

The Schuman Plan: Vision, Power and Persuasion

by

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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The origins of European integration and the factors that made it possible in the post-1945 era have been examined from different perspectives and interpreted in various ways. While federalists argue that the concept of European unity had been developed over centuries by different intellectual movements, the realist approaches of Milward and Dinan stress the importance of economic, political and security motives. Referring to the factors that contributed to the implementation of the Schuman Plan, both the federalist and realist approaches highlight the chief importance of states and their representatives. Yet, the ideas that inspired Jean Monnet, who designed the Schuman Plan, have received little attention. While the state is seen in the literature as the main actor that made the outcome possible, the role of Monnet and that of some of his close associates are almost ignored.

By investigating Monnet's thought, this study shows that the source of his inspiration was not the countless plans for European unity put forward by European federalist movements or the random concepts that he came across, such as the New Deal. Rather, it is argued here that he was in fact constantly exposed to a coherent and well-structured philosophy. This thinking reached him through his direct contacts and frequent encounters with Felix Frankfurter and his associates, who formed an epistemic community, as defined by Peter M. Haas. The core concepts of this thinking inherited from Louis Brandeis and developed by Frankfurter – restoring and overseeing free competition – can be identified in Monnet's 1950 plan. The evidence shows that it became a shared philosophy of Monnet's group of friends. This is a fundamental aspect since, once the Schuman Plan was made public, Monnet's friends rallied around his project and contributed not only to overcoming stalemate at critical moments of the negotiations on the future treaty, but also to convincing statesmen of the value of the project.

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Abbreviations

BDI: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie

CNPF: the Conseil national du patronat français

CVCE : Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe

DBPO: Documents on British Policy Overseas

DGUE: Documents on Germany under Occupation

DKV: Deutscher Kohlenverkauf

DRBSC: Department of Rare Books and Special Collections

ECA: Economic Cooperation Administration

ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community

EEC: European Economic Community

EDC: European Defence Community

Euratom: European Atomic Energy Community

EU: European Union

EUI: European University Institute

FDR: Franklin Delano Roosevelt

FJM: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe

FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

HAEU: Historical Archives of the European Union

HICOM: Allied High Commission [for Germany]

IRA: International Ruhr Authority

ISC: International Steel Cartel

LoC: Library of Congress

OEEC: Organisation for European Economic Cooperation

PPP: Public Policy Papers

PUL: Princeton University Library

SNCF: Société Nationale des Chemins de fer français

TVA: Tennessee Valley Authority

UK: United Kingdom

USA: United States of America

US: United States

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Introduction

In the spring of 1950 a tired and preoccupied Frenchman left a hectic Paris for the Swiss Alps in search of inspiration¹. Economic recovery, conflict, security and cold war were some of the words crossing his mind and worrying him. Endless walks from cottage to cottage and the serenity of the mountains inspired him. In the evenings he put his thoughts on paper. Two weeks later, at the beginning of April 1950, he left the mountains and returned to Paris carrying in his luggage notes containing the answers to his dilemmas. This man was Jean Monnet, the architect of the Schuman Plan, a project that changed the fate of Western Europe after two world wars.

Two world wars in less than forty years starting on the same continent showed that something was not working properly in that part of the world. Although the issue had been addressed before, the desire to avoid war in Europe had without doubt permeated all of Western European society after 1945. With the onset of the Cold War and the danger of an even more intense global conflict, the search for a solution intensified. In addition, the post-war economic crisis and the most severe depression ever seen called into question the whole economic foundations of Western Europe. Yet, nothing of any substance seemed to surface before Monnet drafted his 1950 coal and steel plan.

The French businessman turned political entrepreneur designed a plan that not only provided a solution to the post-war European political and economic crisis, but one that completely revolutionized institutional arrangements in that part of the world. The plan, named after the French Foreign Minister who took the risk of selling it to the world, envisaged a Franco-German political and economic alliance that would help resolve conflicts peacefully by creating joint interests and regular dialogue. As a result, the plan imagined that war would not be regarded as a solution by any of the participating states, particularly by France and Germany. As the Schuman Declaration stated, “the coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany”². Thus, according to the text, “any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”³.

The Franco-German rapprochement was not the only key aspect of the plan. Equally important for its author seems to have been the creation of a Western European common market based on a number of innovative principles. The project provided for the pooling of coal and steel resources and the merging of markets, which would help increase output and economic development in the member states of the future EESC organisation. To achieve this aim it was necessary to invent an entity that would ensure the rules of the market were respected, especially given Europe’s long tradition of market control by national governments and, particularly in the decades before the war, by cartels. In order to fulfil its calling, “the High Authority’s decisions will be enforceable in France,

¹ Jean Monnet, *Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1976), 342.

² *Texte de la déclaration de 9.5.50, traduction américaine*, FJM, AMG 1/3/6.

³ *Ibid.*

Germany and other member countries”⁴. As a result, the decisions of the main body of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) would be binding on the member states and their governments. Additional measures were provided for so as to ensure its autonomy. Thus, the plan stipulated that the High Authority would be “composed of independent persons appointed by the governments, giving equal representation”⁵.

The idea of pooling important resources of a number of states under a joint authority, having binding powers, would change not only the old-style diplomatic methods and economic organisation of Western Europe but also the fate of the continent. Practical mechanisms to avoid war between participating states, primarily between Germany and France, were envisaged. A new economic philosophy was to reform the fundamental principles of Western European capitalism. Government representatives engaged in tiresome negotiations over the principles of the plan in order to set up an organisation that would help preserve peace in that part of Europe and lay the foundations of healthy economic cooperation. The subsequent Treaty establishing the ECSC, signed one year after Monnet drew up his plan, laid the basis of the first European supranational community. This incipient entity set the tone for European cooperation and contributed to the setting up of two other communities in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). States which only recently had fought each other twice in the bloodiest wars in history were not only brought together to the negotiating table, but promised to cooperate with each other and change their approach to international politics.

The result of these negotiations was the creation of an original international entity whose members promised to share and manage key resources, such as coal and steel. Furthermore, the institutional mechanism was designed in such a way that member states would need to accept interference from the chief governing body of the organisation and even its binding instructions. The High Authority received well-nigh discretionary powers concerning competition in the market, having the right to approve or reject any merger of companies and to impose its decisions on undertakings and states alike. The departure from the European tradition is evident. Nation-states were to be stripped of fundamental powers and would see their control over two key sectors of their economy – coal and steel – greatly reduced.

Sixty years later, the results speak for themselves. Although European cooperation is far from perfect, European leaders hold regular summits and also meet whenever a crisis arises to identify solutions. At the grass roots level, a European identity has started to emerge, albeit to a limited degree. The Europe we know today, a “hyper-real Europe, more European than the continent itself”⁶ as Judt calls it, is quite different from that of half a century ago. Although this outcome is not solely due to Monnet’s plan, his revolutionary idea has significantly contributed to this result.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Tony Judt, *A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 4.

What was Monnet's role in this process, not only as author of the ECSC project but also as the one who managed to convince French decision-makers to take it into the political sphere? An ex-businessman in charge of French economic reorganisation after the war was not in a position to present to the world such a groundbreaking idea. This is the reason why he needed to convince those in positions of power of the validity and utility of his project. As a result, what was initially entirely his brainchild entered history under the name of the Schuman Plan. Not all decision-makers though seemed to be happy about the outcome. In June 1950 three French ministers (George Bidault, Prime Minister, Maurice Petsche, Finance Minister, and René Mayer, Justice Minister) expressed their "grave misgiving about placing French industry under a supranational authority"⁷ regretting "M. Monnet's successful attempt to rush ministers into decisions without adequate time for reflection"⁸. However, Monnet's role was not limited to presenting the plan to Schuman.

Given growing opposition from various circles (government and corporatist), he had to follow up on his project and, more specifically, on the way it was interpreted and put into practice. His position as head of the French delegation at the ECSC Treaty Conference put him in an advantageous position. He also relied on a few close friends, who offered him advice and also had immense influence on the international scene, either directly or owing to their capacity to persuade decision-makers. With their help and by employing all his powers of persuasion, Monnet managed to at least partially convince statesmen to accept challenging provisions in the plan and to abandon their proposals to alter its core ideas.

Even though not entirely as designed, European integration became reality after the Second World War. How was this outcome possible? What contributed to the success of the Schuman Plan? How did Monnet come up with his novel and groundbreaking idea? Which ideas influenced him? Where did he get his inspiration? These are some of the fundamental questions that arise when talking about the Schuman Plan, a project that represented a break with Europe's nationalist tradition.

Reading Monnet's memoirs one might think of divine intervention. Monnet climbed the mountains in search of inspiration and, after a period of solitary meditation, he was enlightened from above. Or, to use Dinan's words, "the solution (...) hit Monnet like a bolt of lightning during a hiking holiday in April 1950"⁹. Although his vision, not necessarily divine, cannot be denied, a more down-to-earth investigation into the origins of the Schuman Plan is needed in order to understand the origins of the coal and steel scheme. For this purpose the thinking of the originator of the plan represents an important area of investigation.

⁷ François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York : W.W. Norton, 1994), 205.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Desmond Dinan, "The Historiography of European Integration" in *The Origins and Evolution of the European Union*, ed. Desmond Dinan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 303.

Why focus on Jean Monnet when examining early, post-war European integration? First and foremost he is the creator of the ECSC plan, the one who put on paper a project of political and economic cooperation in Western Europe, which emerged at a historical turning point in that region of the world. Secondly, he was not only the architect of the scheme but also a key actor ensuring its success by pursuing an original strategy to convince decision-makers to embark on the road of European integration.

There are numerous studies which address both early European integration, particularly the Schuman Plan, and Monnet's role in this process and his personality. An obscure and hidden actor, he immediately awakened the interest of many from various fields, including academics and journalists. When examining Monnet and his coal and steel project, authors such as Merry and Serge Bromberger¹⁰, François Duchêne¹¹, Eric Roussel¹² paint a realist image of Monnet concerned about the fate of Europe. For Duchêne, a former colleague of Monnet, he was a pragmatic internationalist who managed to convince various actors, such as politicians, policymakers, financiers and businessmen from different countries, that "interdependence" was the only possible way forward.

The same authors talk about Monnet's great influence behind the scenes in Europe and in the United States. All of them mention his extensive connections with people in power in the US that represented, according to them, the source of his power. Monnet's US connections received extensive attention in the literature. In addition to the authors mentioned, Douglas Brinkley and Clifford P. Hackett collected in a book¹³ a number of essays with more or less the same purpose in mind, namely to show the influence of US players on Monnet and the role of these actors in early European integration. Although Brombergers, Duchêne and Roussel highlight some important aspects of Monnet's life and work in Canada and the US, chiefly his connections and power of persuasion, some important aspects are left out of the equation. Equally relevant to his influence and source of power was the socio-intellectual context in which he operated. In a recently published book, Trygve Ugland focuses on this aspect, arguing that "Jean Monnet saw the future of Europe in Canada through encounters with newly arrived European immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century"¹⁴. Ugland states that the Frenchman saw the Canadian federal system as a model, not in terms of the political organisation of the state and its "vertical integration"¹⁵ but primarily with regard to its "horizontal integration"¹⁶ together

¹⁰ Merry Bromberger and Serge Bromberger, *Jean Monnet and the United States of Europe* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1969).

¹¹ Duchêne. *Jean Monnet*.

¹² Roussel, *Jean Monnet* (Paris : Fayard, 1996).

¹³ *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity*, edited by D. Brinkley and C. Hackett (London: MacMillan, 1991).

¹⁴ Trygve Ugland, *Jean Monnet and Canada: Early Travels and the Idea of European Unity* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press: 2011), Kindle edition, preface, para. 4.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

with “its apparent economic well-being”¹⁷ and “the optimism he observed in the new economic union among economically and ethnically diverse people”¹⁸.

When examining the origins of Monnet’s coal and steel plan the socialising aspect is of fundamental importance. Monnet’s socialisation in the US and Canada undoubtedly played a significant part in the design of the Schuman Plan. The ideas which influenced Monnet have to be examined in more depth and this does not seem to be the case in the present literature. Concepts such as “creating the United States of Europe” or “the New Deal” are in themselves too vague to offer a plausible explanation for anyone trying to understand the ideas that appealed to the architect of the ECSC plan.

It should be pointed out that not everybody assigns to Monnet the prime role in the origins of early European integration. Influential authors in the field downplay his role. Walter Lipgens, in his study designed to cover exhaustively all movements which had promoted European integration before, during and after the Second World War¹⁹, prefers to ignore Monnet and his plan, considering it as the normal result of the intellectual movements concerned with European unity. In fact the German historian continues Brugmans’ thesis²⁰ – that the coal and steel plan was the result of the intellectual reflection of philosophers and politicians over centuries. In his turn, Alan Milward, taking a realist stand, sees the Schuman plan as a project designed to rescue the Western European economy. According to him²¹, Monnet played only a limited role, since key governmental players led the project.

Opinions are also somewhat divided when it comes to the implementation of the Schuman Plan and the main actors that contributed to this outcome. Brombergers, Duchêne, Roussel and the authors of the articles published in Brinkley’s and Hackett’s book emphasise the chief role played by Monnet and a number of his close friends, who, according to them, rallied around the project because of their association with and trust in Monnet. At the same time, governments and their representatives, driven by various interests, are considered to have contributed decisively to the outcome. Others prefer to downplay Monnet’s personal contribution and that of his US allies, focusing their argument primarily on statesmen. Milward considered state officials as the main driving force that moved European integration forward in the early 1950s. The British historian argues that states pursued European integration out of pragmatic economic interests. Even those authors who highlight the idealistic aspect of the European integration project, such as Marie-Thérèse Bitsch²², Pierre Gerbet²³, Walter Lipgens or Charles

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Walter Lipgens, *A History of European integration. Volume 1, 1945-1947, The Formation of the European Unity Movement, with contributions by Wilfred Loth and Alan Milward* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

²⁰ Henri Brugmans, *L’idée européenne 1918-1965* (Bruges : De Tempel, 1965).

²¹ Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe* (London: Taylor and Francis) 2004.

Alan S. Milward. *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, second edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).

²² Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, *Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours* (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1996).

Zorgbibe²⁴ confer the chief role on state representatives, underlining that the European project succeeded only when governments understood the importance of this ideal and offered their support to this cause.

States and their representatives occupied an almost unchallenged place in the debates on early European integration. It is now almost taken for granted that European integration was possible only due to governmental officials, who either promoted it themselves because of its practical advantages or were convinced that, after interminable European war, it was the only possible path for Europe. The sole nuance added to this argument is that Monnet and some of his US friends helped in some cases to overcome crises, driven also by pragmatic geopolitical and economic interests.

While the states' role cannot be denied, other factors seem to be missing from the puzzle of the early European integration. Considering the overemphasis on the state in the literature, a more in-depth investigation of the actions pursued by Monnet and his close friends is of primary relevance. It is important to place them in the intellectual, social and political context in order to understand, on the one hand, which ideas they valued and, on the other, to identify the source of their power that proved decisive at particular moments.

Monnet's reliance on various key US players who became drivers of important political processes, and his working methods, as they have been portrayed so far in the literature, suggest that he was part of a special group of individuals who promoted novel ideas with a view to ensuring economic and social progress. Examining this group in the light of existing knowledge in the literature on power relationships could provide answers to the main questions of this study. For this purpose, the epistemic community approach, put forward by Haas and Adler²⁵ at the beginning of the 1990s, could be a helpful framework for distinguishing the nature of the relationships and the means used to put ideas into practice.

According to Haas and Adler, an epistemic community is a network of experts sharing joint concepts that, in their view, offer solutions to an ongoing crisis. The expertise and ideas of such a community become attractive for decision-makers who, at a particular moment in time (especially during economic, social or political crises), either accept the ideas proposed by the members of an epistemic community or seek their advice. Haas and Adler emphasise that, based on the conclusions of the articles published in the special edition of *International Organization* dedicated to the epistemic community approach, "the policy ideas of epistemic communities generally evolve independently, rather than under the direct influence of government sources of authority"²⁶. It is this process of idea formation that is particularly relevant to this study since Monnet has been depicted in the

²³ Pierre Gerbet, *La construction de l'Europe*, (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1999).

²⁴ Charles Zorgbibe, *Historire de la construction européenne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993).

²⁵ Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program", *International Organization* 46, no. 1, "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination" (Winter, 1992).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 374.

literature both as a great absorber and generator of ideas with the ability to alter the policy options of statesmen.

Equally relevant is the process for implementing the novel ideas generated by epistemic communities. Haas and Adler point out that “epistemic community members play both indirect and direct roles in policy coordination by diffusing ideas and influencing the positions adopted by a wide range of actors, including domestic and international agencies, government bureaucrats and decision makers, legislative and corporate bodies, and the public”²⁷. By looking at the process of implementing the coal and steel plan through the lens of the epistemic community approach, one could gain a better understanding of the forces that made the outcome possible.

In order to shed some light on the ideas valued by Monnet and his associates and the source of their power, one needs, on the one hand, to pinpoint the concepts that appealed to Monnet and see if they can indeed be identified in his 1950 plan and, on the other, to define the nature of his relationship with his associates and the role played by his friends in the implementation of the plan. Yet, conducting research with this aim in mind is not an easy endeavour particularly in the case of someone who set great store by secrecy. By analysing his writings and his educational background one could hope to find out more about the ideas that appealed to him. Furthermore, additional research tracks have been pursued. Given his close connections not only with key players in the political and business arena but also with people who showed a particular interest in the world of ideas, an investigation into the nature of these relationships and the exchange of ideas that took place is of primary importance. This analysis might provide a better understanding of the concepts that were the basis of the Schuman Plan and of Monnet’s “political capital,” which proved so decisive during the governmental negotiations on the plan.

With these aims in mind, namely to identify the concepts that attracted Monnet and the way they reached him, various archives were visited. However, the research was not an easy undertaking, given the attitude of those directly involved in the process regarding historical sources. Before presenting the plan to the world, “on the evening of 8 May, all the working documents were destroyed”²⁸. The same approach, which was so characteristic of Monnet²⁹, was adopted in the next months, when maximum discretion was maintained. Talking about the ECSC discussions, Pierre Uri mentioned that “none of the negotiations were translated, nor were minutes taken”³⁰. Despite the secrecy, a large amount of papers was generated on the Schuman Plan, all across the world. Regardless of Monnet’s intention to keep the written sources to a minimum, there are still numerous papers on the subject.

²⁷ Ibid., 379.

²⁸ *Discretion is the order of the day*, Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe, <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/058bff7e-e81e-4cb5-9491-40f124d36b2a/en;jsessionid=8860B947B44FB4E1148B9065748B0CDD> (accessed 31 December 2011).

²⁹ On Monnet’s secrecy see Frederich J. Franssen, *The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins of the European Community* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 96.

³⁰ Pierre Uri, “Jean Monnet and the Making of Europe”, *Contemporary European Affairs* 2, no. 1 (1989): 137.

Nonetheless the destruction of documents and the extreme secrecy surrounding the matter pose particular problems, especially when trying to identify the origins of the thinking embodied in the plan. The same can be said about the negotiations on the plan, although to a much lesser degree since, at that point, the number of actors involved increased and, consequently, the possibility of controlling (and if necessary destroying) the documents generated became a much more difficult task. The research strategy therefore had to be adapted to this reality.

Since Monnet did not explicitly talk about the ideas that had a profound influence on him or the concepts that were at the foundation of the Schuman Plan, these matters were investigated. For this purpose both primary and secondary sources were used. Monnet's memoirs and other books published on the ECSC do not provide much insight into his thinking or the theories that underpinned his initiative. Consequently, an inquiry was carried out into the primary sources held by a number of archives. One of the aims of the research was to look at Monnet's correspondence and exchanges of documents with several other players in order, on the one hand, to find out about the concepts that appealed to him, and, on the other hand, to identify his close friends who could have influenced his thought before he designed his 1950 plan.

Monnet's personal archives, entrusted by him to the *Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe* in Lausanne, represent an invaluable resource. This collection of documents contains numerous papers related to his thinking (including notes, publications, speeches, interviews, etc.) and his activities during his youth and the last years of his life. In addition, the archives hosted at the Ferme de Dorigny on the campus of Lausanne University contain other important resources for the purpose of this research. The fifty-five interviews with people who either worked with Monnet or knew him, including George W. Ball, Robert R. Bowie, Bernard Clappier, John Jay McCloy, Jacques-René Rabier, are also a significant source. Besides, the Foundation offers access to numerous papers collected from US Archives concerning Monnet, covering mainly his correspondence with various prominent US Players, such as Joseph Alsop, Felix Frankfurter, Averell Harriman (Library of Congress), Dean Acheson, William Clayton (Harry Truman Presidential Library), John McCloy (Amherst College), Allen W. Dulles, John Foster Dulles, (Princeton-Seeley Mudd Library), Dean Acheson, Walter Lippmann, (Yale University Library), Harry Hopkins, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library), etc. Given the significance and amount of the papers relevant for this research, two research trips were conducted: one in the summer of 2005 and another in late spring 2011.

As the evidence showed that Monnet developed a particular affinity and closeness with a few US actors, an investigation into the nature of their relationship and the personality of those individuals was necessary. Therefore, after assessing the excerpts from the US archives grouped under the project *Jean Monnet American Sources*, a more thorough inquiry was conducted, covering the papers of a handful of people who had a close relationship with Monnet, in the hope of better defining his circle of friends and clarifying the concepts that influenced him and which, possibly, formed part of his thinking when he drafted the ECSC plan. With this in mind, the papers of the following

were examined: Joseph Alsop, Felix Frankfurter and Averell Harriman (Library of Congress) and George W. Ball, Allen W. Dulles, John Foster Dulles, David E. Lilienthal (Princeton-Seeley Mudd Library).

Moreover, as these documents revealed that many of Monnet's associates were close friends with each other, a further investigation was conducted to find out what brought these people together, what their relationship was and which ideas circulated among them. The David Lilienthal Papers revealed that he had an extensive correspondence not only with Monnet but also with Dean Acheson, George W. Ball, Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter and John J. McCloy. Ball's Papers showed that he had prolific exchanges of letters with Acheson and McCloy. Likewise, Felix Frankfurter's archives deposited at the Library of Congress (LoC) illustrated that he kept in close touch with his former pupils, Acheson, Lilienthal, McCloy, but also with his mentor, Brandeis.

While attempting to clarify the concepts at the heart of the Schuman Plan, the papers were also evaluated also in an attempt to understand what factors contributed to the success of the plan. In this context one important source was Jean Monnet's documents grouped under the "Schuman Plan" heading at the Jean Monnet Foundation in Lausanne, which cover the 9 May 1950 Declaration, the negotiations of the ECSC Treaty and the implementation of the Treaty. The examination of the negotiations was facilitated by the fact that the JMF archives contain separate folders making it possible to follow the development of the negotiations article by article. The documents gathered from various national archives and made available at the Jean Monnet Foundation also provided valuable insights into the development of the negotiations. In order to evaluate the reactions of national delegations during the ECSC Treaty negotiations, the relevant papers at the Belgian Foreign Ministry in Brussels were also examined. Another valuable resource regarding the negotiations were Robert Schuman's papers hosted also by the JMF, as well as George Ball's documents available at Princeton University Library (PUL).

In addition, the two subjects – the origins of the plan and the reasons for its success – were further explored during an interview with Jacques-René Rabier and a conversation with Henri Rieben in the summer of 2005. As somebody who got to know Monnet very well thanks to his positions as head of private office while Monnet was in charge of France's economic reorganisation and, later on, part of Monnet's private office at the ECSC High Authority, Jacques-René Rabier provided invaluable insights into Monnet's personality and the events of the time. The talk with Henri Rieben, who had not only been in charge of Monnet's archives immediately after the Frenchman entrusted them to the FJM, but also made thorough use of these papers and knew Monnet, further clarified aspects linked to Monnet and early European integration.

In addition to primary archival sources and interviews with actors who witnessed first-hand the events under scrutiny, this study has considered the collections of papers published in the *Documents on Germany under Occupation (DGUO)*³¹, *Foreign*

³¹ *DGUO, 1945-1954* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1955).

*Relations of the United States (FRUS)*³² and *Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO)*³³. These sources were supplemented by an examination of the published memoirs of various actors, including Dean Acheson³⁴, Konrad Adenauer³⁵, George W. Ball³⁶, René Massigli³⁷, Jean Monnet³⁸, Paul Henry Spaak³⁹. Additionally, since a number of key individuals referred to in this study did not write memoirs but kept regular journals, a number of diaries have been examined (both published and unpublished), such as *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal*⁴⁰, *David Bruce Diaries*⁴¹, and excerpts from the published diaries of Felix Frankfurter⁴².

The research was organised in order to cover the main under-researched aspects highlighted above, namely the origins of the idea embodied in the coal and steel plan and the role played by those with whom Monnet had close connections in the process of defining the idea that remained the basis of the Schuman Plan. The same line of thought has been followed when it comes to the structure of this dissertation. The first chapter is entirely dedicated to an examination of the opinions expressed in the literature on the chief concerns of this study. In this regard two main trends can be identified. One sees the Schuman Plan as the obvious result of the intellectual concerns of the centuries to create a united Europe. In contrast, a realist view considered the Schuman Plan as only the result of the governmental concerns regarding the post-war economic situation in Western Europe. An additional interpretation was put forward in the mid-1990s highlighting the political and security interests behind the origins of the plan. While these opinions emphasise important aspects of the origins of the coal and steel plan, they neither investigate Monnet's thinking nor attempt to identify the concepts which were at the core of his project, chiefly the idea of antitrust and a supervisory body of competition, which were entirely new concepts for post-war Europe.

Identifying the concepts that attracted Monnet is the main focus of the chapters that follow the analysis of the literature. The second chapter concentrates on Monnet's connections across the Atlantic Ocean aiming to understand the nature of his relationships and the ideas that were in circulation and to which Monnet was exposed. While many are listed in the literature as Monnet's associates, a close examination of his

³² *FRUS, 1949. Western Europe*. Volume IV (Washington: US Government Printing Office. 1975); and *FRUS, 1950. Western Europe*, volume III, (Washington: US Government Printing Office. 1977).

³³ *DBPO, The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe, and Western European Integration, 1950-1952*, Series II, Volume I. (London: HMSO, 1986).

³⁴ Dean Acheson. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969).

³⁵ Konrad Adenauer. *Memoirs, 1945-1953* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1966).

³⁶ George W. Ball. *The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs* (New York: Norton, 1982).

³⁷ René Massigli. *Une comédie des erreurs, 1943 – 1956, Souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne* (Paris: Plon, 1978).

³⁸ Jean Monnet. *Mémoires*.

³⁹ Paul Henry Spaak. *Combats inachevés* (Paris: Fayard, 1969).

⁴⁰ Personal unpublished manuscript journals (1915-1981) available in the collection David E. Lilienthal Papers, 1900-1981, Series 15: Manuscript Journal, PPP, DRBSC, Princeton University Library (PUL); and the published David E. Lilienthal, *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal*, 7 volumes (New York: Harper & Row, 1964-1983).

⁴¹ Bruce Diaries, 1 May – 31 December 1950, FJM.

⁴² Joseph Lash. *From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter* (New York: Norton. 1975).

relationships shows that only few can be considered close friends. An interesting finding is that those with close links to Monnet were also close associates with each other, being part of a group that shared numerous character traits.

Monnet's transnational encounters left a deep impression on the Frenchman, who adopted a similar worldview to that of his friends. Chapter three is dedicated to the examination of this thought, defined by one of the members of Monnet's group and adopted to a great degree by all those part of his circle of friends. This philosophy, aiming at reforming the economic principles of US capitalism, deeply influenced Monnet. For this reason, the second part of this chapter is dedicated to an investigation trying to understand if the key concepts of this thinking could be identified in the Schuman Plan.

The next chapter explains the process through which the Schuman Plan, once designed by Monnet, was conveyed to policymakers. As someone with a keen sense of how politics functions, despite the fact that he was never a politician, Monnet was acutely aware that decision-makers are the only ones capable of implementing policies. He was conscious that his role could not go beyond drafting the plan when it came to presenting it to the world and securing political endorsement. Considering this, he used all his powers of persuasion to convince policymakers of the advantages of his plan.

The next focus is the follow-up process conducted by Monnet after the plan was taken up into the political sphere. Chapters five shows that he was fully engaged in monitoring the negotiations conducted by those states that accepted the fundamental principles of the coal and steel plan. Chapter six underlines the same commitment to defending its core ideas. During this stage he was not acting alone since his close associates rallied around him recognizing familiar concepts in the Schuman Declaration. The actions of some of them, who at that point occupied key positions on the international scene, proved to be decisive in the date of the plan. They intervened at crucial times of the negotiations to convince leaders of the European states participating in the negotiations of the utility of the plan. Also, they persuaded UK and US decision-makers to give the plan a good reception and give up any intentions of altering it. The conclusion evaluates the role of the concepts to which Monnet was exposed in designing the ECSC and the influence of his associates on early European integration.

Chapter 1: The Historiography of early European Integration

1.1. The Origins of European Integration: State of the Art

The Schuman Plan did not come out of nowhere. Monnet's vision was without doubt the result of his long-term reflection on a plan that would reorganise the economic and political structure of Western Europe. His cultural background, as in the case of any other human being, certainly played an important role in this process. As briefly discussed in the introduction, there is a wide consensus in the literature that Monnet was part of an extremely active intellectual circle of people that had its centre in the US. Furthermore, the authors quoted in the introduction as well as others who will be mentioned in the following paragraphs, underline that this group of people contained highly influential individuals who often supported Monnet's endeavours.

Before attempting an analysis of the matter, it is important to examine the state of the art on a number of fundamental questions: *What were the origins of the plan which made possible the creation of the first supranational European organisation – the ECSC? What are the fundamental concepts embodied in the Schuman Plan? What made possible the creation of such an entity after the second world conflagration? Which actors contributed to this outcome?*

These are some of the most basic and frequently discussed questions in the historiography of European integration, a field that aroused genuine interest among scholars immediately after the establishment of the first supranational European organisation – the ECSC. The uniqueness of the new entity and its development quickly made it appealing to those seeking unique case studies. The main challenge was the fact that this new entity did not fit into any pre-existing theory of international relations. Despite having the appearance of an international organisation, it had as much in common with one as it had with a federal state. From the beginning there was a great temptation to write a history of this organisation, which so many had allegedly dreamed of during the centuries since the Holy Roman Empire. However, the scarcity of primary sources, kept hidden in the archives by the thirty-year rule, made it extremely challenging for historians to examine. Despite this, numerous studies from various disciplines, such as political science and economics, appeared before the 1980s.

According to Piers N. Ludlow, two approaches dominate the historiography of European integration⁴³. One school of thought attached most importance to the interplay of the political and security concerns of Western European states. In contrast, another trend explains the formation of the European Community as primarily the outcome of the economic interests of nation states. The third trend that should be mentioned is the federalist approach, which focused on the role of pan-European ideas from a historical

⁴³ Piers N. Ludlow, "History Aplenty: But still Too Isolated", in *Research Agendas in EU Studies. Stalking the Elephant*, eds. Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent and William E. Paterson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 16.

past and which, in the opinion of its followers, prepared the ground for European leaders to accept the concepts of European unity.

1.1.1. The Federalist View

The first attempts to explain the origins of European integration described the post-war outcome as a victory of federalist ideas over the concept of the nation state, which had dominated European history in the preceding centuries. This triumphalist approach looked at the role played by various thinkers and movements who, it was argued, slowly convinced statesmen that the system of nation states was outdated and that the only solution was a federated Europe. These intellectuals and movements, it is claimed, contributed decisively to the process of defining the idea of European integration, but, in the end, it succeeded because policymakers had finally understood after the Second World War that the only solution was to create a European federation. Therefore, the acknowledgement and endorsement of the idea by European leaders was considered the decisive factor in the post-war outcome.

While the idea had germinated over the ages, according to the federalist narrative, it was the state, and its representatives, which ensured its fulfilment. However, despite the success of the idea, there were also many lost opportunities for which the state was responsible. This was because, ultimately, policymakers were the ones who took decisions and they did not always understand the importance of the moment and meet expectations.

Although this approach started to gain ground after 1950, the roots of the federalist narrative trend can be identified well before the war, when thinkers supporting European integration believed that nothing could be achieved without convincing the states of the utility of the idea. For example, this is the main reason why Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi tried, during the late 1920s, to attract the support of policymakers for his Pan-European idea, by organizing massive gatherings where statesmen had a prominent role or by ensuring they joined his organisation. Pierre Gerbet mentions that his Pan-European Union, founded in 1923 in Vienna, secured “the patronage/sponsorship of numerous politicians, such as Aristide Briand, (...) Leon Blum, Joseph Caillaux, Edouard Herriot, Eduard Benes, Konrad Adenauer (...)”⁴⁴. But it was mainly after 1950 that the federalist school of thought became popular and dominated the field for a couple of decades unchallenged. This literature, that appeared immediately after the creation of the ECSC and the EEC, cannot be ignored when examining the main trends in the historiography of European integration, despite claims that “the historiography of European integration really began only in the 1980s”⁴⁵ because, according to Dinan, “the full range of raw material for the study of European integration only began to become available in the late 1970s with the declassification of most government documents covering the early postwar years”⁴⁶. With no access to the post-war archives, the federalist narrative looked

⁴⁴ Gerbet. *La construction*.

⁴⁵ Dinan, “The Historiography”, 298-299.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

back to the history of Europe, and explained the post-war success of European integration as a linear evolution of the European idea throughout centuries which culminated in the creation of the ECSC, the embryo of a European federation.

One of the main representatives of the federalist school of thought, Henri Brugmans, published numerous studies, which aimed both to support the cause of a federated Europe and also to explain the establishment of the first supranational European institutions – the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom. In one of his main works, published in 1965, entitled *L'idée européenne 1918-1965*, the rector of the College of Europe (Bruges) sets out his federalist thesis by examining “the major stages of the European adventure, the hopes and disappointments, the successes and the setbacks”⁴⁷. The Dutch professor takes us from the prehistory of the European idea, through the interwar and Second World War period, to the crucial year of 1947, when all hopes took a concrete shape⁴⁸. Summarising his main point, Brugmans stresses that “for us the European idea essentially coincides with the desire to unite our continent, with the project launched and the political initiatives taken in this sense”⁴⁹.

For him unity was a solution to the excessive fragmentation of the continent resulting from its division into nation states. However, he claimed that this had not always been the case, since, during the Middle Ages, “the Empire (...) preserved for a long time the nostalgia of an universalism inherited from the Roman world”⁵⁰. Instead of evolving towards greater unity, particular units based on sovereignty had been created. Brugmans explained that this process was based on the development of nationalism, a phenomenon which had its beginnings in 1648 and which became the norm after 1792⁵¹. Despite its influence and almost axiomatic survival, the Dutch professor considered it natural that this concept should also have an end⁵². For him, to question this principle was a normal reaction to the failure of this form of political organisation to address issues such as the Ottoman threat and the continuous conflicts, which ravaged the continent⁵³. It was in this context, according to Brugmans, that an intensive intellectual process began in search of a solution to ensure cooperation within European states and, ultimately, the peace of the continent.

While policymakers remained aloof to calls from intellectuals, the cataclysm of 1914 intensified the intellectual brainstorming. Brugmans mentions a number of federalist plans which aimed to solve the disagreements between states within a common European framework. While mentioning many who drafted plans for European unity, such as Denis de Rougemont and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Brugmans spends time examining a plan which won governmental support in France – the Briand Memorandum. The plan failed allegedly because of insufficient governmental support due to its author’s political

⁴⁷ Brugmans, *L'idée européenne*, 11.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 7-9.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 29.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 29-30.

isolation, together with the death of Stresemann and the negative British reaction⁵⁴. This failure showed that European leaders were not yet ready to accept the idea of European integration. Subsequently, after a period when “the European idea (...) disappeared from the political life”⁵⁵, it vigorously reappeared within the resistance movements of the Second World War all across Europe. According to Brugmans, the development and refinement of the European idea found its corollary in 1947, considered “the crucial year,”⁵⁶ which culminated in the establishment of the Coordination Committee of the Movements in favour of a United Europe⁵⁷.

The year 1950 represented a turning point in the attitude of statesmen towards the concept of a federated Europe, since “the word ‘supranational,’ which until then was the preserve only of the federalist movements, (...) [was] introduced into the daily political vocabulary”⁵⁸. Thus, according to Brugmans, European leaders became convinced of the necessity of European integration as the only possible response to the nationalistic deviations of previous centuries. The creation of the first supranational European organisation was possible thanks to a number of *dramatis personae*, including Konrad Adenauer, Joseph Bech, Alcide de Gasperi, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, . Brugmans concludes that four statesmen, Adenauer, Bech, de Gasperi and Schuman, had a decisive influence on the outcome as they were united “not only by their membership of a Christian party and by their joint hatred of extremist demagoguery, but also by the fact that, in their conversations, they could all use German as their natural language, as a mother tongue or as a quasi mother tongue”⁵⁹. This is the moment when the idea of European integration that had been developed over the centuries by philosophers and federalist movements triumphed, according to Brugmans, thanks to a handful of benevolent political leaders who understood its value.

The same argument, that the establishment of the supranational European organisation was the crowning glory of the activity of various federalist movements, was developed by Lipgens in his massive 1982 study *History of European Integration*, which mainly focuses on the role of these groups during and after the Second World War. By collecting an impressive amount of documents, speeches and other information proving the devotion of the authors to the cause of European unity movements active in the mid-twentieth century, Lipgens aimed to demonstrate that the creation of a supranational European entity was not a coincidence but rather the natural outcome of this intense ideological effort. In Lipgens’ view, these protectors of the ideal of European unity, active all across Europe, kept alive its flame in times of crisis, such as the Second World War, until the policymakers of key powers were ready to accept it after 1945. Therefore, the whole process prepared the leaders of some key powers (with some notable exceptions, such as British decision-makers) and they became convinced that the idea of European integration was worthwhile.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 56-57.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 67.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 85.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 105.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 127.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 133.

Like his federalist predecessors, Lipgens examines the role of those thinkers who supported a European ideal before 1914, but concludes that their ideas were rather isolated attempts without much influence. This is why he concludes that “the movement to unite Europe politically did not really get under way before the First World War”⁶⁰. The interwar period saw a number of projects, primarily aimed at avoiding another disaster, but, according to Lipgens, the unwillingness of European governments made it impossible to put ideas of European unity into practice. For example, Briand’s plan met with the resistance of policymakers such as Brüning, and other key British and Italian leaders. Lipgens regrets this and underlines that after this episode “the concept [of European unity] would be condemned and relegated to the history of ideas”⁶¹. However, the idea survived and was developed within intellectual circles, especially during and after the second world conflagration.

The key period for Lipgens was between 1945 and 1950, which he describes as “the decisive incubation phase”⁶² because “the unification movement, that hitherto had figured ‘only’ as part of the history of ideas, managed in spite of adverse circumstances to exert a strong influence on parties and governments in the larger part of Europe”⁶³. But how did this process take place? Firstly, Lipgens shows that after the war the two main powers, the US and the USSR, “decreed that the European national states should be restored,⁶⁴” a policy which made “the champions of European union endure [...] twelve months of bitter disappointment and impotence, while nationalistic ways of thought and bureaucracies entrenched themselves once more”⁶⁵. All attempts to convince European leaders that the European idea was worthy were “flatly rejected by the British and French, the only governments which possessed a certain freedom of action”⁶⁶. But the unceasing activity of the movements, which organised themselves in 1947 under a unique umbrella called the *Union Européenne des Fédéralistes*, produced the desired result in mid-1947. It was at that point that a key world power – the US – saw the advantages of a federated Europe and “pressed the recipients [of the US economic aid] to put the ideas of European co-operation into practice”⁶⁷. Lipgens argues that this was the major turning point in the change of heart by European governments since “from then on the private associations from below, and American advice from above, combined to put pressure on governments to recognise the federalist ideal”⁶⁸. Lipgens’ idealism can in some ways be seen as more moderate than Brugmans’, who talks about a more natural process of acceptance by European leaders of the European idea, driven by the crisis of the nation state. Lipgens refines the argument, making it more realistic, by highlighting that the US saw the advantages of the concept of a Third Force, supported by the European movements, and pressed key European states to accept it. But, in the end, both Lipgens

⁶⁰ Lipgens, *A History*, 35.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 86.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Dinan, “The Historiography”, 685.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 686.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 688.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

and Brugmans agree that this was only possible because the states consented to put it into practice.

Although the federalist school of thought began to be challenged after the publication of Lipgens' study, as we will see further on, it continued to enjoy support, especially among European academics. While still highlighting the role played by the European movements before governments accepted the idea, the federalist narrative of the 1990s takes a more realistic look at the events than the 1960s studies and explores the political and economic reasons invoked by European governments, without doubt under the influence of other schools of thought which emerged after 1980. However, some, like Pierre Gerbet, still conclude in a triumphalist manner that "the historical aspiration to organise Europe finally materialized after the Second World War"⁶⁹.

The creation of supranational European organisations after 1950 was seen by Gerbet as a consequence of the fact that "the idea of European union became familiar and its realization became one of the key concerns of governments, despite disagreements concerning the means"⁷⁰. Gerbet, like others such as Marie-Thérèse Bitsch and Charles Zorgbibe, attaches major importance to the intelligentsia and movements supporting European integration. All three talk about the dream of ancestors to create a united Europe and regard the failure of the Briand plan as a lost opportunity because "the majority of governments (...) were not at all concerned about organizing Europe"⁷¹. Identifying elements of continuity Bitsch, Gerbet and Zorgbibe stress the importance given to the preservation of peace and the search for security, mentioning the works of Emmanuel Kant, Victor Hugo and Henri de Saint Simon⁷². Like Brugmans, Gerbet claims that this need to propose projects for European unity came from feelings of insecurity in the small European political units that had established themselves after a period when Europe was more homogenous. While Brugmans highlights the role of the German Holy Roman Empire and the Pope⁷³, Gerbet talks about "the personality of Europe, in the form of Christianity"⁷⁴. Derek Urwin also refers to the importance of the old Roman Empire in the writings of those who promoted the cause of European unity, "a united Christian Europe at peace with itself and better able to defend itself against depredations and invasions from outside"⁷⁵.

Also mentioning the importance of the Resistance in preserving the European idea, Bitsch, Gerbet and Zorgbibe identify 1947 and 1948 as decisive years, when governments started to understand the significance of the ideas preached by European idealists. For Gerbet "the main issue was to pass on the idea of European union from private movements and parliamentarians to governments"⁷⁶. According to Gerbet, "it needed a

⁶⁹ Gerbet, *La construction*, 511.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid., 39.

⁷² Bitsch, *Histoire*, 16-18; Zorgbibe, *Historire*, 1-2; Gerbet, *La construction*, 14-15.

⁷³ Brugmans, *L'idée européenne*, 18-20.

⁷⁴ Gerbet, *La construction*, 7.

⁷⁵ Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*. Second edition (London and New York: Longman. 1995), 2.

⁷⁶ Gerbet, *La construction*, 59.

government or governments to take the initiative to open negotiations on a possible organisation of Europe”⁷⁷. While governments had been reluctant to walk down this road for centuries, Gerbet argues that “starting from 1947-1948, the unification of Europe became one of the objectives of government policy in many states”⁷⁸. He saw the creation of the first supranational organisation as a natural result once the concept of European union had been accepted by statesmen. Urwin also highlights the pivotal importance of this awareness process, namely the recognition, appreciation and adoption by policymakers of ideas promoting European unity. Talking about the post-Second World War period, the British historian stresses that “Western European governments were soon obliged to consider some form of both political and economic cooperation because of the worsening international environment”⁷⁹.

As mentioned, after 1990 writers who had acknowledged the importance of federalist movements adopted a more realist approach, highlighting the practical reasons which drove politicians to accept, at that particular moment in time, ideas promoted over the centuries by intellectuals. For example, Urwin explains that “the Schuman Plan had been sold to a French government that was worried about the future political, military and economic potential of the new West German state in part as a measure of keeping a check on that potential”⁸⁰. Even though these concrete objectives of internal and external policy are considered very important, the outcome can be attributed to some key figures who had finally come to appreciate the concept of European unity. Thus, in Urwin’s view, “the idea of a coal and steel community took off because people committed to some form of common future for Western Europe occupied positions of authority in several countries: Schuman, Monnet and others in France, Adenauer in West Germany, Alcide de Gasperi and Carlo Sforza in Italy, Paul-Henri Spaak in Belgium and Joseph Beck in Luxembourg”⁸¹.

Despite some differences, the federalist approach offered similar answers to fundamental questions concerning the origins of the Schuman Plan and the factors, which made European post-war cooperation possible and the creation of the first supranational entity on the continent. Referring to the origins of the post-war plans (not only the Schuman Plan but also other projects such as the Pleven Plan), the federalist school considers them the natural outcome of intense intellectual activity that can be traced back in the Middle Ages. Brugmans and Gerbet, for example, see its origins in the need for security and the desire to find solutions to preserve peace on the continent. According to this trend the two world conflagrations contributed to the rise of the movement for European unity, which brought the matter into the political discourse. It is this factor – the acceptance by statesmen of the concept of European unity – that contributed decisively to the post-war success of European integration.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 12.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 45.

⁸¹ Ibid., 46.

Brugmans, Gerbet and Lipgens also blame the governments for the delay in European unity and the lack of integration after the Second World War because its representatives adopted a functionalist view of European integration, expecting a natural spill-over in time. This is the reason why they talk about the failures of post-war integration such as the plan to create a European Defence Community (the Pleven Plan)⁸². For federalists the state is both angel and demon since it is considered the main cause of European integration through the establishment of the ECSC, EEC and Euratom, but also the main obstacle to further integration. For example, Brugmans complained at the beginning of the 1960s about the stalemate of integration, arguing that “the problem of small states is still discussed because we have not made enough progress along the road of federalism”⁸³. Thus, the federalists made a clear distinction between those who came up with the idea, namely the European movements, and those who should have implemented it, that is the state. In the end, for the representatives of this trend, the state needed to play a key role in the process of European integration, specifically to support the cause and ensure progress.

1.1.2. An Economic View

The first and major challenge to the federalist view came in the early 1980s, when Alan S. Milward questioned both the origins of European cooperation and the factors favouring the creation of the first supranational European organisations. In *The Reconstruction of Western Europe*, published in 1984, he put forward a state-centric view of the process of European integration. Later on he expanded his thesis in *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (1992) by putting more emphasis on the interests of states as the prime mover in European integration.

In his book he “flatly contradicted”⁸⁴ those who saw the idealism of the movements promoting European integration as decisive. He took issue with the representatives of the federalist approach who argued that “human idealism”⁸⁵ overcame “the narrow, anachronistic realism of national governments”⁸⁶. In the early 1990s, he continued his attack on the book to which he himself contributed by underlining that the 1100 political figures listed in the index of Lipgens’ history had only a modest influence on the internal affairs of their states. In addition, “the European Unity Movement which they eventually formed in 1947 appears to have had practically no influence on the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris three years later”⁸⁷. According to Lipgens, these “facts (...) never appear for one moment to have troubled the author”⁸⁸.

⁸² Brugmans, *L'idée européenne*, 139; Gerbet, *La construction*, 121.

⁸³ Henri Brugmans, “Federalisme dans l’Europe en devenir”, in *L’Europe au-delà de l’économie: Conférences du congrès de l’Union européenne, Lausanne, 19-20 novembre 1960*, Henri Brugmans (Neuchâtel: Editions de La Baconnière, 1961), 29.

⁸⁴ Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction*, 492.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 492.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Milward, *The European Rescue*, 16.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

Furthermore, Milward criticises Lippens' inability to explain Monnet's realism, namely his concern with practical economic matters, and his almost total lack of idealism. Referring to one of Monnet's most concrete projects for economic recovery, the British historian asks the following question: "Can we see, for example, the first French medium-term national plan, the Plan for Modernization and Equipment, which stands as the very symbol of post-war national resurrection in Europe and which led to a series of further plans for national development, as embodying any of these aspirations for a less nationalistic world after 1945?"⁸⁹. Solving this puzzle was not easy for Lippens and the federalists in general according to Milward, who argued that the only explanation given was the "conversion in 1947 or 1948 to the greater and nobler cause,"⁹⁰ namely the conviction that the nation state system had expired and that it needed to be replaced by a superior form of organisation.

The core argument of the federalists, based on the conversion of statesmen to the cause of European integration, was also flatly contradicted by Milward. The British historian argued that Western European post-war cooperation was not a reaction to the weakness of the nation state. Rather, according to the British historian, "the very limited degree of integration that was achieved came about through the pursuit of the narrow self-interest of what were still powerful nation states"⁹¹. Milward stressed that the evidence he collected suggested that the post-war European nation states were not on the verge of collapse, either as political entities or as units entrusted with economic governance. Contrary to the mainstream thinking that Europe was on the point of economic collapse, Milward stresses that the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s was not due to Marshall Aid but to the sustained Western European recovery, which started and continued uninterrupted from 1945.

Western Europe's post-war economic boom is the key, according to Milward, to explaining the origins of European integration that was considered the best solution for coping with its sustained economic expansion. Thus, the author judges that "integration was not the suppression of the nation-state by another form of governance as the nation-state became incapable but was the creation of the European nation-states themselves for their own purposes, an act of national will"⁹². Western European states seemed to have understood that cooperation was the only way forward in a period when large amounts of national income came from outside their national frontiers (more than forty percent in the case of the Netherlands and more than one third in the case of Belgium⁹³). Milward underlined that the perception that "sustained economic development required a larger market for their goods and services than that offered by the narrow confines of their national territories"⁹⁴ convinced the states to design a practical way to cooperate among themselves. As a result, by adapting to the new environment, "the European nation-state rescued itself from collapse, created a new political consensus as the basis of its

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 17.

⁹¹ Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction*, 492.

⁹² Milward, *The European Rescue*, 18.

⁹³ Ibid., 7.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

legitimacy and through changes in its responses to its citizens which meant a sweeping extension of its functions and ambitions, reasserted itself as a fundamental unit of political organization”⁹⁵.

Milward attributes the chief role in post-war European integration to national bureaucracies, both in terms of the origins of the ECSC plan and the factors that contributed to the success of plans for European cooperation, of which the Schuman Plan was just one example. He stresses in *The Reconstruction of Western Europe* that the historical evidence shows that the idea came from within and was “created by national bureaucracies out of internal expression of national interest, not by the major statesmen (...)”⁹⁶. Turning to the 1950 plan, Milward considers that “the Schuman Plan (...) was based on two and a half years of the evolution of policy in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs”⁹⁷. More specifically, he argues that “the Schuman Plan was called into existence to save the Monnet Plan”⁹⁸ since the 1950 plan reflected an alteration of the French economic policy pursued after the end of the war, which was dominated by “partition and permanent weakening of Germany and of acquiring a guaranteed access to German coal and coke resources”⁹⁹. Milward claims that this policy was modified in 1948 when “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began the task of moving ministers, governments, parliament and people toward the alternative of a Franco-German economic association”¹⁰⁰. As a result, the Schuman Plan should not be seen as a sudden alteration of French policy, but the ultimate result of such a strategy. Therefore, according to Milward, the main driver behind the Schuman Plan was the concern of the French government to “achieve a better guarantee of access to German resources”¹⁰¹. In the end, the answer to the origins of the Schuman Plan lies, in Milward’s view, in the actions and interests of the civil servants who promoted European integration as a realist solution to the post-war economic realities.

He dismisses the explanation of the federalist school, arguing that “previous writers have always entirely failed to show through what political mechanism the idealists which supported western European integration actually influenced governmental policy-making in the nation-state”¹⁰². He doubts claims that idealists such as Adenauer, Schuman, Sfortza or Spaak, who became convinced of the higher cause of European integration, “were able to override the massed cohorts of government and bureaucracy whose task it was and is to define and uphold the national interest before all else”¹⁰³. Here again Milward contradicts the federalist approach, claiming that each stage of European integration, such as the ECSC, the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Market, “was (...) designed to resolve a particular and limited, not a generalized and

⁹⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁹⁶ Milward, *The Reconstruction*, 492.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 475.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 467.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 468.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 475.

¹⁰² Ibid., 492.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

universal, problem”¹⁰⁴. Thus, concrete economic objectives and not high abstract ideals led national administrations to come up with concrete plans for European cooperation.

Thus, Milward argues that the plans were designed by the states and for the states. In his 1984 book he put forward the idea that European integration was therefore “based on an attempt by the nation states to control and distribute the gains and losses which might arise in particular sectors involved in such as way as to determine beforehand the extent to which the national interest of each party to the agreement would be satisfied”¹⁰⁵. In his later book, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, he develops this concept even further by focusing his argument even more on the state, subordinating European integration to the aim of saving the state from collapse. He writes in this regard that, according to historical evidence, “without the process of integration the western European nation-state might well not have retained the allegiance and support of its citizens in the way that it has”¹⁰⁶. European integration is considered “an indispensable part of the nation-state’s post-war construction”¹⁰⁷. Indeed, “after 1945 the European nation-state rescued itself from collapse”¹⁰⁸ thanks to the establishment of supranational European cooperation. Thus, Milward argues in both books that European integration played a dual role in the post-war world, maintaining Western European recovery and preserving the existence and the prestige of the state.

For Milward the state is at the centre of the process of early European integration. It is both the architect of the projects for Western European cooperation and the guarantor of success. The Schuman Plan, as other similar subsequent plans, was the result of the need for national bureaucracies to put forward ideas that responded to post-war economic realities. These projects were naturally implemented by the civil servants who created them to solve concrete economic problems. Generated from within the state they were also put into practice by the representatives of the states, people concerned with practical matters, not federalists concerned with abstract idealist matters. Thus, Milward dismisses the contribution of any external factors to the process and gives full credit to the state.

1.1.3. A Geopolitical View

Milward set the tone for a more realistic view of the origins of European integration, managing to demolish the myths surrounding the subject. But his purely economic perspective encouraged others to look at the matter from other angles. A decade after Milward’s groundbreaking interpretation was published, Desmond Dinan provided another explanation of the origins of the ECSC in his *Ever Closer Union?*¹⁰⁹, a work which was reprinted in 1999 and whose argument was recycled in 2004 in *Europe*

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 493.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 498.

¹⁰⁶ Milward, *The European Rescue*, 3.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union? : An Introduction to the European Community* (Boulder, CO : L. Rienner Publishers, 1994).

*Recast: A History of European Union*¹¹⁰. Dinan highlights that Western European states were “motivated not by nebulous visions of European unity, but by concrete calculations of national advantage”¹¹¹.

Without taking issue with Milward or with others in the field, Dinan produced a work more akin to a handbook than a monograph that would be offering an alternative interpretation of the subject. Yet, this contribution offers an important insight into the history of European integration. I will discuss it as such. For him the hard game of diplomacy constituted the key to explaining the motivations behind the Schuman Plan the project. More specifically, the change of approach towards Germany in the late 1940s on the part of powers such as the US and Britain forced French officials to alter their attitude to and policy on Germany. The Irish historian examines in detail this change on the diplomatic scene, considering it the crisis that made it possible for Monnet to sell his project to his hitherto reluctant government.

Dinan explains this change in international relations in the late 1940s as follows. After the war France pursued a punitive policy towards Germany, which took into account both its security and economic concerns. By controlling the military potential of its Eastern neighbour, Paris allayed its security concerns. By securing access to the vital Ruhr coal resources and by setting quotas on German production, France was able to enjoy a smooth economic recovery. This situation was about to change in the late 1940s, when Germany became an important ally in the context of the Cold War. For this reason the US and Britain were interested in rebuilding the economic and military potential of Germany. Dinan underlines that in this context, “the threat to France’s own economic recovery and security was immense”¹¹². France tried to resist but Washington’s and London’s pressure was too strong and forced France to give up its punitive policy at the beginning of 1948¹¹³.

This context played a decisive role, according to Dinan, not only in the origins of Monnet’s 1950 plan but also in ensuring its implementation. Although interested in European integration, Monnet was driven to issue his plan more by practical considerations. Here the Irish historian disagrees with the early federalists accounts of the origins of European integration since he does not attribute the origins of the plan to the European movements but to Monnet’s realistic objectives. Talking about Monnet’s relationship with the European movement, Dinan writes that “almost alone among influential Europeans at the time, Monnet stood aloof from the European movement and from the Council of Europe that emerged from it”¹¹⁴. Monnet’s stance was due not to “doubts about European unity but to disdain for the populism of the movement and its constituent parts”¹¹⁵. Dinan suggests that Monnet’s realism encouraged him to pursue a different path, which led to specific objectives that could be achieved only with the

¹¹⁰ Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, xii

¹¹² Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*, 18-19.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

support of powerful politicians¹¹⁶. Convinced that structural integration was the key to European integration, “Monnet devoted his considerable energy to drafting the French Modernization Plan”¹¹⁷, that was “an indispensable component of Monnet’s strategy for European integration”¹¹⁸.

But, as the new policy pursued by the Allies on Germany endangered the Modernization Plan itself, Monnet needed to respond. He was aware that “German economic rehabilitation, if it came before full implementation of the Monnet Plan, would greatly imperil France’s economic fortunes and, by extension, France’s international stature”¹¹⁹. The lifting of the restrictions on German coal and steel production jeopardized the Modernization Plan since “Monnet had predicated his plan for French economic modernization upon a punitive policy toward Germany”¹²⁰. Monnet was directly concerned by this challenge as he was both the architect of the plan and the one responsible for its success or failure¹²¹.

A pragmatic soul, Monnet quickly evaluated the situation and sold to Schuman the idea of pooling French and German coal and steel, “capitalizing on the growing sentiment in the official French circles that policy toward Germany should in the future be based on economic association rather than antagonism”¹²². Here, Dinan seems to imply, like Milward before him, that the Schuman Plan was designed in order to save the Monnet Plan. Dinan suggests that this atmosphere was the result of the US and British policy of loosening pressure on Germany in order to bring it onto their side in the Cold War confrontation. Thus, in the second half of 1949 “French officials gradually grasped the fact that policy toward Germany would have to be revised, not least in order to salvage the all-important and closely related Modernization Plan”¹²³.

The attitude of the French policymakers made it easier for Monnet to sell his plan to key policymakers who could ensure its application. It is at this point, according to Dinan, that the state enters the scene as the main actor called on to follow up on Monnet’s initiative. The same realistic vision, which inspired Monnet, persuaded key statesmen like Schuman and Adenauer to accept and support the project. Dinan introduces another key actor, which, in his account, contributed decisively to the outcome, namely the US, which signed up to the plan because of its realistic economic and security objectives in the area but also its vision “of a grand design for remaking the Old World in the likeness of the New”¹²⁴.

Adopting a realistic approach, Dinan, like Milward, attributes the key role to the state and its pragmatic objectives when explaining the origins of European integration. Despite the

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 19.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 19.

¹²¹ Ibid., 20-21.

¹²² Ibid., 21.

¹²³ Ibid., 20.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 17.

different perspective, focusing more on political and security reasons, Dinan's views coincide with Milward's when it comes to the main actor that drove integration forward. Dinan also disassociates Monnet from the European movements, showing that he was not interested in the actions of these intellectual groups and arguing that his plan had nothing in common with the concepts advocated by the federalist movements. When examining the origins of the Schuman Plan, Dinan argues that pragmatic objectives motivated Monnet to develop his project for Franco-German association. This contradicts both the federalists, who saw it as just another plan generated by the European movement, and Milward's revisionist view that the plan was the outcome of the policy pursued by the French government during the preceding years.

Fundamental questions on the origins of European integration, dealing with the origins of the Schuman Plan and the factors that ensured its success, have received manifold answers over the years. Three schools of thought seem to dominate the debate: the federalist (which saw the outcome of the 1950 plan as a triumph after centuries of fighting for European unity); the revisionist (which considered that pragmatic economic reasons drove European leaders to pursue European integration); and the realist (which focused on the political and security motivations of the Western European nation states).

While the federalist trend can be seen as an entirely separate approach to the subject, Dinan's and Milward's views converge in focusing on the pragmatism of the European policymakers involved. According to Piers N. Ludlow, the last two approaches "shared two important assumptions"¹²⁵. The first was that the main actors in the process were the states, that "it was through the actions of the governments of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Britain that the emergence of the ECSC and the EEC could be best explained"¹²⁶. The second downplayed the idealism of the main actors involved, underlining "the vital importance of head-calculation"¹²⁷ of those involved in the negotiating process, who were driven not by idealist feelings but by national political, economic and social interests. Indeed Ludlow's conclusion that "Milward's striking title *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* could in essence apply to either school"¹²⁸ sums up this point very well.

1.2. The Origins of European Integration: An Alternative Approach

Although all three schools of thought address, to differing degrees, the two main questions of this study, their answers fall short when explaining important aspects related to the 1950 plan. For example, Monnet's thinking behind the 1950 plan and its roots does not receive the requisite attention. In addition, when examining the factors that contributed to the success of the Schuman Plan, the explanations of all schools seem to agree in giving full credit to the state, as an international actor, and its representatives.

¹²⁵ Ludlow, "History Aplenty", 16.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 17.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

The following pages will assess the approach of the three schools of thought to these key aspects of the early history of European integration, namely the origins of the plan and the factors that ensured its success.

1.2.1. The Origins of the Schuman Plan: A Critical View

When tackling the question of the origins of the Schuman Plan, as mentioned before, the opinions of the three schools collide. While federalists see it as the result of activity linked to federalist thought, Dinan and Milward take a more realist approach, viewing it as the product of a cost-and-benefit calculation by statesmen grounded in post-war realities. However, Monnet's thinking, as the originator of the Schuman Declaration, is either ignored or not examined in depth because it does not seem to fit with the narrative of these schools of thought.

For example, the main representative of the federalist trend, Lipgens does not pay particular attention to Monnet's project, mentioning that "our survey will not include the Schuman Plan, still less the beginning of government negotiations over the treaty which founded the ECSC (...)"¹²⁹ because, according to him, by that time: 1. "the movement for European unity had taken shape"¹³⁰ and "nothing of any substance was added to this after 1950"¹³¹; and 2. "the concepts of European unity had by this time achieved recognition within the official channels of public opinion, the political parties; and, as a result of interaction between the pro-European pressure groups 'from below' and stimulating effect on governments of international events 'from above' (...) the first moves were made towards integration"¹³². Thus, the German historian assumes that the Schuman Plan, and as a consequence Monnet's thinking, does not deserve particular attention since it was nothing more than the result of the activity of the European movement. In a similar vein, Derek W. Urwin, talking about the Schuman Plan, considered that "there was, in fact, nothing particularly novel about the proposal"¹³³ given that "the choice of industries and the scheme itself had been partly influenced by two recent publications, one emanating from the Assembly of the Council of Europe and the other from the UN Economic Commission for Europe"¹³⁴.

However, if we look more closely at Monnet's view of the movement for European unity and the content of his plan, we discover that he had little affinity with their methods and thought. The activity of the federalist movements did not interest him much. For example, he makes it clear in his memoirs that he was not interested in the Hague Congress: "I confess that I paid little attention to the Hague Congress [and] the fate of its enthusiastic resolutions, which a year later led to the founding of the Council of Europe, confirmed my belief that this approach would lead nowhere"¹³⁵. He not only disagreed

¹²⁹ Dinan, "The Historiography", 88.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 44.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*. Translated by Richard Mayne (New York: Garden City, 1978), 273.

with the method used but also with the concepts around which the 600 delegates gathered in the Dutch city with the aim of establishing a federated Europe. He was convinced that Europe needed a pragmatic plan to respond to post-war economic needs; not a project based on idealistic principles. He was very aware of the need for change in Europe and cooperation between European states, but did not believe they could be based on abstract principles.

Indeed, if we look at the content of Monnet's 1950 plan, we see that it was in essence completely different from the idealist project advocated over the centuries by the European intelligentsia. For example, the Frenchman used the method of sectoral economic integration, while the federalist project aspired to the federalization of Europe on the basis of supranational political institutions at European level. This is why the institutional arrangement proposed by the Schuman Plan differed fundamentally from that advocated by the federalist movements. Furthermore, Monnet's plan was based on principles that were completely new for Europe, such as antitrust and unhindered competition supervised by an all-powerful supranational authority. Monnet's lack of interest in the projects for European unity in circulation and the content of his plan, which reflected a completely different thinking from that of European federalists, posed difficulties for Lipgens and other representatives of the federalists approach in terms of fitting Monnet's plan into the federalist projects.

The other more realistic historiographical approaches also attach little importance to the study of Monnet's thought. Although Milward's and Dinan's views differ when it comes to Monnet's role in the origins of the plan, one attaching little importance to it and the other considering it crucial, they do not spend too much time examining the concepts embodied in the 1950 proposal. Both of them seem to focus more on the reasons why the plan was drafted rather than the key ideas around which it was formulated.

Milward runs into problems when trying to explain Monnet's thinking and his role in the establishment of the ECSC. While accusing federalists of not providing plausible explanations of the mechanism through which the federalists concepts were passed on to the governments¹³⁶, as well as their inability to explain Monnet's realism and the fact that he was not part of the European movement, but a member of the national administration, together with the other father of Europe, Schuman¹³⁷, Milward himself leaves unexplored some fundamental areas. For example, he almost entirely ignores the role played by the originator of the plan himself because it does not seem to fit his argument. As a result, he leaves unanswered fundamental questions such as: How did Monnet come up with the plan? In which ways did national bureaucracies influence Monnet in drafting a plan to save the French economy and ensure Western European cooperation? These are key questions since, if we apply Milward's reasoning that the projects of European integration – be they the ECSC plan, the CAP or the Common Market – were merely the product of national administrations trying to deal with particular economic dilemmas, we could conclude that the projects came from within the national bureaucracies and not

¹³⁶ Milward, *The Reconstruction*, 499.

¹³⁷ Milward, *The European Rescue*, 16.

from outside. Yet nobody can deny Monnet's chief role in drawing up the document that laid the foundations for post-war Western European cooperation.

Here Milward's story becomes blurry. While accepting that national bureaucracies were driven by realistic economic objectives, such as the need to cooperate in order to survive the post-war realities, Milward does not explain how Monnet came up with his plan. In the end, it was not the French national administration which drafted the plan but Monnet himself, a matter which cannot be denied even by Milward. Also, even though Monnet was, at that point, part of the French administration, Milward cannot provide evidence that the concepts embodied in the Schuman Plan were circulating within that administration. Furthermore, he does not address the issue of the origins of the entirely novel concepts in the Schuman Plan, such as antitrust and unhindered competition.

The strategy adopted by the British historian is to downplay Monnet's role by assimilating him with what he calls the "European saints"¹³⁸ who, according to his account, had only a limited role in the process of early European integration. By mixing Monnet with this blend of people, which included Adenauer, de Gasperi, Schuman and Spaak, who, although they played a role in the subsequent Paris Treaty negotiations, made no contribution whatsoever to the elaboration of the Schuman Plan, Milward also understates the role of the architect of the plan. More than this, in line with his argument that the national bureaucracies produced the plans for European economic cooperation (such as the ECSC and the EEC plans) in order to cope with the post-war realities, Milward argues that others played the prime role in the process. Civil servants, such as the Dutchmen, Johan Beyen and Dirk Stikker, and the Belgians, Achille van Acker, Albert Coppé and Paul van Zeeland, made a more important contribution to the process of European economic cooperation, including the creation of the EEC, in Milward's view than the heroes of the federalist approach. While this might be true when it comes to the subsequent stages of European integration that followed the signature of the Treaty of Paris in 1951, Monnet's role in creating the Schuman Plan cannot be denied. In fact, by downplaying Monnet's contribution and assigning the chief role to national bureaucracy, the British historian runs into a dead-end. Exactly like the federalists before him, he cannot explain the mechanism by which the bureaucrats passed on the entirely novel concepts embodied in the Schuman Plan (such as, antitrust and unhindered competition) to Monnet before he drafted the plan, unless Monnet (as part of the French bureaucracy) became aware of the importance of these concepts by himself.

Unlike Milward, Dinan gives Monnet the major role in the conception of the plan. For the Irish historian the plan was designed to respond to the new international approach of giving more and more economic and military autonomy to Germany, a fact which deeply worried French officials. Equally, the plan embodied Monnet's serious concern that his project to modernize the French economy, based on an entirely subordinated Germany, would be endangered. Yet, Dinan also fails to examine the key concepts of the plan and their origins. In fact, as mentioned before, he pays more attention to the motivations behind the drafting of the plan than to its substance. While stating that Monnet's thinking had little in common with the federalist movements, Dinan does not seem to provide an

¹³⁸ Ibid., 319.

alternative explanation as to the nature and the origins of the concepts embodied in Monnet's 1950 project.

The three schools of thought have provided contradictory explanations of the origins of the Schuman Plan. While federalists looked for its roots in a distant historical past, arguing for the continuity of the European idea, Dinan and Milward focused chiefly on concrete post-war realities in order to justify their side of the story. The federalists do not see much originality in the plan and consider it as just one more attempt to unite and federate Europe. Milward attributes it to the genius of concrete governmental politics, while Dinan praises Monnet's skill and capacity to correctly interpret and respond to the post-war realities. However, none of the representatives of these different interpretations investigates in detail the originator's thinking and the key concepts included in the Schuman Plan which made it original and to a great extent secured its success.

Considering the state of the literature, a more in-depth investigation of the thinking of Monnet, considered by many a unique player in the international and domestic arena at the time, is needed. For this purpose, a number of questions will guide this inquiry: *Which concepts attracted Monnet? What ideas commanded Monnet's allegiance? Who influenced Monnet's thinking? Which philosophy was embodied in the Schuman Plan?*

1.2.2. State-Centric Views

Anyone who tries to identify in the literature the key factor that was seen as contributing to the fulfilment of the Schuman Plan will discover that the state was at the centre of the process. Despite differences, the three schools of thought in general adopt a state-centric view, attributing to the state and its representatives, albeit to varying degrees, the chief role in the implementation of the Schuman Plan.

For federalists, without the states and their representatives nothing would have been achieved. While intellectuals had an important role in their view, namely to define the European integration project and to keep alive the ideal, it was the statesmen who made it possible in the early 1950s. Until the interbellum, the high ideal of European unity was consigned to restrained and powerless circles of intellectuals. In their view, the interwar period was the first missed opportunity, when the reluctance of key statesmen made it impossible to fulfil the objectives of European Union projects such as the Briand Plan. It was only after the Second World War when the state became a cooperative player and, according to the federalist narrative, its representatives finally realised the importance of European cooperation. The statesmen's conversion to the cause of European integration represented the key instance of this process. Here the representatives of this trend display varying degrees of idealism. Brugmans, and even Lipgens, emphasise the idealist conviction of statesmen such as Schuman and Adenauer, who themselves believed in European integration and had their personal plans for European unity. Bitsch, Gerbet and Urwin accentuate more the practical motivations of policymakers – economic and security reasons – which drove them to support the Schuman Plan. As, according to the

federalist narrative, state representatives did not intervene during the formulation of the idea but only in the second stage, it can be argued that the federalist approach is only partially state-centric.

Yet, the state did not play a positive role for a long time. The federalists soon complained about its incapacity to fulfil its calling. Soon enough after the creation of the ECSC, the statesmen withdrew their support for the cause of European integration. This is the reason why, immediately after the signature of the Paris Treaty in 1951, the federalists started complaining that integration was not progressing as it should and that this was the fault solely of the state. Adopting a functionalist view of the process of European integration, federalists blamed the state and its stubborn representatives for the failures of the post-1951 attempts at European integration.

The state's role became even more prominent in Milward's view given that, as he argued in his two works mentioned above, the state was both the generator and the implementer of the plan. Since the state generated the plan for its own advantage – to respond to the post-war economic realities – its implementation was certain. According to Milward's view, the outcome of the Schuman Plan can be attributed to no other force than the state and its representatives.

Dinan, in his turn, makes the distinction between the author of the plan and those who contributed to its implementation. For him, the Schuman Plan was solely the product of Monnet's genius in responding to the problems faced both by France (forced to cope with Germany's remilitarization) and himself personally (since he needed to redesign his project to modernize France by taking into account a more economically autonomous Germany). Motivated by the new international context, French policymakers adopted Monnet's 1950 plan. According to Dinan, other states saw practical advantages in the scheme and added their support: Germany, driven by the desire to regain equality on the international scene, and the US, which, in the context of the Cold War, was searching for strong allies and supported the re-militarization and re-industrialization of West Germany. As a result, according to Dinan, the state was the main actor in the implementation of the Schuman Plan.

While acknowledging the chief role played by the state, Dinan brings into the equation a supplementary factor that, in his view, made possible the implementation of the Schuman Plan. He considers that Monnet's strong US connections¹³⁹ not only ensured the plan was well received but also positively influenced the outcome of the Schuman Plan negotiations. Dinan is not the only one to recognise Monnet's strong transatlantic relationships. Even Milward acknowledges that Monnet's "power and influence were derived not from elections and votes but from close and carefully cultivated relationships, particularly with a small group of bankers and lawyers in Wall Street and Washington who become prominent politicians"¹⁴⁰. Tomas Schwarz also mentions the Frenchman's friendship with prominent US players, even claiming that, because of his strong ties with such individuals, Monnet's actions "conformed to Washington's interest, not to those of

¹³⁹ Dinan, *Europe Recast*, 38.

¹⁴⁰ Milward, *The European Rescue*, 333.

Paris”¹⁴¹. In Dinan’s view, these relationships helped Monnet to achieve his goals on several occasions. For example, Dinan mentions that Monnet consulted Acheson and McCloy before the Schuman Plan was made public because “US support was too crucial to have been left to chance”¹⁴². Thus, when examining the factors that contributed to the success of the Schuman Plan, Dinan stresses that Monnet’s US connections played an important role. This was because other states were more likely to accept the Frenchman’s plan once it had the support of key US players. Yet, Monnet’s relationship with these US actors is regarded as nothing more than a set of connections that made a partial contribution to this outcome.

Despite small nuances, the state is seen to be at the centre of the early process of European integration. While its role in the process of establishing the first European common organisation is well established in the literature, a number of questions arise: *Was the state the sole actor in this process? What role did it play and to what extent can the outcome be attributed to the states and statesmen alone?*

1.3. An Alternative to the State-Centric Approach

The issues discussed in the previous sections derive from the fact that the authors representing the three trends of the historiography of European integration focus on the state as the main actor in the process and the force that made possible the establishment of the ECSC. For federalists, European integration was delayed only because the state was not ready to respond to the call of intellectuals. For Dinan and Milward, integration was possible in the post-Second World War age because the states considered it the best tool to respond to the economic and security challenges of that time.

Because of this focus on the state, the role of other factors, such as the personal contribution of a number of players, has been neglected. For example, the genesis of the Schuman Plan and the thought of its initiator – Jean Monnet – have either been almost entirely ignored (as in the case of federalists) or insufficiently explored (as in the case of Dinan and Milward). Although the representatives of the federalist trend highlight the contribution of the federalist intellectuals in the genesis of the idea of European integration, there is no evidence that Monnet was influenced by these groups, as discussed above and as will be discussed in more detail in a following chapter. In addition, the state interests manifested after the announcement of the Schuman Declaration and during the ECSC Treaty negotiations have received the full attention of the authors representing the three trends. According to Dinan and Milward (who adopt a realist interpretation), but also Bitsch, Gerbet and Urwin (who, even though they favour a federalist interpretation, stress the realistic interests of the states), the interplay of national interests made possible the outcome of the Schuman Plan.

¹⁴¹ Thomas Alan Schwartz. *America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 96.

¹⁴² Dinan, *Europe Recast*, 39.

The primacy of the state within the historiography of early European integration seems to have remained almost entirely unchallenged. If we look at a neighbouring field of research, namely International Relations, the same state of affairs existed until the early 1970s, when Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Robert O. Keohane observed that “the classic state-centric paradigm assumes that states are the only significant actors in world politics and that they act as units”¹⁴³. Furthermore, they stressed that “intersocietal interactions are relegated to a category of secondary importance”¹⁴⁴. Nye and Keohane reacted to this situation and attempted to demonstrate that the state is not the sole actor on the world political scene. In their conclusion to the special issue of *International Organization*, they argue that transnational relations “affect interstate politics by altering the choices open to statesmen and the costs that must be borne for adopting various courses of action”¹⁴⁵. Yet, they do not claim that “states are obsolete”¹⁴⁶ or that that transnational relations “supersede interstate politics”¹⁴⁷. Therefore, while they recognise that the state has played and will continue to play an important role in international affairs, Nye and Keohane emphasise that other factors, particularly transnational relations, have to be taken into account when examining international interactions. They claim that their suggested model is more comprehensive and “includes transnational, transgovernmental, and interstate interactions”¹⁴⁸.

For Nye and Keohane “the broad term transnational relations includes both transnational and transgovernmental interactions – all of world politics that is not taken into account by the state-centric paradigm”¹⁴⁹. As a result, in their view, both governmental and non-governmental actors should be considered as relevant players in international affairs since “any unit of action that attempts to exercise influence across state boundaries and possesses significant resources in a given issue area is an actor in world politics”¹⁵⁰. Thus, transnational organisations, such as the Roman Catholic Church or the Ford Foundation, but especially multinational businesses, which are “by far the most important of these organizations,”¹⁵¹ are influential forces in world politics. Referring to the governmental actors, Nye and Keohane claim that they do not always act completely in unison given that “subunits of governments may also have distinct foreign policies which are not all filtered through the top leadership and which do not fit into a unitary actor model”¹⁵². This is the reason why they talk about the importance of transgovernmental interactions, “defined as interactions between governmental subunits across state boundaries”¹⁵³.

¹⁴³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion,” *International Organization*, 25, no. 3, “Transnational Relations and World Politics” (Summer, 1971): 721.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 724-725.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 748.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 724.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 748.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 733.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 727.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 731.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 733.

Hence with the publication of Nye's and Keohane's study on translational relations in the first half of the 1970s, the solid ground of the state-centric approaches began to shake as the impact of actors other than the state became relevant when examining international cooperation. It has become more and more customary in the field of international relations to accept their claim that "transnational actors sometimes prevail over governments"¹⁵⁴. Two decades later Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas refined and developed this theory, arguing that transnational groups of experts, called "epistemic communities," shape the vision of policymakers and alter their options and choices¹⁵⁵. Such transnational networks are considered by these authors "less a 'new' international actor or unit of analysis than they are a vehicle for the development of insightful theoretical premises about the creation of collective interpretation and choice"¹⁵⁶. Therefore, societal actors contribute to the shaping of the policy preferences of statesmen and, as a result, they should be considered when analysing contemporary world politics.

In Haas' words, an epistemic community is "a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area"¹⁵⁷. He argues that this notion of an expert group "resembles [Ludwig] Fleck's notion of a 'thought collective' – a sociological group with a common style of thinking"¹⁵⁸. Haas adopted this term, which had been used most frequently to describe scientific communities, and expanded its definition to include experts from various fields sharing: "(1) a set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) notions of validity- that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence"¹⁵⁹.

Haas stresses that the importance of such an elite group, linked together by a common belief, is that it helps states identify their interests, proposing specific solutions and policies to an ongoing crisis. This is why he underlines that "epistemic communities are channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country"¹⁶⁰. Thus, he assigns a special place to communities of influential people in the process of international policy cooperation. Although, like Nye

¹⁵⁴ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 386.

¹⁵⁵ Adler and Haas, "Conclusion".

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 368.

¹⁵⁷ Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination". *International Organization* 46, no. 1, "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination" (Winter, 1992): 3.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 3, footnote 4.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 27.

and Keohane, Haas and Adler recognise that “the state remains the authoritative source of policymaking,”¹⁶¹ they argue that state-centric approaches cannot sufficiently explain the policy choices of statesmen and that the action of transnational networks should be taken into account. Given the current predominance of state-centric approaches within the historiography of early European integration, the paradigms suggested by Nye and Keohane, and later on by Adler and Haas, might prove useful for the purpose of this work.

In the present narratives, statesmen are at the centre of the early European integration process. Yet, only by examining the literature, one realises that this was not an exclusively state affair. People who refused to see themselves as part of a particular national administration – Monnet being the best example – made a decisive contribution in the initial stages of European integration. First and foremost, by designing an entirely original project that took the world by surprise mostly in terms of its boldness and timing. Secondly, by the fact that Monnet and a number of his associates contributed to different degrees to the outcome.

Considering Monnet’s and his associates’ contribution, this study will focus precisely on those aspects which, although mentioned in passing in the literature, have not sufficiently been explored or rather have been neglected. Tracing the core idea of the Schuman Plan and identifying Monnet’s source of inspiration is of fundamental importance. The hypothesis put forward by this study is that the origin of the Schuman Plan idea is much more complex than presented by the federalists, who focus on the philosophical concept and idealism, and Milward, who assigns primary importance to national administrations.

Monnet’s source of inspiration should not be searched in philosophical works popularizing European unity. Rather one should look closer to his associates’ thinking and try to identify concepts that might have been appealing to Monnet. In the same time the clarification of the origins of the idea could also contribute to a better understanding as to why Monnet’s friends provided their full support to the project. An additional aspect of the hypothesis is that this endorsement was very likely not only due their acquaintance with Monnet or the fulfilment of perceived political objectives, but to more profound causes than the one mentioned until now in the literature. Shared worldviews or ideas might have contributed also to the decision of Monnet’s associates to enlist themselves as supporters of the plan and to persuade states’ representatives to accept it.

Thanks to their persuasiveness state interests were modified and, it could even be argued that they evolved in the direction sought by Monnet and his close friends. The formation of states interests in this particular instance did not seem to be only the result of their inner force or, in other words, of the interests pursued by their administrations. Their key preferences were shaped during that time by people who gathered around Monnet’s idea. Thus, rather than concentrating almost exclusively on the state, this study aims to look at the event through different interpretative lenses and attempt to situate the key actors in their respective cultural, social and political environments.

¹⁶¹ Adler and Haas, “Conclusion”, 389.

The premise of this hypothesis is based on the character of originator of the Schuman Plan himself, Jean Monnet, a man who never held elected office and was averse to being part of a state administration. However, he gave his views to policymakers before a particular course of action was decided and he was present countless times when important decisions on world affairs were taken. For example, there were numerous occasions when French statesmen turned to Jean Monnet for counsel on specific economic, financial, military or diplomatic matters. Monnet was called on to sketch out a plan to reorganise the post-war French economy and also to use his expertise in Washington when the Blum government negotiated a US loan. Furthermore, the officials in Paris were not the only ones interested in his services. In the early 1940s, a ‘chameleon-Monnet,’ acting in Washington as a member of the British Supply Council, was sent by President Roosevelt to Algiers to mediate in the dispute between Charles de Gaulle and General Henri Giraud, and returned to Washington as a member of the French National Liberation Committee. In all these cases Monnet did not act alone but, as he recognised many times, relied on a small group of close friends. As we will see, these friends, like Monnet, although they avoided being part of national administrations, were regularly consulted by policymakers in times of crisis and, in general, before important decisions were taken. Therefore, it is possible that this exchange of ideas between the members of this group of friends and policymakers represents a pattern that could help elucidate the origins of post-war European integration.

The following pages will investigate, on the one hand, the genesis of the Schuman Plan and, more specifically, the origins of the concepts that were the foundations of the project, and, on the other hand, the process through which state preferences were shaped at this particular moment. Here we come back to the original questions of this study: 1. *What philosophy was embodied in the Schuman Plan? Which ideas commanded Monnet’s allegiance? Who influenced Monnet’s thinking?* and 2. *Was the state the sole player that made possible the creation of the first supranational European organisation – the ECSC? If not, what other players and other factors contributed to this outcome?*

In this attempt to elucidate the reasons for the transformation of state interests under the influence of external actors, Haas’ epistemic community approach will be employed as it seems to be both a useful and promising framework for the purpose of this inquiry given Monnet’s unorthodox methods and his wide-ranging connections across national frontiers. By using Haas’ epistemic community approach to study the origins of European integration, this work aims to clarify a number of questions, mentioned earlier, which so far have received unsatisfactory answers in the literature. As Haas argues, in times of crisis, experts can help states identify their interests by unveiling the issues for debate in the area of international cooperation.

This study will investigate if experts did indeed offer solutions to post-1945 European leaders at a time when states were looking for the best way to overcome the political and economic deadlock. The study’s structure is based on the framework suggested by Haas in his work on epistemic communities, focusing on “identifying community membership determining the community members’ principled and casual beliefs, tracing their

activities and demonstrating their influence on decision makers at various points in time, identifying alternative credible outcomes that were foreclosed as a result of their influence, and exploring alternative explanations for their actions of decisions makers”¹⁶². First, it will identify the members of Monnet’s circle of friends and define the nature of their relationship. Second, it will investigate their thought and the concepts in circulation, which could have influenced Monnet when he drew up his 1950 plan. Third, it will examine to what extent this group of people, which was consulted on numerous occasions by policymakers, shaped the ideas of policymakers by passing on their beliefs and by following them up. Finally, the conclusion will come back to the issues raised in this chapter and will assess to what degree actors other than the state contributed to the genesis and implementation of the Schuman Plan.

Chapter 2: Monnet’s Transatlantic Group of Friends

The idea at the basis of the ECSC did not appear as an instantaneous revelation nor was it by any means the result of a short personal brainstorming as suggested by Monnet’s memoirs. It is very likely that the originator drew his inspiration from various concepts he encountered during his life that left a profound influence on him. There have already been some attempts in the literature to identify those ideas that attracted the attention of the originator of the plan.

As already mentioned, federalists argued that Monnet’s source of inspiration was the philosophical projects promoting European unity. The idea of creating the “United States of Europe,” based on the United States federal model, has been one of the most obvious concepts identified. It is also one of the most commonly used concepts in practice by the grass-roots when trying to explain the origins of European integration. Others have tried to refine the argument of North American inspiration. Considering Monnet’s experience in interwar North America, John Gillingham identified common ground between the Schuman Plan and the New Deal concepts¹⁶³. Furthermore, Gillingham¹⁶⁴ as well as Clifford A. Jones¹⁶⁵ and to some degree Volker Berghahn¹⁶⁶ proposed the US antitrust tradition as another source of inspiration for Monnet. At his turn, Trygve Ugland puts emphasis on Monnet’s Canadian experience, highlighting the importance of Canadian social and economic model.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶² Haas, “Introduction”, 34.

¹⁶³ John Gillingham, “Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community: A Preliminary Appraisal” in *Jean Monnet*, ed. Brinkley and Hackett, 139.

¹⁶⁴ John Gillingham, “American Monnetism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the fifties,” *Journal of European Integration History* 1, no. 1 (1995): 22.

¹⁶⁵ Clifford A. Jones, “Foundation of Competition Policy in the EU and USA: Conflict, Convergence and Beyond” in *The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which Competition?* ed. Hanns Ullrich (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar, 2006), 26.

¹⁶⁶ Volker R. Berghahn, *The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973* (New York: Berg, 1986), 144.

¹⁶⁷ Trygve Ugland, *Jean Monnet and Canada*. preface, para 4.

While some of these explanations undoubtedly have value, they do not manage to put together the jigsaw of origins of the Schuman Plan. As many studies highlight Monnet's attraction to North American concepts, more work needs to be done in this direction, namely to isolate which ideas in circulation during Monnet's extensive stays there attracted, influenced and convinced him to include them in the coal and steel plan. This is why focusing on Monnet's North American connections and, more specifically, his close friends could help unveil some of the ideas he was exposed to and that attracted his interest. In addition to providing an explanation on the origins of the Schuman Plan, this investigation could also offer a more in-depth understanding of the actions pursued by a number of Monnet's friends once the 1950 plan was presented to the public.

Thus, this chapter concentrates on a number of aspects of Monnet's life trying to answer the following questions: *Who was Jean Monnet? Who were his friends? What was their relationship with Monnet and each other?* These are fundamental questions for the purpose of this investigation since answering them will help clarify not only the personality of the originator of the Schuman Plan but also that of his associates whom, as will be discussed in the next pages, he constantly consulted before taking important decisions.

Jean Monnet was a man who did not like labels. His life is the best example of that. The son of a famous French cognac producer, he refused to attend university dedicating his early youth to learning the art of business. At the age of about 30 he began his international career as an expert in diplomatic and financial matters, when he became deputy secretary general and financial advisor of the League of Nations (in 1919). Four years later he returned to his family business that he managed to save from bankruptcy. This was a turning point in his life since as a result of his wholesale trade of his brandy in the US and Canada he established contacts with key players of the New World. After this point in time, the US became the centre of his activity for years to come. Both in Washington and New York he engaged in financial transactions firstly with Blair Investment Bank. In this capacity he was involved in various financial endeavours, including providing the Romanian and Polish governments with important loans that kept afloat their economies. The financial crash of the late 1920s seriously affected Monnet who, according to Frederich J. Fransen who is quoting George Ball, "may have lost as much as \$5 million overnight"¹⁶⁸. This episode did not discourage him from continuing his activity in the financial sector throughout most of the 1930s.

The end of the 1930s marked a switch in his career, since the Frenchman turned towards advising governments, a position that put him, on numerous occasions, in odd situations. When travelling to the US as Vice-President of the British Supply Council, when the airplane stopped in Bermuda, a British customs officer to whom Monnet showed the mission order signed by Churchill, exclaimed: "it just doesn't make sense (...) for a Frenchman to hold a British job at this point"¹⁶⁹. After acting as Roosevelt's envoy to North Africa, Monnet returned to France and finally put his skills to the service of the French government.

¹⁶⁸ Fransen, *The Supranational Politics*, 17.

¹⁶⁹ Monnet. *Mémoires*, 179.

Despite the wide range of Monnet's jobs, most of them were peculiar and involved a great degree of independence. In many respects they entailed novel tasks and, in many cases, were specially created for him. This is the reason why it is extremely difficult to attach a particular label to him. Businessman, financial and economic advisor, diplomat, banker, political economist are some of those attached to him in the literature. He also received more pretentious titles, such as "unconventional statesman"¹⁷⁰ or "the first statesman of interdependence"¹⁷¹. A unique character who did not seem to enjoy walking along the same old paths and liked not only looking at things from a different angle but also imagining new ways of doing old things.

Jean Monnet is portrayed in the literature as part of a transnational group whose centre of interests gravitated around the US¹⁷². Despite this, there has been little investigation of the origins and development of this transnational circle of friends and Monnet's position within it. What brought these people together? How did Monnet become a member of this group? What were the shared characteristics of this group of people?

Various studies analysing Jean Monnet's personal connections have emphasised the importance he attached to individual relationships. Monnet's head of private office, both at the French National Planning Board (1946–1952) and at the High Authority of the ECSC (1952–1953), Jacques-René Rabier, qualified this description by saying that Monnet "did not belong to a network: he had his own network"¹⁷³. He believed it was worth investing in personal relationships. He cultivated strong friendships industriously knowing that, as in business, in the international arena a friendship could pay off. This does not mean that he maintained and developed these friendships only out of strategic interest. In fact, Monnet's personal and business friendships were intertwined. As many accounts show, he genuinely enjoyed the company of his friends and took every opportunity to meet with them and exchange ideas.

Monnet often gave the impression that he knew everybody, but in fact he had very few friends¹⁷⁴ he trusted, met and consulted regularly. In conducting his activities across borders, Monnet managed to establish numerous personal connections, most of them across the Atlantic. Still, as George W. Ball underlined, "he got along just as well with the British, probably better than he did with the French in many ways"¹⁷⁵. Indeed,

¹⁷⁰ Sherill Brown Wells, *Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman* (Lynne Rienner Publishers; 2011).

¹⁷¹ Duchêne, *Jean Monnet*.

¹⁷² Milward, *The European Rescue*; Dinan, *Europe Recast*; Urwin, *The Community of Europe*; Schwartz, *America's Germany*; John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe 1945-1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community* (Cambridge [England] and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Peter M. R. Stirk, *A History of European Integration since 1914* (London: Pinter, 1996); Roussel, *Jean Monnet*.

¹⁷³ Interview with Jacques-René Rabier: the origins of the Schuman Declaration by Étienne Deschamps, (Luxembourg, 8 February, 2002), Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe, <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/ebd44d0e-c5ad-4b7f-9ce5-b1f1406c00e7/7896515b-4e93-454a-9faf-603d5548ece4/en;jsessionid=DEFF53C5EE85ACC791FDE51B55685EF2> (accessed 8 January 2012).

¹⁷⁴ Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, 109.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with George W. Ball by Leonard Tennyson for the Jean Monnet Foundation, 15 July 1981, New York City, FJM., Lausanne, 2.

national loyalties were secondary for Monnet as he demonstrated on many occasions. As John J. McCloy told Felix Frankfurter, Monnet's "national loyalties (...) are unimportant whatever they are, I know you can depend on his loyalty to the main task"¹⁷⁶.

Despite his extensive connections in various countries, Monnet was best known for his US links. A number of works were dedicated to this aspect of his personality. Clifford Hackett's *Monnet and the Americans: The Father of a United Europe and his US Supporters*¹⁷⁷ comprises a collection of essays examining Monnet's relationship with various prominent US actors, including Dean Acheson, George Ball, Robert Bowie, John Foster Dulles, John Jay McCloy, Robert Nathan, Robert J. Schaetzel, William Tomlinson, members of the Roosevelt administration, including President Roosevelt himself and Harry Hopkins. Similarly, the European University Institute of Florence, George Washington University, and the Jean Monnet Foundation (Lausanne) organised an ambitious research project called *Jean Monnet American Sources* to bring together photocopied excerpts from various US archives relating to Monnet's US connections¹⁷⁸. The result was an impressive collection of photocopied papers documenting Monnet's links to numerous influential US players, such as: Dean Acheson, Joseph Alsop, George Ball, William Clayton, Oscar Cox, Allen W. Dulles, John Foster Dulles, James V. Forrestal, Felix Frankfurter, Averell Harriman, Harry L. Hopkins, John F. Kennedy, Walter Lippmann, Isador Lubin, John McCloy, Robert R. Nathan, and Shepard Stone. The aim of this remarkable endeavour, namely to demonstrate Monnet's strong North American links, was very likely achieved, since the collection demonstrates that he did indeed have wide connections across the Atlantic¹⁷⁹.

In fact, Monnet had a special relationship with a number of US players whom he trusted and consulted regularly. As George Ball wrote in his memoirs, "Monnet was addicted to the transatlantic telephone (in those days an exercise in masochism because voice transmission was solely by radio)"¹⁸⁰. A revealing episode happened when the draft of the French Modernization Plan (the so-called Monnet plan) was ready. When the director of the Bank of France, Emanuel Monick, wanted to show the draft to the government, Monnet exclaimed: "Not on your life! I have to talk it over first with the doorman at the Waldorf-Astoria"¹⁸¹. Monnet was of course referring to his prior consultations with his transatlantic friends since he was very much interested in hearing what his associates had to say.

¹⁷⁶ Thomas Alan Schwartz, "The Transnational Partnership: Jean Monnet and Jack McCloy" In *Monnet and the Americans: The Father of a United Europe and his US Supporters*, ed. Clifford P. Hackett (Washington DC: Jean Monnet Council, 1995), 174.

¹⁷⁷ Clifford P. Hackett, ed., *Monnet and the Americans: The Father of a United Europe and his US Supporters* (Washington DC: Jean Monnet Council, 1995).

¹⁷⁸ *Jean Monnet American Sources*, EUI, HAEU, Florence, March 2006, www.eui.eu/HAEU/pdfinv/inv-jmas.pdf (accessed 8 January 2012).

¹⁷⁹ These papers were accessed for the purpose of this study at the Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe, Lausanne.

¹⁸⁰ George W. Ball, *The Past*, 75.

¹⁸¹ Merry Bromberger and Serge Bromberger, *Jean Monnet and the United States of Europe* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1969), 48.

He felt compelled to consult his friends, as he confessed in a letter to Frankfurter in February 1948: “I am hoping that I shall be able to go to see you and my friends in Washington in the near future”¹⁸². He continued that he would “arrange [...] for a quiet visit without any specific task to perform, so as to give me a chance of talking with my friends and understanding what is happening in your great country”¹⁸³. Frankfurter responded that, after talking “with a few of your [Monnet’s] devoted friends (...) it is really absurd – almost wrong – for you [Monnet] to have been away from here all this time”¹⁸⁴. The Harvard Law professor underlined that Monnet should realise that a “smell of the American atmosphere, a sense of the forces that are, partly clearly and partly cloudily, at work, are indispensable to doing your job”¹⁸⁵. Of course this was only possible with the help of his close transatlantic associates, who were ready to offer him this essential information.

Given his US connections and since his power to influence decisions in Washington, where he was “a minor legend,”¹⁸⁶ was well-known, Monnet was accused countless times of putting US interests first, particularly by Charles de Gaulle, who had always considered Monnet an “American agent”¹⁸⁷. By the same token, Thomas Schwartz concluded that Monnet was “a man whose action conformed to Washington’s interests, not to those of Paris”¹⁸⁸. This observation could be considered extreme since it is difficult to find evidence that Monnet supported any action that was beneficial to the US and detrimental to France. Nevertheless, as Max Kohnstamm remarked in an interview, one thing is clear: his relationship with the US players was extremely “intimate”¹⁸⁹.

Monnet’s cultural affinity for the New World probably contributed to this sense of kinship. During his stays in the US, he became especially attracted to the North American way of life, based on expansion and entrepreneurship and endless opportunities¹⁹⁰. A revealing example is illustrated by the fact that, although Monnet did not spend much time reading books (an aspect to which we will return in another section of this thesis) as several accounts have indicated, he was seen carrying around de Tocqueville’s *America*, “which he must have had leather-bound himself”¹⁹¹. In many respects, Monnet was

¹⁸² Letter from Monnet to Frankfurter, Paris, 13 February 1948, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress (LoC), Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., Box 85, Reel 51.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Letter from Frankfurter to Monnet, 2 March 1948, Felix Frankfurter Papers, LoC, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., Box 85, Reel 51.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with George W. Ball, 15 July 1981, 2. “Marshall knew him [Monnet], because everyone in Washington knew this man Monnet. He was already such an influential figure around town and knew so many people” (Interview with John Jay McCloy by Leonard Tennyson for the Jean Monnet Foundation, 15 July 1981, New York City, FJM, Lausanne, 10).

¹⁸⁷ Schwartz, “The Transnational Partnership”, 179 and Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, 363 and 449.

¹⁸⁸ Schwartz, *America’s Germany*, 96.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Max Kohnstamm, 27 September 1984, Paris, published in Maria Grazia Melchionni and Roberto Ducci, *La genèse des traités de Rome : entretiens inédits avec 18 acteurs et témoins de la négociation* (Economica: Paris, 2007), 365.

¹⁹⁰ Monnet. *Memoirs*, 272.

¹⁹¹ Interview with Robert R. Bowie by Leonard Tennyson for the Jean Monnet Foundation, 15 June 1981, in Washington D.C., FJM, Lausanne, 20.

another Frenchman who explored and was impressed by the North American spirit just like Alexis de Tocqueville a century before him. His belief in the superiority of the North American cultural model, amplified by the political and economic influence of the US elites, also predisposed him to transatlantic friendships.

In fact, during his numerous stays in the US, the French businessman internalized numerous North American cultural values and habits¹⁹². As the Harvard professor Robert R. Bowie testified, Monnet was fascinated by North American food. According to Bowie, Max Kohnstamm, who travelled frequently with Monnet, said that he was always concerned about arriving at the restaurant before Monnet, because Monnet “would invariably order hamburgers, ordinary American-type hamburgers”¹⁹³ for both of them. Also, when going back to Europe, Monnet carried cases of V-8 juice or arranged to get them at a time when this product was not available in Europe¹⁹⁴.

Monnet’s transnational encounters predisposed him to various cultural models and influences. As his preferences demonstrate, he was inclined to assimilate many of the North American traits of character even though this triggered criticism and accusations by many. His business brought him closer to North America. However, the New World was more than a business terrain for him. It was an environment that made people think differently, where novelty was embraced and traditional hierarchies had been left behind. “No one thought about limits; no one knew where the frontier was”¹⁹⁵ wrote Monnet in his memoirs. This world and its mindset helped him “to get rid of the old atavistic suspicions which are so much pointless worry and a waste of time”¹⁹⁶. He was impressed by the trust cultivated among people, which he contrasted with the suspicion built up over centuries in Europe. A particular episode profoundly impressed Monnet. He tells the following story in his memoirs: “One day at Calgary, Canada, I wanted to visit some Scandinavian farmers. (...) I asked a blacksmith who was working in front of his forge what means of transport there were. Without stopping work he answered that there were none. ‘But’ he added, pointing to his horse ‘you can always take this animal. When you come back just hitch him up in the same place’. His confidence was perfectly natural and if I had shown him how surprised I was he would certainly have been hurt”¹⁹⁷. Monnet’s fascination for North America, which he always preached, played a very important role in his choice of partners.

This offers a partial answer to the question why most of Monnet’s close friends, whom he trusted and who put their confidence in him, were from the US. They included highly educated people, mostly lawyers who, at different stages of their career, became key players in the international arena. Given Monnet’s character, it did not take long for him to establish strong relationships with these people who favoured not only the

¹⁹² Fransen, *The Supranational Politics*, 13-14.

¹⁹³ Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 15 June 1981, 20.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ Monnet. *Mémoires*, 48.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

development of a strong mutual confidence but also a prodigious exchange of ideas. But how large was this group of people and who were these US actors?

2.1. Building Invisible Bridges across the Atlantic: Monnet and his Transatlantic Group of Friends

The group of people Monnet was part of was carefully meshed together to form an invisible and intricate web across national frontiers. Despite claims that he had numerous friends across the Atlantic, the circle of individuals he belonged to was not big. This reflected his philosophy that only a small group could ensure the success of a particular endeavour. A conversation between Monnet and Lilienthal reveals the Frenchman's view on this. When Lilienthal told Monnet his Persian projects would need the support of more people, the Frenchman did not agree saying that, "it is better to have just a few, I think. (...) If there were too many, there is a lot of talk but nothing gets done. If there are only a few, changes can be made"¹⁹⁸. This does not seem to have been an isolated remark to Lilienthal, who described in his journal Monnet's "eyes lighting up as they do when he hits on a point that touches on his fundamental philosophy"¹⁹⁹.

Although most of the authors who mention the importance of Monnet's US connections list numerous people as his close friends, a distinction needs to be made. In fact, this notion of "Monnet's US connections", which has repeatedly been used in the literature, needs clarification. Can a distinction be drawn between those described as Monnet's US friends? It can and must be, not only for the purpose of this research, but for the benefit of clarifying this notion.

As his activity attests, Monnet had continual contact with only a small number of US players. This is not to deny that, at various times, he collaborated and established strong relationships with many other transatlantic partners. Yet, it cannot be claimed that he was close friends with somebody just because he collaborated with them at a particular moment and afterwards maintained sporadic contact. There are numerous examples of this type of friendships. Monnet collaborated closely with Harry Hopkins and President Roosevelt in the second half of 1940 negotiating the purchase of US warplanes for the Allies. This cooperation continued in 1943 when the Frenchman reported regularly to them on the de Gaulle – Giraud relationship. After these episodes that will be dealt with in other parts of this study Monnet continued to cultivate a close relationship with the President and especially with his close advisor. Similarly, Monnet collaborated very closely with Robert Bowie, an envoy of John J. McCloy, during the drafting of the antitrust articles of the ECSC Treaty. They remained friends afterwards and even when Bowie returned to his academic life in Harvard, they met when they had the chance²⁰⁰.

¹⁹⁸ A journal of David Lilienthal, "Leaving Orly, heading for Teheran, Paris, 27 October 1961, 3pm," David E. Lilienthal Papers, 1961, Box 427, Folder Number: AM 19859, Series 15: Manuscript Journal, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Wyatt Wells, *Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 215.

An analysis of a number of primary sources, including correspondence between Monnet and various influential US actors²⁰¹, and publications on this aspect, shows that Monnet was particularly attached to several key figures in the United States. Although this list might not be perfect or exhaustive, it must include the likes of Dean Acheson, George Ball, Felix Frankfurter, David Lilienthal and John Jay McCloy. It was not an easy endeavour to establish such an inventory and, during the research and even during the writing of this thesis, the list has been adjusted because a number of players who were originally considered close long-term friends to Monnet proved to have had a sporadic relationship with him. The fact that, after a particular episode, someone remained in contact with Monnet cannot be considered as sufficient proof of a very close relationship. The main criteria used for this purpose were mutual reliance, regular meetings, and continuous consultation before important decisions were taken. The next section will examine Monnet's relationship with these people by focusing on the aspects mentioned above.

Before turning to Monnet's link with these individuals we need to briefly address a question: who were these people? First and foremost they were particularly influential individuals whose opinion was valued and considered by members of the US administration and Presidents alike. For instance, Felix Frankfurter and John McCloy had been regularly consulted by Roosevelt in the 1930s, but also by other US Presidents during and after the Second World War, an aspect that will be developed later on in this chapter. But US Presidents were not the only ones considering their opinion. Other influential US policymakers also consulted them before taking important decisions. In this manner they managed to pass on their view on economic and political matters on to policymakers. This is the reason why a number of their ideas were taken on board and implemented to a greater or lesser extent. Owing to people such as Professor Frankfurter, academic concepts passed into the political realm. In addition, these actors were not acting in isolation but knew each other closely and, as evidence (such as their correspondence with each other) shows, they regularly sought advice from each other. The following pages will be devoted to the examination of these individuals by focusing on their relationship with Monnet and with each other.

2.1.1. Felix Frankfurter: A Door-Opener for Monnet

Until his appointment to the Supreme Court, Frankfurter was a professor at Harvard Law School (except for some very short-lived periods of governmental involvement), where he obtained his law degree in 1906²⁰². He was born in Vienna at the end of the nineteenth

²⁰¹ Correspondence of Jean Monnet with Dean Acheson, Joseph Alsop, Henry Aurand, George Ball, David Bruce, Mc George Bundy, William Clayton, Allen W. Dulles, John Foster Dulles, James V. Forrestal, Felix Frankfurter, Ernest Goldstein, Alfred Gruenther, Averell Harriman, Harry Hopkins, Milton Katz, Walter Lippman, John J. McCloy, McGeorge Bundy, Dick Moose, Clarence Randall, Walter Rostow, Walter Bedell Smith, Jack Valenti, Samuel Waugh (consulted at FJM; PUL and the LoC).

²⁰² Assistant United States attorney, Southern District, New York (1906-1910); Law officer, Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department (1911-1914); Harvard Law School professor (1914-1939); Supreme Court Justice (1939-1962). Felix Frankfurter, A Register of His Papers in the LoC, Biographical Note,

century in a Jewish family that immigrated to New York in 1894 when he was twelve years old²⁰³. He stood out during his studies and made a profound impression on his professors. Graduating from Harvard University Law School with one of the most impressive academic records²⁰⁴, he was called to join this establishment as a professor in 1914.

When Monnet first met Frankfurter, the Harvard Professor was known not only in the academic circles but also in policymaking. Soon after he met Monnet, he became a confidant of the Frenchman, who did not miss any opportunity to meet with him and seek his opinion on various matters. The two were introduced in Washington in the summer of 1940, by Joseph Alsop, a US journalist, and became lifelong friends. Alsop wrote to Monnet about this in 1965: “unless, I am mistaken, it was I who brought you and Sylvia and the Frankfurters together (...) and I have always been very proud of this”²⁰⁵. Monnet confirmed this fact in his reply to this letter: “it was indeed you who brought Sylvia and I and Felix and Marion together”²⁰⁶.

Routine consultations with Frankfurter and regular visits to his office became a habit for Monnet. For example, Monnet felt compelled to consult with him before his North Africa trip on behalf of the US to assess the situation of the French political leadership. There were long telephone and dinner conversations on this matter between the two of them. As Frankfurter mentioned in his diary, “we dined at the Monnets’ because he was anxious to discuss fully what seemed to him the possible far-reaching implications for him (...) of his North African trip”²⁰⁷.

Family dinners represented a valuable opportunity to meet, since, as Duchêne underlines in his influential book on the Frenchman, “Monnet did not attend dinners without a purpose”²⁰⁸. The diaries of Felix Frankfurter show that the Monnets and Frankfurters became very close family friends taking every opportunity to get together. Monnet and Frankfurter always felt comfortable in each other’s company, enjoying long and stimulating discussions on economics and politics. In many instances the Monnets and Frankfurters were joined by others, probably most often by the McCloys²⁰⁹.

Manuscript Division, LoC, Washington, D.C.
<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/eadxmlmss/eadpdfmss/1999/ms999002.pdf> (accessed 28 December 2011).

²⁰³ Frankfurter, *A Register of His Papers*.

²⁰⁴ Michael Alexander, *Jazz Age Jews* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 77–8.

²⁰⁵ Letter from Joseph Alsop to Jean Monnet, 26 February 1965, Joseph Alsop Papers, LoC, Manuscript Collection, Washington D.C., Box 72.

²⁰⁶ Letter from Joseph Alsop to Monnet, 4 March 1965, Joseph Alsop Papers, Box 72.

²⁰⁷ Felix Frankfurter Diary, 1943, Felix Frankfurter Papers, LoC, Manuscript Collection, Washington D.C., Box 1, Reel 1.

²⁰⁸ Duchêne, *Jean Monnet*, 65.

²⁰⁹ Felix Frankfurter Diary, 4 January, 1943: “Dined with Jean Monnet’s, the other being Ben Cohen, Milton Katz, and Robert Nathan (...); 16 February, 1943: “Dined at Jean Monnet’s with McKetrick, President of the International Bank of Settlement at Basle”; “20 March 1943: “We had the McCloys and Sylvia Monnet to dinner” (Felix Frankfurter Diary, 1943, Felix Frankfurter Papers).

Monnet's friendship with Frankfurter was indeed an invaluable opportunity for the Frenchman to meet various key players and seek their views on a range of subjects free of official constraints. Frankfurter played an important role in this process by arranging many of these encounters. Furthermore, in support of his friend, he wrote many letters of reference describing his complete trust in the Frenchman and asking the addressee not to question Monnet's loyalty. He was the one who sent Roosevelt a letter of introduction for Monnet, describing him as "a man in whose understanding and discretion I have complete confidence"²¹⁰. In 1941, it was again the Harvard professor who alleviated the distrust of Halifax, the British ambassador in Washington, by writing: "I have heard no higher praise of an official entrusted with British interests than what has been accorded Monnet (...). I might add that everyone to whom I have spoken who has worked on close and intimate terms with Monnet has absolute confidence in him"²¹¹.

Frankfurter's reference opened Roosevelt's door to Monnet, who became, thanks to the law professor, a trusted insider of President's circle. As Monnet mentioned in his memoirs, despite the fact that Frankfurter did not have an official position in the Roosevelt administration, "the President's door was open to him whenever he thought fit"²¹². As an intimate of Frankfurter, Monnet gained Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR)'s confidence although there is no evidence that he ever became a close friend of the President.

An enlightening episode in the Roosevelt-Monnet relationship was Monnet's mission to North Africa. It seems that Harry Hopkins, the chairman of the Joint Munitions Board and one of the most influent advisers of the President, asked Monnet to travel to Algiers on behalf of this organisation. As was customary for Monnet, he first met Hopkins at the Frankfurters²¹³. Monnet's main task was to keep Hopkins and the President informed of the differences between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. It was Hopkins who persuaded the President to support Monnet's North African mission²¹⁴ and who, in the end, made the assignment possible. FDR contained Cordell Hull's distrust of Monnet²¹⁵ and explained to Eisenhower, the US military commander in North Africa, who Monnet was and what his role was. Indeed, as a testimony of his confidence in Monnet, Roosevelt wrote a very strong letter that the French businessman presented to General Eisenhower. In a phone conversation with his friend Frankfurter, Monnet said regarding this letter: "I am not a modest man, but I would never have written such a letter for myself as the President has given me"²¹⁶.

²¹⁰ Max Freedman, *Roosevelt and Frankfurter: Their Correspondence, 1928-1945, Annotated by Max Freedman* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 566.

²¹¹ Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Halifax, 14 November 1941, LoC, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., Box 85, Reel 51.

²¹² Monnet, *Memoirs*, 154.

²¹³ Clifford P. Hackett, "Jean Monnet and the Roosevelt Administration" In *Monnet and the Americans: The Father of a United Europe and his US Supporters* edited by Clifford P. Hackett (Washington DC: Jean Monnet Council, 1995), 46.

²¹⁴ Henry Hitch Adams, *Harry Hopkins: A Biography* (New York: Putnam, 1977), 310.

²¹⁵ Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, 291 and Hackett, "Jean Monnet and the Roosevelt Administration", 55.

²¹⁶ Lash, *From the Diaries*, 195.

Thanks to Frankfurter's help, Monnet was introduced to and accepted by key decision-makers in Washington, such as Roosevelt and Hopkins. His references opened doors for the Frenchman, who was then able to gain the trust of these key US players at crucial times, such as when negotiating the purchase of US warplanes for the Allies before the US entry into the Second World War. Frankfurter not only introduced Monnet to various key players, blindly supporting his actions, but eventually made him a member of his restricted circle of friends, a matter that will be examined in the next pages.

2.1.2. John J. McCloy and Monnet: "Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur"²¹⁷

Another close US friend of Monnet, but also of Frankfurter, as mentioned already, was John Jay McCloy. Born in 1895, he graduated from Amherst College and in 1916 he began studying law at Harvard, a great achievement in itself for "a poor boy struggling to succeed"²¹⁸ which "was the perfect ticket to the top"²¹⁹. However, his studies got suspended one year later when he joined the US Army and he only returned to Law School in 1919. After graduation, in 1921 he started practising law with a number of Wall Street law firms, namely Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft and as of 1925 Cravath, de Gersdoff, Swaine & Wood, of which he became a partner. His Cravath years offered the young graduate invaluable opportunities to learn not only about legal affairs but also about finance and especially international finance. It was at the time when McCloy was working for Cravath that this firm "participated with J.P. Morgan in a mammoth \$110 million loan to the German government"²²⁰. Owing to this McCloy spent extended periods of time in Europe following up on these private loans given to European governments that according to him, were "the forerunner of the Marshall Plan"²²¹. His reputation on Wall Street reached its climax after he demonstrated that the 1916 Black Tom explosion was caused by German agents. His fame spread over the years, his experience and his connections made his opinion one of the most sought-after by US decision-makers.

He got to know Monnet when the French businessman associated himself with the US firm "Blair & Company". McCloy became later on the lawyer of this company. Their relationship was strengthened in the late 1920s and early 1930s when McCloy headed the Paris office of a law firm²²². The family and business ties became stronger as McCloy and Monnet visited each other frequently, both in Europe and in the US²²³. The family relationship was reinforced by a close friendship between Ellen McCloy and Sylvia Monnet, who volunteered together during the war. Dinners with the McCloyes and the Frankfurters were commonplace during Monnet's stays in the US. One example was the 27 January 1943 dinner between the three, just before McCloy's departure for North

²¹⁷ "A friend in need is a friend indeed".

²¹⁸ Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The wise men. Six friends and the world they made. Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 70.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid., 122.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Interview with John Jay McCloy, 15 July 1981, 2.

²²³ Ibid., 5.

Africa²²⁴. After the Casablanca Conference (14 – 24 January 1943) McCloy was expected to receive instructions from Roosevelt. At this particular juncture a consultation between the three was critical to define the guiding principles of the future action, particularly regarding the French matter and the Giraud-de Gaulle relationship.

It is important to mention that this consultation involved two of the most prominent US figures of the time. If we are to believe a number of accounts, Frankfurter and McCloy were considered among the most influential players in the United States. General Hugh S. Johnson, in charge of the National Recovery Administration, described Frankfurter in 1935 as “the most influential single individual in the United States”²²⁵. Referring to McCloy, Brinkley considered that he deserved the title of “the most influential private citizen in America”²²⁶. The same author also added Monnet to this equation judging that in some respects McCloy, “a minister without portfolio,”²²⁷ was the North American Monnet²²⁸. While it is definitively not easy to measure the degree of influence of these two actors, it is beyond doubt that their influence survived almost all changes of political leadership in Washington.

Despite the fact that McCloy had a tendency to stay away from the political scene, it seems that he was often present when important decisions were taken in order to offer his advice to the executive. Regardless of his Republican affinities, he advised presidents from both sides of the political spectrum, including Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy. Decision-makers felt a need to consult him constantly regardless of the government in power. Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, “wondered whether anyone in the administration ever acted without having a word with McCloy”²²⁹. To a large extent, this was also true of Frankfurter and Monnet, who became accustomed to offering his opinion to different administrations on a variety of political, economic and diplomatic issues.

After Monnet met McCloy, the two became very close friends and supported each other ever after. For example, in 1947, the US lawyer, at the time president of the World Bank, acted as the middleman and made possible a loan to France of \$250 million that kept afloat the Monnet Plan for the modernization the French economy. This was thanks to the esteem the McCloy felt towards Monnet. It was possible only because at that time McCloy enjoyed almost absolute power at the World Bank having consolidated the prerogatives of the President, “consigning the directors to a decidedly subordinate role”²³⁰.

²²⁴ Felix Frankfurter’s Diary, 27 January 1943, Felix Frankfurter Papers, LoC, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., Box 1, Reel 1.

²²⁵ Freedman, *Roosevelt and Frankfurter*, 7.

²²⁶ Alan Brinkley, “Minister without Portfolio: The Most Influential Private Citizen in America”, *Harper’s Magazine* (February 1983): 31.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

²²⁸ Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, 109.

²²⁹ Alan Brinkley, “Minister without Portfolio”, 34.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 37.

There is no doubt that the most striking instance of McCloy's support for Monnet was his categorical and immediate backing of the Schuman Plan. Indeed, the first president of the ECSC High Authority, Jean Monnet, admitted that the Treaty of Paris "would never have been signed but for Mr McCloy's support"²³¹. Direct support to Monnet's cause was just one side of the lawyer's contribution to the success of the 1950 coal and steel plan. At the same time, McCloy lent his support through various envoys who were assigned explicit tasks. This was the chief reason why the US High Commissioner for Germany at the time of the Schuman Plan sent Robert R. Bowie, a Harvard law professor, to Paris to meet Monnet. Bowie was at the time McCloy's "closest adviser"²³² and a specialist in anti-trust and breaking up cartels. McCloy's reference was all Monnet needed to welcome and trust the expertise of the law professor. By commuting weekly from Berlin to Paris, Bowie helped Monnet draft the anti-trust provisions of the Treaty of Paris.

Together with Frankfurter, McCloy was one of Monnet's close associates. But, as their actions attest, they were not only friends of Monnet but also of each other. It seems that the three met regularly and consulted on numerous decisions with far-reaching implications for the international arena.

2.1.3. Dean Acheson

McCloy was not the only one close to Frankfurter and Monnet. Dean Acheson also developed a long-lasting relationship with both of them, Frankfurter being the focal point of this association. The encounter with Frankfurter was in fact the turning point in Acheson's life. His first years in school had been traumatic not so much because of the "cruel torture"²³³ of his schoolmates, but mostly of the rigidity of the establishment he was part of. As he "didn't happen to feel like conforming"²³⁴ at Groton, disdaining the snobbery of the place, Acheson refused to integrate and follow the rules. As a result, his academic record suffered and "on his final report card he finished with a 68 average, the very lowest among twenty-four in his form"²³⁵. It was only after entering Harvard Law School that Acheson's approach to studying was to change and this was only thanks to his encounter with Professor Frankfurter, whose method of teaching law inspired the young Acheson. Frankfurter encouraged students to present their views in stimulating and lively discussions. This was exactly what Acheson needed to awaken his academic interest. This was indeed the turning point since, as Isaacson and Thomas wrote, "his transformation into a serious scholar can be dated to the beginning of his second year when he took his first course from Frankfurter"²³⁶. From that moment on Acheson's intellectual path became clear following the guidance of his mentor and, later on, close friend.

²³¹ Schwartz, "The Transnational Partnership", 188.

²³² Wells, *Antitrust*, 163.

²³³ Isaacson and Thomas, *The wise men*, 54.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 88.

Isaacson and Thomas made an interesting parallel between the treatment Acheson received during his Harvard years from Frankfurter and McCloy's experience, who was attending the same school in the same time. Not excelling in any particular way, McCloy remembered that during his first year, "he would audit Frankfurter's lectures from the back row and envy those such as Acheson, who was a year ahead, sat up front and were invited to the professor's house for tea afterward"²³⁷. McCloy, who became intimate friends with both later²³⁸, could only watch with admiration as this relationship developed.

Apart from the ideological inspiration (a matter that will be examined later), Frankfurter was nurtured by his former professor who took him under his wing immediately after he graduated from Harvard Law School in 1918. It was Frankfurter who persuaded Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis to take on Acheson as a clerk in 1919. This was not the only example of this sort in the Frankfurter-Acheson relationship. Later on, when acting as an unofficial employment agent for government service activities,²³⁹ Frankfurter advised President Roosevelt to enlist his protégé²⁴⁰. As a result, in 1933, Roosevelt appointed him Under Secretary of the Treasury. Monnet, who witnessed this relationship growing, devoted some lines in his memoirs to the unfolding of this close friendship of which he became part. Monnet testified that he frequently met the two friends, Acheson and Frankfurter, "the incarnation of Law and the Constitution,"²⁴¹ walking together to work in the Rock Creek Park. Furthermore, Monnet wrote that "every morning, he [Acheson] could be seen walking to the office with Felix Frankfurter"²⁴².

According to Brinkley, "Jean Monnet first met Dean Acheson in 1927 at a small Washington dinner party (...) [where] Acheson arrived with Felix Frankfurter, his mentor at Harvard Law School and his 'enthusiastic door-opener' in Washington, [and] who first introduced Acheson to Monnet"²⁴³. This claim has profound implications since it suggests a different date for the first meeting between Monnet and Frankfurter, from that mentioned by Alsop and Monnet (1940). Notwithstanding this controversy, it is beyond doubt that Acheson, Frankfurter and Monnet were very close friends and that the development of a strong Monnet-Acheson relationship can to a large extent be attributed to the Harvard professor.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Jeremy Schiffres '11, Dean Acheson on Leadership, *Dean Acheson Papers. Manuscripts & Archives, Yale University*.
<http://www.library.yale.edu/mssa/exhibits/OtherwiseEngaged/politics/schiffres/03schiffres.html> (accessed 4 January 2012).

²³⁹ Ellis W. Hawley, *The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 283.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 301-2.

²⁴² Ibid., 301.

²⁴³ Douglas Brinkley, "Dean Acheson and Jean Monnet: On the Path to Atlantic Partnership" In *Monnet and the Americans: The Father of a United Europe and his US Supporters*, ed. Clifford P. Hackett (Washington DC: Jean Monnet Council, 1995), 75.

Not surprisingly, Acheson and Monnet developed a strong friendship around “sardine sandwiches and Christmas cognac”²⁴⁴. The lawyer became a close and lifelong friend of Monnet soon after the two met and, like Frankfurter and McCloy, he was consulted before important decisions. The example of the discussions before the Schuman Plan was announced is revealing. Acheson was one of the first to find out about the scheme when he stopped briefly in Paris on 8 May 1950²⁴⁵ on his way to London. It is difficult to reconstruct the reasons why he did so. Monnet’s customary secrecy undoubtedly played an important role in this instance.

While in his memoirs Acheson gave no reasons for the visit, in his book *Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known*, he wrote that some of his colleagues “advised that it would be courteous to go to London via Paris and have informal talks there”²⁴⁶. A plausible explanation is that Acheson was following his habit of meeting Monnet and consulting him while he was in Europe. In addition, others had encouraged him to take some time to discuss with the Frenchman. While not many people knew about the plan, and considering that Monnet was famous for his secrecy, it is very likely that McCloy was the one who encouraged Acheson to stop off in Paris. In fact, both Acheson and McCloy were informed about the proposal before it was made public. Acheson made reference to Monnet’s meeting with McCloy, who “was invited to talk with Monnet in great detail about the proposal, which he did on the night before the announcement”²⁴⁷. It is difficult to understand the attitude of the three players only through the prism of international diplomacy. It is very likely that personal connections played a more important role in this instance than traditional diplomacy. Monnet wanted to inform his friends, Acheson and McCloy, and find out what the official US reaction to the plan might be, but he was mainly interested in getting their personal views on his scheme. Official diplomacy played a role in this instance but it was secondary.

From that moment on, Acheson was convinced of the utility of the plan and put all his effort into ensuring its success, as will be discussed in another chapter. His long friendship with Monnet, and with others such as Frankfurter and McCloy, contributed greatly to his positive attitude towards the Frenchman’s project.

2.1.4. David E. Lilienthal

Another protégé of Frankfurter who joined his restrictive circle while studying law at Harvard was David E. Lilienthal. Born in Morton, Indiana, in 1899 to Slovak immigrants, he graduated from the Harvard Law School in 1923 and had been, like Acheson, taken under Frankfurter’s wing. Under this tutelage, Lilienthal was able to access important positions including joining the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933 as a member

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 91.

²⁴⁵ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to the Acting Secretary of State [James E. Webb], Paris, 9 May 1950, *FRUS 1950: Western Europe*, volume III (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977), 692, footnote 2.

²⁴⁶ Dean Acheson, *Sketches From Life of Men I Have Known* (London: H. Hamilton, 1961), 40-41.

²⁴⁷ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to the Acting Secretary of State [James E. Webb], London, 10 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 694.

of its board of directors²⁴⁸. In the years after his graduation Lilienthal was continually guided by his mentor and always consulted him before taking important decisions, an aspect that will be further developed in the next section of this thesis.

David E. Lilienthal's relationship with Monnet has received very little attention in the literature and probably for this reason it was neglected in the *Jean Monnet American Archives* project already referred to. Despite this, an analysis of the documents included in the David E. Lilienthal Papers reveals that the two were not only very close friends but also had a profound influence on each other.

As in the other cases mentioned above, Monnet and Lilienthal seized every opportunity to meet, consult and exchange ideas. They had countless meetings in various places, including New York, Paris, Washington and Princeton. In 1959, when Monnet was in Princeton to receive an honorary degree, Lilienthal hoped "very much to have a glimpse of (...) [him]"²⁴⁹. These were valuable opportunities to test their ideas, but also to keep each other up-to-date on their plans and thinking. At a time when Monnet was implementing in Europe one of the most impressive and daring plans ever conceived, Lilienthal was eager to find out first-hand about the project and the philosophy behind it. Although this consultation continued over the years through a regular exchange of letters and phone calls, their face-to-face meetings represented the best opportunity for discussion. When the habit of regular meetings was interrupted for a while, due to Monnet's more numerous commitments linked to the European Communities, Lilienthal confessed (in 1966) that he "miss[ed] talking to Monnet"²⁵⁰. Their mental connection intensified over time and it explains to a great extent their desire for regular consultation. They became close friends mainly because their paths often crossed as a result of their friendships with Acheson and Frankfurter.

Over the years Lilienthal's activity in the Tennessee Valley became a case study for Monnet, who was profoundly impressed by the project. When Monnet returned to Europe after the war, he aimed to apply many of the TVA president's ideas to the reconstruction of France. Monnet intended to invite Lilienthal to France immediately after taking up his new job as head of the French modernization plan so that the former TVA president could explain his thinking to those involved in the plan. When the trip was subsequently cancelled,²⁵¹ Monnet sent some of his team to the US to meet Lilienthal. In his turn, the Lilienthal was interested in seeing the results of Monnet's work in France. When on a trip to Europe in the spring of 1950, Lilienthal asked for Monnet's advice on where to go to see the results of the French agricultural and water development²⁵². As a result, Monnet

²⁴⁸ Freedman, *Roosevelt and Frankfurter*, 24.

²⁴⁹ Letter from David E. Lilienthal to Monnet, 28 April 1959, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1959), Box 414, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

²⁵⁰ A handwritten note of reflection of Lilienthal, 3 November 1966, David Lilienthal Papers (1966), Box 462, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

²⁵¹ Steven M. Neuse, *David E. Lilienthal: The Journey of an American Liberal* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996), 258.

²⁵² Letter from David E. Lilienthal to Monnet, 24 April 1950, David Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence Monnet (1950), Box 361, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

arranged for him to visit the Rhone valley, an area that was representative of Monnet's post-war work in France.

An interesting and revelatory example of their attachment to each other's ideas and projects was the total support offered by the ex-TVA head to Monnet's 1950 plan. Although Lilienthal was not as influential in Europe as he was in the US, his achievements reached the ears of key players in continental Europe as well as in Britain. He enjoyed the respect of many prominent individuals in the UK. Coincidentally or not, he was in Europe only days after the announcement of the Schuman Plan. He left for Europe by boat on 15 May 1950, arriving "shortly after Schuman's announcement of the plan"²⁵³ and had, as he said, "the opportunity to visit with French and British leaders – including the creator of the plan, the French statesman and planner Jean Monnet, and British leaders who oppose it"²⁵⁴.

Despite his busy agenda, Monnet found the time to meet his friend at the beginning of June 1950²⁵⁵. Lilienthal felt that "big things are stirring,"²⁵⁶ since the subject of the meeting was, as he wrote in his journal, the coal and steel plan. It was an invaluable opportunity for Lilienthal to be enlightened about the plan's aims and thinking by its initiator, and for Monnet to hear the opinion of the architect of one of the most successful projects of regional development in the world. Even after this consultation, Monnet felt the need to talk again with his friend before his departure for the US. As a result, and, despite the very busy period coming up, Monnet asked Lilienthal "if it was possible (...) to come back to Paris before sailing for home, after the international conferences, due to begin 15 June"²⁵⁷. Lilienthal could not refuse and agreed to return at least for a day²⁵⁸.

Lilienthal was due to leave for the UK, where the Schuman Plan was viewed sceptically both by public opinion and by the government. Interestingly, his trip across the Channel was entirely dedicated to the Schuman Plan that now had a new supporter. His meeting with Monnet provided him with a clear understanding of the objectives of the plan, but also with arguments in support of it. He had lengthy talks in London with several important figures, such as Prime Minister Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Sir Edwin Plowden (Chief Government Planner) and Derick Heathcoat-Amory, Oliver Lyttleton and David Eccles (Conservative MPs) and, as he wrote in his journals, "all the talk was about the Schuman proposals"²⁵⁹. It seems that his trip was a mission to convince key British players of the legitimate and constructive objectives of Monnet's plan and to convert them, if possible, into supporters of the plan. Although it is hard to evaluate the results of his actions, one consequence is clear. More decision-makers got to hear about the real aims of the plan from somebody whose opinions were

²⁵³ David E. Lilienthal, *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume III, Venturesome Years, 1950-1955* (New York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969), 10.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ Letter from Monnet to Lilienthal, 3 June 1950, David Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence Monnet (1950), AM 19859, Box 361, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

²⁵⁶ Lilienthal, *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal*, 13.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.

highly respected and who not only met its originator but also was one of the few capable of understanding his thinking. Lilienthal's support for the Schuman Plan had as its basis a long friendship that had contributed to the development of a strong relationship of mutual trust and an understanding of each other's thinking.

2.1.5. George W. Ball

The group of friends would not be complete without mentioning one of Monnet's closest associates, namely George W. Ball. There is no doubt that soon after he met this lawyer in the early 1940s, Monnet considered him a reliable friend. From the time he got to know Monnet and before becoming Under Secretary of State in the Johnson administration, Ball's activity gravitated around the French businessman, who wanted to keep him as his personal lawyer and adviser.

There are many similar examples. When, after the war, Ball established a law firm together with some friends, he could not start work immediately as he was asked by Monnet to become general counsel of the French Supply Council. He was again delayed by Monnet when asked to advise Léon Blum during his visit to the US. When Ball finally joined his law office, "Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly & Cox," in July 1946, Monnet hired the company to represent the French Government because he wanted to keep Ball close to him. The lawyer reports a conversation he had with Monnet, who asked him at the time: "well, why don't we become a client of your law firm, so this relationship can go on?"²⁶⁰.

In the following years, Ball worked with Monnet in Paris, in an unofficial capacity, on the establishment of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and also on the drafting of the Treaty establishing the ECSC. After the first European Community was in place, Ball was retained as an adviser to the organisation²⁶¹ and later served as adviser to the Euratom and the EEC. In 1954, when Monnet decided to set up an ECSC information office in Washington, which was to become the fully-fledged EU diplomatic mission to the US, he relied on his close friend Ball to organise it. The lawyer, who was the first Community envoy to the United States, set up the Washington ECSC office next to his law firm.

Monnet met Ball when the latter was working for the Lend-Lease administration²⁶². They grew closer over the years, becoming lifelong friends. Three years before Monnet died Ball sent a letter to the Monnets underlining the French businessman's influence on him. "Jean was a magnificent teacher and I think I have learned more from you, Jean, than from anyone else"²⁶³. This statement was confirmed by his wife, Ruth Ball, who

²⁶⁰ Interview with George W. Ball, 15 July 1981, 5.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁶³ David L. DiLeo, *Catch the Night Plane for Paris: George Ball and Jean Monnet*, In *Monnet and the Americans: The Father of a United Europe and his US Supporters*, ed. Clifford P. Hackett (Washington DC: Jean Monnet Council, 1995), 166.

considered Monnet to have had “the greatest impact on her husband’s life”²⁶⁴. Their relationship was a mixture of admiration of each other’s qualities and mutual dependency and trust.

This is the reason why Ball often found himself in unique situations while working for Monnet. While his law firm was representing the French government, Ball worked with various divisions of the French Embassy, among them the Commercial and Financial Attachés²⁶⁵, and also advised the French *Patronat*, the most influential French industrial trade association. However, his tasks were not always clearly defined and in fact his main activity was to give his opinion to Monnet on various matters. This was Ball’s mission in 1950 and 1951 while working on drafting the Treaty of Paris at the Rue de Matignon, Monnet’s office. Both in his memoirs and in an interview in 1981, Ball spoke about his peculiar situation working in a little office under the stairs, trying to be as discreet as possible to avoid the potential mistrust of the European delegations present in the same place. Monnet “didn’t want them to know he had an American working for him, so I was being smuggled up to his office, and smuggled out the back door”²⁶⁶. Monnet’s reliance on Ball was such that he would ask him to come the next day whenever Monnet needed him. On 18 June 1950 Ball got a phone call from Monnet and heard the usual phrase: “be here tomorrow”²⁶⁷. This short sentence neatly sums up their relationship as one based on complete mutual reliance.

Even though he had never been a public figure, Monnet was well known by those in power both in his native France, and across the Channel and Atlantic, even before his major undertaking – the ECSC – was put in place. He was known especially for his capacity to influence decisions, mainly thanks to his far-reaching connections. Many were puzzled and even frightened by his ability to access key players and influence their decisions. But Monnet never acted alone. He always had the backing of an exclusive group of individuals connected to each other in a web of relationships. Two of them, Acheson and Lilienthal, had grown up around their mentor, Felix Frankfurter, who watched over not only their education but also their careers. Lilienthal never failed to consult his mentor before taking important decisions, such as during the uneasy years of his TVA presidency. In his turn, Acheson paid daily visits to the Justice’s office, as Monnet wrote in his memoirs. Similarly, Monnet confessed that he had always sought Frankfurter’s opinion. John McCloy was also very close to Frankfurter, as well as to Acheson and Monnet. The Monnet-McCloy-Acheson meeting in early May 1950 before the Schuman Declaration was presented to the world was not a coincidence but consistent with their habit of consulting each other at crucial times. George W. Ball was possibly the least connected with the other members of this group. However, he was by no means an outsider since he was close to McCloy²⁶⁸, Acheson and Monnet.

²⁶⁴ James Alban Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 104.

²⁶⁵ Interview with George W. Ball, 15 July, 1981, 5.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

²⁶⁸ “Ball had been a friend of McCloy for twenty years”, Brinkley, “Minister without Portfolio”, 44.

This circle of friends became stronger over time and its members developed a habit of taking pivotal decisions only after extensive mutual consultations. To a large extent, this practice was facilitated by its well-developed channels of communication that established invisible ties between these individuals across regions and continents. Monnet, like his friends, relied on mail and especially on the telephone, as his diary shows and as he confirmed on many occasions. Face-to-face encounters were also part of this regular consultation routine. All these interactions contributed to the formation of a transnational group of people sharing many traits of character, which vastly contributed to the strengthening of the ties between these individuals who were part of this restricted and small circle of friends.

2.2. A Transatlantic Group of Friends of Shared Traits

An examination of this gradually developing friendship largely gravitating around Professor Frankfurter reveals a number of shared characteristics among its members. These common traits have a particular significance because, at various moments, they influenced the course of the actions and policy choices of the members of the group.

One of the most important characteristics of these people is that they were almost always present when important decisions were taken, although none of them ever held elective office. Their job was to take on essential tasks and to be consulted by public figures in moments of crisis. As James Bill wrote, George Ball was not “interested in authority associated with the formal trappings of government”²⁶⁹. Similarly, McCloy preferred to avoid the entanglement of public positions. On many occasions he was offered Cabinet positions, such as Secretary of State by Eisenhower or Secretary of Treasury by Kennedy, “Supreme Court justiceships, ambassadorship, even (briefly in 1956) of a dark-horse nomination for president”²⁷⁰. It was claimed that “he may hold the record for the number of Cabinet posts rejected by one man, preferring to spend most of his life as one of the nation’s most influential private citizens”²⁷¹. As the future World Bank president said, “they wanted me to be a caretaker, a figurehead and I would not do it”²⁷². Like his friends, Monnet was considered for ministerial and ambassadorial positions but he wished to remain in obscurity. In a personal and confidential letter to Roosevelt in 1939 William Bullitt expressed his opinion that, while “Monnet would do excellently in Washington, he could be much more useful if he were relieved from the polite duties of an Ambassador and charged with nothing but the serious business of supply”²⁷³.

While many of the members of this group stayed away from and even refused high-ranking official positions (possibly with the exception of Dean Acheson, who was

²⁶⁹ Bill, *George Ball*, 107.

²⁷⁰ Brinkley, “Minister without Portfolio”, 40-41.

²⁷¹ Isaacson and Thomas, *The wise men*, 23.

²⁷² Brinkley, “Minister without Portfolio”, 40.

²⁷³ Bullitt to Roosevelt, 13 September 1939, Personal and Strictly Confidential, Orville H. Bullitt, ed. *For the President, Personal and Secret; Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 371.

Secretary of State after the Second World War, and Felix Frankfurter, who became a member of the US Supreme Court of Justice), they took on short-term key executive positions that gave them more freedom of action than an official governmental job. Their prestige, influence and capacity to fulfil their tasks always made them attractive to political leaders. When McCloy resigned from the War Department in 1945, Truman sent him a letter expressing his hope that “we can from time to time call upon you”²⁷⁴.

By accepting these short term posts they acted as trouble-shooters in times of crisis, when their unique skills were in great demand. In early 1943, both McCloy and Monnet were sent to North Africa to help resolve the Giraud – de Gaulle clash that affected relations between the Allies and the war effort. The two were special emissaries of the President carrying his direct orders. On 21 February 1943 the President told Frankfurter about his frustration with the conflict between the two French leaders, especially with respect to de Gaulle’s attitude. At the President’s suggestion he take over the military leadership in France, de Gaulle replied that “he was no longer a military man but had become the leader of a great national movement, like Jeanne d’Arc”²⁷⁵. After summarizing in great detail to Frankfurter his two one-to-one meetings with de Gaulle, he concluded: “‘I think he is a little touched here’ – tapping his right temple”²⁷⁶. After the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt was particularly troubled by the Giraud – de Gaulle relationship.

Immediately after his return from the conference, he sent McCloy and, only weeks after, his close associate Monnet. The two envoys managed mainly to work out the details of the French army’s role once the invasion of the European continent had begun. It was on 20 March 1943, around Frankfurter’s dinner table, that McCloy, just back from Africa, reviewed the results of his and Monnet’s activity with those present, namely the Frankfurters and Sylvia Monnet. Frankfurter concluded that, despite McCloy’s modesty, he had “a major share not only in working out the political problems but also, and primarily, a number of major military changes to secure complete cooperation among American and the British”²⁷⁷. Later in April 1943 Bob Sherwood, who had also just returned from Africa, underlined once more to Frankfurter the decisive role played by Monnet there, mentioning that “it is a perfect Godsend to have Jean Monnet in Africa”²⁷⁸. He continued that he “cannot imagine what course the political developments would have taken if Monnet had not been there to straighten out things (...)”²⁷⁹. The confidence placed by the President in McCloy and Monnet in this particularly sensitive and difficult matter, which disturbed him profoundly, shows just to what extent he relied upon their skills to solve the issue.

Another significant characteristic of the members of the group, linked to those listed above, is that they moved backward and forward between public and private positions. Just before being appointed Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of

²⁷⁴ Brinkley, “Minister without Portfolio”, 36.

²⁷⁵ Felix Frankfurter’s Diary, 21 February 1943, Felix Frankfurter Papers, LoC, Manuscript Collection, Washington D.C., Box 1, Reel 1.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Felix Frankfurter’s Diary, 20 March 1943, Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Felix Frankfurter’s Diary, 26 April 1943, Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

New York, Felix Frankfurter worked with a New York law office. However, most of his career oscillated between teaching at the Harvard Law School and official positions such as assistant to the Secretary of War (from 1917 until the end of the First World War) and US Supreme Court member (1939-1962).

In fact, the professional career of most of the members of the group of friends was split between positions with law offices and short-term official jobs. Before Acheson was appointed Undersecretary of the US Treasury in 1933, he worked at a law firm in Washington D.C., “Covington & Burling”. After resigning from this position, he returned to private law practice until 1940 when Roosevelt asked once again for his services. As a senior official of the State Department he played a central role in the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank at the Bretton Woods Conference. President Truman appointed him Undersecretary of State (in 1945) and Secretary of State (in 1949). After the 1952 presidential campaign, Acheson returned to his private law practice. However, despite his private status, he continued to advise unofficially both Kennedy and Johnson.

The former Secretary of State served in Johnson’s “Senior Advisory Group” together with John McCloy. Like his friend, McCloy made a practice of officially and unofficially advising US presidents from Roosevelt to Reagan. Also like Acheson, McCloy divided his professional career between short-term governmental positions and private jobs. He served as Assistant Secretary of War during World War Two, president of the World Bank and High Commissioner for Germany. Nevertheless, his career was dominated by private positions with law firms, US corporations (such as Westinghouse, AT&T, Allied Chemical, United Fruit) and philanthropic organisations (e.g. the Ford Foundation). After graduation he worked for over fifteen years as a lawyer with the “Cravath” law firm (in 1930 he moved to France to become chairman of Cravath’s Paris office). Later in his career, he returned to the practice of law as a senior partner of the law firm “Milbank”, known as the “Rockefeller law firm”²⁸⁰. McCloy’s executive skills were appreciated both in private and public circles. He served as an official or unofficial adviser to various Presidential administrations but he also applied his skills to the service of the private sector, such as when acting as chief counsel in the US to the “Seven Sisters,” the major petroleum companies: Exxon, Mobil, BP, Texaco, Shell, Gulf, and Socal²⁸¹. His public positions helped him on many occasions fulfil his tasks as private counsel. In turn, his knowledge and connections made him a valuable asset in governmental positions.

A long-time close friend of both Acheson and McCloy, George Ball also divided his professional career between private and public positions. He was Undersecretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations for a short period (from June to September 1968). In 1933 he worked on major New Deal policies for the Farm Credit Administration, where he met Acheson, and for the Henry Morgenthau’s Treasury Department. However, Ball’s career was dominated by private positions as a lawyer and as an official and unofficial government adviser. Monnet had asked for Ball’s advice and

²⁸⁰ Brinkley, “Minister without Portfolio”, 44.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

skills on many occasions. As a result, Ball served as general counsel of the French Supply Council and, later on, as the French Premier Léon Blum's advisor during his mission to Washington to discuss Franco-US relations. His activity gravitated around various law offices, such as "Midwest" that he joined in 1935 and the prestigious Sidley, McPherson, Austin & Harper (1939). After the war he founded his own law firm but was delayed in joining it by Monnet who asked him to lend his skills to the French government. Even after July 1946, when Ball was finally able to join his firm, "Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly & Cox," he continued to stay close to Monnet by advising him and the French government. Ball hoped to maintain his freedom of action by taking on private positions. In his memoirs he wrote that it would be best to avoid any governmental position until he had established "a private-sector port of return"²⁸². He considered that "too many bureaucrats (...) had been trapped in frustrating tasks or compelled to carry out distasteful policies because they had no place to which they could retreat"²⁸³.

Monnet also considered that he had to preserve unrestricted freedom of action. As he said himself: "I never felt that I had a career or was part of a hierarchy, be it French, English, American or European"²⁸⁴. But in order to be able to act at will, Monnet needed to secure a stable financial situation. This is the reason why he left his job as a Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations in 1923 to devote his time and skills to reorganising his family cognac business that was in difficulties. During the second half of the 1920s, Monnet continued his private activities that brought him into contact with influential New York bankers. As Vice-President of the Paris branch of the investment company "Blair and Co." from 1926, Monnet was sent to Warsaw and Bucharest from 1927 to 1929 to help stabilize the Polish zloty and Romanian leu.

Without any formal banking training, Monnet became what Emily S. Rosenberg would later call a "financial missionary to the world"²⁸⁵. In her book of the same name, Rosenberg shows that, following the First World War, the US government avoided any official involvement in European economic stabilization, but "it encouraged private bankers to make loans" to European governments²⁸⁶. As Monnet wrote in his memoirs, at the time investment bankers were penetrating the European market, by offering loans to industrial firms or governments. According to Monnet, "the investment bankers had to go right to the heart of the problem, advising Governments on how to balance their budget, and penetrating the holy of holies, the central bank"²⁸⁷. He continued in his memoirs that "Blair and Co. were big enough for such ventures, which were a matter of politics as much as of finance"²⁸⁸.

²⁸² Ball, *The Past*, 67.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Jean Monnet, *Clefs pour action*, exemplaire no. 34 imprimé spécialement pour Mr. George Ball, AJM, George Ball Papers, Box 71, Folder Number:1, PPP, DRBSC, PUL, 8.

²⁸⁵ Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 101.

²⁸⁷ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 102.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

This is the reason why Monnet found himself negotiating with the governments of two Central and Eastern European states. Under the agreements signed with the head of the Second Polish Republic, Józef Piłsudski, and the Romanian Prime Minister, Iuliu Maniu, “Blair and Co.” made loans to the governments of the two countries, which helped keep afloat their economies. The investment company’s aim was to offer public loans to national governments, which would be guaranteed by those states. He continued his international financial adventure by co-founding the San Francisco “Bancamerica-Blair” bank in 1929. Later on, between 1934 and 1936, he was in China promoting financial investments that would contribute to the reorganisation of the Chinese railway network.

His financial experience and, above all, his connections within the financial world, made him a strong candidate for various governmental positions. However, he avoided official jobs at all costs, taking on posts that involved less publicity but not necessarily less influence. In December 1939 he was sent to London to supervise the Franco-British war collaboration. This task lasted only few months, since in August 1940 Churchill asked him to go to Washington as Vice-President of the British Supply Council to negotiate the purchase of US airplanes for the Allies. After the war, Monnet took on a more visible job aimed at reviving a devastated French economy. The Monnet Plan he drafted precisely to fulfil this task envisaged the establishment of a Commissariat General du Plan. Since Monnet did not want to subordinate his activities to political authorities, he designed the Commissariat General in such a way to make it an independent commission reporting directly to the prime minister not to a particular minister. Thus, Monnet, as head of the Commissariat, wanted to make sure that he and his team would maintain their freedom of action while fulfilling the fundamental task of French post-war recovery. As with the Commissariat, Monnet envisaged the establishment of a coordinating institution of the ECSC free of governmental control.

Monnet had earned the confidence of various official circles in London, Paris and Washington as his activities demonstrate. However, like his close friends, Monnet never held elected public office and was never interested in political positions, preferring the anonymity and influence of a behind-the-scenes actor. He identified himself with his friends, such as Acheson, Frankfurter and McCloy, who were entirely uninterested²⁸⁹ in public positions and accepted them only provisionally until the situation was settled.

Despite their lack of interest for public positions, they were always close to official centres of power, advising governments and decision-makers. Roosevelt always valued Frankfurter’s opinion even though he did not always take it into account. Frankfurter’s relationship with the President is a controversial subject, still debated in the literature. It is still ambiguous to what extent Frankfurter was able to influence Roosevelt on economic policy. However, it is clear that he was close to the President and advised him on various matters. He was in fact appointed to the Supreme Court of Justice by Roosevelt at a time when the Democrat President desperately needed the support of the Court for his New Deal reforms. Freedman wrote that Frankfurter “was outside the Administration but always within Roosevelt’s confidence”²⁹⁰. As a result, he could talk

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 154.

²⁹⁰ Freedman, *Roosevelt and Frankfurter*, 3.

directly to the President “with the authority of an expert and the intimacy of a friend”²⁹¹. This is the reason why, although it cannot be claimed that Frankfurter’s view was always taken on board by the President, it could be safely argued that he was within Roosevelt’s circle of close advisors.

McCloy too was behind the scenes of every US presidency from Roosevelt’s onwards. Likewise, Acheson was never far away when the White House Presidents needed his advice. Monnet, who “has been called the most influential foreigner to move across the Washington stage,”²⁹² knew that the source of his and his friends’ power came from being close to the key actors. Ball also understood the importance of this aspect saying that “nothing propinks like propinquity”²⁹³.

A fourth important characteristic of Monnet’s circle of friends was that most of its members were Harvard-educated lawyers and protégés of Professor Frankfurter. Except George Ball, who graduated from Northwestern Law School, all the others attended the prestigious educational institution.²⁹⁴ Felix Frankfurter graduated from Harvard Law School and, after a career as lawyer he was appointed professor at his alma mater. During his tenure, between 1914 and 1939, he became a mentor to many of his students, including Dean Acheson, David Lilienthal and John McCloy. Acheson and Lilienthal became protégés of Frankfurter, who recommended them for various positions. At that time, Frankfurter “had become a sort of unofficial employment agency”²⁹⁵ both for the government service and the private sector. As a result, many Harvard graduates ended up designing and implementing New Deal policies, which profoundly impressed Monnet during his stays in the US.

When President Roosevelt needed to find a good candidate for an important position, he often turned to Frankfurter for advice. Consequently, as Hugh Johnson wrote in 1935, a very influential group built up around the New Deal. “The Harvard Crowd” or the “Happy Hot Dogs,” as this group was often called, was led by Professor Frankfurter who placed his “boys” in “obscure but key positions”²⁹⁶ where they became influential. Indeed, Professor Frankfurter gathered around himself his brightest students and placed them in positions of power within the New Deal management. But the brightness of his students was not always the most important criterion for Frankfurter. Even though Lilienthal did not stand out during Frankfurter’s seminars, the Harvard Professor lobbied Roosevelt intensively to appoint him to the TVA. McCloy, who was an average student, managed to impress Frankfurter, who, in his turn, “befriended and cultivated him”²⁹⁷.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Harold C. Deutsch, “The Western Crisis of the Sixties” In *The Changing Structure of Europe: Economic, Social, and Political Trends*, Beck, Robert Holmes, ed. (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1970), 71.

²⁹³ Hugh Sidey, “Learning How to Build a Barn,” *Time*, 17 October 1983, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,952191,00.html>, (accessed 20 March 2009).

²⁹⁴ *Harvard University. Quinquennial Catalogue of the Officers and Graduates 1636-1930* (Cambridge [Mass.]: The University of Harvard, 1930).

²⁹⁵ Hawley, *The New Deal*, 283.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Brinkley, “Minister without Portfolio”, 33.

Therefore, most of the members of Monnet's group of associates were not only graduates of the same post-secondary establishment but were also Frankfurter's protégés, whom he supported and placed in key positions.

Another collective characteristic of the members of Monnet's group of friends is that they were involved in the New Deal policies, intimately advising Roosevelt and designing and implementing New Deal programmes. Monnet, who was often nearby, watched closely the development and implementation of New Deal programmes. He later acknowledged that this enterprise influenced his thinking profoundly. Frankfurter and McCloy, together with Benjamin V. Cohen, formed an informal "study group" that regularly advised Roosevelt on New Deal policies. Despite his Republican sympathies, McCloy was a close adviser of the President until the end of his administration.

During his presidency, Roosevelt constantly sought Professor's Frankfurter's opinion and advice. The two got to know each other and became friends when they worked for the Wilson Administration²⁹⁸. During the Democrat administration of Roosevelt, the Harvard Law Professor continuously advised the President on New Deal policies. David Lilienthal managed one of the most important regional economic development agencies established under the New Deal, the TVA. As head of this public power company Lilienthal made it one of the most successful New Deal programmes. In Jordan Schwarz's words, "Roosevelt was TVA's architect, but Lilienthal was its engineer"²⁹⁹.

Both Dean Acheson and George Ball were involved in implementing New Deal policies and in advising Roosevelt on various issues. In May 1933 Ball accepted a position with the New Deal's Farm Credit Administration, whose main aim was to develop credit facilities for farmers. In November 1933 Ball joined the Treasury Department and worked on international trade and tax legislation. In the same year, Dean Acheson was appointed by Roosevelt Undersecretary of the Treasury. Later on, after a period of private practice as a lawyer, the New Deal President solicited Acheson's services again by bringing him back into the government as a senior official of the State Department. By advising Roosevelt and being involved in New Deal policies, Acheson, Ball, Frankfurter, Lilienthal and McCloy became part of the President's elite group, of what Krueger and Glidden called the "Roosevelt intelligentsia"³⁰⁰.

Even though some of Monnet's associates avoided political entanglements and others displayed their political loyalties openly, their beliefs brought them closer to liberalism and Democratic politics. This is another distinguishing characteristic of Monnet's US friends. Frankfurter refuted any party affiliation, underlining in his memoirs that he "never was a party man"³⁰¹. He continues that many journalists tagged him as being a

²⁹⁸ Freedman, *Roosevelt and Frankfurter*, 11.

²⁹⁹ Jordan A. Schwarz, *The New Dealers: Power Politics in the Age of Roosevelt* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 222.

³⁰⁰ Thomas Krueger and William Glidden, "The New Deal Intellectual Elite: A Collective Portrait" In *The Rich, the Well Born, and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History*, ed. Jaher Frederic Cople (Urbana, Chicago and London: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 338.

³⁰¹ Felix Frankfurter, *Reminiscences Recorded in Talks with Dr. Harlan B. Phillips* (New York: Reynal and Company, 1960), 240.

“hide-bound Democrat simply because Roosevelt named me”³⁰². This was probably not the only reason, since in many respects Frankfurter’s ideas of economic and social reform resembled Roosevelt’s thought. He supported many of the Democratic principles advocated by Roosevelt and advised the President regularly on economic and social reform. However, like his mentor Louis Brandeis, he did not always agree with Roosevelt’s New Deal policies (a matter that will be examined in the next chapter). As he did not openly advocate any party line and supported a more active role for the state in economic matters, Frankfurter was accused on many occasions of promoting socialist ideas. He responded to these allegations by saying that he “cannot compress life into a formula”³⁰³ and, for this reason, he considered himself as “politically homeless”³⁰⁴. In the end, Frankfurter preferred to remain loyal to his liberal principles without joining a party list.

Frankfurter’s student, Lilienthal, was an open advocate of liberal principles but, just as his professor, the TVA chairman was not attracted by rigid party principles. This was not the case of another student of Frankfurter, Dean Acheson, who was a lifelong active Democrat. In his book, *A Democrat Looks at His Party*, Acheson describes his party affiliation and his Democratic ideas. Another close friend of Monnet who became involved in Democratic politics was George Ball, who supported the Presidential campaign of Adlai Stevenson, who ran unsuccessfully for president against Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. The only member of Monnet’s group of friends who advocated a different party line was John McCloy, who was a lifelong Republican. However, despite his lack of enthusiasm for, if not open opposition to, the New Deal, McCloy served the Democrat President Roosevelt loyally. Furthermore, he was trusted by leaders from both Republican and Democratic administrations alike who offered him governmental positions. It is probably worthwhile noting that “the only public jobs held by John McCloy (...) were in Democratic Administrations”³⁰⁵. Both he himself and those who employed him often tended to forget his political kinship. This was the case of the Democratic President Roosevelt, who once replied to McCloy’s remark that he was a Republican: “Damn it, I always forget it”³⁰⁶. In the end, as his activity demonstrates, party politics and political allegiance were secondary for McCloy.

Despite the fact that Jean Monnet avoided party affiliations and public support for any given political group, it seems that he developed an affinity with the US Democratic Party. In this sense, the Head of Monnet’s Private Office during his Presidency of the High Authority, Jacques-René Rabier, described Monnet as a “Democrat – in the American sense of the word”³⁰⁷. Also, Monnet himself had confessed to Bromberger that he had “always voted Socialist, except, on one occasion”³⁰⁸. Like Frankfurter, Monnet did not fully support a political line since he also felt that there was no party programme

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Schwarz, *The New Dealers*, 134.

³⁰⁴ Alexander, *Jazz*, 82.

³⁰⁵ Isaacson and Thomas, *The wise men*, 29.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Interview with Jacques-René Rabier: the origins of the Schuman Declaration by Étienne Deschamps (Luxembourg, 8 February 2002).

³⁰⁸ Bromberger and Bromberger, *Jean Monnet*, 19.

that could fully incorporate his thought. Nevertheless, like most of his associates, Monnet felt that the Democratic Party programme reflected best his ideas.

An additional common feature of Monnet's friends is that they formed a special transatlantic group whose members had regular encounters with him and with each other. As Monnet wrote in his memoirs, his regular visits to London, New York and Washington "always began with calls on well-informed friends"³⁰⁹. He continues that, until Frankfurter's death in 1965, he never failed to seek his opinion³¹⁰. Furthermore, he emphasised the importance of his regular encounters with US lawyers such as Dean Acheson and George Ball³¹¹. Acheson, who became a regular at Monnet's Washington house, confessed to him that he greatly appreciated French cuisine³¹². He visited the Frenchman's house in Europe whenever he had the chance since, as he told one of his personal assistants, "no European trip was worthwhile unless (...) [there was] at least an hour 'jaw session' on current affairs with Jean Monnet"³¹³.

The Monnets and the McCloys became very close family friends and, in addition to the ordinary family dinners, Ellen McCloy and Sylvia Monnet cultivated a genuine friendship. Ruth Ball had also become close to Sylvia, meeting her regularly when she was in Washington³¹⁴. This was encouraged by Monnet's numerous get-togethers with George Ball, who was an "amanuensis and intellect punching bag whenever he [Monnet] came to the United States"³¹⁵. In addition to these regular meetings, the French businessman maintained and tightened up his set of connections by communicating regularly with his friends either by phone or by mail³¹⁶.

These regular meetings and constant communication were due to the fact that the members of this circle of friends felt the need to consult each other at key moments before taking important decisions. This represents another joint characteristic of this group of people. As mentioned already, Monnet attached crucial importance to his consultations with Frankfurter. In addition, he regularly consulted and was consulted by Acheson, Ball, Lilienthal and McCloy.

Consulting friends before taking important decisions was not an exceptional practice and it was employed by other members of the group. For example, as mentioned by Monnet in his memoirs, Acheson met almost every morning with Frankfurter. The Frankfurter-Acheson correspondence³¹⁷ testifies to this. It is interesting to note that, in many cases, Frankfurter was at the centre of these consultations since his opinion was highly valued

³⁰⁹ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 271.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid., 301.

³¹³ Brinkley, "Dean Acheson", 94.

³¹⁴ Bill, *George Ball*, 105.

³¹⁵ Interview with George W. Ball, 15 July 1981, 1-2.

³¹⁶ Interview with Jacques-René Rabier: the origins of the Schuman Declaration by Étienne Deschamps (Luxembourg, 8 February 2002).

³¹⁷ Correspondence between Felix Frankfurter and Dean Acheson, General Correspondence (1878-1965), Box 19, Reel 11, Felix Frankfurter Papers, LoC, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C..

not only by his former pupils but also by Monnet (an aspect to which we will return in the following pages). A good example in this sense is Lilienthal's relationship with Frankfurter, which could largely be characterized as that of a master and pupil.

A close examination of the Lilienthal-Frankfurter correspondence reveals that the most prominent president of the TVA never failed to ask for Frankfurter's advice on career and life matters. Frankfurter never offered superficial counsel even at the risk of upsetting his former pupil. For example, when, after his graduation, Lilienthal was tempted by an academic career teaching labour law, Frankfurter gently advised him to focus his attention and spend his energy on something else. He criticised him saying that wasting his energy trying to do too many things at once might be detrimental and had affected the quality of his work. He gave the example of a poorly written brief that disappointed his mentor, who started to wonder whether his ex-pupil's energy was not somehow scattered³¹⁸. Lilienthal was in no way offended by the remarks of his former teacher either on his teaching aspirations or the quality of his work. On the contrary, he not only welcomed them but put them immediately into practice by entirely giving up the idea of teaching and promising to focus more on his current tasks³¹⁹. Years later, in 1929, when Lilienthal's association with a law firm turned out to be not as profitable as he had initially believed it would be, Frankfurter encouraged him saying that "the interests to which you are devoted are not on the side of the biggest money bags"³²⁰. The Law Professor firmly believed, as he confessed in the same letter, that there were only few who were as "equipped for rate and utility matters on the public side"³²¹ as Lilienthal.

As proof of his belief, Frankfurter strongly advised President Roosevelt, even before his investiture, to recommend Lilienthal to become part of the TVA Board. "Of course I am delighted over what you tell me President-Elect Roosevelt has done about my situation, and even more pleased to learn that he thinks well of me (...)",³²² wrote Lilienthal to Frankfurter in January 1933. His appointment came at the right moment since the future member of the TVA board confessed to his former teacher in the same letter that he was facing financial difficulties because of the "very limited salary"³²³ in his current job. This episode, like many previous ones, illustrates the decisive role played by Frankfurter in shaping Lilienthal's career, as with Acheson, from the moment he obtained his degree to his nomination to the most important post of his career.

But Frankfurter's role did not stop there. He consistently influenced Lilienthal's important decisions as his former student continually consulted him and asked for his advice. He sought every opportunity to do so, be it a dinner table, a short one-to-one meeting or through an exchange of letters. "I am very anxious to see you and, if you

³¹⁸ Letter of Felix Frankfurter to David E. Lilienthal, 4 June 1924, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1912-1924), Box 47, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³¹⁹ Letter of David Lilienthal to Felix Frankfurter, 6 June 1924, *Ibid.*

³²⁰ Letter of Felix Frankfurter to David Lilienthal, 31 October 1929, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1928-1929), Box 49, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

³²² Letter of David Lilienthal to Felix Frankfurter, 7 January 1933, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1933), Box 59, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³²³ *Ibid.*

possibly can afford it, to have an hour to talk to you about a number of pressing matters of policy”³²⁴ wrote Lilienthal to Frankfurter in 1936. Numerous letters to the same addressee contained the same message. In response, the Law Professor dedicated long hours trying to solve Lilienthal’s dilemmas on important points of case-law or TVA-related decisions. Frankfurter’s “incalculable superiority of (...) mind and judgment”³²⁵ helped Lilienthal clarify his thoughts. In turn, Frankfurter was kept informed of important case-law and policy matters, which offered him the opportunity to convey his thoughts on particularly sensitive matters. In fact, Frankfurter encouraged Lilienthal to send him this kind of information, as a 1925 letter testifies: “please keep on sending on your briefs”³²⁶. We could safely say that this interest grew once Lilienthal became part of the TVA management. In a letter sent in 1934, Frankfurter highlighted that the news on the TVA “is about the most interesting and exciting news I get (...)”³²⁷.

When the TVA’s autonomous capacity to take decisions was threatened,³²⁸ Lilienthal turned again to Frankfurter for counsel. This constant communication and consultation between the two helped Lilienthal not only to clarify his thoughts but also reassured him that the decisions taken mirrored his mentor’s thought and will. On many occasions Lilienthal closely followed his former professor’s advice, as he informed later on: “I have been fortunate in being able to carry out your general advice (...)”³²⁹. When Lilienthal tried to put into words his feelings about Frankfurter in a congratulatory letter in 1952, he underlined that his gratitude was greater than that felt by a pupil for his teacher. He continued: “your helpfulness and your inspiration to me has continued from that time to this”³³⁰. Over the years the Law Professor passed on his thoughts to Lilienthal, also keeping his mentor, Louis Brandeis³³¹, informed of his former pupil’s actions that had profound social and economic consequences. As we will see in the third chapter, the two shared common beliefs mainly on economic and social matters, but also sometimes when it came to politics as well. The implications of their collaboration and exchange of ideas cannot be ignored since many of the concepts passed on by Frankfurter to Lilienthal had first been formulated by Brandeis.

³²⁴ Letter of David Lilienthal to Felix Frankfurter, 7 March 1936, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1936), Box 74, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³²⁵ Letter of David Lilienthal to Felix Frankfurter, 15 November 1934, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1935), Box 63, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³²⁶ Letter of Felix Frankfurter to David Lilienthal, February 1925, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1925-1929), Box 48, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³²⁷ Letter of Felix Frankfurter to David Lilienthal, 1934, unidentified exact date, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1934), Box 63, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³²⁸ Letter of David Lilienthal to Felix Frankfurter, 14 February 1934, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1934), Box 63, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³²⁹ Letter of David Lilienthal to Felix Frankfurter, 20 May 1936, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1936), Box 74, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³³⁰ Letter of Felix Frankfurter to David Lilienthal, 17 November 1952, Felix Frankfurter Papers, General Correspondence (1932-1964), LoC, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., Box 75, reel 46.

³³¹ Letter of Felix Frankfurter to David Lilienthal, 9 May 1933, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1933), Box 59, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

2.3. Conclusion: Monnet's US Friends

An examination of Monnet's US connections shows that they were not random choices or a long list of arbitrary acquaintances. As already highlighted in the literature Monnet indeed had a preference for US friends. However, the list of his close associates is much shorter than suggested in the current literature and could not include all those who at different moments and for various reasons collaborated with him. Only some could claim to be Monnet's close friends on the basis of their regular meetings, constant and extensive consultations before taking important decisions and even family friendships. To identify these individuals even on the basis of these criteria was not an easy endeavour. Yet, for the purpose of this study, this classification is a fundamental stage in considering the premise that the ideas to which Monnet was exposed influenced him greatly during the drafting of his coal and steel plan.

By examining the nature of his relationships with some US players on the basis of the criteria exposed, one could reduce the wide list of Monnet's friends presented in the current literature to a few individuals only. Not many people could be considered to have had a closer relationship with him than Felix Frankfurter. From the time they met, Monnet would almost never fail to consult the Harvard law professor, who on many occasions played his favourite role of door-opener to American decision-makers for his French friend. Another US actor who had been in Monnet's entourage since the two had met was John J. McCloy. During Monnet's life, McCloy played various roles from business partner and political advisor to family friend. Monnet's relationship with Dean Acheson largely followed the same pattern. Constant meetings, family gatherings and regular consultation were commonplace. Similarly, Monnet had a long friendship with David E. Lilienthal, the man who organised the most ambitious regional development programme in the interwar US. The list would not be complete without George W. Ball, who dedicated many years of his life to Monnet himself and his friend's plans. As already mentioned he even put his business interests on hold in order to offer advice to Monnet at critical times.

The examination of Monnet's relationships with these individuals showed that they were not only close friends with Monnet but also with each other. Acheson, Lilienthal and McCloy had not only been Frankfurter's students at Harvard Law School but continued after their graduation to be in constant contact with their professor, who in the case of Acheson and Lilienthal became their mentor. Acheson's and Lilienthal's careers were closely monitored by Frankfurter, who counselled them constantly, intervening on their behalf and convincing key players, such as Brandeis and President Roosevelt, to offer them employment. McCloy also kept in close touch with his former Professor, meeting and consulting him regularly. In his turn, Ball, maintained close friendships with some of the same individuals, primarily with Acheson, with whom he was involved in joint New Deal projects, and also with McCloy. This shows that the majority of people who were close to Monnet had very well developed links with each other.

This finding prompted further examination of this group of people, which revealed novel insights regarding Monnet's connections with these individuals, on the one hand, and

their workings methods and philosophy, on the other hand. These continual consultations between Monnet and his associates show that over time they formed a distinct circle of friends based on mutual confidence and shared methods. This group crossed national frontiers and the relationships between its members formed an invisible web across the Atlantic. Jean Monnet was part of this transnational circle of friends that, as mentioned above, shared numerous distinct characteristics.

While most of its members held key short-term executive jobs, they avoided taking on public offices, preferring the anonymity of obscure but chief positions. In fact, their professional careers oscillated between private assignments and short-term public jobs. They were ever present regardless of the administration in power and their valuable opinion was constantly sought by Presidents and other key actors. The large majority of the members of the group had attended and completed their education at Harvard Law School, where, under the tutelage of Felix Frankfurter, they were educated in the spirit of Brandeis' progressive thought (a matter that will be discussed at length in the next chapter). Sharing a belief in liberal concepts of economic and social reform, the protégés of Frankfurter were placed by their professor in key positions within the New Deal administration, where they applied their thinking, expertise and skills. This group of people became instrumental, not only in the implementation of the New Deal policies, but also in designing most of its programmes.

At first sight an outsider who did not graduate, Monnet was adopted by the Harvard Law professor, Frankfurter, and included within this Ivy League group. Monnet became another protégé who was introduced and recommended to the members of this circle of friends. This group of people, knit together by their regular encounters and shared approaches to issues, formed a web of experts who were always ready to offer their services, to deploy their knowledge and experience or to formulate a solution to a given crisis. They acted and employed their expertise across and beyond governments and national boundaries.

It is likely that, under this reciprocal influence, the members of this group adopted a number of the shared characteristics mentioned above. One not discussed at length in this chapter, is their allegiance to a particular system of thought. It has been mentioned that, although the great majority avoided political party membership, all of them, with the notable exception of McCloy (who is a special case as discussed above), were sympathetic towards liberal concepts and the Democratic Party. However, this label did not satisfy some, like Professor Frankfurter, who did not consider himself a Democrat in the pure sense of term. This was probably because the meaning of the concept Democrat, like many other political ideas, had changed over time. It is likely that the Harvard Professor did not always agree with the way in which Democratic concepts were interpreted and put into practice. This was the case during the first phase of the implementation of the New Deal, when, as discussed in the next chapter, Frankfurter could not agree with President Roosevelt about the Democratic policies.

Considering the difficulty to identify the allegiance to a particular thinking of the members of this circle of friends, a more in-depth investigation of the concepts

circulating within this group of people is necessary. This will contribute to a better understanding, not only of the thinking of the group, but above all of the concepts to which the originator of the Schuman Plan was exposed.

Chapter 3: A Process of Learning: The Formulation of Common Beliefs

Considering the close connection between the members of the group, their regular consultations and exchange of opinions, an investigation into their thinking is of fundamental significance. *What were the ideas circulating within this circle of friends? Which concepts attracted Monnet? What ideas commanded Monnet's allegiance? Who influenced Monnet's thinking?* Finding answers to these questions will provide a better understanding of the concepts embodied in the Schuman Plan.

3.1. Shaping Monnet's Worldview: Transnational Encounters and Exchange of Ideas

Before examining the ideas circulating within this group of people, it is important to underline some of Monnet's main personality traits. This is significant because the whole aim of this endeavour is to understand not only the thinking behind the Schuman Plan but also the means through which it reached Jean Monnet.

A person's worldview, their constructed perceptions and ideas, is strongly shaped by their family, education and social milieu. Once the process of formal education has been completed, reading and encounters with other people, who pass on new concepts, play an essential role in the process of knowledge acquisition and formation of a worldview. In this respect, Jean Monnet represents a fascinating case study.

At the age of sixteen, Monnet abandoned formal education after attending university for one year. He moved to London, where he learned the language of international trade and became familiar with the functioning of the world business community. First-hand encounters with professionals were more valuable for him than formal training in an educational establishment, which he considered an unnecessary detour in his process of training. "I never liked school. I would not, or could not for some reason, learn bookish knowledge by heart. When it was proposed that I should become a boarder at Pons (...), I fell ill,"³³² confessed Monnet in his memoirs.

The formal academic world did not fascinate Monnet and, as Robert R. Bowie said in an interview, the Frenchman "seemed to abstain from any systematic reading (...) or any extensive reading"³³³. This claim is substantiated by another close friend of the businessman, John J. McCloy, who underlined that Monnet "didn't read books"³³⁴. Despite this, Monnet was exposed indirectly to the most influential ideas of the time as his circle of friends included highly educated lawyers and professors of prestigious US

³³² Monnet, *Memoirs*, 38.

³³³ Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 15 June 1981, 14.

³³⁴ Interview with John Jay McCloy, 15 July 1981, 7.

higher education establishments. As many accounts demonstrate, Monnet's conversations with his friends always gravitated around contemporary political topics and various theoretical concepts even at the risk of exasperating other dinner guests not always interested in the same subject. His behaviour was very much influenced by the advice he received from his father when he left home at the age of eighteen: "Leave aside the books. Nobody can think for himself. Look out the window, talk to people. Pay attention to the one close by"³³⁵.

Monnet preferred to get acquainted with various political or economic theories through his highly educated Ivy League friends. As the Harvard Law professor, Bowie, said, Monnet got "most of his information from discussion [and] talk"³³⁶. Since Monnet's enthusiasm for reading books was rather limited it is undoubtedly that his ideas were not particularly shaped by his readings. Rather his regular encounters with close friends played a much more important role. Indeed, the Frenchman wrote that "(...) through it [cognac], one had an immense area to observe and a very active exchange of ideas. Through it, or form it, I learned more about men, and about international affairs, than I could have learned from a specialized education. I had only to listen and watch"³³⁷.

Indeed, Monnet took advantage of his regular meetings to make a remarkable exchange of ideas with his friends. His friendships grew closer around engaging discussions during which ideas blossomed and circulated freely. Ball called this free flow of ideas between himself and the French businessman a "collective spiral cogitation,"³³⁸ a reciprocal and continuous process of learning. Monnet was relentlessly in search for a constant exchange of ideas with his associates. As Ball said, "Monnet wanted a punching bag. He wanted somebody he could throw ideas against"³³⁹. Ball was not an isolated case since many of Monnet's friends speak in the same terms about their relationship with him. There is no doubt that this process stimulated Monnet's thinking and enriched his knowledge. To some extent, Monnet substituted his readings with a constant exchange of ideas with his friends who, on various occasions, communicated and passed on their ideas to him.

It was a custom for Monnet to meet and exchange ideas regularly with his associates, people such as Acheson, McCloy, Lilienthal and Bowie. However, the person whom he found most engaging was Professor Frankfurter. Indeed, they managed to build up a special relationship dominated by stimulating and ceaseless discussions. Speaking about the Monnet-Frankfurter relationship, a very close friend of both McCloy said that "they go to the point where they were foregathering with each other all the time (...). Their minds became very well attuned"³⁴⁰. To some extent, even without attending the Harvard Law School, Monnet became Frankfurter's disciple. This is the reason why an analysis of the ideas advocated by the Harvard Law professor is critical for understanding the

³³⁵ Monnet, *Clefs pour action*, 7.

³³⁶ Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 15 June 1981, 14.

³³⁷ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 38.

³³⁸ Ball, *The Past*, 73.

³³⁹ Bill, *George Ball*, 108.

³⁴⁰ Interview with John Jay McCloy, 15 July 1981, 6.

thinking of the originator of the Schuman Plan and of those who rallied around this project.

3.2. The Frankfurter-Brandeis Philosophy: A Shared Thinking of Monnet's Group of Friends

3.2.1. A New Economic Vision

During his professorship at Harvard, Frankfurter trained a generation of lawyers who assimilated, supported and put his ideas into practice. In turn, Frankfurter owed much to one of his professors in particular, namely Louis D. Brandeis³⁴¹. After Frankfurter's graduation in 1906, Brandeis kept a close eye on his brilliant student, asking his opinion on various sensitive legal issues, such as when proposing amendments to the Sherman Antitrust Act. Very soon they become close associates³⁴² and, as a result, Brandeis did not hesitate to entrust him with extremely sensitive and important tasks. Frankfurter was Brandeis' special envoy at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, not as a member of the US delegation, but representing the interests of the Zionist Organization of America led by Brandeis. Frankfurter's biographer, Liva Baker, quoted by Levy and Murphy, wrote: "at the Peace Conference he was Brandeis' eyes, ears, and spokesman"³⁴³. As Levy and Murphy show in their article analysing the Frankfurter-Brandeis relationship, Justice Brandeis privately and unofficially employed Professor Frankfurter, regularly depositing various sums of money in Frankfurter's account or paying him directly for services rendered³⁴⁴. This financial arrangement lasted until Frankfurter was appointed Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court of Justice in 1939, after which time it was no longer compatible with his professional responsibilities. However, the Frankfurter-Brandeis relationship entailed more than regular assistance and support. It implied constant meetings and exchanges of letters stimulating thought-provoking discussions.

Thus, in order to understand the thought of Felix Frankfurter, it is necessary to investigate his professor's thinking. The free-thinker Brandeis not only dedicated his life to promoting progressive policies, but also made an invaluable contribution to 'New Freedom' thinking. His ideas became prominent and relevant at the time of the

³⁴¹ Supreme Court Justice (1916-1939).

³⁴² Numerous studies addressed this special relationship. See, Bruce Allen Murphy, *The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Leonard Baker, *Brandeis and Frankfurter: A Dual Biography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984); Nelson L. Dawson, *Louis D. Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and the New Deal* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1980); Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy, eds., *"Half Brother, Half Son:" the Letters of Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Melvin I. Urofsky, "The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations," *The Supreme Court Review* 1985 (1985): 299-339.

³⁴³ David W. Levy and Bruce Allen Murphy, "Preserving the Progressive Spirit in a Conservative Time: The Joint Reform Efforts of Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter, 1916-1933." *Michigan Law Review* 78, no. 8 (August 1980): 1269.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1261-1263.

formulation of the New Deal policies. A strong supporter of Wilson's "New Freedom," Justice Brandeis advocated a philosophy that offered both an explanation and a solution for the US economic depression. Profoundly distrustful of large business, Brandeis considered that the source of the depression could be found in the unjust and excessive accumulation of economic power by the big trusts. The power of these trusts increased not due to their greater efficiency but because of their unlawful and unfair practices since, according to Brandeis, "there are no natural monopolies in the industrial world"³⁴⁵. He argued that natural growth in itself could not explain the establishment of monopolies that were only the result of suppressed competition and market control. Brandeis' findings stressed that "where the trusts had a high degree of control, the profits were great; where they had a small degree of control the profits were small"³⁴⁶.

Brandeis argued on many occasions that the suppression of competition by mergers³⁴⁷ led to the accumulation of economic power by a small group of businessmen. The exercise of this disproportionate economic power destroyed competition and unbalanced the economy. As a result, Brandeis underlined, only the dismantling of monopolies could solve the economic crisis and restore market competition. Indeed, as Hawley wrote, "decentralization was the key concept in the Brandeisian program"³⁴⁸. He believed that the natural laws of business would not be affected in any way if the illegal trusts were dismembered.

Overcoming the "curse of bigness" was only the first step towards a healthy economy since it would only cure the disease that had spread out throughout the economy. More important was the maintenance of fair economic practices. To achieve this, Brandeis proposed strict control of monopolies through firm antitrust regulations. Indeed, he emphasised that "if the law prohibiting such practices is clearly defined and enforced (...) no similar trust will arise in the future"³⁴⁹. Therefore, the judicial machinery had an important role to play in this process by dismantling the combinations and reinforcing antitrust legislation.

Brandeis considered economic regulation, overseen by central government, critical for the "preservation and development of competition"³⁵⁰. Again, he underlined that regulation was not against natural economic laws. On the contrary, he argued that it was the only way to avoid the establishment of monopolies and preserve competition by "keep[ing] open the path of opportunity"³⁵¹. The government needed to hold business in check, preventing companies from becoming too large or acquiring unrestricted power. Like liberty that could degenerate into absolutism competition needed to be promoted by

³⁴⁵ Osmond K. Fraenkel, ed., *The Curse of Bigness: Miscellaneous Papers of Louis D. Brandeis* (New York: The Viking Press, 1934), 105.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 110.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 131.

³⁴⁸ Hawley, *The New Deal*, 289.

³⁴⁹ Fraenkel, *The Curse of Bigness*, 105.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 104.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 110.

regulation in order to avoid its destruction³⁵². The aim was not to replace capitalism but to make it work by establishing a system of economic democracy.

As a close associate of Brandeis, Frankfurter was exposed to his thinking. Brandeis passed on to his student many of the ideas he preached fervently, fundamentally shaping Frankfurter's intellectual development. "Brandeis was the prophet, Frankfurter the disciple", wrote Jordan Schwartz³⁵³ who closely examined this relationship. However, their rapport went much further than this since, as Levy and Murphy stressed, "Brandeis unconsciously regarded Frankfurter as an alter ego"³⁵⁴. Frankfurter internalized many of his professor's principles, although he denied that he "saw completely eye to eye with Brandeis on socio-economic matters,"³⁵⁵ as he wrote in a letter addressed to Arthur Schlesinger.

Despite this claim, there seems to be much common ground between the thinking of the two Harvard Law Professors. Like his mentor, Frankfurter believed in and advocated the philosophy of liberalism, whose aim was the restoration of equality of opportunity in the US. The concentration of economic power in the hands of a small group of people who manipulated economic mechanisms represented, in his view, the root of economic decay. It was therefore a menace to the economic freedom necessary for the preservation and development of capitalism. Frankfurter argued that the only solution was decentralization, the dismemberment of the trusts that destroyed effective competition, individual enterprise and capitalism in general³⁵⁶. In his draft of the 1936 Democratic platform, Frankfurter stressed that it was imperative "to destroy the roots of economic fascism,"³⁵⁷ by stamping out monopolistic practices. Therefore, like his mentor, Frankfurter believed in the importance of establishing an economic system based on unhindered competition.

3.2.2. Frankfurter-Brandeis Philosophy in Practice

These concepts, made public on different occasions by their authors and highly critical of the US capitalist arrangement, were not confined to a theoretical sphere. They managed to penetrate the walls of governmental buildings by various means. If, in the first decades of the twentieth century, it was not possible for Brandeis to implement his ideas, the late 1920s offered a different state of affairs. With the onset of the economic crisis and Roosevelt's presidency, Brandeis' and Frankfurter's philosophy came of age. In this situation, Frankfurter managed to pass on some of their thinking to the US administration. At the same time, the concepts were being implemented by many of Frankfurter's pupils, who meanwhile, thanks to their mentor, had become part of the New Deal arrangements.

³⁵² Ibid., 109.

³⁵³ Schwarz, *The New Dealers*, 123.

³⁵⁴ Levy and Murphy, "Preserving the Progressive Spirit", 1296.

³⁵⁵ Freedman, *Roosevelt and Frankfurter*, 25.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., 351.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

A short discussion of the effects of the New Deal thinking on the interwar United States is relevant for different reasons. During that time the originator of the Schuman Plan, who was in the USA and without doubt constantly shadowing Frankfurter, was closely observing not only this unique experiment – the New Deal – but also how some of Frankfurter’s ideas were put into practice. More than this, as the two were constantly exchanging ideas, he was very likely discussing with his friend the implementation of his ideas. In addition, many of the members of Monnet’s transnational group were implementing this thinking during Roosevelt’s administration. In short, this examination will help us understand to what extent the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy was internalized by Monnet’s associates and the Frenchman himself.

How relevant was Brandeis’ and Frankfurter’s thought during the New Deal? At a time when the USA was ravaged by economic distress, the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy offered an explanation of and a solution to the crisis. The Great Depression represented a great opportunity for both Frankfurter and Brandeis to implement their thought. In addition, the election of a Democrat President was undoubtedly seen by the two academics as a great opportunity.

Before examining the influence of the concepts promoted by Frankfurter and Brandeis on Roosevelt’s New Deal, it is important to point out some brief aspects of the New Deal. Historians judge the New Deal programmes as lacking consistency as Roosevelt did not follow a coherent set of principles or ideology. Two stages are identified in the development of the New Deal: the first New Deal, whose policies were close to a conservative programme of cooperation and accommodation with business, and the second New Deal that marked a shift towards a liberal programme. Talking about this alteration of Roosevelt’s policy in the mid-1930s, Otis L. Graham underlined that “it seems that historians had reached a striking unanimity, agreeing upon the nature of Roosevelt’s ‘fundamental change’, labelling it progressive, liberal, a step forward”³⁵⁸. By the same token, Anthony Badger argued that after 1935, Roosevelt abandoned his early policies of “conciliation with business” and adopted an “anti-business” approach aimed at “redistributing wealth”³⁵⁹. While the results of this political alteration are still debated in the literature there seems to be a consensus regarding Roosevelt’s leftward shift that contributed to the application of a liberal programme based on antitrust and welfare measures. The New Left historian Ellis Hawley neatly summarizes Roosevelt’s policy during those years arguing that “the New Deal began with government sponsorship of cartels and business planning; it ended with a campaign and the attack on rigid prices; and along the way, it engaged in minor excursions into socialism, public utility regulation, and the establishment of ‘government yardstick’”³⁶⁰.

Thus, given that before the mid-1930s Roosevelt promoted conciliation with trusts, neither Brandeis nor Frankfurter could agree with his approach. While Brandeis disdained all monopoly, Roosevelt and his supporters considered that concentration of economic

³⁵⁸ Otis L. Graham Jr., “Historians and the New Deals,” *The Social Studies* 54, no. 4 (April 1963): 135.

³⁵⁹ Anthony Badger, *The New Deal. The Depression Years 1933-1940* (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 94.

³⁶⁰ Hawley, *The New Deal*, 15.

power was inevitable and that the solution was sustained economic planning and a bigger role for central government. Brandeis opposed Roosevelt's "first New Deal" on the grounds that the President's policy that encouraged big government did not offer a solution to limit the domination of big business.

Yet Brandeis did not manifest his opposition directly. It seems that during the New Deal, Frankfurter was the link between Brandeis and Roosevelt. He was constantly consulted by the President on the course of the New Deal. As the President's policies seemed to lack a comprehensive and consistent philosophy,³⁶¹ Roosevelt was always in need of the valuable opinions of trusted men and Frankfurter was ever present and ready to offer his advice on the future direction of the New Deal. However, given the direction of the policies before the mid-1930s, there is little evidence that during the first New Deal Frankfurter's recommendations were put into practice. As his ideas were very close to those of his mentor, Frankfurter, like Brandeis, was not entirely supportive of Roosevelt's accommodation with and support to the Wall Street trusts during the first years of the New Deal. There is no doubt that Roosevelt's policy shift in 1934-1935 made the President more open to Frankfurter's ideas and more inclined to put them into practice.

Historians still debate the degree of influence of the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy on Roosevelt's policies during the second New Deal. Freedman mentioned that Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., in his book *The Age of Roosevelt*, argued that Brandeis' influence increased during the second New Deal when he became the "central intellectual force"³⁶². Nevertheless, Freedman does not accept this interpretation considering it too tidy an explanation for decisions that often were taken under pressure and without too much ideological consideration³⁶³. Even though it is difficult to demonstrate that Roosevelt closely followed the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy after the mid-1930s, Freedman argues that his policies show that the influence of big business diminished and the President put in place antitrust policies. This was the main reason why the second New Deal was judged to have been closer to Brandeis' and Frankfurter's anti-monopoly beliefs.

A good example of the degree of Frankfurter's influence on the Democrat President is mentioned by Freedman, namely the Democratic platform of the 1936 campaign, drafted by the Harvard Law Professor. This political programme underlined that the government should play an active role in the preservation of capitalism and warned that competition, and with it the whole capitalist system, was in danger as "private socialism" was expanding, which was as dangerous and alien to the US society as "state socialism"³⁶⁴. Even though the President did not accept this document unaltered, Frankfurter's strong antitrust principles survived and were accepted by the President. This episode confirms that indeed in the second period of the New Deal a number of the concepts promoted by Frankfurter and Brandeis not only penetrated the walls of the US administration but were also implemented.

³⁶¹ Dawson, *Louis D. Brandeis*, vii.

³⁶² Freedman, *Roosevelt and Frankfurter*, 24.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 347.

As mentioned earlier, Frankfurter's direct influence on Roosevelt was only one way in which some of Brandeis' and Frankfurter's ideas became part of the New Deal. In addition, many of the concepts were implemented by Frankfurter's pupils, who with their professor's help accessed top positions within the New Deal administration. These disciples shared many of the principles preached by both Frankfurter and Brandeis and applied them accordingly. As Hawley argues, men like Acheson and Lilienthal did not act like a unit but supported a liberalism of "Wilsonian-Brandeis vintage,"³⁶⁵ which emphasised the importance of dismantling monopolies and restoring competition between small economic units. Furthermore, Hawley makes this point very clear by arguing that "it was through Frankfurter and his disciples that the Brandeisian philosophy was to have its greatest impact upon the making of New Deal policy"³⁶⁶. While working as a clerk for Louis Brandeis between 1919 and 1921, Dean Acheson not only familiarized himself with Supreme Court Justice's philosophy but, as he confessed later on, the time spent with Brandeis proved to be critical for "his intellectual development"³⁶⁷. Also, Jordan Schwartz supports this idea, by adding that "the Brandeis-Frankfurter disciple who ultimately made the greatest impact upon New Deal concepts of development was (...) David E. Lilienthal"³⁶⁸.

The evaluation of Lilienthal's influence on the New Deal comes as no surprise since, as mentioned earlier, he continuously consulted Frankfurter before taking important decisions. Frankfurter's student believed that cheap energy supplied unrestrictedly would boost competition and the development of small business³⁶⁹. Like his Harvard professor, Lilienthal considered that centralized business that controlled the distribution of power in various regions of the US amplified the effects of the 1929 economic depression, since decisions were taken at the centre without considering the interests of "people whose lives would be affected"³⁷⁰. Therefore, the federal government needed to step in "to meet the evils that were bred"³⁷¹ by limiting the power of monopolies.

However, although he considered that the central government had to play a more active role, Lilienthal believed that decisions should be made as close to the people as possible. This was the role played by the TVA, a decentralized regional agency led by people who understood the economic problems of that geographical area and the social difficulties faced by the people. As chairman, Lilienthal used the TVA to promote the decentralization of business. In his book, *TVA: Democracy on the March*, Lilienthal showed that the system of management and distribution of power in the area covered by the TVA had been decentralized, with more than one hundred power distribution

³⁶⁵ Hawley, *The New Deal*, 284.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Jeremy Schiffres '11, Dean Acheson on Leadership, *Dean Acheson Papers. Manuscripts & Archives, Yale University*.
<http://www.library.yale.edu/mssa/exhibits/OtherwiseEngaged/politics/schiffres/03schiffres.html> (accessed 4 January 2012).

³⁶⁸ Schwarz, *The New Dealers*, xv.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., 220.

³⁷⁰ David E. Lilienthal, *Tva, Democracy on the March* (New York and London: Harper, 1944), 142.

³⁷¹ Ibid., 141.

companies³⁷². The TVA offered energy at affordable prices contributing to the dismantling of the Wall Street monopoly on energy supply, supporting small business and restoring fair competition in the region.

Unveiling the philosophy behind the TVA to his mentor, Lilienthal wrote in the summer of 1935 in a memorandum to Frankfurter that the “business of producing and selling electricity is not a private business (...) but by its nature a public business”³⁷³. Because energy was “an essential of life,”³⁷⁴ Lilienthal believed that governments should both supervise its production and marketing and that the control of private corporations selling the energy should be strictly limited. This is why he called for the establishment of a “yardstick” that would help the government determine how much it should cost so that it could be available to everybody, houses and factories, at an affordable price.

Lilienthal’s approach conflicted with that of Arthur Morgan, the TVA chairman, who invited Lilienthal to become a director of the TVA upon Roosevelt’s request. Immediately after joining the TVA management Lilienthal, who did not trust the private utilities companies that controlled prices and the power distribution in the region, strongly supported the idea of public distribution of power. Conversely, Morgan argued that the power produced by the TVA should be distributed by the existing private companies. As the two could not resolve their differences, President Roosevelt asked Morgan to resign in 1938. Lilienthal, who remained the only TVA chairman, was a firm believer that the system of trusts controlling the distribution of power in the Tennessee Valley would not contribute to the development of small enterprises that could not afford the high power prices maintained by the private utilities companies. To support his claims that the TVA aimed at encouraging small business, Lilienthal mentions in his book *TVA: Democracy on the March* that the Alabama Dairy Products Corporation published an advertisement in a local newspaper saying that “the cheese plant is a child of the people and TVA (...)”³⁷⁵. Therefore, Lilienthal’s approach was vindicated, since small companies started to have access to fairly priced energy supplies, which in the long run reformed the economy of the region, until then dominated by companies that could afford the high prices maintained by the energy trusts.

Throughout his TVA leadership, Lilienthal adopted and promoted an approach that reflected the Frankfurter-Brandeis ideas of decentralization, support for small enterprises and restoration of competition. Although Lilienthal did not seem to follow a blueprint based on Frankfurter-Brandeis thought, the TVA became an institution that not only put into practice many of their ideas, but in many respects also achieved some of the results sought by the two Harvard Law Professors, namely decentralization and equal opportunity for small economic units. This was the result of Frankfurter’s profound influence on his disciple, as the TVA President confessed in a letter addressed to his former professor in 1964 introducing the first two volumes of his Journals: “That you

³⁷² Ibid., 134-5.

³⁷³ Letter from David E. Lilienthal to Felix Frankfurter, 3 August 1935, David Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1935), Box 69, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Lilienthal, *Tva*, 98.

appear again and again in these entries, and that your influence upon me is evident throughout will hardly surprise you”³⁷⁶. Even though Frankfurter was the one who influenced him directly, he was not the only one. Lilienthal also recognised Brandeis’ profound influence on his thinking and decisions. In this vein, the TVA President confessed in a letter in 1939 (when Justice Brandeis was in retirement): “what your career, your great opinions, and your character have meant to me I can never tell you (...). The only way I have to repay my debt to you (...) is to try from day to day to perform my duties as I believe you would want me to”³⁷⁷.

Therefore, there is no doubt that the two thinkers, Brandeis and Frankfurter, had a profound influence on Lilienthal’s thinking and, as a result, on the policies he pursued while head of the most important New Deal entity. Lilienthal is probably the best example of a disciple of Frankfurter implementing the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy. But, as mentioned, he is not the only one since many others who grew up under Frankfurter’s wing became convinced by his ideas and put them into practice.

3.2.3. The Frankfurter-Brandeis Thought: Shaping Monnet’s Thinking

While Lilienthal was applying his expertise as head of the agency charged with the economic reorganisation of a large region, Jean Monnet, the man who would later be responsible for reforming the French economy, was conducting his business in the US. In 1929 he became vice-president of the Bancamerica-Blair Corporation and established his residence in San Francisco. From then, even though he travelled to various places, his life gravitated around his circle of friends. In fact, these regular transnational encounters contributed to the formation of his ideas. He had not only become accustomed to Frankfurter’s and Brandeis’ ideas, he had also observed them being put into practice by Lilienthal and other disciples of the Harvard Law Professor and, to some extent, by Roosevelt during the New Deal. During this time, he had been constantly exposed to his friends’ ideas and, as his actions show, he not only valued but also internalized many of these concepts.

For example, as the Frenchman was impressed by Lilienthal’s work in the Tennessee Valley, he aimed to use it as a paradigm for the post-war economic revival of France after being appointed head of the French National Planning Board by de Gaulle. Eric Roussel dedicated a number of pages to the examination of this aspect in his biography of Monnet. Immediately after his appointment in January 1946, Monnet recommended to those involved the writings of the ex-TVA chair as an outline of a successful project of regional development and deconcentration. According to Libert Bou, a French businessman co-opted by Monnet in his small Commissariat Général du Plan team, Monnet gave to Philippe Lamour, the initiator of the Compagnie du Bas-Rhône-Languedoc, a company in charge of the modernization of southeastern France,

³⁷⁶ Letter from David Lilienthal to Felix Frankfurter, 5 October 1964, Felix Frankfurter Papers, LoC, Manuscript Division, Washington D.C., Box 75, reel 46.

³⁷⁷ Letter from Lilienthal to Brandeis, 18 February 1939, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Correspondence (1939), Box 91, Folder Number: AM 19859 PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

Lilienthal's book *Adventurer in Planning* as a model plan on water and land management and agricultural development. Later on, Lamour was introduced to Lilienthal by Monnet, who said to the ex-TVA chair: "tell this young man what you have done in Tennessee"³⁷⁸.

In addition to encouraging people to familiarize themselves with Lilienthal's writings, Monnet organised "productivity missions" to the US for those involved in the activities of the French National Planning Board. He wrote in his memoirs that he sent Libert Bou to Lilienthal to learn about the methods implemented so successfully by the TVA head "whose work on the Tennessee Valley Authority had greatly interested me as a possible object-lesson for France and Europe"³⁷⁹. Bou observed and returned with an understanding of Lilienthal's techniques of regional development. As a result, as Monnet wrote, "Libert Bou came back with the idea of the Bas-Rhone-Languedoc project, which he carried out with the help of Phillippe Lamour: it became a model of French and European agricultural progress"³⁸⁰. In an interview with historian Eric Roussel, Bou further expanded on his experience in the USA and the implementation of the US model in France underlining that, in the end, "it was Lilienthal who convinced us"³⁸¹. The TVA head argued on numerous occasions that his techniques could be implemented successfully in other parts of the world. In fact, after he finished his work at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, he founded a consultancy firm and offered his expertise and TVA experience to various governments around the world interested in regional development³⁸². Monnet had watched Lilienthal work and become familiar with his methods while he was in the USA and he genuinely believed that they represented one of the best solutions for the reorganisation and modernization of the French economy.

This episode, when Monnet tried to better understand the TVA project, is just one example demonstrating Monnet's admiration for a project that implemented Brandeis' and Frankfurter's ideas. But, in addition to that, the Frenchman was one who was familiar with this thinking (as one who had first-hand access to it thanks to Frankfurter) and internalized many of its concepts. For instance, Monnet became convinced that the key to a healthy economy was free competition, unhindered by the market control of the big business. For this reason, he was a strong supporter of decentralization that he saw as a first step in the process of restoring competition. Dismantling monopolies, big businesses that grew on the basis of unfair economic practices, and the establishment and maintenance of fair economic practice on the market became the cornerstone of Monnet's thinking that was transposed in his 1950 plan for pooling French and German coal and steel. He was not afraid to defend this belief even at the risk of displeasing close friends.

In 1953 the Frenchman challenged his friend Lilienthal, who meanwhile had changed his view of the effects of big business on the economy of a country. After his TVA chairmanship had finished and he had resigned from the Atomic Energy Commission,

³⁷⁸ Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, 493-4.

³⁷⁹ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 276.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, 495.

³⁸² See David Ekbladh, "'Mr. TVA': Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933-1973," *Diplomatic History* 26, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 335-74.

Lilienthal decided to pursue a business career and became a passionate defender of “big business” as his book *Big Business: A New Era* published in 1953 testifies³⁸³. In an accompanying letter sent together with a copy of the book to Monnet, the ex-TVA President underlined the positive effects of big business on a big market, taking the example of the coal and steel community: “The preoccupation of the book is not with ‘efficiency’ nor with legal or economic doctrines, but rather the political, community and individualist consequences of large-scale enterprise vis-à-vis small-scale undertakings”³⁸⁴. He continued: “In this connection, for example, in the chapter ‘Competition and the One Big Market’, I speak of the ‘unifying consequences of Bigness’ in connection with the Schuman-Monnet Coal-Steel Plan”³⁸⁵. Despite their very close friendship, the Frenchman did not share Lilienthal’s opinion and, in spite of his balanced language, he did not shy away from showing his skepticism of the positive effects of big business. In order to alleviate the disagreement he tried to make a distinction between conditions in the US and Europe by underlining that he did “not think one can be as optimistic about the effects of Big Business in Europe as in the United States”³⁸⁶. The Frenchman made it clear that his plan was drawn up around the concept of free competition, writing to his friend that “the Schuman Plan is constructed on the belief that it need certainly not be so as long as the spark of competition can be fired again”³⁸⁷.

These sentences summarize Monnet’s thinking as embodied in the Schuman Plan, which aimed to restore competition and limit the negative effects of market control by restricting and dismantling big business. Lilienthal understood clearly the Frenchman’s point as his letter of reply demonstrates: “The heart of the matter is competition; no doubt of it”³⁸⁸. The same aim was explained by Monnet to the heads of delegation participating at the ECSC Conference in a draft letter of 1 March 1951 that underlined that the scope of the plan was to “give to all equal opportunities in order to promote the development of the best producers”³⁸⁹. For this reason and in order to “exclude all discrimination,”³⁹⁰ the future community could not accept a situation where “the Ruhr industries could occupy a dominant position thanks to artificial advantages which would allow them to maintain their traditional structure”³⁹¹. Furthermore, Monnet envisaged that this process of dismantling big business and guarding free competition would be overseen by a central institution that would apply strict antitrust legislative instruments.

³⁸³ For a more detailed analysis on Lilienthal’s beliefs see Neuse, *David E. Lilienthal*.

³⁸⁴ Letter from David Lilienthal to Jean Monnet, 5 March 1953, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Box 373, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Letter from Jean Monnet to David Lilienthal, 10 April 1953, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Box 373, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Letter from David Lilienthal to Jean Monnet, 19 May 1953, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Box 373, Folder Number: AM 19859, PPP, DRBSC, PUL.

³⁸⁹ “Projet de lettre aux chefs de délégation”, autre version, no. 4, 1 mars 1951, FJM, AMG 13/2/4, 2.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

Monnet's thinking was not surprising since he was part of a group of people who internalized and valued many of the principles advocated by Frankfurter and Brandeis. There is no doubt that people such as Dean Acheson, David Lilienthal and John McCloy familiarized themselves with Frankfurter-Brandeis thought during their university studies. Also many of these concepts were clarified in the following years when they remained close to their mentor and engaged in continuous consultations with the Harvard Law Professor. Therefore, when employed in concrete jobs, they tried to implement the concepts advocated so vigorously by their mentor. Lilienthal's policies in the Tennessee Valley Authority, his continuous consultation with Frankfurter and even with Brandeis, and his remarks to the two Harvard Law Professors show his commitment to their philosophy. As a result, it is not surprising that individuals like Jean Monnet, Dean Acheson, David Lilienthal, and, even, the Republican John McCloy were strong supporters of free competition, decentralization and central economic supervision.

In addition to the mutual traits listed in the previous chapter, the members of this circle of friends shared the way of thinking that Frankfurter had inherited from his mentor Brandeis. Although it cannot be claimed that they all supported these ideas to the same degree, it can be safely argued that they agreed upon a number of concepts that attached great importance to the idea of free competition based on the elimination of all market monopolies and the maintenance of an open market by a supervisory authority.

As its activity and thought demonstrates, this transnational group of people had to a large extent many of the characteristics of an epistemic community as defined by Haas. They shared "a set of normative and principled beliefs", "casual beliefs" and "notions of validity", which were listed by Haas as essential traits of epistemic communities³⁹². Educated in the spirit of Frankfurter-Brandeis thought, most of the members of this circle of friends valued Wilsonian liberal concepts that underlined the pivotal importance of economic supervision. In addition, they shared a genuine belief that their thinking provided a solution to the economic crisis and improved social welfare. Acting as autonomous experts, these individuals considered that their enterprise transcended political partisanship and ideologies. Many of the concepts of this knowledge-based group of experts had been applied with questionable results in the US during the New Deal. Monnet, who was at that time a simple observer, learned a lot about these concepts from Frankfurter directly, but also from the other members of his group and, when the time came, he aimed to employ his expertise.

3.3. Monnet Applies his Knowledge: Decentralizing, Restoring and Supervising Competition

As someone who did not seem to pay too much attention to, or be impressed by, the prominent economic theories in circulation at that time (such as Keynesianism), Monnet was convinced of the practical utility of the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy that surpassed any ideology preached by political movements. It offered solutions to various

³⁹² Haas, "Introduction", 3.

crises but, most importantly, it aimed to reform the very economic principles of the capitalist world. Monnet knew that in the post-Second World War context, a solution offering temporary economic and social relief would not be sufficient. The Great Depression and the role played by the big corporations in its origins were all too fresh in people's memories. There was a real desire for change, a need to restructure the economic foundations of Western Europe. "The public would not tolerate a return to the conditions of the thirties"³⁹³ wrote A.W. Lovett. Referring to the mood of the post-war France, J.C. Asselain wrote that, "at the Liberation [it] was animated (...) by anti-capitalist feelings the intensity of which is hard to conceive today"³⁹⁴. The main reason for this frame of mind was that "private enterprise was widely felt to have failed the country before the war (...)"³⁹⁵. Therefore, many believed that the state needed to step in and take charge of not only economic reconstruction but, most importantly, the supervision of economic practice.

It was against this background of anti-capitalist feelings that Monnet designed his 1950 plan for Western European economic cooperation under a joint supranational authority called on to supervise fair economic practice on a common market. The coal and steel plan reflected Monnet's thinking on the redefinition and reorganisation of European capitalism. As mentioned, the value of capitalist principles for providing economic growth and social welfare was questioned not only in France but all over Europe. As were many others, Monnet was convinced that the ruined economies of Western European countries had to be built on different principles from those that set the stage for the most terrible world economic depression and for the beginning of a new world conflagration. The Frenchman underlined that the economic reorganisation of Western Europe "required an entirely new approach which would eliminate any possibility of governmental and private measures maintaining or creating distortions of natural competitive conditions in order to give advantages to special groups against the interests of the community"³⁹⁶.

Competition was indeed the key concept around which Monnet designed his 1950 plan. He stressed that his project was not intended to preserve what he called "the Balkanization of European production under nationalistic planning"³⁹⁷ since this would "lead to the end of European efficiency"³⁹⁸. The ultimate aim of the proposal was to establish a common market based on free and unhindered competition, watched over by a High Authority. Even though this plan reminded some of the French of the "old continental project of the 1926 French-German steel cartel,"³⁹⁹ Monnet defended it

³⁹³ A.W. Lovett, "The United States and the Schuman Plan. A Study in French Diplomacy 1950-1952", *The Historical Journal* 39, no. 2 (June 1996): 426.

³⁹⁴ J.C. Asselain quoted by François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 157.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁶ The economic operating principles for the implementation of the Schuman proposal: draft of outline – Traduction, 8 August 1950, Archives Jean Monnet for Europe, FJM, Lausanne, AMG 5/6/4.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁹ Jean Monnet's comments on the editorial in the *Times* of 14 July on Western Union, Archives Jean Monnet, FJM, Lausanne, AMG 5/6/2.

arguing that these kinds of accusations are “totally false”⁴⁰⁰. On the contrary, he claimed that the organisation envisaged would be called on to supervise the functioning of the vast European market in order to preserve the conditions for real competition. Writing about the aims of his scheme Monnet emphasised that, during the negotiations on the Treaty of Paris, “Hallstein had understood, as had several others, that we were not planning to substitute the High Authority for private enterprise, but seeking to make possible real competition throughout a vast market, from which producers, workers, and consumers would all gain”⁴⁰¹.

In fact, many misunderstood Monnet’s project considering it some sort of plan to create a European planning agency designed to regulate the market. This is understandable to some extent given Europe’s habit of having a coal and steel market regulated by cartels that in many instances decided the fate of these industries. However, the aim of the plan was not to regulate and strangle the market, quite the opposite. This was clearly explained in a note written by Ball in December 1950 after Monnet had asked him to put down on paper the French delegation’s position on the economic philosophy of the future market⁴⁰². Building on the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy, Monnet’s project aimed at “the development of competition to the greatest extent compatible with the structure of the coal and steel industries”⁴⁰³ that was considered as “an essential part of the process of generating those forces which will compel industry to increase productivity and production and reduce prices”⁴⁰⁴. The note continued that this arrangement was designed to counter the very forces interested in controlling the market, namely monopolies, that aimed at “furthering the narrow interests of one group of private industry at the expense of the larger interests of the Community”⁴⁰⁵. The memo made it clear that the intentions of the author of the Schuman Plan were to establish and maintain unhindered competition on the market and not to control its functioning.

The same position can be found in a memorandum of 6 December 1950 drafted by Pierre Uri, which followed George Ball’s model, but clearly indicated that it summarized Monnet’s views as presented during the meeting of the heads of delegations of 4 October and in document no. 18 of 27 October⁴⁰⁶. Explaining the objectives of the Schuman Plan, this memo indicated that its aims were to “satisfy the needs of the Community by creating a market within which the enterprises are constantly encouraged to increase their productivity and to improve their production”⁴⁰⁷ which can only be done by “develop[ing] competition”⁴⁰⁸. At the same time the document identified a danger in “the

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 329.

⁴⁰² Lettre d’envoi de G. W. Ball a Jean Monnet, 6 December 1950, Archives Jean Monnet, FJM, Lausanne, AMG 10/2/8bis.

⁴⁰³ Note regarding French position on articles 41 and 42, 6 December 1950, Archives Jean Monnet, FJM, Lausanne, AMG 10/2/8, 2.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Dispositions proposées relatives aux cartels et aux concentrations industrielles, décembre 1950, Archives Jean Monnet, FJM, Lausanne, AMG 10/1/3, 1.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

establishment of private monopolies, as well as the creation of cartels, [which] would strengthen existing structures and replace the pursuit of the common good by the domination of private interests”⁴⁰⁹. In other words, such a situation would reduce competition even more and undermine the public interest. By contrasting the interests of industry with those of the public, the memorandum was reminiscent of Brandeis’ view of big business as only interested in controlling the market and ensuring profit by any means. In the opinion of those involved in the drafting of the document, the only way out of such a situation, where the market was dominated by monopolies, could only come as a result of a firm intervention by “a public authority”⁴¹⁰. Once again the memorandum underlined that the aim of the plan was “to eliminate all forms of organizations which both destroy competition and give political influence to private interests”⁴¹¹.

Having been educated at the Frankfurter-Brandeis school, Monnet was aware that competition could be seriously hindered by big business, namely trusts, that restricted market access and set prices at will. This is the main reason he considered the removal of trusts a *sine qua non* condition for the establishment of an innovative economic system in Europe founded on genuine open competition. He regarded this as the first necessary step, just as Brandeis and Frankfurter had argued some decades earlier.

3.3.1. Taking Apart Big Business

The situation Monnet discovered in Western Europe following his return after the war was not much different from that in the US at the turn of the twentieth century which led to Brandeis’ attack on big business controlling the market⁴¹². After the war the trusts controlling the European steel market began to revitalize, especially in Germany,⁴¹³ given that they were at the heart of the economic system in that part of Europe. Europe had had a long tradition of powerful trusts operating both at national and international level. One of these cartels that controlled the interwar steel market in Europe by fixing prices and allocating market access was the International Steel Cartel (ISC), founded in 1926 by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg. The ISC’s main aim was to make sure that steel output did not exceed the needs of the market. Its method was to fix at the beginning of each trimester a maximum amount of production in tons, which was subsequently split between each national group; if the quotas were exceeded, financial compensation needed

⁴⁰⁹ Mémorandum relatif aux articles 41 et 42 par P. Uri et revu par E. Hirsch, la version 6 décembre 1950, Archives Jean Monnet, FJM, Lausanne, AMG 10/2/9, 1.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Dispositions proposées relatives aux cartels et aux concentrations industrielles, Ibid.

⁴¹² See Louis Brandeis, *The Regulation of Competition Versus the Regulation of Monopoly*, An address to the Economic Club of New York on 1 November 1912.

<http://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/260>, (accessed 25 September 2011).

⁴¹³ For an extended discussion on the formation of the German trusts see Isabel Warner, *Steel and Sovereignty: The Deconcentration of the West German Steel Industry, 1949-1954* (Mainz: Verlag Philipp Von Zabern, 1996), 4-5. Also, Gillingham, *Coal*, 366.

to be paid⁴¹⁴. This kind of control of the market had troubled Brandeis years earlier when he attacked the monopolies controlling the US steel market.

Monnet's position during the drafting of the Schuman Declaration and the negotiations on the Treaty of Paris, as well as his activity as President of the High Authority, reflected his personal concern that the trusts would gain ground and obstruct economic reform and Western European reconstruction. Talking about Monnet's feelings on trusts Bowie said that "he was always very leery of the industrialists"⁴¹⁵. "Educated" at Frankfurter's school Monnet understood very well the dangers of market control by the trusts and, for this reason, he considered it crucial to insert into the Schuman Declaration and the subsequent treaty negotiated on its basis strong antitrust provisions designed both to limit and to break up monopolies.

The Schuman Declaration contained explicit anti-cartel provisions, not only to alleviate the fears articulated by the US administration that the planned organisation would revive the interwar trusts, but also because of Monnet's conviction that big business curbed competition. For the same reason, Monnet insisted on the inclusion in the ECSC Treaty of antitrust provisions. As the one who designed these anticartel provisions, Bowie underlined that Monnet considered them "absolutely essential"⁴¹⁶ and that they were not only introduced to please the US, Monnet considering them as "something that the treaty needed for its own integrity, for its own validity"⁴¹⁷. In fact, the articles 65 and 66⁴¹⁸ of the Treaty constituting the ECSC, which defined the antitrust terms, are at the core of the functioning of the ECSC. The Treaty prohibited all mergers that would allow an enterprise to gain a dominant market position as the first paragraph of Article 65 stipulated: "All agreements among enterprises, all decisions of associations of enterprises, and all concerted practices tending, directly or indirectly, to prevent, restrict or impede the normal operation of competition within the common market shall be prohibited, and in particular those tending: (a) to fix or influence prices; (b) to restrict or control production, technical development or investments; (c) to allocate markets, products, customers or sources of supply"⁴¹⁹. The treaty that established the EEC embodied similar thinking, containing similar anti-monopoly provisions that prohibited "all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as

⁴¹⁴ For details see Clemens A. Wurm, "Les cartels internationaux de l'acier de l'entre-deux-guerres: Precurseurs du Plan Schuman ?" In *Le Plan Schuman dans l'histoire. Intérêts nationaux et projet européen*, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2004), 60-80.

⁴¹⁵ Interview with Robert R. Bowie conducted by François Duchêne, Washington, 28 September 1988, EUI, HAEU, European Oral History, <http://www.warc.eui.eu/idchn/pdf/INT490.pdf> (accessed 14 October 2010), 15.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁸ Articles 65 and 66 are the renumbered versions of the initial articles 41 and 42 and of the later on articles 60 and 61 of the drafts treaty. They "started in draft articles 19-20 and finished up in 65-66" Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 28 September 1988, 13.

⁴¹⁹ Article 65(1), Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm>, (accessed 9 July 2008).

their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market (...)”⁴²⁰.

Indeed, Monnet attached crucial importance to the inclusion of carefully defined anti-cartel provisions in the two founding treaties. During a discussion with representatives of the French *Chambre syndicale* he underlined that “the core idea of the plan was the condemnation of all agreements”⁴²¹. Monnet’s close friendship with Frankfurter, whose thinking was inspired by many of the concepts advocated by Brandeis, and their long and insightful conversations very likely contributed to the formulation of his strong anti-monopoly beliefs. He saw the dismemberment of the trusts as a requisite stage in the process of establishing a common market based on free competition. These regulatory policies were designed to have a temporary effect in as much as to restore competition. George Ball, who had been closely involved in the drafting of the ECSC Treaty, underlined the aims sought by the French delegation during the negotiations of the Schuman Treaty emphasizing that “the prohibition of horizontal concentrations when they tend towards monopoly is a fundamental condition for attaining the objectives of the Schuman Plan”⁴²². This objective was subordinated to “the development of competition to the greatest extent compatible with the structure of the coal and steel industries [considered as] (...) an essential part of the process of generating those forces which will compel industry to increase productivity and production and reduce prices”⁴²³.

As mentioned earlier Bowie, who was sent to Paris by the High Commissioner to join Monnet’s team after the Schuman Declaration announcement,⁴²⁴ recalled in an interview that Monnet was the one who suggested he draw up the famous anti-trust articles of the ECSC Treaty because “he was quite convinced that it was necessary to have some provisions of this sort”⁴²⁵. In order to remove all doubt about these provisions, McCloy’s personal assistant underlined that “the initiative was his not mine”⁴²⁶.

Nevertheless the introduction of antitrust provisions in the Schuman Treaty was a challenging undertaking. Repeatedly Monnet argued for decartelization. When he explained the origins and scope of the Schuman Declaration to the members of the Council of the Allied High Command for Germany in Bonn, shortly after his plan was made public, he stressed that one of its most important aims was the elimination of bad producers (“*mauvais producteurs*”), who survived only thanks to their protectionism. The Frenchman argued that the plan is designed to counteract the cartels and their unfair

⁴²⁰ Article 85(1), Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, *Ibid*.

⁴²¹ Philippe Mioche, “La patronat de la sidérurgie française et le Plan Schuman en 1950-1952. Les Apparences d’un Combat et la Réalité d’une Mutation” in *The Beginnings of the Schuman-Plan: Contributions to the Symposium in Aachen, 28-30 May 1986*, ed. Klaus Schwabe, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988), 309.

⁴²² Note regarding French position on Articles 41 and 42 [articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty] by G.W. Ball, Archives Jean Monnet, Fonds Plan Schuman, Dossier George W. Ball, FJM, Lausanne, AMG 10/6/2.

⁴²³ *Ibid*.

⁴²⁴ Ball confirmed also Bowie’s contribution: “Bob Bowie (...) came down to help on the provisions”. Interview with George W. Ball, 15 July 1981, 17.

⁴²⁵ Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 15 July 1981, 6.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid*.

practices⁴²⁷. In fact, the success of the Schuman Plan depended on decartelization, as Monnet emphasised in a letter to Schuman in which he stressed that “without effective measures of decartelization and deconcentration, the implementation of the Schuman plan is impossible (...)”⁴²⁸. Monnet considered the deconcentration of the Ruhr a “fundamental requirement of the implementation of the Schuman Plan”⁴²⁹ and of the creation of the common market based on “effective application of the rules of fair competition and non-discrimination”⁴³⁰.

After the Schuman Plan was made public its fate and that of the process of deconcentration in Western Europe and especially in West Germany were bound together. The anti-cartel provisions were at the very core of Monnet’s 1950 plan and, as a result, represented an extremely sensitive issue for him. He threatened to resign when the German delegation at the Schuman Conference proposed giving responsibility for defining the anticartel provisions of the treaty to ministers instead of experts⁴³¹. Monnet’s style of negotiation denoted little inclination for compromise in general. But, due to the importance he attached to economic deconcentration, this was one of the aspects he was least willing to sacrifice.

The negotiations on the antitrust provisions of the Treaty of Paris were the most challenging part of the Schuman Plan conference,⁴³² both in terms of finding an agreement and duration because Monnet was not inclined to make concessions regarding this section of the treaty. In fact, the articles of the ECSC Treaty, which defined the terms of agreements between undertakings and concentrations, were the last to be approved. Writing about this stage of the negotiations, Monnet said: “for three months now the Treaty had been lying on my desk – one hundred articles, but two of them subject to reservations that were holding everything up”⁴³³.

It was during this stalemate on the negotiations on the antitrust provisions that Monnet showed his profound attachment to the cause of decartelization. However, he was not the only member of the group of friends who attached the greatest importance to these provisions. A concerted effort was needed to convince the German delegation to accept the two disputed articles. At that moment other members of Monnet’s transatlantic group of friends intervened to defend the importance of the antitrust provisions because of their personal conviction that without decartelization competition could not be restored. One of

⁴²⁷ Exposé de Jean Monnet devant le Conseil de la Haute-Commission alliée, Petersberg, 23 mai 1950, Archives Jean Monnet, FJM, Lausanne, AMG2/3/8.

⁴²⁸ Lettre de Jean Monnet a Robert Schuman, Paris, 22 January 1951 Archives Jean Monnet, FJM, Lausanne, AMG 11/1/9.

⁴²⁹ Note sur l’article 61 et le deconcentration de la Ruhr, 25 février 1951, FJM, AMG 13/2/8, 1.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Frances Lynch, “The Role of Jean Monnet in Setting up the European Coal and Steel Community”, In *The Beginnings of the Schuman-Plan*, ed. Schwabe, 128.

⁴³² Pierre Uri, a member of the French delegation, supports this statement: “L’obstacle le plus sérieux s’est révélé être les dispositions qui s’attaquaient aux cartels et aux concentrations abusives(...)”. Pierre Uri, *Penser pour L’action* (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1991), 89.

⁴³³ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 352.

the most active players was John McCloy, an ex-student of Frankfurter who put the decartelization of Western Germany at the top of his agenda.

As at that point there were only two articles under negotiation, McCloy directly pressed Adenauer to accept the anticartel stipulations included in the draft treaty. In addition, McCloy negotiated directly with the German steel industrialists, who were outspoken in their hostility to Schuman's proposal. McCloy's endeavour was not solely motivated by the desire to ensure the success of the Schuman Plan, but also by his personal belief that German trusts had to be eliminated. In parallel with McCloy's actions, Acheson made efforts to secure British support for an eventual agreement. With a view to convincing policymakers across the Channel, "Acheson dispatched his principal adviser on German affairs, Colonel Byroade, to London with warnings that the consequences of a failure of the Schuman Plan would be disastrous in terms of Allied policy in Germany"⁴³⁴. The combined efforts of Monnet's close friends⁴³⁵, made possible the agreement that put an end to the deadlock of the Schuman Plan Conference. The contested antitrust articles were accepted by the German delegation on 14 March 1951, which enabled the Treaty of Paris to be signed on 18 April 1951. This aspect, namely the pressure exerted by the members of Monnet's transatlantic circle of friends on statesmen, will be further examined in a later section of this work.

Both Monnet and his close friend, McCloy, were strong supporters of decartelization. The Frenchman clearly indicated this in his memoirs by saying that "McCloy, more than anyone else, had become the advocate of decartelization"⁴³⁶. A moderate conservative, McCloy genuinely believed that the trusts' behaviour prevented other companies from competing on equal terms, hindering competition and, subsequently, economic development. Indeed, both believed that decartelization was a pivotal step in the process of Western European reconstruction. Ultimately, the decartelization process supported by McCloy and Monnet took two forms in the aftermath of the war: the implementation of strict antitrust legislation, which aimed at instantly liquidating the *Konzerne*, and the settlement of temporary price controls at ECSC level, which had as its aim the elimination of monopolies that maintained high prices.

The immediate rationale behind the decision to decartelize the German economy was the desire to dismember the trusts that supported the Third Reich's war effort and regulated the European market in the interwar period. The implementation of antitrust measures and the dismantling of the *Konzerne* had started in the post-war years in accordance with the provisions embodied in Article 12 of the Potsdam Agreement (August 1945) that stated that "the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentrations of economic power as exemplified in particular by

⁴³⁴ Warner, *Steel and Sovereignty*, 35.

⁴³⁵ Monnet underlined especially the pivotal role played by McCloy. See Lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman, Paris, 22 décembre 1950, Archives Jean Monnet, Correspondance Jean Monnet-Robert Schuman, 1947-1953, FJM, Lausanne, AMG 26/3/13.

⁴³⁶ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 352.

cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic agreements”⁴³⁷. While the Allied powers apparently agreed on the importance of deconcentration, they had had different perceptions of the methods to be employed to achieve this aim. Isabel Warner has made a detailed examination of these differences, arguing that while the British supported the “socialization” of the German steel industry, namely the transfer of the steel companies to public ownership, the French aimed at limiting “its military potential”⁴³⁸. In addition to these two positions, the US pushed, according to Warner, for “introducing a measure of real competition into the Ruhr steel industry by purging it of discriminatory business practices”⁴³⁹. Since there was no comprehensive approach between the Allied powers, the deconcentration process took many forms in the immediate post-war period with very limited results. The debate was well under way in late 1949 and early 1950.

Further clarification of the attitudes of the Allied Powers was offered by Robert Bowie in an interview in 1987. The antitrust specialist admitted that the British viewed the process differently since, “the Labour government really would have loved to have seen the whole industry nationalized”⁴⁴⁰. On the other hand, he emphasised that the French had a desire to accomplish the process but “didn’t have any effective apparatus in Frankfurt to do much about it”⁴⁴¹. Bowie’s comments on this important aspect of post-war West German reorganisation elucidate that in fact the process was led by the US component of the Allied High Commission even though the US was negotiating with the British and the French in a “legal sense”⁴⁴². Talking more specifically about the legal act that defined how the process of decartelization would be carried out, Law no. 27, Bowie said that he believed that “(...) it would be fair to say that in the implementation of it, in carrying it out and developing the way in which it was actually executed, it pretty much fell to the American element”⁴⁴³.

The presentation of Monnet’s 1950 plan intensified the debate about the fate of the German cartels. It coincided also with a change in the US leadership in Germany, where McCloy took up his new assignment in July 1949. He had made decartelization a priority of his activity as a High Commissioner. Immediately after taking up his appointment, he reshuffled the Decartelization Branch that was moved from the Economics Division to the office of the General Counsel⁴⁴⁴ under the direct guidance of Bowie, the young Harvard law professor who joined McCloy’s team in early 1950. McCloy’s strategy was to surround himself with a team of experts in decartelization, including Bowie, who was nicknamed “the mullah of decartelization”⁴⁴⁵. Talking about his recruitment, Bowie, who

⁴³⁷ Excerpts from the Report on the Potsdam Conférence (Potsdam Agreement) (2 August 1945), http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2979 (accessed 14 January 2012).

⁴³⁸ Warner, *Steel and Sovereignty*, 3.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁰ Interview with Robert R. Bowie conducted by François Duchêne, Washington, 12 May 1987, EUI, HAEU, European Oral History, <http://www.eui.eu/HAEU/OralHistory/pdf/INT490.pdf> (accessed 14 October 2010), 16.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁴ Wells, *Antitrust*, 163.

⁴⁴⁵ Warner, *Steel and Sovereignty*, 25.

became McCloy's general counsel, acknowledged that the new High Commissioner's interest in deconcentration made him, as somebody who was teaching anti-trust law at Harvard, an ideal candidate for this job. In his turn, Bowie brought others, "who had worked on anti-trust and federal trade commission matters,"⁴⁴⁶ across the Atlantic Ocean to join him in this unparalleled endeavour, that is not solely to reorganise the economic principles of an important European state, but also to change deep-rooted mentalities and practices. All these personnel moves had profound effects on the priorities of the Allied High Commission, as the process of dismantling the *Konzerne* intensified after McCloy became US High Commissioner in Germany.

Shortly after the announcement of the coal and steel pool, the pressure on the German trusts mounted. On 16 May 1950 a new deconcentration law that had been in preparation since the new High Commissioner took up his position was issued under McCloy's close guidance. It provided fresh impetus to the process of decartelization by increasing the powers of the Allied High Commission in this area. Law no. 27 clearly specified that it was within the competence of the Allied High Commission to determine which enterprises could continue to operate on the coal and steel market. The law drew up a list of enterprises that would immediately be liquidated or reorganised since they constituted monopolies on the market. In addition, a number of enterprises would be evaluated by the High Commission to determine whether or not they represented an excessive concentration of economic power⁴⁴⁷. In accordance with Law no. 27, the Allied High Commission would be the institution supervising the dismemberment of the trusts dominating the German market. The results of the antitrust policy pursued by McCloy in Germany are judged to be modest by Warner, who argued that the European cartels had been restored, especially in the Ruhr region where the prewar giants recaptured their strength. In her account on the deconcentration of the West German steel industry she argued that "the reconcentration process was over by 1958 when (...) there were again eight concerns dominating the West German steel industry"⁴⁴⁸.

Although the Law was designed to destroy monopolies in general its "main focus was on coal and steel"⁴⁴⁹. Since the new US leadership had taken office at the High Commission its key aim was the definition of the conditions under which the German trusts, especially the coal and steel ones, would be broken up. What makes this aspect more interesting from our perspective is that Bowie and McCloy did not work in complete seclusion. They were looking for the approval of the French and even of the Germans, as Bowie recalled years after: "now, all during this effort [the definition of the future antitrust law], I was constantly in communication with Hallstein, representing the Chancellor, (...) and also with Monnet and had very extensive discussions as to whether or not this was going to be something which the French would be prepared to accept as reasonable in terms of the application of Law 27, and with respect to the Germans whether it was reasonable in

⁴⁴⁶ Interview with Robert R. Bowie conducted by François Duchêne, 12 May 1987, 17.

⁴⁴⁷ Law N° 27: Reorganization of German Coal and Iron and Steel Industries, done at Bonn, Petersberg, on 16 May 1950, by order of the Allied High Commission, John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Chairman of the Council, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/european_navigator-en-6148d81c-88f9-4afd-9f95-d2b626b9ed0b (accessed 16 July 2008).

⁴⁴⁸ Warner, *Steel and Sovereignty*, 236.

⁴⁴⁹ Interview with Robert R. Bowie conducted by François Duchêne, 12 May 1987, 16.

terms of not being unfair or unduly discriminatory against the Germans”⁴⁵⁰. Thus, Monnet, as an important interlocutor of McCloy and Bowie, was very much aware of the plans of the US side of the High Commission. From this perspective, coal and steel might not seem such a random choice for the Frenchman since as Bowie said a year later in another interview: “I’m sure that Monnet must have been kept fully abreast of what was being done so that the question of treatment of the coal and steel industry in Germany was certainly in the forefront of his mind”⁴⁵¹. The desire of the US component of the High Commission to associate German leaders was also a novelty. This move was determined by the desire to avoid the feeling that the process was yet another measure imposed on the defeated Germans. For this reason, the US leadership within the High Commission thought of a mechanism that would give the impression of German acceptance of the decartelization law, as Bowie witnessed: “And so we devised the idea that we would have a letter written from the German government to the Allied High Commission, ostensibly proposing this as the solution”⁴⁵². It is very likely that Monnet was conscious of this other important feature of the policy pursued in West Germany by his close friend, McCloy, namely the desire to avoid alienating the German political class and, subsequently the public, by associating it, even falsely, with the process of decisionmaking.

Even though Law no. 27 was published only days after the Schuman Plan was announced, it soon became apparent that it could not co-exist with a future community based on equality between members and that some sort of accommodation needed to be worked out⁴⁵³. However, these aims were largely complementary. As already mentioned, McCloy’s strategy was to give the impression that the decartelization process was an initiative coming from Bonn. He even managed to convince Erhard to “take the political onus of approving the letter from Adenauer to the High Commission,”⁴⁵⁴ an act that represented his tacit agreement with the proposed solution. The pronouncement of the Schuman Plan came as a considerable relief for those involved in the drawing up the decartelization process of West Germany. It was clearly a softer way to inflict reform than that based on Law no. 27. Certainly in both cases the industrialists’ opposition was vociferous. However, it was much easier to convince the opposition within the context of the Schuman proposal based on equality between the participating components. As recognised by one of the key actors of the process, Bowie, “if the Schuman Plan hadn’t come along, we would simply have gone ahead and made our decisions – after extensive discussion, obviously, with industries (...) – but nevertheless we would have ended up with a diktat”⁴⁵⁵. The association of Germany introduced by the Schuman Plan very much satisfied both Bowie and McCloy, who were the most interested in moving the decartelization process forward.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid., 10.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid., 18.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., 18.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid., 22.

While both McCloy and Monnet attached crucial importance to the decartelization process, they realised that the European industries could not change their cartel practices overnight. It required concentrated action not only in Germany but across Western Europe. This is one of the reasons why Monnet's ECSC treaty, defined by Duchêne as "Europe's first strong anti-cartel law,"⁴⁵⁶ received such support from McCloy. Both McCloy and Monnet hoped that the ECSC would put in place a system of strict antitrust regulation that would keep in check the cartels. This was indeed the case not only for the ECSC Treaty but also its successors. Building on the Schuman Treaty, the Treaty establishing the EEC gave the EEC exclusive competence in the area of competition. The European Commission, the successor of the High Authority, exclusively verifies and authorises mergers in the Single Market with a view to avoiding abuses of dominant market positions. Indeed, antitrust policy has become a cornerstone of the current EU. It seems that even the name of the European Commission was inspired from across the ocean, as Pierre Uri testified in an interview⁴⁵⁷. The Frenchman underlined that, during the negotiations on the EEC Treaty, those participating, when searching for a name for the future institution, were inspired by the names of well-known US bodies empowered with anti-trust supervision (such as the Anti-Trust Commission, and the Federal Trust Commission).

The outright dismantling of the cartels was the desired intention of both Monnet and McCloy. However, it was clear from the outset that this policy required various mechanisms to succeed. As a result, Monnet imagined a mechanism of temporary price control at the ECSC level. It was envisaged that the High Authority would set maximum and minimum margins within which prices could fluctuate. The overall aim was twofold: on the one hand to encourage efficient production and on the other to eradicate trusts. This objective was made public on 23 May 1950 to the members of the Council of the Allied High Command. Monnet emphasised that "if we set a unique price the bad producers would be eliminated"⁴⁵⁸. He considered that the trusts maintained their monopoly in the market only thanks to their high prices and protectionist policies, an idea that recalled Brandeis' view on the matter. In his presentation of the aims of the Schuman Plan, Monnet made it clear that the plan was directed against the old cartels whose dismantlement would, at the same time, eliminate discriminatory practices and dumping and would determine price decreases⁴⁵⁹. The maximum and minimum prices will be only temporarily⁴⁶⁰ set by the High Authority in order to dismember the monopolies. Therefore the capacity of the trusts to set prices, which was their main mechanism to

⁴⁵⁶ Duchêne, *Jean Monnet*, 214.

⁴⁵⁷ Interview with Pierre Uri, 21 September 1984, published in Melchionni and Ducci, *La genèse des traités de Rome*, 274.

⁴⁵⁸ Exposé de Jean Monnet devant le Conseil de la Haute-Commission alliée, 23 mai 1950, FJM, Ibid. See also Principes économiques essentielles présidant à la mise en œuvre du Plan Schuman; projet, 1 août 1950, Archives Jean Monnet, Conférence de Six: du 20 juin au 28 août 1950 : dossier de regroupement. Sous-dossier : réactions américaines, FJM, Lausanne, AMG 5/6/3.

⁴⁵⁹ Exposé de Jean Monnet devant le Conseil de la Haute-Commission alliée, 23 mai 1950, FJM, Ibid.

⁴⁶⁰ See also Richard T. Griffiths, "The Schuman Plan Negotiations: The Economic Clauses" In *Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950/51-The Beginning of the Schuman Plan*, ed. Klaus Schwabe (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1988), 47 and Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, *The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), 83 and 105.

control markets, would be curtailed. The Schuman Declaration clearly stated that “the establishment of compensating machinery for equating prices”⁴⁶¹ was only a transitional measure. The originator of the 1950 plan envisaged that, once the cartels were eliminated, the temporary measure of price control would be abandoned.

An examination of the draft articles on price control shows the importance of this mechanism not only in establishing the common market but also in maintaining it. Draft article 38, finalised in mid-December 1950, prohibited, “in terms of price, the unfair or artificial competition practices, and, particularly, the drop of prices only temporarily and only locally aiming to the attainment of a position of monopoly”⁴⁶². Precisely to avoid this situation, where an enterprise dominated the market by setting prices, the draft article provided that “the High Authority can fix: a) maximum prices (...) and b) minimum prices”⁴⁶³ if it deemed that such a decision were necessary in order to overcome a particular crisis or for the establishment of the common market. In addition, the High Authority was granted the possibility of overseeing that monopolies were not established and that fair competition was observed. Both draft articles 38 and 56 (the latter drafted at the end of December 1950) stipulated that the supranational authority could impose fines⁴⁶⁴ on enterprises that established discriminatory conditions on the market in order to gain an unfair advantage.

Monnet strongly advocated that economic deconcentration was an indispensable step in the process of Western European reconstruction. He and his close friend McCloy had been leading the way in the process of decartelization. They were helped by Bowie, who like McCloy and Monnet, valued the concepts preached by his former professor at Harvard Law School, Frankfurter. It was no coincidence that McCloy asked for Bowie’s services as he was not only one of the best experts on anti-cartel legislation but was familiar with Frankfurter’s thought. They all genuinely believed that the elimination of big business was an indispensable stage in the process of establishing a free market based on unhindered competition.

On this account and in order to make sure that their vision was embodied in the text of the treaty, McCloy and Monnet entrusted to Bowie the task of drafting the relevant articles. At first sight it was only his antitrust expertise which made him appealing. That is why a number of authors have attempted to identify to what degree the US antitrust experience played a role in the drafting of the antitrust provisions, a “fundamental innovation”⁴⁶⁵ for Europe, and the subsequent development of the European competition rules. Clifford A. Jones argues that the competition provisions of the ECSC Treaty and EEC Treaty “bear the substantive imprint of the Sherman Act derived from their American ancestry”⁴⁶⁶. Furthermore, Jones shows that the language of the provisions

⁴⁶¹ *Texte de la déclaration de 9.5.50, traduction américaine*, JMF, AMG 1/3/6.

⁴⁶² *Projet de rédaction de article 38 par P. Uri*, 14 décembre 1950, JMF, Lausanne, AMG 10/2/5, 1.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁶⁴ *Projet de rédaction de article 56*, 24 décembre 1950, JMF, Lausanne, AMG 10/2/6, 2.

⁴⁶⁵ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 353.

⁴⁶⁶ Jones, “Foundation of Competition Policy”, 26, note 49.

included in the treaty differs from the Sherman Act, because it was reworded by Maurice Lagrange⁴⁶⁷, who was a member of the French delegation and future Advocate-General of the European Court of Justice, but the content and the aims reflected “the same substantive principles as developed in the US case law”⁴⁶⁸. Therefore, according to Jones, the US experience strongly influenced the drafting process of the Treaty of Paris antitrust rules. Conversely, David J. Gerber denies that the US antitrust legislation and case-law served as the basis for the definition of the competition rules included in the Treaty of Paris solely because of the USA’s involvement in their drafting (i.e. Bowie’s association). He argues that the US “involvement was clandestine and generally limited to supplying basic ideas, many of which were already known to key drafters” and that the US experience had little influence on the first European antitrust provisions⁴⁶⁹. Volker Berghahn takes a more balanced stand in this debate by arguing that, while there are similarities between Monnet’s reasoning and the US anti-trust legislation, the anti-cartel provisions “were not an exact replica of the American model” since the European cartel tradition was also embodied in articles 60 and 61⁴⁷⁰.

While it is hard to entirely ignore the US experience, as codified by the Sherman Act (1890) or Clayton Act (1914), when talking about the ECSC Treaty anti-trust articles, it is misleading to make it the sole focus of the discussion. In addition to being an expert on anti-trust, Bowie was first and foremost seen by McCloy and Monnet as someone who was able to put on paper their vision on the matter. In practice, Bowie needed to consult only with McCloy and Monnet when looking for the best combination of words to spell out the anti-trust provisions. When asked if others had been involved in the drafting process, Bowie said: “as far as the getting of a draft went, yes, it was just the two of us, me and Monnet”⁴⁷¹. He underlined that not even Uri or Hirsch participated in the process: “I don’t remember them particularly. I rather more remember discussions directly with Monnet, but I don’t know why that is”⁴⁷². However, despite the fact that he received “a very considerable amount of latitude in working it out,”⁴⁷³ Bowie continually kept McCloy informed.

In an interview in 1981, Bowie acknowledged that he had an unprecedented role, confessing: “I was not representing the US government strictly speaking. I was representing McCloy”⁴⁷⁴. He did not consider his mission an official one at all, but saw it “essentially as a service to Monnet at his request”⁴⁷⁵. Therefore, Bowie’s assignment was to design the provisions in such a way that they would embody McCloy’s and Monnet’s vision of the matter. For this reason Monnet kept a very close eye on the content of these

⁴⁶⁷ Bowie confirms that the articles drafted by him were reworked by Lagrange “who put them into French treaty language”, Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 15 June 1981, 6.

⁴⁶⁸ Jones, “Foundation of Competition Policy”, 26.

⁴⁶⁹ David J. Gerber, *Law and Competition in twentieth century Europe: Protecting Prometheus* (New York and Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1998), 342.

⁴⁷⁰ Berghahn, *The Americanisation*, 144.

⁴⁷¹ Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 12 May 1987, 21.

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, 24.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

key articles, as Bowie indicates when he writes that he and Monnet “talked about these at great length and about the theory and the concept behind them”⁴⁷⁶.

Although the US antitrust tradition (which can be hardly seen as unitary) probably played a role in this process, it was most likely the thinking of those directly involved, namely Bowie, McCloy and Monnet, three players educated at “Frankfurter’s school,” that contributed decisively to the shaping of the antitrust vision of the treaty. McCloy and Monnet considered it crucial not only that the provisions be inserted into the Treaty, but also that their views on the matter, anchored in the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy, be reflected accurately in the text. For this purpose they employed not only one of the best specialists in the field, but one who continued the Harvard tradition of teaching on the subject. Bowie was not a random choice by McCloy, who first invited him to join his team in Germany and afterwards sent him to Monnet. Both McCloy and Monnet were aware that Bowie was a follower of the antitrust tradition founded at Harvard by Brandeis and continued by Frankfurter. By entrusting Bowie with this task and by overseeing this process, both McCloy and Monnet could be confident that the antitrust vision to which they adhered was embodied in the text of the treaty.

The importance given to these stipulations by McCloy and Monnet made them pay particular attention to the way they were designed. But, more than this, both were concerned about the practical results of their ideas. Educated in the spirit of Brandeis’ and Frankfurter’s thought, McCloy and Monnet put particular emphasis on breaking up trusts dominating the coal and steel market with a view to establishing free competition in the region. As a consequence, they insisted on the decartelization of West Germany and forced German policymakers and the business community to accept the anti-monopoly measures and put them into practice. Their firm stand on anti-trust regulation contributed greatly to the establishment in Europe of anti-trust regulation and the implementation of a systematic decartelization policy in that part of the world.

3.3.2. The High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community: Guaranteeing Fair Economic Practices

As one of Frankfurter’s disciples, Monnet knew that the process of breaking up monopolies was just the first stage in the process of establishing economic normality, where no entity controlled the market and all concerned could freely compete under the same conditions. But, he was aware that competition could not be preserved without some kind of supervision. The dilemma faced by Monnet was clearly spelled out by Bowie in an interview: “But that left the problem, in the sense that, were you going to go through all this break-up of these to create a situation which at least at the beginning would leave them [enterprises] on a relatively equal footing, and then immediately have the possibility that they can reconstitute these things without any constraints?”⁴⁷⁷. For this reason Monnet imagined an entity that would oversee the market and intervene, if needed, in order to defend its unhindered functioning. His solution clearly had echoes of

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., 19.

Brandeis' conception of economic governance, where the government was called on to play an active role in market supervision in order to avoid the re-establishment of new trusts in the place of those dissolved.

However, as Monnet could not use a particular government for the purpose of market supervision, he needed to come up with an original entity that would be given, as Bowie said, "a number of powers to deal with keeping the market from getting out of hand or getting chaotic – but the basic premise was that this was to oversee a private market, a market of free enterprise (...)"⁴⁷⁸. As someone who listened over and over again to Frankfurter's arguments, there is no doubt that Monnet was very concerned about the functioning of the market and did not believe in *laissez-faire*. He therefore envisaged the creation of an independent authority empowered "to keep some check on both the practices among enterprises, which would impair the market, and also the size of enterprises"⁴⁷⁹ since, as Bowie confessed, "he immediately felt, well, this could get the whole thing put off balance if it wasn't under some kind of control"⁴⁸⁰. Thus, he even went a step further than Brandeis by imagining an institution that would be independent not only from the enterprises' interests but also from the government's involvement. In practice this central supervisory entity, the High Authority, was designed to fulfil two main functions: to protect competition and to intervene in situations of crisis to restore competition.

Competition was the cornerstone of the ECSC plan. As Monnet was exposed to Frankfurter's and Brandeis' thinking, he became convinced that a measure of economic intervention was necessary in order to establish and preserve competition. This conviction was enforced by Ball's observations regarding the proposed articles on combinations and restrictive agreements sent to Monnet in November 1950. The lawyer stressed that "the single market can operate only if the enterprises producing for that market are prevented from establishing 'restrictive practices' or a 'dominance through combination'"⁴⁸¹. Accordingly, the Frenchman supported the establishment of a supranational institution entrusted with supervising the observance of fair economic practices.

The competences assigned to the High Authority empowered it to exercise almost absolute power when deciding which economic concentrations would or would not impede competition in the single market. The ECSC Treaty made provision that the "High Authority has exclusive competence, subject to appeals to the Court, to rule on the conformity of such agreements [agreements among enterprises]"⁴⁸². In addition, Article 66 of the Treaty stipulated that "any transaction which would have in itself the direct or indirect effect of bringing about a concentration (...) shall be submitted to a prior

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸¹ "Note regarding proposed articles on combination and restrictive agreements" by G. W. Ball, November 1950 (?), FJM, Lausanne, Archives Jean Monnet, AMG 10/6/1, Fonds Plan Schuman, Dossier George W. Ball.

⁴⁸² Article 65(4), Treaty Establishing the ECSC, *Ibid.*

authorization of the High Authority”⁴⁸³. The High Authority was called on to oversee that free market conditions were observed and that no enterprise took control over the market. According to Ball, the instrument given to the entity for this purpose was “an antitrust law which is more far-reaching and goes much farther and deeper than even the antitrust laws of the United States”⁴⁸⁴. When considering and defining the character of the ECSC, Ball clearly spelled out the two chief tasks to be entrusted to the High Authority under the plan: “they should see to it that competition is not interfered with by national states and they should see to it that competition is not interfered with by cartels and collective action”⁴⁸⁵.

The second task the High Authority was called upon to carry out was the implementation of regulatory policies intended to rescue the economy of the participating states in situations of crisis. The High Authority was designed to assist the Member States with overcoming economic crises by fixing maximum and minimum prices⁴⁸⁶ and setting up quotas⁴⁸⁷. However, these interventionist measures were to be applied only for a short period of time, until competition was restored.

Monnet’s model of economic intervention embodied in the draft treaty evoked Brandeis’ thinking on central economic supervision. The Harvard Law Professor emphasised constantly in his writings and speeches that the central government had a critical role to play. It was called upon to oversee that fair competition was observed and that concentrations of excessive economic power were not established. Unlike Brandeis, Monnet could not rely on a traditional institution, such as central government, to fulfil this task as there was no such establishment at the European level. Consequently, he invented an original institution that would be given absolute powers to supervise and preserve competition. Monnet was not the only one involved in this brainstorming process. Immediately after the Schuman Plan was made public, he enlisted his close friend George Ball, who had been consulted mainly on two interconnected issues: the design and the role of the High Authority and the antitrust provisions of the draft treaty⁴⁸⁸. Rooted in Brandeis’ thinking and US experience, the High Authority turned out to be an utterly unique institution.

In order to fulfil its task of economic supervision, the High Authority was designed as an autonomous institution, not accountable to national governments. Furthermore, this supranational institution would encompass independent experts conducting their activities and taking decisions free of governmental interference⁴⁸⁹. These were the two features devised to preserve the independence of the ECSC’s highest institution.

⁴⁸³ Article 66 (1), Treaty Establishing the ECSC, Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Interview of George Ball and Clarence B. Randall, The University of Chicago Roundtable, *The Steelmen Look at the Schuman Plan*, University of Chicago, 1952, George Ball Papers, Box 129, Folder 10, Interviews 1952-1965, PPP, DRBSC, PUL, 5.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁶ See article 57 of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ See article 58(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ See Dossier George W. Ball, AMG 10/6, Fonds Plan Schuman. FJM, Lausanne, Archives Jean Monnet.

⁴⁸⁹ See article 9(5), Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Ibid.

During the negotiations on the Treaty Monnet insisted that the members of the High Authority should be independent experts devoted to the cause of the ECSC and not concerned with defending the narrow national interests of the states they were representing. A note drafted at the beginning of December 1950 mentioned that the HA “is composed of a small number of players chosen exclusively on their general capacities, in conditions which guarantee their independence both with regard to the governments and private interests”⁴⁹⁰. The High Authority was designed to implement new thinking and to overcome the economic policies driven by nationalistic considerations, which had been applied and protected by the bureaucracies of the participating countries. In a note sent to Monnet at the time of the drafting of the Paris Treaty Ball underlined that this novel approach could not be put in place by an old bureaucratic establishment since “individuals can learn a new philosophy, but experience has shown that institutions normally cannot”⁴⁹¹. In the minds of those involved in the drafting of the treaty, this organisation of central economic supervision was designed to implement a coherent policy formulated by autonomous experts who did not follow the blueprint of any political movement or try to preserve backward thinking. According to the note concerning the appointment of the members of the High Authority, “the members of the High Authority (...) [had to] be appointed on the strength of their general skills”⁴⁹². One of the main aims underlined in the note was that the main characteristics of the future members would be their “impartiality and the capacity (...) to carry out loyally and objectively the functions of joint representatives of the six countries”⁴⁹³.

In the end, none of the members of the first High Authority was a renowned politician or a prominent public figure⁴⁹⁴. They were known more for their expertise in economic or social affairs, having been involved in the process of post-war reconstruction, headed trade unions or steel enterprises, or acted as special envoys to various post-war organisations including the International Ruhr Authority (IRA). Although it had been agreed that the members of the HA would be appointed by the governments of the Member States⁴⁹⁵, they were expected not to represent the interests of those governments but to carry out their duties in complete independence. By inserting this provision into the treaty, Monnet sought to protect the autonomy of the HA and, even, to make governments responsible to the leading ECSC institution. According to Article 67 of the ECSC Treaty, “any action of a member State which might have noticeable repercussions on the conditions of competition in the coal and steel industries shall be brought to the attention of the High Authority by the interested government”⁴⁹⁶. Monnet’s intention was to set up a supranational institution that would observe the economic practices of the

⁴⁹⁰ Note de F. Fontaine : “Les institutions”, 4 décembre 1950, FJM, AMG10/3/1, 1.

⁴⁹¹ “Note regarding proposed articles on combination and restrictive agreements” by G. W. Ball, FJM.

⁴⁹² “Note relative à la “Désignation de la Haute Autorité” et aux institutions de la Communauté”, FJM, AMG 17/3/7.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Monnet made a portrait of the members of the first High Authority team in his memoirs; Monnet, *Memoirs*, 374.

⁴⁹⁵ See article 10(1) of the Treaty Establishing the ECSC, Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ Article 67(1), Treaty Establishing the ECSC, Ibid.

governments and make recommendations to the states in cases of “impairment of the conditions of competition”⁴⁹⁷.

The institutional design defined by the Treaty, which included an intergovernmental institution, the Council of Ministers, was not what Monnet had initially intended. In fact, it ran entirely against his project. In July 1950, when asked about the relationship between the High Authority and national governments, Monnet replied to Tomlinson that “there is no question of (...) making the High Authority responsible to the Governments”⁴⁹⁸. It was Dirk Spierenburg who proposed the establishment of a council of ministers,⁴⁹⁹ as the Dutch delegation could not accept the establishment of an institutional system where the High Authority takes the ultimate decision without any governmental interference⁵⁰⁰. Monnet reacted harshly to this suggestion, underlining that it would cut the very root of Schuman’s proposal and would water down the character and function of the supranational Authority “as we understood it”⁵⁰¹. He continued: “we replied to the Dutch that we hoped they would not insist on this point as we could not accept it”⁵⁰². This issue became one of the most contentious matters between Monnet and Dirk Spierenburg, the latter characterized by the Frenchman as the “living incarnation of Dutch stubbornness”⁵⁰³. Despite his initial intransigence, Monnet was forced to compromise and to accept a degree of governmental participation in the future ECSC decision-making mechanism. He needed to undertake and accept major adjustments of his project in order to alleviate the fears of the Dutch policymakers, who were not entirely ready to blindly embark on the Frenchman’s plan without what they considered the necessary safeguards.

Building up on the thinking of Brandeis and Frankfurter, Monnet designed an entity that was called upon to protect the market from the disruptive forces of monopolies. While the result was not entirely identical to Brandeis’ view (who considered that this role should be played by the government), the High Authority received the same powers, namely to supervise the functioning of the market. Since the conditions in post-war Europe were to some extent different from those across the ocean, Monnet needed to improvise in order to put his ideas into practice. For this reason, he invented a body independent both from corporatist and governmental influence acting beyond national boundaries. By innovating in this respect, Monnet not only managed to adapt the thinking of Brandeis and Frankfurter to post-war Western Europe, he also developed it further.

⁴⁹⁷ See Chapter VII: Impairment of the conditions of competition, Treaty Establishing the ECSC, Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Questions asked orally to Jean Monnet by W. Tomlinson, on behalf on Ambassador Bruce, 19.7.1950, FJM, Lausanne, Archives Jean Monnet. AMG 5/6/1 and Jean Monnet’s reply, AMG 5/6/1bis. Conférence de Six: du 20 Juin au 28 aout 1950 : dossier de regroupement. Sous-dossier : réactions américaines.

⁴⁹⁹ Uri, *Penser*, 84.

⁵⁰⁰ Spierenburg and Poidevin, *The History*, 16.

⁵⁰¹ Questions asked orally to Jean Monnet by W. Tomlinson, on behalf on Ambassador Bruce, FJM, Ibid. and Jean Monnet’s reply, FJM, Ibid.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 324.

3.4. Conclusion: Monnet's Thinking and the Origins of the Schuman Plan

As one who was not interested either in formal education or in the academic debates of the time⁵⁰⁴ but spent extended periods in small circles of friends, Monnet constructed his own vision of the world on the basis of the concepts he was exposed to during all these encounters. Of all those with whom he was constantly exchanging ideas, Professor Frankfurter was doubtless the individual to whom he felt intellectually most attached. McCloy's assertion mentioned above clearly illustrates this point. However, the Harvard Law Professor does not seem to be the only one with whom Monnet exchanged ideas. The Frenchman was engaged in a continuous dialogue with people who made up a transatlantic group of friends, an epistemic community according to the definition formulated by Adler and Haas in their influential study.

As his activity demonstrates, Monnet was constantly looking for any opportunity for dialogue with Acheson, McCloy, Lilienthal or Ball. All of these individuals, except Ball, had not only been Frankfurter's students, but had become some of the most devoted disciples of his thought. As has been shown, they all came to appreciate the ideas preached by Frankfurter and, as their actions prove, they tried to put them into practice. During the New Deal era, Acheson and, especially, Lilienthal implemented a number of the ideas of Brandeis and Frankfurter. Thanks to this, Monnet was able to observe how their philosophy was implemented.

Throughout the period, Monnet became convinced of the utility of the concepts advocated by Frankfurter and adopted by his disciples. As a result, he designed a plan that embodied the core conception of the thought of Brandeis and Frankfurter. The common market envisaged in the Schuman Plan and the ECSC Treaty was designed around the vision of the two North American thinkers. The core concepts of this utterly novel economic reorganisation for the reform of European capitalism proposed by Monnet reflected Brandeis' recipe for market functioning. Just as the US lawyer advocated the elimination of monopolies controlling the market, Monnet made the antitrust provisions his top priority, explaining on numerous occasions that a healthy market could not be built if the cartels were maintained. Furthermore, he attached crucial significance to the application of this concept and together with McCloy pushed aside fierce opposition. But again like Brandeis, Monnet considered that only this process could restore competition. However, this was not sufficient since the unhindered functioning of the market had to be maintained, primarily by ensuring that no enterprise acquired a dominant market position. Accordingly, Monnet made provision for an independent supervisory authority whose supreme goal was the preservation of unhindered competition.

The emphasis on restoring and maintaining competition by implementing rigorous anti-trust measures and by establishing a supervisory authority represented the concepts around which the Schuman Plan and, especially, the Treaty of Paris were designed. As the negotiations on the Schuman Plan show (a matter that will be further developed in a

⁵⁰⁴ In addition to McCloy's testimony mentioned above, see also, John Gillingham, *European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 17.

next chapter), these were the last aspects on which Monnet was inclined to compromise. But, as already discussed, Monnet was not the only one supporting these concepts. Both Acheson and McCloy supported the project from the outset and their action proved to be crucial in the following months in ensuring its success. However, as the plan was designed by Monnet alone, he needed to clarify the ideas embodied in it to these two actors. This is the reason why he met them ahead of the announcement of the plan. Since the vision embodied in the plan was based on Frankfurter's view of competition, the concepts of the plan no doubt sounded familiar to Acheson and McCloy.

Many were puzzled by the originality of the thinking behind Monnet's 1950 plan. For example, Gillingham mentions that "there was no precedent in European tradition for an institution based on an economic philosophy that resembled neither state socialism nor the approach preferred by the businessmen of the Continent"⁵⁰⁵. Despite its fascinating originality, no significant attempt has been made to unveil the origin of Monnet's thinking. As discussed in the chapter examining the debates on the subject, federalist studies have made no effort to examine the core ideas of the Schuman Plan, merely observing that it contained the idea of European integration. Nor does the revisionist approach spend much time examining Monnet's thought and the origins of his ideas. While Milward attaches little significance to Monnet himself, focusing mostly on the role of national civil servants, he states that "the suddenness boldness and timing of this declaration strongly suggest that the ideas had come from America"⁵⁰⁶. Neither does Dinan, who recognised the prime role played by Monnet, get closer to offering an explanation of the origin of the Frenchman's thought. While acknowledging the general US influence, John Gillingham is to some extent more specific in stressing that the "9 May 1950 proposal had much in common with the New Deal thinking"⁵⁰⁷. The same author later acknowledged another aspect of US influence, underlining that "although Jean Monnet, who inspired the Schuman Plan proposal, drafted these rules, they were modeled on the American antitrust tradition"⁵⁰⁸. Also, as mentioned earlier Clifford A. Jones⁵⁰⁹ and to some extent Volker Berghahn⁵¹⁰ consider that the antitrust provisions of the ECSC Treaty had the imprint of the antitrust experience built up across the Atlantic Ocean.

Therefore, US concepts, such as the New Deal and the antitrust tradition, have been considered by a number of authors as a source of inspiration for the creator of the Schuman Plan. However, despite their apparent usefulness, these concepts were regarded in themselves as too vague and were disputed in the North American academic and political milieu. The USA antitrust tradition in no way represented a coherent approach that could be relied upon and used as a source of inspiration. The turn of the twentieth century witnessed fierce disputes about the character of US antitrust regulation. One of those most active in this clash of ideas was Louis Brandeis, who took a firm stand against

⁵⁰⁵ Gillingham, "Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community", 140.

⁵⁰⁶ Milward, *The European Rescue*, 335.

⁵⁰⁷ Gillingham, "Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community", 139.

⁵⁰⁸ John Gillingham, "American Monnetism", 22.

⁵⁰⁹ Clifford A. Jones, "Foundation of Competition Policy", 26.

⁵¹⁰ Berghahn, *The Americanisation*, 144.

monopolies and the evil they did to the US economy. For this reason, he argued for the application of strict antitrust regulations designed to break up big business and restore competition.

As highlighted in the specialist literature, the New Deal was to an even lesser extent a coherent policy. For example, it is unlikely that the policy of accommodation with big business of the first New Deal could be considered a source of inspiration for Monnet. Conversely, the estrangement of the US government from big business and the application of firm antitrust policies characteristic of the second New Deal (from mid-1930s) probably influenced Monnet's thinking. It must not be forgotten though that after 1934-1935 Frankfurter's and Brandeis' ideas became increasingly influential within the Roosevelt administration. Thus, we can accept that the US antitrust tradition and the New Deal shaped Monnet's thought, not in their broad and ambiguous sense, but as defined by Brandeis and Frankfurter in the second half of the 1930s. In fact, it was the vision of antitrust and the New Deal shaped by Frankfurter and Brandeis which was Monnet's source of inspiration. Thus, even though we can distinguish some traces of US antitrust tradition and of New Deal policies, the thought of Brandeis and Frankfurter and their vision of economic organisation was the foundation of Monnet's plan for the reorganisation of post-war Western European capitalism. The prominence given in the Schuman Plan and the negotiations that followed to concepts such as antitrust and supervision is not a coincidence or the result of a sporadic influence of a number of concepts in circulation in interwar USA. It was Monnet's constant exposure to the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy that led him to attach such pivotal importance to the notions of decartelization and economic supervision.

This is not to say that concepts such as European integration, peace or Franco-German rapprochement were not important to the author of the Schuman Plan. On the contrary, they were of significant value. In fact all these notions of European integration, peace, Franco-German rapprochement on the one hand and a Common Market based on free competition on the other were complementary, mutually dependent and self-reinforcing. Indeed, nobody can deny Monnet's feelings towards European integration given his numerous actions in support of Western European cooperation, of which the 1940 Franco-British union is just one example. However, it is obvious that his vision of European unity was different from that pursued by the European integration movements across European history. This is why the federalists' claims that the Schuman Plan was nothing more than the culmination of the activity of European integration movements can be easily dismissed.

Apart from the notion of European unity and peace, the Schuman Plan had little in common with the ideas espoused by the intellectual associations grouped in 1947 under the umbrella of the European Movement. Monnet proposed an entirely different arrangement, not only from that advocated by the European unity movements (in essence, based on the political federal model), but also from those rooted in the tradition of European political organisation (based on the traditional separation of power in the state). The High Authority was called upon to supervise the economic governance of the participating states and was vested with powers superseding national rule. In addition,

Monnet himself did not give too much weight to the ideas advocated by the European integration movements. When hundred of delegates gathered in The Hague at the call of the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity in May 1948, Monnet preferred to stay away as mentioned before.

The ideas put forward by these associations had little or no influence on him. Therefore, Lipgens' claim that the European Community has its origins in the resistance movements cannot be substantiated by Monnet's project. Milward is right to argue that "Monnet remained entirely uninfluenced by the burgeoning of political groups between 1945 and 1948 in favour of European unity"⁵¹¹. Indeed, it seemed difficult for Lipgens to integrate Monnet's plan into his long list of projects on European unity and, on that account, Monnet "is not once directly mentioned in the exhaustive 500-page study by Lipgens of all the politicians who shared those aspirations"⁵¹².

The Schuman Plan can thus be considered the result of an entirely different vision from that of the federalist movements. While those who talk about the US origins of the ideas embodied in the 1950 plan come a bit closer to reality, they still do not pinpoint the thinking that made a decisive impact on the originator of the post-war coal and steel plan. But by examining the thought of those with whom Monnet came into contact across the Atlantic Ocean we have been able to locate the origins of these concepts. Monnet's connection with Frankfurter and his disciples, the economic vision embodied in the 1950 project and the importance attached during the negotiations to the antitrust and supervisory concepts demonstrate the Frenchman's attachment to the thought of Brandeis and Frankfurter.

Chapter 4: Monnet and Policymakers: Convincing People in Power

Once Monnet had designed his plan on the basis of the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy, he knew that he could not put it into practice on his own. It is at this point that we return to the other question tackled by this study, namely the complex decision-making process that led to the implementation of Monnet's coal and steel plan. So far, as discussed in the chapter examining the historiographical debates on the origins of the ECSC, the state has been considered the main force that made possible early European integration. Yet, was the state the sole actor in the process? In order to offer an adequate answer to this question, a number of aspects need to be examined, including the process of passing on the idea to policymakers and the role of the members of Monnet's circle of friends thereafter. This examination will offer a more complex picture of the actors involved in the process and of the forces that influenced the outcome of the Schuman Plan.

⁵¹¹ Milward, *The European Rescue*, 335.

⁵¹² Ibid.

4.1. Conveying the Idea to Policymakers

Once Monnet had designed his plan aimed at establishing and maintaining free competition within Europe, he needed to convey it to those with the power to ensure its implementation. But, at the same time, given the secrecy of its genesis, he also had to explain it to other members of his group. This is why he met with his close associates, Acheson and McCloy, before the announcement of the plan. It did not take much to convince them of the plans' importance since its concepts resonated with them. As mentioned earlier, Acheson stopped in Paris for informal talks on 8 May 1950, before attending a conference in London on the future of Germany. Similarly, McCloy travelled from Germany to Paris for a tête-à-tête discussion on the plan with Monnet. Afterwards their role became twofold, given their association with the group of which Monnet was part and which shared common thinking, and the fact that they were themselves key decision-makers in the post-war world (US Secretary of State and High Commissioner for Germany, respectively).

This process of conveying the idea to policymakers reminds us of the important stage mentioned by Adler and Haas when the members of a 'knowledge-based' group work together to convince those in power of the validity of their idea and to persuade them to put it into practice. Examining the impact of epistemic communities on policy change, Adler and Haas conclude that they play an "evolutionary role"⁵¹³ since they are channels through which new ideas circulate to those in power. As Adler and Haas underline and as our case study illustrates, "the policy ideas of epistemic communities generally evolve independently, rather than under the direct influence of government sources of authority"⁵¹⁴. Hence, the need to convey them to those with the means to implement them. The members of an epistemic community pass on their knowledge to decision-makers by offering solutions to a particular crisis either on their own initiative or when asked by the leaders to share their ideas. Adler and Haas talk about two moments of the "institutionalization" of the knowledge of the epistemic community: in the short term, through "the political insinuation of their members into the policymaking process and through their ability to acquire regulatory and policymaking responsibility and to persuade others of the correctness of their approach"⁵¹⁵; and in the long term through "socialization", defined by G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan as "a process of learning in which norms and ideals are transmitted from one party to another"⁵¹⁶. In this fashion, "epistemic communities play an evolutionary role as a source of policy innovations and a channel by which these innovations diffuse internationally"⁵¹⁷.

It is the first stage of this process mentioned by Adler and Haas, namely the transfer of the idea to the political realm, which will be the focus of this chapter; or, to be more specific and to refer to our case study, how the post-1945 world leaders were persuaded of the utility of Monnet's idea. As the historical evidence shows, it was not Monnet alone

⁵¹³ Adler and Haas, "Conclusion", 374.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ quoted by Adler and Haas, Ibid.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

who convinced those in power, all the members of his circle of friends were involved. However, as the events demonstrate, the Frenchman played a leading role and he employed all his energy and knowledge to achieve his aims. Although he did not always follow a predesigned plan, Monnet applied a series of principles that he believed would persuade policymakers to accept his scheme.

Many of those who knew Monnet realised that he had a special method of persuasion, which he employed when trying to convince those with the means to put his ideas into practice. In his turn, the Frenchman was very much aware of the role he was called on to play and of the capabilities and the limitations of his means. He knew precisely what he needed to give up in exchange for a positive result. He was conscious that he could not have both the outcome he intended and the fame and glory. A booklet he wrote and sent to his closest friends called *Clefs pour action* helps us identify and understand his guiding principles in this respect. As he wrote, he was conscious that “it takes a long time to come to power”⁵¹⁸; but he also realised that it takes much less time and effort to explain to those in power what needs to be done in order to overcome a particular crisis: “it is a language to which they will gladly listen at the critical moment”⁵¹⁹. He explained that, at this key moment, when there is a lack of ideas, “they accept yours gratefully provided you give them the paternity”⁵²⁰. Monnet also knew why it had to be that way: “as they take the risks, they need the laurels”⁵²¹. As a result, he realised that he needed to leave the glory to those in power and to stay out of the limelight even though he did not necessarily do this by choice, but mainly because this was the price he had to pay for achieving the desired results.

Monnet was a man who firmly believed in the classification described by one of his associates, Dwight Morrow: “there are two types of people: those who want to be somebody and those who want to achieve something”⁵²². This classification was very important for Monnet and, as he recognised, he had seen its validity proved on various occasions. Talking about the first category, namely those in power, executives and politicians, Monnet said that, even though they “were outstanding people, their main concern was to create a positive image and play a central role”⁵²³. He continued that they were indeed “useful for the functioning of a society where image is very important and where the affirmation of character is necessary to get things done”⁵²⁴. However, there was, according to Monnet, another kind of person who was more interested in the results of their actions than glory. Consequently, he considered that it was this “species of people who make things happen and get things moving, and they look above all for the places and instances where they can influence the course of events”⁵²⁵. Such people focus more on the result and give up the limelight and the possibility of public adulation.

⁵¹⁸ Monnet, *Clefs pour action*, 10.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Ibid. see also Uri, “Jean Monnet”, 136.

⁵²² Monnet, *Clefs pour action*, 12.

⁵²³ Ibid.

⁵²⁴ Ibid.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

Over the years, Monnet realised that his role was to provide ideas and leave the credit for them to others, as Ball once said: “Jean sought nothing for himself. If he could get others to launch – and take credit for – his ideas, so much better”⁵²⁶. This was not necessarily altruism on Monnet’s part, but rather a trade-off since he knew that it was the price of securing the desired outcome. As he confessed, he was aware that “the authority of an individual is precarious if it is exercised in his own name”⁵²⁷. This is why at all costs he needed to avoid giving the impression that his plans were designed for personal or partisan advantages. His non-involvement in party politics helped him boost his credibility and did not impede policymakers from across the political spectrum from accepting his ideas. Monnet realised early on that the alternatives of politicians and their chances of implementing whatever plan they might have were limited since they could only be sure of the endorsement of those of the same political colour. Furthermore, their options were limited as, “for the politician, the continuous objective is to be in government and, once there, to lead”⁵²⁸. During this time, when all their energy is focused on gaining and securing power, “the issue which needs to be solved is forgotten”⁵²⁹. This became one of the guiding principles of Monnet’s thinking and method, and he emphasised that he could not be this kind of person, not out of modesty, but because he believed that “once cannot be focused on an objective and on oneself”⁵³⁰. Consequently, he preferred to trade glory for the accomplishment of his ideas.

It is interesting to note that Monnet was not the only one from this group of individuals who used this principle to guide his actions. George Ball was described in similar terms by James Reston as “being a connecting rod between people, [as] (...) being obscure, patient, and obstinate, and never taking credit for what he did”⁵³¹. It is very likely that others, such as Frankfurter and McCloy, who were close Presidential advisors, played this role throughout their careers. Just as Monnet, they understood that getting results came at a price, one which they willingly accepted since, as mentioned in another section, they preferred the anonymity of obscure positions if it meant they could achieve concrete objectives.

Over the years, like some of his peers, Monnet not only learned his role well, he also became extremely comfortable playing it. He knew his weaknesses and strengths and, thanks to his realism, he made the most of every situation. Robert Nathan probably summarized best the role played by the Frenchman: “Monnet was a salesman of ideas”⁵³². Or as Etienne Hirsch said, Monnet was “an inventor, an inspirer”⁵³³. Nathan believed that Monnet had other important qualities, such as good organisational skills, but “he didn’t

⁵²⁶ Ball, *The Past*, 74.

⁵²⁷ Monnet, *Clefs pour action*, 13.

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

⁵³⁰ Ibid.

⁵³¹ Bill, *George Ball*, 107.

⁵³² Interview with Robert Nathan conducted by François Duchêne, Washington, 15 May 1987, EUI, HAEU, European Oral History, <http://wwwarc.eui.eu/idchn/pdf/INT512.pdf>, 22, (accessed 1 November 2010).

⁵³³ Etienne Hirsch entretien avec F. Duchêne, Sevres St-Cloud, 22 septembre 1987, <http://wwwarc.eui.eu/idchn/pdf/INT506.pdf>, EUI, HAEU, European Oral History, 2. (accessed 1 November 2010).

want to manage and run an outfit”⁵³⁴. This seems to be an accurate description: after only a few years as President of the High Authority of the ECSC, Monnet became uncomfortable. Although other factors might have played a role in his resignation in 1955 after only three years in charge (such as the failure of the EDC), it is more likely that he did not feel at home in a leadership role. Traditional negotiations and open politics were not to his taste. Also, it is very likely that his capacity to influence decision-making faded since his position required him to be centre stage rather than behind the scenes.

A “salesman of ideas,” Monnet realised that policymakers would be ready to listen to what he had to say sooner or later. As he wrote in *Clefs pour action*, he knew that officials were keen to come up with novel projects but did not necessarily have the imagination needed to do so. Therefore, he argued, “they are open to original initiatives and anyone who knows how to present them has good chances of being listened to”⁵³⁵. Haas writes about this mechanism of disseminating information and argues that it could either come from the epistemic community’s own initiative or at the request of policymakers. In some circumstances statesmen had to turn to specialists for advice because their understanding of a particular situation was limited. However, this process does not always take place voluntarily since “decision-makers do not always recognize that their understanding of complex issues and linkages is limited”⁵³⁶. As a result, Haas underlines, “it often takes a crisis or shock to overcome institutional inertia and habit and spur them to seek help from an epistemic community”⁵³⁷. In a similar vein, Haas emphasises that “decision-makers are most likely to turn to epistemic communities under conditions of uncertainty”⁵³⁸. It is interesting to note that in our case the initiative came from a member of an influential group of people. The specific post-war context created shock conditions under which executives were open to what Monnet and his associates had to say.

Monnet talked about this mechanism, explaining that he understood the different roles he, on the one side, and the executives, on the other, had to play: “I had an idea; only the President of the Council [of Ministers] had the power to apply it”⁵³⁹. He continued: “I’ve never acted differently: having an idea first, then searching for the person with the power to apply it”⁵⁴⁰. In order to convince the leaders of the validity of his ideas, Monnet employed a variety of means, including direct persuasion. For this purpose he had one-to-one meetings with those concerned aimed at explaining the scope, implications and especially the advantages of his proposal. He was able to present his ideas in such a way that decision-makers saw palpable gains in accepting his proposals. McCloy, who became very familiar with Monnet’s method and its results, underlined that “those executives felt that they were drawing real values from Monnet as he spoke to them”⁵⁴¹.

⁵³⁴ Interview with Robert Nathan, 15 May 1987, 22.

⁵³⁵ Monnet, *Clefs pour action*, 19.

⁵³⁶ Haas, “Introduction”, 14.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁵³⁹ Monnet, *Clefs pour action*, 14.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴¹ Interview with John Jay McCloy, 15 July 1981, 14.

Many were amazed by his capacity of persuasion. Among them Robert Bowie, who talked about the Frenchman's "remarkable" talent for winning over decision-makers: "I don't know if I have ever seen anybody with that same ability, certainly not to the same degree"⁵⁴². The results of his method of direct contact with those in power cannot be doubted or contradicted since Monnet managed to convince them to implement groundbreaking ideas that radically changed the course of events such as World War Two (see his role in the design and the application of the Victory Plan) and post-war reconstruction (that is the subject of our case-study, namely the ECSC plan). We will develop these points in the following paragraphs. Monnet informed governments, supplied valuable information and, in this fashion, managed to "lead people on, executives, operators – the power boys – with the breadth and the method of his thought"⁵⁴³.

How was he able to convince those with the means to implement his ideas? In first instance, by the logic of his arguments. In support of this claim we could quote Robert Nathan, who explained that Monnet, an outsider, managed to "winkle himself into the system"⁵⁴⁴ and convince executives "because he made so much sense"⁵⁴⁵. In order to guarantee success, he ensured that his arguments were tailored to the particular conditions in which he was presenting his case. In addition, he made sure that the answers he gave seemed logical to his interlocutors. For this purpose he studied his audience well and chose his words carefully to convince them. This explains his efforts to produce the perfect outline of whatever document he was working on, be it a letter, a working paper or an article of a future treaty. His close friend Ball recalled the countless instances of drafting and re-drafting various proposals "before he would ever approach any of these various people to whom he had access, the leaders"⁵⁴⁶. The reason for this approach was, according to Ball, that Monnet wanted to be entirely confident of the logic of his proposal, but also "to be able to get these other leaders like Adenauer, and the French, and the Italians and so on, to see it through his eyes, to see it in the same way"⁵⁴⁷. In addition to the logic of his argument, Monnet realised the importance of the consistency of his ideas. As he underlined, "while it is not always useful to say everything to all, it is indispensable to convey the same message to all"⁵⁴⁸. This was what he had to do to gain and maintain the trust of the key actors.

Furthermore, Monnet always presented his proposals in the name of a supreme ideal, such as defeating Nazism (see the Lend-Lease Programme), reconstructing France (see the Monnet Plan), and safeguarding peace and European integration (the Schuman Plan). If we took the example of the 1950 plan, we would discover that the key idioms used are "peace," "European integration," "European federation," and "economic unification". The Schuman Declaration starts by underlining that "world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it"⁵⁴⁹.

⁵⁴² Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 15 June 1981, 11.

⁵⁴³ Interview with John Jay McCloy, 15 July 1981, 7.

⁵⁴⁴ Interview with Robert Nathan, 15 May 1987, 13.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁶ Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 12 May 1987, 9.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁸ Monnet, *Clefs pour action*, 11.

⁵⁴⁹ *Texte de la déclaration de 9.5.50, traduction américaine*, Ibid.

It continues: “the contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations”⁵⁵⁰. Summing up the aims of the project, it was argued that this organisation would represent the “foundation of a *European federation* indispensable to the preservation of peace”⁵⁵¹. Presented this way, the project of pooling German and French coal and steel production could not be rejected on the grounds of personal bias. It served an ultimate ideal that could appeal to politicians and the public in Europe and around the world. As a man who lived through two world wars and worked towards bringing them to an end (see his activity during the First World War when he worked on the coordination of French and British war efforts in London as an envoy of the Premier René Viviani or his mission to Washington in 1940-1941), his stand was a very credible one. This is another reason why he managed to gain the trust of policymakers.

As he was not defending any particular political ideology and since his proposals could not be regarded as being motivated by personal gain, his chances of convincing people in power increased. All his life Monnet avoided any party affiliation although he had his political kinship that was closer to Democratic thought, as discussed in the second chapter. Even though he did not seem to hide it, he did not speak about it loudly. But this did not impede him from showing his complete detachment from any political ideology when approaching leaders, either in Europe or in the United States. Like McCloy, who, despite his declared Republican affinity, could work with administrations from both ends of the USA political spectrum, Monnet, in his turn, did not differentiate on the basis of party politics. There is no doubt that this approach helped Monnet in many decisive moments when broad political support was necessary. One can hardly identify an episode in Monnet’s life when he was turned down because of his political preferences. What seemed to make the difference at decisive moments was that, when suggesting a project to decision-makers, he never gave it a political spin but presented it from a practical angle. In addition, when making a suggestion to leaders, he was very careful to make sure that they would not think that he had any personal interest in the matter. Pierre Uri made this point explicit by mentioning that Monnet underlined that “they listen to me because they know I’m not going to take anyone’s place”⁵⁵². By employing this method, Monnet was “able to help these leaders who did have power, to see it in these terms, so that they saw both his conception, and they also saw why it fit[s] into their purposes”⁵⁵³. George Ball understood Monnet’s bridging role “in identifying from time to time, circumstances when the forces at work were such that you could bring about (...) a new way of going at it, or a new solution”⁵⁵⁴.

As explained above, Monnet used his personal and direct influence to convince decision-makers to implement his ideas. However, this was not his only method and was arguably not the most effective or the most frequently used. Monnet preferred to identify and to convey his ideas to the *second tier*, namely people who were not in the forefront of

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵⁵² Uri, “Jean Monnet”, 136.

⁵⁵³ Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 12 May 1987, 9.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid., 9-10.

decision-making, but were always consulted by and managed to decisively influence key players. James Bill wrote about Ball's and Monnet's strategy of focusing "their attention upon the government's second tier"⁵⁵⁵. They both understood that those with power and influence were not necessarily in the most important or visible executive positions. In many cases it was "those who worked in the second tier, the step just below cabinet secretary or minister,"⁵⁵⁶ who played a decisive role both in policymaking and policy implementation. In many instances it is very likely that this method was used in parallel with the one mentioned earlier, that is more direct influence on executives. However, when Monnet accessed the second-tier he was not the one who passed on his ideas to policymakers; he left that role to people who had the ear of those in power and whose voice was more familiar.

Identifying people in the *second tier* was one of Monnet's main concerns before contacting key leaders, such as presidents or prime ministers, or after a change of leadership. This was the secret to the success of his method, namely the fact that he knew that the person in office was not necessarily the one with the power or, more specifically, the influence. His secret was that he knew "that somewhere, down in the bowels of an organisation, there was a little fellow who was making the policy"⁵⁵⁷. As a result, he was aware that his most important task would be "to locate that fellow"⁵⁵⁸. Afterwards, according to Ball, who closely analysed Monnet's method, the Frenchman needed to build a relationship with this person by meeting him at lunch and in general by spending long hours with him in order to create a close bond so that he could ask him to support his plans: "'Could you arrange for me to see So-and-So?' or 'Do you think you could speak to So-and-So about these things' or send him a note about these things"⁵⁵⁹. Ball underlined that this was the chief stage given that, once Monnet had met the official, all the details had been worked out.

Leonard Tennyson mentioned a specific example. A month after the election of Kennedy, Monnet went to Washington to take the pulse of the new administration and, in particular, to find out who was running the show. When he met Tennyson, he asked him the key question: "who [is] the most important man next to Kennedy?"⁵⁶⁰. The US actor replied that he believed it was Arthur Schlesinger, but he was quickly contradicted by Monnet, who said: "it's a young man named Sorenson [Sorensen]"⁵⁶¹. Monnet was certainly right, but it was not obvious at the time to Tennyson or to other people. As Tennyson confessed in an interview in 1987, he knew Sorensen⁵⁶², "but (...) had no notion, at that early stage,

⁵⁵⁵ Bill, *George Ball*, 107.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁷ Interview with George W. Ball, Under-Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations Interview with F. Duchêne, Library Place, Princeton, 10 August 1987, EUI, HAEU, European Oral History, <http://www.eui.eu/HAEU/OralHistory/pdf/INT488.pdf>, 27 (accessed 3 January 2011).

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁵⁶⁰ Leonard Tennyson in Interview with Robert R. Bowie, 15 June 1981, 12.

⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶² Theodore Sorensen was President Kennedy's close adviser and speechwriter. He is credited by some as the one who wrote Kennedy's inaugural address of 20 January 1961, including the famous part: "Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country." Yet, Sorensen does not confirm these claims in his book *Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History* (New York: Harper, 2008), 225.

of the degree of influence he wielded”⁵⁶³. Of course, Tennyson was not the first person to be asked this question by Monnet, who wanted to double-check that the information he had was accurate. During this particular trip Monnet had “several luncheons with Kennedy”⁵⁶⁴ but, before this, “firstly saw other people,”⁵⁶⁵ who could help him understand the sensitivities and politics of the new administration and who decisively contributed to policymaking. It is interesting to note that Monnet did not consider meetings with official policymakers the most significant. Ball believed that he did not in fact meet Kennedy many times, probably only twice⁵⁶⁶. However, everything was prepared in advance of these meetings and as a result the conversation lacked substance, “just a couple of conclusive sentences”⁵⁶⁷ that were “pre-cooked anyway”⁵⁶⁸. Ball explained that this was the case because he had briefed both in advance on what they needed to say. This preparation was decisive as it gave Monnet a special aura that fascinated the President and made him trust the former businessman. The President was “interested in meeting him, and talking to him, and he was always very impressed by these astute ideas Jean had made, and so on”⁵⁶⁹.

Monnet and others members of his group knew that the most effective approach was to convey a message directly to those who had the most influence. This is the reason why Monnet and his peers disliked formal diplomatic channels and favoured a one-to-one approach, preferring to take the shortcut, “trying to get to the heart of where the opinion was effective, and where decisions are being made”⁵⁷⁰. He was “a non-channel follower,”⁵⁷¹ as Nathan called him, not out of personal conviction, but because of his realism and his experience that this was the most effective way to ensure the application of an idea.

A noteworthy episode showing Monnet’s disdain of diplomatic channels is the way he notified Adenauer of the Schuman Plan. Talking about his strategy, Monnet emphasised in his memoirs that, during his consultations with Schuman, Clappier and Alexandre Parodi, general-secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, they agreed to conduct “the operation outside official diplomatic channels and to (...) bypass the ambassadors”⁵⁷². As a result, it was decided that Schuman would establish direct contact with the Chancellor and send a reliable person to Bonn. Clappier later confirmed to Monnet that an associate of Schuman, Robert Mischlich, had left for the German capital, where he met directly with the chief of Adenauer’s private office, Herbert Blankenhorn, and immediately afterwards the Chancellor himself.

⁵⁶³ Interview Leonard Tennyson with François Duchêne, 2 and 4 June 1987, EUI, HAEU, European Oral History, <http://wwwarc.eui.eu/idchn/pdf/INT527.pdf>, 28 (accessed 1 November 2010).

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid., 27.

⁵⁶⁷ Interview with George W. Ball, 10 August 1987, 28.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁰ Interview with Robert Nathan, 15 May 1987, 2.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

⁵⁷² Monnet, *Mémoires*, 356.

The French envoy managed to conduct his mission in complete discretion, even bypassing a key player at the time in Germany, namely the French High Commissioner, François-Poncet⁵⁷³. After his meeting with Adenauer, Mischlich asked the Chancellor to “help him disappear (...) because the French High Commissioner and his services do not know and do not have to know about my mission”⁵⁷⁴. The use of this method “infuriated especially André François-Poncet,”⁵⁷⁵ who “did not understand why he, the representative of France – the ‘viceroy’ in Germany as he archly liked to call himself – was not entrusted with the mission of informing Chancellor Adenauer of the intentions of the French government”⁵⁷⁶. As Mischlich testified, this episode created great tension between the two. At their first subsequent meeting, François-Poncet provoked his interlocutor by asking: “Well, Mr. Mischlich, how are things in the black room?”⁵⁷⁷. The special envoy replied, using similar irony, that “the shadowy men working there continue to apply themselves to their sorry task and so far there have been no casualties”⁵⁷⁸. This episode shows that Monnet not only disliked official diplomatic channels, but also that he was able to convince even executives to employ his methods despite all the diplomatic dangers this implied. Making use of unofficial channels entailed numerous risks, from diplomatic conflicts to personal jealousies. Monnet was ready to take this risk knowing that going through official channels might jeopardize the outcome of a daring plan. There is no doubt that the idea of using this unconventional method came from Monnet and that Schuman accepted it because he was convinced that it would increase the chances of achieving the desired result.

Referring to Monnet’s ability to influence executives, Nathan said that not “even a Frankfurter (...) had quite the technique of a Monnet”⁵⁷⁹. Justice Frankfurter was known for his remarkable capacity to get across his ideas and, as mentioned earlier, he was constantly consulted by decision-makers as part of Roosevelt’s restricted circle of advisers. However, Nathan considered that Monnet was a greater strategist in this respect with a better mastery of the technique of achieving results without following official channels. Although he knew about the results of Monnet’s method, Nathan recognised that he “didn’t know all the channels through which he was working”⁵⁸⁰. For example he was aware that Monnet had direct access to Churchill and that he was trusted to the extent that he was sent to Washington as a deputy Minister of Supply without portfolio, but he did not know who made this possible.

One of Monnet’s constant concerns was to identify the most influential sources of power within policymaking circles. This was common knowledge to his close friends, as McCloy said in an interview: “his antennae were always out, always very sensitive of

⁵⁷³ Ibid., 357. See also Robert Mischlich, *Une mission secrète à Bonn* (Lausanne: FJM; Centre de recherches européennes, 1986), 59.

⁵⁷⁴ Mischlich, *Une mission*, 62.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid., 68.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid., 68-69.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁹ Interview with Robert Nathan, 15 May 1987, 3

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid., 17.

where power lay”⁵⁸¹. Likewise, Shepard Stone underlined that the Frenchman “knew where the power was”⁵⁸² and, as a result, employed all his skills and knowledge to influence it and bring it over to his side. This is the reason why Monnet did not use official channels that he knew were not the most effective for achieving his aims.

4.2. The Prevailing Link: Monnet and the Second Tier

Using the second tier to convey his ideas seemed to be Monnet’s favourite method and the one he used most. Two examples that will be the focus of the following section are revealing in this sense: the Lend-Lease Programme (1940-1941) and the ECSC (1950). The discussion will focus on what these unofficial channels were, how Monnet identified them, and what role they played in historic turning points, including, and most importantly, at the time of the establishment of the ECSC.

4.2.1. Selling the Lend-Lease Programme to Roosevelt

One of these enlightening episodes is Monnet’s persuasion of President Roosevelt to support the Allied, and especially Britain’s, war effort. As Frankfurter wrote in a recommendation letter for Monnet, quoting a key official, “Monnet has really been a teacher to our defense administration”⁵⁸³. Indeed, in the literature, Monnet is credited as the originator of the Victory Programme⁵⁸⁴. Under the Lend-Lease Act, or as it was called officially An Act Further to Promote the Defense of the United States, signed on 11 March 1941, the US would supply the Allies (including China, France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom) with war materials. This programme represented a break with the alleged non-interventionist policy of the US. As we will see Monnet played a crucial role in this particular instance and, as the British economist Keynes estimated, by achieving this challenging objective, Monnet managed to shorten the war by a year⁵⁸⁵.

Monnet arrived in Washington in August 1940 as an extraordinary envoy of the British government and a member of the British Supply Council with the special mission to negotiate the purchasing of war supplies from the US government. Britain was in great need of military supplies to support its war effort against Nazi Germany. The United States declared its neutrality by continuing the supposed non-intervention policy it had pursued since the end of the Great War. However, it was seen by many as an important source of military supplies – if not a war ally.

⁵⁸¹ Interview with John Jay McCloy, 15 July 1981, 6.

⁵⁸² Interview with Shepard Stone by Leonard Tennyson for the FJM, 23 July 1982, South New Fane, Vermont, FJM, Lausanne, 4-5

⁵⁸³ Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Halifax, 14 November 1941, Felix Frankfurter Papers, LoC, Box 85, Reel 51.

⁵⁸⁴ Dinan, *Europe Recast*, 347.

⁵⁸⁵ François Fontaine, “Forward with Jean Monnet” In *Jean Monnet*, ed. Brinkley and Hackett, 51.

The context in which Monnet's mission to Washington took place reveals a lot about the challenges he faced during his mission. Firstly, there were some very influential voices in the US administration opposing USA's involvement in the war. Selling arm supplies to one side might already be interpreted, besides the financial gains of the transaction, as an important political commitment. Although there were voices emphasizing that the US needed to prepare for the worst, there was no coherent idea what this might mean. President Roosevelt won the 1940 elections promising "to keep America out of the war"⁵⁸⁶. However, the context of the mid-1940s forced people to reevaluate US foreign policy. Even President Roosevelt started to soften his position, saying "Let's have bigger Defense. Defense. Not war. Defense."⁵⁸⁷. However, it was not clear to anyone what this meant; how much was needed for "defense" or even what the concept encompassed. The establishment of the Defense Advisory Commission was of course a sign of alarm, but was not a straightforward pledge for a war effort and left the US administration in what Nathan called a "twilight zone"⁵⁸⁸. This was the political context Monnet encountered in the late summer of 1940 when he arrived in Washington.

A second very important aspect linked to the context in which Monnet conducted his activity was the unusual position he found himself in. He was a French national representing the British government in a pivotal mission for the fate the war. He was a foreigner whose aim was to convince the US administration to get involved in the war to some extent. Furthermore, there were some, like Morgenthau, who saw the Frenchman as a potential spy. He was, according to Robert Nathan, who was at that time part of the National Defense Advisory Commission, the only foreigner in this position⁵⁸⁹.

Notwithstanding his unique position and the overall context he found himself in, Monnet managed to rally most of those involved in the process around his idea of increasing US arms production, especially of aircraft, and supplying the British army. As Nathan confirmed, "the people in the military, the top civilian people that I was trying to work with were always supportive of Monnet"⁵⁹⁰. The first consequence of Monnet's persuasion was that Britain was to receive significant arms supplies from across the Atlantic Ocean. But there was also another consequence for the US and for the fate of the war. Once the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had brought the US into the war, the US administration could make use of the famous Victory Programme of war mobilization.

According to Nathan, who was very closely involved in the Lend-Lease Programme episode and had a deep knowledge of the context, Monnet's main achievement was that he managed to define a plan that included accurate military output targets for the US economy. As an associate director of research at the Defense Advisory Commission in charge of the military requirements of the US army, Nathan investigated in the summer of 1940 whether the Army and Navy Munitions Board, which was the planning entity for the military, was aware of the US army's needs. He was surprised to find that confusion

⁵⁸⁶ Interview with Robert Nathan, 15 May 1987, 5.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., 17.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

surrounded this pivotal defence matter. The Board could not set targets since there was no comprehensive military strategy: “military requirements for what? peace, war, defense?”⁵⁹¹. With only months before the November 1940 elections, Roosevelt was extremely cautious about US military commitments. Against this background, Monnet needed to conduct his mission of setting big production goals for the US while keeping the country out of the war. It was Monnet who finally helped those in charge define high military production targets and guidelines, which not only helped the Allies before the US entry into the war, but also the USA itself after December 1941. As Nathan said, “if Pearl Harbor had arrived and the President didn't have these numbers, and we had no goals it would have been chaos”⁵⁹². Thanks to Monnet, these numbers existed and after Pearl Harbor, the President was able to announce and make use of the Victory Programme.

Monnet's method for getting his aims across to executives was, as emphasised earlier, to get in touch with the second tier, convince them of the validity of his ideas and follow up on the end result. During the second half of 1940, it was obvious to Nathan that Monnet was manoeuvring between Churchill and Roosevelt and that the Frenchman was “sending cables from Churchill to Roosevelt and Roosevelt to Churchill and he was writing those cables on both sides”⁵⁹³. How was this possible? How did Monnet get so close to Churchill and Roosevelt and gain the trust of both to the extent that they accepted his suggestions almost blindly?

On this occasion Monnet applied his favourite method of using those who were close to the main policymakers Britain and the US, Churchill and Roosevelt. He was trusted by both but, in the end, it appears that it was not Monnet who conveyed and ensured the accomplishment of his idea but somebody from second tier. Monnet managed to convince his executive counterparts of the utility of his proposal because, as Frankfurter wrote, he had “the great advantage of enjoying the friendship and confidence of Americans who happen to be in key places”⁵⁹⁴. As mentioned earlier, the Frenchman was interested in identifying those who had most power to forward his ideas. He considered this strategy the most effective way to get his ideas across. After identifying these channels, he made use of them and succeeded in the end in convincing those in power to accept his project.

Two of his close friends, Frankfurter and McCloy, seemed to have been instrumental in this instance. Both of them, as highlighted earlier, were part of Roosevelt's inner circle and were regularly consulted by him before important decisions were taken. Even though Frankfurter was probably not the main voice he listened to, the opinions of the Law Professor were always valued by the Democrat President. As mentioned in a previous section, Justice Frankfurter not only introduced Monnet to the President but ensured that he gained the President's trust. In addition to Frankfurter's support, Monnet's idea was

⁵⁹¹ Ibid., 6.

⁵⁹² Ibid., 12.

⁵⁹³ Ibid., 10.

⁵⁹⁴ Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Halifax, 14 November 1941, Felix Frankfurter Papers, LoC, Box 85, Reel 51.

carried to the ears of the President by another close friend, McCloy. Throughout this process of persuasion, Monnet regularly checked the strategy to be followed with McCloy, as Nathan underlined⁵⁹⁵.

Even though Frankfurter and McCloy played a key role and managed to influence Roosevelt both in his decision to trust Monnet and to accept his project, it is unlikely that their intervention was decisive. During his dialogue with Duchêne, Nathan mentioned that Monnet was helped to open Roosevelt's door by Frankfurter and McCloy but also by Harry Hopkins⁵⁹⁶. As Anthony Badger underlines, Roosevelt "allowed no one (...) to come too close to the private Roosevelt except for Louis Howe and Harry L. Hopkins"⁵⁹⁷. By following his method of identifying the most influential second tier, Monnet learnt that Hopkins was beyond question the one who had the decisive say in Roosevelt's appraisal and verdict of a particular situation. The literature on Roosevelt's personal circle agrees that Hopkins was the President's closest associate and most prominent counsellor. Anderson goes even further, arguing that Hopkins "was probably the most powerful presidential aide who ever lived"⁵⁹⁸. Samuel I. Rosenman, an advisor and speechwriter to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, acknowledged that Hopkins was "the second most powerful man in Washington"⁵⁹⁹. Over the years Hopkins took up different posts, but "No matter what his official position is – if he's the first person who sees the President in the morning and the last person who sees him at night"⁶⁰⁰.

Indeed, Harry Hopkins, a former Secretary of Commerce before moving into the White House as the President's key advisor and confidant, was probably one of the most influential and trusted employees of the New Deal President. But, he was also very close to Frankfurter, as part of an informal "study group" that included Benjamin V. Cohen, a leading member of Roosevelt's Brain Trust, Frankfurter and McCloy. In 1943, an article published by *The United States News* mentioned that Roosevelt's "inner cabinet" consisted of Hopkins, as its head, Ben Cohen, Sam Rosenman, and Felix Frankfurter⁶⁰¹.

As was customary for Monnet, "he first met Hopkins at the Frankfurters"⁶⁰² and went on to develop a long-term friendship with him. In early 1941, before going to London as the chief negotiator to discuss the terms of possible aid to Britain, Hopkins asked for Monnet's opinion. The Frenchman, who was at that time a member of the British Purchasing Commission in Washington, recommended Hopkins deal directly with Churchill and not waste time on the subordinate ministers in the British Cabinet⁶⁰³.

⁵⁹⁵ Interview with Robert Nathan, 15 May 1987, 18.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵⁹⁷ Badger, *The New Deal*, 5.

⁵⁹⁸ Patrick Anderson, *The Presidents' Men; White House Assistants of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson* (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday, 1968), 66.

⁵⁹⁹ Paul A. Kurzman, *Harry Hopkins and the New Deal*, Fair Lawn (N.J. : R. E. Burdick, 1974), 145.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰¹ Adams, *Harry Hopkins*, 326.

⁶⁰² Hackett, "Jean Monnet" In *Monnet and the Americans* ed. Hackett, 46.

⁶⁰³ Adams, *Harry Hopkins*, 199.

In his turn, Monnet used his closeness to Hopkins to transmit his message to the President that it was absolutely imperative to increase production and to help Britain. Nathan, who knew the President's man quite well from their work together when Hopkins was Secretary of Commerce⁶⁰⁴, would not dare to approach him and say: "Look, Harry, you've got to go to Roosevelt, and he's got to set goals"⁶⁰⁵. It was at this point that, as Nathan said, "Monnet's genius came in"⁶⁰⁶. The strategy Monnet used in this particular instance amazed many. Nathan, who was closely involved not only in the process but also had top personal connections, knew that Monnet was preparing cables for both Churchill and Roosevelt and that he had a group in England and the US who supported his idea. He could contact both groups with confidence and give them directions, saying: "Now Churchill has to do this (...) Now, here's what Roosevelt has to do"⁶⁰⁷. How did he manage this? By constantly briefing those in the second tier who had the decisive say, people such as McCloy and especially Hopkins, about the next steps⁶⁰⁸.

He continuously manoeuvred between the two key actors, on the one hand helping Roosevelt to see the pivotal importance of Britain and its survival and, on the other hand, revealing to Churchill the approach to be followed in order to ensure the accomplishment of his aims. He pursued this strategy until the summer of 1941, when, according to Nathan, the US President asked those in charge of military planning: "I want you to tell me what you would need if we got into the war"⁶⁰⁹. When trying to identify the originator of the idea and the channels through which it was passed on to President Roosevelt, Duchêne sought Nathan's viewpoint asking whether "from Roosevelt's point of view, this question had come from Churchill and Hopkins?"⁶¹⁰. Nathan agreed, but he argued that Monnet "was the real creator"⁶¹¹. Despite this, it was still not clear for Duchêne how Monnet had managed to get his idea to the top even though "Roosevelt wouldn't have seen Monnet - or might not have seen Monnet"⁶¹². To this Nathan responded that "the help of McCloy, the help of Hopkins, the help of the fellows near the top"⁶¹³ helped clinch the outcome. Since Hopkins was the President's main counsellor, it is likely that his judgment played a key role in this instance.

Hopkins is probably one of the best examples of a second tier who contributed decisively to the process of convincing the President. But what was the method he used to win the President over? Nathan had the opportunity to closely examine Hopkins' skills and his method of persuasion when the President's man was the head of the works programme in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. In addition the two worked together in the Commerce Department when Nathan was the first chief of the National Income Division (from December 1934), a field in which Hopkins showed a particular interest.

⁶⁰⁴ Interview with Robert Nathan, 15 May 1987, 9.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., 10.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid., 11.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² Ibid.

⁶¹³ Ibid.

Hopkins himself once described his strategy to Nathan. He said that nine times out of ten, he would say “yes” to Roosevelt on less important matters so that he could say “no” the crucial tenth time. Hopkins was aware that if he continuously said “no” to the President when he had doubts or believed that Roosevelt should not have done something trivial, his capacity to convince him to say “no” at the decisive moment would have faded. As Hopkins said, if he had not known this he would “have been useless to him [Roosevelt]”⁶¹⁴. Hopkins explained that he had a very good understanding of the politics in the environment within which he was operating. Therefore, it was key to “acquiesce in many, many things which on pure principle you would be against”⁶¹⁵, but to be able to identify the crucial matter and to “fight like the devil”⁶¹⁶ to obtain the desired result. Nathan’s conclusion shows that he not only understood Hopkins’ method very well, he also believed that it was most effective one. He was aware of the need to identify the key issue and focus his energy on that particular matter⁶¹⁷, compromising on less relevant matters even if he did not agree with the decision taken.

Hopkins was the individual in whom Monnet put all his trust to convince the President of the value of the plan to ship military equipment over to Britain. He was the most important second tier at that particular moment and the events show that the Frenchman was very much aware of it. Of course, other forces were involved. Frankfurter’s and McCloy’s influence cannot be neglected. Even Robert Nathan played a role since he had been part of the National Defense Advisory Commission since June 1940 as an associate director of research and statistics⁶¹⁸. Above all it was Monnet’s extraordinary capacity to sell his idea and to find channels that would help him in this process that was the key to his success. As Nathan underlined, he had never “run across a better strategist”⁶¹⁹. Once Monnet “would get a hold of an idea that was good he would tenaciously stick to it and hang in”⁶²⁰. Then, the logic of his argument would convince not only those who had influence over key decision-makers but the policymakers themselves. In addition, this process was much facilitated by the fact that it did not run against the line of policy of the President and that of other influential actors who clearly understood the danger of a defeated Britain.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., 21.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., 22.

⁶¹⁸ For details on Nathan’s bio see Arnold J. Katz “A Tribute to Robert Nathan”, *Survey of Current Business Online* (February 2002) Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce, <http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2002/02%20February/0202Tribute.pdf> (accessed 11 December 2010).

⁶¹⁹ Interview with Robert R. Nathan, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Oral History, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/nathanrr.htm> (accessed 13 December 2010).

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

4.2.2. Persuading Schuman: A Plan for a Place in History

When Monnet needed to sell his idea of pooling French and German coal and steel to the key decision-makers, his skills of persuading statesmen reached their climax. He had gained extensive experience in identifying people with the power to influence decision-makers. Furthermore, he refined his capacity to identify the key needs of those with the means to implement his idea and to shape it in response to their particular dilemma. The fact that he was always close to the main centres of power helped him both identify the most influential second tier and made him aware of the challenges they were struggling with.

Unlike the Victory Programme, when he needed to persuade only those in charge of US policymaking, and particularly Roosevelt, the 1950 plan was a more complex endeavour given that there were multiple characters and countries involved. Here, Monnet's ability to focus his energy where it was most effective was essential. He understood the key role that France was called on to play, but he did not ignore the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States or even Britain. In all these cases second tiers contributed largely to the outcome, but their efforts were supplemented by members of Monnet's group, such as Acheson and McCloy.

As on other important occasions in the past, when his idea to pool the French and German industrial sectors began to take shape in his mind, Monnet looked for those able not only to carry his idea to the ears of policymakers, but also capable of influencing them in their judgments. The first and one of the most important stages was the identification of the executive "who had the power and would have the courage to use it in order to bring about such a great and unexpected change"⁶²¹. Despite Monnet's skill, it seems that it was not clear from the outset who would play such a role.

Initially, in the second half of April 1950, Monnet turned to the man behind the French foreign minister, Bernard Clappier. Monnet first met Clappier in May 1947, immediately after his appointment as head of Schuman's Private Office,⁶²² and he knew that Clappier had a particular role within Schuman's circle of advisers. Robert Mischlich, who was very familiar with the politics of the French government at the time, considered him Schuman's "most valued adviser"⁶²³ with "an extraordinary force of persuasion"⁶²⁴ that allowed him "often to make his point of view prevail"⁶²⁵. The reason for contacting the French Foreign Minister was, according to Monnet, because Schuman was seen as best suited for the task at hand. First of all Monnet approached Schuman's head of private office, to whom he "talked in general terms about (...) [his] ideas which strongly

⁶²¹ Monnet, *Mémoires*, 353.

⁶²² Interview de Bernard Clappier: extraits sur les origines du plan Schuman et le rôle de Jean Monnet (11 novembre 1980), CVCE, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/interview_with_bernard_clappier_extraits_origins_schuman_plan_role_jean_monnet_novembre_1980-en-278699a3-a23a-4688-8fe2-c4a83186c762 (accessed 18 January 2012).

⁶²³ Mischlich, *Une mission*, 58.

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

interested him”⁶²⁶. Clappier was the one who needed to make the next move since Monnet expected him to consult his superior on the proposal and get back to him. However, it seems that this took too long and Monnet interpreted the delay as a refusal. Consequently, under time pressure and thinking that the response was negative, Monnet turned to the Prime Minister, George Bidault on 28 April 1950⁶²⁷. Once again, Monnet did not make direct contact with the policymaker, but got in touch with somebody from the second tier, a man who could pass on his idea to the premier. He entrusted Pierre-Louis Falaize, who was Bidault’s head of office, with presenting his idea. However, as before, Monnet got no answer⁶²⁸.

These two episodes might show that, to some extent, Monnet’s approach had its limitations. However, this is not entirely true. It seems that only his impatience put him in this situation. Apparently Clappier had not forgotten about his idea and even talked to Schuman about it⁶²⁹. Coincidence or not, Monnet was contacted apologetically by the head of Schuman’s office on the same day⁶³⁰ he handed his proposal to Falaize. This time Monnet had the opportunity to supply Clappier with the official text of the proposal. Until then, Clappier had only seen some excerpts of the draft, but this did not prevent him from considering the idea and informing Schuman of it. Clappier explained that his silence had been due to the fact that he was waiting for Monnet’s written proposal. As he confessed in an interview in November 1980, Clappier informed Monnet in mid-April 1950, when asked about Schuman’s reaction to the proposal, that he had only heard verbally about his ideas and that his “superior likes things in writing”⁶³¹ so that he could study them closely. Therefore, he apparently suggested to Monnet to put his idea on paper. It seems that somehow this message did not reach Monnet, who in the meantime contacted another executive he believed was able to apply his idea.

This time Monnet approached the policymaker with a written proposal that clearly stated his intentions. It was exactly what Clappier had requested from him and, as the two met on the same day that Monnet communicated his idea to Bidault, the head of Schuman’s office was also given the text. Clappier realised that he could waste no time and he gave the paper to Schuman the same day⁶³². Schuman took time over the weekend to think about Monnet’s idea and when he was back in Paris, on Monday, 1 May 1950, he announced to Clappier, who was waiting for him at the train station, that he had taken the idea on board: “I have read Monnet’s paper. And the verdict is yes”⁶³³. Therefore, Monnet’s search for the right executive able to carry out his plan ended at the beginning of May 1950.

Reflecting on the moment when an executive accepted his idea, Monnet seemed to be fully aware of its significance. He knew that his idea had passed to the next level, the

⁶²⁶ Monnet, *Mémoires*, 353.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*, 354.

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*,

⁶²⁹ Interview with Bernard Clappier by Roger Massip, 11 November 1980, FJM, Lausanne, 4.

⁶³⁰ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 354.

⁶³¹ Interview with Bernard Clappier, 11 November 1980, 4.

⁶³² *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶³³ *Ibid.*, 6.

political one and, as a result had “become a matter for those in power with their dangerous responsibility”⁶³⁴. As mentioned earlier, Monnet realised that there was a clear separation between those who produced the ideas and those who put them into practice. “It is the privilege of the policymakers to decide the general interest,”⁶³⁵ he wrote in his memoirs. As he did not have this power, he understood that he could only “help exercise it through an intermediary”⁶³⁶.

There are two important factors that played a critical role in Schuman’s decision to accept the plan. First, it seems that the messenger chosen by Monnet to convey his message was instrumental in convincing the Foreign Service Minister to accept the scheme. Second, the context was favourable for such an initiative and Monnet was very much aware of this situation.

The course of events that led to Schuman’s acceptance of the plan had been steered to a degree by the man behind the French Foreign Minister. Although he did not seem to have the influence of a Hopkins, Bernard Clappier was the one who not only passed on the plan but made sure that its aims were clear to his minister. Part of the influential second tier, Clappier sought every opportunity to make the scheme known to Schuman. Despite the fact that the minister was on his way to his weekend retreat, Clappier talked to him about the importance of Monnet’s plan and its significance for the future of France.

It was Clappier who dispelled many of the minister’s doubts about the plan. Their main discussion seemed to take place while the minister was on his way to the train station and in the train wagon⁶³⁷. Before giving his blessing the minister needed Clappier’s opinion on the technical aspects of the plan, namely the practical consequences of pooling the coal and steel production of two large countries and its impact on the coal and steel industries. It was at this point that Clappier’s power of influence over the politician came to the fore. He started to “reassure the minister”⁶³⁸ saying that he had already talked to Monnet about the issue and, as a result, he believed that “our industry could withstand the test”⁶³⁹. Immediately after his discussion with Schuman, Clappier examined this particular episode and his feelings about it. While discussing with the minister, he avoided any trace of doubt concerning the positive effects of the plan. However, once the train left, Clappier “remained alone, with quite some concern in his heart”⁶⁴⁰. Regardless of this aspect, his words, opinion and attitude might have played an important role in Schuman’s decision to accept the plan.

However, as mentioned earlier, it seems that Clappier’s influence was not the only factor that contributed to the Foreign Minister’s judgement. Monnet’s and Clappier’s awareness of the context they were operating in facilitated their task. In other words Monnet’s proposal did not go against the policy line of the Foreign Minister. This illustrates the

⁶³⁴ Monnet, *Mémoires*, 354.

⁶³⁵ Ibid.

⁶³⁶ Ibid.

⁶³⁷ Ibid.

⁶³⁸ Interview with Bernard Clappier, 11 November 1980, 6.

⁶³⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid.

conclusion reached by Adler and Haas in 1992 that “communities expressing ideas close to the mainstream have a greater propensity to acquire influence than those further away”⁶⁴¹.

There is evidence that clearly indicates that Monnet and Clappier knew that Schuman was looking for an idea to ease the Franco-German relationship. Clappier argued that the turning point in Schuman’s mood was the US-British-French meeting on 15 September 1949 (Washington), where he was also present. During this discussion one of the key topics was the future of Germany or, more precisely, of Federal Germany. As Clappier witnessed, at some point Dean Acheson proposed that the matter be left to France and implicitly to Schuman, who was asked “to define the main lines of the common policy towards Germany which we would need to follow”⁶⁴². In his turn, Ernest Bevin agreed tacitly to delegate this task to the French government. Since his return to Paris the issue had “become an obsession for him”⁶⁴³ Clappier said. Furthermore this brainstorming soon had a deadline imposed on it in the shape of the Conference called on 10 May 1950 in London by the three Western Allied powers, Britain France and the US, to discuss the German problem.

This context was very well known to Monnet thanks to his close transatlantic friends, including Acheson, who was a key player on the international stage at that time. However, Clappier also mentioned that Schuman “was looking for an initiative which he could present in London on 10 May”⁶⁴⁴. Consequently, Monnet was aware both of the pressure on Schuman and of the approaching deadline. Furthermore, Schuman was also apparently facing an unavoidable political crisis and felt extra pressure to come up with an original project that would save his position. Pierre Uri wrote that Clappier understood that Schuman’s “career to date had been undistinguished, that the government was about to fall, and that Schuman might not keep his portfolio in a future cabinet”⁶⁴⁵. Consequently, according to Uri, Clappier considered that “the plan would either sink or save the foreign minister”⁶⁴⁶. Monnet and Clappier exploited this situation when presenting the coal and steel plan to the French Foreign Minister. As the proposal responded to the minister’s needs, it was easy for him to take on board.

Adler’s and Haas’ findings on the significance of the context in which an idea is conveyed to executives also help elucidate an important instance of the case study under scrutiny. Why did Bidault not take on Monnet’s proposal? Looked at through the lens of the epistemic community approach, this decision or rather indecision was determined by the fact that Monnet’s proposal did not facilitate the Premier’s projects. Bidault was concerned about the success of his proposal to create an Atlantic High Council for peace, presented on 19 April 1950, shortly before Monnet’s plan reached him. Once Bidault found out about the plan, after Schuman briefly alluded to it during a French Council of

⁶⁴¹ Adler and Haas, “Conclusion”, 382.

⁶⁴² Interview with Bernard Clappier, 11 November 1980, 3.

⁶⁴³ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶⁴⁴ Monnet, *Mémoires*, 353.

⁶⁴⁵ Lovett, “The United States”, 430.

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Ministers meeting, he was offended that he had not been the first to learn about it. He immediately convoked Monnet, whom he learned was the author of the plan, to a meeting at Matignon. He received him “with a dark look of anger”⁶⁴⁷ and complained to Monnet, showing him a copy of the proposal given to him by Schuman, that he was not “the first to be informed”⁶⁴⁸. When Monnet responded that he had been already informed, he looked for the letter that he found on his desk. It seems that Bidault indeed read the letter, as he confessed in his memoirs⁶⁴⁹, but, as Monnet speculated, the plan did not appear to catch the attention of the Prime Minister, since he was more concerned about his Atlantic High Council project than with a scheme that would reconcile France and Germany. Monnet noted this observation in his memoirs, arguing that “without doubt it did not correspond to his current preoccupation which was to create an Atlantic High Council”⁶⁵⁰. Although Monnet’s proposal did not run counter to Bidault’s project, it did not appeal to him since his energy was focused on something else. It is very likely that this is the reason why history books write about a Schuman and not a Bidault Plan.

4.3. Conclusion: Monnet’s Sharp Method of Persuasion

As highlighted above, the process of conveying Monnet’s idea to policymakers was a complex and, one could even say, challenging one. Despite this he was able to bridge politics and policy-making with great success in many instances, by unveiling to leaders his ideas and convincing them of their value. As an outsider to official political circles, Monnet developed his original concepts within a restricted group of people that inspired and helped him refine them. Just as Adler and Haas emphasised when examining the genesis of ideas within epistemic communities, in Monnet’s case the formulation of his chief ideas took place independently from governmental influence. This was the case of the Lend-Lease Programme and the Schuman Plan defined by Monnet at the beginning of the 1940s and 1950s respectively.

As someone who realised that his ideas stood no chance of being put into practice without the help of people in power, Monnet developed and made use of refined methods for approaching political leaders in order to sell them his ideas. The basis of this method was his awareness that the process of putting an idea into practice involved two complementary stages: the production of an idea and its implementation. Even though these stages were mutually dependent, Monnet was acutely aware that two sorts of people were needed to accomplish them: the authors of ideas on one side and those with the political power on the other. His writings, correspondence and actions demonstrate that he acted in accordance with this principle.

As a result, once he had summarized his idea using perfectly balanced words, he approached the men in power. For this purpose he employed two means: direct contact and persuasion of the leaders on the one hand and the use of unconventional channels

⁶⁴⁷ Monnet, *Mémoires*, 355.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.

(the second tier) in order to encourage the executives to accept his idea on the other. His activity shows that he was more inclined to use the second approach given that it seemed to be more effective. The Lead-Lease Programme (1941) and the Schuman Plan are just two pertinent examples in this regard. Harry Hopkins and Bernard Clappier, who were in the second tier of President Roosevelt's and Robert Schuman's governments respectively, played a key role. By employing this method (that was not specific to Monnet, but was also used by Ball, Frankfurter and McCloy), the idea was conveyed to the political level that ensured its implementation.

In the particular instances mentioned, Monnet was the one leading the process of diffusion of novel ideas to policymakers, convincing them of their utility and even of political advantages. He did this at his own initiative, greatly surprising political leaders with his entirely novel and challenging ideas. As the examination of his persuasive actions in the two case studies examined shows, Monnet's strategy paid off once he convinced a key individual to take on his project. Yet, this was not enough since the project needed to be defended in case of attempts to alter it coming from other circles of power. Considering this, the next chapters expand the examination focusing on the follow-up process and the complex decision-making process that it involved.

Chapter 5: Shaping the Interests of the States Participating in the Negotiation Process

What happened with the plan once it was passed to decision-makers? This was a key stage in the process of the plan's fulfilment. However, it was not sufficient to ensure its success since there were multiple dangers, including possible misunderstanding of the plan's rationale and purpose or its misapplication. Accordingly, Monnet and his circle of friends needed to follow up on the way in which his idea was understood and implemented. In other words, they needed to monitor the way in which the idea was embodied in the future treaty to be negotiated between the participating countries. Monnet understood the need for close follow-up throughout the whole process: "it is not enough to write a letter: you must ensure that it has been sent and that it has arrived safely"⁶⁵¹. Therefore, Monnet and his associates needed to make sure that the idea was correctly understood and applied, and above all that it was not misinterpreted or misused.

From the start of the treaty negotiation process it became apparent that there was a clear need to steer the states in the intended direction in order to avoid the distortion of the original idea. It is probably at this stage that Monnet's group of friends rallied around his plan that encompassed the ideas preached to its members earlier on by people such as Frankfurter. Consequently, many of them put all their energy into ensuring its success. To achieve this objective, they needed to convince states and their representatives of the utility of the project and particularly of some key principles it embodied. It is at this point that the states' interests were shaped and defined. The next sections will examine the

⁶⁵¹ Monnet, *Clefs pour action*, 37.

means by which Monnet's associates influenced states in their decisions related to the Schuman Plan and the channels through which this strategy was pursued.

We will focus in the first instance on the attitudes of the states participating in the negotiations of the ECSC Treaty and primarily on their reactions to the most challenging treaty draft provisions. However, it is not the purpose of this study to examine in detail the reactions of every state to all the issues debated. There are other studies dedicated to that⁶⁵². It is useful though to broaden the examination to other global actors, such as Britain and the US, given their importance on the international scene.

5.1. From In Principle Acceptance to Contentious Interests

After a first phase of initial acceptance of the principles in the plan, the participating states began a process of altering the aims of the plan under the pretext of defending their perceived national interests. As a result, at a very early stage it became clear that key principles of the scheme were questioned and under attack. In this context, Monnet and his associates were called on to prevent the principles of the scheme being diluted. It was during the process of negotiating the future treaty that the interests of Monnet's circle of friends on the one side and those of the states on the other collided.

The examination of the governments' attitudes after the release of the Schuman Declaration shows that the period between May 1950 and the signature of the ECSC Treaty (18 April 1951) can be divided into two phases: a first one that can be defined as an initial acceptance of the aims of the plan and a second one characterized by attempts made by the governments of the participating states to alter the main principles of the plan.

5.1.1. Acceptance in Principle

As stated in the Schuman Declaration, the plan was primarily directed at France and Germany whose coal and steel sectors were to be pooled. Other states were invited to participate but the overall condition was the acceptance of the general principles and objectives of the project. These terms were highlighted in the French Memorandum of 25 May, addressed to the Belgian, British, Dutch, Italian and Luxembourg governments (the German government had already accepted it at that point). It underlined that the interested countries would engage in the negotiations on the future treaty "on the basis of the principles and key commitments of the 9 May proposal"⁶⁵³. As a result, in the immediate period after its disclosure, those states announcing their participation fully agreed on the general clauses of the plan.

⁶⁵² See Wilkens, ed., *Le Plan Schuman*; Schwabe, ed., *The Beginnings of the Schuman-Plan*; Richard T. Griffiths, ed., *The Netherlands and the integration of Europe 1945-1957* (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1990).

⁶⁵³ *Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman, 1^e partie, du 9 mai au 28 août 1950, Phase de groupe de travail : 5 juillet – 10 août 1950, JMF, AMG 0/2/1, 6.*

The German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, accepted the plan without delay⁶⁵⁴, identifying obvious political advantages for his country, such as an equal footing in the international arena and the lessening of the control of the Allied High Commission. In his analysis of the main interpretations of why Adenauer accepted the plan, Desmon Dinan argued that the federalist narrative focused mainly on Adenauer's "personal yearning for Franco-German reconciliation"⁶⁵⁵. However, he noted that, by focusing on "Adenauer's supposed European idealism and Christian Democratic principles,"⁶⁵⁶ the federalists ignored the practical reasons that convinced the German Chancellor, namely that "shared sovereignty was the sole means of achieving Germany's international rehabilitation"⁶⁵⁷. It seems that the Chancellor understood at once these advantages and gave his unconditional approval. Immediately after Robert Mischlich handed him the papers summarizing the plan, Adenauer informed him: "tell your minister (...) that I agree entirely with his proposal"⁶⁵⁸. This attitude fulfilled Monnet's chief condition, namely the unconditional acceptance of the main aims of the project.

Likewise, Italy saw practical political, but mostly economic, advantages in adhering to the envisaged organisation⁶⁵⁹. After the announcement of the plan, Count Sforza declared that "Italy is ready to give its agreement immediately and cooperate fully in the establishment of both this economic entity and the future organization"⁶⁶⁰. Furthermore, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands gave their unconditional agreement to the general principles of Monnet's plan. Immediately after the plan was unveiled, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, Van den Brink, welcomed the plan for its political implications and, above all, its "economic advantages for the young Dutch iron and steel industry"⁶⁶¹. The official Dutch reply, issued after a Cabinet meeting on 22 May, emphasised the acceptance "in principle"⁶⁶² of the scheme despite serious reservations raised by some. Despite its acceptance, the Dutch government felt the need to inform its French counterpart in a verbal note sent on the same day as the acceptance letter (31 May) that The Hague executive "reserves the right during the negotiations to reconsider the acceptance of these principles in case their application proves to be impossible in practice"⁶⁶³.

For Luxembourg the plan provided a solution for its steel industry that represented "between 80 and 85% of the industrial output of the Grand Duchy"⁶⁶⁴. It was considered

⁶⁵⁴ See Official reply by Konrad Adenauer to Robert Schuman (Bonn, 8 May 1950) in *L'Europe une longue marche* (Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Centre de recherches européennes, 1985), 62.

⁶⁵⁵ Dinan, "The Historiography", 303.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Mischlich, *Une mission*, 61.

⁶⁵⁹ See Daniela Preda, "Finalites politiques et raisons economiques. L'Italie et le Plan Schuman," in *Le Plan Schuman dans l'histoire*, ed. Wilkens, 371-377.

⁶⁶⁰ *Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman*, JFM, Ibid., 3.

⁶⁶¹ Albert Kersten "A Welcome Surprise? The Netherlands and the Schuman Plan Negotiations" in *The Beginnings of the Schuman-Plan*, ed. Schwabe, 285.

⁶⁶² Ibid.

⁶⁶³ *Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman*, JFM, Ibid., 8.

⁶⁶⁴ Emile Krier, "L'industrie lourde luxembourgeoise et le Plan Schuman", In *The Beginnings of the Schuman-Plan*, ed. Schwabe, 357.

as offering two major advantages: on the one hand, it was a way of accessing vital coal for its steel output since Luxembourg was “entirely dependent on coke imports”⁶⁶⁵ and, on the other, it opened up the prospect of extending its export market given that it exported “97% of its output”⁶⁶⁶. As Emile Krier wrote, Luxembourg’s economic situation inclined it towards international cooperation “either at the state level within economic and customs unions or at the private enterprise level within private enterprise agreements and cartels”⁶⁶⁷. Given its particular situation, the Luxembourg government sent the French Foreign Minister a letter on 31 May 1950 confirming that it was “happy to agree in principle to the initiative taken by [France]”⁶⁶⁸.

Belgium’s economic position was not much different from that of its south-eastern neighbour. The two industries concerned by Monnet’s plan were chief contributors to Belgium’s GDP, accounting for 16 percent in 1950⁶⁶⁹. However, as in Luxembourg’s case, the steel industry was heavily dependent on coal imports and on the export of its output. Thus, the arrangements included in the Schuman Plan seemed at first sight to satisfy the Belgium government and steel and coal industries. A positive reply from Brussels, accepting the aims of the plan in principle, was therefore only natural.

Nevertheless, accepting the aims of the plan, sketchy as they were, was not an easy undertaking for others. Britain, seen as a key European power able to make a successful case for European unity, was expected to have a positive attitude towards the plan. Once Monnet’s plan was made public, the pressure mounted on London to endorse the scheme. Yet, it was obvious from the outset that London could not unreservedly accept the stipulations of the Schuman Declaration and, consequently, intended to alter it. But Monnet was not open at this stage to negotiating and compromising on the scope of his plan. It was clear from the early stages of the Franco-British negotiations that the government in London could not accept Monnet’s sine qua non conditions. In its reply to the 25 May French memorandum, it underlined that, “if the French government continues to insist on the commitment to pooling resources and the establishment of an Authority having certain sovereign powers as a prior condition to participation in the negotiations, her Majesty’s government find itself, unfortunately, unable to accept such a condition”⁶⁷⁰.

London’s attitude did not change in the weeks to come and in its decisive Cabinet meeting of 2 June 1950, the British government concluded that it could not take part in the future negotiations of the Schuman Plan since “this would commit us to accepting the

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁸ Lettre de l’Ambassade du Luxembourg à Paris au ministère français des Affaires étrangères (Paris, 31 mai 1950), CVCE, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/letter_luxembourg_embassy_paris_french_foreign_ministry_paris_31_1950-en-daa35f15-4e30-4b9e-b32a-2924949f21eb (accessed 18 January 2012).

⁶⁶⁹ Alan S. Milward, *The Belgium Coal and Steel Industries and the Schuman Plan*, In *The Beginnings of the Schuman-Plan*, ed. Schwabe, 437.

⁶⁷⁰ Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman, JFM, Ibid., 7.

principle of the French proposal before any of its details had been made known to us”⁶⁷¹. As a result in the official British communiqué of 3 June 1950, the British government “judged impossible, considering its obligations toward the Parliament and the people, to associate itself [at] the negotiations on the conditions proposed by the French government”⁶⁷².

The British reply did not come as a surprise to Monnet. In fact, he did not consider UK’s participation as essential to the future of his project. Even before the plan was issued publicly, Monnet and his associates had evidence indicating that the British executives did not intend to participate in a future European organisation established on federal principles. On 27 April 1950, Acheson informed various diplomatic offices of the USA that during a discussion with British policymakers, they “stated flatly that the UK would refuse to ‘sink its identity’ in European union and that the Brit[ish] concept of a North Atlantic community is not one of federation but one of cooperative arrangements”⁶⁷³. It is likely that Monnet, as someone who was very close to Acheson, knew about the British approach and, as a result, designed a plan where British participation was optional. Therefore, given that Britain could not accept the overall principles of the plan and particularly its supranational side, the negotiations on the future treaty started without it. Nevertheless, Britain was called on to play a role in this process, as the sixth chapter of this thesis will show.

In the first phase after the release of the Schuman Declaration, Monnet did not accept any alteration of the principles of the plan and demanded that the governments that showed an interest in it adhere unconditionally to the scheme. In their first official reactions, the governments of the Benelux countries, Italy and West Germany fully accepted the aims of the plan. Furthermore, after taking note of the official British refusal to participate, the six countries that accepted in principle the conditions of the Schuman Declaration, published a joint communiqué confirming their commitment to open negotiations on the basis of the principles included in the 9 May French proposal⁶⁷⁴. As a result, they were invited to send their representatives to negotiate the terms of the future treaty. This was not the case of Britain whose government could not agree with the overall aims of the plan and proposed, in return for its participation, the alteration of some basic principles included in the scheme. However, Monnet did not agree to compromise on the key aims of the plan, such as the supranational principle, and, as a result of his intransigence, the British government declined to take part. Consequently, only the Benelux, Italy and West Germany governments were invited by France to send their delegates to the negotiations in Paris.

⁶⁷¹ Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet on the refusal to participate in the negotiations on the Schuman Plan (London, 2 June 1950), CVCE, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/conclusions_meeting_cabinet_refusal_participate_negotiations_schuman_plan_london_june_1950-en-8737a230-6924-4905-8004-dee4385ad38e (accessed 18 January 2012).

⁶⁷² *Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman*, JFM, *Ibid.*, 8.

⁶⁷³ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to certain diplomatic offices, Washington, 27 April 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 71-72.

⁶⁷⁴ *Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman*, JFM, *Ibid.*, 8.

5.1.2. Adjusting Opinions

After a short period of acceptance in principle, the contending interests of various groups started to surface. Given that the project concerned large strata of society, immediately after it was made public an intense activity of defining particular interests began. The states that had agreed to participate in the negotiations started a meticulous process of identifying firstly where their interests lay and secondly the strategy that would ensure that they prevailed. Furthermore, steel and coal producers in the participating countries drew up complex documents examining the implications of the Schuman Plan for their particular field and lists of requirements that needed to be fulfilled in exchange for their support. Equally, coal and steel trades unions worked intensively on drafting documents defining their position. At times this activity produced odd results, such as creating peculiar alliances between governments, producers and unions, who joined forces either to show their discontent with the plan or, more often, to bargain for a favourable agreement. This section will examine these particular interests of the states, coal and steel producers and unions and also their actions during the negotiation process to alter the content of the plan.

It is interesting to note the range of debates sparked off by the roughly one-page Schuman Declaration. Although it is difficult to draw up an exhaustive list, some major topics analysed by the governments, producers and unions can be identified, grouped into two major fields: institutional (the supranational character and role of the High Authority; the intergovernmental checks to be put in place for the supranational body) and economic (anti-trust, competition). Although other topics have been identified, those mentioned above will be examined closely in the following pages since they seemed to be some of the most contentious and time-consuming in terms of negotiation.

5.1.2.1. The Institutional Matters: The Supranational versus Intergovernmental Visions

After a short-lived phase when the governments focused on the overall advantages of the project, the Schuman Plan came under close scrutiny by various circles, from the policymakers of the states involved to the steel and coal producers and the workers' unions directly concerned. All of them tried to make sure that their interests would be considered in the negotiations on the future treaty. The following pages will examine the attitudes of the parties involved and their attempts and strategies to incorporate their interests into the future treaty.

One of the most criticised provisions concerned the institutional design of the future EESC organisation. There were not few who considered that the supranational authority, called the High Authority, would receive excessive powers over economic governance and even the political systems of the states involved. At the end of March 1951, the representatives of the Belgian employers participating in the debate on the Schuman Plan organised by the Central Economic Council (*Conseil Central de l'Economie*) argued that "the provisions of the treaty were unacceptable and dangerous because they completely strangled the initiative and responsibility of enterprises, conferring on the High Authority

clearly excessive powers (...)”⁶⁷⁵. The same language was used by the Luxembourg steel producers who complained chiefly about the “clearly excessive powers”⁶⁷⁶ that would be given to the main governing body of the ECSC. Both the Belgian and Luxembourg representatives considered that this would result in the establishment of a “regime based on total *dirigisme*”⁶⁷⁷ that would be overseen by a “dictatorial High Authority”⁶⁷⁸. Industry representatives were not the only ones to use this language. The Belgian foreign minister, van Zeeland, explained to the delegation representing his government that “the nation (...) could not delegate to a High Authority powers of control over industry which it did not itself have”⁶⁷⁹. One of the members of the Belgian delegation, Francois Vinck, went even further confessing that, in September 1950, he told the British that “had Belgium known in advance the nature of *Monnet’s* initial *document de travail*, it would in ‘all probability’ have taken the same attitude as the United Kingdom and refused to negotiate on that basis”⁶⁸⁰.

Also in Germany the prerogatives of the High Authority became one of the most controversial subjects related to the future European organisation together with the antitrust provisions, as underlined by Andreas Wilkens⁶⁸¹. In France, the reaction of the Cabinet in December 1950 to the draft treaty “was openly hostile”⁶⁸² not because of the macro-economic policies of the plan, which were considered an advantage for Paris, but because of the powers of the High Authority. Richard T. Griffiths underlined the objections raised by René Mayer, representing the ministries of finance and economic affairs, and Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, secretary of state to the president of the council. The latter argued that the powers invested in the High Authority as formulated in the draft treaty “surpass enormously those approved by national governments of democratic countries even in war time”⁶⁸³. In addition, given that the French steel industry was not consulted, Monnet was facing serious opposition from those circles. As noted by Acheson on 12 May 1950, it was hoped that the “industry opposition was based primarily on irritation because [the] French government took [the] initiative without consulting them”⁶⁸⁴.

The unions also marked their opposition to the institutional design of the envisaged entity. The representatives of the *Chambre syndicale* showed their suspicion about the future institutions, considering that “they represent a threat to the freedom of enterprises

⁶⁷⁵ Michel Dumoulin, “Le Belgique et les débuts du Plan Schuman (mai 1950-février 1952)” In *The Beginnings of the Schuman-Plan*, ed. Schwabe, 278.

⁶⁷⁶ Krier, “L’industrie”, 361.

⁶⁷⁷ Dumoulin, “Le Belgique”, 278.

⁶⁷⁸ Krier, “L’industrie”, 361.

⁶⁷⁹ Milward, “The Belgium Coal and Steel Industries”, 440.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 437.

⁶⁸¹ Andreas Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations. L’industrie allemande et le Plan Schuman” In *Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire*, ed. Wilkens, 287.

⁶⁸² Richard T. Griffiths, *The Schuman Plan Negotiations: the Economic Clauses* (Bruxelles: European Commission Library, 1986), 32.

⁶⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸⁴ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to the Acting Secretary of State, London, 12 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 699.

and to the autonomy of the professional organisations”⁶⁸⁵. Furthermore, the President of the *Chambre syndicale de la Siderurgie Française*, J. Aubrun, was downright obstructionist, as reflected in Monnet’s complaint in December 1950 to the French Ministry of economic affairs that he had had difficulties obtaining information concerning prices⁶⁸⁶. This was likely due to Aubrun’s frustration with the whole project since in his opinion “this whole question of cost prices represents only a secondary aspect of the serious problems posed by the Schuman Plan and, especially, the manner in which its application is envisaged and prepared”⁶⁸⁷. Showing his irritation that, despite letters to various members of the French government (including the Premier), he had received no replies, the representative of the *Chambre syndicale* pointed out that the future agreements need to be studied in detail by those whose interests were at stake. In response to Louvel’s indication that the French government desired a quick conclusion of the negotiations, Aubrun stressed that he would prefer “healthy agreements, studied as long as is necessary, both by those who have the supreme responsibility – responsibility which should not be delegated to third parties – and by those who are directly in charge of the economic and social interests at stake”⁶⁸⁸. In fact, Wilkens concluded that the *Chambre syndicale* maintained its opposition to the treaty throughout the negotiating process⁶⁸⁹.

The powers to be invested in the High Authority worried also the Dutch government that was, at that time, pursuing an interventionist policy with regard to wages, based on the cost of living rather than productivity⁶⁹⁰ and aimed at offering social protection to steel and coal workers. The Dutch policymakers were anxious about a possible transfer of these powers to the High Authority and about the outcome of such a move. As noted by Albert Kersten, Monnet was ready to alleviate these concerns by accepting, from the outset of the conference, that the main governing body of the organisation would not intervene in matters such as wages and labour conditions in general⁶⁹¹.

The opposition from governments, unions and steel and coal producers was not restricted to individual national protests and concerted opposition. In January 1951, the industrial confederations of all the participating states – including the *Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie* (BDI) and the *Conseil national du patronat français* (CNPFF) – concluded a joint declaration criticizing the “allegedly excessive powers assigned to the High Authority”⁶⁹². According to Wilkens, the signatories of the declaration intended to propose the modification of the draft treaty in an attempt to limit the powers of the future

⁶⁸⁵ Sylvie Lefèvre-Dalbin, “Les sidérurgistes français face au plan Schuman : La réaction ambivalente de la maison de Wendel, 1950-1952” In *Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire*, ed. Wilkens, 204.

⁶⁸⁶ Lettre du Ministre de l’industrie et du commerce, J.M. Louvel à Jean Monnet, 4 décembre 1950, FJM, AMG 10/5/1.

⁶⁸⁷ Lettre du Président Aubrun au ministre Louvel, 5 décembre 1950, FJM, AMG 10/5/3.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁹ Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 296.

⁶⁹⁰ Kersten, “A Welcome Surprise”, 297.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid., 297-298.

⁶⁹² Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 294-295.

supranational authority and “to reinforce significantly the means of action of the producers”⁶⁹³.

It is interesting to note that the joint objections raised by the steel producers, unions and governments are no coincidence. The coal and steel industries were key economic sectors for the participating countries, which had protected them over the years. Even though Monnet did not consult the industrialists or the unions in the drafting phase or before making the plan public, their interests could not be ignored. As a result, they were subsequently closely involved by their governments in the brainstorming phase, during which the governments formulated their positions before the negotiations. But their role did not stop there; they were consulted throughout the negotiation phase.

As noted by Wilkens, who examined the case of Western Germany, immediately after the plan was made public, “the industrialists were very closely involved in its evaluation, often at the express request of Adenauer”⁶⁹⁴. Moreover, the German scholar underlined another important aspect of the relationship between the German government and the industrialists, namely that “the chancellor had more confidence in the expertise of the heads of industry than in that of his ministry of economy Ludwig Erhard”⁶⁹⁵. As proof of his intentions to closely involve industrialists in the negotiations, Adenauer intended to appoint as head of the German delegation Hermann Joseph Abs, who was immediately rejected by Monnet⁶⁹⁶. Wilkens emphasises that these industrialists formed a circle of informal advisers who were regularly consulted by Adenauer. Among the most prominent were Fritz Berg, president of the employers’ confederation, and Günter Henle, the head of the “Iron and steel” subcommittee⁶⁹⁷. Gillingham talks [maybe use present tense throughout when talking about the literature] about the existence of a “solidarity of fact between industry, ministries, and government which, by the time the Schuman Plan negotiations had been concluded, embraced the coal and steel unions (...)”⁶⁹⁸. In many ways, representatives of different areas put aside their differences with a view to steering the negotiations in the direction they desired.

The Luxembourg industrialists, as their German counterparts, were involved from the beginning in the consultation process by the government of the Grand Duchy. As noted by Emile Krier, “the Luxembourg delegation was assisted by experts from industry and the unions”⁶⁹⁹ formed a “Consultative Committee” in charge of examining all disputed matters in the negotiations. However, Krier underlines that this entity not only had a consultative role, “they could really influence the negotiations given that they participated, as representatives of Luxembourg, in different working groups and acted sometimes as official delegates”⁷⁰⁰ of this country.

⁶⁹³ Ibid., 295.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid., 282.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., 282-283.

⁶⁹⁸ John Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem: German Heavy Industry and the Schuman Plan” in *The Beginnings of the Schuman-Plan*, ed. Schwabe, 418.

⁶⁹⁹ Krier, “L’industrie”, 365.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid.

Even though the Belgian coal and steel industries were not involved to the same extent as their Luxembourg counterparts, they nevertheless took an active part in the process. As Milward, who analysed the reaction of the two industries to the plan, underlined “on most issues the two industries concerned were not only fully consulted but also strongly supported by the Belgian delegation”⁷⁰¹. This was also the intention in France, where on 23 June 1950 Schuman announced to Leon Jouhaux, president of the Conseil National Economique, that he intended to involve him in the future discussions on the French proposal “in order to obtain, at any time, your opinion and suggestions”⁷⁰².

It seems that all these consultations were tolerated by Monnet, but he did not view them favourably, considering that too close an association of these interests would endanger the negotiations. At the end of November 1950 Monnet showed his plain disapproval of too close an involvement of experts with direct interests in the negotiations. Writing to the head of the Luxembourg delegation, Wehrer, he underlined that the participation of steel producers in the discussions between the heads of delegations was unacceptable. He underlined in his letter that “it was never agreed that representatives of the interests at stake, either producers or union members, take part in a meeting of heads of delegations”⁷⁰³. However, the Luxembourgish delegate did not seem to have the same reading of the situation, saying to Monnet that he had “no recollection that we decided that at the Saturday meeting each President of Delegation be only accompanied ‘by an expert who does not belong to the professions concerned’”⁷⁰⁴. Furthermore, Wehrer insisted that he would have contested such a constraint had he heard about it during the previous meeting, arguing that every participating state had the right to choose the composition of its delegation⁷⁰⁵. He protested that a member of his delegation was excluded, despite the fact that the French delegation had not objected when it was informed about the composition of the Luxembourg delegation. Monnet, who was not entirely happy with the reply from the Luxembourg delegation, seized the opportunity to express his concern to Schuman warning him “if we accepted that the interests directly concerned were not only consulted but also took part in the discussions (...) the nature of the conference would change (...)”⁷⁰⁶. This particular instance shows Monnet’s profound concern about the odd alliance that focused all its energy on channelling the discussion towards their desired outcome and, due to this, in some cases distorted the aims of the plans.

The involvement of the coal and steel producers and unions in the negotiations is just one example to illustrate the relationship between the political executives and employers and employee bodies. Entities, that in most cases were on different sides of the barricade, joined forces to shape the outcome of the ECSC Treaty negotiations. This explains, for

⁷⁰¹ Milward, “The Belgium Coal and Steel Industries”, 440.

⁷⁰² Lettre de Schuman à Leon Jouhaux, président du Conseil National Economique, 23 juin 1950, FJM, AMG 3/3/5.

⁷⁰³ Lettre de Jean Monnet au Président de la délégation luxembourgeoise, Wehrer, 25 novembre 1950, FJM, AMG 9/7/1.

⁷⁰⁴ Réponse du President Wehrer à Jean Monnet, 28 novembre 1950, FJM, AMG 9/7/2, 1

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁶ Lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman, 28 novembre 1950, FJM, AMG 9/7/3.

example, why both governments and industrialists expressed concerns about the powers of the High Authority and, as we will see further on, the antitrust provisions.

As mentioned above, this odd coalition between governments, industrialists and unions manifested its opposition to the High Authority and especially its future powers listed in the Schuman Declaration and in the successive draft treaties. For countries such as Luxembourg this was a matter of national interest given the preponderance of the steel industry in the economy. The argument of the steel producers was that “the powers of the High Authority allow interference in the economic policy of Luxembourg”⁷⁰⁷. They went even further, saying that “once the treaty has been ratified the prosperity of the country is placed in the hands of the HA”⁷⁰⁸. While this was particularly plausible in the case of Luxembourg, other participating countries were not in a dissimilar position. Hence, the widely expressed need to set precise boundaries to the powers of the High Authority.

The powers to be attributed to the High Authority were also a cause for concern for the organisation of European industrialists. Despite its original attachment to the idea of the Schuman Plan, the Industrial Federations of Europe argued in a memorandum (17 January 1951) that the draft Treaty had departed from the initial intentions of the project. They were particularly critical of the provisions that aimed “to give to a High Authority of six to nine persons the power to rule at its own will the coal and steel industries of the six participating states, constituting thus a ‘superstate monopoly’”⁷⁰⁹. In fact, the federations considered that the project was founded on two “assumptions” that they regarded as a dangerous basis for the functioning of the economies concerned. It seems that the memorandum identified very accurately the core of Monnet’s project – unhindered competition supervised by an all-powerful entity – which recalled fundamental concepts of Frankfurter-Brandeis thought.

The first assumption identified by the group of federations was that “the functioning of the pool involves the delegation to the High Authority of the most absolute powers, which give it control over the management and destiny of all enterprises”⁷¹⁰. The attribution of such power to one entity was inconceivable to the authors of the memorandum, who also argued that if these powers were granted to the High Authority it would mean governments acknowledging it had “powers which they themselves do not exercise within their territory and would hesitate to claim for themselves”⁷¹¹. The envisaged arrangement puzzled them even more because it “appeared to be inspired by a hyper-dirigisme unknown to our democracies and specific to the most extreme totalitarian regimes”⁷¹². To defend their claims, the authors of the memorandum listed a number of fields where the HA could intervene, including price fixing (maximum and minimum levels), establishing quotas, approving or outlawing concentrations, etc. The second assumption was that competition could only be preserved by the HA and that

⁷⁰⁷ Krier, “L’industrie”, 365.

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 363.

⁷⁰⁹ “Réponse aux observations faites sur le Plan Schuman par les Fédérations industrielles d’Europe”, 5 mars 1951, FJM, AMG 13/3/3, 1.

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁷¹² *Ibid.*

mergers aimed at controlling the market should be forbidden. We will come back to this reason for the opposition of the Industrial Federations of Europe in the following section when examining the opposition to Monnet's concept of competition.

After only several months of reflection, it became clear that most of the delegations and the representatives of the steel industries and unions of the participating states saw the dangers of establishing a European supranational organisation. This was also one of the chief reasons why Britain would not approve the plan in principle. Those who had agreed worked hard in the months following the announcement of Monnet's project to come up with ways to limit the powers of the High Authority. One of the most concrete and far-reaching proposals was put forward by the Dutch delegation, which proposed the establishment of a new institution to counterbalance and limit the powers of the High Authority. The Dutch delegation made known its intentions from the early stages of the negotiations on the ECSC Treaty. On 3 July 1950 Spierenburg, talking about the important role of governments in economic policy, argued that, although his government accepted the supranational entity, it took the view that it was "dangerous to hand over exorbitant powers to a council made of technicians"⁷¹³. This position can be identified at an even earlier stage of the negotiations. In his report to the French delegation of 22 June 1950, Monnet mentioned to his colleagues that already at that point Spierenburg had argued that "an intergovernmental agreement regarding the levels of production is indispensable"⁷¹⁴ and that the High Authority should intervene afterwards.

In fact, the Dutch attitude was determined by a dominant tendency in its Cabinet. Albert Kersten, who examined the Dutch participation in the negotiations, underlined that "the supranational structure had few supporters within the [Dutch] Cabinet"⁷¹⁵. In a similar vein, Max Kohnstamm, who was a member of the Dutch Governmental Delegation at the official ECSC treaty negotiations, stressed in an interview that "the Netherlands did not like this political aspect, meaning the supranational [character]"⁷¹⁶ of the organisation. Indeed, numerous ministers were anxious about the unfettered powers of the HA. A meeting between Monnet and representatives of the Benelux countries at the end of May 1950 could neither offer answers to nor alleviate the Dutch fears about the "accountability of the High Authority"⁷¹⁷. Before the beginning of the Paris Conference, the Dutch government was looking for solutions to this dilemma. The debate, as summarized by Kersten, divided the Dutch Cabinet into intergovernmental and supranational positions. However, even the only supporter of supranational integration, Van den Brink, the Minister for Economic Affairs, criticised the unrestrained powers of

⁷¹³ Conversations sur le Plan Schuman, Délégation française, séance restreinte, du 3 juillet 1950, FJM, AMG 3/3/17; Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman, FJM, Ibid., I5-I6.

⁷¹⁴ Conversations sur le Plan Schuman, Délégation française, séance restreinte, du 22 juin 1950, FJM, AMG 3/3/1.

⁷¹⁵ Kersten "A Welcome Surprise?", 286.

⁷¹⁶ Interview with Max Kohnstamm by Étienne Deschamps, Fenffe: CVCE [Prod.], 11.05.2006. CVCE, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/interview_max_kohnstamm_negotiations_schuman_plan_fenffe_11_2006-en-5a6dca48-0e99-4414-95b0-1cfee1f3fff0 (accessed 18 January 2012).

⁷¹⁷ Albert Kersten "A Welcome Surprise?", 288.

the HA and recognised that an intergovernmental check – a Council of Ministers – needed to be put in place⁷¹⁸ with the main aim to limit the powers of the HA.

After a lengthy discussion on the final instructions to be given to the Dutch delegation within the governmental Committee for Economic Affairs, the draft “stated that the High Authority had to be controlled by a Council of Ministers composed of the representatives to the OEEC Council”⁷¹⁹. Furthermore, it was proposed that “at the request of one of its members, the Council could dismiss a decision of the High Authority and could reject or reaffirm it”⁷²⁰. Although, there were some reservations during these discussions that the draft might not be compatible with the Schuman Plan, there was general agreement that a Council of Ministers should counterbalance the powers of the HA. The discussion, as summed up by Kersten, focused not on whether the establishment of a Council of Ministers would be appropriate, but on the characteristics of the institution designed to defend the interests of the governments of the member states. Even after the start of the negotiations, the Dutch government continued to refine and harden its position, arguing for example that the Council of Ministers should have the final say “on matters related to wage scales”⁷²¹. In addition, as underlined by the US ambassador to the Netherlands, Chapin, in a letter sent to Acheson in July 1950, the Dutch cabinet instructed its delegation to propose that the Council of Ministers should have the authority “to instruct [the] supra-national authority on matters related to defence in [the] coal/steel field [by three-fourths majority]”⁷²².

In accordance with the guidelines from its government, the Dutch delegation highlighted from the outset of the negotiations that its government would surrender part of its sovereignty in return for the establishment of an institution that would circumscribe the powers of the High Authority. During the discussions on 3 July Spierenburg was joined by the Belgian and Luxembourg delegates in his attempt to question the limits of the HA. Suetons believed that “it did not seem useful (...) to give to the High Authority exorbitant powers making it a scarecrow (...) [given that this] would not be strictly indispensable to the achievement of its objectives (...)”⁷²³. The Luxembourgish delegate, Wehrer, expressed his government’s concern over the unrestricted powers of the HA and underlined the importance of a remedy against its decisions⁷²⁴.

The discussion continued at the subsequent meetings, where the attitude of those concerned, particularly the Belgian and Dutch delegates, crystallized. As recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the Committee of the heads of delegation on institutional questions on 5 July 1950, Spierenburg underlined that it was “indispensable that the

⁷¹⁸ Ibid., 292.

⁷¹⁹ Ibid., 293.

⁷²⁰ Ibid.

⁷²¹ The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State, The Hague, 18 July 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 741.

⁷²² Ibid.

⁷²³ Conversations sur le Plan Schuman, Délégation française, séance restreinte, du 3 juillet 1950, Ibid.

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

governments should be closely involved in the work of the High Authority”⁷²⁵. During this discussion, Suetens also stressed that his government attached importance to the creation of a “Board of Ministers”, since the “governments could not give up their prerogatives ‘en bloc’”⁷²⁶. Making the case for a high degree of government involvement, Suetens questioned the principle of the total independence of the future members of the HA and especially their capacity to remain unbiased. According to him, “no matter how well they are chosen, men are men”⁷²⁷. For this reason he considered pivotal the establishment of “a remedy against their decisions”⁷²⁸.

Therefore, the Dutch delegation, supported by Belgium and, to some extent, Luxembourg delivered a clear message at the ECSC conference that an all-powerful supranational institution – as the High Authority was designed to be – would be unacceptable to the government in The Hague. Consequently, one of the main objectives of the delegation headed by Dirk Spierenburg was the establishment of a Council of Ministers that would defend the interests of the governments or the future member states. However, as intended by the Dutch government, this new institution would not only counterbalance the power of the HA, it would overpower it. This was one of the main early challenges to the plan, which needed to be addressed by Monnet and his associates. Yet, as we will see further on, it was not the only or the most difficult one.

5.1.2.2. Economic Matters: Antitrust and Restoring Competition

The powers of the High Authority were contested for various reasons, including the fact that they would supersede those of the governments of the participating states in the coal and steel fields. The tasks that until then had been carried out by national executives would be transferred to a different entity. However, the new institution would also be given prerogatives that traditionally had not even been in the hands of national executives. During the interwar years the steel and coal industrialists controlled their fields with minimum involvement from governments through transnational agreements that took the form of cartels. Under Monnet’s project, these trusts, in addition to the governments, would lose their powers. Moreover, according to the articles on trusts drafted at the end of 1950, the cartels would be wiped out. This was completely new for Europe, where for decades trusts had regulated their sectors in most cases with government blessing. Thus, when Monnet presented the antitrust articles, which proposed the destruction of cartels, he faced fierce opposition, both from the by then “traditional” Western European cartels and from the national executives, used to working with a system run by trusts.

⁷²⁵ Compte rendu de la “Réunion du Comité de chefs de délégations sur les questions institutionnelles”, 5 juillet 1950, FJM, AMG 17/3/1.

⁷²⁶ Ibid.

⁷²⁷ Compte rendu de la réunion du 5 juillet 1950 du Comité de chefs de délégations sur les questions institutionnelles”, FJM, AMG 4/1/1.

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

As mentioned earlier, cartels were part of the Western European economic system before the Second World War and played an important role in the economic governance of various economic sectors in that part of the world. According to Harm G. Schröter, during the interwar period, “international cartelization was at its peak”⁷²⁹ given that “practically all industrialized states took part in the cartel movement, which became an important factor of the world’s economy”⁷³⁰. It is interesting to note that during the interwar period opinions on cartels were divided. While some states, such as the US, Australia or Argentina considered them detrimental to the economy and, as a result, outlawed them, others, especially in Western Europe (e.g. Italy and the Netherlands) “were so enthusiastic about cartels that they passed laws during the 1930s, under which outsiders could become cartel-members by compulsory means”⁷³¹. Many Western European governments preferred to tolerate or even encourage cartels that regulated various economic sectors by fixing prices, sharing markets and customers, and allocating output.

Even though the war led to debates on many pre-war economic and political principles, the existence and utility of cartels was not questioned by Western European governments or private enterprises. It therefore seemed normal to many that the old cartels should be revived after the war. John Gillingham wrote that “the managers of the Ruhr heavy industry wanted, plain and simple, to resurrect the international cartels of the interwar years, which they had led”⁷³². The process can also be seen in France, where, as Philippe Mioche underlined, just before the announcement of the Schuman Plan, French industrialists were busy establishing a fresh national cartel. In the second half of 1949, the *Chambre syndicale* drew up a project for a new French cartel that responded to the post-war economic realities. It was intended that “this new cartel must substitute the association of steel products, which does not have sufficient control in the more difficult economic climate of the end of 1949”⁷³³. Furthermore, this cartel was considered a preliminary stage in the establishment of an international organisation in the steel sector⁷³⁴. The same trend can be identified in Belgium, where, as Milward wrote, “both industry and government began the negotiations in the hope of restoring something akin to the International Steel Cartel of the inter-war period”⁷³⁵.

As Gillingham highlighted⁷³⁶ the hatred of the war seemed to be abandoned quickly in the steel sector out of necessity given that the members of the interwar cartels wanted to prevent an uncontrolled return to the market of Germany. This is the reason why, according to Gillingham, the OEEC proposed the coordination of steel production and exports, which “presumed the resumption, in some form, of the friendly relationships

⁷²⁹ Harm G. Schröter, “Fields of Competition and of Cooperation: Cartels Structures in the International Chemical Industry” in *Competition and Cooperation of Enterprises on National and International Markets*, ed. Hans Pohl (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag, 1997), 36.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷³¹ *Ibid.*

⁷³² Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem”, 400.

⁷³³ Philippe Mioche, “La patronat”, 307.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁵ Milward, “The Belgium Coal and Steel Industries”, 447.

⁷³⁶ Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem”, 406.

maintained between the wars by the leading members of the international steel cartel, Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg”⁷³⁷. Furthermore, Gillingham argued that at the beginning of 1950, negotiations were underway for the establishment of a new cartel⁷³⁸. As these examples show, cartels were considered as a necessary ingredient of the post-war economic recovery in Western Europe.

In this context, the idea put forward in the Schuman Declaration was perceived as a major alteration of the interwar and immediate post-war economic policy of national governments and steel and coal producers. However, it was not obvious from the outset to what extent it would affect the traditional way of functioning of the coal and steel industries. The Schuman Declaration outlined that the new organisation would have extended powers in these fields but did not give details. In addition, the text was drafted so as to make it clear that the new entity was not a cartel. Yet, it did not say what the fate of the current or future cartels would be⁷³⁹. The anti-cartel note attached to the Schuman Declaration aimed to create the legal framework that would allow for “the increase of production and productivity, by improving the methods, enlarging the markets and the rationalization of the production”⁷⁴⁰. In addition, this declaration underlined the differences between the future organisation and cartels that were considered detrimental to the functioning of a free market because they aimed at controlling the market. Cartels made use of various levers to achieve their aims, such as price fixing, “the ascription of production quotas, repartition of markets, namely the permanent elimination of competition with a view to the exploitation of the markets by the profession”⁷⁴¹. To counter this, the note made it clear that Monnet’s plan had well defined provisions against industrial concentrations and that it would have different aims, ways and means of action⁷⁴². Even though the note stressed the differences between the future entity and cartels, it did not give details about the attitude to the trusts already in place and the mechanisms to limit their influence.

It was only at the end of 1950 that it became clear that the future organisation could not coexist with any entity regulating the coal and steel market and that cartels would need to be wiped out. The articles drafted by Bowie under the close supervision of Monnet clearly indicated this aim. This is probably one of the explanations why in the first phase the opposition of the coal and steel industry to the cartel aspect of the project was rather limited. In fact, the first stages of the ECSC Treaty negotiations did not focus on cartel provisions that were only drafted at the end of 1950.

As a result of the delay in the negotiations of the antitrust articles, in the days immediately after the Schuman Plan announcement the only criticism that the steel producers mentioned to Monnet was that they were not consulted in the drafting process. Indeed, the plan was accepted by some key players in the first phase, as was the case with

⁷³⁷ Ibid.

⁷³⁸ Ibid., 410.

⁷³⁹ *Texte de la déclaration de 9.5.50, traduction américaine*, Ibid.

⁷⁴⁰ Note anticartel jointe à la Déclaration du 9.5.1950, FJM, AMG, 17/8/62.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid.

⁷⁴² Ibid.

Georges Villiers, the president of the National Council of French Employers (*Conseil national du patronat français*)⁷⁴³. German steel producers took the same view, initially giving their agreement in principle and displaying an attitude that was “all in all favourable”⁷⁴⁴. In John Gillingham’s view this was seen “as the grant of a reprieve from the sentence hanging over its [Germany industry] head”⁷⁴⁵ given that the Allies were determined to punish the steel cartels for supporting Hitler. Andreas Wilkens argues that Germany’s reaction was the result of political considerations, such as the support of the US, and by Adenauer’s concern to see the project realised⁷⁴⁶.

However, some did not understand very well what the plan entailed. This is why the French steel producers imagined a steel entity organised “on the basis of the national cartel which they have prepared”⁷⁴⁷. In Germany, the business manager of the *Stahlvereinigung* imagined an organisation run by the steel industry, reminiscent of the interwar International Steel Cartel⁷⁴⁸. Therefore, for different reasons, such as lack of information or plain confusion, some steel producers had a positive reaction in the weeks following the announcement of the plan. But these were rather isolated and short-lived opinions.

Although Monnet’s intentions regarding the fate of the cartels was not clarified until the end of 1950, those interested in the subject began to catch glimpses of what he had in mind. Even at an early stage some, like the association of German steel producers, had warned that a cautious attitude would be more appropriate⁷⁴⁹. Once the intentions of those involved in the drafting process regarding the cartels became clearer, the opposition to the plan started to gradually coalesce. This is the reason why, as Mioche wrote, the joint opposition of the *Chambre syndicale* and the French steel producers was reinforced between September 1950 and April 1951⁷⁵⁰. For example a document drafted in mid December 1950 showed that as soon as the French government expressed its support for articles 41 and 42, it “faced a strong and growing opposition from both political and industrial circles in France based on assumption that the concentration programme in Ruhr would include provisions to definitively break the ties between coal and steel”⁷⁵¹. The main reason for this strong opposition was, according to this document, the fact that it became increasingly clear to French industrial circles that, while the process of deconcentration primarily concerned the coal and steel industry, it would “have to be carried out later for all the other industries which are for the most part cartelized”⁷⁵².

⁷⁴³ Mioche, “La patronat”, 308.

⁷⁴⁴ Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 287.

⁷⁴⁵ Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem”, 403.

⁷⁴⁶ Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 284.

⁷⁴⁷ Mioche, “La patronat”, 307.

⁷⁴⁸ Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem”, 418.

⁷⁴⁹ Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 284.

⁷⁵⁰ Mioche, “La patronat”, 310.

⁷⁵¹ Proposed cable regarding articles 41 and 42, 16 December 1950, FJM, AMG 10/3/5.

⁷⁵² Ibid.

The same attitude was identified by Wilkens in the case of the German steel producers, who from the autumn of 1950 began to harden their position⁷⁵³. Various key players openly displayed their opposition to the intention to liquidate the trusts and to concentrate the power in the fields of coal and steel in the hands of a number of people operating at the European level. For instance, Robert Lehr, the future Interior Minister, vehemently criticised in a speech the establishment of a “steel hegemony” at the expense of Germany⁷⁵⁴. Hermann Reusch expressed his opposition by resigning from the committee of experts established by the German executive in charge of studying the Schuman Plan⁷⁵⁵. In fact, as in France, the opposition to the cartel provisions took the form of odd coalitions. In late 1950 the resistance of the steel producers received the surprising support of Adenauer’s government, but also that of coal producers, employer’s unions and even of the Social Democratic Party⁷⁵⁶. It is somehow not surprising that, in a country where cartels had deep roots, a plan aiming to obliterate them faced strong and large-scale opposition.

As mentioned in the previous section, some of the fiercest opposition to the projected Treaty came from the Industrial Federations of Europe. In their Memorandum of 17 January 1951, the industrialists claimed that the whole ECSC project was based on two postulates – an all-powerful HA and the concept of competition supervised by the HA. We will now focus on the second postulate not examined previously. The Industrial Federations of Europe criticised the assumption that “competition, exclusively limited by interventions of the High Authority, is the only guarantee of a healthy economy”⁷⁵⁷. In addition, it could not agree with the supposition that “all mergers between producers with a view to effective participation in the organisation of the market are forbidden and deemed to be against the general interest”⁷⁵⁸. On the contrary, the organisations that signed the memorandum judged that “only professional organisations are in a position to take on the necessary tasks for the proper functioning of the common market”⁷⁵⁹. As a result, the memorandum proposed that the role of the High Authority should be limited to “coordination and control, and only exceptionally direct intervention”⁷⁶⁰. For these reasons, the authors put forward a number of proposals, including that “the High Authority completes its task in collaboration with the industrialists”⁷⁶¹. The industrialists could not accept that once the High Authority was put in place, their power over decisions influencing the market would be seriously reduced. This is how their outright negative reaction to the envisaged distribution of power between themselves and the HA can be interpreted.

⁷⁵³ Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 287.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid., 289.

⁷⁵⁷ “Réponse aux observations faites sur le Plan Schuman par les Fédérations industrielles d’Europe”, 5 mars 1951, FJM, AMG 13/3/3, 2.

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁶¹ Ibid.

What happened in the autumn of 1950 to cause such a radical alteration of opinion on the ECSC plan? It was not a coincidence that opposition became vociferous in the late fall of 1950. During the first stage of the negotiation process, which took place in the summer of 1950, the participants did not address the question of cartels. Monnet and McCloy's envoy, Robert Bowie, began to work intensively on the antitrust provisions in the fall of 1950. Furthermore, the two articles that had almost exclusively been drafted by Monnet and Bowie, as mentioned earlier, began to be the subject of discussion in October and November. Wilkens emphasised that on "4 October only, and apparently to the surprise of the other delegations, Monnet launched an attack on cartels and agreements in general"⁷⁶². During a meeting of the heads of delegations on 4 October 1950, Monnet argued that the objectives of his project could only be achieved if "the restrictive practices of cartels are excluded"⁷⁶³. While the objective seemed clear to Monnet, the means of achieving it still had to be defined. It did not take long before the matter was clarified. On 27 October a proposal was issued regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Schuman Plan concerning restrictive agreements that, after underlining once again the principles included in the 9 May 1950 plan and its subsequent anti-cartel note, suggested outlawing all agreements between enterprises aimed at directly or indirectly controlling the market⁷⁶⁴.

Thus, in the late fall of 1950 Monnet's radicalized position on cartels became obvious. It was at this point that the *Handelsblatt*, a Dusseldorf-based newspaper, published an article on Monnet's assault against the cartels, considering that he had exceeded the initially declared intentions. The article, published on 8 November 1950, highlighted the unexpected nature of this position that was revealed during the last stages of the negotiations. According to the author of the article, this "true battle against the cartels"⁷⁶⁵ went too far, "exceeding even the current measures taken in the United States and having nothing in common with the European traditions respected until now"⁷⁶⁶. Furthermore, the article highlighted that "the demands presented are much greater than those of the American and British occupying authorities in their well-known orders against cartels"⁷⁶⁷.

As drafted at the beginning of November 1950, articles 41 and 42 empowered the HA to outlaw all agreements designed to control the coal and steel sectors in terms of price, access to resources or markets⁷⁶⁸. Furthermore, it provided for the application of fines and even confiscation by the HA of shares acquired by infringing these provisions⁷⁶⁹. If,

⁷⁶² Wilkens, "Le fin des limitations", 288-289.

⁷⁶³ "Observations sur le mémorandum du 28 septembre 1950, exposées par M. Jean Monnet au cours de la réunion restreinte des chefs de délégation, le 4 octobre 1950", 5 octobre 1950, FJM, AMG 17/8/64.

⁷⁶⁴ Propositions relatives à la mise en œuvre du Plan Schuman en ce qui concerne les accords et les pratiques restrictives ou tendant à la constitution des monopoles, 27 octobre 1950, FJM (no. 18), JMF, AMG 17/8/65.

⁷⁶⁵ Article paru en *Handelsblatt*, 8 novembre 1950 : "Jean Monnet à l'assaut des cartels : les propositions françaises vont trop loin : désapprobation générale", FJM, AMG 9/3/3.

⁷⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁸ Article 41 (proposition française), FJM, AMG 17/8/66 and Article 42 (proposition française), FJM, AMG 17/8/67.

⁷⁶⁹ Article 42 (proposition française), FJM, AMG 17/8/67.

until this date, there had been rumours and even assertions by Monnet or others regarding the incompatibility of the cartels with the aims of the plan, the details and the impact of such measures was still unknown. It was at this point, when Monnet and his associates made public their intentions, that it became apparent that the old-style economic governance, under which the cartels were not only tolerated but encouraged to take the lead, would need to be eradicated.

Examining the November – December 1950 period, Wilkens wrote that the situation had changed dramatically and that there was no doubt that “the period of engagement with the Schuman Plan was finished, as Henle argued [Günter Henle, the head of the ‘Iron and steel’ subcommittee], giving way to an in-depth examination of the conditions of the ‘marriage contract’”⁷⁷⁰. The article published in *Handelsblatt* at the beginning of November 1950 examined in detail Monnet’s ferocious attack on cartels, which “has caused great surprise everywhere”⁷⁷¹. The German newspaper underlined that the French memorandum “requests that all forms of merger, all participation in capital (even as loans) and all other agreements should be banned within the territory of the High Authority”⁷⁷². Also outlawed were “all agreements concluded between enterprises aiming to share markets, products, sources of supply, and customers [and in general] all agreements modifying the conditions of competition”⁷⁷³. According to Monnet’s memorandum, it was clear that the only entity empowered to grant exceptions was the High Authority that watched over all participations to capital⁷⁷⁴. Such a proposal coming from Monnet puzzled many who could not understand “the reasons for the brutality of the French position, especially since these plans are in complete contradiction with the French legislation on cartels”⁷⁷⁵.

When the intentions of the authors of the plan became public, almost all those concerned expressed their opposition. As described in the *Handelsblatt* article, Monnet’s attack on cartels gave rise to fierce opposition from various circles, not only in Germany, but also in the Benelux and Italy since “such a policy on cartels appears absolutely foreign to the principles of European economic law”⁷⁷⁶. In Luxembourg, the steel producers disapproved of the antitrust provisions, proposing that all mergers between enterprises should be authorised “if necessary, under the control of the High Authority”⁷⁷⁷. Since for the Belgian steel industry the chief issue was the maintenance of its agreements, the “Belgian steel makers had refused to participate in any attempt to scrap cartel”⁷⁷⁸. The main spokesman of the Belgian steel producers, Pierre van der Rest, argued that “the producer’s organisations had to be protected from the prying eyes not only of unions and consumers but also of the High Authority”⁷⁷⁹. The opposition of various groups from

⁷⁷⁰ Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 290.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷⁷² Article paru en *Handelsblatt*, 8 novembre 1950, Ibid.

⁷⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁷ Krier, “L’industrie”, 362.

⁷⁷⁸ Milward, “The Belgium Coal and Steel Industries”, 448.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid.

almost all participating countries constantly increased from the late fall 1950. In fact, it seemed that the negotiations had entered a new critical phase marked by a radicalisation of opinion and behaviour on both sides.

While the opposition to the anti-cartel articles was noticeable, although to different degrees, in most of the participating countries, it was in Germany where it took the most intransigent form. As in the case of the opposition to the High Authority, the resistance to the antitrust provisions brought together the Ruhr industrialists, unions and the government⁷⁸⁰. Schwabe emphasised that this action took “violent” forms and encouraged Chancellor Adenauer to maintain his position of refusing to concede to the proposal to dismantle the steel and coal trusts⁷⁸¹. As evidence of this attitude, Schwabe mentions that, in November 1959, Adenauer warned that the plan might “fail if Monnet and the Allied High Commission continue to insist on the realisation of their conception of the decentralization of heavy industry in the Ruhr”⁷⁸². Furthermore, according to Schwabe, Adenauer went so far as to threaten, in front of the High Commission, that “Germany would recall its delegation from the ECSC talks if Monnet continues to insist on the antitrust articles”⁷⁸³. In addition, the influential German economics minister Ludwig Erhard, despite his strong anti-cartel feelings, did not like the approach of the Schuman Plan since it envisaged the liquidation of Deutscher Kohlenverkauf (DKV)⁷⁸⁴. Also, the German industry radicalized its discourse and started to formulate, in November-December 1950, conditions for the German approval of the plan, including the end of all controls and discrimination and a proposal to “redistribute the competences [of the High Authority] either in favour of the national governments or in favour of associations of producers or even of enterprises”⁷⁸⁵. In a letter dated 22 December 1950, Monnet indicated to Schuman that the anti-cartel clauses continued to meet German resistance⁷⁸⁶.

Monnet was indeed right to point out to Schuman the attitude of the German government, which refused to accept the deconcentration of Ruhr industry and especially the cutting of the link between the steel producers and ownership of the coal mines. This approach was well summarized in a memorandum of 27 December 1950 on the reorganisation of the German steel industry sent from the government in Bonn to the Allied High Commission, a document that was forwarded to Monnet on 2 January 1951⁷⁸⁷. This paper recalled the position expressed in a memorandum dated 3 November 1950, in which “the Federal Government underlined that ownership links between steel producers and coal mines have a critical importance for technical and economic reasons”⁷⁸⁸. Furthermore,

⁷⁸⁰ Klaus Schwabe, “L’Allemagne, Adenauer et l’option de l’intégration à l’ouest” In *Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire*, ed. Wilkens, 100.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid.

⁷⁸² Ibid.

⁷⁸³ Ibid. see also Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem”, 423.

⁷⁸⁴ Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 289.

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid., 290.

⁷⁸⁶ Lettre de Jean Monnet à Rober Schuman, Paris, 22 décembre 1950, FJM, AMG 26/3/13.

⁷⁸⁷ Lettre du P. Leroy-Beaulieu à Jean Monnet, 2 janvier 1951, FJM, AMG 10/3/12ter.

⁷⁸⁸ Mémorandum du gouvernement fédéral sur la réorganisation de l’industrie sidérurgique allemande, FJM, AMG 10/3/12, 2.

Adenauer pointed out that in order to draft this memo, the German government conducted wide-ranging research and consultation of stakeholders. As a result, the memo concluded that “all German services concerned are unanimous in considering that the ownership link between steel producers and mines are necessary in Hamburg, Oberhausen (...) Bochum and Dortmund regions”⁷⁸⁹. By sending this memorandum, Adenauer expressed a clear message on the importance attached by the German government and industry to the coal-steel connection. Also, the resolute tone of the document showed that the German government seemed to fail to understand how important the matter was for those who supported Monnet’s project.

Germany’s attitude did not seem to change much in January 1951, when Monnet informed Schuman that “the Federal Government has not modified its initial position, and continues to support the existence of the DKV, that is to say, of a single entity having the selling monopoly of the Ruhr coal”⁷⁹⁰. This policy was also understood by Bruce (the US ambassador in Paris), who informed Acheson in the second half of February 1951 of Germany’s obstructionist policy: “Adenauer is seeking unreasonable concessions on coal-steel (...) [hoping] to use [the] opportunity of expected opposition from [the] British Government and German mining unions to reopen [the] question of [the] dissolution [of the] DKV”⁷⁹¹. As we will see in the next section the German attitude became much more radical at the beginning of 1951. This policy was heavily influenced by the changing international context, marked by the outbreak of the Korean War and the perceived desire of the US to enlist West Germany among its allies.

As we have seen in the previous pages, many of the proposals in Monnet’s plan came under close scrutiny by the stakeholders and caused fierce opposition from some quarters. The provisions aimed to dismantle the trusts and a whole “traditional” way of economic governance in Western Europe. In addition, and not by coincidence, those who criticised the antitrust articles, showed their hostility to the High Authority and, more specifically, to its future powers. This is not a surprise since the two issues were closely intertwined, given that the HA would supersede the associations of enterprises without being itself a cartel. While, in the case of the HA, the opposition came up with proposals designed to limit its powers (such as the establishment of a Council of Ministers), in the case of the trusts the opposition took more radical forms. Such an attitude was due to the fact that the two opinions were almost incompatible since one demanded the establishment of a reformed economic system without cartels and the other their preservation.

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁹⁰ Lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman, Paris, 22 janvier 1951, FJM, Lausanne, Archives Jean Monnet. AMG 11/1/9.

⁷⁹¹ The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, Paris, 21 February 1951, FRUS 1951: *Europe: Political and Economic Developments*, volume IV, part 1, 95.

5.2. Convincing Policymakers

The proposals or rather counterproposals from various groups, including governments, producers' associations and unions, tended to shape and even remove the content of the original proposals in the plan. As showed in the previous section, this process took two forms: on the one hand, the tabling of counterproposals limiting the plan's initial purpose, such as the establishment of a Council of Ministers restricting the powers of the HA; and, on the other hand, outright opposition to particular proposals, such as the antitrust provisions, on which no party was inclined to make concessions. Given the mounting opposition and demands to alter the concepts of the plans from various sides it would be legitimate to ask what the reaction of Monnet and his associates was and whether they were ready to compromise on the aims of Monnet's plan.

Before addressing these questions, it is necessary to briefly examine the position in the negotiations of some key actors who were part of Monnet's circle of friends. This might help us identify the distribution of power between the executives, on the one hand, and Monnet and his associates, on the other hand, and, consequently, the extent to which both groups managed to shape the results of the negotiations. Two of the main players, Acheson and McCloy, not only occupied key positions in the post-war world, but were well placed to decisively influence the ECSC treaty negotiation process. Acheson was the foreign policy chief of the key post-war economic, political and military world power – the US. For his part, McCloy was in a key position, as a member of the Allied High Commission, which allowed him to have a major influence over the decision on the fate of West Germany. Even though the US government was not part of the negotiations, neither of these two actors could ignore the process given the foreign policy implications and especially their personal convictions and attachment to Monnet's idea.

Even more interesting is Monnet's position within the French delegation and his relationship with the French executives. It seems that during the negotiations Monnet enjoyed an unprecedented freedom of action for a member of a delegation participating in international negotiations. John Gillingham made this point clearly, arguing that "Monnet played ringmaster"⁷⁹² since "he set the agenda, chaired the conference, headed the French delegation (...)"⁷⁹³. Writing on the same topic, Griffiths clarified Monnet's unique position and that of the other members of the French delegation who "seemed to have operated almost independently from the French cabinet which does not appear to have been consulted as a body at all between the end of June 1950 and the middle of December"⁷⁹⁴. This happened on 15 December 1950, when Monnet presented in detail how the draft treaty embodied the principles of the Schuman Declaration to an inter-ministerial Committee chaired by René Pleven⁷⁹⁵. Furthermore, Griffiths highlighted that, when the French ministers were consulted in mid-December 1950⁷⁹⁶ they did not support

⁷⁹² Gillingham, *European Integration*, 25.

⁷⁹³ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁴ Griffiths, *The Schuman Plan*, 4.

⁷⁹⁵ Exposé au Comité interministériel, 15 décembre 1950, FJM, AMG 10/4/1.

⁷⁹⁶ Griffiths, *The Schuman Plan*, 32.

the results of the negotiations. Despite this, according to Griffiths, “the cabinet never appeared to have gained the initiative”⁷⁹⁷.

The same opinion was shared by Raymond Poidevin, who in his study published at the end of the 1980s, underlined that Monnet had “extensive freedom of action; the Minister [Schuman], although he was president of the conference, intervened very rarely”⁷⁹⁸. The study concludes that nevertheless Schuman played a very important role “beyond the day-to-day negotiations”⁷⁹⁹ focusing on the British opposition expressed in Strasbourg and the negotiations with the Germans.

Indeed, the French foreign minister played a marginal role during the negotiations, a fact he even recognised himself. During a discussion on institutional matters on 12 July 1950, Schuman “joined the meeting, apologising for being an ‘intruder’”⁸⁰⁰. This shows that Monnet, as head of the French delegation, enjoyed a high degree of independence and had a free hand with respect to the objectives sought during the negotiations. In many respects, Monnet managed to neutralize the French executives and their interests and thus he was free to defend the objectives of his plan.

Despite the fact that some of Monnet’s associates occupied key positions at the time of the negotiations, the pressure to alter the main objectives of the plan could not be avoided. At this point we come back to the questions previously asked about Monnet’s and his associates’ reaction to the counterproposals to the coal and steel plan. These will be answered by examining their response to the two main issues referred to in the previous paragraph, namely the proposals to alter the institutional design by establishing a council of ministers and the opposition to the planned establishment of unhindered competition by breaking up cartels.

5.2.1. Monnet and his Associates Facing the Intergovernmental Challenge

As mentioned, the proposal to create a supranational authority empowered to supervise the functioning of the internal market met with the distrust of many executives, chiefly in London and Amsterdam. Although the British and Dutch governments shared the same concern, they adopted a different strategy. Whereas the British refused to take part while the supranational principle was maintained, the Dutch agreed to participate in the hope that they could alter it during the negotiations. As a result, the Dutch delegation received clear instructions to defend the creation of an intergovernmental check – the Council of Ministers.

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁹⁸ Raymond Poidevin, “Le rôle personnel de Robert Schuman dans les négociations CECA (juin 1950-avril 1951), in *The Beginnings of the Schuman-Plan*, ed. Schwabe, 105.

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁰ Compte rendu de la réunion du 12 juillet 1950 du Comité de chefs de délégations sur les questions institutionnelles, FJM, AMG 4/1/2.

The Dutch counterproposal that emerged during the first conversations on the future text of the treaty was not well received by Monnet and his associates. To some extent, it came as a surprise to the Frenchman, who highlighted in his opening speech of the Paris Conference on 20 June 1950 the importance he attached to the High Authority as a supranational entity⁸⁰¹. Despite his surprise he did not hesitate to react vigorously because he understood that the Dutch initiative affected the fundamentals of his proposal. In his report to the French delegation of 22 June 1950 he already expressed his belief that “there is here a very clear disagreement”⁸⁰² on the supranational aspect of his proposal. However, he did not show his total discontent to the other delegates. On 3 July he refrained from making a firm reply and tried to alleviate the contradictions by even suggesting to those present not to mention to the press the differences that had emerged during the meeting⁸⁰³.

Two days later he came up with a proposal to deal with the Dutch challenge. He said that the focus should not be on the details of an institutional mechanism that would include a Council of Ministers but on the “underlying reasons for Mr Spierenburg’s position”⁸⁰⁴. The solution proposed by Monnet was to try to educate the ministers who “should get used to considering problems from the point of view of the community”⁸⁰⁵. During the discussion of 5 July Monnet preferred to buy some time in the face of pressure from Spierenburg supported by Suetons, mentioning that “it is not possible to decide without detailed consideration”⁸⁰⁶. However, he underlined his attachment to the initial approach and said that “the French delegation remains firmly committed to the supranational idea”⁸⁰⁷.

Understanding the danger Monnet tried to alleviate the pressure by defending his initial solution to Spierenburg’s proposal, namely to ensure that the High Authority would create cohesion between the members states, “contributing to the substitution of individual national consciences by a joint supranational conscience”⁸⁰⁸. Only days after, on 19 July 1950, he hardened his position highlighting, during a conversation with Tomlinson, that the Dutch proposal would distort the very aim of his project⁸⁰⁹. Monnet was not the only one to worry. In a similar vein, at the end of July 1950, Dean Acheson feared that the Dutch proposal, would “nullify [the] supranational character of Authority, which US believes of key importance”⁸¹⁰. Both Acheson and Monnet were only too

⁸⁰¹ *Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman*, FJM, *Ibid.*, I2.

⁸⁰² *Conversations sur le Plan Schuman, Délégation française, séance restreinte, du 22 juin 1950*, JFM, *Ibid.*

⁸⁰³ *Conversations sur le Plan Schuman, Délégation française, séance restreinte, du 3 juillet 1950*, JFM, *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁴ *Compte rendu de la “Réunion du Comité de chefs de délégations sur les questions institutionnelles”*, 5 juillet 1950, *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁵ *Ibid.*; *Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman*, JFM, *Ibid.*, I7.

⁸⁰⁶ *Compte rendu de la “Réunion du Comité de chefs de délégations sur les questions institutionnelles”*, 5 juillet 1950, JFM, *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁸ *Note relative aux instructions de la Communauté, extraite du compte rendu de la réunion des chefs de délégation sur les questions institutionnelles, 12 juillet 1950*, FJM, AMG, 17/3/2.

⁸⁰⁹ Questions asked orally to Jean Monnet by W. Tomlinson, on behalf of Ambassador Bruce, FJM, *Ibid.* and Jean Monnet’s reply, FJM, *Ibid.*

⁸¹⁰ The Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic Offices, Washington, 25 July 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 741.

aware that the Dutch proposal would affect the core aim of the project and, as a result, they understood that a firm reaction was needed.

However, the Dutch executive clearly instructed its delegation to stand firm and impose the creation of a Council of Ministers on Monnet and the others. Monnet's reaction was to try to reduce the pressure by having successive meetings with the supporters of the proposal, namely Spierenburg and the Belgian delegate, Suetens⁸¹¹. At the first meeting between the heads of delegations, which took place after face-to-face negotiations between Monnet, Spierenburg and Suetens on 12 July 1950, Monnet proposed the creation of some sort of regular consultation (quarterly for example) between the HA and an entity composed of the Ministers of the participating countries. During these meetings the HA would "inform the ministers of what had been done and discuss with them what the HA intended to do"⁸¹². As a result, these meetings would be, according to Monnet, an opportunity for the ministers to make known their views to the HA⁸¹³. By proposing such a compromise Monnet had "the feeling that he had taken advantage of the suggestions made by Mr. Suetens and Mr. Spierenburg – suggestions and not proposals". This shows that even after all the discussions with those having a conflicting opinion, Monnet still hoped that an intergovernmental institution would not emerge. Accordingly, he made one last attempt to satisfy the Dutch delegate by proposing this compromise. Yet, he did not seem to entirely grasp the degree of importance assigned by the Dutch government to the Council of Ministers. Of, if he did, he probably hoped that it could be satisfied otherwise.

However, Spierenburg had clear instructions that a separate intergovernmental institution should be created. After fierce negotiations and after Spierenburg's threat that "the Dutch delegation would leave the conference if no concessions were made"⁸¹⁴, the Frenchman needed to reconcile and accept an intergovernmental intrusion into the decision-making mechanism of the new organisation. In fact, as Albert Kersten highlighted in his detailed study on this phase of the negotiations, the Dutch managed to impose the Council of Ministers on Monnet but not entirely as they intended.

For this reason Spierenburg came back to the negotiating table on 20 July with renewed instructions from his government to extend the initial compromise and request that "the High Authority should be responsible for well-defined issues regarding the coal and steel industries, but decisions with repercussions outside these industries would fall within the competences of a Council of Ministers"⁸¹⁵. In addition, the specially established Dutch governmental commission to deal with the ECSC proposal – the Cabinet Committee for Economic Affairs – instructed the delegation led by Spierenburg to secure a treaty clause that the Council "could expand its powers by unanimity and could give instructions to the High Authority on issues concerning the policies of the national governments"⁸¹⁶. These

⁸¹¹ *Compte rendu de la réunion du 12.7.1950 du Comité de chefs de délégations sur les questions institutionnelles*, FJM, Ibid.; *Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman*, JFM, Ibid., 17.

⁸¹² *Compte rendu de la réunion du 12.7.1950 du Comité de chefs de délégations sur les questions institutionnelles*, FJM, Ibid.

⁸¹³ Ibid.

⁸¹⁴ Kersten, "A Welcome Surprise?", 294.

⁸¹⁵ Ibid.

⁸¹⁶ Ibid.

proposals led to heated discussions during the second stage of the negotiations within the Working Group on institutional matters (20 July – 10 August 1950). These requirements were not entirely new since, already on 12 July, Spierenburg had insisted that “the ministers’ entity should have, in certain cases, and for questions having political character, the capacity to give directives to the High Authority”⁸¹⁷. The possibility of extending its powers by unanimity was met with firm opposition⁸¹⁸. In particular, it was the German delegate who “saw in the Dutch idea a dangerous tendency”⁸¹⁹ that modified the course of negotiations. At that point Monnet took a firm stand reminding the Dutch delegate that the main aim of the negotiations was the creation of a supranational community by the “merging of sovereignty”⁸²⁰.

Ultimately, this Dutch attempt was less successful than the initial one since it was agreed that the powers of the Council could only be enlarged by a treaty modification. Moreover, regarding the balance of power between the institutions, “the experts admitted that the powers of the special Council of Ministers (...) could take the form of recommendations”⁸²¹. The minutes of the 20 July meeting underlined that it was agreed to create “a Committee of competent Ministers, functioning jointly with the High Authority, the High Authority not being under the command of the ministers”⁸²². Despite this outcome the Dutch government concluded in January 1951 “that the Dutch institutional and economic wishes had for the most part been met”⁸²³.

Therefore, the introduction of an intergovernmental institution fundamentally altered Monnet’s initial conception but not to the extent initially desired by those who initiated the counterproposal. Monnet and his friends were extremely concerned about the turn of events but could not win the day. In December 1950, Acheson showed his unease about the outcome of the negotiations given that the “influence of Council of Ministers will prove too strong and will provide extensive possibilities for national bargaining based on autarchic considerations”⁸²⁴. This particular example shows that Monnet and some of his associates had lost an important battle with political leaders, who managed to impose a major alteration of the plan.

⁸¹⁷ Note relative aux instructions de la Communauté, extraite du compte rendu de la réunion des chefs de délégation sur les questions institutionnelles, 12 juillet 1950, FJM, Ibid.

⁸¹⁸ Compte rendu de la réunion du 20.7.1950 du Comité des Chefs de délégation sur les questions institutionnelles”, FJM, AMG 4/1/3.

⁸¹⁹ Ibid.

⁸²⁰ Ibid.

⁸²¹ Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman, JFM, Ibid., 26.

⁸²² Compte rendu de la réunion du 20.7.1950 du Comité des Chefs de délégation sur les questions institutionnelles, FJM, Ibid.

⁸²³ Kersten, “A Welcome Surprise?”, 298.

⁸²⁴ The Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic Offices, Washington, 8 December 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 762.

5.2.2. The Big Business: Conflicting Visions

The battle over the intergovernmental proposal was the first major test of Monnet's plan. Even though it challenged the cohesion and the persuasive power of Monnet's group of friends, it did not prove to be its most difficult test. As mentioned earlier, the introduction in the draft treaty of proposals to curb the influence of big business gave rise to fierce opposition from producers' organisations and even from the unions and governments.

It is interesting to note that the joint opposition of governments, industrialists and unions became radicalized at a point when many expressed their optimism that the negotiations would be concluded swiftly. At the end of 1950 the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Thorp, announced to the Secretary of State that the negotiations should be closed soon and that "the two or three remaining issues, which include the scope of the plan's provisions on cartels (...), may possibly be resolved in the next two or three weeks"⁸²⁵. In a similar vein the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Perkins, underlined in a memorandum sent to Acheson that the negotiations were close to completion and that the "chief remaining obstacles to complete agreement by the negotiators appear to lie in the proposed cartel provisions of the treaty and in arrangements for the interim protection of the high-cost Belgian coal mines"⁸²⁶. Nevertheless, these evaluations proved to be too optimistic given that the opposition to the anti-cartel provisions increased gradually until reaching its peak in the first months of 1951.

The main challenge that endangered the outcome of the conference was the impossibility of reconciling the competing opinions on antitrust provisions. On the one hand those supporting the trusts backed a model of economic reconstruction based on the revitalization of cartels and, on the other, Monnet and his associates (and mostly, Acheson and McCloy) envisaged an economic system founded on free competition supervised by an independent body. Thus, what was Monnet's and his associates' reaction to the intransigence of those supporting the trusts? Were its members ready to compromise as in the case of the Council of Ministers?

Contrary to the other clauses where Monnet eventually accepted a compromise, in the case of articles 60 and 61, referring to the destruction of cartels and the absolute power of the HA to decide on agreements between undertakings, the Frenchman showed his intransigence. This was clear from early in the second stage of the negotiations since at the end of October 1950, the Chargé in France, Bohlen, wrote to Acheson that "Monnet intends to defend vigorously [his] position on [the] cartel question"⁸²⁷ despite the fact that he seemed to be aware that this would not be easy given the "extreme language in [the] present draft"⁸²⁸.

⁸²⁵ Mémorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 14 December 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 765.

⁸²⁶ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 28 December 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 766 - 767.

⁸²⁷ The Chargé in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State, Paris, 25 October 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 760.

⁸²⁸ *Ibid.*

The initiator of the Schuman Plan attached crucial importance to the antitrust provisions and felt that no concessions could be made in this respect. Both primary and secondary sources show his firm position. Writing to Schuman in December 1950, when the two articles were finalised, Monnet explained that the disappearance of the main body in charge of selling Ruhr coal “is (...) an essential condition for the success of the Schuman Plan”⁸²⁹. He made the same point in mid-January 1951 saying that “without effective measures of decartelization and deconcentration, the implementation of the Schuman Plan is impossible because it would submit the Community of six states to the domination of the monolithic organisations in the Ruhr and, (...) would lead to the maintenance and reinforcement of cartels in other countries”⁸³⁰. Writing about the same instance, Alan Milward emphasised that in December 1950 Monnet “felt at liberty to threaten Hallstein that unless they were agreed ‘in substantially their present form’ he would abandon the conference”⁸³¹. Likewise John Gillingham, in his study on the effects of the Schuman Plan on German heavy industry, underlined that “by Christmas Monnet had decided to write off the entire idea of a coal-steel pool unless the Germans agreed to genuine decartelization, and he so informed Schuman on the 22nd”⁸³². Similarly, Frances Lynch describes how Monnet “threatened to resign”⁸³³ when the German delegation proposed to pass the matter from experts to statesmen.

Monnet’s attitude hardened in the first months of 1951, as many primary documents, such as letters and memorandums, demonstrate. In January, he explained to Schuman that this was a critical time of the conference and that the “following days will decide the success or failure of the Schuman Plan”⁸³⁴. He made clear to Schuman once more where the main difficulty lay, namely “whether the other delegations will accept the clauses which we have proposed in order to eliminate cartels and prevent excessive concentrations within the Community we want to create (articles 60 and 61 of the draft Treaty)”⁸³⁵. Monnet underlined that the German government was the last obstacle to the conclusion of the negotiations despite the French and US efforts to satisfy German demands. To demonstrate this Monnet gave an example. The initial proposal provided that each Ruhr coal producer would organise its sales individually and accordingly no organisation that would control selling should be allowed on the market. Despite the importance of this proposal, Monnet informed his German counterparts, who opposed such a measure, that it would be acceptable to replace the DKV, the organization with the monopoly on the selling of Ruhr coal, with a number of organisations. However, Monnet informed the French minister that, despite this flexibility, the German policymakers insisted on preserving the DKV⁸³⁶. He still hoped that the German government would accept the plan without the imposition of deconcentration measures by the High Commission because, according to the Frenchman, this would, on the one hand, provide

⁸²⁹ Lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman, Paris, 22 décembre 1950, FJM, Ibid.

⁸³⁰ Lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman, Paris, 22 janvier 1951, FJM, AMG 11/2/19, 3-4

⁸³¹ Milward, “The Belgium Coal and Steel Industries”, 451.

⁸³² Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem”, 425.

⁸³³ Lynch, “The Role of Jean Monnet”, 128.

⁸³⁴ Lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman, Paris, 22 janvier 1951, FJM, Ibid., 1

⁸³⁵ Ibid.

⁸³⁶ Ibid., 2

reasons for the opponents of the Schuman Plan in the Bundestag to reject it and, on the other, “if the plan were accepted, would allow the Germans in the future to call into question and undo all that has been done”⁸³⁷.

In a letter drafted by Monnet to be sent to Hallstein probably in January 1951, only days before the letter sent to Schuman, the Frenchman expressed his “serious concern”⁸³⁸ regarding the German delegate’s “telephone comments that new difficulties have arisen with regard to the plans for the deconcentration of the industry of the Ruhr under Law 27”⁸³⁹. Monnet explained to his German counterpart that a discussion on the antitrust articles had been postponed in December at the request of the German delegation and that all efforts had been made both by the French and US players to accommodate Bonn’s concerns, giving as an example the fact that “the French government found it possible to support a program on the size of the steel unit companies based entirely upon the propositions of your [German] government”⁸⁴⁰.

Despite these concessions, the negotiations seemed to stall and Monnet found it “difficult to interpret the uncompromising attitude of the Ruhr industrialists on the question of the integration between the steel and coal industries as anything but an attempt to attain an *artificially-preferred* position for German industry in the common market to be established by the Schuman Plan”⁸⁴¹. Although, according to Monnet, there were still pending issues that served as a reason for the Bonn government to delay the conclusion of the negotiations, such as the future of the IRA or some matters related to Law 27, “articles 60 and 61 of the Schuman Treaty caused (...) [him] more concern”⁸⁴².

It is at this point that the Frenchman clearly showed his intransigence regarding the antitrust provisions by underlining that “if the Germans cannot agree upon the provisions in substantially their present form there is no alternative but to report the failure of [the] Conference to our respective Governments”⁸⁴³. Furthermore, Monnet explained to the head of the German delegation that he was “not able therefore to accept the present proposals of [the] German delegation for changes in Article 61, which would substantially emasculate its intended purpose”⁸⁴⁴. It seemed that Monnet felt at that point that his whole project would be endangered if the antitrust articles, as drafted at the beginning of January 1951, were altered.

Monnet continued to employ various means, such as phone conversations and letters, in order to maintain pressure on Hallstein and make sure that his interpretation of the antitrust articles was not only accepted by the German delegate but also well understood. On 29 January he sent a personal message to the head of the German delegation with a

⁸³⁷ Ibid.

⁸³⁸ “First draft” of a letter from Jean Monnet to W. Hallstein, translated into English (for W. Tomlinson?), January 1951 (?), FJM, AMG 11/2/13.

⁸³⁹ Ibid., 1.

⁸⁴⁰ Ibid., 2-3.

⁸⁴¹ Ibid., 5.

⁸⁴² Ibid., 6.

⁸⁴³ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid.

view to “check that no misunderstanding had slipped into our discussions on articles 60 and 61”⁸⁴⁵. For this purpose, the Frenchman reminded his German counterpart that “article 60 forbids cartels; while article 61 concerns only operations for which it provides for prior authorization which are not revocable”⁸⁴⁶. At the end of his message Monnet reiterated that the maintenance of article 61 was indispensable for the future organisation. He considered that it was necessary to clarify all details of these provisions in order to avoid any misunderstandings given that these articles had been modified numerous times since November 1950. At the same time, he wanted to underline the importance he attached to these articles and the fact that he believed that no more concessions could be given to the German government on them.

Moreover, the US Ambassador to France, Bruce, reported to Acheson in the second half of February 1951 that “Monnet has issued [an] ultimatum to [the] conference that he will close one way or another this Sunday”⁸⁴⁷. According to Bruce, the Frenchman wanted “to face each delegate with a take it or leave it decision on Articles 60 and 61 before that time”⁸⁴⁸ in order to show his firm position on the matter and make it clear that “if [the] Germans or Belgians do not accept, that [the] conference failed because of their opposition to anti-cartel provisions”⁸⁴⁹. Furthermore, Bruce expressed his view that if all diplomatic means had been exhausted, “the only real bargaining counter that [the] French now have if the Germans remain intransigent is the threat of Monnet’s resignation from [the] conference”⁸⁵⁰. The US Ambassador believed in fact that the German industrialists were using delaying tactics in order to obtain more concessions even though, according to Bruce, who expressed the same view as McCloy, “every reasonable concession has been made to meet their [Ruhr industrialists and Adenauer] views”⁸⁵¹. He listed these concessions that had still not satisfied them, namely the fact that Germany’s proposed size for the steel companies had been accepted together with the proposed transitional period of the dissolution of the DKV, whose tasks were to be carried out by the German Federal Government⁸⁵².

As these sources show, Monnet could not accept any suggestion that would undermine his antitrust proposals, which simply aimed at the destruction of coal and steel cartels in the participating countries. He was not the only one of this view. Months before the announcement of the Schuman Plan, the US High Commissioner for Germany revitalized the antitrust policy by surrounding himself with specialists able to assist him in this process. Interestingly enough, the announcement of the Schuman Plan almost coincided with the publication of Law no. 27 on the reorganisation of the German coal, iron and steel industries (16 May 1950). Although from different sources the two initiatives had the same aim – the destruction of trusts in that part of Europe. The personal convictions of McCloy and Monnet, examined in the third chapter, without doubt played a key role in

⁸⁴⁵ Premier “Message personnel du M. Monnet à M. Hallstein”, 29 janvier 1951, FJM, AMG 11/2/22.

⁸⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁷ The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, 21 February 1951, Ibid., 95.

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁵¹ Ibid., 96.

⁸⁵² Ibid.

their decision. Furthermore, as concluded in the third chapter, those involved in this process agreed that the Schuman Plan and Law no. 27 complemented each other and that the French proposal represented a softer way to achieve the desired result. Therefore, McCloy, who was the chief proponent of the antitrust policy in Federal Germany, enlisted himself as one who, like Monnet, could not accept any compromise in this respect.

McCloy and Monnet were not alone in sharing this view. Dean Acheson also expressed his opposition to cartels, explaining at the beginning of December 1950 to certain USA ambassadors that a distinction between “good” and “bad” cartels could not be made and that a “procedure of this kind has never worked when tried”⁸⁵³. This was his evaluation of competing proposals on how to deal with cartels by legalizing some on arbitrary criteria. On these suggestions he concluded that the “effect of such provision based on case-by-case evaluation would be to retain [a] cartel-like pattern of operations with real power in producers groups rather than in [the] High Authority”⁸⁵⁴. Given their economic convictions, strongly influenced by Frankfurter-Brandeis thought, it does not come as a surprise that Acheson, McCloy and Monnet showed little inclination to accept the perpetuation of a system based on cartels.

Since they had little willingness to compromise on the strategy pursued to convince the executives and others who wanted to maintain cartels, a concerted action was put in place by Monnet and his associates who were directly involved in the process, namely, Acheson and McCloy. The Frenchman was one of the first to bargain with the opponents. He seemed to have used all possible means at his disposal in late 1950 and early 1951, including issuing ultimatums and threatening to leave the conference. Also, he played the card of the US loan, which he warned would not be granted unless the High Authority received the right “to inspect business agreements and control associations”⁸⁵⁵. Despite Monnet’s efforts, the opponents of deconcentration measures, such as the German executives and steel producers, could not be convinced.

Why did the German government harden its position on the matter of trusts? One of the answers could be the fact that those against could not envisage a different economic system from the one based on trusts. The habit of relying on cartels to adjust the market could not be abandoned without fierce resistance. Another answer that complements the first one, is that, with the onset of the Korean War and the discussion on German rearmament, the Federal Government had gained more bargaining power. This was the impression of the Chargé in France, Bohlen, who wrote to Acheson at the end of October 1950 that “the Germans have been dragging their feet since the injection of the German rearmament issue”⁸⁵⁶ and that some interest groups believed that “they would quickly receive the advantages and equality offered by the Schuman Plan without accepting the commitments and limitations which proposals in present form would impose on all

⁸⁵³ The Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic Offices, 8 December 1950, *Ibid.*, 762.

⁸⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 763.

⁸⁵⁵ Milward, “The Belgium Coal and Steel Industries”, 450.

⁸⁵⁶ The Chargé in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State, 25 October 1950, *Ibid.*, 760.

participants”⁸⁵⁷. During a meeting with Monnet at the end of September 1950, Erhard complained about “the contradictions of the Allied policy in Germany”⁸⁵⁸. The German Economy Minister underlined that the High Commission had applied decartelization measures in Germany “without taking at all into account the opinion of the German government in fields as important as the mining and steel industries (...)”⁸⁵⁹. Erhard mentioned to the Frenchman that this would affect German public opinion on the plan since “the Allies continue to legislate on absolutely essential matters as if a German government did not exist”⁸⁶⁰. As the one who was in charge of the German economy, Erhard was aware of the importance of the coal and steel sectors for the economic development of his country’s economy.

At the end of December 1950, Acheson himself noticed that the resistance had toughened and, as he wrote to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Thorp, “the Germans appear[ed] to be on the verge of demanding that they be relieved of the requirement to deconcentrate the Ruhr coal and steel industries, as a condition of joining the plan”⁸⁶¹. However, the Secretary of State underlined that “this position has not yet fully emerged, but it is becoming more prominent in comments from Frankfurt and Paris”⁸⁶². Therefore, at the end of 1950 it became increasingly clear to Acheson, McCloy and Monnet that the German counterparts were not ready to give in and accept the antitrust clauses.

It was at this point that Monnet realised that the hardening of the German position needed a matching response from himself and his friends, who attached crucial importance to decartelization. This is why on 22 December 1950 the Frenchman reported to Schuman that “Mr. McCloy and Mr. Bowey [Bowie] will take the initiative of holding discussions with the Germans”⁸⁶³. Even though Monnet continued his efforts, from this moment on the US High Commissioner was at the forefront of the negotiations. He understood very well the danger of the failure of the negotiations or of a compromise affecting the pivotal clauses of the project – the antitrust provisions.

In order to have a clear picture of the situation and of the main challenges, McCloy and his office drafted a briefing paper at the beginning of 1951. This document, published on 2 February 1951, stated that the main unsettled issues were linked to the number of German steel companies, the problem of the ownership by the steel companies of coal mines and the future of the DKV that had a monopoly on the selling of Ruhr coal⁸⁶⁴. First, regarding the number of unit companies, the briefing paper emphasised that in December 1950 the Federal Government had received a proposal to reorganise the

⁸⁵⁷ Ibid., 760-761.

⁸⁵⁸ Note pour Monsieur Schuman [from Jean Monnet], 28 September 1950, FJM, AMG 20/4/3.

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁶¹ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 14 December 1950, Ibid., 766.

⁸⁶² Ibid.

⁸⁶³ Lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman, 22 décembre 1950, FJM, Ibid.

⁸⁶⁴ Briefing Paper Drafted in the Office of United States High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt, 2 February 1951, *FRUS 1951*, 86.

German steel industry into twenty-nine unit companies. However, this suggestion was not taken on board by the German executives, who claimed “that their ability to withstand periods of severe economic crisis would in some cases be improved by the increase in rationalization and diversification which would be made possible by its suggested combinations”⁸⁶⁵. Thus, they continued to stick to their position attaching major importance to associations of enterprises considered as a chief factor of economic stability.

Second, the paper analysed the question of the control by the German steel producers of coal mines, which recalled the pre-war situation and would be completely incompatible with the aims of the Schuman Plan. According to the document, the Germans argued that it was indispensable for the steel industry to have full control over coal supply, especially in periods of crisis, in order to ensure steel production. This position collided with the French view as the French steel industry was completely dependent on German coal. It was easy to envisage that in periods of shortage German coke would thus be available only for the domestic producers. As the High Commission paper highlighted, such a situation would hamper competition and would offer an unfair advantage “based on control rather than economic factors”⁸⁶⁶.

Lastly, the document produced by McCloy and his staff examined one of the most contentious issues facing the negotiations, namely the dissolution of the DKV, an agency that had a monopoly over the Ruhr coal sales. The US High Commissariat concluded that “the continued existence of the DKV is completely inconsistent with both Law 27 and the Schuman Plan”⁸⁶⁷. It recalled that both Law 27 and the Schuman Plan aimed to establish different coal sellers that would supply the market independently. Again, the text emphasised that “articles 60 and 61 of the Schuman Plan treaty are designed to prevent combinations and cartels which might restrict competition or create a monopoly”⁸⁶⁸. Therefore, the document concluded that the maintenance of a company that controlled the coal market in periods of economic shortage and would favour German producers could not be accepted in the context of the Schuman Plan⁸⁶⁹.

With this situation in mind, McCloy underlined that the negotiations with the Germans had reached a crucial stage and said “we are taking a firm position that while we are willing to concede the necessity for a transition period during which the DKV will be gradually phased out, and while we are not in principle opposed to reasonable ownership of coal mines by steel producers or to the existence in the steel industry of units of industrially efficient size, all cartels and excessive concentrations of power must be eliminated under Law 27”⁸⁷⁰. McCloy understood the complexity of the moment and the need for a special negotiation strategy in the following months in order to ensure that German or other executives (such as Belgian policymakers) accepted the formulation of

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid., 88.

⁸⁶⁷ Ibid., 89.

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid., 86.

the antitrust articles in such a way as to guarantee the achievement of the Schuman Plan aims.

The situation was considered critical not only by McCloy but also by many others. Bruce, the US Ambassador to Paris, realised it also and proposed that, if Adenauer's obstruction continued, "you [Acheson] and McCloy carefully consider whether you are willing to place the deconcentration issue before HICOM for decision and to insist on a quick action"⁸⁷¹. According to Bruce this action should have been decided only after evaluating the results of Hirsch's visit to Bonn, which took place in February 1951. This was one of the last attempts by Monnet to convince Adenauer to accept the proposals on the deconcentration of Ruhr industry⁸⁷². The bargaining strategy used by Monnet through his envoy Hirsch was to inform Hallstein that France would accept the dissolution of the IRA only if the ECSC were put in place⁸⁷³. Yet, this strategy did not yield the intended outcome. Despite this result, the suggestion of placing the matter before the Allied High Commission was not taken on board by Acheson and McCloy, not because the German executives conceded, but because the US High Commissioner considered that another strategy would produce better results.

McCloy decided to conduct a direct dialogue with the representatives of the opposition camps, be it Adenauer or other executives, steel producers or unions, considering that direct persuasion could result in a better outcome. During his negotiations McCloy did not shy away from blaming directly the German political executives and industrialists for the stalling of the negotiations. During his meeting on 19 February 1951 with Adenauer and Erhard, McCloy underlined to his interlocutors that the desire to see the plan fulfilled, "had led us to propose, and enabled us to induce [the] French to accept, compromises going far beyond what would otherwise be conceivable"⁸⁷⁴. Furthermore, the US representative highlighted that these "concessions went to limit of possible acceptance by High Commission in view of known attitudes of British and French"⁸⁷⁵. Therefore, the only obstacle identified by the US High Commissioner was the obstructionist attitude of the German industrialists. Once again, Adenauer mentioned the desire of the German steel producers to have unhindered access to coal sources. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the personal note to Acheson, McCloy insisted that this was incompatible with the Schuman Plan scope since it might limit supply to other European companies. Adenauer continued to bargain arguing that he had a precarious political position now that the unions had received the right to be consulted on industrial policy and that there was a risk that "he might not be able to obtain [a] Bundestag majority for [the] Schuman Plan against SPD [Social Democratic Party] and industrialist and trade union opposition"⁸⁷⁶. This argument did not seem to impress McCloy, who mentioned to the Secretary of State that he "pointed out to him [Adenauer] that if [the]

⁸⁷¹ The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, 21 February 1951, *Ibid.*, 96.

⁸⁷² *Ibid.*, 93.

⁸⁷³ Lettre de Jean Monnet à E. Hirsch, 8 janvier 1951, FJM, AMG 11/2/14

⁸⁷⁴ The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State, Frankfurt, 19 February 1951, *FRUS 1951*, 91.

⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 92.

Schuman Plan failed on account of Ruhr steel efforts to obtain [an] artificially dominant position, Germany would suffer [a] serious set-back in Europe and the US”⁸⁷⁷.

The US High Commissioner did not shy away from directly accusing Adenauer and the industrialists that their obstructionist attitude prevented the finalization of the Treaty. During his meeting with the German Chancellor on 2 March 1951, McCloy used the same argument or rather accusation employed by Monnet, namely that “the conclusion of the Schuman Plan has been delayed for more than two months in order to achieve a negotiated solution with the Federal Government”⁸⁷⁸. Again like Monnet, McCloy threatened his partners in the discussions that, in case an agreement was impossible, “the French and American representatives would be obliged to bring the issue of deconcentration directly to the High Commission”⁸⁷⁹. Despite his promise to further discuss the issue with the industrialists, McCloy could not identify any progress at the beginning of March as he reported to Acheson the next day⁸⁸⁰. Once again the US High Commissioner expressed his concern to the Chancellor, underlining that he “was deeply discouraged about progress for constructive solution”⁸⁸¹ which, according to him, was caused by the German desire to obtain more than was intended in the Schuman Plan, namely an economic advantage over its competitors. While McCloy maintained his position, the Chancellor promised once more to continue his dialogue with the industrialists. This time he agreed, in his discussions with the industrialists, to support McCloy’s proposal that “no German steel works should own mines which had a capacity to produce more than 75 percent of its coking requirements”⁸⁸².

Even though the Chancellor informed McCloy that he was negotiating with the industrialists, the US High Commissioner continued in parallel to hold intensive negotiations with coal and steel producers. These interest groups strongly supported the maintenance of the DKV, considering that “it guarantees, in their opinion, the security of Ruhr miners’ employment”⁸⁸³. But, McCloy wanted to make sure that his message got through to these opposition groups. In addition, he also wanted to underline the importance he personally attached to these provisions of the treaty. As Wilkens wrote, “the Ruhr industrialists had quickly made clear that their most difficult interlocutors, in the matter, were neither the French, nor the British, but the Americans with their antitrust complex”⁸⁸⁴. During his meeting with Ruhr industrialists between 3 and 5 March McCloy highlighted once more that he considered that the steel producers should not be allowed to control coalmines that produce more than 75 percent of their needs⁸⁸⁵.

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁸ Mémorandum sur la deconcentration de la Ruhr et la conclusion des négociations sur le Plan Schuman, 8 mars 1951, FJM, AMG 13/2/10, 2.

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁰ The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State, Frankfurt, 3 March 1951, *FRUS 1951*, 97.

⁸⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸⁸² Ibid., 97, note 6.

⁸⁸³ Mémorandum sur la deconcentration de la Ruhr et la conclusion des négociations sur le Plan Schuman, FJM, Ibid., 3.

⁸⁸⁴ Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 291.

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid., 297.

It appeared that the industrialists could not easily accept McCloy's view on limiting the influence of the trusts. Consequently, they looked desperately for a strategy to ease the continuous pressure from McCloy. For this purpose they put into practice what Wilkens called a "method less orthodox,"⁸⁸⁶ namely to employ Robert Patterson, a former US Defence Minister to convince the US High Commissioner to compromise. Calling an ex-superior of McCloy was indeed a bold move by the Ruhr industrialists, which disturbed many including Monnet, who warned Patterson that "the results of adhering to the present position of the Ruhr interests can only injure everyone including Germany"⁸⁸⁷. Nevertheless, the "rebellion of the Ruhr industrialists against the Schuman Plan"⁸⁸⁸ as it was called by Walter Lippmann, ended in failure since they neglected to consider how deeply entrenched the antitrust feelings were in McCloy's and Monnet's thought. In the end, the ex-diplomat recommended to the industrialists that they agree with McCloy's and Monnet's conditions.

McCloy's pressure did not stop with Adenauer or the Ruhr industrialists as he knew that the opposition came from different influential circles that could have an influence on the outcome. This was the case of Dr Schumacher, the leader of the influential SPD, who strongly opposed the Schuman Plan considering it "part of a Franco-American conspiracy against Ger[man] workers"⁸⁸⁹. Schumacher warned McCloy that a liquidation of the DKV would mean "unemployment, possible unrest and lower living standard for the miners of the Ruhr"⁸⁹⁰. This discussion did not seem to convince the German politician, who, as McCloy wrote, "stated emphatically that his party would never approve the Schuman Plan in its present form and that it would launch a determined campaign against its ratification"⁸⁹¹. Furthermore, McCloy discussed the issue unofficially with Ludwig Erhard, the finance minister who championed economic laissez-faire and manifested his opposition to the Schuman Plan approach, considering it "too dirigiste"⁸⁹². Despite his limited success, McCloy wanted to discuss the issue with as many key players as possible in an attempt to convince them and get across the message that he was backing Monnet's project and attached crucial importance to coal and steel decentralization.

Between January and March 1951 McCloy used all his influence to attempt to convince key German executives, political players, steel producers and unions to accept the antitrust policy pursued by himself and others such as Acheson and Monnet. Since McCloy was aware that all these discussions had achieved limited outcomes, he gave, as Gillingham wrote, an "ultimatum to Adenauer"⁸⁹³ on 2 March 1951 stressing that the time for negotiations had ended. Two days later he stated the terms of the agreement to the Chancellor on the three main points identified as most challenging in the US High

⁸⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 293.

⁸⁸⁷ Telegramme from Jean Monnet to R. Patterson, 23 février 1951, FJM, AMG 20/4/12.

⁸⁸⁸ Wilkens, "Le fin des limitations", 293.

⁸⁸⁹ The Liaison and Political Reports Division to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt [letter signed by McCloy], Bonn, 16 March 1951, *FRUS 1951*, 105.

⁸⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹² Interview with Robert R. Bowie conducted by François Duchêne, 12 May 1987, 23.

⁸⁹³ Gillingham, "Solving the Ruhr Problem", 432. See also Wilkens, "Le fin des limitations", 296.

Commission report published about a month before. In the end, Adenauer accepted these terms on 14 March 1951 knowing that further discussions were futile.

In his letter, the Chancellor replied to the High Commission on exactly these three points, namely steel companies, integration of coal mines and steel producers and the liquidation of the DKV. Adenauer's letter listed the names of the twenty-four approved steel companies⁸⁹⁴ (the maximum number allowed) while accepting that none of them could control mines that produced more than 75 percent of their coal needs⁸⁹⁵. Furthermore, the letter described in detail the procedure that would be used for the liquidation of the DKV, a process that would start on 1 July 1951. For this purpose, a liquidator appointed by the German Federal Government, would carry on its activity under the supervision of the High Authority once it was in place. With a view to "establish[ing] effective competition in the selling of Ruhr coal,"⁸⁹⁶ Adenauer informed the High Commissioners that "the liquidator will have the responsibility to eliminate the centralized distribution of coal"⁸⁹⁷. In addition, the letter mentioned that the liquidation would take place in three stages, the final deadline being 1 October 1952, when "the DKV and all regional selling companies of the union will be completely liquidated and all activity of centralized selling (...) will cease"⁸⁹⁸. The letter concluded that "the Federal Government considers that the solutions outlined constitute a reasonable compromise within the Schuman Plan"⁸⁹⁹.

By comparing the terms outlined by the US High Commissioner before starting the negotiations with key German political players, unions and producer representatives with the points listed in the 14 March letter, we can conclude that McCloy's conditions hardly changed as a result of the negotiations he conducted. For example, while his briefing paper of 2 February 1951 stated that the German steel industry had to be reorganised into twenty-nine unit companies, the number ultimately accepted was twenty-four. But more important than the number was the fact that the Federal Government ultimately accepted this condition despite its initial intention to maintain the post-war situation, in which associations of enterprises dominated the market. When it came to coal-steel integration, McCloy maintained his firm position that German steel producers could not have full access to coal supplies despite the German insistence that this was fundamental for Germany's economic balance and development, especially in periods of crisis. The High Commission February paper emphasised that "an intermediate position would be to permit the Germans to have partial integration of coal and steel production (...) but not to such an extent that German steel producers will be fully independent of coal shortages"⁹⁰⁰. As a result, McCloy managed to convince his counterparts that the best bargain they could obtain was what he initially called an intermediate position, which meant in practice that steel companies could control mines that covered a maximum of 75

⁸⁹⁴ Lettre du Chancelier Adenauer à la Haute Commission, 14 mars 1951, traduction française, FJM, AMG 13/3/6, 2.

⁸⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁸⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁸⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰⁰ Briefing Paper Drafted in the Office of United States High Commissioner for Germany, 2 February 1951, *FRUS 1951*, 88.

percent of their coal needs. While the first two points underwent some small adjustments, the last point mentioned in McCloy's February paper – the dissolution of the DKV – was not negotiable and needed to be accepted in full by the German stakeholders. These measures would indeed have a great impact on the German economy since, as reported by Monnet, “following this limitation, the German steel producers will control around 15 percent of the German coal production in comparison with 56 percent before the war”⁹⁰¹.

German executives, steel producers and unions tried to obtain as many concessions as possible but did not want to endanger the prospect of removing Allied control over their coal and steel sectors. McCloy knew that the prospect of ending control by the International Authority for the Ruhr satisfied the Germans. Therefore, he not only dictated the terms of the agreement but also underlined that the opposition groups had every interest in seeing Monnet's plan succeed since the removal of these controls “would be acceptable only in context of the Schuman Plan containing effective provisions against cartels and combinations”⁹⁰².

Despite the acceptance by the German political executives, such as Adenauer and Erhard⁹⁰³, of the antitrust clauses, the negotiations on these stipulations did not end there. Immediately afterwards, Brussels expressed similar concerns, as McCloy confessed to Acheson on 15 March 1951⁹⁰⁴. At the time of the German acceptance, the US Ambassador to Belgium, Murphy, reported to McCloy that Van Zeeland had complained about the results of the Schuman Plan negotiations arguing that they “had gone far beyond its original objectives”⁹⁰⁵ given that “its far reaching implications and [the] dirigisme inherent in proposed structure almost defeat its purpose”⁹⁰⁶. In fact, McCloy understood very well that this criticism stemmed from the “general lack of sympathy with Articles 60 and 61”⁹⁰⁷. The same news was reported by the US Ambassador to France, Bruce, who informed Acheson on 20 March of Schuman's discussion with Van Zeeland. The Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister expressed his concerns about the excessive powers given to the High Authority, referring primarily to the antitrust articles⁹⁰⁸. Therefore, very soon after he ended his German endeavour, the US High Commissioner realised that he would need to continue persuading the policymakers of the countries participating in the ECSC Treaty negotiations.

In this situation McCloy could not accept any further concession as he had already managed to obtain the accord of the German counterparts. As a result, as Milward wrote,

⁹⁰¹ Lettre de Jean Monnet envoyée au Président Auriol et au Ministres H. Queuille, R. Pleven, G. Bidault, J. M. Louvel, R. Mayer et G. Mollet, 16 mars 1951, FJM, AMG13/3/7, 1.

⁹⁰² The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State (15.3.1951) Report on German attitudes to the terms of the ECSC treaty, <http://www.hum.leiden.edu/history/eu-history/historical/schuman.html> (accessed 9 January 2011).

⁹⁰³ Interview with Robert R. Bowie conducted by François Duchêne, 12 May 1987, 23.

⁹⁰⁴ The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State (15.3.1951) Report on German attitudes to the terms of the ECSC treaty.

⁹⁰⁵ The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State, Frankfurt, 15 March 1951, FRUS 1951, 103, note 4.

⁹⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁸ The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, Paris, 20 March 1951, FRUS 1951, 106.

“the day after McCloy obtained Adenauer’s agreement to these terms he formally requested the Belgian government to drop all further objections”⁹⁰⁹. Again McCloy showed his lack of flexibility when it came to statesmen’s objections to Articles 60 and 61.

The discussion on the anti-concentration articles proved to be one of the most difficult phases of the ECSC Treaty negotiations because of the very small room for manoeuvre left on these provisions. Monnet and other members of his group were not ready to compromise in any way on the intention to dismantle the trusts and curb the influence of big business in post-war Europe. McCloy’s intervention ensured that those opposing the introduction of these stipulations in the treaty accepted them in the form desired by those behind the drafting of the treaty. There is consensus in the literature about McCloy’s decisive role. Schwartz underlined the US High Commissioner’s critical role, considering it as “one of McCloy’s greatest achievements as high commissioner”⁹¹⁰. To prove his point, he quoted Monnet, who confessed that the ECSC Treaty “would never have been signed but for McCloy’s support”⁹¹¹. Likewise, Wilkens argued in a paper published almost a decade later that McCloy’s support was “utterly decisive”⁹¹². Also, Marie-Laure Djelic considered the US High Commissioner’s actions as pivotal “in bringing Germans finally to accept and ratify the anti-cartel provisions of the ECSC Treaty”⁹¹³. In addition, others who witnessed them, judged McCloy’s actions as crucial in convincing political leaders. Robert Bowie expressed his view that Adenauer and other important German ministers “were sufficiently sensitive”⁹¹⁴ to McCloy’s pressure to accept his opinion on antitrust. In the end, by using various methods from direct negotiation to ultimatums, McCloy persuaded the German and Belgian executives to accept his opinion to disband trusts.

It must be noted that McCloy’s merit went even further than convincing German industry and the political leaders in Bonn and Brussels. At the end of 1950, in the context of growing opposition in French industrial circles, a document drafted by the French government, very likely with Monnet’s input, highlighted that “if the American, in the High Commission, will not support, whole heartedly, French position in the matter, it will be impossible for the French Government to insist successfully on articles 41 and 42 in their present form”⁹¹⁵. This proposed cable aimed to underline the crucial role to be played by McCloy, who was called on to send a decisive message of support for the decartelization process. Without such support the authors of the document considered that it was “inconceivable that the French government (...) [could] break the power of French steel (...) and convince the public that equal treatment has been guaranteed in the single market when [the] German steel industries would from the outset possess this

⁹⁰⁹ Milward, “The Belgium Coal and Steel Industries”, 453.

⁹¹⁰ Schwartz, “The Transnational Partnership”, 188.

⁹¹¹ Ibid.

⁹¹² Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 290.

⁹¹³ Marie-Laure Djelic, *Exporting the American Model. The Postwar Transformation of European Business* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 236.

⁹¹⁴ Interview with Robert R. Bowie conducted by François Duchêne, 12 May 1987, 23.

⁹¹⁵ Proposed cable regarding articles 41 and 42, 16 December 1950, FJM, AMG 10/3/5.

overwhelming advantage”⁹¹⁶. While in the case of Belgian and especially German opposition, McCloy needed to intervene personally to impose the deconcentration measures, when it came to the French opposition, his strong anti-cartel views and his firm action seemed to be enough to convince them to give up their resistance. However, this does not diminish in any way McCloy’s role in weakening the opposition to the anticartel provisions in France.

Even though the US High Commissioner played the decisive role in the conclusion of the negotiations, he was not the only one to put pressure on policymakers to accept the anticartel provisions. As mentioned during the first part of this section, Monnet himself played his part especially during the last months of 1950 but his attempts apparently did not yield the desired outcome. But even after McCloy’s direct involvement, Monnet did not cease his actions. In fact, the two consulted continuously on the course of action. For example, two days after McCloy’s decisive meeting with Adenauer, the McCloy was in Paris where he met Ambassador Bruce, Ambassador Jessup and Monnet⁹¹⁷. As a result, it does not come as a surprise that on many occasions both McCloy and Monnet employed the same language and used the same arguments when discussing with their German counterparts opposing the antitrust articles. Also, very likely because of their permanent consultations, they maintained the same degree of intransigence during the negotiations, such as when pushing for the complete dismantlement of the DKV. In addition, due to their dialogue but equally to their joint beliefs they seemed to form a common front. This is probably why Monnet reported to the French President at Auriol on 16 March 1951 that “the agreement corresponds to the joint position which has been agreed between the French and Americans in Germany (...)”⁹¹⁸.

5.3. Conclusion: Monnet and his Group of Friends following-up on the Schuman Plan

As their actions show, Monnet and his associates could not leave the fate of the project in the hands of the governments. As a result, even at the stage when the representatives of the states were negotiating the clauses of the future treaty based on the Schuman Declaration, Acheson, McCloy and Monnet shaped their interests. Consequently, their role was not limited to conveying the idea to policymakers. They supervised and actively participated in the discussions and, at times, influenced them decisively.

However, as the two examples examined (the establishment of the Council of Ministers and the antitrust provisions) reveal their action in each case had different results. In the case of the intergovernmental proposal Monnet and his friends needed to back down and accept a situation where the power of the supervisory authority would be shared with a body representing the national governments. Indeed, Monnet and his associates needed to compromise on the initial aims of the project. However, not to the extent desired by those

⁹¹⁶ Ibid.

⁹¹⁷ “Communique de l’Ambassade américaine” sur la rencontre McCloy-Jean Monnet, 4 mars 1951, FJM, AMG 13/3/2.

⁹¹⁸ Lettre de Jean Monnet envoyée au Président Auriol et au Ministres H. Queuille, R. Pleven, G. Bidault, J. M. Louvel, R. Mayer et G. Mollet, 16 mars 1951, JMF, Ibid., 1.

who proposed the creation of a Council of Ministers. The situation was completely different in the case of the antitrust proposal since Acheson, and especially Monnet and McCloy, could not accept concessions that would endanger this key aim of the plan. The Frenchman and the US High Commissioner made it clear that they would rather give up the project than jeopardize the clauses designed to put an end to the control of the coal and steel market by big business. Therefore, they used all possible means to convince those opposing the measures, especially the German and Belgian governments, but also coal and steel producers and unions. Contrary to the proposal to create a Council of Ministers, which altered the supranational principle, the antitrust proposal remained largely untouched.

Why then was the reaction of Monnet and of his transatlantic friends to the proposals to alter the concepts of the Schuman Plan different? It seems that Monnet and others gathered around his project attributed to some extent different degrees of importance to the proposals embodied in the plan. They even accepted its alteration as long as its aims were not affected profoundly and it still seemed possible to achieve them. For example, although the supranational principle was altered, it remained very much in place and the High Authority maintained the prime role in the future institutional structure of the organisation. Thus, as long as the supranational authority maintained its supervisory role of the market, the existence of the Council was tolerated. But this was not the only case when Monnet accepted compromise. Sylvie Lefèvre-Dalbin mentioned a number of concessions obtained by the French steel producers. They were allowed to have transitional periods during which governmental subsidies were permitted in the coal and steel sectors⁹¹⁹ or the promise that the French steel producers would “obtain the electrification by the SNCF [*Société Nationale des Chemins de fer français*] of the Dunkerque-Thionville railway”⁹²⁰. In addition, Monnet reluctantly accepted the appointment to the High Authority of two members considered as defenders of the interests of the steel industry, namely Léon Daum, regarded as “compensation offered to the steel producers”⁹²¹ and Franz Etzel, named Vice-President of the High Authority, considered as “a solid guarantee that the interests of the Ruhr industry will be taken into consideration”⁹²². In a similar vein, Griffiths argued that many of the economic clauses were modified under the influence of the national governments. He lists a series of domains where Monnet and others supporting the initial plans needed to compromise, such as wages, production programmes and investment control, prices and commercial policy⁹²³.

As noted above, the situation was much different when it came to the antitrust provisions. They were at the core of the scheme and any alteration was considered as undermining the aims of the Schuman Plan. In practical terms, McCloy and Monnet believed that the objectives of the project could not be fulfilled if big business continued to exist and control the majority of market shares and prices. Therefore, any negotiation that

⁹¹⁹ Lefèvre-Dalbin, “Les sidérurgistes français”, 214.

⁹²⁰ Ibid., 215.

⁹²¹ Mioche, “La patronat”, 314.

⁹²² Wilkens, “Le fin des limitations”, 299.

⁹²³ Griffiths, *The Schuman Plan*, 5-17.

endangered the aims of the plan was rejected by Monnet and McCloy. The latter used all his influence, derived from his function as High Commissioner, to break up monopolies (see the decision to disband the DKV) and to ensure that they would not be restored in the future. In this case, although some spoke about an “agreement,”⁹²⁴ the result demonstrates that the initial intention to break up the DKV, to limit the number of units, and to restrict the control of coal supply by the steel companies largely survived the negotiations. Also, the way in which these negotiations were conducted show Monnet’s and McCloy’s lack of inclination for conciliation. Even though McCloy consulted Adenauer, other policymakers and coal and steel producers, the terms of the deal ended up very much the same as initially intended.

Thus, Monnet’s and his associates’ actions intended to preserve the initial intentions of the plan yielded different results and, consequently, one could conclude that the aims of the plan were altered, in some cases, decisively. This is the conclusion reached by Griffiths who, after a thorough examination of the negotiations on the economic clauses, underlined that “very few of the original ideas were to survive unchanged in the final treaty”⁹²⁵. According to him, this outcome was due to the fact that the “governments fought to defend their perceived national self-interest”⁹²⁶. Likewise, Gillingham argued that “the Paris negotiations followed a tedious, meandering downhill path eventually to get bogged down in swamps of bureaucratic manoeuvring in the national self-interest”⁹²⁷. Therefore, the clash between the representatives of the national executive of the states participating in the negotiations and those of Monnet and his friends resulted in the alteration of the initial intentions of the creators of the project. This claim recalls Haas’ conclusion that “epistemic communities create reality, but not as they wish”⁹²⁸. In the end, Monnet’s and his associates’ intentions behind the Schuman Declaration were never implemented in a pure form. Even though the High Authority, and its successor the European Commission, maintained primacy on antitrust decisions, their powers were restricted in others areas where the Council of Ministers gathered increased influence.

Despite this outcome, the core intentions embodied in the Schuman Plan remained untouched thanks to the actions of some of Monnet’s friends. While Acheson, McCloy and Monnet could accept the alteration of many aspects of the project, they defended, even at the risk of abandoning the plan altogether, those provisions around which the whole project was designed. For example, regardless of the changes made to it, the High Authority survived as the main decision-making institution charged with the supervision of the future common market. Moreover, the stipulations aimed at restoring competition in Western Europe – the antitrust articles – were preserved almost intact after the negotiations. Historical evidence shows that this was the outcome of Monnet and his associates’ actions, who were driven by the conviction that a healthy Western European market could not be created without restoring and establishing mechanisms for maintaining its proper functioning. Their motivation was doubtless grounded in their

⁹²⁴ Ibid., 27.

⁹²⁵ Ibid., 1.

⁹²⁶ Ibid.

⁹²⁷ Gillingham, “Solving the Ruhr Problem”, 414.

⁹²⁸ Adler and Haas, “Conclusion”, 381.

personal vision on economic matters, based on contempt for big business, which they considered, in the Frankfurter-Brandeis spirit, not only dangerous but also responsible for economic misfortune. This is the main reason why Acheson, McCloy and Monnet made almost no concessions on these aspects of the project and overcame all opposition during the treaty negotiations.

Chapter 6: Shaping the Interests of Major International Actors: Britain and the US

Monnet's and his friends' role in the follow-up to the ECSC plan was not limited to persuading the representatives of the states participating in the negotiations. It was obvious from the outset that other international actors would have an important part to play in the process and that their reaction had to be steered in the right direction. For a number of reasons, the actions and reactions of Britain and the US need to be considered. More specifically, the international context and Germany's particular situation (governed by the Allied High Commission) required the consultation of Britain and the US.

Britain was widely regarded as one of the leading international actors in terms of European integration. As a result, it was unconceivable to many to have a European integration project without the UK's participation. Also, at the end of the war, despite its economic shortcomings, it was one of the key European powers and continued to be influential on the international diplomatic stage. But perhaps the chief reason why its reaction could not be ignored was the fact that it was one of the governing powers of West Germany and, as a result, none of Bonn's foreign policy decisions could be taken in the aftermath of the war without the UK's endorsement.

In its turn, the US' reaction was significant for many reasons. After the Second World War it emerged as the leading military and economic power and, consequently, it had a decisive say in the international arena and especially in Western Europe. Although its place was challenged by the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War, once the spheres of influence in Europe became clearer, the US assumed the principal role in Western Europe. Furthermore, as it participated in the governance of the Federal Republic within the Allied High Commission, like the UK, all decisions required its approval.

Monnet and his associates were keenly aware of this distribution of power in the international arena. Accordingly, people such as Monnet, Acheson and McCloy realised the significance of inducing the right attitude among decision-makers in London and Washington. This section will therefore focus on Monnet's and his friends' approach towards those in power in the capitals of the two countries.

6.1. Steering Britain's Attitude in the Desired Direction

In the post-Second World War period Britain was seen as the key European power able to make a successful case for European unity. Many expected London to come up with a proposal that would create some sort of economic or political integration in Western Europe. However, its post-war attitude demonstrated little inclination to lead an initiative that would result in the creation of a European supranational organisation. The best illustration of this is possibly London's refusal even to contemplate such an organisation during the Hague Conference negotiations (May 1948).

The UK attitude seemed to send a clear message that its government would neither take the lead in proposing such a plan nor ever accept involvement in one. It seems that Acheson was very much aware of this state of play. George Kennan wrote in his memoirs that, in July 1949, he gave his opinion to the Secretary of State on Britain's attitude and its refusal to associate itself with the cause of European integration. Kennan told Acheson that he "found both serious and compelling (...) the reasons that caused the British to hesitate in associating themselves with any move towards a continental union – so serious and compelling that if any such movement had to include the Britain, then, I thought, it could not go very far"⁹²⁹. It is beyond doubt that the US diplomat was aware of the hesitations of policymakers in London. In October 1949, at a meeting in Paris with USA diplomats serving in Europe, Acheson made it clear that the initiative for European integration was expected to come from French politicians. He underlined that, in his opinion, "France and only France alone can take the decisive leadership in integrating Western Germany into Western Europe"⁹³⁰. Examining this aspect Schwartz concluded that, because of the UK's hesitations, "London's policy was a great disappointment to the Americans"⁹³¹.

It is likely that Monnet, who was never far from a relevant piece of information, was perfectly aware of the discontent of the US officials. As a result he designed a plan that was primarily addressed to Federal Germany and not necessarily to the UK. Even though his intentions were not clear from the beginning, as underlined by Roger Bullen, "by the late summer of 1950, it had become a settled conviction within the Foreign Office that Monnet had deliberately set out to exclude the British from the negotiations"⁹³². Britain was invited to join, but Monnet was in no way ready to compromise on the aims of the plan to obtain London's participation. While its refusal to take part was not seen as endangering the success of the plan, its reaction was considered crucial. A project involving political and economic transformations in Western Europe that did not have Britain's moral support would have been difficult to get off the ground. Furthermore, Britain had a very important say in the governance of Federal Germany as a member of

⁹²⁹ George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown, 1967), 453.

⁹³⁰ Meeting of the United States Ambassadors at Paris, 21-22 October to Discuss Major Developments Relating to Europe. 840.00/10-1949: Telegram *The Secretary of States to the Embassy in France*. In *FRUS 1949: Western Europe*, volume IV (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 470.

⁹³¹ Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 108-109.

⁹³² Roger Bullen, "The British Government and the Schuman Plan, May 1950-March 1951," In *Le Plan Schuman dans l'histoire*, ed. Wilkens, 210.

the Allied High Commission. Therefore, in the next pages we will focus on the immediate attitude of British leaders once the Schuman Plan became public.

6.1.1. Britain's Eagerness to Undermine the Schuman Plan

Since Monnet attached little importance to British participation, he paid little attention to UK officials in the days before the announcement of the scheme. He was more concerned about informing the key partner and ensuring its reaction was positive. He therefore sent an envoy to Bonn to explain in detail the aims of the plan to West German policymakers so as to avoid any misunderstandings. Adenauer recounted in his memoirs that he was informed of the plan before its public announcement and that he immediately replied that he “accepted his [Schuman's] proposal whole-heartedly”⁹³³.

Even more important than a positive reaction from Bonn was the approval of Monnet's group of friends. Before making the plan known to Adenauer, the Frenchman consulted with Acheson and McCloy, whose opinion was very likely to have been considered pivotal on account of their key role in post-war Europe and, more importantly, because they belonged to the same circle of friends sharing a thought. On 7 May 1950, Acheson, who was on his way to the Allied conference called to discuss the fate of Germany, stopped in Paris, where he was informed of the scheme by Monnet. It is hard to identify the reasons why he visited Paris at that particular time, but it is clear that it was not a coincidence. McCloy also paid a short visit to Monnet the same day. This encounter intrigued many, such as Massigli, the French Ambassador to London, who asked rhetorically in his memoirs “is it by chance that on 7 May he [McCloy] found himself in Paris during the Robert Schuman – Dean Acheson meeting?”⁹³⁴. This shows Monnet's concern to dispel any possible misgivings Acheson and McCloy might have had if the aims of the plan had not been clearly explained to them.

Monnet's prior consultation with Acheson and McCloy, who were part of a small circle of people informed of the plan before it was announced, shows that he was very anxious to receive their blessing. The same cannot be said about his attitude towards key British policymakers, who were told only hours before the plan was made public by René Massigli and utterly disagreed with the approach, writing: “to drop such a bombshell without taking any precautions was to run the risk of causing a major crisis”⁹³⁵. Acheson, who met the UK Foreign Minister the next day, related this incident, writing that Ernest Bevin “was in a highly emotional state and very angry with me”⁹³⁶ and got into “towering rage”⁹³⁷. The US Foreign Secretary described in detail his meeting with Bevin both in his memoirs and in *Sketches of Life of Men I Have Known*, mentioning that he was accused

⁹³³ Adenauer Konrad, *Memoirs: 1945-1953*. translated by Beate Ruhm von Oppen (Chicago: H. Regnery Co. 1966), 257.

⁹³⁴ Massigli, *Une comédie des erreurs*, 195.

⁹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁹³⁶ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 385. Massigli wrote that Bevin “était (...) dans un état de grande fureur: ainsi Acheson était au courant et ne l'avait pas prévenu.” Massigli, *Une comédie des erreurs*, 189.

⁹³⁷ Acheson, *Sketches*, 39.

by the UK official of conspiracy, together with the French, against British interests⁹³⁸. Acheson's explanations did not impress Bevin, who wondered suspiciously "why would an honest man have gone from Washington to London via Paris at this precise moment?"⁹³⁹.

Bevin's reaction clearly illustrates his feelings about a plan that was designed without British input and, even worse, did not envisage British participation. Furthermore, as he underlined, he considered the plan against London's interests since Britain would be excluded from a continental economic agreement in fields of particular interest such as coal and steel. Also, Acheson's support for the plan sent a strong message that the UK's tutelage over Western Europe would end. Bevin felt that, in a diplomatic world full of uncertainties, this might mean political and economic isolation for his country, especially since the scheme had received the blessing of the US Secretary of State. It is therefore not difficult to understand the irritation and uneasiness of the British official, who felt that such a plan could not bring anything good for his country. As a result he was ready to dismiss it from the outset and, as Acheson confessed, he was "rapidly working himself into bitter opposition to (...) the Schuman Plan"⁹⁴⁰.

6.1.2. Ensuring a Positive British Reply

The lack of consultation and accommodation with Britain made its government liable to dismiss the plan. This was, however, not desirable for either side for various reasons. For example, in the context of the Cold War, it would have created a break in the Western alliance, whose key power in Western Europe was precisely Britain. A diplomatic crisis with Britain was probably one of the last things Monnet, Acheson or McCloy wanted. Acheson, who was one of the first to face Bevin's emotional reaction, clearly understood the dangers of British hostility. Therefore, he felt that no effort should be spared to ensure a moderate UK response if its participation was not possible.

Acheson took the lead in this process of convincing UK officials to draft a moderate response to the plan. However, the aim was not to convince those in charge of British policy that UK participation was indispensable. While the door was left open, the participation of other countries in addition to France and Germany was optional. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that the way in which Monnet drafted his plan and his reaction to any concessions requested made it almost impossible for Britain to unconditionally accept it, as the Frenchman demanded. In this sense, John Young highlights that, indeed, Monnet "had now devised a scheme which did not require British participation"⁹⁴¹.

⁹³⁸ Ibid., 44.

⁹³⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁰ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 385.

⁹⁴¹ John W. Young, *Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999* (Basingstoke. Hants. England: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin's Press. 2000), 29.

One of Acheson's main aims was to reassure those directly involved in the process. This was his first reaction to Bevin's irritation and desire to water down the plan. He tried to assure his interlocutor that the plan was not conceived against Britain's interests. Describing this episode, Acheson confessed: "it took a long time to reduce his blood pressure to the point where discussion would replace denunciation"⁹⁴². Despite his best efforts, Acheson did not seem to convince his British counterpart about the sincere intentions of the author of the plan⁹⁴³. Even though he had limited success, he did manage to prevent a rushed and, possibly, emotional response that would have damaged the fate of the plan. Acheson's efforts did not stop there since he was well aware of the need for follow-up to ensure a moderate reaction. Before examining his actions in the following weeks, it is important to analyze the options that were open to the British officials.

Having realised that a hurried reaction would be unwise, British policymakers needed to evaluate their options. The US Ambassador to the UK, Douglas, emphasised the dilemma of those in power in London, who "on the one [hand](...) were not prepared to join in the Schuman proposal, and on the other [hand] (...) were not prepared to pay the consequences for not joining"⁹⁴⁴. Against this background, Douglas reported to Acheson that British policymakers had to choose to either "frustrate the whole project or to recast it according to their own liking"⁹⁴⁵. The same opinion was passed on to the Secretary of State from the British ambassador to the US, Franks, who emphasised that Bevin "preferred either (a) to strangle it by protracted discussions, or (b) to remodel it quite drastically"⁹⁴⁶. For this purpose, Douglas considered that "they [the British] believe, (...), that a ministerial meeting to discuss either procedure or substance would probably produce precisely this effect"⁹⁴⁷.

Analysing the British attitude until the beginning of June 1950, when the official British communiqué on the Schuman Plan was issued, it seems that UK officials preferred a delaying tactic that would give them the necessary time to fundamentally alter the plan. The main challenge for them was the acceptance of the supranational principle, namely that the High Authority would take binding decisions that would affect the participating countries. Despite an intensive search for a compromise between mid-May and early June⁹⁴⁸, the two sides maintained their positions unchanged.

The two opinions seemed to be irreconcilable and Monnet did not appear to make any effort to find a middle ground. A note sent by Bevin to the French on 25 May 1950, showed that the British government was ready to participate in the future international conference "from the outset with the hope that obtaining a clearer picture of how the

⁹⁴² Acheson, *Sketches*, 44.

⁹⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴⁴ The Ambassador in the United Kingdom, (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, London, 5 June 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 719.

⁹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴⁶ The British Ambassador in the US (Franks) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 8 June 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 727.

⁹⁴⁷ The Ambassador in the United Kingdom, (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, 5 June 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 719.

⁹⁴⁸ Bullen, "The British Government", 206.

scheme would operate in detail they might be able to participate in it”⁹⁴⁹. In other words, the UK government wanted to participate in the negotiations but without previously committing to or unconditionally accepting the aims of the project, as Monnet requested from all concerned. This was unacceptable for Monnet, as the US Ambassador to Paris, Bruce, reported to Acheson, the French considered that “the consequent delays attendant upon the consideration of the Schuman Plan proposal in detail would make its eventual adoption much more difficult and probably impossible”⁹⁵⁰. Monnet wanted to avoid opening Pandora’s Box, especially because Germany, the key partner, had already unconditionally accepted the plan as the basis for discussions. In this sense Roger Bullen wrote that Monnet “feared that if the British entered the negotiations uncommitted to the French formula they would be able to press their own solution of a community based on inter-governmental co-operation”⁹⁵¹. The Frenchman considered this a very dangerous move, given that the “Dutch and Belgians preferred a looser British formula to the French [one]”⁹⁵².

The reply to the British proposals sent at the end of May recalled the main aim of Schuman’s proposal, namely the establishment of a European Community governed by “a high authority of a new kind [which should] be independent both of governments and of private interests”⁹⁵³. As communicated to Acheson by Bruce, the scope of this memo was once again to clarify the content of the plan to UK officials and to “dissipate any misunderstanding”⁹⁵⁴ on the main principles of the proposed negotiations. In the end, the communiqué concluded that the British government was welcome to participate in the future negotiations on the basis of the principles included in the project⁹⁵⁵. It is beyond doubt that Monnet had an important say in the way this note was drafted. Once again the British government was reminded that the supranational principle was not negotiable. Even though Monnet was not able to preserve it unaltered until the end of the negotiations on the ECSC Treaty, he was not inclined to accept any concessions at this point, possibly also because he did not consider British participation indispensable.

While it is hard to find evidence that, after Acheson’s conversation with Bevin on 9 May 1950, the UK government tried to “strangle it”⁹⁵⁶ (to recall the first option highlighted by Franks), an examination of the attitude of UK officials shows that the aim was to radically alter the plan. However, this intention was counteracted by Monnet, who was without doubt behind every French reply to UK suggestions. Even though British participation was not Monnet’s primary concern, he and Acheson were worried about the tone of the future British reply to the Schuman Declaration, which needed to be moderate and, preferably, positive. This was the aim towards which Monnet’s friends, especially Acheson, worked after the announcement of the plan.

⁹⁴⁹ The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, Paris, 26 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 709 -710.

⁹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 710.

⁹⁵¹ Bullen, “The British Government”, 207.

⁹⁵² *Ibid.*. See also *DBPO.*, Series II, Vol 1, no. 92.

⁹⁵³ The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, Paris, 31 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 713.

⁹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 714.

⁹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵⁶ The British Ambassador in the US (Franks) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 8 June 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 727.

Acheson followed the negotiations between the British and French governments very closely and made sure he was kept up-to-date about the attitude of the two sides. The US Ambassador to Paris, David Bruce, was one of the most important channels of information for the Secretary of State. When sending notes to Acheson, Bruce considered it important to mention that “since the above information was given to me on an entirely personal basis by Monnet it is highly important that only the most limited distribution be made of this message”⁹⁵⁷. In this manner the Secretary of State found out not only what the course of the Franco-British negotiations was but, possibly even more importantly, also Monnet’s opinion on the matter. Knowing in detail the sensitivities of those concerned and the fact that British participation was not indispensable, Acheson focused his energy on ensuring a moderate reply from London that would not endanger the future negotiations between the participating countries.

At a very early stage British officials understood the signals coming from Acheson, namely that it was not in the UK’s interest to sabotage the plan. On 11 May 1950, the British Ambassador to Paris, O. Harvey, confessed to Bevin that he “fear[ed] that unless we soon show at any rate appreciation for the spirit behind M. Schuman’s proposal we shall begin to be accused of attempting to wreck it”⁹⁵⁸. The same signals were sent to Bevin from Washington by O. Franks, the British Ambassador to the US, who underlined that “it is clearly important that the communiqué be so drafted as not to give the Americans any excuse for once more accusing us of ‘dragging our feet’ in the matter of cooperation with Western Europe”⁹⁵⁹. It seems that Acheson did not need to intervene bluntly in order to pass on his message to UK policymakers. He appeared to be closely monitoring the direction of internal British discussions. Furthermore, he was making sure that British officials understood very clearly the importance he attached to the proposal. However, he did not exclude the possibility of direct intervention, as he confessed in a message to certain US diplomatic offices on 2 June 1950, in which he stressed that it was “possible that a situation will develop in which strong US influence should be exerted in order to avoid watering down of proposal by one participant (British for instance)”⁹⁶⁰.

Acheson was not the only individual of Monnet’s group of friends who followed closely the development of British attitudes before the publication of its official reply. As mentioned in a previous section, David Lilienthal visited the UK in the second half of May 1950 and tried to explain the aims of the plan to key British figures, including Prime Minister Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps and Sir Edwin Plowden⁹⁶¹. Since he had become a supporter of the plan after conversations with his close friend Monnet, there is no doubt that Lilienthal managed to convey the message that the scheme was not directed against British interests and that Britain should not try to undermine it. Even though he was not

⁹⁵⁷ The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, Paris, 26 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 710.

⁹⁵⁸ Sir O. Harvey (Paris) to Bevin, 11 May 1950, no. 124 Telegraphic, In *DBPO*, Series II. Volume I, *The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe, and Western European Integration, 1950-1952* (London: HMSO, 1986), 21.

⁹⁵⁹ Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Bevin, 29 May 1950, no. 1547 Telegraphic, *Ibid.*, 106.

⁹⁶⁰ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to Certain Diplomatic Offices, Washington, 2 June 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 715.

⁹⁶¹ Lilienthal, *The Journals*, 19.

acting in tandem with Acheson, since he was involved on a private basis, the effects of his actions could not be entirely neglected.

The British reply issued on 3 June 1950⁹⁶² was indeed moderate in tone and even encouraging regarding the forthcoming negotiations. It showed that the UK wished to participate in the future discussions, but could not accept the sine qua non condition formulated by the French, that all participating states must accept unconditionally the supranational principle, namely that the decisions of the HA would be binding on the governments of the participating countries. The note continued that the UK government was willing to discuss the principles of the plan in detail, hoping that this dialogue would fully clarify its consequences. As a result, the UK government “(...) found it impossible to associate themselves with the negotiations on the terms proposed by the French Government”⁹⁶³. The communiqué concluded by underlining once again the regret of the UK government that it could not participate in the discussions on the French proposal but also the hope that the negotiations would be successful⁹⁶⁴.

Immediately after the official British reply was issued, Acheson expressed his satisfaction with the restrained tone chosen by UK policymakers. In a message to some US embassies, Acheson considered that “it is (...) a source of satisfaction to know that the Government of the UK, although it feels unable to accept, in advance of further exploration, the far-reaching implications of the French proposal, has expressed its sympathy with the broad purposes of the Schuman Plan (...)”⁹⁶⁵. The tone of the British communiqué contrasted sharply with Bevin’s first reaction and his intention to quickly dismiss the scheme. That Acheson, who followed the events very closely, played an important role in this change of attitude is beyond doubt. Indeed, his pressure on UK policymakers and support for the plan contributed significantly to this moderate reply. Furthermore, the Foreign Service considered it necessary to justify their choice and to underline that “we have taken the only line possible for us”⁹⁶⁶. Later, on 8 July 1950, Acheson was informed that the British Ambassador to Paris, “had assured [the] French that although [the] British could not participate on [the] basis [of the] present working papers they continued [to] wish Schuman Plan success as Attlee stated in Commons”⁹⁶⁷.

There is no evidence to indicate that either Monnet or Acheson were in any way surprised or disappointed by the British decision to remain outside the future negotiations. However, Acheson was very keen to make sure that Britain would in no way influence other countries that had expressed their interest in the scheme. For this reason, British officials informed Acheson that nothing would be done to discourage participation [of]

⁹⁶² *DBPO*, Series II, Book I, *The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe and Western European Integration, May 1950 - December 1952* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1986), 146-147.

⁹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶⁵ The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices, Washington, 5 June 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 720.

⁹⁶⁶ Younger [who replaced Bevin, who was in hospital] to Sir O. Franks, 5 June 1950, no. 2634, Telegraphic, In *DBPO* (London: HMSO. 1986), 155.

⁹⁶⁷ The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices, Washington, 8 July 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 740.

other countries, particularly Benelux”⁹⁶⁸. Furthermore, the UK government offered assurances that it would “withhold any alternative proposals at this time”⁹⁶⁹.

Acheson was somewhat concerned about the possibility of the British coming up with a counter-proposal that would endanger the success of the negotiations. As he mentioned in his letter to some US Embassies on 8 July 1950, “although we are not aware of any official lobbying on [the] part of [the] British to water down [the] Plan or to dissuade others from joining”⁹⁷⁰, he was “disturbed by [the] possibility that recent remarks by important British officials (...) will cause European countries [to] slacken their efforts [to] reach agreement on [a] treaty embodying essentials on Schuman concept”⁹⁷¹. These actions were to some extent rooted in the statement included in the official British reply of 3 June that the UK officials were “actively engaged in working on proposals inspired by the French initiative of 9 May in order that they may be ready to make a constructive contribution”⁹⁷².

Although this statement and information reported in the British press⁹⁷³ caused Acheson some concern, British policymakers were quick to dispel it. The US Ambassador to London, Douglas, informed Acheson on 8 June that Edwin Plowden, “the chairman of the interdepartmental group studying all aspects [of the] Schuman Plan, (...) stated categorically [that the] British [were] not preparing [a] counter-proposal to Schuman Plan”⁹⁷⁴. Furthermore, according to Douglas, the UK official “vigorously denied British attempting ‘sabotaging’ plan”⁹⁷⁵. Despite these assurances the Ambassador expressed his scepticism that Plowden’s opinion reflected the view of those involved in the final drafting of the British note of 3 June 1950.

The discussions in the British media and official circles and his personal belief that a counterproposal might jeopardize the ECSC Treaty discussions, encouraged Acheson to take all necessary precautions. Consequently, on 8 July 1950, he advised the US Ambassadors that they “should seek to counteract possible adverse effects of developments described above”⁹⁷⁶ by informing the governments of the countries to which they were accredited that, “even though Britain may not be able to join, this fact will not prevent other countries from going forward with implementation (...)”⁹⁷⁷. This attitude was very well understood by US diplomats, who knew that British officials should be discouraged from doing anything to harm the plan. Douglas reported to Acheson in mid-October 1950 that the “Embassy agrees that if Britain should attempt prevent consummation Schuman Plan by six countries (...) every effort should be made

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁷¹ Ibid.

⁹⁷² *DBPO*, Series II, Book I, 147.

⁹⁷³ The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, London, 8 June 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 725.

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid., 724.

⁹⁷⁵ Ibid., 725.

⁹⁷⁶ The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices, Washington, 8 July 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 740.

⁹⁷⁷ Ibid.

to deter them from so doing”⁹⁷⁸. In addition, he advised that, “in view [of the] strong assurances given by British that no attempt will be made to sabotage [the] plan,”⁹⁷⁹ a positive attitude towards the UK government should be adopted in order to avoid any indication that “we distrust their assurances”⁹⁸⁰.

Acheson’s cautiousness in the months after the publication of the Schuman Plan shows his concern about the effects of the British attitude. As mentioned, he did not appear to be worried that Britain might not join the discussions on the future treaty. Yet, he was very afraid that a negative British reply might influence others in their decisions. As a result, he focused his attention on ensuring that the official British reply would not endanger the future of the plan. He was very successful in conveying his opinion to British officials, who understood that an obstructionist attitude would jeopardize Britain’s relationship with the US. Furthermore, in the months after the publication of the British reply, he was able to make sure that no counterproposal was put forward by London. He used all his power of influence and all his channels to convey his view to policymakers in London and other European capitals concerned. Considering the radical modification of the British attitude between the Acheson-Bevin encounter and the announcement of Monnet’s plan, it can be concluded that Acheson’s pressure on London yielded the results he expected.

Britain’s direct involvement in the fate of the Schuman Plan did not stop when it issued its official reply to the coal and steel plan. On the contrary, its position was judged to be critical to the future of the proposal, mainly because after the Second World War London played a key role in the political and economic governance of Germany, a state directly concerned by Monnet’s scheme. Indeed, according to the Occupational Statute, Britain, France and the US were responsible for taking all important decisions regarding the future of Germany.

At the end of the second world conflagration, it was decided that Germany would only enjoy a limited degree of sovereignty. As a result, in the wake of the Schuman Plan, the “degree of independence gained by the Federal Republic was extremely restricted and conditional”⁹⁸¹. The Occupational Statute, drawn up in April 1949 in Washington⁹⁸², imposed stringent limitations on the German government and reserved the following matters to the control of the occupational authorities: “foreign affairs and trade, (...) control of the Ruhr basin (...)”⁹⁸³. Thus, according to the Occupational Statute, West Germany was not allowed to act without consulting the three High Commissioners⁹⁸⁴

⁹⁷⁸ The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, London, 13 October 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 759.

⁹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 760.

⁹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸¹ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Britain* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 18.

⁹⁸² Text of Occupation Statute promulgated on 12 May 1949 by the Military Governors and Commanders in Chief of the Western Zones, In *Official Gazette of the Allied High Commission for Germany*. 23.09.1949, No 1.

⁹⁸³ Hanrieder, *The Foreign Policies*, 19.

⁹⁸⁴ André François-Poncet (France), Sir Brian Robertson (UK), and John Jay McCloy (US).

both on foreign affairs and on matters regarding the Ruhr region given that the “Federal Republic does not have full sovereignty”⁹⁸⁵.

Since the Schuman Plan had profound implications for Germany’s foreign relations and the governance of the Ruhr area, the law defining the conditions for governing Germany needed to be modified. However, this was not possible without the agreement of the Allied Powers in charge. The French government, as the one who proposed the plan that made this necessary, could do no more than encourage such as modification. The main US representatives involved, Acheson and McCloy, as moral supporters of Monnet’s plan, also agreed on the need to amend the Occupational Statute.

Nevertheless, UK political leaders were not sending the same signals; they did not seem very enthusiastic about Germany gaining increased autonomy through the Schuman Plan. Moreover, British officials wanted to take advantage of the situation in order to delay a decision on Monnet’s plan. When discussing the formulation of the British reply during a Cabinet meeting at the beginning of June 1950, “it was suggested that use might be made of the argument that the German Government were not free to engage in these discussions without the permission of all the Occupying Powers”⁹⁸⁶. British officials felt that, by making use of this argument, radical decisions regarding Germany could be delayed and even impeded. However, this did not seem to be acceptable to McCloy and Acheson, two players who had a critical say in the fate of mid-twentieth century Germany.

Not long after the publication of the plan, the question of the legal implications for Germany was raised. On 23 May 1950 at a meeting of the Allied High Commission at Bonn-Petersberg, Gordon Macready (acting for the UK High Commissioner, Robertson) asked “whether in view of [the] fact [that] West German coal and steel industry was still under HICOM control, HICOM observer should not be present at any negotiations on Schuman proposal participated in by the Federal Republic”⁹⁸⁷. British statesmen, who did not expect the UK to take part in the project, were concerned that the British viewpoint might not be taken into consideration. In addition, as mentioned by MacReady, it was obvious that Monnet’s project implied crucial changes to Germany’s international statute. Monnet, who was in fact at that time presenting the project to the HICOM, strongly opposed such a prospect, arguing that “it was unwise to create [the] impression of any pressure on Federal Republic in [the] negotiations by appointment of HICOM observer”⁹⁸⁸. The Frenchman considered it unnecessary, arguing that the HICOM would be kept informed of developments and that, in the end, the Allied Commission would ultimately have the opportunity to approve the treaty. McCloy, who was keeping Acheson informed of the issue, emphasised that he agreed with Monnet and that he

⁹⁸⁵ Mémorandum de la délégation allemande : Communauté de Charbon et d’acier et droit d’occupation, FJM, AMG 20/4/4.

⁹⁸⁶ Minutes of Cabinet (2.6.1950), The cabinet meeting deciding against British participation in the Schuman Plan. <http://www.hum.leiden.edu/history/eu-history/historical/schuman.html> (accessed 9 January 2011), 3.

⁹⁸⁷ The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State, Bonn, 23 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 708.

⁹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

“supported this argument pointing out [that the] significance of occasion justified extraordinary methods”⁹⁸⁹. In the end, Monnet’s point of view prevailed and it was agreed that the HICOM would not send an observer to the discussions. The meeting between Monnet and the HICOM concluded that Monnet would be allowed to establish direct contact with the German Chancellor who, in his turn, “should then ask [the] HICOM [for] agreement to participate with [the] understanding that [a] favourable reply would be given to request”⁹⁹⁰. Also, it was agreed, as suggested by Monnet, that the HICOM would receive the draft treaty for its formal approval at the end of the negotiations.

The debate on HICOM’s participation in the negotiations on the Schuman proposal was one of the first occasions on which differences of opinion surfaced between Monnet and McCloy, on the one side, and British representatives, on the other, regarding the legal implications of the Schuman Declaration for Germany’s international statute. McCloy and Monnet won the day since Germany was allowed to negotiate directly without the participation of the High Commission. It was in fact the US Commissioner, McCloy, who argued during the discussion of 23 May 1950 that the German government should enjoy freedom of action and decision during the ECSC Treaty negotiations. This was without doubt possible only owing to the influence enjoyed by McCloy in western Germany after the war since, as he recognised, “I had the powers of a dictator as High Commissioner of Allied Forces in West Germany”⁹⁹¹. This instance was the first time that the Occupational Statute of Germany was called into question and, as Gordon McReady said, if the procedure were approved it would be a “significant innovation”⁹⁹² in the law on the governance of Germany after the war.

The freedom of action to participate in the international negotiations accorded to Federal Germany was not the only innovation to the Occupational Statute brought about by the Schuman Declaration. The proposal to pool French and German coal and steel touched an essential aspect of the post-war organisation of Germany. The very existence of the IRA started to be called into question since its activities and prerogatives mirrored those of the entity envisaged. Yet, this matter was not obvious from the outset given that “the problem of coexistence of the two organizations was put neither in the 9 May Declaration nor in the June working document”⁹⁹³. The Schuman Declaration only contained a provision that “the common High Authority will take into account the powers conferred upon the International Ruhr Authority”⁹⁹⁴. In the months that followed the announcement of the Schuman Plan, the coexistence of the two entities was not discussed in detail; at the end

⁹⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁹¹ “John J. McCloy, Lawyer and Diplomat, Is Dead at 93,” *New York Times*, 12 March 1989, <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/12/obituaries/john-j-mccloy-lawyer-and-diplomat-is-dead-at-93.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>, (accessed 28 December 2011).

⁹⁹² Henri Rieben, Martin Nathausius, Françoise Nicod and Claire Camperio-Tixier, *Un changement d’espérance, La Déclaration du 9 mai 1950: Jean Monnet-Robert Schuman* (Lausanne: FJM. Centre de recherches européennes, 2000), 222.

⁹⁹³ Note de F. Valéry sur l’Autorité de la Ruhr et la Communauté charbon-acier, 7 novembre 1950, FJM, AMG 9/5/1, 2.

⁹⁹⁴ *Texte de la déclaration de 9.5.50, traduction américaine*, FJM, AMG 1/3/6.

of 1950 it became clear that clarification of the matter could not be further delayed. This was mainly due to the fact that, after the ECSC Treaty negotiations, it was obvious to all parties involved that the powers of the IRA overlapped with those of the HA.

For this reason, in mid-October 1950, Hallstein sent a memorandum to Monnet exposing the “contradictions between the provisions envisaged by the Conference on the Schuman Plan and the occupational law currently in place in Germany”⁹⁹⁵. In fact, as Monnet mentioned to Rene Pleven, to whom he forwarded the German note, this was the first document to reveal these contradictions in detail⁹⁹⁶. The memorandum summarized in four points these inconsistencies between the Schuman Plan and Germany’s Occupation Statute, namely: “1. the provisions concerning disarmament and demilitarization (...); 2. the control measures concerning the Ruhr, the decartelization, deconcentration and discrimination in business; 3. the provisions concerning foreign policy, including international agreements; 4. the control of external trade”⁹⁹⁷.

Indeed the paper that aimed to prove that “a corresponding modification of the occupational law is inevitable”⁹⁹⁸ provided a detailed analysis of all conflicting aspects that needed to be considered. One of the first issues mentioned concerned Germany’s international statute, which had been seriously limited after the war. The document stressed that “while the occupational law denies Germany’s sovereignty, the Schuman Plan implies as [a] prior and indispensable condition the fact that Germany can sign and put into application the future treaty as a sovereign state”⁹⁹⁹. In addition, the memo highlighted a judicial contradiction that, according to the authors, would create further difficulties for Germany. While the draft ECSC Treaty envisaged that Germany would have total freedom of action, the Occupational Statute restricted its overall autonomy. Hence the question included in the German memo sent to Monnet whether “it might be legally interpreted to mean that in case of a conflict between the occupation law and the law of the Coal and Steel Community, the occupation law must take precedence”?¹⁰⁰⁰. Furthermore, the note examined the contradictions in the economic sphere, mentioning that while “the Ruhr Authority distinguishes (...) between internal German consumption and exports from Germany to all other countries (...) the Schuman Plan distinguishes only between consumption within the territory of the Community and exports from the territory of the Community (article 19)”¹⁰⁰¹. Thus, the right of the IRA to set quotas for Germany’s internal needs was in direct contradiction with the provisions of the Schuman Plan, which did not provide for such restrictions.

The German note to Monnet was one of the most detailed documents highlighting the incompatibilities between the current statute of Germany and the one envisaged by the

⁹⁹⁵ Lettre de Hallstein (Commission allemande à la Conférence sur le Plan Schuman) à Monnet, 14 octobre 1950, FJM, AMG 20/4/4 bis.

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁷ Mémorandum de la délégation allemande : Communauté de Charbon et d’acier et droit d’occupation, FJM, AMG 20/4/4.

⁹⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰¹ Ibid.

coal and steel plan. These contradictions were again emphasised by Professor Hallstein on 11 November 1950. In front of the Allied High Commission, the German delegate presented the position of his government stressing that “it seemed impossible for the High Commission and the Ruhr Authority to retain their powers in certain areas once the bodies of the Community began to exercise their functions in the same areas”¹⁰⁰². Given that it was envisaged that the members of the future organisation will have an equal footing, the German delegate considered that his country needed to be free to sign the future treaty and that the contradictions between the Schuman Plan and Ruhr Authority, especially in terms of distribution, deconcentration, and investments, should be resolved¹⁰⁰³.

The issue of the coexistence of the IRA and the HA became critical because it was obvious that the treaty could not be concluded without clarify it. For this reason, in the following months a number of papers were issued, in order to show to the members of the French delegation that some adjustments to the international statute of Germany needed to be made. In mid-December 1950, L. Hulbert listed “the controls that are likely to be duplicated”¹⁰⁰⁴ once the High Authority was put in place: “(i) those resulting from the agreement on the Ruhr; (ii) the powers of the High Commission concerning deconcentration and decartelization; (iii) the limitations of steel”¹⁰⁰⁵. In fact, after examining various aspects, the paper underlined that “all important tasks of the Ruhr Authority are concurrent with those of the High Authority”¹⁰⁰⁶.

Even before Hulbert's document was issued, F. Valéry made an in-depth examination of various articles of the Ruhr Statute at the beginning of November 1950, stressing the consequences of the envisaged ECSC Treaty for these stipulations. For this purpose, he focused on the provisions that were seriously affected by the 1950 plan, including distribution (article 14), non-discrimination (article 15) and deconcentration (article 18). Overseeing coal distribution was a fundamental task of the Ruhr Authority given that many states, including Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the UK, depended on German coal. Yet, according to the draft ECSC Treaty (article 39), the HA was called on to fulfil this function, by “ensur[ing] an orderly supply of the common market and granting all users equal access to sources of production”¹⁰⁰⁷. The powers of the two entities were in competition also when it came another key issue, namely deconcentration in Germany. While, according to the Occupational Statute, the issue was placed under the authority of the Allied High Commission, the draft ECSC Treaty, in articles 41 and 42 assigned to the

¹⁰⁰² Compte rendu de la conversation ayant lieu sur le « Transfert du pouvoir de deconcentration de l'Autorité de la Ruhr à la Haute Autorité », 11 novembre 1950, FJM, AMG 9/5/3, 3.

¹⁰⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Note de L. Hulbert sur l'adaptation des contrôles en matière de charbon et d'acier existant en Allemagne, la position de la Sarre, les demandes italiennes concernant le minerai nord-africain et la pondération des voix dans les organes de la Communauté, 13 décembre 1950, FJM, AMG 10/3/4, 1.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Note de F. Valéry sur l'Autorité de la Ruhr et la Communauté charbon-acier, 7 novembre 1950, FJM, 9/5/1, 3.

future Community the powers to conduct the decartelization process and to maintain the future market free of trusts¹⁰⁰⁸.

In the late 1950s the issue of overlap of powers between the IRA and the HA became a hot topic and given that the limiting of the IRA's powers would have had a great impact on France, Valéry made a number of suggestions to the French government to overcome the deadlock and make the most of the situation. Thus, supposing that the draft treaty would be adopted in its existing form (November 1950), he advised the French government to recognise that, "the coexistence of the Ruhr Authority and the ECSC appears neither possible nor necessary"¹⁰⁰⁹. In practice, Valéry proposed that the government in Paris should guarantee to the German authorities that France would take the necessary steps in order to end the Ruhr control system as soon as the ECSC was in place. Yet, because this was not possible unilaterally (given Germany's Tripartite Allied supervision), he proposed that the "French government will make (...) the necessary recommendations to all other governments signatories of the Ruhr Agreement"¹⁰¹⁰. At the end of his recommendations, Valéry underlined that "it should be understood that no solution of continuity should in fact exist between the regime of the Statute of the Ruhr and the regime of the community"¹⁰¹¹. This situation was exploited during the negotiations especially by Monnet in order to put pressure on German officials to accept the antitrust articles. Accordingly, it was only on 18 April 1951, that Schuman informed his German counterpart, Adenauer, that the French government considered that "the specific obligations imposed on Germany regarding coal and steel are no longer (...) compatible with the common rules"¹⁰¹² of the ECSC Treaty. As a result, the French government showed its readiness to "bring an end to the existence of the Authority of the Ruhr and of the competences of the Allied High Commission in the coal and steel field"¹⁰¹³.

Despite some fear that the demise of the Ruhr Authority would endanger France's position, French officials seemed convinced that the two entities could not conduct their activity concomitantly. However, French officials could not decide alone on such an essential matter that fundamentally altered Germany's statute. This had been obvious from the start and is the reason why Leroy Beaulieu warned on 11 November 1950 that "there may be English reactions if the convention with the Germans is not very well proportioned"¹⁰¹⁴. Beaulieu considered that such a reaction might happen because "in fact, the British Government currently guarantees the maintenance of deconcentration in the Ruhr as a member of the Ruhr Authority"¹⁰¹⁵. If the HA received these powers at the expense of the Ruhr Authority, according to Beaulieu, "the British labour government [would] be the only one not to monitor the future of the deconcentration in the Ruhr, a

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Ibid., 7.

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹¹ Ibid.

¹⁰¹² Wilkens, "Le fin des limitations", 298.

¹⁰¹³ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁴ Note de P. Leroy Beaulieu sur le "Transfert du pouvoir de deconcentration de l'Autorité de la Ruhr à la Haute Autorité, 11 novembre 1950, FJM, AMG 20/4/7 and AMG 9/5/2.

¹⁰¹⁵ Ibid.

region which is, in addition, in the British occupation zone in Germany”¹⁰¹⁶. Indeed, the situation was considered as very delicate because Britain was not participating in the Schuman Plan negotiations and, as a result, its voice was silenced in such crucial matters, such as Germany’s international statute, coal and steel resources, and economic reorganisation.

As expected, this state of affairs did not satisfy the British government, who considered that “this went altogether too far”¹⁰¹⁷. The British government was irritated not only by the prospect that Germany would gain more power in key fields, such as foreign policy or coal and steel matters, but also because London would almost completely lose control over these areas. UK policymakers argued that, since Germany’s statute was agreed on a tripartite basis by the Occupying Powers, any alteration of the law should be agreed upon by the same parties. The British therefore protested that the French were acting unilaterally in matters where all three Allied Powers governing Germany should decide jointly. In fact, this frustration became visible, according to Bullen, in the spring of 1951 when “the British government became irritated by its exclusion from those aspects of the negotiations on which it felt it ought to have been consulted”¹⁰¹⁸. However, this attitude was not easy to understand, even for some British officials, such as the UK ambassador in Paris, William Hayter, who stressed to his superiors in the Foreign Office that he was “not quite sure why we were too worked up about it”¹⁰¹⁹.

Therefore, even in 1951 British policymakers continued their obstructionist policy towards Monnet’s proposals and the subsequent negotiations. Part of their strategy was to highlight that any change to Germany’s statute was the joint responsibility of the three Allied powers involved. Furthermore, the British government attempted to show that no modification of the fundamental law governing Germany was possible, since the government in Bonn was not respecting its international obligations. For example, the *Chargé* in the United Kingdom (Holmes) reported to Acheson, following his meeting with Stevens at the Foreign Office, that Britain was delaying the change in Germany’s international statute by arguing that Germany was not living up to its promise to provide the UK with scrap supplies. Holmes informed the Secretary of State that British officials had said that “any change in this position would have to be referred to Ministers (...) [given the] long record of failure of Germans to live up to promises to improve their performance in scrap supplies to the UK”¹⁰²⁰. According to Stevens there were no optimistic signs despite the numerous British efforts, such the MacCready-Erhard agreement and Morrison’s trip to Germany in May 1951, to convince the government in Bonn to increase scrap supplies to the UK. In this particular context, Holmes emphasised that the “British government felt that [the] scrap problem was so important that they must take advantage of every possible bargaining point with the Germans in order to increase supplies”¹⁰²¹.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁷ Griffiths, *The Schuman Plan*, 30.

¹⁰¹⁸ Bullen, “The British Government”, 209.

¹⁰¹⁹ Griffiths, *The Schuman Plan*, 30.

¹⁰²⁰ The *Chargé* in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State, London, 21 June 1951, FRUS 1951, 122.

¹⁰²¹ Ibid.

British policymakers were aware that an obstructionist attitude was not well received either by Monnet or by Acheson and McCloy because it endangered the conclusion of the Schuman Plan negotiations. Stevens was afraid that the British attitude might be interpreted as obstructionist for using the scrap issue to sabotage the plan. However, Stevens “denied this flatly and assured us that if they could be satisfied on scrap point they would withdraw reservation”¹⁰²². Holmes did not end his report to his superior, Acheson, before underlining the importance of Stevens’ views that would be taken into consideration by Morrison “before making a decision”¹⁰²³. This is an important and extremely relevant aspect since the Secretary of State needed to know exactly whose views must be shaped in order to overcome the deadlock.

Acheson could not accept such an attitude and he took a firm position in order to discourage key British policymakers from continuing to maintain their obstructionist approach. For this purpose he used all possible means to convey his message that the UK government could not delay the changes required to the Occupational Statute. In June 1951, he instructed the US Embassy to London to “inform [the] Foreign Office that [the] US cannot agree to connect [the] solution [of the] UK scrap problem with the dissolution [of the] IAR [IRA] and the abolition of controls”¹⁰²⁴. Acheson underlined that only when London dissociated the two matters, would the “US representatives in Germany [be] prepared to participate fully in talks with [the] Germans designed to make certain that Germany exports equitable quantities scrap and semi-finished steel”¹⁰²⁵. In his turn, the US Ambassador to Paris, Bruce, reported to Acheson that he was supporting Germany’s participation in the ECSC as an equal partner and “it was therefore out of the question now for the United States to support ‘an irrelevant prior condition’ to the elimination of the Ruhr Authority and other controls over German coal and steel industries”¹⁰²⁶. Indeed, Bruce informed his superior that “he had ‘pressed again’ the US offer to participate in direct talks with the Germans to increase deliveries of scrap and semifinished steel to the United Kingdom”¹⁰²⁷. Bruce's action was done in exchange for the UK abandoning its obstructionist policy on Germany’s participation. This happened indeed on 26 June 1951, when representatives of Germany, the UK, and the US discussed the deadlock¹⁰²⁸ and looked for a solution that could satisfy London’s concerns.

Acheson’s pressure on UK officials continued over the summer and on 18 August 1951 he “informed the Embassy in the United Kingdom that the Department of State agreed with Bruce that it was very important that the British Delegate to the Ruhr Conference be authorised to sign the agreed documents as soon as possible”¹⁰²⁹. The British could still

¹⁰²² Ibid., 123.

¹⁰²³ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁴ The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, 22 June 1951, *FRUS 1951*, 125.

¹⁰²⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁶ Ibid., 126.

¹⁰²⁷ Ibid., 126, note 4.

¹⁰²⁸ The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, 27 June 1951, *FRUS 1951*, 126, note 3,

¹⁰²⁹ Editorial Note, *FRUS 1951*, 135,

not be convinced, as the reply from Minister Holmes the next day showed. He reported that, despite the fact that the Foreign Office officials mentioned that they were aware of the importance of the matter, London could still not accept the dissolution of the Ruhr Authority on the grounds that “the United Kingdom was bound by a ministerial decision that the scrap agreement with Germany must be reached before the Ruhr documents could be signed”¹⁰³⁰. It was only on 11 September 1951 that Acheson received the news that “agreement had now been reached”¹⁰³¹ regarding “a definitive English text of the agreement terminating the Ruhr agreement”¹⁰³². In the end, the “Communiqué and Agreements Relating to the Termination of the International Authority for the Ruhr” were signed in Paris on 19 October 1951.

Acheson not only closely monitored these intense negotiations, he used all possible channels to convey his view, including by warning that the continuation of an obstructionist policy endangered US-UK relations. The US Secretary of State sent strong signals that he was willing to support Britain’s effort but, at the same time, that he could not accept any attitude that would jeopardize Monnet’s plan. He was convinced that the aims of the plan could not be achieved without a radical alteration of Germany’s Statute. That being the case, he persuaded British officials to accept unconditionally the termination of the Ruhr Authority that had become obsolete in the context of the ECSC Treaty.

Despite the fact that Britain was not directly involved in the Schuman Plan negotiations, its opinion could not be ignored by those directly concerned for the reasons highlighted above. This is the reason why, for example, an outright British rejection or any attempt to sabotage the plan needed to be avoided. With this aim in mind some of Monnet’s associates, especially Acheson, tried to alleviate the concerns of British policymakers. Notwithstanding the difficulty created by British officials being poorly informed of the Schuman Declaration, Acheson managed to convince UK statesmen, particularly Bevin, that a balanced response from London would be most appropriate. Yet, this was not the only moment when Acheson’s involvement proved pivotal. As an Allied occupying power, Britain was part of the post-war agreements and, as a result, its approval was needed for any decision modifying Germany’s fundamental law after the war. Therefore, even if it was not directly involved in the treaty negotiations, Britain was an important actor in the process. Knowing that once the ECSC Treaty was implemented, its decision-making power in Germany would be curtailed, Britain expressed its opposition to the alteration of the Occupational Statute, including the dissolution of the IRA. Acheson’s intervention was again critical in influencing British decision-makers to accept the termination of the post-war agreements limiting Germany’s autonomy. In the end, his constant pressure on UK statesmen and his unwavering attitude made it possible to overcome the deadlock.

¹⁰³⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰³¹ Ibid., 136,

¹⁰³² Ibid.

6.2. US Administration: Taking on board Monnet's Plan

While Britain needed to be convinced not to undermine the plan and to collaborate with other Allied Powers in changing Germany's statute, the other key international actor not participating in the ECSC negotiations – the US – needed to be persuaded to give its full support to the plan. One of the most obvious reasons was that no project aimed at entirely reorganising the post-war order could succeed without the sponsorship of the leading economic and military power of the world. This was indeed apparent to many, including the architect of the plan but also to some of his associates, especially Acheson and McCloy. In view of this, they focused their energy on convincing US policymakers to take on board the coal and steel plan.

Immediately after he found out about the content and the aims of the plan from Monnet on 8 May 1950 and his fears that the plan was nothing more than a European cartel were alleviated, Acheson understood the significance of guiding US statesmen towards a positive attitude to the plan. With this purpose in mind, he knew that at this stage any rushed and emotional reactions would endanger the project. Thus, while informing the President without delay that “an important development might (repeat might) take place within a few days”¹⁰³³ and encouraging him to “favor”¹⁰³⁴ it, Acheson advised Truman to “withhold comment until I could inform further”¹⁰³⁵ in case rumours reached the US administration in Washington. Acheson's reaction was determined by his fear that there was a risk that “the first report of the plan would arise fears in the department of Justice and Commerce [of a possible cartel] and someone might shoot from the hip”¹⁰³⁶. It is no surprise that Acheson was worried that the US Antitrust Division would react harshly to the plan, considering it as nothing more than a large European cartel. His advice was indeed followed by the Democrat President who “replied that he would”¹⁰³⁷. In fact, in a telegram to James E. Webb, Acting Secretary of State, sent only hours before the public announcement of Monnet's plan, Acheson recommended “not [to] bother [the] President until the news breaks or we advise that it will”¹⁰³⁸ and to warn “him to wait further information before comment”¹⁰³⁹. Truman was not the only one to receive this counsel. In addition, the Secretary of State said that “the Executive Branch should be advised to withhold comment”¹⁰⁴⁰ just as “the Chairman of Foreign Committees”¹⁰⁴¹. Thus, Acheson's primary aim before the official announcement was to alleviate the fears of US policymakers while encouraging a moderate but positive attitude. This was exactly the core idea of his telegram to Webb, advising the US government to express its interest in the proposal, while refraining from criticizing it¹⁰⁴².

¹⁰³³ Acheson, *Sketches*, 43.

¹⁰³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁸ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to the Acting Secretary of State [James E. Webb], Paris, 9 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 692.

¹⁰³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴² *Ibid.*

Nothing changed in Acheson's attitude after Monnet's 1950 plan was made public since he continued to call for a positive yet balanced reaction from the USA capital. In one of his first telegrams to Washington after the plan was published, the Secretary of State advised the US administration that "in commenting on [the] proposal I believe it is important that [the] French be given credit for making a conscious and far reaching effort to advance Franco-German *rapprochement* and European integration generally"¹⁰⁴³. Acheson's actions paid off since the President welcomed the plan, characterizing it on 18 May 1950 as "a constructive governmental act"¹⁰⁴⁴. Later on, on 9 June 1950 Truman considered it as "one of the most reassuring actions which have occurred since the end of the war"¹⁰⁴⁵.

In addition to closely monitoring the situation and advising US policymakers to adopt a moderate but positive attitude, Acheson took charge of the issue and instructed USA representatives around the world, including in Frankfurt and Paris, to avoid "express[ing] opinions purporting to be US views except on [the] basis [of] instructions from or clearance with [the] Department (...)"¹⁰⁴⁶. He wanted to put strong controls in place and ensure a consistent opinion, but above all he wanted all US diplomatic offices to follow his line. His attitude seems appropriate especially given his position as US Secretary of State. The importance he attached to the project and its follow up shows how much he wanted it to succeed.

On 2 June 1950 he sent to a number of US diplomatic offices in Europe clear "instructions which should be followed by all US rep[esentative]s in handling Schuman proposals re[garding] coal and steel"¹⁰⁴⁷. The note emphasised that the diplomats should use the same language and convey the same message when talking about the coal and steel plan. More precisely, Acheson underlined in his message that the "US welcomes [the] Schuman proposal as imaginative and constructive,"¹⁰⁴⁸ because the plan put the "emphasis on objectives of cost reduction through increased productivity, benefits to consumers and workers and recognition of desirability of retaining benefits of competitive process"¹⁰⁴⁹. By stressing these features of the plan, Acheson pre-empted any accusations that it would lead to the creation of a European cartel. As someone who understood the philosophy behind the plan very well, the Secretary of State passed on this justification to others who might be put on the spot and asked to take a stand on Monnet's proposal.

While formulating the US official response, Acheson advocated restraint, asking that "(...) no further public statements of US position or attitude should be made at this time except to reaffirm general position expressed in present statements and no formal US

¹⁰⁴³ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to the Acting Secretary of State [James E. Webb], London, 10 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 695.

¹⁰⁴⁴ *Projet de chronologie sur les travaux de Plan Schuman*, JFM, *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰⁴⁶ The Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic Offices, Washington, 25 July 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 742.

¹⁰⁴⁷ The Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic Offices, Washington, 2 July 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 714.

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

proposals for detailed implementation of plan should be made to European governments”¹⁰⁵⁰. This is why he recommended that the US government should not get involved directly in the subsequent actions but should observe from behind the scenes and steer the course of the negotiations in the right direction, knowing that “situation will develop in which strong US influence should be exerted to avoid watering down of proposal by one participant (British for instance) or to assure retention of favourable economic elements outlined in original Schuman announcement (...)”¹⁰⁵¹. By conveying this message, Acheson aimed to limit the interventions of US policymakers, which might have negative outcomes due to poor knowledge of the plan, but mainly to retain personal control of the issue. He knew that official US involvement was not necessary since information could be obtained by various means including “informal arrangements (...) with France and Germany”¹⁰⁵² or thanks to “US rep[erentative]s [in] Paris and Bonn [who] will obtain regular and current info on progress negot[iation]s in maximum detail, including working doc[ument]s and drafts as negot[iation]s proceed”¹⁰⁵³. By establishing this detailed line of action, Acheson sought to avoid any possible escapade of US policymakers that would somehow endanger Monnet’s initiative. At the end of his communiqué to US Embassies in the main European capitals, Acheson recalled that the official policy on the matter was to be decided under his close supervision and, as a result, “all future instr[uction]s on this subject will originate jointly [Secretary of] State and ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration]”¹⁰⁵⁴.

Another critical task taken on by Monnet’s associate in the days after the announcement of the plan was to give assurances to various policymakers that the Frenchman had no intention of setting up a European cartel. There were many voicing this concern in the US. One of them was the Acting Secretary of State, who warned in a letter to his superior on 11 May 1950 against a “strong tendency which will develop to use [the] mechanism to limit competition and protect marginal producers by [the] usual cartel methods”¹⁰⁵⁵. On that account, James E. Webb considered that one “probable area of difficulty will be in working out[the] proposal in such a manner as to accomplish its politically and economically desirable objectives while minimizing [the] econ[omic] dangers inherent in monopolistic enterprises”¹⁰⁵⁶. There is no doubt that the Acting Secretary of State was expressing the unease felt by other US policymakers and Acheson therefore understood how important it was to address these concerns and, if it was not possible to bring them to an end, at least to ease them.

Consequently, Acheson put a lot of effort into explaining to key US policymakers that Monnet had no intention of creating a supranational European cartel. This was one of the first and most challenging endeavours he tackled – already on 12 May 1950 he responded to those fearing such an outcome. In a letter to the Acting Secretary of State, who was

¹⁰⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵¹ Ibid., 715.

¹⁰⁵² Ibid.

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁵ The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, London, Washington, 11 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 697.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Ibid., 696.

replacing him in Washington while he was in London, Acheson stressed that “Monnet is [the] leading advocate [of] real anti-cartel legislation and policy of expansion and production”¹⁰⁵⁷. To support these claims, the Secretary of State included in his letter a memorandum drafted by Monnet and his circle providing evidence that the plan had nothing in common with cartels. Claiming that “in all its characteristics, [the] projected organisation runs counter to cartel,”¹⁰⁵⁸ the memo listed a number of areas where the plan opposed trusts, such as the objective, mode of operation, means of action, management and scope. While the aim of cartels was to maintain their high profits by preserving their control of the market, the “objective of [the] proposed organization is [an] increase of production and of productivity by improvement of methods, broadening of markets and rationalization of production”¹⁰⁵⁹. When it comes to the mode of operation, the projected organisation would “be placed under [the] scrutiny of public opinion,”¹⁰⁶⁰ as opposed to trusts that were based on secret agreements.

Also, according to the paper drafted under Monnet’s close guidance, the ECSC would operate differently from trusts. While trusts were based on price and quota fixing, which resulted in “permanent elimination of competition for [the] benefit of an exploitation of markets by industry,”¹⁰⁶¹ the ECSC would make use of “mechanisms of repartition and price equalization only as transitional measures designed to produce without shock necessary adjustment to a situation in which activity will divide itself rationally under most economic conditions”¹⁰⁶². The management of the future European coal and steel entity would be different from that of cartels since it would “be confined to independent personalities”¹⁰⁶³ and not to “delegates of industry charged with serving [the] interests of their principals”¹⁰⁶⁴. When defining the scope of the envisaged entity, the note recalled the thinking of Frankfurter and Brandeis, since “as opposed to a cartel, it [the envisaged organisation] will tend to produce [the] same effect which would result from perfect competition but in doing so to pass through necessary steps without which [the] establishment of this competition would run up against insurmountable resistance”¹⁰⁶⁵. All these features convinced Acheson that the ECSC plan did not aim in any way to create a cartel but, just as his former Harvard Professor preached, intended to establish perfect competition conditions unhindered by cartels that in fact would be wiped out in the preliminary stages. This was the message he meant to transmit to US policymakers who, by not perceiving correctly the aims of the plan, could have jeopardized its outcome.

Acheson was then trying his best to convince policymakers in Washington that the Schuman Plan was full of good intentions and was not jeopardizing economic relations

¹⁰⁵⁷ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to the Acting Secretary of State, London, 12 May 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 699.

¹⁰⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 701.

¹⁰⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

with Western Europe. But he was not the only one. Monnet used all possible channels to convey positive messages to US decision-makers. Yet, as he did not have the tools at the disposal of people such as Acheson or McCloy, he needed to invent original ways to achieve his aims. As discussed above, he was one of the most imaginative persons in this respect – he employed one of his favourite methods described in another section, namely the use of the second tier.

Yet again, though Monnet needed to adapt his method. If, in the past, his strategy was directed towards identifying the most influential player close to key decision-makers (as was the case with Hopkins), this time he needed to make sure that the right message reached the ears of various key players in Washington. Although this aim was largely achieved thanks to Acheson and McCloy, Monnet knew that the US Embassy in Paris would also play a major role. The language of the notes from Paris to Washington needed to be positive and to encourage a constructive reaction from US officials.

At first sight, the best man for this job appeared to be the US Ambassador in Paris, Bruce, who was theoretically in charge of the matter and above all friends with Monnet. However, according to Robert Bowie, a man who was directly involved in the affair and was very knowledgeable about the behind-the-scenes negotiations, Bruce did not play this role. According to Bowie a less well-known actor acted as a go-between between Monnet and the US administration. “The one who took the active part, with Monnet, in the negotiations”¹⁰⁶⁶ was William Tomlinson (nicknamed “Tommy”), an official of the US Treasury who was an economic adviser at the Embassy. Comparing Monnet’s relationship with Bruce to that with Tomlinson, Bowie considered that “they were very warm and cordial, but I don’t think they were as intimate as Tommy’s relations”¹⁰⁶⁷.

Talking about Monnet’s relationship with Tomlinson, Bowie considered that they got along so well because “they were of the same sort,”¹⁰⁶⁸ namely people who based their affinity on trust and respect. Provided this condition was fulfilled, Monnet would accept someone to participate in his highly sensitive and secret discussions. Bowie stressed that, although Tomlinson was representing Washington’s interests, Monnet was entirely at ease with this situation as Tomlinson was “was the kind of person whom Monnet could count on to be serious and straightforward in talking about a problem and then be able to relate an honest discussion of the problem to whatever instructions he felt he had”¹⁰⁶⁹. Indeed, Tomlinson’s official job in no way impeded Monnet’s relationship with him. On the contrary, like in many other instances, Monnet realised that Tomlinson was capable of conveying his ideas to policymakers. As in previous instances, after identifying the individual exercising most influence, he employed his skills towards his desired end. This is not to say that he used his friends to achieve his aims. As many other similar examples illustrate, the Frenchman convinced those with the power to influence decision-makers that his objective served a higher ideal and a common good. The logic of his argument very likely persuaded Tomlinson in this case and converted him to Monnet’s cause.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Interview with Robert R. Bowie conducted by François Duchêne, Washington, 28 September 1988, 11.

¹⁰⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁰⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Indeed, it can be argued, as Francois Duchêne concluded after his discussion with Bowie, that “such a relationship in some ways violates all the notions of traditional negotiation”¹⁰⁷⁰. Of course, this was not at all surprising for a man like Monnet who paid so little attention to traditional diplomacy and its methods, but was very much concerned about achieving the intended result. There is no doubt that he knew that Tomlinson had a key role to play and was probably the most influential individual in the US Embassy in Paris, a chief information foot-bridge across the Atlantic Ocean towards US policymakers. Bowie substantiated this claim asserting that “Monnet (...) knew that Tommy had the full confidence of Bruce”¹⁰⁷¹ and, as a result, the Frenchman could be certain that “if Tommy was satisfied with the way things were going, he could count on it that Bruce would back up whatever the result was”¹⁰⁷². Thus, Tomlinson was the main link between Monnet on the one side, since “he dealt (...) pretty much with Monnet,”¹⁰⁷³ and Bruce and his administrative staff on the other side. This was one of the most convenient and efficient ways used by Monnet to penetrate the walls of the US Embassy in Paris and to convey his message to US diplomats operating in France.

However, Tomlinson’s actions were not limited to Paris. US policymakers across the ocean needed to receive a message that would generate a positive reaction to the ECSC plan and its subsequent negotiations. As Monnet’s main interlocutor from the US Embassy in Paris, Tomlinson was very much aware not only of the objectives of Monnet’s project but also of the effects that ought to be produced in Washington. Consequently, he employed all his expertise to that end and he was, as Bowie called him, “a very skilful bureaucrat”¹⁰⁷⁴ because he would focus on the overriding objective and avoid getting bogged down in discussions on specific provisions of the treaty. In addition, the Bowie said that “Tommy was somebody who understood how things worked in Washington”¹⁰⁷⁵.

Owing to his skills and his knowledge of Monnet’s objectives, Tomlinson employed a special strategy to avoid any negative reaction from Washington, an approach described in detail by Robert Bowie. One of the foremost parts of this approach was to obtain the intended result without running the risk of being accused of not respecting the rules of the bureaucratic machinery he was part of or the guidelines received from his superiors. In order to give the impression that US diplomats were fully informed and that their opinion counted, Tomlinson prepared detailed and extremely descriptive documents summarizing each day’s debates on the ECSC plan. Thus, he could show that he kept his superiors in Washington informed. Yet he knew that long cables of twenty or even thirty pages would only be sent to the US capital after a number of short and apparently more urgent papers. As a result, as Bowie testified, “the cable would be sent out so that it would arrive, probably, at the end of the day in Washington due to the time-change – Washington, of

¹⁰⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷¹ Ibid., 12.

¹⁰⁷² Ibid.

¹⁰⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Ibid.

course, six hours less but even so, if it was sent at midnight, and as a result after coding and decoding and all that, it would get there just about at or after the end of the working day”¹⁰⁷⁶.

These cables were discussed by a committee charged with following the ECSC plan negotiations. According to Bowie, “Tommy (...) understood completely that this committee would not be able to meet till the next day, effectively, that it would have some haggling to do that it would then presumably prepare cables commenting on what they would like to see changed or modified or what not, which could be much too detailed for his taste”¹⁰⁷⁷. Tomlinson used this delaying strategy, on the one hand, in order to give the impression that US policymakers in Washington were fully informed and consulted and, on the other, with a view to pursue his goals, namely to make sure that the negotiations did not get bogged down as a result of detailed comments on individual articles or restrictive instructions from Washington. Thus, by the time they were ready to be discussed by US decision-makers, the documents sent by Tommy were outdated because another day of negotiations had been completed in Paris. Therefore, as Bowie stressed, “many of the suggestions would have been by-passed, many of the suggestions would not longer be relevant to what was then the state of the treaty – or he [Tommy] could presumably take the view that they didn’t fully understand the context as a result if the new stage had been reached”¹⁰⁷⁸. By employing this strategy, Tomlinson managed not only to act independently to a great degree and pursue the ends discussed with Monnet, he also “made it very difficult for the people back in Washington to criticise him because he was giving them full reports on what was taking place, but at the same time, he was always in a position to explain why this, that or the other of these detailed comments were no longer relevant (...)”¹⁰⁷⁹. By getting Tomlinson on his side, Monnet was able, on the one hand, to have control over the information that crossed the ocean and, on the other, to influence the mood of US policymakers in Washington, a chief battle ground for the Schuman Plan.

Acheson and Monnet were aware that they needed to put all their efforts into steering the US officials in the desired direction because a negative US reaction would have meant the end of the coal and steel plan. Their efforts needed to be concerted and sustained since the Schuman Plan had awakened enormous interest across the ocean. In this sense, François Duchêne mentioned that in his “delvings into the National Archives, here in Washington, I’ve been amazed at the absolutely immense amount of papers that was being generated here by Ray Vernon, and being sent to the US Embassy in Paris – signed Acheson, of course – regarding details, virtually article by article of the negotiation of the Schuman plan”¹⁰⁸⁰. Providing more details on the matter, the historian stressed that “there really are hundreds of pages of these sorts of cables being sent, with very detailed

¹⁰⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Ibid., 13.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid., 12-13.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Ibid., 11.

comments”¹⁰⁸¹. Consequently, Duchêne concluded that “one then thinks, ‘Gracious me, there clearly were seven partners in the negotiation, not six’”¹⁰⁸².

Indeed, many US policymakers had taken sides and got involved in the debates on the plan. This was of course seen as a dangerous approach that required a prompt reaction from those who rallied around Monnet’s scheme. Consequently, Acheson and Monnet concentrated their action on convincing US policymakers of the significance of the plan. Various means were used towards that end. Immediately after the announcement of the Schuman Declaration, Acheson got fully involved and took charge of the issue in order to avoid speculation on the subject by US statesmen. Hence, he advised President Truman to welcome the plan and to wait for his recommendations before issuing other official positions. Also, he instructed US Embassies to follow closely the line defined by Acheson’s office and to refrain from speculation. In addition, he put a lot of effort into explaining to US policymakers the true aims of the plan and especially the fact that Monnet’s project was not a cartel but, on the contrary, aimed at restoring and supervising competition.

Monnet on his side put in place a whole strategy designed to direct the opinion of US political actors in the intended direction. The key actor in this strategy was William Tomlinson, a man who not only passed on Monnet’s message to key US diplomats in Paris but also to US policymakers across the ocean. In addition, by employing a special technique, Tomlinson managed to avoid any negative reaction from official US circles both on the plan itself and especially on the development of the European treaty that it led to.

The strategy pursued mainly by Acheson and Monnet clearly paid off since, despite occasional negative opinions, US policymakers supported the coal and steel plan. There were also a number of practical consequences of this positive attitude from across the Atlantic Ocean. An immediate one was that other states such as Britain and the countries directly involved in the ECSC negotiations felt that a negative reaction on their part would imperil their relations with Washington. Furthermore, the new organisation was to be set up using US funding. Less than a year after the announcement of the plan, Monnet received an indication of financial support from the US for his initiative¹⁰⁸³. This promise took a concrete form in 1953, when Monnet received for his organisation “a loan of US 100 million” for a period of 25 years under exceptional terms¹⁰⁸⁴. His friends also contributed to this outcome. Ball, Frankfurter and McCloy were present at the decisive meeting on 28 May 1953 with “major representatives from large US banks, including Russel C. Leffingwell (J.P.Morgan Co.), George Murane (Lazard Frères Co.) and

¹⁰⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸² Ibid.

¹⁰⁸³ Lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman, Paris, 24 mars 1951, FJM, Lausanne, Archives Jean Monnet. AMG 15/4/3.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Spierenburg and Poidevin, *The History of the High Authority*, 144.

Howard C. Shepherd (National City Bank)”¹⁰⁸⁵. Another practical consequence was that the US, through Acheson, was the first state to recognise the ECSC (in August 1952)¹⁰⁸⁶.

It must be underlined that these consequences were neither the result of a coincidence nor the outcome of a generally positive attitude of the US administration regarding European integration. It was rather the corollary of the action undertaken by various players such as Acheson and Monnet. Talking with George Ball in 1987 about the role of the US in this process, Duchêne said that he recalled Ball always “writing, and saying, (...) that it's quite wrong to think that the American policy towards Europe was a sort of naive Let's-have-the-United-States-of-Europe, and so on, and that it was thought through, and properly calculated”¹⁰⁸⁷. However, Ball denied Duchêne's claim that he heard somebody saying (though not recalling the source) “that there were actual discussions, and a formal decision taken, under Truman, to back European integration”¹⁰⁸⁸. While he could not “imagine that it was a very formal decision,”¹⁰⁸⁹ Ball speculated that “people who were instrumental at that time and around Truman, Acheson primarily, but McCloy was very close to Dean [Acheson], (...) I think they may well have thought this”¹⁰⁹⁰. While it is hard to find evidence that there was a blueprint in the US administration for backing European integration (the opposite appears to be true), there is strong evidence that various US players, including Acheson and McCloy, but also others such as Tomlinson, were instrumental in steering US policymakers in the desired direction. It was their action that made a major contribution to alleviating any fears and forming a positive attitude within the US administration regarding Monnet's coal and steel plan.

6.3. Conclusion: Gaining the Support of Major International Actors (Britain and the US)

Knowing that without London's and Washington's positive reaction the plan stood no chance of succeeding, Monnet and some of his associates put a lot of energy into convincing the leaders of the two powers of the advantages of the project. Yet the politicians of the two countries had totally different issues to deal with. The decision-makers of the leading political, military and economic power – the US – were primarily concerned with the preservation of their country's position that was under threat because of the rise of the Soviet Union. British leaders, by contrast, aimed to rebuild the foundation of their once held world power, struggling with deep political and economic problems, including a massive debt to the US from war expenses.

Since many expected an initiative for European integration to come from London, Monnet's proposal came as a surprise, especially considering that Britain was not seen as a necessary participant in the envisaged organisation. The lack of prior consultation and the disregard of Britain infuriated British leaders. Immediately after he found out about

¹⁰⁸⁵ Ibid., 136.

¹⁰⁸⁶ European Union Delegation of the European Commission to the US, <http://www.eurunion.org/News/speeches/2004/040506gb.htm>, (accessed 22 October 2011).

¹⁰⁸⁷ Interview with George W. Ball, 10 August 1987, 24.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Ibid.

the plan, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, started to prepare a strong negative reaction. It was at that point that those directly involved in supporting Monnet's initiative realised the dangers of a British negative reaction that could have influenced other governments in their decision whether to join the future organisation. Thus, Acheson and Monnet (the US actor was at the time of the events in London) needed to convince British leaders that the plan was not directed against London's interests and that a positive reply was required. There is no evidence that Monnet or his associates attempted to convince British policymakers that Britain should join the scheme. However, historical evidence shows that the objective sought was to obtain a positive official response from London.

Appeasing British officials was primarily a task taken on by Acheson, who held long discussions with British leaders, primarily with Bevin, trying to convince them that a negative reaction was counterproductive and even dangerous for Britain's relationship with Washington. In the end it was due to Acheson's persuasion that the British official reply had a positive spin and did not endanger the outcome of the plan, even though Britain chose to stay aside, emphasizing the positive aspects of Monnet's scheme. In addition to Acheson's actions, David Lilienthal defended the plan in the UK during his trip there after the plan had been presented to the world.

The role of Monnet's transatlantic group of friends did not stop there as Britain continued to be a chief player in the subsequent stages. Despite the positive reply and the later negotiations on possible British participation, no progress was made since Monnet was in no way ready to compromise his project in return for British participation. Given these circumstances, some started to talk about a possible counter-proposal from London. Again a firm attitude was required from those supporting Monnet's initiative. Once more, Acheson took the lead in order to discourage any such action.

British participation and its reaction to the Schuman Plan was indeed a fundamental challenge to Monnet's plan. Yet, it was not the only one from across the Channel. In order to allow the participation of West Germany in the plan, a profound revision of Germany's Occupational Statute was fundamental. British officials were not ready to allow Germany more autonomy citing various political and economic reasons. This strategy was not acceptable to Acheson and McCloy, who intervened promptly to curb British obstructionist approach. Despite the high stakes, namely the loss of British say in matters such as coal and steel in Germany, Acheson managed to convince the British leaders to give up their endeavours that would put at risk the Schuman Plan itself.

The same persuasion was used with US policy makers since Monnet and his transatlantic associates were conscious that the slightest misinterpretation from Washington would permanently undermine the plan. At that time, initiatives with major implications for the international arena had no chance of succeeding without the moral sponsorship of the US. Needless to say that any hint of negative reaction from Washington would have rendered the project void.

Acheson was the first one to interpret the meaning of the plan to US decision-makers and primarily to President Truman. His initiative was of major importance because US leaders needed to be convinced that the ECSC plan was not a plot to create a European super-cartel. This was not an easy endeavour, but Acheson was up to the task since the majority of key players reacted positively to the plan. By presenting it in terms of economic and security advantages for Washington, he managed to win over the great majority of policymakers. In addition to his persuasion of Washington officials, Acheson set the line for reactions from US diplomatic offices and closely monitored their actions. He put in place strong controls over the opinions expressed by US Embassies in order to avoid any personal opinion that would endanger the plan.

Combined with Acheson's actions, Monnet conducted his personal strategy aimed at gaining the support of US leaders. Once again Monnet used the method he knew best. Mindful that the US Embassy in Paris was a chief centre of power able to exert great influence over the mood of US leaders, Monnet tried to win it over. Unsurprisingly, he managed to identify the key actor pulling the strings. By employing his skills Monnet won over William Tomlinson, who despite his rather average position within the Embassy, acting as an economic adviser, exerted the greatest influence over US politics. By sending the "right" messages, filtered by Monnet in advance, to Washington Tomlinson guided the US government in the desired direction at crucial times, mostly during the negotiations on the ECSC Treaty.

These particular instances when Acheson, McCloy, Monnet, and, even, Lilienthal made use of their power of influence in order to steer British and US policymakers in the desired direction show, once again, the complexity of the circumstances that led to the implementation of the Schuman Plan. Members of Monnet's transatlantic group of friends and the Frenchman himself used their skills of persuasion so as to avoid official reactions that would have endangered the fate of the plan. The evidence mentioned in this chapter shows once more that states and their representatives reconsidered and even changed their first reaction to the coal and steel plan under the influence of the actions of Monnet and his associates.

Chapter 7: Conclusion: Jean Monnet and the Origins of European Integration

It is necessary at this point to return to the original purpose of this study and evaluate its findings. As discussed in the introduction and the first chapter, there was a need for a more in-depth investigation into the origins of the Schuman Plan and, more specifically, the thinking of its originator, Jean Monnet, given the shortcomings of the existing studies on the subject. The source of the concepts underlying the ECSC needed particular attention in order to shed light on the intentions of its creator and the foundations of the first European community. Despite numerous studies on both the EESC plan and early European integration, this fundamental aspect has not received the attention it deserves. According to prevailing opinions in the literature, the plan was inspired either by European federalist projects or US-type federalism peppered with New Deal concepts. Yet, these are in themselves either too vague or cannot be identified either in the Schuman Plan or in Monnet's thought.

Nor does Monnet's account in his memoirs provide much insight into the matter since he focuses more on the motivations and outcome than on the substance of his project. In view of this situation, this study has sought to pinpoint the ideas that not only appealed to Monnet but can also be found in the text of the 1950 plan. With this aim in mind the research was guided by the following questions: *Which ideas commanded Monnet's allegiance? Who influenced Monnet's thinking? What philosophy was embodied in the Schuman Plan?*

In addition to identifying the origins of the ideas underpinning the plan, this study has aimed to understand how it was possible to implement Monnet's coal and steel project. The opinions on that are almost unanimous in the literature. As examined in the first chapter, authors from all schools of thought regard the states and their representatives as the chief players in the fulfilment of the plan. The federalist school and Alan Milward downplay Monnet's role in this process. For Desmond Dinan states that were driven by concrete objectives to pursue the ECSC project had most influence. Nonetheless, Dinan underlines that Monnet played a decisive role even after he handed over his plan to the political realm. The Irish historian also acknowledges that Monnet relied on a group of US friends to help him in his endeavour.

Dinan is not alone in mentioning Monnet's connection with US players. As discussed in the introduction, Merry and Serge Bromberger, François Duchêne, Eric Roussel, and the authors of the papers published in the collection edited by Douglas Brinkley and Clifford P. Hackett discuss and highlight the importance of Monnet's transatlantic friends. As regards their role in implementing the Schuman Plan, they are seen in the literature as intervening at decisive moments, either because they wanted to pursue the interests of the US administration or out of friendship with Monnet or both.

Despite this acknowledgement in the literature that Monnet and his group of friends stepped in at particular moments in order to help fulfil the plan, the specialist literature considers the states and policymakers the main players in the plan's implementation. This aspect that is discussed at length in the first chapter prompted a number of important

questions: *Was the state the sole player that made possible the creation of the first supranational European organisation – the ECSC? If not, what other players and other factors contributed to this outcome?*

In order to answer these research questions, this study has analysed Monnet's personality and examined his group of friends. Firstly, it has focused on Monnet's relationship with particular US players so as to identify who could indeed be considered a close friend and what contributed to their friendship. Secondly, it has explored the ideas in circulation within Monnet's group in order to identify the concepts that might have appealed to Monnet and been included in his plan. After defining the ideas incorporated into the ECSC plan and their origin, this study has focused on how Monnet conveyed his project to policymakers, his techniques of persuasion and his close follow-up.

The fifth and sixth chapters of this work have focused on the actions of Monnet and his group of friends during the complex follow-up process that took place after politicians adopted the plan. Here a distinction had to be made between the states that participated in the negotiations on the ECSC Treaty and those that were major actors on the international scene but were not involved in the negotiations. Although Monnet's approach was different towards each set of countries, his objective was the same, to preserve the core ideas of the plan. He employed all his knowledge and his best techniques in order to achieve this aim. Throughout this endeavour he was supported by his group of friends, who rallied around his venture from the outset.

The conclusions of the previous chapters show that the Schuman Plan was a complex endeavour involving multiple actors, both in terms of its origins and its implementation. The thinking embodied in the plan had its origins in a unique philosophy of economic reform and governance shared by a small group of friends that included the architect of the Schuman Plan. Its implementation was not only down to policymakers who accepted that the project served a supreme ideal of European integration or provided a practical way out of the economic, political and security crisis in post-war Europe. Monnet himself and his transatlantic friends actively engaged in follow-up once policymakers had adopted the plan in order to ensure not only that it was put into practice but also that its fundamental principles were not compromised. In the following sections of this conclusion, which refer to the two sets of research questions, I will discuss in detail the findings of this study.

7.1. The Genesis of the 1950 Coal and Steel Plan

Although there are countless studies dedicated to the origins of the Schuman Plan, there has been very little investigation of Monnet's thought and the concepts around which he built his coal and steel project. This is also a shortcoming of the most influential studies dedicated to post-war European integration. The federalists and especially their main representative, Lipgens, focus on the concept of European integration, considered as a catch-all for every plan for European unity, including the Schuman Plan. Nor does Milward, who totally opposed the federalist view, explain the origins of the absolutely

novel concepts of the plan, mainly because of his almost exclusive focus on the practical motivations that drove decision-makers to accept the plan. Dinan, who also takes a realistic view of the topic, does not investigate Monnet's thinking or the origins of his philosophy and, like Milward, concentrates mainly on the reasons why policymakers accepted the plan.

It is exactly this lack of investigation into the thinking embodied in the plan and the over-concentration on statesmen's interests and motivations that prompted further examination into Monnet's philosophy. When we try to understand the ideas that shaped Monnet's thinking we discover that they were not random concepts to which Monnet was arbitrarily exposed. His thinking was not shaped, as has been claimed, by all sorts of concepts in circulation in interwar North America, such as antitrust regulation or the New Deal. In fact, as discussed in the introduction and the third chapter, these concepts lacked consistency and, as a result, caused intense debate in the US. Rather, if we revisit the subject and inquire about the concepts that influenced Monnet's vision we discover that he was in fact constantly exposed to a coherent and well-structured philosophy.

This philosophy was advocated by his close friend, Felix Frankfurter, and it reached Monnet by various means. Particularly, the Frenchman got acquainted with Frankfurter's ideas through his direct contact and frequent encounters with the Harvard Law Professor, who was a passionate preacher of a reformed capitalism based on free competition. The philosophy, which has its origins in the thought of Frankfurter's mentor, Louis Brandeis, and is defined as the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy, advocated the restoration of unhindered competition that had been seriously undermined by big corporations controlling the market through unfair practices. According to this thinking, the only way of restoring fair economic practices was the destruction of trusts that unlawfully monopolized the market. Yet, as discussed in the third chapter, this was only the first step towards a free market. Equally critical was the supervision of the market, a task to be assigned to the judicial machinery that would apply firm antitrust regulations in order to avoid market domination.

In addition to direct contact with Frankfurter, Monnet familiarized himself with the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy through his regular dealings with others who also appreciated the ideas of Justice Frankfurter. As ex-students and disciples of the law professor, Dean Acheson, David Lilienthal and John McCloy valued his ideas and, when they had the opportunity, tried to put them into practice. Thus, Monnet enriched his knowledge of this thinking not only by means of his endless encounters with these individuals, but also through witnessing some of its concepts being applied. During the New Deal, the Frenchman observed his friend David Lilienthal implementing these ideas in the Tennessee Valley, where he strove to break up the monopoly of big business over power distribution in order to allow small companies to compete in the market under similar conditions.

Adler and Haas help us better understand this process of knowledge transfer, stressing that "for example, individual members of epistemic communities learn from their

transnational encounters with one another (...)”¹⁰⁹¹. The epistemic community approach represents in the case at hand an important research tool that explains the mechanisms for creating and disseminating ideas within a limited circle. Over time, by dint of constant encounters and exchange of ideas, approaches and techniques, Monnet and his group of friends had developed distinguishing joint characteristics, such as their preference for avoiding public office and lack of political affiliation. At the same time, they developed a predilection for a well-defined body of thought to which they were exposed first during their studies (except in the case of Ball and Monnet) and afterwards in their encounters with one another. The Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy became the shared thinking of this group that included Monnet.

This was the philosophy Monnet was exposed to during his transatlantic meetings and this is the thinking he incorporated into the Schuman Plan and its subsequent treaty, after adapting it to the post-war Western European realities. If we look more closely at the concepts of the Schuman Plan, we see that the core idea around which European integration and Franco-German reconciliation were to be built was the notion of market-based free competition supervised by a supranational all-powerful authority. In order to arrive at this stage, the project provided for strict antitrust regulations designed to curb the domination of the cartels that were about to regain control over the coal and steel market in France and Germany, and also in other Western European countries. This was an entirely novel notion for Western Europe, where trusts were considered as the only way of controlling the vagaries of the market. The same can be said about the entity created to supervise the market and oversee the observance of fair competition. The powers of the High Authority were designed to supersede those of the national executives and, even more significantly, governments would receive instructions from this supranational body.

The significance attached by Monnet to these concepts is shown also by his passionate defence of the core ideas of the plan. On numerous occasions he demonstrated his intransigence regarding the antitrust provisions of the draft treaty and the decentralizing actions designed to wipe out monopolies in order to restore competition. The same approach can be identified with respect to the High Authority, the body designed to protect competition and intervene in crises to restore it. Although Monnet’s actions had debatable results, his determination to defend these provisions showed how much he valued them.

The core concepts of the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy, namely free competition, strict antitrust regulations and market supervision, were indeed the source of Monnet’s inspiration when he drafted his plan. He attempted to create a market on the model advocated by Brandeis and Frankfurter. This shows that the US influence on early European integration manifested itself strongly in the conception of the idea, but not as it has been considered by some authors, namely by exporting the US federalist model in order to create a United States of Europe. It was not the USA federalist model that Monnet wanted to put in place in continental Europe. Nor was it the influence of random ideas, such as New Deal, that laid the foundation of Monnet’s coal and steel plan. It was

¹⁰⁹¹ Adler and Haas, “Conclusion”, 386.

Brandeis and Frankfurter's restricted, original and coherent philosophy, which circulated within a limited circle of individuals, that was Monnet's source of inspiration.

The USA's influence could not be regarded only from a geo-political or economic viewpoint. It became manifest on the ideological side due to the socialization of the author of the Schuman Plan. The novel concept of managing the economy developed, popularized by Brandeis and Frankfurter in the US, was internalized by Monnet who embodied it in his 1950 plan. This philosophy, born as a reaction to the alteration of capitalism in the US at the turn of the twentieth century, was designed to respond and to provide solutions to the economic problems faced by the United States. It was entirely designed to fit US-style capitalism and its challenges. Monnet saw its value and adapted it to the post-war Western European realities. Monnet was influenced by a well-structured philosophy originating in the US, which he used as the basis of his plan.

Since it was grounded in Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy, the plan had little in common with the ideas promoted by the federalist movements, which were considered by the federalist school the origin of the Schuman Plan. Although interested in European integration, Monnet felt that such philosophical plans for European unity could not solve Europe's post-war problems. Thus, he drafted a plan that not only provided a solution to the political problems of Western Europe, but also addressed its economic crisis brought about by distrust in the capitalist model. The thinking behind the Schuman Plan makes it very difficult for representatives of the federalist school to fit it into their argument. This is probably the reason why it has received negligible attention from those authors adopting a federalist approach to the origins of European integration. While Lippens does not examine Monnet's 1950 plan at all, Bitsch, Gerbet and Urwin spend some time analysing it, yet without trying to identify its origins, taking it for granted that it comes from a distant longing for European unity.

Those taking a more realist approach, Milward (economic perspective) and Dinan (political and security perspective), do not address this fundamental question mainly because they focus on the reasons for issuing the plan and the motivations of those statesman who took the project on board. Yet, as mentioned already, Milward refers in passing to the US origins of the plan¹⁰⁹² without further investigating this issue. By pinpointing the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy, this study has not only clarified the concepts that commanded Monnet's allegiance and constituted the core ideas of the plan, it has also provided an explanation as to why the Schuman Plan received such immediate and strong support from actors such as Acheson and McCloy. Their adherence to the same thought facilitated their understanding of the concepts and aims of the plan, and contributed to their unquestionable support for it, which, in the end, led to its successful implementation.

¹⁰⁹² Milward, *The European Rescue*, 335.

7.2. Implementing the Schuman Plan

The question of the implementation of the Schuman Plan and the factors that contributed to this outcome is intrinsically linked to the question of the genesis of the plan, the thought of its creator and the core ideas of the project. The immediate and decisive support received by Monnet from his friends was by no means a coincidence. The fact that the concepts of the plan resonated with them made them understand it quickly and, in addition, encouraged them to advocate and push for its implementation. To some extent the coal and steel plan became what Haas calls a “common policy enterprise”¹⁰⁹³ of Monnet’s associates and reflected their “commitment to the application of knowledge”¹⁰⁹⁴. Their actions contributed not only to overcoming stalemate at critical moments of the negotiations on the future treaty but also to convincing statesmen of the utility of the project.

This view represents a clarification of and an addition to the accepted wisdom in the literature, which is dominated by opinions that assign to the states and their representatives the leading role in the process. Without attempting to reopen the discussion on this matter, it must be recalled that the main historiographical approaches of the field stress that the states and their actors made possible the implementation of the plan. For federalists the governments implemented the plan as soon as they were converted to the cause of European integration and became convinced of the value of the plan. For the revisionist school, the state and its representatives were even more prominent and were regarded as the main cause of the outcome. In his turn, Dinan also assigns the key role to governments driven by cost-benefit calculations.

Historical evidence testifies that, although the contribution of the state and its decision-makers cannot not be denied, other actors must be taken into account when examining who contributed to the success of the Schuman Plan. This is because the primary and secondary sources show that transnational actors played an important role in the process at different stages, first in persuading statesmen to take on the plan and subsequently in defending its core aims.

Monnet himself put the plan to statesmen and, in doing so, he decisively shaped their thinking. In this way novel ideas on competition and economic governance penetrated the walls of governmental buildings in some Western European countries. At this stage, Monnet employed his skills of persuasion, which he had refined over the years, in order to convince key French and German political players to take on board his scheme. His chief merit was that he was able to adapt to the post-war needs of Europe the thinking he was exposed to during his conversations with Frankfurter and others disciples of the US professor by narrowing it down and by defining it as a solution to the post-1945 realities in Europe.

The Frenchman underlined both the importance of the ground in which the seed is planted and the quality of the seed. The post-war context was indeed a fertile ground for

¹⁰⁹³ Haas, “Introduction”, 3.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Ibid.

novel ideas, both because of the profound crisis of the capitalist model, seen as incapable of offering solutions, and also the onset of the cold war. Monnet was aware that policymakers had run out of ideas for solving the post-war economic and political predicament. In addition, he felt that statesmen were not capable of coming up with solutions, given their “rigidity of thinking characteristic of the pursuit of a single goal [referring to the fear of the cold war]”¹⁰⁹⁵. As a consequence, Monnet presented his plan to political leaders as the solution they were looking for. Thus, the quality of the seed was first rate, as Monnet made sure that the idea for change sold to national representatives was well defined and suited their needs.

Just as Adler and Haas emphasise, timing is crucial since “crises and dramatic events have the effects of alerting decision makers to the limitations of their understanding of the issue-area and of either triggering their search for advice from an epistemic community of experts or increasing their reliance on a community with an established foothold”¹⁰⁹⁶. As a keen observer of his times, Monnet knew that the time was ripe for providing decision-makers with an original idea designed to renew the economic and political arrangement of the post-war world. He explained in this regard that he had the necessary patience to “wait for favourable circumstances”¹⁰⁹⁷. Taking advantage of good timing, Monnet provided European leaders with the necessary knowledge that, in his opinion, would help them to overcome the crisis. As Adler and Haas note, the uncertainty in which policymakers find themselves makes them more prone to listen to what members of epistemic communities have to say.

Monnet was not only aware that May 1950 was the right moment for imaginative ideas, he knew how to convince leaders of the need to accept them. At the time of his 1950 plan, the Frenchman became acutely aware of the sensitivities of this process and of the techniques that needed to be employed in order to convince political leaders to take the risk of accepting such novel concepts. Monnet had employed the same strategy in the past, such as when selling the Lend-Lease Programme to Roosevelt, but on this occasion his skills reached their zenith. He clearly understood that, while he was called on to play the role of originator of ideas, only statesmen would be able to implement them. He therefore needed to persuade decision-makers to accept and endorse his novel concepts. To that end, he applied both the strategy of direct persuasion and the use of key second tiers able to pass on the message to their superiors. This approach paid off since policymakers became convinced of the utility of Monnet’s project and accepted the political risk of presenting it to the world.

The process of influencing state interests produces effects, according to Adler and Haas, because “members of transnational epistemic communities can influence state interests either by directly identifying them for decision makers or by illuminating the salient dimensions of an issue from which the decision makers may then deduce their

¹⁰⁹⁵ Note de réflexion de Jean Monnet, le 3 mai 1950, pièces remises à René Pleven le 10 juillet 1950, FJM, AMG 5/1/5.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Adler and Haas, “Conclusion”, 380.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Monnet, *Clefs pour action*, 8.

interests”¹⁰⁹⁸. Mindful of the context he was operating in and the sensitivities of political leaders, Monnet was able to sell his plan to those in positions of power. If we look at Monnet’s action through the prism of Adler’s and Haas’ approach, we see that the initiative was entirely his and that policymakers made no attempt to ask for his advice in this particular case. However, the crisis with its multiple facets was more than present and policymakers were very much looking for a solution to overcome it. Yet, while they were trying to innovate on the basis of the existing system, Monnet provided a radical solution to the post-war economic, political, diplomatic problems.

Selling the plan to policymakers was a crucial endeavour but could not guarantee its successful implementation. Monnet knew that careful follow-up was essential to ensure the accomplishment of the plan and, in particular, that it was not misinterpreted or altered in its core concepts. To that end Monnet closely monitored how it was interpreted by political leaders and intervened when there was a danger of deviation. He was not alone in this enterprise, since the coal and steel plan became a joint venture of his circle of friends. These other actors were not at all passive but intervened at critical moments in order to steer those with political power in the desired direction.

Even after the project had passed to the governmental sphere, it was not entirely expropriated by national representatives. The actions conducted by Monnet and his associates were very much needed given that the governments of the states participating in the negotiations and their allies (such as, associations of steel producers and union), pressed hard for the modification of the concepts of the plan. While this was acceptable to some extent, Monnet could not compromise on the core ideas of his project. For example, he opposed all attempts to alter the antitrust provisions of the draft treaty. But he could not convince his interlocutors on his own. McCloy’s intervention convinced German and Belgian government officials and other stakeholders, including associations of steel producers and unions. When the essence of the coal and steel plan was endangered, the US lawyer engaged in a sustained campaign against those opposing the antitrust articles and, implicitly, the decartelization of Germany and the other participating states.

By allowing his German interlocutors practically no room for compromise, McCloy managed to save not only the antitrust provisions but, to a great extent, the plan itself, since both sides (on the one hand, the author of the plan and, on the other hand, the opposition made up of key representatives of the German government, trade unions and steel producers) were prone to adopt radical solutions. While the US lawyer’s role is not new in the literature, it is important to underline that he did not act in isolation or merely out of friendship with Monnet. His understanding of the author’s philosophy and of the plan itself and his links to the same group of friends were the stimuli that prompted his actions.

He was not the only one in this situation. As someone who grew up in the shadow of Frankfurter and understood his thinking, Dean Acheson did not need many explanations

¹⁰⁹⁸ Haas, “Introduction”, 4.

of the plan's aims on the eve of its announcement. This was without doubt one of the main reasons for his commitment to the plan, which promoted his actions in support of it. For this reason, he engaged in a number of battles that were decisive for the fate of the plan. As soon as he found out about Monnet's project to establish a free common market, Acheson joined McCloy and Monnet and engaged in a sustained effort to steer British and US policymakers in a direction that would ensure the success of the plan. He took up the challenge of responding to Ernest Bevin and, consequently, to British officials, who reacted angrily to the fact that Britain was kept in the dark regarding Monnet's intentions. Even before the Schuman Plan was published he advised US leaders on a course of action that would not endanger the project.

His persuasion of the British leaders paid off quickly, as demonstrated by the moderate British reply issued about a month after the announcement of the plan. Similarly, as a result of his actions, no trace of doubt remained among Washington officials or the personnel of US Embassies around the world. His firm control and scrutiny of official US reactions to Monnet's plan avoided major public deviations from his course of action. Monnet also made a major contribution to this outcome, with the help of the influential Tomlinson and his own special techniques, and managed to avoid negative reactions from Washington. In addition, Monnet, but especially Acheson and McCloy, made a decisive contribution towards changing the obstructionist attitude of the British officials during the ECSC Treaty negotiations regarding the modification of Germany's international statute. The amendment of the Occupational Statute of Germany was only possible because of Acheson's and McCloy's contribution and disregard for the reasons invoked by the UK statesmen for delaying the changes. Faced with a warning that such an obstructionist attitude would not be tolerated and that Britain risked isolation within the Allied High Commission, UK policymakers agreed to grant Germany more independence.

Whereas the state representatives were at the forefront of the negotiating process, Monnet, together with Acheson and McCloy continually worked behind the scenes to steer policymakers in the intended direction. This was vital since, immediately after their initial acceptance of the project, the governments of the states participating in the negotiations demanded alterations to it. Various members of Monnet's group of friends played a pivotal role in the outcome of the Schuman Plan at different stages. While Monnet was the centre of all these actions, following up the key developments, others, like Acheson and McCloy, supported his initiative. Their concerted actions on multiple fronts made it possible to persuade those with the power not only to take on the plan but also to overcome stalemates at crucial moments of the negotiations. But, above all, Monnet's associates were called on to preserve the core ideas of the plan, founded on the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy, against the attempts of statesmen to alter it.

In order to enable the implementation of the plan, Monnet and others who rallied around it accepted a number of alterations to the initial proposal. However, when it came to the key provisions, they combined all their efforts to convince political leaders. Although they did not manage to entirely preserve even the key provisions of the plan, the core idea – the establishment of a market based on free competition supervised by an independent

supranational authority – survived in the ECSC Treaty. This outcome was to a great extent the result of the action of people such as Acheson, McCloy and Monnet. Therefore, while representatives of the states were the most obvious actors in the process, there were indeed other forces that contributed to the outcome. The members of Monnet's transatlantic circle of friends played a vital role in the implementation of the Schuman Plan, saving the negotiations at critical moments and ensuring that the fundamental provisions of the project survived in the subsequent treaty and were put into practice.

While Monnet is regarded by many as the “father” of early European integration, historical evidence shows that it would be more appropriate to consider him as someone who successfully represented and employed a far broader epistemic community. The actions and the results achieved by Monnet's group of friends illustrate that its members not only shaped the interests of the policymakers but also steered events in the desired direction and, to a large extent, obtained the intended result. Even though Monnet's initial plan underwent modifications, its core ideas, grounded in the Frankfurter-Brandeis philosophy, survived in the face of fierce opposition from various sides, primarily from state representatives. The picture is indeed more complex than that painted until now in the literature. The findings of this study illustrate that, while states and their representatives did indeed play a critical role in the process of early European integration, they were not the only actors and, at times, they did not play the central role.

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