

Synchronizing an approach: DFATD's security sector programming

Kate Churchill-Smith, MPA candidate
School of Public Administration
University of Victoria
March 2014

Client: Tara Denham, Deputy Director, Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (IRG/START), Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD)

Supervisor: Dr. John Langford
School of Public Administration, University of Victoria

Second Reader: Dr. Herman Bakvis
School of Public Administration, University of Victoria

Chair: Dr. Thea Vakil
School of Public Administration, University of Victoria

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This research focuses on how best to harmonize the four security sector programs at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). It produces two key deliverables, including a literature review as well as targeted recommendations.

There has been some corporate indication that the programs should begin to integrate their processes in order to generate more strategic outcomes, and to align with best practices¹ for both transfer payments and engagement in fragile states. However, there is little consensus as to how the programs should interact to increase collective outcomes, nor is there consensus about whether or not to harmonize key documents like the programming terms and conditions. This paper focuses on both operational and technical means for coordination and collective responses. It will also act as a “challenge function” to departmental decision-making regarding the integration of the programs.

Methodology

The research methodology included primarily document analysis, with some comparative analysis. Documents included existing publications, such as the literature and best practices on multi-unit coordination, various programming documents like terms and conditions, as well as evaluations and audits of the security sector programs. The project had several limitations including a tight timeline, the unpredictability of senior DFATD corporate decisions regarding harmonization, as well as the literature's focus on inter-departmental partnership while the problem at hand is one of intra-departmental coordination. The research was also planned to have a sufficiently narrow focus. Parameters or delimitations precluded producing a set of full terms and conditions, analyzing the type of programming underway (or its appropriateness) and making organizational structure recommendations.

Literature Review

The literature review, or the first deliverable, is three-part. The first section focuses on transfer payment programs, as well as terms and conditions. It concludes that harmonized terms and conditions are increasingly recognized as a best practice, as is streamlined program administration. The second section focuses on donor engagement in fragile states, which also calls for a Whole-of-Government approach. Although coordination and joint programming lead to long-term development and stability at a lower cost, donor proliferation remains a serious problem – which leads to increased transactional costs and the diffusion of donor responsibility for both successes and failures.

The third part of the literature review is the most substantive, and focuses on horizontal coordination – or working collaboratively across jurisdictions to integrate policy and programs. It discusses the reasons why working horizontally is a good idea, such as the government's ability to address complex policy problems more holistically, and to bring together the necessary resources. It also leads to better coordination, increased

¹ “Best practices” is a contentious term in the public policy domain. The analytical work to date is skeptical of the existence of such practices, and the ability to transfer them (Pal & Clark, 2013, p. 2).

information exchange, a broader pool of expertise and increased operational flexibility. Yet working horizontally and creating value is widely recognized as difficult, and the processes to achieve it are not well defined. Common challenges include accountability, working horizontally in a bureaucratic culture, the under-estimation and allocation of costs, and turf protectiveness.

The literature, however, also includes best practices. While there is no single model of a successful horizontal initiative, trust and flexibility are absolute cultural requirements. Other key cultural values include information sharing, openness to risk, a supportive organizational culture, and interpersonal collaboration. As for mechanical components, successful initiatives often require champions and strong leaders, support and resources, the right set of managerial skills, and clear objectives. A sound decision-making structure is also needed, one that is appropriate to partnership needs, as well as a combination of formal and informal mechanisms, which lend the initiative structure and stability.

DFATD-specific analysis

The potential DFATD initiative will face many of the challenges cited in the literature. Cultural alignment, for example, will be impeded by factors like limited buy-in, insufficient information sharing and interpersonal collaboration, as well as turf protectiveness. Mechanical alignment will face challenges such as streamlining administration, articulating a clear mandate, establishing a governance system and demonstrating accountability and results. Lastly, sustaining increased integration over time will be difficult as a result of several factors, including the potential for limited buy-in, as well as the number of rotational employees that move positions each summer meaning relationship-building and trust will be even more difficult to sustain.

Recommendations

The paper makes 12 recommendations for DFATD in order to encourage greater integration among its four security sector programs. They address both cultural and mechanical challenges, and are listed in the order that they should be implemented. Recommendations include committing to horizontal work, adopting joint terms and conditions, and establishing clear roles and responsibilities, as well as alliance norms. A flexible and equitable secretariat should be established, as well as formal and informal processes encouraging collaboration. The integrated program should take a “single view of the client,” meaning standardizing administration across the four programs. Management should also ensure across-the-board adoption of the project management tool in order to give the initiative momentum, and propel it forward. Lastly, managers, as well as project officers, should be supported in their efforts to work collaboratively, and the initiative should focus on strategic sector level approaches in order to be able to effectively tell its “stories” and demonstrate value.

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii

1. INTRODUCTION 4

 1.1. Project Client and Problem 4

 1.2. Project Objectives 4

 1.3. Rationale 4

 1.1. Background 5

 1.2. Organization of Report 8

2. METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 9

 2.1. Methodology 9

 2.2. Methods 9

 2.3. Data Sources 9

 2.4. Limitations and Delimitations 10

3. LITERATURE REVIEW 11

 3.1. Transfer Payment Programs, and Terms and Conditions 11

 3.2. Coordination in fragile states 14

 3.3. Horizontal coordination 15

4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS 26

 4.1. Key concepts and ideas 26

 4.2. Framing the analysis and discussion of the four programs 26

5. RECOMMENDATIONS 29

6. CONCLUSION 34

REFERENCES 35

APPENDICES 39

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Project Client and Problem

The project client is the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), a division within the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). START manages a funding envelope of approximately \$120 million annually. Its programming targets fragile states, with a focus on rule of law, the security sector and conflict resolution (DFATD, 2013a, para. 1-2). It is one of four security sector programs in the department. Later this year, those four programs will be more closely integrated in order to generate more meaningful and efficient outcomes.

This research project was originally focused on the harmonization of the programming terms and conditions, a government-approved document that defines the program objectives, what can be funded, who the eligible recipients are, and what costs can be covered (Larkin & Clark, 2006, p. 33). However, it broadened to address more comprehensively what could be done to align the work of the four programs. This new focus includes both mechanical and cultural means for coordination and collective responses. While DFATD programs are slowly becoming more integrated, there is little consensus as to how the programs should interact to increase collective outcomes, nor is there consensus about whether or not to harmonize the programming terms and conditions.

1.2. Project Objectives

This project will produce strategic recommendations on how best to harmonize the four security sector programs. Suggestions will focus on both integrative management practices as well as the alignment of mechanical components, such as the terms and conditions. The project will act as a “challenge function” to departmental decision-making regarding the integration of the programs.

The primary research question is: How can the four security sector programs be most effectively integrated?

1.3. Rationale

The project's recommendations will help DFATD better coordinate its security sector programming – or present its four programs as a security sector programming “one-stop shop.” The client needs this project completed because the four security sector programs are likely going to be integrated next fiscal year, or April 1, 2014. There are two issues that should be addressed. First, the four security sector programs will be coordinated via a newly created secretariat, housed within the START structure.² Second, START's

² As of March 2014, there continues to be a lack of clarity about the structure's role, with most discussions remaining confidential among senior management.

programming terms and conditions³ are set to expire on March 31, 2014 and, as part of the pending renewal of the new program,⁴ DFATD may or may not seek approval of a harmonized set of terms and conditions for all four of the programs.

This provides the researcher with an opportunity to provide timely recommendations. START management will use the project findings to shape discussions around the integration of the programs, as well as the appropriate approach for the terms and conditions. The project, at the very least, will act as a “challenge function,” ensuring decisions around integration and authorities are informed.

1.4. Background


There are several background issues that will provide useful context to the research. These include a description of the security sector programs and their current status, an explanation of terms and conditions, and DFATD's recent merger.

1.4.1. Description of the four programs

The four programs include START, the Global Partnership Program (GPP), the Anti-Crime Capacity-Building Program (ACCBP) and the Counter-Terrorism Capacity-Building Program (CTCBP).

START seeks to provide timely, coherent programming in fragile states (DFATD, 2013a, para. 1). Its objectives include: to strengthen the security sector and rule of law institutions; to enable integrated responses to peace and security challenges; and, to promote conflict resolution (DFATD, para. 2). However, START is anticipating a mandate change in fiscal year 2014-2015, one that includes a broader focus on democracy and human rights. START currently has an annual budget of up to \$120 million (DFATD, para. 1), making it the largest program by funding level (see Figure 1 for annual budgets.) That may also change with the renewal.

Figure 1: Approximate program funding



³ The Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) is a funding envelope that exclusively finances START; thus, while the corporate name of the division is START, the terms and conditions are actually for the “GPSF.”

⁴ The renewal has not yet occurred, but is expected to take place at some point in Spring 2014.

GPP is focused on the prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism (DFATD, 2013b, para. 2). It aims to increase Canadian and global security by reducing threats related to nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical terrorism (DFATD, para. 2). The GPP has an annual budget of \$73.4 million (DFATD, para. 3)

CTCBP helps states respond to terrorist activity through training, funding and equipment provision, as well as technical and legal assistance (DFATD, 2013c, para. 2). The CTCBP has an annual budget of \$12 million (DFATD, 2009, Program Overview section).

ACCBP addresses threats posed by transnational criminal activity in the Americas (DFATD, 2013d, para. 1). The program focuses on illicit drug trafficking, security-sector reform and crime prevention, as well as corruption and human trafficking (DFATD, para. 2). The ACCBP has an annual budget of \$15 million (DFATD, para. 1).

1.4.2. Current program interaction and overlap

The programming mandates overlap in some areas. Project locations are often similar given the collective focus on fragile states and countries with weak security institutions. A police training project overseen by START, for example, could easily be implemented alongside an ACCBP project focusing on drug trafficking. Other times there are similar projects with a different geographic focus. An ongoing START project, for example, is building capacity among UN member states, international organizations and the private sector to effectively implement sanctions. The project is based in New York, and will result in trainings as well as the publication of a “user-guide”-style sanctions implementation manual. Another recently approved GPP project will build sanctions implementation capacity in targeted regions around the world. This overlap is an example of an opportunity to more closely coordinate.

The programs operate in much the same manner. They are all transfer payment programs, but also grants and contributions programs – meaning they each have two programming mechanisms. They can either enter into a grant arrangement, or a contribution arrangement with a recipient organization. The type of transfer payment used depends on several factors, including risk, project complexity, the level of funding, the department's relationship with the recipient, as well as performance conditions (DFATD, 2013f, p. 5).⁵ The programs work through similar recipients, including foreign states, multilateral organizations, international and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Projects in all programs are typically multi-year projects, with comparable funding levels. Larger projects generally have annual budgets of several million dollars, whereas smaller projects often have budgets of less than one million dollars.

The programming objectives work towards the same broader departmental goal. The four programs align under DFATD's strategic outcome, “Canada's International Agenda,” and the sub-program called “International Assistance Program Governance” (See Annex 1 for Program Alignment Architecture). The programs also align within the DFATD corporate structure. All fall within the International Security and Crisis Response branch and are

⁵ Typically, grants are only given to federal Crown corporations or entities and international organizations to which Canada is a member (DFATD, 2012, p. 26), such as the United Nations.

therefore managed by the same Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM). All four programs were part of the "Foreign Affairs" side of the department, both before and after amalgamation with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

Despite this corporate alignment, interaction between the programs is minimal. There is a coordination mechanism in place among senior management; a Director General (DG)-level interdepartmental advisory committee discusses international security and democracy-related programming. Further, project officers and deputy directors see their programming counterparts at occasional country- or region-specific coordination meetings. However, there are no other formal mechanisms or processes in place facilitating or mandating coordination at the working level, such as a shared database enabling officers to see what else is being concurrently funded or whether a potential new recipient has in fact worked with one of the other programs before. There is also no strategic framework for security sector programming – or a broader strategy that brings the programs together to build complementarity and avoid redundancy – which is something that could improve outcomes.⁶

There is greater collaboration among the capacity-building programs, both of which share a set of terms and conditions. START and GPP have their own terms and conditions, although the three sets do not vary significantly and share many of the same key clauses like eligible recipients, projects and expenditures.

1.4.3. What terms and conditions are

Terms and conditions are a document approved by either the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) or a minister that sets out the parameters for a program's transfer payments (Centre of Expertise (SMFC), 2013, personal communication). All four of the security sector programs are grants and contributions programs, meaning they manage transfer payments subject to pre-established eligibility or performance conditions (Centre of Expertise (SMFC), personal communication). There are other grants and contributions programs within DFATD, including, for example the Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), the Partnerships with Canadians programs, the Global Citizens Program, and the Global Commerce Strategy (See Annex 2 for a list of DFATD funding programs). On the "development" side of the department, there is a significant amount of programming – all of which is governed by one set of terms and conditions.

1.4.4. DFAIT and CIDA amalgamation

The Department merged with the CIDA in Spring 2013. As a result of the merger, the new Department reassessed its internal structure in order to ensure that all of the various components were functioning well together. While the four security programs existed on the "Foreign Affairs" side of DFATD, amalgamation is likely one of the forces that drove thinking around their increased integration.

1.4.5. Plans for increased integration

It is clear upper management would like the four security sector programs to coordinate

⁶ START has traditionally developed its own strategic placemats, which sets out broad programming objectives and aligns them with ministerial directives and announcements.

more closely to achieve enhanced outcomes. While the Department signalled these intentions in late 2013, what that “coordination” will look like remains unclear.

There have, however, been some tentative decisions that relate to harmonization. DFATD has begun piloting country-specific strategic frameworks for all four programs, and it will likely establish a secretariat within START's policy branch to coordinate the four programs. Furthermore, as part of START's renewal process, several sets of terms and conditions have been drafted, including one specific to START and another that would harmonize the four programs. The Memorandum to Cabinet (MC) submission is still pending and – once it is approved – a single set of terms and conditions will be chosen as part of the TB submission (see Annex 3 for comparison of MC and TB submissions). While several decisions have been made, almost all of the planned changes will not take place until START as a program is renewed.

1.5. Organization of Report

This report is divided into five sections. Following this introduction is a methodology and methods section. It provides information about the researcher's approach, data sources, and the limitations and delimitations. The third section – one of the project's deliverables – is a three-part literature review, with a focus on transfer payments, donor engagement in fragile states, and horizontal coordination. The fourth section describes the research's conceptual framework, setting out the key ideas and concepts emerging from the literature and best practices around which the discussion of the DFATD-specific management challenges are organized. The fifth section, another key deliverable, includes 12 pragmatic recommendations that are informed by the literature, reports of best practices and the DFATD context.

2. METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

2.1. Methodology

The researcher used a qualitative approach that included two methods: document analysis and comparative analysis. The research included only existing publications, or secondary sources of data, and it was staged; the first phase focused on programming terms and conditions, and a subsequent phase focused on coordination literature and best practices.

2.2. Methods

The project research included two methods: document analysis, and comparative analysis. They were sequenced, as seen in Figure 2.

- **Document Analysis:** The researcher analyzed best practices and the literature to inform how best the four programs should harmonize. This responds to the research’s main question. The researcher also analyzed and compared the various sets of terms and conditions,⁷ in order to understand where key differences and commonalities lie. The researcher also examined program evaluations to understand what aspects of the legal framework have been effective and ineffective.
- **Comparative Analysis:** The researcher compared the document analysis findings with other harmonized programs, such as the Global Commerce Strategy (GCS). The goal was to understand how other bureaucrats have dealt with the challenge of bringing together programs under the same legal framework.

Figure 2: Ordering of key research tasks



It should be noted that the research – which includes a focus on best practices – was performed while acknowledging that claims of best practice can be perceived as problematic. Pal & Clark (2013) describe their use in the public sector as a “paradox,” largely because it is not clear what the “best” is, nor is it clear how or why adaptation occurs (p. 2).

2.3. Data Sources

The researcher did not collect data or perform interviews, but instead relied exclusively on existing publications, or secondary data sources, including:

- Literature and best practices on multi-unit coordination, including TBS publications

⁷ This includes START’s terms and conditions, the GPP terms and conditions, and the terms and conditions that the other two programs – ACCBP and CTCBP – already share.

- Relevant evaluations and audits of the four programs (see Figure 3)
- TBS directives on terms and conditions for grants and contributions programs
- 3 sets of security sector terms and conditions⁸

Figure 3: Relevant evaluations and audits, all publicly available⁹

Program	Evaluation	Date
CTCBP	Formative Evaluation of the Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program	May 2009
START (GPSF)	Evaluation of the GPSF	Feb 2011
	Summative Evaluation of GPSF – Haiti	April 2009
	Formative evaluation of the GPSF	Feb 2008
GPP	Formative Evaluation of GPSF - Sudan	Sept 2007
	Audit	June 2010
	Summative Evaluation	Feb 2008

2.4. Limitations and Delimitations

There were several limitations. First, the researcher was working with a tight timeline. With the need to produce draft deliverables in early 2014, the time to research, analyse and write was limited to several months. Second, the Department's planning around programming integration and the terms and conditions has largely stalled as it waits on the approval of the START Memorandum to Cabinet (MC). As a result, the research was done autonomously; this may limit its relevance if, for example, a significantly different path is pursued. However, it also reinforces the integrity of it being used as a "challenge function." Lastly, much of the coordination literature focuses on interdepartmental, inter-jurisdictional or even cross-sector partnerships; DFATD, however, will be undertaking intradepartmental coordination. The analysis and recommendations take this into consideration.

There are several delimitations. First, the researcher is clarifying the rationale driving harmonization, describing what it would entail and providing overarching recommendations as to how to approach it. She is not drafting a final set of harmonized terms and conditions for several reasons. Document analysis and comparative analysis do not provide sufficient insight as to how certain clauses in the terms and conditions should be harmonized, something typically resolved by programming lawyers and the Department's Centre of Expertise on Grants and Contributions (SMFC). In this way, such an approach would have required extensive primary research, which the project's timeline did not permit. Second, the report will not look at the different kinds of programming within each security sector program, nor will it make recommendations that hinge on changes to the organizational structure. Instead, it will focus on best practices around the mechanical and cultural aspects of programming coordination.

⁸ The ACCBP and CTCBP share a set of terms and conditions. The other two include the START and GPP terms and conditions. All the terms and conditions, while not publicly available, were obtainable at work. Permission was facilitated through management overseeing the researcher.

⁹ The ACCBP only started late 2010. No evaluations or audits to date.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review is three-part. The first section addresses transfer payment policy, with a focus on terms and conditions. The second section addresses coordination specific to aid delivery, including security sector programming. The third, more substantive section focuses on horizontal coordination including the costs and benefits of working horizontally, as well as challenges common to launching and managing horizontal work.

3.1. Transfer Payment Programs, and Terms and Conditions

Assessing the literature on transfer payment programs will ensure the new program reflects best practices. The review touches on emerging practices among other departments, TBS policies, relevant program evaluations and recommendations made by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG). Together, they show that harmonized terms and conditions are increasingly the norm, as is streamlined program administration.

3.1.1. *Harmonizing terms and conditions*

Consolidated terms and conditions are often considered a better way to achieve strategic objectives (Department of Justice, 2013, Section 4.3.8). When consolidating many of its program authorities, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) cited the following benefits: a unified, predictable program environment; a decreased administrative burden on recipients; standardization of program operations; and consolidation of proposal and reporting processes (2013a, Question 2).

The literature is sparse on design, but it seems that developing “umbrella” terms and conditions for programs with similar objectives appears to be the most common approach (Larkin & Clark, 2006, p. 66); this means the use of a single, adaptable contribution instrument that includes the spelled out elements of each program (Larkin & Clark, p. 70). Terms and conditions should also be clear, accessible and simple. The 2006 Blue Ribbon Panel on Grants and Contributions called for the simplification of accountability documents, including terms and conditions (Larkin & Clark, p. 33). The panel referred to them, at the time, as “needlessly complex and confusing”, and expensive and time-consuming to prepare (Larkin & Clark, p. 33).

As a reference, it is useful to reflect on the changes being tackled by AANDC to consolidate its transfer payment terms and conditions. The department is in the process of consolidating 39 of its 69 total authorities into 14 authorities, in order to streamline application and reporting processes and to reduce administration on First Nations communities (AANDC, 2013a, Question 1&2). The various terms and conditions were grouped together under Strategic Outcomes, according to the department's Program Alignment Architecture (PAA) (AANDC, 2013b). Other departments have taken similar approaches. Health Canada's First Nations Inuit Health Branch (FNIHB) consolidated its authorities from 32 to 10 in 2007, and then down to 3 in 2011 (AANDC, 2013a, Question 4).

3.1.2. Policy reform regarding transfer payment administration

The changes initiated by AANDC reflect the government's attempts to provide across-the-board consistency regarding transfer payments (AANDC, 2013a, Question 1). Specifically, they reflect recommendations made by the Blue Ribbon Panel on Grants and Contributions, the TBS *Policy on Transfer Payments* and a 2011 OAG Report (AANDC, Question 1). These policy documents are worth quickly summarizing.


In 2006, the independent Blue Ribbon Panel called for changes in the delivery of grants and contributions (OAG, 2012, p. 1). It encouraged a "single view of the client", after finding problems like a lack of information-sharing about programs within the same department, the need for recipients to submit similar reports to multiple program managers and to submit the same information multiple times when applying (Lankin & Clark, 2006, p. 22-23). The panel recommended improved horizontal coordination within and across departments, and, to the extent possible, the harmonization of information, reporting and audit requirements for grants and contributions at the federal, provincial and municipal levels (Lankin & Clark, p. 23).

A 2008 government action plan responded to the Panel's findings by reforming the approach to grants and contributions in order to reduce the administrative burden (see Figure 4 for an overview) (OAG, 2012, p. 1). As part of the plan, the TBS *Policy on Transfer Payments* was updated; an expected result is to render transfer payment programs "accessible, understandable and useable by applicants and recipients," (TBS, 2012a, Section 5.2.1). In particular, it called for collaboration within and among departments to, where appropriate, harmonize transfer payment programs and standardize their administration (TBS, Section 5.2.1).¹⁰ It also called for the administrative burden on recipients to be proportionate to a project's risk profile (TBS, Section 5.2.1), something that means all organizations should be using a review and challenge function for its risk assessments (OAG, p. 15).

Public service structures and incentives increasingly reflect this new policy direction, as can be seen with management roles and responsibilities. The Government of Canada has actively promoted horizontal initiatives and management practices (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 14). Deputy Ministers (DMs), as well as Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADMs) are now accountable for how well they have achieved horizontal objectives (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 12). In addition, Deputy Heads are also responsible for ensuring the harmonization of Transfer Payment programs, and standardizing their administration (TBS, 2012a, Clause 6.5.10 and 6.5.11).

¹⁰ Responsibilities of deputy heads includes, among other things, ensuring harmonization of transfer payment programs (TBS, 2012a, Section 6.5.10) and standardizing transfer payment administration (TBS, Section 6.5.11).

Figure 4: Main elements of the 2008 Government Action Plan (OAG, 2012, p. 4)



3.1.3. Program evaluations and audits

Past program evaluations and audits contain suggestions and critiques relevant to the drafters of the new terms and conditions. The 2011 Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund is the only evaluation with sustaining value, given the other evaluations date to 2009 and 2008¹¹ and contain little relevant information pertaining to terms and conditions.

In the 2011 evaluation, Finding 46 raises several issues regarding START's terms and conditions. First, it lists the exemptions permitted to START in its application of the TBS *Policy on Transfer Payments* (DFATD, 2013e, Section 5.4). Exemptions included those related to conflict of interest and post-employment code guidelines, the rule against making advance payments, the TBS cash management policy, and the need to deduct imputed interest (DFATD, Section 5.4). Second, Finding 46 also cites several problems with respect to the terms and conditions. These include:

- a lack of clarity regarding parameters for overhead and administrative charges;
- no mention of retroactive eligible expenditures, despite its use by START;
- the need for a more consistent approach to dealing with the risk of exchange rate fluctuations; and,
- the need to differentiate between recipient type in order to clarify who can use their own rules and regulations, and who must follow TBS guidelines (DFATD, Section 5.4).¹²

¹¹ There was also a 2010 audit of the Global Partnership Program, but it too was largely silent on terms and conditions.

¹² Two other problems – that vehicles are not an eligible expenditure, and a difference in the maximum grant and contribution ceilings – were cited (DFATD, 2013e, Section 5.4), but both appear to have been addressed in START's terms and conditions as renewed in 2011.

Finding 46 also mentions several other issues pertaining to START's terms and conditions. These include: the inability to accept third-party funds in American dollars in specified purpose accounts; START's inability to reallocate resources and avoid lapsing funds at year's end; the lack of clear financial thresholds regarding the exceptional use of direct purchase and sole source options; and, START's inability to provide core funding (DFATD, 2013e, Section 5.4).

3.2. Coordination in fragile states

The literature urges the adoption of horizontal, or coordinated, approaches when engaging in fragile or conflict-affected states. Despite it being acknowledged as the preferred way to engage, aid proliferation continues to be a problem.

3.2.1. Whole-of-Government Approach

Because the security sector programs often engage in fragile states, there is increased rationale driving the adoption of a Whole-of-Government (WoG) approach. Such an approach to fragile states can contribute to long-term development and stability at a lower cost, and can boost the legitimacy of the policies in the eyes of the recipient countries (OECD, 2006, p. 7). It also reduces the risk of objectives not being met (OECD, p. 7).

The OECD's principles on fragile state engagement are also careful to note that successful development depends on well-sequenced and coherent progress across political, security, economic and administrative domains (2006, p. 7). These domains are interdependent, with a particularly strong tie between security and development, noting that "failure in one risks failure in all others" (OECD, p. 7).

Other best practices in aid delivery urge for coordination and joint programming. Canada signed the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness calling on donor actions to be "harmonised, transparent and collectively effective" (OECD, 2005, p. 6). In doing so, donors were asked to harmonize their activities and procedures, and to reduce the number of separate missions to the field (OECD, 2005, p. 6-7).

3.2.2. Donor fragmentation persists

Despite best practices, donors are not coordinating (Aldasoro & Nunnenkamp, 2010, p. 920) and, instead, aid proliferation remains a serious problem (Bigsten, 2006). It has deleterious effects on programming; it increases aid-related transaction costs (Acharya et al., 2006),¹³ and can diffuse donor responsibility for successes and failures (Belton, 2003).

As for why aid proliferation persists, Lalonde's (2009) Canadian-specific research shows that domestic factors continue to affect the lack of its aid coordination (p. ii). Factors include government rules and procedures, decision-making processes, and government interests (Lalonde, p. ii).

¹³ This is demonstrated through multiple donor missions, different sets of policy conditions as well as different reporting requirements.

3.3. Horizontal coordination

The reasons for working horizontally are convincing. It enables government to think about problems more holistically, and to bring together the resources to address them (Bardach, 1998, p. 306). We see this reflected in the government's adoption of a Whole-of-Government approach to expenditures, one that urges collectively working towards 16 high-level outcomes, including "a safe and secure world through international engagement" (TBS, 2013b, Section III) (See Annex 4 for all 16 WoG outcomes). Horizontality also creates value (Anand & Khanna, 2000, p. 295). But working collaboratively is "harder than it sounds" (Bardach, p. 306), value creation is widely recognized as difficult and horizontal management is not a "well-defined process" (Anand & Khanna, p. 295-296).

3.3.1. *Why we work together*

Whole of Government (WoG), or working horizontally, involves working collaboratively across jurisdictions to integrate policy and programs (Halligan, Buick & O'Flynn, 2011, p. 76). There are numerous factors pushing all kinds of horizontal and collaborative work (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 5). They include new technology, and an increased willingness of public servants to work across boundaries (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 1). There is also pressure on national budgets and the uncertainty following the financial crisis, as well as the current government's control of policy direction, communications and the public service (Lindquist, 2012, Stock-take section, para. 3). Other drivers of collaboration include reactions to the New Public Management (NPM) movement, complex policy problems and demands for accountability.

Horizontal approaches are considered useful strategies to address the silo effect that resulted from New Public Management (NPM) reforms introduced in the 1980s and 90s. (Halligan et al., 2011, p. 78). The NPM movement aimed to provide single-window service delivery in order to better meet client needs (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 13). However, this involved hiving off activities and creating agencies and self-standing organizations, something that ultimately contributed to organizational fragmentation (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 13).¹⁴

Complex policy domains are another primary driver for greater coordination (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004b, Section 2, para. 6), such as issues like climate change or urban homelessness. These policy problems are making the management of horizontal issues more visible and urgent (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 10-11), and the pressure to work collaboratively to address them only increases as the government's agenda incorporates more crosscutting issues (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 1).

Increased coordination can also help the government respond to growing accountability demands (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004b, Section 2, para. 6). Canadians are increasingly demanding citizen-centred programs that are efficient, effective and transparent (Fox & Lenihan, 2006, p. 1), something that greater coordination can help achieve.

¹⁴ Compared to other jurisdictions, though, NPM had a far limited impact in Canada than in other jurisdictions (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 13).

3.3.2. *Benefits of working horizontally*

The benefits of increased coordination are as varied and numerous as the factors driving it. Horizontal and collaborative work can lead to increased effectiveness, as well as financial leveraging and risk sharing, something that can ultimately enable bigger and bolder initiatives.

Mulder & Rodal (1993) point to a number of reasons why collaboration can lead to improved effectiveness (Purposes of Partnership (POP) section). There is often better coordination, increased information exchange, a broader pool of expertise, and enhanced operational flexibility (Mulder & Rodal, POP section.) By bringing teams together, collaboration can also lead to creative problem solving and help avoid duplication or conflicting goals (Mulder & Rodal, Terms and Definitions (T&D) section.)

Horizontal initiatives can also lead to more resources, and the sharing of risk. Mulder & Rodal (1993) explain that resources are sometimes more readily available when several players are acting collaboratively (POP section.) Collaboration can also lead to sharing the accountability for outcomes (Mulder & Rodal, T & D section.) By risk-sharing and leveraging funds, partners are often able to undertake bolder and more innovative initiatives than might otherwise have been considered (Mulder & Rodal, POP section.)

3.3.3. *Partnership Definitions*

It is important to understand the many partnership terms. Without consistent terminology, partners may have different expectations, and their actions may not work towards common objectives (Mulder & Rodal, 1993, T&D section.)

Collaboration: Bakvis & Juillet (2004a) describe collaboration as the process of coordinating activities, but also the process of developing, agreeing to and implementing a strategy around set objectives (p. 8). Collaboration typically involves a shared authority, sometimes requiring ministerial involvement, as well as collective accountability (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 9). Bardach (1998) notes that collaboration also aims to increase public value (p. 8).

Coordination: Coordination is the practice of aligning structures and activities to help achieve horizontal objectives, but also to reduce overlap and ensure objectives are not harmed by the work of a contributing partner (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 8).

Horizontal Management: Horizontal management is the coordination and management of activities among two or more organizational units (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 8). The units do not have hierarchical control over each other, and the relationship's objective is to generate outcomes not feasible working in isolation (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 8).

Partnership: There is disagreement on how to define partnership.¹⁵ Bakvis & Juillet (2004a) define it as a formalized arrangement involving legal contracts, deliverables and

¹⁵ Langford (2002) argues the word "partnership" acts as a "catch-all" phrase for various arrangements, one that is over-used and therefore has little meaning (p. 2).

payments, something we often see with external partners (p. 9). However, Mulder & Rodal (1993) define it as an arrangement between two or more parties who are working together toward a shared objective (T&D section.) It also includes shared authority, joint resources, shared liability and mutual benefits (Mulder & Rodal, T & D section.)

Despite the number of definitions and terms used in the partnership domain, Mulder & Rodal (1993) insist that categories are not rigid and that there is considerable overlap (PT section). They also note that an arrangement often evolves throughout the course of its existence (PT section).

3.3.4. Cultural characteristics of successful horizontal initiatives

While trust and flexibility are absolute requirements, there is no single model of a successful horizontal initiative (Fox & Lenihan, 2006, p. 7). However, the literature identifies characteristics that, when combined with others, may lead to success. These include trust and information sharing, flexibility, openness to risk, a supportive organizational culture, and interpersonal collaboration.

Trust is the “lubricant making horizontal arrangements work” (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 9). It increases tolerance for poor behaviour, helps avoid conflict, and improves the quality of communication (Langford, 2002, p. 5), which is critical given the level of resource sharing among partners (Langford, p. 11). Trust can also facilitate synergy, where one partner’s strengths complement another’s weakness (Lynch, 1990, p. 7). Trust can be difficult to sustain and a lack of trust can hinder collaboration and information sharing (Langford, p. 5).

Partnerships introduce more “novelty and variety” than each partner would face on its own, and flexibility helps them adapt to an uncertain and dynamic environment (Bardach, 1998, p. 116). Langford (2002) notes the value of flexibility when the rules of engagement are not yet established, and the partnership’s future is unclear (p. 6). Bardach, however, notes the usefulness of loosened controls around budget expenditures, and the provision of greater latitude to frontline staff (p. 161). This can lead partners to forge working-level links, and to organize themselves into teams (Bardach, p. 117).

Successful partnerships must have a high tolerance for risk and uncertainty (Langford, 2002, p. 4). First, alliances are complex, and the transfer of knowledge between partners is “fraught with ambiguity” (Langford, p. 5). Second, the operating environment could change throughout the partnership’s life, altering the incentives of each party (Langford, p. 5). Lastly, factors like personalities and organizational cultures could affect the relationships between partners (Langford, p. 5).

An organizational culture that promotes values of trust, information sharing, networking, negotiation, consensus, flexibility and collaboration is important (Langford, 2002, p. 5). Although it can be difficult to sustain, collaboration, for example, displaces hierarchical values and instils the sense of a true horizontal network (Langford, p. 6). The culture should also promote innovation and creativity, a tolerance for mistakes, and a readiness to “think and act” across boundaries (Halligan et al., 2011, p. 91). Without all these

components, a partnership has little chance of success, even if all the right managerial structures, processes and skills are in place (Langford, p. 5).

Partnerships rely heavily on interpersonal collaboration, and their value increases when partners can easily work together (Bardach, 1998, p. 268). Indeed, successful partnerships typically have eradicated the “silo” mentality and structures that foster competition in large bureaucracies (Langford, 2002, p. 4). But encouraging interpersonal collaboration can be difficult, particularly given bureaucratic cultural barriers (Bardach, p. 268).

The importance of partnership norms should also be noted because they can also encourage collaboration towards a shared objective (Langford, 2002, p. 7). When partners understand their role and responsibility as part of the initiative, governance also becomes easier (Langford, p. 7).

3.3.5. Mechanical components of successful horizontal initiatives

There are certain mechanical components critical to the success of horizontal initiatives. These include champions and strong leaders, support and resources, the right set of skills, clear objectives and a sound decision-making structure.

The presence of champions and strong leaders is considered a key determinant of success (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 2), and a cornerstone of successful joint initiatives (Fox & Lenihan, 2011, p. 8). Champions find innovative solutions and resources (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 2), secure executive commitment (Lynch, 1990, p. 8), and facilitate the setting of goals (Bardach, 1998, p. 308). They are therefore a critical component both in launching the initiative, and sustaining it over time (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 19). Without strong leadership at the top, horizontal work will have limited impact and may, in fact, be counter-productive (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004b, Intro para. 3). Yet finding and motivating the right people to fill the leadership role can be difficult (Bardach, 1998, p. 308).

Timely support and resources are needed for a horizontal initiative to succeed. This includes the injection of funding at critical junctures (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 45), and timely executive support – particularly given the nurturing many initiatives need at the outset (Lindquist, 2012, Annex, para. 1). Horizontal initiatives also need people, including dedicated human resources (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 21). Over-reliance on temporary secondments, part-time participation and even volunteers can be problematic. (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 21). Training is also essential, as it enables individuals to stay involved and committed (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 21).

Appropriate skillsets are critical given the demands managers face performing horizontal work (Langford, 2002, p. 4). Even with the best structures and processes in place, the success of the partnership still hinges on the skills of the individuals at the centre (Langford, p. 8). Horizontal management is more than good management (Lindquist, 2012, Annex, para. 1), and requires different skills and values (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 21). They include negotiation, communication and mediation (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 2), as well as developing consensus around key issues (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 22). Managers

incapable of working in a collaborative environment will perform poorly in horizontal settings (Lynch, 1990, p. 8).

Given the need for quality management, training is a priority. Capacity building should focus on required skills like negotiation and mediation skills to facilitate collaboration (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 66). However, some public servants already have experience working across boundaries (Lindquist, 2012, Annex, para. 1). That knowledge needs to be identified where it exists, and shared among colleagues (Lindquist, Annex, para. 1).

Langford (2002) notes the temptation in government to use consultants throughout the partnering process (p. 14). Consultants can facilitate an initiative's launch, but managerial capacity is what sustains long-term relationships (Langford, p. 14).

Every partnership requires clear objectives. Ambiguous goals and uncoordinated activities often lead to failure (Lynch, 1990, p. 8). Thus, a partnership needs to articulate a vision, define its own mission and choose precise goals (Bardach, 1998, p. 199). This process is political, because it involves values, constituencies and turf, as well as power and ego (Bardach, p. 199).

All horizontal initiatives need an efficient and collaborative decision-making structure (Lynch, 1990, p. 8). Values like negotiation and consensus are critical to partnership decisions (Langford, 2002, p. 6). If one partner is not the lead, for example, then negotiation will be required to establish consensus (Langford, p. 6). Langford also notes that decision-making within a collaborative setting is different than within a hierarchical bureaucracy where the focus is more on controlling subordinates, rather than juggling constituencies (Langford, 2002, p. 6). Decision-making bodies should have clear processes that are transparent, and in line with the initiative's governance, departmental governance as well as TBS evaluation requirements (TBS, 2012b, p. 10).

3.3.6. Structures and Processes

Horizontal management requires formal and informal mechanisms, which together provide structure and stability (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 16). Bakvis & Juillet describe a continuum of structures with informal networks at one end and a secretariat at the other. Working groups and departmental committees of varying degrees of formality are found in the middle (p. 16) (See Figure 5). The allocation of responsibilities and reporting relations are created through agreements, understandings and even formal structures (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 17). Some governments, for example, create new organizational units with resources, authority and some sense of permanency (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004b, Section 2, para. 12).

Figure 5: Continuum showing various structures, informal on left to formal on rights



3.3.6.1. Informal coordination approaches

Successful partnerships use boundary-spanning structures and processes that promote multi-unit collaboration (Langford, 2002, p. 8). However, in order for them to be successful, there often needs to be processes in place that encourage key values (Langford, p. 8). A process promoting open communication, for example, would be a joint taskforce (Langford, p. 8). However, practitioners should be wary of putting in place too many heavy coordinating mechanisms given the demands they make on the executive (Lindquist, 2012, Annex, para. 1).

3.3.6.2. Considerations for choosing a structure

It is important to choose a structure that suits partnership needs (Bardach, 1998, p. 231). Considerations include the initiative's scope, complexity and the importance of its policies and programs (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004b, Section 2, para. 13) (See Annex 5 for a complexity grid). Other considerations include the partnership's level of risk, the amount of integration required, and how fast decisions need to be made (Langford, 2002, p. 9). A partnership's operations should be considered more closely than technicalities like legal agreements; the latter does not typically affect partnership success (Lynch, 1990, p. 7).

3.3.6.3. Examples of how to steer

TBS (2012) suggests the following approach to horizontal steering. It advises that arrangements usually include an advisory or steering committee at the ADM level, a management committee at the Director General or director level, and a number of interdepartmental working groups to address specific issues (p. 15).¹⁶ The lead partner usually provides a secretariat (TBS, p. 15).

Several horizontal case studies showcase other steering approaches. Bakvis & Juillet (2004a) analysed three initiatives, including: the Innovation Strategy, the Urban Aboriginal Strategy (UAS) and the Climate Change Secretariat. Each initiative employed a mixture of instruments, which helped foster interdepartmental coordination (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 14). They also helped deliver three key outputs, including: authority, financial incentives, and information exchange (p. 15) (See Figure 6). Interdepartmental committees, for example, foster dialogue and information exchange, which generates trust and comprehension of the work underway (p. 14). The case studies also provide a warning. Regardless of how much dialogue and information sharing occurs, without sufficient authority, a horizontal initiative will likely fail (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 16).

¹⁶ The TBS guidelines are designed for interdepartmental coordination; intra-departmental coordination may require a less formal approach.

Figure 6: Examples of instrument use (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 15)

	Authority	Financial Incentives	Information Exchange
Innovation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cabinet mandate ▪ DM committee ▪ PCO intervention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pooled budget (consultation and citizen engagement phase only) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interdepartmental meetings
UAS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cabinet mandate ▪ DM steering committee ▪ Clerk's mandate letters and lead departments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pooled budget ▪ Joint Terms and Conditions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Secretariat ▪ Working group and local coordinating committees ▪ Federal Regional Councils
Climate Change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cabinet mandate ▪ DM steering committee ▪ PCO intervention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pooled budget (CCAF) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Secretariat and associated committees ▪ Reference Group of Ministers on Climate Change

3.3.6.4. *Smart practices when setting up the steering process*

There are several smart practices to consider when designing the steering process. First, quality management should be used instead of governance procedures because the latter is too serious for steering (Bardach, 1998, p. 211). A strategic approach, for example, is to hold informal discussions that result in short, operational briefs (Bardach, p. 300). Second, stakeholders do not have to agree on every issue (Bardach, p. 209). Instead, consensus should be limited to what is practically sufficient (Bardach, p. 231), given the need to push through the development phase, which can be “endless and wearisome” (Bardach, p. 209). Complex steps like needs assessments, priority-setting exercises and planning can stall action and should be eliminated where possible (Bardach, p. 299). Lastly, management should always first try to alter the working relationships without changing organizational identities (Bardach, p. 17). Formal restructuring produces little value, and is expensive and time-consuming (Bardach, p. 16).

It is important to note that one partner typically takes the lead in a horizontal arrangement (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 63); it is often the one with the most funds (Mulder & Rodal, 1993, Managerial Issues (MI) section). But it is important to have an equitable arrangement that encourages joint ownership, and balances everyone's needs (Mulder & Rodal, Balance section). To accomplish this, the dominant partner can delegate power, build the capacity of partners requiring support and put in place mechanisms to correct predictable imbalances (Mulder & Rodal, Balance section). Furthermore, Langford (2002) warns practitioners to avoid the establishment of a master-servant relationship among partners (p. 13), and to mute competitive and opportunistic behaviour (p. 6).

3.3.7. *Challenges to horizontal work*

Working collaboratively introduces many challenges and risks, and practitioners should try to identify and address the most serious ones (Bardach, 1998, p. 39). Challenges include staff turnover, the lack of a competent leader, budget constraints and disagreement over goals (Bardach, p. 39). Langford (2002) also notes incompatibilities between systems, poor communications and insufficient representation among stakeholders (p. 13). Although these are more difficult to plan for, talent and expertise sometimes dissipates, and there can be disruptions that arise from the political or fiscal environment (Bardach, p. 305). Some of the most common challenges include accountability, workload, working horizontally in a bureaucratic culture, the under-estimation and allocation of costs, and turf protectiveness.

One of the most significant challenges horizontal initiatives face is accountability, mostly due to the public sector's traditional vertical lines and hierarchical structure (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 56). Collaboration can blur missions and political accountability parameters, meaning measuring results using the current accountability practices is difficult (Bardach, 1998, p. 13).¹⁷

It is helpful to distinguish among the types of accountability. The conventional view of accountability, that partners are only accountable for the resources and efforts they contribute, does not sufficiently capture horizontal work (Fox & Lenihan, 2006, p. 7). As a result, Fox & Lenihan argue that horizontal initiatives introduce an element of shared accountability, one that recognizes the partnership as more than the sum of its parts (p. 3).

Working horizontally is a demanding activity (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 61). It requires staff time, adds to the paper burden, and can complicate measurement and reporting (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 61-62). Collaboration challenges like turf protectiveness, cultural differences and interpersonal conflicts are common problems that require time and effort to address (Langford, 2002, p. 13). Horizontality does not save time, nor does it save money (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 63).

The public sector's organizational culture is not conducive to horizontal coordination (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 47), and bureaucrats often feel they are "pulling against gravity" when working horizontally (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 4). In order for horizontality to be effective, worldviews and professional ideologies need to be reconciled, and the work of each partner has to align despite complex government administrative systems that "presuppose deliberate nonalignment" (Bardach, p. 306).

The costs of horizontal work are often under-represented (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 2). Bakvis & Juillet identified the principle cost as time invested in countless meetings and discussions (p. 48). There are also difficulties in creating a shared vision, an accountability framework, shared performance indicators, and complex reporting requirements (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 2). Another cost is the need to balance competing policy interests, meaning partners often have to compromise (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 49).

¹⁷ The RMAF, for example, may not be a suitable way to capture the outputs produced by horizontal initiatives (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 24).

Another challenge is the reluctance of partners to contribute resources (Bardach, 1998, p. 163). Partners are generally not inclined to contribute programming costs, and acquiring sufficient human resources can be difficult too (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 21).

Horizontality is often not considered a priority at the operational level, meaning work driving horizontality is often done on top of regular duties (Bakvis & Juillet, p. 66).

Beyond money and people, other important resources include: mandates; autonomy and each partner's ability to take action without consensus; political standing; and information (Bardach, p. 164).

Turf protectiveness often occurs on the part of senior managers (Bardach, 1998, p. 39).

There are many reasons why partners do not enthusiastically embrace horizontality (Bardach, 1998, p. 176). There is the fear that the partner's core mandate will suffer from collaboration (Bardach, p. 167), but also the sense that collaboration could lead to job loss (Bardach, p. 174).

3.3.8. What's happening in practice

Fox & Lenihan (2006) make a compelling argument that the reality of horizontal initiatives is quite different from the theory (p. 8). In practice, governments are engaging in all types of successful joint initiatives, although much of their work still occurs in silos (Fox & Lenihan, p. 9). Typically, partners come together at the early stages to coordinate their programs, after which the partners retreat to manage from their programs in silos (Fox & Lenihan, p. 9). Even when the work is done in silos though, partners still maintain a relationship (Fox & Lenihan, p. 10).

3.3.9. What to consider during pre-planning and implementation

There are many practical considerations at the pre-planning stage. First, a range of departmental and central agency specialists should be consulted on a slate of issues, including legal, financial and risk issues as well as human resources, project management and communications issues (Langford, 2002, p. 12). Creating a planning checklist is also beneficial, and should include activities like situational analysis, objective-setting, risk management, audit and evaluation and dispute resolution (Langford, p. 12).

Horizontal initiatives tend to improve their efficiency as they gain momentum. First, the steering capacity improves as partners adopt the skills needed to work collaboratively and leaders emerge (Bardach, 1998, p. 269). Trust also grows as partners work to solve problems together, and evaluation mechanisms improve performance and enable partners to tweak their administrative machinery (Bardach, p. 269).

A smart management practice during implementation is to stay focused on benchmarks (Langford, 2002, p. 9). As the initiative develops, the use of shared progress can be useful in pushing forward momentum; it can persuade partners to contribute more resources and to establish the next series of objectives (Langford, p. 9). When deciding how best to showcase success, Bardach (1998) encourages managers to begin by "plucking the low-hanging fruit", or problems that can provide quick and demonstrable progress (p. 283). Operational tasks like information pooling or shared databases are sometimes the best

material with which to pull together an “early string of small wins” (Bardach, p. 284). Managers can also send out congratulatory messages at key junctures that emphasize the need to forge ahead, something Bardach refers to as “reflect and celebrate” (p. 281). But just as momentum building is important, managers must also be wary of the negative effect failures and setbacks can produce (Bardach, p. 291).

3.3.10. Horizontal accountability and evaluations

3.3.10.1. Smart practices regarding accountability

There are several smart practices to consider regarding accountability and evaluations. Despite the challenges posed by accountability, results-based accountability remains important (Fox & Lenihan, 2006, p. 3). One smart practice is to designate a lead department and provide it with sufficient resources (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 56). Fox & Lenihan also suggest publishing a regular “partnership report”, making partners publicly accountable to each other (p. 10). The reports satisfy public interest in the collaboration, but can also act as a practical document – one that tracks the partnership’s success, establishes when and how decisions are made, documents lessons learned as well as the contributions of partners and their value (Fox & Lenihan, p. 10-11).

Accounting for joint initiatives is a new skill, and is something with which the government will likely continue to struggle (Fox & Lenihan, 2011, p. 19), particularly because there is no one model (Fox & Lenihan, p. 23). However, Fox & Lenihan also point out that governments have a lot of experience with partnerships, and have generally been adept at finding ways to report on them (p. 23).

3.3.10.2. Smart practices regarding evaluations

Evaluations of horizontal initiatives are complex, and require sound governance and planning (TBS, 2012b, p. 40). Evaluation pre-planning usually begins at the time of an initiative’s inception, alongside the development of cabinet documents, and should continue until a sound evaluation foundation is in place (TBS, p. 10).

There are several smart practices to consider. A lead partner with sufficient decision-making authority is seen as a necessity, as is clarity among partners about their responsibilities and commitments relating to data and reporting (TBS, 2012b, p. 9). Furthermore, a Performance Measurement Strategy (PMS) should be implemented as soon as possible, enabling data collection and reporting (TBS, p. 10).¹⁸ It is also wise to decide whether or not to declare an initiative as “joint” (Fox & Lenihan, 2011, p. 21).

Partners should agree how best to collect data, including the ongoing performance data needed to support an initiative’s evaluation (TBS, 2012b, p. 17). A secretariat, if it exists, plays a key role, receiving all performance data and coordinating the performance measurement process (TBS, p. 17). Clear expectations regarding the collection and analysis of data at specific intervals, in appropriate formats, should be established and, where possible, the reporting should be aligned with the partners’ planning cycles (TBS,

¹⁸ Cabinet documents, including the Memorandum to Cabinet (MC) and Treasury Board (TB) submissions (see Annex 6 for evaluation considerations), should include references to a PMS or, if not, then at least should contain a logic model with common indicators.

p. 17).¹⁹ Lastly, centralized processes like a database or template can facilitate data compilation, particularly when someone is designated to occasionally analyse and report on the overall initiative (TBS, p. 53).

At evaluation time, partners will need to decide on the merits of a horizontal approach and decide how to proceed (TBS, 2012b, p. 14) (See Annex 7 for horizontal evaluation factors to consider). Options include a unified exercise, or one that rolls up component pieces into an overview report (TBS, p. 14). The component approach is not separate evaluations, but rather separate data-gathering and reporting exercises around common outcomes (TBS, p. 14).²⁰ A joint evaluation, however, typically takes up to twice as long (TBS, p. 26).

¹⁹ The PMS should be agreed upon at the preplanning phase, but can be refined on an ongoing basis to ensure the right information is being collected (TBS, 2012b, p. 20).

²⁰ The nature of the initiative often determines which approach is taken, although the component approach does require a strong justification (TBS, 2012b, p. 14).

4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS


4.1. Key concepts and ideas

The theoretical framework grounding this research project is the ability of coordination to lead to enhanced outcomes (see Figure 7). However, alignment between the four security sector programs needs to include both cultural and mechanical components, and challenges like accountability and turf protectiveness need to be considered and addressed at the outset.

While working horizontally creates value, it is also difficult to attain. However, the literature articulates many best practices and lessons learned. Successful horizontal initiatives often promote cultural values like trust and information sharing, an openness to risk and interpersonal collaboration. Mechanical elements include strong leadership, support and resources, a sound decision-making structure, as well as formal and informal mechanisms and processes that span program boundaries. Harmonized terms and conditions and standardized administration have emerged as a notable best practice for Canadian transfer payment programs.

Working collaboratively also introduces many challenges and risks. It is demanding work, the costs are often under-represented and turf protectiveness is a common problem. Accountability is often cited as the most significant challenge, although there are many smart practices – many of which should be addressed at the pre-planning stage.

Figure 7: Theoretical Framework: Enhancing mechanical and cultural coordination



4.2. Framing the analysis and discussion of the four programs

Much of the literature's insights and best practices can be applied as DFATD works to integrate the four security sector programs. Before laying out recommendations, it might be useful to first characterize the coordination of the four security sector programs, and to establish the anticipated DFATD challenges specific to this kind of horizontal work.

4.2.1. Characterizing the partnership

The four security sector programs appear to be engaging in “horizontal management”, something that Bakvis & Juillet (2004a) describe as the coordination and management of activities among two or more organizational units (p. 8). Indeed, the programs do not have control over each other, and their collective objective is to achieve goals together that they could not do on their own (p. 8). A secretariat will likely be formed, which will act as the group’s “steering structure.”

The steering structure does not, however, qualify as a “horizontal initiative” as described by government, given that all of its partners are within DFATD. TBS refers to a horizontal initiative as involving partners from two or more organizations working toward shared outcomes (TBS, 2013c, para. 3). Nonetheless, there is much to learn from the literature on working horizontally, with recommendations in the following section.

4.2.2. Challenges facing cultural alignment

Cultural alignment will be impeded by a number of factors, including turf protectiveness, limited buy-in, and insufficient information sharing and interpersonal collaboration.

Turf protectiveness will exacerbate the challenge of program harmonization. Because there will likely be a secretariat housed in the policy area of the START division, the other programs may sense that the integration is START-led – something that could lead to additional resistance or an unwillingness to participate. There are similar concerns that joint terms and conditions could provoke turf protectiveness and hostility. Even in these early stages, for example, managers are voicing fear that “harmonization” actually means “homogenization.”

DFATD will likely have a difficult time convincing all stakeholders that working more closely together to achieve enhanced outcomes is a good idea. It will strike some as a “make work” project with little value, or a directive from upper management that is out-of-touch with the reality at the working level. Given the lack of understanding about why enhanced integration is needed but also due to the potential work it will create, getting buy-in at various levels will be difficult.

There is currently insufficient information sharing to facilitate broader coordination. While this arguably could be fixed by establishing several pointed processes, such as a bi-weekly meeting, there needs to be sufficient buy-in or authority to ensure stakeholders meaningfully share information, and establish trust and relationships.

4.2.3. Mechanical Alignment

Mechanical alignment will face challenges such as streamlining administration, articulating a clear mandate, establishing a governance system and accountability.

Administrative alignment will be difficult. While the capacity-building programs (ACCBP and CTCBP) are already somewhat integrated, the four programs otherwise work almost entirely autonomously. They have their own project management approaches, finance teams, evaluation specialists and departmental lawyers. There are

also a lot of steps and components to consider – such as the receipt of concept notes, their approval process, the consultation of project proposals, and the risk analysis framework. Introducing change will be difficult, particularly if there is not a sound understanding justifying it.

The programs will also have to establish a governance system that includes a decision-making structure, as well as formal and informal mechanisms. While the literature suggests that steering systems manage rather than govern, the steering structure will also need sufficient authority – particularly if buy-in is a challenge at the working- and managerial levels. The structure will also have to be sufficiently sophisticated to recognize when coordination is necessary, and when it is not. The programs do have different mandates, and requiring coordination on every project would be onerous and unnecessary. Good examples are GPP non-proliferation projects that are both highly technical and specialized.

Evaluation and reporting is an ongoing challenge for the programs, and will likely remain a problem. The horizontal initiative may not have the capability to report collectively on strategic outcomes, particularly at the outset – and it will likely take several reporting cycles until the programs and their respective evaluation experts establish a feasible approach to collective data collection and reporting. There is also the strong possibility that stakeholders will resist the notion of reporting on strategic outcomes altogether; it will be considered too difficult to achieve and too much work to implement. There may also be varying approaches to evaluation, some more sophisticated and rigorous than others.

Generating strategic outcomes is also going to be difficult. The programs already have a hard time gathering meaningful performance data, in part because of the complexity of both country contexts and the policy issues being tackled. Improving the security sector in Haiti, for example, requires more than a one- or two-year multi-million dollar initiative. Thus, showcasing how increased integration can lead to demonstrable change in fragile states will be challenging.

4.2.4. Sustaining integration

Sustaining increased integration over time will likely be a challenge as well. Once structures and processes are formalized and reflected in systems and directives, it is less likely that integration will fail. However, sustaining the initiative in the short- to medium-term could be difficult, particularly given the number of rotational employees that move from position to position each summer. As corporate memory moves on, the initiative could lose its champions or its working-level staff just as they have built boundary-spanning trust and relationships.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation #1: Commit to horizontal work

The literature on transfer payment programs, engagement in fragile states and horizontal coordination is clear. DFATD security sector programs should take decisive action to function more collaboratively while maintaining the integrity of each respective mandate. Senior management should clearly signal its intentions to integrate the programs more meaningfully, and to take concrete steps to move the programs in this direction. Without this clear commitment, little work will be done to promote meaningful coordination.

Recommendation #2: Adopt joint terms and conditions

DFATD should harmonize the terms and conditions for the four security sector programs. They lead to enhanced outcomes while lessening the administrative burden on both recipients and government. Establishing joint terms and conditions is also a strategic first step because it will set the stage for the mechanical alignment of the programs, while also sending a signal to all involved that senior management expects greater collaboration.

The terms and conditions should adopt the “umbrella” design, meaning the individual program elements are reflected within the document – something that will help mitigate the risk of turf protectiveness. Effort should be made to ensure the terms and conditions retain sufficient flexibility to operate in fragile states and conflict areas, and the GPSF 2011 evaluation findings – particularly Finding 46 – should be methodically addressed and discussed. To the extent possible, the terms and conditions should be simple in design.

Recommendation #3: Establish clear roles and responsibilities, as well as alliance norms

In integrating the four security sector programs, DFATD needs to ensure that partners understand their role, their responsibilities and the rules of the game. To achieve this, the partnership needs to articulate its collective vision, its mission and its objectives. If the vision is greater DFATD security sector programming coherence and enhanced outcomes, for example, then managers will be encouraged to design directly complementary programs; without that explicit impetus, facilitating coordination across units will remain difficult and, instead, work will continue to be performed in silos.

Partnership norms, or the rules of engagement, are needed for several reasons; they facilitate better governance, and help lay the groundwork for accountability exercises like evaluations. Thus, DFATD needs to ensure stakeholders understand why the initiative was set up, what each player contributes, and how they are expected to interact. At the working level, info-sessions can be used to educate staff about their roles, expectations of greater collaboration as well as the composition of the larger structure. This should signal to staff to start building relevant relationships – something that should lead to trust and information sharing. It could also help reticent employees understand the value of horizontal work, which could help with a lack of buy-in.

Recommendation #4: Establish a flexible and equitable secretariat

A flexible secretariat that includes a decision-making structure should be designed to reflect the initiative's needs. In this case, those needs are greater policy and programming coordination in fragile and insecure states. It also means providing sufficient authority – likely from a combination of ADM and Director General messaging of support – to ensure changes are implemented, and collaboration takes place.

The secretariat should also establish a flexible and quick-acting decision-making structure. That would mean, for example, managing rather than governing, holding informal discussions that result in operational briefs, limiting consensus to what is sufficient, and eliminating complex steps like needs assessments. Flexibility is key, as the steering structure may need to be tweaked in order to better meet the programs' needs or to adapt to evolving circumstances.

There are several actions the secretariat should avoid in order to minimize the risk of turf protectiveness, and to help facilitate trust. First, it should not make too many heavy-handed decisions, nor implement unnecessarily burdensome coordination mechanisms.²¹ Second, it should avoid re-organizing the partnership structure, such as re-naming or merging programs, as it requires a lot of work but generates little value (Langford, 2002, p. 8). Lastly, it should also avoid dominance by one partner (in this case, likely START) and instead aim to be equitably arranged in order to reflect the needs of all its members.

Recommendation #5: Implement other (formal and informal) processes that will lead to true collaboration

The secretariat should not be the only boundary-spanning structure. There should be other processes in place that help instil partnership values like trust, collaboration and information sharing. Other informal and formal processes and approaches should include:

- PAT/DPAT project approval meetings that bring together deputy directors and directors from all programs, in order to review projects at the review stage;
- Bi-weekly coordination meetings among project officers and deputy directors, perhaps organized by region; and,
- Joint trainings and info sessions for project officers that, as a tool, can also help the programs standardize their administration (see Recommendation 7: Single view of the client.)

Recommendation #6: Tackle the challenge of accountability at the outset

A harmonized evaluation framework should be developed as soon as possible to enable data collection and reporting. The secretariat should establish reporting templates, and collect and collate all performance data. There should be a clear understanding of when data should be submitted, in what format and, where possible, the reporting should be aligned with the partners' own planning cycles. A centralized process like the Security and Stability Project Management Tool (SSPMT) can facilitate programming data compilation, although someone should be designated to report on the overall work being done.

²¹ Horizontal management derives its structure and stability from a mixture of formal and informal mechanisms (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004a, p. 16), and too many heavy coordination mechanisms can take a toll on executives.

If it is not too late, the TB submission should indicate what evaluation approach the initiative will take.²² If a full PMS is not feasible at TB submission stage, DFATD should at least design a logic model with common indicators so each partner understands how it contributes to the initiative; this will also facilitate clarity around roles and responsibilities too (see Recommendation 3). Each partner's contribution should be noted against the department's Program Alignment Architecture (See Annex 1).

Recommendation #7: "Single view of the client" and harmonizing processes

The integrated program should take a "single view of the client," meaning standardizing administration across the four programs. This will involve synchronizing service delivery standards, and harmonizing the business process as well as the application process, something that was recommended by the Blue Ribbon Panel (Larkin & Clark, p. 24).

The four security sector programs will also have to align their approach to risk, particularly given that a project's risk level should correlate to the administrative burden placed on the recipient. Several practical steps can be taken to achieve this. Across-the-board adoption of the project management tool will help, as would joint risk training for project officers. However, the management-level Project Approval Team (PAT) could be a useful tool in this regard. Deputy Directors and Directors, as members of the PAT and DPAT teams, will informally help the programs establish a standardized approach to risk by reviewing projects within their own program, as well as projects from others. (This would also act as an informal boundary-spanning structure that can facilitate trust and information sharing; see Recommendation 5). Aligning all of these elements will help the security sector programs truly integrate as a "one-stop shop."

Recommendation #8: Ensure across-the-board adoption of the SSPMT to provide some initial momentum

The four security sector programs should adopt the Security and Stability Project Management Tool (SSPMT) in order to generate an early success. Such a move will create momentum for the initiative, which is particularly critical at the early stages when the launch can seem never-ending and tedious (Bardach, 1998, p. 283). It will also serve a practical purpose, enabling partners to easily share information and to better track the work of others. In this way, it will also act as an informal boundary-spanning process, which can re-enforce the legitimacy of the steering structure.

To ensure its adoption, senior management should formally communicate the importance of the tool to all four programs. If needed, a half-day training or two-hour seminar should be held for new users by the SSPMT consultant. Once the SSPMT is in use by all parties, management should send out a congratulatory message, providing the group with an opportunity to "reflect and celebrate" (Bardach, 1998, p. 281). Similar messages should be sent out at other moments to help generate more momentum – particularly when there has been a success reflecting the strategic value of working together. This will push the initiative along, and will hopefully co-opt reticent employees and boost buy-in.

²² This includes each partner's role and responsibility as well as an indication of whether the initiative has committed to a horizontal PMS that includes common outcomes and performance indicators (TBS, 2012b, p. 12).

Recommendation #9: Provide the initiative with sufficient resources

The launch and maintenance of the integrated security sector programs will require people, time and money. Many arrangements rely on part-time participation, and individuals are often expected to engage in horizontal work on top of their existing duties. Thus DFATD needs to find a way to encourage horizontal coordination as a priority at the operational level.

There are several practical approaches to consider. First, consider using the Performance Management Program (PMP); including one or two indicators that reflect a project officer's capacity to coordinate programming across unit lines would establish a behavioural incentive to coordinate. Doing the same for managers would similarly be smart. Secondly, coordination should be built into the business process, specifically when project officers consult a project proposal with their project teams. The proposal checklist should be edited to include a coordination section, where a project officer would indicate whether or not counterparts were consulted, and whether there were any complementary initiatives in place or being considered.

Recommendation #10: Support your managers

Skilled managers should be identified, trained and those that play a pivotal role in the horizontal initiative should be supported. They will play a key role in developing trust and processes that promote information sharing. If possible, managers should be trained on negotiation and mediation skills, and there should be an effort to educate managers on horizontal challenges and case studies. Public servants with existing horizontal experience should be encouraged to share their experiences with colleagues – either directly, or channelled via managers. Where possible, the work of consultants should be minimized to an initiative's launch; instead, managerial capacity should be prioritized in order to sustain long-term relationships.

Recommendation #11: Provide project officers with latitude

Project officers should be provided with more latitude than seen elsewhere in the public service to facilitate collaboration across units (Bardach, 1998, p. 161). Increased flexibility will lead to stronger working-level relationships, information exchange and more aligned programming, important given the strong link between interpersonal working relationships and effective collaboration (Bardach, p. 18). While flexibility should be considered at all design stages, it should particularly be stressed in the approach taken to managing frontline workers.

Within DFATD, project officers should be encouraged to attend coordination meetings in order to forge relationships with their counterparts. If informal mechanisms do not already exist at the working level, they should be created in order to bring together working-level staff from the four security sector programs.²³ Coordination meetings and

²³ This echoes, again, the need to establish boundary spanning structures with re-enforcing processes in place; joint task forces and the co-location of activities, for example, would both encourage more open communication and information-sharing (Langford, 2002, p. 8).

loose networks spanning the four programs will promote interpersonal relationships, minimize the “silo” mentality and help establish the sense of a true horizontal network.

Recommendation #12: Strengthen the initiative’s ability to tell its “stories”, with a focus on strategic sector level approaches

There should be a concerted effort to better capture overall results and tell the initiative’s “stories.”²⁴ Just as celebrating successes in the early stages are important for gaining momentum, managers must stay focused on mid- to long-term milestones such as shared outcomes. While every project does not have to be coordinated, managers should seek complementarity where it exists. At the beginning, that might mean packaging the most obvious projects together and only striving for more complex integration as the initiative matures. If this approach is not taken, the rationale driving the integration will soon be forgotten and much of the work done to promote it would be at risk of eroding away.

The initiative should develop strategies of engagement at the sector level in order to facilitate programming coherence. This will enable greater cohesion, but will also facilitate collaboration with other DFATD programming or initiatives undertaken by Other Government Departments (OGDs).²⁵

²⁴ Performance management was cited as areas of weakness for both the GPP (DFATD, 2010, p. 5),²⁴ as well as the GPSF (DFATD, 2013e, Performance Section.)

²⁵ This has traditionally been an area of weakness for the programs. One previous evaluation, for example, noted START’s tendency to manage individual initiatives rather than taking “a more holistic, synergistic, strategic, country approach” (DFATD, 2007, Section 3.4.2).

6. CONCLUSION

The literature is clear. Best practices for transfer payment programs, donor engagement in fragile states and, more generally, horizontal initiatives urge joint programming and coordination.

However, despite the benefits, working horizontally is not easy and requires commitment. Indeed, DFATD will face serious challenges harmonizing its four security sector programs. Notable difficulties will be a lack of buy-in, insufficient information sharing and interpersonal collaboration, as well as turf protectiveness. Establishing accountability and joint results, streamlining program administration and sustaining horizontal work over time are other likely challenges senior management will need to address.

Should DFATD decide to pursue harmonization, there is a wealth of information and best practices on horizontal coordination that it can rely on. This paper summarizes much of the literature, and adapts the best practices to the proposed integrated initiative at DFATD. Recommendations like taking a “single view of the client” and celebrating milestones – however small – in order to propel the initiative along are some of the proposed suggestions. It should be remembered that there is no one model for horizontal work, although values like trust and flexibility are absolutely required if horizontality is to have any chance of being successfully implemented.

REFERENCES

- Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC). (2013a). *Frequently asked questions – Consolidation of transfer payment terms and conditions*. Retrieved from the AANDC website at <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1386687294001/1386687345599>
- Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC). (2013b). *Terms and conditions for AANDC's transfer payments*. Retrieved from the AANDC website at <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1385747327206/1385747397222>
- Acharya, A., Fuzzo de Lima, A.T. & Moore, M. (2006). Proliferation and fragmentation: Transaction costs and the value of aid. *Journal of Development Studies*, 42(1), 1-21. Doi: 10.1080/00220380500356225
- Aldasoro, I., Nunnenkamp, P. & Thiele, R. (2010). Less aid proliferation and more donor coordination? The wide gap between words and deeds. *Journal of International Development*, 22, 920–940. Doi: 10.1002/jid.1645
- Anand, B.N. & Khanna, T. (2000). Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances. *Strategic Management Journal*, 21(3), 295-315. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094189>
- Bakvis, H. & Juillet, L. (2004a). *The horizontal challenge: Line departments, central agencies and leadership*. Canada School of Public Service. Retrieved from <http://publications.gc.ca/Collection/SC103-1-2004E.pdf>
- Bakvis, H. & Juillet, L. (2004b). *The strategic management of horizontal issues: Lessons in interdepartmental coordination in the Canadian government*. Available from the University of British Columbia website at <http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/campbell/sog-conf/papers/sog2004-bakvis-juillet.pdf>
- Bardach E. (1998). *Getting agencies to work together: the practice and theory of managerial craftsmanship*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Belton, R. (2003). Rebuilding Iraq: No job for a coalition. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.island.lk/2003/04/29/featur01.html>
- Bigsten, A. (2006). Donor coordination and the uses of aid. *Göteborg University*. Retrieved from <http://gupea.ub.gu.se/dspace/bitstream/2077/2723/1/gunwpe0196.pdf>
- Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). (2007). *Formative evaluation of Canada's Global Peace and Security Fund – Sudan*. Retrieved from the DFATD website at http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/2007/evaluation/gpsf_fpsm07.aspx?lang=eng

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. (2009). *Formative Evaluation of the Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program*. Retrieved from the DFATD website at http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/2009/evaluation/ctcb_parca09.aspx

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. (2010). *Audit of the Global Partnership Program*. Retrieved from the DFATD website at http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/cae-dv/audit_partnership_program-verification_programme_partenariat-2010.aspx?lang=eng

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. (2012). *Amended terms and conditions for grants and contributions for the Anti-Crime & Counter-Terrorism Capacity-Building Programs; Afghanistan Counter-Narcotics Program; and Annual Voluntary Contributions (AVC) to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Organization of American States – Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission*. Ontario, ON: DFATD.

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. (2013a). *The Global Peace and Security Program*. Retrieved from the DFATD website at <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/gpsp-ppsm.aspx>

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. (2013b). *Global Partnership Program*. Retrieved from the DFATD website at http://www.international.gc.ca/gpp-ppm/global_partnership-partenariat_mondial.aspx

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. (2013c). *Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Assistance*. Retrieved from the DFATD website at <http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/ctcb-rcat.aspx?lang=eng>

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. (2013d). *Anti-Crime Capacity Building*. Retrieved from the DFATD website at <http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/accbp-prclc.aspx>

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. (2013e). *Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund (February 2011)*. Retrieved from the DFATD website at http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/2011/evaluation/gpsf_fpsm11.aspx?lang=eng

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. (2013f). *Terms and conditions for grants and contributions under the renewal of the Global Partnership Program (GPP) 2013-2018 for the destruction, disposal, and securing of weapons and materials of mass destruction and related expertise*. Ontario, ON: DFATD.

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. (2014). *Funding programs*. Retrieved from the DFATD website at <http://www.international.gc.ca/department-ministere/funding-financement.aspx?lang=eng>

- Department of Justice. (2013). *National anti-drug strategy evaluation. Section 4: Summary of the major findings*. Retrieved from the Department of Justice website at <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cp-pm/eval/rep-rap/12/nas-sna/p4.html>
- Fox, G. & Lenihan, D. G. (2006 November). Where does the buck stop? Accountability and joint initiatives. *Public Policy Forum and Crossing Boundaries*. Available from the Public Policy Forum website at http://www.ppforum.com/sites/default/files/Where_does_the_buck_stop.pdf
- Halligan, J., Buick, J. & O'Flynn, J. (2011). *Experiments with joined-up, horizontal and whole-of-government in Anglophone countries*. Available from https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/staff/janine_oflynn/2012/chapter-5-experiments-with-joined-up-horizontal-and-whole-of-government-in-anglophone-countries.pdf
- Langford, J. (2002). Managing public-private partnerships in Canada. In M. Edwards & J. Langford (Eds.), *New players, partners and processes: a public sector without boundaries*. Canberra and Victoria.²⁶
- Lalonde, J. (2009). *Harmony and discord: International aid harmonization and donor state domestic influence. The case of Canada and the Canadian International Development Agency*. (Doctoral dissertation.) Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses (Accession Order No. 3395662) at <http://gradworks.umi.com/33/95/3395662.html>
- Lankin, F. & Clark, I. (2006). *From red tape to clear results: The report of the independent blue ribbon panel on grants and contribution programs*. Retrieved from the Government of Canada website at <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/BT22-109-2007E.pdf>
- Lindquist, E. (2012). Défis horizontaux dans la gestion du secteur public: Canada dix ans plus tard. *Optimum Online: La Revue de gestion du secteur public*, 42(3). Available from the Optimum website at <http://www.optimumonline.ca/print.phtml?lang=french&e=eeafictnb&id=422>
- Mulder, N. & Rodal, A. (1993). Partnerships, devolution and power-sharing: Issues and implications for management. *Optimum*, 24(3). Available from the Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly website at <http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA15294244&v=2.1&u=uvictoria&it=r&p=CPI&sw=w&asid=233068aa12b1d0e8433ceaaabe5fe5b5>
- Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG). (2012). *2012 Fall report of the Auditor General of Canada. Chapter 2—Grant and contribution program reforms*. Retrieved from the OAG website at http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201210_02_e_37346.html

²⁶ Author provided the relevant chapter as a PDF, to which the page citations correlate.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2005). *Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness*. Paper developed from the High Level Forum, Paris, 28 Feb – 2 March 2005. Retrieved from the OECD website at www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/46874580.pdf

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2006). *Whole of Government approaches to fragile states. A DAC reference document*. Retrieved from the OECD website at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/37826256.pdf>

Pal, L. & Clark, I. (2013). *Best practices in public management: A critical assessment. A working paper for the best practices in public management project*. Retrieved from [http://portal.publicpolicy.utoronto.ca/en/BestPractices/Documents/Best_Practices_in_Public_Management - A Critical Assessment, Pal and Clark, 8 March 2013.pdf](http://portal.publicpolicy.utoronto.ca/en/BestPractices/Documents/Best_Practices_in_Public_Management_-_A_Critical_Assessment,_Pal_and_Clark,_8_March_2013.pdf)

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS). (2011). *A guide to preparing Treasury Board submissions* [archived]. Retrieved from the TBS website at https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/oepubs/tbm_162/gptbs-gppct01-eng.asp

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS). (2012a). *Policy on transfer payments*. Retrieved from the Government of Canada website at <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?section=text&id=13525>

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS). (2012b). *Guidance on the governance and management of evaluations of horizontal initiatives*. Retrieved from the Government of Canada website at <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cee/gmehi-ggeih/gmehi-ggeih-eng.pdf>

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS). (2013a). *Whole-of-government framework*. Retrieved from the TBS website at <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ppg-cpr/frame-cadre-eng.aspx>

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS). (2013b). *Descriptors for Government of Canada outcome areas*. Retrieved from the Government of Canada website at <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ppg-cpr/descript-eng.aspx>

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS). (2013c). *Horizontal initiatives database*. Retrieved from the TBS website at <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/hidb-bdih/home-accueil-eng.aspx>

APPENDICES

Annex 1: Program Alignment Architecture showing overall context of the four security sector programs (DFATD, 2013e, Section 1.3)

Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Program Alignment Architecture							
Strategic Outcome	Canada's International Agenda		International Services for Canadians			Canada's International Platform	
		The international agenda is shaped to Canada's benefit and advantage in accordance with Canadian interests and values.		Canadians are satisfied with commercial and consular services.			The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade maintains a mission network of infrastructure and services to enable the Government of Canada to achieve its international priorities.
Program	International Policy Advice and Integration	Diplomacy and Advocacy	International Commerce	Consular Services and Emergency Management	Passport Canada	Governance, Strategic Direction & Common Service Delivery	Government of Canada Benefits
Sub-Program	International Information and Analysis	Bilateral and Regional Diplomacy and Advocacy	International Business Development	Safe Travel Promotion		Mission Platform Governance and Common Services	Foreign Service Directives Payments
	Integrated International Policy Advice	Summitry and Multilateral Diplomacy and Advocacy	Foreign Direct Investment in Canada	Consular Assistance for Canadians		Real Property	Employer Contributions to Locally Engaged Staff Pension, Insurance and Social Security Programs
		Contributions to International Organizations	International Innovation, Science and Technology	Emergency Preparedness and Response		Security	
		Trade Policy, Negotiations, Dispute Settlement and Controls				Information Management/ Information Technology	
		International Assistance Program Governance*				Other Government Department Locally Engaged Staff	

*This sub-program contributes to the governance of Canada's International Assistance Envelope (IAE). Its sub-sub-programs include DFATD's START (or specifically the Global Peace and Security Fund), the Global Partnership Program and both of the Capacity Building Programs. It also includes the Investment Cooperation Program, the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, and the Religious Freedom Fund (DFATD, 2013, Section 2.1.2.5)

Annex 2: DFATD funding programs (DFATD, 2014)


Development	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Development Assistance • International Development Research Centre 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Humanitarian Assistance Program • Canada Fund for Local Initiatives
Foreign Policy	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Partnership Program • Canada's Office of Religious Freedom • Anti-Crime Capacity-Building Program • Global Peace and Security Program • Policy and Planning and Federal/Provincial Cooperation • United Nations Trust Fund on Indigenous Issues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Canada in La Francophonie • Canadian International Arctic Fund • Counter-Terrorism Capacity-Building Program • International Scholarships • Permanent Secretariat on the Convention on Biological Diversity • United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture
Trade	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invest Canada – Community Initiatives • International Science and Technology Partnerships Program 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Opportunities for Associations

SYNCHRONIZING AN APPROACH: DFATD'S SECURITY SECTOR PROGRAMMING

Annex 3: Comparison of Memoranda to Cabinet, and Treasury Board submissions (TBS, 2011, Section 2.2)

	Memorandum to Cabinet	TB Submission
Purpose	To seek approval of a policy or new initiative	To seek approval of elements for a program's design, delivery, and implementation
Focus	Policy or program rationale with clear objectives, expected results and outcomes; links to horizontal objectives; relationship between new and existing programs; options and risks; opportunities for reallocation	Detailed program design and implementation plan; detailed costing; results measurement and accountability frameworks; opportunities for reallocation
Resource details	While sponsoring organizations normally provide cost breakdowns to central agencies, the MC often contains only high-level information on total resources required each year	Specific funding details and a clear rationale for what resources will be spent each year
Target audience	Cabinet ministers	Treasury Board ministers
Key federal organizations involved	Organization sponsoring the MC, central agencies, and other interested federal organizations	Organization(s) sponsoring the submission (in the case of a Crown corporation, the corporation itself and the portfolio department) and the Secretariat

Annex 4: Canada's Whole-of-Government Framework, showing both spending areas (4) and outcome areas (16) (TBS, 2013a)



Annex 5: Factors to consider regarding complexity of governance (TBS, 2012b, p. 32)

Overarching Governance Considerations	Characteristics of Horizontal Initiatives		
	Low Complexity	Moderate Complexity	High Complexity
Number of partners in the horizontal initiative	Small number of partners (2–4)	Medium number of partners (5–7)	High number of partners (more than 8)
Financial materiality of the horizontal initiative	Low (less than \$50 million)	Medium (\$50–\$100 million)	High (greater than \$100 million)
Strength of working relationship	Frequently work together	Sometimes work together	Rarely work together
Strategic importance of the initiative activities related to departmental mandates	Low level of strategic importance related to departmental mandates	Moderate level of strategic importance related to departmental mandates	High level of strategic importance related to departmental mandates (or varying levels of strategic importance)
Level and point of integration of partners' activities (activity versus outcome level)	Low level of partner engagement for program delivery (distinct activities lead to shared outcomes)	Moderate level of partner engagement (some integration of activities at the process level leads to shared outcomes)	High level of partner engagement (multiple components and varying levels of activity integration)

Annex 6: Recommendations relating to horizontal initiatives and evaluation (TBS, 2012b)

Recommended Provisions for Evaluation in Cabinet Documents (TBS, p. 12)

- Commitment to evaluate the horizontal initiative;
- Identification of lead and partner departments;
- Governance structure, roles and responsibilities (See Appendix A: Governance Toolkit, Roles and Responsibilities Matrix);
- Definition of evaluation objectives and general approach;
- Performance Measurement Strategy or a commitment to develop one;
- Funding for evaluation; and
- Overall schedule

Issues to be explored by evaluation units with respect to evaluation include (TBS, p. 13):

- What is the rationale for working collaboratively as a horizontal initiative?
- What is the policy framework for the horizontal initiative?
- What are the objectives of the horizontal initiative?
- What is the nature and extent of collaboration required to achieve the objectives of the horizontal initiative?
- Who are the key stakeholders, and what are their interests?
- What are the funding arrangements and the related accountability requirements?
- What are the risks related to the horizontal initiative? (These may include its complexity, the number of partners and their history of working together, the materiality of the initiative, and the importance of the initiative to the mandates of participating departments.)
- What is the merit of evaluating as a horizontal initiative?

Annex 7: Factors to consider regarding whether an initiative should be evaluated horizontally and, if so, what structures to use (TBS, 2012b, p. 42)

