"'Foreign Villains and Home-grown Heroes': A critical geopolitical re-reading of a neo-liberal text from *The Atlantic Monthly*"

by

Andrea L. Lloyd
B.A., University of Victoria, 1994

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Geography

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

[redacted]

Dr. Pamela Moss, Supervisor (Faculty of Human and Social Development)

[redacted]

Dr. Stephen Lonergan, Supervisor (Department of Geography)

[redacted]

Dr. Martha McMahon, Outside Member (Department of Sociology)

[redacted]

Dr. Rennie Warburton, External Examiner (Department of Sociology)

University of Victoria

Supervisor: Dr. Pamela Moss and Dr. Stephen Lonergan

ABSTRACT

This study presents a critical analysis of neo-liberal discourses of international migration. Through a close reading of the text "Must it be the West against the Rest?", I challenge the authors' representation of refugee/migrants as a pre-eminent geopolitical threat to 'global order' in the post-Cold War period. I employ a critical geopolitical approach to problematise this identification of a 'new' antagonism not as an objective description of reality, but as part of powerful discursive representational practices that produce exclusion. I argue that these sorts of explanations are less about refugees/migrants and the 'reality' of international migration, and more about the need to secure Western hegemony and its idealised way of life. One means to resist the exclusions in neo-liberal texts is to resist the narrow conceptual categories that they force upon their readers, and to reject the exclusive 'we' that is created for 'us' in these texts.

Examiners:

Dr. Pamela Moss, Supervisor (Department of Human and Social Development)



Dr. Stephen Lonergan, Supervisor (Department of Geography)



Dr. Martha McMahon, Outside Member (Department of Sociology)

Dr. Rennie Warburton, External Examiner (Department of Sociology)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to many people for their support and encouragement during my graduate work at the University of Victoria.

Many thanks are due to my supervisor, Pamela Moss, for your support and guidance throughout this thesis project. I have learned so much from the way that you conduct yourself as a teacher and scholar and I admire greatly the work that you do. Your expertise, patience and good humour encouraged me through the good times and enabled me to carry on though the difficult times, and I am truly grateful for all your hard work and assistance with this project.

Thank you to my supervisor, Stephen Lonergan, for inspiring me to begin a graduate program in Geography and for encouraging me to look at "Must it be the West against the Rest?". I thank you for your support and guidance, your many helpful thesis conversations, especially in the early days as I worked through how to approach the topic, and for giving me the opportunity to learn valuable research skills.

Martha McMahon, thank you for your encouragement. I very much appreciate your ideas and comments on my work and for challenging me to think widely and to write as clearly and as simply as possible. Thank you for sharing your wisdom and for helping me to keep my head on straight. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to work with Lawrence Berg while at the University of Victoria. Thank you for your excellent suggestions and engaging conversations on refugee and migrant issues, for helping me to focus my questions, and for somehow managing to make theory fun. Thank you also to Rennie Warburton in the Department of Sociology for your careful reading of my thesis and insightful comments.

Thank you to *The Atlantic Monthly* and to Paul Kennedy and Matthew Connelly for granting me copyright permission to reproduce the article "Must it be the West against the Rest?"

For friendship and memorable times at UVIC, I am grateful to Carolyn Almen, Kathleen Gabelmann, Anne Hammill, Wanda Ollis, Denise Pritchard, Ranu Sharma, Amy Zidulka, and Ann Zurbrigg. Thank you to my parents for their unfailing love and support.
And finally, to Gray Lloyd, I cannot express what your love and encouragement has meant to me.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

There are a variety of grand labels circulating in foreign policy and international relations literature to both make sense of and map the present political and historical juncture. This period has been described most commonly by the vague term 'post-Cold War period', most optimistically as the 'new world order', or most ominously as the (new) 'world disorder'.[1] What these labels have in common is that they imply a pervasive sense of change and movement in contemporary social, political, economic relations – relations characterised increasingly by flows of communication, technology, capital, commodities, services, and people.

This thesis concerns a particular category of these flows – international migration. The movement of people in its multiple forms is a significant aspect of the ongoing re-positionings of power, society, and space (Tesfahuney, 1998). Unlike flows of technology, communication, and money, flows of people are not regarded as contributing to a (idealised) 'global village', as depicted in advertisements from Microsoft, IBM and transnational brokerage firms. Instead, the mobility of people is viewed as a threat and a danger to more narrow, hegemonically defined conceptions of community.[2] International migrants, by their very definition, cross and transgress borders between states, and therefore present a challenge to the dominant socio-political organisation of nation-states, imagined as an order of proper people (culturally homogeneous citizens) in their proper place (the territorial state). Since the late 1980s, international migration has become a deeply politicised and divisive issue for wealthy countries in the West.[3] The object of

---

[1] To those who concur with the 'disorder' interpretation, however, these are not necessarily 'new' developments. As Eisenstein (1996:63) argues: "The problem with 'post'-times is that they misrepresent the newness of the 21st century". Similarly, Lazarus (1991:95) remarks: "The new world order – an imperialist and capitalist world system – is from any internationalist or postcolonial perception, distressingly reminiscent of the old world order".

[2] I use the passive construction "is viewed" here to call attention to the hegemony of such a vantage point. Those that participate in the regulation of the flows of people (e.g. some capitalists, some nationalists, some politicians) somehow, often circuitously, benefit from having us all view people moving as threatening 'our' security.

[3] A note on language: I use the term 'West' here (rather than 'First World' or 'North', as it is now increasingly called since the 'Second World' no longer exists) because the relation that is the focus of this study is between 'West' and 'Rest'. But, of course, all of these terms are problematic because they refer to extra-geographical, socio-economic phenomenon. They are *political* designations that signify a

this politicisation and division, however, is a particular kind of flow of mobile persons. It is not the flow of international business travellers from North America or Europe that is viewed as a 'threat'; rather, it is the flow of peoples of the non-Western world into Western territories/geographies (Soguk, 1996) that is deemed threatening. Increasingly, Western states define international migration as a crucial issue, poised to become the most pressing danger in the post-Cold War period.

Motivation for Study and Research Question

I focused on this issue in particular after I came across a commentary by Ted Koppel in an article about genocide in Rwanda and the ensuing refugee crisis (Fair and Parks, 1998). Koppel (*Nightline*, 1994) said:

> Maybe it's an outgrowth of the age of television, but we do prefer to keep our crises simple, stories with a definable beginning and a predictable end. We like our villains to be foreign and our heroes home-grown. What we do not like are long, open-ended, complicated involvements far from home, in which America's good intentions are misunderstood.

This commentary is provocative to me because my understanding of refugees/migrants is always mediated by a multitude of media representations and shaped, in part, by the kind of news programming that Koppel describes. His words prompted me to consider the apparent contradiction between the language of 'good intentions' and its increasingly evident limitations, exemplified by a proliferation of negative representations of refugees/migrants in the media. 'Foreign villains' and 'home-grown heroes' is surely a simplistic media gloss, but I want to consider why this image of two camps is so powerful.

In trying to make sense of these things in my own (situated) context – I came to my research question. *How are international migrants represented in a (hegemonic) neo-liberal text?* My motivation for this study is to try to make sense of the seemingly paradoxical situation of how the least secure can become the most threatening; to try to

---

hierarchical relation. Because this issue of naming cannot be resolved satisfactorily, and certainly not equitably, I will hereafter place the terms 'West' or 'South' (to refer to the 'Rest') in quotation marks to highlight this difficulty.

make sense of the increasingly visible racism and xenophobia within wealthy states; and perhaps most importantly, to try to understand why and how it is that it is not racism and xenophobia that are constructed as problems, rather it is the refugees and migrants themselves.

One of the ways that international migration is sustained as an issue and problem is through different kinds of texts. It is important, therefore, to look at texts as one of means through which social phenomena acquire meaning. The principal objective of this study is to understand how exclusive definitions of the world (and peoples' places within it) are produced, sustained and circulated. To achieve this objective I employ a critical discourse analysis to reread a geopolitical text. I have chosen a relatively popular forum through which geopolitical explanations are expressed – the article "Must it be the West against the Rest?" from a prominent U.S. liberal monthly magazine (Connelly and Kennedy, 1994).

Geopolitical discourse(s) are powerful explanations, which further act as representations that differentially construct some peoples and places as 'threats' or dangers, in order to reinforce boundaries between 'us' and 'them', 'North' and 'South', the 'West' and 'Rest'. In this thesis, I use a *critical* geopolitical approach to challenge geopolitical explanations. I argue that these explanations are neither objective, self-evident descriptions of 'reality', nor concrete physical or geographical locations, but powerful discursive representational practices that define hierarchically what issues matter in international politics. "The ability to control the items that figure, or do not figure, on the agenda, and the sort of phenomena regarded as political, are themselves a 'big' issue" (Kofman and Peake, 1990:311). By challenging the 'big' issues of geopolitics, I aim to politicise the (re)mappings of global 'order' in the post-Cold War period. Specifically, I endeavour to problematise representations of refugees/migrants as a threat or enemy to this order. I argue that these sorts of geopolitical explanations are less about refugees/migrants and the 'reality' of international migration than about the 'West' and the"need to discipline the ambiguity of global life in ways that help secure always fragile identities" (Campbell, 1992:18).

It is imperative to make explicit, however, that although I claim that this study is less about refugees/migrants, and more about powerful discursive practices, I do not intend to diminish the materiality of their struggles. "After all, hunger still hurts and bullets still kill…." (Soguk, 1996:286). An emphasis on discursive and textual practices in no way denies the social practices that continue to displace people, force people out of their homes, prevent them from making a home or belonging *anywhere*, and render them the targets of suspicion, abuse, torture or death. Looking at texts is but *one* means to understand how these practices keep going on and on.

Context: International Migration System

My focus in this study is to examine the representations of refugees/migrants in a neo-liberal text. Refugees and migrants, however, are not a homogenous group – both are considered international migrants, but they are addressed separately in law and policy. This distinction is based on the simple binary understanding that refugees constitute a political form of migration, immigrants an economic form (Hein, 1993).[4] However, I do not think that this is a useful distinction when actually sorting through the meanings generated by neo-liberal texts. In the following section, I situate the terms 'refugee' and 'migrant' in changing political and institutional contexts. In addition, I explain why in this study I resist the conventional separation of refugees/migrants as separate categories of international migrants.

[4] Alternatively, the distinction can also be made on the basis of whether movement is 'forced' or 'voluntary'. Implicit in the definition of 'economic' or 'voluntary', as opposed to political/forced, is the depoliticisation of economic factors. For example, this distinction assumes (in a reductionist scenario) that migrants are reacting to (abstract) 'laws of the market' that are above and beyond politics. The effect is that issues like hunger or environmental degradation are taken out of political context. The movement of 'economic' or 'voluntary' migrants, then, is based on 'individual' economic decisions, and ignores the structural organisation of the international/global political economy that rewards some and penalises others.

The international refugee protection system

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been significant political and policy shifts relating to refugees/migrants. I identify two parallel trends – first, the dismantling of the international refugee framework in place since 1951 by the world's wealthiest states, and second, the closer political integration among wealthy 'receiving' states to address international migration as a crucial geopolitical issue.[5]

Refugees are a distinct subset of international migrants. Defined by their predicament as victims of political persecution, and outside their country of origin, refugees are recognised by international law as an exception to the norm of state-controlled immigration (Shacknove, 1993). An international framework to protect refugees has been in place since 1951 and has shaped nation-state responses to international migrants and refugees. The 1951 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Convention legally defines a 'refugee' as:

> A person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality an is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country, or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, 1993:11).[6]

The category 'refugee' was formulated at the end of World War II as a specific legal and institutional response to the issue of post-war resettlement. The UN Convention was intended to be a temporary measure to address a particular *European* phenomenon, yet it set historical precedent as a *universal* declaration. Prior to 1951, no international agreement existed to deal with refugees as a collective, humanitarian issue (Malkki, 1995). The UN Convention standardised the refugee as a category, and formalised an "international refugee regime" (Zolberg et. al, 1989), comprised of the United Nations

[5] The word 'receiving' is somewhat misleading here. Nearly two-thirds of all refugees are being hosted *outside* of Europe or North America (UNHCR, 1997; USCR, 1999). The world's wealthy states offer resettlement to less than one per cent of the world's refugees (Loescher 1993).

[6] In 1999, the UNHCR, the main international organisation charged with assisting and protecting refugees, estimated 11.5 million displaced people in this situation (UNHCR website, www.unhcr.ch).

High Commissioner for Refugees, other UN agencies, non-governmental organisations, and humanitarian agencies. With the 1951 Convention, the contemporary refugee with recognised rights to protection, asylum and assistance was created.[7]

To date, 134 countries have ratified the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 1997).[8] Though the United Nations provides a 'universal' definition, in practice narrow criteria restrict who is entitled to receive relief and protection. The 1951 Convention restricts the classification of refugee to those individuals who faced with political persecution, have crossed an international border, and individual states assume responsibility for adjudicating refugee claimants according to the UN Convention.[9] Refugees are not treated equally within the international regime, nor do all states respond uniformly to refugee crises/problems. As Bhabha (1996:4) comments, "The common dignity supposedly inherent in all human beings is… differentially coded throughout the refugee adjudication system".[10] Whether a refugee receives protection and assistance depends on a shifting combination of domestic and foreign policy considerations. Such considerations include perceived expense (in terms of social assistance and 'integration' costs); perceived gains (in terms of public relations, as proof that the receiving country is 'civilised' and 'humane' in the eyes of the 'international community'); as well as the relationship between the receiving country

---

[7] Here I prioritise the 1951 UN Convention as a definitive moment in refugee protection, but this is not to say that refugees did not exist prior to this date. Throughout history people have sought to escape life-threatening situations by seeking refuge. However, I concur with Malkki (1995:497) "there is no 'proto-refugee' of which the modern refugee is a direct descendant".

[8] The 1967 Protocol removed geographical and temporal restrictions of 1951 Convention that restricted the definition of refugees to pre-1951 refugees of European origin.

[9] In practice, UNHCR has assisted a broader group than those included by Convention mandate – including 'stateless people' (for example, Roma or gypsy communities in former Czechoslovakia, and Palestinians, the largest group of stateless people in the world (UNHCR, 1997); 'returnees' (including former refugees from Mozambique, Cambodia, and most recently, Kosovo); 'others of concern' (for example, war affected populations and internally displaced people, such as in the Sudan, Somalia, and including relocating peoples in former USSR).

[10] The granting of asylum to refugee claimants is an important feature of the international refugee protection system. However, although the refugee is 'universally' defined, the granting of asylum is the purview of individual states. No right to receive asylum yet exists in international, regional, or municipal law, although states are obligated by international law to the principle of non-refoulement, which forbids states from returning refugees to countries where their safety would be at risk (UNHCR, 1997).

with the country of origin, or country of first asylum (for example, whether the sending country is an 'ally' or an 'enemy').[11]

Since the late 1980s, this combination of factors has not favoured the protection of refugees. There are several reasons for the erosion of humanitarian principles and non-compliance with international refugee law. Among them is the changing geopolitical context since the end of the Cold War. Western states no longer perceive refugees as valuable ideological and strategic tools (Chimni, 1998). During the Cold War, refugees were considered corporeal proof of the supremacy of the capitalist system and liberal democracy. Today's refugees (the so-called 'new asylum seekers' who are predominantly from the 'South') do not serve these political ends, and Western states are reluctant to provide protection. Instead, efforts are aimed at stopping the flow of refugees. Refugees are portrayed as different from refugees of the Cold War era – predominantly white males fleeing communist persecution (Chimni, 1998, Tesfahuney, 1998). In today's context of neo-liberal economic reform and the erosion of the 'welfare state', refugees are also "uniformly portrayed as a burden which the state, involved in cutting back social programmes, can no longer afford" (Basok, 1996:147). States want to assert their right to deal with refugees on an individual basis, and support for United Nations mechanisms has declined. For example, in 2000 donations to the UNHCR by the world's wealthy states reached a ten year low (UNHCR website, www.unhcr.ch. Accessed 12/10/00).

The combined effect of this changing context is that even though the UN Convention is one of the most widely endorsed of all international legal instruments (UNHCR, 1997:53), "wherever the demands of democracy or humanitarianism run contrary to the exigencies of the nation-state, it is the latter that will always win out" (Ghosh, 1994:421).

---

[11] As Chomsky (1994) argues, the Indonesian annexation of East Timor in 1975, and the subsequent murder/death of one-third of Timorese population, is one such example of how the relationship between the receiving country and sending country determines potential responses to humanitarian crises. In this case, because Indonesia is/was an important trading partner/ally of U.S. (and others), there was no international intervention, protection or assistance granted to the East Timorese. This is in contrast with the United States policy of accepting refugees from communist countries. For example, of the over 700,000 refugees accepted during the Reagan administration, 96% were from communist countries (Loescher, 1993:21).

Policy and discourse concerning refugees has shifted from one of providing asylum to one of austere containment (Shacknove, 1993). Refugees and migrants, as a result, have become "subject to a variety of anxiety-driven forms of hostile scrutiny and policy initiative" (Shapiro, 1997:1). States have initiated a series of restrictive measures that Hathaway (1991) has termed the "non-entrée regime". These measures, including tightened controls over entry of foreigners through stricter border controls; imposition of fines on airline carriers which transport passengers without valid visas, passports, and travel documents; finger printing of refugees; greater powers to the police and immigration authorities to deport or keep asylum-seekers and 'illegal' migrants in custody; re-definitions of asylum rights and procedures for dealing with asylum requests; and the 'safe third country' provision which allows officials to return without a hearing any claimant who arrived via a third country where asylum could have been sought, restrict access to wealthy Western states and tighten the criteria for asylum for those able to claim it (Tesfahuney, 1998; Basok, 1996). Noble (1988) has called these measures an "arms race against humanitarianism" whose simple purpose is to keep refugees away from the West because United Nations obligations begin only when a state agrees to receive refugees. The non-entrée regime effectively shifts the burden of asylum and providing protection to the world's poorest countries (Chimni, 1998).[12] The increased unavailability of asylum means that in more and more cases, displaced people cannot seek refuge outside their country of origin at all.

The non-entrée regime corresponds with a huge rise in the internally displaced: "those people who, as a result of persecution, armed conflict or violence, have been forced to abandon their homes and leave their usual place of residence, and who remain within the borders of their own country" (UNHCR, 1997:99).[13] Internally displaced persons,

---

[12] At the end of 1996, at a time when the number of applications in the North were coming down, Iran alone was host to 2,020,000 refugees, Jordan to another 1,362,500, and Guinea to 650,000 (World Refugee Survey 1997:11).

[13] While the number of refugees has declined slightly over the last several years, the number of internally displaced has risen consistently (World Refugee Survey, 1999). UNHCR estimates that there are currently 25-30 million internally displaced persons, of whom approximately 16 million are located in Africa (UNHCR, 1997). However, these are approximate figures only. No one knows exactly how many people are internally displaced due to methodological and political reasons. For example, it is difficult for UN agencies or other groups to collect data in war zones, and the countries with internally displaced

according to the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) are among the most vulnerable people in the world because they are 'not quite refugees' – no international instrument or treaty defines internally displaced persons, nor provides for their protection (USCR website, www.refugees.org).

These barriers to the mobility of the world's most vulnerable and oppressed people are justified in various ways. Because most refugees are from the 'South', the 'West' claims that the problems generating their movement likewise are located there. The world's wealthy states, therefore, are not obligated to consider refugee crises as their responsibility. Poverty, political oppression and conflict are viewed as internal to refugee-producing states, not as international or world systemic phenomena. The implication of this internal focus, then, is "if the state of physical origin alone is responsible, than other countries would appear to have no obligation to resettle those fleeing inhumane conditions" (Chimni, 1998: 361). This reluctance to get involved is compounded by the (perceived disastrous) failure of humanitarian interventions in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, and the resulting 'compassion fatigue'.[14]

A further justification for the non-entrée regime is the claim by Western states that these restrictive measures are merely to discourage 'false' applicants from abusing liberal asylum procedures.[15] The majority of asylum-seekers from poor countries are labelled and classified as economic migrants, illegal migrants, or persons with unfounded claims

---

populations may prohibit this collection and resist outside involvement in their internal affairs. There is also reluctance on the part of other countries to overstep the sovereign rights of states, even those that persecute their own citizens (USCR website, www.refugees.org.). For a detailed discussion of the political implications of numbers and counting, see Crisp (1999) "Who has Counted the Refugees?: UNHCR and the politics of numbers".

[14] Hoffman (1996:33) summarises this sentiment:

> [I]t is as if the motto 'we should, and therefore we must', had been replaced with: 'we can't, and therefore we ought not to'; or as if the imperative of doing good had yielded to a far more pessimistic appraisal: 'there is little good we can do, and some of the good we try to do produces more harm than good - so let us above all not do harm, even if it means caring less about doing good.

[15] In Canada, this sentiment was fuelled by the well-publicised case of Somali refugees committing welfare fraud in 1993, and by media reports of Honduran refugees dealing drugs from the streets of Vancouver (Basok, 1996).

to asylum. This is where the distinction between refugees and migrants breaks down. As the UNHCR (1997:214) states: "Politicians and the public in wealthy countries fail to make any distinction between refugees, asylum-seekers, legal and illegal immigrants". Now, no longer granted 'exceptional' status, refugees/asylum-seekers are instead increasingly forced into routine patterns of immigration management efforts.

The internationalisation of migration control

In contrast to the standardised international definition of 'refugee', there is no single definition of an international ('voluntary') migrant. Instead, migrants are classified by different states in different ways at different times (e.g. as 'family class', 'skilled labour', 'guest worker', 'business class', 'illegal'). Individual states deal with the arrival of migrants as they see fit, and the desirability or undesirability of accepting or rejecting migrants parallel changing economic and political circumstances. As Portes and Kelly (1989:15) state:

> At times of relative prosperity, immigrants have been alternatively portrayed as symbols of creative potential and as victims fleeing poverty in pursuit of opportunity and freedom. At times of economic crisis or political turmoil, immigrants have been perceived as bearers of cultural contamination and unfair competition for native-born citizens.

Of course, states have always played an important role in defining 'ideal citizens' (Anderson, 1991; Basok, 1996) and to this end, select immigrants on the basis of preferred socio-economic and demographic ('racial'/cultural) characteristics.[16] The selectivity of migrants, then, is not a new phenomenon. But what is new is the increased political significance accorded to immigration and the extent of inter-state co-ordination. It is only since the late 1980s that international migration began to receive high-level and

---

[16] For example, prior to 1967 Canada preferentially accepted immigrants from Western Europe (particularly those from Britain) and putatively restricted immigrants from Asia via a 'head tax'. The government of Canada levied the first head tax of $50 in 1885. In 1902, the *Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration* declared all Asians "unfit for citizenship...obnoxious to a free community and dangerous to the State" (Asian Canadian website, www.asian.ca). In 1903, the tax was raised to $500 per person, and in 1923, federal legislation was passed suspending Chinese immigration indefinitely. This law was repealed in 1945, but the Canadian government continued its de facto restriction of Asian immigration until immigration policies liberalised in the 1960s. The Chinese Canadian National Council served a Statement of Claim on the Federal Government of Canada on December 18, 2000, seeking redress for head tax discrimination. For more information on the Chinese head tax and exclusion redress, see Asian Canadian website, www.asian.ca.

systematic attention. This lack of co-operation and co-ordination is all the more noteworthy when compared with the international management of trade and capital flows. Throughout the 1990s, the issue of immigration gained increasing attention from politicians and policy-makers as a crucial geopolitical issue by Western states. These states now see it is in their interest to work together to create a unified 'front' or 'hard outer shell' in the face of international migration from the 'South', evidenced by the increased co-operation internationally in the form of a series of regional and multi-lateral agreement to standardise the policies of wealthy Western states. This process has been called the 'harmonisation' of policies by its authors, and the creation/reinforcement of 'Fortress Europe' or 'Fortress North America' by its critics.[17]

In Europe, TREVI and the Schengen Accord are two of the most prominent examples of the internationalisation of migration/mobility controls (Tesfahuney, 1998). TREVI, the prototype for Schengen, is an acronym for terrorism, radicalism, extremism, and violence. As the name suggests, TREVI was initiated by European states in 1976 as a surveillance program to deal with issues of international and internal security concerns. In 1986, its mandate was extended to immigration issues and regulation of non-European nationals within Europe, and in 1989, TREVI become a permanent secretariat within the European Community. With TREVI, border maintenance moves beyond issuing a passport toward highly technologised co-ordination of computerised surveillance systems and internationally-accessible information networks (that maintain a list of 'undesirables'). In 1995, seven of the 15 European member states signed the Schengen Accord to facilitate freedom of mobility for European Union citizens. The introduction of Schengen also involved increased mobility controls for non-members via the strengthening of external border controls. One example of these restrictions is Schengen's expansion of visa requirements to 126 nations. Significantly, no country from Western Europe, Canada, the United States, Australia or New Zealand is on this list of 'suspect' countries.

---

[17] Fortress North America, of course, excludes Mexico. Indeed, the militarised label 'fortress' is mirrored by the names of border control laws and policies enacted to (violently) contain/curtail Mexican border crossings into the United States. These include Operation Hold the Line, Operation Gatekeeper, and Operation Safeguard (Doty, 1996b).

In North America, regional efforts generally mirror the agreements first established among the EU states. Since 1985, representatives from Australia, Canada, and the United States have collaborated with European officials in a series of 'information-sharing' meetings called the 'Informal Consultations', whose purpose is to elaborate and formalise common views on migration control (Hathaway, 1994). In 1995, Canada and the U.S. proposed the Canada/U.S. Accord on Our Shared Border. This agreement would have made asylum claims much more restrictive, but it was abandoned after much debate among politicians and opposition from refugee and immigrant advocacy groups, as well as pro-immigration business groups. A North America-wide Regional Conference on Migration – the Puebla Process – was initiated in 1996 and brought together migration and foreign policy officials from Canada, the United States, Mexico and Central American countries (Nezer, 1999). This process deals with issues such as migrant trafficking and human rights, but critics maintain that the main purpose of the Puebla Process is to restrict access to North America via the south-ward migration of the U.S.-Mexican border, and to "put a more humanitarian gloss on the process of expulsion" (Nezer, 1999). In 1999, the U.S. arrested a rejected Algerian asylum-seeker who was attempting to cross the border from Canada into the U.S. with alleged explosive materials. Following this incident, the U.S. pressured Canada to tighten its immigration and refugee procedures. Lamar Smith, Chair of the U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on immigration labelled Canada a "Club Med for terrorists" (Kumin, 2000), highlighting increasing intolerance of a 'soft touch'.

These agreements are aimed at combating 'illegal' immigration but they contribute to a racialised climate where all immigrants are suspect because of their (visible) 'foreignness'.[18] The politicisation of immigration/international migration as an issue of

[18] What is often left out of these discussions about 'illegal' immigration is that many migrants attempt illegal forms of entering a country because the legal route is closed to them. For example, many Western countries require refugees to produce identity documents upon arrival and automatically deport asylum seekers without proper documentation. However, many asylum-seekers/refugees cannot get documents because governments may confiscate them, or there may be no government to provide documents (as in the case of Somalia). This issue of documentation also disproportionately affects women because in many societies women have limited access to identity documents (Canadian Council for Refugees website, www.web.net/~ccr. Accessed 10/7/2000).

'high politics' and a crucial security concern conflate issues of freedom of movement and 'foreignness' with terrorism and violence (Tesfahuney, 1998). The lack of support for refugees among the wealthiest signatories of the UN agreements is even greater for immigrants from the 'South'. The increasing politicisation of international migration and co-ordination of mobility controls demonstrates a discursive shift from immigrants as potential citizens, to immigrants as probable security threats to the dominant (and idealised) system of culturally homogeneous nation-states.

In the following section, I explain why I resist the conventional classification of refugees and migrants as separate categories of international migrants. Instead, I conflate the concepts of migrant and refugee. However, this is not to justify the adoption of the lowest common denominator which is often the practice of Western states – that is, by conflating refugee with migrant, especially an 'illegal' migrant, states have no responsibility (to grant them asylum and to provide services) other than to turn them away. Rather, my conflation merely emphasises the arbitrariness of the terms 'refugee' and 'migrant' and exemplifies the ways people have excluded and been excluded on the basis of socially constructed categories (Kobayashi, 1997:4).[19] In the current political and institutional context oriented toward containment of international migrants (from the 'South'), it is nearly impossible to distinguish clearly refugees from migrants. There are too many overlaps and complexities in terms of their experiences "to map a world of refugees that is clearly distinct from the supposed world of migrants" (Soguk, 1996:321).

Nor am I interested in explaining migration in a causal sense, other than to acknowledge that reasons for movement are highly complex, and therefore cannot be reduced to a single cause and subsequent effect. My focus is not on theories of international migration, nor does it consider possible explanations by refugees/migrants themselves. This is not to deny the multitude of possible reasons and explanations that mobile people give to their movement to make sense of their particular life situations. Rather, it is to

[19] My decision to use the terms refugee and migrant together runs contrary to many efforts by refugee advocates and refugee theorists. They argue for refugees to be recognised as a unique category of human rights victim precisely to counter the exclusionary conflation of state definitions which reduce refugees to the 'lowest common denominator' – that of the ('voluntary') migrant.

say that once in circulation in larger contexts, "movements of individual bodies have far more important implications for the historically contingent practices and processes by which peculiar identities … are constructed, assigned, negotiated, resisted, and most importantly, made peculiar to a particular territory, that is, territorialised in the image of statist practices (Soguk, 1996:293). For what I am most interested in this thesis, is how the hegemonic practices of the state appropriate the reasons for the movement of refugees and migrants, how it tells their stories, and in doing so, makes it possible to believe that its story is the *only* story. This enables me to understand how it is that the most vulnerable people can become the most threatening.

Organisation of Thesis

Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework that informed my approach – a critical geopolitics that calls for an (embodied) geopolitics of mobility. In Chapter 3, I describe the influences and decisions that guided my choice of methods to fulfil my objectives in this study and specify the data collection and analysis. In this chapter, I also link these decisions to a broader political context of knowledge production by situating myself in the research process and reflecting on some implications for my re-reading. I present my re-reading of a neo-liberal text in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I conclude the thesis with some critical reflections on what I set out to do in this research project.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

This chapter establishes the theoretical framework that informed my re-reading of the neo-liberal text "Must it be the West against the Rest?" I outline why a critical geopolitical approach is useful as a means to investigate my research questions, and the geopolitical arguments presented in "Must it be the West against the Rest?" The aim of this thesis is to make explicit the politicisation of writing global space in the post-Cold War period, and more specifically, to problematise representations of international migration as a crucial geopolitical issue. The approach of critical geopolitics is useful in this endeavour because it explicitly challenges explanations that seek to pass themselves off as truthful and self-evident. A critical geopolitical approach helps me to understand refugees/migrants, not as self-evident, pre-existing political identities, but as a constructed political 'status' defined by states and state practices. This status is unstable, however; a critical geopolitical theoretical approach asserts that social categories are changeable, and therefore offers a glimpse of alternative constructions.

I divide this discussion of my theoretical framework into three parts. In the first and second parts, I discuss geopolitics and critical geopolitics, respectively. In the third, I consider some "problems and paradoxes with using geopolitical arguments as a mode of critique" (Sparke, 2000:378), and how my approach attempts to address these problems.

Why Geopolitics?

A focus on geopolitics may seem out-of-date compared with the variety of theoretical approaches conceptualising global politics, and the deterritorialising and reterritorialising of spaces and identities in 'postmodern' times. Many of these approaches focus on themes of speed, flux, and change. As Ó'Tuathail and Dalby (1998:2) remark on its extravagence: "In a world of perpetual speed and motion, convulsed by globalisation, saturated by information, and entranced by ephemeral media spectacles and hyperbole, geopolitics seems decidedly old-fashioned and out of place".

I maintain, however, that fruitful discussions of the so-called 'new world order' do not have to be limited to what is 'new'. Rather, I argue that understanding the 'old' and the continuities between the present historical juncture and what has been identified as the last is just as important. My attempt to understand matters as routine, as banal even, involves "refusing the rush to essentialise change" (Ó'Tuathail and Agnew, 1992:191) (as necessarily positive/good); it allows me to investigate how it is that 'old' explanations and 'old' social relations still have considerable power.

Geopolitics is old, perhaps even dowdy, yet it is still quite dangerous.[20] 'Geopolitics' did not become obsolete, for example, with the end of British imperial expansion, or the defeat of the Nazi regime, or even in 1989, the end of the period marked as the 'Cold War'. Indeed, geopolitical explanations have never really gone away; instead, they are continually re-articulated and renewed as a theoretical approach and practice. With its focus on the 'big picture' and comprehensive explanations, geopolitics is appealing during this post-Cold War period when the attention of many foreign policy makers, strategic analysts, transnational managers and academics is increasingly centred on 'global' issues – environmental degradation, drugs/trafficking, migration, overpopulation, terrorism, religious extremism (called 'multi-dimensional' threats) – and competing definitions of the 'new world order'. As Ó'Tuathail (1998:1) states:"[Geopolitics] has a multidimensional global cachet - global both in a geographical (worldwide) and a conceptual (comprehensive and total) sense - and appears more visual than verbal, more objective and detached than subjective and ideological".

In the following section, I present a brief history of the term 'geopolitics'. I discuss something of the context within which it 'came into being' as a discipline of power/knowledge, and introduce some of the key assumptions of geopolitics that are relevant both to the critique of geopolitics, which I discuss in part two of this chapter, and also to recurring themes in my analysis of the neo-liberal text "Must it be the West against the Rest?"

---

[20] It is interesting and ironic that the first word to come to my mind to disparage the masculinised theory/practice of geopolitics was the feminised word 'dowdy'. This reminds me how difficult it is to avoid words that reproduce established (and hegemonic) social relations.

A Concise History of Geopolitics

> "Geopolitics: The lurid career of a scientific system which a Briton invented, the Germans used and Americans need to study"
> – Title of main article in *Life* magazine, December 21, 1942[21]

This pithy quote is a simplification, but still a useful starting point for a discussion of geopolitics. My intention is not to provide a thorough account of how geopolitics came into being; rather, I begin with a concise history of 'geopolitics' to explain some of its assumptions and priorities as a form of thought and action that takes "space as central to an understanding of the basis of world politics" (Hyndman, 2001:2). The title 'concise history' is purposefully ironic because I do not believe that geopolitics has much to do with history. In fact, I argue that geopolitics is *ahistorical*. Geopolitics is not a new or trendy theoretical approach. It is a (diverse) tradition of thought/practice that is over 100 years old. However, I contend that its key premises and assumptions can be distilled without doing 'it', that is the 'body' of geopolitical literature, too much disservice. This claim is not due to intellectual arrogance, but due to my contention that the strength of geopolitics is its ability to recycle and retool itself to adapt to changing circumstances in a manner that produces the appearance of a timeless and unchanging presence in international political explanation (Sharp, 1994).

It is important to add that this summary, which in effect constitutes a retelling of the history of geopolitics as a 'thing', recreates and reinforces a particular (dominant) history. Tracing a discrete history or tradition of geopolitics reinforces the authority of a (masculinist) canon composed of the 'right' authors/works. It also constitutes potentially a forgetting that this term geopolitics "embodies histories of struggle over how it is to be represented and understood" (Shapiro, 1988:92), and therefore (artificially) recreates an even and linear historical surface for my theoretical project (Ó'Tuathail, 1996).

[21] Quoted in Ó'Tuathail (1996:111).

Classical Geopolitics

The perspective (later) termed 'classical' or 'conventional' geopolitics was developed and popularised by mostly English and German scholars in the late nineteenth and early 20th century.[22] Its initiators (Halford Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, Karl Haushofer, Rudolf Kjellen, Friedrich Ratzel, and Nicholas Spkyman) developed geopolitics as a practical problem-solving approach with a set of techniques that made it possible to manage and control the empires of their corresponding territories and societies (Ó'Tuathail and Dalby, 1998). The 'science' of geopolitics, as its practitioners called it, centered on the determining relationship between the physical environment (location, resources, territory) and international politics. The key feature of this geopolitical worldview was its global or unified perspective, and a conceptual division of the world into vast swathes of territory (e.g. heartland, rimland, civilisation blocs, West/East) (Ó'Tuathail, 1998). The naming and categorisation of the world by geopoliticians was exercised to secure the claims of Western places and powers – famously expressed by Mackinder (1919:150): "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island (Euro-Asia); Who rules the World Island commands the World". Geopolitics, therefore, found favour with political elites as a tool and justification for the violent nation and empire-building and consolidating projects of the late 19th and early 20th century. The determining influence of 'nature' coincided with dominant socio-cultural beliefs of this period, influenced by bio-deterministic and Social Darwinist theories of evolution. In the geopolitical perspective, these political acts of domination and exploitation were considered as inevitable and eternal processes of nature (Ó'Tuathail, 1996).

The geopoliticians themselves attained elite status as 'experts' or 'masters of the globe' who claimed to know 'truths' about international politics (Ó'Tuathail, 1998). This mastery assumed multiple and interlocking forms of 'natural' supremacy – the supremacy of their culture/nation over others; the supremacy of the white 'race' over other 'races'[23];

---

[22] The term 'geopolitics' itself was coined by Kjellen in 1899 (Ó'Tuathail, 1996).

[23] I put 'race' in quotations to mark that race is not an unproblematic or 'natural'/biological description, but

and the supremacy of men over women. The geopoliticians fit into stereotypes and characterisations associated with white, European constructions of masculinity. In their articulations of politics as the domain of white men, they projected the values of strength, power, autonomy, independence and rationality that dominant elites in Western society deemed necessary in the defence of their national and imperial interest.[24]

Contemporary Geopolitics

In the twentieth century, geopolitics was called "an intellectual doctrine that any aspirant power needs to take seriously" (Ó'Tuathail, 1996:112). The Nazi regime and the Cold War are two of the most prominent examples of (geopolitical) aspirations to world power and domination. In the 1930s and 1940s the Nazi regime's search for *lebensraum* operationalised the geopolitical vision of politics as a struggle for survival between competing states. This expansionist conquest was not only to secure 'living space', but also to control and to 'purify' that space through the extermination of Jews, gypsies, homosexuals and other peoples marked as 'inferior' by racist ideology. The Nazi's formulation of geopolitics in terms of 'racial' mastery as well as territorial mastery over the globe was a genocidal and murderous expression of geopolitics.

During the Cold War, American politicians and theorists such as George Kennan, Henry Kissenger, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan extended and perhaps displaced in some form the meaning of earlier, more environmentally determined theorisations of geopolitics to consolidate a power symbolic imaginary. Their geopolitical vision imagined international politics as primarily a moral struggle between absolute good and absolute evil, West and East, capitalism versus communism, and democracy versus totalitarianism. As Sharp (1996:566) notes, "the invocation of morality clearly changes

---

a socially constructed historical category (Jackson and Penrose, 1993).

[24] If their credentials were suspect, as in the case of Mackinder, who as an academic at Oxford University, did not fit the prescribed 'geographer as a man of action' role, geopoliticians proved themselves to be 'the real thing' in tests/rites, such as climbing Mt. Kenya – to penetrate and take possession of what he described as the 'cold feminine beauty' of Mt. Kenya (Ó'Tuathail, 1996:75). The language of domination and masculine supremacy is unmistakable here.

the discursive base of geopolitics. It allows geopolitics to be written not as power-political relations between countries but as a clash of world views". Cold War geopolitics abstracted the 'West' into a (imaginary) community of democratic states representing the highest peak of civilisation, and the Soviets (epitomised by the 'Russian') into the 'evil empire', an expansionist and polluting threat.

The demise of the Cold War brought with it contemplation of a 'new world order' without the kind of bipolar antagonism that characterised the second half of the twentieth century. After the Cold War, writings by Francis Fukuyama (1989), "The End of History", and George Bush (1992), "Toward a New World Order", gave (triumphant) voice to an eagerness to consign WW II and the Cold War to history. Geopolitics, likewise, seemed passé. It was no longer necessary, after all, because now there was no longer an 'enemy'. But I want to assert it is misleading to write the history of geopolitics as over, for the optimism immediately following the collapse of the Berlin Wall was soon replaced by more pessimistic appraisals of the international political scene.[25]

In the 1990s, geopolitical writings have shifted from the closely guarded and privileged realm of foreign policy intellectuals and politicians to 'popular' contexts. Articles such as Robert Kaplan's (1994) "The coming anarchy", Samuel Huntington's (1993) "The clash of civilisations?", John Meirsheimer's (1990) "Why we shall soon miss the Cold War", and Benjamin Barber's book (1996) *Jihad vs. McWorld* offer similar kinds of sweeping geopolitical explanation that characterised classical geopolitics. These writers recycle the themes of classical and Cold War politics. For example, Mackinder's idea of a 'geographical pivot' and admonition of the 'yellow peril' or Oriental threat is reinvigorated by these writers as an eternal clash between Western civilisation and the East, a clash between rich and poor, etc. The dangers once solely posed by the Soviet threat are transferred to the threat of immanent disorder wrought by the inundation of the 'Rest'. This 'new' geopolitics gives expression to "anxieties that the whole world system (and particularly 'Western civilisation') will come apart as a result of economic rivalry,

[25] Maynes (1995:40) calls this mood 'the new pessimism': "America is passing through a very conservative period in its history, and traditionally pessimism has been the mood of choice for the well-to-do and for those in favour of the political status quo".

spreading crime, destabilising migrations, environmental degradation or civilisational clashes" (Dalby, 1998a:306, my addition in parentheses). Although a new enemy is introduced, there is much in common with 'old' ways of thinking. While the foe may have changed, importantly, geopolitical styles of reasoning persist; the Cold War has maintained its structure, a form of politics defined by the tension between an 'us' and 'them', and merely changed players. In the writings by Kaplan and Huntington, for example, they define a narrower version of 'us', and an increasing number as well as a lumping together of 'them'. What remains constant is "the 'need' for geopolitical certainty in which the basic components of global politics can be clearly demarcated, known and hence controlled" (Dalby, 1998a:306).

This assumption of the superiority of the 'West' is not an innovation of geopolitics, either at the turn of the twentieth century or mid-century. The geopolitical worldview is authorised by a Western (political) ethos that privileges its own ontology and epistemology as an exclusively valid mode of knowing and being. Geopolitics forms part of a tradition that is based upon "the presumption of the inexorable progression of an omniscient Western civilisation" (which is, of course,.... "in contrast to stereotypes of fixed cultures elsewhere, presumed to be beset by privations and moral degeneration") (Grovogui, 1998:501).

The authoritative Western languages of politics have traditionally been divided into two categories – liberalism and realism. Liberalism refers to a view of international history and politics as one propelled by the progressive internationalisation of 'universal' (read: European) norms (e.g. democracy, reason, humanism, notion of law and process, progress, etc.) (Grovogui, 1998). In contrast, realism refers to the inherent national rivalry and competitions derived from bio-determinist theories of human behaviour such as natural selection, class struggle, and 'survival of the fittest'. The realist worldview envisages antagonistic political scenarios – the history and destiny of the 'West' is not one of inevitable progress, but of inevitable power struggles to keep the 'West' on top. I do not, however, subscribe to this division of Western politics into the binary of either/or, with realists representing the 'hawks' and liberals the 'doves'. Instead, I argue that liberalism and realism are just two aspects of the worldview of modernity. They are not,

therefore, separate or opposing, but are premised on the same foundation. I draw on Onuf's (1991:426) precise summary of this particular worldview:

> Modernity is characterised by an interpretation of the world – the world of meaning and the world of experience – as human-centred. Second, is an emphasis on individuality, reason, and mastery over circumstance. Third is a preoccupation with method, the differentiation of tasks, and material prosperity. All in the name of progress. Liberalism is modernity's core ideology, capitalism its paymaster, and the state its highest social realisation, primary agent, and paramount problem.

Again, it may be argued that this summary is too much of a gloss at the expense of historical particularities and complexities. But the point I want to make, following Malkki (1994:62), is that at this more 'global' level, realism and liberalism are "neither antagonistic nor even separable principles, but are rather, mutually entailed aspects of a wider process of categorical thought and action".[26]

In this 'concise history' I have attempted to contextualise geopolitics. This history is necessarily partial and incomplete. There are many forms of geopolitics and geopolitical explanations, some of which I have discussed, some not, but in general, "geopolitics concerns the geography of international politics, particularly the relationship between the physical environment and the conduct of foreign policy" (Sprout and Sprout, 1960, in Ó'Tuathail and Agnew, 1992:191). While contemporary articulations of geopolitics are less environmentally determined than this 'classic' definition, geopolitics is still concerned with the control of external environments, and still relies on similar assumptions and foundations as 'classical' geopolitics. Its common theme, whether classical or contemporary, is "the production of knowledge to aid the practice of statecraft and further the power of the state" (Ó'Tuathail and Agnew, 1992:192). Geopolitics, as Dalby (1998b:309) clarifies further, is also about "ways of reading and writing global political space".

[26] Malkki (1994) discusses this with reference to nationalism and internationalism, but I believe one can also read these categories realism and liberalism.

What is Critical Geopolitics?

In this section, I introduce 'critical geopolitics' as a theoretical perspective, its purpose and goals, and also discuss the notion of discourse that is central to the critique of conventional geopolitics. Critical geopolitics is articulated by a relatively small self-identified group of geographers and scholars of international relations as a "perspective from which to launch alternative accounts or explanations of phenomena defined as 'geopolitical'" (Dodds and Sidaway, 1994:515).[27] These writers put forth the perspective of critical geopolitics in the late 1980s and 1990s out of a context of debates concerning reconceptualisations of security and political identity and competing visions of a global (dis)order.

The aim of critical geopolitical analyses is to challenge the 'naturalness' and inevitability of geopolitical organisations of territory/space. Ó'Tuathail and Dalby (1998:2) state that their concern is to radicalise its components – geo and politics – "so that the self-evident character of the sign 'geopolitics' can be problematised and pluralised". Critical geopolitics attempts to expose the supposedly objective foundations of geopolitical explanations, and to embody and situate them within historically and culturally specific interests (Sharp, 1996). In this way, critical geopolitics is "less a theory of how space and politics intersect than a taking apart of normalised categories and narratives of geopolitics" to insist that other interpretations of geography and politics are possible (Hyndman, 2001:3).

Critical geopolitics' problematisation of the foundations of geopolitics forms part of a broader post-structuralist critique of naïve realism which holds that the world is self-evident and that facts 'speak for themselves' (Dodds and Sidaway, 1994). Post-structuralists argue that the foundations of Enlightenment/modernist thought – its claims to universality and truth, and the primacy of the white Western male which constitutes its subject – are not universal and unified, but partial and incomplete. Poststructuralist theorists contend, contrary to modernist theorists, that nothing in the world is fixed or

[27] The 'critical geopoliticians' include: John Agnew, Richard Ashley, Simon Dalby, Klaus-John Dodds, Timothy Luke, Derrick Sidaway and Gearóid Ó'Tuathail.

immutable. Instead, all foundations are shifting and contested. In this questioning, many post-structuralist theorists replace the language of (fixed) foundations with the more fluid metaphor of 'fields'. From a post-structuralist understanding the field is not a place or a physical location, but a set of relations, a "social terrain" (Nast, 1994). It is also highly politicised and very different from the conventional notion of the stable, pre-existing field that the researcher/geographer enters. The effect of this critical approach for critical geopolitics, then, is to undermine geopolitics' status as a 'thing' by approaching it instead as a verb. Critical geopolitics does not accept geopolitics as a science that can predict particular (political) results; rather, it argues that geopolitics is a field of political contestation in which particular results are produced by controlling and manipulating depictions of 'reality'. Geopolitical descriptions are imposed through an exercise of power.

The aim of critical geopolitics is to make explicit how power works in these representations of geopolitical reality. Power, as conceptualised by critical geopolitics, is not a kind of external relation that pre-existing social actors possess and exercise; rather, it is *constitutive* of social actors and the meanings that make political action intelligible. One means to investigate this kind of power, then, is to analyse discourse – specific social practices that reproduce power relations.[28] Critical geopolitics, as set out by Ó'Tuathail and Agnew (1992:192), argues that geopolitics is one such discourse:

> Our foundational premise is the contention that geography is a social and historical discourse which is always intimately bound up with questions of politics and ideology. Geography is never a natural, non-discursive phenomenon which is separate from ideology and outside politics. Rather geography as a discourse is a form of power/knowledge itself.

---

[28] Critical geopolitics' focus on discourse is particularly influenced by Foucault's (1980) insistence that one should explore the power/knowledge nexus in discourse. As Dodds and Sidaway note, many critical geopolitical writers have cited Foucault's comments with the editors of *Herodote* in 1976:

> The longer I continue, them more it seems to me that the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge needs to be analysed, not in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception and forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and strategies deployed through the implementations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organisation of domains which could well make up a sort of geopolitics where my preoccupations would link up with your methods... Geography must lie at the heart of my concerns (1980:77).

As Ó'Tuathail and Agnew (1992:192) define, "discourses are best conceptualised as sets of capabilities people have, as sets of socio-cultural resources used by people in the construction of meaning about their world and their activities". Discourse is the medium or organising principle that enables one to conceptualise the circulation of meaning (Berg and Kearns, 1996). It is not simply words or language but the rules by which words and language are made meaningful. These 'rules', however, are not codified or visible as such. Instead, discourses are more implicit or unwritten, but this does not mean they are ineffectual or innocent, nor is this assertion intended to deny the existence of the material world. Rather it is to say that material objects and subjects, places and peoples are constituted as such within discourse (Doty, 1996c) by the ways in which it is intelligible and legitimate to talk about them in a particular time and place (Cameron, 1998). Relations of power are embedded in discourse to impose a specific understanding which legitimises some meanings/texts while, at the same time, delegitimises others. This means that no 'truths' or 'facts' are eternal, but that what one thinks are 'truths' or 'facts' are *temporarily* fixed through their association with particular relations of power and with institutions that legitimise the 'truths' that the discourse produces (Foucault, 1980). "In other words", as Mouffe states, "the hegemonic arrangement cannot claim any source of validity other than the power basis on which it is grounded" (Mouffe, 1995:261).

Critical geopolitics applies this understanding of discourses and the power relations embedded within them to geopolitical explanations. It is through discourse that political practices such as defining an inside and outside, an 'us' and 'them', are made meaningful and legitimised. And indeed, for the purposes of my study, this is the most valuable aspect of critical geopolitics. International relations and conventional geopolitics historically have excluded the issue of representation from their analyses. When other disciplines were confronted by a 'crisis of representation' within academia/institutions of knowledge production, international relations and geopolitics have carried on as a last bastion of the 'realm of necessity'. The significant contribution of critical geopolitics is to make explicit and de-mystify the processes of knowledge production that inform 'our' understanding of foreign policy and international events.

Challenging conventional geopolitical 'truths' means deconstructing the supports that underwrite geopolitical representations and explanations as necessary and inevitable descriptions of the world. A particularly useful example of this deconstructive effort for my study is Campbell's (1992) analysis of discourses of 'danger'. Danger is integral to geopolitical conceptions of politics; the realm of international politics is assumed to be inherently dangerous, and anything or anyone who is not 'us' is potentially an enemy. This danger, then, is pre-existing and inevitable. Indeed, "commonsense' tells us that it is an innate natural/biological condition, exemplified by hair raising involuntarily on the back of one's neck in the face of fear/danger – the 'fight or flight' response.

This is just the kind of acute yet timeless danger that is evoked by Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy in the text "Must it be the Rest against the West?" However, Campbell (1992:1) argues that there is nothing essential about danger: "Danger is not an objective condition. ' It' is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat".[29] Campbell's articulation of danger helps me to conceptualise that the 'new' danger identified by Connelly and Kennedy is less a response to any *actual* reality, than the construction of a particular reality. I draw on critical geopolitical theorisations of discourse and power relations in texts to identify and challenge the particular political discourses that Connelly and Kennedy deploy in order to substantiate their claims. Connelly and Kennedy draw on and embed their arguments in discourses that then reproduce and reinforce conventional power relations and dichotomies of 'us'/them' by

---

[29] But this is not to deny that there are real dangers understood in terms of life and death. My understanding of 'danger' (discursive/textual), following Campbell, does not want to remove or separate danger from 'real'/material. Rather I wish to argue instead that they are woven together. To illustrate this point, I use an example from Butler (1992:11):

> But here you think that I have make a distinction between the action itself and something like a representation, but I want to make a stronger point. You will perhaps have noticed that Colin Powell, the General of the Joint Chief of Staff invoked what is, I think, a new military convention of calling the sending of missiles "the delivery of an ordnance". The phrase is significant, I think; it figures an act of violence as an act of law (the military term 'ordnance' is linked etymologically to the juridicial 'ordinance'), and so wraps the destruction in the appearance of orderliness; but in addition, it figures the missile as a kind of command, an order to obey, and is thus itself figured as a certain act of speech which not only delivers a message - get out of Kuwait - but effectively enforces that message through the threat of death and through death itself. Of course, this is a message that can never be received, for it kills its addressee, and so it is not an ordinance at all, but the failure of all ordinances, the refusal of communication. And for those who remain to read the message, they will not read what is sometimes quite literally written on the missile.

recycling particular phrases, notions and words that resonate culturally to the extent that they appear 'natural' and commonsensical. In my analysis of "Must it be the Rest against the West?" I will explore how power works in discourse. I try to problematise Connelly and Kennedy's naming of a 'new' problem, a 'new' antagonism, and in so doing, "cast doubt upon the possibility of a 'new' that is not in some way already implicated in the 'old'" (Butler, 1992:6).

Some Problems and Paradoxes

Critical geopolitics, as I have demonstrated in the above discussion, has assisted in destabilising some of the foundations of geopolitical representations and explanations – its 'truth claims' and 'power moves', etc. Nevertheless, I believe there are some important (even glaring) omissions. In my evaluation of *critical* geopolitics, it is useful to keep in mind, as Ó'Tuathail (1996:67) notes, "critical geopolitics is not an absence of geopolitics but a variation of it". I must take care that I do not simply replace one hegemonic geopolitics with another (Smith, 2000). In this section, I discuss my concerns with using a critical geopolitical approach, and how I attempt to address these problems.

My main concern is that critical geopolitics sustains a similar kind of authoritative stance as conventional geopolitics because it also maintains a narrow focus of what is (regarded as) political, and does not question its own complicity with power. This authority is evidenced by indications that this once loose perspective has reached a kind of congealing as an identifiable 'body'. The appearance of special issues from *Political Geography* (1996), *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (1994), and the books *Critical Geopolitics* (1996); *The Geopolitical Reader* (1998), and *Rethinking Geopolitics* (1998), suggests that critical geopolitics has successfully staked out academic terrain, and even, perhaps, settled into an orthodoxy.[30] A potential consequence of this orthodoxy is that critical geopolitics as a 'radical' critique of geopolitics may become just

[30] I must add that I am conscious of perhaps unfairly generalising. My examples are necessarily selective. And indeed, as the debate in *Political Geography* indicates, this is a continuing debate, not a closed-off issue. But perhaps more importantly, the cementing of authority is not unique to critical geopolitics, but is common in all academic knowledge production practices. The dominant knowledge validation processes (e.g. as in journals) create and help solidify closures, groupings, and identifications in the effort to draw intelligible boundaries around the 'thing' that is critical geopolitics.

"another discursive power politics" (Ó'Tuathail, 1996) – a kind of self-referential and therefore mutually reinforcing *academic* exercise.[31] It risks becoming ahistorical and ageographical itself, even as it condemns conventional geopolitics for these flaws, because it is not politically engaged. By lack of engagement, I mean that critical geopolitics does not depart far enough from the limitations and narrowness of conventional geopolitics: it retains for it own sake a disembodied elite focus. As a consequence, critical geopolitical practitioners make too little an attempt to connect with other interpretations and analyses. This lack of connection, I think, is a significant shortcoming in the struggle for a transformative knowledge and politics.

I consider this to be a very important, potentially damning issue. Indeed, given the imperialist and masculinist tradition of geopolitics, I need to question why I am hitching my wagon to this theoretical horse at all. In order to sort through and address my ambivalence, I incorporate some of critical geopolitics' ways of looking, but I also resist some things. That is, I want to resist critical geopolitics' exclusions and omissions (while at the same time recognising that there will always be exclusions and omission in *any* theoretical approach). In the remainder of this chapter, I attempt to address the omissions and exclusions of a critical geopolitical approach in two ways: first, through 'embodying' critical geopolitics; and secondly, through expanding the analytical focus of critical geopolitics to incorporate non-elite texts and previously neglected issues. To aid this discussion, I will highlight some issues and criticisms pointed out by reviewers (Sharp, 2000; Smith, 2000, Sparke, 2000) in a recent issue of *Political Geography* aimed at pushing critical geopolitics in a potentially more transformative direction.

Embodying critical geopolitics

> Classical geopolitics is a form of geopolitical discourse that seeks to repress its own politics and geography imagining itself as beyond politics and above situated geographies in a transcendent Olympian realm of surveillance and judgement. The response of critical geopolitics is to insist on the situated, contextual and embodied nature of all forms of geopolitical reasoning (Ó'Tuathail and Dalby, 1998:6).

[31] I should point out that I am using Ó'Tuathail's words against himself. This quote is from Ó'Tuathail's (1996) *Critical Geopolitics* and refers to the author's critique of international relations theorists, but I agree with Sparke (2000) that these comments are applicable as a self-critique also.

Critical geopolitics, as the above quote by Ó'Tuathail and Dalby demonstrates, provides a thorough critique of the detachment and panopticism of the geopolitical worldview. I argue, however, that many analysts themselves fail to relinquish the detached authority of the geopolitical gaze. In their sophisticated readings of geopolitical texts, critical geopolitical analysts replicate the masterful narrations of classical geopoliticians. But in this case, as Smith (2000:368) states, "the object of sight ... is not so much the landscape or the globe but the array of pre-existing geopolitical texts viewed and read by the detached theoretical eye/I". In this way, critical geopolitical analysts reinforce the dominant knowledge validation practices (based on the separation and cleavage between 'self' and 'other', 'here' and 'there', etc.), and their privileged position as elite academics.

One means to ameliorate this disembodiment is to insist on the partiality of critical geopolitical analyses. Rather than maintain the disembodied gaze of the classical geopolitician, I believe critical geopolitics needs to address the question of how (or from where) the analyst is positioned and how s/he is *embodied,* in order to make it explicit "as a situated project accountable for its socio-political debts" (Sparke, 2000:379).[32] The question of embodiment (in this case, responsibility/accountability) is an important one because whether texts are read (textually) or visualised (panoptically) is "less the point than who gets to do the reading and viewing, who gets to fill in the substance" (Smith, 2000:368).

To embody oneself 'as a critic' means that critical geopolitics must recognise that 'it', as well as classical/conventional geopolitics is still (mostly) articulated and written by a particular body. In this case a white, European or North American 'dissident' who can decode the texts of classical geopolitics (Smith, 2000). It is crucial to address the unequivocally masculinist and imperialist underpinnings of geopolitics because, as Sharp (2000:363) argues, "The history of struggles for space and representation are reduced to a male genealogy, not just when discussing the masculinist history of geopolitical strategies

[32] I will discuss my own positioning in Chapter 3.

of elite practitioners, but also the interventions of 'critical geopoliticians'". This has the effect of marginalising other possible interventions.

Where feminist analyses of international relations and foreign policy are mentioned it is almost always the work of Cynthia Enloe (1989, 1993) who draws attention as an example of an 'anti-geopolitical eye' (Ó'Tuathail, 1996). Yet her radical questioning and repositioning of the assumptions of dominant political theory are undermined by the otherwise lack of consideration of other feminist critics of international relations/geopolitics. Enloe is identified almost as a (disembodied to be sure) voice in the wilderness. One example of this kind of marginalisation appears in an otherwise sensitive and sophisticated analysis by Dalby (1994). He comments that what is surprising about Enloe's 'take' on international politics/relations is that she does not have any of the 'familiar', and therefore 'legitimate', citations in her reference list. Although Dalby undoubtedly makes mention of this to note how her analysis subverts geopolitical authority, it also has the simultaneous effect of undermining her analysis because of the conventions within academic discipline. Dalby's comment suggests surprise that there could be entries and approaches to international relations and geopolitics other than the rarefied 'body' of theorists officially recognised as international relations theorists or geopoliticians, critical or otherwise.

In *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, her attempt to make feminist sense of international politics, Enloe (1989) warns of the potential consequence of this singular focus with particularly vivid/subversive geographic imagery: "*If we employ only the conventional, ungendered compass to chart international politics, we are likely to end up mapping a landscape peopled only by men, most elite men" (Enloe, 1989:1). This highlights the importance of moving beyond the dominant conceptions of what is political and the* necessity to combine critical geopolitical analyses with other (feminist, post-colonial) theoretical perspectives, not to appropriate these 'radical' perspectives, but to be part of ongoing dialogue aimed "not just to develop a better understanding, but also to create a broader basis for formulating alternative strategies (which are sensitive to difference)" Marchand, 1996:602). The effort to 'embody' critical geopolitics in this way, then,

enables the possibility of theorising the relationship between my body, for example, and other bodies as situated and contextual, material *and* theoretical.

Expanding the focus: popular geopolitics

Critical geopolitical analyses have maintained conventional geopolitics concern with elite themes, and in so doing, have replicated the distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics. Where geopolitics took the state for granted as the primary actor, critical geopolitics takes the state for granted as the primary unit of analysis. An important consequence of this elite, state-centric focus is that other peoples and (political) spaces are rendered invisible. One way that I attempt to address this problem is to widen the analytical lens of critical geopolitics by studying non-elite forms of geopolitical knowledge. My approach is inspired by the work of Sharp (1993; 1994; 1996) and Billig (1995) who argue for the need to analyse popular forms of geopolitical explanation.

Sharp's study of Cold War discourse in *Reader's Digest* moves away from the exclusively top-down focus of many critical geopolitical analyses of international politics. Her aim, instead, is to look at the construction of 'commonsense' popular understandings of international politics (e.g. 'the Russian' as arch-enemy). Sharp's study of popular geopolitics enriches critical geopolitics "by providing the context within which elite geopolitical texts are received but also in which they are produced" (Sharp, 1993:491). In his study of "banal nationalism", Billig (1995) traces the construction and reproduction of nationalism in the "embodied habits of daily life" (1995:8). Nationalism, Billig argues, is not (only) an expression of the violent passions of extremists, it is reproduced everyday in seemingly ordinary ways. But this banality is not synonymous with harmlessness; these popular and mundane practices are all the more dangerous and insidious because they are largely taken-for-granted. This is an important aspect of maintaining hegemony because social acquiescence is constructed not only from the 'abstract' realm of political ideology, but more immediately through detailed scriptings of all aspects of everyday life (Sharp, 1996).

The work of Sharp and Billig offers a valuable 'corrective' to the elite, 'high politics' focus of conventional and critical geopolitics, and a reminder that the meanings 'we' attach to political events and interpretations of social phenomena have far-reaching implications. For my study, expanding the focus of critical geopolitics to encompass popular forms of geopolitical representations and explanations is useful because images of refugees/migrants regularly circulate in the media and exclusionary policies of states are justified on the basis of 'this is what the people want'.

Expanding the focus: A critical geopolitics of mobility

It is not only important for critical geopolitics to study different texts, but also to study different issues that were previously identified as non-political. One such 'non-political' issue is mobility. Critical geopolitical analyses have directed very little attention to mobility and migration with some exceptions (Tesfahuney, 1998; Hyndman, 2001). Although critical geopolitics has concerned itself with issues of the post- Cold War era and changing global configurations of power and hegemony in the 'new world order' (Tesfahuney, 1998), the question of where migrants and refugees fit into these reconfigurations is under-theorised in critical geopolitics. Once again, I believe this neglect is due to critical geopolitics' over-emphasis on issues of 'high' politics and the 'big questions' - war, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international trade. Migration and refugee issues have not received attention as a 'big question' because until recently theorists and policy-makers have addressed immigration/migration as a 'domestic' issue, along with such issues as labour, education, and health. The question of 'refugees', likewise, has been addressed largely within a depoliticised 'humanitarian' framework as objects of the 'public goodwill' (Loescher, 1993) and 'philanthropic universalism' (Malkki, 1996) of the 'respectable' international community. In this respect, critical geopolitics is lagging behind conventional geopolitical accounts, which have targeted immigration as a central security concern since the late 1980s.

In response to this lack of attention, Tesfahuney (1998) proposed the need for a 'geopolitics of international migration'. This is a timely call, for in the process of shifts

from the 'absolute' political spaces of the Cold War to the fluidity and indeterminacy that characterise the (new) 'global' space of the post-Cold War period, mobility is a key issue. There is a great need for a critical questioning of dominant discourses of migrants and refugees that are congealing more and more into a 'common-sense'. Indeed, the neglect thus far by critical geopolitics is curious because as Tesfahuney argues, "Mobility and the extent to which space is permeable to entry and exit or not, are geographical issues par excellence (Tesfahuney, 1998:501). The issues of absolute and exclusive borders and their necessary 'by-product' – refugees/migrants – are integral to modernist/conventional geopolitical organisations of space/territory (which is the stuff of critical geopolitical analyses). Refugees and migrants are produced through states' assertions and practices to uphold an image of the world divided into discrete sovereign space, each supposedly with homogeneous cultures and impermeable essences (Soguk, 1996).

I believe a critical geopolitical perspective has a lot to offer in this questioning of dominant modes of thinking about and dealing with refugees/immigrants as a 'problem'. Critical geopolitical analyses, elaborated in work such as Dalby (1997), Dodds (1993), Ó'Tuathail (1999), and Sidaway (1994) which examine how danger/threat is constructed and boundaries are fortified, can be applied fruitfully to examine how moving peoples from the 'South' are contained, and how these material and conceptual practices of containment are legitimated and justified. By emphasising the arbitrary and non-essential character of geopolitical danger/enemies, a critical geopolitical theoretical approach makes it possible to resist binary geopolitical framings of antagonisms between 'rich' and 'poor', 'West' and 'Rest'. The critical geopolitics of migration that I propose looks at containment of international migration not as an issue of an absolute lack of geographical space as conventional geopolitics' claims, but as an issue of political definitions and practices of boundary-making that produce exclusion.

A critical geopolitics of migration thus highlights issues of inequitable control of space and access to space. Perhaps a geopolitics of mobility is an effort at embodying geopolitics as theory. Insisting on the materiality and corporeality of flows is a way to resist the abstract and disembodied geopolitical theorisations of the world as primarily

animated by fixed and abstract state actors. Instead of contemplations of a 'new world order' and the (arbitrary) rewriting of political/territorial spaces as empty 'global' space, a critical geopolitics of mobility instead insists on a world already filled with people, who struggle against and contest this 'global' space – who defines it and who belongs. In my theoretical approach I, too, wish to engage with critical geopolitics in debates about concrete and theoretical re-mappings of global 'order', but I want to insist also that these debates take both the nation-state *and* its transnational 'Others' into account (Malkki, 1994).

This relates to the question, once again, of engagement and what a discursive analysis is used to do. I will discuss this question further in Chapter 3 where I present the research design and methods.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

"The act of beginning necessarily involves an act of delimitation by which something is cut out of a great mass of material" (Said, 1978:16). Said's quote is an important reminder that I, from the beginning of this research project, engaged in 'an act of delimitation'. My delimiting involved drawing boundaries whereby some material is included and some excluded, constructing a field of reference that foregrounds certain contexts over others, and imposing a framework through which the field should be understood. These acts of delimitation are necessary in order for this study to be intelligible, but they are neither unproblematic, nor innocent. I need to acknowledge from the outset that this is a political process and recognise the implications of my decisions.

In this chapter, I describe and explain my choice of methodology for this study. This methodology is not just the steps I took conducting this research, but considers the process of doing research as a political project. I divide this discussion of my approach into three parts: the approach to popular geopolitics; the data – *The Atlantic Monthly* and "Must it be the West against the Rest?"; and analysis.

Approach to Popular Geopolitics

This study is a critical analysis of discursive constructions of refugees/migrants as threats. As discussed in the previous chapter, I situate this study theoretically within 'critical geopolitics'. My aim is to study the construction and circulation of geopolitical discourses in the context of popular knowledge through a critical reading of the text "Must it be the West against the Rest?" This text is an example of a key site where a 'significant' problem has been articulated as an issue of pre-eminent geopolitical importance by politicians and writers in foreign policy and international relations circles– the fact that 'we' have an immigration problem in the West.

"Must it be the West against the Rest?" is a 'popular' text. It appears in *The Atlantic Monthly*, a popular 'liberal' monthly with a wide subscription and newsstand readership. "Must it be the West against the Rest?" is not a missive formulated in specialised government foreign policy departments or academic think tanks outside of public involvement in the tradition of classical geopolitics. The power of states is consolidated not just at the level of 'high' politics; authority and legitimacy is communicated and reinforced in popular texts too. As Ó'Tuathail and Agnew (1992:194) state: "Geopolitics is not a discrete and relatively contained activity confined only to a small group of 'wise men' who speak in the language of classical geopolitics". Indeed, simply to describe an issue as a 'problem' is to engage in geopolitics for one is implicitly and tacitly normalising a particular world (Ó'Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Assuming that something or someone is a 'problem' means using prevailing modes of speaking that do not consider the question: A problem for whom? As Harding (1987:6) points out, problems are rarely universal: "Reflections on how social phenomena get defined as problems in need of explanation in the first place quickly reveals that there is no such thing as a problem without a person (or group of them) who have this problem: a problem is always a problem for someone or other". By not attempting to embody a problem then, one is by default reinforcing hegemonic (but *particular)* assumptions and interests.

The study of popular geopolitics is important because it challenges the separation between 'political' and 'non-political' spheres. Such a study shakes up the orthodoxy of conventional and critical geopolitical analyses which have tended to focus on the texts of the political elite. Critical geopolitical accounts, as I discussed in Chapter 2, are not without value but it is necessary that they be accompanied by attention to how these elite understandings are circulated, accepted (or even rejected) in wider contexts. Though I employ the term 'popular geopolitics', I also want to challenge the assumption that it implies – that there are distinct realms or divisions between elite and popular, high and low politics. A singular focus on 'high politics' tends to marginalise or erase the fact that politics takes place elsewhere, with people other than the certified experts. In addition, I want to point out that these boundaries are permeable. Popular geopolitics and practical geopolitics reproduce each other (Ó'Tuathail and Dalby, 1998:12); many 'popular' texts

are read by elites and many elite texts are circulated in popular media. In this way, I do not want to reinforce these divisions inherited from dominant ways of thinking about politics and what is political. Rather I wish to explore, by singling out the 'popular' as a site, how popular texts can be considered "a moment of fixity in the articulation of politics where the concerns of individuals are actively articulated with global and national issues" (Sharp, 1994:43).

Approach to 'Data'

Choice of text: "Must it be the West against the Rest?"

I have drawn the primary empirical data for this study from a close reading of the article "Must it be the West against the Rest?" by Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy from the December 1994 issue of *The Atlantic Monthly*. I chose to study "Must it be the West against the Rest?" because I was drawn to the engaging rhetorical flow of the narrative and the particularly dramatic and suggestive title and illustrations. I consider it to be an excellent example of a popular site, both in influence and in form, where a number of key articulations in the changing neo-liberal discourse(s) of immigration/refugee politics are located.

My motivation for this study was inspired in part by Joanne Sharp's (1993; 1994; 1996) comprehensive analysis of (Cold War) geopolitical discourse in *Reader's Digest*. Sharp examined how popular, or mass media, sources of representations work alongside elite geopolitical texts to reinforce the image of the 'enemy' (Sharp, 1993). This type of research is useful to analyse how discourses are shaped through repetition and recycling of themes in texts, and deployed in popular contexts to construct a 'consensus' or hegemonic formation about the way individuals, as well as states, come to see and interpret particular issues. In addition, a study such as Sharp's demonstrates how discursive formations have an impact very 'close to home'. In the case of the Cold War, Sharp highlights how elite constructions of the Soviets as a national security threat connect very intimately with the daily fears and anxieties of American people (for example, fear of invasion and nuclear war). Her research shows that the 'discursive' or

'textual' is not a realm located outside everyday life, but a means through which everyday life acquires meaning through the transmission of deeply embedded, continuously inscribed cultural attitudes (Meijer, 1993). As Sharp (1993:493) states:

> The nature of explanations by elites cannot be understood independently of knowledge of wider cultural values. What is of interest is the question of which discourses are utilised and why it is that certain of these discourse resonate reasonably well with the population. It is illuminating to study what is used by the media to tie events happening in another part of the world to the concerns of the potential readership.

While I draw on Sharp's conceptualisation of 'popular geopolitics', I do not situate my study in the same way as Sharp. This thesis is not an exhaustive analysis of *The Atlantic Monthly* itself. I began this research as a widely based study looking at changes in refugee and immigration discourses from institutional, academic and popular sources. However, the vast amount and complexity of literature concerning refugees and migrants became too large for the scope of a single study. I decided, therefore, to narrow my primary data source to just one article, although this by no means narrowed the focus of my study. In this study, I am not hoping to achieve representativeness, rather I am concerned with how this changing discourse is articulated from within one institutional location.

Determining what is influential is, of course, a problematic process. Said (1978) describes it as the process in which a text acquires and maintains authority outside of its original (historical/political) context. "Knowledge no longer requires application to reality; knowledge is what gets passed on, silently, without comment, from one text to another…what matters is that [ideas] are *there*, to be repeated, echoed and re-echoed uncritically (Said, 1978:116). What I am describing then, is not only a choice of a data source, but a process of constructing and determining authority. In this way, establishing the authority of the texts I critique also establishes the 'authority' of *my* critique. This process of establishing authority is also, paradoxically, what I want to resist.

Choice of text: The Atlantic Monthly

Before I explain my approach to analysis of "Must it be the West against the Rest?", I need to contextualise the article both within this 'location' (wider context) and within the stated concerns of *The Atlantic Monthly* magazine. As part of this background, it is important to consider the question: who does *The Atlantic Monthly* cultivate as its audience of readers? And, to whom is the provocative question "Must it be the West against the Rest?" addressed? I regard these questions as relevant to the background assumptions and central notions of the article because, though the authors are not considered staff writers for the magazine, I assume that their opinions are consistent with the messages *The Atlantic Monthly* wants to express.

I consider "Must it be the West against the Rest?" to be part of an ambitious project undertaken by the magazine to map the changing role of the United States in the post-Cold War period. Throughout the 1990s, *The Atlantic Monthly* ran a series of articles called "The Atlantic Monthly Looks Ahead to the 21st Century" with articles intending to look at the 'state of America' and the 'state of the world' moving into the third millenium.[33] This search to define who 'we' are in the world seems incongruous after the Cold War – a time that has been described as a period of unparalleled American hegemony (Fukuyama, 1989; Bush, 1991, 1992). The title of the articles published in the series – including, "Why we will soon miss the Cold War? (1990), "The Coming Anarchy" (1994), and "Can we still afford to be a nation of immigrants?" (1996) – suggests a state of crisis of identity or authority in which the naturalness of the existing order (- "the American century" -) is in danger of unravelling (Doty, 1996c).

This perception of crisis and insecurity concerning the stability of identities and boundaries is crucial to why I chose to study this article. As Doty (1996c:13) states,

---

[33] "In a nation as self-consciously aware of potential as ours has been, contemplation of the future possesses some of the stabilising function of tradition. To mark its 140th anniversary, *The Atlantic* will publish … a series of articles that look at aspects of the long-term future of the nation and the world. The subjects will be diverse, ranging from issues in the physical and biological sciences to issues of intellect and philosophy to mundane but far-reaching issues involving politics, demography, and the environment" (www.theatlantic.com/issues/21stcent.htm. Accessed 12/10/99.)

these moments of uncertainty and perceived instability "engender discussion, debate, directives, and other forms of discourse that provide a source of 'data' from which to examine the representational practices that attempt to reaffirm or reconstruct identities". "Must it be the West against the Rest?" is an example of such a source of data. It is an example of intensified rhetoric that goes beyond the ordinary and everyday 'flag waving' like singing the national anthem at a baseball game (Billig, 1995). The article is significant because it attempts to create some fervour among American people that even though the United States occupies an incredibly strong presence throughout the world, they cannot afford to be complacent. Connolly and Kennedy's article is a call to action. For it is in this discursive world of geopolitics that hegemony can be strengthened alongside the materiality of guns, troops, and money because it creates sides that Americans need to choose – one must be either the 'West' or the 'Rest' – otherwise 'America' and the 'West', as 'we' know it, will collapse.

The Atlantic Monthly: A popular magazine?

It is important to take the self-presentation of the magazine into account in my consideration of *The Atlantic Monthly* as a site where a popular geopolitics is articulated. *The Atlantic Monthly* has a clear view of its role as a magazine, as a significant presence in American culture. To assist with this discussion, I draw on "The History of The Atlantic Monthly" by Cullen Murphy, managing editor, published in the magazines's official website – *The Atlantic Unbound* (www.theatlantic.com). Indeed, as I link this study to a theoretical understanding of 'popular geopolitics' I should begin by asking just how 'popular' is *The Atlantic Monthly*? The significance of the magazine is due not to its achieving the highest readership or commercial success – *Reader's Digest* and *Time*, for example, far outsell *The Atlantic Monthly* – rather, it is its claim as America's premier intellectual and cultural monthly.[34] *The Atlantic Monthly* represents itself as a magazine of 'high culture' –"politics, society, the arts, and culture" – not as a publication tailored to

[34] In 1993 *The Atlantic Monthly* won National Magazine Award for General Excellence. In 1995, it won the National Magazine Award for Reporting and was nominated for National Magazine Awards in the General Excellence category – the industry's top honour.

mass consumption and more commercial or 'low' tastes. Rather than being read in "dentist's waiting rooms" as Sharp said of *Reader's Digest, The Atlantic* considers itself "a fixture of the American cultural landscape for more than 140 years". Its readers may not represent a large numerical portion of American society, but they represent quite a powerful minority.[35] According to demographic information provided by *The Atlantic Monthly* for advertisers, readers of the magazine are cultural and political decision-makers. They are highly educated, affluent, and influential.[36]

The Atlantic Monthly of today traces explicitly its history in a continuous line to *The Atlantic Monthly* of old – whose founding fathers (*sic*) occupied the summit of "America's literary Olympus". As the managing editor states: "We would like to think that the magazine our readers are getting today is, at least in its tone – in its stance toward the world – similar to the magazine that James Russell Lowell and his friends first brought forth" (Murphy, 1994). The exposition of an illustrious history establishes the continuity and authority of *The Atlantic Monthly*. This comparison hearkens back to the traditional role of the American magazine as a vehicle of culture – specifically the culture of well-to-do families in Boston and New York. In this way, *The Atlantic Monthly* reproduces the eighteenth and nineteenth century (idealised) notion of the 'gentle reader' – an active yet gentlemanly exchange between the author and the reader (Wilson, 1983), where the (elite) reader and (elite) author/publisher are considered to share the same interests and values.[37]

Given this exclusive history and its eager reclamation by today's editors, the question arises again – how 'popular' is *The Atlantic Monthly*? The magazine, I argue, may be

---

[35] In 1995, for example, *The Atlantic Monthly's* annual circulation was 459,404. 50,000 copies were sold at newstands per month, with a general readership of 1.2 million people each month (www.theatlantic.com/about/aboutunb.htm).

[36] According to Adsmart, the *Atlantic Unbound's* site sales sheet, the readers of *Atlantic Unbound* are: 53% male, with an average age of 38, an average HHI (income) of $75k, of whom 45% have a post-graduate education.

[37] Note: the 'gentle reader' is a *gentleman* reader. This democratic exchange of culture is a very gendered exchange.

considered 'popular', not because of its mass appeal, but because it locates itself outside the explicitly political sphere. The overtly political and prescriptive messages of an article such as "Must it be the West against the Rest?" are depoliticised by its appearance in *The Atlantic Monthly*. By stating that its role is "not unlike that of a liberal education", *The Atlantic Monthly* detaches itself from the 'fray' of the political sphere. The aim of *The Atlantic Monthly*, according to one of its staff writers is "to raise important questions and make them available for intelligent debate" (Lester, 1996). It is 'formally' political only in the sense that it sees its role as facilitating knowledge and the democratic exchange of ideas.

The implied reader, or 'people who need to know'

Although *The Atlantic Monthly* may deny it, I argue that its role and messages are indeed political. One of the stated goals of its editors is "to spread the conclusions of our authors to people who need to know".[38] This is not simply about spreading information and knowledge but a means through which the magazine actively constitutes the reader in the political process. The magazine becomes a site through which individuals are constituted as political subjects and constructed as a 'community of readers' – specifically a community of people *who need to know*. I argue further that the kind of subjectivity constructed here is a *hegemonic* one. *The Atlantic Monthly's* dominant subject/implied reader is one who drives the kinds of automobiles advertised; a patron of the arts; a consumer of the latest technology; in short, a thoroughly 'modern', thoroughly liberal, educated (elite) man, or in Rose's (1993) terms, the 'master subject'.

I recognise that the assumption of an implied (monolithic) reader is problematic. It does not perhaps give adequate consideration that each individual can interpret in a different way. A (singular) implied reader also has the potential to deny agency; it suggests that the audience will simply receive the 'wisdom' of the authors in some kind of (pre)

[38] "One of the roles of *The Atlantic Monthly* is an obligation to provide a considered look at all aspects of our national life' to write, as well, about matters that are not strictly American; to emphasize the big story that lurks, untold, behind the smaller ones that do get told;….. to shun the bandwagon, and to spread the conclusions of our authors to people who need to know" (Murphy, 1994).

determined way. However, while I argue that there is a hegemonic construction of the 'Reader' as male, liberal, 'middle class', etc., I am not suggesting that this hegemonic subject position is monolithic and/or complete. As Gramsci (1971) argued, hegemony can never be absolute or uncontested, but is instead always contingent and disputed. The relationship of individual readers to the hegemonic discourse of liberalism as reconstituted in *The Atlantic Monthly* may be highly problematic and unstable. This process, then, represents the constitution of the 'ideal' reader rather than any actual individual (Sharp 1996). It is a fiction that relies on a homogeneous and undifferentiated 'community' in which all readers are equal players, and all share a set of common meanings and codes (Ferguson, 1997). There is a consensus or commonality of interests implied– the readers share an implicit understanding with the author(s). The dominant subject position/implied reader is thus linked within a particular type of community - 'the community of good (American) citizens' (Anderson, 1991). This linking reinforces the 'we' identity that communicates that the *national* interest is *our* interest. It works to create the impression of democratic exchange or debate that is central to the rhetoric of the United States as a truly democratic state (Sharp, 1996).

Approach to Analysis

Setting an analytical framework

I evaluate "Must it be the West against the Rest?" through critical discourse analysis. In this study, I have adopted Harvey's (1990) understanding of critical social research as my starting point. Critical social research is concerned with social processes, their historical specificity and structural manifestations, and the processes and institutions that legitimate knowledge (Harvey, 1990). A critical approach rejects the notion of self-evident or objective knowledge. Knowledge is socially constructed, multiple, and therefore, contested. This means that there is not just one interpretation of social phenomena, there are many. However, not all knowledges are accepted equally. Knowledge is legitimated via relations of power that underwrite whose view of social reality becomes dominant. This explicit recognition of the power involved in knowledge production suggests a much

more active conception of language. As Opie (1992:56) states, "language cannot be regarded as a transparent, truthful medium through which the world is simply apprehended as it is but, instead, that it is fully implicated in power relations". Language is not just a passive reflection of reality; it is constitutive of reality. Moreover, it is not a reality that is universal or absolute, but positional. Positional in the sense that interpretations of 'reality' are just that. There can be no singular reality because peoples' interpretations are shaped differentially through their specific locations in (various) relations of power.

'Deconstruction' is an analytical technique used to expose the positional status of meaning. I interpret deconstruction broadly; the attempt to denaturalise and re-temporalise some explanations that appear to be common-sense, apolitical statements (Riggins, 1997). Discourse analysis is a diverse and heterogeneous field. For my purpose here it is not possible to discuss the various approaches to discourse analysis at length. I will try only to make *my* approach as clear as possible. To illustrate my perspective, I discuss examples from two analysts engaged in deconstruction – Timothy Luke (1994) and Judith Butler (1992). This, I hope, enables me to differentiate between the range of approaches that may be labelled 'discourse analysis'. The first example is from Luke (1994:626):

> Words are realities. Realities are words. Perhaps this recognition is key. New words generate new realities, and new realities generate new words. Until and unless one shatters old language games with new terms, the old realities remain comfortably nested in old words, disabling fresh recognitions and crippling alternative discourses. This must change if the system is to be named.

I highlight this as an example, perhaps, of what I do *not* want to do. The authority invested in word such as "this must change" and the language of "shattering" seem to me reminiscent of a masculinised project like the geopolitics I reject.[39] Luke's deconstruction seems to suggest that resistance to oppressive and hegemonic power structures/relations is (only) a textual intervention, "a subversion of a sign or a

[39] The language of breaking down or shattering is a kind of 'death' project. In contrast, Haraway speaks in very poignant terms: "We need the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and bodies get made, not in order to deny meanings and bodies, but in order to build meanings and bodies that have a

displacement of meaning" (Sharp, 2000:364). I do not want to suggest in my critique that resistance is *only* textual, or that this struggle is only played out over academic terrain. For example, I do not want my analysis to be only a dialogue between me 'the critic' and Connelly and Kennedy 'the authors'. This would serve to de-link my arguments from social processes, and from those people who are classified as either 'refugees' or 'illegal migrants'. Privileging this text as *the* site of intervention focuses attention back to the researcher/writer and away from inequitable processes that construct refugees/immigrants as 'threats'. In my analysis therefore, I try, as Mohanty says, to avoid "the analytic elision between the *experience* of oppression and the *opposition* to it...." (Mohanty, 1992:82). Mohanty's distinction is an important one. For me it means acknowledging that my analysis is only textual and that deconstruction in this sense can only be textual. But I am not suggesting by any means that *resistance* is only textual. One means to address this elision is to move away from any suggestions that I 'as a critic' am engaged in dangerous work or somehow on the 'frontline'.

The approach to deconstruction I have chosen, therefore, is not concerned with doing away with, or 'shattering' truth claims. I want to resist making foundational claims and/or 'creating' new names. In contrast to Luke, Butler (1992) states that deconstruction means that the analyst continues to use names, "to repeat them, to repeat them subversively, and to displace them from the contexts in which they have been deployed as instrument of oppressive power.... To call a presupposition into question is not the same as doing away with it; rather it is to free it up from its metaphysical lodgings" (Butler, 1992:17). Rather than *shattering*, Butler describes discourse analysis/deconstruction as a way of *shaking-up* non-innocent conversations (Haraway, 1991), because it is the contexts, not the words themselves that give discourses their power. I prefer Butler's mode of critique because she does not try to do away with power. In my understanding to think it possible to rid myself of power makes my less vigilant in examining how I am implicated.

---

chance for life" (Haraway, 1988:580). Thus, a reconstructive aspect, but not a Frankenstein project.

Steps in my reading

In "Must it be the West against the Rest?", Connelly and Kennedy construct a grand story, a kind of meta-narrative replete with allusions and examples from history and the present day. This organisation is like the plot of a story. The narrative structure of "Must it be the West against the Rest?" is an important means by which the text rhetorically convinces its readers by engaging the reader in a dramatic story with a distinct sequence of events leading towards a resolution. Because of the significance of this structure to their overall story, I chose to respond to organise my reading according to the structure of Connelly and Kennedy's narrative. My reading is arranged into eight sections following the subtitles of Connelly and Kennedy's text. I recognise that it is potentially problematic to organise my critique in this way because I risk reproducing or reinforcing their rhetoric, instead of subverting or disrupting it, as is my intention. However, I want to keep this format because the subtitles are provocative rhetorical markers, which I attempt to (re)use to interrupt their telling of the story and insist on the possibility of alternative readings.

In each of the eight sections, I mapped Connelly and Kennedy's narrative according to four main 'coordinates' – naming, boundary-making, dichotomy, and metaphor. In each section, I sort their arguments into two types of rhetorical strategies – naming and boundary-making – that Connolly and Kennedy use to support and reproduce ongoing hegemonic conceptualisations of American life. By using these strategies, Connolly and Kennedy contribute to the naturalisation of specific propositions, touting them as 'common-sense'. In addition, I identified a dichotomy constructed by Connelly and Kennedy, as well as a primary metaphor. Where appropriate, I refer also to the cover art and illustrations accompanying the text as integral (visual) reinforcement to extend the meaning of Connelly and Kennedy's narrative. Each section of my analysis follows the same format and is meant to stand-alone as a kind of 'vignette', a short descriptive (and critical) sketch. In general, I follow the structure of the article. Yet, because of the interconnectedness and reoccurrence of certain themes, some topics will be mentioned a number of times in different places. Although repetitive in places, I think it necessary to

organise my analysis in this way. In many cases, themes run through the entire narrative, but I wanted to isolate them so I could discern 'nodal points' and make explicit how discourses connect and reconnect. I understand 'nodal points', following Mouffe (1992) as privileged discursive points that fix meaning in relatively stable ways and enable the distinction between the inside (the 'self') and the outside (the 'other'(s) to be made. As discourses can never achieve complete closure and stability of meaning, they 'work' to connect to other discourses.

Emergent dilemmas

In addition to selecting "Must it be the West against the Rest?" as my primary source, I read widely and collected supplementary sources to aid the process of my analysis. My data collection and analysis procedure can be described as a snowball effect. One of the greatest difficulties in the initial stages of researching and writing, I discovered, was to halt the progress of this snowball. I deliberately refer to this snowball not as a process, but as a 'thing' to express the sense that 'it' – my ever-expanding collection of data/literature – had a momentum of its own. At this phase, it was difficult to know when one has 'enough' – enough background, enough information, enough understanding. Of course, my theoretical commitments tell me that data are always partial. And the collection of data can never be complete or whole. The dilemma became for me, then, when is there enough to promote a *partial* reading? In many ways, this situation became a dilemma (perhaps unique to my situation and experience, perhaps not) – the desire to 'back-up' my ideas and arguments as a MA student by pointing to and aligning myself with authority(ies), while also resisting this process of creating authority.[40] This contradiction invites me to consider Opies's question (1992:57): "What does it mean to write critically but less authoritatively when the act of writing is so strongly associated with authority and centrality?" I discuss this dilemma and my own position within this process in the following section.

[40] McDowell (1992:59) articulates this paradox: "It is difficult to simultaneously be seeking validation from and critiquing the academy".

My reading/analysis consisted of a process of reading, discussion and reflecting, sorting, writing, more discussion and reflecting, and rewriting. I did not follow a 'set' method with a beginning and an end, and a set of established steps; rather my approach was an ongoing, emergent process in which the analysis and data collection continually overlapped (Kirby and McKenna, 1989). I worked out the above framework to structure all the 'loose ends' that threatened to take me in too many different directions. Of course, there will always be 'loose ends'. Again, there is no singular method of proceeding, no 'right' way to read texts. It is not possible, nor desirable, to close off contestations and alternative readings. It is for these reasons that a "problem arises when one attempts to discuss the 'method' of discourse analysis. The notion of 'method' is itself the product of a positivist discursive frame which constructs an acceptable set of procedures that lead to the 'discovery' of truth"(Berg and Kearns, 1996:101). My intention, then, is not to describe laboriously the process of my reading as a series of methodological steps. Reading is not usually broken down in this way; it is usually thought of as an unconscious and private activity. But I want to say that reading is productive. It is a political process, and this is why my explanation or justification for *how* I am doing things, like providing a critical reading, is so important.

Defining an oppositional reading

In this study, I analyse how discourses/texts work to construct a (social) reality and pass off particular, political interpretations as apolitical statements *reflective* of reality. This approach contextualises knowledge production. It asks of "analysis and critique not its proximity to some notion of Truth, but to the effects of knowledge: who does it enable and who does it exclude" (Sharp, 2000:363). I examine Connolly and Kennedy's articulation of international migration as a 'problem' and attempt to shake-up and destabilise its status as a self-evident or universal problem. To destabilise the 'problem' in this way necessitates close attention to the political context(s) of its enunciation, and at *how* a text works and what it is used to *do* in particular interpretative context(s) (Gill, 1995).

In my reading of Connelly and Kennedy's text, I do not want to refute their argument point by point, and measure it according to the 'validity' of its truth claims. I do not want to make the 'opposite' argument. What I want to do instead is resist and disrupt the very logic of their argument that requires one to think in these binary terms. For although I acknowledge "Must it be the West against the Rest?" to be eclectic and wide-ranging in the scope of its arguments, I argue that it reproduces and reconstitutes a simple binary logic – the construction of an 'us' and 'them'. I define my approach as a critical analysis with the aim to create a 'space' for an *oppositional* rather than an *opposite* reading. I undertake a process of questioning the inevitability and naturalness of Connelly and Kennedy's narrative in order politicise, as Shapiro states (1988:xii), "the objects of representation as problematic and ambiguous – thereby making possible the recognition that what we have regarded as political realities could be rendered otherwise".

Although I do not intend to prove that my analysis is more correct or 'true' than Connelly and Kennedy's, the often repeated but important acknowledgement that interpretation is *always* partial and incomplete does not excuse me from accepting responsibility for my analysis because I am not innocent in the process of reading, interpreting and analysing. Reading (or textual/discourse analysis) is a socially constructed and mediated activity, and inevitably takes on the characteristics of the reader. As Kirby reminds me: "texts are never passively received, but are, in fact, actively reinterpreted by both writers and readers. Reading is an act of transformation, not a simple retrieval or diagnostics" (Kirby, 1993:32). This transformation raises some significant dilemmas, as I have discussed – the potential of reproducing dualism/authority in the text, how to understand the relationship between 'text' and 'material', the relationship of the text to 'truth', and how to define an oppositional reading (that is not simply opposite). One way to address these dilemmas is through critical reflexivity.

Towards a resolution

An integral part of the methodological approach that I propose is critical reflexivity. In this research project, critical reflexivity involves contextualising my self (formerly

anonymously and generically termed 'the researcher') within the context of providing a critical reading of a text. Critical reflexivity, more generally, is concerned with accountability in the process of research and writing and acknowledging one's positionings within social and political relations - "to place ourselves in relationship to other people, including bonds that tie us together as well as differences that keep us separate" (Moss and Matwychuk, 2000:84). It involves the explicit acknowledgement of the research process as a *political* project. The justifications for one's readings and interpretations, therefore, are inherently political. As Gill (1995:179), states critical reflexivity is a commitment that requires analysts "to make explicit the position from which they are theorising, and to reflect critically upon their own role - not simply becoming the 'certified deconstructors' (Jackson, 1992) of other people's discourse".

Implicit in the role of 'certified deconstructor' is the assumption that I, 'the critic', do not exist in discourse(s), and that I am somehow outside of, or removed from, the political processes of which I am critical. This is a privileged position that is temptingly and sometimes inadvertently claimed - "a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere" (Haraway, 1988:584). In my case, since I am critical of geopolitics - a 'tradition' of thought/theory which makes the theorist appear to be a disembodied, objective observer of the world political map - it is even more important that I ask myself the same questions(s) that I demand of a/the geopolitical text: *to what extent do I also assume this perspective?* Indeed, though I have chosen to discuss this last, Gramsci (1971:324) states that this recognition is the *first* step in elaborating a critical perspective:

> The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself' as a product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory. Therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.

Having stated my theoretical commitment to critical self-reflexivity, Gramsci's point raises the difficult question of how does one 'do' reflexivity? How would I even begin to compile such an inventory? This brings with it a knot of difficulties and dilemmas that I believe is important to make explicit. First, is the difficulty or impossibility of determining 'what one is' in terms of some kind of essence. For example, in the context

of this study I think it is important that I write *as a* white, third generation Canadian woman of Welsh immigrant descent. Of course, I am also traces of many other historical processes, some of which I can identify, some of which I can't. Yet I must also be aware that the designations I present here are not fixed or homogeneous pre-existing categories, but are social forms that are naturalised as a result of social and political processes operating in specific social fields (Moss and Matwychuk, 2000). For example, I am disempowered relative to the discourse of geopolitics as an elite, masculinist form of knowledge production, and as an atypical (young, female, low-income) 'consumer' of a magazine such as *The Atlantic Monthly.* At the same time, however, my positioning enables me the taken-for-granted 'privilege' of 'belonging' as part of the hegemonic social group (white, European) within Canada (within the 'West'). The tensions between these multiple positionings shape the way I approach research – the questions that I want to ask and the way that I ask them. For example, I am interested in how geopolitical discourses create exclusion, particularly how refugees/migrants are marginalised in discussions of international migration. But because of my positioning, I rarely think about or question my own *inclusion.* This is one of the reasons why I am interested in the study of geopolitics because it articulates so many assumptions about the way 'we' (the 'West') see the world and our place in it that it becomes 'common-sense'. I am interested because I want to know how to challenge and resist 'common-sense' and commonplace understandings of a world where some people belong and some don't.

By compiling such an inventory and stating my multiple positionings, I acknowledge that complex, interwoven relations of power that include class, 'race', and geography form my analysis and knowledge. This involves the realisation that I, for example, do not occupy 'stable ground' but rather a contradictory and shifting perspective that is temporally, spatially, and historically constructed. While the insistence on the heterogeneity and partiality of my (or any) subject position averts the illusion that I can exist outside of relations of power, it does not *equalise* relations of power, either. For example, there has been considerable criticism from women of colour and post-colonial writers who point out that self-reflexivity and this kind of positioning is often shallow; it is so easily and comfortably adopted by academics that it becomes like a badge that can

be taken on and off at one's convenience. It is this 'convenience' that is ultimately the privilege of race, class, and not least the hegemony of Western scholarship that conditions whose 'voice' should be heard and whose knowledge is 'legitimate' (Mohanty, 1991). The assumption that one can override difference through this type of linguistic manipulation is powerfully expressed by Ray (1992:189):

> The autobiographical preamble that foregrounds the critic's subject positions in terms of race, class, sexual orientation, and geographic location/displacement, instead of ratifying and reinforcing the political significance of her reading, is transformed into a series of nouns and adjectives that produces a renewable symbolic economy with the addition of yet another denomination. In one's desire to argue for multiple mediations in a heterogeneous and highly politicised academic and social landscape, one can seemingly more and more easily dip into the well of terminologies, unproblematically contextualise oneself, and come up barely wet.

Ray's point raises a second dilemma: how does the political significance of acknowledging one's subject position become de-radicalised or colonising even if one has the 'right intentions'? To avoid this, it is important that I remember that reflexivity as a method is a continuous process. In my research project, I must continually confront this challenge. Simply stating one's bias up front and 'wiping the slate clean' is not adequate. In order that my commitment to contextualise my critical arguments does not, as Sparke has commented (2000:379), "fade away into a series of distant echoes", I employ two writing strategies.

First, I attempt to deal with the partiality of interpretation through the extensive use of footnotes. My intention is not just to provide additional information (the addition of which would disrupt the flow of my analysis) but additionally to link the fragments of my analysis to other arguments. This is, again, to aim for a politicised form of writing, and to point out that there is always the possibility that (my) explanations (*as well* as Connelly and Kennedy's) could have been rendered otherwise. Second, I employ the (perhaps over-) use of 'scare quotes' to signal the difficulties that I experience with language and the choice of words that the authors of "Must it be the West against the Rest?" and myself employ. I aim for an effect similar to Butler's (1992:19): "I place them in quotation marks to show that they are under contest, up for grabs, to initiate the

context, to question their traditional deployment, and call for some other.... The effect of the quotation marks is to denaturalise the terms, to designate these signs as sites of political debate". I mark these words to highlight that there are many possible meanings and nuances to language, and that the use of particular words in some contexts puts into play a range of other meanings and activates particular discourses.

These strategies are part of positioning myself in my text to reject (if possible) the convention of positivist, geopolitical explanations and analyses where the author is present but never announced. These explanations/analyses, then, seemingly author themselves, which enables them to appear as objective and neutral statements of 'fact'. Through my explicit presence in the text, I want to announce (to the contrary) that my analysis is an argument that is both political and contestable. In addition, my efforts to interrupt and disrupt textual production are, again, an attempt to undermine the assumption of authority and panoptic perspective of the author as all-knowing and all-seeing – an assumption that writers of geopolitics, in particular, claim. It is, nevertheless, a relation of power (the power to name, to define, for example) that exists in *all* research.

This dilemma once again highlights the difficulty of writing critically but less authoritatively. I think this recognition presents a great challenge because it involves giving up the 'certainty' and 'control' that underlies my epistemology or 'will to know'. Yet, I believe this dilemma does not necessarily close off the possibility or usefulness of this kind of analysis. In trying to work through this tension, Smith's (1987:78) comments are important in shaping my research goals: "A critique is more than a negative statement. It is an attempt to define an alternative". I believe it is constructive to consider the power relations within the literature and to make them explicit. This will create space for a critical intervention, one that would allow a refocusing or repositioning of this (example of a) geopolitical text to be part of the ongoing dialogue "within feminist, postcolonial, postmodern, and multicultural struggles over academic terrain and scholarly discourse in recent years to force an expanded intellectual practice which embraces a multiplicity of experience to improve our understanding of the world" (Katz, 1992:505).

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS

Introduction to Analysis

Welcome to the article by Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy. The strength of the drama created by Connelly and Kennedy's narrative might seduce readers into the uncritical acceptance of their arguments and explanations. I offer a critical (re)reading, that destabilises the taken-for-granted meanings inherent in their narrative. To this end, I organise my thoughts into three sets of comments. First, I argue that the context is crucial in a/ny critical reading. Meanings and social practices are ravelled and mutually constitute one another within what social, political, geographic and historical contexts. It would be difficult to come to any understanding of a/ny text without somehow accessing these constitutive processes of both meaning and practice. Second, I argue that Connelly and Kennedy, in their representation of what matters in international political discourse, fix identities and meanings as a means of imposing order and containing politics and spaces. (Re)reading this text critically exposes some of this fixity, leaving space to create another interpretation, another politics, another possibility Third, I argue that both Connelly and Kennedy's representation and my critical reading are exercises in boundary-making. By solidifying a/ny reading in a written text privileges that which is written and closes off the immediacy of competing readings. In this sense, both texts – "Must it Be the Rest Against the Rest?" and "'Foreign Villains and Home-grown Heroes': A critical geopolitical re-reading of a neo-liberal text from *The Atlantic Monthly*" – bound and fix meaning. One difference between the two is that in my text I am trying to problematise the process of creating a text.

Connelly and Kennedy's publication is part of a series of discussions "by opinion-makers, news journalists, and professional politicians casting about for a new interpretative system" (Ó'Tuathail, 1996:243)[41] with the demise of the Cold War.[42] Post-

[41] Examples here, as I have discussed in previous chapters, include works by Fukuyama, 1989; Meirsheimer, 1990; Huntington, 1993; Kaplan, 1994. This list indicates the specific types of analyses arising out of international relations and foreign policy circles. In general, these have in common the task of creating a textual space for *a* (reified) 'world politics'.

WWII ushered in an artificial state of congealment between two opposing blocs whereby clear, defensible lines could be drawn by both sides symbolically and concretely, as for example, the Iron Curtain.[43] Being able to position oneself on one side or the other permitted easily recognisable enemies, an 'us' and a 'them'. The constancy of the immediate threat of military or ideological invasion necessitated a permanent state of alert that justified vast expenditures and the expansion of multiple-stranded apparatuses of surveillance and defence.[44]

Over a period of time, the illusory stasis of this dichotomous arrangement waned, prompting further justification to maintain a state of crisis. With the symbolic dismantling of the Cold War in 1989, "opinion-makers, news journalists, and professional politicians" were at a loss as to how to conceptualise safety and security. "With the 'red threat' fading into the past, new threats to the 'safety and security' of the West have been conjured" (Tesfahuney, 1998:506). The West was facing a new 'disorder' that augured 'chaos'.[45] Unpredictability replaced predictability, formlessness replaced structure,

---

[42] Campbell (1992) makes an important point about 'endings': "To proclaim the end of the cold war assumes that we know what the cold war was. Moreover, the very act of proclaiming the end of the cold war serves to write history in such a way that the cold war becomes an era the understanding of which is not problematic. In considering the issue of where to go from here there is a tendency to uncritically accept a particular story of how we got to here. By constantly invoking the advent of a new phase in world politics, analysts tend to accept one particular rendering of the period from which we are emerging, a rendering that privileges the legitimacy of 'the West' (and the United States in particular) in its entirety" (Campbell, 1992:17).

[43] This is not to say that this is the first dichotomous politicised (geopolitical) arrangement of (international) foes. Dichotomous categories exist in many philosophical systems, but I am interested specifically in Western systems. Said (1978), for example, argues that Anglo-American geopolitical writing has been essentially predicated on a Western discourse which positions the 'East' as a threat or danger to the 'West' (Dodds and Sidaway, 1994:517). This 'Orientalist' discourse predates Cold War categories of inclusion/exclusion.

[44] These apparatuses are focused not only on an external enemy, such as 'them' over there, but also on 'them' within 'us'. This extension of containment into domestic life, to cite two examples, is evidenced by the 'Red Scare' and the Committee for Un-American Activities.

[45] In an article titled "From Cold War to Chaos and Chloera", J. Brian Atwood (1994), USAID administrator and President Clinton's special envoy to Rwanda, assessed the contemporary international political scene:

> Containment of communism defined our national security policy for nearly half a century. ... Now, we must forge the tools and policies needed to meet a threat that can best be summarised by the word 'chaos'. Increasingly we are confronted by countries without leadership, without order, without governance itself. They pyre of failed states is being fired by common fuels: long-simmering ethnic, religious and territorial disputes; proliferating military stockpiles built

volatility replaced stability.[46] The plethora of fluid, multi-dimensional threats fuelled fears that the established 'order' of the West was in danger. These threats were not only imagined as *external* to Western states, in the form of problems, perceived or 'real', such as environmental degradation, terrorism, migration, overpopulation, religious extremism, but also *internal*, in the form of increasing challenges by the perspectives of women, 'racial' and ethnic minorities to the authority of the state and to the privileged positions historically enjoyed by conservative white males within these states (Ó'Tuathail, 1996). This combined confusion and uncertainty externally and internally evoked sentiments of nostalgia and longing for a "world where dramas are simple, identities pure, and antagonisms clear" (Ó'Tuathail, 1998:111).[47] Scrambling to find a secure meaning of who 'we' are, these analysts latched on to familiar geopolitical strategies of containment and exclusion (Dalby, 1998a). Through this repositioning the opinion-makers, news journalists, and professional politicians recycled Cold War discourses of danger and security in such a way as to recast chaos as all-inclusive. Chaos becomes a bounded entity – inclusive of all disruptions, all dissonance, all contestations. In this way, chaos as a threat is set up to "suit the changed contours of political economy, hegemony and space" (Tesfahuney, 1998:506), and an enemy is produced that is fixed, containable, undifferentiated, and dehumanised. In its new configuration, opinion-makers, news journalists, and professional politicians can now easily define who 'the enemy is'; it is everything external to an idealised 'we'.

> dangerously high during the old War; endemic poverty; rapid population growth; food insecurity; environmental degradation; and unstable and undemocratic governments....But we are in a transition period. We are just beginning to wrestle with the necessities, and frustrations, of multilateral diplomacy. A highly dynamic and increasingly independent set of nongovernmental variables - information and financial flows, international citizen networks, proliferating and accessible weapons of war and millions of migrating people - is challenging our analytical capacity and undermining traditional diplomacy. We are still in the process of defining the elements required to combat the new, multidimensional threats (Atwood, 1994:21).

[46] I am not arguing here that volatility and instability did not exist during the Cold War. Rather, I wish to point out that it is being re-written as such by some political commentators.

[47] The most obvious example is John Meirsheimers's article "Why we will soon miss the Cold War". This view is also echoed by Connelly and Kennedy's observation, "It would be much easier, clearly, to confront a military foe, such as a Warsaw Pact nation" (p.62).

Connelly and Kennedy's text is located within this redefinition of threats. "Must it be the West against the Rest?" is not an isolated example of a particular kind of geopolitical thinking, despite its presentation as a sudden, stunning declaration – a looming 'problem' that the authors, Connelly and Kennedy, have only just discovered. I wish to recover from the text how they constructed this 'problem'. Two rhetorical strategies, naming and boundary-making,[48] serve Connelly and Kennedy well in their attempt to recast uncertainty as certainty, and assign a 'formless' enemy a corporeal form, one whose presence – wherever in the world – is in its very self a threat.

One way to fix identities and meanings is through naming. Naming as a strategy is part of a (imperial) 'geo-graphing' tradition that empowers its practitioners to 'see' and classify the world. "The collectors of knowledge were important in defining agendas, establishing standards of intelligibility, and creating social realities" (Dodds and Sidaway, 1994:519). Thus, naming is not "a neutral, objective practice of surveying global space." (Dalby and Ó'Tuathail, 1998:2). Rather, naming fixes space by setting up dominant visions of space. In this sense, naming is a constitutive practice (not a designation of a given, transparent 'reality') – naming *produces* space. Names are "part of both a symbolic and material order that provides normality and legitimacy to those who dominate the politics of (place) representation" (Berg and Kearns, 1996:99). There is always power at work here. Butler (1992:15-16) expresses this clearly: "identity categories are never simply descriptive, but always normative and thus exclusionary". The question, then, becomes who gets excluded by whose norms.

The act of naming sets parameters around an entity; parameters that appear unalterable. Fixing a name establishes a kind of authority and control over (contested) spaces/places. The exclusivity of names operates as a means of control: "'We claim the right to call 'ourselves' what 'we' want and to have no one else usurp 'our' name" (Billig, 1995:73). Naming, allows the namer, in a sense, to 'occupy' that space. As Yaeger, (1996:8, citing

---

[48] Of course, there are other strategies that Connelly and Kennedy use, but I will only focus on these, because they reveal most cogently my points about how they have constructed a problem out the 'empty' and 'enemy-less' post-Cold War political space.

Lefebvre 1991:280) states: "Each new form of political power partitions space in its own way, constructing a set of classifications that 'make it possible for a certain type of non-critical thought simply to register the resultant 'reality' and accept it at face value'". A name becomes normalised, naturalised, and assumes a transparency, a taken-for-grantedness. Through this process of naming, these meanings become rooted in space. While naming gives the impression of the exclusivity and discreteness of spaces and identities, boundary-making helps to mark and police these partitions. Boundary-making processes put into place culturally intelligible markers that demarcate the politicisation of particular topics, issues, and subjects. These processes concern "more than 'merely' symbolic production, because these social symbols are inextricably linked to the production of material conditions"(Berg and Kearns, 1996:119). And it is these material conditions that mediate the outcome of 'real' effect.

The imagined separation and discreteness of 'West' and 'Rest' sets up boundaries that create a distance between ourselves and that perceived as threatening (Sibley, 1995). The bifurcated worldview Connelly and Kennedy present is not just a self-evident, politically neutral description of the world map, but a politicised boundary-making practice, defining a 'new' axis, a 'new' antagonism, and reflecting a particular politics of space. Once meanings are fixed and reinforced as boundaries, the only possibility is a kind of dualism continually (re)producing unresolvable antagonisms. The power of dualisms lie in simplifying thought so that it is difficult to imagine any other way of thinking. Complexity is suppressed in favour of controllable abstractions (Ó'Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Creating this bounded knowledge of the world forces other 'problems' and other explanations to recede into the background. For example, Connelly and Kennedy specify the movement of peoples – nota bene, particular 'types' of peoples – as a problem and a threat, yet never address why the movement of peoples is *necessarily* a 'problem' or a 'threat'. Herein lies the power of the geopolitical text. According to Dalby (1998a:295): "the power to construct a popular understanding of the context is a crucial discursive task of geopolitics". This fixing of identities and meaning reinforces the power of authoritative, 'naming' groups and reterritorialises the 'empty' global space of the post-Cold War.

Through these strategies – naming and boundary-making – Connelly and Kennedy construct a series of difference-producing dichotomies among peoples and places within a context that mobilises support to enforce the separation of these places. I elaborate these arguments in my reading of the first section of Connelly and Kennedy's text. Before turning to these arguments, it is necessary to acknowledge that I, too, am guilty of naming and boundary-making through my attempt to provide an 'oppositional', alternate/alternative reading. My (re)naming attempts to interrupt the naturalisation process that constructs taken-for-granted identities and endeavours to create new points of articulation within the discourse.[49] I also create and reinforce existing boundaries through my choosing what to include and exclude in my critique, what is worthy of my attention, and what sort of explanation emerges from my critical reading.

In this way, I, too, am complicit in silences and erasures because my assumptions and arguments cannot be removed from the same power-laden contexts within which Connelly and Kennedy produce their text. As Billig (1995:12) points out: "It is naïve to think that a text of exposure can escape from the times and place of its formulation." In support, Hall (1997:185) argues: "Modern theories of enunciation always oblige us to recognise that enunciation comes from somewhere....It is when a discourse forgets that it is placed that it tries to speak for everybody else". Therefore, I need to acknowledge the positioning of a text, and myself 'as a critic', who is already, inevitably situated within discursive apparatuses/formations. Without this destabilisation, any boundary becomes naturalised, whether it is through hegemonically defined norms of social and political interaction, or any of its critiques. Thus, any enunciation is an integral part of the boundary-making process, and implicated in the politics of space. As a way to resist Connelly and Kennedy's boundary-making practices, I suggest, like Gupta and Ferguson (1992:14), that 'we' need to disrupt the very familiarity and ease of the assumption of 'we' and attempt "to problematise the unity of the 'us' and the otherness of the 'other'

[49] The limits of language and thought necessitate naming and boundary-making – the crucial theme is to be mindful of who has done the naming and for what purpose.

and question the radical separation between the two that makes the opposition possible in the first place".

An Introduction to "Must it be the West against the Rest?"

> *A million poor wretches, armed only with their weakness and their numbers, overwhelmed by misery, encumbered with starving brown and black children, ready to disembark on our soil, the vanguard of the multitudes pressing hard against every part of the tired and overfed West. I literally saw them, saw the major problem they presented, a problem absolutely insoluble by our present moral standards. To let them in would destroy us. To reject them would destroy them.*
> *During the ten months I spent writing this book, the vision never left me. That is why The Camp of the Saints, with all its imperfections, was a kind of emotional outpouring.*
>
> Jean Raspail, Preface, 1973, cited in Connelly and Kennedy, 1994: 66.

In this opening section, Connelly and Kennedy introduce the reader to *The Camp of the Saints*, by Jean Raspail. *The Camp of the Saints* is the fictional story of a million desperate Indians who sail to France in search for a better life, and the predicament of the French as they decide whether to accept or repel the "armada of helpless yet menacing people" (p.62). Connelly and Kennedy's introduction is little more than a brief sketch of the dramatic plot of *Camp*, but it is here that the authors introduce the grand antagonism between 'West' and 'Rest' that is the focus of the article. The introduction is a crucial part of Connelly and Kennedy's narrative, for they need the audience to accept their identification and definition of enemies and threats. Or, as Billig, says, they "seek to enrol 'us', their readers, in their literary march" (Billig, 1995:73). In my reading of this section, I consider some questions and issues raised by the provocative title "Must it Be the West against the Rest?", namely how this bifurcated world view spatialises the world map in accordance with dominant, taken-for-granted understandings of identity and territory. I draw attention to the power-laden, deeply ethnocentric assumptions at work in this division of two unequal worlds. Connelly and Kennedy mobilise support for their arguments, through the process of building an 'us' and 'them', and through naming the categories as already-existing (and inevitable) geographic entities.

This brief introductory section effectively sets the tone of the article and immediately establishes a 'relationship' with the reader. As a reader, I cannot help but be struck by the drama of the article. Selective quotes from Raspail's narrative create the impression of a state of crisis, a sense of urgency enhanced by the ominous, matter-of-fact finality of the projection that appears on the opening page: "Absent major changes in North-South relations, the wretched should inherit the earth by about 2025." The question, "Must it be the West against the Rest?" summons up the grand civilisational antagonism reminiscent of the sort envisioned by Huntington (1993) in "The Clash of Civilisations". But, whereas Huntington was mainly concerned with the threat posed by Islamic 'fundamentalism', Connelly and Kennedy's focus is the more diffuse threat of the 'Rest', whose very 'bodily' danger threatens to blur boundaries (national, 'racial', social), and disrupt imagined cohesions and established 'ways of life' in the 'West'.

The title question rhetorically positions the authors and their audience. It sets up the illusion of an open, dialogue-like exchange between the authors, who often speak from personal experience in a conversational manner, and the readers, who are cast as an imagined/imaginary community of concerned citizens. This rhetorical strategy engages the reader as a participant in the definition and solution of the 'problem', a participant in 'something big'. Connelly and Kennedy achieve this sense of 'community' with a minimal amount of effort. Stereotypes of character, identity and history are called upon with ease, and draw on existing cultural myths. 'We' the community of readers already know to whom and what the 'West' and 'Rest' refers. "No details had to be specified, nor argument advanced" (Billig, 1995:72), because Connelly and Kennedy can presume that their audience would well understand, and align themselves with the 'West'.[50]

The 'we' that Connelly and Kennedy employ acts as a kind of double signifier – it is a 'we' in a particular sense – the first person plural (Billig, 1995). But in the context of the dominant discourse of (transnational) liberalism, there is a strong moral component

[50] The notion of a separate and superior 'West' is naturalised in various ways. I, for example, learned what 'Western Civilisation' was in a course by that name in high school. To my recollection, 'Western' civilisation was the only civilisation. Other contenders were just 'different' cultures.

embedded in this 'we'. The 'we' also asserts something universal – the 'we' refers to the "universally reasonable world" (Billig, 1995:90). "Thus 'we' speak in 'our' own interests with an authority which stretches beyond 'ourselves'" (Billig, 1995:82). This assumption of authority, however, does not present a problem for Connelly and Kennedy because 'we' can be trusted to do the 'right thing' when faced with a problem involving 'them'.[51] The ideology that constructs or employs this 'we', particular or universal, as Billig argues further, is "also the ideology of the third person. There can be no 'us' without 'them'" (Billig, 1995:78). 'Us' and 'them' are part of a hierarchical dichotomy. Establishing the identity of 'us' is dependent, to varying extents, on the denigration of 'them'. The 'them' is not only constructed as the antithesis of 'us', it is the site, the identity where all undesirable qualities of 'us' can be transferred/projected and, therefore, externalised.

The act of naming, in addition to assigning an immutable identity, also fixes the 'West' and 'Rest' in space, assigning them their particular place. In their representation, the 'West' and 'Rest' as a unit is presented as an unproblematic description of the world map. The assumption is that categories represent discrete spatial containers – but if not in precisely geographical terminology, it is more in the sense of a discrete, self-evident 'here' and 'there'. It is not necessary, for example, for Connelly and Kennedy to write: "Must it be the West: Western Europe, and North America (but not Mexico) versus the Rest?": North, Central and Southern Africa (but only certain aspects of South Africa), Central and Southeast Asia (including China, but not Japan and certainly not Australia and New Zealand), and Central and South America?" The subtle irony is submerged through the simplicity of 'we', thereby illustrating the taken-for-grantedness of this division of the world, and also that some are more 'Rest' than others.[52]

---

[51] This type of morality has been invoked by the rhetoric of the European Union in disciplining Austria as a result of the Freedom Party's incorporation into 'mainstream' politics. The Freedom Party does not uphold the standards of the EU as democratic, peace-loving, tolerant societies. The EU with respect to the content of its immigration policies may not differ too greatly from the Freedom Party, but the Freedom Party makes its xenophobic and racist sentiments too explicit for the EU to accept – it is a reminder that racism and xenophobia can no longer be shrugged off as a 'fringe' element. The Freedom Party is also not part of the 'international community' that is the EU – within this union it is not tolerable to allow mavericks doing exactly what they want, just for 'national' power.

[52] This list, obviously, also does not account for members of the 'Rest' in close proximity to the 'West' and located within the boundaries of the 'West'. In addition, I want to emphasise that this list is fluid, that is, there are is a variety of different groups at different times displaying different vulnerabilities to exploitation

This division relies then, on a homogenised, essentialised writing of space that elides differences both within and between 'West' and 'Rest'. The 'West' is the norm, the taken-for-granted – an alliance of the 'right kind' of societies. A mythologised, idealised "way of life based upon the will of the majority, and distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression" (Truman, 1947, cited in Ó'Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998). The 'West' is an international expression of the "national order of things" (Malkki, 1995) – the predominant/hegemonic mode of political and social organisation in modernity. The powerful coincidence of territory and identity in this order means that "the bonds linking people and place are held firm by a universal grammar which promises a cleansed vision of proper peoples in their proper places" (Billig, 1995:78).

What do we know about the 'Rest'? As Retamar (1997:165) says: "Eurocentric expressions like ...[the Rest] mean nothing, except that the one who uses these words is not there". It represents a blank space compared to the 'fullness' of the West, akin, perhaps, to the colonial designation of Africa as 'the dark continent'. In opposition to the homogenous 'unity' of the 'West', the 'Rest' represents a motley, undifferentiated heterogeneity, abstracted into language as, for example, "inexorably advancing multitude", and "a million poor wretches". Throughout the article Connelly and Kennedy fill this 'blank' space with meaning by the suggestive use of subtitles, such as "The Doom of the White Race" and "Not since Genghis Khan". The illustrations accompanying the narrative serve as an important reference point, and visually reinforce the impression that the 'Rest' is a dark crowd of interlopers, just as 'we' suspected. Through the presentation of the text, Connelly and Kennedy as well as *The Atlantic Monthly* confirm the status of the 'Rest' as "people from the 'wrong end' of the social position and/or power axes" (Tesfahuney, 1998:501).

---

and confronting different levels of exclusion (Shapiro, 1997). As for example, the Shah of Iran, Kuwaiti royalty, and Jordan's late King Hussein.

This introductory section of the article is important to reinforce a collective 'we' and differentiate 'us' from 'them'. I argue this is a moment of identity-construction – through a naming and boundary-making exercise – to position the reader within the geopolitical space that Connelly and Kennedy create, and "to demarcate the domestic space [the West] as separate from the threatening other" [the Rest] (Dalby 1990:17). In the rest of the chapter, I will analyse how a series of binary hierarchies reinforces and reproduces this central dichotomy of 'West' and 'Rest'.

The Voyage of the Golden Venture

In the "Voyage of the Golden Venture", Connelly and Kennedy explain why they chose to revisit *The Camp of the Saints*, a book published nearly thirty years ago. The authors state that their intention is to "recover this neglected work to call attention to the key global problem of the twentieth century: unbalanced wealth and resources, unbalanced demographic trends, and the relationship between the two" (p. 63). Connelly and Kennedy introduce the mainstream audience of *The Atlantic Monthly* to *The Camp of the Saints* despite the fact that Raspail's work has been denounced as 'racist propaganda' by French politicians.[53] Rather than decry Raspail's narrative, Connelly and Kennedy point to the 'real-life' journey of the migrant-transporting ship, the *Golden Venture*, as support for Raspail's thesis: "Many members of the more prosperous economies are beginning to agree with Raspail's vision: a world of two "camps", North and South, separate and unequal, in which the rich will have to fight and the poor will have to die if mass migration is not to overwhelm us all" (p. 62).

---

[53] Instead, the authors signal approval of Raspail's thesis. For example, Connelly and Kennedy are careful to inform us that Raspail has won awards from the *Academie Francaise*. They also provide favourable reviews of Raspail's flare for storytelling: "chapters skillfully arranged", "the book also seems realistic", "the denouement is especially dramatic..." "Raspail is particularly effective here...".
The Camp of the Saints is not only a favourite of Connelly and Kennedy's, however. It is also popular with an ultra-nationalist web-page, the "Northern Voice", where *The Camp* is described as "an underground classic". "Northern Voice" describes itself as - the "politically incorrect bookstore" – "nationalist, pro-American, anti-liberal, and anti-New World" (www.anu.org.northernvoicebookstore.htm). Connelly and Kennedy's resurrection of *The Camp of the Saints* is notable because they bring *The Camp* to a mainstream audience. Today, for example, Raspail's diatribe receives an average customer rating of 4 out of 5 stars on the Amazon.com website, where one enthusiastic reader said: "This book is so politically incorrect that I admire Amazon.com for actually carrying it" (Lloyd A. Conway, 7/31/00, Amazon.com website).

In my reading, I consider how Connelly and Kennedy lend credibility to this alarming conclusion. The authors validate Raspail's narrative through establishing themselves as trustworthy 'experts', and anchoring their account in 'real life'. In "The Voyage of the Golden Venture", Connelly and Kennedy delineate a boundary that constructs the 'Rest' as different and undesirable through developing the notion of good and bad refugees and migrants. This attempt to fix migrants as 'good' or 'bad' effectively establishes a criterion of who belongs and who doesn't, that is, who is a worthy, legitimate member of the 'West'.

The racist language of *The Camp* is undeniable and offensive, Connelly and Kennedy concede, but its message is legitimated through its appearance on the pages of *The Atlantic*, a magazine with (self-described) "impeccable Brahmin breeding" (from *Atlantic Unbound* website). This speaks to an important characteristic of discourse - a text does not appear 'alone' or 'singular', but always within a particular context, which enacts closure upon the text produced, and establishes authority over a number of other possible interpretations. "The limitation upon actual readings of any text stems from the production of discourses as facilitated by institutional structures. Authors often gain credibility from credentials they have obtained (association with institutions recognised as being producers of knowledge for instance)" (Sharp, 1994:65). In this way, *The Atlantic Monthly* can itself be considered an author, an American cultural institution with the authority to choose the best (Sharp, 1994). *The Atlantic Monthly* magazine is proud of its reputation as an arbiter of 'taste' and testament to all things civilised. This reputation tames the violence of Raspail's narrative; ugly expressions of xenophobia assume an air of respectability tucked between advertisements for luxury cars and liqueurs.[54]

The status of Connelly and Kennedy as authors also validates this message. The authors have chosen to discuss Raspail's narrative and in doing so, declare that his message is

[54] For example, on page 64-65, an advertisement for Acura automobiles testifies to this exclusivity. Acura tells the reader "Some things are worth the price". At the bottom of the ad, in large letters, the caption reads: "Few people are discerning enough to appreciate the very best. Which, of course, is part of the appeal".

worth resurrecting and repeating. Kennedy is a well-known author and director of International Security Studies at Yale University, and Matthew Connelly is a doctoral candidate in history at Yale. They are not, in other words, some kind of 'right-wing alarmists'.[55] Kennedy, particularly, is recognised as an 'expert' on the subject, and privy to the latest information and international policy decisions. This pedigree reassures the reader that s/he can rely on the expert status and experience of the authors. "The recognition of authority places the author closer to the Truth than the reader and as such enhances the realism of the author's account" (Sharp, 1994:66).[56] We can 'trust' them because they are 'in the know'.

Connelly and Kennedy do not (just) let their credentials 'speak' for themselves, however. It is interesting that they choose to introduce the autobiographical voice, the voice of the 'first person' here. Connelly and Kennedy 'get personal' to enhance the 'validity', and the 'author-ity' of their account.[57] This first person voice is reassuring to readers, because "first-hand experience and descriptive accuracy through careful reporting are so deeply entrenched in our culture that we often fail to question much that is presented as

---

[55] Six years after "Must it be the West against the Rest?", Paul Kennedy continues as the Director of the Yale International Security Studies program, and sits on the editorial board of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and *the Journal of Strategic Studies*. His latest book, with William Hitchcock, is called *From War to Peace: Altered Stategic Landscapes in the Twentieth Century* (2000, New Haven: Yale University Press). Matthew Connelly graduated for Yale University with a PH.D in history, and now teaches foreign policy and race and ethnicity in international relations at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan.

[56] Foucault (1984:107) also comments on this process of constructing authority:

> The author's name serves to characterize a certain mode of being of discourse: the fact that the discourse has the author's name, that one can say 'this was written by so-and-so' or 'so-and-so is its author,' shows that this discourse is no ordinary, everyday speech that merely comes and goes, nor something that is immediately consumable. On the contrary, it is speech that must be received in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status…the name seems always to be present, marking off the edges of the text, revealing, or at least characterizing its mode of being.

[57] I perhaps need to make a distinction here. Connelly and Kennedy use the autobiographical voice to establish authority by claiming access to truth via experience. This is a gendered/racialised process, however, for within the genre of autobiography, despite the relative, contextual truth it implies, some knowledge and experience (not surprisingly) is valued more highly than others. Autobiographies and the personal voice of women and non-white oral traditions, for example, are not seen as truthful/authoritative in the tradition of autobiographical writing (Miller, 1991; Moss, 2001). The conventional approach to autobiography focuses on the personal lives of great (European) men, and emphasises the individual as a supreme and unique being. In this way, "masculinity and authorship merge in a culturally accepted author-ity" (Frye, 1986:8).

self-evidently true" (Duncan, 1993:43).[58] Through these claims to authority, the authors are able to establish their account as 'legitimate'. This naturalising practice serves to divert attention from other possible accounts and interpretations. In Connelly and Kennedy's formulation, their partial and political interpretation appears as the 'correct' and only explanation.

Legitimacy works to define what text is good and bad. Interestingly, Connelly and Kennedy use the same technique to differentiate between good and bad refugees and migrants. The story of the Golden Venture is a first-hand example of these naturalising representational practices. In 1993, the *Golden Venture* transported 290 Chinese refugees/illegal immigrants[59] around the Cape of Good Hope to New York City. Connelly and Kennedy describe this 'real life' voyage as even more 'fantastic' than the fictional armada from *The Camp of the Saints.* From this example, Connelly and Kennedy project that Raspail's terrifying vision may be in the process of realisation in the United States - only those arriving will be 'yellow' instead of 'brown', but still non-white (Maynes, 1995).

Connelly and Kennedy express their amazement at the example of the Golden Venture. This example, I suggest, exemplifies one of the authors' main preoccupations throughout the article, that is, their anxiety at people who are out of place: "Take a look at an atlas and pose the question, just how does a desperate citizen of, say, Bulgaria get to Morocco *without* going through western Europe?" (p.63). By posing this question rhetorically, Connelly and Kennedy make a direct appeal to their audience – "see for yourself". They invite the reader to refer to her/his knowledge of the map of the world, and confirm that this just doesn't make *sense*. Here, the expert status of the authors is corroborated and legitimated by 'common-sense'.[60] "For it is self-evident that 'real' nations are fixed in

---

[58] Duncan comments on this with reference to ethnographic accounts: "This tension between rhetorical modes perhaps accounts for the odd mixture in twentieth-century ethnography of the use of the first person in one part of the text (usually the beginning in order to establish personal presence) and the use of impersonal, scientific language elsewhere" (Duncan, 1993:42).

[59] Since either choice of word puts into play a range of meanings and practices, I use both terms to emphasise the contestedness of these definitions.

[60] The appeal to 'common-sense' is a useful rhetorical/discursive device because this form of knowledge

space and 'recognisable' on a map....The world of nations is thus conceived as a discrete spatial partitioning of territory; it is territorialised in the segmentary fashion of the multicoloured school atlas" (Malkki, 1992:26). The power of the atlas appeals to common understandings of the world and how it is organised. An important question arises from this segmented understanding of the school atlas – what are the social and political consequences for people who do not fit, who represent 'matter out of place'? (Malkki, 1992).

The refugees/migrants of the *Golden Venture* exemplify this notion of 'matter out of place'. Connelly and Kennedy use Raspail's narrative and the example of the *Golden Venture* to summon up vivid scenarios of mass migration. The authors call attention to the 'startling fact' of this 'non-traditional' migration: "The most startling fact in the report was not that ambitious, unemployed North Africans were heading to Europe to find jobs but that such traffic has now become pan-continental or even global" (p.63). This kind of movement, though Connelly and Kennedy may forget, is not unprecedented. This is not the first global migration. [61] Why, then, is it remarkable that one arrives from one place or another? This global traffic, I suggest, is so remarkable to Connelly and Kennedy not because of the migrants' mode of travel (ships transported an estimated seven million slaves from Africa), nor because they have arrived in Morocco from Bulgaria, but because this movement indicates the violation of the 'proper order'. What is deeply unsettling about this example is the sense that some people do not '*know their place*'. The story of the *Golden Venture* suggests that 'natural' barriers no longer separate the 'Rest' from the 'West'. It is all the more important, therefore, to construct a 'new' boundary. Connelly and Kennedy use this example as a means to differentiate

---

ceases to seem theoretical or political; it is, rather, embedded in habits and thoughts of everyday life (Billig, 1995). 'Common-sense' is convincing because it is perceived as 'democratic'. Everyone (potentially) has 'common-sense'; it does not exclude on the basis of education, 'class', etc. The appeal to 'common-sense', however, elides the question: Who are the 'common' people to whom this sense belongs? While discursively constructed as reflecting the interests of the whole of the people, it actually belongs to the dominant groups (Patten, 1996). 'Common-sense', therefore, is not a 'natural sensibility' but is shaped by particular relations of power that construct an appropriate political subject (e.g. the citizen) and an appropriate common-sense (e.g. a citizen is one of 'us' and not one of 'them').

[61] International migration is a constant, not an aberration, in human history. In the previous century alone, an estimated 50 million people emigrated from Europe (Santel, 1995:88), or as Tesfahuney adds, they *immigrated* to somewhere in the Americas, Oceania, South Africa (Tesfahuney, 1998).

between 'good' or 'bad' refugees/migrants.[62] The 290 Chinese migrants from the *Golden Venture* (and others like them) are 'bad' because they're not legitimate, 'bad' because they don't know their place. They have arrived unwelcomed and unwanted to 'our' shores.[63]

The language and imagery Connelly and Kennedy employ to describe contemporary migration as 'bad' migration stands in stark contrast to the laudatory and eulogising adjectives showered on previous migrations from Europe (Tesfahuney, 1998).[64] What is different? Why are today's refugees/migrants described in such negative terms? Chimni (1998) argues that there is nothing particularly different or 'new'; rather difference is created through what he calls – 'the myth of difference'. 'Third World' refugees/migrants are constructed as radically different from the stereotypically 'normal' – white, male, anti-communist – refugee of the Cold War period.[65] This distinction gives

---

[62] Connelly and Kennedy construct this difference by representing refugees/migrants as inadequate and undesirable. The authors repeatedly describe the primary motivation of refugees/migrants as *envy*. "One reason for exodus was that the Albanians had been watching television – including commercials for consumer goods, cat food being served on a silver platter and the like" (p. 63). Later, on page 68, Connelly and Kennedy ask: "Where else to go but France, whose television programs they can view every evening, much as Albanians goggle at Italian cat food commercials?" The authors' suggestion that envy is a primary causal factor in migrations is trivialising and exemplifies Connelly and Kennedy's attempt to depoliticise discourse throughout the article. It also suggests to me that, despite their insistence otherwise, Connelly and Kennedy are as contemptuous in their attitude and language towards the 'Rest' as Raspail.

[63] The definition of refugees/migrants as 'bad' is not limited to the United States, of course. In Canada, four boats carrying 599 Chinese migrants landed in British Columbia during a six week period in the summer of 1999. Their arrival triggered intense immigration debates and an outpouring of anti-immigrant and anti-Asian sentiment, prominently displayed in newspaper headlines. One example from Victoria, British Columbia's *Times-Colonist* read: "Go home", followed by the sub-heading: "We asked you to have your say about the latest wave of migrants to reach our shores. Your response was huge, the message was clear: Send them back immediately". The staccato rhythm of the first line of the article reinforces the unambiguous message of the headline: "Go home. By plane. By boat. Just go" (Cindy E. Harnett, August 13, 1999, p.1). This article can also be read as an example of the construction of 'common-sense' – the 'people' have spoken and they say "Go home". Harnett presents the newspaper poll, described as "having your say", as an unproblematic exercise of the democratic process.

[64] In North America, these adjectives include: 'Founding Fathers' (but not, significantly, 'Founding Mothers'), 'brave pioneers', and 'courageous settlers'. These terms imply that the land was not previously discovered, settled or occupied, which, of course, was not the case.

[65] This point can be illustrated by Martin (1988:10-11):

> [A]n important percentage of those who now move directly are people who would not have chosen to leave home, troublesome as their economic and political prospects might be there, if they thought they were moving to a camp in Honduras or the Sudan rather than the greater benefits available in most Western countries. The motives of *these* new asylum seekers, whatever their

the impression that asylum-seekers/migrants are 'here' for no good (read: legitimate) reason. In this construction, they themselves are not victims of abuse; instead they abuse the hospitality of Western states.[66] It is important to note that Connelly and Kennedy never give any consideration to what a 'good' reason may be. There is no discussion of the legal and humanitarian entitlements that refugees and asylum-seekers may justifiably and justly claim. Connelly and Kennedy reduce all refugees and migrants, whatever their reasons or compulsions, to the lowest common denominator, that is, the individualised and depoliticised pursuit of a 'better life'.[67] The good/bad dichotomy is sustained by analyses such as Connelly and Kennedy's which divorce contemporary movement from its political, economic and historical contexts. For example, relationships between France and North Africa are represented "not as continuing neo-colonial relations conceived in radical political inequality" (Malkki, 1994:58), but as 'equal' relations between two discrete, disconnected, and 'different' sovereign states.

"The Voyage of the Golden Venture" thus signals the acceptance of a bipolar geopolitics between 'rich' and 'poor', 'West' and 'Rest'. In answer to the question "Must it be the West against the Rest?", "The Voyage" affirms that the answer is regrettably, inevitably, resoundingly 'yes'. It is unfortunate that 'they' do not meet 'our' standards, but because they are the 'wrong colour' and the 'wrong culture' they are illegitimate/bad and thus constitute a threat and must be bounded. I argue with Huysmans (1995) that the

---

deeper merit, do not carry the same connotation of specialness that built and sustains the unique provisions for refugees, at least in the eyes of much of the public in Western nations.

[66] Abu-Laban (1998:194) argues this construction of illegitimate claimants to the 'hospitality' of the 'West' is part of a dynamic within Western states, linked not only to general economic decline but also to the effects of neo-liberal policy prescriptions advocating 'cost-saving' rather than any form of redistribution: "Neo-liberal prescriptions have a tendency to create discourses of enemies and scapegoats, transforming what were once seen as victims into victimisers (e.g. single mothers, the poor, immigrants and so on are blamed for stealing 'our' welfare, 'our' social and educational services, or 'our' jobs). In many Western countries, such discourses relating to immigrants have resulted in both a tightening of criteria for formal citizenship, and a tightening of immigration control vis-à-vis certain groups and nationals - typically those from countries of the Third World".

[67] The double standard of the 'pursuit of a better life' must be noted here. Migrants of the 'South' are not allowed to seek a better life in the heroicised manner that previous European migrations have been narrated – a conception that is also enshrined in the U.S. constitution. Europeans are characterised as leaving a land that was rich and progressive. The 'new' migrants leave a land that is poor. Therefore, something is inherently wrong with these people collectively. *Their* 'pursuit of a better life' is characterised as a theft, a diminishment of the rightful property of citizens of the 'West'.

judgement comes down to: "as long as these differences last, they do not belong here" (Huysmans, 1995:61). And if they don't belong here or deserve to be here, then 'we' the 'West' have just cause to keep 'them' out.

The Doom of the White Race

The brief, but provocatively titled "The Doom of the White Race" allows Connelly and Kennedy to give readers of *The Atlantic* a taste of some particularly vicious language from Raspail's *The Camp of the Saints*. I focus my analysis not on the contents of Raspail's speeches, but on how "The Doom" exemplifies "the master theme of immigration politics: the fear that we are losing control of our way of life" (Doty, 1996a:180). Instead of considering the potential realisation of a multicultural society or even cosmopolitan ideals, Connelly and Kennedy name the 'problem' as the 'doom' of the white race – not in the context of a genetic mutation; rather, in the context of the end of cultural dominance. "All [members of the West] have enjoyed too large a share of the world's wealth for too long and their common fate is now at hand" (p.66).

I read "The Doom of the White Race" as an expression of a perceived crisis in the cultural identity of the 'West', as a reaction not only to the perceived blurring of spatial boundaries, but to the blurring of physical/visible markers of inclusion/exclusion based on (imaginary) criteria of affinity – cultural and 'racial'. By framing immigration, or the movement of people, in terms of the dichotomy of white or non-white, Connelly and Kennedy force the reader to engage their text as being one or the other. They leave no room for an additional category, and even prevent the possibility of being both. Differentiating people by the visual marker of colour permits a cursory boundary-making exercise of inclusion and exclusion. Through such reterritorialising practices, Connelly and Kennedy attempt to shore up the 'naturalness' of a domestic community of (white) citizens (Soguk, 1996).

Throughout "The Doom of the White Race" Connelly and Kennedy (once again) call upon pre-existing, inclusive notions of community. 'Our way of life',[68] for example, does not require further explanation. If there is any doubt of its meaning, one need only to look at the cover illustration. A white middle-aged man in what should be the comfort of his backyard clearly denotes who 'we' are and whose 'way of life' in a highly nostalgic representation of the 'good life'. This representation also cleverly depicts the impending 'doom' of the (sub)title: the man looks warily from the corner of his eyes as an anonymous group of conspicuously different non-white faces peer over his white picket fence. 'Our' man reappears later in the article in a white collar and suspenders, looking perplexed in the midst of a sea of brown and black faces.

These homely/homey illustrations, complemented by Connelly and Kennedy's narrative, set up a specific configuration of space, territory and identity. The reader is led to see (literally and figuratively) the apparent given of a world divided into 'ourselves' and 'others' (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992). This representation fits dominant geopolitical assumptions that society is (already) contained within the domestic boundaries of the sovereign state, and anarchy is located in the international realm beyond the picket fence. The domestic sphere, occupied and populated by the likes of 'our' man on the cover, is constructed to be perceived as the embodiment of peace and security. This man is a reminder to the reader that the 'West' is represented by a particular kind of body, one that is racialised, classed, (hetero)sexualised, and gendered, and supposed to be seen as the 'normal' and 'natural' inhabitant of this space. The white male 'citizen' is the standard identity, a reminder that 'our' way of life is a 'white' way of life. It is this particular configuration of space, territory and identity that bestows a specialness to America/the West, a specialness that needs to be preserved. The danger suggested by these representations is the outsider, the excluded, the 'Other'. With the presentiment of doom is the notion that some sort of act has set the scene for the downfall of the 'white race', in this case, the perceived blending of white and non-white through liberal immigration

[68] Significantly, this is a North American, and specifically (United States of) 'American' ideal. The backyard depicted in the illustrations is specific to American national myths. The suburban home and the suggestion of the nuclear family (with a dominant, patriarchal 'head' of the family) embodies liberal values of individualism, citizenship and the right to private property

policy. If 'we' continue to permit movement of non-whites into 'our' space, our 'home', our territory, then we are inevitably doomed. 'Our' man and the values he embodies (the 'decency', safety and comfort of 'Home Sweet Home') will go the way of the dodo.

Underlying Connelly and Kennedy's arguments are two interrelated and seemingly contradictory assumptions about culture: first that it is monolithic and bounded, and second, that it is a boundless ideal. Connelly and Kennedy build on a modernist and totalising understanding of culture as an autonomous internally coherent universe (Rosaldo, 1988). It is imagined as an organic whole, akin to the geopolitical metaphor of the (nation as) 'body politic'. Organic metaphors are powerful metaphors that naturalise the link between people and place. It is common, for example, to speak of 'cultural heritage' as a living thing – a genealogical tree rooted in one place by the soil that nourishes it (Malkki, 1992). This essentialised writing of 'culture' permits 'us', as Balibar (1991) emphasises, to speak of culture –'our' culture – "as if it were a precious genetic inheritance, to be transmitted uncontaminated and unweakened" (cited in Billig, 1995:71). In this formulation, "culture, like nature, functions as a way of locking individuals and groups a priori into an immutable determination" (Doty, 1996c:165). By positing culture as a biological 'essence', Connelly and Kennedy make a foundational claim to demarcate those who belong from those who do not. The authors make this claim to argue that the 'identity' of people is the basis for the legitimacy of 'Western' culture and its subsequent practices (Campbell, 1992). It also allows the reader to think it possible that (white) culture is indeed a 'thing' that is or can be threatened by extinction – "the doom of the white race".

Second, the 'West' is imagined not only as a material/bounded space/place but also as a mythological, imaginary and universal ideal with no specific spatial bounds (Ó'Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). In this mythology, the 'West' is imagined to have a role, a destiny to fulfil in the world. As Billig (1995:171) states: "'We' have ambitions to spread 'ourselves' – 'our message', 'our politics' across the globe". And importantly, these particular ambitions are imagined as universal ambitions, the ambitions and aspirations of everyone. These ambitions assume a transparency; they are represented as universal but

they are highly specific to members of the hegemonic class – white, European, masculine (Berg and Kearns, 1996:100), or as Rose (1993:6) describes it – the unmarked 'Master subject'.[69]

The writing of culture as an ideal gives/bestows the illusion of unchanging permanence. In the United States, in particular, this illusion of universality takes the form of a myth of (national) exceptionalism – the propensity to formulate American/Western identity in antithesis to external perceived dangers (Dalby, 1998a). This enables fears of decline and disorder to be projected outward and onto 'Others'.[70] The bodies of refugees/migrants and other outsiders become the site where these fears are played out. 'Other' people, that is, 'people with a different culture' are seen to be the transmitters of/from anarchy of the outside (Soguk, 1996) in the form of generalised social problems such as rising unemployment, criminal behaviour, welfare dependency, costly education, etc. They are perceived as a threat to the imagined homogeneity of 'Home Sweet Home' and to stable identities encapsulated within.

In Connelly and Kennedy's formulation, (Western) 'culture' is quite explicitly imagined as '*racial*' culture, as the authors demonstrate by their reading of Raspail:

> The message is clear: race, not class or ideology determines everything, and the wretched of the earth will see no distinction between unfriendly, fascistic

---

[69] Renato Rosaldo (1988) speaks of this transparency as a hierarchy. 'We' at the top of this hierarchy are transparent – we imagine ourselves as 'people without culture', people without 'race'. For example, the term 'white' or 'Western' is not considered an *ethnicity*. "In this pseudo-evolutionary ladder, people begin without culture and grow increasingly cultured until they reach that post-cultural point where they become transparent to/like us" (Rosaldo, 1988:81). However, while this structure effectively allows for 'Others' to reach this post-cultural 'state', the 'West' has not/will not acknowledge other cultures as 'equal'. It must define itself through *difference* that can never be the *same*.

[70] I will illustrate this point with two examples: The first is Margaret Thatcher's famous 'swamping' remark:

> People are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture, and, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the world (Margaret Thatcher in a television interview with Gordon Burns on Granada Television's World in Action, 30 January 1978, cited in Doty, 1996a:252).

The second example is a passage from Raspail, where a character from *The Camp of the Saints* asks:

> But don't you ever ask yourself what something like this would mean? The mixture of races, and cultures, and life-styles. The different levels of ability, different standards of education. Why, it would mean the end of France as we know it, the end of the French as a nation (Connelly and Kennedy, 1994:87).

> Frenchmen on the one hand and liberal-minded bishops and yuppies on the other. All have enjoyed too large a share of the world's wealth for too long, and their common fate is now at hand (p.66).

This articulation is remarkably blunt. Connelly and Kennedy do not shy away from the language of 'race'. Instead, the authors leave behind the class-based or ideological explanations that characterised the Cold War between West and East to present a crudely deterministic vision of a chaotic, visceral *racial* future.[71]

From an 'evolutionary' perspective, it does not appear that Connelly and Kennedy's arguments have advanced much since the nineteenth century.[72] This is surprising to me because, as Shapiro (1997:2) points out, there are more sophisticated ways available to articulate racism: "Certainly, the use of the word *race* is jarring in the context of what is now acceptable academic and journalistic discourse about the effects of immigration; today's 'meta-racists' explicitly deny that they are racists and refer instead to 'national suicide' and 'cultural suicide'".[73] Although this 'meta-racist' option is available to them, Connelly and Kennedy take the opposite strategy. The authors invoke 'race' in a cultural sense to cloak their cultural arguments (to establish 'our way of life', for example) rather than the other way around. In this way, Connelly and Kennedy 'play the race card' to engage the reader emotionally, so that the impending doom becomes palpable and corporeal. Connelly and Kennedy do not have to deny explicitly that they are racist because they allow Raspail to speak for them. "The Doom of the White Race" is replete with Raspail's "bitter, powerful prose" (p.66). This approach enables the authors to

---

[71] The important distinction between class/ideological and 'racial' arguments is that ideology implies a politics and thus the realm of the 'social', and 'race' implies something 'natural'/biological and is therefore, inevitable, immutable. It is interesting that the word 'fate' is used repeatedly in conjunction with these discussions to reinforce the point that nothing can be done except total exclusion.

[72] For example, William Z. Ripley, the author of a 1908 article in *The Atlantic Monthly* "Races in the United States" asks: "Is it not indeed the very beneficence of Nature in these regards which has induced, or permitted, a higher evolution of the human species in Europe than in any of the other continents? The races certainly began even. Why then are the results for Europe as a whole so superior to-day?" (1908:21).

[73] The concept/term 'meta-racist' is from Etienne Balibar (1991) who argues that concerns of 'race' are displaced on to 'culture'. Thus, when 'we' read 'culture' in this context, race may be substituted, or be 'lurking' not too far in the background. This 'racism without race' constitutes an important sub-text of these discourses on 'cultural or national purity' (Doty, 1996c).

repeat Raspail's words while not directly voicing the words themselves, for they are too nationalist (too racist!) to be uttered directly (Billig, 1995, my addition in parentheses). In this way, they are safely able to tap the emotive power of the word 'race' Connelly and Kennedy give the closing words of this section to Raspail (p.66):

> Our hypersensitive and totally blind West … has not yet understood that whites, in a world become too small for its inhabitants, are now a minority and that the proliferation of other races dooms our race, my race, irretrievably to extinction in the century to come, if we hold fast to our present moral principles.

Raspail's words bring to mind the indifferent, biologically determined world of Social Darwinist and 'survival of the fittest' discourse where only the laws of nature apply. There can only be 'winners' and 'losers' in this view. Although it is cast as a 'do or die' situation, "The Doom of the White Race" has nothing to do with genetics. Connelly and Kennedy are not *really* suggesting that the 'white race' is threatened with extinction. The doom really has to do with being raced in the sense of being 'white' and losing hegemonic universality denoted first and foremost by skin colour.

Connelly and Kennedy's formulation of the problem in such terms means there is no choice but to (re)act. The argument resonates because readers can imagine that it is *their* backyard that is thus 'violated'. Ó'Tuathail and Agnew (1992:196) state, "the generation of such resonances often requires the repetition and recycling of certain themes and images even though the socio-historical context of their use may have changed dramatically". Though the world has changed dramatically since 1908 when "Races in the United States" was published in *The Atlantic Monthly*, for example, discourses of the 'Other' display a remarkable continuity. In this case, Connelly and Kennedy effectively tap anxieties and pre-existing stereotypes of 'spatial blurring' (for example, the fear that the South is invading the North) (Rosaldo, 1988) or in other words, that "disease-ridden, violent, and proliferating, coloured people…will overwhelm Westerners in their islands of comfort" (Maynes, 1995:37). And indeed, as the cover art depicts, 'they' *are* arriving in 'our' very backyards. Connelly and Kennedy count on this visual reminder to provoke a predictably defensive response: "Not in my backyard"!

In "The Doom of the White Race", Connelly and Kennedy marshal militarised language of security and danger to convey that 'our culture'/the 'body politic' is under siege. The territory and identity of the 'West' is threatened from 'Others' ("all the numberless, nameless, tortured, tormented, indispensable mass…" p.66), and from itself (from its "hypersensitivity", "its present moral principles" p.66). The problem cannot be avoided by half-measures or liberal wishful-thinking; instead, the West needs to secure itself against the threat of dissolution and the impurity of an impending invasion of non-white migrants. In Connelly and Kennedy's articulation, survival is conditional on the capacity to ward off the forces of disintegration. The equation is strikingly simple: "exclusion ensures survival and harmony, inclusion disharmony and extinction" (Tesfahuney, 1998: 508). "The Doom of the White Race", then, is by no means a subtle argument. It affirms that one must be white or non-white, for there is no such thing as 'in-between'. Connelly and Kennedy provide a potent reminder that the 'West' and the 'Rest' are strictly delineated according to (aggressive) racialised boundaries.

Not Since Genghis Khan

Under the sensational headline, "Not Since Genghis Khan", Connelly and Kennedy once again frame their arguments in crisis language. The authors quote a wide array of sources both 'fact' and fictional – France's immigration minister; the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR); an editorial writer from the *Washington Times;* a BBC television show, "The March" – as confirmation that "the themes of the *Camp* continue to resonate" (p.68). I argue, however, that these examples are merely supporting actors, for the real star of Connelly and Kennedy's drama is Genghis Khan. With the invocation of Genghis Khan, Connelly and Kennedy divide the world into two camps – the 'civilised' and the 'barbarian' – and introduce the instrument of 'doom' from the previous section: "Not since Genghis Khan rode out of the Asian steppes has the West – Europe as well as the United States – encountered such an alien invasion" (p. 69, from *Washington Times* columnist Samuel Francis).

In my reading of this section, I must explore the implications of Connelly and Kennedy's naming a 'new' enemy in a familiar 'old' form. The example of Genghis Khan enables Connelly and Kennedy to reinforce their vision of a wild and anarchic world, and to construct a mobile enemy that threatens to transgress *all* boundaries. With the menace of such an enemy, the authors position the West as defensive, and enlist support to vigorously reclaim control of 'our' borders. The invocation of Genghis Khan has rich implications. The personage of Genghis Khan, to Western imaginations, represents the image of the 'Other' *par excellence* – a raper, a pillager, an alien, an enemy of the most alarming kind.[74] Genghis Khan embodies the archetypal 'Eastern/Oriental' barbarian in contrast to the civilised West. The selection of Genghis over other possible bogeymen/antagonists is highly suggestive of how Connelly and Kennedy view the post-Cold War world. Connelly and Kennedy's identification of the Genghis Khan as the 'new' arch-enemy epitomises Western ethnocentrism. In Mongolia, Genghis Khan is not vilified as the harbinger of evil; he is a heroic figure.[75] It is interesting to compare the 'status' of Genghis Khan to other invaders. For example, as Western history is usually written, it is difficult to see parallels between conquering Roman generals or Christian crusaders – the 'forefathers' of Western 'civilisation' – and the 'Mongol hordes'.

---

[74] Genghis Khan so typifies these qualities that he is sometimes (paradoxically) admired by the 'West' at the same time that he is feared. For example, in the Hollywood movie *The Conquerer,* the quintessential American hero John Wayne played Temujin, Genghis Khan's birth name. This example demonstrates a kind of ambivalence in Western representations of the 'Other'. Certain kinds of Others, like Genghis Khan, earn a kind of respect as a formidable enemy.

[75] This point can be illustrated by a recent newspaper article from The Daily and Sunday Telegraph, reprinted in the Victoria Times-Colonist, March 4, 2000:

> Up to a million Mongolians are threatening to name themselves after Genghis Khan as they race to comply with a new law requiring them to have surnames rather than using one given name as at present. Mongolians dropped their family or clan names a century ago, and there have been complaints for years that the popularity of a handful of given names has caused endless confusion. To the dismay of those hoping for clarity, Mongolia now is dividing between those citizens who are returning to their old family or clan names and those taking the chance to indulge in a spot of reinvention. According to some reports, 60 per cent of the population have decided to 'remember' that they are from the same lineage as Genghis Khan, the 13th century warlord whose horseman founded an empire that at its height stretched from Vietnam to Hungary. The result threatens to be more than a million Mongolians with his surname, Borjigon. "Most people are just laughing at this new rule. They are all trying to claim to be descended from Genghis Kan," said Duran, a 23-year-old business graduate from the country's crumbling Soviet-built capital, Ulan Bator.

The ambiguity of this last line is interesting. Is it an easy knock against the Soviets and their 'faulty' system, or is it a warning?: 'This is what will happen if there is no civilisation and no order to uphold it'.

With the demise of the Cold War, the world can no longer be imagined as the simple story of a great struggle between a democratic 'West' and an expansionist East (Ó'Tuathail and Agnew, 1992).[76] While the Cold War was/is (re)imagined in terms of a stable bipolarity, the vision vividly suggested by the name Genghis Khan is that of a return to barbarism (Ó'Tuathail, 1996) – the reversion to a dangerous and turbulent world where civilised or *tame* zones are confronted by *wild* zones (Luke, 1995) – multi-dysfunctional places characterised by 'failed states', proliferating population growth, drugs, social breakdown, violence and uncontrolled population movement in the form of refugees and illegal immigrants.

Connelly and Kennedy call forth the figure of Genghis Khan (out of the winds of time, from a place still closed off to most Westerners) to embody and contain these fluid dangers. Genghis Khan is the most 'Other' of Others. The threat posed by the ex-arch enemy 'the Russians', Connelly and Kennedy suggest, is nothing by comparison. 'The Russians' are less dangerous because they are known/intelligible as one half of the most influential and durable geopolitical script of this period (Ó'Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). The Soviet Union after fifty years presented a fully developed alter ego, an 'orderly' definable marker for the Western Self (Sharp, 1996). Not only is there a kind of safety in familiarity, but 'the Russians' were also constructed as European, albeit (unfortunately) under the sway of an abstract and quite recent ideological evil called communism (Farmanfarmaian, 1998).[77] It was not impossible, therefore, for the Russians to redeem themselves by abandoning their way of thinking and politics. Now that the Soviet Union does not pose any serious ideological and political danger to the West, Russians have been welcomed back into the 'family of nations' to some extent.

In contrast to the intelligibility and stability of the Soviet 'Other', the racial other – the 'Orient' and Africa – is constructed as the realm of abandon, irrationality, and violence

---

[76] Of course, there was also a 'Third World' 'role'– zoned as a space of material and ideological competition between the'West' and' East'.

[77] This construction, as Farmanfarmaian (1998) noted, significantly erased the Muslim and Asian populations of the Soviet republics.

(Farmanfarmaian, 1998). There is no possibility for redemption for the likes of Genghis Khan. 'He' represents not a political 'difference of opinion' but something *essentially* and dangerously 'different'. Genghis Khan does not fit the Cold War model, nor does 'he' follow the implicitly flattering Western construction of the 'familiar' colonial/imperialist relationship envisaged in codes of superior/inferior, colonial 'master' as adult, and colonial 'subject' as child in some kind of civilising tutelage. Genghis Khan is so 'alien', so 'barbarian', 'he' eludes any attempts to be ordered and assimilated. Genghis Khan is utterly *untamable*. It is as if this barbaric 'wild zone', because it is incapable of reflecting back conventionally accepted images of sovereignty and development, places the very figuration of such Enlightenment concepts in question (Luke and Ó'Tuathail: 1997). Genghis Khan is not a reflective pool by which the West can recognise its own image, but an abyss that will suck the West up in its blackness if the West continues to follow its present course of action.[78] In this way, Connelly and Kennedy summon the spectre of Genghis Khan to embody a diffuse danger that threatens the very foundations of Western civilisation, a civilisation that is seen to reach its pinnacle of development in the liberal democratic nation-state.

If I follow Connelly and Kennedy's narrative and allow myself to be carried away by the imagery and implications of Genghis Khan, it is almost easy to believe that there is indeed such an enemy. Through his figurative reincarnation, Connelly and Kennedy metamorphose a complex, heterogeneous, unstable social mosaic of peoples/places into a single, stable, predictable (that is, predictably 'barbarian') actor (Ó'Tuathail and Agnew, 1992, my addition in parentheses). It is almost easy to forget *who* it is that represents Genghis Khan in these discussions. The apparently passive bodies of refugees/migrants depicted on the cover illustration seem at odds with the representation of Genghis Khan and the Mongol hordes as aggressive, voracious invaders. How, then, is it possible to draw such an unproblematic and excessive association of refugees/immigrants with the

[78] Again, the invocation of Genghis Khan recycles colonial/imperialist representations. For example, as Duncan states (1993:46): "Africa was depicted as a moral abyss that Europeans could possibly fall into if they succumbed to their own repressed animal instincts".

likes of Genghis Khan? To put it most simply, how do the least secure, the weak become the most threatening?[79]

Connelly and Kennedy choose an easy route – nowhere in the text do they invite readers to consider refugees and migrants, the 'subject' of their narrative, as living human beings. Instead, refugees and migrants are constructed as objects; they are either 'disembodied' as in the cover illustration (one only sees heads above the picket fence), or dehumanised, as in their reduction to 'hordes' in "Not Since Genghis Khan". The stories and histories of refugees and migrants are never welcomed and never told. In this way, Connelly and Kennedy are able to substitute *their* story; one that merges with another (dominant) story which has over time coalesced into a 'shared understanding'. Without such shared understanding, the comparison of Genghis Khan with refugees and migrants would be too puzzling (Billig, 1995).

Connelly and Kennedy, therefore, are able make such an unproblematic association because in many ways it has already been made for them. The authors draw on already existing understandings of the 'Other'/'Rest' that have become so naturalised as to become common-sense. Images used to signify the threat of 'Others' have a venerable genealogy (Rosaldo, 1988). The appeal and durability of some metaphors/discourses of the 'Other' is such that they may be understood as 'scripts', whose meaning is inscribed through repetition and performance.[80] The metaphor of Genghis Khan is one such script – a variation on the 'yellow peril' theme.[81] As Farmanfarmanian (1998:288) has noted,

---

[79] Of course, the simplest answer to this question is that it is their very weakness and marginality that makes them 'desirable' and 'obvious' as a threat/enemy. The externalisation of dissatisfaction and fear on to those people who are less powerful (e.g. women and 'minorities') acts as an outlet, a way of disciplining the domestic population.

[80] Some discourses of the Other are as familiar as a classic children's bed-time fable to convince children to "be good, otherwise [insert monster] will come get you".

[81] By the word 'script', I do not want to suggest a deterministic/mechanical definition in which fixed actors play out fixed roles (Gibson-Graham, 1996/97). Rather I employ 'script' as a form of story whose plot and ending is not yet finalised. I maintain that discourses/scripts can be continually recycled and retooled to fit changing circumstances. This entails a more fluid and ambivalent understanding that allows for improvisation.

> People of the ['third world'] have been depicted as inherently 'barbaric' and 'uncivilised' in accord with the conceptions of that region passed down from the nineteenth century. In all other capacities, people of that region are absent from the machinery of public knowledge, so that when a threat appears, the steadfast notions of two centuries past reappear in White consciousness.

The name of Genghis Khan and the imagery of 'hordes' are critical as a discursive reference point around which Connelly and Kennedy enact a geography of containment. It provides a text for the illustration; the group of conspicuously dark and different people (who may/might have temporarily occupied an ambivalent 'stranger' position/category [82]) are transformed definitively into the enemy. The presence of Genghis Khan helps remove moral obstacles and allows the expression of aggressive sentiments and attitudes. In Connelly and Kennedy's formulation, the arrival of dark-skinned 'barbarians' is not the 'peaceful invasion' depicted in the illustrations and described in Raspail's introduction, but a form of war. This most recent 'alien invasion' is more threatening still, because it has far exceeded the territorial extent of the original. It's only 'natural', then, to seek protection from endangering 'Others'. By representing it as a hostile invasion, Connelly and Kennedy place the 'West' in a defensive and (morally) defendable position. Indeed, because Genghis Khan is such a 'bad' enemy, Connelly and Kennedy position the 'West' on the (moral) offensive; repelling him, by extension, must be a 'good' war.[83]

Connelly and Kennedy tap into anxieties that liberal immigration policies have unleashed the forces of anarchy/disorder.[84] But the ideal(ised)/civilised Western citizen has only

---

[82] Bauman (1993) argues that the stranger is so unsettling because s/he is neither friend nor foe – yet. The stranger is characterised by ambivalence and undecidability; s/he has the potential to be both an 'insider' to the group and an 'outsider'. In the Western binary conceptual system, there is no (or very little) 'space' for the 'stranger' – hence you are either one of 'us', or one of 'them'.

[83] Genghis Khan is a 'bad' enemy because he rode around invading and did not play by the established rules of warfare. It is interesting to note that this, too, is how America's enemy the North Vietnamese/Viet Kong was constructed. This classification as a 'bad' enemy is thus a powerful image to the middle and late-middle aged readers of *The Atlantic Monthly*.

[84] In their closing remarks of this section, Connelly and Kennedy express this point clearly: "Those who predict that immigration will become one of the hottest political issues of the 1990s may be correct; what is less certain is that Fortress America attitudes will win the day. Yet if the US maintains a liberal policy while every rich nation decides, like France, to do the opposite, will that not simply increase the pressures on this country's borders?" (p. 69). In this example, the authors invoke a familiar 'tragedy of the

> of a relatively small number of rich, satiated, demographically stagnant societies and a large number of poverty-stricken, resource-depleted nations whose populations are doubling every 25 years or less. The demographic imbalances are exacerbated by gross disparities of wealth between rich and poor countries. Despite the easy references that are made to our common humanity, it is difficult to believe that Switzerland, with an annual average per capita income of about $35,000, and Mali, with an average per capita income of less than $300, are on the same planet. But Raspail's point is that they are, and that a combination of push and pull factors will entice desperate, ambitious Third World peasants to approach the portals of the First World in ever-increasing numbers (p.69).

In this passage Connelly and Kennedy present, in a conversational and inclusive tone, a vision of two radically separate worlds. Although they note the dangers of 'ambitious Third World peasants' compromising First World plenty, the authors do not entertain the possibility that the economic affluence of 'here' is related to the poverty of 'there'. Not only is any relationship between 'West' and 'Rest' denied, it is, as they say, difficult to believe that the 'Rest' even inhabit the same *planet*. In this instance, Connelly and Kennedy move beyond questions of mere geographical proximity to suggest that, by virtue of their astronomical remoteness, the 'Rest' are less than human. Through this rhetorical strategy, Connelly and Kennedy again divide and dichotomise the world into two camps – human and non-human. Through this example, Connelly and Kennedy presume to define the limits of humanity – a humanity that does not stretch so far as Mali, here defined very literally as an alien 'Other'.

Connelly and Kennedy's suggestion that the cornucopia, and indeed, humanity, is a finite 'quantity' seems to go against the grain of the dominant liberal transnational imagination, where to strive for plenty is assumed to be a universal human ambition, and evocations of a universal 'global community' and 'common humanity' are routinely celebrated. However, I maintain, following Malkki (1994) that these (increasingly ritualised) invocations are already circumscribed within a system of imagining and ordering difference among people (that is, a system of nation-states) and thus are more often parochial than universal/global. Connelly and Kennedy, therefore, are consistent with liberal political ideology that is premised not on *one* humanity, but a kind of hierarchical arrangement of *humanities*. As Malkki (1994:43) states: "[C]onventional understandings

of *how* people are human (or even, horribly, to what *extent* they are human) rely in crucial ways on the representation of human variety as "human varie*ties*," often specifically national 'varieties'". A hierarchy of humanities makes it possible to define others as less than 'us', even so far as less than human. Where Malians (or any other mobile members of the 'Rest'), fit into this classificatory order Connelly and Kennedy do not leave open to question, as they tell the readers:

> If the problem is global, it is not all of a piece. There is a world of difference between say, Mexican immigrants searching for a better life and Rwandan refugees fleeing a grisly death. But the most relevant divide is not between migrants and refugees - we will be seeing a lot more of both - but rather what they lack and what we have to offer. Regardless of whether it is an increasingly resentful American labour market or an overcrowded relief camp, the West will be hard put to provide answers to this burgeoning problem (p.72).

With this claim, Connelly and Kennedy draw a clear boundary between the deserving and the undeserving. Their statement underlines how swiftly the lines of inclusion and exclusion can be redrawn and illustrates what a flimsy shield 'common humanity' presents against an increasingly defensive (national) identity. The relevant divide is *what they lack and what we have to offer*. The effect of this statement is that humanity can be measured by wealth and by whether one has a proper 'place' in the world. Clearly people from Mali, Mexican immigrants and Rwandan refugees do not meet this requirement. As the next section, "Numbers Count", emphasises, what is important are numbers, not whether 'they' happen to be "fleeing a grisly death".

This passage is notable for the reason that the word 'refugee' is mentioned at all. Connelly and Kennedy carefully refrain from using the word in their narrative, nor do they make any mention of the legal and humanitarian framework in place to protect refugees. Through this omission, Connelly and Kennedy collapse all refugees (and migrants) into the negative stereotype of the immigrant as the illegitimate and grasping outsider. The word 'refugee' presents a problem for Connelly and Kennedy because it represents a challenge to cherished liberal/humanist concepts of charity and human solidarity, and ultimately, 'our' humanity. Abu Laban (1998:194) describes this apparent contradiction succinctly: "The tightening of immigration controls and citizenship policies is, indeed, a major illiberal feature of contemporary liberal democracies".

To reconcile this contradiction, Connelly and Kennedy appeal to moral arguments to justify the illiberality in turning people away. Some of these arguments converge around the concept of 'home'. Home assumes symbolic importance in this discussion because it is the site where morality is (thought to be) inculcated and enduring social values such as humanity, community and belonging are learned and transmitted from one generation to another. In this way, home is constructed as humanising; this is where people are (re)produced as worthwhile citizens. Connelly and Kennedy present an example of this kind of justification on page 68. They quote a Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) publication:

> A traditional moralist may object, asserting, "I am my brother's keeper." We must ask him: "And what about your children? And your children's children? What about the children of your neighbour next door? Must we subdivide and distribute our patrimony among the children of the world?" Americans are already outnumbered twenty-to-one by the rest of the world. Our grandchildren will be outnumbered even more. Must we condemn them to the poverty of an absolutely equal distribution? How would that benefit them or the descendants of other people? Total poverty can be avoided only if people agree that the ancient admonition 'Charity begins at home' is still the best guide to philanthropic action.

In this example, Connelly and Kennedy allow FAIR to voice their arguments, while simultaneously condemning FAIR's predictable rhetoric (p.69). Connelly and Kennedy's inclusion of this argument alerts readers to the dangers concealed behind what well-meaning readers might interpret as progressive causes (Sharp, 1996). If 'philanthropic action' is applied indiscriminately, then the cornucopia – the patrimony of the 'West' – is sure to be depleted by insatiable members of the 'Rest'. The adage 'Charity begins at home', therefore, does not account for those that are 'homeless'. Here again is defined the limits of humanity, for those without a home fail in some way to be fully human. The vague category 'children of the world' is too far removed, too remote to be 'our' concern. As Billig (1995:83) states: "Making sacrifices for others is much easier to do if we accept other people as 'one of us'". 'We' have, therefore, no responsibility to them because 'they' are not worthy of it as fellow human beings like 'us'. The sacrifice of 'our' share of the cornucopia requires a level of solidarity beyond mere humanity or humanitarianism.

Another example of this kind is the cover illustration, which depicts 'our' man, the BBQ man, securely cloistered in the privacy of his backyard.[86] This particular (highly selective and ethnocentric) vision of home is universalised as the proper moral order. In this example, the personal (home) and the national (homeland) become one: "The country is the place of 'our' personal homes – my home, your home – and, as such, it is the home of all of 'us', the home of homes, the place where all of 'us' are at home"(Billig, 1995:75). But the picture of blissful domesticity, represented by the 'Home Sweet Home' apron, is (rudely) interrupted by the 'swarm' of dark faces peering over his fence.[87] The presence of the 'Other' - the 'homeless' - destabilises this secure representation of home and marks the permeability of the boundary between 'inside' and 'outside', 'us' and 'them'.

I read the dark crowd of people, not (only) as a security threat, but as a reminder that notions of home often depend on the exclusion of the 'homeless'. "Cornucopian Hopes" is a reminder that 'our' home will not be the same home if 'we' submit to any lessening of the boundaries/borders between home and non-home, between the 'homed' and the 'homeless'. "For once you open the door and let others in, the room don't feel like the room no more. And it ain't home no more" (Reagon, 1983:359). Here the notion of

---

[86] Mufti and Shohat (1997) out that 'phrases like 'there's no place like home', and 'charity begins at home, as well as 'home sweet home' depicted in the illustration, give expression to a Euro-American masculinist ideology of domesticity. 'Man the hunter' is in his yard bbq'ing, but where is 'the wife', for example, or perhaps the 'illegal' Mexican immigrant housekeeper? Presumably in the kitchen preparing the salad. This scenario reproduces gendered, heterosexist, bourgeois stereotypes of domesticity.

[87] A similar scenario is presented by Raspail in *The Camp of the Saints*, p. 15. This passage describes the musings of a professor who likens mail-solicitation charities with an invasion of nameless people into the private space of 'home':

> …[U]nbridled charity is, after all, a sin against oneself. …after a while, there were too many poor. Altogether too many. Folk you didn't even know. Not even from here. Just nameless people. Swarming all over. And so terribly clever! Spreading through cities, and houses, and homes. Working their way by the thousands, in thousands of foolproof ways. Through the slits in your mail boxes, begging for help, with their frightful pictures bursting from envelopes day after day, claiming their due in the name of some organisation or other. Slithering in. Through newspapers, radio, churches, through this faction or that, until they were all around you, wherever you looked…

This example depicts the link between home/human, homeless/non-human very vividly – the 'homey' language of 'folk' is here juxtaposed with the dehumanising language of 'slithering' and 'swarming'. The people described by Raspail are nameless, anonymous, but above all else, malicious and sneaky people 'claiming their due'. Clearly, 'we' don't want 'them' in our home.

home works to designate others as completely external, as non-human. This exclusive definition of 'home' means not only the loss of a particular place, but a denial of the possibility of being at home anywhere, and a denial of humanity (Xenos, 1996). It "mirrors the increasingly elaborated nativism of anti-immigrant or xenophobic violence that often relies on the slogan ['Category name], go home!'" (Malkki, 1992:509). And this means as far away as possible, to whatever 'home' 'they' came from. But one thing is certain, it is not like 'ours' and they are not like 'us'. In "Cornucopian Hopes", Connelly and Kennedy transform the metaphor of the cornucopia, the horn of plenty, into something that provides hope and plenty for the 'West', and that the 'Rest' stay put.

Numbers Count

"Numbers Count" reaffirms an antagonistic geopolitics after brief consideration of the possibility of other, less pessimistic, readings in "Cornucopian Hopes". Connelly and Kennedy attempt to provide a demographic and numerical, thus 'scientific', foundation to the fears tapped in "The Doom of the White Race" and "Not Since Genghis Khan". My purpose is to call attention to some of the implications of 'objective', naturalised language of 'numbers'. I argue that the words 'numbers' or 'demography,' though seemingly innocent and devoid of politics, are not so vacuous, primarily because the threat or enemy that is constructed through the use of numbers has already been given a name by the narrative and a face by the illustrations:

> Perhaps the global problem of the early twenty-first century is basically this: that across our planet a number of what might be termed demographic-technological fault lines are emerging, between fast-growing, adolescent, resource-poor, undercapitalised and undereducated populations on one side and technologically inventive, demographically moribund, and increasingly nervous rich societies on the other (p.76)
> How those on the two sides of these widening regional or intercontinental fissures are to relate to each other early in the next century dwarfs every other issue in global affairs. (p.79)

The writing of territory and states in organic terms is a major part of the geopolitical imagination (Ó'Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Connelly and Kennedy embellish their narrative with the unsettling metaphor of the fault line. I argue that this strategy does not point to any concrete 'reality'; instead, the strategy enables Connelly and Kennedy to

construct a dichotomy of order and chaos. The 'order' of the 'West' – the 'Camp of the Saints' – is contrasted with the 'chaos' of the numerically proliferating 'Rest'. The 'Rest's' natural and environmental condition is imagined as one of exponentially growing populations, degraded resources, and social upheaval that threatens to shake up conventionalised modes of spatial/territorial organisation.

Connelly and Kennedy use the discourse of the 'natural' – the language of fissures and flows – to situate 'the problem' outside politics and human intervention.[88] Their use of a geological metaphor makes this bipolar antagonism as inevitable as plate tectonics. Connelly and Kennedy's fault-line metaphor suggests that all that is solid is crumbling beneath us, a spectre particularly unsettling to 'our' man, or Western worldview. The specification of the problem as 'natural', means that it is not only outside human intervention, but it resists any kind of control whatsoever in the more fundamental sense of 'nature unchecked' (Dalby, 1998a). Nature unchecked is boundaryless, boundless, and unboundable. The discourse of the natural serves to distance 'us' as 'cultured people' from the chaotic problems with 'them', 'over there'. Connelly and Kennedy identify the growing proportion of bodies emanating, moving and migrating from the 'South' to the 'West' as a threat to 'Western populations'.[89]

In "Numbers Count", they deftly shift the rhetoric from the threat of black and brown bodies to an abstract set of numbers, depersonalising the 'problem' of migration by assuring the reader that 'it's nothing personal'. Connelly and Kennedy's arguments are infused with allusions to natural selection, and the 'survival of the fittest': "Was he (Raspail) really getting at the idea that rich societies could expect to preserve the status quo only if they were prepared to use any means necessary to cut global population?" (p.79). But rather than linking their ideas to the impact of numbers on the 'blood' or

[88] It is interesting that rather than invoke the water metaphor, with its familiar imagery of 'waves' and 'floods', Connelly and Kennedy chose instead a geological metaphor to keep their arguments 'scientific'. This sustains the connection to numbers, which is synonymous with science, and subsequently, knowledge.

[89] A reminder: 'Western' means '*white*' populations, as "The Doom of the White Race" makes clear.

'stock' of the nation, they call attention to its diluting effect on culture and society.[90] This shift in focus allows Connelly and Kennedy to move away from nasty racial and eugenic theories, introduced by "The Doom of the White Race", toward a more palatable argument to liberal citizens of Western nations. *The Atlantic Monthly* serves an important legitimating role in this example by lending respectability to this argument. Though racism may assume multiple forms, Minh-ha (1997:417) contends, its residues still linger, easily recognizable despite the refined rhetoric of those who perpetuate it".[91]

Connelly and Kennedy use the threat of exponential numbers to support Raspail's suggestion that "our present moral principles are dooming the West" (p.79). Reading "Cornucopian Hopes" and "Numbers Count" in tandem reinforces Connelly and Kennedy's point that 'we' in the 'West' can no longer afford to be unilaterally benevolent. 'We' can no longer afford to be "a nation of immigrants", or as I read it, a 'moral nation'.[92] It is easier to care less about others if they are imagined as merely numbers. There is a particular reductionism inherent in numbers. Numbers leach out individual stories, memories, and contexts and act to trivialise and silence history and politics. Bare numbers have the effect of constructing those that are counted as a bare humanity – even as a merely biological or demographic presence (Malkki, 1996).[93] A

---

[90] As Connelly and Kennedy state: "[D]enying that migration is an international problem, as some American liberals do, invites the possibility that a continuing (and growing) flow of immigrants will place even greater strains on this country's social and cultural policies" (p. 79).

[91] Shapiro (1997:3) notes that "today's immigration alarmists argue on cultural rather than race/biological grounds. They invoke an amalgam of undigested sociologisms, anthropologisms, and political theories to question the ability of US society to assimilate culturally the current influx of people to (what they construct as) an 'American' cultural core. And they posit this cultural core as a foundation that makes possible the US democratic ethos and the functioning of the US economy. … They still construct peoples within a state-oriented cartography, but what was (for Ross) a very specific bodily threat has become for today's alarmists a demographic one. The strange bodies have become abstracted and assembled; the threat is to the US demographic entity, a 'population', not to an exemplary and sightly citizen body".

[92] A full-page advertisement for FAIR, several pages later, reinforces Connelly and Kennedy's neo-liberal arguments that immigration is 'beyond our means':

> Our role must be to try and help people improve conditions where they are, within our capacity as a nation. If we and the other developed nations are to control our own destinies and respective national security, then we must recognise that most people around the world will have to 'bloom where they're planted' (p.123).

[93] Arendt (1973) argues that from the perspective of the 'counted', the acknowledgement of this (minimal) humanity is most dangerous of all. "Mankind (*sic*), for so long a time considered under the image of a

minimal humanity becomes a useful means to contain and condense different peoples and histories into an intelligible and manageable status or label. This naming and labelling is an important strategy by which human beings come to be 'known' and acted upon. At the same time, naming externalises the 'named' from the 'namer'; it then becomes difficult to trace a connection between 'me/us' and 'them'. Or, more precisely, as Malkki (1996:388, my emphasis) has argued, "it becomes difficult to trace a connection, a relationship, *other* than that of a bare, 'mere,' common underlying humanity". The reduction of peoples to generic and abstract 'numbers' is a clinical and sanitising process.[94] It is also *dehumanising*. Connelly and Kennedy, however, invite us to engage in this process, because we can lessen or lose 'our' misgivings more readily when we are convinced of and confronted by the absolute lack of theirs.

In contrast to the besieged morality of the 'West', the 'Rest' are presented as immoral – "the vulgar antithesis to white Eurocentric norms"(Fair and Parks, 1998:6). Because refugees/migrants are reduced to numbers, because they are uprooted people without a 'home', they are also assumed to have lost their culture (Malkki, 1992). They are de-cultured because their identity is no longer territorialised and tied to a nation-state. This enables their displacement to be viewed as pathological.[95] Thus, "the ideal-typical refugee is like a native gone amok" (Malkki, 1992:34). Through constructing the 'Rest' as immoral peoples who, like nature, are running around unchecked, Connelly and Kennedy implicitly propose that the 'West' is not just facing steady demographic advancement, a situation where nature is taking its course, but a proliferation that is

---

family of nations, had reached the stage where whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organized closed communities found himself thrown out of the family of nations altogether…the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their greatest danger" (1973:294, 300).

[94] It is no coincidence, I believe, that the flotilla barricade erected to prevent refugees/migrants from Haiti into the U.S. and from Albania into Italy, for example, is called a *cordon sanitaire*).

[95] I will illustrate this point with an extreme example from Cirtautas (1957:70,73):

> Homelessness is a serious threat to moral behaviour….At the moment the refugee crosses the frontiers of his own world, his whole moral outlook, his attitude toward the divine order of life changes….[the refugees'] conduct makes it obvious that we are dealing with individuals who are basically amoral, without any sense of personal or social responsibility….They no longer feel themselves bound by ethical precepts which every honest citizen…respects. They become a menace, dangerous characters who will stop at nothing.

particularly *malicious*.[96] The 'Rest' is imagined to exact a kind of retribution through its wanton 'overbreeding'. Connelly and Kennedy consider this moral abandon to be so dangerous because the 'Rest' is perceived to have nothing to lose. Here, Connelly and Kennedy's arguments link up very directly with the rhetoric of 'overpopulation'. The subtext of overpopulation – the crude equation that more people equal fewer resources and more political disorder – is based on masculinised, racialised discourses of the monolithic 'third world woman', a dehumanised body characterised only by her hyper-fertility (Mohanty, 1991). The 'third world women' is simultaneously a target of invasive and aggressive management strategies in the form of birth/population control technologies, as well as a threat to Western national imaginaries equating racial superiority, the nation and women (Yuval-Davis, 1997). As in "The Doom of the White Race", Connelly and Kennedy name the diluting effect of 'numbers' as one of the gravest dangers to the existence of the 'West', for "Numbers Count" demonstrates that the 'Rest' is not content to let things remain the way they are; instead, they are preparing to upset the 'proper' order, conceived in terms of stability and social coherence (Malkki, 1992).

In "Numbers Count", numbers mean chaos, chaos means immorality. The mobile 'Rest' represent a disordered, undifferentiated mass that doesn't belong in the neat binary category that Connelly and Kennedy have devised; the mobile 'Rest' is an aberration of categories (Malkki, 1992).[97] Thus, counting is necessary to justify the need for firm and vigilant containment of the proliferating, disruptive 'Rest'. The authors present this strategy as self-evident, as they tell the readers: "Numbers do count" (p.76). I argue, however, that "Numbers Count" represents an intentional obscuring. The 'scientific', objective and naturalised language of numbers is an integral element of the exercise of

---

[96] Raspail, for example, has a character say in *The Camp of the Saints*, p. 43: "There's no Third World. No, not anymore. That's only a phrase you coined to keep us in our place. There's one world, only one, and its going to be flooded with life, submerged". This quote gives the impression that the fertility rates of the 'Rest' are a form of intentional revenge exacted for colonialism and the debt burden.

[97] The assumption underlying this is that there is a differentiated mass that is acting appropriately – the citizen of the (Western) nation-state. This definition makes distinctions between foreigners and nationals clear, and reinforces the proper order - the citizen rooted in his home(land). The 'West' is constructed as an exemplar of order (restraint/discipline), in contrast with the chaos/abandon of the proliferating 'Rest'.

disciplinary power/practices undertaken by the 'West'. "Numbers do count", but it is only some (the 'Rest') who are counted.

A New (North-South) Deal

In "A New (North-South) Deal", Connelly and Kennedy attempt to propose some solutions to the grave problems they have outlined in the preceding sections of "Must it be the West against the Rest?" The components of the "Deal" are: "more aid more efficiently allocated, appropriate and accessible technological advances, reduced fertility rates, enhanced peacekeeping powers, acceptance of cultural diversity". This project does not differ substantially from the proposals of other global power-brokers, such as the World Bank. In this respect, Connelly and Kennedy offer nothing that has not been said before.

I argue this section is important, not because of the content of their prescriptions, but because Connelly and Kennedy offer a new definition of what a 'deal' is. A deal usually implies some kind of agreed upon and equivalent transaction between two parties. Instead, Connelly and Kennedy construct an asymmetry based on a Master-servant dichotomy[98] that privileges the 'West' as "a moral community, a community that may be entrusted with numerous powers" (Malkki, 1994:45), and denigrates (used purposefully here to 'blacken' or 'race') the 'Rest' as a 'failed' community that cannot be trusted to look after itself. The authors set up the terms of "A New Deal" in accordance with the interests of the 'West'. They empower themselves with the definition of the relevant boundaries and the limits of political thinking on this issue, and thereby 'order' the world in a particular way. As these boundaries are made, "so an identity of interests is exerted: 'our' interests are the interests of the whole world"(Billig, 1995:176). This appeal to a higher authority serves to efface the sordid dealings of ideology and politics and the self-

[98] This has many historical manifestations. Most relevant here, perhaps, is colonial ideology, supported by (evolutionary) theories of Social Darwinism, which argued, as Duncan describes: "as white Europeans represented the climax of racial and social evolution, their relations with Africans should be one of masters to servants for this was the only possible relation between peoples occupying such different mental and moral spaces" (Duncan, 1993: 53). A more recent example is the doctor/patient metaphor in the dominant medical model. With this metaphor, Connelly and Kennedy diagnose the problem in such a way that they, the 'West', can administer the cure. In this way, they reproduce the notion that the health (or security) of the larger population is dependent on the specialised knowledge of an elite (Campbell, 1992).

interest of their proposition. From this position of mastery, Connelly and Kennedy construct their "Deal" not as a will for conquest, but for *expansion*. They frame their motive as one to uplift and civilise, not through the use of physical force but by example (Doty, 1996c).[99]

Connelly and Kennedy situate their approach as a "pragmatic, non-ideological politics" (Billig, 1995:172), or as they deem it, "a truer form of realism"(84). The authors' positioning as 'experts', as social scientists within networks of power/knowledge anoints them as 'legitimate' managers of global affairs (Grovogui, 1998). Readers are seduced into believing that they can readily rely on Connelly and Kennedy's definition of the problem, as well as accept the authors' proposed solutions. By claiming this secure foundation, they can present their highly political arguments as a politically neutral response to an array of observable 'facts' from a disinterested and objective stance, or 'god's eye view.[100] A 'god's eye view', Haraway (1991) argues, articulates national and personal variations of racial, sexual and cultural supremacy in the name of 'common-sense', 'reason' and an objective perspective. Connelly and Kennedy's claim of a 'truer form of realism' encourages a forgetting of the political and power-ridden context of their enunciation. It is this play of power that gives the illusion of political neutrality and objectivity. Their effacement of power is a crucial aspect of geopolitical reasoning, as Dalby (1998b:311) points out: "Geopolitical texts are not 'neutral' writings from some detached position outside politics, history or geography, attempting to answer a single commonly agreed upon 'question'. Indeed, these claims to a 'god's eye' view of the world is a rhetorical tactic repeatedly used to convince readers that the author of the text has just this kind of 'answer'".

---

[99] The language of 'expansion' and 'uplifting' is familiar in the lexicon of colonialism. This language allows conquests and exploitations to be couched in terms of missions of deliverance and salvation (Doty, 1996c). I argue "A New (North-South) Deal" can be viewed in the context of coercive history(ies) of colonialism, and through contemporary imperialistic arrangements like structural adjustment policies, orchestrated by the World Bank and the IMF 'for their own good'.

[100] Similarly, Bordo (1990) calls the ideal of an abstract, universal position - beyond race, class, gender, history, and geography - a 'view from nowhere'.

Connelly and Kennedy's "A New (North-South) Deal" elides their assumption of authority and their exclusion of the 'Rest' from any participation in either the designation of the 'problem' or the provision of solutions. Instead, the 'Rest', in the role of 'servant', is expected only to co-operate in decisions that are made for them. Through this exclusion and debasement, other forms of knowledge/explanations and other social realities are erased/disappear from consideration:

> Naomi Schor, among others, has attributed the ideological assumptions underlying such exclusions to a discursive tradition, originating in the Enlightenment, that questions the ability of certain subjects - particularly the formerly colonised, women, and Western minorities - to 'feel responsible for the Universe'. This means that they are unable to transcend their particular experiences in order to derive universalist conclusions from them (Grovogui, 1998:503).

This relation of dominance and subservience is constructed in such a way that it is not only the case that the peoples of the 'Rest' are incapable of looking after themselves, but they need to be *saved* from themselves.[101] The chaotic, undisciplined landscape of the South, once again, is constructed in moral terms (Price, 2000). "It is widely assumed that many societies in the South have failed their people and that therefore, in some sense, they are morally inferior to those of the West" (Furedi, 1997:81). The 'West', then, is particularly suited to look after the interests of the 'Rest'; hence the world. Whereas in "Numbers Count", this argument is used to justify keeping the 'West' separate, in a "New Deal", the authors use it to legitimate Western hegemony. Who else to manage the affairs of the world? Connelly and Kennedy's one-sided definition of the problem isolates and contains the 'threat' within the 'Rest', and deflects any consideration away from the possibility that the 'West' could be a source of danger (Tesfahuney, 1998). The problem is sufficiently externalised and contained to appear as fundamentally separate from the institutions and discourse of the respectable international community (Calhoun, 1995).

---

[101] Once again, the evangelical overtones to this relationship constitute a recycling of colonising missionary themes of salvation. Furedi (1997) argues that this relationship is constructed to offer an opportunity to demonise the 'South' and morally rehabilitate Western imperialism.

Two examples from Connelly and Kennedy's text illustrate the duplicity and paternalism of discourses articulating to construct the 'Rest' as *the* problem. The first is a proposal to employ ex-Cold War scientists and engineers to develop sun-powered energy to be made available to the peoples of Asia and Africa. Such "a truly dramatic breakthrough", the authors advise, could "*wean* them from their reliance on wood, oil, coal and other fossil fuels"(p .82, my emphasis). Aside from the fact that technology such as solar ovens already exists, and thus do not need further development from nuclear physicists, there is a striking irony that this plan is highlighted as a priority by Connelly and Kennedy. The language of 'weaning' reinforces the Master-servant dichotomy – the 'Rest' needs to be taught by the 'West'. But there is no corresponding suggestion to *wean* 'us', the readers of *The Atlantic* and disproportionate consumers of energy, from our penchant for luxury automobiles (advertised nine times in the magazine) and energy-intensive consumer goods. As Maynes (1995:36) queries: "Could there be a more immediate nightmare for the readers of *The Atlantic* than to lose their European-made cars?" From this standpoint, the contribution of the 'Wes't in sustaining a highly inequitable division of the world's wealth and resources is displaced, and ipso facto deproblematised.[102]

A second example illustrates Connelly and Kennedy's appeal for greater recognition of cultural diversity: "A genuine North-South entente is unlikely unless Third World countries grow less fearful that their cultures will be swallowed up by the technologies and material way of life of richer nations, especially the United States"(p. 82). This statement, though in apparent contradiction to the authors' earlier assertions that state the poor are in fact *lured* by the promise of such a 'material way of life', exemplifies Connelly and Kennedy's expertise in using opposing arguments for the same purpose. In this case, they deflect the fear and discomfort that the 'West' is beginning to feel by the movement of the 'Rest' and project it back to the 'Rest'. This strategy refocuses attention away from the fearful and defensive 'West', who, anxious that their way of life will be swallowed up by the very *diversity* of the 'Rest', has enacted discriminatory

[102] As Tesfahuney (1998:509) elaborates, this is a thorough displacement. It "elides previous and current global relations of exploitation, for example: huge capital transfers, through debt and interest repayments to the West, (196 billion dollars between 1983 and 1994); systematic tariffs and trade walls of the EU that

practices to contain mobility. This statement implies, moreover, that one way to maintain 'cultural diversity' and their 'way of life' is to remain where they are, and not attempt to challenge Western mastery of space.

I offer this critique above not to deny that many things need to be done; rather I point out that such policy claims such as "A New (North-South) Deal" disguise the political context of their formulation and often become a useful way to strengthen the power and legitimacy of the existing order. Although Connelly and Kennedy's suggestions, couched in benevolent and pragmatic terms, are supposedly aimed to provide humane and liberal solutions, in the manner that readers of *The Atlantic Monthly* should expect, they cannot compete with, nor combat the messages of doom presented throughout their narrative. I read "A New (North-South) Deal" as a kind of triage invoked in order to maintain and reinforce the separation of peoples and places. Connelly and Kennedy have constructed their arguments in such a way that power, wealth, and people, are not substantially redistributed; instead inequitable relations are reinforced through repeated allusions to the 'West' as 'Master' and the 'Rest' as 'servant'. "A New (North-South) Deal", despite its name, is not in fact *new* at all, but part of continuing processes to "inscribe and re-inscribe 'difference' in the service of the re/production of peculiar power relations, which, if left unchallenged, have a tendency to engender continuous poverty for some and unending wealth for the others - just a curious coincidence of history" (Soguk, 1996:306).

Donne's Island

At the end of their narrative, Connelly and Kennedy present a gentler vision of the world's prospects than offered in the preceding pages of "Must it be the West against the Rest?" In "Donne's Island", Connelly and Kennedy call upon the imagery of John Donne's classic poem to argue against 'fortress mentality' politics and the renewal of isolationism.[103] In its place, the authors propose a global ethic "that recognises our

---

foreclose 'Third World' countries from earning export income, and the role of Western military-industrial complexes and arms sales to 'Third World' countries".

[103] "Donne's Island" refers to John Donne's famous meditation. By invoking a classic in English literature, Connelly and Kennedy draw a continuous line of civility and tolerance that suggests the redemptive and regenerative powers of Western Civilisation.

common human destiny and the necessity for shared stewardship of our delicate global ecosystem"(p.84). A 'global ethic' promises the best that liberalism has to offer – the possibility for humanity to fulfill its potential in a more open and cosmopolitan world, beyond the particularised interests of nation-states.[104]

With this proposal, Connelly and Kennedy continue the (transaction) theme of "A New (North-South) Deal" and package their global ethic as a 'new', more inclusive image of community/citizenship. In my reading of "Donne's Island", I question the assumption of universality underlying their espousal of a 'global ethic'. Despite the inclusiveness that the term suggests, it is imbued with restrictive assumptions concerning the identities of the subjects who are entitled to enjoy these things (Doty, 1996c). That is, only some people are entitled to be 'global', others are not. Connelly and Kennedy's 'global ethic' is premised on a dichotomy of citizen/non-citizen. In the world of "Donne's Island", moreover, criteria of inclusion/exclusion are determined not only through belonging and citizenship to a nation-state, or 'national community', but on whether or not one is a consumer. The assumption implicit in the global ethic is that in order to participate, you have to be one of two things: either a citizen or a consumer. The identity that is allowed to be 'global', not surprisingly, is the Western 'consumer-citizen'.

Discourses of the 'global' or 'common humanity' are widely accepted in the 'West' because they project a kind of egalitarian diversity (among peoples or nations) that is desirable as an alternative to parochial and chauvinistic nationalisms. It is self-evident that a 'global ethic' and 'common humanity' is a 'good thing' and ought to be encouraged (Malkki, 1994). But as I have argued, it is expedient to be wary of such universals, because claims to a 'universal' are always claims made on behalf of a 'particular', in their self-interest. The ethic Connelly and Kennedy envisage is a

[104] But if this promise is not enough to convince readers of the desirability of the 'global ethic', Connelly and Kennedy back their promise with a threat. The world is interdependent by necessity: "[T]empting though it is to turn away from the world, too large a proportion of humankind is heading into the twenty-first century in too distressed a condition for any nation to imagine that it can avoid the larger consequences" (p.84). "Richer societies need to recognise that John Donne's reasoning applies on an international scale. 'No man is an island, entire of itself' - with massacres, social collapse and migrations occurring across our planet on a weekly basis, do not ask 'for whom the bell tolls' it tolls for thee'" (p.84).

specifically bounded ethic occurring in a particular space/place/context. While their creative imagination depicts a world from which nations are supposedly disappearing – 'No man is an island', they say – the picture of the fence in the cover illustration undermines this vision. It is a reminder that rather than sharing a common human destiny, cultural and political identity is constructed through a process of 'othering', as suggested by the adage 'Good fences make good neighbours'. The discourse of the 'global' enables Connelly and Kennedy to both create cultural diversity and contain cultural difference (Bhaba, 1990). For example, diversity in the 'non-threatening' form of 'global' cuisine is acceptable, but difference in the form of 'threatening' bodies in one's own neighbourhood – or in this case, backyard – is not. In this way, the 'global ethic' provides Connelly and Kennedy with an effective conceptual package "to order and domesticate the dangerous difference ... that otherwise threatens the whole logic of the 'nation-state'" (Malkki, 1994:60).

In "Must it be the West against the Rest?", Connelly and Kennedy name what kind of difference is tolerable, what kind of movement is allowed, and what kind of citizen is acceptable. In "Donne's Island, the authors address particularly the question of who gets to be 'global' because, contrary to what it appears to suggest, the term 'global' is not all-inclusive.[105] Instead, as Connelly and Kennedy reveal in previous sections of their narrative, what is meant by global is really information, material, and capital and certainly not people, or at least certain kinds of people. Throughout their narrative, Connelly and Kennedy suggest that the 'global' in the form of the global mobility of people must be contained, and propose instead that it is only some people who are

[105] The words of Margaret Thatcher (in reference to the European Union) exemplify this point: "We have joined Europe to have free movement of goods...not...to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, plant and animal diseases and illegal immigrants". (Margaret Thatcher in Tesfahuney, 1998:506). Here, what is meant by 'free movement' is really information and material. The motley collection of terrorists, criminals, and drugs trammel with 'our' rights to free access. Immigrants (always 'illegal') are lumped in with this undifferentiated group of 'undesirables'. At the same time these mobile people are equated with 'human' but 'bad' terrorists and criminals, they are also dehumanised and likened to plant and animal disease. The effect of this representation, then, is that refugees/migrants are both non-citizens and non-humans.

entitled to be good, white, civilised, ordered, human, master and in "Donne's Island", the self-actualised global citizen (with the right to access things in an unrestricted market).[106]

This new global citizen is in contrast to the 'old' citizen, the familiar figure of the BBQ man depicted on the cover. The BBQ man exemplifies a fixed, territorial 'national' identity – the dominant model of societal organization of modernity. However, Connelly and Kennedy acknowledge implicitly that this territorial model of identity is embattled. The illustration accompanying Connelly and Kennedy's narrative depicts a highly nostalgic, almost tragi-comic drawing of the modernist understanding of territory/identity. The BBQ man appears with a bewildered and weary/wary expression on his face, as if he can't keep up with the pace of change. Certainly, this caricature does not resemble the rugged individual of American mythology, or the kind of identity that sophisticated readers of *The Atlantic Monthly* would aspire to. Although he represents the comfort of familiarity, the comfort of home, he is uninspiring and pitifully out-of-date. The citizen, with his old-fashioned suspenders and shirt-sleeves, can't quite capture the excitement of the 'global' and all that it has to offer. He is, by no means, *cutting edge*, and clearly lacks the sophistication that is required of the 'new' global citizen, and the 'new' model of territory/identity.[107]

---

[106] Tesfahuney (1998) argues that differential entitlement to mobility acts as a 'class' division separating those who are allowed to move and those who are fixed:

> First class mobile subjects obtain global reach in mobility with little or no hinders to movement. The possibility of being denied entry on account of who they are, is rarely an issue that bothers this class of mobile subjects. These are not the objects of suspicion, are rarely questioned by customs officials, can obtain visas, if so required, without much ado. In the West, they enjoy entry without visa to almost all the countries. The countries of which they are nationals do not appear in the list of nationals labelled as origins of undesirable migrants. White Westerners and citizens of other advance countries (Japan), belong to this class of mobile subjects.
> On the other hand, second class mobile subjects are objects of suspicion, a feature that makes the very fact of mobility problematic. The validity of the passport they bear are checked and they may have to produce additional evidence of identity, letters of invitation, frisked, asked questions or taken aside by police. Even if they are naturalised citizens of a Western country, if one is not white, the privileges accorded first class mobile subjects are waived. However, it is nationals of a Third World country or citizens of states listed as undesirables by European regimes of migration control, that are victims of the racialising and criminalising geopolicing systems instituted by Europe (Tesfahuney, 1998:513).

[107] Hall (1997:181) describes this new model of territory/identity as the "global postmodern":

> In constrast to the static modernist model of citizenship, the global postmodern is dizzyingly attractive: If you are just jetting in from Tokyo, via Harare, you come in not with the sense of how everything is the same but with the sense that everything is different. In one trip around the world,

The comforting/comfortable figure of the BBQ man is challenged by the unfixed, deterritorialised, and threatening 'global' identity of the refugee/migrant. Refugees/migrants are 'global' in the sense that they belong nowhere and are claimed by no nation-state. Because of this liminal status, some say they are (unwitting) representatives of a cosmopolitan alternative to the idea of a homeland (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Bhabha, 1990).[108] But in "Must it be the West against the Rest?" refugees/migrants are not constructed as cosmopolitan ideal types but as thoroughly disembodied non-citizens (non-beings) – without homeland, history, agency. Connelly and Kennedy portray refugee/migrant movement as the (over) determined response to negative stimuli (e.g. "fleeing a grisly death") or the irresistible pull to the 'West' (e.g. "visions of cat food on a silver platter and the like"). Refugees/migrants are represented as unable to control their destiny, a control that citizens of liberal democratic nation-states are imagined to possess.[109] Their insecure and vulnerable presence on the international political scene is superfluous economically and politically. Not only do refugees/migrants fail to contribute to processes of (global) accumulation, their mobile and transitory status threatens to blur boundaries and fragment the coherence and integrity of the order of 'pure' nation-states. In this way, refugees/migrants fail in some

---

> you could, in short order, see every wonder of the ancient world. You could take them in as you go by, all in one swoop, living with difference, wondering at pluralism, this concentrated, corporate, over-corporate, over-integrated, over-concentrated, and condensed form of economic power that lives culturally through difference and that is constantly teasing itself with the pleasures of the transgressive other".

[108] Fair and Parks (1998), however, are impatient with 'the refugee' likened to an emancipatory political status, because: "Although refugees' movement may expose the constructedness of national boundaries and thereby support postcolonial models of resistance that valorise 'in-between' identities and 'deterritorialised' spaces, it is important to recognise that there is nothing necessarily liberatory about refugees' mobility because it constitutes a kind of enforced rather than willful nomadicism.

[109] Appadurai (1988) describes this distinction in terms of a Western/native dichotomy. 'The Native' becomes subject to Western representative conventions that work to confine or incarcerate them in their supposedly given space:

> Natives are in one place, a place to which explorers, administrators, missionaries, and eventually anthropologists, come. These outsiders, these observers, are regarded as quintessentially mobile; they are the movers, the seers, the knowers. The natives are immobilised by their belonging to a place. Of course, when observers arrive, natives are capable of moving to another place. But this is not really motion; it is usually flight, escape, to another equally confining place (Appadurai, 1988:37).

way to be suitable 'representatives' and 'ambassadors' of the system of nation-states. They fail the liberal ideal as 'citizens of humanity' (Malkki, 1994).

The citizen that is truly 'global' in Connelly and Kennedy's terms is the global elite. The global elite, like the refugee/migrant, is an unfixed, deterritorialised, transnational identity. But unlike the refugee/migrant, this global identity is viewed as non-threatening.[110] Indeed, this elite is privileged as the post-national ideal – a cosmopolitan, knowledgeable 'universal man'. Like Connelly and Kennedy's caricature of national identity, the global elite has 'roots', but not the kind that binds one to a particular national soil. Instead, the global elite sets up monetary 'roots' and electronic connections to those roots. 'He' is sovereign unto himself. This figure, implicit in "Donne's Island", acts as a solution to the instability and insecurity of the world the authors' describe. It "represents increasingly common discourse about the global economy and the place of state, citizenship and identity in it" (Maurer, 1998:497).[111]

---

[110] But of course, nonthreatening to whom? It depends which way you look at it.

[111] A sensational example of this global elite is the PT, the 'brainchild' of Adam Starchild (cited in Maurer, 1998:497). This character is an excessive caricature that encapsulates the masculinised, racialised concepts of liberal individualism:

> The majority of Somalis are nomads who have proved themselves gratifyingly resistant to the chaos of civil war and famine. While Western attention has been focused on farmers and devastated city dwellers, the nomads continue to use their mobility – as they have for centuries – to avoid much of the hardship. Cities and mechanised agriculture, the results of 'civilisation' are the first to be hurt when the structure of civil order collapses. War has destroyed the largest towns; farmers were quickly cut off from supplies with the onset of hostilities. Nomads with their camel, goat, and sheep herds, are highly mobile and can generally avoid areas where there is fighting.
>
> On an international scale there is a survival lesson here for the civilised world as well. Do you want to escape the control over your life and property now held by modern governments? The PT concept could have been called Individual Sovereignty, because PTs look after themselves. We don't want or need authorities dominating every aspect of our existence from cradle to grave. The PT concept is one way to break free.
>
> In a nutshell, the PT merely arranges his or her 'paperwork' in such a way that all governments consider him a tourist – a person who is just 'passing through'. The advantage is that being thought of by government officials as a person who is merely 'parked temporarily', a PT is not subject to taxes, military service, lawsuits or persecution for taking part in innocent but forbidden pursuits of pleasures. Unlike most citizens or subjects, the PT will not be persecuted for his beliefs or lack of them. PT stands for many things: a PT can be a 'prior taxpayer', 'perpetual tourist', 'practically transparent', 'privacy trained', or 'permanent traveller', if he or she wants to be. The individual who is a PT can stay in one place most of the time. Or all of the time, PT is a concept, a way of life, a way of perceiving the universe and your place in it. One can be a full-time PT or a part-time PT. Some may not want to break out all at once, or become a PT at all. They just want to be aware of the possibilities, and be prepared to modify their lifestyle in the

In the promotion of a new global identity, citizenship is proclaimed to be a changeable, fluid status to be adopted and abandoned at will, and it has everything to do with one's power as a consumer. Through concepts/identities like the elite global citizen, citizenship is paid for through a monetary transaction and becomes transformed into the ability to consume. This, however, is not the kind of transaction suggested by a 'deal' or the 'old' contractual models. The responsibility is not to an individual agent, for example, it is to the market. The 'global', in this sense, is not "an ethic of responsibility" at all. The 'global' is merely a container through which (some) people move. It is a reified space of flows, but these flows are not free-flowing or unregulated. The global is not a 'free for all', a case of anything and anyone goes. For it is only some boundaries that are becoming increasingly blurred, others, as in the case of barriers to the movement of refugees/migrants are becoming increasingly rigid.

In "Donne's Island", Connelly and Kennedy's proposed 'global ethic' does not represent an inclusive notion of community and citizenship, but a supplement to existing modernist categories exclusively tied to geopolitics and the control of space (Luke, 1998). Despite the 'new' aspirations and possibilities of space/identity articulated in "Donne's Island", what is offered as a solution is a retreat to the messages of previous sections wrapped in a new package. While Connelly and Kennedy do not advocate physical borders (although these borders have not disappeared nor do they remain unfortified), they enhance existing borders with a different but complementary kind of barrier/border – marked by differential entitlements to access or non-access as a consumer. For, as Baxi (1996:545) states, the "globalisation of consumerism does not transform 'aliens' into 'neighbours'. They remain 'socially distant even after they acquire the likeness of appetite to consume".

I read "Donne's Island" as Connelly and Kennedy's attempt to reassert the claims of 'West'. Though it appears that they offer their proposed global ethic for the 'good of

---

event of a crisis. Knowledge will may you a sort of PT – a 'possibility thinker' who is 'prepared thoroughly' for the future.

everyone', it is, in effect, only a minimal kind of solidarity. They avoid any consideration of the relations of power inherent in the question '*Whose* ethic is a global ethic?' Connelly and Kennedy's appropriation of the term 'global' allows them to supplement their national arguments. The seductiveness and appeal of 'global' gives them credibility in a post-modern world – they are no nativists, xenophobes, etc. However, the constructed 'we-ness' of their notions of 'common humanity', 'sharing' and 'diversity' leaves me with a very unsatisfied and sceptical conception of what kind of transformative politics a 'global ethic' might entail. Connelly and Kennedy do not address the issue of how, given the severity and intractability of the 'problems' they outline, a 'shared' destiny or common ethic is to be created. In "Donne's Island", I argue that Connelly and Kennedy's frame of reference, far from imagining a world without borders, invokes closure in accordance with a hegemonic transnational liberalism. For a universal global ethic implies a potential for domination, for maintaining a particular order in the interest of the 'West' at the expense of the 'Rest'.

CHAPTER 5: INTERIM REFLECTIONS

Earlier in this thesis, I commented that starting a research project involves a crucial moment(s) of inclusion and exclusion. The act of beginning, to revisit Said (1978:16), necessitates an act of delimitation by which something is cut out of a great mass of material. At this point in my study, I believe it is important to consider the question: What does the act of ending involve? If beginning involves an act of delimitation, it follows that ending may also entail this act in order to impose closure and distinguish *conclusively* that 'something' from the great mass of material. Instead of marking out the boundaries between this study and others, however, I prefer to consider the act of ending as reflecting on the piece that I cut out, carved into a space I found within the literature.

But the 'piece', this thesis, is really about a lot of things. It is about re-reading a neo-liberal text, problematising the representation of refugees/migrants as an enemy/threat, challenging the authority and boundary-making of a text, understanding and trying to describe carefully how exclusive definitions of the world are made and remade, attempting to interpret images and stories that counteract their dominant meanings, and defining what an alternative reading might look like. And, for me, it is also about trying to write and not reproduce the same authority as the text that I am analysing, trying to make the process of writing a thesis less alienating for me as a student, experimenting with different strategies of writing, and trying to be less absolute.

It is difficult to talk about a lot of things at once, so I begin first by putting down on paper some thoughts about why I do not consider this a 'conclusion' in the sense of an end-point or closure, and second, by organising my 'interim reflections' into three sets of comments –on analysis, on methodological approach, and on theoretical approach. I describe these reflections as 'interim' because I consider this chapter to be just a break or pause from ongoing critical readings of neo-liberal (and other authoritative) texts. This break – the end of this thesis – is a good stage to offer some interim reflections on the points I make in my reading, the process I followed as a way to read the text, and the possibility of contributing to geopolitical explanations offered in the literature.

The goal of this thesis as a whole is to try to resist the authority of Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy's neo-liberal naming and writing of the world, to resist the authority of the privileged and panoptic Western author/writer, and to resist the authority of geopolitical explanations. In my re-reading of "Must it be the West against the Rest?" I tried to show how Connelly and Kennedy present an impressive and engrossing story with a definite beginning and end, leading inevitably to an affirmative answer to the question "Must it be the West against the Rest?" The authors enlist the reader on a voyage of their own, and the reader is irresistibly drawn to their destination – to conclude that it is possible to make war on refugees and migrants and still be 'liberal'. Unlike the authors of this narrative, I refuse to ask the reader to accept my story of how 'we' got to here. (Indeed, I want to resist the creation of 'we-ness' in this sense altogether!). I offer these interim reflections in lieu of concluding something about what I set out to do in this thesis, where I have met my expectations, and where I did not (and/nor shouldn't ever). In my analysis, I try to fragment Connelly and Kennedy's story in order to understand how their argument is put together. But it is not my intention now to provide something synthetic, to try to weave it seamlessly together again in a 'new' critical mode precisely because I do not want to create a new authoritative text. I want to be wary of making *big* claims, and reaching *big* conclusions. This is why I try not to make a *big* point, but a series of many little ones, sometimes non-sequiturs, in an effort to avoid creating unity and reproducing yet another authority of (geopolitical) text. I would like to leave this thesis open for critical analysis and contestation … if possible.

Interim Reflections on Analysis

In this 'piece' of work, I sought to challenge and destabilise geopolitical claims to truth and to make explicit relations of power and domination within a neo-liberal text. To achieve this objective, I employed a critical discourse analysis to reread the text, "Must it be the West against the Rest?" An advantage of a close critical re-reading is an analysis rich in detail. By combing through and isolating elements of Connelly and Kennedy's narrative, I could understand how their argument – economically and effectively reduced

to one simple question – was in fact a complex weave of numerous rhetorical strategies, well-known binaries, and popular metaphors that combined to form a powerful and seemingly inevitable 'reality'. What I have hoped to demonstrate in my analysis is that this reality is a construction. There is nothing essentially dangerous or threatening about refugees/migrants. But what *is* dangerous is Connelly and Kennedy's methods of estranging them.

"Must it be the West against the Rest?" does not uncover a 'truth' or 'tell it like it is'. Connelly and Kennedy's naming and boundary-making is neither innocent, nor 'new'. Instead their arguments rely on durable and familiar binaries and metaphors in Western thought/practice. I think this kind of analysis can be applied fruitfully to other neo-liberal texts because of this consistent repetition and recycling of themes. Neo-liberal texts probably offer such exclusive views of the world habitually. It is useful to apply this kind of analysis, then, not only to investigate the representations of refugees/migrants, but any identification of an enemy or elucidation of a problem presented in such a way that it appears there is no alternative other than what is provided for you. One means to resist the exclusiveness and exclusions going on in texts is to investigate binaries within texts and the narrow conceptual categories that they force upon 'us', and to reject the exclusive 'we' that is created for 'us' in these texts. But resisting this 'we' does not mean that 'we' should assert 'ourselves' as a singular 'I'. Instead, this can be a useful starting point to think about how identity and community can have alternative meanings that are not dependent on either/or, and us/them.

Interim Reflections on Methodological Approach

My methodological approach was designed to study the construction and circulation of geopolitical knowledge/discourse in a popular text. My approach outlined not just the steps I took, but also considered the process of doing research as a political project. In these interim reflections on this process, I focus on two aspects of my methodological approach. First, I offer my thoughts on the choice of text, popular geopolitics, and what I think this approach can contribute, and second, I reflect on where and why my

methodological approach did not meet my expectations.

With respect to the first point, I need to answer: Why does an article now over six years old from a magazine that I don't even read matter? I believe that texts are significant because they continue to tell their story long after they are written – the resurrection of Jean Raspail's *The Camp of the Saints,* published in 1973, by Connelly and Kennedy is an excellent example of this prolonged existence. What matters about texts is that their ideas and arguments are there to be repeated – echoed acceptingly or rearranged critically. Texts don't end when, for example, the 'ideal' or 'gentle' reader of *The Atlantic Monthly* gets up from his leather armchair and turns off his reading lamp. In this way, Connelly and Kennedy's arguments are neither 'new', nor 'old news'. Instead they are part of a continuing argument – the reconstruction and reinforcement of Western hegemony and its idealised 'way of life'.

Therefore, while I have argued that I look at this article from one institutional location, I believe it does offer clues as to how ongoing arguments concerning refugees/migrants are presently constructed. For example, "Must it be the West against the Rest?" shares some similarities with the proliferation of (negative) representation and images of refugees/migrants in the media. While not 'representative', the current context towards refugees and migrants (outlined in Chapter 1), suggests that views like Connelly and Kennedy's are indeed becoming increasingly normalised or internalised as 'common-sense' in a neo-liberal climate of self-help and individual responsibility.

I believe that understanding these hegemonic processes in the context of popular geopolitics is instructive because the 'popular' (in the form of news media, television, entertainment, etc.) often obscures what is political in its apparently banal representations of 'everyday life'. The approach of popular geopolitics places (specific) texts in the context of the institutions that produce them, rather than accept them as a complete, discrete, disparate world unto themselves. Conceptualising the 'popular' as just one location where the concerns of individuals are articulated with global and national issues helps me to understand where I fit in with these processes, and how my comprehension of

issues is constituted and shaped by a multitude of mediated images and representations. It also helps me to consider where I can possibly resist or intervene in the textual transmission of alienating and exclusive images and representations.

But I also need to acknowledge, and this brings me to my second point, that this form of intervention is (necessarily) limited. One of the aims of my methodological approach was to strive for an embodied representation of refugees/migrants and an embodied geopolitics of international migration. But even though the 'subject' of this study is not centred directly on the material experience of refugees/migrants (but rather how they are represented), I nevertheless accept that my analysis (as an intervention) may also appropriate their stories, and that I, too, participate in the process of the disembodiment of refugees/migrants through a focus on representation. I cannot profess, therefore, that my resistance can intervene or change the daily material struggles of refugees/migrants. What I can do is to give an example of how an alienating representation is constructed through its (re)presentation as a popular geopolitical neo-liberal text and subsequently imposed as 'common-sense'.

But if I fell short and did not meet my *own* expectations, at least I can attempt to embody my *own* analysis. Critical reflexivity was an important means for me to address my ambivalence about the politics of doing discursive work. For me, critical reflexivity involved first making myself accountable in the text, and trying to explain what I am doing and why as clearly, as transparently, as possible. It is also about not always answering or resolving questions, and in so doing, attempting to promote a partial reading. If this is the goal of critical reflexivity as I understand it, I am uncertain how to assess whether my effort was 'successful' or not. After all, it is difficult to leave questions open, and accept that this may be viewed instead as *avoiding* them. It is also difficult, after all the research and writing and the knowledge that I have gained through this process, not to try be an 'expert' and make authoritative claims. The writing strategies I employed to make these difficulties explicit are only tentative. But whether or not I am 'successful' in this endeavour (and again, the perplexing question arises, by whose standards do I judge it?), I feel it is important that I tried. Because this process is

not just about agreeing with the political goals of critical reflexivity 'theoretically', but also attempting to put them into practice in my thesis in a way that is relevant to me, that I can live with politically.

Interim Reflections on Theoretical Framework

I believe a critical geopolitics is useful because it offers important critical insights about both 'old' and 'new' geopolitics. An argument/point that I have tried to make throughout this study is that this kind of argument is not 'new'. Instead, a critical geopolitical approach shows that the 'new' shares a remarkable continuity with the 'old', and (of course), 'old' explanations and 'old' social relations still have considerable power. I have tried to make the point that it is necessary to be critical of Connelly and Kennedy's naming a 'new' enemy and a 'new' antagonism in "Must it be the West against the Rest?" It is important to be wary of things describing themselves as 'new' (and this is not to take a socially and politically conservative stance) because this description encourages the forgetting of important contexts, for instance, who defines it as such and why.

This argument to not forget the context, or the partiality of contexts, is also relevant to my choice of theoretical approach. For example, I chose to situate "Must it be the West against the Rest?" and its identification of a 'new' antagonism within the context of post-Cold War politics, and redefinitions of 'new' world order. Alternatively/additionally I could have emphasised primarily the context of racialised constructions of the 'Other' and post-colonial theoretical literatures, or focused particularly on feminist literatures and the highly gendered aspect of who is constructed as most threatening 'demographic' to the 'purity' of the West. Each of these different approaches would have significant implications for the questions that I asked in this thesis and the way that I asked them. My reading would have taken a different turn. But contexts are neither a starting point nor an end point. A text like "Must it be the West against the Rest?" can be read in many contexts and take on new meanings. I accept, therefore, that my approach is partial.

My theoretical approach involved taking on the process of rehistoricising and recontextualising geopolitical explanations that critical geopolitics engages, and applying this process of critical questioning not only to the issue of refugee/migrants, but also against geopolitics itself and against my own reading. As I discussed in Chapter 2, I believe critical geopolitics does not go far enough in challenging its own claims to power and questioning the context of its articulation. I offered a critique of critical geopolitics that hopefully assisted me in getting me where I wanted to go – to try to envision a critical *and* embodied geopolitics of international migration. To this end, I endeavoured to extend and make more complex a critical geopolitical approach that would enable a dialogue with other critical approaches (e.g. political-economic, feminist, post-colonial) in the struggle for a transformative knowledge and politics.

As for me, I can accept these shortcomings because I want to approach/understand theory not as a singular way of 'looking', but as different sets of lenses. And by this I do not mean in the positivist sense of a 'penetrating scientific' gaze to test a proposition, but instead something more kaleidoscopic. Some lenses allow you to see certain kinds of things, certain kinds of threads and permit you to tell certain kinds of stories, certain kinds of tales. But none can provide absolute clarity or complete vision by themselves; instead they may be superimposed on each other to provide a wider range of partial visions/views. It is for this reason that I believe it is okay to say a little about a lot of things. And of course, at the 'end' of a project one realises that 'ending' is only a temporary point. I could begin again with the insights that I have gained from this project and focus on different questions and approach these questions with different theoretical frameworks. This would address some omissions and shortcomings of my theoretical approach while at the same time create new ones.

ROY BLOUNT: IN PRAISE OF PAULINE KAEL / JEFFERSON AND RELIG

The Atlantic Monthly

DECEMBER 1994

MUST IT BE THE REST AGAINST THE WEST?

BY MATTHEW CONNELLY AND PAUL KENNEDY

Whether it's racist fantasy or realistic concern, it's a question that won't go away: As population and misery increase, will the wretched of the earth overwhelm the Western paradise?



02058
12
0
395525

Must It Be THE REST Against THE WEST?

by MATTHEW CONNELLY AND PAUL KENNEDY



"Now, stretching over that empty sea, aground some fifty yards out, [lay] the incredible fleet from the other side of the globe, the rusty, creaking fleet that the old professor had been eyeing since morning. . . . He pressed his eye to the glass, and the first things he saw were arms. . . . Then he started to count. Calm and unhurried. But it was like trying to count all the trees in the forest, those arms raised high in the air, waving and shaking together, all outstretched toward the nearby shore. Scraggy branches, brown and black, quickened by a breath of hope. All bare, those fleshless Gandhi-arms. . . . thirty thousand creatures on a single ship!"

—THE CAMP OF THE SAINTS

WELCOME to the 300-page narrative of Jean Raspail's disturbing, chilling, futuristic novel *The Camp of the Saints*, first published in Paris twenty-one years ago and translated into English a short while later. Set at some vague time—perhaps fifteen or twenty years—in the future, the novel describes the pilgrimage of a million desperate Indians who, forsaking the ghastly conditions of downtown Calcutta and surrounding villages, commandeer an armada of decrepit ships and set off for the French Riviera. The catalyst for this irruption is simple enough. Moved by accounts of widespread famine across an Indian subcontinent collapsing under the sheer weight of its fast-growing population, the Belgian government has decided to admit and adopt a number of young children; but the policy is reversed when tens of thousands of mothers begin to push their babies against the Belgian consul general's gates in Calcutta. After mobbing the building in disgust at Belgium's change of mind, the crowd is further inflamed by a messianic speech from one of their number, an untouchable, a gaunt, eye-catching "turd eater," who calls for the poor and wretched of the world to advance upon the Western paradise: "The nations are rising from the four corners of the earth," Raspail has the man say, "and their number is like the sand of the sea. They will march up over the broad earth and surround the camp of the saints and the beloved city. . . ." Storming on board every ship within range, the crowds force the crews to take them on a lengthy, horrific voyage, around Africa and through the Strait of Gibraltar to the southern shores of France.

Absent major changes in North-South relations, the wretched should inherit the earth by about 2025

Illustrations by C. F. Payne

But it is not the huddled mass of Indians, with their "fleshless Gandhi-arms," that is the focus of Raspail's attention so much as the varied responses of the French and the other privileged members of "the camp of the saints" as they debate how to deal with the inexorably advancing multitude. Raspail is particularly effective here in capturing the platitudes of official announcements, the voices of ordinary people, the tone of statements by concerned bishops, and so on. The book also seems realistic in its recounting of the crumbling away of resolve by French sailors and soldiers when they are given the order to repel physically—to shoot or torpedo—this armada of helpless yet menacing people. It would be much easier, clearly, to confront a military foe, such as a Warsaw Pact nation. The fifty-one (short) chapters are skillfully arranged so that the reader's attention is switched back and forth, within a two-month time frame, between the anxious debates in Paris and events attending the slow and grisly voyage of the Calcutta masses. The denouement, with the French population fleeing their southern regions and army units deserting in droves, is especially dramatic.

THE VOYAGE OF THE *GOLDEN VENTURE*

WHY revisit this controversial and nowadays hard-to-obtain novel? The recovery of this neglected work helps us to call attention to the key global problem of the final years of the twentieth century: unbalanced wealth and resources, unbalanced demographic trends, and the relationship between the two. Many members of the more prosperous economies are beginning to agree with Raspail's vision: a world of two "camps," North and South, separate and unequal, in which the rich will have to fight and the poor will have to die if mass migration is not to overwhelm us all. Migration is the third part of the problem. If we do not act now to counteract tendencies toward global apartheid, they will only hurry the day when we may indeed see Raspail's vision made real.

One of us (Kennedy) first heard *The Camp of the Saints* referred to at various times during discussions of illegal migration. One such occasion was in the summer of 1991, following media reports about the thousands of desperate Albanians who commandeered ships to take them to the Italian ports of Bari and Brindisi, where they were locked in soccer stadiums by the local police before being forcibly returned to a homeland so poor that it is one of the few parts of Europe sometimes categorized as "developing" countries. Apparently, one reason for this exodus was that the Albanians had been watching Italian television—including commercials for consumer goods, cat food shown being served on a silver platter, and the like. More than a few colleagues mentioned that the incident struck them as a small-scale version of Raspail's grim scenario.



If a short trip across the Adriatic seems a far cry from a passage from Calcutta to Provence, the voyage of the *Golden Venture* was even more fantastic than anything imagined by Raspail. This 150-foot rust-streaked freighter left Bangkok, Thailand, in February of 1993 carrying ninety Chinese refugees, mostly from the impoverished Fujian province. Two hundred more Chinese boarded in Mombasa, Kenya. When they finally came ashore, on June 6, in the darkness and pounding surf off Rockaway, Queens, in New York City (eight drowned trying to swim to land), all had traveled a much greater distance than Raspail's fictional refugees.

What was remarkable about the *Golden Venture* was not that Chinese refugees tried to smuggle themselves into the United States—some experts estimate that 10,000 to 30,000 manage to do so each year—but that in traveling west rather than east, they were taking a new route to America. In the past most Chinese illegal immigrants came ashore on the West Coast or crossed into California after landing in Mexico. But the *Golden Venture* rounded the Cape of Good Hope and thus crossed some of the same waters as Raspail's imaginary armada.

The Camp of the Saints was also to some extent recalled in a special report of October 18, 1992, by the *New York Times* correspondent Alan Riding, about the remarkable increase in illegal immigration across the Strait of Gibraltar, the narrowest gap between Africa and Europe. The most startling fact in the report was not that ambitious, unemployed North Africans were heading to Europe to find jobs but that such traffic has now become pan-continental or even global. Of the 1,547 immigrants detained by the Spanish authorities in the first ten months of the year of Riding's report, 258 were from Ethiopia, 193 from Liberia, seventy-two from South Africa, and sixty-four from Somalia. Seventy-two from South Africa! Did they walk, hitchhike, or take buses across the entire continent? Even a journey that long pales beside Riding's further point that "word of the new route had spread far beyond Morocco, with not only Algerians and growing numbers of sub-Saharan Africans, but also Filipinos, Chinese and even the occasional Eastern Europeans among those detained." Take a look at an atlas and pose the question, Just how does a desperate citizen of, say, Bulgaria get to Morocco *without* going through western Europe?

THE DOOM OF THE WHITE RACE

JEAN Raspail, born in 1925, has been writing works of travel and fiction since the 1950s. Many of his books recount his experiences in Alaska, the Caribbean, the Andes; he is not ignorant of foreign lands and cultures. Raspail won prizes from the Académie Française, and last year only narrowly failed to be elected to that august body. *The Camp of the Saints* is different from his other writings. In the preface, written a decade after the book, he states that

one morning in 1972, at home by the shore of the Mediterranean, he had this vision:

> A million poor wretches, armed only with their weakness and their numbers, overwhelmed by misery, encumbered with starving brown and black children, ready to disembark on our soil, the vanguard of the multitudes pressing hard against every part of the tired and overfed West. I literally saw *them*, saw the major problem they presented, a problem absolutely insoluble by our present moral standards. To let them in would destroy us. To reject them would destroy them.
>
> During the ten months I spent writing this book, the vision never left me. That is why *The Camp of the Saints*, with all its imperfections, was a kind of emotional outpouring.

Is this simply a work of imagination or, as Raspail's critics charge, a racist tract dressed up as fiction? In some parts of the novel Raspail appears to be resigned, fatalistic, *not* taking sides: "The Good are at war with the Bad, true enough," he says at one point. "But one man's 'Bad' is another man's 'Good,' and vice versa. It's a question of sides." And he has the President of France, puzzling over the question of inequality among races, attribute to the Grand Mufti of Paris the idea that it is "just a question of rotation," with "different ones on top at different times"—as if to imply that it is quite natural for Europe, having expanded outward for the past 500 years, to be overwhelmed in turn by non-Western peoples. Indeed, Raspail claims that in depicting the French armed forces fleeing from confrontation rather than bloodily repulsing the armada, he shows he is no racist, for "I denied to the white Occident, at least in my novel, its last chance for salvation."

Yet for much of the rest of the novel Raspail makes plain where his cultural and political preferences lie. Whereas the Europeans all have characters and identities, from the Belgian consul in Calcutta, trampled to death by the crowd, to the French politicians paralyzed by their impending fate, the peoples of the Third World, whether already laboring in the slums of Paris or advancing upon the high seas, are unrelentingly disparaged.

> All the kinky-haired, swarthy-skinned, long-despised phantoms; all the teeming ants toiling for the white man's comfort; all the swill men and sweepers, the troglodytes, the stinking drudges, the swivel-hipped menials, the womanless wretches, the lung-spewing hackers; all the numberless, nameless, tortured, tormented, indispensable mass. . . . They don't say much. But they know their strength, and they'll never forget it. If they have an objection, they simply growl, and it soon becomes clear that their growls run the show. After all, five billion growling human beings, rising over the length and breadth of the earth, can make a lot of noise!
>
> Meanwhile, along with Josiane and Marcel, seven hundred million whites sit shutting their eyes and plugging their ears.

If anything, Raspail's contempt for sympathizers and fellow travelers in the West is even more extreme. The collection of churchmen who plead for tolerance of the approaching armada; the intellectuals and media stars who think this is a great event; the hippies, radicals, and counterculture people who swarm south to greet the Indians as the panic-stricken Provençois are rushing north—all these get their comeuppance in Raspail's bitter, powerful prose. In one of the most dramatic events, close to the book's end, the leader of the French radicals is portrayed as rushing forward to welcome the "surging mob" of Indians, only to find himself "swept up in turn, carried off by the horde. Struggling to breathe. All around him, the press of sweaty, clammy bodies, elbows nudging madly in a frantic push forward, every man for himself, in a scramble to reach the streams of milk and honey." The message is clear: race, not class or ideology, determines everything, and the wretched of the earth will see no distinction between unfriendly, fascistic Frenchmen on the one hand and liberal-minded bishops and yuppies on the other. All have enjoyed too large a share of the world's wealth for too long, and their common fate is now at hand.

It is not just the people of France who suffer that fate. Near the end of Raspail's novel the mayor of New York is made to share Gracie Mansion with three families from Harlem, the Queen of England must marry her son to a Pakistani, and just one drunken Russian general stands in the way of the Chinese as they swarm into Siberia. "In the Philippines, in all the stifling Third World ports—Jakarta, Karachi, Conakry, and again in Calcutta—other huge armadas were ready to weigh anchor, bound for Australia, New Zealand, Europe. . . . Many a civilization, victim of the selfsame fate, sits tucked in our museums, under glass, neatly labeled."

To describe *The Camp of the Saints* as an apocalyptic novel would be a truism. The very title of the book comes, of course, from Saint John's Apocalypse, the lines of which are uttered almost exactly by the messianic untouchable early on in the book. The work is studded with references to much earlier clashes between "the West" and "the Rest": to Charles Martel, to the fall of Constantinople, to Don John of Austria, to Kitchener at Omdurman—all to fortify the suggestion that what is unfolding is just part of a millennium-old international Kulturkampf that is always resolved by power and numbers. When Europe dominated the globe, the Caucasian race's relative share of world population achieved its high point; as the proportion shrinks, Raspail argues, so the race dooms itself. In his 1982 preface he spells it out again: "Our hypersensitive and totally blind West . . . has not yet understood that whites, in a world become too small for its inhabitants, are now a minority and that the proliferation of other races dooms our race, my race, irretrievably to extinction in the century to come, if we hold fast to our present moral principles."

"NOT SINCE GENGHIS KHAN"

WHEN *The Camp of the Saints* first appeared, in 1973, it was, to put it mildly, not well received. Sixties radicalism still prevailed in Paris; a century of capitalist imperialism was blamed for the problems of the Third World, though the feeling was that Africans and Asians now at least had control of their own destinies; and French intellectuals and bureaucrats believed that they had a special rapport with non-European cultures, unlike the insensitive Anglo-Saxons. Besides being shocking in its contents, Raspail's book was also offensive: it insulted almost everything that Sorbonne professors held dear. *The Camp* was swiftly dismissed as a racist tract. As for Raspail, he went off to write other novels and travel books. But in late 1985 he offended again, by joining forces with the demographer Gérard Dumont to write an article in *Le Figaro Magazine* claiming that the fast-growing non-European immigrant component of France's population would endanger the survival of traditional French culture, values, and identity. By this time the immigration issue had become much more contentious in French politics, and only a year earlier Jacques Chirac, then the mayor of Paris, had publicly warned, "When you compare Europe with the other continents, it's terrifying. In demographic terms, Europe is disappearing. Twenty or so years from now our countries will be empty, and no matter what our technological power, we shall be incapable of putting it to use." The Raspail-Dumont article was highly embarrassing to the French Socialist government, which, though pledged to crack down on illegal immigrants, was deeply disturbed by the potential political fallout from such a controversial piece. No fewer than three Cabinet Ministers, including Prime Minister Laurent Fabius, attacked it as "racist propaganda" and "reminiscent of the wildest Nazi theories." It was no consolation to them that Jean-Marie Le Pen, the head of the fast-growing National Front, was making immigration the leading issue as he campaigned among the discontented French electorate.

Despite attempts by centrist politicians to ignore this touchy topic, it refuses to go away. For example, although the early 1990s were supposed to mark the culmination of the decades-long drive toward the European Union's integration, an increasing number of Europeans were looking over their shoulders, especially after the British Broadcasting Corporation raised the specter of a "march" on Europe in a 1990 made-for-TV movie of that name. In the program a band of Sudanese refugees decide to walk straight across the Sahara rather than slowly starve on the paltry rations of Western relief agencies. With timely assistance from the Libyan government, which calls them the "spirit of suffering Africa," a throng swollen to 250,000 finally arrives at the Strait of Gibraltar. "We've traveled almost as far as Columbus," says their leader, now called the Mahdi. "We have no power but this: to choose where we die," he proclaims before embarking for the European shore. "All we ask of you is, watch us die." On the advice of a media-savvy African-American congressman, the flotilla washes ashore in the glare of flashbulbs and prime-time TV broadcasts—and a large force of EU soldiers. The movie ends there, and what happens next is left to the viewer's imagination. But its production was enough to provoke Raspail to complain. The producers insisted that when they began the project they had been unaware of the earlier work—an insistence that only confirmed that the themes of *The Camp* continue to resonate. *The March* has itself become something of a cult classic. Though rejected by the Public Broadcasting System as "not suitable to their programming" (nobody actually said it was too hot to handle), after four years it continues to be shown to audiences throughout Europe.

All of which brings us to the present day. Raspail may have written the most politically incorrect book in France

WHY revisit Jean Raspail's controversial and hard-to-obtain novel? Many members of the more prosperous economies are beginning to agree with his vision: a world of two "camps," North and South, separate and unequal, in which the rich will have to fight and the poor will have to die if mass migration is not to overwhelm us.

in the second half of the twentieth century, but the national mood concerning immigration is nowadays much less liberal than it was two decades ago. In fact, France's tough new Conservative government began this year by announcing a series of crackdowns on illegal immigrants, including mass deportation. "When we have sent home several planeloads, even boatloads and trainloads, the world will get the message," claimed Charles Pasqua, the hardline Cabinet Minister in charge of security and immigration affairs. "We will close our frontiers." Last year he announced that France would become a "zero immigration" country, a stunning reversal of its 200-year-old policy of offering asylum to those in need. That Pasqua believed it was in fact possible to halt immigration was called into doubt when he later remarked, "The problems of immigration are ahead of us and not behind us." By the year 2000, he asserted, there will be 60 million people in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia under the age of twenty and "without a future." Where else to go but France, whose television programs they can view every evening, much as Albanians goggle at Italian cat-food commercials?

The Camp of the Saints is not well known in the United States, but it has attracted some attention in predictable circles. The only English-language edition we could find came from the American Immigration Control Foundation, which, as its name suggests, campaigns for stricter policies. That is an aim also expressed by the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) in its recent publication *Crowding Out the Future: World Population Growth, U.S. Immigration, and Pressures on Natural Resources*, which presents the following argument very early on:

> A traditional moralist may object, asserting, "I am my brother's keeper." We must ask him: "And what about your children? And your children's children? What about the children of your neighbor next door? Must we subdivide and distribute our patrimony among the children of all the world?" Americans are already outnumbered twenty-to-one by the rest of the world. Our grandchildren will be outnumbered even more. Must we condemn them to the poverty of an absolutely equal distribution? How would that benefit them or the descendants of other people?
>
> Total poverty can be avoided only if people agree that the ancient admonition "Charity begins at home" is still the best guide to philanthropic action.

The Washington Times is also strongly in the "let's regain control of our borders" camp, and its staff writers and op-ed contributors find reference to Raspail particularly useful in attacking the United States' liberal immigration policy. Illegal immigrants caught coming by boat—Chinese, Haitians—make for especially neat comparisons, and nowadays the language is as blunt as Raspail's own. "Not since Genghis Khan rode out of the Asian steppes has the West—Europe as well as the United States—encountered such an alien invasion," the *Washington Times* columnist Samuel Francis has written. His fellow columnist Paul Craig Roberts predicts "a cataclysmic future." Roberts has written, "Not since the Roman Empire was overrun by illegal aliens in the fifth century has the world experienced the massive population movements of recent years." Both writers posit what others have called a growing "Third-World-ization" of America's cities, with a privileged minority increasingly besieged by a disgruntled, polyglot lumpenproletariat. (Raspail had carefully built such a situation into *The Camp of the Saints*: the night came when the "black tide," learning what had happened in Provence, rose up and overwhelmed the elegant apartments around Central Park.)

Readers made uncomfortable by all this nativist and racist opinion will no doubt find it easy to counterattack. Migrants are not usually the poorest of the poor—instead they are the ones best informed about opportunities elsewhere and able to act on them. Paul Craig Roberts's figure of an "estimated" three million illegal aliens who find their way into the United States *each year* is much higher than other guesses we've seen. And historically, the greatest population migrations of all consisted of the tens of millions of "illegal aliens" who sailed from Europe to the Americas, Africa, and Australasia during the past 250 years; in the face of them the aboriginal inhabitants could do little but submit or be annihilated. In pointing to the reversal of that flow, Raspail was at least willing to concede that "different ones [are] on top at different times." Moreover, many economists—Julian Simon, at the University of Maryland, is one—argue that immigration gives a net boost to the United States, a position also held by the free-market paper *The Wall Street Journal*. Those who predict that immigration will become one of the hottest political issues of the 1990s may be correct; what is less certain is that Fortress America attitudes will win the day. Yet if the United States maintains a liberal policy while every other rich nation decides, like France, to do the opposite, will that not simply increase the pressures on this country's borders?

CORNUCOPIAN HOPES

LET us now get to the heart of the matter. Readers may well find Raspail's vision uncomfortable and his language vicious and repulsive, but the central message is clear: we are heading into the twenty-first century in a world consisting for the most part of a relatively small number of rich, satiated, demographically stagnant societies and a large number of poverty-stricken, resource-depleted nations whose populations are doubling every twenty-five years or less. The demographic imbalances are exacerbated by grotesque disparities of wealth between rich and poor countries. Despite the easy references that are made to our common humanity, it is difficult to believe that Switzerland, with an annual average per capita income of about $35,000, and Mali, with an average per capita income of less than $300,

are on the same planet—but Raspail's point is that *they are*, and that a combination of push and pull factors will entice desperate, ambitious Third World peasants to approach the portals of the First World in ever-increasing numbers. The pressures are now much greater than they were when Raspail wrote, not only because we've added 1.5 billion people to our planet since the early 1970s, but also, ironically, because of the global communications revolution, which projects images of Western lifestyles, consumer goods, and youth culture across the globe. Ambitious peasants no longer need a messianic untouchable to urge them to leave by boat for Europe; they see the inducements every day on their small black-and-white television sets.

Is all this gloom and doom justified? What about rosier visions of the future? What about the good news? The apocalyptic literature appears to be at odds with an equally large array of writings, chiefly by free-market economists and consultants, that proclaim a brave new world of ever-greater production, trade, wealth, and standards of living for all. In these portrayals of "the coming global boom," a combination of market forces, diminished government interference, ingenious technologies, and the creation of a truly universal customer base will allow our planet to double or treble its income levels during the next few decades. In the view of those who believe that the global technological and communications revolution is making the world more integrated, rather than more envious, the constant modernization of the world economy is leading to a steady convergence of standards of production and living. As more and more countries open up to a borderless world, the prospects for humankind—or, at least, for those able to adapt—are steadily improving.

Yet a closer look at this cornucopian literature reveals that its focus is overwhelmingly upon the world's winners—the well-educated lawyers, management consultants, software engineers, and other "symbolic analysts" analyzed by Secretary of Labor Robert Reich—who sell their expertise at handsome prices to clients in other rich societies. To

---

LONG POINT LIGHT

Long Point's apparitional
this warm spring morning,
the strand a blur of sandy light,

and the square white
of the lighthouse—separated from us
by the bay's ultramarine

as if it were nowhere
we could ever go—gleams
like a tower's ghost, hazing

into the rinsed blue of March,
our last outpost in the huge
indetermination of sea.

It seems cheerful enough,
in the strengthening sunlight,
fixed point accompanying our walk

along the shore. Sometimes I think
it's the where-we-will-be,
only not yet, like some visible outcropping

of the afterlife. In the dark
its deeper invitations emerge:
green witness at night's end,

flickering margin of horizon,
marker of safety and limit.
But limitless, the way it calls us,

and where it seems to want us
to come. And so I invite it
into the poem, to speak,

and the lighthouse says:
Here is the world you asked for,
gorgeous and opportune,

here is nine o'clock, harbor-wide,
and a glinting code: promise and warning.
The morning's the size of heaven.

What will you do with it?

—MARK DOTY

the extent that they consider the situation in the Third World, the cornucopian writers typically point to the model minority of global politics—the East Asians. The techno-liberals pay hardly any attention to the mounting human distress in Calcutta or Nicaragua or Liberia, and no wonder: were they to consider the desperate plight of the poorest two *billion* beings on our planet, their upbeat messages would sound less plausible.

Our global optimists might consider Robert D. Kaplan's horrific analysis, in the February, 1994, *Atlantic Monthly*, of the collapse of entire societies across West Africa. With governments losing control of any areas they cannot intimidate through their armies and police, groups of unemployed young men plundering travelers, AIDS and tuberculosis joining malaria to kill people in their prime, forests cut down and topsoil washed away, the region increasingly looks like strife-torn, plague-ridden medieval Europe. Even *The Economist*, claiming to detect "a flicker of light" in Africa amid the gloom, admits that if the sub-Saharan countries did grow at the (overoptimistic) rates recently predicted by the World Bank, "Africans would have to wait another 40 years to clamber back to the incomes they had in the mid-1970s. Exclude Nigeria, and the wait would last a century." What *The Economist* did not ask was whether the more than a billion and a half Africans likely to be living in 2035 will be content to watch the Northern Hemisphere grow and prosper while they themselves struggle to attain the same standard of living their great-grandparents had.

It is often argued that Africa is a special case (the Third World's Third World, as the saying goes), although Kaplan's more general point is that the same combination of rapid population growth, mass unemployment among youth, environmental devastation, and social collapse is to be seen, in a less acute form, everywhere from central China to the Euphrates Valley. Reportedly the State Department has sent copies of Kaplan's article to many embassies and missions abroad; the Pentagon prefers Martin Van Creveld's grim portrayal of future chaos and ethnic conflict, *The Transformation of War* (1991)—to which Kaplan's article pays tribute—as recommended reading for its service officers. Perhaps the most significant thing about these writings is their assumption that the demographically driven breakdown of order will not be confined to one continent but will be global in its manifestations—precisely what Raspail sought to convey in his stark account of swarms of immigrants moving out of Jakarta, Karachi, and Conakry.

If the problem is global, it is not all of a piece. There is a world of difference between, say, Mexican immigrants searching for a better life and Rwandan refugees fleeing a grisly death. But the most relevant divide is not between migrants and refugees—we will be seeing a lot more of both—but rather between what they lack and what we have to offer. Regardless of whether it is in an increasingly resentful American labor market or an overcrowded relief camp, the West will be hard put to provide answers to the burgeoning problem.

The techno-liberals are right to draw attention to the fact that virtually all the factors of production—capital, assembly, knowledge, management—have become globalized, moving across national boundaries in the form of investments, consulting expertise, new plants, patents, and so on. What they ignore is that one factor of production has not been similarly liberated: labor. Even the most outré proponent of free-market principles shrinks from arguing that any number of people should be free to go anywhere they like on the planet. This irony—or, better, this double standard—is not unnoticed by the spokespeople of poorer countries, who charge that while the North presses for the unshackling of capital flows, assembly, goods, and services, it firmly resists the liberalization of the global labor market, and that behind the ostensible philanthropic concern about world demographic trends lies a deep fear that the white races of the world will be steadily overwhelmed by everyone else.

NUMBERS COUNT

It is impossible to isolate population growth from the economy, environment, politics, and culture of each country to prove that it causes external migration—though it is suggestive that Haiti and Rwanda have about the highest fertility rates in Latin America and Africa. What cannot be contested is that the sheer size of other countries that are "at risk" will make international migration a problem of ever greater magnitude. Similarly, in broad figures the future pattern of global population increases is not in dispute. At present the earth contains approximately 5.7 billion people and is adding to that total by approximately 93 million a year. It is possible to estimate the rough totals of world population as the next century unfolds: by 2025 the planet will contain approximately 8.5 billion people. The pace of growth is expected to taper off, so the total population may stabilize at around 10 or 11 billion people by perhaps 2050, although some estimates are much larger. By the second quarter of the coming century India may well rival China as the world's most populous country—with 1.4 billion to China's 1.5 billion inhabitants—and many other countries in the Third World are also expected to contain vastly expanded numbers of people: Indonesia 286 million, Nigeria 281 million, Pakistan 267 million, Brazil 246 million, Mexico 150 million, and so on.

Of the many implications of this global trend, four stand out—at least with respect to our inquiry. The first and most important is that 95 percent of the twofold increase in the world's population expected before the middle of the next century will occur in poor countries, especially those least equipped to take the strain. Second, although globally the relative share of human beings in poverty is expected to shrink, in absolute numbers there will be far more poor peo-

ple on earth in the early twenty-first century than ever before, unless serious intervention occurs. Third, within the Third World a greater and greater percentage of the population is drifting from the countryside into gigantic shanty-cities. Even by the end of this decade São Paulo is expected to contain 22.6 million people, Bombay 18.1 million, Shanghai 17.4 million, Mexico City 16.2 million, and Calcutta 12.7 million—all cities that run the risk of becoming centers of mass poverty and social collapse. (Right now there are 143,000 people per square mile in Lagos and 130,000 per square mile in Jakarta, as compared with 23,700 per square mile in the five boroughs of New York.) And fourth, these societies are increasingly adolescent in composition—in Kenya in 1985, to take an extreme case, 52 percent of the population was under fifteen—and the chances that their resource-poor governments will be able to provide education and jobs for hundreds of millions of teenagers are remote. In many North African cities unemployment rates among youth range from 40 to 70 percent, providing highly combustible levels of frustration among young men who turn with interest to the anti-Northern messages of fundamentalist mullahs or, equally significant, to tempting televised portrayals of European lifestyles.

THE only solution is to persuade our political leaders to recognize the colossal, interconnected nature of our global problem and to strain every element of our human ingenuity, resourcefulness, and energy to slow down, or if possible reverse, the buildup of worldwide demographic and environmental pressures.

Regardless of the rosy prospects for East Asia, the gaps between rich and poor countries—between Europe and Africa, between North America and Central America—are widening, not closing; and, as Raspail bluntly put it, numbers do count. The southern European states of Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Greece, whose combined populations, it is estimated, will increase by a mere 4.5 million between 1990 and 2025, lie close to North African countries—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt—whose populations are expected to grow by 107 million in the same period. The population of the United States is expected to rise by 29 percent by 2025, while its southern neighbors Mexico and Guatemala may grow by 63 percent and 135 percent respectively. Together Europe and North America, which contained more than 22 percent of the world's population in 1950, will contain less than 10 percent by 2025.

In any case, even if tremendous economic progress were to be made over the next few decades in some of the poor regions of the globe, the result, ironically, would also challenge the West, as the economic and political balances of power swung toward countries that, on current evidence (the 1993 human-rights conference in Vienna, the Singapore caning), will actively resist cultural homogenization. Kishore Mahbubani, the deputy secretary of Singapore's Foreign Ministry, recently suggested as much when he pointed to a "siege mentality" in the West, affirming that "power is shifting among civilizations." "Simple arithmetic demonstrates Western folly," he wrote. "The West has 800 million people; the rest make up almost 4.7 billion. . . . no Western society would accept a situation where 15 percent of its population legislated for the remaining 85 percent." Westerners' "fatal flaw," according to Mahbubani, is "an inability to conceive that the West may have developed structural weaknesses in its core value systems and institutions." He added, "The West is bringing about its relative decline by its own hand." It is probably still premature to predict when China will overtake the United States as the world's largest economy, but it is undeniable that a shift in material power toward Asia is under way. Raspail's "seven hundred million whites" may well confront two very different challenges by early next century: Africa's collapse and Asia's rise.

Perhaps the global problem of the early twenty-first century is basically this: that across our planet a number of what might be termed demographic-technological fault lines are emerging, between fast-growing, adolescent, resource-poor, undercapitalized, and undereducated populations on one side and technologically inventive, demographically moribund,

and increasingly nervous rich societies on the other. The fault line central to *The Camp of the Saints* lies along the Mediterranean, but it is easy to point to several others, from the Rio Grande to central Asia. One of the most interesting lines of all runs right through China, dividing most of the coastal provinces from the interior. How those on the two sides of these widening regional or intercontinental fissures are to relate to each other early in the next century dwarfs every other issue in global affairs.

If one accepts that this is our biggest long-term challenge, then the inadequacies of simplistic, knee-jerk responses assume great importance. The zero-immigration policies of France and Japan do nothing to affect tilting population balances and probably increase the resentment of these countries' poorer neighbors, but denying that migration is an international problem, as some American liberals do, invites the possibility that a continuing (and growing) flow of immigrants will place even greater strains on this country's social and cultural politics.

Yet what are the alternatives? Even if we wished to alter demographic balances, is there any acceptable prospect of doing so? When Raspail said, obliquely, that our "present moral principles" were dooming the West, was he really getting at the idea that rich societies could expect to preserve the status quo only if they were prepared to use any means necessary to cut global population? It is easy to see where that logic leads. To take but one of the more extreme examples, a Finnish philosopher has become a best-selling writer in his country by arguing that the world can continue to be habitable only if a few billion human beings are eliminated; another world war would therefore be "a happy occasion for the planet."

Some would argue that we must reverse the decline of Western populations, and that any people that falls below the replacement fertility rate (2.1 children per woman) is committing demographic suicide. This is a sensitive topic. Quite apart from environment-oriented objections to a rise in the birth rates of rich societies (the average American or European baby will consume in its lifetime hundreds of times as many resources as the average Chadian or Haitian baby), there are simply too many social and cultural obstacles to reversing a declining national birth rate. Japanese and American politicians who bemoan the failure of "bright, well-educated women" to bear enough children have been noticeably unsuccessful in their campaigns. Perhaps, then, we should just accept that the global demographic imbalances are so huge that nothing can be done to affect them, and, like the old professor in Raspail's book, simply hunker down and survey the impending invasion through a spyglass.

The only serious alternative, it seems to us, is simultaneously to persuade our political leaders to recognize the colossal, interconnected nature of our global problem and to strain every element of our human ingenuity, resourcefulness, and energy to slow down, or if possible reverse, the buildup of worldwide demographic and environmental pressures. Such an effort cannot rest upon a single policy, such as urging Third World countries to reduce their population growth; it must instead be part of a major North-South package wherein all parties, in accepting changes to their present policies, are persuaded to see that a comprehensive and coordinated response is the only way forward. If political leaders and their advisers cannot come up with some sort of win-win solution, in which every country can see benefits for itself, serious reforms are unlikely and humankind's prospects by 2025 may indeed be bleak.

A NEW (NORTH-SOUTH) DEAL

WHAT elements should be included in such a package? In offering some answers to that question, it is important to stress that nothing that follows is either new or impossible. In theory, there are lots of things that the global community could do to improve its condition, and such ideas have been around for decades, if not longer. The real problem has been the lack of political commitment to change, or, to put it more charitably, the tendency of national leaders and delegates to see only the elements of the package that call for sacrifices on their part—the North to contribute more money, the South to accept environmental monitoring—and to ignore both the individual and the collective gains that could flow from a linked set of agreements between developed and developing countries. If that mindset can be changed, so can everything else.

• What if, for example, the rich Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries actually fulfilled their quarter-century-old promise to allocate 0.7 percent of gross domestic product annually to development aid, instead of (for the most part) falling far short of that target? The United States, with one of the poorest records of all, now contributes less than 0.2 percent of GDP each year. What if the OECD countries were bold enough to contribute one percent of GDP each year? As a kind of global insurance premium—protecting not only poorer countries but also ourselves from the worst consequences of mismatched demographics and development—this is not very much. In fact, if viewed more positively, as an investment in the future of the people of our planet, it is a modest sum indeed.

• What if this money could actually be spent efficiently and appropriately, instead of falling into the wrong hands and being devoted to the wrong purposes? For the fact is that international-aid agencies have (again for the most part) acquired a reputation for investing in ambitious, technologically inappropriate schemes, channeling funds to highly paid consultants and local leaders and ignoring the ideas of indigenous inhabitants, while poor countries themselves have provided far too many examples of corrupt, oppressive, or

simply inefficient regimes that have squandered their treasuries and their resources for years. Extra development aid has no chance of succeeding unless it is accompanied by vastly improved accounting and supervisory techniques. However, the failings of present regimes and of previous aid programs are no reason not to continue to try to assist development; if anything, these provide compelling reasons to redouble—and reform—our efforts.

• What if we were able to use some of this money to employ the tens of thousands of scientists and engineers now released from Cold War–related research to seek solutions to our global environmental problems? Such solutions might include a truly dramatic breakthrough in solar or photovoltaic energy production, achieving such a drop in the cost of sun-powered energy that it could be made available to the peoples of Asia and Africa, and could wean them from their reliance on wood, oil, coal, and other fossil fuels. The enhanced technology might also include the mass production of small solar ovens, sufficient to cook a village's meals without a daily search for firewood. The results of breakthroughs in biotech agriculture (new disease-resistant and heat-resistant crop strains) might be shared without requiring large patent and user fees from poor nations.

• What if it were possible to respond to the desire of hundreds of millions of women in Third World countries for access to safe and inexpensive contraceptives, to allow them to stabilize family size and concentrate on nurturing their existing children? The costs involved are not enormous—a few billions of dollars rather than hundreds of billions—and when such programs are administered through women's groups and supported by enlightened governments, they can have a dramatic effect on fertility rates, as has recently been demonstrated in Kenya and Egypt. (Such programs ought to be kept apart from the issue of abortion, which is much more problematic politically and which, in any case, is used disproportionately in many Third World countries to prevent the birth of girls.)

• Since order is the precondition of social betterment, what if, instead of the nations of the world having to respond to or rebuff the United Nations Secretary General's pleas to send troops for peacekeeping purposes to one crisis spot after another, some of the more useful schemes to improve the UN's capacities—from creating a military staff to establishing "ready-to-go" units—were agreed upon by the Security Council nations and implemented in the next year or two?

• And what if, as a separate yet parallel measure to reduce violence, a much more serious effort were made to stem the flow of arms (simple guns as well as sophisticated systems) into Third World countries—arms that are manufactured primarily by the five permanent members of the Security Council?

• What if, as a contribution to reducing the forecast clash of civilizations, the United Nations strove to promote agreement not just in the important sphere of human rights but also on the equally important issue of recognizing cultural diversity, both within countries and between technologically dominant cultures and the rest of the globe? This is not a call for a revival of the crude and ideologically inept UNESCO programs of the early 1980s. We would, however, argue that a genuine North-South entente is unlikely unless Third World countries grow less fearful that their cultures will be swallowed up by the technologies and material way of life of richer nations, especially the United States. Cultural arrogance bedevils our planet and gives rise to many conflicts and antagonisms, just as it suffuses *The Camp of the Saints*. If the relationship between North and South is to be improved significantly, a set of norms (and agreements to disagree) must be established that all or at least most nations can abide by.

Various other matters—from measures to enhance the status of women in Third World countries to improved coordination between UN agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions—might also be incorporated into a North-South package of linked agreements. As it is, any one of the aforementioned elements—more aid more efficiently allocated, appropriate and accessible technological advances, reduced fertility rates, enhanced peacekeeping powers, acceptance of cultural diversity—might by itself make all the difference, though we cannot know which one that might be.

DONNE'S ISLAND

How likely are any of these changes to come about during the next few years? This is the critical period if we hope to change the socio-economic condition of humankind in the early decades of the twenty-first century. A global idealist could point to some promising indicators even in the midst of our present woes. There is a growing awareness in at least a few rich societies (the Scandinavian countries, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada) that a serious effort has to be made to improve the lot of poorer countries and protect their environments. There are the impressive economic successes of most of the nations of East Asia, which are raising the quality of life of hundreds of millions of people and which, provided that further environmental damage can be avoided (a big proviso, admittedly), offer a possible model to Third World countries. The end of the Cold War, while certainly not signaling the start of any new world order, has at least permitted the UN Security Council to function as it was designed to. International agencies, especially those within the UN but also innumerable nongovernmental ones, are actively pursuing policies that not only are more realistic than those of previous decades (for example, no more World Bank loans for giant dam projects) but also reveal a greater awareness of the interconnectedness of agendas for real improvement: economic growth, environmental protection, population control, the status of women, migration, jobs, investment, education, human rights, and democracy are all related considerations in any serious effort to improve the condition of the poorer half of humanity. And at least some commentators are openly ar-

guing that the need for concerted action ought to be presented no longer in humanitarian-response terms (because, for example, after the fifth or sixth Ethiopian famine "aid fatigue" sets in) but in terms of a global ethic that recognizes our common human destiny and the necessity for shared stewardship of our delicate global ecosystem.

But can these sporadic signs of promise really prevail against the lack of effective political leadership, the turning inward of so many rich societies, the problem of global structural unemployment in an age of intensified modernization, the resistance to many programs to encourage the limitation of family size (even when the thorny issue of abortion is excluded), and the widespread lassitude and even downright hostility that exist in many quarters toward the idea of helping the world's two billion poorest? As Zaire, Rwanda, and Yemen follow Somalia, Sudan, Bosnia, Georgia, and Tajikistan into bloody chaos and ethnic wars, while Boutros Boutros-Ghali finds fewer and fewer nations willing to contribute peacekeeping forces, can one seriously expect significant reforms soon? With the political leadership of the world's most powerful nation deeply divided over scandals and parochial issues, with its public evincing exhaustion in respect to international problems, and with irresponsible though powerful senators blaming the United Nations for every peacekeeping mishap (such as the deaths of U.S. Rangers in Somalia), is it not naive and unrealistic to hope for a North-South package of reforms along the lines suggested above?

Perhaps it is. Perhaps, as some observers fear, we shall have to observe truly awful and widespread societal destruction—the collapse of continents rather than single states; oceans of dead rather than mere rivers—with repercussions that significantly affect rich countries as well as poor before our public and our political leadership finally appreciate that an intelligent and far-reaching response is unavoidable, and that, tempting though it is to turn away from the world, too large a proportion of humankind is heading into the twenty-first century in too distressed a condition for any nation to imagine that it can avoid the larger consequences. We will have to convince a suspicious public and cynical politicians that a serious package of reform measures is not fuzzy liberal idealism but a truer form of realism. It is simply a matter of perspective—or of timing. Doing little or nothing at present seems the more practical course; yet given the pace and intensity of global change, the richer societies need to recognize that John Donne's reasoning applies on an international scale. "No man is an island, entire of itself"—with massacres, social collapse, and migrations occurring across our planet on a weekly basis, do not ask "for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."

These are, of course, idealistic arguments, and just how many Americans, Europeans, and citizens of other privileged countries will heed the tocsin is unclear. For the remainder of this century, we suspect, the debate will rage over what and how much should be done to improve the condition of humankind in the face of the mounting pressures described here and in other analyses. One thing seems to us fairly certain. However the debate unfolds, it is, alas, likely that a large part of it—on issues of population, migration, rich versus poor, race against race—will have advanced little beyond the considerations and themes that are at the heart of one of the most disturbing novels of the late twentieth century, Jean Raspail's *The Camp of the Saints*. It will take more than talk to prove the prophet wrong. ❦

SECOND OPINION

OPTIMISM AND OVERPOPULATION

Well, yes, the West must pay attention to the population problems of the Third World. But what sort of attention? The conventional wisdom holds that economic development —and thus economic aid from the West—is the key to curbing population growth in poor nations. Not true, says **VIRGINIA ABERNETHY**

OVERPOPULATION afflicts most countries but remains primarily a local problem—an idea that this article will seek to explain. Reproductive restraint, the solution, is also primarily local; it grows out of a sense that resources are shrinking. Under these circumstances individuals and couples often see limitation of family size as the most likely path to success.

Many scholars, ancient and modern, have known that actual family size is very closely linked to the number of children people want. Paul Demeny, of The Population Council, is exceptionally clear on this, and the World Bank economist Lant Pritchett asserts that 85–95 percent of actual fertility rates are explained by parents' desires—not by mere availability of contraceptives. Pritchett writes that "the impressive declines in fertility observed in the contemporary world are due almost entirely to equally impressive declines in desired fertility." Of Paul Kennedy's contention, in his book *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century*, that "the only practical way to ensure a decrease in fertility rates, and thus in population growth, is to introduce cheap and reliable forms of birth control," Pritchett says, "We could not have invented a clearer and more articulate statement of the view we argue is wrong."

WORKS CITED

Abu-Laban, Yasmeen. 1998. Welcome/STAY OUT: The contradiction of Canadian integration and immigration policies at the millenium. Canadian Ethnic Studies, 30 (3): 190-211.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.

Appadurai, Arjun. 1988. Putting hierarchy in its place. Cultural Anthropology 3 (1): 36-49.

Arendt, Hannah. 1973. Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Asian Canadian website. www.asian.ca. Accessed 12/22/00.

Atwood, J. Brian. 1994. From the cold war to chaos and cholera (development or recolonisation?). New Perspectives Quarterly 11 (4): 21-23.

Balibar, Etienne. 1991. The nation-form: History and ideology. In Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. New York: Verso, 86-106.

Barber, Benjamin. 1996. Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World. New York: Ballantine.

Basok, Tanya. 1996. Refugee policy: globalisation, radical challenge, or state control? Studies in Political Economy 50, Summer: 133-166.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1993. Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Cameron, Deborah. 1998. Gender, language, and discourse: A review essay. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 23 (4): 945-973.

Campbell, David. 1992. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Canadian Council for Refugees. www.net~ccr. Accessed 8/7/00.

Chimni, B.S. 1998. The geopolitics of refugee studies: A view from the South. Journal of Refugee Studies. 11 (4): 350-374.

Chomsky, Noam. 1994. An island lies bleeding. Guardian 2, 5 July, 6-9.

Cirtautas, Claudius Kazys. 1957. The Refugee: A Psychological Study. Boston, Mass.: Meador.

Connelly, Matthew and Paul Kennedy. 1994. Must it be the West against the Rest? The Atlantic Monthly 274 (6): 61-79.

Connelly, Matthew and William Hitchcock. 2000. From War to Peace: Altered Strategic Landscapes in the Twentieth Century. New Haven: Yale University.

Crisp, Jeff. 1999. Who has counted the refugees?: UNHCR and the politics of numbers. Working Paper No. 12, Policy Research Unit, UNHCR. Geneva: UNHCR.

Dalby, Simon. 1990. Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics. London: Pinter.

Dalby, Simon. 1994. Gender and critical geopolitics: Reading security discourse in the new world disorder. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12 (5): 595-612.

Dalby, Simon. 1997. The threat from the South: Global justice and environmental security. In David Deudney and Richard Matthew (eds.), Contested Ground: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Dalby, Simon. 1998a. Geopolitics and global security: Culture, identity, and the 'pogo' syndrome. In Gearóid Ó'Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), Rethinking Geopolitics. New York: Routledge, 295-313.

Dalby, Simon. 1998b. Geopolitics, knowledge and power at the end of the century. In Gearóid Ó'Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader. New York: Routledge, 305-312.

Dalby, Simon and Gearóid Ó'Tuathail (eds.). 1994. Special Issue: Critical geopolitics. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12 (5): 513-613.

Dalby, Simon and Gearóid Ó'Tuathail (eds.). 1996. Special issue: Critical geopolitics. Political Geography 15 (6): 451-661.

Deleuze and Guattari. 1997. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Dodds, Klaus-John. 1993. Geopolitics, cartography and the state in South America. Political Geography 12 (4): 361-381.

Dodds, Klaus-John. 1994. Geopolitics and foreign policy: recent developments in Anglo-American political geography and international relations. Progress in Human Geography 18 (2): 186-208.

Dodds, Klaus-John and James Derrick Sidaway. 1994. Locating critical geopolitics. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12 (5): 515-524.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1996a. Immigration and national identity: Constructing the nation. Review of International Studies 22 (3): 235-255.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1996b. The double-writing of statecraft: Exploring state responses to illegal immigration. Alternatives 21 (2): 171-189.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1996c. Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations. Borderlines, Volume 5. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Duncan, James. 1993. Sites of representation: Place, time and the discourse of the Other. In James Duncan and David Ley (eds.), place/culture/representation. London: Routledge, 39-56.

Eisenstein, Zillah. 1996. Stop stomping on the rest of us. Retrieving publicness from the privatisation of the globe. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 4 (1): 59-96.

Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

Enloe, Cynthia. 1993. The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

Fair, Jo Ellen, and Lisa Parks. 1998. Inspecting African Bodies: Television News Coverage and Satellite Imaging of Rwandan Refugees. Paper presented at the Sixth Annual African Studies Consortium Workshop, October 2, 1998. Cited with permission of the authors, 1-23.

Farmanfarmaian, Abouali. 1998. Did you measure up? The role of race and sexuality in the Gulf War. In Gearóid Ó'Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader. New York: Routledge, 286-293.

Ferguson, James. 1997. Parodoxes of sovereignty and independence: "Real" and "pseudo" nation-states and the depoliticisation of poverty. In Karin Fog Olwig and Kirsten Hatrup (eds.), Siting Culture: The Shifting Anthropological Object. London: Routledge, 123-141

Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, Michel. 1984. What is an author? In Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon Books, 101-120.

Frye, Joanne. 1986. Living Stories, Telling Lives: Women and the Novel in Contemporary Experience. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. The end of history? The National Interest 16, Summer: 3-18.

Furedi, Frank. 1997. The moral condemnation of the South. In Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (eds.), Globalisation and the South. New York: St. Martin's Press, 76-89.

Ghosh, Amitav. 1994. The global reservation: Notes toward an ethnography of international peacekeeping. Cultural Anthropology 9 (3): 412-422.

Gibson-Graham, Julie-Kathie. 1996/97. Querying globalisation. Rethinking MARXISM 9 (1): 1-27.

Gill, Rosalind. 1995. Relativism, reflexivity and politics: Interrogating discourse analysis from a feminist perspective. In Sue Wilkinson and Celia Kitzinger (eds.), Feminism and Discourse: Psychological Perspectives. London: Sage, 165-186.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Grovogui, Siba N'Zatioula. 1998. Rituals of power: Theory, languages and vernaculars of international relations. Alternatives 23 (4): 499-528.

Gupta, Akhil and James Ferguson. 1992. Beyond "culture": Space, identity, and the politics of difference. Cultural Anthropology 7 (1): 63-79.

Hall, Stuart. 1997. The local and the global: Globalisation and ethnicity. In Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufi, and Ella Shohat (eds.), Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 173-187.

Haraway, Donna. 1988. Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. Feminist Studies 14 (3): 575-599.

Haraway, Donna. 1991. A cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. In Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs andWomen: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge, 149-181.

Haraway, Donna 1997. Modest_Witness @Second Millenium.FemaleMan Meets OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience. New York: Routledge.

Harding, Sandra. 1987. Is there a feminist method? In Sandra Harding (ed.), Feminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1-14.

Harnett, Cindy. 1999. Go Home, The Times Colonist, August 13, A1.

Harvey, Lee. 1990. Critical Social Research. London: Unwin Hyman.

Hathaway, James. 1991. Reconceiving refugee law as human rights protection. Journal of Refugee Studies 4 (2): 113-131.

Hathaway, James. 1994. Commentary. In Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin and James Hollifield (eds.), Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 49-51.

Hein, Jeremy. 1993. Refugees, immigrants, and the state. Annual Review of Sociology 19: 43-59.

Hoffman, Stanley. 1996. The politics and ethics of military intervention. Survival 37 (4): 29-51.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. The clash of civilisations? Foreign Affairs 72 (3): 22-49.

Huysmans, Jef. 1995. Migrants as a security problem: Dangers of 'securitising' societal issues. In Robert Miles and Dieter Thrandardt (eds). Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion. London: Pinter, 53-72.

Hyndman, Jennifer. 2001. Towards a feminist geopolitics. The Canadian Geographer 45 (2), forthcoming 2001.

Jackson, Stevi. 1992. The amazing deconstructing woman. Trouble and Strife 25: 25-31.

Jackson, Peter and Jan Penrose (eds.). 1993. Constructions of Race, Place and Nation. London: University College London Press.

Kaplan, Robert. 1994. The coming anarchy. The Atlantic Monthly 273 (2): 44-76.

Katz, Cindi. 1992. All the world is staged: Intellectuals and the projects of ethnography. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 10 (5): 495-510.

Kennedy, David M. 1996. The price of immigration: Can we still afford to be a nation immigrants? A view from the perspectives of history and economics. The Atlantic Monthly 278 (5): 51-68.

Kirby, Vicki. 1993. Feminisms, reading, postmodernisms: Rethinking complicity. In Sneja Gunew and Anna Yeatman (eds.), Feminism and the Politics of Difference. Halifax: Fernwood, 20-34.

Kirby, Sandra L. and Kate McKenna. 1989. Experience Research Social Change: Methods from the Margins. Toronto: Garamond Press.

Kobayashi, Audrey. 1997. The paradox of difference and diversity (or, why the threshold keeps moving). In John Paul Jones III, Heidi J. Nast and Susan M. Roberts (eds.), Thresholds in Feminist Geography: Difference, Methodology, Representation. Lanham, Mass.: Rowman and Littlefield, 3-9.

Kofman, Eleonore and Linda Peake. 1990. Into the 1990s: A gendered agenda for political geography. Political Geography 9 (4): 311-334.

Kumin, Judith. 2000. Between sympathy and anger: How open will Canada's door be? United States Committee for Refugees website, www. refugees.org/world/articles/wrs00_sympathy. Accessed 7/27/00.

Lazarus, Neil. 1991. Doubting the new world order: Marxism, realism, and the claims of postmodernist social theory. differences 3 (3): 94-138

Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The Production of Space. Translated by D. Nicholson Smith. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Lester, Toby. 1996. Beyond "The Coming Anarchy". Sidebar. The Atlantic Unbound, www.theatlantic.com/issues/96aug/proport/kapsid.htm. Accessed 9/23/99.

Loescher Gil. 1993. Beyond Charity: International Co-operation and the Global Refugee Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Luke, Timothy. 1994. Placing power/siting space: The politics of global and local in the new world order. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12 (5): 613-628.

Luke, Timothy. 1995. New world order or neo-world orders: Power, politics and ideology in informationalising glocalities. In Michael Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Roberston (eds.), Global Modernities. London: Sage, 91-107.

Luke, Timothy W., and Gearóid Ó'Tuathail. 1997. On videocameralistics: the geopolitics of failed states, the CNN International and (UN)governmentality. Review of International Political Economy 4 (4): 709-733.

Luke, Timothy W. 1998. Running Flat Out on the Road Ahead: Nationality, Sovereignty, and Territoriality in the World of the Information Superhighway. In Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), Rethinking Geopolitics. Routledge, 274-294

Mackinder, Halford. 1919. Democratic Ideals and Reality. New York: Henry Holt.

Malkki, Liisa. 1992. National geographic: The rooting of peoples and the territorialisation of national identity among scholars and refugees. Cultural Anthropology 7 (1): 24-44.

Malkki, Liisa. 1994. Citizens of humanity: Internationalism and the imagined community of nations. Diaspora 3 (1): 41-68.

Malkki, Liisa. 1995. Refugees and exile: From "refugee studies" to the national order of things. Annual Review of Anthropology 24: 495-523.

Malkki, Liisa. 1996. Speechless emissaries: Refugees, humanitarianism, and dehistoricisation. Cultural Anthropology 11 (3): 377-404.

Marchand, Marianne. 1996. Reconceptualising gender and development in an era of globalisation. Millenium: Journal of International Studies 25 (3): 577-603.

Martin, David A. 1988. Introduction. In David A. Martin (ed.), The New Asylum-Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Pulishers, 1-16.

Maurer, Bill. 1998. Cyberspatial sovereignties: Offshore finance, digital cash, and the limits of liberalism. Indiana Journal of Global Studies 5 (2): 493-520.

Maynes, Charles. 1995. The new pessimism. Foreign Policy 100, Fall: 33-49.

McDowell, Linda. 1992. Multiple voices: Speaking from inside and outside 'the project'. Antipode 24 (1): 56-72.

McGrane, Bernard. 1989. Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other. New York: Columbia University Press.

Meijer, Maaike. 1993. Countering textual violence: On the critique of representation and the importance of teaching its methods. Women's Studies International Forum 16 (4): 367-378.

Meirsheirmer, John. 1990. Why we will soon miss the Cold War. The Atlantic Monthly 266 (2): 35-50.

Miller, Nancy K. 1991. Getting personal: Autobiography as cultural criticism. In Nancy K. Miller (ed.), Getting Personal: Feminist Occasions and Other Autobiographical Acts. London: Routledge, 1-30.

Minh-ha, Trinh T. 1997. Not you/like you: Postcolonial women and the interlocking questions of identity and difference. In Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufi, and Ella Shohat (eds.), Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 415-419.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1991. Under western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. In Chandra Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres (eds.), Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 51-80.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1992. Feminist encounters: Locating the politics of experience. In Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips (eds.), Destabilising Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 74-92.

Moss, Pamela. 2001. Writing one's life. In Pamela Moss (ed.), Placing Autobiography in Geography. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1-21.

Moss, Pamela and Margo Matwychuck. 2000. Beyond speaking as an "as a" and stating the "etc.": Engaging a praxis of difference. Frontiers 21 (3): 82-104.

Mouffe, Chantal. 1992: Feminism, citizenship and radical democratic politics. In Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds.), Feminists Theorise the Political. New York: Routledge, 369-84.

Mouffe, Chantal. 1995. Post-Marxism: democracy and identity. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 13 (3): 259-265.

Mufti, Aamir and Ella Shohat. 1997. Introduction. In Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufi, and Ella Shohat (eds.), Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1-12.

Murphy, Cullen. 1994. A history of *The Atlantic Monthly*. From a presentation given by Cullen Murphy, managing editor, in The Atlantic Unbound, www.theatlantic.com. Accessed 12/10/99.

Nast, Heidi J. 1994. Women in the field: Critical feminist methodologies and theoretical perspectives. Professional Geographer 46 (1): 54-66.

Nezer, Melanie. 1999. The Puebla Process: U.S. migration controls moves south of the border. United States Committee for Refugees website, www.refugees.org/world/articles/wrs99_migrationcontrols.htm. Accessed 12/10/99.

Nightline. August 9 1994. Ted Koppel, ABC.

Noble, P. 1988. Refugees and other migrants viewed with a legal eye - or how to fight confusion. In Kirsten Holst Peterson and Anna Rutherford (eds.), Displaced Persons. Sydney, Australia: Dangaroo, 18-31.

Onuf, Nicholas. 1991. Sovereignty: Outline of a conceptual history. Alternatives 16 (4): 425-446.

Opie, Ann. 1992. Qualitative research, appropriation of the "other", and empowerment. Feminist Review 40: 52-67.

Ó'Tuathail, Gearóid and J. Agnew. 1992. Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy. Political Geography 11 (2): 190-204.

Ó'Tuathail, Gearóid. 1996. Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. Borderlines, Volume 6. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Ó'Tuathail, Gearóid, and Simon Dalby. 1998. Introduction: Towards a critical geopolitics. In Gearóid Ó'Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), Rethinking Geopolitics. New York: Routledge, 1-15.

Ó'Tuathail, Gearóid. 1998. Postmodern geopolitics? The modern geopolitical imagination and beyond. In Gearóid Ó'Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), Rethinking Geopolitics. New York: Routledge, 16-38.

Ó'Tuathail, Gearóid. 1999. A strategic sign: The geopolitical significance of 'Bosnia' in U.S. foreign policy. Environment and Planning D 17 (5): 515-533.

Patten, Steve. 1996. Preston Manning's populism: Constructing the common-sense of the common people. Studies in Political Economy 50, Summer: 95-131.

Portes, Alejandro and M. Patricia Fernandez Kelly. 1989. Images of movement in a changing world: A review of current theories of international migration. International Review of Comparative Public Policy 1: 15-33.

Price, Patricia. 2000. No pain, no gain: Bordering the hungry new world order. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 18 (1): 91-110.

Raspail, Jean. 1973. The Camp of the Saints. Translated by Norman Shapiro. Social Contract Press.

Ray, Sangeeta. 1992. Shifting subjects shifting ground: The names and spaces of the post-colonial. Hypatia 7 (2): 188-201.

Reagon, Bernice Johnson. 1983. Coalition politics: Turning the century. In Barbara Smith (ed.), Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology. New York: Kitchen Table, Women of Colour Press, 356-368.

Retamor, Roberto Fernández. 1997. Caliban speaks five hundred years later. In Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat (eds.), Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 163-172.

Riggins, Stephen H. 1997. The rhetoric of othering. In Stephen H. Riggins (ed.), The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage, 1-30.

Ripley, William Z. 1908. Races in the United States. The Atlantic Monthly 102 (6): 745-759.

Rosaldo, Renato. 1988. Ideology, place, and people without culture. Cultural Anthropology 3 (1): 77-87.

Rose, Gillian. 1993. Geography and Gender. Oxford: Blackwell.

Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. London: Penguin.

Said, Edward. 1983. The World, the Text and the Critic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Santel, Bernhard. 1995. Loss of control: the build-up of a European migration and asylum regime. In Robert Miles and Dietrich Trandhart (eds.), Migration and European Integration. London: Pinter, 75-91.

Shacknove, Andrew. 1993. From asylum to containment. International Journal of Refugee Law 5 (4): 517-533.

Shapiro, Michael J. 1988. The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Shapiro, Michael J. 1997. Narrating the nation, unwelcoming the stranger: Anti-immigration policy in contemporary "America". Alternatives 22 (1): 1-35.

Sharp, Joanne. 1993. Publishing American identity: popular geopolitics, myth and *The Reader's Digest*. Political Geography 12 (6): 491-503.

Sharp, Joanne. 1994. Condensing Communism: Popular Geopolitics and the *Reader's Digest*. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Syracuse University.

Sharp, Joanne. 1996. Hegemony, popular culture and geopolitics: *The Reader's Digest* and the construction of danger. Political Geography 15 (6/7): 557-570.

Sharp, Joanne P. 2000. Remasculinising geo-politics? Comments on Gearoid O'Tuathail's *Critical Geopolitics*. Political Geography 19 (3): 361-364.

Sibley, David. 1995. Geographies of Exclusion. New York: Routledge.

Sidaway, James Derrick. 1994. Geopolitics, geography and 'terrorism' in the Middle East. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12 (3): 357-372.

Smith, Dorothy. 1987. The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

Smith, Neil. 2000. Is a critical geopolitics possible? Foucault, class and the vision thing. Political Geography 19 (3): 365-371.

Soguk, Nevzat. 1996. Transnational/transborder bodies: Resistance, accommodation, and exile in refugee and migration movements on the U.S.-Mexican border. In Michael Shapiro and Hayward Alker (eds.), Challenging Boundaries. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 285-325.

Sparke, Matthew. 2000. Graphing the geo in geo-political: *Critical Geopolitics* and the re-visioning of responsibility. Political Geography 19 (3): 373-380.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout. 1960. Geography and international politics in an era of revolutionary change. Journal of Conflict Resolution 4 (1): 145-161.

Stepputat, Finn. 1994. Repatriation and the politics of space: The case of the Mayan diaspora and return movement. Journal of Refugee Studies 7 (2/3): 175-185.

Tesfahuney, Mekonnen. 1998. Mobility, racism, and geopolitics. Political Geography 17 (5): 499-515.

Truman, Harry. 1947. The Truman doctrine. In Gearóid Ó'Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader. New York: Routledge, 58-61.

UNHCR. 1993. The State of the World's Refugees: the Challenge of Protection. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

UNHCR. 1997. The State of the World's Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

USCR. 1997. World Refugee Survey. New York: United States Committee for Refugees.

USCR. 1999. World Refugee Survey. New York: United States Committee for Refugees.

Wilson, Christopher P. 1983. The rhetoric of consumption: Mass-market magazines and the demise of the gentle reader, 1880-1920. In Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears (eds.), The Culture of Consumption. New York: Pantheon Books, 40-64.

Xenos, Nicholas. 1996. Refugees: The modern political condition. In Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward Alker (eds.), Challenging Boundaries. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 233-246.

Yaeger, Patricia.1996. Introduction: Narrating space. In Patricia Yaeger (ed.), The Geography of Identity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. Women, citizenship and difference, Feminist Review 57: 3-26.

Zolberg, Aristide, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo. 1989. Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

VITA

Surname: Lloyd Given names: Andrea L.

Place of Birth: Victoria, British Columbia, Canada

Education Institutions Attended:

University of Victoria	1989-1994

Degrees Awarded:

B.A., Political Science	University of Victoria	1994

PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant the right to lend my thesis to users of the University of Victoria Library, and to make single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the Library of any other university, or similar institution, on its behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or a member of the University designated by me. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis:

"Foreign Villains and Home-grown Heroes": A critical geopolitical re-reading of a neo-liberal text from *The Atlantic Monthly*

Author 

Andrea L. Lloyd
April 18, 2001