INTO THE LIGHT:

Understanding How Feminism Informs Counselling Psychology

by

Roxanne Koren Yanishewski
B.A., University of Alberta, 1983

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Psychological Foundations,
Faculty of Education

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

[redacted]

Dr. R. Vance Peavy, Supervisor (Department of Psychological Foundations)

[redacted]

Dr. Marilyn Callahan, Outside Member (School of Social Work)

[redacted]

Dr. Holly Devor, External Examiner (Department of Sociology)

University of Victoria

Supervisor: Dr. R. Vance Peavy

ABSTRACT

In order to understand how feminism informs counselling psychology, the feminist perspective and the relationship between theory and practice are first investigated using a modified version of the framework developed by science philosopher Thomas S. Kuhn. He suggests that theories are one dimension of a paradigm or the perspective through which we view our world, and that paradigms determine our behavior or practice. Paradigms consist of at least four dimensions: theories and laws, methods and their underlying values and presuppositions, exemplars or the solved puzzles training us in the values and theories of the paradigm, and models, demonstrating how the phenomena of interest to that perspective function. His framework is expanded to include our socio-cultural norms of behavior, thereby allowing us to explore the demographic qualities of the people creating knowledge, and the political goals inherent to any perspective. This framework is then used to examine the differences between and commonalities among several approaches within feminism. The various schools of feminism are found to differ in models and political goals, yet share common theories, values, exemplars, and socio-cultural norms. Feminism as a paradigm is found to present a radically different perspective from the patriarchal paradigm along all of its dimensions, providing for the argument that feminism represents a paradigm shift. Counselling psychology is then explored along the six dimensions in order to understand the results of a paradigm shift from the patriarchal to the feminist paradigm. Four central theories are described: revalorizing the feminine, un-covering the dominant-subordinate structuring of relationships and society, celebrating diversity and conflict, and recognizing sociocultural, political and historical factors. Two models, the self-in-relation and the self-in-context are identified. Empathy, consciousness-raising, and political activity are discussed as three methods of therapy based upon the principle of relationality. A set of ethical guidelines are presented. Two different visions of change are presented and evaluated for their potential to transform our world from a male-centered

(androcentric) to a women-centered (gynocentric) society. Finally, the importance of presenting the feminist paradigm in counselling training programs is discussed.

Examiners:

[redacted]

Dr. R. Vance Peavy, Supervisor (Department of Psychological Foundations)

[redacted]

Dr. Marilyn Callahan, Outside Member (School of Social Work)

[redacted]

Dr. Holly Devor, External Examiner (Department of Sociology)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis records my growth and development within feminism over a period of five years. It has been a joyous journey of learning, of discovering the trail made by others on this same journey. By sharing my work with others, I hope to stimulate thought and discussion leading to the further development of our understanding of feminism and how it informs our practice as supporters, searchers, and facilitators. More importantly, I hope it inspires us to act upon our convictions, to connect with each other, and to work together to improve our world.

While I take full responsibility for what I have presented here, there are many people to whom I am indebted for their support, challenging ideas, and listening hearts. My ideas and images have grown out of many hours spent together with these people, sharing our lives and hearing each other into being. I wish to thank those people who have come to me seeking support and assistance, for sharing with me their stories of courage, creativity, and perseverance. They taught me more than I could ever hope to express in any one written work. I am grateful to Dr. Holly Devor for her challenging and insightful feedback; to Dr. Marilyn Callahan, who could convey her faith in me and inspire me with only a few words; to Dr. Vance Peavy for his patience, honesty, and caring support; and to Rey Carr for encouraging me to explore feminism and for his guidance. I am thankful to Marie Hoskins for many hours of inspiring, challenging, and often humorous conversations, and for her loving friendship. I am especially grateful to Marie, Rey, and Vance for being there as I struggled with the events that eventually led me to doing this research. They were, and are, true friends.

There are many other people whom I have the joy of claiming as friends and who made the completion of this project possible: Julie and Buddy, Kelsie, Morgan, Paige, Lona, Sarah, Darrell, Nyla and Wayne, Nan and Grant, Mim and Greg, Nad, Alana, Tuvy, Terrill, Morgen, Roselyne, and the women of our counselling program's support group. All of these people inspired me with their own journeys and their joy of discovery. I am especially

grateful to my parents, Alex and Irene, who were there whenever I needed them, in whatever way I needed them. I love you both dearly.

To my mother,

Irene

– My hero –

CHAPTER ONE: HOW I GOT TO WHERE I AM (AND WHAT I WANT TO LEARN NOW)

What led me to wanting to do this research? Several years ago, while in my first year of graduate studies, I encountered a difficult situation. One of my professors began to harass me. He repeatedly interrupted the class to raise an issue with me which he and I had settled in his office. At one point, he interrupted several classmates who were leading an exercise so he could congratulate me upon a recently published article I had co-authored. He thereby broke the flow of the exercise, angering the other students, and implying to them that they were less competent than I. On other occasions, he minimized my comments in class and used class time to berate me for being "perfect". My classmates reacted with anger at having our class activities interrupted and to being humiliated, and he carefully directed their anger towards me.

At first I tried to ignore him and my confusion, but had no luck on either account. Aside from having to deal with this man in class once a week, I would also meet him in the hallways and offices. If we were alone, he would take advantage of these chance meetings to address me by an inappropriately intimate nickname. As my embarrassment and confusion turned to feelings of anger and fear, I began to focus my time and energy on his harassment instead of on my studies.

At one point I summoned the courage to discuss with him my concern over a grade and some written comments he had given me on the most recent class assignment. Assuming we were both skilled communicators who wanted to be honest and helpful to each other, I met with him in his office. The meeting was a disaster because he used it as an attempt to manipulate me emotionally. He accused me of having no sense of humor, of behaving seductively towards him, and of failing to be sympathetic and understanding of him. I left in tears, more afraid, confused, and angry than ever before.

I finally approached a sessional instructor who recommended that I say nothing to administration or anyone else until I graduated. This instructor's advice was based on

having seen what had happen to a woman who had spoken out against sexual harassment in another program. As a result, I tried for the rest of that year to ignore him and my feelings.

Unfortunately, seeing him in the hallway meant my feeling rage for the next hour. Denying my own anger and fear wore me down and I had increasingly less energy for my work. I also criticized myself for failing to work as diligently as I wanted and was accustomed to. Consequently, my self-doubts about my abilities grew stronger. I was afraid of the consequences should I dare to confront him again and feared being seen as incapable if I approached another professor with my complaints.

Thinking back on it now, I recognize the vicious cycle of self-blame in which I was caught. But at that time, I was unaware of how much of an effect his harassing behaviors and my own silence were having on me. Consequently, I minimized my feelings and thoughts, blamed myself for being too sensitive and irrational, and avoided complaining to anyone. Thus, when my program supervisor confronted me about an assignment which I was abnormally late in completing, I was unable to identify the harassment as the source of my problems. I replied that I was simply exhausted from the heavy workload of the year. Moreover, because I had failed to acknowledge the effects which that professor's harassing behaviors were having on me, my supervisor's concern over my late assignment further fueled my self-doubts about my abilities.

Several weeks after this meeting, at the beginning of my second year of studies, I discovered that I was neither the first nor the last woman upon whom he had preyed. To this point, it had never occurred to me that he had harassed anyone else. I had assumed I was all alone in this until the day I was approached by a new female graduate student, only two weeks into her counselling program. It seemed to me that she was confused and upset about something which had happened with this same professor and needed to talk to someone about it.

I listened while she told me about her recent experiences and her resulting feelings. As she cried and expressed her self-doubts, I recognized my own story in what she told me. At last I was able to acknowledge that, like her, I was hurting from his abusive and

degrading comments and behaviors. As more women told me about how he was treating them, I recognized that this professor had abused a number of his female students in addition to myself. At that point, I decided to try to stop him from being abusive to anyone again. However, this time I realized I wanted the help of a faculty member.

At that time the tenured counselling faculty were all male. There were two professors whom I felt would listen to me without prejudice and with whom I had experienced a sufficient degree of trust that I could openly discuss my experiences and concerns with them if I choose to do so. That same week I approached one of them and told him part of what had happened to me. He suggested that I also tell the other professor, my program supervisor, about my experience. With support from both of these men, I filed a formal complaint with a sexual harassment advisor at the university and began a long and arduous process of collecting and presenting evidence, trying to convince fellow survivors to speak out, dealing with their anger, dealing with the resentment of colleagues and other professors, having my office broken into and possessions stolen, dealing with harassing phone calls, arranging for meetings and conversing with the university's administrators.

After eight long months of hard work, one other female student and I had our complaints vindicated. The professor involved received a reprimand. By that point, I had envisioned that my pain and anger would have dissipated, but it had not. Although I had "won", I was also left trying to pull myself together after going through the university's complaint procedures. Trying to convince other women to speak up with their stories, as well as trying to find students willing to be witnesses, had been stressful. Professors and students openly or covertly attempted to discredit and blame me. My office was broken into and personal items were stolen, forcing me to deal with city police and uninterested campus police. Several job offers were withdrawn without notifying me. Demeaning rumors about me were spread throughout our local professional community. I kept telling myself that it was worth going through all of this in order to have my complaint acknowledged and the professor restrained, educated about proper conduct, and taught respect for his female students.

I tried to appreciate congratulations from my few supporters for my having acted with courage. I commended myself for having acted with integrity in speaking up about that man's abusive behavior. Yet after it was over, I still felt bitterly angry about the token of a reprimand the professor received while I had been painfully treated by colleagues, professors, and friends who blamed and threatened rather than supported me. I had gone through an exhaustive year of anger, fear, frustration, and confusion only to find these feelings persisting.

Even more so, I was afraid to voice my thoughts and feelings. Continuing to feel anger and frustration seemed to me evidence that something was wrong with me rather than with the system which had appeared to vindicate me and my complaint. Feeling this way and being blamed, discredited, and threatened left me with the impression that I was a person of little value or worth. For how could a loving, compassionate, caring person earn the wrath of so many people? Therefore, it seemed logical to me that I must be uncaring, cold, irrational, and driven by an unhealthy anger.

The support I needed in order to acknowledge and examine my fear, frustration, and anger came when I read an interview of Carol Gilligan, author of In a different voice, (1982). It was the opinion of the interviewer, Francine Prose (1990), that Gilligan had accomplished ground breaking research in the field of psychology. Despite her accomplishments and persistence, Gilligan expressed her weariness and pain at having to deal with her colleagues' misunderstanding of her work and her apprehensiveness that she would be misunderstood by them again. In Gilligan's words, the experience of publishing her research had "not been entirely positive".

Reading about Gilligan's experiences helped me in several ways. For one, her acknowledgment of her feelings gave me permission to me to validate my own frustration and anger. Secondly, Gilligan's ability to acknowledge the negative experiences she had as a result of publishing her work indicated to me that she valued herself enough to trust her senses and respect her feelings. Following her example, I began to respect my feelings and to

consider my own worth. I then reevaluated my experiences of those eight months in the light of my worth as a person and my right to be treated with the respect due to all people.

At last I believed I had the right to say what I realized I had long wanted to say: I would not, if I could go back in time, place a complaint and go through the whole formal process at the university again. I would never do it again and I strongly recommended that any woman avoid subjecting herself to the same set of offensive experiences I had encountered. I had endured an experience which was, for the most part, horrible. The sexual harassment had been unpleasant and confusing, but the process the university employed, down to the very definition of sexual harassment used, had been even more frightening, painful, and exhausting. Most of all, the treatment I received from all but a few friends and professors was abusive and demeaning. I refused to give support to what I had been put through by saying I would do it all over again if I had to.

Having acknowledged this, I was free to direct my anger into creative channels. I began to wonder how many women had experienced sexual harassment and how their experiences would compare to mine. How were counsellors addressing this issue with their female clients? What did critiques of sexual harassment policies and procedures reveal? What did we know about the harassers and their behavior? What explanations were being offered for this phenomenon? With these questions in mind, I began researching sexual harassment.

As I read and reflected upon the research I had collected, I was impressed by the work done from a feminist perspective. Feminist research contained a large body of information on sexual harassment and a number of explanations for it. The more I read, the more I respected and appreciated the work done from this perspective. With my program supervisor's support, I spent most of the following year immersed in literature on feminist perspectives and reflecting upon the various ones I encountered. Each feminism defined and explained sexual harassment in its own way.

Of the feminist perspectives I explored, the radical feminist model most fully acknowledged what I had actually experienced and offered what seemed to me the richest

and deepest explanation. I realized, in fact, radical feminists had identified the phenomenon of sexual harassment. There was a high degree of similarity between what I had experienced as harassing and what they described. Radical feminists were analyzing sexual harassment policies and concluding that, while these policies appeared to be supportive of women and to curtail the abusive behavior of offenders, they were in reality harmful tactics intended to more fully confuse and silence women. Their analysis matched my ordeal after filing my complaint. The radical approach also provided a counselling model acknowledging that the abusers, rather than the survivors, would have to change and speculated on how sexual harassment could be stopped. Furthermore, radical feminist theory seemed to illuminate and offer rich explanations for many other forms of violence and oppression.

In examining other feminist perspectives, such as liberal or socialist feminisms, I found that, like the non-feminist approaches, they suffered from a number of inadequacies. They failed to acknowledge fully the range of my experience and the experiences other women had shared with me. Their explanations of harassment and abuse were wanting, lacking the depth and range of the radical feminist approach. They failed to provide models for counselling to assist survivors of sexual harassment or to prevent its occurrence. Choosing a radical feminist perspective seemed to provide the most meaningful and fruitful approach to discussing and researching sexual harassment.

At this point, investigating sexual harassment further might seem like the logical direction for my research to take. However, the research I had just completed proved to be an experience in and of itself from which I gained two valuable insights. First, I discovered the value of theory in dealing with experience. I had not expected a theory to validate and clarify my experiences, thoughts, and feelings, and was surprised at how it enriched my understanding of my experiences.

Second and most importantly, I realized that theories, or what I later discovered were actually models, varied in how they described phenomena in our world. Their description could either validate my experiences, providing guidance and support for action

or invalidate my experiences, thereby confusing and silencing me with their denial and disbelief. As in the case of women being sexually harassed, traditional psychological approaches such as the humanist, behavioral, and cognitive perspectives were failing to acknowledge the experiences of women, while radical feminism was giving me the language to discuss them, as well as theories, models, exemplars, and research methods to explore and understand them. I also discovered that there were several models within the feminist paradigm, such as liberal, socialist, and radical, and that each focused my attention on a different facet of my experiences and varied in their concepts, explanations, and solutions. And while liberal and socialist feminisms had failed to offer insight into the phenomenon of sexual harassment, they helped me to understand other issues which I had experienced.

My discovery of this congruence between feminist thought and my own experiences enticed me. I began to haphazardly explore feminist thought and literature. I became involved in a feminist group organized by a number of women within our graduate counselling program. At the same time, I was also gaining experience as a counsellor and becoming increasingly aware of the overwhelming evidence of very high rates of men abusing their children, female partners, and other men, individually and systemically. My training in traditional approaches left me unprepared to deal with such issues. As students in undergraduate and graduate school, we were often forbidden and certainly never encouraged to discuss violence and abuse. Now I was uncovering an entirely foreign (and seemingly forbidden) field of research and literature focusing directly upon these very issues as well as providing and critiquing approaches dealing with them.

With growing experience as a counsellor, my involvement with feminist groups, and continuing exploration of literature and research, I began to explore how feminism could impact upon my work as a counsellor and my ongoing research. Several questions evolved, forming the focus of this thesis. First, how is theory and practice linked? Second, what is feminism? Third and most importantly, how does feminism inform psychology and, in particular, counselling psychology?

In order to explore these questions, I needed to be able to link theory and practice, and develop a framework which would allow me to examine the variations within feminism, as well as the commonalities. I eventually found a practical framework and support for my growing belief in the centrality of theory in counselling practice in Thomas S. Kuhn's The structure of scientific revolutions (1970) and in feminist scholarship itself.

Kuhn proposes that a theory in science is actually part of a paradigm. Paradigms have certain components, evolve in an identifiable pattern, and are eventually discarded and replaced. Every paradigm is built upon values and presuppositions which necessarily determine a researcher's choice of topics and issues, definitions, research methods, results and interpretations, and models for practitioners. Kuhn's analysis of science reinforced my intuitive understanding that all counsellors function from within some sort of a perspective or paradigm, that it was possible to identify components in each paradigm, and that this choice of paradigm would profoundly impact research and practice. His thesis describes the relationship between theory, research, and practice. It also provided me with the framework I needed to describe and compare the content of significant feminist perspectives.

Feminism also recognizes the relationship between theory and practice as well as offering additional dimensions along which to examine various perspectives. By relying upon a feminist perspective I am able to elaborate upon Kuhn's work and adapt it to serve the purposes of my thesis. As a feminist, I use the standards created by gynocentric ("women-centered") values in exploring and describing my world. This has very specific consequences for my next task, examining Kuhn's thesis. First, it means that in approaching Kuhn's account of science, I am not interested in whether it is "true", rational, logical, or supportive of objectivity, individuality, or autonomy (Hövelmann, 1984; Kuhn, 1970; Notturno, 1984). Rather, I am interested in how Kuhn's description of science fits with my experiences and my intuitive understanding of science, as well as with the growing body of feminist literature on the sciences. I am interested in how it helps me to understand relationships between the following: practitioners, theory, models, values, norms of behavior, and political activism. I am especially interested in Kuhn's understanding of how adopting a set

of values affects our perceptions and explorations of our worlds. With this information, I will eventually turn to the heart of my thesis: Exploring and analyzing how feminism informs psychology and, in particular, counselling psychology.

The following are the tasks which I have undertaken and what I hope each task accomplishes. First, I describe a framework for examining theories within paradigms, exploring the structure of a paradigm and a theory's place within it. In this same section, I summarize the relationship between practice and theory as described by Kuhn's view of science with the hope that it will assist counselling practitioners in developing a fuller understanding of the role theory plays in practice. I include several critiques of Kuhn's work, including those of feminists, and develop these ideas further in order to expand his framework and its usefulness. Second, using the framework developed out of Kuhn's thesis, I examine various feminist perspectives, thereby developing a common understanding and language from which to proceed. Third, again using Kuhn's framework, I explore how feminism informs counselling psychology, and psychology in general. Finally, I return to where I began – the specific issue of training practitioners in counselling psychology.

I am committed to the belief that caring for others is an essential and rewarding task. Yet at times I wonder how well we, as counsellors, accomplish it. Consequently, this document carries, along with my hopes and inspirations, my fears and my doubts about how well we counsellors perform our task of helping others.

It is my hope that what I present in the pages which follow will provide counsellors with a clearer picture of feminism, especially as it relates to our work as counsellors, and that it will stimulate discussion. I aim to support counsellors to consider the actual outcomes our clients' experiences of therapy, rather than what we would like to believe they gain from our time together. I trust it will direct us to reflect upon our responsibilities to our clients and honestly assess what we, as counsellors, gain from our clients. Finally, I hope the ideas conveyed in these words will contribute to empowering our profession to move away from treating and into preventing the seemingly endless and needless pain of oppression in so many lives.

CHAPTER TWO: KUHN'S FRAMEWORK

I. KUHN'S THESIS

The opening chapter hinted at the insight provided by science historian and philosopher, Thomas S. Kuhn (1970), into the nature of science. While it is important to review possible problems with his thesis, it is useful to first develop a common understanding of it. Following a summary of his work, I will briefly examine several critiques of it, including those from a feminist perspective. Finally, I will add two components to his original framework, thereby allowing a more comprehensive examination of feminism and of how feminism informs psychology and counselling psychology in particular.

Two central ideas of Kuhn's (1970) account of science are critical to my thesis: Paradigm and paradigm shift. The first concept, paradigm, provides us with a framework for examining the various dimensions of feminism. The second, paradigm shift, will be useful for understanding the uniqueness of feminism.

Paradigms

After initially introducing his thesis, Kuhn (1970) received criticism for his philosophical stance and the many definitions he assigned to the term "paradigm". While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully address philosophical orientations in the study of the nature of science, I believe it is critical to clearly understand the term "paradigm". (In one review of his book, Masterman (1970) identified twenty-one meanings assigned to the word "paradigm".)

In acknowledging the various uses of the term "paradigm" and the confusion and misunderstanding this created, Kuhn more clearly defined "paradigm" in subsequent publications, notably his enlarged second edition, The structure of scientific revolutions (1970). Here he provided two specific definitions, renaming them "disciplinary matrix" and

"exemplar". The first meaning assigned to paradigm, that of a disciplinary matrix, is central to my thesis and therefore needs attention here.

Kuhn (1970) explained his use of the term paradigm as disciplinary matrix to mean "'disciplinary' because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline; 'matrix' because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts" (p. 182). Practitioners commit themselves to a set of interrelated elements or components, of which he explicitly identifies four, "conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological" (p. 42). A commitment to each of these elements governs the behavior of practitioners within each community. That is, a paradigm is a way of interacting with, seeing, thinking about, and being within our world, and it consists of a number of elements that we accept as our own when we accept a paradigm. Moreover, everyone functions within a paradigm. We tend to describe it as our perspective, beliefs, and ways, or just simply as who we are as a person.

The first dimension Kuhn (1970) describes is theoretical and is often expressed as theories and laws. These are generalizations or beliefs about the fundamental nature of phenomena. They explain and explicitly state generalities in data, identify relationships among data, and provide a common language. Theories and laws identify acceptable phenomena and problems to research, or more accurately, puzzles to solve, and predicts their solutions. For instance, as compared to Newton's theory of mechanics, Einstein's theory of relativity and his famous law, expressed as the mass-energy equation $E = mc^2$, provided a new explanation for motion using Newton's concepts of mass, energy, and speed. However, Einstein redefined both the meaning of Newton's terms and the relationships between these entities.

Using a more relevant example, feminists believe patriarchy shapes our society and provides an almost invisible universal norm against which all other ways of being and ideas are compared. Feminist theories of patriarchy allows us to identify the phenomenon of oppression based on gender and explains how power over others is connected to gender. They direct our attention to issues of violence and explicitly states that the rates of violence are evidence of oppression. Accepting this generalization creates a common language (for

instance, the terms "patriarchy" and "oppression"), specifies the importance of identifying how patriarchy structures our society, and suggests solutions for ending male domination, such as recommending political activity to restructure society so as to eliminate oppression (Adamson, Briskin, & McPhail, 1988; Code, 1988; Tong, 1989).

The second component is conceptual or metaphysical, and is often expressed as shared commitments or beliefs in particular models. Although often confused with theories, models are constructed of one or more theories and laws, and provide simplified, abstracted versions of the world, demonstrating the relationships between its components. That is, models show *how* the phenomena function and *what* the relationships are between various components. However, models must refer to theories to explain *why* phenomena function in particular manners and *why* these relationships exist. They identify concepts and phenomena regarded as legitimate, and just as importantly, illegitimate and inconsequential. Models "determine what will be accepted as an explanation and as a puzzle-solution" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 184). They provide preferred analogies and metaphors, help to identify unsolved puzzles, and evaluate puzzles to identify which shall be given priority.

For example, the model of radical feminism is based upon several theories, including that of patriarchy. In assuming that patriarchy exists, it demonstrates how patriarchy functions in our lives. A common metaphor used in describing the relationship between men and women is that of the oppressor and the oppressed. Concepts such as "oppression", "abuse", "exploitation", and "power" are considered to be legitimate and important. Acceptable explanations must explain how gender differences are used to justify the exploitation and abuse of women. Within the radical model of feminism, priority is given to issues such as sexual harassment and assault, wife assault, child abuse, pornography, and sexual discrimination.

Thirdly, Kuhn (1970) identifies an instrumental dimension which determines how laws and theories are to be applied. Given the endless possibilities for applying ideas, every field of science limits its range of legitimate applications to suit its purposes. This is

done primarily with shared examples from within the community or what Kuhn labels as "exemplars". Exemplars are "concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from the start of their scientific education..." (p. 187) and take the form of case studies, examples in textbooks, and questions at the end of chapters and on exams. They demonstrate how to apply a given theory or law and develop a student's ability to eventually see the similarities in various situations, thereby learning to generalize from one problem or case to another. Exemplars differ from models in that models describe how a phenomena occurs while exemplars are a specific instance to walk through, providing an opportunity to explore the phenomenon in question from the perspective of that paradigm.

The issue of men assaulting their female partners, identified by radical feminist theory and given priority by the radical feminist model (Code, 1988), is an instance of an exemplar. Using case examples, students of feminism are taught to view this issue in terms of men expressing and maintaining their power over women by controlling, abusing, and killing them, rather than as a disagreement between two equals, implying each are equally responsible. Eventually, students learn to see this phenomena from a feminist perspective, and, given more exemplars, learn to generalize to other phenomena such as child abuse and sexual harassment. In effect, exemplars are the principle tools for training the student in the accepted perspective of a given paradigm, and the fourth dimension, methods.

Kuhn (1970) holds that his fourth dimension, methodological, is the most widely held in any scientific community and that science itself is often equated with its methodologies. Scientific investigations, and indeed most areas of scholarship, are often presented as following a specific set of rules for research and scholarship. However, Kuhn argues that the methods of science are determined by a set of presuppositions, which are in turn based upon an identifiable set of values. Some examples from a feminist paradigm of androcentric ("male-centered") versus gynocentric ("female-centered") values include objectivity being valued over subjectivity, reason over non-reason, rationality over intuition, and reductionism over relationality (Gilligan, 1982a; Wine, 1989).

These value-based judgements affect all of the dimensions of a paradigm, determining the group's behavior to a greater degree than the other three dimensions. For example, they determine the choice of theories and models. A theory's worthiness is judged by its fruitfulness at generating puzzles and their solutions, and in being accurate, "simple, self-consistent, and plausible". Models and metaphors must support the laws and theories they seek to illustrate. And as we shall see in the next section, when competing paradigms arise, Kuhn (1970) contends that these same values will serve to determine which paradigm will be selected.

Members of a scientific community, by virtue of "the features of individual personality and biography that differentiate the members of a group" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 185), may vary in how they apply these commonly held values. Judgements are relative and different values, if used individually or given differing priority, may dictate different choices. The result is that members may disagree over models, theories, and applications or their interpretations. Yet despite differences in judgement, their work is directed by the same set of values or presuppositions and hence, they share a common paradigm. For example, while feminists may agree that patriarchy and oppression exist, we disagree as to how patriarchy and oppression is manifested. Feminists using a liberal model to demonstrate how oppression functions, challenge our laws, arguing that they fail to apply equally to men and women. Feminists using a radical model contend that it is insufficient to change our laws. Rather, they argue that we need to reconceptualize and restructure our legal system. Yet despite these differences in models, feminists of diverse views are distinguished by our increasing awareness of and commitment to gynocentric values and the resulting feminist methodologies. We are increasingly rejecting scientific methods relying solely on the presuppositions of objectivity and reductionism in favor of a methods valuing subjectivity, intuition, emotions, relationality and interconnectedness, a sense of responsibility to others, and an awareness of consequences.

The differences amongst feminists reflect differing interpretations of how the standards developed out of our values should be applied. They also reflect the differing

priority given to the various values providing the standards used in decision-making. The resulting differences amongst feminists (or any group of people) are possible because, as Kuhn (1970) writes, "a paradigm governs... not a subject matter but rather a group of practitioners" (p. 180). That is, a paradigm requires uniform behavior rather than agreement over specific ideas. The point here is that there is considerable room for disagreement within the community because a paradigm is determined by values and their standards which can and are variously applied, and that a paradigm governs the behavior of the community of practitioners rather than the actual content of their work.

Being committed to the conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological components of their field's paradigm and working within the perspective provided by the sum of these four dimensions enables practitioners to devote their finite time to a limited and therefore manageable set of phenomena, and to identify puzzles, give priority to them, and conduct research in a predetermined manner. Moreover, one must be willing to extend this view to the rest of the world which she or he is interested in exploring. When encountering phenomena failing to fit the known laws or theories, or defying instruments and methodologies, it is imperative that one must refine observational and methodological abilities. Failing this, one must further articulate theory so that the phenomena in question is accounted for. That is, the failure to solve a puzzle is normally seen as caused by the practitioner's incompetence rather than the paradigm's inviability.

By remaining committed to one perspective, only a few practitioners are distracted by the pursuit of anomalies and new theories, the majority of which are proven wrong. The main body of scientists continue to engage in solving the paradigm's significant puzzles, ignoring known anomalies. Moreover, they are able to ignore issues, phenomena, and methods visible only from a different perspective, and to avoid attending to philosophical and metaphysical debates. Thus, confidence in one's paradigm enables pursuit of research free of doubts about the paradigm's viability and reliability.

Paradigm Shifts

Paradoxically, it is this pursuit and confidence in the paradigm which leads to a new paradigm emerging to replace it. According to Kuhn (1970), it is because of this "knowing with precision what he should expect" that a scientist engaged in puzzle-solving is then "able to recognize that something has gone wrong" (p. 65). These unexpected, and more importantly, unexplainable results or phenomena are what Kuhn refers to as counterinstances or anomalies. As mentioned above, anomalies require explanations as to their existence, and when a paradigm's theory fails to provide them, a crisis may develop within the relevant scientific community. Lesser anomalies will provoke crises in smaller areas, such as within a particular theory or subfield of a science, or may be ignored altogether. However, if the anomaly is severe enough it may cause a crisis to develop at the level of the paradigm itself, challenging directives in each dimension. Because individual practitioners differ in their application of the community's values and presuppositions, some will judge an anomaly to be severe enough to merit serious attention. Their choice to pursue the anomaly in order to understand it may result in challenges to the theories and laws, models, presuppositions, and exemplars of the existing paradigm.

When the whole of a paradigm is affected by a crisis, symptoms common to paradigm shifts appear: New versions of the dominant paradigm's theory develop. The theory begins to lose utility and becomes increasingly vague. Existing presuppositions are questioned thereby making normal problem-solving activity increasingly difficult. Puzzles once considered solved (and used as exemplars), or all but solved, are discovered to be unsolved after all. Finally, it is realized that the new theory or solutions "had been at least partially anticipated during a period when there was no crisis in the corresponding science; and in the absence of crisis those anticipations had been ignored" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 75).

Such a crisis serves a useful purpose: It enables an old paradigm to be replaced. By creating doubts about expectations, it loosens the bounds of scientific activity. Research may be initiated in areas once thought of as inconsequential, new theories can be speculated upon, new instruments and procedures may be developed or new applications created for old

instruments. All of this provides increasing support for the new paradigm. Kuhn (1970) describes this period as being characterized by "the proliferation of competing articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit discontent, (and) the recourse to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals" (p. 91).

According to Kuhn (1970), a paradigm shift is revolutionary, being similar in nature to a political revolution. The new paradigm is incompatible with the old, and requires changes that are radical and irreversible. The old and the new paradigms are incommensurable; that is, there is no neutral perspective from which to evaluate their relative worth and they will present two irreconcilable ways of viewing the world. Recalling that a paradigm is a "strong network of commitments – conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 42), a change in paradigm effects profound changes in all these aspects of scientific activity.

Consequently, scientific revolutions at the level of a paradigm often cause radical shifts in the nature and content of the community's work. A paradigm shift, rather than being an accumulation, transforms all knowledge and experience. Previous experiences are viewed from a new perspective. Knowledge gained from the old paradigm is either discarded or rethought and expressed in new language. In any case, it fails to accumulate as is often the claim of philosophers and practitioners alike. The paradigm shift is also irreversible, in that once it occurs, it is impossible for a science practitioner to unlearn or switch back to a former way of thinking and seeing. Thus, a paradigm shift entails a radical and irreversible change in how one views the world, and consequently in what exists in one's phenomenological world.

Kuhn (1970) likens a paradigm shift to learning a new "language-culture" (p. 205), which tends to be easier for those learning to speak for the first time than for someone already well versed in a language. Similarly, new paradigms appear to be more easily accepted by those new to a field, in that they are less committed to the old paradigm. For practitioners who may have spent most of their lives living within the old paradigm or language-culture, they may be unable to accept the shift and consequently never understand

or be able to work within the new paradigm. Some who attempt to change their perspective are only able to translate concepts, methods, theories, and other aspects of the new paradigm into the old. As in learning a language, they have difficulty becoming fluent in the new paradigm, failing to ever see from within it directly, without the aid of translation.

Perhaps most importantly, a different language actually does develop within the new paradigm. While the name or phrase of a concept or law existing within the old paradigm may be used in the new, it is given a new meaning in the new paradigm. New interpretations and applications develop which may bear no resemblance to the old. Moreover, "within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships one with the other" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 149). (Recall Kuhn's example of Einstein's famous equation, $E = mc^2$.) Even the definition of what science is changes, for "the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds" (p. 150). The result is that when practitioners from each of the paradigms attempt to communicate with each other, they are speaking different languages and, at best, only partial understand the other. Any ability to understand each other is often largely due to sharing a common past in the old paradigm. That is, any successful communication depends upon the ability of the practitioner of the new paradigm to translate into the language, metaphors, and concepts of the old paradigm.

Resolving a revolution can be a lengthy process, requiring practitioners to eventually decide upon and adopt one paradigm. Kuhn (1970) argues that values such as "...accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like..."(p. 199) provide the basis of this decision. By appealing to what they value, practitioners are persuaded to change their choice of paradigm. Consequently, support for a new paradigm grows as it solves anomalies creating the crisis, provides more precise and accurate solutions to old problems, predicts phenomena unsuspected in the old paradigm, is neater, simpler, or more aesthetically appealing, and fosters a belief in practitioners that it is more "fruitful" in producing interesting and useful problems for research.

Members of the scientific community most likely to first experience a paradigm shift fall into two categories. First, there are those few practitioners who are intensely focused upon "crises-provoking" anomalies. Their interest and commitment to solving the puzzles of the anomalies usually creates the new paradigm. Second, there are the practitioners new to the field who are not yet deeply committed to the old paradigm. In other words, students. Access to this group plays a key role in maintaining the old paradigm or ushering in the new one.

Students learn a paradigm through the most commonly used pedagogical tool, a textbook. Kuhn (1970) emphases here that textbooks, written within the perspective of the new paradigm, serve to strengthen the position of the new paradigm. As he notes, most textbooks are very similar, in that they open with a chapter reviewing the history of the field. Scientists of the past, and often of a different paradigm, are presented as having been working on the same puzzles central to the new paradigm. Knowledge appears to accumulate, thereby strengthening the new paradigm and denying the existence of the old. Thus, exemplars or puzzles which have been solved serve to train students in the conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological dimensions of the new paradigm.

II. RATIONALE FOR USING KUHN'S THESIS

While Kuhn (1970) developed his thesis out of the natural sciences, it has been applied in a variety of ways in the social sciences. For example, within the field of psychology, Kuhn's work is used by Ian S. Burgess (1972) to suggest that there are many paradigms within psychology, by Patrick K. Dooley (1982) to analyze the disagreements separating behaviorists and phenomenologists, by Isabel F. Knight (1985) to explore the historical development of psychology, by P. Susan Penfold and Gillian A. Walker (1983) to discuss the history of psychiatry and psychology, by Gerald L. Peterson (1981) to describe how various approaches within psychology have misapplied Kuhn's thesis to support their point of view, and by Walter B. Weimer and David S. Palermo (1973) to describe the school of behaviorism. S. R. Coleman and Rebecca Salamon's (1988) review of psychological, behavioral, and human development literature revealed that 652 articles, written between 1969 and 1983, referred to Kuhn's thesis, with 92 per cent acknowledging him as an authority. Of these, Kuhn's ideas played an important role in 163 articles, of which 83 per cent agreed "with the general validity of Kuhn's ideas or with a specific application of them... to psychology or to other social sciences" (p. 417). More recently, I counted approximately 250 citations in the social sciences of the second edition of his book, The structure of scientific revolutions (1970) in each of the years between 1989 and 1991. As further evidence of his popularity, his work is so widely accepted in the social sciences that I find it increasingly common to see his name and theory referred to without being cited. Moreover, his interpretation of concepts such as "paradigm" is commonly used today, indicating to me that it is widely regarded and accepted.

However, this continuing trend of applying Kuhn's (1970) account of the natural sciences to the social sciences and psychology in particular, has been challenged. A brief review of his critics' key points highlights my very reasons for choosing his work, and consequently, they shall be given attention here. In general, there are two streams of criticism. The first group of scholars agree with his thesis and find it useful for psychology,

but allege that it has been misunderstood and misapplied, and make suggestions for its proper use. The second group suggests that Kuhn's thesis has serious shortcomings and is inappropriate as a model of, or a theory for, understanding science.

The Misuse of Kuhn in Psychology

The first stream of criticism allows that Kuhn's (1970) work is reliable and useful for understanding and addressing the field of psychology, but that it had been seriously misunderstood and misapplied. Knight (1985) asserts that terms such as "paradigm" and "anomaly" have been repeatedly invoked "for their symbolic value with little regard for their actual meaning" (p. 610). If such superficial use of his work is avoided, she believes his thesis would be useful. Weimer and Palermo (1973) discuss the improper use of Kuhn's account of science as a template to illustrate the differences among approaches in psychology and to claim paradigmatic status. They refer to Kuhn's allowance for disagreements within paradigms and assert that these controversies have been mistakenly presented as evidence of a new paradigm. Peterson (1981) complains that Kuhn's thesis has been superficially applied in order to exemplify the differences between various schools of thought in psychology and then incorrectly used to claim superiority for one of these schools. That is, disagreements are erroneously dismissed as paradigm clashes rather than as necessary and useful challenges generating novel ideas and elucidating fundamental issues within one paradigm.

Knight (1985), Weimer and Palermo (1973), and Peterson (1981) also emphasize the descriptive rather than the evaluative value of Kuhn's thesis. Kuhn (1970) provides a set of dimensions along which to identify the fundamental components of each school. He also provides useful information to help determine the difference between disagreements over interpretations and a paradigm clash. And while he clearly avoids endorsing a particular set of values by which to choose a paradigm, he does describe the centrality of values in determining the choice of a new paradigm. Moreover, given that Kuhn intended his thesis to be treated as one needing constant revision, I will, as Knight (1985) and Weimer and

Palermo (1973) suggest, modify it for use here. A feminist critique of Kuhn's work, presented later in this chapter, identifies the limits of his perspective and suggest additions resulting in a far more robust framework with which to describe and compare feminist perspectives.

Challenges to Kuhn's Account of Science

The debate over the validity of Kuhn's (1970) thesis has been lengthy, and characterized by arguments back and forth, misunderstandings, and language which unfortunately is, at times, far too esoteric for anyone unable to afford several years of schooling in philosophy. Nevertheless, I briefly present here some of the more relevant and understandable issues raised.

Frederick Suppe (1984) criticizes Kuhn's thesis as a "bad history of science and fundamentally defective philosophy of science" (p. 89). He takes issue with what he perceives as Kuhn's "part descriptive and part prescriptive" view of science as a recommendation for how science ought to proceed. He asserts that a prescriptive view misleads scientists in fields such as psychology to attempt to fit into a predetermined and inaccurate mold of scientific behavior and activity. Gerd H. Hövelmann (1984) disagrees with Suppe's contention that Kuhn's thesis is prescriptive and suggests that Suppe has misinterpreted Kuhn's work. However, he does believe Kuhn's thesis wrongly dismisses the importance of a proper "foundation and justification of scientific propositions" (p. 109) and that Kuhn's attempts to replace it by using sociological and historical reflections to secure such propositions have disastrous implications. While agreeing that Kuhn attempts to comprehend science by analyzing the social and historical constitution of the scientific community, Peterson (1981), on the other hand, believes that Kuhn's hermeneutical approach makes his thesis credible and useful. He argues that Kuhn's alternative view of science avoids the circular reasoning inherent in attempts to justify scientific propositions and is therefore, far more useful.

As is apparent from these examples, critics disagree on the nature of the problems with Kuhn's (1970) thesis and accuse each other of misinterpreting and misunderstanding

Kuhn. It is as if their perspectives differ from Kuhn's, thereby illustrating the arguments which can arise when varying perspectives are employed or values are applied in different ways. While their lack of agreement fails to invalidate their critiques, it does point to the fact that there are fundamental differences between views provided by Kuhn and philosophers such as Karl Popper (Notturno, 1984). It is possible, as Peterson (1981) and M. A. Notturno (1984) note, that Kuhn is presenting a new paradigm within the philosophy of science.

If this is true, then adopting Kuhn's (1970) perspective for the purpose of this thesis requires, following Kuhn's arguments, evaluating it according to values accepted by a feminist approach. Several points make Kuhn's thesis particularly appealing to a feminist perspective of science. First, Hövelmann's (1984) argument that Kuhn demonstrates how many of science's major developments are the result of intuitive rather than rational thinking supports Margaret Benston's (1989) contentions that science's claims of relying solely on the rational are false. Indeed, Kuhn devotes an entire section of his book, The structure of scientific revolutions (1970) to articulating and defending the role of intuition in discovery and learning.

Second, Hövelmann (1984) and Peterson (1981), along with Margaret Masterman (1970), stress that Kuhn studied the sociological and historical features of the scientific community to determine the development and results of science. Like Kuhn, feminists have found social-historical analysis to be a useful tool for allowing us to examine our embeddedness in our social and historical context. For instance, Jill McCalla Vickers (1989) and Benston (1989) also attend to these features in identifying the male norm of behavior in scientific communities. Third, Kuhn (1970) emphasized the need to observe behaviors rather than stated intentions in identifying the values underlying science. His attention to the actual consequences of science and scholarship, and to the people creating science in order to understand the nature of science is consistent with the work of feminists. Benston addresses the importance of studying these same features in order to identify the androcentric values guiding research.

Fourth, as Notturno (1984) explains, Kuhn maintains that the ideal of truth serves no useful purpose and scientists need to aim at moving away from the false. Again, feminists such as Sandra Harding (1990) contend that feminists will be more productive if they attempt to move away from the false rather than trying to discern the truth. Fifth, Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson (1990) stress that it is becoming increasingly important to feminists to recognize that a multiplicity of overlapping theories arriving from varying standpoints may be more valuable and less false than a perspective which assumes or attempts to be universal. Kuhn's (1970) thesis, with its emphasis on values and acknowledgment of a paradigm's embeddedness in time and culture, accounts and allows for the multiple views of marginalized people. Hence, Kuhn's thesis in several fundamental ways agrees with feminist scholarship. Regardless of whether Kuhn is presenting a new paradigm within his field, he has developed a perspective consistent with feminist scholarship.

At the same time, it is important to recognize the limits of Kuhn's (1970) thesis and to make several additions to it. Further scrutiny reveals a number of shortcomings of special interest to my thesis. First, Kuhn's examination of the sociological and historical aspects of scientific communities ignores how these communities interact with the larger socio-political community in which they are embedded. Benston's (1989) analysis of scientific communities' goals and their norms of behavior (reviewed in the following chapter) reveals the importance of understanding how our patriarchal society's goals and the male universal affects these communities.

This leads us to Vickers (1989) challenge to the "value-neutrality" of theories of change such as Kuhn's (1970) thesis. She maintains that theories of change are designed to serve the purposes of the powerful. More specifically, she observes how descriptions of "progress" tend to ignore how marginalized people are affected by these progressive changes. That is, as a theory of the history of science, Kuhn's perspective directs us to attend to certain aspects while ignoring others, such as the impact of science on humanity. He is limiting his description of science to how it affects the actual work of its practitioners,

rather than identifying its consequences for nonscientists. To be acceptable for feminist scholarship, we need to extend his thesis to consider science and scholarship within a broader context. We need to move beyond the community of practitioners to include those people affected by their work. Thus, for Kuhn's account of science to be most useful, it must first be modified to address political and cultural dimensions of modern science.

III. KUHN AND FEMINISM

Kuhn's (1970) thesis provides a common language and a necessary tool to discuss and compare communities of practitioners. His description of the four dimensions of a paradigm and of a paradigm shift allow us to examine perspectives in an orderly manner. However, as feminist arguments have demonstrated, we need to modify Kuhn's thesis to address the cultural and political dimensions inherent in scientific practice. As Joyce McCarl Nielsen (1990) notes, there are "some interesting limitations of his model, though one might conclude that his analysis is more incomplete than wrong" (p.22). Vickers (1989), Benston (1989), and Evelyn Fox Keller (1990) have discussed at least two additional commitments required of practitioners upon entering their perspective communities. They have observed that scientific communities expect men to adhere to and women to adopt a norm of behavior equivalent to the male norm of behavior in society. They have also identified how affiliations with male-dominated institutions affect the practice of science by making the central criteria in choosing a new paradigm it's ability to defend the values and achieve the goals of patriarchy. It is these two additional components which I will develop here from a feminist perspective.

A Commitment to Socio-cultural Norms of Behavior

While Kuhn (1970) discusses the differences amongst practitioners' "features of individual personality and biography", many feminists have been more interested in science practitioners' similarities. What is most evident is a common norm of acceptable behavior in the various scientific communities and that this standard equals that of the male norm in society. Benston (1989), a theoretical chemist specializing in quantum mechanics, and Keller (1990), a mathematical biologist with training in physics, note that our society has very distinct norms of behavior for men and women. The norm of behavior prescribed for men includes such characteristics as logic, reason, aggression, dominance, independence, abstract, objective thought, and mechanical and mathematical abilities. These male characteristics

also describe the norm of behavior for those in science, and consequently, only men have been considered capable of practicing science. As Benston observes, it is not that men must have all of these characteristics before granted entry into the realm of science, but rather that they strive for them.

In contrast are those qualities traditionally associated with women, such as caring, nurturance, interdependency, emotionality, irrationality, the body, and nature. Vickers (1989), Benston (1989), and Kellor (1990) have observed that the characteristics ascribed to women are also those of objects being studied and which science strives to dominate. In order to be accepted as practitioners, women must reject these qualities and emulate those associated with men. The extent to which they do so determines, in part, the degree of their acceptance. Hence, being accepted as a science practitioner requires, whether male or female, committing oneself to this powerful norm.

This male norm has been identified in various ways by feminist scholars in a wide variety of fields. A small sampling of them includes Benston (1989) on the natural sciences, Vickers (1989) on philosophy and culture, Kathleen A. Lahey (1989) on law, Marjorie Cohen (1989) on economics, Jeri Dawn Wine (1985, 1989) on psychology, P. Susan Penfold and Gillian A. Walker (1983) on psychiatry, Alison Prentice and Ruth Pierson (1989) on history, Geraldine Finn (1989a, 1989b) on philosophy, Helen Levine (1989) on the helping professions, and Mary Daly (1990) on medicine and scholarship in general. As many of these women note, those raised to behave differently from the accepted norm and who remain unwilling to adopt it become the objects rather than the subjects of discovery.

A feminist consideration of science's norm of behavior includes more than an analysis based on gender. Together with Sandra Harding (1990), Nancy Fraser and Linda J. Nicholson (1990) observe that nonwhite, native, immigrant, lesbian, working class and poor women have accused white, middle-class, heterosexual feminists who strive to bring more feminine characteristics into science of continuing to produce incomplete and distorted knowledge. Anne Cameron (1989) poignantly expresses her anger at wealthy, white, heterosexual feminist scholars who fail to acknowledge the experiences of immigrant,

working-class, poor, lesbian, native women and women of color. From my own experience I am aware of the condescending attitude of some urban feminists toward rural prairie women, despite their historic efforts on the behalf of all Canadian women.

Thus a dimension addressing our socio-cultural norms of behavior needs to be expanded beyond gender to include other characteristics defining our experiences. What of race and culture? Socio-economic status? Sexual orientation? Age? Imagine how being too poor to eat on a regular basis would affect priorities for research; or how choices about methods would be affected by a strong belief in the spirit world where deceased parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents are always ready to listen and give guidance, or how a close physical and emotional connection with the land which provides daily sustenance, as it does for many fishers, farmers, and hunters, would affect how science is applied. While gender differences are primary to some feminists, we need to recognize the qualities associated with each of these demographic features before we will understand the limits of the present norm and develop strategies to change it.

To illustrate this further, imagine being introduced to a new professor. Visualize his or her clothes and behavior. That person would probably be male, dressed in a range from neat and casual to neat and sophisticated, be of white European descent, heterosexual and married and probably has children, is of at least middle-class standing, and is anywhere from 35 to 65 years old. His language would include a broad vocabulary, cover a wide range of topics, and reflect his knowledge about topics he considered important such as *his* field of study, *his* interests away from work, and *his* last vacation. For the most part, he would dominate the conversation, directing it where he prefers, interrupting often and listening only briefly to anyone else's comments. (With only a few exceptions, this describes the majority of my professors during my seven years of study. If my professor were female, she was far more likely to be single and interested in what I had to say.)

Now imagine being introduced to a woman who looks twenty-five, with native facial features, dressed in black jeans and a well worn black jacket, who smiles quickly and listens intently for a long time to many people. She speaks only once and when she does she

speaks at some length about her impressions, her life, and how she feels inside. She speaks haltingly and with a strong Tahltan, Nuu-Chah-Nulth, or Cree accent (what many white people commonly refer to as a "native" accent). She may arrive at the point she is presenting in ways we may not recognize. When she is finished she turns to listen again. After being introduced to her, you discover that she is a new faculty member at the local university. Surprised? I know I would be. And my surprise would not be over her intelligence, but rather, that she would be allowed into a community which resents and rejects much of what she may represent.

Thus, norms determining our behavior or way of being as practitioners represent an important dimension of the matrix of science. This dimension is closely related to the methodological dimension, for as Benston (1989) argues, those values associated with male attributes are represented in the principles underlying the methods of science. In other words, expected norms of behavior do more than determine acceptable scientific behavior; they also exemplify and sustain the values determining our way of doing (our methodologies) and our way of knowing (our epistemologies). Furthermore, they help us to identify a unique paradigm, as shall be demonstrated in the following chapter on feminism.

A Commitment to Political Power

The sixth and last dimension addresses the political nature of scientists' endeavors. By the word "political" I am referring to a group's status and influence gained by their collective activities. I am particularly interested in how their status and activities affect people outside of the scientific and academic communities. Specifically, I am interested in the often unspoken political goals of science practitioners as reflected in their very real consequences for nonscientists and non-academics. Margaret Benston (1989) argues that the actual consequences of applying scientific and academic findings further reveals the goals of modern science and that these goals are identical to those expressed by our patriarchal society. That is, the goals of patriarchy are the goals of science.

Benston (1989) maintains that science practitioners' present goals and activities lead directly to dominating and exploiting women, other marginalized people, and nature through our industrial, military, and political institutions. Yet science practitioners repeatedly deny having any moral responsibility for how science is applied by oppressive groups or that they are influenced by society's patriarchal institutions. Benston suggests that examining how science and academia depends upon and is used by nonscientific and nonacademic institutions is vital in developing a more useful picture of science. A brief examination of the complex relationships between the scientific and academic community in general and their larger social and political world reveals how practitioners must commit themselves to supporting and defending the goals of the larger male-dominated world.

It is possible to catch glimpses of this complex interaction from several angles. People from various fields of science serve as expert consultants within industry and the field of medicine; our social, cultural, and judicial systems; and in government decisions on issues with major economic, social, and legal impact. Depending on the level, legal precedents, medical findings, government policies, and business decisions may affect large populations in various ways. Benston (1989) notes that most often expert opinions and the results of research are used by businesses, corporations, and the military to justify their decisions to control and exploit women, other subordinated groups, and nature. Moreover, knowledge produced by these experts is presented to the public in an effort to gain support for the expletive actions of various social institutions and businesses. Expert knowledge is equated with the truth while knowledge gained from the nonscientific experience of daily life is minimized and ignored. Consequently, experts and the people whose power is supported by these experts wield tremendous political, social, and economic influence and power over the general populace. Thus, present social, cultural, judicial, and political institutions, and military and business interests maintain political power by using science to justify their actions.

In return for the weapons and justification they provide to these institutions, practitioners are supported in at least two ways. First, they are rewarded with research

funds and high-paying, secure positions for developing more of the expert knowledge needed to justify exploitation and to expand the power of the dominating group. As both Benston (1989) and Notturno (1984) note, they gain money and prestige within their own fields and more access to power as researchers, teachers, and consultants. Second, scientists are given the deference needed to avoid their own and the public's scrutiny. This can take the form of unquestioned private or public funding, being repeatedly referred to and called upon as reliable authorities, being granted tenure at universities, and access to public forums to express their views as authorities, such as conferences, interviews with the media, and publishing articles and books.

This protective seclusion from the public is enhanced by adopting presuppositions which, as Kuhn (1970) has noted, prevents science practitioners from investigating "socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm provides" (p. 37). Benston (1989) echoes this same argument, noting specifically the presupposition of reductionism. While reductionist techniques free science practitioners from distractions, they also justify avoiding social and political issues not easily reducible to quantifiable variables. These same political and social issues reveal the oppressive nature of our social, cultural, economic, and political institutions. Their examination could result in challenges to and consequently, a loss of power for these institutions and their stakeholders. By avoiding the complex reality of oppression, science practitioners and the people controlling these institutions maintain their political power and socio-economic privileges.

Consequently, as Susan Faludi (1991) documents, institutions support and protect the expert power of only those practitioners supporting the reign of those in privileged and powerful positions. Adopting a non-supportive paradigm means gambling with financial, moral, and institutional support. Indeed, Notturno (1984) observes that only those scientists of the early British Association for the Advancement of Science whose work served specific political interests saw their careers flourish. He points out the "importance of ideological and political affiliations in the structure and function" (p. 283) of science, observing how a

very small group "defined its interests, dispensed its funds, appointed its officers, and articulated its policies" (p. 284). Although thousands were members of the association, only ten men controlled over half of the money and patronage was common. Faludi lists a number of cases where publishers have ignored research findings supportive of women's rights and freedoms. Jeri Dawn Wine (1989) notes how researchers deviating from methods based on reductionism and objectivism endure considerable attacks from colleagues. Mary Daly (1990) describes Boston College's decision to deny her full professorship because her feminist views challenged the authority of the Catholic Church. Science practitioners presenting information which threatens the power and privileges of the present institutions and the people controlling them can expect, at the very least, to be isolated, and at the very worst, persecuted.

With their own expert power and socio-economic privileges intrinsically linked to the fortunes of the socially, economically, and politically powerful groups and institutions supporting them, scientists must maintain the positions of these groups. However, while feminists explicitly state the importance of their political affiliations and activities, the practitioners of modern science have vehemently denied that they have any agenda other than "pure research". Yet it is clear that modern scientists have failed to be objective or remain isolated from the interests of patriarchal institutions. In briefly discussing how a community of practitioners is affected by their social and political world, my point here is that the interests or goals of the institutions and groups most closely associated with practitioners reveals the interests and goals of practitioners and the nature of their activities.

Finally, as with the other previous five dimensions described in this chapter, becoming a scientist requires committing oneself to these mutual interests and goals, and allowing them to guide their behavior while at the same time denying their existence. Thus, the goals of a school of practitioners serve to identify it as a unique paradigm or part of a larger community.

IV. SUMMARY

It is by committing themselves to these six dimensions – theoretical, conceptual, instrumental, methodological, socio-cultural, and political – that ordinary people become science practitioners. Together, these dimension serve to determine the universe to be explored, which models and concepts will be considered legitimate or illegitimate, acceptable theories and laws, appropriate ways of knowing, being, and doing, the proper affiliations to be maintained and goals to be achieved, and most importantly, the values to be upheld. While these dimensions remain largely unexpressed, they determine most aspects of science practitioners' lives and work.

How then is theory and practice related? As discussed in this chapter, a theory exists within a paradigm and its acceptability is based upon its ability to express and explain generalities in data and meeting the criteria based upon the values underlying that paradigm. Theories provide us with a common language, identify puzzles to probe and suggest possible solutions. In this way, they guide our research in whatever form this may take: laboratory research, field work, case studies, etc. They also guide our work as we seek out solutions and test their completeness or effectiveness.

The relationship between theory and practice is further illustrated by examining the relationship between psychology and counselling. Within psychology, practitioners emphasize developing theories. Consequently, much time and energy is spent studying human behavior, or as one of my professor described it, studying how to study human behavior. The research serves to help develop theories by generating more data and hopefully, solving puzzles. This data usually strengthens (or in some case, challenges) our theories. Counselling is the practical application of these psychological theories. As counsellors, we spend much time and effort trying to identify what we believe are our clients' real problems or the puzzle they are presenting to us. Then we attempt to resolve the problems or solve the puzzles by helping our clients make what we believe are the appropriate changes. Our theory, however articulated it may be, plays a vital role by

directing our attention to (or away from) certain aspects of our clients' inner and/or outer world, and determines how we should go about assisting them in resolving their difficulties. Counselling then, tends to focus more on the practical application of psychological theories and models in the lives of individuals, couples, families, and groups, and on research into the effectiveness of therapy. Hence, the theories guiding research and discussion in psychology are the same ones guiding the work of counsellors.

More importantly, researchers and counsellors, like other science practitioners, share similar norms of behavior, political goals, specific beliefs and values underlying their work, and accepted models and concepts to describe their work. In all aspects, they are science practitioners who operate within the same paradigm. The model or models we rely upon are only one dimension of this paradigm. Other aspects of it, especially the values and fundamental beliefs of the paradigm are crucial in determining our thoughts and actions. This also explains how counsellors are able to be eclectic (draw from more than one model) or integrate various approaches. As Kuhn (1970) explains, those counsellors using eclectic or integrative approaches are able to do so because their models of choice co-exist within the same paradigm.

With this in mind, I now turn to exploring the various forms of feminism along some of the dimensions I have presented here. In a later chapter, I will describe how feminism informs psychology and counselling psychology in particular.

CHAPTER THREE: THE FEMINIST PARADIGM

I. INTRODUCTION

In order to discuss how feminism informs counselling practice and theory, it is first necessary to understand feminism. Feminism is a multidiscipline, or more precisely, a megadiscipline, addressing itself simultaneously to all areas of intellectual analysis, political activism, and personal struggle. Therefore, a discussion of feminism necessarily involves moving beyond counselling and psychology into political, economic, social, and philosophical arenas. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to study the historical development of modern feminism or to detail its present philosophical debates, it is necessary to briefly explore the varieties of current feminist theories and beliefs, models and exemplars, methodological approaches and their underlying values and presuppositions, cultural norms, and political agendas. In using the framework based on Kuhn's thesis, we are able to examine, along critical dimensions, the similarities and differences among the various schools of feminism.

Using Kuhn's framework also allows us to explore the possibility that feminism may be so vastly different from the present patriarchal paradigm of our society that it may, by Kuhn's definition, constitute an entirely new paradigm. In claiming a new paradigm, I risk committing the error of assuming the existence of an emerging paradigm and of a paradigm shift when there may be only a smaller and less significant variation in applying values or development of a new model. However, it is worth exploring this possibility in order to understand the potential and consequences of a feminist paradigm for counselling psychology, and our society in general.

This discussion is meant to introduce the reader to feminism while at the same time limiting this discussion to those ideas, concepts, and issues serving a purpose in this thesis. A discussion of how feminism informs counselling, and psychology in general, will follow in the next chapter.

II. COMMON THEMES IN FEMINISM

Feminism's Generalities and Theories

Feminism is based upon a fundamental set of generalizations or beliefs and explanations or theories. These theories provide the basis for the various models of feminism, as well as identifying problems/puzzles and their solutions. It is essential to identify these beliefs, as they are shared by some or all feminists and are fundamental to the discussions to follow.

All feminists have in common at least this one belief or theory: Women are considered to be and are treated as subordinate to men in our society (Code, 1988; French, 1985). Some women are subordinate to other women. Moreover, a few men dominate all women and other men. That is, feminists recognize that additional features aside from gender are used as the basis of stratifying among women and among men. These include, but are not limited to socio-economic status (the homeless, poor, and working-class versus middle- and upper-class), religion (christian versus non-christian), ethnic and racial background (white, Anglo-European versus non-white, native, black, non-European, etc.), physical abilities (physically abled versus physically disabled), sexual orientation (heterosexual versus homosexual), culture (Anglo-European, urban, middle-class versus non-Anglo-European, rural, lower-class), and age (young versus middle-aged versus elderly). Those people, especially women, who belong to more than one subordinate group, such as lesbian, immigrant, and First Nations women, are considered to be at a multiple disadvantage. In addition, many feminists consider men's attempts to dominate nature and the very real destruction of our natural world to reflect the dominant/subordinate structuring of our society.

Some feminists, especially those of the radical model, believe that men's domination of women cuts across socio-economic status, religion, ethnic and racial background, sexual orientation, culture, and age, and time and place in history and is the basis of all other forms of oppression (Code, 1988; French, 1985; Tong, 1989). As Angela Miles

(1989b) states "...we know that this oppression is the most profound condition of alienation, the deepest division of humanity within itself and from itself, upon which all other fragmentation and domination is built" (p. 18). Men's domination of women, both individually and structurally, is referred to as patriarchy (French, 1985). Feminists of other models or approaches within feminism, such as the socialist feminist model, may adopt this theory, but give it a lower priority relative to other theories.

As a result of this stratification based on gender and other demographics, the dominating group, made up primarily of heterosexual, able-bodied, middle- or upper-class, Anglo-European men, have more status than all women and other subordinate groups. They have greater privileges, meaning more access to and control of resources, greater rights before the law, and control over most aspects of the lives of women and other subordinate groups (Benston, 1989; Code, 1988; French, 1985; Tong, 1989). Society and its institutions, such as the law, media, family, schools, businesses, religions, and governments are designed to justify, maintain, and protect the privileges of the dominant groups at the expense of the subordinate groups. They establish the culture of the dominant groups as the norm against which all others are subcultures. Most importantly, feminists believe that the exploitation of women, nature, and all oppressed groups is wrong and harmful to all, including our oppressors (Benston, 1989; Finn, 1989a; French, 1985; Miles, 1989b; Miller, 1986).

Feminists believe that those institutions and systems maintaining and promoting all dominant/subordinate relationships are structured upon those characteristics and values traditionally attributed to men (Benston, 1989; French, 1985; Miles, 1989b; Miller, 1986). The male element of these artificial dichotomies is referred to as the masculine; it is valued, celebrated and institutionalized. Conversely, the female element, referred to as the feminine, is devalued and degraded. In all its forms, the institutionalized masculine or patriarchy, is so prevalent that it is the standard against which nonpatriarchal ideas are measured. Simone de Beauvior (Beauvior, 1994) describes this as the male norm and false universal against which the female is the Other and the Object: "He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other" (p. 8). It pervades all aspects of men's and women's public

and private lives, structuring our cultural, social, academic, and political institutions, as well as our language, images, ideas, visions, and spirituality. It determines our relationships to each other, to ourselves, and to nature.

All feminists challenge one, some, or all of a number of dichotomies fundamental to patriarchal organization, practice, and scholarship (Finn, 1989b; Harding, 1990; Miles, 1989b; Miller, 1986). Feminists demonstrate the artificiality of these divisions and in their place celebrate wholeness, commonality, relationality, and multiplicity. The following summaries are feminists' attempts to identify some of these dualisms:

> The presumed splits between public and private, rational and emotional, cultural and natural, mental and physical, objective and subjective, universal and particular, sacred and profane, knowledge and belief, subject and object – and male and female, of course – are constitutive of philosophical discourse and academic discourse generally.... The first element in each pair of opposites (according to the tradition, differences are oppositional) is aligned with "Man" as the essential human nature; and the second element with that which threatens "Man's" uniqueness, order and freedom. It is associated with Man's "eternal" Other, against whom, or which, he pits both brain and brawn – conquering nature, as they are wont to say. Woman appears along with this Other, as that which threatens the uniqueness of Man. (Finn, 1989b, p. 226)

> ... emotional versus intellectual and manual activity; sensuous, concrete, and relational versus abstract activity; unconscious (and repressed) versus conscious projects; ideas arising from everyday life versus those arising from administrative work; socially caused false beliefs versus true beliefs with no social origins. (Harding, 1990, p. 101)

One dichotomy central to this thesis is the separation of theory and intellectual work from practice and daily life. Feminists believe that theory and practice are inextricable (Code, 1988; Finn, 1989a; Harding, 1990; Nielsen, 1990; Tong, 1989). Theory grows out of the lived reality of women's lives and in turn informs our experiences. One of the

hallmarks of feminism is that theory is constantly compared to daily realities and modified, or if failing to match reality, rejected. This requires that we become critically aware of our world and ourselves, examining the very process of change itself (Benston, 1989; Code, 1988; French, 1985; Hartsock, 1990; Westkott, 1990). At the same time, theory illuminates women's experiences, giving words to describe and models to explain the nature of the event. As Lorraine Code (1988) observes, "theoretical analysis is an integral part of the feminist project, for none of the facts of women's experience speak for themselves" (p. 19). Reuniting theory, our growing awareness of oppression, and practice, our individual and collective activities to end oppression, means that being a feminist implicitly requires that one is actively working to bring about an end to the system of domination and oppression.

Feminists, initially radical and now most feminists, have declared that the tenet, the personal is political, and conversely, the political is personal, reflects the experiences of women and men (Code, 1988; French, 1985; Levine, 1989). That is, the often painful experiences of individual women and men, and the privileges of men as a whole reflect the values and structure of a male-dominated society. Moreover, what happens to one person affects all people, as when a violent act against one women affects the safety of all women. Conversely, the male domination of the public sphere, whether it be in politics, industry, education, unions, or the professions, oppresses women at these public levels and privately, in our relations with those we love and ourselves. The result is an oppressive isolation from other women and a marginalized existence. Through our coming together and a collective understanding of the culture of women, feminists challenge the artificial dichotomy of the personal and the political, and the oppression it imposes. Discovering common ground means discovering our subordination and oppressors, at individual, community, institutional, and societal levels. These common experiences are collective issues and hence, political issues.

As previously mentioned, all women and other subordinate groups experience, to varying degrees, the multiple forms of violence used to maintain our subordination. We each struggle with being alienated from ourselves and each other (Miller, 1986). In addition, members of subordinate groups need to learn to survive in a world based on the

characteristics of members of the dominant groups. This survival requires understanding and anticipating the needs of members of the dominant groups. These common experiences of negotiating our survival and of embodying the "Other" to the male universal of the dominant groups, result in the potential for subordinates to develop a deep empathy for each other which is unavailable to members of dominant groups.

Our awareness of our common experiences as subordinates serves as a basic presupposition of feminism. Feminists argue that members of dominant groups are unable to truly understand what it is like to be members of subordinate groups (Harding, 1986, 1990; Hartsock, 1990; Miller, 1986). For instance, some radical feminists believe that because gender differences are the most basic form of stratification and one must be a woman to truly understand what being a woman means, only women can be feminists (French, 1985). While men may experience some forms of exploitation, radical feminists argue that it is a qualitatively different experience. Hence, by virtue of not being female and of not sharing in the experiences of women, men are unable to fully empathize with women and therefore, can never be "feminist". However, they are able to provide support to women struggling to survive in and change our world. (Men who support women and engage in the struggle to achieve a feminist vision of the world are sometimes referred to as "profeminist"). More importantly, members of dominant groups are increasingly considered to be an indispensable part of the solution, for it the dominants who need to change if oppression is to end (Finn, 1989a; French, 1985; Hughes, 1989; Miller, 1986).

Feminism's Puzzles & Solutions

As noted in the previous chapter, these commonly held generalities or theories about the reality of the lives of members of subordinate groups also serve to identify acceptable puzzles and predict their solutions. Several inter-related puzzles affecting every dimension we shall explore here are of interest to feminists. A primary concern for feminists is understanding the exact nature of "power over" or dominate/subordinate relationships, and oppression. A second puzzle is multiplicity, being able to account for diversity among

women and among ways of being, doing, and thinking while at the same time identifying our specificity, those qualities and characteristics unique to us as women as compared to men. While there are many other puzzles, these two are common to most schools of feminism.

The first puzzle presented by feminism is to identify the nature of the dominant/subordinate relationship. What forms does it take? And how is it developed and maintained in all of its various forms? Feminism in general aims to identify the systematic oppression of women, as well as to develop strategies to end this oppression and to prevent further oppression. We are examining economic, political, and social policies and activities, structures, cultural norms, the arrangements of production, reproduction, and relationships, such as marriage and heterosexuality, the choice and enforcement of laws and the legal process, and the expression of violence, abuse, and exploitation. In examining these areas, we are also exploring how traditional science and scholarship have failed to identify our oppression and the structural sources of our oppression. It is clear to many feminists that traditional theory and research practices have failed to provide us with acceptable solutions. (Accepting our "natural place" is not an acceptable solution for the majority of women.) Why is this so? In response, feminists are examining what it is about the traditional sciences and scholarship that has failed to identify the nature of our oppression and direct us toward plausible solutions. We are developing ways of searching which enable us to identify and analyze oppression, as well as create alternatives.

Our critique (which is more fully explored in a later section of this chapter) has led us to consider a number of issues. Gail Stenstad (1989) warns that the search for a single theory and perspective, even among feminists, implies that we should all be the same, homogeneous. In adopting a single grand theory and universal laws, characteristics are assigned to people and women in particular as if they occurred naturally. Grand theories and universal laws also automatically create an in-group and an out-group consisting of those who accept the theory versus those who disagree with it. Stenstad argues that we need to recognize that our different situations and experiences give rise to different values and perspectives, the most fundamental of these being gynocentric and androcentric ones. In

reflecting on androcentric values, she notes that the structure of our language limits our expectations to rational discourse, and hence limits descriptions, meanings and ways of thinking. She stresses that our language needs to reflect anarchic thinking, that is, "thinking that does not work from, posit, or yield objective distance, supra-historical truth, hierarchical orderings, or a unitary reality" (p. 332-333). Feminism must be an approach which is embedded within an historical time, culture and place, is subjective, encourages differing views, and, as Jill McCalla Vickers (1989) asserts, distinguishes "between things governed by 'laws' (that is, which cannot be changed) and things which have only seemed to have been universal" (p. 52).

According to Stenstad (1989), the four most significant elements of a feminist approach to scholarship are "persistence in questioning, working and playing with ambiguities, being alert for the presence of the strange within the familiar, and allowing for concealment or unclarity in the midst of disclosure" (p 334). (For example, see the work of Mary Daly [1990].) Such a way of thinking and communicating allows for theoretical thinking and language, but "demotes 'the theory' to a situational analysis, useful and accurate within limits clearly demarcated in each case" (p. 333). Adopting women's unique and diverse forms of analysis, thought, and expression, allows us to see the limiting effects and falseness of patriarchal belief in the existence of a single "Truth", or only one acceptable way of searching for knowledge. In identifying these limits, Stenstad claims we are loosening the boundaries of male-stream thinking and thereby subverting its power to limit.

This leads us to a second major puzzle for feminists: The issue of specificity and multiplicity. In struggling to identify and end our oppression, feminists are increasingly aware of our unique experiences as women, our specificity. This has created what Code (1988) summarizes as the two paradoxes of feminism: First, although feminism stresses the differences in male and female experiences and qualities, it seeks to eliminate gender roles and redefine humanity. Second, by emphasizing the universality of women, feminism ignores the diversity of women. Concentrating on the similarities between women

strengthens our unity against an oppressive patriarchy. At the same time, observes Code, attempting to create a "false universalism" about women by generalizing about our experiences ignores our differences, raising protests from women about our dissimilarities due to race, culture, class, age, and sexual orientation. As Nancy Adamson, Linda Briskin, and Margaret McPhail (1988) maintain, although all women are without power because of their gender, some women have some power due to their race, sexual orientation, or class. Furthermore, these two paradoxes are intertwined. Code notes that some feminists have ironically observed that as the diversity amongst women is increasingly emphasized, so are the differences between women and men.

Our diversity needs to be reflected in our scholarship and theory-making. Because our experiences and situations are reflected in our methods, values, and ways of thinking, and because women are not a homogeneous group, it is also vital that the population of researchers reflect women's diversity. That is, women of color, lesbians, rural, immigrant, and working-class women must be among those directing and generating research. By continuing to deny our differing situation and experiences, we perpetuate racist and classist ideals and structures reflecting the sexism all women experience. As Anne Cameron (1989) observes, what do middle and upper class women know about the fear, frustration and anger of dealing daily with poverty, homelessness, and hungry children? Pretending we understand when we actually do not and could not because of our different situations is another form of stratification separating and silencing us.

At the same time, striving to identify our specificity as women and to be subjective still allows for a collective view of ourselves. Indeed, a central tenet of feminism is the belief in the importance of collectivity and the substantive changes resulting from collective or political action. Moreover, a truly subjective approach is vital to recognizing our diversity *and* identifying our commonalities, our specificity as women. Put another way, I must be in aware of my own past and present situation, even if this means first hearing others describe their experiences in order to find the words and images, and especially the courage and support to express my situation. By beginning with our personal experiences, we

discard the illusion of the objective observer and stand a better chance of working from within a genuine gynocentric perspective, a woman's culture. As Stenstad (1989) notes, we can "clear out lingering internalizations of patriarchal presuppositions" (p. 335) and begin to think creatively.

The Language of Feminism

In addition to identifying puzzles to solve, theories also create a new language. As Kuhn notes, a new paradigm means a new language wherein old words are given new meanings and new words are created. However, the invisibility and pervasiveness of the dominant/subordinate structuring of our society means that we are often unaware of how words are used to maintain our oppression. Consequently this issue is of special concern to feminists.

Our language is based on male experience and reflects the masculine universal. It is, as Madeleine Gagnon (1989) notes, our second language, the language of women being the first. Like Mary Daly (1990), she decries its lack of passion, desire, fantasy and sexuality. It denies and hides the experience and often even the existence of women. Gail Stenstad (1989) concludes that it is a language of a single voice, assuming universality and authority, seeking to delineate, divide, define, and "master its material", hiding as much as it reveals. It structures our thinking such that we are unable to identify oppressive patriarchal theories, values, and presuppositions, and move on to discover and explore alternatives allowing us freer expression. For example, Jill McCalla Vickers (1989) and Daly (1990) in critiquing positivist science, have identified some of the dangers of our present language with its euphemistic nature. They stress the importance of reclaiming language and the power to name, restoring context in discovery, and restoring agency in language. The people creating and upholding oppressive myths, beliefs, and actions must be identified, while accurate and empathic understandings of people's lives are needed in place of euphemistic and dispassionate descriptors such as "ritual" and "custom". What these feminists are advocating is a language which encourages us to think and which

captures our irrational modes, passions, and desires. It allows us to reunite what we know with what we do. The technical, cold language of modern science discourages creative and disruptive thinking, as well as responsibility, while isolating and hiding our humanity.

Cameron (1989) refers to the language of the male universal as "manguage", resulting in dense and complex texts which only academics and professionals can decipher. It is also, as she notes, the system in which women attempting to succeed in colleges, universities, businesses, and politics are trained. The use of "manguage" does more than hide women's experiences and situations. Cameron observes that it serves to separate women from each other, the academic versus the nonacademic, the professional versus the nonprofessional. It prevents feminists' discoveries from contributing to the understanding of research in other fields and the work of feminists outside of the boundaries of scholarship. For example, this document must meet the academic standards of my professors and my university in order that it might be made available to others. Yet those very academic standards make it distant and suspect to the women interested in its topic: frontline workers, feminist counsellors with little or no training, and women seeking support and acknowledgment. The ability of feminist scholarship to cross these boundaries is, as Vickers' notes, fundamental to feminism.

Stenstad (1989) calls for women to "return desire to the centre of language" (p. 383) and advocates an irrational, opaque, and multi-voice language whose elusiveness "makes a place for, and *makes way* for the opening up of creative possibilities" (p. 337). The work of Mary Daly (1990) exemplifies this, as she reinvents words in a number of ways and in doing so, reclaims them for women. For instance, she dismembers them (such as "dis-cover", "re-member", and "gyn/ecology") thereby calling our attention to their meanings, makes up words (such as "methodolatry" and "hagocracy") to more fully express her ideas, desires, feelings, and experiences, capitalizes words when they express a woman-centered language (such as "Lesbian" and "Spinster") as compared to the meaning given them by men, and uncovers hidden meanings (for words such as "Haggard", "Crone", and "Glamour") to revalorize them. She also advocates moving away from patriarchal styles and recognizes in

her own work her tendency to almost break "into incantations, chants, alliterative lyrics" (p. 24).

It is especially important to realize that the very words being used by feminists have often been given new meaning, arising out of women's unique experiences and situations. Again, the work of Daly (1990) clearly demonstrates how we are creating a new language. For instance, she returns the word "Crone" to its original meaning of "wise old woman" and enriches it to mean those survivors of patriarchy who have "dis-covered depths of courage, strength, and wisdom in her Self" (p. 16). Less evident are the changes to words and phrases such as "being in relation to oneself", which traditionally has referred to being in touch with one's spiritual centre in some mystical, transcendental way. For feminists such as Jean Baker Miller (1986, 1991), Janet L. Surrey (1991), and Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan (1992), this more often means a new awareness of and appreciation for our emotions and relationships, dreams and nightmares, our spirit and our body (especially our body as it is the source of our difference), our oppression and ultimately, our strength. It means being authentic, acting upon what we know and desire. Hence, relating to ourselves means exploring and celebrating our physical, social, and emotional selves in addition to our spiritual being.

Summary

While these common theories, puzzles and language are shared by the various models of feminism, this is often overlooked. A number of factors may be contributing to this emphasis on differences: the media's misrepresentation of feminism and stereotyping of feminists; the gulf between feminists who are academic or frontline, white or First Nation, colored or immigrant, upper- and middle-class or lower-class and homeless; or our lack of analysis. Nevertheless, these common presuppositions are shared by most feminists and underlie the various models feminists employ to demonstrate phenomena women experience, such as poverty, sexual assaults, or silence and isolation. As we shall see in the next section, these same theories are expressed in different forms within each of the various models of

feminism and their puzzles are given differing priorities. Whatever their expression, these theories form for many feminists the almost unspoken beliefs about our world as women.

III. MODELS AND EXEMPLARS OF FEMINISM

According to Kuhn (1970), models consist of one or more theories and within any paradigm there usually exists several models. This is clearly apparent within feminism, for feminists, while sharing a belief in the presuppositions I have just listed, have adopted a diverse range of models. Unlike theories, models describe how the phenomena function, the related phenomena needing to be explored and the priority these will receive; provide critical exemplars explaining how to apply these interpretations of the theories; and determine legitimate concepts. Quite often these models are mistakenly referred to as theories (see for instance, Rosemarie Tong, 1989). The result is that there appears to be many contradictory and competing "theories" of feminism, with the differences between models often receiving attention at the expense of considering feminism's commonalities along other dimensions. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile here to explore our differences in order to understand and appreciate our diversity in thought and deed.

Having said that, it is equally important to note that in daily practice, feminists often simultaneously draw on a number of models in addressing various forms of oppression and creating avenues for change. That they are able to do so is further evidence that the models I will present here are actually drawing on the same set of generalizations. Their differences do not reflect differing theories; rather, as Kuhn (1970) suggests, they reflect differing value judgements in determining the importance given to each of these theories. Furthermore, when proponents of differing models consider a theory to be a priority or central, their models will likely share similar descriptions of phenomena, strategies, etc.

While there are a number of taxonomies delineating models of feminism, I have chosen models exploring political activity and analysis, as these tend to underlie other areas of study, such as psychology and economics. I am presenting here some of the more predominant models which have proven the most useful for the purposes of this discussion. Although they overlap in daily practice, I have simplified and artificially separated them here for the sake of discussion.

In examining these models, I am drawing on the work of a number of feminists. Lorraine Code (1988) describes and critiques the most commonly recognized feminist models: liberal, Marxist/socialist, and radical feminism, and identifies how they differ in at least three ways using the key elements of models described by Kuhn (1970). First, they vary in characterizing the main components of women's oppression. Second, they differ in explaining how oppression occurs, and third, they offer diverse strategies for ending oppression. She also provides us with a number of useful exemplars to illustrate how to apply each model's interpretation of feminism's basic beliefs or theories. Rosemarie Tong (1989) offers a more detailed picture of these models and more clearly distinguishes between Marxist feminism (which I only briefly explore here) and socialist feminism, the latter being of specific interest to this thesis and widely used by feminists. Nancy Adamson, Linda Briskin, and Margaret McPhail (1988) clarify the differences between liberal, socialist, and radical models' emphasis on priorities and strategies for change. Together, their analyses of various feminist models provide insight into the differences within feminism. Although I also draw on additional models, the four I explore here provide the most useful frames of reference for examining counselling, and psychology in general.

A fourth taxonomy, by Angela Miles (1981, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c), examines two alternative models of feminism, pressure and transformational, based on an analysis of political activism and vision of change. Her work is especially useful in understanding the goals of feminist politics and therefore is presented in a latter section.

Liberal Feminism

Lorraine Code (1988) contends that liberal feminists believe, based upon principles of justice, fairness, and self-determination, women are entitled to the same freedom and equality men enjoy. They contend that beliefs in biological determinism, which maintain that women are, for example, biologically ordained to be emotional, irrational, and poor at math and business, restrict women to the roles of mother, wife, sex object, child bearer, and server. Social structures founded on this belief system discriminate against women, denying

us equal educational and work opportunities, and human rights. Liberal feminists argue that as a result of these beliefs and structures, women are relegated to the home where we receive no pay, little acknowledgement, and conditional support for our work of sustaining humanity. We are financially dependent upon our husbands, or, if working outside the home, restricted to low paying service jobs. Those gathering the financial and social support to enter a profession continue to face lower pay and the notorious "glass ceiling". Our poverty prevents us from securing our legal rights while our inferior social status denies us our social rights. In all cases, argues Code, women face "oppressive sexual standards according to which (we) are viewed as sex objects, and hence limited in (our) freedom to move about society" (p. 35).

Consequently, liberal feminists strive to ensure women have equal access to educational and employment opportunities, and financial and legal support in an effort to achieve our emancipation. They argue that, given the same opportunities as men, women can be as good as men and that society needs to change its social structures to provide women with support and equal access to opportunities, resources, and rights. Rather than defining women solely in terms of our roles as mothers, wives, and sex objects, liberal feminists work toward assisting women to develop the skills necessary to compete with men, become financially independent, and be as equally involved as men in public decision-making structures. Liberal feminists seek to eliminate gender stereotyping by promoting androgyny or a model of humanity wherein each person can develop feminine and masculine characteristics.

The efforts of liberal feminists, contend Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail (1988), can be recognized in initiatives to encourage women to choose careers in the sciences, to hire more women in management, and to encourage flexible work hours. They seek to place women within power structures by running for political positions or seeking advancement, or to influence these structures through lobbying and voting. Groups such as the National Action Committee on the Status of Women or the Section on Women and Psychology of the Canadian Psychological Association seek change inside our present structures, rather than

to change the structures themselves. As Tong (1989) points out, the work of liberal feminists has historically resulted in many of the educational and legal reforms women enjoy today.

There are, however, a number of problems with liberal feminist approaches. As Code (1988) notes, they fail to offer practical strategies for achieving women's equality in social structures "defined and constructed to promote masculine well-being" (p. 36) and whose existence requires women's domestic labour. Men have refused to surrender their power and privileges to make room for women and to assume their share of domestic duties and caring for others, thereby freeing up women's time and energy. Flexible work hours translate into women being more available as parents while fathers continue to ignore their child-rearing responsibilities. Liberal feminists' goal of women developing our own identity beyond the confines of motherhood and marriage ignores the value of and desire to be in heterosexual relationships and be a parent, ignoring that the roles of partner and mother can be meaningful ones.

More importantly, Tong (1989) notes that many women disagree with the liberal model's claim that women can, want to, and "should become like men, to aspire to masculine values" (p. 32). An example of this is found in discussions on androgyny which value male over female qualities. Androgyny encourages women to give up their learned ability to nurture growth and community in favor of learning to dress for success, be assertive, competitive, and non-emotional. It creates the misleading image of the "liberated woman", of women-who-are-trained-to-be-men. At the societal level, liberal feminists fail to challenge the structure of these patriarchal institutions and the stereotyped conceptions of men they are based upon, as well as the resulting social relations enforcing women's social and economic dependence. Women are judged on their ability to "make it in the system" without questioning the structure of the system nor how it isolates us from the support of other women. Within the liberal model, women continue to be defined in relation to men and a male concept of humanity.

Moreover, both Code (1988) and Tong (1989) identify several problems with the concept of equality. Accepting the concept requires that all men are equal and this is clearly

untrue. Therefore, women would achieve equality with either subordinate or dominate groups of men, and once again, the issue of inequality would remain unaddressed. In addition, there is the issue of being equal but different. Many liberal feminists acknowledge that they want women to complement rather than be like men. However, the implicit danger in the equal but different argument is that women will be forced to complement male needs and plans by serving as their wives and mothers. As Code observes, women's roles and rights will again be determined by men's concepts of equality. There is also considerable doubt as to whether the concept of equality can be employed in achieving women's freedom, for it is highly abstract and requires "sameness of goals, rights, and opportunities" (Code, 1988, p. 46). Finally, Tong notes that the emphasis on the abstract individual's rights is unrealistic and assumes a white, middle-class, heterosexual stereotype. Moreover, individual rights fail to equate with a creating a better community or society, resulting in only a few elite or privileged women gaining "equality" at the expense of other women.

Socialist Feminism

Socialist feminism, contends Tong (1989) and Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail (1988), is an attempt to unite Marxist and radical models of feminism. The Marxist model of feminism, according to Code, is based upon the theory that capitalist societies depend upon increased consumerism and productivity, and require a class of labourers trained to believe that their oppressive and alienating working conditions are natural. In addition,

> the ruling class dominates not only the modes of production, but also the development and spread of knowledge and values. Hence it generates perceptions of human nature and social reality that are distorted by its own perspective so as to make the status quo seem the 'natural' way for things to be. (Code, 1988, p. 28)

From the radical model, as we shall see, socialist feminists draw on their analysis of patriarchy and gender differences. Tong (1989) notes that socialist feminists argue that capitalism relies upon the subordination of women. The result, asserts Code (1988), is a

model wherein families reflect the oppressive capitalist structures of the workplace. Like the working class under the ruling class, women as a group are subjected by men to alienating work and living conditions as well as economic, social, and material oppression, and are taught to believe this is natural. Thus, according to this model, socialization into male and female roles, rather than biological determination, results in women's oppression. The traditional family structure, as the essential vehicle of our oppression, "sustains women's dependent status, enforces compulsory heterosexuality and perpetuates stereotypes of masculine and feminine gender in members of the next generation" (Code, 1988, p. 39). Within this structure, we are our husbands' property and are expected to be naturally selfless nurturers and caregivers, serving the needs and interests of our husbands and children. Our reproductive labour of conceiving, bearing, and raising children, as well as caring for and nurturing men is unrecognized, undervalued, unpaid, without social regard. Heterosexuality is used to reproduce and justify our lack of choices. We are alienated from our bodies, our children, other women, and the public sphere in order to serve the needs of men.

Socialist feminists, as Code (1988) points out, assert that women in capitalist societies need to enter the workforce as full participants, yet when we attempt to do so, we face other forms of oppression. We often must work for men whose supposed superior competence is neither apparent nor real. We earn approximately sixty to seventy per cent of what men earn and continue to face a full-time job in the home. We own "neither the means of (our) production nor the products of (our) labour" (Code, 1988, p. 36), thus experiencing the same alienating conditions that working class men must deal with.

Consequently, socialist feminists strive to eliminate gendered attitudes which assign differences to men and women, and the artificial separation of the private/home and the public/workplace. They seek alternatives to patriarchal family arrangements which include, to name just a few, sharing domestic duties collectively, access to abortion and birth control, establishing universal daycare, and granting higher esteem, if not wages, to the tasks of bearing and raising children, and caring for others. In the workplace they seek

changes such as wage equity and job security for women. Politically they seek to remove power from an elite and return it to those struggling for change. Their strategies include, according to Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail (1988), collective action such as organizing unions within businesses, political confrontations, and rallies against governments.

In providing both class and gender analyses, feminists relying on a socialist model are able to locate themselves within their material and historical contexts. As Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail (1988) argue, this allows us to specify causes of and challenges to men's domination over women. More importantly, they contend that in avoiding an analysis based solely on gender differences and generalized across time and situations, we are able to recognize common goals shared by women and men, as well as ways in which women have resisted oppression. They suggest that the socialist model offers "a challenge to the complex relations of power as they are expressed through class, race, and sexual orientation, as well as those based on gender" (p. 174).

Code (1988) lists a number of difficulties feminists have raised with the socialist model of feminism. First, women are clearly oppressed in non-capitalist societies. Second, some of the barbaric practices men have forced upon women, such as foot-binding, hysterectomies, and breast enlargements, fail to be fully explained by analyzing labour in a capitalist society or by tacking on an analysis based on gender. Third, the structure of the labour market has failed to change as a result of women's increasing participation in it. The majority of working women have jobs with no security and are underpaid. Hence, they continue to remain in poverty or be economically dependent upon men. Fourth, if employed outside the home, women usually hold two jobs as they continue to be responsible for the majority of work in the home. Fifth, analysis along class lines is an unreliable method. It is unsafe to assume that the income and social status of men reflect the standards of living for their wives and children. Sixth, an analysis based on the unit of the "family" fails to account for women who are divorced, widowed, have female partners, or have never married. The final and greatest weakness of the unified model that socialist feminists are attempting to create, notes Tong (1989), is that it "runs the risk of erasing, or at least

eroding, the differences that exist among women" (p. 193). She argues that the unity of viewpoints would be achieved "at the expense of diversity".

Radical Feminism

According to Code (1988), radical feminists, like Marxist and socialist feminists, believe that women face economic and social oppression, and consequently share many strategies with them. However, in contrast to Marxist, socialist and liberal feminists who minimize the differences between women and men, radical feminists stress women's specificity. That is, they emphasize women's biologically-based differences from men and that our differences, especially our ability to reproduce, have defined women and led us to develop distinct characteristics. Tong (1989) contends that radical feminists, more so than feminists of other models, have attended to "the ways in which men attempt to control women's bodies.... (and) constructed female sexuality to serve not women's but men's needs, wants, and interests" (p. 72). That is, male self-definition and legitimacy depends upon exploiting women and insisting upon the illegitimacy of women's ways, knowledge, and values. Radical feminists believe men use these differences to justify exploiting, abusing, and oppressing women, and have structured our institutions on androcentric values and the devaluing of the gynocentric. This is the essence of patriarchy.

Moreover, radical feminists, such as Marilyn French (1985), believe that the oppression of women by men lies at the root of all forms of oppression. Judith Myers Avis (1988) writes that radical model of feminism demonstrates how the oppression of women "has operated across time, across culture, across class – and that it is embedded in every aspect of life, including language, and is therefore the hardest form of oppression to eradicate" (p. 25) and that men, regardless of their race, class, and culture, unite in dominating women. French argues that if this form of oppressive stratification is no longer necessary and consequently eliminated, then other forms of domination, such as racism, classism, and ecological exploitation will also be eradicated. Consequently, the focus of radical feminist analysis is patriarchy, writes Code (1988), "as manifested in patriarchal

family arrangements, in gender stereotyping, pornography, wife and child abuse, and rape" (p. 39).

The ideology of radical feminists, according to Code (1988), is often summed up in the maxim, "the personal is political, demonstrating how patriarchal society structures personal experiences and relations in ways disadvantageous to women" (pp. 39-40) while supporting male power and privilege. They identify how power differences between women and men are systematically created, enforced and defended through legal and social control of women's "sexual, procreative, and emotional labour". For example, when an aspect of life within the home fails to meet a man's expectations or he sees his authority undermined, Code observes that women are often held accountable by their husbands, the clergy, the media, and the law for failing to have been appropriately submissive and obedient. Relationships based on power over others are further enforced through myths created by men about gendered attributes and unknowingly internalized by women who then struggle to live up to them. Moreover, men use these myths to justify exploiting, oppressing and abusing women. These myths include beliefs that all women should be thin, physically beautiful, emotional, dependent, poor at reason and logic, responsible for our husband's anger and our children's failures, available as objects for male sexual satisfaction, and naturally desiring to be wives and mothers, as well such contradictory beliefs that women are saintly virgins who abhor sex and deceiving whores who seek to seduce men and desire to be raped. Radical feminists seek to expose myths about women and men, and challenge the patriarchal social and family structures built upon them.

Radical feminists, maintains Code (1988), are responsible for bringing issues of violence in the home, such as wife assault and child abuse, into the public forum for scrutiny and change. Together with socialist feminists, they address additional oppressive issues of the home, such as poverty, reproduction (abortion, contracted motherhood, sterilization, and contraception), and sexuality; and of the workplace, such as discrimination, pornography, prostitution, sexual harassment, and rape. Both groups simultaneously attend

to the public and the private, home and the workplace, demonstrating how what happens in one arena affects the other.

More so than liberal and socialist feminists, radical feminists revalorize and celebrate qualities and values traditionally associated with women, such as caring, loving, intuition and interdependence as the means to restructure society and redefine humanity. Radical feminists such as French (1985) consider women's values, knowledge, and skills at least equal to, if not more important, than those of men. They stress revalorizing women's qualities and using them to transform societal structures which have been built exclusively upon male norms. They also argue, as Jean Baker Miller (1986), Mary Daly (1990), and Judith Myers Avis (1980) note, that what has been labeled as our personal defects are actually our responses to being systematically oppressed and dominated. What has been labeled as our "maladjustment" by members of the dominating groups is the normal and healthy response to an unhealthy, that is patriarchal, society.

Tong (1989) writes that radical feminists have been uncovering and developing women's culture, including our religions, "science, art, poetry, literature, song, dance, cuisine, (and) horticulture" (p. 72). As Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail (1988) contend, they have exposed and challenged oppressive myths through consciousness-raising groups wherein women can unite to identify and validate our experiences of oppression and power, enabling us to move from personal isolation to political action for change. They have also encouraged women to remove ourselves from male-defined and dominated systems and structures, and to create women-centered alternatives. To this end, many radical feminists believe that power inequalities between men and women are so entrenched that "female separatism" is the only solution for change. They consider heterosexuality as a means of perpetuating male domination by coercing women to be emotionally, sexually, socially, and economically dependent on men. These separatist feminists, Code (1988) writes, believe that "lesbianism offers the basis for a radical restructuring of sexuality through the creation of a woman-culture founded on non-hierarchical, supportive female values" (p. 42).

Radical feminists' emphasis on biological-based differences is often times seen as restating the biological determination argument long used to justify women's oppression. Indeed Susan Faludi (1991) and Jeri Dawn Wine (1985) maintain that explorations of women's specificity such as Carol Gilligan's (1982a) research on women's moral development have been used in discriminatory arguments against women. However, as Jeri Dawn Wine (1985, 1989) contends, it is the patriarchal devaluing of women's qualities and values rather than women's specificity causing our oppression. Wine maintains that it is vital that we identify and celebrate our unique ways of being, knowing, thinking, and doing, as these are our means of transforming our male-dominated world.

A more serious argument against the radical model offered by Tong (1989) and Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail (1988) is that, like the concept of equality, patriarchy may be too abstract a concept to be useful. In emphasizing the persistence and continuity of patriarchy across time and place, our oppression appears timeless; it seems to lack any origins and consequently, also may offer little hope for change. This has the unfortunate effect of leaving women feeling overwhelmed and hopelessness while also hiding our acts of resistance to patriarchy. It makes it difficult for many women to envision alternatives and to develop strategies for change. It also tends to portray women and men as opposites in conflict with each other, making it difficult to identify the points of cooperation between men and women in striving for common goals. Nevertheless, it has been radical feminists, such as Marilyn French (1985) who have detailed the adverse effects of patriarchy for men, thereby providing arguments and strategies for expanding the base of the feminist movement to include the energy and resources of men.

IV. THE METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF FEMINISM

Feminist ways of searching have grown out of a dissatisfaction with the methods of modern science, especially empirical methodologies. They have consistently been inadequate, making invisible issues which are important to feminists. Therefore, in understanding the nature of feminist methodologies, it is vital to first understand the practice and goals of modern science with its dependence upon empiricism and some of the more relevant modern alternative approaches which have developed recently. By critiquing these from within a feminist perspective, we are able to quickly identify and address those issues of interest to this thesis. Recalling Kuhn's (1970) assertion that methodologies are actually based upon a set of values, this section will also include a discussion of those values underlying traditional and feminist research methods. Finally, I will present some of the directions taken recently in discussions on feminist research and outline a set of guidelines for feminist research methods.

The Nature of Modern Science

Given that feminist methods of inquiry are what Jill McCalla Vickers (1989) has labeled a "rebellion" against the positivist view of science, it is important to first understand modern science, including its presuppositions, goals, methods, and procedures. Margaret Benston (1989) writes that "science can mean several things: the social institution made up of scientists plus the relations between them; the total body of propositions and information about the world; or a methodology describing how to carry out investigation of the world" (p. 63). As she observes, science consists of interrelated aspects (or what Kuhn referred to as dimensions) of the community of practitioners. These components have been developed by practitioners of the physical sciences and explicitly adopted by practitioners of the social sciences. She also asserts that modern science is considered such a powerful and effective method of gaining specific information about our world that its methods are now equated with knowledge and truth:

> Such an approach is widely perceived not simply as one important way of understanding and interpreting the world, but as the only legitimate way. Science is no longer just one form of knowledge; it has become identified with knowledge itself. (p. 58)

Kuhn (1970) maintained that science practitioners rely upon presuppositions based upon a set of values rather than upon a set of rules to determine their methods. Benston (1989) identifies these critical presuppositions characterizing science and common in scientific practice:

> 1. There exists an "objective" material reality separate from and independent of an observer. This reality is orderly.
> 2. The material world is knowable through rational inquiry and this knowledge is independent of the individual characteristics of the observer.
> 3. Knowledge of the material world is gained through measurement of natural phenomena; measurement in a scientific sense consists of quantification, i. e., reduction to some form of mathematical description.
> 4. The goal of scientific understanding is the ability to predict and control natural phenomena. (This postulate often takes the form of the equation between science and power.) (pp. 63-64)

To these Benston (1989) adds postulates representing the "reductionist" paradigm of modern scientific practice:

> a) The specific sciences are arranged in hierarchical order, varying from high level ones like sociology and psychology through biology and chemistry to particle physics at the base.
> b) The sciences at the base are more fundamental. Phenomena in higher level sciences can be reduced on the basis of a one-for-one correspondence to phenomena, and hence laws appropriate to the lower level sciences; ultimately, physical laws, beginning with ones for the particle level, can be derived which will subsume and explain sociology, for example.

> c) The phenomena to be studied can be isolated out from their surroundings; the essential features of these phenomena can be described by a mathematical theory that offers some insight into the workings of physical reality. (p. 64)

Feminist Critiques of Modern Science

A feminist critique of modern science grows out of the developing awareness of a woman-centered perspective. From within this perspective feminist scholars such as Benston (1989), Vickers (1989), Nielsen (1990), and Harding (1990) are identifying a number of difficulties with the empirical methods of science which fall into two general categories. The first group addresses the "impoverished reality" of reductionist techniques, while the second deals with the falseness of objectivism.

The postulates of reductionism, argues Benston (1989), dictate that objects and phenomena be stripped of nonquantifiable content in order to be studied. Reductionism further implies that "the quantifiable, 'scientific' aspects of the phenomenon under study are in fact, the important ones" (p. 65). Subjective, ethical, or qualitative aspects are considered incompatible with rationality and objectivity. Such a view of reality, maintains Benston, represents male norms and is incompatible with female norms. And given that male norms are more highly valued than female norms in our culture, reductionism is supported while challenges to it are considered illegitimate. Consequently, when feminists, environmentalists, First Nations people, etc., object to or question the methods employed, the incomplete way issues are presented or explored, or the results obtained by science practitioners, their voices are ignored for being unreasonable, uninformed, biased, subjective, and emotional.

In her critical analysis of modern scientific methods, Vickers (1989) echoes some of Benston's (1989) arguments, identifying four feminist "rebellions" against the reductionist postulates. The first, a rebellion against decontextualization, questions the assumption that society consists of homogeneous individuals about whom generalizations can be made and applied. Like Benston, Vickers contends that analytical methods strip the context from a

person, including even their sex, making invisible issues of key importance to feminists, such as men abusing their children, female partners and other men. Feminists, writes Mary Brown Parlee (1979), are "concerned with phenomena which cannot be readily be abstracted, even conceptually, from the complex, rich, and varied world of human experience – phenomena which clearly cannot be simulated in laboratory experiments" (p. 128).

Second, Vickers (1989) maintains that context is removed from discovery, often through the use of language. She notes that many feminist linguists have argued that our language reflects the patriarchal power structure of our society and the male universal. Vickers observes how marginalized groups such as women and children remain hidden by words like "man" and "mankind". These words, when their context is examined, are meant to exclude anyone who is not "man". Such a language, she argues, undermines women's power to shape and determine our reality, as it does when we attempt to describe our experiences. Moreover, in examining scientific language, she attributes some of the difficulties we encounter in recognizing our experiences and identifying our oppressors to the lack of agency in scientific language and to the exclusion of women as agents with the power to name. Mary Daly (1990) asserts that women have been denied the power of naming and consequently, we fail to have the words to investigate the largely unexplored and unknown mental processes involved in, for example, our intuition.

The power of naming is further demonstrated when agency is hidden with euphemisms such as "attitude", "custom", "force" and "rites". These categories have the effect of explaining away the origins, causes, and people who gain by oppressive and exploitive actions. More specifically, agency, when falsely presented in vague terms such as "forces, factors, roles, structures, stereotypes, constraints, attitudes and influences" (p. 48) hides the identities and motives of the people responsible for maiming, torturing, and killing others and misleads us in our search to understand and transform our world.

Third, Vickers (1989) claims that context is again removed from discovery through reversal. Reversal is in place when women, First Nations' people, and other oppressed groups are presented as having adopted an abusive and oppressive activity such as foot-

binding, women eating only after men have eaten, sexual abuse, breast enlargements, and genital mutilation, rather than having it imposed on them by their oppressors. Vickers argues that implying that these activities have been chosen has the effect of making the survivors responsible for the tyranny, mutilation, pain, and death inflicted upon us. Moreover, she observes how casual words such as "ritual" and "custom", when presented together with the hidden assertion that women freely adopt practices resulting in our pain and at times, death, diminishes horrendous experiences to the point of invisibility. Vickers arguments echo earlier charges by Parlee that these context-stripping methods conceal the relationship between women, cultural norms, and the institutions directing our lives, to the benefit of people who want to discourage investigation into these political relationships. In addition, Parlee asserts that practitioners employing such methods "actively obscure or falsify" what our senses tell us is happening by insisting on alternative explanations.

The result of presenting phenomenon using these reductionist techniques becomes evident when contrasted with feminist techniques in depicting the same phenomenon, as with, for example, the "practice" of clitoridectomy. In the language of modern science, a clitoridectomy is the removal of the clitoris in the customs or rituals of, among others, the Christian Kenyans, the Indian Muslins and the Egyptian Nubians. Compare this to Marilyn French's (1992) detailed portrayal from a feminist perspective of the "practice" of clitoridectomy. The sex of the people who have "adopted" this "practice" is plainly presented. Since only women and girls have a clitoris, they are the only ones who undergo a clitoridectomy. French also provides a description of a clitoridectomy which is probably closer to reality than that implied by the dispassionate medical term. Usually performed by a midwife or male barber, the young woman or girl is held down by relatives and will at times struggle to the point of having her bones broken by them. As she struggles, her most sensitive organ, her clitoris, will be crudely cut out, normally with a rusty knife, a piece of broken glass, or a razor. The girl will experience excruciating pain as no anesthetic will be given to her. Some of the many consequences she also will likely experience include "hemorrhage; shock; inability to urinate; urinary infection; blood poisoning or tetanus (from

unsterilized instruments); fever; death from any of these" (p. 108). If she should survive this terrifying mutilation, she will never again be able to experience sexual excitation and orgasm.

According to French (1992), members of cultural and/or religious groups, including Europeans and North Americans, who inflict clitoridectomies upon girls and women, consider girls and women to be the property of their fathers and husbands, and consequently, have little, if any, power to voice their objections within their culture's patriarchal social and political institutions. Moreover, French discusses the extreme difficulty researchers have in gathering information about female genital mutilation. Both men and women regard researchers as intruders who are profaning religious beliefs and attempting to impose Western views of the world upon these women.

While the words "custom" or "ritual" implies that these women have "adopted" this activity, thereby eliminating the identities of their tyrants, French (1992) points out that in reality they are coerced in a number of ways by their misogynist husbands, fathers, and religious leaders to undergo and even perform this brutal act. In some countries male religious leaders have led women to believe that this is required for their religious salvation. In others, men demand women have their clitoris removed for fear it will kill a baby by touching it during the birthing process, grow as big as a penis, or decrease a man's pleasure and control over his orgasm. Without mutilation, men fear women will not be virgins for marriage, will masturbate, be unable to become pregnant, or simply be unsuitable for marriage. They complain that a woman's clitoris is ugly and smells foul, and resent that women have an analogous organ to their penis, symbol of their authority. In fact, French argues that some of these men are aware of the superiority of a woman's clitoris and envy that, unlike a male's penis, it is "compact, protected, and unique – it has no other function but producing sexual pleasure" (p. 112). French points out that women who refuse to believe any of the justifications men provide still believe it is necessary to mutilate their daughters to prevent them from becoming social outcasts. Men refuse to marry unmutilated girls, and in

many parts of the world, the lack of a husband means they are viewed as any man's prey: hence, they will still face abuse and death at the hands of men.

Thus, to describe clitoridectomy as a custom adopted by certain cultures or freely performed by mothers upon their daughters, is to hide the men and the patriarchal institutions who today continue to force it upon over twenty million women as a means of tyrannizing and controlling them in order that men may feel superior and maintain their power over women and girls. While this example may seem removed from the lives of the majority of North American women, it could just as easily be applied to many of our own experiences. For instance, Naomi Woolf (1990) discusses how anorexia, bulimia, diets, breast implants, liposuction, cosmetic surgery, and even high-heeled shoes cause tremendous destruction to women and at times, our death. However, these practices are often viewed as women's choices, without any consideration for the tremendous social and cultural pressure exerted upon us.

Vicker's (1989) fourth rebellion against reductionism focuses on universal laws about human behavior and inevitability. She addresses several problems therein. First, practitioners often assume that there are regularities in human behavior which can be identified and expressed in quantifiable terms. Second, such laws must avoid reference to an object or location in time and space. This makes it impossible to address issues evident only when seen in relation to other objects, historical times, or places, such as oppression. While some universal laws may be useful, Vickers argues that "the point is that not all universal statements are meaningful quite simply because they strip context beyond the point which is useful" (p. 52).

Furthermore, Vickers (1989) warns that a danger in labeling exists. Once women's characteristics are ascribed to their sex rather than their gender, theses characteristics are seen as occurring naturally, and therefore, *"about which most would conclude that meaningful universal statements can be made"* (p. 52). She illustrates her argument with the example that many people believe that women naturally want to bear and raise children. It is untrue that all or some women must raise children. She also argues that women are not

born with a "natural" instinct to raise our young. However, our species' survival is subject to a universal law wherein the young require nurturing behavior for a long period of time and the species must have people willing to provide this nurturance. Presenting a myth, that women must raise children, as a universal law justifies dominants' arguments that this is our primary and natural function and consequently, women should be forced to stay at home and out of the public realm where decisions are made by members of dominant groups regarding women's and children's lives. As in the case where women are oppressed because of a belief that women must raise children, Vickers contends that laws must no longer serve as a means to justify limiting women's expression and development or the privileged positions of power occupied by white, heterosexual males. She notes that many feminists argue for a need to be sensitive to the socio-cultural milieu and to changes occurring with time, recognizing that humans seem to be a "self-making species which exists within limiting material parameters" (p. 52).

Vickers' (1989) argument against linearity "relates to the assessment of the impact of change" (p. 53) as reflected in universal laws and the theories of change associated with these laws. Invariably, these laws and theories reflect what is considered important from an androcentric standpoint and yet are generalized to include women. By way of an example, she notes how androcentric theories of economic change have described events as progressive, despite these same events oppressing and exploiting women. Or consider how our governments taught us that Canada was settled by Europeans and that this has been beneficial to all, thereby ignoring how we have devalued and destroyed the cultures of most of the First Nations' people and many ecological areas, such as the Great Lakes and the wild prairies. Assuming laws and theories of change are universal reflects an androcentric bias requiring the knowledge and insight of the powerless to be silent, for their experiences and situations provide evidence against universality and linearity.

As Benston (1989) concludes, while reductionism insists "that a quantitative description of reality is the truest one", feminists argue that in many cases, it distorts and denies reality. All too often, reductionism and its techniques are used to create untrue and

oppressive generalizations, make impossible the study of issues important to oppressed people, remove context from discovery in a number of ways thereby distorting reality and misassigning responsibility, strip phenomena of its identifying qualitative and ethical features, and deny the history and knowledge of marginalized peoples.

Benston (1989) maintains that whereas practitioners use reductionism to justify a quantitative description of phenomena, they use the postulates of objectivism to contend that this description is possible to achieve. The first two postulates of science lead to the assumption of objectivism, and in particular, the objective or separate observer. Science focuses its attention on the "invariant quantities" natural objects are assumed to have. This includes reducing human beings to their quantitative features. By virtue of their training, observers are expected to be impersonal, distant, and "independent of context" and a measurer using standard accepted methods and procedures to identify these invariant quantities. They are expected to be rational and emotionally detached, an impartial judge, and skilled at identifying and measuring quantitative aspects of natural objects and phenomena. Experimental methods are objective if research can be replicated by different observers with the same results and if the researcher/observer/subject and participant/object are seen as different and separate. Benston concludes that this approach to science authorizes the observer to "assume the right of mastery over objects" (p. 67), including humans.

Given these features, Benston (1989) argues that objectivism is unacceptable for two reasons. First, in actual practice, objectivism fails to describe scientific methods, and second, objectivism as an ideal is unacceptable to feminists. Benston contends that objectivism is one of the myths put forward by modern scientists, noting that it rests on the assumption that theory grows out of experimentation. However, as she points out, science philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn (1970) have argued that in actual practice, experiments depend on theory. Theory will determine what the observer notices and ignores, how the observer interprets the results, which questions will be asked, and which phenomena observed. For example, science practitioners within the field of quantum physics at one point debated whether

light had the properties of particles or waves. They eventually realized that light can be either a particle or a wave. The determining factor was what the observers/researchers believed they would see. As a result, notes Nielsen (1990), theorists in quantum physics now realize that the interests of the researcher will determine the properties of subatomic particles.

Furthermore, as Benston (1989) notes, in sciences such as chemistry where experiments are relatively simple and involve uncomplicated phenomena, variation among observers will be small. However, in disciplines such as biology, and even more so, psychology, practitioners are observing phenomena which are highly complex and for which it is extremely difficult to control for all factors. The result, she argues, is that the observer must necessarily draw conclusions and rely on subjective factors to do so.

Additional factors erode the ideal of objectivism. Benston (1989) points out that the industrial, military, and ruling class's need for power has always determined the agenda for science:

> On the institutional level, the objectivity myth is encouraged by the ruling class which uses science to legitimate the subordination of human beings to anti-human ends which serve the purposes of those with power disguised in a kind of technological determinism. (p. 69)

In other words, objectivism is used to justify manipulating living beings. The interests of the powerful determine the practice and focus of science. Science is not, contrary to popular belief, free of outside influence in determining which issues will be explored, how they will be viewed, and what to do with the results.

The common goals of science and patriarchy have been duly noted by feminists such as Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English (1978), Susan Faludi (1991), Marilyn French (1985, 1992), and P. Susan Penfold and Gillian A. Walker (1983). They have examined how science and our patriarchal institutions work together to expand their power over women. Faludi thoroughly documented how businesses and the legal system manipulate women by

controlling and directing science research and its applications. She also detailed how the media distorts research identifying women's oppression and accurately reports only that research countering women's efforts against oppression. Ehrenreich and English examined how, in the past, medical experts increased our isolation as women and men's power over us by persistently undermining our efforts to move out of the home and gain control over our lives. Penfold and Walker reported the massive sums of money made by drug companies when doctors ignore social causes of women's suffering and instead diagnose us as having a biologically-based mental illness requiring medication. French provided numerous accounts of individual men and legal, religious, political, business, and military institutions using science to justify their exploitive and abusive actions. The list of these examples is endless. To assert that scientists and their activities are objective is to deny the reality of scientific practice and the functions science serves.

As some of these examples demonstrate and as Sandra Harding (1990) asserts, the postulates of objectivism have been adopted by members of dominant groups functioning outside of the natural sciences. These include practitioners in other areas of scholarship such as sociology, psychology, and education, and by decision makers within our public institutions such as judicial, political, social welfare, and health care systems. Results created with and defended by supposedly objective methods and researchers are used by members of dominant groups to determine social policy.

More importantly, subordinates have little access to producing these results. The claim that only the dispassionate, objective, and rational methods of science can produce a true picture of reality automatically eliminates work generated by feminists' concerns. Harding (1990) maintains that "objectivist discourses... are used to devalue and justify calculated ignorance about any thought, research, or scholarship that begins and proceeds by asking questions from the perspective of women's activities" (pp. 87-88). How often have we heard political, military, academic, and industrial leaders dismissing the concerns of women, lesbians and gay men, First Nations' people, immigrants, environmentalists, and other groups as "special-interest"?

Even if practitioners could achieve the ideal of objectivism, Benston (1989) lists a second reason that this ideal is unacceptable to feminists: objectivism relies upon the belief that rationality can be made "pure", or isolated from ourselves with our emotions and needs. In reality, as Benston maintains, the pure rationality practitioners have sought to employ in modern science has been fraught with and inseparable from irrationalities. Practitioners who continue to believe in the possibility of and celebrate an isolated rationality, according to Vickers (1989) and Benston, are anti-human. They are denying human emotion, the dignity and value of life, and humanity itself.

As Vickers (1989) explains further, rationality is part of the dualism of reason versus non-reason so central to the world of science created by practitioners. This parallels the separation of mind and body, spirit and nature, wherein mind, spirit and reason are worshipped while nature, the body and non-rational processes such as emotions and intuition are despised. Members of subordinate groups are associated with the despised elements while members of dominant groups are associated with the admired elements. Feminists are unwilling to continue accepting the present practice of artificially separating and degrading those qualities attributed to subordinates as a basis for inquiry and scholarship.

The Goals of Modern Science

A number of feminists such as Nielsen (1990) and Benston (1989) identify the goal of practitioners of modern science as the ability to predict and control natural phenomena. Modern science, Benston maintains, is "accompanied by tendencies to mechanization of the material world and dehumanization of the social one – people increasingly become means to ends outside themselves" (p. 62). Practitioners use reductionism to justify reducing systems and phenomena down to models representing only measurable components. Models demonstrate the relationships between components and allow for prediction. If accurate, they reveal how the components can be arranged to get the desired results. Hence, the models of modern science have the potential to enable members of dominant groups to control

phenomena, including human beings and especially women because of their close affiliation with nature. This becomes a frightening prospect when, as Benston notes, we realize that science "rests on the assumption of the legitimacy of control and domination of the natural world" (p. 71) and "is not simply about knowledge, but is intended to lead to power over the world" (p. 72). When practitioners team reductionism with a "pure" and hence, irresponsible rationality, they enable members of dominant groups to oppress and exploit members of subordinate groups.

Benston (1989) concludes that practitioner use science to search for the power to dominate and exploit the world, and the ways to maintain their positions of privilege. And as long as the values, beliefs, methods, and norms of science exclude members of subordinate groups, and the norms and values associated with these groups, especially women, science as we presently know it will not change.

Alternative Methodologies

According to Benston (1989), Nielsen (1990), and Harding (1990), while empiricism has been and continues to be the predominant methodology used by practitioners within the natural and human sciences, over the past several decades it has become the focus of increased debate and criticism. As Nielsen notes, this debate gained tremendous momentum when Kuhn (1970) published his thesis on paradigms and paradigm shifts. These debates and criticisms have led us to develop a number of alternative methodologies, as well to modify present empirical methods. Feminist searchers have critically examined and experimented with empiricism and several of its alternative methodologies. We have also begun exploring the principles and standards provided by gynocentric values. In doing so, feminists searchers have begun forming a number of guidelines, or a feminist methodology. In order to understand these guidelines, I will first explore some of the debates and alternatives being offered.

First, there are the critiques of empirical methods, especially those developed by feminists. As noted above, feminist scholars have identified problems with empiricism due

to it relying (and insisting) upon reductionism, objectivism, and rationalism. Nevertheless, a number of feminists, notes Harding (1990), have struggled to adapt empiricism by challenging the sexist bias historically distorting empirical research methods. These feminist empiricists, according to Harding, argue that the methods and presuppositions of science are acceptable. They contend that the difficulties experienced by women in the past are the result of "badly done science", of failing "to control for gender bias in the research process" (p. 94). Unlike traditional empiricists, they attempt to identify and eliminate myths about women and other oppressed groups in formulating research questions, defining concepts, identifying phenomena to study, and collecting and interpreting data. They have produced research whose results conflict with androcentric claims and developed guidelines for research, such as the Canadian Psychological Association's guide on nonsexist research (Boehnert, 1988).

Harding (1990) contends that because feminist empiricists adhere to the presuppositions underlying traditional empiricism, and consequently, adopt the same methods, they are able to maintain their position within traditional scientific and academic circles. Their acceptance within these groups permits them to influence students and policy makers, obtain necessary funding, and gain access to publishers.

Feminist empiricists, in leaving unchallenged their discipline's oppressive methodologies and underlying presuppositions, have left intact the underlying principles of empiricism. They continue to support the presupposition that it is possible to be an objective, transcendent knower/observer, independent of our social context. Harding (1990) notes that this means that practitioners of science are incapable of doing what they were supposedly trained to do, that is, objective inquiry, without a feminist challenge based in an awareness of our cultural and historical context to eliminate the androcentricity of their perspective. However, this challenge is possible only because we are aware of our situation, our time and place in history. As Harding writes, "the ideal agent of knowledge, the ideal scientist, is not a disembodied mind, but one located in history" (p. 93). Empiricists' inability to consider our history and culture, and their insistence on separating the knower/observer/subject from

the known/object, means that researchers of "this epistemology (are) not particularly welcoming to issues of race, class, or cultural difference in women as subjects of knowledge – that is, between women as agents of knowledge" (p. 92).

Hence, for many feminists today, empirical methods, even when modified, are unacceptable. This leaves us searching for alternative methods. One tradition both critical of empirical methods and offering an alternative which has shaped feminist methodologies is critical theory. Critical theorists, according to Nielsen (1990), argue that knowledge is socially constructed and as such, they work to uncover hidden ideologies within society. They are especially interested in those aspects and ideologies of society serving to "maintain the status quo by restricting or limiting different groups' access to the means of gaining knowledge" (p. 9). They argue that people are incapable of being neutral or objective and consequently, they work to locate knowledge socially and historically. Unfortunately, contends Nielsen, such an approach means that everyone's stance is relative and that there is no way of selecting one perspective to rely upon when determining policies and politics, deciding upon various theories and explanation, or choosing between contradictory claims and ideas. That is, while at first the idea of accepting everyone's perspectives as equally valuable is attractive, this approach presents problems when deciding upon whose perspective shall be adopted in setting policies, determining priorities, and allocating funding and resources, given that historically the perspectives of those with less power have gone unrecognized.

Nevertheless, feminists working with critical theory have developed an approach popular within feminist research today: feminist standpoint methodology. Feminist standpoint theorists offer an alternative to the empirical approach, and Harding (1990) claims, a more serious challenge to androcentric empiricism. Nancy Hartsock (cited in Nielsen, 1990) identifies four fundamental principles to this approach. First, our material life, such as our surroundings and what we do for a living, determines and limits our understanding of life. Second, a difference in power between two groups may result in members of these groups potentially having inverted or opposed perspectives. That is, our

views of the world will clash to the point of appearing to be opposite of each other. Third, members of the more powerful or dominant group will have a distorted and incomplete view of the world compared to members of less powerful or subordinate groups. This is due to the dominant group's need to justify, maintain, and legitimize their positions of relative power and inordinate share of resources. Finally, members of the less powerful group must question the view of reality put forward by members of the more powerful group and develop a viewpoint reflecting our reality. We must develop a self-awareness or political consciousness, often through education, or as Nielsen notes, consciousness-raising activities.

The standpoint approach has been popular with feminists who believe, as Harding (1990) explains, that knowledge and inquiry should be grounded in experience, that the diversity of women and other subordinates must be represented in this experience, and that members of subordinate groups be the agents of knowledge. Questions for inquiry and categories for analysis need to grow out of our diverse experiences, as heterosexuals and lesbians, working class, rural, immigrant, native, colored, and white women, and reflect gynocentric qualities, values, and perspectives.

Practitioners adopting a feminist standpoint approach are also able to offer support to the importance of political activism in developing knowledge. Harding (1990) suggests that, like feminist empiricists, feminist standpoint theorists locate science in history, viewing social movements, such as the proletarian movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the international women's movement, as necessary to advance science. However, while feminist empiricists maintain that these movements develop room for new ideas, feminist standpoint theorists argue they engender new relations which alter social structures, thereby creating new knowledge. In Harding words:

> So the point about my culture observing through my eyes is, here, that my actual daily activities, structured by social divisions of activity by gender, set limits on what I (and, therefore, my culture) can see. Movements of social liberation make possible new kinds of human activity, and it is on the basis of this activity that new sciences can emerge. (p. 98)

Feminist standpoint theorists clearly ground themselves in specific historical times and places and as a result, have no need to assert the absoluteness or universality of their representations. Rather than trying to draw closer to truth, they attempt to move away from the false. Moreover, unlike feminist empiricists, they are able to address women's diversity and analyze the otherness men assign to women. Consequently, they focus on identifying and analyzing oppressive social structures and developing the politics necessary to eliminate them.

Harding (1990) raises several important points in her analysis. Whereas feminist empiricists attempt to reform science from within and, in Harding's opinion, are inadvertently challenging the empirical methods of science, feminist standpoint theorists are transforming science by operating outside of its tenets. Feminist standpoint theory offers a critique of empiricism and the norms of science, provides a genuine alternative to it located in women's diversity, while also identifying and analyzing institutionalized oppression. In reflecting women's specificity in the role of the researcher, the feminist standpoint approach is potentially capable of offering a cultural norm of scientific behavior genuinely reflecting the qualities traditionally associated with women and rejected by men and empirical science. It has the possibility of reflecting our diversity and to develop out of our experiences, including differences due to gender, sexual orientation, culture, religion, age, physical and mental abilities, marital status, and socio-economic conditions. And, as Harding notes, feminist standpoint theory supports political activism and arrives at more radical conclusions. In comparison to the empirical feminist approach, feminist standpoint methods provide us with potentially more complete and less distorted knowledge claims.

Harding (1990) maintains that feminist standpoint theorists, as compared to feminist empiricists, appear more able to identify the instruments of our oppression, develop inclusive theories, build upon women's specificity, and propose realistic strategies for change. They seemingly offer a richer and more viable alternative for feminists at this time. More importantly, they provide an alternative wherein those qualities associated with women's culture – the integrative, relational, subjective, intuitive, irrational,

emotional, sensual, profane, concrete, physical, and natural – are welcome and indeed fundamental in conceptualizing and realizing a feminist approach to searching and knowing.

Unfortunately, as Harding (1990) contends, feminists engaging in a feminist standpoint methodology are limited by the same difficulties as those practitioners of their encompassing critical school of inquiry. While feminist searchers employing a standpoint approach rely upon the viewpoints of women and therefore, potentially provide a more complex, accurate, and complete picture of reality, they also imply that the perspective of women is "better" because of this. The problem with the use of standards such as "accurate" is that we must once again rely upon the notion of an objective reality in judging the value of various perspectives. The second difficulty with the standpoint tradition is the belief that the more oppressed group will have a more complete and accurate view of reality. Two problematic questions arise from this; first, who is more oppressed and second, how does one decide upon criteria for this or prove the degree of oppression? Finally, in moving away from accepted research traditions, feminists adopting this perspective tend to have less access to students, publishing, funding, and policy makers. This greatly limits the amount of research we are able to accomplish or the amount of political activity and social change we can create.

In reviewing other alternatives, Nielsen (1990) discusses the interpretive or hermeneutic tradition, defining it briefly as "a theory and method of interpreting meaningful human action" (p. 7). Practitioners within this school emphasize the meaning of social interactions and it is this attention to meaning that has attracted a number of feminists. However, feminists are uncomfortable with this school's continued insistence on distinguishing between the subjective and the objective. They argue that it is impossible to "bracket" or set one's own experiences and values aside. Furthermore, even if "bracketing" was possible, it would remain undesirable to feminists as it represents another form of subjectivism. In addition, as Jeri Dawn Wine (1989) argues, by emphasizing the uniqueness of individuals "independent of context and without explicit linkages to the experiences of

others", researchers are once again assigning responsibility to individuals rather than to the larger context. As a result, we are isolated from each other and the context of our lives and it becomes impossible to examine our social, political, cultural and economic milieu. As Wine contends, in the context of the "personal is political", researchers of this school err by suggesting that "the personal is highly personal".

This dissatisfaction with and rebellion against certain aspects of androcentric methodologies and presuppositions, as well as male norms of behavior have led feminists to develop alternatives meeting the needs and standards developed by feminists. This has not meant rejecting all of the old. However, it has required feminists to critically examine present methods, as seen above, and more importantly, to offer an alternative. That is, if present methods are unsatisfactory, what methods are acceptable? What alternative is being offered by feminists? And what will serve as the foundation for a feminist alternative?

Guideposts to Feminist Methodologies

In discussing how science practitioners conduct research, Kuhn (1970) noted that they fail to follow a specific set of guidelines. Rather, he argued that they rely on values and a set of presuppositions arising out of those values to guide their actions. In examining feminist methodologies and outstanding examples of feminist research, the same conclusion can be reached. According to feminists such as Joyce A. Cook and Mary Margaret Fonow (1990) and Jill McCalla Vickers (1989), there is no clearly defined methodology arising out of feminist epistemologies (methods or ways of knowing). That is, feminists have yet to articulate rules for uncovering our knowledge. And, if Kuhn's thesis is correct, we never will.

As feminists such as Nielsen (1990) and Parlee (1979) have argued, we need not discard our entire experience with traditional schools. Certainly, at this point, by critically reflecting on our experience with positivist methods and examining alternative methodologies, we understand what it is about traditional methods dissatisfying us. Uncovering our experiences, our qualities, our specificity as women, has enabled us to

identify what dissatisfies us as well as what we want. For example, we have learned that we want to avoid using a male-centered language because it is foreign to us as women, failing to capture our experiences as we know them and serving to silence us. At the same time, we have realized that what we do want is a female-centered language. This critical analysis is an essential first step yet it is only a first step. A feminist alternative needs to be more than a compilation of things to avoid, a list of "do not's"; it needs to be based upon a woman-centered culture, arising out of our awareness of our personal ways of searching. As we discover our culture of women, we are discovering we have common ways of learning and knowing which have gone unrecognized within academia and the sciences. Discovering/uncovering these ways means discovering/uncovering our culture as women, especially those qualities and values specific to a culture of women. As we increase our understanding of gynocentric values, we are defining "maps" or guiding principles to guide feminist searchers in a general direction.

What then are these gynocentric values and feminine qualities underlying feminist searches? What do our critiques of traditional research methods reveal to us about what is we are looking for in a feminist methodology? And what are the resulting presuppositions determining our methods and goals, as well as our choice of perspective?

Values Directing Feminist Perspectives & Scholarship

Values, notes C. H. Patterson (1989), are an individual's, culture's, or society's consistent standards for choosing. Unlike preferences, we require or feel obligated to judge actions, ideas, goals, and things according to standards based on our values. Values grow out of our experiences and living situations. Consequently, different experiences and situations give rise to different values. Given the vastly different world women and men experience, it is not surprizing that women have developed a set of values unique from those most often expressed by men. As Angela Miles (1981) stresses, it is not that these values belong exclusively to women, but that they "have been labeled as feminine and their practice has

largely been restricted to women and the female sphere of reproduction and personal relations" (p. 486).

Modern science, in its almost complete exclusion of women, is built upon a masculine set of values. Within science, values determine our choice of theories, models, methods, behaviors, applications, and goals as well as the perspective we adopt. They are often most clearly expressed within the presuppositions and principles guiding methods of practice, as was demonstrated in the critiques of modern science's methodologies by Benston (1989), Harding (1990), Nielsen (1990), and Vickers (1989). Feminists are able to recognize the various limitations of male-stream science because our perspective is based upon a set of woman-centered or gynocentric values which contrast sharply with the androcentric values underlying modern science.

Carol Gilligan (1982a, 1982b, 1988a) conceives of androcentric values as a "morality of rights", wherein choices of theories, models, methods and of entire paradigms reflect a concern with autonomy, individual rights, independence, and abstraction. On the other hand, a woman-centered approach to being, judging, searching, and knowing, reflects a "morality of responsibility" and care. Jeri Dawn Wine (1989) contrasts values arising out of the differing experiences of women and men as follows:

> Females' judgements reflect our gynocentric values, our sense of a connected self, of the interdependence of human beings in relationship, of the responsibility of each human to care for others and to be aware of the consequences of one's actions on others. In contrast, male moral judgements reflect a separated sense of self, are focused on individual rights, and assume that people are essentially interchangeable in an abstract system of justice. (p. 94)

Wine (1989) organizes the values associated with women within a principle of "relationality", wherein relationality refers to

> the consciousness of the necessary interdependence of human beings, to a sense of connectedness to others, to awareness of one's embeddedness in human, social and

> historical contexts, to the maximization of well-being for all persons, and to commitment to nonviolence. (p. 78)

As Gilligan (1982a) notes, we seek a balance between caring for others and caring for ourselves, a revaluing and reinterpretation of individual rights such that responsibility becomes the primary value, "anchoring the self in a world of relationships and giving rise to activities of care" (p. 132). Gynocentric values provide the organizing principle for evaluating and transforming androcentric values such that the acts of caring, cooperating, taking responsibility for our actions, remaining connected to our feelings, to ourselves, and to others, is given value over and reinterprets what it means to be autonomous, independent, rational, logical, and ultimately, a man, a woman, and a human being.

This integrative aspect of gynocentric values challenges the artificial dichotomies separating, to name just a few, women and men, men and nature, reproduction and production, leisure and work, and the personal and the political. Like Gilligan, Angela Miles (1981) directs our attention to the unique transformational power of a perspective founded on gynocentric principles, emphasizing its centrality in the feminism of today. Miles argues that a perspective based on gynocentric values or what she refers to as the "integrative feminine principle", is capable of synthesizing these separations and creating a new humanity with new relationships to ourselves, each other, and the world. Although integration is a tremendously creative project requiring cooperation, Jean Baker Miller (1986) stresses that women are familiar with integration for we have historically employed these processes in maintaining human life. She directs our attention to the creative and cooperative processes most evident in women in our struggle to survive.

As we learn more about gynocentric values, they increasingly provide the standards for determining and judging the methods, theories, models, goals and norms of behavior of feminist research and political activity. The struggle to develop our awareness and understanding of gynocentric values and their resulting methodologies is great, for many feminists must first overcome their years of training in androcentric methodologies and

reassess the androcentric values they were required to adopt. Nevertheless, this project is vital.

Transforming Androcentric into Gynocentric Methodologies

Returning again to our examination of methodologies, we are left with the problem that all present methodologies fail to satisfy the needs of feminists. We are unwilling to remain with traditional androcentric approaches to research because, as Nielsen (1990) describes, they adopt relativism or objectivism (or worse yet, both). Each approach has its inherent difficulties and both are unacceptable to many feminists. Rejecting objectivism results in some form of relativism; rejecting relativism leads us to objectivism. Each, while offering some useful elements, seems inherently encumbered with unacceptable forms of objectivism and reductionism.

It is becoming apparent to an increasing number of feminist researchers, such as Joyce McCarl Nielsen (1990), Marcia Westkott (1990), and Judith A. Cook and Mary Margaret Fonow (1990), that an approach based on the feminine valuing of integration enables us to create a tension between dichotomies and hence, a new more acceptable methodology. These dichotomies include the either/or stance of subject and object (objectivism), objectivism and relativism, and the separation between self-knowledge (the personal/subjective) and social knowledge (the public/objective).

According to Nielsen (1990), each of the major schools of learning suggest how we may integrate these seemingly contradictory elements, thereby creating a synthesized approach allowing us to work toward the emancipatory project of feminism. She contends that the very first issue needing to be address is selecting criteria for developing our approach and suggests that it be "empirical, interpretive, and critical". In other words, any methodological stance adopted by feminists should resolve those dilemmas experienced by each approach while also retaining the strength of each approach. Continuing this argument, Parlee (1979) suggests that researchers continues to use the standard principles of reliability, consistency, logical inference, and honesty with at least one additional

criterion: Feminists need to continually evaluate the plausibility of their work, both their questions, and the completeness of their results, against their own experiences and intuition. Just as importantly, they need to evaluate their work against the experiences of people who are members of other subordinate groups. Both Vickers (1989) and Parlee recommend using intuition, empathy, and experience to identify and determine the priority of research questions. I shall summarize here the ways in which these feminists advocate drawing upon the strengths of each of the various schools of methods.

Critical theory, argues Westkott (1990), has challenged the notion that we are abstract or objective knowers, separated from the "object " or "other". Instead, we occupy specific positions within our culture and society, and share characteristics by virtue of our common condition. When we allow ourselves to be aware of our similarities with the "object" of our study, we can no longer maintain this sharp subject-object distinction; "knowledge of the other and knowledge of the self are mutually informing, because self and other share a common condition of being women" (p. 61). Westkott asserts that critical theory's notion of the subject's and object's shared humanity converges with the interpretive tradition, in that interpretive theory emphasizes that social knowledge has meaning only within its historical context. Hence, "truths are, therefore, historical rather than abstract, and contingent rather than categorical" (p. 61). Interpretative and critical theories converge in the belief that these "historical truths" are created through the process of dialogue between the subject and the object, through the sharing of self knowledge. Knowledge which is outside of the self or objective/social knowledge is created in this sharing while at the same time remaining personal or subjective/self knowledge.

Before we move on, it is useful here to further explore the notion of self knowledge. According to Nielsen (1990), our experiences of our specific position within culture and society results in our ever changing and always present "prejudgments". She contends that our prejudgments are the conditions by which we encounter the world, "the means by which one reaches the truth". They are our "horizons", meaning "the full range of one's standpoint and includes the particulars of one's situation (for example, historical time, place, culture,

class; any number of contextual variables are appropriate here)" (p. 29). Although we are unable to set aside our horizon or world perspective which is necessarily "limited and finite", we are still able to connect with others. That is, we are able to enlarge or broaden our world perspective and knowledge through relating and sharing with others. Consequently, although feminism begins with women's experiences, as feminists we are able to hear and include the experiences of men. This is also potentially true for differences due to sexual orientation, race, age, socio-economic status, etc. It also possible that members of dominant groups are able to listen to and grow from the related experiences of members of subordinate groups. While we may never have a set of experiences identical to those of others, we are able to incorporate their knowledge with ours, thereby changing and enriching our own horizon.

The process of enriching our horizons occurs by engaging in dialogue with others and subsequently creating a social knowledge. This is the "dialectic relationship" or "intersubjectivity" of subject and object of the interpretive tradition. Both Westkott (1990) and Nielsen (1990) interpret this to mean that we each contribute to the creation of knowledge. As subjects or researchers, we bring with us questions which have grown out of our experiences of our unique life situation. This is a vital component as can be seen by examining what happens when we fail to do so. Kathleen Rockhill (1987) points out that when we, as feminist searchers, begin with the perspectives and situations of other women rather than ourselves, we end up forming theories and models about their lives. By continuing to distance ourselves from the women we study, and more importantly, from the violence and oppression we have personally experienced, we maintain the rigid and limiting forms of present academic discourse. That is, we remain emotionally distant in studying and forming theories about "them", and once again reduce women to the status of the "other" and the object to be studied. In failing to examine our own lives, we disallow mutuality and intersubjectivity.

However, as Nielsen (1990), Parlee (1979), and Vickers (1989) recommend, if we, as researchers, develop our questions out of our personal situations, thereby bringing ourselves

into the relationship, we are able to enter into a dialogue with the other person. Nielsen explains that the objects' responses to our questions as the researchers, whether to confirm, expand, deny, oppose, or remain silent about those experiences and ideas implicitly (or explicitly) carried within the questions, are unpredictable and beyond our control as the subjects/researchers. This dialogic process allows us to freely exchange and juxtapose ideas and thoughts, and in doing so, modify, develop, and create new ideas, models, beliefs, and perspectives. Nielsen emphasizes that even if one person has a set agenda, the result of exchanging, challenging, and sharing ideas, beliefs, models, etc., is unpredictable. (See, for example, the research published by Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan, 1992.)

According to critical theorists, a final condition is necessary for a dialectic relationship to develop: People entering into such a process must have a relationship of mutual respect and trust where they are "roughly equal in materialistic terms". Nielsen (1990) explains that it is only within this condition that any two people will be able to hold a dialogue which is potentially unpredictable and creative.

Creating this final condition returns us again to the emancipatory goal of feminism; that is, to create those very conditions where two people can freely enter into a relationship of respect and trust, and materially as equals. Westkott (1990) believes that the vision of this freedom is vital, in that it indicates to us which facts in the present are important to uncover. She also argues that women are able to envision this because of the tension we experience between our actions and our awareness. Women live in a world where surviving means we must act in ways we disagree with, such as staying with an abusive partner. At times, our sense of who we are, as well as our survival and the survival of our children, has depended upon it. Because of this tension and awareness, we are able to envision a world in the future different from the one we live in. As Westkott writes,

> The difference between a social science about women and a social science for women, between the possibilities of self-exploration and those of liberation, is our imaginative capacity to inform our understandings of the world with a commitment to overcoming the subordination and devaluation of women. (p. 65)

As researchers without this vision, we are lost amid an endless stream of data without knowing what to investigate further and which avenue of research will direct us towards a better future. Westkott (1990) warns that this is happening in academia, where the study about women, rather than for women, has become the most recent fad:

> As objects of knowledge, women have become marketable commodities measured by increasing profits for publishers and expanding enrollments in women's studies courses. While women are riding the crest of the wave which we ourselves have helped to create, it may be a rather sobering, albeit necessary, task to reflect on the ephemeral nature of the academic market in which we are now valued. (p. 62)

Westkott (1990) explains that when we use women as a commodity to sustain our academic lives as researchers, we once again leave other women and members of other subordinate groups out of the creation of knowledge. Consequently, knowledge continues to reflect the viewpoints and preserve the interests of the dominant group. And women will remain the focus of interest until a large clutter of data is collected and something more interesting arises. However, if we create a social science for women, are guided by a vision of a future free of domination, build upon the commonalties experienced by subjects and objects, create the possibilities for free and equal relationships, and engage in dialectic relationships bridging personal experience and social knowledge, we are beginning to create an integrated approach to research. A feminist methodology is, as Nielsen (1990) writes, "a communal, intersubjective, dialogic examination or observation of facts" (p. 31).

And how does empirical theory contribute to this? Nielsen (1990) is clear that if we wish to avoid returning to relying upon superstitions and myths, it is necessary to maintain some aspects of empirical inquiry. She advocates that what empirical theory has to offer us is "objectivity". Objectivity refers to actions and words which, once performed or created, are available to a larger audience. Objectivity is an activity vital to the feminist project for it allows us to share information and expand our horizons. This differs sharply from objectivism, "the assumption that there is a reality that is separate and distant from a

subjective knower" (Nielsen, 1990, p.31). ("Objectivism" is what many feminists, such as Margaret Benston [1989], appear to be describing when they use the word "objectivity": hence there is some confusion around these two terms.) Clearly it is objectivism rather than objectivity which many feminists have rejected.

Stenstad (1989), Parlee (1979), and Benston (1989) also contend that it is unnecessary to vanquish the methods and procedures of modern science and male-stream thinking. They each argue that the limits of reductionism and objectivism need to be identified and their dangers acknowledged. Benston offers a number of considerations for actual practice: We must acknowledge the limits of what cannot be known and is not known, as well as identifying subjects and phenomena inappropriate for androcentric scientific methods. Non-quantifiable facets of problems should be given at least the same, if not more regard and attention than quantifiable aspects and integrated into scientific practice. Guidelines are needed to determine the appropriate level of discourse, offering, for example, explanations based in basic chemistry or physics versus explanations grounded in the relationship of the organism to its environment. Most importantly, our understanding and use of rationality and scientific inquiry must incorporate "both subjectivity and the interactions between the knower and the known in a context of care and responsibility for both natural processes and other creatures" (Benston, 1989, p. 62).

A final reason remains for the need to incorporate empirical methods. As Nielsen (1990) notes, much of the world still relies upon empirically-based facts and if we wish to communicate or convince anyone, we must continue to incorporate facts and figures into our arguments.

Guiding Principles for Feminist Scholarship

The remaining challenge in considering feminist methodologies is putting these philosophical and theoretical arguments into action. Providing step-by-step directions is impractical if not impossible, and, as Kuhn (1970) noted, researchers tend to be guided by presuppositions rather than rules. Feminists are now creating, based upon the gynocentric principle of relationality, general guidelines for research. It is important to remember that these guidelines arise out of more than a purely intellectual reflection upon philosophical issues. Our awareness of the difficulties with traditional androcentric methods and the possibilities of integration also grows out of our experiences as women researchers. The principles being presented here illustrate this point. Through critical analyzing exemplary research conducted by feminists in the social sciences, Judith A. Cook and Mary Margaret Fonow (1990) have identified five principles guiding feminist scholarship. The principles they describe are summarized here.

The first is to attend to the "pervasive influence of gender". The primary aspect of this principle is that our experiences as women are the focus of inquiry and the lens through which the world is viewed. Our research should serve to validate the internal, emotional, private world. The second element is to recognize that the majority of research conducted, knowledge developed, and the perspective presented is about men and reflects their perspective. Their knowledge of themselves is traditionally considered the norm, scientific, rational, and scholarly and makes "gender asymmetry" invisible. The third feature is that, as researchers, we need to begin by recognizing our existence as women within a specific socio-cultural time and place, and acknowledge how this shapes our world. Our shared experiences as subordinates provide a link between ourselves and the women with whom we search.

The second principle underlying a feminist methodology is an emphasis on consciousness-raising. The first element is our own consciousness-raising as feminist searchers. As women, we are part of the larger world, having become familiar with it through the need to survive in it, while at the same time belonging to another world though

virtue of our gender, race, age, etc. An awareness of this creates the "double vision" of feminists whereby we can see our lives in new and different ways and yet continue to see them according to the larger world. For some women, especially scholars, we are in the position of being both the oppressor by virtue of our class and the oppressed, by virtue of our gender. By being conscious of and exploring our double vision, we are able to analyze and criticize phenomena unavailable to those lacking this vision. We are potentially aware of the contradiction between action and awareness described by Westkott (1990) while at the same time having more freedom to implement our consciousness than women with less access to resources and privileges. The crucial element here, is that we have begun to develop our perspective as women and apply our awareness to the larger world we inhabit.

A second aspect is that consciousness-raising itself is a methodological tool. In meeting with individual women or groups of women to examine issues and conditions, both the women we meet with and ourselves as the researchers become further aware of our shared situations as women. Together we are able to "demystify" the "natural" organization of our patriarchal society. Once again, we also legitimize the private, intimate worlds of the women participating, including the ourselves as the researchers, and uncover a wealth of useful data. A third aspect is that the objects of study, the participants, become the subjects of study. That is, with their increasing consciousness, they become aware of the contradictions of gender asymmetry within their world and consequently, of the need for and the means to political action.

The third principle is the rejection of objectivism, or the separation of the subject and object. By enforcing a rigid dichotomy between the two, women are reduced to objects to be quantified and that only quantifiable knowledge is valid. As feminists, we reject this and instead, as Cook and Fonow (1990) suggest, have developed ways to integrate subject and object. For instance, interactive interviewing is a technique allowing us to answer the participant's questions and the participants to determine which issues are important in their lives. Eliminating the boundaries between subject and object can also include enlisting participants in all aspects of the research. This includes determining issues to be explored,

developing research questions and instruments, analyzing results, drawing conclusions, presenting the research, and implementing change. Both the meaning of the interview or research and the quality of the relationship for the participant and for ourselves as researchers are vital.

A second element is to make apparent and avoid the political domination of women by treating them as objects. Feminists seek to demystify the subject to the object, revealing the contradiction between the two and the existence of both within us. It also discloses the exploitation of women in general, and, uncovers how researchers of the patriarchal paradigm have exploited the assistance of wives, students, assistants, and secretaries in generating research.

A third aspect of this principle is a challenge to the equating of measurement and quantification with objectivity. Typically, statistical and lab instruments are capable of measuring only those factors which are easy to measure. As Cook and Fonow (1990) point out, this means that phenomena such as physiological and sexual abuse of women and children are attended to while the often more damaging psychological abuse is ignored. Other problems, such as equating the effects of violent actions by women with those of men, deny the gender inequality of our world.

The fourth principle of feminist research is a concern with ethical issues. Feminists include under this principle the issue of men using language to maintain the invisibility and devaluing of women through the exclusive use of male pronouns, subsuming women's experiences within categories designed to describe men's experiences, and using derogatory labels and words to describe women's experiences and qualities. We are also concerned with gatekeeping, whether this occurs in selecting, funding, and publishing research, and in hiring, supervising, and promoting women. We strive to find alternatives to this form of power over others and are examining what happens when feminists assume this role.

In conducting research, feminists have begun to consider the consequences of the act of searching in the lives of the participants. In wanting to intervene in the lives of the women who are participating in the research, we may create a painful awareness of oppressive

situations from which avenues of escape are unavailable. It may be that the survival strategies employed by the participants are more than just their most effective means of survival at this point: their strategies may be their only means of survival. As Judith Dilorio (cited in Cook & Fonow, 1990) wonders, what is to be gained by increasing awareness when there are no ready alternatives? Feminists are also questioning the implications of withholding information from research participants. Given the isolation that many women are forced to live in, we may be participants' only source of reliable information.

The fifth and final principle guiding feminist research identified by Cook and Fonow (1990) is one of empowering and transforming. This means that the knowledge we are producing should be "elicited and analyzed in a way that can be used by women to alter oppressive and exploitative conditions in their society" (p. 80). Our research must be relevant and it is the women we are studying with/studying who can best determine the important issues in their lives. Furthermore, as researchers, we must produce more than a clear picture of the present: we must provide a vision of the future. Ideally, we need to provide a goal and indicate the means to achieve it.

V. FEMINIST NORMS OF BEHAVIOR

As Vickers (1989), Nielsen (1990), and Benston (1989) have independently demonstrated, practitioners of modern science rely upon methods of searching and knowing which are based on presuppositions, goals, and norms resulting in antihuman and exploitive actions against members of subordinate groups and nature. Within the context of science's search for power over nature and people, Benston asserts that scientists are trained and expected to exercise this power. Using Kuhn's (1970) language, only access into the scientific community by committing to these theoretical, conceptual, instrumental, methodological, socio-cultural, and political dimensions permits one to claim both knowledge and the ability to create it, and the resulting power. They are expected to control and manipulate the objects they study, be they inanimate or living beings. Their institutions require them to exercise evaluative power over their students and to operate within hierarchies of power. They must aggressively promote and defend their theories and research results, and compete with each other for funding available from their universities, the government, businesses, and the military. They must justify and promote oppressive and exploitive uses of knowledge they have developed while ignoring ethical features such as human factors or the cost to humans and to our environment. In addition, Harding (1990) notes that science practitioners have immense political power as teachers with access to students, as reporters with access to publications and the media, and as researchers with access to public policy. The result is that they are required to be separated from and out of relation to others, be independent, aggressive, competitive, logical, rational, and ignore how they work is used or misused.

Sandra Harding (1990) argues that men, as members of dominant groups, have been and continue to be the agents controlling what science is and who it shall be about. As a result, science and those who practice it reflect the characteristics of the masculine. Because science is built upon a valuing of the masculine, adopting appropriate behaviors is relatively easy for men. In one sense, they have been trained to be scientists since birth.

However, how do women respond as theorists, researchers, and practitioners in a world where the male is the norm? Benston (1989) maintains that upon entering science, women, unlike men, experience a role conflict which challenges our basic assumptions about our world. Vickers (1989) details this clash using Mary Daly's (1990) image of a journey to illustrate how we eventually comes to question, challenge, and rebel against modern science.

In the first phase a woman in science and academia encounters research on women, wherein she has the option of distancing herself from them and becoming a "methodological male", thereby ending her journey. Or she can identify with the women being studied and enter the second phase. In this phase a dilemma arises when her seemingly objective knowledge of women conflicts with her experience and intuition. If she accepts the image of women developed by her discipline's theories, methods, and exemplars, it proves that she is a "freak" and she will see herself as different from other women. Or she may intuitively realize that not all women are alike or fit the discipline's description, and begin to question the evidence of her discipline, some of which she may have produced. If she is isolated from supportive feminists/profeminists in her social system, she may abandon her journey and envision herself as different and perhaps even better than other women. However, if she becomes aware of the converging experiences of other feminists, she begins to identify and illustrate the sexist bias of her discipline's research.

According to Vickers (1989), it is in the third phase that she recognizes, through her experience of inquiring, the need to examine her discipline's methods. Despite the apparent productivity and success of these methods, she realizes that they are contributing to her oppression by systematically concealing the very things she needs to discover. Vickers contends that the next step is the most important and difficult. The feminist researcher must maintain her vision of her goals while transcending the accepted doctrines of science and scholarship which have constituted most, if not all, of her formal training. She has been taught to rely on those presuppositions as the only reliable means of accessing the truth and now she needs to reject them because of the boundaries they create. Unfortunately, as Vickers observes, feminist scholars who challenge these doctrines and presuppositions have

been severely attacked and ostracized by being denied tenure, funding, and access to publication.

Like all women, women searchers must maintain a tension between that which they know and that which they need to do to survive. Nadya Aisenberg and Mona Harrington (1988), after interviewing a number of women researchers, scholars and teachers, describe how these women must constantly struggle to be true to themselves and yet sufficiently conform in order to remain within academia. Some quit trying. In the end, Aisenberg and Harrington conclude that the traditional "rules of the game" dictating our norms of behavior fail to include those things valued by women. Genuine freedom requires changing the norms of behavior and the values upon which they are based. Until then, women will continue to be what Aisenberg and Harrington describe as "outsiders in the sacred grove".

This tension extends beyond women who are in research and academia to women in other professions. For example, Dana Jack and Rand Jack (1988) describe the experiences of women who are lawyers, writing that "to opt for the norms of the legal system, she must deny her culturally formed, feminine ways of knowing and relating to the world" (p. 271). She must give up nurturing, warm relationships in favor of competitive individual achievement. (Even then, notes Anne Innis Dagg and Patricia J. Thompson [1988], women, by virtue of being female, may be denied the chance to earn a living. For instance, physicist Maria Goeppert Mayer had to win a Nobel Prize before being offered a paid position.) Like academics, many professional, nonprofessional, and trade women struggle with choosing between being women-who-are-trained-to-be-men, forfeiting our careers and jobs, or eventually finding a way to pursue our career goals and earn a living in ways celebrating the gynocentric. The danger here, as many women have discovered, is that failing to continue to act like men often means we will be unable to find permanent employment or lose our jobs. (See, for example, Dagg & Thompson, 1988; Daly, 1990; Vickers, 1989).

Thus far I have discussed women in relation to work. It is important here to also examine how women, even in women-centered groups, have struggled to be in ways other than the male norm of behavior. We seek ways which foster our relationships with each

other as well as ourselves, and nurture the growth of everyone. Because this happens in relationship, or collectively, the way we are together is also a political act. It also reflects feminists' interests in integrating our knowledge and behaviors, as well as our visions with our means of achieving those visions. We want our behavior to reflect our values, especially our belief in the importance of being together, of helping and supporting each other. Given that our behaviors are so intertwined with our vision of the future, I shall first discuss two models of the politics of change.

VI. THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM

Pressure versus Transformational Politics

While the models of feminism examined earlier reflect the historical development of feminism and are useful in understanding some of the common theories of feminism today, Angela Miles (1981, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c) argues that a more important division exists in feminism, cutting across the models described earlier and reflected in its political goals. The first model, pressure politics, attempts to have the feminine added on to the masculine universal. The feminine is presented as complementing the male norm, thereby attempting to give women's qualities the same amount of esteem given to those of men. In practice, this often means ensuring that women have the same opportunities to become like men. The second, transformational politics, seeks to use the feminine to displace the male universal by transforming it with the feminine. Given the usefulness of Miles' conceptualization of feminism, I will address transformational politics in more detail here.

Understanding Miles' (1981, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c) thesis requires recognizing the differing characteristics traditionally assigned to women and men, and the artificial dichotomies imposed in our lives. The history of women, and indeed humankind, includes our exclusion, and indeed, the exclusion of all subordinate groups from the decision-making level of politics, scholarship, culture, religion and the public realm of society. These structures have been developed on the values traditionally associated with men and just as importantly, on excluding women and depreciating gynocentric values. Patriarchal structures have created dichotomies which, to name just a few, separate private from public life, the reproductive work of caring for others from producing goods, and leisure from work. In each instance, women's qualities and efforts are marginalized while those of men are glorified. For example, while men achieve their status as workers in the public realm and are rewarded with privileges and power over women and nature, women have been relegated to the private realm of the home where our work of bearing and raising children, and caring for others continues to be consistently undervalued, unpaid, and sentimentalized.

And despite our constant presence in the workforce, we have only nominally been allowed to expand beyond vital yet underpaid and low status employment.

Feminism is about identifying and addressing this systematic devaluing of the feminine, and of men dominating women in every aspect of our lives. In Miles' (1981, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c) analysis of how feminist political goals and strategies are envisioned, she identifies two models: pressure and transformational politics. Pressure politics, like the liberal model of feminism, attempts to include women as a special interest group into the already existing and presumed complete social and political structures. It involves demonstrating that women can be as good as or like men, thereby challenging men's definition of women as less than and inferior. In contrast, transformational politics, like the radical and socialist models of feminism, is about incorporating the female such that it totally restructures and redefines human and social relations. Women strive neither to be like men nor to be their complement, the "other". Instead, they seek to be acknowledged as and to enter into the public sphere as women.

In addition, Miles (1981, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c) contends that transformational politics moves beyond challenging men's definition of women to challenging their definition of humanity and of men. This means taking these new definitions of men, women, and humanity, and rebuilding our political, cultural, social, religious, and educational institutions such that they embrace and reflect the whole of humanity. As Miles (1989a) observes,

> The difference between feminisms that claim a specific voice and vision for women and those that do not is the difference between pressure politics and transformational politics, between politics that addresses the woman question and politics that addresses the whole of society. (p. 11)

Challenging the existing order requires women to revalorize those qualities necessary to transform it. The difficulty here, maintains Miles (1989a, 1989b, 1989c), is that we must identify and celebrate the very values and activities associated with women

which have historically been inseparable from our oppression. (For example, consider the reactions to and misuse of the work of Carol Gilligan on women's preferred moral orientation in Larrabee, 1993.) Those qualities associated with women, as opposed to men, include:

> The holistic, collective, intuitive, co-operative, emotional, nurturing, democratic, integrated, internal, and natural... affirmed against the over-valuation of the competitive, analytical, rational, hierarchical, fragmented, external, and artificial (man-made). (Miles, 1989b, p. 21)

> It is assumed that men are or should be aggressive, strong, independent, logical, dominant, in control of their physical environment, handy with tools and mechanical systems, in control of their emotions, and capable of abstract, objective thought. (This list may vary slightly in different Western cultures but the core of it remains remarkably constant.) Women, in contrast, are assumed to be intuitive, nurturant, emotional, dependent on and with strong connections to those around them, loving and caring, passive, and with limited capability for rationality and objectivity. (Benston, 1989, p. 61)

In identifying and celebrating our undervalued and displaced qualities, argues Miles (1989b), we develop the autonomy "essential to building the sisterhood and developing the consciousness and theory to challenge these definitions and contexts. It provides the power base from which women can mass (sic) pressure and develop new ideas outside organizations in support of those (often the same) women struggling inside them" (p. 22). It is when we bring into those very structures our qualities as women that we will be able to bring about this desperately needed transformation and integrate the artificially imposed dualisms of patriarchy. Revalorizing our unique values and maintaining our authentic identity as women is essential if our specificity is to provide the "organizing principle of all of society" (Miles, 1989c, p. 279).

Marcia Westkott (1990) further explores a dichotomy of critical importance in understanding women' political activity. She argues that women experience a disconnection

between knowing and doing, between consciousness and awareness. Other feminists, such as Anne Cameron (1981) describes it as "women who do not always manage to Do what they Know" (p. 63). Westkott contends that men, by virtue of being male, are free to act upon their thoughts and desires within the restrictions of age, race, culture, socio-economic status, etc., and create concepts reflecting that power. Women, however, do not experience this freedom. Living within a world structured around the masculine and valuing men means we do what is necessary to survive, despite what we know or desire. We may be aware of the ways in which we are oppressed, yet our survival means we are unable to act upon our awareness.

Westkott (1990) claims that experiencing our consciousness as separated from our actions frees women's imagination from the constraints of oppression, allowing us to envision a world free of patriarchy. More importantly, our vision indicates to us what it is we need to know and do in order to make it a reality. Without our vision, our self-exploration remains futile, for it is self-awareness without a critical framework in which to understand what we are seeing. She argues that it is our vision of a future free of oppression which directs our attention and informs our actions.

Celebrating the gynocentric, that is, our ability to integrate, allows us to align our behaviors with our vision. Consequently, when we speak of transforming our world, we are imagining the creativity of integration and the growth developing out of increasing intimacy, rather than the violence of a revolution. As Marilyn French (1985) notes, revolutions are based on dichotomous thinking, depending on an "us versus them" mentality and that each group thinks alike. She argues that the nature of the revolting group varies only in degrees from the ruling regime, and that "in the end, patriarchy returns to its beginnings" (p.121). Feminists want to avoid this vision in conceiving how we will transform our world and yet we recognize ways in which we have adopted masculine strategies in our effort to change our world. In many of our attempts, we have adopted strategies and behaviors of the dominant groups. We have created hierarchical organizations, structured agendas and meetings, and excluded women who are not white, Anglo-European, christian, urban, middle class heterosexuals. But we are learning from the voices of those of us who

have been excluded. Feminists such as Mary Childers and bell hooks (1990; hooks, 1992) and Anne Cameron (1989) have repeatedly drawn attention to the need to create a feminist vision reflecting the needs of all women, rather than just those of the most privileged. Together with feminists such as Marcia Westkott (1990), they suggest that the answer lies in bridging the gap between what we know and what we do.

What we have learned from our experiences is that the process of change itself must reflect what we value in ourselves as women. This translates into valuing relationships more than we value achievement, competition, and individualism. In other words, it is relationships and collectivity that we want to achieve. What we desire is a world were relationships matter, where supporting and caring for each other and ourselves are mutual, nonconflicting experiences. It is through building relationships that we want to change our world. Being in relation is not to be equated with sameness. Sameness is neither necessary nor even desirable. Differences do require extra work and time, yet it is differences which stimulate us to grow.

A number of feminists, most notably Charlene Eldridge Wheeler and Peggy L. Chinn (1989) and Margo Adair and Sharon Howell (1990) have examined feminist processes, identifying central principles as well as detailing the process itself. Essentially, they believe that who we are as women must be reflected in how we are with each other at all times. Adair and Howell suggest that we begin by acknowledging our situations as individuals and our diversity as women, including the fact that some of us are more privileged than others. We need to appreciate and respect ourselves before we can move on to appreciating and respecting others. Respecting diversity is essential. It requires that differences are recognized and appreciated, rather than set aside as tokens, as when one First Nations woman or lesbian is accepted or invited into an organization. Tokenism, notes Adair and Howell, is an attempt to relieve the guilt of our privileges.

Creating changes means actively involving at every stage everyone who is affected. As guidelines, Adair and Howell (1990)suggest that we consider who benefits from and who sustains the present system. Who has the power and who do they power over? Who makes

the decisions, who benefits from them, and who loses? Who creates the information, who has access to it and who is denied the information? Who is creating the vision, what alternative visions exist, and can they co-exist?

Adair and Howell (1990) recommend that we approach people with a desire to trust and support each other. They suggest we begin by acknowledging our commonalities, such as the fact that everyone has been hurt by domination, everyone deserves respect, is intelligent, sensitive, creative, and wants to learn, and has something to contribute. They also emphasize that we are social beings who rely on our collective well-being and on the well-being of nature.

The actual process of being together requires commitment to each other and our vision, and the ability to listen. Listening to ourselves and each other is vital, and remaining committed to this process is even more important. If, as Mary Daly (1990) suggests, we listen each other into being, then listening is essential for growing together. It is in listening to ourselves and each other that we become aware of who we are, what our past is, and what we want in our future. We hear our feelings and desires, whether in our own stories or the voices of other women. Out of our shared stories and visions, and our supportive commitment to each other grows our determination and courage to act upon what we know.

The clearest example I have of this is my own experience of the women's support group we created in my graduate counselling program. After I brought a complaint against my professor, a number of female colleagues in my program could no longer tolerate the silence our administration had forced upon them regarding any information about the harassment case. With the exception of a few professors, one sessional instructor, and a few friends who were supporting me, most of the faculty refused to discuss the case with any students. This was frightening for the other students, for they were unable to identify the professor who was charged, the degree of severity of the harassment, and most importantly, what they needed to do to keep themselves safe. Initially they gathered to learn more about the case; I participated because I wanted their support, yet first needed to know how they were going to react to me. (Most people treated me – and some still do – as if I were

guilty of harassing my professor and not being "nice".) As I described the details of the case, that is, my experiences, they began to share their own feelings of fear and frustration, as well as similar stories of harassment.

Initially, we simply shared our experiences with each other. As we did so, however, we began to notice patterns in how the faculty and university treated us as women. As we grew closer, we also grew more confident in our knowledge of what we experienced and more clear in our vision of what we wanted. Although we had initially intended to be just a support group for each other, we discovered we were also a political group. Our very being together, the existence of a "women's group" generated a certain amount of fear and retaliation (for daring to break our silence and leave our isolation) amongst our fellow students and some of our professors. We also began working diligently at developing a course on feminist therapy and lobbying hard to have it accepted within our program. We realized the need to support women new to the counselling training program and to teach them the herstory of our program. We discovered that together we could find ways to accomplish anything. But the most important thing we learned was the value of just being together, being there for each other. What we were working on mattered less than the way we treated each other. Disagreements required that we spent the time and energy needed to understand each other and value the other's point of view. Everyone's perspective was wanted and valued. And if a sense of distrust arose between anyone within the group, then our priority became the need to explore the conflict until the issue was resolved and our relationships were restored.

While this process may have required a lot of work at times, it accomplished many things. It restored our faith and trust in ourselves and each other. Together we discovered that we could dream of a better way, were capable of acting upon our dreams, and were willing to work hard and long to achieve our goals. We also learned a great deal about ourselves and each other. We grew as individuals and as a collective. Together we explored how to be healthy and discovered what it took to create and maintain those relationships.

I believe that the various processes I have discussed – the guidelines for feminists methodologies, consciousness-raising groups, the collaborative groups described by Adair and Howell (1990) and Wheeler and Chinn (1989), and our women's support group in our graduate counselling program – illustrate what Miles (1981, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c) describes as transformational politics. A feminist transformational process fuses together our ways of being, knowing, and doing, our personal and political activities, our private and public selves, our rational and irrational processes. It is a way for us to maintain a tension between what has been artificially separated, to reunite what should never, and could never be divided. It may at times be confusing, for as I discovered in writing this thesis, it became difficult to separate knowing from doing and the present from the our vision of the future. Yet I believe this also more accurately reflects the complexity of our lives and the goals of feminism. This then leads us to the final section on the goals of feminism.

The Goals of Feminism

The goals of feminism contrast markedly with those of patriarchal society with its male cultural norm: to dominate and make the subordination of women and all groups who are not white, english-speaking, heterosexual, middle- or upper-class, etc., seem "natural". They also contract with those of modern science: to provide the means to predict and control, to power over and exploit women, other subordinated groups, and nature. The gynocentric valuing of integration and relationality set the political agenda for feminist activism and research, providing both a means and an end. Examining the goals arising out of the valuing of the feminine and its resulting methodologies and politics is a useful way to further understand feminism.

As has been demonstrated, feminists in academia and science are seeking out those methods, as Benston (1989) discusses, capable of dealing with complex systems without reducing them to measurable units or losing their fundamental nature. Vickers (1989) asserts that feminism seeks to reconcile the artificially created dualisms of the mind and body, reason and non-reason. She believes feminists aim to restructure human knowledge and

existence, "understanding and changing what has been called reality" (p. 43). Harding (1990) maintains feminists "want less false stories about nature and social life; they want scientific explanations that can provide useful guides to improving the conditions of women" (p. 83). Geraldine Finn (1989a) writes of feminist scholarship: "our goal is a practical and political one: the production of the practical truths and theoretical tools necessary and indispensable for liberation" (p. 419). From a feminist perspective there is clearly a need to limit male-stream theories, models, and presuppositions denying our experiences, knowledge, and as Carol Gilligan (1988) has noted, our very existence. More importantly, we need to recognize the androcentric values and norms underlying the scientific, academic, and political activity of dominant groups and which are leading to our invisibility and degradation. Feminists are increasingly seeking out perspectives, norms, and methods guided by values such as caring, responsibility for our actions and for others, and a sense of connectedness to ourselves and to others.

While feminism is initially about understanding the situation of women and our interrelatedness with the world, Benston (1989) further argues that feminism's aim is to "attempt to understand and evaluate human affairs" (p. 59). Along with Lorraine Code (1988), Judith A. Cook and Mary Margaret Fonow (1990), Marcia Westkott (1990), and many others, she stresses that the purpose of understanding and evaluating society is to change it. Benston conceives of feminism as insisting on "the centrality of human interests and the primacy of human worth and development" (p. 62), while redefining what the word "human" entails. What all of these women share is the desire to develop scholarship and science on a valuing of the feminine/gynocentric which, ultimately, is capable of assisting feminists in acknowledging and understanding women's experiences, identifying the sources of oppression, and providing strategies and resources for changes affecting all of humanity.

As Code (1988) and Finn (1989a) noted, the point of studying our situation, both historically and today, is to enable us to end oppression and achieve our emancipation. Yet as discussed earlier in this section, this goal seemed to be expressed in two different ways within feminism. The first is to make women like men or at least celebrated as important

and necessary complements to men, without which men are unable to survive. While this may seem an admirable or noble cause to some, it is unsatisfactory to many feminists for those reasons listed earlier, mainly that such a vision fails to recognize the structural and institutional subordination of women and other oppressed groups by white, heterosexual men, and it devalues gynocentric qualities and values while celebrating and instituting androcentric values. We want more than an end to the poverty and powerlessness that so many people experience; the division of our world into endless dichotomies, separating us from ourselves and each other; and the destruction of our bodies and our world for the sake of profits and privileges. Increasingly, feminists speak of restructuring society in the way Miles describes, transforming the male norm with the feminine and ultimately remaking the whole of our world. We want a world which acknowledges and celebrates the gynocentric, relationality, an ethic of care, and diversity. We want to express our being in the very way we go about achieving our goals – in collective, collaborative, inclusive processes.

It is this transformation which we seek and it is to this end that we struggle together in our respective disciplines, professions, agencies, groups, and homes, as well as within our very being. We bring to our struggle our abilities and skills at surviving and growing, birthing and creating, joining and making whole. We are uncovering our herstory of how we have already made this happen, our knowledge and wisdom, and the strength born of our mutual and supportive relationships. We are fueled and guided by our anger and bitterness at past and present isolation and suffering, the joy and hope of our dreams and visions, and the very values and beliefs upon which these are built.

VII. SUMMARY

Feminism, as I have attempted to illustrate in this chapter, challenges all areas of modern science and scholarship, from physics and mathematics through biology and chemistry to economics, history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and even philosophy. However, feminism questions more than the contents of these fields, that is, the phenomena practitioners of traditional schools examine, and their results and conclusions. Feminism is, more importantly, about new and diverse ways of seeing, thinking, expressing, exploring, learning, knowing, imagining, creating, doing, and even feeling. It provides a perspective fundamentally different from that of an androcentric perspective. It relies on radically different presuppositions and theories to guide inquiry, as well as standards based on gynocentric values by which to judge theories, models, norms for behavior, politically activism, and indeed, entire perspectives. Indeed, after applying Kuhn's (1970) analysis, feminist scholars such as Nielsen (1990) have concluded that feminism represents a unique paradigm relative to a paradigm based on androcentric values, theories, etc.

The fundamental difference between feminism and the traditional/androcentric perspective is that the former is generated by gynocentric values such as relationality, multiplicity, caring, responsibility, and nonviolence, while the latter has developed out of the valuing of individual rights, autonomy, aggression, and dominance to the exclusion of gynocentric values. The result is two radically ("at the roots of") differing approaches to living, learning, knowing, doing, and being. The androcentric paradigm is based on stratification and subordination, of members of one group dominating and exploiting members of another group. Feminism is about integration, mutuality, and celebrating the feminine. Feminists believe that our alternative to androcentricity lies within women.

Feminism's uniqueness as a paradigm is evident along all six dimensions. New words have been created (for example, "gynocentric", "hagocracy", "phallocentric", and "manguage"); old words have been given new meanings (for example, "glamour", "feminine", and "patriarchy"). Puzzles once invisible, ignored, or considered as anomalies within the

traditional paradigm have been identified and given priority: violence, abuse, oppression, silence, inequality, sexism. There are completely different models, exemplars, norms of behavior and political goals. Most importantly, a feminist paradigm is based upon a completely unique set of gynocentric values. Its world view begins with women. As a result, it has produced new guidelines and exemplars for learning and knowing, doing and being, and for selecting a paradigm.

The various approaches within feminism presented in this chapter – liberal, socialist, and radical, as well as pressure versus transformational – differ from each other in their models and politics as I have presented them here. Yet in daily practice, there is a great deal of overlap of the various models. More importantly, the differences exhibited along these two dimension are minor compared to the similarities along the remaining four dimensions. Each of these approaches share a common language and beliefs; struggle to end oppression and domination; seek gynocentric-based ways to achieve this; and most importantly, celebrate those values and qualities rejected and devalued by the dominant groups of our society: gynocentric and feminine. Feminist models seek to illustrate and address the same general category of phenomena experienced by members of subordinate groups: our systematic subordination to members of dominant groups. Along their most critical dimensions, feminists share the same perspective. Our differences in models and political activity appear to be the expected variations within a paradigm which Kuhn described. Given their overwhelming similarities, it can be argued that feminism is a unique paradigm relative to the norm/paradigm of modern society, patriarchy. It is an alternative, an option, another way of thinking about and constructing our world. For the purpose of this thesis, feminism shall be discussed as a unique paradigm.

Given that feminism provides such a radically different perspective from that of modern science, including the field of psychology, we can expect a feminist perspective of psychology in general and counselling psychology in particular to vary radically from those traditionally employed. This unique perspective has been applied with increasing clarity for the past several decades by feminist counsellors and psychologists. As a result, we now

have excellent examples of feminist scholarship and action, feminist theories of psychology, models, ethical codes, etc., to guide feminist psychologists, counsellors, and frontline workers. These shall be explored in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR: HOW FEMINISM INFORMS COUNSELLING

I. INTRODUCTION

Feminism is still considered an insignificant approach within counselling psychology and psychology in general or at least at the three major western Canadian universities I have attended. Aside from my undergraduate women's studies courses, during my seven years of undergraduate and graduate studies, the only mention of feminism arose in small, but daring, gatherings of female colleagues. They were daring because being labeled a feminist meant our ideas and opinions, for the most part, would be discredited and our presence in the program would be considered suspect. When one of us would occasionally attempt to present a feminist perspective in a class discussion, we consistently were encountered ambivalence or hostility.

However, at great personal cost and with tremendous collective efforts, things are slowly changing. After my sexual harassment case, a group of female students in our program formed a support group in the face of other students' suspicions and hostility. As a result of our endless and carefully planned lobbying, new students in our counselling program are now allowed to spend one morning (out of their entire one- or two-year program) of class time discussing feminism. We also worked at creating a course on "gender-fair" counselling. (We are told it would be sexist to leave the men out of the topic of discussion; we also must avoid using the word "feminism" in the title because we should not be discussing "that".) Beginning as a request from our student group, it was in due time approved by the department as "gender-fair" counselling.

Based on publications, program outlines, and conversations with colleagues from various universities, there is little opportunity to explore how feminism informs counselling psychology in most of our counselling programs across Canada. For the most part, this scenario where the mere mention of the words "feminism" or "feminist" brings on hostility from others seems typical. Given that feminism, whether pressure or transformational,

liberal, radical or social, is a perspective or paradigm whose goal is to improve the lives of all people, it is tragic to me that feminism is rejected and ignored in Canadian counselling programs.

Yet despite the fear and hostility many men and some women feel, a feminist perspective has been increasingly applied to psychology and counselling. This is evident in a number of areas. First, there is a growing body of literature on "feminist counselling/therapy", "feminist psychology", the "psychology of women", as well as issues and concepts arising solely out of feminist thinking such as relationality, violence, and abuse. For instance, some of the women presenting what they believe is a feminist perspective of psychology are Jean Baker Miller and her colleagues at the Stone Centre for Developmental Services and Studies (at Wellesley College, Cambridge), Carol Gilligan and her colleagues at the Harvard Project on Women's Psychology and Girls' Development (at Harvard, Cambridge), Paula Caplan and her colleagues at the Ontario Institute of Studies in Education, Toni Ann Laidlaw and Cheryl Malmo (1990, 1991), Harriet Goldhor Lerner (1988), Jocelyn Chaplin (1988), Jeri Dawn Wine (1989), Susan Sturdivant (1980), Lynne Bravo Rosewater and Lenore E. A. Walker (1985), Dorothy E. Smith and Sara J. David (1975), Dana Crowley Jack (1991), Ellen Kaschak (1992), Bonnie Burstow (1992), and Miriam Greenspan (1983).

A second area where a feminist approach to counselling is clearly evident is among frontline workers at the many transition houses, safe houses, sexual assault centres, friendship centres, support and volunteer groups, and Elizabeth Fry Society centers across Canada. "Frontline workers" is a phrase used to identify those people who provide initial intervention and often long term support to the women and children seeking their help. Women active as frontline workers vary in the amount of training they receive and in their status as volunteers, part-time and full-time employees. Their very activities are, by definition, feminist. Any description and analysis of feminist counselling would be incomplete without the experience and knowledge of these "nonprofessionals". Their

perspective is offered in the many training and educational manuals published by a number of these organizations and their provincial and national bodies.

A third important area of literature demonstrating how feminism has come to inform psychology are those personal stories and critiques offered by women who have been on the receiving end of therapy. Their stories go beyond our hopes of what therapy is to reveal its actual results and consequences. It is vital that we pay close attention to the experiences of therapy reported by those who come to us for help if we are to develop approaches which truly help others.

In addition to these published works, the growing influence of feminism in psychology is visible within my own life as a woman and a feminist counsellor. I also bring with me those experiences shared with me by other counsellors and women. In examining literature and personal stories, I hope to present here a clearer picture of the actual nature and practice of psychology within the feminist paradigm. I am especially interested in how feminism informs counselling psychology. That is, what does feminist counselling/therapy look like? What theories and models specific to feminist psychology (versus feminism in general) guide it? Are there various approaches within feminist psychology? If so, what are they and how effective are they? What does a feminist psychology hope to achieve and what are its actual consequences?

II. THEORIES UNDERLYING FEMINIST PSYCHOLOGY

Traditionally, psychology has been defined as the study of human behavior, emotions, and thoughts (Davison and Neale, 1986). Its models deal with our development through our life times, our personalities, our mental health and illnesses, and how to treat our abnormal behaviors, inappropriate feelings, or irrational beliefs and illogical thoughts. Given how profoundly different the feminist paradigm is from a patriarchal or masculinist paradigm, a psychology based upon a feminist perspective will also be radically different from traditional/patriarchal approaches.

Feminism has profound implications for psychology and counselling, the clinical practice of psychology. A feminist perspective means redefining what psychology is, what we attend to as practitioners and researchers, what we are interested in exploring, what we will see, how we will gather this information, what will be considered relevant (and irrelevant), how we will act as practitioners and researchers, and what we are trying to achieve. It requires us to challenge everything we have learned about what psychology is and does. Consequently, I will examine how feminism informs counselling psychology and psychology in general along those six dimensions developed in Chapter Two.

As noted in the previous chapter, a major identifying feature of feminism is its underlying presuppositions or what are more commonly referred to as theories and laws. These serve, in part, to explain phenomena we are interested in exploring. They also distinguish feminism from a masculinist paradigm and provide a starting point in examining how feminism informs psychology. In this section, I shall examine the theories underlying a feminist psychology and detail their puzzles and solutions. Much of feminist psychology has grown out of a strong dissatisfaction with the theories of the powerful traditional paradigm with its various schools, such as the humanists, behaviorists, and the cognitivists. Hence, understanding how feminism informs psychology requires examining some of the inadequacies of the traditional paradigm in psychology visible from a feminist perspective. This critique makes those theories central to a feminist psychology far more

visible and easy to understand. These generalities or theories, while often unstated, are hallmarks of feminist psychology.

Uncovering and Revalorizing the Feminine

If we are learning that feminism needs to be based on the gynocentric, on a valuing of women and the ways of being, doing, and knowing associated with women, then this is also a vital starting point in understanding how feminism informs psychology. Several feminist psychologists, most notably Jean Baker Miller (1986) and Carol Gilligan (1982a, 1982b), together with their colleagues, have developed or inspired others to develop our understanding of women (and paradoxically, of men). Miller describes women in the context of our world and interprets our actions and choices as our strengths and survival strategies rather than as had traditionally been done, as signs of our inferiority. Miller (1987) and her colleagues at the Stone Centre (Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Striver, & Surrey, 1991) are exploring women's desire to use our "powers to increase the powers of others – that is, to increase other people's resources, strengths and effectiveness in many dimensions – emotionally, intellectually, etc." (Miller, 1987, p. 5). She has observed that our mutuality, caring, supportiveness, and connectedness is essential for the survival of humanity. Our existence, as individuals and as a species, has depended upon someone (usually women) caring, nurturing, supporting, working together, and constantly adjusting to the ever changing needs of ourselves and others. Our connectedness to others, our mutual caring and sharing, writes Miller (1987), "is the only way psychological development occurs at all" (p. 5).

Carol Gilligan (1982a) listened to women, something which had previously been considered unnecessary, and heard an expression of morality unique from the morality most commonly expressed by men. Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan (1992) have been interviewing the same group of nearly one hundred girls and young female teenagers over several years to discover, in part, how their development is influenced by their culture and society. Dana Crowley Jack (1993) in examining women's experiences of depression,

uncovered how women's subordinate position combines with culturally dictated patterns requiring men to be emotionally unresponsive and women to restrict their initiatives and expressiveness within their relationships. Mary Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck Tarule (1986) uncovered women's ways of knowing and learning.

These are some of the better known studies helping to uncover what it means to be a women and the ways of women. Lesser known work occurs daily in small group meetings, support groups and consciousness raising groups, counselling sessions, women's studies classes in colleges and universities, and in chats with friends, daughters, mothers, grandmothers, and colleagues, where women recognize themselves in the words and images used by other women. These women, whether frontline workers, paid or volunteer counsellors, or friends, sisters, and mothers, are recognizing and valuing the ways of women. The uniqueness of those characteristics, attributes and values traditionally associated with women are the focus of interest, not for the sake of studying "women's issues", but rather, in order to celebrate them as an organizing principle for our world.

This work has happened in response to the inadequacies that women experienced within psychology. For example, feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan's interest in the moral development of women grew out of her need to "'put to rest certain things that had been bothering me since high school and all through graduate school" (Prose, 1990, p. 37), including the fact that women had been ignored in psychological studies. As Miller (1987) notes, traditional psychology has, in general, described development as "a series of separations from others" (p. 6) which should result in full independence. Practitioners of the traditional schools insist that it is healthy to pursue our individual needs, even at the price of losing relationships and denying mutual needs and concerns. In addition to Miller, Wine (1989), Jack (1991), and Brown and Gilligan (1992) argue that psychologists of the androcentric paradigm have defined health as being separate from others, as caring for and considering only the self through the use of competition and aggression, despite these actions resulting in domination, destruction, and death. Consequently, the qualities of

women have come, in our present society and in our approaches to psychology, to define the unhealthy, as when our desire for mutual caring and connectedness has been presented as our problem, as our failing to properly and fully separate, to be independent.

Traditional schools of psychology, according to Naomi Weisstein (1969, 1971), Susan Sturdivant (1980), Miriam Greenspan (1983), Phyllis Chesler (1971), Dorothy Smith (1975), and Meredith Kimball (1975), differentiate between those attributes, norms, and characteristics expressing androcentric values and those expressing gynocentric values. Androcentric characteristics and norms are valued and rewarded; they are desired, viewed as healthy and are the norm against which the unhealthy can be identified. Thus we see traditional psychology valuing, for example, the rational, as when cognitivists emphasize cognitive processes to the exclusion of emotions. They identify "irrational" beliefs and irrational thinking as a problem, and rational beliefs and logical thinking as the solution (Ellis, 1984).

Brown and Gilligan (1992), Chesler (1971), Greenspan (1983), Kimball (1975), Miller (1986), Smith (1975), and Sturdivant (1980) argue that while the masculine, or those characteristics associated with men, define health, the opposite is true of the feminine: Those characteristics attributed to women define what is unhealthy for an adult and at the same time, healthy for women. The well known study by Inge K. Broverman, Donald M. Broverman, Frank E. Clarkson, Paul S. Rosenkrantz, and Susan R. Vogel (1970) provided evidence of the existence of this double standard. They revealed that clinicians (of both sexes and regardless of their school of thought within the masculinist paradigm) attributed the same set of behaviors and characteristics to healthy males as they did to healthy adults (sex unspecified), such as being very aggressive, very dominant, logical, very competitive, very objective, non-emotional, and very independent. These same characteristics were considered unhealthy for women. Those behaviors and attributes characterizing a "mature, healthy, socially competent adult women" were the opposite of those considered healthy for men and adults. The characteristics for women included:

> being more submissive, less independent, less adventurous, more easily influenced, less aggressive, less competitive, more excitable in minor crises, having their feelings more easily hurt, being more emotional, more conceited about their appearance, less objective, and disliking math and science. (p. 4-5)

These results raise a number of troubling issues for us. Chesler (1971), Greenspan (1983), Miller (1986), Smith (1975), and Sturdivant (1980) conclude that the existence of two standards of health is more than just a double-standard for women. It is actually a double-bind for women when the qualities traditionally assigned to women are despised and labeled as unhealthy while those traditionally of men define the norm for health, *but only for men*. The point here is that there are no socially acceptable healthy ways of being for women. As Kimball (1975) explains, the research by Broverman and her colleagues (1970) reveals that our counsellors, therapists, and social workers consider a healthy woman to be sick as a person while being a healthy person means she is sick as a woman. In failing to conform to societal expectations of a healthy adult, she is considered ill and her difficulties are blamed on her being passive rather than assertive, emotional rather than rational. In failing to conform to societal expectations of a healthy woman by being assertive and rational, she is a cold-hearted bitch, a trouble-maker, greedy, and most of all, terrifying.

These social stereotypes are also oppressive in defining the female as the lack of the male. Wine (1989) observes that essential characteristics are defined as those which men have more of than women. Any characteristic, such as caring, of which women are considered to have more, are signs of weakness and inferiority. In defining behaviors and characteristics as the absence of the more important male characteristics – "not competitive", "less independent", and "less aggressive"– women's valuable qualities are degraded and hidden. Thus, as Miller (1986) concludes, our mutuality and connectedness to others are seen as a dependency or a lack of independence; our nurturing abilities are defined as passivity; and our creativity and ability to cooperate are interpreted as our need to be more assertive and competitive.

Furthermore, notes Weisstein (1971), socially constructed, mutually exclusive stereotypes of men and women are social norms which are never realized in any one person and yet are always held up as the ideal to be achieved. They fail to be grounded in reality. Women are capable of acting independently and rationally. Men can be and are wonderful parents and partners, able to express their emotions, and work cooperatively. Yet these stereotypes are used to "define the possible" for human potential and clearly present differing expectations and limits for the two sexes. Marilyn French (1985), Greenspan (1983), and Miller (1986) stress that these enforced limitations have a devastating impact on women and men. It forces us to restrict ourselves in damaging ways, destroying our creativity, draining our energy, and stunting our psychological growth. Our whole world suffers from its effects at institutional levels. Miller (1987) points out that these stereotypes discourage men from entering into healthy, mutually supportive relationships. Instead as Miller and French explain, they are encouraged to be aggressive to the point of mutilation, murder, and war. They are expected to constantly control their emotions, women, and "lesser" men through the violent and aggressive use of power over others.

While men define themselves according to their actions and achievements, Miller (1986) argues that it is socially unacceptable for women to be in relation to self. Within our patriarchal society, women's self meanings must revolve around men's perceptions of us and our activities must center on the men and children in our lives. We are expected to ignore and deny our own needs, using our emotional/psychological, spiritual, sexual, and physical energy to serve the needs of others and to live up to their expectations. Our creativity is limited to our homes, and if we should move beyond it, we must continue to serve the needs of men.

It is vital at this point to emphasize how powerful these stereotypes are and how strictly they are enforced. With very few exceptions, media images emphasize the passive, stupid woman and consistently degrade her qualities. She screams, she is the victim, she is silly, she is the home-body, she is an object for sex and for servitude, or she is not a woman, but a woman-trained-to-be-a-man playing the police officer, the lawyer, the tough one, the

bitch. Inevitably, she must either be the bimbo or the bitch. Women who respond to their own needs are shown as incapable of intimate relationships with male partners and therefore must confess their unbearable loneliness and failures as women. More importantly, we are told that it is their own fault that they are without a man, for they dared to stop serving the needs of men first. Feminists are consistently presented as "man-haters". Lesbians, if presented at all, are usually depicted as "sick". Native women are rarely allowed to say anything; they are usually presented as if they exist only to serve the bodily needs of men.

The media presents us daily with the images and stories of women who are mutilated and killed for daring to leave their husbands or boyfriends, or for simply being a woman. As I took a break from writing this, it was reported on the news that another woman went missing from Calgary (she is the third woman to go missing this week) after a man who frightened her inquired as to when she would be working by herself. She was one of many who have vanished this winter. They have since found her body. They have charged him with murder, but this will not help her now. As for the rest of us, we have already listened and learned, adding it to the other lessons. We watch our mothers at home serve our brothers and fathers, and as girls and women we too are expected to serve them. If our mothers or sisters work outside of our home as well, it is usually to serve others with little compensation or respect. We go to school where women are teachers and men are administrators, where even though we know we are intelligent we are ignored while the boys have the attention and the financial support. We go to stores were women serve us while pictures of the stores' male owners and managers smile down on us. We go to work and school were our daily harassment and humiliation, we are told, is all in our head. We speak up and protest, make changes, bring charges and sometimes even winning, and then are humiliated, harassed, fired, blacklisted, beaten, raped, and killed.

These socially constructed and divisive norms run deep within ourselves and our culture. As discussed earlier, they shape our society and its institutions. In order to survive within it, Miller (1986) notes that men need only learn the masculine, while women must

learn to be feminine and yet be familiar with the masculine for it determines the world they must live in. As she observes, women learn to listen to the unspoken, to attend to the unknown, to anticipate the future in order to survive. We interact with our oppressors at the most intimate levels. Our survival depends upon how well we learn to supplicate, nourish, and care for others (usually our oppressors), often at the expense of meeting our own needs.

Psychologists, whether in counselling practice, in formulating research questions, searching for solutions, creating models, or teaching students, perpetuate this stratification and dominance when they adhere to these stereotypes and value the masculine over the feminine. Bonnie Burstow (1992), Chesler (1971), Sturdivant (1980), and Greenspan (1983) warn that clinicians define for the client what is normal, healthy, socially acceptable behavior and more importantly, that the overwhelming majority of therapists/counsellors/clinicians continue to hold these oppressive stereotypes. Even when practitioners attempt to retreat to a higher moral ground by claiming to be above stereotyping individuals and just accepting individuals for who they are, they are in actual fact retreating to the deeply entrenched social norms of separating and valuing the masculine over the feminine. From my experience with many male and female professors, counsellors, psychologists, supervisors, and students, these stereotypes are very alive and healthy.

It is also evident, in reviewing literature by women professing to be feminist psychologists, therapists, and counsellors, that it is difficult, after years of training in these theories and beliefs, to leave a lifetime of socialization and training behind. Harriet Goldhor Lerner (1988) and Clair M. Brody (1984) encourage women to move beyond the stereotypes presented by our culture. However, they repeatedly encourage us to move toward the masculine stereotype, that is, to be less "frigid, angry" and "passive" (Brody, 1984, p. 16) and more "aggressive, competitive, ambitious" (Lerner, 1988, p. 11). Lerner and Brody seem unable to appreciate that the qualities of women have been devalued and that the strategies developed by women have helped us in our survival. Instead, they seem to argue that women should be more like men.

This theory of feminist psychology raises for feminists a critical puzzle regarding those characteristics, qualities, and values traditionally associated with women. We have realized that because of the valuing of the masculine over the feminine in our culture in general and in psychology in particular, we do not fully know what the "feminine" is. As Gilligan (1982b, 1988a) first noticed, women simply have been considered too unimportant or insignificant (if considered at all) to be included. Until recently, our specificity or uniqueness as women was ignored. Or, when we have been noticed, it was in terms of our "natural" deficiencies and inadequacies. According to Miller (1987), traditional psychology has viewed women in the images and concepts of the language of the dominant group, and using their categories of experience, in ways which they want us to see ourselves. That is, we se ourselves through the eyes of our oppressors, rather than through our own eyes. Feminists in psychology are interested in perceiving women and other oppressed/subordinate groups "in their own terms, without trying to fit their experience into old slots (categories)" (p. 5). For example, Jack (1993), in studying women's experiences of depression, trusted that "women are reliable witnesses of their own experiences" (p. 23). She invited and supported women to name their experiences and define their issues. We are now in the process of un-covering and revalorizing women's being, with the vision of transforming our individual and collective understanding of what it means to be a woman and a man.

Uncovering and Undoing Domination/Subordination

Understanding the nature of the dominant/subordinate relationship underlies many feminist efforts in the field of psychology. We are interested in how it is maintained, how it is experienced by men and women, and what we can do to eliminate it. In describing dominance and subordination, Miller (1986) explains that the valued attributes and their associated roles are limited to the dominant group. Tasks the dominants want to avoid are relegated to subordinates as "second class citizens". For instance, the task of looking after our bodily functions, such as preparing food for meals, sexual gratification, and cleaning up our body's wastes are assigned by white, middle-class men to women and other subordinates

such as First Nations' people, immigrants, etc. The dominants also assign characteristics to subordinates which are pleasing to the dominants. The assigned qualities suit their needs, and justify their decisions and actions. Thus subordinates such as women and natives are presented as passive, objects for sex, unable to decide, unadventurous, helpless, childlike, needing protection and decisions made for us, and our affairs overseen. Furthermore, as was described in the previous section, as subordinates, we must adopt these characteristics in order to be considered healthy and well-adjusted. Likewise, the psychological well-being of dominants depends upon their adhering to their own stereotypes.

Miller (1986), along with Dorothy E. Smith (1975), notes that as the dominant group has the greatest influence and power, it structures society such that our culture, politics, economics, laws, religions, sciences, and philosophy legitimizes oppressive and exploitive relationships. It becomes the invisible norm, the lens through which we see our world. This assigning of characteristics is presented by the dominants as the natural order of being. Members of subordinate groups, such as women, natives, and immigrants, are considered to be born with these inferior qualities. Unfortunately, subordinates are taught to believe that our potential is defined by these stereotypes. Failing to meet these stereotypes means that we are sick, evil, wrong, and bad. In contrast, argues Miller, men are taught that the most terrifying thing in the world would be to acknowledge and attend to their needs as humans and their emotions. They are taught to believe they would stop being a man and thus, cease to exist.

According to Miller (1986), the need to enforce conformity arises when the dominant group, men, despise and fear that which they cannot control: their emotions and their needs. Women, in particular, embody men's neediness and humanness at individual and societal levels and as such, women are despised and oppressed, also at individual and societal levels. If women can be controlled and made to continue to attend to these terrifying aspects of humanity, then the self-image of men will remain unchallenged. There will be no danger to their existence as men. Thus, women must conform to the stereotypes established by the dominant group. That is, we must live within the limits established for us by men. Only

then can men be assured that they will never be forced to confront their terror and fears. As even our recent history demonstrates, there is no limit to the violence and terror they will bring upon women in an attempt to "keep us in our place". Witness the massacre of the fourteen female engineering students and employees in Montréal (Franklin, 1991). Or the letters to three hundred female students living in residence at the University of British Columbia sent by their male counterparts threatening them with violence, rape, and death (Harris, 1991). If these numbers seen relatively minor, consider that twenty-five percent of the women surveyed in the Women's Safety Project reported being physically assaulted and in every case the attacker was their male partners (The Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, 1993). These women were harassed, abused, and killed because they rejected their stereotypes, refusing to be subservient to men, to exist only for the needs of men.

We continue to uncover the various forms of violence and abuse, ranging from the withholding of affection to torture and death, and are exploring how these are used to maintain women in a subordinate position. For example, Ellen Pence and Michael Paymar (1993) of the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project contend that dominant groups, especially men, have learned through our culture and their families to enforce their dominant positions and how needing to maintain control has restricted their own lives. They describe the variety of abusive tactics employed by men, such as economic, emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, using intimidation, isolation, threats, children, coercion, and male privilege, as well as minimizing, denying, and blaming others, especially their female partners, to maintain their dominance over women and other subordinate groups. The Elizabeth Fry Society of Prince George (Owston, 1993) has published a book detailing through personal stories how men have used these strategies against their partners in an effort to control and contain them. Male abusers and female survivors describe how they felt and what they thought, the beliefs they developed and how they managed their situations.

As academics and workers in the field of psychology, we are especially interested in how women are affected within ourselves by our enforced subordination. For example,

Patricia Evans (1993) details the many forms of abuse experienced by women who have written to her over the years to share their stories with her. The letters written by these women tell us in their own words how they came to see themselves in response to the abuse they experienced from intimate male partners. Brown and Gilligan's (1992) work is revealing the slow and often subtle transformation of articulate, outspoken, uncompromising, confident girls into teenagers who have learned that acting on our desires may mean painful and threatening isolation and how this results in girls growing up to become women vulnerable to abuse. Jack's (1993) work focuses on depressed women's descriptions of their internal world of feelings, patterns of thoughts, and imaginings in response to their enforced subservient roles within heterosexual relationships, and how their responses enable them to survive.

We are also documenting how psychology and therapy in particular is used by men and women-trained-to-be-men to maintain their domination over women and other groups. Not surprisingly, they use the same tactics as men outside of psychology, except that they can use the authority and trust given them in their role as psychologists, therapists, and counsellors. This includes sexualizing relationships and responding to women as sexual objects (American Psychiatric Association, 1975; Burstow, 1992; Sturdivant, 1980); engaging in sex with the people seeking their help, especially women, (American Psychiatric Association, 1975; Burstow, 1992; Chesler, 1989; Penfold, 1987; Pope, Keith-Spiegel, & Tabachnick, 1986); blaming women for the abuse inflicted on us by men (Boehnert, 1988; Chesler, 1989; Greenspan, 1983; Miller, 1986; Penfold, 1987); denying that men are abusive and insisting instead that women are masochistic (Caplan, 1985); minimizing the abusive and oppressive situations women describe while also discrediting women's understanding and analysis of our situation (Greenspan, 1983; Penfold, 1987; Smith, 1975); defining men's dominating behavior as normal while women's survival techniques are described as self-defeating and sick (Miller, 1986; Pantony & Caplan, 1991a, 1991b); reinforcing women's traditional role of serving the needs of men (American Psychiatric Association, 1975; Boehnert, 1988; Greenspan, 1983; Miller, 1986; Sturdivant, 1980); acting out traditional roles

within therapy (Penfold, 1987); devaluing women and the characteristics and values traditionally associated with women (American Psychiatric Association, 1975; Miller, 1986; Sturdivant, 1980); and ignoring the power differences existing between therapists/researchers and their clients/participants (Burstow, 1992; Greenspan, 1983).

Attempting to understand and un-do domination has led us to speculate upon and experiment with various ways of offering assistance to people seeking our help which are sensitive to dominant/subordinate relationships within the helping relationship. This includes closely examining the meaning of caring (Striver, 1991); the relationship between empathy, mutuality, and change (Jordan, 1991b, 1991c; Kaplan, 1991a); male and female roles within therapy (Kaplan, 1991b); and the consequences of and ways to eliminate power differences between counsellors/researchers and those people seeking support or participating in research (Berman, 1985; Brown, 1985; Burstow, 1992; Laidlaw & Malmo, 1991).

Celebrating Diversity and Conflict

The third theory underlying a feminist approach to psychology acknowledges and celebrates the diversity of humans and the role of conflict within our lives. Differences, according to Miller (1986), "are a source of strength for each of us – so long as they are not used against us" (p. 136). Adair and Howell (1990) insist that variety is an essential aspect of humanity and our differences are sources of learning. When, as Miller describes, we attend to our own uniqueness, desires, strengths, and limitations, and bring these together with others, we all grow. Adair (cited in Wheeler & Chinn, 1989) writes that "it is the diversity of nature that gives the web of life its strength and cohesion. Imagine a time where everyone welcomes diversity in people because that is what gives community its richness, its strength, its cohesion" (p. 13). Within this perspective, explains Miller, acknowledging that conflict exists and handling it openly enhances each individual, leads to higher goals, and because of the mutual sharing, more resources. Being engaged in conflict is stimulating. It is the source of life, generating energy and creativity. Yet in order for this growth and life to

happen, conflict must be acknowledged and recognized as the source of growth. It must be dealt with openly. We also need to recognize, as Miller, Adair and Howell conclude, that conflict and growth are at times painful, frightening, and uncomfortable conditions during which we feel vulnerable.

However, argues Miller (1986), in our present culture conflict is often suppressed or disallowed, despite conflict being an inevitable outcome of the male/dominate-female/subordinate relationship. As we saw earlier, dichotomous stereotypes of men and women are used to teach us what is normal (although not healthy) behavior. These stereotypes are essential in structuring the dominant-subordinate relationship. As subordinates, women and other "second-class" groups have been assigned the task of caring for the ever changing needs of the dominant group and of finding ways to live together. Of necessity, this means, on a daily basis, dealing with change due to physical and psychological development, as well as conflict arising out of differing needs and desires. Furthermore, characteristics attributed to women and other subordinate groups are also indicators of a lack of mental health, signaling our deficiency within our patriarchal culture. Miller also notes the converse, that members of dominant groups are considered to possess healthy characteristics and lack nothing. As Miller writes "everyone is terrified of differences because it means deficiency" (p. 137) and our "alleged deficiencies are used against us" (p. 137). As she argues, both the dominant groups' alleged lack of deficiencies and our alleged deficiencies are falsities.

Hence, we struggle against the restrictions imposed by stereotypes and the degradation of the feminine. Consequently, as Miller (1986) contends, women and other subordinate groups are very familiar with conflict. At the same time, we have been taught to fear conflict as a destructive force expressed by men and that women are bad for engaging in conflict. In her analysis of conflict, Miller notes that it is often associated with destruction, pain, restriction, lowered goals, and less resources; "knowing only the pain and futility of hidden conflict, one believes that *that* is what conflict *is*" (p. 127).

It is necessary to hide or suppress our challenges to stereotypes and the dominant-subordinate structuring of our society because conflict is unacceptable to members of dominant groups and our male-oriented culture and structures. As Miller (1986) explains, acknowledging that there is conflict would challenge and eventually destroy the myth of the naturalness of the dominant-subordinate system and the system itself. Destroying this system would mean dominants losing their power over women and other "second-class" groups. It would mean members of dominant groups would have to deal with unpleasant emotions and experience being vulnerable rather than in control and in charge. It would destroy the essential self-image of what it means to be male for many men. Thus, the dominant group must suppress and deny conflict. As Miller (1986) writes:

> dominant groups will tend to suppress conflict. They will see any questioning of the "normal" situation as threatening; activities by subordinates in this direction will be perceived with alarm. Dominants are usually convinced that the way things are is right and good, not only for them but especially for the subordinates. All morality confirms this view, and all social structure sustains it.
>
> It is perhaps unnecessary to add that the dominant group usually holds all of the open power and authority and determines the ways in which power may be acceptably used. (p. 9)

Therefore, members of dominant groups in power must always be controlling conflict, and they have two predominant ways of accomplishing this. First, as Dorothy E. Smith (1975) emphasizes, they can control how conflict is conceived, and second, enforce conformity to stereotypes. They can control how we conceive of conflict and our experiences of conflict by dominating our institutions, and defining our language, ideas, images, and ways of thinking and knowing. In this manner, members of dominant groups can then define the nature of conflict. The institution of psychology, according to Bonnie Burstow (1992), Paula Caplan (1985, 1991a, 1991b), Phyllis Chesler (1989), Mary Daly (1990), Miriam Greenspan (1983), Helen Levine (1989), Jean Baker Miller (1986, 1987), P. Susan Penfold and Gillian A. Walker (1983), Susan Sturdivant (1980), and Smith, is instrumental in defining the nature of conflict.

Psychology, they argue, is an institution founded on domination. It exists to enforce our otherness and status as being "naturally" inferior to men, white Anglo-Europeans, middle and upper classes, heterosexuals, able-bodied persons, etc. If our attributes are defined as naturally inferior and unhealthy, then we are also considered to be unhealthy or mentally ill.

At the same time, as these feminists explain, we are also categorized as mentally ill for failing to conform to our culturally defined stereotypes. Any pain and suffering we may experience is attributed to our failure to adhere to our natural way of being. If we do suffer, so the dominant group argues, it is because we are failing to accept our positions with gratefulness and grace. Consequently, the dominant group is able to justify enforcing conformity to social stereotypes and avoiding the need to change relationships, societal structures, stereotypes, or beliefs. Conflict and challenges to the dominant-subordinate system are minimized and ignored. And as Miller (1986) contends, the members of dominant groups continue to maintain groups of subordinates to meet their needs.

Moreover, as these feminists note, by associating conflict with pain and suffering, and by defining these as unbearable and intolerable conditions, then conflict itself is then defined as intolerable and unhealthy. That is, in viewing health as being free of conflict and of the pain and suffering associated with it, the experience of conflict can then be defined as being unhealthy. Therefore, when we fail to conform and as a result experience pain and conflict, we are, according to this definition, unhealthy. More importantly, we are labeled as being mentally ill. Consider the association between pain and mental illness in this definition of mental illness from a standard manual referred to by psychologists and many counsellors in diagnosing clients, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Third Edition, Revised (DSM III-R) (American Psychiatric Association, 1987):

> In DSM III-R each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavior or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in a person and that is associated with present distress (a painful symptom) or disability (impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly

> increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom.... Whatever its original cause, it must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the person. (p. xxii)

By describing conflict as painful and intolerable, and that individuals are mentally ill if they experience distress and pain, it becomes easy to control conflict: Control the person. Convince them that they are unhealthy and that their coping strategies and challenges to the system of domination are signs of their illness. Some of the strategies used by subordinates to cope with their oppressive situations are seen as symptoms of mental illness: short attention spans in students, dropping out of school, drug and alcohol use, dieting, anorexia, bulimia, the use of steroids, depression, suicide, having multiple personalities, loss of memory, etc.

The belief in the existence of mental illness is so powerful, notes Penfold and Walker (1983), that it is now viewed as the source of our actions, feelings and thoughts. It is circular reasoning: Mental illness causes the symptoms resulting in the mental illness. As Burstow (1992), Caplan (1991a, 1991b), Chesler (1971), Daly (1990), Greenspan (1983), Miller (1986), Penfold and Walker (1983), and Sturdivant (1980) argue, the theory of mental illness and the need to avoid conflict is central to the traditional approach to psychology. While each school has its own theory on mental illness, their own descriptions of it as the problem and their own solutions for eliminating it, these differences are all variations on the belief that mental illness exists as a part of the fundamental nature of humans. As Smith (1975) asserts, with the authority men and women-who-are-trained-to-be-men have as the dominants to define the experiences of their subordinates, mental illness becomes a legitimate theory for explaining the conflict experienced by women. These feminists contend that a "mentally ill" person is dis-credited and dis-abled. In addition, the authority given counsellors and theorists by our society and the power they have over the people seeking their assistance allows them to use a number of dangerous, painful, and detrimental measures to eliminate any questioning of or challenges to the dominant-subordinate system.

These measures are often referred to as "treatments". Women such as Marsha Enomoto (1975), Barbara Findley (1975), and Helen Levine (1989), Kelli Quinn (1984), and those interviewed by Phyllis Chesler (1989) have described how they have been hospitalized in psychiatric wards in horrible conditions and/or subjected to dangerous "treatment" for failing to be appropriately feminine, challenging their subordinate roles. Their freedom was purchased by demonstrating that they had learned to conform to the stereotype of women as subservient to members of dominant groups.

As feminists, we reject the theory and existence of the phenomena of mental illness; we view distress and pain as indicators of our struggle to adapt and survive within distressing and painful situations which are oppressive and exploitive. We see ourselves as survivors struggling for some power over our own lives rather than as patients and victims needing to be looked after. Instead of conformity, we support diversity and change. We seek out and celebrate differences and the richness of diversity among ourselves as women and among all people.

We are also un-covering those ways in which women and other members of subordinate groups manage conflict and encourage growth. We are looking for ways to encourage changes enhancing everyone's lives, whether within our relationships or our society's structures and institutions. To this end feminist collectives and organizations are experimenting with new ways of encouraging diversity and engaging in conflict so that it will lead to growth. As discussed in the previous chapter, several excellent models include those developed by Margo Adair and Sharon Howell (1990) and Charlene Eldridge Wheeler and Peggy L. Chinn (1989).

Recognizing Socio-cultural, Political, and Historical factors

This leads us to the last of the four fundamental beliefs underlying a feminist approach to psychology: Relational and structural rather than individual factors account for our suffering and pain. Feminists in the field of psychology, such as Miller (1986), Greenspan (1983), Chesler (1971), Brown and Gilligan (1992), Sturdivant (1980), and Jack 1991), as well as Ellyn Kaschak (1992), believe that it is no longer acceptable or even conceivable to consider people separate from the relational and structural world we experience. Instead, we attend to social, cultural, economic, and political factors when addressing problems presented by individuals. We view individuals as healthy people surviving in unhealthy situations and an unhealthy society. The problems themselves are defined as being within our culture and societal structures as opposed to being within the individual. For example, rather than believing violence is one women's problem, we believe it is experienced by everyone to varying degrees as a result of how our society is structured. The men who kill or hurt women and people in general are seen as acting out societal attitudes rather than as extremely ill individuals who are the exception to the rule. As reported by the Canadian government in their report, The war against women, abusive behavior is normal for men and is a means to "gain power and control over women.... men have absorbed societal values and attitudes which give men permission to abuse women and children.... (and) which reinforces male dominance and control over women" (Standing Committee on Health and Welfare, Social Affairs, Seniors and the Status of Women, 1991, p. 34).

Burstow (1992), Chesler (1971), Daly (1990), French (1985, 1992), Greenspan (1983), Miller (1986), Smith (1975), and Sturdivant(1980) conclude that psychology reflects our cultural acceptance of men dominating and exploiting subordinates. Practitioners within the traditional male-centered paradigm are unable to see the complex relationships between social, cultural, historical, religious, economic, and political factors in the lives of individuals. They ignore social norms, stereotypes, and expectations, and produce information which Naomi Weisstein (1969, 1971) maintains is blatantly false. She lists the

research documenting the validity of information describing consistent characteristics in such groups as women and homosexually-oriented people. Not only has this information about these two groups been shown to be useless, it has, more importantly, been shown to be false. Like Carolyn Wood Sherif (1979), Weisstein argues that traits assigned to people on the basis of their sex, race, sexual orientation, age or socio-economic status reflects the beliefs and expectations of those making the observations. Both Weisstein and Sherif conclude that pronouncements that women are naturally happier when married to men and serving as his slave and caretaker in his home or that aboriginal people are less than human and devoid of rationality consistently justify and maintain the power and wealth of the dominant race, class, sex, and age group. The group historically making these pronouncements, that is, white, middle class, Anglo-European, heterosexual men, continues to enforce a view of reality upon women and other subordinate groups which serves the interests of men. They want us to see ourselves and our world the way they want it to be, for reasons we have already discussed.

Feminists are arguing that practitioners of traditional schools of psychology are guilty of underestimating social, cultural, and economic factors in women's lives and that we need to attend to the ways in which they have focused our attention on individual causes to explain our suffering and exploitation. The predominant approaches to psychology within the traditional paradigm are based on the belief that individuals act in ways (Wilson, 1984), have irrational beliefs (Ellis, 1984) and make choices (Meador and Rogers, 1984; Glasser, 1984) which result in our suffering. As Burstow (1992), Greenspan (1983), and Sturdivant (1980) note, traditionally, the emphasis has been and continues to be upon the individual. In each case, explanations of our behavior, thoughts, and feelings focus on the individual's choices, thoughts, and behaviors while ignoring or underestimating social, political, economic, and religious factors.

Feminists such as Weisstein (1969, 1971) and Sherif (1979) contest the centrality of individual factors in determining our behavior, pointing to research documenting the powerful influence of our socio-cultural context, and how our expectations and beliefs

influence others' performance. In the classic study by R. Rosenthal and L. Jacobsen (cited in Weisstein, 1971), students were given I.Q. tests and their teachers were advised as to which students showed the most potential. In reality, those students had been chosen randomly. When retested later, those students identified as promising actually showed drastic improvement compared to the other students. Similar results were arrived at in the Milgram experiments (cited in Weisstein, 1971), in which subjects were ordered to give increasingly powerful and potentially lethal electric shocks to individuals who answered incorrectly in a learning experiment. The individuals in the learning experiments were actually actors who were in league with the experimenters and simulating the pain of the electrical shocks. 62.5 percent of the subjects administered what they believed were electrical shocks powerful enough to kill the actor. When subjects were paired with two associates (also actors and accomplices of the experimenters) who refused to administer the shocks, only 10 percent continued to the maximum voltage. Experiments such as these cast serious doubts on the possibility of human behavior resulting solely from individual choices, responding to stimuli, or our perceptions. Their results call our attention to our ability to adjust our behavior to meet social expectations.

Sherif (1979) also cites evidence of the significantly greater impact of social factors as compared to individual factors in determining behavior. She reviewed studies of cooperative and competitive situations, concluding that images or stereotypes of people "reflect the history of relationships between groups or classes of people. Mutually supportive alliances promote mutually positive images of the other group or class. Competition for mutually exclusive ends, conflict, or domination-subordination promote negative, even derogatory, images" (p. 124). Hence, it is the nature of the relationship between people as compared to individual characteristics determining behavior. For instance, studies by Muzafer Sherif (cited in Sherif, 1979) revealed that when boys at summer camps were placed in groups and had to compete with other groups to reach a goal, they developed very negative stereotypes of the boys in the other groups. Yet when these same boys had to cooperate with the other groups to achieve their goal, they developed

very positive stereotypes of the boys in the other groups. The same results were arrived at by Rozet Avigdor (cited in Sherif, 1979) with groups of girls placed in similar situations. As these studies demonstrate, it is the system of relationships among people and their social circumstances rather than individual forces determining our behavior.

In addition, Miriam Greenspan (1983) warns that when practitioners of the masculinist paradigm emphasize our ability to choose, they are implicitly blaming women for choosing our own exploitation and subordination. They ignore Miller's (1986) argument that women are caught in a situation where we are forbidden to define ourselves in relation to our self, taught to deny and ignore our needs, and must direct all of our energies to serving others. Women recognize that we will be punished, sometimes severely, for pursuing our own needs or that the loss of our relationships and mutuality will be greater than that gained by meeting our own needs. As Miller concludes, therapists/counsellors of all traditional schools are guilty of being blind to the context of women's lives and of their own lives.

Nevertheless, practitioners of the traditional paradigm of psychology insists that the problem lies within one person. Restricting it to one person denies the need to change a situation or the nature of a relationship. It requires change of only one person: The one with the problem. Nathan Hurvitz summarizes this as making "personal problems of political problems" (cited in Sturdivant, 1980, p. 63).

In contrast, a feminist view of psychology is based upon the theory that the personal is political and that the political is personal. The first half of this belief has several implications. It directs feminists to consider the individual within her life situation and how other individuals are affected by similar situations. This moves us away from the traditional viewpoint of the personal being highly personal. From a feminist perspective, the problem is located outside that person. Abnormal behaviors, irrational thoughts, or inappropriate feelings are considered to be insufficient and dangerous explanations. Labeling individuals with syndromes and disorders is considered to be abusive of the people seeking our help. As Burstow (1992) explains, the DSM III-R is irrelevant and nonexistent within feminist psychology unless to examine how traditional schools of

psychology use the DSM III-R to promote the male domination and degradation of the female, of men over women. (See for example, Kaye-Lee Pantony and Paula Caplan's examination of several proposed DSM III-R categories locating the cause of men's violence towards women within women [Caplan, 1985, 1991a, 1991b; Pantony & Caplan, 1991a, 1991b].)

In attending to social, political, economic, and cultural causes rather than to the individual, feminists maintain that the solution, the responsibility to change will be found in the structures and institutions of society. Our work involves reframing women's experiences from being problems within our heads to coping strategies and reactions to oppressive conditions. We refuse to place the responsibility on the terrified woman abused by her husband and ignored by police to stop being abused, the overworked, exhausted, single mom living below the poverty line to stop being poor, the vulnerable secretary and student to stop being sexually harassed, the dependent child to avoid being sexually, physically, and emotionally abused, and First Nations people denied their land, cultural heritage and access to opportunities within non-native society to stop feeling alienated.

The coping strategies employed by subordinates are viewed as healthy and natural reactions to abusive situations. They are seen as our strengths rather than as the problems and illnesses of individuals. Thus, for example, a person who has developed multiple personalities is seen as having a creative way to handle horribly abusive situations. She or he is celebrated for having developed a creative and successful means to survive, of having hung on to life, rather than viewing their coping strategy as a "problem". (Practitioners in the androcentric paradigm would probably refer to this same person I am describing as having a multiple personality disorder.)

Discovering how the personal is political also means that we actively seek out how women and other members of subordinated groups as a whole are affected by the subordination of a few or only one. For instance, we are interested in how women are affected when we are aware of male partners and friends assaulting women in our home communities. We are interested in how watching our mother being psychologically abused daily by our

father affects our sons and daughters. We want to understand how violence and exploitation affects the way we think, feel, and act; the way we perceive ourselves and our world; the way it restricts who we are and our choices; and the creative strategies we develop to cope with restrictions and domination. Conversely, we also strive to identify how the decisions and actions of the dominating minority impact on subordinated individuals. We want to know how political and educational policies, as well as medical and legal practice affect us individually. Within psychology, we want to know how the traditional paradigm has been used to control and exploit us.

Just as the problems/puzzles to be solved are defined as political/collective rather than as individual, so to are the solutions political/collective. That is, the solution is to change society, not the individual. Change happens when we move from individual acts to uniting and acting politically. Understanding how our world is unhealthy and how it affects us, how we survive in it, how to unite and act politically, and how to create societal change becomes the puzzles and the solutions of this theory.

There are additional implications for a feminist psychology here. Understanding the impact of societal factors upon our lives means that it is important for feminist researchers/practitioners in psychology to work together with other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, law, political science and other fields of inquiry. It means that academics need to work closely with non-academic women to collect their stories and perspectives. Theory is developed collectively, with frontline workers, volunteers and survivors. It is informed by our experiences and informs our experiences. It is a result of collective/political action and results in collective/political action.

The Issue of Language

The four feminist theories informing psychology – the desecration of the feminine and the need to revalorize it, uncovering and undoing domination, celebrating diversity and conflict, and that the etiology and solutions to problems are structural and collective rather than individual – determine the language to be used. Because these beliefs require us to

make such a radical shift in the language we use as counsellors, researchers, and theorists, the effects of these beliefs deserves further attention here.

Dorothy E. Smith (1975) argues that a belief in the value of the masculine over the feminine shapes our language, images, symbols, our conception of our world, our knowledge, and our ways of knowing. The responsibility to shape our language around a male-centered view of the world is invested in men and women-trained-to-be-men within institutions and professions, especially psychology. In order to accomplish this, they are accorded with the necessary authority to develop a masculine language (or "manguage"). It is more important that those with authority value the masculine – the abstract, separate, and rational – than be male. Hence, we see women accepted into professions if they give up being feminine (although there are strong cultural prohibitions against this and punishment for doing so) and adopt masculine qualities. Smith stresses that men and women-as-men rule these institutions and make up the majority of the professions.

Psychology's authority to define our experiences and its valuing of the masculine gives professionals in this field tremendous power to shape how women's realities are conceived and expressed. As Smith (1975) explains, psychology

> deals with problems of fit between the terms (women) are given to think and become conscious of their world, and the actualities of their existence.... (Psychology) creates and authorizes for women ways of thinking about their unhappiness and despair, their sense of oppression, of being trapped by husband and children, or being stifled by subordination to the house. (p. 5)

With the help of psychologists, counsellors, and therapists, our experiences, our consciousness, asserts Miller (1986), are defined by men, around men, and for men. Our expected roles become that of man's caretaker, wife, lover, secretary, child-bearer, nurturer, and nurse, and we are described only in reference to these roles. To neither have nor desire a man as the center of our life results in being defined as mentally ill. Adjusting to our prescribed roles, according to Meredith Kimball (1975), is equated with happiness, both by

women who are being taught nothing else and by every male-dominated institution and profession in our society. It is impossible within such a perspective to conceive of our lives in terms which center on and celebrate our specificity as women, or even more so, as lesbians, poor women, handicapped women, women of color, native, rural, and immigrant women, etc.

Consequently, the language, images, and concepts sanctioned and used by counsellors, theorists, and researchers are incapable of allowing women to express our experiences free of shame and in supportive ways reflecting our creative ability to cope and survive. Our strengths are consistently twisted around until they appear as the sources of our difficulties. Case after case, notes Smith (1975), reflects how counsellors take women's words and use them against us. For instance, she cites the case of a housewife who, using the only words available to her to describe her experience, "felt she would 'go crazy' if confined to domestic routines" (p. 19). The therapists then used the woman's statement as evidence of her mental illness.

Miller (1987) explains the difficulty we face in trying to accurately and positively describe our experiences and activities as women when she tries to describe various women's activities, such as "'nurturing', 'caretaking', 'mothering'":

> While there many not be anything terrible about those words, they do not describe adequately the actual activity – engaging with another person in such a manner that you foster the psychological development of the other person. When we try to describe this activity more accurately, we often find ourselves involved in long phrases (such as the phrase I have just used) because we do not find readily available words. (p. 5)

Other examples of the awkward language feminists are forced to use include such phrases as "women and other subordinated groups" or "women of color, immigrant women, working-class women, lesbian women, First Nations' women, rural women, and disabled women" to speak about members of subordinate groups while acknowledging our subordination, specificity, or diversity. Feminists in psychology are also often

uncomfortable with the term "client". Yet our alternative is awkward: "people who come to us seeking support". Nevertheless, the feminist alternatives more accurately reflect our theories and beliefs.

III. MODELS AND EXEMPLARS

At least two different models have emerged within feminist psychology: the self-in-relation and the self-in-context. These two models are based upon the fundamental theories of feminism in general and of feminist psychology in particular. They differ in the emphasis they place upon each theory. Because they give priority to different theories, they explore different puzzles raised by feminist theories, use different concepts, and focus on different phenomena. Each of these models figure predominantly today in feminist thought and activity amongst academics and practitioners, and will be presented here.

The Self-in-Relation Model

The self-in-relation model challenges the assumption that masculine attributes are more valuable than feminine attributes by seeking out and valuing those characteristics traditionally associated with women. Like radical feminists, feminists of this model struggle to understand women's images of ourselves, our experiences of our world, and our ways of being and doing. In exploring women with an emphasis upon celebrating our uniqueness as women, a number of prominent feminists working in clinical, developmental and educational psychology have found a common theme in understanding women. Whatever their differences, as Dana Crowley Jack (1991) describes

> ...they all agree that interpersonal intimacy is the profound organizer of female experience and the key to understanding women's 'different voice'. They also agree that gender differences in ego capacities, vulnerabilities, and strengths arise from the different social contexts and cultural norms that affect male and female development in characteristic ways. (pp. 11-12)

That is, women and men have developed into different genders, organizing their lives around different principles, as a result of living in different situations. For women, this

principle has often been referred to as relationality or the self-in-relation; for men, it is separation and individuality.

Jean Baker Miller and her colleagues at the Stone Centre (Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Striver, & Surrey, 1991; Miller, 1986), Carol Gilligan and her colleagues at Harvard University (Brown & Gilligan, 1992; Gilligan, Ward, Taylor, & Bardige, 1988), including Dana Crowley Jack (1991), and Mary Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck Tarule (1986) have been key proponents of the self-in-relation model. As Jean Baker Miller (1987) asserts, they have sought to understand women "in their own terms", paying close attention to how women express ourselves and to what we are saying about ourselves and our worlds. Their findings contradict the image of humans constantly seeking to separate and of individualism as the goal of human activity. For women, activity leads to rather than away from relationship. Much of women's relational activities seem to focus on actively participating in the development of others. "In essence, they seek an increasing ability to *represent* their experience *within* relationships, and the ability to *act* effectively within relationships" (Miller, 1987, p. 6). Psychological well-being is based on the ability to be in relation to others and to ever increase the level of intimacy while still retaining a sense of the self. Indeed, Miller (1991) argues that a sense of oneself grows within relationships and that being-in-relation means "developing all of one's self in increasingly complex ways, in increasingly complex relationships" (p. 21). At the same time, as Alexandra G. Kaplan (1991b) explains, facilitating the growth of others "becomes a validating part of one's own self development" (p. 274). Growth and development of the self is seen as happening in the process of helping someone else grow. This relates well to those instances which I have experienced where, as a teacher/trainer/facilitator and supporter/counsellor, I have grown in the act of facilitating the growth and leaning of the person seeking my assistance.

However, as Jack (1991) contends, entering into relationship and being known, whether to others or to ourselves, requires a voice. Yet the work of Jack (1991), Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986), Miller (1986), and Brown and Gilligan (1992),

reveals that women are often forced to be silent, facing either "subordination or isolation" (Jack, 1991, p. 191). Our society requires women to have no voice to express our authentic or inner selves, with often devastating effects for women, such as the high rates of depression we experience relative to men. Feminists such as Jack have explored the moral themes in women's depression, uncovering "how and why a woman feels ashamed of the authentic self" (p. 191). They have examined how society ensures that women must deny our sense of who we are and give up our voice, even to ourselves, if we hope to maintain relationships with our partners, as well as with our friends, employers, family members, and communities. The loss of the voice expressing our inner self is especially damaging for it is our voice which brings intimacy and connection with others and with ourselves. It is this inner, authentic self and the way we manage our inner world in order to survive within our society as women, and as women of color, immigrant and First Nations' women, physically challenged women, lesbians, rural and homeless women, single mothers, etc., which is of interest to feminists adopting the self-in-relation model.

Jack (1991) summarizes this model as focusing on the internals, such as imaginings, feelings, and thought patterns, rather than on the externals, such as "the violence directed towards them, the money they earn or fail to earn, their ages and marital status" (p. 3). It is not that these researchers ignore the various forms of violence and oppression which women experience. Rather, the puzzle they are interested in pursuing is understanding how we develop and change internally in response to the external realities of our lives as women. Not surprisingly, the results of this focus have paradoxically led us back to further understanding the externals of how violence and oppression occurs.

An exemplar illustrating the various aspects of this model is the research reported by Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan (1992) on girls' and teenage women's psychological development. Their work has helped to uncover the psychological factors contributing to girls and women becoming vulnerable to abuse. In exploring how the relational world of girls is slowly destroyed, Brown and Gilligan describe how girls lose a sense of who they are when their sophisticated understanding of what their relationships are really like clashes

with idealized images presented to them of themselves and their relationships. Conflict and differences are disallowed and they are expected to be images of "selfless love and perfect kindness". As they documented, girls realize that if they fail to conform to these images, they will be rejected as friends or daughters.

Brown and Gilligan (1992) describe the crucial moment in the development of girls as the crossroads on a path leading to their healthy development as confident women engaging in genuine relationships with themselves and others or to vulnerability to abuse from others. If they are allowed and encouraged to explore conflict and differences, to remain true to their feelings and sense of what is happening in their relationships, and to act upon their perceptions and desires, their faith in their knowledge and judgments increases and their voices gain strength. However, if conflict and disagreement is discouraged and disallowed, if they are repeatedly presented with idealized images of girls and women as being kind, nice, and never angry or in conflict, and if they are given the message that they are allowed to remain in relationship only if they conform to these images, then they may be forced to abandon their faith in their own complex understanding of relationships. In losing their confidence in their knowledge gained from their experiences and being forced to rely upon unreal and mutilated images, they lose their knowledge and their voice. As a result of losing "their ability to name relational violations they become, in new ways, vulnerable to abuse – both psychological and physical" (p. 106).

Brown and Gilligan's (1992) complex understanding of the psychology of girls illustrates the self-in-relation model. In the terms of reference provided by Kuhn's thesis, the self-in-relation model illustrates how oppression works within girls and women. By focusing on what women perceive and describe of our internal processes in our own language and with an awareness of the context of our lives, we are able to develop our understanding of how we develop psychologically, how our world affects us, and the exact nature and mechanism of our oppression. Such knowledge enables us to develop visions, plans, and strategies to end our oppression.

Feminists developing this model have greatly developed and enhanced our understanding of oppression through the concepts of domination and subordination. It makes legitimate concepts such as "self-in-relation", "relationality", "silence", "voice", "domination", and "subordination". It also requires that any acceptable solution celebrate and value the feminine, especially the centrality of relationships, illuminate the nature of the male/dominate-female/subordinate relationship, and explain the commonalities and differences among women, as well as the differences between women and men.

While this model is based on the experience of women, it encompasses more the experiences of members of subordinate groups. As a model which is about women, by women, and for women, it must both illuminate the male-dominated world we live in and aid us in ending our oppression and in stopping our oppressors. Consequently, it must also speak about the lives of men, our oppressors. Identifying the nature of our oppression means understanding our oppressors, how they are oppressive, what leads them to be oppressive, and how their oppressive/dominating behavior can be stopped and prevented from occurring again. Traditional models based on masculinist theories and androcentric values are unable to identify men's oppressive behavior and are therefore, of little help to women seeking emancipation. Instead, by learning more about women and developing our perspective as women, we have been able to approach men's experiences in a new light. Feminists such as Miller (1986, 1987, 1991a) and Striver (1991) have explored the how emphasizing separation and individuation impairs the psychological development of boys and men by interfering with the development of their relational selves. Some of the results for men are a fear of and an inability to express their feelings, lack of emotional and psychological growth and maturity, an inability to be intimate, equating sex with intimacy, and being unable to provide support, nurturance, and caring to those with whom they are in relation.

Miller (1986, 1987, 1991a) and Striver (1991) identify some of the obvious consequences these realizations have for women: men fear and hate women for our ability to express our feelings and needs, and consequently abuse women; as members of dominant groups, men base their sense of self on their being independent; dominants often fail to

recognize, appreciate, and return the support and nurturing they receive, thereby ignoring their partners needs; and men who dominant often believe that it is their natural right to exercise power over others, and as a result, dominate and abuse their partners, women, children, employees, students, etc. in order to maintain this sense of power over others.

It is not surprising then, that feminists and profeminists such as Ellen Pence, Michael Paymar and their colleagues at the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (Paymar, 1991; Pence & Paymar, 1993) have also developed a self-in-relation model as central to successful programs aimed at helping men to stop their distancing, abusive, and sometimes deadly behaviors. Within the project, men are responsible for learning to recognize their relational needs, value being in relationships, and build and maintain healthy relationships in healthy ways. Indeed, this aspect of these programs for violent men is one strategy developed out of the self-in-relation model to end the oppression and exploitation expressed within the male/dominant-female/subordinate relationship.

As a model for therapy, the self-in-relation model directs counsellors/supporters to act in a number of ways. Using the example of a woman experiencing abuse who has approached another woman for support and counselling, several significant differences in therapy are apparent. The counsellor/supporter acknowledges the abuse that the woman is experiencing from her partner. She also listens for and acknowledges the self-meaning the relationship has for the woman. What is this woman's sense of who she is? What is the ideal she has adopted of how she should be in her role as partner and the ideal of how their relationship should be or is? How is this conflicting with her sophisticated understanding of what is really happening in the relationship and what she is really like? How are relationships with children, parents, in-laws, friends, etc., affecting her? How are pressures and models from institutions such as the media and the family, affecting her in choosing between trusting her sense of the situation versus what she has been encouraged to believe is happening? What does this woman want for herself and what is the dilemma she faces?

A feminist therapist using a self-in-relation model would likely help her to explore and trust her perception of her partner being abusive and of the relationship being oppressive. She would help her to celebrate the importance she gives to relationships and to nurturing and fostering the growth and development of others, including her partner. She would likely explain that relationships require us to believe in the ability of the other to grow toward greater intimacy and that her abuser's destructive behaviors were due to her partner's inability or refusal to return the same nurturing and support, rather than some deficiency or failure on her part. All of this information is shared within the context of how society encourages and supports relationships where men rely on women's subordination to them and separation from ourselves. The woman seeking support would be encouraged to value her ability to connect with others and the importance she gives to fostering growth in others. She would be encouraged to foster that growth within herself and to gather around her people who would support and nurture her. She would be supported in her desire for intimacy and encouraged to seek this in many types of relationships, especially friendships with other women. She would be taught to critically analyze society's unrealistic and dangerous ideals of women and relationships, and to explore how these have affected her. She would be supported in trusting her sense of what is happening for herself and in her relationships, and given support to explore confusing feelings and dilemmas when they arise or in anticipation of them.

The Self-in-Context Model

While the self-in-relation model emphasizes uncovering and celebrating the feminine, the self-in-context model gives priority to the fourth theory underlying feminist psychology: That it is relational and structural factors such as cultural, social, political, and economic structures rather than individual factors which account for our oppression and suffering. Proponents of the self-in-context model seeks to identify these external factors and explore how they affect individual women and men from the public to the most intimate areas of our lives. That is, feminists using this model are interested in the context of our

lives, in everything outside of our heads. This model of feminist psychology is similar to the socialist model of feminism in its avoidance of women-centered alternatives and its emphasis on social and historical situation.

More specifically, while the self-in-relation model presents people as consistent over time, proponents of the self-in-context model, such as Ellen Kaschak (1992) argue that our individual characteristics vary with situational factors, and hence situational/external factors need to be the focus of our attention. She asserts that

> the demands of a situation, as interpreted by the people in it, evoke certain ways of behaving/feeling/thinking.... There is not one certain kind of self for all women. Instead there are differences between women in these groups as a result of unique combinations of experience and unique meanings made of those experiences. And the differences within a woman in different situations depend upon the meanings they evoke for her. (p. 154-155)

Consequently, within this model, attention is focused on the situation in order to understand the individual. This approach differs from schools such as the behavioral or constructivist in that feminists are interested in studying how structures, relationships, and institutions are used to oppress us. Unlike the other approaches, we believe our relationships are unequal and nonreciprocal, thereby denying us the freedom and resources to make a variety of healthy choices. This models demonstrates how subordinates have very little influence upon these systems and structures, and how our society is structured to the disadvantage of subordinates.

For example, numerous feminist therapists developing this model, especially Bonnie Burstow (1992), Phyllis Chesler (1989, 1972), Miriam Greenspan (1983), and the many women who are survivors of treatment within the traditional paradigm have described how the theory of mental illness has been used to deflect our attention and energy away from societal and structural factors, focusing our attention instead on intrapsychic and chemical/biological explanations and solutions to our suffering. In reviewing the historical

development of psychology and psychiatry, Bonnie Burstow describes how it was made into a powerful mechanism for members of dominant groups to use in gaining and maintaining control over members of subordinate groups. They gained and have maintain this power over others despite needing to rely on circular reasoning and lacking evidence to support their many claims of its benefits to subordinates. Survivors of treatment interviewed by Phyllis Chesler have described how therapists, counsellors, and psychologists applied the label of "mentally ill" as a tool whose singular purpose was to destroy and terrify women, thereby helping to "keep us in our place".

Greenspan (1983) provides further evidence of the abuse women experience through the use of the theory of mental illness and the priority given this theory within the patriarchal paradigm of psychology. During her training within various school of the traditional paradigm, she realized that what she

> had taken to be the individual quirks of my first two therapists and the overt sexism of the third were essential aspects of the way in which traditional therapy functioned. The emphasis on diagnosis and its apparent irrelevance to helping patients in any concrete way, as well as the belief in a theory of women as feminine creatures whose normalcy rested on subordination to men, were all a part of the traditional theory and practice of therapy as taught to trainees in the field. (p. xx)

The self-in-context model is predominant within literature produced by agencies and organizations providing or supporting frontline services, such as the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, Vancouver's Battered Women's Support Services, and the Ministry of Attorney General of British Columbia. Groups like these have helped us to further understand how structural factors such as our legal system, financial and social policies, and the institution of marriage support men to become and remain abusive towards people with less power, these being predominantly women and children, gay men and lesbian women, First nation, immigrant, and handicapped people, women and men of color, etc. For example, handbooks for frontline workers on wife assault (Ministry of Attorney

General and Ministry of Women's Equality, 1993b) and sexual assault (Ministry of Attorney General and Ministry of Women's Equality, 1993a) explore a number of cultural factors contributing to violence against women. These include identifying and challenging the various cultural myths such as women provoking their partner's anger and violent behaviors, immigrant women remaining in abusive relationships because these relationships are a part of their culture, women secretly wanting to be raped, sexual assaults being a crime of passion, older and disabled women being less likely to be assaulted then younger women, and strangers committing most assaults. They also explore how structural factors, such as our laws, legal enforcement policies, and language barriers contribute to male violence against women. For example, the "Power and Control wheel" developed by the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (Pence & Paymar, 1993) details how women are oppressed by their partners. The authors use it to demonstrate how male power and control over women are maintained through the use of physical, emotional, sexual and economic abuse, isolation, intimidation, male privilege, threats, and manipulating her through the children. They also describe how the cultural approval of men's violence against and exploitation of women affects how men think about and treat women.

Within this model legitimate concepts include "survivor", "heterosexism", "power", "control", "violence", "abuse", "subordination", and "oppression". Perhaps even more telling are some of the concepts considered to be illegitimate, such as" mental illness" and "victim". It demonstrates how violence and abuse through structural and institutional factors continue to keep us subordinate to men. Acceptable solutions must be able to uncover various forms of structural oppression and present ways of restructuring our society's institutions, structures, and systems such that oppression is eliminated and prevented.

Within therapy, the self-in-context model emphasizes educating women so that they can recognize the oppressive structures and situations they are constantly dealing with. They are taught to analyze their situation from a feminist perspective so that they can remove the responsibility for their suffering from within themselves and place it on the oppressive situations, structures and individuals they are dealing with. Thus, a woman

feeling afraid and exhausted is helped to recognize the number of ways she has been abused by both individuals and institutions. She is encouraged to view her feelings of depression as a naturally response to unhealthy situations, a response which has kept her alive. (For an excellent example of a therapeutic self-help guide in learning to see our responses as survival strategies, see The courage to heal: A guide for women survivors of child sexual abuse, by Ellen Bass and Laura Davis, 1988.) She is taught to analyze her situation so that she can see how her self-perception of being crazy is exactly what her oppressors want her to experience in order that she will remain confused, doubting her perceptions and judgements, and most importantly, remain their subordinate.

For feminists adopting the self-in-context model, understanding the complexity of societal and structural factors shaping our lives will reveal how we are oppressed and what we can do about it. For feminists adopting the self-in-relation model, valuing feminine ways of being are central to understanding how we are oppressed and how we will be able to end and avoid further oppression. These two models do not contradict each other; rather, they offer us different perspectives on our oppression and alternative strategies for eliminating and preventing it. When assisting and supporting women, counsellors/therapists/supporters are able to draw on both models. The self-in-context model helps in analyzing the situation we are living in. We are able to acknowledge external sources of oppression and what we are able to do about them. The self-in-relation model demonstrates for us our internalized oppression or how oppression affects us within ourselves. It directs us in identifying how we, as women, have been devalued and supports us in reclaiming/celebrating/aligning with our desires. This is the beginning of envisioning a women-centered world and the changes necessary to achieve our visions/dreams/hopes.

IV. METHODS OF THERAPY

The methodological dimension, as Kuhn noted, refers to the methods of a paradigm which are in turn determined by the values underlying it. By examining some of the gynocentric values underlying feminist searching, we can see the resulting methods directly arising out of them. I am using the word "methods" to mean those techniques and strategies employed in counselling, research, and writing, including the type of language used, whether it be the "manguage" described by Anne Cameron (1989) or women's reclaimed language as exemplified by Mary Daly's (1990) work. In the previous chapter and in sections of this chapter, I have already described feminist methods of research and explored issues regarding language. Therefore, in this section I will address how feminism informs methods (versus models or ethical guidelines) of therapy/counselling/support-giving. I will begin this section by returning briefly to reiterate our understanding of gynocentric values.

The Principle of Relationality

As described in Chapter Three, feminism is based upon a valuing of the gynocentric as opposed to the androcentric/phallocentric. More specifically, we value mutuality, integration, interdependence, irrationality, emotionality, subjectivity, caring, avoiding violence to others, and being responsible for ourselves and others. This contrasts with the androcentric/phallocentric valuing of rationality, reason, objectivity, independence, domination, isolation, and individualism to the exclusion of gynocentric values. Consequently, those methods relied upon by feminists engaged in counselling psychology and psychology in general, reflect the valuing of the gynocentric, often summarized and referred to as the principle of relationality.

Relationality, as developed by Jean Baker Miller (1986, 1987, 1991a), Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan (1992; Gilligan, 1982a), Janet L. Surrey (1991), Alexandra G. Kaplan (1991a, 1991b), Judith V. Jordan (1991a), and Jeri Dawn Wine (1989) means valuing being in relation as central to our beings, as a way of identifying and knowing ourselves, as a

way of learning and growing, and as the goal of our development. It means being aware of and fostering our relationships with ourselves, of experiencing our emotional, sexual, physical, sensual, spiritual, intellectual, and relational self as one, rather than as separate and foreign entities, and fostering our own growth in each of these areas. It means being aware of and fostering our relationships with others, and in doing so, helping the other and ourselves to grow and mature. It is, in the words of Surrey, "a mode in which all of life activity is carried on in a context of attentiveness and responsivity to the other as an intrinsic ongoing aspect of one's own experience" (p. 57).

Relationality also refers to being responsible for ourselves and our actions, and aware of the consequences of our actions upon ourselves, others, and our natural world. It is, as Wine described, a sense of connectedness, of mutuality, of the "necessary interdependency" we as humans need with each other and our physical environment in order to survive. Relationality means cooperation such that all persons benefit without harm to any individual or group and achieving this in nonviolent and environmentally friendly ways. It means that we are aware of our existence within our historical, cultural, political, social and physical contexts, and consciously adapt to survive within these contexts. Finally, central to the principle of relationality is our desire to be understood and to understand the other. This requires that we are able to voice our authentic self and to share in another's inner self. Dialogue is redefined from being a form of speech to an act of being-in-relation.

If, as these feminist psychologists suggest, relationality and its act of dialogue is central to a female understanding of self, and women gain the greatest self-awareness and growth by being in relation, then as Kaplan (1991a) argues, therapy needs to be a specific experience of being in relation. This would also seem to hold true for therapy with men. Irene P. Striver (1991), as well as Michael Paymar and Ellen Pence (1993), contend that the perspective offered by theories and models based on a valuing of the relational is vital in helping men achieve nonviolent, mutual, caring, mature, intimate relationships with

themselves and others. Therefore, methods of therapy for women and men need to represent being in relation to ourselves, to others, and to the world we live in.

There are several important methods central to feminist therapy arising out of the valuing of relationality: empathy, consciousness-raising, and political activity. Each of these methods are described in the following sections.

Empathy

Feminists contend that empathy develops as a result of our being in relation with others. Surrey (1991) describes this process as beginning during our early development as girls and young women in relationships with our mothers and/or other female caretakers. We experience "a heightened, enhanced sense of (our) personal identity and personal powers in the contexts of relationships" (p. 37). Our "early emotional sensitivity" develops into the complex cognitive and affective abilities we know as empathy. Striver emphasizes that while both men and women have the capacity to develop empathy, it is usually only women who are motivated to do so because of the importance of relationships to our very sense of being.

Empathy itself is described by Jordan (1991a) as beginning with the capacity to relate to another human being. This capacity allows us to identify the sometimes minute and subtle verbal and nonverbal indicators of another's feelings. Upon perceiving these cues, we must allow ourselves to feel those very feelings we have sensed in the other person. In effect, we must become one with them emotionally. Jordan suggests that in the last phase, we regain "a sense of separate self" that is able to reflect upon this experience and understand what has happened.

Kaplan (1991a) elaborates upon how we are both separated and connected to the person we are listening to. She maintains that we are simultaneously connected emotionally to the other while we are cognitively our own person: "The therapist, throughout, never loses sight of herself as a distinct being; at the same time she is emotionally joined with another" (p. 47) and "the therapist is both intimately connected with the other person and

yet, without losing that connectedness, is in touch with her own individuality" (p. 48). By remaining our own person cognitively, we are able to reflect upon our shared feelings and the context of our shared emotions (her story, our memories and awarenesses, and our relationship), and analyze these feelings within their context. The result is an extremely sophisticated understanding of the experiences of the other and of their very being, together with a richer understanding of our own lives.

Kaplan notes that our ability to cognitively understand another person also seems to be based upon shared life and developmental experiences. Common features such as sameness of gender, race and culture, socio-economic status, age, physical ability, and sexual orientation increase our ability to empathize with another person. For example, lesbian women from rural communities are likely to understand other rural, lesbian women more easily than women who are only lesbians or only from similar rural communities.

Kaplan (1991a) explains that we are engaging in a highly creative and complex process requiring us to intimately connect with a person on one level while remaining completely aware of our own memories, awarenesses, and thoughts on another. It is a process demanding "a creative merger of affective closeness and also a very high level of cognitive activity" (p. 50). And while she is referring to therapists, what she describes holds equally true for women in every role they hold; as daughters, sisters, friends, wives, mothers, employees, employers, students, teachers, etc. The end result of empathy is a shared knowing; it is when both the speaker and the listener know that the listener has heard the spoken details of her existence and more importantly, she has also "been there", living through the intricacies of the speaker's feelings and desires of that experience, and understanding what it is like to "be" her.

In being empathic with the individual seeking help, we assist in several ways. We are providing a supportive and safe relationship within which she may explore her sense of self. Jack (1991) describes it as providing the "freedom to risk being themselves and to test out new images of self in relationship" (p. 199). As she explains, being empathic requires us as listeners to give up the belief that we know best how to interpret her words and instead

"be with her in attentive receptiveness for what *she* will uncover as she listens to her own self-knowledge within a safe relationship" (p. 203). In this safe atmosphere, we are, in Mary Daly's (1990) rich terms, "re-membering" ourselves, rejoining our dismembered being. In doing so, we act as a midwife to her as she brings herself together and forward, discovering and re-membering her authentic self. This re-membering can only happen through the act of empathy provided by the listener, for as Jack points out, " the relational perspective asserts that the self *is* social. Mind and self come into being through communication with others. One cannot heal the self in isolation" (p. 205).

Examples of the tremendous impact of listening in this way, free of any form of analysis, takes place daily in authentic feminist practice. For instance, a woman whom I was assisting repeatedly expressed her sense of not knowing who she was. To assist her, I allowed myself to feel with her while also keeping in mind her unique situation. Together we were able to identify her feelings, acknowledge her struggles, and celebrate her re-membering. In my continual reflecting back to her what she shared with me while also avoiding intrepreting her words, she began to develop a sense of herself that seemed to her to be authentic. It was through this repeated act or ongoing process of feeling with her while remaining separate enough to reflect her situation back to her that she was able to regain a sense of who she was. This is being-in-relation. The experience of being-in-relation through the ongoing process of empathy is how we affirm each other's sense of authentic self, that this self exists, and that it is worth the time and energy of the woman who is listening. It is an act women repeatedly perform for those they care for, such as their partners and children, yet usually receive only from other women. (Unfortunately, many members of subordinate groups are isolated by their male partners, employers, religions, etc., from their peers. Consequently, they receive little if any empathic support.

Empathy, as Surrey (1991), Jordan (1991a), Jack (1991), and Kaplan (1991a, 1991b) argue, is neither a magical nor an innate ability: it is learned. Women are socialized from infancy to attend to the needs of others and because our primary caretaker is usually a woman, our mother, with whom we can identify with and model ourselves upon, we tend to

develop very high levels of empathic ability and are motivated to be empathic. The majority of men, however, grow up lacking same-sex models teaching and reinforcing them to be empathic. Instead, they encounter a society teaching them to shun and fear emotions, including their own. Nurturing, listening, and fostering their own and others development are activities which are mocked and devalued, and relegated to girls and women. Consequently, Kaplan notes that male therapists/counsellors are initially poor at empathy, yet when motivated eventually develop it through training and experience. However, as Kaplan also notes, our traditional schools of psychology offer little practical insight into the workings of empathy and training programs offer little discussion or training in it. Indeed, traditional approaches to research and therapy encourage practitioners to emphasis their differences from their clients or study participants, reinforcing objectivism and separateness from the "other".

Being empathic with the women and men who seek our support is a mutual relationship between two equals in many ways. Both Striver (1991) and Jordan (1991b) contend that in empathic relationships, we genuinely care about each other. It is, as Jordan notes, a mutual experience in that both the therapist/counsellor/supporter and the person seeking assistance are "touched emotionally by each other, grow in the relationship, gain something from one another, risk confessing of themselves in the process – in short, both are affected, changed, part of an open system of feeling and learning" (p. 288).

Surrey (1991) emphasizes that experiences of "mutual empathy and shared understanding" contribute to intellectual and emotional growth for each person. Drawing on the work of Belenky and her colleagues (1986), Surrey describes this experience of "connected learning" as "taking the view of others and connecting this to one's own knowledge, thus building new and enlarged understanding of broader human experience" (p. 171). This description of connecting, learning, and growing parallels Joyce McCarl Nielsen's description from the previous chapter of horizons or a world perspective unique to our particular standpoint, and our ability to fuse our horizons through sharing them with

another person. As a result of this "connected learning", we develop a new horizon, expanding our perspectives to become deeper, broader, and richer.

However, Striver (1991) and Jordan (1991a, 1991b) also note that the relationship is neither completely mutual nor equal. It fails to be mutual because of the power differences between the counsellor/supporter and the person seeking assistance (to be discussed in the next section), and because the person seeking assistance is the center of the relationship. It is her or his self-disclosures, experiences, desires, and needs which are the focus of attention. The therapist/counsellor/supporter's self-disclosures are only offered in so far as they will assist the person seeking help. Jordan (1991b) describes the therapist as offering "herself to be used for healing" (p. 288). As with the woman I was assisting, our time together was spent focused upon her life. My story only entered in when she needed to hear that she was not alone in her experiences or unique in what she felt.

Consciousness-Raising

A second method synonymous with the feminist movement is consciousness-raising. Rarely discussed in counselling psychology or psychology in general, it is considered by a number of feminist therapists, such as Jack (1991), Greenspan (1983), Burstow (1992), Miller (1986), Surrey (1991), and Sturdivant (1980), to be a vital method of feminist therapy. Consciousness-raising activities place emphasis on "examining and understanding experience and on connecting personal experience to the structures that define our lives" (Josephine Donovan, cited in Adamson, Briskin, & McPhail, 1988, p. 235). We need to be aware of how social, cultural, political, and economic structures produce the conditions leading to our personal and collective pain and oppression. Consciousness-raising helps move us from seeing our situations from within the terms of reference instilled in us by the dominant ruling culture, patriarchy, to seeing it within the terms of reference of women's experiences. That is, we makes the shift from a patriarchal to a feminist paradigm, from internalizing our oppression to externalizing it. In Mary Daly's (1990) words, we transform "the previously unknown into that which we explicitly know, and therefore can reflect

upon, criticize" (p. 23). In effect, as Burstow explains, we stop being the object of analysis and become the subject doing the analysis.

The process of consciousness-raising or reframing often begins with what Judith A. Cook and Mary Margaret Fonow (1990) describe as a crisis situation or traumatic event, such as being sexual assaulted or discovering that one's own child has been abused, being widowed or divorced, being sexually harassed or fired (or both), or being physically assaulted. Such events will often challenge our cognitive understanding of and beliefs about our world and our relationships. Thus, we begin to search for a perspective which helps us make some meaning of the event and determine how we can be safe again. Jack (1991) describes the remainder of the process as follows. Once women are exposed, however informally, to an alternative perspective, such as feminism, we begin to question the way our lives and our society are at the present. Jack argues that it is the standards imposed by our society which come into question and as these begin to collapse, we are able to rely upon new standards, ones which more closely fit with our inner selves. Recalling that standards are based on values, what women experience, then, is a shift away from androcentric to gynocentric standards and values. More precisely, we revalorize gynocentric values and adopt a feminist paradigm.

Thus, consciousness-raising allows us to challenge moral codes prescribing the "should's" and "ought's" we have internalized. Existing cognitive frameworks unable to include or even acknowledge our experiences are relinquished in favor of frameworks which do, beginning with the most important aspects of our being and moving to less significant areas. For instance, in my journey, it began with my experience of being sexually harassed. While I could live with having been harassed, I was unwilling to stand by and watch female colleagues be harassed as well. Like many women, I was able to do for others what I had been unwilling to do for myself. In questioning the abusive professor's actions towards others, I came to question how he had acted towards me. Eventually, I questioned the moral imperative that I be "nice" by ignoring or minimalizing his or the university's abusive actions or making excuses for them. As I sought out literature on sexual harassment, I was

introduced to a feminist perspective offering a more accurate description of my experiences than those of the traditional schools of psychology. Compared to the new framework I was learning within a feminist perspective, my old ways of thinking failed to as fully acknowledge or explain what I had experienced. With more reading, gradual political involvement, personal reflection, and much time spent with supportive feminists and a profeminist professor, I began to recognize and appreciate women's ways. And I applied what I was learning and discovering to more and more of my life. In a way it was a cycle of growing awareness: Explanations led to a growing awareness which in turn led to wanting more explanations. The more I read and heard, the more I could see and understand, and the more I wanted to read, hear, and discuss.

This method of therapy, like empathy, is a process. Consciousness-raising is never completely finished. Being aware, in touch, connected, is a way of being. Lorraine Code's (1988) description of theory informing practice and practice informing theory is appropriate here, as consciousness-raising is a dialogue between knowledge and action. It is also a dialogue between people. One of the most common and powerful forms of consciousness-raising is when we gather together and share our own stories. This breaks us free of our isolation and silence, as we recognize our experiences in each other's individual past and present. The presence of others provides support through giving permission, connecting emotionally, acknowledging our experiences, and providing examples or role models. Mary Daly (1990) notes that this is the way women have always developed strong beings and relationships. It is through consciousness-raising activities, contends Joyce McCarl Nielsen (1990), that we increase our self-awareness and political consciousness.

Political Activity

This leads us to the third major method of feminist therapy: political activity. This group of methods arises out of our sense of being authentic, beings-in-relation while also valuing awareness of and responsibility for our actions. It is the act of breaking down our isolation, of making personal and collective/political change. It also reflects the second

model, the self-in-context, with its emphasis on understanding the nature of the oppressive structures, institutions, and systems forming our society. In taking responsibility for ourselves, valuing our ways of being, especially being-in-relation, and desiring to change our situation, we recognize the need to change the world we are living in if we want a place where we can move out of isolation and dis-memberment into authentic relationships and oneness. Political activity means acting on our awareness of the causes of our oppression, recognizing the need for change, and working towards our vision of the future.

By political activity, I mean more than being involved in voting processes, political parties, and policy making. I am referring here to any collective activity, especially those acts determining the lives of people other than those making the decisions. This includes especially those acts often considered to be isolated aberrations, such as a man beating his partner, a father sexually assaulting his child, or even the Montréal Massacre. These acts are collective, for they happen within the context of a society which is oppressive and condones individual acts of violence as a means of maintaining domination over less powerful groups. They are political acts because they remind us of our vulnerability to violence and ultimately, our subordination to men. This occurs whether we are the survivors of this violence directly or indirectly as the sisters, friends, partners, mothers, or the women a thousand miles away watching it on television or reading about it in the paper.

Political activity then, as discussed in Chapter Three, is the individual and collective action of women directed at ending and preventing violence, exploitation, and ultimately oppression based on the stratification of women and men. Political activities engaged in by feminist supporters/therapists include creating a safe place for women to rest and meet other women, connecting women with community and government resources, informing them of their rights as human beings and helping them discover their rights before the law, helping them to become aware of their situation and be able to critically analyze it, helping them discover what they can do, individually and collectively, to challenge and change oppressive structures and institutions, entering into relationships with women struggling to develop their voice while advocating on their behalf, helping

them revalorize those qualities and values associated with women (the gynocentric), and developing processes and systems based on the gynocentric. Feminist therapists/supporters work to change our laws, legal systems, and social and economic policies to reflect the reality of women's lives, and create training, education, and research centres to explore our needs, support learning, and to celebrate women. We partake in consciousness-raising activities to raise our own and other's awareness of the oppression and exploitation of girls and women in all our diversity, of the limitations placed upon boys and men, of the destruction of nature, and of the structures and systems maintaining the masculine/dominant-feminine/subordinate relationship.

In so far as political activity intervenes and prevents our devaluation as women, our oppression and exploitation, and even our death, it is therapy. Or more precisely, therapy is political activity. In Miriam Greenspan's (1983) words, "*therapy is, in fact, both a personal relationship and a political activity*" (p. 248). Therapy is political insofar as it is the act of reuniting women with our authentic selves, with other women, and with our world, as a method of reframing our experiences and adopting a new paradigm enabling us to identify our oppression and our oppressors, as a way to envision a new future arising out of our past, and as a collective act to end this oppression. This redefining of the concept of "therapy" is so radical ("at the roots of") that Mary Daly (1990) suggests we avoid referring to these healing and energizing methods as therapy; "the very concept of 'feminist therapy' is inherently a contradiction. I hasten to add that gynergizing, en-couraging, healing communication among Hags/Crones is not a contradiction. Therefore, when this is taking place it should *not* be called 'therapy'" (p. 282).

These acts of knowing oneself and being authentic, of developing and valuing relationships with other women, and of working together to find ways of challenging and changing oppressive structures and behaviors, are therapeutic. It is therapeutic to develop and carry out strategies to achieve our freedom, our emancipation. The act of being with other women, of speaking and acting on what we believe is therapeutic and political. However, by traditional definitions it is not therapy. Nor are we then, "therapists", or the

women and men who seek our assistance and support "clients". These terms reflect relationships based on tremendous differences of power, of subordination and domination, of exploitation. They fail to capture what it is that we engage in with the women and men seeking our support.

I suggest that a more accurate term describing what I do would be "listener/supporter/facilitator". I support anyone who is seeking my assistance in her learning and growth. I facilitate her development of a feminist perspective which more fully acknowledges her being and experiences, and provides a way of seeing allowing her to critically analyze the society she lives within and how it affects her and those she loves. I assist her in her journey of self- and other-discovery. I provide a safe environment and relationship within which she can explore, dis-cover, and re-member. And I struggle together with her to end our oppression within our society.

In summary, the methods of feminist therapy are built upon the valuing of being in relation to ourselves whether we are the supporter or the one seeking support, being in relation to others as in the supportive relationship of therapy, and to our society and culture. Brown and Gilligan (1992) summarize the effects of these processes in describing how the women conducting the research were affected by their research participants:

> Listening to girls' voices, particularly in the time before adolescence, affected many women in ways that were unexpectedly powerful. Small voices began to give way to stronger voices, not knowing began to yield to memories of knowing, then of needing not to know or not to say what one felt and knew. And women began to speak in public and to act on the basis of what they knew through experience – to trust their own experience and the experiences of girls and other women. (p. 224)

I wish to emphasize here that therapy is itself a relationship, an act of being-in-relation. Consequently, the most effective tool, as a Greenspan (1983) contends, is our very being. Helping others is a tremendously creative and rewarding act. It is emacipatory, and as such, is exciting to experience. Yet it is also a relationship of power differences. Because

of the vulnerability of the women and men seeking our help, therapy must be an act of respect and care. Developing ethical guidelines to assist us in being respectful and caring is the topic of the next section.

V. ETHICAL GUIDELINES

Ethics are guidelines for our behavior, outlining the absolute minimum standards of care. Ideally, they alert us to the vulnerability of others and to our responsibilities. They should take into consideration ethical issues arising among all levels of workers, including volunteers and professionals working in small communities, whether these are defined geographically, such as women working in rural or isolated communities, or demographically, as with ethnic minority groups or lesbians in larger urban centers. They also need to be in a constant state of revision, for as we work to change our situation/condition, as we find new ways/women's ways to bring about these changes and goals to be achieved, the issues needing to be addressed change. Therefore, what I present here is a set of guidelines culled from a number of sources and which address the issues I have been faced with or able to anticipate up to this point. They are temporary, in that, as my situation changes and as I grow more aware, they will change again.

According to Carol Gilligan (1982a, 1982b, 1988a, 1988b) and her colleagues, Jane Attanucci (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) and Nona Plessner Lyons (1988), there are two basic orientations to considering our social reality and ethical issues. They provide distinct approaches to defining what constitutes a moral or ethical dilemma and how it can be resolved. The first of these, a morality of justice, defines moral problems as "conflicting claims between self and others (including society)" (Lyons, 1988, p. 35) and as issues of equality. Relationships are between equal individuals who act according to the duties and obligations of their roles. The moral ideal is one of equal and mutual respect. Within this perspective, we see ourselves and others as separate from the context and situation, and treat others the way we would want to be treated, independent of the context. Decisions are based upon one's role-related obligations and principles or rules ensuring that everyone is treated in the same way. This orientation leads us to construct a set of ethical guidelines outlining our obligations as listeners/facilitators/supporters and the obligations of the people seeking our assistance, whether principles such as fairness are maintained, and how

we justify our decisions. This approach is most often employed by men in making moral decisions.

The second orientation is based on a morality of care and is often how women choose to address moral dilemmas. Within this orientation, we see ourselves as connected to others, and see everyone within their contexts and situations. Relationships are based on our responses to each other. Moral problems are issues of relationships and consist of determining how to respond to the needs of others as they see them, within the context of their situation and through the act of caring. The goal is to maintain relationships and promote the well-being, prevent harm to, and relieve the suffering of others. We evaluate our decisions upon whether relationships were maintained or restored and how well the relationship issue was resolved or will be resolved. This orientation focuses our attention on how well we care for the people who seek our support, how we can avoid doing harm to them, and carefully considering the situation we live in.

Gilligan (1988a) argues that women and men seem able to employ each orientation. However, she also notes that we seem able to employ only one orientation at a time with each focusing our attention on different types of concerns, and that in general, men prefer a justice orientation and women prefer a care orientation. Gilligan stresses that

> these two approaches are not opposites or mirror images of one another (with justice uncaring and care unjust). Instead they constitute different ways of organizing the problem that lead to different reasoning strategies, different ways of thinking about what is happening and what to do. (p. xxi)

While each orientation guides our behavior as listeners/facilitators/supporters, the care orientation speaks more to the perspective developing out of a feminist approach to psychology and is most often expressed by women addressing issues of counselling relationships, support giving, and care, such as Miller (1986, 1991a), Jack (1991), Striver (1991), Kaplan (1991b), Jordan (1991b), Burstow (1992), and Greenspan (1983). The most detailed and encompassing of these is by Burstow. I will draw on her guidelines extensively,

as well as those developed by Joan R. Saks Berman (1985) and Laura Brown (1985), in considering the dilemmas we face and how we can approach them.

Burstow (1992) offers fifteen guidelines which I have summarized as five basic ethical concerns based upon our responsibility to care for the people seeking our help, protect and promote their well-being, care for ourselves, and avoid harming them. She recognizes the vulnerability of a person seeking our help and cautions that we have a responsibility to "question continually the ethicality of our approaches and our decisions, despite how many years we have been working this way, how many counselors operate similarly, and how many revered theorists have written that it is right" (p. 48). This responsibility to question, while not listed by Burstow as a guideline, is what I consider to express the most essential aspect of our work as listeners/facilitators/supporters: We are responsible for continually examining what we are doing against an ethic of care to ensure that we are at all times assisting that person and promoting their well-being. With this in mind, we can consider the following issues.

Our first obligation, Burstow (1992) notes, is to the people seeking our care. Employers (including our own), colleagues, third parties or even special causes are secondary. Listeners/facilitators/ supporters are responsible for protecting the privacy of the person seeking our assistance. If we seek to share identifying information about that person, as when we are being supervised, making a referral or consulting with a colleague, it should be only with their full permission. The only exception is when there is a danger to another person, as when a child or partner may be in danger of being (further) abused. This is especially relevant when working with people who are abusive, most notably, in programs for men who abusive their partners and/or children. Ensuring the safety of their partners/ex-partners and their children often requires the listeners/facilitators/supporters to remain in close touch with the partners/ex-partners, the police, social service agencies, safe houses, and transition homes. Indeed, this is standard practice within effective programs such as the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (Pence & Paymar, 1993). In

essence, men are being held accountable for creating relationships where they have power over others and for abusing the vulnerability of those people.

Second, we need to ensure that we protect and support the right of people to have power over their own lives. As Burstow (1992) argues, this includes their right to kill themselves and not cooperating with psychiatric interference. As long as they are not harming another being, they have the right to injure or end their life. At a less severe level, this includes informing people seeking our help of the ways in which we provide help so that they can decide if they want this for themselves. At no point do we have the right to assume that we know what is best for someone else or that we have more knowledge or insight into their life than they do. We must be especially sensitive to and protective of the right of survivors of abuse who are still in abusive situations to determine when it is safest for them to leave or if they can no longer risk staying. We have no right, according to Burstow, to employ the psychiatric or medical model, to label them, thereby reducing them to an object. Nor should we try to move them in a direction or speed they neither want nor choose.

Third, we must avoid harming the people seeking our assistance and support. This requires us to avoid behavior and remarks which are or condone oppression in any form, including oppression based on sexual orientation, race, culture, religion, physical abilities, socio-economic status, age, or marital status. Burstow (1992) insists that we incorporate within our work an awareness of these systemic oppressions. I would take this one step further and suggest that we also engage in actions to eliminate oppressive systems and structures at all times in our lives. Avoiding harm also means, as Burstow emphasizes and Brown (1985) suggests, that at all times and with all people, we must avoid further harming the people seeking our assistance by employing non-feminist approaches, such as medical and psychiatric treatment.

We are neither to harm a person by deliberately frightening the person seeking our assistance, nor should we try to push a person beyond her or his comfort level. As mentioned earlier, each person seeking our help is responsible for determining the pace s/he wishes to

work at and the issues s/he wants to address. We are responsible for providing a safe place and a safe relationship. This again includes our work with people who are abusive. Most people in these programs, consisting almost entirely of men, attend as a condition of probation or parole, or as part of their incarceration. Listeners/facilitators/supporters, and indeed, all of society are responsible for confronting these men with their abusive behavior and the consequences of their abusiveness in order to protect/avoid harm to everyone else. Listeners/facilitators/supporters should ensure that their work is done in a safe and caring environment.

Avoiding harm also means we should avoid beginning work when there will be insufficient time to support the person through it, as when there is no more time in that session or when we are aware that we need to terminate a relationship (due to a person moving, an agency closing, a program ending, etc.). Sufficient notice should be given, where possible, of the need to end the relationship. Avoiding harm also means, as Burstow (1992) notes, that we avoid misrepresenting ourselves (which is usually self-serving), as when we falsely claim to be competent in a field or guarantee that counselling/support will be useful. She also explains that it is unethical to assure someone seeking our help that she is able to do anything that she wants to in this world, that she must want to be abused if she stays with an abusive partner, or that she will never be oppressed or abused again. In addition, we are "obliged to seek supervision or consultation or to refer clients when we are aware that we are not serving them well" (p. 50). It is also important to acknowledge when we are no longer able to provide them with additional benefits through counselling/support. Burstow describes this as arriving at a point of "highly diminished returns". When such a time arrives, we need to suggest ending the counselling/supporting relationship.

Finally, avoiding harm means we avoid engaging in any type of a relationship which will harm the people seeking our care, especially sexual relationships. Burstow (1992) describes sexual relationships as genital contact, unwanted physical contact, sexual remarks, terms of endearment, suggestions, and invitations, nudity, displaying the client directly or through photographs, irrelevant sexual disclosures on our part, questioning the

client about their sexual experiences beyond what they consider relevant for counselling, dwelling on details of sexual abuse beyond what she wants or is needed, and having the client act out sexual experiences or abuses. Even if the person seeking our help wants any form of a sexual relationship with us, it would be extremely inappropriate for the listener/facilitator/supporter to view this as an invitation or permission to partake in such a relationship.

However, as Berman (1985) explains, listeners/facilitators/supporters may be unable to avoid befriending the people seeking their assistance or being their friends before they seek assistance. She refers to these as "overlapping relationships". For example, people living in small rural or isolated communities must deal with each other daily in several capacities – as colleagues, store-owners and customers, nurses and patients, teachers and students, etc. Moreover, looking after our own well-being as listeners/facilitators/supporters means that we develop a healthy supportive social life. Consequently, within small communities we will at times befriend or do business with people who have sought our support or have friends and/or colleagues seek our assistance. The same is true of people living in larger centres who are restricted to small communities by virtue of their culture, religion, sexual orientation, marital status, etc. Understandably, people want listeners/facilitators/supporters who are most likely to accept and understand them, and who are, therefore, most likely from the same group. In these cases, argues Berman, a friendship may incorporate a counselling relationship and vise versa. However, it is important that we are aware of the vulnerability of the person seeking our support. It would be highly inappropriate for us to establish a sexual relationship while counselling support is ongoing. It is also inappropriate after the relationship is ended, until vulnerability is no longer an issue. Furthermore, as Burstow (1992) explains, it is inappropriate to accept expensive gifts, expect mutual support and care, or take time for our own issues within the counselling session.

Fourth, we are to promote the well-being of others. Our perspective should identify the ways in which we have been and are oppressive, as well as our strategies for survival. It

should explore and celebrate our ways of surviving and living. We should encourage people seeking our support to identify their oppression and discover their strengths, especially in their relationships with other people. We should assist others in discovering their own knowledge instead of presenting ourselves as the sole sources of knowledge.

People coming to us should be encouraged to seek support and assistance outside of our relationship. However, at times this may initially be difficult, as when listeners/facilitators/supporters are working within small isolated communities. These may be communities isolated geographically or by their demographics. In these cases, the listeners/facilitators/supporters may be the only safe people initially. Their need for extended assistance should not be viewed as a form of dependency, which traditionally implies a weakness. Rather, it should be seen as a sign of their health and they should be supported until a larger community of safe, caring people has been formed, such as a consciousness-raising group or a women's centre. At the same time, listeners/facilitators/supporters need to be aware of our own needs, as well as the limits to the amount of support we can provide while still caring for ourselves.

We should also find ways to make counselling/support available to anyone seeking it. I agree with Burstow (1992) when she suggests that at any given time, private practitioners should provide free or affordable support to one or more people who are unable to afford support. Bartering is also acceptable, contends Brown (1985), as long as it is voluntary and each person agrees to the value of the items/skills being exchanged. I also believe we should advocate for and support government and business initiatives to provide free services. It is important to note here that services should not be forced to compete with each other for funding, as when counselling programs for abusive men are funded by taking money away from programs to assist women or when there is insufficient funds for the variety of programs we need to support women within our society.

The finally ethical issue involves our need to care for ourselves. It is important that we recognize our needs, strengths, and limits. It is important that we establish friendships where the care-giving and support is mutual, as long as we avoid asking this of people

seeking our support as a condition for gaining our help. We have the right to have sexual partners, as long as these are never the people seeking our assistance or people who are vulnerable to us in any way. It is important that we feel free to turn down anyone seeking our support with whom we are uncomfortable. We need to be free to refuse to enter into dangerous or uncomfortable situations. We need to be able to recognize our limits and be allowed to act on them, including refusing to without supervision work in areas in which we lack experience, or with people who we feel inadequate to support. We also have the right, as Burstow (1992) and Brown (1985) explain, to support ourselves financially, and therefore, have the right to ask people to pay us for our assistance.

VI. Pressure versus Transformational Feminism in Psychology

It is important to explore how feminism informs psychology in the two ways Angela Miles (1981, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c) describes feminism – pressure and transformational – because of the profound implications of the choice between these two approaches. They represent two very different ways in which feminism informs psychology and two different sets of goals. Both are evident in psychological literature and the spoken experiences of women. From a pressure perspective, psychology needs to change by adding women's perspectives onto the existing androcentric views. The feminist pressure approach is very similar to feminist empiricism, as discussed by Sandra Harding (1990) in the previous chapter. Such an approach allows women to identify the sexist results of research and sexist practices in therapy. A feminist pressure/empiricist approach is apparent in the work of Harriet Goldhor Lerner (1988), Jocelyn Chaplin (1988), Claire M. Brody (1984), and the Canadian Psychological Association's guide on nonsexist research (Boehnert, 1988).

For example, Jocelyn Chaplin (1988) writes about feminine nurturing and co-operation being as important as the masculine attributes of independence and assertiveness. She recommends that an individual's repertoire of behaviors include both the masculine and feminine modes of behavior. That is, she suggests adding the feminine onto the masculine. Lerner (1988) and Brody (1984), as discussed earlier, encourage women to become healthier by becoming more like men.

Their recommendation that women become like men or be their complement typifies the pressure/empiricist approach. The androcentric nature and structure of our world and psychology in particular, remains unrecognized and unchanged. That is, it leaves unchallenged the empirical and androcentric presuppositions and values, theories, and models essential to the traditional paradigm of psychology. In failing to challenge the androcentricity of traditional approaches, argues Wine (1985, 1989), such an approach is incapable of valuing the feminine. In addition, Harding (1990) emphasizes that a feminist empiricist approach is inhospitable to the racial, class, and cultural differences amongst

women. When we apply this to psychology, a feminist pressure/empirical approach, with its fundamental reliance upon objectivism and reductionism is unable to capture our lived reality as members of subordinate groups in all of our diversity. We remain restricted to those categories, images, and concepts created by and for members of dominant groups. This lack of challenge to the male universal, together with the continued disregard and devaluing of the gynocentric and of subordinates, makes the pressure/empiricist model unacceptable to many feminists.

In comparison, a transformational approach requires redefining psychology itself such that it is primarily viewed from a feminist perspective. This requires beginning with our specificity or common qualities as women, while at the same acknowledging and incorporating our differences. It allows the agents of knowledge to work from their specific place and time in history, requires no absoluteness or truth to give strength to its claims, and can account for diversity and specificity. By beginning with women, this approach enables us to recognize androcentricity and offer a genuine alternative to it. That is, by using a transformational perspective we are able to identify and analyze how the traditional paradigm of psychology and counselling in particular values the masculine while degrading the feminine. Most importantly, as Wine (1985, 1989) argues, it offer an alternative to traditional androcentric approaches to psychology by guiding us in identifying gynocentric values and methods. It is these gynocentric values and qualities – the relational, integrative, subjective, intuitive, irrational, emotional, sensual, profane, concrete, physical, and natural – which serve as the basis of this perspective. Some examples of this approach are the work of Carol Gilligan (1982a, 1988b), and her colleagues (Brown & Gilligan, 1992; Gilligan, Ward, Taylor, & Bardige, 1988), Jean Baker Miller (1986, 1987) and her colleagues at the Stone Centre (Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Striver, & Surrey, 1991), Dana Crowley Jack (1991), and Ellen Bass and Laura Davis (1988).

These feminists have through their work redefined psychology to mean the study of our lives from the perspective of women. Wine (1985, 1989) describe this refocusing by feminists as a switch from a focus on androcentric values and models to gynocentric values

and models. In doing so, I believe that they have created a genuine alternative to the traditional patriarchal psychology and counselling practices. Moreover, unlike a pressure approach to psychology, a transformational approach seems to be for women, about women and by women, and consequently, more likely to assist us in achieving our goal of emancipation.

A number of feminists have elaborated on what they believe should be the objectives of feminist psychology in general, and counselling/support in particular, in achieving our emancipation. Miller (1991a) expresses a number of important objectives. She suggests that we first need to understand women in their own terms and that this will "provide clues to a deeper grasp of the necessities for all human development and, simultaneously, to a greater realization of the realities of the vast, untapped human capacities" (p. 26). In her analysis of women and power, Miller (1991b) argues that our experiences of subordination have led us to avoid power as "power over" others. What we are struggling to find is a way to express power in all the areas of our lives such that it enhances the power of others as it enhances our own power. As Miller first explained in Toward a new psychology of women (1986), we have been expressing our power in the strategies we have developed to survive. Brown and Gilligan (1992) advocate societal and cultural change through women and girls maintaining our relationships with each other and our authentic selves. Jack (1988) argues that we need to assist women to be authentic, to remain true to their perceptions and judgements, and to enter into new forms of dialogue. Or, as Brown and Gilligan suggest, perhaps we need to return to the authentic dialogue some of us knew as children. Jack believes that we only find these new/old forms by searching together "on a larger level, in ever widening circles" (p. 206) and to eventually draw men into these circles.

What is repeated throughout their work is the need for women to first discover who we are and how we are, as well as how we want to be. Only then can we move on to bring men into this process, to teach them other/Other's ways of being, gynocentric ways. From there, we can change our world in the ways which women are re-membering.

VII. SUMMARY

In comparison to psychology within the masculinist paradigm, there is clearly a fundamental and substantially unique approach to psychology from within a feminist paradigm. Traditional psychological perspectives inhibit the possibility of conceiving of our situations and experiences in ways which might result in an alternative gynocentric framework. By their very nature, theories of and models based on a dichotomized view of humanity and valuing the masculine over the feminine, writes Jeri Dawn Wine (1989), preclude "the possibilities of mutuality, harmonious relationships, and recognition of the interdependence of human beings" (p. 83). Furthermore, approaches based on the superiority of members of dominant groups over all others and their "natural" right to dominate us will generate research questions and identify issues in counselling serving to maintain and strengthen their dominant position. As Wine notes, psychology's investment of "time, energy and money in demonstrating that women are different than men, and therefore inferior to men" (p. 80) is "unparalleled". Traditional approaches are profoundly biased against women and other members of subordinate groups, and will always provide results which further devalue feminine qualities.

It is little wonder, concludes Wine (1989), that some feminist psychologists are highly suspicious of questions focused on women's specificity and sex differences. Women's qualities have either been degraded or used to return us to the stifling and deadly "pedestal" of the gentle, nice, all-loving, all-nurturing-of-others-and-never-herself wife and mother. For example, witness how Carol Gilligan's (1982a) ground-breaking work on women's morality was misapplied in an attempt to demonstrate that it was unnatural and unhealthy for women to move beyond our roles as caretakers and nurturers (Faludi, 1991). Or how the research on women's "fear of failure" or our "motive to avoid success" was used by businesses and governments to avoid promoting women (Horner, cited in Wine, 1989). Even the popular assertiveness training courses for women confirmed that assertiveness is desirable and that we were lacking in this attribute.

There is another body of psychological literature which at first glance may seem to fall within the realm of the feminist paradigm. However, upon closer examination it is evident that they are interested in women as a specialized topic, rather than for the sake of achieving any feminist goals. These are the women and men who present themselves as feminist while failing to understand or advocate any of the values or principles fundamental to feminism. Alison Kerr (1992) writes that these "self-styled feminist therapists... are inadequately educated as feminist theorists" (p. 25). She warns of the confusion and harm these therapists cause to the people seeking their assistance contending that this form of therapy "does as much harm as any abusive therapy and packs an additional punch for the feminist client in the form of betrayal by someone who was supposed to be on her side" (p. 25). They cause tremendous confusion and suffering when claiming to be feminist while their practice fails to reflect any feminist theory the underlying gynocentric values.

One notable example is the work of clinical psychologist, Ellen McGrath (1992). She repeatedly refers to the efforts of feminists to increase our awareness of our economic and cultural oppression, and then proceeds to very briefly discuss the implications of this for women. At the same time, she clearly states that women have failed in our attempts to stop our victimization by failing to be sufficiently motivated to change ourselves. As she explains, "real, lasting change requires substantial determination and commitment" (p. 92). She suggests that the fault lies within us and consequently, that we change ourselves rather than challenge how our culture is structured, how stereotypes are dichotomized and unrealistic, or how gynocentric principles are systemically devalued while androcentric principles are celebrated. Many of her strategies for helping women encourage us as individuals to channel the anger and fury of being "victimized" into exercises symbolizing our rebellion. That is, she encourages us to spend our energy on futile exercises and to view ourselves as helpless at the hands of our oppressors. Her exercises are designed for individuals, thereby discouraging us from collectivity. She fails to encourage women to do anything beyond the symbolic and the isolated, such as collective political activity.

Indeed, she contends that "feminist therapy isn't about politics" (p. 292); rather it is about what is happening within us and how we need to change and adapt ourselves to the world we live in. At times McGrath will refer to the need to acknowledge oppressive structures and the need to change our society. However, she fails to incorporate any of the fundamental theories of feminism into her own perspective and repeatedly suggests strategies which isolated women from each other and discourages us from questioning the oppression and devaluation we experience.

The danger for people seeking our assistance when they encounter a non-feminist therapist claiming to be feminist is the direct harm to the client. Her concerns are treated as issues for her to resolve within herself. No critical analysis is offered of how economic, cultural, social, and political factors are affecting her, nor support given for her ability to survive. More importantly, we need to be able to trust those people who are assisting us that they have some understanding of feminism and feminist therapy as they claim. We want to avoid being told once again that our oppression is our fault or nonexistent.

How then, can we recognize a feminist approach to psychology, and counselling psychology in particular? I believe feminism provides a paradigm expressing the experiences of women from the perspective of women with the goal of transforming out world around the gynocentric. Consequently, when we consider psychology from within a feminist perspective, it reflects how we experience our world, celebrates women and those qualities and values associated with us, and assists us in ending oppression and exploitation. That is, psychology stops being an instrument of our oppression, and instead, leads to our freedom. What psychology can and should be about is helping us identify and eliminate oppression and creating healthy alternatives. Within the feminist paradigm, the act of counselling in particular is about building strength through connecting with each other in ways which are simultaneously personal and political.

As feminist listeners/facilitators/counsellors, we need to direct our attention and energy towards changing the oppressive structures and institutions of our society, beginning at the most intimate level. Our process of change at the institutional level is ideally

reflected in our individual relationships. When we are in relation with the people seeking our assistance, real change can take place. The therapeutic relationship is transformed, as are the people within that relationship. When we are in relation with the people seeking our assistance, real change can take place. The therapeutic relationship is transformed, as are the people within that relationship. Moreover, oppressive individuals and institutions are no longer supported when we, as counselling practitioners, give up our power over the people seeking our support. We need to move from rationalizing oppressive beliefs, practices, policies, and laws to helping to identify and eliminate them.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS

In working on this thesis, an entirely new world was opened up to me – a woman-centered world. Moreover, I was introduced to a psychology redefined and reconceptualized by feminists. In particular, the work of Jean Baker Miller, Carol Gilligan, and their colleagues, as well as frontline agencies, illuminated experiences for which previously, I had neither the words nor concepts to express. They helped me understand myself, my relationships, and the factors shaping my life. They provided me with guidelines on what to listen for in the stories people seeking my help shared with me and how to support and assist those same people. As I listened to them as gendered beings, as people with differences based on age, race, religion, socio-economic standing, sexual orientation, etc., I became increasingly aware of the incredibly sophisticated forms of oppression and exploitation we experience. I heard women describe their abusive situations at the hands of the men with whom they were the most intimate and men of power and privileges speak about how they, to a lesser degree were suffering from their own emotional isolation. I better understood the stories of First Nation and immigrant people, and of people with physical disabilities. I had a richer understanding of my own story and of how my freedom from exploitation and oppression is linked to everyone's emancipation.

However, the more I read, the more I wondered why a feminist perspective had been locked away from me. No feminist work had been presented to me as a student. After four years of studies in psychology and two in graduate studies in counselling psychology, I had been completely unaware of any feminist voices. None had ever been mentioned, referred to, or offered as an alternative. Feminist ideas and perspectives were ignored. Worse, it seemed to me that female colleagues expressing a feminist perspective were usually ridiculed or attacked by some of our male professors and fellow male students. The only support I experienced within my program came from my program advisor who encouraged me to explore feminism (outside of class hours) in researching sexual harassment and from my thesis supervisor in allowing me to pursue this topic. After reviewing the

wealth of research and theorizing available from the front lines and from academia (and everything in between), I was and continue to be amazed that nothing was presented to us. I am more than surprised when I consider that the majority of students in counselling psychology are women and that the majority of the people seeking our assistance are women. Surely research relevant to women would have been deemed appropriate as a substantial topic to research and discuss.

Even if I avoid the obvious issue of gender and only consider the types of issues I encounter consistently in my counselling practice, in facilitating trainings, and in developing programs, I am again confused by the choice of courses and information available to us. All of the models presented in our theory classes failed to acknowledge, let alone provide reasonable, realistic explanations for what I encounter in every client's story: Power and control achieved and maintained through various forms of violence and exploitation. It is not as if knowledge of these issues is foreign to us; I have worked with frontline agencies and First Nation communities who are very aware that drug and alcohol abuse, self-abuse, and abuse of others stems from experiences of emotional neglect and abuse, psychological, physical, and sexual abuse, and exploitation. These groups are acknowledging and beginning to deal with widespread male violence against women and children. They understand the socio-political dimensions of oppression and violence, and realize that change at the individual level requires change at the community level. Even the provincial and federal governments, often considered to be the slowest to acknowledge and respond to the needs and situations of its constituents, has begun to recognize the magnitude and severity of abuse and exploitation, and are responding.

My understanding of feminism developed through studies which I pursued with my own time outside of our graduate studies program; with money over and above the cost of graduate studies; through my work; and through many hours of discussing feminism with friends and colleagues. I maintained my journey into feminism as it was and is so relevant and useful in my personal life and in my work as a counsellor and program director. Indeed, it provides the only useful guidance I have for dealing with the overwhelming amount of

violence and exploitation I see as a counsellor. Consequently, I am left to wonder why my counselling training program failed to provide me with the education I needed to be a useful counsellor to the population I am serving.

So what is happening with our training programs for counsellors? What is preventing us from exploring how feminism informs counselling psychology? I suspect it is, as Kuhn suggests, partly due to having been educated within and remaining for many years within the traditional paradigm. Consequently, it will be difficult to learn a new paradigm. However, in my opinion, an even more significant factor may be the fact that all of our tenured professors are male, and that as men, there are little, if any, financial or personal gains in store for them should they adopt the feminist paradigm. Moreover, by even allowing others to voice the feminist perspective, they could be challenged on and lose their positions as experts and their freedom from scrutiny. Some could loss the exploitive power relationships they maintain with their students. Eventually they could even lose their research funding, access to publishing, and comfortable positions of prestige and wealth.

If as Kuhn (1970) suggests, that old paradigms are maintained or new ones introduced through access to students, then it is important to gain access to students. This is not a matter of one group needing to gain power over another, as in a feminist paradigm needing to gain control over a masculinist/patriarchal paradigm. To me, this issue is about counsellors providing support and assistance to the people who approach them for help. If we are to be helpful, we must be able to hear them on issues of major concern to them, such as the violence and exploitation they experience. We need to be able to acknowledge and provide support on these issues. If our paradigm, our perspective, determines what we hear, recognize, attend to, and form useful theories about, then we need to give serious consideration to the paradigm we adopt and to the consequences of adopting that paradigm.

Therefore, as trainers of counsellors, we need, at the very least, to offer counselling students the opportunity to study a paradigm which is woman-centered and woman-friendly. We need a perspective acknowledging that women grow up in and live in a world

different from that of men, and providing us with the language and concepts to begin exploring our world. We need a paradigm capable of acknowledging all of our differences, whether they are based on gender, sexual orientation, race, age, culture, socio-economic status, physical abilities, etc. We need the opportunity to study a paradigm capable of providing us with guidelines for addressing issues commonly experienced by members of subordinate and dominant groups. We need fewer women-who-are-trained-to-be-men and more educators, researchers, facilitators, and listeners/supporters who are women celebrating women and encouraging men to celebrate the gynocentric. And we have some excellent examples to celebrate. The theoretical and clinical work of Jean Baker Miller and her colleagues has demonstrated how we have ignored what women and men have been telling us and provides us with examples of how to hear and respond.

As students of counselling, we need access to a feminist alternative. It is not enough to allow us to study how feminism informs psychology and counselling on the side, without any support or guidance. It is costly, both financially and in terms of time. I spent too much money buying books because they promised to focus on feminist therapy and then presented me with the perspective of a woman who was celebrating rather than challenging our patriarchal society. And I spent two years studying perspectives developed by men, about men and for men, when I could have been focusing on a more relevant woman-centered approach, as demonstrated by the work of Carol Gilligan and her colleagues (Brown & Gilligan, 1992; Gilligan, 1982a, 1982b, 1988a, 1988b; Gilligan, Ward, Taylor, & Bardige, 1988;), and by Mary Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck Tarule (1986). These women have provided us with examples of the potential of feminist scholarship in psychology. Their work has illuminated with incredible clarity what it means to be a woman, what we experience daily, why we think the way we do, and why we act the way we do. They have begun unlocking doors, not to secret rooms, but to entire worlds that have been hidden away from us.

With the hope of improving our counsellor training program from the viewpoint of a feminist practitioner, I recommend the following changes: First, we need to offer courses

within the feminist paradigm which are central to the program, rather than being merely alternatives. Nearly all counsellors will work with women and other oppressed groups, and with issues of exploitation and oppression. Many listeners/facilitators/supporters will also be working with the members of dominant groups and with people who are simultaneously members of both groups. These listeners/facilitators/supporters need to know how to address issues experienced by both group. We need ethics courses exploring the orientations of justice and of care, and their implications for our practice, our research, and our lives in general. Students within ethics courses need to be supported in examining how we can attend to the various situations and issues experienced by caregivers and, just as importantly, by the people seeking our assistance from within these differing orientations. We need skill training courses focusing on empathy at more sophisticated levels of understanding than are presently available. We need classes on feminist theories, models, and exemplars training us in a feminist paradigm. We need to be discussing issues of relevance to us as women and as women helping women. Students need to be encouraged to explore what it means to be an oppressor and the ways in which they both exploit and abuse others as well as how they suffer in their role as the dominants. We need feminist and pro-feminist role models of professors, supervisors, researchers and listeners/facilitators/supporters. These role models need to be trained within and experienced with the feminist paradigm.

Thus far, I have only addressed the content of a counselling training program. I believe it is also vital that we explore the process of training listeners/facilitators/supporters. At the moment, we have a process fostering power differences and encourages power over others: administration over faculty, professors and supervisors over students, counsellors over the people seeking their support, etc. This system promotes situations of harassment and the abuse of power. Unacceptable learning environments have other common features. They are based on evaluation by an all-powerful other thereby discouraging students from trusting our own sense of what we are learning and destroying the sense of safety necessary for learning. We are also unable to express our experiences because the words, concepts, and images given to us are foreign, shaming, and silencing. Such a process

seems incapable of recognizing and challenging the way in which it functions, yet it clearly needs to be examined and changed.

We need a training program which invites and encourages differences. We need a process promoting power over self and challenges power over others. Our training programs need to be remodeled upon ways promoting our growth and development instead of requiring us to abandon curiosity, growth and caring in favor of conformity to male-centered approaches and perspectives. We need to create learning situations where it is safe to explore and learn from our experiences and to share in the learning of others. We need to be taught to return to our senses, to our knowledge, and to sharing this with others. We need to learn how to trust our judgement of what we are experiencing as helpers. We need to experience support, for in doing so, we can begin to learn how to offer support to others. We need to focus on how our own world and vision is tied up in the experiences of others around us. We need to examine what it means to be a student and a teacher.

In writing this thesis, in struggling to find the words to express my ideas and experiences, I have tried to weave a tapestry of how the work of all of these feminists have illuminated my own life and inspired my work. Needless to say, they have given me direction and more importantly, a renewed sense of hope. We can and should move beyond the goal of bandaging people up – there are alternatives, ways to prevent oppression and exploitation. More importantly, there are ways to achieve our emancipation, our freedom. I firmly believe that our work as teachers, trainers, facilitators, supporters, and listeners, should and can reflect this goal. If we really are interested in ending exploitation and abuse, in transforming our world around the gynocentric and the feminine, then we must consider how seriously we are interested in achieving our vision. We need to reconsider the task of putting ourselves as listeners/facilitators/supporters out of work and to take that project to heart.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adair, M., & Howell, S. (1990). *Breaking old patterns, weaving new ties: Alliance building.* Tools For Change, P. O. Box 14141, San Francisco, CA 94114.

Adamson, N., Briskin, L., & McPhail, M. (1988). *Feminist organizing for change: The contemporary women's movement in Canada.* Toronto: Oxford University.

Aisenberg, N., & Harrington, M. (1988). *Women of academe: Outsiders in the sacred grove.* Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts.

American Psychiatric Association. (1987). *Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders* (3rd ed., rev.). Washington, DC: Author.

American Psychological Association. (1975). Report of the task force on sex bias and sex-role stereotyping in psychotherapeutic practice. *American Psychologist, 30,* 1169-1175.

Avis, J. M. (1980). Deepening awareness: A private study guide to feminism and family therapy. *Journal of Psychotherapy & the Family, 3*(4), 15-46.

Bass, E., & Davis, L. (1988). *The courage to heal: A guide for women survivors of child sexual abuse.* New York: Harper & Row.

Beavoir, S. D. (1994). The second sex (Introduction). In M. Schneir (Ed.), Feminism in our time: The essential writings, World War II to the present (pp. 3-20). New York: Vintage.

Belenky, M. F., Clinchy, B. M., Goldberger, N. R., & Tarule, J. M. (1986). *Women's ways of knowing: The development of self, voice and mind.* New York: BasicBooks.

Benston, M. (1989). Feminism and the critique of scientific method. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 57-76). Montréal: Black Rose.

Berman, J. R. S. (1985). Ethical feminist perspectives on dual relationships with clients. In L. B. Rosewater & L. E. A. Walker (Eds.), *Handbook of feminist therapy: Women's issues in psychotherapy* (pp. 287-296). New York: Springer.

Boehnert, J. B. (1988). The psychology of women. In S. Burt, L. Code, & L. Dorney (Eds.), *Changing patterns: Women in Canada* (pp. 264-290). Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.

Brody, C. M. (1984). Authenticity in feminist therapy. In C. M. Brody, (Ed.),*Women therapists working with women: New theory and process of feminist therapy,* (pp. 11-21). New York: Springer.

Broverman, I. K., Broverman, D. M., Clarkson, F. E., Rosenkrantz, P. S., & Vogel, S. R. (1970). Sex-role stereotypes and clinical judgements of mental health. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 34* (1), 1-7.

Brown, L. (1985). Ethics and business practice in feminist therapy. In L. B. Rosewater & L. E. A. Walker (Eds.), *Handbook of feminist therapy: Women's issues in psychotherapy* (pp. 297-304). New York: Springer.

Brown, L. M., & Gilligan, C. (1992). *Meeting at the crossroads: Women's psychology and girl's development.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Burgess, I. S. (1972). Psychology and Kuhn's concept of paradigm. *Journal of Behavioral Science, 1*(4), 193-200.

Burstow, B. (1992). *Radical feminist therapy: Working in the context of violence.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Cameron, A. (1981). *Daughters of Copper Woman.* Vancouver: Press Gang.

Cameron, A. (1989). Classism, racism, and academic elitism run headlong into low-rent criticism. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 313-325). Montréal: Black Rose.

Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women. (1993). *Changing the landscape: Ending violence – achieving equality* [Final report] (Cat. No. SW45-1/1993E). Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.

Caplan, P. J. (1985). *The myth of women's masochism.* New York: E. P. Dutton.

Caplan, P. J. (1991a). Professional issues: How do they decide who is normal? The bizarre, but true, tale of the DSM process. *Canadian Psychology, 32*(2), 162-170.

Caplan, P. J. (1991b). Response to the DSM wizard. *Canadian Psychology, 32*(2), 174-175.

Chaplin, J. (1988). *Feminist counselling in action.* London: Sage.

Chesler, P. (1971). Patient and patriarch: Women in the psychotherapeutic relationship. In V. Gornick & B. K. Moran (Eds.), *Woman in sexist society: Studies in power and powerlessness* (pp. 251-275). New York: BasicBooks.

Chesler, P. (1989). *Women and madness (with a new introduction).* San Diego, CA: Harvest/Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Childers, M., & hooks, b. (1990). A conversation about race and class. In M. Hirsch, & E. F. Keller (Eds.), *Conflicts in feminism* (pp. 60-81). New York: Routledge.

Code, L. (1988). Feminist theory. In S. Burt, L. Code, & L. Dorney (Eds.), *Changing patterns: Women in Canada* (pp. 18-50). Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.

Cohen, M. (1989). The problem of studying "economic man". In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 147-159). Montréal: Black Rose.

Coleman, S. R., & Salamon, R. (1988). Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the psychological journal literature, 1969-1983: A descriptive study. *The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 9*(4), 415-446.

Cook, J. A., & Fonow, M. M. (1990). Knowledge and women's interests: Issues of epistemology and methodology in feminist sociological research. In J. M. Nielsen (Ed.), *Feminist research methods: Exemplary readings in the social sciences* (pp. 41-57). Boulder, CO: Westview.

Dagg, A. I., & Thompson, P. J. (1988). *MisEducation: Women & Canadian universities.* Toronto: OISE.

Daly, M. (1990). *Gyn/ecology: The metaethics of radical feminism (with a new intergalactic introduction by the author).* Boston: Beacon.

Davison, G. C., & Neale, J. M. (1986). *Abnormal psychology: An experimental clinical approach* (4th ed.). Toronto: John Wiley & Sons.

Dooley, P. K. (1982). Kuhn and psychology: The Rogers - Skinner, Day - Giorgi debates. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 12,* 275-289.

Ehrenreich, B., & English, D. (1978). *For her own good: 150 years of the experts' advice to women.* Toronto: Anchor.

Ellis, A. (1984). Rational-emotive therapy. In R. J. Corsini (Ed.), *Current psychotherapies* (3rd ed.) (pp. 196-238). Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock.

Enomoto, M. (1975). It was an eighteenth century horror show! In D. E. Smith & S. J. David (Eds.), *Women look at psychiatry* (pp. 47-57). Vancouver: Press Gang.

Evans, P. (1993). *Verbal abuse survivors speak out: On relationship and recovery.* Holbrook, MA: Bob Adams.

Faludi, S. (1991). *Backlash: The undeclared war against American women.* New York: Doubleday.

Findlay, B. (1975). Shrink! Shrank! Shriek! In D. E. Smith & S. J. David (Eds.), *Women look at psychiatry* (pp. 59-71). Vancouver: Press Gang.

Finn, G. (1989a). Conclusion. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 419-425). Montréal: Black Rose.

Finn, G. (1989b). On the oppression of women in philosophy – or, whatever happened to objectivity? In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 203-231). Montréal: Black Rose.

Franklin, U. (1991). Commemoration for the Montréal massacre victims. *Canadian Woman Studies, 11*(4), 9.

Fraser, N., & Nicholson, L. J. (1990). Social criticism without philosophy: An encounter between feminism and postmodernism. In L. J. Nicholson (Ed.), *Feminism/postmodernism* (pp. 19-38). New York: Routledge.

French, M. (1985). *Beyond power: On women, men, and morals.* New York: Ballintine.

French, M. (1992). *The war against women.* New York: Summit.

Gagnon, M. (1989). My body in writing. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 375-388). Montréal: Black Rose.

Gilligan, C. (1982a). *In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Gilligan, C. (1982b). Why should a woman be more like a man? *Psychology Today, 16*(6), 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77.

Gilligan, C. (1988a). Adolescent development reconsidered. In C. Gilligan, J. V. Ward, J. M. Taylor, & B. Bardige (Eds.), *Mapping the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to psychological theory and education* (pp. vii-xxxix). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Gilligan, C. (1988b). Remapping the moral domain: New images of self in relationship. In C. Gilligan, J. V. Ward, J. M. Taylor, & B. Bardige (Eds.), *Mapping the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to psychological theory and education* (pp. 3-19). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Gilligan, C., & Attanucci, J. (1988). Two moral orientations. In C. Gilligan, J. V. Ward, J. M. Taylor, & B. Bardige (Eds.), *Mapping the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to psychological theory and education* (pp. 74-86). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Gilligan, C., Ward, J. V., Taylor, J. M., & Bardige, B. (Eds.). (1988). *Mapping the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to psychological theory and education.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Glasser, W. (1984). Reality therapy. In R. J. Corsini (Ed.), *Current psychotherapies* (3rd ed.) (pp. 320-353). Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock.

Greenspan, M. (1983). *A new approach to women and therapy.* Toronto: McGraw-Hill.

Harding, S. (1986). The instability of the analytical categories of feminist theory. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 11*(4), 645-664.

Harding, S. (1990). Feminism, science, and the anti-enlightenment critiques. In L. J. Nicholson (Ed.), *Feminism/postmodernism* (pp. 83-106). New York: Routledge.

Harris, D. W. (1991). Keeping women in our place: Violence at Canadian universities. *Canadian Woman Studies, 11*(4), 37-41.

Hartsock, N. (1990). Foucault on power: A theory for women? In L. J. Nicholson (Ed.), *Feminism/postmodernism* (pp. 157-175). New York: Routledge.

hooks, b. (1992). Out of the academy and into the streets. *Ms.*, 2(1), 80-82.

Hövelmann, G. H. (1984). Against historicism: Critical remarks on Thomas Kuhn's conception of science and its reception in parapsychology. *Journal of Parapsychology, 48*, 101-119.

Hughes, P. (1989). Fighting the good fight: Separation or integration? In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 403-417). Montréal: Black Rose.

Jack, D. C. (1991). *Silencing the self: Women and depression.* New York: Harper Perennial.

Jack, D., & Jack, R. (1988). Women lawyers: Archetypes and alternatives. In C. Gilligan, J. V. Ward, J. M. Taylor, & B. Bardige (Eds.), *Mapping the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to psychological theory and education* (pp. 263-288). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Jordan, J.V. (1991a). Empathy and the mother-daughter relationship. In J. V. Jordan, A. G. Kaplan, J. B. Miller, I. P. Striver, & J. L. Surrey, *Women's growth in connection: Writings from the Stone Center* (pp. 28-34). New York: Guilford.

Jordan, J.V. (1991b). Empathy, mutuality, and therapeutic change: Clinical implications of a relational model. In J. V. Jordan, A. G. Kaplan, J. B. Miller, I. P. Striver, & J. L. Surrey, *Women's growth in connection: Writings from the Stone Center* (pp. 283-289). New York: Guilford.

Jordan, J.V. (1991c). The meaning of mutuality. In J. V. Jordan, A. G. Kaplan, J. B. Miller, I. P. Striver, & J. L. Surrey, *Women's growth in connection: Writings from the Stone Center* (pp. 81-96). New York: Guilford.

Jordan, J. V., Kaplan, A. G., Miller, J. B., Striver, I. P., & Surrey, J. L. (1991). *Women's growth in connection: Writings from the Stone Center.* New York: Guilford.

Kaplan, A. G. (1991a). Empathic communication in the psychotherapy relationship. In J. V. Jordan, A. G. Kaplan, J. B. Miller, I. P. Striver, & J. L. Surrey, *Women's growth in connection: Writings from the Stone Center* (pp. 44-50). New York: Guilford.

Kaplan, A. G. (1991b). Female or male psychotherapists for women: New formulations. In J. V. Jordan, A. G. Kaplan, J. B. Miller, I. P. Striver, & J. L. Surrey, *Women's growth in connection: Writings from the Stone Center* (pp. 268-282). New York: Guilford.

Kaschak, E. (1992). *Engendered lives: A new psychology of women's experience.* New York: BasicBooks.

Keller, E. F. (1990). Gender and science. In J. M. Nielsen (Ed.), *Feminist research methods: Exemplary readings in the social sciences* (pp. 41-57). Boulder, CO: Westview.

Kimball, M. (1975). Women, sex role stereotypes, and mental health: Catch 22. In D. E. Smith & S. J. David (Eds.), *Women look at psychiatry* (pp. 121-142). Vancouver: Press Gang.

Knight, I. F. (1985). Paradigms and crises in psychoanalysis. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 54*(4), 597-614.

Kuhn, T. S. (1970). *The structure of scientific revolutions* (2nd ed., enlarged). London: University of Chicago.

Lahey, K. A. (1989). Celebration and struggle: Feminism and law. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 99-122). Montréal: Black Rose.

Laidlaw, T. A., & Malmo, C. (1991). Feminist therapy. *Canadian Journal of Counselling, 25*(4), 392-406.

Laidlaw, T. A., Malmo, C., & Associates. (1990). *Healing voices: Feminist approaches to therapy with women.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Larrabee, M. J. (Ed.). (1993). *An ethic of care: Feminist and interdisciplinary perspectives.* New York: Routledge.

Lerner, H. G. (1988). *Women in therapy.* Toronto: Harper & Row.

Levine, H. (1989). The personal is political: Feminism and the helping professions. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 233-267). Montréal: Black Rose.

Lyons, N. P. (1988). Two perspectives: On self, relationships, and morality. In C. Gilligan, J. V. Ward, J. M. Taylor, & B. Bardige (Eds.), *Mapping the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to psychological theory and education.* (pp. 22-48). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Masterman, M. (1970). The nature of a paradigm. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), *Criticism and the growth of knowledge* (pp. 59-89). Cambridge: University Press.

Meador, B. D., & Rogers, C. R. (1984). Person-centered therapy. In R. J. Corsini (Ed.), *Current psychotherapies* (3rd. ed.) (pp. 142-195). Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock.

Miles, A. (1981). The integrative feminine principle in North American feminist radicalism: Value basis of a new feminism. *Women's Studies International Quarterly, 4*(4), 481-495.

Miles, A. (1989a). Ideological hegemony in political discourse: Women's specificity and equality. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 271-285). Montréal: Black Rose.

Miles, A. (1989b). Introduction to the first edition. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 17-23). Montréal: Black Rose.

Miles, A. (1989c). Introduction to the second edition. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp.11-15). Montréal: Black Rose.

Miller, J. B. (1986). *Toward a new psychology of women* (2nd ed.). Boston: Beacon.

Miller, J. B. (1987). Preface. *Canadian Woman Studies, 8*(4), 5-6.

Miller, J. B. (1991a). The development of women's sense of self. In J. V. Jordan, A. G. Kaplan, J. B. Miller, I. P. Striver, & J. L. Surrey, *Women's growth in connection: Writings from the Stone Center* (pp. 11-26). New York: Guilford.

Miller, J. B. (1991b). Women and power. In J. V. Jordan, A. G. Kaplan, J. B. Miller, I. P. Striver, & J. L. Surrey, *Women's growth in connection: Writings from the Stone Center* (pp. 197-205). New York: Guilford.

Ministry of Attorney General, & Ministry of Women's Equality. (1993a). *Sexual assault: Victim service worker handbook.* Victoria, BC: Author.

Ministry of Attorney General, & Ministry of Women's Equality. (1993b). *Wife assault: Violence against women in relationships.* Victoria, BC: Author.

Nielsen, J. M. (1990). Introduction. In J. M. Nielsen (Ed.), *Feminist research methods: Exemplary readings in the social sciences* (pp. 1-37). Boulder, CO: Westview.

Notturno, M. A. (1984). The Popper/Kuhn debate: Truth and the two faces of relativism. *Psychological Medicine, 14,* 273-289.

Owston, J. (Ed.). (1993). *Please don't bring me flowers: Women in violent relationships.* Prince George, BC: Elizabeth Fry Society.

Pantony, K., & Caplan, P. J. (1991a). Delusional dominating personality disorder: A modest proposal for identifying some consequences of rigid masculine socialization. *Canadian Psychology, 32*(2), 120-133.

Pantony, K., & Caplan, P. J. (1991b). Response to commentators. *Canadian Psychology, 32*(2), 161.

Patterson, C. H. (1989). Values in counseling and psychotherapy. *Counselling and Values, 33,* 164-176.

Parlee, M. J. (1979). Review essay: Psychology and women. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 5*(1), 121-133.

Paymar, M. (1993). *Violent no more: Helping men end domestic abuse.* Alameda, CA: Hunter House.

Pence, E., & Paymar, M. (1993). *Education groups for men who batter: The Duluth model.* New York: Springer.

Penfold, S. (1987). Sexual abuse between therapist and woman patient. *Canadian Woman Studies, 8*(4), 29-31.

Penfold, P. S., & Walker, G. A. (1983). *Women and the psychiatric paradox.* Montréal: Eden Press.

Peterson, G. L. (1981). Historical self-understanding in the social sciences: The use of Thomas Kuhn in psychology. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 11,* 1-30.

Pope, K. S., Keith-Spiegel, P., & Tabachnick, B. G. (1986). Sexual attraction to clients: The human therapist and the (sometimes) inhuman training system. *American Psychologist, 41*(2), 147-158.

Prentice, A., & Pierson, R. (1989). Feminism and the writing and teaching of history. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 161-176). Montréal: Black Rose.

Prose, F. (1990, January 7). Confident at 11, confused at 16. *The New York Times Magazine,* pp. 22-25, 37, 38, 40, 45, 46.

Quinn, K. (1984). The killing ground: Police powers and psychiatry. *Women and Therapy, 3,* 71-77.

Rockhill, K. (1987). The chaos of subjectivity in the ordered halls of academe. *Canadian Woman Studies, 8*(4), 12-17.

Rosewater, L. B., & Walker, L. E. A. (Eds.). (1985). *Handbook of feminist therapy: Women's issues in psychotherapy.* New York: Springer.

Sherif, C. W. (1979). Bias in psychology. In J. A. Sherman & E. T. Beck (Eds.), *The prism of sex: Essays in the sociology of knowledge* (pp. 93-133). Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin.

Smith, D. (1975). Women and psychiatry. In D. E. Smith & S. J. David (Eds.), *Women look at psychiatry* (pp. 1-19). Vancouver: Press Gang.

Smith, D., & David, S. J. (Eds.). (1975). *Women look at psychiatry.* Vancouver: Press Gang.

Standing Committee on Health and Welfare, Social Affairs, Seniors and the Status of Women. (1991). *The war against women.* Ottawa: Author.

Stenstad, G. (1989). Anarchic thinking: Breaking the hold of monotheistic ideology on feminist philosophy. In A. Garry & M. Pearsall (Eds.), *Women, knowledge, and reality: Explorations in feminist philosophy* (pp. 331-339). Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Striver, I. P. (1991). The meaning of care: Reframing treatment models. In J. V. Jordan, A. G. Kaplan, J. B. Miller, I. P. Striver, & J. L. Surrey, *Women's growth in connection: Writings from the Stone Center* (pp. 250-267). New York: Guilford.

Sturdivant, S. (1980). *Therapy with women: A feminist philosophy of treatment.* New York: Springer.

Suppe, F. (1984). Beyond Skinner and Kuhn. *New Ideas in Psychology, 2*(2), 89-194.

Surrey, J. L. (1991). The relational self in women: Clinical implications. In J. V. Jordan, A. G. Kaplan, J. B. Miller, I. P. Striver, & J. L. Surrey, *Women's growth in connection: Writings from the Stone Center* (pp. 35-43). New York: Guilford.

Tong, R. (1989). *Feminist thought: A comprehensive introduction.* Boulder, CO: Westview.

Vickers, J. M. (1989). Memoirs of an ontological exile: The methodological rebellions of feminist research. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 37-56). Montréal: Black Rose.

Weimer, W. B., & Palermo, D. S. (1973). Paradigms and normal science in psychology. *Science Studies, 3,* 211-244.

Weisstein, N. (1969). Woman as nigger. *Psychology Today, 3*(5), 20, 22, 58.

Weisstein, N. (1971). Psychology constructs the female. In V. Gornick & B. K. Moran (Eds.), *Woman in sexist society* (pp. 49-57). New York: BasicBooks.

Westkott, M. (1990). Feminist criticism of the social sciences. In J. M. Nielsen (Ed.), *Feminist research methods: Exemplary readings in the social sciences* (pp. 41-57). Boulder, CO: Westview.

Wheeler, C. E., & Chinn, P. L. (1989). *Peace & power: A handbook of feminist process* (2nd. ed.) (Pub. No. 15-2301). New York: National League of Nursing.

Wilson, G. T. (1984). Behavior therapy. In R. J. Corsini (Ed.), *Current psychotherapies* (3rd. ed.) (pp. 239-278). Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock.

Wine, J. D. (1989). Gynocentric values and feminist psychology. In A. Miles & G. Finn (Eds.), *Feminism: From pressure to politics* (2nd rev. ed.) (pp. 77-97). Montréal: Black Rose.

Wine, J. D. (1985). Models of human functioning: A feminist perspective. *International Journal of Women's Studies, 8*(2), 183-192.

VITA

Surname: Yanishewski — Given Names: Roxanne Koren

Place of Birth: Spirit River, Alberta, Canada — Date of Birth: April 21, 1962

Educational Institutions Attended:

University of Victoria	1988 to 1994
University of British Columbia	1987 to 1988
University of Alberta	1980 to 1983

Degrees Awarded:

B.A.	University of Alberta	1983

Honors and Awards:

David W. Stewart Prize for Counselling	1989

Publications:

Yanishewski, R. (1990). A field evaluation: The excellent adventures of Mike and Tim as told to Roxanne Yanishewski. *Peer Counsellor, 7*(1), 15-19.

Yanishewski, R. (1989). Training native peer counsellors. *Peer Counsellor, 6*(2), 11-12.

Carr, R., Yanishewski, R., & de Rosenroll, D. A. (1989). Pearls among peers: A conversation with peer leaders. *Canadian Journal of Counselling, 23*(1), 5-28.

PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant the right to lend my thesis to users of the University of Victoria Library, and to make single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the Library of any other university, or similar institution, on its behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or a member of the University designated by me. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis: INTO THE LIGHT: UNDERSTANDING HOW FEMINISM INFORMS COUNSELLING PSYCHOLOGY

Author [redacted]

ROXANNE KØREN YANISHEWSKI

DECEMBER 14, 1994