THE TWISTED ROAD TO FREEDOM:

America's Granting of Independence to the Philippines in 1946

by

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ABSTRACT

While America's role in the Philippine Islands had been controversial throughout half a century of colonial rule, seldom had policy debates reached the intensity witnessed in the final years before the granting of independence in 1946. In selecting the date for independence in the 1930's, American officials could not have predicted Japan's invasion of the islands or the United States's subsequent postwar global concerns. Resultingly, final American decisions regarding issues of Filipino collaboration with the Japanese and future Philippine-American economic relations became urgent concerns in the mid-1940's. The road to Philippine independence which had originally seemed so well engineered, now proved treacherous and intimidating.

American policy regarding Philippine independence has been the subject of three distinct historical approaches. The first views America as a benevolent parent granting its maturing child considerable political freedom while gradually weaning it from economic dependency. The second far more cynical approach sees America's hesitation to completely remove war time collaborators from power as an expression of Washington's reactionary response to indigenous Filipino leftist elements and to the rising spectre of cold war communism. This school contends that the final economic arrangements calling for continued post-independence free trade were attempts by American business interests to perpetually subordinate the agrarian Philippine economy to that of the industrialized United States. Scholars of the third historical perspective, while not yet having looked at the specific issues surrounding independence, have generally contended America was never sufficiently interested in the Philippine Islands to consistently assist or exploit them. Rather America paid only cursory attention to its colony, leaving the traditional Philippine elite essentially free to shape events to their own advantage.

In describing and analyzing American policies concerning Philippine independence, this study, while borrowing from all three historical approaches, will most closely resemble the third. However, while acknowledging that Washington's interest may have been cursory throughout the colonial period, this paper will argue that there were times,

including the mid-1940's, when American officials became intimately involved in shaping Philippine policy. Due to the sporadic nature of this attention Americans were usually inclined to act within established political, cultural, and economic parameters, yet the role of major individuals could also be significant. Regarding the collaboration issue, the conflicts between General Douglas MacArthur (who selectively exonerated certain prominent puppet government figures) and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes (who led the forces opposing all collaborators) will be examined. Specific attention will be paid to the hitherto ignored possibility that due to MacArthur's personality and to his prolonged exposure to the islands, the General's conduct was heavily influenced by dictates of Filipino culture. Concerning post-independence trade, American officials were forced to choose between rebuilding or recreating the war devastated Philippine economy. The precedent of colonial trade policy combined with a desire to rehabilitate the islands as quickly, humanly, and inexpensively as possible all helped influence the Truman administration's decision. Also, Philippine legislation would have to conform to the State Department's postwar policy of dismantling trading blocks and the administrations reluctance to antagonize powerful vested interests in the Cuban-American sugar market. Finally, much of American policy resulted from the confusing era in which it arose. Squeezed between the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, the issue of Philippine independence was often subordinated to more pressing domestic and global concerns.

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DEDICATION

In Memory of Kerry

INTRODUCTION

The decision by the government of the United States to grant independence to the Philippine Islands on July 4, 1946, involved an unprecedented non-violent cession of power from an imperial overlord to its colonial subjects. Moreover, American actions, or inactions, in the important months just prior to the granting of independence at the end of the Second World War were ultimately responsible for establishing the pattern of subsequent American-Philippine relations. Yet, the complex process through which the American government renounced its sovereignty, a fascinating tale of ideological disputes, administrative chaos, personality clashes, interdepartmental rivalries, and political and economic intrigue, has received but cursory attention from students of American diplomatic history or American-Philippine relations.

Predictably, the nearly five decades which have elapsed since Philippine independence have spawned a variety of schools of thought or interpretations regarding the Philippine-American relationship. The earliest efforts were traditional narratives providing little analysis and only superficial documentation. Histories of this type generally portrayed America and its officials as benevolent benefactors who transplanted into the Malayan Archipelago American ideals of republican democracy and free enterprise, which eventually "Americanized" the Philippines into Asia's "Showcase of Democracy." The Philippine Trade Act of 1946, which extended the colonial era reciprocal free trade agreement between the two countries for a period of twenty-five years while gradually weaning the Filipinos from their dependence on such a special relationship, was viewed by historians of this school as a further illustration of American generosity and magnanimity modeled upon earlier policies of establishing universal education and public health in the islands. Even America's tolerance of Filipino wartime collaborators was defended as a necessary means of utilising the skills and resources of the elite to promote postwar economic recovery.[1]

The second historical interpretation dealing with Philippine-American relations arose from the economic revisionist school of diplomatic history which came into prominence in the 1960's and 1970's. These studies fundamentally challenged the earlier works, supplanting their narrative framework and reliance on official records with in-depth analysis focusing almost exclusively on economic concerns. Scholars applying this approach developed paradigms of "neo-colonialism," which suggested thoughtfully

constructed and efficiently executed plans by American governmental and business elites to exploit the people and resources of the world's former colonial nations. Thus the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, with its "parity clause" granting American businessmen the right to "exploit and develop" Philippine natural resources on an equal footing with Filipinos, was viewed as the major cause of continued American economic domination of the Philippines in later decades. While somewhat useful in explaining the independence era, the conclusions reached by this interpretation were particularily flawed concerning the mid 1940's due to tunnel-vision research which precluded consideration of non-economic motivations for political behavior, and by a present-minded tendency to mine the past selectively to explain and critique more contemporary circumstances.[2]

The final school of interpretation of Philippine-American relations germinated in the 1980's under the auspices of historians and social scientists who combined an innovative analysis of both social and cultural factors with access to official government documents declassified in increasing numbers throughout the 1960's and 1970's. Their research determined that much of what was previously taken for granted by historians was incorrect. For instance, they established that during the colonial period, and beyond, the one outstanding feature of American policy towards the Archipelago was neither benevolence nor exploitation, but rather apathetic and ambivalent neglect, a neglect only occasionally punctuated by brief interludes of either philanthropy or focused self-interest. This suggested that in no great or systematic way had America either assisted or assailed the Philippine people. In fact, the United States had intentionally left domestic and internal matters of the islands in the hands of the Filipino elite. Thus, what exploitation did occur was perpetrated through the Filipino feudal aristocracy, who played off their American overseers and the Philippine peasantry for the elite's own economic and political gain. This interpretation is significant for anyone studying American policy towards the Philippines immediately following its liberation from Japan's Co-prosperity Sphere, a period largely neglected by recent scholars. There is little doubt that the "neglect" which distinguished the colonial period certainly had an impact upon the policy disputes in the months prior to independence. For example, General MacArthur snubbed and alienated the largest anti-Japanese guerrilla force in the Philippines because of its opposition to the prewar feudal aristocracy who had collaborated with the Japanese, a decision that caused Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, to advocate social and agrarian reform on the Islands. The question then arises of whether MacArthur was absent-mindedly following the established American colonial policy of deferring to the Filipino elite or participating in an exploitative conspiracy, as the economic revisionists maintain.[3]

The tendency of historians and social scientists who study American-Philippine relations in general is to draw broad stereotypical conclusions about both American policy and Filipino responses. This appears to hold true regardless of the interpretation employed: America was either benevolent, exploitative, or apathetic depending upon one's research findings and/or preconceptions. Such over-generalization about American intentions and behaviour is understandable in works seeking to explain American policy over a prolonged period of time (usually the entire period of American contact with the islands from 1898 until a work's publication date). Yet, such panoramic overviews, while appearing to offer authoritative conclusions, tend to obscure and even bury the natural complexity of the relationship between these two countries. The particular intricacies of any given period or event become lost in generalizations which camouflage as much as they reveal.

Conversely, focused studies that have been undertaken regarding early post war American-Philippines relations neglect the larger picture. To conduct research wearing blinkers which prohibit an event or decision from being placed within historical context is as misleading as a broad overview which ignores the complexity and uniqueness of particular events. A typical focused study entitled *American Economic Policy Towards The Philippines* studies the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 fairly diligently, yet the research is limited to legislative action in Congress.[4] The broader trends of colonial economic policy as well as executive department concerns are viewed as secondary to the actions of Congressional committees. Had the author broadened the analysis of her study, she would have discovered that the conclusions she reached were only partial truths.

Clearly then, anyone intending to explain the process by which America granted independence to the Philippines can seek insights from the three major schools of thought in the relevant historiography, but interpretive generalizations must be tested by detailed study of the key personalities and peculiar historical circumstances associated with Philippine independence. The rich complexities of these events have to be revealed and analysed.

All too often, for example, the "human factor" is left out of the historical equation. This holds true especially where economics are concerned. Biography, apparently, is often perceived as having little if any place in discussions of international trade, economic investment, and business cycles. Yet, to truly understand the nature of Philippine independence, one must also understand the motivations of the human actors involved. Recognizing this, this thesis has attempted to study in detail the personal papers of each of the major figures involved, including President Harry S Truman, Secretary of the Interior

Harold L. Ickes, High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, Senator Tydings, and Congressman C. Jasper Bell . Admittedly complete reliance upon such sources may prove disastrous, as diaries and letters are often self-serving, yet to a discerning researcher these legacies provide invaluable insight into the true intentions of American officials. Harold L. Ickes' support of a twenty year duty and quota-free reciprocal trade agreement stemmed from his intense concern for the well being of the Filipino *tao*, or peasant, who after four years of war faced starvation if something substantial were not done to "jump start" the Philippine economy. Concern for the interests of American capital and investment did not play a role in Ickes' decision so far as both his public and private papers demonstrate. Relatedly, the concern of certain top-ranking American officials for such abstract notions as morality and adherance to principle account for much American policy which some researchers have attributed to economic self-interest. For instance, in the spring of 1946, President Harry S Truman rejected the advice of his Attorney General's advisory committee to have American military courts try Filipino collaborators. This was not because Truman wanted to defend the political and economic interests of the feudal aristocracy, but primarily because meddling in Philippine affairs when the date of their independence was so near would have been perceived throughout the globe as excessive infringement on Philippine sovereignty, as well as considerable lack of faith in the Filipinos' ability to resolve their own problems.

Likewise, a number of factors which are intricately tied to the issue of independence have been seen by earlier historians as unrelated or even unimportant. Chief among these is the interrelatedness of the entire collaboration problem to the Philippine Trade Act of 1946. These two aspects of American policy have typically been written about as separate entities, and, while it is true that each is worthy of individual contemplation, it is only when they are viewed as sub-categories of the larger question of independence that their true significance becomes evident. Had the issue of collaboration not been muddied in late 1944 and early 1945 by General MacArthur, it is possible that the Trade and Rehabilitation Agreements would have been dealt with more quickly by the American government, thereby avoiding the long debates which peculiarly shaped the agreements and delayed rehabilitation. Moreover, the prominence of Filipino collaborators and their vested interest in maintaining the agricultural export economy of the islands stymied economic diversification after the war.

As for the broader historic context (so often ignored by historians of American decolinization in the Philippines), not only was the United States still embroiled in a two-front global war in late 1944 when MacArthur returned to the Philippines, but

President Truman, who succeeded Franklin Roosevelt just as the war was ending in Europe, was completely uninformed about Philippine matters. Consequently, he was compelled to defer to the opinions of subordinates whom he did not know, or necessarily even trust, during the first months of his presidency. Moreover, as he became more competent regarding Philippine issues, he was simultaneously preoccupied with atomic diplomacy, the economic rehabilitation of Europe, and increasing tensions with the Soviets, as well as a plethora of domestic problems. Similarly, due to their own broader concerns, various departments under his auspices had adopted opposing agendas regarding the Philippines. The world being what it was in the mid-1940's, it is not surprising that much confusion, contradiction, and insensitivity on the part of the American government surrounded Philippine independence.

Only when these previously undeveloped factors are considered, and when the conclusions of the broader studies are recognized for what they are—over-simplified generalizations—can one ascertain the true nature of American decolonisation in the Philippines. It is the intent of this thesis to do just that. By being aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the secondary sources and by conducting in-depth research into the relevant private, public, and official papers it is possible to understand far better the significant events which constituted the most important year and a half of Philippine-American history. Simple explanations based upon benevolence, exploitation, or apathy are inadequate. Rapidly changing political and economic circumstances all over the world led American officials to reexamine most of the nations foreign policy, a process that made a break with traditional United States relations with the Philippines more likely than any time before or since. Despite strong ideological and economic legacies, many options were possible, and, given the chaos of early postwar America, consistent planning was difficult. The road to Philippine independence was not carefully designed by a team of well coordinated engineers. Rather it was a haphazard construction consisting of numerous twists and forks reflecting the conflicting priorities and intentions of its builders.

NOTES

1 Some typical examples of this approach are John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947); Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of The Philippines 1929-1946* (New Haven / London: Yale University Press, 1965); Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livesey, *The Philippines and the United States* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press 1951); and Milton Walter Meyer, *A Diplomatic History of The Philippine Republic* (Honolulu Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1965).

2 Two of the better examples of the corporatist school are William J. Pomeroy, *An American Made Tragedy: Neo-Colonialism and Dictatorship in The Philippines* (New York: International Publishers, 1974); and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, *The United States and The Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism* (Philadelphia Pennsylvania: Institute For The Study of Human Issues, 1981).

3 Three very good illustrations of this third approach are Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989); Gary Hess, *The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); and Peter W. Stanley, *Reappraising an Empire, New Perspectives on Philippine-American History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Committee on American-East Asian Relations, 1984).

4 Shirley Jenkins, *American Economic Policy Toward the Philippines* (Palo Alto California: Stanford University Press, 1954).

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SETTING THE SCENE

Judging from the mutually flattering speeches of the dignitaries and the smiling faces of thousands of rich and poor Filipinos who had gathered to witness the independence ceremony on July 4, 1946, one would have surmised that the road to Philippine independence had been smooth and direct. The spectacle was shadowed, however, by the hulks of twisted steel and shattered concrete that had once been Manila's towering buildings, grim reminders that the Philippines had borne the brunt of recent fighting for the Allied cause in the Pacific war, and that American aid and relief had yet to arrive in significant quantities. The man lowering the American flag as he expounded his nation's "infinite understanding,"[1] High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, was one of the chief architects of a trade agreement between the two countries that many observers then and later deemed exploitative. His counterpart raising the Philippine flag, President Manuel Roxas, declared that his homeland was "a staging ground for democracy in this part of the world,"[2] in spite of the fact that he himself was tainted by charges of having collaborated with the Japanese during the war. Meanwhile the extremely popular General Douglas MacArthur, who extemporised to a friend at the ceremony that "America buried imperialism here today," was responsible for Roxas' rise to power.[3] Clearly the rhetoric of these men obscurred the subtle realities of America's granting of independence to the Philippines. The actions of American policy makers were not characterized by infinite understanding, nor was President Roxas a shining model of America's ability to instil in the culture of the Malayan archipelago the principle of democracy. The question of whether imperialism had been laid to rest was just as contentious, especially in the economic realm.

Understanding these issues initially requires a retrospective look at Philippine-American relations beginning in 1898 when the United States Congress declared war on Spain, the only time in American history that Congress so acted without a presidential request. This historic anomaly is important as it illustrates just how divided the American government was over the issue of armed conflict. Moreover, even among those who pushed for war, few were concerned with territorial expansion in Asia.

(Indeed, after Commodore Dewey's fleet destroyed Spain's Asian Armada, most Americans, including President William McKinley, had to search atlases and globes even to find the Philippines.) The Spanish-American war was fought over issues and events in Cuba. The Philippines only became involved after zealous expansionists such as Theodore Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, acted without the consent of superiors to orchestrate a naval engagement in Spain's far-flung colonies.[4] Even after the occupation of Manila the United States still lacked a clearly articulated policy outlining its postwar intentions regarding the islands, and American policy continued to drift aimlessly following the cession of hostilities as the McKinley government sought to adjust to the crosswinds of domestic politics. Naturally this caused much tension with Filipino nationalists who hoped that America would allow them to forge their own political destiny.

Ultimately expansionist elements in Congress and the press carried the day. They convinced most Americans that it was part of their manifest destiny to expand across the Pacific just as they had on the North American continent. Expansionists argued that the Philippines would act as a stepping stone for American manufactured goods seeking access to the Great China Market and that the United States had a moral obligation to uplift the savage Filipinos, to take up the white man's burden in civilizing one of the world's "lesser breeds". Moreover, expansionists contended that if Americans did not keep the islands for themselves the Japanese, Germans, or French would readily incorporate the Philippines into their own empires. President McKinley ultimately succumbed to these arguments, justifying his decision to retain the Philippines to a group of Methodist missionaries by telling them that he could not hand the islands over to America's "commercial rivals" nor abandon them to the natives who were as yet "unfit for self-government." Instead God had directed him to ensure that America would "educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best... for them...."[5] (Apparently both God and McKinley failed to realize that most Filipinos had already been Roman Catholic for over three hundred years.) Thus, divinely inspired or not, William McKinley drifted into acquisition of America's first overseas colony.

Following the end of Spanish imperialism in the Philippines, American domination was not easily imposed. The deeply entrenched racism of American officers and enlisted men stationed in the Philippines combined with the evolving expansiveness of American policy led to an explosive collision with the olive skinned Filipino nationalist forces of Emilio Aguinaldo, and in February, 1899, open fighting broke out between the two sides, precipitating a decade of gruesome battle. At its height the Philippine insurrection involved over seventy-five thousand American troops, and the war claimed the lives of

over four thousand American and sixteen thousand Filipino soldiers, as well as two hundred thousand Filipinos civilians, most of whom died of starvation and disease.[6] The McKinley Administration, growing frustrated by this increasingly unpopular war, appointed William Howard Taft as civilian governor of the Philippines, and he, in conjunction with President Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Elihu Root, soon devised policies designed to facilitate a peaceful end to the insurrection and to stabilize American control. These initiatives, intended to address immediate military problems, decisively shaped American policies that would endure until independence in 1946, and, to some extent, to the present day.

Governor Taft came to the Philippines with few instructions regarding his duties and objectives. President McKinley's only statement of policy had been that America's "earnest and paramount aim was to win the confidence, respect and affection of... [the Filipinos by] proving to them that the mission of the United States was one of benevolent assimilation." To demonstrate American sincerity, he agreed to allow the Filipino elite to hold political office if they acknowledged American supremacy. There was nothing in McKinley's statement to indicate how long the islands would remain under American jurisdiction, but by implication the reference to winning Filipino confidence and respect implied that in time the Filipinos could determine that matter for themselves. Moreover, in granting the right to vote and hold office to cooperative elite segments of the native population, McKinley demonstrated a sincere desire to train the islanders to govern themselves.[7] Within these broad directives Taft tried to construct a workable program.

The main concerns of Taft's governorship were education, sanitation, and economic development. He hoped that by increasing the standard of living of the Filipinos he could induce them to accept a lasting connection with the United States agreeable to both peoples. To achieve this, Taft realized that Filipinos required some control over their own destiny; thus, he conceived a "policy of attraction" designed to induce the Filipino elites to abandon the radical nationalists leading the uprising against the United States.[8] Secretary Root, who apparently thought that all Filipinos should be included in the policy of attraction, instructed Taft to grant the population "the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent to which they are capable... consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty."[9] To which Taft replied: "the masses are ignorant, credulous and childlike.... [Therefore] the electoral franchise must be limited, because the large majority will not, for a long time, be capable of intelligently exercising it."[10] Accordingly, while Taft provided a system of universal public education for the masses, he established a national legislature exclusively for the elite. One economic class would

thus learn the rudiments of the English language and American history while the other attended "a political academy [legislature] to learn parliamentary procedures."[11]

Taft believed that the combined benefits of internal political autonomy and economic prosperity would reconcile all Filipinos to American sovereignty, at least for the immediate future. However, to bring economic prosperity to a nation in which only a small minority of Spanish Friars, Chinese merchants, and Filipino/Spanish landowners (Mestizos) had ever been anything more than serfs and peasants posed a formidable problem. Taft saw the only remedy in a massive influx of American capital investment, and he therefore lobbied Congress for a reciprocal free trade arrangement with the Philippines. It was hoped that the profits generated from the exports of sugar, tobacco and coconut into an open American market would enable Filipinos to purchase ever increasing amounts of American manufactured goods, thereby raising the Philippine standard of living and pleasing American producers. This arrangement would then induce American capital to invest more heavily in the Philippines, enabling the growth of secondary non-agricultural industries. At first the American Congress and business community were cool to the idea of Filipino products flooding the American market, but finally in 1909 free trade legislation was passed after American manufacturing interests convinced Congress to open the Philippines exclusively to American exports.

The next significant development in America's relationship with the colonial Philippines occurred under the Wilson Administration when the United States conceded more self government to the islands. Despite the fact that many Democrats, including Wilson, had originally supported the acquisition of the Philippines, by the 1910's the Democratic party had become the champion of independence. Much of this inconsistency can be attributed to the party's long-term failure to win either the White House or a majority in Congress (opposition parties by definition must oppose government initiatives), but the Democrats were also responding to that element in the American electorate which had never reconciled itself to the United States' new role as an imperial power. Terrible reports of the suffering and atrocities committed by both sides during the long years of the Philippine insurrection had led many Americans to become disgusted with imperial conquest and all that it entailed, and even the military establishment was losing its original enthusiasm. President Theodore Roosevelt had commented that the Philippines were Americas' "heel of Achilles" in the Pacific[12], and now, in the face of increasingly bellicose rhetoric from the Japanese after their victory over Russia in 1905, Roosevelt's metaphor seemed even more fitting. In fact, throughout the years from Theodore Roosevelt's Administration to Pearl Harbor, the military consistently concluded

that the Philippines were indefensible. Even in the best case scenario of a short term sea battle against Japan, American strategic planners lamented that the United States could not provide even temporary defence of the islands. Only an exorbitant increase in the military budget could hope to alter the realities of American weakness, yet neither the American government nor the American public was willing to make the huge financial sacrifices necessary to protect the Philippines from external aggression. The Democratic Party of 1912 was aware of these problems and expediently adopted a campaign platform that included a promise of Philippine independence.

In 1913 President Wilson pledged that "every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands."[13] Accordingly, the new American governor of the archipelago, Francis Burton Harrison, soon invited the leading Filipino political figure, Sergio Osmeña, to replace the entire American administration with Filipinos. Osmeña declined the offer, fearing that the islanders were not mature enough to shoulder such responsibility,[14] yet there was no longer any question that the Philippines would be granted independence — it was simply a matter of how and when. In 1926, the final draft of Congressman William Atkinson Jones' long delayed independence bill extended the franchise to all literate Filipinos and gave nearly complete authority in domestic matters to the islands' elected officials. The Jones Bill vaguely declared that independence would be granted as soon as "stable government could be established."[15] Earlier drafts of the legislation called for independence to be granted at a specified time (four or eight years), but pressure behind the scenes from Filipino officials like Manuel Quezon, who sat with non-voting status in the U.S. Congress and ultimately became the first president of the Philippine Commonwealth, successfully pushed for the more ambiguous language in order to protect the vested interests of particular segments of the Filipino population.

Finally, in 1934, under the Franklin Roosevelt administration, the Tydings-McDuffie Act created a Philippine Commonwealth essentially in charge of its domestic affairs and fixed the date for independence on July 4, 1946. The decision to give the Filipinos their freedom was due mainly to the concerns of America's domestic and Cuban sugar producers who, in the depths of the Great Depression, believed that Philippine imports were wounding their enterprises. Consequently, traditional free trade arrangements were to be phased out during the decade prior to independence.

By European standards, American colonial policy in the early twentieth century had been fairly benevolent. While the best example of this was the nearly free hand that the Philippine legislature enjoyed regarding internal affairs from 1907, well-meaning paternalism was also extended to the economic realm. Early during American rule, Congress insisted that Filipinos had to have majority shareholding ownership of their business enterprises, and, in order to prevent large-scale American agricultural companies from developing in the Philippines (and competing with stateside firms), Congress passed legislation limiting land holdings on the islands to thirty-five acres for American individuals and twenty-five hundred acres for U.S. corporations. This prevented Americans from raping the archipelago, although, as historian Stanley Karnow points out, American legislation did nothing to prohibit exploitation of the land and peasants by the Filipino elite.[16]

Clearly the two aspects of American colonial policy which would most affect the nature of Philippine independence after World War II were Taft's early decision to give free reign to the Filipino elite and the subsequent decision to establish free trade. With regard to the first of these, a 1949 Central Intelligence Agency report concerning the "Democratic Movement in the Philippines" concluded that "during the Spanish period the Filipino upper class learned to collaborate with the Spanish in order to dominate their own lower classes. This continued under American rule and became blatantly obvious during Japanese occupation in World War II."[17] Moreover the report found that World War I had nurtured a new Filipino exporting business class which quickly united with the old feudal class to benefit from American control of the Islands. These two groups joined together publicly to demand independence from the United States, since such a nationalistic appeal enabled them to retain the support of the increasingly literate and educated Filipino masses, but privately the elites discouraged the end of empire, an event that could endanger their protected political and economic interests.[18] Hence Osmena's rejection of Governor Harrison's offer to replace all American administrators with Filipinos and Quezon's torpedoing of the clause in the Jones Bill which would have fixed a date for ending American sovereignty. Taft's "policy of attraction" therefore not only permitted feudalism to continue unmolested in a territory of the United States, but it also allowed the Filipino elite to play off the Filipino lower classes constantly against the American overlords.

Subtly undermining America's tendency to rule through the elite, however, was the American policy of universal education. Never before had such a large proportion of the Philippine population been literate, and with literacy came knowledge of the American ideals of equality of opportunity, democracy, and civil liberties. As a result the Philippine

lower classes and intellectuals, angered at their discovery that the society in which they lived was far removed from the idyllic world of Horatio Alger novels, staged increasingly large and violent uprisings against the entrenched privileges of their feudal landlords in the 1930's. Conversely, as far as the Filipino aristocracy was concerned,"universal education meant... [they] had to be more cunning and ruthless [than ever]."[19] The 1930's became a decade of increased polarity and social stratification in the Philippines. Many of the upper class who were to collaborate with the Japanese in World War II and support Roxas for the presidency in 1946 were the leading figures in the Spanish fascist, or falangist, movement of the decade before, while a large number of the peasant guerrillas who prevented central Luzon from falling into the hands of the Japanese during the occupation and who demanded land reform after the war were also veterans of prewar economic conflict.

Free trade, the second of Taft's major colonial initiatives, also played a key role in determining the character of Philippine independence. Many of the Philippine elite hypocritically criticized the 1909 trade agreement. While publicly decrying it as inconsistent with America's promises of independence, they fully realized that they would be among the major financial and political recipients of its benefits. Not only would free trade secure a vast and protected market for their inexpensively produced agricultural products, it would also bring high quality American manufactured items to the islands, items that only the privileged class could easily afford. The elite realized as well that if American industries continued to benefit from their monopoly of the Philippine market they would likely act as a strong counterweight to interests in Congress advocating quick and complete independence for the archipelago. Under American sovereignty the elite expected to continue profiting from Americas' policy of benign neglect.

A strong argument can be made defending reciprocal free trade as having been beneficial to all segments of Philippine society. Free trade enabled agriculture techniques in many parts of the islands to be modernized; it stimulated limited secondary industries related to the refining of sugar and making of tobacco products; it led to greater profits for landowners and marketers which in turn meant slightly higher wages for peasant workers; it spawned the growth of a small, but growing, urban middle class; it permitted Filipinos to purchase American consumer goods; and, ultimately, when coupled with improvements in education and health, it raised the standard of living in the Philippines to the highest in all Asia.[20]

Unfortunately, however, free trade was also responsible for creating many problems for the islands and its people, problems which were to be fully exposed during post-World

War II debates about the nature of Philippine independence. The most obvious criticism of the free trade arrangement was that binding the Philippine economy so tightly to the United States was clearly insensitive to the long term needs of the Filipino people. Such a relationship, if left unaltered, would leave the Philippine economy at the mercy of a protectionist American Congress even after the transfer of sovereignty. Hard lessons had been learned in the early 1930's when the crash of the world economy meant American sugar beet producers and Cuban cane sugar interests (which were American owned and had free access to the American market) viewed protected Philippine sugar exports to the United States as unfair competition. Moreover, reciprocal free trade had dictated that the Philippine economy would be severely stunted and dependent upon a small variety of agricultural exports. This meant that the Philippines was prone to booms and busts as the American demand for sugar, tobacco, and coconut products rose and fell in market cycles dictated by the the laws of supply and demand. Economic diversification and industrialization, developments which would have shielded the Philippine population from the most cruel aspects of a single crop economy, were never seriously attempted, much less achieved.

One final aspect of America's colonial legacy which must be understood is the relationship of America's colonial administrators in the Philippines to officials in Washington and to the Filipino elite. When America first acquired the archipelago many prominent expansionists sought positions in the colonial administration. Spanish-American War hero, Theodore Roosevelt, for example, unsuccessfully employed influential Senators to endorse his bid for the governorship of the islands.[21] By the 1930's, however, with the date for independence set and American politicians preoccupied with the depression and administering New Deal legislation, the Philippines became more a place of political exile than promotion. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the persons of General Douglas MacArthur and High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, who both arrived in the Philippines because of personal rows with President Roosevelt. MacArthur, who disagreed with the New Deal administration's liberalism and frugal spending on the military, resigned as Chief of Staff of the Army to become Quezon's military advisor charged with helping prepare the islands for independence.[22] McNutt, governor of Indiana, had presidential ambitions that Roosevelt sidetracked by offering him the post of Philippine High Commissioner.[23] Unable to get along with Franklin Roosevelt, these two exiles also shared an intimate relationship with the Philippine's top economic, and hence political, elite. The longer MacArthur and McNutt stayed in the islands, the more closely they became bound by ties of friendship to the native ruling class

and the less these unperceptive proconsuls knew of, or showed concern for, the plight of the Filipino poor. In the 1945 debates centering on post-independence trade agreements and the punishment of collaborators, such personal factors were to play major roles.

Until the 1940's American policy regarding the Philippine Islands had demonstrated much continuity. The only significant deviation was the 1934 decision to fix the date of independence and terminate the free trade agreement, but by 1938 the second of these altered policies was well on its way to being at least temporarily reversed. In that year the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs, a special body commissioned to study Philippine-American trade relations before sovereignty was fully transferred, recommended that "both American and Philippine interests should have a reasonable opportunity to adjust themselves to the changed relationships.... This could best be accomplished by increasing the tariff rate on... [each country's] products five per cent each year after independence until January 1, 1961, when full duties would be assessed."[25] Apparently American officials intended that the preferential free trade agreement was to be revived and then slowly phased out over a period of time so as not to jolt the Philippine economy too harshly.

In part, this renewed caution was due to unsettled social conditions in the Philippines where a perceivable rift was developing in the political relations between the feudal rich and the peasant poor. The combined influences of public education and the economic crisis of the world depression led a small, but increasingly militant, portion of the lower classes into demonstrations that approached open rebellion. The most common objective of the peasants was for higher wages, but as the depression lingered their demands became more radical.[26] Philippine politics, while still superficialy united behind the traditional Nationalista party, was in reality polarizing between secret societies of falangists on the right and liberals and socialists on the left. In the middle lay the great mass of Filipinos who sympathised with the more liberal element of the radicals, but had yet to reject the paternalistic leadership of the right.

This is not to say that the Philippines was at the brink of being torn apart by civil war, nor should it be assumed that American statesmen were fundamentally re-evaluating their policies. Extraordinary circumstances would be required to fracture the sturdy continuities of life and thought that had long dominated the Philippine colonial experience.

Such circumstances finally materialized in 1941. The Pacific theatre of the Second World War delivered its heaviest blows to the inadequately defended Philippine Archipelago. In the words of Paul McNutt, returning from a presidential fact finding mission to the islands in August, 1945:

> "The Philippines was without question the most completely destroyed and dislocated battle ground of the war.... The Japanese killed, slaughtered, burnt, and wantonly destroyed without check or mercy.... The United States was then forced to bomb heavily populated areas [during its reconquest] as the Japanese set up their military installations there. Then Japan rescorched the earth... [on their withdrawal]. Most of the Philippine Islands' industry, agriculture, even concrete roads had been torn up and taken to Japan. No cars remained — even carts were destroyed.... Not a single coconut mill was operable, and of the forty-one prewar sugar mills only five were operable. Over 80% of Manila, and 90% of the Philippines' second largest city, Cebu, had been destroyed."[27]

Senator Millard Tydings, the patron of the 1934 independence legislation, pointed out after his return in May of 1945 that "all transportation by boat, rail, bus, and truck is non-existent, [and] the carabao [the essential work animal of the archipelago] were nearly all killed and destroyed by the Japanese."[28] Moreover, his mission, which sought to determine the extent of damage the islands had sustained, noted that Manila's 45,000 kilowatt power supply had been obliterated during the fighting and that 10-15% of all buildings in the Philippines had been completely destroyed, and another 10% seriously damaged.[29] Thus, by the summer of 1945 the entire Philippine economy had ground to a halt. The islands' only income stemmed from employment by the American armed forces, who were attempting to restore the most rudimentary facilities and services on the islands.

Yet, in spite of this fantastic destruction, many Filipinos and some Americans did not perceive the economic situation as the most pressing problem in the Philippines. Instead, potentially explosive political issues took precedence. The vast majority of Filipinos had remained loyal to the United States during the Japanese occupation and had tried to live their lives as normally as possible under the circumstances. Accounts of their patient wait for the return of American forces and their numerous acts of bravery and loyalty to captured American G.I.'s would fill American newspapers in the years following the conflict. Yet the polarized minorities of falangist right and radical left were responsible for worried debates both in the American capital and on the streets of Manila.

Fear of losing their land and influence to the bureaucracy of the East Asian

Co-prosperity Sphere had caused the Philippine feudal and business elite to collaborate openly with the Japanese. Nearly every high ranking political and economic figure of the prewar era had retained a privileged position under Japan's puppet government. In fact, of the Filipino Senators who were elected in November, 1941 (a month before the Japanese occupation), not one was free from substantiated accusations of assisting in Japan's economic and political manipulation of the islands' people and resources.[30] Conversely, in the Philippines' most fertile agricultural regions in central Luzon, a group of Filipino peasants under the leadership of communist intellectual Louis Taruc had formed a guerrilla force which ultimately consisted of approximately one hundred thousand men. They called themselves the *Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon* (The People's Anti-Japanese Army), or *Hukbalahap,* or *Huks* , for short. The original self proclaimed purpose of the Hukbalahap was monumental in its difficulty, yet simple in its forthrightness — they intended to rid Philippine soil of all "Japanese, collaborators, and puppets."[31] Consequently, as they witnessed the landlord class embrace their enemy, the *Huks* in turn quickly occupied the sugar plantations and other large estates of the region. They implemented a form of land redistribution in the areas they held, and somewhat naïvely anticipated American support after the war to legitimize their acts. The *Hukbalahap* were not the only peasant resistance force, nor were they the only ones to advocate social and political reform. Indeed depending on one's definition the Philippines produced between two hundred thousand and one million guerrillas during the course of the war.[32] But the *Hukbalahap* was the most determined and successful. From 1942 until after the end of the war, neither the Japanese nor the old feudal landlords were ever able to gain control of central Luzon.

As the war drew to a close American policy makers were faced with many complex problems. With the Philippine economy in shambles, it fell to American officials to decide ultimately whether the economy should be rehabilitated to its prewar state, dependent upon a protected American market, or recreated so that it could stand alone among the free trading economies of the world. Either option would require a massive influx of capital from the United States. There was also the problem of the postwar political structure. Obviously Filipino collaborators had acted treasonously towards the United States, whereas the majority of the people and especially the guerrilla resistance had admirably defended American and Commonwealth interests. Yet years of precedent dictated that internal matters be left in the hands of the Filipinos, including the question of removing collaborators from power. Moreover, those Americans most familiar with Philippine matters, such as General Douglas MacArthur and Paul McNutt, men who were personal

friends of the Filipino elite, believed that collaboration was not simply a physical act, but more "a matter of the heart." In their eyes a person was not a collaborator simply because he had assisted the enemy. On the contrary, only someone who truly desired to aid the Japanese could qualify as a traitor.[33] Accordingly, upon MacArthur's triumphant return to the archipelago, Philippine puppet president Jose Laurel was arrested for treason, while Manuel Roxas, a prominent puppet government figure who had signed a declaration of war against America but who had also been MacArthur's prewar military assistant and personal friend, was greeted by the General with a bear hug and reported "liberated." The stage was set for confrontation and confusion.

NOTES

1 Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of The Philippines 1929-1946* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 262.

2 Ibid., p. 262.

3 Ibid., p. 263.

4 For accounts of Roosevelt's actions, and those of the expansionists in general, see Edmund Morris, *The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Ballentine Books, 1979), pp. 565- 590.

5 A succinct account of America's drifting policies and Mckinley's revelation is found in Stanley Karnow, *In our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), chapters 4 and 5, and p.128.

6 Claude A Buss, *The United States and The Philippines*, (Palo Alto, California: Hoover Instititute on War and Peace/Stanford University Press, 1977), p. 13.

7 Karnow, *In Our Image*, p.174.

8 Garek A. Grunder, and William E. Livzey, *The Philippines and The United States* (Norman Oaklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), pp.78-80; Karnow, *In Our Image*, p.174.

9 Karnow, *In Our Image*, p.230.

10 Ibid., p.230.

11 Ibid., p.233.

12 Friend, *Between Two Empires*, pp.7-8.

13 Karnow, *In Our Image*, p.245.

14 Friend, *Between Two Empires*, pp. 3-5.

15 Grunder, *The Philippines and The United States*, p. 147.

16 Karnow, *In our Image*, p.221.

17 Central Intelligence Agency Report, "Democratic Movement In The Philippines" (February 3, 1949, declassified June 14, 1979.) John F. Melby Papers, Philippine Folder, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

18 Ibid. Moreover, the CIA Report stated that these structures had to be changed before true democracy could develop in the Philippines. It also implicated Sergio Osmena and especialy Manuel Quezon as key actors in the game of demanding independence while working to prevent it.

19 Ibid.

20 Between October 1945 and June 1946 the point was frequently made in the House and Senate hearings regarding the Philippine Trade Act that free trade had enabled the Philippine Islands to enjoy the highest standard of living in all Asia.

21 Morris, *The Rise Of Theodore Roosevelt*, chapter 27.

22 A more detailed account of MacArthur's move to the Philippines will be developed in the next chapter.

23 McNutt's conflict with Roosevelt is chronicled in the published version of Harold L. Ickes, *The Secret Diary Of Harold Ickes*, Vol. 3 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), pp.13, 65-66, 74-90, 98-103.

24 Friend, *Between Two Empires*, p. 254.

25 Grunder, *The Philippines and The United States*, p231.

26 See Karnow, *In our Image*, pp.272-277, 337-340; and Louis Taruc, *Born of The People* (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press,1975), pp.22-48.

27 Paul V. McNutt, *Seventh And Final Report of The High Commissioner To The Philippines.* 80th Cong., 1st Ses., House Document, v.9, n.389. (Washington, July, 1947) p.20.

28 Senator Millard E. Tydings, *Remarks of Hon. Millard E. Tydings; Conditions of Philippines Caused By War, And Recommendations for Relief and Rehabilitation* . 79th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document, v.14 n. 1-77. (Washington, June 7,1945) p. 2.

29 Ibid., p.6.

30 "Intreview with Mr. James P. McGranery [Assistant to Attourny General], June 20, 1946 . Harold L. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines, 1945-46". Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington D.C. Mr. McGranery claimed that the Attorney General had determined that: "Everyone was a collaborationist; the whole Senate was charged; there was not an office holder who was not charged." Subsequent published sources have generally agreed that there were eight Senators substantially free of having collaborated.

31 Taruc, *Born of The People*, p.66.

32 It is impossible to determine the exact number of guerrillas. Their numbers fluctuated continuously throughout the conflict and swelled considerably in 1944 when it became increasingly likely that the Americans would retake the islands. Moreover, as Buss points out on page 20 of *The United States And The Philippines*, it was difficult even to define the term guerrilla, for "the Huks had an army of 10,000 with 100,000 reserves."

33 Paul V. Mc Nuttt consistently insisted that collaboration was a matter of the heart, particularly when he referred to Manuel Roxas. In his unpublished diary, Harold Ickes noted that "McNutt has a fondness for Roxas and he [McNutt] again expounded his theory that collaboration was a matter of the heart. I replied that I could not agree with him fully." See Ickes Papers, Ickes' Diary, Sunday, November 4, 1945. Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

2

MACARTHUR AND THE RISE OF THE COLLABORATORS

"Those who have collaborated with the enemy must be removed from authority and influence over the political and economic life of the country; and the democratic form of government guaranteed in the Constitution of the Philippines must be restored for the benefit of the people of the Islands."[1] These were the words of Franklin Roosevelt on June 29, 1944, a few months before American forces landed on the beaches of Leyte and restored American authority to the Philippine Islands. A simple interpretation of Roosevelt's declaration would suggest that the American position regarding Filipino collaborators was cut and dried—all those who had assisted the Japanese during their occupation would be stripped of economic and political influence; they would be treated as traitors to both the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth governments. Yet in making this blanket pronouncement, President Roosevelt had vastly oversimplified the complicated issue of motivation. After nearly three years of military occupation, many Filipinos had found that in order to earn enough money to survive it was necessary to work with their Japanese overlords. Also, there were some Filipinos who accepted positions at various levels of the puppet government in order to act as a buffer between the Japanese and their countrymen. On the other hand, there were members of the Philippine political and economic elite who accepted political positions under their occupiers simply to advance their own fortunes. Given these complications, Roosevelt's pronouncement actually worked at odds with its purpose. Rather than clarifying Washington's intentions, the president's speech served to obscure them. Consequently, the highly controversial and emotionally charged issue was abandoned to the discretion of American officials on the scene to deal with as they saw fit, which essentially meant that the collaboration issue was left in the hands of General Douglas MacArthur.

MacArthur's personal involvement with the Philippine Islands can be traced back to October, 1903, when as a young officer he was stationed there for one year during the Philippine insurrection. By that time, MacArthur's father, Arthur MacArthur II, who had served a term as military governor of the islands before the arrival of Howard Taft, had enchanted his son with fascinating tales of the Orient. Easily persuaded by his father and

by personal experience, Douglas sentimentally wrote of his stay in the Visayas (the centre group of islands in the archipelago): "The languorous laze that seemed to glamourize even the most routine chores of life, the fun loving men, the moon beam [sic] delicacy of its lovely women, fastened me with a grip that has never relaxed."[2] Carol Morris Petillo, in a psycho-biography entitled *Douglas MacArthur: the Philippine Years,* argues that it was only in the Philippines that MacArthur could truly feel at ease. Petillo believes that various experiences in MacArthur's childhood, along with the domineering manner of his father and mother, reinforced in the General's personality a fear of women and a resentment towards authority. Consequently, it was in faraway and exotic Manila that MacArthur was always most relaxed, where he encountered submissive oriental women who did not threaten his macho egoism and where early twentieth century technology rendered the islands quite removed from the politicians of Washington whom MacArthur consistently believed were trying to thwart his purposes and ambitions.[3] Accordingly, after a successful foray in France during the First World War, MacArthur returned to the Philippines for much of the 1920's. Then after an extended stint as Army Chief of Staff under presidents Hoover and Roosevelt, he returned to the archipelago once again, to leave only under duress when the Japanese invasion forced him to withdraw to Australia. It was MacArthur's 1935 return to the Philippines, after his term as Army Chief of Staff, which best reveals his personal and political make-up and which ultimately sheds the most light upon his subsequent actions regarding Filipino collaborators.

To understand fully the reasons for his leaving Washington, it is useful to look at MacArthur's behaviour three years earlier in 1932 when 20,000 unemployed World War I veterans, with their wives and children, converged on Washington to demand the deferred bonus Congress had promised them in 1924. The Hoover administration considered the "Bonus Expeditionary Force," as the veterans called themselves, a threat to national security and, perceiving a Communist conspiracy, Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur devised a plan to have the subversive elements dispersed and removed.[4] Unfortunately, a tiny number of the veterans who were camped in unused federal buildings were not willing to cooperate with the General's plans and hurled bricks at over-zealous policemen. What occurred at that point is still the subject of debate, but most scholars agree that President Hoover lost control of the rapidly unfolding events. General MacArthur acted quickly and decisively: "Donning his uniform and ribbons, he referred to himself in the third person as he declared: 'MacArthur has decided to go into active command in the field. There is incipient revolution in the air.'" Then "mobilizing eight hundred troops..., he pursued [the veterans and their families] with bayonets and tear gas across the

Anacostia River" where "his men burned their encampment of shacks and tents."[5] MacArthur never displayed any regret over his action on that day, in spite of public outrage over what was accurately perceived as an excessively bellicose and unnecessary display of force. To the reactionary and militaristic MacArthur, the veterans appeared to be both unpatriotic and radical. They were communists who challenged his ideal American society.

When Franklin Roosevelt became president, he had already confided to friends that in his opinion Douglas MacArthur was "one of the two most dangerous men in the country,"[6] and unsurprisingly the remainder of MacArthur's stay in Washington as Chief of Staff was distinguished by clashes with the President. New Deal policy dictated that less money be allocated to the military and more to social services, although MacArthur argued that it was both politically and morally wrong to weaken the military establishment in such a fashion. In his mind it became just another instance of Washington politicians recklessly meddling in military matters they did not fully understand. Realizing that MacArthur could become a fierce political rival if offended too often, the President shrewdly suggested that the general become military advisor to the newly created Philippine Commonwealth. In this way MacArthur would gracefully be removed from Washington and would also provide a valuable service to the soon to be independent Philippine Islands. Understandably, MacArthur warmed to such an offer, especially after the president of the Philippine Commonwealth, Manuel Quezon (a long time friend of the General's), personally asked him to prepare the national defence forces of the islands.

Consequently, in October, 1935, MacArthur retired to the Philippines. It offered him the solace of a homecoming. If his vague aspirations for higher office were ever to materialize he had every reason to believe that a significant tour in the Philippines would lead to political success at home, as it had for William Howard Taft. If not, then at least the islands would provide many challenging opportunities for the man entrusted with their defence.[7]

Once in the Philippines, MacArthur had the opportunity to rekindle old friendships, and he naturally continued his earlier practice of selecting his associates from the upper crust of Filipino society. Consequently, no one within MacArthur's inner circle of friends and acquaintances was less than a national political figure, a baron of Philippine industry, or a large plantation owner. Much has been made of MacArthur's friendships with members of the Filipino elite, and all of MacArthur's biographers agree that those associations explain a great deal of the General's behaviour towards various collaborators after the war. Yet, Western style friendship alone seems an inadequate explanation for all

MacArthur's actions, many of which threatened to jeopardise his career and reputation. What biographers and historians have generally overlooked is the extent of MacArthur's immersion in Philippine society. He frequently referred to himself as a Filipino, and in 1946 he was made an honorary citizen of the islands, a title he bore with great pride.[8] His love for the archipelago, its people and life style, are well documented, and it was in the Philippines that MacArthur felt most comfortable and at home. It is only reasonable to assume then that MacArthur, after spending so much of his life in the Philippines, adopted many Filipino customs and traditions as his own and that, as a result, his conciliatory attitude towards certain Filipino collaborators exhibited a friendship of a special kind. Manuel Quezon, for example, was more than an old friend in the American sense of the word: he was MacArthur's *compadre*, or ritualistic brother.

Philippine society is sustained by complex interpersonal relationships. To succeed or get ahead in the Philippines does not so much depend upon individual effort as on group cooperation. The extended family unit (or fraternal organizations such as college fraternities or lodges) form not only the social, but also the political and economic support system. If a member of one's group needs something the group will explore all of its complex personal networks until that need can be fulfilled. To expand the networks, families intermarry much as European royalty once did. Similarly, an outsider can enter into the network by becoming a *compadre*, or Godparent to the children of parents within the network. This employs the Roman Catholic sacrament of baptism, but expands upon it since after the ceremony the Godparent becomes, for all intents and purposes, a full member of the child's family. This demands strict and unflinching loyalty to the family involved. It also carries heavy financial obligations, as the *compadre* is responsible for the child in the event of the biological parents' deaths and must generally be willing to assist the child financially and socially should he ever require it. Thus, the Godparent becomes a ritualistic, but by no means exclusively ceremonial, brother of the child's parents. In that role the new member of the interpersonal network is morally and socially bound to win and retain the esteem of that family's network and, should that network ever become disappointed with the *compadre*, he would be considered *walang hiya*, or shameless. In other words, he will have lost face with the group, an act which results in being socially, emotionally, politically, and financially excluded from the network system. In the Philippines, where personal rather than institutional relationships buttress the inner structure of society, to be excluded from the network is comparable to being branded a leper.[9]

MacArthur, after residing so long in the Philippines, was keenly aware of the

workings of Filipino culture and society. As the representative of the American military establishment he realized that the Filipinos (both rich and poor) considered his word to be synonymous with that of the American government — after all, the United States Army was a part of the network of the United States government, and MacArthur was the spokesman for the Army. Likewise, he realized that to have any influence with the Philippine political elite he would have to enter their network. Consequently, in 1938 Philippine President Manuel Quezon became the Godfather of General MacArthur's son, and from that point onward, each man was sworn to assist the other and the other's network of family and associates in whatever way possible should the need arise.[10]

There is one other feature of Philippine culture which was to play a role in MacArthur's behaviour during and after the Japanese invasion, and that was *utang na loob*, or the reciprocal debt of gratitude. Filipina sociologist Mary Hollnsteiner points out that "in the traditional Filipino patron-client relationship the poor and weak give loyalty to the rich and powerful with the expectation that they will receive help from their benefactor whenever needed. Each side owes to the other a debt of gratitude, or *utang na loob*, although the subordinate in this hierarchical relationship is not expected to repay the debt in equivalent amounts."[11] In a more equal relationship, such as that which exists between two brothers or people of the same social standing the debt is one of equal value. Moreover, once the debt is repaid, the other partner in the relationship is automatically considered re-indebted, thus perpetuating the relationship. If one fails to reciprocate at any level of this continuing cycle of indebtedness, one becomes guilty of *walang hiya* .

Significantly, in the final days before MacArthur and Quezon surrendered to Japan the fortressed island of Corrigedor, the Philippine president gave the American general 1,000,000 pesos, or $500,000.[12] Although nobody can say with certainty why Quezon gave MacArthur the gift, Quezon probably felt he owed MacArthur (and the United States) something for assisting the islands before and during the Japanese invasion—*utang na loob*. According to American law, MacArthur, as an officer of the United States Army, could not have legally accepted the money, but by Filipino tradition MacArthur could do nothing else without severely damaging his relationship with Quezon, and by implication the entire Philippine elite.[13] Now the onus of *utang na loob* was reversed. Quezon, in giving the General half a million dollars, had repaid MacArthur for his services, and Quezon could rest assured that his *compadre* would now do everything in his power to look out for the interests of the Philippines and its president. If that meant staying on Corrigedor and fighting to the death, so be it. If on the other hand MacArthur retreated from the Philippines, as was to be the case when he abandoned the Bataan peninsula a few

weeks later, then he would undoubtedly remain sensitive to the postwar political needs of his *compadre* and his *compadre's* network system.

MacArthur's intimacy with the Filipino elite and his fondness for the islands led him to believe that he alone was somehow entrusted with determining their destiny. He demonstrated this Messiah complex many times before and after the Japanese invasion, but perhaps nowhere as obviously as when originally preparing the islands' defence. Upon MacArthur's return to the Far East in 1935, he astounded American military strategists by proclaiming the Philippines defensible. Every other military authority since Theodore Roosevelt's administration had reconciled himself to the fact that token resistance to an invading force was the best the United States could hope for in the islands, a view reinforced by American military cutbacks and the growth of Japanese power. Yet somehow General MacArthur believed that, if he personally managed the preparations, the Philippines could become the Switzerland of the Pacific — an impregnable bastion defended by an indigenous native force of professional and reserve soldiers.[14] Throughout the 1930's MacArthur made increasingly optimistic reports about Philippine defence capabilities, sharply contradicting the opinions of his advisor and assistant, Major Dwight Eisenhower, who believed that the general's reports were "far too optimistic" and likely to "build up illusions that could prove to be dangerous in the future."[15]

Needless to say Eisenhower was correct. MacArthur's performance from December 7, 1941, until Wainright's surrender a few months later was a fiasco. Yet, due to President Roosevelt's need to win public support for the war effort, MacArthur was built up to be a hero. The press was saturated with accounts of his brave resistance (the General supplied a steady stream of flattering press releases), and, in spite of the fact that he had never performed bravely in combat, he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honour.[16]

Years later when decisions were being debated as to how best to defeat Japan, MacArthur was the one who convinced the Joint Chiefs of Staff to abandon the militarily sound policy of leapfrogging over the Philippines to Formosa. He argued that Filipinos would not understand if America did not give a high priority to liberating their colonial children. They would resent what would appear to be American neglect, and America would subsequently lose face. What he was saying, without using the words, was that America would be guilty of violating its obligations under *utang na loob* —and would therefore be *walang hiya*. Moreover he, MacArthur, would have been *walang hiya* since *he* had promised "to return."

To avoid such shame and embarassment MacArthur also moved quickly to assist the collaborators. He first insisted that Philippine President Sergio Osmeña (who as vice president had succeeded Manuel Quezon to the presidency after the latter died of tuberculosis in 1944) accompany American forces as they liberated the Philippines. Moreover, the General stipulated that no American High Commissioner was to accompany them. Osmeña had been a long-time political opponent of Quezon, but, because of the Philippines' *de facto* one party political system, he had been selected as vice president in the 1930's to keep peace within the party. Although a member of the entrenched oligarchy, Osmeña represented a more liberal and legalistic segment of the upper class which was not identified with the falangist elements and which was outspokenly critical of MacArthur's defence program during the 1930's.[17] The fact that MacArthur did not like Osmeña and that he felt "the Old Man", as Osmeña was referred to in Philippine circles, to be incapable and ill-suited to the presidency was an open secret.[18] That Osmeña was an opponent of Quezon, and therefore outside of Quezon's and MacArthur's *compadre* network, doubtlessly also helped shape the General's attitude. Thus, it is not surprising that MacArthur insisted that an isolated Osmeña return to the Philippines with him, especially since the General "intended to be the supreme civil authority in both combat and non-combat areas, and 'to delegate' [only] such civil authority as he chose to Osmeña."[19] Osmeña complained to Secretary of the Interior Ickes, who after the fall of Bataan had the residual powers of the High Commissionership transferred to his department, that "civil authority derives from the people and the governments of the United States and the Philippines, and that MacArthur cannot 'delegate' authority he does not have unless President Roosevelt intervenes... to establish a full military government in the Philippines and appoints MacArthur to be Military Governor."[20] There was little Roosevelt could do, however, since he had been responsible for granting national recognition to MacArthur's "heroic" capabilities. Consequently, without legal sanction MacArthur established his military government simply by amending a War Department directive. [21]

During MacArthur's maneuverings, Osmeña realized that he would become disgraced in the eyes of his people if all of his power derived from MacArthur's paternalistic tutelage. Moreover, such embarrassment could only strengthen the hand of his old opponents who had remained in the Philippines and collaborated with the Japanese.

Osmeña therefore attempted to have Harold Ickes appoint a High Commissioner to act as a buffer between MacArthur and the Philippine President and to offer Osmeña a direct link with President Roosevelt which MacArthur could not manipulate. However, Ickes' efforts on Osmeña's behalf were cut short when MacArthur learned of the plans and secretly sent Major General Richard Marshall to order Osmeña to fly at once to New Guinea to join MacArthur's invasion force. Furthermore, MacArthur had by this time convinced Secretary of War Stimson that it was inadvisable to appoint a High Commissioner. When Ickes contacted Stimson on September 30, 1944, to gain support for the proposal, Stimson wrote back: "It would be most unwise to introduce a High Commissioner on to the scene during the period of military administration...; on the other hand... it would be of the greatest advantage to have President Osmeña land with General MacArthur." Stimson frankly concluded that "at the outset the administration [of the Philippines] will be a military administration, and it will be a United States administration, the head of which will be General MacArthur."[22]

Without the hindrance of a High Commissioner or a powerful Philippine presidency, MacArthur's hands were free to engage in other activities designed to perpetuate his almost dictatorial powers and those of his upper class Filipino collaborator friends. Most controversial was the "liberation" of Manuel Roxas. Before the war, Quezon had made it known that Roxas, speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives, was his chosen successor. An astute and ambitious politician linked with the falangist element in the Philippines, Roxas had expediently cultivated MacArthur's friendship. When war broke out with the Japanese, the General made him a United States Army colonel and personal military aide. Due to his official and private relations with MacArthur and Quezon, Roxas was witness to the one half million dollar money exchange and was given the option of leaving the islands with Quezon and Osmeña. He chose not to, and his motivation for remaining continues to be debated to this day. It is known that for a brief time after Quezon's evacuation Roxas continued to fight the Japanese on Mindanao, the Philippines' southern island group, under the promoted rank of brigadier general. Subsequently, after being captured, he was offered the position of puppet president under the Japanese, an offer he repeatedly refused. Ultimately, however, he accepted a position as Minister at Large in the Japanese sponsored administration, played a key role in drafting the puppet constitution, and, in the action for which he was most remembered by his antagonists, he signed a declaration of war against the United States.[23] Later, in early 1944 when American liberation seemed imminent, Roxas jockeyed to keep his political options open by establishing contact with MacArthur and the Allied forces. Although it cannot be

determined conclusively whether Manuel Roxas collaborated in order to secure the best possible treatment for the Filipino people, as he later contended, or whether he welcomed the Japanese occupation as many of his critics charged (Roxas lived a life of luxury under the Japanese and apparently enjoyed his considerable political influence),[24] it probably is accurate to conclude that Roxas was an extraordinary politician who carefully tried to insure his personal success regardless of the war's outcome. In April, 1945, as American control was extended over the last Japanese hold-outs in the Philippines, Roxas, along with a group of his puppet colleagues, was taken into custody by the American Army, but soon Roxas was singled out and proclaimed "liberated" by General MacArthur. MacArthur moved quickly to have Roxas reinstated as an American Army officer, but at Roxas' own request he was placed on the inactive list and, armed with the General's personal exoneration, prepared to reenter politics.

Ignoring evidence of possible treason, MacArthur said he had known Roxas personally for many years and therefore knew he was not a collaborator. Apparently that was all that was required. As historian Stanley Karnow observed, "MacArthur had spoken,... and that was that."[25] MacArthur's generosity probably had ulterior motives — he clearly would have preferred to work with Roxas rather than Osmeña. But one must also acknowledge the possibility that MacArthur was thinking and acting as a traditional Filipino. As a *compadre* of Quezon, Roxas was also a member of MacArthur's network system. Filipino protocol dictated that MacArthur's debt of *utang na loob* resulting from the exchange of money on Corrigedor would be owed not to the now deceased Quezon, but to someone close to Quezon — ideally his protegé and heir apparent. Had MacArthur not assisted Roxas, he would have become *walang hiya* in the eyes of the Filipino elite and would thereby have lost the respect of the people he most cared for in the land in which he hoped to retire. It was not until a full year after Roxas' "liberation" that MacArthur felt compelled to justify to his increasingly vocal American critics any reasons beyond friendship for his forgiveness of Roxas' wartime record. Both immediately before and after the April, 1946, presidential election in which Roxas defeated Osmeña, MacArthur declared: "Roxas is no collaborator.... He not only was instrumental in providing me with vital intelligence of the enemy but was one of the prime factors in the guerrilla movement."[26] Interestingly, as MacArthur biographer D. Clayton Jones noted, "no guerrilla could be found afterwards to attest to Roxas' anti-Japanese work.... Even an American counter intelligence officer said he 'tried to find Roxas' connection with the underground, but no one knew anything about it."[27]

There is no disputing that MacArthur worked hard to assist his friends among the

prewar elite. Aside from becoming personally involved in Roxas' exoneration, the General visited one of the prison compounds for Filipinos accused of having helped the Japanese invaders. Among the prison's captives were members of the feudal aristocracy, his "misunderstood" friends whom he told "would soon be absolved."[28] For MacArthur even to talk to a person accused of treason was forbidden by a War Department directive, but the General, claiming to be better suited to make such a decision than were men in distant Washington, had "stricken from the proposed directive the paragraph forbidding him to have any dealings with the collaborators."[29] The War Department apparently agreed with MacArthur's reasoning since his amendment was allowed to stand.

Yet all of these earlier actions seem trivial compared to MacArthur's decision to reconvene the Philippine legislature, a body elected in 1941 which never had time to meet before the Japanese invasion and whose members were virtually all accused of being quislings. Osmeña, who correctly foresaw that immunity bestowed upon legislators within the chambers of Congress would make a mockery of the collaboration issue, wished to wait until all of those charged with treason had been tried. But Roxas—the man hand picked by MacArthur for forgiveness—soon defended the collaborators. Aware that with the cooperation of the old legislature he could eventually become head of state, Roxas advised Osmeña that as president he was legally obligated to seat the Congress. When Osmeña objected, MacArthur sided with Roxas and "demanded that the Congress be called into session without delay."[30] Osmeña had little choice but to acquiesce.

From within the Senate chambers Roxas moved quickly to thwart Osmeña's initiatives and advance the interests of the collaborators. Predictably, Roxas was immediately elected to the powerful position of president of the Senate, and he also chaired the crucial senatorial committee charged with confirming presidential appointments. From this position Roxas was able to rebuke Osmeña when the "Old Man" sent to the Senate for ratification a list of potential cabinet ministers which included leaders of the guerrilla resistance movement. Embarrassed by all the attention drawn to the issue of collaboration, MacArthur demanded that the two antagonists work "without friction,"[31] but again it was Osmeña who was forced to capitulate by appointing men who were tied to Roxas and tainted with treason.

This same pattern was to repeat itself concerning other appointments during the summer of 1945, most blatantly regarding judges to the Filipino People's Courts, specially created courts of law for the purpose of trying collaborators. After President Roosevelt's death, MacArthur tried to claim that the creation of these courts had been Roosevelt's idea, for, when the American Attorney General considered the matter in the

autumn of 1945, MacArthur produced a memorandum "purportedly from Roosevelt" and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which instructed the General to let the Filipinos run their own courts.[32] Whether MacArthur or Roosevelt originated the idea may never be settled definitively, but clearly MacArthur's actions made the People's Courts a travesty of justice. Without the assistance of the American Army, the Philippine government could not even afford adequately to equip and staff the courts. James P. McGrannery, a top aide to the Attorney General, stated that

> there were seven such courts working under the most impossible conditions... [They] were terribly handicapped just from the lack of physical equipment such as typewriters, etc. There were no means of investigation. There was no simple solution. Witnesses had scattered; the chief collaborators were not on hand. This was MacArthur's fault.[33]

Furthermore, not only had the General recalled the legislature, thereby placing many of the top collaborators beyond the reach of the courts, but, by late 1945, he was holding puppet president Jose Laurel and a select few other collaborators in far off Japan.

Meanwhile, Roxas continued to block potentially troublesome appointments. When the question arose as to whether Filipino judge, L.Tanda, a man known to be an anti-collaborationist, would be appointed Solicitor General and prosecutor for the People's Court, Roxas again "showed his true colors." As a journalist reported to Secretary Ickes after a conversation with a high ranking Philippine legal official: "Roxas began to harangue the commission members against the appointment. He injected his comments into the deliberations... both on the chair and in the corridors."[34] Disturbed by the prospect that the Courts might actually become headed by someone who would actively prosecute collaborators, Roxas favoured one of those judges who had retained their positions on the bench during the Japanese occupation. The impression that MacArthur had initiated the People's Courts only to appease the American public seemed to be shared by Roxas, and if it were not for a telegram to Osmeña from Secretary Ickes implying that American rehabilitation assistance might be withheld if collaborators were not properly dealt with, it is likely that Roxas' tactics would have succeeded.

The appointment of magistrates was only one of the dilemmas facing the court system. From the outset Osmeña had sought American assistance in defining collaboration and in punishing collaborators, but his efforts were to no avail. Apparently MacArthur had not let Osmeña's requests get through to receptive ears in Washington.[35] In a conference with Paul Steintorf, the American Consul in Manila, Osmeña said that

American "army authorities repeatedly refused to divulge information concerning the charges against the collaborators they took into custody."[36] This resulted in four thousand collaborators becoming eligible for bail on grounds of *habeas corpus* after being held beyond the maximum period of six hours without evidence against them being produced. Significantly, although the four thousand suspects had been rounded up by the American army, MacArthur still refused to release to the courts the evidence upon which the collaborators were arrested.[37] Thus, while reporting to Washington that he was capturing the collaborators, he could still rely on later obstruction to retain the respect of his Filipino friends.

The most adamant and vocal opponents of the collaborators were the guerrilla forces who had fought against Japanese rule throughout the invasion. After the war all except the *Hukbalahap* had put down their arms. The *Huks* however controlled the land and the plantations of central Luzon and had no intention of giving that land back to the aristocracy, especially an aristocracy that had worked with the Japanese. Compared to the "Bonus Expeditionary Force," which had marched on Washington over a decade earlier, the *Huks* posed a far more revolutionary and socialistic threat to an established political elite, yet, this time MacArthur's reaction was more cautious and subtle. Careful to avoid criticism, he also apparently empathized with the plight of the *Hukbalahaps* and their families, for, when asked if he was going to force them to lay down their weapons, he replied: "Do you see that hangdog look they have here, resentful, poorly dressed.... They tell me the *Huks* are socialistic, that they are revolutionary, but I haven't got the heart to go after them. If I worked in those sugar fields I'd probably be a *Huk* myself."[38] But while the American military was not used to engage the *Huks*, MacArthur did permit ruthless right-wing vigilante groups to go into the *Huk* controlled areas in attempts to regain the land lost by the old oligopoly. In freeing Roxas and permitting him and other members of the feudal class to control the legislative branch of government, MacArthur had facilitated the Filipino elites' hiring of thugs and assassins to recapture their lost land and privileges. Moreover, the *Hukbalahap* were the only large guerrilla force denied formal recognition by the United States military,[39] which resulted in their being denied access to military back pay and pensions and in their being left without legal recourse when attacked by the landlords' death squads.

With the *Hukbalahap* ostracised and denied American assistance and with the Philippine Senate effectively blocking Osmeña's initiatives and appointments, the road was open for the collaborator faction to try to monopolize political power. By the summer of 1945, it was obvious that Roxas was seeking to displace the "Old Man" and become

president of the Philippine Commonwealth. The members of the Filipino elite who had collaborated in order to advance their private interests viewed Roxas as their saviour, but he was also gaining support from those lower class Filipinos who had worked with the Japanese only in order to support their families. Although this segment of the population resented the way the Roxas clique openly embraced the enemy, they were afraid that America, as both FDR and Ickes had implied, might treat all collaborators with equal severity. Thus, they felt that with Roxas in the executive mansion there was greater chance that all those who had collaborated would be granted a general amnesty. Paul Steintorf sent Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, a secret memorandum in September, 1945, noting that within Congress Roxas had "become the great exponent for soft treatment of collaborators. He has used every possible trick to confuse the issue and to minimize the offences committed during the occupation period.... Furthermore there can be little doubt that rich, powerful and intelligent elements are allied with Roxas on the collaboration issue while the anti-collaborators are much less powerful and influential."[40]

The "tricks" Steintorf mentioned essentially referred to manipulation of the media. Roxas owned one of the largest Manila newspapers, the *Manila Daily News*, and from the time of the liberation of Manila until the unconditional Japanese surrender in August, 1945, MacArthur had permitted only Roxas' newspaper to operate freely in the Philippines. Roxas realized the extent to which the General was revered in Filipino eyes for his role in their deliverance from Japanese occupation; so front page stories belaboured the fact that Roxas had been exonerated "personally" by General MacArthur. Concurrently, the *Daily News* sought to slander Osmeña and shift the focus of popular concern away from collaboration. Frequently columns and editorials stated that the Chinese merchant class was the real enemy of the average Filipino, not the collaborators who had actually sought to soften the blow of the Japanese on the islands. The prejudice and propaganda became so extreme that an American news reporter informed Secretary Ickes that if you "substitute the word 'Jew' for Chinese you would have the Nazi creed of racial intolerance."[41] The Chinese had long been the victims of racial prejudice in the Philippines, and, since they emerged from the war relatively prosperous compared to average Filipinos, they became the focus of resentment. Reiterating such bigotry, the *Daily News* missed no opportunity to allude to the fact that Osmeña was of Chinese descent.[42]

The part of Steintorf's message to Secretary Byrnes concerning the "rich and powerful" elements of Filipino society who were consolidating around Roxas' candidacy also referred to the interactions of Douglas MacArthur with prominent members of the

Philippine elite. The case of Don Andrés Soriano, a close personal friend of MacArthur and a financial and political supporter of Roxas, is both useful and illustrative. Although he lived all his life in the Philippines, Andrés Soriano retained his Spanish citizenship until late 1941 when the fear of having his assets in the Philippines and the United States frozen in the event of war caused him to become a Filipino national. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, he had engaged in many lucrative business ventures and had become one of the richest men in Manila. Among his holdings were the massive San Miguel Brewery conglomerate, rich gold mines in the Bagio district, many banks and insurance enterprises, and a large brewery in the United States. As a Spanish citizen he had been the moving spirit in the falangist movement and even served as a personal representative of the Spanish dictator, Franco, by becoming honorary Spanish Consul General in Manila. This appointment came as a reward for the over one half million pesos Soriano had given to Franco for his war effort during the Spanish Civil War. Moreover, in the late 1930's, Soriano cultivated close friendships with not only Commonwealth President Quezon, but also Manuel Roxas and Douglas MacArthur. Subsequently, by the time of the Battle of Bataan he held the combined honours of major political financier for Quezon, business associate of Roxas, and military aide to MacArthur. These financial and personal affiliations served Soriano well, for, through his ties to MacArthur and Quezon, he secured a cabinet portfolio after the fall of Corregidor and was evacuated to the United States. He retained his cabinet post until after Quezon's death, when he was expelled from government in a purge conducted by Osmeña against men intimately associated with the fascist movement.[43] Shortly before the American liberation of the Philippines, MacArthur promoted Soriano from the rank of captain to that of colonel in the United States Army and then appointed him Chief, G-2, Intelligence on the American General Headquarters staff from which Soriano directed the activities of the Criminal Investigation Committee (CIC).[44] As head of the CIC, as well as a ranking member of the Philippine elite and a "Falangist big name", Soriano was placed in charge of "apprehending Falangists, Japanese collaborators, and war criminals"[45] — a situation akin to American Ku Klux Klan members in the 1920's sitting on a Southern jury to try a white man for killing a black.

In the early months after the Leyte landings, Soriano became MacArthur's most trusted aide. Not only did the CIC director shield collaborators from criminal charges, but, as Stanley Karnow suggests, Soriano also protected "MacArthur from progressive ideas... [and] reinforced his paranoiac belief that enemies were conspiring to usurp his prerogatives."[46] Because of this, MacArthur became even more attached to conservative

ideas and more willing to defend his Filipino friends. Thus, when Roxas officially declared his candidacy for the presidency in the summer of 1945, MacArthur did nothing to mitigate the barrage of political propaganda proclaiming Roxas to be the General's choice. Soriano also contributed to Roxas' election victory in more concrete and direct ways by offering a one million dollar campaign contribution (by far the largest Roxas was to receive), and withholding from the People's Court information concerning the Senate president's wartime activities.

In the Meantime, while sponsoring Roxas' bid for the presidency, Soriano was also using his privileged position with MacArthur to further his own and the General's financial interests. In the years 1945 and 1946, the Soriano empire grew to include new breweries built by the Japanese during the war and confiscated by the American Army, the Philippines' first large scale commercial airline, an importing/exporting shipping franchise, one of the largest broadcasting corporations on the islands, the first company to develop Philippine oil reserves, and a plethora or other ventures.[47] MacArthur had invested in Soriano's gold mines before the war, but now the value of his shares in the Soriano-San Miguel dynasty increased significantly.[48]

One might wonder why MacArthur's defence of the collaborators did not provoke cries of outrage from the American government and public. Part of the answer to this lies in MacArthur's prestige and stature as hero of the Pacific war and his ever watchful public relations staff who screened much of what became known about the General, but more significant was a news and information black-out MacArthur proclaimed in the Philippine Islands, a form of censorship that denied information even to American cabinet officers. After resigning his cabinet portfolio, Harold Ickes publicly referred to MacArthur's actions as having placed an "iron curtain around the archipelago."[49] Throughout the period of American liberation, MacArthur's restrictions on communications from the islands were virtually air tight. Consequently, by the time officials in Washington became aware of events in the Philippines, it was already difficult to alter established policies. There were, however, forces opposing the General's actions; though they worked from a position of great disadvantage. While this movement drew upon many sources, it was spearheaded by Harold L. Ickes, Franklin Roosevelt's combative Secratary of the Interior.

NOTES

1 Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, *The United States And the Philippines: A Study Of Neocolonialism* (Philadelphia Pennsylvania: Institute For The Study Of Human Issues, 1981) , p.7.

2 William Manchester, *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964* (New York: Dell Publishing Co. , Inc, 1978) , p.76.

3 Carlos Moriss Petillo, *Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years*_ (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1981) , p.157.

4 Ibid., p.161.

5 Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image:America's Empire In The Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989) , pp. 268-269.

6 Ibid., p.161.

7 Petillo, *Douglas MacArthur*, pp.167-168.

8 Hernando J. Abbaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* (New York: A.A. Wyne Inc.,1946), p. 84.

9 After finding that other historians were unable adequately to explain MacArthur's behavior regarding collaborators except in terms of friendship, I became frustrated. Like them I too felt that such an explanation was incomplete. However when discussing the Generals actions with members of my wife's family (Filipinos ranging in age from mid-twenties to mid-eighties), I was surprised to hear that they saw MacArthur's behavior as perfectly understandable. They said he was simply following the dictates of Filipino culture. Although there is no documented evidence to definitively substantiate this hypothesis, I feel that it goes farther to explain the General's actions than the traditional interpretations, which all historians agree are inadequate. A more complete discussion of these key aspects of Philippine culture are found in Karnow, *In Our Image* , pp. 20-22 and Frank H. Golay, ed., *The United States And The Philippines* (Bloomington Indiana: Columbia University, Prentice Hall Inc., 1966), pp. 152-155.

10 Karnow, *In Our Image* , pp.271

11 Golay, *The United States And The Philippine*, p.152. Moreover, the point is made here that many Filipinos considered American delay in rehabilitation after the war and some of the less than reciprocal features of the 1946 Trade Agreement to be examples of America's violation of their debt of gratitude to the Filipino's for their assistance throughout the war.

12 Petillo, *Douglas MacArthur*, p.208.

13 Eisenhower, who was MacArthur's aide in the Philippines in the 1930's, refused a similar offer from Quezon upon the Philippine President's arrival in Washington.

14 For an account of MacArthur's plan to defend the islands and the traditional arguments against its plausibility see Petillo, *Douglas MacArthur* pp. 169-180.

15 Karnow, *In Our Image*, p.275.

16 In Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes' Diary, Monday, March 30, 1942, Ickes tells of a

discussion in the Oval Office in which Roosevelt wanted MacArthur to get the Congressional Medal of Honour in order to boost civilian support for the war. Ickes said that when the president was told that MacArthur had "never performed bravely in battle... [but rather] hid on Corrigador" Roosevelt responded "Make up an incident then." Harold L. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

17 Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal Of The Philippines, 1929-1946* (New Haven/ London: Yale University Press, 1965), p.164.

18 Frequently MacArthur treated Osmena as a contemptible subordinate, dictating to him how he should act on even small matters. Later MacArthur confided to Senator Tydings that "I can't work with Osmena." Friend, *Between Two Empires* p. 251.

19 Secret memorandum for Secretary Ickes, [most likely] from Assistant Secretary of the Interior E.D. Hestor regarding an 11:00 A.M. telephone call from Sergio Osmena on September 25, 1944 -declassified April 25, 1975. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1944", Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

20 Ibid.

21 Ickes Diary, Sunday, October 1, 1944, p.9254. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Divison, Washington, D.C.

22 Secret correspondence from Secretary of War Stimson To Secretary Ickes, October 5, 1944 - declassified January 8, 1974. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1944", Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

23 A well balanced account of Roxas' wartime activities is found in Manchester, *American Caesar*, pp.439-440, 489-492, and 623.

24 Interview with Philippine diplomat and American Brigadier General Carlos P. Romolo, June 1,1946. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1946-50", Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

25 Karnow, *In Our Image*, p.328.

26 Press release from Office of Commanding General Army Forces of Pacific. May 9, 1946. Paul V. McNutt Papers, Box 311, Philippines 1946, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana .

27 James D. Clayton, *The Years Of MacArthur*, vol. II; 1941-45 (Boston: Houghton Miffen Co, 1975).

28 Manchester, *American Caesar* , p. 491.

29 Ickes Diary, Sunday, October 1,1944 p. 9254.

30 Secret memorandum no.393 from Paul Steintorf United States Consul in Manila to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. September 19, 1945. Subject: Conference with President Osmena Concerning Treatment of Collaborators in the Philippines." Paul McNutt Papers, Box 311, Philippines 1945, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

31 Abbaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* , p.89.

32 Secret Memorandum no. 393 from Paul Steintorf to Secretary of State. McNutt Papers, Box 311, Philippines 1945, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

33 Ibid.

34 "News Report" for Secretary Ickes, October 5, 1945. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1945," Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

35 Secret Memorandum no. 393 from Paul Steintorf to Secretary of State. McNutt Papers, Box 311, Philippines 1945, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington Indiana.

36 Ibid.

37 Interview with James P. McGranery [Assistant to Attorney General] June 2,1946. Ickes Papers, Series Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1946-50" Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

38 Manchester, *American Caesar* , p.489.

39 Abbaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* , pp. 59-60.

40 Secret Memorandum no. 393 from Paul Steintorf to Secretary of State. McNutt Papers, Box 311, Philippines 1945, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

41 Material delivered (Overseas News Agency. Inc.) to Ickes on instruction of Sidney Rietman of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Manila, from November 29, 1945. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, , Folder "Philippines 1946-50", Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

42 Significantly, the only other printed media available during the liberation period was the American Army controlled *Free Philippines.* It was this paper that carried the front page story entitled "Roxas Is Among Liberated, Four Cabinet Aids Caught" following Roxas liberation. Together, Roxas and MacArthur made certain that it was known that Roxas was "the General's man." Abbaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* , pp. 59-60.

43 The events of Sorianos prewar activities chronicled in this paragraph are taken from Abbaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* , pp.165-172, and Shalom, *The United States and The Philippines*, pp.5-7.

44 Material delivered (from Overseas News Agency. Inc.) to Ickes on instruction of Sidney Rietman of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Manila, November 29, 1945. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, , Folder "Philippines 1946-50", Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

45 Ibid.

46 Karnow, *In Our Image,* p.325.

47 Abbaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* , p168.

48 Ibid.

49 Second draft of an article entitled "Collaboration in the Philippines" for *SEE* magazine, September, 1946. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1946-50", Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

3

THE ANTI-COLLABORATIONIST FORCES: HAROLD ICKES STRIKES BACK

Secretary Ickes had long been considered both by himself and the American public as a champion of the rights of the oppressed. Throughout the 1930's he was instrumental in organizing and administering many New Deal programs designed to assist drought stricken farmers and the urban unemployed, and even more to his credit, he consistently insisted that domestic economic interests should not be helped at the expense of colonial peoples in the Philippines, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Ickes recognized that stagnation of the world economy had injured these dependent people far more seriously than their American counterparts, and he took it upon himself, as head of the body charged with overseeing American territories and protectorates, to ensure that their interests were not completely subjugated to the vagaries of domestic politics. It was very much in character, then, that after being informed of Philippine High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt's close ties to members of the Filipino falangist movement in 1939, Ickes privately concluded that McNutt was "a fascist at heart."[1] Nor is one surprised that, upon hearing of Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon's growing intimacy with, and dependence upon, General MacArthur in the 1930's, Ickes declared that "MacArthur comes pretty close to being a dictator on the islands.... Of course MacArthur is greedy for power and perhaps has a situation over there quite to his liking."[2] Consequently, years previous to the rise of the collaboration problem, Ickes had already found himself estranged from both the Filipino elite and Douglas MacArthur.

As 1944 drew to a close Ickes had grown increasingly frustrated that Roosevelt still had not sent a High Commissioner to Manila. Ickes appreciated that time was of the essence; that if a high ranking civilian official were not dispatched to the Philippines quickly the falangists and collaborators who were working with MacArthur would soon be in an irreversible position of political domination. The Secretary became convinced of this after aids who had served in the High Commissioner's office before the war continually informed him of MacArthur's suspicious behaviour regarding major collaborators, revelations that led Ickes to vow that, since "the Spanish clique oppose Osmeña and intend

to work through MacArthur to crush him," he [Ickes] would do whatever he could "to block their efforts."[3]

Following his failure to secure an early appointment of a High Commissioner, Ickes tried to prevent President Roosevelt from granting independence to the archipelago before the July 4, 1946 deadline set in the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act. Throughout the Second World War, many American officials believed that granting early independence to the Philippine Commonwealth in exile would discredit Japanese propaganda about American imperialism. The most influential of these figures was Maryland Senator, Millard Tydings, co-author of the 1930's independence legislation and chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs. In September, 1943, Tydings shocked the State and Interior Departments (then drafting initiatives for Philippine policy) by publicly stating that President Roosevelt favoured a Tyding's Senate resolution granting independence to the Philippine Commonwealth within thirty days of a Presidential request. Ickes and Secretary of State James Byrnes were joined by Secretary Stimson of the War Department in opposing that measure. They all believed that the psychological benefits of the Tydings resolution were nullified by the fact that the Japanese could declare independence for their puppet government at the drop of the hat without waiting thirty days. Moreover, precipitous action would thrust into the arena of world politics a Philippine Commonwealth totally unprepared for the burdens facing it at war's end. When Ickes and the other departmental chiefs confronted the President with these realities they found to their relief that, unlike so many important things that Roosevelt did "unheedingly and without proper consultation,"[4] this time he had not consented to a brash initiative before contrary opinions had been heard. Actually, Tydings had prematurely anticipated the President's support and taken the liberty of speaking on Roosevelt's behalf. Accordingly the matter was soon temporarily laid to rest when the Senator openly admitted that he had not received Presidential endorsement for his resolution. However, a year later Congress passed essentially the same resolution because of its appeal to the American public, and, bowing to public pressure, Roosevelt, in December 1944, stated that he too favoured advancing the date of independence to some early appropriate date. In the early months of 1945, both Sergio Osmeña and the "liberated" Manuel Roxas were pressuring President Roosevelt to honour this tentative promise.

One should not assume that on the issue of early independence the two Filipino political leaders were working together in the best interest of the Philippine people. Rather, both men must have perceived that advancing the date of independence would

work to their own personal advantage. For his part, Osmeña was attempting to regain some of the respect he had lost in the eyes of Filipinos due to MacArthur's patronizing delegation of authority. He probably anticipated the bleak political future that awaited him in the wake of having been labelled *walang hiya*, and he realized that by having the date for independence moved forward before the scheduled, November 1945, elections he would automatically become the first president of a free and independent Philippines. This honour in itself would restore much of the face he was perceived to have lost. Moreover, from such an exalted position Osmeña would be in a far stronger position to confront Roxas and his collaborator allies, who, with General MacArthur removed from the Philippines, would lose their influential patron and mentor.

From Roxas' and the collaborators' perspective, early independence meant that the threat of American punitive action against collaborators would be entirely eliminated. All they would have to fear would be the Filipino People's Courts, and from Roxas' position in the Philippine Senate he would be able to render such a threat impotent. Furthermore, so long as his trusted friends, General Douglas MacArthur and Criminal Investigation Committee director Andrés Soriano, retained *de facto* control over the Philippine Islands until independence, there was little reason to doubt that the falangist and collaborator elements would be positioned to assume the reins of power upon the United States' withdrawal. To bolster the collaborators' hopes in mid-March, 1945, MacArthur informed the State Department that he continued to favour the plan he had originated to grant independence on August 13, 1945.[5] He also told Osmeña "to remain in Washington until he obtained a definite promise of independence, and the necessary economic concessions from the American Government." This could be construed as another attempt by the General to keep Osmeña away from the Philippines for a prolonged period of time, thereby leaving MacArthur unfettered to pursue his own objectives on the islands.

In addition to these defeats Harold Ickes would soon lose another bid in his crusade to punish the collaborators and defend the political and economic liberties of the Philippine people. By January, 1945, the State Department not only had abandoned its opposition to early independence, it also resisted the appointment of a High Commissioner. It seems that, with the war drawing to a close in both Europe and the South Pacific, the State Department had become preoccupied with the spectre of world public opinion. The Department feared that reappointing a High Commissioner, or any high level American civil official, would "lead the Filipino people to feel that the older order had been restored whereas actually they are probably expecting the President to declare the Philippines free before the date of July 4, 1946...."[6] America was running the

risk of damaging its traditional reputation as champion of anti-colonialism and of confirming the Leninist charge that the western powers relied upon exploitative colonialism to maintain their capitalist economies.[7]

With the State and Interior Departments working at cross purposes, events became increasingly confused. Secretary Stimson's War Department continued to oppose early independence, agreeing with the Department of Interior that long-term national interest should take precedence over immediate concerns about America's public image. Additionally, in 1945 the War Department dropped its support of General MacArthur's opposition to the appointment of a High Commissioner. They now concurred with Ickes' belief that such an appointment was required to balance MacArthur's domination of Osmeña. Meanwhile, as the State Department abandoned its objections to early independence, it reiterated its view that the appointment of a High Commissioner would be detrimental to American interests. In an attempt to strike a compromise between these diverse positions, Roosevelt in early February suggested that he appoint Douglas MacArthur High Commissioner. The President did not want to offend the General and reasoned that if MacArthur himself was given the title of High Commissioner his opposition would be silenced and all parties might be pacified. However, Ickes and Stimson both made it clear to Roosevelt that they thought it gravely unwise to place so much civil and military authority at MacArthur's disposal. Ickes pointed out that "MacArthur is being very high handed and dictatorial about this High Commissionership. It is plain to see that what he wants is to block everything so he can run matters to suit himself."[8] Agreeing, Stimson argued that the President's idea would only serve to accentuate the problem. Ickes then presented the President with a list of names of possible appointments to the post, including former High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, a man Ickes considered qualified, but whom both he and Stimson did not personally like.[9] Faced with such bellicose opposition, Roosevelt agreed not to appoint MacArthur, but beyond that concession he made no commitment.

As political stalemate continued in Washington, events continued to unfold in the collaborators' favour in the Philippines. In the last week of January, Ickes had written a letter outlining his frustrations to a friend:

> My status with respect to the Government of the Philippine Commonwealth is quite hazy. Certain routine matters are reported through this Department but I have no administrative authority, either as Secretary of the Interior, or as the repository of rather nebulous and attenuated powers of the High Commissionership which have been

put in storage here for the duration of the war.[10]

By the first week of March, the Secretary took the drastic step of asking President Roosevelt if he (Ickes) could resign as Secretary of the Interior in favour of becoming High Commissioner of the Islands so that he might go to Manila to confront the issues of collaboration and independence directly.[11] It seems that Ickes, like MacArthur, possessed a Messiah complex with regard to the Philippines: he believed that his past experience in dealing with America's colonies had endowed him with the knowledge to discern what was best for the islands. He further justified his request by suggesting that, after more than a decade in the cabinet, he was growing tired of Washington life and considered a short stint in the Philippines to be a fitting retirement.

In his diary, Ickes said Roosevelt rejected this offer by stating that the Secretary's services were still of value in government, and that, in the President's opinion, Ickes' new young wife would undoubtedly find the archipelago overly hot and humid.[12] Thus dismissed, Ickes abandoned the proposal. Roosevelt then broached the possibility of appointing McNutt, to which Ickes replied that, while he was in favour of an appointment in general, he was "neutral" to McNutt in particular. Discouraged and feeling somewhat patronized, Ickes left the Oval Office realizing that there was little likelihood of making headway on his Philippine intiatives unless some drastic transformation occurred in Roosevelt's thinking.

During the next month Ickes' hopes for the appointment of a High Commissioner and the postponement of independence grew even dimmer when, in spite of the Department of the Interior's recommendation that a special fact finding mission be sent to the Philippines before any major decisions regarding the islands be made, Roosevelt informed President Osmeña that the American Government would grant independence sometime in the autumn—over half a year before the scheduled date.[13] Roosevelt's sudden decision came with the endorsement of the State Department and seemed to settle the matter, but on April 12th, the very day of the press release and before a specific independence date could be agreed upon, President Roosevelt died. Now the onus of decision making would fall on the shoulders of a new Chief of State.

Harry S. Truman acceded to the Presidency essentially uninformed, especially

regarding events in the Philippines. Roosevelt selected the Missouri Senator as his vice presidential running mate for a variety of political reasons, not because he believed Truman would contribute significantly to national policy formulation. Accordingly, when the sceptre of power fell into the Missourian's hands, Truman knew nothing more than scant generalities regarding even such important matters as the recent Yalta Conference or the military and political implications of the atomic bomb. The initial weeks and months of the Truman Administration were therefore occupied in briefing the President concerning these and other pressing issues, and, although the subject of the Philippine Islands was mentioned by Secretary Ickes, Truman did not assign it high priority. Yet, to Truman's credit, he did make a concerted effort to accumulate all the information he could regarding the islands before making any final decisions regarding rehabilitation, trade relations, and the timing of independence. Thus, in the first week of May, after a briefing by Ickes concerning General MacArthur's behaviour and the Philippine situation in general, Truman announced that he would send Senator Millard Tydings to the Philippines on a fact finding mission. Furthermore, Truman confided that he too did not like General MacArthur and that he would not be stopped by him from appointing a High Commissioner.[14]

On May 5, 1945, the President instructed Senator Tydings and Mr. E.D.Hester, a Philippine specialist in the Department of the Interior, to create a special committee to examine "conditions in the Philippines."[15] As chairman of the committee and special envoy of the President, Senator Tydings decided that the trip would last approximately six weeks and that over half a dozen of his fellow Senators would accompany him. Truman, however, opposed a "Senatorial junket" and insisted that the dire straits of the Filipinos warranted a team composed of more experts than politicians.[16] Thus officially instructed (and chastized), the mission set out for the Philippines.

Upon their arrival they were informed by General MacArthur that for reasons of military security they would be unable to leave the metropolitan Manila area. Additionally much of the information the mission had hoped to analyze was in the custody of the U.S. Army and CIC, who claimed that, since the war against Japan was still in progress, many of the documents and reports the mission had hoped to see were off limits to non-military personnel.[17] Due to these restrictions the Tydings' mission was compelled to abandon plans for studying broad Philippine issues and instead concentrated almost exclusively on the physical destruction caused by the war. After only six days they found there was nothing left for them to do except return to Washington to make recommendations regarding the rehabilitation of the archipelago.[18]

On June 7, upon the mission's return, Secretary Ickes spoke to J. Wendle Jones, one of the Philippine specialists from the Bureau of Budget who had accompanied Tydings. Jones gave Ickes "the impression that MacArthur [was] sitting firmly on the situation over there," and Ickes informed President Truman that all members of the commission had returned except Mr. Hester "who was graciously permitted by MacArthur to stay upon his understanding that he would not communicate with anyone in Washington except through MacArthur."[19] This was the first evidence Ickes and Truman had that the military news and information blackout MacArthur had imposed was to apply even to the White House, and predictably it did not sit well with either man. Ickes confided in his diary that after hearing of MacArthur's suspicious and arrogant actions Truman "engaged in some pretty vigorous Missouri explanations," before calling the General an "upstage and temperamental stuffed shirt" whose military ability had been greatly exaggerated. (Here is the genesis of the conflict between Truman and MacArthur which would culminate years later in Truman's dismissal of the General over Korean War strategy.) For his part, Secretary Ickes insisted that, since he possessed no effective authority over Philippine matters, he wished to be relieved of all responsibility for the islands.[20] Truman dissuaded Ickes from such rash action by telling him that the Philippine situation was a mess and that he wanted Ickes to help straighten it out. "The Filipinos had been as loyal as our own people" the president concluded, "and he wanted to do something substantial for them."[21] Thereby bolstered in his resolve to circumvent MacArthur's veil of censorship over the islands, Ickes agreed to continue in his current capacity while Truman promised to at least dispatch one of his own men to the archipelago to supervise expenditures of Army and Navy money and to prevent further graft and corruption. Ickes then began establishing unofficial contacts with various press, private, and military personnel in the Philippines in order to obtain alternative, and more accurate, descriptions of events in the islands. These covert reports were to form the core of Ickes' information and opinion regarding the Philippines from June through October, 1945. It was from these reports, usually relayed hand to hand, that Ickes first heard of how Manuel Roxas and other collaborators had come to dominate the Philippine legislature. It was also through these means that the Secretary learned about Andrés Soriano.

Accordingly, as increasingly bleak information (from an anti-collaborationists point of view) trickled into Washington, Ickes renewed his efforts to secure the appointment of a High Commissioner and to prevent the advancement of Philippine independence. Responding to these pleas and to similar requests from people concerned about America's future trade policy with the Philippines, Truman sent Paul McNutt to the islands to

"survey the broad social and political issues [facing the Filipinos] and to formulate recommendations for action by the United States Government."[22] With the fighting now over in the Philippines, it was anticipated that McNutt would not find as many barriers to his research as the Tydings mission had encountered two months earlier.

At McNutt's departure from Washington, Ickes presented the President with a report constructed from the fragmentary notes the Secretary was receiving from overseas. In the report he again emphasized his concerns regarding the "rigid control by the military over information." Moreover, although "very little accurate information as to the actual conditions is available to the public,... reports reach me from reliable sources which indicate that we may be leading up to a condition of chaos." This was the first time Truman, or anyone else outside the Philippines, had heard suggestions that social and political breakdown might result in the islands as a result of Washington's inattentiveness to MacArthur's actions. In describing the "principal factors" which had led up to the crisis, Ickes emphasized "the political situation":

> A violent struggle seems to be in the offing for political control between those who led the guerrilla movement on the one hand and the quasi and outright collaborators on the other.... [Osmeña's moderate position] may be destroyed by one of these groups. The Philippine Congress has assembled... [and is] a forum for the two sides. At the present, control is in the hands of men whose objective seems to be to oust President Osmeña from effective control and to adopt a policy of virtual forgiveness for practically all who are charged with collaboration.... This is our fault for these reasons: Lack of information from the Philippines due to military operations; strict army censorship; the resistance of General MacArthur to effective action by civilian agencies; and the lack of any authorized United States official of general responsibility, namely, a High Commissioner.... [23]

Again Ickes concluded that the solution lay in appointing a High Commissioner with enough authority and resources to reverse the damage which had been done.

Since Ickes' argument was now far more alarmist and better supported by evidence, it commanded more attention and consideration from the White House. Yet, in spite of Truman's genuine concern after receiving the report, late July, 1945, was an inconvenient time for the President to undertake bold initiatives regarding the Philippine Commonwealth. Indeed it is uncertain how long the report sat on Truman's desk before he even had time to read it. The war with Germany had only just been won, and all of Europe lay in shambles. On the very day Ickes sent the report to Truman the President

arrived at Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam for his first "Big Three" meeting with Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill. Thus, Truman was preoccupied with a German peace treaty, Poland's western border, the fate of the Polish government in exile in London, the structure of the United Nations Organization, and a deepening political rift with the Soviet Union. Moreover, after returning to the United States, another issue dominated Truman's thoughts: the war with Japan and the options of invading the Japanese homeland or using the atomic bomb.[24] Little time could be spared to contemplate Philippine matters when more important global concerns demanded immediate attention.

Not until late August, after Japan's unconditional surrender, was the President able to devote energy to the Philippine problem. By that time Ickes' anxiety over General MacArthur's censorship had caused the Secretary to recall E.D. Hester from the Philippines and to arrange for him to meet with President Truman to offer first hand accounts of the Philippine situation. Hester corroborated the opinions Ickes had expressed in his report and agreed that the appointment of a High Commissioner was long overdue. The President conceded that MacArthur had overstepped his prerogatives, but in an attempt to protect his own record Truman passed the buck, charging that "Roosevelt is to blame for MacArthur being where he is." Agreeing, Ickes interjected that Roosevelt had erred in taking MacArthur rather than Wainwright from the Philippines, which led Truman to observe that the "campaign under MacArthur was a fiasco, but unfortunately the [American] people don't know it. To them MacArthur is an outstanding hero." So, despite Truman's sympathy for Ickes' and Hester's recommendations regarding a High Commissioner, the President would not commit himself until McNutt's mission filed a complete report. He did placate the two men somewhat, though, by suggesting that his recent promotion of MacArthur to Supreme Allied Commander Far East would remove the General from immediate influence over the Philippine Islands. Ideally, MacArthur's expanded jurisdiction and authority would leave him little time to meddle in Philippine affairs, whereby he would drop his opposition to the High Commissionership. Truman acknowleged that promoting MacArthur was hardly what Ickes desired, but the President lamented that politically he "could do nothing else."[25]

Truman's hope that MacArthur's promotion would end his unsanctioned interference in Philippine domestic politics was generally fulfilled, for on August 13 Paul Steintorf wired Secretary of State Byrnes, that, according to confidential information from Chief CIC officer Andrés Soriano, General MacArthur, on V-J Day, intended to "end all censorship in the Philippines and release all persons now interned solely for reasons of military security."[26] Furthermore, Soriano had confided that all persons charged with

collaboration would be turned over to Philippine authorities. Steintorf informed Secretary Byrnes that these actions were being undertaken because "MacArthur has been disturbed by reports that he has been intervening in Philippine political affairs," but in Steintorf's judgement, the damage had been done. Truman's interventions were too little too late. MacArthur knew that "little or no action would be taken by the Commonwealth against collaborators" through the proposed People's Courts. Moreover, Steintorf contended that the position of the collaborators had been further enhanced by Roxas' excellent chance of victory in the upcoming election.

The State Department in Washington was shocked by Steintorf's reports, for until then it had placed little faith in Ickes' pessimistic view. In early September, the Department actively began to gauge the influence of Filipino collaborators, and Steintorf soon informed them that

> liberals, guerrillas and anti-collaborationists are very bitter.... They feel that [the] American government should have taken some action... [to enforce President Roosevelt's proclamation] 'that those who have collaborated with the enemy will be removed from authority and influence over the political and economic life of the country.' Complaints that collaborators have benefited most from liberation are heard increasingly often.[27]

This information was forwarded to the President, and Steintorf was instructed by Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to inform Osmeña that his government's failure to "deal more promptly and effectively with this problem... had created an unfavourable impression in this country."[28]

With the State Department once more echoing the Department of the Interior's recommendations and with reports from Paul McNutt — who had consulted with Steintorf during his mission — further chronicling the tense situation in the Philippines, President Truman was ultimately compelled to give more serious consideration to the islands. On September 6, 1945, he decided to nominate McNutt as High Commissioner, and on September 16 the Senate confirmed the appointment. In response to Ickes' warnings that a High Commissioner would have to be vested with both responsibility and authority if he were to be effective, Truman issued Executive Order No. 9816, which granted the widest possible powers, all the authority the President could legally delegate, to the High Commissioner.[29] Furthermore, Truman publicly stated that he was dissatisfied with the political situation in the Philippines as well as with American tardiness in rehabilitating the archipelago. Therefore, since the Philippines needed time to conduct free and democratic

elections while America fulfilled her obligation to repair the war ravaged islands, he announced that the date of independence would not be advanced. [30] Perhaps it was not too late to correct almost one full year of Washington's neglect and MacArthur's abuses.

Meanwhile, a rejuvenated Harold Ickes decided that he had been a spectator of Philippine events long enough. Early September was the time that Roxas and the Philippine Senate had chosen to sabotage Osmeña's nomination of Judge L. Tanda for the position of Attorney General, and Ickes astutely anticipated that with the Pacific War over, America's armies about to demobilize, and still no High Commissioner in Manila, it was possible that the Filipino People's Courts would be rendered permanently impotent. Subsequently, on September 10th, he sent President Osmeña a threatening telegram insisting that collaborators be dealt with severely. The concluding remarks of the communique are the most enlightening as they take the form of a threat: "I would call the attention of your government to the probable reluctance with which (American) funds may be appropriated for relief, rehabilitation and support of the Commonwealth government if it becomes generally believed that the (Philippine) government has failed diligently and firmly to convict and punish those guilty of collaboration."[31] The immediate effect of Ickes' telegram, as mentioned earlier, was to cause the Roxas clique to drop its resistance to Tanda's appointment and to act with less self-assured arrogance in the future. The secondary result was to focus the attention of Washington officials on the difficulties facing the People's Court.

With Ickes' telegram to Osmeña setting a precedent, Paul McNutt's first official action as High Commissioner was to recommend to Truman "that the United States Government... act promptly to investigate and correct the adverse trend in the Philippines." Confirming facts Ickes had presented during the military blackout, McNutt emphasised that most Filipinos had remained loyal during the enemy invasion while a majority of the prewar political leaders "adhered to and assisted the enemy." He bluntly stated that Washington's "inattention to civil affairs... allowed the enemy collaborators to come into control of the legislative branch of the Commonwealth government and to force Osmeña, who is weak and aging, to compromise with them." The concluding paragraph of the memorandum called on Truman to "name and empower a special commission of three members to act under the direction of the Attorney General for the purpose of investigating enemy collaboration in the Philippines and recommending that proper steps to be taken to assure fair and speedy trial of those who gave aid and comfort to the enemy."[32]

Perhaps because McNutt's report in no way implicated MacArthur as the central

figure in the rise of the collaborators, as Ickes had earlier done, Truman decided to act upon it. Moreover, busy in Japan (ironically ensuring that country's transformation from a feudal militaristic society to a modern democracy), MacArthur no longer opposed a High Commissioner superseding his authority in the Philippines. In any case, by the time he left the Malayan archipelago, the General had so firmly entrenched his friend Roxas and other collaborators in positions of power that he had no reason to believe that they could possibly be in danger of prosecution. So, with the popular General both complacent and removed from the scene, Truman could now launch his investigation without fear of intense opposition, especially since any of MacArthur's actions exposed by the Attorney General's impartial investigation would not be known until a later, less politically sensitive, date.

With near unaminity of opinion among Washington officials that something needed to be done to expose and punish the Filipino traitors, President Truman, on October 25, informed Attorney General, Tom Clark, of reports which indicated that "the Commonwealth Government was only beginning to investigate, charge and try collaborators," and that "it was essential that this task be completed before the holding of the next Commonwealth general election." Truman realized some people had collaborated in order to earn a basic income or to "sustain the physical and cultural welfare of their people," but others (Filipinos of the political and economic elite) had worked with the enemy to expedite their own fortunes or those of the Japanese. Disloyalty to the Commonwealth was disloyalty to the United States, as Truman saw it, and he directed Clark to send experienced personnel to the islands to "recommend such action as may be appropriately taken by the United States." To ensure that MacArthur and Soriano did not place obstacles in the mission's path, Truman had the Secretaries of War and Navy "direct their intelligence sections to cooperate and make available all records and evidence bearing on this important problem." Thus, with Presidential directives and support, Clark assigned Walter Hutchison as head of an investigation committee studying collaboration.[33]

During the next several months, while Hutchison continued his investigation in the Philippines and Congress began the long delayed work of providing for the archipelago's economic needs, a disturbing inconsistency became perceivable in High Commissioner McNutt's attitudes. For, although the Commissioner in many ways assisted Hutchison's investigation, certain pronouncements by McNutt seemed to question the mission's objective. For example, on November 1, McNutt, Osmeña, and Filipino dignitary Carlos Romolo all met in Secretary Ickes' office to discuss the issue of collaboration. McNutt said he had not been in favour of a recent special meeting of the Philippine legislature that

Osmeña had called at MacArthur's insistance since such action strengthened the hand of the collaborators. McNutt recommended that in the future Osmeña ignore MacArthur and refrain from calling another session, a suggestion endorsed by all those present at the conference. But at that point the High Commissioner parenthetically interjected the opinion that collaboration was really "a matter of the heart" dependent upon one's inner loyalties and motives. Ickes and the others present all interpreted this as a reference to Manuel Roxas, for whom they believed "McNutt had a fondness," and Ickes made it clear that he could not agree that Roxas' intentions in accepting a puppet cabinet post, writing the puppet constitution, and signing a declaration of war against the United States had been founded in altruism.[34]

That Paul McNutt had closely associated with Roxas and a select few other members of the prewar Philippine elite during his first tour as High Commissioner in 1939 must account for some of his inconsistency. Yet, unlike MacArthur, McNutt had not been on the archipelago long enough to become immersed in Filipino culture or to enter into the complex web of a *compadre* network system. He had been there long enough to become familiar with Philippine politics, though, and his return to the islands as special envoy of the President during the preceding summer had convinced him that a young, forceful, and dynamic leader was required to guide the Philippines out of the ruins of war. Osmeña, in McNutt's opinion, was not up to such a task, and the former Indiana politician, himself a realist and a less than scrupulous power broker, had a natural affinity for Roxas. For McNutt it seemed logical that, since Roxas had already been in a position of power for over six months and was known to be Quezon's selected heir, he would be ideally suited to meet the challenges facing the islands in the months and years ahead. Furthermore, as America had not traditionally interfered in Philippine domestic politics, it was unlikely Roxas would be stripped of power for any war-time activities revealed in Hutchison's report. It is not surprising then that the High Commissioner would soon tell the press that America would "continue to work, as in the past, through the leaders of the Filipino people, and without regard for local politics,"[35] and that, concerning the nearing presidential election contest between Osmeña and Roxas, America would honour the decision of the Filipino people.[36] Consequently, many Filipinos continued to believe that America had decided to endorse Roxas, not punish him.

Harold Ickes, however, remained determined not to let Roxas ride to electoral victory on MacArthur's coat tails, and Truman also had become more personally concerned with the probable effects of a Roxas election victory. Both men had received a series of letters from various sources expressing objections to MacArthur's and Roxas' manipulation of

political events. One such letter to Truman was from a California labour organization, which condemned the American Army for permitting collaborators to come to dominate the Philippine Islands.[37] Ickes received mail from the editor of *The Nation* telling how MacArthur had sought to prevent their publishing information concerning the collaboration issue and how he had attempted to discredit their journal by publicly stating that one of their articles was founded upon lies. MacArthur had declared that regardless of what was printed in *The Nation*, there were "no left-wing or right-wing elements in the Philippines. All are united on the basic issues. The only political rivalries are based on the personalities of candidates,... [and furthermore, there has been] no political censorship imposed.[38] Even more alarming was a letter Ickes received from Isaac Brock, a former naval officer, who provided a long list of collaborators for whom MacArthur had secured amnesty. Brock randomly punctuated his communication with dramatic pleas requesting that Ickes not use or publish his name ("*** DO NOT USE MY NAME !!!! ***") for fear that the collaborators would use their money and influence to have him killed.[39]

Fearing the consequences of a Roxas presidency, Ickes and Truman now decided to postpone the Philippine national elections beyond the scheduled November date. They hoped that by holding the elections in the spring Roxas and other collaborators would be neutralized by the People's Courts and Hutchison's investigation and that the issue of collaboration would then be removed from the political agenda. On December 14, 1945, the American Senate confirmed Truman's proposal and designated April 23, 1946, to be Philippine election day.[40]

One other initiative undertaken by the American government while they waited for the Hutchison mission to return was to launch an investigation into the question of agrarian unrest in the Philippines, focussing on the matter of the *Hukbalahap's* refusal to surrender their weapons or captured territory at war's end. On October 23, Truman explained to McNutt that, while those guerrillas who called for agrarian reform posed a threat to stable government, they also had a legitimate claim to fair treatment as they had rendered valuable assistance during the war. "This requires that they not be dealt with in a ruthless manner."[41] The High Commissioner was then directed to conduct a "prompt" investigation to recommend the remedies or reforms that ought to be undertaken by both the Commonwealth and the United States governments. It appears that President Truman was sincere in his concern for the plight of the Philippine peasant and hoped that workable recommendations for reform would arise from McNutt's study. McNutt however, always the traditional politician, interpreted the President's directive as a public relations stunt, or at most a subtle suggestion to the Philippine oligarchy not to be blatantly harsh with the

Hukbalahap. The "prompt" investigation never produced anything more than polite observations.

In late January, 1946, the High Commissioner's office apologetically reported to the public that the agrarian problem was not brought to the islands by Americans; rather it was a remnant of Spanish colonialism. Furthermore, the report announced that "we are not interested in, and will not address ourselves to, the political aspects of the so-called agrarian unrest. We are interested in the basic economic grievances of the tenant farmers."[42] Accordingly, McNutt declared that he would "ask whether the landlords were observing their obligations, as well as whether the tenants were economically capable of fulfilling theirs." Rather than recommend measures which would abolish the anachronistic institutions of feudalism, the press release merely stated that the "*tao* [peasant] should have a fair return for his labour," so that he might become "a consumer and purchaser of consumer goods." With regard to the question of violence and the legal and moral rights of the *Huks* in light of their wartime activities, McNutt concluded that "the maintenance of law and order... is primarily the responsibility of the Commonwealth Government. I do not expect to look into that aspect of the situation at all. Nor is it the prime responsibility of the United States to solve the land problem." In other words, the High Commissioner's office had determined that, while there was an agrarian problem, it was inconsequential compared to the greater need for political and economic stability. Moreover, America had no desire to play a role in transforming Philippine feudalism. Any effort to better the Filipino peasants' existence should be evolutionary, not revolutionary, and would depend upon the aristocracy's acquiescence.

A similar expression of McNutt's opinions regarding agrarian unrest is found in an article he wrote for the January, 1945, edition of *Reader's Digest* entitled, "Report on the Philippines." In it he noted that "feudalism has dominated the life of the average Filipino land worker, the *tao*, for centuries. It still exists. That feudalism must be progressively eradicated."[43] But McNutt insisted that the cure for such an antiquated form of exploitation existed not in revolution or even legislation, but rather in industrialization: "The *tao*, with his *carabao*, perpetually in debt to the money-lender and the landlord is a poor customer for industrial goods. He must be given a share of the benefits of the twentieth century, ...of cheap power, of electricity, of the untold possibilities of the atomic age." Thus sympathising with the plight of the peasant, but stopping far short of endorsing the Hukbalahap's revolutionary methods, McNutt concluded by declaring that the impetus for reform and industrial evolution must continue to come from the Filipino elite. It was not the lowly peasant who should determine the direction or speed with

which change would come. On the contrary, it was "primarily the obligation of the men and women who... [were] leaders in the Philippines, leaders in business, education, and politics, to chart the way. To the Filipino landlords who had abandoned their plantations to collaborate with the Japanese in Manila during the war, McNutt's words must have seemed an invitation to regain their lost land through escalating attacks on the *Huks*, for undoubtedly the landlords felt assured that American military and judicial power would not be employed to aid the peasant-guerrilla cause.

Anticipating the High Commissioner's recommendations two weeks before McNutt's January press release, the leader of the *Hukbalahap*, Louis Taruc, wrote to Truman in hopes that the President would be more sympathetic to the plight of loyal guerrillas if he heard of their grievances first hand. In the telegram Taruc informed Truman that "contrary to your directives the Commonwealth Government, under pressure [from the] collaborationists, is applying armed policy in solving agrarian unrest and dealing with HUKBALAHAP problem.... Already [there have been] five civilians killed, eleven wounded and forty arrested by military policy."[44] He said the enforcement of Truman's directive was crucial, as the Philippines were close to "civil strife." A "satisfactory solution" could be achieved, Taruc advised, if the "semi-martial law" were lifted and if all collaborators, "especially Roxas," were immediately removed from government, arrested and tried. Taruc's appeal went unanswered. It is unlikely that Truman favoured the collaborators' actions against the *Hukbalahap*, but at the same time he was immersed in a quagmire of international and domestic problems. America's readjustment to a peacetime economy, along with plans to revitalize war-torn Europe, demanded the President's undivided attention. Events in the Philippines would have to be dealt with by officials on the scene, at least until Hutchison completed his report and Congress concluded hearings regarding Philippine trade and rehabilitation legislation.

On the first of March, 1946, the long awaited findings of Walter Hutchison's investigation were presented to Truman. Hutchison had actually delivered his preliminary report to Attorney General Clark on January 28, but the Justice Department wanted to study the proposals before forwarding them to the President. In the abbreviated version of the report Truman received, Hutchison noted that Filipinos who gave aid and comfort to the enemy fell into two categories: "political collaborationists who held political office under the Japanese, and economic collaborationists who engaged in commercial transactions which materially aided the military forces of the Japanese."[45] Hutchison related that in lieu of an American trial of collaborators, the Filipino People's Courts were created, consisting of fifteen judges, twenty-three prosecutors and forty agents. These

meagre forces were then directed by the Philippine Government to have all cases filed by March 25, 1946. By the end of January, 6,203 such cases had been filed, but only "five minor" ones completed. In explaining the many reasons why the People's Courts had proven so ineffective, Hutchison primarily accused the American army of having erred in turning the issue of collaboration over to the Philippine Government when that institution was "still badly disorganized and investigative facilities were practically nonexistent." He told how, during the subsequent government inefficiencies, numerous newspaper articles argued that collaboration was not a crime against the Filipino people and how the demoralized courts began to forsee a general amnesty for all collaborators after independence on July 4, "especially if the Roxas ticket were elected." Also mentioned in the report were the inexperience of the prosecutors, inadequate facilities for the prosecutor's staff, and a "lack of coordination between the special prosecutor's staff on the one hand and other agencies, including the Japanese War Crimes Commission and the United States Intelligence Services, on the other." To rectify the situation Hutchison recommended that the United States "immediately participate" in all cases involving treason and that these cases be handled by either a war crimes tribunal, an extraterritorial court, or officials of the Philippine Executive Committee in the United States, any of which should be permitted to continue operations after July 4. Hutchison alleged that McNutt concurred with his proposals in general and believed Washington should state immediately whether it would, or would not, become involved.

Attorney General Clark reported to Truman that, although Hutchison had "examined all available data on the subject," he (Clark) was still "unable to concur fully with his recommendations."[46] While he acknowledged that there were two groups of collaborators, he chose to redefine the categories. "One group," he felt, "should include the members of the Philippine Executive Committee, those officials who held policy making positions in the [puppet] government of the Republic of the Philippines," along with "the most notorious of the economic collaborators." He believed that this group should be tried immediately before a "special War Crimes Commission" and that the United States should "assume full responsibility for the prosecution of those offenders... and should furnish all personnel, including judges, prosecutors and investigators in sufficient number to insure completion of all cases on or before July 4, 1946." Moreover he felt all charges against collaborators of this group should be filed prior to the scheduled April 23 election. Clark contended that these collaborators were all prominent and well educated men, recognized as leaders of their country, who by their treasonous actions aided the enemy, increased the American military burden, and caused the death of many

loyal citizens. Accordingly, they had forfeited their right to retain their influential positions in Philippine society and must now "assume full responsibility for their punishment," a punishment America had an obligation and right to dispense. The second group, according to Clark, should consist of "all other collaborationists", who could be tried by the existing People's Court without American interference.

Had Truman adopted Clark's recommendations as policy, he would have ensured that Roxas and much of the Philippine elite were forever removed from positions of authority. Such a development would likely have given legitimacy to the actions and aspirations of the *Hukbalahap*, threatened the entire Filipino aristocracy and all other vestiges of Philippine feudalism, and paved the way for peaceful democratic and economic reform. Likewise, another probable result of having the major collaborators tried by American courts (under the eyes of the American public) would have been the exposure of Douglas MacArthur's pro-collaborationist activities.

However, before accepting his Attorney General's plan, Truman forwarded the proposals to Robert Patterson, the new Secretary of War. Since Clark's recommendations called for the participation of military authorities, Truman sought assurances that the War Department had no objections before implementing them. It only took the War Department two days to report back to the President that the Justice Department's proposals were unacceptable. Most important, with Philippine independence only four months away,

> U.S. prosecution of collaborationists... would indicate to the Philippine people and the world that we do not trust the ability of the Philippine Government to manage its own affairs. This evidence of lack of faith would weaken the new Government at the outset. Moreover, selection of a group of defendants purporting to be the most important collaborationists would have grave political implications, which might leave us open to a charge of attempting to influence Philippine political life after independence.[47]

Since MacArthur had already indicated that ultimate responsibility for trying collaborators rested with Philippine civil authorities, and since the People's Court had been in existence for almost half a year, a change in American policy in the last few months before independence would arouse Filipino suspicions. Moreover, in Patterson's judgement there were also practical considerations which had to be factored into the equation, not the least of which was the improbability of being able to collect, file, and index the required documents, then recruit judges, lawyers and translators, and finally conduct hearings and trials—all before July 4th. Even if conditions in the islands were optimal, it would have

been virtually impossible to spare the time and personnel required to conduct such a tribunal. The military's legal and judicial division was already "critically straining its resources" to meet its commitments in Japan, Korea, China, India, and Germany. Trials concerning the High German Command and Gestapo alone involved approximately 2000 "major war criminals" and 2,500,000 who might be considered members of criminal organizations, of which only 90,000 were then in custody. In the opinion of the War Department, sparing resources at this late date for the Philippines would "endanger other important objectives." Finally Patterson indicated that he was aware that such prosecutions would "involve delicate political matters closely affecting the future international affairs" of the Philippines, matters "in which the Army is not qualified to act and from which the military should, if possible, be excluded." Here the Secretary of War demonstrated an acute understanding of the Filipino political climate, as well as a keen sensitivity to the possible ramifications of the military over-extending its authority into the civilian sphere. For the United States Army to become entangled in a decision making process that would likely affect the outcome of the Philippine national election, and consequently the nature of future domestic and international Philippine government policy, was contrary to American principles of military subordination to civilian authority. Moreover, employing the military to undertake activities which would result in changes in the archipelago's political leadership would set a dangerous precedent for both the American and Philippine armies. His recommendations were therefore twofold: first, that the United States prosecute none of the Philippine collaborators; and second, that if the United States did undertake such prosecutions, they be made the responsibility of American civilian agencies.

Accompanying Patterson's letter was a hastily composed appeal from General MacArthur in Japan imploring Truman not to accept the recommendations of the Attorney General. MacArthur wrote that the only valid reason to intervene would be doubt regarding the willingness of the People's Court to dispense punishment, and he questioned Hutchison's pessimism on that issue. Furthermore, for the United States to demonstrate such a lack of faith in the Filipinos' abilities to deal with the collaboration issue would result in a loss of respect for America throughout the Far East. The General then warned the President that he could "anticipate the gravest challenge by the Philippine Judicial System... and quite possibly by the entire Philippine Government." (MacArthur apparently knew that the quislings he had assisted in recapturing positions of influence and authority in the islands would employ whatever means at their disposal to prevent or postpone their trial by any American courts.) Concluding MacArthur's appeal was a

self-flattering report describing how he and the forces under his command had executed their directives regarding collaborators in perfect accordance with Presidential directives, and how as far as he was concerned there was no need for revisions in American policy at this late date.[48]

Given the Justice and War Department's diametrically opposed policy recommendations, Truman was compelled to weigh long-term objectives against short-term practicalities. To follow the advice of Patterson and MacArthur would likely allow many of the major collaborators to circumvent prosecution and retain political and economic control of the archipelago. Yet such a development, while undesirable, would mean that collaborationist elements would no longer use propaganda portraying America as a nation which did not consider its wards prepared for full sovereignty. Also, in not appointing military courts to deal with Filipino collaborators, more American resources would be free to ensure proper trials and convictions of German and Japanese war criminals, actions the President viewed as essential to prolonged world peace. And finally, there was also the chance, albeit slim, that the People's Courts would prosecute Filipino tergiversators, thereby saving America not only scarce resources, but also the embarrassment of contravening the Philippine justice system.

Concerned about straining American resources and sensitive to potential accusations of violating Philippine sovereignty, Truman chose the recommendations of Robert Patterson over Tom Clark. In a press release on March 16, 1946, Truman announced that there would be no changes in America's "established policy of leaving the disposition of civil collaborators in the Philippines to the civil authorities there." Justifying this decision, he selectively extrapolated from Hutchison's initial report the hopeful opinion that "the manner in which the collaborationist cases have been handled indicates an earnest and well directed effort to dispose of these cases as speedily as possible." Significantly, the President also noted that "we have not been asked by any group in the Philippines to intervene," an important consideration in convincing him to reject the Attorney General's proposals. In the end, Washington only exerted moral pressure on Filipino officials in the expectation that "their own devotion to democratic ideals... [would] eliminate from their national and political life all of those of questionable allegiance to those democratic principles." This was nothing more than a delicate slap on Roxas' wrist. [49]

The one person in America's capital who might have been concerned enough to oppose Patterson and MacArthur vigorously, and who might have used his considerable powers of persuasion to convince Truman to establish a military tribunal, had been effectively removed from the Oval Office's privileged circle. A crisis, totally unrelated to

the Philippines, concerning the appointment of a new Under Secretary of the Navy, had so preoccupied Harold Ickes in the early months of 1946 that on February 15 he resigned from office in a state of frustrated exhaustion. Roxas, secure in his position, narrowly defeated Osmeña in the April 23rd election. Except for occasional attacks from former Secretary Ickes in a syndicated press column over the next year, those who had cooperated with the Japanese were now beyond reproach. With Roxas as President, there was only one issue remaining to be settled before the July 4th independence deadline—American trade and rehabilitation programs for the islands. After over a year of study, months of Congressional hearings, and constant adjustment to the collaboration problem, the American Government was finally prepared to make some major economic decisions regarding its soon-to-be-liberated Asian colony.

NOTES

1 Harold L. Ickes' Diary, Saturday, July 15, 1939, p. 3581. Harold L. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

2 Ibid., Saturday, January 30, 1937, p.1951.

3 Ibid., Saturday, September 9, 1944, p.9210.

4 Ibid., Sunday, October 3, 1943, pp.8218-8219.

5 The Consul General at Manila (Steintorf) to the Secretary of State, Manila, March 21, 1945. *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1945, vol. VI: The British Commonwealth; The Far East.* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), p.1196.

6 Ibid., Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Lochart) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew), p.1193.

7 In fact, the Soviet News Agency, *Tass*, began accusing America of just such intentions a few months later when proposals for future trade relations with the Philippines were being discussed.

8 Ickes' Diary, Sunday, February 4, 1945, p.9537, and Saturday, February 10, 1945, p. 9548. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

9 Ibid., p.9584. Years earlier Ickes had indicated that his dislike for McNutt had originated in the former Governor of Indiana's practice of taxing State employees 2% of their income for his campaign fund and his use of state troops to repress labour strikers at the slightest provocation.

10 Letter to John S. Lord, Esq., January 25, 1945. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1945-1946," Library of Congress Manuscript Collection, Washington, D.C.

11 Ickes' Diary, Sunday, March 4, 1945. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

12 Ibid.

13 Secretary of State to the Consul General in Manila (Steintorf), April 14, 1945. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, p. 1196.

14 Ickes' Diary, Sunday, May 6, 1945. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

15 Letter from President Truman to Secretary Ickes, May 5, 1945. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1945-1946," Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

16 Ickes' Diary, May 19, 1945. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

17 Ibid., June 24, 1945.

18 See, Senator Millard E. Tydings, *Remarks of Hon. Millard E. Tydings: Conditions of Philippines Caused by War, and Recommendations for Relief and Rehabilitation,* 79th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document, Vol. 14, nos. 1-77, (Washington, D.C., June 7, 1945). This subject will be dealt with more completely in a later chapter.

19 Ickes' Diary, Saturday, June 9, 1945. p.9783. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

20 Ibid., Ickes had also indicated his desire to be relieved of authority in a formal letter a week before. Letter from Secretary Ickes to President Truman, May 30, 1945. Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

21 Ickes' Diary, Saturday, June 9, 1945, p.9783, Ickes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

22 Paul V. McNutt, *Seventh and Final Report of the High Commissioner to the Philippines.* 80th Congress, 1st Session, House Document vol. 9, no. 389, (Washington, D.C., July 1947), p.12.

23 Report to President Truman from Secretary Ickes, July 17, 1945. Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

24 Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Vol. Two, Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), chapters 23-26.

25 All references in this paragraph taken from: Ickes' Diary, Saturday, August 26, 1945. p.9949. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

26 Consul General at Manila (Steintorf) to the Secretary of State, August 13, 1945., *Foreign Relations of the United States.* p.1231.

27 Ibid., Consul General at Manila (Steintorf) to Secretary of State, September 5, 1945, p.1232.

28 Ibid., Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Manila (Steintorf), September 10, 1945, p.1233.

29 Ibid., p.1201. However in McNutt, *Seventh and Final Report of the High Commissioner of the Philippines*, p.13, these broad powers are cited as being given to McNutt in Executive Order No. 9616, not 9816.

30 Ibid., Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Manila (Steintorf), October 3, 1945, p.1262.

31 Telegram from Secretary of Interior to Philippine President Sergio Osmena. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1945." Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

32 Joint memorandum to President Truman from High Commissioner Paul McNutt and Assistant Secretary of Interior Abe Fortas relating to enemy collaborators in the Philippine government, September 29, 1945. Papers of Samuel I. Rosenman, Philippine File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

33 All references in this paragraph taken from Letter from President Truman to Attorney General, October 25, 1945. Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File 583-C, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

34 All references in this paragraph taken from Ickes Diary, Sunday, November 4, 1945. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

35 Press release from Office of High Commissioner, November 18, 1945. McNutt Papers, Box 311, Philppines 1945, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

36 Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, *The United States and The Philippines: A Study of Neo-Colonization* (Philadelphia Pensylvania: Institute For The Study of Human Issues, 1981), p.22.

37 Letter to Truman from California Labour Organization, November 12, 1945. Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1090, Folder 884, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

38 Letter from Freda Kirchwey to Secretary Ickes, including a public statement by General MacArthur, July 30, 1945. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1945." Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

39 Ibid., Letter from Isaac Brock to Secretary Ickes, circa October, 1945.

40 Letter to State, Justice, and Interior Departments from Executive Office of President, Bureau of Budget, asking if they would oppose the Senate changing date for election to spring. Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box 1090, Folder 584, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. In *In Our Image*. p.329, Karnow states that MacArthur set the date for the Philippine elections at April 23, 1946, before he left the islands to go to Japan.

41 Ibid., Letter from Truman to High Commissioner, McNutt, October 25, 1945.

42 Press release of Office of High Commissioner, January 29, 1946. McNutt Papers, Box 311, Philippines 1946, Lilly Library, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana.

43 Copy of article for *Readers Digest* entitled "Report on the Philippines," January 1946. McNutt Papers, Box 311, Philippines 1946, Lilly Library, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana.

44 Telegram to President Truman from Commander in Chief of Hukbalahap, Louis Taruc, January 12, 1946, -- originally handed to Colonel Martin, January 14, 1946. Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File 400, Box 1090. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

45 Memorandum for President Truman from Office of Attorney General, March 1, 1946. President's Secretary's Files, Box 185, Philippine Islands, Folder 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

46 All references in this paragraph, Ibid., pp.1 and 5.

47 All references in this paragraph, Ibid., p.5.

48 All references in this paragraph, Ibid., Accompanying correspondence from General MacArthur to President Truman, March 3, 1946.

49 All references in this paragraph, Statement of President Truman, March 16, 1946. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1946-1952," Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

4

DRAFTING TRADE AND REHABILITATION LEGISLATION

In 1936, just two years after passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, a special Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs composed of both Americans and Filipinos began reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of terminating the American-Philippine reciprocal trade relationship after Philippine independence. On May 20, 1938, the committee recommended to President Roosevelt an extension of free trade as long as fifteen years after independence lest an overly rapid transition to an open world market devastate the Philippine economy. With Presidential endorsement, the committee's recommendations were eventually forwarded to Congress, and on August 7, 1939, the original Tydings-McDuffie independence legislation was correspondingly amended. However, rather than follow the recommendations exactly, Congress determined that, while tariffs would probably be increased slowly (at a rate eliminating preferential treatment by 1960), the final decision regarding postponing full duties would not be made until yet another committee examined the issue two years prior to July 4, 1946. Congress perceived that by waiting an additional six years a decision could be reached more in keeping with future developments in the Philippines.[1] By coincidence, the legislature's delay proved remarkably appropriate, for the Second World War and its effects upon the Philippine Islands unquestionably introduced new conditions which required study. Accordingly, in December, 1943, Representative C. Jasper Bell, chairman of the House Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, the committee charged in the 1930's with overseeing the Philippine transition to independence, sought Presidential assistance in creating the second investigatory committee, ultimately the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission.

The Filipino Rehabilitation Commission consisted of eighteen members: three chosen by the American Senate, three by the House of Representatives, three more appointed by President Roosevelt, and nine appointed by Philippine president Manuel Quezon. Chairing the body was Senator Millard Tydings. The purpose of the Commission was to:

> investigate and make recommendations concerning the postwar economy, trade, finance, economic stability, and

> rehabilitation of the Philippine Islands, including the matter of damages to public and private property and to persons occasioned by enemy attack and occupation and by reoccupation.[2]

While this body has been credited with making detailed studies which "formed the basis of later recommendations,"[3] in fact, as of March, 1945, the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission had only met twice, first in October of 1944, and then again on February 26, 1945.[4] The Commission's various subcommittees had only been slightly more active, tending to rely heavily on the findings of the 1938 Joint Preparatory Committee.

There were two main obstacles to thoughtful planning. The first was that most of the American members were involved in many other projects unrelated to the Philippines at war's end and had to divide their time. The second was that almost immediately after its creation the Commission became polarized into two uncompromising blocs. The Filipino members, mostly wealthy land owners and established businessmen, vigorously advocated a policy which would eliminate all American tariffs on Philippine goods for a period of twenty years, after which the issue could be reevaluated to determine if further extensions were mutually desirable.[5] For their part, most of the American members viewed such a proposal with disdain, labelling it excessively generous to the Filipinos and unfair to domestic producers. Alternatively, the Americans favoured a proposal, similar to the 1938 study, recommending a gradual increase in tariff rates between the two nations over a period of roughly twenty years until the Philippine economy had been fully "weaned."[6] Seeking to break this deadlock, Congressman Bell, who chaired the Commission's subcommittee studying future trade relations, directed its secretary, Vernon Moore, to provide summaries of every report created by the Commission so that he (Bell) might begin the actual process of drafting legislation.[7]

The information Bell received from the various subcommittees tended to support the opinion of the Commission's Filipino members. Perhaps this was because the Filipino members were more active in the proceedings and had therefore provided material designed to buttress their position, but equally important was the way the small subcommittees focused on narrow, specific goals. Unconcerned with trade matters beyond the limited parameters of American-Philippine relations, these subcommittees were not heavily influenced by the broader problems of global trade being considered by the State Department. Also, since the Philippine members had all been appointed by Quezon and were all intimately associated with the Philippine aristocracy, most of the evidence they had solicited for the Commission was designed to advance the interests of the

Philippines' feudal agricultural elite. It is not surprising then that the reports Bell acquired concluded that:

> reciprocal trade between the United States and the Philippines... was the great stimulating factor in Philippine commerce before the Japanese attack [and that] the evident progress and contentment of the Filipino people and the unprecedented happy relations between Americans and Filipinos are obvious proofs of the beneficial effects of... continuing this relationship.

The same report argued that the "objective of free trade" had been to "give the Filipinos the opportunity to grow in the habits of industry, and in the building of national pride and national power," a successful experiment that had produced a substantial increase in the Philippine standard of living, improved means of transportation and communication, the highest government salaries in the Tropics or the Orient, the growth of private capital, and vastly improved levels of health and education. Moreover free trade had supposedly made possible the modernization and growth of such enterprises as the sugar, coconut oil, cigar, and embroidery industries, while it simultaneously generated in the islands a "lucrative and highly safe field for American investments."[8]

Abrupt termination of the existing trade relationship was the concern of a large portion of the information Bell accumulated. It was predicted that ending free trade would result in not simply an inconvenient dislocation or harsh readjustment of the islands' economy, but "a total or partial liquidation of all the Philippine's major industries." Statistics demonstrated that those Philippine enterprises dependent upon American trade preferences constituted eighty-one percent of the islands' total merchandise exports to the United States, and that for key industries such as sugar the total was ninety-nine percent. More important though, from the viewpoint of America's elected officials, the reports also speculated that, contrary to common assumptions prior to passing the 1934 independence legislation, abandoning free trade with the Philippines would also result in injury to American economic and financial interests. It was hypothesized that:

> with greatly reduced Philippine purchasing power as the inevitable result of the termination of free trade, American exports to the islands would be relatively curtailed. Since over 99% of the exports of the U.S. to the Philippines are duty free, most of these products would probably lose the commanding position that they have held in the Philippine market, after they have ceased to enjoy their preferential status.

In other words, not only would Filipinos have less money with which to buy American goods, but American products would be subjected to tariffs and foreign competition, so that what little money the Filipinos had would be divided among non-American suppliers as well. Considering that in 1939 the Philippines had been American's sixth largest trading partner, one can appreciate the concern with which United States manufacturers would view the loss of their protected market.[9] In reading these reports Bell reached the conclusion that an extension of free trade would be in the best interest of both the United States and the Philippines.

Naturally Bell felt that any legislation with such long term implications would have to be carefully constructed and gingerly advanced through various legislative stages if it were ever to become government policy. Accordingly he sought to incorporate into his proposal enough safeguards for vulnerable American producers and enough concessions to Filipino interests to retain the support of both. However, he realized that constructing a consensus within Congress was a difficult task, for, by 1945, American manufacturing interests had not yet grown sufficiently confident in their ability to compete with foreign producers for Capitol Hill to abandon its general policy of protectionism. In fact, the very words "free trade" were anathema to a Congress still convinced that insufficient protection for domestic producers was to blame for the severity of the Great Depression. Desperate to escape responsibility for any future economic calamity, both Senate and House members were fond of stating that they had learned the lessons of the 1930's.[10]

In order to surmount this formidable obstacle, Bell recognized that he required help from the Executive Department. Towards that end, he solicited from Philippine President, Sergio Osmeña, a statement asserting that the Philippine government supported continued free trade and would appreciate President Truman's endorsement of the Commonwealth's position.[11] Then, on April 13th, Bell asked the State Department to provide the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission with a concrete statement of policy regarding the proposed twenty years of free trade.[12] And finally, the Interior Department lent a hand by creating a "Philippine Economic Survey," under the direction of E.D. Hester, to assist in the drafting of legislation.[13] Consequently, by early May, 1945, Bell could feel relatively confident that the proposal to extend free trade with the islands for a further two decades was well on its way to becoming law.

Contrary to Bells assumptions, however, the first significant opposition to his initiative did not arise from protectionist Congressmen. Rather, it was Senator Millard Tydings, chairman of the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission, who reported after his

truncated excursion to the Philippines, that it would be difficult for anyone to plan future trade relations in the interest of both Filipinos and Americans. Noting the incoherence of the two countries' political systems, the Senator feared that any current law could not be guaranteed as it was always within the prerogative of a future legislature of either nation to revoke the decision of its predecessors. Thus, the private economic interests of both countries would never know whether their rights and privileges would long endure. According to Tydings, economists believed that such uncertainty would constitute risks for most capital ventures and that the solution lay in creating a trade arrangement so straightforward and clearly defined that the probability of a future legislature rejecting it would be minimized. In his judgement, the proposal of Congressman Bell and the Filipino members of the Rehabilitation Commission calling for an indefinite, or twenty year, free trade agreement did not meet this requirement.[14]

Tydings implied that it would be Filipinos, not Americans, who stood to lose the most should reciprocity be legislated. He suggested that, in light of the valiant and heroic wartime loyalty of most Filipinos, America had incurred a responsibility to its dependent people to help ensure their economic and social prosperity in the years to come. It would be irresponsible and cruel to place them in a position where their economy would be tied to that of the United States and constantly at the mercy of an American legislature. Furthermore, Tydings predicted that even if a twenty year free trade agreement could be guaranteed for the Filipinos, once it elapsed the islands would still have to readjust their economy. Therefore, why not implement that readjustment now when the Philippine economy was already destroyed by war? Instead of designing American trade policy to rebuild the old economic structure, why not create an entirely new Philippine economy, one that could sustain itself without relying upon American preferences? To accomplish this, the senator proposed that the United States grant the islands three to five years of complete free trade (a period of grace to enable the economy to rebuild its most basic infrastructure) followed by approximately twenty years of gradually increasing tariffs. He felt that declining preferences, while placing no unreasonable burden on American industry, would compel the Philippine economy to create enterprizes not dependent on free trade.

Adding moral force to his remarks, Tydings concluded that the United States:

> could never make the Filipinos free if their economy was linked to America's indefinitely.... We have a good reputation in Asia for our policies in the Philippines. This record is too good for us to mar now. We must show nations

> that the United States is one nation which not only talks freedom, but carries out their [sic] professions.[15]

For Tydings, then, free trade was a form of exploitative neocolonialism which would keep the Philippines perpetually subordinate to, and dependent upon, the United States, a condition he believed the American government should not tolerate.

Although Tydings had just returned from the Philippines, it is difficult to conclude that his declining preference proposal was much influenced by his Asian travels. In fact, the breach of opinion between Tydings and Bell derived not from any independent investigations by either man, but rather from their reactions to positions taken by the State Department. Determined to prevent the recurrence of either depression or World War, the State Department opposed renewed protectionist sentiments in Congress. The State Department concluded that one of the major causes of global economic stagnation in the 1930's had been artificially high tariff barriers and that the major incentive for Japanese aggression had been paranoia over access to raw materials and markets for manufactured products. Clearly, then, an obvious solution to securing future peace and prosperity lay in reducing world tarrifs rates and eliminating preferential trade relationships within European colonial empires. Assuming that foreign trade created bonds of interdependence among nations which reduced the possibility of armed conflict the State Department anticipated that economic reconstruction and the revival of free flowing world trade and finance were possible only if countries worked and prospered together. Moreover, with the United States possessing the largest, and by far the healthiest, economy it was also supposed that to ensure the world did not plummet into another Great Depression, America had to sustain its energizing function in the international market place. Admittedly, certain American manufactures pushed for the elimination of European tariffs in hopes that America's unparalleled industrial efficiency would guarantee large profits, but, for the State Department, national prosperity was an intregal part of international economic recovery.

Towards such ends the Department had initiated preliminary negotiations among the Dutch, French, and, most important, the British and it was anticipated that if these major trading nations agreed to reforms leading to an "open door" world economy, then other countries would reciprocate. Early discussions were encouraging, for by the early summer of 1945 France had agreed to liberalize trade on the condition that Great Britain comply, while the English were receptive as long as no other country insisted upon special privileges. Therefore, on March, 20, 1945, the acting Secretary of State had sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt explaining that the proposal of the Filipino members

of the Rehabilitation Commission (which Bell endorsed) calling for the establishment of reciprocal free trade between the Philippines and the United States for twenty years would be inconsistent with broader government objectives to remove preferences and discriminations on a global basis.[16]

The State Department did recognize, however, that America had a special responsibility towards her colonial people, and, to demonstrate American gratitude for Philippine loyalty during the war and to properly prepare the archipelago for independence, the State Department conceded that "it may be desirable with a view to the economic rehabilitation of the Islands to provide for a period of declining preferences."[17] After Roosevelt's death, this memorandum was forgotten until May 10, 1945, when a department official stumbled upon it and forwarded it to President Truman with an added notation: "Roosevelt recently approved this policy," and "Senator Tydings is now engaged in formulating specific recommendation for [its] implementation."[18] Here lay the groundwork for Tydings' remarks before the Senate.

Giving further momentum to the State Department-Tydings' proposal was the completion of the "concrete statement of policy" that in March the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission had requested of the State Department. This detailed report was delivered to Tydings on July 9th, two days after his speech in the Senate. The study actually was not prepared by the State Department alone, but by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy (ECEFP), a group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State, William Clayton, and consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and Labour, as well as the United States Tariff Commission and Foreign Economic Administration. After careful study and in accordance with overall United States trade policy, this body recommended that preferential trade relations with the Philippines be continued until January 1, 1949 or 1950, after which preferences should be "gradually reduced until they are eventually eliminated after about twenty years."[19] It was also proposed that rehabilitation assistance should go towards "industries which will not be dependent on free trade" rather than traditional industry which would have to be "weaned from dependence on the American economy."[20]

While the ECEFP justified its opposition to free trade in terms of America's global trade policy, it was also true that rehabilitation of industries not dependent upon reciprocity would challenge Philippine feudalism and the economic control of the falangists. Since the Philippine aristocracy was sustained through an agricultural economy consisting of landless, heavily indebted peasants labouring on large sugar and tobacco plantations which were dependent upon free trade, it is reasonable to assume that, should the ECEFP

recommendations have been implemented, they would have precipitated the demise of Philippine feudalism and many of the problems associated with it. The Philippine economy, in order to survive after losing its privileged access to the vast American market, would have been forced to diversify and industrialize. This would have stimulated a large increase in the Philippine middle class and created a new industrial labour class, both possessing the organizational potential to threaten the Filipino aristocracy's political and economic hegemony.

For a variety of reasons, then, Bell's proposal appeared destined for failure. Armed with nothing beyond the support of the Filipino members of the Commission, he lacked the backing necessary to challenge Tydings and the State Department in Congress. Then, unexpectedly, he received major endorsement from an unlikely source. One member of the ECEFP disagreed with the opinion of its chairman and wrote a separate dissenting recommendation to accompany the Commission's formal report. The dissenting voice was that of Harold Ickes' Interior Department.

One would have expected Ickes to have been an enthusiastic supporter of the Tydings position, if for no other reason than it carried the possibility of undermining the feudal elite and, by implication, the collaborators. Moreover it promised to break the yoke of economic dependency, seen by many as an integral feature of the existing free trade arrangement. However, the Department of the Interior maintained that the ECEFP report, as adopted, was merely a regurgitation of the recommendations of the 1938 Joint Preparatory Committee, and as such it failed to take into account the results of nearly four years of enemy occupation of the islands:

> It would be difficult enough to restore normal conditions in the Philippines under the best circumstances, but to attempt that difficult task and at the same time require a rapid reorientation and a complete change in the whole internal economy of the islands and expect the establishment of an orderly and democratic government seems too much. It is argued that the war has wrecked the economy and that this is the time to rebuild properly. From a purely theoretical standpoint that may be correct, but it ignores all human factors involved. The ECEFP plan, as proposed, must inevitably reduce government revenue from taxation, and sharp reductions... in all government expenditures would be necessary. Social, political and economic stability will be seriously threatened.[21]

Thus, rather than being concerned that free trade would enable falangists and collaborators to continue their political and economic control in years to come, Ickes emphasized that

terminating free trade would result in extreme economic and social hardship for average Filipinos, especially those making their living as peasant workers on plantations. Such hardship would likely lead to increased friction between rich and poor and the breakdown in orderly government, developments which would endanger the lives and livelihoods of the Filipino poor more than the wealthy elite.

Ickes did not limit himself, however, to predictions of social breakdown and a bleak future facing the islands' destitute and poor, for his report also countered all of the other major ECEFP arguments. In challenging free trade with the Philippines, the ECEFP contended it was naïve to assume that after twenty years of reciprocity the Philippines would have redirected their economy to enable it to survive without American preferences. Thus, Filipinos would request a further extension of special privileges, a request for special treatment that would again embarrass America's policy of seeking the removal of preferences and discrimination on a global basis. In response, Ickes contended that America's overall success in removing world trade restrictions would "thereby automatically lessen the value of the free trade privileges which the Filipinos have heretofore enjoyed and would tend to accomplish what the... [ECEFP] proposes; that is, the gradual removal of the Philippines' present dependence on the American market."[22] If the State Department wanted to eliminate world trade restrictions, Ickes asked, what could possibly be wrong with commencing that process by eliminating trade restrictions between the United States and the Philippine Islands? Indeed, should the State Department be successful in preventing free trade with the Philippine Islands while simultaneously eliminating trade preferences elsewhere in the world, then, theoretically, after twenty years the Philippines might be the only country with which the Unites States did not have reciprocity. Ickes maintained that, however unlikely, such a development would be morally wrong. Also, in his opinion, suspending reciprocity with the Philippines in the hope that Britain and other colonial powers would initiate similar actions within their own empires was asinine, and it was ludicrous to suppose that Filipinos would passively accept such logic.

Furthermore, Ickes believed that America's future military security made free trade with the Philippine Islands essential. During World War II, American strategists had concluded that to prevent another global war it was crucial that America abandon isolationism and maintain a strong military presence in areas of potential trouble throughout the world. This meant that Americans might wish to retain some of their old bases on the Philippines, bases that as Ickes pointed out "would not be of full utility if the Filipinos themselves were not bound to the United States by a feeling of loyalty and

economic interdependence." Obviously, "the strongest conceivable bases in the midst of an unfriendly population would be of little value." Moreover, the War Department had already indicated that the attainment of its objectives in the Philippines would be best advanced by sustaining the friendship of the people and by maintaining "a stable government based upon a prosperous economy." [23]

Summing up his critique of the ECEFP proposal, Ickes charged that denying the islands free trade would be, for the moment, "the most convenient and least troublesome [policy] for the United States," but it would insensitively and adversely affect "a country now completely demoralized and disorganized by war." He also cautioned that, while ending free trade might appear to be in America's short-term interest, an economic abandonment of the Philippines clearly did not serve broader objectives, especially since the Filipinos and other colonial peoples would accuse the United States of having ruthlessly jettisoned the islands at their "time of greatest need." Indeed, Ickes maintained that the loss of life and property during the war with Japan and the loyalty exhibited by average Filipinos during that conflict morally obligated the United States to provide the Philippines with a continued reciprocal arrangement.[24]

For his part, Tydings considered Ickes' denunciation a serious threat. Although the Maryland Senator seemed convinced that, with State Department and Presidential endorsement, as well as the power of anti-free trade sentiment on Capitol Hill, his proposal ultimately would prevail, he was still concerned that further squabbling over policy options would unnecessarily delay trade and rehabilitation legislation, thus prolonging the suffering of Filipinos. Accordingly, on August 4, 1945, Tydings advised Truman that trade legislation was "vital" and needed to be passed immediately. He claimed that he had just introduced in the Senate a bill drafted by the Tariff Commission which met with State Department approval, and he hoped Truman would help secure its speedy passage.[25]

Due to the Potsdam meeting and a host of other pressing matters, President Truman was forced to rely upon the opinion of his subordinates concerning Tydings' request, especially upon Samuel Rosenman, who had been receiving and coordinating information concerning Philippine rehabilitation since the previous spring. The variety of requests and suggestions Rosenman received from private as well as government sources convinced him that Tydings was correct in assuming that, if policy were not decided upon quickly, discussions would likely break down into a stalemate between two or more uncompromising positions. No doubt familiar with Secretary Ickes' tenacity and determination, Rosenman suggested to the President that Senator Tydings and Secretary

Ickes meet to resolve their differences and submit one complete program of relief that included a trade agreement. Truman agreed to this, but suggested that Bell (who represented Ickes' position) rather than Ickes himself be the one to meet with Tydings. Subsequently, on August 17, in compliance with Truman's directions, Rosenman asked both legislators if they would meet with him a week later to work on a policy proposal.[25] Tydings was agreeable, but Bell, probably concerned that his free trade position still lacked the backing required to supplant Tydings' motion, insisted that he was too busy with his other Congressional duties.[27]

That Bell was busy cannot be disputed, for he had occupied much of his time in the summer of 1945 soliciting support for his reciprocal free trade initiative. Painfully aware that making free trade appealing to Congress would require the unqualified support of at least one additional prominent figure, preferably someone considered an expert on Philippine matters, Bell again turned to the Department of Interior. There Bell discovered that E.D. Hester, the advisor responsible for inspiring Ickes' criticism of the State Department, had contacted Paul McNutt while in the Philippines and was now confident that McNutt would add his voice to those endorsing reciprocal free trade. A few weeks later, the former Indiana Governor assumed the responsibilities of Philippine High Commissioner, and, as America's top Philippine official and the President's representative in the islands, McNutt's opinion would now carry considerable weight on Capitol Hill. Holding McNutt's support like a trump card, Bell, on September 17, received from Hester and the Philippine Commonwealth Secretary of Finance (and vice-chairman of the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission), Jaime Hernandez, five copies of the twenty-five year Philippine free trade bill they had drafted for him.[28] After spending a few days examining Hester's bill to ensure it contained nothing that could stall its progress during committee hearings, Bell introduced his legislation in the House of Representatives.

Thus, by the end of October, there were two separate and opposing bills dealing with future American trade relations with the Philippine Islands. The first, Senator Tydings', was more of an omnibus bill along the lines suggested by Presidential Secretary, Samuel Rosenman, for not only did it address the issue of trade, but also war damages (including a $100,000,000 grant from the American treasury to repair some of the physical damage caused by war), the disposal of surplus properties, the transfer of enemy properties, and even resource exploration and job training.[29] Supporting Tydings' proposal were not only the State Department and the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, but theoretically the President as well, for, while Truman had yet to openly express an opinion, his early encouragement of Tydings' mission and his receptiveness to State

Department arguments in the early weeks after assuming office were interpreted as endorsement. Moreover, traditional Congressional apprehension regarding free trade with the Philippines was seen as working in Tydings' favour.

The second bill, apparently much narrower in scope, dealt exclusively with the subject of trade, yet, Bell's legislation was considered by Americans and Filipinos alike to be designed as a part of America's overall policy of rehabilitating the Philippines. In fact, in a press release accompanying his bill's introduction in Congress, Bell claimed that it was necessary to extend Philippine-American reciprocal free trade in order to reduce the total cost to the American tax payer of assisting the war ravaged islands. Backing Bell's bill were High Commissioner McNutt, Harold Ickes and his Department of the Interior, a small but influential group of Senators and Congressmen,[30] the Filipino members of the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission, and, theoretically, President Truman given his appointment of McNutt (an open supporter of free trade) as High Commissioner.

In truth, as much as President Truman had given any serious thought to the Philippines, he had concentrated almost exclusively on the question of collaboration. He would not even familiarize himself with either of the two trade bills for many weeks, and, consequently, the full burden of decision fell into the hands of the appropriate House and Senate committees. Throughout the autumn of 1945, two diametrically opposed proposals, each claiming to be in the best interest of both America and the Philippines, vied for the support of Congress.

NOTES

1 Report: "Need for Special Trade Relationship Recognized," April 26, 1945. C. Jasper Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8917, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Society of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia Missouri.

2 Ibid., memorandum, undated, Folder 8940.

3 "Summary Of Principal Steps Taken By President Truman To Implement United States Policy Towards The Philippine Islands...", undated, but written shortly after Truman left office. Papers of Eben A. Ayers, Box Number 8, General File "Philippines", Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

4 Report of Filipino Rehabilitation Commission, March 28, 1945, Millard E. Tydings Papers. Series IV, Box 1, Philippine Rehabilitation Commission, Folder 2, Maryland Room, Special Collections Division, University of Maryland College Park Libraries, College Park, Maryland. — Unfortunately the Tydings collection is incomplete as upon his retirement from the Senate, in 1950, Millard Tydings apparently burned 128 boxes of records in his back yard.

5 Report by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy regarding a press release by Filipino members of FRC, March 12, 1945. *Foreign Affairs of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1945; Volume VI, The British Commonwealth, The Far East.* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 1215-1216.

6 Ibid., Memorandum by Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, March 20, 1945, p. 1216.

7 Memorandum from Bell to Vernon E. Moore requesting a summary of all reports, early April, 1946. Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8970, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Society of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

8 "Summary of Report of the Technical Committee to the President of the Philippines on American-Philippine Trade Relations", February 1, 1945, received by Bell on April 16, 1945. Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8977. Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Society of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

9 Ibid., Moreover, statistics are provided which demonstrate that 81% of all Philippine steel imports were then American; 99% of all automobiles and parts, 99% of tobacco products, and over 70% of all paper products, chemicals, and drugs, and electrical products.

10 Congress, Senate, Committee on Ways and Means, *Philippine Trade Act of 1945: Hearings before the Committee On Ways And Means*, 79th Congress,1st session, October 15, 16 17 19, November 14, 15, 1945; February 15 and March 15,1946. This is a theme that both McNutt and Bell repeatedly made while giving testimony.

11 Letter from Sergio Osmena to President Truman, April 10, 1945, and memorandum of meeting between Osmena and Truman, May 3, 1945. President's Secretary's Files, Box 185, Philippine Islands, Folder 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

12 Letter from Chairman of Filipino Rehabilitation Commission, Senator Tydings, to William Clayton of the State Department, April 10, 1945, Millard E. Tydings Papers, Series IV -- Philippine Islands, Box 2, Folder 3, Historical Manuscripts and Archives Department, McKeldin Library, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.

13 Memorandum from Secretary Ickes to Truman regarding creation of "Philippine Economic Survey," May 9, 1945. President's Secretary's Files, Box 185, Philippine Islands, Folder 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

14 Senator Millard Tydings, *Remarks of Hon. Millard E Tydings; Conditions of Philippine Caused by War, And Recomendations for Relief and Rehabilitation.* 79th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document v.14, n. 1-77. (June 7,1945), pp. 12-13.

15 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

16 Memo by Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, March 20, 1945. *Foreign Affairs of the United States.*, p. 1216.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., Memorandum from Associate Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Willoughby) for President Truman, May 10, 1945, p. 1217, footnote 68.

19 Ibid., Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to Chairman Millard E. Tydings of the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission, July 9, 1945, p. 1217.

20 Secret ECEFP report on Philippine Free Trade, June 26, 1945. President's Secretary's Files, Box 185, Philippine Islands, Folder 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

21 Attachment B, ECEFP D-91/45. The Secretary of the Interior's dissenting report concerning declining preferences with the Philippines, July 3, 1945, p. 1. White House Central Files: Confidential, Box 2117, Folder "Philippine Islands 1945," Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

22 Ibid., p. 2.

23 Ibid., p. 2.

24 Ibid., p. 3.

25 Letter from Tydings to Truman, August 4, 1945, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

26 Memorandum from Samuel I. Rosenman for President Truman, August 16, 1946; letter from Rosenman to C. Jasper Bell, August 17, 1945. Samuel I. Rosenman Papers, Box 3, Folder "Philippines 1945," Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

27 Letter from Bell to Rosenman, August 17, 1945, Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8991, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Society of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

28 Ibid., Letter from Hester to Bell, September 17, 1945.

29 Ibid., A comparison study of H.R. 4185 (Bell's Bill) and S. 1488 (Tyding's Bill), undated, p. 1.

30 The most vocal Senatorial supporter of Bell's bill to this point had been a fellow Missourian, Harry B. Hawes. His efforts on Bell's behalf would become even more significant in the ensuing months.

5

ENACTING TRADE LEGISLATION

The intense conflicts that developed during the spring and summer of 1945 concerning the preliminary drafting of Philippine trade legislation were mere preludes to the more vicious battles over enactment. While advocates of either free trade or declining preferences occasionally cooperated, typically the two factions tried their best to discredit one another's position and, when pressed, to question their opponents' motives as well. These debates dramatically illustrate the complex nature of America's granting of independence to the Philippines, for here the interdepartmental rivalries and personality conflicts that characterized so much of America's dealings with the islands are clearly revealed.

After receiving the draft copy of the reciprocal free trade bill (H.R. 4185) from E.D. Hester, Jasper Bell anticipated few difficulties in committee hearings. As chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, he assumed the bill would be referred to his own committee as had all other matters dealing with Philippine independence during the 1930's. However, on this occasion, primary legislative responsibility was given to the House Committee on Ways and Means. Possibly Tydings or the State Department exerted influence in the House to prevent Bell from expediting free trade through his own committee, or perhaps concerned individuals in the House simply believed that the Ways and Means committee could deal with the issue most effectively. At Bell's insistance President Truman requested the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, Robert L. Doughton, to consider relinquishing control of the bill — the Philippines were in desperate need of rehabilitation, and the Ways and Means Committee might be too "busy with tax matters" to move quickly enough on the trade issue.[1] Doughton responded that, while he personally would be most willing to yield jurisdiction, his committee's members were jealous of their authority. The best he could offer would be a promise to hurry the bill along. Frustrated, Bell then attempted to have his bill reintroduced as an amendment to the original Independence Act, clearly a matter for his own committee. However, by this time H.R. 4185 had been assigned to Ways and Means, and the House was unwilling to disturb the orderly flow of business.[2]

On Monday, October 15, 1945, the Ways and Means Committee opened hearings on

Bell's bill in executive session to help eliminate unnecessary delays. The first testimony came from Representative Bell who began by emphasizing the terrible destruction the Philippines had sustained as a result of the war. The United States had an obligation to assist the archipelago, which could be done in one of two ways:

> We can either pour millions of dollars into rehabilitation, or we can give them a favorable trade agreement, making it possible for citizens of this country to enter into private industry over in the Philippines. Then Filipinos and American businessmen will both show a profit and prosperity will come.[3]

In defining the purpose of his bill in this way, Bell was hoping that Congress would view free trade as an inexpensive alternative to direct rehabilitation, as well as a way of providing American business with secure opportunities for investment.

In describing the workings of H.R. 4185, Bell explained that it provided for twenty years of reciprocal free trade accompanied by a system of absolute quotas based upon allocations assigned in 1934 (the first year of the Philippine Commonwealth). Designed to offer some protection to American producers and to force the Filipinos to diversify their production, new absolute quotas would differ from previous "tariff quotas" by establishing maximum levels of Philippine exports to the United States. For example, whereas under the 1934 Independence Act the Philippine Islands were permitted to export 6,000,000 pounds of cordage duty free to the United States each year and as much additional cordage at the full international tariff rate as they could find American buyers for, under H.R. 4185 the Philippines was restricted to selling only the 6,000,000 pounds of duty free cordage. Regardless of tariff rates or customer demand in America, they could not exceed that total.

Beyond free trade and still generous quotas, Bell's bill also contained a third feature intended to promote the islands' rehabilitation: Section 17 stipulated that American citizens and industries would have equal rights with Filipinos to "develop and exploit" natural resources in the Philippines.[4] Anticipating accusations that this "parity clause" might have been designed to perpetuate American influence beyond independence, Bell quickly added that its only purpose was "to make the Philippines a safe and attractive investment" for American entrepreneurs.[5] He was convinced that existing Philippine law requiring all business firms in the archipelago to be at least sixty percent Filipino owned discouraged American capital from moving there.[6]

The one other key provision of Bell's bill promised that those Philippine enterprises

which had been operating before the Japanese invasion, and were subsequently destroyed, would be rehabilitated first. This meant that the large sugar and tobacco plantations would become the major recipients of American assistance, enterprises that would also be guaranteed the same percentages of the trade quota allocation they had possessed before the war. Testifying after Bell, High Commissioner McNutt explained that all this was designed to facilitate the speedy recovery of the islands' most fundamental industries since established enterprises could "get production going quicker than someone new starting up."[7] Not only did the rehabilitation of the entire Philippine economy rely upon these central industries being repaired first, he insisted, but also the success of an independent Philippine government was doubtful "unless the traditional basis of economic stability was reestablished."[8]

In substance, the ever "realistic" McNutt was advocating that economic and political stability were more important concerns than economic or political justice. His prediction that a post-commonwealth government would not succeed unless the traditional economic order were reestablished was a response to agrarian unrest and the *Hukbalahap* problem, and McNutt also sought to prevent the instability and uncertainty that he perceived would accompany any last minute American meddling in Philippine affairs. In his view the islands' first and foremost requirement was the rebuilding, not the redesigning, of their economic and political system. While the High Commissioner acknowledged that Philippine society was far from ideal, he pointed out that prior to the war it had at least been functional. The war was an historical anomaly, and America had to ensure that certain radical elements of the Filipino population did not exacerbate the resulting political and economic chaos. Once the prewar status-quo had been reestablished the Philippine Islands could be left alone to chart their own destiny, but, in the meantime, the United States was primarily obliged to "jump start" the economy and ensure that people found food and employment.

McNutt's approach may seem to have been out of step with American policies of the time which did try to reform other societies, but the Philippines was not like defeated Germany or Japan. The islands' people had been America's wartime allies, and if the United States did not demand economic and political reform from her other cobelligerents, how could such be asked of America's "little brown brothers"? Predictably the Filipino prewar elite and wartime collaborators heartily endorsed McNutt's reasoning.

It appears that McNutt and Bell were initially successful in selling their arguments to the members of the Ways and Means Committee. Most of the Committee's comments and questions during the early hearings were friendly and even suggested America enlarge

the proposed quota allocations so that the Philippines could additionally benefit even more from free trade. Regarding the "parity clause" and other features of the bill that critics deemed exploitative, the Ways and Means Committee appeared willing to accept Bell's insistance that his intention was to assist the Philippine people. In fact, assured that no American or Philippine political party or economic interest group, or any concerned third nation (Cuba), would especially benefit from the bill, the members were prepared to believe that high-minded benevolence was the major inspiration for the proposed legislation.[9]

However, on October 17, Senator Tydings appeared before the Committee and presented arguments which challenged many of these early conclusions. Catering to the sentimentality of the Committee members, Tydings began his testimony by declaring that it did not matter if he personally was "in favour or opposition" to Bell's bill. Rather it was "a question of whether or not, if enacted, the best interests of the Philippines and the United States would be served." The Maryland Senator argued that, even if twenty years of free trade were able to stimulate economic revitalization, such a solution would only bring temporary prosperity. Undoubtedly, after the twenty years expired the islanders, after accusing America of sudden abandonment, would request an additional period of reciprocity, thereby perpetuating dependence. Furthermore, he contended that, if Congress saw fit to accept the Bell bill, the State Department would be forced, while promoting free trade on a global basis, to say "except in the case of Cuba and the Philippines to which we give a certain preferential tariff." Logically, this would encourage a similar response from the British who would demand comparable privileges "with Australia, Canada, South Africa, India and the rest of their empire." As a result, protective tariff barriers would remain, and *ad hoc* bilateral trade agreements of the kind that helped cause the Great Depression would forever keep the world teetering on the brink of another economic calamity. Tydings reasoned that the only economically sound, yet compassionate, option for the United States would be to offer the islands five years of free trade to get their economy started and then an additional twenty years of declining trade preferences to gradually wean Filipinos away from their reliance on special treatment. This proposal, far better than H.R. 4185, would ensure that the archipelago's people became truly free and independent, the Senator maintained, for one could not in reality be free "when one's life blood is hooked to the economy of another country by the laws of another country."[10]

After illustrating what he saw as the probable economic and political ramifications of Bell's bill, Tydings then criticized the motives of H.R. 4185's sponsors. He charged that

McNutt's and Bell's, "whole philosophy is to keep the Philippines economically even though we have lost them politically."[11] In making this accusation Tydings was referring not only to provisions contained in the free trade bill, but also to the reputation Paul McNutt had acquired in the 1930's of favouring a longer period of Commonwealth status.[12] Upon his first arrival in the islands as High Commissioner, McNutt had overheard his associates among the Filipino elite discussing how they personally opposed independence, and, unaware of the elaborate game the elite played in advocating independence publicly to retain peasant support while simultaneously working behind the scenes to avoid American abandonment, McNutt had foolishly stated that the doubts of so many influential Filipinos convinced him that the issue should be reexamined. Predictably, he had found himself isolated from the Philippine people, temporarily rejected by an embarrassed and angry Filipino elite, and repudiated by his own government. Indeed, in 1939, Quezon received assurances from President Roosevelt that McNutt would never again be reappointed as High Commissioner.[13] Tydings was reminding Doughton's committee of McNutt's political *faux pas* in an attempt to discredit his earlier testimony.

Returning to economic matters, Tydings responded to questions about the Filipino law restricting foreign ownership of Philippine firms and the "parity clause" in Bell's bill which would emasculate that law. The Senator noted that, "by virtue of the free trade market" in the 1930's, most American and Filipino businessmen had accumulated a "nest egg of good old American money," and, even considering losses incurred in the war, "most of them had a lot of black instead of a lot of red on the ledger." Therefore, they did not require, nor were they entitled to, special investment assistance now. Furthermore, he did not believe that concessions for American citizens, requiring an amendment to Philippine law, were essential for attracting American capital to the islands. All that was required, in his opinion, was a stable trade agreement informing investors of what they could expect in years to come, an objective that he thought his proposal for declining preferences would accomplish. If, however, American capital remained timid, the Philippine government, not the American Congress, should determine if special investment concessions for Americans were desirable.[14]

At this point, after attacking Bell's trade bill on both moral and pragmatic grounds, Tydings explained how the House Committee should adopt his measure instead. Tydings recognized that time was of the essence, not only for Filipinos desperately in need of rehabilitation, but also for the Ways and Means Committee who would not like to think that it had wasted two days of hearings. Accordingly, in the interests of humanity and

expediency, the Senator proposed that his initiative be considered as an amendment to Bell's bill. He suggested that the Committee strike out everything in H.R 4115 following the first two words: "A Bill..." and replace the deleted portion with his own proposed legislation. When asked if such brash action would be accepted by the State Department and White House, the Senator replied that he had visited the President that very morning and gained his unqualified endorsement.

Realistically, Tydings did not anticipate easy success. Probably fearing that Doughton would balk at amending his colleague's bill by completely eliminating it, the Senator (in one of the more conciliatory gestures of the competition) wrote Bell asking if, "in the interests of the House, Senate, and Philippines," he would consider a compromise.[15] Tydings acknowledged their differences concerning matters of trade, but hoped Bell's concern for the Philippine people would cause the Congressman to support the other aspects of Tyding's legislation. Philippine-American trade relations could then be left to the Ways and Means Committee to resolve.

Tydings was resurrecting Truman's proposal that the two sides meet to devise a mutually satisfactory settlement, and to achieve this the Senator now suggested that his Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs sit in special joint session with Bell's House Committee on Insular Affairs to conduct simultaneous hearings. However, Bell again rejected cooperation. Replying immediately, the Congressman said he considered Tydings' bill too complex to deal effectively with Philippine rehabilitation. Moreover, after frankly stating that he did not want to work with Tydings, Bell confidently predicted that Doughton's committee would reject the Senator's radical amendment tactics as unjust and unworkable.[16]

Bell's bellicose reply and his unwillingness to cooperate with Tydings were astutely pragmatic. Bell must have understood that, if he supported joint hearings and those portions of Tydings' bill not dealing with trade, it would be difficult not to accept the rest of the Senator's measure. Capitulation would be demanded in the interests of rapid Philippine recovery. Having declared trade legislation to be the most important aspect of rehabilitation, Bell could hardly help rush Tydings' bill through Congress without a section dealing with trade and then insist that Filipinos and Americans wait patiently for his own trade bill to struggle through a morass of House and Senate hearings.

A representative of the State Department was scheduled to come before the Ways and Means Committee on Monday, October 22, 1945, but, in light of Senator Tydings' testimony, Secretary Byrnes requested that hearings be postponed until the Administration decided which bill it favoured.[17] Doughton complied, and once again the advocates of free

trade and declining preferences scrambled to secure the endorsement of President Truman. Apparently, just as in 1944 when Tydings had falsely announced that Roosevelt supported legislation facilitating early Philippine Independence, the Senator had taken the liberty of assuming that Truman's willingness to discuss the declining preference bill was synonymous with Presidential support. In reality Truman had not known enough about either bill to make a decision regarding Philippine trade when he met with Tydings on the morning before the Senator's testimony. The President had never given the matter serious consideration.

In an attempt to sway Truman's judgment, Bell and Tydings each manoeuvred frantically in late October and early November to familiarize the President with the positive aspects of their respective bills. Prompted by Congressman Bell, President Osmeña sent a memorandum to the White House insisting that free trade was "the single most important need of the Philippines today."[18] Clearly expecting that Truman would follow precedent and defer to Filipino opinion on matters concerning the islands, Osmeña repeated this message twice (in a personal interview and in a second memorandum on November 8), and, meanwhile, Bell had other influential advocates of his proposal send supportive letters to both the Executive Mansion and the State Department.[19] Tydings and the State Department were equally determined to secure Truman's endorsement. Soon after the Ways and Means Committee suspended hearings, Secretary Byrnes reminded the President that the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy had thoroughly studied the matter and that it was on the basis of this study that Tydings had drafted his bill. Byrnes insisted that only Tydings' resolution would:

> be conducive to a sound and orderly adjusting of the Philippine economy in line with its future independent status. Such a program would be consistent with the established policy of this government to bring about an expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-preferential basis and our efforts to get commitments from the British for the reduction or eventual elimination of Empire preferences....[20]

After not hearing from the President for a week and fully aware that Bell and his supporters were also lobbying Truman, Byrnes decided to write to his superior once again. In a memorandum suggesting the State Department's frustration with Truman's noncommittal attitude, Byrnes wrote that he now:

> considered it urgent that the Administration take a position on the matter of assistance to the Philippines by establishing a

> sound basis for their trade upon independence. This can best be done by a gradual tapering down of their trade preferences with the United States which would enable them to establish their industry and trade on a sound basis with protection in the initial stages when it is needed, but no false hopes for the future.[21]

Truman was now in an awkward position. America's postwar economic problems, provocative Soviet actions in Poland and Germany, and the dismal condition of Western Europe all made it difficult for the President to devote much time to Philippine trade issues. Moreover, the contradictory information he received from his advisors further impaired Truman's normal decisiveness. Troubling him most was that both free trade and declining preference advocates could plausibly argue that their respective proposals would most effectively benefit both the Philippines and the United States. Likewise, both maintained that Truman's endorsement of their opponents' bills would result in terrible short and long-term suffering for the Philippine people. Recognizing that he lacked the expertise in Philippine matters to make a proper endorsement, Truman returned to Rosenman's suggestion that the competing parties meet to resolve their differences. Accordingly, on November 13, Bell, Tydings, McNutt, Byrnes, Will Clayton, and Ickes were all ordered to come to the White House. Aware that Truman's support had become a prerequisite for the success of any bill dealing with Philippine trade, all those summoned by the President (save Secretary Ickes who sent Assistant Secretary Abe Fortas in his stead) attended the Oval Office conference.[22] Sincerely concerned about the millions of Filipinos waiting for rehabilitation, Truman refused to adjourn the meeting until a compromise had been struck.[23]

It was soon determined that Tydings, the State Department, and even the Department of the Interior were willing to accept a formula consisting of eight years of free trade followed by twenty-five years of declining preferences. Additionally it was agreed that Tydings would introduce separately the section of his original bill calling on the American Congress to grant the Philippines approximately $500,000,000 for the repair of war damage. McNutt and Bell were unhappy with a bill retaining only eight of their proposed twenty years of free trade, but, fearing continued stalemate if they left the White House without Truman's endorsement, they ultimately agreed to the compromise.

One might assume that following the White House meeting the revised Bell bill would have secured quick and easy Congressional approval. Indeed, the very next morning Bell already had the revised proposal ready for Chairman Doughton's committee.[24] However, as with most other aspects of establishing Philippine independence, the process of

transforming the compromise trade legislation into law proved complex and protracted. Despite President Truman's hearty support and the supposed unanimity of opinion between Capitol Hill and the various Executive Departments, there immediately arose fresh and unforeseen criticism of the trade bill.

Ironically, blame for the renewed schisms can be traced back to the President's reconciliation conference, for in focusing exclusively on the most obvious cause of disagreement—free trade versus declining preferences—Truman had ignored all other features of Bell's bill. Moreover, intimidated by Truman's insistence upon cooperation, participants at the meeting professed to be satisfied with a broad "agreement in principle," despite minor or technical objections they intended to raise later in committee.[25] But, the failure to air grievances in Truman's presence inevitably led to further delays for Philippine rehabilitation.

The first of what was to become a series of renewed attacks on Bell's revised trade bill came from Secretary Clinton Anderson and his Department of Agriculture. Chairman Doughton had become concerned over the possible effects Bell's trade bill (now H.R. 4676) would have upon domestic agriculture producers, and, once the compromise bill was drafted, Doughton had a copy forwarded to Anderson asking for his opinion.[26] It took the Department of Agriculture three weeks to comment on the trade bill, in a report initially presented to President Truman. Anderson explained that regardless of the State Department's views, his researchers felt that H.R. 4676 continued to be inconsistent with overall policy designed to end preferential trade agreements within the British Empire. More importantly, though, Anderson warned that Cuban sugar interests would suffer if Philippine trade preferences were maintained. Thus, in order to conform to traditional State Department policy and at the same time protect Cuban interests, he recommended eliminating all tariffs and using only quotas.[27]

It may seem odd for the Department of Agriculture to have expressed greater concern for Cuban sugar cane suppliers than domestic sugar beet growers. To understand this one must remember that by 1946 virtually the entire Cuban sugar industry was American owned. Furthermore, Cuban sugar suppliers had been guaranteed access to the American market at an artificially low tariff rate with the added privilege of a fixed percentage of the American import market reserved for them alone. In fact, despite the Philippines having been a United States colony while Cuba was technically a sovereign nation, the preferences granted Cuba in the prewar years had been greater than those offered to the Philippine Commonwealth. The reason for this dates back to the 1934 Jones Act and the Sugar Act of 1937, agreements regulating the production and consumption of sugar in

America. These agreements set quotas on domestic producers as well as on America's colonies, and, because of the vast amounts of American capital invested in Cuban sugar, Washington officials decided to ensure that Cuban interests were also included. The resulting arrangement gave domestic producers (including Hawaii and Puerto Rico) 55.59% of the market, and foreign countries (including the Philippine Commonwealth) 44.41%. Of the latter figure the Philippines received 34.7%, or 15.41% of the total, the remainder going almost exclusively to Cuba, which additionally retained a special tariff rate it had acquired in 1902 which was 20% lower than the general rate.[28] Significantly, with Philippine products cut off from American buyers during the war, the Cubans increased their share of the foreign countries quota to 60%, gains they were reluctant to relinquish in 1945.[29] It was these interest groups who looked to the Department of Agriculture to be their sympathetic spokesman.

Although unimpressed with any argument designed to further penalize the already decimated Philippine economy, Truman sought to avoid the wrath of influential Cuban sugar interests. Scribbled in the President's handwriting at the bottom of Anderson's letter is a notation reading:

> "Our commitments to the Philippines should be carried out as agreed to. They fought for us. There is no reason why quotas may not be established for sugar on an equitable basis for Cuba and our home producers as well as the Philippines."[30]

Before informing the Secretary of Agriculture of his feelings, however, Truman wanted to explore other opinions within his cabinet. The next day a copy of Anderson's letter was forwarded to Harold Ickes.

Initially Ickes displayed little concern over Anderson's proposed amendments. Likely the Secretary of the Interior anticipated that, with the State Department and Senator Tydings both now supporting H.R. 4676, a late objection by the Department of Agriculture would not seriously threaten the bill's passage, especially when the amendment threatened to retard Philippine rehabilitation. Accordingly, on January 21, Ickes wrote the President a brief letter dismissing Anderson's recommendation.[31]

But, on January 23, Anderson's threat to the trade bill suddenly took a new direction. Instead of simply recommending that tariffs be replaced by quotas, the Department of Agriculture now argued that, in order to be fair to Cuban and domestic suppliers, sugar should not be dealt with in Philippine trade legislation at all. Anderson pointed out that American sugar production and consumption was normally considered by a national sugar

conference held every three years, where all sugar interests competed for quota allocations. Should Bell's bill be approved, the Philippine quota would be fixed for twenty-eight years in total disregard of Cuban and domestic producers. If, on the other hand, the Philippine sugar quota were regulated by the next sugar conference (scheduled for December, 1946), then all interests would be able to manoeuvre on a level playing field. Disguising his true intentions, Anderson's letter inferred that at the conference the Philippine quota might even be increased.[32]

Ickes recognized that Anderson's persistence reflected the Cuban sugar interest's determination to prevent the Philippines from regaining the quota allocations lost during the war. Voicing his anger at such insensitivity to the need for Philippine economic revitalization, the Secretary of the Interior reviewed for Truman many of the arguments earlier directed towards the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy:

> The purpose of... [H.R. 4676] is the rehabilitation of the Philippine export economy and not to grant preferences to the Philippines for an indefinite period. The effect of this bill will be to help restore the Philippines to the position occupied before the war in the world sugar market..., and in my judgment the Philippines have a claim on the United States superior to the claim of any country or economic group.... Secretary [Anderson's]... arguments would be entirely natural and logical except for one paramount factor.... I do not see how this Nation can so lightly disregard the effects on the Philippines of practically four years of war and enemy occupation. Surely we need offer no apologies to any other nation [Cuba] in support of a program which is designed to carry out a solemn pledge to establish an independent government under conditions which do not from the start foredoom it to failure.[33]

Adding force to Ickes' rebuttal was the arrival at the White House of Paul McNutt's response to the first of Anderson's objections to the Bell bill. McNutt adopted an argument to preserve H.R. 4676 which radically departed from what Ickes or anyone else in Washington had emphasized to this time. Echoing the Secretary of the Interior, McNutt stated that "the reasons for administrative sponsorship of H.R. 4676 are of a nature that transcend the advantages of rigid adherence to normal policies. The more compelling reasons arise from the nature of our past Philippine policy and from the war."[34] Unlike Ickes, though, McNutt did not emphasise the war's destruction as the prime reasoning behind the trade act. Instead it was the inconsistency of previous American colonial policy. Had there been no war, Bell's bill would still have been necessary:

> One is forced to conclude that the institution in 1909 of reciprocal free trade and its continuance virtually to 1941 over territory which was pledged from the first to advance to a position of self government and, after 1916, to a position of independence was unwise in that it embraced the mutually exclusive aims of political separatism and economic and financial dependence.... A sudden reversal of economy is impossible without courting disaster. The mistake was ours and we have an obligation to adopt remedial measures which will not destroy the Philippine economy.[35]

Profoundly influenced by Ickes' and McNutt's arguments, yet reluctant to interfere in the legislative process, President Truman simply ignored the Cuban lobby and let the Ways and Means Committee resume hearings on the bill.

The battles, however, were far from over. Frustrated at the long delays resulting from one after another Executive Department opposing the trade legislation, Chairman Doughton now sought the opinion of all major agencies and departments who might have an interest in the Bell bill (now H.R. 5185). Responding immediately to the threat posed by Cuban Sugar and picking up McNutt's new line of reasoning, Ickes asked that, if the 1938 Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs had suggested that a sudden termination of the existing American-Philippine trade arrangement would prove disastrous to the islands, how much more compelling would that argument be now in light of the devastation caused by war? In other words, if America had been wrong in binding the Philippine economy to the United States while preparations were made for political independence, then how could four years of enemy occupation of the archipelago have in some way rectified that inconsistency? He went on to say that H.R. 5185, being the "result of a compromise," did not go far enough to assist the Filipinos in this economic transition, but, to avoid further delay he again endorsed the Bell legislation. It was "the very least that this Government could do."[36]

Confused by Truman's inability or unwillingness to resolve the rift between the supporters of Bell's bill and the Department of Agriculture, Chairman Doughton informed the White House that, if unity of opinion could not be achieved, the Ways and Means Committee would discontinue Executive Session hearings and open the proceedings to the public and press so that all interests could be heard. If, on the other hand, unity could be demonstrated and if the bill threatened no "foreign or domestic interests," then Doughton promised he would see that the bill was reported out quickly and favourably.[37] Bell's

supporters were aware of the consequences of having the Ways and Means move to open hearings. As Secretary of the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission, Vernon Moore, noted, even interests "who would not really be hurt" by H.R. 5185, would "like to make noise," an exercise which would slow the process even further.[38]

Frightened by the new stalemate, McNutt had returned from Manila in hopes of resolving the deadlock, whereupon he immediately assumed responsibility for quelling the Cuban lobby and getting all of the Cabinet offices back on track.[39] He first convinced Truman to inform Doughton that the Secretaries of State, Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce, as well as the High Commissioner all agreed not only "in principle" with H.R. 5185, but also with "most, if not all [of the] detail."[40] At Truman's request, McNutt then personally visited each of the department heads, and, by explaining the Philippine's dire economic straights, attempted to convert any lingering opposition or ambivalence into support. When, on February 15, after two months of waiting, Doughton's committee reopened hearings, the High Commissioner reported that he had secured the endorsements he had sought—even the Department of Agriculture, convinced of "the urgency of the Philippine situation," now withdrew its objections. However, despite having temporarily won over Secretary of State Byrnes, the High Commissioner regretted to inform the committee that that support had proven ephemeral. Immediately after leaving Byrnes' office "some of the lower echelon" convinced the Secretary to reconsider.[41] Once again progress on the bill was halted.

When asked to clarify their perpetually shifting position, State Department officials explained that once again they felt obliged to question certain aspects of H.R. 5185. Now opposing the inclusion of absolute quotas, the Department argued that preventing Filipinos from exporting beyond maximum levels if they consented to paying the full tariff rate was "inconsistent with the [global economic] liberalism the United States was encouraging."[42] Second, the "parity clause" granting Americans the right to "develop and exploit Philippine resources" on an equal basis with Philippine citizens was criticized as being "too great an infringement of sovereignty," especially as it required the Philippines to amend their constitution.[43] And finally, on a purely technical level, the State Department wanted the phrase "except Cuba" removed from page 13, line 7 of the bill, as its inclusion would have guaranteed special treatment for the Philippines beyond the twenty-five year life of H.R. 5185 should trade concessions for Cuba continue to that time.

Reiterating their standard defence, both Bell and McNutt insisted that absolute quotas were necessary to prevent those Filipino producers "with less regard for long range economic adjustments necessary to an independent Philippine people than for quick profits

during the duty free period" from expanding production to such an extent that the islands would "once again find themselves with an economy dependent almost entirely on the American market."[44] Diversification depended upon absolute quotas. (In a gesture of conciliation, Bell did recognize that certain smaller industries such as cigars and pearls should be able to export beyond a fixed quota.) Concerning the "parity clause", however, Bell stood firm:

> If we strike out... [the parity clause] the whole purpose of this bill is going to fail.... Literally billions of dollars of American capital will fold up and seek hiding; it will not go to the Philippines. But the thing of immediate importance is that if you take [this clause] out of this bill you will immediately sign the death knell of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos; they are going to starve.[45]

For Bell, absolute quotas and the "parity clause" represented a bad tasting medicine that America, as the mother of democracy, had to feed her Filipino children. If not compelled to accept those features of H.R. 5185, irrespective of their extraordinary infringements of Philippine sovereignty, Filipino industry would not diversify, and badly needed American capital would not stimulate new industry.

Exasperated by the ceaseless wrangling and afraid the State Department would recommend a presidential veto of the trade bill in its present form, the Ways and Means Committee adjourned for yet another month, and, despite optimistic hopes immediately following adjournment about a new compromise between the opposing blocs, only one significant development occurred in the interim. Bell agreed to adopt the State Department amendment concerning the phrase "except Cuba." The State Department had intended this rather routine amendment to clarify that Philippine preferences would indeed end after the trade agreement expired. However, in a dramatic illustration of the role accidents can play in government policy formulation, an overzealous clerk charged with making the correction misunderstood his instructions and eliminated "except Cuba" not only from the one specified line of text, but from wherever it appeared within the entire document. Another reference to "except Cuba" was originally included to ensure that the Philippines would pay no more than the lowest tariff rate given any country trading with the United States with the exception of Cuba, which had a special twenty percent reduction. The removal of this second "except Cuba" would have the effect of also perpetually guaranteeing the Philippine Islands an extra twenty percent reduction in their tariff. As a confused State Department official noted, "This was not our intention."[46]

Yet, whatever the cause of the deletion, members of Doughton's committee now rallied to ensure that this new, more generous feature of Bell's bill be retained. When told that the omission of the other "except Cuba" was an error, which if left unrepaired would anger Cuban interests, Representative Knutson replied for many of his colleagues: "I am not too much concerned about Cuba. Cuba was not devastated by war, and we are trying to do something for people who are practically prostrate." Then, after listening to one further day of testimony and determining that the differences between proponents and opponents of H.R. 5185 were irreconcilable, Chairman Doughton, on March 15, 1946, recommended transferring the trade bill over to the Senate in the hopes that they could establish a foundation upon which consensus could be built. To expedite this process, Bell's bill was accepted unanimously by the Ways and Means Committee without any of the State Department amendments except, ironically, the deletions of "except Cuba."

On April 2, 1945, the Senate Finance Committee accepted the House Committee's challenge. Again Paul McNutt insisted that "speed and more speed were of the essence" and that it was "preferable to get a somewhat imperfect bill out in a hurry than to argue economic theory until sometime in 1948 while millions of Filipinos starved."[47] Likewise, the State Department (now represented by Assistant Secretaries of State William Clayton and Dean Acheson) continued to argue that absolute quotas and the "parity clause" were inconsistent with America's intentions to expand world trade and grant genuine independence to the Philippines.[48] The only innovative feature of either position's testimony was McNutt's new insistence that the trade bill sought to reestablish Philippine industry in the hands of the traditional Philippine elite because this "pattern" had been so firmly set by previous American Congresses that it would be difficult to alter.[49] He conceded that America had been wrong in establishing a Philippine economy which survived only through American trade preferences and which was overly dependent upon sugar production. However, he cautioned that it was irresponsible to advocate radical restructuring now in the aftermath of war, when, to prevent complete economic collapse, the old economy had to be rebuilt. The other facets of Bell's bill, the "parity clause" and quotas, would see to it that the island's economy eventually diversified and modernized. In this light the trade bill was portrayed as a necessary evil with redeeming long term benefits.

While the State Department never reconciled itself to this argument, the Senate Finance Committee did. On April 5th, after seven months of House hearings, and four full days of repetitive Finance Committee sessions, the Philippine trade bill was finally approved by the full Senate, the last legislative hurdle on its way to the White House for

President Truman's signature.

Perversely, just as the American Congress washed its hands of the controversial trade legislation, a new source of opposition arose. As the long delayed Philippine national election entered its final weeks of campaigning, both Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Roxas searched for an issue which would arouse the Philippine voters. Collaboration was only a fringe concern as both men strove to retain the support of the collaboration-tainted feudal elite. Accordingly, American rehabilitation and trade, as well as the broader question of independence, now rose to the electoral forefront as each candidate manoeuvred to demonstrate that he alone could both stand up to, as well as work with, the Americans to secure prosperity and security for the archipelago. Neither Roxas nor Osmeña addressed the issue of agrarian unrest or any other fundamental social, political or economic malady, and in this environment Bell's trade bill, while in reality quite appealing to both men, became an easy and safe target for criticism. By attacking a foreign influence the general population could be rallied without the risk of alienating many Filipinos. The only danger lay in antagonizing the United States, a danger neither man paid much heed to in light of their past expertise in playing Philippine nationalism against the American Congress.

Thus, by the time the Senate Finance Committee began studying the trade bill, the Philippine press and population had grown increasingly resentful. On April 4, 1946, Bell received a letter from Philippine Resident Commissioner General Romulo stating that, while he knew the intentions of the trade bill were "honest and sincere," Filipinos generally were beginning to "misunderstand." Accompanying the letter was a copy of a telegram from President Osmeña criticizing the "parity clause" as "unAmerican," and as "going against Philippine Sovereignty."[50] Moreover Bell directly received dozens of letters from Filipino individuals and organizations criticizing the "exploitative 'parity clause.'"[51]

Desperate not to let what he considered "uninformed" Filipino opinion sabotage the trade bill just when it appeared the American government was going to accept it, High Commissioner McNutt drafted a press release, intended for consumption in both countries, reiterating that "this bill has no subtle or ulterior motives."[52] A week later on April 13, McNutt released another message to the press, this time in direct response to a Roxas campaign speech in which the "parity clause" was severely criticized: "Senator Roxas' remarks are interesting, but they are based on misapprehensions and a failure to have the facts at hand."[53] Then, anticipating that Bell might "have received protests... and become somewhat puzzled by their implications," McNutt assured the Congressman that there was no reason to fear that conniving American corporate interests had deceived him

into becoming the bill's sponsor:

> The intent, purpose and scope of this bill were completely misconstrued [in the Philippine election campaign] and the result was a great deal of heat but very little light.... I have taken occasion to clarify the situation... and do not expect there will be any more protests against this rather routine legislation.[54]

While McNutt's denial that Bell and his trade bill were tools for corporate America appears to have been sincere, his assertions that he expected no more protests from Roxas and Osmeña seem contrived. For on the same day he hurriedly left Washington for Manila in order to confront the Filipino candidates personally. What he found confirmed his belief that the two men were simply playing the old elitist game of pretending to attack America in order to secure domestic support. Soon McNutt was able to confidently report to Bell that Osmeña and Roxas both supported the trade bill and that their use of the issue in the election had been "artificial campaign rhetoric."[55]

Theoretically, with Filipino opposition muzzled and Senate hearings completed, the way was finally clear for the Bell bill to become law. Yet the State Department, now joined by Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, still could not accept all aspects of the legislation.[56] In two secret memoranda to Truman on April 10 and 18, Secretary Byrnes argued that, beyond being opposed in principle to the "parity clause" and absolute quotas, the State Department was compelled to object to yet another section of the Bell bill which had not previously been brought to the President's attention. This clause limited American monetary aid to Philippine citizens and corporations (provided for in Tyding's separate $7,000,000 financial rehabilitation bill) to a mere $500 each until the trade bill had been accepted by the Philippine Congress and President. McNutt and Bell had included this provision to discourage the Filipino elite from self-interestedly stirring up further anti-American sentiment and to expedite the free trade bill's passage by the Philippine legislature. To Byrnes, however, the idea of forcing a nation to accept what he considered an exploitative and patronizing trade agreement by withholding urgently needed dollars was "unnecessary blackmail," especially since the Filipinos would "undoubtedly" conclude on their own that the trade act was generally "good for them." Had there not been a need for immediate humanitarian aid in the Philippines, Byrnes, and possibly Anderson and Wallace as well, would have recommended that Truman veto the proposal. But a veto at this late stage would have caused the United States even greater international embarrassment than would the objectionable features of the Bell bill. Thus, in order to

avoid "further resentment in the Philippines and loss of prestige for the United States," Byrnes asked that Truman sign the bill, but "make a general statement which would leave the way open for possible future remedial action."[57]

President Truman concurred with Byrnes' reasoning. Truman (a man who had two envelopes of stamps on his Oval Office desk, one purchased with government funds for official correspondence and one bought with his own money for personal use) was easily influenced by arguments of honesty and integrity.[58] And once the decision was made, it mattered little to Truman that rookie Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug feared that Byrnes' suggestion for remedial action would lead demagogues in the Philippines to anticipate future beneficial changes to the Trade Agreement and therefore "hold out for better terms."[59] On April 30, 1946, President Truman finally signed into law both the long delayed Philippine Trade Act and the relatively routine $700,000,000 financial rehabilitation bill Tydings had drafted as part of the compromise with Bell at the November 13th presidential meeting. Referring to the Trade Act, the President declared that, while the clause limiting aid to $500 per claimant until both pieces of legislation had been accepted by the Philippines was unfortunate, overall he heartily approved of the legislation. "Its sole purpose and guiding philosophy" he concluded, "is to furnish a formula for the rehabilitation of the Philippine national economy through the encouragement of private enterprise and private initiatives."[60] Essentially, the road to Philippine independence was now cleared, and America's twentieth century experiment in Far Eastern colonialism was about to come to an end.[61]

NOTES

1 Letter from President Truman to Robert L. Doughton, September 28, 1945. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

2 Letter from Robert L. Doughton to President Truman, September 29, 1945. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

3 Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, *Philippine Trade Act of 1946*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, October 15, 1945. pp. 11-12.

4 Ibid., p.14.

5 Ibid., p.14.

6 Ibid., p.15.

7 Ibid., p.35.

8 Ibid., p.33.

9 Ibid., See especially comments by Representative Jenkins, pp.29-30, 68; comments and questions by Representative Knutson, pp. 66, 77.

10 Ibid., All quotes taken from statement of Senator Tydings pp.83-85. Wednesday, October 17, 1945.

11 Ibid., p.90.

12 Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire In The Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), p. 324; Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929-1946.* (New Haven / London: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 186-190.

13 Beyond concern over the boldness of McNutt's statement historian Theodore Friend demonstrates that Quezon's hostility towards McNutt was also based upon a fear that McNutt was attempting to eclipse the Commonwealth President as the *de facto* leader of the islands as it was from the High Commissioner's Office that major policy proposals originated.

14 Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, *Philippine Trade Act of 1946*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, October 17, 1945. pp. 105.

15 Letter from Tydings to Bell including Bell's response, October 18, 1945. Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8946, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Secretary of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

16 Ibid., Bell letter.

17 Letter from Senator Harry B. Hawes to Representative Bell telling Bell that he [Hawes] had been told by members of the Ways and Means Committee that hearings had been stopped at the request of

the State Department, November 8, 1945. Bell Papers, Folder 8946, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Secretary of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

18 Memorandum from Osmeña to Truman, delivered through Secretary Ickes, in advance of personal meeting between the two Chiefs of State, October 20, and November 8, 1945. President's Secretary's Files, Box 185, Philippine Islands, Folder 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

19 One particularly indicative letter of this nature was from Senator Hawes to Secretary Byrnes in which Hawes condemned the State Department's postponing of hearings as being "almost criminal" as many Filipinos continued to suffer while waiting for rehabilitation. Hawes claimed it was also wrong for the State Department to oppose free trade when it was supported by MacArthur, McNutt, Ickes, and Wainright. Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8946. Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Secretary of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

20 Memorandum from Byrnes to Truman, circa late October, 1945. President's Secretary's Files, Box 185, Philippine Islands, Folder 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

21 Memorandum from Byrnes to Truman, November 5, 1945. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

22 Letter from Ickes to Truman, November 12, 1945. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1945-1946," Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

23 Statement by C. Jasper Bell, Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, *Philippine Trade Act of 1946*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, October 15, 1945. pp. 11-12; and statement by Paul McNutt, Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, *Philippine Trade Act of 1946*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, April 2, 1946, p.88.

24 Statement by C. Jasper Bell, Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, *Philippine Trade Act of 1946*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, November 14, 1945, pp.132-134; Letter from Bell to Truman, November 14, 1945, Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

25 Throughout the early months of 1946 the opponents of Bell's bill frequently cited to either the Congressional Committees conducting hearings or to President Truman the reason for their opposition to some portion of the trade bill was that it had not been discussed or resolved at the November 13 compromise meeting. Likewise, proponents of the bill maintained that all new criticisms were in breach of the agreement stuck in the White House.

26 Statement of Francis A. Flood, Associate Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture. Committee on Ways and Means, *Philippine Trade Act of 1946*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, November 15, 1945, p.169.

27 Letter from Secretary of Agriculture, Clinton Anderson to President Truman, January 7, 1946. Rosenman Papers, Box 3, Folder Philippines 1945, Harry S. Truman Library, Indiana, Missouri.

28 Congress, House, Committee of the Whole from Committee of Ways and Means, *Philippine Trade Act of 1946*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, April 2, 1946. p.16.

29 Ibid.

30 Written notation in Truman's handwriting at bottom of letter from Secretary Anderson to President Truman, January 7, 1946. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

31 Letter from Ickes to President Truman, January 21, 1946. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri. A copy is also found in President's Secretary's Files, Box 185, Philippine Islands, Folder 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

32 Letter from Secretary Anderson to President Truman, January 23, 1946. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

33 Letter from Ickes to Truman, January 24, 1946. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

34 Letter from McNutt to Truman, January 18,1946. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

35 Ibid., moreover, McNutt repeated this line of argument in a press release from the High Commissioner's Office; January 27, 1946: McNutt Papers, Box 311, Philippines 1946, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington Indiana.

36 All references in this paragraph taken from: Letter from Secretary Ickes To Robert Doughton, February 7, 1946. Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1945-1946," Library of Congress Manuscript Collection, Washington, D. C.

37 Letter from Vernon E. Moore to President Truman and Paul McNutt, February 9, 1946. Moore had been in contact with Chairman Doughton who said his Committee would report the bill out favourably if Truman could get all departments to agree that they had no objections to the bill. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri; letter from Truman to Chairman Doughton, February 11, 1946. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

38 Ibid.

39 Press release of High Commissioner's Office in Manila, January 30, 1946, stating: McNutt was leaving for Washington on the "most important mission since assuming office in the Philippines... [he had] a job to do and would not return until it was completed." It continued, McNutt intended to do all he could to get "action" on the Bell bill. McNutt Papers, Box 311, Philippines 1946, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington Indiana.

40 Letter from Truman to Chairman Doughton, February 11, 1946. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

41 Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, *Philippine Trade Act of 1946*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, February 15, 1946. p.204

42 Ibid., p. 217.

43 Ibid., p. 221.

44 Ibid., p. 238.

45 Ibid., p. 227

46 Ibid., p. 269

47 Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, *Philippine Trade Act of 1946*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, April 2, 1946. Statement of Paul McNutt: p.18.

48 Ibid., see especially the testimony of William Clayton: pp. 50, 54, 58, 61, 91, and 99.

49 Ibid., see the testimony of Paul McNutt: p.95.

50 Letter from General Romolo to Congressman Bell, April 4, 1946. Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8982, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Secretary of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

51 Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8982, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Secretary of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

52 Press release by Paul McNutt, April 8, 1946. Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8982, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Secretary of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

53 Press release by Paul McNutt, April 13, 1946. Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8982, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Secretary of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

54 Letter to Bell from McNutt, April, 15, 1946. Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8982, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Secretary of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

55 Memorandum from Philippine High Commissioner for Congressman Bell, May 25, 1946; Letter from McNutt to Bell, delivered from Manila to High Commissioners Office in Washington, June 7, 1946. Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 8982, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Secretary of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

56 Letter from Secretary of Agriculture H.A. Wallace to President Truman, April 19, 1946. President's Secretary's Files, Box 185, Philippine Islands, Folder 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. Also Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

57 All references in this paragraph taken from: Secret memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to President Truman, April 10, 1946, and Secret memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to President Truman, April 18, 1946. President's Secretary's Files, Box 185, Philippine Islands, Folder 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

58 This and a series of other anecdotes demonstrating the "unimpeachable honesty" of President Truman were related by archivists and Forest Rangers working at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence Missouri.

59 Letter from Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug to President Truman, April 24,1946. President's Secretary's Files, Box 185, Philippine Islands, Folder 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

60 Press release from White House, President Truman, April 30, 1946. Papers of Harry S. Truman Official File 400, Box 1090, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

61 While the American government may have finally finished with the issue of post-war trade relations the matter still remained unsettled in the Philippines. Fearing that if he waited until after July 4, 1946, to ratify the agreement, his opponents would declare the agreement a treaty, thereby requiring a two thirds majority for ratification, Roxas worked frantically to have the bill passed at a marathon session of Congress on July 2. The "parity clause" required an amendment to the Philippine Constitution, however, and, for this a simple plurality was clearly insufficient. To secure the necessary votes Roxas denied eleven of his most vocal opponents their seats on the pretence that they had been elected through "fraud and terror." He then replaced these men with his cronies, many of whom were charged with collaboration. Ultimately the amendment passed, but in employing such crude techniques Roxas had planted the seeds for further discord. Six of those he had removed from the legislature were members of the *Hukbalahap*, who returned to the boondocks to organize an uprising that was to embroil the islands in open rebellion for many years.

CONCLUSION

On July 4, 1946, as the American flag was lowered for the final time over the city of Manila, the world witnessed the twentieth century's first non-violent session of sovereignty to a colonial people. Yet, that transfer of power occurred under less than ideal conditions. Despite American passage of the Trade Act, it would be months before American aid dollars arrived in significant amounts, and, until then, a vast proportion of the Philippine's population would be forced to live without adequate nutrition or medical care in tiny shacks made from the bombed remnants of what were once considered the most beautiful and modern cities in Asia. In rural areas life for the average Filipino was no better. Sugar and rice fields lay uncultivated, transportation lines between the archipelago's 7000 islands had yet to be repaired, and children who were five at the time of the Japanese invasion were now ten and still had never attended school. Industrially and financially, the Philippine economy was paralyzed. Anxiously awaiting renewed investment and restored trade, factories and plantations on the islands had sat idle since the American liberation, and it would be months before many of them could gear up for production and again provide employment. These factors, coupled with the "parity clause" of the Trade Act, threatened to make a mockery of economic independence.

Furthermore, Filipino military relations with the United States still remained to be clarified. In the final months of the Hoover Administrations legislation for Philippine independence had been proposed which permitted the American President to retain army and naval bases for the protection of United States security interests in the Pacific. Perceiving that the overall independence bill was designed to benefit excessively various special American and Filipino economic interests Hoover vetoed the measure, only to be overridden by Congress. Had Manuel Quezon not slyly manouvered to defeat the legislation in the Philippine Congress (the bill had been negotiated by his chief political rival Sergio Osmeña who would thus have become the "father of Philippine independence"), the 1931 proposals would have become law. Two years later, the substantially same Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act—negotiated by Quezon—was adopted instead, but one major difference between the two initiatives resulted from Franklin Roosevelt's perception that the retention of military bases beyond the Commonwealth era would antagonize Filipino nationalists. Likewise, with strong isolationist sentiment opposed to retaining any bases and with the military establishment

fearful that, in the face of Japanese ambitions, maintaining a feeble military presence in the far off Pacific outpost was courting disaster, Roosevelt scuttled the provisions for permanent military bases and merely provided for naval base arrangements to be settled later on mutually satisfactory terms. It was at this time that General MacArthur was dispatched to the archipelago to prepare the Filipinos for the military responsibilities of independence.

The premises upon which Roosevelt had based these decisions were fundamentally altered when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour and the Philippine islands on December 7, 1941. During the next few years, American policy makers as well as the general public concluded that the United States would have to abandon its isolationist traditions if the next generation were to be spared the agony of yet another world war. An independent Philippine Republic would have to be protected, and, to achieve this, Senator Tydings in late 1943 introduced legislation authorizing the American President, after negotiation with the Philippine President, to "withhold or to acquire such bases as he may deem necessary for the full and mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and the United States." By that time Japanese atrocities had so eroded Filipino resentment over an American military presence that no Commonwealth official raised a voice of protest, thereby permitting the legislation to pass through the American Congress with minimal debate. Because of this unanimity of opinion and a desire on the part of both the State and War Departments to demonstrate for the world that American intentions concerning Philippine independence were sincere, it was determined that negotiations over the bases would not commence until after the islands had achieved independence. Thus, the issue of military bases was not a part of the general process of granting independence to the Filipinos. Indeed, negotiations were not even initiated until June, 1946, and were not underway until late in the following month.[1]

By August, 1946, it was clear that without wartime pressure for consensus the congruence of American-Philippine opinion concerning military bases could not endure. Soon the Philippine press and many of the country's regional and national leaders were criticizing what they termed an excessive infringement of sovereignty. Even MacArthur's protegé Manuel Roxas found it necessary to bow to nationalist elements and criticize American demands that the United States have jurisdiction over military personnel both on and off of the bases. Moreover, by autumn Truman's advisors were questioning the assumption that installations on Filipino soil were of vital importance. Desiring to retain the goodwill of the Philippine people and aware that maintaining bases throughout Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia placed an excessive burden on the American

treasury, Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower and other top military officials recommended abandoning the islands militarily. Truman appeared to concur, but after the news was relayed to Roxas and the Filipino cabinet the American government was once again given an interesting lesson in traditional Philippine politics. As with other Filipino leaders before him, Roxas had only been critical of the bases to ensure popular support for his regime. Faced with the real probability that the American military establishment would abandon the collaborator government to its own devises and deprive it of a lucrative source of income, Roxas moved quickly to assure the United States that he and the Filipino people both wanted American military bases on the islands. To the surprise of American officials who had already halted construction on the bases and begun to withdraw personnel, Roxas publicly asked the Truman Administration to continue with their originally planned expansion of military facilities. Truman therefore instructed his negotiators to reopen talks, whereupon, on March 14, 1947, the two countries signed 99 year leases for both naval and air bases (Subic and Clark).[2] Thus militarily, as well as economically, Philippine independence was pragmatically compromised.

In retrospect, the quality of Philippine political independence and the extent to which Filipinos enjoyed the benefits of a democratic system could also have been called into question at the time of the July celebrations. Manuel Roxas and other top collaborators had a firm grip on the reins of power. With the assistance of the feudal aristocracy and General Douglas MacArthur, Roxas had manipulated the political apparatus to ensure that the conservative oligarchy (still closely associated with American interests) kept political responsibility out of the hands of the masses. Meanwhile, the *Hukbalahap* and similar guerrilla organizations were branded traitors and excluded from the electoral process while the government simultaneously increased its violent attacks on all those involved in the agrarian rebellion. For their part, liberals and intellectuals, having supported Osmeña in the election, found themselves pushed into the political backwaters. After half a century of American colonial rule, the Philippine Islands had hardly been transformed into a sturdily independent model of democracy in Asia.

In the 1990's, nearly a half a century later, the Philippine Republic continues to haunt Washington much as it did in the chaotic months following the Second World War. The archipelago remains a country characterized by a feudal agricultural economy, government graft and corruption, agrarian rebellion, reactionary military insurrections, an asphyxiating national debt, and a bankrupt financial infrastructure. The fragility of democracy in this environment remains an embarrassment to Americans who still exert considerable political influence in their former colony. Filipinos increasingly blame their

past masters for their current plight, although Americans evasively deny responsibility, and this dramatic difference of perspective makes any study of Philippine independence controversial and politically charged. American-Philippine relations continue to be a popular topic, and the temptation is strong for historians to search the records for a politically useful past. Yet, to do so would risk repeating the mistakes of previous historiography regarding America's early postwar policies in the islands.

America's policy of decolonization in the Philippines was distinguished neither by the benevolence described in the narrative histories of the 1950s, nor the exploitation suggested by the economic revisionist school of the 1960s and 1970s. Likewise, the conclusions of social scientists in the 1980s that American policy prior to July 4, 1946, was characterized by ambivalence and neglect also lacks credibility. Each of these approaches, while useful and helpful as points to build from, are inadequate in themselves. The first suffers from a naïveté stemming from its lack of analysis and its extensive reliance upon official and public government pronouncements. The revisionist school tends to lack objectivity due to its exclusive preoccupation with economic matters and its selective search for exploitive American self-interest, a search motivated largely by more recent political concerns. The third approach, while rooted in sturdier research, shares with both of its predecessors a proclivity for over-simplified, highly generalized interpretation. Moreover, the "neglect" hypothesis simply does not apply to the short time between American liberation and July 4, 1946. As the private papers of the major figures demonstrate, this period was in fact distinguished by a great deal of attention being showered on the archipelago. Indeed the ambivalence of earlier years provided the possibility of truly altering the economic and political landscape of the islands. Thus, while reducing complex realities to general theories may be tempting, the all encompassing concepts of "benevolence," "exploitation," and "ambivalence," are of limited utility in describing America's Philippine policy in the mid 1940's. These stereotypical explanations, usually associated with broad studies of American-Philippine relations from 1898 to the recent past, in many ways do more harm than good as the particular becomes facilely attributable to the general.

To understand American decolonization in the Philippine Islands one must recognize the interrelatedness of the issues of trade and collaboration—a relationship which is not at all clear in most historical accounts. Had Roxas and other top tergiversators not escaped prosecution it is improbable free trade would have received the extension (albeit watered down) that it did. On the other hand, had the State Department succeeded in completely thwarting Bell's bill, the collaborators would have found themselves without the economic

base necessary for nurturing their hegemony. Once the symbiotic nature of these two issues is realized one can begin looking at the secondary literature to interpret the broader features of the American-Philippine relationship.

Like a puzzle gradually being pieced together, American policy regarding Philippine independence is steadily becoming clearer. Patiently each of the past historical approaches can be joined to provide insights regarding the Philippine-American relationship. The traditional narrative works dealing with this subject, while simplistic and naïve, did make thorough use of available government documents and press reports. Thus, a reading of these studies provides one with a good starting point for further research into official sources which have only recently been made available to scholars. Moreover, the narratives' emphasis on the magnanimity of American officials and the general adherence of the United States Government to "principle" and "honour" is also useful to the student of American-Philippine relations, for, while these factors are typically exaggerated in prevalence and importance, they did play a role in the American decision-making process.

Regarding the second historical approach, the economic revisionist school, one must acknowledge that their insights into the nature of the Philippine-American relationship have been substantial. Works of this type were the first to reveal the often exploitive nature of American capital in the archipelago. Unsatisfied with official government explanations concerning the effects of the American-Philippine trading relationship upon the Malayan islands and people, revisionists attempted to describe and explain the way in which American industry sought to manipulate the United States government to secure political arrangements which would translate into financial profits. Similarly, the economic revisionists were relentless in exposing such blatant examples of graft as the efforts of General MacArthur and André Soriano to use public power for private gain. In general, this historiographical approach helps remind one to be skeptical of official explanations.

The historical approach claiming that American policy towards the Philippines was distinguished by ambivalence and neglect has similarly proven useful. Social scientists in the 1980's, employing new research techniques to examine the cultural and social effects of American colonialism on the Philippines, argued that for the most part the American government, industry, and people did not coherently or systematically shape the archipelago during the colonial period. Historians of this school maintained that, contrary to commonly held assumptions, distracted and uninterested Americans neither uplifted nor exploited the Filipino people to any significant degree. Thus it is suggested that the Filipino feudal elite, not American business or government, was responsible for

preventing the growth of secondary manufacturing and the development of modern political democracy in the islands. The Filipino elite simply perfected the system developed under Spanish rule of working closely with colonial authority to ensure that they retained responsibility over local and domestic matters. Guided by this hypothesis, it is possible to look beyond the prewar period studied by the social scientists to discover how members of the Filipino aristocracy defended their preferred position just prior to independence. Using their close relationship with Douglas MacArthur, Roxas and Soriano were able to consolidate political and economic power in their own hands in spite of the efforts of Secretary Ickes and others to strip collaborators of political and economic hegemony over the islands.

Recognizing the value of these various broad interpretations, this study has sought to borrow whatever can help describe American intentions and actions towards the Philippine Islands in the years and months immediately preceding independence. Yet, this should not to imply that a simple synthesis of general interpretations will satisfactorarily explain America's granting of independence the Philippines. American policy was extremely disorderly and frequently the product of *ad hoc* decisions. Policy formulation was influenced by such unpredictable factors as global war, interdepartmental rivalries, personality conflicts, preoccupation with other issues, the established tradition of deferring to the Filipino elite, simple desires to assist the Philippine people, and a host of other factors. The simple fact that each stage of constructing Philippine policy required months of rancorous, often inconclusive, debate refutes assumptions that American decision making can be explained by all-encompassing generalities, even when such explanations are combinations of the best aspects of a number of interpretations.

Above all else it is the human factor which has received the least attention from students of Philippine-American relations. Human behavior is almost always complicated, contradictory, and difficult to capture within broad analytical categories. We know this from our own experience in daily life. How often do we form an opinion before learning all the facts? How many times do we begin a project with one goal in mind and then later shift direction? How frequently are our ideals entirely distinct from self interest? And how common is it for people to fully understand the probable consequences of their often poorly informed actions?

If we accept such inconsistencies in our own personalities, why is it more difficult to recognize them in government officials? In looking beyond the generalities to the specific day to day experiences of American officials this thesis has shed light on a hitherto unexplored aspect of the American policy formulation process regarding the archipelago.

Harold Ickes' sincere concern for the Philippine *tao* was unquestionable, and he was indisputabley a man who normally placed human needs above narrow political or economic interests. Yet, he was also a man prone to making instant decisions without thoroughly considering their effects. This was well demonstrated in his support for the Bell free trade bill in the early summer of 1945. Ickes' primary concern was to keep the Filipinos from starving, and he anticipated that this could best be achieved through the continuation of traditional trading arrangements. It appears that Ickes never familiarized himself with the other features of Bell's bill—the Secretary had made his decision to support free trade; the rest was inconsequential. Later, even when it became obvious that the Filipino elite (and by implication Filipino collaborators) would be the greatest benefactors of the bill, Ickes continued his endorsement as he narrowly focused on the short-term welfare of the Philippine poor. Also, in late 1945 and early 1946, Ickes was too preoccupied with other, non-related issues to notice arguments being advanced against the "parity clause," and thus he remained oblivious to the trade bill's most objectionable feature. It was not until after he retired that Ickes could again devote time to Philippine matters, and it was only then, as a syndicated columnist, that he attacked the "parity clause" of the trade bill and accused Bell and his entourage of exploiting the Philippine people and economy.[3]

Paul McNutt's conduct was similarly complex. Despite the fact that Roxas and his associates were intimately implicated in collaboration, McNutt believed that utilizing their political experience and economic alliances outweighed the need to "purify" the Philippine political system. McNutt was a realist. His own political career in Indiana had demonstrated for him that noble intentions and popular enthusiasm were inadequate alternatives to sound economic and political management. As High Commissioner he accepted the premise that the Philippine economy required immediate rehabilitation if the suffering of millions of Filipinos were to be avoided. Accordingly, he gave subtle assistance to Roxas' campaign for president anticipating that Roxas' qualifications best suited him to the task of stimulating economic revitalization. Likewise, after determining that the American Congress would be unwilling to rehabilitate the Philippine economy through a massive gift of dollars, McNutt strongly advocated free trade, as well as the "parity clause" to ensure that American investors did not look exclusively to the markets of the Western Hemisphere. The previously forgotten or ignored letters the High Commissioner wrote to Congressman Bell professing no ulterior motives appear sincere. Moreover, the fact that no particular American industries ever endorsed the "parity clause," despite its near destruction by the State Department and various legislative committees,

suggests that its inclusion was designed to attract investment in general and not to cater to the needs of any one industry in particular. Indeed, since restrictions placed on the allocations of the absolute quotas in the Trade Act ensured that the established sugar, cordage and tobacco markets would be dominated by prewar producers, the "parity clause" would essentially benefit only investors in new fields of economic activity. This is not to say that McNutt's original concern for Philippine welfare would preclude some later personal profit taking. One year after the Philippines became independent he resigned as ambassador to the islands to become chairman of the Philippine-American Trade Council and a director of several Manila companies.[4] McNutt had a keen eye for the main chance.

The behavioral characteristics of General Douglas MacArthur are perhaps the most fascinating of all. Interestingly, they are the least well explained by previous historical analysis. Arrogant, egotistical, and reflexively conservative, the General believed he could never be wrong, and his sense of infallibility regarding Philippine matters became boundless once he had become so completely immersed in Filipino culture. This previously unrealized feature of MacArthur's emotional and intellectual character helps explain much of his political behaviour. Assuming that MacArthur was acting as a Filipino, one can understand how he could have accepted the large monetary gift Quezon offered him on Corrigedor. More important for the purpose of this study, however, mere financial gain probably does not fully explain MacArthur's decision to actively assist Roxas and other important Filipino collaborators regain the reins of political power. The General was intricately bound to Quezon's *compadre* network and was thereby intimately linked to the Filipino elite. With Quezon's death, a heavy obligation fell to MacArthur to assist the past President's protegé, Manuel Roxas. For the General to prosecute Roxas and other major collaborators would have meant being labelled *"walang hiya",* or a shameless person (a grave insult in Philippine society), and MacArthur would have been rejected by the one group of people whose acceptance he most dearly sought. The Philippines were MacArthur's adopted home, and it was among the Filipino elite that he hoped to retire and live out the remainder of his life. Moreover, with the islands' independence so near, MacArthur undoubtedly wanted to retain his prominent role in Philippine politics. Alienating the elite threatened to make him a social and political orphan.

Beyond questions of personality, this paper has sought to demonstrate how considerations as simple as historical precedent profoundly shaped American decolonization in the Philippine Islands. The United States had a long tradition of deferring to the Filipino political elite, a tradition originating in efforts to pacify Filipino

nationalists during the insurrection and in subsequent attempts to prepare the islanders for eventual autonomy. The impact of these early decisions were strongly felt in the mid-1940's. MacArthur undoubtedly believed that precedent would allow him to reestablish major collaborators in positions of political and economic power. Indeed, even after Ickes and the American Attorney General were able to demonstrate that those Filipinos had cooperated with the Japanese, the Truman Administration balked at interfering in Philippine domestic affairs. The President feared that such actions would appear throughout the Far East as unjustified infringements on Philippine sovereignty.

MacArthur was not the only one to remind Washington of America's tradition of leaving Philippine matters in Filipino hands. Jasper Bell initially decided to sponsor a free trade agreement between the two countries largely because the Filipino members of the Rehabilitation Commission favoured it, and then later, when attempting to convince either the Administration or the House Ways and Means Committee to approve free trade, Bell never hesitated to point out the strength of Filipino support. On more than one occasion, Bell and McNutt solicited from Commonwealth President Osmeña and other prominent Filipinos statements of powerful official endorsement.

The reluctance of the United States to ever seriously challenge the Filipino aristocracy and institute land reform is another prime example of America's deference to Philippine autonomy. While it is true that Americans wished to preserve a stable political and economic environment, the greater concern was over probable Philippine and American accusations of overbearing imperialism. Americans had deemed the Philippine colonial legislature, and later the Commonwealth Government, effective democratic instruments; to usurp their authority by imposing structural reform would have acknowledged that American lessons in democracy had failed. When the *Hukbalahaps* refused to return land to the feudal landlords after the war, the Filipino elite quickly reminded Washington that Commonwealth officials and not the guerrillas were the duly elected government. When Ickes convinced Truman to launch an investigation into Philippine agrarian unrest, McNutt reported that while the *Huks* had legitimate grievances, the United States should not interfere in what was so clearly a Philippine domestic problem. Similarly, when the islands' landed aristocracy employed ruthless force to regain their plantations, the American Administration hesitated to impose reforms on a colony so near its independence. Just after World War Two, the United States did not wish to lose its cherished reputation as the champion of anticolonialism—historical precedents were still overwhelmingly strong. Yet, the simple fact that reforms were even being considered at the cabinet level was a vast departure from American experience in the colonial era, and

economic changes imposed on Japan demonstrate that options for the Philippines were truly possible.

Finally, one must always remember that America did not grant the Philippines independence within an historic vacuum. There were many important events preoccupying American officials, and Philippine policies were partially determined by their low priority. The overall delay in establishing a specific date for independence, the difficulty Ickes had in convincing the Administration that MacArthur was working with the collaborators to subvert Philippine democracy, and the protracted committee hearings concerning the free trade bill are excellent examples of this fact. At the end of the Second World War the United States was the world's foremost political and economic power, yet the world still seemed very dangerous. Many predicted that another depression like that following the First World War would beset the nation as war production diminished and as wartime destruction hindered the recovery of world trade. Some believed that the worsening Cold War might turn hot as the bipolarized world slipped into the labyrinth of geopolitical power politics. Such concerns appeared doubly worrisome when Franklin Roosevelt's death left the inexperienced and uninformed Harry S Truman in political control. It was understandable for Truman to ignore the relatively unimportant question of Philippine independence until he had come to terms with the more pressing tasks facing him as American Chief of State and leader of the the Western Allies. At the same time, the State Department could hardly be expected to sacrifice the global trade policy it had developed to ensure world peace and economic prosperity just so the Philippine Islands' shattered economy could be rebuilt. What other historians have interpreted as silent support for exploitation or callous neglect was infact a simple example of setting priorities.

America's granting of independence to the Philippines occurred in an era of change and uncertainty when the men responsible for American foreign policy constantly struggled to comprehend and influence a chaotic series of events. Indeed, in few other periods of time has the American government been forced to respond to so many demanding circumstances as in the months and years immediately following World War Two. For this reason, new political and economic directions in the Philippines were a possibility. For the first time the Filipino elite faced the potential of not only a loss of American backing, but prosecution, while at the same time the agrarian aristocracy and those state side firms which profited from free trade confronted the permanent loss of secured markets. Yet, coherent American planning proved to be impossibly difficult. Had Philippine independence come at a different time under different circumstances, it could well have resembled a well engineered highway built by men who knew where they

wanted to go and how they wanted to get there. As it was, however, the road to July 4, 1946, was characterized by confusing twists and turns that conformed more to the political landscape than transformed it. Events were less characterized by the coherent patterns described later by historians than by an improvisation that gave considerable leeway to personality, precedent, and concerns for the immediate economic recovery of a prostrate people about to be left to their own devices.

NOTES

1 Garel A. Grunder, and William E. Livezey, *The Philippines and The United States* (Norman Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), pp. 206, 222, 244, 273; Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, *The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Institute For The The Study of Human Issues, 1981), pp. 59-63; Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), pp.330-332.

2 The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to Secretary of State (Byrnes), Manila, September 6, 1946; The Ambassador in the Philippines to Secretary of State, Manila, September 7, 1946; The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Philippines, Washington, September 11, 1946; The Ambassador in the Philippines to Secretary of State, Manila, September 16, 1946; The Ambassador in the Philippines to Secretary of State, Manila, September 25, 1946; The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Philippines, Washington, September 27, 1946; The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Philippines, Washington, October 15, 1946; The Ambassador in the Philippines to Secretary of State, Manila, November 7, 1946; The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, November 29, 1946; The Ambassador in the Philippines to Secretary of State, Manila, December 23, 1946; Secretary of War to Secretary of State, Washington, December 27, 1946. *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1946,Vol. VIII, The Far East.* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 905-908, 912-913, 917-924, 935-936, 939. The Ambassador in the Philippines to Secretary of State, Manila, January 27, 1947 [portion of President Roxas speech dealing with military negotiations]; The Ambassador in the Philippines to Secretary of State, Manila, March 14, 1947 [statement of President Roxas on signing of base agreement] *Foreign Relations of the United Staes: Diplomatic Papers 1947, Vol. VI, The Far East* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 1103, 1108.

3 Included in the Ickes papers are draft copies of two articles he wrote criticizing Philippine independence and the men who orchestrated it. Entitled "Collaborationists Capture the Philippines" and "Speaking of Broken Promises", these articles attack MacArthur's patronage of Roxas and the controversial "parity clause". Ickes Papers, Series Subject File, Box 402, Folder "Philippines 1946-50", Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington D.C.. In the Bell Papers there is a copy of another article Ickes wrote condemning those who assisted the collaborationists to come to power and who incorporated the "parity clause" into the Trade Act. In this essay, rather than focussing essentially on MacArthur, Ickes accuses Tydings of being partially responsible because of the way he brooded over the Philippines "as if it were an egg he laid all by himself", and Bell because he was "unprepared to fight for his convictions unless he was personally or politically affected." Commenting on the article in correspondence with Senator Harry B. Hawes, Bell referred to Ickes as a "'Pink' of self-proclaimed honesty" and an "unsavory character" who associated with "unamerican friends." Hawes responded that in his opinion Ickes was a "sonofabitch." Bell Papers, Collection No. 2306, Folder 9000, Joint Collection of Western Historical Manuscript Collection, and State Historical Secretary of Missouri Manuscripts, Ellis Library, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

4 Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, *The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Institute For The Study of Human Issues, 1981), p. 48.

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