

Canadian Newspaper Coverage and Transnational Human Migration Discourses:
the 2015-2016 Migrant and Refugee Crisis in Europe

by

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Abstract

The current dissertation serves as the only Canadian media analysis of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe (RMC) of its kind, using said “crisis” as a case study of a time when migration was at the forefront of political and social debates

The project had two aims. The first was to fill in the gap in the academic literature on discursive formations of migration in Canadian media coverage. There have been a total of seven studies that examined the potential links between the Canadian media and the migratory wave that occurred in Europe in 2015–2016. Each of these focused on the so-called ‘Syrian Refugee Crisis’ (SRC) and Canada’s role in it and either briefly alluded to the events in Europe or simply ignored them altogether, which is an oversight of key contextualizing elements of the time. The current research project demonstrates that Canadian media extensively covered the events in Europe during the 2015 Federal Election and the development of the SRC. The SRC might not exist, or at least not have been developed as such nor had the political and social support it received, without the constant and sizeable media coverage of the events in Europe not the least of which are the Alan Kurdi photograph and the numerous migrant-associated terrorist attacks throughout Europe between 2015 and 2016. The second aim of this project has been to contribute to the growing body of critical scholarship linking media coverage and transnational human migration discourses, researching how media acts as a discursive actor. It has served to decipher the narratives that emanated from said coverage and how these might change over time in reaction to the events unfolding.

The project posits, therefore, that the media acts simultaneously as agent and field of discursive deliberation, whose coverage has a complex and multi-layered influence on perception and discourse creation – especially when it comes to politically charged issues such as transnational human migration. As both field and agent, media coverage thus has an indirect discursive influence on how a subject matter is constructed and acted upon. It investigated the media coverage of 4 highly read newspapers in Canada (the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, the Montreal Gazette, and the Vancouver Sun). The qualitative and quantitative approach taken by the project allowed for the content and discourse analysis to be performed organically through the constant comparison method, not the least of which came from the careful and numerous reading and re-reading of each article to decipher the key events, topics, contextualisation, and so forth.

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Notable Acronyms

AfD - Alternative for Germany

CEAS - Common European Asylum System

CJEU - Court of Justice of the European Union

ECHR - The European Convention on Human Rights

EU - European Union

GM – The Globe and Mail

GPS - Global Positioning System

IOM - International Organization for Migration

ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (DAESH)

ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (DAESH)

LGBTQ* - lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and more

MG - Montréal Gazette

MIT – Minimal Influence Thesis

MPI - Migration Policy Institute

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO - Non-governmental organization

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OHCHR - Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

PEGIDA - Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (German: Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes)

RM - Factiva search criteria for articles including: refugee, refugees, migrant, migrants, réfugié, and réfugiés

RMC - Refugee Migrant Crisis

TS - Toronto Star

UK - United Kingdom

UN - United Nations

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

VS – Vancouver Sun

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1. Introduction

The refugee and migrant crisis (RMC) in Europe, also known as the refugee crisis or the migration crisis, refers to a period in 2015 and 2016 when human migration from the Middle East and Africa toward Europe was the object of alarm, scrutiny, and debate. While this research project refers to the RMC as such, there is no consensus in the academic literature on what the RMC is or what timeline it occurred in. The international community became captivated with it in April 2015 after the sinking of five boats in the Mediterranean Sea carrying nearly 2,000 individuals who had hoped to reach Europe. This period—which arguably ended with the EU-Turkey refugee-return agreement of March 2016, when Europe agreed to pay Turkey 6 billion euros in exchange for restricting the number of migrants crossing into Europe (see, for example, Papademetriou 2017) — saw attention toward human migration raised in the media internationally. Ultimately, the RMC led to a mixture of regional and national debates about immigration, identity, and security in many parts of the world.

1.1. Research Objective & Research Questions

Academic literature supports that the media is pivotal in the creation of emotionally charged migration-related crises reflected in and broadcasted by the media, which labels instances of heightened mobility a ‘crisis’ (Hier and Greenberg 2002). According to Georgiou and Zaborowski (2017), it was the media that first referred to the 2015-2016 period as a ‘crisis,’ a label later emulated by other international actors. Indeed, migrant movements received remarkable media attention in the Summer of 2015, playing a key role in how the RMC was understood (Ambrosini et al., 2019, 12). Indeed, Beciu and colleagues (2018) observed that the media are a key factor in hyperbolization and politicisation of migration. Studies have suggested that in a general sense, the ‘mediatized’ coverage of migration-related events are often overly negative (Wallace 2018; Krzyzanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2018); with

journalists, as Gois and Faraone (2018, 139) have put it, “exploiting receiving societies’ fears and ignorance in search of audiences and profit.” The media has been found to be a platform for the spread of “anxious politics” towards migration (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), which are chiefly constructed on fears and misinformation propagated by sensationalistic media and xenophobic rhetoric, infusing migration discourses with marked elements of security (Hier and Greenberg 2002; Gois and Faraone 2018). Gois and Faraone (2018, 140) have found that the idea of a ‘migration crises’ has been promoted and employed by political elites and media alike to muster negative responses by linking migration with state (in)security, resource depletion, and cultural and religious incompatibility. Being so emotionally driven, moreover, labelling human flows as a ‘crisis’ may be counterproductive to the development of appropriate states responses. With the perception of urgency oftentimes resulting in reactionary policies, states risk sidelining everyday systemic issues as well as relevant legal frameworks, such as human rights law, to the detriment of both citizens and incoming migrants. It may lead to the de-prioritization of more thought-out and long-lasting solutions. The resulting responses may not be apt to tackle the deeper and entrenched inequalities based on class, race, gender, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, or other; and may, in fact, further entrench the inequitable power-relations at play (Menjivar, Ruiz, and Ness 2019, 43). During the RMC, media and political rhetoric frequently focused on the administrative and economic demands, as well as perceptions of refugees’ genuineness in their claims (Wallace, 2018).

Most Canadians - much like most Europeans - experienced the RMC almost exclusively through headlines, articles, and various other forms of news coverage. It was through media that Canadians were exposed to and could form an opinion on how Europe tackled the unusual influx. While social media platforms have also play a significant role in exchanging information across Europe and beyond, mainstream media’s informational role remains sizeable. Traditional (i.e., mainstream) media of

information dissemination, such as newspapers, television broadcasts, and radio, to a lesser extent, remain in the position of primacy as trusted resources for public officials and civil society to make sense of and respond to ongoing events. According to a 2017 pan-European report by the Council of Europe on the local media coverage of the RMC, it was found that the media was more “crucial than usual” during those years on three accounts (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). The first was the scale and speed of events that occurred throughout the RMC, followed by “the lack of familiarity with the new arrivals, their histories and the reasons for their plight meant that many Europeans depended exclusively on the media to understand what was happening;” and lastly the need to analyse media coverage of ‘the refugee/migration crisis’ is critical to understanding the “narratives of ‘the crisis’.” Whether the RMC media coverage and the resulting narratives truly reflected the events is up to debate. Some scholars, such as Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak (2018) and Triandafyllidou (2018), advance that, jointly and interactively, the media and political spheres fanned the flames of ‘hysteria’ surrounding the discourses of migration and security throughout, and arguably since, the RMC.

My dissertation contributes to the growing body of critical scholarship on the role of media coverage in transnational human migration discourses. My study aims to address a gap I have identified in the academic literature on discursive formations on migration and Canadian media coverage. Numerous studies have examined the potential links between the Canadian media and the migratory wave that occurred in 2015–2016. These are: Tyyskä and colleagues’ (2017) “The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Canadian Media;” Wallace’s (2018) “Contextualizing the Crisis: The Framing of Syrian Refugees in Canadian Print Media;” Winter, Patzelte, and Beauregard’s (2018) “L’imaginaire national, l’asile et les réfugiés syriens en Allemagne et au Canada;” Mustafa and colleagues’ (2021) “The Representation of Syrian Refugees in Canadian Online News Media”; Dumouchel (2021) “Au coeur de la tempête : L’opinion publique électorale et la crise des réfugiés”; Xu (2021) “Constructing the refugee:

Comparison between newspaper coverage of the Syrian refugee crisis in Canada and the UK”; and Omidian Sijani (2023) “A corpus-assisted discourse analysis of the representation of Syrian refugees in Canadian newspapers.” However, each of these focused on the so-called ‘Syrian Refugee Crisis’ (SRC) and Canada’s role in it and either briefly alluded to the events in Europe or simply ignored them altogether. The omission could be partly understood because if the RMC seemed abstract and far away for most Europeans, Canadians were at an even greater distance.

It does not mean, however, that Canadian media paid no attention to the events in Europe. The quantitative assessment of Canadian media coverage between 2015 and 2016 in merely a handful of newspapers testifies to the contrary. Furthermore, the Kurdi photograph and the consequent push for the Syrian Resettlement Program in Canada - the most sizeable resettlement efforts in Canada since the 1970s (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017) - did not occur in a vacuum. Both require to be contextualised within the RMC. Therefore, this dissertation aims to address the gap in the literature by further exploring the SRC and the country’s responses to it by including the discourses surrounding the RMC in Europe.

The role of media in elaborating migration discourse calls for various interesting research questions, not the least of which is: *At a time in which migration was at the forefront of political and social debates, how have Canadian newspapers covered the events surrounding the RMC?*

Related research questions are as follows:

- What narratives were found in said media coverage?
- What do the narrative show about the way transnational human migration was perceived in 2015-2016?

This research project aims to answer these questions and situate their findings within the broader international academic literature on how the media in various states covered the events of the RMC. One hopes, moreover, that in using the RMC as a contemporary example, this research will add to the existing academic body on media as an actor of discursive creation and elaboration, an established and contested field of academic literature.

1.2. Outline of the Dissertation

This research project is based on three research questions and is organised in a way that answers them methodically. Part 1, chapter 1 of this dissertation introduces the research framework behind the project, providing its theoretical framework and its research methodology. It also provides the ethical consideration of the research and its limitations. Part 1, chapter 2 provides a review of Canadian literature on narratives surrounding transnational human migration. This chapter provides the introductory basis of how migration is perceived in Canada prior to delving into the media analysis.

Part 2 of the dissertation is a chronological analysis of the Canadian media coverage of the RMC, providing detailed descriptions of key events and topics mentioned in each sample group. It includes a brief overview of the related media coverage for each sample group.

Part 3 of the dissertation is divided into two chapters. The first chapter is predominantly qualitative while the second contains a strong quantitative component. Part 3, Chapter 1 lists all the narratives that emanated from the Canadian coverage of the RMC, providing detailed descriptions and examples for each. The narratives are organised by narrative theme. Part 3, Chapter 2 in turn delves deeper into the data and demonstrates the reactive and polarising nature of RMC-related media coverage, eventually linking said polarity with European challenges to respond to the RMC.

The conclusion of this dissertation offers general concluding remarks and a further contextualisation of Canadian actions and discourses linked with immigration in light of the polarity of the subject-matter.

1.3. Context Behind the Research Project: Defining and Understanding the RMC

The following section is a general introduction to the RMC, prior to delving into its Canadian-specific media construction. In doing so, the section elaborates on the context behind this research project, providing information surrounding the RMC such as: What is it and what did it entail? Who was involved? In what context did it occur? When did it happen, and why then?

The rest of this chapter is organised as such: in the first place, it explains what said ‘crisis’ entails, describing the actors involved, what occurred during said crisis, what made it a crisis in the first place, as well as the legislative and regional context in which it occurred. In second place, this introduction defines the RMC, describing how it is referred to within the context of this dissertation. The last section will explain why the RMC occurred when it did, discussing the numerous migrant-related push and pull factors that resulted in the migrant influx to Europe in 2015 and 2016 from Asia and North Africa.

1.3.1. The RMC: What is it? Who was involved? What happened, and in what context did it occur?

Lindley (2014) puts forth that a crisis must entertain two qualities: that things are not normal and that things are not going well. In many ways, 2015 and 2016 were anormal, record-breaking years in terms of global human displacement. In 2015, 59.5 million people were forced out of their homes, affecting 5.8 million more individuals than the previous year (UNHCR 2016, 2). Moreover, 2016 saw 65.6 million displaced, an increase of 300 thousand over the last year (UNHCR 2017a). These years

would prove to be humanity's second-biggest mass displacement in history, the first being World War II (1939-1945). In Europe, more specifically, there were 2.3 million individuals found to be in Europe irregularly in 2015 and 2016, with 1.8M and 500,000, respectively (European Parliament 2022).¹ These numbers contrast with those of the five years prior (2010-2014) and after (2017-2021) the RMC, averaging to 141,000 and 164,000 individuals respectively (Statista 2023a). More than 2.5 million people applied for asylum in the EU during both years, a far bigger number than any of the previous or following years (European Parliament 2022). 2015 alone saw a doubling in asylum requests from the prior year (Eurostat 2024).

Moreover, for some of Europe's portal countries like Greece, Italy, and Hungary, gaining thousands of incomers daily while administering to those already present pushed capacities to the breaking point. Upon reaching Europe, a handful of European countries were prioritised by incoming migrants, here depicted by the countries receiving the highest number of asylum claims in 2015 and 2016. According to Eurostat, Germany received more than a third of the overall applicants (35%) in 2015, followed by Hungary (14%), Sweden (12%), Austria (7%), Italy (7%) and France (6%) (Eurostat 2024). The list of preferred final destination countries changed the following year as migrants reacted to the various reactionary policy and attitudinal changes. While Germany remained the most popular destination for asylum hopefuls, receiving 60% of all claims in 2016, other countries received fewer claims, such as Italy (10%), France (6%), Greece (4%), Austria (3%) and the United Kingdom (3%) (Eurostat 2024). In addition to this, there were an estimated 4,000 deaths in the Mediterranean linked

¹ According to the European Parliament definition, being irregularly – or what they refer to as illegally - present can mean that a person has either failed to register properly with an EU Member-State or that they have left the EU Member-State responsible for processing their asylum claim (European Parliament 2022). As it stands, the definition allows for an overlap in the number of individuals irregularly present within the region and those aiming to apply for asylum. While this overlap may serve to mitigate the exceptional 2015 and 2016 numbers; within the context of this research project, however, these statistics are utilized to depict the singularity of 2015 and 2016 in terms of migratory flows, as well as the sizeable bureaucratic pressure it created within and between European states.

with the surge in migration (UNHCR 2024a) an unusually high number that does not include the many who succumbed along the way

What became evident during the RMC was the region's inability to coordinate a response to the situation, even with it being the world's most integrated regional political entity and the existence of a supranational legal and procedural framework aimed to address asylum requests. Following the adoption of the Schengen agreement in 1985 and the 2004 Amsterdam Treaty, the post-Cold War EU had undertaken the harmonisation of national refugee and asylum laws amongst its Member States to handle a small influx of refugees and migrants from Eastern to Western Europe. It led to the elaboration of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) between 1999 and 2005, establishing a joint system and common standards to process asylum applications and intra-state financial solidarity to shoulder refugee protection. Discussions about asylum standards and procedures began as early as 2001 with the adoption of the Temporary Protection Directive, introducing a scheme for voluntary burden-sharing in situations of mass influx. Common standards were later adopted, first through 'minimum standards directives' on asylum procedures, reception conditions, and status determination between 2003 and 2005, followed by their recast into 'common standards' between 2011 and 2014. These common standards, however, even after the recast, remained vague, leaving much of its application to the discretion of ratifying Member States (Trauner 2016).

A key component of the CEAS is the development of the Dublin System, which establishes that the Member-State responsible for the examination of the asylum application is the first country in which the asylum-hopeful has entered EU territory. This mechanism results in peripheral (i.e., portal) countries, such as Italy or Greece, being more likely to receive asylum requests than other EU countries, creating uneven bureaucratic pressure on those receiving a more asylum applications merely due to their geographic positioning. Consequently, as the reception and protection of applicants are viewed as a

burden on receiving countries due to financial, administrative, social, and political implications, it has rendered the registrations of asylum hopefuls to be viewed as an encumbrance (Wagner, Perumadan, and Baumgartner 2019). Already in 2011, the EU Court of Justice ruled its migration regulatory bodies (including the CEAS and the Dublin System) dysfunctional and insufficient (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018 and Lavenex 2018). Research shows that asylum hopefuls would actively seek to bypass the ‘first country of entry clause’ as portal countries became notoriously overloaded with asylum cases, attempting instead to register in another ‘more desirable’ country, in what is colloquially known as ‘asylum shopping’ (Wagner, Perumadan, and Baumgartner 2019; Juhász, Hunyadi and Zgut 2015, 6). Asylum shopping is empirically demonstrated by the preferred list of destination countries listed above for both 2015 and 2016, all of which stood distant from external Schengen borders. Indeed, bypassing the ‘first country of entry clause’ has been shown to be encouraged by some EU Member-States themselves, at times actively refusing to register asylum claims or simply allowing/encouraging individuals to transit through their country in stark violation to international and European law (Human Rights Watch 2020).

The CEAS was ill-designed to redistribute asylum applications between Member States, especially with these higher-than-normal numbers. To ease the burden of portal states, in April 2016, the European Commission proposed the *Fairness Mechanism* as a way to counter “organised non-responsibility” (Pries 2020) by urging the redistribution of pending asylum requests between Member States according to countries’ wealth and population sizes (European Parliament News 2023). The Mechanism would rely on an automated system that would record and track all asylum claims to EU member-states and help determine each country’s capacity to process the claims, ensuring that no country would be under “disproportionate pressure (European Commission 2016).” It further stipulated that for any country deemed under too much pressure, additional asylum claims would be sent to other

Member States with a lesser ‘pressure quotient,’ or receive a financial “solidarity contribution” per applicant should the individual not be apt to move. Ultimately, the mechanism was never implemented. Its proposal met strong opposition from some Member States, principally from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

The Fairness Mechanism was the second attempt at reforming the CEAS, the first of which was implemented with meager success. On September 14th, 2015, a year prior, the European Council adopted a plan to redistribute 160 thousand asylum seekers from Greece and Italy throughout the union over the next two years (Legislative Train 2023). The plan was devised on the basis that Member States would receive a quota of asylum seekers measured by 40% of the size of their population, 40% of their GDP, 10% of their past number of asylum applications, and 10% of their unemployment rate. In some cases, strong supporters of this quota initiative, such as Germany, France, UK, agreed to take on more to alleviate the burden of the RMC on the overwhelmed coastal countries (Upadhyay 2016, 12). Ultimately, however, the initiative’s implementation was met with staunch opposition, chiefly from the same four Member States that would later oppose the Fairness Mechanism.

In both undertakings, their opposition was based on concerns surrounding notions of state sovereignty and control. Some Member States, for example, view the burden of migration (asylum) as a zero-sum phenomenon, one that incites policymakers to promote stricter deterrence policies than those of neighbouring countries (Thielemann 2018, 71), ultimately creating what Nikolic and Pevcin (2022, 250) called a race to the bottom. Slovakia and Poland, for example, announced they would solely relocate refugees of Christian faith within their sovereign territory, citing concerns about state security (Hughes 2016). Hungary and Slovakia, furthermore, filed a legal case against the quota plan in the European Court of Justice, stating that it was flawed on two premises: “that the adoption of the decision was vitiated by errors of a procedural nature or arising from the choice of an inappropriate legal basis,”

and “that the decision was neither a suitable response to the migrant crisis nor necessary for that purpose (CJEU 2017).” This lawsuit, eventually dismissed by the European Court of Justice in September 2017, served to stall reform.

All in all, only 2% of the expected number of asylum seekers were relocated as of July 2017 (Scipioni 2018, 1368), and only Malta and Finland met their obligations towards Italy and Greece (Benková 2017). Hungary, Austria, and Poland, moreover, refused to follow both schemes, while other countries such as the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia joined in the initial quota system to a limited degree (Benková 2017). Ultimately, even EU Member States with long-standing histories of welcoming asylum seekers, such as the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom, chose to take fewer asylum seekers than the European average (Ambrosini et al., 2019, 18).

1.3.2. The RMC: What should it be referred to?

There is no consensus on what to call the RMC. Delving into the numerous European media analysis of the RMC, one can discern that academics refer to the events of 2015 and 2016 in a myriad of ways. Out of the eleven European studies found, only two studies refer to the RMC as a refugee *and* migrant crisis (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, and Moore 2015; Verleyen and Beckers 2023); though even the latter of the two vacillates in their naming of the crisis, sometimes referring to it as the “European Refugee Crisis” or again the “European Migration Crisis” in their title. The remaining nine articles either refer to the RMC as the “refugee crisis” outright (Lekic-Subasic 2018; Chouliaraki and Zaborowski 2017) or tries to address the difficulty in defining the instance by either putting the term in quotations marks (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017; Galantino 2022; Gabor and Messing 2016) or by calling it the “so-called Refugee Crisis” (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017; Kluknavska, Bernhard and Boogaarden 2019; Heidenreich et al., 2019; Gabor and Messing 2016).

This author suspects that the lack of consensus is anchored in the dissonance of labels utilised when referring to the migrants making their way into Europe. Indeed, a study by Berry, Garcia-Blanco and Moore (2015) demonstrated the media coverage in numerous European states utilised different terminology when covering the same events and therefore the same individuals. For example, while the German and Swedish media referred to the incomers primarily as ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers,’ the media in the UK and Italy preferred the term ‘migrant,’ whereas Spanish media used ‘immigrant.’ The distinction between the terms implies certain assumptions that contribute to a range of framings, from support and sympathy to rejection and threat. Politicians of various countries, moreover, were known to use various terms themselves when referring to the migrants. Aided by xenophobia, Islamophobia, and the willful or inadvertent muddling of these terms, right-leaning politicians, for example, were able to legitimise their discourse of fear and aid their anti-immigration positions. A few well-known instances of this are: Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán comparing incomers as “Trojan horses of terrorism”; French Presidential Candidate Marine Le Pen insinuating that the RMC was comparable to the “barbarian invasion” of the fourth century; former Polish prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński comparing the influx to “parasites and protozoa”; and, former British Prime Minister David Cameron comparing newcomers to Europe to a “swarm” of insects (Viktor 2015; LePoint 2015; Cienski 2015; and BBC News 2015).

When discussing transnational human migration, the terminology utilised when referring to migrants has significant implications. Zetter (2007, 172) identifies migrant ‘labels’ as a ‘convenient image,’ “driven by the need to manage globalized processes and patterns of migration and forced migration in particular.” Migration-related labels define and stratify people in terms of agency, economic cost, the length of their stay, and their type of threat (Lee and Nerghes 2018; Lawlor and Tolley 2017; Baker et al., 2008; De Coninck 2020). In that sense, labels have tangible, real-life

implications unto the people they define. They are the “tangible representation of policies and programs, in which labels are not only formed but are then also transformed by bureaucratic processes which institutionalize and differentiate categories of eligibility and entitlements (Zetter 2007, 180).” Labels are, as such, how migrants are made to be legally and socially ‘legible,’ serving as convenient and accepted shorthand. Thus, the migrant labels carry a narrative, as if knowing their legal status suggests knowing what they need, where they belong and who they are. The few seemingly homogenous labels stand in contrast to the actual heterogeneous lives they qualify.

Calling the RMC a ‘refugee crisis,’ in turn, brings its own assumptions. While it is the most ‘commonly accepted’ term with the flow of events that took place in the late summer and early Autumn of 2015 in Southeast and Central-East Europe, according to Gabor and Messing (2016, 5), naming it so ignores the numerous realities of those who made up this unusual influx. Even looking into the three most frequently reported countries of origin for asylum seekers to EU Member-States in 2015 and 2016, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, not all of them could be qualified as refugees; many fell under the description of an economic migrant. Some, moreover, like Ambrosini and colleagues (2019, 16), say that calling the RMC merely as a ‘refugee crisis’ is emblematic of the superlative media coverage of the time. Upon using the term ‘refugee crisis’, Gabor and Messing (2016, 5) stated that they did so:

“in spite of our conviction that the primary cause of the crisis situation was not the arrival of the refugees, but rather the inability of the state, its institutions and the European Union to cope with it, and that it was therefore more an institutional than a refugee crisis.”

The term ‘migrant’ would perhaps be best suited all those involved in the RMC influx. According to the UNHCR, a person was labelled a ‘migrant’ when their cross-national mobility was done by choice rather than coercion, be it to join a family member or out of economic opportunism (UNHCR Emergency

Handbook 2019). The definition stood opposite to that of ‘refugee,’ which is “[a] person fleeing armed conflict or persecution”. The term ‘migrant,’ however, has since become an umbrella term for all human mobility within and across territorial lines regardless of whether the movement is forced or voluntary.

Even attempts to bypass migration-related taxonomy when referring to the RMC bring its own set of challenges. Labelling the overall European experience as a ‘*migration* crisis,’ moreover, is said to hyperbolize the experience of an entire continent (see above) while laying focus to the migrants themselves rather than the ineffective legislative structure in which most affected European states anchored their responses. As McAdam (2014) observes, moreover, the notion of a ‘migration’ crisis pathologizes all types of human mobility, which is “counterproductive, especially in a climate of general hostility toward ‘outsiders.’” Calling it so simultaneously problematizes the individuals involved and sets an alarmist and politicizing tone in a way that fosters emotionally charged responses that may or may not be most apt (Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak 2018). It is for this reason that some refer to the events of 2015-2016 as a “reception crisis,” leading some to call the RMC the “Refugee Reception Crisis” (Ambrosini et al., 2019) or, more simply, the “Reception Crisis of 2015” (Rosenberger and Müller 2019).

Taking all these considerations in mind, the RMC is referred to as such in this research project for two reasons. The first and most important is in recognition of ‘refugee crisis’ being the most accepted term to define the 2015–2016 episode, situating this project within the existing body of academic literature on the RMC. The other is premised upon the broadened definition of the term ‘migrant,’ in recognition of the variety of legal statuses of those making up said influx (i.e., refugee, economic migrant, asylum seekers, etc.). It should be noted, moreover, that within the context of this research, ‘migrants’ are presumed to be international ones that have crossed international territorial boundaries,

usually from Africa and Asia, making their way towards the European continent. The author recognises that calling it so is in no way less hyperbolic nor problematic than other names that have been used.

1.3.3. The RMC: why 2015 and 2016, via Push and Pull Factors?

Since 2013, Syria remains the most frequent country of origin for asylum seekers to EU Member States (Eurostat 2018). The ongoing violence in Afghanistan and Iraq, moreover, along with the human rights abuses in Eritrea, as well as poverty in Kosovo, are some of the leading causes encouraging individuals towards Europe in 2015 and 2016. In 2015, more precisely, the number of Syrians seeking protection had doubled compared with the previous year, making up twenty-nine percent of the total number of asylum seekers. Similarly, the number of Afghans nearly quadrupled, making them fourteen percent of the total number of asylum seekers, while asylum seekers from Iraq made up ten percent, multiplying 2014 numbers by seven (Eurostat 2024). These three countries accounted for fifty-three percent of the total asylum claims for that year. Similarly, Syrians accounted for twenty-eight percent of the total asylum seekers in 2016, Afghans accounted for fifteen percent, and Iraqis eleven percent. These three countries accounted for fifty-four percent of the total asylum claims of that year for EU Member States.

The voyage from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan to the European continent is as long as it is risky. It is also one which would incur significant expenses, expenses which would continue to be daunting even upon reaching Europe as newcomers would need to steel themselves for the long and complicated bureaucratic process towards attaining legal authorisation to remain. All three states faced political and economic hardships pre-dating 2015. Considering that they accounted for over half of incomers during the RMC, it is worth contextualising the particularities that led to a seemingly synchronised mass-exodus towards Europe.

1.3.3.1. Country-specific Push Factors: Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan

In 2011, the Arab Spring, the pro-democracy civil movement sparked a civil war against the bi-generational sectarian Assad regime began in Syria. As the conflict between sectarian divisions persists to this day, it is estimated that approximately half a million people have lost their lives because of this conflict. Over a decade of war has left the country in a systemic and economic collapse, leaving Syria's neighboring countries faced with the brunt of displaced individuals. By 2016, nearly half of the country's population had been forced to relocate to foreign territories, with statistics showing Turkey (2.8 million), Lebanon (1 million), Jordan (655,000), Iraq (230,000), and Egypt (116,000) as the main receiving countries (Immenkamp 2017, 2). Four years into the conflict, neighboring host countries, which had initially welcomed Syrian refugees, found themselves unable to cope financially or socially with the high number of refugees (Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke 2015; Eboch 2018). For the displaced Syrians, there were limited options available to them; they could either reside in internationally funded refugee camps or try to integrate into their host societies. The UNHCR reported that in 2017, a significant number of Syrians not residing in camps lived below the poverty line. It was the situation in Jordan (93%), Lebanon (70%), Egypt (65%), and Iraq (37%) (Immenkamp 2017, 2), being chiefly employed in physically demanding, low-skill industries such as agriculture, domestic work and construction (Masri and Srour 2014). A report by the Migration Research Institute (2016) demonstrated that living conditions in camps were so that "life in the camps (or even outside them) is often no less dangerous for the refugees than back home, with conditions which can generally be described as inhuman." Testimonies demonstrate that camp conditions and general lack of opportunities has resulted in some Syrians heading back to their war-torn country rather than staying in host countries (Upadhyay 2016, 7-8).

For more than three decades, Afghanistan was found to be the number one source country of refugees around the world. As of 2014, however, it now stands as number two in the global order of displacement behind Syria (Hakimi 2016). Unfortunately, this “demotion” comes not from ameliorations within Afghanistan but rather from the escalating tensions within Syria. Similar to Syrians, a large number of Afghans were compelled in 2014 and 2015 to make the dangerous trek toward Europe. In their case, the main reasons cited for leaving were insecurity, a lack of satisfactory governance, and economic issues (Alexander 2015, 4-6). In 2014, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) withdrew from the country, handing the reigns to a much-disputed local government, leading to mass protests and low confidence in the establishment. While the country is currently under chief control of the Taliban since the 2020 withdrawal of US armed forces, the political situation in 2015 was more complex. Since the early 2010’s, conflict over regional control within the country has resulted in large-scale violence, terrorist activity, and a general lack of stability (Hakimi 2016). Overall, there are more than three million Afghans in Iran and more than two million Afghans in Pakistan, both chosen for geographic proximity and linguistic, religious, and cultural similarities. After three decades of hosting millions of Afghans, there remain tensions between Iran and Pakistan and their respective Afghan communities. In both host countries, there are no paths to citizenship nor legal employment opportunities available to Afghan refugees. It is a similar situation for Afghans wishing to relocate to the Gulf region, India, Turkey, or Central Asia, as well as for the highly educated Afghans who may prefer economic migration into a nearby country rather than aiming for an uncertain future and a dangerous journey towards Europe (Hakimi 2016; Marchand et al., 2016).

Iraq was the third most common country of origin for asylum claimants making their way to Europe during the RMC. By 2014, Iraq was still facing the repercussions of the 1990 economic sanctions that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 2003 US-led coalition invasion of the country, and the

subsequent execution of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in 2006. All three events have had severe implications for the Iraqi community and society, leading to slow nation-building progress and low growth in employment opportunities (Upadhyay 2016, 6). US forces remain within Iraq to this day. Much like Afghans, Iraqis would oftentimes blame insecurity, economic instability as well as a lack of adequate governance as the main reasons for departure. As of 2017, however, the UNHCR has estimated that there are 2.6 million Iraqis displaced internally and another 220 thousand that have been forced to flee outside the country (UNHCR s.d.). Iraq's social, economic, and administrative capacities are further strained as it hosts more than 300 thousand refugees, most of which originate from Syria (UNHCR s.d.). After the invasion by coalition forces in 2003, Iraq began fracturing along sectarian lines, ushering in a period of violence and mass displacement. After war broke out in neighboring Syria in 2011, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) - more commonly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) - took advantage of societal tensions and grievances in the region and began territorial expansion in the region (UNHCR s.d.). According to the UNHCR, moreover, the living conditions in some of the Iraqi refugee camps have been highly problematic due to overcrowding, resulting in 700,000 displaced individuals in Iraq living in informal settlements, making it difficult for local NGOs and international humanitarian organisations to allocate aid and services adequately. Considering the persistence of both political tensions and subsequent constraints on institutional capacities within the country, there is no obvious push factor for Iraqis to make their way to Europe in 2015 and 2016 specifically. There is, however, something to be said about timing and opportunity. Out of the four million Iraqis displaced, forty-three percent remained within the country, while another forty-four percent were in Syria or Jordan, and only four percent made their way to Europe (UNHCR 2024b). In this 2016 study by the International Organisation for Migration (2016), interviews with Iraqi migrants in Europe shows that the main reasons for taking on the journey Northwards was trifold (IOM Iraq 2016). The first centered around Europe promising security, equality

and social justice, a logic shared by all migrants making their way to Europe, independently of the RMC. The second and third reasons cited in the study are directly related to the RMC; they can be best summarised as timeliness and community. Already in 2014, the flow of migrants into Europe was on the rise. By 2015, reports on migrant flows into Europe and on favourable state responses made the paths seem not only open but also accessible. For migrants, largescale arrivals implied both opportunity and a probability of success. Through community, Iraqi migrants were able to deliberately select their final destination within Europe, basing their decision on the ease of attaining residency permits and the likelihood of family reunification. The two reasons to attempting to reach Europe in 2015 and 2016 cited above by Iraqis, timeliness and community, are most likely shared by other communities.

1.3.3.2. Internationally shared pull factors: chain migration and technology

In a more general way, while there were multiple reasons that incited refugees and migrants to make their way towards Europe in 2015 and 2016, reasons which are referred to as push factors, it is also worth exploring the attraction factors - the pull factors - which made Europe seem so appealing in 2015 and 2016 to such a high number of them. The aforementioned country-specific push factors are the real explanation as to why the RMC occurred in 2014 and 2015. This is not to say, however, that the pull factors have not had their part to play in the development of the crisis, but rather that the pull factors are generally present independent of time. They have been and remain a constant attraction force for migrants to engaged in mobility. Moreover, these pull factors are not specific to any nationality; they are shared amongst all. It could be in large because unlike push factors, which are directly related to national-scale challenges to peace and fulfillment, pull factors are felt at a more personal level. These factors include chain migration and access to technology.

In some instances of familiarity with a migrant that has already successfully traveled to Europe and has acquired asylum, there may occur what is called chain migration. Chain migration is when a migrant is incited to mobilise in hopes of reunifying with a loved one who has successfully migrated to another state. During the RMC, the highly mediatised success of the many in reaching Europe may have “emboldened” those who had “previously resisted leaving,” as would have coverage of the welcoming nature of countries like Germany or Sweden towards asylum seekers (Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke 2015). The migration pattern is visible in all parts of the world and has always been a significant decision-making factor for individuals leaving their homelands, willingly and forcefully. The logic behind the concept is easily understood, migration is a drastic action. Oftentimes, these individuals will leave behind loved ones and all the comforts of familiarity with no certainty of what is yet to come. As such, the notion of having a familiar face who can welcome you into these foreign lands and ease you into these unknown ways can be a great comfort for migrants. It is a way of removing some of the mental and potentially financial barriers to migration.

For EU Member States, the European Parliament declares chain migration possible when “those who have settled on a family reunification basis can themselves sponsor further family members, consistent with European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) obligations” (European Commission 2018a). This family reunification program is available in 25 EU Member States, excluding the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. Not all migrants who made their way towards Europe in 2015 and 2016 aimed to reunite with a loved one. For some, they were the first ones in their circles, most likely hoping to eventually acquire the legal means of having their loved ones join them.

The second pull factor, the use of social media and of the technology which enable constant and far-reaching communication has revolutionised the way humans interact with each other and their environment. Together, they stand as testimony to this increasingly globalised world in which we live in,

allowing anyone perpetual access to boundless information. During the RMC, technology and social media are said to have played an important role in convincing migrants that Europe was the right choice for them, and they also served as a support mechanism amongst migrants and refugees every step of the way.

A great example of this is extracted for the work of journalist Patrick Kingsley (2016) in his book titled *The New Odyssey*, which describes the journey of migrants during the RMC. On multiple occasions, he mentions the role social media and technology played in these events. According to him, social media became a marketing tool for smugglers, making and phones an essential tool of the trade. For example, in Egypt and Turkey, smugglers were known to use Facebook groups to acquire business (Kingsley 2016, 93). Another example is a smuggling practice from Libya in which the men in charge will bring the boat near the Italian coast, after which they will use satellite phones to call the Coast Guard directly. There are instances of smugglers choosing to go through third-party activist groups to call the coast guards. Once the connection is made, they will provide them with GPS coordinates found on their phone and wait to be rescued (Kingsley 2016, 114).

Beyond just word of mouth, technology and social media are said to have played an important role in convincing migrants to head for Europe. They also served as a support mechanism amongst migrants and refugees every step of the way. For example, in *The New Odyssey* (Kingsley 2016, 93), a book describing the journey of migrants during the RMC, Patrick Kingsley alludes to social media becoming a marketing and operational tool for smugglers, making smart phones for both communication and navigation, an essential to the trade. For migrants, moreover, Kingsley demonstrated that technology enabled them to travel, making it more feasible, more affordable, and cheaper. Widespread use of smartphones permitted migrants to swap advice on platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp. One group, for example, detailed the steps to ensure safe passage through Hungary into Northern Europe, including

street names, desired attire, locations to purchase train tickets, and necessary equipment. The role of communities through social media is thought to have guided hundreds of thousands of migrants towards Europe in 2015 (Kingsley 2016, 185-186).

These are just a few examples to demonstrate the role of social media and technology for migrants during the RMC. For them, they served as means of communications, navigation tools, and research medium and created a sense of community for the millions embarking on the journey towards Europe. Additionally, it was not solely used to spread some countries' reputation as a safe haven but also to make them aware of the dangers of the trip and the potential difficulties that may lie ahead (Alexander 2015, 4).

Part I – Constructing the Research Project

1. Research Framework

Understanding discourses is key to understanding the pre-existing social structures and power relationships at a given time. Discursive practice, as such, builds upon history and intersubjective norms to reveal how the creation of knowledge is intertwined with the mechanism of political power. It involves common terminologies, accepted assumptions, and presumed rationales propagated to make sense of social practices and phenomena. The media, whose coverage acts as both agent and field of discursive deliberations, are important actors to consider when trying to make sense of the complex subject matter of transnational human migration. The chapter presents the conceptual and theoretical foundations on which this research project is based. It demonstrates the indirect link between discursive formations, narratives, and media coverage, presenting both the methodology and the methods utilised in this dissertation.

Integrated into this chapter are eleven European studies on RMC media coverage published between 2015 and 2023. There being no Canadian equivalent, these publications focus on the newspaper coverage of the RMC in sixteen European states: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Germany, Sweden, Greece, France, UK, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Belgium. As elaborated below, there is little beyond an overarching subject matter that links all of these research projects. Not only is there no consensus between them on what to call the RMC in the first place, nor on when it occurred, but they also demonstrate significant differences research approaches. Even allowing for these differences, including these studies in this research framework chapter is a worthwhile endeavour; it serves to present the methodologies of comparable projects and provides additional clarification on the chosen methodology of this doctoral dissertation.

1.1. Theoretical Framework

1.1.1. The Discursive Articulation of Narratives

Jørgensen and Philipps (2002, 5) define discourse as a “form of social action that plays a part in producing the social world – including knowledge, identities and social relations – and thereby in maintaining specific social patterns.” Alternatively, discourse was described as “a structured totality resulting from articulatory practice, (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 105)”, “systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects” (Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis 2003), and an epistemologically constructed set of ‘truths’ anchored in social norms and values, representations of reality, social identity and legal norms (Foucault 1972). Each of these definitions allows for a discourse to create a vision of social reality built upon historically-contingent, intersubjective norms and practices that lead to the organisation, construction, and institutionalisation of what can be ‘known’ beyond our immediate senses and experiences. Dijk (2014, 43-44) defined knowledge as a construction (i.e., a belief) justified and warranted by intersubjectively-accepted criteria. Therefore, how something may be known is acquired, expressed, and reproduced through all forms of communication, themselves situated and codified by discourse. Discourse as a reality-creating system plays a crucial role in the production of how something may be known.

Discourses and narratives have an intersectional and interdependent relationship. If a discourse is a socially constructed reality, a narrative is a meaningful structure constructed through the linkages of events and activities, which renders them intelligible, meaningful, and indeed coherent (Czarniawska 2010). Narratives are, as such, temporal structures in which a discursive actor (i.e., a narrator) constructs a sequence of events, oftentimes linearly with a beginning and an end. Discourses within a social unit may be understood through the articulation of narratives. For Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 105), discursive articulation is ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements,’ creating and fixing their identities

contextually and relationally. An articulation, therefore, is an attempt to ‘fix’ meaning in a way that may render it intelligible at any given time by comparing and contrasting the novel information with the existing one (Wedeen 2002). Indeed, upon being exposed to a narrative, the understanding of its contents is thus either reinforced and maintained or challenged and altered altogether, both on a societal level and on a more immediate, personal one. Most importantly for this historically-focused research project, the articulation of narratives occurs at the “intersection of content and context,” (Goodsell 2005, 6) as cited in Dolinska, Niedzwiecka-Iwanczak, and Opilowska 2021), meaning that its reception is situationally dependent on both narrator’s and the audience’s perceived reality. Narratives are thus both a condition and a consequence of discourse.

While many narratives are organic and spontaneous, others are highly orchestrated and designed to effect policy outcomes, reinforce or shift the status quo, and often influence societal power and political dynamics. Narratives deemed organic are usually the product of similar stories told time and again without any preconceived motivations or desired outcomes. In contrast, orchestrated narratives are created and propelled by a one or numerous influential storytellers with specific intent (Banulescu-Bodgan, Malka and Culbertson 2021, 2). Studying narratives, therefore, provides a window into the narrator’s cognitive frameworks, enabling the perception of causal linkages, the prioritization - and omissions - of information, and, eventually, their normative stance (D’Amato and Mucarelli 2019). Indeed, the resulting narratives - whether organic or orchestrated - demonstrate what is deemed normative.

A diverse set of actors creates, disseminates, and reinterprets migration narratives, including policymakers, politicians, civil society, researchers, international organizations, traditional and social media, and migrants. In their intersubjective construction narratives – both organic or orchestrated - are not neutral, but somewhat shape and are shaped “by particular understandings of the world which tend to prioritize one meaning over another” (Phibbs 2008). Narratives, as such, may codify outcomes. When

faced with a specific narrative, social actors interpret it according to the rules and resources provided by the pre-existing discursive articulations they have been privy to. Indeed, through logic and debate, social actors ‘negotiate’ how to make sense of a given situation. At any given time, actors participate in a “crossfire” of multiple heterogenous and perhaps even contradicting narratives (Keller, Hornidge, and Schünemann 2018, 19).

Numerous narratives being interpreted in different ways results in what Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, 56) referred to as the ‘order of discourse,’ in which two or more discourses strive to establish themselves in the same ‘domain’. Both terms refer to the different and potentially conflicting discourses surrounding the same subject matter. While Foucault supported the existence of a reigning knowledge - an episteme - at any given time, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) provided a model promoting a multitude of competing discourses that feed on and contend with one another. Such a vision still allows for a hegemonic discourse being rivaled or at least mitigated by discursive antagonisms. A hegemonic discourse is one that has become the predominant ‘reality’ for a given society, structuring it and attributing meaning to both objects and subjects. Considering the complexity of modern society in which polarisation is seemingly ever-growing, it is no stretch to state that when it comes to the contentious topic of transnational human migration, a hegemonic discourse might, at best, bear a semblance of dominance rather than having it.

1.1.2. Narratives Surrounding Transnational Human Migration

When discussing transnational human migration, it is important to note that there are multiple narratives at play in how it may be known within a social unit. Studies demonstrate that there is a dissonance, and indeed a competition, between narratives (D’Amato and Lucarelli 2019). By being normative, the influential weight of narratives can thus be viewed as an indirect political force. While they

may not directly bring forth an outcome, it may influence one. The result made transnational human migration highly politicized and often instrumentalized by political leaders to garner support from an “ever more disgruntled” public feeling threatened by these ‘outsiders’ (Grande, Schwarzböl and Fatke 2019). The stories told about migration and migrants can paint a rich picture of how people view the opportunities and challenges associated with the movement of people, and through what lenses.

Importantly, narratives codify the representation of an individual or a group of people within either physical and/or abstract spaces, in turn playing a significant role in how this individual (or group) is perceived and understood. As reality-creating tools, narratives position people as social subjects and render them intelligible; in doing so, they create subjectivity. According to du Gay (2007), subjectification refers to the overlapping processes and practices through which an individual - or a social unit at a larger scale – comes to understand and recognise themselves in a way that shapes their identity. Subjectification formulates how individuals establish their sense of ‘self’ and of ‘others’ within the abstract confines of an identity. In turn, identities are constructed in a way that is not deterministic but rather changeable, fragmented, and decentred (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). Identities are determined relationally; they are given meaning vis-à-vis that of others (i.e., through comparison and intersubjective reasoning). Subjectification may be ascribed to an individual. Indeed, subjects may resist the externally imposed identity, may not acknowledge it, or may not be aware of its application in the first place. Alternatively, individuals sometimes stand to gain by altering the perception of their identity to fit a prescribed script. The subjectification of migrants is frequently linked to an established categorisation system in which individuals are ‘made up’ by external forces outside of their control (Lyon 2007, 91). Indeed, migrants are usually understood according to their legal status, defined by their motivations to mobilise across state boundaries. All individuals moving across international state boundaries are migrants. In accordance with Canadian standards, migrants can be divided into three categories: economic, family, and humanitarian

(Gibney 2004; Watson 2009). Economic migrants are admitted into host communities because of the value of their labour, understood in terms of their skill level (high or low) and the length of their stay (i.e., temporary or permanent). Family migration, more commonly known as chain migration, is performed by individuals aiming to rejoin with loved ones residing in another state. Humanitarian migrants, in turn, are based on the value of human life and on a shared sense of humanity that transcends territorial borders. Including both refugees and asylum seekers, it proposes that refusing these individuals entry would endanger their lives. It is worth noting that each of these three categories are attributed unto them by receiving states. While they may not reflect the motivations or reality of the people targeted by them, these labels remain vital to migrant reality, informing the qualities of their perception and consequent reception into host communities.

Narratives surrounding humanitarian migrants, for example, range from economically driven notions to duty-bound humanitarian ones just to name a few. Considering the sheer magnitude of RMC experiences throughout the European continent or even the multitude of actors involved, it would make pinpointing a hegemonic discourse surrounding the RMC an impossible task, one that dismisses the complexity of social reality. There may also not be a hegemonic discourse, as the issues involved are highly contested and comprise competing narratives. As such, this research project will aim to study the discursive formations (i.e., the narratives) surrounding transnational human migration in Europe during the years 2015 and 2016 in Canada. A list of narratives surrounding transnational human migration in both a general Western and a more specific Canadian context is provided in the next section.

1.1.3. Media as both Agent and Field of Discursive Deliberation

As an influential medium of information dissemination, the media's role as a narrator becomes relevant insofar as it holds influence (i.e., its gatekeeping and editorial capacities) on the convictions and

the actions of actors within a political system (Scolari 2012, 205). Within this research project, the ‘media’ does not refer to a single medium, but rather to an amalgamation of all of them, not the least of which include newspapers, television, radio, social media, blogs, and so forth. McLuhan (2003, 43) referred to this amalgamation as a ‘media ecology,’ an ecosystem-like structure in which “no medium has its meaning or existence alone, but only in constant interplay with other media.” Within this ecology, as Postman (1985, 10) put it, each medium provides a “new orientation for thought, for expression, for sensibility [...] (they) classify the world for us, sequence it, enlarge it, reduce it, color it, argue a case for what the world is like.” The term ‘media’ also relates to the institutionalised practices of mustering and propagating information speedily and with some credible level of accuracy; information, in turn, is referred to as ‘news,’ or at least to narratives being deemed ‘newsworthy’ aimed to be disseminated. The ‘media’ is a discursive actor both tangibly as an organisation and abstractly as an actor with known discursive influence. As a conveyor of narratives, the way media depicts events holds the potential to influence how they are received. As such, the media ecosystem creates an ‘environment’ in which society and individuals model their perception and cognition of the information conveyed via news and, indirectly, the world around them.

The link between media coverage and discourse elaboration is contested. On the one hand, the notion that the media’s principal role regarding public opinion reinforces pre-existing attitudes – and is as such politically inconsequential – remains pervasive across many political and social science sub-disciplines, and in non-academic commentary (Gavin 2018). Such thinking can be traced to the minimalist influence thesis (MIT) (Klapper 1968), premised on the assumption that people have stern, preformulated opinions and that lead them to filter their media exposure, both in terms of news outlets and in the interpretation of the information. MIT advances that individuals are likely to select media sources whose output they find congenial while actively dismissing and/or reinterpreting information that stands contrary

to their beliefs and opinions (Anderson 2007; Kuhn 2007). In relation to the increasingly complex media ecosystem following the advent of social media, MIT could be linked to the idea that the additional ease of access allows individuals to filter their exposure to information to a greater extent.

Alternatively, some argue direct relationship exists between media coverage, discourse and consequently action, reaction and mobilisation. For some, the representation of an individual or a group of people within a physical space through the mediatization of politics is one of the main influences in migration discourses, and exploring related news coverage is vital to understanding how citizens formulate and justify their opinions toward transnational human migration (see for example Wallace 2018; Krzyzanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak 2018; Gois and Faraone 2018). Often first to make known an instance and/or a political decision, the position argues that most people's understanding of human flows comes from mainstream news coverage and social media exposure. Jointly and interactively with the civil and political spheres, media coverage maintains an important role in producing and reproducing prevalent discourses, which in turn influence national public and political attitudes, frame debates, and set agendas towards key issues and events; in this instance, transnational human migration (Krzyzanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2018; Triandafyllidou 2018).

None of the European countries' studies on the media coverage of the RMC supported the MIT (Klapper 1968), in which media coverage is viewed as having little to no discursive importance. In their research parameter, each article allowed for media coverage to have some level of discursive influence; this was not a surprising outcome, as it is unlikely that a researcher would attempt such a project believing said coverage to have no discursive importance and/or influence. That being said, the eleven European studies differed in terms of the level of influence they allowed media coverage to have surrounding discourses on transnational human migration. On the one hand, some publications supported the theoretical positioning of direct influence. For example, Berry and colleagues (2016, 5) advance the

argument that media coverage has a direct cause-and-effect relationship with migration discourses, mentioning that “mass media can set agendas and frame debates,” and therefore providing citizens with the information to make sense of the world around them and their place within it. The sentiment was echoed by the Chouliaraki and Stolic (2017) and Georgiou and Zaborowski (2017, 4,7) articles, both citing the Berry, Garcia-Blanco and Moore (2015) publication. The latter of two added that ‘quality’ media have a “central role in pivoting information and framing events as crisis.” Indeed, Chouliaraki and Stolic (2017) even argued that the direct relationship between discourse creation and media coverage meant that new outlets had a responsibility to the public when presenting information and formulating opinions to be aware of the power they hold and to wield it responsibly.

On the other hand, the remaining studies take on a more subtle approach to media’s discursive influence, promoting an indirect influence. According to Lekić-Subašić (2018), media’s influence comes from its editorial capacities, meaning its ability to create visibility on someone or something and, therefore, impress upon the collective problematization of events as they occur. This vision of media influence is also shared by Kluknavska, Bernhard, and Boomgaarden (2019) and Garzia Galantino (2022), with both studies advancing, moreover, that newspapers’ editorial capacities provide spaces for migrants to express themselves and become known, mitigating the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ attitude usually associated with foreigners. The importance of giving voice to migrants is part of many of the eleven studies (see more below). Similarly to the latter grouping, this research project positions itself between these two viewpoints, allowing for preformulated opinions to steer media consumption to some extent, and allowing for the informational role of media coverage to influence attitudes and positions. It focuses more on the indirect influence of media coverage on discursive elaboration and propagation. The media allows civil society and policymakers alike to access knowledge on issues that could be relevant to them, an apprising role of greater importance still when the audience stands physically distant from the events taking place or during

rapidly evolving times such as the RMC. The media's informative powers and authority as an 'on the ground' source are mitigated in this modern media ecosystem in which large availability and accessibility of viewpoints vying for an audience's time have been linked with shifts in media consumption. The current research, therefore, follows that media coverage has a complex, multi-layered, and indeed long-term influence on perception and discourse creation, not least with regard to politically charged issues such as transnational human migration. For instance, by discussing migrants in a negative light repetitively, be it by referring to them as terrorists or criminals, the media may trigger what is known as a "cultivation effect" and influence readers' perception of the subject matter through repetitive exposure (Arendt 2010; Balabanova and Balch 2010; Balch and Balabanova 2016). By choosing which narratives get told, through which lens, and with which frequency, they act simultaneously as fields and agent of discursive articulation, which in turn may be reflected in political (in)action.

The theoretical position taken for this project is supported by its focus on well-established newspapers. The decision to focus on a handful of selected newspapers was deliberate. Other means, such as the radio and television, are not considered, nor are the input of blogs, forums, and smaller or independent forms of journalism. Newspapers, more specifically, being perceived as a 'traditional' medium of information dissemination remain influential discursive actors. Nerone and Barnhurst (2001, 1) stated that newspapers were an "almost sanctified" medium in many nineteenth- and twentieth-century societies. Allowing for contemporary changes within the media industry, such as the advent of social media and calls for "fake news," are hence viewed as having merely mollified the long-held reputational 'sanctity' of mainstream media; with newspapers retaining their role as the 'fourth branch' of government and the watchdogs against power abuses, democratic functions and civic values (Jandric 2018). Indeed, even in increasingly polarised societies, 'traditional' media such as television broadcasting and newspapers are still known to gatekeep what narratives remain newsworthy over time and with which

frequency. It allows for the newspaper outlets being studied to maintain their role as credible sources of information despite widespread changes in media consumption and in the media industry (Boyd-Barret 2011; Chadwick 2013). Studies demonstrate that rather than being replaced altogether by new technologies and novel news consumption practices, ‘traditional’ mediums remained at the heart of the media ecosystem, leading to what Bohman (2004) referred to as digitally expanded public spheres or what Chadwick (2013) called ‘hybrid media systems.’ In this digital age, traditional news agencies were said to have been capable of revamping their business models to remain the dominant news providers around the world (Boyd-Barret 2011).

Print media do not capture all ideological positions in the public debates, indeed doing so is neither their goal nor their ambition. In fact, it is inherently incapable of doing so by its very nature, as it depends on a selected few to detail major events. Therefore, it is worth noting that newspapers have what May (2022, 1944) called an “undeniable ‘elitist’ bias,” one that may not be found on public social media platforms. Even so, ‘traditional’ media today remain key news dissemination actors, even going so far as to say they are keenly discursively influential over the public sphere not so much because they alone decide what captures the political agenda - that much they share with virtual influences - but because, thanks to their editorial capacities that select and process information, they can script what stays on it (Coleman and Ross 2010; Habermas 1996, 379). Editorial capacities, in this instance, highlight two factors: the length of news articles (generally between 700 and 100 words) in comparison to social networks like Twitter, where the limited length of messages does not allow in-depth argumentation, and legitimacy born out of the long-held practice of intellectuals and journalists of different backgrounds choosing to express themselves primarily via print media (Kaufmann 2008). Further research into the influence of social media within the same framework as this study would be complementary.

The media is a web of local and international outlets that treat information as a commodity to be shared in a presumably neutral voice in hopes of informing the public. According to Machin and Van Leeuwen (2007, 7), this media format, originated within a Euro-American cultural framework that was then replicated throughout the world because of globalisation. As of the 19th Century the emergence of news agencies altered the industry by supplying news outlets with set lists of stories to be covered from across the world to increase urgency, topicality, and speed of delivery. The result has been large-scale cultural homogeneity within media processes and practices internationally as news outlets increased their reliance on news agencies to meet industry standards (Machin and Van Leeuwen 2007). The Canadian media landscape is significantly dependent on news agencies. It is said that most “dailies and broadcasters,” which includes radio and television networks, obtain their information and/or news subject selection from the Canadian Press, the national news agency owned and operated by its member newspapers, and to other international agencies to varying degrees (Johansen and Potter 2006). In the context of this research, the role of the Canadian Press is important as a number and types of news outlets increasingly rely on news agencies within the 24/7 news cycle for rapid access to news-worthy stories and to reduce their production costs (Boumans et al., 2018, 1769). While it cannot be assumed that newspapers and television, for example, covered the events of the RMC in the same light nor with the same frequency, their shared sources of information via the news agencies do make this sole focus on newspapers as a representative of the Canadian media coverage at large less presumptuous. Furthermore, in aiming to discern discursive particularities, the current research project does not center around the information selected by news agencies. While their role in the Canadian media ecosystem is acknowledged, it is worth clarifying that a variety of newspapers were chosen deliberately to allow for the analysis of the interpretation of said information by each outlet as well as the way it was conveyed to the Canadian public.

1.2. Research Methodology

1.2.1. Timeframe Selection

The research timeframe of 2015 and 2016 for this study was selected deliberately. A review of the literature surrounding the RMC demonstrates no consensus on when it occurred. Some publications delineate the RMC via distinct events, such as Papaderidou (2017), who claims it to be an eight-month window between April 2015 and March 2016. Others take a broader approach, mentioning the migratory flows between 2014 and 2017 (NoVaMigra 2022) and the events between Winter 2015 and 2016 (Nissen 2022). Even Wikipedia refers to the RMC as the “2015 European migrant crisis,” limiting its span to merely one calendar year.

The literature surrounding the European media coverage of the RMC hints to a similar lack of consensus within academia. While some articles skirt the issue entirely by avoiding providing a timeframe altogether (Gabor and Messing 2016), some are more precise. Chouliaraki and Zaborowski (2017, 614), for example, mention it being first and foremost a “major policy issue” policy, acquiring a level of urgency in May 2015 following two mass-casualty shipwrecks off the Italian coast. Kluknavská, Bernhard, and Boomgaarden (2021, 242) speak of ‘crisis years’, ones which intensified in mid-2015 due to the growing migrant flows into Europe. Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017) provided only the calendar year 2015 as the timeframe. Finally, Lekic-Subasic (2018, 81), who published their piece in 2018, speak of the RMC as “ongoing.” Lekic-Subasic’s (2018) claim of ongoing ‘crisis’ may hold to some extent, especially when RMC is viewed as a crisis of regional policy and a general lack of cohesion and collaboration between EU

Member States. Whether the RMC continues to impact European politics beyond 2016, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.²

Despite the lack of consensus, the majority of European studies refer to RMC developments in both 2015 and 2016 (Chouliaraki and Stolic 2017; Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017; Heidenreich et al., 2019; Garzia Galantino 2022; Verleyen and Beckers 2023; Heidenreich et al., 2018), inciting this research project to adopt a similar timeframe. Adopting a broader timeframe also aims to ensure that all potential events and aspects of the ‘crisis’ are included in the media analysis.

1.2.2. Source Selection

The research presented in this dissertation is premised upon four newspapers: The Globe and Mail (GM), a national newspaper; The Toronto Star (TS), based in Toronto; The Montréal Gazette (MG), based in Montréal, and The Vancouver Sun (VS), based in Vancouver. These sources were selected carefully, weighing readership, geographic, linguistic considerations, as well as political affiliations.

It should be noted that in the province of Québec, while Le Journal de Montréal, a French-language publication, is found to have a higher daily readership base than the Montréal Gazette, it was not chosen for this study for two reasons. The first and most important was that it was not available as a source on Factiva, making it impossible to access its previous publications. The second is due to it being a French media source. As argued by Beaupre and Fischer (2020), language has real-life impacts on how an event, or a group may be perceived and discourses elaborated and/or maintained; not the least of which may be tied to terms and labels associated with human migration. As such, the Montréal Gazette was selected because it is the next most-read daily newspaper in Québec (Agility PR 2022). It being an anglophone

² For more information about post-2016 European migration policies and the EU’s ongoing efforts to address the systemic discrepancies brought to light by the RMC see Beaupré (2023).

source ensures linguistic consistency with the other sources being studied and ultimately mitigates potential nuances in the terminology utilised in the newspaper articles.

The four sources selected for this project are some of Canada's most circulated daily newspapers (Chepkemoi 2019). While based in Toronto, The GM is deemed a national newspaper and is the most circulated outlet in the country. The other three sources figure in Canada's top 10 most consumed newspapers, with TS being 2nd, VS being 7th and GM being 9th respectively (Agility PR 2022). Most importantly, the latter three sources are highly circulated in each of their respective cities; cities that are the largest urban centers and the biggest migrant-receiving hubs in the country. These three cities, moreover, stand geographically distant enough to allow for geographic considerations - albeit limited ones - in a pan-Canadian research project.


It deserves to be clarified that in Canada the media is not under government control. Since 1982 there has been an amendment to the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, providing constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication. Instead, mass media, both in print and digital, is owned by private corporations. The selected newspapers fall under the ownership of 3 separate entities. TS belongs to Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd., GM belongs to the Woodbridge Company Limited, and lastly VS and GM belong to PostMedia. Moreover, these four selected newspapers are reputable and well-established within the country, each rated with 'high credibility' by Media Bias Check, a virtual and international directory of newspapers outlets. Moreover, multiple sources report that these four sources hold a variety of political affiliation. GM reports a centrist affiliation, TS is deemed left-centrist, and VS and GM are considered right-centrist.

1.2.3. Data Selection

The selection of news articles from each news source relied heavily on the use of the Factiva portal, which allows one to compile and compare the outputs of various news outlets. Through Factiva, it was possible to generate a list of all articles published in English by these four media outlets, both in print and online from January 1st, 2015, until December 31st, 2016, that pertained in a general manner to the European continent. To ensure that the articles analysed in this dissertation were at least thematically related to transnational human migration, the articles analysed were filtered via Factiva to ensure they contained at least one of the keywords related to transnational human migration. The keywords are as follows: asylum, migration, migrant, migrants, immigration, immigrant, immigrants, refugee, and refugees.

Combined, articles containing keywords and regional specificity are aimed at finding articles concerning transnational human migration in Europe; they are hereby called articles containing the RM criteria. When looking into articles with the RM criteria by the selected four sources over time, it is evident that 2015 and 2016 are exemplary years. It is worth noting that the year 2020 saw a spike in migration-related news in Europe, most likely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Additional research on the specificities of 2020 and transnational human flows would be required to corroborate the above statement. The graph below demonstrates RM coverage from 2001 to 2021. While 2015 and 2016 resulted in 1,535 and 1,562 RM articles, respectively, the overall average between 2001 and 2021 was 820 RM articles.³ The graph illustrates how extraordinary the years 2015 and 2016 were regarding media attention.

³ Data on RM articles by the selected 4 sources was not available for 2003 on Factiva

Graph 1-Part1: Number of Articles Containing RM Criteria between 2001 and 2021

Overall, there were 18,631 articles published by these four newspapers in 2015 and 2016 surrounding events in Europe; of these, 3,098 articles (17%) included at least one of the keywords. The latter group has been the focus of this research project. A total of 320 articles were analysed. The selection parameters allowed various types of articles, including opinion pieces, letters to the editors, editorials, and so forth. To ensure chronological understanding of the RMC, the articles were divided into eight sample groups of three months. Each sample group contained forty articles, made up of ten articles from each media source selected according to Factiva’s “most relevant” selection.

It should be noted, however, that Factiva’s method of selection for these “relevant” articles could not be found. As such, while still interesting and relevant to this research, the qualitative findings need to be considered with a certain level of skepticism. Furthermore, to ensure a greater breadth of analysis, the articles selected for this study precluded both duplicate articles and articles found to be topically unfocused

to events in Europe or that of a European state; such articles were replaced by the following “most relevant” article as devised by Factiva.

1.2.4. Methods of Research

As narratives exist at the intersection of content and context, the methodology developed for this research project included a content analysis of the selected articles and a discursive analysis. From a quantitative perspective, all statistics presented in this dissertation concerning news articles were performed according to the Factiva-generated numerical outputs. Qualitatively, the content and the discursive analyses of the 320 articles were conducted manually and categorised into a software-assisted NVivo database. They were performed according to the constant comparison method, in which each article is systematically compared to the others to ensure consistency in both the definition and logic of each code (Halperin and Heath 2020, 380). The overall analyses provided a detailed, chronological map of Canadian newspaper coverage of the RMC from January 1st, 2015, until December 31st, 2016. Ultimately, it provides a framework with which one may identify the content and contexts that make up RMC-related narratives in Canada. Rather than examining these narratives in silos, the research mapped how they overlap, intersect, and influence each other, both within and across the various migration-related frames and RMC-related events.

The collected texts were coded using a scheme designed to identify narratives by breaking them down into different characterizing elements representing their main attributes. The content analysis of each article was performed in two steps. First, each article was read meticulously to determine the key topics found in each, as well as which term is used to refer to the migrants arriving in Europe. Key topics, for example, may refer to the geographic focus of the article, both state-specific or regional, the route(s) travelled by the migrants themselves, public and policy responses to the migrant influx and/or specific

events such as the Brexit vote, or again any of the pan-European summit established in response to the migrant influx. Understanding which topics were mentioned the most by Canadian newspapers is viewed as a means of establishing both what topics were deemed the most mention-worthy and which ones were associated the RMC.

Secondly, each article was subjected to a discourse analysis that investigated how the topics were constructed into broader narratives. It was done by identifying how the authors presented the context surrounding each topic, looking into, for example: who was quoted in each article (i.e., whose voice was heard); which past events are mentioned and to what effect; which migrant stories were highlighted; what comparisons were drawn, be it between states, regions, actors, etc.; along with what information was substantiated via statistics, polls and studies. Below is additional information on key aspects of the content and discursive analyses performed in this research project.

In addition to the initial deciphering of ‘what was mentioned’ and ‘how it was constructed,’ each article was further analysed to establish the article’s framing of migrants’ arrival to Europe. According to Neuman, Just, and Crigler’s (1992, 60) definition, frames are “conceptual tools which media and individuals rely on to convey, interpret, and evaluate information.” They are, as such, cognitive devices that help structure and process said discourses by filtering in the way narratives and information are processed and enacted upon (Lekic-Subasic 2018; Ahad and Banulescu-Bogdan 2019, 14). Indeed, how issues are framed matters because it determines how they are received, how they came to be problematized, as well as the range of solutions or responses to such problems. Discourses are framed via narratives. To further understand how Canadian newspapers presented migrants during the RMC, each article was discursively analysed and attribute one or more frames. The frames used are defined by recent studies by the Migration Policy Institute (Ahad and Banulescu-Bogdan 2019; Banulescu-Bogdan, Malka,

and Culbertson 2021), which found that migration-related narratives tend to fit within three categories: the ‘benefit/hero’ frame, the ‘victim’ frame, and the ‘threat/villain’ frame.

The studies define the ‘benefit/hero’ frame emphasizing the positive contributions migrants bring to their host societies, be they economic and/or cultural. The associated narratives usually include notions of migrants’ ‘merit’ to be integrated by highlighting their being entrepreneurial and hardworking, as well as their ability to fill specific labour shortages. By presuming a migrant ‘deserves’ to partake in the host society, it, therefore, implies that belonging and acceptance are precarious and strongly predicated on the actions of migrants themselves.

The ‘victim frame,’ in turn, aims to elicit empathy. It usually spotlights the dire reality migrants, portraying them as vulnerable victims in need of compassion and humanitarian assistance. The frame is usually associated with- but not limited to- humanitarian migration. The inherent assumption of migrants needing help reinforces the stereotype of migrants necessitate a greater level of resources from the host society than what they can provide in return, reinforcing both their passivity and their being an expense. Lastly, the ‘Threat/Villain frame’ depicts migrants as a burden and/or a threat. It advances that their presence is likely to provoke disorder, danger, and/or competition within the host society, be it socially and economically. Associated narratives with this framing usually follow these four axes: economic (migrants take limited jobs or drive down wages), security (they are a threat to safety or public order), health (that they spread disease), and culture and identity (that newcomers’ beliefs and practices are incompatible with core national values) (Banulescu-Bogdan, Malka, and Culbertson 2021, 8).

It should be noted that in the attribution of frames, more than one could simultaneously be attributed to an article. Literature suggests that migration-related media coverage frames migrants as either ‘victims’ or ‘threats/villains,’ and sometimes both at the same time (Van Gorp 2005; Horsti 2016). For example, the ‘victim’ and ‘threat/villain’ frames were frequently found to be co-present in the newspaper

coverage of the RMC (Verleyen and Beckers 2023; Kluknavska, Bernhard, and Boomgaarden 2019). Chouliaraki and Zaborowski (2017) spoke of this as the seemingly contradictory *humanitarian securitisation* discourse, in which humanitarian migrants are simultaneously viewed as vulnerable and, therefore, in need of assistance and as potential sources of danger. They found this contradiction the result of the ambiguous use of migrant labels, in which the perception of refugees may shift from a position of 'victim' to one of 'threat' following events.

The European media studies argued that the said shift terms, may be both reactionary and anchored in pre-existing national constructions. In a study on eight European countries, Chouliaraki and Zaborowski (2017) found that the 2015 coverage which had previously framed RMC-related events in through a 'victim' frame - increasingly-so following the publication of the Kurdi photograph-, switched to a securitised 'threat/villain' frame after the November Paris attacks. Studies found, therefore, that because of the Paris attacks, media use of migrant labels increasingly converged with terrorist labels (Chouliaraki and Zaborowski 2017; Nail 2016). Comparing what they called the 'crisis' period (2015 and 2016) to the 'non-crisis' period (2017-2020), Verleyen and Beckers (2023) found that overall, migrants were less often framed as 'victims' during the crisis period than in the following years. Instead, during RMC years, they- and their arrival- were predominantly framed as burdens for European states. Galantino (2022), moreover, by comparing Italian and German newspapers, found stark dissimilarities regarding political and public attitudes towards migration, concluding that the framing of migration is greatly influenced by the country's national attitude and history. According to them, Italy's comparatively recent introduction to immigration resulted in an inadequate system of policies and regulations and general hostilities towards newcomers pre-2015. Unprepared and faced with an unprecedented influx in 2015, the result was an overwhelmingly negative media coverage of the RMC instrumentalized by right-wing politicians to gain political favour. Germany, on the other hand, with a longer and more consolidated

tradition of immigration post-1940's and its adoption of the *Willkommenskultur* met migrant-arrivals with relatively positive attitudes. Gabor and Messing (2016) found similar results when comparing Hungary's and Austria's media coverage and national responses to the RMC. Both studies found that the media of more welcoming states framed RMC-related events through the 'victim' frame whereas their counterparts overwhelmingly employed the 'threat/villain' frame. It is interesting to note that not a single European study on media coverage of the RMC included the 'benefit/hero' frame as part of their analysis, as one would presume that it would have been present to varying degrees throughout the continent.

To offer additional information on the framing of 2015-2016 migrant arrival in Europe in Canadian newspaper coverage, moreover, each article was studied according to a set list of existing narrative themes. The narrative themes are as follows: Humanitarian solidarity, National pride, Pragmatism, Economic insecurity, Threats to physical security, Threats to national identity, and State ability to control human flows across borders. Below is chart depicting each narrative theme with their most-frequently associated migrant frame and defining features.

Table 1-Part1: Breakdown of Narrative Frames with Migrant Frame and Defining Features

Narrative Theme	Migrant Frame	Defining Features and key concepts
Humanitarian Solidarity	Victim	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moral obligation to help • Shared Humanity • Compassion
National Pride	Benefit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pride in humanitarian legacy • Pride in diversity and multiculturalist legacy
Pragmatism	Benefit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Declining birthrate and dwindling demographics • Labour influx and economic development
Economic Insecurity	Threat/villain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scarcity of resources • Migrants as burdens to the state • Labour market competition • protectionism
Threats to physical Security	Threat/villain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • criminal activity • terrorism & religious extremism
Threats to National Identity	Threat/villain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • citizenship variegation • belonging and 'othering' • losing sense of identity
State Ability to Control Human Flows across Borders	Threat/villain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • controlling human flows • perception of invasion • migrant abuse of the system

The pre-existing narratives have been established according to an extensive literature review on discourses surrounding transnational human migration, focusing on Canadian discourses. Introducing

these narratives is an important aspect of this research project because frames are present in numerous mutually constructed narratives.

1.3. Ethical considerations of the Research Project

The content analysis is entirely based on texts in both the historical and political science components of this project. As such, while the topic is sensitive by its very focus on migration flows at a time of heightened attention towards them, it does not involve any human participants. The current dissertation did not require any ethics approval from either institutions and/or departments.

1.4. Limitations of the Research Project

The content and discursive analyses presented in this project are inherently tied to individual interpretation of the data gathered and must allow for some level of subjectivity in its final products. Moreover, the author is aware that even if Canada's vast geography is taken into consideration when selecting the media sources, there are limitations in terms of representability in the current project. The three out of four newspapers selected represent three provinces: Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. Even if those are the most populated ones within the country, additional research into how media outlets from the Maritimes, the Prairies, and the Canadian Territories would be complementary to offer a more accurate pan-Canadian media analysis. Similarly, the present project is limited to English-only sources and could have benefited from a bilingual approach.

Moreover, while newspapers are deliberately selected as the main source for media analysis (see above), greater technological advancement and, especially, the advent of social media are to be kept in mind. As such, the project's findings are limited by the changing media ecosystem. Already in 2000, for

example, newspapers were showing signs of losing favour among younger people (Putnam 2000; O'Neil 2009).

The author would like to remind readers that the identified migration narratives related to media coverage of the RMC in Canada and the findings from their analyses are limited to the research framework in which they are developed.

Moreover, the use of the Factiva to compile this project's database, moreover, precluded the analysis of media portrayal via images. The software does not provide access to the photographs published alongside the article's understory, and while it would have been interesting to add this element to the current discursive study, it was impossible to do so.

It is worth mentioning that numerous complementary studies investigated other types of media sources that were not included in this literature review. For example, Lee and Nerghes (2018) discursively analysed video portrayal of RMC-related events on YouTube, bravely delving into commentary section to decipher how migrants were being constructed in the virtual sphere. Other studies focused on social media looking, for instance, into how political actors in Italy (Colombo 2018) and various other European countries (Heidenreich 2018) portrayed the 'crisis' on Facebook. Or again, how far-right groups in Poland (Krzyzanowski 2017) and Sweden (Ekman 2018) mobilised anti-immigration sentiments via Twitter and Facebook respectively. The above-listed studies constitute in no way an exhaustive list, but they are indicative of the complementary body of work that delves into the discursive analysis of non-newspaper, European media representation of RMC.

The current research project is limited in it focusing on 'quality' (i.e., reputable) news sources. It may be worthwhile to conduct complimentary research, including other mediums such as tabloid (i.e., sensational) news coverage of the RMC, to compare and contrast the journalistic techniques used in both mediums. In Europe, the analysis of varied mediums was performed by Greussing and Boomgaarden

(2017) and Gabor and Messing (2016) because one may expect a significantly more negative portrayal in the emotionally-driven, 'horse-race' journalism associated with tabloids – especially in times of 'crisis.' It is worth adding, however, that for the most part, the studies found only minor divergences in the discursive construction of the RMC between the two types. As the coverage of both outlets has proven to be marginally different, it reinforces this project's reasoning to focus on a single type of media.

2. State of the Art: Canadian Narrative Themes Surrounding Transnational Human Migration

This chapter aims to delve into academic literature surrounding transnational human migration and introduces related narratives. The narratives, in turn, are organised into seven overarching themes, according to their underlying logic. The chapter is organised in a way that presents first the pro-migrant and then the con-migration migration narrative themes, divided according to their most-commonly associated migrant frame. The themes have been identified and organised as such according to research projects with similar methodological approaches such as this one, albeit all focusing on European-based media coverage of the RMC (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, and Moore 2015; Heidenreich et al., 2019; Galantino 2022; Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017; and Lekić-Subašić 2018). It is worth noting that while the themes are organised as such, they are not mutually exclusive but rather frequently build upon one another. They may also contend with one another in interesting ways; numerous examples of this are below. The themes are as follows: humanitarian solidarity, national pride, pragmatism, economic insecurity, threats to physical safety, threats to national identity, and a state's ability to control human flow across its borders. A comprehensive list of Canadian narratives associated with transnational human migration may be found in Appendix A.

For each theme, examples are provided to illustrate the key narratives at play, with particular attention to Canadian instances. The chapter presents a brief introduction of how narratives are constructed and how they may be reflected in real-life through policies, civic mobilisation, and media depiction. Highlighting the Canadian history of transnational human migration in relation to the various interacting and contending narratives is utilised to set the scene for how migrant framing and narratives are perceived in this research project.

2.1. Pro-Migration Narratives Themes

There are three narrative themes in this section. The first, is ‘Humanitarian Solidarity’. Narratives associated with this theme usually frame migrants as ‘victims’ and incite pro-migration sentiment and initiatives. The other two narrative themes are ‘National Pride’ and ‘Pragmatism’. These themes are often associated with the ‘benefit’ frame.

It is important to note that narratives do not need to be accurate to be persuasive and widely shared. Indeed, as Banulescu-Bogdan, Malka and Culbertson (2021, 9) stated, “they may gain currency precisely by oversimplifying, distorting, or omitting details.”

2.1.1. Humanitarian Solidarity

The first theme identified is linked to a single philosophical narrative, one of human solidarity. Stories related to this narrative are usually associated with the ‘victim’ frame and are premised upon a moral obligation for host societies towards migrants anchored in shared humanity and, indeed, in a more contemporary sense in Human Rights. It is worth mentioning, moreover, that while human solidarity and is frequently associated with humanitarian migrants, it is not solely reserved for them. It advances that all transnational migrants, be they regular or irregular, be entitled to be treated fairly and with compassion in light their being human. This narrative is propelled by a variety of actors and fuels countless public and private humanitarian initiatives, civil society campaigns, and even migrant advocacy groups, to name a few. The narrative is one of ‘duty’ in the face of disparity, in which the fortunate ones (i.e., individuals, societies, states, etc.) are morally required to lend a hand to those in need precisely because of their privileged position and ability to do so. It also suggests that transnational humanitarian migrants find themselves in dire situations, inciting a mixture of emotions, be it pity towards the migrant, resentment towards the perceived cause(s) of their precarity, and/or a level of

compassion towards the individuals in need of assistance. In turn, these emotions may result in a desire to help migrants through various means, such as physical and financial donations and calls to welcome those in need.

The narrative, moreover, has been codified into an international humanitarian regime. While the practice of sheltering ‘others’ in need predates the 20th century, it has been argued that it was the two World Wars that standardised the practice and the perception of transnational humanitarian migration, making it a distinctively modern phenomenon (Bessel and Haake 2009). Indeed, when the international community adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, it agreed on the minimum civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights that all humans are entitled to due to their humanity (OHCHR 2017), including the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in states other than their own. The 1951 UN Refugee Convention and later the 1967 Protocol were the first to separate transnational migration on humanitarian grounds from economic migration (Watson 2009), constituting the cornerstones of the humanitarian regime in place. Transnational humanitarian migration includes the forced and voluntary mobility of refugees and asylum seekers as well as victims of trafficking. ‘Refugees’ are those whose claims have been both processed and recognized under the terms of the 1951 Convention or as people in need of protection based on humanitarian grounds not explicitly included in the 1951 Convention but included in a state’s domestic legislation, whereas an ‘asylum seeker’ is a person seeking protection into a state other than their own and whose claim for refugee status has not yet been determined. In turn, victims of trafficking are individuals who have been threatened or forced into transportation, recruitment, or exploitation for reasons including sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery, servitude, or removal of organs (UNODC 2019). As such, the moral obligation born out of human solidarity and compassion towards strangers in dire conditions has provided individuals needing assistance with legal pathways to cross state boundaries.

In academic literature, the narrative is chiefly associated with post-colonial thinking. Not only does it presume wealthier countries to be duty-bound *and* willful, benevolent benefactors. The narrative does not reflect the global reality. According to Triandafyllidou (2018), while most research on transnational humanitarian migration focuses on the reception and governance of transnational humanitarian flows into European and other Western/Global/North/First World/etc. states; it is, in fact, developing countries which host 84% of the world's refugees (UNHCR 2017a). Studies demonstrate that there are real-life limitations to states' willingness to meet said moral obligation, leaving those in precarious situations being vilified precisely because of their precarity. Watson (2009), for example, demonstrated how policies had been designed in Western democracies to shirk said moral obligation, including, but not limited to, carrier sanctions, visa requirements, safe third-country agreements, mandatory detention, and temporary protection. These policies are substantiated by the fear-based themes established below, not the least of which is related to how humanitarian migrants are depicted. The vision of refugees and asylum seekers needing to be pitied and in need of help creates a specific image of what is a humanitarian migrant. Humanitarian migrants are generally constructed as 'passive' actors and thus void of agency and victims of their past experiences and current situation (Ticktin 2016).

As one of the northernmost states surrounded by oceans on three sides and an economically powerful Southern neighbour, Canada's geographic position has mainly safeguarded it from large-scale unauthorised human flows and allowed it to have a selective immigration system (Hiebert, 2016, 1). As a result, Canada is deliberate in who it allows in the country and grants permanent residency to around 250 thousand individuals every year, less than 10% of whom are refugees, the rest, being economic migrants by a large majority, selected to fill labour shortages (Epp 2017, 1). Not only does Canada get to hand-select humanitarian migration they allow within their borders thanks to its unique geography, evidence shows, moreover, that contrary to the country's image as a leader in refugee resettlement, some

still vilify refugees as “queue-jumpers,” resource-drains, and security threats (Huot et al., 2015), sentiments bolstered my media depictions (Winter, Patzelte and Beauregard 2018; Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2018).

For host countries, the victim-saviour association is premised upon historically entrenched notions of ‘worthiness’ of assistance entrenched in race, superiority and colonialism (Anderson 2013; Fassin 2011; Vickers 2016). To be ‘worthy’ of assistance and therefore ‘legible’ to state-approved humanitarian criteria (Ehrkamp 2017), as well as to differentiate their applications from other seemingly ‘bogus’ ones, individuals have been known to cater their identity to ensure recognition of their passivity, vulnerability, and moral purity (Kyriakides 2017; Kyriakides et al., 2018). A study by Shuman and Bohmer (2014, 949), for example, demonstrated that some refugees in Turkey were emphasizing LGBTQ* characteristics in hopes of gaining third-country resettlement based on being persecuted due to their sexual orientation. Migrant passivity, moreover, has a gendered component. As the Shuman and Bohmer’s (2014) study highlights, refugee reallocation programs are known to prioritise women, unaccompanied minors, entire family units or members of specific communities (i.e., LGBTQ*). Building upon narratives of migrants as both threats to national identity and physical security, these trends oftentimes leave men, especially racialized ones, to be viewed as ‘culturally backward’ perpetrators of violence and discrimination (Olivius 2016; Ghebrai and Ballucci 2022). Said passivity, moreover, simultaneously depicts migrants wholesale as victims of human traffickers and/or smugglers. Doing so reinforces the association between transnational migration on the one hand and criminality and immorality on the other, ultimately fuelling anti-immigration sentiments. The resulting association is what Kneebone (2010) called the “trafficked-smuggled” person dichotomy.

It stands to show, therefore, that the ‘victim’ frame, often associated with narratives concerning human solidarity and compassion, may simultaneously present a ‘threat/villain’ frame. Such narratives may support both pro- and con-migration rationales.

2.1.2. National Pride

There are two narratives on transnational human migration thematically associated with national pride. The first, focuses on the abovementioned theme of human solidarity and compassion. In this narrative, citizens feel proud of their country’s humanitarian endeavours, whether it’s linked to a specific event/program like Canada’s track record of mass refugee resettlement programs or because their country has a reputation of benevolence. Germany’s well-known efforts to welcome Syrian refugees during the RMC, for example, stood in stark contrast to the attitude taken by nearby states like Hungary and even France. In this sense, Canadians and Germans may have simultaneously found satisfaction in helping others as and gratification in being perceived in such a positive light.

The second associated narrative speaks to pride in one’s legacy of diversity and heritage of transnational human migration. In Canada, for example, immigration is a key national history and identity element. Indeed, only Canada, New Zealand, and Australia diverge from the rest of the OECD countries because of their relatively low public hostility towards immigration. Even if these states face “acute” integration dilemmas due to increasingly diversified sources of immigration (Hollifield et al., 2022, 9), the authors attribute this exceptionalism to their shared history of settler-colonialism in which immigration is a key feature of their founding myths and historical consciousness.

To further illustrate, pro-migration national pride for Canadians includes the country viewing itself as a ‘migration nation,’ as a leader among Western nations in refugee protection and resettlement (Molnar 2016), and it implies the country priding itself on its immigration background, its diversity, and

its multiculturalism (Trebilcock 2019; Fiřtová 2022). Canadian society perceives itself as a cultural “mosaic,” one of peaceful coexistence, tolerance, diversity, and accommodation, standing in sharp contrast with the American assimilation-based “melting pot”. The narrative is legislatively supported, as Canada was the first country to adopt multiculturalism as an official policy in 1971, championing a pro-immigration stance reinforced by a set of policies, not the least of which include the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act. Multiculturalism here refers to the state’s active role in preserving and promoting different cultures, religions, and minority languages within the same territory.

More than merely a policy, however, Canadian multiculturalism was viewed as a normative social project (Winter 2011). The Canadian approach to transnational human migration, moreover, has been labeled as a kind of “Canadian exceptionalism” (Bloemraad 2012) premised on the relative pro-immigration and pro-multicultural consensus across the political spectrum (Gordon, Jeram, and Linden 2020). Others, however, seek to nuance said ‘exceptionalism,’ citing evidence of anti-immigration, nationalistic, Islamophobic rhetoric about the integration of minorities in Canada, especially those of Muslim origin (Kymlicka 2018; Ryan 2010; May 2022), a rhetoric, in turn, similar to that of Europe’s rising anti-immigration right-wing parties (Gillies, Raynauld, and Turcotte 2020).

Narratives around national pride may be used to mobilise civic and public action. In Canada, for example, the what would later be known as the ‘Syrian Refugee Crisis’ sparked during the Fall of 2015 federal elections, during which time the photograph of Alan (Aylan) Kurdi, a deceased two-year-old Syrian boy who drowned crossing with his family from Turkey to Greece was published. The photograph proved significant for Canadians, not only because it horrified the world and reproduced *en masse* in the international media, but also because the country was directly implicated with it. Within a week of its publication, it became known that Alan’s family had attempted to gain humanitarian

protection in Canada but had been refused for administrative reasons, spurring them to attempt the dangerous journey into Europe (Kurdi 2019). While it would later be known that it was extended family members and not Alan's immediate family members that had been rejected by Canada, by then the Canadian public was already calling for greater government action towards Syrian refugees. The Kurdi photograph, fueled a chain of events in Canada which culminated in narratives of national pride. Once emblematic of national shame and inaction, the story of the Kurdi family spurred humanitarian solidarity within the country and incited actions and initiatives that kindled feelings of national pride. It is an example of how numerous narratives may interact and/or intersect with one another, influencing outcomes.

The image's media resonance can be understood within the context of the 2015 Canadian Federal Election, as elections are a time of heightened political scrutiny and debate (Gavin 2018). Prior to the election, the incumbent Conservative candidates were resisting a more expansive refugee response and made blunt links between the Syrian refugees, Islam, and terrorism with comments that would resurface increasingly after the terrorist attacks in Europe. At that same time, Sweden, which has only about a quarter of Canada's population, had opened its doors to more than 30,000 Syrians, and Germany was expecting to receive 800,000 refugees (Goodspeed 2018, 285). As such, in September 2015, in the last few weeks leading up to Canada's 42nd federal election, the Kurdi tragedy, the RMC, and the Syrian Refugee Crisis became politicized, prompting Canada's major parties to distinguish themselves by promising refugee-resettlement policies, with special attention to Syrian refugees.⁴ Numerous scholars have attributed the Liberal Party's most-welcoming position on refugee resettlement among the

⁴ The Conservative party citing financial, resource and security concerns, proposed the smallest number. The New Democratic Party suggested resettling 10,000 in 2015 with a total of 36,000 over the next 4 years. Lastly, the Liberal and Green parties supported the arrival of 25,000 Syrians in 2015, citing both humanitarian reasons and economically driven ones, hoping to boost the labour force and the demographics of the ageing country (Hussen 2018).

contributing factors to their victory in October 2015 (Molnar 2016, 70; Carver 2016, 232; Fiřtová 2021; Bose 2020,14).

It could also be, as Goodspeed (2018) stated, that the photograph reminded civil society of their power to act as they did in the 1970-1980s. Following the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam in 1975, nearly a million people fled the region. Canadians first became aware of the events thanks to the technological development of televisions, which brought the plight of “boat people” into Western living rooms. The story followed more than 2,500 Vietnamese aboard the *Hai Hong* cargo ship fleeing the warzone. The vessel was in dire conditions and its passengers had been denied permission to land by numerous countries. Sizeable reporting and imaging on the conditions on the *Hai Hong*’s cramped quarters, Canadians “fretted” over the world’s failure to help the refugees according to Goodspeed (2018, 288), comparing this developing situation with that of the WWII Jewish population. News of Pol Pot’s camps and Vietnam’s re-education camps, it seemed, conjured nightmares of the Nazi Holocaust and Canada’s shameful refusal of the MS *St Louis* with a thousand Jews aboard in 1939.⁵ Following a sizeable humanitarian media campaign, the Canadian government was the first of many countries to select, process, and remove people from the *Hai Hong*, taking over 600 individuals. The story of this ship began Canada’s unique tradition of private sponsorship of refugees. Forty years later, feelings humanitarian solidarity incited civil society to revamp this tradition, with the top Google search term in Canada post- Kurdi publication being: “How to Sponsor a Syrian?” (Goodspeed 2018). The desire to help many Syrians being portrayed as an inherently ‘Canadian’ thing to do, was reflected in the articulation of all parties throughout the 2015 election (Molnar 2017). Overall, private sponsorship

⁵ Between 1933 and 1945, Canada admitted fewer than 5,000 Jewish refugees. All in all, it accepted the lowest number of refugees among developed nations. When world leaders met in France in 1938 to tackle the dire reality of Jews fleeing Nazism, Canada made no commitment to help stating economic reasons. Not only did the government take a passive response to the crisis, but it also raised the capital requirement for Jewish immigrants (from \$5,000 to \$20,000, and denied admission for other reasons to those with sufficient funds (Epp 2017, 7)

accounted for almost half of the resettled Syrian refugees (Xu 2021). The call to action also reflects a narratives associated with human solidarity and national pride, as they jointly and interactively led to mass mobilisation. Overnight, it seemed, the prevailing negative perception of refugees in Canadian migration discourse, which had prevailed for over a decade, was overhauled by a newfound desire to help, a reminder of the so-called Canadian “values” of welcoming those in need of help (Tyyskä et al., 2017; Winter and Beauregard 2018).

On the narrative of national pride, more specifically, it has been said that the widespread call to action seemed so grand that, if anything, refugee advocates felt that the resulting self-congratulating news coverage “amounted to a massive Internet ‘selfie’ in which Canada’s admiration for its response to the Syrian crisis threatened to overshadow the narratives of the Syrians themselves” (Goodspeed 2018, 301). This statement was also supported in Tyyskä and colleagues’ study (2017) which found that the media coverage of the Syrian resettlement program usually ignored the program recipients altogether by instead fixating on the deeds and generosity of the Canadians involved.

2.1.3. Pragmatism

Narratives that fall under the pragmatism theme are linked by their underlying pro-migration logic. Each of these premises a transactional logic, depicting the numerous ways in which host societies may benefit from both regular and irregular migrant injections. The focus of these narratives is not the migrants themselves as much as their contributions to hosts societies. They are, as such, usually associated with a supportive stance towards immigration.

The first narrative supports the need for immigrant arrival in societies facing a declining birth rate and/or an ageing population. Immigration can help aging populations by increasing the size of the working-age population, which can help maintain a senior-to-working-age ratio (United Nations

2001). Migration may thus reduce population decline, improve age dependency ratios, and keep the labor force from shrinking. For example, beyond mere humanitarian duty, as well as national pride, boosting Canadian demographics was also an important consideration behind Canada's largescale Syrian Resettlement Program in 2015 (Mustafa et al., 2021). The importance of migrant influx into Canadian society is sizeable. The country faces the challenges of an ageing population. Between 2016 and 2021, the number of people aged 85 and older grew by 12%, which is more than twice as 5% population growth rate (Statistics Canada 2022). As of 1972, Canada's birthrate dropped below the threshold needed to maintain a steady population (Statistics Canada 2024). A study delving into historical immigration patterns and birthrate statistics estimated that immigration accounted for 71% of the country's population growth between 1867 and 2011 (Edmonston 2016). Indeed, among nearly 8 million births between 1993-2018, almost 22% came from immigrant parents, of which 37% were economic migrants, 60% had come to the country for family reunification purposes, and 13% came as refugees (Yang et al., 2024).

The second narrative views migrant labour to host societies as an infusion of human capital, a stimulus for creativity, entrepreneurship, and investment (see, for example, Kloosterman and Rath 2004). It should be clarified that this economic narrative, more for than the previously demographic-incited one, is usually associated with—but not limited to—economic migration and its potential contributions rather than humanitarian migration. In many countries, immigration law and policy have historically been aligned with economic interests. This narrative is usually reflected in policies such as these. It was the case in Canada (Green and Green 1999), where even the country's initial colonization efforts called for migrant-supplied "manpower needs" (Knowles 1997, 6). Since the mid-80s, the country has taken around 250 thousand new permanent residents per year, or roughly 0.8 percent of its population annually (Reitz 2012; Hiebert 2016). Canada is deliberate in who it allows within the

country. Out of the 250,000, less than ten percent are refugees, preferring economic migration to fill labour shortages and boost economic competitiveness (Epp 2017,1). Considering that Canada allows, on average, three times more immigrants than the USA does per year, it is worth mentioning that the country maintains comparably high levels of public support for immigration and toleration for the increasing diversity than other OECD countries (Hollifield et al., 2022). Economically, moreover, migrant populations are important contributions to the country's skilled labour supply. Not only are they statistically younger, but they are also more educated. Immigrant males in 2011 were twice as likely as non-immigrant males to have a bachelor's degree, even if data shows that migrant populations experience lower family incomes than non-immigrants (Edmonston 2016). These economic benefits are not felt uniformly throughout the country. Immigrant families are forty-four percent and sixty-six percent more likely to settle in British Columbia and Ontario, respectively, than non-immigrants, leaving relatively fewer immigrants in Quebec and the Prairies and fewer still in the Atlantic provinces. This vision stands contrary to the presumption that migrant labour 'flood' local labour markets and increase competition, thereby diminishing the job prospects of citizens.

The narrative has been codified into policies pertaining to temporary foreign workers (TFW) who come for a specified amount of time, and irregular migrant labour. The contribution of irregular labour plays a significant role in sectors like agriculture, elder and children care, hospitality, construction, and industry. A study found that irregular labour is key in low-skilled and low-wage sectors and in high skilled ones such as education, health, public administration, and financial services. The latter body is chiefly comprised of international students who have overstayed their education visas and are thus irregular (Chappell et al., 2011).

The Covid-19 pandemic, for example, highlighted the importance of regular and irregular migrant labour in Western societies, not the least of which in healthcare and agriculture. Migrant labour was then

labelled ‘essential’ to countries’ efforts to curb the spread of the pandemic as well as to economic recovery from subsequent recession. Even before 2021, there was widespread acknowledgement in Canada that its agricultural system depends on the labour of TFWs, with the influx of nearly 60,000 TFWs each year from predominantly Southern American countries (Falconer 2020).

A mixture of both narratives results in the view that the youth migration be prized as a demographic advantage in the global economic competition to retain skilled labour among industrialized countries whose natural birth rates are in decline (Bauder 2011). The role and retention of international students in this global competition is particularly important, not only because they provide a pool of skilled labour but also because of their presumed youth. From a policy perspective, the interact of these narratives may be seen in policies targeting international students. In 2017 and 2018, the sizeable international student body has been said to inject between 18 and 22 billion dollars each year in Canada, translating into the creation of over 180,000 jobs and contributing over 3 billion dollars in Federal tax revenue (Government of Canada 2020). Moreover, it is estimated that between twenty and twenty-seven percent of international students apply for Permanent residency within ten years of graduation, providing an influx of young, skilled labour into the country (Statistics Canada 2015).

2.2. Con-Migration Narrative Themes

The remaining four narratives are driven by feelings of insecurity within the host society and are thus usually associated with the ‘threat/villain’ migrant frame. The first three of these narratives present three facets of nativism: economic nativism, centered on the notion that jobs should be reserved for native citizens; welfare chauvinism, based on the idea that native citizens should be accorded absolute priority when it comes to social benefits; and symbolic nativism, advancing the notion that government should do everything to defend the cultural identity of a given society (Betz 2019).

Often sporting negative portrayals of migrants, these narratives are considered con-migration. Even in societies where migration is prized and widely accepted, they may come a point where narratives of threat, loss, and fairness eclipse pro-migration ones. Such a shift has been visible in Canadian history.

2.2.1. Economic Insecurity

Two narratives fall under this theme: migrant influx into the labour market increases competition to the detriment of citizens, and the cost of care for humanitarian migrants takes away from capacities to care for citizens. Each of these narratives carries the underlying logic of economic insecurity and resource scarcity and depict migrants as resource drains. These negative portrayals inject anxiety into debates surrounding the future of the state and future immigration. While data demonstrates that migration is an economic boon for the host society, public opinion, in any case, usually takes little account of the intricacies of economic analysis (Betz 2019). What follows instead is the narrative of ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of globalisation, in which host societies feel their ability to ‘win’ be challenged by the influx of labour migrant.

Following the 2008 globe recessions transnational human migration has been said to be increasingly viewed in this light (Poole and Williamson, 2021). By 2016, a wave of nativism and migrant-focused resentment could be found in political debates across Europe and North America (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Schwartz et al., 2021). The 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK, for example, is said to have been predominantly driven, by fears over transnational migration and a desire to ‘regain control’ from the EU on corresponding policies (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017; Ford and Goodwin 2017; Prosser, Mellon, and Green 2016). In the same year, Donald Trump became president of the USA, building a large part of his electoral campaign on anti-immigrant sentiment. Nativism supports a fiscally austere approach to government spending, one that Poole and Williamson (2021) say blurs the

myths of ‘national unity’ and ‘alien disruption’ with the myth of ‘overspending.’ It necessitates the excluding of certain people from participating in the national economy, either in the form of jobs or welfare. By hiding behind fiscal responsibility and urgency, they argue that such nativist discourses enable political parties and media depictions a “post-racist and radical disguise (Poole and Williamson 2021, 265).”

Even in historically pro-multicultural Canada, there is evidence of what Betz (2019, 119) referred to as economic nativism. As examples, he cites a 1905 report from Quebec on immigrants that claims the country “cannot afford to be populated with outcasts from all countries of Europe, thrown to be a burden on us by the United States officials in our midst” (Woodworth 1909, 229). In the early 1930s, moreover, Western Canada officials blamed recent Central European immigrants for exacerbating ‘relief’ (i.e., public assistance) problems in the country and consequently advocating for “ship[ping] them out of the country” (Palmer 1982, 130).

The first narrative under this theme is linked to the idea that migrants ‘steal’ jobs away from local citizens. It could be, in part, because migrant youth in Canada are statistically more educated than non-migrant Canadians. However, the difference may speak more to how they value higher education rather than an unfair advantage, considering that migrant populations are more likely to be less financially resilient than their counterpart (Edmonston 2016). The narrative, reflected in the protectionist measures the Canadian government took to prevent such a scenario, contends with other narratives that fall under the pragmatism theme.

International students, for example, whose long-term and short-term benefits the host societies are recognised in pragmatist narratives, find themselves with restricted labour market access because of policies influenced by this narrative of economic insecurity. Foreign students in Canada on study permits are only entitled to work part-time during the academic term, up to twenty hours per week off-

campus. In between academic terms and for a maximum of three years post-graduation, they are entitled to work full-time (Government of Canada 2024a). Similarly, while Canada's dependence on TFW's labour may be viewed as taking away jobs from citizens under the logic of economic insecurity such labour visas are permitted exclusively to fill industry gaps in labour-intensive areas such as seasonal agricultural, food service, domestic cleaning, and so forth. In 2014, for example, Canada's agriculture sector was unable to fill 26,400 job positions, which cost the industry \$1.5 billion and left farmers with "excessive stress and hours as a result of not being able to find the workers they required" (Canadian Agricultural Human Resources Council 2019). Hiring a TFW requires employers to fill a Labour Market Impact Assessment (Government of Canada 2023), which provides that there is a need for said foreign labour, and that no Canadian citizen or permanent resident can do the job. It is a long-standing Canadian practice in place since 1966. TFWs in 2018 accounted for only 0.6% of the Canadian labour force (Government of Canada 2024b).

The second narrative is motivated by welfare chauvinism, a term used to describe the perspective that state support should be restricted to national citizens and not provided to 'others' (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990). 'Others' may refer to humanitarian migrants, family members of immigrants, and even disabled migrants. In some instances, welfare chauvinism may thus be seen as counter-argumentative to narratives of humanitarian solidarity and compassion. According to Capurri (2020, 8) Canada has since the 1860s upheld the "belief that individuals are worthy only insofar as they are productive and useful to the material growth of the country," such a vision of transnational human migration falls under the narrative theme of economic insecurity.

The narrative's real-life applications can be seen, for example, in the country's medical provision of inadmissibility, as a way to prevent "undue economic burden and a necessity for the preservation of Canadian health and social services to the benefit of Canadian citizens" (Capurri 2020, 8). Data shows

that since the mid-1990s, there has been a general backlash against immigration and multiculturalism, prompting some countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States to adopt various restrictions and limitations on immigrants' access to social programs. While Canada has been deemed "comparatively immune to the welfare chauvinism that is troubling other countries (Koning and Banting 2013, 593)," migrants still face some exclusion from social services. Access to Canadian social services such as old age benefits, health care, child benefits, unemployment benefits, and social assistance is premised by the migrants' status. Canada recognises three types of permanent immigrants, associated with permanent residency (Koning and Banting 2013). Two of them, economic migrants and refugees, have almost complete access to Canadian social programs. Migrants who have come under the 'family reunification' category are allowed into the country only with a sponsor, meaning a close relation who has proven capable of supporting the migrants financially between three to ten years. In this system, any claims made by the migrant might be required to be paid back by the sponsor. As for temporary residents, including TFWS, international students, and asylum seekers, they have little access to services. Moreover, TFWs are exempt from employment insurance based on their status, and elderly immigrants are at a disadvantaged position in the pension system premised upon length of employment. The exclusion of some migrants and not others from social services speaks to the intersection of humanitarians, pragmatists, and economic insecurity narratives, where the reflection of duty towards those in need, or again, the perception of benefit from migrant labour is being recognised as 'worthy' of publicly funded assistance, while others are not.

2.2.2. Threats to Physical Security

There is one overarching logic associated with narratives within this theme: it follows that migrants pose a tangible threat to the safety of host society members. These narratives are based on

migrants being viewed as more likely to partake in harm-inducing activities, both abroad and within the host society, not the least of which is linked with criminal activity and even terrorism.

The first narrative links migration with criminality. It is such a frequent association that it has been given a name, *crimmigration*. It is a multifaceted idea (Atak and Simeon 2018). It involves a legal process in which criminal law processes, categories, and techniques are used for migration control. Within the logic, violating migration-related legislation is akin to a criminal offence. Criminality as such may be attributed solely to a migrant's lack of status. Undocumented migrants, also frequently referred to as illegal migrants or "illegals", are deemed to be breaking the law by virtue of their status (or lack thereof), associating them with crime (Demleitner 2018). It is as if not going through the regular channels upon crossing a state border implies a penchant for criminal activity, ignoring the fact that many undocumented migrants are asylum seekers legally entitled to irregular mobility according to human rights. Yet, the assumption that undocumented migrants commit more crimes than citizens remains pervasive, a fact criticized in academic literature (Ewing, Martínez, and Rumbaut 2015; Matos 2018). In a similar vein, asylum seekers and refugees are frequently presented as faking persecution and abusing the humanitarian regime designed to offer them protection (Demleitner 2018), demonstrating a counterbalance to the humanitarian solidarity narratives.

The narrative of migrants being irregular movement while discursively associated with law-breaking, poor intentions, and general negativity, does not necessarily befit the reputation. Indeed, 'irregularity, and especially 'illegality', does not refer to the individuals themselves but rather to their migratory 'identity' - or lack of - at a certain point in time. This notion of time is vital as any changes in laws and policies may turn a regular migrant into an irregular one and vice-versa, rendering their legal status apt to change mid-journey and/or stay. These changes render it arduous not only for the migrants, who are subjected to bordering processes, but also for anyone attempting to assess a comprehensive

picture of international migration. Indeed, while there has been a global trend to increase security in a post-9/11 world due to fear of illegal migration, terrorism, and smuggling, international levels of irregular entry have gone unabated despite extensive efforts. For irregular migrants, the securitization of migration discourses on both sides of the Atlantic legitimized control measures to curb migration that might not have otherwise been acceptable - or even just humane - had it not been viewed so threateningly (Horsti 2012; about securitizing concept see Wæver 1995). There were numerous instances during RMC that demonstrate how official policies to curb human flows - some of which are inspired by life-saving, humanitarian logic - have instead resulted in forcing migrants to take on additional risks, take on additional financial expenses, and/or travel via more dangerous routes to bypass said policies (see for example Border Walls in Sample Groups 3 and 4, the EU-Turkey Deal in Sample Groups 5 and 6, and Dismantling migrant camps Sample Group 8).

In Canada more specifically, policies towards human migration in 2015 were becoming increasingly securitised. The Steven Harper-led Conservative administration between 2006 and 2015 took a hard stance on immigration. During this time, the country increased immigration detention, strengthened border controls, and enhanced its international cooperation in the fight against irregular human mobility (Atak and Simeon 2018, 6). Moreover, asylum policy was perceived one of the most contentious issues during this administration. Immigration policies were revisited to divert resources from refugee and migrant resettlement and integration programs to strengthening border controls to “root out” potential terrorists (Antonius, Labelle, and Rocher 2021). The reception of refugee claims was significantly reduced, followed by restrictive humanitarian migration policies in an attempt at discarding “bogus” applications from “economic freeloaders” meant to save the government \$1.6 billion over five years (Goodspeed 2018). Years of migration-related policy changes go hand in hand with shifts in public discourses, casting migrants as untrustworthy, costly, and associated with criminal

activity (Carver 2016). In doing so, the Harper government is said to have both responded to and reinforced nativist strands in Canadian public opinion (Carver 2016) and ultimately “introduced a new demarcation line between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in a topoi of comparison, where the former is associated with ‘generosity’ and the latter with ‘crime’” (Fiřtová 2021, 277). It was no surprise, therefore, that the five terrorist attacks on European soil between 2015 and 2016, four of which were either directly or indirectly linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), furthered entrenched the securitisation of migration discourses in Canada and in other non-European Western countries. The association was in large part, according to de B. Taillon (2015), due to the idea that ISIS was linked to plots in Canada, Australia, Libya, Tunisia, and the U.S. during the same time frame. While one should be wary of blatantly linking refugees and migrants involved within the RMC to terrorism, assuming a correlation would be grossly injudicious, these linkages persist and are, as such, worth delving into.

There is some debate between academics on the 9/11 effects of on Canadian migration discourses. For some, the narrative of ‘Canadian exceptionalism’ associated with openness extended to both post-2001 and COVID-19 Canadian societies, which saw no additional immigration restrictions despite stricter border controls (Hollifield et al., 2022). Others, however, argue that the securitization of Canadian immigration post 9/11 created the perception of a system vulnerable to exploitation bolstered by domestic media (Winter, Patzelte, and Beauregard 2018; Krzyřanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak 2018). The migration-related policy shifts during the Harper administration hint at securitised narratives being more salient politically than those of national pride, humanitarian solidarity and compassion, and pragmatism. While still present within the national discourse, the latter three were perhaps overshadowed by the former three.

The shift could be in part explained by the influence of media portrayal, as it has been found to fuel fear and anxiety surrounding migrants. For example, Mejívar (2016) found that, more frequently

than not, media coverage implies migrants' potential for crime rather than substantiating said claims with real examples. Upon evidence, on the other hand, stories of migrants committing criminal acts tend to be disproportionately broadcasted and alarmist in tone (Menjívar 2016; Demleitner 2018). Moreover, studies have demonstrated that by focusing on the voice of authorities rather than that of migrants and by framing dangerous modes of travel as crime rather than a policy-led compulsion, the media promotes the securitisation and criminalisation of migration (Van Gorp 2005).

Another explanation could be a general shift in Western societies towards more securitised narratives concerning transnational human migration. The aftermath of 9/11, saw a resurgence of border controls, border walls and corresponding attitudes. To this effect, there is a wide array of border studies literature (see, for example, Diener and Hagen 2012; Staudt 2017; Longo 2017). They demonstrate that one of the most significant impacts perceived post-9/11 in the realm of the political is that borders have been imbued with discourses of security that have significantly increased - and even "weaponized" (Hale et al., 2019) - uncertainty around the prevailing high mobility of goods, services, capital, and individuals. Indeed, as demonstrated by Williams (2007), notions of security and human mobility more specifically have become so enmeshed that they are discursively merged. The link between transnational human migration and physical security is often attributed to the 9/11 attacks of September 2001, with the more recent 2015-2016 RMC in Europe further entrenching it (Bose 2020). Since then, various terrorist attacks in the Western world have led to the assertion of a close connection between migration and terrorism and, in turn, state security concerns. It is an association so intrinsically enmeshed in Western societies that it has led some, like Nail (2016, 159), to say that "migration and terrorism [...] have become each other's doppelgänger in contemporary politics." While such a statement could be deemed hyperbolic, it highlights a highly influential narrative.

2.2.3. Threats to National Identity

There is one overarching narrative associating migration with threats to national identity, its underlying logic supposes that migrants of different backgrounds hold the potential to alter the culture of the host society. In Canada, it follows that its official policy of multiculturalism embraces diversity over integration, and erodes the national identity, however defined. The narrative may be associated with symbolic nativism, a type of identity politics centred on ‘othering’ and “the defence of the fundamental traditions, values and historically evolved institutional arrangements that define a particular community, its culture and identity (Betz 2018, 123).”

The narrative is often associated with a racially informed logic, sometimes referred to in its most extreme form as the ‘Great Replacement Theory.’ The theory states that welcoming immigration policies, particularly those promoting immigration from non-white regions, are part of a plot designed to undermine or “replace” the political power and culture of white people living in Western countries (National Immigration Forum, n.d.). Nowadays, poll data has found that thirty-seven percent of Canadians believe in said theory, that “there is a group of people in this country who are trying to replace native-born Canadians with immigrants who agree with their political views (Coletto 2022).

The narrative, while associated with migrants, is not exclusively tied to recent arrivals. It tends to group racialized pockets of society with migrants, themselves presumed to be non-white. Presuming ‘whiteness’ in turn, is an example of citizenship variegation in which citizenship and immigration laws have worked to construct a specific vision of what a ‘citizen’ looks like as a core feature of belonging (De Genova 2005; Dick 2020; Haney López 2006). It implies that if one does not ‘look’ the part of an average citizen, they are likely to be viewed as an ‘other,’ no matter how long they or their family have been legal citizens of a country. The perspective of ‘others’, however, in relation to citizenship variegation is not entirely delineated through legal and administrative status but rather by socially and

racially charged notions of who belongs. Reinforcing cultural differences, furthermore, may cast doubt on the incomers' abilities to integrate into host societies (Alexander, Brewer, and Herrmann 1999).

Canada has a long-standing history of non-European immigration. It was not until 1947, for example, that it revoked the formal ban on Chinese immigration. As of 1962 the federal government ended racial discrimination as a feature of the immigration system. Even so, marked elements of symbolic nativism may be found in Canadian society. There is a prevailing view in Canada's immigration discourse that since the 1960's immigration reform, there rose this covert pattern of apprehension towards "non-traditional" sources of immigration from Asia and Africa (i.e., non-white), and that the sudden growth of non-white immigrants has posed a challenge for Canada, especially on the front of diversity (Li 2001). As far back as 1914, the country was upholding a "White Canada" policy, reflecting a eugenics mindset often associated with the early 20th century Western Societies. It's underlying assumption, they stated, was that the passengers were "sexually threatening to white women, and by extension, could lead to the 'extinction' of the white race (Panesar, Pottie-Sherman & Wilkes 2017, 94)." These depictions of the passengers' 'Oriental tendencies' towards immorality, dirtiness, radicality, and disease legitimized all persecution by the public and the Government and ultimately excused their exclusion from entering Canadian society (Buchignani 1977; Sohi 2014; Wallace 2013; Panesar, Pottie-Sherman, and Wilkes 2017). The authors also found that the media coverage of the issue furthered such beliefs and imposed them into the public's psyche. They found that the journalists covering the events relied heavily on claims by government officials and cooperated with exclusionary notions, accepting and encouraging, for example, the potentiality of these passengers "derail[ing] Canada's white destiny (Panesar, Pottie-Sherman, and Wilkes 2017, 96)." It should be noted, moreover, that these racist notions toward Indian nationals preceded the arrival of the Komagata Maru. The ship

merely brought them to the fore of political debates, and indeed, its arrival simply reinforced the fear of the so-called “Hindu menace” of the early 20th century (Mongia 1999).

The logic of symbolic nativism sometimes overlaps with that of economic insecurity. The 1914 ship’s arrival coincided with an economic recession (Buchignani 1977). As such, white workers and immigration officials feared that, if allowed to come ashore, the passengers would compete for the already scarcely available jobs, endangering the “livelihood of the white working man” (Ward 2002). Willing to accept lower wages and worse working conditions, Asian immigrants at large quickly became sought after in the economic downturn (Panesar, Pottie-Sherman, and Wilkes 2017). Feeling disadvantaged in the labour market, workers transferred their animosity towards the existing East Asian community to those in the Komagata Maru. Therefore, preventing their admittance into the country was a way of preventing that Indian immigration “flooding” the province (Ward 2002).

The intersection of narratives of economic insecurity and threats to national identity surrounding transnational human migration are not always overt in Canada; even so, they have real-life implications. Indeed, Li (2001) argues that Canada is ‘covertly’ racist and that its historical and current migration policies support the notion that non-white migrants “possess such different cultural beliefs that they would undermine Canadian values, traditions, and institutions: (Li 2001, 84). Trends would suggest that the increased diversity in some urban settings has produced tensions based on both real and alleged ‘cultural’ differences between long-time residents of Canada (i.e., of predominantly European origins) and immigrants from different cultural backgrounds (i.e., many of whom come from anywhere else). Typical examples of issues linked with the arrival of these foreign cultures include ‘stealing’ jobs, adding stress to the education system, the creating of ethnic-specific areas, and - first and foremost - challenging the status-quo Canadian heritage and values (Li 2001). Data shows that some citizens hold such views and that the governments - at all levels - are obligated to consider these opinions while

elaborating policies. Diversity, therefore, has been used repeatedly in immigration discourse and has become a code word for non-white immigrants and the subsequent ‘problems’ they represent. Simply put, ‘diversity,’ often outrightly mentioned as a national strength and the central premise of the reigning multicultural model, also signifies racially-assumed concerns for national unity and social cohesion (Li 2001; Chuong and Sadaf 2016; Gulliver 2018).

2.2.4. State Ability to Control Human Flows across Borders

The last narrative associated with transnational human migration is linked with the perception of losing control over migration in the sense that a state’s border controls are lacking. In many such cases, the threat perception of migration is elevated to the level of an ‘invasion’ and migrants are perceived as existential threats (Banulescu-Bodgan, Malka and Culbertson 2021, 4). Narratives associated with this theme is multifaceted, it results in migrant influxes constructed as threats to the rule of law and government management capabilities, creating anxieties on resources and infrastructure, culture, or political power.

The role of borders in this narrative is key. Human mobility and human migration are distinguishable through the existence of borders. Borders sort and rank the movement of people around the world into a differentiated hierarchy of permissibility and varieties of mobility. While human mobility and human migration are often semantically used interchangeably, they are subject to different practices, policies, and discourses. Human flows are controlled via what De Genova (2016) called the “border spectacle,” a robust and grandiose militarised display of technology, administrative procedure, and general techniques of exclusion. From a human mobility perspective, he argued that this spectacle is the cultural response. It is a reaction to the mass mobilisation of mankind in a globalised world. As such, De Genova (2016) puts forth that to designate all mobility as ‘migration’ is to buy into the naturalisation

of the borders that serve to produce the difference between one or another state's inside and outside. And yet, returning to its roots, man has always been mobile. While human mobility can only be viewed as natural, migration is viewed as unnatural. As Weinar, Bonjour, and Zhyznomirska (2018) put forth, while migration is often viewed negatively, mobility, on the other hand, is considered an asset. It is perceived as a transgression against what is normatively considered fixed. 'Migration' is the cultural output of a socially constructed world in which tangibly and intangibly borders have been drawn to make sense of human flows. The distinction between the two terms calls back to Agnew's (1994) "dehistorisation" and "decontextualisation" of borders and – consequentially – of the state system. Nowadays, notions of states, identity, citizenship, insider, and outsider are axiomatic, which leads De Genova (2016) to argue that contemplating the framing of public discourse and political debate concerning migration is to confront 'the border' as a taxonomic force.

Administrative 'identity' systems at borders have become the status quo, facilitating security screening for all who cross boundary lines, especially when foreign nationals are concerned. Transnational human mobility is enabled and monitored through the issuance of visas and passports by states, with all border crossings being monitored and enabled by increasingly complex and evolving policies and processes. Frequently associated with passports and/or identity cards, the ascribed 'identity' is a 'password' for entry and participation to a given society or a deterrent. State-attributed identity is *the* means of attempting to reconcile the notion of a globalised mobility with the idea of state security (Amoore 2008). Rose (1999) called this legal, administrative process the 'securitization of identity,' describing a situation in which the exercise of freedom (of being and of movement) in society requires proof of a legitimate and accepted identification upon control. Once they enter a territory other than their own, migrants are continuously subjected to various borderisation policies and attitudes. Unless naturalised into their host society, the ease through which they may navigate the social, legal, and

administrative web of said territory is tied their ascribed identity. As Weiner, Bonjour, and Zhyznomirska (2018) observe, migration is the politics of ‘membership’ and belonging, a membership negotiated through discourse, policy, and practice. The discourse that maintains the ‘insider’ cultural boundaries, for example, may have far-reaching effects; it may influence language policy initiatives, which in turn feed into education, employment, cultural, and political (citizenship) rights.

Looking into Canada’s humanitarian migration system, for example, one can see the interaction of humanitarian solidarity narratives, state ability to control human flows across border and numerous others. The first way a humanitarian migrant may enter the country is through refugee resettlement. This pathway follows that an asylum seeker is vetted and accepted by the host state ahead of being brought into the host territory. For host states, it is their preferred mode of entry of humanitarian migrants. From a control perspective, pre-selection enables Canada to determine the number of refugees it welcomes, and where they may arrive within the host territory. From a security perspective, moreover, resettling refugees allows for the host state to vet refugee hopefuls beforehand, enabling states to select individuals based on their ability to integrate and succeed (Watson 2009, 117). The vast majority of resettled refugees in Canada originate from communities with significant lobbying support (Epp 2017), with all of Canada’s large-scale resettlement programs have fallen under this format.

The other two ways represent a circumvention of a state’s control over its borders to varying degrees and are, therefore, less desirable. The second way to acquire refugee status is to enter a country legally, through the issuance of a visa (i.e., tourist visa or study permit), and to request protection from the host state upon arrival. Canada’s Universal Visa system began in 1978 for all foreign nationals. It was introduced in the 1976 Immigration Act and further upheld in the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. This method of humanitarian migration still allows some form of control by the state, in that the person would have been vetted to some extent to acquire the initial visa. According to Watson

(2009, 118), this mode of entry has not been viewed as especially problematic. However, it remains discouraged through the controlled issuance of visas and the creation of a list of visa-exempt states. Individuals entering Canada in this manner experience a legal change in status upon requesting asylum. The third way is viewed as the most concerning one by the host state. It is premised upon the unauthorised arrival of the migrant into the host territory, be it with an invalid or illegal visa or without one altogether. In this case, the migrant's arrival is oftentimes met with punitive measures (Watson 2009, 118), such as: imprisonment, fines, deportation and a prohibition to return. While Article 31 of the 1951 UN convention explicitly prohibits punishment of refugees based on their mode of entry, states have "played fast and loose with their borders; excising parts of their territory, intercepting asylum seekers on the high seas or creating non-arrival zones in their ports and airports to circumvent some of the obligations" (Watson 2009, 119).

Both the second and third ways to acquire refugee status fall under irregular migration. As mentioned, however, the third method is the one viewed as the most problematic. Canada has always benefited from its northern location, which is bordered by oceans on three sides. Canada's geographic position has safeguarded it from mass arrivals or large-scale unauthorised flows and allowed it to have a selective system (Hiebert 2016, 1) As a result, Canada is deliberate in who it allows within the country, and grants permanent residency to around 250 thousand individuals every year, less than ten percent of whom are refugees, the rest being economic migrants by a large majority selected to fill labour shortages (Epp 2017, 1). Not only does Canada get to hand-select humanitarian migration they allow within their borders thanks to its unique geography, evidence shows, moreover, that contrary to the country's image as a leader in refugee resettlement, refugees are still vilified by some as "queue-jumpers," resource-drains, and security threats (Huot et al., 2015), sentiments bolstered by media depictions (Winter, Patzelte and Beauregard 2018; Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2018).

Part II - Data Analysis: Canadian media Coverage of the RMC

In this section, the media coverage of the 320 selected newspaper articles will be delved into chronologically. It aims to present the most recurring narrative themes, related main events, and most frequently mentioned topics in each sample group. In addition, considerations will be provided on how migrants were framed in relation to key narrative themes in hopes of identifying some of the most important narratives that emanated from said media coverage.

The section aims to present a chronological understanding of how Canadian media understood the RMC between 2015 and 2016.

1. Sample Group 1 – January 1st to March 30th, 2015

Below is the breakdown of media coverage found in Sample Group 1, from January 1st to March 30th, 2015. The main three narrative themes were ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ (53%), ‘Threats to national identity’ (50%), and ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ (43%). The main topics found in articles of Sample Group 1 were: migrants of Muslim faith (53%), the social perception of migrants (53%), and the potential for migrants to experience danger and even death when attempting to cross the Mediterranean (30%). Below is a breakdown of the narrative themes found in this sample group:

Table 2-Part II: Breakdown of Narrative Themes Found in the Articles of Sample Group 1

Narrative Theme	Percentage
State ability to control human flows across borders	53%
Threats to national identity	50%
Humanitarian solidarity	43%
Threats to physical security	38%
Economic Insecurity	20%
Pragmatism	10%

The main events mentioned in these articles were: the Charlie Hebdo attacks on January 7th (25%), 2015; the sizeable anti-Islam protests in Dresden, Germany (33%); and various migrant naval rescues in the Mediterranean (23%), notably the Ezzadeen maritime incident on January 2nd, 2015. The narrative themes are reflected in the most mentioned events in this sample group, and the key topics found in these articles.

1.1. Event #1 – Naval Rescues of Migrants in the Mediterranean

In Sample Group 1, nine articles (23%) focused on European-led naval operations to rescue migrants in the Mediterranean Sea (Group1_MG4; Group1_TS10; Group1_TS2; Group1_TS4; Group1_TS5; Group1_TS7; Group1_TS9; Group1_VS1; Group1_VS3). They depict a continent struggling to respond to a growing number of migrants entering its territory by sea and attempting to avoid casualties while curbing the influx. The increasingly large-scale migrant-smuggling operations from Northern Africa, primarily Libya, which left migrants in increasingly dangerous positions, feature prominently in these articles.


The Mediterranean Sea links the European continent with the African and Asian continents, serving as an exchange hub in the region. It became an important route towards Europe for migrants during the events of the RMC. During 2015 and 2016, millions have felt compelled to risk these dangerous waters, often doing so at significant financial and personal costs. For the unlucky ones, crossing the Mediterranean resulted in their deaths. Below is a chart depicting the number of sea arrivals throughout the years and the number of casualties between 2014 and 2017. The chart shows that in merely four years, more than fifteen thousand people have perished while attempting to cross the Mediterranean (UNHCR 2024c).

Table 3-Part II: Number of sea arrivals over the years and number of casualties, 2014-2017

Previous years	Sea arrivals	Dead and missing	Casualty Percentage
2017	172,301	3,139	1.8 %
2016	362,753	5,096	1.4 %
2015	1,015,078	3,771	0.4 %
2014	216,054	3,538	1.6 %

To cross these rough waters, refugees and migrants would have embarked on one of three paths: The Central Mediterranean Route, the Western Mediterranean Route, and the Eastern Mediterranean Route. The map below explains the numerical importance of these routes during- and in the years prior to- the RMC (Laczko, Singleton, and Black 2017).

Map 1-PartII: Arrivals along the Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes throughout the years, 2012–2016



According to the IOM (2024), the Mediterranean naval route continues to be the deadliest migrant pathway. The high death tolls are linked to overcrowded vessels, strong currents, and rough weather conditions. During the RMC, the plights of refugees and migrants crossing these waters were a frequently mediatized issue, as is evident here.

In every single one of these nine articles, the focus was the numerous naval migrant rescues by European operations in the Mediterranean and the role of smugglers in enabling such perilous crossings. Smugglers were mentioned by most, not only as organisers, but also in terms of their increasing operational capacities in the region. Instead of resorting to the ‘usual’ (i.e., previously utilised) rubber dinghies, the increasing demand for their services by 2015 led them to scale up their capacities using retired cargo ships bought online (Group1_TS2; Group1_MG4). Nearly all the articles mention one

specific cargo ship, the “ghost ship” Ezadeen. The Ezadeen was a Lebanese ship “flying the flag of Sierra Leone, but registered to a Lebanese company” (Group1_TS1), which “arrived at the port of Corigliano, Italy” in January 2015 (Group1_TS7). With some discrepancies concerning statistics, the articles depict a ship carrying upwards of 350 migrants, including numerous women and children. The Ezadeen is referred to as a “ghost ship” because it had been deserted by its crew, leaving the migrants without technical know-how on how to steer the vessel. According to the articles, even if the crew remained aboard, it was found speeding towards land with no means of stopping it, because the “smugglers had wrecked the controls before leaving” (Group1_VS3). This incident is often cited as an example of the numerous rescue operations that have had to take place in similar conditions in the Mediterranean. It is also used to highlight the precarious situations in which migrants attempted to reach Europe.

Despite the heavy focus on smuggling operations, all but two of the articles carry a ‘victim’ frame. These articles support narratives of human solidarity and compassion, describing the dire situations of migrants in their home countries, which led them to make their way to Europe and the perilous conditions they face on their journey, especially when crossing the Mediterranean (Group1_GM9, Group1_MG4, Group1_TS10, Group1_TS2, Group1_TS4, Group1_VS3, Group1_TS5). Overall, the articles depict migrant desperations both before and once aboard these vessels. There is also a frequent mention of statistics of migrant deaths attempting to cross, highlighting the sheer scale of the practice.

What is made clear from the articles is that the smugglers are increasing their operations due to the high demand from refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war, as well as the conditions in which they have been residing in Turkey since 2011. Indeed, Syrians are singled out amongst all other nationalities and described as “willing to pay top dollar to flee their ravaged homeland,” to embark on ships “pointed toward Europe and abandoned, the migrants' fate hanging between shipwreck and rescue”

(Group1_VS3). Syrian nationals are highlighted in each of the seven articles with the ‘victim’ frame, reiterating the association between humanitarian migration and the need to help those from war-torn countries. By focusing on Syrian nationals almost exclusively, the need for assistance is extrapolated to all the other nationalities involved. Along the same lines, these articles have been found to hold the narrative theme of ‘human solidarity and compassion.’ Combined, the labels and themes present in these seven articles promote narratives of pity and humanitarian duty toward these individuals in dire situations.

The only two articles that hold both the ‘victim’ and the ‘threat/villain’ frames focus primarily on the role of smugglers rather than the migrants in need of rescue (Group1_TS9 and Group1_TS2). While the difficulties faced by migrants crossing the Mediterranean are acknowledged in these articles supporting a ‘victim’ framing, it is the scale of the criminal operations that are highlighted first and foremost. The ‘threat’ perception thus stems from the smugglers being depicted by both articles as ingenious, flexible, and sizeable cartels exploiting migrants with the potential of physically threatening Europeans. In Group1_TS2, they are associated with Turkish gang members, highlighting the breadth of criminal enterprise. In Group1_TS9, they are mentioned as having the potential for violence, describing how some of them have attacked European Coast Guards as well as having the possibility of transporting terrorists into Europe by blending them with rescued migrants.

1.2. Event #2 – Anti-migration & anti-Islam marches in Germany, January 2015

In late 2014 and early 2015, there were multiple protests throughout Germany against immigration into Germany, especially those of Muslim-majority countries, organised by the pan-European group Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA). These protests were sometimes met with sizeable counter-protestations, notably in Cologne, Berlin, Stuttgart, Munich, and Hamburg. The

articles linking the narrative theme of ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ and the anti-migration marches in Germany call for stricter border controls in Germany and other Western countries, especially towards migrants from Muslim-Majority countries. These articles highlight the growing Islamophobia, anti-immigration sentiments, and associated political discontent in Western countries, notably Germany.

Of the 40 articles in Sample Group 1, thirteen articles (33%) mentioned the Dresden marches. These articles depict significant - if dwindling, especially in the later articles – support for the cause (Group1_GM1; Group1_GM3; Group1_GM4; Group1_GM8; Group1_MG2; Group1_MG5; Group1_MG7; Group1_MG8; Group1_TS1; Group1_TS6; Group1_VS2; Group1_VS5; and Group1_VS9). According to German news, the largest demonstration occurred on January 12th, 2015, attracting over 25,000 protesters in Dresden, Germany, in reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attacks (Brady 2015). Between October and December 2014, the protests are described as doubling in size nearly weekly (Group1_MG5). According to the narrative depicted in these articles, support for the marches was mitigated by two events. The first was Chancellor Angela Merkle’s 2015 New Year’s Eve speech, in which she said, “[d]o not follow those who have called the rallies. Because all too often they have prejudice, coldness, even hatred in their hearts” (Group1_MG2). The second was the resignation of PEGIDA founder Lutz Bachmann on January 21st, 2015, following the publication of a photograph of him emulating Adolf Hitler. The photograph anchored what had already been a growing association between PEGIDA and neo-Nazi ideology. Bachmann had already been known to refer to immigrants as “trash,” “scumbags,” and “cattle” (Group1_GM3).

Only one article mentions migration from the ‘benefit’ frame, promoting a narrative of pragmatism by describing how Germany may benefit from the Canadian model of immigration to boost the German economy (Group1_GM1). In this context, the anti-Islam marches are mentioned as the political context

in which the German administration must navigate policy changes. Migrants, in the article, are as depicted as required to fill labour shortages within the country and having the potential to boost economic competitiveness. In Group1_GM1, the construction of migration follow the narrative theme of ‘Pragmatism.’

The remaining twelve articles have either a ‘threat/villain’ frame or both the ‘threat/villain’ and ‘victim’ frame. Those with solely the ‘threat/villain’ frame include narratives of migrants being a threat to the host society’s identity, citing that the rising anti-Islam movement within Germany is having a tangible effect on electoral support for the extreme-right political party the Alternative for Germany (AfD) (Group1_GM3 and Group1_VS10). Those with both frames also mention similar narratives but allow for a ‘victim’ frame in as much as they decry the negative effect the rising Islamophobia has on the existing Muslim population in Europe (Group1_MG2; Group1_MG5; Group1_TS6; and Group1_VS5).

While all eight articles allude to migration from Muslim-majority countries in relation to growing Islamophobia and broader anti-migration sentiments growing in Western countries, only three articles linked the rising Islamophobia to the backlash from the Charlie Hebdo attacks (Group1_TS6; Group1_VS10; and GM3). Both events, the German marches and the Paris attack, are said to have resulted in public unrest both locally and internationally, with some articles stating that within “two days after the shootings at Charlie Hebdo, sixteen places of worship around France were attacked by firebombs, gunshots or pig’s heads — an insult to those who don’t eat pork,” (Group1_TS6); and “[t]he recent terror attacks in Paris have unleashed a barrage of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant comments on the Facebook pages of federal politicians and their parties in Canada - much of it plainly visible to the public” (Group1_VS10).

1.3. Event #3 – The Charlie Hebdo attacks, January 7th, 2015

The Charlie Hebdo attacks (or shootings) occurred in Paris, France, on the morning of January 7th, 2015. The event was organized by the two Kouachi brothers, French nationals of Algerian origins whose adherence to Islamic fundamentalism goes back to 2005 (Petrikowski 2022). The left-leaning, satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo newspaper, became the target of jihadists ire following the publication of numerous cartoons of Prophet Mohammad; notably, the 2006 reprinting of the Danish Jyllands-Posten's images and the 2011 special issue titled *Charia Hebdo* they claimed was “guest-edited” by the Prophet himself, promising “100 lashes if you don't die of laughter” (Nelson 2015). The latter event resulted in a firebombing of the outlet's offices on November 2nd, 2011. Jihadist anger at the news outlet was not limited to the ridiculing of the faith itself but also because depictions of the Prophet are prohibited by Islam's principle of aniconism, which bans the usage of icons or images to portray living creatures. The 2015 attacks, more specifically, resulted in a total of seventeen deaths, including eleven journalists and security personnel employed by the newspaper. The attack occurred on the same day that Michel Houellebecq's book *Soumission* became publicly available for purchase. The novel is a political fiction *dit* social commentary in which France's far-right politician Marine LePen loses an election to a Muslim candidate, turning the country into an Islamic state. The book, mentioned in three articles (Group1_GM8; Group1_GM10; and Group1_GM6), had been leaked online prior to January 7th and was said to be already making headlines (Snaije 2015). While it cannot be confirmed that the book launch and the shootings were related, the three articles which mention the book certainly imply it added ‘fuel’ to an already tense situation.

The response to the attacks was immediate, resulting in large-scale protests throughout France and around the world against Islamic fundamentalism and in solidarity with the victims under the banner of “Je suis Charlie” (“I am Charlie”). Official marches were organized on the 10th and 11th of January

2015, to offer further sympathy to the victims' families and support for freedom of the press and freedom of speech. According to some sources, an estimated 3.7 million individuals marched in France in response to the attack, joined by more than 40 world leaders (Charlton and Adamson 2015).

The Charlie Hebdo attacks were mentioned in ten articles (25%) of the Sample 1 group (Group1_GM10; Group1_GM4; Group1_GM5; Group1_GM6; Group1_GM8; Group1_MG10; Group1_MG8; Group1_TS6; Group1_VS10; and Group1_VS8). All but one (Group1_MG8) were published in January 2015, closely following the events. The incident was referred to chiefly as an “attack” or, more precisely, a “terror” or “terrorist” attack by the articles covering it. A few articles, moreover, wanting to stress its deadly outcome, used stronger language, referring to the events as a “slaughter” (Group1_MG10), a “massacre” (Group1_GM10), and even a “murder spree” (Group1_MG8). Only one of the ten articles mentioning the incident focuses exclusively on the attack itself (Group1_GM6); the remaining nine articles mention it alongside previous terrorist attacks in Europe and/or the anti-immigration marches in Germany. Together, they construct an image of a perduring and sizeable Islamic Extremist terrorist presence within Europe, of which the shootings are only the latest instances.

Overall, nine of these articles cover the Charlie Hebdo attacks through the theme of threats to national identity, and five of them directly link Muslims and Muslim migration as potential threats to the physical security of Europeans. Due to the topic at hand, it comes as no surprise that each of these nine articles carries the ‘threat/villain’ frame when discussing migrants.

Three of these articles also mention the Paris attacks alongside the German anti-migration marches (Group1_GM6; Group1_GM8; and Group1_VS10), furthering the association between the faith of Islam with violence and threats and citing the rising levels of Islamophobia through statements the likes of:

“[t]his attack – the deadliest terrorist attack on French soil in 50 years – may well pitch the country into profound crisis, because it crystallizes what everybody knows. France has a serious Muslim problem, a serious immigration problem and a serious terrorism problem, and the political class has no idea what to do about it. France is an easy target for Islamist terrorists because a large number of French Muslims are sympathetic to their causes;” (Group1_GM6)

Or again,

“European countries have long wrestled with issues related to Muslim immigration, but Wednesday's events are likely to intensify unease across the political spectrum (Group1_GM8).”

The overarching narrative that comes out of the articles covering the Charlie Hebdo shootings is one of genuine concern about the growing percentage of human migration from Muslim-majority countries, the ability with which they have been - and will be - able to respect and integrate into the broader Western culture, and the subsequent “Islamisation” of Europe. All these articles directly mention migrants of Muslim faith, supporting the narratives that those who practice said faith pose a threat to the future development of the continent’s safety and cultural identity. It is worth noticing that even though some of the articles frame migrants of Muslim backgrounds as victims of societal anxieties, rising Islamophobia, and the misconstrued perception of the size of Europe’s Muslim population (Group1_GM8; Group1_MG10; and Group1_MG8), all of them include elements that frame Muslims and Muslim migration as potential threats. It is worth mentioning that said anxieties towards those practicing Islam are not limited to France but also to the whole continent. In one article, moreover, these anxieties are found to also exist in Canada, more specifically in the Quebec province “[b]ecause of Quebec's longstanding historical ties and special relationship with France (Group1_MG8)”.

The narrative theme of ‘Economic insecurity’ is also frequently found alongside ‘Threat to national identity’ in some of these articles (Group1_MG7; Group1_GM5; Group1_VS8; and Group1_VS5). These articles reinforce the narrative of a cultural and economic mismatch between European societies and migrants of Muslim background. In some articles, the narrative theme of economic insecurity stands alone, like in Group1_GM2, which states that supporters of political parties deemed anti-migration do so because they “genuinely fear losing their jobs to low-paid foreigners,” independently on whether they are of Muslim faith or not, and worry about “being left behind in a world of easy mobility, supranational organizations, and global networking.” Others link economic insecurity with identity politics, highlighting Muslim migrants’ difficulties integrating into Western societies, linking, for example, the cultural “[d]isputes over Islamic clothing, Shariah courts and what should be taught in schools” as well as Muslim youths’ difficulty in joining the local labor markets, concluding that it is an “underlying cause is that much of Europe is in a ruinous state economically (Group1_VS8).” In the latter article, the lack of economic opportunities for Muslim youths is portrayed as a source of insecurity itself, as they may find themselves victims to campaigns of radicalisation targeting struggling youths (Group1_VS8). The joining of anxieties surrounding economic and cultural futures was also found in Group1_VS5, which states that “[f]ew of the asylum seekers come with the skills or cultural background to fit into German society - particularly in the east, where fear of Islam is strongest,” and again, “[w]hile Germany needs immigration to make up for its dwindling workforce, few of those applying for asylum come with the necessary skills or cultural background to fit seamlessly into German society - particularly in the east, where fear of Islam is strongest” (Group1_MG5). Another aspect of economic insecurity is tied to the notion of criminality, which presumed that humanitarian migrants or what some articles refer to as ‘economic refugees’ - which is not an existing migration-related label - as well as asylum seekers “are not genuine political refugees” (Group1_MG7). Instead, the negative

‘threat/villain’ frame carried by these articles presumes that humanitarian migrants who come to Europe, and in this case Germany, do so for personal gain rather than the genuine need for asylum, implying that they are exploiting a system based on European’s good faith and genuine desire to help those in need. Such wording premises that humanitarian migrants are wrong for trying to better their financial and personal situations once situated safely in a host community. In each of these articles, the Charlie Hebdo attacks are used to rationalize anxieties.

Final thoughts on Sample Group 1 media coverage of transnational human migration

The articles of Sample Group 1 contain two overarching and dichotomous narratives. The first portrays a benevolent continent attempting to help those most in need, and the second one depicts a continent under threat from both the sheer scale of the migrant flow and the type of migrants that make up said flow (i.e., Muslims).

The first narrative was chiefly demonstrated in the first event most frequently mentioned, the naval rescues of migrants in the Mediterranean. As early as January 2015 – in which some authors argued the RMC is yet to begin (see for example, Papademetriou 2017) – Europe is being perceived as already struggling with the scale of the incoming migrant flow. In the articles mentioning the numerous naval rescues in the Mediterranean, the benevolent European efforts to both rescue and curb the migrant flow are constructed as exemplary of the continent’s humanitarianism, implying that simply stopping migrants from attempting to cross the sea prevents the loss of lives.

The second narrative was primarily evident in the media coverage of the second and third most mentioned events, the anti-immigration Marches in Dresden, Germany, and the January 7th Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris, France. At the same time, there is some acknowledgement of migrants being benefits to host societies in the related media coverage. In this narrative, migration, and especially

migration from Muslim-majority countries, is predominantly perceived as a threat; in fact, they are made into numerous forms of threats. Migrants are constructed as threats to the economic security of the continent as they increase competition for nationals in the labour markets. Contrastingly, young Muslim men pose threats because of their lack of economic opportunity, being oftentimes marginalised and therefore primed for Jihadist radicalisation. Their faith is thus constructed as too diverse from Europeans, making them unlikely to integrate within the general European society and, therefore, a threat to the future cultural developments. The aforementioned radicalisation is also problematic because it has led to the Islamic extremist terrorist threat that the Western world has faced since 9/11. The Charlie Hebdo shootings, performed by the radicalised sons of Muslim migrants, were then only the latest testaments to this looming threat.

The Dresden marches and countermarches in Germany, in turn, speak to both narratives existing alongside one another: a benevolent Europe and a Europe under threat.

2. Sample Group 2 – April 1st to June 30th, 2015

Below is the breakdown of media coverage found in Sample Group 2, from April 1st to June 30th, 2015. Overall, two narrative themes were most mentioned in these articles: ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ (73%) and ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ (55%).

The most recurring topics in all 40 articles are reflected in those narrative themes. These are: the scale of migrant flow into Europe (78%); the potential for death and the danger experienced by migrants crossing the Mediterranean (80%); human smugglers enabling migrant crossings of the Mediterranean (70%); migration-related EU-level policies (65%); and lastly, migrant rescue operations in the Mediterranean (50%). Below is a breakdown of the narrative themes found in this sample group:

Table 4-PartII: Breakdown of narrative themes found in the articles of Sample Group 2

Narrative Theme	Percentage
Humanitarian solidarity	73%
State ability to control human flows across borders	55%
Economic Insecurity	18%
Threats to physical security	15%
National Pride	10%
Pragmatism	10%
Threats to national identity	5%

The most mentioned events in this sample group and the key topics found in these articles reflect both narrative themes. These events are categorised as regional efforts to combat migrant smuggling across the Mediterranean (38%) and EU-level negotiations to tackle the influx of migrants arriving in Europe not the least of which centered around an emergency migrant relocation scheme (23%).

2.1. Event #1 – EU Human Smuggling Combat Operations

The RMC prompted a sizeable increase in EU efforts and funding of both external border controls and third-country transit capacities. Ensuring security for the Schengen zone is a joint effort and, as there are no permanent border controls between Schengen countries, making external border controls a joint effort. While EU Member States retain primary responsibility for their frontiers, Frontex was created in 2004 and granted limited powers and operational capacity regarding external borders, performing technical assistance, training, data collection, and risk analysis tasks (Segura 2016). It has since become a central point of contact and sets standards for all European border guards, ensuring key intelligence is shared between all border authorities. Frontex does not have its own equipment nor border guards; it relies instead on national EU country's resources. Throughout the RMC, Frontex Joint Operation Triton in Italy and Frontex Joint Operation Poseidon in Greece joined to the deployment of Frontex Rapid Border Intervention teams in the Aegean which helped save more than 400,000 people in 2015 and nearly 100,000 in 2016 (Consilium 2023). Other EU Agencies such as Europol Eurojust, have similarly scaled up their operations (European Commission 2016). In June of 2015, Triton joined forces with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operation EU Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) 'Sophia,' targeting smuggling networks and consequently irregular migration (European External Action Service (EEAS) 2017a; 2017b).

Following a regional summit in April 2015, European leaders reiterated their promise to devote more resources to the EU's Triton patrol program, the naval force that replaced Italy's larger Mare Nostrum patrols in 2014 (Group2_GM9). Frontex received a sevenfold increase in its budget as a direct result of the RMC, from €19 million in 2006 to €14 billion in 2015, receiving another sevenfold increase to €75 billion in 2022 (Statista 2023b).

To curb human smuggling and irregular mobility an agreement was struck on the strengthening of external EU border patrolling, resulting in the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (the successor of Frontex) with additional competencies (Segura 2016). Apart from a new name, the new guards were given more money, equipment, staff, and responsibilities in border management and return operations. The development came after portland countries like Italy and Greece complained of the systemic inequality created by the Dublin system (Segura 2016). Moreover, in June 2015, to curb the migrant flow from Libya to Italy, then the most utilised migrant route to Europe, and the precarious smuggling practices famously associated with the route, the EU put a deal with Libya in place. The deal was developed to establish 'safe' refugee camps within Libya, repatriate refugees who are willing to return to their countries of origin, boost training and equipment to Libya's struggling coastguard, and get more involved with neighboring nations, including Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt to contain flows of migrants (Karakoulaki 2018). With conditions being too dangerous on the ground, the EU-Libya deal, while funded by the EU, was implemented by locals with the help of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

In total, fifteen articles (38%) in Sample Group 2 tackled EU-level operations to combat human smuggling activity in the Mediterranean. The overarching theme surrounding this event may best be summarised by this quote from one of the EU's top migration officials, Dimitris Avramopoulos: "Europe is declaring war on smugglers" (Group2_VS4).

Of these articles, ten of them did so from a 'victim' framing of migrants, in which human smuggling cartels are highlighted as a source of migrant precarity by being known to utilise overly packed and frail vessels "to maximise profit." Smugglers were known to frequently abandon migrants mid-crossing to fend for themselves in hopes of being rescued by one of the EU's naval patrols (Group2_MG4).

It is worth noting that the use of smugglers by migrants also extended beyond crossing the Mediterranean but was also common practice within the continent of Europe, as migrants attempted to rejoin friends and relatives in Northern Europe (Group2_MG9). Articles with the ‘victim’ framing, moreover, tended to present emotionally filled narratives. While most of them emphasized the plight of migrants taking on such the infamous route, stressing their need to flee war, repression, and poverty in the Middle East and Africa (Group2_TS2 and Group2_Vs6), some would highlight the sheer deadliness of the crossing via statistics on general migrant deaths and disappearances, sometimes stressing the numbers surrounding children and mothers (Group2_TS8 and Group2_Vs6). The victim framing was perhaps most evident through the emotional retellings of shipwrecks, not the least of which was this one from one failed rescue mission:

“It was a sight that broke the hearts of even men of the sea like us. I saw children's shoes, clothing, backpacks floating in the water. [...] Every time we saw a shoe or a bag, any sign of life, we thought we might have found a survivor. But every time we were disappointed. ... We didn't find a single survivor, not one.” (Group2_GM10).

What was made evident in articles with ‘victim’ framings is that these militarised smuggling-deterrent operations were rationalised as humanitarian. The operations are said to be “spurred by the massive loss of lives” at sea (Group2_VS6) inciting European Union leaders to commit resources “to save lives in the Mediterranean [...] [by] destroy[ing] vessels that could be used for trafficking” (i.e., smuggling) (Group2_VS4).

The remaining five articles held a ‘victim’ and ‘threat/villain’ framing of migrants simultaneously. In these articles, the migrants are still being talked of as victims of both the situations that led them to flee towards Europe and of criminal smuggling rings. What is noteworthy, however, is how their being so still

does not preclude them from being framed as potential threats to Europeans. In Group2_GM1, the article positions migrants as a source of internal discord for the EU, highlighting how the Dublin system in its current formulation is “straining under the rising flows” of migrants. The articles Group2_MG2 and Group2_VS7 demonstrate similar logic of a system of states being overwhelmed but from an economic insecurity standpoint. Group2_MG2 stresses that many EU Member States are experiencing an economic crisis, making the integration of so many newcomers both politically contentious but also an issue of feasibility. On a similar note, Group2_VS7 adds that

“Europe has not yet completely digested refugees fleeing the fighting in Ukraine, as well as the hundreds of thousands displaced by wars in the Balkans and Horn of Africa in the 1990s. Beset with grave economic problems of their own, voters are telling their leaders enough is enough” (Group2_VS7).

As for Group2_TS3 and Group2_TS1, the perception of ‘threat’ was more of a physical security issue, in the sense that there were “concerns the lucrative trade is helping finance terrorism in North Africa and offering terrorists a way into the EU” (Group2_TS1).

2.2. Event #2 – Emergency Migrant Relocation Scheme

As the capacities of portal countries were pushed to breaking point due to the high number of incomers, the CEAS and the Dublin system proved to be inadequate and contentious (Roots 2016). The initial EU-level reactions to the RMC were a set of ad hoc measures designed to ease the situation at the ports of entry, including failed relocation mechanisms and the establishment of asylum-processing ‘hotspots’ in both Greece and Italy (European Commission 2016; Lavenex 2018).

The erection of emergency ‘Hotspots’ aimed to mitigate the geographic inequality of the Dublin system by strengthening the processing and containing capacities of portal EU countries. Between September 2015 and September 2017, they were set up to contribute to the temporary emergency relocation mechanisms that helped to transfer asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy to other Member States (European Parliament Briefing, 2020). It is worth mentioning that, unfortunately, these hotspots were found to be not only violent and inadequate but also unsanitary, to the detriment of those dwelling in it (European Commission 2016).

On September 14th, 2015, the European Council adopted an initial emergency migrant relocation scheme to redistribute 160 thousand asylum seekers from Greece and Italy throughout the union over the next two years (Legislative Train 2023). The plan was devised on the basis that Member States would receive a quota of asylum seekers measured by 40% of the size of their population, 40% of their GDP, 10% of their past number of asylum applications, and 10% of their unemployment rate. In some cases, strong supporters of this quota initiative, such as Germany and France, agreed to take on more to alleviate the burden of the RMC on the overwhelmed coastal countries (Upadhyay, 2016, 12). The agreement labelled as “controversial” (Group2_MG5) was met with resistance from other countries like the UK and Hungary (Group2_TS1). Some articles were unfavorable to Europe’s lack of response to the RMC, stating, for example, that the lack of consensus around how to tackle the influx was the result of “foot-dragging and verbal sniping,” exposing deep regional divisions (Group2_VS5).

These efforts to redistribute migrants throughout the region were mentioned in nine articles (23%) in Sample Group 2. Of these, four articles framed migrants as ‘threats/villains’ (Group2_MG5; Group2_TS1; Group2_TS7 and Group2_GM1). It was interesting to see that while each of those articles still promoted traditionally negative narratives surrounding migrants, like that of them carrying the

potential for diseases and being physical threats to the host societies (Group2_MG5), all of them primarily viewed the sheer scale of the migrant influx more so than the migrant themselves as problematic within those three months (Group2_MG5; Group2_TS1; Group2_TS7 and Group2_GM1). By highlighting the flow into Europe via numbers and statistics, they depict a continent struggling to cope with the situation, resulting in the sizeable geographic inequality created by the Dublin System (Group2_TS7 and Group2_GM1).

The two articles simultaneously holding both ‘threat/villain’ and ‘victim’ frames, held similar notions, even going so far as including the ‘physical threat’ notions with the potential for carrying diseases (TS9). However, they also displayed notable concern for the migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean. These articles allowed for both the plight of migrants and that of a continent under pressure (Group2_TS9 and Group2_VS5).

The remaining three articles carried a ‘victim’ framing of migrants solely, and all did so via the ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ narrative theme. These articles often highlighted migrants’ potential to experience danger and even death crossing the Mediterranean. Moreover, articles containing the humanitarian solidarity narratives frequently spoke of them being preyed upon by smuggling operations, which add to the risk and danger they face upon attempting to reach Europe. Through statements the likes of “[d]espite shocking images of the refugees' bloated corpses being collected from the water, affluent countries such as Britain, France and Germany, which have long taken great pride in their welcoming liberal social policies, have no interest in organizing a managed resettlement programme” (Group2_MG7) or again “[w]ith some 60 million refugees in the world, this effort from a wealthy, half-a-billion-strong bloc appears paltry when countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey are hosting hundreds of thousands of people displaced by conflict” (Group2_MG3), some of the articles were demonstratively discouraged by Europe’s inability (not to say unwillingness) to tackle the migrant influx

better, citing the contentions surrounding the emergency relocation scheme as an example. It was a discouragement made worse through the emphasis on the difficulties faced by specific pockets of migrants, like that of women or children more specifically (Group2_MG6).

The opposition to the emergency relocation scheme was based on concerns for state sovereignty and the ability to control migrant flows. Some EU Member States, for example, viewed the burden of asylum as a zero-sum phenomenon, one that incites policymakers to promote stricter deterrence policies than those of neighbouring countries (Thielemann 2018, 71); ultimately creating what Nikolic and Pevcin (2022, 250) called a race to the bottom. Slovakia and Poland, for example, announced they would solely relocate refugees of Christian faith within their sovereign territory, citing concerns about state security (Hughes, 2016). Hungary and Slovakia, furthermore, filed a legal case against the quota plan in the European Court of Justice, stating that it was flawed on two premises: “that the adoption of the decision was vitiated by errors of a procedural nature or arising from the choice of an inappropriate legal basis,” and “that the decision was neither a suitable response to the migrant crisis nor necessary for that purpose” (CJEU 2017). The lawsuit, eventually dismissed by the European Court of Justice in September 2017, served to stall reform. All in all, only 2% of the expected number of asylum seekers were relocated as of July 2017 (Scipioni 2018, 1368), and only Malta and Finland met their obligations towards Italy and Greece (Benková 2017). Hungary, Austria, and Poland, moreover, refused to follow both the initial September 2015 scheme and the later 2016 Fairness Mechanism scheme, while other countries such as Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia only joined in the initial September 2015 scheme to a limited degree (Benková 2017).

It is worth adding that while the EU member-states were discussing the details of this imposed division of asylum seekers, for the migrants concerned the relocation quota system was set up without

their input. The policy meant that asylum seekers could be sent to any EU country, independently of the migrants' preferences for wealthier and more 'welcoming' states like Germany and Sweden (Maldini and Takahashi 2017, 64).

About Central and Eastern European Member States' unwillingness to partake in relocation efforts, moreover, two additional logics that deserved to be considered. The first, as devised by Upadhyay (2016, 21), highlights internal cultural divisions between Member States, in which former Soviet Bloc Member States are more culturally homogenous and therefore more reticent to take in migrants from foreign cultures and religions. Contrastingly, the sizeable increase in immigration in the 20th and 21st centuries in Western European countries has made them more diverse and accustomed to other peoples. Upadhyay's premise is empirically supported when looking into European statistics on foreign-born populations (OECD 2023). The second logic is linked to the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea, which resulted in numerous Ukrainians claiming refugee in neighboring countries. High concentrations of Ukrainian refugees in Central and Eastern Member States could, in part, explain their unwillingness in 2015 to host additional refugees. The argument, of course, could be seen as complementary to the initial ideosociological East-West divide argument, as Ukrainians would be perceived as culturally and racially akin to their host societies.

State-level contentions dissuading regional cooperation were highlighted during the RMC as human mobility moved to the fore of debates. In 2015, the continent was attending to the complexities of the increasingly frequent Islamist-linked terrorist attacks since 2006, the 2008 financial crisis, the Greek debt crisis of 2010, the Crimea/Ukraine crisis of 2014, as well as the rise of right-wing, nativist political parties agitating European Union politics (European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 2018). Already in 2015, sensitivities towards foreigners - especially those of Muslim faith -

were heightened in most of Europe. Evidence of this may be evident in the media coverage of the Charlie Hebdo shootings in France and the Dresden Marches in Germany in Sample Group 1.

As Postelnicescu (2016, 203) advances, by 2015, the EU was at a “crossroad,” divided between its ideals of freedom and justice on the one hand, and the rise of nationalistic fervour and Euroscepticism on the other. While the EU faced the financial crisis and the debt crisis through regional cooperation, the RMC resulted in primarily state-level responses. Some EU Member States, notably (but not exhaustively): Germany, Austria, France, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Hungary, chose to publicly move against EU regulations, reverting towards the state-level management of human flows and increasing border controls to varying degrees (Hauswedell 2018). Lehne (2018) called Member States’ inward responses to the RMC the result of a ‘logic of renationalisation,’ combining xenophobia and identity politics to the detriment of regional collaboration.

Final thoughts on Sample Group 2 media coverage of transnational human migration

The first narrative theme of ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ centered around ‘desperate’ migrants fleeing dire situations hoping to start over in ‘safe’ and ‘welcoming’ Europe. The second narrative theme, while still focusing on the constant stream of migrants into Europe, approaches the idea from a perception of control, primarily that of a lack of- or at least a diminishing ability to- control the influx. Within the second narrative theme, the migrant influx associated with geographic inequality and regional systemic discrepancy under the Dublin System is viewed as a source of tension and internal strife within the European region. Jointly and interactively, both narrative themes are anchored in the notion that there is a constant and sizeable stream of migrants making their way from North Africa and Asia via the Mediterranean, many of whom will require humanitarian assistance and some of whom may pose a threat to Europeans.

Within the articles in Sample Group 2, there is an overarching notion of ‘urgency’ and ‘crisis’ associated with the sizeable influx of migrants. It is perceptions of anxiety such as these that made the RMC into a crisis.

By being heavily focused on the sheer scale of influx, the articles in Sample Group 2 demonstrate an overall focus on regional and state-level responses. They depict a continent reacting and attempting to tackle this new challenge. These early-day reactions to the RMC are found in the most found narrative themes, ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ and ‘State ability to control human flows across borders.’ It is evident in the media coverage that the initial RMC reactions highlight the plight of migrants, which are indeed chiefly recognised as needing humanitarian assistance, and that of a continent struggling to cope with the scale of the influx. The perception of ‘threat’ most identified in this sample group is geared towards the scale of migrant flows rather than the ‘threat’ perceptions of migrants most found in Sample Group 1 (i.e., associated with economic insecurity, threat to physical security, and threats to national identity narrative themes). From the articles in this sample group, the main narrative is that of a benevolent Europe willing to help those most in need but struggling to administer to the scale of the demands being imposed on it.

What is also noteworthy in Sample Group 2 are the hints to the upcoming internal regional discord that would follow during the RMC. It would later be said that faced with the seemingly impossible task of fixing the internal system of refugee admission and mustering support for a joint solution, the lion’s share of EU initiatives in relation to the RMC resulted in the externalisation of its responses (Slominski and Trauner 2018; Lavenex 2018). Said externalisation carried one logic: reducing administrative pressure within the EU by preventing migrants from reaching Europe. The prevention of migrants coming into Europe was performed in two ways, first by militarising the external borders of the

Schengen zone and second by inciting non-European states along traditional RMC routes to withhold human mobility towards Europe. In the articles of Sample Group 2, the militarisation efforts are exemplified in the operations to reduce human smuggling, and the growing internal tensions are seen in the tensions surrounding the emergency relocation schemes.

Already in 2014, Andersson (2014) argued that the externalisation of migration control created a vicious circle in which smuggling networks would benefit from the incentivization of rescue missions. Throughout the RMC, some men and women determined enough to enter the EU were subjected to increasingly creative smuggling practices such as Jet Ski trips from Morocco to Spain, parachute jumps from Turkish cargo flights, and in some more creative instances, “some kind of self-made submarines” (UNHCR 2017c, 44). Yet, there remained a strong emphasis on externalizing migration control, precisely because, as Borevi (2022, 196) put it, it was “one of the few areas where the member states have managed to reach agreement.”

According to Raineri and Strazzari (2021), externalizing such responses served as a “compromise” between the fear that Europe-bound rescue operations could incentivise irregular sea-crossings and the illegal practice of returning rescued migrants and asylum seekers to third-party states viewed as unsafe under EU Human Rights law. While the number of reported crossing-related deaths in the Mediterranean decreased sizeable after the introduction of various European Coast guard and Frontex initiatives, there was an increase in proportion of deaths per crossing in the following years linked with increased militarised presence and increasingly aggressive smuggling practices.

3. Sample Group 3 – July 1st to September 30th, 2015

Below is the breakdown of media coverage found in Sample Group 3, from July 1st to September 30th, 2015. Like the previous sample group, the two narrative themes found to be most mentioned in these articles were ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ (68%) and ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ (50%). Jointly and interactively, both narratives are anchored in the notion that there is a constant and sizeable stream of migrants making their way into Europe from North Africa and Asia via the Mediterranean. The most recurring topics in all forty articles are reflected in those narrative themes. These are scale of migrant flow into Europe (88%), the potential for death and the danger experienced by migrants crossing the Mediterranean or traveling throughout Europe (68%), the political repercussions of the migrants’ arrival (53%), and the gender and age of migrants arriving in Europe (50%). Below is a breakdown of the narrative themes found in this sample group:

Table 5-PartII: Breakdown of narrative themes found in the articles of Sample Group 3

Narrative Theme	Percentage
Humanitarian solidarity	68%
State ability to control human flows across borders	50%
Economic Insecurity	30%
Threats to national identity	28%
Threats to physical security	20%
Pragmatism	13%
National Pride	10%

The two most frequently mentioned RMC-related events in those articles were the construction of border walls to curb migrant flows (35%) and what would later be known as the Walk of Hope (25%)

from Hungary to Austria and Germany. Both narrative themes are reflected in the most mentioned events in this sample group, as well as the key topics found in these articles.

3.1. Event #1 – The Introduction of Border Walls within the Schengen Zone

Border walls featured in fourteen articles (35%) in Sample Group 3 (Group3_GM2; Group3_GM7; Group3_MG1; Group3_MG5; Group3_MG6; Group3_MG8; Group3_TS1; Group3_TS3; Group3_TS4; Group3_TS6; Group3_TS7; Group3_TS9; Group3_VS3; and Group3_VS9). While other border walls were erected in response to the RMC, it was the action of Hungary to introduce a border wall along its borders with Serbia and Croatia that mustered attention in these articles. Hungary's large number of asylum claims in 2015 was more due to its strategic location along the Balkan route and its being a portal country to the EU than its actual pulling power for migrants. Hungary's attitude towards this unprecedented number of asylum applications was less than welcoming, as demonstrated by Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán's anti-immigration political stance. Since the beginning of 2015, Hungary's political agenda had been predominantly geared towards Orbán's popular "zero admission" policy, according to Juhász, Hunyadi, Zgut (2015, 6), who claimed that:

“This cannot just be explained by Hungarian society's seemingly irreversible xenophobic attitude; instead, this is the result of a well-planned, manipulative propaganda campaign at times verging on inciting public hysteria, such as the Orbán cabinet's springtime 'national consultation', i.e., its letters with anti-immigrant messages sent to each household, and its billboard campaign launched in the early summer. Both measures increased xenophobia in a country with hardly any actual immigrant presence. Most people in Hungary have no experience living with foreigners and fears fed by lack of information about them are easily reinforced.”

While many traveling along this route would have already passed through Greece, another EU Member State, there was a chance that the overtaxed Greek asylum system would allow them to fall through the cracks and make their way North towards Western Europe. The application of the regional policy is much at the discretion of Member States. According to the Dublin Regulations, many refugees and migrants would feel compelled to apply for asylum in Hungary as the ‘first’ country of entry within the EU.

As more than 1000 refugees and migrants per day arrived in July 2015 and more than 3000 per day in August, the steady flow of migrants in the country overwhelmed the Hungarian administration (Moving Europe 2016). Prior to 2015, Hungary had never experienced a refugee and migrant flow of this scale, and the RMC introduced them to an unprecedented challenge (Juhász, Hunyadi, Zgut 2015, 7). The situation became so dire that the state agencies stopped allowing transfers back of detained asylum seekers from other EU countries as of June 23rd, 2015 (Than and Nasralla 2015). By the end of 2015, it had become “virtually impossible” to receive asylum in Hungary due to new restrictions, with approval numbers being below 0.5 %, rejection rates being around 2%, leaving the remaining 98% of applications to be dropped, indicating that the asylum seekers leave Hungary before a decision can be handed down in their cases (Juhász, Hunyadi, and Zgut 2015, 6). Indeed, out of the 180 thousand registered asylum applications in 2015 in Hungary, only “a few thousands” remained within the country, with the vast majority continuing onwards to more ‘desirable’ final destinations (Juhász, Hunyadi, and Zgut 2015, 8).

These figures contrast with pre-RMC statistics, which demonstrate that in 2010 less than 2,400 individuals were thought to have travelled through Hungary, though it has been said “in just the first half of 2015, that figure ha[d] been matched fifty times over” (Kingsley 2016, 224). In an attempt to safeguard the country from this high influx of foreigners, the country began the construction of a border

wall with Croatia and Serbia in the Summer of 2015. The location of the wall may be seen in the map below (Thorpe 2018).

Map 2-PartII: Map of the Hungarian border wall with Croatia and Serbia as of September 2015



Hungary built a 175-kilometer-long, 4-meter-high wall, completed in September 2015, aimed to physically prevent migrants from entering Hungarian territory by deflecting them onto neighboring states. It was an operation which proved effective. Hungary claimed that, overall, its fences on the borders of Croatia and Serbia helped to reduce the inflow of migrants by 99.7 percent (Kisbenedek 2017). Consequently, the border wall and the widespread anti-immigration policies adopted by the Hungarian government would explain the significant drop in asylum applications to Hungary between 2015 and 2016. According to the IOM Hungary (s.d.), asylum applications fell from 177,000 in 2015 to

29,000 in 2016, with Syrian applications falling by ninety-two percent, Afghan applications falling by seventy-six percent, and Kosovar applications dwindling by ninety-nine percent.

At state-level, the challenges to respond to the RMC cohesively both stemmed from- and resulted in- Member States leaning towards the ‘re-nationalisation’ of policies surrounding asylum and migration (Borevi 2022), not the least of which included the reintroduction of controls along internal Schengen borders. Postelnicescu (2016) stated that Europe, when faced with the RMC, was “at a crossroad, divided between the need to remain faithful to its core democratic values and freedoms, maintaining an area of freedom and justice and the need to protect its citizens against the new terrorism and the rise of nationalistic leaders and parties that require less Europe and more power back to the nation states.” No freedom, however, has since been more challenged by the migration influx than the freedom of movement within Europe’s internal borders as established by the Schengen Agreement. Between September 2015 and December 2019, according to the European Commission (s.d.), border controls have been reintroduced and prolonged almost 50 times (European Parliament s.d.). Contrastingly before the RMC, there had been only 36 cases of reintroduced border controls since 2006, most of which were linked to ensuring the safety of high-profile international meetings. Since, however, the “serious threats [from the RMC and instances of terrorism] compelled some Member States to prolong reintroduced border control several times until the exhaustion of the legal time frames” supported by Article 25 *et seq* (European Parliament s.d.). While discouraged, reintroducing border controls along internal Schengen borders remains within the rights of Member States. Article 25 *et seq* (25 to 35) of the Schengen Borders Code provides these sovereign Member States with this possibility “in the event that a serious threat to public policy or internal security has been established” (European Commission, “Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control”). Making use of these articles is always meant to be a last resort, proportional and— more importantly—short-lived; a view reiterated in 2017 when the European Commission published a proposal

for an amendment to the Schengen Borders Code giving Schengen states greater leeway when addressing threats to national security (European Commission 2017).

Sample Group 3's media coverage of Hungary's border wall had various migrant framing. In two articles, the construction of the wall - and the implied migrant deterrence - was decried as a hindrance to future European development (Group3_MG1 and Group3_GM7). Taking on 'Pragmatism' narrative themes and a 'benefit' framing of migrants, these two articles view migrants as a boon to future European demographic and economic development, stating that "[m]ost refugees are young, well-educated and highly motivated," a worthwhile consideration when "many Eastern European countries face a population decline" (Group3_MG1); and "Europe, with its aging population, stagnant growth and falling birth rates, needs immigrants – lots of them" (Group3_GM7). In the latter article, moreover, Hungary's border wall stood against the very notion of Europe, saying that it "appeared as if a new Berlin Wall or Iron Curtain were going up in a region where the very notion of a wall violates the concept of an open and free Europe."

Moreover, some of the 14 articles covered Hungary's border wall via the migrant framing of 'victim' (Group3_TS9; Group3_TS1; Group3_MG8; and Group3_GM2). These articles all viewed the wall as an additional layer of precarity for migrants already in precarious situations. Diminishing Hungary's response to high numbers of migrants, one article called the wall emblematic of the country's "full-blown paranoia" (Group3_GM2) to the RMC, one that only served to further what was already a humanitarian crisis (Group3_TSI). By frequently highlighting stories of migrant hardships via personal stories, as well as the gender and age of numerous of these migrants to further humanise the situation, these articles depict resilient and ingenious people who were once again faced with a difficult challenge in their quest for safety. For some migrants, the wall equated to additional expenses, forcing them to rely

on the help of smugglers. The wall is viewed as such as more of a hindrance than an actual deterrence to migrant mobility throughout the continent, with one article articulating that:

“[i]f they build it, they (i.e., the migrants) will just find a way to cross it. It will raise the level of corruption, but it will not change anything" (Group3_GM2).

There were, moreover, another six articles mentioning the Hungarian wall which framed migrants as both ‘victims’ and ‘threat/villains’ (Group3_TS7; Group3_TS3; Group3_TS6; Group3_MG6; Group3_MG5; and Group3_VS3). In all of these, the ‘victim’ framing elements highlight much of the same viewpoints as the above four articles, in which the wall is viewed as an additional layer of danger to migrants already in precarious situations. The additional layer of negative framing is linked to the high scale of migrant flow; it is – much like some of the articles of Sample Group 2 – viewed as overwhelming capacities of European states, notably those of Hungary. It is, as such, constructed as a situation to be dealt with, with articles highlighting how various EU Member States are tackling the influx (Group3_TS7 and Group3_MG6). Other articles, moreover, construct the threat not solely in terms of migrant flow and lack of capacity to meet it but also because of the high level of criminal activity associated with smuggling (Group3_VS3), as well as a financial burden, citing the cost of processing a high number of asylum claims and of hosting applicants (Group3_TS6 and Group3_MG5). These notions are also found in the two articles sporting a ‘threat/villain’ framing soely (Group3_TS4 and Group3_TS3)

There is, moreover, the notion that the lack of consensus between EU Member States is creating a situation, one being compared to the 2010s debt crisis, with the potential of putting the very idea of the EU in peril (Group3_MG5). This vision differs from the articles that lament how the erection of walls counters EU ideals, which is based on the fear that regional contentions may become insurmountable for

the supranational entity, leading it to its potential dissolution. Indeed, the scale of the internal divide between Eastern and Western EU Member States, and even between Northern and Southern states, is a key narrative in the articles of Sample Group 3. Here, Hungary and Germany are posed as contenders in tackling the RMC, where their positions stand diametrically opposed. These positions are best explained via this statement:

“Migration has supplanted the debt crisis as Europe's most controversial issue, with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán building a fence to keep people out and German Chancellor Angela Merkel opening the doors to refugees while pressing for an equitable distribution”

(Group3_MG5).

The way Germany and Hungary were pitted against one another to exemplify the regional contentions in the Canadian media coverage of the RMC between April and June 2015 is well developed in the articles discussing the Walk of Hope.

3.2. Event #2 – Walk (March) of Hope

The Walk of hope - also known as the March of Hope - resulted in thousands of refugees and migrants gathered in Budapest choosing to push forward with their journey despite the attempts by the Hungarian state to restrain their movements. It was seen as a turning point in the RMC in as much as it exemplified a complete inability to ensure border controls between European states when faced with such a sizeable influx of migrants unwilling to adhere to regional migration policy.

Faced with unprecedented numbers of migrants entering their territory and with migrant detainment camps becoming too full, Hungary eventually stopped trying to process incoming asylum applications and instead released the individuals; this, however, did not mean that migrants would be

free to travel. For most released individuals, leaving the camps meant making their way to Budapest to find transport out of the country, where they would be met with mobility restrictions from the Hungarian state and policing. The whole resulted in the two train stations in Budapest, Keleti and Nyugati, becoming increasingly important hubs of the migration movement, or “a market for the onward journey by car or truck to Austria and on to Passau” (Moving Europe 2016). The result was creating a profitable smuggling industry within the country, spearheaded by locals. Like other smuggling hubs, the Budapest smugglers were under severe state scrutiny, which peaked on August 27th, 2015, upon the discovery of a refrigerated lorry containing seventy-one bodies. The lorry incident, mentioned in seven articles in Sample Group 3, became front-page news internationally, adding pressure on the Hungarian state and the European Union to respond to the escalating crisis (Moving Europe 2016). Despite the incident receiving less attention than that of the Walk of Hope or even the Alan Kurdi photograph, two reasons rendered the incident a marking tragedy of the RMC. The first was the sheer gruesomeness of the story in which a local highway maintenance crew found a lorry with “fluids from the decomposing bodies seeping from its back door” leading to the discovery of seventy-one corpses, including ten children’s (Strohecker 2015). The second was the fact that this incident broke away from the more commonplace stories of migrant and refugee drowning at sea. It could be also that for those dwelling outside countries most affected by the RMC, who perhaps felt geographically detached from its events, the fact that this incident occurred in central Europe brought the plight of refugees and migrants ‘closer to home.’ This incident is made even more poignant when considering that it occurred merely a week before the pictures of Alan (Aylan) Kurdi were first published.

On August 24th, 2015, as Germany made public of opening its borders to Syrian refugees, the message spread among migrants in Hungary, making Germany destination country number one in Europe (Moving Europe 2016). The decision could be the result of Germany’s position towards asylum

seekers which stems from its World War II legacy. Following the mass exodus during the hostilities, the country has since adopted a *Willkommenskultur*, or welcoming culture, towards refugees (McDonnell 2015). This attitude, joined by the fact that the country has boasted Europe's biggest economy and a low unemployment rate for many years, has resulted in Germany having a strong pull factor for migrants. More than purely historical, according to McDonnell (2015), the welcoming attitude in Germany is also private sector boosted, with:

“some of the country's most prominent backers of refugee-friendly policies are industry groups, who have argued that migrants are needed to help fill a labor shortage[...] [As such,] Germany has a relative bounty of social services directed toward migrants: Subsidized housing, education, health care, and so on, and a streamlined process for filing immigration paperwork”.

This has greatly aided the widespread perception that Germany is a safe and accessible country “with liberal asylum laws, [in which] the strong diaspora networks that have built up over time, particularly with Middle Eastern countries, act as a pull for new arrivals” (Trines 2017).

The pull factor associated with Germany's *Willkommenskultur* meant that other EU Member States were less concerned about the potentiality of migrants coming into their territory, a situation which rendered the “ruthlessness” of the Orbán-government “reduced to a rather farcical caricature of its own self” (Moving Europe 2016). In contrast, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made international headlines when she adopted an open policy towards refugees in 2015 and 2016. The policy was mainly geared towards Syrian nationals, stating in August 2015 that “Syrians [could] stay in the country while applying for asylum, rather than being turned back to the EU country where they first arrived” (McDonnell 2015); the last part contradicted the EU Dublin regulations which establishes that the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application is based primarily on the first point of

entry in the EU (European Commission 2018b). Consequently, Germany has received the effects of chain migration, through which family and friends of individuals who had already made their way to the country could join them (Mcdonell 2015). Moreover, the country has maintained nearly thirty percent of all asylum claims in Europe for nearly three decades, demonstrating a pulling effect that has yet to be matched by any of its EU counterparts.

Quickly thereafter, on September 4th, 2015, near the time the Hungarian border wall was completed, the Walk of Hope began from Budapest with several thousands of refugees. It was the beginning of the 170km march to the Hungarian-Austrian border. The March rapidly became a media sensation, with social media being flooded with the hashtag “*#marchofhope*” depicting long lines of people leaving Budapest in a collective and spontaneously coordinated action. This wave of attention and harsh criticism from the international civil society spurred European states into action, resulting in approximately 4000 migrants being transported to the border buses and trains. The migrants’ arrival was greeted with applause in Munich, with civilians providing migrants with packed lunches and toys for the children (Mcdonell 2015).

The Walk of Hope was featured in nine articles (23%) in Sample Group 3. In the four articles covering the events and framed migrants exclusively as ‘victims,’ the precarity of migrants was emphasised (Group3_TS1; Group3_Vs7; Group3_VS1; and Group3_Mg10). Simultaneously, Hungary’s reasons for wanting to erect the wall and keep migrants out of their territory were diminished in these articles as baseless, reiterating that it was but a transit country for most applying for asylum. The articles described the events in a general manner, often emphasizing the poor treatment migrants received in Hungary as a means of explaining why they desired to push forward towards other EU states. For example, one article featured Human Rights Watch report depicting migrants “in pens like animals, out

in the sun without food and water” in the border town of Roszke, where they were also exposed to repetitive, violent behaviour by security guards (Group3_VS7). The Walk of Hope is then being constructed as a means for migrants to express their agency in revolt for their poor treatment and unfair policy restrictions.

In the one article with solely the ‘threat/villain’ framing, the Walk of Hope was depicted as the result of ill-intentioned migrants (Group3_TS3). The article described the event as the outcome of “several days of chaos and civil disobedience by the migrants,” leaving Hungarian officials to “thr[ow] in the towel” and comply with the migrants’ demands to leave the country (Group3_TS3). Quoting Orbán, it followed that the migrants were invading the continent, bringing with them “concerns about public safety and the threat of terrorists sneaking in along with the many escaping war and conflict - a worry shared throughout Europe in the wake of terrorist attacks, some carried out by those who have returned from war zones in the Middle East” (Group3_S3). In this depiction of the event, Europe was being quite literally “threatened by a mass inflow of people,” emphasizing how these thousands of incomers could be later joined by millions of others - “and there is no end to this” (Group3_TS3).

In the three articles which framed migrants as both ‘victims’ and ‘threats/villains’, the migrants were depicted as ‘victims’ of their situation, sometimes highlighting the ill-treatment they received in Hungary. The important element is that the ‘threat’ perception was linked to EU-level contentions. In this narrative, the internal regional contentions are exemplified by the actions of both Hungary and Germany. Hungary was described as “full of fear” (Group3_TS1), aiming to “introduce a tough new immigration law that will make illegal crossings into Hungary punishable with jail terms” (Group3_GM10). The country, moreover, blamed Germany’s open-door policy towards Syrian refugees as a key factor behind the RMC (Group3_MG10). Germany, in turn, blamed Hungary for the regional gridlock, saying it lacked solidarity and humanitarian willingness to help. Indeed, Orbán is even quoted

as saying, “these people are not fleeing danger and don't need to be scared for their lives,” emphasizing that Hungary held no obligation towards these migrants (Group3_GM10). In this instance, the ‘threat’ is both the sizeable wave of migrants and the lack of cooperation within the Member States. According to the articles, the future of Europe is in peril through statements like:

“The principle of free movement across continental Europe is at particular risk. The abolition of border controls between EU nations has been a central pillar of European leaders' dreams of stitching together a continent of common values and interconnected economies. But in just weeks, the migration crisis has begun to erode a system that took decades to build” (Group3_MG7)

What emanates from the media coverage of the Walk of Hope is a general sense that during the RMC, EU Member States became overwhelmed by the sizeable influx and lost the ability to control transnational human mobility across its borders.

There is, moreover, the notion that the lack of consensus between EU Member States is creating a situation, one being compared to the 2010s debt crisis, with the potential of putting the very idea of the EU in peril (Group3_MG5). This vision differs from the articles that lament how the erection of walls counters EU ideals, which is based on the fear that regional contentions may become insurmountable for the supranational entity, leading it to its potential dissolution. Indeed, the scale of the internal divide between Eastern and Western EU Member States, and even between Northern and Southern states, is a key narrative in the articles of Sample Group 3.

Final thoughts on Sample Group 3 media coverage of transnational human migration

There appears to be a dichotomy of logic at play for EU Member States' responses to the RMC. These logics are exemplified on the one hand by the welcoming and humanitarian actions of Sweden and Germany and the securitisation attitude of Eastern European Member States on the other hand. Of the latter group, it is Hungary which features most prominently in the media coverage of the Sample Group 3. Both events most frequently covered within these three months center around Hungary's response to the RMC.

Throughout the articles, EU Member States' humanitarian duty and the plight of migrants making their way towards Europe remains an important talking point. Indeed, the potential for death and danger for migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean and traveling within Europe is the second most recurring topic in all 40 articles, second only to the sheer scale of the migrant flow. The general push factors such as war, persecution, poverty, and so forth are frequently mentioned, as are the gender and age of migrants involved, the whole being highlighted in half of all articles (50%).

Both most frequently found narrative themes, 'Humanitarian solidarity' and 'State ability to control human flows across borders' - to be read as inability – about transnational human migration are prominent in both key events covered. Sample Group 3 also furthers a common narrative about the RMC previously introduced in Sample Group 2 articles, concerned with the lack of regional solidarity in response to the RMC. Sample Group 3 introduced the narrative that the RMC could pose a real challenge for the future of the regional union, as EU Member States demonstrate an inability and an unwillingness to cooperate on how to tackle RMC influxes. Within these three months, the articles depict a continent divided in responding to a significant and seemingly constant stream of migrants.

4. Sample Group 4 – October 1st to December 31st, 2015

Below is the breakdown of media coverage found in Sample Group 4, from October 1st to December 31st, 2015. Like the previous two sample groups, the two narrative themes found to be most mentioned in these articles were ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ (60%) and ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ (60%). The most recurring topics in all forty articles are reflected in those narrative themes. These are scale of migrant flow into Europe (60%), the potential for death and the danger experienced by migrants crossing the Mediterranean or traveling throughout Europe (40%), and the political repercussions of the migrants’ arrival (38%). Below is a breakdown of the narrative themes found in this sample group:

Table 6-PartII: Breakdown of narrative themes found in the articles of Sample Group 4

Narrative Theme	Percentage
State ability to control human flows across borders	60%
Humanitarian solidarity	60%
Threats to physical security	25%
Economic Insecurity	20%
Threats to national identity	15%
Pragmatism	10%
National Pride	10%

The two most frequently mentioned RMC-related events in those articles were the construction of border walls to curb migrant flows (20%), the November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris, France (18%), as well as the Canadian Syrian Resettlement Program (18%). Both narrative themes are reflected in the most mentioned events in this sample group and the key topics found in these articles.

4.1. Event #1 – The Introduction of Border Walls within the Schengen Zone

Eight articles (20%) mentioned the use of border walls within the EU in Sample Group 4. Similarly to Sample Group 3, all of them spoke of the Hungarian border wall with Serbia and Croatia, with most of the articles focusing not only on Hungary's reasons for erecting it but also on the wall's effects on neighbouring states as the flow of migrants remained unabated. The key distinction between the way the border wall was covered between this sample group and the previous one was the novel focus on Hungary's neighbouring countries and how the wall affected their level of migration rather than focusing on Hungary itself and its reasons for building said wall.

Only one of these articles framed migrants as a 'benefit' to Europe, decrying anti-migration measures such as the use of walls as anti-European. If anything, it stated that migration was a continental tradition, mentioning the throngs of Europeans with "itchy feet" who migrated "from one town to another, one country to another, one continent to another and, often, back again," in a way that "blended people, their ideas and technologies" (Group4_TS7). The practice is credited for the economic and cultural construction of Europe. Via this historical lens, the article attempted to create a 'bridge' between Europe and its newest migrants, depicting the latter's migration as a boon and inherently European in nature.

The remaining seven articles framed migrants as either 'victims' (14%), 'threats/villains' (57%), or a mixture of both (43%). The one 'victim'-framed article described the plight of migrants following the erection of the Hungarian border wall, describing how it had made their already difficult journey even more difficult, much alike the articles with similar framing in Sample Group 3 (Group4_VS5).

The articles containing the other migrant frames focused on the wall's effects on both migrants and nearby countries, notably Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. For Croatia and Serbia, the wall resulted in a bottleneck in migrant flows along the Balkan route, adding pressure to the country's already strained

capacities. For example, following the arrival of 4,000 individuals in Croatia in October, migrants – some of whom it was emphasized were “women holding babies in their arms” – are described as being stuck in migrant camps as they await transportation towards Slovenia, the alternative route towards Northern Europe (Group4_MG4). The situation of migrants was described as exponentially worse off since the construction of the wall because of the cold weather in the region, a reality most migrants were not only unacclimated to but also ill-equipped to face (Group4_MG4; Group4_GM10; and Group4_TS8). The whole fell under the humanitarian solidarity narrative theme, in which the plight of migrants in need of assistance was stressed via the emphasis of their precarity, the reminder of their ‘gentle nature’ (i.e., their female gender and young age), and personal stories of the situation which led them to take on such a perilous journey. The way the ‘victim’ frame was presented in these articles aimed to incite compassion and a desire to help.

As for Slovenia, the articles depicted the “tiny alpine nation” of only 2 million people as “overwhelmed” by the additionally large influx of migrants, estimated to be up to 6,000 individuals a day (Group4_VS10 and Group4_MG2). In the case of Slovenia, more particularly, the ‘threat’ perception during the RMC was due to both the scale of the influx as well as the origin of the migrants. As stated in Group4_MG2, “[t]he largely Catholic nation fears it could be overwhelmed by mostly Muslim refugees if neighbouring Austria and Germany further west decide to stop the flow from the Balkans.” The ‘threat/villain’ frame in the articles was therefore linked with the scale of the migrant flows and not the notion that the migrants themselves posed a threat to host societies.

4.2. Event #2 – The Canadian Syrian Resettlement Program

Seven articles in Sample Group 4 mentioned Canada’s Syrian Resettlement Program. The program was devised in large part as a response to the Alan Kurdi photograph, in part because “[t]he

image of Alan Kurdi's lifeless three-year-old body on a Turkish beach quickly became a symbol of the world's indifference to Syrian refugees and changed that crisis (i.e., the RMC) forever" (Group4_TS10). Interestingly, the death of Alan Kurdi and the photograph that made it infamous were not among the most cited events in this – or any other - sample groups. Instead, it is the mobilization effect it is presumed to have inspired that was most mentioned. Looking at the project globally, however, it is worth mentioning that the Kurdi name itself features in at least thirty-three percent of all news articles featured in this research project.

The Kurdi photograph is attributed with placing a face to the RMC, a humanizing element said to break away from abstract and impersonal statistics such as '71 migrants' or '3,000-plus deaths' in the Mediterranean Sea (Goodspeed 2018). In September 2015, the photo of the child is thought to have galvanized a mobilizing force for Canadians to take a greater role in alleviating the Syrian refugee crisis (Tyyskä et al., 2017; Winter, Patzelte, and Beauregard 2018). In Canada, it has been argued that following the Kurdi photograph, the prevailing negative perceptions of Middle Eastern refugee claimants in local migration discourse, which had prevailed for over a decade were mitigated by a strong desire to help, and Canadians were called upon to welcome those in need (Tyyskä et al., 2017; Winter, Patzelte, and Beauregard 2018).

Prior to the RMC, the Harper-led Conservative administration, in place between 2006 and 2015, took a stern stance on immigration. During that time, immigration policies were revisited to divert resources from refugee and migrant resettlement and integration programs to strengthening border controls to "root out" potential terrorists (Antonius, Labelle, and Rocher 2021). The reception of refugee claims was significantly reduced, followed by restrictive policies in an attempt at discarding "bogus" applications from "economic freeloaders" meant to save the government \$1.6 billion over five years (Goodspeed 2018). The securitization of Canadian immigration post-9/11 created the perception that the

system in place was vulnerable to exploitation, a sentiment bolstered by domestic media (Winter, Patzelte, and Beauregard 2018; Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak 2018). Years of migration-related policy changes mirror shifts in public discourses, casting migrants as untrustworthy, costly, and associated with criminal activity (Carver 2016). In doing so, the Harper government is said to have both responded to and reinforced nativist strands in Canadian public opinion (Carver, 2016) and ultimately “introduced a new demarcation line between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in a topoi of comparison, where the former is associated with ‘generosity’ and the latter with ‘crime’” (Fiřtová 2021, 277). By 2015, it was harder for refugees and asylum seekers to come to Canada than at any other point since the twentieth century (Goodspeed, 2018).

Immigration had become such a contentious topic that Fiřtová (2021) advances that for the first time, immigration became a wedge issue in the 2015 federal election. Multiculturalism had previously been so ingrained into the official political debates that it made immigration an electoral non-issue (Fiřtová 2021). In the last few weeks leading up to Canada’s 42nd federal election in September 2015, the Kurdi tragedy, the RMC, and the Syrian refugee crisis became politicized.

The media coverage of the Syrian Resettlement Program in Sample Group 4 articles more specifically followed two trends. The first, found in three articles, highlighted the role of the Kurdi photograph in the creation of- and support for- the program (Group4_GM2; Group4_GmM9; and Group4_TS10). These articles had a ‘victim’ framing of migrants, demonstrating how, for example, the lives of migrants could be improved by being welcomed into Canada (Group4_GM2) or, again, how it was important for the country to do its part in the global humanitarian crisis (Group4_TS10 and Group4_GM9). The Group4_GM9 article, more specifically, went so far as to compare Canada’s inaction to the RMC and Syrian refugee crisis to that of the Holocaust, reiterating that the country failed

then to respond adequately and is risking doing so now. Indeed, between 1933 and 1945, Canada admitted fewer than 5,000 Jewish refugees.

All in all, it accepted the lowest number of refugees among developed nations. When world leaders met in France in 1938 to tackle the dire reality of Jews fleeing Nazism, Canada did not commit to help, stating economic reasons. Not only did the government take a passive response to the crisis, but it also raised the capital requirement for Jewish immigrants (from \$5,000 to \$20,000 and denied admission for other reasons to those with sufficient funds (Epp 2017, 7).

The second trend associated with the resettlement program could be found in the remaining four articles, all of which frame migrants as both ‘victims’ and potential ‘threats/villains’ (Group4_GM6; Group4_VS6; Group4_MG7 and Group4_MG9). What emanated from these articles is that Canadians were torn vis-à-vis the program in so far as they recognised the need to protect those in need, such as Syrians who have been at war since 2011, but they also called for a careful examination of those selected to take part in the program. While notions of false claims and abuse of the system, which is often associated with humanitarian immigration, are not the main factor of reticence here, there remained elements of threats related to the incoming migrants. The most notable one is a repercussion of the November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris, France, in as much as there were concerns about potentially inviting terrorists into the country via the program (Group4_GM6; Group4_MG7 and Group4_MG9). Even Prime Minister Trudeau, in a visit to the UK shortly after the attacks, is quoted as linking migration and terrorism, citing “very real security concerns that we’re all faced with around the world and at home” (Group4_VS6). The initial support the program received was therefore mitigated by the events in France, and the Liberal government published several statements that suggested that its refugee-resettlement program would prioritize women and complete families rather than individual men, promoting its pre-selection vetting processes for the incoming Syrian refugees (Canadian Council for

Refugees s.d.). It should be noted, however, that single men could still be eligible for resettlement if they identified as LGBTQ*; they, along with families and single women, were the preferred candidates. Doing so corroborated “the assumption and implication that single [and presumably religious] Middle Eastern men are a greater security risk and should be feared because they fit the stereotype of most terrorists” (Molnar 2016, 71).

Moreover, while only mentioned in one article (Group4_VS6), there was an additional concern surrounding the resettlement program that is worth highlighting. It is one that spoke to another kind of anxiety: economic insecurity. The article drew parallels between the Syrian asylum seekers who made their way to Europe and those who would benefit from the Canadian program, depicting the latter group as somewhat ‘less than’ because of their lack of financial ability and/or the fortitude of making such the long journey between Syrian and Europe. It hints to these individuals being likely burdens to the country, “because they could not afford the extortionate fees charged by human smugglers to get them to Europe” (Group4_VS6). The statement implied the migrants’ poverty and/or lack of opportunity could hinder them from having something to contribute to the host country. The article stands contrary to Group4_GM2, which praised the program for bringing in young workers in a country with an aging population. These two articles represent the narrative theme dichotomy that surrounds humanitarian migration, with burden-focused economic insecurity on the one hand and advantageous pragmatism on the other.

Additional information on how the Canadian media covered the November 2015 Paris attacks may be found below.

4.3. Event #3 – Paris, France, November 13th attacks

There was a significant overlap (over 75%) in the articles in Sample Group 3, which treated the Canadian Syrian Resettlement Program and the November 13th attacks in Paris. As such, this section will not discuss the articles' framing of migrants per se but will instead integrate them into the general discussion of the event's aftermath.

It did not take long after the Kurdi photograph for the national migration discourse to be swayed once more in reaction to RMC-related events. Two months after the initial surge in Canadian willingness to take in Syrian refugees and one month after the Liberals had been put into power, the conversation seemed to have circled back once more toward fear and insecurity in the wake of terrorist attacks in Europe (Showler 2015; Molnar 2016).

In 2015, the continent was already attending to the complexities of the increased frequency of Islamist militant attacks since 2006 (Europol 2021). In 2015 and 2016 alone, multiple attacks occurred (Foster 2017), notably the Charlie Hebdo shootings (January 2015), the Paris attacks (November 2015), the Brussels bombings (March 2016), and the Berlin Christmas-market attack (December 2016). While each of these were devastating events, none sparked the same level of coverage in Canadian newspapers as the November Paris (Bataclan) attacks [see Sample Groups 1, 4, 5, and 8]. The media attention on the Paris events was mostly due to it being the deadliest. It is worth mentioning that bluntly linking migration and terrorism is perpetuating unwarranted labels on the men and women who simply wish to secure a safer and better future for themselves. Unfortunately, this association is often made, resulting in statements such as this one by Nail (2016, 158–159):

The refugee crisis in Europe can no longer be understood as separate from the crisis of terrorism after the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015. In fact, the two crises were never really separate in

the nationalist imaginary to begin with.... It should hardly go without saying that migration and terrorism are not the same thing, but the fact that they have become each other's doppelgänger in contemporary politics, at least since 9/11, cannot simply be dismissed or ignored.

Sensibility toward Muslims in Europe - already made evident in the articles in Sample Group 1 - became increasingly apparent in the aftermath of the November 2015 attacks according to Oztig, Gurkan, and Aydin (2021). It was also mentioned in Group4_MG9, Group4_TS5, and Group4_GM1. The association was furthered when a Syrian passport was found near the body of one of the aggressors (Funk and Parkes 2016; Ball 2015; Vinocur 2015). The document, however, belonged to a completely unrelated party, an asylum seeker who had arrived in Greece a few weeks earlier and had his documents stolen (Kingsley 2017), a detail which was at times left out in the reporting of the event. In fact, only one of the seven articles mentioning the attack mentions the attackers all being European-born (Group4_GM1). Unsurprisingly, the media reporting made it so that many linked the threat of Islamic-extremist terrorism to the ongoing RMC despite all the attackers holding either French or Belgian nationalities (Farmer 2016). The Paris event reinforced the prevailing post-9/11 association of refugees and migrants from the Middle East with extremist violence, and ultimately depicted them as potential threats to national security for Europe in general.

Islamophobia then becomes a form of "strategic opportunism" for anti-immigration and anti-integration parties, mobilising fear to justify both actions and support, all in the name of security and control (Postelnicescu 2016, 206). The 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK, for example, is said to have been predominantly driven by RMC-fueled fears over transnational migration and a desire to 'regain control' from the EU on corresponding policies (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017; Ford and Goodwin 2017; Prosser, Mellon, and Green 2016). In Group4_TS5, the rise of anti-immigrant, nativist

political parties on social media platforms was cited as a genuine source of precarity for newly arrived migrants, as it may hinder their support in exercising their right to apply for asylum.

Increased sensitivity to Muslims in 2015, moreover, could also be perceived in Canada, with a 61% rise in the number of police-reported crimes motivated by hate against the Muslim population (Statistics Canada 2017). In Toronto, for example, a Muslim mother picking up her children from school was accosted and told to “go back to [her] country” (Rieti 2015); a mosque was torched in Peterborough, Ontario (CBC News 2015b), and another mosque was defaced twice in Alberta (CBC News 2015a). To blame this discursive shift solely on the Paris attack perpetrators and the influx of refugees and migrants of Middle Eastern backgrounds into Canada would be unjustified. Islamophobia in Canada was already on the rise, and the Paris attacks only served to fuel it. In 2016, there was a thirteen percent decrease in the number of police-reported crimes motivated by hate against the Muslim population; in 2017, however, there was a 150 percent increase (Gaudet 2018; Armstrong 2019).

The perception of asylum seekers involved in the RMC played a role in how they were welcomed by civil society and policymakers alike (European Social Survey 2017). In eighty percent of EU countries surveyed by the Pew Research Center in September 2016, those on the political right were found to discursively associate refugees with security rather than a humanitarian cause (Poushter 2016). The threat perception stems from the origin of asylum seekers involved in the RMC, most of which came from Muslim-Majority countries, discursively associating them with ISIS and/or other Islamic terrorist groups. The characterisation of Muslims as terrorists invading the Western world, rooted into a post-911 mainstream, is highly problematic for multiple reasons, perpetuating unfair - and frankly unwarranted - labels on the men and women who simply wish a fresh start and harbor no ill-wishes unto their host societies. The narrative has been promoted by law enforcement organisations, such as Europol (2021, 9), which stated that:

A real and imminent danger is the possibility of elements of the (Sunni Muslim) Syrian refugee diaspora becoming vulnerable to radicalisation once in Europe and being specifically targeted by Islamic extremist recruiters. It is believed that a number of jihadists are travelling through Europe for this purpose. According to unconfirmed information, German authorities were aware of around 300 recorded attempts made by jihadists to recruit refugees who were trying to enter Europe by April 2016.”

During the RMC, media and political rhetoric frequently focused on administrative and economic demands, as well as perceptions of refugees’ genuineness in their claims (Wallace 2018). The findings of this research project also support this statement. Studies have suggested that in a general sense, the ‘mediatized’ coverage of migration-related events is often overly negative (Wallace, 2018; Krzyzanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak 2018); with journalists, as Gois and Faraone (2018, 139) have put it, “exploiting receiving societies’ fears and ignorance in search of audiences and profit.” The media is thus argued to be a platform for “anxious politics” towards immigration (Albertson and Gadarian, 2015), constructing fears and propagating misinformation via sensationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric and infusing migration discourses with marked elements of security (Hier and Greenberg, 2002; Gois and Faraone, 2018).

Final thoughts on Sample Group 4 media coverage of transnational human migration

There are no clear storylines in the media coverage of Sample Group 4. What emanated from it were stories of how various countries, notably Hungary and its neighbours, France, and Canada responded to various events. Much alike the previous sample group, Sample Group 4 also covered the erection of the Hungarian wall significantly, featuring in twenty percent of all articles. The latter focused

on the ripple-effects of the wall for both neighbouring countries and for the migrants themselves. The coverage of the Hungarian border wall almost all emphasized the plight of migrants who then faced additional challenges to their mobility, with over half the articles also stressing the strain of European states to respond to the scale of RMC-related migrant flows. The coverage of the border wall, thus, stands exemplary of the two dichotomous narratives that were most present in the Canadian media coverage of the RMC.

Moreover, Sample Group 4 introduced the first and only Canadian-specific event, the Canadian Syrian Resettlement Program. It demonstrated that the media coverage of the Kurdi photograph and the November 13th, 2015, Paris attacks were indirectly associated with the Canadian attitudes towards the Syrian Resettlement Program. It also highlighted the reactionary nature of the Canadian public to both instances which were only two months apart.

Lastly, the media coverage of the Paris attacks introduced an additional element to the RMC narrative of European states struggling to cope with the size of the RMC. As connections between RMC-related migrant flows and the potential for increasing terrorist activity emerged, so too did a narrative concerned with the rise popular support for far-right, anti-immigration political parties in Europe as a result of the RMC.

5. Sample Group 5 – January 1st to March 31st, 2016

The main narrative themes found in the articles in Sample Group 5, spanning between January 1st, 2016, and March 31st, 2016, were that of: ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ (58%), ‘Humanitarian Solidarity’ (48%), and migrants posing ‘Threats to physical security’ (35%). The most frequently found topics within the articles were: the scale of migrant flow into the continent (78%); state-level policies relating to migration, notably that of Germany (48%); the social and political responses to migrant arrival throughout the region (30% and 35% respectively); and the death and danger faced by migrants (33%). Below is a breakdown of the narrative themes found in this sample group.

Table 7-PartII: Breakdown of narrative themes found in the articles of Sample Group 5

Narrative Theme	Percentage
State ability to control human flows across borders	58%
Humanitarian solidarity	48%
Threats to physical security	35%
Threats to national identity	23%
Economic Insecurity	20%
Pragmatism	13%
National Pride	8%

The key events in the group are the EU-Turkey deal (33%), and the terrorist numerous attacks that occurred throughout Europe, notably those on New Year’s Eve in Germany (20%), the November 2015 in Paris (18%), and March 2016 in Brussels (15%). These themes are reflected in the most frequently mentioned events and in the most found topics.

5.1. Event #1 – The EU-Turkey Deal

In March 2016, the EU struck a deal with Turkey to stop the flow of irregular migration via Turkey to Europe. The agreement followed a series of meetings with Turkey since November 2015 dedicated to strengthening Turkey-EU relations and cooperation on the RMC. It led to the creation of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan on the 29th of November 2015, and the EU-Turkey statement on the 7th of March 2016. Furthermore, on December 15th, 2015, the Commission proposed a voluntary humanitarian admission scheme for Syrian Refugees in Turkey (European Parliament “EU-Turkey Statement & Action Plan”). The March 2016 deal, known colloquially as the EU-Turkey deal, stipulated that all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of the 20th of March 2016 would be returned to Turkey and that for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands another Syrian would be resettled in the EU. In exchange for this, the EU committed to reducing visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, to speed up the membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU, and to allocate three billion euros to Turkey to build facilities to tackle the high flow of refugees and migrants, with an additional three billion euros before the end of 2018 (Legislative Train 2023).

The deal was one of the various ways the EU took to mitigate RMC-related migrant flows. Some to militarised efforts were aimed to tangibly prevent migrants from reaching Europe like the EU-Turkey and EU-Libya deal (mentioned in Sample Group 2 articles). There were also non-militarised efforts taken by the EU to share the ‘burden’ or the migrant influx with non-EU partners. A key initiative was the creation of a communal *Safe Third Country list*, suggested in May 2015. While ratifying EU Member States pledged to help those in need of protection, each of them abided by their list of safe countries. It should be noted that the concept of a *Safe Country of Origin* is different from that of a *Safe Third Country*. The first concept describes a country in which its own citizens are not persecuted and,

therefore, not legally entitled to asylum. The second one refers to countries where asylum seekers and refugees are well protected should they remain there. The Safe Third Country concept is mainly used to rule about the admissibility of an asylum application, given that the asylum seeker could have presented the request in some other country, and to systemise the return process of those who may be accused of the aforementioned ‘asylum shopping.’ The primary purpose of this list was to prevent abuses of the EU and national asylum systems and “support the swift processing of asylum application from countries designated as safe” (Benvenuti 2016). Unfortunately, however, similarly to the emergency relocation schemes mentioned in Sample Groups 2 and 3, the common Safe Country of Origin List was dropped following futile discussions on which countries should be included. Since then, EU Member States have turned inwards and returned to their pre-existing lists, creating difficulties under the shared Dublin System over what is considered a valid asylum claim. Part of the EU-Turkey deal had hints of a common Safe third country list, as Turkey was not viewed as a safe country for migrant by any of the EU Member States except Bulgaria in 2015 (GM2).

Overall, thirteen articles (33%) in Sample Group 5 mentioned the EU-Turkey deal. Of these, six of them framed migrants as a ‘threat/villain’ (Group5_GM4; Group5_MG8; Group5_TS5; Group5_TS6; Group5_VS2 and Group5_VS6). A whole year of the RMC under their belt, these articles depicted numerous threats, the most frequently mentioned being the sheer scale of the migrant influx as being a threat to European states’ ability to cope and control migratory flows across territorial borders (Group5_MG8; Group5_TS6 and VS6). Other articles, moreover, took on narratives that would fall under the ‘Threats to physical security’ theme, like Group5_GM4, which expressed worries about the gender imbalance in the type of migrants coming to Europe, as most are “young men travelling alone to Europe are their family's chosen delegate”; and Group5_TS5 who reiterated the link between migrants

and their potential of being undercover terrorists. Other articles viewed the migrants as threats to the EU, highlighting how individual Member States struggled to cope with the influx and the lack of regional unity in coming up with a solution. To this effect, Group5_VS2 added that even the most welcoming countries like Germany began facing internal political and social upheavals as a response to the RMC in 2016, stating that “[t]he shocks caused by the refugee crisis in Germany and the burning of asylum seekers' homes there have reawakened fears the country might somehow lapse back into the violence and xenophobia that led to the rise of the Nazis in the 1930s.” More information about the social and political backlash of the EU-Turkey deal can be found in the articles of Sample Group 6.

The remaining seven articles framed migrants as either ‘victims’ (Group5_TS2; Group5_TS8; Group5_VS4 and Group5_VS5) or both ‘victims’ and ‘threats/villains’ (Group5_GM1; Group5_GM2 and Group5_MG9). The ‘threat’ perception in the latter group reflected the narratives mentioned above, focusing chiefly on how the scale of the migrant influx was a threat to regional unity. What is worth mentioning in these articles is that the depictions associated with the ‘victim’ framing highlighted how the EU-Turkey deal worsened the conditions of migrants. Because of EU border closures between Greek islands and the rest of the EU, migrants, via personal stories of the hardships they faced both in their origin country and during their transit towards the EU, were sometimes described as “desperate” and “stranded” in Greece (Group5_TS8). Indeed, the deal made it such that the EU, even with the sizeable financial support, “effectively turn[ed] the bloc's weakest member into the Continent's refugee camp” (Group5_VS5). For more information about how the EU-Turkey Deal increased migrant precarity, notably by affecting migratory routes to Europe from Asia and North Africa, please refer to the various shipwreck event breakdown in Sample Group 6.

The outcomes of the EU-Turkey deal still leave much to be debated. As of April 2018, the deal resulted in over 12,000 Syrians being relocated from Turkey to EU Member States, headed primarily to Germany and the Netherlands; and in return, over 2,000 refugees were sent to Turkey from Greece (Lavenex 2018; Karakoulaki 2018). It is unclear if it was able to mitigate migrant mobility altogether, as while mobility along the Eastern Mediterranean route decreased as Turkey took on a more active policing role in the region, the restrictions led to the reopening of the land-based border crossing between Greece and Turkey through the river of Evros; a longer and more dangerous path that can only be navigated through the use of smugglers (Laczko, Singleton, and Black 2017, 64). Before this, the Turkish coastal economy had been modifying itself to meet the growing demands of the many refugees and migrants making their way there. While this example is merely one of many, it highlights the effects the RMC may have had on local economies along the route. According to testimony from journalist Patrick Kingsley (2016, 190-192), a great number of businesses in Turkish coastal cities, such as restaurants and clothing stores, were seen redirecting part of their activities to cater to the needs of the passersby, choosing to display dinghies and lifejackets rather than their traditional merchandise. He adds, moreover, that while Turkey refuted this, it is said that prior to this deal, Turkish law enforcement took a very laissez-faire attitude towards the migrants, choosing to turn a blind eye to the burgeoning smuggling and naval industries along the coast. The EU-Turkey deal was developed partly to target and eradicate human smuggling across the Aegean Sea. It is unclear if Turkish efforts to curb human smuggling were increased following the deal.

In Greece, the deal meant that those irregularly crossing the Aegean Sea could log their asylum requests into one of the country's new hotspots, identification facilities that were created to register and fingerprint asylum seekers. According to Karakoulaki (2018), however, slow asylum procedures met with restrained but still sizeable levels of migrant arrivals meant that the hotspots quickly became

overcrowded. The living conditions in the hotspots were said to be inadequate and unsanitary, resulting in constant violence and mental degradation of those dwelling in it.

As such, the deal has been widely criticized by NGOs and other local actors, which was reflected in the media coverage of the EU-Turkey deal in Sample Group 5. Numerous groups were dubious of the deal's effectiveness, outcome, and its inherent morality. As a result, UN refugee agency and Doctors Without Borders decided to stop their assistance in Greek hotspots, stating that staying would make them complicit "in a system we consider[ed] to be both unfair and inhumane" (Group5_VS4). In Group5_TS6, civil rights groups referred to the deal as a "fig-leaf to hide the deportation of migrants, even though the EU insists that each person can make a case in an interview and can appeal." In Group5_TS2, a civil rights activist described the deal as "double-speak," referring to Orwellian language that deliberately obscures, disguises, distorts, or reverses the meaning of words. In this case, the "European Union's dogged determination to turn its back on a global refugee crisis and wilfully ignore its international obligations" (Group5_TS2). It is evident in these articles that the effects of the deal on Greece within the first months of 2016 seemed uncertain.

5.2. Event #2 – Numerous attacks in Europe, notably the ones in Cologne, Germany, Paris, France, and Brussels, Belgium

On March 22nd, 2016, the city of Brussels experienced two coordinated suicide bombing attacks, one at the airport and the other in the metro system (Eurojust "Brussels terrorist attacks of March 2016"). The attacks, which killed 32 individuals and injured hundreds more, were later claimed by Islamic militant group ISIS. The subsequent investigation uncovered a sophisticated terrorist network active in numerous EU Member states, responsible for not only this event but also the November 2015

Paris attacks. The suicide bombers were part of a vast network of extremist militants with connections to other serious crimes and networks involving arms trafficking and forgery of documents.

In Sample Group 5, there was a total of thirteen articles (33%) mentioning at least one of these three terrorist-associated events in Europe: the November 13th, 2015, Paris attacks, the December 31st, 2015 ‘Cologne’ attacks, and the March 22nd 2016, Brussels attacks.

The seven and six articles (respectively) mentioning the Paris and Brussels events overlap for the most part, in large parts because the events were perpetrated by the same group. The one article mentioning both attacks with a ‘victim’ framing of migrants focused on Canada’s reaction to the events (Group5_MG6). The migrants – and here it must be specified that the focus is on Syrians - are themselves framed as ‘victims’ of the same terrorist cells that organised both attacks. The article outlines Canada’s reiteration of its commitment to the Levant region. The move is said to align with the country’s efforts to resettle Syrian refugees in Canada and remains, according to Prime Minister Trudeau, “much more focused on empowering locals on the ground on a military level [i.e., the Global Coalition against DAESH and Operation IMPACT], on a humanitarian level, on a refugee level, is going to be an extraordinarily strong piece of the coalition's fight against ISIL.” Canada’s efforts in the region came with a financial and militarised commitment of 4.7\$ (CAD) over nine years (2016-2025, aimed) towards helping conflicts in Iraq and Syria and helping refugees and economic development in Lebanon and Jordan (Government of Canada 2024c).

Group5_MG6 contrasted significantly with the five other articles framing migrants as ‘threats/villains’ (Group5_MG2; Group5_MG3; Group5_MG5; Group5_MG7; and Group5_TS1). In all articles of the latter group, the link between the migrant influx associated with the RMC and the attacks was reiterated, falling under the ‘threat to physical security’ and ‘threat to national identity’ narrative themes. Indeed, in Group5_MG2, the link between the Syrian passport and the Paris attacks was

reiterated, even if by then, reports identified the passport as stolen. Said link was once more reinforced in the media when it would be reported that one of the Brussels airport suicide bombers, Najim Laachraoui, was thought to have posed as an asylum seeker alongside other Syrians to travel between Syria and Belgium (Group5_MG7). Laachraoui was born in Morocco but grew up in Belgium. He travelled to Syria in 2013, where he is thought as having been radicalised by ISIS. Linking both the Paris and the Belgian attacks with Syrian asylum seekers, the Group5_MG3 article quotes Belgian civilians of Muslim backgrounds themselves supporting the association between RMC and the potential for increased terrorist activity.

In Group5_MG5 and Group5_TS1, the articles support narrative that would fall under the ‘threat to national identity’ theme. The articles mention all three events. In them, Europe – and the Western world by association – is depicted as under attack by Islamic extremists in such a way that it holds the potential to alter societies. What is interesting in these two articles is not that the Muslim pockets of Europe are viewed as themselves problematic, in fact, Group5_MG5 directly quotes the UK Prime Minister saying, “Christian leaders should help their brothers and sisters who are Muslim,” but that the way European societies respond to these threats may alter European societies by making them more inward-looking. In Group5_MG5, for example, the UK Prime Minister is quoted as saying, “[t]he atrocities in Brussels on Tuesday, coming so soon after the November bombings that killed 130 people in Paris, have heightened the meaning of jihadist violence. We knew the world was in trouble. Now we have an appalling sense of how bad the trouble is.” Group5_TS1, furthermore, highlighted that the attacks and the “poor bureaucratic preparation” of the EU towards RMC have provided “massive oxygen into the fires on Europe’s political far-right,” and that “Brussels looking enfeebled, at best,” promoting Euroscepticism in the region. Group5_GM5 added that the numerous attacks have shifted and shocked public opinion.

Another incident that captivated European audiences was the 2016 New Year's Eve attacks in Germany, when hundreds of women were harassed and sexually assaulted in Cologne, Stuttgart, and Hamburg. In response to what would later be colloquially known as the 'Cologne' events, local authorities issued warnings to women to avoid certain places, towns barred migrants from entering swimming pools, thousands of police personnel were readied to patrol carnival marches, and pink security zones for women were proposed (Gümplova 2016).

For the refugees and migrants newly arrived in the country and for German citizens of North African or Arab origins, this turn of events was worrisome. While in the Summer of 2015, masses of ordinary people greeted arriving migrants and refugees at the train stations, Germany's *Willkommenskultur* seemed greatly diminished after the attacks, resulting in increasing support for far-right parties in Germany (Vieten 2018; Gümplova 2016). It came at a time when Germany had registered a sharp increase in vandalizing attacks on refugee facilities and asylum seekers' accommodations since mid-2015. The German newspaper *Zeit* reported that there had been over 220 such attacks in 2015 alone, leaving one to wonder about the eventuality of additional unreported ones (Blickle et al., 2015). The article states that the attacks led to physical injuries from presumed migrants. Germany, it seemed, merely a few months after publicly opening its borders to Syrian refugees, was losing public support for Chancellor Merkel's initiative by calling instead for limits on immigration, such as caps on the number of incoming refugees, limits on welfare benefits, the return of economic migrants, and the control of borders (Gümplova 2016).

In total, the 'Cologne' events were mentioned in eight articles in Sample Group 5. In some of the articles, as mentioned above, the attacks are positioned as having the potential to change European society (Group5_TS1 and Group5_GM5). Six of those articles framed migrants as 'threats/villains'

(Group5_TS1; Group5_GM3; Group5_GM5; Group5_Vs7 and Group5_TS7), with all of them highlighting the social and political backlash the events had on Germans' attitude towards migrants. It is evident throughout the articles that the 'Cologne' events have created a shift within German society and Europe at large. Group5_GM3 states that 'Cologne' thrust the "itinerant men" (i.e., migrants that have arrived during the RMC) "into the forefront of Europe's politics and turned their problem into a continental crisis."

In Germany, specifically, the political shift resulted in Chancellor Merkel facing political backlash for her open and welcoming attitude towards Syrian refugees in 2015 (Group5_VS7). The same could be said about other politicians, like Cologne mayoral candidate Henriette Reker. Ms. Reker won the election in October 2015 while in a coma, as she had been stabbed at a public event by a German national as he shouted about the migrant influx into the country (Group5_GM9). Following the 'Cologne' incidents, a protest in Cologne featured thousands of people holding up signs saying, "Merkel take your Muslims with you and get lost," and "Muhammad not Welcome" (Group5_TS7). Social protests were also visible in virtual spaces, with German Twitter-users are sharing such things as, "German Muslims: Ban alcohol because it leads to rape — so why not ban refugees, they lead to rape, too" (Group5_TS7). What made the 'Cologne' attacks so poignant to the German population was not the novelty of such incidents; quite to the contrary, it was, as was stated in Group5_GM3, because the perpetrators "were brown-skinned and most of the victims were white" (i.e., constructed as Muslim men 'others').

The remaining two articles mentioning the 'Cologne' events framed migrants as 'victims' but also as 'benefits' to the host society (Group5_GM4 and Group5_VS1). These articles covered the migrants' arrival in an opposite light, highlighting the potential good migrants could bring to Germany and the ease with which they could integrate into its society, considering most of them arrived with the

necessary language skills and desirable experience. To them, the ‘Cologne’ events were sad realities falsely blamed on migrants and even Muslim Europeans. In Group5_GM4, for example, the article stresses that Europe’s problems with terrorism are more an issue of localised radicalisation in “alienated suburbs of Paris and Brussels, where the children of Muslim immigrants were allowed to grow up as angry outsiders within French and Belgian society.” To resonate with a Canadian audience, the article added, “[l]ook to Canada's own native reserves, where a community that started behind was allowed to fall even further behind.” Furthermore, in Group5_VS1, the backlash against Muslims in Europe was merely a historical trend coming to light, as “frictions between Christians and Muslims in Europe are as old as Islam itself,” mentioning the Moors’ invasion of the Iberian Peninsula of the 700s, and even the backlash against the waves migrants from Northern Africa following the French decolonisation in the mid-1990s.

Final thoughts on Sample Group 5 media coverage of transnational human migration

Overall, the articles of Sample Group 5 are the ones with the highest level of negative associations with migrants, with the vast majority of articles covering either the EU-Turkey deal or the numerous attacks in Europe framing migrants as ‘threats/villains.’ The articles can be divided into streams. The first focuses on the EU-Turkey deal, which aimed at curbing the flow of migrants into the continent, associated with narratives of an overwhelmed continent in need of stopping migrant flows to protect itself economically, physically, and even culturally. The second centers on the increasingly negative responses to RMC-related migrant flows as well as a political backlash against initial humanitarian responses to the RMC. German Chancellor Merkel is especially depicted as facing political pressure and even blame for the negative events in Europe.

What follows from this sample group is the notion that EU Member States were incapable of agreeing on a solution to disperse and receive the high flow of migrants, choosing to instead stop the flow altogether – or at least try to. The numerous attacks, moreover, being associated with the wave of migrants, led to significant political and social backlash, putting additional pressure on regional powers towards finding solution to the RMC or else face the consequences of increasingly nativist and Eurosceptic far-right political parties.

6. Sample Group 6 – April 1st to June 30th, 2016

The most frequently found narrative themes in Sample Group 6 were ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ (63%) and ‘Humanitarian Solidarity’ (58%). The most frequently found topics within the articles were the scale of migrant flow into the continent (48%), the death and danger faced by migrants (38%), the gender and age migrants involved in the RMC (28%), and the migrant use of human smugglers to reach- and travel through- Europe (28%). Below is a breakdown of the narrative themes found in the articles:

Table 8-PartII: Breakdown of narrative themes found in the articles of Sample Group 6

Narrative Theme	Percentage
State ability to control human flows across borders	63%
Humanitarian solidarity	58%
Economic Insecurity	25%
Threats to national identity	20%
Threats to physical security	13%
National Pride	10%
Pragmatism	8%

The most frequently mentioned events in Sample Group 6 media coverage of the RMC were the EU-Turkey deal (43%), Brexit (18%), and the numerous shipwrecks involving migrants in the Mediterranean (18%). The narrative themes are reflected in the most frequently mentioned events and in the most found topics.

6.1. Event #1 – The EU-Turkey deal

Of the seventeen articles (43%) in Sample Group 6 mentioning the EU-Turkey Deal, only three framed migrants as ‘threats/villains’ (Group6_VS4; Group6_VS8; and Group6_TS1). The overarching narrative in the three articles is that Greece was incapable of implementing the deal as stipulated. In Group6_VS4, Greece was described as overwhelmed by the number of migrants needing to be processed according to the agreement. In Group6_TS1 and Group6_VS8, the same idea could be found, with both articles highlighting Greece’s limited administrative capacities due to the scarcity of EU-provided staff despite it being promised in the deal. Adding to the administrative pressure, were the physical altercations between Syrian and Afghan migrants in the Piraeus, Lesbos and Chios Greek detention camps due to the slow progress in processing migrants (Group6_VS8). These articles thus depict the challenges of EU Member States, and especially Greece, in meeting its obligations as stipulated in the EU-Turkey Deal.

The rest of the articles in this sample group treating the EU-Turkey deal did so framing migrants as ‘victims.’ The administrative challenges of implementing the deal were also found in some of the articles framing migrants as ‘victims’ (Group6_GM8; Group6_MG1; and Group6_VS1). The key difference between the articles with the ‘threat/villain’ and the ‘victim’ framing when discussing the administrative fallout of implementing the deal centers around the subject focus of the article. In the ‘threat/villain’ articles, Greece that is the focus, along with its challenges to meet expectations. In the ‘victim’ framing articles, it is the migrants that are being focused on. In the latter group of articles, migrants are described as stranded by the deal and its ripple effects. In Group6_GM8, the fates of 2000 migrants are left uncertain following the destruction of the makeshift Idomeni camp in Greece. The camp had served as a base for migrants hoping to reach the European mainland. With the closure of the

border between Greek islands and the rest of Europe, they were later put into buses towards one of the official hotspots to be processed for potential deportation to Turkey.

In numerous of these articles, moreover, criticism of the deal's morality and indeed its legality are highlighted. In Group6_VS1, humanitarian organizations, along with the UN refugee agency, warned that Greece's lack of capacity in implementing the deal had resulted in migrant returns being rushed and lacking in procedural fairness, likely to rob migrants of a fair hearing. Civic organizations thus worried that the already traumatized people could balk at being herded onto boats and sent to uncertain conditions in Turkey, conditions they had statistically likely already paid sizeable amounts of money to avoid. The criticism centered around the implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which has for core principle 'non-refoulement,' "assert[ing] that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom" (UNHCR "The 1951 Refugee Convention"). While the EU added Turkey to the list of Safe countries as part of the EU-Turkey deal, the conditions to which they were being returned remained questionable even with the financial donations to Turkey (Group6_MG1; Group6_VS1 and Group6_VS10). In Greece itself, Group6_VS2, critics of the deal also highlighted the dire living conditions in processing hotspots created by the deal. A UN representative was quoted as saying that "people sleep outside; the food provision doesn't cover the needs of people; there's a lack of access to basic services and information" (Group6_VS2). The result of the "agreement," the article argued, was the deprivation of refugees' fundamental rights, the challenge of the right to asylum, confinement and detention of asylum seekers and finally, their prevention from entering and staying on EU territory. Overall, only 2,140 people have been returned from Greece to Turkey under the deal; according to one civil rights group, the low number is partly Greek courts acknowledged in numerous hearings that Turkey is not a safe country in which to return migrants (International Rescue Committee 2023).

A recurring theme in the articles covering the EU-Turkey Deal in Sample Group 6 was that it indirectly led to more shipwrecks in the Mediterranean. For further development between the deal and the naval routes, please refer to the event development below.

6.2. Event #2 – The Numerous Migrant-associated Shipwreck in the Mediterranean

There was a total of seven articles in Sample Group 6 that mentioned the numerous migrant-associated shipwrecks in the Mediterranean. Of these, six did so framing migrants as ‘victims’ (Group6_MG4; Group6_TS10; Group6_TS9; Group6_VS5; Group6_MG3; and Group6_GM4). A full year later, the media coverage of the numerous migrant-associated shipwrecks was like that of Sample Group 2, discussing the EU’s regional efforts to combat smuggling operations in the Mediterranean. In the Sample Group 6 articles, while the focus was not directly on the smuggling cartels, smugglers were still highlighted as a source of migrant precarity, being known to utilise dangerous means to transport migrants to maximise profit. On this, Group6_GM4 says that “the Mediterranean smuggling networks have proven to be endlessly creative and ruthless,” bringing forth that the cartels remained not only active but thrived despite EU efforts developed in Sample Group 2.

These articles chiefly focused on the first five months of 2016, when more than 880 migrants were believed to have drowned while trying to reach European soil (Edwards 2016). By May, less than half a year into 2016, the official death statistics by the UNHCR (2,510) had already surpassed that of the entirety of the year 2015 (1,855). Prior to May 2016 and the adoption of the EU-Turkey deal, most migrants travelled along the Eastern Mediterranean Route, also known as the Turkey-Greece migration corridor. The popularity of the Central Mediterranean Route varied throughout the RMC. While in 2014, the route was the most traveled by, the increasing political instability in Libya – more so than the effects

of the EU-Libya deal - resulted in a steep decline in its utilization in 2015 (Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke 2015).

The EU-Libya deal has been widely criticized for its poor outcome. While numbers arriving in Europe from Libya have decreased since the end of 2016, a report from Amnesty International has found that the precariousness of the naval corridor, along with the notoriously bad conditions of the Libya migrant camps, played a bigger role in migrants preferring the Eastern Mediterranean route than the EU efforts to increase militarisation in the region (Scazzieri and Springford 2017, 4). Indeed, while Libya has been known to disregard the human rights abuses within its borders, the EU-Libya deal – and the EU Member States by association - have been blamed for trapping refugees and migrants in Libya to be abused (Amnesty International 2018). Consequent to being unable to leave the country, numerous migrants have been found to have:

“suffered horrific abuse, including forced labour, torture, and sexual violence at the hands of smugglers. The various Libyan authorities are unable to deal with migrants humanely and effectively. By the EU’s own admission, ‘conditions in the centres where migrants are held are unacceptable and fall short of international human rights standards’. Unless conditions in Libyan detention centres are improved, the EU’s current approach will continue to put people’s safety at risk” (Amnesty International 2018).

While EU officials credit their collaboration with the IOM’s repatriation program for the voluntary departure of 7,000 migrants from Libyan detention centers to their country of origin since the start of 2017, others argue that said exodus may have more to do with external factors (Scazzieri and Springford 2017). As such, it is difficult to fully assess the outcome of the EU-Libya deal.

Similarly, following the EU-Turkey deal's closure of the migrants' pathways between Greek islands and the larger European mainland, migrants' mobility once again favoured the use of the Central Mediterranean Route or the North Africa-Italy migration corridor. The shift in migrant route was mentioned in four of the Sample Group 6 articles (Group6_GM4; Group6_MG4; Group6_VS5; and Group6_TS9). In 2016, and on a Mediterranean-wide basis moreover, the odds of migrants dying on the crossing were estimated to be as high as one in eighty-one attempts, with most of them occurring along the Central Mediterranean Route; itself estimated to have one in twenty-three attempts leading to migrant deaths (Edwards 2016). As such, while the EU-Turkey deal all but closed the Eastern Mediterranean Route on humanitarian grounds, as a way "to stop the boats from making the perilous crossing," the deal effectively pushed migrants into taking on greater risks along another corridor (Group6_MG4). Frequently calling back to the case of Alan Kurdi's family, the 'victim' framing of migrants in these articles - again in a similar manner to the articles in Sample Group 2 - presented emotionally filled narratives that emphasized the plight of migrants taking on such the infamous route stressing their need to flee war, repression, and poverty in the Middle East and Africa. The whole stirred up the image of a humanitarian disaster caused by perhaps good intentions by EU Member States but with unfortunate consequences for the individuals most affected. Through personal stories and often the emphasis of the shipwrecks' victims' age and gender, the whole humanised the RMC and created a picture of tragedy and a need for additional humanitarianism.

In all seven articles, Group6_GM5 was an outlier, framing migrants as a 'threat/villain'. In this article, it was the very notion of humanitarian need that was being challenged. From the offset, it repudiated the migrants need for asylum, stating that:

“[t]hese people aren't fleeing for their lives, as were refugees from the Syrian war or conflict in Afghanistan. Almost all are Africans, from Gambia, Eritrea, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria. The vast

majority are young men. Quite a few are unaccompanied minors, whose families believe they have a better chance of being taken in because they are legally children” (Group6_GM5).

From that statement, the article projected negative narratives surrounding transnational human migration. The first was that the migrants’ African origin necessarily makes them ‘economic migrants’ rather than asylum seekers, as if only those fleeing armed conflict in Syria and Afghanistan may apply for asylum. The second hinted that the young age of some migrants is a deliberate form of emotional manipulation to incite actions/reactions from impressionable Europeans. It added, moreover, that the migrants were not worthy of being helped because “they kn[ew] their boats [were] deathtraps” and were “betting they’[d] be rescued before they die[d]” (Group6_GM5). The quote reiterated the narrative that the EU’s rescue efforts are inciting and helping irregular migration and that Europeans are playing into the smugglers’ hands. To further the notions of migrants coming towards Europe as unworthy of aid and in search of a handout to the detriment of host societies, moreover, the article put the RMC into a Canadian context, saying that should the country be facing the same influx as Italy, then, it would mean “hundreds of thousands of people - unskilled, semi-literate, culturally very different, demanding food, shelter, health care and permanent residency – were expected to pour into the country” (Group6_GM5). Even ignoring the blatant hyperbolization of the scale of the migrant flow, it is evident that the article promotes negative narratives surrounding the RMC, ones fall under the theme of ‘Economic insecurity’ (i.e., burdens to the state and lacking necessary skills to contribute positively to the host society), ‘Threats to national identity’ (i.e., culturally unsuitable), ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ (i.e., taking advantage of the system and policies in place), and ‘Threat to physical security’ (i.e., supporting and enriching criminal activity in the region).

What is interesting to note is that despite the high death toll and limited capacities, the EU's Border and Coastguard Agency spoke against NGO-led search-and-rescue actions, at times even implying their collusion with traffickers and smugglers (Hayes and Barat 2017). EU law stipulates that it is illegal to facilitate entry and residence to refugees and migrants who are irregularly present. The 2002 Directive was aimed at curbing human trafficking and dangerous smuggling practices while still allowing humanitarian assistance when needed. According to a EuroActiv article:

“Search-and-rescue missions, conducted by household names like *Medicins Sans Frontieres* and *Save the Children* as well as new organisations that emerged in response to the humanitarian crisis, have been relentlessly targeted. In Greece, three Spanish firemen, on a rescue mission for the *Proem-Aid* association, were arrested at sea and detained for 60 hours before being bailed on charges of human trafficking. In Italy, undercover intelligence agents have infiltrated NGOs and operated covertly on search-and-rescue boats. Several vessels have been now been seized pending further investigations. Coupled with a ‘voluntary’ Code of Conduct which all but ended the capacity for the NGOs to operate independently, these actions have had the desired effect of stopping the rescue missions altogether. [...] The manufactured narrative around NGOs and trafficking has also been seized upon by populists and fascists” (Hayes and Barat 2017).

Overall, it has been said that the dismembering of Europe's values and principles in the EU-Turkey Deal has turned the Mediterranean into a mass grave to create a “deterrent’ effect” (Hayes and Barat 2017).

6.3. Event #3 – Brexit

‘Brexit,’ or British Exit from the EU, took place on January 31st, 2020, following a referendum held in the UK on June 23rd, 2016. The ‘Leave’ side of the referendum won with 51.9% of the votes, starting so-called ‘divorce’ negotiations between the UK and the EU from 2017 to 2019. The 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK is said to have been predominantly driven by RMC-fueled fears over transnational migration and a desire to ‘regain control’ from the EU on corresponding policies (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017; Ford and Goodwin 2017; Prosser, Mellon, and Green 2016).

The articles of Sample Group 6, spanning from April to June 2016, covered the last few months of the campaigning and the vote itself. Seven articles (18%) in this sample group mentioned Brexit. Of these, only one did so while framing migrants as ‘victims’ (Group6_GM1). The article juxtaposed how governments were reacting to the RMC, calling it reactionary and lacking humanity, with the manner in which their citizens did, highlighting their generosity and desire to help migrants in need of assistance. The argument here was not limited to the British state but rather to the entirety of the European continent, citing ways in which civil society has volunteered to help and welcome migrants while their states acted in ways that resulted in “a reactive panic; a crisis of drownings, disgraceful camps, human disorder and suffering” (Group6_GM1). As a regional entity, the EU and its reactions to the RMC, the latest of which in this article is exemplified by the EU-Turkey deal, “crosses basic ethical lines and so in the long run will make matters worse” (Group6_GM1). Indeed, the EU’s lack of ability to adequately respond to the RMC “is so profound that the continent is failing and governments are justifying this failure by blaming others” (Group6_GM1), the most extreme form of it being the UK’s “deeply romantic desire” to depart from the EU.


Another outlier article from most of those covering Brexit in this sample group was Group6_GM10. The article framed migrants as ‘benefits’ to the state, promoting narratives that fall

under the theme of Pragmatism. Stating that “it was worse than disingenuous to target immigrants as the root of Britain's problems,” migrants are thus viewed as a boon to the UK and other European “rich but aging” states, as they rely on immigration to fill labour shortages and demographic challenges (Group6_GM10). It argues that by normalising “racist sentiment by their own rhetoric, and by their tolerance of others' xenophobic behaviour,” European states fueled nativist politics, far-right political support, and Euroscepticism (Group6_Group6_GM10). Brexit, much like in the previous article, is thus viewed as an extreme form of revived nationalism within Europe.

Five articles of this sample group framed migrants as ‘threats/villains’ (Group6_GM2; Group6_GM6; Group6_GM9; Group6_MG8; and Group6_VS9). What was interesting in these articles was the lack of consensus around which origins of migrants were threatening UK society. In Group6_MG8 and Group6_GM9, for example, the desire to regain control over British immigration was to prevent “unfettered” (Group6_GM9) or again “unlimited” (Group6_MG8) immigration from the EU, as those immigrants were seen as stealing jobs from British nationals while also putting a strain on housing and social services throughout the country. In these articles, Brexit was thus constructed to prevent the free flow of EU Member State nationals promoted in the regional agreement. In Group6_GM6 and Group6_GM2, moreover, the RMC that is viewed as a threat, amid “growing concerns that the refugee and migrant crisis that has gripped the Mediterranean could spread to the English Channel” (Group6_GM6). In Group6_GM2, migrants from the RMC are also depicted as physical threats to the security of British citizens, as incidents of assaults by migrants are cited. The article Group6_VS9 cites both EU-originated and RMC-related migratory flows as causes of concerns. Using the border-tightening actions of Austria, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark as examples to be replicated, it calls for the UK to regain control of its ability to control human flows across its borders.

The idea of revived nationalism in Europe seemingly clashes with the European project as nationalist parties tend to advocate for a departure from the European Union. The link between nativist and nationalist politics is not direct. Nativism is a political ideology promoting and protecting the interests of native-born or indigenous people over those of immigrants, while nationalist politics advocates for the gaining and maintaining of national (i.e., sovereign) control. Nativist politics may manifest in various forms, most often and most recently as nationalism. The chart below demonstrates the percentage of votes won by Nationalist parties in Europe in May 2016 (McCarthy 2016).

Map 3-PartII: Percentage of votes won by Nationalist parties in Europe as of May 2016



The RMC has been associated with a resurgence in nationalistic politics in Europe. On this, a survey from the Jacques Delors Institute states that:

“[a]t the end of 2015, the difficult recovery, following the economic crisis, of favourable attitudes to the EU stopped: between the spring and autumn, the EU’s image, the trust expressed in it, opinions on the direction taken and the level of optimism for its future fell again, with all these indicators reaching levels substantially lower than those prior to the crisis. In 2016, they were further eroded (except for the degree of trust—but its decline in 2015 had been particularly sharp), alongside a deterioration in citizens’ morale about the economic situation. However, citizens’ opinions on membership of the EU and the resulting benefits for their country remained relatively stable year on year, at a level comparable to pre-crisis levels. In short, most citizens are not breaking away from the European project but are increasingly expressing dissatisfaction and concern” (Debomy and Tripier 2017, 1).


The highest and lowest national opinions on EU memberships at the end of 2016, according to the Jacques Delors Institute (Debomy and Tripier 2017) survey were as followed:

Table 9-PartII: National Opinions on EU membership, 2016

Highest		Lowest	
Luxembourg	81% against 4%	Greece	31% against 29%
Netherlands	72% against 8%	Czech Republic	32% against 19%
Belgium	65% against 11%	Cyprus	34% against 20%
Germany	71% against 9%	Austria	37% against 24%
Lithuania	67% against 8%		
Estonia	63% against 7%		
Sweden	64% against 13%		
Denmark	62% against 12%		
Poland	61% against 9%		
Finland	60% against 10%		

It should be noted, however, that even in the countries with the lowest score, the number of citizens who believed that EU membership was counter to their country's interest, it did not exceed the number of people who consider it a good thing (Debomy and Tripier 2017, 4). These statistics come to show that despite the growing support for far-right, nationalist groups, there is still a sizeable support base within EU Member States to ensure that the union is not threatened.

While the extraordinary events of the RMC are in all probability linked with a significant increase of support for far-right, anti-migration parties throughout Europe, these political parties were amassing more support even prior to 2015. It is because, for many, the rapid rate of European immigration, as shown by the graph below, has been a source of worry for some linked with xenophobia and Islamophobia throughout the continent for quite some time (Davis and Deole 2018). Below is a graph that demonstrates rising levels of immigration per share of the population in some European countries between 2002 and 2014. The graph is used to highlight the general trend of increased immigration to EU Member States.

Graph 2-PartII: Trend in immigration share of the population of some European countries, 2002-2014

It has been argued that political orientation plays a large role in how refugees and migrants are viewed by civil society (European Social Survey “Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities”). In eight of the ten EU countries surveyed by the Pew Research Center in September 2016, those on the political right are more likely to view migration as a threat than those on the political left (Poushter 2016). This division was most evident in France, where sixty-one percent of those who place themselves on the political right say that refugees are a major threat, compared with only twenty-nine percent of those on the left. In many cases, the threat-perception is particularly targeted at the Muslim refugees and migrants coming into Europe as they are perceived to be linked with ISIS and/or other Islamic terrorist groups (Upadhyay 2016, 22). While this characterisation of Muslims as terrorists invading the Western world is highly problematic for multiple reasons, it is also deeply rooted in a post-9/11 mainstream. Elements of this rising Islamophobia were visible in the articles of Sample Groups 1, 4, 5, and 6.

Final thoughts on Sample Group 6 media coverage of transnational human migration

Sample Group 6 is the second sample group that covered the EU-Turkey Deal extensively. While the articles of Sample Group 5 mostly framed migrants as ‘threats/villains,’ the articles of Sample Group 6 chiefly perceived migrants as victims. Mixed with the articles focused on the numerous shipwrecks in the Mediterranean, it can be deduced that the Canadian media coverage of the RMC between April and June 2016 was mostly focused on the negative impact the deal has had on involved migrant groups and the ways through which it made their situation more precarious. Even so, there remained significant levels of apprehension towards RMC-related migrant flows and migration in general, exemplified by the coverage of the Brexit vote, which painted migrants predominantly as threats, be it economically, physically and even culturally. Combined, the articles of Sample Group 6 represent the perduring dichotomy surrounding transnational human migration. Presenting narratives associated with numerous narrative themes, both positive and negative, it is a good example of the complex discursive landscape that surrounds migration.

A key element of this group’s articles surrounds regional policy gridlocks and the rise of nationalist politics in Europe. Sample Group 6 is not the first group of articles to tackle this narrative. The rise of anti-immigrant, far-right political support in Europe was already mentioned in Sample Groups 4 and 5, in relation to the Paris attacks and the elaboration of the EU-Turkey deal. Even so, Brexit is an example of what could happen in other EU Member States should its political parties continue to gain support while regional tensions remain unabated. The breakdown of the rise of nationalist political parties in Europe shows that it was indeed a growing reality within the continent. Brexit thus served as a tangible illustration of what regional tensions could entail for the future of the EU. While the British desire to leave the EU cannot be solely explained by Europe’s perceived failure to respond to the RMC nor a desire to reclaim control over human flows, deliberations surrounding human

migration and border control remained key issues championed by the 'Leave' platform. Academic support the notion that the 2016 Brexit referendum was predominantly driven by RMC-fueled fears over transnational migration and a desire to 'regain control' from the EU on corresponding policies (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017; Ford, and Goodwin 2017; Prosser, Mellon, and Green 2016).

7. Sample Group 7 – July 1st to September 30th, 2016

This is a breakdown of media coverage found in Sample Group 7, made up of articles from July 1st to September 30th, 2016. The narrative themes most mentioned in these articles were ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ (60%), ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ (45%), and ‘Threat to the physical security’ (40%). The most recurring topics in all forty articles are reflected in those narrative themes. These are scale of migrant flow into Europe (60%), migrants of Muslim faith (38%), terrorism (30%), and political responses to the RMC-related migrant flows, predominantly in the UK and Germany (30%). Below is a breakdown of the narrative themes found in the articles:

Table 10-PartII: Breakdown of narrative themes found in the articles of Sample Group 7

Narrative Theme	Percentage
State ability to control human flows across borders	60%
Humanitarian solidarity	45%
Threats to physical security	40%
Threats to national identity	28%
Economic Insecurity	25%
National Pride	13%
Pragmatism	5%

The two most frequently mentioned RMC-related events in those articles were Brexit (25%) and the numerous terrorist attacks that occurred in France and Germany in July 2016 (25%). The narrative themes are reflected in the most mentioned events in this sample group, as well as the key topics found in these articles.

7.1. Event #1 – Brexit

There was a total of ten articles (25%) in Sample Group 7 that mentioned Brexit. While most (71%) articles in Sample Group 6 mentioned the event mostly in the frame of migrants as ‘threats/villains’, the articles in this sample group were more diverse in their framing.

In three of the articles, migrants were framed as ‘victims,’ and the UK was portrayed as lacking humanitarianism. In Group7_GM1, the UK’s refugee intake in 2015 of 168,000 compared to that of Germany’s 7337,000 was called “shameful”. On a global scale, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that, on average, twenty-eight thousand individuals are forced to flee their homes every day due to conflict or persecution. It meant that there were approximately sixty-six million displaced individuals worldwide as of June 2017, fifty-five percent of whom come from three countries: South Sudan (1.4 million), Afghanistan (2.5 million), and Syria (5.5 million) (UNHCR “Figures at a Glance”). Europe was then considered home - if only temporarily - to seventeen percent of these displaced individuals. In Group7_VS3 and Group7_MG5, moreover, it was the UK’s anti-immigration sentiment that was compared to Canada’s attitudes towards immigration. In the articles, Canada’s Syrian Resettlement Program [see Sample Group 4] was juxtaposed with the UK’s efforts to stop migrants from entering their territory, using the Brexit vote preamble as exemplary of the country’s lack of willingness to help in the global crisis. Group7_MG5 quoted London Mayor Khan saying that Canada was “a beacon of how a civilized, G7 country should treat those who are vulnerable and need help.” What emanated from these three articles are narratives that reflect the seemingly global perception that Canada is a welcoming and generous country towards those in need.

In Group7_MG3 and Group7_TS2, migrants are framed as both ‘victims’ and ‘threats/villains.’ In these articles, migrants, portrayed as asylum seekers all, are indeed recognised as individuals worthy of- and in need of- assistance. Their status as humanitarian migrants is not being questioned, supporting

the ‘victim’ framing. What constructs these migrants as ‘threats,’ however, is the sheer number of them and the EU Member States’ inability to control such a sizeable influx. In this context, France and the UK are portrayed, despite the Brexit ‘divorce,’ as allies in their militarised efforts to curb the migrant flow across the English Channel. Said flows are described in both articles as economically draining to EU portal states to the detriment of locals, notably in Italy (Group7_MG3) and Greece (Group7_TS2).

The remaining five articles in Sample Group 7 that mention Brexit framed migrants exclusively as ‘threats/villains’ (Group7_GM10; Group7_GM9; Group7_TS10; Group7_TS5; and Group7_VS7). In Group7_TS10, the threat perception was linked to the scale of the migrant flow that makes up the RMC, much like the above articles containing both ‘victim’ and ‘threat/villain’ migrant frames. The difference between this article and the other three, was that it focused exclusively on EU Member States, by their lack of consensus on how to control migrant flows across their borders best. The notion of lack of control was also found in Group7_VS7, where Brexit is depicted as a means of regaining control over migrant flows into the UK. The EU and the Dublin system are said to be unable “to deal effectively with the flow of illegal migrants across the Mediterranean,” boosting popular support for ‘Leave’ supporters (Group7_VS7).

In Group7_GM10, Group7_GM9, and Group7_TS5, the threat perception is not regional but rather global. In these articles the entire Western world is depicted as being in an identity crisis caused by chaos and political turmoil. In Group7_TS5, Danish people are described as threatened by the “migrant waves of Muslims, wash[ing] over the country,” making them worry about the long-term effects it may have on their traditionally Christian culture. ‘Brexit’ (i.e., breaking away from regional politics) is thus offered as a potential means of protection against undesirable changes. For its part, Group7_GM10 stated that “[f]or many people in Britain, Europe, and the United States, things are changing too fast – life is unfamiliar, and far from what it used to be. They no longer feel at home.”

Brexit is thus emblematic of general discontent and a time of increasingly inward-looking societies; societies lacking general economic and cultural because of events like the Nice terrorist attack and the RMC, and general ones like economic inequality and the rise of ring-leaning politics. As a whole, said lack of control suggests that perhaps the Western world in 2016 had been too accepting of outside influence to the detriment of its core self; however, that 'self' may be defined.

Similarly, these articles suggested support for the 'loser and winner of globalisation' narrative. Globalisation is here framed according to Green's (2019) distinction as both a process and a condition. A condition in the sense that interdependence is now beyond debate and a process in as much that it involves widening and deepening cross-border flows. Much like the USA's Trumpian populist rhetoric of 'Make America Great Again,' the narrative supports that globalisation has failed in its promise of economic benefit for all by raising living standards in advanced economies, emerging markets, and developing countries alike, resulting instead in greater economic disparity and a general informalization of the global neoliberal economy. The informalization of the economy, more specifically, resulted in increasingly tangible state-level socioeconomic stratification, as well as gendered and racial systemic components. Group7_GM9, for example, illustrates this through this statement:

"Brexit was won in the small cities and towns of England, places where globalization has meant de-industrialization, the closing of factories and the transfer of work to cheaper locales overseas. The phenomenon was exacerbated by an influx of job-seekers from Eastern Europe who made competition for remaining jobs even stiffer."

This narrative of Brexit being an example of 'loser and winners of Globalisation' falls under the narrative theme of economic insecurity.

7.2. Event #2 – Terrorist Attacks – varia

The second most mentioned events in Sample Group 7 were the numerous terrorist attacks that occurred in France and Germany in July 2016. The ‘event’ discussed here is thus an amalgamation of the five attacks. Below is a summary of each event:

The first incident happened in France, when on July 14th, 2016, a lorry was deliberately driven into a crowd of people celebrating Bastille Day in Nice. The event resulted in the deaths of eighty-six people and injured 434 others. The driver of the lorry was Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian with French residency. The attack, later claimed by ISIS, ended following an exchange of gunfire, during which Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was killed by the police.

A few days later, on July 18th, 2016, a teenage Afghan refugee attacked passengers on a train in Wuerzburg, Germany, with an axe and knife. He wounded five individuals. The perpetrator was later shot dead by the police.

On 22 July 2016, a mass shooting occurred near a shopping mall in Munich, Germany. The shooter, David Sonboly, was the eighteen-year-old German-born son of Iranian asylum seekers. The event resulted in the deaths of nine individuals as well as the suicide of the shooter. According to a report by Deutsche Welle, the shootings took place on the fifth anniversary of the killing of seventy-seven people by Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik, an event investigators later confirmed the shooter had prior researched (Janjevic 2017).

Two days later, fifteen people were injured in the suicide bombing of outside a bar in Ansbach, Germany. The Perpetrator, Mohammad Daleel, also known as Abu Yusuf al-Karrar, was a twenty-seven-year-old Syrian refugee from Aleppo who had arrived in Germany in 2014 seeking asylum. According to Bild, he was a member of the Islamic State of Iraq many years ago. Daleel’s initial asylum request on December 2nd, 2014, was rejected, and German officials ordered his deportation to Bulgaria

according to the Dublin System. Sources demonstrate that following an attempt at suicide, his deportation was suspended pending psychiatric care (Corner and Gill 2017). It is believed that the second deportation notice to Bulgaria submitted on July 13th, 2016, motivated his attack on July 24th, 2016.

On the same day, July 24th, 2016, a twenty-one-year-old Syrian asylum seeker attacked his colleague and injured two others in Reutlingen, Germany. There is little information available about the perpetrator, online sources state that he was previously known to police for allegations of violence (Al Jazeera 2016). The attacker was in a relationship with the victim, and both had previously lived together in a refugee camp. Following the incident, he was arrested and sentenced to life in prison in 2017 (Indian.com 2017).

There was a total of ten articles (25%) within Sample Group 7 that mentioned the numerous attacks. Of these, Group7_TS1 and Group7_GM3 are the only articles that spoke about the terrorist incidents in Germany, Paris, and Brussels with both the ‘victim’ and ‘threat/villain’ migrant framings. Both articles frame migrants as ‘victims’ in the sense that they acknowledge the need for Germany to continue providing humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers. As for the other frame, it is not the incidents of violence that framed migrants as threats to Europeans, to the contrary, they are mentioned as incidents distinct from migrants “despite what the lurid headlines indicates” (Group7_TS1). Instead, the threat perception comes from “the legitimate debate on how Germany took on more than its bureaucracy was able to manage,” promoting a narrative in line with ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ theme (Group7_TS1). Through the emphasis on numbers, that is “50 times the number of carefully selected refugees Canada is currently absorbing from Syria; [and] more than 100 times what the United States has managed to take in during Donald Trump’s fear-based ascent to the Republican

nomination,” Germany is thus described as unable to cope with the sheer scale of migrant it allowed within its borders (Group7_TS1). To this, Group7_GM3, adds that the unfortunate reality of Germany’s overexerted capacities has left their recipients with “a sense of disappointment and a feeling of being disenfranchised and uprooted are spreading among some refugees – particularly among unaccompanied minors, who are especially vulnerable in many ways.”

The remaining eight articles all frame migrants as ‘threats/villains,’ stressing migrant association with Islamic extremism and terrorist activity (Group7_TS6; Group7_TS9; Group7_MG2; Group7_MG6; Group7_VS1; Group7_VS10; Group7_VS8; Group7_GM5; and Group7_GM9). The articles Group7_TS6, Group7_MG2, and Group7_VS8 all focused on the events in Germany, argue that even if Germany had thus far avoided large-scale terrorist attacks the likes France’s November 13th, 2015, in Paris and July 14th, 2016, in Nice, the fallout the July 2016 incidents could have long-term, nefarious outcomes on Germany’s political scene. It is, therefore, the migrant-terrorist association that was reiterated during the ‘Cologne’ incidents (Group7_MG2) [see Sample 5], rather than the actual attacks themselves that are viewed as threats to Germany, in so far as it could lead to a rise of far-right political support. While all three articles expect Chancellor Merkel’s support to dwindle because of her welcoming policies towards asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, she fared well in the 2017 Federal Election [See Sample Group 8].

In Group7_VS10, Group7_MG6, and Group7_TS9, on the other hand, the ‘threat/villain’ framing of migrant is linked with the terrorist-migrant association. These three articles promote narratives under the ‘Threat to physical security’ theme. Focusing on either all four attacks in Germany (Group7_VS10) or one more so than the others (Group7_TS9 and Group7_MG6), the articles stressed the link between asylum seekers and a penchant for religious-based terrorist activity. Group7_TS9 and Group7_MG6, indeed stressed that both the July 18th and the July 24th attacks were later claimed by

ISIS. While they admit that there was no way to confirm prior contact between the attackers and the Jihadist group, the fact that both attackers identified with them, either by claiming to be a “soldier of the caliphate” (Group7_TS9) or by posting a video diatribe (Group7_MG6) prior, is said to be proof enough of ISIS’s influence within the country. According to them, migrants – and especially young, male migrants (Group7_TS9) - do not need to be an active member of the group to pose a legitimate security threat to the German population. Both July attacks are precedence enough to demonstrate this notion. The articles called for German authorities to increase their investigation into migrants, especially considering how one man was able to collect enough material to make at least two bombs in his room in an asylum-seeker home (Group7_MG6).

Furthermore, two articles framed migrants as ‘threats/villains’ that did not focus exclusively on Germany but instead on the consequences of the rise of terrorism in Europe (Group7_GM5 and Group7_GM9). Similarly to Group7_TS1 and Group7_GM3, Group7_GM5 and Group7_GM9 express concerns about the what the future holds. Group7_GM5 admits that even if migrants are not necessarily the problem, the migrant-terrorist association is enough to have an impact on regional policies, potentially leading to “[a]n end to immigration, mass deportations, [and] harsh restraints on civil liberties,” especially towards racialized minorities (Group7_GM5). Group7_GM9 described Europe as “angry,” expecting future historians to describe the post-9/11 Western world as a “period of instability,” citing the global war on terror, the rise of terrorism activity, and the 2008 financial crisis, all of which served to radicalise Muslim youth in impoverished, disenfranchised, Western suburbs. Group7_GM9, called this a “vicious cycle.” In both articles, their vision of Europe is bleak; one that Group7_GM5 states “could make Donald Trump seem like a nice guy,” referring to his Islamophobic, anti-immigration, nationalist and indeed even nativist tirades (Group7_GM5).

Final thoughts on Sample Group 7 media coverage of transnational human migration

In both events most covered in Sample Group 7, migrants were predominantly framed as ‘threats/villains.’ These articles represent some of the most negative portrayals of narratives associated with transnational human migration, which correspond with numerous articles focusing on migrant-associated terrorist activity in Europe. As for media coverage concerned about Brexit, more specifically, while it presented with marginally more diverse migrants framings than the articles of Sample Group 6, the articles of Sample Group 7 still presented with a penchant for negative narratives on migration. Jointly, the articles covering Brexit in Sample Groups 6 and 7 introduced the narrative of ‘losers and winners of globalisation,’ associated with the ‘Economic insecurity’ theme.

Lastly, it was interesting to see in the articles covering Brexit with a ‘victim’ migrant framing, how Canada’s generosity, exemplified in the sheer size and public support for the Canadian Syrian Resettlement Program, is juxtaposed against the UK’s efforts to leave the EU. In this narrative, the UK’s desire to increase its control over human flows is perceived as a means of avoiding partaking in regional and global efforts to respond to the RMC, which is framed as a humanitarian crisis. Canada’s generosity is thus contrasted with the UK’s ‘shameful’ behaviour, which corresponds with Canadian narratives of ‘National pride’ in the country’s humanitarian track record and pro-migration benevolence.

8. Sample Group 8 – October 1st to December 31st, 2016

Below is the breakdown of media coverage found in Sample Group 8, covering articles between October 1st to December 31st, 2016. The narrative themes most mentioned in these articles were ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ (65%), ‘Threat to physical security’ (30%), and ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ (25%). The most recurring topics in all forty articles are political responses to the RMC-related migrant flows (38%), scale of migrant flow into Europe (35%), the gender and age of migrants (28%), and and the potential for migrants experiencing danger and even death when attempting to cross the Mediterranean (23%). Below is a breakdown of the narrative themes found in this sample group:

Table 11-PartII: Breakdown of narrative themes found in the articles of Sample Group 8

Narrative Theme	Percentage
Humanitarian solidarity	65%
Threats to physical security	30%
State ability to control human flows across borders	25%
Threats to national identity	18%
Pragmatism	5%
Economic Insecurity	0%
National Pride	0%

The two most frequently mentioned RMC-related events in those articles were the dismantling of migrant encampments in France, notably the Calais ‘Jungle’ (35%) and the numerous terrorist attacks that occurred in France, Belgium and Germany (18%). The narrative themes are reflected in the most mentioned events in this sample group and the key topics found in these articles.

8.1. Event #1 – Calais Migrant Camps dismantling

In 2015 and 2016, issues surrounding the refugee and migrant camp in Calais, France, near the English Channel became news around the world. Individuals amassing in the French border city of Calais in hoping to make their way to the UK was not a novel phenomenon during the RMC. Throughout the RMC, nine camps assembled near Calais, with the Calais ‘Jungle’ being the most well-known (Sandri 2016). In related Canadian articles, the Calais ‘Jungle’ was “a vivid symbol” of- or again the epitome of- the RMC (Group8_GM5 and Group8_TS8). For many, the Calais camps were a place to bide their time, waiting for their asylum applications, for the opportunity to go to the UK, and/or the situation in their home country to stabilise (Singh 2017,7). The camps were informal, with no official accommodations until French involvement January 2016, when the container camp was built. Consequently, the majority lived in outdoor makeshift abodes created through whatever means available and, at times, with the help of volunteer organisations. By September 2014, the Mayor of Calais requested additional assistance from the UK to help with the migrant situation, eventually resorting to threats to block the port between Calais and the UK (The Guardian 2014).

Being an unauthorised development, the camp was repeatedly raided and bulldozed by French authorities (Singh 2017, 13). One of the most mediatised destructions of the camp occurred in October 2016, when an estimated six to ten thousand people resided there (Singh 2017, 7). The effort was one of the many taken to curb the movement of migrants across the channel. Throughout 2015 and 2016, the UK and French governments invested in physical infrastructure around the border area, including additional fencing and floodlighting, CCTV, and infrared detection technology. The UK supported an increase in security guards along the Eurotunnel, and the French deployed several hundred more police to the area (House of Commons UK 2016, 9). State involvement peaked in November 2015 in the aftermath of the Paris attacks when “the French authorities were able to enforce more coercive and

violent practices, such as daily raids, rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons, which were often justified in terms of security” (Sing 2017, 15).

In Calais, the running of the numerous camps was performed by NGOs, aid organisations, and benevolent civilians as the French authorities were unwilling to help “in the fear of creating an official and permanent camp” (Singh 2017, 19). Their assistance criminalised by EU policy (Hayes and Barat 2017), resulting in some more extreme cases being fined more than £15m over five years by the Border Force agency (Dearden 2016). As was stated by Euractiv (Hayes and Barat 2017):

“The criminalisation of refugee solidarity is the latest salvo in an EU policy long predicated on stopping refugees reaching in EU states at any cost [...] The targeting of activists who oppose these policies [...] is about removing witnesses to what is happening and dissuading other European citizens that more humane policies are possible. This dismembering of Europe’s values and principles has turned the Mediterranean into a mass grave in the name of creating a ‘deterrent’ effect.”

Overall, there were fourteen articles (35%) in Sample Group 8 that mentioned the dismantling of migrant camps by French authorities (Group8_GM5; Group8_GM7; Group8_MG1; Group8_MG7; Group8_MG8; Group8_MG9; Group8_TS3; Group8_TS5; Group8_TS4; Group8_TS8; Group8_VS3; Group8_VS7; Group8_VS8; and Group8_VS9). All but one of the articles focused on the dismantling of the Calais ‘Jungle,’ it is also the only article about migrant camps in this sample group that framed migrants as ‘threats/villains’ (Group8_TS8). The article presents with this framing of migrants because it focuses on the violent pushbacks of migrants in Parisian camps and the physical confrontations with riot police forces. The arrival and residency of “more than 19,000” migrants in Paris since June 2015 are thus problematized as sizeable and recurring menaces, with camps being erected time and again despite

the numerous attempts to demolish them within the state's capital. By highlighting the perseverance and the violence associated with said camps, the article thus presents the whole as a lasting and unruly force creating disorder and with the potential for harming French citizens.

As for the remaining thirteen articles, all of them frame migrants as 'victims.' The framing was done in numerous ways, not the least of which was the recurring attention given to the migrants' unfortunate realities, which led them to seek a new life in Europe, be it to escape war (Group8_GM7 and Group8_MG1) or even "dictators or grinding poverty" (Group8_MG1). Only by demonstrating a genuine need to flee do the articles explain why migrants are willing to face the dire living conditions of the 'Jungle,' which some articles described as a "slum" (Group8_MG7 and Group8_TS4) and a "shantytown" (Group8_GM7), in hopes of reaching the UK. As could be expected from the situation, the living conditions in the camp were substandard, believed to be worse than the conditions in Turkish migrant camps; it is estimated that at least 15 migrants died in Calais in 2014 (Taylor and Grandjean 2014).

One of the most recurring elements in these articles was the UK's pull factor for migrants, considering the magnitude of anti-immigration sentiments in a country associated with the Brexit vote. The UK's pull factor is best developed in Group8_TS3, associated with high levels of chain migration, a thriving informal economy where migrants may expect work, and – most important of all – it being an English-speaking country. The whole, it states, was "irresistible" to migrants (Group8_TS3), making it appear like a "promised land" (Group8_GM7). It is worth mentioning that crossing the English Channel is a dangerous endeavour, an element that was only stressed in one of the articles (Group8_GM7). First, it implies migrants from North Africa and Asia have made their way to the North of France, a journey that would have required them to cross the infamously difficult Mediterranean Sea and navigate throughout numerous European countries, not the least of which like Hungary might have installed

tangible barriers to migrant mobility. During the RMC, most migrants would attempt to cross into the UK via the Eurotunnel. The Calais-Dover route, the narrowest point of the English Channel, has the quickest ferry times, the most ferry crossings, and regular trains via the Eurotunnel (House of Commons UK 2016, 7). Since its opening in 1994, migrants have been known to gather there to jump on the back of lorries before embarking on the freight train or walking the entire 50 KM of the tunnel (Sandri 2016). To stop migrants from stowing away on trucks heading for Britain, the UK built a 4m-high wall along both sides of the main road to the northern French port (BBC News 2016).

It is also worth mentioning, moreover, that the ‘victim’ framing of migrants was also achieved through the strong emphasis on migrant precarity. The first way this was done, was through personal stories of hardship and resiliency. The October 2016 dismantling of the camp was not the first attempt at doing so; authorities had previously torn down the southern half of the camp in March 2016, “a chaotic, even brutal, bulldozing operation that drew complaints from human rights groups” (Group8_VS3). Despite previous attempts, the ‘Jungle’ stood testimony to migrant resiliency, with semi-permanent structures like churches, mosques, schools, and shops remaining throughout (Group8_VS9 and Group8_MG9). Another way the ‘victim’ frame was performed was through the stressing of the migrants’ age and gender. Indeed, in the story of the dismantling of the ‘Jungle,’ some articles centered on the administrative task of relocating the numerous female migrants and the estimated 1,500 unaccompanied minors (Group8_MG1; Group8_MG8; Group8_VS8; Group8_GM7; and Group8_GM5).

Of the 13 articles in Sample Group 8 presenting with a ‘victim’ frame, it is worth mentioning that one of them also framed migrants as ‘benefits’ to the host society (Group8_TS5). The article supports narratives associated with the ‘Pragmatism’ theme. In the first place, it highlighted how the mainly male migrant involved in the RMC influx, here depicted as mostly between the ages of twelve

and eighteen, could prove to be beneficial to the UK as a host society, providing a “flow of young people into aging countries that made it too difficult for their own citizens to have and raise children” (Group8_TS5). Their lack of experience and skills, in turn, was also perceived as boon to the UK, as it might provide an influx of “temporary workers Britain finds it useful to bring in to pick fruit and exploit” (Group8_TS5).

The novel narrative that came out of this article was that of young men being a positive addition to the UK society precisely because of their gender. Should the UK go to war in the future, since “[t]he codes of human behaviour aren't changing as quickly as climate or calls to war,” the country could benefit from the presence of such enduring and innovative men (see above comments about the dangerousness of reaching the North of France) (Group8_TS5). Their ‘masculinity’ (i.e., virility) was thus encouraged and not something that “complacent British citizens who think, beyond reason, that they'll never see conflict in their time” should fear (Group8_TS5).

8.2. Event #2 – Attacks by migrants

Similarly to Sample Group 7’s development on terrorist attacks in France and Germany, the development of this ‘event’ is an amalgamation of numerous attacks most frequently mentioned in the articles of Sample Group 8. There are seven articles in Sample Group 8 that mention these attacks (Group8_TS6; Group8_GM3; Group8_GM4; Group8_GM6; Group8_TS10; Group8_VS10; and Group8_VS6).

Of these, only one article did not frame migrants exclusively as ‘threats/villains’ but instead framed migrants as both ‘benefits’ and ‘threats/villains’ (Group8_TS6). The article provided interesting, if contradictory, narratives. On the one hand, the article centers around the events of December 19th,

2016, when a truck was deliberately driven into the Berlin Christmas market, killing twelve people and injuring more than seventy individuals. One of the victims was the truck's original driver, who was found shot dead in the truck. Like the events of July 18th and July 24th, 2015, in Germany, the perpetrator, Anis Amri, was a migrant who had been declined asylum. The attack was also later claimed by ISIS (Eurojust “Berlin Christmas market terrorist attack of December 2016”). The article reiterated the migrant-terrorism association found in some of the Sample 7 articles (Group8_TS6), drawing a link between this event and the four attacks in July 2016, all associating migrants, attacks claimed by ISIS, and acts of physical insecurity towards the German people.

On the other hand, the article is the only one treating the numerous attacks by migrants in this sample group to also highlight the heroic deeds of three Syrian asylum seekers who tackled a fugitive wanted in an alleged Islamic extremist bomb plot and handed him over to police. The article stresses the lengths these men had to go through to result in said arrest, describing how dangerous it had been and how they had put their lives at risk to the benefit of the German people. Indeed, the article quotes them as saying they were “so grateful to Germany for taking [them] in,” and that they “could not allow him to do something to Germans” (Group8_TS6). The arrested man was Jaber al-Bakr, a Syrian national with suspected ties to ISIS who had been granted asylum by Germany in November 2015. It was later found that he had been in possession of explosives and chemicals similar to the ones utilised in the November 13th, 2015, Paris attacks (BBC News 2016b).

The latter narrative of heroism by asylum seekers stands out from the remaining narratives supported in the remaining articles. All of them framed migrants as ‘threats/villains’ and focused on the political backlash Merkel faced in response to the December 19th Christmas market attack in Berlin (Group8_GM3; Group8_GM4; Group8_GM6; Group8_TS10; Group8_VS10; and Group8_VS6). Both Group8_VS6 and Group8_GM4 provided summaries of what could be best described as a year of

narratives linking migrants with threats to physical security, starting from the New Year's Eve 'Cologne' incidents, the four July attacks, the Christmas market lorry incident, three of which were claimed by ISIS. According to them, the association between migrants and insecurity - not to say outright terrorism - was so ingrained in the German psyche that Merkel's political challenge in the upcoming 2017 Federal election was to be "extremely high given political climate of the time" (Group8_GM4). Talking of political climate, moreover, Group8_GM4 also included events outside of Germany, such as Brexit, President Trump's victory in the USA, and what they described as "unprecedented disarray" in the West. The potential backlash from the attack on Merkel's campaign was a recurring theme in all articles, with Group8_TS10 saying that "her campaign for a fourth term as Germany's leader will be her most difficult yet." Merkel's expected political campaign struggle due to her "open door" refugee policy was most often contrasted with the rise of the "upstart" far-right, anti-immigrant Alternative for Germany (AfD) party (Group8_GM3). Less than an hour after the attack, the Chairman of the AfD tweeted the victims were "Merkel's dead!" (Group8_GM3), to which another party member added, "Under the cloak of helping people Merkel has completely surrendered our domestic security" (Group8_VS6).

Despite the significant political upheaval, Merkel fared well in the 2017 Federal Election. Heading the coalition between the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CDU/CSU), she retained her role as Chancellor with a 33% majority vote. Even so, that same election also resulted in the AfD party, previously unrepresented in the Bundestag, becoming the third largest party in the country with 12.6% of the vote (The Federal Returning Officer 2017). As was demonstrated in Sample Group 6, Germany was not immune to Europe's wave of nationalist politics. More recently, for example, while the AfD received less support in the 2021 German federal

election, it did win second place in the 2024 European Parliament elections, second only to the CDU/CSU and almost five percentage points more than in the 2019 election (Angelos 2024)

Final thoughts on Sample Group 8 media coverage of transnational human migration

As the final sample group under study, it is fitting that the media coverage of Sample Group 8 highlights the overarching dichotomous logic that reigned during the RMC: one in which migrants are perceived as threats to be wary of and in need to be controlled (here exemplified by the coverage of the numerous attacks in Germany), and one in which the plight of migrants is being highlighted, inciting calls for compassion and ultimately protection (here exemplified by the Calais migrant camps being dismantled).

The articles of Sample Group 8 included numerous narratives already mentioned in previous groups, like the one in which a Europe state (i.e., France) attempted to regain control over the sheer scale of the migrant flow (via the dismantling of irregular migrant camps and the redistribution of migrants into formalised processing facilities). The same could be said of the narrative in which migrants, especially those of Muslim faith, are potential threats to their host societies, citing complementary narratives of ‘Threat to physical security’ or again ‘Threat to national identity.’ Even if interesting in their reiterations, none of these were novel.

There were, however, two new narratives that emanated from Sample Group 8. In one of them, migrants predominantly framed as ‘threat’ can also play the hero role, promoting a narrative that stands contrary to the ‘few bad apples’ metaphor (Group8_TS6). While this narrative allows for some migrants to be boons to their host communities, it remains one in which migrants are predominantly perceived negatively. If anything, instead of countering negative perceptions surrounding transnational human migration, it may justify them further, as the ‘few’ may not outweigh the ‘many.’ As for Group8_TS5,

however, not only does it present with a positive twist to the predominantly negative perception of male migrants (i.e., violence, anger, lack of respect or knowhow, etc.), but the narrative may hold some weight in today's European climate as the war between Russia and Ukraine persists. Even so, while it might be easily dismissed as far-fetched, it still invokes an innovative take on the benefits of migration.

Part III – Findings and Analysis

1. Narratives found in Canadian media coverage of the RMC

This chapter lists the key narratives that came out of the data analysis on Canadian media coverage of the RMC. They are organised according to narrative theme, themselves ordered in increasing amount of frequency found in all articles. It presents narratives associated with transnational human migration in general and specific ones to the RMC, demonstrating the various ways in which the events of 2015 and 2016 in Europe were portrayed to the Canadian public.

It should be noted that in many cases, the narratives may be attributed to more than one narrative theme. In such instances, nuances and examples were provided to explain how the narratives may be understood according to the various theme's framing. Please note that this chapter aims not to agree or disagree with the inherent logic portrayed in these narratives. While some are provided with additional context, it aims merely to expose their underlying logic and illustrate them via examples found in the chronological media analysis. A comprehensive list of all the narratives is provided in Appendix B of this dissertation.

1.1. Narrative Theme: National Pride

The narrative 'National pride' was found in eight percent of all 320 articles. These articles predominantly frame migrants as 'victims,' with only one article also framing migrants as 'threats/villains' (Group7_GM7). Examples could be found in all Sample Groups, except for Sample Group 1, with an average of three articles per sample group. The articles tackling narratives of national pride during the RMC relate to both pride in the humanitarian actions of states or Europe in general. They also include narratives of shame about a lack of humanitarianism in the face of the RMC, most

notably by Germany and Denmark. In all of these, it is worth mentioning that both pride - and mentions of lack of pride - are geared towards humanitarian migration and that there is the underlying assumption that RMC-migrant flows consist exclusively of those in need of protection.

It is worth noting that the articles containing these narratives were often compared to Canadian equivalents, undoubtedly because the sources are themselves Canadian and, in all likelihood because they support Canadian-made narratives of it being a kind and generous state.

Narrative 1 – Canadians are welcoming and generous people towards those in need, unlike Europeans

Of all 320 articles, there are eight of them explicitly demonstrating pride in Canada's humanitarian endeavour during 2015 and 2016, notably geared towards the Syrian Resettlement Program [see Sample Group 4] (Group3_TS2; Group 4_GM6; Group 4_GM9; Group 5_GM7; Group7_GM7; Group 7_VS3; and Group 8_TS8). Appearing with relative consistency throughout all sample groups, these articles express amazement at the country's humanitarian efforts, calling it, for example, "one of the most generous per capita" (Group 3_TS2). This sentiment of pride was linked, in part, to Canada being one of the only countries that permit private citizen sponsorship of refugees (Group 7_VS3), a process that not only enables a great amount of humanitarian sponsoring but also stands as an example of the general goodness of Canadians for desiring to partake in such a program.

Notably, pride in Canadian actions was contrasted against European inaction. In Group5_GM7 and Group7_GM7, the EU's lack of ability to inspire humanitarian sentiment towards the RMC influx is blamed for the regional social and political turmoil during the RMC. In Group7_GM7, the only article treating narratives associated with the 'National pride' theme, the migrants are framed as both 'victims' and 'threats/villains' in recognition of both migrants being presumed humanitarian migrants deserving of protection and because the sheer number of them has caused "political and social turmoil within

individual countries and the European Union as a whole.” In Group8_TS2, moreover, it is Chancellor Merkel’s lack of ability to portray how much the country could benefit from humanitarian migration in the long run that is blamed for the “surprise victories by right-wing politicians in local elections and subsequent moves by Merkel to slow the movement of refugees.” It should be noted that how Germany stood to benefit from humanitarian migration was never explained in Group8_TS2; therefore, assuming that the notion ‘goes without saying,’ one must refer to traditional ‘Pragmatism’ narratives of demographic and economic developments as potential reasonings for encouraging migration. Much like the previous articles contrasting Canadian and European actions, however, the notion of shame surrounding European responses to the RMC was also present in Group2_MG7 and Group2_Vs7, decrying a general lack of humanitarian solidarity towards the migrant influx. These articles depicted a continent made of once-humanitarian states, now lacking morality and decency in the face of the growing levels of migrant precarity and loss of lives associated with the RMC. To illustrate this, here is a quote from Group2_MG7:

“[d]espite shocking images of the refugees' bloated corpses being collected from the water, affluent countries such as Britain, France and Germany, which have long taken great pride in their welcoming liberal social policies, have no interest in organizing a managed resettlement program.; More than 50 former European leaders described the calamity unfolding in Italian, Maltese and Greek waters as a "stain on the conscience of our continent."

Both articles focus on a lack of resettlement programs and refer to regional disagreements in European efforts towards emergency migrant relocation schemes [see Sample Group 2].

Group4_ST7 is the only article featuring migration-related narratives of ‘National pride’ that expresses pride in how Europe (as a whole) tackled the RMC, providing humanitarian recourse towards

migrants in need. In this article, Europe's 'national' pride is constructed as the historically acquired respect for migration of a continent that has always prized travel and discovery of other territories.

1.2. Narrative Theme: Pragmatism

The narrative 'Pragmatism' was found in nine percent of all 320 articles, all framing migrants as 'benefits' to the host state. Examples of it could be found in all Sample Groups, with an average of four articles containing elements of it per sample group.

Narrative 1 – Host societies with ageing populations and dwindling labour forces benefit from migrant labour & birthrates

Taking on a chronological approach to the appearance of this narrative theme throughout the whole research project, the articles of Sample Group 1 and Sample Group 2 focused exclusively on Germany and Italy. Sample Group 1 articles containing this narrative were concerned with Germany and how it stood to benefit from the migrant influx, considering its aging population and dwindling birth rates (Group1_GM1; Group1_GM7; Group1_MG5; and Group1TS_1). Sample Group 2 articles were split geographically, demonstrating how Italy (Group2_TS6 and Group2_VS9) and Germany (Group2_GM4 and Group2_TS5) would benefit from migrant arrivals. The way migrant was perceived in both countries differed in the quality of work they were associated with. While articles about Germany were quick to mention the likelihood of Syrian refugees having professional and technical skills from which the host society could benefit, articles about Italy emphasized the need for migrant labour in agriculture throughout the country, a sector associated with unskilled labour. The German use of 'Syrians' to refer to all incoming migrants was noteworthy; it was undoubtedly linked to Merkel's welcoming message to Syrian refugees.

While Germany retained a sizeable level of attention, championing messages much like that of the first two sample groups (Group3_MG1; Group3_TS6; Group4_GM5; Group6_MG5; and Group5_GM9), articles with pragmatist narratives in later sample groups were broader in their geographic attention. Some articles focused on how Europe would benefit from migrant arrivals, citing a mixture of reasons spanning from its aging population, stagnant growth, and falling birth rates (Group3_GM5; Group3_GM7; Group3_GM9; Group4_GM2; and Group5_GM4). In many of these articles, there is an acknowledgement of rising anti-immigration sentiments throughout the continent, associated with months of uninterrupted migrant influx. Narratives of pragmatism are thus used to offset such sentiments and mitigate the fearmongering and general negativity associated with the RMC. The Group5_GM4 article stood out from the lot because it added a gender consideration to the incoming migrants. While not claimed to be a good nor a bad thing, the article highlights the likelihood of migrant families sending “their best-educated or most-skilled child,” from which Europe would undoubtedly benefit, adding simply that said child would most likely be male considering the exigencies and dangers associated with the trip to Europe (Group5_GM4).

Some of the articles were more precise in their geographic focus, demonstrating how Denmark (Group5_TS9), Finland (Group5_VS1), France (Group8_TS5), and the UK (Group6_GM10 and Group7_VS7) stood to benefit from migrant labour. These articles, citing the usual benefits of demographic and economic development, would use these boons to criticize protectionist governmental actions (i.e., Brexit in the UK and dismantling migrants’ camps in France). In Group6_GM10, for example, migration-informed Brexit is framed as a mere “interruption” in the “arc of history,” citing how the irreversible forces of international trade, global interconnectedness, and “an emerging global culture” make migration a fact of modern-day societies.

Narrative 2 – Migrants may serve to repopulate depopulated areas

Group4_GM7, moreover, introduced a novel version of the demographic boon narrative, one in which migration could be an opportunity to solve rapid depopulation. Of the world's top twenty countries with the fastest population decline in 2019, all but two of them (Japan and Cuba) were in Europe (World Population Review 2024). Featuring as number twenty on that list, Italy is now facing depopulation, meaning a decrease in the number of people living in some areas and/or regions. In Group4_GM7, migration was cited as being used to re-populate parts of Sicily, turning the RMC into an opportunity. In addition to offering free houses to European tourists who fancied holiday homes in Sicily, Italy accepted fifty migrants from Somalia, Nigeria, and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, giving them free houses in sparsely populated towns.

Narrative 3 – The Canadian model of migrant integration is great for ensuring long-term success for both migrants and host society

From a Canadian perspective, more particularly, the country's model of migrant integration was praised as the best way to ensure migrants benefit their host societies (Group4_GM1; Group5_GM7; Group7_MG5; and Group8_TS2). Often bridging in narratives of national pride, the articles present Canadian society as a tolerant and welcoming one worthy of emulation. Group8_TS2, for example, stresses how Canadians, in late 2016, remained pro-migration "at a time when fear is on the rise," using the recent elections in the USA and Europe as emblematic of rising xenophobia in the West. By citing speeches from Prime Minister Trudeau, moreover, stating how Canada had perfected "drawing in people from around the world" to the benefit of not only the "country and well-being and our sense of selves, but to our economy and to our success as a nation" (Group7_MG5), the articles jointly construct this idea that the Canadian model of immigration should be a 'how to' and 'best practice' guide for

European states, promoting how migrants thrive in large part because they've been able to set up shop, in an ad hoc way, without many bureaucratic or legal barriers (Group4_GM1). In these articles, the narrative implies that the migrants are unlikely to return to their home countries once they've successfully integrated into their host societies. In Group5_MG7, moreover, it is clearly expressed that migrant integration is key, as the consequences of their marginalization would result in some "end[ing] up among society's poor, excluded, and possibly even radicalized." The links between poverty and radicalisation and the potential of it all having dire consequences on European peoples are explained in greater details in narratives associated with 'Economic insecurity.'

Only Group6_GM7 challenges the narrative of Canada as being an example to the rest of the Western world. The article states that "there are signs that the 'Canadian dream' is beginning to flag," arguing that while not visible quite yet in the "raw national figures," social mobility in the country is waning, one of the main reasons cited for long-term migrant success. Dwindling social mobility is attributed to the increasingly unaffordable housing market, regional differences, and even uneven access to education in the country. Comparing Canadian statistics to that of Finland, the article thus argues against copying the Canadian model and that European states should turn 'Westward' rather than 'Eastward'. Finnish education models are particularly prized in the article for creating equitable opportunities between national and migrant children, removing barriers to integration, and promoting social mobility for all. The Group6_GM7 article was ahead of its time. As of 2024 Canadian economists are warning that the country was experiencing a "population trap," wherein the booming population of a country starts clashing with the limits of the infrastructural capability needed to absorb that population. Indeed, the collapse of Canada's capital stock per capita, close to 1.5% in 2023, meant that the Canadian population was growing so rapidly that the country did not have enough savings to stabilize its capital-labor ratio and increase its GDP per capita. As a result, the federal government is working to stabilize

the number of immigrants to Canada every year in response to reports (Singer 2024). While the details of the ‘population trap’ are convoluted and difficult to grasp for the average person, it would be no stretch to assume that following such public federal discourses, ant-migration sentiment in the country is likely to be on the rise, challenging the above notions of Canadian exceptionalism.

1.3. Narrative Theme: Economic Insecurity

The narrative ‘Economic insecurity’ was found in twenty percent of all 320 articles, with all but one article exclusively framing migrants as ‘threats/villains’ (Group2_TS3). Examples of it could be found in all Sample Groups except Sample Group 8. The remaining sample groups held an average of seven articles containing elements of this narrative per sample group.

Narrative 1 – Migrant labour increased competition in the labour market to the detriment of citizens

There were ten articles in total which depicted migrants as potentially stealing jobs from citizens. All these articles framed migrants as potential ‘threats/villains’ to their host societies. Of these, six of them were geographically focused on the UK and the deliberations which led ‘Leave’ supporters to vote for the country leaving the EU (Group1_GM2; Group7_GM9; Group7_VS9; Group6_GM9; Group7_GM10; and Group4_GM9). Migrant labour increasing bearing negative economic effects on the country was part of the platform taken up by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) to incense a desire for additional UK border controls, citing for example, “high youth unemployment” (Group4_GM9) or and again migrants stealing jobs while simultaneously putting pressure on housing and social services (Group6_GM9). There was an interesting element of ‘losers and winners of globalisation’ discourse in some of these articles, with Group7_GM9, Group1_GM2, Group7_GM10, and Group7_VS7 arguing that British elites were the ones benefiting the most from EU membership and

the corresponding influx of migrant labour, leaving uneducated British nationals to bare “the negative impact of importing cheap labour” (Group7_VS7). Notions of migrants taking away labour opportunities in different countries was also mentioned in Austria (Group4_MG6), Finland (Group5_VS1), and Germany (Group1_MG7 and Group1_TS6).

Narrative 2 – There are no jobs available for the predominantly unskilled migrant workforce in the host society

In relation to the RMC-related migrant influx, there were four articles that mentioned migrants being a source of insecurity in as much as there were few economic opportunities for them within host societies, most likely making them burdens to the state or forcing them into illicit activities. The notion of illicit activity, which has the potential to bring them to criminal activities, overlaps with narratives associated with the ‘Threat to physical security’ narratives.

In a similar sense as some of the above UK-focused articles, these narratives bear ‘losers and winners of globalisation’ discourse, as migrants are constructed as unskilled labour fueling competition in societies with already limited economic opportunities. Bridging the two ideas, Group2_TS6 and Group2_VS9 centered on Italy, arguing that the country’s already high unemployment rates of thirteen percent left incoming migrants with little opportunities to find gainful employment, often leading them into illicit agricultural opportunities with dire working and living conditions.

In Sweden and Finland, moreover, the argument for lack of migrant opportunity is further contextualised into the country’s general inability to integrate migrants into the host society, pushing disgruntled migrants into its margins (Group3_GM1 and Group6_GM7). The articles cite Sweden and Finland as having high employment gaps between natives and non-natives because of their technologically driven post-industrial economies. It should be noted that the notion of post-industrial

societies adds another layer to the ‘losers and winners of globalisation’ narrative, as unlike industrial societies rooted in producing material goods, post-industrial societies are based on the production of information and services. The role welfare states in post-industrial labour markets is cause for debate, as the latter is associated with increasing informality, disparity, and general precarity. For migrants, more specifically, post-industrial societies in the West are associated with increasing marginalization as there are fewer jobs available to them that do not have high barriers of entry (skill-based, experience, education, etc.) (for more information, see Visser and Guarnizo 2017).

Narrative 3 – Migrants do not have the right skills to join the labour market of the host society

Similarly, an additional six articles frame migrants potentially experiencing economic precarity within their host societies from the point of view of them lacking the necessary skills to flourish within their host societies. The argument here is like the above one focusing on lack of economic opportunity, but it differs in that the focus is not on the host society being ill-suited to receive migrant labour, but instead on the migrants themselves being ill-suited to their host societies. The distinction between these two is nuanced in the subject-framing. In these articles, the migrants are depicted as lacking the skills and sometimes even the ability to integrate, positioning them as probable burdens to their host societies; article Group6_GM5, for example, states that migrants hoping to settle in Italy are “unskilled, semi-literate, culturally very different, demanding food, shelter, health care and permanent residency”. Similar arguments are made for Hungary (Group2_MG1) and Germany (Group1_GM5; Group1_VS5; and Group4_GM4). The article Group4_GM9 also makes similar arguments but focuses on Canada, highlighting a petition with upwards of 61,500 signatures, receiving online commentary such as “[w]e can't even look after our own homeless,” “[r]efugees should stay home,” and “[I]earn to write and we'll

take you more seriously”. The overall notion of burden associated with migrants’ lack of skills is exemplary welfare chauvinism narratives.

Narrative 4 – Migrants (predominantly of Muslim faith) will be/are economically marginalised and therefore likely to be radicalised

An interesting narrative that emanated from articles focusing on migrants risking being marginalised by their host society, was linked to its potential for religious radicalisation, especially associated with migrants of Muslim faith. The gender of migrants in these articles is presumed to be chiefly male, furthering the securitisation of male migrants. While only mentioned three articles (Group1_GM6; Group1_VS8; and Group4_GM1), it remains a noteworthy narrative, especially as it ties in narrative elements of ‘Economic insecurity’ and ‘Threats to physical security’. In these articles, a lack of migrant economic integration into their host society, mixed with a lack of labour opportunity and the resulting marginalization, is depicted as a conduit for migrant Islamic extremism and, therefore, a propensity for terrorism. The whole is said to have resulted in Muslim youths being ‘ghetto-ised’ in France (Group1_GM6), Germany (Group1_VS8), and Europe in general (Group4_GM1). In relation to the RMC, the pipeline from migrant to potential terrorist is associated with the existing migrant communities within Europe, some of which have been there for generations, and is thus transferred to the RMC-related influx as most of them come from Muslim-majority countries. More development on said pipeline between economic precarity and radicalisation can be found in the narratives associated with ‘Threats to physical security’.

Narrative 5 – The cost of caring for migrants drains local resources to the detriment of the host society

The most recurring narrative related to this theme was that of the cost of care for the unusually high migrant influx in 2015 and 2016. Mentioned in forty-one percent of articles associated with this narrative theme, these articles presented migrants as a financial burden to receiving European states, notably Italy (Group2_Gm5), Sweden (Group6_VS6; Group4_MG1; Group7_VS2; Group7_VS1; and Group5_MG10), Denmark (Group7_TS5; Group6_TS2; Group5_TS9; and Group4_VS8), Germany (Group7_GM3; Group4_VS7; Group3_TS6; and Group1_GM7), Hungary (Group3_VS5;), Greece (Group6_TS1; Group6_GM8; Group5_GM5; Group3_VS4; and Group3_MG4) and Europe in general (Group5_TS10; Group5_TS1; Group5_GM4; Group5_GM1; Group2_TS3; Group2_MG7; and Group2_MG2). The specificities of this narrative are developed at length in the chronological analysis of the RMC. A quick summary of these presents: Europe, in general, centered on regional discord to address the uneven burden of care for incoming migrants, often highlighting the geographic inequality created by the EU's Dublin system and efforts to externalize RMC responses [see Sample Group 3, 5 and 6 for additional information]. Articles about Italy, Greece, and Hungary, as EU portal countries, highlight similar elements, describing these states as economically unable to meet the administrative demands of the RMC as stipulated by the Dublin system. Moreover, articles about Germany and Sweden depict the administrative demands they face as countries with a high number of asylum requests. The articles about Sweden, more particularly, reflect the shift in attitudes towards migrants between 2015 and 2016 and the corresponding political shift, depicting migrants as threats to the country's generous welfare system and labour market pressures to integrate unprecedented levels of migrants [see above narratives of 'National pride'].

As for Denmark, a country that received no development in the chronological analysis of Canadian RMC media coverage, the country deserves to be investigated on how it tackled the financial

demands of processing asylum requests during the RMC. Like Sweden, it is a good example of how this specific narrative may impact host societies. The country received over 14,000 and 21,000 asylum requests in 2014 and 2015 respectively (Dyvik 2024). In 2016 it received 6,000 requests, showing similar rates to pre-2014 levels. Between 2016 and 2022, moreover, there was an average of 3,000 asylum requests per year. The shift between 2015 and 2016 can be explained by the country's adoption of policy in 2015 to make the country less attractive to potential asylum seekers, providing that temporary protection status could be withdrawn when conditions in home countries improve even slightly (Pace 2021). In 2016, the country also passed laws restricting access to family reunification in 2016. The country, which had previously been described as having "one of the most progressive in the world on asylum policy and refugee protection" globally (Pace 2021), was increasingly becoming a beacon of anti-immigration in the region. The five articles featuring Denmark, all of them published between December 2015 and September 2016, demonstrate rising anti-migration sentiment in the country ran by an administration that "believe[d] these new migrants are draining Denmark's cherished social-welfare system but failing to adapt to its customs" (Group7_TS5). The growing hostility towards humanitarian migration, more specifically, is depicted, often citing the country's adoption of a policy allowing for the seizure of asylum seekers' jewelry and other valuables as a method of helping subsidize the costs to the state. It should be noted that Switzerland also adopted a similar policy during the RMC to offset migrant-care costs (Group5_GM4 and Group5_GM1). In the Canadian coverage of the RMC, Denmark is used, alongside other European states such as Switzerland, Hungary, and Sweden (in 2016), to demonstrate the 'threat' perception of all types of migration in Europe, notably here tied to migrants being financial burdens to the state and likely to continue being so in the future.

Narrative 6 – RMC flows have had negative impacts on local economies

Some articles depicted the ways in which the RMC influx had negatively impacted local European economies. Indeed, while these are only three articles, the narrative they represent is worth mentioning as it adds another layer to the negative economic association of the RMC. Group7_TS2 demonstrated how it negatively impacted the economy of tourism-dependent Greece, as stories of migrant deaths, overrun beaches, and unprecedented levels of migration led to a reduction in tourism throughout the country. Group7_TS3 and Group7_TS4, moreover, added that the Calais ‘Jungle’ and related security efforts to curb migrant flow across the Channel impacted the every-day running of the Calais port, a major employer in the region, ultimately leading to citizen protests [See Sample Group 8].

Lastly, there were nine articles that linked economic insecurity and the RMC with the rise of far-right, xenophobic political parties in Europe. For more information about how the RMC is associated with the rise of far-right political parties in Europe, see Sample Group 5. These articles all depict how economic insecurity in the wake of the RMC migrant influx, not the least of which was tied to the above-mentioned narratives (i.e., cost of care, lack of migrant skills, perception of negative impact on the local economies, etc.) led to a growing support for nativist politics. These articles focus on different geographical areas, notably Hungary (Group3_GM2), the UK (Group3_GM6 and Group6_GM2), the whole of Europe (Group3_GM9; Group3_MG1; Group3_MG5; Group3_TS4; and Group6_GM10), and even the Western world in general (Group6_TS8). The link between nativist politics and general economic impact is associated with a desire for increased protectionist measures and anti-supranationalist sentiments for EU Member States more specifically. A good example of this is Brexit, cited in all abovementioned UK articles, and the ‘Leave’ campaign’s desire to regain economic control is in part link with a general desire for control from the EU structure perceived as detrimental to British individuals.

1.4. Narrative Theme: Threat to National Identity

Narratives associated with ‘Threat to national identity’ theme were found in twenty-three percent of all 320 articles, of which ninety-five percent exclusively framed migrants as ‘threats/villains.’ Examples of it could be found in all Sample Groups with an average of nine articles containing elements of this narrative theme per sample group. Featuring throughout the whole of research timeframe, it can thus be assumed that the narrative of migrants’ ‘otherness’ being perceived as culturally incompatible with European cultures and therefore a threat was present throughout both 2015 and 2016. Articles presenting these narratives were predominantly in Sample Group 1 mainly in relation to the Charlie Hebdo shootings and the Dresden marches in Germany and in Sample Groups 3, 5 and 7, about Hungary’s border wall with Serbia and Croatia, and the numerous terrorist attacks in Europe like the Paris attacks, the Brussels attack and ‘Cologne’ incidents respectively.

Narrative 1 – Muslim Migrants are too culturally deviant from Western/European societies to be integrated successfully

Of the articles treating this narrative theme, fifty-nine percent of them focused on migration from Muslim-majority countries as a perceived threat to European ‘national cultures.’ It should be noted that the ‘threat’ perception was associated with incoming migrants and European nationals of migrant descent alike.

As the sample group with the most sizeable use of this narrative theme, one which nearly doubles the next two sample groups with the most feature of this narrative theme, Sample Group 1 is singled out in this narrative breakdown. All the articles in Sample Group 1 treating this narrative theme focused on migrants and the descendants of migrants of Muslim faiths posing a threat to the future of European national identities. Moreover, all but one of these articles focused on either France or

Germany being potentially threatened by Muslim migration, either in the form of it bringing the potential for jihadist terrorist activity and/or at risk of being culturally altered by it. In this formulation, both countries' national identity is made akin to their social and political cultures. The only article of this Sample Group focused elsewhere, centering on Canadian society responses to the Charlie Hebdo shootings in France and how they “unleashed a barrage of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant comments on the Facebook pages of federal politicians and their parties in Canada” (Group1_VS10). The article demonstrated how Canada was not immune reactionary politics vis-à-vis national identity threats perceptions about Muslim migration.

The articles in the remaining sample groups were geographically focused on Finland (5_VS1), Sweden (Group5_MG10 and Group3_MG3), France (Group7_GM9), Belgium (Group5_MG3 and Group4_GM1), Germany (Group4_GM4; Group6_TS3; Group6_VS3; Group8_GM1; Group8_TS6; and Group7_TS1), Austria (Group6_VS7), Slovenia (Group4_MG2), Hungary (Group3_TS3), Eastern Europe (Group3_Gm4), Europe in general (Group3_MG1; Group5_MG5; Group5_TS1; Group3_TS4; Group5_GM4; Group6_GM2; and Group7_MG7) and the Western world (Group6_VS1).

The key narrative that emanates from these articles is how the Christian heritage of European and Western states renders those practicing Islam incompatible with European cultures, sometimes citing the use of headscarves, a lack of respect for women, and hinting at a propensity for terrorist activity as a means of constructing this Muslim ‘other.’ Often, there is no description of how those practicing Islam differ culturally from ‘normal’ Europeans; the distinction between both groups within society at large is not only presumed but also diminished solely to faith. Articles supporting this narrative were predominantly written in association with one of the terrorist attacks or incidents of migrant violence, such as the ‘Cologne’ incidents [see Sample Group 5]. Linking the cultural incompatibility and the potential for migrant radicalisation, with one of those events served to further the

perception of Muslims as threats. As was mentioned in the narrative theme development of economic insecurity above, the radicalisation of young male Muslims was a narrative associated with their marginalization, itself associated with their cultural marginalization and lack of ability to integrate within European societies.

Narrative 2 – Migrants in general are too culturally deviant from Western/European societies to be integrated successfully

Without pinpointing the ‘otherness’ of those practicing Islam, there remained twelve articles citing the cultural incompatibility of migrants as a reason to worry about their ability to integrate into their host societies. These articles focused geographically on Hungary (Group3_GM2; Group2_MG1; Group7_GM6; and Group8_GM2), Sweden (Group3_GM1 and Group7_VS2), Germany (Group5_GM9), the UK (Group3_GM6), Italy (Group6_GM5), Denmark (Group7_TS5) and Europe in general (Group3_GM3 and Group8_TS1). Often citing economic concerns on their ability to integrate and contribute meaning to their host societies alongside cultural ones, the resulting narrative is one framing migrants as ‘threats/villains’. It is interesting to note that in none but one of these articles is said culture under threat defined. Instead, the focus is on unwanted social changes in the face of diverse migration. Only in Group8_TS1 are concrete examples of cultures at risk presented, citing:

The Nordic countries of Sweden, Denmark (and Norway) are much admired. Culturally, Sweden is the land of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo and Wallander, not to mention the Nobel Prizes, Ikea and, in earlier years, Abba and Ingmar Bergman. While Sweden and Denmark collaborated to create Skype and the TV series The Bridge, Denmark is known on its own for The Hunt, Borgen and the top restaurant, Noma, not to mention Maersk shipping and Legoland.

Narrative 3 – High levels of Muslim immigration have altered the local landscape

Moreover, these articles depict the increasing presence of Muslims as a cause for internal tensions within European states and within the region in general. It has resulted in a wave of anti-migration sentiment throughout the continent not the least of which was in the West (Group7_GM10), Europe in general (Group2_TS3; Group6_GM10; Group5_GM10; Group6_TS8; and Group5_TS7), Germany (Group8_GM9), Austria (Group7_GM2 and Group4_MG6), and Sweden (Group4_TS9). In each of these places, RMC-related migrant influxes of presumed- or outrightly cited as being of- Muslim faith, have triggered economic and cultural fear, or a “sense of loss” (Group7_GM10). Especially as the numerous terrorist attacks during 2015 and 2016 were linked with RMC-related migrants or associated with individuals of migrant-descent, the whole fueled support for far-right, anti-immigration political parties throughout the Europe and indeed the rest of the Western world [see Sample Group 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8]. Illustrating the rise of anti-immigration political support in Europe as a reaction of events, Group5_TS7 presents the narrative of a reactionary Europe:

Rarely has compassion and empathy turned so quickly and so aggressively into hatred and rejection. I refer to the “migrants,” the refugees, the asylum-seekers — the semantics are less important than the humanity when you work with them — and how both socially and politically they have been transformed in the media from victims into perpetrators.

Narrative 4 – High levels of diverse immigration have altered the local landscape

Following a similar logic to narrative number three, this narrative takes on a more general approach. It supports that immigration from diverse background holds the potential to alter the local cultural landscape. It was found in four articles, in which the concept of multiculturalism was mentioned as a negative trait to uphold. In three of them, the Canadian approach to migration integration and the

promotions of diversity was contrasted with the Hungarian desire for migrant assimilation into their culture (Group2_MG1; Group8_GM2; and Group7_GM6). In these articles, Hungary decried multiculturalism as a cultural threat to appease ‘others,’ championed by “liberal politicians who have diluted the continent's culture with open-door policies toward refugees and migrants from the Middle East and elsewhere” (Group8_GM2). In Group6_VS7, furthermore, Austrian President Hofer was contrasted to US President Trump, with both men being found having similar populist rhetoric vis-à-vis migrants, using fear of migrant ‘invasion’ and ‘losers and winners of globalisation’ notions to fuel the support of those “who feel left behind and threatened by a fast-changing, multicultural society.” These formulations of multiculturalism as a threat rather than a strength stand contrary to its conception in narratives associated with the theme of ‘National pride,’ in which a history of multiculturalism and embracing diversity is viewed as a boon. It could be construed, however, that viewing ‘others’ as threats to national identity is, in fact, a form of ‘national pride,’ one in which individuals are proud of their culture and history and desire to protect it from outside pressure. It is not that they desire to make a ‘national identity’ invariable per se – though perhaps that is true in some cases – but rather to reduce cultural influences to forces within rather than outside forces.

This narrative speaks perhaps to a romantic - if reductionist - take on history, as outside forces are both inescapable and have always been present in human history. Indeed, this notion is supported in Group1_GM2, which states that “[n]ational, religious and cultural identities (for lack of a better word) are being transformed, though less by immigration than by the development of globalized capitalism.”

1.5. Narrative Theme: Threats to Physical Security

Narratives associated with ‘Threat to physical security’ theme were found in twenty-seven percent of all 320 articles. Ninety-five percent of these articles framed migrants exclusively as

‘threats/villains.’ Examples of it could be found in all sample groups with an average of eleven articles per sample group. Narratives associated with this theme could be found in all sample groups, particularly in Sample Groups 1, 5, 7, and 8, coinciding with- although not limited to- the numerous terrorist attacks Europe during 2015 and 2016, notable the Charlie Hebdo shootings, the Paris attacks, the Brussels attacks and the Berlin attacks. These narratives featured throughout the whole of research timeframe, even if only at varying degrees, it can thus be assumed that the notion of migrants’ posing threats to the physical security of Europeans remained a constant element of the media coverage of in 2015 and 2016.

Narrative 1 – RMC-related flows may harbour hidden terrorists

The first narrative was found in at least twenty-nine articles across all sample groups. The narrative linking RMC migrant flows with the potential for terrorist activity presumed terrorists (here exclusively associated Islam-based activity) hid among the migrant flows entering Europe, posing as humanitarian migrants in need of protection. On the one hand, the narrative presumes that the scale of RMC-migrant flows would make it harder than usual for authorities to screen the incoming migrants for potential jihadist connections, as the capacities of numerous European countries became overwhelmed. On the other, it presumes that the European benevolence to help those in need is being weaponised by migrants with ill-intents (see, for example, Group3_TS3). The narrative is linked as one of the reasons why numerous EU Member States reinstated border controls along internal Schengen border (Group5_TS5). It is also associated with far-right, anti-immigration political rhetoric and civil society mobilisation such as the PEGIDA protests in Germany (Group7_TS1) [see Sample Group 1].

Narrative 2 – Muslims migrants and their descendants have a propensity for terrorist activity

The second narrative supports that terrorist activity in Europe is associated with migrants of Muslim faith and religious extremism in general, independently of RMC developments. The articles in Sample Group 1 linking migration with terrorist activity are good examples of the second narrative. Mainly focused on the Charlie Hebdo shootings, these articles focus on social perceptions of danger associated with migrants and descendants of migrants practicing Islam, predominantly in France and Germany, linking faith with a propensity for terrorist violence (see, for example, Group1_Gm4; Group1_GM5; Group1_GM8; Group1_MG10; Group1_MG3). Elements of it could also be seen in later articles, many of which centered on different European states like Denmark (Group7_TS5), Finland (Group5_VS1), and the UK (Group6_GM9 and Group7_VS7).

These articles are aligned with the way Islamic practitioners are constructed in narratives associated with the ‘Threats to national identity’ theme and general post-9/11 securitisation of migration discourses and rising Islamophobia in Western societies. In Europe, more precisely, they are also linked with notions of migrant marginalization and radicalisation, itself associated in parts with narratives in the ‘Economic insecurity’ theme. In this sense, the social and economic marginalization of migrants of Muslim faith, whether established or newly arrived, is a security concern, as it links racialized pockets of migrants with terrorist activity. In the Canadian media coverage of the RMC, the narrative of migrant radicalisation as a source of potential physical insecurity is expressed in numerous geographic settings, notably Belgium (Group5_Gm10), France (Group1_GM6 and Group4_GM1), Germany (Group8_TS6) and Europe in general (Group1_VS8).

Examples of this narrative were also found in a Canadian setting. In three articles, at least, the fallout of the November 13th, 2015, Paris attacks were directly cited as causes for security concerns in the country (Group4_GM6; Group4_GM9; and Group4_MG9). Linking the events with the Canadian

Syrian resettlement program [see Sample Group 4] and calling for additional security screenings of incoming Syrian migrants. These articles show that Canada is also linked to this narrative.

Narrative 3 – Migrants pose biosecurity threats to their host societies

In five articles, the narrative that migrants posed a biosecurity threat to Europeans was reiterated (Group1_MG9; Group1_VS6; Group2_MG5; Group2_TS9; and Group2_VS3). In all these articles, the migrants were framed as potential ‘threats/villains.’ They centered exclusively on pockets of newly arrived migrants in France and in Germany. In France, the articles spoke of migrants carrying diseases associated with poor hygiene and squalid living conditions, citing scabies, dysentery, and parasite infections (Group2_GM5; Group2_TS9; and Group2_VS3). These migrants resided in makeshift migrant camps in Paris, camps that were deemed security concerns by the authorities and were thus frequently dismantled in attempts to curb the spread of diseases. In Germany, newly arrived migrants were associated with a spike of measles in Berlin, with both articles stressing that they were unvaccinated (Group1_MG9 and Group1_VS6). In both cases, the narrative of ‘dirty’ migrants, be it physically due to living conditions or in association with their lack of medical care, is posed a potential threat to ‘clean’ European citizens.

Narrative 4 – Migrants have a propensity of criminal activity

There were, moreover, numerous narratives associating migrants with criminal activity within the studied articles. One such narrative tied migrants with a propensity for criminal activity. In the way it is developed in the Canadian media coverage of the RMC, the narrative does not provide a reason as to why migrants are perceived as such.

In the Winter of 2015, Hungary, for example, felt the need to organize a nationwide billboard campaign of messages directed at the migrants - but written in Hungarian - warning them to abide by local laws (Group3_TS4). In Sweden, moreover, one article states that “[t]he majority of people charged with murder, rape and robbery are either first- or second-generation immigrants” (Group3_GM1), a notion that was backed by academic literature on migrant-related Swedish crime rates in the 1990s (Martens 1997).

Narrative 5 – RMC-related migrant flows are financing transnational criminal rings and terrorist cells

There were two narrative linking transnational human migration and criminality that were closely tied to the RMC. The first was associated with human smuggling rings, in which migrants’ desire to reach Europe financed large-scale criminal operations. The narrative is chiefly associated with smuggling activity in the Mediterranean, though the coverage of efforts to mobilise migrants throughout the European continent remained a consideration.

During the RMC, the sheer scale of migrant mobility resulted in the perception that human smuggling rings thrived and grew in both their capacity and ability to elude efforts aimed to curb migrant mobility, some of which were large-scale, multi-party militarised operations [see, for example, Sample Group 2]. The so-called “criminal boom” (Group3_VS3), was also associated with terrorist financing in Northern Africa and the Middle East, adding to the threat perception associated with smuggling activities (Group2_TS1).

Narrative 6 – RMC-related migrant flows may contain criminals

The second narrative linking transnational human migration and criminality concerned migrants making up RMC flows and their potentially being criminals. It was visible in articles like Group3_VS10 which depicted European efforts to “identify, register, fingerprint and screen people for criminal backgrounds.” The ‘othering’ of migrants in this case, mixed in with the scale of the migrant flow and the ‘unknown’ they represent, could be aptly described with the colloquial notion of ‘stranger danger.’ This narrative implied that not knowing migrants’ pasts equates them with a potential for criminal propensity and, therefore, pose a danger to host societies.

Narrative 7 – Male RMC-related migrants do not respect Western/European authority and, therefore, have a propensity for violence

There are two more narratives associating RMC-related migrants with physical security threats to Europeans, both of them center on migrants’ ability for violence. The first one concerned migrants erupting in violent altercations, often causing bodily harm to European security forces. In many cases, the commotions were the result of frustrated migrants faced with barriers to mobility in Macedonia (Group4_VS9 and Group5_VS10), Italy (Group2_VS2), and Hungary (Group4_TS3), resulting in violent altercations with police and military forces barring their way. In other cases, migrants were reported as clashing with authorities in migrant camps, either as a result of the camp being dismantled (Group8_TS8) or in protest against the living conditions of said camp (Group6_VS8). In only one instance, migrants were depicted as fighting with other migrants due to ethnic tensions in a migrant hotspot on a Greek mainland (Group6_VS1). The clash resulted in violent clashes with the authorities and significant property damage to the camp facilities. In these retellings, the narrative that emanates is

one of predominantly of angry male migrants causing disorder. The whole depicts them as being potential security threats, by emphasising they physical ability to cause harm as well as a presumed lack of respect for European authority forces.

Narrative 8 - Male RMC-related migrants do not respect Western/European culture and therefore have a propensity for sexual deviance

The other narrative linking RMC-related migrant flows and violence centered on male migrants, depicting them not as angry per se but as sexually deviant in a way that poses threats to European citizens - presumably females ones. The narrative was most found in relation to the German ‘Cologne’ incidents [see Sample Group 5], where women were sexually harassed by racialized migrants presumed to be newly arrived in the continent (Group5_GM5; Group5_GM9; Group5_GM3; and Group8_GM1). It was also found in the UK, where a tabloid referred to the migrants as “rap[ing] fears spread across Europe” (Group5_TS7), and in Austria (Group6_GM2) and Sweden (Group7_Vs1 and Group7_VS2) where incidents of sexual violence were associated with newly arrived migrants.

In this narrative are mixed in elements of ‘Threats to national identity’ narratives, as migrants are not only depicted as able and willing to harm Europeans but also considered culturally prone to sexual deviance, emanating from cultures in which women are not respected. In the media coverage of the ‘Cologne’ incidents, more particularly, said sexual deviance and ‘otherness’ is associated predominantly with Muslim migrants.

1.6. Narrative Theme: State Ability to Control Human Flows across Borders

Narratives associated with ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ theme were found in fifty-three percent of all 320 articles, with ninety-one percent of these articles framing migrants as ‘threats/villains.’ Examples of it could be found in all sample groups with an average of twenty-one articles per sample group. Narratives associated with this theme could be found in all sample groups with relative consistency in the number of articles referring to it, except for Sample Group 8, which significant reduced related media coverage.

Narrative 1 - Migrants are a security threat, and states need stricter border controls

One narrative associated with border controls is linked with the notion that uncontrolled migration is a physical security threat. This narrative is often associated with other narratives under the ‘Threat to physical security’ theme, notably that migrants may carry the potential of harming citizens, may be radicalised terrorists, or may carry deadly diseases. The desire for additional border control may be preventative and/or reactionary. Calls for stricter border controls to prevent security threats were found throughout the timeline studied. For example, both Group1_VS1 and Group6_MG10, published a full year apart, mention a need for stricter border controls in Canada to prevent future attacks. They were published in the aftermath of terrorist incidents in Europe, proving to be, therefore, both preventative and reactionary. Another example are calls for additional border security in Macedonia (Group3_VS9) and Slovenia (Group4_MG2) following altercations between border forces and migrants.

Narrative 2 – The scale of RMC-related migrant flows in and throughout Europe is problematic and urgently needs to be curbed

A frequently recurring narrative associated with this theme centered on the sheer scale of the RMC influx. By highlighting the unusually high statistics in migrant mobility towards Europe in 2015 and 2016, numerous articles depict the RMC as an uncontrollable and incessant wave of migrants coming into Europe. The whole depicts a continent under invasion, attributing it to greater smugglers capacities, greater number of migrant deaths, and a general lack of ability for European states to control human mobility across their borders (see for example Group1_MG1; Group2_GM5; Group3_TS10; Group4_TS5; and Group5_GM4).

It is a narrative associated with sentiments of urgency, calling on the one hand for joint solutions to regain control over Europe's Southern border with Asia and North Africa. The narrative's focus on the incessantness of migrant flows is illustrated in this quote from Philippe Fargues, director of the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute (Group4_TS5):

"The problem is that the flow will not stop [...] There is still a war in Syria, the environment for refugees in Turkey is deteriorating, not to speak of Lebanon and Jordan. In the coming hours or days, decisions will be taken to tighten controls."

It is interesting to note that in this narrative is it Europe that is framed as a 'victim;' a victim of the sheer number of incoming migrants.

On the other hand, the narrative has also been attributed with individual European states, depicting how some of them were feeling the pressure to respond to the administrative demands of the high number of incoming asylum requests, general size of the influx, as well as the related political and social fallouts. Featuring in at fifty articles, the narrative was chiefly geographically associated with a

handful of European states, notably Greece (Group3_TS4 and Group5_VS4), Italy (Group2_TS7 and Group2_VS2), Germany (Group1_MG2 and Group7_MG10), Hungary (Group2_VS1), Sweden (Group4_TS2 and Group7_VS2), Slovenia (Group4_TS3), Macedonia (Group4_VS9), the UK (Group6_GM2), Austria (Group7_GM2 and Group6_GM6), and Finland (Group5_VS1). The ways in which each of those states stood to be affected by the RMC influx is developed at great length in the chronological media analysis.

To cite a few examples, the social and political discontent with how the remaining of the continent tackled the RMC, led the UK to wanting to attain greater border controls and leave the regional union. The RMC is thus viewed as key element for the success of the Brexit campaign. Sweden, moreover, while previously open to high numbers of humanitarian migrants, opted for stricter border controls in 2016, adopting policies to limit migration into the country. Each of those changes, often associated with public discontent and an increasing support for anti-migration, far-right political parties, could be in part explained by a general desire to regain control over human flows across state borders.

Narrative 3 – EU Member States came together to find ways to curb RMC-related migrant flows

This narrative focuses on the efforts made by the EU to mitigate migrant mobility across borders during the RMC. It is a narrative in which Member States are collectively attempting to resolve RMC-related contentions. Externally, examples of such efforts are the EU-Libya Deal, the EU-Turkey Deal, and the efforts to combat smugglers in the Mediterranean [see Sample Groups 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6]. A good example of this narrative is Group3_MG5, in which European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker is seen urging the EU's 28 governments to “share the burdens - financial, political and moral - of resettling asylum seekers who hazard the journey across the Mediterranean Sea to enter the EU predominantly through Greece, Italy and Hungary.”

The narrative follows, moreover, internal regional efforts to mitigate geographic inequalities created by the Dublin system as well as finding ways to appease tensions between contending member states. The narrative may be found throughout all sample groups, especially in earlier ones, as regional efforts redistribute migrants and redress geographic inequality [see Sample Group 2].

Narrative 4 – EU Member States cannot agree on how to respond to the RMC causing regional tensions

This narrative builds upon the previous one and highlights the regional tensions that emanated from a lack of consensus between EU member states in the wake of the RMC. This narrative differs from the previous one in its pessimistic focus, rather than the previous one's collaborative and hopeful focus. Not only does it center on the geographic and administrative inequalities between member states because of the Dublin system, but it also stresses state-specific measures taken to curb migrant mobilities between Member States. Often associated with the rising support for far-right politics in the continent, the narrative centers on euroscepticism and fears concerning the future viability of the EU in the wake of such widespread discontent and disagreement.

In this narrative, individual states – sometimes blocks of states such as the Visegrad group – are opposed to the proposed regional solutions such as the Emergency Relocation Scheme [see Sample Group 2]. Article Group3_VS7 demonstrates this narrative clearly, quoting Czech Foreign Minister Lubomir Zaoralek saying, “We need to have control over how many (migrants) we are capable of accepting,” speaking on behalf of Central European nations rejecting refugee quota proposals. In late 2016, tensions were still high, exemplified by Group8_MG5 which describes Hungary's vote to scrap the EU's 2nd attempt at redistributing migrant quotas as a "domino effect" of anti-refugee sentiment across Eastern Europe. The link between regional responses to the RMC and increases in social and political discontentment within EU Member States was also visible in the leading up to the Brexit vote

[see Sample Group 6 and 7] and the rise of the anti-immigration, far-right political parties [see the political repercussions to Merkel's initially welcoming attitude towards asylum seekers in the articles of Sample Group 8].

Tensions also happened in responses to state inaction vis-à-vis RMC flows, like Germany, who expressed disappointment in fellow EU Member States for choosing to refuse migrants of Muslim faith, calling out their lack of humanitarianism and lack of solidarity with fellow Member States. This version of the narrative was most visible in the articles of Sample Group 3 that covered the Hungarian construction of a border wall to curb migrant flows and what would later be known as the Walk of Hope from Hungary to Austria and Germany.

Narrative 5 – Most migrants involved in the RMC were not in need of humanitarian protection and were abusing/defrauding the benevolence of European states

The notion that asylum seekers are only pretending to be in need to humanitarian protection is a constant narrative throughout 2015 and 2016 media coverage. Already in Sample Group 1 articles, German protesters were calling for a revamping of their country's humanitarian policies, stating that most asylum seekers were "economically motivated false asylum seekers" (Group1_VS4) or simply "illegitimate" (Group1_GM3). In this narrative, not only is Europe's benevolence being defrauded by 'fake' claimants with economic motives, but the regional efforts to save lives and rescue migrants in the Mediterranean [see Sample Groups 1 and 2] are only serving to attract additional false claimants. In Group2_GM6, an Italian politician was quoted calling rescue missions in the Mediterranean a "taxi service" for economic migrants. It was evident even in later articles, like this one from Spring 2016 That states that RMC-related flows were not:

“fleeing for their lives, as were refugees from the Syrian war or conflict in Afghanistan Almost all are Africans, from Gambia, Eritrea, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria. The vast majority are young men. Quite a few are unaccompanied minors, whose families believe they have a better chance of being taken in because they are legally children” (Group6_Gm5).

This narrative is fuelled in large part with the idea that while asylum seekers are legally entitled to come to Europe in search of protection, it remains that this type of mobility is considered outside of the usual (i.e., preferred) refugee resettlement initiatives, and is therefore considered ‘irregular’. It is this irregularity which is here construed as illegality that frames migrants as ‘threats/villains,’ especially considering the scale of ‘asylum shopping’ involved during the RMC contrary to the Dublin system.

1.7. Narrative Theme: Humanitarian Solidarity

Narratives associated with ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ theme were found in fifty-six percent of all 320 articles. Ninety-three percent of these articles framed migrants exclusively as ‘victims.’ Examples of it could be found in all Sample Groups with an average of twenty-three articles per sample group. Narratives associated with this theme could be found in all sample groups, particularly in Sample Groups 2, 3, 4, and 8, in which it was the most featured narrative theme. In the associated narratives, the ‘victim’ framing is chiefly attributed to the RMC-related migrant flows consisting of humanitarian migrants. These narratives stand contrary to the narrative associated with ‘State ability to control human flows’ in which the migrants’ status as humanitarian migrants is in doubt. With associated narratives featuring throughout the whole research timeframe at a high rate, it can thus be assumed that the notion of migrants’ being presumed worthy of humanitarian assistance from European remained a constant element of the media coverage of in 2015 and 2016.

Narrative 1 – Asylum seekers deserve humanitarian protection from Western/European states

The narrative in which RMC-related migrant flows are made up of asylum seekers deserving protection from Western and European states alike is omnipresent throughout the Canadian media coverage of the RMC. The chronological analysis of said media coverage testifies to this statement.

The articles supporting this narrative sometimes mustered compassion towards migrants through personal stories of their plight. Found across all sample groups, numerous articles included stories of migrant hardship in their home countries (see, for example, Group1_GM1; Group1_GM3; Group3_VS8; Group5_TS8; and Group8_GM1). These stories were predominantly focused on stories from Syrian and Afghan asylum seekers describing the dire situations they face in their home countries and the events that led them to mobilise towards Europe at great personal risk and expense. Also found across all sample groups were stories about the precarity migrants faced while in transit to Europe, predominantly speaking to the dangers they faced when crossing the Mediterranean. Sample Groups 1, 2, and 6 articles especially expanded upon the dangers of said sea voyages, often highlighting stories of shipwrecks and rescue operations led by European, NGO, and civil society. When discussing state-level efforts to curb migrant mobility, moreover, there were also numerous stories linking such efforts to personal stories of hardship notably in Sample Groups 3, 4, and 8 concerning the Hungarian border wall and the French and UK efforts in Calais. Wanting to construct a picture of precarity from start to finish, numerous articles included stories on the difficulties migrants experienced in their final destination countries such as Germany (see, for example, Group1_VS4), Sweden (Group5_VS9), Denmark (Group7_TS5), Austria (Group8_GM1), France (Group3_TS8), and Greece (Group6_MG1). A few examples of these stories concerned: the lack of labour opportunities available to asylum seekers in Austria (Group8_GM1) until their asylum request is approved, the racism they experienced from locals in Denmark (Group7_TS5),

and their difficulty to integrate in Sweden due to linguistic differences (Group5_VS9). These articles differed from those including con-migration narratives in as much as their challenges to integrate - be they economic, cultural, or linguistic - are not perceived as threats to their host societies but simply challenges the migrants must eventually overcome.

In numerous articles, moreover, migrants were quoted as pleading for help, often side by side with personal stories of hardship. Migrant quotes in these articles depicted two trends. The first was to plead for help, like in Group1_MG4 when a migrant on a sinking ship near the Italian coast is quoted raising alarm in hopes of being rescued. The second aims to humanise migrants by highlighting the difficulties they faced once in Europe. In Group1_MG8, for example, a Muslim migrant is quoted explaining the discrimination they faced in Germany as a result of their religious beliefs and appearance.

What emanates from this narrative is two logics, one in which migrants are praised and one in which they are to be pitied. These are not mutually exclusive logics. The first, by frequently highlighting stories of migrant hardships via stories and pleas for help, these articles depict resilient and ingenious people who were once again being faced with a difficult challenge in their quest for safety. In this version, the migrants are being celebrated for their agency and drive in a way that ties in with 'Pragmatist' narratives. Indeed, such individuals are viewed as welcomed additions to their host society. The second way these depictions were used in the media coverage was to incite sympathy and reinforce the moral obligation of European states to protect those less fortunate. In this second version, the plight of migrants often associated with the 'tender' age and gender (i.e., young and female) of some migrants is used to muster compassion and mobilise European humanitarianism. While in the second version, migrants are perceived as burdens, that burden is not necessarily tied with the negativity associated with con-migration narratives like those associated with the 'Economic insecurity' theme. Instead, that

burden is construed as the result of international engagements by the fortunate towards the less fortunate.

Narrative 2 – The RMC has dwindled levels of humanitarianism in some European states to the detriment of deserving asylum seekers

Closely tied with the ‘National pride’ narrative of a benevolent Canada in comparison to a lacking Europe emerges a narrative in which the humanitarian commitment of some European states was diminished (or at least appeared to be so) as the RMC evolved to the detriment of deserving humanitarian migrants. In this narrative, migrants’ deserving of protection is presumed, as is their being humanitarian migrants. On the one hand, the narrative praises the perduring humanitarianism of some European states throughout the RMC, like Greece. At a time when the negative effects of the EU-Turkey Deal on migrants were beginning to show, some articles praised Greece’s efforts to welcome and administer to the arriving migrants (Group6_TS4 and Group6_VS1). Such praises were contrasted with the admonishing of other European states, especially “at a time when some of [their] partners, even in the name of Christian Europe, were erecting walls and fences to prevent defenceless people from seeking a better life" (Group6_TS4). This quote from Greek President Tsipras refers to the construction of the Hungarian Wall [see Sample Group 3 and 4]. Similarly, Group6_TS6 also contrasts the actions of Turkey to that of European states, demonstrating how Turkey had not refused entry to Syrians (here used to refer to all migrants), unlike ‘some’ European states that actively sought to not only return migrants to third party countries, but also tried to prevent migrant mobility by placing a “razor wire fence” (here again referring to Hungary’s wall). In this latter article, the narrative associated with the theme of ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ aims to shame European actions by contrasting to that of other states.

On the other hand, the narrative presses that while some states remained consistent in their willingness to help humanitarian migrants, others were less so. Out of all European states, the actions of Sweden and Germany mustered significant attention in articles containing narratives of dwindling ‘Humanitarian solidarity.’ The case of Germany’s attitude towards migrants during the RMC has been well-developed in the chronological analysis of Canadian media coverage of the RMC [see Sample Group 3s and 5]. Via the chronological analysis of Germany’s response to the RMC, one can see a dissonance in the coverage of the country’s responses to the RMC. For example, Group2_TS5, Group3_TS5, and Group7_TS1, the authors express pride in the country’s continuing application of its *Willkommenskultur* throughout 2015 and 2016, even when “German nerves were rattled by major Daesh attacks in neighbouring France and Belgium” and the rise of anti-immigration, far-right politics (Group7_TS1). Both Group2_TS5 and Group7_TS1 advance narratives of praise in light of the country’s history of nationalism in the 1930s, highlighting how Germans, having learned from their past, could not turn a blind eye to people in need. These articles contrast with Group2_GM7 and Group5_GM5, which express a lack of pride in the country’s actions, with the first, published in the first few months of the RMC and at the height of media attention to migrants’ deaths in the Mediterranean, calling for additional humanitarian measures. Group5_GM5, a full year later than Group2_GM7, was an interesting piece, arguing that the initial pride Germany’s felt towards the country’s humanitarian efforts “especially given its history,” calling it Germany’s “finest hour,” was, in fact, the country being taken advantage of, as it argued that most migrants it welcomed were not humanitarian migrants in need of protection but were in fact in search of better economic opportunities. As data would later show that of the over one million asylum applications Germany received during the RMC, seventy-two percent of the asylum seekers had been granted protection in Germany by 2018, with a remaining seventeen percent of cases still pending revision (Brücker, Jaschke and Kosyakova 2019); the contrast between Group2_GM7

and Group5_GM5, therefore, hint perhaps to the effects German ‘nerves’ being rattled by RMC developments after all. The whole depicts an enduring level of humanitarian commitment by the German state even when its society’s political support demonstrated increasing levels of apprehension towards incoming migrants.

As for the articles on Sweden, they demonstrate the country’s transition towards migrants during the RMC. In 2015, Sweden initially held an open policy towards migrants, accepting fifty-five percent of processed asylum claims. Their welcoming attitude, along with generous welfare benefits for asylum seekers, made the country a popular destination for migrants during the RMC. Sweden became the country with the second highest number of refugees per capita in Europe in 2015 (England 2016). As the year evolved, the welcoming attitude was beginning to put financial effort on the local economy and society, resulting in a drastic decline in public support of this open policy and an increasing support for the anti-immigration far-right party within the country (Bilefsky 2016).

Sweden’s historically high support for multiculturalism and pro-migration policies was highlighted in Group3_GM1, stating outright that “Sweden's generous immigration policies are essential to the image of a country that (like Canada) prides itself as a moral superpower.” However, the increasing support for the far-right political party, the Swedish Democrats, was perceivable in the other articles, which mentioned Sweden’s pride in its humanitarian track record. Group5_MG10 demonstrate the political shift, stating that polls showed support for the governing Social Democrats, while support for the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats had risen by eighteen percent since the 2014 election. Shifts in Swedish society are mentioned as early as September 2015 (Group3_MG3) and supported throughout 2016 as well, featuring in Group4_TS9, Group5_MG10, and Group7_VS1. Together, these four articles depict Swedish nationals feeling dwindling levels of national pride vis-à-vis immigration, citing, for example, that:

“Like Canadians, Swedes pride themselves on being moral. They have seen themselves as generous and tolerant toward anyone who wants into their country. But the everyday people and specialists I talked to in Scandinavia in the past two weeks recognize the flood of refugees has provoked an unprecedented crisis.; Could Canada, which Swedes tend to admire because of our multicultural policy, survive what the Swedes are enduring?” (Group7_VS1).

Consequently, the country adopted stricter immigration regulations at the beginning of 2016, discouraging asylum seekers from making their way to Sweden (England 2016). In addition, the country adopted firmer border controls and a stricter attitude vis-à-vis chain migration. It also publicized its plans to expand the immigration detention centers and deportation proceedings in a deliberate attempt to dissuade refugees and migrants from making their way towards Sweden (Government Offices of Sweden 2024; Crouch 2016). With the widespread access to technology and information, migrants that were hoping to establish themselves in that country would be aware of these deterring policies in place, which could explain the significant drop in asylum application in Sweden between 2015 and 2016.

Narrative 3 – Rising levels of Islamophobia/xenophobia are putting racialized migrants at risk

There is moreover a counternarrative to that of Europe under threat by ‘others’ associated with ‘Threats to national identity’ narratives. Like the previous narrative, this narrative focuses on a predominantly compassionate and moral Europe, struggling to appease the voices of an unfortunate few. In some articles, the link between migrants’ faith and terrorist activity is decried as prejudiced and in need of redressing as a way of preventing migrants from being victimised by the narrative (Group3_MG3 and Group8_GM2). The narrative frames migrants as ‘victims’ of European prejudice rather than ‘threats/villains’ to Europe. As stated in the development of the first narrative, the use of

migrant quotes and personal stories sometimes helps construct this narrative. They are a way of mitigating the ‘otherness’ of migrants by humanising them rather than referring merely to impersonal sources like studies and statistics.

These articles emphasized with how migrant vilification, xenophobia, and Islamophobia pre-dating and furthered during the RMC, increased the precarity of racialized Europeans of migrant descent, Europeans practicing Islam, and migrants in general. It portrays how the apparent rise in hostility has also been met with a wave of compassion and an outpouring of sympathy by some, often highlighting civilian acts of generosity towards migrants and a general desire for them (see, for example, Group3_TS5; Group1_MG8; and Group6_VS7). An example of civilian generosity is when German citizens received participants of the Walk of Hope [see Sample Group 3] with food, water, and goods. In this narrative, the association with Islam with that of terrorist radicalisation and the cultural threat is deemed hyperbolic, akin to fearmongering, and opportunistic political rhetoric used by far-right political parties to muster support. It acknowledges the long-standing history of Muslims practicing peacefully within the region and that the growing numbers of Muslim migrants are amplified and indeed weaponised for political ends. Further supporting this narrative are articles that promoted the words of European politicians like President of the European Commission Junker and German Chancellor Merkel to be the moral voices of Europe, as they chided European states refusing to take Muslim asylum seekers as lacking humanitarianism (Group7_TS2 and Group7_VS6). Chancellor Merkel’s pro-tolerance rhetoric was also highlighted during the Dresden marches in early 2015 (Group1_MG2). It should be noted that even when being perceived as the voice of reason, politicians were not immune to Islam-specific notions of ‘Threats to national identity’ as the RMC evolved, citing, for example, Merkel’s call for a ban on full-face Islamic coverings in December 2016 along with stricter migrant screenings, citing security reasons in Winter 2016 (Group8_MG10).

In all the articles treating this narrative theme, there was only one other article about Canadian society that expressed concerns about Muslim migration. It is an article in Sample Group 1 following the Charlie Hebdo shootings in France (Group1_VS10). The only other articles linking migration and Islam (Group4_GM9 and Group6_VS1) depicted how a greater number of Canadian Politicians of Muslim faith were elected in the 2015 Federal election and how the campaign was affected by media coverage of the plight of migrants in Europe and especially the Kurdi photograph. In this article Canada is depicted as standalone from the xenophobic, Islamophobic wave of Western societies, with public polls demonstrating continuing support for migration. Indeed, Group6_VS1 cites Stephen Harper's anti-immigration and Islamophobic 'campaign of fear' as a reason for his losing the election to Justin Trudeau. In Group8_TS2, moreover, while not linking migration 'otherness' with Islam per se, still refers to Canadian remaining predominantly pro-migration contrary to global trends, despite polls demonstrating considerable levels of concerns with migrant integration (54%) and them posing security threats (26%).

Narrative 4 – European efforts to reduce RMC-related migrant flows are increasing migrant precarity

There exists a counternarrative to the narrative associated with the 'State ability to control human flows across borders' in which Europe's efforts to curb human flows are perceived as benevolent. It is one in which regional efforts to increase external and internal border controls are viewed as increasing migrant precarity. From a regional perspective, this narrative is mostly found in Sample Groups 2, 5 and 6 articles covering the EU-Turkey deal. Numerous articles in these sample groups argue that similarly to the EU-Libya deal [see Sample Group 2], the EU-Turkey deal made the journey from Asia and North Africa to Europe more dangerous by limiting the routes available to them and indirectly leading to more expensive travel and a higher likelihood of dying. While in the initial narrative, migrants were framed as

‘victims’ of criminal smuggling rings, in this counternarrative, migrants are framed as ‘victims’ of regional EU efforts (see, for example, Group5_GM; Group5_TS3; and Group6_VS5).

The narrative was also found at a state level, in relation, for example, to French and British efforts to curb migrant flows across the English Channel. Similarly, the numerous attempts at dismantling the illegal migrant camps in the North of France were a means to control migrant flows. It aimed to regain control of irregular migrant flows, in part by redirecting migrants into the formal French asylum system, which most were avoiding in hopes of settling in the UK [see Sample Group 8]. Simultaneously, the French government invested in physical infrastructure around the border area, including additional fencing and floodlighting, CCTV, and infra-red detection technology. The whole had for effect of forcing migrants into more precarious traveling routes, leaving some to attempt the dangerous journey by boat (Group6_GM6 and Group7_TS4). Another key example of this narrative at state-level features prominently in the articles of Sample Groups 3 and 4 when discussing the ripple effects of the Hungarian border wall with Serbia and Croatia. In these articles, the situation of migrants was described as exponentially worse off since the construction of the wall because of the cold weather in the region; a reality most migrants were not only unacclimated to but also ill-equipped to face (see for example Group4_MG4; Group4_GM10; and Group4_TS8). The whole fell under the humanitarian solidarity narrative theme, in which the plight of migrants in need of assistance was stressed via the emphasis of their precarity, the reminder of their ‘gentle nature’ (i.e., their female gender and young age), and personal stories of the situation which led them to take on such a perilous journey. The way the ‘victim’ frame was presented in these articles aimed to incite compassion and a desire to help.

Narrative 5 – The age and gender of some migrants is increasing their precarity

In one narrative, the age and gender of some migrants is perceived as an additional source of precarity. The narrative's framing of migrants as 'victims' is mainly attributed to the underaged and female portions of RMC-related migrant flows, as if the presumed 'tenderness' renders them deserving of more sympathy and ultimately humanitarian assistance. Male migrants, as such, are still to be perceived as threats, especially those of Muslim faith. In many ways, it is a complimentary narrative to the narratives associated with the 'Threat to physical security' theme in which male Muslim migrants are perceived as having a propensity for violence, terrorism, and, indeed, sexual deviance. In this narrative, there is a presumed innocence attributed to both females and youthful migrants.

An example of this narrative having real-life implications was found in the articles of Sample Group 4 concerning the Canadian Syrian resettlement Programs (Group4_GM6; Group4_VS6; Group4_MG7 and Group4_MG9). These articles demonstrate that the initial widespread civil support the program was mitigated by the events in France, causing the Canadian government to announce that the program would prioritize women and complete families rather than individual men and that it would ensure a pre-selection vetting processes for the incoming Syrian refugees (Canadian Council for Refugees s.d.). In this case, more particularly, the innocence of the young and the female was also extrapolated to single men who identified as LGBTQ*. Doing so corroborated "the assumption and implication that single [and presumably religious] Middle Eastern men are a greater security risk and should be feared because they fit the stereotype of most terrorists" (Molnar 2016, 71).

It is a recurring narrative, found in all sample groups with an average of twelve articles per sample group, featuring more prominently in Sample Groups 2 and 3 as well as 6 and 7 to a lesser extent. In all the related articles, the 'tenderness' of some migrants is being used to muster compassion, sympathy, and ultimately humanitarian solidarity.

2. Analysis of the Canadian Media Coverage of the RMC: a lesson in polarity


This chapter will present a global analysis of the Canadian media coverage of the RMC as presented in the selected newspaper articles. The data from this research project shows that, if anything, the RMC resulted in the polarisation of narratives associated with transnational human migration between 2015 and 2016. The result has been two overarching and contending logics: morality-based humanitarianism and fear-based protectionism. It is where these logics intersected and contended for primacy within public and political discourses that made the RMC a time of urgency and, ultimately, crisis for Europe.

It should be noted that parts of this chapter's last section were inspired from a previous publication (Beaupre 2023).

2.1. Deciphering polarity in the Canadian Media Coverage of the RMC


Below is a graph breaking down the chronological trajectory of all seven narrative themes throughout 2015 and 2016 according to the Canadian media coverage of the RMC. From it, one can extrapolate that the 'Humanitarian Solidarity' and 'State ability to control human flows across borders' feature most prominently in all sample groups except for Sample Groups 1 and 8.

Graph 3-PartIII: RMC Narratives Trends on Transnational Human Migration in Canadian Media Coverage of Transnational Human Migration, 2015-2016



Looking at the overall pro-migration narratives, one can see that narratives associated with the ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘National pride’ themes are consistently the least included. These two nearly alter between each sample group for lowest number of mentions. Below is graph demonstrating the trajectory of pro-migration narratives.


Graph 4-PartIII: The Trajectories of Pro-Migration Narratives in Canadian Media coverage of Transnational Human Migration, 2015-2016



Considering the low level of media attention to the narratives associated with the ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘National pride’ themes, it can thus be deduced that media coverage supporting the arrival of RMC-related migrant flows are chiefly attributed to narratives of ‘Humanitarian solidarity.’ Overall, narratives associated with the ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ theme were found in fifty-six percent of all 320 articles. The fact that ninety-three percent of these articles framed migrants exclusively as ‘victims’ demonstrates that any sentiments that did not expressively counter the arrival and/or reception of migrants were in recognition of RMC-related flows consisting of numerous humanitarian migrants deemed worthy of protection. These articles that are associated with the morality-based logic of humanitarianism found within the Canadian coverage of the RMC.

As for the con-migration narratives, the graph shows that these narratives related to state’s ability to control migration retained the highest level of attention consistently throughout all sample groups, except for Sample Group 8. Below is a graph that demonstrates the chronological trajectory of con-migration narratives.

Graph 5-PartIII: The Trajectories of Con-Migration Narratives in Canadian Media Coverage of Transnational Human Migration, 2015-2016




While it was possible to see that ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ dominated the media coverage of pro-migration narrative themes, the con-migration themes showed more variance. The graph shows that narratives associated with the ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ theme ranked the highest of all the con-migration narratives. They accounted for fifty-three percent of all 320 articles, with ninety-one percent of these articles framing migrants as ‘threats/villains.’ Narratives associated with this theme could be found with relative consistency in all sample groups, with an average of twenty-one articles per sample group, except for Sample Group 8, which had a significant reduction in related media coverage. The breakdown of narratives that emanated from the Canadian coverage of the RMC showed numerous correlations between con-migration narratives [see previous chapter]. Each of the narratives associated with ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ built upon migrant threat perceptions were associated with the other three con-migration narratives. As such, the sizeable

threat perception that emanated from the articles treating notions of border controls resulted from an amalgamation of all con-migration narratives.


What comes out of these graphs is the notion that there were two overarching and contending logics within the Canadian media coverage of the RMC, one of humanitarianism and one of protectionism. The first logic, chiefly related to narratives of ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ framing migrants as ‘victims,’ is one in which the RMC was a humanitarian crisis first and foremost. It centers on a vision of RMC-related human flows being made up primarily of asylum seekers in need of protection. The second, made up of the numerous con-migration narratives, genuinely perceives migrants as threats, whether that perception be linked to economic, physical, cultural reasons, or even just because of the size of the influx. The logic thus presents a need to ensure some level of protection against incoming migrants even for the richest and most welcoming states (i.e., Germany and Sweden).

The data indicates that some narrative theme’s trajectories appear to have an inverse relationship as if increasing media attention of the one results in a lesser coverage of the other. Looking into the trajectories of the con-migration narratives shown in Graph5-PartIII there is no perceivable relationship between any of them. Only when comparing some of the con-migration trajectories with the trajectory of the ‘humanitarian solidarity’ narrative theme, on the other hand, can one start to discern hints of an inverse relationship between some themes. The inverse relationship is most easily perceived between the ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ narrative theme trajectories with those of ‘Threats to national identity’ and, especially, ‘Threats to physical security.’ In the latter two graphs, the frequency of related topics is included as they, too, hint to a somewhat inverse relationship.


Graph 6-PartIII: The Trajectories of 'Humanitarian Solidarity' and 'Economic insecurity' Narrative Themes in Canadian Media coverage of Transnational Human Migration, 2015-2016



Graph 7-PartIII: The Trajectories of 'Humanitarian Solidarity' and 'Threats to National Identity' Narrative Themes in Canadian Media Coverage of Transnational Human Migration, 2015-2016



Graph 8-PartIII: The Trajectories of 'Humanitarian Solidarity' and 'Threats to physical security' Narrative Themes in Canadian Media coverage of Transnational Human Migration, 2015-2016



From the latter two graphs especially, the data hints at the occurrence of terrorist incidents reiterating narratives associating migrants with the potential of causing harm to host societies, resulting in less attention on the plight of humanitarian migrants. The same could be said, albeit to a lesser extent, about the linkages these terrorist incidents had on narratives pertaining to Muslim migration being a threat to European national identities. In acknowledgment of the limited size of the media samples under study, what these two graphs represent, therefore, is the reactionary nature of media coverage on transnational human migration, as well as the polarising logics associated with related narratives.

2.2. Depicting Polarity in the Canadian Media Coverage of the RMC

To further illustrate how these two logics may have an inverse relationship, it is worth looking at the chronological analysis of the Canadian media coverage of the RMC. Already in the articles of

Sample Group 1, the two overarching and dichotomous logics that can be seen in the coverage of the numerous boat rescue missions in the Mediterranean and of the anti-Muslim social ire in Europe associated with responses to the Charlie Hebdo shootings and the anti-immigration marches and countermarches in Germany. In these articles, the contending logic of a benevolent continent attempting to help those most in need while also being a continent under threat by both the sheer scale of the migrant flow and the type of migrants that make up said flow (i.e., Muslims) is introduced, even at a time where media attention was only beginning to focus on the scale of migrant flow into the continent. Indeed, media attention to the topic of RMC-related migrant flows in Sample Group 1 is at its lowest, as can be expected considering the novel nature of the topic. It featured in only twenty-three percent of its articles, contrasting with an average of sixty-three in the remaining sample groups. Media focus on the scale of migrant flows peaked in Sample Group 3, featuring in eighty-eight percent of articles. While a complimentary study with a larger timeframe would be needed to confirm this, being able to perceive the dual logics in Sample 1 in the initial days of the RMC hints at the contending logics existing pre-RMC.

Going back to Graph (Graph 9-PartIII) it shows that from April to September 2015 (Sample Group 2 to 4), media coverage of the RMC was primarily focused on narratives associated with humanitarian solidarity. By being heavily focused on the sheer scale of the influx, the articles in Sample Group 2 demonstrate an overall focus on regional and state-level responses to the RMC. They depict a continent reacting and attempting to tackle the growing challenge. These early-day reactions to the RMC are found in both the most featured narrative themes, ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ and ‘State ability to control human flows across borders.’ It is evident in the media coverage that the initial RMC reactions highlight both the plight of migrants, which are indeed chiefly recognised as needing humanitarian

assistance and that of a continent struggling to cope with the scale of the influx. Most notably, the perception of ‘threat’ most identified in this sample group is geared towards the scale of migrant flows rather than the ‘threat’ perceptions of migrants found in Sample Group 1 associated with ‘Economic insecurity,’ ‘Threat to physical security,’ and ‘Threats to national identity’ narrative themes. From the articles in this sample group, the main narrative is that of a benevolent Europe willing to help those most in need but struggling to administer to the scale of the demands being imposed on it.

While there were hints of the upcoming regional discord the RMC would invoke in the articles of Sample Group 2, the dichotomy of logics at play for EU Member States’ responses to the RMC was visible in the articles of Sample Group 3. These logics were exemplified on the one hand by the welcoming and humanitarian actions of Sweden and Germany and the securitisation attitude of Eastern European Member States on the other hand. Even allowing for the important coverage of protectionist responses to the RMC, the EU Member States’ humanitarian duty and the plight of migrants making their way towards Europe remains the most important talking point. Indeed, the potential for death and danger for migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean and traveling within Europe is the second most recurring topic in all 40 articles, second only to the sheer scale of the migrant flow. Migrant push factors such as war, persecution, poverty, and so forth are frequently mentioned, as are the gender and age of migrants involved, the whole being highlighted in half the articles of Sample Group 3.

It is only until Sample Group 4 that the dichotomous logics receive the exact same level of media attention. This was perceivable in the ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ and ‘State ability to control human flows across borders’ narrative theme, receiving the same level of media coverage in the articles of Sample Group 4. What emanated from this sample group were stories of how various countries, notably Hungary and its neighbours, France, and Canada responded to multiple events, not the least of which was linked to the November 13th Paris terrorist attacks. Like the previous sample Group, Sample Group

4 covered the erection of the Hungarian wall significantly, featuring in twenty percent of all articles. The media coverage of this event differed between the two groups because the latter focused on the ripple effects of the wall for both neighbouring countries and the migrants themselves. In this latter narration of wall-related events, the sizeable attention given to Hungary's lack of humanitarian solidarity towards migrants and their fellow EU Member States was mitigated with increasing focus on how the RMC posed security threats, with over half the articles also stressing the strain of European states to respond to the scale of RMC-related migrant flows. Thus, the border wall coverage is exemplary of the two dichotomous logics that were most present in the Canadian media coverage of the RMC.

Between Sample Groups 5 and 7, the logic of protectionism against migration featured more prominently than the logic of humanitarian solidarity. Overall, the articles of Sample Group 5 are the ones with the highest level of negative associations with migrants, with most articles covering either the EU-Turkey deal or the numerous attacks in Europe framing migrants as 'threats/villains.' The articles can be divided into streams. The first focuses on the EU-Turkey deal, which aimed at curbing the flow of migrants into the continent, associated with narratives of an overwhelmed continent in need of stopping migrant flows to protect itself economically, physically, and even culturally. The second centers on the increasingly negative responses to RMC-related migrant flows as well as a political backlash against initial humanitarian responses to the RMC. German Chancellor Merkel is especially depicted as facing political pressure and even blame for the negative events in Europe.

While the articles of Sample Group 5 mostly framed migrants as 'threats/villains,' the articles of Sample Group 6 chiefly framed migrants as victims, paying significant attention to the negative impact the EU-Turkey deal had on migrants, ultimately increasing their precarity. Even so, the securitisation logic retained more coverage than the humanitarian one. Significant levels of apprehension remained towards RMC-related migrant flows and migration in general as the scale of the flow – even one made

of migrants understood to be in dire straits – was depicted as something Europe should securitise against. It was exemplified by the coverage of the Brexit vote, which painted migrants predominantly as threats, be it economically, physically, or even culturally. Combined, the articles of Sample Group 6 represent the perduring dichotomy surrounding transnational human migration. Presenting narratives associated with numerous narrative themes, both positive and negative, it is a good example of the complex discursive landscape that surrounds migration.

A key element of this group's articles surrounds regional policy gridlocks and the rise of nationalist politics in Europe. Sample Group 6 is not the first group of articles to tackle this narrative. The rise of anti-immigrant, far-right political support in Europe had already been mentioned in Sample Groups 4 and 5 in relation to the Paris attacks and the elaboration of the EU-Turkey deal. Even so, Brexit is an example of what could happen in other EU Member States should its political parties continue to gain support while regional tensions remain unabated. The breakdown of the rise of nationalist political parties in Europe shows that it was a growing reality within the continent between 2015 and 2015. Brexit thus served as a tangible illustration of what regional tensions could entail for the future of the EU. While the British desire to leave the EU cannot be solely explained by Europe's perceived failure to respond to the RMC nor a desire to reclaim control over human flows, deliberations surrounding human migration and border control remained key issues the 'Leave' platform championed. Academic support the notion that the 2016 Brexit referendum was predominantly driven by RMC-fueled fears over transnational migration and a desire to 'regain control' from the EU on corresponding policies (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley 2017; Ford and Goodwin 2017; Prosser, Mellon, and Green 2016).

As for Sample Group 7, migrants were predominantly framed as 'threats/villains' in their corresponding media coverage. These articles represent some of the most negative portrayals of narratives associated with transnational human migration, along with the articles of Sample Group 5.

The articles in both of these sample groups paid significant attention to migrant-associated terrorist activity in Europe. As for media coverage concerned about Brexit, more specifically, the articles of Sample Group 7 still presented with a penchant for negative, protectionist, and indeed securitising narratives on transnational human migration.

The articles of Sample Group 8 featured the second least level of attention to RMC-related migrant flows, found in only thirty-five percent of the articles to the average sixty-eight between Sample Groups 2 to 7. Even so, its media coverage still highlighted the overarching dichotomous narratives that reigned during the RMC: one in which migrants are perceived as threats to be wary of and in need to be controlled (here exemplified by the coverage of the numerous attacks in Germany), and one in which the plight of migrants is being highlighted, inciting calls for compassion and ultimately protection (here exemplified by the Calais migrant camps being dismantled). The articles of Sample Group 8 included numerous narratives already mentioned in previous groups, like the one in which a Europe state (i.e., France) attempted to regain control over the sheer scale of the migrant flow (via the dismantling of irregular migrant camps and the redistribution of migrants into formalised processing facilities). It also presented the narrative that migrants, especially those of Muslim faith, are potential threats to their host societies, citing narratives associated with ‘Threat to physical security’ or, again, ‘Threat to national identity’ narratives. Even if interesting in their reiterations, none of these were novel.

Looking into the media coverage of Sample Groups 1 and 8 more precisely, the fact that the two contending logics remained visible even when RMC-related migrant flows received comparably little attention demonstrates that the two contending logics on transnational human migration most likely transcend the RMC. As such, it can be argued that RMC only highlighted their existence and served to exemplify how these logics are enacted in real life. If anything, it is likely that the RMC further

entrenched the logics in the psyche of Western societies and deepened the depth of their contentions. Indeed, it is where these logics intersect via the responses of peoples and states to instances of heightened migration – and probably even mere cases of perception of heightened migration - that makes transnational human migration such a polarising topic.

2.3. Polarity during the RMC, making the ‘crisis’ both preventable and inevitable

The RMC, therefore, being the result of two contending logics being brought to light, is not a novel conception. Other authors have previously concluded that the ‘crisis’ component of the RMC was attributed to regional contentions and a widespread unwillingness between EU Member States to cooperate rather than a lack of capacity and/or ability to respond (see, for example, Lavenex 2018 and Ambrosini et al., 2019). They argued that the RMC was a crisis because the totality of the 2015- 2016 influx into Europe was concentrated within only a handful of countries. This version of the RMC admits to it being trying times, taking into consideration the numerous terrorist incidents, the social and political dissent, and the unusually large size of the migrant influx. It was, however, one that was preventable and inevitable precisely because of the duality of logics informing European decision-makers.

Indeed, the RMC being a challenge for a few overwhelmed states resulted from a lack of solidarity between EU Member States. When looking at the RMC from the point of view of the entire continent, the RMC should not have been as challenging as it ended up being. The 2.3 million irregular migrants making up RMC-related flows constituted less than 0.2% of the EU’s total population. They could have readily been dispersed between the comparatively rich - at least in global terms - EU Member States (Lavenex 2018). Therefore, it has led some to call the RMC a “governance crisis” (Lavenex 2018) or even a “reception crisis” (Ambrosini et al., 2019). Similarly, according to

Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak (2018) and Wallace (2018), RMC was a discourse-fueled crisis, as most Europeans had no concrete, first-hand experience of the events other than media reports and the political captivation. It meant, therefore, that for most Europeans, the RMC remained a faraway, abstract notion that had little to do with the actual events and more to do with how it stood to affect them. When saying that the RMC was preventable, one is not speaking about the migrant flows themselves; detailed descriptions of why migrant flows were so elevated in 2015 and 2016 are provided in the introduction of the dissertation. What was preventable, however, was the urgency and ‘crisis’ components of the RMC. Had states shown more humanitarian solidarity towards those in need – and in this instance ‘those in need’ refers to their struggling counterparts (i.e., states) and not the migrants themselves – 2015 and 2016 would most likely have gone down in history in a whole other light.

The RMC, however, was inevitable because of the contending logics surrounding transnational human migration. The Dublin system on which the EU based the majority of their responses to the RMC was constructed on the presumption that ratifying states maintained the same definitions of refugeehood, as well as comparable procedures to administer to asylum seekers, thereby negating the need for a more defined policy or discussions on its underlying values (Lavenex and Wagner 2007; Lavenex 2018). The right to asylum is informed upon the supposed universal logic of human rights to life and protection, to which most states adhere through international conventions. Even so, Member States were found to differ greatly in both reception conditions and recognition practices for asylum seekers, irrespective of the legislative attempts to reform and presumed ideological conformity (Scipioni 2018; Lavenex 2018). From an operational standpoint, Lahusen and Wacker (2019, 154) refer to the Dublin system as a European administrative field, enforcing a system of mutual exchanges, joint working conditions, and an interdependent division of labour. While abiding states retain the sovereign right to control their borders and decide who may enter their territory, they must also live up to EU laws and international

conventions. In practice, however, the system in its current formulation fails to consider a member state's particularities, not the least of which include administrative capacities, notions of territorial security, and political disposition. It is organised in a way that individual Member State's compliance with its regulations is strongly impacted by not only each other's bureaucracies but also their ability and, most importantly, their willingness.

The RMC highlighted the systemic inequities and inefficiencies of the CEAS and the Dublin system, demonstrating a cleavage between the normative, protective aspirations and the existing protectionist practice adopted by member states vis-à-vis the RMC and asylum in general. Said cleavage exists precisely because of the dual contending logics on transnational human migration. It was established prior to 2015, as already in 2011, the EU Court of Justice ruled its migration regulatory bodies (including the CEAS and the Dublin rule) dysfunctional and insufficient (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013; Lavenex 2018). Indeed, according to Scipioni (2018, 1357, 1363), the RMC was "years in the making" and "more than a simple accident," as the CEAS advanced cooperation with incomplete, lowest-common-denominator agreements with respect to emergency measures, thereby creating the conditions for failure.

The 'first country of entry' clause, for example, results in portal countries, usually either Italy or Greece, receiving significantly higher levels of asylum requests than other EU countries, creating uneven bureaucratic and financial pressure due to geographic positioning (Heijer et al., 2016; Zaun 2017). As described by Thielemann and Armstrong (2013), the CEAS and the Dublin system, in general, are based on a 'responsibility principle' rather than a 'capacity principle,' making Member States responsible for the asylum-seekers they let into their – and therefore the Schengen – territory. Consequently, as the reception and protection of applicants are viewed as a burden on receiving countries due to financial, administrative, social, and political implications, it has rendered the

registrations of asylum hopefuls to be viewed as an encumbrance (Wagner, Perumadan, and Baumgartner 2019). It is documented that asylum hopefuls sought to bypass the ‘first country of entry clause’ as knowledge spread of portal countries being overloaded with asylum cases, attempting instead to register in another ‘more desirable’ country (Wagner, Perumadan, and Baumgartner 2019; Juhász, Hunyadi, and Zgut, 2015, 6; Niemann and Zaun 2018, 4). The practice is colloquially known as ‘asylum shopping,’ and has been encouraged by some EU Member States, at times actively refusing to register asylum claims or encouraging individuals to transit through their country in stark violation to international and European law (Human Rights Watch 2020).

It deserves to be clarified that the CEAS or the EU at large have no formal responsibility towards- and no means of exerting pressure on- the elaboration of policies surrounding the integration of immigrants into Member State societies; that much falls under the prerogative state sovereignty. Legislations surrounding migration and Asylum stand distinct from those concerning integration into the receiving state. At the utmost, EU institutions may be utilised to discuss and, in turn, encourage preferred strategies to ‘welcome’ newcomers (Adam and Caponio 2018; Borevi 2022). That being said, some authors denote a certain level of convergence on national policies between member states, a shift they attribute to regional integration (i.e., Europeanisation) (see, for example, Block and Bonjour 2013; Kaunert and Léonard 2012). During the RMC, Borevi (2022, 211) found that states altered their procedures to either incite or deter immigration; indeed, should one Member State provide conditions viewed as more “welcoming” than its counterparts, it is thought to “furnish potential immigrants with an incentive to choose that particular country as their destination.” Examples of this could be found in the articles of Sample Group 3 when Hungary blamed Germany’s welcomeness for inciting migrant flows to Europe. It follows the dual-functionality of civic integration, in which strict conditionality and selectivity promote immigration control and facilitate integration (Goodman 2014). The differences

between Sweden's 2015 and 2016 immigration regimes are a prime example. Initially a favored destination for asylum seekers, it hardened its position in the latter year to give itself "time to breathe" (Stern 2017, 7) and to avoid being "an asylum magnet" (Borevi 2022, 212). Following a similar logic, many other Member States adopted stricter measures to dissuade the inflow of asylum seekers, such as restricting family reunification, changing the safe third country list, switching from permanent to temporary protection, and even shortening the duration of residence permits (European Migration Network 2017).

Consequently, jointly EU-level and state-level responses to the RMC, something Lavenex (2018) argued to be a failure of coordination and a crisis of governance, resulted in open discontent towards supranational politics and a divide in the internal EU politics. The crisis of governance, as established by Lavenex (2018), stemmed from the EU Member States' limited ability and even willingness to coordinate both state-level and regional RMC responses, not the least of which can be linked to migration being an increasingly contentious and politicised matter. Most notably, when faced with the unusually high influx in 2015 and 2016, Member States were reluctant to abandon the 'responsibility principle' in favour of a 'capacity principle' set in the Dublin regulation, resulting in a push for the externalisation of responses outside of EU territorial boundaries.

Conclusion

This research project was based on three research questions. The main question aimed to understand how Canadian newspapers covered the events surrounding the RMC at a time when migration was at the forefront of political and social debates. This research question was answered via the chronological analysis of the RMC media coverage. The next research question wanted to identify the narratives that emanated from this media coverage. Similarly, this question was answered in detail and with examples in Chapter 1, Part 3 of this dissertation. A comprehensive list of all RMC-related narratives is available in Appendix B. The last question, moreover, wanted to know what the resulting narratives showed about the way transnational human migration was perceived in 2015-2016. The second and third chapters of Part 3 tackled this question, demonstrating the polarity of the migration discourses and their effects.

This concluding chapter reiterates the key findings of this research project and ultimately aims to contextualise important events in Canada between 2015 and 2016 in light of the reactive and polarising media coverage it was exposed to.

Overview of the Research Project

This dissertation contributed to the growing body of critical scholarship on the role of media coverage in transnational human migration discourses. It addressed a gap in the academic literature on discursive formations on migration and Canadian media coverage. There have been numerous studies that have examined the potential links between the Canadian media and the migratory wave that occurred in 2015–2016 (Tyyskä et al., 2017; Wallace 2018; Winter, Patzelte, and Beauregard 2018; Mustafa et al., 2021; Dumouchel 2021; Xu 2021; and Omidian Sijani 2023). Each of these studies, however, focused on the so-called ‘Syrian Refugee Crisis’ (SRC) and Canada’s role in it and either

briefly alluded to the events in Europe or simply ignored them altogether. It does not mean, however, that Canadian media paid no attention to the events in Europe. The quantitative assessment of Canadian media coverage between 2015 and 2016 in merely a handful of newspapers testifies to the contrary. Furthermore, the Kurdi photograph and the consequent push for the Syrian Resettlement Program in Canada - the most sizeable resettlement efforts in Canada since the 1970s (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017) - did not occur in a vacuum. Both require contextualisation within the RMC. Therefore, this dissertation aims to address the gap in the literature by further exploring the SRC and the country's responses to it by understanding the narratives surrounding the RMC in Europe.

The 320 articles selected for this study reflect the media coverage Canadians were exposed to in relation to the RM during both years. If the RMC seemed abstract and far away for most Europeans, Canadians were at an even greater distance, rendering media portrayal the chief way of understanding the events in Europe. The data from this study confirms that Canadian media covered RMC-related events extensively. Graph 1 in Part 1 of this dissertation depicting the number of articles discussing events in Europe between 2001 and 2021 shows that both 2015 and 2016 received comparatively high media attention to the events in Europe. Overall, there were 18,631 articles published by only the four selected newspapers between 2015 and 2016 surrounding events in Europe. Of these, 3,098 articles (17%) included at least one of the migration-specific keywords. The numbers mean that between only the four selected media sources, there was an average of four newspaper articles per day between both years. Considering the low number of media sources selected for this project versus the size of the overall Canadian media landscape, it is no stretch to say that the RMC received considerable media attention in Canada.

Studying media portrayal of transnational human migration is important as it is deemed pivotal in understanding this emotionally charged and contentious subject matter (Hier and Greenberg 2002;

Beciu et al., 2018). Indeed, the RMC was first labelled a time of crisis by the media (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017), a label later emulated by other actors. In general, RMC-related migrant flows received remarkable media attention across the globe, and it was through these lenses that the RMC was understood first and foremost (Ambrosini et al. 2019, 12).

As a medium of information dissemination, the media's role as a narrator becomes relevant insofar as it influences, via its gatekeeping and editorial capacities, the construction of a subject matter and, indirectly, the actions of actors within a political system (Scolari 2012, 205). The 'media' is a discursive actor both tangibly as an organisation and abstractly as an actor with known discursive influence. As a conveyor of narratives, the way media depicts events can influence how they are received. As such, the media ecosystem creates an 'environment' in which society and individuals model their perception and cognition of the information conveyed via news and, indirectly, the world around them.

The Importance of Narratives in Discursive Constructions

Through the quantitative and qualitative analysis of 320 newspaper articles, taken from four sources, themselves selected because of their high readership, this research project was able to discern how Canadian media covered the events related to the RMC between 2015 and 2016. Part 1, Chapter 1 provides a detailed breakdown of the research framework, elaborating on the project's theoretical framework and research methodology. It also includes ethical considerations and the research limitations of the project. The methodology was greatly influenced by that of numerous similar research projects focusing on European-based media analysis of the RMC (Chouliaraki and Stolic 2017; Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017; Heidenreich et al., 2019; Garzia Galantino 2022; Verleyen and Beckers 2023; Heidenreich et al., 2018). It allowed for a content and discursive analysis of the chosen articles and a codification of each article including key events, recurring topics, and the framing of migrants (i.e.,

victim, threat/villain, or benefit). In turn, the content of each article was attributed to key narrative themes, themselves identified through a literature review of discourses on transnational human migration. The narrative themes are as follows: Humanitarian solidarity, National pride, Pragmatism, Economic insecurity, Threats to physical security, Threats to national identity, and State ability to control human flows across borders.

The Canadian media analysis of the RMC performed in this project concluded that out of the seven narrative themes, ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ and ‘State ability to control human flows’ were the most featured. Below is a quantitative breakdown of how each narrative theme is featured in the overall analysis:

Table 12-Conclusion: Breakdown of narrative themes in Canadian media coverage of the RMC, 2015-2016

Narrative Theme	Overall percentage
Humanitarian solidarity	58%
State ability to control human flows across borders	53%
Threats to physical security	27%
Threats to national identity	23%
Economic insecurity	20%
Pragmatism	9%
National pride	8%

Tackling wide-ranging theoretical positions, this research project follows that media coverage has a complex, multi-layered, and indeed long-term influence on perception and discourse creation, not the least with regard to politically charged issues such as transnational human migration. For instance, by discussing migrants in a specific light repetitively, be it by referring to them as terrorists, criminals and/or

victims in need of protection, the media may trigger what is known as a “cultivation effect” and influence readers’ perception of the subject matter through repetitive exposure (Arendt 2010; Balabanova and Balch 2010; Balch and Balabanova 2016). By choosing which narratives get told, through which lens, and with which frequency, they act simultaneously as fields and agents of discursive articulation, which in turn may be reflected in political (in)action.

Gois and Faraone (2018, 140) have found that the idea of a migration ‘crisis’ has been promoted and employed by political elites and media to muster negative responses by linking migration with state (in)security, resource depletion, and cultural and religious incompatibility. The presence of these narratives and numerous others - not all of which were negative in portrayal - was evident in the Canadian media coverage of the RMC. A detailed development of all narratives found in media analysis is provided in Part 3, Chapter 1.

The media analysis provided that the seven narrative themes identified in the literature review were reflected throughout the Canadian media coverage of the RMC to various degrees. What comes out of the analysis is that there were two overarching and contending logics within the Canadian media coverage of the RMC, one of humanitarianism and one of protectionism. The first logic, chiefly related to narratives of ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ framing migrants as ‘victims,’ is one in which the RMC was a humanitarian crisis first and foremost. It centers on a vision of RMC-related human flows being made up primarily of asylum seekers needing protection and of a benevolent continent and/or European states offering to provide said protection. The second, made up of the numerous con-migration narratives, genuinely perceives migrants as threats, whether that perception be linked to economic, physical, cultural reasons, or even just because of the size of the influx. The logic thus presents with a need to ensure some level of protection against incoming migrants even for the richest and most welcoming states (i.e., Germany and Sweden).

The first logic is chiefly associated with the ‘Humanitarian solidarity’ narrative theme, which was found in fifty-six percent of all 320 articles, of which ninety-three percent of these articles framed migrants exclusively as ‘victims.’ Its significant media attention demonstrates that most sentiments that did not expressively counter the arrival and/or reception of migrants were in recognition of RMC-related flows consisting of numerous humanitarian migrants deemed worthy of protection. Similarly, the second logic is associated with the high coverage of narratives of ‘State ability to control human flows across borders.’ These narratives were found in fifty-three percent of all 320 articles, with ninety-one percent of these articles framing migrants as ‘threats/villains.’ These narratives, moreover, built upon migrant threat perceptions associated with the other three con-migration narratives: threat to physical security, economic insecurity, and threat to national identity. As such, the sizeable threat perception that emanated from the articles treating notions of border controls result from an amalgamation of all con-migration narratives.

The data analysis shows that the primacy of one narrative or another at any given time depended on ongoing events. Discursive articulations are thus reactionary. In the first months of the RMC, the media focus was predominantly centered on narratives of humanitarianism. Only between Sample Group 4 and Sample Group 7 is the desire to control (i.e., curb) migrant flows higher than willingness to help. It appears thus that the November 13th Paris attacks, the terrorist incident with the highest numbers of casualties and the greatest level of media coverage in Canada, had significant effects on European social and political responses to the RMC. Upon closer inspection, one can see that the narrative themes ‘Humanitarian Solidarity’ and ‘Threat to physical security’ have seemingly opposite trajectories throughout both years. It thus illustrates that according to the Canadian media of the RMC, European willingness to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants was nearly inversely related to the fear of migrants posing physical threats to European societies, primarily geared towards acts of terrorism.

Being an emotionally driven topic labelling human flows as a ‘crisis’ may be counterproductive to the development of appropriate states responses. During the RMC, media and political rhetoric frequently focused on the administrative and economic demands and perceptions of refugees’ genuineness in their claims (Wallace 2018). With the perception of urgency often resulting in reactionary policies, states risk sidelining everyday systemic issues as well as relevant legal frameworks, such as human rights law, to the detriment of both citizens and incoming migrants. It may lead to the deprioritization of more thought-out and long-lasting solutions. The resulting responses may not be apt to tackle the deeper and entrenched inequalities based on class, race, gender, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, or other and may, in fact, further entrench the inequitable power relations at play (Menjívar, Ruiz, and Ness 2019, 43). Again, the current analysis concurs with these notions, demonstrating the real-life implications of migration perception and how it may hinder responses using the RMC as an example. Chapter 2 in Part 3 of this thesis tackles this discussion in depth.

The chapter argues that the RMC was simultaneously preventable and inevitable precisely because of the duality of logics informing European decision-makers. It allows for the RMC to become a crisis because of regional tensions and lack of solidarity, resulting in the totality of the 2015- 2016 influx being concentrated within only a handful of countries. Had states shown more humanitarian solidarity towards those in need – and in this instance ‘those in need’ refers to their struggling counterparts (i.e., states) and not the migrants themselves – 2015 and 2016 would most likely have gone down in history in a whole other light. The RMC was also inevitable because of the systemic inequities and inefficiencies of the EU’s CEAS and the Dublin system, premised on a cleavage between the normative, protective aspirations and the existing protectionist practice adopted by member states vis-à-vis the RMC and asylum in general. According to Scipioni (2018, 1357, 1363), the RMC was “years in the making” and “more than a simple accident,” as the CEAS advanced cooperation with incomplete,

lowest-common-denominator agreements concerning emergency measures, thereby creating the conditions for failure. Having no systemic ability to ensure state compliance and cooperation, acceptance and redistribution efforts depended on Member States' 'good faith' and general willingness to comply. As such, EU-level and state-level responses to the RMC resulted in open discontent toward supranational politics and a divide in internal EU politics. The result was a rise in far-right, anti-immigration political support throughout Europe and genuine concerns about the future of the union as states turned inward. Below are some of the key conclusions of this research project.

Narratives may have real-life repercussions: Western examples

While the extraordinary events of the RMC are in all probability linked with a significant increase of support for far-right, anti-migration parties throughout Europe in the late 2010s, these political parties were amassing more support even prior to 2015. Statistics demonstrate that rising levels of immigration had a source of worry in Europe linked with xenophobia and Islamophobia as far back as 2002 (Davis and Deole 2018). It has been argued that political orientation plays a large role in how refugees and migrants are viewed by civil society (European Social Survey "Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities"). In many cases, the threat perception is particularly targeted at the Muslim refugees and migrants coming into Europe as they are perceived to be linked with ISIS and/or other Islamic terrorist groups (Upadhyay 2016, 22). While this characterisation of Muslims as terrorists invading the Western world is highly problematic for multiple reasons, it is also rooted in post-911 societies. Elements of this rising Islamophobia were visible in the articles of Sample Groups 1, 4, 5, and 6.

Rising nativism in Europe remains a prevalent part of politics today. The 2024 EU Parliamentary elections demonstrated a surge of far-right parties in EU member states. In 2019, far-right groups had a

total of 165 seats out of 720 (20%), whereas in 2024, they gained 170 seats (24%) (Ivaldi 2024). Currently, Far-right groups are the ruling parties of Switzerland (Swiss People's Party), Italy (Brothers of Italy, Lega), and Hungary (Fidesz). They also make up important parts of the government in Finland (Finns Party), Sweden (Swedish Democrats), and in Serbia (United Serbia). The AfD in Germany, a party that articles in late 2016 referred to as political “upstarts” (Group8_GM3 and Group8_GM6), won a state parliament election in Eastern Germany in September of this year, marking the first far-right political victory in Germany since WWII (Kirby and Parkey 2024). Even Canada, a country that prides itself on its history of diversity and multiculturalism, is experiencing a perceivable hardening of sentiments towards migration throughout the country (Graves and Smith 2020), both virtually through the sizeable online mobilization of Canadians on far-right sites and forums (Daigle 2020) and tangibly with the creation of the anti-immigration People’s Party of Canada [PPC]. The PPC’s agenda drew on a mix of Islamophobic, racist, and nativist discourses, with its leader, Maxime Bernier, promising an end to ‘mass migration’ and multicultural policies to ‘protect’ Canada’s identity and increase the securitisation of immigration, especially of Muslim background (Walsh 2021). Ultimately, the PPC received less than two percent of popular votes, with most Canadians supporting electoral parties committed to upholding the country’s traditional pro-migration stance and multiculturalism. Even so, the PPC’s agenda continues resonating with right-wing voters, creating future political openings and signalling nativism’s reappearance in federal politics and public discourse (Kleinfeld and Dickas 2020; Walsh 2021). As of 2024, moreover, Canadian economists are warning that the country is experiencing a “population trap,” wherein the booming population of a country starts clashing with the limits of the infrastructural capability needed to absorb that population (Singer 2024). While the details of the ‘population trap’ are convoluted and difficult to grasp for the average person, it would be no stretch to

assume that following such public federal discourses, ant-migration sentiment in the country are likely to continue being on the rise.

Narratives don't need a 'cause' to have an 'effect'

Discursive formations of transnational human migration contain a multitude of narratives. The RMC introduced a variety of narratives, some of which were not based on facts but rather on their adherence. Narratives associated with the 'threat to physical security' theme illustrate this well. It is a fact that not all Syrian asylum seekers who arrived in Europe between 2015 and 2016 had a propensity for terrorist activity. The narrative is a reiteration of the migrant-terrorism nexus in media and political discourses around the world and the idea that "[t]here are terrorists pretending to be refugees, entering our countries to cause violence and destruction" (Ipsos 2017, 22). On the contrary, many of them left their home country to avoid being persecuted by jihadist cells. Even so, the narrative has been promoted by law enforcement organisations, such as Europol (2021, 9), in statements the likes of:

A real and imminent danger is the possibility of elements of the (Sunni Muslim) Syrian refugee diaspora becoming vulnerable to radicalisation once in Europe and being specifically targeted by Islamic extremist recruiters. It is believed that a number of jihadists are travelling through Europe for this purpose. According to unconfirmed information, German authorities were aware of around 300 recorded attempts made by jihadists to recruit refugees who were trying to enter Europe by April 2016.

It was also present in articles expressing desires to securitise against the terrorist threat associated with RMC-related flows, which could be found in all sample groups, particularly in Sample Groups 1, 5, 7, and 8, coinciding with- although not limited to- the numerous terrorist attacks Europe

during 2015 and 2016, notable the Charlie Hebdo shootings, the Paris attacks, the Brussels attacks, and the Berlin attacks. In their construction of migrants as ‘threats,’ these articles highlighted the fact that RMC-related migrant flows were made up of predominantly migrants from Muslim-majority countries.⁶ Overall, the faith of RMC-related flows received sizeable media attention in Canadian coverage of the RMC. The topic of ‘terrorism’ was mentioned in seventeen percent of all articles, while the Muslim faith of RMC-related migrant flows was mentioned in twenty-three percent of all articles. These two feature as some of the most recurring topics in all articles.

Already in 2015, sensitivities towards foreigners - especially those of the Muslim faith - were heightened in most of Europe. The perception of asylum seekers involved in the RMC played a role in how they were welcomed by civil society and policymakers alike (European Social Survey 2017). In eighty percent of EU countries surveyed by the Pew Research Center in September 2016, those on the political right were found to discursively associate refugees with security rather than a humanitarian cause (Poushter 2016). The threat perception stems from the origin of asylum seekers and their association with ISIS and/or other Islamic terrorist groups. The characterisation of Muslims as terrorists invading the Western world, rooted in a post-911 notion, is perpetuating presumptive labels on men and women.

While the outright association of Muslim men with terrorism is erroneous, what of the narrative linking RMC-related flows with the potentiality of them including terrorists? On the one hand, numerous instances linking the RMC-related migrant flows and terrorist activity were found to be baseless between 2015-2016. For example, there were reports of the European Union's counter-terrorism agency identifying fake passports for known ISIS supporters in Greek refugee camps (Group7_MG8). The story was initially presented in the Italian media and was picked up in numerous other outlets,

⁶ In 2015, nationals from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq accounted for fifty-three percent of the total asylum claims for that year, whereas they made up fifty-four percent of the total asylum claims in EU Member States of 2016 (Eurostat 2024).

notably the Canadian Montreal Gazette and UK and Australian sources (McKenna 2016a; McKenna 2016b). Additional research has been unable to corroborate this story in a way that ties it to non-media sources.

Furthermore, the Syrian passports that were initially tied to the Paris attack perpetrators were later found to be stolen from an unrelated party [see Sample Group 4]. Even so, Canadian media promoted the narrative linking RMC migrant flows and terrorism, citing the passport as evidence even after it was rebuked (Group4_TS10; Group4_VS1; Group5_MG2; and Group5_MG7). A similar situation can be found in relation to the Brussels attack of March 22nd, 2016, attributed to a Moroccan-born Belgian national. According to one Canadian article, he was said to have traveled to Syria in 2013 where he joined ISIS, and was thought to have posed as an asylum seeker alongside other Syrians to travel between Syria and Belgium (Group5_MG7). The story was picked up in other media sources (The Hindu 2016) but could not be linked to sources outside of the media. Overall, it shows that the narrative connecting the RMC-related migrant flows and terrorism was media-fueled even when evidence was lacking.

On the other hand, three of the five attacks in Germany in 2016 were attributed to RMC-related migrants and claimed by ISIS. The attacks on July 18th and July 24th, 2016, and was as the Berlin attack of December 19th, 2016. All of them had arrived in Germany within the last two years. One of them had been granted refugee status by Germany, while the other two were refused humanitarian protection and were facing imminent deportation to their home country. Focussing on the July incidents, Group7_TS9 and Group7_MG6, stressed that while there was no way to confirm prior contact between the attackers and the Jihadist group, the fact that both attackers identified with them, either by claiming to be a “soldier of the caliphate” (Group7_TS9) or by posting a video diatribe (Group7_MG6) prior, is said to be proof enough of ISIS’s influence over migrants. According to them, migrants – and especially young

male migrants (Group7_TS9) - do not need to be an active member of the group to pose a legitimate security threat to the German population. Both July attacks are precedence, which enough to demonstrate this notion. The articles called for German authorities to increase their investigation into migrants, especially considering how one man was able to collect enough material to make at least two bombs in his room in an asylum-seeker home (Group7_MG6).

As such, while some allowances could be made between RMC-related Muslim migrants and terrorist activity about the July events in Germany, it all comes to show that narratives may be stretched beyond their initial conception (factual or not) and be built upon to the extent of fearmongering. Through such narratives, Islamophobia becomes a form of “strategic opportunism” for anti-immigration and anti-integration parties, mobilising fear to justify both actions and support, all in the name of security and control (Postelnicescu 2016, 206).

As I type this conclusion, a more contemporary example of this is playing out in Springfield Ohio, USA. Within days of the to-this-day-remaining-baseless allegations from former President Trump claiming that Haitian migrants are stealing pets to eat them, US-based media is reporting on numerous government buildings and elementary schools having received bomb threats that the city’s mayor said included “hateful language” against Haitians (Mannie 2024). The examples show that a narrative’s potency lies not in its factuality, but in its beliefs.

Lastly, a Canadian example shows that narratives would be apt to change were they given the required context. The RMC-related coverage depicts Canadians as welcoming and generous people towards those in need, whereas Europeans are seen as lacking in humanitarianism (‘National Pride’ narrative theme) should be relativized in relation to geography. Indeed, Canada’s geography has mainly

safeguarded it from large-scale unauthorised human flows and allowed it to have a selective immigration system (Hiebert 2016, 1). As a result, Canada receives comparatively little irregular migration to its Southern neighbour with whom it shares a Safe Third Country Agreement. The whole allows the country to be selective in the levels of humanitarian migration they allow within their borders. To further contextualise the reality of the Canadian state to that of Europe, in 2015 and 2016, while the whole of Europe received over two million asylum requests, Canada received 16,000 and 24,000 applications, respectively. By comparison, Group4_MG4 describes Slovenia, a country with a population of 2 million people, as receiving upwards of 4,000 individuals per day during the Fall of 2015 following the erection of the Hungarian border wall. While Canada had the privilege of hand-selecting who it allowed as part of its Syrian Resettlement Program, European states could not. That is not to say that Canada was not generous in taking in tens of thousands of Syrians, but that the narrative comparing Canadian and European levels of humanitarianism is unfairly advantageous towards Canadians' actions.

It would be interesting to see how Canadian narratives of national pride would hold up in more contemporary climates. Evidence shows that contrary to the country's image as a leader in refugee resettlement, Canadians still vilify refugees as "queue-jumpers," resource-drains, and security threats prior to the RMC (Huot et al., 2015), sentiments bolstered my media depictions and indeed perceivable in the policy actions taken under the Harper administration (Winter, Patzelte, and Beauregard 2018; Krzyzanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak 2018). Indeed, a historical study on anti-immigration sentiments in Canada demonstrated while statistics show a notable forty-one percent decline in Canadians who favoured reducing immigration numbers between 1988 and 2008, it shows that anti-immigration sentiments have been on the rise since 2008 (Mohamadian, Javdani, and Heroux-Legault 2024). Despite articles like Group8_TS2 actively arguing to the opposite and claiming Canadian

remaining predominantly pro-migration contrary to global trends in 2016, this study shows that by 2019 anti-immigration sentiments led forty percent of Canadians saying they would prefer a reduction in immigration levels. The apparent growth in anti-immigrant sentiment contradicts a long-standing consensus in Canada that the country welcomes newcomers on humanitarian and economic grounds. Indeed, the study suggests that economic insecurity concerns are often cited in the immigration debate, as are aspects like religion, ethnicity, and personal and familial immigration history. The study thus concludes that Canadian narratives of ‘Threat to national identity’ and ‘Economic insecurity’ are on the rise, mitigating the so-called Canadian exceptionalism.

Moreover, if 2015 was the first election in which levels of immigration was a contentious issue, the 2019 election introduced the first openly anti-immigration Federal party. The election occurred at the same time as what some claimed to be a migration ‘crisis’ along the US-Canada border following US President Trump’s implementation of a ‘refuge ban’ (Walsh 2021). As a result of the said crisis, migration in general, and not only irregular mobility and asylum-seeking, became “more politicised than ever before” (Birch and Péry 2022, 124). Until then, Canada’s stance towards irregular border crossings along its Southern border was deemed fairly lax in compared to other states. The then Conservative opposition labelled this ‘uncontrolled’ migration a security risk and an affront to Canadian sovereignty and hospitality (Gaucher 2020).

This is not to say that Canada’s increasing anti-immigration support is the result of the RMC; proving such a correlation is beyond the scope and ability of this research project. It does, however, relativize the narratives supporting Canadian exceptionalism that came out of the Canadian media coverage of the RMC. If anything, it hints that Canada is not immune to global trends, and that events like the 2022 truckers’ protests, border blockades, and weeks-long occupation of Canada’s national

capital, may eventually change the notion of Canadian exceptionalism when it comes to transnational human migration.

Narratives may mobilise, securitise and/or both

In Canada, the Kurdi photograph and the consequent push for the Syrian Resettlement Program in Canada - the most sizeable resettlement efforts in Canada since the 1970s (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017) - did not occur in a vacuum and should be contextualised within the RMC.

The Syrian Resettlement program was devised in large part as a response to the Alan Kurdi photograph, in part because, as one article puts it, “[t]he image of Alan Kurdi's lifeless 3-year-old body on a Turkish beach quickly became a symbol of the world's indifference to Syrian refugees and changed that crisis (i.e., the RMC) forever” (Group4_TS10). Interestingly, the death of Alan Kurdi and the photograph that made it infamous were not amongst the most cited events in the chronological media analysis. The Kurdi name features in thirty-three percent of all news articles in this research project. Instead, it is the mobilization effect it is presumed to have inspired that was mentioned in the articles of sample Group 4 covering the Syrian Resettlement Program.

The Kurdi photograph is attributed with placing a face to the RMC; a humanizing element said to break away from abstract and impersonal statistics such as ‘71 migrants,’ or ‘3,000-plus deaths’ in the Mediterranean Sea (Goodspeed 2018). In September 2015, the photo of the child is thought to have galvanized a mobilizing force for Canadians to take a greater role in alleviating the Syrian refugee crisis (Tyyskä et al., 2017; Winter, Patzelte, and Beauregard 2018). In Canada, it has been argued that following the Kurdi photograph, the prevailing negative perceptions of Middle Eastern refugee claimants in local migration discourse, which had prevailed for over a decade, were mitigated by a strong desire to help, and Canadians were called upon to welcome those in need (Tyyskä et al., 2017;

Winter, Patzelte, and Beauregard 2018). Indeed, the widespread call to action from coast to coast seemed so grand that, if anything, refugee advocates felt that the resulting self-congratulating news coverage “amounted to a massive internet ‘selfie’ in which Canada’s admiration for its own response to the Syrian crisis threatened to overshadow the narratives of the Syrians themselves” (Goodspeed 2018, 301). In an interview with an official from a provincial partner agency, Bose (2020, 17) found that “this mayor or that councillor or this family [called] asking when they were getting the Syrians [...] like they all wanted their own Syrian doll family.” Such statements were also supported by Tyyskä et al. (2017), who found in their own media coverage analysis that the stories usually ignored the program recipients altogether by instead fixating on the deeds and generosity of the Canadians involved. Indeed, studies show that the top Google search term in Canada after publication of the Kurdi photograph was “How to Sponsor a Syrian?” (Goodspeed 2018).

The call for action was mirrored in varying degrees in the articulation of all party positions throughout the 2015 election, seen in statements regarding RMC responses and refugee-resettlement plans beyond the already agreed-upon annual numbers (Molnar 2017). The largescale call for action prompted Canada’s major parties to distinguish themselves by promising refugee-resettlement policies, with special attention to Syrian refugees. Following widespread media coverage of the so-called Syrian Refugee crisis and the publication of the photograph of Alan Kurdi, Liberals promised to repeal some of the most contentious Conservative migration-related policies.

By 2015, following the three mandates of Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2006-2015) during which time migration became increasingly securitized, the topic of immigration had become such a contentious topic that Fířtová (2021) advances that for the first time ever, it became a wedge issue in the federal election. Whereas multiculturalism had previously been so ingrained into the official political debates that it made immigration an electoral non-issue (Fířtová 2021). In the last few weeks leading up

to Canada's 42nd federal election in September 2015, the Kurdi tragedy, the RMC, and the Syrian refugee crisis became politicized.

During the election, the media coverage focused on Syrian refugees rather than the other nationalities involved in the RMC because of three factors: Syrians made up the largest pocket of refugee claimants in Europe; attention toward the Syrian civil war was already heightened because of the ongoing debate, since 2013, on Syrian refugee resettlement; and because the Alan Kurdi story hit a chord with the Canadian people because his death, and that of his mother and five-year-old brother (Kurdi 2019), were tied to reports of their failed attempt to receive asylum in Canada. Some authors argue that the debates on refugee resettlement swayed voters in 2015 to elect Liberal leader Justin Trudeau into power (Carver 2016, 232; Fiřtová 2021). While others, like Birch and Pétry (2019, 116) maintain some reservation on such direct causality, they advance that to the very least the 2015 elections "set the stage" for the growing polarisation amongst federal parties on immigration. Indeed, some have attributed the Liberal Party's welcoming position on refugee resettlement among the contributing factors to its victory over the Conservatives on election day, October 19th 2015 (Molnar 2016, 70; Bose 2020,14).

As the chronological media analysis demonstrates, it did not take long after the Kurdi photograph for the national migration discourse to be swayed once more in reaction to RMC-related events. Following the November Paris attacks, only two months after the initial surge in Canadian willingness to take in Syrian refugees and one month after the Liberals had been put into power, the conversation seemed to have circled back once more toward fear and insecurity in the wake of terrorist attacks in Europe. Academic sources also corroborate the shift in Canadian attitude vis-à-vis the Syrian Resettlement Program, the Kurdi photograph, and the aftermath of the Paris attacks (Showler 2015; Molnar 2016).

The findings of this research project demonstrate that the media coverage of the Syrian Resettlement Program in Sample Group 4 articles more specifically followed two trends. The first, found in three articles, highlighted the role of the Kurdi photograph in the creation of- and support for- the program (Group4_GM2; Group4_GmM9; and Group4_TS10). These articles had a ‘victim’ framing of migrants, demonstrating how, for example, the lives of migrants could be improved by being welcomed into Canada (Group4_GM2) or again how it was important for the country to do its part in the global humanitarian crisis (Group4_TS10 and Group4_GM9). The Group4_GM9 article, more specifically, went so far as to compare Canada’s inaction to the RMC and Syrian refugee crisis to that of the Holocaust. They reiterated narratives of shame in the country’s failure to respond to pleas for help from European Jewish individuals. By contrasting the Holocaust to the RMC, they aimed to mobilise humanitarian sentiments in the Canadian public and allow them an opportunity to redress past wrongs.

The second trend associated with the resettlement program could be found in the remaining four articles, all which frame migrants as both ‘victims’ and potential ‘threats/villains’ (Group4_GM6; Group4_VS6; Group4_MG7; and Group4_MG9). What emanated from these articles is that Canadians were torn vis-à-vis the program in so far as they recognised the need to protect those in need, such as Syrians who have been at war since 2011, but they also called for a careful examination of those selected to take part in the program. While notions of false claims and abuse of the system, which is often associated with humanitarian immigration, are not the main factor of reticence here, there remained elements of threats associated with the incoming migrants. The most notable ‘threat’ perception came after November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris, France, in as much as there were concerns about potentially inviting terrorists into the country via the program (Group4_GM6; Group4_MG7; and Group4_MG9). As a result of increasing security concerns, the newly elected Liberal government published several statements that suggested that the Syrian Resettlement Program would

prioritize women and complete families rather than individual men, promoting its pre-selection vetting processes for the incoming Syrian refugees. It should be noted, however, that single men could still be eligible for resettlement if they identified as LGBTQ*; they along with families and single women were the preferred candidates. Doing so corroborated narrative in which men and especially Muslim men are perceived as having a propensity for violence.

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Appendix A – List of Canadian narratives associated with Transnational Human Migration

Humanitarian Solidarity

- Narrative 1 – Asylum seekers deserve humanitarian protection from Western/European states
- Narrative 2 – The age and gender of some migrants is increasing their precarity

National Pride

- Canadians are welcoming and generous people towards those in need, it may be proud of its humanitarian legacy
- Canadians may be proud of their country's history of diversity and multiculturalism

Pragmatism

- Canadian society has an ageing population and a dwindling labour force, it may benefit from injections of migrant labour and birthrates

Economic Insecurity

- Migrant labour increased competition in the labour market to the detriment of citizens, especially in unskilled sectors because of the injection of international students and TFWs
- The cost of care for migrants drains resources to the detriment of the host society

Threats to Physical Security

- Muslim migrants and their descendants have a propensity for terrorist activity
- Migrants pose an unspecified threat to their host society
- Migrants have a propensity for criminal activity

Threat to National Identity

- Muslim and racialized migrants and their descendants are too culturally deviant from Western/European societies to be integrated successfully
- Migrants in general are too culturally deviant from Western/European societies to be integrated successfully

State Ability to Control Human Flows across Borders

- Migrants are a security threat, and states need stricter border controls

Appendix B – List of narratives associated with Canadian media coverage of the RMC by narrative theme

National Pride

- Canadians are welcoming and generous people towards those in need, unlike Europeans

Pragmatism

- Host societies with ageing populations and dwindling labour forces benefit from migrant labour and birthrates
- Migrants may serve to repopulate depopulated areas
- The Canadian model for migrant integration is great for ensuring long-term success for both migrant and host society

Economic Insecurity

- Migrant labour increased competition in the labour market to the detriment of citizens
- There are no jobs for the predominantly unskilled migrant workforce
- Migrants do not have the right skills to join the labour market of the host society
- Migrants (predominantly of Muslim faith) will be/are economically marginalised and therefore likely to be radicalised
- The cost of care for migrants drains resources to the detriment of the host society
- RMC-related flows have had a negative impact on host economies

Threat to National Identity

- Muslim migrants and their descendants are too culturally deviant from Western/European societies to be integrated successfully
- Migrants in general are too culturally deviant from Western/European societies to be integrated successfully
- High levels of Muslim immigration have altered the local landscape
- High levels of diverse immigration have altered the local landscape

Threats to Physical Security

- RMC-related migrant flows may harbour terrorists
- Muslim migrants and their descendants have a propensity for terrorist activity
- Migrants pose an unspecified threat to their host society
- Migrants have a propensity for criminal activity
- RMC-related migrant flows are financing transnational criminal rings and terrorist cells
- RMC-related migrant flows may contain criminals
- Male RMC-related migrant flows do not respect Western/European authority and therefore have a propensity for violence
- Male RMC-related migrant flows do not respect Western/European culture and therefore have a propensity for sexual deviance

State Ability to Control Human Flows across Borders

- Migrants are a security threat, and states need stricter border controls
- The scale of RMC-related migrant flows in and throughout Europe is problematic and urgently needs to be curbed
- EU Member States came together to find ways to curb RMC-related migrant flows
- EU Member States cannot agree on how to respond to the RMC, causing regional tensions
- Most migrants involved in the RMC were not in need of humanitarian protection and were abusing/defrauding the benevolence of European states

Humanitarian Solidarity

- Narrative 1 – Asylum seekers deserve humanitarian protection from Western/European states
- Narrative 2 – The RMC has dwindled levels of humanitarianism in some European states to the detriment of deserving asylum seekers
- Narrative 3 – Rising levels of Islamophobia/xenophobia are putting racialized migrants at risk
- Narrative 4 – European efforts to reduce RMC-related migrant flows are increasing migrant precarity
- Narrative 5 – The age and gender of some migrants is increasing their precarity

Appendix C – Comprehensive list of codes utilized in media analysis of all 320 articles associated with Canadian media coverage of the RMC

Recurring events

- Boat rescues
- Emergency Relocation Schemes
- European Regional Summit
- European Smuggling-combat operations
- Migrant Hotspots
- Shipwreck(s)
- The 2015 Canadian Federal election
- The Alan Kurdi Photograph
- The Berlin attack, Germany
- The Brexit vote
- The Brussels attacks, Belgium
- The Canadian Syrian Resettlement Program
- The Charlie Hebdo shootings, France
- The Cologne events, NYE 2016, Germany
- The Dismantling of Migrant camps
- The Dresden Marches, Germany
- The erection of Border walls
- The EU-Turkey Deal
- The Lorry incident, Austria
- The Nice attack, France
- The Safe Third country list
- The Walk of Hope
- Violent/Terrorist incidents (other than those listed here)

Content

- Human smuggling/trafficking
- Migrant pull-factor (Europe in general)
- Migrant pull-factor (state specific)
- Migrant push-factor (general)
- Migrant push-factor (specific)
- Migrants of Muslim faith
- Migration policy – regional
- Migration policy- state specific
- Militarization of migration
- Political response(s) to migrant arrival (state & regional)
- Racism
- scale of migrant flow
- Social response(s) to migrant arrival (state & regional)
- Terrorism
- the death and danger faced by migrants involved in RMC
- the gender and age of migrants involved in RMC
- The status of migrants (i.e., legal, illegal, asylum seeker, refugee, etc.)

Development of Articles

- Quotes by migrants
- Quotes by politicians
- Quotes by others
- Historical event
- Inclusion of expert opinion
- Inclusion of statistics, polls and/or studies
- Stories of migrants while transiting throughout and towards Europe
- Stories of migrants arrived at their destination country
- Stories of migrants in their country of origin

Frame of Migration

- Benefit
- Threat/villain
- victim

Narrative theme

- Economic Insecurity
- Humanitarian Solidarity
- National Pride
- Pragmatism
- State Ability to control Human Flows across Borders
- Threats to National Identity
- Threats to Physical Security