

THE LOBBYIST IN BRITISH COLUMBIA  
IN 1978

by

KENNETH C. VANCE

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We accept this thesis as conforming  
to the required standard

Dr. Neil A. Swainson

Dr. Norman J. Ruff

Dr. W.R. Derrick Sewell

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UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA

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*Advisor: Dr. Neil A. Swainson*

*ABSTRACT*


This thesis examines the place of the designated lobbyist in British Columbia's political system, within the context of a communication framework. It examines his role from the perspectives of the lobbyist, the interest group on whose behalf he is employed, and the government. Initially, it reviews the relevant literature concerning these lobbyists - as they are found elsewhere in Canada and the United States. Out of this survey of the literature emerges an underlying hypothesis which is explored throughout the thesis. This is to the effect that the lobbyist in British Columbia can be expected to act primarily as a communication link - as do his counterparts elsewhere, notwithstanding the differences between this province's political system and others on this continent. The conclusion which emerges from this study is that the lobbyist in British Columbia does act as a communication link as suggested in the hypothesis. Furthermore, a second hypothesis, which is implicit throughout the thesis, suggests that there are constraints on the lobbyist's role in British Columbia which contribute to and shape the

lobbyist's behaviour as a communication facilitator. The dissertation examines the impact of the interest groups concerned - their objectives, their size, and their resources - on the role of the lobbyist. In addition, it explores the effect of the political and institutional environment in British Columbia on the lobbyist's role. More precisely the thesis examines the effect of the parliamentary structure of government and the associated policy-making process on the performance of the lobbyist in this province in the calendar year 1978.

Overall, the lobbyist in British Columbia emerges from this study as a communication facilitator binding key personnel in interest groups with those in the legislative and executive branches of government. The designated lobbyists in British Columbia, though few in number, in performing this function have served to strengthen our democratic system by ensuring greater input into and a better understanding of the policy-making process.

Examiners:

  
Dr. N.A. Swainson

  
Dr. N.J. Ruff

  
Dr. W.R.D. Sewell

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## INTRODUCTION

This thesis, focuses on the role of the 'designated' lobbyist in British Columbia. It seeks to examine the role of the lobbyist in the context of a communication framework. It will look at the lobbyists associated with ten British Columbia organizations which, in 1978, employed someone to monitor the government in Victoria. These organizations are:

- the Sierra Club,
- the International Woodworkers of America (I.W.A.),
- the British Columbia Federation of Agriculture (B.C.F.A.),
- the Federation of Independent School Associations (F.I.S.A.),
- the British Columbia School Trustees Association (B.C.S.T.A.),
- the British Columbia Teachers Federation (B.C.T.F.),
- the Employers' Council of British Columbia,
- the British Columbia Independent Logging Association (B.C.I.L.A.), and
- the Council of Forest Industries (C.O.F.I.)

In addition, the role of the lone freelance lobbyist in British Columbia will be examined in relation to a major interest group he represents: the British Columbia Medical Association (B.C.M.A.).

Throughout this study three basic terms (interest group, lobbying, lobbyist) will be used. It is important that their meaning be clarified at the outset. An interest

group, as we use this concept, "is an organization whose members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest."<sup>1</sup> The term lobbying, as used in the context of this paper, refers to "the stimulation and transmission of a communication by someone other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, directed to a governmental decision-maker with the hope of influencing his decision."<sup>2</sup> Finally the noun lobbyist used here refers to an intermediary in the lobbying process who "provides influence for his client [or organization] by acquiring and translating relevant information."<sup>3</sup> The lobbyist behaving in this manner "tempers the system . . . by promoting continuous interchange between governors and governed."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>A. Paul Pross, "Pressure Groups: Adaptive Instruments of Political Communication," *Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics*, ed. A. Paul Pross (Toronto, 1975), p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Lester W. Milbrath, *The Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago, 1963), p. 8.

<sup>3</sup>Lauriston R. King, *The Washington Lobbyists for Higher Education* (Toronto, 1975), p. 46.

<sup>4</sup>Don McGillivray, "Lobbying at Ottawa," *Politics: Canada*. Third edition. Edited by Paul W. Fox (Toronto, 1970), p. 164.

Much of the information on which this dissertation is based was collected in a series of interviews with politicians, civil servants, and lobbyists involved in the political process in British Columbia. Each politician was asked a series of ten general questions (see Appendix 2). Each lobbyist was asked a total of thirteen general questions (see Appendix 1). The civil servants interviewed were asked questions relating to their contacts with lobbyists and the relationship which existed at the time of the interview between their ministries and the interest groups with which they deal. In addition, the perspective of each of the interest groups which employed a lobbyist was probed by a written enquiry (see Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 for further information).

## CHAPTER I

### THE LOBBYIST

As we have sought in this century to understand the nature of representative government, we have become conscious of the fact the function of political representation is not limited to those formally elected. In the modern democratic state the views or perceived interests of individuals and groups of individuals may be relayed to government through a vast array of extra-parliamentary mechanisms. One of these is the designated group representative, known to students of political behaviour as the lobbyist.

It is elemental that the lobbyist is an institutional reflection of a number of beliefs held by a group of principals. One of these is that the making of public policy is a malleable process, and that representations made to government may influence the process in desired ways. Another, which may not incorporate the beliefs just mentioned, is that such an instrument may advantageously alert a group of principals to impending or non-impending action by government. A still further belief, of course, held by the principals involved is that the

cost of lobbying in the long run will be matched or exceeded by corresponding benefits.

Lobbyists are not a new phenomenon in society. The first lobbyists:

were the hangers-on around the king who traded their amiability, wit, wisdom, or lesser potential for the privilege of being where the action was.

As societies became more complicated these adroit insiders performed the dual service of interpreting the law while at the same time engineering for themselves the privilege of controlling or manipulating access to the seat of power.<sup>5</sup>

With the codification of laws, these individuals gained new prominence as "the growing complexity of the laws made it much too complicated for the majority to understand, and thus effectively necessitated a body of experts to advise not only the people - but the ruler."<sup>6</sup> They maintained influence through their possession of superior knowledge, either of the law, or the problems with which the law dealt. In time two major changes took place. The first was the emergence of law as a professional practice, and the second was the emergence of mass political movements which ultimately gave the ordinary people power over

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<sup>5</sup>Jon W. Kieran, "Lobbying," *Executive* (April, 1969), p. 33.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 33.

the legislative process and opened the way toward lobbying "via political rather than legislative means."<sup>7</sup> With this development emerged the lobbyists of today: "the experts in communication, political organization, applied sociology and operations research."<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the advent of popular democracy added a new dimension to the strategy and tactics a lobbyist could employ. Where previously the lobbyist had been limited to invoking appeals to the common good or the positive self interest of the legislator or bureaucrat, he was now able to invoke, as well, a fear of the electorate and a perceived ability to shape or alter public opinion as a means of influencing the political process.

One of the most effective frameworks for analyzing the role of the lobbyist as this individual has emerged in the modern democratic state is that developed by Lester Milbrath in his book, the *Washington Lobbyist*. Milbrath relies on what may be called communication theory to focus on the transfer of information between the various principals involved in the process, and to trace the communication patterns with which lobbying is concerned

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<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*


(see Diagram 1). The government is viewed from a macro perspective in the theory. In addition, within the model there are two underlying assumptions. The first of these is that lobbyists and interest groups have a legitimate role to play in the political process. The second assumption is that the decisions of government reflect the general desires of the public. Milbrath's concept of the government as a communication network on the one hand, and these two assumptions on the other, will provide the underlying framework for the inquiry pursued in this study.

This thesis specifically will examine the relationship between the lobbyist and the three major dimensions to his working environment: the interest groups employing him; the political arena (both political actors and political environment); and the bureaucracy. It is set, inevitably, in the context of the relationships Milbrath represents in Diagram 1 between pressure groups, lobbyists, and elected and appointed officials.

One may further refine this relational approach to the political process by viewing the lobbyist as the pivot or hub of a communication network, which in part he has created. This perspective is illustrated in Diagram 2. In the context of this framework the lobbyist normally can be expected to attempt to channel any exchanges between the political arena, the bureaucracy, and his interest

Diagram 1

Government As A Communication Network




Legend

- Power relationship —————>
- Message transmission <====>
- Feedback loops - - - - ->

Lester W. Milbrath, *The Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago, 1963), p. 181.

Diagram : 2




Information flow

group through himself. This communication network is represented by the black arrows in the diagram. In attempting to obtain control over the flow of information between these forces the lobbyist must compete with and perhaps complement a variety of other contacts between each of these components of the political system, as indicated via the dotted lines in Diagram 2. The extent to which he can develop contacts with and monopolize the exchange of information between these principals will normally determine the strength of the lobbyist's position.

The 'nature' of the communication linkages and the potential strength of these linkages is illustrated in Diagram 3. The strength of these linkages is highly variable, and difficult to measure, not least because it can be assessed from "either end" of each communication channel. Clearly, subjective judgement is involved in the evaluation process. Both the literature on lobbyists and practical experience, however, do suggest that a number of factors, in combination, can be expected to determine or influence the strength of these linkages involving the lobbyist. These include the personality of the lobbyist, his experience, the nature of the policy under discussion, and the timing of initiatives undertaken by the lobbyist. Other relevant and at least partial determinants of the strength of these linkages may well

Diagram: 3



↔ strong linkages  
↔ moderate linkages  
- - - weak linkages  
- - -

include the size and resources of the interest group or groups involved, their expectations, the attitudes of the actors involved in the decision-making process, and the impact which the structure of government has on the on-going scenarios in its policy-making process.

Two crucial assumptions of those who employ lobbyists are (1) that lobbyists may help to shape the evolution and implementation of new or of on-going policy in directions preferred by the interest groups involved, and (2) that, whether this be true or not, using lobbyists may assist the interest group to respond more intelligently to whatever policy government does establish. In an ideal state of affairs (from the lobbyist's perspective), the lobbyist in time comes to exercise real influence over the broad thrust of government policy, over governmental (political and bureaucratic) perceptions of the legitimacy of interest group objectives, and over the behaviour of the interest group on whose behalf he is working. The extent to which the lobbyist can play this role, and occupy the key position as a communication facilitator identified in Diagram 3 will depend on many of the considerations outlined earlier, and also on the extent to which government and interest group can come to respect, if not entirely to share, each other's values.

There are a number of observations and propositions concerning lobbyists and their role which emerge from the literature on this subject and will be examined in this thesis.<sup>9</sup> One of these observations is that lobbyists tend to possess backgrounds which are varied, but still limited in range. Professor Milbrath, for example, concludes from his studies that the typical American lobbyist is likely to come from one of the following careers: "law, politics, journalism, business, governmental services, association work or labour union work."<sup>10</sup> In addition, he suggests that the lobbyist will commonly have experience in "legislative and political process, law and legal process, subject matter of concern to the organization, and an understanding of public relations techniques."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>The following are the major books and articles used to examine the role of the lobbyist in this study: *The Washington Lobbyists* by Lester Milbrath, *Lobbying: Interaction and Influence in American State Legislatures* by Harmon Zeigler and Michael Baer, *The Washington Lobbyists for Higher Education* by Louriston R. King, *The Business Representatives in Washington* by Paul W. Cherington and Ralph L. Gillen, *Cooperative Lobbying - The Power of Pressure* by Donald R. Hall, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* by Robert Presthus, and "Lobbying: A Comprehensive Report on the Art and Its Practitioners," *The Globe Magazine* by Hugh Winsor.

<sup>10</sup>Milbrath, p. 76.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 61.

Another observation that emerges from the literature is that there is a variety of ways of classifying lobbyists. Harmon Zeigler and Michael A. Baer, in their examination of four American state legislatures, provide three typologies for a lobbyist. They envisage him as a contact man who relies primarily on personal interaction with legislators, as an informant who prepares information for legislators, and as a watchdog who essentially warns his clients about legislation which might affect them.<sup>12</sup> Hugh Winsor, while not adding to Zeigler's and Baer's classification of lobbyists, places them in the context of the Canadian political system. He provides a practical, if not an academic, perspective of the types of lobbyists who operate on Parliament Hill:

- (1) Presidents and executive directors of associations - often former makers and shakers or mandarins in the civil service. Some are former cabinet ministers. Preferably men of high stature and good connections.
- (2) Company men - should have qualifications similar to the association men, but efforts are on behalf of one company.
- (3) 5 per centers - often mentioned but seldom seen on stage. Primarily concerned with contracts and purchase orders.

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<sup>12</sup>Harmon Zeigler and Michael A. Baer, *Lobbying: Interaction and Influence in American State Legislators* (Belmont, 1969), p. 77.

- (4) Ottawa representatives - mixed lot who engage in some contract work but more likely are on a retainer, often call themselves public relations consultants. Also concerned with advising clients on how and whom to approach with a problem, preparing briefs on future developments, present clients arguments to politicians or officials, arranging occasional fishing or football trips. Contacts essential.
- (5) Ottawa Liberal lawyers - these players change of course when government changes. Often referred to as door-openers. Long associations with the Liberal Party and Party finances. Some are senators. Not all live in Ottawa. Many are frequently players before the various regulatory boards and commissions . . . Can usually arrange appointments with ministers for clients.
- (6) Senators and M.P.'s.<sup>13</sup>

The communication function performed by the lobbyist emerges from the literature as his primary role. In Donald R. Hall's work *Cooperative Lobbying - The Power of Pressure* officials from Hill and Knowlton, one of the leading public relations firms in Washington, describe their role as a facilitator of communication as follows:

"The reporting function is 99 per cent of our work" said Robert K. Gray, vice president in charge of the Washington office. "One man in the office goes through the Con-

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<sup>13</sup>Hugh Winsor, "Lobbying: A Comprehensive Report on the Art and Its Practitioners," *The Globe Magazine* (February 27, 1971), p. 2.

gressional Record every day looking for anything that might affect Hill and Knowlton clients. We look over all government press releases. We report to our clients on upcoming appointments to federal posts that affect them. On legislation, we may check with the sponsor of a bill to see whether he intends to push it, but we make no attempt to influence legislation . . ."

One of Gray's associates explained that the Washington office advises Hill and Knowlton clients on how to make their testimony more effective. "We don't usually write the testimony," he said, "but we do go over it and liven it up if necessary, to make it more presentable." Then we get it to Washington newspapermen in the form of press releases . . . . We're sort of resident representatives. We can't speak for the client, but we can certainly keep his mind in everything we do. It's a matter of staying in touch with everything that goes on.<sup>14</sup>

In Canada John de B. Payne of Interprovincial Public Relations describes his job as "providing fundamental analysis of both federal and provincial relations in Quebec. 'I do not speak to ministers or MPs for a client - I just tell them how to throw the spitballs.'"<sup>15</sup> Bill Lee and Bill Neville, whose corporate manifestation is Executive Consultants Limited, describe their role as a facilitator of communication in the following manner:

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<sup>14</sup>Donald R. Hall, *Cooperative Lobbying - The Power of Pressure* (Tuscon, 1969), p. 9.

<sup>15</sup>Winsor, p. 6.

Our service in this area essentially is to provide the private sector with a more complete understanding of the whats, hows and whos of the federal bureaucracy and, hopefully, as an important by product, to better attune politicians and bureaucrats to the needs and concerns of the private sector. This is not I should stress, a lobbying service . . .

We will not importune our friends the ministers, their aides or civil servants to do 'special things' for our clients. We feel that such actions would in the long run be a mistake both for our clients and ourselves.<sup>16</sup>

The overall objective of their efforts according to Mr. Neville, a former executive assistant to Judy LaMarsh and E.J. Benson, is " . . . to correct some of the nonsense that we used to see from the other side. Industry and government often seek the same goal, but they don't speak the same language."<sup>17</sup>

This dissertation will probe at some length the concept of the lobbyist as a communication link. Illustrative of this proposition is the description of the educational lobbyist provided by Lauristan R. King. There, the lobbyist's function as a communication link is described as an obligation to:

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<sup>16</sup>Winsor, p. 6.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*

- (1) provide a mechanism for assessing the views and opinions of the membership in the field;
- (2) establish liaison with congressional staffs and open channels for information prior to legislative action;
- (3) maintain contacts with executive branches like the Office of Education, Department of Justice, and the National Institute of Health, and keep the membership informed on developments within the various agencies;
- (4) simply keep the membership informed about guidelines, administrative regulations, and deadlines.<sup>18</sup>

In a similar fashion Paul W. Cherington and Ralph L. Gillen describe the communication function performed by the business lobbyist in Washington as a bridge between his company and the government. They divide the lobbyist's duties as a communication link between his interest group and the government into the following categories:

- (1) [providing] general intelligence and information - the 'listening-post' function;
- (2) furnishing help and information to the agencies;
- (3) expediting government action;
- (4) transmitting company points of view to government officials on a wide range of matters from regulations to broad economic policy.<sup>19</sup>

A further proposition derived from the foregoing is that the lobbyist, in acting as a communication link, uses

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<sup>18</sup>King, p. 49.

<sup>19</sup>Paul W. Cherington and Ralph L. Gillen, *The Washington Business Representative* (Washington, 1962), p. 33.

a variety of mechanisms to pass information on to his interest group. Milbrath had this to say on communication mechanisms from his examination of the lobbying process:

Lobby organizations usually have a regularized medium for disseminating this information, such as their own newspaper or magazine. The lobbyist himself may edit the paper or write a column or section. Some organizations put out weekly newsletters on the legislature and political situation; still others issue special legislative bulletins dealing with one or two matters at a time. Usually these are published only when Congress is in session.<sup>20</sup>

It is also clear from the literature that there is a real premium associated with the accuracy of the information which the lobbyist relays (both ways). Accuracy indeed, is essential if the lobbyist is to maintain access to his contacts. As an official cited by Milbrath put it:

. . . information must be reliable not only because they need it for their own discussions, but also because they use this information in communications with other officials and with the public. An official who has committed himself using information supplied by a lobbyist which is later proved incorrect will be seriously embarrassed and will cut off further access for the lobbyist.<sup>21</sup>

To further understand the role of the lobbyist as a communication link it is necessary to look at the

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<sup>20</sup>Milbrath, pp. 203-204.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 211.

nature of the interest group which employs him, and in turn its relationship to the government. What emerges from this examination are a number of propositions concerned with the abilities of interest groups to employ lobbyists, and their reasons for doing so. A number of propositions focus on why interest groups choose to utilize a lobbyist and how they focus his activity in specific areas of government enterprise. For example, one proposition suggests that the role of the lobbyist is broadly effected by the general relationship between 'his' interest group and the government. A second proposition contends that the lobbyist is employed by the interest group as a desired communication link between it and the government. A third proposition maintains that the scope of the lobbyist's activities is determined to a significant degree by his interest group's interests. A fourth proposition, which will be examined, is that the role of the lobbyist is effected by the size and resources of the interest group. This section of the thesis is designed to inquire into the constraints the interest group places on the lobbyist.

The next section will look at the political environment in which the lobbyist operates and the manner in which this environment constrains his activities as a communication link. A long standing issue here concerns the

acceptability of the lobbyists' role in the political process. This is an important consideration for if the lobbyist is to act as a facilitator of communication he must be recognized as having a legitimate role to play in the political process.

Robert Presthus in his study, observed that "contrary to conventional opinion, most legislators tend to regard interest groups and their agents as functionally necessary and normatively legitimate elements in the political process . . . in Canada."<sup>22</sup> With respect to the provincial legislators' attitudes toward lobbyists in British Columbia, Presthus found that our provincial legislators trusted lobbyists more, but were less influenced by lobbyists than politicians in Quebec and Ontario or at the federal level.<sup>23</sup> The media, to the extent that it both reflects and shapes the general views of the public, have tended in recent years to strengthen the perceived image of the lobbyist as possessing a legitimate role to play in the political process.

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<sup>22</sup>Robert Presthus, "Interest Groups and the Canadian Parliament: Activities, Interaction, Legitimacy and Influence," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (December, 1971), p. 459.

<sup>23</sup>Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 240-241.

Another approach to understanding lobbying draws attention to the obstacles or, if one will, to the communication barriers the lobbyist must overcome. As a general proposition the literature suggests that these barriers can be grouped into three categories: attitudes of individual actors, the structure of the government, and the decision-making pattern in government. Milbrath emphasizes that each government decision maker has his own predispositions which "not only guide behaviour but also provide a perceptual screen allowing some stimuli to pass through while arresting or shutting out others."<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, Milbrath observes that "officials suffer from a serious overload of communications"<sup>25</sup> which often makes the source of data an important guide to its credibility. In the end it must be remembered that "in relations between officials and would-be influencers, it is the official who decides whether communication channels to himself will be opened or closed."<sup>26</sup>

The other two barriers to the communication process - the structure of the government, and the decision-making

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<sup>24</sup>Milbrath, p. 187.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 210.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 187.

pattern adopted by it, are closely linked. The different structures of government and the patterns of decision-making adopted by it serve to facilitate or hinder access and direct lobbyists' activity to different 'pressure points' in the system. J.W. Grove, in commenting on the parliamentary system and its relationship with interest groups, described the effect of its structure on this association as follows:

The British political system (unlike the political systems of most other Western democracies) is characterized by the almost complete dominance of the Executive in policy-making as well as in the direction of day-to-day business, by the correlative weakness of the Legislature, and by the monolithic character of the two great political parties which makes for a high degree of party discipline in Parliament and unified approach in matters of party policy. Thus, a British interest group seeking to promote or to block some change of policy thinks first of the appropriate Minister and his department where an American interest group, for example, thinks first of Congress and its legislative committees. It is an exaggeration, but a justifiable exaggeration, to say to the British interest group: "If you can bring over the Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer you have not much else to worry about."<sup>27</sup>

One task of this study will be to determine if generalizations

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<sup>27</sup>J.W. Grove, "The Collective Organization of Industry," *Decisions, Organizations and Society*, Edited by F.G. Castles, D.J. Murray and D.C. Potter (The Open University, 1971), p. 267.

of this order are applicable, insofar as the role of the lobbyist is concerned, to the political system of British Columbia.

In a similar fashion, it will look at in a general way the relevance to this province of observations concerning the decision-making process advanced by R.G.S. Brown. One of Brown's major contentions is that ministries tend to adopt a set pattern, and "methods which have been adopted for one purpose tend to be used for another."<sup>28</sup> The second observation is that where no pattern exists "decision time tends to be short and the outcome is likely to be influenced more by the order in which alternatives are presented than by any serious attempt to find a common yardstick."<sup>29</sup> This means that "if some additional money suddenly becomes available, it will go to those who are quick off the mark. The beneficiaries are likely to be those whose strategic position in the communication system enables them to time their bids rather than those who have a good case on merit."<sup>30</sup> A major requirement for the

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<sup>28</sup>R.G.S. Brown, "The Administrative Process: Britain," *Decisions, Organization, and Society*, Edited by F.G. Castles, D.J. Murray, and D.C. Potter (The Open University, 1971), p. 91.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 98.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*

lobbyist would appear to be to identify the decision-making patterns chosen by the political/bureaucratic actors with whom he is expected to interact, and to adjust his activities accordingly. Brown in this case is describing an operative time constraint which the lobbyist must adapt to. The implications of this operative time constraint on the lobbyist in British Columbia will be examined.

The final section of this thesis will reflect on the difficulty involved in assessing the impact of lobbyist activity not least because policy and behavioural outcomes are commonly the result of many interrelated factors. It is apparent that any exercise in assessment involves agreement on the 'goals of the enterprise.' As Milbrath argues, there are real difficulties here:

The goals of lobbying are constantly shifting; they are usually much broader than securing the passage or defeat of legislation. The means for pursuit of goals is not static or well-defined. Even if a given end is achieved, there is no certainty about which means or pattern of means were most instrumental in that achievement.<sup>31</sup>

The literature provides no real answers as to what factors determine success. The complexity of this assessment

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<sup>31</sup>Milbrath, p. 108.

exercise is well reflected in the literature. The key determinants to a lobbyist's success according to King, for example, are

patience, availability to decision makers when called upon, and the careful cultivation of acquaintances and contacts so that when policy questions [did] come up, the representative [was] called upon at least to express an opinion.<sup>32</sup>

Andrew Roman, Executive Director and General Counsel, of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre in Ottawa, on the other hand, views the key determinants to a lobbyist's success as "discretion and good contacts [as the] Ottawa lobbyist has to know who in government actually does what and where."<sup>33</sup> To Johana Der Hertog, a lobbyist for the Status of Women organization in British Columbia in 1976, and Director of Research and Legislation for the British Columbia Federation of Labour in 1978, the factors determining a lobbyist's success are much more numerous and include the following:

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<sup>32</sup>King, p. 58.

<sup>33</sup>William T. Stanbury, "Lobbying and Interest Group Representation in the Legislative Process," Comments by Andrew J. Roman, Johana Der Hertog, and Alasdair J. McKichan. *The Legislative Process in Canada the Need for Reform*. Edited by William A.W. Neilson and James C. MacPherson. Proceedings of a Conference held at the University of Victoria sponsored by the Institute for Research on Public Policy and the Faculty of Law, University of Victoria, March 31-April 1, 1978, p. 212.

- (1) the amount of established presence a group has with the media
- (2) the number of people who are visibly supporting your position
- (3) the comprehensiveness of your brief or other presentation
- (4) your knowledge of the structure of government
- (5) your politeness and style
- (6) the size of your organization
- (7) your vote affecting potential
- (8) whether your political ideologies and prejudices mesh with those of the legislator you are lobbying.<sup>34</sup>

In summary, the chapters which follow will examine the role of the designated lobbyist in British Columbia in 1978 - from the perspective of the propositions outlined in the preceding pages. Chapter II will deal with the background of the lobbyists, the typologies which can be applied to them institutionally, the patterns of their behaviour and the nature of the information they gather. The next chapter will examine the relationship between the lobbyist and his interest group. The following chapter will look at the legitimacy of the lobbyists' role in British Columbia, and, on a more extended scale, the barriers the lobbyist faces in the communication process. Finally, an assessment will be advanced in Chapter V of the over-all role of the lobbyist in the province's political system.

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<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 218-219.

*CHAPTER II**THE LOBBYISTS' ROLE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA*

This chapter will look at the lobbyists' role in British Columbia. Specifically it will examine the role of those individuals who have been designated as lobbyists within their respective organizations and whose primary function is to monitor the political and bureaucratic arena on a regular basis. Some lobbyists maintain a full-time presence in Victoria, while others monitor the house when it is sitting. The focus of this dissertation is on the individual who fills a perceived and designated role of the lobbyist in British Columbia.

*Background*

The backgrounds of lobbyists in British Columbia shows a training and experience basically in harmony with those outlined by Milbrath earlier: "law, politics, journalism, business, governmental services, association work or labour union work."<sup>35</sup> Here, as elsewhere, these previous experiences appear to endow lobbyists with the

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<sup>35</sup>Milbrath, p. 76.

necessary skills in communication, and with an understanding of bureaucratic and political structures to carry out their role.

The backgrounds of those employed as lobbyists in British Columbia have a good deal in common.<sup>36</sup> All of the lobbyists have had some university education. However, the type of degree they have received and/or the length of time they have spent at university has differed: one has a B.A. in History (C.O.F.I.), one a B.A. in Geology (C.O.F.I.); another has three years honours in Psychology (B.C.I.L.A.); two have a B.A. in Economics (Employers' Council, B.C.F.A.); another an M.A. in History (B.C.S.T.A.); another an M.A. in Political Science (B.C.T.F.); another a Ph.D. in Philosophy (I.W.A.); and another a Ph.D. in Political Science (freelance lobbyist).

All of the lobbyists had previous experience in dealing with political actors and civil servants, prior to taking on this role. In the case of those lobbyists employed by C.O.F.I., their senior lobbyist before joining the council in 1963 had done public relations work for the B.C. Telephone Company and the Community Chest organization in Vancouver. The junior lobbyist employed by C.O.F.I.

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<sup>36</sup>The general information regarding the background of the lobbyists was obtained from an interview with each of them.

had worked as a legislative reporter for *The Province* prior to joining it in 1972. The lobbyist for the B.C.I.L.A. had done public relations work for the University of Notre Dame in Nelson before being hired by the loggers' association. In a similar fashion the lobbyist for the B.C.S.T.A. had done public relations work for the B.C. Trucking Association before becoming a legislative officer for the school trustees.

Other lobbyists have obtained their experience within their respective interest groups. The lobbyist for F.I.S.A. previously worked as a principal at a private school. The lobbyist for the B.C.F.A. began as a researcher and worked his way up the organizational ladder. In the case of the Sierra Club its lobbyist had previously worked for the Manitoba government doing environmental assessments and was responsible for establishing the Winnipeg branch of the Sierra Club.

Not surprisingly a number of lobbyists have had previous political experience, a factor which gives them a special understanding of governmental operations. The lone free lance lobbyist is a student of government and was an executive-assistant to David Anderson, leader of the Liberal Party in British Columbia from 1972 to 1975. The representative of the Employers' Council worked as an assistant (stationed out of Vancouver) to the

Honourable Ron Basford, who held several portfolios in successive Liberal governments in Ottawa, before retiring. Of the two remaining lobbyists under discussion, the legislative agent for the I.W.A. worked as a researcher for the N.D.P. and acted as Dennis Cocke's executive assistant, while the latter was the Minister of Health in the Barrett government. The liaison officer of the B.C.T.F., in addition to being a student of government, was a British Columbia Legislative Intern in 1976, during which he worked in the Ministry of Education, and acted as a researcher for Gordon Gibson, at that time the leader of the Liberal Party in British Columbia.

### *Typology*

The classification of lobbyists and the title applied to them by their respective organizations does not follow any pattern. Zeigler and Baer in their study divide the lobbyists' role into three categories: contact men; informants; or watchdogs.<sup>37</sup> The British Columbia lobbyist, however, does not fit easily into any one of these categories; rather he appears to embody a combination of two of the these roles, that of informant and watchdog.

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<sup>37</sup>Zeigler and Baer, p. 77.

Even the six categories Winsor provides to describe the lobbyist in Ottawa do not work in classifying the British Columbia lobbyist: presidents and executive directors (former politicians or civil servants); company men; five per centers; Ottawa representatives; Ottawa liberal lawyers; Senators and M.P.'s.<sup>38</sup> Only one of these categories, the "representative," really applies in a British Columbia context. It is apparent that, in general, most of the literature deals with political systems in which the role of the lobbyist is far more developed and far more specialized than it is in British Columbia.

Little help in classifying the lobbyist and his role can be derived by the title employed by the interest group to describe the lobbyist's function. Each of the organizations employing a full-time lobbyist in British Columbia has given him a different title: Vice-President of Communications (C.O.F.I.); Government Relations Manager (Employers' Council); Executive Representative (Sierra Club); Legislative Information Officer (B.C.S.T.A.); Liaison Associate (B.C.T.F.); Executive Director (F.I.S.A.); and General Manager (B.C.F.A.) The lone freelance lobbyist is entitled a Public Affairs Consultant.

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<sup>38</sup>Winsor, p. 2.

A simple but useful classification of lobbyists in this province, however, focuses on the interest groups on whose behalf they are employed. Thus, the lobbyists in British Columbia can be grouped in six interest group categories - agricultural, environmental, educational, labour, professional association, and business.

*The Lobbyist's View of His Role*

As we have seen, the role of lobbyists according to King, Cherington and Gillen, Hall, and Winsor in the literature is basically to provide their principals with information about the nature of government policy and access to key decision-makers. All of the evidence generated in this research suggests that the lobbyist in British Columbia perceives his role in a similar fashion. Any differences between the role of the lobbyist in British Columbia and that described in the literature, appears to relate to the political culture in the province, the nature of the political system and the kinds of interest groups involved.

In 1978 both the Western Canada Chapter of the Sierra Club and the I.W.A. employed a lobbyist at the legislature for the first time.<sup>39</sup> The lobbyist for the Sierra Club

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<sup>39</sup>The information regarding the role and duties of the lobbyist for the Sierra Club and the I.W.A. were obtained in a series of interviews in 1978 and 1979.

saw his role as obtaining information, not available through official channels, about environmental concerns and making this information available through the media both to the club's members in Western Canada, and, to the general public. He attempted to obtain copies of environmental studies done for the government and to analyze the validity of these studies. When issues arose of concern to a local chapter of the Sierra Club he provided the professional research and organizational expertise that the local group lacked. Furthermore, he recommended the strategy the local group should adopt in pursuing its goals, and, on occasion, made representation on behalf of a chapter to the minister concerned. The activities of the Sierra Club's lobbyist were confined primarily to the British Columbia legislature, as the majority of the club's membership was in British Columbia and because the Sierra Club lacked the financial resources to send him into other parts of Western Canada.

Unlike the broad perspective of the Sierra Club's lobbyist, the perspective of the lobbyist for the I.W.A. was much more precise, and he defined his role in terms of specific issues of concern to the I.W.A. in 1978. These issues were reforestation, pensions, "right to work" legislation, and the regulations to the new Forest Act passed in June 1978. The lobbyist for the I.W.A. saw his role as keeping the I.W.A. executive informed of the mood

and direction of the government on the specific issues mentioned and others. He monitored the legislature from a Victoria base, while it was in session, but otherwise worked out of the Vancouver office of the I.W.A. doing organizational work and/or research for the union.

Both the lobbyists for the Sierra Club and the I.W.A. were attempting to establish a new presence for their respective organizations at the legislature in 1978. Their roles therefore were not defined through earlier experience. In this way they differed from the lobbyists who will be described hereafter. However, the major function of these individuals was to serve as communication facilitators in a similar fashion to the other lobbyists.

In contrast to these two the lobbyist for the agricultural sector was part of a long-standing institutional arrangement. The historical relationship between agricultural interests and the government, and the perception on the part of officials from the Ministry of Agriculture that their role is to "serve the farmer" made the role of the general manager/lobbyist for the British Columbia Federation of Agriculture (B.C.F.A.) unique. The general manager/lobbyist for the B.C.F.A. spends at least two days a week visiting the various associations which compose the federation, to determine what their concerns

are.<sup>40</sup> Many of these associations are located in the Fraser Valley.

On the bureaucratic front the B.C.F.A.'s lobbyist meets with the Deputy-Minister of Agriculture on a monthly basis to discuss any problems which have arisen with respect to agriculture and the future actions each might undertake in this field. In addition, he is in intermittent contact with other senior ministry officials in various sectors of the government.

At the political level the lobbyist for the B.C.F.A. concentrates his activities in two directions. He meets with the Minister of Agriculture whenever a problem arises which is of immediate concern to the federation, and which needs the minister's consideration. In addition, he directs his activities toward the rural M.L.A.'s in the legislature whose constituencies have a strong agricultural base. He attempts to keep these members aware of any legislation or present or proposed government policy which might affect the constituents in their riding. Working closely with these M.L.A.'s can be highly rewarding to the lobbyist, as they are highly sensitive to pressure from the agricultural interests in their constituencies.

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<sup>40</sup>The information regarding the role and duties of the lobbyist or general manager for the British Columbia Federation of Agriculture was obtained in an interview February 20, 1979.

The B.C.F.A.'s lobbyist on a more general note coordinates the federation's activities with those of other interest groups, such as the Union of British Columbia Municipalities and various Chambers of Commerce, in the process creating alliances designed to generate support for proposals advanced by the federation. Furthermore, he directs the activities of the federation's staff in Victoria. The staff arranges whatever meetings are required between the B.C.F.A. executive and political or bureaucratic officials. Furthermore, in consultation with the B.C.F.A.'s membership, the staff prepares the federation's annual brief to the Cabinet. In addition, it answers all of the executive's correspondence and attempts to help individual farmers who are having problems with the government.

The agricultural sector's lobbyist provides a mechanism through which the B.C.F.A. and the government can exchange views. He basically gathers information and ensures that both the federation's membership and the government understand each other's actions. His basic function appears to be a communication facilitator between the two bodies.

The major 'education' interest groups in British Columbia have employed lobbyists for some time. The British Columbia Teachers Federation (B.C.T.F.), for instance, had an official who monitored the legislature

on a periodic basis from 1948 to 1972.<sup>41</sup> The federation in 1978 decided to re-establish a representative at the legislature, although on a more intensive basis, by employing an individual to monitor the government full-time.<sup>42</sup> The British Columbia School Trustees Association (B.C.S.T.A.)<sup>43</sup> and the Federation of Independent School Associations (F.I.S.A.)<sup>44</sup> have also employed lobbyists to monitor government activity since 1970.

The role of the educational lobbyist in British Columbia has closely resembled that of the educational lobbyists outlined by King earlier. The full-time lobbyist employed by the B.C.T.F. in 1978 had two basic roles. The first was to provide the federation with information about government

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<sup>41</sup>Interview, with the former Assistant General Secretary and lobbyist for the British Columbia Teachers Federation, October 18, 1978.

<sup>42</sup>The information regarding the role and duties of the lobbyist for the British Columbia Teachers Federation, was obtained in an interview on June 5, 1979.

<sup>43</sup>The information regarding the role and duties of the lobbyist for the British Columbia School Trustees Association obtained in interviews on May 16, 1978 and February 25, 1979.

<sup>44</sup>The information regarding the role and duties of the lobbyist for the Federation of Independent School Associations was obtained in an interview on October 18, 1978.

activities related to education and the second was to provide the B.C.T.F.'s executive and its local associations with access to both political and bureaucratic officials concerned with education. The B.C.T.F.'s lobbyist monitored the legislature while it was in session. Furthermore, he arranged appointments for the executive and local associations with the minister or other key officials in the Ministry of Education, and initiated meetings between the federation and the cabinet. In addition, he advised the federation on the tactics it should use in approaching the government and helped establish the agenda to be discussed when meeting with the government.

The lobbyists for the B.C.S.T.A. and the F.I.S.A. performed the same basic functions. The B.C.S.T.A.'s lobbyist described his three most important functions, as follows (for further detail see Appendix 5 and Appendix 6):

1. to provide information to school boards as to the government's actions in regard to education;
2. to provide information to M.L.A.'s as to how the association is reacting to government policy;
3. to advise the school boards in interpreting the Public Schools Act.

All of the 'educational' lobbyists have been involved in both the bureaucratic and political arena to various degrees. The lobbyists for the B.C.T.F. and the B.C.S.T.A. have been aided in performing their duties by the organi-

zational linkages between their respective groups and the Ministry of Education, particularly that of a Deputy Minister's committee created in 1977. This committee is made up of senior officials from the Ministry of Education and senior officials from the B.C.T.F. and the B.C.S.T.A., along with both their lobbyists. The committee looks at the future direction of education policy in the province and the legislative changes it might implement. It provides the lobbyists from the B.C.T.F. and the B.C.S.T.A. with a direct line to much of the information their organizations want to know about, and access to the key decision-makers in the ministry.

As the Federation of Independent Schools Association (F.I.S.A.) does not have the same working relationship with the Ministry of Education, its lobbyist has been forced to adopt a different approach. In fact the F.I.S.A. has generally perceived officials in the ministry as being opposed to, rather than supportive of public funding for private schools. As a consequence, the F.I.S.A.'s lobbyist has concentrated most of his efforts on the political front.

Unlike the lobbyists from the B.C.T.F. and the B.C.S.T.A. who confined their political activities to monitoring the legislature or providing assistance to individual members, the lobbyist for the F.I.S.A. has been involved in a broad

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spectrum of political activities outside of monitoring the legislature and the cabinet. While the B.C.T.F.'s lobbyist was content to supply opposition members with information on questions of concern to the B.C.T.F., or with reports prepared by the federation's research staff, or by himself on specific areas of interest to the B.C.T.F. and individual M.L.A.'s, the lobbyist for the F.I.S.A., prior to 1977, concentrated on trying to convince individual M.L.A.'s to support public funding of private schools. As well he attended the conventions of each of the political parties and was successful in getting most of the parties to adopt a resolution in support of public funding of private schools. Furthermore, he travelled around the province encouraging F.I.S.A.'s members to get involved in a political party and to become active within it in pushing for the public funding of private schools. In addition, he organized its members throughout the province and directed their activities (letter writing campaigns to local M.L.A., phone-in campaigns to hot-line shows, and all-candidates meetings during elections) to focus attention on the need for public funding of private schools (see Appendix 7). The lobbyist for the F.I.S.A. has depended on the activity of its members to ensure his credibility and to generate the perceived demand for public funding of private schools. These tactics appeared to culminate

in success in 1977 when the Independent Schools Act was passed providing public funding for private schools.

Since the achievement of its objective the federation has tended to modify its lobbying activities. The federation's lobbyist in 1978 curtailed his presence around the legislature and concentrated instead on attempting to bring about incremental changes in the Independent Schools Act. These changes included a reduction in the accreditation period of private schools from five years to three years, and an increase in the per capita funding formula for private schools from 30 per cent to 50 per cent of the province's per capita educational budget. In contrast to earlier practice, F.I.S.A.'s lobbyist in 1978 focused his activities to greater degree on the public bureaucracy in an effort to develop new contacts to counter the new pressures exerted on the federation and its member schools from within the government over the allocation of finances.

It is apparent that the role of the educational lobbyist has changed, as indicated in the activities of the lobbyist for F.I.S.A., according to the changing objectives of the interest group. These lobbyists on the whole, however, have maintained as their basic function those outlined in Chapter One, the acquiring of information about government activities and the provision of access to government for their respective interest groups.

The lobbying efforts of British Columbia's professional associations and business interests overlap to some degree, as both categories or groups are found in the clientele of the lone free lobbyist in the province.<sup>45</sup> The function performed by the freelance lobbyist in British Columbia is very similar to that outlined by the Washington firm of Hill and Knowlton, or to that described in Winsor's article on the activities of lobbyist firms in Ottawa. He deals primarily at the vice-presidential level when working for a corporate client and with the director of public affairs or the equivalent official when working for an association. His basic function appears to be to act as his clients' eyes and ears around the legislature and in the halls of government generally.

The freelance lobbyist does *not* act as a direct advocate for any of his clients: rather he advises them on the nature of any briefs they wish to present to the government. When problems arise, he arranges meetings between his client and the appropriate cabinet minister or civil servant, so that they may present their cases in person. His role is essentially that of a facilitator of communication between interest groups and the government

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<sup>45</sup>The information regarding the role and the duties of the freelance lobbyist was obtained in an interview on June 15, 1978.

with the intent of aiding both in understanding each other.

The other business lobbyists appear to follow the same basic role as that of the freelance lobbyist in acting as watchdogs for their respective interest groups. However, the duties and the focus of the lobbyists for the British Columbia Independent Logging Association (B.C.I.A.),<sup>46</sup> the Council of Forest Industries (C.O.F.I.),<sup>47</sup> and the Employers' Council of British Columbia<sup>48</sup> within this narrow framework may differ. The lobbyist for the B.C.I.L.A. concentrates most of his effort on the bureaucracy. The association's lobbyist handles virtually all of its correspondence with the government. He does most of his own research and prepares any briefs the association decides to make to the government. Furthermore, his job

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<sup>46</sup>The information regarding the role and the duties of the lobbyist for the British Columbia Independent Logging Association was obtained in interview on February 22, 1979.

<sup>47</sup>The information regarding the role and the duties of the lobbyists for the Council of Forest Industries was obtained in a series of interviews on June 14, 1978, February 25, 1979, and March 22, 1979.

<sup>48</sup>The information regarding the role and the duties of the lobbyist for the Employers' Council of British Columbia was obtained in interviews on June 5, 1978, and February 15, 1979.

involves monitoring government and industry policies, reviewing and analyzing new and existing legislation and pursuant regulations, arranging meetings with government personnel, and preparing press releases and other data for the communications media. In addition, he is involved over a number of the industry's day to day problems with respect to such matters as weigh scales and workers' compensation. This broad diversification in the role of the B.C.I.L.A.'s lobbyist, has meant that he spends little time watching the legislature when it is in session, even though his office is located within walking distance of it (see Appendix 8 for further details).

In contrast to the lobbyist for the B.C.I.L.A., the lobbyists for the Employers' Council and C.O.F.I. concentrate much of their effort on the political arena. The lobbyists for both these organizations monitor the legislature on virtually a full-time basis when it is in session, as, it will be remembered, does the freelance lobbyist.

Lobbyists from both these organizations act as a liaison between their interest group and the government. They arrange appointments for their respective executives with cabinet members or other government officials, and on occasion will act as the spokesman for them at emergency meetings. Outside of arranging appointments,

the lobbyists for the two organizations advise their principals as to the mood of the government, how they should approach the government, who to see, and on what factors their presentations to the government should focus. In addition, the lobbyists for C.O.F.I. arrange an annual dinner between its board of directors and each of the major caucuses (Social Credit and New Democratic). These dinners play a very important function as they make both the politicians and the businessmen aware of the individuals they are dealing with, and allow possible friendships to develop.

The lobbyists for neither organization, however, deal with the concerns of the individual companies which make up the employer groups. Each of the companies handles its own specific problems. This was best illustrated in the debate on the new Forest Act in 1978. When the debate in the house began to centre around the coastal forest industry, the large forest companies concerned - in particular Macmillan Bloedel and Crown Zellerback - sent their own people to watch over the legislature and to do their own lobbying.

Unlike the other business lobbyists, the Employers' Council's lobbyist and C.O.F.I.'s lobbyists are supported by large research staffs. Both of these lobbyists have become an important part of their 'own' organization's

internal administrative structure. The roles that these lobbyists play within their respective business groups, however, are quite different.

The Employers' Council's lobbyist is a relatively junior executive in its administrative structure. He sits on two of the Employers' Council's major committees: the Public Relations Advisory Committee, which generates mainly internal working papers, and the Economic Committee. When the legislature is not in session the Council's lobbyist participates in research projects undertaken by it, and does public relations work.

In contrast to the Employers' Council, C.O.F.I. employed two lobbyists in 1978. One held a senior position in C.O.F.I.'s administrative structure and the other a junior position. The senior lobbyist has worked for C.O.F.I. since 1963, and has been described by the Financial Post as "probably the best known [lobbyist] in Western Canada."<sup>49</sup> He is entitled the Vice-President of Communications; in this capacity he heads a small public relations unit in the Council. Furthermore, he is the manager of C.O.F.I.'s northern division headquartered in Prince George. In addition, he handles most of the environmental issues which come before the Council and looks after its lobbying

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<sup>49</sup>"People," *The Financial Post*, December 30, 1978, p. 20.

activities in Ottawa and Washington - as well as Victoria.

The Council's junior lobbyist has worked for C.O.F.I. since 1972. He is a member of the Council's public relations unit and is responsible for all of C.O.F.I.'s press releases and its general relations with the media.

Overall, the 'business' lobbyists in British Columbia appear to perform a 'listening-post' function in a fashion similar to that described by Cherington and Gillen. They appear to be primarily concerned with transmitting information between the business sector and government, in the hope that both parties will be able to make more intelligent assessments of their policy options.

#### *The Lobbyist and Information Transmission*

Lobbyists obtain their information from a variety of sources. They obtain information from orders-in-council, government reports, the British Columbia Government News, and the general media (newspapers, television, and radio). When the Legislative Assembly is in session most of the lobbyists monitor the debate in the house, as it is as important at times to understand the tone of the debate, as it is to know what was actually said. Furthermore, they read the blues (a rough draft of Hansard prepared for members of the legislature after each sitting of the house), and/or Hansard regularly. The sources outlined to date

are all formal in nature, and are all generally available to the public.

In addition, lobbyists develop a number of informal contacts which must be cultivated on a personal basis over time. Lobbyists develop a variety of contacts amongst politicians and civil servants. Communication links are established with both government backbenchers and opposition M.L.A.'s, who through their own information channels can provide the lobbyist with a valuable insight into the mood of the government, and the policy initiatives it might undertake. Their major focus, however, is on those cabinet ministers and government ministries with which their interest groups must deal regularly.

It has been suggested in the press and elsewhere that lobbyists use entertainment as a means of extracting information from M.L.A.'s. For example, James K. Nesbitt, a columnist for the *News Herald* in the 1950's, described lobbyists as

people who habitually seek to buttonhole M.L.A.'s, praise them, flatter them, invite them out, buy them lunch, dinners, and drinks, send them bottles, seeking to sway them to what they called reason.<sup>50</sup>

However, in studies undertaken by Milbrath and Presthus of lobbyists in the United States and Canada, the assumption

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<sup>50</sup>James K. Nesbitt, "Premier Bennett Undaunted By Lobbyists," *News Herald*, February 3, 1953, p. 9.

underlying this assertion has not been supported. Milbrath, in his examination of lobbyists, found that "one-third did no entertaining of officials at all, and over 80% [spent] less than 5% of the time entertaining."<sup>51</sup> Presthus concluded from his study that:

social affairs, however frequently they may occur, are usually not the occasion for interest groups to seek to promote their goals. Their underlying objective instead is the effort to nourish personal relations to the extent that subsequent official interacting can occur on a friendly first name basis.<sup>52</sup>

In British Columbia entertainment in the form of a luncheon or dinner has been used by lobbyists as a means of providing a more amiable setting in which to get to know the politician or the civil servant on a personal basis. The role of the lobbyist on the British Columbia political scene and his use of entertainment is best described in the following manner:

Here it is strictly soft-sell; no sleeve-plucking in corridors. Lunch or perhaps dinner and drinks at the Empress Hotel for members. The special interest is sometimes never mentioned. But if a question is asked the answer is quick and full.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>Milbrath, pp. 120-121.

<sup>52</sup>Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canada*, p. 451.

<sup>53</sup>Ian Street, "Soft Sell Works," *The Province*, April 1, 1966, p. 5.

Of the ten lobbyists mentioned in this paper, some do virtually no entertaining. The lobbyists for the Sierra Club, the B.C.I.L.A., the B.C.F.A., and the I.W.A., along with the freelance lobbyist entertain on a very limited basis. Their caution or abstinence if one will, is due in part to financial considerations. The I.W.A.'s lobbyist, for instance, was limited in 1978 to an expense allowance of twenty dollars a day for food and entertainment. The lobbyists for C.O.F.I., the Employers' Council, the B.C.S.T.A., the B.C.T.F., and F.I.S.A. have more liberal budgets with respect to entertainment. Even they, however, limited the use of this to lunch or dinner and/or drinks three or four times a week. The amount of entertaining they did depended on whether or not the house was in session.

Another valuable source of information for the lobbyist are the media personnel in and around the legislature. A good reporter, for example, will maintain close relations with a number of cabinet ministers, and have reasonable access to all areas of the government. In this manner, a reporter will gain access to a variety of information, much of it rumour and gossip, some of which may prove to be useful to the lobbyist. | Furthermore, the media represents a potentially powerful tool which the lobbyist can use. | The lobbyist can use the media to transmit information to

members of his interest group scattered throughout the province. In addition, it can be used to transmit information, or more specifically, an interest group's position, to the general public, and in this fashion the lobbyist through the media can exert pressure on political and bureaucratic actors. A favourable presence in the media, as Johanna Der Hertog alluded to earlier, can strengthen an interest group's case and enhance the potential influence of its spokesman at the legislature.

Lobbyists transmit information they obtain back to their respective interest groups in a number of different ways. The mechanisms they have adopted in British Columbia to distribute this information are similar to those described by Milbrath in Chapter One. The telephone call is a method frequently used by the lobbyist to pass on information which may require an immediate response from his interest group or play a major role in its strategy. The usual method used by the lobbyist in transmitting information to his employer, however, is the written report, article, or newsletter. Who is made aware of the information passed on by the lobbyist differs from group to group, and the method used in transmitting it.

The lobbyists from the B.C.F.A., the B.C.I.L.A., the I.W.A., and the B.C.T.F., all produce written reports on government activities for their executives only. These

reports vary in length and frequency. For example, the B.C.T.F.'s lobbyist produced an eight to ten page report on government activities with respect to education every two weeks. In the case of the freelance lobbyist, how often, and in what form the information he gathers is passed on, depends on his client. Some desire a monthly report, while others want reports on a periodic basis - depending on the issue under discussion in the house or policies under consideration in the civil service. These reports either deal with a specific concern of a client and are directed to the executive, or involve more general concerns of the organization and appear in its monthly journal or newsletter. The freelance lobbyist, for example, writes a ghost column in the B.C.M.A. News with respect to political activities in British Columbia.

Of the remaining lobbyists all produce a newsletter or write a column in a newspaper or journal which is produced by their interest group, and is widely distributed to its membership. In the case of the Sierra Club this is done in a haphazard fashion, as the lobbyist involved issues a weekly "news release" which is distributed to all the M.L.A.'s and the media, outlining specific concerns of the Club, in the hope that these will become issues in both the legislature and the media. The lobbyists for the B.C.S.T.A. and the F.I.S.A. write formal newsletters. The newsletter

produced by the B.C.S.T.A.'s lobbyist is issued generally while the house is in session, and concentrates on educational matters brought out in the legislature. This newsletter is distributed to all the school boards in the province, the superintendents, and to each of the M.L.A.'s; it is widely read by officials in the Ministry of Education. The F.I.S.A.'s lobbyist writes a column in a newsletter produced by the federation and issues special bulletins to all of its member schools, outlining the federation's position in the political arena. The lobbyists for C.O.F.I. and the Employers' Council each produce a newsletter marked "confidential" which is distributed to a broad spectrum of the Councils' members. These newsletters are issued on a periodic basis, mainly when the house is in session, and concentrate on the activities in the political and bureaucratic arena.

As has already been indicated, the content or the nature of the information the lobbyist distributes varies widely, in accord, with the clientele groups' interests. The lobbyist for the Sierra Club attempted to supply the general public and the political actors in British Columbia with information concerning the environmental impact of specific government policies, and information about deficiencies in proposed government legislation (see Appendix 9). Here is an excerpt from a typical news release:

British Columbia environmental organizations are calling for the tabling of Bill 12, Ministry of Forests Acts and Bill 14, Forest Act, until next session of the legislature . . . . The organizations believe the proposed legislation appears regressive in many areas:

- (1) lack of provisions for public participation in the "government-industry partnership,"
- (2) inclusion of a broad-ranging provision for secrecy of forest land-use information,
- (3) failure to provide provisions for protection of fish and wildlife values in licences . . .

The lobbyist for the B.C.S.T.A., on the other hand, uses his newsletters to keep school trustees throughout the province informed of what is discussed in the legislature with respect to education. He is careful to ensure that every member of the legislature who mentions education is identified, and that what the individual said is put on record in the newsletter, regardless of the party the M.L.A. belongs to. The following is a typical example of what is reported (Appendix 10):

Gerald Strongman (SC Vancouver South) asked about school teachers with tenure who are surplus to requirements and means of getting "non-productive administrators back into the class-room." Chris D'Arcy (NDP Rossland-Trail) said there is a problem of "administrative overload in the public school system, adding that even where the number of teachers has decreased there has been a growth in the number of administrators.

In a slightly different manner the lobbyist for the F.I.S.A. uses F.I.S.A.'s newsletters and special bulletins to not only keep the member schools informed, but also to motivate

and direct their activities in support of government aid to private schools. In these newsletters, for example, he outlines how individual schools can help (see Appendix 11):

The FISA would like to re-emphasize the necessity of local schools to keep contact with their M.L.A.'s and mention their association with the Federation. It is imperative that the Independent schools show very clearly that they do [not] represent undue duplication of educational services. As the F.I.S.A. constitution indicates it is one of the objects of the Federation 'to make known to the public the rightful place and responsibility of the Independent schools within a democratic and diversified society' and it is this aspect perhaps that we have not paid sufficient attention to. Invite your community and your M.L.A. to see what you are doing, and why you are doing it.

In a similar fashion the business lobbyists use their newsletters or columns to inform as well as to advise their respective interest groups. The freelance lobbyist reports on significant developments, analyzes them, and at times may suggest certain forms of action the interest group in question might undertake to further their position. For example, he provided the B.C.M.A.'s membership with an assessment and summary of the legislature's handling of the province's health estimates in 1977, as follows:

The 1977 estimates [of the Ministry of Health] were discussed for a total of less than 10 hours, with 19 of the province's 55 M.L.A.'s participating.

. . . . .

The decision to build a teaching hospital at U.B.C. received the most attention during the health estimates . . . . Both Gibson and Cocke criticized the B.C.M.A. for alleged lack of opposition to the government's plans.<sup>54</sup>

In another report, he outlined the potential impact on the B.C.M.A. of the Ombudsman Act introduced in the house in 1977. The Ombudsman Act brought down in 1977 gave the ombudsman "the right to seek investigation of the administrative actions of the governing body of the medical professions."<sup>55</sup> At the same time he went on to advise the B.C.M.A. that the act had "obvious implications for traditional areas of doctor-patient privilege"<sup>56</sup> and suggested that it "seek clarification of some of its provisions while the bill [was] being debated in the legislature."<sup>57</sup>

The lobbyist for C.O.F.I. in a manner similar to that of the freelance lobbyist, in his newsletter outlines the mood of the legislature and attitude of the Minister with respect to legislation of particular concern to the Council, such as the Forest Act in 1978. In a more general fashion

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<sup>54</sup>"Victoria File," *B.C. Medical Journal*, September 1977, p. 329.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 315.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*

these newsletters inform the Council's membership of anything said in the legislature or policies adopted by the government of interest to them. In addition, C.O.F.I.'s lobbyist advises its members of responsible action they should undertake to further their case.

In summary, using a variety of mechanisms or processes, the lobbyist relays information and/or advice to his principals. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the lobbyist relays information from the clientele group to bureaucratic/political actors. The lobbyist for the Employers' Council, for example, relays its quarterly economic forecasts to the government. These economic forecasts provide valuable feedback to M.L.A.'s and government officials as to the perceived impact their policies are having on the business sector. Furthermore, they provide a survey of "executive comment" on the direction future government policy should take, as shown in these examples:

What three areas of federal, provincial or local government regulations have the greatest cost impact on the firm?  
(Please rank these in order and comment if you wish).

- (1) Taxation policies (federal and provincial).
  - (2) Environmental policies (federal and provincial).
  - (3) Resource policies (provincial).
- /

" . . . the overlapping series of regulations at the three levels of government hinder and impede operations and impose extra costs on the firm."

What can the business community and/or the provincial government do to improve the climate for investment in British Columbia?

" . . . (3) Move the seat of government to Vancouver."

"(1) Business community: Keep pressure on governments to restore confidence, reduce spending and generally keep their fingers out of the free enterprise system, i.e. stop trying to expand their control over actions.  
(2) Provincial government: Continue to tighten Labour Code to give management more rights to manage."<sup>58</sup>

Other lobbyists in British Columbia, as well, relay to government officials research data generated within their clientele organizations. Overall, however, while the reciprocal nature of the information flow via the lobbyist must be recognized, the transmission of information to government in this way appears to be intermittent, often informal, and, while important, difficult to probe.

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<sup>58</sup> *Business Trends Survey February 1979, Employers' Council of British Columbia.*

*CHAPTER III**THE INTEREST GROUP AND THE LOBBYIST  
IN BRITISH COLUMBIA*

In a fundamental sense the lobbyist can be viewed as a creation of the interest group. Certainly the relationship between the interest group and the lobbyist is a very basic one. The lobbyist depends on the support of the interest group in various forms to monitor the government and the interest group depends on the lobbyist to acquire information about government actions which might affect it. This dependency, if given time and the proper circumstances, will grow and bring with it an interlocking responsibility. The interest group involved has a major responsibility to inform the lobbyist of its objectives and goals and to direct the lobbyist in his relations with the government as explicitly as circumstances permit. At the same time the lobbyist must have the freedom to interpret the goals and objectives of the interest group according to his own capacities and the opportunities which present themselves, while ensuring that the interest group's overall objectives are in some way met. The relationship between the lobbyist and the interest

group in general is highly complex and a very special link in the overall communication network developed by the lobbyist.

As elsewhere, interest groups appear to have employed lobbyists in British Columbia for a variety of reasons. A prime motivation behind their utilization has been a determination on the part of an interest group to maintain, restore or improve its image and/or general relationship with the government. This motive appears to have played a major role in the employment of a lobbyist by the B.C.M.A., the B.C.S.T.A. and C.O.F.I., as well as a number of other interest groups in British Columbia.

The B.C.M.A., in order to restore what it viewed as a deteriorating relationship with the government, hired a lobbyist in 1976. In actual fact the association's relationship with the British Columbia government had begun to decline during the administration of W.A.C. Bennett. This development was highlighted by a series of incidents. The first occurred in 1968, when the Bennett government passed revisions to the Medical Services Act without consultation with the association. This action was followed, in 1969, by the decision of the Social Credit government to publish the gross individual incomes of the province's doctors. The relationship between the B.C.M.A. and the government deteriorated further in 1970 when Premier

W.A.C. Bennett placed a moratorium on increases in doctors' fees. The relationship between the government and the doctors continued to decline with the election of the N.D.P. in 1972, even though the new Minister of Health agreed to meet with the association on a regular basis every six weeks. In 1974 Order in Council 1140 restricted the right of doctors to extra bill, and later the Public Services Labour Relations Act (Bill 75) forced salaried physicians employed by the government to join the Professional Employees Union. Both of these enactments were introduced without prior consultation with the B.C.M.A. In the same year the Medical Services Commission was re-structured without informing the association. In 1975 Bill 8, which advocated extending the statute of limitations from one to thirty years, passed first reading and went unnoticed for some six weeks before the B.C.M.A. recognized the significance of this measure for its members.<sup>59</sup> This incident caused the medical association to question its existing situation, and to ask: "Why? the news media missed it. Why? In spite of representation was the board not informed of Bill 8 when they met on May 31?".<sup>60</sup> The B.C.M.A. decided to restore

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<sup>59</sup>"Editorial: Why? Why? Why?" *B.C.M.A. News* (June, 1975), p. 2.

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 2.

what it felt had traditionally been a partnership between itself and the government in the delivery of health services in the province - a partnership, indeed, which could be dated back to the creation of the B.C.M.A. in 1900, when its first president Dr. R.E. McKechnie was a minister without portfolio in the Semlin government.<sup>61</sup>

The B.C.S.T.A. found itself in a similar situation as the B.C.M.A. in the late 1960's. A series of confrontations emerged between it and the Social Credit government in 1969 and again in 1970. The Social Credit government in 1969 restricted school board budgets to a 10 per cent increase and further lowered this increment in 1970 to an 8 per cent increase.<sup>62</sup> The B.C.S.T.A., in an effort to re-establish its consultative position with the government which it had enjoyed earlier, hired a lobbyist in 1970. The major role of this individual was to improve the association's communication links with the government and with the other political actors in the province. The B.C.S.T.A. hoped, through the employment of a lobbyist, that the province's politicians would be made more aware of the problems faced by its

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<sup>61</sup>"Early VMA activities - The founding of the BCMA," *B.C. Medical Journal* (June 1978), p. 183.

<sup>62</sup>"B.C. Teachers Engaged in Jungle Warfare," *The Province*, March 11, 1972, p. 4.

local school boards, and that the association would develop a better understanding of the government's concerns, in order that conflicts in the future would be minimized.

The Council of Forest Industries, in contrast to both the B.C.M.A. and the B.C.S.T.A., employed a lobbyist as early as 1963 in an effort to ensure the existing relationship between the forest industry and the government was maintained. The takeover of the B.C. Electric in the early 1960's by the Social Credit government created an atmosphere of uncertainty amongst the business community in the province. Some within it feared that the government might try to take over the forest industry next. At this time the Council was a loosely knit coalition of five associations (the B.C. Loggers' Association, the B.C. Lumber Manufacturers' Association, the B.C. division of the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association, the Consolidated Red Shingle Association, and the Plywood Manufacturers of British Columbia)<sup>63</sup> formed, originally in 1960, as a reaction to proposed import restrictions in the United States. In 1961 C.O.F.I. "retained agents in Washington D.C. to make representations to the United States Congress on the entry of B.C. forest

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<sup>63</sup>This information was obtained from a pamphlet put out by COFI - Council of Forest Industries of British Columbia. Revised 1976.

products into the U.S."<sup>64</sup> In the light of new uncertainty, it was only logical for the forest companies to look to the Council for protection. Thus it appointed a lobbyist at the British Columbia legislature, and established an intricate government relations network at both the federal and provincial level in Canada as a means of protecting its members' interests. The role of this lobbyist, in association with C.O.F.I.'s headquarters staff, has been described, as follows:

COFI maintains liaison with many government departments and agencies, both provincial and federal, through its various divisions. A special body monitors federal moves in Ottawa. COFI committees backed up by staff, work regularly to inform government officials of the industry's position on taxation, tariff negotiations - in fact, any legislation that may affect the forest industry.

Daily reports on parliamentary progress are made when the provincial legislature is in session, and legislative action is interpreted for members.<sup>65</sup>

Other interest groups such as the B.C.I.L.A. have employed a lobbyist in Victoria since 1974 to ensure that they have a voice in the government's forest policies.

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<sup>64</sup>"Nicholson Quits Top Forestry Post," *The Vancouver Sun* (November 28, 1961), p. 28.

<sup>65</sup>Pamphlet C.O.F.I. "Government Relations."  
Revised 1976.

The decision by the I.W.A., on the other hand, to employ a lobbyist in 1978 was an immediate response to the government's latest Forest Act, which was to be introduced in the legislative session that year. The decision by the Sierra Club to employ a lobbyist in Victoria in 1978 was primarily an attempt by it to change the image of the environmental movement in the province. The environmental movement which emerged in British Columbia in the late 1960's, according to Draper, had generally "attempted to embarrass and harass the industrial and government powers they [opposed]." <sup>66</sup> Furthermore, these groups "[had] raised barriers of criticism and skepticism between themselves and the government, and [had] created a negative alienating image." <sup>67</sup> It was this negative image that the Sierra Club hoped to overcome. The Club in employing a lobbyist hoped to establish itself as a credible, responsible spokesman for the environmental movement, and, in this way, to obtain input into government policy-making with respect to environmental matters.

It is apparent from these examples that there are a variety of special circumstances which can lead to the

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<sup>66</sup> Dianne Louise Draper, *Eco-activism: issues and strategies of environmental interest groups in British Columbia*, Unpublished Master Thesis, (Victoria, 1972), p. 37.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

utilization of a lobbyist. The primary stimulus is generally government action which is felt to be against the interest group's welfare, or it may lie in a perception of lost opportunities for decisive government action in the interest group's favour. Other contributory factors may include a lack of sensitivity on the part of the government to the major concerns of the interest group, the failure of the government to consult with the interest group, or unanticipated government action. The result of any or all these, in combination, can create a feeling of uneasiness and uncertainty in the relationship between the interest group and the government, a mood which the interest group may wish to dispel.

This general mood of uncertainty in existing linkages between an interest group and the government and the decision to employ a lobbyist was well illustrated in the case of the Employers' Council of British Columbia. The Employers' Council was first formed in 1966 under the auspices of the Commercial and Industrial Research Foundation (C.I.R.F.) and represented some 30 companies.<sup>68</sup> It was a product of two years of discussion amongst some of the province's leading businessmen. Its first board of directors contained many of the province's corporate

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<sup>68</sup>Pat Carney, *The Vancouver Sun*, (March 23, 1966), p. 28.

elite. The chairman was J.E. Richardson, president of B.C. Telephone, and the other members were Ed Brown, R. Murray Brink, Frank H. Brown, G.R. Dawson, J.V. Clyne (Chairman of Macmillan Bloedel), G.B. McLean (president Standard Oil of B.C. Ltd.), and Gerald H.D. Hobb (president Western Canada Steel Ltd.).<sup>69</sup> The Council was created by a consortium of business interests in response to increasing labour unrest in the province and a perceived inability of the business sector to present its case to the public.

A major concern of the Council and its members since its inception has been with labour management relations in British Columbia, and the relationship to them of the government's labour policies. Today the Council has 160 members and it provides services in the fields of industrial relations and economic research.<sup>70</sup>

It was not until 1978 that the Employers' Council hired a full time representative to look after its government relations and advise it of any government activity, particularly with regard to labour policies, which might effect it and its members. This task had previously been handled

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> Personal interview lobbyist for the Employers' Council of British Columbia on June 5, 1978 and February 15, 1979.

by the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Council (Bill Hamilton). However, the Council's board of directors in 1978

decided to put somebody in this task full time because none of it was being effectively done by [the President and Chief Executive Officer] or other members of [the] staff all of whom [had] specific areas of responsibility so that government relations became a secondary consideration.<sup>71</sup>

In the final analysis, it appears that the interest group in utilizing a lobbyist is attempting to eliminate uncertainty in its ties with the government. Uncertainty can never be completely erased in any relationship; it can however, be reduced. The need for stability and a certain degree of predictability in a relationship is essential, particularly if long term decisions are to be made with any degree of accuracy. This is particularly true in the case of the business community which requires a stable political climate if it is to make decisions concerning long-term investments in the province. The employment of a lobbyist by an interest group is designed to create a better understanding of the government such that a stable relationship can be established between the two.

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<sup>71</sup>Letter April 5, 1979 from W.M. Hamilton President and Chief Executive Officer, Employers' Council of British Columbia.

*Employers' View of Lobbyists*<sup>72</sup>

Interest groups can have varied perceptions of the role their lobbyists are to perform, reflecting in part early and current desired expectations of the way in which they hope lobbyists will influence their relationship with the government. On the whole these perceptions are very general. A few of the interest groups in British Columbia have laid down guidelines as to the specific duties of their lobbyists. These guidelines have frequently been drawn up with the aid of the lobbyist concerned, and have tended to be very broad in nature. (Examples of the guidelines established by the B.C.S.T.A. and the B.C.I.L.A. can be seen in Appendices 5, 6 and 8.)

Of the environmental groups in the province the Sierra Club is the only that has attempted to employ a lobbyist in Victoria on a full-time basis. To the Sierra Club the function of their lobbyist is:

to gather information and share it with the volunteer Club members. He develops contacts

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<sup>72</sup>The discussion of employer attitudes toward lobbyists is limited to those groups who were willing to respond to the questions sent them. In many cases this letter was referred back to the person I had originally talked to for a reply and I felt it was redundant that they answer my questions. The groups which replied in some manner were the I.W.A., Employers' Council of British Columbia, C.O.F.I., F.I.S.A., Sierra Club, B.C.I.L.A., and the B.C.S.T.A.

with key people in government and industry, information services and sources such as libraries, universities and other places of research. This is important for all the volunteers, but particularly those . . . who aren't in the large centers where these things are available or decisions are being made that affect issues.

The conservation rep also disseminates information through lobbying in government, both to the politicians and the civil servants, while at the same time Making Quite Clear the Club Is Absolutely Non-Partisan.<sup>73</sup>

The Sierra Club from the perspective of this description perceives its lobbyist as a communication link between their membership and the government.

While the labour groups in the province have employed lobbyists at various times, in 1978, when this study was undertaken, the I.W.A. was the only labour organization to have a lobbyist at the legislature. The function of this lobbyist for the I.W.A. was "to represent the I.W.A.'s views on legislative matters, and to keep them informed of developments in Victoria."<sup>74</sup> In performing this function the I.W.A.'s lobbyist was perceived as a conduit for information between the government and the union.

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<sup>73</sup>Letter, Shirley Duncan, Chairman Sierra Club of Western Canada, April 7, 1979.

<sup>74</sup>Letter, J.J. Munro, Regional Council No. 1, International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, April 11, 1979.

In the field of education there have been a number of lobbyists. In 1978 the B.C.T.F., the B.C.S.T.A. and the F.I.S.A. each employed a lobbyist in Victoria. The B.C.T.F. saw the role of their lobbyist as being:

. . . responsible for monitoring developments in Victoria and, in particular, the Legislative Assembly and Ministry of Education that affect educational policy or administration, as well as developing and maintaining personal contact with MLAs and appointed officials.

He will also prepare reports to keep the federation abreast of developments, advise the B.C.T.F. of appropriate reactions to developments and assist B.C.T.F. representatives to meet decision-makers and/or their advisors.<sup>75</sup>

In a similar fashion the B.C.S.T.A. felt the role of their lobbyist was (see Appendix 6):

to ensure the trustee viewpoint is understood by MLA's and public servants; to report to trustees on developments in legislation and policies through "Report from the Legislature" and to maintain continuing liaison with Press Gallery members.

An executive member of the Federation of Independent Schools Association in replying to an inquiry expressed a rather contradictory view of its representatives role in Victoria, as she stated that "at no time has the Federation employed anyone to lobby in Victoria"<sup>76</sup> while at the same time

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<sup>75</sup>"Burkle appointed liaison," *B.C.T.F. Newsletter* (December 1, 1977), p. 4.

<sup>76</sup>Letter, Molly Boucher, Vice-President, Federation of Independent School Associations, May 4, 1979.

pointing out that:

From time to time the Executive Director of the Federation of Independent Schools Association has visited Victoria and called on various members of all the political parties, primarily to inform them of the service performed by independent schools in British Columbia in educating about 5% of the province's students. These contacts have always been made on a non-partisan basis, in conformity with the Federation's continuing policy to avoid becoming involved in party politics.<sup>77</sup>

In reality the Executive Director acted as a lobbyist for the federation and was perceived as such by the politicians at the legislature. The education lobbyists overall are seen by their respective interest groups as a communication link between them and the government. The major emphasis of these organizations appears to be on the exchange of information between the two bodies.

The business sector like the education interest groups in the province employs a number of lobbyists. Each of the business interest groups in 1978 viewed its lobbyist in a similar fashion. The executive of the B.C.I.L.A. saw the role of their legislative agent as providing them access to the government. As one member of the executive put it:

In order to get a hearing and have access to those departments, you have to have a person with the ability to make your group familiar to the ministers and their executive bodies

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<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*

and create an acceptable image of us to them.<sup>78</sup>

The Council of Forest Industries in a like manner felt that their lobbyist was:

to provide a thorough information-gathering service - to monitor and where possible, influence both provincial and federal government policies as they affect the interests of Council.<sup>79</sup>

C.O.F.I. felt that their representative accomplished this by

[establishing] and [maintaining] an awareness by key decision makers in Victoria and Ottawa of C.O.F.I.'s interests and perspectives with respect to a broad range of policies which have an impact on the forest industry of British Columbia.<sup>80</sup>

The Council saw its legislative agent as playing an active role in its relations with the government, as it felt he "must identify, in advance, possible legislative and policy changes and develop mechanisms and strategies within C.O.F.I. for protecting and advancing the Council's interests."<sup>81</sup> The Employers' Council of British Columbia

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<sup>78</sup>Letter, Robert A. Lind, President, British Columbia Independent Logging Association, April 6, 1979.

<sup>79</sup>Letter, John Rosalind, Executive Assistant to D.A.S. Lanskail, President, Council of Forest Industries, March 20, 1979.

<sup>80</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*

described the role of their lobbyist as follows:

Essentially we expect our representative in Victoria to maintain a high level of knowledge not only about what the government has done, or is about to do, but also what is under consideration. Much of this is not solid knowledge in a factual sense but rather the accumulation of hints, rumors and expectations of what a given set of circumstances may logically produce in the way of action.

. . . . .

. . . the representative is also expected to communicate the ideas of our own organization to those who are in either administrative or policy making decisions which we feel are in the general interest of the province as well as our constituency.

. . . . .

. . . the representative is also expected to spend a considerable part of his time - about 40% - in Vancouver in order to maintain a high level of knowledge of what our own views are and those of our members and to communicate information about what is happening in Victoria to our own organization and its members.<sup>82</sup>

The Employers' Council in the final analysis saw the role of their representative as "[making] sure that the government [understood] and [appreciated their] sectorial interests and positions."<sup>83</sup> The business interests outlined

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<sup>82</sup>Letter, W.M. Hamilton, President and Chief Executive Officer, Employers' Council of British Columbia, April 5, 1979.

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*

have in general perceived the role of their lobbyist as providing them with access to the government, and information about it.

Overall, there are a number of general observations that can be made with respect to employers' attitudes in British Columbia toward the role of the lobbyist. The major emphasis of all the interest groups mentioned has been on the communication link the lobbyist provides between themselves and the government. In addition, the lobbyist is perceived as providing them with an understanding of how the government operates and access to the key political and bureaucratic actors in the government. Outside of the fact that these interest groups have realized a need for closer contact with the government, how this is to be attained has been left up to the lobbyist.

#### *Scope and Focus of the Interest Group*

While interest groups do not interfere with the lobbyist's day-to-day activities, the evidence available to date suggests that they do determine the focus and scope of the lobbyist's attention when he interacts with the government. The lobbyists for C.O.F.I., the B.C.I.L.A., and the I.W.A. have all centered their attention principally on the Ministry of Forests. In a similar fashion the lobbyists employed by the B.C.T.F., the B.C.S.T.A., and

F.I.S.A. have concentrated their efforts on the political actors and the civil servants concerned with educational matters. The lobbyist for the B.C.T.F. and the B.C.S.T.A. have focused most of their activity on the Ministry of Education. Only when the house is in session have the lobbyists for the B.C.T.F. and the B.C.S.T.A. been active in the political arena. The lobbyist for F.I.S.A., on the other hand, has concentrated most of his activity on the political front, as the federation desired a major change in government policy which it felt it could only achieve with the cooperation of the province's political actors.

The legislative agent for the Employers' Council has focused mainly on the Ministry of Labour, the lobbyist for the B.C.F.A. on the Ministry of Agriculture, and the free-lance lobbyist when working for the B.C.M.A. on the Ministry of Health. The lobbyist for the Sierra Club due to the broad concerns of his interest group has operated somewhat differently from the others. Rather than direct his attention to a single ministry the lobbyist for the Sierra Club has adopted a wide-ranging approach to the government and interacts with a considerable number of ministries whose responsibilities bear on the environment.

In some cases the employment of a lobbyist has reflected a major effort by an interest group to improve its overall relations with the government. The employment

of a lobbyist by the B.C.M.A. is an example of this. The B.C.M.A. in 1976 changed the name of its Public Relations Committee to the Communications Committee.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore, it established an M.D./M.L.A. bulletin designed to keep members of the legislature informed about matters of concern to the profession.<sup>85</sup> In addition, the medical association created a personal doctor-M.L.A. contact system throughout the province to further aid its communications in and out of the legislature.<sup>86</sup> To improve its public image the B.C.M.A. established a system of doctors "who are in contact with local newspaper editors and radio and television stations and . . . take an active part in providing health information to the public."<sup>87</sup> The decision to employ a freelance lobbyist was thus expressly intended to supplement an intricate communication network the B.C.M.A. was in the process of establishing with the government and the public at large.

In summary the concerns of the interest groups has significantly influenced lobbyists' strategies when dealing

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<sup>84</sup>"Communications Review," *B.C. Medical Journal* (May, 1976), p. 135.

<sup>85</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*

with the government. Obviously, most of the time the ministry primarily responsible for the major concern of the interest group has become the prime target of the lobbyist. Overall, this is natural phenomenon as the lobbyist attempts to serve the needs of the interest group and provide it with the information it desires.

*Resources of an Interest Group*<sup>88</sup>

Clearly, an interest group requires some basic resources to employ a lobbyist. The extent of these resources will have a direct bearing on how the lobbyist operates. Initially these resources may be broken into two basic components: size in membership terms, and financial capability. These two factors will obviously determine directly or indirectly in a significant way the capacity of the interest group to support its lobbyist. Ultimately the existence of these resources will directly influence the lobbyist's capability to interact with government and the sophistication of the information with which he can support his interest group's position.

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<sup>88</sup>The information concerning the resources (size, financial cost and staff) of the interest group were obtained in a series of personal interviews with the lobbyists examined in this study.

The sizes of the interest groups vary: the B.C.M.A. has a membership of 4,500 doctors, the B.C.F.A. a membership of 11,000 farmers, the I.W.A. a membership of 51,664, the B.C.T.F. a membership of 29,000 teachers, the B.C.S.T.A. a membership of 500 to 515 elected school trustees, the F.I.S.A. a membership of 105 schools containing 5,000 students, the Sierra Club a membership of 500 to 600 individuals, the majority of whom are located in pockets throughout British Columbia and across Western Canada, and the B.C.I.L.A. has a membership of approximately 1,000 independent logging operators, the majority of whom are located in the northern part of the province. The B.C. Employers' Council has 160 members and C.O.F.I. approximately 129 members; the membership in both these organizations is made up of a variety of other associations. The potential influence of the interest group is reflected in its size. The size of the group, combined with its leadership, the circumstances, and the historical and socio-economic role its membership has played in the province, will in the end ultimately determine in a major way the influence of the interest group and its lobbyist.

The resources of the interest group are reflected in its size, it involves as well, a number of other closely related factors such as the strength of its members' commitment to the organization, and the skill of its

leadership. These factors represent the human resources that the lobbyist can employ in obtaining information, and in establishing informal contacts, as well as applying pressure on the government. This was evident in the case of F.I.S.A. The federation's lobbyist orchestrated a province-wide lobbying campaign, depending on the parents, students, and teachers to convince the government to provide public funding for private schools (see Appendix 11).

Other measurements of an interest group's resources are reflected in financial commitment toward the deployment of a lobbyist, and its ability to employ an organizational staff whose efforts can be of assistance to him. The allocation of financial resources directly to the lobbyists in British Columbia in 1978 varied greatly. The B.C.M.A. employed its lobbyist on a \$500.00 a month retainer and was guaranteed ten hours of work a month, the Sierra Club spent a modest \$12,000.00 per annum, and the B.C.T.F. allocated \$15,000.00 to employ a lobbyist for six months. The B.C.S.T.A. committed in the neighbourhood of \$65,215.00 a year to maintain a lobbyist around the legislature, the I.W.A. an estimated \$30,000.00 to \$40,000.00 (salary \$24,000.00 + \$16,000.00 expenses), the F.I.S.A. spent approximately \$60,000.00 to employ a lobbyist (rent, secretary, salary and expenses), and the B.C.I.L.A. spent an estimated \$50,000.00 to \$60,000.00 to maintain a full-

time lobbyist in Victoria (office rent, salary, part-time secretary). C.O.F.I. spent an estimated \$60,000.00 to \$70,000.00 (salary, general expenses, and \$625.00 a month for an executive suite on the twelfth floor of the Harbour Towers), while the Employers' Council spent between \$40,000.00 to \$50,000.00 to maintain a lobbyist in Victoria. This included "the salary of one individual, 25-30 trips a year between Victoria and Vancouver, accommodation and meals for between 100-125 days, and a budgeted amount for entertainment."<sup>89</sup> In the case of the B.C.F.A. it is difficult to determine what was allocated for its lobbyist. Its Victoria office had a proposed budget of \$332,000.00 in 1978: \$125,000.00 for salary and benefits (4 secretaries and 4 B.C.F.A. officials), \$20,000.00 for office rent, and \$11,000.00 for office supplies.

The allocation of these resources represents a major commitment by each of these interest groups to the role of the lobbyist. It does not represent in any way, however, the potential influence of the lobbyist or the interest group. These costs according to W.M. Hamilton, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Employers' Council are "almost exactly comparable to the cost of maintaining a

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<sup>89</sup> Letter April 5, 1979 from W.M. Hamilton.

travelling salesman for an organization which sells merchandise of any kind."<sup>90</sup> This is an appropriate comparison as the lobbyist is in part a salesman, a salesman of ideas who must use many of the same communication techniques in distributing his message, and must understand his market in the same fashion as the salesman.

Experience in British Columbia suggests that, while the financial capacity to directly employ a lobbyist is important, of equal significance is the capacity to employ support staff to aid the lobbyist. The size of the staff and expertise contained appear, in a number of cases in British Columbia, to have had a major impact on the lobbyist's effectiveness. These factors have determined the lobbyist's ability to supply information quickly and accurately. Furthermore, they have determined in some part the extent to which the lobbyist can specialize in either the political or bureaucratic arena.

The Council of Forest Industries with a staff of 105, allows its lobbyist to concentrate on the political arena, by providing that the everyday problems its members have with the bureaucracy and any minor changes in regulations are dealt with by other members of the staff. The lobbyist

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<sup>90</sup>*Ibid.*

for the Independent Loggers' Association on the other hand is forced to look after both the everyday problems of its membership as well as the association's responses to any changes proposed by the Ministry of Forests. With a part-time secretary and the other seven members of the association's staff located in Prince George to administer the organization, there is no one else to look after these functions. In general, the lobbyists employed by interest groups with fairly large support staffs, such as the B.C.T.F. with a staff of 125, the B.C.M.A., the I.W.A., the B.C.S.T.A. or the Employers' Council with a staff of around 20 or so, can allocate more time to developing and expanding their communication links with the government. If asked for information of a technical nature or a report, the lobbyists for these interest groups normally can obtain it from someone within the organization or request that a staff member gather the data they require to prepare an intelligent reply. In contrast the lobbyists from those interest groups with only one or two staff members, such as the Sierra Club or F.I.S.A., normally must gather the data requested of them as well as prepare the reply themselves. The lobbyists for these smaller groups therefore are forced to diversify their activity in response to the demands of the membership. In the process, inevitably, they forfeit some of the advantages associated with the

specialization of labour.

In summary, the resources of the interest group in terms of staff and money do effect the strategy of the interest group and that of its lobbyist, as well as, the quality of the presentations the lobbyist and the group are able to make to the government. These factors are not the sole determinant of lobbying effectiveness; in the government, in the leadership of the interest group, in government policy, or the mood of the public may also have a major impact on the effectiveness of the interest groups presentations. But they remain significant, and the significance is well illustrated by the way in which a new source of funding can both effect the interest group's capacity to employ a lobbyist and the manner in which he is employed.

The metamorphosis of the B.C.F.A. is a case in point. Prior to 1973 the federation was a loosely knit organization. The relationship between the B.C.F.A. and the Ministry of Agriculture was rather loose; the two did not maintain close contact. The introduction of the Land Commission Act (Bill 42) by the N.D.P. in 1973, however, unified the farmers behind the B.C.F.A. The federation opposed the introduction of Bill 42 unless it was combined with a farm income assurance scheme. Eventually, the government agreed to the B.C.F.A.'s proposal and the federation

agreed to work with the B.C. Land Commission in preserving the province's farm land. The unification of the farmers behind the federation strengthened its image as the "voice of the farmer." The implementation of the Farm Income Assurance (F.I.A.) program increased the B.C.F.A.'s resources. This is indicated in the dramatic rise in the federation's budget which resulted when the income assurance plan was fully in place in 1975, as outlined in Table I:

Table I  
B.C.F.A. Budget<sup>91</sup>

1969	47,574.47	1974	88,061
1970	57,024.65	1975	198,522
1971	59,149.62	1976	416,000
1972	63,878.17	1977	323,000
1973	73,172.00	1978	332,000

(FIA accounted for 1975: 96,835; 1976: 365,000; 1977: 210,000; 1978: 210,000).

The B.C.F.A., as a result of this expansion in its resources increased its staff and developed closer ties to the government. The staff increase was modest, but did mean that the federation acquired a designated researcher and public relations officer. The federation as a result of

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<sup>91</sup>B.C.F.A., *Convention Yearbook*, Budget reports from 1968 to 1978.

these added resources was able to prepare better briefs in presenting its case to the government.<sup>92</sup> Furthermore, it could now afford to diversify its tactics in dealing with the government. As an example of this, in 1978, the B.C.F.A. launched a letter writing campaign in opposition to a decision by the Minister of Agriculture to alter the farm income assurance program. The federation sent letters to all of its members informing them of the situation and requesting that they write the minister and their local M.L.A. opposing the proposed changes. In addition, the federation sent a letter to each of the M.L.A.'s in the province informing them of its position. These tactics were unprecedented in the B.C.F.A.'s history, and were a direct result of the new resources at its disposal.

Another result of these increased resources was to give the B.C.F.A.'s lobbyist the opportunity to expand his communication links with the government. The lobbyist for the federation now began meeting with the Deputy-Minister of Agriculture to discuss concerns of mutual interest. In addition, the B.C.F.A.'s lobbyist began to develop closer ties with the Minister of Agriculture and other political actors who might share a mutual interest

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<sup>92</sup>Senior Civil Servant in the Ministry of Agriculture, April 19, 1979.

in agricultural matters. This activity was designed to strengthen the federation's ties to both the political and bureaucratic arena.

In the final analysis, an interest group must be very careful about the manner in which it utilizes the resources at its disposal. Governments are constantly attempting to determine the public mood, and lobbying is one form of behaviour it uses to monitor its intensity. Sophisticated interest groups know this, and will attempt to use it to their advantage. This knowledge, however, must be used very cautiously as while lobbying may provide them with an advantage in dealing with the government, it may also have disadvantages. For one thing lobbyists and interest group executives are not at all identical; they may reflect different perspectives, which, if both are pursued at the same time may complicate an interest group's relationship with the government. Furthermore, an independently minded government may react negatively to those who operate on the basis of a crude belief that money or overt political power talks. In the end an ineptly handled attempt to influence government policy may be dysfunctional.

*CHAPTER IV**THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE  
LOBBYIST IN BRITISH COLUMBIA*

To this point we have concentrated on the role of lobbyists in British Columbia in 1978. We have examined their backgrounds and looked at their role from the perspective of both the employer and the employed. In addition, we have attempted to outline what services they provide. In this chapter we turn to investigate the degree of legitimacy which the lobbyist has in the political process in British Columbia. This is an important question, as to a considerable degree, the legitimacy accorded the role of the lobbyist will determine the extent to which he can establish himself at the centre of the communication network outlined via Diagrams 2 and 3 in Chapter One. In a fundamental sense, the lobbyist must be recognized, and the political actors and others must be receptive to his communication function, if he is to perform this role.

In addition Chapter IV will look at the barriers posed by individual actors, the structure, and the decision-making pattern of the government to the communication process.

In general the political environment affects the lobbyist in three ways, (1) by establishing basic legitimacy of the lobbyist role, (2) by establishing the basic behavioural rules, and (3) by identifying the basic communication barriers within which he must work. The perceived legitimacy of the lobbyist is very important as he must be seen as performing a credible function and a useful one of he is to maintain a presence at the legislature. The legislature is the established domain of the elected politicians in the province and the presence of the lobbyist there is therefore always subject to the wishes of these individuals. The politicians in the legislature in effect exist as club and have established their own rules in which they operate. The lobbyist must learn what these rules are, and how to operate within them, if he is to remain as a guest of the legislature. Finally the structure of government and the nature of those operating it represent a potential obstacle to the communication network the lobbyist is attempting to create. Organizations by their very structure both facilitate communications and create barriers to it. The lobbyist must identify those areas which promote the exchange of information and those areas which present difficulties for the communication process.

*Legitimacy of Lobbyists*

Lobbying and lobbyists are not a new phenomenon. They have existed in British Columbia since its early beginnings. In 1924, for instance, in an article on British Columbia's legislature, lobbyists were described as "a species of predatory bird gathering into small groups with different objects - but all intent upon getting the ear and interests of the ministers."<sup>93</sup> The lobbyists of the day were said to be:

Vancouver lawyers who had been retained by the various conflicting interests in the province or represented growing bodies of citizens whose newly-required weight in the affairs of the nation urged them to seek close incorporation.<sup>94</sup>

Three years later the *Victoria Daily Times* described lobbyists as

mysterious individuals who have swarmed into this fair city, each with an axe to grind - lobbyists who drag the poor member into a secluded nook to expound to him the necessity, if the country is to be saved of legislation in favour of this scheme or that enterprise. It is a veritable gauntlet the member runs as he proceeds about his duties of making the laws of his Province . . .<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> J. Butterfield, "Following the Birds to Victoria," *The Province*, November 22, 1924, p. 21.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>95</sup> "Behind the Scenes of the Legislature Forty-Eight Members Have Had Strenuous Two Months Work," *Daily Times*, Magazine Section, February 26, 1927, p. 1.

*The Province* in 1929 characterized the lobbyist in British Columbia as follows (see Appendix 12):

A forceful personality is our Victoria lobbyist. He is sleek, well-fed, exquisitely grounded: he wears what the full-page advertisement tells us the well-dressed man should wear including a change of garters every other day.

. . . . .

Many of these exquisite gentlemen are lawyers and therefore not at all concerned with the merits of the case they advocate. They serve whoever pays, but they themselves do not know who is pulling the strings.

The bankroll of the lobbyist is of generous proportions and is at the service of a worthy cause . . . . It has been estimated, perhaps wrongly that lobbyists buy more dinners for members of Parliament than the members buy for themselves.

Certainly they buy better dinners.

Lobbyists have been both feared and accepted in British Columbia. They have been described as "a curse of our public life,"<sup>96</sup> and there has been concern at times that they might exercise undue influence over government decisions. However, the lobbyist has continued to survive.

Politicians have been worried about lobbyists since the province's early beginnings. The members of the legislature have taken a variety of steps to protect themselves from

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<sup>96</sup>Jim Nesbitt, "Too Many Cocktails for City Fathers," *News Herald*, October 16, 1951, p. 4.

lobbyists who they felt were 'becoming a nuisance' while the house was sitting. As early as March 1, 1892 lobbying was the subject of some heated exchanges in the legislative precincts. The incident in question involved the M.L.A. from West Kootenay, Mr. Kellie. Mr. Kellie had been approached by a Victoria lawyer to support and take charge of a bill to incorporate the Consumers' Waterworks Company of Nelson, which he agreed to do provided an amendment was made to the bill which would allow the city of Nelson when it became incorporated "to purchase the works at a certain percentage of the costs."<sup>97</sup> When he had introduced the bill into the house and spoken on it, suggesting his proposed amendment, Mr. Kellie received a note from the Victoria lawyer to meet him in the lobby. On entering the lobby the lawyer was standing beside Mr. Barnard the M.P. from Cariboo who proceeded to call Mr. Kellie "a liar and a stinker, and a traitor"<sup>98</sup> for his handling of the waterworks bill. Mr. Kellie brought this incident to the attention of the legislature after waiting nearly a week and receiving no apology.

This incident precipitated a discussion about lobbyists and their activities around the legislature. Mr. Semlin

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<sup>97</sup>"Provincial Legislature," *Daily Colonist*, March 2, 1892, p. 6.

<sup>98</sup>*Ibid.*

(M.L.A. Yale), who was to become the Premier of British Columbia in 1900, stated:

he did not think it was right for the promoters of private bills to be all the time lobbying while the house was in session, and more especially when their particular bills were up before the house for discussion.<sup>99</sup>

Mr. Booth, the member for East Kootenay, suggested "that it would be very much better that lobbying should be done away with altogether."<sup>100</sup> The Speaker at this time suggested "that unless this matter was satisfactorily settled, he would order that the lobby be closed and no strangers be admitted at all during the sittings of the legislature."<sup>101</sup> A special committee of the legislature was established to investigate this matter, but no action was taken as an apology was received from Frank S. Barnard, Esq., M.P. for having committed a breach of privilege of the house.

In 1911 the legislature passed the following motion restricting lobbyists' access to the house, while it was sitting:

Hereafter the whole class is to be kept out while the House is sitting. They and the rest of the public will be kept out of the

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<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*

main rotunds and only ticket holders will be admitted to the intermediate lobby. To gain access to the lobbies surrounding the chamber a visitor must be accompanied by his sponsor. The member is held responsible for him and must see that he passes outside as soon as his business is done.<sup>102</sup>

During the decade of the twenties, the role of the lobbyist was debated by provincial legislators on at least two occasions. The first, in 1921, was precipitated by the announcement of Mr. Pooley, then an M.L.A. from Vancouver, that he had been verbally attacked and told "he was in the pay of the B.C. Electric," by a "gentleman connected in a professional way with putting through the Vancouver bill," for having spoken against some of the proposed amendments to the legislation.<sup>103</sup> He demanded that this man make "a written apology not only to himself but to the House through the Speaker for the remarks he had made in the corridor."<sup>104</sup>

In bringing this matter before the house Mr. Pooley did not question the right of lobbyists to operate around the legislature, though he pointed out that he had the right

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<sup>102</sup>"Regulation of Motor Traffic," *Daily Times*, January 24, 1911, p. 3.

<sup>103</sup>"Serious Charge Against Lawyer," *Daily Times*, November 18, 1921, p. 7.

<sup>104</sup>*Ibid.*

to have the gentleman:

removed from the corridors of the House and call in the card signed by the speaker granting [the lobbyist] certain privileges around the legislature because of the work he was engaged on, but [that he would] not go that far because by doing so [he] might jeopardize the cause of Vancouver in their private bill.<sup>105</sup>

Mr. Pooley was careful when presenting this incident to the legislature to ensure that the credibility of Vancouver's other lobbyists was not damaged, by pointing out that "it was not E.J. Jones, corporation counsel of Vancouver to whom he referred but another 'professional gentleman.'"<sup>106</sup>

The second incident, in 1928, emerged when George A. Walker, Conservative M.L.A. for Richmond-Pointed Grey, asked in effect,

what Mr. Speaker Buckham intended to do about 'the disgraceful' lobbying which had gone on during recent sessions and was being resumed now. He said that it was objectionable to members to have the corridors of the House forever crowded with lobbyists.<sup>107</sup>

Premier MacLean, while expressing keen sympathy, replied "that no one could enter the lobbies of the House without a card signed by a member" and "the control of lobbyists was

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<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> "Would Put Lobbyists Under Ban," *The Province*, January 27, 1928, p. 25.

thus with the House itself and not with the government."<sup>108</sup>  
The result of this outburst, it was predicted in the media, would be "a tightening up of the rules governing the use of lobbies and more careful scrutiny of the activities of lobbyists."<sup>109</sup>

Such incidents as those just described make clear two things. Interest groups have used lobbyists for a long time in the province, and, while real difficulties have been associated with the practice, gradually politicians have accepted the proposition that lobbyists have a legitimate role to play here. The difficulties which emerged over half a century ago with respect to lobbyists appear to have surfaced in periods when, for a variety of reasons, lobbying activity was greatly intensified.

During the last fifty years provincial lobbyists seem to have been circumspect in their approaches to the legislature itself. Thus, there has been very little discussion of their role formally in it, and, while they have been accorded no formal status in its precincts, they have received a form of unofficial recognition there. They have been granted privileges not extended to the general public.

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<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

These privileges have varied over the years. At times lobbyists have been granted passes to the locked and guarded legislative corridors. By the late 1960's, however, this privilege was no longer in evidence. Thus Mr. Speaker William Murray could declare in 1966:

Most lobbyists are quiet and well behaved and adhere to the rules.

The rules include no entry to the Speaker's area around the chamber while the House is sitting.<sup>110</sup>

Lobbyists, however, were provided with passes into the legislative gallery where they could listen to the debate, and where they were able to reserve permanent seats in the gallery. As Speaker Gordon Dowding described the situation in 1975, "they don't have to worry about school children taking their space when the gallery is crowded."<sup>111</sup> Speaking on behalf of the legislature at this time, Mr. Dowding added that, "we don't treat them as being other than members of the public at large in any way."<sup>112</sup>

Whether or not the privilege that was prevalent in the early history of the province of issuing lobbyists corridor passes was ever formally changed is unknown, as the pass system fell into disuse in the 1960's. M.L.A.'s were still

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<sup>110</sup> Ian Street, *The Province*, April 1, 1966, p. 5.

<sup>111</sup> Neale Adams, *The Vancouver Sun*, April 19, 1975, p. 15.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

issued the passes, but it was strictly as a formality, for the legislature was virtually a club where everyone knew everyone else. However, the Speaker in an effort to tighten security in the legislative buildings revived the pass system in 1976. Lobbyists were once again included in the ranks of those granted passes - though not all of them feel a need for this privilege or have taken advantage of it.<sup>113</sup>

In 1978 the Speaker introduced some new administrative practices with respect to the operation of the legislative buildings. One of these changes took away the privileges of providing permanently reserved seats in the gallery for executive assistants, senior civil servants, and lobbyists. Lobbyists were now forced to reserve seats in the gallery on a daily basis as was the case for the rest of the public. However, while losing this privilege, they retained the right to be issued Speaker's passes.

The Speaker's pass is perhaps the most important privilege now granted lobbyists - especially as it affects those who operate primarily on the political front. The passes permit the lobbyist direct access to the politicians in the legislative corridors. This is particularly important

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<sup>113</sup> Interview, Mr. Speaker, Legislative Buildings of British Columbia, March 7, 1979.

for lobbyists seeking access to cabinet ministers who are normally protected behind their office doors by their secretaries and executive assistants. These passes allow the lobbyist the opportunity to quietly speak to a member of cabinet or to an M.L.A. as he or she enters or leaves the house, to arrange a meeting for his interest group, to clarify a point or to inform the member of the current position of the lobbyist's interest group with respect to a matter before the legislature. In addition, this privilege permits the lobbyist to pass messages directly (through Sergeant of Arms personnel) to a member of cabinet or an M.L.A., if that person is in the legislature.

Overall, then, today provincial politicians view the lobbyist as anything but a problem. The lobbyist is generally seen by them rather as an honest individual and a reliable source of information. The M.L.A.'s at times use them to gauge the importance of an issue and the interest of it in their constituencies. The possibility of an increase in the number of lobbyists around the legislature, however, is still viewed with apprehension by some politicians. In general, though, lobbyist activities were not viewed by M.L.A.'s in 1978 with concern.

*The Impact of Formal and Informal Legislative Rules on Lobbyist Behaviour*

The activities of interest groups and their representatives have been restricted by the rules of the legislature in British Columbia. The Constitution Act and Standing Order 89 have made it illegal for interest groups to hire or in other ways to obtain direct assistance from elected officials in their cause.

The offer of any money or other advantage to any member of this House, for the promoting of any matter whatsoever depending or to be transacted in the House, is a high crime and misdemeanour and tends to the subversion of the Constitution.

Members in general have been reluctant to jeopardize their political careers for the sake of money. In the 1950's Robert Sommers, the Minister of Lands and Forests, is alleged to have accepted money from a lobbyist employed by British Columbia Forest Products Ltd. He was subsequently convicted "of being part of a conspiracy to accept bribes while he was a cabinet minister"<sup>114</sup> and was sentenced to two years in prison. His political career was totally destroyed. This incident, and the occasional scandal involving other ministers during the 1960's and the 1970's have served to remind members of the constant dangers that

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<sup>114</sup>Paddy Sherman, *Bennett* (Toronto, 1966), p. 168.

exist to their political careers from a violation of this rule. Today even the offering of modest gifts is widely viewed as a questionable practice. Often gifts to M.L.A.'s are returned as a matter of principle. Thus, the lobbyist has had to recognize, both the formal and informal code to which politicians adhere to in British Columbia. This has tended to rule out the offering of gifts as a means of influencing policy development.

#### *Communication Barriers*

Lobbyists operate on the edge or the periphery of the formal decision-making process in government. Their goal is to penetrate it, when necessary, either to stimulate or prevent action, or to acquire or relay information. The process which they monitor so closely in time becomes familiar; governments inevitably and often wisely develop scenarios, routines of repeated action when facing over time a succession of familiar problems. The decision-making process, however, is more than an artifact of organizational memory. It is significantly the result of the formal organizational structure of government, and the result, also, of the abilities and predispositions of the key individual sectors within the structure. All of these components - actors, structure, decision-making processes - are obviously of great concern to the lobbyist.

We direct attention now to the way in which each in turn may constrain lobbyist activity, or, if one will, each may serve as a barrier to the communication process involving the lobbyist.

Individual ministers at times have restricted an interest group's or its lobbyist's access to cabinet, and have forced them to alter their tactics in approaching the government. Two cases illustrate the power and influence a minister can exercise over access to the government. Eric Martin, the province's Minister of Health and Welfare in 1955, for example, recommended that the Senior Citizen's Association of British Columbia should not be permitted to see cabinet as in his view their president (Appendix 13):

Mr. Edwards [represented] the rebel section of the Old Age Pensioners Organization which broke away from the main body. He was the man who organized a mass meeting in protest against, he supposed, the \$2.50 Cost-of-living bonus increase just before the last Session.

Neither Mr. Edwards nor his association were granted an audience with the full cabinet. However, Mr. Martin did meet with Mr. Edwards privately and in later years the organization he represented was allowed to meet with the full cabinet. In a similar manner the Minister of Education in 1943, H.G.T. Perry, openly attacked the lobbying activities of the British Columbia Teachers' Federation (B.C.T.F.) in the legislature. He described the B.C.T.F.'s "two days in

the Parliament Buildings handing out briefs and pamphlets to members of the legislature" as "engendering ill-will toward the department" and "getting the association into a sort of group pressure movement."<sup>115</sup> It was only after the B.C.T.F. met with the Premier and reaffirmed "the mutual spirit of good will that had existed for so many years between the Department and the teachers' representatives"<sup>116</sup> that the incident was straightened out.

The mood of the cabinet, as well as individually, can determine the nature of lobbyists' access to the government. The Bennett government for instance in 1953 "departed from tradition" when it refused to meet any delegates "during the time the house was in session."<sup>117</sup> Interest groups were told they could meet with individual cabinet ministers or send briefs to the cabinet. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association, however, vitally concerned with the government's decision to place the Labour Relations Board on a part-time footing, in face of its objections, and annoyed

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<sup>115</sup>"Perry Scores Teachers for 'Group Pressure,'" *Victoria Daily Times*, March 6, 1943, p. 5.

<sup>116</sup>"Teachers Answer 'Lobbying' Charge," *Victoria Daily Times*, March 17, 1943, p. 2.

<sup>117</sup>"Cabinet Door Shut Against Delegates While House Sits," *Victoria Daily Times*, January 9, 1953, p. 13.

because it was not allowed to personally present its brief to cabinet on the subject, attempted to pressure the government to change its decision. Hugh Dalton, manager of the B.C. division of the C.M.A. sent a circular letter to all of the Social Credit League in the province.

It read as follows:

The purpose of this letter is to ask you to bring up this matter for discussion in your league, and, if you feel so disposed, to indicate your support of these views to your member of the legislature, with a view to having the Labor Relations Board returned to its full-time status in order to ensure the maximum of stability in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act as it stands on the statute books.<sup>118</sup>

This attempt to gain the support of the party's members and in essence to undermine the power of the newly elected government was publicly criticized by W.A.C. Bennett, when it was brought to his attention. In a special press conference the Premier stated that:

This is a government that does not yield to power lobbying. I would like to draw the attention of the public to the pressure lobbying of the B.C. section of the C.M.A.<sup>119</sup>

The Canadian Manufacturers' Association, needless to say, was not successful in obtaining a meeting with cabinet.

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<sup>118</sup>"Premier Charges Manufacturers with Pressure Lobbying Tactics," *Victoria Colonist*, January 31, 1953, p. 13.

<sup>119</sup>*Ibid.*

The lobbyist must adapt his tactics and, that of his interest group, to the changing mood of the ministers and, of the government in general. Furthermore, the lobbyist must change his approach according to the style, structure and decision-making process adopted by the government.

The style or more precisely the decision-making process within a government varies from government to government, and, often, within the term or terms of one administration. Under W.A.C. Bennett, who as the leader of the Social Credit Party, was Premier of British Columbia from 1952 to 1972:

The Style of . . . management was highly autocratic. Communication between departments and divisions was not encouraged and was top-down. Decision-making was highly centralized.<sup>120</sup>

The cabinet was the final authority on all government decisions and the bureaucracy was used more as a vehicle for implementing decisions, rather than as a vehicle for generating new ideas. The government under W.A.C. Bennett was highly personalized and it was perceived that those who had the ear of the minister or access to Mr. Bennett were more likely to have their proposals adopted by the government. Cabinet decisions were strongly influenced by Mr. Bennett, who as Minister of Finance controlled the

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<sup>120</sup> Stan Persky, *Son of Soered* (Vancouver, 1979), p. 175.

government's expenditures, and who had a strong dynamic personality, and in matters of concern could be very persuasive.

The New Democratic Party which formed the government from 1972 to 1975, under Premier Barrett, operated in much the same fashion as that under W.A.C. Bennett. The cabinet as a single body looked at all the proposed legislation and very often those cabinet ministers who had strong personalities and could carry through their arguments appear to have had their legislative proposals adopted.<sup>121</sup> Mr. Barrett, like Mr. Bennett, exercised a strong personal influence over cabinet decisions.

Under the first Social Credit government, and later under the N.D.P., legislation was normally developed almost entirely within the isolation of a single ministry and taken by its minister to cabinet, where it was either accepted or rejected. This process assumed a high concentration of ministerial power and potentially allowed the minister, if he so desired, to act independently of his ministerial staff and their recommendations. The ability of the minister to dominate the legislative direction of his department made

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<sup>121</sup>Paul Tennant, "The NDP Government of British Columbia: Unaided Politicians in an Unaided Cabinet," *Canadian Public Policy* (Autumn, 1977), p. 489.

it very important in those years that the lobbyist understand the minister's views in policy areas of concern to his interest group. It also meant that the bureaucracy did not view itself as initiating policy, but rather as administering it, once it was adopted. Lobbyists thus sought to develop close personal relationships with ministers, particularly those whose departments provided the services required by their organization. It is obvious that cultivating personal relationships of this sort is risky, in that it involves the possibility of a lobbyist-ministerial identification (whether valid or not) which could be detrimental with a change in administration. This is particularly true in British Columbia where the political system is highly polarized. It must be remembered that cabinet dominates the policy-making process and the direction of the government, thus controlling the lobbyist's access to much of the information he requires to fulfill his role.

With the election of the new Social Credit government in 1975, the policy-making process was changed. The new Social Credit government created a cabinet committee system to screen proposed legislation. (A move in this direction had actually been made by the NDP during its last months in office.) Furthermore, the civil service became more involved in both the initiation and development of government policy. The new Social Credit government adopted a

more decentralized approach to policy-making, in a style which still exists today.


The cabinet committee system in British Columbia now provides a rather explicit procedure by means of which policy may be initiated. However, the structure involved is still very loosely knit. Unlike the practice in Ottawa, there are no formalized meeting times for cabinet committees; they meet on an ad hoc basis. (One day a week has been set aside, but no regular pattern of meetings has yet evolved.) The cabinet committee system is made up of four committees which examine policy initiatives, Treasury Board, Economic Development, Social Services, and Priorities and Planning. There is a fifth committee called the Legislative Committee which examines a new proposal once it has been accepted and drafted into bill form (see Charts I and II). This new cabinet committee structure has opened up the policy evaluation process in new ways to the upper echelon of the bureaucracy who now accompany their ministers to these meetings.<sup>122</sup> This process differs dramatically from the past when new proposals were discussed in cabinet, where civil servants were rarely, if ever, permitted. The key civil servants in British Columbia, in contrast to the past,

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<sup>122</sup>Senior Civil Servant, March 6, March 8, and April 19, 1979.

CHART I


ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  
CABINET COMMITTEE STRUCTURE



*The Organization of the Public Service of the Province of British Columbia, Staff Development Division, Public Service Commission, Legislative Buildings, 1979/80, p. 25.*

CHART II

ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA



*The Organization of the Province of British Columbia, Staff Development Division, Public Service Commission, Legislative Buildings, 1979/80, p. 26.*

now are privy to the interaction between ministers directly and can assess the strengths and weaknesses of their ministers with respect to their colleagues, and the political constraints they face in getting new proposals adopted. This process has made it more difficult for ministers to act independently of their ministries. In addition, it has provided the impetus for the creation of two Deputy-Ministers' committees parallel to the cabinet committees on Social Services, and Economic Development. The Deputy-Ministers' committees, at the present time, do not initiate policy, but only act on proposals passed down from the cabinet or its respective committees. The formalized cabinet committee system has thus tended to enhance the importance of the bureaucracy, as a valuable source of information to the lobbyist with respect to the attitudes and interaction between ministers, and as a channel through which to relay information to the political level.

Overall, a major consequence of the adoption of a cabinet-committee system is that it has "opened up" the policy-making process. A minister is now informed of impending legislation from other departments which might affect his ministry, and is given an opportunity to comment on it. This has led to greater consultation between ministries, as a means of solving differences between committees. If a ministry is opposed to proposals, it

is now able to invoke valuable assistance from interest groups with which it works by alerting them well in advance to any legislation which might affect them adversely. The Ministry of Agriculture, for instance, worked closely with the British Columbia Federation of Agriculture (B.C.F.A.) in commenting on the new Range Act proposed by the Ministry of Forests in 1978.<sup>123</sup>

The cabinet committee process has led to the creation of special advisory committees - such as the Coal Advisory Committee<sup>124</sup> - when a consensus cannot be reached in the bureaucracy. The Coal Advisory Committee was a joint government-business committee created in 1976 to examine whether or not the current freehold system (whereby land is sold in blocks without any assessment of its potential value) or a bidding system (under which land is sold according to the potential value of its coal deposits and the price those interested in coal exploration are willing to pay) should be used in the sale of land for coal exploration. This committee was created when the Ministry of Economic Development, and the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum Resources (now Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources) - backed by a

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<sup>123</sup>Senior Civil Servant, April 19, 1979.


<sup>124</sup>Senior Civil Servant, March 6, 1979.

joint brief (as suggested by the ministry), from the Canadian Coal Association, the British Columbia Mining Association, and the British Columbia and Yukon Chamber of Mines - could not agree on what system to adopt. The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum Resources wanted to maintain the current freehold system while the Ministry of Economic Development wanted to change to the bidding system. The cabinet committee system in general appears to be moving British Columbia in the same direction as the federal government, where a consensus must be agreed to by the bureaucracy as well as agreed to by cabinet before a proposal is drafted as legislation and presented to the house. This process has increased the importance of the bureaucracy to the lobbyist not only as a valuable source of information with respect to new government proposals, but as a potential ally in preventing new legislation from being adopted to which the lobbyist's interest group is opposed.

The cabinet committee system, while it has opened up the policy-making process, has also placed new constraints on it (see Chart III). Legislative proposals are generally developed first in a ministry and then sent to the appropriate cabinet committee (Economic Development or Social Services) for discussion and approval. In addition, all legislation must gain the approval of Treasury Board, if it involves the expenditure of government money, and the

Chart III

## Policy-making Process of the Government of British Columbia



Priorities and Planning Committee to ensure it is in harmony with the government's overall legislative plans for the session. These two committees, are the most important ones, and are the only ones on which the Premier sits.

The Treasury Board attempts to allocate the province's financial resources in the most efficient and effective manner. The development of the Treasury Board has created new constraints on the political process as now each government department must justify every program it has and all its expenditures before the Board. This internal justification of a ministry's programs and expenditures, as a Deputy-Minister suggested is greater pressure than an interest group can exert normally.<sup>125</sup> The creation of a separate Treasury Board staff and its tight control over government expenditures has made it more difficult for an interest group to get a new program adopted which requires government expenditures. Paradoxically, in another sense, it has made the lobbyist's job easier, as all proposals to be examined by the Treasury Board are given a priority standing, which allows the lobbyist to follow its progress easier and time any actions he wishes to take more effectively. The timing of a proposal can be a significant

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<sup>125</sup>Senior Civil Servant, April 19, 1979.

factor in its initial and ultimate reception. In summary, the establishment of a Treasury Board staff, has both restricted the demands made on the government - by forcing them to be far more detailed and analytical -, while at the same time it has opened up the policy-making process from the lobbyist's perspective.

After legislation has been examined by the appropriate cabinet committees it goes before the full cabinet for final approval. In many cases this approval is simply a formality. However, where a bill has been rejected by one of the cabinet committees, a minister may ask the full cabinet to review it. Cabinet reserves the final decision on all government actions. After a proposal is approved by cabinet it is sent back to the appropriate ministry and then to the Legislative Counsel to be drafted into legal form.

The Legislative Counsel is part of the Attorney-General's Ministry and is responsible for drafting legislation for its own ministry, as well as the legislation for all other ministries in the government. The Counsel represents the last major obstacle a proposal must overcome before being presented to caucus. The Legislative Counsel does not establish any priority system with respect to drafting incoming legislative proposals, a bill may be set aside at any time for what is felt to be more

important work.<sup>126</sup> If a bill is not drafted during the current legislative session it cannot be presented to the legislature and must go through the whole process again.

Once a bill is drafted and has been checked by the Legislative committee of cabinet it is sent to caucus. Frequently approval by caucus is seen as a mere formality. However, this is not always true, as caucus on a number of occasions has refused to support legislation designated for the house. The Oliver government in 1924 for instance, due to conflicts within the caucus over the selling of beer by the glass, choose a non-party vote, when finally placing this option before the legislature in order to avoid embarrassment and possible defeat. The Pattullo government in 1935, faced with a similar problem in relation to the serving of liquor in restaurants, also choose a non-party vote in the legislature to avoid defeat. The potential power of caucus was, perhaps, best illustrated in 1968 when W.A.C. Bennett was forced to demote then Highways Minister Phil Gaglardi, over the abuse of government air flights, "when at least seven backbenchers and four cabinet ministers" said "they would not vote for Mr. Gaglardi's salary as a cabinet minister and threatened

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<sup>126</sup>Senior Civil Servant, March 15, 1979.

the fall of the government."<sup>127</sup> The caucus is potentially very powerful, even though it rarely exercises this latent capacity.

Both the government and opposition caucuses hear briefs from interest groups attempting to obtain input into the political process. Lobbyists frequently advise their clients to make presentations to both government and opposition caucuses to ensure that their positions on impending government policy are clearly understood. Furthermore, these occasions are perceived by the lobbyist as a means of enhancing an amiable relationship amongst legislative backbenchers, as these presentations are frequently combined with a cocktail or dinner party. Between 1976 and 1978 the caucuses heard presentations from a number of interest groups, as shown (see Appendices 14, 15, and 16).

Table II  
Caucus Presentations<sup>128</sup>

	<u>Social Credit</u>	<u>New Democratic Party</u>
1976	15	48
1977	18	83
1978	17	93

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<sup>127</sup> John Mika, "Bennett 'Covering' Real Party Crisis," *Victoria Times*, March 23, 1968, p. 1.

<sup>128</sup> Gerry Kristianson, "Lobbying in British Columbia," Political Science Seminar, February 19, 1979.

The willingness to 'hear-out' many of these presentations in many cases represents a courtesy designed to speed up the legislative process, as frequently the government will have already established its policy position prior to the meeting in question. In some situations interest-group presentations to caucus are designed simply to inform rank and file members of the legislature about impending policy and to answer any questions they might have so that the proposal before the caucus will be passed quickly in the legislature. In other cases the presentation-to-caucus represents an attempt by an interest group to have a policy which has been rejected by cabinet reconsidered.

The discrepancy between the number of representations heard by the government caucus and opposition caucus, illustrated in the table above, can be explained in a variety of ways. Interest groups and their lobbyist advisors are well aware of the fact that cabinet ministers are part of the government caucus, and normally, at this stage of the legislative process, ministers and their caucus are unlikely to modify a previous decision. A further explanation for this difference lies in the desire of the opposition to obtain information from a variety of sources, much of which is already at the government's disposal.

Two factors have made lobbyists in British Columbia aware of the legislative caucuses. These considerations are the small size of the legislature (57 members), and the polarization in the political system in British Columbia. The small size of the legislature has meant that in the event of a cabinet shuffle the government has only a few competent backbenchers to choose from. The polarization of the political system in British Columbia has accentuated the significance of the possibility that the government could change at the next election. These factors have made it imperative that the lobbyist cultivate relationships with backbenchers on both sides of the house, who might become future cabinet ministers, to ensure access to the government over time.

After a bill has been presented to, and has received caucus approval, it is read three times in the legislature. In first reading it is introduced and placed on the order paper, and in second reading it is debated in principle. Then the bill is either sent to the committee of the whole (discussed on the floor of the legislature), where amendments can be introduced and debated, or sent to one of the standing committees.

In the past, standing committees in the British Columbia legislature were used far more extensively than they are today. During the 1920's special legislative

committees were established to deal with the conflict between the medical profession and chiropractors as well as with a number of other policy areas. At one time interest groups such as the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (U.B.C.M.) and the Advisory Board of the Farmers' Institute presented their resolutions regularly to standing committees. These committees would then recommend that the minister introduce certain legislative proposals during the then current session. Those standing committees which sat regularly, forced the various interest groups to maintain a constant presence in Victoria watching their proceedings. The use of standing committees to some degree increased the presence of lobbyists and affected how they operated. A former lobbyist for the B.C.T.F. when asked why he only spent a day or so every week at the legislature during the session, while the lobbyist for C.O.F.I. spent almost every day of the week at the legislature while it was in session, attributed the difference in their operation to the fact that the Standing Committee on Forestry was highly active in the mid-1960's while the Standing Committee for Education and Social Welfare remained almost totally dormant. At present the Legislature's standing committees, outside of three basic ones (Standing Orders and Private Bills, Public Accounts, and Crown Corporations) are totally inactive and play little or no role in the government's

decision-making process.

Today, if any changes are to be made to a bill before the legislature, they will generally be introduced during the committee phase. It is unusual, however, that any major amendments are made after the bill has been introduced to the house. The third and final reading stage involves a clause by clause debate of the bill after which it is passed by the legislature (provided the government is in a majority) and then sent to the Lieutenant-Governor for royal assent.

In summary what has been discussed to date in this chapter is the political environment in which the lobbyist must operate in British Columbia. The lobbyist has little or no control over his environment in general. He must learn to understand it and to work within it. This environment is constantly changing through cabinet shuffles, governmental reorganizations, and the very fact that policy-making is a dynamic process not a static one.

Each ministry has its own organizational structure and its own unique decision-making process. The lobbyist must familiarize himself with those ministries with which his interest group interacts. The cabinet in a parliamentary system, as Grove points out, dominates the policy-making process; thus the cabinet-committee system of all the structures and policy-making processes is most important to the lobbyist.

The cabinet-committee system as it now exists in British Columbia has created a formal consultative process between government ministries. It has meant that proposals must be more analytical to withstand the scrutiny of other government agencies. The increasing scope of government activity has made it essential that the civil service and the political actors in the province have access to expert information in highly specialized areas, "information of which the sectional group may sometimes have a monopoly, but which in any case it can provide more quickly and more accurately than any other source."<sup>129</sup> Furthermore, the government requires the "willing cooperation of those who the laws most affect"<sup>130</sup> for a policy to be smoothly administered. This is more important today than in the past as "the greater the degree of detailed and technical control the government seeks to exert over industrial and commercial interests the greater must be their degree of consent and active participation in the very process of regulation, if regulation is to be effective or successful."<sup>131</sup> All of these considerations have created

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<sup>129</sup>Grove, p. 271.

<sup>130</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup>Samuel Hutcheson Beer, *Modern British Politics; A Study of Parties and Pressure Groups* (London, 1969), p. 420.

a need for greater consultation between ministries and interest groups and have enhanced the role of the lobbyist in British Columbia, as a formal mechanism through which the desired exchange of information can take place.

*CHAPTER V**CONCLUSION*

This thesis has examined the role of the designated lobbyist in British Columbia in the context of a communication framework. There have existed two underlying hypotheses throughout this study. The first hypothesis, which emerged from an examination of the literature, was that notwithstanding the political systems or the differences in jurisdictions, the role of the lobbyist in British Columbia like his counterparts elsewhere (Ottawa, Washington D.C., etc.) is fundamentally that of a communication link or communication facilitator between the government and an interest group. This study has concluded that this hypothesis is valid. The role of the lobbyist in British Columbia is in fact viewed as a communication link or communication facilitator by the lobbyist, the interest, and the government.

The second hypothesis which underlies the thesis emerged in the process of examining the role of the lobbyist in British Columbia. This hypothesis was that while the lobbyist acts as a communication link, there are a variety of factors which operate as constraints on his activities,

and each of these factors in some fashion contribute to and shape how the lobbyist performs his communication linkage function. The major factors which were identified was the perception of the lobbyist; the access points in the political system; the locus of power; the resources of the interest group; and invariably the nature of the demand. This study concluded from the examination of the role of the lobbyist in British Columbia that these factors did constrain the lobbyist in acting as a communication link and did determine how this communication function was performed.

This study has examined the close relationship which exists between the lobbyist and the interest group. This is a special relationship as noted earlier. It should be remembered that it is ultimately a decision by the interest group which creates the position of the lobbyist. The role of the designated lobbyist in British Columbia as already mentioned is seen as a communication link between an interest group and the government. How this role is to be performed is determined in the initial stages by the lobbyist and the interest group. Both perceive the primary task of the lobbyist as the transmission of information about government activities, both to and from the interest group. The tactics used by the lobbyist in collecting this information have depended on the personal contacts

he has been able to develop. The major method used by the lobbyist to relay this information to the interest groups membership has been through a column in a magazine or a newsletter published by the interest group - this method is also used to distribute information to political and bureaucratic actors in the government.

While the personality and experience of the lobbyist will affect his own role, the nature of the interest group, as this study has shown, has a major impact on it as well. The employment of a lobbyist reflects in a general way a desire on the part of the interest group to enhance or sustain its relationship with the government and make its operations environment "safe and predictable."<sup>132</sup> The motivation of the interest group and its specific concerns focus the lobbyist's activities on the government. The resources of the interest group - size, financial capability, and staff - determine the tools the lobbyist has at his disposal and the strategy he can use when interacting with the government. The interaction between the lobbyist and the interest group combines to provide the skeletal framework from which the lobbyist's role evolves.

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<sup>132</sup> Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," *Political Behaviour: A Reader in Theory and Research*, ed. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Jarrowitz (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 236-237.

The lobbyist is in essence an instrument of an institutionalized interest group, a group which has moved from being a "technical instrument designed as a means to definite goals" to "a responsive, adaptive organism."<sup>133</sup> Characteristically what is identified by the academic observer as an institutionalized interest group is one which has a sense of continuity and cohesion, a stable membership, which tends to develop its objectives in a pragmatic fashion, and has a desire to keep its communication channels with the government open.<sup>134</sup> These interest groups, therefore, are concerned with their on-going credibility, and are generally loathe to offend unnecessarily any political party in or out of power. The institutionalized interest group in British Columbia, as elsewhere, is generally reluctant "to risk jeopardizing [what is perceived as a] privileged position by deliberately antagonizing or embarrassing its Minister and his department."<sup>135</sup> In addition, the institutionalized interest group

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<sup>133</sup>A. Paul Pross (ed.), "Pressure Groups: Adaptive Instruments of Political Communication," *Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics* (Toronto, 1975), p. 9.

<sup>134</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>135</sup>Grove, p. 268.

is not only concerned with the type of policy adopted by the government, but also the manner in which it is administered. The designated lobbyist in British Columbia thus emerges from this study as an instrument enhancing such an interest group's effectiveness by giving it "access to those decision makers having influence in the policy area of greatest concern to the pressure group."<sup>136</sup>

While the lobbyist and the interest group provide the skeletal framework within which the lobbyist works, the political and bureaucratic arena provide the body in which the lobbyist must operate. The behaviour of the lobbyist is to some degree determined by the style, the structure, and the decision-making pattern adopted by the government. The lobbyist has had to adapt his techniques to the personalities of the political and bureaucratic actors in the system and to the manner in which they have chosen to operate the government. Furthermore, the parliamentary structure of the government in British Columbia has tended to focus the lobbyist's attention in the political arena on the cabinet, as this is where the decision-making power is perceived to be concentrated. It is also important to note that recent changes in or refinements of the policy-

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<sup>136</sup>Pross, p. 19.

making process adopted by the British Columbia government have increased the points of access into the system, while at the same time they have placed new constraints on the system, through tightening up the budgetary process and improving the quality of the analytical support required for tentative policy proposals. These developments in British Columbia, as elsewhere, have had a major impact on the lobbying function. The lobbyist's understanding of these processes and of the personalities involved will determine in part what kind of success he may have.

It is impossible, however, to provide a precise measurement of the effectiveness of a lobbyist in British Columbia - or elsewhere. Any attempt at evaluation involves assessments of the impact which an interest group feels it has had (utilizing a lobbyist's services) on shaping government policy. The lobbying community, of course, is inclined to identify strong causal linkages between its own efforts and what governments do or do not do. These judgements reflect, in part, the expectations of what the interest group perceive as constituting success. Clearly, interest group expectations may be unrealistic, and the lobbyist may be viewed as a failure when he is unable to meet the standard. A former lobbyist for the B.C.T.F. testified to the situation in this way:

Disappointment stems from false expectations, and [the B.C.T.F. has] failed to recognize on occasion that [it] can't write the law and can't dictate the solutions.<sup>137</sup>

Even when apparently successful, lobbying behaviour becomes extremely difficult to assess with any reliability in view of the difficulty of precisely relating the actual contribution of the lobbyist to the final outcome. An example of how difficult it is to assess a lobbyist's influence over government policy is illustrated in the activities of C.O.F.I.'s lobbyists during the 1970's. The Council of Forest Industries' lobbyists are widely held to have played an important role in the government adopting policies favourable to the forest industry on a number of occasions in the 1970's. The first occasion on which their influence seemed to be manifest occurred in 1971 when the government adopted effluent standards on a plant by plant basis, rather than setting effluent standards which applied uniformly to all plants in the province, and again in 1976 when this policy was reviewed and reaffirmed. Another incident involved the introduction of the Timber Products Stabilization Act (Bill 171),<sup>138</sup> into the legis-

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<sup>137</sup>K.M. Aitchison, "The Measure of a Man," *The B.C. Teacher*, January-February, 1976, p. 84.

<sup>138</sup>Interview, lobbyist for C.O.F.I.

lature by the N.D.P. government in 1974. This act, as introduced, promised to drastically change the forest industry in the province, as it was designed to give the government control over the marketing of lumber in British Columbia. Under this bill the minister had the power to establish marketing boards for a variety of forest products. C.O.F.I. with the aid of its lobbyists launched a number of initiatives in an effort to get the government to change the bill. Long distance phone calls were made to Premier Dave Barrett who was touring China with Denis Timmis, chief executive officer of MacMillan Bloedel and others. Furthermore, sawmill operators were encouraged to contact their local N.D.P. constituency presidents to complain about the impact of this legislation on them. In addition, a meeting was arranged by C.O.F.I.'s chief lobbyist between the Council's directors and the minister. The result of all of this activity was that the minister agreed to accept three amendments to the bill proposed by the industry. In the end, even though the bill was passed, it was never implemented, as the forest industry ran into economic problems in its world markets and the government felt that the application of the bill would only worsen the already depressed state of the industry. Which of these factors or others determined the government's final decision and what influence if any the lobbyist had cannot be

determined with any degree of accuracy.

Just to what extent lobbyists in fact in British Columbia do influence government policy directly - or do help others to influence it - naturally remains the subject of speculation. Clearly, as lobbyists seldom enjoy "tenure," they do all that they can to encourage perceptions of their own usefulness - past, present, and future. They do this knowing full well that interest groups themselves are forever generating subjective assessments of their own lobbyists' usefulness, and are continually examining their utilization in light of the alternative strategies available to them.

During 1978 one major interest group in British Columbia, the B.C.T.F., created a lobbyist position on a trial basis for six months. At the end of this time the B.C.T.F. decided not to continue it. The lobbyist for the federation was unable to overcome a feeling by some of that body's executive that the B.C.T.F. "as an organization [did] not have the qualities that apply to a lobbyist."<sup>139</sup> On the other hand, some designated lobbyists in British Columbia have enjoyed greater security as time has gone on and their principals have become progressively more

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<sup>139</sup>"BCTF to hire liaison assistant," *British Columbia Teachers Federation*, October 11, 1977, p. 4.

persuaded of their lobbyists' usefulness. The most notable of these is the lobbyist for C.O.F.I., who has 'survived' three major reorganizations of the Council. The first reorganization took place in 1968, the second in 1972, and the third in 1978. (This last change resulted in a substantial reduction in C.O.F.I.'s budget.) Uncertainty remains very much a part of the working environment of the lobbyist in British Columbia.

Overall, in terms of the total number of interest groups involved in lobbying the government the lobbyist has not had a major impact on the political scene in British Columbia. This study in its attempts to examine the role of the lobbyist in British Columbia could only identify ten individuals who maintained a presence in Victoria. This limited number of lobbyists does not represent the vast number of interest groups which exist in British Columbia, thus the majority of interest groups do not employ a lobbyist, but rather continue to rely on informal contacts, and meet with the government only when points of contention arise. Studies at the federal level on business/government interaction have concluded in general that "business [has] no mechanism to influence government . . . [and] that business [has] limited understanding of the legislative process and the points of

influence available for action"<sup>140</sup> and has recommended that in the future business must develop a better understanding of how the government operates. These studies have suggested that it is important that business develop a better understanding of how the government operates "to avoid regulation which is expensive, unnecessarily time consuming, and dysfunctional, both to business and the economy as a whole."<sup>141</sup> What is true of business interest groups in its relations with the federal government appears to be true of many non-economic groups as well. Precisely these same generalizations appear to apply to the broad range of interest groups in British Columbia, with obvious consequences for the potential use which some of them might have for a designated lobbyist. As provincial governments in general become more and more involved in regulating society in the future it may become necessary for interest groups to employ specialists who understand how the government operates and can ensure them access to those sectors of the government they consider important.

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<sup>140</sup>T.F. Causey, R.C. Hodgson, R.J.A. Lord, and D.A. Peach, *Managing the Political/Regulatory Environment: A Study of Business Response to the A.I.B.* (London, 1976), pp. 90, 97.

<sup>141</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 97.

In summary the lobbyist has emerged from this study as a specialist in communications, a key figure at the centre of a complex network of linkages binding key personnel in interest groups with those in the legislative and executive branches of government. In performing this function the lobbyist in British Columbia has helped his interest group to understand how government operates and adapt to the political environment here. In addition, he has provided the province's political actors and bureaucratic officials with information concerning the impact of their policies or proposals on various sectors in society. In this manner the lobbyist has strengthened the democratic system in which we live by broadening the base on which decisions are made, or, if one will, by ensuring greater participation in the policy process on the part of those affected by it.

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- Letter, W.M. Hamilton, President and Chief Executive Officer, Employers' Council of British Columbia, April 5, 1979.
- Letter, Colin Fraser, Executive Representative, British Columbia Independent Logging Association, May 17, 1978.
- Letter, Robert A. Lind, President, British Columbia Independent Loggers Association, April 6, 1979.
- Letter, (Mrs.) Shirley Duncan, Chairman Sierra Club of Western Canada, April 7, 1979.
- Letter, J.J. Munro, Regional Council No. 1, International Woodworkers of America, A.F.L.-C.I.O.-C.L.C., April 11, 1979.
- Letter, Molly Boucher, Vice-President, Federation of Independent School Associations, May 4, 1979.

APPENDIX 1

Question to Lobbyist

Question to Lobbyist

1. Name
2. Background
  - Education
  - Political Experience
  - Previous Employment
3. What do you do?
  - What groups do you represent?
  - Nature of the group you represent?
    - Structure
    - Conflicts within the group?
    - How do you handle these?
    - How do they effect your position?
4. What services do you provide for interest groups you represent?
  - Information
    - What kind?
    - What form
      - report
      - newsletter - To whom?
    - Put forward the groups position to the government.
  - Liaison between the government and the interest group.
    - advisory capacity
5. How do you approach lobbying?
  - What kind of information do you gather.
  - What techniques do you use
    - quiet talk
    - information sheet
    - lunch, dinner (How many times a week?)
6. Who do you approach when lobbying?
  - Bureaucracy
  - Cabinet Minister
  - M.L.A. (backbencher)
    - government
    - opposition (N.D.P., Lib., Con.)
    - How often would you approach the politician?
  - Executive assistant
7. Which area to you approach the most often?
  - Which area do you find you have the greatest success
    - Why
    - How important is the politician?
8. What is your function while the House is not in session?
9. How important is it for you to be known around the buildings?
  - How often are you in the House?
    - Daytime
    - Evening
  - How often are you around the buildings?
  - Can you be around too much?

10. What other groups or individuals does similar activity to yourself around the legislature while the House is in session?
11. What kind of success have you had as a lobbyist?
  - How do you measure your success (give example of a policy or ask for an example).
12. Do you think lobbyists should have to register?
13. How much do you estimate it costs a year to keep you in Victoria?
  - 10,000 to 20,000
  - 20,000 to 30,000
  - 30,000 to 40,000
  - 40,000 to 50,000
  - 50,000 to 60,000
  - 60,000 to 70,000
  - 70,000 to 100,000
  - How much for
    - a) accomodation (Where?)
    - b) expense account (How much?)
    - c) salary (How much?)

APPENDIX 2

Questions M.L.A.'s

Questions M.L.A.'s

1. Name
- 2.. Background
  - Education
  - Experience as M.L.A.
    - A) Number of years
    - B) CABINET experience
3. What is your reaction to interest groups (lobbying)?
4. What role do you see interest groups (lobbyists) playing?
  - in the legislature (bills in the house)
  - policymaking
5. What do you see as interest group (lobbying) activities?
  - information sheets
  - talk
    - a) individual
    - b) caucus presentation
  - Lunch? Dinner?
6. What kind of interest groups have approached you?
7. Do you use interest groups?
  - Information
  - In what other ways?
8. Which interest groups (lobbyists) do you see as the most active?
  - effective (Why)?
9. How effective do you think interest groups are in getting what they want?
10. Do you think interest groups (lobbyists) should be registered.

APPENDIX 3

Questions to Interest Groups

I am writing a Masters' Thesis on Lobbying in British Columbia. I have talked to your representative in Victoria as to his responsibility and would like to find out your views on lobbying and the role of your representative:

What services do you expect your representative in Victoria to perform?

Why did your organization decide to place a representative in Victoria?

On what basis was your representative selected?

- past experience in government
- knowledge about the organization
- expertise in a specialized field
- educational level
- personality

Did you establish terms of reference for your representative? ( When? What are these terms of reference or why was it felt unnecessary to establish any?)

What do you see as your representatives job in Victoria?

On what basis do you judge his effectiveness?

What are the estimated costs of this activity?

How do you justify this expenditure?

I would very much appreciate your cooperation in answering these questions.

APPENDIX 4

People Interviewed

*Politicians Interviewed:*

Honourable James Chabot	Ministry of Lands, Parks, and Housing (Columbia River - SC)
Honourable Hugh Curtis	Provincial Secretary (Saanich & the Islands - SC)
Howard Lloyd	(formerly M.L.A. Fort George - SC)
Ed Smith	(formerly M.L.A. North Peace River - SC)
Cyril Shelford	(formerly M.L.A. Skeena - SC)
Harvey Schroeder	Speaker (Chilliwack - SC)
Honourable Tom Waterland	(Yale-Lillooet - SC)
Dennis Cocke	(New Westminster - NDP)
Eileen Daily	(Burnaby North - NDP)
Bill King	(Shuswap-Revelstoke - NDP)
Gary Lauk	(Vancouver Centre - NDP)
Norman Levi	(Maillardville-Coquitlam - NDP)
Robert Skelly	(Alberni - NDP)
David Stupich	(Nanaimo - NDP)
Gordon Gibson	Leader of the Liberal Party in British Columbia (until December 1978) - formerly M.L.A. North Vancouver-Capilano

*Civil Servants:*

S.B. Peterson	Deputy-Minister of Agriculture
Mark R. Krasnick	Director, Policy Planning Ministry of the Attorney-General
Tex Enemark	(formerly) Deputy-Minister of Deregulation, Deputy-Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, (lobbyist in Ottawa and a former Executive-Assistant to Ron Basford)
Frank A. Rhodes	Assistant Deputy Minister, Administration, Ministry of Labour
Dr. Jim Rae	Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Planning and Research Development Ministry of Economic Development
J. Phillipson	Associate Deputy Minister, Schools, Ministry of Education
E. Karlsen	Assistant Director Resource Plan- ning Unit - Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat Ministry of Environment
W.C. Cheston	Resource Manager - Special Studies Division - Ministry of Forests
J.T. Fyles	Senior Assistant Deputy Minister Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources
Bill Nielson	formerly Deputy-Minister of Con- sumer Services and for a short time Deputy-Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. Now a professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Victoria

*Lobbyists Interviewed:*

Clay Perry	I.W.A. (1978)
Jack Wessel	B.C.F.A. (1968)
John H. Nixon	Employers' Council of British Columbia (1978)
Colin Fraser	B.C.I.L.A. (1974)
Gerry Ensing	F.I.S.A. (1970)
Gerry Kristianson	G.L. Kristianson Ltd. Public Affairs Consultants (1976)
Fred Moonen	C.O.F.I. (1963-1978) MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. (1979)
Pat Hrushowy	C.O.F.I. (1972-1978)
Alan C. Nicholls	B.C.S.T.A. (1970-1978)
Eric Burkle	B.C.T.F. (January 1978 to June 1978)
Robert W. Nixon	Sierra Club (1978-1979)
Stan Evans	B.C.T.F. (1945-1976)

APPENDIX 5

*BCSTA Job Description*

D R A F TBCSTA JOB DESCRIPTION

**JOB TITLE:** COORDINATOR, LEGISLATIVE SERVICES

**JOB SUMMARY:** The Coordinator of Legislative Services is responsible to the Executive Director for planning and implementing a program of legislative reporting and action on behalf of the school boards of British Columbia.

**JOB DUTIES:**

- 1) Represents trustee viewpoint and role to members of the provincial legislature and senior public service.
- 2) Attends appropriate legislative sessions and reports to the membership on legislative matters of concern to education.
- 3) Maintains a liaison with groups and individuals who may have an impact on legislation or regulations.
- 4) Assists school boards in becoming more effective politically in representing the public's local interests in education through seminars and consultation with local boards.
- 5) Maintains liaison with news media on matters of concern to education.
- 6) Develops a means for sharing ideas and information among school trustees on legislative action, including the provision of service to local school boards for assistance in representing their concerns and viewpoint to government.
- 7) Participates in internal or Ministerial committees, as directed by the Executive Director.

**EVALUATION:** The incumbent will be evaluated according to two major criteria:

- 1) BCSTA Legislative Services enable school trustees to be more effective politically in representing the public's local interests in education.
- 2) The trustee viewpoint is reflected in provincial legislation and regulations.

**PAYGRADE:** 26

## APPENDIX 6

BCSTA - Provincial Legislation and Policies (#9)

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION AND POLICIES (#9)


- OBJECTIVE** BCSTA services enable school trustees to be more effective politically in representing the public's local interests in education.
- CRITERIA**
- a) The trustee viewpoint is reflected in provincial legislation, government and political party policies.
  - b) Trustees are continually made aware of government and party actions of relevance to school boards.
  - c) Trustees are kept informed about the mechanism for effecting change in education at the provincial level.
  - d) A legislative information network, to share information on pending provincial legislation and to organize means of legislative action, is developed and operated through Association branches.
  - e) School board requests for advice and assistance on legislative matters are met to the boards' satisfaction.
  - f) The government and the political parties are concerned, should their legislation and policies be contrary to BCSTA beliefs, that adverse trustee reaction will be certain, and that in many cases there will be adverse news media reaction.
  - g) The news media utilize the BCSTA as a source of credible, current viewpoints and information which reflect the trustee viewpoint.
  - h) Trustee viewpoints and concerns are made readily available to all MLAs and those who influence legislation.
- ACTIVITIES**
- a) Policy formulation - Policies and resolutions are formulated by school boards, BCSTA committees, and the Executive and are brought before the annual general meeting for approval.
  - b) Policy circulation
    - BCSTA Reports of Proceedings, position papers and research reports made available to all MLAs, political parties, and influential public servants.
    - BCSTA briefs, submissions, and news releases, are prepared and made available to MLAs, in order to emphasize certain resolutions and concerns. (Including Committees of the Legislature and Committees of Inquiry appointed by the Legislature or the Government.)

- c) Service to boards - Assistance to boards for improving political effectiveness in representing the local interest in education.
- d) Liaison with media - Continuing BCSTA relationship with the Press Gallery in Victoria, and with other media representatives throughout the province.
- e) Presence in Victoria - Presence of LIO in Victoria during Legislative sessions, to ensure the trustee viewpoint is understood by MLAs and public servants; to report to trustees on developments in legislation and policies through "Report from the Legislature," and to maintain continuing liaison with Press Gallery members.
- f) Liaison with MLAs - Maintenance of relationships with MLAs, to establish BCSTA and school board access to Cabinet or party caucuses.
- g) Professional development - Staff knowledge and skills in the art of political action are further developed and updated.
- h) Liaison with groups/individuals - Contacts with influential groups and individuals throughout B.C. are maintained and developed.
- i) Legislative information network - A means for sharing information and ideas on legislative action, provision of service to local school boards for assistance in representing their concerns and viewpoint to government.

COST: \$65,215

APPENDIX 7

*E.I.S.A. Memo*



Federation of independent school associations

MEMO

April 22, 1977

150 Robson Street, Vancouver, B.C. V6B 2A7 - Tel. 684-6023 684-7846

To: Independent School Principals

From: Gerry Ensing, Executive Director

Subject: Bill 33, the Independent Schools Support Act

1. Enclosed is a copy of the B.C.T.F. Newsletter. We sincerely appreciate the generosity of the B.C.T.F. in giving the FISA space to put its case. We were able to obtain only one copy per school. Please share your copy.

2. N.B. It is not known how much time will be allowed to elapse between now and the final reading of Bill 33.

Speedy passage of the Bill must be encouraged now!

Independent School Supporters must be active now by

- writing letters to the MLA's
- writing letters to newspapers
- calling in on open-line broadcasts
- protesting negative pronouncements of associations they are associated with

It is vital that such supportive action take place within the next few weeks to give the government the confidence to proceed without delay!

\*\*\*\*PRINCIPALS - You are the key in communication with parents and supporters. Please use the following model to send home or to publish in your school and/or church bulletins FOR THE NEXT FEW WEEKS:

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL SUPPORTERS: Bill 33, the Independent Schools Support Act is now before the Legislature. Please do all you can to help it pass during the current session. Express your support of the Bill by writing your MLA (Parliament Buildings, Victoria, B.C. V8V 1X4), by writing your local newspaper, by calling your local radio station's phone-in program. This time particularly, don't leave it to someone else. You do it too. Don't delay. (This appeal comes to you directly from the Federation of Independent School Associations which represents "your school" with the government.)

(See corrected list of MLA's on reverse)

## APPENDIX 8

*British Columbia Independent Logging Association -  
Terms of Reference*

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# British Columbia Independent Logging Association

SUITE M7, 635 HUMBOLDT STREET  
VICTORIA, B.C. V8W 1A7

TELEPHONE 382-8284

Office of the executive representative

17 May, 1978

Mr. R.A. Lind,  
Chairman,  
Board of Directors,  
B.C.I.L.A.,  
P.O. Box 177,  
Princeton, B.C.

Dear Bob:

The Constitution Committee, at its meeting of April 5 and 6, 1978 recommended that terms of reference for the Victoria Office and job specifications for the Executive Representative be submitted for consideration by the Board of Directors. In response to that request please find outlined below those items as I see them.

#### Victoria Office Terms of Reference

Under the direction of the Board of Directors.

1. Maintain liason with government and industry to promote B.C.I.L.A. objectives.
2. Promote the independent logging operator image through appropriate public relations and information media.
3. Develop communications within the forest industry and toward government.
4. Engage in research programs to further the logging industry.
5. Advise the Board of Directors on government and industry policy and directions.

#### Executive Representative Job Specifications

Under the direction of the Chairman.

1. Monitor government and industry policies.
2. Review and analyse new and existing legislation and pursuant regulations.
3. Prepare briefs and letters for presentation to government and industry.

.....2

.....2

4. Arrange meetings with government and industry personnel.
5. Prepare press releases and other informational data for communications media.
6. Devise and implement research programs.
7. Prepare reports on activities to the Board of Directors.
8. Coordinate association committee activities.
9. Maintain liason with the association's Head Office.

The above is presented for your consideration.

Best regards,



Colin Fraser,  
Executive Representative.

CDF/af

APPENDIX 9

Sierra Club - News Release



Sierra Club . Western Canada Chapter  
 1645 Broadmead Ave.  
 Victoria, British Columbia

NEWS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

6 JUNE 1978

COUNCIL OF FOREST INDUSTRIES CALLED TO ACCOUNT

BRITISH COLUMBIA ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE CALLING FOR THE TABLING OF BILL 12, MINISTRY OF FORESTS ACT AND BILL 14, FOREST ACT, UNTIL THE NEXT SESSION OF THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE... CITING A NUMBER OF SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION, THE ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH INCLUDE FEDERATION OF MOUNTAIN CLUBS OF B.C., FEDERATION OF B.C. NATURALISTS, CANADIAN SCIENTIFIC POLLUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SOCIETY, COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE FOREST LEGISLATION AND THE SIERRA CLUB, ARE CALLING UPON THE COUNCIL OF FOREST INDUSTRIES TO ENDORSE AND SUPPORT THEIR STAND IN ORDER TO PREVENT A RETURN TO THE ERA WHEN THE ONLY MEANS TO RESOLVE RESOURCE-USE CONFLICTS WAS THROUGH CONFRONTATION.

THE ORGANIZATIONS BELIEVE THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION APPEARS REGRESSIVE IN MANY AREAS:

- 1) LACK OF PROVISIONS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE "GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIP",
- 2) INCLUSION OF A BROAD-RANGING PROVISION FOR SECRECY OF FOREST LAND-USE INFORMATION,
- 3) FAILURE TO PROVIDE PROVISIONS FOR PROTECTION OF FISH AND WILDLIFE VALUES IN LICENCES,
- 4) FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF WILDERNESS VALUES, 5) FAILURE TO EVEN ATTEMPT THE DEFINITION OF SUSTAINED YIELD, HARVESTING PRINCIPLES AND YIELD OBJECTIVES, 6) INCLUSION OF PROVISIONS FOR POSSIBLE LOGGING IN PARKS, 7) FAILURE TO PROVIDE PROVISIONS FOR REGIONAL DISTRICT, COMMUNITY/LOCAL INVOLVEMENT IN PREPARATION OF MANAGEMENT PLANS FOR TIMBER SUPPLY AREAS, 8) FAILURE TO PROVIDE STRONG PROVISIONS FOR REFORESTATION.

THE LETTER QUESTIONS THE COUNCIL OF FOREST INDUSTRIES ON WHETHER OR NOT THE COUNCIL AGREES IT NECESSARY FOR THERE TO BE BROAD PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE FULL MEANING AND INTENT OF THE FOREST LEGISLATION PROPOSALS BEFORE THE BILLS RECEIVE FINAL OR AMENDED PASSAGE IN THE LEGISLATURE.

APPENDIX 10

*BCSTA Report From the Legislature*



- 2. -

- (3) Vandalism needs to be further reduced, and the causes of vandalism are being sought.
- (4) To provide more challenge for the gifted student by improving the depth and quality of programs available.
- (5) Provision of a French language core program.
- (6) Improved articulation between secondary and post-secondary courses, and to "get down to the practicalities of the world of work" through work experience programs.

The Minister added that major emphasis will be on quality and building back confidence and morale. Due to the efforts of teachers and students, said Dr. McGeer, improved performance has already been shown in this year's Grade XII scholarship examinations.

#### Funding of Public Schools

Several opposition members criticized the last three years' increases in the basic mill rate, and the decrease in the Province's funding share. The Minister said that school boards make up district budgets, and the Government intends that this responsibility continue. But, he added, the public is asking why the budgets are so high. Total school board budgets have nearly doubled in the last five years, said Dr. McGeer, despite a decline in the number of pupils. "I have not proposed an operating referendum but I would be remiss if I did not tell the House that I continuously receive complaints about the cost of education," said the Minister.

Education critic Dennis Cocke replied that school boards have little flexibility in setting budgets, but despite this have done a better job than the Government as the provincial budget has tripled in the same period. He asked when the cost of colleges will be removed from school board budgets; the Minister replied that the Government is moving as rapidly as possible on this. Liberal leader Gordon Gibson pointed out that local taxes for the basic education program have been increased by \$225 million in the last five years; he urged that the SEP, including equalization for high cost school districts, should be financed largely from provincial revenues, but with extra local funding to ensure local options. Charles Barber (NDP Victoria) spoke of a growing taxpayer revolt over the Government's funding policies, while Eileen Dailly (NDP Burnaby North) suggested that the Minister is "deliberately creating warfare between school boards and municipalities." She added that it is hypocritical to blame lack of spending restraint by school boards for higher local taxes.

#### Pupil/Teacher Ratios

The Minister replied that he is not blaming school boards but rather the previous Government. "It has taken several years for the foolish, wasteful policy of adding 2,500 more teachers, despite a declining student population, to come to roost," said Dr. McGeer. This policy costs approximately 10 mills, he continued, and "we can't go on reducing class sizes in B.C. without breaking the bank." Dr. McGeer added there has been no evidence of improvements in the classroom as a result of lowering PTRs in the last few years, and this could be part cause of the current public disillusionment with the public school system. Indeed, said the Minister, a recent study states that under certain circumstances learning is better in large classes.

Dennis Cocke asked the Minister why, if he opposed the previous Government's policy of lowering the PTR, he had not reversed it since becoming Minister.

#### Funding of Independent Schools

Eileen Dailly said that "the Minister has opened a Pandora's box," by providing money to independent schools, when there is no guarantee it will be spent for the purposes provided. Dennis Cocke criticized the manner in which "certain groups intend to use the funding."

The Minister replied that payments to independent schools will be made for services rendered (payments starting this August will be for the 1977/78 school year). The Minister added that inspections of schools applying for funding have been made and "we are now starting to get information on why they can operate so much more cheaply than public schools."

#### Effects of Declining Pupil Enrolments

Gerald Strongman (SC Vancouver South) asked about public school teachers with tenure who are surplus to requirements, and means of getting "non-productive administrators back into the classroom." Enris D'Arcy (NDP Rossland-Trail) said there is a problem of "administrative overload" in the public school system, adding that even where the number of teachers

is decreased there has been a growth in the number of administrators.

The Minister replied that teacher attrition more than compensates for the decline in student population, but "we must control the number of entrants into teacher training facilities." The number and salaries of administrators revealed in a recent study are a concern, said Dr. McGeer, and we will be working with school districts to resolve the problem. The Public Schools Act, said the Minister, provides for administrators "to return to the higher calling of classroom teacher," and he added that district superintendents will shortly be hired on a term contract basis.

Mr. Strongman pointed out that attrition will result in an older teaching force. Gordon Gibson said that high salaries for qualified administrators should be at local cost: "If the local school boards think it worthwhile for their taxpayers they should be entitled to pay that kind of money for senior administrators."

#### Closing of Schools

Charles Barber spoke on the local community pressures faced by a school board which is contemplating closing a school due to declining student population. He wondered if the Government is encouraging such closures, and what criteria are used by the Minister before approving them. Mr. Barber also asked if there is an appeal procedure for a group of parents opposed to a closure, and if there is provincial assistance available to a school district which wishes to "wind down" rather than close a school. The Minister thanked Mr. Barber for his "meritorious suggestions" and replied that a joint study is under way which hopefully will produce a report and recommendations by September. Dr. McGeer also took the opportunity to compliment the Victoria School Board on the manner in which it is tackling the problem of declining enrolment.

#### Other Comments and Suggestions

MLAs made several other contributions to the debate:

- Norman Levi (NDP Vancouver-Burrard), Gary Lauk (NDP Vancouver Centre) and Stephen Rogers (SC Vancouver South) spoke on the need for special aid to teach children of immigrants who speak English as a second language. The Minister said that Vancouver, where most such pupils live, has received over \$2 million in special approvals, and perhaps the school district needs to reorganize its spending priorities.
- Gordon Gibson raised the question of French immersion programs. The Minister said that where there are 10 pupils (not necessarily in the same grade) in a school wanting the program, it will be provided; the Minister is currently discussing with school districts how to do this.
- Dennis Cocke and Gordon Gibson questioned the adequacy of programs for handicapped pupils. Human Resources Minister Bill Vander Zalm said that the integration of handicapped pupils in regular classes is proving very effective, and is developing improved understanding and communication among all pupils.
- Stephen Rogers said he receives many complaints from parents on the number of professional days for teachers. He asked why these cannot take place during the last week of August. The Minister replied that there will be one professional day less this year, and also that parents must be advised of all professional days by September 30 - "I hope this will get a better acceptance of the concept."
- Rosemary Brown (NDP Vancouver-Burrard) spoke on the deleterious effects of declining enrolment for the few women teachers in administrative positions. The Minister said this is a matter for school boards to deal with, and added there are now three women superintendents appointed by the Ministry.
- Gordon Gibson and Lyle Kahl (SC Esquimalt) stressed the importance of kindergarten and pre-school programs in the education process. They asked the Minister for comparative cost figures on K versus XII, which the Minister undertook to supply.
- Gordon Gibson called the current trustee honorarium limit of \$2,000 "woefully inadequate and not fair to the hard working people who serve as trustees." Inflation has reduced the value by a third since set at \$2,000, said Mr. Gibson, and trustees should set their own honoraria.
- Mr. Gibson also called for more local appointments of superintendents, saying there would still be "lots of checks and controls in Victoria."
- Pat Jordan (SC North Okanagan) spoke on the difficult task facing trustees in representing effectively all viewpoints in a community, and urged Provincial courses in such matters as budgeting and finance. She also said there is a need to encourage

- 4 -

Increased parent participation in decision making within the school system. Gordon Gibson added that people with concerns on education should "get in there and make their views known to school boards."

- Although the Premier did not take part in this debate, he did speak on education finance matters on May 8 during discussion of spending estimates for the Premier's office:

"The control of school budgets is not with the Provincial Government but with local school boards...if the Province were fully accountable (financially for schools) you would lose that local measure of direction and control."

"The Provincial Government doesn't do the (teacher salary) bargaining; it's under the control of the school trustees."

"What really concerns us (the Government) is the poor voter turnout at school trustee elections...we only hear the concerns when the public get the bills."

- In question period on June 6 Progressive Conservative leader Vic Stephens asked whether the Government is prepared to accept any responsibility for municipal tax increases, having promised a decrease in the provincial budget speech. Minister of Finance, Evan Volfe, replied that the Government has given the municipalities a substantial increase in provincial revenues, and "it's up to them how they want to administer their own budgets."

The education spending estimates was likely the last education debate during this session of the Legislature, although some "housekeeping" changes to the Public Schools Act may still be brought in.

The Report From The Legislature is circulated to all B.C. trustees, secretary-treasurers, superintendents, IAs, other trustee organizations, and organizations interested in B.C.'s public schools. Circulation, 1155. Enquiries regarding this report should be directed to

## APPENDIX 11

*"Tell It The Way It Is,"*  
*FISA Spokesman, Summer, 1974*

## TELL IT THE WAY IT IS

The FISA would like to re-emphasize the necessity of local schools to keep contact with their M.L.A.'s and mention their association with the Federation. It is imperative that the Independent schools show very clearly that they do indeed provide a viable alternative that they do not represent undue duplication of educational services. As the F.I.S.A. constitution indicates, it is one of the objects of the Federation 'to make known the public the rightful place and responsibility of the Independent schools within a democratic and diversified society' and it is this aspect perhaps that we have not paid sufficient attention to. Invite your community and your M.L.A to see what you are doing, and why you are doing it.

The FISA suggests that each school invite its local M.L.A. to spend a day in school, while it is in operation, to see for himself or herself, the alternative that is being presented. When the M.L.A. has given assurance that he or she will in fact come to visit a school, it is well to alert the press and the F.I.S.A. That way the community is informed as well. Combining a visit with an open house for the community could be very effective. Of course, you will identify with the FISA and please let us know your own reaction to the visit so that we can follow-up in Victoria.

A number of schools have told us about M.L.A.'s visiting their schools and we commend them for their action. We hope that many others will follow suit. Only when you do your share in your own community, can the Federation be truly effective provincially.

## PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT

Individual action is, of course, very important, because the Federation as a federation cannot influence any of the political parties. The work within the parties has to be done by individuals that support those parties. Individuals can help to sponsor resolutions at local constituency meetings. Such resolutions, when approved, will be sent on to the convention. Individuals can help by being delegated to attend the provincial convention, and there encourage the adoption of favourable policies with respect to Independent schools. It is important to the Federation to know who these individuals are, that hold active party membership, so that the Federation can help to co-ordinate the placing of resolutions and the supplying of information to the people involved in the different political parties. The FISA would be greatly helped if local schools or FISA representatives would forward to the Federation names and party affiliations of known members. Better yet, write to us yourself.

*FISA Spokesman, Summer, 1974.*

## APPENDIX 12

*P.W. Luce, "The Lobbyist," The Province,  
January 29, 1928, p. 6.*

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## The Odd Angle

By P. W. LUCE

### The Lobbyist

**G**LORGE A. WALKEM, Conservative member for Richmond-Point Grey, has raised his mellifluous voice in the Legislature in protest against the activities of lobbyists, which he has stigmatized as "disgraceful."

Strong language, that! The lobbying gentlemen who fill the corridors of the Parliament Buildings with fragrant cigar smoke might very well resent it, if they were of the resenting kind. As it happens, they're not. They've been in politics too long to be thin-skinned. Some of them (though of course they don't boast about it) have even been members of Parliament.

A forceful personality is our Victoria lobbyist. He is sleek, well-fed, exquisitely groomed; he wears what the full-page advertisement tells us the well-dressed man should wear, including a change of garters every other day. There is a boutonniere in the lapel of his coat. He frequently carries a glossy walking stick, and if he displayed any more jewelry he would have too much. He all but uses scent.

He is a suave and confidential gentleman; his voice is soft and low. He has a wonderful command of language and can put a world of meaning in a wink. He has an unlimited stock of funny stories, quite a few of which are not to be told to the woman member.

The lobbyist shaves twice a day and has a massage six times a week. He is worth a small fortune to the manicurist, even though he does not always show his hand. It is part of his creed that he must be good to look upon; he fairly exudes prosperity and oozes good fellowship at all times, but especially around midnight.

Many of these exquisite gentlemen are lawyers, and therefore not at all concerned with the merits of the case they advocate. They serve whoever pays, but they themselves do not always know who is pulling the strings.

The bankroll of the lobbyist is of generous proportions and is at the service of any worthy cause. No legislator need go hungry in Victoria so long as there is a dollar left in the jeans of the gentleman who has something he would like attended to right away. It has been estimated, perhaps wrongly, that lobbyists buy more dinners for members of Parliament than the members buy for themselves.

Certainly they buy better dinners!

The lobbyist is always ready to sit in a little game of poker, Sundays excepted. If it is a very select party and the stakes are high, the lobbyist loses heavily. Strangely enough, this seems to put him in high good humor.

He is not always known as a "lobbyist," of course. Sometimes he chooses to be styled parliamentary agent; sometimes he is plenipotentiary extraordinary. Occasionally he comes and goes under the alias of legislative counsel, or he may dignify himself as vice-president in charge of public relations. It all depends on how much experience he has had and how big is his retainer. The work, in every case, is much the same.

As a rule, the lobbyist belongs to no party, but when an emergency arises he can belong to all parties at the same time. He willingly contributes to all campaign funds, but on the distinct understanding that none but the right people should be advised of his liberality. For he does not seek applause; all he wants is results.

The suggestion that the lobbyist should be given the order of the boot by the sergeant-at-arms is not likely to be carried out. The lobbyist wouldn't stand for that at all. He would lobby against it night and day, and in the end he would win out. For he is a convincing fellow, and when he grabs a member's ear between forefinger and thumb and pours honeyed words down the auricular channel he is almost certain to make a convert to his cause. The member may not know what the other is talking about; he yields in self-defense.

However, the lobbyist is not worrying. He never does. No matter what may turn up, he is equal to it.

In fact, he is equal to anything.

## APPENDIX 13

*Letter, Eric Martin, Minister of Health and Welfare,  
January 24, 1955*

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January 24th, 1955.

RECEIVED  
JAN 25 1955  
PS-XIII  
PROVINCIAL SECRETAR.

The Honourable W. D. Black,  
Provincial Secretary,  
Buildings.


My dear Colleague:

On January 14th I received a letter from Mr. George F. Edwards, President of the Senior Citizens' Association of British Columbia, requesting an appointment for a delegation from that Association to meet with a Committee of the Cabinet (approximately one and one-half hours in length) to discuss the resolutions passed at their Annual Convention. I replied to Mr. Edwards that it would not be possible to meet with them until after the House prorogued. Today I have received another letter, copy of which is enclosed, again pressing for a meeting.

Mr. Edwards represents the rebel section of the Old Age Pensioners Organization which broke away from the main body. He was the man who organized a mass meeting in protest against, he supposed, the \$2.50 Cost-of-Living Bonus increase just before the last Session.

I would recommend that he be not received by the Cabinet. Mr. Edward's letter has not been acknowledged.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
Yours faithfully,



ERIC MARTIN  
Minister of Health and Welfare

Encl.

*I propose to receive him myself, but the matter is to be arranged through Mr. A. Amathen M.L.A. ED*

APPENDIX 14

*Delegations Received by the Social Credit Caucus - 1976*

DELEGATIONS RECEIVED BY  
THE SOCIAL CREDIT CAUCUS  
1976

Downtown East Side Residents Association  
B.C. Federation of Agriculture  
Pacific Life Community  
B.C. Tenants Organization  
B.C. Hotels Association  
Bulk Oil Dealers Association  
B.C. School Trustees Association  
Council of Forest Industries  
Chiropractors Association of B.C.  
Canadian Paraplegic Association  
Pro Life Society  
S.P.E.C.  
B.C. Teacher's Federation  
Independent Schools Association  
Airport Delegation  
U.B.C. (Tour Campus)

## APPENDIX 15

*Delegations Received by the Social Credit Caucus - 1977*

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DELEGATIONS RECEIVED BY THE  
SOCIAL CREDIT CAUCUS  
1977

Insurance Agents Association  
Trident Group  
College Faculty Association  
Automotive Retailers Association  
B.C. Safety Council  
Rental Housing Council  
National Farmers Union  
B.C. Teachers Federation  
Community Forum on Airport Development  
B.C. Petroleum Association  
Council of Forests Industries (dinner)  
Canadian Manufacturing Association  
Rape Relief Group  
Musqueam Band  
Chiropractors Association  
Independent Business Contractors Association  
U.B.C. Alumni Association  
B.C. Federation of Agriculture  
B.C. School Trustees Association  
P.A.C.I.F.I.C.  
Worker's Compensation Board

APPENDIX 16

*Delegations Received by the Social Credit Caucus - 1978*

DELEGATIONS RECEIVED BY THE  
SOCIAL CREDIT CAUCUS

1978

Canadian Institute of Forestry (tour)  
Wine Council of B.C. (dinner)  
Chiropractors Association of B.C.  
Council of Forest Industries (dinner)  
U.B.C. Alumni Association (reception)  
B.C. Hotel's Association (dinner)  
National Farmer's Union  
U.B.C. Alma Mater Society  
Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs  
Registered Nurses Association of B.C.  
B.C. Independent Logger's Association  
Denturist's Association (dinner)  
Legal Services Commission  
Western Guides and Outfitter's Association  
D.A.R.E.  
Imperial Oil Ltd. (dinner)  
Rape Relief Society  
U.B.C. (Tour Campus)

VITA

Surname: VANCE Given Names: KENNETH CECIL

Place of Birth: PRINCE GEORGE, B.C.

Date of Birth: JULY 12, 1955

Educational Institutions Attended, with Dates of Entering and Leaving:

COLLEGE OF NEW CALEDONIA, B.C. 1973 to 1974

UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, B.C. 1974 to 1977

UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA, B.C. 1977 to 1980

Degrees, Diplomas, Etc., Awarded with Dates and Names of Institutions:

B. Arts 1977 Univeristy of British  
Columbia, B.C.

Honors and Awards:

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Title of Thesis

THE LOBBYIST IN BRITISH COLUMBIA IN 1978

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Author

  
KENNETH C. VANCE

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October 17, 1980

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