further rapprochement. In contrast to the Joint Declaration, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement also demonstrates visible language change: it carries some

²⁵⁸ “Joint Political Declaration on Partnership and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union.”

²⁵⁹ “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation” Article 56 (3).

²⁶⁰ Ibid. Preamble.

elements of *assertives* and *directives* with the EU intent to regulate one-sided transformation and modernization of Russia.

Both partners strongly privilege the pattern of cooperation in these early examples of EU-Russia cooperation, confirming the necessity for closer relationship with each other and with the rest of the international community. Specifically, the Joint Declaration demonstrates the desire of the partners for closeness and an understanding of each other. In the PCA, however, the same quest for cooperation is complicated by Russia's somewhat muted response as a partner, who is bound to follow EU directions.

In the PCA, the EU takes on the role of a normative leader, a "norm-setter"²⁶¹ who introduces and privileges the pattern of cooperation with Russia on the basis of principal-agent relations. "The EU has persistently tried to project an image of a "normative power," a global force in the promotion of democracy, rule of law and market economy."²⁶² The discursive practice of what I call the EU normative dominance is prevalent in EU-Russia interactions in the PCA. It remains to be seen what will be the role of EU practice of normative dominance in the future interactions between the partners.

The expressed goal for cooperation and gradual integration is also complicated by the vulnerability of the EU to act as a unified actor in its external relations with Russia. In the subsequent analysis of the EU-Russia dialogue, I address the following questions posed by the examination of the Agreement: Can the EU address its vulnerability to speak with desired "one voice" in its relations with Russia and to speak openly about the ongoing transformation of its political identity? How do the EU and Russia plan to

²⁶¹ Anonymous. European External Action Service, interview.

²⁶² Prozorov, interview.

achieve their gradual mutual rapprochement? Will the partners get closer to their expected outcome of integration in the course of their relationship? Will the interrelatedness established in the foundations of the PCA between the EU, Russia and the rest of the international community undergo any changes. Will Russia gain its voice? Will the EU and Russian expectations and goals undergo any corrections? The following chapter addresses these questions in the analysis of the next stage of EU-Russia cooperation.

CHAPTER 5 - DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF EU-RUSSIA

DISCOURSE II

5.1. Introduction

Chapter Five analyses the next important phase of EU-Russia interactions – two Strategies adopted by partners towards each other. I continue with supplementary statements chosen to enrich the findings of the analyses of the two Strategies. Similar to the previous chapter, the goal of this empirical chapter is to provide further inquiry into the prevalent practices and privileged patterns of *autonomous cooperation*. The chapter discovers unique features and paradoxical tensions in partners' experience of cooperation.

In June 1999, the European Council in Cologne adopted the second fundamental document in the EU-Russia partnership – the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia²⁶³ (the EU Common Strategy). At the first sight, the EU Common Strategy is replete with broad references to policies already mentioned in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The role of the Strategy is to clarify and elaborate further the EU's views on cooperation with Russia. The EU Common Strategy and the PCA are dialogically linked within the EU-Russia conversation. The EU Common Strategy is not only a *reaction* to the PCA, it is also a *proactive* message sent from the EU to Russia in

²⁶³ “Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia.”

anticipation of a Russian reply. Therefore, the EU's political statement exemplifies the *proactive, reactive and interactive* nature of speech acts.

The adoption of the Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union for 2000-2010²⁶⁴ (The Russian Strategy) affirms careful attention of Russia towards its cooperation with the EU and recognition of the EU status as a partner.²⁶⁵ It appears that the Russian Strategy presents the necessary rapid response to the EU Common Strategy. For instance, Russia says: "The [Russian] Strategy reflects the main orientation and objectives of the European Union Collective Strategy with respect to Russia, adopted by the European Council in Cologne last June."²⁶⁶

"Someone else's words introduced into our own speech assume a new interpretation and become a subject to our evaluation of them."²⁶⁷ The goal of my analysis is to reveal the interpretations that Russia provides in its Strategy to the statements of the PCA and the EU Strategy. The analysis of the Russian Strategy traces dialogic links with already existing milestones of EU-Russia cooperation. I examine whether the milestones contain responses to each other's messages.

In lieu of the adoption of the EU and Russian Strategies, I have chosen several documents to supplement the analysis of these Strategies. As already explained in the previous chapter, the goal of incorporating these statements into my analysis is to enrich the milestones with a discovery of special, unique, often paradoxical features of the EU-Russia dialogue. The supplementary statements that accompany the adoption of the partners' Strategies consist of the joint statements agreed by both the EU and Russia, as

²⁶⁴ "The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000 - 2010)."

²⁶⁵ Ibid., Preamble.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 195.

well as the speech acts adopted by either the EU or Russia within one dialogic space of the EU-Russia discourse.

The structure of Chapter Five reflects the choice of selected statements. The introductory section is followed by section two, which analyses the EU Common Strategy on Russia. Section three examines Russian strategic response to the EU. Sections four, five and six provide detailed analysis of supplementary statements surrounding these two important milestones. The concluding section summarizes the findings and provokes the reader with several questions for the next stage of discursive analysis.

5.2. Common Strategy of European Union on Russia, 1999

Crystallization of the Self and the Other and latent message

The Community and its member states obtain one voice in the EU Common Strategy: it is the EU that articulates the “vision...for its partnership with Russia”²⁶⁸ in its Strategy. It is the EU that “[invites] Russia to work”²⁶⁹ together on the basis of its Common Strategy. It is EU actions and institutions that implement provisions of its Common Strategy.²⁷⁰

Furthermore, the EU’s Self crystallizes in the Common Strategy precisely through its relation to the Other. The EU draws a clear image of Russia that is based on what the EU already “is” and what Russia “is not”: “a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia, governed by the rule of law and underpinning a prosperous market economy

²⁶⁸ “Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia” Part I.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Part I.

²⁷⁰ “Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia” Section: Instruments and means (1).

benefiting alike all the people of Russia and of the European Union.”²⁷¹ In other words, by pointing at what Russia “is not” or what it needs to become in order to be considered as a desirable partner, the Union asserts its own identity as a stable democracy governed by the rule of law and a market economy.

This message is very important because it represents the view that the EU communicates to Russia about its vision of the Self and the Other. For the first time in the partners’ dialogue the EU attempts to construct a sense of identity and alterity through the classic act of “othering of the other” on the basis of perceived differences with Russia. Although the assumption that the EU “is” what Russia “is not” underlines the logic of the Common Strategy, it is an implicit assumption that plays the role of the EU’s *latent message* sent to Russia.

Forming an image of Russia, the EU strengthens its conditional stance articulated in the PCA. Specifically, in its message to Russia, the EU not only perceives the country as its “unequal Other,” but also draws *the image of Russia* it would welcome as a friend: it is a “stable democratic and prosperous Russia,”²⁷² which “rightfully” belongs to “the European family” and “asserts its European identity.”²⁷³ The “paramount importance” of the rule of law and respect for human rights...and market economy, written down earlier in the PCA,²⁷⁴ transforms in the Common Strategy into a strict prerequisite for Russia to fulfill in order to finally occupy its “rightful place in the European family.”²⁷⁵ Paradoxically, by emphasizing the difference between itself and Russia, the EU is not only crystallizing its own identity, but it is also attempting to turn the existing

²⁷¹ Ibid., Part I.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation,” Preamble.

²⁷⁵ “Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia,” Part I.

“undesirable” Russia into its own self-sufficient Self. As a result, the EU re-instates the leading normative stance in cooperation with Russia by re-enforcing the discursive practice of normative dominance initially emerged in the PCA. More importantly, the EU for the first time produces a new utterance, a pattern of its autonomous self-sufficiency in relations with Russia.

EU message to Russia and vision of cooperation

The EU aspires to build cooperation “benefiting alike all the people of Russia and of the European Union.”²⁷⁶ In its message, however, the EU reinforces its position that “the main responsibility for Russia’s future lies with Russia itself,”²⁷⁷ which means that any deviations in the Russian course of transformation become an individual responsibility of Russia. In this vein, *the main message* by the EU can be defined as follows: in order to be given an opportunity to cooperate with the EU, Russia must transform and be responsible for its modernization itself.

As evident from the EU’s main message, *the EU vision of cooperation* with Russia is based on the idea that Russia has to undergo changes and to transform its own Self in order to obtain more resemblance with the EU and, eventually, to belong to Europe. In this logic the EU’s self-sufficient Self remains autonomous within the framework of the EU-Russia relationship. Sending such a message, the EU demonstrates an individual intention rather than a spirit of mutuality and interrelatedness privileged earlier in the pattern of cooperation in the PCA. Increasingly, the EU privileges the pattern of self-sufficiency and individualized, autonomous action in the process of

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

constructing the Self and the Other. In the EU Common Strategy, the EU concept of cooperation with Russia is predominantly based on the EU normative dominance. By assuming this role of an independent superior partner, the EU moves further away from an equally invested co-operator, who is seeking to achieve rapprochement with Russia towards an autonomous and normatively superior partner.

EU goals and expectations

To discuss this finding further, I ask the following question in my analysis: what *goals and expectations* does the EU articulate in its Common Strategy? The EU defines modernization of Russia as its strategic interest in the framework of the EU-Russia partnership.²⁷⁸ As mentioned in the PCA, the EU continues to *expect* Russia to “consolidate democracy and the rule of law” through the building of civil society and “the establishment of public institutions.”²⁷⁹ Provided Russia acquires the necessary features to become treated as a friend, partners have a chance to establish a “strategic partnership” and to cooperate on “the New European Security Architecture.”²⁸⁰ Hence, *the goal* of the EU Common Strategy is to clarify and to define the exact criteria that Russia needs to meet in order to become partners with the EU and to build “a common European economic and social area.”²⁸¹ This goal prioritizes the discursive practice of the EU normative dominance in its relations with Russia. The EU Strategy anchors this practice on the EU pattern of autonomy and self-sufficiency, rather than on the pattern of cooperation and mutuality privileged in the earlier PCA.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., Preamble.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., Part I.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., Part II.

²⁸¹ Ibid., Principle objectives (2).

Prioritizing commonality

In addition to emphasizing the need to build a *Common* European area of cooperation, the EU extensively discusses *common* interests in addressing *common* challenges on the European continent and *common* problems with money-laundering, illegal trafficking, drug trafficking, organized crime, energy resources and more.²⁸² The notion of *common*, while almost non-existent in the PCA, receives significant development in the EU Common Strategy. It becomes apparent that the term “common” has a special meaning for the EU, who attempts to act with one voice in its Common Foreign and Security Policy and to adopt a Common Strategy towards one of its most significant neighbours. In its Strategy, the EU puts forward *commonality* as a prevalent discursive practice. The question remains what meaning do both partners prescribe to the concept of commonality and will this meaning change over the course of EU-Russia interactions?

Present absence and influence of the Third

When related to the PCA, the EU Common Strategy grants an equal importance to the “continuity, flexibility and substance”²⁸³ of the existing political dialogue with Russia. What remains *unsaid* in the EU message towards Russia?

The EU thoroughly discusses *common interests* in addressing common challenges on the European continent and common problems in its EU Common Strategy. However, the EU does not talk about *uncommon interests*; it only articulates the changes that Russia needs to make in order to become closer to the EU. Alternatively, the Union opens up the discourse on commonality between the partners as the symbol and guarantee of the future

²⁸² “Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia.”

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, Part III.

success in cooperation. As a result, presumably different strategic views, goals and interests between the partners remain indefinable in the EU message because they are perceived by the EU as factors that hinder the effectiveness of EU-Russia cooperation; the factors that interfere with the EU intentions to homogenize the EU-Russia cooperative space on the basis of common, not different views, values interests and norms. It becomes obvious that the discussion of differences is *absent* in the EU-Russia dialogue.

Following the PCA, the EU expands the notion of “regional cooperation,” promising to promote partnership with Russia in “the various fora for regional cooperation” and to enhance the “cross-border cooperation with neighbouring Russian regions (including Kaliningrad).”²⁸⁴ Initially neutral reference to the Third in the PCA – for instance, international institutions and neighbouring countries – changes in the EU Common Strategy into an exclusive domain of the EU enlargement policy.

Moreover, the EU is ready to enhance EU-Russia cooperation in the area of preventive diplomacy by contributing to conflict management and “curbing the proliferation of WMD [weapons of mass destruction]” within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN).²⁸⁵ However, the EU leaves out in its message a discussion of the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in European Architecture and in the context of EU-Russia relations. The absence of discussion on NATO is not fortuitous: this organization represents rather conflictual Third. Indeed, the discussion of NATO within the framework of the EU-Russia dialogue is problematic for the EU internal development. For instance, the formation of the European Security and Defence Policy as a security

²⁸⁴ Ibid., Part II “Areas of action” (c).

²⁸⁵ Ibid., sec. Preventive Diplomacy.

and defence component in the EU architecture, which is supposedly independent from NATO is underway during this period of time. The discussion of NATO becomes even more conflictual for the EU's external collaboration with Russia whose interests fall far short of NATO. Therefore, debates over NATO remain *absent* in the EU message towards Russia.

Concluding remarks

The EU Common Strategy clearly reinforces the discursive practice of the EU normative dominance and anchors this practice on the EU's image of self-sufficient autonomous Self. The Union latently identifies that it views itself as a stable and fair democracy based on a market economy. The EU perceives this image of the Self as an obvious truth and, therefore, it does not problematize this truth in its message to Russia.

The EU also formulates its own concept of cooperation with Russia. Based on the act of "othering of the other," the Union portrays Russia as unequal to its own Self. As a result, the pattern of mutuality and cooperation as the "operation together" expressed in the PCA remains understated in the EU Common Strategy.

The EU sends a clear message that in order to cooperate, Russia must modernize by itself. Paradoxically, by imposing the condition on Russia to cooperate on the EU terms, the EU attempts to turn the existing insufficient Russia into its own self-sufficient Self. Strategic views, goals and interests that are different between the partners are *absent* in the EU message. Instead, the EU produces the discursive practice of *commonality* as a key to success in EU-Russia cooperation. The question remains what role will the practice of commonality favoured in the EU Common Strategy play in subsequent EU-Russia interactions?

The analysis of the EU Common Strategy for the first time indicates the signs of *autonomous cooperation*, where one partner – the EU – starts emphasizing its autonomy through the discursive practice of normative dominance, characterized by conditionality principles and imposition. It will become evident in the Russian response whether the EU message is followed, followed with amendments, or completely rejected by Russia.

5.3. Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy Towards the European Union, 1999

Russia's images of the Self and the Other

In its Strategy, Russia starts up by clearly defining *itself* as a sovereign nation-state having a well-developed, coordinated approach towards Europe. This approach echoes its consistent foreign policy written into Russian National Doctrines.²⁸⁶ Moreover, Russia clearly points out that the EU-Russia partnership is not aimed at “Russia’s accession to or ‘association’ with the EU.”²⁸⁷ In relation to the EU Common Strategy, this statement has an important declarative meaning as Russian reaction to the EU strategic directives. In contrast to the integrative and cooperative logic of the privileged pattern of cooperation in the PCA, Russia for the first time voices a clear response to the discursive practice of the EU normative dominance by distancing itself from the EU influence and settling into the concept of an independent Westphalian sovereign state, which is not aimed at integrating with the EU institutions.

²⁸⁶ “The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000 - 2010),” Preamble. Several National Doctrines including the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2000) were issued around the same period as the Russian Strategy during the first term of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. This period was characterized by detailed attention towards formulation of the main postulates and principles of the Russian foreign policy and national security concepts.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pt. 1.

Russia clearly defines its own image very differently from the one created by the EU, saying that “... as a world power situated on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign policies, its status and advantages of an Euro-Asian state and the largest country of the CIS, independence of its position and activities at international organizations.”²⁸⁸ Does Russia’s claim for a special status and independence indicate the emergence of a specific pattern of cooperation and a new discursive practice? In order to address this question, I examine the image of the Other and the concept of cooperation that Russia offers in its Strategy in response to the EU messages.

Russia predominantly perceives the EU as a group of European nation-states – for instance, “common histories of nations,” a “responsibility of European States”²⁸⁹ – rather than a kind of a post-national “multi-perspectival”²⁹⁰ post-modern entity representing a unitary actor. It appears that Russia perceives the EU through the lens of its own concept of the sovereign nation-state, which it attempts to build in a coherent manner. However, Russia openly responds to the EU vulnerability to act “with one voice” latently expressed in the PCA, recognizing the EU as a form of a collective Other and equating it with the geo-political concept of Europe. Therefore, the Russian State does not fully accept the self-identification offered by the EU in its Common Strategy as a Community of nations acting in unity. Instead, the country provides its own version of the EU as a collective Other historically rooted in the concept of Europe.

Additionally, in the text of its Strategy, Russia treats the EU rather instrumentally, as a source of modernization, getting attracted to a possibility of “[mobilizing] the

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., Preamble.

²⁹⁰ Ruggie, “Territoriality and beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” 172.

economic potential and managerial experience of the EU”²⁹¹ within the framework of the EU-Russia partnership. In Russia’s response to the EU Common Strategy, the Union becomes a partner in Russia’s modernization rather than a normatively dominant collaborator.

Russia’s concept of cooperation: Re-enforcing mutuality

In response to the EU strategic goal of Russian modernization articulated in the EU message, the country explicitly states that it is not only Russia, but it is also the EU who is to undergo transformation in order for *successful cooperation* to occur. Russia emphasizes that either its own modernization or the success of EU-Russia cooperation depend on an “evolution within the EU...the development of international situation” and an outside “organizational, legal and material support”²⁹² for change in Russia. Russia openly declines the EU demands for Russia’s one-sided transformation, demonstrating how its own internal change is closely related to a number of external factors. Evidently, in its strategic response to the EU, Russia reinforces the pattern of cooperation previously privileged in the PCA, re-producing *the concept of cooperation* based on mutuality and interrelatedness.

Russian responses to the EU: An equal strategic partner

Russia responds to and questions the EU pattern of autonomy and self-sufficiency that emerged in the EU Common Strategy. The country states that “Europe [is] currently going through the transition period in its development (... expansion, institutional reform,

²⁹¹ “The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000 - 2010),” Preamble.

²⁹² Ibid., sec. 12 (1).

creation of ‘defence identity’, consolidation of the common foreign and security policy and of the EU economic and monetary union)...”²⁹³ For Russia, the EU development is incomplete; similar to Russia, the EU needs to undergo changes and transformations, therefore, the EU cannot be considered as a self-sufficient agent. Russia’s refusal to accept the EU quest for autonomy provides Russia with more equal ground in its negotiations with the EU.

Recognizing the need for its own modernization, Russia simultaneously states that it will “protect Russia’s national interests in cooperation [with the EU]”²⁹⁴ during the difficult period of Russia’s transition. “Taking into consideration Russia’s concerns”²⁹⁵ and “securing the Russian interests in an expanded European Union,”²⁹⁶ Russia demonstrates the will to “[eliminate or set off] possible negative consequences”²⁹⁷ of the EU enlargement. It becomes clear that the Russian state attempts to protect its own autonomy in relations with the EU, seeking to free itself of the EU normative influence and EU intervention into Russia’s sphere of interest. However, Russia perceives its autonomy very differently from the EU. As opposed to the EU, Russian autonomy is based on the idea of securing the country’s seemingly unprotected Self during the difficult time of its own transition and the EU expansion.

For the first time Russia sends a strong message to the EU about its desire to be considered as an independent and *equal strategic partner*, a sovereign and autonomous

²⁹³ Ibid., Preamble.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., sec. 2.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., sec. 5.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

state.²⁹⁸ It is on the basis of its own insecurity under normative pressures from the EU, that Russian discursive practice of an equal strategic partner emerges.

As a result, in its Strategy, Russia questions the concept of EU-Russia cooperation based on the prevalent practice of the EU normative dominance. Instead, the Russian state puts forward its own alternative practice of an equal strategic partner and starts to negotiate between the pattern of cooperation and autonomy in its relations with the EU.

Messages received and accepted

In section two of the document on “Enlarging the format and improving the efficiency of the political dialogue,” Russia accepts the EU willingness to continue developing the political and security dialogue and joint foreign policy initiatives.²⁹⁹ It also recognizes and confirms the necessity of institutionalization of the EU-Russia dialogue expressed in the EU main message to Russia. As well, the EU achieves a great success in the part of its message concerning the establishment of the New European Security Architecture.³⁰⁰ As obvious from the text, Russia accepts the EU message and places a great emphasis on “building pan-European Security”³⁰¹ together with the EU and establishing a pan-European economic and legal infrastructure.

In response to the notion of *common* in the EU message, Russia only briefly mentions “common histories of [European] nations...and complementarity of their

²⁹⁸ Ibid., sec. 1.2.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., sec. 2.

³⁰⁰ “Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia,” pt. II.

³⁰¹ “The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000 - 2010),” sec. 1.5, 1.8.

economies.”³⁰² It seems that the country quietly accepts and welcomes the EU prevalent practice of commonality as the necessary condition for successful cooperation.

Russian latent message and present absence

Russia’s main expectation from EU-Russia cooperation is “the construction of a united Europe without dividing lines and the interrelated and balanced strengthening of the positions of Russia and the EU within an international community of the 21st century.”³⁰³

Along with the mentioned-above responses to the EU strategic message, Russia sends its *latent message* – a claim for a special position of an independent nation-state, who plays a special role in the European Neighbourhood through its relations with the EU. An important role of a regional player to which Russia subscribes itself becomes visible immediately in the Preamble of the Russian Strategy.

The Russian response clearly voices what is left *unsaid* in the EU message. Russia is not hesitant to emphasize differences existing between the partners that remain indefinable and unsayable in the EU message.³⁰⁴ It also openly reflects on the EU ambiguous, flexible and unstable “defence identity” in the sphere of defence and security, and the potential difficulties this ambiguity and indefiniteness can cause in establishing the new security architecture in Europe.³⁰⁵ Moreover, the country discusses the creation of a new joint security architecture as a possibility for counter-balance to NATO centrism in Europe – the topic that is largely conflictual and is therefore *absent* in the EU message.

³⁰² Ibid., pt. I.

³⁰³ Ibid., Preamble.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., sec. 2.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., sec. 1.5, 1.8, 2.1. Preamble.

In its message, Russia responds not only to the EU Common Strategy, but also to the starting point of the EU-Russia dialogue – the PCA. Russia demonstrates a very pragmatic approach to the PCA, emphasizing that “the Russia-EU partnership should be based on the maximum use of benefits offered by the PCA and the fullest possible realization of its provisions and follow-up goals.”³⁰⁶ However, the discussion of specific internal problems and the domestic situation in Russia, mentioned in both the PCA and the EU Common Strategy, is absent in the Russian response. Similar to the EU, Russia keeps internal problems in silence: the country leaves out the discussion about its internal state of affairs and does not respond to the parts of the PCA and the EU Common Strategy, which raise concerns about democracy, human rights and organized crime issues in Russia.

Influence of the Third

Russia increasingly refers to a wider international community in the text of its response to the EU. For instance, it refers to “the protection of national production in certain sectors of economy is justified, subject to international law and experience,” or “strategic partnership with an emphasis on supremacy of international law.”³⁰⁷ Suddenly, the Third acquires significance for Russia in building cooperation with the EU: the country increasingly refers to the abstract symbolic image of the international community, international law and international society. It remains to be seen whether the role of the international community as a significant Third remains influential in the EU-Russia dialogue.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., pt. 1(4).

³⁰⁷ Ibid., Preamble.

Concluding remarks

The Russian Strategy revealed multiple connections to the PCA and to the EU Common Strategy. The analysis of the Strategy showed how the chosen statements are deeply interrelated within the EU-Russia dialogic space. Most importantly, Russia's declaration expresses commitment to the future cooperation with the EU.

In the context of its own modernization, Russia reinforces the pattern of cooperation and introduces its pattern of autonomy in the attempts to secure its own Self from the influence of the EU. The country also questions the EU pattern of autonomy advanced in the EU Common Strategy by emphasizing the need for the EU to undergo transformations in order to address its financial problems and foreign policy challenges. Russia provides a response to the prevalent discursive practice of the EU normative dominance. It does so by distancing itself from the EU influence, negotiating the patterns of cooperation and autonomy and putting forward its own discursive practice of an equal strategic partner.

Similar to the EU, the Russian Strategy shows the effects of autonomous cooperation. Rather than focusing on similar shared positions, Russia distances itself from the EU by starting to formulate and emphasize differences between the partners. The country avoids openly addressing its domestic problems. Russia does not accept the EU's views on cooperation and starts to perceive the EU's actions as a threat to its independence and autonomy.

By actively intervening into the process of identity and alterity construction, Russia also provides its own version of the Other in relations with the EU: the Union becomes either a source of Russia's modernization or an abstract collective Other

historically rooted in the concept of Europe. The EU's consequent responses to the Russian Strategy will inform whether Russia's assertive message results in weakening or strengthening of the EU normative dominance introduced in the PCA and reinforced by the EU Common Strategy.

On the one hand, Russia distances itself from the EU by voicing differences between the partners, privileging the pattern of autonomy and putting forward its own discursive practice of an equal strategic partner. On the other hand, Russia accepts the EU's demand for commonality as the guarantor of success in EU-Russia cooperation and seems to privilege the pattern of cooperation and mutual responsibility. Thus, Russia starts negotiating between its autonomy and an ability to cooperate with a very different Other.

5.4. Supplementary statements adopted jointly by the EU and Russia

In this section I examine the Joint Statements at the EU-Russia Summits in 1999 and in 2003.³⁰⁸ Although these documents are rather instrumental and technical in their character, there do offer a few observations about the EU-Russia dialogue that are worth mentioning.

The Statement of 1999 mentions that the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia and the Medium-term Strategy of the Russian Federation “highlight the significance both sides attach to a close political and economic partnership and its further

³⁰⁸ “Joint Statement at EU-Russia Summit” (Helsinki, Finland, October 22, 1999), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/12119.en.html; “Joint Statement at EU-Russia Summit” (Saint-Petersburg, Russia, May 31, 2003), <http://ue.eu.int/>.

development within the framework of the PCA.”³⁰⁹ The later Statement privileges the pattern of cooperation, stating that Russia and the EU “reconfirmed [their] commitment to further strengthen [their] strategic partnership.”³¹⁰ The EU and Russia demonstrate the intention to “reinforce [their] co-operation in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” and to work towards a joint approach and “practical co-operation in the framework of European security and defence policy, notably in crisis management.”³¹¹

Looking back at the Strategies adopted by the EU and Russia, the earlier Statement claims that “[The Strategies] are based on common values such as respect of the principles of democracy and human rights, the rule of law and the market economy and share the common objectives of enhancing political stability and economic prosperity in Europe.”³¹² In the later Joint Statement, the partners also emphasize that they have agreed to strengthen their partnership “on the basis of common values, which [they] pledged to respect”³¹³ and their “common interest in further developing co-operation between Russia and the EU in the 21st century.”³¹⁴

What is interesting is that the pattern of cooperation is strengthened together with the discursive practice of commonality: “We agreed to reinforce our co-operation with a view to creating in the long term a common economic space, a common space of freedom, security and justice, a space of co-operation in the field of external security, as well as a space of research and education, including cultural aspects.”³¹⁵ As a result, the Joint Statements confirm that Russia has accepted the EU discursive practice of

³⁰⁹ “Joint Statement at EU-Russia Summit,” October 22, 1999, 1.

³¹⁰ “Joint Statement at EU-Russia Summit,” May 31, 2003, 1.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 6. Specifically, the Parties planned Russian participation in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and discussed the use of Russian long-haul aircraft for EU-led crisis management operations

³¹² “Joint Statement at EU-Russia Summit,” October 22, 1999, 1.

³¹³ “Joint Statement at EU-Russia Summit,” May 31, 2003, 1.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

commonality. Moreover, we can see that the practice of commonality receives a significant conceptual and institutional development in the EU-Russia dialogue as an idea of common spaces. It becomes evident that the privileged pattern of cooperation is significantly reinforced in the Joint Statements by the institutionalization of the EU discursive practice of commonality.

The preceding detailed analysis of the privileged patterns and discursive practices in the partners' Strategies demonstrated that both partners have privileged the pattern of autonomy *together* with the pattern of cooperation, thereby producing distance rather than a closer relationship. In their Joint Statement, they keep their patterns of autonomy in silence. Does it mean that both partners have agreed to privilege the pattern of cooperation over the pattern of autonomy? This question is to be answered in the subsequent analysis of EU and Russian statements.

The cooperators conclude that “developing an EU-Russia strategic partnership will contribute substantially to peace, stability and economic prosperity in Europe as a whole and will help it meet the challenges of the next millennium.”³¹⁶ Contrary to the EU or Russian perceptions of Europe, which equal Europe with the EU, Europe in the analyzed Joint Statements is perceived with Russia and the EU being parts of it.

Concluding remarks

The analysis of the Joint Statements has demonstrated that these speech acts exclusively privilege the pattern of cooperation over the pattern of autonomy. They reinforce the pattern of cooperation by developing and institutionalizing the EU discursive practice of commonality into the concept of common spaces between the EU and Russia. The

³¹⁶ Ibid., 2.

concept of *Europe* in the Statements embraces both the EU and Russia as inseparable parts with common culture and history. The following questions remain to be explored by the analysis below: Will the process of building the common spaces “be approached...on equal footing,”³¹⁷ thereby accepting the Russian discursive statement of an equal strategic partner? Will the pattern of cooperation become privileged by both partners or the quest for autonomy return?

5.5. Supplementary statements adopted by the EU

Speech by President of European Commission, 2000, 2002 and European Parliament Recommendation, 2003

In the Speech by Prodi, the then President of the European Commission,³¹⁸ the EU is presented as a well-established global economic actor, “with its huge single market ... and with its own currency, the Euro.”³¹⁹ Prodi’s speech addresses the Russian critique of the EU self-sufficiency in its relations with Russia. “The EU is operating based on a method of a “continuous process of pooling Member States’ sovereignties.”³²⁰ “The EU remains a ‘work in progress.’”³²¹ “But there can be no doubt that the EU is on its way from being a global economic actor towards being a genuinely global political actor as well.”³²² This statement is supported in a later speech by Prodi “What the 21st Century holds for the EU-Russia relationship”: “The Union of the future will not be inward

³¹⁷ Ibid., 1.

³¹⁸ Romano Prodi, “Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission” (Moscow, Russia, May 29, 2000), <http://www.bits.de/EURA/prodi290500.pdf>.

³¹⁹ Ibid., 1.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Ibid.

looking. It will look outwards for its own sake and for that of its partners.”³²³ It is obvious that in Prodi’s speeches, the EU rethinks its own self-sufficiency and completeness, recognizing the need for transformation of its own Self that is looking *outwards* in its search for its global economic and political actorness.

The concept of the EU as a collective actor undergoes yet another change, especially in terms of its relation to Europe: in Prodi’s speech of 2000, Europe is a geographical measure with the EU institutions aimed at unifying the European continent: “For the first time in many centuries we have the opportunity to unite Europe – not by force of arms but on the basis of shared ideals and agreed common rules.”³²⁴ The importance of the notion of *common* and *shared* becomes even more evident in the European Parliament Recommendation on Russia: “Common interests should be linked to shared values upon which to develop a genuine and balanced partnership.”³²⁵ The EU and Russia can contribute to resolving different security problems through “enhanced common security in Europe through more intense dialogue and cooperation.”³²⁶ It is evident that the discursive practice of commonality becomes firmly entrenched into the day-to-day language of the EU.

In Prodi’s speech in the year 2000, the EU and Russia become interrelated not only as parts of Europe, but also as parts of the global whole: “The partnership between the EU and Russia is there to stay and to grow. ...but we are also global partners, and in

³²³ Romano Prodi, “What the 21st Century Holds for the EU-Russia Relationship” (Moscow, Russia, May 28, 2002), 1, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-237_en.pdf.

³²⁴ Prodi, “Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission,” 1.

³²⁵ “European Parliament Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations” (European Parliament, 2003), 2, P5_TA(2004)0121, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/ta/p5_ta-prov\(2004\)0121_/p5_ta-prov\(2004\)0121_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/ta/p5_ta-prov(2004)0121_/p5_ta-prov(2004)0121_en.pdf).

³²⁶ Prodi, “Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission,” 2–3.

this new century we must work together with the other major actors to find just and sustainable solutions to global problems.”³²⁷

For the first time in the EU-Russia discourse, the EU compares Russia with its own fluid Self, explicitly stating that “like the EU, Russia is now at a major turning point. It has a new parliament, a new President and a new Government.”³²⁸ In 2003, this statement is complemented with the EU’s claim that “among our neighbours, none is more important than Russia.”³²⁹ European Parliament’s recommendations on Russia echo this expressed importance of Russia: “Russia plays a crucial role for security and stability in Europe and whereas the EU conducts a policy of constructive engagement vis-à-vis Russia,”³³⁰ and “Russia's importance as a direct neighbour of the EU will further increase as a result of EU enlargement.”³³¹

In these statements, the EU attends to Russia’s claim to be considered as an equal strategic partner. However, the EU also continues to condition its relations with Russia and to prioritize its discursive practice of normative dominance: it emphasizes that Russia will “attract considerable investments” only after it implements the “outstanding structural reforms” to establish a strong democratic State based on a genuine market economy, under the so-called “dictatorship of the Law.”³³²

The conditional nature of the success of the partnership becomes even more evident in the recommendation by the European Parliament: “as a member of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, Russia has committed itself to upholding universal and

³²⁷ Ibid., 4.

³²⁸ Ibid., 2.

³²⁹ Prodi, “What the 21st Century Holds for the EU-Russia Relationship,” 1.

³³⁰ “European Parliament Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations,” 2003, 2.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Prodi, “Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission,” 2.

European values and, as stated in the Commission's communication on relations with Russia (COM (2004) 106) Russian convergence with these values will to a large extent determine the nature and quality of the EU-Russia partnership.”³³³ It is obvious that the EU does not accept Russian demands for modernization as a responsibility of both partners. Nor does it accept Russia’s demands for equality in the relationship. Normative convergence with European values remains to be the central requirement for the EU in its relations with Russia.

The EU provides rather negative evaluation of Russia emphasizing that “Russia has not undergone a transition of the kind envisaged when the international community, including the EU, formulated its basic response to developments there a decade ago.”³³⁴ Therefore, it appears that the prevalent discursive practice of the EU normative dominance comes in direct disagreement with the Russian stance of an equal strategic partner: the EU, on the one hand, recognizes Russia’s demand for a position of an equal partner, on the other hand, it seeks to reclaim its normative dominance by negatively evaluating Russia’s transformations.

The texts of the chosen supplementary statements demonstrate the continuity and comprehensiveness of the EU-Russia dialogue. However, the Union avoids the full-fledged discussion of the Strategies, referring predominantly to the PCA:

That is why the PCA laid a special emphasis on the need for Russia to modernize its laws, technical norms, standards and business practices. It is now more vital than ever to give priority to this process, for three main reasons. First, most of these legislative changes are necessary anyway under Russia's WTO accession bid. Second, it lays the groundwork for the next stage of our economic partnership, which will lead us to explore the appropriateness of a future free trade agreement. Third, it will allow

³³³ “European Parliament Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations,” 2003, 4.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

Russia to gain the maximum benefits from the closer economic co-operation we want to build under the EU's new neighbourhood policy.³³⁵

This reference to the PCA reinforces the discursive practice of the EU normative dominance and Russian one-sided transformation. Time and again, the EU employs its conditionality tools in attempts to persuade Russia to adopt proper standards.

The EU only briefly recognizes the Russian Strategy and mentions the adoption of its own Common Strategy. “We welcomed Russia's submission of its own mid-term strategy for relations with the EU, which ... enables us to compare notes and to have a better grasp of Russia's longer-term ambitions for our partnership.”³³⁶ The Union further explains its constant reference to the PCA instead of the reference to its newer Strategy:

Why, then, did we adopt a much-heralded Common Strategy in June last year? We felt it was essential to bring our partnership into line with the new emerging dimensions of the EU – the introduction of the Euro and the significant headway made in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs and of our Common Foreign and Security Policy. Russia was the obvious choice for our very first Common Strategy, which is a new foreign policy tool under the Amsterdam Treaty. The Common Strategy does not replace the PCA: it uses the PCA channels and is meant to reinvigorate the PCA.³³⁷

When placed within the context of the EU-Russia dialogue, it becomes apparent that the EU refers to the PCA instead of the more recently adopted Strategies. This way the EU avoids possibly conflictual debate over two contradictory practices of Russia as an equal strategic partner and the EU as a normatively dominant cooperator. As the previous analysis has demonstrated, the Russian Strategy started this debate. Will Russia try to re-negotiate its stance of an equal strategic partner? Which discursive practice is going to dominate in EU-Russia cooperation?

³³⁵ Prodi, “Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission,” 3.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Ibid.

The Union expresses confidence in the continuity of its relations with Russia. Prodi claims that “our partnership is, in my view, sufficiently solid to weather very real, even acute, disagreements.”³³⁸ The EU also openly discusses the conflictual issue of Chechnya in its relations with Russia.

Another paradox born by the Strategies comes into surface in the chosen supplementary statements. The EU practice of normative dominance is anchored in the EU Strategy on the pattern of autonomy and self-sufficiency. As evident from the analysis of Prodi’s speech, the EU questions its own autonomy and self-sufficiency but it does prioritize the practice of the EU normative dominance. To complicate matters further, in the already analyzed Joint Statements, the pattern of cooperation was exclusively privileged over the pattern of autonomy. What will happen to the EU pattern of autonomy and self-sufficiency? Can the practice of the EU normative dominance be sustained and be anchored on the pattern of cooperation, instead of the pattern of autonomy?

EU Country Strategy Paper on Russia 2002-2006

In the EU Country Strategy Paper on Russia, the EU thoroughly demonstrates the continuity of the EU-Russia dialogue, providing multiple references and discussing the role of all three already analyzed milestones.³³⁹ The EU pays special attention to Russian responses to the EU policies and to the EU Common Strategy: “it appears that Russian foreign policy is increasingly geared to relations with the EU. In response to the EU Common Strategy on Russia (June 1999), Russia adopted its medium-term Strategy of

³³⁸ Ibid., 4.

³³⁹ “Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006” (European Commission, Brussel, Belgium, December 27, 2001), 1, http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/02-06_en.pdf.

co-operation with the EU (2000-2010). The Strategy foresees the development of a mature partnership.”³⁴⁰

The EU gains a better understanding of the internal situation in Russia, recognizing Russia’s growing stability and assertiveness: “After the presidential elections of 2000, Russia has experienced political stability, with a consolidation of presidential powers and strengthening of the state, but with a tendency towards weakening of opposition and media independence.”³⁴¹ “There has been, by and large, continuity in Russia's foreign policy, with some more emphasis on co-operation with the EU. But consolidation of power and stability as well as improvements in Russia's economic situation have led to a more assertive stance.”³⁴²

The EU also re-states the importance of Russia as a strategic partner: “Due to its size and location, Russia is a key actor for the stability and security of the entire European continent and a bridge between the EU and Asia. Russia is naturally a factor for many EU policies. After enlargement, the EU will be even closer to Russia and there will be even greater need for joint approaches to tackle crucial common issues.”³⁴³

When contemplating the role of Russia in EU-Russia cooperation, the EU continues to emphasize that the success of cooperation is conditioned by the necessity for Russia to modernize and to become suitable for further cooperation with the EU: “Russia should be able to develop its position as a prosperous market for EU exports and

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 6.

³⁴¹ Ibid., 1.

³⁴² Ibid., 7.

³⁴³ Ibid., 2–3.

investments and a reliable source of EU energy supplies, as well as a stable, predictable and co-operative partner for security in Europe.”³⁴⁴

The EU further states that it supports the modernization of Russia, especially if it guarantees that Russia resembles the EU models and standards: “Legislative, regulatory and institutional convergence on the basis of European models and standards should be supported,”³⁴⁵ and “strengthening all aspects of civil society and free media, ... the judiciary, and [support of] Russia’s integration into international institutions, e.g., Council of Europe, OSCE, G8 and WTO”³⁴⁶ become the necessary prerequisites of the EU view of Russian modernization and a path to the European future.

The EU warns that “should [Russia] not achieve a deep reform of its judiciary and public administration, this would threaten the investment climate and economic development and make deeper partnership with the EU and other western partners more difficult.”³⁴⁷ There is no place in the EU Country Strategy Paper for recognizing Russia as an equal partner. Instead, the EU reclaims its normative dominance. Discussing the future of EU-Russia cooperation, it clearly states that “cooperation is conditioned by Russia’s success: A broad, deep, long-term strategic partnership between the EU and Russia is desirable and should be pursued as much as circumstances in Russia allow for it.”³⁴⁸

Russia’s strong message about the significant Third, i.e., NATO and US, is recognized by the EU without further evaluation: “While being on the whole positive about the EU enlargement, Russia has being opposed to NATO expansion and US plans

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 1.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., 2.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 10.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 15.

for a national missile defence system.”³⁴⁹ However, the EU endorses the Russian “positive view of the development of the ESDP” and its desire to cooperate within the ESDP framework.

Concluding remarks

The analysis of the EU supplementary statements surrounding the adoption of the EU and Russian Strategies has demonstrated how all the statements become woven with each other in the internal logic of the EU-Russia dialogue. Moreover, the EU and Russia become interrelated not only as parts of Europe, but also as parts of the global whole. Following Russian firm rejection of the EU pattern of autonomy and self-sufficiency, the EU reconsiders this pattern and confirms the need for its own transformation. The EU emphasizes similarities between Russia and the EU: in Prodi’s speeches the EU and Russia are both recognized to be in transition with the examples of giving Russia credit for the novelty of its political institutions and the country’s difficult economic situation. It remains to be seen what happens to the EU pattern of autonomy and self-sufficiency in the course of the dialogue.

The discursive practice of commonality becomes firmly entrenched into the day-to-day language of the EU. Most importantly, the EU supplementary statements reveal the conflict between the prevalent discursive practices and the controversy caused by the patterns of autonomy and cooperation. Specifically, although the EU emphasizes the importance of trust and continuity of its relations with Russia as its most important neighbour, it does not accept the Russian discursive practice of a strategic and equal partner. Instead, the EU reclaims its normative dominance and eventually reverses to

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 6.

conditionality measures in its conversation with Russia. It appears that the prevalent discursive practice of the EU normative dominance comes in direct disagreement with the Russian stance of an equal strategic partner. The question remains how to resolve this disagreement? Will Russia try to re-negotiate its stance? Which discursive practice is going to dominate in EU-Russia cooperation? Can the conflicting discursive practices reconcile each other? Can they co-exist with each other in one dialogic space of EU-Russia cooperation?

5.6. Supplementary Statements adopted by Russia

Meetings of the Expert Committee on International Affairs, Federation Council, 2002, 2003, 2004

The collection of session minutes from the Committee on International Affairs of the Council of Russian Federation gives a good grasp of Russia's internal debates about the EU-Russia relationship, especially Russia's discussion about the nature of its own Self and its understanding of the Other.

In this chosen issues by the Committee on International Affairs of the Council of Russian Federation, Russia starts looking "inwards" in its formation of the Self, claiming that "without understanding its own national³⁵⁰ origin, it is impossible not only to carry out a successful foreign policy course, which would consider the interests of the country, but also, very importantly, to reform the society."³⁵¹

Russia ventures itself into the construction of its national identity and in its search for origins, it tries to reach a better understanding of the Self independently of any

³⁵⁰ "National" is used here to indicate the origin of Russia as a country, the origin of the nation-state, rather than an "ethnic" origin.

³⁵¹ "Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam," 2002, 723. Translation is mine

reference to the Other. Already in 2003, the Committee reviews the “civilizational values of Russia:”³⁵² it states that these values are very different from that of the European.³⁵³ In 2004, the Committee members emphasize that “we [Russia] will not be able to become them [the EU] and are not planning to become them, instead, we will resolve our internal problems by ourselves.”³⁵⁴ This utterance presents one of multiple examples of Russia’s internal discourse, which in a way is a response to the EU prevalent practice of commonality: Russia questions its ability to become similar to the EU; it starts showing signs of isolation from a very different Other by turning “inwards” and attempting to cut off the outside interference into its internal problems. For the first time and similar to the EU, Russia privileges the pattern of autonomy that is based on self-sufficiency and independency.

Russia also speaks about the EU interests being “non-homogeneous” and representing “a ‘summary vector’ of diverging interests of different countries.”³⁵⁵ At the same time, Russia blames the EU for considering itself as a “center of Europe, which has the right to dictate its conditions [to others].”³⁵⁶ Obviously, Russia continues to perceive the EU as a “summary” of the nation-states, rather than a unified and homogenous actor with one voice and questions the EU’s abilities to be the “center of Europe.”

³⁵² “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam” (Sovet Federatsii, Russia, 2003), 135, <http://www.council.gov.ru/files/journalsf/number/20061016090739.pdf>.

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam” (Sovet Federatsii, Russia, 2004), 123, <http://www.council.gov.ru/files/journalsf/number/20061016092643.pdf>.

³⁵⁵ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2002, 723.

³⁵⁶ “European Parliament Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations” (European Parliament, 2004), 123, P5_TA(2004)0121, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/ta/p5_ta-prov\(2004\)0121_/p5_ta-prov\(2004\)0121_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/ta/p5_ta-prov(2004)0121_/p5_ta-prov(2004)0121_en.pdf).

When offering its approach to resolving “Kaliningrad issue,” the country emphasizes that it treats the EU enlargement³⁵⁷ positively as an “objective process, which is not limited in time or space.”³⁵⁸ Russia “sooner or later will become part of the Euro-Atlantic political, legal and economic space.”³⁵⁹ Moreover, the EU enlargement “creates [for Russia] additional opportunities for a mutually beneficial cooperation,”³⁶⁰ and “modernization has always been closely related to Europe in Russian consciousness.”³⁶¹ It becomes evident that the pattern of cooperation and mutuality acquires a slightly different meaning: “opportunities” and “benefits” from cooperating with the EU are prioritized by Russia. Therefore, similarly to its Strategy, Russia privileges the pattern of cooperation based on a perception of the EU as a source of Russian modernization.

Most importantly, after the adoption of both Strategies, Russia’s ambition to be part of Wider Europe than to be out of it grows rather strong. In 2002, “Russia proclaims as a priority of its own development, the movement towards Europe, the formation of a Wider Europe with [Russia’s] participation, integration of the country into the Euro-Atlantic economic space.”³⁶² Russia also claims that it “does not demand any special

³⁵⁷ The EU Enlargement here refers to the fourth Enlargement of the EU, the biggest in its history when 10 countries joined the Union. Enlargement was a very debatable issue during the period of 2000-2004 with diverging opinions of the effects it would have on EU-Russia partnership. The debates were mitigated by the adoption of the “Statement of the Russian Duma on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Russian Federation and the EU” in October 2004, where Russia proclaims that it extends the PCA to the new 10 EU member-states (see more, Statement of the Russian Duma on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Russian Federation and the EU: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/d-russ2004111802_/d-russ2004111802_en.pdf)

³⁵⁸ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2002, 735.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 734.

³⁶¹ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2004, 341.

³⁶² “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2002, 734.

conditions of its integration, but it intends to stand up for its national interests.”³⁶³ In 2003, after a wide discussion of the need to preserve “Russian originality” and the differences between Russian and European “civilizational values,” the Committee re-states that Russia “needs to integrate with Europe, but in a way that will allow it to preserve its own originality, its own civilizational values.”³⁶⁴ It is also important to note that when talking about its strategic views, Russia emphasizes mutuality: “In strategic approaches of Russia and the EU, there are more coinciding than mutually exclusive positions. This is true about political, legal, economic aspects of interactions between Russia and an expanding European Union.”³⁶⁵

It is vital to trace how does the integration vector affect Russia’s process of negotiation between the pattern of autonomy and cooperation, as well as the need to preserve its originality and to secure its national interests while integrating with a Wider Europe on the basis of coinciding strategic views.

Russia demonstrates concerns about the state of affairs in EU-Russia cooperation asks provocative questions: “In order to resolve problems existing between Russia and the EU, Europe should once and for all determine who Russia is – a partner or a source of potential threat, an additional part of European economic complex or a potentially dangerous competitor, a part of European civilization or its burden.”³⁶⁶

Concluding remarks

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2003, 135.

³⁶⁵ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2002, 735.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., 748.

The chosen supplementary statements adopted by Russia demonstrate that the new Russian state embarked on the process of continuous negotiation between the pattern of autonomy and cooperation. Autonomy acquires one more dimension for Russia, who now seeks to be self-sufficient and independent when facing the challenges of its external environment and the necessity to cooperate with a normatively dominant EU. Russia simultaneously undergoes two processes: one is an internal process, which is characterized by inclusion of a modernistic sovereignist concept into political and social realities of Russia. This internal process is also characterized by Russia's turn *inwards* in search for its own identity and originality independently of any reference to the Other. The other process is an external process of cooperation with the EU that forces Russia to formulate its strategic views and imposes pressures on Russia to change. As a result of these two processes, Russia tries to distance itself and to become "internally closed"³⁶⁷ ("vnutrenne zamknutym"). It is not surprising that Russia privileges the pattern of autonomy in its cooperation with the EU. Similar to the EU, Russia's pattern of autonomy becomes based on self-sufficiency and independency. Along with this pattern of autonomy, the pattern of cooperation remains strongly present in the chosen supplementary statements adopted by Russia. However, cooperation with the EU acquires a pragmatic cost-benefit direction for Russia, who perceives the EU as a source of its own modernization, rather than as an equal and trustful partner.

It is necessary to examine in the subsequent statements of the EU-Russia dialogue where does Russia's own search for its national self-identification lead the country? Can Russia become part of a Wider Europe? What is "Europe" for Russia and is the EU at the center of it? What role does the *integration vector* gain in the process of the EU-Russia

³⁶⁷ Bakhtin, *Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics)*, 81.

dialogue? How does the integration vector affect Russia's process of negotiation between the pattern of autonomy and cooperation? How does further rapprochement with the EU affect Russia's strong need to preserve "originality" and to secure its national interests while integrating with Europe? What is the role of Russia's modernization in the context of EU-Russia relations? Finally, following rhetorical questions asked by Russia in the analyzed statement, we should ask what would Europe eventually decide about the status of Russia in the EU-Russia partnership?

5.7. Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the EU and Russian Strategies as significant milestones in EU-Russia cooperation. The chapter has also provided a detailed analysis of supplementary statements surrounding the adoption of these milestones. Chapter Two of this study emphasized that in order to understand the partners' messages towards each other, we need to uncover their dialogic overtones, to witness how the speakers express their attitudes towards other utterances. The analysis of the speech acts in this chapter has demonstrated interconnectedness of all political statements in their responsive logic.

In its Common Strategy, the EU speaks with one voice, clearly re-enforcing the discursive practice of normative dominance. This prevalent discursive practice for the first time becomes anchored on the EU pattern of self-sufficient autonomous Self. The EU asserts itself as a stable and fair democracy governed by the rule of law and based on a market economy. By emphasizing that the EU "is" what Russia "is not" and defining the exact criteria that Russia needs to meet in order to become partners, the EU formulates its concept of cooperation with Russia. In this concept, it views the Self versus an unequal Other, instead of the Self together with the Other.

In the EU Common Strategy, the EU's ambition to turn the existing undesirable Russia into its own self-sufficient Self leads the Union to privilege the pattern of autonomy over the pattern of cooperation in its relations with Russia. The EU discursive practice of *commonality* introduced in the Common Strategy becomes a symbol of and a guarantee for the future success in cooperation. Differences between the partners appear to be the factors that may hinder Russia's one-sided transformation and the effectiveness of EU-Russia cooperation.

The EU Common Strategy contains a set of criteria for actions, which the EU wants Russia to perform. In Onuf's classification, It provides a good example of *directive* issued to the hearer. The only exception is the part of the EU message about the importance of the rule of law, democracy and human rights that carries insignificant elements of *assertives*.

The responsive character of Russia's utterances, their addressivity becomes especially obvious in the Russian Strategy towards the EU. The Russian answer demonstrates that the EU strategic *directive* is successful in encouraging Russia to send a response and to voice its own views. Russia signifies the necessity to interrelate partners' positions by re-enforcing the pattern of cooperation that was privileged in the PCA. For Russia, this pattern is based on the mutual responsibility for the transformation of both partners.

Russia's speech act signifies both the reactive response to EU messages and a proactive action with an assertive intent to make the conversant accept Russia's views and beliefs. Therefore, *assertives* and *commissives* are the two main elements of Russian response to the EU. However, the number of issues raised by the EU message and

questioned or explicitly rejected by Russia's response undermines the overall success of the EU Common Strategy.

While the EU tries to reinforce the discursive practice of normative leadership in its Common Strategy, Russia demonstrates the first attempts to question this practice. For the first time in the EU-Russia discourse, the country puts forward an alternative discursive practice of an *equal strategic partner*. It is on the basis of its own insecurity and normative pressure from the EU that this discursive practice of an equal strategic partner emerges. It is remarkable that the term of *strategic partnership* initially appears in the EU Common Strategy, and Russia subsequently provides this prior utterance with its own reinterpretation.³⁶⁸

Russia also reacts to the EU directive by establishing its own pattern of autonomy based on securing Russia's unprotected transitioning Self. In a dialogic response to the EU, Russia acquires its own voice: the voice of resistance and insecurity. It becomes evident that the EU and Russian images co-emerge in the EU-Russia dialogue according to the standard of one partner trying to dominate and another partner starting to resist – all through the acts of “othering of the other.” It becomes obvious that in their Strategies, both partners start to negotiate between their autonomy and their ability to cooperate with the Other.

The EU and Russian Strategies contribute to an early formation of *autonomous cooperation* in the EU-Russia dialogue: we can witness the process of mutual identity and alterity construction as well as numerous instances of partners' deliberative attempts to negotiate between the patterns of autonomy and cooperation.

³⁶⁸ For more details on Bakhtin's “varying degrees of reinterpretation” see Hodges, “The Dialogic Emergence of ‘Truth’ in Politics,” 5.

The analysis of supplementary statements surrounding the adoption of the EU and Russian Strategies demonstrates that the EU and Russia begin to relate to each other not only as parts of Europe, but also as parts of the global whole. The supplementary statements reveal the ways in which the partners start to practice the fundamentals of relations laid down in the key milestones.

Following Russia's firm critique, the EU briefly reconsiders its pattern of autonomy based on self-sufficiency and confirms the need for its own transformation. The EU also emphasizes similarities between Russia and the EU as entities in transition. In supplementary statements, the pattern of autonomy acquires one more dimension for Russia, who now seeks to be self-sufficient and independent when facing the necessity to cooperate with the EU.

The analysis of the chosen supplementary statements clearly demonstrates growing tensions between the patterns of autonomy and cooperation. The analysis also reveals continuous competitive rivalries between the partners' discursive practices aimed to reinforce the contradictory patterns. As a result of these rivalries, the EU rejects Russia's discursive practice of an equal strategic partner and re-affirms its normative dominance. Russia initially reinforces its practice of an equal strategic partner. However, it then distances itself from the EU and becomes "internally closed" in search for its own self-identification.

Cooperation with the EU acquires a pragmatic cost-benefit direction for Russia, who perceives the EU as a tool of its own modernization, rather than as an equal and trustful partner. For the EU, practicing cooperation with Russia becomes firmly entrenched into the concept of commonality – common interests, goals and values. As a

result, the EU practice of commonality becomes successfully institutionalized into the concept of common spaces between the EU and Russia.

The following questions remain to be addressed in Chapter Six: Can the conflicting patterns and discursive practices reconcile each other within the concept of common spaces? What does Europe decide about the status of Russia in the EU-Russia partnership and in a Wider Europe? What is “Europe” for Russia and is the EU at the centre of it? How does further rapprochement with the EU affect Russia’s strong need to preserve its own originality and to secure its individual national interests?

CHAPTER 6 - DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF EU-RUSSIA

DISCOURSE III

6.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses the next significant milestone in EU-Russia interactions – the “Road Maps of Four EU-Russia Common Spaces,” which were signed in May 2005.³⁶⁹ As in the previous chapter, I enrich the analysis of this important step in EU-Russia cooperation with supplementary statements adopted before and soon after the Road Maps.

Among numerous other issues, this chapter tackles the following key questions posed by the investigations of the previous chapters: Can the conflicting patterns and discursive practices reconcile and co-exist with each other within the concept of common spaces? Is further rapprochement between the EU and Russia possible? Most importantly, can the tension revealed between the autonomy and cooperation be resolved in the EU-Russia relationship?

In the Road Maps, the partners declare one more time “the coming closer together” that occurs in four spheres of cooperation.³⁷⁰ Paradoxically, the initiative developed with participation of *both* sides through the discussions during several EU-Russia summit meetings, as well as the activities of joint working groups are eventually interpreted by the EU as “an expression of EU policy towards the Russian Federation ... a

³⁶⁹ “Road Maps for EU-Russia Four Common Spaces.”

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

robust and coherent approach to Russia.”³⁷¹ Despite questions about the character of this chosen speech act, I integrate this statement into the analysis as a jointly adopted statement and one more instance of dialogic exchange between the EU and Russia.

Numerous examples of subsequent speech acts analyzed in this study reference the Road Maps, which are fully integrated into the EU-Russia dialogue. The Road Maps would hardly be a result of EU-Russia interactions if not for the agreements of the 1990s. Initially, the Road Maps were supposed to “...remain, in any event, the short and medium term instruments for the EU-Russia relationship, and this is likely to be confirmed in the new agreement.”³⁷² However, in lieu of the absence of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the Road Maps came to represent a significant milestone in the EU-Russia political dialogue.

At the time of the adoption of the Road Maps, many scholars and representatives of political elite were very sceptical about the role of this joint agreement and critiqued it as being too vague.³⁷³ My analysis investigates whether the scepticism about the role and the place of the Road Maps in the EU-Russia dialogue is sufficiently substantiated.

Another important characteristic of this speech act is that a large part of the statement is dedicated to the task of developing the concept of the Common Economic Space. However, due to the choice of political and security areas for my analysis,³⁷⁴ the focus in this chapter is on the third Road Map, “The Common Space on External

³⁷¹ “Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013: Russian Federation,” 1.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁷³ For example, “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam” (Sovet Federatsii, Russia, 2005), 230, http://www.council.gov.ru/publications_sf/2005/10/item52.html; Emerson, “EU-Russia – Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 71, 1 May 2005.”

³⁷⁴ See in more details, Chapter Four.

Security,”³⁷⁵ simply because “it aims to enhance cooperation on foreign policy and security issues, while underlining the importance of international organisations such as the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe.”³⁷⁶

Including the introduction, the chapter consists of seven sections. The second section introduces the pretext to the adoption of the Road Maps – the Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations by the European Parliament. Section three provides a detailed analysis of the third Map. Sections four, five and six analyze the supplementary statements surrounding the adoption of the Road Maps. The last section provides conclusions.

6.2. In the wake of the Road Maps

In the Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations by the European Parliament, in the wake of the adoption of the Road Maps, the EU emphasizes that “good-neighbourly relations and cooperation between the EU and Russia are crucial for stability, security and prosperity across the whole of the European continent.”³⁷⁷ The policy of the EU and Member States “acknowledges the importance of Russia as a partner for pragmatic cooperation with whom the Union shares not only economic and trade interests but also an objective to act in the international arena, as well as in the common neighbourhood, as strategic partners.”³⁷⁸ The EU clearly responds to Russia’s concerns over its status in Wider Europe and determines that Russia is a strategic partner

³⁷⁵ “Road Maps for EU-Russia Four Common Spaces.”

³⁷⁶ “Delegation of the European Union to Russia,” n.d.,

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/political_relations/political_framework/index_en.htm.

³⁷⁷ “European Parliament Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations,” 2004, sec. A.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, sec. 1.

for pragmatic cooperation rather than a dangerous competitor, a burden or a potential threat.

Following Russia's desire for pragmatism in its relations with the EU, the Union emphasizes pragmatism and practicality of EU-Russia cooperation. It also views the EU-Russia partnership as an exemplary model of cooperation not only in the European continent but also in the international arena. It is therefore not surprising that the EU connects the EU-Russia partnership to the international world and views the partnership as an instrument to "providing peace, stability and security, and fighting international terrorism and violent extremism, as well as addressing 'soft security' issues."³⁷⁹

The EU clearly recognizes the problem of its unity and calls on "the Commission and the Council to show solidarity and unity within the EU between the old and the new Member States alike in the event of Russia aiming to differentiate its approach towards them."³⁸⁰ In its desire to give the EU-Russia partnership model an international dimension, the EU is obliged to address the problem to act as one in its relations with Russia.

The EU also expresses eagerness to cooperate in the area of security, stressing "the importance of setting up the common space of external security, which in time could lead to the creation of a specific high-level forum for the EU-Russia dialogue on security, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, non-proliferation and disarmament."³⁸¹ It is important to trace in the subsequent statements what will be Russia's response to the EU's invitation to cooperate in the area of external security.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., sec. B.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., sec. 2.

³⁸¹ Ibid., sec. 26.

For the EU, the relationship with Russia “must be based on common values, thus encompassing human rights, the market economy, the rule of law and democracy.”³⁸² The EU warns that if commonality becomes unachievable – for instance, democracy, rule of law, human rights – then the “development of the EU-Russia partnership will be more difficult.”³⁸³ This approach shows the EU one-sided view of the notion of *common* because it does not contain any reflection on Russia’s view of what *common* should mean within the framework of the EU-Russia partnership. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how Russia receives the EU aspiration “to conduct a dialogue with Russia on issues relating to their common neighbourhood.”³⁸⁴ Can Russia accept the EU request for Russia “to see the spread of democracy in its neighbourhood and the development of stronger ties with the EU, including membership, not as a danger to Russia’s position, but as a chance to renew political and economic cooperation with those countries on the basis of equality and mutual respect”?³⁸⁵ Will Russia problematize the EU notion of commonality?

6.3. Road Maps of Four EU-Russia Common Spaces

Perceptions of the Self and the Other

Addressing questions about the EU vulnerability to act as one and the Russian capacity to acquire its own voice, both the EU and Russia state their positions clearly in the Road Maps. The EU starts speaking with the desired “one voice.” Russia declares significant presence in this speech act, especially in comparison with the PCA where Russia’s

³⁸² Ibid., sec. A.

³⁸³ Ibid., sec. 17.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., sec. B.

³⁸⁵ Ibid., sec. 23.

position was silenced by the EU. An additional distinctive feature of the Road Maps is that in contrast to the PCA, it becomes very clear that the conversation between the EU and Russia is a double-voiced dialogue: semantically, most of the sections in this statement start with “the EU and Russia.”³⁸⁶

Contrary to the EU and Russian Strategies, the Road maps continuously emphasize that the EU and Russia “work together”³⁸⁷ in building their partnership: they share common values and responsibilities, recognize the challenges, enhance cooperation and much more. The partners underline that they aspire to drive the road of cooperation together, in collaboration with each other.

The idea of the EU and Russia as inseparable parts of Europe emphasized earlier in the Joint Statements surrounding the adoption of the EU and Russian Strategies receives further development in the Road Maps. Both the EU and Russia appear to be indivisible parts of “Greater Europe.”³⁸⁸ The parties agree that EU-Russia cooperation “contributes effectively to creating a greater Europe without dividing lines and based on common values.”³⁸⁹ The question remains: provided that Russia is part of Europe, what is Europe for Russia and is the EU at the center of it?

Goals and Expectations

The “coming closer together” between the EU and Russia is the main goal identified in the Road Maps. The expectation is that the rapprochement will occur in the sphere of the

³⁸⁶ “Road Maps for EU-Russia Four Common Spaces.”

³⁸⁷ Ibid., 38.

³⁸⁸ Ibid., 35.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

common economic space, common space of security and justice, as well as external security, education and culture.³⁹⁰ Eventually, these Road Maps are followed by newly introduced political practices, for instance, fourteen dialogues and several sectoral agreements,³⁹¹ action plans in the area of Energy, Materials and Nanotechnologies, Space.³⁹²

The EU continues requests to develop joint approaches to external security issues and suggests an exchange of views and “comparative analysis of the EU and Russian approaches to non-proliferation with a view to elaborating a joint document on strategic partnership in this area by 2006,”³⁹³ as well as “the development of principles and modalities for joint approaches in crisis management.”³⁹⁴

Most importantly, the goal and commitment of the partners gets crystalized in the Road Maps: it is to “to further strengthen their strategic partnership on the basis of common values, which they pledged to respect.”³⁹⁵ What we observe here is two major components at interplay: the first one is the notion of *strategic partnership*, which is a special feature of Russian discursive practice of an equal strategic partner. The second component of the partners’ goal is *commonality*. The concept of commonality that was emphasized by the EU in its Common Strategy, accepted by Russia in its strategic response and further developed in the supplementary statements becomes significantly reinforced by the Road Maps. Both partners are committed to the creation of the

³⁹⁰ “Road Maps for EU-Russia Four Common Spaces.”

³⁹¹ European Commission, *EU-Russia Relations*, May 2007, <http://ue.eu.int/>.

³⁹² D. Isaev, “The Main Theories of Harmonization of Legislation in the Process of Creating the EU-Russia Common Spaces,” *RECEP* 19 (2005), <http://www.recep.ru/ru/group-eurf-docs>.

³⁹³ “Road Maps for EU-Russia Four Common Spaces,” 41.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 43.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Preamble.

Common Spaces. The partners employ the term “common” in the Road Maps when they talk about, for instance, spaces, economic sphere, interests and values, challenges and objectives.

In response to the questions raised by analyzed statements, the partners’ goal of EU-Russia cooperation undergoes corrections in the Road Maps. As a result of these corrections, it combines two discursive practices produced by the EU and Russia – Russia’s practice of an equal strategic partner and the discursive practice of commonality prioritized by the EU. Can this mutually agreed compromise serve as a stable foundation for the EU-Russia relationship?

Present Absence and latent messages

The paradoxical feature of the Road Maps is that there is absolutely no direct reference to the EU and Russian Strategies in the Road Maps. This does not mean that the continuity of the EU-Russia dialogue is disturbed because the Road Maps are replete with multiple links and responses to the messages sent by two key milestones. One possible explanation for the absence of direct reference is that the partners pursue the goal of cooperating together in achieving further rapprochement. As the previous analysis has shown, the Strategies brought up conflictual issues, patterns and practices. In their desire to avoid the conflict, the partners, first of all, set up their goal in cooperation as a compromise between the practice of commonality and an equal strategic partnership. Second, they anchor these practices throughout the whole statement on the pattern of cooperation, rather than on the pattern of autonomy, which remains absent. We should not forget that chronologically, the Road Maps precede the negotiation of a new Partnership and

Cooperation Agreement. In lieu of an adoption of the new PCA, the parties seek to “strengthen political dialogue at all levels on EU and Russian security and foreign policy strategies and concepts, and academic co-operation in this field.”³⁹⁶ The focus is on the cooperative spirit because the Road Maps serve as a preparatory step towards the adoption of the new Agreement. Therefore, the partners are trying to remove potentially conflictual issues born by the Strategies.

Another possible explanation why the reference to the EU and Russian Strategies is absent in the Road Maps is the striking similarity between the Road Maps and the PCA. Indeed, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997 express a strong need for connection between the partners and a declaration to cooperate in order to achieve further rapprochement. The Road Maps further develop the essential feature of the PCA and obviously represents the same type of speech act in Onuf’s classification – *commissives*. This feature of the Road Maps that creates a continuity of the dialogue was not elaborated upon by the existing scholarly critique.

Influence of the Third and views on cooperation

In earlier statements, the Third was presented in a neutral manner and served for the EU and Russia as either an abstract reference or the place to escape the direct discussion of conflictual issues. The role of the Third acquires a symbolic importance in the Common Spaces under the flagship of multilateralism and a shared responsibility. Specifically, the EU and Russia emphasize that together they “share responsibility for an international order based on effective multilateralism. They therefore co-operate to strengthen the

³⁹⁶ Ibid., 37.

central role of the United Nations,... and promote the role and effectiveness of relevant international and regional organizations, in particular the OSCE and Council of Europe.”³⁹⁷ The concept of multilateralism briefly occurs in the EU-Russia dialogue³⁹⁸ following the adoption of the European Security Strategy³⁹⁹ and in Russia’s foreign policy and security concepts.⁴⁰⁰ It is almost expected that this discourse on multilateralism would appear and have a significant effect on the EU-Russia dialogue.⁴⁰¹

Through the privileged pattern of cooperation both partners confirm the necessity of strong connection with each other and with the rest of the international community. In the Road Maps, their view of cooperation is characterized by the readiness to connect to the rest of the world through their relationship with each other. The distinguished feature of the Road Maps is that the partners achieve this desired connection to the international community through specific and mutually agreed rhetorical means – the concept of multilateralism and mutual responsibility. These are not “empty containers” for the EU and Russia: these are very instrumental concepts for the partners to connect to the complexity of regional and international tiers.

Along with multilateralism, both partners prioritize the pattern of cooperation: they commit to be “working together at the international level”⁴⁰² in fulfilling and sharing their responsibilities for “securing international stability, including in the regions adjacent

³⁹⁷ Ibid., 35, 37.

³⁹⁸ “The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000 - 2010)”; “European Parliament Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations,” 2004.

³⁹⁹ “A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy.”

⁴⁰⁰ “MID Rossii | Basic Documents on Domestic and Foreign Policy of Russia,” accessed March 9, 2015, <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd!OpenView&Start=1&Count=30&CollapseView>.

⁴⁰¹ The notion of multilateralism is closely connected with multipolarity, which becomes a central element in all Russia’s political and security doctrines starting with the year 2000.

⁴⁰² “Road Maps for EU-Russia Four Common Spaces,” 38.

to the EU and Russian borders.”⁴⁰³ For the first time in the EU-Russia dialogue, this pattern of cooperation is reinforced by rhetorically influential means of shared responsibility and multilateralism – all within the framework of international relations.

The novel feature of the Road Maps that affects the dynamics of the EU-Russia dialogue is that partners view cooperation as an arrangement that can only be strengthened within the context of international relations. The partners seek “to strengthen EU-Russia dialogue and co-operation on the international scene, in particular, in regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders, both bilaterally and within international and regional organizations.”⁴⁰⁴ Therefore, in their Road Maps, both the EU and Russia turn “outwards” in their mutual effort to connect the existing partnership to the rest of the world. It is not surprising that the language used by partners to describe cooperation in four spheres contains a specific semantic component, the notion of “space” that creates a possibility of an inclusive understanding of cooperation: it opens up the way for the emergence of interrelatedness in the EU-Russia dialogue, freedom to cooperate and a possibility to connect to many different Others through the notion of space. The semantic meaning of “space” is less mechanistic and demanding.

Concluding Remarks

Following the European Parliament Recommendation, the EU starts to speak with one voice in its dialogue with Russia in the Road Maps. Moreover, Russia obtains its own clear voice, especially in comparison with the PCA where Russia’s position was silenced by the principal-agent dynamics of the relationship. Most importantly, the Road Maps

⁴⁰³ Ibid., 35.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 37.

clearly demonstrate that the conversation between the EU and Russia is a double-voiced dialogue of two equally strong voices that work together as indivisible parts of Greater Europe in order to enhance their cooperation.

In line with the recommendation by the European Parliament, the EU continuously requests Russia to develop joint approaches to external security. Russia does not seem to provide any specific answer to the EU's requests on this matter, nor does it comment on the EU's request to view the EU enlargement in the neighbourhood as an enhancement of security in Europe rather than as a danger to the Russian position. It remains to be seen what is Russia's response to the EU messages to develop joint security agenda.

The Road Maps further develop the European Parliament Recommendation to make the EU-Russia partnership an exemplary model of cooperation in Europe and internationally. The distinguished feature of the Road Maps is that the partners achieve this desired connection to the international society through specific rhetorical means – the concept of multilateralism and mutual responsibility. These concepts serve as instrument for the partners to turn “outwards” in order to connect their existing model of partnership to the complexity of regional and international tiers. The Road Maps are the cooperators' significant attempt to create connections not only to their closer neighbourhood but also to the international world.

Most importantly, in the Road Maps both partners seek to avoid an open discussion of conflictual issues and set up their goal in cooperation as a compromise. Moshes views this compromise as a “momentum” in the EU-Russia relationship,⁴⁰⁵ a chance for partners to make their cooperation work. This compromise is achieved by

⁴⁰⁵ Moshes, interview.

institutionalizing the EU discursive practice of commonality into the concept of common spaces between the EU and Russia. It is also achieved by accepting Russia's discursive statement of an equal strategic partnership.

Both partners anchor these practices on a highly privileged pattern of cooperation, rather than on the pattern of autonomy. The pattern of autonomy and the discursive practice of the EU normative dominance remain absent in the Road Maps. For the first time in the EU-Russia dialogue the compromise is reinforced discursively by the strong rhetoric of shared responsibility and multilateralism – all within the framework of international relations.

As justly critiqued by scholarly literature and political discourse, the Road Maps do not provide clear practical and pragmatic guidelines on how to implement EU-Russia cooperation. The most important achievement of this speech act lies in its nature: similar to the PCA, this statement, according to Onuf's classification, represents the type of *commissives*, declaring the need to cooperate and achieve further rapprochement. However, our dialogic analysis of this speech act clearly demonstrates that the partners' intention was to prepare a foundation for the new PCA. In contrast to the PCA, this statement was not meant to be a significant milestone in EU-Russia relations. The goal was to produce rhetoric and achieve a compromise rather than give a new substance to the partnership.

We cannot therefore expect to see the appearance of new discursive practices in this statement. What we do witness in this speech act is an achievement of a compromise between two confluctual discourses of commonality and an equal strategic partnership and a significant reinforcement of the pattern of cooperation. Therefore, the existing

critique of the Road Maps is not well substantiated because it does not really capture the essence of the statement – that is to achieve compromise and to prioritize cooperation over partners’ autonomy.

It is not surprising that the Road Maps are replete with multiple references to the PCA, yet the references to the EU and Russian Strategies are missing. Both partners are focused on the upcoming negotiation process of a New Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and the Road Maps is the partners’ attempt to create a cooperative environment and to lay down the foundation for the future PCA.

6.4. Supplementary Statements adopted jointly by the EU and Russia

Joint Press Conference Following EU-Russia Summit, 2005

The spirit of working together that characterized the Road Maps is reflected in the statement of the Joint Press Conference by all of its participants. The participants emphasize and further develop three aspects of cooperation: first, the importance of cooperation⁴⁰⁶; second, the need to deepen and strengthen cooperation⁴⁰⁷, bringing cooperation to “a new more intense and stronger level”⁴⁰⁸; third, the need of a pragmatic and “practical cooperation ...in [everyone’s own common and mutual interest.”⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁶ “Joint Press Conference with British Prime Minister Anthony Blair, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso and European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana Following the Russian-EU Summit” (London, the Great Britain, October 4, 2005), 1, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/8012>.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., 1.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., 1, see also 3,4.

The partners view each other as “two strategic partners, neighbours and friends.”⁴¹⁰ Contrary to the Road Maps, it is clear from the text that Russia is not yet an indivisible part of Europe. It is in the process of rapprochement with Europe with both partners recognizing the need “to remove dividing lines between states on the European continent”⁴¹¹ and to bring Russia on board for Europe’s own security and safety.⁴¹²

Not only the importance of cooperation between the EU and Russia is perceived a self-evident true, but also the notion of commonality: “the relationship between us is important in terms of our common interest.”⁴¹³ The common and mutual interests are emphasized by the EU side in the sphere of security and external security, “a strong common interest in relation to organised crime and terrorism,”⁴¹⁴ “the implementation in the four common spaces.”⁴¹⁵

The common interest, in other words, the EU practice of commonality is jointly reinforced by both partners in this example of supplementary statements that closely follows the adoption of the Four Common Spaces of Cooperation. The practice of commonality is employed by both partners to explain the very nature and the foundation of EU-Russia cooperation. The question remains whether commonality is a stable foundation for the EU-Russia partnership if it assumes that the partners only cooperate on the aspects of common interests. What is clear from the partners’ messages to each other is that they refuse to accept interdependence as the foundation for their relationship: “the relationship is one of mutual interests rather than one of dependence.”⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., 3, 6.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., 2, see also 1.

⁴¹² Ibid., 1.

⁴¹³ Ibid., 4.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., 1, 4.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., 4.

Russia also re-states that “we have every intention of engaging in a dialogue on an equal footing with our partners and of looking for compromise solutions where we think it possible, taking into account that our European partners will also give consideration to our national interests.”⁴¹⁷ The terms of the compromise achieved in the Road Maps become very visible in this supplementary statement. Although Russia accepts and reinforces the EU practice of commonality, it also demands recognition of its equal strategic status within the EU-Russia partnership. Russia makes it clear that its differing interests should be considered by the partner for EU-Russia cooperation to work.

Russia continues to privilege the pattern of cooperation in its relations with the EU. However, in contrast to the Road Maps, it brings the pattern of autonomy back into the dialogue with the EU. Russia makes it clear that due to the Russian economy’s growth, it is “able to pursue an independent foreign policy. This is naturally the case.”⁴¹⁸

All participants express the need to strengthen certain aspects of the relationship and to adopt a new PCA. The EU side prioritizes “the new institutional arrangements that will supersede the present Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.”⁴¹⁹ As the EU predicts, these arrangements “likely to see a significant institutional strengthening of the relationship between Europe and Russia for the future.”⁴²⁰ Putin stresses “the key role” of the PCA in the development of EU-Russia cooperation⁴²¹ and the need to create an updated Agreement. “Both the fact that 2007 will mark the end of its initial ten-year term and that the EU plans to accept new members requires creating an up-to-date legal

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., 5.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., 4–5.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., 1, see also 4.

⁴²¹ Ibid., 2.

framework in line with the realities of our time.”⁴²² Putin is also anxious to secure the “legal framework”⁴²³ of cooperation.

The Joint Press Conference clearly confirms that both sides achieved a tangible compromise: we observe the dominance of the pattern of cooperation and the prevalence of the practice of commonality and an equal strategic partnership. The EU practice of normative dominance remains absent in the dialogue. However, Russia, while recognizing the achieved compromise, re-states its independence and autonomy in relations with the EU. Will the EU continue to accept the engagement with Russia on an equal footing? Will commonality institutionalized by the Road Maps and the notion of an equal strategic partnership remain a foundation for EU-Russia interactions? Will Russia’s assertive position of autonomy and independence in its relations with the EU disturb the balance of the compromise achieved in the Road Maps?

EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee Minutes, 2008

In addressing the role of the EU in Europe and in the world, Russia finally gives its response to the questions raised by previous statements. It recognizes the EU’s central role in Europe. However, it questions the significance of EU example in the rest of the world, stating that “The EU was no longer at the centre of the world civilization because many countries, such as Japan, China, India, Middle East and Latin America states were far away from Europe and were not necessarily following the example of the European Union.”⁴²⁴

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ “EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee” (European Parliament, June 2008), 2, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/d_ru_20090216_02_/D_RU_20090216_02_en.pdf.

Russia demonstrates a solid understanding of EU affairs and continues to question the EU's ability to speak and act as one: "Should the EU be a federation or confederation in the long term or just an alliance of independent states? What was "European solidarity" in practice? Where was the "European united voice"?"⁴²⁵

While questioning the EU's role in Europe and in the world, "Russia did not separate itself from the European civilization"⁴²⁶: "the Russian citizens had no doubts that they were part of the European civilization. Therefore, a constructive long-term cooperation was needed for both the EU and Russian citizens."⁴²⁷

Both sides emphasize in their statement a long way of transition, reforms and changes that they underwent since the adoption of the PCA. Russia stresses out that "the country had undergone a long way of reforms and integration."⁴²⁸ The EU emphasizes that "significant transformations had occurred in Russia and the EU in the last years."⁴²⁹

The EU also emphasizes the problem of trust in EU-Russia relations and calls both parties to increase mutual trust, which should lead onto an open and constructive dialogue."⁴³⁰ Russia tries to explain the growing distrust for the West by first looking back into the 1990s, when "Western liberal theories in the 1990s resulted in a serious social crisis and 1998 financial default. This partly accounted for the critical attitude in Russia to the advice from abroad."⁴³¹ Russia also cites the example of the EU enlargement. Following it, Russian citizens had to obtain visas to go to the Baltic States

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., 5.

⁴²⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., 3.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Ibid., 2.

and to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe.”⁴³² Russia also mentions “NATO expansion to the East and the US attempts to deploy new missiles and radars close to the Russian border as the actions undermining mutual trust.”⁴³³ Time and again, Russia openly expresses its concern over NATO and the need to discuss the status and role of this organization. “This was one of the reasons why Russia did not consider NATO to be an organization that was needed.”⁴³⁴

Addressing the question of the adoption of the new PCA, Russia says that “the agreement should not include all the international agreements Russia had already signed, but it should be more to the point covering specific issues. The agreement should be legally binding”⁴³⁵ Following the idea of using the EU-Russia partnership as a model of cooperation that could be transferred to other examples existing in the world, Russia favours “a new EU-Russia agreement, which would serve as an example of a certain code of conduct and cooperation model for the whole world.”⁴³⁶ Russia also hopes “that the new agreement would result in further rapprochement between the parties on the principles of equality and would serve future generations”⁴³⁷ Russia stresses the importance of EU-Russia cooperation on the international arena.⁴³⁸ Therefore, exporting the model of EU-Russia cooperation to the international world, simultaneously sustaining the achieved compromise remains the priority for both partners. Indeed, the EU confirms that “the agreement itself ... should provide a framework for future cooperation and integration, taking into account substantial changes that occurred in Russia and the EU

⁴³² Ibid.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., 6.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., 5.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 4.

and serve as a basis for the EU-Russia strategic partnership.”⁴³⁹

In this statement, Russia clearly distinguishes between problems of bilateral agenda with EU countries and EU-Russia dimension of cooperation. Russia also points out three types of problems in its relations with the EU: “The first type of problems came from the fact that Russia and the EU were partners and competitors at the same time in a globalized world. It was natural and should not be dramatized too much. The second type of problems was of transitional nature. Both sides were going through the period of reforms and needed to adapt to each other. Finally, there were subjective issues in the EU-Russia dialogue, which had appeared after the EU enlargement and the attempts of some countries to bring their bilateral issues with Russia to the EU-Russia agenda.”⁴⁴⁰

Russia also emphasizes that it is part of European civilization and it welcomes the EU’s requests for a joint approach in security area: “Speaking about potential areas of cooperation between Russia and the European Union...European security could not be ensured without Russia’s participation.”⁴⁴¹

Concluding remarks

The chosen supplementary statements jointly adopted by the EU and Russia demonstrate that the partners are willing to sustain the new compromise that was achieved in the Road Maps. Both parties agree that they had to undergo a long way of transition, reforms and changes since the adoption of the PCA. Russia clearly states that it considers itself to be part of the European civilization. Both partners prioritize the need to export the model of

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., 3.

the EU-Russia strategic partnership to the rest of the world and both emphasize the need to work with each other in “a pragmatic manner.”⁴⁴²

However, we observe the return of the pattern of autonomy, this time clearly voiced by Russia. Moreover, both partners are concerned with the problem of trust in their relationship and observe the intensification of tensions. It remains to be seen whether these trends have an effect on the achieved compromise between the EU practice of commonality and the Russian practice of an equal strategic partnership. Is Russian assertive position of autonomy and independence in its relations with the EU going to disturb the balance of already achieved compromise? Is the EU willing to engage with Russia on equal footing or is it going to bring the EU practice of normative dominance back into the dialogue? What will be the result of Russia’s attempts to question the ability of the EU by Russia to act as one single actor and to play a significant role in the world? Finally, how do the partners understand the problem of trust in their relations? In order to address these questions, I analyze the speech acts produced in Russia and the EU during this period of time.

6.5. Supplementary statements adopted by Russia

Meetings of the Expert Committee on International Affairs, Federation Council, 2005, 2006 2007

Russia’s view of cooperation is “the creation of an economic hybrid of the EU and Russia where economic systems will be mutually interdependent, but the political decisions will

⁴⁴² Ibid., 5.

be taken autonomously”⁴⁴³. Russia emphasizes that the current state of affairs between the EU and Russia is far from this ideal of cooperation because their cooperation has “a selective and pragmatic”⁴⁴⁴ character. This desire for pragmatism is also closely related to the distrust of the EU and the perception of the EU that Russia develops. Specifically, it calls the EU “a cunning tactic” (“hitryi taktik”)⁴⁴⁵, and re-emphasizes that “trust, dialogue and actions” is the formula for a successful partnership⁴⁴⁶

Russia attempts to understand the systemic political crisis in the EU and the consequences it would have for Russia in the medium and long term.⁴⁴⁷ Russia is increasingly concerned with the EU constitutional crisis, the future of the EU and EU-Russia cooperation.⁴⁴⁸ “Weak Europe cannot grow into the yet another centre of the world power and help Russia build a desired multipolar world.”⁴⁴⁹

It also believes, however, that the EU is going to resolve its constitutional crisis and will successfully develop its CFSP.⁴⁵⁰ “The EU will not get more efficient but it will preserve itself in its present state.”⁴⁵¹ In Russia’s view, “what can really hurt the EU is the uncontrollable Enlargement.”⁴⁵² Russia is fearful of the EU super-state power and the

⁴⁴³ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 231.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam” (Sovet Federatsii, Russia, 2006), 47, http://www.council.gov.ru/publications_sf/2006/12/item158.html.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., 34.

⁴⁴⁷ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 222.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., 224.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., 227.

⁴⁵⁰ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam” (Sovet Federatsii, Russia, 2007), 437, http://www.council.gov.ru/publications_sf/2007/12/item220.html.

⁴⁵¹ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 224.

⁴⁵² “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2007, 437.

limitation of the sovereignty of EU member-states⁴⁵³ precisely because it views the “amorphous” EU foreign policy⁴⁵⁴ under systemic crisis as a chance for Russia to effectively use its “special relations”⁴⁵⁵ with EU member-states such as France, Germany and others.⁴⁵⁶ Moreover, already in 2005, Russia sees the EU political and financial crisis as an opportunity to lead Russia’s own successful politics on the post-Soviet space.⁴⁵⁷ Therefore, in lieu of EU political and financial stalemate, Russia seems to feel increasingly insecure about the future of EU-Russia cooperation. Along with its pattern of cooperation, Russia starts to bring back the pattern of independency and autonomy to the relationship with the EU.

While reflecting on its own Self, Russia emphasizes its “uniqueness.”⁴⁵⁸ What is interesting is that it interprets its uniqueness as a country in a negative way: “Europeans for a short period of time have created a model to follow.”⁴⁵⁹ “Russia at present time has not offered any model. To speak about a Russian model is very difficult because [Russia] represents a unique phenomenon... Uniqueness cannot become a model.”⁴⁶⁰

Most importantly, Russia openly recognizes that the idea of common follows the EU logic of relations with neighbours.⁴⁶¹ Russia omits the word “common” in its discussions, using “the Four Spaces”⁴⁶² instead and asks the following question: “Why

⁴⁵³ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 224.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., 227.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2007, 437.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 230.

⁴⁶² Ibid., 230–231.

did we need the Four Spaces?”⁴⁶³ It emphasizes that both partners created a “framework document,”⁴⁶⁴ “a summary of moral and political obligations,”⁴⁶⁵ which would emphasize the dialogue with Russia, rather than an agreement on the EU's terms.⁴⁶⁶ Russia emphasizes that the Road Maps is “a foundation for the ‘program of international and legal cooperation between Russia and the EU.’”⁴⁶⁷ They were adopted to “prepare the ground for transformation”⁴⁶⁸ in EU-Russia relations. The only point that remains to be seen is whether this dialogue is going to be “a true dialogue,”⁴⁶⁹ the dialogue which, in Russia’s view, is not based on “a principal-agent relationship.”⁴⁷⁰

By 2007, the level of tensions grows significantly, which is recognized by both partners. For instance, Vladimir Putin “urges participants to refrain from aggravating tensions in Russia-EU relations, relations which will inevitably develop as a result of the countries’ economic interdependence.”⁴⁷¹ In its meeting in 2007, the Expert Committee on International Affairs of Russia⁴⁷² raises numerous concerns over the status of EU-Russia relations, as well as Russia’s relations with the West. At the same time, there is a strong attempt to understand the reasons of increasing tensions.

⁴⁶³ Ibid., 230.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2006, 36.

⁴⁶⁶ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 230–231.

⁴⁶⁷ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2006, 36.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., 38.

⁴⁶⁹ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 231.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ V. Putin, “Russia and the EU Are Intent on Cooperating despite the Fact That They Still Have Certain Questions for One Another,” May 18, 2007, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/14658>.

⁴⁷² “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2007.

Russia views the situation in EU-Russia cooperation as rooted in the “ideological battle” between the West and Russia.⁴⁷³ According to the Russian view, strong, semi-authoritarian and independent Russia causes “a lot of irritation from the West”⁴⁷⁴ as opposed to Russia weakened by democratic regime. This strong Russia is the reason of “a new confrontation from the West and an anti-Russian pressure from Europeans,”⁴⁷⁵ especially in light of the “temporary weakness”⁴⁷⁶ of the EU. In 2005, Russia fears the ideological confrontation and it seeks “to persuade the public opinion that there is a need for further rapprochement with the EU.”⁴⁷⁷ Therefore, the pattern of cooperation is reinforced by Russia in the statements after the Road Maps. Already 2006, Russia talks about the “paradox of rapprochement.”⁴⁷⁸ The partners are getting closer with each other, and there is a certain level of rapprochement that has already been achieved.⁴⁷⁹ However, by getting closer the EU and Russia encounter problems, such as anti-Russian stance of new member-states, or NATO factor in European security politics. These and other problems create a paradox of rapprochement.⁴⁸⁰

Russia does recognize that frustration is mutual and co-created by all the participants and that in the intensifying situation “Russia and the West and the EU countries have to face the same challenges. [All of them] are not ready to formulate a

⁴⁷³ Ibid., 422.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., 410. Also, Prozorov, interview.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., 411.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid. “temporary weakness” meaning the financial troubles and constitutional crisis in Europe and its “in-betweenness”. Ibid. 422.

⁴⁷⁷ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 227.

⁴⁷⁸ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2006, 42.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid., 43.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., 42–43.

clear response to the challenges and to make this response work. Therefore, everybody is nervous and is condemning each other.”⁴⁸¹

The solution to these problems of further rapprochement for Russia are to start discussing what is not being openly discussed in the EU-Russia relationship. In other words, Russia addresses the issues that fall under the *present absence* in our analytical model and requires the EU to talk openly about what remains unsaid. It is only through a “mutual dialogue,”⁴⁸² “mutual recognition of standards and norms,”⁴⁸³ “mutual rapprochement”⁴⁸⁴ and “institutions of partnership”⁴⁸⁵ that Russia sees the future of its relations with the EU. It wants to learn “how to lead healthy bureaucratic relations”⁴⁸⁶ in which the directives would be adopted with participation from the Russian side.⁴⁸⁷

Russia continues to view the EU as the only source of its own modernization: “If [Russia] wants to modernize and become competitive country...it should not turn away from the West and the US, because they are the only sources of modernization.”⁴⁸⁸ “Russia cannot implement a large scale modernization project without its partnership with Europe, without identifying itself as part of Greater Europe.”⁴⁸⁹ “Modernization of Russia lies in its relations with the West, not the East.”⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸¹ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2007, 428.

⁴⁸² “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2006, 43.

⁴⁸³ Ibid., 47.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., 43.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., 44.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., 37.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2007, 424.

⁴⁸⁹ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2006, 32.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

Concluding remarks

In the analyzed supplementary statements, Russia views the EU as a desirable source of its modernization. However, the country starts raising numerous concerns about its relations with the EU and with the West. In its attempts to understand the reasons for the tensions, Russia emphasizes an ideological battle, weak position of Europeans and strong position of “irritating” Russia. By doing so, Russia reverts back to the process of “othering of the other,” this time through the creation of binaries of “weak” and “strong,” “democratic” and “undemocratic.”

In lieu of the EU political and financial crisis, Russia continues to question the EU’s ability to remain strong and act unilaterally. The country feels increasingly unsafe about the future of cooperation and, as a result, Russia reinforces its pattern of independency, autonomy, and sovereignty.

While reflecting on its own Self, Russia emphasizes its “uniqueness” as an independent and strong country that plays a distinctive role in international matters due to its long history of relations with other international actors and a unique geopolitical position between the West and the East. What is interesting is that at this stage of relations, Russia interprets its uniqueness in a negative way, as an obstacle to further rapprochement with Europe. It becomes apparent that Russia continues to negotiate between its pattern of autonomy and the pattern of cooperation. The former is now supported by the concept of a unique Russia, and the latter is supported by the necessity of the Russian modernization through cooperation with the EU.

Russia’s pattern of autonomy and self-sufficiency starts to disturb the fine balance negotiated in the Road Maps. Russia also recognizes that mistrust and frustration is

mutual, and both partners are unable to address the tensions constructively. In order for Russia to be able to trust its partner, the country demands addressing the issues that fall under the *present absence* in our analytical model: the country requires the EU to talk openly about what remains to be unsaid.

Why do we observe the intensification of tensions after the compromise has been already achieved? Are the partners able to address their growing tensions? Why does the trust become a problem in partners' relations? Can the EU-Russia dialogue become “a true dialogue,”⁴⁹¹ which is not based on “a principal-agent relationship”?⁴⁹²

6.6. Supplementary statements adopted by the EU

EU Country Strategy Paper

Contrary to the previous statements, in its Country Strategy (2007-2013) adopted in 2007⁴⁹³ (EU Country Strategy Paper) the EU openly recognizes its internal problems: “the EU seems a great deal weaker following its constitutional crisis (it is already clear that the Kremlin considers Berlin, London, Paris and Rome of more significance than Brussels).”⁴⁹⁴ In a later statement by European Commission, the EU emphasizes its problem of unity claiming that: “When the EU speaks with one voice, and acts as one, Russia takes notice and the EU is able to influence the course of events. The unanimously

⁴⁹¹ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 231.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ “Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013: Russian Federation.”

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid., sec. 3(2).

agreed mandate for the negotiations for the New EU-Russia Agreement provides us with an important instrument to pursue our objectives in a united way.”⁴⁹⁵

As Russia earlier stated, both sides are not ready to address the challenges and problems in their cooperation. Instead, they tend to blame each other for the rise of tensions. The EU in its Country Strategy Paper renews its attempts to apply a well-developed criteria for democracy to Russia, criticizing Russia for the state of its democracy: “it is far from being the case that everyone in Russia shares the European view of what a stable, secure and prosperous Federation will involve: accountable institutions and an independent judiciary, a free market system integrated with the rest of the European economy, and a strong civil society.”⁴⁹⁶ Therefore, the continues to conceive of Russia in terms of an “unstable,” “undemocratic,” “unlawful” country, repeatedly pointing out that these characteristics of Russia cannot “be taken for granted,”⁴⁹⁷ they “cannot be discounted.”⁴⁹⁸

Along with the critique of the Russian state of democracy, the EU pays noticeably more attention to Russia’s actions, goals and the trends of its development. For instance, the EU frequently says “Russia seems to be...” or “the signs are that Kremlin....”⁴⁹⁹ Following its Strategy towards the EU, Russia finally succeeds in its assertive action aimed at the “improvement of the image of Russia in Europe.”⁵⁰⁰ In the EU Country Strategy paper, the EU changes *its perception* of Russia. For instance, the EU recognizes

⁴⁹⁵ “Communication from the Commission to the Council: Review of EU-Russia Relations” (Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, n.d.), 5, COM(2008) 740 final.

⁴⁹⁶ “Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013: Russian Federation,” sec. 3(1).

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., sec. 3(2).

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid., sec. 2.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid., sec. 3(2).

⁵⁰⁰ “The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000 - 2010),” Preamble.

that Russia “becomes more assertive.”⁵⁰¹ Moreover, The EU emphasizes the key role by Russia in the UN Security Council and “a significant influence on its [Russia’s] near abroad.”⁵⁰² It seems that Russia’s prevalent discursive practice of an equal strategic partner is finally more or less accepted by the EU who also recognizes Russia as a “key ally in EU efforts to combat new threats to security, crime, terrorism.”⁵⁰³

The EU continues to insist on “a significant degree of economic integration and political cooperation, on the basis of shared values and common interests.”⁵⁰⁴

Commonality obtains a sense of strategic instrumentality for the EU in its cooperation with Russia. Its continuous importance for the EU is articulated once again in this statement. The question remains if there is any space in the EU’s political agenda for utilizing numerous differences that legitimately exist between the partners.

To confirm it, the EU defines EU-Russia cooperation as follows: “EU cooperation with Russia is conceived in terms of, and is designed to strengthen, a strategic partnership founded on shared interests and common values.”⁵⁰⁵ The EU’s definition of cooperation in the EU Country Strategy Paper sets up the requirement of *commonality* as a prerequisite for the success of the EU-Russia partnership; it identifies the components of cooperation (interests and values) that should be in *common* between the two partners in order to, first, meet the EU’s requirement and, second, to succeed in EU-Russia cooperation.⁵⁰⁶ The concept of commonality plays the role of *the latent message* in the EU message to Russia. *Uncommon* interests and other differences between the partners

⁵⁰¹ “Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013: Russian Federation,” sec. 3(2).

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, sec. 3.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, sec. 2.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

become objectified in the EU's statement as a self-evident obstacle to the success of cooperation. Is the EU willing to support the status of an equal strategic partner desired by Russia?

The EU refers to numerous EU documents, policies and strategies, as well as to the PCA and seeks to generate "a robust and coherent approach to the EU relationship with Russia"⁵⁰⁷ based on all documents issued by the EU towards Russia (e.g., PCA, EU Common Strategy), or wider EU neighbourhood (e.g., EU Neighbourhood policy, 2004), or the rest of the world (e.g., European Security Strategy, 2003). Apparently, the EU has an ambition to build its new self-image of an international actor that has a strong external foreign policy based on a "policy mix."⁵⁰⁸ However, it remains to be seen whether the new EU international identity is accepted or rejected by Russia.

Instead of the cooperative rhetoric in the EU's voice, the section "lessons learned"⁵⁰⁹ emphasizes the EU's abilities in monitoring, evaluating and managing its instrumental financial support rendered to Russia under TACIS or ENPI.⁵¹⁰ Time and again, the EU leaves out the notion of mutual responsibility and interrelatedness in its message, with the exception of several moments when the EU talks about "mutually-beneficial engagement with...the Russian government" or "a spirit of ...mutual self-interest" in cooperation.⁵¹¹ Time and again, the EU emphasizes that Russia is solely responsible for all these problems, and the EU exclusive role is to provide a financial assistance in numbers carefully written down in the EU Country Strategy Paper.⁵¹²

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., 6(1).

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid., sec. 5(2).

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., sec. 6.

⁵¹² Ibid., sec. 1,2.

In the EU Country Strategy Paper, relations with the Third – neighbouring countries to the south and east – become an exclusive domain of the EU Neighbourhood Policy.⁵¹³ All other relations with the Third are regulated under the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the European Security and Defence policy. Obviously, the EU aspires to appropriate its relations with the Third outside of the EU-Russia dialogue. Russia, for its part, has little to add as “a strategic partner” to all the spectrum of EU policies adopted and implemented without Russia’s participation and outside of the framework of EU-Russia cooperation.

Concluding Remarks

In its Country Strategy, the EU has responded and recognized an “equal but different” status of Russia, and the Russian prevalent discursive practice of an equal strategic partner was more or less accepted by the EU. What Russia succeeded to do is to question the EU pattern of a self-sufficient autonomous actor and to provoke the EU interest in Russia.

The EU Country Strategy Paper reinforces the discursive practice of commonality as part of the compromise achieved in the Road Maps. According to the EU view, uncommon interests and other differences between the partners remain an objective obstacle to the success of EU-Russia cooperation. The EU thoroughly questions its privileged pattern of autonomy and self-sufficiency in EU-Russia cooperation. Despite the fact that the EU recognizes the need for mutual transformation and change, the responsibility for the successful modernization of Russia continues to be exclusively a burden of Russia.

⁵¹³ Ibid., sec. 5(2).

The Country Strategy Paper re-instates the EU discursive practice of normative dominance launched in the PCA and reproduced in the EU Common Strategy in 1998. How can the EU sustain the compromise achieved in the Road Maps and to fulfill its strong desire of normative leadership in relations with Russia? The answer to this question is provided in the EU Country Strategy Paper: the EU turns *outwards*, bringing its relations with the Third, i.e., regional and international community outside of the EU-Russia dialogue. By doing so, the EU attempts to reinforce its normative leadership with other actors outside of EU-Russia relations. The EU also sends a clear message to Russia that it intends to strengthen its international identity of a significant global player outside of the borders of the EU-Russia dialogue and separately from Russia. Therefore, the reference to the Third starts playing a strategic role in the EU-Russia dialogue: it helps the EU to reinforce the previously muted discursive practice of normative dominance.

We already know that Russia expressed serious doubts over the EU's ability to act as one unitary actor in the world of the international politics and in the European neighbourhood. It remains to be seen whether the EU's attempts to strengthen its position of normative leadership are accepted or rejected by Russia. Is the EU willing to sustain the achieved compromise and prioritize cooperation and mutuality over its discursive practice of normative dominance?

6.7. Conclusion

Chapter Six examined one more milestone in EU-Russia cooperation, The Road Maps, which have come to represent a double-voiced dialogue of two equally strong and well-defined voices. In this political standpoint, both partners resolve tensions and achieve compromise through a complex solution. Specifically, they exclusively privilege the

pattern of cooperation, institutionalize the EU discursive practice of *commonality* into the concept of four *common* spaces, accept Russian discursive claim for an equal strategic partnership and mute the EU practice of normative leadership.

For the first time in the EU-Russia dialogue, the partners seek to reinforce the achieved compromise by connecting their model of partnership to the complexity of regional and international tiers. In other words, they attempt to place the partnership within a broader framework of the international system.

The most important achievement of this speech act lies in its nature: similar to the PCA, this statement, according to Onuf's classification, represents the type of *commissives*, declaring the need to cooperate and to achieve further rapprochement. The partners rely on a strong rhetoric of shared responsibility and multilateralism. The goal is to achieve a compromise between conflictual discursive practices and to privilege the pattern of cooperation over autonomy. This compromise becomes visible only through a dialogic lens.

The context of cooperation explains partners' intentions: both cooperators are focused on the upcoming negotiation process of a New Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The Road Maps reflect the partners' aspiration to create a cooperative environment and to lay down a solid foundation for the future PCA. The integration vector of partners' strategies gains a significant role. As Moshes emphasizes: "The Common Spaces envisions the relationship of *quasi-integration*, this is not just the partnership."⁵¹⁴

The supplementary statements following the adoption of the Road Maps demonstrate that the partners undertake attempts to sustain the new compromise achieved

⁵¹⁴ Moshes, interview, emphasis mine.

in the Road Maps. Both partners prioritize the need to export the model of the EU-Russia strategic partnership to the rest of the world. They emphasize the necessity to work with each other in a pragmatic manner.

In supplementary statements, the EU recognizes an “equal but different” status of Russia, accepting Russian prevalent discursive practice of an equal strategic partner. Russia clearly states that it considers itself to be part of the European civilization. The country views the EU as a desirable source of its modernization. Russia simultaneously emphasizes its own “uniqueness.” Russia also succeeds in questioning the EU pattern of self-sufficient autonomous partner and provokes the EU interest in Russia.

The chosen supplementary statements, however, clearly indicate the return of the pattern of autonomy, this time it is Russia’s emphasis on its independency, sovereignty and autonomy in relations with the Other. It appears that the country feels increasingly unsafe about the future of the partnership and the future of the EU. As a result, in the chosen supplementary statements, Russia starts to deliberate openly between the pattern of autonomy and cooperation.

Both partners recognize the problem of trust in their relationship. In its efforts to find explanations for tensions, Russia emphasizes an ideological battle, re-creating the binaries of “weak” Europeans and “strong” Russia. In order for Russia to be able to trust its partner, the country demands to discuss what remains to be unsaid in EU-Russia interactions.

In the supplementary statements, the EU reinforces its discursive practice of commonality: uncommon interests and other differences between the partners remain an objective obstacle to building trust and achieving success of EU-Russia cooperation. The

EU also re-instates its discursive practice of normative dominance and demands Russia to take an exclusive responsibility for its modernization. It seems that the only way the EU can sustain the achieved compromise and, simultaneously, to reinforce its previously muted practice of normative dominance is by strengthening its international identity of a global player outside of the borders of the EU-Russia dialogue and separately from Russia. Thus, the Third – the international community – starts playing a strategic role of a mediator in the EU-Russia dialogue: although the EU does not privilege its pattern of autonomy, it attempts to mediate between its desire for normative leadership and the need to sustain the achieved cooperation compromise with Russia through the abstract Third.

Following these conclusions, the subsequent analysis of EU-Russia interactions addresses the following questions: Do both partners sustain the compromise achieved with the Road Maps? How does Russia react to the EU attempts to strengthen its position of normative dominance outside of the framework of EU-Russia cooperation and separately from Russia? Does Russian assertive position of autonomy and independence in its relations with the EU disturb the balance of already achieved compromise? Does the EU intend to bring the EU practice of normative dominance back into the EU-Russia dialogue? Finally, how do the partners address the problem of trust in their relations?

CHAPTER 7 - DIALOGIC ANALYSIS OF EU-RUSSIA

DISCOURSE IV

7.1. Introduction

As early as 2006, the Federation Council of Russia anticipates the breakthrough in EU-Russia relations – the adoption of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

Politicians and scholars alike widely discuss the upcoming adoption of a new Agreement, which they call in Russia a “factor of 2007.”⁵¹⁵ A new PCA is to answer many questions in EU-Russia cooperation. I ask in this chapter: Can the partners build their relations on the basis of the compromise achieved in the Road Maps? How do they address the lack of trust in their relations?

The analysis of the Road Maps has demonstrated that the EU and Russia negotiated a compromise. To put it simply, the compromise privileges the pattern of cooperation and is based on the partners’ strategic equality and commonality of their goals. By achieving this compromise, the partners negotiated and found a discursive resolution to the rivalries between the pattern of autonomy and cooperation, between the EU discursive practice of normative leadership and Russian practice of an equal strategic partnership. Moreover, the partners reinforced their discursive resolution by introducing new rhetorical tools of multilateralism and mutual responsibility. They supported their negotiated compromise with Russian proclaimed desire to modernize and to be part of

⁵¹⁵ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2006, 38.

Europe. The partners also institutionalized the compromise into the new concept of Common Spaces and expressed mutual desire to export the EU-Russia partnership model to the rest of the world.

This chapter focuses on the overall dynamics of the EU-Russia discourse in the period from 2007 up until the Ukrainian political crisis in 2013. The EU-Russia discourse during this period of time is significantly affected by the partners' anticipation of a new PCA. In contrast to the previous chapters, this chapter does not offer any analysis of a milestone, simply because the partners fail to reach much anticipated Agreement.

In the absence of a new PCA, the partners' interactions become very fragmented. Therefore, I analyze what is left of the dialogue between the EU and Russia by looking at the selected examples of statements through the lens of my discursive model, describing the symptomatic trends the EU-Russia relationship during this period of time and pondering over the new concept of selective, sectoral cooperation offered in the Partnership for Modernization declaration in 2010.⁵¹⁶

Chapter Seven consists of five sections. Following introduction, the second section discusses what I call the silence vacuum in EU-Russia cooperation. The third section analyses the Partnership for Modernization and its potential. The fourth section observes the latest dynamics of the EU-Russia strategic partnership. The fifth section provides final conclusion for the study's empirical analysis.

7.2. Silence Vacuum in EU-Russia Relations

⁵¹⁶ "Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation."

In 2006, the Federation Council of Russia predicts that the Road Maps “will lose their role and importance in the EU-Russia dialogue after the adoption of the new Agreement.”⁵¹⁷ Starting with the year 2007, the EU and Russia step into the process of negotiation of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in order to substitute the old PCA expiring that year. Already in 2008, we observe continuous interruptions in the negotiation of a new PCA due to multiple tensions and stalemates in the EU-Russia relationship, including but not limited to the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008 and Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009. The EU and Russian official sources announce continuous delays in the process of negotiation. The newspapers are replete with comments such as the following: “inappropriate Russian behaviour caused tensions with the EU which took measures to enforce compliance with its norms by suspending all talks on a new PCA.”⁵¹⁸ Russia is increasingly viewed as being the outsider. Tatiana Aleseeva notices that “Russia should be consistent with the Western norms, otherwise it will be perceived as a threat.”⁵¹⁹

At this time in EU-Russia cooperation, “the political cooperation appears to lack a sense of direction, resulting in the widely shared perception of an impasse since 2007-2008.”⁵²⁰ Growing tensions, suspension and multiple delays in the PCA negotiations quickly exacerbate the problem with the “legal vacuum” in EU-Russia cooperation – the absence of a solid and updated legal and political framework for the EU-Russia

⁵¹⁷ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2006, 39.

⁵¹⁸ Europe quietly caves in to agree to new partnership talks with Russia. (2008, Nov 6.) *The Economist*, 33-37.

⁵¹⁹ Aleseeva, “Rossiia v Prostranstve Globalnogo Vospriiatia.”

⁵²⁰ Prozorov, interview.

relationship.⁵²¹ The Road Maps, which were initially meant to prepare the ground for the negotiation of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, become the only most recent reference of commitment to cooperation jointly adopted by the partners. At least discursively, the Road Maps maintain the dialogic continuity and support the initial integration vector in EU-Russia relations during this difficult period of the legal vacuum.

In this context, EU-Russia cooperation starts resembling a “ping-pong” game, which delays the project of rapprochement between the partners.⁵²² In response to delays from the EU side, Russia addresses the EU earlier invitations to create a joint security agenda. It attempts to open up an international discourse on a New European Security Treaty.⁵²³ With this discourse, Russia openly addresses security issues that, as the previous analysis has already shown, incur multiple present absences in EU-Russia cooperation.

“Russia signals to the West that it is unsatisfied with the current situation in the sphere of security.”⁵²⁴ “It requests to think about the notion of collective security and to develop clear rules on European-Atlantic space regarding military-political sphere.”⁵²⁵ Russia stresses the fact that the country is “an indispensable participant of the processes of negotiating and taking decisions on the questions of military-political security in Europe and that it can count on the fact that in several years we will live in a secure and

⁵²¹ Nadeshda Arbatova, N. (2006). *Obshee politicheskoe prostranstvo mezhdru Rossiei i ES: utopiia ili real'nost'*, *Mirovaia Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia*, 12, 3-12.

⁵²² See in more details, Chebakova, “Rethinking a Problematic Relationship: Toward a Hybrid Strategic Vision of EU-Russia Cooperation.”

⁵²³ Medvedev, S. (2008). *The crisis in EU-Russia relations: Between 'Sovereignty' and 'Europeanization.'* Working paper WP14/2007/02/ Moscow: State University, Higher School of Economics.

⁵²⁴ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam” (Sovet Federatsii, Russia, 2010), 151.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, 144.

stable world.”⁵²⁶ Obviously, Russia searches for recognition of its exceptional role in providing security at the European and international level. Russian initiative to play a significant role on security issues in Europe falls on deaf ears. As a result, “the Treaty has been universally rejected by the rest of Europe. The proposal has been buried.”⁵²⁷

In turn, the EU embarks itself on the task of setting its own agenda in the “closer neighbourhood” by initiating the Eastern Partnership project.⁵²⁸ This EU’s step to deepen bilateral relations with six Eastern European neighbours is often explained by scholars as the EU response to Russian attempts to “rebuild its sphere of influence.”⁵²⁹ I view this step as the EU’s attempts to accumulate and administer a non-state power in its “near abroad.” The EU’s primary goal is to strengthen its practice of normative dominance and to test its ability to act as a unitary actor, framing the regional set up in its neighbourhood.⁵³⁰ The Eastern Partnership project is symptomatic of the EU desire to sustain its practice of normative leadership, at least discursively.⁵³¹ In the absence of a new PCA and with an increasing instability in the European Neighbourhood, the EU has no choice but to go outside of its EU-Russia framework to preserve its normative dominance that remains significantly questioned by Russia.

Russia’s reaction is predictable. Frowning upon the EU regional initiative, the country views the EU Eastern Partnership as a geopolitical event symbolizing the EU

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

⁵²⁷ Moshes, interview.

⁵²⁸ See in more details, Chebakova, “In Search of a Dialogic Relationship: Perspectives on a Possibility for Political Transformation in the Contested European Neighbourhood.”

⁵²⁹ Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, “The Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood” (ECFR, June 2009), 2, http://ecfr.3cdn.net/66e95c3cd50b72d59a_87m6y59xi.pdf.

⁵³⁰ Chebakova, “In Search of a Dialogic Relationship: Perspectives on a Possibility for Political Transformation in the Contested European Neighbourhood.”

⁵³¹ The Eastern Partnership has been criticized as an amorphous project having very limited results. See in more details, *ibid.*

growing presence in its near abroad and the EU's ambitions for a normative leadership in the region. The fine balance of the achieved compromise becomes disturbed by the EU desire to strengthen its normative dominance, and Russian reaction to distance itself from the EU and to find its unique Self independently of its relations with the Other. In this situation, the EU is turning *outwards* pursuing the task of strengthening its position in the neighbourhood. Russia is turning *inwards* due to the fear of the future of the EU and an insecure position within the framework of the EU-Russia partnership.

Both partners reduce the Other to an image of absolute negativity, thereby reducing their ability to know the Other. "The Russian-Georgian War in 2008 represents the low point in EU-Russian relation, [when] a shift from integrative rhetoric to mutual resentment, the limitation of cooperation to sector-specific initiatives [occurs]."⁵³² As a result, the partners experience the problem of growing mistrust in their relations, and the discursive compromise achieved through their dialogic exchange becomes unstable.

Ultimately, by the time of negotiation of a new PCA, the partners demonstrate their inability to prioritize the pattern of cooperation or to negotiate between the pattern of autonomy and cooperation in a way that would be less threatening to their partnership. They abandon their attempts to sustain the achieved compromise: Russia critiques the practice of commonality as being exclusive to the EU and irrelevant to Russia, which considers itself to be different but equal. The EU does not accept Russian demands for an equal strategic partnership, at least not until Russia has more resemblance to the EU's Self. The EU views Russian actions as its inability to cooperate and to build trust. Finally, both partners crave to discuss what remains unsaid: "the EU and Russia should be able to

⁵³² Prozorov, interview.

discuss areas of disagreement in an open and constructive manner. This is essential to a confident and mature partnership. We should strive to improve our capacity to manage differences while advancing our common goals.”⁵³³

During this period, the EU and Russia create not only the “legal vacuum,” but also the vacuum of present absence, the vacuum of silence, which is based on the partners’ inability to negotiate their conflicting stances they themselves co-created in the course of their relationship. This vacuum of silence produces emptiness and distance between the partners. Instead of a common space of cooperation the EU and Russia create an empty space of distrust and disagreement. At this stage of cooperation, it is precisely the present absence that becomes responsible for partners’ inability to cooperate. The continuous tensions are located in the zone of the unsaid, so is their resolution. Can the vacuum of silence be resolved?

7.3. Partnership for Modernization

As early as in 2005, Russia emphasizes that the current state of affairs between the EU and Russia is far from the ideal of the partnership because their cooperation has “a selective and pragmatic character.”⁵³⁴ However, the analysis of supplementary statements surrounding the adoption of the Road Maps further demonstrates multiple messages from both partners expressing the need to make their relationship more pragmatic and productive. The scholarly literature refers to this phenomenon as a “pragmatic turn”⁵³⁵ in EU-Russia cooperation. Because of their inability to sustain the relationship on the basis

⁵³³ “Communication from the Commission to the Council: Review of EU-Russia Relations” (European Commission, Brussel, Belgium, May 11, 2008), 4, COM(2008) 740 final.

⁵³⁴ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 231.

⁵³⁵ Nitoiu and Tomic, *Europe, Discourse, and Institutions*, 100.

of the compromise achieved in the Road Maps, the partners start searching for stability in pragmatism. In 2010, the Partnership for Modernization Declaration⁵³⁶ officially pronounces the pragmatic turn, which is based on the instrumental and results-oriented approach towards EU-Russia cooperation.

In the Partnership for Modernization, the co-operators introduce a new sectoral and selective vision of cooperation, where “the sectoral dialogues [are] a key implementation instrument.”⁵³⁷ The sectoral character of the Partnership continues to be based on the previously agreed idea of commonality: “The European Union and Russia have a common interest in enhancing bilateral trade and investment opportunities.”⁵³⁸ In other words, the partners agree to cooperate in areas of common interest, and they do not cooperate in areas of disagreement. The overall goal is to remove the political strain of conflicting norm-value divergences and to perform day-to-day “business as usual.”⁵³⁹

It becomes obvious soon that the partners’ view of modernization is different. Russia views the Partnership for Modernization as a flexible framework for promoting economic reform, enhancing growth and raising competitiveness. For Russia, modernization is “gaining access to new technologies, creating more efficient and less energy intensive economy...upgrading social institutions.”⁵⁴⁰ The country claims that the Partnership “will extend cooperation in the framework of the four EU-Russia Common Spaces, complementing partnerships between EU Member States and Russia.” Therefore, the Partnership becomes yet another expression of the Russian trend towards

⁵³⁶ “Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation.”

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁹ Moshes, interview.

⁵⁴⁰ Dmitry Medvedev, in “Joint News Conference. With President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso,” December 7, 2010, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/9730>.

modernization-driven interest-based foreign policy. It symbolizes an attempt by Russia to establish a new discursive practice of *pragmatic modernization*.⁵⁴¹ The EU in this limited framework of cooperation becomes an instrument of Russian technological and economic transformation, rather than a trustworthy partner.

For the EU, the Partnership for Modernization is the first mutual agreement with Russia after Lisbon reforms. The EU also emphasizes pragmatic character of cooperation with Russia saying that “we have now a very concrete plan on the development of concrete actions around this partnership for modernisation.”⁵⁴² Moreover, the post-Lisbon EU says that both the EU and Russia are in the process of modernization and transformation: “The union itself is also involved in a broad movement of reforms, indispensable in a highly competitive world.”⁵⁴³

For the EU, Russian modernization should be “based on democratic values, by building a modern economy, and by encouraging the active involvement of civil society.”⁵⁴⁴ The EU attempts to question Russia’s notion of modernization, emphasizing that “modernisation is not only about technology. Rule of law, protection of citizens’ rights, civil society engagement, and a level playing field for companies are all crucial elements of successful modernisation.”⁵⁴⁵ Both the political and economic modernization is a priority for the EU.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴¹ Russia’s eagerness to support this practice is expressed in : Russian government took lead in the development of internet-based platform for the project. Finally, both partners established 16 area dialogues and produced detailed plans and reports on the Partnership for Modernization. (<http://formodernization.economy.gov.ru/info/>)

⁵⁴² “Joint News Conference. With President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso.”

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ Catherine Ashton, “Speech of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the EU-Russia Summit” (European Parliament, December 13, 2011), 3.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

The EU's view of the Partnership systematically echoes its "iron thesis,"⁵⁴⁷ the idea of Russian harmonization with the EU democratic standards and practices. In other words, the EU desires the approximation of Russia with its own Self as a way to build trust. While the EU emphasizes the commonality of approaches and "[the] direction of ...relations... towards more convergence,"⁵⁴⁸ Russia tries to build the relationship with the EU on the basis of economic reforms with preservation of uniqueness and difference of Russia. The Russian understanding of how to modernize and how to build trust between the partners is obviously very different from that of the EU. In this vein, the European scholars insist that the EU should "actively pursue the Partnership for Modernization. Disagreements over the concept of modernization should be addressed in an open dialogue aiming at a conceptual rapprochement in the medium and long term."⁵⁴⁹

Russia responds that "we are always in dialogue,...which, of course, does not mean that our positions coincide perfectly on all subjects."⁵⁵⁰ While the EU is leaning towards convergence and commonality in its cooperation with Russia, Russia obviously starts leaning towards divergence and the difference of opinions. As Moshes claims, at this stage of cooperation Russia emphasizes "divergence, not convergence"⁵⁵¹ of partners' interests and values. As a result, both partners have contradicting expectations from each other and from their cooperation. They are unable to build trust because they do not agree on how to achieve it.

⁵⁴⁷ "Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam," 2005, 229.

⁵⁴⁸ "Joint News Conference. With President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso."

⁵⁴⁹ *A Strategy for EU Foreign Policy* (Institute for Security Studies, June 2010), 49.

⁵⁵⁰ "Joint News Conference. With President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso."

⁵⁵¹ Moshes, interview.

Despite disagreements between the EU and Russia on the approach towards modernization and on the issues of trust, both partners do exhibit a decisive attempt in the Partnership to re-invent the terms of their relationship and to privilege the pattern of cooperation in a pragmatic way. Is this sectoral approach of selective cooperation capable of resolving the contradictions of autonomous cooperation between the EU and Russia?

One may argue that economic cooperation is the key, and the sectoral pragmatic partnership is the answer to constructive cooperation between the EU and Russia.

“Economic cooperation, the arrival to Russia of European companies and European technologies, noticeable results of reforms – all these changes would make Russia pro-European country faster than decades of political efforts.”⁵⁵² The political agenda always intervenes in a way of selective economic achievements between the two partners.⁵⁵³

Moreover, without a firm foundation of sustainable political arrangements, cooperation would be impossible.

The paradox of cooperation is that the existing legal institutional arrangements, modernization and integration vectors fail to address the problem of trust in EU-Russia cooperation, which is sustained through multiple issues, which remain unsaid. These issues form a vacuum of silence and contribute to partners’ negative perceptions of each other. The most recent conflict in Ukraine has clearly demonstrated that sectoral and selective framework of the partnership is not sustainable at times of critical junctures of autonomous cooperation.

⁵⁵² Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Partnerstvo Radi Modernizatsii: Kak Pomoch’ Emu Sostoyat’sya?,” *Rossiiia Segodnya I Zavstra* 9 (2010): 4.

⁵⁵³ Liliana Proskuryakova, interview by Anastasia Chebakova, September 22, 2012.

7.4. Anticipating Agreement or deepening impasse

The previous section has shown that the “constructive engagement”⁵⁵⁴ between the EU and Russia under the framework of the Partnership for Modernization did not really occur. Already in 2011, Russia displays an overwhelming emphasis on the Third, expressing “hopes for better cooperation between the European Union and the Russian Federation in various regions of interest...”⁵⁵⁵

At this point in EU-Russia cooperation, the EU continues its “calls on the Russian Federation ...to actively pursue the negotiations on the New Agreement that should ...further promote comprehensive strategic partnership.”⁵⁵⁶ However, Russia expresses concerns and doubts over the EU future. In his speech at the EU-Russia summit, the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev emphasizes that “the European Union is indeed a major partner for us, and we hope that our colleagues will be able to overcome the difficulties they face. We are almost certain they will, and we are most interested in this outcome.”⁵⁵⁷

Russia focuses on problems in the relationship with the EU, saying that “we are partners, so our summits are not just held for the sake of thanking one another, but also to discuss unresolved problems which certainly exist between us, as is the case between any partners.”⁵⁵⁸ Russia also stresses the importance of the dialogue and the role of the international security: “I would like to once again emphasise the importance of foreign

⁵⁵⁴ Ashton, “Speech of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the EU-Russia Summit,” 2.

⁵⁵⁵ “EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, 14th Meeting,” September 19, 2011, 2–3, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201109/20110929ATT27897/20110929ATT27897_EN.pdf.

⁵⁵⁶ Ashton, “Speech of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the EU-Russia Summit,” 4.

⁵⁵⁷ Dmitry Medvedev, “Speech at EU-Russia Summit,” December 15, 2011, 1.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

policy dialogue between Russia and the European Union in today's agenda and in issues of strengthening international stability and security."⁵⁵⁹

The partners' conversation does not seem to occur. As a result, Russia embarks itself on the autonomous search for alternatives outside of the framework of EU-Russia cooperation. In these conditions, the new discursive practice of Russian regional leadership occurs. Trenin identifies this new phenomenon as the Russian "post-imperium."⁵⁶⁰

Specifically, the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announces the Eurasian Union in 2011, which he calls "a historic milestone for all three countries and for the broader post-Soviet space."⁵⁶¹ The Eurasian Union highlights the integration process with Russia being the main principal in building the Eurasian integration community. "We suggest a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world and serving as an efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region."⁵⁶² According to Russia, "the Eurasian Union will be based on universal integration principles as an essential part of Greater Europe united by shared values of freedom, democracy, and market laws."⁵⁶³

Putin does not view the Eurasian Union as an antithesis to the EU. He emphasizes that "we do not intend to cut ourselves off, nor do we plan to stand in opposition to anyone."⁵⁶⁴ For many this would be at least controversial, if not paradoxical, to try to launch yet another integration project in Greater Europe. This project is so similar to

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁰ Trenin, *Post-Imperium*.

⁵⁶¹ Vladimir Putin, "A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making," *Izvestia*, October 3, 2011.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

European integration ideas in its approach and its rhetoric. However, if we look at the dynamics of the EU-Russia dialogue more closely, the paradox disappears. First, Russia provides a very creative response to the inability of the partners to build constructive cooperation. By simply re-interpreting already existing discourses of EU-Russia cooperation – specifically, the discursive practice of Russian equal partnership and the practice of EU normative dominance – into a new discourse of Russian regional leadership, Russia makes a step outside the framework of EU-Russia cooperation.

Second, Russia builds one supra-national model along with another supra-national model with the objective to be able to speak with the EU as equals. Russia seeks no less than “a partnership between the Eurasian Union and EU that is economically consistent and balanced, [which] will prompt changes in the geo-political and geo-economic setup of the continent as a whole with a guaranteed global effect.”⁵⁶⁵ This way, Russia reinforces the connection between the EU-Russia relationship and the regional-international ties. The question remains, will this practice penetrate the EU-Russia dialogue and will the EU accept it?

In these conditions, the notion of Russian autonomy and sovereignty gains a different meaning. As Vadim Voynikov emphasizes, “Russia has an overall advantage over the EU because it is considered to be more autonomous and sovereign as a state, whereas the EU does not hold the same level of sovereignty or autonomy... Especially outside the framework of EU-Russia cooperation, Russia seems to hold more sovereignty and autonomy.”⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Vadim Voynikov, interview by Anastasia Chebakova, April 15, 2015.

The notion of sovereignty brings the categories of “strong” and “weak” into Russian identity formation, firmly fixating Russia’ self-image on the autonomous, strong and sovereign Self: “Russia is only respected and considered when it is strong and stands firmly on its own feet. Russia has generally always enjoyed the privilege of conducting an independent foreign policy and this is what it will continue to do.”⁵⁶⁷

Prozorov problematizes this transformed notion of Russian sovereignty, stating that “this image of ‘sovereign power’ evidently conflicts with the EU’s self-presentation as a normative power, since Russia’s claims to sovereignty presuppose and entail resistance to any exercise of normative power within its territory.”⁵⁶⁸

In conditions of deepening impasse, the EU attempts to adjust to new realities of an assertive Russia, stating that the partners “should transform what is today interdependence by necessity into interdependence by choice.”⁵⁶⁹ Russia continues to demand the EU to recognize the integration structures in the post-Soviet area with Russia as a regional leader. It insists that “the new Russia-EU agreement must reflect the changing international situation and the Eurasian integration processes.”⁵⁷⁰ “The Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the historical Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world. Eurasian integration is a chance for the entire post-Soviet space to become an independent center for global development, rather than remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia.”⁵⁷¹

At this stage of EU-Russia cooperation, Russia finalizes its self-image, stating

⁵⁶⁷ Vladimir Putin, “Russia and the Changing World,” *Moskovskiye Novosti*, February 27, 2012, 1.

⁵⁶⁸ Prozorov, interview.

⁵⁶⁹ “EU-Russia Summit – President Barroso’s Main Messages” (European Commission, December 21, 2012).

⁵⁷⁰ The Official Website of the President of Russia, “News Conference Following the Russia-EU Summit,” *President of Russia*, June 4, 2013, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18253>.

⁵⁷¹ “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club” (Official Site of the President of Russia, September 19, 2013), 6, <http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/6007/print>.

that “for us...questions about who we are and who we want to be are increasingly prominent in our society.”⁵⁷² “We also understand that identity and a national idea cannot be imposed from above, cannot be established on an ideological monopoly.”⁵⁷³ “The desire for independence and sovereignty in spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres is an integral part of our national character.”⁵⁷⁴

As we can see from all these examples of the EU-Russia discourse, Russia has wrestled with its European neighbour to reaffirm a desirable status of an autonomous strategic partner capable of playing an independent and dominant role in the neighbourhood. At the same time, the EU new geopolitical projects have gradually contributed to Russian resurgent feelings of an unrecognized “lonely empire”⁵⁷⁵ in its “solo voyage.” As a result of these identity transformations, we observe a more forceful Russian foreign policy towards Georgia, Ukraine in the protracted Gas Wars and the recent political turmoil, Moldova in Transnistria tensions. By the end of 2013, Russia starts to believe that “it has a great, powerful future, and that this is a very promising nation,” whereas “Europe does not have a future without Russia.”⁵⁷⁶

7.5. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the stability achieved by decision-makers with the adoption of the Road Maps is temporary. Time and again, the contradictions of autonomous cooperation destabilize the EU-Russia relationship, creating a shift from the

⁵⁷² Ibid., 2.

⁵⁷³ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁵ Trenin, “The Lonely Power.”

⁵⁷⁶ “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” 30.

pattern of cooperation to the pattern of autonomy. As Moshes emphasizes, “the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU of 1994 obliged Russia to harmonize all its norms with those of the European Union. This is important because this was a voluntary commitment by Russia.”⁵⁷⁷ The analysis of this chapter has shown that starting with the year 2007, the initially pursued integration vector is halted by the silence vacuum on issues on which the partners cannot or do not want to agree. As a result, during this period of negotiating a new PCA, “the momentum was lost, the chemistry was lost between the partners,”⁵⁷⁸ and many opportunities were missed.”⁵⁷⁹

In the absence of a new PCA, the EU continues its attempts to homogenize the cooperative space with Russia by projecting its soft power of norms, rules and economic instruments.⁵⁸⁰ However, at this stage we observe an increasingly vulnerable EU, whose integrity is constantly questioned by internal and external financial crises. Moreover, the EU expectation of Russian compliance meets a strong resistance from the Russian side. Russia feels increasingly uncomfortable under the “iron thesis”⁵⁸¹ of the EU normative power. “This image [becomes] increasingly controversial and conflict-generating in the Putin period, characterized by the hyperbolic reassertion of sovereignty by Russia and a correlate de-democratization, which makes European claims to ‘normative power’ at least an irritant, if not a threat, in EU-Russian relations.”⁵⁸² As a result, we observe Russia’s growing ambitions about its role outside of the framework of EU-Russia cooperation.

⁵⁷⁷ Moshes, interview.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁹ Voynikov, interview.

⁵⁸⁰ Yurii Zaytsev, interview by Anastasia Chebakova, October 2012.

⁵⁸¹ “Rossiia V Novom Veke: Vneshnepoliticheskoe Izmerenie. Sbornik Materialov Zasedanii Ekspertnogo Soveta Komiteta Soveta Federatsii Po Meshdunarodnym Delam,” 2005, 229.

⁵⁸² Prozorov, interview.

As the Partnership for Modernization demonstrates, although Russia continues to view its partner as a “modernization tool,” for Russia the EU is not yet an indicator of a political “oughtness”; rather, it is an indicator of a political “doubt.” For Russia, the EU has not succeeded in becoming a positive object of gravitation, a positive image and an attractive model for Russia to follow. “A fundamental reassessment in Russia has taken place. It would not any longer view this kind of the European Union as the role model.”⁵⁸³

The analysis of this chapter shows that Russia has chosen to view the European West as a negative Other, an object of repulsion, which complements Russia’s necessity to become independent from the EU and consolidate its own Self against the invented negative image of the Other. The opposite is true for the EU, which stigmatizes Russia the negative Other, the “alien” country in the West European society.⁵⁸⁴ The negative images of each other in EU-Russia cooperation produce constant discursive turmoil between the two partners, which becomes especially visible at times of critical junctures.

My analysis demonstrates that Russia resists an unequal and asymmetrical position in its cooperation with the EU by demanding a special status of an equally independent strategic partner. Eventually, not having reached sufficient recognition from the EU and unable to fill in the vacuum of silence between the partners, Russia excludes itself from cooperation.⁵⁸⁵ We also observe Russian attempts to evade the EU gravity by introducing a new discourse of the *regional leader* outside of the framework of the EU-Russia partnership.

⁵⁸³ Moshes, interview.

⁵⁸⁴ Zaytsev, interview.

⁵⁸⁵ Sergei Prozorov, “Beyond the Paradigm of Integration in EU-Russia Relations: Sovereignty and the Politics of Resentment,” in *Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches*, ed. Kjell Engelbrekt and Bertil Nygren (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010), 60–81.

Russian pattern of autonomy echoes that of the EU: Russia insists that it is not only an independent and self-sufficient actor, but it is also a unique country. The country slowly becomes immune to the EU's demands for transformation and modernization and starts to prioritize exclusively its autonomy over cooperation. However, the main difference between the EU and Russian patterns of autonomy is that the EU privileges autonomy as an attempt to reinforce its influence inside and outside the framework of EU-Russia relations. Russia privileges the pattern of autonomy when it feels insecure in its exposure to other influences.

Both partners co-create the images of resentful Russia, claiming the special status of an independent sovereign state, and an imposing EU attempting to cooperate with Russia on the basis of its own "European" principles, norms and values. Equating the notion of commonality with the EU interests, norms and values, Russia eventually disengages with the EU demands for commonality and embarks itself on the course of difference. As a result, both the EU and Russia experience "the feelings of disillusionment."⁵⁸⁶

As a result of these dynamics in EU-Russia cooperation, the partners start emphasizing the role of international tiers over the importance of their bilateral cooperation. Ironically, the role of the Third transforms in EU-Russia interactions from a mediator connecting the EU-Russia partnership to the rest of the international community at earlier stages of EU-Russia cooperation to a mediator allowing the partners to isolate each other and to avoid direct discussions of problems in EU-Russia cooperation.

At this stage EU-Russia discourse is characterized by the rivalry of four discursive practices: the EU practice of normative dominance and commonality, as well

⁵⁸⁶ Anonymous. European External Action Service, interview.

as the Russian practice of an equal strategic partner and a new practice of modernization. The partners' understanding of modernization differs with the EU focusing on normative aspects of Russian transformation, and Russia focusing predominantly on instrumental approaches of upgrading its economy and institutions, as well as pragmatic sectoral cooperation. This chapter concludes that the sectoral approach applied by both partners is symptomatic of their inability to converse effectively and it holds little potential to build trust between the partners and to secure constructive cooperation.

As a result, the partners produce more and more areas of cooperation where they cannot agree and cannot communicate. Increasingly, they silence their cooperation rhetoric by their autonomous attempts to dominate and resist, impose and isolate. Both partners have not overcome the "alienness" of each other: the unrestricted process of autotomizing Self and simultaneously isolating The Other prevails in EU-Russia political practices. The political transformation becomes limited by the way the partners practice their relationship, and not only by the contradictory nature of their autonomous cooperation.

"The strategic partnership is dead, it has to be buried it will not be resumed any time soon under any circumstances."⁵⁸⁷ Following the most recent EU and Russian experiences of their autonomous cooperation, the feeling of the dead-end is not surprising at all.

⁵⁸⁷ Moshes, interview.

CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSION

“Political leaders need to be imaginative and innovative. They need to discard old ways of thinking and create a new framework for commercial, cultural and social interchange.”⁵⁸⁸

8.1. Summary

Seeking to understand the complexity of the EU-Russia relationship and to explain its ongoing conflicts, this study has provided an alternative view of the EU-Russia partnership by conceptualizing this partnership in a relational, dialogic way. In search of possibilities for a new kind of political dialogue between Russia and the EU, I have examined the discursive construction of *autonomous cooperation* in political statements of the EU-Russia discourse. I have learnt how the partners experience and practice their cooperation discursively, how they co-produce the images of each other, and how the products of their interactions affect the overall dynamics of EU-Russia cooperation. The goal was not to overload the reader with new facts about the partnership, but to engage closely with the texts of political statements as carriers of the EU-Russia conversation.

The overview of scholarly landscape in this study has demonstrated that despite the existence of a considerable body of literature on EU-Russia cooperation, insufficient work has been done to investigate tensions and conflicts between the EU and Russia, as well as the intricacies of identity formation and discourse dynamics in EU-Russia cooperation.

Currently, the dominant realist and liberal theoretical approaches in EU-Russia studies tend to explain the conflicts in cooperation through the concept of rational

⁵⁸⁸ Prodi, “What the 21st Century Holds for the EU-Russia Relationship,” 2.

individual interests of the partners. There is a lack of theoretical imagination that would allow us to explore new possibilities for change in the EU-Russia partnership. Although intrigued by the complexity and the failures of the EU-Russia partnership, the current debate continues to provide either EU or Russia-centered perspectives on EU-Russia cooperation. My study calls for a solid *relational* conceptualization of EU-Russia cooperation because it can provide better understanding of how both partners construct the relationship and how both of them are responsible for the outcomes.

In search for a better approach to understand autonomous cooperation, I have explored Onuf's constructivist account of speech acts. Described in the theoretical chapter, Onuf's classification states that assertives are "speech acts stating a belief . . . with the intention that the hearer accepts this belief";⁵⁸⁹ directives contain an action the speaker wishes the hearer to perform (regulative intent); and commissives consist of the declaration of the speaker's commitment to a stated course of action. The PCA and the Road Maps represent commissives, with the PCA carrying some elements of assertives and directives. The role of these two milestones, when viewed through Onuf's lens, is to declare the EU and Russian commitment to cooperation. The EU Common Strategy represents directive, a regulative intent with the specific goal to impose rules on Russia as the hearer and to state a set of actions that the EU wishes Russia to perform. The Russian strategic response confirms the success of the EU directive. The Russian Strategy represents a mix of assertives and commissives, declaring Russia's overall commitment to cooperation with the EU and stating a belief that the EU accepts Russia's position of an equal strategic partner. The analyzed milestones represent all three types of speech

⁵⁸⁹ Onuf, *World of Our Making*, 87.

acts introduced by Onuf, demonstrating a strong performative effect on the dynamics of EU-Russia cooperation.

This study has undertaken the task of blending Onuf's work with Bakhtin's dialogic analysis in order to understand how the speech acts produced by the partners interact with each other. This unique theoretical and methodological blend, I argue, permits us to witness the performative effect of issued political statements on their receiver and the role of partners' interactions on the overall dynamics of EU-Russia cooperation. Bakhtin's dialogism provides a flexible process-oriented conceptualization of autonomous cooperation and its conflictual nature. Most importantly, this study's approach allows us to imagine the relationship dialogically, revealing mutual formation of the Self and the Other, as well as co-creation of tensions in EU-Russia autonomous cooperation.

This study has developed an analytical model to conceptualize EU-Russia cooperation through a dialogic lens. The model permits the analysis of selected political statements as interrelated parts of a continuous dialogue between Russia and the EU. With this model, conflicts and tensions of EU-Russia cooperation become more immediate to our perception.

Dialogic analysis through the lens of the model has revealed complex problems of asymmetry, equality and difference in the EU-Russia relationship. The analysis established that the EU and Russia co-produce a specific form of autonomous cooperation by means of contradictory patterns of autonomy and cooperation. Depending on the stage in EU-Russia cooperation and under the influence of conversants' messages to each other, the character of partners' privileged patterns changes.

For the EU, the pattern of autonomy ranges from a self-sufficient autonomous partner to an independent co-operator who is willing to transform together with Russia. For Russia, the nature of its autonomy ranges from an insecure country opposing normative pressures from the EU to an assertive autonomous sovereign state counteracting any kind of intervention from the EU.

In the beginning of its cooperation with Russia, the EU pattern of cooperation is predominantly characterized by the EU principles of conditionality and is driven by the EU attempt to homogenize the EU-Russia cooperative space. The EU pattern of cooperation changes over time towards less ambitious approach of engagement with Russia where possible and necessary. The Russian pattern of cooperation ranges from Russia's voluntary attempt to cooperate on the EU's terms to Russia's instrumental cooperation in a limited number of areas chosen for collaboration.

The described fluctuations in characteristics of the pattern of autonomy and cooperation give us clear indication of their continuous changes. This is an important conclusion, which gives reason to believe that under certain conditions less tension and more balance can be achieved between the subjects' autonomy and their ability to cooperate.

The partners reinforce their privileged patterns by the following prevalent discursive practices: the EU practice of normative dominance and the practice of commonality, as well as the Russian practice of an equal strategic partner and the practice of modernization. These new practices are all born out of multiple messages sent and received throughout partners' interactions. At different times in their cooperation, depending on whether the partners accept or resist each other's messages, these practices

play the role in increasing or decreasing the tension of autonomous cooperation.

Altogether, the patterns and discursive practices generate intertextual sequences across the texts of the chosen political statements, allowing us to make empirically-based observations of the tensions produced during the process of EU-Russia cooperation.

The dialogic modelling of the EU-Russia discourse has also shown how the relationship between the EU and Russia has deteriorated over the past twenty years. I now offer to incorporate the concepts and findings of my interpretive analysis into *a discursive narrative* of EU-Russia autonomous cooperation.

We have observed how the partners co-produce perceptions and images of the Self and the Other. Right from the start of their dialogue, both conversants tend to reduce their partner to a negative image of an alien Other, thereby restricting possibilities for knowing a positive Other. The “othering of the other” begins with the EU positioning itself as a normatively dominant co-operator in the PCA (1994) and the EU Common Strategy (1999), where the EU extensively critiques Russia’s state of affairs. Russia does not hesitate to respond, providing critique of the EU’s self-sufficiency in the Russian Strategy (1999) and pointing at the need for transformations for the EU. Especially during the last observed period leading up to Russia-Ukraine conflict, the acts of “othering of the other” proliferate.

The negativity causes a tsunami of different reactions and, in essence, builds insecurity and mistrust that leads partners to privilege the pattern of autonomy and to question the idea of cooperation. The only exception is the Road Maps of 2005, when the partners recognize each other’s achievements, call for the need of mutual transformation and tune down their critical attitudes.

The conflictual nature of autonomous cooperation fully reveals itself at such turning points of cooperation as the adoption of Strategies by both partners towards each other in 1999, the period surrounding the negotiation of a new PCA during which the vacuum of silence becomes especially evident (2007-2010) and the period after the adoption of the Partnership for Modernization Agreement in 2010. These turning points of cooperation present us with numerous instances of partners' struggle to negotiate between the patterns of autonomy and cooperation, as well as their refusal to accept the autonomy of one another.

The analysis of the PCA and the EU Common Strategy has demonstrated that in the 1990s the EU privileges its autonomy, which is reinforced by the discursive practice of normative dominance. The EU employs conditionality principles and imposition in its relations with Russia. In the Russian Strategy towards the EU, Russia responds to the EU's quest for autonomy perceiving it as a threat to its own independence. The country puts forward its own pattern of autonomy reinforced by the discursive practice of an equal strategic partner. Starting with the Russian Strategy, Russia puts forward demands for equality with the EU and resists to EU normative pressures.

The only exception when the EU and Russia have succeeded in achieving compromises between contradictory patterns of autonomy and cooperation is the adoption of the Road Maps for the four common spaces of cooperation in 2005. My analysis of the dynamic of EU-Russia cooperation after the Road Maps agrees with Moshes' conclusion that this was the momentum in cooperation that was lost.⁵⁹⁰ The contradictions of autonomous cooperation once again destabilize the EU-Russia relationship.

⁵⁹⁰ Moshes, interview.

Our empirical analysis has demonstrated that in their dialogue, the partners continuously send latent messages – these are presumptions that are perceived as a self-evident truth. Most importantly, in the course of their dialogue, the partners co-create what I call the *present absence* – a non-articulated view strategically suppressed in the speech acts of conversants. Latent messages and present absences eventually produce the *vacuum of silence* – the issues, problems, information, which remain unsaid in the EU-Russia dialogue.

I argue that this vacuum of silence is the major contributor to the lack of trust in EU-Russia relations. Starting in 2007, during the period of negotiations of a new PCA, the vacuum of silence becomes especially visible, causing the lack of responsiveness between the EU and Russia. Coupled with the partners' need for autonomy, the vacuum of silence results in the situation when the EU abandons its ambitious agenda of close cooperation with Russia and often is unable to respond to Russia's demands to address what remains unsaid in EU-Russia dialogue.

The analysis has shown to us another peculiar characteristic of EU-Russia dialogue. In order to avoid direct confrontation on the issues of disagreement, the EU and Russia often revert in their statements to the Third – the abstract “international community” with its institutions – as an escape from their inability to fill the vacuum of silence and to make their relationship work.

The growing insecurity produced by the way the partners experience their autonomous cooperation leads them to privilege the pattern of autonomy, and to demand insistently, to gain control or force each other into accepting each other's conditional terms, to cooperate on a selective basis or to disengage completely. All these

characteristics of relations between the partners become especially evident in the period surrounding the adoption of the Partnership for Modernization Agreement in 2010.

With the adoption of this Agreement, the partners apply the sectoral approach of selective cooperation (see section 7.3). The desire of both partners to employ a sectoral, selective approach in order to give cooperation a more productive character is understandable.⁵⁹¹ As Voynikov insists “these two are neighbours, who have to deal with numerous challenges on a daily basis.”⁵⁹² However, I argue that this sectoral and selective approach is not capable of effectively addressing the contradictions of autonomous cooperation between the EU and Russia. Selective approach to cooperation cannot effectively address the daily challenges of EU-Russia relationship because it deepens the vacuum of silence and contributes to a higher level of mistrust between the partners. The most recent conflict in Ukraine has clearly demonstrated that reducing the wide range of EU-Russia relations to sectoral and selective cooperation is not sustainable under the external pressures. Unresolved issues will simply create a downward spiral with less and less areas available for partners to cooperate and will deepen the vacuum of silence co-produced by the partners. Perhaps, the conclusions of this study may be of interest to those seeking to understand the current Ukrainian crisis, which demonstrates the old ways of the EU and Russia to cooperate on most difficult questions of security and regional stability.

What we have seen in the last section of empirical analysis is the result of unresolved tensions of autonomous cooperation. During the period from 2010 up until 2013, Russia does not accept the EU’s conditional terms of cooperation; it tries to gain

⁵⁹¹ All of my respondents emphasized in their interviews the need for a pragmatic cooperation, especially as a solution to future problems in EU-Russia partnership.

⁵⁹² Voynikov, interview.

control over the post-Soviet space by launching its own integration project of Eurasian Union with parallel selective cooperation or disengagement with the EU. The EU, intimidated and appalled by Russia's decisive actions, decreases the level of response to Russia, continuously silencing problematic issues.

Summarizing the two decades of EU-Russia cooperation, Russia has struggled to separate its own Self from the EU influence, whereas the EU has attempted to recreate a somewhat extreme form of cooperation based on turning the Other into the Self. As a result, Russia has solidly anchored itself in the concept of an autonomous sovereign nation-state, which at present time cultivates resistance to the EU influence. A "polycentric"⁵⁹³ EU has attempted to go beyond the traditional state-oriented differentiation and consolidation models of political entities, pursuing the agenda of inculcating Russia into its Western European values, norms and institutions. My analysis has demonstrated that by applying such tactics, Russia has not succeeded in its attempts to disposition itself discursively in the EU-Russia dialogue and to be recognized as an equal partner. The EU, for its part, has not succeeded in its efforts to use the power of norms, rules and economic instruments to exercise control and homogenise the cooperative space with Russia. Finally, both partners have not succeeded in "operating together" and creating a *common space*. They only intensified power struggles and induced conflicts in relations, ultimately immersing the European and Eurasian region into a continuous flux.

Based on the empirical and theoretical findings of this study, the following section ponders over possible implications as avenues to go beyond the limits of EU-

⁵⁹³ Magnus Ekengren, *The Time of European Governance* (Manchester University Press, 2002), 12.

Russia autonomous cooperation and to open up the possibilities for change in the EU-Russia partnership.

8.2. A cooperative vision

EU-Russia strategic partnership: impossible, buried, dead?

The EU-Russia strategic partnership is difficult, if not impossible: it requires that the EU establishes and sustains constructive relations with Russia, who has repositioned itself since the dissolution of the Soviet Union as an autonomous and assertive nation-state. Russia, for its part, refuses to comply with the wishes of its powerful neighbour and to subdue the idea of having its own vision, mindset or views that are different from European principles, values and norms. Instead, it desires to be viewed as an “alternative Europe.”⁵⁹⁴

As a result, the EU and Russia practice their cooperation in a conflict-prone way, producing mutual frustration and validating “us” versus “them” categorical thought. However, as Peter Katzenstein concludes, “viewing the world in terms of binary distinctions – us-them, rational-irrational, modern-traditional, East-West – is wrongheaded. This way of thinking produces little more than a clash of ignorance.”⁵⁹⁵ The binary categorical thought often leads politicians and scholars alike to conclude that the current EU-Russia strategic partnership “...is dead, it has to be buried, it will not be resumed any time soon under any circumstances.”⁵⁹⁶ How can we conceive of the

⁵⁹⁴ Moshes, interview.

⁵⁹⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Cornell University Press, 2005), 244.

⁵⁹⁶ Moshes, interview.

relationship between the EU and Russia in such a way that will allow us to avoid the dead end and to imagine alternatives for a renewed EU-Russia relationship?

One may argue that the political discourse is far removed from the actual intentions, policies and problems of the EU and Russia. My study has demonstrated that it is not the case: I reveal that when the partners interact and respond to each other, both of them co-produce problems discursively. The paradox of EU-Russia autonomous cooperation becomes obvious with a closer look at the interplay of contradictory patterns and the discursive practices that reinforce these patterns: these constitutive parts of the EU-Russia communication continuously reproduce inequality and asymmetry, inevitably leading to re-occurring problems in EU-Russia cooperation.

The nexus between partners' desire for autonomy and simultaneous need for cooperation is indeed problematic: it reflects the roots of contradictions in relations between two different actors in the existing international system. The study's analysis has demonstrated that the relational contradiction and instability of autonomous cooperation has not been resolved. As the empirical chapters have shown, the cooperators will continue to achieve temporary stability only to unbalance it. As important as they are, negotiation and compromise seem to present only temporary solutions to EU-Russia autonomous cooperation. What lessons can we take from studying the intricacies of the EU-Russia dialogue? Is further rapprochement between the EU and Russia even possible? How can both partners frame their political dialogue in a new way and foster a shift in their relationship from a state of recurring crises towards a new cooperative vision? I further discuss possible avenues for the EU-Russia partnership.

Avenue I

I start with the following question: what conditions should be in place for a new vision to occur? My respondents mostly agreed that both partners need each other and they will continue to cooperate.⁵⁹⁷ Yet, the respondents were hesitant to answer under which conditions a new partnership would emerge. More often than not, they would point out that the answer depends on either Russian⁵⁹⁸ or the EU⁵⁹⁹ course of actions and political will. I argue that both sides are responsible for the final product of their dialogue. The tensions are co-produced by both partners, and it will take two of them to re-imagine their relationship in a different way.

More generally, the cooperators need to provide a supportive environment for each other where both commit to cooperate and to build mutual trust. The EU, for instance, has had a significant experience in building such an environment throughout the history of cooperation of its member-states. In this environment, both partners can free their political imagination and perceive their autonomous cooperation as an opportunity rather than a constraint.

Specifically, I argue that it is impossible for a new partnership to occur under the current conditions of sectoral and selective cooperation, which, as already discussed, has little to no potential to address the vacuum of silence and the grave distrust between the partners. Many scholars and politicians would not agree with me, trying to focus on immediate solutions of, for example, security and economic matters in EU-Russia cooperation and neglecting the discussion of political matters and the so-called value gap.

⁵⁹⁷ Anonymous. European External Action Service, interview; Voynikov, interview; Zaytsev, interview.

⁵⁹⁸ Anonymous. European External Action Service, interview.

⁵⁹⁹ Moshes, interview.

The vacuum of silence is co-produced by both partners. Only when both partners realize that they need and have an ability to cooperate, only when they are ready to accept or at least to discuss the demands for autonomy of each other, a successful renewal of cooperation will have a chance to occur.

These conditions are currently very hard to meet: the level of Russia's reactive resistance is very high, whereas the EU is disillusioned in its attempts to make Russia more "European" and failing in this project completely. As one of my respondents said: "Cooperation between the EU and Russia will happen again, the question is when...and when it happens, it has to be a more pragmatic cooperation, with the EU no longer holding any illusions about Russia."⁶⁰⁰ The pressures and tensions of a constantly changing and increasingly complex world may become unbearable sooner than we think, and the existing system of interactions will be pressured to re-organize itself. Considering the current situation, the question remains: how can the EU and Russia move towards a more promising dialogue?

Avenue II

The autonomous cooperation between the EU and Russia cannot be reduced to one permanent solution: it is permanently unstable, ambiguous and complex. The autonomous cooperation is also a form of relationship that reflects the current international system. This system demands autonomy in any cooperative forms of international relations,

⁶⁰⁰ Anonymous. European External Action Service, interview.

thereby imposing its own limits on the experiences of sovereignty, possibilities for differences and the aspiration to cooperate.⁶⁰¹

As we have learnt from the analysis of EU-Russia political discourse, the characteristics of the pattern of autonomy and cooperation change over time. Although the partners tend to privilege one pattern over the other, the study's analysis of the Road Maps has demonstrated that under certain circumstances, when the partners are able to engage in negotiation between autonomy and cooperation, the compromise between the two contradictory patterns can be reached, bringing a temporary stability to the relationship.

With certain level of abstraction, we can imagine the situation when each pattern carries the elements of the other. Due to its internal logic of responsiveness, a "genuine dialogue"⁶⁰² is impossible if one partner or the other gets to decide its rules. The empirical analysis has shown numerous instances when one partner counteracts the other partner's attempts to shape a cooperative space on the basis of their own vision of cooperation or a set of rules. We cannot and should not reduce the subject's need for autonomy. The subjects' will does not have to merge into one single monological perspective, nor do the two subjects have to be subordinated one to another. Therefore, prioritizing the pattern of cooperation with simultaneous recognition and respect for the subject's autonomy could be a possible solution for a more constructive dialogue.

With both partners establishing the patterns of cooperation based on the set of rules agreed by both, the desire for autonomy is partially fulfilled. As our analysis has

⁶⁰¹ This relates to a much bigger problem of sovereignty and state-centrism of the current international system. I leave the ambitious solutions to be tackled by prominent scholars such as: Ashley and Walker, "Conclusion"; R. B. J. Walker, *After the Globe, Before the World*, 1 edition (London ; New York: Routledge, 2009).

⁶⁰² Hellmann, "Are Dialogue and Synthesis Possible in International Relations?," 2003, 142.

shown, each partner has had difficulties to accept the quest for autonomy of their cooperator. This approach has a potential to help partners recognize and accept the autonomy of each other.

Avenue III

Currently, the very possibility of cooperation has been conditioned by both the EU criteria imposed on Russia to be considered as a friend and by Russian claims for equality with the EU. Instead of focusing on the irreconcilability of differences or contributing to the increase of numerous value and ideological gaps, the partners should work towards learning a way to co-exist with a very different Other. In Bakhtin's words (see Chapter two), they should "overcome alienation of 'the other' without attempting to turn 'the other' into 'self'." The partners can start by looking back at their cooperation to re-discover what their perceptions of differences are. Better understanding of differences creates an opportunity to learn about the other partner as a positive Other, to repair and change together through a constructive and reflective debate. Without creating this opportunity, a new cooperative vision that Romano Prodi calls "a new framework for commercial, cultural and social interchange"⁶⁰³ will not occur.

One may disagree that this approach to creating a more promising dialogue between the EU and Russia are practically unachievable, if not impossible. It may very well be the case. However, the partners already have a solid foundation to build on, even if it is currently overshadowed by the recent crisis in their relationship. Indeed, the extensive experience of the EU-Russia partnership, a historical past shared by the partners, sophisticated institutions of cooperation, and significant experience in

⁶⁰³ Prodi, "What the 21st Century Holds for the EU-Russia Relationship," 2.

deliberative practices of decision-making process, as well as a well-developed culture of dialogues⁶⁰⁴ – all have already prepared a formidable ground for pursuing avenues for a constructive change.

Avenue IV

The last suggestion I have is to create “a new set of discursive practices [that] are needed, ones which develop, embrace, work with, relate to the complexity we find.”⁶⁰⁵ There is a need for an exploration of cooperative discursive practices that would overcome the confines of cooperation currently existing between the partners. The production of new discursive practices, which carry a potential for transformation of the EU-Russia relationship, is a difficult question, from a methodological and practical point of view. The partners would need to achieve fine balance through skilled diplomacy and institutional arrangements. This study is limited to witnessing the current modes of thinking within the framework of autonomous cooperation. I reserve elaborations on this fundamental change for future theoretical research.

The current stalemate in EU-Russia cooperation presents the partners with an opportunity to be creative in re-interpreting the existing discursive practices towards a more cooperative vision. “Political actors ‘assimilate, rework, and re-accentuate’ (Bakhtin, 1986:89) prior discourse.”⁶⁰⁶ Moreover, the autonomous cooperation can destabilize itself, at one point or another, either due to internal tensions or external demands. Yet, it is an endless, continuous and complex interaction that secures the

⁶⁰⁴ For instance, after the Road Maps, twelve sectoral dialogues with well-developed institutional structure were launched between the partners: <http://www.russianmission.eu/en/sectoral-dialogues>

⁶⁰⁵ Trueit and Doll, in Doll, *Pragmatism, Postmodernism, and Complexity Theory*, 8.

⁶⁰⁶ As cited in Hodges, “The Dialogic Emergence of ‘Truth’ in Politics,” 1. For an in-depth discussion of this argument, see Section 3.3. of this study.

longevity and a possibility for change towards more promising dialogue between Russia and the EU.

Today's world is too complex to think that any form of relationship can be based on the same set of long-term goals and the same set of permanent solutions. From a dialogical point of view, both partners will need to learn to live in the continuous process of interaction and to mediate the contradictions of their relationship.

The relationship between the old and the new is always complex; "the future is not so much a break with, or antithesis to, the past as it is a transformation of it."⁶⁰⁷ This study does not provide an exact image of what this transformation will look like. It only explains possibilities available to us through the means of dialogue. Russia and the EU can eventually move towards a more promising cooperation, most likely through conflicts and resolutions, but ultimately, through their commitment to the perpetual engagement where "everyone has the right to be understood."⁶⁰⁸

In the very end, despite re-occurring problems in their cooperation, both the EU and Russia have an opportunity to view their cooperation as an open concept for re-thinking and re-definition. The scheme of analysis offered in this study may serve as a model for understanding possible future events in EU-Russia cooperation, for instance a successful negotiation of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. This new Agreement has a symbolic sense of continuation. It is not a "final say" in the EU-Russia dialogue; rather, it is a "new" beginning.

It is through a perpetual relational re-interpretation of cooperation between the Self and the Other that we can ensure a cooperative spirit of mutuality. It is through

⁶⁰⁷ Doll, *A Post-Modern Perspective on Curriculum*, 8.

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 155.

continuous engagement, responsiveness and commitment to the relationship with a very different Other that we can open up possibilities for a political transformation. Finally, it is through the continuity of dialogue that we discover the ultimate creativity of language and possibilities for change.

The EU and Russia will need to find a new form of pragmatic and constructive cooperation. Russia will fail if it tries to reduce the complexity of international ties to the assertive politics of “sovereign” disagreement and isolation. The EU will fail if it continues to reduce the Other to a stigmatic version of Russia and ambitiously try to turn Russia into its own version of the Self. Finally, both will fail if they get caught up in the vacuum of silence and put an end to their interactions: *“When dialogue ends, everything ends. Thus dialogue, by its very essence, cannot and must not come to an end.”*⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁹ Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 252.

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APPENDIX 1 – LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

- Anonymous, Senior Policy Advisor, Strategic Planning Division, European External Action Service, April 13, 2015
- Arkady Moshes, Programme Director, The EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia research programme, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Finland, April 13, 2015
- Liliana Proskuryakova, Director of the Institute of Statistic Research and Economics in Moscow, September 22, 2012
- Sergei Prozorov, Academy Research Fellow, Department of Political and Economic Studies at the University of Helsinki, September 26, 2012
- Vadim Voynikov, Director of Kaliningrad Regional Center of European Studies and Governing Board Member of the European Studies Association in Russia, April 15, 2015
- Yury Zaitsev, Deputy Director of The Research Center For International Development and Cooperation, Senior Research Fellow, The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in Moscow, October 22, 2012