The Philosophy of Charles Taylor: Schmittian Distinctions, Augustinian Grace and a Language of the Good

by

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B.A., University of Victoria, 1994

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Political Science
(Contemporary Social and Political Thought Program)

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ABSTRACT

This thesis demonstrates that Taylor's philosophy, particularly in his Sources of the Self, occupies a site between the philosophy of Carl Schmitt and that of John Rawls et. al. As such, it opens up discussion regarding political distinctions, most notably the Schmittian distinction of friend and enemy. It is a discussion which has been effectively shut down by atomist liberal theories that give scant attention to the social nature of the human condition. While Taylor indirectly excavates 'the other', it is an otherness tempered with a respect for human dignity, articulation of this respect and it sources, and with a love of liberal democracy. It is also argued that Taylor's strong theistic premise, the fear of which has caused a number of his critics to caricature his message, is not a call to God, and should not act as a barrier to Taylor's many insights.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis came together with the assistance and support of a number of people. I extend my heartfelt gratitude to my outside committee member, Dieter Haselbach, for introducing me to the works of Carl Schmitt; to my second reader, Rob Walker, for suggesting that I read Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self just for fun; to my thesis supervisor, Warren Magnusson, for his guidance and wisdom; and to all my colleagues in the Political Science Department with whom I have had the pleasure to debate and share ideas. Special thanks to my husband, Gerald Pash, for his support, patience and love during this long project.

In a time of ignorance, one has no doubts even while doing the greatest evils; in an enlightened age, one trembles even while doing the greatest goods.

Montesquieu[1]

Chapter 1 - Introduction

In his critique of Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Quentin Skinner tells of a man who wanted to place an inscription on all the churches: "Important, if true." Skinner says that this motto should also be inscribed on Taylor's book.

> In part the appropriateness of the motto is simply a testament to the grandeur of Taylor's theme. But in part it stems from the fact that Taylor's final message, like that of the Churches, is that we cannot hope to realize our fullest human potentialities in the absence of God.[2]

Because Skinner is adamant that all right-minded people are atheist, it is obvious that he is dismissing Taylor's work as unimportant.[3] However, Skinner's interpretation of Sources is skewed from the start. Although Taylor is a believer, he is not saying that we must all return to a theistic source to realize our fullest potential; rather, he is calling for an accounting or an articulation of the moral sources of the self, which are constitutive goods that may or may not be defined theistically. This thesis will demonstrate that Taylor's work is important, even if not true. In other words, whether or not one shares Taylor's personal belief in God, or accepts his history of modern identity, his work nevertheless opens up lines of thought and discussion crucial for our age. To dismiss it in the glib manner demonstrated above, reflects an uncritical instrumentalist stance towards the world--the very position that Taylor is arguing against in Sources. Before fleshing out the thesis statement, some background is in order. What

follows is a selective summary of Taylor's opera, an outline of Sources, a sampling of some of the criticisms of his work, and, finally, the full thesis statement.

I

Charles Taylor obtained his doctorate at Oxford University in 1961, having studied under Isaiah Berlin. He has since been teaching at McGill University in Montreal. Between 1976-1981, he held the prestigious position of Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford. He has also been a visiting professor at many universities. As a member of the New Democratic Pary, he has been engaged in Canadian politics, and remains an active participant in debates surrounding the future of Quebec and Canada. He is also a major voice in the long-standing Liberal-Communitarian debate.

Taylor has written and published voluminously in the areas of philosophy and political theory, but, in one sense, his life's work is easy to describe, because he only has one project. He approaches it from many different angles, but the purpose is more or less the same. He is promoting the importance, the worth, and the necessity of the common good, albeit pluralities of common goods which reflect particular communities in all their variety. In another sense, his work is remarkably difficult to describe, because Taylor has had to go to extraordinary lengths and complexities to be heard. It would appear that the common good is uncommonly difficult to promote in an age marked by individual

freedom and autonomy, and by a neutral liberalism designed to protect these atomized goods while at the same time prescribing the same generalized formula for everyone.

The publications of Charles Taylor which inform this thesis are: Hegel and Modern Society (1979),[4] which is Taylor's contribution, along with his Hegel (1975), to the rehabilitation of Hegel, and the introduction of this German thinker to Anglo-American society; Philosophical Papers, I: Human Agency and Language (1985)[5] in which he works out his constitutive theory of language, a pivotal idea in Sources; Philosophical Papers, II: Philosophy and the Human Sciences (1985)[6] where it is argued that scientific naturalism is an inadequate model for philosophy, another major theme in Sources; his magnum opus, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (1989)[7]; The Malaise of Modernity (1991)[8], originally a series of radio broadcasts on CBC's "Ideas," which presents a condensed version of many themes found in Sources; Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, (1992)[9] an essay arguing for the necessity of a pluralist vision of liberalism in a multicultural society, followed by criticisms by Jurgen Habermas, Susan Wolf, Steven Rockefeller, Michael Walzer, and K. Anthony Appiah; Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism (1993)[10], which is a compilation of his essays regarding Quebec nationalism within the mosaic of Canada, most of which contains the argument that Canada cannot follow the atomistic liberalism of the United States; and Philosophical Arguments (1995)[11], a collection of essays,

which can be seen, in part, as a response to the many critics of Sources. In this last book, there are four essays which Taylor says can be considered as a continuation of Sources: "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate;" "Invoking Civil Society;" "The Politics of Recognition;" and "Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere." It is here that Taylor's promotion of the common good is grounded in a particular political vision--communitarian liberalism--as opposed to a particular philosophical theory, or history, of the good. This thesis will focus primary on Sources and these four essays. References will be made to his other publications, but they will be secondary.

II

In Sources of the Self, Taylor argues that there are three major facets of modern identity: 1) a sense of inwardness, which he traces from Saint Augustine of Hippo to the present; 2) the affirmation of ordinary life, which, since the Reformation, has been replacing the value of 'the good life' in the forms of the warrior hero, the Citizen and the contemplative; 3) and an expressivist notion of nature originating in the late eighteenth century, and continuing in modern versions up to the present time.

Sources is divided into five parts. Part One, "Identity and the Good," makes the connection between the self and morality. For Taylor, the self is morally defined. In a key sentence, he claims that "we are only selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation

to the good."[12] He justifies this claim by appealing to the intuition we have that human life is to be respected:

> If you want to discriminate more finely what it is about human beings that makes them worthy of respect, you have to call to mind what it is to feel the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about injustice, or the awe you feel at the fact of human life.[13]

'How do we account for this awe?' and 'why should we account for it?' are two questions that are central to Sources. That we feel awe, respect and compassion for fellow humans indicates to Taylor that humans are by nature oriented to the good. As noted by Isaiah Berlin, "Taylor believes in essences."[14]

Connected to the moral self, is the necessity of frameworks, or horizons of significance. Taylor claims that it is impossible to live outside of frameworks.

> To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what is not, what has meaning and importance for you, and what is trivial and secondary.[15]

The people around us also make up this framework. "One is a self only among other selves," and "there is no way we could be inducted into personhood except by being initiated into a language."[16] This ties back to his theory of language which is explicated in full in Philosophical Papers I. Language is constitutive; it makes us who we are, and creates that public space where we can engage with each other, not as atomistic selves communicating with other atomistic selves, but as a community engaging in a conversation that represents "common action."[17]

Stemming from this theory of language, is the belief that goods only exist

through articulation. Countering the natural science models, or naturalism, which cannot account for things like the good because it is not objective, Taylor insists that the good is as real and objective as anything else in the world; however it must be articulated or else the language of the good will wither. He claims that a humanities theory must be able to account for goods such as dignity, respect, and other intangibles which define the human condition. Even though a definitive account cannot be given, Taylor says that we must give our "Best Account," which he calls the B.A. principle. A theory which does not have a B.A. to account for constitutive goods is seriously flawed and promotes "an ethics of inarticulacy."[18]

Part One begins to weave an argument that is patiently threaded throughout the book (including the last four chapters of Philosophical Arguments) to the effect that the moral sources of the self, if articulated, create the necessary conditions for a society united around common goods and goals; in other words, for a communitarian liberalism. Our sense of the good, or moral sources, constitute the self, and in a language shared with others, this sense constitutes the society in which we live.[19] Not only do we need an orientation to the good, "of the incomparably higher," but we must also understand ourselves in a narrative, in the form of a "quest."[20] "In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going."[21] Sources is an attempt to articulate this narrative.

In another criticism of naturalism, Taylor distinguishes between

substantive and procedural reasoning. Modernity is plagued with too much of the latter, and not enough of the former. Procedural reasoning focusses on the process, whereas substantive reasoning focusses on the underlying right. The process of how to get to what is right is secondary. Taylor explains:

> I call a notion of reason substantive where we judge the rationality of agents or their thoughts and feelings in substantive terms. This means that the criterion for rationality is that one get it right....By contrast, a procedural notion breaks this connection. The rationality of an agent or his thought is judged by how he thinks, not in the first instance by whether the outcome is substantively correct. Good thinking is defined procedurally.[22]

This later ties into his argument against procedural liberalism.[23]

Part Two of Sources, "Inwardness," traces the self's inward turn. Whereas the ancient self looked outwards to find the moral source, or the higher good, either to God, or to the Platonic forms, or to nature, the modern self turns inward. This inward turn began with Augustine and was further entrenched by Descartes, Montaigne and Kant. Taylor says that, while it is inevitable that the modern self turns inward, what has been lost is the fact that the self is situated in a space of moral issues.[24]

In modernity, the inward turn takes on a radical reflexivity. In Taylor's narrative, Montaigne is the exemplar of this idea. Taylor demonstrates that Montaigne and Descartes represent a split in the development of the modern self. Whereas Montaigne looks to the self in its particularity, Descartes looks to the self in its generality. Cartesian thought

> requires him to build an order of thought for himself, in the first

> person singular. But he must do so following universal criteria: he reasons as anyone and everyone. Montaigne is an originator of the search for each person's originality.[25]

Taylor then traces this split in the self's inner nature throughout the Enlightenment and the Romantic Era.[26]

By the turn of the eighteenth century, individualism was three-sided, marked by self-responsible independence, recognized particularity, and personal commitment. The modern inward turn reflected the new ideas of self-responsibility, self-control, freedom, reason, and dignity.[27] It was a time that saw the decline of "magical practices," even in Catholicism,[28] and a corresponding rise in atomism and rights theory, particularly in the social contract theories of Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke.[29]

Part Three, "The Affirmation of Ordinary Life," traces the shift from the valuing of the good life to a valuing of so-called ordinary life of production and reproduction. In a sense, it is the story of the Catholic-Protestant divide. Taylor explains it as a shift away from the Catholic idea that everyone is in a common ship--the "ecclesial ship on its journey to God," to the Protestant idea that everybody is rowing their own boat.[30] The Protestants rejected priesthood in favour of the priesthood of all believers, therefore personal commitment became total. They rejected the special vocation of the monastic life, and affirmed the value of lay life. With this affirmation of ordinary life came an instrumental stance toward the world, which created a hospitable ground for scientific advancement.[31]

With the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries comes a valuation of commerce, the rise of the novel, a new focus on marriage and family life, and a new sentiment and growing feeling for nature, as well as a surge in Deism. Taylor explains that Deism, the idea that God made the world and has had a hands-off policy ever since, has suppressed the role of grace. "The good that God wills comes more and more to centre on natural good alone."[32]

In Part Four, "The Voice of Nature," Taylor demonstrates this increasing sentiment for nature that finds its expression in Romanticism, and explains how nature becomes another moral source among alternatives. The moral horizon becomes increasingly fractured. Where there was once only the theistic moral source, God, there is now the Cartesian-Kantian disengaged reason and nature itself.

Taylor tells the story of the utilitarian and atomist philosophy of the Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction to it. The disengagement of the Enlightenment was perceived to create barriers between humans and nature, as well as schisms within humans themselves between their head and their heart.[33] Romanticism was a reaction to heed the inner voice of the heart.

> This notion of an inner voice or impulse, the idea that we find the truth within us, and in particular in our feelings--these were the crucial concepts of the Romantic rebellion....[34]

Romanticism countered atomism with ideas of holism, and communal living to bring "us back in contact with nature, healing the divisions within between reason and sensibility, overcoming the divisions between people, and creating

community. These aspirations are still alive."[35] This is the same idea expressed in Hegel and Modernity, where Taylor demonstrates that Hegel's work speaks to our problems today because Hegel tries to reconcile instrumental reason and human unity with nature. This idea is indicative of Taylor's exercise of retrieval. He wants to make the point that we need to take an historical inventory of our moral sources so that we can see where we have been so that we can see where we are. He believes that such a retrieval can illuminate, and possibly alleviate, the present human condition.[36]

Connected to Romanticism is the "expressivist turn" which stems from nature as a moral source:

> If our access to nature is through an inner voice or impulse, then we can only fully know this nature through articulating what we find within us. This connects to another crucial feature of this new philosophy of nature, the idea that its realization in each of us is also a form of expression.[37]

He calls this view "expressivism," and "it is art which comes to fill this niche."[38] Art no longer mirrors or imitates reality, instead art expresses reality.

Part Five of Sources, "Subtler Languages," delves into literary theory to illustrate that art issues from or realizes an epiphany. Art becomes

> the locus of a manifestation which brings us into the presence of something which is otherwise inaccessible, and which is of the highest moral or spiritual significance; a manifestation, moreover, which also defines or completes something, even as it reveals.[39]

In other words, art brings about epiphanies. This has been an understanding of art since the Romantic era.[40] He then demonstrates with an insightful discussion

of various authors, including Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, that art (literature, in this case) can be a constitutive good, or moral source:

> In the case of Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche, the change [in stance towards the self and the world] involves something like the recognition of reality as good, but this at the same time helps to bring about this goodness. Accepting to be part of the world contributes to healing it for Dostoyevsky; affirming the will to power carries the will to a higher potency for Nietzsche. As in Genesis, seeing good makes good.[41]

If literature can be a way of seeing good, then it functions as a moral source.[42]

In the conclusion, Chapter 25, Taylor says that we, like our Romantic predecessors, are still trying to counter "disengaged and instrumental modes of thought and action which have steadily increased their hold on modern life."[43] Like the Romantics, we "search for sources which can restore depth, richness and meaning to life."[44]

Taylor gives weight to the three moral sources that emerge in his exercise of retrieval: the original theistic grounding; the naturalism of disengaged reason; and Romantic expressivism or "one of the modernist successor visions."[45]

> What emerges from the picture of the modern identity as it develops over time is not only the central place of constitutive goods in moral life,...but also the diversity of goods for which a valid claim can be made. The goods may be in conflict, but for all that they don't refute each other.[46]

Contrary to Skinner's interpretation of Sources, Taylor is not promoting the theistic position above all. Rather, Taylor is saying that it is damaging to the human condition to cling to one source to the exclusion of all others. The moral

source then becomes too narrow, and the human identity atrophies, because "various repudiations and denials are not just intellectual errors. They are also modes of self-stultification, if an acknowledgement of the good can empower."[47] All the constitutive goods impact on us, and to deny them in favour of disengaged reason or instrumentalism "involves a massive blindness."[48]

Taylor ends Sources by anticipating his critics who will say that articulating the good in the public realm leads to destruction and mutilation. He responds that he has "a large element of hope" that such mutilation is not an iron fate.

> It is a hope that I see implicit in Judaeo-Christian theism (however terrible the record of its adherents in history),and in its central promise of a divine affirmation of the human, more total than humans can ever attain unaided.[49]

It must be noted, however, that Taylor is not promoting this particular theism; rather, he is calling for an accounting, or an articulation, of the love, benevolence and charity that he sees stemming from it.

Taken as a whole, Sources can be viewed as a theory of the good, a good which is real, objective, and 'out there.' It is a "thick theory" as opposed to Rawls' self-described "thin theory of the good." It is not an individual good that changes with circumstance or desire. Similarly, it is not a metanorm in the Habermasian sense, because Taylor's metanorm is not dialogical. It does not change with democratic consensus. Taylor's good is existential--a certitude waiting to be found.

The bottom line for Taylor is that the good must be articulated, because,

although the constitutive good is not dialogical, the self is constituted dialogically. If our language articulates certain goods, these goods become part of our potentiality. But if this language of the good is not articulated, it will wither from lack of use, and that part of us will die.

Taylor despairs of modern philosophy, because, for the most part, it refuses to articulate this language of the good. It is, in Taylor's view, coopted by naturalism, the application of natural science methodology to the human condition.[50] In this paradigm, there is no room to articulate the good, because it is not tangible, not objective. Taylor argues that goods are objective. We create goods through language. For example, we talk about dignity, human rights, love, charity, benevolence, and the reduction of suffering, and hence these goods exist. If we cannot articulate the source of these life-goods, then, according to Taylor, we are living beyond our moral means. There will be nothing to sustain these values. George Scialabba, in his review of Sources, explains:

> Taylor objects that naturalism's methodological restrictions have impoverished philosophy and social theory, and thereby public life. Neutralism about values inevitably slides over into subjectivism, the glib dismissal of all values as "fictitious" or relativism, the equally mindless acceptance of all values as equally valid and beyond rational adjudication. Individualism slides into atomism, the denial that some common good, over and above the goals of individuals or aggregates, may rightly command a person's loyalty, even obedience.[51]

Furthermore, Taylor argues that one must be able to account for those transcendental moments and epiphanies that he believes we all experience from time to time when "we are carried away by rapture and may believe ourselves

spoken to by angels...."[52] Natural science methodologies will not suffice, because they cannot capture, or account for, the complexity and mystery of the human condition.

What is required is our Best Account. Taylor's Best Account includes a loving God, although he is quite clear (contrary to Skinner's reading) that God does not have to be included in one's Best Account, as long as the B.A. includes a constitutive good, "the love of which empowers us to do and be good."[53] A higher good must also be able to "command our awe."[54] Taylor's hypergoods "not only are incomparably more important than others but provide a standpoint from which these [life-goods] must be weighed, judged, decided about."[55] It can thus be inferred that the higher, constitutive good in one's Best Account need not be God.

III

The argument against Taylor's thick articulation of the good rests upon the liberal principle of neutrality regarding the good life. The higher goods cannot be articulated because they will be different for different people and will conflict. Instead, a 'thin' theory of the good, such as Rawls', articulates life goods such as "rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth."[56] A thick theory is not articulated because, according to Rawls, such an articulation implies an imposition of goods, and this would lead to conflicts that would hinder individuals in pursuing the good life of their choice and thus limit their freedom

and autonomy.[57]

Taylor has been an active participant in the debate between neutral and communitarian liberals. Arguing on the side of communitarianism, Taylor's arguments and rebuttals seem to be particularly directed toward the American liberal theorists, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.[58] He insists that, although neutral liberalism may be best suited for the United States where it evolved, it is not necessarily the best model for other countries, particularly one as multicultural as Canada. Canada requires a liberalism which will accommodate different ways of living for different nations within the country, specifically French and Aboriginal. This requires articulations of common goods and goals and an acceptance of different accommodations for the various nations within the federation; in other words, there must be a community oriented liberalism that can protect the particularities of culture and language. A neutral liberalism cannot offer such protection, because it cannot promote the common good.

Sources has provided added fuel to the liberal debate. In a number of book reviews and general reviews of his philosophy, Taylor's critics attempt to correct his allegedly flawed conception of liberalism, as if all that Taylor needs is a better understanding of Grotius and Kant. For example, Richard Tuck says that Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf and Locke theorized in terms of rights, not because they thought that "rights are the only form in which a moral language can be cast," but that they are "the only means whereby in practice different cultures can negotiate a modus vivendi which allows their other values to be

preserved and respected--that is, their overall aim was much closer to Taylor's own programme than he has allowed."[59] J. B. Schneewind's criticism is similar:

> [Taylor] provides no sustained treatment of modern natural-law theory, the work of writers from Grotius through Kant who tried to develop explanations of morality showing how people could live together despite deep disagreements about the good. Whether reductionists or not, they thought they could construct viable programs for social life precisely by ignoring the issues Taylor takes as central.[60]

In a similar vein, Will Kymlicka, refers to Rawls thin theory of the good, in an attempt to discredit Taylor's argument for a thick theory:

> ...the strategy adopted by most modern moral theorists is not to come up with lists of substantive goods, but rather to think about what we might call 'discovery procedures"--i.e. about what sorts of social conditions are best suited to enabling individuals to make these judgments on an on-going basis....Although Rawls himself does not try to make judgements regarding the relative worth of particular ways of life, he leaves conceptual room for these qualitative distinctions about the good by describing the conditions under which these judgments can be made in a free and informed manner.[61]

But Taylor is saying that this "conceptual room" will dry up eventually, because it is the language of the good, and the articulation of it, which creates this very space. Stop talking about the higher good, and this space will vanish. Furthermore, if a community does not have common higher goods, what will unite that community? Taylor believes that a community must be united around certain higher goods so that it may be able to understand itself as a community, to give a sense of belonging to the populace, to be able to combat such things as mindless bureaucratization, and the inhumanity of the capitalist Machine,[62]

and to give a sense of meaning and purpose to those within the community.

The sense of meaning, or the lack of it, opens up another criticism of Sources. Skinner suggests that Taylor's fear of the loss of meaning, "a fear he appears to experience almost as a phobia," could be explained in terms of Marxist alienation, rather than a loss of meaning.[63] He complains that Taylor does not give enough space to Marxist theory. However, it is more probable that it is Skinner's fear of theology which causes him to displace Taylor's fear.

Like many of Taylors critics, Skinner is disturbed by Taylor's theological leanings. He claims that Taylor does not understand the depth and spread of unbelief in general society. Skinner is quite convinced that belief in God has gone the way of the dinosaur, (this despite the fact that recent polls have Canadian atheists at a whopping 2% of the population,[64]) and that the few remaining believers are "unintelligible," "grossly irrational," and "must be suffering from some serious form of psychological blockage or self-deceit."[65] To make his point regarding the waning of faith, he quotes from a novel about lapsed Catholicism:

> Dennis continued going to mass, for the sake of the family, for the sake of a quiet life, but it had no meaning for him. Nothing had, except small, simple pleasures--a glass of beer at the local, a soccer game on TV--handholds by which he kept moving from hour to hour, from day to day.[66]

However, this quote could demonstrate, not just the demise of faith and meaning, but the very necessity of it. Dennis is starved for meaning, the kind that inspires awe, and, while it is possible that Dennis will sink deeper into

depression, or that he may stoically bear it, it is also possible that he will turn to something--anything--to find a deeper meaning. He may fall prey to something far more insidious than a higher good.

Dennis is suffering, and Skinner's response is, "Sorry, that's the way it is." Taylor, on the other hand, holds out hope that something can be offered to relieve this modern malaise.

In an instance of All-knowing, Skinner insists that Taylor has never suffered the depressing experience of Dennis, "as his passing references to 'complacent agnostics' make painfully clear."[67] Actually, it is more likely the case that it is Taylor's acute awareness of such depression brought on by the thinness of meaning that steeled him to write a book of such immense compassion for his fellow man.

Skinner is not the only critic of Taylor's theism. Richard Rorty says that he sees no point in looking beyond the self for moral sources, and besides, "moral life is a series of compromises."[68] Like Skinner, Rorty thinks that Taylor fails to see that the good that has emerged in modernity is due to happenstance. The good is contingent.[69]

There seems to be a general distrust of Taylor's theism, mostly because, like Skinner, they mistakenly believe that Taylor is promoting God above all other constitutive goods. Allen Wood sums up the trend:

> Taylor is right that the spirit is stifled whenever the articulation of ethical truth is suppressed; but the human spirit is equally smothered when it piously accepts venerable folk wisdom that

> critical reason might expose as a system of pernicious lies. If we are too hasty to drink from old moral sources, we may find ourselves ingesting polluted water.[70]

This caricature of Taylor's message reflects not only the suspicions between theist and atheists, but between Catholics and Protestants. Charles Larmore, summing up his own criticisms of Taylor's theism, says it best:

> the more God is seen to be transcendent and idolatry rejected, the more the world itself must be understood in its own terms. If this is so, then in wanting to anchor the moral good in God, Taylor may be pushing against an inner logic of his own faith. Perhaps this is a point at which Catholic and Protestant views divide.[71]

If Taylor is pushing against "the logic" of any faith, it is not his own: it is Protestantism, atheism, and naturalism.

Another concern among many scholars is Taylor's alleged affirmation of ordinary life, which raises feminist critiques from Skinner and Jean Bethke Elshtain. Skinner thinks that by affirming ordinary life, Taylor is eliding feminist concerns about the patriarchal structure of the family:

> Although the ideology of liberalism has always proclaimed the values of freedom and equality, liberal societies have always been underpinned by a sexual contract in which these ideals have been systematically violated.[72]

Elshtain says that Taylor does not consider the new reproductive technology, which "occludes a horizon of meaning and intelligibility of the sort that Taylor believes we can and must retrieve."[73] Actually, Taylor is not affirming the affirmation of ordinary life as wholeheartedly as these critics believe. This subject will be taken up again in Chapter Three.

This selection of criticisms is not meant to be exhaustive, but in order to survey the lay of the land, it would be remiss not to mention the following lines of critique: Taylor is criticised by Skinner and Mario Moussa for his use of the allegedly all-inclusive "we"[74]; by Skinner, Russell Hittinger,[75] Charles Larmore and Susan James[76] for his questionable understanding of history and interpretation of various theorists; by Clifford Geertz and George Scialabba for his alleged heavy handed treatment of natural science[77]; by Daniel Weinstock for his theory of moral agency, and for raising "the entry conditions to personhood to an impossibly high level[78]; by Mette Hjort for his selective literary theory, accusing him of rejecting art "contaminated by interest and poor taste"[79]; by Skinner for his Eurocentrism[80]; and by Skinner, Elshtain, and Shklar for his optimism and for "dwelling on the sunny side of the street."[81] They all make their point.

V

Reference to a few of the more interesting criticisms noted above will be made throughout this text; however, this thesis will explore another avenue. Many of Taylor's critics imply that his call for an articulation of the good necessitates some kind of imposition of that good: that his liberal theory harbours shades of authoritarianism. This charge, however, is never fully articulated. Instead, his critics get bogged down in minutiae, or they prefer the safer waters of trendy and politically correct criticism, or, worse, they dismiss Taylor's

philosophy entirely in a fit of intolerant atheism or anti-Catholic vitriol. But if one is to actually contend with the philosophy of Charles Taylor, then it is imperative to establish whether or not there is a ground upon which his liberal sensibilities are not subsumed under a soft dictatorship of the good. Discrediting Shklar's assertion that Taylor is walking "on the sunny side of the street," this thesis will explore the underside of Taylor's philosophy.

Taylor's work is important, because it exposes, intentionally or not, the dangers of strong evaluations as well as the dangers of an atomistic relativism in the form of procedural, or neutral, liberalism. He demonstrates that life is dangerous and politics is dangerous and that only when this danger is acknowledged can there by any hope of diffusing it. Taylor's philosophy exposes harsh political distinctions, not unlike the way the philosophy of Carl Schmitt does. At the same time Taylor attempts to retain the sense of justice, equality and democracy that is at the heart of liberalism, be it Rawlsian or communitarian. In his search for a language of the good, Taylor is taking a moderate position between the extremes of Schmitt, who wants to abandon liberalism altogether, and Rawls et. al., who would cling to a strictly neutral and procedural liberalism. In doing so, Taylor opens up critical avenues of discussion that have been effectively shut down by both Schmittian and Rawlsian positions.

It is already established by Taylor's work that he is concerned with the same issues as those in the Rawlsian camp--justice, democracy, equality, freedom, and so forth. But there are also issues in Taylor's opera that parallel

Schmitt's. Both Schmitt and Taylor discuss or imply the same political distinctions and exclusions: the theological realm versus the secular; the affirmation of ordinary life versus the good life; freedom versus order; equal versus unequal; and friend versus enemy. They also discuss or invoke the same socio-political issues: the recognition that the self must have a framework, an ordered space, a moral source; the definition of humanity; decisionism and the exceptional case; the order of protection and obedience; and the exclusion of divine intervention, the miracle, and the grace of God in the theological-political realm.

The differences between Taylor and Schmitt are equally important. Known for his sharp, succinct writing style, Schmitt is reminiscent of Machiavelli in that there are no "rounded periods" in his work. He writes as the law professor that he is, weaving a seemingly air-tight, unambiguous argument. His essays come in slim volumes. Taylor, on the other hand, buries his messages in layers of historic and philosophic cushioning. In style, he writes unlike Machiavelli, but he has absorbed Machiavelli's message to a much greater degree than Schmitt has. By avoiding the hard issues that he himself exposes (the political distinctions that will be the focus of this paper) and by giving appearances that may have little basis in reality (Skinner's position), Taylor has surpassed the Master in Machiavellian moves. But more importantly, Taylor captures the 'Catholic' essence of Machiavelli--rhetorical, poetic, passionate, seemingly schizophrenic, and ambiguous. It is this comfort within ambiguity which prevents

Taylor from turning differences into gulfs that cannot be crossed--a lesson which Schmitt never learned.

Schmitt wrote three essays in the 1920's: Political Theology[82], Concept of the Political,[83] and On the Contradiction Between Parliamentarism and Democracy.[84] The following three chapters--"Theology," "Political Concepts and Distinctions," and "Liberalism," will loosely follow the arguments in Schmitt's essays in an attempt to expose, by way of a foil, the Schmittian distinctions embedded in Sources.

The argument presented here is that Taylor's philosophy, while adopting Schmittian distinctions, carries within it the potential of transcending the authoritarianism favoured by Schmitt. Nevertheless, many troubling aspects of Taylor's distinctions remain to be discussed by serious scholars who do not fear discussion with those who occasionally believe themselves spoken to by Angels.

Chapter 2 - Theology

> When these men who affirm the solidarity of humanity deny the solidarity of religion, they affirm the effect and deny the cause....It only proves that man always remains subject to faith, and that when he seems to reject its teachings in order to follow his own reason, he only abandons that faith which is divinely mysterious in order to embrace what is mysteriously absurd.
>
> Don Juan Donoso Cortes, c.1854[85]

A number of Taylor's critics find the theological tone in Sources disturbing. This is not surprising given that God has been dead in academia for quite some time. This chapter will explore Taylor's theistic premise to determine if the disturbance is justified. The topic is divided into three general areas: 1) the assertion that the original theistic moral source underpins all modern sources; 2) the Catholic theology which underpins Taylor's general philosophy and political theory; and 3) the connection between Taylor's appeal for an articulation of the good and Carl Schmitt's appeal to articulate 'the exceptional case' and its relation to theology and sovereignty. An examination of these three areas will show that Taylor is more theologically ambiguous that some of his critics allow. This ambiguity prevents his philosophy from becoming untenable in a liberal world.

I

In 1923, Schmitt wrote an essay, Political Theology, in which he argued

that all political theory is based on some form of theology, and all current political arrangements and identity reflect the current theology.

> The metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world has the same structure as what the world immediately understands to be appropriate as a form of its political organization. The determination of such an identity is the sociology of the concept of sovereignty.[86]

Extrapolating from this, he indicates that, if the underlying theology leans toward the Catholic, then the form of government is more authoritarian, favouring order and obedience over freedom and autonomy, as well as monarchy or dictatorship over democracy.[87] Both the theology and the politics are grounded in the medieval order of protection and obedience. This is a relationship of vassal and lord, patron and client: it is about the hierarchical chain of being and knowing one's place in it. On the other hand, if the underlying theology is one that developed after the Reformation--Protestantism, Deism, or even atheism--then more liberal notions of individual freedom, autonomy, equality and democracy will prevail.

According to Schmitt, all political theory rests upon theology, not only historically but also sociologically:

> All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development--in which they were transferred from theology to theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver--but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts.[88]

Taylor would not disagree. For him, theology cannot be discounted in any

accounting of the human condition, political or otherwise.

In Sources, Taylor presents a detailed history of moral sources of the self to support the idea that theology underpins our understanding of modern identity: "To understand our moral world we have to see not only what ideas and pictures underlie our sense of respect for others but also those which underpin our notions of a full life."[89] These ideas and pictures are theistic ones; however, one does not have to be a believer to recognize the connection.

Schmitt does not hesitate to make this connection in the political realm. He concurs with the Spanish philosopher, Donoso Cortes, who

> saw that the moral vanished with the theological, the political idea with the moral, and all moral and political decisions are thus paralyzed in a paradisiacal worldliness of immediate natural life and unproblematic concreteness.[90]

Thus for both Schmitt and Taylor there is no clear distinction between secularism and theology. Theology, morality and political life are interdependent, if not on the surface, then just below it.

Taylor argues that the secular and the spiritual are dependent on each other:

> It may appear...that religious groups have been forced to take on board bits of the secular humanist culture to survive. But secular humanism also has its roots in Judeao-Christian faith; it arises from a mutation out of a form of that faith. The question can be put, whether this is more than a matter of historical origin, whether it doesn't also reflect a continuing dependence. This is one of the issues I want to take up in what follows. My belief...is that is does.[91]

Like Schmitt, Taylor is saying that theology underpins the modern identity, both

socially and politically. To occlude theology in philosophy or political theory is to engage in a form of self-mutilation. In an age of secularism, many of Taylor's critics balk at the prominent place Taylor gives to theology; however, one does not have to be a believer to accept his position--only to recognize the role that theology has played, and continues to play, in the making of modern identity.

Taylor's theistic project seems to be the opposite of Machiavelli's. Machiavelli argued for separate moralities in the private and the political spheres. Taylor now argues for the opposite--an articulation of Judeao-Christian morality, specificually charity, benevolence and love, in the political realm. Can he be serious? He is serious and explicit:

> It will be my claim that there is a great deal of motivated suppression of moral ontology among our contemporaries, in part because the pluralist nature of modern society makes it easier to live that way, but also because of the great weight of modern epistemology...and, behind this, of the spiritual outlook associated with this epistemology. So the work I am embarked upon here could be called in large degree an essay in retrieval.[92]

Like Schmitt, Taylor notes that the "spiritual outlook" affects the way in which we understand the world.

Recognizing the problems inherent in an articulated moral ontology, Taylor acknowledges that many crimes against humanity have been committed in the name of religion; however,

> adopting a stripped-down secular outlook, without any religious dimension or radical hope in history, is not a way of <u>avoiding</u> the dilemma....It doesn't avoid it, because this too involves 'mutilation.' It involves stifling the response in us to some of the deepest and most powerful spiritual aspirations that humans have conceived.

This, too, is a heavy price to pay.[93]

This is Taylor's essentialist positition. Humans have a spiritual nature; therefore, a theory or philosophy which does not account for this spiritualism is flawed. However, when Taylor calls for a "religious dimension or radical hope," he is not promoting religious faith per se; rather, he is searching for a means to recognize and articulate what he believes to be the spiritual nature of man.

Taylor defines the self in terms of its moral sources, because he is looking for "articulacy about the good." He asks, "what is the point of articulacy about the good?" And he answers that goods "only exist for us through some articulation."[94] In other words, if we cannot articulate the source of our good, then that good will wither. Articulacy "will open us to our moral sources, to release their force in our lives."[95]

He despairs of the modern philosophy that has adopted naturalism, because naturalist, relativist, and scientific explanations are "ethics of inarticulacy" when they speak of life goods--justice, freedom, equality, and so forth--without acknowledging the source of those goods.

Although it is clear throughout Sources that Taylor himself believes that the theistic moral source is superior, a careful reading gives equal assurance that such a belief is not a requirement for taking Taylor's philosophy seriously. Taylor's list of viable constitutive goods includes God, Plato's Idea of the Good, Kant's rational agency, and "a form of human life which consists precisely in facing a disenchanted universe with courage and lucidity."[96] But in modern

philosophy, even the non-theistic constitutive goods usually remain "the great unsaid."[97]

Taylor recognizes multiple constitutive goods, but, on the other hand, he demonstrates the difficulty with the existence of alternatives:

> We might say that all positions are problematized by the fact that they exist in a field of alternatives. But whereas faith is questioned as to its truth, dignity and nature are also called into question in respect of their adequacy if true. The nagging question for modern theism is simply: Is there really a God? The threat at the margin of modern non-theistic humanism is: So what?[98]

The problem with non-theist alternatives is that they claim to be morally based, but there is no source for that morality, unless one connects them to the theistic foundation. That is to say, they stem from the theistic foundation, and owe their morality to that foundation, even if the claim is atheism. "Even where the theology is lost, the story marches on."[99] Taylor illustrates his difficulty with non-theistic moral sources, beginning with a gentle criticism of disengaged reason.

> Descartes' ethic...calls for disengagement from the world and body and the assumption of an instrumental stance towards them. It is of the essence of reason, both speculative and practical, that it push us to disengage...Just as correct knowledge doesn't come anymore from our opening ourselves to the order of (ontic) Ideas but from our constructing an order of (intra-mental) ideas according to the canons of evidence; so when the hegemony of reason becomes rational control, it is no longer understood as our being attuned to the order of things we find in the cosmos, but rather as our life shaped by the order which we construct according to the demands of reason's dominance....[100]

For Plato reason is found, but for Descartes, reason is made.

Disengaged reason has been claimed as a moral source, in various

guises, since Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum." However, as Pope John Paul II has recently declared, it is not cogito ergo sum, but the other way around--"Sum ergo cogito"--I am, therefore I think.[101] This reflects the basic philosophy of Donoso Cortes, Schmitt, and Taylor. Subjectivity precedes thought, theology precedes theory, and, as Donoso Cortes clarifies, "truth is derived from faith and science from truth."[102] In other words, there is a moral ontology--a goodness which is real, and which philosophy and science should acknowledge. Taylor says that

> it is an unjustified leap to say that [right and good] therefore are not as real, objective and non-relative as any other part of the natural world. The temptation to make this leap comes partly from the great hold of natural science models on our entire enterprise of self-understanding in the sciences of human life.[103]

It is this belief in ontological goodness--a goodness that is external to the self--which is a stumbling block for some of Taylor's critics. But even if one does not possess this faith in ontology, there is still the possibility of acknowledging the theological contribution to constitutive and life goods.

Similar to disengaged reason, the other non-theistic constitutive goods are also lacking: nature becomes "the prime moral source, without its Author;"[104] the affirmation of ordinary life has "engendered a suspicion of the claims made on behalf of 'higher' modes of life against the 'ordinary' goals of activities that humans engage in;"[105] and regarding Deism, "the place of mystery in this religion shrinks to the vanishing point," and "more fundamentally, the place for grace tends to disappear."[106] Taylor is willing to give such non-theistic constitutive goods their due, but what he really wants is a philosophy which can

accommodate things such as mystery and grace; in other words, he is looking for a 'Catholic' element in philosophy.

II

In addition to Taylor's argument that the original theistic moral source underpins all other sources, there is another theistic aspect in his work. The philosophy presented in Sources is Catholic philosopy, or to put it another way, his arguments are couched in specifically Catholic terms. Some may balk at this suggestion that Sources is a Catholic philosophy. They may say that it is a philosophy which rests upon a Judeao-Christian theology without denominational requisites, but this is not the case.

Taylor's philosophy was not produced in a vacuum, but stems from his Catholic culture. One does not have to be a practicing Catholic, or even a believer, to appreciate this line of thought, because 'Catholic,' in this Judeao-Christian sense means medieval,[107] pre-Lutheran, dialectical, ambiguous, accepting of two or more opposing ideas at once, (the Trinity is the prime example,) distinguishing between ordinary life and the good life, appealing to an hierarchical order of protection and obedience, appealing to mystery, grace and intervention by a higher good. Taylor's philosophy is Catholic in its essence, and floats in stark contrast in a sea of modern thought.

This is not to say that Taylor presents a medieval political theory. He promotes a liberal political theory in the secular realm, which is underpinned by

Protestant theology, a theology which supports the ideas of autonomy, equality, and an instrumental stance towards the world. However, he also promotes a philosophical theory of human agency and moral sources that is underpinned with Catholic theology--hierarchical, contradictory, appealing to mystery and grace. Can the two theologies mix? Is it possible to combine a modern, democratic, liberal order with the medieval order of protection and obedience? The modern Catholic church does just that. The Church--undemocratic, heirarchical and anti-liberal--promotes liberal-democratic principles in the political realm, which are more compatible with a Protestant theism. Since the Reformation, the Church has had to take on bits of Protestantism to survive. Catholics have lived with this dichotomy for generations, and Taylor's philosophy embodies it well.

A model of the polis with conflicting theologies does not lend itself to scientific principles. It would not pass any positivist testing. It is not replicable, because it lends itself to vastly differing interpretations. To accept Taylor's theory, one must be able to accept a rather large dose of ambiguity. It is a requirement that leaves many academics uncomfortable.

Taylor's definition of the self and his understanding of the nature of man stem directly from Catholic dogma. Man is by nature good, because he is created in the image of God. On the other hand, man is by nature evil, because he is tainted with Original Sin.

Adding to the idea that all political theory reflects a theological base, Carl

Schmitt argues that "every political idea in one way or another takes a position on the 'nature' of man and presupposes that he is either 'by nature good' or 'by nature evil.'"[108] For instance, he claims that liberalism, socialism, and anarchy assume that man is by nature good. Schmitt's view is shared by Donoso Cortes who caustically asks: "Since God has not said it to him, whence does he know that he is good?"[109] Monarchy and dictatorship, on the other hand, assume that man is by nature evil and, therefore, that the people must be guided.

Schmitt explains that by "evil" is meant that man is inherently dangerous, because he has the potential, or the free will, to slide from passion into evil.

> The dogma of Original Sin promulgated by the Council of Trent is not radical is any simple way. In contrast to the Lutheran understanding, the dogma asserts not absolute worthlessness but only distortion, opacity, or injury and leaves open the possibility of the natural good.[110]

As for Taylor, it is difficult to place him in regard to the nature of man. What follows will demonstrate that he stands in both camps.

If every good text has a key sentence, as Schmitt insists, then Taylor's in Sources must be this:

> [W]e are only selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation to the good.[111]

This 'good,' which he also calls the hypergood,[112] and the constitutive good, is the source of the self; more specifically, it is the "moral" source. The idea that the self is seeking and finding the good is an optimistic view of the self, or of human nature. It is an optimistic stance, because to assume that we are selves

only as we are oriented to the good, assumes that man is by nature good, and knows good when he sees it. The Catholic position on the nature of man is confusing, because Catholic theology embraces the teachings of both Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, who take quite different positions. For Augustine, man is by nature evil, because he is tainted with Original Sin and has free will.[113] Furthermore, man has no hope of knowing what leads to the good or bad unless God bestows grace upon him--a rare occurrence. Aquinas is much more optimistic and teaches that man can intuit the good.

To confuse the matter further, in Catholicism, man cannot be 'essentially' evil, because, according to Church teachings, evil does not exist. God is goodness, and all that he created was good.[114] The manifestation of evil is simply a manifestation of the good that has become disordered; i.e., evil is modal, not essential. Taylor recognizes this modality when he says that "something good becomes bad through the non-recognition of the context which gives it sense."[115] Evil equals disorder. Thus, the Catholic position on the nature of man is that he is prone to slide into evil, "a swerving of the will...away from you, O God."[116]

In the Catholic narrative, man fell into disorder with the fall from Paradise, and thus man is corrupted, tainted by Original Sin. In this condition, man cannot know what is good. What may appear to be good may be bad, and vice versa. Only the grace of God can free a man from this aggrieved state. Furthermore, grace is not found, but bestowed. This was the accepted Augustinian position

for almost one thousand years. Then, in the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas argued that man can intuit God's will and therefore be oriented to the good. If the Catholic faith were logical, Thomism would displace Augustinianism, but it does not. The two coexist as illogically and comfortably as the ideas of the oneness of God and the Trinity.

As noted by Judith Shklar, Augustine is "the hero of Taylor's genealogy," and he "hovers" over every page of Sources. But she is critical of the Augustine that Taylor invokes:

> In his emphasis on Augustine's celebration of our capacity to reach out toward perfection, Taylor seems to underestimate the overpowering sense of evil that makes The City of God so significant for contemporary readers. His Augustine is mild and hopeful, not the excoriating critic of Roman civic ideology, the lamenter of our inability to ever know enough to make judgements, and the theological geographer who put original sin in all its pride and cupidity on the moral map of Europe.[117]

While Shklar presents an interesting insight, she fails to note that Taylor has another hero of equal import--Aquinas. It is Taylor's blurring of the two theologians which makes Augustine appear mild. Typifying modern Catholic thought, ('modern' meaning post-Aquinas,) Taylor oscillates blithely between Augustine and Aquinas. He seems to align himself with Aquinas, but he has an unwritten, despairing side that mirrors Augustine, and that longs for grace. This theological fudging lends itself to Taylor's political ambiguity, but makes sorting out his philosophy somewhat confusing in these rational and scientific times.

Defining the self, Taylor takes the Thomist position, or so it seems. Man

can intuit the good. He is adamant that "orientation to the good is not some optional extra, something we can engage in or abstain from at will, but a condition of our being selves with an identity."[118] He says that "selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes."[119] He does not mean that the self aspires to the good, whether or not the good can be ascertained. He says: "we are only selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation to the good. [author's emphasis]" This is not the Augustinian position, because, according to the Bishop of Hippo, such certitude, or grace, cannot be found by the self, but must be bestowed by God.

According to Taylor, to be a modern self, a self must know what questions to ask:

> To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary.[120]

But how does the self know which questions to ask, and what if there are no answers to these questions? Would that not lead to a spiritual instability, an identity crisis? This idea that the self can have certitude just by asking the right questions, and being able to intuit the right answers, is the very Cartesian thought that Taylor wishes to discredit. On this track, Taylor will never find the grace that he seeks.

Despite his strong belief that the self is oriented to the good, and that the

self can intuit the good, Taylor believes that the destabilized self has been a problem since the time of Montaigne and Descartes, thereabouts. The unstable self, he believes, is a modern phenomenon caused by the existence of alternative moral sources rather than the sole theistic source of premodernity. In addition, it is brought about by the lack of articulation about the moral sources, and the lack of common goods in a liberal society that enforces neutrality about the goods. The fact that Taylor can view the self as simultaneously ontologically stable and unstable indicates that Taylor can believe in opposing ideas as a matter of course. Furthermore, the fact that Taylor recognizes the ontological instability of the modern self indicates that the definition he gives of the self is idealistic. The modern self is often outside of the "certain space of questions," and therefore the self is unstable, disordered, or 'by nature evil.' This is the underside of Taylor's definition of the self, the despairing Augustinian side that Shklar is looking for.[121]

Taylor poses the question: "What are the requirements of 'making sense' of our lives?"[122] The answer lies in making distinctions and building a framework. To repeat the key sentence again: "we are only selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation to the good. [author's emphasis]" To move within a certain space of questions is to speak of a certain framework.

> I want to defend the strong thesis that doing without frameworks is utterly impossible for us; otherwise put, that the horizons within which we live our lives and which make sense of them have to

> include these strong qualitative discriminations....[T]he claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood.[123]

This assertion is troubling, because those asking a different set of questions, or who fail to ask any questions at all, are obviously outside of this "certain" framework in which we can be "selves." He is making a narrow definition of what it means to be human, and by implication, what it is to be less than human. This idea will be picked up again in the next chapter.

Taylor says that "not to have a framework is to fall into a life which is spiritually senseless."[124] To be without a framework is to have no identity, and one is then unable to answer the question, "Who am I?"[125] Certainly history and literature are full of examples with Adam and Eve being the epitome of such a fall. They ate the forbidden fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, stepped outside of a "certain space of questions," and fell from the grace of certitude. In the Augustinian framework, we are all living a life which is "spiritually senseless," because we are separated from God. No doubt, however, Taylor would not want to take it that far, because that would negate his belief that we can intuit the good, which forms the basis of his optimism.

Instead, Taylor is focussed on the intensified senselessness of modernity:

> What Weber has called 'disenchantment,' the dissipation of our sense of the cosmos as a meaningful order, has allegedly destroyed the horizons in which people previously lived their spiritual lives.[126]

The word 'allegedly' implies that Taylor disagrees with Weber. We can have a meaningful order. We do not have to live spiritually senseless lives. What we need is a framework. Taylor defines a framework as "a crucial set of qualitative distinctions."

> To think, feel, judge within such a framework is to function with the sense that some action, or mode of life, or mode of feeling is incomparably higher than the others which are more readily available to us. I am using 'higher' here in a generic sense. The sense of what the difference consists in may take different forms. One form of life may be seen as fuller, another way of feeling and acting as purer, a mode of feeling or living as deeper, a style of life as more admirable, a given demand as making an absolute claim against other merely relative ones, and so on.[127]

To have a framework one must make distinctions--"an absolute claim." This implies a distinction between higher and lower, sane and insane, friend and enemy, acceptable and unacceptable. Taylor may be right, depending on the definition of "strongly qualified horizons," but, if so, there are a lot of damaged people walking about, and although ontological instability may be uncomfortable, it is not "utterly impossible."

III

Schmitt links the necessity of norms and frameworks to sovereignty and the deciding instance.

> Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a homogeneous medium....For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation

> actually exists.[128]

This is what Taylor consistently elides. Who, or what group, decides what is right and good, what are the frameworks, the horizons of significance, the norms, and the exceptions? Taylor is talking about sources of the self, but the definition of the self and human agency impacts the political realm; therefore, he is dealing with matters of sovereignty. "Sovereign is he who decides the exception," is Schmitt's most famous dictum.[129]

> Whether God alone is sovereign, that is, the one who acts as his acknowledged representative on earth, [the Pope,] or the emperor, or prince, or the people, meaning those who identify themselves directly with the people, the question is always aimed at the subject of sovereignty....[130]

This is what Taylor is addressing in a roundabout way. Who or what is the sovereign moral source of the self, and, therefore, who or what is the sovereign of the self? It is clear from Taylor's writings on liberalism that the people are sovereign, but in a multicultural society, who are the people, and for whom are they deciding?

It may be the case that sovereignty, in its pure form, is no longer interesting.[131] This makes sense to Schmitt, who sees the whole concept pushed aside by a deistic theology:

> The idea of the modern constitutional state triumphed together with deism, a theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle from the world. This theology and metaphysics rejected not only the transgression of the laws of nature through an exception brought about by direct intervention, as is found in the idea of a miracle, but also the sovereign's direct intervention in a valid legal order. The rationalism of the Enlightenment rejected the exception in every

> form.[132]

Furthermore,

> the sovereign, who in the deistic view of the world, even if conceived as residing outside the world, had remained the engineer of the great machine, has been radically pushed aside. The machine now runs by itself.[133]

But if there is no longer a sovereign in the theistic or Hobbesian sense, then who or what is steering the boat? Taylor never mentions sovereignty in Sources, but it may be what he is arguing for.[134]

In the rationalist scheme of things, according to Schmitt, a sovereign is not needed if the exceptional case can be argued away:

> It would be consequent rationalism to say that the exception proves nothing and that only the normal can be the object of scientific interest. The exception confounds the unity and order of the rationalist scheme.[135]

However, "a philosophy of concrete life must not withdraw from the exception and the extreme case, but must be interested in it to the highest degree."[136] Schmitt is preparing his argument for a return to a Hobbesian sovereign. As noted by George Schwabb, "for Schmitt the sovereign authority not only was bound to the normally valid legal order but also transcended it,"[137] and "although Schmitt was prepared to accept modern constitutional developments, he was determined to reinstate the personal element in sovereignty and make it indivisible once more."[138]

Taylor is not trying to reinstate "the personal element," but, like Schmitt, he wants something to transcend the law in the exceptional case. The good

must be articulated, because whatever falls outside of the norm, particularly in the political realm, is an exception. Exceptions require a decision based upon a previously agreed to common good. If the common good cannot be recognized in the decision, then the sovereign risks the loss of legitimacy.

Schmitt says that "it is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that is, the whole question of sovereignty."[139]

> The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception. In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition.[140]

The sovereign who decides the exceptional case must be guided by a common (higher) good, because although the exceptional case is outside the realm of the established law, it must still appear to be just.

Sovereignty may be the root of the problem that Taylor struggles with. There is no articulated common good, no underlying moral ontology, because such metanorms require a deciding instance; they require a sovereign of some sort. If no-one is interested any longer in the extreme case, in the exception, then this is a serious obstacle to the common good, because it is in just this area that a common good, or moral ontology comes into play.

What gives the sovereign (be it a person, group, or institution) legitimacy to decide in the exceptional case, if not a common understanding of the good? What establishes this good, in the first place, if not a sovereign entity, profane or divine? The examples that Taylor gives for the necessity of articulated goods,

such as universal human rights and the protection of French culture in Quebec, are situations that require a transcendence of the law for an exceptional case. In the first example, the United Nations would have to transcend national law, and in the second, Quebec would have to transcend the federal Charter of Rights. How can the law be transcended, if there is no adequate recognition of the exceptional case, and no common good to refer to? Taylor is arguing for a sovereignty of the good, a good which is informed by the theistic moral source. Without rescinding the Treaty of Westphalia, is this possible?

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the ambiguity in Taylor's theistic philosophy by examining three aspects of it. First, the original theistic moral source of the self informs all other modern sources; however, one does not have to be a believer like Taylor to accept that there are theistic underpinnings to our ideas of the good. Secondly, the theology underpinning Taylor's general philosophy is Catholic, but, like the modern Catholic Church, it incorporates an appreciation for non-Catholic goods such as autonomy and freedom. And thirdly, underneath Taylor's insistence for an articulation of the good is a connection to Schmitt's call for an articulation of the exceptional case, as well as an unarticulated appeal to a sovereignty of the good informed by the original theistic source. All three aspects demonstrate Taylor's ambiguity. It is this ambiguity which prevents his philosophy from becoming mired in Schmittian distinctions, and which keeps him on a middle course between Schmitt's preferred dictatorship and neutral liberalism.

Before going on to Taylor's concept of liberalism, Chapter Three will examine the political concepts that are latent in Sources, and which are clarified by reference to Schmitt.

Chapter 3 - Political Concepts and Distinctions

> ...there exists no philosophy and no anthropology which is not politically relevant, just as there is no philosophically irrelevant politics.
>
> Carl Schmitt[141]

In Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor calls for an articulation of the good; not only of life goods such as Rawls' "rights and liberties, opportunities and powers," but of constitutive goods. Contrary to Rawls, he is calling for a "thick" theory of the good. Such a theory would necessarily impact upon the political realm. Taylor claims that it would help to establish common goods and horizons of significance, which, in turn, would enable a community to understand itself as such. Ironically, what remains inarticulate in Taylor's allegedly "optimistic" philosophy are the political distinctions embedded in this retrieval of moral ontology.

This is not necessarily a criticism of Sources. Given Taylor's immense project, he could not cover everything, even in 600 pages. However, in the four chapters in Philosophical Arguments, which continue his project in a political framework, he still leaves the major distinctions raised in Sources inarticulate. It is this inarticulacy, or ambiguity, which is at once troubling and promising. It leaves room for misinterpretation, but also for the possibility of discussion and debate; it opens up avenues for further theoretical development.

Taylor's philosophy raises questions specifically around political concepts such as freedom, the affirmation of ordinary life, human agency, equality, belonging and Otherness. The darker side of these concepts implies political distinctions which need to be examined more closely in light of three Schmittian categories: friend and enemy; freedom and order; and protection and obedience. As in the case of Taylor's theistic premise, it will be demonstrated in this chapter that Taylor's philosophy takes a middle road which would neither embrace neutral liberal principles to the exclusion of the common good, nor would it fall into the Schmittian camp and eradicate liberalism altogether.

I

According to Carl Schmitt, the essence of 'the political' rests upon the distinction between friend and enemy.

> Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable....The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.[142]

A devout student of Hobbes, Schmitt likes his definitions to be very clear. Defining the enemy, he says:

> The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship.[143]

When brought into the political realm, Taylor's philosophy accommodates this friend-enemy distinction. Although it is not articulated as such, it is implied throughout his work. For example, there are selves that are oriented to the good, and selves that are not. There are communities who understand themselves as such, and those who do not. (It can also be assumed that communities with common goods and goals would have within them dissident individuals.) There are people who distinguish between higher and lower ways of doing and being, and those who do not, and so on. Whether Taylor is articulating the sources of the self, or defining that self, or arguing for a distinct status for Quebec, the friend-enemy distinction is there. His philosophy rests upon the necessity of such 'strong qualifications.'

Schmitt says that "the distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation."[144]

> Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is being affected, combated, refuted, or negated by such a term.[145]

This distinction is most notable in Taylor's discussions of Quebec. A common good for Quebec includes the protection of its French language and culture. Canada requires a type of liberalism that would recognize that such common goods need to supersede the individual good in specific communities, in some instances.[146]

In the modern world it will always be the case that not all those living as

> citizens under a certain jurisdiction will belong to the national group thus favoured. This by itself could be thought to involve some discrimination. But beyond this, the pursuit of the collective end will in all likelihood involve treating insiders and outsiders differently.[147]

This is why Taylor's philosophy is political, because, according to Schmitt:

> Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy.[148]

Schmitt embraces 'the other' as an essential element of the political realm:

> The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.[149]

The enemy, as such, is essential to Taylor's philosophy, and although he is not as explicit as Schmitt, he makes no apologies: "the horizons in which we live must include strong qualitative discriminations."[150] He does not shun the use of 'we' and 'us' and 'our' in his work, in part because he is making a distinction between those in a specific framework and those outside of it. He does not refer to 'them,' the altern, the internal or external enemies, but an 'us' must have a 'them.' This is not to say that all those people falling on the outside of Taylor's distinctions are "morally or aesthetically ugly," but they are 'the Other.'

Philosophers such as Taylor, Schmitt or Machiavelli are not afraid to acknowledge the existence of 'the other' in their theories. It is certainly a more honest position to take than to entertain false universalisms. What is troubling in

Taylor's work, however, is that there is little acknowledgement of the underlying possibility of violence in the friend and enemy distinction. Schmitt refers to this as the unwillingness in liberal thought to acknowledge the possibility of war:

> Liberalism in one of its typical dilemmas...of intellect and economics has attempted to transform the enemy from the viewpoint of economics into a competitor and from the intellectual point into a debating adversary.[151]

This is particularly evident in the discussions surrounding Quebec sovereignty, where anyone who suggests the possibility of civil war is alarmist. Similar to the evasion of the friend-enemy distinction, the refusal to give sufficient weight to the distinction's underlying potential for violence is, as Machiavelli tells us, a danger in itself. This evasion could also be considered Machiavellian, particularly if the philosopher thought his work would not be accepted if it focussed too much on the dangers of an articulated good.

Taylor's "strong qualifications," also raise the issues of equality and inequality. Those in the framework are equal, those outside the framework may be equal among themselves, in other categories, but they are not equal to those inside. Canadians are equal to all other Canadians; aliens on Canadian soil are not so equal. Quebec Francophones are equal to each other, but a non-Francophone in Quebec is not so equal. Quebec, as a distinct society, would change the meaning of equality among provinces. Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms would not be applied equally across the board. This kind of plurality of equality contradicts the principles of neutral liberalism; however,

in they only can be communicated

Taylor believes that liberalism per se is not abandoned:

> A society with strong collective goals can be liberal...provided it is also capable of respecting diversity, especially when this concerns those who do not share its goals, and provided it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights. There will undoubtedly be tensions involved, and difficulties, in pursuing these objectives together, but they are not uncombinable.[152]

Of course, even neutral liberalism recognizes the distinction between political equality and inequality at the borders of the nation-state. However, Taylor's distinctions are also within the nation-state. He recognizes political equalities and inequalities between cultures, or nations based upon language within a wider federation. He seems to agree with Schmitt that equality is nonsensical without a correlate inequality. 'We' can only be equal if 'they' are unequal to us, and for equality to exist there must be, to a large degree, internal homogeneity within 'nations.' Whether arguing for distinct status for Quebec, or defining the self, Taylor follows the patterns of the friend-enemy and equal-unequal distinctions.

Defining the self, he says that "we are only selves in so far as we move within a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation to the good." It follows, therefore, that those who are not in this framework are not complete selves. They are deviant. If a self is not oriented to the good, then that self is disordered or evil, and, in fact, does not exist as a "self" as Taylor defines it.

Given that self-hood is a prerequisite to human identity, could it not be

said that those who are not oriented to the good, (and surely there are those,) are not human by definition, but merely potentially human? Those who are non-human would, of course, become the natural enemy. Schmitt warns that such a distinction has its uses, "such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity."[153] Undoubtedly, it is not the intention of Charles Taylor to deny anyone their humanity, but someone else, not so well-intentioned, could appropriate his definition of the self for that purpose nonetheless. Again, this is the underside of Taylor's philosophy, which reveals the inherent dangers of "strong qualifications." It reflects a Machiavellian understanding of the world, in the true sense of that adjective.

It is not the case that Taylor does not appreciate the equality essential to democracy. He certainly does. However, his is not the kind of equality normally associated with liberalism. It is not a universal equality (although he does argue for universal human rights which are to be premised by the articulated goods--love, charity and benevolence.) There are pluralities of equality with correlates of inequality. As Schmitt says, "the political world is a pluriverse, not a universe," and there has never been a universal equality.[154] However, departing from Schmitt, Taylor warns against taking any good to its extreme, (such as nationalism) and therein may be Taylor's saving grace.

Taylor recognizes that the other side of distinctions are exclusions:

One of the important themes one can find in the work of the late M.

> Foucault is the understanding of the way in which ethical and spiritual ideals are often interwoven with exclusions and relations of domination.[155]

He recognizes that history is bloodstained with such distinctions and exclusions, but he makes the point that just because we are led to a wrong answer does not necessitate the founding principle to be in error. He says that this "dilemma of mutilation" is a challenge, not an iron fate.

> It is quick to jump to the conclusion that whatever has generated bad action must be vicious (hence nationalism must be bad because of Hitler, communitarian ethics because of Pol Pot....) What it loses from sight is that there may be genuine dilemmas here, that following one good to the end may be catastrophic, not because it isn't a good, but because there are others [other goods] which can't be sacrificed without evil.[156]

This is one of Taylor's redeeming insights, and what sets him apart from Schmitt: "that following a good to the end may be catastrophic." Moderation and political ambiguity is critical to good government. Unfortunately, Taylor does not elaborate on this point, and such a long book about moral distinctions needs such an elaboration.

II

Another dominant political concept in Sources is freedom, specifically Augustinian freedom. For the Bishop of Hippo there are two kinds: the freedom to choose, and the freedom that comes from knowing that one has chosen correctly. This second, and more important, freedom is only acquired by the grace of God. In Sources, Taylor laments the absence of this grace in

modernity; nevertheless, he has "a large element of hope" that such grace can be actively found. Unlike Augustine, he will not wait for it to be bestowed. In that regard, Taylor is more like Thomas Aquinas.

Augustine's second freedom was always intended for the private realm of the individual. He believed that such certitude or grace was not to be found in the City of Man--in the political, communal sphere. The political realm is a curse, an inescapable effect of original sin, and as such it is a region inhospitable to grace.[157] Machiavelli, keeping quite close to Augustinian thought regarding the nature of man, nevertheless attempts to break free of Augustine's heavy determinism, suggesting that Fortuna rules but half of men's actions.[158] The other half is subject to free will; therefore the political realm does not have to be such a curse after all. However, Machiavelli never suggested that a certitude could be found, at least not in the political realm. This is where Taylor seems to deviate from the Catholic, and Machiavellian, tradition. He seems to be searching for the grace of certitude in the public/political realm. Or is he?

Perhaps it is the case that Augustine's city of man and Machiavelli's principality had this certitude, not in society's superstructure, but in its base, i.e., in society's understanding of its moral ontology. The cultural and religious homogeneity of their society (religion not only as theology, but as social practice) created what Taylor would call "the horizon of significance," which gave a modicum of meaning and stability even to the uncertainties of political life. Perhaps Taylor is not so much attacking a principle of Machiavellian tradition--

separate moralities for the political and private sphere--but is attempting to re-establish the basis of the common good, that which the Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance thinkers could take for granted.

In modernity, Augustine's second freedom has been largely abandoned. Freedom is associated with choice, not certitude, and is expressed in terms of rights. As Taylor says:

> The modern notion of freedom which develops in the 17th century portrays this as the independence of the subject, his determining of his own purposes without interference from external authority.[159]

Taylor is appealing to a more "meaningful" freedom, a freedom which can be equated with Augustine's second freedom, and yet one which will not negate the affirmation of ordinary life. Such freedom with certitude is necessarily based upon a type of order or discipline. The question is: Can such "meaningful" freedom survive in a modern context?

The freedom to choose is connected to the affirmation of ordinary life with its question of "What is it good to do?" as opposed to the affirmation of, or contrast to, the good life, with its question of "What is it good to be?" The contrast, says Taylor, is no longer between mere life and a higher activity such as contemplation, citizenship or asceticism, but is now between different modes of production and reproduction.

> [T]his affirmation of ordinary life, [production and reproduction] although not uncontested and frequently appearing in secular form, has become one of the most powerful ideas of modern civilization. It underlies our contemporary "bourgeois" politics, so much concerned with issues of welfare and at the same time powers the

> most influential revolutionary ideology of our century, Marxism, with its apotheosis of man the provider.[160]

This focus is on what a man does, rather than on what a man is. Taylor is ambivalent about the notion. He recognizes that the affirmation of ordinary life--family and work--is important for democracy, but he also wants to resurrect the ancient idea of the good life. While Taylor is not complaining about the promotion of ordinary life, and its associated ideas of freedom, equality, and democracy, he despairs of such promotion when it is at the expense of a higher life. This is not the case of Taylor wanting to have his cake and eat it too, rather, he is merely trying to avoid the pitfalls of an either/or philosophy. By gaining one, we do not have to accept the demise of the other.

The affirmation of ordinary life is critical to this discussion because it is embedded in modern liberal notions of freedom, equality and democracy. Taylor says that "an inherent bent towards social levelling is implicit in the affirmation of ordinary life."[161] To some extent, he seems to question the liberal notion of equality, but he does so under the guise of "social levelling":

> these ideas of freedom and dignity, in association with the promotion of ordinary life, have steadily eroded hierarchy and promoted equality--and that in all sorts of dimensions, between social classes, races and ethnic and cultural groups, and the sexes. Most notably, it has helped to bring about the steady rise in democracy as a legitimate form of political rule, to the point where it has become in the late twentieth century the inescapable source of legitimacy....[162]

Taylor is in favour of democracy, but the levelling aspect of the affirmation of ordinary life, at the expense of the good life, along with the modern notion of

freedom (all of which makes democracy possible) confounds him.

Taylor understands that freedom, in order to be meaningful, must be disciplined or ordered within a framework. In The Malaise of Modernity, Taylor notes that the modern goal of authenticity, that is the aspiration to be one's own person, to be free to follow one's own unique inclinations, "can't be defended in ways that collapse horizons of significance."[163]

> [U]nless some options are more significant than others, the very idea of self-choice falls into triviality and hence incoherence. Self-choice [the freedom to choose] as an ideal makes sense only because some issues are more significant than others.[164]

Paradoxically, in order to be individually unique in a meaningful way, there has to be a common horizon of significance. There must be accepted common goods in the narrow sense. In other words, the individual's freedom to choose must be bounded by certainties that have been communally decided as such so that the individual knows that he or she has decided correctly. There must be a backdrop of commonly recognized goods, against which one can measure the significance of one's choices, and thereby obtain the freedom that comes from knowing that one has chosen correctly: in other words, to obtain a measure of grace.

Although some liberals may argue that a bounded freedom contradicts basic liberal principles, the idea is not totally foreign in the Western tradition. It is not unlike the Hobbesian concept of freedom, in which one is free insofar as the law is silent. We are bounded by law and by circumstance. In Hobbes' famous

example, we are free to throw our belongings overboard, or we are free to go down with the boat.[165] However, what Taylor is suggesting is more than this negative freedom. His is not only a freedom circumscribed by law and circumstance, but by communally determined higher goods. This is not the atomized concept of individual freedom put forward by Hobbes, but a communitarian, and Augustinian freedom--a certitude bestowed by a constitutive good.

Taylor believes that the modern ideals of individual freedom and autonomy are good things, but that if any good is carried to an extreme, that goodness will self-destruct. He is appealing for moderation concerning individual freedom. Carl Schmitt also despairs of individualism and its freedom when carried too far:

> All liberal pathos turns against repression and lack of freedom. Every encroachment, every threat to individual freedom and private property and free competition is called repression and is eo ipso something evil. What this liberalism still admits of the state, government, and politics is confined to securing the conditions for liberty and eliminating infringements of freedom.[166]

He claims that liberal thought tolerates the state only insofar as it protects individual freedom.

> In a very systematic fashion liberal thought evades or ignores state and politics and moves instead in a typical always recurring polarity of two heterogenous spheres, namely ethics and economics, intellect and trade, education and property. The critical distrust of state and politics is easily explained by the principles of a system whereby the individual must remain terminus a quo and terminus ad quem.[167]

This mirrors Taylor's criticism of neutral liberalism. He is critical of a liberalism that begins and ends with individual rights. It is not that Taylor does not respect and endorse the liberal principle to ensure individual freedom, but there are limits, he says.

Schmitt's criticism of liberalism, in which he says that "there exists a liberal policy in the form of polemical antithesis against state, church, or other institutions which restrict freedom,"[168] is not applicable to Taylor's communitarian liberalism. Unlike neutral liberals, Taylor puts forward a liberal theory that is not antithetical to institutions which restrict individual freedom.

If a meaningful freedom requires horizons of significance, that means it requires higher goods to anchor that freedom. Putting aside the difficulties of an anchored freedom, it is unclear whether Taylor is seeking to institutionalize these higher goods. He does not say. If this good is to be articulated, who is doing the articulating, and in what shall the good be enshrined--in the state constitution?--in the church? If it is the state constitution, how is a language of the good to be enshrined in legal terms, in a language of rights? Love, charity, and benevolence cannot be enacted. The Pope says that love is a human right. "The person is a being for whom the only suitable dimension is love. We are just to a person if we love him."[169] He makes a compelling argument, but can it be legislated? As Ignatieff says, you can make it law that all people are entitled to basic welfare, but you cannot make the people in a welfare state care about the needs of strangers. The system delivers the essential services, but the system

cannot guarantee that those services will be provided with agape--with love and charity. Philosophers and spiritual leaders can preach about the necessity of love, but will it impact the political realm, or the bureaucracy attached to that realm?

Taylor is not advocating a return of the Church to political power, and because he is not, it is difficult to see how a institutionalized language of the good could coexist with, or be incorporated into, a liberal political entity. How can a language of the good be articulated to the extent that Taylor insists upon in the public realm in a liberal, democratic and multi-cultural society?

Taylor may be assuming that Judeao-Christian values, such as love, charity and benevolence, already underpin Anglo-American societies, but this is contested ground. There seems to be no consensus on what constitutes moral sources, or personal values, or higher common goods. If "love, benevolence, and charity" is to be the motto, a specifically Judeao-Christian articulation of these values may hinder the process before it begins. On the other hand, perhaps the project only seems to be impossible, because, as Taylor argues, we are conditioned by modern epistemology, "and, behind this, of the spiritual outlook associated with this epistemology."[170] We are also conditioned by centuries of Machiavelli's influence, but it should be remembered that when Machiavelli argued for separate moralities for the political and social realms, he was considered to be a fringe element. Furthermore, it may be the case that the separation of church and state has gone to extremes that Machiavelli never

intended.

III

On the one hand, Taylor is raising political questions, but on the other, he may be dissolving political issues into ethical ones. A Schmittian argument may be that Taylor attempts to tie the political to the ethical, and hence is denying the state:

> Although liberalism has not radically denied the state, it has, on the other hand, neither advanced a positive theory of state nor on its own discovered how to reform the state, but has attempted only to tie the political to the ethical and to subjugate it to economics.[171]

But this is not so in Taylor's theory. According to Schmitt's own definition of the political entity, Taylor's theory holds up, because

> [t]he political entity is by its very nature the decisive entity, regardless of the sources from which it derives its last psychic motives. It exists or does not exist. If it exists, it is the supreme, that is, in the decisive case, the authoritative entity.[172]

In Taylor's model, the authoritative entity is the constitutive good. Has Taylor dissolved the political into the ethical, or is he merely articulating that theological underpinning that Schmitt insists characterizes all political theory?

Foreshadowing Hannah Arendt, Schmitt criticizes what he sees as the liberal tendency to depoliticize:

> There must no longer be political problems, only organizational-technical and economic-sociological tasks. The kind of economic-technical thinking that prevails today is no longer capable of perceiving a political idea. The modern state seems to have actually what Max Weber envisioned: a huge industrial plant.[173]

Taylor sees the same problem, and hopes that by articulating higher goods, the Machine can be controlled. A liberalism that only protects individual goods cannot generate the common will necessary to combat mindless bureaucratization. Taylor says that "bureaucracy creates its own injustices and exclusions and that a great deal of suffering is not so much relieved as rendered invisible by it."[174] So too with international mobile capital, or with "the machine:"

> The condition of the machine's running effectively is that no one tries to control its priorities too closely. Thus, we get the culture that moral critics object to--the fixation on brute quantitative growth unalloyed by judgements of priority. The justification for this is an image of the good life in which the acquisition of more and more consumer goods--what the system is good at producing--is seen as a central purpose of life.[175]

It comes down to protection. Who will protect people from mindless bureaucracy and the capitalist machine? Individuals can not fight these things on their own; rather, it requires a community effort in a community which recognizes higher goods. A liberalism which protects only the rights of individuals to pursue their own goods will not help to generate the feelings of communal belonging and loyalty which would enable such protection.

Michael Ignatieff makes a strong argument for embedded layers of belonging and protection, similar to Taylor's. He claims that an appeal to human rights of any kind is useless if that appeal is made to humanity in general. Using Shakespeare's story of King Lear as an example, he claims that what is required for any appeal to human rights, or for protection against life's injustices, is a nation-state, as well as a clan, a family, and friends. Ignatieff says that people

who are suffering and alone in this world

> have, at the end, only one claim to make: Lear's claim..that because they are human they deserve to live. This last claim, as Lear had to discover, is the weakest claim that people can make to each other: it is the claim addressed to anyone, and therefore to no one. When there is no family, no tribe, no state, no city to hear it, only the storm hears it.[176]

Unlike Taylor, however, Ignatieff argues for a nationalism based upon a civic belonging, and not upon blood ties. Nevertheless, both make the point that humans are social animals, and atomistic theories which take no account of people's need to belong, and the protection that belonging entails, are quite inadequate to the task.

Protection is a good word to describe, in part, what Taylor is seeking. He wants to protect the Judeao-Christian moral source of love, benevolence and charity, and the human qualities which he believes it generates. To do so, he wants an articulation of the good so that this language, and the particular humanity it generates, does not atrophy. He wants to protect the ideal of an ontologically stable self, and, similarly, stable communities that understands themselves as a unity. Nationally, he want to protect specific languages and ways of life. Internationally, he want to protect human rights by articulating, and, one must assume, institutionalizing the moral sources behind those rights.

Carl Schmitt insists that the other side of protection is obedience. In Sources, there is a strong element of protection and obedience which, on the surface, seems to negate liberal ideals of equality, or at least to restrain them.

However, it can be reasonably argued that every liberal state involves some level of protection and obedience. Taylor's distinctions and his order of protection and obedience are just a little stronger than neutral liberalism's.

If a citizen wants the protection of a state, s/he must obey certain rules. Similarly, one will be protected by a clan or family, church, or by some other inclusion, if certain rules, explicit or implicit, are obeyed. Schmitt says:

> No form of order, no reasonable legitimacy or legality can exist without protection and obedience. The protego ergo obligo is the cogito ergo sum of the state. A political theory which does not systematically become aware of this sentence remains an inadequate fragment.[177]

Unlike neutral liberalism, Taylor offers a form of protection and obedience which protects, not only the individuals' concepts of the good, but also those of the particular community. However, he does not take the other half of the equation--obedience--into consideration.

If a language of the good is somehow articulated, what institution, or institutions, will protect it, and what kind of allegiance will be extracted in exchange? Will the institution itself become so bureaucratized that it becomes another problem? If the good is institutionalized plurally, there is still the problem of the source of these variously institutionalized goods. Beyond scrapping the Treaty of Westphalia and re-politicizing the Vatican, there seem to be two major problems: the lack of political will; and the inability to turn back the clock. Nevertheless, unlike Schmitt who wants to return to a Hobbesian order of protection and obedience and do away with liberal ideas altogether, Taylor

combines a love of democracy and individual autonomy with the understanding that in order for people to obtain, and retain, a sense of belonging, they require a certain amount of protection which neutral liberalism fails to provide.

This chapter has explored some of the political concepts raised in Sources, as well as the political distinctions that they expose. Taylor's philosophy incorporates the Schmittian friend and enemy distinction, but it is inarticulate, and is modified by an appeal to respect fundamental human rights. In his concept of freedom, he introduces a larger element of corresponding order than would his colleagues in the neutral liberal camp; however, he does not give up the liberal concepts of freedom and autonomy. Taylor recognizes the need that people have for a sense of belonging, as well as the need to protect their systems of belonging. It is a protection that a neutral liberalism cannot supply. Although Taylor does not consider the other side of the protection equation--allegiance and some level of obedience--he does not shut down the possibility of discussion about such issues.

As demonstrated in the case of Taylor's theistic premise, his ambiguity opens up avenues for additional theorizing. Taylor's philosophy is important, because it opens up discussion of issues that atomistic, neutral liberalism effectively shuts down: the friend-enemy distinction and the inherent violence underpinning the political realm; the plurality of equality, and the need for people to identity with groups, and their need to have their sites of belonging protected.

Taylor's theistic premise, and his political distinctions inform his

understanding of liberalism. The next chapter will focus specifically on his argument for a communitarian, rather than a neutral, liberalism; this will be juxtaposed to Schmitt's argument that liberalism as a theory is flaccid and unworkable, and therefore should be abandoned in favour of a dictatorship.

Chapter 4 - Liberalism

The universe is made of stories, not atoms.

Muriel Rukeyser[178]

The focus of this chapter will be on three conflicting visions of liberalism: communitarian, procedural or neutral, and Carl Schmitt's. What follows will be roughly divided into three sections. The first part of this chapter will outline the key points of the Liberal-Communitarian debate. It will be followed by Schmitt's objections to liberalism found in On the Contradiction Between Parliamentarism and Democracy, written in 1923. The third section will clarify Taylor's position, and will demonstrate that Taylor occupies a site between Schmitt and procedural liberalism.

I

In the long-running Liberal-Communitarian debate, Taylor is critical of procedural liberalism, a neutral liberalism that favours individual rights and goods at the expense of a common good. He argues that procedural liberalism leads to excessive fragmentation and an inability to combat problems which assail the community as a whole. He claims not to abandon liberalism, but advocates a communitarian liberalism which articulates a common good. This good is more

than the sum of individual goods, and is not to be confused with the general interest. It is a higher good that serves as a "horizon of significance," an external moral source or standard which can guide the community, and help to establish and preserve its unity.

Western society is already founded on common goods, such and democracy and liberalism, but Taylor distinctly refers to "narrow" common goods.

> The misunderstanding turns on two senses of "good." In the broad sense, it means anything valuable we seek; in the narrower sense, it refers to life plans or ways of living so valued.[179]

Taylor's critics in the Liberal-Communitarian debate claim that this conception of a narrow common good would hinder the autonomy and freedom of individuals to seek their own "life plans or ways of living so valued." For the neutral liberal camp, "human dignity consists largely in autonomy--in the ability of each person to determine for him or herself a view of the good life."[180] In an age and in a society marked by multiculturalism, does not an insistence on articulated moral sources and narrow common goods suggest a soft dictatorship of one group's conception of the good over those who hold a different conception? Who is to decide the horizon of significance, or the way of living so valued?

Taylor is not against the neutrality principle in liberalism:

> Quite the contrary, it is clearly an important good, even indispensable, in certain contexts of the modern liberal state. For instance, these states are neutral between different religious confessions and it is extremely important that they be so....Really the aim (as far as I'm concerned) is more modest: I just want to say that single principle liberalism can't suffice.[181]

However, according to Habermas, Taylor's understanding of neutral liberalism is selective and incorrect. There is no need to rework the theory of neutral liberalism if it is correctly understood in the first place.

> If the selective reading of the theory of rights is corrected to include a democratic understanding of the actualization of basic rights, there is no need to contrast a truncated Liberalism [Camp] 1 with a model that introduces a notion of collective rights that is alien to the system.[182]

Taylor might counterargue that Habermas has missed the point. Neutral liberalism, like the Habermasian discourse ethics, is not grounded in an external moral source, or, if it is, this source in unarticulated.

Neutral or procedural liberalism locates its source in the United States and is best exemplified in the writings of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Taylor summarizes the main argument as it is presented in Dworkin's "Liberalism":

> Dworkin makes a distinction between two kinds of moral commitment. We all have views about the ends of life, and about what constitutes a good life that we and others ought to strive for; but we also acknowledge a commitment to deal fairly and equally with one another, regardless of how we conceive our ends. We might call the latter "procedural" commitments, while those that concern the ends of life are "substantive." Dworkin claims that a liberal society is one which, as a society, adopts no particular substantive view about the ends of life. Rather, the society is united around strong procedural commitments to treat people with equal respect.[183]

While Taylor agrees that people should be treated with equal respect, and that individual concepts of the good must be respected, he is critical of procedural liberalism, because it embraces the good of individual autonomy to the exclusion of common goods. He says that this type of liberalism may be suitable for the

United States, but that for other countries that have evolved differently, particularly countries as multicultural as Canada, such a neutral liberalism will not suffice.

Taylor is adamant that a community must be able to offer a sense of identity and belonging to its people if it is to be successful politically. "The condition of successful participatory politics is a strong identification with the community."[184] The American styled liberalism, with its emphasis on Kantian autonomy, is not necessarily suited to countries outside the American experience:

> It is clear that the attempt to make procedural liberalism the basis of Canadian unity is both illegitimate and doomed to failure. For it represents an imposition of one's society's model on another, and in the circumstances of late-twentieth century Canadian democracy this cannot succeed.[185]

It is the political reality, says Taylor, that Canada is multicultural--not a melting pot like the United States, but a mosaic. Therefore, pluralities of equality must be recognized, not only for the two "founding" nations, but also for the First Nations, and for the differing regions. Part of this recognition includes the recognition of specific languages and cultures as common goods which are to be protected:

> Because the language/culture that we need for our identity is one that we always receive from others, from our surroundings, it becomes very important that we be recognized for what we are. If this is denied or set at naught by those who surround us, it is extremely difficult to maintain a horizon of meaning by which to identifies [sic] ourselves.[186]

If people cannot identify with their community, this sets up a dangerous situation which is more perilous than having common horizons of significance which may or may not impinge on the individual autonomies of a minority.

Taylor is not alone in his quest to resurrect an ontological stability. According to Schwabb, Schmitt calls for "fundamentally tranquil social pillars" to uphold "a sound constitutional order."[187] Hannah Arendt also believes that there are some things worth preserving for future generations.

> Only the existence of a public realm and the world's subsequent transformation into a community of things which gathers men together and relates them to each other depends entirely on permanence. If the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one generation and planned for the living only; it must transcend the life span of mortal men.[188]

This idea of permanence requires some agreed upon metanorms or common goods.

Quebec is a good example of this quest, and one that is close to Taylor's heart. If the French majority in Quebec want to preserve their French culture and language (and one cannot preserve a culture without preserving its language) then they must have, at least, the equivalent of Bill 101, if not political independence. In Bill 101, the French majority decided for present and future generations, that French will be the dominant culture, and that Quebec, in order to preserve that culture, will only have one official language.[189] Procedural liberals consider Bill 101 to be in conflict with liberal principles, because it holds a narrow common good above the individual goods of those whose mother-culture

is other than French. The ways of living so valued of Anglophones, Aboriginals, and immigrants from non-French speaking countries are subsumed under a larger way of life so valued.

Some critics of Taylor suggest that his communitarian liberalism ceases to be liberalism if neutrality regarding the good life is not adhered to. But what is the alternative? In the Quebec example, if neutrality were adhered to, it could mean that the French culture would eventually be consumed by the larger Anglo society surrounding it. Similarly, in the European Community, one can see the mother-languages being quickly eroded by the persistent incursion of English. Will the Continent permit the erosion of their languages, and with it the decline of their unique cultures? Will the countries making up the E.C. eventually adopt their own versions of Bill 101? If they do, as France is already attempting, the politics of recognition will be taken up ever more strongly by the immigrant populations.[190] And yet, the desire to protect the mother-culture is understandable. It would be a dreadful bore, if nothing else, to have the whole world subsumed under a monolithic English-speaking culture of consumerism. However, the troubling aspects of cultural protection do not go away particularly in light of recent events in the former Yugoslavia, which is still reeling under the effects of ethnic cleansing. It seems to be a struggle between two evils--cultural imperialism on the one hand, and cultural protection and exclusion on the other.[191]

Culture is only one example of a common good that could unite a

community, and Taylor says that there must be many competing goods in a healthy society. However, underlying them all is a shared understanding, an agreed upon reason for belonging. The key phrase is "agreed upon." Taylor's conception of the common good is based upon the democratic principle of majority rule. Nevertheless, a belonging based on culture, ethnicity, religion, or language cannot escape the dialectic of equality and inequality. We are equal and homogenous because of what we are not. As both Ignatieff and Schmitt say, belonging is not about identity; it is about difference. So, are Taylor's critics correct to insist upon a neutral liberalism?

Bill 101 reflects an ethnic nationalism, as opposed to a civic nationalism, and it is a bill that Taylor supports. Michael Ignatieff suggests that such appeals to belonging based upon blood ties rather than civic ties inevitably lead to racism, and worse:

> ...there is a deep connection between violence and belonging. The more strongly you feel the bonds of belonging to your own group, the more hostile, the more violent will your feelings be towards outsiders. You can't have this intensity of belonging without violence, because belonging of this intensity moulds the individual conscience: if a nation gives a people a reason to sacrifice themselves, it also gives them a reason to kill.[192]

Schmitt comes to the same conclusion when discussing his theory of the friend-enemy distinction. However, Taylor does not fully address this potential for violence, except to admit that all positions carry a risk. He insists that it is equally dangerous, perhaps more so, to take the neutral liberal position in which there are no recognized common goods and no community identity to be

protected. Furthermore, Taylor tempers his politics of recognition and belonging with respect for fundamental human rights and the democratic process. In response to Ignatieff, Taylor might argue that if a multicultural nation-state respected and recognized the different cultures within it, and if it offered protection for these differences to the main groups, perhaps the violence that Ignatieff refers to could be avoided.

According to Taylor, one of the problems stemming from procedural liberalism is that a community bereft of narrow common goods cannot problem-solve without creating further division in the community. A neutral liberalism, says Taylor, "entrenches fragmentation."

> Its spirit is an adversarial one in which citizen efficacy consists in being able to get your rights, whatever the consequences for the whole society.[193]

> A common good derived only from rights and law makes for a very litigious society--in which winner-take-all battles rage. Or in which there is no winner at all--eg. the abortion debate. There is no room for compromise.[194]

Taylor's example of the abortion debate demonstrates well this fragmentation. The individual rights of the pregnant woman are pitted against the individual rights of the foetus. Framed in this way, the debate stalls. The only major voice in the debate who avoids the rights discourse is John Paul II. He speaks instead of a culture of love versus a culture of death. This is not to suggest that Taylor is advocating a return to Catholic dictatorship (unlike Schmitt.) Rather, the Pope's discourse is indicative of what Taylor is trying to show--that an ethics debate can

be opened further, not by abandoning individual rights, but by recognizing that there are other avenues that are complementary, such as a discourse of individual responsibilities, community rights, love, charity and benevolence.

The problem with such moral talk is that the state cannot speak effectively in these terms. It can only speak effectively in terms of rights and law. A language of the good articulated by the state will not be able to silence a raging debate based on competing individual rights. This is another argument for procedural liberalism, which draws on a long history of the division between the secular and the religious, or moral.

In this tradition, and following from Machiavelli, Montesquieu says that spiritual and human laws should not be mixed:

> The laws of perfection, drawn from religion, have for their object the goodness of the man who observes them, more than that of the society in which they are observed; civil laws, on the other hand, have for their purpose the moral goodness of men in general, more than that of individuals.
>
> Thus, however respectable may be the ideas which spring immediately from religion, they should not always serve as principles for civil laws, because civil laws have another principle, which is the general good of society.[195]

Similarly, Steven C. Rockefeller, in his critique of Taylor's essay on multiculturalism, suggests that the politics of recognition, or identity--the need for acceptance and belonging--may be more of a religious need than a political one. And in Ignatieff's words, "the test of responsible political argument is to know which needs can be satisfied through politics and which cannot."[196] However, Taylor argues that while the state should stay out of the religion business, this is

not the same as articulating a language of the good in public space.

Hannah Arendt sees the problem of moral discourse in another light. She claims that a language of the good, which is a private good, cannot survive in public space. Arguably, to speak about private goodness is to negate it:

> Because goodness and love are otherworldly, and cannot be seen and heard; it is antithetical to the public space where everything and everybody are seen and heard by others....Goodness, therefore, as a consistent way of life, is not only impossible within the confines of the public realm, it is even destructive of it. Nobody perhaps has been more sharply aware of this ruinous quality of doing good than Machiavelli, who, in a famous passage, dared to teach men "how not to be good."[197]

Nevertheless, Machiavelli held strongly to the necessity of the common good (behind which is an articulated language of the good) and it is this which Taylor wishes to retrieve.

II

In a liberal democracy, the people elect those who will represent them in parliament. Supposedly, parliamentary debate and decision-making reflect the will of the people. In other words; the people engage in public discussion and debate, and this discussion, in theory, informs the representatives' discussion in parliament. According to Schmitt:

> Freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of discussion, are not only useful and expedient, therefore, but really life and death questions for liberalism.[198]

Taylor agrees that the public space is created by free discussion and debate in

the various media.[199]

For Schmitt, the key principles of liberalism are democracy and Parliamentarism. The principle of democracy is equality, and as seen in Chapter Three, Schmitt does not believe that this equality can ever exist without the correlate of inequality. He is therefore able to dismiss democracy as a viable theory of government. Similarly, Parliamentarism rests on the principles of openness and discussion: "The essence of parliament is therefore public deliberation of argument and counterargument, public debate and public discussion."[200] Schmitt takes pains to show that these concepts are also impossible, and hence "the crisis of modernity." Both democracy and Parliamentarism, by which he means liberalism, are in crisis, because democracy is based on a homogenous equality which exists nowhere in the world, and the principles of openness and discussion are corrupted by narrow interests.

Schmitt questions the very reality of open society. Do we really have a free press if it is controlled by capitalist forces? "[F]reedom of speech and the press is good; but it won't endanger the real holders of political power,"[201] because parliament divides off into "increasingly smaller committees," and these committees in turn are coopted by the interests of big business.

> In the face of this reality, the belief in a discussing public must suffer a terrible disillusionment....If in the actual circumstances of parliamentary business, openness and discussion have become an empty and trivial formality, then parliament...has also lost its previous foundations and its meaning.[202]

Contrary to Schmitt's pessimism, Taylor believes in the impact of public discussion on parliament, although he does recognize the difficulties. These difficulties, however, are due not to the impossibility of discussion, or to its lack of impact on parliament, but to the incorrect conception of liberalism as atomistic and always neutral. A community united under recognized common goods can be a power in itself and combat big business when necessary.

> The effective re-enframing of technology requires common political action to reverse the drift that market and bureaucratic state engender towards greater atomism and instrumentalism.[203]

If he is right that there needs to be an agreed upon political action to activate a common good to combat atomism and instrumentalism, who, or what, shall define this common political action? How can such unity be reached? First of all, the bureaucratic or capitalist enemy so defined must be named and located. This could be a problem.

In One World, Many Worlds, R. B. J. Walker observes that "it is no longer possible to pretend that real power is an object located in a particular place--a state apparatus, a social elite, a conspiracy of corporations."[204] Similarly, Mike Davis, in The City of Quartz, makes the point that power has become "fragmented and dispersed without a hegemonic centre."[205] He says that a possible consequence of not knowing who, what, or where the enemy is, is illustrated by the Los Angeles riots of 1992. The residents did not go after Beverly Hills, or any other bastion of privilege; rather, they destroyed their own neighbourhoods. This is illustrative of the difficulty of fighting an enemy that is

both invisible and dispersed. Taylor might argue, however, that the community cannot locate the enemy, precisely because it is too fractured. Give a community the means to identify what is important to its people in the way of common goods and goals, and then it may become easier to identify the threats to that community.

In addition to questioning the actual openness of society, Schmitt insists that public discussion, even if it does impact upon parliament, is fruitless, because liberal discussion lacks a deciding instance. Discussion goes on ad nauseam, and no decisions are made. Therefore, because openness is an illusion, and discussion goes nowhere, liberalism is flaccid, irrelevant and should be replaced. And since, as noted by Donoso Cortes, "there are no more kings," it must be replaced with dictatorship.[206]

An essential of Parliamentarism, expounded by both Schmitt and Taylor, is the crucial role of the public sphere. Schmitt says that "the essence of parliament is...public deliberation of argument and counterargument, public debate and public discussion," and that such discussion is pointless, because the ultimate decisions will be made by elites behind closed doors. Schmitt, the hard-core realist, is willing to abandon the ideal where it is not found in practice, but Taylor still holds out hope for liberalism. Taylor defines the public sphere as that common space where members of society meet through various media:

> So what the public sphere does is to enable the society to reach a common mind, without the mediation of the political sphere, in a discourse of reason outside power, which nevertheless is

normative for power.[207]

For Schmitt this is theory only, and in practice there are pockets of power which control both politics and media. To some extent he is right. Taylor must be talking in ideal types again.

Granted, Taylor and Schmitt are writing in very different circumstances. Due to almost instant media accountability, parliament must now consider the will of the people to a greater extent than it did when Schmitt was writing in the 1920's. Therefore, this accountability is not so much Taylor's concern. He is more concerned that the discussions will fail to result in a decision because of severe political fragmentation brought about by a lack of common ground.

This brings us to a discussion of discussion itself, a favourite topic of Schmitt. He invokes Donoso Cortes when he wants to lambast the liberal belief in discussion. The Spaniard disdainfully refers to liberals as "the discussing class." The discussion goes on and on, but no decisions are actually made. This reflects Schmitt's two-part critique of public and parliamentary discussion.

> Great political and economic decisions on which the fate of mankind rests no longer result today (if they ever did) from balancing opinions in public debate and counterdebate. Such decisions are no longer the outcome of parliamentary debate.
>
> In this way the parliamentary plenum gradually drifts away from its purpose (that is, from its public), and as a result it necessarily becomes a mere facade.[208]

But like Taylor, Schmitt is also talking about ideal types, only he's approaching it from the other end. His is the ideal type of Machiavellian appearances--pure

facade, masking unimpeded power. This does not exist any more than an ideal liberalism. This is pure conspiracy theory. Particularly in our day, more so than in Schmitt's, such facades are particularly difficult to erect and maintain.

The second line of Schmitt's critique points to the erosion caused by discussion:

> For socialism and its ideas of class struggle there is no greater danger than professional politics and participation in parliamentary business. These wear down great enthusiasm into chatter and intrigue and kill the genuine instincts and institutions that produce a moral decision.[209]

For Schmitt a moral decision is not made by committee. Such a decision involves truth, and truth is not found in debate. It is a general liberal principle, says Schmitt, "that the truth can be found through an unrestrained clash of opinion and that competition will produce harmony."[210] Taylor is looking for truth at the ontological level, but at the level of politics he's looking for compromise and agreement.

Schmitt is emphatic that moral decisions are not found in discussion groups. For Taylor, a decision is not moral unless it is produced democratically, by discussion. Taylor outlines three conditions for democratic decision-making: first, "that the people concerned understand themselves as belonging to a community that shares some common purposes;" second, "that the various groups, types and classes of citizens have been given a genuine hearing and were able to have an impact on the debate," (although Taylor does admit that some groups are not satisfied with simply being heard); and third, "that the

decision emerging from this is the majority preference."[211]

These criteria for decision-making are similar to those in Habermasian discourse ethics, which assumes an ideal speech situation consisting in symmetry, reciprocity, and reflexivity, and which will result in a "rational coming to an agreement."[212] However, there is an important difference. In Taylor's conception, change is disciplined in a framework of articulated metanorms. Unlike the metanorm of a Habermasian discourse ethics, which can change in any direction as long as it is in the general interest, Taylor's metanorms remain fairly constant. These metanorms dictate the framework of the debate. The debate does not dictate the metanorm. In Habermas' theory, it is not at all clear how a metanorm is constructed out of a plurality of individual goods. If there is no common horizon of significance, or a shared understanding of a higher good, then a utopian speech situation, assuming that it exists, will produce a metanorm that will be battered in whichever political or economic wind happens to be blowing. The Habermasian metanorm is dialogical, and is therefore subject to continuous change. In an age of rapid change, how can a rapidly changing metanorm remain a metanorm? Isn't a norm something that remains fairly constant? Is it not a standard, a horizon of significance against which we measure things? If the metanorms constantly change, then they are no longer metanorms.

A problem with any kind of discourse ethics is that society cannot come to a common mind if it is too fractured, and lacking in metanorms to begin with.

Taylor says that when groups in a society feel that they have not been heard, then there is political fragmentation and "any invocation of the community good as grounds for restraint tends to be viewed with suspicion."[213]

In the Malaise of Modernity, Taylor says that discussion of "the good life" in the political realm has been silenced by "moral subjectivism":

> ...moral positions are not in any way grounded in reason or the nature of things but are ultimately just adopted by each of us because we find ourselves drawn to them. On this view, reason can't adjudicate moral disputes.[214]

This problem has been commented upon by Liora Salter of Osgoode Hall Law School.[215] Salter says that there has developed an "impossibility to politics" in that it becomes increasingly difficult to discuss issues, to share information, and to resolve conflict. She suggests that "perhaps what is going on here has something to do with language," and with value systems:

> Public controversies today quickly transform themselves into debates about social values. Those involved quickly stake out a moral position. They set about to expose the underlying values and the morality of others as compared to their own. They believe that information...cannot be considered information because it is too value-laden. They fit all information into a pre-existing picture, and that picture is about morality. And they say, and it is commonly believed, that the reason people disagree is because they subscribe to different value-systems--they subscribe to different moralities.

Salter is despairing of multiple private moralities entering the public realm and stalling the decision-making process.

She goes on to say that public debate has become almost impossible, because the values crowd out the information:

> What is to discuss among people whose values simply differ? Value debates are not about information. They are about positions. And value debates cannot be resolved. After all, what more can be said if everything is just a matter of someone's beliefs?

Salter calls this "a politics of fundamentalism," and she insists that it is not necessarily a problem of representation, or the lack thereof. It does not matter who, or how many, join the debate. Additional numbers only serve to make the debate louder:

> For the subscribers to the politics of fundamentalism ...political discussion is nothing more or less than faithfully reflecting all the positions in the debate--insuring that each position gets its fair share of air-time--the opportunity to point out why it's morally right, and why everyone else is morally wrong.

What has been lost is the freedom to be heard by others, which is one of Taylor's prerequisites for decision making. It is liberalism's neutral principle taken to extremes.

In The Human Condition, Arendt frames the problem as an erasure of the division between the private and public realms. She, too, despairs of the ability to be publicly heard, which is caused by the lack of a "common world:"

> The erasure of the public realm, the "common world," can happen under conditions of radical isolation, where nobody can any longer agree with anybody else, as is usually the case of tyrannies. But it may also happen under conditions of mass society or mass hysteria, where we see all people suddenly behave as though they were members of one family, each multiplying and prolonging the perspective of his neighbor. In both instances, men have become entirely private, that is, they have been deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being heard by them. They are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times.[216]

They are imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, because there is no longer an appreciation for the common goods which are the foundations of public space. The radical isolation stems from a culture that embraces individualism to the exclusion of all else. To correct the problem, Taylor calls for a shared morality in the public realm, or a Communitarian liberalism.

III

In Taylor's theory of liberalism, he identifies the principles of liberal society as representative government, rule of law, a regime of entrenched rights and a guarantor of freedom. A liberal society is one in which we try to realize to "the highest possible degree certain goods or principles of right."[217] While he agrees that a liberal society must remain neutral about individual goods, it must also have common goods, because "there can't be a community in any meaningful sense that doesn't understand itself as such."[218] True liberalism cannot remain neutral in regard to questions concerning the good life, nor can it forget its republican roots with its conceptions of liberty and self rule.

Taylor says that neutral liberalism, Camp 1, is concerned with limiting power. Camp 2, communitarian liberalism, is concerned with limiting power and with self-rule, that is, a community ruling itself.

> Liberalism must also be concerned with self-rule, that is, it must strive to make power and in general whatever shapes the conditions of our lives responsive to collective decisions.[219]

If you hold Toqueville's view that self-rule is vital to freedom, "then you have an additional reason to adhere to the second camp, and to be concerned with the quality of collective decisions."[220] But in order to appreciate self-rule, a community must understand itself as such.

Taylor's definition of the self in Sources can be applied to the community as well: "we [the communities] are only selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation to the good."[221] This definition is an ideal type both for the individual and the collective. Perhaps this republican-communitarian concept of self-rule has been all but abandoned because of the ontological instability of the collective, as well as of the self. How is a fractured community able to resurrect itself as a united front?

Emphasizing the fractured nature of communities in late modernity, Manuel Castells, in The City and the Grass Roots, talks about "disconnection between people and spatial form, and therefore between people's lives and urban meaning."[222] If the population of a given place is not rooted in the community; if they have no history there, and the historical landmarks of collective memory have been bulldozed to make way for progress; if there are no family ties or ties to the workplace; if the population is culturally heterogenous and migratory, then how can this aggregate group of people, who just happen to live in the same geographic area, recognize itself as a community, as a people? Taylor address this problem:

> the contemporary development of the society of growth-

> concentration-mobility threatens citizen self-rule. Concentration and mobility increase the burden of government. At the same time, the felt need for coordination and more and more massive resources tends to concentrate the functions of government at the centre. As a consequence, the functions of government tend to be both more bureaucratically rigid and more distant from citizenry.[223]

Taylor holds out hope that the threat to self-rule is not an inevitability. "Not only may it be possible to moderate the trends to growth and concentration, but there may be more than one way of reacting to them even where they are unstoppable...."[224] The key is to permit common understandings and goals. One way to begin is to permit an articulation of common goods, as well as the sources of those goods, in philosophical and political theory.

In addition to self-rule, the other forgotten concept is liberty. Taylor poses the question--What kind of freedom should a liberal society strive for? He differentiates between negative freedom versus a meaningful freedom, which involves "real self-determination, an excellence of moral development."[225] Machiavelli and Montesquieu would call this kind of freedom political virtu. It requires a horizon of significance, a moral ontology. It is a freedom connected to community-recognized common goods. This is not the autonomous freedom expounded by neutral liberalism, although Taylor's communitarianism does not abandon this negative freedom either.

Both of Taylor's concepts, a retrieval of self-rule and meaningful freedom, would simultaneously draw from, and reproduce, the common understandings which would enable a deciding instance, and would consequently disable

Schmitt's theory that liberalism is untenable.

By retrieving the old republican ideas of self-rule and meaningful freedom, it can be argued that Taylor offers a more complete vision of liberalism than does Camp 1 with its single-principle liberalism. Nevertheless, it is difficult to reinstate common goods that have been lost. Some kind of massive re-education would be required to wean people away from the American-styled liberalism which has become dominant. Schmitt would argue that what is required is what has always been required--a dictatorship by the vanguard.

> There will always be a vanguard...the apex of the development of consciousness, an avant-garde that has the right to act because it possesses correct knowledge and consciousness, not as the chosen of a personal God, but as a movement in development.[226]

Undoubtedly, Taylor would not argue about the existence, and the importance, of a vanguard, particularly because he is part of one. But, it is one thing to recognize the normality of vanguardism, it is another to say that the vanguard has a right "to enforce the 'objectively necessary.'"[227] Taylor wants majority rule, and this is not the same as an "educational dictatorship" of the vanguard. However, if Taylor wants a communitarian liberalism, and he is in the vanguard of this movement, then a tremendous amount of educating must be done to convince the majority that an ontology must be retrieved to preserve self-rule and meaningful freedom.

To demonstrate the connections between development, education and dictatorship, Schmitt says that

> those who have a higher consciousness and who believe themselves to be representatives of this great force will shake off the constraints of a narrow outlook, and will enforce the "objectively necessary." Here too their will forces the free to be unfree. In practice that is an educational dictatorship.[228]

Taylor would not want an such an educational dictatorship, but how is his retrieval project to be achieved without one? As usual, Taylor only presents what he believes is required for a meaningful world. He offers few suggestions about how to get there.

What would an educational dictatorship look like? If liberal principles and democratic principles were upheld, perhaps it would be as banal and as mildly irritating as political correctness--just another movement to produce the guilt trips that were once escorted by the Church. But still, there are those of Neutral Camp 1 who would deny the possibility of any liberalism in such a retrieval. For them, an "educational dictatorship," no matter how soft, would have shades of Stalinism or of the Nazism that took Schmitt's philosophy and ran with it. However, such extremism can be indulged only if one ignores, or misunderstands, the ambiguity in Taylor's liberal philosophy.

In this chapter, Taylor has been located between the Schmittian and 'procedural' positions. Along with the previous chapters, it attempts to demonstrate that Taylor is not advocating a soft dictatorship of the good. His liberal theory includes the democratic principle of majority rule. Given that it is not a perfect world, Taylor allows for the compromise and moderation regarding all goods whether individually or communally held.

Conclusion

Courageous in its vision and scope, Taylor's philosophy is important if true, and important if not true. In other words, his work is important even if his theistic premise, his moral ontology, and his essentialist position on human nature are all mythical. It is important, because his philosophy and political theory, particularly as it culminates in Sources of the Self, challenges the legacy of the Enlightenment. It opens up lines of theoretical inquiry previously obscured by a purely instrumentalist stance, and illuminates forgotten aspects of early liberal thought.

Comparing Taylor to Schmitt helps to expose the underside of Taylor's philosophy--the Schmittian distinctions that necessarily arise when "strong qualifications" are made. But the comparison also shows that while Taylor's strong qualifications excavate 'the other,' it is an otherness tempered with a universal respect for human dignity, and most importantly, an insistence for an articulation of this respect and the sources thereof. Taylor's indirect recognition of 'the other' opens up discussion regarding the realities of political distinctions, a discussion which has been effectively shut down by atomist and neutral liberal theories which give scant attention to the social aspects of human nature.

In this thesis, Taylor's conception of liberalism has been situated between the Schmittian and neutral liberal positions to illuminate Taylor's moderation.

Taylor's insistence on a thick theory of the good does not necessitate an imposition of that good. He does not abandon the liberal principle of neutrality, but combines it with a love for the common good. He recognizes that a liberal self, for all its autonomy, is still a social animal with a need for multiple levels of belonging, and a need for those sites of belonging to be protected. Calling for a balance of individual autonomy and community self-rule, he does not abandon the principle of autonomous freedom, but argues for the disciplining of such freedom by a horizon of significance. His ambiguity permits the space required for discussion, an essential feature of liberalism, but his articulation of the good opens the possibility for the recognition of the exceptional case, and, consequently, for a deciding instance.

The comparison to Schmitt highlights Taylor's saving grace--his ambiguity. In this respect he is more like Machiavelli than Schmitt. He combines the seemingly impossible: an Augustinian acknowledgement of the inherent evil in the nature of man with a Thomistic insistence that man can intuit the good; an insistence on articulacy about the good with an appreciation for ambiguity and compromise in the political realm; an affirmation of ordinary life with a strong valuation of higher modes of being; and a love of freedom and equality with a love of order and hierarchy. This ambiguity and balancing informs all aspects of Taylor's philosophy .

Taylor's theistic premise, the fear of which has caused a number of his critics to caricature his message, is not a call to God. Nor is Taylor's insistence

upon an articulation of the good an attempt to reunite the secular and religious realms. Similarly, Taylor's Catholicism, with its contradictions, and its love of order and hierarchy, is not necessarily anathema to a love of democracy, equality, and an instrumentalist stance towards the world.

By positivist standards, Taylor's theory is unsupportable, because it is a deeply conflicted model, full of principles and distinctions completely at odds. Nevertheless, his philosophy resonates. It reflects the political realm with its conflicting concepts and needs: individual versus community; particular versus general; rights versus responsibilities; and secular versus spiritual. It reflects the human condition--untidy, complex, rich and mysterious. Taylor's philosophy combines an appreciation for Schmittian distinctions with an insistence for an articulation of the good, and "a large element of hope" for Augustinian grace. And if grace can no longer be bestowed, Taylor suggests that it can be found. This message is not unlike Machiavelli's message of political virtú--the understanding that Fortuna permits man to determine his own fate at least half of the time. Unfortunately, those blinded by anti-theism, or anti-Catholicism, will think that Taylor's message is primarily a religious call to virtue, rather than for what it is--a political call to virtú. Important if true; important if not true.

Endnotes

1. Montesquieu. Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, xliv.

2. Skinner, Quentin. "Who are 'We'? Ambiguities ofthe Modern Self." Inquiry 34.2 (June 1991), 133, 133-53. See also: Skinner, Quentin. "Modernity and disenchantment: some historical reflections," in Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 37, 37-48.

3. Skinner, "Who Are 'We'? Ambiguities of the Modern Self," 148.

4. Taylor, Charles. Hegel and Modern Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

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12. Sources, 34.

13. ibid., 8.

14. Berlin, Sir Isaiah. "Introduction." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 2.

15. Sources, 28.

16. ibid., 35.

17. see "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate." Philosophical Arguments, 189-91.

18. Sources, 58.

19. ibid., 39-40.

20. ibid., 51.

21. ibid., 47.

22. ibid., 85-86.

23. see "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate."

24. Sources, 112.

25. ibid., 182.

26. For a similar argument regarding the Descartes-Montaigne split, see: Toulmin, Stephen. Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 27, 55.

27. Sources, 177.

28. ibid., 192.

29. ibid., 193.

30. ibid., 217.

31. ibid., 233.

32. ibid., 247.

33. ibid., 383.

34. ibid., 368-9.

35. ibid., 384.

36. This is not unlike the exercises of retrieval found in Toulmin's Cosmopolis, as well as Marshall Berman's All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity. New York: Penguin Group, 1982.

37. Sources, 374.

38. ibid., 376.

39. ibid., 419.

40. ibid., 425.

41. ibid., 454.

42. ibid.

43. ibid., 495.

44. ibid.

45. ibid.

46. ibid., 502.

47. ibid., 504.

48. ibid.

49. ibid., 521.

50. ibid., 80-1.

51. Scialabba, George. "The Modern Mind." Dissent 37 (Fall 1990), 535, 534-7.

52. Sources, 48.

53. ibid., 93.

54. ibid., 20.

55. ibid., 63.

56. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. London: Oxford University Press, 1971, 92.

57. ibid., 396-7.

58. see for example, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate." Philosophical Arguments, and "Alternative Futures," "Shared and Divergent Values," and "Institutions in National Life." Reconciling the Solitudes.

59. Tuck, Richard. "Rights and Pluralism." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 164.

60. Schneewind, J. B. "Book Reviews." Journal of Philosophy 88 (August 1991), 426, 422-6.

61. Kymlicka, Will. "The Ethics of Inarticulacy." Inquiry 34.2 (June 1991), 162, 155-82. For a similar argument, see also Daniel W. Weinstock's "The Political Theory of Strong Evaluation." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism.

62. see "Alternative Futures." Reconciling the Solitudes, 79-80.

63. "Who are 'We'?" Inquiry, 142.

64. "Maclean's/CBC News Poll." Maclean's. Dec. 25, 1996, 23.

65. "Who are 'We'?" Inquiry, 148.

66. ibid., 149.

67. ibid.

68. Rorty, Richard. "Taylor on Truth." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 32.

69. Skinner, "Modernity and Disenchantment," 45.

70. Wood, Allen. "Book Reviews." Philosophical Review 101.3 (July 1992), 626, 621-626.

71. Larmore, Charles. "Book Reviews." Ethics 102 (October 1991), 161-2, 158-162.

72. Skinner, "Modernity and Disenchantment." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 42.

73. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. "The Risks and Responsibilities of Affirming Ordinary Life." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 69 and 76-79.

74. see Skinner's "Who are 'We'?" Inquiry, and Mario Moussa's "Writing the History of "We": The Claims of Practice." Social Theory and Practice 18.2

(Summer 1992), 211-29.

75. Hittinger, Russell. "Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self." Review of Metaphysics. 44 (September 1990), 111-130.

76. James, Susan. "Internal and External in the Work of Descartes." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism.

77. Geertz, Clifford. "The Strange Estrangement: Taylor and the Natural Sciences." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, and George Scialabba, "The Modern Mind." Dissent.

78. Weinstock, Daniel W. "The Political Theory of Strong Evaluation." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 174, and Martin Low-Beer's "Living a Life and the Problem of Existential Impossibility." Inquiry 34, 217-36.

79. Hjort, Mette. "Literature: Romantic Expression or Strategic Interaction?" Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 130.

80. Skinner. "Modernity and Disenchantment," 45.

81. Shklar, Judith. "Books in Review." Political Theory. 19.1 (February 1991), 106, 105-143.

82. Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. 1922. Trans. George Schwab. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1985.

83. Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. 1927. Trans. George Schwab. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976.

84. Schmitt, Carl. On the Contradiction Between Liberalism and Democracy. 1923. Trans. Ellen Kennedy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985.

85. Donoso Cortes, Don Juan. An Essay on Catholicism, Authority and Order. Trans. Madeleine Vincent Goddard. New York: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc.1925, 319.

86. Schmitt, Political Theology, 46.

87. Both Schmitt and Taylor's work is deliberately Eurocentric; therefore, for historical purposes, Catholicism and variants of Protestantism are the only theologies considered.

88. Theology, 36.

89. Sources, 14.

90. Theology, 65.

91. Sources, 318-19.

92. ibid., 10.

93. ibid., 520.

94. ibid., 91.

95. ibid., 107.

96. ibid., 93-94.

97. ibid., 104.

98. ibid., 317.

99. ibid., 96.

100. ibid., 155.

101. John Paul II. Crossing the Threshold of Hope. Ed. Vittorio Messori. Trans. Jenny McPhee and Martha McPhee. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 1994, 38.

102. An Essay on Catholicism, 319.

103. Sources, 56.

104. ibid., 315.

105. ibid., 81.

106. ibid., 245.

107. The beginning of the Medieval Age is contested, but the sixth century is generally accepted. (see William R. Cook and Ronald B. Herzman. Medieval World View: An Introduction. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, xviii-xxii.) Augustine, writing in the fifth century, belongs to the world of late antiquity; however, because his writings were so much a part of Medieval thought, the term "Medieval," as it is used in this thesis, will include the writings of Augustine.

108. Political Theology, 56. Schmitt adds that Marxist socialism elides the question of the nature of man, "because it believes that changes in economic and social conditions change man."

109. quoted in Political Theology, 58.

110. ibid., 57.

111. Sources, 34.

112. ibid., 69.

113. Evans, Allan S., Riley E. Moynes, and Larry Martinello. What Man Believes: A Study of the World's Great Faiths. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1973, 300. See also: Cantor, Norman F. and Peter Klein, eds. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas: Medieval Thought. Waltham, Mass., Toronto and London: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1969, 47.

114. See The Book of Genesis, Chapter 1, Verse 31.

115. Taylor, Charles "Reply and Re-articulation." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 231.

116. from Augustine's Confessions, quoted in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, 52.

117. "Books in Review." Political Theory, 106.

118. Sources, 68.

119. ibid., 3.

120. ibid., 28.

121. It is interesting to note that when Taylor writes about Dostoevsky's work, as an example of epiphanic art, he refers only to those rare moments in Dostoevsky's oeuvre in which the self is portrayed as stable and well-grounded in a higher good. Dostoevsky's characters are usually noted for their ontological instability.

122. Sources, 57.

123. ibid., 27.

124. ibid., 18.

125. ibid., 29.

126. ibid., 17.

127. ibid., 19-20.

128. Political Theology, 13.

129. ibid., 5.

130. ibid., 10.

131. For a similar point of view see: R.B.J. Walker. "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice." Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community. Eds. R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 159, 159-185.

132. Political Theology, 36-37.

133. ibid., 48.

134. Jean Bethke Elshtain also connects Taylor's story of the self to the story of sovereignty. See: "The Risks and Responsibilities of Affirming Ordinary Life." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 74.

135. Political Theology, 14.

136. ibid., 15.

137. ibid., xvii-xviii.

138. ibid., xvi.

139. ibid., 6.

140. ibid., 15

141. Concepts of the Political, 60.

142. ibid., 26.

143. ibid., 28.

144. ibid., 26.

145. ibid., 30-31.

146. see for example: Taylor. "Shared and Divergent Values." Reconciling the Solitudes.

147. ibid., 173.

148. Concepts, 37.

149. ibid., 27.

150. Sources, 32.

151. Concepts, 28.

152. "Shared and Divergent Values," 177.

153. Concepts, 54.

154. ibid., 53.

155. Sources, 518.

156. ibid., 503.

157. see Skinner, Quentin. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 91-97.

158. Machiavelli, Niccolo. "The Prince." The Chief Works and Others. Trans. Allan Gilbert. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965, 90.

159. Sources, 82.

160. ibid., 14.

161. ibid., 214.

162. ibid., 395.

163. Malaise of Modernity, 38-39.

164. ibid., 39.

165. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 146.

166. Concepts, 71.

167. ibid., 70-71.

168. ibid., 70.

169. John Paul II. Crossing the Threshold of Hope, 201.

170. Sources, 10.

171. Concepts, 61.

172. ibid., 43-44.

173. Political Theology, 65. See also: Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1958, pp. 33, 41, 45, 58.

174. Sources, 398.

175. Taylor. "Alternative Futures." Reconciling the Solitudes, 79.

176. Ignatieff, Michael. The Needs of Strangers. New York: Penguin Books, 1986, 51.

177. Concepts, 52.

178. qtd. in A Woman's Notebook: Being a Blank Book with Quotes by Women. Don Mills, Ont.: Running Press, 1980.

179. "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate." Philosophical Arguments, 194.

180. "Shared and Divergent Values," 175.

181. Taylor, Charles. "Reply and Re-articulation." Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 250.

182. Habermas, Jurgen. "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State." Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Ed. Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 116.

183. "Shared and Divergent Values," 174.

184. "Alternative Futures." Reconciling the Solitudes, 106.

185. "Shared and Divergent Values," 178-9.

186. "Why Do Nations Become States?" Reconciling the Solitudes, 52.

187. Political Theology, xxv.

188. Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1958, 55.

189. "Shared and Divergent Values," 173.

190. see Taylor's essay, "The Politics of Recognition."

191. For a discussion of cultural imperialism see: Tomlinson, John. Cultural Imperialism. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991.

192. Ignatieff, Michael. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. Toronto: Penguin Group, 1993, 188.

193. "Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere," 285.

194. ibid., 283-4.

195. The Spirit of the Laws, 502.

196. The Needs of Strangers, 19.

197. Arendt, 77.

198. On the Contradiction Between Liberalism and Democracy, 36.

199. see Taylor's "Invoking Civil Society." Philosophical Arguments.

200. On the Contradiction Between Liberalism and Democracy, 34.

201. ibid., 16.

202. ibid., 50.

203. Taylor, Charles. The Malaise of Modernity. Concord, Ontario: House of Anansi Press, 1991, 120.

204. Walker, R.B.J. One World, Many Worlds. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Reiner, 1988, 115.

205. Davis, Mike. The City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles. London: Vintage Books, 1992, 11.

206. Donoso Cortes, Don Juan. An Essay on Catholicism, Authority and Order. Trans. Madeleine Vincent Goddard. New York: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc. 1925.

207. "Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere." Philosophical Arguments, 266.

208. On the Contradiction Between Liberalism and Democracy, 49.

209. ibid., 71.

210. ibid., 35.

211. "Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere," 281-2.

212. see: Arato, Andrew and Jean L.Cohen. Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1992, 364.

213. "Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere," 281-2.

214. Malaise of Modernity, 18.

215. Liora Salter was a participant in a televised media conference called, "Covering Politics in the 90's." It aired on CBC's "Newsworld" in the summer of 1993. I video-taped the program, and the following Salter quotations are from my transcription of this tape.

216. On the Human Condition, 58.

217. "Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere," 257-8.

218. ibid., 276.

219. ibid., 272.

220. ibid., 273.

221. Sources, 34.

222. Castells, Manuel. The City and the Grassroots. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Ca.: University of California Press, 1983, 313-14.

223. "Alternative Futures," 89.

224. ibid.

225. "Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere," 258.

226. On the Contradiction Between Liberalism and Democracy, 58.

227. ibid., 57.

228. ibid.

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