

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION: The Augmentation of Macedon's Military Population Under
Philip II and Alexander III
360-323B.C.

by

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B.A., University of Nottingham, 1988

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Classics

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

ACCEPTED

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

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ABSTRACT.

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
This thesis is an examination of the conventional wisdom and methodological approaches that underly a particular part of the scholarly debate surrounding the rise of Macedon in the latter half of the fourth century B.C. The wider debate needs to be intimately connected with an appreciation of Macedon's military strength, which was, in a pre-technological age, largely dependent upon the number of men that could be conscripted into the army. While this relationship has been acknowledged in modern works it has rarely received more than a cursory treatment and even then has been done in such a manner as reveals a simplistic approach to the evidence. Theories have been based upon imperfectly understood evidence - the results have been predictable.

As a result of this the first three chapters examine the varying methods that have been employed in an attempt to enumerate the number of Macedonian soldiers that fought for Alexander III and for his father, Philip II. Chapter 1, "Evidence, Problems and Approaches", aims to create a model that assesses the possible number of Macedonian casualties throughout Alexander's reign. Chapter 2, "The Human Resources of Macedonia", attempts to calculate a total for the Macedonians that fought for both Philip and Alexander and to which the model created in the previous chapter can be applied. Chapter 3, "Demography and Ancient Macedonia", seeks to establish whether the large numbers of Macedonians that, it is argued, fought for their kings, can be accounted for by an internal population boom, generally assumed to be the result of the "peace and prosperity" established under Philip. As modern historiography has focused almost exclusively on Alexander's military reserves, and rarely on both his and his father's, it is argued throughout that credible results can only be attained if both reigns are examined in tandem.

The fourth chapter, "Immigration and Integration within Macedonia 360-323B.C.", presents an argument for substantial immigration of non-Macedonians into Macedonia under Philip. Thus Macedonia is considered to have exploited the worsening social and economic conditions prevalent in Greece during the fourth century B.C. It is suggested that only through such a mechanism, external of

Macedonian demographic realities, can the size of Macedonian armies under Alexander be accounted for. The conclusion contains a brief restatement of the various methodological approaches of modern historiography and contrasts it with that employed herein. While the dearth of evidence means that no models can be considered to provide any absolute answer it is to be hoped that those suggested here help represent an advance on previous work.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

Without the often considerable input of time, effort and expertise on the part of those acknowledged here this piece of work would be far the poorer, even presuming it had been completed. The members of the committee, Professor P.E. Harding and Dr. D.K. Zimmerman, who have had to contend with the erratic and non-sequential appearance of the various parts of the thesis have, nonetheless, done so with good humour and provoked through their comments much that is herein worthwhile. Particular thanks are due to Professor Gordon Shrimpton, not only for undertaking his role as supervisor under somewhat charged circumstances but also for his consistent support, encouragement, and assistance over the last two years. Samuel Johnson once wrote of a certain author's book; "all that is good he stole, all the nonsense is evidently his own." That there is less nonsense than there might otherwise be is largely a testimony to the endeavours of my committee. Naturally, none of the above is responsible for any remaining defects or omissions.

Thanks are also owed my parents, Dr. K.R and Mrs. S.G. Ross, and my grandparents, Professor T.K. and Mrs. V. Ross, by whose encouragement, moral and practical, the last two years have been rendered far more worthwhile. The translation of M. Errington's, *Geschichte Makedoniens* (Munich 1988), by my grandfather, was a particular boon. Mention should also be made (though space and numbers prohibit it) of all those members of the Department of Classics, staff and students, and of the community of Victoria who have made my stay here such an enjoyable one. The award of a Graduate Fellowship from the University of Victoria has made the undertaking of this degree (and much else), possible. Thanks also to Mark Standring who's knowledge of computers saved me endless time and trouble.

Finally, I wish to express my gratitude and love to Julie M. Baker, who, over the past two years has helped me realise what is really important. The dedication cannot express all that I owe her.

To

Julie

*for all her love and understanding
in circumstances where they
were not always easy to give*

ABBREVIATIONS.

Abbreviations of periodicals are given in the format of *L' Année Philologique* in the text and in full (as are all references) in the bibliography. After the first citation references to articles and books are given in a shortened format in the footnotes. The following abbreviations for standard works are also used.

- Arrian* (II) P.A.Brunt, *Arrian: History of Alexander and Indica I, II* (London, LCL 1976, 83).
- Commentary* A.B.Bosworth, *Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* (Oxford 1980).
- FGrHist* F.Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker I* (Berlin 1923-9, Leiden 1940-).
- HM* 1., 2. G.T.Griffith, N.G.L.Hammond, *A History of Macedonia I, II* (Oxford 1969, 79).
- Plutarch* J.R.Hamilton, *Plutarch Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1969).
- PM* G.Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London 1978).
- PMI* J.R.Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976).
- Roos* A.G.Roos, ed., *Flavii Arriani II: Scripta Minora et Fragmenta* (Leipzig, Teubner 1967).
- Syll.*³ W.Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum I-IV* (third edition, Leipzig 1915-24).
- TMS* N.G.L.Hammond, *The Macedonian State: The Origins, Institutions and History* (Oxford 1989).

All ancient references are abbreviated as in the format of *L' Année Philologique* and the translations are those of the Loeb Classical Library, except where noted. The following were also used.

J.S.Watson, *Justin, Nepos and Eutropius* (London 1890).

R.Shepherd, *Polyaenus: Stratagems of War* (London 1793, reprinted Chicago 1974).

INTRODUCTION.

Philip II and Alexander III. Two kings whose very names evoke the picture of Macedonian greatness. The father, Philip II (360-336), was the architect of Macedonian power, whose military and diplomatic expertise paved the way for his son's, Alexander III's (336-323), monumental conquest of the Persian Empire and beyond. The change in Macedon's fortunes is stunning; from a small, victimised and threatened kingdom on the margins of the Greek world to that of a colossus astride it. These two kings ushered in a new age, that of the Hellenistic Kingdoms, lands the *Diodochoi* carved out for themselves from the legacy of empire the dead Alexander left his generals. However apocryphal Alexander's dying words - *Tôi kratistôi* - may have been, there can be no doubt that the sentiment did not go unheeded.¹ The fragments of a once extensive ancient historiography that remains to us reflect the impact that Philip and Alexander had on their contemporary world. That Theopompus wrote a work entitled the *Philippica*, encompassing the later fourth century; not a *Hellenica*, as his earlier history had been called reveals this. Theopompus felt that "Europe had never brought forth such a man as Philip the son of Amyntas"; a view Diodorus, writing his *Library of History* three centuries later, concurred with.² Alexander's exploits spawned a rash of anecdotal biographies and histories, of which only a late and derivative selection have come down to us.³ His achievements reached down the centuries to influence the Roman *imperators* whose conquests emulated his own.⁴

¹ D.S.XVII.117.4; Arr.vii.26.3. The Greek - "To the strongest" - could equally be translated as "To the best". D.S.XVIII.1.4 gives this less dramatic alternative (*Tôi aristôi*); which would agree with Curt.x.5.5 (*optimus*), and Justin xii.15.8 (*dignissimus*).

² Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F27; D.S.XVI.1.1-3, 95.1-4. Cf. R.Develin, "Pompeius Trogus and Philippic History", *Storia della Historiografia* 8 (1985), 110-15.

³ A.B.Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1988), 295-300 [hereinafter *Conquest and Empire*], provides an excellent thumbnail introduction to the extant sources. For the lost sources see L.Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (New York 1960).

⁴ See e.g. P.Green, "Caesar and Alexander. *Aemulatio, imitatio, comparatio*", *AJAH* 3 (1978), 1-26; E.Rawson, "Caesar's Heritage. Hellenistic kings and their Roman equals", *JRS* 65 (1975), 148-59; L.Morawiecki, "The Power Conception of Alexander the Great and of Gaius Julius Caesar in the Light of the Numismatic Sources", *Eos* 68 (1975), 99-127.

The importance and interest of these two kings is no less apparent in both the abundant popular and scholarly literature of the past century.⁵ So, Andrew Lintott, *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City*, can see a change brought about in Classical Greece owing to the external and internal warfare that left the *poleis* "at the mercy of a new power, the ruthless and single-minded Philip of Macedon."⁶ Philip, an outsider, thus succeeded where Persia, Athens, Sparta and Thebes all failed in their attempts to become the final arbitrators of Greek independence. Elsewhere it is Alexander, or Antipater, who finally demonstrate the futility of resisting Macedon to the Greeks.⁷ The change is one of degree rather than of kind, but it does reveal a problem of where to categorize Philip and Alexander within the artificiality of our historical time-frames. Did Philip or Alexander 'end' (politically, at least) the Classical Age of Greece? If Alexander inaugurated the Hellenistic Age, should he be considered part of it, or not? And what of Philip's own role here; without whom, it is widely and rightly thought, there would have been no conquests of the kind Alexander accomplished?⁸ The dilemma is revealed in the organisation of the modern textbooks. The peculiarities involved in publishing have tended to cleave the reigns of Philip and his son between differing volumes, most regrettably in those series' which synthesize the latest scholarly interpretations. For instance the Fontana History of the Ancient World assigns Philip to J.K.Davies', *Democracy and Classical Greece*, and Alexander to F.W.Walbank's, *The Hellenistic World*.⁹ Methuen's Classical Civilizations takes the

⁵ See the best selling novels of Mary Renault, collected as *The Alexander Trilogy* (Penguin 1984). For Philip's reign see the bibliography, below pp.138ff; and that in Ellis *PMI*, 240-44. There is no bibliographical survey for Philip (or recent book with one) as E.Badian has provided for Alexander, "Alexander the Great, 148-67", *CW* 65 (1971), 37ff, 77ff. Nearly everything of more modern relevance for Alexander can be found in Bosworth's bibliography, *Conquest and Empire*, 300-14.

⁶ A.Lintott, *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City* (London 1982), 252 [hereinafter *Civil Strife*].

⁷ E.g. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 227-8.

⁸ E.g. M.Errington, *Geschichte Makedoniens: Von den Anfängen bis zum Untergang des Königreiches* (Munich 1986), 95-97 [hereinafter *Makedoniens*]; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 5-19; Cawkwell *PM*, 157-8, 163-5, 182-3.

⁹ J.K.Davies, *Democracy and Classical Greece* (New Jersey 1978), [hereinafter *Classical Greece*]; F.W.Walbank, *The Hellenistic World* (New Jersey 1981), [hereinafter *Hellenistic World*].

opposite approach: Philip and Alexander are treated together in Simon Hornblower's, *The Greek World 479-323 BC*. However, the following volume in the same series, *The Hellenistic World 321-31 BC*, by Susan Sherwin-White, cannot, for the sake of the internal integrity of the book, avoid a lengthy discussion of Alexander's reign.¹⁰ There are further permutations in other erudite works.¹¹ The lines, of course, need to be drawn somewhere. But the manner in which we periodize the writing of our history tends, in a subtle fashion, to define and demarcate it. In this manner much of importance risks being lost, or underemphasised, surely a great pity in what is after all a seminal period in ancient history.

It is the contention of this thesis that there is more continuity of policy between the reigns of Philip and Alexander (and their successors) than is always acknowledged. More specifically the focus of this study is directed towards the inter-action amongst Macedon's kings, their state's population and economy, and between these and the wider scene of *Magna Graecia*. Ultimately, Alexander's vast conquests were dependent upon the ability of Macedonia to provide him with the soldiers his ambitions required. The main question must be: How many Macedonian soldiers were there? The modern historiography has almost exclusively adopted a philological technique in addressing the problem. One that has been largely sterile in its results. Two exceptions are the articles of G.T.Griffith and A.B.Bosworth, who feel the number of Macedonians has been consistently under-estimated.¹² However, even these two scholars argue their respective cases within the limits imposed by the logic of the conventional approaches to the subject. It is therefore unfortunate that their methods are, to a greater or lesser degree, flawed by a number of underlying assumptions. It is these methodological

¹⁰ S.Hornblower, *The Greek World 479-323 BC* (London 1983), [hereinafter *Greek World*]; S.Sherwin-White, *The Hellenistic World 321-31 BC* (London 19**).

¹¹ For example in the collaboration that has produced *A History of Macedonia I-III* (Oxford 1969-88), the division of Philip and Alexander occurs not only between volumes, but authors. G.T.Griffith narrates Philip's reign in volume II; N.G.L.Hammond, Alexander's in III.

¹² G.T.Griffith, "The Macedonian Background", *G&R* 12 (1965), 125-39 [hereinafter "Background"]; cf. *Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge 1935), 41 [hereinafter *Mercenaries*]; A.B.Bosworth, "Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon", *JHS* 106 (1986), 1-12 [hereinafter "Decline"], is a superb piece of work to which I owe a great deal; even if, in practice, I disagree with virtually all Professor Bosworth's historical conclusions.

difficulties that the first three chapters seek to address. Their objective is an examination of the limitations inherent in the textual evidence and the work based upon it, and at the same time to construct two models for the purpose of allowing the number of possible Macedonians to be more critically assessed. While there is a degree of overlap between the chapters each is concerned with a particular aspect of the problem. Thus, Chapter 1 focuses on the wastage rate of the Macedonian army and Chapter 2 considers (in combination with this) the total number of Macedonians who served in the army, at any one period, between 360-323B.C. The third chapter then reviews the demographic assumptions that have been advanced in order to explain the rapid increase in the size of the Macedonian military and suggests that these are, by themselves, inadequate. Chapter 4 then suggests an alternative mechanism by which, through considering the reigns of Philip and Alexander together, the problem may be resolved and a high level of Macedonian military manpower accepted.

1. EVIDENCE, PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES: HOW TO ASSESS

MACEDONIAN MILITARY MANPOWER?

*I see
The imminent death of twenty thousand men,
That for a fantasy and trick of fame,
Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot
Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause,
Which is not tomb enough and continent
To hide the slain? O! from this time forth,
My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth.
Hamlet (Act IV, scene IV)*

The Reliability of the Sources.

In any study that is concerned with the interaction of a nation's demographics with its economy and its ability to field an army the most obvious requirement is the provision of reliable figures. Here ancient history is at an inescapable disadvantage. Our extant sources often do contain figures concerning population sizes or, more frequently, military strengths particular to a specific battle. But, by their very nature, these numbers are less than fully trustworthy. How can we trust them? And, presuming that we do, how can we be sure that the manner in which we choose to present the number, or the significance that we attach to it, is appropriate? For instance, is it justifiable to take the figure that existed for Macedonia's army in 334 (35,000 men), as J.R.Ellis has done, and to multiply it by 3½ or 4 and claim to have a "very general approximation to the total citizen population."¹ Numbers may appear 'objective', but unless they are generated for known purposes they must lose most of any significance that we would care to grant them. Not one of the figures that are available for Macedon between 360-323 has come down to us in a context specific enough to enable us to say that it represents the total military strength (all our numbers come from military totals) of Macedon at a given point.

Undoubtedly, generals of the calibre of Philip and Alexander must have had at least a rudimentary understanding of the size, composition, and requirements of the armies they led. Though we would never know it from the extant sources.² Thus Donald Engels, in his, *Alexander the Great and*

¹ Ellis, *PMI* 34.

the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, finds it necessary to deduce Macedonian logistical practice by comparison with evidence drawn from later armies, and accepts the risks the method entails.³ Nonetheless Engels' work is a valuable one, adding to our appreciation of Alexander's military genius and demonstrating that extensive planning and support was necessary to keep the Macedonian army in the field, even if we cannot trace the details in the sources. The merit of Engels' work lies in the possibilities the creation of his model allows. The reader may care to dispute some of Engels' claims concerning the size of Alexander's army, the daily human consumption of grain, or even the amount of water the horses required; but these are changes that involve fine-tuning the model. Engel's conclusions and method are still valid, even if the numbers necessitate a little manipulation.

Sir Moses Finley was perhaps the strongest advocate for the view that the ancient historian "now possesses an adequate array of concepts for the construction of hypotheses and explanatory models."⁴ Finley, rightly, found little satisfaction in any assessment of, or reliability in, solitary figures in any single source tradition.⁵ There was some hope amidst the pessimism, however:

I do not counsel despair. What I seek is a shift in the still predominant concentration of research from individual, usually isolated documents to those that can be subjected to analysis collectively, and where possible in a series over time; an emancipation from the magnetism of the words in an individual text in favour of a quasi- (or even pseudo-) statistical study.⁶

It will be argued that the evidence for Macedon's military strength is sufficiently numerous and consistent enough internally, within a particular source, as well as between the sources that Finley's

² An illustrative example is sufficient. In 480B.C. Xerxes decided to count his army prior to crossing the Hellespont and invading Greece. According to Herodotus (vii.60), Xerxes marked out an area sufficient to hold 10,000 men. His army then passed through that square until Xerxes knew how many 10,000's of men he had. Herodotus claimed the total to be 1,700,000; clearly exaggerated, but we have no idea how Herodotus arrived at his total.

³ D.W.Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley 1978), 1-10 (detailing some of the difficulties) [hereinafter *Logistics*].

⁴ M.I.Finley, *Ancient History: Evidence and Models* (London 1985), 6 [hereinafter *Ancient History*].

⁵ Finley, *Ancient History*, 27-46.

⁶ Finley, *Ancient History*, 44.

directive that numerical documents need to be "subjected to analysis collectively, and where possible in a series over time....", is practicable. Of course it will still be impossible (and indeed, inappropriate) to claim any real precision for the figures that will be examined and manipulated. However, it is still feasible to write in terms of trends and of orders of magnitude; and so to attempt an explanation for the upwards tendency that existed in the size of Macedonian armies.

Some answers will simply be beyond the evidence's capacity. At no stage is it possible to consider Macedon's military strength as in any way a reliable guide towards an assessment of the total population. Although T.H.Hollingsworth ranks military records sixth out of a list of nineteen sources of viable demographic data it has to be admitted that after the first four the value of the remainder diminishes rapidly.⁷

To my knowledge no historian has questioned the basic validity of the figures for Alexander's reign. The divergent and independent source traditions are sufficiently in accord to preclude that. The difficulty here lies in the partial nature of the record, particularly that relating to the potential number of Macedonian reinforcements. The problems associated with this have been addressed in the following chapter. The size of Macedon's armies is, however, only one half of the problem. In one sense the evidence is of a positive nature: the Macedonian army at such-and-such a time equalled such-and-such a number. But we also need to know how many Macedonians died between 360-323B.C. and that is much harder to establish. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to provide a model which, although crude, will enable some estimate of this factor to be made. It is hoped that when applied to the data that we do have it will allow us to make a fairer estimate of the number of Macedonian soldiers that were available to Philip and Alexander for their wars.

The injunction "Seek and ye shall find" is a precept with two edges. The defenders of history, whatever else they may claim, do not support an objective science. This is equally true of any model the historian creates. The theory that the historian pursues in many ways determines the kind of

⁷ T.H.Hollingsworth, *Historical Demography* (London 1969), 42-44 [hereinafter *Demography*]. The first four are: (1) censuses; (2) vital registration data; (3) Bills of Mortality; (4) ecclesiastical records (particularly parish registers).

evidence that counts. The virtue of a model is that it may pick out things that in a certain sense were not evident before. The model itself cannot formulate the questions, or even provide the answers. It can, however, be a guide to a lost reality; but, must remain in the end, nothing more than a guide. For this reason great care has been taken to point out the limits, not only of the evidence, but of the model, at every stage.

In the latest issue of the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (1989), Prof. N.G.L.Hammond has taken the position that "the literary evidence should take precedence over the assumptions."⁸ Furthermore, calculating that Macedonian losses totalled less than 3,000 men in over ten years of campaigning in Asia, and while noting that there are many unknown factors that his paper cannot take into account Hammond duly asserts that "these calculations are nothing more than probable in themselves"; adding in a footnote:

But the probabilities are strong enough to rule out the need to depart from the literary evidence and to postulate either the sending of large reinforcements of Macedonian citizen troops to Asia between 330 and 323 or a spectacular upgrading of such reinforcements before 330 and enormous casualties of citizen troops in Asia."⁹

On what basis can Hammond feel such confidence in his results? In his view the "arguments turn on the origins of the figures and on the practicalities of warfare."¹⁰ Hammond's thesis is thus born of a naïve confidence in the veracity of the sources and unsubstantiated assertions about their nature, the whole picture further compounded and distorted by an unacceptable complacency about the conditions men faced in the ancient world and of the status of the *Macedones* themselves. The order in which Hammond presents his case is acceptable, however. Therefore, like him, we shall first consider the origins of the figures themselves, followed by a brief discussion of the military conditions the

⁸ N.G.L.Hammond, "Casualties and Reinforcements of Citizen Soldiers in Greece and Macedonia", *JHS* 109 (1989), 56-68: at p.67 [hereinafter "Casualties"].

⁹ Hammond, "Casualties", 68 with n.64.

¹⁰ Hammond, "Casualties", 56.

Macedonians faced. Finally, we shall turn to those general considerations Hammond does not consider worthwhile examining.

The *Ephemerides*.

The nature and authenticity of the *Ephemerides* or "Royal Journal", or even "Royal Diaries", remains one of the outstanding, fascinating, and potentially explosive problems of Alexander scholarship. The *Ephemerides* are drawn upon by four authors; Arrian, Athenaeus, Aelian and Plutarch and, as excerpted, only in connection with two episodes in Alexander's reign. The more important is a day-by-day account of Alexander's final actions before his illness claimed him. The other deals with the king's social activities during the Macedonian month of Dios.¹¹

Together these extracts have been thought to comprise the necessary proofs for the existence of a comprehensive Journal, since lost, that detailed Alexander's actions throughout his reign. More remarkably it has been thought that Ptolemy drew upon the *Ephemerides* for his history and that, combined with Arrian's explicit statement that Ptolemy was one of his two principal sources, has led to the belief that an archival and wholly trustworthy document formed the basis for Arrian's narrative.¹² It is a hypothesis that has always had its detractors, however.

As long ago as 1955 L.Pearson argued that the *Ephemerides* were a spurious creation, in his view the fantasy of a Hellenistic writer of the second century B.C. With various changes of emphasis

¹¹ The fragments are collected by Jacoby, *FGrHist* 117.

¹² Cf. A.B.Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation* (Oxford 1988), 157-8 for the modern historiography [hereinafter *Arrian to Alexander*]. In English scholarship this position was argued for by Sir W.W.Tarn, *Alexander the Great II: Sources and Studies* (Oxford 1948), 1, 263, 331, 374 [hereinafter *Alexander*]; and has been continually restated by N.G.L.Hammond, particularly at, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great: the so-called Vulgate Authors, Diodorus, Justin and Curtius* (Cambridge 1983), 4-11 [hereinafter *Three Historians*]; "The Royal Journal of Alexander the Great", *Historia* 37, (1988), 129-150, [hereinafter "Royal Journal"]; "Aspects of Alexander's Journal and Ring in his Last Days", *AJPh* 110 (1989), 155-60 [hereinafter "Last Days"].

and origin Pearson's view that the Journal is a forgery has been accepted by almost all recent scholars.¹³ A full treatment of the subject is not here relevant; suffice it to say that herein it is accepted that the Journal was a forgery of some kind and its contents restricted in scope and reliability.

However, the particular authority Hammond has granted the Journal as *the* paramount source, as transmitted through Ptolemy to Arrian, for the acceptability of Arrian's totals for Macedonian battle-casualties needs to be examined.¹⁴ Concerning the debate over the authenticity of the *Ephemerides* Hammond wrote, most recently in his discussion of Macedonian casualties:

No one has yet doubted the existence of a *King's Journal* of Philip II and Alexander. The modern discussion is whether the *Journal* cited by Alexander-historians was a genuine *Journal* or a forged version. If the *Journal* they used was a forged one, it is difficult to see why a forger would produce such detailed figures [for Macedonian dead].¹⁵

This is a gross misrepresentation of the complexities of the subject at hand. No-one has doubted or otherwise considered the possibility that Philip possessed a Journal. There is simply no unequivocal evidence either way.¹⁶ Moreover, Hammond's presentation of the problem concerning Alexander's Journal is overly simplistic. The issue is not simply a dichotomy as to whether the *Ephemerides* were forged or not; the difficulty surrounding the scope of the *Ephemerides* itself needs to be addressed. Hammond's contention that it would be impossible for anyone to replace a section of the "official archive" (his term) with a forged portion carefully side-steps a crucial objection to his view

¹³ L.Pearson, "The Diary and Letters of Alexander the Great", *Historia* 3 (1954/55), 429-39. Cf. A.B.Bosworth, "The Death of Alexander the Great: Rumour and Propaganda", *CQ* 21 (1971), 112-36 [hereinafter "Rumour and Propaganda"] and *Arrian to Alexander*, 156-84; Brunt, *Arrian*, xxiv-vi, *Arrian* II, 288-93; E.Badian, "The Ring and the Book", in J.Heinrichs, W.Will, edd., *Zu Alexander der Grosse* I (Amsterdam 1987), 607-25, who also argues for forgery has not been available to me. An exception was A.E.Samuels' attempt ("Alexander's Royal Journals", *Historia* 14 [1965], 1-12), to prove the Journals were based upon Babylonian documents. His case has won no adherents either.

¹⁴ Cf. Hammond, "Casualties", 58-9.

¹⁵ Hammond, "Casualties", 58 n.16. Hammond then directs his reader to his article "Royal Journal" above n.12).

¹⁶ Nepos, *Eum.*1.5 (cited by Hammond, "King's Journal", 130), does not count. Philip was bound to have a secretary, which is all Nepos confirms.

of the nature of the *Ephemerides*.¹⁷ The citations of the Journal are limited in content to Alexander's social life (even the account of the king's death emphasizes this fact). Furthermore, Bosworth argues that the *Ephemerides* preserve an account limited to considerably less than the final year of Alexander's life.¹⁸ Therefore, even Hammond's use of the title itself is somewhat misleading:

The *Ephemerides* ... are not in any sense a full archive or extracts from an archive. Nor are they a deliberate forgery, purporting to be something other than what they are. They are memoirs of the king, with the peculiarity that they are written on a day-to-day basis.¹⁹

Hammond, of course, can "see no merit in the idea of a shortened version; for [there] would not have [been] found so very many instances of drinking in such a version." This is a form of *apologia* that goes all the way back to Aristobulus' equally specious claim that Alexander drank little and when he did indulge it was only for the sake of humouring his *hetairoi*.²⁰ This is no defence against Bosworth's thesis.

For the sake of argument, however, let us temporarily suspend judgement and accept, for the moment, Hammond's declarations concerning the nature of the *Ephemerides*. If, then, they were a complete documentary record of Alexander's reign how can we be sure Arrian's *Anabasis* is based

¹⁷ Hammond, "King's Journal", 132-136. Cf. pp.147-8: "...the composition of a bogus Journal full of false information and designed to replace an authentic Journal would have been an enormous task.... The forgery of only a part of a Journal would have been less arduous; but it would have been extremely difficult to infiltrate the forged part into the papyrus rolls of the genuine Journal, kept as it must have been in a secure place." However, the real ingenuity of Bosworth's argument ("Rumour and Propaganda", 117-23) is that Alexander's past and present secretaries, Eumenes and Diodotus, and the cabal of nobles backing them, would have precisely the access to any archive (if it even existed) that Hammond's objections require to be met.

¹⁸ Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander*, 170-3, 182-4. Cf. "Rumour and Propaganda", 117.

¹⁹ Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander*, 183. Bosworth goes on to argue (p.183-4) that the fragments that are preserved are, in the main, reliable so far as they go. However, he remains sceptical about the motive for the selection of what information went into the *Ephemerides*. Contrast Hammond, "Royal Journal", 131, 133.

²⁰ Arrian (vii.29.4) accepts Aristobulus' defence. Cf. Hammond, "Royal Journal", 140 n.36. For the symposia as a regular feature of the Macedonian court of both Philip and Alexander cf. E.N.Borza, "The Symposium at Alexander's Court", in *Ancient Macedonia III* (Thessaloniki 1983), 45-55 [hereinafter "Symposium"]; Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander*, 170-8.

upon any Journal, even as transmitted through Ptolemy? None of the fragments of Ptolemy's history make any reference to his possession of the *Ephemerides*; let alone inform us as to how he gained control of Alexander's Journal when he died.²¹ Hammond acknowledges that: "The answer to this question is not given by any writer."²² The fact that we have no references of any kind relating to the disposal of any king's (presumed) Journal would in itself give pause to the wary about the very existence of the type of Journal Hammond believes in. Nonetheless, Hammond is undeterred:

The Archive of each king after his death was still his possession and as such was probably deposited at Aegeae. In the case of Alexander the corpse, the weapons and presumably the Archive were intercepted by the army of Ptolemy and taken eventually to Egypt. It is probable that Ptolemy "took over" the Archive, as Perdicas had done, and kept it secret.²³

This is simply not a good enough basis on which to establish such a far reaching conclusion. Hammond's view of the *Ephemerides* are a farrago of unsupportable assumptions and unsubstantiated claims; in effect an exercise in historical fiction, not scholarly reconstruction.

Aside from these, in themselves, fundamental reservations there exist further objections to Hammond's use of the sources. Throughout his discussion of Macedonian casualties the evidence for higher Macedonian losses than Arrian would confirm has been consistently rejected. Yet, when Hammond comes to estimate the number of surviving Macedonians in 323 he accepts Curtius' evidence that Alexander retained 15,000 Macedonians in Asia to form its garrison.²⁴ Why this sudden trust in Curtius' numerical testimony? Curtius was not relying on any Journal (so far as we know), and he is

²¹ Jacoby *FGrHist* 138 assembles the fragments. The only passage where Ptolemy and the Journal are connected (and this by Arrian, vii.26.3), states that neither he nor Aristobulus wrote anything "far from" the account of the *Ephemerides* concerning Alexander's death. The implication must be that there were differences (however, insignificant) which is perhaps surprising if one accepts the view that Ptolemy based his history on the Journal.

²² Hammond, "King's Journal", 134.

²³ Hammond, "King's Journal", 134. Cf. also p.147, where the Journal soon becomes public property, as Hammond's case requires: "This Journal, we surmise, was in the possession of Ptolemy I until his death, and then or soon afterwards passed into the Library, where it or a copy of it was available for consultation...." Cf. Hammond, "Casualties", 59 n.17, as well.

²⁴ Hammond, "Casualties", 68, esp.n.62.

our only source to make this claim about a garrison-army. Of course, the acceptance of his figure, which is justified, enables Hammond to assert that Macedonian losses were in fact minimal, as Arrian, but not Curtius, would allow. Considering Hammond's earlier rejection of the acceptability of Curtius' figures this makes his conflation of the two sources questionable and suggests rather suspicious *a priori* reasoning on Hammond's part.²⁵ One cannot pick and chose amongst the evidence merely to confirm one's own prejudices. The end can not so justify the means.

Armour, Warfare and Casualties.

In general Hammond provides a sensible account of the Macedonian military's propensity to inflict heavy losses on its opponents; a reflection of superior equipment and ability combined with the cavalry's sustained pursuit of a defeated enemy.²⁶ However, Hammond's faith in the absolute precision of the sources is too often misplaced on specific points. In support of Arrian's claim that at Issus Alexander's cavalry pursued the Persians by crossing a gully upon the bodies of the enemy's dead Hammond believes that Arrian should be accepted at face value for, "it must be allowed that Ptolemy and Arrian knew more of cavalry warfare and of panic in flight than we do."²⁷ Even if Ptolemy and Arrian did understand battle conditions better than we do (experiencing them and comprehending, intellectually, both individual and group reactions to them are perhaps two very different

²⁵ Hammond claims Curtius' account to be based on the "factual and dependable Diyllus" ("Casualties", 68 n.62). Naturally the work of a historian of which precisely three fragments remain (*FGrHist* 73) can embody any virtues or vices we require. Hammond's method of *Quellenforschung* enables a grant of spurious authenticity to be distributed where necessary. The evidence contained in the majority of our sources rather needs to be evaluated on its own basis, not by determining its reliability through the arbitrary and subjective assignation of further sources (with the assumed reliability or otherwise of their writings), about whom we know even less. In general on Hammond's methods see the devastating review by E.Badian of *Three Historians* in *CV/EMC* 4 (1985), 454-468.

²⁶ Hammond, "Casualties", 59-62.

²⁷ Hammond, "Casualties", 61 with n.28, commentating on Arr.ii.11.8 (citing Ptolemy).

propositions),²⁸ this does not preclude Ptolemy's indulging himself with a rhetorical gloss on his writing. Nor do horses behave as historians may like to believe they do - they will not step upon the bodies of the dead if it all possible; nor, incidentally, will dead men pile up in such a way as to provide a stable platform upon which heavily armoured cavalry could, for instance, cross a gully.²⁹

Of greater account, however, is Hammond's failure to distinguish between the ability to inflict casualties on others and the potential to limit them on oneself. Disproportionate figures for battle-casualties are, in themselves, unremarkable and Hammond is correct to point out that the Persians suffered heavy losses in comparison to the Greeks throughout the fifth century in their failures to defeat hoplite armies, itself a consequence of better Greek defensive armour.³⁰ To be sure, Alexander's soldiers had superior weapons and training than their Persian foe, but is Hammond's claim that "the Macedonians suffered fewer casualties in set battles than comparable Greek armies would have done" a valid one?³¹ The trend in Greek hoplite armour in the fifth and fourth centuries had been towards lighter equipment and less of it, as well.³² In 480, a Spartan hoplite at Thermopylae, trusting absolutely in his comrades, his skill and his equipment, could nonchalantly dismiss the threat of Persian archery with the phrase:

So much the better, then, if by this we shall fight in the shade.³³

²⁸ The psychology of men in battle has been much studied since the Second World War. Cf J.Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (London 1976), 114-116, 134-144, 274-284, 331-343 and his bibliography at pp.348-50 [hereinafter *Face of Battle*].

²⁹ Keegan, *Face of Battle*, 107, 197 (on the dead), 94-97, 153-159 (on equine behaviour).

³⁰ Hammond, "Casualties", 59. Nor is it surprising that Alexander (and presumably Philip), could defeat the northern tribesmen, who Arrian characterises (i.1.12) as "lightly-clad" and "poorly-armed." At the Granicus Arrian (i.15.5) saw Macedonian strength, experience and *offensive* equipment ("cornel-wood lances against short javelins"), behind the Macedonian victory.

³¹ Hammond, "Casualties", 60.

³² Cf. most recently, V.D.Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (New York 1989), 55-88 [hereinafter *Western Way of War*]; with J.K.Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley 1970), 20-37, 40-42 [hereinafter *Military Theory*].

At the turn of the century the Ten Thousand could not so lightly dismiss Persian archery, particularly horse-archers, even though harassment was rarely more than half-hearted.³⁴ Macedonian success in Asia was the result of combining various military arms, and this mixture of troop-types effectively took the initiative away from the Persians, Alexander's own brilliance notwithstanding.³⁵ Philip, to state the issue simply, increased the offensive capability of his infantry by arming them with the *sarissa*. His reforms did not, however, increase the defensive armament of his soldiers.³⁶ Against Greek hoplites, where the battle was decided at spear-point, the difference favoured the phalangite. Yet, against the Persians, less defensive armour would have made the phalanx vulnerable to archery. Persian losses were undoubtedly devastating, but the Macedonian army was itself the most susceptible of the European armies of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. to Persian archery, and the losses that this could produce.³⁷ Bezalel Bar-Kochva, in his study of the Seleucid army, persuasively argues that the reason behind its progressive adoption of heavier armour for the phalangites was the inescapable influence of oriental missile-troops.³⁸ As is well known, Macedonian military superiority was not to be denied, but

³³ Plut.*Moralia* 225C. Herodotus (vii.226) attributes the remark to Dieneces. It is worth noting the fact that at Marathon the Athenians advanced at double time to limit the effectiveness of the Persian bowmen (Herodotus vi.112).

³⁴ Xen.*Anab.*iii.3.19ff. is an excellent case in point. For the difficulties faced in Asia by a hoplite army see: Anderson, *Military Theory*, 115-119; P.A.Rahe, "The Military Situation in Western Asia on the Eve of Cunaxa", *AJPh* 101 (1980), 80-4, 95-6 [hereinafter "Military Situation"].

³⁵ For a brief analysis of this development see Rahe, "Military Situation", 79-96, esp. 87-9, 95-6.

³⁶ See G.T.Griffith, "MAKEDONIKA: Notes on the Macedonians of Philip and Alexander", *PCPhS* 4 (1956/7), 3-10 [hereinafter *MAKEDONIKA*].

³⁷ The Alexander-historians continually remark upon Persian archery and the strategies Alexander adopted to counter its effect. See e.g. Arr.iv.4.6f. (with success), 5.4ff., 5.9 (with failure). Note also that the Indians were particularly fond of the bow, and that they used steel weapons capable of dealing far more punishing blows than Macedonian weapons. Cf. S.D.Singh, *Ancient Indian Warfare with Special Reference to the Vedic Period* (Leiden 1965), 92-108 [hereinafter *Indian Warfare*]. Alexander was presented with a 100 talents of Indian steel: Curt.ix.8.1.

³⁸ B.Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army: Organisation and Tactics in the Great Campaigns* (Cambridge 1976), 54-6, 65-6 [hereinafter *Seleucid Army*]. Bar-Kochva accepts Griffith's view (n.36, above), that the Macedonian phalangites of the Antigonids (as was the case under Philip and Alexander), did not possess breastplates, noting that, "the rarity of 'missile-troops' in the

is Hammond's argument, upon examination, worthy of acceptance at face value? Hammond's simplistic equation; that because the Greeks beat the Persians, and the Macedonians the Greeks, we may infer that the Macedonians would defeat the Persians with even fewer losses than the Greeks suffered, ignores the structural differences between the various armies and avoids making the only comparison that is worthwhile - the direct one between Macedonians and Persians.³⁹

Naturally, Hammond feels he has a somewhat better basis on which to make this claim - namely the "very small numbers reported by Arrian to have been killed in individual actions."⁴⁰ But, as we have seen, there is no reason to believe that Arrian had privileged access (even indirectly) to a better record of Macedonian losses than our other extant sources. This is not to suppose that Arrian's figures are any worse than those preserved in the remainder of our sources; however, they are consistently lower.⁴¹ The real problem is that Arrian is also consistently selective in those tallies he does reproduce, not always giving any total he may have possessed for all the Macedonian losses.⁴² Furthermore, it is difficult to deny Bosworth's contention that Arrian's figures (and to a lesser degree those of all our sources) are simply propagandistic, bearing little relation to reality.⁴³ Two examples should illustrate the problem.

European arena made this extra weight of body armour unnecessary - and besides, the financial resources of the Antigonids were rather limited." (p.55). It is noteworthy that amongst the first Oriental cavalry that Alexander recruited (and, exceptionally, deployed alongside his Macedonians) were *hippotoxotai* drawn from Dahae (Arr.v.12.2, 16.4; Curt.ix.2.24). It is an obvious conclusion that these horse-archers filled a gap in the order of battle that Alexander had felt to be lacking.

³⁹ For a brief introduction to the various military systems see the consecutive chapters by J.F.Lazenby (on Greek hoplites), N.Sekunda (on the Persians) and A.Devine (on Alexander's Macedonians) in, General Sir John Hackett, ed., *Warfare in the Ancient World* (London 1989), 54-129.

⁴⁰ Hammond, "Casualties", 68.

⁴¹ The sources and casualties of all Alexander's major battles (except the Hydaspes) and sieges can be conveniently compared in Bosworth, *Commentary*, 83, 124, 214, 216-7, 254-5, 312. For the Hydaspes cf. Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 163-7.

⁴² Cf. Hammond, "Casualties", 57-8 for this. Hammond's praise of Arrian, who does not provide "mere totals", unlike the vulgate, misses the point entirely. It is the totals that we need if Arrian's figures are to be of real use. Arguably, Arrian's failure to produce totals for the Macedonian losses is another way of subtly down-playing Alexander's casualties.

At the Battle of the Granicus Arrian informs us that "about 25 of the Companions fell in the first shock" and that over 60 other cavalry and 30 infantry also fell.⁴⁴ These are insubstantial losses, quite remarkable when Arrian also considers Alexander to have massacred a Greek phalanx of 20,000 men, whose plea for surrender he refused.⁴⁵ Arrian's narrative gives the impression that the battle against the Greeks was an easy affair. Plutarch surely provides a more realistic picture when he claims that "most of the Macedonians who were slain or wounded fought or fell there, since they came to close quarters with men who knew how to fight and were desperate."⁴⁶ Given Arrian's selective reporting how plausible is his figure of 115 for the total Macedonian losses? Not very, it is submitted. Unfortunately, we have no way of amending it.

The second example concerns the siege of Tyre, in which, according to Arrian, Alexander's "entire ... losses were about 400." Bosworth dismisses this total as "fatuous".⁴⁷ Hammond has, however, seen fit to defend it. He believes the 500 Macedonian casualties suffered at Thebes to be comparable to the losses at Tyre.⁴⁸ On what basis (other than two superficially similar numbers) is far from clear. Thebes fell after the city's defenders lost such control of events that the battle outside the city's walls was carried inside the gates, helped by the fact that the Macedonian garrison itself besieged in the Cadmeia broke out.⁴⁹ Alexander was not so fortunate at Tyre. The city closed its gates before him and this action, combined with the city's superb natural defences, required Alexander to prosecute

⁴³ Cf. Bosworth, *Commentary*, 217, 254.

⁴⁴ Arr.i.16.4. Aristobulus (Plut.*Alex.*16.7) believes that there were only 34 dead in all.

⁴⁵ Arr.i.14.4, 16.2, 16.6. Only 2,000 were made prisoners, and they were sent as slaves to Macedonia.

⁴⁶ Plut.*Alex.*16.6-7. Cf. Bosworth, *Commentary*, 124-5 for Alexander's miscalculation here. Greek mercenaries in Persian service now fought bitterly against Alexander and refused to accept terms when offered.

⁴⁷ Arr.ii.24.4; with Bosworth, *Commentary*, 254, 312. Tyrian casualties were over 8,000 in the assault and subsequent massacre.

⁴⁸ Reported by D.S.XVII.14.1. There were 6,000 Thebans killed.

⁴⁹ For discussion of the source problems posed by the diametrically opposed accounts of Arrian and Diodorus cf. Bosworth, *Commentary*, 80-4.

a siege of seven months' duration. During this period there were a number of naval clashes as Alexander constructed a mole so as to bring siege machinery to bear directly against the city followed by at least one failed assault on the walls, which apparently led Alexander to consider abandoning the siege.⁵⁰ Arrian's total of 400 dead is unacceptable, as is Hammond's defence of it. His comparison is invalid and his comment that Bosworth fails to consider Arrian's source (presumably by this Hammond means the *Ephemerides* as derived through Ptolemy), irrelevant.⁵¹ Hammond's contention is a circular one. The idea that Arrian's figures are more trustworthy ultimately depends upon his conception of the *Ephemerides*, itself subject to a great deal of doubt, and whose trustworthiness is considered vindicated by the small casualty figures Arrian gives. Yet the other points Hammond raises in support of Arrian's figures are extremely tenuous (indeed, one questions why he selects a figure from Diodorus to support Arrian, when, on Hammond's own hypothesis Diodorus had no access to information supposedly preserved in the Journal). Any selection of a particular author's casualty figures *in toto* has to be purely subjective considering the hopelessness of questioning any of the totals.

Some comparative material further reveals the remarkable discrepancy between the Macedonian losses (as given by all our sources), and the rates of loss suffered by other, pre-industrial revolution, armies, for which we have somewhat fuller evidence. The difficulty of sustaining an army at a constant, let alone increasing strength, is highlighted by Geoffery Parker in his study of the Spanish Army of Flanders during the 1570s. Interestingly, the actual outbreak of hostilities had only a limited upwards effect on the wastage rate of the veteran *tercios*. However: "The average attrition rate for élite trained troops ... was around 2 per cent per month, or roughly a quarter of total strength per year."⁵² Desertion and disease are singled out as the real causes of continual attrition, and while there is absolutely no evidence that Alexander's Macedonians deserted him we can hardly assume that his soldiers were immune to disease.

⁵⁰ So D.S.XVII.44.1-7. See, again, Bosworth, *Commentary*, 238-56 for an excellent discussion.

⁵¹ Hammond, "Casualties", 61-2 with n.31.

⁵² G.Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge 1988), 50-8; esp. Table 3, pp.56f. This pattern did not vary between nationalities, nor through the next half century (the length of time Parker studies).

James Powell's work on the Fifth Crusade is also instructive. He undertook a prosopographical study of the crusade's members, insofar as they could be traced, and his conclusions have highlighted the difficulties the crusade leaders faced in keeping an army together. The limited sample does pose methodological constraints on the applicability of his conclusions to all groups, as Powell acknowledges, owing to the fact, "it [the sample] does not represent a cross-section of participants in the crusade."⁵³ Nevertheless, his analysis still suggests that the feudal aristocracy suffered a mortality rate comprising "one-third of its total membership." Amongst the lesser combatants and non-combatants Powell postulates that "a much higher mortality rate ... is very possible." Moreover, the majority of crusaders did not remain in Egypt much over eighteen months on average, and very few indeed the possible full four years.⁵⁴

Admittedly, the conditions that these soldiers endured would have been very different to those Alexander's men faced; arguably they were easier for many periods. Yet the attrition rate is so different and so much larger, over a limited period compared to Alexander's ten years campaigning, that one suspects the evidence the Alexander-historians provide that bears on the wastage rate the Macedonian's suffered, even where it is anything like complete (principally for battles), to be inadequate. We should at least be honest with ourselves. The quantity of evidence is hardly overwhelming and the reliability of what we do have is not conducive to our respecting it. At best the sources provide an absolute minimum for the number of Macedonians who were lost to the army, but let us not delude ourselves to thinking that this total approaches reality in any way. As Brunt has remarked:

the sources understate casualties in fighting and ignore deaths from disease, and seldom state how many [men] were left behind in garrisons and colonies.⁵⁵

⁵³ J.M.Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221* (Philadelphia 1986), 166-7, 169-71 [hereinafter *Crusade*]. Under a thousand individuals can be usefully scrutinied and only for 261 of these is the evidence available concerning whether or not they survived their time on crusade.

⁵⁴ Powell, *Crusade*, 167-9, 171. Cf. also Table 9.1 and Fig.9.1.

⁵⁵ Brunt, *Arrian II*, 482.

Before reaching any final conclusions, as far as such are possible, the other subjects that Brunt mentions need to be assessed.

Colonies, Garrisons, Disasters and Diseases: Further Reasons

for a Reduction in Macedonian Field Strength.

As Alexander conquered the Persian Empire he established colonies throughout his new realm in an effort to secure his newly acquired possessions. It is noticeable that these cities were established where Alexander had faced the strongest resistance, as in Bactria-Sogdiana, or on the remote frontiers, such as India.⁵⁶ The local populations were compelled to support a Greco-Macedonian ruling-élite who, in the case of the Greek mercenaries, were either chosen from amongst volunteers or selected by Alexander for the purpose. Indeed, some settlements were established with only a Greek and subject native presence.⁵⁷ For it does seem that Alexander was only willing to release his Macedonians from active service when any disabilities, or age, made them less able to endure the strenuous military regime. Nonetheless, their number will not have been inconsiderable.⁵⁸ Furthermore, other Macedonians were assigned to garrison duty; notably in the great cities of the Persian heartland - Babylon, Susa and Persepolis.⁵⁹ It is likely that the majority of these soldiers were

⁵⁶ Plutarch, *Moralia* 328E, credits Alexander with 70 new foundations; a great civilizing (or, at least, Hellenizing), process. For a more realistic view cf. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 245-50.

⁵⁷ E.g. Arr.v.29.3, vii.21.7. Not all were happily located. After Alexander's death the Greek settlers in Bactria-Sogdiana revolted in an attempt to reach Greece and only harsh action by Perdiccas forced them to return to their cities: cf. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 249-50.

⁵⁸ Arr.iv.4.1 first distinguishes Macedonian settlers (in contrast to Greek or native), as *hosoi apomachoi êdê êsan*. The distinction probably applies only to Macedonians: cf. Arr.iv.22.5, 24.7; v.1.5, 27.5. Such men faced considerable hostility; the first Macedonian settlers in Bactria-Sogdiana were massacred: Arr.iv.1.3. However, their loss was replaced: Arr.iv.17.4.

⁵⁹ Babylon: 700 men (Curt.v.1.43; D.S.XVII.64.5); Susa: 1,000 (Curt.v.2.16); Persepolis: 3,000 (Curt.v.6.11).

superannuated veterans, as Curtius specifically informs us the thousand men at Susa were (*aetate gravibus*). Only on one occasion do we find Alexander sending such men back to Macedonia. Again they are veterans and, according to Curtius, their number came to 900.⁶⁰ It would thus seem that within five years of Alexander's campaign he had effectively to retire some thousands of aged or injured Macedonians from active service. To a degree, this is not totally unexpected. Justin claims that when Alexander's selected his initial army:

he did not choose robust young men, or men in the flower of their age, but veterans, most of whom had even passed their term of service, and who had fought under his father and his uncles; so that he might be thought to have chosen, not soldiers, but masters in war.
(Translated Watson, *Justin*, 95).⁶¹

If Justin is reliable these men would have to be at least 40 years of age, and in many instances considerably older. It is no wonder that the emphasis was on the recruitment of younger soldiers down to 323, nor that so many were required.⁶²

Ancient life expectancy was low at birth (*ca.* 20-30 years), stabilized after 5 years of age and then began to decline again after 35 years. If these soldiers had all been aged 40 in 334, a demographic life table would suggest that 30 per cent of them would have died of old age by 323; if they averaged 55 years in 334 then 50 per cent would have died in the intervening ten years.⁶³ The older any given individual was the smaller the likelihood would be that he would survive to the next year. Even if all

⁶⁰ Curt.vii.5.29; Arr.iii.29.3 places the incident in 329, prior to the crossing of the Oxus; but gives no numerical details.

⁶¹ Justin xi.6.4. Cf. D.S.XVII.9.3. More time-served veterans (10,000 in number) had to be demobbed in 323: Arr.vii.8.1, 12.1.

⁶² Cf. D.S.XVII.49.1; Curt.iv.6.30. Alexander recruited a *ca.* 19,000 Macedonians down to 330 (below pp.42-6).

⁶³ A largely theoretical life table for the Roman Empire has been devised by B.W.Frier, "Roman Life Expectancy: Ulpian's Evidence", *HSCP* 86 (1982), 213-251 [hereinafter "Life Expectancy: Ulpian"]. A further study of Frier's, "Roman Life Expectancy: The Pannonian Evidence", *Phoenix* 37 (1983), 328-44, [hereinafter "Life Expectancy: Pannonian"] finds these results 95% in accord with the skeletal evidence (p.331). For the figures given see "Life Expectancy: Pannonian", Table 1, p.329. The demographic model is examined in full in Chapter 3.

Alexander's soldiers had been in their 20s (like their king), ten years later elementary demography still suggests that some 17 per cent of their number would have passed away. Furthermore these figures are based on the actions and lifestyle of a stable community, hardly the case for an army on campaign. Hence it is impractical to believe that any Macedonians placed in garrisons or colonies would have been ordered back to Opis in 324 to take up active duty or be discharged. Many would have died and the remainder would have hardly been in any condition to campaign.⁶⁴

Further losses would have been expected from other causes. Simple accidents could have fatal results. Parmenio's son, Hector, drowned in the Nile and once a siege-bridge collapsed killing the Macedonian soldiers on it.⁶⁵ Worse were the fatalities inflicted by natural disaster and disease and the sources suggest that these had a greater effect on losses than the continuous warfare. Many of the former probably resulted in psychological blows rather than physical ones, but such was not always the case. While crossing the Gedrosian Desert a flash-flood swept away all the camp-followers and the army's equipment. Arrian's narrative would allow us to expect that some soldiers were lost as well.⁶⁶ The crossing of the desert to the Oxus five years earlier had resulted in heavy loss of life and tainted water had caused further deaths.⁶⁷

Once again the sources unremarkably provide only partial evidence. Ancient authors tended only to remark upon the extraordinary when they were concerned with common circumstances. We

⁶⁴ Cf. R.D.Milns, "The Army of Alexander the Great", in *Entretiens Fondation Hardt* xxii (Geneva 1976), 87-129, asserting that these men were summoned to Opis (p.112). Milns' includes all of these men amongst the survivors of the campaigns and so argues for a total casualty rate of 38% (from a total of 21,000 combatants) throughout the campaigns.

⁶⁵ Curt.iv.8.7-8; Arr.iv.26.6f.

⁶⁶ Arr.vi.25.4-6. Plut.*Alex.*66.2 claims that only one-quarter of Alexander's army survived, though on what basis he made this estimate we cannot know. Craterus (Arr.vi.17.3) had taken part of the army on an inland route. On the subject of the Gedrosian disaster cf. Brunt, *Arrian* II, 474-83; Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 181-85. Cf also H.Strasburger, "Alexanders Zug Durch Die Gedroisische Würte", *Hermes* 130 (1952), 456-93. At pp.470-3 Strasburger has collected the references to the natural disasters that struck the army.

⁶⁷ Curt.vii.5.13-15. Cf.Arr.iv.4.8-9 where Alexander himself fell ill (dysentery?) from drinking impure water while in pursuit of the Scythians. Bosworth, "Decline", 4 n.25 provides a list of senior officers who died of disease. It is a list Alexander should be included in as well.

are thus fortunate that Nearchus was sufficiently interested in the dangers caused by snakes in India to digress about the local physicians (who could cure the snake-bite where Greek doctors were at a loss) and the remarkable fact that there were few illnesses in India; a fact he attributed to the uniform climate.⁶⁸ The implicit contrast Nearchus is making can only be with his past experience, suggesting that he accepted the continual presence and dangers of disease as commonplace.

Indeed, the continual dangers of one particular infection, that of malaria, to the Macedonian army has been stressed in recent years. Donald Engels has argued that several of the regions that Alexander's army traversed in Asia were malarial and that Alexander's dangerous illness in Cilicia was as a result of malarial parasites.⁶⁹ E.N.Borza has taken the argument a stage further and convincingly extends the presence of the affliction to Macedonia throughout Alexander's reign.⁷⁰ With this in mind Coenus' speech at the Hyphasis, when the Macedonians mutinied and refused to follow their king any further, makes sobering reading. Coenus, appealing to Alexander, claimed that:

Surely you see yourself how many Macedonians and Greeks we were when we set forth with you, and how many survive? ... they [the Greeks] and the Macedonian forces have lost part of their number in battle; others have been invalidated from wounds, and have been left behind in different parts of Asia; but most have died of sickness, and of all that host few survive, and even they no longer enjoy their bodily strength, while their spirit is far more wearied out. (Translation: Brunt, *Arrian II*, 89-91).⁷¹

Hammond, naturally, denies any significance to Coenus' words, referring to it as a "fictitious speech".⁷²

That may be so for the content but there can be no doubt that Coenus made a speech and it may well

⁶⁸ *Arr.Ind.*15.10-12, citing Nearchus. D.S.XVII.90.5-7 believed the snakes to be a particular hazard of the Indian campaign. Cf. *Curt.*ix.1.12.

⁶⁹ D.Engels, "A Note on Alexander's Death", *CPh* 73 (1978), 224-9 [hereinafter "Alexander's Death"]. Engels further suggests that Alexander's death was the result of reinfection.

⁷⁰ E.N.Borza, "Some Observations on Malaria and the Ecology of Central Macedonia in Antiquity", *AJAH* 4 (1979), 102-24 [hereinafter "Ecology"]. N.G.L.Hammond's attempt to deny this, "Alexander's Veterans After His Death", *GRBS* 25 (1984), 52 and n.8 [hereinafter "Veterans"], by reasoning that Alexander's success required a healthy army has been rebutted by Borza in a further discussion of the subject: "Malaria in Alexander's Army", *AHB* 1 (1987), 36-38.

⁷¹ *Arr.v.*27.5-6. Cf. D.S.XVII.94.1-2.

be that there is some basis to Coenus' words, if not in whatever speech Arrian may have reworked, then at least as Arrian felt it demonstrated the conditions ancient armies endured.⁷³ The weight of evidence, however allusive, suggests that Alexander's soldiers had to deal with specific diseases and conditions that were unknown to them, but represented the reality of a world where such factors were commonplace. Once more the problem lies in assessing this evidence in a quantitative manner.

There is only one occasion where a source may seem to provide an estimate of the number of Macedonians who may have died in Asia. Diodorus claims that of the army that returned with Craterus to help Antipater in the Lamian War some 6,000 were survivors of the army that crossed into Asia with Alexander.⁷⁴ Unfortunately the passage is extremely problematical and the exact nuances of Diodorus' statement are hard to establish. What exactly did Diodorus mean by Asia? Ancient geographical terms are not synonymous with modern ones and by Asia Diodorus could possibly mean modern Asia or the Persian Empire in general. Are we to understand that Diodorus was referring to the army that crossed the Hellespont, or the one that left the Mediterranean, or another alternative?⁷⁵ The situation is further confused by Hammond's theory that a further 4,000 men "who had been enlisted on the march" and whom Diodorus contrasts with the original 6,000 had not fought in Asia at all, but had been recruited by Craterus as he passed through Macedonia into Thessaly.⁷⁶ Hammond argues that Craterus has to be the agent of the *proseilêmmenôn* ('recruited' or 'enlisted'), but it is equally possible that the phrase *tôn d' en paradôi proseilêmmenôn tetrakischiou* is subordinate to the

⁷² Hammond, "Casualties", 66. Both Brunt (*Arrian II*, 531-3) and Bosworth ("Decline", 8 n.48) accept the content of Coenus' speech as (in Bosworth's phrase), "rhetorically pointed", but feel that this passage contains a factual basis.

⁷³ That Coenus made a speech is reported as fact by Arrian (v.27.1) and Curtius (ix.3.3-16) also attributes a speech to Coenus.

⁷⁴ D.S.XVIII.16.4: *tôn eis Asian Alexandrôi sundiabebêkotôn*.

⁷⁵ For these difficulties see Bosworth, "Decline", 5 with nn.31-2 (who feels Diodorus means 6,000 survivors from the troops who crossed down to 331: a *ca.* 25% survival rate if these were all the survivors); and P.A.Brunt, "Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry", *JHS* 83 (1963), 38 with n.35 [hereinafter "Cavalry"], where he sees the distinction as between those who fought at Gaugamela and any later reinforcements.

⁷⁶ Hammond, "Veterans", 55-7; "Casualties", 65 with n.49.

dative *Alexandrôî*, who thus becomes the agent as Bosworth and Brunt have translated it (n.75, above). Regardless of such niceties we are still left with two insurmountable difficulties. It is impossible to know whether these 6,000 totalled all the survivors of the army at any particular stage, nor how Diodorus arrived at his conclusion. It is extremely unlikely that Diodorus possessed a series of synoptic texts to which he was able to add and subtract in order to arrive at a precise number of Macedonians who were on active service, had been demobbed, or had died, at any one stage. Ancient historians did not conceive of history in a modern manner and were not at all impelled to provide 'evidence' or to add to the record of what they wrote a cliometric analysis.⁷⁷ Diodorus' evidence, however attractive, is wholly inadequate for our purposes.

No precision can justifiably be claimed, or even attained, for these influences under consideration. Yet they must have had an appreciable effect upon the wastage rate the Macedonian soldiers suffered and, in the case of certain instances such as the Gedrosian march, a disastrous upwards effect. The life-tables discussed above (p.20-1), suggest that between 17 and 50 per cent of the soldiers who were present throughout the ten year campaign, depending on where one is prepared to mark the average age of these men, could be expected to die through natural causes. The tables are based on a generally sedentary population, and the number of deaths from violent causes in a continuously campaigning army must have been considerable. How to amalgamate these two causes of death is, frustratingly, impossible. Put crudely, those soldiers that died in battle, experienced a 'real' death, not the statistical possibility of a later death due to natural causes. We cannot conflate the two methods, the one 'real', the other hypothetical, because Alexander's Macedonians do not represent a stable enough population (visible to us), such that a statistical life table can be applied to them.

⁷⁷ For the ancient conception of history see (though somewhat overstated), T.P. Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics. Three Studies in Greco-Roman Literature* (Leicester 1979), esp. 3-53 and Finley, *Ancient History*, 7-46. In a paper delivered in May 1990 before the Classical Association of Canada/ Société Canadienne des Études Classique, at Victoria, B.C., Catherine Rubincam demonstrated that not even Thucydides, of all our extant authors the most rigorous in his approach to the evidence, was concerned to present numbers as a simple record. Often he was motivated by dramatic reasons and, indeed, many of the casualty figures he reproduces are qualified or conventionally rounded in multiples of ten (especially 50 and 100). I am grateful to Prof. Rubincam for a copy of her paper and for permission to make use of it here.

Indeed, for that matter, even if we exclude death from combat from consideration (which, of course, we cannot), how applicable would the life table be to an army campaigning in foreign climes? They would hardly experience a 'normal' demographic trend, the body being more susceptible to disease and individuals to injury when in strange environments.⁷⁸

It is impossible to quantify the effect of the various conditions and policies the army was subject to on the number of Macedonians that Alexander had with him at any one time. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that their repercussion were considerable; and Hammond's view, that only *ca.* 3,000 Macedonians were lost to the Royal Army in ten years campaigning, from all causes (?!), must be acknowledged for the ludicrous figure that it is. If we take Milns' figure as a basis with which to work (a conservative 38 per cent losses owing to battle mortality, natural disaster and the discharge of Macedonians into garrisons and colonies), then only a further 12 per cent mortality as a result of disease and natural causes is required to bring that total up to 50 per cent, which should be regarded as a minimum figure. This is the total that both Bosworth and Brunt consider at least acceptable. It may well have been significantly higher. The remaining problem is to which group, and at which time, do we apply the 50 per cent loss rate? As this procedure will dramatically increase the number of Macedonians that are assumed to have fought for Alexander it will have to be done with some care. That task, however, must wait for the appropriate moment (below pp.41-2). Now we need to turn to the evidence for Macedon's military strength itself.

⁷⁸ Engels, *Logistics*, *passim*, discusses the various climatic and topographic details for Alexander's route.

2. THE HUMAN RESOURCES OF MACEDONIA.

The Growth of Macedonian Military Manpower

Under Philip II (360-336).

Diodorus, who provides our only surviving consecutive narration of Philip's reign, was in no doubt that Macedon's military strength grew remarkably under this exceptional king. In a proleptic passage in Book 16 summarizing the growth of Philip's power and his achievements, Diodorus states that, "he [Philip] left armies so numerous and powerful that his son Alexander had no need to apply for allies in his attempt to overthrow the Persian hegemony."¹ Yet Philip came to power only after one of the most calamitous defeats in Macedonian history. His elder brother, Perdiccas, gave battle against the Illyrians in 360; it cost him and 4,000 Macedonians their lives.² When, in 359/8, Philip prepared to confront Bardylis, he did so with what we must suppose was the full levy available to him.³ In a very real sense the battle would set the pattern for his reign: would Macedon be dominated by the highland tribes or not? Philip mustered an army of 10,000 foot and 600 horse, providing him a marginal advantage in cavalry against Bardylis' "picked" force.⁴ It was enough.

Between 354/3 and 353/2 Philip fought four battles in Thessaly. While victorious in the first he was defeated in the next two by the Phocian general Onomarchus.⁵ Despite Thessalian support

¹ D.S.XVI.1.5.

² D.S.XVI.2.4.

³ This was probably the reason Philip withdrew his garrison from Amphipolis. This does not necessarily mean that he gave up any claim to control the city as is commonly assumed (Cawkwell, *PM* 43-5, 73ff; Ellis, *PMI* 48ff; Griffith, *HM* 2.236ff.). The Amphipolitans became autonomous (D.S.XVI.3.3, 4.1) and Philip finally subjugated the city when he considered that it had acted against his interests (D.S.XVI.8.2-3). For a proper understanding of autonomous in this context see: M.Ostwald, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (American Classical Studies 11, 1982).

⁴ D.S.XVI.4.3. The adjective perhaps suggests Bardylis' confidence and his estimate of the capability of Philip's army.

Philip was outnumbered and, for once, outgeneraled. Nonetheless the two armies must have been numerically similar as both generals were prepared to risk two pitched battles in seeking a decisive result.⁶ Returning to Thessaly in 353/2 Philip fought his fourth battle against the Phocians at the Crocus Field. He successfully led an army "numbering more than 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse."⁷ The crux comes in assessing what portion of Philip's army was provided by his Thessalian allies. We know that they were present, for Diodorus claims that Philip "gathered them [the Thessalians] all together"; a phrase sufficiently unhelpful it is necessary to fall back upon considerations of general probability.⁸

Xenophon reports a boast of Jason of Pherai that a united Thessaly would have "a cavalry force of 6,000, and a hoplite army of more than 10,000."⁹ Jason's successor, Alexander, had been capable of raising a largely mercenary army of 20,000 for the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 364.¹⁰ And after making terms with Philip, Lycophron and Peitholaos, the last of Jason's house, still retained some 2,000 mercenaries. Nor can it be certain that the tyrants' army fought at the Crocus Field, for Philip had to go on to reduce Pherai and Pagasai by siege.¹¹

⁵ In general see: J.Buckler, *Philip II and the Sacred War* (Leiden 1989), 58-81 [hereinafter *PSW*]; Griffith, *HM* 2.267-281; H.B.Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century BC* (London 1935), 173-178 [hereinafter *Thessaly*].

⁶ As suggested by Griffith, *HM* 2.269. The first clash was obviously indecisive. D.S.XVI.35.1-2 notes Onomarchus' numerical advantage.

⁷ D.S.XVI.35.4. Onomarchus army totalled 20,000 infantry and 500 cavalry.

⁸ D.S.XVI.35.5.

⁹ *Xen.Hell.vi.1.8*. The circumstances are tendentious and suggest such a total would be exaggerated: Polydamas warning Sparta of Jason's ambitions. Yet, upon being elected *tagus*, Jason's enumeration of his military strength apparently came to a total of 8,000 cavalry; 20,000 hoplites and numerous peltasts (*Xen.Hell.vi.1.19*). Xenophon also mentions a force of 6,000 mercenaries (*Hell.vi.1.5*). For discussion and acceptance of these figures see: Westlake, *Thessaly*, 105-112.

¹⁰ Westlake, *Thessaly*, 148-152 feels Diodorus (XV.80.4) is guilty of only slight exaggeration at most. Cf. *Plut.Pel.32* and J.Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony* (Harvard 1980), 175-182 for circumstances.

¹¹ The mercenaries: D.S.XVI.37.3, 38.1. Hammond, *TMS* 113 suggests that Philip prevented the union of Onomarchus and the tyrants' forces. For events following the battle: Buckler, *PSW* 78-81; Griffith, *HM* 2.277-8.

The outbreak of civil war between the Thessalian League and the tyrants of Pherai, in which Philip had been induced to intervene, would naturally preclude the concentration of such numbers on one side. The figures that are preserved in our sources probably reflect the fragmentation of Thessalian manpower from the Sacred War onwards. The League was still able to dispose of 6,000 troops at the Battle of Argolas in 355, yet felt sufficiently intimidated by a resurgent Pherai to request Philip's help to offset their inferiority.¹² More significantly, after the 340s there is evidence of an absolute decline in available Thessalian strength. Although Isocrates, in his speech *On the Peace*, estimates that the Thessalians could provide in excess of 3,000 horsemen in the mid 350s, Diodorus states that only 2,000 Thessalian cavalry fought in the Lamian War against Antipater.¹³

Regarding Philip's 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse at the Crocus Field, the modern consensus seems to be that 15,000 of the infantry were Macedonian.¹⁴ Opinions are more varied concerning the cavalry; not surprisingly perhaps when Justin's claim that Philip was motivated to intervene by his desire to acquire the Thessalian cavalry for his own purposes arouses the suspicion that Philip would have put pressure on his allies to contribute as many as they were able.¹⁵ For while it was not until 341, after Philip's final reorganisation of Thessaly, that it is possible Thessalian troops operated outside of their homeland, Diodorus certainly thought that the allied cavalry were instrumental in securing Philip's victory.¹⁶ The king's reliance upon them is understandable considering the effect the two

¹² The 6,000 at Argolas did include some of Thessaly's Amphictyonic allies, perhaps no longer available: D.S.XVI.30.4. Buckler, *PSW* 48, 58, suggests, on the basis of D.S.XVI.33.3, that Delphic gold was subsidizing the tyrants' costs. Cf. also Westlake, *Thessaly*, 172ff.

¹³ Isocrates 8 [*On the Peace*].118; D.S.XVIII.15.2. Westlake, *Thessaly* 229-235 for Thessalian motives in opposing Macedon and for the suggestion that Thessaly's loyalties were divided, in which case 2,000 horse only represents those committed to the Greek cause.

¹⁴ Hammond, *TMS* 113-14; Griffith *HM* 2.273-4. Buckler, *PSW* 74 has 15,00 as the total Macedonian strength. T.R.Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece* (Princeton 1985), 288 [hereinafter *Sovereignty and Coinage*] is simply mistaken in referring to the whole army as Thessalian.

¹⁵ Justin vii.6. Griffith, *HM* 2.274 settles for 1,000 Macedonian cavalry; Hammond, *TMS* 113, for 1,500; and Westlake, *Thessaly*, 175 seems to imply that all the cavalry were Thessalian.

recent defeats had had upon his army. Considering that Thessaly seems to have only possessed the potential to field large hoplite forces when united under a *tagus* and that the League put somewhat less than 6,000 men into battle at Neon at the start of the Third Sacred War I would suggest that the Thessalians could have provided Philip with between 4-5,000 men, of which perhaps half were cavalry. In which case the Macedonians would have numbered a little under 20,000, with *ca.* 18,000 footmen and *ca.* 1,500 horse.

That Philip would not have left garrisons behind in Macedon seems unthinkable. Therefore, in 352, within eight years of Philip's accession, Macedon's army must have approximately doubled in size. Ten years later, when besieging Perinthus, Philip had an army of 30,000 under his command.¹⁷ Again, we cannot be sure about the percentage of non-Macedonians involved. Demosthenes could speak of reinforcements being summoned from Thessaly and Macedon. Either Philip was drawing upon Macedonian garrisons or non-Macedonian allies were present (above n.16). Either way Philip was commanding armies of ever greater size as his reign progressed.

By the time of Chaeronea, in August 338, Philip led an army even larger than that at Perinthus to victory in a decisive battle against the Greeks. According to our only source for Philip's strength, Diodorus, it totaled "more than 30,000 infantry and no less than 2,000 cavalry." As usual there is no breakdown given to enable the purely Macedonian strength to be extracted from the total force.¹⁸ Neither is there any reason to think that the army at Chaeronea represented the full Macedonian levy.¹⁹ It is possible that another Macedonian army was operating at this time in Aitolia, where it may

¹⁶ For soldiers from Thessaly being ordered to Thrace: Demosthenes 8 [*On the Chersonese*].14. It is possible that Philip was drawing upon his garrisons based there, and not Thessalian fighters themselves. D.S.XVI.35.5 for their role at the Crocus Field.

¹⁷ D.S.XVI.74.5.

¹⁸ D.S.XVI.85.5-6. This, if any, is the figure most likely to be distorted. Diyllus was understandably pro-Athenian (N.G.L.Hammond, "The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVI. Pt.1", *CQ* 31 [1937], 90) and the statement that, "the king had the advantage in numbers" (D.S.XVI.85.6.), contradicts Justin ix.3. The evidence of Plutarch (*Dem.*17.3) is worthless, mentioning only mercenaries, who had anyway been defeated earlier and whose presence is not mentioned at Chaeronea.

¹⁹ *Contra* N.G.L.Hammond, *Studies in Greek History* (London 1973), 546 [hereinafter *Studies*]. "The full strength of the Macedonian army was employed ... two-thirds of the cavalry strength was

have been dispatched in early 338.²⁰ Parmenio may have commanded this force, though there is no evidence beyond the fact of his otherwise surprising absence from Chaeronea. And it was Alexander and Antipater whom Philip later sent to negotiate a peace with defeated Athens.²¹ Indeed there are several instances of Macedonian armies operating apart from the king, so the possibility of Parmenio holding an independent command should not surprise us.²²

We are told that Philip waited for the arrival of his allies before advancing into Boeotia. As he seems to have been presenting the forthcoming war as an Amphictyonic affair the ostentatious display of his Greek supporters would not be unlike Philip.²³ Though no mention of the allies' role is provided in either of the sparse battle narratives of Polyaeus or Diodorus; some allies - at the very least the Thessalians - must have been present. So too the smaller states of central Greece. Long dominated by Thessaly they would have in turn passed under Philip's aegis when he tightened his grip upon Thessaly in the late 340s.²⁴ An exception may be Phocis. Pausanias claimed that the Phocians were induced to join the Greek side. However, modern works have tended to stress a division in their allegiance based upon the pragmatic fact that their territory was effectively split between the antagonists and upon Philip's generous treatment of the Phocians in the aftermath of Chaeronea.²⁵ However, considering the Phocians' recent trials their capacity to provide meaningful aid to either side must have been drastically limited. While Philip requested the aid of his Peloponnesian allies, they,

sufficient..." Hammond also takes no notice of the Macedonian allies. Cawkwell, *PM* 145 makes the same error.

²⁰ Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F235. This theory depends upon the restoration of the book number of Theopompus' fragment. On the whole problem of Philip's relations with Aetolia see A.B.Bosworth, "Early Relations Between Aetolia and Macedon", *AJAH* 1 (1976), 164-181; especially 169ff with n.54 for the date of the expedition.

²¹ Justin ix.4.

²² Plut.*Alex.*3.8, 9.1; Theopompus *FGrHist* 115, FF217.

²³ Demosthenes 18 [*De Corona*],156-158 refers to Philip's propaganda. A good account of Philip's manoeuvres in Ellis, *PMI* 186-193, 196.

²⁴ For their action in Philip's interests see Ellis, *PMI* 191, 196. For Philip's tightened grip on Thessaly see: Griffith *HM* 2.285-295, 523-544; Westlake, *Thessaly*, 182-185, 191-193, 199-200.

²⁵ Pausanias x.3.3-4. Griffith, *HM* 2.592-3; *contra* Ellis, *PMI* 194ff.

still linked by alliances to either Athens or Thebes, chose the wiser course of neutrality.²⁶ This still leaves the problem of estimating the strictly Macedonian military strength at this time. The cavalry total (2,000 troopers), illustrates the problem. By this stage Macedonia was undoubtedly capable of fielding 2,000 horsemen herself. Moreover, Philip could probably have summoned a further 2,000 cavalry from the Thessalians.²⁷ Thus he seems to have deliberately restricted the numbers of his cavalry - amongst the best troops available to him - and the conventional view that Alexander led cavalry against the Greek's left wing to defeat the Thebans is open to further doubt.²⁸ Since Philip commanded Macedonians on the right wing, this leaves only a number of alternative dispositions. The cavalry were probably held in reserve as the selection of the battlefield by the Greeks would have necessitated. If indeed the battle was a contest of infantry, and Macedonian phalangites held both wings, we must consider the unpalatable alternative that Philip's Greek allies held the centre of the line between two Macedonian phalanxes. On no other occasion when phalangites can be seen in battle is the phalanx split in such a manner. A more plausible option would be to have the Greek allies forming a second line as they did in Alexander's battles.²⁹ Despite the uncertainties, it seems reasonable that Philip's Macedonian phalanx provided the majority of his army at Chaeronea. When combined with a

²⁶ Demosthenes 18 [*De Corona*].156-158 mentions Philip's summons. Isocrates 5 [*To Philip*].50, 74 refers to the reliance of the Peloponnesian states on Philip for protection against Sparta. D.H.Kelly, "Philip II of Macedon and the Boeotian Alliance", *Antichthon* 15 (1980), 64-83 disentangles the alliances of these states. Three did, however, fight on the Greek side at Chaeronea: Megara, Corinth and the Achaeans. Ellis, *PMI* 293 n.62 provides full references to the other allies of Athens and Thebes.

²⁷ In 334 there were 3,300 Companions (i.e. 1,800 with Alexander and 1,500 with Antipater) alone under arms: D.S.XVII.17.4-5. Alexander also took 1,800 Thessalians with him across the Hellespont: D.S.XVII.17.4.

²⁸ See now P.A.Rahe, "The Annihilation of the Sacred Band at Chaeronea", *AJA* 85 (1981), 84-87 *contra* Hammond, *Studies* 547-8. Ellis, *PMI* 197-201 and Griffith, *HM* 2.596-603 basically follow Hammond. We know that the Theban Sacred Band fell resisting Macedonian troops because of Plutarch's remark that their wounds all faced the *sarissa*: Plut.*Pel*.18.

²⁹ For the topography of the battlefield see Hammond, *Studies* 534ff; and W.Kendrick Pritchett, "Observations on Chaironeia", *AJA* 62 (1958), 307-311.

possible army in Aetolia and the undoubted presence of garrison troops in Macedonia, a reasonably conservative army of 30,000 active Macedonian soldiers can be conjectured for the summer of 338.

From the evidence discussed so far the trend is unmistakable. In 358 Philip's army was under 11,000, but had increased to over 20,000 in 352, to *ca.* 30,000 at Perinthus in 341 and to at least 30,000 by 338. The evidence from Alexander's reign would also suggest in retrospect that still larger reserves were available but that Philip chose not to mobilise them. If that is true, there are interesting implications for the king's estimation of potential Greek resistance and the probability of a Macedonian defeat in 338.

Military Strength Under Alexander III (336-323).

In 335/4, shortly after his accession, Alexander led his army south into Greece to deal with the Thebans' challenge to his authority. Diodorus records that the Macedonian army numbered more than 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry whom, he stated, were "all veterans of Philip's campaigns."³⁰ The Corinthian League allies that fought against Thebes are only mentioned after the siege, at the council which was to decide the captured city's fate; and no numbers are provided for them.³¹ Nor should it be forgotten that Alexander's forces had just seen fighting in Illyria, across the Danube and in Thrace.³² Casualties and garrison troops required to stabilize the recently disturbed borders need to be taken into account as do the known Macedonian garrisons Philip had established at Thebes, Ambracia, Corinth and possibly in Chalcis following his victory at Chaeronea.³³

³⁰ D.S.XVII.9.3. Diodorus' statement that these troops "had hardly suffered a single reverse" may imply that many (all?) had been enlisted after 352, the date of Philip's serious defeat in Thessaly. This is, however, a great deal of weight to put on Diodorus' words.

³¹ D.S.XVII.13.5. The accounts of Justin (xi.3); Arrian (i.8.8); and Plutarch (*Alex.*11.5) contain no figures at all.

³² For an account of these campaigns see Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 28-32.

³³ Plut.*Arat.*23.4; Polybius 38.3.3.

Furthermore, it has become the orthodox view that another Macedonian army was simultaneously operating in Asia at this time and had been doing so since Philip ordered it there in early 336. Polyaeus claims that Parmenio and Attalus had 10,000 men with them at Magnesia; and Diodorus mentions a third general, Calas, as "*echôn Makedonas kai misthophorous stratiôtas*" in the Troad in 335.³⁴ Recent emphasis has shifted to trying to assess the number of Macedonians present in a force that, it is rightly considered, would have been predominantly made up of mercenaries. Bosworth proposes a Macedonian contingent at a maximum of 3,000 phalangites, a total Hammond is prepared to accept.³⁵ In reality, we can say little more than that it would have been necessarily substantial, if the stratagems described by Polyaeus are reliable.³⁶ Regrettably it is not so clear whether these Macedonians were still present in Asia by 334. We do not know if Calas' command was contemporary with that of Parmenio's and Attalus', or if it was created after the murder of the latter. If the former, then two forces, each with a Macedonian presence, can be seen as operating concurrently: one at Magnesia and the other in the Troad.³⁷ However, Justin names Philip's three commanders as Parmenio, Amyntas and Attalus.³⁸ Diodorus, whose text implies that he knew of only three commanders, is the only one to mention Calas in this context.³⁹ It would seem better to err on the side of prudence and accept Calas as the replacement for the murdered Attalus. This does allow for the possibility of Macedonian soldiers still fighting in Asia as late as 335 and their location is also

³⁴ Polyaeus v.44.4; D.S.XVII.7.10. Brunt, *Arrian*, lxi-lxxi finds Polyaeus' 10,000 advance force necessary to reconcile the various traditions concerning the total strength of Alexander's army in 334 at ca. 40,000 foot and slightly over 5,000 cavalry. His arguments have been implicitly accepted by more recent works. See Bosworth, *Commentary* 98-9.

³⁵ Bosworth, "Decline", 2-3. with nn.9-10. The figure is selected on the basis of the proportional strength of the phalangites in the invasion army as a whole (at 30%) being identical to that in the force Philip selected. Hammond, "Casualties", 67 n.58. See also Brunt, "Cavalry", 27-47; Milns, "Army", 87-136.

³⁶ Polyaeus v.44.4,5.

³⁷ Bosworth, "Decline", 3 n.9 assumes this.

³⁸ Justin ix.5.

³⁹ D.S.XVII.7.10 mis-spells Calas as Callas; cf. XVII.5.1-2 for Attalus' assassination. Arr.i.17.1 later mentions Calas' appointment as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia in 334.

acceptable: by now the Persian counterattack so ably led by Memnon had recaptured all but a slender bridgehead around Abydos.⁴⁰ Questions remain, however. Neither Bosworth nor Hammond have clearly thought out the implications of the addition of 3,000 phalangites to the Macedonian invasion force of 334. Where were these men, the equivalent of two phalanx battalions, at the Granicus, for instance? If attached to the invasion force, then logically, Alexander's phalanx must have totalled 12,000 men in eight battalions, something we know not to have been the case.⁴¹ It was not until after his victory at the Granicus that Alexander began detaching units of his army on separate duties. Thus Hammond is premature in assigning them to Antigonos' command by 331.⁴² A more contingent solution (preferable if only because it avoids the difficulties outlined above), is that with the success of Memnon's campaign the Macedonian troops were recalled to reorganise, recuperate and to bid their families farewell. Alexander's concern for the *neogamoi* in the winter of 334 makes a suggestive parallel.⁴³ The task of keeping the bridgehead secure through the winter of 335 could be left to the mercenaries of the advance force.

To recapitulate: Alexander had over 33,000 Macedonians at Thebes in 335. As we have seen, some Macedonians were still operating in the Troad with Calas in the summer of the same year. Still others were scattered in garrisons throughout Greece and there must have been others keeping Macedon's borders secure. Even our far from comprehensive sources would allow the Macedonian

⁴⁰ Diodorus.XVII.7.10: if not simply a linking device the use of *meta de tauta* suggests time had elapsed. Cf. A.J.Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks: the Epigraphic Evidence* (Norman 1980), 58-70 [hereinafter *Alexander and the Greeks*]; and E. Badian, "Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia", 39-41 in *Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies Presented to V.Ehrenberg* (New York 1967), 37-71 [hereinafter *Anc. Soc.& Inst.*], for the evidence. Arrian i.11.6 makes it clear that the Macedonians still retained control of both shores of the Hellespont.

⁴¹ Unless six battalions of more than 1,500 men each are to be preferred. It is possible, after all even the size of the phalanx battalion is modern conjecture, but unlikely. Cf. Milns, "Army", 101-2.

⁴² Hammond, "Casualties", 67 n.58. This is on the basis of Polybius xii.19.3, who speculates that 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry were unavailable to Alexander at Issus. This estimate is, however, totally theoretical; moreover it encompasses casualties. For the meaning of the Greek see F.W.Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* (3 Vols. Oxford 1957-79), 2.364-376 [hereinafter *Commentary*].

⁴³ Arr.i.23.6, 24.1-3.

army to consist of at least 35,000 men in 335, excluding mercenaries and allies. This minimal total makes it clear that Alexander began his invasion of Asia with a relatively small nucleus of the Macedonians available to him and that substantial numbers of men were left as reserves with Antipater, some of whom were serving in a second army under the regent's command. Such a decision is understandable. Alexander could hope for widespread support from the Greek cities in Asia Minor and, initially, need only to have considered opposition from the satrapal levies, inferior in both number and quality to his own soldiers.⁴⁴ Diodorus, who gives the only detailed figures that we possess, confirms this. He informs us that the Macedonian infantry with Alexander at the Hellespont (both phalangites and hypaspists) totalled 12,000. A force of 1,800 Companion cavalry are attested and to these should be added some Macedonian archers and the *prodromoi*, four of whose five squadrons were Macedonian.⁴⁵ A further 12,000 infantry and 1,500 horsemen were left with Antipater.⁴⁶ An approximate total of 30,000 enlisted Macedonians under arms seems roughly correct for the year 334. As we have seen there were more fighting men available than this. The army as a whole was not a standing force and selection for the levy was based on age, if several anecdotes are trustworthy.⁴⁷ It seems probable that while Alexander intended to conquer the Persian Empire and draw upon Macedonian reserves as necessary Antipater was instructed to maintain a standing force, in effect down

⁴⁴ Arr.i.18.1; D.S.XVI.92.3; Pausanias vi.18.2 for Greek support. Full references in W.E.Higgins, "Aspects of Alexander's Imperial Administration", *Athenaeum* 58 (1980), 129-152., and, with a negative view Badian, *Anc. Soc. & Inst.* 37-71. Arrian i.15.5 makes clear Macedonian expertise at the Granicus and Chaeronea clearly demonstrated the phalanx's capabilities against Greek hoplites.

⁴⁵ D.S.XVII.17.4, whose text is corrupt where it concerns the *prodromoi* here. See R.D.Milns, "Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry and Diodorus 17.17.4", *JHS* 86 (1966), 167-8 [hereinafter "Cavalry"], who suggests "*Thrakes de <kai> prodromoi kai Paiones*". These troopers (also referred to as *sarissophoroi*) were later amalgamated with the Companions, in all probability owing to heavy losses in both units. Brunt, "Cavalry", 28, 35. They probably numbered 900 in 334: Milns, "Cavalry", 167. The archers are first named as Macedonian at Gaugamela: Arr.iii.12.2.

⁴⁶ D.S.XVII.17.5.

⁴⁷ D.S.XVII.27.1; Justin xi.6.4. This is also the necessary interpretation behind the various criteria established for the discharge of veterans at Opis (see below pp.36ff) Cf. also Livy 42.51.11 where, in 197, we are informed Philip V conscripted the young and old.

to 323, comparable with the army left with him in 334. This would be necessary to keep control over the various Greek *poleis* with their citizen armies. These precautions were a necessity, for Antipater faced challenges to his authority from Thrace in 331 and from Greece in 331/0 and 322. Despite Alexander's demands for reinforcements Antipater still retained sufficient forces to lead an army of 13,000 foot and 600 horse into Greece during the Lamian War; though this time it was not sufficient to suppress the Greek insurgents.⁴⁸

It is problematical, in the least, to try to recover the precise nature of the demands Alexander placed upon his kingdom's manpower. Extrapolating figures from the sources in order to discover the exact number of reinforcements summoned east is effectively impossible owing to the incomplete documentation of the records. Achievable results can, however, be measured against an analysis of the data we possess concerning the number of Macedonian troops remaining with Alexander towards the end of his life in 324, when a substantial reorganisation of the royal army took place.⁴⁹ Variations in the source tradition surrounding the events of the Opis mutiny do, however, provide obstacles in recreating a clear picture of its consequences, particularly with regard to a statement unique to Quintus Curtius. Before assessing the profound implications of Curtius' remark concerning an Asian garrison-army it will be helpful to set it within context.

Upon arriving at Susa Alexander took the decision to discharge a large proportion of his Macedonian soldiers. It was not a decision undertaken lightly or without planning. Nonetheless it provoked a seemingly unexpected reaction amongst the Macedonians themselves, who, for a number of reasons, became mutinous and demanded their collective discharge. If we set aside the set speeches in

⁴⁸ D.S.XVIII.12.2. *Contra* Bosworth, "Decline", 8 n.51, who claims Diodorus' *Makedones* to be a "blanket designation"; it is clear from Diodorus' next sentence that he is referring to Macedonians in particular - the country is considered short of troops, though Sippias remained in Macedon raising another army. Furthermore, Bosworth is incorrect ("Decline", 8-9) in stating that Antipater had difficulty in gathering an army to deal with Agis' attack in 331/0. Aeschines 3 [*Against Ctesiphon*].165 says only that Antipater was slow: *polun chronon sunêge stratopedon*. As a Thracian revolt had not yet been settled this is not surprising: D.S.XVII.63.1-2 adds that a force of 40,000 was eventually raised, though not all were Macedonian.

⁴⁹ As Bosworth, "Decline", 2-3 points out.

Curtius and Arrian, the incidents leading up to the mutiny are otherwise reported along broadly similar lines in every source. All mention the discharge of the army's debts prior to the mutiny though details and emphasis differ, and Curtius narrates the episode in flashback, heightening the impression of the soldiers' perceived worthlessness.⁵⁰ Common agreement has it that the mutiny was finally provoked when Alexander announced his intentions regarding the veterans. But there is no such consensus concerning when these men were discharged and their role in the mutiny itself. This is largely owing to the fact that relevant details are absent from our sources.

Yet Arrian's account has differing implications to those contained in the remainder of our sources. In Arrian Alexander makes his announcement, the mutiny ensues, is settled, and then, after the great banquet of reconciliation, the veterans "were ready to leave him." The contrast between those who were to remain in Asia and those returning to Macedonia is clear from Arrian's text, but this is the only distinction he makes.⁵¹ However, Plutarch, Diodorus and Justin refer to the veterans in a manner that suggests that they were not involved in the mutiny, and may indeed have already departed from Opis. Plutarch indicates that they had gone down to the coast, while Diodorus and Justin contrast them with the Macedonians remaining with Alexander at Opis.⁵² Compared to the truncated accounts of these three authors Curtius is the most forthcoming, even to the extent of providing details found in his work alone. In Curtius' version, Alexander, having first returned the elder veterans to Macedonia, turns to the remainder and orders a further 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry to be selected for retention in Asia, apparently to serve as a garrison force.⁵³ Therefore, Curtius distinguishes two

⁵⁰ Arr.vii.10.3; Curt.x.2.9, 25-26; D.S.XVII.109.2; Justin ix.11; Plut.*Alex.*70.2. Further details and similarities, with references to modern works, in Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander* 101ff.

⁵¹ Arr.vii.8.1 and 12.1 (retaining the reading *menousi* at 8.1 as suggested by N.G.L.Hammond, "Some Passages in Arrian Concerning Alexander", *CQ* 30 [1980], 469-471). For the various reasons behind the mutiny see: Curt.x.2.12ff; D.S.XVII.109f; Plut.*Alex.* 70-71; Justin xii.11f; (the vulgate all misplace this incident at Susa); Arr.vii.8.1-12.3 correctly places the mutiny at Opis and has those being sent home commence the mutiny (vii.8.2-3), feeling despised by Alexander. However one considers this emphasis Alexander ends up looking either wronged, or misunderstood.

⁵² Plut.*Alex.*71.2; D.S.XVII.109f; Justin xii.11.

⁵³ Curt.x.2.8.

groups that would no longer be under Alexander's direct command. However, the royal army, a third force that would immediately continue Alexander's planned conquests, must be considered a separate force from the dismissed veterans and the garrison-army. This would seem to be the implication behind Alexander's remark that he had dismissed more men than had been retained (presumably in the royal army) and the scorn he casts at those he characterises as wearied of Asia. This last remark only makes sense if directed towards those men who were to form the army in Asia - it would make little sense to ask this (admittedly rhetorical) question to those veterans who had already been ordered back to Macedonia, even if they had been present, something far from clear in itself.⁵⁴

While Curtius seems to be suggesting the presence of three military groups of Macedonians in Asia in 323 his evidence concerning a Macedonian garrison-army has been received with a great deal of scepticism, in part because he is its only source and doubtless because the long lacuna that commences at x.4.3 has meant the loss of any further details Curtius possessed. With the exception of Hammond recent work has tended towards agnosticism or the dismissal of Curtius' evidence.⁵⁵ Milns is led astray by his misinterpretation of the Opis mutiny to find indirect confirmation of his calculations (that there were *ca.* 13,000 phalangites at Opis) in Curtius' statement. Bosworth considers Curtius to have misunderstood his source and concludes that the figure was meant to include mercenaries. Brunt considers this option and rejects it (though Bosworth mis-cites him in support of his own contention), and concludes "that A[rrrian] has omitted somewhere between 326-323 the arrival of a very considerable body of Macedonian recruits."⁵⁶ Diversity of opinion makes one thing clear: somewhere the source

⁵⁴ Curt.x.2.19, 25. It should be noted that in Curtius it is the fear that Asia would become the seat of Alexander's empire that is uppermost in the minds' of the mutineers - perhaps they would never return home, or else would become neglected by their king? (x.2.12). Unfortunately Curtius' subject is not always perfectly obvious. See x.2.16-17. The same verb, *retinere*, is used to describe all those who were not returning to Macedonia, whereas before it referred to those remaining in Alexander's personal service - a typical conception of the king's. Interestingly Justin claims that when the king and his men were reconciled Alexander released another 11,000 men. While clearly wrong Justin may here be misinterpreting the information provided by Curt.x.2.8 concerning the infantry who were to remain in Asia. Equally, this could be Justin's figure for the total number of veterans discharged.

⁵⁵ Hammond, "Casualties", 68; whose reasons for following Curtius I find unacceptable (see chapter 1).

tradition is either incomplete or untrustworthy. In this instance there seems no reason not to trust Curtius. His evidence is not contradicted elsewhere, nor is it inherently incredible. Where reservations are held there are not enough cogent arguments provided for the rejection of Curtius' garrison-army. His figure seems to be dismissed because, in effect, it suggests too many Macedonians. The method is questionable: the evidence should inform the argument, not be dictated to by it. As Griffith noted in 1965 the history of Macedon's rise and of the Hellenistic kingdoms "is very much easier to account for", if we can think in terms of a considerable number of Macedonians.⁵⁷

We now have approximate strengths for three Macedonian armies. Antipater, in Europe, commanded a force numbering somewhat over 13,000 men. Two further commands were in Asia. One was the garrison-army that was to total 15,000 men; the other Craterus' veterans: over 10,000 foot and 1,500 horse.⁵⁸ Craterus had been ordered to replace Antipater as regent and the latter was commanded, along with his army, to Asia.⁵⁹ In all likelihood this new levy was to form the Macedonian core for the further conquests the king planned. In effect the soldiers with Craterus were to be a straight exchange for the younger soldiers with Antipater. These men, no matter how old or battle-scarred, would, in Alexander's estimation, face little difficulty in keeping the troublesome Greeks and highland tribes subdued, as their later record would attest. This leaves only the royal army to be considered.

Amidst the dislocation caused by the rerouting of his armies Alexander was faced by one temporary problem. In the immediate future the royal army would be temporarily light on

⁵⁶ Milns, "Army", 112-13; Bosworth, "Casualties", 4 n.22; Brunt, "Cavalry", 38, the citation comes from his *Arrian* II 489-90.

⁵⁷ Griffith, "Background", 131. Griffith thinks in terms of 50,000-60,000 soldiers: "... the more Macedonians we can allow them [the Successors] the more understandable we find their history."

⁵⁸ D.S.XVII.109.1, XVIII.12.1 *ontas huper tous murious*; Arr.vii.12.1. For the presence of 1,500 cavalry with Craterus cf. D.S.XVIII.16.4; Brunt, "Cavalry", 38, argues that they must be discharged Macedonian veterans also.

⁵⁹ Arr.vii.12.3-4; Justin xii.12.4. Antipater's soldiers were men of "mature age" (Arrian), suggesting that they would already have served some years in the army. Down to 331 Alexander's reinforcements, whenever so specified, were young soldiers: Curt.iv.6.30; D.S.XVII.49.1.

Macedonian troops, particularly for the campaign Alexander was about to launch against the Arabians.⁶⁰ This explains the summoning of satrapal armies to Babylon and the appearance of the *Epigonoi*, Persians trained in the military techniques of their conquerors and whose proficiency so distressed the Macedonians.⁶¹ The context of the Opis mutiny allows an insight into what must have been a substantial undertaking - the creation of a Macedonian-commanded Persian army. This makes its first appearance in the charged atmosphere of the mutiny, though Persian soldiers had already displayed their prowess before Alexander prior to the mutiny's outbreak. Alexander's plans were only fully revealed now, though there can be no doubt that the king took the opportunity to throw the fact of the existence and loyalty of these troops in the faces of the mutinous Macedonians.⁶²

This does not mean, however, that, following the mutiny, the royal army at Babylon was totally denuded of Macedonian soldiers. This is demonstrated by the formulation of a racially mixed phalanx. In it 20,000 Persian infantry were integrated with Macedonian phalangites at a ratio of 12:4.⁶³ This means that there were at least a minimum of 6,700 Macedonians phalangites. There was at least one other wholly Macedonian unit - the hypaspists (now termed *argyraspides*) who numbered 3,000.⁶⁴ Presumably there were other units such as the Companion cavalry, but any indication as to their strength is completely lacking. It is unlikely that this racial compound outlived Alexander; the wars of the Successors, which broke out almost immediately, and the common Macedonian hostility towards Alexander's Orientalizing, would preclude the possibility. In addition these same wars reveal that a substantial number of Macedonian soldiers fought under the command of Alexander's former generals. In the aftermath of Alexander's death native Macedonians were at a premium for their military abilities and experience and the Diadochoi competed amongst themselves to gain and hold the loyalty of these

⁶⁰ Arr.vii.19.6ff.

⁶¹ Arr.vii.8.2; Plut.*Alex.*71.2.

⁶² Arr.vii.6.1ff, 23.1, 24.3f; D.S.XVII.101.3; Plut.*Alex.*47.3, 71.3; Curt.viii.5.1. See A.B.Bosworth, "Alexander and the Iranians", *JHS* 100 (1980), 1-21 [hereinafter "Iranians"].

⁶³ Arr.vii.23.3-4. See Bosworth, "Decline", 3-4 and "Iranians", 14, 17ff, for full discussion.

⁶⁴ D.S.XVIII.58.1, XIX.28.1, 30.6.

men. At least down to Triparadeisos (321) the various historical narratives constantly differentiate between Macedonian and non-Macedonian forces and it should be noted that not one of them provides a breakdown of Macedonians loyal to the various kings at any one time. This obviously frustrates any attempt to calculate their number with exactitude but from the evidence examined above it would seem that we need to think of a force of approximately 25,000 men.⁶⁵

Before this figure can be accepted as reasonable conjecture, however, one final possibility needs to be considered. Could the Macedonians we know to have been in Babylon in 323 actually constitute only the garrison army Alexander intended to hold Asia? Were the Macedonians assigned to the royal army for the Arabian campaign on a temporary transfer from the garrison-army? For a number of reasons this seems unlikely. With the disbanding of the satrapal armies some garrisons needed to be provided for the heartland of the now-defunct Achaemenid Empire. Alexander's absence in India between 328-324 clearly revealed how thin the Macedonian hold upon the vast reaches of the empire really was.⁶⁶ An army had to be left to resecure and enforce Macedonian control while the king was in Arabia. The army that Curtius is our sole informant for was clearly meant to undertake that role. The phalangites in the Macedonian-Persian phalanx should be counted as in addition to the garrison-army and those ordered back to Macedon with Craterus. The peculiar total given for them (6,700), suggests that this was the full remnant of Alexander's Macedonian phalangites. When their number is added to other Macedonian units in the royal army (at the least the hypaspists and Companions), we would not be far amiss in suspecting that the Macedonians here were comparable in number to that of the invading army in 334; around 12,000 men.

⁶⁵ The figure combines the garrison-army with that of the royal army. Bosworth, "Decline", 3 provides some discussion. Further references in Griffith, "Background", 130-1 who opts for a total of at least 20,000 men in Asia and another 35,000 under Antipater.

⁶⁶ Witness the campaigns around Babylon itself: Arr.vii.15.1-2; D.S.XVII.111.5. For details see: Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 146-150, 153-4, 235-241; Brunt, *Arrian II*, 504-509, 568-9. The fundamental modern (and pernicious) influence on this aspect of Alexander's reign has been the work of Ernst Badian, "Harpalus", *JHS* (1961), 16-43 [hereinafter "Harpalus"]; his views on Alexander summarized in "Alexander the Great and the Loneliness of Power" in his *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (London 1963), 192-205. While Badian has rightly discredited Tarn's portrayal of Alexander his own is equally as schematic and overdrawn.

The Macedonian army with Alexander (and in particular its phalangites) was stronger in 323 than in 334. The total comes to approximately 38,500 Macedonians of all arms.⁶⁷ This is the reverse of what one would expect after years of prolonged campaigning in often harsh conditions. If these men suffered losses at a conservative rate of 50% the total number of Macedonians who served under Alexander in Asia would come to *ca.* 58,000 men (to the nearest thousand).⁶⁸ The application of the model to the soldiers in Persia in 334 is not unreasonable. Many of these men were veterans who had served their time and, even if not all these soldiers had fought from 334 onwards, the majority would have served in India and undergone the disaster that was the march through Gedrosia. Nor should it be forgotten that no account is being taken here of the losses that Antipater must have suffered in suppressing the Thracian revolt and in defeating Agis. Furthermore, as will be shown, the large numbers of reinforcements that can be traced in the sources as going east reveal that the largest percentage of these were concentrated in the first years of Alexander's campaign, when the king knew he would have to face the huge levies of the Great King and that many of his soldiers would have to be decommissioned through old age (see above pp.19-21). Some insight into this process is possible but it needs to be stressed that it is unlikely that all the reinforcements that reached Alexander are recorded. The extant sources are largely derivative pieces of work and their authors had no reason to be exhaustive. Particularly unfortunate from the perspective of a study such as this is the unremitting focus placed upon the actions of Alexander and his immediate entourage. The extensive conquests are narrated by the Alexander-historians in a biographical framework centred on the king. Not until after Alexander's death does the wider picture begin to become more intelligible.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, some results may be achieved.

⁶⁷ 12,000 (royal army) + 15,000 (garrison-army) + 11,500 (with Craterus) = 38,500.

⁶⁸ These numbers are based upon the model outlined in chapter 1.

⁶⁹ Bosworth, "Decline", 5; Brunt, *Arrian II*, 542-572 contains a good summary of Arrian's failings in this regard, though it does seem unreasonable to criticise an author for failing to provide information he had no interest in, nor aim to so do. See also the remarks of M.M.Austin, "Hellenistic Kings, War, and the Economy", *CQ* 36 (1986), 450-466 [hereinafter "Hellenistic Kings"].

The first reinforcements that are attested are the 3,000 Macedonian infantry and 300 cavalry Arrian records arriving at Gordium in the spring of 333.⁷⁰ At Ancyra in the same year Curtius mentions an unspecified number of Macedonian reinforcements.⁷¹ Unfortunately Curtius repeats his numerical imprecision when reporting Alexander's decision to fight at Issus and not to wait for the reinforcements known to be on the way from Macedonia. Curtius' information has been doubted owing to its vague nature. The context is not rhetorically tendentious, however, and the narrative reads factually and so should be accepted.⁷² Hammond has suggested that these men may be the same as the 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry Polybius claims were unavailable to Alexander at Issus for a variety of reasons.⁷³ Similar predicaments arise in connection with the replacements Callisthenes (as cited by Polybius) has arrive in the summer of 333, consisting of 5,000 infantry and 800 cavalry. Milns makes the suggestion that Callisthenes' totals are those for the whole of the reinforcements that reached Alexander prior to the invasion of Cilicia.⁷⁴ But this ignores the other evidence and is an assumption partly based on Milns' belief that only limited reinforcements were needed because of very low casualties suffered by the Macedonians. The veracity of Callisthenes' report should be accepted, but the belief that these soldiers are necessarily Macedonian is unwarranted. Their origins are unspecified and although Polybius counts them amongst the Macedonian phalangites he counts the whole of

⁷⁰ Arr.i.29.4. The cavalry are not specified Macedonian but are usually, and rightly, taken to be so. Brunt, "Cavalry", 36-7; R.D.Milns, "Alexander's Seventh Phalanx Battalion", *GRBS* 7 (1966), 162 [hereinafter "Phalanx"].

⁷¹ Curt.iii.1.24; "recently arrived." The information may be complicated owing to various locations given for the arrival of the same reinforcements. It is possible that the reinforcements given by Curtius as arriving at Ancyra are the same contingent as Arrian places at Gordium.

⁷² Curt.iii.7.8: "*novi milites quos ex Macedonia adventare constabat.*" As argued by Bosworth, "Decline", 6. Cf. J.E. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni: Books 3 and 4* (Amsterdam 1980), 97-8, 181 [hereinafter *Commentary*]: "(it) may represent imaginative writing."

⁷³ Hammond, "Casualties", 67 n.58. He further suspects these men to be mainly mercenary soldiers. However, it is difficult to be sure whether this figure has any basis other than a theoretical estimate decided upon by Polybius (xii.19.3). Cf. Bosworth, "Decline", 6 n.34. See below n.75 also.

⁷⁴ Polybius xii.19.2. Milns, "Phalanx", 162 n.19.

Alexander's infantry force as such in attempting to show that Callisthenes was an incapable military historian. There are no grounds for certainty concerning the nationality of the reinforcements Callisthenes obviously described. As they are preserved in Polybius' excerpt the necessary details have been lost; only the fact of their presence in Asia remains in the historical record.⁷⁵ The last explicit record of Macedonian soldiers reaching Alexander are the 6,500 Macedonians whom Amyntas, son of Andromenes, brought to Iran towards the end of 331.⁷⁶ If there were other contingents of Macedonians sent east between 334 and 331 we are not informed about them. Remaining reinforcements are either Greek mercenaries or tribal levies from around Macedonia.

Does this lack of attested Macedonian reinforcements after 331 suggest that Macedon had been drained of men? Bosworth's reading of a remark of Curtius' leads him to believe that Amyntas' operations were "apparently plagued by draft dodging."⁷⁷ While the statement is detailed and trustworthy, Bosworth makes too much of it. Amyntas was speaking with reference to the complaints Olympias had made against him. Some of the men he had drafted had been on her staff and Amyntas had earned Olympias' enmity for enforcing Alexander's orders "with more zeal than was expedient." The passage does not reflect a widespread protest against military service but rather a specific incident (for control of the services of a small group of men), the results of which Amyntas feared might contribute to his death.⁷⁸ Alexander continued to recruit from Europe. In 327 Sopolis, Epocillus and Menidas were detailed "to bring up the army from Macedon." Though no Macedonians are specified

⁷⁵ Bosworth, "Decline", 8 n.34. who treats them as Macedonian as does Brunt, "Cavalry", 36; *Arrian*, lxxii. For a reaction against Brunt's use of the cavalry figure on different grounds to that given above cf. Atkinson, *Commentary*, 98-9. On Polybius' complete misunderstanding and misuse of Callisthenes see Walbank, *Commentary* 2.364-376.

⁷⁶ Amyntas had been sent recruiting in winter 332: D.S.XVII.65.1; Curt.iv.6.30. He returned with a total force of 15,000 (of which 500 of the Macedonians were cavalry). Only the vulgate provide the strength of the reinforcements: D.S.XVII.65.1; Arr.iii.16.10; Curt.v.1.39-42; placing their arrival at Sittacene, at Susa and at Babylon respectively.

⁷⁷ Curt.vii.1.37-40; with Bosworth, "Decline", 6 and n.40.

⁷⁸ Curt.vii.1.12, 36-40. The context is the trials connected with the execution of Philotas for treason. The best study of this problem is W.Heckel, "The Conspiracy Against Philotas", *Phoenix* 31 (1977), 9-21. which seeks an explanation for the judicial deaths of Philotas and others (and the murder of Parmenio) through tensions within the Macedonian court nobility.

amongst the 36,000 horse and foot that reached Alexander in autumn 326, it is possible that Macedonians were included.⁷⁹

Alexander seems not to have doubted that soldiers would be made available to him, for in 329 he sent home a contingent of veterans.⁸⁰ This is not the action of a general worried over a potential shortfall in the number of needed replacements. Not until the Lamian War broke out did Diodorus refer to Macedonia as lacking in citizen soldiers. A reason is provided: it was the result of keeping Alexander's army up to strength.⁸¹ Yet in the same passage Diodorus informs us that Antipater's army numbered 13,600 men and that his lieutenant, Sippias, had been left in Macedon with some soldiers and orders to raise more. This is still a substantial army and it is strange for Diodorus to refer to Macedon as short of soldiers. The clue to this outward paradox is provided in the remainder of the narrative. Antipater was discomfited at the outbreak of the war, his small army contrasted with the "great force ... [of the Greeks] ... who far outnumbered the Macedonians."⁸² This was an unusual position for the Macedonians to be in. Since the 340s they had had considerable reserves of trained manpower on which to draw in times of need. On this occasion it was not so and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Diodorus (or his source) was aware of the discrepancy. It would appear reasonable to suggest that Antipater had continued to send Macedonians to Alexander after 331 even if there is no direct evidence of their passage east. If no reinforcements had been sent since 331 it is hard to see why Antipater's hold on Greece became so rapidly precarious. The army had only been gone ten years

⁷⁹ Only Arrian (iv.18.30) mentions Alexander's command but it is the vulgate who reveal the arrival of the reinforcements: D.S.XVII.95.4; Curt.ix.3.21. Brunt, "Cavalry", 37 felt the inclusion of Macedonians to be "probable ... as new age groups grew to maturity." For a list of reinforcements see Brunt, *Arrian*, 526-532. For reservations about the possibility of Macedonians being present see Bosworth, "Decline", 7 with n.47.

⁸⁰ Arr.iii.29.5: "the oldest men who were no longer fit for service...." Justin refers to the desire amongst the Macedonian soldiers to return home at his time (xii.3-4) and it may be that these men were returned to Macedon, instead of being settled in garrisons, as a gesture to appease the discontent.

⁸¹ D.S.XVIII.12.2.

⁸² D.S.XVIII.12.4. Note the contrast with the statement quoted at the beginning of this chapter: D.S.XVI.1.5.

(and many of its soldiers less than that), not enough time to have had a marked effect on the number of newly matured men available for service in the phalanx. That problem was to arise later. Indeed, just prior to the Lamian War's outbreak (itself largely precipitated by Alexander's death) the king had expected a further army to be sent east to sustain his desire for conquest and the soldiers necessary to achieve it. These would be the (presumably) younger men that comprised Antipater's army. The veterans being returned to Macedon with Craterus would replace them in Greece.⁸³

At the least our direct evidence (if we accept the numbers Callisthenes gives as Macedonian and add nothing further for the unspecified number of Macedonian arrivals in Curtius' text) suggests that 18,900 men, of whom 1,900 were cavalry, had left Macedonia by 331. This was a larger number of native Macedonians than had commenced the invasion of the Persian Empire in 334. The incomplete nature of the evidence and Alexander's own plans should, one suspects, lead us to the belief that the number was in fact greater and that there were still trained reserves available within Macedonia; at least down to 323, though numbers may have declined rapidly after 331. The evidence from the end of Alexander's reign would seem to demand that the number be larger than the accessible record considering that there were a minimum of 32,000 phalangites and hypaspists alone in Babylon in 323. When numbers for cavalry and other troops have been factored in, there were, as we have seen, *ca.* 38,500 Macedonian soldiers at Opis before Alexander dismissed Craterus and the veterans.

As there is no prospect of calculating the number of reinforcements that reached Alexander in a fashion directly from the sources we are compelled to turn to a model for the supply of raw data (see Chapter 1, above). The best available figures come from the end of Alexander's reign; the 38,500 men at Babylon. The model suggests that a figure of 50% fatalities be applied to this final total and the resulting figure, when added to the original total would provide an approximate upper limit for the number of Macedonians that served in Asia. Thus 38,500 men, less the 6,000 survivors mentioned by Diodorus, results in a total of 16,250 battle casualties; providing a total of 54,750 for the Macedonians

⁸³ On the subject of Alexander's last plans cf., most importantly; E.Badian, "A King's Notebooks", *YSCP* 72 (1968), 184-204; J.Hornblower, *Hieronimus of Cardia* (Oxford 1981) 87-97 [hereinafter *Hieronimus*]; Brunt, *Arrian II*, 500ff; Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander*, 185-211.

who served Alexander.⁸⁴ There are various implications. If the invasion army of 334 was *ca.* 14,000 Macedonians then the number of reinforcements and replacements came to slightly more than 40,000. The partial record of reinforcements we do possess for the years 334-331 lead to the conclusion that a minimum of 19,000 Macedonians were sent east by Antipater within three years. Thus, for the first three years of the war Alexander received over 6,000 men a year; for the next seven, 3,000 a year at the most. These yearly totals are of course mathematical abstractions but they do fit into the wider historical framework. The higher percentage of reinforcements in the first three years would fit Alexander's need for men to fight at Gaugamela. It would also reflect the fact that, with only *ca.* 21,000 soldiers drawn east in the next six or seven years after this, Macedon's great surplus of manpower had been rapidly drained by 331, bearing in mind of course that a strong field army had been retained at all times by Antipater.

It may now be possible to suggest some rudimentary figures for Macedonian military manpower for the end of Philip's reign and the beginning of his son's. In 334 *ca.* 14,000 Macedonians were in Asia with Alexander. Some 13,500 remained with Antipater throughout the conquests. At an estimate *ca.* 19,000 men reinforced Alexander throughout his first three years of campaigning. In which case the Macedonian army and its reserves in the middle 330s equalled somewhere between 45,000 and 50,000 men. By the end of Alexander's conquests at least another 21,000 men had fought and died, been pensioned off, or used as settlers in both Asia and Europe.⁸⁵ To return to the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter it can be better appreciated why Diodorus was so impressed by the fact of the strength of Macedon's armies. The evidence we have, when subjected to reasonable military and demographic models, strongly suggests that *ca.* 70,000 men had contributed to the glory of the most famous of Macedon's kings. Approximately half of them had served under Philip II, the

⁸⁴ The 6,000 men having been added back to the total. Therefore $32,500 + 16,250 + 6,000 = 54,750$. For the problems surrounding Diodorus' survivors cf. pp.23-4.

⁸⁵ These calculations take no real account of Macedonian garrisons or settlers in Asia. The totals could perhaps be revised upwards without difficulty.

father of Alexander the Great, as well. Thus, to a very real degree, Philip's supremacy over Greece was established thanks to the formidable reserves of manpower which he built up in an extremely short time.

Modern Scholarly Work and Macedon's

Population Explosion.

A considerable increase in Macedonian manpower has been suggested in the previous chapter. Therefore, the question of possible demographic mechanisms that would explain such a remarkable increase needs to be addressed. As usual the sources, largely unconcerned with demographic and social trends, are unhelpful. Where the modern literature concerned with Macedon's meteoric rise to supremacy has gone beyond the military-political narratives of the sources it has done so in a brief and generalized fashion. Moreover, owing to the biographical orientation of most contemporary Macedonian studies (which focus on either Philip or Alexander) demography has not become a central issue. Yet it is, I would suggest, only through the perspective brought by the study of two or three generations of Macedonia's history that an adequate basis on which to construct any theory concerning Macedon's population can be provided. Where demographic work has been undertaken for the classical Greek world the focus has, perhaps understandably, been centred upon Athens. The results achieved there have so far not been applied to Macedonia.

Macedon's burgeoning population has not gone unnoticed, but there is a tendency to seek (and find) a simple explanation for it. Growth is considered to be a consequence of security and prosperity, which in turn allow natural demographic trends their full, positive, influence. An extreme version is N.G.L.Hammond's chapter in *A History of Macedonia II* where he discusses the internal organisation of the state. While Hammond (and others) are surely correct in attributing a significant role to the effects of peace and prosperity upon Macedonia in general it remains to be seen whether these factors had any significant demographic effects upon the population between the years 360 and 320.¹ Hammond's parallel with the modern development of Albania is of highly questionable relevance. It is

¹ Hammond, *HM* 2.647-675, especially 657-662. The question as to whether Philip's embarkation upon "a social and economic revolution" (p.658) had any demographic effects will be discussed below; pp.74-82.

meaningless to point out that Albania's population has doubled since 1945; modern medical expertise alone has had profound effects upon the birth rate and neo-natal mortality. Contrary to Hammond's assertion modern analogy is of limited use for an understanding of the interaction of population and an economy.² Such comparisons are only meaningful if models from other pre-industrial and demographically pre-transitional societies are applied. G.L.Cawkwell is more circumspect. He points out that Macedonian resources were greater than those possessed by any other one Greek city and that the *poleis* would need to combine against Philip if they were to hope to keep their independence.³ While Cawkwell's observation is correct he regrettably provides no explanation for his assertion which might have contributed towards an assessment of these longer term factors which resulted in Macedonian primacy. In similar vein P.A.Brunt suggests that the reinforcements he suspects reached Alexander in 328/7 were made possible by Philip's actions. Brunt states that:

Philip's successes in expanding Macedon, settling his people in more productive lands and giving the country more security against the northern and eastern barbarians were now bearing fruit in an amazing increase in population.

Again the explanation is superficial and, as will be seen, based upon an incorrect understanding of the demographic process. Brunt may be correct in his conclusions, but what is at issue here is the method of arriving at them. The same reservations apply equally to the assessment of the gain in Macedonian military strength made by G.T.Griffith. He states: "If we are to believe in a great increase of population which can be measured (however roughly) between the years 334 and 321, we need some such basis as this on which to support it." The basis of the changes which Griffith refers to are peace in Macedon and an increase in material prosperity at the individual level. The underlying perceptions of Brunt and Griffith are typical of the causes that are considered to have resulted in the fortuitous (for Macedonia) by-product of a population explosion.⁴

² Hammond, *HM* 2.658-9. Restated in *TMS* 152ff: "Again a modern analogy will help us to understand the extent of the change." Equally irrelevant is Hammond's comparison between modern population distributions and (unknown) ancient ones: *HM* 1.15-18; below n.77.

³ Cawkwell, *PM* 47-49.

Yet how valid is the view that, with guaranteed security and an assumed consequent prosperity, a given population will rapidly expand to the limits of the available food supply?⁵ On the surface such a contention is extremely persuasive - after all, it would seem to be common sense. However, the provision of more food only provides the potential for population increase, it does not automatically mean that such an increase would occur. Furthermore, critical examination of the assumptions behind this common misunderstanding leads to an exposure of some weaknesses. Two separate, yet inter-related, misconceptions have tended to oversimplify scholarly conclusions in the past. The first is that 'natural increase' or 'natural growth' are understood as unequivocally positive terms. In fact these terms are neutral in a demographic context. They refer simply to the number of births minus the number of deaths within a given population over a stated period of time. A negative and not a positive trend has an equal chance of being the end result. Yet conceptually it is a positive view that is applied to the raw data. A.H.M.Jones has spelt out the prevailing tendency (of historians) most explicitly:

Modern populations of the same pattern as the Athenian - those of Egypt and India for instance - respond very rapidly to economic prosperity. The birth rate is high, and the population is only kept down by high mortality. If there is more food available, more survive and the population leaps up rapidly.⁶

⁴ Brunt, "Cavalry", 37. He also states that these men would have been born between *ca.* 349-6. This exact supposition would have soldiers sent east as soon as matured. Cf. also his *Arrian*, xliii: "The creation of greater internal security seems to have promoted a population explosion..."; Griffith, "Background", 137; and Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 10.

⁵ On the importance of foodstuffs not only for the security of the *polis* but also as a means of estimating its population see, P.Garnsey, "Grain for Athens" in P.Cartledge, D.Harvey, edd., *Crux: Essays Presented to G.E.M.de.Ste.Croix* (London 1985); and the essays in P.Garnsey, C.R.Whittaker, edd., *Trade and Famine in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 1987).

⁶ In A.H.M.Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1957), 177-8 [hereinafter *Democracy*]; cf. the following essays: "The Social Structure of Athens in the Fourth Century B.C.", 75-96; "The Citizen Population of Athens during the Peloponnesian War", 161-180. . Also A.W.Gomme *The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC* (Oxford 1933), 4-5; "The Population of Athens Again", *JHS* 79 (1959), 61-68; who, from general considerations, finds it difficult to conceive of a static population.

The second concerns the assumed beneficial effect a strong economy has upon a closed demographic system. From the time of Malthus classical economists have considered gross population size to possess a passive role in relation to the availability of subsistence and the demand for labour. This view has either implicitly or explicitly formed the basis for all but the most recent discussions of ancient Greek demographics. Fertility, mortality and nuptiality are considered epiphenomena dependent upon economic realities at the level of the individual. While this is an acceptable consideration in the long term (over centuries), the constituent agents having an influence upon gross population variation in the short and middle term are not so easily sought.⁷ Before an examination of the role of economics and the economy upon the ancient demographic process can begin, the immediate vital rates for population growth itself need to be considered, as does the Macedonian context itself.

The vital rates of natural change within a population (as opposed to alteration through mechanical change: primarily immigration) are the birth and death rates. The age and sex structure of a population possess important, interdependent influences upon the vital rates. High fertility rates when combined with, for instance, early marital customs, are conducive to a high birth rate. Supported by low mortality, the result can be a rapid increase in population size.⁸ A combination similar to the hypothetical situation sketched above would be typical of a demographically transitional society. This was characteristic of Europe from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century and describes much of the developing world at present. Prior to this, pre-transitional societies were the norm, displaying both high birth and death rates and generally stable populations.⁹ Jones (and others) who have accepted the few ancient figures we possess at face value have done so as if these figures were arrived at as the

⁷ Ronald Lee, "Population Homeostasis and English Demographic History", 75-77 [hereinafter "Homoestasis"]; in R.S.Schofield, E.A.Wrigley, ed., *Population and Economy: From the Traditional to the Modern World* (Cambridge 1986) Cf. pp.90-1, 100 for reservations concerning the influence of subsistence and labour on the long term also.

⁸ Hollingsworth, *Demography*, 14-23; E.A.Wrigley, *Population and History* (London 1969), 14-29 [hereinafter *Population*].

⁹ D.W.Engels, "The Use of Historical Demography in Ancient History", *CQ* 34 (1984), 386-7 with n.2 for references [hereinafter "Demography"].

result of a clearly defined modern census count. As chapter 1 has demonstrated we are not entitled to make such assumptions with ancient numerical figures. Thus Jones, in making a comparison between ancient evidence based upon funerary inscriptions and transitional Egypt is, in Hopkins' words, merely constructing "a bridge between two improbables."¹⁰ Furthermore, the importation and imposition of modern assumptions onto the ancient data is to automatically accept, in Patterson's words, the presence of "many interlocking factors, most of which were not present in the ancient world".¹¹ The last decade has borne witness to a substantial reassessment of ancient demography, largely owing to the concerns and efforts of historians and social scientists working in other periods of history. On both general methodological grounds and on particular points of interpretation older works concerned with population trends in ancient Greece have been built upon and largely superceded.¹² It is their results that are to be applied to Macedon under Philip and Alexander.

Naturally, the data necessary to estimate vital rates is all but non-existent for the ancient world, and more so for Greek history than for Roman. The Greco-Roman world was, however, undoubtedly typical of other pre-transitional societies: virtually stable gross population levels with high birth and death rates. The birth rate approached the biological maximum for pre-transitional societies of between 35-45 per thousand per year with a correspondingly high death rate.¹³ On this basis it is

¹⁰ K.Hopkins, "On the Probable Age Structure of the Roman Population", *Population Studies* 20 (1966), 245-264 is the fundamental article that began methodologically sound work on population in the ancient world [hereinafter "Age Structure"]. Hopkins' comment (p.251) concerns the graph in Jones, *Democracy*, 82.

¹¹ Cynthia Patterson, *Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451/0 B.C.* (New York 1981), 40ff [hereinafter *Pericles' Law*].

¹² In addition to the works cited above see also the works by S.Hodkinson: "Social order and the conflict of values in Classical Sparta", *Chiron* 13 (1983), 239-281; "Land Tenure and Inheritance in Classical Sparta", *CQ* 36 (1986), 378-406; and most importantly "Inheritance, Marriage and Demography: Perspectives Upon the Success and Decline of Classical Sparta", 79-122 in A.Powell, ed., *Classical Sparta: Techniques behind her Success* (London 1989). M.H.Hansen, "Demographic reflections on the Number of Athenian Citizens 451-309 B.C." *AJAH* 7 (1982), 173-189 [hereinafter "Athenian Citizens"] and *Demography and Democracy* (Vogens 1986) [hereinafter *Demography*] are important. Useful insights contained in M.H.Hansen, "How Many Athenians Attended the Ecclesia?", *GRBS* 17 (1976), 115-134 and P.A.Brunt "Athenian Settlements Abroad in the Fifth Century BC", in ed. E.Badian, *Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies Presented to V.Ehrenberg* (Oxford 1966).

possible to use comparative material from other pre-transitional societies, particularly those of medieval and early modern Europe *ca.* 1400-1700.¹⁴

The debate over which models are the most appropriate to the ancient world has taken place (and still continues) primarily between Mogens Hansen and Eberhard Ruschenbusch. In practice Hansen's general arguments for preferring the Coale-Demeny model life-tables as opposed to those contained in B.R.Mitchell's, *European Historical Statistics 1750-1970*, are persuasive. The latter, based on later European populations as they are, reflect higher growth rates more germane to those transitional societies than pre-transitional ancient ones.¹⁵ The Coale-Demeny models are, however, not based upon empirical populations (though using empirical data) unlike Mitchell's which are based primarily upon unmodified national statistics. Furthermore, the tables in Coale-Demeny are of stable populations which leave out fluctuations caused by natural disaster, migration and short-term instabilities in the vital rates. Thus any models they could provide for Macedon would lack specificity but must be considered superior to Mitchell's tables because of their historical neutrality (see the comments of Cynthia Patterson, above p.52). Fortunately, for the purposes of this study the lack of a specific model is not a difficulty. Nowhere does there exist a figure for Macedon's gross population; all we possess are numbers based upon the size of armies. Thus the problem in which Hansen and Ruschenbusch are embroiled - the selection of a model that will allow the age distribution of the Athenian population to be realised in order to decided between conflicting evidence and calculate the size of the (male), adult, citizen population - does not arise.¹⁶ However, the models do provide a basis

¹³ J.C.Russell, "Late Ancient and Medieval Population", *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 48.3 (1958), 19-21; Wrigley, *Population*, 23, 54, 62, 111-113; Engels, "Demography", 387 with n.6 and 390-393 for limited role of infanticide on the death rate.

¹⁴ So Hopkins, "Age Structure", 256; Engels, "Demography", 387; Hansen, "Athenian Citizens", 175-6. In general see M.W.Flinn, *The European Demographic System 1500-1820* (Baltimore 1981), esp. 20-22, 47-64 with an extensive bibliography (703 entries) listing the detailed case studies that have provided the basis of modern demographic work.

¹⁵ The Coale-Demeny tables are sometimes referred to as the Princeton tables: A.J.Coale, P.Demeny, *Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations*² (New York 1983) [hereinafter Coale-Demeny]. The tables in B.R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics 1750-1970* (London 1975), present growth rates in excess of the 0.2 per cent per annum considered the norm for pre-transitional societies.

against which the visible increase in Macedonian military manpower can be tested to see if this falls within acceptable demographic parameters for a pre-transitional society. In other words the Coale-Demeny models describe what 'normal' populations should resemble under certain specific variations in the vital rates and levels of mortality. General considerations are thus a possibility and while it will only be possible to speak of impressions and trends (and even then only with qualifications), rather than of facts, the particular subject of Macedon's military resources can at least be addressed in a rather crude demographic context.

Long and Short-Term Demographic Models and
Potential Macedonian Growth Rates.

It is generally accepted that pre-transitional societies only rarely exceeded a 0.2 per cent rate of increase per annum.¹⁷ This figure is of course a reflection of long-term trends and effectively 'smooths out' the short-term responses of a demographic system, whatever the reasons for their existence. Even if population totals were well short of the levels at which severe Malthusian checks could be anticipated, short term fluctuations in population levels would have been a regular occurrence as the result of preventative checks such as plague or famine. In addition short term population changes exhibit a cyclical nature with a drop in population followed by a relatively rapid reconstitution. As Lee remarks : "short term fluctuations in natural increase have little effect on population size, which is itself a kind of long cumulation of such variations."¹⁸ Wrigley adds (p.62) that: "In any closed

¹⁶ See most recently M.H.Hansen, "Demography and Democracy - A Reply to Eberhard Ruschenbusch", *AHB* 3 (1989), 40-44 with full references to the locations of their various disagreements. The problem, in Hansen's words (*Demography*, 9.), is that: "In order to calculate the size of the citizen population (i.e. all male citizens above 18) on the basis of army and navy figures (e.g. a call up of x citizens between 20 and 39) we must know the age distribution of the Athenian adult male population."

¹⁷ Engels, "Demography", 387-189; Wrigley, *Population*, 23, 70, 108-113.

¹⁸ Lee, "Homeostasis", 90: short-term fluctuations are those occurring within a ten year time span (p.76). See also D.E.C.Eversley, "Population, Economy and Society", 30-1, 44-5 [hereinafter

population (that is one where there is no migratory flow either in or out) changes in numbers over the short-term can occur only through birth and death."¹⁹ Clearly there is no chance that demographically positive short-term influences within Macedonia can be traced through the extant record. While the presence of negative factors can be anticipated to some degree (see Chapter 1: death through warfare and senility) this is of little help in trying to understand a population that seems to evidence a gross population increase. Population dynamics are responsive to extremely local stimuli and the growth rate of 0.2 per cent per annum that is typical of pre-transitional cultures is the result of a broad spatial and chronological range. As a result it submerges particular variations and loses some utility for our purposes, being overly crude for a narrow time frame consisting of only two generations.

Leaving aside for the moment the question of medium-term demographic fluctuations and their causal determinants we shall turn to an examination of suggested growth rates and apply them to the Macedonian figures that we possess. Hansen has suggested a wider margin of variation than long-term trends would allow, arguing for a population increase of between 0.5-1.0 per cent per year. Under the favourable demographic conditions he considers the Athenian state to have enjoyed in the fourth century (the ubiquitous 'peace and prosperity') Hansen acknowledges as possible, though not definite, "an annual growth rate of 5 per thousand".²⁰ Although he does not state so explicitly Hansen is clearly considering here variations over the medium term, spanning periods of up to a century in duration. Concerning the situation at Athens during the classical period Hansen is even prepared to concede that: "In the fourth century, the annual growth rate of the population *may* have been in the range of 0.5-

"Population"]; in D.V.Glass, D.E.C.Eversley, ed., *Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography* (Chicago 1965).

¹⁹ Wrigley, *Population*, 62-76. He also accepts that there is a constant short-term fluctuation within a population, referring to a "wave-like surge in numbers with a periodicity of about a generation." (p.69).

²⁰ Hansen, "Athenian Citizens", 173-176. In *Demography*, 9-11, Hansen takes as his analogy Model West, male, mortality level 4 (with its life expectancy at birth of 25.26) and a growth rate of 0.5 per cent per annum. He himself admits he could have selected a more cautious model or combination of models. Frier, "Life Expectancy: Ulpian", 238ff prefers a mortality level of 2; again using Model West. Coale-Demeny (p.29-30), suggest the use of the Model West tables where there is no reliable guide to mortality levels. These tables are based upon residual data "not showing a persistent systematic pattern of deviations" (pp.4-7, 11-12).

1.0 per hundred...." The emphasis is Hansen's and because a Greek city's citizen population was defined in exclusive legal terms, not as a geographical or demographic entity, he would prefer to see such a rate of increase counterbalanced by the absence of Athenian citizens from Attica.²¹

Would it be justifiable to seek a higher annual rate of increase for Macedonia? One suspects not. For while it is possible that growth rates could theoretically exceed 1.0 per cent for a brief 'boom' period, the onus of proof must be on those who would support such an occurrence. The argument *ex silentio* is not at all appropriate here. Immediate increases tend to occur as a result of some disaster (and were not inevitable in any case), involving the reconstitution of a devastated population, not, in a pre-transitional society, the sudden increase in a heretofore stable one as a result of normal demographic pressures.²² Nevertheless, for purposes of comparison, the tables of growth rates constructed below (p.57) contain columns anticipating an annual increase of 1.8 per cent factored in over the 37 years of Philip's and Alexander's reigns. This figure comprises the highest single decadel increase (1811-21) per annum for demographically transitional England and Wales throughout the industrial revolution.²³ For a variety of reasons such a sustained rate is *prima facie* unacceptable. The long growth in European population (sustained for over three centuries note, not 37 short years) was the result of three independent factors acting upon each other - demand for labour, rising living standards and incomparably improved personal and public health care.²⁴

²¹ Hansen, "Athenian Citizens", 176-184; cf, as well, *Demography*, 7-9.

²² Eversley, "Population", 31, 44-5. See further the examples in Hansen, "Athenian Citizens", 175-6 of Colyton in Devon and of Iceland illustrating this point.

²³ C.P.Hill, *British Economic and Social History 1700-1982*⁵ (London 1985), 3-4 [hereinafter *History*].

²⁴ Hill, *History*, 1-12 with references. Eversley, "Population", 43-57. Lee's theoretical examination of this exceedingly complex situation warns against over-generalisation and dogmatism in ranking the importance of each factor: "Homeostasis", 76-80, 91, 99-100.

Putative Macedonian Military Populations based upon Varying

Demographic Growth Rates.

Table 1: Population Growth under Philip II (360-336).

	Percentile Increase per annum (over 24 yrs)			
Base Figure	0.2 ¹	0.5 ²	1.0 ³	1.8 ⁴
10,600	11,121	11,948	13,459	16,265
25,000	26,228	28,179	31,743	38,361

Table 2: Population Growth from Philip II to Alexander III (360-323).

	Percentile Increase per annum (over 37 yrs)			
Base Figure	0.2 ¹	0.5 ²	1.0 ³	1.8 ⁴
10,600	11,842	12,748	15,318	20,512
25,000	26,918	30,067	36,127	48,374

Note:

The base figure of 10,600 comes from the first known size of Philip's army in 359/8 (D.S.XVI.4.3). The number 25,000 has been selected as an approximate estimate of the number of men who eventually became available to Philip as a result of controlling Upper Macedonia (see further, below pp.58, 63-5). We should also be aware that 4,000 Macedonians had recently died in battle (D.S.XVI.2.5). In general the model for death-rates has been conservatively biased, that for population growth errs on the generous side (cf. pp.67-8). Thus the number of soldiers Macedon was capable of mustering from *internal* resources has been assessed as high as possible.

1. Standard acceptance for pre-transitional societies ie. Engels, "Demography", 387-8.
2. Hansen, "Athenian Citizens", 175-6; used in *Demography*, 10-11, and used as the standard throughout this thesis.
3. Accepted as a possible maximum by Hansen, "Athenian Citizens", 184 and *Demography*, 10.
4. Highest single decadel increase per annum in England and Wales during transitional period (1811-21), Hill, *History*, 3-4. Wrigley, *Population*, 54 gives the figure for the same period as 1.67%. The larger of these inexplicably different figures has been arbitrarily selected here.

The higher base figure in both tables is suggested as a more reliable guide to the level of manpower Philip and subsequently Alexander had available to recruit from. However, there are certain assumptions that need to be made clear. First, this figure estimates the number of soldiers that both Upper and Lower Macedonia could field *ca.* 358, the former eventually becoming assimilated through Philip's unification of Macedonia.²⁵ Philip would have been the beneficiary of any population growth beginning at this point. Secondly, these figures are not guides to absolute population increase, which we have no means of estimating in Macedonia. Thus the putative increases the tables display assume not only a closed population but also, in the case of the higher figure, that some control can be exercised on Philip's military reforms as they affected the proportion of male citizens capable of serving in the phalanx. It is then further assumed that this process was complete by *ca.*350 and that the percentage of men in the army remained constant throughout the remainder of Philip's reign and that of Alexander's (this is argued below pp.63ff).

Having said this several general conclusions can be drawn from these tables. If Macedon's demographic pattern followed a pre-transitional typology, then the country could not have provided the number of men that Alexander was commanding at the end of his life. Nor would there be enough if Macedon had undergone a growth rate similar to that found at the peak of transitional England and Wales. For purposes of illustration, to reach a total of 70,000 men (as existed by 323) with a growth rate of 1.8 per cent per annum we would have to assume a base military figure of 36,171 in 360; both of which are obviously far too high. The growth rate and the base figure would not only be unexplainable but, frankly, unbelievable. Normal demographic trends do not provide a solution for the number of Macedonian soldiers we know existed and fought in the wars of Philip and Alexander. To an extent this is no surprise: individuals do not mature as rapidly as Philip's armies swelled in numbers. This does not mean that the demographic model has failed to provide any help at all, however. By the end

²⁵ See the remarks of Griffith, "Background", 129. Hammond, "Casualties", 63 believes that the incorporation of Upper Macedon's soldiers enabled Philip to double the size of his army. However, that the further rise in Philip's numbers was the result of "an increase in wealth throughout the kingdom" is absurd. Even on Hammond's manpower figures this would require an absolute population increase of 20% for the phalanx and over 130% for the cavalry!

of Philip's reign and from the outset of Alexander's new generations will have arisen and will have been capable of partaking in the expansionist campaigns of their kings. Their number at least can be approximated, depending on which growth rate one wishes to select. At the end of Philip's reign, if Macedon's military strength is considered *ca.* 45,000 soldiers and a growth rate of 0.5 per cent taken as the norm throughout, there are *ca.* 25,000 soldiers that the model cannot account for. This is a point to which we shall return.

A Place in the Phalanx: Structural Considerations.

Other possibilities still need to be considered. The tendency in much modern work has been to consider Philip's conquests the result of a need for, and an inevitable achievement of, territorial expansion.²⁶ The inference is that Philip merely realised the potential Macedon had possessed for some (unspecified) number of years, albeit in a brilliant fashion. Ellis has taken this to an extreme. His Philip directed the pressure for conquest that arose as a direct result of the formation of the new army. However, if such a modernizing view is going to become a basis for historical interpretation, some evidence is required. Unfortunately, the evidence illuminating Macedonian society is virtually non-existent.²⁷ Moreover, Ellis seems to have forgotten that Macedonian soldiers were principally agricultural small-holders. As Errington has remarked, Philip's army was, "in the last resort an army of Macedonian farmers and their sons, as it had always been."²⁸ Nonetheless, the subject of Philip's

²⁶ J.R.Knipfing, "German Historians and Macedonian Imperialism", *Amer. Hist. Rev.* 26 (1921), 657-671, discusses the foundation of the extremely positive view of Philip. That this still exists is shown by M.B.Hatzopoulos, "A Century and a Lustrum of Macedonian Studies", *AW* 4 (1981), 91-108. Cf. the remarks of R.M. Errington, "Review-Discussion: Four Interpretations of Philip II", *AJAH* 6 (1981), 82-87 [hereinafter "Review"]. Errington's own view of Philip is one of admiration also: *Geschichte Makedoniens: Von den Anfängen bis zum Untergang des Königsreiches* (Munich 1986), 95-97 [hereinafter *Makedoniens*], in a sub-heading entitled "Philip's Contribution to Macedonian History."

²⁷ Ellis, *PMI* 8-9, 230-2. Ultimately, Ellis has little option but to interpret events as resulting from Philip's decisions.

military reforms remains an important one; one, furthermore, that has implications for any demographic model.

The supposition is that Philip's development of the phalanx, as a part of the military reforms he undertook, may have enabled him to utilize a greater proportion of Macedon's population for military purposes than a comparable Greek city could have. It is generally accepted that a phalangite's equipment would have required less outlay than the panoply necessary for a city-state hoplite. Furthermore, a phalangite's expenses were offset by royal patronage, perhaps as a result of the fact Philip created Macedon's first *permanently organised* infantry force.²⁹ While Macedonian infantry did exist prior to Philip's reign it is difficult to judge either its quality or quantity, at least in relation to their neighbours. When Sitacles, the Thracian king, invaded Macedonia in 429/8 Perdiccas only opposed his advance with his superior cavalry. In 424-3 Perdiccas induced the Spartan Brasidas to combine his Greek hoplites with his own Macedonian soldiers in order that he could defeat his rival Arrhabaeus, who somehow had the support of Greek hoplites.³⁰ Perdiccas' son, Archelaus, made some improvements to his infantry but it is far from clear just what these may have been. Thucydides' says that Archelaus: *t'alla diekosmese ta [te] kata ton polemon hippos kai hoplois kai tei allêi paraskeuêi,*

²⁸ Errington, "Review", 86. He further points out that while the Macedonians demonstrated a willingness to campaign the Greek cities could not compete with, the majority of Philip's campaigns were relatively local and short-lived.

²⁹ The details of Macedonian military equipment and techniques have been exhaustively discussed elsewhere and need not detain us. See M.M.Markle III, "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armour", *AJA* 81 (1977), 323-339 [hereinafter "SSRA"]; "Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon", *AJA* 82 (1978), 483-497 [hereinafter "USPAM"]; "Macedonian Arms and Tactics under Alexander the Great", 87-112; in E.N.Borza, B.S.Barr-Sharrar, edd., *Macedon and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, Washington History of Art, Vol.10 (Washington D.C. 1982), and N.Sekunda, *The Army of Alexander the Great* (London 1984). See also Griffith, "*MAKEDONIKA*", 3-10 and Errington, *Makedoniens*, 94, 213-220. The differing methods of the Greek cities can be found in W.K.Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practices* (London 1971), 3-52.

³⁰ Sitacles: Thuc.ii.100. Brasidas: Thuc.iv.124.1, 79-83. Thucydides condemned both Macedonian (iv.124) and Thracian (ii.98) infantry as a rabble. Markle, "USPAM", 484-5 suggests the evidence demonstrates that before Philip, "Macedonia did not possess significant numbers of foot soldiers." In fact on both these occasions Macedonian infantry are available (or at least presumed to be in 429/8). The important distinction is that in neither case were they capable of facing their opposition. Perdiccas could not match Arrhabaeus' hoplites and Sitalces' army was so vast he eventually had to withdraw his cavalry in order to prevent them being overwhelmed.

which does not automatically suggest the creation of a Hellenic-style hoplite force.³¹ The fact that Amyntas, Philip's father, and his ally, Dardas of Elimiotis, only provided cavalry to aid the Spartan attempts to break up the Olynthian League does not have to mean that Macedonian infantry were not available. Only that their presence opposite the Olynthian hoplites would have led to disaster.³² Philip's brother, Alexander II, had been prepared to fight an infantry battle against Illyrian invaders, however disastrously it eventually turned out. At least this would seem the only logical inference from Diodorus' report that 4,000 Macedonians were killed in the battle. It is an inconceivable possibility that there could have been more than this number of Macedonian cavalry.³³ Nor is it possible to believe that Alexander II could have created an infantry force from nothing when his reign consisted of less than a year, never mind the other reforms that are sometimes attributed to him.³⁴

There seems no doubt that Philip did not need to create an infantry force from scratch during his first few years. The quality of Macedonian infantry had probably been improving throughout the course of the century as a result of Hellenic influence. However, Markle's arguments concerning the development of the sarissa-techniques, suggesting that Philip created a hoplite force and that the sarissa was introduced to the infantry after Chaeronea, are important. If correct, then the manpower

³¹ So A.M.Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour of the Greeks* (London 1967), 116; Markle, "USPAM", 485. *Contra* N.G.L. Hammond, "Training in the Use of a Sarissa and its Effect in Battle, 359-333 B.C.", *Antichthon* 15 (1980), 54 [hereinafter "Sarissa"], who accepts this as evidence for the creation of a hoplite phalanx.

³² *Contra* Markle, "USPAM", 485. Full references are provided in Markle's n.13.

³³ D.S.XVI.2.5. This point is neglected in the discussions of Anaximenes *FGrHist* 72 F4. See below n.34.

³⁴ The most detailed discussions of the difficulty surrounding the Anaximenes fragment (*FGrHist* 74 F4) and that of Theopompus (*FGrHist* 115 F 348), concerning the origin of the term *pezetairoi*, are: P.A.Brunn, "Anaximenes and King Alexander I of Macedon", *JHS* 96 (1976), 151-3; Griffith, *HM* 2.406, 705-9; Bosworth, *Commentary*, 171-2. I find myself tempted by the arguments of R.Develin, "Anaximenes (F GR HIST 72) F 4", *Historia* 34 (1985), 493-6 [hereinafter "Anaximenes"] and A.Erskine, "The *pezetairoi* of Philip II and Alexander III", *Historia* 38 (1989), 385-394 [hereinafter "*Pezetairoi*"], who, on separate grounds, opt for Alexander III as the one responsible for naming the infantry *pezetairoi*.

gains that might be assumed would be to some degree lost.³⁵ For our purposes the moment of real importance is the first few years of Philip's reign, particularly the crucial victory over the Illyrians. Diodorus' account (the only one that we have) suggests that Philip may have had only a limited number of well-trained infantry with him. It was *tous aristous ton Makedonon* that Philip led in the hardest fighting on the right wing. Literally, it translates as "the best of the Macedonians."³⁶ Hammond has suggested that this "was the charge of 'the finest infantrymen', that is the men of the sarissa-phalanx."³⁷ Markle's objections to such an early introduction of the sarissa seem valid here.³⁸ The battle was a hard fought confrontation with the numerically and probably qualitatively superior Macedonian cavalry proving decisive. Nothing else can be taken from Diodorus' account and nothing is suggestive of innovation either in infantry equipment or in tactics.³⁹ Furthermore, the persuasive arguments of Vivienne Grey should warn us not to take even the little information Diodorus gives us at face value.

³⁵ Markle's articles *op.cit.*n.29. Hammond has most recently (and inadequately) restated the conventional view that Philip's reforms were in place prior to 358: *op.cit.* n.31.

³⁶ D.S.XVI.4.5.

³⁷ Hamond, "Sarissa", 58. G.T.Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge 1935), 9 [hereinafter *Mercenaries*] suggests the phrase refers to those properly trained and armed. Cf. Frontinus (Str.2.3.2): *fortissimis suorum in dextro cornu conlocatis*.

³⁸ Markle, "USPAM", 485-6.

³⁹ The excellence of Macedonian cavalry was recognised by Thucydides: ii.100. Hammond's version of the battle states that: "Adopting the tactics of the great Theban generals, Philip in person led his finest infantry forward, delaying the advance of his centre and left wing, and ordered the cavalry on his right to charge in, on the flank and rear of the enemy, as soon as an opening appeared. ... his infantry smote the left corner of the Illyrian square, stove it in, and spread confusion into the flanks and rear, where his cavalry galloped in to the attack." ("Sarissa", 58 quoting his own *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* [Oxford 1959], 539). None of this is in Diodorus and Hammond's account is an exercise in positivist historical fiction. Nonetheless, such a viewpoint dominates modern work, in regard to either a Theban connection for the battle plan or for the importance of new tactics. Cf. Cawkwell, *PM* 30-35; Griffith, *HM* 2.204-6, 213-4; Markle, "USPAM", 486. Ellis has a sensible account of both: *PMI* 52-58. The common assumption of Theban influence over Philip (Cf. A.Aymard, "Philippe De Macédoine Otage A Thèbes", *REA* 56 [1954], 15-36; and the references above, *passim*) do not convince. An alternate view: J.G.Best, *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare* (Groningen 1969), 134-42.

On her analysis Diodorus is guilty of rewriting and conventionalising his battle narratives to conform to a pattern of his own devising.⁴⁰

That does not mean, however, that the problem is cut and dried. Diodorus, despite the proleptic nature of the passage as a whole, seems to have considered Philip's reforms to have begun immediately.⁴¹ And no matter how prophetic and generalised as a whole the passage may be it is difficult to accept Markle's thesis *in toto* with regard to the introduction of the sarissa-phalanx; though the poor nature of our evidence is ably revealed. While a definitive answer is impossible considering the state of the documentation it seems probable that the military reorganisation began before 356 when Philipoi was founded and the gold mines exploited. With their wealth at hand Philip may have been tempted to procure a hoplite army for himself.

If we are then prepared to accept the early introduction of the sarissa-techniques we can also attempt to evaluate another fundamental aspect of the early years of Philip's reign. Victory over Bardylis resulted in Philip being able to dominate the independently-minded Upper Macedonian kingdoms. Thus, from early on Philip could draw upon all Macedonia for his military needs. While there is no direct evidence for the number of troops these territories were able to provide Philip they would probably have been substantial. For instance, in 429/8 the king of Orestis provided 1,000 troops for an invasion of Acarnania being undertaken by his Epirot ally, identical in number to those Perdiccas of Macedon contributed.⁴² In 382 Derdas of Elimiotis provided considerable numbers of cavalry for the Spartan expedition dispatched to break up the Olynthian League.⁴³ Regrettably the

⁴⁰ V.Grey, "The Value of Diodorus Siculus for the Years 411-386 B.C.", *Hermes* 115 (1987), 72-89. See also her "The Years 375-371 B.C.: A Case Study in the Reliability of Diodorus Siculus and Xenophon", *CQ* 30 (1980), 306-26.

⁴¹ D.S.XVI.3.1-2. The military reforms are towards the end of the proem to Book 16 (1.1-3.4) and need to be taken in context. Diodorus disconcertingly provides a thumb-nail sketch of Philip's achievements and methods while at the same time interspersing his narrative with some of the immediate problems the new king faced.

⁴² Thuc.ii.80.6. Though this provides no indication of the relative power of the two kings it does reveal that the Upper Macedonian kingdoms were capable of fielding substantial forces on occasion. The subject of the kingdoms of Upper Macedonia at this time are discussed by A.B.Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia", *CQ* 21 (1971), 93-105 [hereinafter "PUM"].

⁴³ *Xen.Hell.*v.2.38; D.S.XV.19.2.

evidence with respect to the contribution these kingdoms may have made for Philip's reign is lacking. Fortunately Alexander's historians are more forthcoming. It seems that three of the six phalanx battalions (the so-called *asthetairoi*) taken to Asia were from Upper Macedonia: Lyncestis and Elimiotis contributed a full *taxeis* of 1,500 men each, while Orestis and Tymphaea provided a third.⁴⁴ If we accept, with Bosworth, that the other upland *ethnos* (Eordaea) was able to contribute a fourth battalion then Upper Macedonia provided at most four of the fourteen battalions in existence in 334.⁴⁵ As the manpower of a single district was not always enough to provide a full battalion it seems unlikely that corresponding units from Upper Macedonia remained with Antipater.⁴⁶ Therefore we are left with a total of 6,000 phalangites and an undisclosed number of cavalry. Let us assess the Upper Macedonian contribution in 334 at a generous 25 per cent and further assume the ratio to remain constant throughout Philip's reign and to be similar for their portion of the total the Macedonian reserves.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Curt.iv.13.28; D.S.XVII.57.2. Cf. A.B.Bosworth, "*Asthetaipei*", *CQ* 23 (1973), 245-253 [hereinafter "*Asthetairoi*"], who further states that: "The *asthetairoi* will have comprised three or, more probably, four battalions" and whose views are here accepted. Griffith, *HM* 2.709-13 argues that the word denoted an élite phalanx battalion and was not a regional designation. That Alexander called newly enrolled Persian recruits *asthetairoi* (Arr.vii.11.3) seems a critical difficulty for Griffith's case (one he admits: *HM* 713 n.1). For Alexander to claim a regional parallel with the out of favour Macedonian *taxeis* is perhaps permissible, to assimilate their veteran status surely not. Furthermore, if the term *pezhetairoi* was coined (by either Alexander or Philip: see n.34, above) to promote the loyalty of all the infantry to the king what would be the point of artificially imposing further distinctions amongst the infantry at a later date? For other objections see Bosworth, *Commentary*, 251-3. N.G.L.Hammond, "A cavalry unit in the army of Antigonos Monophthalmus: *Asthippoi*", *CQ* 28 (1978), 128-35 has suggested on this analogy that these cavalry were recruited from Upper Macedonia.

⁴⁵ Antipater retained 12,000 foot; that would be eight phalanx battalions (D.S.XVII.17.5). Cavalry from Upper Macedonia is attested to at the start of Alexander's reign (Arr.i.2.5). As this group is not heard of again it is likely they were retained by Antipater: Bosworth, *Commentary*, 58.

⁴⁶ The evident unrest in Macedonia and particularly Upper Macedonia following Philip's murder, at whoever's instigation, would provide good reason for the *asthetairoi* to be removed from Macedon.

⁴⁷ Bosworth, "*Asthetairoi*", 250 points out that: "On any chronology the infantry from Upper Macedonia became part of the national army at least a decade after the organisation of the *pezetairoi*." A ten year delay from the reign of Alexander II (whom Bosworth credits with the creation of the *pezetairoi*) seems highly questionable to me. Nevertheless, Bosworth's statement does not preclude the possibility that Philip was able to utilize Upper Macedon's military resources,

Before we can make even tentative suggestions for the structural effects of Philip's reforms upon the Macedonian army and its possible influences upon our demographic model, it is again necessary to stress the limitations of what has actually been achieved. It needs to be emphasized that the figures being dealt with are all military ones and, unlike the case of Athens, there are no other controls on them. This means accepting these figures not as absolute totals, but as a proportion of the manpower available. Philip may have been able to raise larger armies but chose not to; alternatively the military totals that we have may represent the full levies Philip was able to call upon at any one time. We simply have no way of knowing and speculation seems useless.⁴⁸ It should be noted that no state has ever been able to conscript 100 per cent of its manpower, no matter what the crisis.⁴⁹ It would be useful if some assessment of the demand's Philip made upon his soldiers was possible. The historical record of Macedon throughout Philip's reign is that of a militarily successful and consequently expansive state. Such success is paid for in blood and sweat and does not come easily. However, the evidence that is available is contradictory, comes from Demosthenes, and furthermore represents special pleading dependent upon the political needs of the moment. So, in the *Second Olynthiac* delivered in 349/8, Demosthenes' claimed that "they [the Macedonians] are perpetually buffeted and wearied and distressed by these expeditions north and south, never suffered to give their time to their business or their private affairs...." and suggests that the Macedonian army should not be over-estimated.⁵⁰ An appropriate conclusion for a politician advocating the dispatch of an Athenian expeditionary force. By the time of the *Third Philippic*, delivered eight years later, it was better to attribute Philip's success to his use of mercenaries and to conclude that "most disasters are due to

merely that it took an inordinate length of time for their absorption into the new sarissa-techniques.

⁴⁸ Ellis, *PMI* 34 feels that multiplying military totals by "a factor of 3½ or 4 may give a very general approximation to the total citizen population." Despite Ellis' claim to the contrary I can see nothing useful in the exercise - there are simply too many imponderables. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 10 is rightly more circumspect.

⁴⁹ See the remarks of Hansen, *Demography*, 16-21; and for a particular instance preventing this B.Baldwin, "Medical grounds for Exemptions from Military Service at Athens", *CP* 62 (1967), 42-43.

⁵⁰ Demosthenes 2 [*Olynthiac II*].15. Cf. 3-10, 14-22.

traitors, and none are the result of a regular pitched battle."⁵¹ Hugo Montgomery has analysed Demosthenes' changing perceptions of Macedonian power and reaches a conclusion all too easily disregarded by those prepared to suspend critical disbelief for the perceived advantages that any information is better than none.⁵² He proposes (p.16) that:

The historical value of Demosthenes' descriptions of conditions in Macedonia is surely insignificant. He had little concrete information about the country, and what little he had ... he employs in a highly tendentious manner.⁵³

The absence of the internal discord that had plagued Macedon for the previous half-century is not to be underestimated when assessing reasons for Macedon's rise to supremacy in the Greek world. How reasonable is it to add, though, with Griffith that the benefits of "freedom from actual foreign invasions ... [should not] be thought of as nullified or undermined by the insatiable activity of Philip's foreign policy."⁵⁴ Griffith seems to be remarkably sanguine about the probable casualties Philip's conquests resulted in. In contrast Hammond reminds us to "remember the strain put upon Macedonia's troops in Philip's last ten years." Strangely, Hammond believes Alexander put no strain at all upon his reserves, a discrepancy of interpretation between the two reigns that it is difficult to account for.⁵⁵ To suggest that the defeat Philip suffered at the hands of Onomarchus' Phocians was the only occasion at which heavy Macedonian losses were sustained is to tell only part of the story.

⁵¹ Demosthenes 4 [*Philippic III*].49-50. Cf. 10-14, 21-26, 56-68.

⁵² The case for accepting Demosthenes' own evaluations of how to defeat Philip is made by J.W.Leopold, "Demosthenes' Strategy in the *First Philippic*, 'an away match with Macedonian cavalry?'," *AW* 16 (1987), 59-69 [hereinafter "Strategy"]. One of Sir Moses Finley's pointed remarks concerns the problem posed by using a single ancient source; resulting in, "a rewriting that ends by tacitly accepting the essential veracity of the original.": *Ancient History*, 8.

⁵³ H.Montgomery, *The Way to Chaeronea: Foreign Policy, Decision Making and Political Influence in Demosthenes' Speeches* (Oslo 1983), 15-18, 39-63.

⁵⁴ Griffith, "Background", 134. Ellis, *PMI* 55, notes Philip's use of mercenaries that would relieve native Macedonians from such onerous duties as garrison work, but still rightly believes "an appreciable call for service must have been made on the smaller farmer, who could least afford it."

⁵⁵ Hammond, "Casualties", 65 and passim.

Philip was out-manoeuvred and defeated for a second consecutive time; it is not surprising he suffered desertions and precipitously withdrew his men.⁵⁶ Lack of success was Philip's problem here, not high casualties. Successful armies tend to be more forgiving and it is no surprise to discover that Philip's control of his army is secure throughout the remainder of his reign. But nowhere are we entitled to believe that this was owing to limited battle-mortality. Nevertheless, the demographic tables have been constructed without taking into consideration the possibility of battle casualties nullifying any possible gains. When it is realised that losses of over 2,000 men (at the lower and more acceptable demographic growth rates) would do this, it makes this a substantial concession.

It can not be assumed that the increase that can be seen in the military numbers of Philip's reign between 360-340 is symptomatic of a larger demographic trend within the Macedonian state. The increase is too great for a closed population to sustain (from *ca.* 10,000 to *ca.* 30,000) even if not too rapid for the purely physical restraints imposed by the maturation of new generations. The percentile rates of increase provided in the tables above all assume a demographically closed society. The direct absorption of the Upper Macedonian kingdoms in Philip's first years clearly contradicts this but fortunately allowances can be made. If a 25 per cent increase in Philip's manpower is accepted as a result of their subordination to Lower Macedonia then we still lack an explanation for the size of the army Philip commanded in 352 at the Crocus Field. An army of 10,600, with a 25 per cent addition comes to 13,250; not the *ca.* 20,000 men required (see above pp.27-9). The difference in the size's of the armies in the intervening ten years is, I would suggest, due to the structural alterations in the ability of Macedonia to field a larger army as a direct result of the introduction of the sarissa-armed phalanx. Hence the table includes an estimated base figure of 25,000 from which to calculate expected increases in the number of soldiers Macedon could provide over the next thirty-seven years.

⁵⁶ Griffith, "Background", 134. Cf. Polyaeus ii.38.2; D.S.XVI.35.2. One would suppose that the casualties at Perinthus and Byzantium were heavy (D.S.XVI.74.1-76.4), perhaps also the defeat inflicted by the Triballians when the Macedonians fled fearing Philip had been killed (Justin ix.2). Nor can we be sure that we possess a full record of Philip's campaigns: cf. the remarks of J.R.Fears, "Pausanias, the Assassin of Philip II", *Athenaeum* 53 (1975), 120-22, concerning Diodorus' conflation of the battles against Pleuratus in 344/3 and Pleurias in 337/6.

It could be objected that the formation of the phalanx was all important and that its effect has been grossly underestimated. Admittedly the two all-important variables - the gains Philip made from the accession of Upper Macedonia and the numerical effect that differing fighting techniques resulted in - are far from secure. These have been set at high levels, however, partly out of caution and partly to anticipate just this type of challenge. Nor should potential objectors be allowed to both have their cake and eat it. The more men that Philip conscripted into the army the less there would be available to provide the economic boom so commonly believed in and itself considered responsible for the upsurge in the Macedonian birth rate. Ultimately every historian is compelled to decide what to believe on his or her own criteria of probability. It seems preferable to seek an explanation for a population surge in the context of Philip's reign that does not require Macedonia to deviate from probable economic, technical, cultural, or social norms.

Once more, while it is possible to pose questions of the evidence and to discuss the implications, the data discussed up to this point makes it impractical to come to any definitive conclusions, let alone a quantitative assessment of Macedon's population. Even excluding manpower losses attributable to warfare and taking the higher base figure of 25,000 against which to estimate military manpower, resulting growth is still far too high to be attributable to natural demographic causes. The structural changes Philip introduced will have played their part in increasing the number of Macedonians able to serve in the phalanx, but expected gains will have terminated by *ca.* 350 at the latest. Otherwise we are left having to explain why Philip did not care to make full use of Macedon's military strength in the critical early period of his reign. Such widespread reform of the infantry was, so far as we know, a single occurrence under Philip. The Hellenistic kings of Macedon continued to use the phalanx yet their armies never disposed of the number of soldiers available to Philip in his later years and to Alexander during his conquests. If they could have conscripted more men into their armies we should expect them to have done so.

"All Things Being Equal": Negative Historical Criteria with which to

Establish a Surge in Macedonian Manpower.

As far back as M.I.Rostovtzeff scholars have commented upon the fact that the kings of Macedon who followed after Alexander the Great never commanded armies the size of which he had led. The Macedonians who had followed their king east in the 330s risked not only the ultimate price of their loyalty but also dispersion amongst the new colonies scattered around the empire. Few returned to their native land, a phenomenon Rostovtzeff put succinctly:

It is probable from general considerations that in the days of Philip II and Alexander the Great Macedonia was drained to the utmost of her manpower. Thousands of adult male Macedonians left their native country never to return. A large part of the Macedonian army of Alexander was never demobilised after Alexander's death; on the contrary, it was from time to time reinforced by fresh Macedonian recruits. Many of them, and of the children whom they reared while on active service, remained in the East as settlers in the colonies of Alexander and his successors.⁵⁷

Rostovtzeff remained neutral about the demographic results of these conquests upon Macedon's population and assigned no blame to Alexander or the Successors for the permanent removal of these men. Not so Professor Bosworth. For him the picture is "sombre":

It can be shown that the numbers of Macedonian reinforcements summoned to Asia has been consistently underestimated. A considerable proportion of the child bearing male population was taken away and never returned, with disastrous consequences for the military strength of Macedon. Within a generation her manpower was perceptibly lower, and she never regained the supremacy enjoyed at the end of Philip's reign.⁵⁸

The judgement upon Alexander personally is equally condemning:

It was as a destroyer that Alexander impinged most upon Macedon itself. The finest generation of fighting men produced in the ancient world was snatched from its homeland

⁵⁷ M.I.Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 1941), Vol.2, 1136.

⁵⁸ Bosworth, "Decline", 2. "... child-bearing male population" is an unfortunate lapse.

and taken to fight and die in the recesses of Asia; and the country was set upon a path of decline that proved irreversible.⁵⁹

Furthermore, Bosworth would claim that "Alexander's conquests, for all their glory were ultimately fateful for the military and political destiny of Macedon."⁶⁰ These are harsh words, indeed; and one is entitled to ask on what basis Bosworth feels able to make such charges. The question Bosworth asks, for which Alexander is found wanting, is absolutely relevant: "What was the demographic effect of the incessant overseas combat?"⁶¹ Bosworth's answer, as we have seen, is categoric. It is also, in the main, simply incorrect. Where Bosworth's arguments are sound his method of achieving his results is often flawed. Partly this is the result of failing to define what it was Bosworth believes Macedon's "military and political destiny" should have been. Clearly the vast Eastern conquests and their legacy, the Hellenistic kingdoms, were not enough. Partly, it is the over-schematic presentation of his case; in which as much evidence as possible designating soldiers to be Macedonian is accepted prior to 331. After this Bosworth believes Macedon to be emptied of potential military reserves. Hence the refusal to take as credible Curtius' evidence for the existence of a Macedonian garrison-army in Asia. To accept this necessitates belief in more substantial reinforcements, and so greater reserves, than Bosworth is prepared to allow. One wonders with what validity we can dismiss one part of a record and cite another part, although in the same author, as if it described a better reality? One needs to be more careful in rejecting an authority, on whatever basis, if it is done by criteria which cannot be found in that or any other authority.⁶²

⁵⁹ Bosworth, "Decline", 12. Cf. also *Conquest and Empire*, 177, 266-8.

⁶⁰ Bosworth, "Decline", 10.

⁶¹ Bosworth, "Decline", 2. Bosworth, of course and quite rightly, admits that there is no easy or definite answer. Hammond's discussion in "Casualties" and elsewhere is vitiated by his perverse view of the nature of Macedonian citizenship which he regards as strictly hierarchical. According to Hammond even reinforcements labelled as *Macedones* means "we should not conclude that these Macedonians were all elite citizens ... who were qualified to serve in the Hypaspists, phalanx brigades and the Companion cavalry." From *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman* (London 1980), 152. See, further, below pp.124-7.

⁶² Bosworth, "Decline", 7. For instances of the method see: pp. 4 n.22; 6 n.34; 8 n.51 (particularly), 9 n.60; 10 n.62, 63. See also the discussion on "draft-dodging", above p.44. Bosworth's final

Surely there were more Macedonians available after 323 than Bosworth accepts? Events immediately following Alexander's death clearly demonstrate that Macedonian armies possessed formidable numerical strengths. In 321 Craterus and Antipater each led an expeditionary force into Asia. Craterus' infantry, "chiefly" Macedonian veterans, numbered 20,000 alone. At the same time his opponent Eumenes possessed 20,000 infantry, but not enough were Macedonian for him to feel confident of relying on them in the battle he eventually won.⁶³ While Antipater was in Asia his lieutenant in Thessaly and much of the garrison were killed during an Aetolian inspired revolt. These losses notwithstanding Antipater's regent, Polyperchon, still had enough manpower left in Macedon to recover Thessaly with seeming ease.⁶⁴ Such a concentration of Macedonian troops under a single authority (Antipater) was not to exist again.

Nonetheless in 318 Polyperchon was able to assemble an army of 20,000 Macedonian infantry, plus cavalry, elephants and allies to try and drive Cassander from Athens.⁶⁵ In desperate straits in 302 Cassander could raise 29,000 foot and 2,000 horse to face Demetrius' army, which was nearly twice the size of his.⁶⁶ It is clear that Macedonian reserves at this period were still substantial but that they were becoming increasingly fragmented, fighting against each other under and for different commanders as personal preference dictated.⁶⁷ With Perdiccas' death, the Macedonian particularism of Antipater and

point, "Decline", 11-12, concerning Alexander's damned posthumous reputation in Macedonia is not as clear as his text would suggest. Against R.M.Errington, "Alexander in the Hellenistic World", *Entretiens Fondation Hardt* xxii (Geneva 1976), 146-52 (whom Bosworth follows) see E.D.Carney, "The Sisters of Alexander the Great: Royal Relicts", *Historia* 37 (1988), 386-404, especially 403-4.

⁶³ D.S.XVIII.30.4. For a different view on what follows see Bosworth, "Decline", 8-10.

⁶⁴ D.S.XVIII.38.1ff; 39.7 (Antipater's return).

⁶⁵ D.S.XVIII.68.3.

⁶⁶ D.S.XX.110.4. It is difficult to assess how many of this total were Macedonian as no break down is given. What is more some of Cassander's army was serving in Asia Minor under his ally, Lysimachos. Cf. Bosworth, "Decline", 9 n.60. Demetrius' troops, we are told, included 8,000 Macedonians.

⁶⁷ Hammond, *TMS* 250-262, 273-281 provides a serviceable narrative if used with care. Austin, "Hellenistic Kings", 450-466 is excellent on the motivations of the Macedonians and their Hellenistic rulers.

the separatist intentions of Ptolemy combined to ensure the breakup of Alexander's empire. The concentration of forces available to Antipater were dispersed following the arrangements at Triparadeisos. These soldiers, having once disposed of the remaining Perdiccan supporters, were then available to opportunistic individuals throughout the empire who used them to support their attempts to carve out for themselves their own kingdoms.⁶⁸ It seems unjust to hold Alexander responsible for what occurred after his death.⁶⁹ Whether or not events would have turned out any differently for the Macedonian soldiers if Alexander had survived his illness is a moot point. But that is not the issue and speculation would get us nowhere.

Bosworth is correct to say that in the later third century and afterwards Macedonian strength (as represented by the Kingdom of Macedonia) did not equal that fielded by Alexander. At Sellasia in 222B.C. the Macedonian infantry totalled only 13,000 men.⁷⁰ At Cynescephalae in 197B.C. Philip V's full levy only produced a total of 18,000 Macedonians.⁷¹ According to Livy the next generation was subject to fewer military demands and Philip and his son Perseus actively encouraged an increase in the birth rate. It is open to doubt as to whether it was royal agitation, or some other means, that enabled Macedon's army to increase and reach a total of 26,000 native infantry by 171B.C., but the rise in numbers is uncontested.⁷² However, to simply point all this out as if it confirmed a drastic decline in

⁶⁸ For the shift of alliances down to 320 cf. R.M.Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323-320B.C.", *JHS* 90 (1970), 49-77. Antigonus received 8,500 of Antipater's Macedonians (D.S.XIX.29.3). Even relatively humble individuals could hope to start a dynasty. Cf. most recently, R.A.Billows, "Anatolian Dynasts: The Case of the Macedonian Eupolemos in Karia", *Cl.Ant.* 8 (1989), 173-126 with references cited there. The satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Arrhidaeus, had 1,000 Macedonians in 319 (D.S.XVIII.51.1). Further examples in Bosworth, "Decline", 8-10.

⁶⁹ Unless one is prepared to accept that Alexander was murdered and the responsibility for what followed lies at his feet for provoking the conditions that led his officers to murder him. That would seem more than a little perverse. The view that Alexander was poisoned is made by Bosworth, "Rumour and Propaganda", 112-36. For what they are worth the sources' description of Alexander's illness most closely resemble Typhoid Fever (personal communication, Dr.K.R.Ross). The best case for malaria is made by Engels, "Alexander's Death", 224-8.

⁷⁰ Polybius.ii.65.2-6.

⁷¹ Livy.xxxiii.3.1-5.

manpower following Alexander's reign is not enough. Bosworth fails to consider the evidence (paltry as it is) for the state of Macedonian manpower under Philip II and because he possesses only partial data it leads him to the wrong conclusions. As has been documented the change in the size of Philip's armies is remarkable. Bosworth rightly considers Philip to be the architect of Macedonian greatness; but he fails to reflect on where Philip himself procured the men necessary to underwrite his own successes and the achievements of his son. It seems that Bosworth also believes in a substantial increase in the internal birth-rate throughout Philip's reign as a result of that monarch's success. If so his assumptions about the demographic realities of Macedonia are as inappropriate as those of Brunt and Griffith mentioned earlier.⁷³

To generalise, with all things being equal between Macedonia of the fourth and second centuries, why cannot a comparable increase in the population (at least as it can be traced in military strengths) be seen under say, the Antigonids, when Macedon was stable, prosperous and successful once more?⁷⁴ After all, the armies *deployed* by Philip in the 350s are comparable in numbers to those of his Antigonid successors. Nor does Philip appear to have made fewer demands on his soldiers than they did (so far as we can tell), which might have allowed for the survival of a larger population. The question has, to my mind, been incorrectly focused. The issue should not be the perceived decline after Alexander but should rather address the problem of where Philip found the men willing and able to serve in his army. If the internal demographics of Macedon and structural alterations in the military undertaken by Philip cannot provide the full picture then where else may we legitimately seek for these Macedonians? One final twist must be added as well. If their source can be found, some explanation will be required not only for their presence in Macedon, but also for their availability in the fourth

⁷² Livy.xxxix.24.3; xlii.51.3-11, where Livy states that this was the largest army commanded by a Macedonian king since Alexander. In general see Bosworth, "Decline", 10-11. This too is an unacceptably high natural growth rate. However, it can be explained (see below pp.123-4).

⁷³ I may be doing Bosworth an injustice here; though see the suggestive remarks in *Conquest and Empire*, 10.

⁷⁴ Macedon's reported wealth in 167B.C. impressed Livy years later: xlv.40.1-3. For Rome's fear of Macedonian wealth see E.S.Gruen, "Macedonia and the Settlement of 167 B.C.", 257-267 in W.L.Adams, E.N.Borza, edd., *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage* (Washington 1982).

century. In other words, why were later Macedonian king's unable to respond as Philip and perhaps Alexander had done and supplement their armies with what must clearly now be recognised as non-native Macedonians?

Medium-term Demographic Change and the Supposed

Impact of the Economy.

So far the evidence and theories that have been examined (on a largely hypothetical basis) have ignored the context that would be most suitable for such views as N.G.L.Hammond espouses: that economic growth has a direct, positive, influence upon population growth. Hammond's comments were noted at the beginning of this chapter; since those words were written in 1979 he has not had occasion to alter his stance.⁷⁵ Thus, in *The Macedonian State* (p.186):

The financial and economic achievements of Philip, though less spectacular than his military achievements, were equally as important. He created a strong and stable economy within his enlarged kingdom which was to sustain Macedon as a leading power for almost two centuries.

Beforehand Hammond had provided a list of Philip's particular aims and the implications of their implementation. For example, the growth of towns indicates "surplus produce and commercial development"; furthermore, "land reclamation by drainage and clearing (e.g. near Philippi) and organised irrigation" leads to the expansion of the agricultural base.⁷⁶ Naturally, it would be extreme

⁷⁵ All the relevant evidence is provided by Hammond, *HM* 2.657-668 and the references listed below. I would not wish to imply (in fairness to Hammond) that he is guilty of dogmatically restating his opinions without considering the objections to them. To my knowledge Hammond has not read the works of other scholars dealing with the issue at hand (there are no references). Naturally, therefore, he would not be expected to know that his views may need modification or further justification.

⁷⁶ Hammond, *TMS* 177-8. Cf. *HM* 2.659 and Cawkwell, *PM* 17-18, 47. As Leopold, "Strategy", 68-9 incisively remarks, "the very same historians who argue the invulnerability of Macedonia to

to suggest that Philip's policies (or reign: there is a difference) had no impact on these various areas. However, it is not at all clear that changes were as widespread or had the results Hammond would like to believe. Even if Hammond's evidence were irrefutable it does not necessarily follow that these economic indicators had any immediate or marked effect on the birth rate. Hammond ignores a host of structural and evidential problems when he assumes that the undoubted wealth of fourth century Macedon percolated down into the hands of each (or indeed, most) Macedonians.⁷⁷

From a demographic perspective the most important of Philip's supposed achievements would be a rapid agricultural expansion. In a pre-industrial society (such as Macedonia), land is necessary to support a growing population with the required sustenance. Theophrastus, a contemporary of Philip's, reported that the plain of Philippi was drained and cultivated in his time. Hammond assumes, without any evidence that this transpired at Philip's initiative and that this project is illustrative of many others: "What Philip did for Philippi he certainly did for the coastal plain of the Thermaic Gulf."⁷⁸ However, as E.N.Borza makes evident, the problems involved in making the plain of Philippi and the coast around the Thermaic Gulf productive are of an entirely different order of magnitude. The latter would have been beyond Philip's resources; technical if not financial.⁷⁹ The single most important issue is ignored, however. Namely: Who performed all this reclamation work and why? If we are to assume a

sea-power also tend to give Philip credit for vastly expanding the trade of the country and developing its commerce by sea as well as by land."

⁷⁷ Further notice of Hammond's demographic simplicity concerning numbers can be found in *TMS s.v.* "population-transfers" (p.410). E.g.: "thus in the years after 358 the [ancient] government's subjects rose, if we may take the [modern] 1961 figures, from 1,000,000 to 3,300,000; or, if we assume half as many in antiquity, which is probably an underestimate, from 550,000 to 1,650,000.... How were the king and the Macedones to cope with the enormous change?" By conquering a goodly part of the known world of course!!

⁷⁸ Theophrastus *De causis plantarum*, v.14.5-6. Hammond, *HM* 2.659, also *HM* 1.160. In general cf. the sceptical reflections of H.Montgomery, "The Economic Revolution of Philip II - Myth or Reality?", *SO* 60 (1985), 37-47 [hereinafter "Economic Revolution"]. H.Kroll, "Bronze Age and Iron Age agriculture in Kastanas, Macedonia", in W.A Caspari, W.Van Zeist, ed., *Plants and Ancient Man: Studies in Paleoethnobotany* (Rotterdam and Boston 1984), 243-46 suggests that farming techniques and products, in the lower Axios valley at least, remained similar into the Archaic and Classical periods.

⁷⁹ Borza, "Ecology", 102-24. If malaria was endemic in Macedonia, as Borza suggests, this would severely hamper troop mobilization in the summer campaigning months.

closed society then a delay of at least a generation would be required in order for a new set of potential farmers to mature, move on, and to develop their own farms. In other words the birth rate would need to double, otherwise sons would merely continue to work and inherit their father's land. Obviously this is a simplified presentation. The situation is a hypothetical one, though such a process, or one similar to it, must be assumed by those who believe that peace plus prosperity equals population growth (at least in the period under examination). With our defective evidence we are left without any meaningful idea of the prevailing social and economic conditions facing the majority of Macedonians and that means that models, largely based upon conjecture, are as close to reality as we can get.

That does not mean that where the evidence allows it modifications should not be made. If the outpouring of Macedonian wealth (as represented by the abundant coinage) reached into all levels of Macedonian society, then, presumably, families would have monetary resources that would enable them to raise more children. Adherents of such a theory could suggest military booty and campaign pay as the source of new wealth, though it may be doubted whether this was substantial enough in Philip's day to galvanize the population into (say) doubling within the length of his reign.⁸⁰ If so, it would be demographically unique, and Philip does seem to have claimed back some of his subject's new found wealth through direct taxation.⁸¹

Nor are we entitled to believe that economic growth was a goal of Classical or Hellenistic governments, either for reasons of state or owing to personal or philanthropic motives. Sir Moses Finley has pointed out that the ancients "lacked the concept of an 'economy' and, *a fortiori* ... they

⁸⁰ The end of Alexander's reign was clearly another matter: he discharged his veterans with a bonus of a talent a piece: Arr.vii.12.1. However, circumstances were exceptional and it seems that Alexander's soldiers were unable to survive on their wages alone. The king had to liquidate their debts at huge cost: Arr.vii. 5.1-3 and Just.12.11.1-2. (20,000 talents); Curt.x.2.8; D.S.XVII.109.2; Plut.*Alex.*70 (10,000 talents).

⁸¹ For the royal dues (personal and financial) see Bosworth, *Commentary*, 126-7; preferable to Hammond, *TMS* 178-9. Even at its peak the land-tax was not a great source of revenue for Macedon's kings. Plutarch (*Aemilius Paulus* 28.3) records that after the defeat at Pydna in 168B.C. the Macedonians "were to pay the Romans 100 [silver] talents in tribute, a sum less than half of what they used to pay the kings." And this was after the deliberate attempt to increase Macedon's wealth in the second and third centuries: cf. Walbank, *Hellenistic World*, 85-90. Philip was fortunate to have his mines.

lacked the conceptual elements which together constitute what we call 'the economy'.⁸² Individuals undoubtedly possessed the concept of self-sufficiency, but this did not translate into a desire for economic growth. A.E.Samuel has persuasively argued that self-sufficiency would provide stability and it was this that the Greeks really desired. The search for and promotion of internal or external markets to exploit was not undertaken for its own sake; indeed, was only rarely undertaken at all. Monetary wealth was largely attained through political and military means, not economic advancement, and was as often as not spent to achieve further political and military objectives. Those states that possessed such means Finley terms "conquest states", and Macedon is rightly listed amongst their number.⁸³

These distinctions apply with force to Macedon. While the kingdom (in an abstract sense) was wealthy in the fourth century it does not automatically follow that every individual Macedonian became prosperous at the same time.⁸⁴ A definition of what is meant by a wealthy kingdom is needed. Hugo Montgomery has listed some of the questions that need to be addressed (p.123):

Did a state have resources such as fertile soil or mines which permitted the inhabitants to live a carefree life? Or do we mean that the state owned many warships, had invested its assets in well-built fortifications, harbours, temples and had a well-furnished treasury? Or was it possible that only a few rich citizens exploited the majority of the population?⁸⁵

⁸² M.I.Finley, *The Ancient Economy*² (London 1985), 21 [hereinafter *Ancient Economy*]. "The prevailing mentality was acquisitive but not productive." (p.144).

⁸³ A.E.Samuel, *From Athens to Alexandria; Hellenism and Social Goals in Ptolemaic Egypt* (Louvain 1983); M.I.Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 1983), 61-4, 109-16; *Ancient Economy*, 204-7.

⁸⁴ That many Athenians benefited from their empire in the fifth century is true. Cf. R.Meiggs *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1973), 256-7 for calculations that suggest the property values that the *eisphora* was realised upon were much greater; Finley, *Ancient Economy*, 168-73 and in detail, "The Fifth Century Athenian Empire: A Balance Sheet", 103-126 in P.D.A. Garnsey, C.R.Whittaker, ed., *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 1978). The difficulty with the analogy is the fact that Philip was an hereditary autocrat; he was not required to consider the wider welfare of his citizens in quite the same manner democratic Athens did. For the concept of property on the Greek world, G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London 1981), 112-133.

⁸⁵ H.Montgomery, "Silver, Coins and the Wealth of a City-State", *OJ* 15 (1984), 123-33. For the view that ancient traders and their governments were economically more sophisticated and concerned to some degree with profit generation see, H.Montgomery, "Merchants Fond of Corn'. Citizens and Foreigners in the Athenian Grain Trade", *SO* 61 (1986), 43-61; M.V.Hansen, "Athenian Trade in the 4th Century B.C. Operation and Finance", *Classica et*

Answers are of course limited by the lack of evidence but some general observations can be attempted. All mineral and timber resources were, for instance, monopolies of the crown and exploited for the purposes of the crown, not to enrich the Macedonians in general.⁸⁶ There is no need to be dogmatic, however. Doubtless many individuals did benefit from the expansion in the fourth century. Theopompus is quite explicit about the gains made by Philip's *hetairoi*, for instance.⁸⁷ Any debate over the nature and extent of the Macedonian economy will achieve little. However, it may be possible to forestall the response that any denial of Macedon's economic expansion renders invalid the demographic scenario argued for throughout this chapter. In other words, it is not acceptable to merely assert that Macedon was a remarkably exceptional case.

A complex causal chain exists between the constant interaction of a population and its economy. To express this at its broadest marriage habits, which condition the birth-rate and female fertility, are constrained by the existing economic and social structure. As such they are sensitive to changing opportunities of employment and subsistence.⁸⁸ How this modifies any gross population increase or decrease, particularly through the short and medium term, is still imperfectly understood. Acknowledging marriage as the most sensitive regulator of population with regard to economic change, Ronald Lee, (note 7, above) has performed the most sophisticated attempt to understand the driving force behind vital rates and the swings in fertility and demographic change over the medium term. Taking English population figures between 1540-1840 and acknowledging the gross upward trend in the

Mediaevalia 35 (1984), 71-92; W.E.Thompson, "The Athenian Entrepreneur", *Ant.Class.* 51 (1982), 53-85. Walbank, *Philip V*, 5-9, 164, 224 believes Macedon's economy never approached the relative sophistication achieved by the Greek cities.

⁸⁶ For timber see E.N.Borza, "Timber and Politics in the Ancient World: Macedon and the Greeks", *PAPS* 131 (1987), 33-52. For the mines: Hammond *HM* 1.12-16 (Map 9, *HM* 2.655) and the monumental study of G.Le Rider, *Le monnayage d'argent et d'or de Philippe II, frappé en Macédoine de 359 à 294* (Paris 1977). For evaluations of his conclusions on the die links and mints see M.Jessop Price, "The Coinage of Philip II", *NC* 1979, 230-41; and on Le Rider's faulty historical assumptions Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage*, 271-92.

⁸⁷ *FGrHist* 115 FF224, 225b. See below pp.106ff.

⁸⁸ Eversley, "Population", 23ff.

long run he has constructed a series of models with which to experiment upon the data.⁸⁹ The models suggest to him that "fertility was a more important proximate determinant of population change than mortality" but notes two possible interpretations of the causal determinant of this relationship. Fertility appears to lag behind wages and population growth and if it and mortality vary exogenously then this time lag is both predictable and misleading. However, the other possibility is that fertility responds passively and sensitively to wage alterations, though with a fifty year time lag, and mortality remains a constant.⁹⁰ It is a demographic truism, excusing the wage based vocabulary of the modern economy, "that a given population will grow under the best possible conditions if all the manpower it produces will, when it comes of working age, be in demand for its skill at a constant or rising real wage."⁹¹ Eversley is here assuming a closed system, not that the comment is invalid for one such as Macedonia in the fourth century. Philip's demands for military service and the availability of land with which to reward his successful soldiers would create the *basic* necessary conditions for population growth in Macedon.

Unfortunately, before we decide that the apparent problem of Macedon's population explosion is so easily resolved Eversley would point out that only "responses to the stimuli appropriate to the type of society, whether they are climatic, political or customary" are allowable.⁹² So we will still remain with a time lag before any demographic response can be assumed, no matter whether favourable conditions can be pointed to, unless Macedon's social customs can provide reasons for us to think to the contrary. As usual we are left facing an impasse owing to defective documentation. There

⁸⁹ Lee, "Homeostasis", 75-78. The other population regulators are the birth and death rates. Cf. Eversley, "Population", 39-44, 47-8; Hollingsworth, *Demography*, 15-22; Wrigley, *Population*, 11-13, 116-27.

⁹⁰ Lee, "Homeostasis", 83-89 (tables 1-4), 99-100. He reserves judgement and I am in no position to challenge his uncertainty. See, more simply Eversley, "Population", 58-64; Wrigley, *Population*, 113-131.

⁹¹ Eversley, "Population", 58.

⁹² Eversley, "Population", 35, 64. This is another demographic truism. No human system works in isolation from behavioural patterns. Cf. also Wrigley, *Population*, 140ff: "Patterns of social behaviour and their associated demographic characteristics were often slow to change."

is little information about Macedonian marriage customs and social mores. Certainly there is little enough to enable us to postulate some social changes peculiar to Philip's reign so that a new factor could intrude in a positive demographic fashion.

Perhaps there is one noteworthy point that needs consideration: the polygamous nature of the Argead royal house. Peter Green's attempts to revive the view that Macedonian monarchs were serial monogamists by trying to label seemingly contemporaneous wives as mistresses or to argue that their demise meant that they did not overlap each other are unacceptable, as Tronsen and Greenwalt have shown.⁹³ Tarn's older claim for Alexander, that he too was monogamous as well as chaste - "the expression of a most definite purpose, the subjugation of his body to his mind..." - has been debunked by Brunt.⁹⁴ But neither Philip's unions with his seven wives, nor Alexander's with his three, resulted in a prodigious number of offspring.⁹⁵ No doubt a polygamous society has the potential to increase the birth rate by exploiting female fertility to the maximum.⁹⁶ In Philip's and Alexander's cases this was clearly not so. Along with the ancients we can only speculate as to why. Theophrastus, as preserved by

⁹³ First put forward in P.Green, *Alexander of Macedon*² (London 1974), 27-8, 515 n.55. Restated in "The Royal Tombs of Vergina: A Historical Analysis", 129-151 [hereinafter "Vergina"] in W.L.Adams, E.N.Borza, ed., *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage* (Washington 1982). See W.Greenwalt, "Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia", *Arethusa* 22 (1989), 19-45; A.Tronsen, "Satyrus the Peripatetic and the Marriages of Philip II", *JHS* 105 (1984), 116-26.

⁹⁴ Sir.W.Tarn, *Alexander the Great II: Sources and Studies* (Cambridge 1948, repr. 1979), 319-338. P.A.Brunt, "Alexander, Barsine and Heracles", *Riv.Fil.Inst.Class.* 103 (1975), 22-34. Barsine may not have been a legitimate wife. Alexander never seems to have publically acknowledged paternity of his son or ever considered him as his heir. There is no doubt about his simultaneous marriages to three different woman, however; Roxane, (Arr.iv.19.5; Plut.*Alex.*47.7; Curt. viii.4.25); Stateira (Arr.vii.4.4; Plut.*Alex.*70.3), and Aristobulus adds Porysatis, another Achaemonid princess (Arr.vii.4.4).

⁹⁵ Philip had three daughters and two sons, Alexander two sons. The evidence is conveniently tabulated by Green, "Vergina", 140-1.

⁹⁶ See Engels, "Demography", 387-9 and n.6 where he warns "that for an ancient society to attain a birth rate as high as 50 per 1,000 per year may require the abandonment of the institutions of marriage and the family by that society." The tables above (p.57) have a column at this rate (0.5 per cent) and my calculations throughout use this figure as a further concession to those who would like to believe in Macedon's high birth rate. Furthermore, while mild polygamy may enhance population growth, extreme polygamy has a negative effect. Cf. A.Preuss, "Biomedical Techniques for Influencing Reproduction", *Arethusa* 8 (1975), 239-40.

Atheneaus, believed the reason for Alexander's lack of offspring to be the fact that he "was not in good condition for sexual commerce", citing Aristotle's view that constant heavy drinking makes the imbibers' semen watery and unfit for procreation. Philip himself was another continual drinker, but perhaps we would not wish to credit Aristotle's precise medical reasoning, even if it may be broadly correct.⁹⁷ The real question is, of course, how far were the marital practices of the Argead monarchy typical of their subjects? Neither polygamy nor concubinage were practised to any extent by the Greeks and to risk the argument *ex silentio* just this once, this was also true for Hellenizing Macedonia. If not, one would expect to find some Greek writer (Herodotus?) making reference to it as a pervasive cultural difference setting the Macedonians apart from the Greek 'norm'.⁹⁸

At any rate near-balancing sex-ratios would suggest that the habit not be widespread. While the numbers of males in a pre-transitional society tends to increase as a proportion of the population from ages 14-40 the trend reverses after this point. The higher mortality for women in this age group is in all likelihood due to the dangers of childbirth in their fertile years.⁹⁹ With generally high fertility and consequently high birth-rates (accepting Macedonia as typical of pre-transitional societies) the possibility for a territorially expanding state to use its newly conquered resources (above all land in Macedonia's case) to guarantee a livelihood to a growing population was present. However, as the foregoing discussion has suggested, such a situation would not be immediately reflected in a gross

⁹⁷ Athenaeus x.434F, 435A. Atheneaus cites evidence for Philip's mores at 434A-D. Aristotle's suggestion of male reproductive failure seems a fairer assessment than Ellis' (*PMI* 62): "the wives he [Philip] thus marshalled were not, as it happened, to be remarkable for their fecundity.", considering the numbers of each sex involved. Borza, "Symposium", 45-55 suggests that Macedonian drunkenness was the result of drinking higher quality Macedonian wines unmixed. This may be so, but most side effects from drinking are at the level of male desire, not the spermicidal capacity to fertilize.

⁹⁸ See W.K.Lacey, *The Family in Ancient Greece* (London 1968), 214 (Polyandry was another rare practice: 199, 203); S.B.Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity* (New York 1975), 70; A.R.W.Harrison, *The Law of Athens: Family and Property* (Oxford 1970), 15-17.

⁹⁹ For female fertility in Greece see most recently L.Dean-Jones, "Menstrual Bleeding According to the Hippocratics and Aristotle", *TAPhA* 119 (1989), 177-92. Also Engels, "Demography", 387-8. Hansen, *Demography*, has an age-sex pyramid on the cover of his book that is his representation of Classical Athens using Coale-Demeny. See his table on p.12 as well.

population increase. The time lag between the conditions arising that enable change to take place and for such a change to take place (never mind the chronological restraints that can be imposed on our sources by the time necessary to allow a given individual to be born and mature) would effectively exclude Philip as the beneficiary of the economic reforms Brunt and Griffith have assumed and Hammond argued for; and quite possibly Alexander as well. Even if a population increase as a result of economic prosperity did take place the demographic bulge that would occur would be far less in an ancient than a modern society in which employment opportunities are more readily available and as a whole more responsive to prevailing conditions and opportunities.

Therefore, while it is fair to believe that Macedon's population would have expanded even if demographically isolated it is not acceptable to conclude that this expansion took place within Philip's generation and that Macedonian armies from 360-323 were filled with native Macedonians alone. The rate of growth is simply too rapid. While structural alterations in the military system can account for some of the visible increase, as can the absorption of Upper Macedonia, a total by the end of Philip's reign of perhaps 30,000 militarily available men is the very maximum acceptable. This would be consistent with the size of Macedonian armies down to the dissolution of the kingdom by Rome. Patently it is not enough for the number that existed under Philip and Alexander. It is hoped that the final chapter can provide some answers for this phenomenon that is acceptable within the context of fourth century Greece and does not have to treat Macedonia, on whatever basis, as demographically, economically or culturally exceptional.

4. IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION WITHIN MACEDONIA

360-323B.C.

The Denial of Opportunity in the World of the City-States in the

Fourth Century B.C.

By the end of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth centuries two things were abundantly clear. Politically, southern Greece was in a state of flux. Sparta had overcome Athens after twenty-seven years of war, but had been unable to replace an Athenian Empire with a Spartan one. In both instances Persian gold had been the deciding factor in the eventual outcome. This illustrates the second point. Neither at the institutional level of the cities, nor at the level of the individual citizen, could the necessary financial resources be found to support and to impose an empire on others. The Peloponnesian War had shown up and exacerbated, not just caused, the economic weakness of the Greek states.¹

There were two inter-related results. Firstly, without the power of the Athenian-led Empire or Spartan-dominated Peloponnesian League to impose some degree of stability, however resented, there was a growth in *stasis* and coercive wars within and between the smaller cities. The struggles of the two hegemonical rivals, now joined by Thebes (and at times Jason of Pherai, the Syracusan tyrants and Persia), promoted local partisan strife in the hope of achieving ascendancy over one another and were thus less concerned with preventing conflicts amongst the lesser city-states than with exploiting them.² Secondly, the increasing level of conflict (low intensity or otherwise) meant less stability in Greece for those whose living was made at the myriad small scale occupations available within the city-states and a reduction of opportunities for others by which to earn such a living. At the same time the numbers of men exiled or forced to flee their home states as a result of internal strife steadily increased. Certainly

¹ For an excellent overview of the consequences of the Peloponnesian War on Greece: Hornblower, *Greek World*, 153-80.

² Hornblower, *Greek World*, 154. Lintott, *Civil Strife*, 82-120, 252-62.

these were changes in degree rather than in kind but the accelerating breakdown in the social cohesion of the Greek world has important implications for explaining the transfer of sovereign power away from the Greek city-states to that of dynasts such as Philip of Macedon; men whom Professor Davies has termed 'The Opportunists'.³

Professor Davies accounts for Philip's success in creating a lasting power "in terms of his having been able to add a second role, as mercenary commander, to that of traditional king."⁴ Apart from some semantic quibbles over the use of the word mercenary this is a sophisticated explanation for the establishment of Macedonian power. However, as Paul McKechnie points out, the simple acknowledgement of Macedonian power is not totally adequate as an explanation for the establishment of the Hellenistic kingdoms.⁵ McKechnie's work demonstrates that the Hellenistic kings were able to take advantage of an identifiable community (the "Outsiders" of his title) to gather the necessary men they needed with which to administer and defend their kingdoms. Philip's destruction of independent Greek power in the northern Aegean McKechnie considers part of the process that dramatically increased the number of his outsiders. Thus, in contrast to Philip's urbanization policy in Macedonia and Thrace:

... non-Macedonian Greeks had more occasion to notice how Philip destroyed cities.... [and] the distribution of land to Macedonians is an example of how Macedonian expansion in north Greece under Philip was tending to limit the area in which non-Macedonian Greeks could live.⁶

³ Davies, *Classical Greece*, 228-53. A comprehensive and wide-ranging survey of the evidence as it relates to the effect on city populations in: P. McKechnie, *Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC* (London 1989), 34-60 [hereinafter *Outsiders*].

⁴ Davies, *Classical Greece*, 249. In contrast to the "insuperable contradictions between the practice of power and the theory of the state" that afflicted would be Greek hegemony "...the Macedonian monarchy was strong enough to take the strain, just distant and outlandish enough to be acceptable, but just Greek enough for the monarch, as a Greek, to move into the various supra-polis roles that existed in Greek society." (p.253).

⁵ McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 1-11. McKechnie identifies three modern perceptions of the decline of the Greek city-state: that of Greek Unity theme, the theme of the Power of Macedon and another concerning the Decline of Democracy.

⁶ McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 49. See fully pp.48-51.

Both these analyses can reasonably form the basis for an improved understanding of the manner in which Philip established Macedon's power. However, it will be suggested that Davies' use of 'mercenary' gives the wrong impression about the nature of the relationship between Philip and the men he commanded, despite the fact that they were clearly not all native Macedonians (as Davies realises). Rather, those men who turned to Philip and became his supporters were bound by more than strictly 'mercenary' bonds. Whatever their original motives in going to Macedonia such men became fully integrated into Macedonian society, becoming in effect Macedonian citizens, with all the ties of privilege, loyalty, responsibility and duty that would have implied. Furthermore, while acknowledging the importance of McKechnie's view of the fourth century it will be argued that in its particulars with regard to Philip's actions it is over-simplified. For though Philip did indeed destroy a number of Greek cities it will be suggested that he exploited the phenomenon of the outsiders to augment his military strength, and did not solely contribute to the problem as McKechnie suggests. Philip merely limited the space available in which Greeks could live in independent sovereign *poleis* and in so doing began a process which became the model for the ethnically diverse world the Successors ruled.

However, before we turn to the evidence for the admission of Greeks into Macedonia some criteria by which their motives for so doing need to be established, if only to see what it may have been that they would hope to gain. Immigration and the acceptance of metic status in a foreign *polis* would undoubtedly be a major psychological and practical undertaking for an ancient Greek.⁷ By leaving his home city the typical migrant would be effectively cutting off opportunity to take part in whatever political process his state's constitution allowed him. Furthermore, in every *polis* about which we know anything, *enktesis*, the right of ownership of land or the property upon it, was a citizen monopoly. Immigrants would be obliged to earn their livelihood at occupations which did not entail landownership and, moreover, were often the foci of official and public contempt.⁸ This much, perhaps, is obvious.

⁷ For the acceptance of immigrant as a translation for *metoikon* see: D.Whitehead, *Ideology of the Athenian Metic* (Camb.Phil.Soc.Supp. vol 4 1976), 5-7 [hereinafter *Ideology*].

What is not immediately patent is why an immigrant would choose to become a metic at, for instance, Athens. Despite a lack of evidence for Macedonia, it is nonetheless worthwhile examining the status, the institutional limitations, and the desires of immigrants throughout the Greek world.⁹ The conclusions noted can be fairly assumed to hold true for the motives of immigrants to other regions such as Macedon.

David Whitehead's portrayal of the duties of a metic relative to his privileges is not a positive one. All metics had to pay a mandatory poll-tax and, if wealthy enough, were eligible for any liturgies, with the exception of the trierarchy, and were required to contribute towards the city's *eisphora*. Athens' metics were available to her for service in the military as well, particularly in the city's fleet.¹⁰ The realities were of course known to the prospective metic. Economic advantage was a substantial enough gain to draw metics to other cities, however, as Whitehead is at pains to point out:

the fact that so many did choose to *Athenesi metoikein* cannot plausibly be attributed to the attractions of metic-status as such but the more general assets of Athens - which for the majority meant the economic activities of a large city and major port.¹¹

By the fourth century Greece in general and Athens in particular, now without her empire, were no longer the only options available to a prospective migrant. This was especially true of those individuals who had genuine skills to offer. The passing of the Athenian Empire meant a diaspora of sculptors and intellectuals throughout the Greek and Greek-influenced world.¹² Asia Minor was a

⁸ Aristotle (*Pol.*1278a 35-8) defined a metic as one excluded from political life in the widest sense. In general: Finley, *Ancient Economy*, 97, 144, 163-4; Whitehead, *Ideology*, 116-25.

⁹ Athens is, of course, the source of the majority of the available evidence and was probably atypical by virtue of the size and importance of her metic community; as was Spartan *xenelasiai* (*Thuc.*1.144.2, 2.39.1; *Xen.Lac.* 14.4). However we are not entitled to assume that metics did not exist elsewhere. See the evidence collected in D.Whitehead, "Immigrant Communities in the Classical Polis: Some Principles for a Synoptic Treatment", *AC* 53 (1984), 47-59; and *ibid*, "IG 1² 39: 'Aliens' in Chalcis and Athenian Imperialism", *ZPE* 21 (1976), 251-59.

¹⁰ Whitehead, *Ideology*, 75-86.

¹¹ Whitehead, *Ideology*, 18.

¹² McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 142-60; Hornblower, *Greek World*, 171, 175-6.

particular beneficiary, undergoing a revival after the years of depression under the Athenian Empire.¹³ Monumental buildings were commissioned at Ephesus and Priene, in Lycia and in particular at Halicarnassus under the direction of the Hecatomnids, Mausolus and Artemisia.¹⁴

Quite clearly other options were possible for the skilled. But what of the majority of metics, those whose work was concentrated in the minor *technai*, or the *emporía*? Where their movements can be traced it seems that they were prepared to leave Greece, though we cannot assess either their motives or opportunities.¹⁵ Where the criteria of residence was based purely upon economic comfort there was little in the way of emotional ties to keep a metic in a foreign city. Again, David Whitehead expresses the point well:

In a situation of free choice ... men will only migrate to Athens if the *de facto* advantages there - economic for most, social and intellectual for some - can be judged to outweigh any loss in political status and prerogatives; and the evidence, such as it is, suggests that fewer men and families now considered Athenian *metoikia* a 'supportable' *long term* investment.¹⁶

However, the establishment of metic status was hardly a privilege in itself. The designation fell upon all foreign residents in Athens after a period of perhaps a month.¹⁷ Considering the social and political disabilities inherent in a metic's status it is unsurprising that many tried to have themselves accepted into the citizen body. Following the introduction of Pericles' citizenship law in 451/0 B.C. admittance into the *demos* became more restrictive than it had been previously. Partly as a reaction towards the increasing demand and privileges of their citizenship the Athenians defined themselves in an exclusive fashion and were unwilling to admit foreigners into the *demes*.¹⁸ By the fourth century

¹³ J.M.Cook, "The Problem of Classical Ionia", *PCPhS* 7 (1961), 9-18.

¹⁴ S.Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982), 323-30, 237-44, 333-9.

¹⁵ For a particular case study see: B.R.MacDonald, "The Emigration of Potters from Athens in the late fifth century B.C. and its Effect on the Attic Pottery Industry", *AJA* 85 (1981), 159-68.

¹⁶ Whitehead, *Ideology*, 159.

¹⁷ Whitehead, *Ideology*, 7-9, 14-15.

only the possession of wealth or political connections (and usually both were required) could give hope of citizenship at Athens. The atmosphere was competitive amongst this group and, according to Apollodorus, the son of the metic banker Pasion, a continual outlay was necessary to maintain one's position and the immigrant citizen was still faced with popular prejudice.¹⁹ And, although there is some evidence that suggests the number of enfranchisements increased slightly in the fourth century, their number remained limited. Therefore, it has been remarked that:

For the most part the beneficiaries were metics, aliens, or even freedmen, and it is clear that they positively strove to acquire Athenian status and certainly intended to utilize their grants. Some of them were already in receipt of earlier privileges (such as *enktesis*, *ateleia*, *isoteleia*, and even *proxenia*) and naturalization was the culminating step in their struggle for status.²⁰

This was, of course, a process which by its very nature would exclude the majority of metics from any hope of becoming Athenian citizens. It is no surprise, therefore, to find that when Athens was threatened the metics were prepared to flee from the city despite their expected role in the city's defence. After Chaeronea, and in a mood of crisis in 338, the Athenians were to go so far as to issue a decree forbidding metics to leave the city.²¹

This survey of the metics has touched upon some of the limitations of their position and concentrated upon their aspirations, however impossible to realise for the majority. It would seem that a paramount desire was to be included within the citizen body where they were resident. Even if this need was primarily motivated by the desire for the increased personal and economic security that

¹⁸ Whitehead, *Ideology*, 140-167; M.J.Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens I-III* (Brussels 1981-3), 3.141-54 [hereinafter *Naturalization*]; Patterson, *Pericles' Law*, 8-28, 82-115.

¹⁹ [Demosthenes] 45 [*Against Leochares*].50, 78. Cf. Osborne, *Naturalization*, 3.139, 146, 150-54, 195-97. Nor was that all: at times metics were faced with the possibility that their goods could be expropriated and they themselves put to death. Cf. Whitehead, *Ideology*, 256-9, P.Krentz, *The Thirty at Athens* (Cornell University Press 1982), 80-81.

²⁰ Osborne, *Naturalization*, 3.195.

²¹ Hyperides 3 [*Against Athenogenes*].29, 33. Cf. also Aeneas Tacticus, x.5-13, who suggests it was normal practice during wartime to restrict the movement of foreigners. This is a far cry from the autumn of 431 when the metics had participated in the invasion of the Megarid: Thuc.ii.31.1-2.

would ensue it should not be underestimated. Nonetheless, the unfranchised metics were still fortunate to some degree. They had at least a minimum trade that enabled them to travel from city to city to earn a living and the right of abode, if not acceptance. The situation was vastly different for the largest group of outsiders whom McKechnie identifies.

These were the homeless body of men who had little or no skills, except as soldier, and who appeared with increasing frequency as the fourth century continued. Mercenary service and the conditions under which it operated seems to have become well established towards the end of the Peloponnesian War. By then Greek bodyguards and garrisons were familiar under the Persian satraps. And when Cyrus planned his attempt to overthrow the Great King, Artaxerxes, he found little difficulty in raising the army of mercenaries that Xenophon later immortalised in the *Anabasis*.²² Their numbers grew in the course of the century. At one stage over 20,000 Greeks fought in aid of Egyptian independence from the Persians, and the most important component of Artaxerxes' army at the same time were Greek mercenaries.²³ Others fought in Sicily, both for and against Dionysius I and his son; and yet more were employed throughout Greece.²⁴

Isocrates both despised and feared these wandering soldiers. In an age when the communal ties of the *polis* were all important many mercenaries not only lived apart from the obligations and privileges of city-life, but, in Isocrates' eyes, were also a direct threat to the very existence of the

²² J.Roy, "The Mercenaries of Cyrus", *Historia* 16 (1967), 287-323. In general: H.F.Miller, "The Practical and Economic Background to the Greek Mercenary Explosion", *G&R* 31 (1984), 153-60; S.Perlman, "The Ten Thousand. A Chapter in the Military, Social and Economic History of the Fourth Century", *Rivista storica dell' Antichità* 6-7. *Scritti in Memoria di Gianfranco Tibiletti* (1976-77), 269-275.

²³ D.S.XVI.44.1-52.8: perhaps 35,000 Greeks total.

²⁴ McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 79-93 for references. W.H.Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford 1933), 227 [hereinafter *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*]; commenting on the table (II) at the end of his book suggests that "between 399 and 375 BC there were never less than 25,000 mercenaries and later the average number must have remained about 50,000." McKechnie (pp.91-2), argues that even this total is too low, omitting as it does substantial numbers of mercenaries utilized by 'small' employers.

polis.²⁵ From the *Panegyricus*, composed about 380, down to the *Philippus* of 346, Isocrates continually warned about those:

Greeks who share our language but live like barbarians. If we had any sense we should not overlook them gathering together under the generalship of any chance fellow - nor would we overlook the fact that larger and stronger armies come into being from the wanderers than from those who live in cities.²⁶

His solution was to find a leader powerful and philanthropic enough (from a Greek perspective, of course) to lead these homeless and landless soldiers against the Persian empire where victory would mean they could be settled in Asia Minor. Isocrates first proposed Athens as the leader of his pan-Hellenic enterprise, followed by Jason of Pherai and Dionysius I, then the Spartan, Archidamus, and finally, Philip II of Macedon.²⁷ There is no reason to believe that any of them took the slightest notice of the substance of Isocrates' missives. For though Philip too was exhorted to preserve Greece from its plight at the expense of the Persians, and in one sense at least he and Alexander did, the prelude to the invasion would undoubtedly not have met with Isocrates' approval. Isocrates complained to Philip that as a result of wandering people "it was easier to raise from them a larger and better army than from those who are citizens of their cities."²⁸

This, it will be argued, was exactly what Philip did. Only his means and methods would not have been appreciated by the Athenian sophist. Philip was not concerned with the general well-being of Greece, but rather with his own power. Macedon had land to spare and, if Philip's ambitions were

²⁵ McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 16-29; who points out that other theorists such as Plato and Aristotle considered these groups to have a deleterious effect upon the stability of the *polis*.

²⁶ Isocrates 9 [*Archidamus*].8-9.

²⁷ For modern reactions to Isocrates perceptions of Greece's troubles cf. N.H.Baynes, "Isocrates", in *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London 1960), 144-167 [hereinafter "Isocrates"]; A.Fuks, "Isocrates and the Social-Economic Situation in Greece", *Anc.Soc.* 3 (1972), 17-44 contains exhaustive references; reprinted with other relevant studies in A.Fuks, *Social Conflict in Ancient Greece* (Leiden 1984). M.M.Markle III, "Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip: A Study of Isocrates' Philippus and Speusippus' Letter to Philip", *JHS* 96 (1976), 80-99 [hereinafter "Athenian Intellectuals"]; has argued that Isocrates' message was more strongly directed towards influencing Athenian domestic opinion than is commonly supposed.

²⁸ Isocrates 5 [*Philippus*].96.

to be realised, his need was for men capable of serving in the army. The exchange, if hardly an obvious one, or one which the ethos of a Greek citizen or state made economically or socially practical, was nonetheless straightforward to Philip. These men, it will be argued, were to become Macedonians first and foremost; not settlers in Asia as Isocrates would have hoped. As such it is ironic that they were to become instrumental in providing the military resources for Macedon's suppression of Greek independence.

Isocrates' prime consideration in his speeches was his concern that property owners should be able to enjoy their land and wealth in safety.²⁹ And while McKechnie is right to caution against the belief that all mercenaries were necessarily poor or landless it has to be accepted that the majority were both.³⁰ Furthermore, it would seem that a strong motivating factor behind the mercenary's willingness to fight was a hope to gain land for himself. In 308B.C. Ophellas, governor of Cyrene, planned an attack on Carthage in alliance with Agathocles of Sicily. To this end he sent envoys to Athens in search of soldiers. As Diodorus records it, Ophellas' envoys met with success:

... a good many of the Athenians eagerly enlisted in the campaign. No small number also of the other Greeks were quick to join in the undertaking since they hoped to portion out for colonisation the most fertile part of Libya and to plunder the wealth of Carthage. For conditions throughout Greece on account of the continuous wars and mutual rivalries of the princes had become unstable and straitened, and they expected not only to gain many advantages, but also to rid themselves of their present evils.³¹

Many of Ophellas' followers even brought their wives and children with them, such was their hope for land and their confidence of success.³² This suggests the possibility that many Greek

²⁹ Convincingly demonstrated by Baynes, "Isocrates", 154-60.

³⁰ McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 80-1, 89-93. He further argues that large-scale mercenary employers needed to provide equipment for many of those they hired (pp.81-5), and that mercenary life was not, in the main, well-paid (pp.92-3).

³¹ D.S.XX.40.6-7.

³² D.S.XX.41.1. Cf. also D.S.XIV.78; XVII.83.2, for other instances of soldiers hope for rewards in the form of land. Add Griffith, *Mercenaries*, 313-16; p.313: "But one still has to mention the greatest reward of all, the highest good pursued, one imagines, by most soldiers of fortune - land."

mercenaries would rather have farmed than fought. Similar conditions prevailed in Greece throughout the second half of the fourth century. Two further examples may help clarify both the scale of the problem for Greece, and the nature of the opportunity for Macedon.

Despite the continual settlement of Greek mercenaries throughout Asia under Alexander the problem Isocrates was so concerned with was still acute at the end of the Macedonian king's reign. In 324 Alexander responded to the crisis with the promulgation of the so-called Exiles' Decree. While the king's reasoning was far from disinterested (Alexander hoped to gain adherents in the cities who would promote his cause, as well as to stabilize Greece and display his magnanimity), Diodorus claims that the majority of Greeks welcomed the move.³³ Considering that over 20,000 exiles gathered at Olympia to hear Alexander's herald, Nicanor of Stageira, proclaim the decree there was clearly going to be a great deal of disruption in the cities in order that their return could be accommodated.³⁴ Nor can it be assumed that these men comprised anything near the majority of Isocrates' *planomenoi*. Those who were exiled because of Alexander's actions were not allowed to return to their cities (notably the Thebans), nor those whose exile was a result of murder or religious transgressions and had been cursed.³⁵ Nor will those who were wanderers because of poverty or lack of opportunity in their home cities have been effected. The Decree contained no welfare provisions, and, as the following example demonstrates, what many wanted was the chance to farm land of their own.

From the early sixth century the tyrants of Sicily had manipulated the populations of the cities they controlled and conquered in an effort to secure their positions and strengthen the island against Carthaginian invasion. In the fourth century Dionysius I and his son undertook the same policies on an

³³ Diodorus' statement is open to a great deal of doubt: Alexander's action was that of an autocrat. No account was taken of the Corinthian League's provisions forbidding outside interference in the internal government of the *poleis*. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 220-28 is excellent. Cf. also Heisserer, *Alexander and the Greeks*, 203-29; *contra* Badian, "Harpalus", 25-31 the problem was not of Alexander's making.

³⁴ *Syll.*³ 306 shows the difficulties encountered at Tegea owing to the Exiles' Decree.

³⁵ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 222-4; McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 26-7.

even greater scale.³⁶ When Dionysius II was eventually overthrown in 344 by the Corinthian adventurer Timoleon the victor turned to Greece for the colonists necessary to revitalise Sicily and:

He made proclamation in Greece that the Syracusans would give land and houses to those who wished to come and share in their state, and many Greeks came to receive their allotments.³⁷

The response was indeed astounding: Diodorus claims that 40,000 were settled in Syracuse and a further 10,000 at Agrigium. Plutarch, in his life of Timoleon, puts the total higher still, at 60,000.³⁸ For once it seems our sources are guilty of underestimation. The archaeological record would suggest that the total eventually exceeded 60,000; doubtless a reflection of the on-going process of immigration that Diodorus hints at. Diodorus' description of the new prosperity in Sicily, the result of the presence of these industrious immigrants, contrasts sharply with the picture of strife-torn Greece quoted above (p.91).³⁹ There would seem little question that there were men who would emigrate to Macedonia given the possibility. Now it remains to gather the evidence that suggests that they did just this.

City Foundations and Population Redistribution in Macedon Under Philip II.

That Philip founded cities throughout his reign is a widely accepted fact in modern scholarship. Archaeological research, as yet relatively sparse within Macedonia, will undoubtedly provide more physical remains and resolve some of the disputes.⁴⁰ Many of the cities that Philip

³⁶ M.I.Finley, *Ancient Sicily* (London 1979), 45, 51-2, 55, 59-61 (for the early tyrants), 74-96 (Dionysius I and II); McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 35-45.

³⁷ D.S.XVI.82.5.

³⁸ D.S.XVI.82.5; Plut.*Tim.*23.6.

³⁹ D.S.XVI.83.1-3. This same passage contains a picture of Sicily under the tyrants that is not so different to his view of Greece.

established were little more than garrison settlements the aim of which was to guard the passes down from the Pindus and to keep watch over the Thracians and the southern approaches into Macedonia. The social and economic aspects of Philip's policies have, however, been far more vigorously debated. For J.R.Ellis, "Philip's evident proclivity for transferring population-groups ... arose in part out of an attempt to overcome the serious problem of social and political disunity which had always plagued Macedon in the past."⁴¹ Hammond's emphasis shows more concern with Philip's presumed desire to exploit Macedon's resources by bringing about a change from "nomadic pastoralism to a settled agricultural life." Ultimately, a "redistribution of population which was directed by the king both for purposes of defence and for the economic development of his resources", was required.⁴² The singular lack of evidence has not prevented a new presentation of Philip from arising. Not just a successful imperialist, Philip has also been considered an administrator and economist of some note! While there may be a great deal of truth to the theories' of Ellis in particular, it has to be acknowledged that the arguments of both authors are largely inferential. Macedon had indeed suffered disunity for decades, but because Philip was not similarly troubled it does not automatically mean that he solved the problem through deliberate population distribution and the creation of a national army.⁴³ If this is so, however, just what does the existing evidence allow us to surmise in the way of a considered policy concerning the nature of these apparent population redistributions?

⁴⁰ Discussion of Philip's colonisation: Ellis, *PMI* 69-70, 86-7, 134-5, 167-8 230-1; Cawkwell, *PM* 39-40, 90, 114, 175-6 (speculating on Philip's plans to colonise Asia. The evidence is slim, tendentious and early: Demosthenes 7 [*On Halonnesus*].35); Hammond *HM* 2.653-7, 660ff. is particularly useful for the location of the settlements. Cf. also the important inscriptions published, with commentaries, by L.Missitizis, "A Royal Decree of Alexander the Great on the Lands of Philippi", *AW* 12 (1985), 3-14; N.G.L Hammond, "The King and the Land in the Macedonian Kingdom", *CQ* 38 (1988), 382-391 [hereinafter "King and Land"]. For a reaction to these see E.N.Borza, "Some Toponym Problems in Eastern Macedonia", *AHB* 3 (1989), 60-67.

⁴¹ Ellis, *PMI* 230-1.

⁴² Hammond, *HM* 2.657-660

⁴³ Cf. Montgomery, "Economic Revolution", 37 and above, pp.74ff, for criticisms of Hammond's econocentric views.

There are two passages of particular importance; one in Arrian, the other in Justin.⁴⁴ The former has been considered the definitive eulogy of Philip from the ancient world, ostensibly delivered by his son, Alexander, before the mutinous Macedonians at Opis. Both Cawkwell and Hammond consider this passage an excellent encomium of Philip. Cawkwell goes so far as to state that the passage is the "most striking survey of Philip's career" and "reflects what Alexander said"; adding that, the possibility of whether "Arrian was right to believe that he was rendering Alexander's own words is not here important...."⁴⁵ Following such an accolade it is best to quote the speech in full:

For Philip found you vagabonds, mostly clothed in skins, feeding a few animals on the mountains and engaged in their defence in unsuccessful fighting with Illyrians, Triballians and the neighbouring Thracians. He gave you cloaks to wear instead of skins, he brought you down from the mountains to the plains; he made you a match in battle for the barbarians on your borders, so that you no longer trusted for your safety to the strength of your positions so much as to your natural courage. He made you city dwellers and established the order that comes from good laws and customs.

(Arrian vii.9.2: Translated Brunt, *Arrian* II, 229.)

The first thing that strikes the reader is the rhetorical nature of the passage. This comes as no surprise when one considers the circumstances: Alexander's angry desire to shame his mutinying troops enables an easy contrast to be drawn between the benefits his father brought upon Macedonia with the even greater munificence he himself had conferred upon his now ungrateful subjects.⁴⁶ The real difficulty lies in assessing just what may be factual within the speech and what merely demonstrates an available opportunity for Arrian (and Curtius) to indulge in an epideictic display-piece. Despite these problems, however, the passage has been linked to specific instances of policy and, in the process, given a historical validity it does not really deserve. Ellis connects Arrian's words with the rigidification of

⁴⁴ Arr.vii.9.2-3 (cf. Curt.x.2.24-30); Justin viii.5.7-6.2.

⁴⁵ Cawkwell, *PM* 17; Hammond n.4 (above); Ellis has comparatively little to say at PMI 136; referring readers to his more extensive "Population Transplants By Philip II", *Makedonika* 9 (1969), 9-17 [hereinafter "Transplants"].

⁴⁶ Arr.vii.6. This theme is most strongly emphasised in Curtius x.2.19-30, both in its particulars and its abusiveness.

Macedonia's mountain borders and populations following on from Philip's victory in 358 against the Illyrians. Ellis further believes that Philip's purpose was:

perhaps threefold: to create defensible *poleis* ... on the plains that gave access to the centre of the Macedonian realm; to differentiate ... between Macedonian elements in the border-population; and to split up, in the west at least, the traditional local hierarchies through which such independent nobilities as the Upper Macedonian's princely families exercised their authority.⁴⁷

This is simply too much weight for Alexander's supposed words to bear (whether or not the Justin passage is enough for this will be considered later). Furthermore, Professor Bosworth's work on the methods of Arrian's historical composition has made such a precise approach untenable.⁴⁸ He points out that the speech is filled with historical anomalies and its general presentation of Macedonian wealth is inconsistent with other evidence. His scrutiny of the passage suggests to him that "Arrian created his own foundation myth, setting Philip [up as the founder] of civic life and an agricultural economy."⁴⁹ The context of the speech clearly requires that it refer to the Macedonians as a body. To adduce from it specific events and policies would require us to believe that Alexander (if these were his words) was prepared to make himself appear foolish.

However, it can be legitimately objected that it is less important whether Alexander impugned his soldiers with the words Arrian selected for him, than it is whether or not Arrian had the requisite evidence to support his presentation of the king's speech. There is no evidence that Arrian knew any more about Macedon or Philip at this period than what was in his immediate sources; and Curtius, our

⁴⁷ Ellis, "Transplants", 15; cf. *PMI* 58-9.

⁴⁸ A.B. Bosworth first expressed his views concerning Arrian in "Arrian and the Alexander Vulgate", *Entretiens Fondation Hardt* xxii (Geneva 1976), 1-34. See now also his *Commentary*, 16-38; and *From Arrian to Alexander*, passim and 101-113 on the Opis speech in particular.

⁴⁹ Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander*, 108-10, 134. Bosworth points out that Arrian reworks the same literary *topos* elsewhere. Cf. Brunt, *Arrian*, xxxv-vii. Where Arrian's method can be compared with an extant source, such as Xenophon, it reveals that he was quite capable of reworking the material to suit his own purposes: see P.A. Stadter, "Xenophon in Arrian's *Cynegeticus*", *GRBS* 17 (1976), 157-67. Contrast Hammond, *HM* 2.657: "it [the speech] is specific in detail and particular to the Macedonians; of course it is rhetorical in expression but it is not made up of rhetorical generalizations at all."

only other writer to report the speech, gives an account that while superficially similar to Arrian's, further undermines the historical credibility of his version. Curtius' account of the mutiny at Opis is clearly dependent upon the source common to the vulgate authors and independent of Arrian's. Curtius mentions the severity of conditions in Philip's Macedonia (they are not primitive as Arrian would have it) and, more significantly, also has Alexander draw a parallel between the scant resources he inherited from his father and those he has now distributed amongst his Macedonians.⁵⁰ Such limited common ground only suggests that each author possessed a synopsis of Alexander's words which contrasted his grandiose achievements and initially limited resources with the lesser accomplishments of Philip. From this Arrian was able to create a speech elaborating upon a common rhetorical theme - the changeover from primitive nomadism to urban civilization. None of this required Arrian to utilize evidence demonstrating what his own concerns have all too easily been taken to provide.⁵¹ Bosworth is surely right in concluding that:

the greater part of the speech in Arrian can be shown to be rhetorical elaboration. Neither in its shape nor in its detailed content can it bear any relation to what was actually said by Alexander.⁵²

In reality, Arrian's evidence has always been subsidiary to Justin's as a potential indication of population movement, however uncritically it has been seen to confirm the less reputable historian's account. Unfortunately, Justin's account leaves a great deal to be desired and its generality has inevitably given rise to a number of modern interpretations. Once again the passage is suffused with a

⁵⁰ Curt.x.2.23-4; Arr.vii.9.6.

⁵¹ Cf. Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander*, 101-3 (with references to the remainder of the Alexander Vulgate), 112-13. P.A.Stadter, *Arrian of Nicomedia* (Chapel Hill 1980), 110-12 believes Arrian carefully crafted this speech (amongst others) so as to display: "The motif of toil (*ponos*) [which] thus emerges as that which will distinguish Alexander from other men and win him the honor he craves." (p.111). There is no room in Stadter's view for a historical validity underlying Arrian's choice of words.

⁵² Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander*, 113. This would have severe implications for Cawkwell, *PM* 18, who believes his book to be "largely an extended gloss on this speech."

rhetorical gloss but in this instance the circumstances are fortunately not so tendentious and the passage is widely regarded as important.⁵³ It is here quoted in full:

On his return to his kingdom, as shepherds drive their flocks sometimes into winter, sometimes into summer pastures, so he transplanted people and cities hither and thither, according to his caprice, as places appeared to him proper to be peopled or left desolate. The aspect of things was everywhere wretched, like that of a country ravaged by an enemy ... there prevailed a sorrow and a sadness not expressed in words, the people fearing that even their very tears would be thought signs of discontent....

Some people he planted on the frontiers of his kingdom to oppose his enemies; others he settled at the extremities of it. Some, whom he had taken prisoners in war he distributed among certain cities to fill up the number of inhabitants; and thus out of various tribes and nations he formed one kingdom and one people. When he had settled and put in order the affairs of Macedonia....

(Justin viii.5.7-6.2. Translation: Ellis, "Transplants", 13.)

J.R.Ellis speaks for the majority when he argues that the direction of the population transfer primarily involved a shift towards Macedon's border regions.⁵⁴ To a lesser (and admittedly speculative) degree, Ellis also accepts Justin's words concerning exchanges of population within certain settlements.⁵⁵ Bosworth's interpretation is a severely limited one: "The extensive movements of population, which Justin says occurred after 346, seem to have involved only a redistribution within existing settlements."⁵⁶ Furthermore, a great deal of ingenuity has been expended on assigning a date

⁵³ Montgomery, "Economic Revolution", 37-8 has reservations. Ellis, "Transplants", 13ff refers to it as the "*locus classicus* for decantation under Philip."

⁵⁴ Ellis, "Transplants", 15; Errington, *Makedoniens*, 46; Hammond, *HM* 2.661 does not commit himself to any particular over-riding trend.

⁵⁵ Ellis, "Transplants", 16. Ellis regards this as, in part, a security measure and also a method of centralizing power. As such he is forced to reject (p.14 n.3) Justin's explicit statement that Philip used prisoners of war for this purpose, but is unable, or unwilling, to postulate an alternative to Justin's words. Errington, *Makedoniens*, 46 simply ignores them: "These statements [of Justin's] seem to make clear that Philip was anxious to settle the border areas with reliable people." Cf. Hammond, *HM* 2.661.

⁵⁶ Bosworth, "*Asthetairoi*", 150 with nn.6 and 7. Here Justin's veracity with reference to the borders is dismissed owing to Bosworth's belief that Philip only founded towns in Thrace. But nothing in Justin requires us to believe that only new settlements are being referred to; and, given the present state of our archaeological knowledge of the Pindus Mountains, it is perhaps dangerous to assume that Philip undertook no foundations there.

to the passage: for what they are worth the chronological limits imposed by Justin's narrative are the Pythia of 346 and Philip's intervention in Epirus in 342. Both Ellis and Hammond accept a date of 346; the former remarking that "this placement of the passage [in Justin] implies that in 346/5 some particularly notable instances [of social and strategic population redistribution] took place".⁵⁷ Before commenting on this, however, an otherwise neglected passage of Justin's warrants examination. For, besides being concerned with Philip's manipulation and abuse of people it also deserves to be seen as important for any discussion of Philip's policies. Justin writes that Philip:

sent persons through the kingdoms and the richest of the cities, to spread a report that King Philip was ready to contract, at a vast sum, for the rebuilding of the walls, temples and sacred edifices, in the several towns, and to invite contractors by public criers; but when those who were willing to undertake these works went to Macedonia, they found themselves put off with various excuses, and, from dread of the king's power, returned quietly to their homes. (Justin viii.3.7-10. Translated Watson, *Justin*, 77-8.)

Any attempt to establish a chronological (or even textual) context for this citation is problematical. Justin's text contains one corrupt word; unfortunately it is the vital one telling us where Philip had been just prior to his decision to send out a summons for Greek craftsmen. The manuscript reads *Cappadociam*, clearly incorrect since Philip never went to Asia. Equally, any possible alternatives have little to recommend them. *Chalcidiam* seems to be the emendation of preference; but if this was so the particular extract that is our concern would be better situated at the end of Justin's digression on Philip's war against the Olynthians which follows immediately after the reference under discussion. Following Philip's victory (though one need not assume immediately following) there would be cities that Philip could consider of as in need of repair. Demosthenes had, after all, castigated Philip for destroying 32 Greek cities in the Chalcidice.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Ellis *PMI*, 136-7. This is a more positive assertion than the more realistic one in "Transplants", 14; where, in a discussion of the dating problem, Justin's source is alleged to have, "combined within a space of four years a decantation policy that may have been effected piecemeal over a much longer period."

⁵⁸ For some suggestions see O.Seel, *M.Iuniani Iustini: Epitoma Historiarum Philippicarum Pompei Trogi* (Teubner, Stuttgart 1972), 78; Watson, *Justin*, 77. Demosthenes 9 [*Philippic III*].26.

There is, however, another possibility that may resolve the chronological difficulties and perhaps allow a better appreciation of what Philip may have been trying to accomplish. Both citations suggest, through tone as well as content, that Justin's epitome is ultimately dependent upon a single source. The most likely candidate for this must be the *Philippica* of Theopompus.⁵⁹ The thrust of Justin's words, suggesting that Philip's actions had a harrowingly disruptive effect upon his population and upon those Greeks that were prepared to trust him, may well reflect Theopompus' hostility to the king.⁶⁰ It would certainly explain the rhetorical condemnations and hyperbolic prose. A possible context for both these passages in the *Philippica* would stem from Theopompus' digression on the Macedonian court. It is known that Theopompus undertook this topic in Book 49, which our remaining fragments and *testimonia* would place sometime after the preliminaries to the outbreak of war with Athens (the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium) and before the completion of the Thracian campaign of 340/39.⁶¹ The selection of this location by Theopompus for an extended diatribe against the king was surely no accident. His readers would have known the outcome of the war Theopompus was about to describe; and the author intended to leave no doubts in his readers' minds about the sort of man it was who had imposed his will on Greece. If the suggested circumstance within the *Philippica* is accepted, then an attempt to infer either specific or datable policies, or particular episodes becomes an uncertain proposition. Admittedly this context does not fit the parameters of the dates assigned to Justin's testimony by Ellis and Hammond, but the assignation possesses the virtue of rendering this question far less important. Theopompus was concerned to characterise Philip's reign and was not

⁵⁹ Hammond *HM* 2.661 feels Justin viii.5.7ff is "derived ultimately perhaps from Theopompus". For Hammond's methods of source criticism (for Justin) cf. *Three Historians*, 89-113, 160-170. The remarks of Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 65-7 are more apposite. I am indebted to Professor Gordon Shrimpton for his help and advice on this topic; though, of course, he is not responsible for the views here expressed. His book, *Theopompus the Historian*, is to be published by McGill University Press in Spring 1991.

⁶⁰ Cf. also Theopompus, *FGrHist* 115, FF91, 95 and the passages quoted below, p.107-8. For Theopompus' attitude towards Philip in general cf. W.R.Connor, "History without Heroes: Theopompus' Treatment of Philip of Macedon", *GRBS* 8 (1967), 133-154; G.S.Shrimpton, "Theopompus' Treatment of Philip in the *Philippica*", *Phoenix* 31 (1977), 123-144.

⁶¹ These fragments are in Jacoby, *FGrHist* 115, FF217-222, 226-7. The actual fragments (FF 223-225b), concerning the court are considered below p.108-8.

necessarily writing chronologically in this passage. Of course the processes that are described in Justin may have been given a dateable reference by Theopompus and, if this was so, it may help explain the evident nonsense at Justin viii.3.6-10. Either Trogus, or more likely Justin, reassigned these passages on the basis of information now lost to us to a chronological setting, and regrettably did so without due care.

This does not mean that the passages are worthless as evidence (as is the Opis speech in Arrian), merely that we are required to consider them rather more in the context of Philip's reign and less within their placement in Justin's epitome of Trogus. In 343 Aristotle was appointed tutor to Alexander and part of his reward was the refoundation of Stageira, a Chalcidic city Philip had destroyed in 349/8.⁶² When Aristotle's tenure expired it is commonly assumed that he dwelt in the rebuilt city of his birth.⁶³ Arising in part out of his reward to Aristotle we may be justified in believing that Philip decided on a policy that saw a number of towns rebuilt or newly established throughout Macedonia. At this time he was still at peace with Athens and the other Greek states and could justifiably hope that his appeal for craftsmen would meet with a good reception. We are under no obligation to believe the charges preserved in Justin that Philip turned those who responded to his call away empty-handed. The accusation would be typical of Theopompus' malice. Indeed, it would be plausible to suggest that many of those who did aid in the rebuilding would be reimbursed by receiving land and Macedonian citizenship if they so desired. If one accepts the connection between the two passages in Justin it is also possible to make sense of his references to prisoners of war being settled in towns. These would be Chalcidic Greeks who had been absorbed into Macedonia after 348. They would by now be considered, and consider themselves, loyal Macedonians; the appellation prisoners of war can again be dismissed as malicious.⁶⁴ Justin thus provides general evidence that may suggest

⁶² D.S.XVI.52.9 mentions Zereia (which is a mistake for Stageira). Cf. Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 16-20 for full references and discussion. Add Markle, "Athenian Intellectuals", 80, 93-7; for discussion of the competition for the post Aristotle won. It was at this time that Theopompus was present in Macedon. Cf. Hammond, *HM* 1.165, 2.670 for other evidence of rebuilding at this period.

⁶³ D.Ross, *Aristotle* (London 1949), 4-6; Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 17.

⁶⁴ The "frontiers" and "extremities" in Justin can just as easily apply to the coastal regions of Macedon as the other borders. That there were a substantial number of towns in Chalcidic Macedon is

craftsmen emigrated to Macedonia, in this instance as the result of a specific request of Philip's. It is surely significant that Demosthenes in his speech, *On the False Embassy*, reminded the jurors in 343 that after the fall of Olynthus Philip had invited the *technitai* to Macedonia to help stage the Olympian festival he had presided over.⁶⁵ There are other instances where individuals with particular skills can be seen as possessing important positions at Philip's court.

The most striking must be that held by the Thessalian, Polyidus. This man became Philip's chief engineer, vital in designing and building the siege machinery that Philip was to put to such good use. Polyidus' pupils, Diades and Charias, later performed the same role for Alexander.⁶⁶ Specialised knowledge made such men as these highly valued and Philip undoubtedly rewarded them well - although no source says as much, they were in all likelihood numbered amongst Philip's *hetairoi*.

This rank was certainly attained by Alexander's doctor, Philip of Acarnania. In an episode that is celebrated by Plutarch and Arrian as demonstrating Alexander's trust in his friends the king drank the concoction Philip prepared him and was cured, despite a letter warning of a possible poisoning attempt. Bosworth suggests Arrian's account reveals that Philip possessed martial as well as medical abilities but, of greater interest, is the fact that he was clearly of Greek origin. Presumably Philip (or possibly his father), had been attracted to Macedon by its king, and the former's namesake.⁶⁷

clear from the number Cassander synoecised to create Cassandria and Thessalonice: cf. McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 57-9; who believes that many Olynthians remained in Macedonia (as Thebans in Boeotia), perhaps working the land as slaves: 49-50, 57. The Olynthians were treated particularly harshly, many of the other Greek cities surrendered to Philip with minimal, if any, resistance. See also Hammond, "King and Land", 385-8; for particular cities in this locality. Some Olynthians remained free to serve Philip: below, pp.105-6.

⁶⁵ Demosthenes 19 [*False Embassy*].192-3. This passage provides confirmation of Justin's words. We are not obliged to believe that *technitai* here refers only to dramatic actors because Demosthenes' story then concerns the comedian, Satyrus.

⁶⁶ For these men see E.N.Borza, "Macedonian Military Machinery and its Designers Under Philip and Alexander, *Ancient Macedonia II*, 211-23, esp. 218-22. For the importance of the newly developed torsion catapult for Philip cf. E.N.Borza, *Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development* (Oxford 1969), 56ff, 205ff.

⁶⁷ Plut.*Alex.*19.1-10; Arr.ii.4.7-11; with Bosworth, *Commentary*, 191-2. Cf. Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 20 (Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, had been personal physician to Amyntas III [Diogenes Laertius v.1], and 49-50 (on Philip). McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 147-9 discusses the tendency of doctors to travel to both acquire and practise their calling. The same is true of the entertainers of whom McKechnie remarks (p.155): "It was always the business of ... to go on

The information that Justin retains, however muddled and vindictive, may also further suggest that the integration of Greeks into Macedonian society was on a larger scale than the assimilation of talented individuals and was also part of a wider policy that existed throughout Philip's reign. This would not only have been directed towards securing his realm through population transfers and the direct augmentation of the population base through immigration, but also to other ends. Some (as we have seen) had particular skills or experience that Macedon may have needed. Men like Polyidus and Philip of Acarnania would have had the status of metics in a Greek city such as Athens. In Macedon, as *hetairoi* to the king, they could hope for, and achieve, much greater things. The evidence is of course anecdotal and, where more specific, concerns, as is to be expected, particular individuals. To postulate a wider and more considered policy on Philip's part requires evidence that suggests a large scale absorption of Greeks into Macedonia.

Fortunately, there is at least one clear instance where Greeks were in all likelihood settled alongside Macedonians. When left as regent by Philip, his son, Alexander, subdued the Maedi, seized their city and resettled it under the name Alexandropolis.⁶⁸ Plutarch describes the settlers as *summiktois*, by which he probably meant Macedonian and Greek, for he expressly states that Alexander drove all the barbarians from the city. J.R.Hamilton has maintained that Plutarch's adjective implies that the colony was a military one. This may be the case, though his argument that for Alexander to found a fully-fledged *polis* bearing his own name would involve an act of rebellion is anachronistic. It was during the Hellenistic age that such an act was important in both demonstrating and conferring legitimacy.⁶⁹ The significance of a piece of work that Aristotle wrote at Alexander's request, entitled *huper apoikôn*, should not be overlooked either. Alexander's interests could have

tour." For this reason the philosophers, actors and *hetaerae* who thronged to the Macedonian court's of both Philip and Alexander have not been considered amongst those who took up, or were granted, Macedonian citizenship. Cf. McKechnie, *Outsiders*, 150-60, with pp.153-5 for the Macedonian evidence.

⁶⁸ Plut.*Alex.*9.1.

⁶⁹ Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 22-3. For the role's of cities in securing the Hellenistic system see G.A.Cohen, *The Seleucid Colonies* (Leiden 1978), 2-4, 11-14.

been aroused by his father's actions and a desire to emulate the king on Alexander's part is easy to envisage.⁷⁰ Philippopolis had been founded a mere two years earlier, and it would certainly be remarkable if the prince had conducted himself without Philip's knowledge and approval, particularly with Antipater present to supervise the young regent's actions.

However, there is reason to believe that Philip began a policy of accepting Greeks into Macedonian and rewarding them with land from an earlier date. According to Diodorus, when Philip captured Methone in 354, he *ten de chôran dieneime tois Makedosin*. Griffith suggests that the verb *dianeimein* implies distribution, not in large estates, but "to a large number of ordinary Macedonians."⁷¹ It is a point of view that has been widely accepted. Errington rightly states that:

The immediate economic proceeds of the seizure of Methone flowed directly into the Macedonian state treasury. And it is most likely that Philip maintained his citizen army by rewarding the soldiers. The newly won area between the Strymon and the Nestos was shared out between Macedonians, and others who wished to become Macedonian.⁷²

It is lamentable that Errington and others fail to define adequately what they mean when they say that non-Macedonians were accepted into the state. Hammond claims that "Philip certainly gave the franchise to many who were Greeks by origin" but the suspicion remains that he is typical in regarding this as a relatively small-scale affair that involved the *hetairoi*. Thus Hammond mentions the addition of the Upper Macedonians into the state, then categorically adds: "There, however, the expansion of the citizen factor by mass incorporation of people within the kingdom ended."⁷³ Demographically, as

⁷⁰ E.Badian, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind", *Historia* 7 (1958), 442, is surely right to consider Aristotle's treatise as early. He reacts against the common supposition that Aristotle's dialogue was a protest against Alexander's methods of colonisation in Asia Minor. Cf. Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 18-9 for discussion.

⁷¹ Griffith, "Background", 136; *HM* 2.361-2. Cf. the parallel phrase in *Plut.Alex.*15.3. Philip may have done the same at Olynthus. D.S.XVI.53.3. says that Philip distributed "appropriate gifts [to] such soldiers as has behaved gallantly in the battle...." What could be more appropriate than the same land these soldiers had been fighting for?

⁷² Errington, *Makedoniens*, 51. Two pages later (p.53) Errington remarks that: "In Chalcidice, as in all Philip's newly won possessions, Macedonians were settled." Cf. Hammond, "King and Land", 386.

⁷³ Hammond, *HM* 2.671; "Casualties", 63.

has been seen, this is inadequate. The visible supplementation of Macedonia's manpower between 360-323 requires that non-Macedonians were granted citizenship in massive numbers and the most logical place for Philip to begin this policy would be in accepting Greeks from the cities of the Aegean littoral as Macedonians. The example of Krenides is a case in point. Under threat from the Thracians in 358/7 the Thasian colony appealed to Philip for aid, which he promptly provided. Philip was hardly a disinterested spectator - the gold mines in the region were to provide him with colossal wealth - and he effectively annexed the city. Krenides was renamed Philippi and its population increased (not, note, replaced) with settlers of Philip's choosing. The natural inference must be that the original Greek settlers were absorbed into Macedonia *en mass*.⁷⁴

The evidence cited above provides a clear indication that Philip secured control of Macedonia in a rather more sophisticated manner than is usually assumed from Justin's evidence. Philip did found towns and redistribute populations but his real skill lay in attracting and holding the loyalty of the newcomers that came to Macedon while not alienating the monarchy's perhaps more traditional supporters. The gradual conquest of the Greek-held coastal regions meant that Philip secured considerable areas of fertile territory. This he was able to give away in the form of grants to men whose service he wished to reward or to attract to him. It is impossible to believe that there were so many unlanded Macedonians in a country that had never lacked agricultural land, particularly as the newly conquered territories on the coast were capable of supporting thousands of families. In 365 Athens had considered Amphipolis suitable for 10,000 colonists and Olynthus was able to field 10,000 hoplites and 1,000 cavalry from her *chora*. An anecdote in Plutarch's *Moralia*, which aims to illustrate the unsophisticated nature of the Macedonians, suggests further that the 500 cavalymen who deserted to Philip immediately prior to the fall of Olynthus were allowed to retain their land in return for acknowledging Philip's rule. According to Plutarch, "the men associated with Lasthenes the Olynthian, complained ... because some of Philip's associates called them traitors". For these men to have access to the king and to seek redress for being insulted (however justifiably) requires us to accept that they

⁷⁴ D.S.XVI.3.7, 8.6; Appian, *BC*, iv.105. On the circumstances see now E.Badian, "Philip II and Thrace", *Pulpuveva* 4 (1983), 51-74.

were serving in the Macedonian army and retained land in Philip's kingdom. The incident also demonstrates that not all the immigrants were easily assimilated. Philip's words - that the Macedonians called "a spade a spade" - were hardly comforting. Not all immigrants would have such a tainted record, however, and be quite so susceptible to suspicion.⁷⁵ And, even if Theopompus is right to claim that 800 Companions farmed the land of 10,000 Greeks, that figure can hardly comprise all the territory that Philip had acquired through his wars. And men would still be required to work the land the Companions owned.⁷⁶ It seems reasonable to surmise that Greeks shared in the distribution of Chalcidic land, many perhaps being confirmed in their estates by Philip, and now owing their loyalty and service to him. To a degree some of these individuals can be traced and it is to them that we now turn.

Hetairoi, Land Grants, and Macedon's Absorption of Greeks.

Of crucial importance are those passages that give some indication as to the origin of those men whom Philip induced to serve him. In this regard the most frequently cited contemporary passages are three fragments of Theopompus' *Philippica*, listed by Jacoby as fragments 224 and 225a-b. The last of these, F225b, gives the only direct indication as to the number of Philip's Companions; those men who made up the core of the Macedonian heavy cavalry. Theopompus states that:

For I think that although the Companions at that time numbered no more than 800, they enjoyed the revenues of no less land than 10,000 of the richest Greeks....
(F225b: Athenaeus x.46, 435B-C).

⁷⁵ Amphipolis: Thuc.iv.102, 108; Olynthus: Demosthenes 19 [*False Embassy*].266; D.S.XVI.8.4 described Olynthus' population as huge. For Olynthus' traitors: Demosthenes 19 [*False Embassy*].267; for Plutarch's story: *Moralia* 178B. Other Olynthians were, of course, enslaved: D.S.XVI.53.3, 55; Aeschines 2 [*On the Embassy*].156; Demosthenes 19 [*False Embassy*].193-5, 206.

⁷⁶ It cannot automatically be assumed that the Companions were supported purely through slave labour working their estates. Cf.Plut.*Alex*.15.1-3.

The fragment comes from Book 49 of Theopompus' *Philippica* and is again part of the digression on Macedonian court life, focusing in this instance on the personal natures of Philip and the court elite. It is probable then that Theopompus' allusion to a particular time when there were 800 Companions refers to the period when he himself was in Macedon, in 343. However, it is possible that Theopompus is underestimating the total number of the Companions - he aims to show up their vicious nature and greed - and the smaller their number the worse they would seem; especially to an ancient Greek, who would consider the amount of land in their possession incredible. Arnaldo Momigliano has, however, provided an explanation that enables us to retain the sense of Theopompus' comment and does not require us to believe that these 800 represent all Philip's cavalry. Momigliano suggests that:

Teopompo in tutta questa descrizione tiene soltanto d'occhio i nuovi e., non il vecchio <<fondo>> macedonico: tutta la sua caratteristica riguarda nuovi arrivati *ek pollôn.....sunerruêkotes*.⁷⁷

Thus, if Momigliano is correct, Philip had already recruited 800 non-Macedonians into the Companions as early as 343. This, along with Theopompus' hostility towards them, is clear from the remaining two fragments, the relevant sentences of which are here given in full:

Furthermore, his Companions were men who had gathered together from many regions - some from Macedonia itself, others from Thessaly and others from the rest of Greece. They were not selected on the basis of excellence; rather almost all the men of a lewd, disgusting or arrogant way of life from among both the Greeks and the barbarians gathered in Macedonia and were given the title 'Companions of Philip'....
(F224: Athenaeus iv.62, 166F-167C).

For almost all the men of a lewd or arrogant way of life from among both the Greeks and the barbarians gathered in Macedonia at Philip's court and were given the title 'Companions of Philip'....
(F225a: Polybius viii.9.5ff.).

⁷⁷ A.D.Momigliano, "Re e Popolo in Macedonia Prima Di Alessandro Magno", *Athenaeum* 13 (1935), 14. Momigliano's suggestion was endorsed by Griffith, "Background", 34. As Philip had some 600 cavalry (without the benefit of Upper Macedonia's) in 358, and Alexander had *ca.* 2,800 Companions in 334 (and further units of Macedonian light cavalry), Momigliano's explanation is an excellent solution to what would otherwise be an awkward puzzle.

Aside from the Macedonians, Theopompus lists as amongst their origins Thessaly, Greece in general and, from unspecified regions, numbers of barbarians. Particular individuals can be located. Arrian, in the *Indica*, gives a list of those men whom Alexander appointed as trierarchs in the fleet that sailed down the Hydaspes in 326.⁷⁷ The following are recorded as *ek Amphipoleos*: Nearchus, Laomedon and Androstheneas. None of these men was a native Macedonian. Nearchus was from Crete, his father Androtimus had originally been a citizen of Lato.⁷⁸ Androstheneas was a Thasian and Laomedon and his brother, the by now deceased Erygius, were the sons of Larichus of Mytilene.⁷⁹ The likely inference is that these men held fiefs at Amphipolis which had originally been granted to their fathers sometime after the city's capture in autumn 357. Another possibility is that their fathers were immigrants to a then independent Amphipolis. In either case the only logical inference that can be drawn still requires that Philip absorbed Greeks within his kingdom and provided a role for them. It is noticeable that three of the *ilai* of Companions that fought in Asia were recruited from the Chalcidice. It would seem that Philip deliberately utilized the newly conquered territories for the purpose of supplementing his military strength.⁸⁰ Irrefutable evidence is provided by a rescript of Cassander's.⁸¹ In it the king confirms Perdiccas, the son of Coenus (one of Alexander's commanders who died in 326/5), in the possession of land that Philip had granted to his grandfather, Polemocrates, at Sinaea in Botticaea.⁸² The same inscription also attests that the family of Ptolemy, son of Ptolemy,

⁷⁷ Arr.*Ind.*18.3-5.

⁷⁸ The manuscript actually designates Nearchus as *ek Kretes*, in this context clearly inexact. Arrian explains the double ethnic at *Ind.* 18.10, where Nearchus is called a Cretan by lineage who lived in Macedonia.

⁷⁹ Strabo xvi.3.1-6; Plut.*Alex.*10.4; D.S.XVIII.3.1; Arr.iii.6.5, *Succ.* F1b.2 Roos. Further details in Bosworth, *Commentary*, 59, 283-4.

⁸⁰ Arr.i.2.6, 12.7, ii.9.3. Respectively the *ilai* from Botticaea, Amphipolis, Apollonia and Anthemus. See Bosworth, *Commentary*, 58-9, 109-10, 211.

⁸¹ SIG³ 332.

⁸² SIG³ 332.1-15. For Coenus' death cf. Arr.vi.2.1; Curt.ix.3.20.

was granted the title to land in Spartalus, the Botticaean capital, by Alexander.⁸³ Arrian's list of trierarchs also contains the names of Macedonians from Orestis, Pydna, Aegae and a number of smaller towns.⁸⁴ It is of interest that two of the men listed in the *Indica*, as Aristonous of Eordaea and Pithon of Alcomenae, are each given alternative origins in Arrian's *Anabasis*, at Pella and Eordaea respectively. Brunt suggests that these men held territory, as Companions, in two different locales.⁸⁵ Taken together, these three pieces of evidence are extremely important. If there was one group in the Macedonian state that was capable of achieving a rapid numerical increase extraneous of any demographic realities, it was the *hetairoi*. They held their position by virtue of the king's favour and the wealth that enabled them to serve as cavalry. Philip could have increased their number by restricting promotions and by distributing estates exclusively amongst his Macedonians. It was by such largesse that Alexander was able to ensure that the Companions were at full strength on the eve of his invasion of Asia.⁸⁶ Clearly then, as a group, the *hetairoi* were not subject to the constraints the demographic model (of Chapter 3) imposes in order to increase their number as they did. To a degree membership within the Companions was probably hereditary for the nobility and land-owners of Macedon. However, the rank was not an exclusive one and new individuals could be so honoured at the whim of the king. The fact that many of the additions of Philip's reign to the ranks of the *hetairoi*, who were the élite of Macedonian society, are demonstrably non-Macedonian further suggests that large-scale Greek immigration to Macedonia was considerably more wide-spread than is normally allowed for.

Further evidence would suggest that emigration from the Greek *poleis* to Macedonia was not an uncommon occurrence. A letter falsely attributed to Aeschines mentions two Athenians who were given estates by Philip, later married local women, and are assumed to be doing well for themselves.⁸⁷

⁸³ *SIG*³ 332.16-31. Cf. also *Arr.Succ.* F1.38.

⁸⁴ *Arr.Ind.* 18.5ff.

⁸⁵ *Arr.vi.* 28.4; with Brunt, *Arrian II*, 188 n.4.

⁸⁶ *Plut.Alex.* 15.3.

⁸⁷ [Aeschines], *Letter.* 12.8. Hammond, *HM* 2.648 n.1 states: "The letter is not genuine but the persons mentioned seem to be historical."

The "Boastful Man" in Theophrastus' *Characters* likewise implies that Macedonian rulers were interested in gaining the adherence of selected (and in the Boastful Man's subjective opinion, important), individuals. According to Theophrastus the person typical of his caricature:

may well say that he has no less than three letters from Antipater, requesting his attendance upon him in Macedonia, and albeit he is offered free exportation of timber he has refused to go; he will not lay himself open to calumny; the Macedonians ought to have known better than to expect it....⁸⁸

It would be asking too much to expect these asides to have a definite historical truth as far as those mentioned are concerned. However, that incidents as these are preserved in anecdotal material must mean that the circumstance that saw men emigrating to Macedonia was, if not typical, at least well known. Theophrastus' story has more interesting implications. It suggests that Antipater was prepared to actively seek out potential immigrants at the individual level. The only example of an active policy during Philip's reign is his general appeal for *technitai* sometime after the fall of Olynthus. Unfortunately, Antipater can not be acting under Philip's aegis in this instance; Theophrastus' Boastful Man claimed to have campaigned with Alexander. Any specific context for Antipater's request must really be considered to have occurred while he was *de facto* ruler of Macedon in his own right, between 323-317, though there is an outside possibility he was acting whilst still Alexander's regent.

Demosthenes' speeches provide more specific evidence. The most illuminating passage comes from the *Second Olynthiac*, delivered in 349/8. At one stage Demosthenes was concerned to put Philip's soldiers in perspective. Philip's *xenoi* and *pezetairoi*, he remarks, "have indeed the name of admirable soldiers ... [but] they are no better than other soldiers."⁸⁹ *Xenoi* has commonly been translated as "mercenaries", but is this the only option for this context?⁹⁰ Why would Demosthenes

⁸⁸ Theophrastus, *Characters* 23.3-4.

⁸⁹ Demosthenes 2 [*Olynthiac II*].17.

⁹⁰ Milns, "Army", 94; Erskine, "*Pezetairoi*", 385-6; Develin, "Anaximenes", 495. The Loeb translation of J.H. Vince (p.33), is particularly strange: "household troops and footguards". *Xenoi*, on any translation, cannot refer to either of these groups. For an understanding of *xenos* as a form of

characterise the *xenoi*, if they were mercenaries, as crack troops? It would serve no purpose to inform his audience, who, if they were to accept Demosthenes' policy would end up fighting on behalf of Olynthus, that Philip was capable (with his immense wealth) of hiring vast numbers of crack troops. Rather, it would seem, Demosthenes is making reference to those men, many of whom would have been 'professional' soldiers (at least in Greek terms), that had emigrated to Macedon and now fought for Philip. This interpretation allows a more satisfying explanation of Demosthenes' later words and further demonstrates his subtlety as a speaker. The orator goes on to mock the licentious and immoral tone of Philip's court; a court that attracts and welcomes men such as Callias, one of a group of Athenians expelled from the city. Demosthenes thus disingenuously undercuts the force of his earlier words about the quality of Philip's soldiers. Who could seriously fear in battle men of such stature as "Callias ... low comedians, men who compose ribald songs to raise a laugh..."⁹¹

In a later speech attributed to Demosthenes the author is more bitter than mocking. Towards the end of the address *Peri Halonnêsou*, perhaps delivered in early 342, the author condemns Philip's lack of respect for the law and any treaties he has made. Specifically, Philip is accused of seizing land in the Chersonese that the Athenians considered to be theirs and, worse yet, "he [Philip] treats it [the land] as his own, enjoying part himself and bestowing part on others..."⁹²

King, Courtiers and Commons: Relations, Obligations and the Mechanism of Immigration.

Aside from the evidence that indirectly suggests Philip's willingness to accept immigrants from, as far as Demosthenes and Theopompus are concerned, the dregs of society, the Demosthenic corpus

personal obligation and social importance see note 94, below; and the discussion following. For other possibilities along these lines cf. Demosthenes 11 [*Answer to Philip*].10, 18.

⁹¹ Demosthenes 2 [*Olynthiac II*].19-21.

⁹² [Demosthenes] 7 [*On Halonnesus*].39-42. One Apollonides of Cardia is damned as a major beneficiary of Philip's unlawful generosity. Cf. also Demosthenes 5 [*On the Peace*].25.

contains insights into another substantive issue.⁹³ There are suggestions of the manner and social conventions of the Greek world by which Philip was able to attract and bind new men to him in a way that was acceptable to both king and *hetairos*. These conventions have been termed "ritualised personal relations" in a recent study undertaken by Gabriel Herman.⁹⁴ Modern historians have long acknowledged the validity of Demosthenes' claims that Philip's road to power was substantially paved by bribery, as well as the practical and moral support he offered oligarchs throughout Greece.⁹⁵ Herman has provided a sophisticated attempt to aid our understanding of why many upper class Greeks so easily demonstrated a closer affinity for their counterparts in other cities than loyalty to their own *patris*. One of the failings of the *polis* was that the concept of communal interest upon which it was founded never broke the generations old ties of guest-friendship which:

acted as a repository of heroic values, and disillusioned aristocrats could always trust a friend abroad for assistance in their political struggles and refuge in defeat.... Guest-friendship served as a device for the promotion of the material and political interests of the elites engaged in it.... ... and at times the horizontal ties of solidarity which linked together the elites of different communities were stronger than the vertical ties which bound them to the inferiors within their own communities.⁹⁶

Such an interlocking network of mutual obligation, reciprocity, and personal contact was one that dominated the Macedonian court. Indeed, Philip's failure to live up to his perceived obligations in this matter provided the motive that led one of his bodyguards, Pausanias, to murder him in 336. And

⁹³ However, contrast Isocrates 5 [*Philippus*].19, where, in another suggestive allusion for our purposes, he refers to Philip as having "the best and most famous of the Greeks around him."

⁹⁴ G.Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge 1987), 7 [hereinafter *Ritualised Friendship*]. Herman argues, pp.7-9, that *xenia* and its cognates can be conceptually "located within the wider category of social relations known to anthropologists as "ritualised personal relations".

⁹⁵ The two classic instances of Demosthenes' anger are 18 [*On the Crown*].61, and 19 [*False Embassy*].292-95. See, most recently, J.Cargill, "Demosthenes, Aeschines and the Crop of Traitors", *AW* 11 (1985), 75-85; and Markle, "Athenian Intellectuals", 98-9.

⁹⁶ Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 7-8. He discusses Philip's participation (as a master), in these networks: pp.3, 73-6, 81-3, 89, 110; and for a list of Philip's *xenoi* in the Greek cities see Appendix A, 166-74.

it was Alexander's distancing of himself from his Macedonians that was largely responsible for their alienation from the king.⁹⁷ A number of anecdotes conveys the impression that the king of the Macedonians was expected to be susceptible to approach from all his people, and not some distant monarch venerated from afar. When temporarily unable to pay his soldiers (though we are not told why) Philip managed to diffuse the tension through a joke, and then proceeded to ignore the now amused soldiers by going swimming.⁹⁸ This unparalleled and easy-going openness extended to civilians also. Once Philip, claiming the pressures of other demands upon his limited time, intended to defer some judicial cases he was expected to hear. One old woman had no time for the king's excuses and called out "Then do not be king!". Shamed, Philip continued.⁹⁹ Faith that the king was approachable and would consider their minor concerns of consequence would be important to original Macedonian citizen and immigrant alike. While the majority of those who emigrated to Macedon were undoubtedly more concerned with having land to farm and food to eat than taking part in a political process that was, in Macedon anyway, severely limited by the autocratic nature of the monarchy, it would nonetheless still have been reassuring to know that the king fulfilled his obligations as a ruler. Curtius, used to the arbitrary rule of the Roman emperors was impressed enough to remark that the

⁹⁷ Philip's death: XVI.93.1-94.4, esp.94.1-2. For Alexander see most conveniently, Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 157-161, 176, 284-88. Nothing makes this clearer than the Opis mutiny: Arr.vii.6.1-5; 8.2-3; particularly at vii.11.6, where the soldier Callines claimed: "What grieves the Macedonians, Sire, is that you have now made some of the Persians your kinsmen and that Persians are called 'Alexander's Kinsmen', and permitted to kiss you, but no Macedonian has yet enjoyed this privilege." The mutineers and king were immediately reconciled with Alexander naming all his Macedonians kinsmen and allowing any who wished to kiss him (Arr.vii.11.7-8).

⁹⁸ Polyaeus iv.2.6. Cf. Hammond, *TMS* 64-70. For examples of royal munificence and favours attributed to Philip and Alexander towards their companions cf. Plut.*Moralia* 177D-E, 178F, 179F, 181E-F; for the kings' concern to show favours as a mark of status cf. *Moralia* 178C, 178E, 181C. Many, if not all, of these stories are doubtless apocryphal; but they do demonstrate the expectations held of a king from both retainers and public.

⁹⁹ Plut.*Moralia* 179C-D.

Macedonians, although governed by a hereditary monarchy, still retained "a greater freedom than other peoples who are ruled by a king..."¹⁰⁰

We cannot imagine, however, that all those who emigrated to Macedon became assimilated to the court. The majority would surely have become small farmers who served in the phalanx when Philip demanded their service. This must also be true of the 800 non-Macedonian Companions who Theopompus claimed provided particularly degenerate services and entertainment for Philip. Most of these men too would undoubtedly have remained landholders, albeit on a substantial scale, meeting with the king or his representatives most frequently only when they were required to serve in Philip's wars. However, there is evidence that suggests that at least some men of Greek origin maintained themselves at the court and participated in its daily schedule.

This is clearly demonstrated by the Pixodorus affair, an episode that led to many of Alexander's friend's being exiled and heightened his own sense of insecurity at his father's court.¹⁰¹ The names of those banished provide interesting reading. Nearchus, Laomedon and Erygius were amongst them; and all were of Greek descent.¹⁰² The two others amongst Alexander's friends to suffer exile were Ptolemy and Harpalus, members of the princely houses of Upper Macedonia.¹⁰³ None of these young men were connected to the established aristocracy of Lower Macedonia; as has been frequently remarked.¹⁰⁴ Could it be that the younger members of both 'groups', their families

¹⁰⁰ Curt.iv.8.31. Nor should modern democratic sentiment blind us to the fact that in the fourth century democracy was being increasingly rejected at both the political and philosophical level: cf. Hornblower, *Greek World*, 155, 166-7, 170ff.

¹⁰¹ The most recent discussion, with exhaustive references to the modern bibliography, is: P.Dixon, V.French, "The Pixodarus Affair: Another View", *AW* 13 (1986), 73-82. The seminal article on the subject of Philip's last year and murder is: E.Badian, "The Death of Philip II", *Phoenix* 17 (1963), 244-50.

¹⁰² Arr.iii.6.5; Plut.*Alex.*10.3. Plutarch adds that all these men Alexander afterwards recalled "and held in the highest honours." Indeed, they all rose to positions of power under Alexander: cf. Bosworth, *Commentary*, 282-4; Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 21, 26-7.

¹⁰³ Harpalus, son of Machatas, from Elimiotas (*contra* Bosworth, "PUM", 96 with n.6); Ptolemy, whose mother Arsinoe, was from a collateral member of the Argead house: Curt.ix.8.22; Pausanias (i.6.2), even claimed him to be a bastard son of Philip.

¹⁰⁴ J.R.Hamilton, "Alexander's Early Life", *G&R* 12 (1965), 120: "It is noticeable that among Alexander's close friends were few of the greater Macedonian nobility." Z.Rubinsohn, "The 'Philotas Affair' - A Reconsideration", *Ancient Macedonia II* (1977), 415-16 refers to those

newly incorporated into a greater Macedonia, felt more at ease with the crown prince?¹⁰⁵ Whatever the reality, we must still presume that these men's fathers, about whom only their names are known, were important members of Philip's court. Their sons' friendship with Alexander, which would have been forged at Mieza whilst partaking in Aristotle's instruction, would suggest as much.¹⁰⁶ Sharing in the royal tuition cannot have been a privilege open to all.

In the Macedonian context then personal contact, both within the state and in relation to Philip's 'international' support, were clearly of paramount importance. Herman's model is of particular use as an explanation of how Philip and Alexander retained the loyalty of their supporters in a state which, owing to its rapid expansion and ethnic diversity, may have lacked any over-riding institutional ardour.¹⁰⁷ However, there are limitations imposed by the evidence that has severe implications for Herman's thesis as it affects Macedon. This is particularly true with regard to the internal structure of Philip's court and kingdom. Herman asserts that, in a process of which Macedon under Philip is considered a typical example, states grew by:

what can most aptly be described as 'pyramiding'.... For, insofar as the central leader could satisfy the needs of [his] *xenoi* in terms of protection and resources ... and in subduing their enemies, there was no limit to the ability of the periphery to expand. First, a leader himself could have an almost unlimited number of *xenoi*. Secondly, the lesser leaders brought with them both their own followers and their own *xenoi*.... It is this feature which accounts for the

exiled as a faction of "new men" at the Macedonian court; and W.Heckel, "Philip and Olympias (337/6B.C.)", 57, in G.S.Shrimpton, D.J.McCarger, ed., *Classical Contributions* (New York 1981), goes so far as to align that faction with the disgraced Olympias.

¹⁰⁵ Not all the members of "Alexander's faction" were his contemporaries either; Erygius, at least was an older man: Curt.viii.4.34. Interestingly, Philotas, called by Plutarch one of Alexander's friends, was not banished though he was (puzzlingly) present while Philip berated his son for his plotting (Plut.*Alex.*10.2-3). Could it be that Philotas had informed on Alexander (see the revealing aside in Plutarch's *Moralia*, 339F), or had he been saved by his more influential father, Parmenio; one of the established barons of the court?

¹⁰⁶ Plut.*Alex.*7.4.

¹⁰⁷ See the telling remark of Alexander that Craterus "loved the king" and was so worthy of absolute trust, perhaps in contrast to many of those around him who, like Hephaestion, "loved Alexander" (Plut.*Moralia* 181). Perhaps a more fickle loyalty? Alexander, who conquered a vast and unhomogenous empire so rapidly, increasingly focused the loyalty of his subjects upon himself, as king, as also representing the state. Cf., above all, Errington, *Makedoniens*, 100-108; and the remarks of Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 157-60, 179-80.

astonishing ethnic diversity of the ruling circles: the inclusion of foreign leaders was a necessary price of expansion.¹⁰⁸

This hypothesis simply rests on an argument from silence. Herman's citation of the evidence already reviewed above suggests to him "that both the heads of surrounding tribes and Greek citizens were absorbed by the centre [*sic* Philip of Macedon]." But nowhere does this evidence allow us to suppose that the men who migrated to Philip's court did so as the leaders of their own bands of supporters. Nor are we entitled to assume that those non-Macedonians who were fortunate enough to become *hetairoi* "were either *xenoi* of old, promoted to positions of power, or the heads of subdued enemies turned followers."¹⁰⁹ We simply do not know how the majority of these men ended up in Macedonia. However, the far more likely probability is that most of the immigrants came to Macedon either in small groups or as individuals. Where absorption on a larger scale occurred it was as the result of Philip's conquests - either in the highlands of the Pindus, or the once Greek controlled *poleis* of the coast. There is no evidence that suggests Philip's support was based upon a hierarchical system itself reminiscent of feudal Europe. This uncertainty is even true of the great barons of Philip's reign such as Parmenio and Antipater who were long established Macedonians. It is impossible to ascertain whether their pre-eminence was a result of their own resources (financial or military) or of Philip's favour. Indeed, the only evidence that we do possess would suggest that Philip's favour was of paramount importance. For Demosthenes, Philip was:

the despotic commander of his adherents: and in war that is the most important of all advantages.... Then he was well provided with money: he did whatever he chose, without giving notice by publishing decrees, or deliberating in public, without fear of prosecution by informers or indictment of illegal measures. He was responsible to nobody: he was the absolute autocrat, commander and master of everybody and everything.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 153-4.

¹⁰⁹ Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 154 and 155. The prosopographical data he draws from Berve concern the *hetairoi* of Alexander's court (many of whose fathers emigrated to Macedon: cf. above pp.108-9.). Such men as Nearchus of Crete *were* Macedonians for all intents and purposes. Certainly Philip had never concerned himself with the internal politics of Crete, at least so far as we are aware and can justifiably surmise.

We should probably imagine that Philip had, as Alexander certainly did, a council to advise him and offer suggestions as to policy. Even then, as Bosworth remarks: "There is no record of any formal vote and no hint that decisions were in any way binding upon the king."¹¹¹

Those non-Macedonians who emigrated to Macedonia would almost by definition owe everything to Philip and their allegiance may have been partly responsible for his tight hold upon Macedonia itself. This must also be the case throughout Alexander's reign where the evidence is far more abundant. What counted was the military skills and loyalty such men possessed at the present, not past relation and not race. Hence Craterus, who disapproved of Alexander's policy towards the Orientals, was still trusted to become regent of Macedon in 323 because of his unquestionable fidelity.¹¹² While influential officers connected to the old Macedonian aristocracy still existed, such as Perdiccas and Leonnatus, and could even boast of regal connections this fact can have had only a limited role in establishing their position.¹¹³ For others, such as Nearchus and Eumenes, held important commands without such ostensible advantages. In a social structure where access to the king was all-important,¹¹⁴ that access was largely determined through individual merit and loyalty.¹¹⁵ And all Macedonians, both old and new, were given ample opportunity to display both in the continual wars

¹¹⁰ Demosthenes 18 [*On the Crown*].235. Cf. Demosthenes 19 [*False Embassy*].184-5 and Isocrates 5 [*Philippus*].41, 127.

¹¹¹ Alexander's Council: Arr.i.25.4; with Bosworth, *Commentary*, 161-2. For the functioning of the Council under Polyperchon after 317 see D.S.XVIII.49.4, 55.1.

¹¹² Plut.*Eum.*6.2, *Moralia* 181E; Arr.vii.12.3-4.

¹¹³ Curt.x.7.8; Arr.*Succ.* F12 Roos.

¹¹⁴ Cf. the telling remark of Philotas when arrested upon Alexander's orders that "The hatred of my enemies has defeated your friendliness" (Curt.vi.8.22). Earlier, Philotas had not been summoned to the council which discussed the conspiracy against Alexander's life and ended by condemning his negligence (Curt.vi.8.1-5). Cf. also Plutarch's remark (*Moralia* 65D) that it was a "choir of flatterers" whose calumnies resulted in Alexander being turned against his true supporters.

¹¹⁵ Cf. the remarks of Errington, *Makedoniens*, 105-6; though his presentation of the differences between the policy of Philip (with his court of "traditional" nobles) and Alexander (with his eclectic followers) is overly schematic (in full pp.101-108). Philip's policy was not, I suspect, that different from Alexander's. He too drew support from where he could, we simply lack the data necessary to draw the exact conclusions.

Philip and Alexander undertook. Both kings were willing to provide the land and citizenship that immigrants desired most. In return they expected such men to follow them into battle whenever necessary and without question. It was the one obligation Alexander would not release his subjects from.¹¹⁶

A Continuum of Policy with regard to Macedon's Population?

The penetration of Macedonian military-political positions by those of non-Macedonian origin seems to have been a rapid affair. To some degree, however, it may not have been such an innovative occurrence. For while Philip seems to have accepted immigrants on an unprecedented scale, this was neither a policy unknown to his predecessors, nor had the advantages that could accrue from a redistribution of population previously escaped notice within Macedon.

According to Theopompus, when Pericles' captured Histiaea in 446 most of the population migrated to and settled in Macedon.¹¹⁷ The same Macedonian king, Perdiccas II (*ca.* 452-413), was also involved in another transfer of population. Alarmed by the growth of Athenian power he encouraged the Potidaeans in their revolt from Athens in 432. Following this Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to desert their coastal cities and to settle at Olynthus. To encourage the synoecism Perdiccas even offered the displaced Chalcidians the use of parts of his territory for the duration of the war.¹¹⁸ Unfortunately for the Macedonians Perdiccas' actions were not without unpleasant consequences. Olynthus became extremely powerful and the troubled reign of Amyntas III (393-370/69) saw that king compelled to temporarily cede sections of his eastern borders to the Olynthian

¹¹⁶ So, most explicitly, Justin xi.1.10. Cf. also Plut.*Moralia* 181A. The assertion of Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, 114-5 that the recipient of land was not obligated to provide military service in return for his possession of territory is clearly incorrect as far as the Macedonians under Philip and Alexander were concerned.

¹¹⁷ *FGrHist* 115 F387.

¹¹⁸ Thuc.i.58.2.

League in 393 in return for their support. It took a war ten years later and a disadvantageous peace treaty for Amyntas to receive his territories back.¹¹⁹ In both instances we must imagine either that the territories Perdikkas and Amyntas temporarily gave away were deserted, or more plausibly, that the kings were forced to resettle numbers of their own subjects.

This was not beyond the capabilities of the early Macedonian kings. In 410, Archelaus (*ca.* 413-399), frustrated by the Pydnians' recalcitrance in obeying him simply leveled their city and refounded it 20 stades further inland where it was more vulnerable to his authority. In similar fashion he transferred the seat of Macedon's government from Aegae to Pella, undoubtedly dislocating a substantial number of individuals.¹²⁰

Of greater interest are the legends the Macedonians told about their own origins. From early in the fifth century the Argead rulers of Macedon claimed descent from the Temenids of Argos; a claim officially accepted by the *Hellanodikai* at the Olympic Games of (probably) 476.¹²¹ And sometime in the fourth century the genealogy on which the Macedonian king-list of Herodotus and Thucydides was based began to undergo revision. A new king, Caranus, became established as the founder of the Argead line. The reasons for the alteration to Macedon's mythic past are not here important.¹²² However, the nature of the myth that developed around Caranus is. Justin, who preserves one version of it states that:

¹¹⁹ D.S.XIV.92.3, XV.19.2-3. Cf M.N.Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions II* (London 1948), no.111; for Amyntas' troubles see W.Greenwalt, "Amyntas III and the Political Stability of Argead Macedonia", *AW* 18 (1988), 35-44; and J.R.Ellis, "Amyntas III, Illyria and Olynthos 393/2 - 380/79", *Makedonika* 9 (1969), 1-8.

¹²⁰ D.S.XIV.49.1-2; Aelian, *Varia Historia* xiv.17.

¹²¹ Herodotus 5.22. Thucydides (2.99.3) accepted the claim. Cf. E.Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians", in E.N.Borza, B.S.Barr-Sharrar, ed., *Greece and Macedonia in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times* (Washington History of Art, Vol.10, 1982), 34-36, [hereinafter "Greeks"].

¹²² For this see Hammond, *HM* 2.5-14 and Badian, "Greeks", 34-5, who both (on different grounds) feel this occurred under Archelaus. W.Greenwalt, "The Introduction of Caranus into the Argead King List", *GRBS* 26 (1985), 43-49 [hereinafter "Caranus"], suggests instead Amyntas III.

Caranus, with a great multitude of Greeks came into Emathia, having been ordered by an oracle to seek a settlement in Macedonia ... [and] he seized the city of Edessa ... [and] he made this city the seat of his government.... [And], having driven [the] other kings from their territories, he established himself in their place as sole king ... and was the first that, by uniting tribes of different peoples, formed Macedonia as it were into one body, and laid a solid foundation for the extension of his growing kingdom.¹²³
 (Translated, with alterations, Watson, *Justin*, 69-70.)

Hammond attributes the popularization of the king list Justin preserves to Theopompus' *Philippica*.¹²⁴ Indeed, Theopompus could easily have heard the myth while in Macedonia, presuming he had not known of it beforehand. If so there are interesting implications to note for Philip's policies. On the surface the myth narrates the epic establishment of the Macedonian kingdom, but at the same time it clearly stresses three things. First, Caranus' Greek connections and followers. Second, the absorption into Macedonia of ethnically diverse and neighbouring tribal groups. Thirdly, and finally, the strong basis which the acceptance and integration of these groups provided for an expansive Macedonia. All three underlying themes within the myth paint a picture of a past reality and a Macedonia that, while unhistorical, would have been extremely useful to Philip. While Philip may not have invented the myth *ex nihilo* the scanty evidence can hardly preclude the possibility that certain additions and emphases were Philip's personal contribution to the story. Even if this were not so it makes little difference for our purposes. It may be that politically loaded additions were grafted onto the myth while Theopompus was in Macedon, and became integral to it when the *Philippica* was written. The emphasis on the assimilation of non-Macedonians within the Macedonian citizen body would have functioned for Philip's purposes both as a guide to past behaviour and as pointer to future advantages. Greenwalt considers the Caranus myth "valuable for understanding how the Argeads used the past to justify the political realities of their present."¹²⁵ One could easily be a little more Orwellian and suggest that Philip recycled and perhaps reinvented the past to justify and traditionalise his present.

¹²³ Justin vii.1.7-12.

¹²⁴ Hammond, *HM* 2.12.

¹²⁵ Greenwalt, "Caranus", 44-5. Note also the story preserved in Pausanias (*Guide to Greece* vii.25.6), that following the sack of Mycenae the survivors migrated to Macedonia.

Philip thus seems to have displayed concern for his population at both the ideological and practical level. Macedon was strengthened through the transfer of population throughout the kingdom and, even more so, by the direct absorption of thousands of non-Macedonians directly into the citizen body. That concern also seems to have been displayed by Alexander, at least when the demands of his prolonged campaigning would allow him. Thus, in 334, and while still on the coast of Asia Minor, he sent the newly married Macedonians back to their wives for the winter. It was a popular and, one might add, a practical gesture. Alexander was doubtless hoping that sons would be the result of his soldiers' leave. Certainly he exhorted the men he released in 329 to beget children upon their return to Macedon.¹²⁶

Alexander's final year demonstrates his acknowledgement that his power was based upon his control of his subjects and their potential to fuel the conquering armies. When he dismissed the veterans at Opis, Alexander took care to retain the children that ten years campaigning had inevitably produced. Whether the king really did, or claimed to do this out of concern for the effect that these illegitimate and half-Asian children would have on the veterans' wives when they returned, Odysseus-like to Macedon, we cannot know. Alexander promised to bring these children up imbued with Macedonian culture and to make their fathers' proud of them. Doubtless, ten years hence, they would have formed the core of a new army; owing everything to Alexander and only having known the life of the camp.¹²⁷ Another item of continuity between Alexander and his father was the foundations of colonies throughout their respective territories. The scale of Alexander's projects far exceeded Philip's and, according to the Last Plans preserved in Diodorus (and derived from Hieronymus of Cardia), were to become even more grandiose. Alexander planned:

¹²⁶ Arr.iii.24.1-2; Curt.vii.5.26.

¹²⁷ Arr.vii.12.2; D.S.XVII.110.3 refers to the women as captives; Justin xii.4.6 (dated under 330B.C.). Plut.*Alex.*71.5 states further that the orphaned children of those Macedonians who had died in his service should receive their father's pay. Again, the concern for the welfare of future generations is apparent.

to establish cities and to transplant populations from Asia to Europe and in the opposite direction from Europe into Asia, in order to bring the largest continents to common unity and to friendly kinship by means of intermarriages and family ties.¹²⁸

Alexander perhaps underestimated the opposition to be expected - his planned forced transferral of people would not have resembled the generally voluntary emigration of individuals to Macedonia in Philip's reign. But it is remarkable how close to the sentiments of the Caranus myth Diodorus' words are, however unlikely it is that they can be attributed to Alexander himself.¹²⁹

Macedonian military strength never again attained the heights it had reached under Philip and Alexander. With Alexander's death the competition amongst the Successors ensured that Macedon would not be alone in looking to Greece for poor and disenchanted individuals with which to swell their population. Nonetheless, Macedon's military strength did grow (albeit gradually) throughout the third and second centuries B.C. At least, this was the case, until the reigns of Philip V and his son, Perseus. The national levy Perseus fielded had increased by 9,000 men from the beginning to the end of his reign; outside of what normal demographic considerations would allow us to anticipate. To a large extent this was due to a deliberate policy undertaken by Philip V. According to Livy, amongst his reforms was a programme designed:

to restore the population to its ancient level...he not only sought to ensure an increase in the native stock by insisting that everyone must beget children and rear them, but he had also introduced a large number of Thracians into Macedonia.
(Translated Walbank, *Hellenistic World*, 88.)¹³⁰

The resemblance to the method's adopted by Philip II to increase his population is striking and may even be deliberate. Philip V stressed his descent from his earlier namesake and even went so far as to

¹²⁸ D.S.XVIII.4.4. For the modern debate on the subject see the references listed above, Chapter 2 n.83.

¹²⁹ Bosworth's thesis, "Iranians", 1-21, that Alexander never planned to integrate Macedonians and Persians is unacceptable. If Alexander had lived past 323 the Susa marriages and military reforms would guarantee that the empire's political leadership, administration, and military would be of mixed Macedonian-Persian blood; as was Alexander's heir through Roxane.

¹³⁰ Livy xxxix.24.2-4. Cf. also Livy xlii.12.8-10 and Polybius xxiii.10.4-7 with Walbank, *Philip V*, 224-5; *Hellenistic World*, 88-9.

have Theopompus' *Philippica* abridged, reducing it to 16 books solely concerned with Philip II.¹³¹ Livy claimed that Perseus led the largest Macedonian army since the time of Alexander the Great.¹³² The parallel is obvious: as Philip II had prepared the way for Alexander's conquests in Asia so Philip V had put Macedon on a stronger footing for the last fight against Rome. Livy makes clear that the population was augmented by the adlection of foreigners into the citizen body and an inscription found in Boroëa reveals that land was distributed to potential and willing soldiers.¹³³

The reign of Philip V is thus no more an exception to the demographic realities imposed on a pre-transitional society than is that of Philip II's. The only way for an ancient ruler to drastically increase his population in the short term was the direct assimilation of non-citizens into the population. It required the redistribution of land; but Macedon had enough and to spare in the fourth century. The act of will necessary to impose such a policy was possible in the monarchical state Philip headed, unlike the exclusive political societies of the Greek *poleis*.¹³⁴ And the possibilities were tremendous. Philip effectively controlled Greece by his death; Alexander controlled both Greece and the Persian empire by his. This wave of expansion was only made possible by the vast numbers of men the Macedonian kings ruled over.

¹³¹ Cf. Walbank, *Philip V*, 258-9.

¹³² Livy xlii.51.11.

¹³³ Published by C. Bradford Welles, "New Texts from the Chancery of Philip V of Macedonia and the Problem of the 'Diagramma'", *AJA* 42 (1938), 246-9. Philip II had taken substantial numbers of tribesmen into Macedonia (10,000 Sarmisii [Polyaenus iv.2.12], and 20,000 Scythian women and children in 339/8 [Justin ix.2.15-16]); but it is likely that both these groups were sold as slaves to swell the royal coffers.

¹³⁴ It should be noted that the other Greek state whose population underwent exceptional growth, Athens in the fifth century, did so as a result of the admittance of *xenoi* into the citizen body, a process that terminated with Pericles' law of 451/0. Cf. Patterson, *Pericles' Law*, passim esp. 84-107.

"To be or not to be?": Citizenship and the Status of the *Macedones*.

In this context it becomes necessary to establish what exactly the status of these men, as immigrants to Macedonia, was. If they were not fully integrated and were only accepted within Macedonia under conditions that somehow set them apart from native Macedonians it might be expected that the attraction of settling in the north would have been somewhat reduced. Indeed, little better than the social conditions that prevailed throughout the Greek *poleis* of the south from which they were escaping.

Hammond has argued that *Macedones* is a constitutional term and that individuals so specified "were an elite group of men, trained for war and chosen by the king for their prowess in war and dependability in his service.... The position of men within this elite depended entirely upon the king's favour...."¹³⁵ Moreover, the possession of this exclusive citizenship is considered to entitle its possessor to certain rights and privileges not available to the majority of the population (p.651):

...in a juridical sense "Macedones" proper ... [were men] who held Macedonian citizenship from the king, served in his army and formed the Assembly of Macedones. They were a small proportion of the adult men in the kingdom.

Furthermore, Hammond, given his hierarchical view of Macedonian society, asserts that an individual might bear up to three differing degrees of citizenship; that of the supra-national *Macedones* (restricted to the élite), and others both regional and/or municipal.¹³⁶ Yet the evidence he cites says nothing about citizenship *per se*, and the discrepancies Hammond seizes upon to formulate his theory are susceptible to more persuasive interpretations.

¹³⁵ Hammond, *HM* 2.164. See fully pp.160-164, 647-652.

¹³⁶ Hammond, *HM* 2.647: "The essential point to grasp is that ... a free man might have had as many as three citizenships: for example, he might have been a 'Macedon', an 'Elimiotes', and a citizen of the town Aeane.... In practice, since the 'Macedones' were an elite group ... most free men had only the second and third forms of citizenship, namely that of the tribal state, e.g. the Elimiotae, and that of a town, or that of a lesser tribal state...."

The principal evidence for Hammond's selective citizenships comes from the limited epigraphical evidence and a passage the Arrian's *Indica* which has already been discussed. In the list of trierarchs at the Indus in 326 Arrian distinguishes between the Macedonian, Greek and Persian captains. A seeming anomaly is Nearchus' self-description as *ek Kretes*, while simultaneously listing himself amongst the Macedonians as from Amphipolis.¹³⁷ The double ethnic is explained a little later when Arrian divulges that Nearchus was "a Cretan by lineage, who lived in Amphipolis on the Strymon."¹³⁸ It is impossible to make any constitutional deductions from this statement, let alone to assert that the passage reveals Nearchus as possessing an Amphipolitan and a Macedonian citizenship.¹³⁹ The same reservation can also apply to Hammond's argument that, because Eumenes of Cardia is listed with the Greeks, although a Companion,¹⁴⁰ he had had 'Macedonian' citizenship withheld for some reason. However, by the time Eumenes became a Companion any notions of eligibility there may have been for this rank had doubtless altered. Perhaps as early as 330 Alexander had been introducing Persians into the ranks of the Companions.¹⁴¹ To the Macedonian infantry at least it was a matter for disquiet and part of the background to the Opis mutiny. From their point of view Alexander was devaluing things Macedonian.¹⁴² Clearly, by now, to be one of the *hetairoi* did not require that land be owned in Macedonia itself, an obvious corollary of Hammond's view of the Macedonian state, and the Persians are not alluded to as Macedonians. Eumenes himself was closely associated with Cardia and possibly never felt any need or desire for recognition as a Macedonian. His

¹³⁷ *Arr.Ind.*18.4. Presumably this is Nearchus' own appellation; there seems little motive for Arrian to preserve this obscure point unless he copied it directly from Nearchus' text, whose *Indica* Arrian utilized for his own work of the same name. See e.g. Brunt, *Arrian* II, 443-45, 518-25; Stadter, *Arrian of Nicomedia*, 116-21, 123-32.

¹³⁸ *Arr.Ind.*18.10-11.

¹³⁹ Hammond *HM* 2.647-8. See the review of R.M.Errington, "A History of Macedonia, II", *CR* 94 (1980), 78-80.

¹⁴⁰ *Arr.*vii.4.6.

¹⁴¹ *Arr.*vii.8.2, 11.3-6.

¹⁴² *Arr.*vii.6.2-5, 8.2, 11.3-6.

outstanding abilities and the trust Alexander and later Perdiccas placed in him accounts for his position.¹⁴³

The epigraphical evidence also fails to provide the answers Hammond seeks. For, though he believes that the inscriptions are an express record of the status differentials between the Macedonians, this is simply the inference Hammond draws from the variety of language employed on the inscriptions. Considering that these inscriptions are scattered in both space and time there would seem to be no grounds for suspecting anything other than natural diversity at work. Moreover, as Errington rightly points out in his review (p.79):

If the Macedones were indeed an elite group within the state, *we must expect and indeed demand evidence from within Macedonia* that some people there called themselves Macedones. H[ammond] cites none. (Italics in original. Cf. n.139)

J.Gabbert, who makes no reference to Hammond's views, recently collected all the inscriptions that recorded the nomenclature of individual Macedonians.¹⁴⁴ Gabbert wished to determine whether rural and urban Macedonians had a different status relative to their king. In drawing upon the identical evidence (and more) to that to which Hammond had access he arrives at a more considered conclusion:

If in fact there was a real distinction between the use of the city ethnic and the term "Macedonian," there seems no way to determine which was preferable.... The variety of nomenclature attested must be seen as purely arbitrary, based on the limited evidence available.... The conclusion must be negative: language alone does not indicate the citizenship status of any individual in Macedonia. The existing evidence, sparse though it is, contains too many contradictions.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ For Eumenes' association with Cardia and, in general, see E.M.Anson, "The Meaning of the term *Macedones*" *AW* 10 (1985), 67-68 [hereinafter "*Macedones*"]. The earliest reference to Eumenes as a Companion is at Opis in 324. He would have been raised to the status of Companion at a late date (after 330?); this is when he can be seen in important roles: Arr.v.24.6; vii.4.6, 13.1, 14.9. The Thessalian Medias, who must have been a Companion, makes a suggestive parallel (Arr.vii.24, 14.9). Cardia had never been part of the Macedonian state proper, as is clear from Diodorus XVIII.14.4.

¹⁴⁴ J.Gabbert, "The Language of Citizenship in Antigonid Macedonia", *AHB* 2 (1988), 10-11 [hereinafter "*Citizenship*"].

¹⁴⁵ Gabbert, "*Citizenship*", 11.

In sum, there seems little to recommend Hammond's view of citizenship. Therefore, the possible existence of divisive legal or political discrimination amongst the original Macedonian population itself and between them and any immigrants from outside Macedon seems unwarranted. Anson is surely correct in pronouncing that the term Macedon had "both ethnic and regional connotations" and that "a king giving land to outsiders gained a subject and a *Macedon*, an inhabitant of Macedonia."¹⁴⁶ That was what both Philip and those he attracted into his service desired. From Philip's point of view there would be no cogent reason, nor any need, to put artificial obstacles in the way of expediting the integration of Macedon's inhabitants.

Presumed Linguistic Affinities and Difficulties: Some Historical Judgements.

It is not possible to categorically deny the existence of any social problems following Philip's introduction of so many non-Macedonians into the state. The deficient nature of the evidence precludes such certainty. However, an article by Professor Badian has raised the possibility that Greeks and Macedonians were unable to comprehend each others' dialects. In a paper in *The Washington History of Art Volume 10*, entitled "Greeks and Macedonians", Professor Badian has discussed the nature of the relationship between the two groups of his title, particularly with regard to the perceptions each held of the other and the perceived problem of the Macedonian language. In the opening paragraph Badian states that, "From the linguistic point of view ... (i.e. 'Did the ancient Macedonians speak a form of Greek?'), the question seems to me at present unanswerable for the period down to Alexander the Great."¹⁴⁷ Whether or not the Macedonians themselves were Greek as

¹⁴⁶ Anson, "*Macedones*", 67-68. This may not necessarily be true of Alexander as Anson implies. At least not following his victory at Issus in 333 when he had asserted his claim as heir to the Persian throne: Arr.ii.14.9; cf. Bosworth, *Commentary*, 221, 227-32 for sources and discussion. By this time Alexander's horizons were considerably wider than those purely Macedonian.

a body is, of course, a pseudo-problem as Badian acknowledges. Macedonian receptivity towards the Greek cultural penetration is an undoubted fact, even if it has little bearing on the problem here. So is Philip's presentation of the Macedonian monarchy as "thoroughly Greek" for political and propagandist motives, however important these issues are in and of themselves.¹⁴⁸ However, it seems to me that Badian uses often inappropriate evidence in his discussion of the issue; nor does he acknowledge the existence of evidence that contradicts his thesis. The varying degree of hostility directed against Philip and Macedonia reflects the political vacillations of public and personal stances Athenian politicians held towards Macedonia and her king.

Despite some reservations Badian nonetheless discusses linguistic affinities and then, ignoring his own caveats, proceeds to make historical judgements on the basis of his discussion. Thus "technical difficulties" are considered to affect the ability of Macedonian armies to operate under a Greek commander such as Eumenes.¹⁴⁹ These assumptions govern Badian's analysis of Philip's and Alexander's policy of integration. As such the assimilation of Greeks into Macedonia is restricted to a period before the Macedonian conquest of the coastal cities and only "a very select body" of Greeks are

¹⁴⁷ Badian, "Greeks", 33-52 (*op.cit.* n.121, above). Badian's concern "with *sentiment* (his italics), which is itself historical fact and must be taken seriously as such" (p.42), is, in itself, valid. His method of discovering such sentiment is not. To present evidence from orators such as Demosthenes who, naturally, referred to Philip as a barbarian; and to recount the battles between Greeks and Macedonians (pp. 42-3) is, on the one hand to misunderstand the nature of fourth-century rhetoric and on the other the aspirations of the Greek city-state. The poleis disliked any hegemon whether Greek, Macedonian or Persian and the Greeks felt as little compunction about inflicting brutal measures upon their Greek opponents as they did upon the barbaroi. Cawkwell can use the same evidence and methodology as Badian to write a most peculiar chapter (Cawkwell, *PM* 50-57) the title of which, "Thoroughly Greek", is considered to describe Philip himself. On the nature of the oratorical speeches and for their dangers as historical evidence (as opposed to simple abuse) see P.Harding, "Rhetoric and Politics in Fourth-Century Athens", *Phoenix* 41 (1987), 25-39.

¹⁴⁸ For the Hellenism of Macedonia cf. Cawkwell, *op.cit.* n.147; Badian, "Greeks", 33-39. Cf. also Hammond, *HM* 2.39-54, for the languages of Macedonia and nearby tribes with a full discussion of the limited Macedonian vocabulary available. He concludes: "...the Macedones of the fourth century spoke ordinary standard Greek and also on special occasions a Macedonian dialect of Greek" (p.47: but see below p.131). A.B.Daskalakis, *The Hellenism of the Ancient Macedonians* (Thessaloniki 1965), 59-95, deduces that the Macedonians spoke a dialect based upon Doric Greek. S.Perlman, "The Coins of Philip II and Alexander the Great and their Pan-Hellenic Propaganda", *NC* (1965), 57-67 presents the numismatic evidence for Philip's exploitation of "Greekness".

¹⁴⁹ Badian, "Greeks", 39.

considered to have been absorbed into the Macedonian court élite.¹⁵⁰ It was to be Alexander who, in Badian's view, made full use of these talented Greeks; but "it is particularly interesting to notice that he [Alexander] never ... tried to integrate Greeks into the Macedonian infantry." A few lines later Badian categorically states that "integration of Macedonians and Iranians was important, while integration of Greeks with either was not."¹⁵¹ If Badian is correct then the possibility that extensive Greek immigration into Macedon took place, resulting in the inclusion of Greek natives into the phalanx, becomes fraught with difficulties.

What then are the "technical difficulties"? For Badian Eumenes' career is the test case. A recently discovered fragment of Arrian's *ta meta Alexandron* has been given a rudimentary critical apparatus and republished in its proper historical context by Bosworth.¹⁵² The fragment informs us that Eumenes, wishing to avoid battle with Neoptolemos' phalangites in early 321 decided to attempt negotiation first:

When he [Eumenes] saw the close-locked formation of the Macedonian phalanx at its minimum extension and the men themselves heartened to venture every hazard, he sent Xennias once more, a man whose speech was Macedonian, bidding him declare that ... [he would] bar them from provisions....
(Translation is Bosworth's: "Eumenes", 228.)

Eumenes' threat achieved the desired result. Owing to his enemies' preponderance of cavalry Neoptolemos' soldiers would be unable to forage. In itself this is unremarkable but Eumenes'

¹⁵⁰ Badian notes (correctly) that conquered Greek cities counted as part of the Macedonian kingdom, though retaining some civic rights. Only these Greeks were absorbed into Macedonia proper, an action Badian equates with later Roman practice: "Greeks", 39-40: p.40: "To these Greeks, the question of whether to regard Macedonians as Greeks or as barbarians would have been simply irrelevant." Though the language problem that these Greeks would presumably have faced, on Badian's view, is not considered.

¹⁵¹ Badian, "Greeks", 39-40. Cf. p.43: "Alexander himself, with that basic tact that (at times surprisingly) links him to his father, had not tried to force military integration on his Greeks and Macedonians." The implication must be that Philip too never considered such a policy.

¹⁵² A.B.Bosworth, "Eumenes, Neoptolemos and PSI XII 1284", *GRBS* 18 (1978), 227-237 [hereinafter "Eumenes"]. The fragment was discovered near Oxyrhynchus in 1932 and first published by V.Bartoletti, *Papiri greci e latini della Società Italiana (PSI) XII.2* (Florence 1951), 158-165 nr.1284.

seemingly specific choice of a Macedonian speaker has aroused modern comment. Both Badian and Bosworth regard this as evidence for Macedonian as having been a distinct language from Greek during the fourth century. For Badian Eumenes is disadvantaged by "the simple fact that he could not directly communicate with Macedonian soldiers" and this is ultimately fateful to the Greek's bid for power.¹⁵³ The evidence is not as clear as Badian would have us believe, however; particularly with regard to Eumenes. The Greek was a skilled linguist, not surprising in a man who was Alexander's Chief Secretary (*archigrammateus*), at the least capable of understanding Greek and Syriac.¹⁵⁴ It would be remarkable if Eumenes had not familiarized himself with the Macedonian language or dialect (whatever that may have entailed), even assuming that it would not be required of him. Whether Eumenes would have needed to know Macedonian to participate in Alexander's court life is something that cannot be clearly substantiated. The *lingua franca* of the court was in all probability Greek - though here the real issue is one of mutual intelligibility.¹⁵⁵ There is also evidence that Eumenes did directly speak to Macedonian soldiers. When Antigonos tried to seduce his Macedonians away from him in 317, Eumenes went amongst them and related to them Aesop's fable of the lion and the maiden.

¹⁵³ Badian, "Greeks", 41. Cf. Bosworth, "Eumenes", 236. E.M. Anson, "Discrimination and Eumenes of Cardia", *AW* 3 (1980), 56-9, has argued to the other extreme (p.59), "that, if anything, Eumenes' 'Greekness' aided him through his strategic use of it more often than it harmed him."

¹⁵⁴ Plut. *Eum.* 1.2; 2.3 for his role as Alexander's secretary. Polyaeus (viii.1.3) preserves a stratagem that requires Eumenes' understanding of Syriac - which also suggests that the language of Alexander's administration was not exclusively Greek. Other linguistic skills may have been required of Eumenes as well. Note also the case of Laomedon, whom Alexander placed in charge of the barbarian captives as he knew their tongue (Arr. iii.6.6). This is considered remarkable (as was Peucestas' adoption of Persian apparel and command of the language: Arr. vii.6.3), and so worthy of comment. There is no evidence that suggests a Macedonian's knowledge of Greek to be exceptional (or vice-versa); doubtless because the issue never arose. I see no need to accept, with Brunt (*Arrian*, 238 n.2), that *es ta barbarika grammata* is a gloss on Arrian iii.6.6.

¹⁵⁵ The court seemingly functioned without linguistic difficulties - though there were certainly cultural ones. The famous occasion of confrontation between Cleitus and Alexander, resulting in the former's death from a spear-thrust of his king's, was exacerbated by cultural tensions between Macedonians and Greeks at the elite level and towards the Persians from all levels. Plut. *Alex.* 50-53; Arr. iv.8-9.4; Curt. viii.1.20-2.12; Justin xii.6-16. An example of Eumenes' contact with Macedonian officers after Alexander's death: D.S. XVIII.63.1-5.

There was no failure of communication here.¹⁵⁶ Eumenes' decision to send Xennias to speak to Neoptolemos' army can easily be rationalized as the prudent decision of a commander who was in the midst of an impending battle - the possibility of a treacherous death would naturally be a consideration. Of greater interest are the two occasions on which we hear of Macedonians shouting out in Macedonian. The later of these two is an acclamation of the ill Eumenes prior to battle; the soldiers greeting their commander *Makedonisti tei*. There is no suggestion that Eumenes could not comprehend his men's tribute to him - or that any other significance should be attached to this event.¹⁵⁷ The earlier occasion, which arose from the circumstances surrounding Cleitus' murder, is reported by Plutarch. In his account Alexander demands his guards whom he summoned *Makedonisti kalôn tous hypaspistas*.¹⁵⁸ What can be made of this? One is tempted to say very little. However, Hammond has argued that this use of the verb *makedonizein* was a particular dialect of Greek for use on particular occasions; in this instance it: "was an indication of a civil commotion for which military intervention was needed".¹⁵⁹ This is a remarkable over-interpretation, as Badian rightly notes.¹⁶⁰ The military, like all institutions, have their own particular rituals and peculiar vocabularies. How many modern military commands are enunciated in the purest of English? Alexander's choice of words, lost to us, may well have been more important than his use of dialect. If Plutarch's comment, that "...this was a sign of great disturbance", has any validity at all it must be as a reference to Alexander's summoning of the hypaspists, not to the fact that he called out in Macedonian. Nor, however, is Badian's view that: "He [Alexander] used the only language in which his guards could be addressed" any more convincing.¹⁶¹ While Badian notes that Hammond had no knowledge of the

¹⁵⁶ D.S.XIX.25.3-7.

¹⁵⁷ Plut.*Eum.*14.5.

¹⁵⁸ Plut.*Alex.*51.4.

¹⁵⁹ Hammond, *HM* 2.46-47, and n.2. A fine piece of control for a drunken king inflamed with anger!

¹⁶⁰ Badian, "Greeks", 50 n.64.

¹⁶¹ Badian, "Greeks", 41.

papyrus fragment (note 160, above), he, however, would have us believe that Macedonians and Greeks were not only linguistically separated and thus suffered from mutual incomprehensibility but also that the men assigned to protect Alexander's court were incapable of understanding its Greek members whom they were also responsible for. Obviously this is unlikely, and indeed evidence does exist that directly contradicts Badian's hypothesis.

Curtius, in relating the trial of Philotas, has Alexander ask Philotas whether he will address the assembled soldiers in his native tongue. Philotas replies that he would use Greek on the grounds that more than just the Macedonians would then understand his words. He considered that Alexander had employed the Greek tongue on the same grounds, making Alexander's condemnation of Philotas' denial of Macedonian speech grossly unfair.¹⁶² What is clear is the assumption that while Greeks may not have been able to understand Macedonian the reverse was not the case. The same implication is behind Alexander's decision to have 30,000 Persians trained in Macedonian military techniques but in the Greek language.¹⁶³ Temporarily short of troops upon returning from India Alexander combined Persians and Macedonians within the phalanx. Again, one presumes Greek would be the common tongue between the races.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Curt.vi.8.23-10.37 deals with these speeches. They are, in all probability worthless as historical evidence and, in detail, are products of Curtius' own imagination. Curtius does, however, preserve information not within the other sources. Cf. Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 132-8 for a discussion of the source problems. The presence of the soldiers, doubtless "to test Alexander's prestige before he exercised his right to act", was also a gathering "summoned by the king to hear the king's views and to be convinced of their correctness, in order to ensure that he could take the action he intended without meeting serious objection...." (p.107: R.M.Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State Under the Monarchy", *Chiron* 8 [1978], 77-133. Cf. also R.A.Lock, "The Macedonian Army Assembly in the Time of Alexander the Great", *CP* 72 [1977], 91-107); in this context the use of Greek to enable the widest number of those present to understand is appropriate. The Macedonians were not acting as a jury as has been thought - if so why use any speech other than Macedonian - these speeches were emotional appeals, whatever their actual content.

¹⁶³ *Plut.Alex.*47.3, 71.1. Cf. D.S XVII.108.1-3; Arr.vii.6.1.

¹⁶⁴ Arr.vii.23.3-4. There is no indication as to whether these Persians were taught the Greek tongue as was the case with the *Epigonoi*. However, it is likely. When Alexander captured the princesses of the Persian royal house following Darius' defeat at Issus he gave instructions that they were to be educated in the Greek language and customs (D.S.XVII.67.1; Curt.v.2.17). Finally, in 323 these women were amongst ninety-two Persian women married at Susa to

Furthermore, need we assume that Philip would have been reluctant to assign Greek-speaking immigrants to the phalanx, even if it is accepted that there may have been a problem of command and control? The environment of an ancient battle would suggest otherwise. Noise, limited vision and confusion meant that commanders communicated with each other through messengers and that individual soldiers would be restricted to following the banner of their unit; not a vocal command they would be unable to hear.¹⁶⁵

Diodorus and Plutarch do explicitly point to Eumenes' Greek origin as a great handicap in a Macedonian world. As has been noted Badian accepts the ancient estimate at face value. Yet Eumenes commanded troops during the reign of Alexander and was amongst the Companions Alexander had married to Persian women at Susa.¹⁶⁶ More remarkably, when Perdikkas replaced the dead Hephaestion as Alexander's confidant¹⁶⁷ Eumenes received Perdikkas' military command, which was over Macedonian soldiers.¹⁶⁸ In the final analysis Eumenes' "Greekness" seems to have had little impact on his ability to command Macedonian soldiers. In Jane Hornblower's view, "Eumenes' troubles with his army arose chiefly, not, as our sources maintain, from the fact of Eumenes' nationality or from the perfidy of the Silver Shields, but from lack of cash and the failure to win a decisive victory against Antigonos."¹⁶⁹

Alexander and his largely Macedonian staff (cf. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 156 for sources and discussion).

¹⁶⁵ For the environment of battle: Hanson, *Western Way of War*, esp.147-50, 152-156 (dust and noise); 155-6 (sight); 185-193 (confusion). Use of messengers: Arr.iii.15.1. Hephaestion had a banner specially commissioned for his unit: Arr.vii.14.10.

¹⁶⁶ For example Plut.*Eum.*14.1-4,16.1ff; *Comp.Eum.&Sert.*1.1-2. D.S.XVIII.62ff, XIX.15ff. These two undoubtedly reflect the work of Eumenes' biographer and nephew, Hieronymus of Cardia, upon whom both relied. Cf. Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, passim, esp.154-164, 196-211. For Eumenes' importance in Alexander's later years: Arr.v.24.6, vii.4.6, 13.1, 14.9.

¹⁶⁷ And as chiliarch? Arr.vii.14.9-10. Curt.x.4.3 would suggest not, but Perdikkas' growing influence is clear: Curt.x.5-10.

¹⁶⁸ Plut.*Eum.*1.2.

¹⁶⁹ Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 204-5. Cf. also 187-196 for the military ethos of the period immediately following Alexander's death. R.A.Billows, "Anatolian Dynasts: The Case of the Macedonian Eupolemos in Karia", *Cl.Ant.*, 8 (1989), 201-203, emphasises that the Diadochoi, both great

In conclusion, whatever the case may be for the distinct nature of the Macedonian language (or dialect), it cannot be seen as a cause for restricting opportunities amongst Greek-speaking natives for service in the Macedonian state. It is undoubtedly true that the apogee of influence for those of Greek descent came under Alexander - it takes time for any new group to be absorbed into an elite. Nonetheless their presence grew during Philip's reign - a massive expansion in the number of *Macedones* from the new immigrants and the Greeks of the once-independent *poleis* of the coast. Even Badian's assertion that Philip "is not known to have employed any Greeks" to command his infantry relies on an argument from silence.¹⁷⁰ With one perhaps apocryphal exception there is no prosopographical evidence for unit commanders during Philip's reign comparable to that of Alexander's. The exception is derived from Polyaeus, who preserves a precept of Philip's relating to the discipline he enforced upon his army. We are told that:

Philip once broke a Tarentine of rank, who had a command in his army, because he used warm baths saying, "You seem a stranger to the Macedonian customs; which do not indulge the use of warm water even to a woman in child-bed."¹⁷¹

Whatever the veracity of this incident the assumptions are variously noteworthy. Firstly, the Tarentine would presumably be of Greek birth. Secondly, the implication is clear that the unnamed officer held a command of some sort over Macedonian soldiers. Whether it would be possible for Philip to treat a mercenary this way is unanswerable (and it is unlikely that a mercenary would command Macedonians); certainly it would seem peculiar to try and force Macedonian customs upon one.¹⁷² Here Philip is perhaps not only concerned with discipline within his army, but perhaps also with achieving homogeneity of customs amongst both the old and the new Macedonians serving within the phalanx.

and small, stressed their Macedonian background, their prowess in war and the principle of *doroktetos chora* - spear won land - to justify their power and position.

¹⁷⁰ Badian, "Greeks", 41.

¹⁷¹ Polyaeus iv.2.1.

¹⁷² However, Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, 158, assumed the man to be a mercenary.

CONCLUSION.

Any attempt to provide a fuller understanding of the costs of Alexander's conquests in terms of the number of Macedonians who died to achieve their king's aims is a difficult one. Fundamentally, there are two diametrically opposed approaches. One, as espoused by N.G.L.Hammond, demands that we confine ourselves to the evidence that we can glean from the surviving literary texts. In doing so we have to believe that our sources provide full and trustworthy accounts of the number of Macedonian dead, disabled and discharged. As Chapter 1 demonstrated, we clearly cannot have such trust in the partial and propagandist record that has survived. In the end, and despite his trust in Arrian at least, even Hammond is required to base his estimate of Macedonian casualties on criteria other than what an extended body-count drawn from the sources may proffer. Simply put, the number of survivors at Babylon are subtracted from the total of Macedonians known to have served in Asia. Basically, Hammond maximises the number of survivors and down-plays the level of reinforcements to reach a conclusion that "less than 3,000 died over the ten years".¹

The approach undertaken by A.B.Bosworth (and to a lesser degree, P.A.Brunt), attempts to highlight the number of men who served in Asia and to apply a crude percentage increase onto that total by the addition of a suggested number of (hypothetical) dead.² This, of course, avoids the impossible difficulties that surround calculations based upon a head count.³ The method does, however, leave both Bosworth and Brunt (and, incidentally, myself) open to Hammond's charges that such models are based upon unwarranted assumptions. Namely, that disease and natural wastage were at all significant and that we are entitled to believe that the extant sources could possibly have failed to record the arrival of further reinforcements - though, one might argue, the number of survivors

¹ Hammond, "Casualties", 67-8.

² Bosworth, "Decline", 4-5, "we can hardly suppose that even 50% of the original expeditionary force survived the years of campaigning." Cf. Brunt, "Cavalry", 38 n.35: "I doubt if half the 12,000 foot with which Alexander crossed to Asia would have survived...."

³ The attempt is undertaken, with partial and unsatisfactory results, by Milns, "Army", 106-113; and (for different purposes), by Engels, *Logistics*, 146-52. For some criticisms cf. Brunt, *Arrian II*, 482-3.

demands that this was the case. Hammond's denial of these factors is not only contradicted by the evidence that relates to Alexander's army, but also by the daily realities of the ancient world where we can assess them.⁴ Furthermore, elementary demographic considerations make a mockery of Hammond's figures. Quite simply, more men would have died from old age (in ancient terms), by 323, than Hammond would concede had perished from all conceivable causes.

Admittedly, the method of assessing Macedonian casualties argued for here does necessitate accepting that there were far more Macedonians available than is commonly assumed to be the case.⁵ G.T.Griffith, explicitly, and Bosworth and Brunt, to a more implicit degree, have all argued that their number have consistently been underestimated. Regrettably, their methods and demographic conceptions have been inadequate to explain the phenomenal rise in Macedon's level of military service.⁶ Therefore, it has been argued that Macedonia under Philip II and (to a lesser extent), Alexander III, was not a demographically closed system and that this period saw a large number of immigrants settling in Macedon.

While the direct evidence for substantial immigration at all levels of Macedonian society is weak, scattered, and all too often inferential for outright conviction or present comfort, the easy answer of 'peace and prosperity' clearly will not suffice. This is true even if one accepts the presence of an economic revolution as important; a possibility which the evidence does not fully warrant. Some other, perhaps more brutal, mechanism needs to be supposed to satisfy the requirements of the data and the fact of Macedon's remarkable eclipse of the other Mediterranean powers. The absorption of Upper Macedonia and the Greek *poleis* of the northern Aegean, combined with a significant level of immigration, would seem to furnish the key. Macedonia was never a demographically closed system

⁴ Hammond, "Casualties", 66-7, discusses Brunt's and Bosworth's methods. In just over a page of text Hammond taxes them with the word "assumption" on ten occasions. Yet he misrepresents the force of Bosworth's argument in an incredible fashion. Hammond associates Bosworth's use of the word "wastage", with mere fatigue ("Casualties", 66 with n.56: from which, perhaps, we would not expect massive losses); when in fact Bosworth considers "wastage" synonymous with losses experienced from battle, disease, accident and natural disaster as well ("Decline", 4-5).

⁵ Cf. Milns, "Army", 110-113, citing much of the older literature.

⁶ Cf. the discussion in Chapter 3.

and her kings' were receptive from early on in the country's history to the inclusion of other ethnic groups within the state.

Where the demarcation between each factor (natural population growth, whole-scale absorption and immigration) should be set, in a quantitative fashion, is at present unanswerable given the present state of our knowledge. Such distinctions, which perhaps cannot avoid being drawn are, by their very nature, largely based upon subjective criteria. Nonetheless, it is hoped that this thesis has demonstrated that these various mechanisms did act upon the population of fourth century Macedonia and that, as such, Macedon's rise to power needs to be understood within the context of the wider Greek social environment. Levels and degrees of causality are always difficult to fathom. Yet, it may be, as Diodorus claimed, that Philip was justifiably "prouder of his strategy and his diplomatic successes than of his valour in actual battle".⁷ Rather than the modern emphasis on Philip's skills as a general and politician (formidable as they were), the focus should perhaps be directed towards his success in stabilizing Macedon and attracting men to his service at the individual level. Philip established Macedon's power by augmenting its population. His temperament and preference led him to apply it with care and subtlety. Alexander's frighteningly rapid destruction of Thebes demonstrated the alternative method.

⁷ D.S.XVI.95.3. Cf. XVI.1.6 and Polyaeus iv.2.9, 19.

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