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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY, 1945-1964:
A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP, POLICY AND MANPOWER
MANAGEMENT

by

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ABSTRACT

This study examines how well the senior leadership of the Royal Canadian Navy managed the personnel component of its post-World War II expansion from 1945 to 1964. It challenges the popular myth that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) experienced a "golden age" during this period because of the persistence of inadequate personnel policies and poor manpower management that negatively affected the operational capability of the fleet.

The two themes of the postwar period are the effort of the Royal Canadian Navy to build the fleet and the challenge of producing trained personnel in sufficient numbers to man the ships. After demobilization, the navy had virtually to be rebuilt. Canada joined NATO in 1949, and the RCN assumed a heavy commitment to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) that drove expansion. In its zeal to be a strong alliance partner the RCN was over-committed from the outset through its open-ended policy of providing as many anti-submarine escorts as possible. Over-commitment, trying to man too many ships with too few trained personnel, immediately became the major factor affecting personnel policy.

The study shows that the Royal Canadian Navy was relatively successful in achieving its goal of providing the maximum number of ASW escorts possible but that over-commitment constantly outstripped manning resources and defeated an inadequate personnel management system. Instability in ships' companies became chronic. The navy continually fell short in its training and manning requirements which lowered fleet operational readiness. The deliberate over-commitment in the ratio of ships to trained personnel replicated in many respects the problems that the navy had experienced during the Second World War. Personnel shortages, particularly in trained tradesmen, resulted from structural and morale problems created by policy decisions. The

situation was exacerbated by poor personnel planning and management. The training system was starved in order to man obsolete ships to meet NATO force goals. The wastage rate was unacceptably high because the navy failed to offer an attractive career. There was reticence by senior leadership to implement changes in the personnel structure in response to contemporary demands and pressures. When sweeping radical changes were introduced simultaneously in 1960, the already stressed personnel system was overwhelmed. An acute shortage of technicians resulted that led to a collapse in manning on the east coast in 1964. The study demonstrates that although the RCN identified deficiencies respecting the personnel system and structure, it had limited success in developing adequate policies for either correcting problems or implementing changes.

Personnel policy is also used as a vehicle to examine naval policy in general and to identify and discuss the dominant themes, issues and personalities that defined requirements and influenced the decision-making process. Particular attention is paid to roles of the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Naval Board. The effect of inconsistent government support on long-term naval planning and civil-military relations during the period are also analysed.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAW	Anti-Air Warfare
ACNS	Assistant Chief of Naval Staff
ACNS(Air)	Assistant Chief of Naval Staff(Air)
ACNS(A&W)	Assistant Chief of Naval Staff(Air and Warfare)
ACNS(Plans)	Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff(Plans)
ACNS(Warfare)	Assistant Chief of Naval Staff(Warfare)
AFLO	Admiralty Fleet Orders
AGM	Admiralty General Message
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
A/S	Anti-Submarine
BFP	British Fleet Pacific
CANCOMFLT	Senior Canadian Officer Afloat
CANCOMARLANT	Commander, Canadian Maritime Forces Atlantic
CANCOMARPAC	Commander, Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific
CANFLAGLANT	Canadian Flag Officer Atlantic
CANFLAGPAC	Canadian Flag Officer Pacific
CANMARLANT	Canadian Maritime Atlantic Area
CANMARPAC	Canadian Maritime Pacific Area
CANSERVCOL	Canadian Service College
CANUKUS	Canada-United Kingdom-United States
CANUS	Canada-United States
CB	Companion, Order of the Bath
CBE	Commander, Order of the British Empire
CCSC	Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee
CD	Canadian Forces Decoration
CinC A&WI	Commander-in-Chief Americas & West Indies Station
CinC CNA	Commander-in-Chief Canadian North West Atlantic
COMINCH	Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet
CO	Commanding Officer
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief United States Atlantic Fleet
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet
CNS	The Chief of the Naval Staff
CMR	College Militaire Royal
CNP	Chief of Naval Personnel
CNTS	Chief of Naval Technical Services
COAC	Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast
COND	Officer Naval Divisions
COPC	Commanding Officer Pacific Coast
COSC	Chiefs of Staff Committee
CPO	Chief Petty Officer
CPO1	Chief Petty Officer First Class
CPO2	Chief Petty Officer Second Class
CUSRPG	Canada-United States Regional Planning Group

DCNP	Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel
DCNS	Deputy Chief of Naval Staff
DCOMP	Deputy Naval Comptroller
DD	Destroyer
DDE	Destroyer Escort
DDH	Destroyer with Helicopter
DM	Deputy Minister
DND	Department of National Defence
DNI	Director of Naval Intelligence
DNM	Director of Naval Manning
DNOM	Director of Naval Organization and Management
DNOrg	Director of Naval Organization
DNP&I	Director of Plans and Intelligence and Trade
DNPO	Director Naval Plans and Operations
DPlans	Director of Plans
DSC	Distinguished Service Cross
DSO	Distinguished Service Order
DSP	Director Seaman Personnel
EinC	Engineer in Chief
DWT	Director of Warfare and Training
FOAC	Flag Officer Atlantic Coast
FOND	Flag Officer Naval Divisions
FOPC	Flag Officer Pacific Coast
HMS	Her Majesty's Ship
HMCS	Her Majesty's Canadian Ship
KRCN	King's Regulations for the Canadian Navy
LOFAR	Low Frequency Acoustic Ranging
LS	Leading Seaman
MCC	Military Cooperation Committee
MID	Mentioned in Dispatches
MND	Minister of National Defence
NAORPG	North Atlantic Regional Planning Group
NBM	Naval Board Minutes
NCOMP	Naval Comptroller
NSEC	Naval Secretary
NSM	Naval Staff Minutes
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NGO	Naval General Order
NPS	New Personnel Structure
NWSG	Naval Warfare Study Group
OJT	On-The-Job Training
OS	Ordinary Seaman
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defence
PMC	Principle Members Committee
PPCC	Policy and Project Coordination Committee

PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defence
PMC	Personnel Members Committee
PPCC	Policy and Project Coordination Committee
PO	Petty Officer
PO1	Petty Officer First Class
PO2	Petty Officer Second Class
PSC	Principal Supply Officers Committee
QRCN	Queen's Regulations for the Canadian Navy
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RAdmr.	Rear-Admiral
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RCNC	Royal Canadian Naval College
RCN(R)	Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (post-1945)
RCNR	Royal Canadian Naval Reserve
RCNVR	Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve
RN	Royal Navy
RNCC	Royal Naval College of Canada
ROTP	Regular Officer Training Plan
RSC	Rank Structure Committee
UNTD	University Naval Training Divisions
USN	United States Navy
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
TG	Trade Group
UNTD	University Naval Training Divisions
VC	Victoria Cross
VCNS	Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff
WRCNS	Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service "WRENS"
XO	Executive Officer

INTRODUCTION

Commander Tony German wrote, "The tight little navy of 20,000 men and women stood on its own merits in 1964, running at full stride and with the very best and it capably represented its country's interests on the international stage."¹ These stirring words in the best-selling monograph, *The Sea Is At Our Gates*, purport to describe the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) at the pinnacle of its postwar power and glory. The myth that the RCN experienced a "golden age" during the 1950's and early 1960's prevails in the public domain and is well entrenched in Canadian naval lore. However, this vaunted notion of the Royal Canadian Navy fulfilling its quest of "The True Glory" is contradicted by contemporary internal reports and documents. These speak of many Commanding Officers lacking confidence in the fighting effectiveness of their ships' companies, rampant personnel instability, large-scale shortages of trained officers and men, wide-spread morale problems, poor maintenance of ships, and a primary gun considered undependable in war.² It is also a matter of record that in December 1964, the navy's capability to man all its east coast ships collapsed. This occurred after narrowly averting a collapse the previous year. There is obviously a contradiction between German's popular interpretation, which stands unchallenged in the public domain, and the evidence in the historical files of the Royal Canadian Navy. This dichotomy poses serious questions and doubts about the effectiveness of the postwar RCN and its policies, particularly those governing personnel.

This study of the rise and fall of the postwar Royal Canadian Navy is an adventure, a voyage of discovery into uncharted waters. It is the first scholarly examination of post-Second World War Canadian naval policy, focusing on the crucial issues of personnel planning and manpower management. No matter how good the machinery and how advanced the technology, without sufficient numbers of officers, chiefs and petty officers, and ratings, who are well

trained and motivated, no navy can be truly efficient and combat ready. The whole history of the RCN since its founding in 1910, is a study of extremes.³ In the last twenty years there have been exhaustive studies on the history of the Canadian navy pre-1945, particularly on its performance in the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II. While not the objective of scholars, many of the cherished myths and traditions have been challenged or shattered incidentally by systematic analysis of the evidence. Such is the case with this study. The postwar navy also has its share of myths, the most powerful being that 1960 marked the pinnacle of strength, efficiency and effectiveness of the last "golden age" of the RCN. The myth maintains that the world's most proficient ASW force was dismantled and the navy destroyed by Paul Hellyer's ill-conceived integration and unification policies.

Failed policies and inept management suggest a failure by the senior administration. The navy is an archetypical organization where, just as in civilian business and industry, administrative policy is developed and implemented by a small executive body of senior officers. Any study of policy and the decision-making process must focus on this senior leadership group. From 1945 to 1964, manpower and personnel policy in the Royal Canadian Navy was developed and implemented by the Naval Board under the direction of its chairman, the Chief of the Naval Staff. The Naval Board had its own corporate culture that evolved from its indoctrination in the organization, culture, customs and traditions of the Royal Navy (RN), that sustained the completely dependent RCN during the prewar years. The wartime successes enjoyed, and honours shared by the small cohort of permanent force RCN officers who were pre-ordained to administer the postwar navy reinforced their conviction as to the superiority of their culture.⁴ This unique culture was a dominant characteristic of the Naval Board. It greatly influenced the way the RCN was administered and dealt with the complex issues that it faced from the end of the last war until the senior administration of the Canadian Armed Forces was

integrated in 1964. The time-frame for this study will be the postwar life of the Naval Board, from 1945 to July 1964, with an abbreviated preliminary review of the prewar and wartime origins of the "family navy".

The dominant and interdependent themes of the postwar period are the effort by the RCN to build the fleet and the challenge of producing trained personnel in sufficient numbers to man the ships brought rapidly into commission. Given the worn out and obsolescent state of the fleet at war's end and precipitous demobilization of "hostilities only" personnel, the navy had virtually to be rebuilt. The commitment to NATO provided both the incentive and rationale for expansion. It will be argued that in its exceptional zeal to be a strong alliance partner, and coincidentally to build a substantial permanent navy, the RCN was over-committed from the outset through adoption of an open-ended policy to provide as many anti-submarine escorts as possible to NATO. Over-commitment, trying to man too many ships with too few trained personnel, immediately became the major factor affecting personnel policy. This demand created an environment of instability in ship's companies that eventually became chronic. Instability worked like dry rot against fleet operational effectiveness.

The simplest description of the objective of the RCN's personnel policy was to man all ships in commission at the right time with the prescribed complement (number) of officers and men possessing the required skills and training in order to maintain an operationally effective fleet. There was also a parallel civilian personnel dimension to the policy. With respect to personnel policy and the challenge of manning, the RCN had to create a functional personnel structure. This personnel structure had to meet the requirements of a modern navy with rapidly advancing technology, reflect an egalitarian and better educated Canadian society, and also satisfy the government's direction to integrate its personnel policies with the other services. The major question that this study will examine is how well did the RCN manage the personnel component of its postwar expansion?

The argument will be presented that the RCN was relatively successful in achieving its goal of providing the maximum number of ASW escorts possible within national constraints posed by money and industrial capacity but with the consequence of spiralling over-commitment that constantly outstripped available personnel resources and defeated an inadequate personnel management system. The Canadian navy continually fell short in meeting its training and manning requirements and this had a direct negative impact on the operational effectiveness of the fleet. By deliberately over-committing itself in the ratio of ships to trained personnel available, the Canadian navy replicated in many respects the problems that it had experienced during the Second World War. The personnel shortages, largely self-imposed, were both numerical and structural and also had qualitative as well as quantitative aspects. The issue of numerical shortages in manpower might be explained away simply through government imposed ceilings or a failure to compete successfully with outside industry for recruits.

Deeper investigation will demonstrate that these shortages, particularly in high quality trained tradesmen, resulted from structural and morale problems created by internal policy decisions. This situation was exacerbated by poor personnel planning and management, including a decision to starve the training system of sufficient candidates for higher level technical courses in order to man obsolete ships to meet NATO force goals. The long-term negative effect was made worse by an unacceptably high wastage rate of trained men, particularly after their initial engagement. There was also a reticence to implement changes in classification and trade structures for officers and men in response to contemporary demands and pressures. When sweeping radical changes to the personnel structure were introduced simultaneously in 1960, the already stressed system was overwhelmed. The cumulative result of inadequate personnel policies was a shortage of technicians when desperately needed. This ultimately led to a collapse in manning on the east coast in 1964. This study will show that although the RCN identified deficiencies respecting the personnel system and structure, it had

limited success in developing adequate policies for either correcting problems or implementing changes.

Personnel policy will also be used as a vehicle to examine naval policy in general and to identify and discuss the dominant themes, issues and personalities that defined requirements and influenced the decision-making process from 1945-1964. This is a broad and challenging mandate because most decisions respecting naval policy had some impact on personnel matters. Often this was not fully appreciated by the decision makers, particularly with respect to the impact of acquiring new ships and equipment and developing more operational capability. The principal decision-making authority was the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) who was responsible for the administration of the RCN. There were six CNS's during the postwar period and each brought his own ideas, personality and style of leadership to the office. Their performance varied significantly. Each CNS will be discussed in detail and his competence assessed. The CNS chaired the Naval Board, therefore in this top-down examination of the senior administration focus will be on the Naval Board because this group presided over policy development. Included will be a socio-cultural study of the prewar cohort who dominated the administration of the RCN. How this group embraced or resisted change and innovation set the pace of progress. Supporting the Naval Board was a headquarters' staff organization responsible for developing and recommending policy and also for its implementation and the day-to-day administration of the navy. The structure, composition and efficiency of this staff system was critical to effective administration. Of primary interest are the staffs, composed mainly of seamen officers, who dealt with operational and personnel policies. It will be demonstrated that the naval culture and mind-set in many ways impeded the development of an efficient staff system.

Finally, the study will examine civil-military relations, since this had a major influence on all aspects of naval policy making. There are two issues of concern here. The first is how the navy either thrived or suffered under either weak or strong relationships with the government.

During the period, the RCN was subject to increasing government intervention, particularly in demands to adopt standardization through integration, and a drive for fiscal and structural efficiencies. There were also two strong Ministers of National Defence in the postwar period, Brooke Claxton (1946-54) and Paul Hellyer (1962-68), whose direction and initiatives had a profound influence on naval administrators and policy development. A second but complementary issue is the dependency of long-term naval planning on sustained adequate funding. Navies of the postwar period became increasingly more advanced technologically and expensive to build, maintain and operate. The personnel component included the demand for more highly skilled officers and men to complement the fleet who demanded pay and conditions of service commensurate with civilian industry. It will be demonstrated that the navy, in the immediate postwar years, and, especially near the end of the period, was exposed to conditions of extreme budgetary uncertainty. Uncertainty played havoc with long-term planning and thwarted making improvements to conditions of service which directly effected welfare and morale. This environment of fiscal volatility would have challenged the most thorough planning of a fully competent staff.

The study begins after the rapid demobilization of the Royal Canadian Navy after World War II and concludes in 1964, when the senior administration of the navy was absorbed in an integrated headquarters under a single Chief of Defence Staff. After demobilization, the RCN contained approximately 3,800 permanent force personnel and a varying number of "interim force" officers and men. By the end of 1946, there were approximately 8,300 of all ranks, many indifferently trained, to man and support a remnant fleet of wartime-built and mainly obsolete ships.⁵ There were only twelve ships in commission including a light aircraft carrier on loan from the RN. Two Tribal class destroyers, just completing construction, were yet to be commissioned. An additional forty-two ships were in reserve and required

maintenance. The challenge was daunting and government support lacking. The personnel ceiling was frozen at 7,500 and funds needed to improve pay and conditions of service were not forthcoming. Morale plummeted culminating in acts of mass insubordination by sailors in ships of the fleet during 1949 and a subsequent public inquiry into personnel problems. The RCN was rescued from the peacetime doldrums by the Cold War when Canada became a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1948. The Korean conflict inaugurated a rapid expansion of the RCN almost on the scale of the World War II build up. By 1960, the fiftieth anniversary of the RCN, the fleet had risen to sixty-two warships including fourteen modern Canadian designed and built St. Laurent class destroyer escorts (DDE). Seven more DDE's were under construction. The pride of the fleet was the light aircraft carrier HMCS *Bonaventure* with her mix of Banshee jet-fighters and Tracker fixed-wing ASW aircraft. This largest peacetime naval force in Canada's history had a personnel complement of 20,000 of whom 49 percent were serving at sea, a statistic in which the senior naval leadership took great pride. Morale of the sailors was touted as high. The anniversary marked the momentary zenith of the RCN. Four years later the size of the fleet had fallen by half and manning on the east coast had collapsed, necessitating even further reductions. The numerical size of the showcase fleet in 1960, the elegance of the new St. Laurent class ships and impressive proportion of men serving at sea belied an impending personnel crisis of enormous dimensions reflecting a failure of personnel policies and a chronic deficiency in manpower management.

This study is important because it is the first in depth historical analysis of postwar Canadian naval policy. It goes beyond traditional studies that focus on fleet composition and weapons, operations and strategy to examine the decision-making process and establishes cause and effect relationships between decisions in various areas of naval administration by tracing their consequences down through the chain of command to the level of the ships in the fleet.

Those areas include personnel, finances, economics as well as acquisition of ships, weapons and equipment. Decisions can not be made in a vacuum without examining their full and long-term ramifications at all levels. The issue of how effectively the postwar RCN was administered has not been subjected to comprehensive analysis. The complexity of postwar naval organizations demands an integrated analytical approach given the interdependence of component activities. Fleet effectiveness is governed by the combined initiatives and activities of naval administration of which personnel policy is a primary component. The most modern ship will be operationally ineffective if it is not fully manned by skilled, competent and motivated officers and men. Additionally, on yet another level, the interest shown and dedication of government to the development and attainment of the goals of naval policy must be consistent and long term. How effectively successive Canadian governments did this is equally critical to the study of policy and personnel.

The method employed in this study will follow the "new model" for writing naval history that prescribes an integrated examination of personnel, administrative, technical, economic and financial factors in order to interpret the course of policy making and its consequences on the operational readiness of a navy.⁶ As Eric Grove has demonstrated in *Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II*, navies consist of much more than ships, aircraft, and weapons.⁷ Jon Sumida and David Rosenberg have argued that it is necessary to go beyond the style of the core histories of navies, which they define as those of Marder, Roskill and Morison that concentrate primarily on strategy and operations, to examine the component "black boxes" of a navy's organization such as personnel and administration.⁸ This integrated analytical approach contributes to a broader and better understanding of the complex organizations of modern navies and to developing a more accurate assessment of their overall efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, these historians believe that any analysis of the

decision making process must be based on the understanding of the socio-cultural background of the decision makers that influence their intellectual actives.

The historiography of the "new model" integrated approach to naval historical studies and writing constitutes a growing body of work. The majority of contributors to studies of naval personnel and other integrated studies are British or American scholars as might be expected. Their primary focus has been on their national navies but given the close relationship of the Royal Canadian Navy to both the Royal Navy and United States Navy (USN), useful comparisons can be drawn. While somewhat dated, *The Navy of Britain: A Historical Portrait* by Michael Lewis remains an indispensable study of the development up to 1948 of the Royal Navy as a "living organism" and how its component parts including ships, personnel, administration and weapons and tactics contributed to it.⁹ As the prewar RCN was a mirror image of its RN progenitor, Lewis provides essential background information. A publication of the Navy Records Society, *British Naval Documents, 1204-1960*, offers a comprehensive selection of documents arranged by time periods and organized under subject heading which include personnel, administration, and matériel and weapons.¹⁰ There is an excellent introductory commentary for each period contributed by an authoritative scholar. Using documents for the post-World War II period, a comparison of the personnel problems experienced by the Royal Navy can be made with those of the RCN.

The most important example of a "new model" monograph is Eric Grove's *Vanguard to Trident*. Grove goes well beyond the authors of core histories of the Royal Navy to take account of administrative, technical, economic and financial as well as personnel factors in his examination of the postwar history of the RN. Grove's analysis of personnel problems that directly affected fleet efficiency during the early 1950's and at the time of the Suez crisis, relates directly on the RCN's experience. Michael Isenberg applies the same methodology, but

not so successfully as Grove, to an integrated postwar history of the USN in *Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, 1945-1962*.¹¹ Similarly, Isenberg's integrated approach methodology examines the component elements which comprise the complex organization of the postwar USN. The result is a more comprehensive analysis of its overall efficiency and effectiveness. The work of both Grove and Isenberg suffer similarly through lack of access to classified material. This is a problem which presents an impediment to historical research on many naval subjects in the postwar period.

There is a growing body of works on more specific subjects related to personnel. A study that examines the relationship between the social history of naval personnel in conjunction with the social history of their country is Anthony Carew's *The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 1900-39: Invergordon in Perspective*.¹² Among the issues addressed by Carew are conditions of service and financial hardship of RN ratings which were similar to those experienced by RCN ratings in the post-World War II period. *Manning the New Navy: the Development of the Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940* by Frederick Harrod explores the American experience and social dynamics in building a modern technologically oriented navy.¹³ This work helps to understand why the RCN hierarchy had so much difficulty relating to the desires and expectations of recruits taken from postwar North American society.

A work that provides insight on the cultural and intellectual development of the United States Navy's officers' corps, with which interesting comparisons can be made to the RCN's experience, is Michael Vlahos' *The Blue Sword: the Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941*.¹⁴ This should be read in conjunction with *Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy* by Robert O'Connell that explores the development of the mind-set of a "big ship" navy in the USN which also dominated RCN thinking in the immediate postwar period.¹⁵ Donald Schurman's *Education of a Navy: The Development of*

British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914 has yet to be superseded as a primer on how senior naval officers think and why anti-intellectualism prevailed in the RN tradition.¹⁶ James Goldrick has written some very useful articles that compare the development of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) with the RCN, having the same Royal Navy roots. He has explored in particular the striking similarity between the two small pools of regular force officers from which the senior leadership was drawn. Goldrick argues that limited numbers made any sort of quality control impossible. The major difference was that Canada did not turn to the RN as a source of experienced senior officers as did Australia.¹⁷

An important study that examines the evolution of the administration and headquarters of the Royal Navy is N.A.M. Rodger's *The Admiralty*.¹⁸ Some parallels can be drawn for the evolution of the organization of Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa and insights on some policies developed by the Naval Board. The RCN continued to draw heavily on the experience of the Admiralty if only because it had the administrative ability and staff to conduct comprehensive personnel studies. Nevertheless, the influence of the USN grew exponentially during the postwar period as can be seen in many of the administrative and organizational initiatives of Vice-Admiral H.G. DeWolf as CNS. DeWolf spent three years prior to becoming CNS as head of the Canadian Military Mission in Washington and became close friends with Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Thomas Hone's *Power and Change, The Administrative History of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946-1986* can be read profitably for understanding some of the influences informing DeWolf's approach as CNS.¹⁹ A good overview of strategy and policies governing the establishment and evolution of SACLANT is contained in *Alliance Strategy and Navies, The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension* by Robert Jordan.²⁰

Heretofore, the major focus of historians has been on Royal Canadian Naval operations during World War II, and especially the Battle of the Atlantic. Gilbert Tucker's two volumes, *The Naval Service of Canada*, constitute the history of the administration and personnel management of the RCN up to 1945.²¹ The second volume, subtitled *Activities On Shore During the Second World War*, provides a point of departure for this study. Tucker alludes to problems in personnel policy and administration without attempting any analysis, which probably would not have been allowed by the navy in any case. Joseph Schull's navy-sponsored, popular operational history of the RCN in World War II, *the Far Distant Ships*, is the standard work but not very useful as a reference for further research.²² Marc Milner's *North Atlantic Run* and *The U-Boat Hunters* are two scholarly works that examine critically the RCN's role in the Battle of the Atlantic. Milner's integrated analysis enables a comparison with the RCN's operational potential in the postwar period to be made.²³ *The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa* by David Zimmerman also reflects an integrated approach in its analysis of the RCN's difficulty in developing high technology during the war. Zimmerman establishes the benchmark for the examination of how the Canadian navy performed in this area in the postwar period.²⁴ Both Milner and Zimmerman offer important insights on the operation of the RCN's administration during the war and the internecine conflicts that occurred. William Pugsley's *Saints, Devils and Ordinary Seamen* offers a prophetic look at personnel problems facing the postwar RCN as well as providing a useful portrait of the wartime RCNVR sailor.²⁵ *50 North* by Alan Easton, an RCN(R) corvette captain in the Battle of the Atlantic, provides a definitive description of the effect that shortages of trained personnel have on a ship's operational efficiency.²⁶ The situation described by Easton was similar to that of Commanding Officers of east coast ships reported by Commodore M.A. Medland in 1962.

The work constituting the historiography of the postwar RCN is small and uneven. The subject of personnel policy is virtually untouched. There are two short official histories on specific subjects, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1955* and *A History of Canadian Naval Aviation, 1918-1962*.²⁷ Some essays on postwar naval subjects are included in the published papers of three naval history conferences sponsored by Maritime Command held since 1980. These volumes are *RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968*, *The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985* and *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity*.²⁸ The majority of the postwar papers focus on policy development and material acquisition, particularly the design and construction of the special-purpose St. Laurent class destroyer escorts. There are four papers related to personnel but only one, L.C. Audette's "The Lower Deck and the Mainguy Report", focuses on personnel issues.²⁹ Audette's one-sided view of personnel policy and naval administration has been unchallenged. It will be examined in depth in this study. William Glover's essay, "The RCN: Royal Colonial or Royal Canadian Navy?" is biased towards describing the negative aspects of the important but complex relationships between the RCN and RN.³⁰ The RCN's participation in the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) at the Canadian Service Colleges (CSC) is the subject of Richard Preston's essay "MARCOM Education: Is it a Break with Tradition?"³¹ Preston confines himself narrowly to ROTP and excludes other important officer entry programmes. The focus, unintended, is elitist suggesting that only officers are educated. A brief overview of the short history of Royal Roads as a naval college then bi-service, and subsequently tri-service college is provided by William March's "A Canadian Departure: The Evolution of HMCS *Royal Roads*."³²

An important essay by John Harbron, "The Royal Canadian Navy At Peace, 1945-1955: An Uncertain Heritage" published in the *Queen's Quarterly* examines and expands on the charges made publicly by Commodore James Plomer against the naval hierarchy in September

1963.³³ These charges ranging from nepotism of the Naval Board to a lack of combat readiness in the fleet are a matter of public record to which the RCN never responded satisfactorily. Harbron, a former RCNVR officer, stands with Audette as a major critic of the RCN's reactionary "old guard" who maintained control of the postwar RCN. It was Harbron's obviously biased but provocative essay that challenged this author to examine the operation of the Naval Board and the RCN's personnel policies. This author, who is a product of the period under study and indoctrinated in the culture of the RCN, found himself assuming uncomfortably the role of iconoclast as the study progressed.

Scholarly historical monographs on the RCN in the postwar period are few but the number is increasing. One problem has been gaining access to classified documents but restrictions are being lifted on request as the thirty-year rule comes into effect. For example in 1998, the author gained access to information on the Cuban Missile crisis that was not available to Peter Haydon earlier. There has been considerable interest shown primarily by political studies scholars in postwar naval policy and strategy following the lead of Joel Sokolsky who has written extensively on the RCN in NATO.³⁴ Sean Mahoney's thesis, "'To Secure the Command of the Sea': NATO Command Organization and Naval Planning for the Cold War at Sea 1945-54," gives a good perspective of NATO's plans and structure and also the RCN's role in the alliance.³⁵ A policy study on fleet acquisition by Sharon Hobson, *The Composition of Canada's Naval Fleet, 1946-1985*, addresses broader issues of strategic development.³⁶ Commander Peter Haydon's *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered* provides a good insight into RCN and RCAF operations during that event and a description of the interaction between NSHQ and the operational commanders.³⁷ A history of the Canadian submarine service, *Through a Canadian Periscope*, by Julie Ferguson, is light on its survey of the postwar period and the issues pertaining to training submariners and

manning.³⁸ Douglas Bland's *Chiefs of Defence* contain useful insights on the workings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the personalities involved.³⁹ Additionally, he provides a useful overview of the results of Claxton's integration initiatives on the development of the committee system at National Defence Headquarters.

Two popular histories by former naval officers are Commander Tony German's *The Sea Is At Our Gates* and Stuart Soward's two-volume work *Hands to Flying Stations*.⁴⁰ Both works are non-analytical and contain only passing reference to personnel matters. German was an Executive Branch officer and commanded HMCS *Mackenzie* during the early 1960's and Soward was a fixed-wing carrier pilot. *The Sea Is At Our Gates* has been widely read and, in absence of a scholarly study, stands as the reference work for the history of the RCN in the postwar period. German's interpretation reflects a lack of original research and relies heavily on secondary sources. His overview of the period 1945-64 is thin, primarily anecdotal and its strong bias contributes to the myth of the glory days of the RCN. German glosses over the serious personnel problems that existed and does not mention the collapse of manning on the east coast in 1964. Soward's "recollective" history of Canadian naval aviation is comprehensive but relies largely on anecdotal information. His treatment of Vice-Admiral Grant is based largely on rumour. His understanding of the policy development of naval aviation would have been much enhanced by research in the original documents.

The RCN in the postwar period has been the focus of recent unpublished doctoral dissertations by two Canadian naval historians. Shawn Cafferky's "Uncharted Water: The Development of the Helicopter Carrying Destroyer in the Post-war Royal Canadian Navy, 1943-1964" examines the development of naval aviation from 1943 to 1964 with particular emphasis on the origins of the rotary-wing aircraft programme and the genesis of the helicopter carrying destroyer.⁴¹ Michael Hennessy examines the broader issue of Canadian maritime

policy - both naval and commercial - in "The Rise and Fall of Canadian Maritime Policy, 1939-1965: A Study of Navalism and the State."⁴² Neither dissertation addresses the issue of personnel policy or manpower management. A doctoral dissertation in progress by Lieutenant-Commander Richard Gimblett on the Far East deployment of HMCS *Crescent* in 1949, that will include an analysis of circumstances surrounding the "incident" onboard of mass insubordination by junior ratings.

Autobiographical sources are scarce and of varying quality. Rear-Admiral Jeffry Brock's two-volume memoir, *The Dark Broad Sea* and *The Thunder and the Sunshine* is, as Marc Milner commented, "the only memoir of substance, however fanciful, by an RCN senior officer."⁴³ Rear-Admiral H. Nelson Lay's *Memoirs of a Mariner* requires diligent cross-referencing with other sources in order to be useful.⁴⁴ Lay's insights on the social structure of the prewar RCN are invaluable but his chronological inaccuracies present a challenge. Rear-Admiral Roger Bidwell, Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast 1951-57, published his memoirs as *Random Memories* which cover his 43 years in the RCN. The work furnishes an interesting but rambling overview of his career.⁴⁵ Rear-Admirals Kenneth Adams and Frank Houghton left unpublished memoirs that are more useful for the prewar period.⁴⁶ Brooke Claxton's unpublished memoirs and papers are an important primary source covering his tenure as MND and through to the end of Vice-Admiral Mainguy's term as CNS.⁴⁷ Two important sources are unpublished reports by Colonel R. L. Raymont, "The Report on the Organization and Procedures Designed to Develop Canadian Defence Policy" and "The Evolution of the Structure of the Department of National Defence 1945-68".⁴⁸ Raymont was the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and his records and autobiographical reflections are excellent sources for both the development of naval administration and descriptions of some key personalities involved. Of value is Paul Hellyer's *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces* for

the period 1962 up to the elimination of the Naval Board.⁴⁹ It must be kept in mind that Hellyer's book is an effort to justify his draconian approach for implementing his reorganization plans.

Fortunately, there exists in the National Archives of Canada and the Directorate of History at National Defence Headquarters a wealth of open documentation on personnel policy. This includes important studies and reports, both external and internal, on a wide range of personnel issues. Beginning with the Mainguy Report, the title given to the inquiry into the "incidents" of mass insubordination in 1949, a series of major documents up to 1964 enable the researcher to examine the development of personnel policy, study conditions of service and morale, and analyse the effect of personnel decisions on fleet efficiency.⁵⁰ The author has used of oral evidence obtained from many of the principal senior decision makers to supplement information obtained in the official documents and to provide insights and context.

NOTES - INTRODUCTION

- 1 Commander Tony German, *The Sea Is At Our Gates* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), 279.

- 2 See Chapter 11.

- 3 Royal Assent was given to the Naval Service Act, 9-10 *Edward VII*, c. 43, on 4 May 1910.

- 4 "Cohort" is a term used by behavioral scientists to define a particular type of group development. The members of a cohort are of the same generation and have shared similar life experiences. Individuals from cohorts with unique backgrounds and demographic composition exhibit remarkably similar traits and strong allegiance to the mores of the group. Dr. Larry E. Devlin, Dept. of Adult Education, University of Victoria, interview by the author, Victoria BC, 15 June 1995. See also Bernice L. Neugarten and Nancy Datan, "Sociological Perspectives on the Life Cycle," *Life Span Developmental Psychology - Personality and Socialization*, eds. Paul A. Baltes and K. Warner Schaie (New York: Academic Press, 1973), 58.

- 5 Department of National Defence, *Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1947* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1947), 18.

- 6 Jon Tetsuro Sumida and David Alan Rosenberg, "Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management, and Money: The Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of Twentieth Century Naval History," *Doing Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement*, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1995), 25-39.

- 7 Eric J. Grove, *Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987).

- 8 Jon Tetsuro Sumida and David Alan Rosenberg, "Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management, and Money: The Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of Twentieth Century Naval History", 31. Primary examples of RN core histories would include Arthur J. Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940); idem., *From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1914-1919*, 5 vols (London: Oxford University Press, 1961-70); Captain S.W. Roskill, *The War At Sea*, 3 vols in 4 (London: HMSO, 1954-61); and idem., *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, 2 vols (London: Collins, 1968-76).

- 9 Michael Lewis, *The Navy of Britain: A Historical Portrait* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948).

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- 10 John B. Hattendorf, R.J.B. Knight, A.W.H. Pearsall, N.A.M. Rodger, and Geoffrey Till, ed., *British Naval Documents 1204-1960* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1993).
 - 11 Michael T. Isenberg, *Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, 1945-1962* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
 - 12 Anthony Carew, *The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 1900-39: Invergordon in Perspective* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989).
 - 13 Frederick S. Harrod, *Manning the New Navy: Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940* (Westport: Greenwood, 1978).
 - 14 Michael Vlahos, *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1980).
 - 15 Robert L. O'Connell, *Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy* (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
 - 16 D.M. Schurman, *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
 - 17 James Goldrick, "Strangers in Their Own Seas," *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity*, ed. Michael Hadley, Rob Huebert, and Fred Crickard (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 325-338.
 - 18 N.A.M. Rodger, *The Admiralty* (Lavenham: Terrence Dalton, 1979).
 - 19 Thomas C. Hone, *Power and Change, The Administrative History of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946-1986* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989).
 - 20 Robert S. Jordan, *Alliance Strategy and Navies, The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
 - 21 Gilbert Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, 2 vols. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952).
 - 22 Joesph Schull, *The Far Distant Ships: An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in the Second World War* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952).

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- 23 Marc Milner, *North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) and *The U-Boat Hunters: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Offensive against Germany's Submarines* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
- 24 David Zimmerman, *The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
- 25 Lieutenant(S) William H. Pugsley, *Saints, Devils and Ordinary Seamen: Life on the Royal Canadian Navy's Lower Deck* (Toronto: Collins, 1945).
- 26 Alan Easton, *50 North* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1963.)
- 27 Thor Thorgrimsson and E.C. Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1955* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964); J.D.F. Kealy and E.C. Russell, *A History of Canadian Naval Aviation, 1918-1962* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965). Both are publications of the Naval Historical Section, Canadian Forces Headquarters.
- 28 James A. Boutilier, ed., *The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1982), W.A.B. Douglas, ed., *The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988), and Michael Hadley, Rob Huebert, and Fred Crickard, ed., *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).
- 29 L.C. Audette, "The Lower Deck and the Mainguy Report," *The RCN in Retrospect*, 235-249.
- 30 William Glover, "The RCN: Royal Colonial or Royal Canadian Navy?" *A Nation's Navy*, 71-90.
- 31 Richard Preston, "MARCOM Education: Is It a Break with Tradition?" *The RCN in Transition*, 61-89.
- 32 William A. March, "A Canadian Departure: Evolution of HMCS *Royal Roads*," *A Nation's Navy*, 297-309.
- 33 John Harbron, "The Royal Canadian Navy At Peace, 1945-1955: The Uncertain Heritage," *Queen's Quarterly*, Autumn 1966, vol. LXXIII, no. 3 (off-printed 1970), 1-24.
- 34 For example see Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada and the Cold War at Sea," *The RCN in Transition*, 209-232.
- 35 Sean Mahoney, "'To Secure the Command of the Sea': NATO Command Organization and Naval Planning for the Cold War at Sea, 1945-1954" (M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1992).

36 Sharon Hobson, *The Composition of Canada's Naval Fleet, 1946-85* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1986).

37 Commander Peter T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992).

38 Julie Ferguson, *Through a Canadian Periscope* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1995).

39 Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence* (Toronto: Brown and Company, 1995).

40 German, *The Sea Is At Our Gates*; Stuart E. Soward, *Hands to Flying Stations: A Recollective History of Canadian Naval Aviation*, 2 vols. (Victoria: Neptune Developments, 1995).

41 Shawn Cafferky, "Uncharted Waters: The Development of the Helicopter Carrying Destroyer in the Post-War Royal Canadian Navy, 1943-1964 (Ph.D. diss., Carleton University, 1996).

42 Michael Hennessy, "The Rise and Fall of a Canadian Maritime Policy, 1939-1965: A Study of Navalism and the State" (Ph.D. diss., University of New Brunswick, 1995). This should be read in conjunction with Hennessy's essay "Fleet Replacement and the Crisis of Identity," *A Nation's Navy*, 131-153.

43 Jeffry Brock, *The Dark Broad Sea and The Thunder and the Sunshine* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1981-83); Marc Milner, "The Historiography of the Canadian Navy" *A Nation's Navy*, 31.

44 RAdmr. H. Nelson Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner* (Stittsville: Canada's Wings, 1982). The author was fortunate enough to have interviewed RAdmr Lay in 1972, ten years before the memoirs were published, and is also in possession of a large number of Lay's papers.

45 RAdmr. R.E.S. Bidwell, *Random Memories* (Ottawa: Runge Press, 1961). Limited edition, copy in Author's Collection.

46 RAdmr. K.F. Adams, "Memoirs", 89/19, DHist; RAdmr F.L. Houghton, "A Sailor's Life for Me," unpublished manuscript in the possession of the author.

47 Brooke Claxton, NAC, MG 32 B 5, Claxton Papers., vol. 221, "Autobiography". The Claxton Papers also contain other material in numbered files.

48 Colonel R.L. Raymont, "Report of the Organization and Procedures Designed to Develop Canadian Defence Policy", February 1978, 79/17, DHist, referred to henceforth as "Development of Canadian Defence Policy; "The Evolution of the Structure of the Department of National Defence, 1945-68," 30 November 1979, 87/82, DHist.

49 Paul T. Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990).

50 The formal title of the Mainguy Report is *Report on certain "Incidents" which occurred on board H.M.C.S ATHABASKAN, CRESCENT AND MAGNIFICENT and on other matters concerning THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY*, October 1947). Referred to hereafter as the "Mainguy Report". Four major internal reports are: *Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on RCN Commitments* (The Rayner Report) 1955, *The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on RCN Structure* (The Tisdall Report) 1957, *Report of the Personnel Structure Review Team* (The Landymore Report) 1964, *Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Role and Organization of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve* (The Hendy Report) 1964.

CHAPTER 1

THE FAMILY NAVY

"In 1939, we were a 'family navy' where we all knew each other and were now faced with the challenge of going to war."

Commander Peter Chance, RCN(Retired)¹

The search for answers to the development of postwar personnel policy in the RCN begins before the Second World War when permanent force officers referred to the service as the "family navy". The senior naval officers' notion of the shape and character of the postwar RCN had its origins in the experience and influences of Royal Naval College of Canada (RNCC) and matured during the "lean years" of the 1920's and 30's when the tiny navy struggled for survival. Richard Hegmann speaks of navies as having "institutional souls" and "organizational beliefs" that sustain traditional systems such as force structures.² This was perceived by Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence from 1946 to 1954, who characterized the RCN senior officers as, "an extra ordinarily homogeneous group".³ The paramount objective of preserving the "family navy" was passed de manu en manu, from hand to hand, from senior to junior. A strong argument can be made that the officer corps of the RCN, particularly the prewar cohort, held the sustainment of the navy, its ships, customs and traditions, as a sacred trust. Understanding the depth of this commitment is the point of departure for achieving comprehension of the motivation of officers of the prewar cohort that built and directed the postwar navy. Admiral Lord Nelson's guiding principle of duty above every personal consideration was inculcated deep in every officer in the prewar RCN.

The wellspring of this tenet was the RNCC, the cradle of the RCN. One officer at RNCC, Commander Edward Atcherly Eckersall Nixon, had a profound influence in this regard upon the fledgling naval officers placed in his charge.⁴ Nixon had transferred from the RN of

his own volition and was appointed to the staff of RNCC upon its founding in 1910, becoming its Captain in 1915. Nixon taught cadets the values of loyalty, self-discipline and persistence. He emphasized the Nelsonian credo of service above self and kindled a spirit of camaraderie in the "band of brothers"⁵ who would lead the RCN until 1964. Above all, he instilled in them these requirements of a naval Officer, "To be an officer you must be a seaman and to be a good officer you must be a gentleman".⁶ Rear-Admiral Ken Adams wrote of the strict professional focus of their training, "In our academic work there was no relationship with other educational institutions. We were being prepared to be naval officers and nothing else."⁷ Six future Chiefs of the Naval Staff had Commander Nixon as their mentor and the RNCC experience as a common point of reference throughout their careers.⁸ Their credo might best be expressed as a variation on Nelson's signal before the Battle of Trafalgar, "The RCN expects that every man will do his duty."

Circumstances determined that the architects of the postwar navy would be "a homogeneous group." Term mates from the RNCC joined in their early-teens and grew up together. They followed the same career patterns and did all their courses together with the RN, which reinforced their personal relationships. Representative were Harry DeWolf, Nelson Lay, Jack Knowlton and Bill Porteous, all graduates from RNCC in 1921. DeWolf and Lay joined the Executive Branch and Knowlton and Porteous became Engineers.⁹ Lay and DeWolf enjoyed remarkably similar careers. They spent their leisure time and vacations together and moved in the same social circle.¹⁰ They had their first commands concurrently during the war then moved to complementary jobs as Directors of Plans and Operations respectively at Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ). DeWolf's outstanding war record and Lay's falling out with Brooke Claxton, to be discussed later, moved DeWolf's career along faster after they both had reached the rank of Captain. When DeWolf became CNS as a Vice-Admiral in 1956, Lay served as his

Vice Chief as a Rear-Admiral. Knowlton's and Porteous's careers as Engineer Officers also coincided. Knowlton was promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1949 and was appointed to the Naval Board as the Chief of the Naval Technical Services (CNTS). He was relieved by Porteous in 1956 when he retired.

At the beginning of the World War II, 60 of 148 graduates of the RNCC were still serving and they provided the nucleus for the rapid expansion of the navy.¹¹ Rear-Admiral Patrick Brock, RN, observed, "I submit that Canadian naval development [during the war] could not have proceeded so successfully without the officers who had seen the RCN through the lean years and also owed so very much to Commander Nixon."¹² Brock was a Canadian and a graduate of the RNCC who was obliged to transfer to the RN in search of a career when he was shut out of the RCN after the RNCC was closed owing to government budget cuts in 1921. The revered Commander Nixon died three years after the naval college was closed and many graduates blamed this as the cause of his untimely death.¹³ On the political decision to "destroy the College", Rear-Admiral Adams recalled, "We were to regret this stupidity in 1939 when the need [for trained officers] was so great."¹⁴ Adams had also been shut out but was able to re-enroll later. The legacy of both Nixon and the RNCC was the cohort of officers, "the old guard"¹⁵, that directed the RCN until 1960.

In 1922, the Liberal government of Mackenzie King made a series of policy decisions that severely restricted the navy's funding, forcing the reduction to a few small ships and the shutdown of educational and training establishments. Abandoned by the government and forgotten by the public during the period between the wars, the RCN was obliged to survive as best it could. Lacking resources of its own, the Canadian Navy was compelled to become a ward of the RN. It was governed, as it had been since its inception in 1910, by King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions (K.R. and A.I.) promulgated by the British Admiralty

which in some places contravened Canadian law.¹⁶ Neglect simply reinforced this British orientation and the RCN easily settled into the role of an appendage of the Royal Navy.

As a consequence, the RCN became separated from political, educational and societal influences that are essential to foster the normal and healthy development of national characteristics in a military force. The RN provided all advanced training for Canadian naval personnel and positions in ships for Canadian officers to gain vital sea-going experience. From 1922 to 1939, the RN was the primary source of basic level training and education for all officers entering the RCN permanent force. Given the long association with the RN, it is hardly surprising that RCN personnel, officers in particular, would be steeped in the Royal Navy's doctrine, culture and its heroic tradition of Nelson.¹⁷ There were distinct professional disadvantages in this continued adjunct status because a Canadian officer could aspire to command only a destroyer, or possibly a cruiser, in the RN. However, career progression in Canada was even more limited. As a consequence some Canadians, such as Patrick Brock, used the RCN as a "backdoor" to transfer to the RN.

Doctrinally, the influence of the RN during the inter-war period was absolute in that the RCN officers became thoroughly imbued with the credo of offensive action. The RN had convinced itself that the submarine had been mastered after the First World War and that surface raiders would present the primary threat in the future.¹⁸ As late as 1937, the Naval Staff of the Admiralty decreed, "[T]he submarine would never again be able to present us with the problem we faced in 1917."¹⁹ The doctrinal emphasis was on surface warfare operations based on battleships and cruisers with fast destroyers providing escort. Officers seeking good careers and sound promotion prospects aimed for "big ship" employment and experience. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) was considered to be a backwater.²⁰ The RCN assumed this orientation without question and its training, modest ship acquisition programme and inter-war

exercises with the Commander in Chief, American and West Indies Squadron (CinC, A&WI) focused on surface warfare.²¹ As a result, the senior officers who would direct the RCN during the war were professionally and psychologically unprepared for ASW and the convoy escort role.²² Permanent force officers sought employment in destroyers or cruisers employed in surface warfare in preference to convoy operations. In the postwar period, there was an inclination to revert to form. Senior officers of the prewar generation showed a preference for practicing torpedo attacks by destroyers as opposed to more mundane ASW exercises.²³

By default, RN policy dictated the form and content of the professional and character development of RCN officers. What might be happening to these Canadian naval personnel, the training and experience they were receiving, or where they might be serving received scant attention from either the government or the public. Once they were delivered into the hands of the Admiralty, they disappeared from view as well as control. While Canadian government policy might state no involvement in British imperial military initiatives without the consent of Parliament, practically this could not be enforced for RCN personnel serving in RN ships throughout the empire. This was graphically demonstrated by rather ironic circumstances during the Chanak affair in 1922. In response to an invitation by Lloyd George to participate in a military demonstration against Turkey, Prime Minister Mackenzie King was quick to respond with a policy of non-involvement by Canadians in imperial adventures.²⁴ Unbeknown to King his nephew, Horatio Nelson Lay, an RCN midshipman, was serving in an RN ship that was patrolling in the Chanak area.²⁵ Other examples further demonstrate the contradiction. Also in the 1920's, a future Chief of the Naval Staff, Lieutenant Commander (later Vice-Admiral) H.E. "Rastus" Reid commanded an RN destroyer, HMS *Sepoy*, on the China Station and was involved in imperial policing activities.²⁶ Later, in 1936, another Canadian Midshipman, David Groos, served in HMS *Shropshire* operating in Spanish waters during the civil war as a

guarantor of British interests.²⁷ At the same time, Commander L.W. Murray, RCN, (later Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief, Canadian North West Atlantic (CinC, CNA)), was serving in the Operations Division of the British Admiralty and was actively involved in directing the deployment of RN ships.²⁸ Occasionally, Royal Canadian Navy ships also participated in imperial interventions, “gunboat diplomacy” by any other name. The most notable was to support British interests during a crisis in San Salvador in 1932.²⁹

That indoctrination to Royal Naval standards would be complete is hardly surprising whether it be in professional matters or in broader terms of attitudes towards naval or imperial policy. The complete immersion of young Canadians in British and Royal Naval culture for lengthy periods would have a lasting effect. Officers of the RCN would not perceive a difference between “imperialism” and “nationalism” given the influences at work in their development. Pride in empire and a strong identification as being British while being Canadian was also a strong sentiment felt in many parts of Canadian society.³⁰ In English-speaking Canada there existed a continuing sense of cultural dependence on Britain and this was merely accentuated in the RCN. Moreover, it could be expected that this cultural dependence in the Canadian navy would persist as long as there remained an appreciable dependence upon the RN and Great Britain for training and as a source of ships and equipment.³¹

While there was nominal professional equality while serving with the RN, on a personal level the relationships between RCN and RN personnel could be strained. Many Canadian officers experienced superior and condescending attitudes towards them as “colonials” or “black troops”.³² This was most prevalent during training as midshipman in RN cruisers. On occasions, young Canadians would have to resort to physical means of persuasion to wrest respect from overbearing British contemporaries.³³ While not common, this problem persisted and later senior Canadian officers, well known in the RN, reported having had difficult

experiences. Vice-Admiral Harry DeWolf remembered the tongue-lashing he received as a Commander during the war, while in command of HMCS *Haida*. A senior Royal Naval officer singled DeWolf out for verbal abuse for no better reason than he was not RN.³⁴

The most celebrated example of this antipathy was an altercation that occurred during the early days of the war between then Captain H.E. Reid, Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (COAC), and Rear Admiral L.E. Holland, RN, Commander of the Third Battle Squadron (Cdr, 3rd BS) based in Halifax. A dispute over local command and control responsibilities escalated to the highest level requiring personal intervention by both Vice-Admiral Percy Nelles, CNS, and Norman Rogers, the Minister of National Defence.³⁵ On constitutional grounds, Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, was obliged to accept the compromise offered by Nelles and directed Rear-Admiral Holland to remove his flag to a commissioned yacht, HMS *Seaborn*, in Halifax harbour. Personal relations between Reid and Holland had been poisoned by derogatory remarks made against Reid by the admiral. Holland had commented in public something to the effect that if Reid had been in the RN he would not have been promoted above the rank of Lieutenant-Commander.³⁶ Otherwise, a satisfactory solution might have been worked out between them on a professional basis.

The RCN also had to fight for recognition and acceptance by the RN. Rear-Admiral Houghton, as a midshipman in the early days of the Canadian navy, remembered an RN rating demeaning the R.C.N. stamped on his steamer trunk with the remark, "R.C.N. - Royal Catholic Navy! Blimey wot are we coming to?"³⁷ When the San Salvador incident involving RCN ships was discussed in the British House of Commons, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was unable to enlighten members as to the meaning of "C" in HMCS.³⁸ Rear-Admiral Victor Brodeur was given the nickname "Scotty" as a Lieutenant during his long gunnery course because of his strong French-Canadian accent. Mistaken as Scotch, Brodeur's speech was nearly unintelligible

to English sailors.³⁹ Brodeur himself represented the cultural dichotomy that existed for he dressed like an Englishman and married an English lady.⁴⁰ There was, however, no stronger voice than Brodeur's promoting the establishment of an independent Canadian command in the North Atlantic during the war.⁴¹

Not surprisingly, the Naval Staff's concept for the postwar navy had a Royal Naval origin. The idea that Canada required a balanced fleet-in-being was articulated by Admiral Lord Jellicoe who was commissioned by the British Government to advise the Dominions on naval defence after World War I. Admiral Jellicoe made a recommendation to the Canadian government in 1919 for the acquisition of a "complete and versatile naval force".⁴² The Jellicoe Report contained options for programmes to provide naval forces for both local and imperial defence in the post-World War I period. It represented the distillation of the thoughts of what Rear-Admiral Fred Crickard would define as the "strategic culture" of the RN.⁴³ The plan did not coincide with the contemporary Canadian perspective of national naval requirements. Finding no support from a war-weary public and leery of any imperial commitments, the government shelved the report and virtually turned its back on a naval programme. Not until the Second World War did the RCN find an opportunity to realize its dream of a substantial permanent navy.

The originator of the policy to build a postwar navy in tandem with the war effort was Rear-Admiral (later Admiral) Percy Nelles.⁴⁴ Nelles became the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) in 1934 and held that office through the "lean years" and the war until 1944. He entered the RCN with the first class of midshipmen in 1911, which trained onboard CGS *Canada*. As a junior officer, Nelles had experienced the devastating defence cuts of 1922 by the Mackenzie King Liberals that reduced the navy to the point of extinction.⁴⁵ Left with what the Conservative opposition dubbed a "Five Trawler Navy", the then Director of the Naval Service⁴⁶,

Commodore Walter Hose, was compelled to implement a survival strategy of reorganizing the navy into a "naval reserve force" along the lines of the Canadian militia.⁴⁷ Hose's plan was to establish Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR) Divisions across the country with the hope of keeping the navy in the public view and thereby developing support.

The RCN reached its nadir in 1924 when the permanent force shrunk to 67 officers and 385 ratings.⁴⁸ The Navy continued under severe budget restraints into the 1930's but Hose did manage to persuade the government to replace the old worn out destroyers *Patriot* and *Patrician*. Two new Acasta class destroyers, to be named *Saquenay* and *Skeena*, were ordered from the Thornycroft yards in Great Britain and were commissioned in 1930 and 1931 respectively. While the budgetary climate improved slowly and modestly, the RCN had to defend against sustained attacks by the army both to usurp its autonomy and to absorb it into the militia organization. Hose fought determinedly against takeover attempts by Major-General "Andy" McNaughton, Chief of the General Staff, who proposed a form of unification under army control.⁴⁹ In 1933, Hose defeated a direct assault by McNaughton to have the navy's funding reallocated to the army. Hose turned the watch over to Nelles in 1934, during an attempt by McNaughton to gain administrative control of the navy. In his debut as CNS, Nelles was successful in his counter-attack. He won with the argument based on, "The complete dissimilarity of the object of the Navy to that of the other forces...."⁵⁰ Nelles' experiences of the RCN's precarious circumstances during the inter-war years convinced him that he must secure the future of the navy during the war.

Lack of public and government support during the 1920's and 30's had a devastating effect on morale of naval personnel and many found it difficult to continue in the service. The dispatch during a training cruise of RCN ships *Skeena* and *Vancouver* to San Salvador in 1932 made headlines that caused a row in parliament. The acrimonious debate over wasting funds on

British imperial ventures prompted the government arbitrarily to cut short the training cruise. The cruise was to include a transit through the Panama Canal and a link-up with other RCN destroyers and RN cruisers for fleet exercises in the Caribbean. The canal fees were suddenly declared unavailable by the Minister. Deprived of this valuable training opportunity, *Skeena* and *Vancouver* were ordered to return directly to Esquimalt. Rear-Admiral Adams recalled the impact on morale as a result of the government's action:

On the way North we had time to consider. Was there any future in this way of life[?] Obviously our political masters had little thoughts concerning our training and development. Had it not been for the great depression I feel that some of us would have sought greener pastures. Even though our pay had been cut by 10% we realized that this was better than joining the great ranks of unemployed that filled the streets at home. And, all of us had the gut feeling that someday we would be of valuable service to the Country. Then we would be appreciated.⁵¹

In the postwar period successive Chiefs of the Naval Staff were highly sympathetic to those who had experienced the anxiety and uncertainty expressed by Adams. They gave preference in promotion to officers of the prewar cohort like Adams who had "stuck with the RCN" on the grounds that they deserved "a successful career".⁵²

As might be expected, the RCN's trials and tribulations during the inter-war years also had the effect of fostering a strong sense of self-preservation and distrust of politicians, the Liberals in particular. Rear-Admiral Frank Houghton reflected in his memoirs, "It is certainly fair to say that down the years, the Liberal Governments have been inimical to the very existence of our Sea Service".⁵³ The naval experience of the inter-war years created a tension that would become a continuing feature of relationships between the RCN and government. Senior naval officers considered themselves men of principle dedicated to their service while politicians were men of expediency dedicated to winning and holding power.⁵⁴ An equilibrium prevailed until 1963, largely through the imperatives of the Cold War. Over time, mutual

respect was generated through the process of working together against a common threat. Boundaries of control were recognized and respected. Changes wrought in the RCN, even as a result of the Mainguy inquiry discussed below, were essentially symbolic concessions. There were no substantial adjustments in the formal administrative power structure; in fact the navy's position was made more secure through the National Defence Act of 1950.⁵⁵ However, latent distrust of politicians persisted within the prewar RCN cohort and resurfaced when Paul Hellyer became Minister of National Defence.⁵⁶

Nelles followed Hose's example in nurturing the officer corps of the RCN. He hand-picked new officer cadet candidates such as Herbert Rayner for the RCN.⁵⁷ There being no Canadian naval college, these cadets were sent directly for training with the RN. Commodore Hose had been "heartsick" at the necessity of paying off ships and closing the naval college thereby putting officers out onto "civvy street".⁵⁸ Like Hose, Nelles obviously considered that the navy had an obligation to the officers and cadets who had been turned-out in 1922. He re-enrolled those officers he could recover into the permanent force as circumstances permitted. Hugh Pullen and Ken Adams, both later rear-admirals, were amongst these.⁵⁹ The officer corps, so small that they were all acquainted, took on the characteristics of a large extended family. Socially as well as professionally they were cliquey and inseparable, comprising "The Regiment" in the words of Rear-Admiral Murray.⁶⁰ The Nelles' elegant Rockcliffe home in Ottawa became the center of social activity for the small naval cadre in the nation's capital. Mrs. Helen Nelles, a formidable force⁶¹, took a strong interest in the social development and, later, professional advancement of the prewar cohort. Like a mother hen, she was particularly concerned with the welfare of younger unmarried officers. To RCNVR and RCNR officers, this favoured group was known, not affectionately, as "Helen's Babies" after the title of a children's story book.⁶² The designation RCNR, Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, was given to officers

enrolled with a merchant service background and certification. Officers enrolled directly from civilian life or who were serving part time in the Naval Divisions, as was Jeffry Brock, were RCNVR.

The Canadian naval officers' corps matured during the inter-war years in the British tradition to become a true "band of brothers". They had all come from remarkably similar upper-middle class social backgrounds and the majority had attended private schools run on British Public School lines. Because the policy of the navy "was to get them young", most were in their early teens and not educated beyond Grade 10. David Zimmerman has demonstrated in a statistical analysis that more than one-quarter of permanent RCN wartime officers were British born.⁶³ Not surprisingly, many naval officers were from British Columbia and Nova Scotia where the Royal Navy had had a long association and where strong British influence and sentiment persisted.⁶⁴ Of predominantly "WASP" origins, the majority belonged to the Church of England (Anglican).⁶⁵ Two important exceptions of French-Canadian origin were Victor Brodeur and Rouer Roy.⁶⁶ Good political connections were not unusual.⁶⁷ As Vice-Admiral Collins observed, "... to get into that early navy was elitist in the nicest sense of the word."⁶⁸ Also, close familial connections with Great Britain often existed. In the context of the times, the naval officer corps merely reflected the norm in other elitists groups in English Canadian society. Most English Canadians were extremely proud of their British heritage and, as Finlay and Sprague observed, "saw their Canadian citizenship in British terms."⁶⁹ Many aspiring young Canadian professionals and scholars like Lester Pearson sought the highly coveted Rhodes scholarship to attend university at Oxford.⁷⁰ The Union Flag flew over the Peace Tower in Ottawa. The Britishness of the RCN's officer corps is a question of degree, not emphasis when compared to English Canadian society.

In spite of its strong culture and mores, it would be erroneous to presume that tensions or divisive issues did not exist within the prewar officer corps. The structure actually contributed to these. After the RN pattern, the RCN officer corps was organized into branches of which only a member of the Executive or Seaman Branch could aspire to command and sit, with one exception, as a member of the Naval Board. This situation created an Executive Branch monopoly over the top appointments. The Engineering Branch covered all aspects of naval engineering and construction and the Engineer-in-Chief was also a member of the Naval Board. Officers in the Paymasters Branch performed victualling, finance, secretarial and some stores functions. They had a weak branch structure inherited from the RN and had very limited career progression owing to the smallness of the branch.⁷¹ Civilian bureaucrats did many of the stores and commissary functions after the archaic RN model. Preferring to fill permanent positions with RCN Executive Branch officers, the navy's policy was to bring in RCNVR paymaster officers on a temporary basis to perform essential functions. In the postwar period, the branches grew into empires. New branches such as Supply and Electrical sought a new power alignment within the structure. Also, a new division emerged between officers of the prewar RCN, and RCNR/RCNVR officers who transferred to the permanent force after hostilities.⁷²

Promotion in every branch was rigidly based on seniority. Advancement was slow, based on the promotion or retirement of the next ahead on the lists. Poor performers were not weeded out.⁷³ This could create acrimonious relationships between seniors, seen to be blocking promotion, and ambitious juniors.⁷⁴ Some officers employed clever stratagems to gain the advantage of just one day's seniority over a term mate. The extreme example of this tension over promotion, related by Captain E.S. Brand, was the fierce competition between G.C. Jones and L.W. Murray.⁷⁵ They were term mates in the RNCC class of 1911 and their career

competition had important ramifications on service accord. Jones and Murray rose neck and neck until separated by one day's seniority on promotion to captain in 1939. Jones managed to persuade Rear-Admiral Nelles, then CNS, to grant him one day's seniority over Murray because he had completed the Imperial Defence College course and Murray had not. Murray was, in fact, on the course at the time. This manoeuvre assured that Jones would become CNS ahead of Murray. On their way up, Murray and Jones collected followers who anticipated one or the other first attaining the top job.

The plot, which has some farcical dimensions, thickened because early in the war a rift occurred between Nelles and Jones, serving as VCNS. Jones, noted for his political acumen⁷⁶, was ambitious and considered Nelles out of date. He drew some shortcomings in Nelles' performance to the attention of the Minister, Angus L. Macdonald. Nelles initially believed that Nelson Lay was speaking to the Minister behind his back.⁷⁷ Nelles found out it was actually Jones and cut him out of the decision-making loop. Jones had to resort to spying and listening at the keyhole of Nelles' office to find out what was going on. Nelles knew this and on one occasion, during the course of a private conversation, he tiptoed over and opened the door suddenly to Jones' adjoining office and Jones fell in and onto the carpet.⁷⁸ On the other hand, Murray, the RCN's operational commander, enjoyed Nelles' trust and confidence. Two distinct and sometimes hostile camps of supporters emerged in Ottawa and to a certain extent in the RCN at large. There was distrust, spying and intrigue at the top echelon, which created a difficult professional and social environment.⁷⁹ Nelles was fired by Macdonald in 1944, ostensibly for not informing him of training and equipment deficiencies in the fleet.⁸⁰ He was appointed to England as the Senior Canadian Naval Flag Officer (Overseas) but retired in chagrin in 1945. He was promoted to full Admiral on the retired list.

The story ended on an ironic twist. Jones was elevated by Macdonald to the office of CNS.⁸¹ Murray's career was scuttled by the Halifax riots. The Kellock Inquiry was established to determine the cause of the riots which had occurred on VE Day. Murray protected his juniors and took the blame for their lack of preparation.⁸² Jones was notably absent from the proceedings and failed to provide any support, even moral, in Murray's defence. It was also perceived by L. C. Audette that Murray had been abandoned by certain senior RCN officers on his staff, Captains Miles and Hibbard.⁸³ They were the very officers that Murray was protecting. Murray resigned before the end of the war, eliminating him as a contender for CNS. Canada's only commander in a major theater and acknowledged as one of the victors in the Battle of the Atlantic abandoned Canada, disillusioned, for retirement in England.⁸⁴ Jones died of a heart attack early in 1946, worn out by the war and from dealing with the political fallout from the Halifax riots.⁸⁵ This interesting glimpse into relationships at the highest level of the officer corps suggests the navy while cliquish was also provincial and prone to infighting. Relations within the "band of brothers" were not always universally harmonious.

There was an important social dimension both afloat and ashore in the lives of prewar RCN officers. At sea, life centered on the wardroom with its strict code of customs, traditions and dress. Canadian cadets were trained to be thorough gentleman and groomed for their social role through service in RN "big ships" with their emphasis on manners and service etiquette.⁸⁶ Ashore, the RCN inherited the esteemed position the RN had previously enjoyed in elite society of Halifax and Victoria.⁸⁷ The RN officers often introduced the latest fads and fashions from English society. Canadian naval officers perpetuated the Halifax and Victoria connection with British society through their regular postings to Britain for courses and shipboard duty. The company of young available RCN officers was sought by rich and influential families, particularly those with daughters of marriageable age. Naval officers were also a rare

commodity during the 1930's in that they had position, steady jobs and a future.⁸⁸ Also, as might be expected, a number of officers married English women.

Marriages formed important alliances and connections and the ladies took active roles in naval society and formed what was virtually a shadow rank structure based on their husband's seniority and position.⁸⁹ The wife of the captain of a ship was expected to set the standard and guide new wives in the ways of the navy.⁹⁰ The captain's wife also often acted as an unofficial link between the ship's dependents⁹¹ and the RCN's social services.⁹² Officers' wives were integrated into the naval milieu to the extent that those with typing skills were pressed into service as cipher clerks for the most sensitive material in Halifax and Esquimalt during the early days of the Second World War to free officers for other pressing duties.⁹³ This social structure of prewar origins prevailed well into the 1960's but unfortunately space prevents more than passing reference to it.

The huge expansion during the Second World War provided the RCN with a versatile national navy. Admiral Sir Michael Denny, RN, remarked that he regarded "...the expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy as the finest Allied naval achievement of Hitler's war".⁹⁴ The sheer numbers are impressive in themselves. When war was declared on 10 September 1939, the Royal Canadian Navy's fleet consisted of eleven commissioned warships, six of which were relatively modern destroyers capable of open ocean operations. A seventh, HMCS *Assiniboine*, was turned over to the RCN by the Royal Navy in October. This small destroyer squadron was in doctrine, training and appearance virtually an adjunct of the Royal Navy (RN).⁹⁵ The permanent force RCN personnel available for mobilization totalled 1990 consisting of 191 officers and 1799 ratings.⁹⁶ At the peak of its expansion, in April 1945, the RCN comprised 404 "ships of war" and 92,529 Canadian Naval Personnel.⁹⁷

From the point of view of advancement the war was good for the RCN in every respect. Canadian sailors proved themselves in action. Their bravery was recognized through the awarding of 1,677 British and foreign decorations.⁹⁸ There were many inspiring individual acts of heroism, capped by the exploits of Lieutenant Douglas Hampton Gray, DSC, RCNVR. Gray, a pilot serving in the RN aircraft carrier, HMS *Formidable*, who sank a Japanese destroyer and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross - the one Canadian naval V.C. of the war.⁹⁹ Many officers of the permanent pre-war RCN distinguished themselves in battle. One of the most decorated was Captain Harold Grant (later Vice-Admiral and CNS) who commanded three cruisers during the war. HMS *Enterprise*, an RN cruiser commanded by Grant, with HMS *Glasgow*, engaged eleven German destroyers sinking three.¹⁰⁰ Grant was awarded "an immediate" Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for that action. Also Mentioned In Dispatches (MID) for successes off the coast of France, he was subsequently wounded at the bombardment of Cherbourg. For his services in the latter engagement, Captain Grant was awarded the American Bronze Star Medal.¹⁰¹ Captain Harry DeWolf (later Vice-Admiral and CNS) acquitted himself equally well. DeWolf had a brilliant command in the Tribal class destroyer HMCS *Haida*, winning both the Distinguished Service Order and the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).¹⁰² He won the latter for sinking a U-boat during ASW screening duties in support of the Normandy Invasion.¹⁰³ DeWolf created a role model for future RCN destroyer captains. Moreover, he had demonstrated unquestionably that the RCN professional was as good as any officer in any navy.¹⁰⁴

The performance of officers like Grant and DeWolf would confirm in the minds of the officer corps, ownership of the winning tradition in the spirit of Nelson that the RCN had inherited through its "adoption" by the RN.¹⁰⁵ While it might assert its independence for professional and national considerations, the RCN proudly shared in the ethos of its RN

progenitor. Similar to the continuity in apostolic succession, the navies of the Commonwealth believed that the RN's traditions were entrusted to Britannia's progeny. Brooke Claxton remarked on the difficulty of having to deal with these strongly confident officers "who had won the war".¹⁰⁶ But, Claxton never fathomed the depth of sentiment associated with 300 years of tradition that motivated Canadian naval officers.¹⁰⁷ These traditions predated the founding of New France let alone Confederation. As a general observation, the difficulty of creating understanding between politicians and naval officers may be common to western society. Secretary of State Henry Stimson once expressed frustration in his failure to change the doctrinal thinking of American admirals in the remark, "The United States Navy is like a church unto itself and Mahan is its high prophet".¹⁰⁸ A culture supported by a long tradition has both strengths and weaknesses. Both were manifested in the experience of the RCN in the postwar period.

The Second World War had a marked impact on the RCN that forced important changes in personnel policies and created a new identity. The direction of the postwar navy would be determined by these developments. The defining characteristic of the RCN during the war is that it was overwhelmingly a "citizens' navy".¹⁰⁹ The vast majority of personnel, officers and ratings, were enrolled into the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR) through the reserve divisions situated across Canada. The Naval Historian reported that in January 1945 when 87,141 officers and men were enrolled, approximately 78,000 belonged to the RCNVR, 5,300 to the RCNR, and 4,384 to the RCN.¹¹⁰ The enrollment and training processes for both officers and ratings of the three groups are discussed in detail in the official history.¹¹¹ With respect to these divisions, Hal Lawrence argued that at the beginning of the war Canada had three navies, the RCN, RCNVR and RCNR. He observed, "The patent difference between the three was exaggerated by the condescending attitude of the 'Regulars'- the RCN -who

behaved like members of an exclusive club that had been forced to open its doors to a ragtag and bob-tail not previously eligible."¹¹² Another observer, James Lamb, remarked forcefully that, "The divisions between the two navies [RCN and RCNVR] was surprisingly complete and clear cut."¹¹³ Moreover, Lamb suggested that it was mainly RCNVR amateurs that fought the war at sea while the RCN peacetime professionals held down management and administrative positions ashore, an opinion that Jeffry Brock also shared.¹¹⁴ Lamb goes so far as to argue that there was deliberate segregation between roles given the RCNVR/RCNR and RCN at sea. The RCN got the plumb tasks in new destroyers while the reservists were given the corvettes and the dirtiest job, convoy duty against the U-boats.¹¹⁵

The evidence is inconclusive that the RCN maintained a deliberate policy of segregating the reservists until the end of the war. Brock stated that little consideration was given to transferring RCNVR or RCNR officers to the permanent force until after hostilities and Gilbert Tucker infers there were no transfers.¹¹⁶ David Zimmerman has demonstrated that the permanent RCN officer corps doubled in size during the war including transfers from both the RCNVR and RCNR.¹¹⁷ Enrollment for ratings into the permanent force was stopped in June 1941 when it was determined that the recruits were, "inferior mentally and physically to the RCNVR recruit."¹¹⁸ Zimmerman noted that most of the RCNVR officers had some university level education. Direct entry recruiting for the permanent force was resumed in May 1944. Recruits entering the RCNVR were eligible to transfer to the RCN after a probationary period but the number of reserve ratings who transferred to the RCN was kept to a minimum.¹¹⁹ In the opinion of former RCNVR and RCNR officers who were eventually successful in transferring to the RCN, the "old guard" RCN were loath to accept reservists and made no bones about it.¹²⁰ Whether or not this was the case, it became an absolute necessity in order to build the large postwar navy.

The imperatives of wartime forced important changes in the training of RCNVR officers. Initially they were enrolled directly as officers and sent to sea after about three months of professional training. There were exceptions such as the science graduates recruited directly from Canadian universities specifically for service with the RN as radar officers. These officers received one week professional training and five weeks technical training before being sent to duty in RN capital ships.¹²¹ Advancing technology demanded that the training period for RCNVR Executive Branch officers be lengthened and the emphasis placed on learning weapons systems as opposed to drill and naval tradition. Additionally, by 1943, the Canadian navy adopted the RN system of selecting RCNVR officer candidates exclusively from the lower deck. The uniformly high standard of education of the RCNVR recruits permitted this. As a result, a very different sort of RCNVR officer emerged who contrasted starkly with his RCN counterpart. Gilbert Tucker remarked of the difference wrought by wartime circumstances.

It was not possible to produce an [RCNVR] officer who by comparison with his men was a distinct social type. That was done more easily in the RN, especially in the permanent force, since the well-educated Englishman is still in most cases clearly differentiated from his less privileged countrymen in speech and manners. Canadian society, on the other hand, is relatively homogeneous in its social habits, and the creation of an officer group notably different from the men it commanded would have been both difficult and pointless.¹²²

An important consequence of the necessity to concentrate on operational training for both officers and men meant that normal coursing for leadership and personnel administration known as divisional duties was suspended.¹²³ The problem was exacerbated through the promotion of personnel through the ranks without divisional training owing to operational imperatives. The result was that a great gap in the skills required to foster and maintain discipline and morale existed at every rank level, but most importantly in the junior officers and the non-commissioned officers. In some ships, mainly the smaller escorts, this was problematic and some disciplinary problems existed.¹²⁴ Incidents of what can be construed as mutinous

conduct were reported in HMC Ships *Nabob* and *Iroquois*.¹²⁵ These problems were finessed and information about them was suppressed by higher authority. Fighting the war took priority. However, there would remain a general deficiency in divisional skills throughout the navy at war's end. This deficiency would prove to be "dragon's teeth" sown as a consequence of wartime necessity but laying the foundation for serious disciplinary problems in the peacetime navy.

To maintain a "pure laine"¹²⁶ thread within the fabric of the officer corps the RCN reestablished a naval college. During the war, HMCS *Royal Roads* was established exclusively for training permanent force officers.¹²⁷ *Royal Roads* was commissioned initially in 1941, as a training facility for RCNVR officers at "Hatley Park", the magnificent former Dunsmuir estate in Victoria. Vice-Admiral Nelles considered a naval college essential to train suitable officers for the postwar navy and designated *Royal Roads* as the site. Nelles was successful in obtaining the support of Angus L. Macdonald for the scheme and the Minister made it one of his priorities and personally commissioned the facility. Rear-Admiral Antony Storrs maintained that, "'Royal Roads' was established on an emotional desire to resurrect the old RNCC not for educational or intellectual value."¹²⁸ This is substantiated by the fact that the facility was modeled on the RN College at Dartmouth and, more specifically, after the RNCC.¹²⁹ It was planned that the Royal Canadian Naval College (RCNC) would graduate 100 officers a year of which thirty, exclusive of Engineering and Paymaster Branches, would be offered permanent commissions in the RCN. The remainder would serve in the RCNVR until the termination of hostilities.

The RCNC was commissioned on 21 October 1942, on the anniversary of Nelson's victory at Trafalgar. Nelles stated that it was "important to develop a typically Canadian atmosphere"¹³⁰ at RCNC. However, under its Commanding Officer, Captain John Grant

(brother of Captain Harold Grant), this did not materialize.¹³¹ John Grant was a graduate of the first class of midshipman from RNCC and as emotionally attached to the RN as his more famous brother.¹³² He recruited former staff and instructors from RNCC, the Royal Military College (RMC) and private schools for "Royal Roads". The RCNC became a copy of the former RNCC, itself based on the RN model. Moreover, as Richard Preston has indicated, the age and admission requirements were such as to preclude unilingual Francophones from the Catholic school system in Quebec and the college really catered to upper middle-class Anglophones.¹³³ The waspish character of the naval officer corps was to be sustained.

With its two track officer training system, the RCN was producing officers with different professional and societal orientations. The RCNVR officer was primarily technically oriented while the RCN officer had a cultural as well as a professional indoctrination. As Zimmerman has shown, the RCNVR officers, as well as other ranks (lower deck), were predominantly of Canadian origin.¹³⁴ Given also the relative youth of the RCNVR personnel compared to the prewar RCN cohort, these factors would have important consequences in molding the identity of the postwar navy. It should not be expected that this identity would evolve without a certain amount of friction and upheaval.

The RCN professionals may have retained direction of the administration and organization of the wartime navy ashore but they were spread very thin. The edifice was really built by the "hostilities only" officers of the RCNVR. The reservists applied their advanced education and civilian professional managerial training and talents to create "the administrative miracle of the wartime RCN."¹³⁵ The contribution of Hodgson and Todd, RCNVR officers in the Directorate of Plans, to postwar planning will be discussed later.¹³⁶ The key roles they played were typical of other reservists throughout Naval Service Headquarters and shore establishments. Of course, the quality of the contribution varied dependent upon the education,

ability and motivation of the individual. In order to maintain the foundation of the administrative structure and to retain the expertise built up for the expanded postwar navy, the RCN had either to transfer reserve personnel to the permanent force or arrange to hire selected demobilized personnel to fill civilianized positions.¹³⁷ This could help to promote a more progressive environment depending on the division or branch in which they served. For example, branches created postwar, such as Supply and Electrical, were new constructs manned mainly by talented progressives deeply imbued with forward-looking USN doctrine and technology.¹³⁸

The RCN began its reorientation towards the doctrine and technology of the USN during the war. The USN assumed overall strategic direction of all naval forces in the Western Atlantic through ABC-1 in 1941.¹³⁹ Concurrent negotiations within the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) established "command by cooperation" which would govern command relationships between the RCN and USN in ABC-22 for hemispheric defence. American influence increased over time. Vice-Admiral Rayner stated that the establishment of position of the Commander in Chief, Canadian North West Atlantic (CinC, CNA) notwithstanding, the USN retained overall direction in the Western Atlantic and exercised that through direct and continuous contact with CinC, CNA until the end of the war.¹⁴⁰ The RCN began to experiment with USN ASW tactical doctrine as a result of joint operations with American Support Groups against the U-boats in Canadian waters.¹⁴¹ Moreover, RCN communications personnel from Canadian ships ear-marked for the Pacific campaign, were trained in the United States to facilitate operations under USN tactical command.¹⁴² On the Pacific coast, by 1945, it was acknowledged that complete integration in communications with the USN had become a requirement for joint operations.¹⁴³

In the technical field the RCN began to look to the Americans for improved radar and communications equipment when local and British sources failed.¹⁴⁴ The two lend-lease escort carriers, HMS *Nabob* and *Puncher*, commanded and partially manned by Canadians, were built in the United States and had all American equipment and Avenger aircraft. RCN personnel were impressed not only by the quality of the ships and equipment but also the ready availability and large supply of spares. Many of the RCNVR radar officers worked with British then American equipment and were exposed, as Lieutenant Commander (later Rear-Admiral) B.M. Battles stated, to a "startling comparison" that converted him to a strong proponent of American sourcing in the postwar period.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, RCN officers of the Paymaster Branch were envious not only of the obvious superiority of the USN supply system but also the greater career opportunities offered in the Americans' all-uniformed organization.¹⁴⁶ With the continuation of the PJBD and regular navy to navy liaison and equipment contracts, a structure was in place to facilitate increasing USN influence into the postwar period.

The RCN had made plans for a substantial balanced postwar fleet that the Naval Staff, the formal name of the strategy and operations group at NSHQ, believed would reflect Canada's newly acquired status as a "middle power".¹⁴⁷ On 25 June, 1945, the CNS, Vice Admiral G.C. Jones, at a planning meeting of the three Service Ministers proposed that, "...[The] postwar navy be organized around a task force rather than an escort force as present."¹⁴⁸ Jones stated that this task force would comprise two carriers, four cruisers and two flotillas of destroyers, and might include a naval aviation component and certain other types of ships for quick manning in the event of war.¹⁴⁹ The active personnel strength of the fleet would be 10,000 afloat and a further 10,000 ashore. It was agreed that a brief would be prepared and after review by the Chiefs of Staff Committee it would be forwarded as directed by Cabinet to the Advisory Committee, Post Hostilities Problems (PHP) for approval.

The fleet and personnel structure for the postwar RCN was embodied in a naval staff document entitled "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy".¹⁵⁰ This plan was the culmination of a wartime enterprise by the RCN, what W.A.B. Douglas called "conscious manipulation"¹⁵¹, to establish the material resources for a postwar fleet. The navy's objective was to create a substantial fleet that could survive the vicissitudes of political fortune that had nearly scuttled the fledgling Canadian Navy after the First World War and reduced it to a token force. But it was more than a statement of material and personnel requirements. "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy" reflected the maturation of Canadian naval ambitions. The prewar notion of the RCN as a small ship navy operating escorts as a subsystem of the Royal Navy was replaced by a strategic concept of national fleet task groups based on aircraft carriers and cruisers that could operate independently. A light carrier, HMCS *Warrior*, was in the process of commissioning and two cruisers, HMCS *Ontario* and *Uganda*, were already in Canadian hands. All these warships were acquired from the RN.

Interestingly, the original foundation documents for the postwar strategy were written by two RCNVR officers, Hodgson and Todd, who possessed the education and background to articulate the ideas of the permanent force naval planners.¹⁵² However, in the opinion of the first postwar Deputy Director of Naval Plans, Commander A.H.G. Storrs (later Rear-Admiral), the planning process was flawed in that it was based primarily on "emotion". Storrs opined "What that emotion was, it wasn't really thinking, it was that we don't want to go back to a small ship navy".¹⁵³ More specifically Storrs noted, no analysis had been undertaken as to "... what the next war might be like."¹⁵⁴ There is nothing to suggest, for example, that the issue of political acceptability was considered. The evidence points to the conclusion that in the immediate postwar period the RCN officer corps had yet to develop the characteristics of a mature "strategic culture".

Significantly, a Canadian nationalist element must be assumed in the postwar plan. The RCN had demonstrated during the war that it would no longer accept "colonial" status with respect to command relationships with the RN, or the United States Navy for that matter.¹⁵⁵ The Canadian navy, on its own initiative, had demanded and received command authority within the alliance over a significant area of the North West Atlantic. "Progressives" such as DeWolf and Lay convinced Nelles of the necessity of advancing the position of the RCN.¹⁵⁶ This did not represent a break with the RN but rather a coming of age and desire for recognition of professional equality. It would be a mistake to construe that this sentiment was either nationalism or held universally. It would be better defined in terms of loyalty first to the RCN and secondarily to Canada.¹⁵⁷ Nelles was a confessed Anglophile but his first loyalty was to the RCN.

The evidence indicates that officers beginning with DeWolf's and Lay's term at the Royal Naval College of Canada (RNCC) did think more progressively in terms of an independent Canadian navy. The idea at the time happened to coincide with the position of Mackenzie King in asserting the responsibility of the Canadian parliament for taking decisions in matters of imperial defence. The successful quest for autonomy by the RCN replicated the achievement of the Canadian Corps during the First World War and established Canada's right to be included in the determination of naval strategy in the North Atlantic. The responsibility given was commensurate with Canada's contribution to the alliance effort. The RCN knew that to maintain its hard-won recognition and to have a strong naval voice in any future alliance, a substantial fleet was essential.¹⁵⁸

Also implicit in "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy" was a determination that the reputation earned by the Canadian navy in various naval theaters around the world and the prestige gained through achieving status as a "big ship navy"¹⁵⁹ during the war would be

preserved. "Our object", wrote Captain Agnew, Commander of Canadian Ships and Establishments in the United Kingdom, in May 1942, "is to build up a Canadian naval tradition and prestige which should be valuable to Canada in post-war years, as have been the traditions and prestige of the Canadian Corps, earned by hard fighting in the spearhead of attack in the last war."¹⁶⁰ Recent historical writing and commentary have argued that satisfaction in the RCN's performance in the Battle of the Atlantic may be misplaced.¹⁶¹ Viewed in isolation that case can be well made. But war is an admixture of failure and success and the Naval Staff and permanent RCN officers would be inclined to take the broader view and stress the positive results. This would include the navy's successes in Operation Torch¹⁶², destroyer operations in the Bay of Biscay and in the English Channel, and the Normandy invasion operations. Moreover, the RCN rebounded in the Battle of the Atlantic in 1944. Earlier failures contrasted with the successful 100 ship convoys after the RCN took responsibility for all close escort duties towards the end of the war.¹⁶³ Although, Lieutenant-Commander Doug Mclean has shown that gaps in the RCN's ASW capability still persisted particularly with respect to local shallow water operations.¹⁶⁴

Once the guns were silent, the victors would not be expected to indulge in rigid self-examination or analysis of an organization that had vanquished the enemy and was deemed successful. In any event, the wartime organization was dismantled with lightening speed by demobilization and attention turned to building the postwar navy.¹⁶⁵ If anything, the victory contributed to a strong sense of confidence within the regular force officers of the prewar RCN that confirmed their professional standards and reinforced pride and satisfaction in traditional ways. Their culture had been tested and prevailed. They had accomplished all that the Nelsonian tradition demanded. This achievement naturally provided a strong motivation to re-establish the prewar system that was not only familiar and comfortable but also perceived to

have been proven effective.¹⁶⁶ This confidence attitude also created an equally strong resistance to change.

The title, "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy", in itself suggests the preservation of the RCN was a sacred trust. The author of this final version of the RCN's postwar strategic concept was Captain Herbert Sharples Rayner. Rayner was the Director of Naval Plans in 1945 and would be a guiding light during the postwar reconstruction of the RCN. He rose to the rank of Vice-Admiral and served as the last CNS. Rayner enjoyed an exceptional respect from his peers for his example as a naval officer and for his deep religious conviction.¹⁶⁷ Rayner's devotion reflected a strong spiritual tradition in the naval officer corps. It was consistent with his beliefs that Rayner would have chosen a title that reflected the ethos of strong personal commitment to service and the ideals of chivalry. He obviously drew inspiration for the title of the plan from the prayer, well known to RCN officers, of Sir Francis Drake before the Battle of Cadiz in 1587. "O Lord God, when thou givest Thy Servants to endeavour any great matter, grant us to know that is not the beginning but the continuing of the same until it be thoroughly finished, which yieldeth the true glory...."¹⁶⁸

"The True Glory" became the theme that expressed the ethos of the postwar RCN. The phrase appears repeatedly; in addresses by senior officers, as the title of a motivational training film, and in training publications. Vice-Admiral Rollo Mainguy, when CNS, took it as the title for his address at the convocation exercises of the University of Saskatchewan in 1952.¹⁶⁹ "The True Glory" thematically reflected a quest that raised the objective of building the postwar RCN above the material and mundane, giving it an inspired dimension. This says a great deal about the character of the navy, at least in the view of its officer corps. Hal Lawrence may have best expressed it in attesting, "the navy was a religion as much as a profession."¹⁷⁰ To appreciate this is fundamental to understanding the degree of commitment of the prewar

professionals. Difficulties arose with the postwar generation of officers and men who had different expectations and were not imbued with the same notion of service above self. We will see later that Vice-Admiral DeWolf's "I expect..." directive to the navy to embrace sweeping changes in the personnel structure in 1960, failed to obtain the traditional "Ready Aye Ready" response. There were also problems with traditionalists who misinterpreted the call to duty as kind of a divine right to command and whose kind would be exposed by the Mainguy inquiry in 1949.

As the RCN was making preparations to send a national naval task group to join the allies in the Pacific, the necessity was terminated by the atom bombs that brought the war against Japan to an abrupt end. Terminated also was the need for the large "hostilities only" fleet and a rapid reduction to "peacetime status" commenced in August 1945. At Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa, the end of hostilities was viewed with a mixture of confidence and some trepidation. The war had been won but would the ship acquisitions and plans for the postwar navy, carefully and systematically executed during hostilities, survive? In closing the official history Professor Tucker observed, "The Naval Service had successfully completed its difficult and possibly crucial task and having done so turned to face its post-war problems, the outlines of which were largely obscured by what was perhaps the most unpredictable future that had ever confronted a generation of mankind".¹⁷¹

The future was indeed uncertain for the RCN considering the record of the government of Mackenzie King after the First World War. Concern would soon prove to be justified. Prime Minister King was determined that his thesis in *Industry and Humanity*¹⁷², based on "peace, work and health", would be the guide for the postwar reconstruction policy of his government.¹⁷³ He was supported by strong voices in his cabinet who maintained that the decision was between defence expenditures and social legislation. The government could not

have both.¹⁷⁴ This policy was articulated in the Speech from the Throne when Parliament reconvened on 16 September 1945. On that same day, news of what came to be known as the "Gouzenko Affair" was broken to Mr. Mackenzie King by Norman Robertson, Secretary of State for External Affairs. This disclosure of espionage by the Soviet Union against Canada, a wartime ally, heralded the beginning of the slide into the "Cold War" that would shape Canadian defence and naval policy for the next four decades.

The war had enabled the RCN to establish a substantial material foundation for the postwar navy. The personnel situation however was largely unsettled. At war's end, the Canadian navy had three components, the RCN, RCNVR, and RCNR. How would these personnel resources be integrated in peacetime? The prewar RCN cohort that contained both progressives and conservatives was firmly in charge of the navy's future. They had benefited from the war through rapid promotion but few had any solid administrative experience or training that would be required to rebuild the peacetime navy after demobilization. Would they be up to the task?

NOTES - CHAPTER 1

1 Cdr. Peter Chance, From his eulogy to RAdmr. Patrick Budge, 9 January 1998, St. Mary's Anglican Church, Victoria BC.

2 Richard Hegmann, "Reconsidering the Evolution of the U.S. Maritime Strategy," quoted in Fred W. Crickard, "Strategy, the Fleet-in-Being, and the Strategic Culture of the Officer Corps," *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity*, eds Michael Hadley, et al., 60.

3 Claxton Papers, vol. 221, "Memoirs", 869.

4 P.W. Brock, "Commander E.A.E. Nixon and the Royal Naval College of Canada, 1910-22," *The RCN in Retrospect*, ed. Boutilier, 42-43.

5 "band of brothers" was the term Nelson used for the close knit group of naval officers who served under his command and has persisted as a descriptor for the fraternity of British naval officers.

6 Nova Scotia Archives, RAdmr. H.F. Pullen Papers, RNCC File, Seamanship Notebook.

7 RAdmr. K.F. Adams, "Memoirs", 89/19, D Hist, 5.

8 Of the CNS's, Nelles did not attend RNCC but served on the staff under Nixon. Jones, Reid, Grant, Mainguy and DeWolf were graduates. Rayner, the last CNS, joined the RCN as a special entry cadet in 1928, after RNCC was closed and proceeded directly to the RN for training.

9 The branch selection was arbitrary and did not reflect either vocation or aptitude. In 1921, there were only four positions available, two each for Executive and Engineering. They were offered to graduates in the order they placed in the passing-out examinations. The Executive branch was preferred because only they could command. Knowlton wanted to be Executive but finished behind Lay and DeWolf in the examination standings. He tried unsuccessfully to persuade Lay to trade. Knowlton, regardless of calling, became a successful engineer and was promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1949, five years ahead of Lay.

10 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, passim. They even celebrated marriage together. DeWolf was Lay's best man. Knowlton stood up for Lay at his second marriage after the death of his first wife in 1955. Six of Canada's seven serving admirals were in that wedding party.

11 G.W. Hines, "The Royal Naval College of Canada, 1911-1922," *Swords and Covenants*, ed. Adrian Preston and Peter Dennis (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1976), 167.

12 P.W. Brock, "Commander E.A.E. Nixon and the Royal Naval College of Canada, 1910-22," 43. Rear-Admiral Patrick Willet Brock, CB, DSO, RN, was a Canadian and a graduate of the RNCC who transferred to the RN for a more stable and promising career after the RNCC was closed. He was no relation to Rear-Admiral Jeffry Brock.

13 Adams, "Memoirs", 7.

14 *Ibid.*, 8.

15 Storrs interview.

16 Gilbert Norman Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952), 435.

17 Richard A. Preston, "MARCOM Education: Is It a Break with Tradition?" *The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985*, ed. W.A.B. Douglas, 67-68.

18 RAdmr. J.C. Hibbard, interviews by the author, Victoria, BC, 9 and 17 December 1970 cited in W.G.D. Lund, "The Strategy of the Commonwealth Anti-Submarine Forces Against the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic: September 1939 to May 1943," (Honours essay, University of Victoria, 1971), 13.

19 Quoted in Donald Macintyre, *The Battle of the Atlantic* (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1961), 24.

20 Captain John Walker who became the RN's pre-eminent U-boat killer had been a prewar advocate of ASW. On account of his strong advocacy against mainstream doctrinal thinking he had been sidelined by higher authority and passed over for promotion. See *ibid.*, 106.

21 RAdmr. K.F. Adams, "Memoirs," 33. A/S training for ships was limited and only a few RCN officers had training in ASDIC, the sonic submarine detection system, later known as SONAR. ASDIC was not fitted in all RCN destroyers at the beginning of the war.

22 Of criticism levied by contemporary Canadian historians on the "slavish" following of RN doctrine James Goldrick has observed, "A naval service with less than thirty officers of the rank of commander or above on active service [in 1939] is simply too small to do anything more than run its ships the best it can according to the doctrine it derives from larger navies." Goldrick's review of David Zimmerman, *The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa*, in *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 70 (1990), 272.

23 Storrs interview.

24 R. MacGregor Dawson, *William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1874-1923* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), 406-412.

25 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 26. Lay was Mackenzie King's nephew serving as a midshipman under training in HMS Resolution at the time of the Chanak crisis.

26 VAdmr. H.E. Reid, Biographical Sketch, Reid File, DHist.

27 David Groos, HMS *Shropshire* at Barcelona, to Mrs. P.L. James, 15 October 1936. Groos correspondence in the possession of the author.

28 RAdmr. L.W. Murray, interview by the Director of History, 5 October 1970, Murray File, DHist, 28.

29 RAdmr. Frank Llewellyn Houghton, "A Sailor's Life For Me, 1913-1951", manuscript in possession of the author, 115-121. This is the best account extant and also mentions two other little known interventions in Central America by RCN ships.

30 J.N. Finlay and D.N. Sprague, *The Structure of Canadian History* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 278.

31 H.A. Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History*, Revised edition (First edition 1930) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956), 383-384. Innis' work is useful in understanding why Canada remained British. Based on work by Graham Wallas on "social heritage", Innis discusses the difficulty of colonists dispensing with accustomed cultural traits. He suggests that cultural dependency will persist as long as there is significant intellectual and material dependency on the "homeland". Complete change to a new culture developed to suit the new environment will occur only with the "disappearance of the people concerned".

32 Richard H. Lier, "Big Ship Time: The Formative Years of RCN Officers Serving in RN Capital Ships," *The RCN in Retrospect*, ed. Boutilier, 86.

33 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 21. Lay recounts an incident where a Canadian Midshipman (later Rear-Admiral) Jack Knowlton, a champion boxer at RNCC, knocked out a British "snotty" who had failed to show proper respect.

34 *Seasoned Sailors*, Video No.1 VAdmr. H.G. DeWolf (Ottawa: Policy Publishers Inc., 1995).

35 W.G.D. Lund, "Command Relationships in the North West Atlantic 1939-45: The Royal Canadian Navy's Perspective," (M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1972), 11-14.

36 Captain E.S. Brand, interview by the author, Ottawa, Ontario, 19 May 1972. Captain Brand served in Ottawa on exchange from the RN before and during the war as Director of Naval Intelligence. He transferred to the RCN after the war. Reid went on to become a Vice-Admiral and CNS and Holland was lost in HMS *Hood* when she was sunk by the *Bismarck*.

37 Houghton, "A Sailor's Life For Me", 17.

38 Ibid., 116.

39 RAdmr. H.N. Lay, interview by the author, Ottawa, Ontario, 7 March 1972.

40 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 89. Brodeur, a widower, married a former British acquaintance who was also widowed. Their son, Nigel, became a Vice-Admiral and Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.

41 W.G.D. Lund, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic," *The RCN in Retrospect*, ed. Boutilier, 147.

42 "The Jellicoe Report" is discussed in full in Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 1, 311-316.

43 "strategic culture" is a term used by RAdmr. F.W. Crickard to describe an officer corps that has developed the intellectual basis and demonstrates the capability to produce a maritime strategy that reflects all the significant geopolitical considerations and requirements of a nation. See Fred W. Crickard, "Strategy, the Fleet-in-Being, and the Strategic Culture of the Officer Corps," *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity*, ed. Michael Hadley, et al., 57-68.

44 Admiral Sir F. Dreyer to Secretary of the Admiralty, 31 January 1940, ADM 1/10608, DHist, reporting Nelles' plan for building the RCN.

45 James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada; From The Great War To The Great Depression*, vol. 2, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 168-172.

46 The uniformed head of the Canadian Naval Service was called the Director of the Naval Service under the Naval Service Act of 1910. By Order in Council, PC 372 of 7 March 1928, The Director of the Naval Service was appointed Chief of Naval Staff. When the Naval Service Act was revised in 1944 (Royal Assent 24 July), the term Chief of the Naval Staff formally replaced Director of the Naval Service.

47 Cmdre. Hose to MND, memo, 2 February, 1922, quoted in Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, vol. 2, 170.

48 Hugh Francis Pullen, "The Royal Canadian Navy between the Wars," *The RCN in Retrospect*, ed. Boutilier, 67.

49 Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, vol. 2, 256-269.

50 Ibid., 268.

51 Adams, "Memoirs", 44.

52 VAdmr. H.G. DeWolf, interview by the author, tape recording, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 November 1994. DeWolf was CNS from 1956-1960.

53 Houghton, "A Sailor's Life For Me", 92.

54 RAdmr. J.V. Brock, interview by the author, tape recording, Westport, Ontario, 31 October 1994.

55 Government of Canada, *National Defence Act (1950)*, C43. Section 19 gave the CNS sole responsibility for the "control and administration" of the RCN under the Minister of National Defence.

56 Brock interview.

57 Hose and Nelles also took a personal interest in recruiting ratings for the lower deck and in arranging transfers from the RN. RAdmr. P.D. Budge, interview by the author, tape recording, Victoria, BC, 15 June 1995. Budge transferred from the RN as a rating during the 1920s. Note officer "candidates" are enrolled as cadets and men are enlisted as recruits, becoming "new entries".

58 Cmdre. W. Hose, interview by the Naval Historian, 3 December 1955, Hose File, DHist.

59 RAdmr. Adams, "Memoirs". Adams was a final year cadet at RNCC when it closed. Adams graduated but there was no place for him so he was obliged to seek employment in the tow boat industry and qualified for his Inshore Masters Ticket. He was re-enrolled as a Lieutenant on Nelles' initiative in 1928.

60 RAdmr. L.W. Murray, interview by the Director of History, 5 October 1970, Murray File, DHist. Murray's appointment books demonstrate that in Ottawa, for example, he and Mrs. Murray moved exclusively in the naval circle. Social contact with members of the other services are not indicated. NAC, MG 30, Murray Papers.

61 Mrs. Nelles had such influence that she retained office space in Naval Service Headquarters during the war for "The Women's Naval Auxiliary" despite critical office shortage for essential service activities. Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 139.

62 Brock interview.

63 David Zimmerman, "The Social Background of the Wartime Navy: Some Statistical Data," *A Nation's Navy*, ed. Michael Hadley, et al., 259.

64 "English" accents were not uncommon in the homes of many who entered the RCN, especially those from BC.

65 Ibid., 265. Zimmerman uses the contemporary term "Anglican". The documents would actually indicate "C of E" for Church of England, as religious affiliation. This was changed to "ACC", Anglican Church of Canada, in the late 1950s after the national church adopted that title.

66 Victor Brodeur, who rose to Rear-Admiral, was the son of Louis Philippe Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries in the Laurier Government and a classmate of Nelles. Rouer Roy, joined the RNCC in 1916. Unable to speak one word of English, Roy became perfectly bilingual and showed such potential that Lay suggests he would have been the first French-Canadian CNS. Roy was lost while in command of HMCS Margaree in 1940. Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 12.

67 The Lay connection with Mackenzie King who was his uncle has been mentioned. R.Admr. Adams mentions his father's Liberal connections in his "Memoirs". R.Admr. M.G. Stirling, who joined the RCN in 1933, was the son of The Hon. Grote Stirling, then Minister of Defence in the Bennett government. The personal papers of R.Admr. Victor Brodeur, in the possession of his son, V.Admr. Nigel Brodeur, contain personal correspondence between V. Brodeur and Mackenzie King. V.Admr. H.T.W. Grant's father had been Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia.

68 D.A. Collins, interview by LCdr. W. Glover, Victoria, BC, 4 February 1992, V.Admr. Collins File, DHist, 39.

69 Findlay and Sprague, *The Structure of Canadian History*, 314.

70 Cambridge was a favourite alternative as were the American universities, Harvard (Mackenzie King) and Yale.

71 R.Admr. C.J. Dillon, interview by the author, tape recording, Victoria, BC, 6 October 1994.

72 Brock interview.

73 Ibid.

74 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 60. Lay considered Houghton to be passed over in 1937 and infers that he should have given up on it. The war opened up promotion dramatically and Houghton retired as a Rear-Admiral and VCNS.

75 Brand interview. Brand, an ardent diarist, kept his finger on the pulse of professional and social activity at Naval Service Headquarters. At the time he was in the RN and considered a neutral by the officer corps and was well placed to monitor proceedings.

76 DeWolf interview by the author.

77 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 148.

78 RAdmr. W.B. Creery, interview by the author, Ottawa, Ontario, 24 April 1972. RAdmr. Creery, who was COS CinC CNA at the time, described this comic episode that occurred while he was delivering a personal message to Nelles from Murray.

79 Brand interview. Captain Brand stated that the sides between Nelles and Jones supporters were so distinctly drawn that care had to be taken so as not to invite members of the opposing camps to the same social function.

80 Milner, *North Atlantic Run*, 262-264.

81 This is interesting given that Jones' terms of reference as VCNS included fleet operational effectiveness and equipment acquisition. It was for deficiencies in these areas that Nelles was fired. Macdonald and Jones were both from Nova Scotia and previously had close social connections.

82 J.M. Cameron, *Murray the Martyred Admiral* (Hantsport: Lancelot Press, 1981), passim.

83 L.C. Audette to R.L. Donaldson, 18 June 1991, Audette File, DHist. Captain G.L. Miles was Chief of Staff and Captain J.C. Hibbard was Captain D (Destroyers). The actions by these officers was dishonourable in the eyes of Audette who was subsequently appointed as a commissioner on the Mainquy Inquiry into the "incidents" onboard HMC Ships in 1949.

84 Murray became a successful barrister and died in 1971 at the age of 75.

85 Collins, interview by Glover, 14.

86 Houghton, "A Sailor's Life For Me", Chapters 2 to 8 passim.

87 Terry Reksten, *More English than the English: A Very Social History of Victoria* (Victoria: Orca Books, 1986), 31-34, 117-118.

88 Mrs. Ines Hibbard (Nee: Ker, wife of RAdmr. J. C. Hibbard), interview by the author, Victoria, BC, 17 December 1970. Mrs. Hibbard said that in Victoria during the depression naval officers were nearly the only suitable marriage prospects in the circle in which she and her family moved. Miss Ker and many ladies in her social set married future admirals (Hibbard, Lay, Adams, Mainguy, Jones).

89 The most celebrated example was Mrs. E. Rollo "Quita" Mainguy, the daughter of the Hon. Walter Nichol who was a former Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia and founder of the *Vancouver Daily Province* newspaper. Mrs. Mainguy was a notorious for detailing-off officers' wives at social functions for duties such as baby-sitting. Storrs interview.

90 Ibid.

91 "dependents" refers to the families of the officers and men of the naval ship's company.

92 Storrs interview.

93 Mrs. Ines Hibbard interview.

94 Quoted in P. Willet Brock, "Commander E.A.E. Nixon and the Royal Naval College of Canada, 1910-22," 43.

95 See Lund, "Command Relationships in the North West Atlantic 1939-45: The Royal Canadian Navy's Perspective," 3-4.

96 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 7.

97 Department of National Defence, *Report of the Department of National Defence* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), 15.

98 Joseph Schull, *The Far Distant Ships*, 417.

99 Ibid., 416-417; Stuart E. Soward, *Hands To Flying Stations: A Recollective History of Canadian Naval Aviation, 1945-1954*, vol. I (Victoria: Neptune Developments, 1993), 21; J.D.F. Kealy and E.C. Russell, *A History of Canadian Naval Aviation, 1918-1962* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), 23.

100 Schull, *The Far Distant Ships*, 201-203; Captain S.W. Roskill, *The War at Sea*, vol. 3, Part 1, (London: H.M.S.O., 1960), 74-75.

101 VAdmr. H.T.W. Grant Biographical Sketch, Grant File, DHist.

102 VAdmr. H.G. DeWolf Biographical Sketch, DeWolf file, DHist.

103 See Shull, *The Far Distant Ships*, 302.

104 Not surprisingly, the RCN officers like Grant and DeWolf excelled in surface warfare operations which was the focus of their training in the prewar period.

105 RAdmr. K.F. Adams, interview by Chris Mayhem, Sidney, BC, 16 August 1978, Adams File, DHist, 125. Adams said, "It's great to feel that you have this 300 years of background by adoption."

106 Claxton, "Autobiography," 831.

107 Claxton in his memoirs tended to trivialize naval traditions and mannerisms of naval officers and referred to their habits of speech as "quaint". Claxton "Autobiography," file 4. Paul Hellyer experienced similar difficulty in understanding naval traditions.

108 Author's notes, "Stansfield Turner Lecture", Naval War College, March 1980.

109 Mckenna, *War At Sea*.

110 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 274.

111 Ibid., 242-335.

112 Hal Lawrence, *A Bloody War: One Man's Memories of the Canadian Navy, 1939-45* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), 3. Lawrence provides the popular observation, "the RCNR are sailors trying to be gentlemen; the RCNVR are gentlemen trying to be sailors; and the RCN are neither trying to be both."

113 James B. Lamb, *The Corvette Navy*, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), 7.

114 Jeffry V. Brock, *The Dark Broad Seas*, vol. 1, 179. Both Lamb and Brock agreed that the roles for which the two groups were trained, the RCNVR for management and RCN for war, were curiously switched.

115 Lamb, *The Corvette Navy*, 7.

116 Brock interview.

117 David Zimmerman, "The Social Background of the Wartime Navy", 277; Sub-Lieutenant R.J. Pickford, RCNVR, later Rear-Admiral, was among those who transferred. RAdmr. R.J. Pickford, interview by the author, tape recording, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 November 1994.

118 DNP to CNS, May 22, 1941, N.S. 62-21-4 (7) quoted in Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 269.

119 N Sec to COAC, 27 January 1941, N.S. 1-24-1 (4) quoted in *ibid.*

120 Brock, Dillon, Storrs interviews by the author. VAdmr. D.A. Collins, interview by the author, Victoria, BC, 4 October 1994.

121 RAdmr. R.M. Battles, interview by the author, tape recording, Victoria, BC, 22 June 1995. Appointed to aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers as department heads in charge of the new "top secret" radar equipment, there were nearly 200 Canadians in this extraordinary group who learned to be naval officers on the job. They had one week divisional training in Canada where they "learned to put on the uniform and salute" before being dispatched to Great Britain for five weeks technical training. Most served outside Canada throughout the war with no contact with the RCN. Those who joined the newly formed Electrical Branch in the postwar period were the best educated officers and formed the most progressive group in the RCN.

122 Tucker, *Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 251.

123 Budge interview.

124 Lamb, *The Corvette Navy*, 50-51.

125 Schull, *The Far Distant Ships*, 192; Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 157-159. Tucker discusses incidents in three ships. Tucker, *Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 328-329. Schull gives the impression that the Captain of *Iroquois*, Cdr. Holms, was worn out and his injudicious decisions caused dissension. He stated Holms was removed after suffering a heart attack. RAdmr. Brock stated that his father, Cmdre. Eustace Brock, who was the Senior Canadian Officer in the Clyde as CO *Niobe*, "covered up" the reasons for removal of Holms from command of *Iroquois* which was for harsh treatment of his men.

126 "pure wool", a term used by VAdmr. A. Collins who began his career as a rating in the RCNVR, Collins interview by the author.

127 See William A. March, "A Canadian Departure: The Evolution of HMCS *Royal Roads*: 1942-1948," *A Nation's Navy*, ed. M. Hadley, et al., 297-309.

128 Storrs interview.

129 March, "A Canadian Departure: The Evolution of HMCS *Royal Roads*," 303.

130 Royal Naval College of Canada, *The Log*, vol. 5, no. 2, (1945), 12.

131 The position had originally been offered to Captain H.N. Lay by the Minister but he declined it seeking a sea-going job instead. Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 147. John Grant had been retired before the war because of failing eyesight. He was recalled and appointed as Executive Officer at HMCS *Stone Frigate*, the first RCNVR officer training facility established at the Royal Military College (RMC), Kingston.

132 F.L. Houghton, "18 Midshipmen 1911," *Sea Breezes*, Vol.1, No.1 1914, 5. Preston erroneously suggested that Grant was a graduate of the Britannia Naval College, "Dartmouth". Preston, "MARCOM Education", 68.

133 Preston, "MARCOM Education", 68.

134 David Zimmerman, "The Social Background of the Wartime Navy: Some Statistical Data," 259-260.

135 Lamb, *The Corvette Navy*, 6.

136 Shawn Cafferky, "The Organization of War: A History of the Directorate of Plans Division, 1939-1945," Directorate of History Narrative (February, 1994), DHist, Appendix II contains biographical sketches of officers serving in the Directorate of Plans during the war. The director was RCN but the original thinkers and drafters for policy and plans were RCNVR. The organization and functioning of this directorate was typical.

137 Dillon interview. Also reflected in staff memoranda supporting decision in Naval Board Minutes 217-5, 13 June 1947, DHist, where the number of uniformed officers in Naval Service Headquarters would be reduced through employing civilians wherever possible. Naval Board Minutes abbreviated hereafter as NBM.

138 Battles interview.

139 Lund, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic," 140-142.

140 VAdmr. H.S. Rayner, interview by the author, Ottawa, Ontario, 18 May 1972. Rayner served as Staff Officer Operations on the staff of COAC (later CinC, CNA) 1942-43 and later as DNP in Naval Service Headquarters.

141 Doug M. Mclean, "Muddling Through: Canadian Anti-submarine Doctrine and Practice, 1942-1945," *A Nation's Navy*, ed. Michael Hadley, et al., 185.

142 RAdmr. J.A. Charles, interview by the author, tape recording, Victoria, BC, 14 June 1995.

143 Ibid. Charles was the Staff Communications Officer to Commanding Officer Pacific Coast(COPC) in 1945.

144 Zimmerman, *The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa*, passim; David Zimmerman, "The Royal Canadian Navy and the National Research Council, 1939-45," *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 69 (1988), 218-220.

145 Battles interview.

146 Dillon interview.

147 Shawn Cafferky, "The Organization of War: A History of the Directorate of Plans Division, 1939-1945," 147.

148 Extract of the Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Ministers of National Defence and the Chiefs of Staff, held on 25 June 1945, NAC, RG 24 83-84/167, vol.610, file 1818-13, vol. 1.

149 Ibid.

150 "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy", NAC, RG 24 vol. 8186, NS 1818-9. The document was prepared by the Director of Plans, Acting-Captain H.S. Rayner.

151 Douglas, "Conflict and Innovation in the RCN, 1939-1945," *In Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century*, ed., G. Jordan (New York: Crane Russak, 1977), 211-232.

152 Paymaster Sub-Lieutenant J.S. Hodgson, RCNVR, and Paymaster Lieutenant G.F. Todd, RCNVR. Both officers were Oxford graduates and Hodgson had obtained a D.Phil.

153 Storrs interview. RAdmr. Storrs was a member of the Naval Board and later Commandant of the National Defence College. A progressive, he was highly critical of the opposition at the most senior level in the RCN to staff training and higher education.

154 Ibid.

155 See Lund, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic," 138-157.

156 This represented a fundamental change in Nelles' strategic concept of command and control of the RCN. At the beginning of the war, he advised the government to place the RCN "at the disposal" of the RN. Mackenzie King's decision was that the navy would "cooperate to the fullest extent" with the RN. Without direction from the government, it was younger officers with strong ambitions to build the Canadian navy who took the initiative to gain strategic control of the RCN's escorts.

157 Brock interview by the author.

158 Lund, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic," 157.

159 Douglas, "Conflict and Innovation in the RCN, 1939-1945," *Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century*, ed., G. Jordan, 211.

160 Captain R.L. Agnew to Secretary of the Naval Board, 13 May 1942, NAC, RG 24/3840 NS 1017-10-23 quoted in W.A.B. Douglas, "Alliance Warfare 1939-1945: The Case of Canada's Maritime Forces", 1. Author's collection.

161 See Marc Milner, *North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle of the Convoys*, David Zimmerman, *The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa*, Tony German, *The Sea is At Our Gates*, and Brian McKenna, *War at Sea* (Toronto: Gala Films Inc, 1995).

162 See Shawn Cafferky, "A Useful Lot, These Canadian Ships: The Royal Canadian Navy and Operation Torch, 1942-1943," *The Northern Mariner*, vol. III, no. 4 (October 1993), 1-17. The author argues that given modern effective equipment, good training and stability in manning, RCN units and groups both demonstrated that they could perform as well as their RN counterparts. RCN ships and groups operating as close anti-submarine escorts for convoys in the Western Atlantic lacked these vital elements until later in the war. LCdr. Doug McLean suggests that even then the RCN was assigned the "less demanding task" of close escort by the RN that was "more suited to the RCN's capabilities." Lieutenant Commander Douglas M. McLean, "Confronting Technological and Tactical Change: Allied Antisubmarine Warfare in the Last Year of the Battle of the Atlantic," *Naval War College Review*, vol. XLVII, no. 1 (Winter, 1994), 92-93.

163 See Schull, *The Far Distant Ships*, passim; RAdmr. E.W.R. Finch-Noyes, interview by the author, Victoria, BC, 11 December 1970. Finch-Noyes was the Senior Officer C-4 Convoy Escort Group involved in escorting the first 100 ship convoy. The author was given access to his diary and personal correspondence.

164 McLean, "Muddling Through: Canadian Anti-Submarine Doctrine and Practice, 1942-45," 173-185.

165 Dillon, interview by the author. Dillon recalled that people would simply be called away from work and demobilized on the spot. Whole sections disappeared en masse.

166 Dillon interview. Dillon, who was on the staff of the Naval Secretary in 1946, recalled, "The Old Guard tried to reinvent the prewar RCN". VAdmr. Collins was Executive Secretary to three CNS's; Jones, Reid and Grant (1946-1948). In Collins' view the Naval Board was trying to "turn back the clock" to the pre-war navy. Collins interview by the author.

167 RAdmr. R.W. Murdoch, interview by the author, tape recording, Victoria, BC, 27 June 1995; Pickford interview by the author. Rayner was representative of a strong religious inclination in the naval officer corps. The Naval Board remained adamant that obligatory public worship be retained in service regulations against efforts by the other two services to have it abolished.

168 Department of National Defence, *Divine Service Book for The Armed Forces* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1950), v.

169 VAdmr. E.R. Mainguy, CNS, "The True Glory" an address to the University of Saskatchewan, 9 May 1952, NAC, MG 30 E517 Mainguy Papers, vol. 1; *The True Glory* (RCN documentary film, 1956); Department of National Defence, *The Divisional Officer's Handbook* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962).

170 Hal Lawrence, *Tales of the North Atlantic* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), 14.

171 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 501.

172 W.L. Mackenzie King, *Industry and Humanity* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1918).

173 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 3, 1945-1946 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 7.

174 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 4, 1946-1947 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 6.

CHAPTER 2

THE DOLDRUMS

The characteristics of the climatic zone known as the doldrums are calms and light variable winds alternating with squalls, heavy rains and thunderstorms.

Manual of Seamanship, vol. 2

In war, chance, caprice, bad luck and good fortune play a larger role in the activities of men than in peace where ability, hard work, good taste, and social connections play a prominent part. In war the rules change and the expedient dominates. The normal flow of professional training ceases and the emphasis is on operations and much of the peacetime routine such as dress standards, appearance of ships, ceremonial and discipline is placed in abeyance. The rules temporarily put in place in war are, like the men who are governed by them, serving for "hostilities only". Nothing is permanent in war. Although war changes things, it is difficult to perceive the lessons immediately that will apply in the peace that follows. The prewar professionals and "hostilities only" reservists will have different perceptions of what these lessons are, owing to differing outlooks and experiences. Nor will there be a common understanding of what has been accomplished. This is most evident in victorious professionals who have gained a strong sense of confidence that their prewar standards contributed to, and were confirmed by victory. When peace is restored, the natural reaction for the prewar professionals is to attempt to turn back the clock to re-establish the traditions and routines they believed in and had been taught as the standard. The lessons of war emerge later over time through experiencing the consequences of unperceived change. The period of instability that immediately followed cessation of hostilities provided a fertile environment for the lessons to emerge that would govern the postwar Royal Canadian Navy.

The White Paper entitled *Canada's Defence 1947* stated that the priority of defence activities during the period 1945-1947 was concerned with demobilization in all its aspects - personnel, wartime estimates, surplus stores and equipment.¹ Demobilization was carried out under the overall direction of Douglas C. Abbott, Minister of National Defence, who was responsible for both the navy and army.² Colonel Raymont observed that, "He[Abbott] had no particular interest in post-war reorganization of the Department of National Defence or for planning for post-war defence policy."³ In the mind of Prime Minister Mackenzie King, the operative word with regard to defence was "economy".⁴ Future commitments were uncertain, as were the effects of nuclear weaponry on defence requirements. King anticipated a postwar depression and was concerned that the numbers of the service personnel be kept small. His rationale was that in the event of a depression, "[W]e could enlarge the services by transfer of men to these opportunities of public work."⁵ Defence policy was set adrift, identified merely as a potential for public works and the navy, with its sister services, entered the "doldrums".

The transition from war to peace was not easy for the RCN. The immediate objectives of the government's carefully developed demobilization plan were to dismantle the wartime establishment and return the "hostilities only" servicemen and women to civilian life as rapidly as possible.⁶ According to Abbott, there was an "orderly demobilization of Naval Personnel" but the numbers suggest a different story.⁷ Within a year April 1945, the number of naval personnel which stood at 92,529 was reduced by 76,905. This was a reduction of over 83 percent. Some 15,234 personnel remained on active strength in mid-1946 to complete the work of disposing of surplus ships and shore installations. The majority of these were "hostilities only" personnel who would return to civil life when the task of demobilization was completed. Their numbers were dropping daily. The RCN had to struggle to maintain essential services

with what was termed an "Interim Force" until a permanent peacetime force could be established.

The run down in size of the naval fleet was no less dramatic or difficult. "Ships of War" in commission on 1 April 1945 numbered 404.⁸ This was numerically the third largest fleet of the allied navies. Planning for the peacetime navy began in 1943 and matured as the war in Europe wound down. Between the Quebec Conference in August 1943, and V-J Day, the RCN had acquired, or would soon acquire, a total of sixteen different ship types. These included two cruisers and one light fleet aircraft carrier under construction and loaned by the RN. The multi-type ship inventory offered a significant challenge in manning, maintenance and supply. In 1945, attention was solidly focused on assembling the RCN's contribution to the allied naval effort for the final assault against the Japanese homeland. Japan's sudden surrender presented a significant disposal challenge. Choices had to be made. Tucker noted that the temptation of the Naval Staff to retain newly acquired ships for the peacetime fleet was tempered by experience of the heavy cost of maintenance of various types of ships.⁹ The navy, however, was intent on retaining "big ship" status.

The plan for the postwar navy embodied in "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy" remained ambitious. In June 1945, the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), Vice-Admiral G. C. Jones, proposed to the three ministers and the Chiefs of Staff Committee that, "The post-war navy be organized as a task force [around the light fleet carriers] rather than an escort force as present."¹⁰ This task force would comprise two aircraft carriers, four cruisers and two flotillas of destroyers, and possibly some naval air service elements and other types of ships that could be quickly manned in the event of war.¹¹ The personnel requirements would include 10,000 afloat and a further 10,000 ashore. Jones concluded that the plans were in the preliminary stages and had not been discussed with his minister. The navy's plan foundered at the level of

the Post-Hostilities Problems Committee¹² (PHP) where all three services met strong opposition from External Affairs, unsure of the direction of Canada's postwar foreign policy. Agreement on planning force levels became virtually impossible.¹³

The responsibility of developing the postwar navy reverted to the Naval Staff and it became apparent by mid-1945, that it would be difficult to obtain approval from the government for both the funding and manpower level desired. This situation would be exacerbated by a projected acute shortage of trained personnel as the "hostilities only" RCNR and RCNVR members were demobilized.¹⁴ When reality struck, the Naval Staff's plans for the two carrier task force and 20,000 personnel navy were placed in abeyance. To keep even a few ships manned, the navy had to enroll a two-year "Interim Force" of wartime volunteers to serve with the relatively small number of remaining regular force personnel until new recruits could be trained. On 28 September 1945, the Cabinet authorized planning for an Interim Force of 10,000 permanent and 18,000 reserve personnel.¹⁵ It is apparent that the ceiling was arbitrarily based on economic and political factors rather than any strategic assessment.¹⁶ It is also evident that the government was reasserting firm control over the armed forces' spending. This control had diminished significantly during the war. Vice-Admiral Nelles had prudently predicted in 1943, that the government would not approve a postwar naval establishment of more than 15,000 men.¹⁷ His political understanding of, and experience with the peacetime political environment were now lost to the navy.

The Naval Staff revised their plan and the composition of the reduced fleet. It was planned to maintain a Light Fleet Carrier, a cruiser and eight destroyers in commission with full peacetime complements. A second cruiser, a destroyer, two frigates and three coastal escorts would be employed on training duties with special complements. The second carrier, four destroyers, sixteen frigates and twelve minesweepers would be maintained in reserve. Two

fighter, two torpedo-bomber (TBR) and one fighter reconnaissance (FRU) squadrons would be operated.¹⁸ These numbers looked impressive on paper. However, by March 1946, the navy had decommissioned 346 ships.¹⁹ Of those remaining all except HMCS *Warrior*, the Light Fleet Carrier building in Belfast, were non-operational and manned alongside in dockyard for "care and maintenance"²⁰ only. In essence, the RCN temporarily ceased to function as an operationally capable fleet. The bold plan enunciated in "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy" grounded on the hard reality of the immediate postwar climate where neither strategic requirements nor alliance commitments existed to justify a substantial navy.

The Naval Staff came to realize that until these developed, "the size of the Interim Force would thus be dictated by expediency."²¹ Captain Rayner, Director of Plans (DNP), concluded that with a fixed complement of 10,000 the navy had no flexibility and could not participate in any interdepartmental endeavours such as oceanography or Arctic experiments. He advised CNS that, "personnel should be employed almost exclusively on purely Naval problems."²² As Shawn Cafferky observed, "the navy had yet to discover that it would have to fight a constant rearguard action to ensure the continued existence of the fleet, particularly the naval air component, during the first two years of the postwar period."²³ The experience of the Canadian Naval Service after World War I was about to be repeated by the RCN.

It became the responsibility of Naval Service Headquarters to build what would be de facto a new navy. Naval headquarters was lodged in a hastily constructed, gray and unattractive building that was located on Cartier Square in Ottawa.²⁴ The headquarters was itself in a turmoil caused by demobilization and the loss of volunteer reservists who had built and manned the wartime Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) organization. The naval hierarchy very much resented the intractable demobilization process over which it had no control that was pulling its organization apart.²⁵ Whole sections disappeared in a day without warning. The circumstances

resulted in a rather resigned and casual approach to the day-to-day business on the part of naval staff officers. When Lieutenant Collins, newly transferred from the RCNVR to the RCN, arrived at Naval Service Headquarters in the fall of 1945, he noted a prevailing casual "clubby" atmosphere.²⁶ "Buster", the bulldog belonging to the Director of Signals, Commander Sam Worth, had the run of the place and tea was served on a regular schedule by the female secretaries. Moreover, former reservists and newcomers to NSHQ sensed the prewar RCN "old guard" was "turning back the clock" to re-establish the status quo ante bellum.²⁷

Naval Service Headquarters, referred to as "NSHQ", was the administrative heart of the navy. Its basic organizational structure as it had evolved during the war remained largely intact through demobilization although many activities and functions were combined as it contracted.²⁸ The naval personnel and civilians on the staff were organized into separate branches, each with a branch chief, for developing policy pertaining to plans and operations, weapons and training, personnel, equipment and supply, engineering and construction, and the naval reserves. The Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) was in effect the administrative commander-in-chief and the whole of the staff at Naval Service Headquarters was a functionally organized extension of his authority. He was assisted by an Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (ACNS), a Commodore, who also directed the Naval Staff²⁹, the formal collective name of the group of seaman branch officers responsible for plans and operations of the navy. The ACNS position was re-established as the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff (VCNS) in September 1947 as a rear-admiral's position. There were also a Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP), a Chief of Naval Equipment and Supply (CNES), a Chief of Naval Engineering and Construction (CNEC) and Chief of Naval Administrative Services (CNAS).

These officers with CNS and ACNS constituted the uniformed membership of the Naval Board. In February 1942, the Naval Board had been created to advise the Minister of

National Defence for the Naval Services "on all matters relating exclusively to the Naval Service."³⁰ The Naval Board originally constituted five uniformed officers, all flag officers, and the Deputy Minister (DM) of National Defence for Naval Services as the Financial and Civil Member.³¹ The Naval Board was chaired by the Minister, Angus L. Macdonald. The responsibility for coordinating and supporting the work of Naval Service Headquarters, including the Naval Board, devolved on the Secretary of the Naval Board and his secretariat.

Naval Service Headquarters was not responsible for directing day-to-day operations of the fleet but for providing operational commanders on the east and west coasts with overall policy direction and necessary resources. Canadian naval operations on the east coast in the Canadian North-west Atlantic Command³² were directed by the Commander-in-Chief, Canadian North-West Atlantic (CinC CNA). The position was established in March 1943, and within the alliance structure CinC CNA was responsible to the Commander in Chief, US Fleet (COMINCH) for coordinating the operations of allied escort forces in the Atlantic ocean area North of 40°N and West of 47°W. The appointment of CinC CNA was terminated on 6 September 1945, and the previous designation of Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (COAC) was resumed for the senior Canadian naval authority on the east coast³³. The Commanding Officer Pacific Coast (COPC) exercised command of Canadian naval forces in the Pacific Coastal Zone. His headquarters was originally in Esquimalt but he shifted his flag to Vancouver in November 1942, when a joint headquarters was established at Jericho Beach.³⁴ Commanding Officer Pacific Coast returned to Esquimalt in September 1945.

Extraordinary powers rested in the office of the Chief of the Naval Staff. The uniformed head of the Canadian Naval Service had been called the Chief of the Naval Staff since 1928. When the Naval Service Act was revised in 1944, the title Chief of the Naval Staff legislatively replaced the former title, Director of the Naval Service.³⁵ In the postwar period, the

span of control and the extent of responsibility of the Chief of the Naval Staff expanded. He became the Chairman of the Naval Board in practice by 1946. This was formalized through legislation in 1950, when amendments to the National Defence Act charged the incumbent "with control and administration of the Royal Canadian Navy" and required him "to give effect to the decisions and carry out the direction of the Government of Canada or the Minister."³⁶ Colonel Raymont observed, "while in some other democratic countries this was a mere well understood convention, in Canada this was a statutory direction that the decisions of the Government 'shall be issued by or through the Chief of the Naval Staff.'"³⁷ CNS was also a member of the Defence Research Board.

The Chief of the Naval Staff was a powerful figure who virtually ruled the navy through his vast administrative powers. He was invariably a seaman officer of the Executive Branch. The incumbent compelled loyalty because he was ultimately responsible for all officer appointments and promotions. While accountable to the minister, oversight was indirect unless the minister deliberately chose to intervene. The Chief of the Naval Staff directed all the policies and activities of NSHQ as well as the navy through the members of the Naval Board and the Naval Secretary. Although NSHQ was not a command authority, the Chief of the Naval Staff administered the Commanders of Commands who had operational control of the navy for purposes of national defence and fulfillment of international alliance obligations. During the period 1945 to 1964, there were six Chiefs of the Naval Staff.³⁸ and each brought his own ideas, style and philosophy to the office. Their personalities had a pervasive influence of headquarters staff especially on decisions of the Naval Board. As a former Naval Secretary recalled the procedure was that he would take minutes at the meetings of the Naval Board and, "the CNS would vet the draft and decide what would stand with regard to decisions."³⁹

Vice-Admiral George Clarence Jones, CB, was the Chief of the Naval Staff at the inauguration of the period of the Interim Force. Born in Halifax in 1895, he joined the fledgling Canadian Naval Service in 1911, a year after its founding. He was in the first term of cadets to attend the Royal Naval College of Canada (RNCC), graduating in 1913.⁴⁰ Described as an "always bright and sometimes brilliant" cadet, he was placed to do well in the new service and rose steadily.⁴¹ His career stream followed what would become the model for the pre-World War II RCN cohort, alternating between training and ship appointments with the Royal Navy and appointments ashore and afloat in Canada. He was thought to be "unusual" and was known for both his abrupt manner and perpetually red face.⁴² "G.C. Jones", as he was referred to by other officers, gained the reputation of a no-nonsense professional who was stingy with his praise as a Commanding Officer but was respected as a "man's man."⁴³ In 1932, he married Miss Helen "Tillie" Johnson, Daughter of the Honourable J.W.F. Johnson of Vancouver.⁴⁴

Jones, as Captain "D"⁴⁵, was in command of the Canadian destroyer flotilla based in Halifax at the beginning of the war. It was then he became known by the undeserved approbation of "Jetty Jones" that followed him thereafter.⁴⁶ Jones was given increasing responsibility with the wartime expansion and was promoted twice in two years to become the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast as a Rear-Admiral in 1941. In 1942, he was appointed as the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff under Nelles. Jones suffered a heart attack in March of 1942, a fact known only to his naval secretary, Lieutenant Bill Sclater. He swore Sclater to secrecy so that he could finish the war in harness.⁴⁷ Jones achieved both that wish and the career prize he sought. He replaced Nelles as CNS in 1944, in what some observers saw as a palace coup.⁴⁸ But Jones knew that his days were numbered.⁴⁹

During his tenure as CNS, Jones continued the work begun by Nelles to acquire the ships for a substantial postwar navy. The ambitious plan proved to be politically unrealistic. Consequently, the Interim Force level was set at 10,000 personnel, half of that proposed, and the fleet size had to be

reduced. This, however, was not Jones' main preoccupation as CNS as the war wound down. Two events in Halifax caused the navy considerable resentment, the VE-Day riots and an explosion at the Bedford Magazine in July 1945.⁵⁰ The resulting political fallout thrust Jones into a damage control role. In the first instance, Jones personally relieved Rear-Admiral Murray as CinC CNA on 12 May 1945, while investigations into the cause of the riots took place. After the Kellock Commission blamed Murray and the navy for not taking appropriate preventative measures, Murray resigned. As a result, Jones concurrently wore the two "hats" of CinC CNA and CNS until 7 September, 1945.⁵¹

Vice-Admiral Jones shuttled between Ottawa and Halifax to deal personally with the politically sensitive issue of compensation for riot damage. Under the additional pressures of a federal election and being a native Haligonian with close ties in the city, he worked hard to restore relations between the navy and city fathers that had been badly strained during the war.⁵² He was particularly concerned that there should not be a repeat disturbance on VJ-Day, to celebrate the defeat of Japan, and put a trusted officer, Captain Ken Adams, in command of the HMCS *Stadacona* naval barracks.⁵³ Continuing distractions disrupted the normal work of his office as the absence of any Naval Board Minutes between 27 June 1945 and 22 February 1946 indicate. The Naval Staff and Deputy Minister's Advisory Committee (see below) continued to function while the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (ACNS), Commodore Harry DeWolf, supervised the day-to-day operations of the headquarters. That was Jones' normal style, DeWolf recalls Jones "as a great delegator[sic] of authority and he would rely on you to do the job and get it right. His mind was way up there [in high politics], not on the day-to-day problems of the navy."⁵⁴

When Lieutenant Collins took up his appointment as the Chief of the Naval Staff's secretary on 6 January 1946, he found G.C. Jones unusually edgy. Collins had not sought the job and had lobbied to go to the staff in London, England. As a consolation, he managed to have himself appointed as Jones' secretary in the rank of Acting-Lieutenant-Commander. Jones took umbrage with

the audacity of this clever ploy and tore a strip off Collins for half-an-hour during their first meeting.⁵⁵ Jones apologized the next day stating, "Don't pay any attention to me I need to let off steam once in a while...."⁵⁶ Collins recalled, "I found him quite austere but he was hellishly preoccupied in those days. He was down in Halifax half of the month because of the aftermath of VE-Day that was still spilling around and that had never settled. So he died."⁵⁷

G.C. Jones died of heart failure in his bath on the 8th of February 1946.⁵⁸ The other members of the Naval Board wanted no part in clearing out Jones' desk. Collins believed it was for fear of unearthing skeletons, "they were all of the age."⁵⁹ The Jones-Murray competition had created terrible factions and, with Murray gone, it was better to have Jones' secrets die with him. Collins was directed to clear out all private papers and correspondence and not let any of it see the light of day, which he did. As a result, Jones remains to history as he was to the Naval Staff and his ACNS, Commodore DeWolf, "remote".⁶⁰ The exception is the glowing tribute to Jones written by William Sclater in the forward to *Haida*.⁶¹ Jones' long absences from Ottawa merely contributed to the drift of the RCN in the postwar doldrums. He had inherited the plan for the postwar navy as Nelles had created it. As for Jones' legacy, DeWolf observed, "I don't remember that he had any firm picture where the navy was going."⁶²

The navy might not have been going anywhere during those unsettled times but change and uncertainty were being recognized as overriding factors influencing the planning process. It became abundantly clear to Captain Rayner, Director of Plans, that there was a severe manning crisis and 10,000 personnel were not available to implement the proposed structure of the navy and fleet plan.⁶³ The manning situation was exacerbated by a poor response to the navy's efforts to have "hostilities only" men sign on for an additional two-years engagement. This would necessitate holding some personnel who enlisted under this category beyond their contracted engagements. The Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast predicted that, "manning will be a problem until the spring of 1947."⁶⁴ The

manpower shortages and the uncertainty of government policy caused Rayner to question the feasibility of ever obtaining a second carrier after HMCS *Warrior* was commissioned in Belfast. Commodore DeWolf believed that the second carrier must be manned, "whatever the delay", to maintain the integrity of the postwar plan.⁶⁵

Rayner recognized that priority must be given to manning ships and establishments on a care and maintenance basis and to bringing complements of shore training establishments up to strength in order to carry on essential training. The next priority must be given to bringing *Warrior* and two "Crescent Destroyers" to Canada and this would have to be considered a demobilization commitment using personnel due for release. To achieve this plan would entail placing all other ships in reserve except two fleet destroyers for training. Vice-Admiral Jones approved this plan and informed the Minister in October 1945, how the navy was proceeding.⁶⁶ Rayner continued toiling with the manning problem presented by the 10,000 personnel ceiling and concluded that the second carrier, *Magnificent*, also under construction in Belfast, could be manned only if the navy received an additional 1,500 personnel. DeWolf told Rayner, "11,500 is OUT. Try again - with the limit of 10,000. The Minister might be prepared to consider an extra 500 - but a strong argument will be necessary."⁶⁷ DeWolf's idea was to base the argument for extra complement on the necessity of having equal forces on each coast. In the meantime he told Rayner to plan to reduce *Warrior* to care and maintenance in order to man *Magnificent* with the hope of replacing *Warrior* in 1947.⁶⁸

It is apparent from the outset that the Naval Staff was fixed on achieving the balanced fleet navy with a carrier task group on either coast. The consequence of this big-ship fixation was that carrier requirements began to drive RCN postwar policy at the outset. There was at the same time a personnel deficit. Therefore, from the beginning, the challenge for the postwar RCN was in providing sufficient personnel to man ships and establishments that it had in hand, let alone those it planned to acquire. This was similar to the problem the navy faced early in the war when ships were constructed

faster than personnel could be recruited and trained to man them effectively. The navy's mistake then was to assign ships to escort duty that were not operationally efficient.⁶⁹

A collateral casualty of the manning deficit was the programme to establish the naval reserves. A reserve force of 18,000 personnel had been authorized. The allocation to Naval Divisions, located in cities across Canada, was set at 12,800 personnel and 3,000 for the reserve air component, leaving 2,200 for new reserve divisions.⁷⁰ The Director of Naval Reserves (DNR) set the RCN complement needed to train and administer the reserves at 37 officers and 250 men. Even this small number could not be spared from the 10,000 personnel allocated for the interim force without prejudicing manning of ships and establishments. But it was believed that in the long term approximately 5 percent of the RCN complement would have to be allocated to reserve training and administration, "if the reserve was to be relied upon as an efficient organization."⁷¹ It was decided to monitor the situation and impose restrictions on reserve recruiting as necessary. Initially, in April 1946, NSHQ authorized 3,000 reserves to be recruited. However, the reserves were informed that they had to depend on their own qualified personnel to carry out unit and summer training aboard ship.⁷²

Developing the complementing process for the peacetime RCN became a major priority. Experience in this area was almost non-existent. Nominally, complement is determined by the manning requirements of a single ship which is the basic unit. Manning refers to the numbers of officers and men of various ranks and branches (trades) required to maintain, propel and fight a ship. Complements vary from ship to ship, there being obvious differences between aircraft carriers and destroyers. There may also be differences between destroyer types. The complement models for the RCN were provided by the Royal Navy (RN) which designed the ships in the Canadian navy's inventory. Additions of, or alterations to weapons or detection systems of a ship may change the complement. The RN model was based on 100 percent manning of all weapons and detection

systems and propulsion requirements at Action Stations in wartime. Peacetime manning was nominally 80 percent of the wartime complement. This could be further modified for peacetime training requirements. Shore establishments have no set model for complement and vary depending on the support services provided such as maintenance, training, victualling and accommodations.

Determining the commitment, that is deciding the activities that the RCN would conduct annually and the ships required for these, was a planning function. It was the responsibility of the Director of Plans on the Naval Staff to decide which ships would be manned or "commissioned". The Director of Warfare and Training (DWT), also on the Naval Staff, would decide the level of manning of each ship based on the RN model or a variant based on modifications or requirements for training. It was the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (DCNP) in the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) Branch to determine the total complement or numbers of officers and men and their ranks and branches that would be required to fill designated positions in ships and shore establishments. The Chief of Naval Personnel was effectively the personnel manager for the navy providing the manpower resources and also responsible for conducting "substantive" and "non-substantive" training. The navy referred to leadership or administrative training as substantive. Non-substantive training was branch specialization for officers and trade for men. There was obviously a split responsibility resulting in a conflict of purpose between the Naval Staff under ACNS (VCNS) who used the gross manning ceiling figure to determine the ships that the navy could commission and CNP whose staff worked out the complement required against resources actually available. The Naval Staff worked with either the numbers they created, such as the 20,000 personnel in "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy", or authorized by Cabinet, such as the 10,000 personnel for the Interim Force. The Chief of Naval Personnel staff made detailed calculations based on the models for ships and requirements submitted by shore establishments once annual commitments were forecast by the Naval Staff.

Complementing is both an art and a science requiring an exactness and experience that had not been acquired by the RCN during World War II. The RCN had established a depot system based on the RN model to provide a pool and coordination centre for personnel resources on each coast.⁷³ Halifax had the largest depot. The experience acquired was mainly with small ships and the navy was blessed with an abundance of personnel later in the war to man the escort carriers and cruisers. Personnel ceilings and economy were not a factor. There is no evidence to suggest that there was any serious analysis and probably estimated gross complement figures for ships were used to arrive at the number of 20,000 personnel required for the projected fleet and shore establishments in "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy."⁷⁴ It was in all likelihood an intelligent estimate based on the experience, and, undoubtedly, the aspirations residing in NSHQ at the time.

The establishment of the Deputy Minister's Advisory Committee in 1944 was the first step taken by the government to bring some discipline and oversight to the estimates process pertaining to personnel as well as to ship construction, matériel acquisition and building shore facilities.⁷⁵ In response, the Naval Board established the Complement Committee in April 1945, to develop policy with respect to increases or alterations in complements of ships and shore establishments. Proposals were developed by the Complement Committee for consideration by the Naval Board before being submitted to the Deputy Minister.⁷⁶ To give some indication of the importance attached to its work, the CNS originally chaired the Complement Committee.

The Complement Committee was reconstituted under the chair of the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel in January 1946. For a short time, the Director of Seaman Personnel (DSP) had the impossible task of trying to coordinate all branch requirements for the navy on his own.⁷⁷ The terms of reference of the committee were amended to make it responsible for establishing both naval and civilian complements, afloat and ashore, as well as reviewing existing complements.⁷⁸ The work of this committee was time consuming and it had to deal with the pressing problem of naval personnel

first. The complements of shore establishments for the two coasts were recommended by the respective Flag Officers and NSHQ by the Naval Secretary. The complements then had to be verified and negotiated during visits by the Complement Committee. Determining and recommending ship's complements was the responsibility of Director of Warfare and Training (DWT) of the Naval Staff. The complementing process was to be conducted annually, based on the commitments authorized for a particular ship or establishment.⁷⁹ The sum total of all the ships' and shore establishments' complements plus non-effectives formed the complement of the navy.

Not recognized at the time was a serious organizational flaw built into the system that rendered it unworkable. The responsibilities for establishing commitments and complement were split between the Naval Staff (ACNS) and the Personnel Branch (CNP) respectively. The inability to reconcile complement against commitments owing to the fluidity of the naval estimates as well as staff coordination problems merely exacerbated an already difficult personnel management situation with which the RCN had no previous experience. The problem was identified and efficiency improved after VCNS assumed responsibility for both commitments planning and complements but this was not until 1951. It was under circumstances of trial and error that the postwar naval staff system evolved.

The Complement Committee was reconstituted with a completely new staff. Gone was the personnel management expertise of "hostilities only" RCNVR officers who were the heart of the RCN personnel system and were its corporate memory. However, an effort was underway to re-hire some of them as civil servants to provide both badly needed management skills and continuity. The new chairman of the Complement Committee, Acting-Captain J. C. "Jimmy" Hibbard, was typical of many officers then being appointed to staff positions. His experience was almost entirely operational and he had an exceptional war record.⁸⁰ Hibbard had never served in NSHQ before and had no staff training but a high profile staff job in headquarters was necessary to obtain some administrative

experience in order to advance his career. Hibbard eventually served as the Chief of Naval Personnel from 1950 to 1952.

It is apparent that the Deputy Minister, Mr. G.W. Mills, thought the work of the Complement Committee important and threw the weight of office and experience behind it. Mills was insistent that civilian complements should be included in the Complement Committee's terms of reference. He was equally insistent that civilian complements, especially hourly paid workers, be kept within budget. The response from the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel was that if naval officers were expected to manage civilian complements they required appropriate advice.⁸¹ The Deputy Minister's proposal was accepted by the responsible senior officers with the proviso that a senior civil servant would be assigned to the committee to advise on civil complements.⁸² Mills appointed the Assistant Deputy Minister (Navy) as a member of the committee.

The work of the Complement Committee in particular was affected by the new government policy to rationalize the pay of the three services and to develop a pay structure and remuneration comparable to civilian employment.⁸³ The Complement Committee already had the problem of reconciling the postwar rate (rank)⁸⁴ and branch (trade) structure within the navy itself to achieve equality. Superimposed on this challenge was the new requirement to ensure that personnel in the three services carrying out similar functions were compensated equally. In early 1946, a three-service committee was struck to determine what trade qualification justified a particular trade grouping upon which compensation would be based.⁸⁵ The term "tri-service" had not yet made its way into the lexicon but is apparent the government was moving towards integration before the appointment of a single Minister of National Defence in December 1946. In due course, the naval personnel structure would undergo significant changes in order to comply with the thrust towards integration.

The Complement Committee made relatively good progress in a climate of uncertainty. The process however was laborious and very labour intensive. A Working Sub-Committee (Naval) was

established under Commander F.A. Woolcombe, Director of Manning (DManning), to process the submissions of proposed complements against commitments for every ship and shore establishment.⁸⁶ It proved particularly difficult to establish the complement for NSHQ because its peacetime structure was still evolving. The progress of the committee was closely observed by both the ACNS, Commodore DeWolf, and the Deputy Minister. The Deputy Minister believed that the committee was filling a definite need and "acting as a safeguard against overmanning."⁸⁷ This was borne out because almost immediately the Complement Committee determined that the proposed complement of ratings was in fact 458 over the allocation of 8,800. Of the 10,000 authorized 1,200 were officers.⁸⁸ Mills had warned that the estimates for 1946-1947 that established the 10,000 ceiling were very uncertain and could not be exceeded under any circumstances when known.⁸⁹ He was also keen to empower the committee with the final decision on naval and civilian complements with CNS and himself concurring as the final authorities. The working definition of the function of the committee was to "ensure that the necessary authorized complements are formulated for ships and establishments to enable them to operate effectively."⁹⁰ This meant to decide full complements although government policy and funding may not permit full manning. To this end, Hibbard decided that his mandate was to address the personnel requirements for the "continuing navy" and not the temporary interim force. DeWolf agreed that this was necessary "to avoid confusion" as only 10,000 personnel were authorized for the interim force.⁹¹

The greatest challenge facing the RCN was to expand to fill the authorized peacetime complement at the same time that demobilization was shrinking the navy at a rapid rate. There were approximately 3,800 RCN permanent force personnel at the cessation of hostilities.⁹² Further, a portion of these, including 55 officers, had had their careers extended to the end of the war and were retired with demobilization. Significantly, this reduced the total of prewar RCN officers on strength in 1939 from 150 to 95.⁹³ A modest number of officers and virtually no ratings had

been recruited into the permanent force during hostilities. To fill the interim force complement of 10,000, an expansion of nearly 200 percent had to be accomplished and this requirement was immediate to meet urgent fixed commitments such as manning HMCS *Warrior*. As mentioned, a temporary expedient was to hold over "hostilities only" personnel, including members of the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service (WRCNS) that was to disband.⁹⁴ This measure enabled *Warrior* to be commissioned, and the care and maintenance of ships and establishments and other essential day-to-day activities to be carried out. The long term objective to meet manning requirements was to obtain suitable RCNVR and RCNR personnel through transfers to the permanent force and to recruit "new entries" from civilian life.

Ostensibly, the objective of demobilization was, "to reduce the strength of the navy without any loss of overall efficiency".⁹⁵ With respect to the "continuing navy", the official historian observed, "It was planned to raise the general peace-time standard of officer and man by careful weeding."⁹⁶ This meant retaining sufficient high quality volunteers of the appropriate rank and branch to meet balanced requirements and discharging the rest. Success was dependent on the right sort of men volunteering but the navy could only hope that this would happen. Upon reflection Vice-Admiral DeWolf said he mentally divided the "wartime only personnel" into three categories. The first were first class people who wanted to go back to their peacetime businesses and the navy could not keep them. The second were first class people who liked the navy and wanted to stay on and the navy was glad to have them. And, "The third lot were people who never had it better and weren't worth a damn but would still like to stay on."⁹⁷ DeWolf inferred that there were too few of the first category and too many of the third that wanted to transfer to the permanent RCN. The most unsuitable personnel could be weeded out based on conduct and service records but it was relatively easy for mediocre personnel to transfer. The navy set up boards of permanent force personnel to screen all volunteers but the process was subject to extreme pressure to meet urgent manning requirements.⁹⁸

The reason many reservists did not volunteer to transfer was the absence of clear employment opportunities owing to the uncertainty of the navy's future. For example, the 200 degree-holding RCNVR technical officers, like Acting-Lieutenant-Commander Bob Battles, who had gained invaluable experience with the RN radar programme, could see no good prospects for a career in the RCN at the end of the war and returned to civilian life.⁹⁹ Further, doctors and nurses were not volunteering because the policy on naval hospitals had not been decided.¹⁰⁰ There was also a reluctance for the more senior reserve officers like Commander Jeffry Brock to transfer because the opportunities for promotion seemed poor with so many prewar RCN officers ahead of him in the system. Brock believed that the war had allowed mediocrity to prosper and the promotion stream was clogged with "deadwood - good for Sunday Divisions but not much else."¹⁰¹ The particular problem of removing these impediments was addressed by Captain John Earl, a reservist who became Chief Staff Officer Reserves and a Member of the Naval Board and subsequently Chief of Naval Personnel. Earl was a Liberal politician before the war and his appointment as CNP is significant. Brock believed that the "old brigade" resented Earl, a reservist, being given this key position. It was obviously a political appointment made to have someone from outside the system clear out "the deadbeats".¹⁰² Some reservist volunteers like Commander Tony Storrs, RCNR, initially sensed resentment by "the old guard navy" on having to accept large numbers of "Ex-reservists" to fill the ranks.¹⁰³ Both Brock and Storrs were persuaded that there were opportunities for a reasonable career for reservists in the permanent peacetime navy and they were transferred in their wartime ranks and confirmed. The advancement of their careers became the indicators of what reservists who transferred and performed well might expect.¹⁰⁴ Lieutenant-Commander Battles re-entered the RCN after the Electrical Branch was established in September 1945.¹⁰⁵

The results of the initial request for volunteers to transfer to the permanent force or serve in the interim force fell far short of requirements. The Chief of Naval Personnel was inundated with

reports from establishments that services must be cut or discontinued owing to personnel shortages. There were particularly strong complaints that officers' messes were short of stewards giving some indications where priorities were. Numbers were not only short but there existed "glaring deficiencies" in skilled tradesmen such as Radio Artificers to man Radio and Loran stations. These shortages of trained technician were impeding the navy's capability to provide essential services.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, there was also a gross imbalance in the non-commissioned rank structure and the senior rates, Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers, were compelled to carry out the menial tasks of junior men.

An urgent plea was sent through a navy-wide message in an attempt to attract more volunteers to serve in the interim force, as well as to explain that, "during this period of unusual conditions many adjustments will have to be made."¹⁰⁷ The senior rates, most of whom were prewar RCN personnel, were encouraged to meet the challenges of the current transition period as they had the early days of the war, "in an even more successful manner."¹⁰⁸ The incentive provided were promises of the re-establishment of home port divisions,¹⁰⁹ confirmation of temporary higher ratings (ranks) and a new pay system based on parity with civilian industry. The senior rates were also assured that junior rates were in the training system and would soon be available for draft, "to fill the gap." The important contribution of volunteers from the WRCNS during the demobilization effort was given special mention as that branch was scheduled to disappear on 1 August 1946.

All ratings recruited into the RCN underwent common new entry training and providing proper facilities and experienced personnel for this basic training proved to be a challenge. Training establishments were given manning priority followed by ships assigned training duties.¹¹⁰ The Naval Staff had decided that HMCS *Cornwallis*, the wartime new entry training establishment located at Digby, Nova Scotia, would be closed and this training be relocated on the west coast at HMCS *Naden* in Esquimalt.¹¹¹ Coincidentally, the decision was reached to concentrate all advanced and

specialized training at HMCS *Stadacona* in Halifax.¹¹² Accommodation was hastily improvised in *Naden* and 350 recruits were transferred there from *Cornwallis* in the middle of their training over the Christmas period of 1945.¹¹³ In truth, *Naden* was not manned by sufficient officers and senior rates to supervise the recruits properly and to operate an effective divisional system for their welfare. The Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel believed the minimum was "50 officers and 75 chief petty officers and petty officers if a high standard is to be attained" for the anticipated 800 new entries and advised the Director of Weapons and Training of this.¹¹⁴ The Director of Weapons and Training, who was responsible for the determining the complement, responded that the officers and senior rates on the strength of *Naden* "would have to double up for divisional duties as in *Stadacona*", the other training establishment.¹¹⁵

The Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel was skeptical that this policy of dual responsibility would result in the best people being assigned to divisional duties. He suggested to CNP that a visit be made to *Naden* to confirm that the divisional personnel assigned were prepared to watch over the new entry trainees.¹¹⁶ His reason was, "My own experience has been that officers and others who endeavour to serve in dual appointments tend to play one off against the other to the disadvantage of the service."¹¹⁷ In fact, the more urgent problem was to train officers and senior rates at *Naden* in divisional duties. The divisional system formed the basis for the administration, advancement, care and morale of ratings in the RCN. Divisional and administrative training had ceased during the war and junior officers and senior rates were lacking in these skills.¹¹⁸ Acting-Lieutenant-Commander Patrick Budge began to conduct informal divisional training as Executive Officer at *Naden* in the face of morale problems that were developing.

The instability in the navy caused by demobilization and the difficulties of trying to establish the interim force was exacerbated by the sudden death of the Vice-Admiral G. C. Jones. Jones had been close to the centre of administration of the RCN as it went through its rapid wartime expansion

and his passing created a leadership vacuum and continuity was lost. There was no natural successor to Jones. The obvious candidate, Rear-Admiral Leonard Murray, had resigned after the report of the Kellock Commission criticized him severely for not taking precautions to prevent sailors rioting in Halifax on VE-Day.¹¹⁹ Rear-Admiral Victor Brodeur, COPC, wanted the job but had unfortunatously taken himself out of the running when he submitted his resignation to the Minister, D. C. Abbott, just days before Jones' unanticipated demise.¹²⁰ Abbott refused to allow Brodeur to withdraw it.¹²¹ The appointment was given to Rear-Admiral Howard Emerson "Rastus" Reid, CB. Reid had never aspired to be CNS.¹²² Vice-Admiral Collins remarked that Reid had had some administrative appointments during the war but the role of CNS "wasn't something that his life had prepared him for, certainly he came into something he had no part in preparing."¹²³ Reid took the appointment determined to stay no longer than the end of the period of the interim force in September 1947.

"Rastus" Reid presented a stark contrast in style and personality to the enigmatic Jones.¹²⁴ As the youngest, he was called "the Benjamin" of the second term of cadets that graduated from RNCC in 1913.¹²⁵ He survived the sinking of HMS *Attack* during World War I where he served in RN destroyers.¹²⁶ Reid followed the normal pattern of alternating appointments between the RCN and RN during the interwar period. He was known as an "old China hand" having served twice on the China Station and there commanded the destroyer HMS *Sepoy* during his second tour. He also commanded the RCN destroyers *Patriot*, *Fraser* and *Skeena*.¹²⁷ While in command of the latter, he precipitated one of the prewar "incidents" through applying RN standards of discipline to non-compliant Canadian sailors (see Chapter 5).¹²⁸ Reid married Miss Edith Houston, daughter of a Vancouver businessman, in 1936. He was promoted to Captain at the beginning of World War II and appointed as the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast in Halifax. In increasingly important appointments, he was intimately involved with the wartime expansion of the RCN as COAC, VCNS and then Commodore Commanding the Newfoundland Escort Force (CCNF). As COAC, he had the

fractious confrontation, previously recounted, with Rear-Admiral Holland, the British admiral commanding the Third Battle Squadron. As a result of this Nelles noted that Reid was "anti-British" on his personal report.¹²⁹ This episode may be seen as the first indication that the RCN officer corps aspired to a national command structure independent from the RN. Reid was promoted Rear-Admiral in December 1943, and from then until his appointment as the Chief of the Naval Staff in January 1946, served as the Naval Member of the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington DC.

Vice-Admiral Reid's personal secretary described him as, "a real sailor's sailor, abrupt, intelligent, intelligently lazy, perhaps without, because he was no longer interested, really a vision of what lay ahead for the navy in terms of what we were building for the future."¹³⁰ Reid had had a long tiring war and was simply waiting out his time when the appointment of CNS thrust greatness upon him. His mind was more on hunting and fishing, his favourite pursuits, than the challenges of building the postwar navy in a time of uncertainty and financial restraint. He brought casualness to the office at a time when energy was needed and delegated "to the point of laziness."¹³¹ His presence and style reinforced the clubby atmosphere of Naval Service Headquarters. He applied a simple common sense approach to resolution of the important postwar decisions and avoided stressful situations. The Navy avoided controversy with External Affairs, experienced by the other two services, because Vice-Admiral Reid had served with Lester Pearson in Washington and they were able to solve contentious issues, such as those arising from purchases of aircraft from foreign sources, over a drink.¹³² Reid slept for an hour every afternoon, came into the office late, left early and never took a file home.¹³³ He spent a significant amount of time away from Ottawa visiting Naval Reserve divisions. As he enjoyed poker, liquor, hunting and fishing, these visitations allowed him to pursue all four in abundance. Canada was under liquor rationing at the time and his former secretary commented that, "[Vice-Admiral] Reid would spill more than the authorized ration on any day."¹³⁴

Fortunately for the navy, the "benign" Reid had strong personalities to whom he could delegate the business of rebuilding.¹³⁵ Harold Grant, newly promoted to Rear-Admiral, was appointed to Naval Service Headquarters as Chief of Administration Services (CNAS). This was essentially the appointment of Comptroller, ostensibly a technical position requiring a specialist background, but under the rubric of the time filled by an Executive Branch officer. Grant was Reid's natural successor by seniority and had earned a considerable reputation through his war service. He was a man of both vision and energy who was ready to shoulder the responsibility of leading the navy into the new era. Commodore Harry DeWolf, who would serve as CNS from 1956 to 1960, continued as Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff. Captain Horatio Nelson Lay had joined the Naval Staff as Director of Plans in December 1945. DeWolf and Lay were term mates and close friends who had made important contributions during the war as Directors of Plans and Operations, respectively, towards establishing the structure of the RCN and its separate identity within the alliance structure.¹³⁶

DeWolf attributes the vision of the "big-ship" navy to Lay and the ambition to achieve that goal particularly with respect to aircraft carriers and naval aviation.¹³⁷ Lay wrote the plan that led to creation of the Canadian Naval Air Service and commanded the first of two escort aircraft carriers, HMCS *Nabob*, manned partially by Canadians during the war.¹³⁸ In January 1945, he had negotiated the loan of the first light aircraft carrier, HMCS *Warrior* from the RN, around which the postwar navy would be structured. Lay returned to Ottawa in 1945, after attending the Army Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) in the United States. His experience in *Nabob* with American ship construction and aircraft¹³⁹ and staff training at ANSCOL resulted in a strong preference for American designed and manufactured weapons, ships, aircraft and material. He became a strong advocate of a closer affiliation with the United States Navy and North American sourcing for defence acquisitions.¹⁴⁰

Horatio Nelson Lay's own ideas and his ability to appropriate good ideas from others,¹⁴¹ had an important influence on the development of the role and missions of the postwar navy. He intuitively sensed a change in the strategic climate as the Cold War emerged. Initially, in late 1945, as the newly appointed Director of Plans and Intelligence and Trade (DNP&I)¹⁴², he supported Rayner's concept of acquiring fleet destroyers from the RN. The RN's new "Daring" Class destroyer had a general purpose capability, including "strong torpedo armament", to screen carrier forces.¹⁴³ Lay changed his mind as a result of discussions during 1946 within the new Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), a sub-committee of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD).¹⁴⁴ There the Americans advanced the argument that the Soviet Union was the emerging maritime threat through its submarine and long range bomber capability.¹⁴⁵

The deliberations of the Military Cooperation Committee resulted in the proposal of Recommendation 35 to both governments by the PJBD spelling out the need for joint American-Canadian defence efforts.¹⁴⁶ Approval of Recommendation 35 was deferred by Mackenzie King and the cabinet, as a threat to Canadian sovereignty was perceived through the recommendation of an automatic committal of forces.¹⁴⁷ The Canadians proposed amendments that resulted in a revised version in the PJBD's Recommendation 36 discussed below. While Lay was the junior Canadian officer at the Military Cooperation Committee and probably had little influence in the drafting of Recommendation 35, he was strongly committed to the spirit of the original version. Given his key role in building the post war RCN, his influence would be important in the reorientation towards the USN.

Lay's influence would be important in shaping not only the identity of the postwar RCN but also the personnel structure that evolved as a consequence of policy decisions on fleet structure. Lay was a progressive in pressing for North American standards in ship acquisition which had important personnel as well as material ramifications for American emphasis on habitability and crew comfort.

Lay was a pre-eminent staff officer in a service where officers with these skills were not numerous. He was responsible for reorganizing the Naval Board and Naval Staff on two occasions, first as DNP&I in 1946, and later as VCNS.¹⁴⁸ He was the first staunch advocate of staff training for all officers to equip them for positions at Naval Service Headquarters and in tri-service staff and training appointments.¹⁴⁹ Subsequently, as VCNS, he would formalize the requirement for staff training. Even as DNP&I, he became a critic of poor conditions of habitability in naval barracks and pressed for improvements in conditions on ships.

Known for strong opinions and an outspoken irritating manner, he often rubbed people, seniors and juniors alike, the wrong way.¹⁵⁰ His frank and outspoken criticism of Brooke Claxton's policy to make HMCS *Royal Roads* into a tri-service college, delivered face-to-face to the Minister, probably did more than anything else to colour Claxton's opinion of naval officers.¹⁵¹ The consequence of Lay's "honest opinion" was that Claxton refused to promote him to Rear-Admiral in spite of recommendations from two successive Chiefs of the Naval Staff.¹⁵² As a naval Captain he also, by his own admission, tactlessly confronted and embarrassed General Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and probably made an enemy of him.¹⁵³ This certainly did nothing to enhance his promotion opportunities. Interestingly, "Trader Lay" was considered to be a bit of a renegade by his contemporaries.¹⁵⁴ He did not speak with the English accent that Claxton suggested was a universal characteristic of RCN "top officers". And, in the opinion of some, Lay didn't even look like a naval officer.¹⁵⁵ While Horatio Nelson Lay may have had both his supporters and detractors, his influence on the postwar RCN cannot be disputed nor can his contribution to its folklore as a character.

The passing of Vice-Admiral Jones and appointment of Vice-Admiral Reid as CNS coincided with important organizational changes at Naval Service Headquarters and in the personnel structure. After a hiatus of eight months,¹⁵⁶ formal meetings of the Naval Board were reconvened on

22 February 1946¹⁵⁷ under the chairmanship of the Minister. In April 1946, Reid convened the first "Senior Officers' Meeting" which became an informal caucus meeting of senior RCN officers for addressing major issues facing the navy.¹⁵⁸ The Naval Secretariat, introduced during the war, was made permanent. It was composed of both naval officers and civilians under the direction of the Naval Secretary who was to be of Captain's rank.¹⁵⁹ Also, the Naval Information Organization was to be continued in peacetime "to familiarize the public with the national importance, growth, and activities of the R.C.N. in the post-war era."¹⁶⁰ In the Personnel Branch, work was underway to establish Ordnance, Electrical, Constructor Branches for officers and to combine the Torpedo and Anti-Submarine Branches into one, the T.A/S Branch. The Communications Branch was being established at the ratings (men's) level through an amalgamation of the radio and visual (light and semaphore) operators.¹⁶¹ On the tri-service level, studies were underway to reconcile the rank and trade structures for non-commissioned personnel and to develop a new integrated pay scheme.¹⁶²

The RCN was following the RN lead in many initiatives related to training, personnel and administration. It was intended to continue sending personnel to the United Kingdom for specialist courses.¹⁶³ Naval Service Headquarters received regular reports on changes in the RN structure and organization through the Canadian Naval Mission Overseas (CNMO) in London. Royal Navy influence remained strong as the Naval Board directed, for example, "that close liaison be maintained with the Admiralty concerning any uniform changes they may adopt."¹⁶⁴ Naval Service Headquarters and the fleet were advised directly by the RN on policy changes in Admiralty Fleet Orders on items such as uniform and leave, through receipt of Admiralty General Messages (AGMs). Because both culture and regulations demanded that naval personnel act in a certain way, this close RN connection was pervasive. G.C. Jones, however, demonstrated a political sensitivity to undue RN influence. On the issue of designing ship's badges for the RCN, he was "leery" of a Naval Staff recommendation to ask the Admiralty's Heraldic adviser to do this.¹⁶⁵ He wished to ensure that Canadian sources were

explored first. There were staff officers opposing the follow-the-RN-pattern, most particularly Commander Sam Worth, Director Signals Division, who had Vice-Admiral Reid's ear.¹⁶⁶ On Worth's initiative, automatic promulgation of AGM's to the RCN was curtailed and the Naval Secretary was required to vet these messages to determine their applicability to the RCN.¹⁶⁷

A wide range of personnel issues were high on the agenda of both the Naval Board and Senior Officers' Meeting as well as at the meetings of the Deputy Minister's Advisory Committee and Naval Staff. The immediate priority of the Naval Board was sorting out postwar naval uniforms, and, significantly the first decision that was to have far-reaching ramifications was to remove "Canada" badges worn on the shoulders of officers' and men's uniforms.¹⁶⁸ The attendees at the Senior Officers' Meeting were concerned that the instability caused by demobilization had reduced the "esprit de corps below par."¹⁶⁹ There was a great shortage of seagoing personnel and ships could not be manned. The Chief of the Naval Staff was particularly concerned about lodging personnel in old buildings and there was no funding for new construction. The Chief of Naval Personnel cited the need for a "Disciplinary Course of some sort" for Chief Petty Officers in *Naden*, "This would raise the standard in the service for the training of new entries."¹⁷⁰

On the west coast at Esquimalt, the situation in *Naden* with regard to "new entries" messing and accommodation was very poor. Most of the construction during the war had been on the east coast and *Naden* was ill-equipped to receive the flood of recruits after *Cornwallis* closed. The number was originally set at 800 but this was in addition to those already in *Naden* barracks.¹⁷¹ Lay presented a report to the Naval Staff in May 1946, stating that, "the galley facilities [at *Naden*] are entirely inadequate for the 1700 presently undergoing training."¹⁷² He observed that there was an urgent requirement to address deficiencies and enlarge facilities, "if the morale and physical well-being of recruits is to remain at a high standard."¹⁷³ The navy had to use the existing facilities and had no control over their age or condition but could have

controlled the overcrowding. This was a matter of determining a realistic commitment for the resources available. Moreover, the lack of a functioning divisional system through shortage of trained personnel suggests the training and indoctrination of "new entries" were probably inadequate.

The bright spot during 1946 was the commissioning of the Light Fleet Carrier, HMCS *Warrior*, in Belfast on 24 January 1946. The "Happy Warrior" as she was known presented the RCN with an enormous learning challenge, especially to her Commanding Officer, Captain Frank Houghton, whose experience had been in destroyers and "Prince" Class armed merchant cruisers.¹⁷⁴ She was the largest and most complex ship to that date to be commissioned into the RCN. Her full complement was 1,100 personnel with two air squadrons embarked consisting of forty aircraft.¹⁷⁵ However, the ship suited Canadian requirements to the extent that it had been designed to transit the Panama Canal and had "cafeteria style" messing arrangements for the crew.¹⁷⁶ She was unsuitable for year-round operations in the North Atlantic, as were the cruisers, *Ontario* and *Uganda*, and most of the British-built destroyers, because she had not been "arcticized." This necessitated planning deployments to the west coast for the winter months with a view to permanent stationing there once *Magnificent* commissioned.¹⁷⁷ Moreover, *Warrior* lacked many technical advances being built into *Magnificent*.

With the acquisition of *Warrior*, the Naval Staff and Chief of Naval Personnel staff were forced to grapple with the reality and expense of operating two carriers.¹⁷⁸ The immediate problem was two carriers could not be operated with the restricted complement of 10,000 personnel unless the two cruisers were paid off.¹⁷⁹ Even in that event, only one Air Station could be manned and two were required. The RCN approached the Admiralty with the proposal that the RN take *Warrior* into its reserve fleet until she could be modernized in Great Britain or replaced with another *Magnificent* class carrier.¹⁸⁰ The RN declined, citing manpower problems

of its own and stated no decision could be made on her replacement until its own requirements were known, probably in 1948. In September 1946, the Naval Staff decided the RCN must proceed with the acquisition of the more modern and "arcticized" *Magnificent* and place *Warrior* in reserve in Canada, but where or how was not known.¹⁸¹ An additional complication was that there would be four air squadrons in commission but one carrier could carry only two. The negotiations pertaining to the terms of the return of *Warrior* and acquisition of *Magnificent* were eventually raised to the diplomatic level.¹⁸² These were settled largely in the RCN's favour as the RN took back *Warrior* unconditionally and loaned *Magnificent*. This suggests the RCN's acquisition of the British built Firefly IV aircraft may have been a quid pro quo as the RN waived any costs associated with the return of the carrier and cancelled the loan agreement.

By mid-1946, the recruiting situation had worsened, throwing off all fleet manning predictions and the commissioning programme.¹⁸³ The major concern was that the manning policy in effect produced only training ships and no fighting units. The naval and personnel staffs agreed to place more emphasis in "new entry" training on non-substantive training in which branch (trade) skills were learned. The "new entry" training programme was amended to produce a fully trained man capable of shipboard duties in approximately one year.¹⁸⁴ Personnel resources were reassigned to progress non-substantive training including re-qualifying courses. Fleet manning priorities were amended to ensure that *Warrior*, *Ontario*, and *Uganda* (reduced training complement), and nine destroyers (one with reduced training complement) could be retained in commission.¹⁸⁵

Reid convened another meeting of senior officers in October 1946, where the replacement of *Warrior* was discussed at length and some interest was expressed in trying to obtain a carrier from the United States Navy. However it was decided to proceed with the acquisition of *Magnificent* from the Royal Navy.¹⁸⁶ The main topics were personnel issues and

improvements in conditions of service for the men. The members were content to follow the lead of the RN on many issues. However, the senior officers were against carrying out a general review of service conditions in the form recently conducted by the RN in which ratings had been fully represented. The opinion was that the RN review was not considered satisfactory for introduction in the RCN because, "If Commanding Officers and Executive Officers are carrying out their duties in a fashion desired, such reviews should not be necessary."¹⁸⁷ There was no objection to polls of the ratings being conducted if they knew their suggestions would not necessarily be accepted. It was agreed that routines should not vary from ship to ship and that the Senior Officer present should coordinate standardization of routines. Rear-Admiral Tony Storrs made the observation that during this period the RCN "old guard" caucus was in the habit of making decisions without the benefit of staff advice.¹⁸⁸ It is also apparent that the RCN senior officers' caucus thought that some of the personnel management procedures being introduced by the RN were too liberal for their taste.

By November 1946, frustration with the manning situation in the RCN moved the normally reticent Vice-Admiral Reid to resort to public utterance. In a speech on 6 November, that was widely reported in the press, Reid criticized the Government's policy of restricting the navy's complement to 10,000 personnel. Using information gained by Captain Lay at meetings of the Military Cooperation Committee, Reid stated, "The United States Navy plans a post-war personnel of 500,000 men. We have 10,000. Our population is one-twelfth that of the United States. You can figure out for yourself the arithmetic."¹⁸⁹ Reid received more bad news on the heels of his public outburst. Two days later, Captain Lay advised Commodore DeWolf that the Complement Committee had determined the approximate figures used for planning the fleet personnel structure were in error. An additional 820 men above the 10,000 allocated would be required.¹⁹⁰ Lay re-emphasized that the present complement allowed only one carrier to be in

commission therefore both coasts could not have "a small well balanced force."¹⁹¹ Moreover, there was no provision for Combined Operations training and, "If the RCN cannot provide this, training in the other two services will be seriously affected." Finally, there was no training destroyer on the west coast and one was essential. Lay stated that an increase of 2,000 personnel over the present strength was required to meet basic essential commitments.¹⁹²

DeWolf advised the CNS of the miscalculation suggesting, "I think we can man the fleet with 10,000 but a margin of 5%(500) would make for efficiency."¹⁹³ He urged Reid to approach the Minister with the adjusted figure of 12,000 which "is about the lowest figure we could recommend for a continuing service."¹⁹⁴ Reid did this but his public statement had incensed Prime Minister Mackenzie King. At a Cabinet meeting on 15 November, Mackenzie King directed the Minister of National Defence, D.C. Abbott, to reprimand the Chief of the Naval Staff.¹⁹⁵ This probably rendered minimal any chance of Reid's request for more complement receiving a sympathetic hearing in Cabinet.¹⁹⁶ In fact, the government had other plans that included a new Minister of National Defence, integration of service headquarters and cost reductions. Reid was advised instead that he should stand by for a reduction in the naval estimates for 1947.¹⁹⁷ Lay had just completed a revised proposal for fleet employment in 1947 including a new task organization based on a recent adoption of USN communications and associated tactical publications.¹⁹⁸ DeWolf sent this on to Reid with the comment reflecting the uncertainty of the navy's situation, "This is a forecast of what we hope to do. It now appears likely that we won't be able to do all of it."¹⁹⁹ Reid directed his staff to halt all planning until more was known about the estimates.²⁰⁰ Mackenzie King shuffled his Cabinet on 12 December 1946, and the navy was placed on hold awaiting instructions from the new Minister, Brooke Claxton.

NOTES - CHAPTER 2

1 White Paper - *Canada's Defence, 1947* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1947).

2 Colonel R.L. Raymont, "Evolution of the Structure of the Department of National Defence, 1945-1968," 1. Abbott took the navy portfolio on 12 April 1945 from A.L. McDonald, who resigned after falling out with Mackenzie King over the Ralston affair. Abbott took over the army portfolio on 21 August 1946, from McNaughton, who could not win a seat in order to stay in the government.

3 Ibid.

4 J.W. Pickerskill and D.F. Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 3, 1945-1946, 368.

5 Ibid.

6 C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), 62.

7 Department of National Defence, *Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1946* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), 15.

8 Ibid., 9.

9 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 485.

10 Extract of the Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Ministers of National Defence and the Chiefs of Staff held on 25 June 1945, NAC, RG 24 83-84/167, vol. 610, file 1818-13, vol. 3.

11 Ibid.

12 Captain H.S. Rayner, Director of Plans, was the navy's member on the PHP under the chair of Hume Wrong from External Affairs.

13 Donald Munton and Donald Page, "The Operations of the Post-War Hostilities Planning Group in Canada, 1943-1945," Paper presented to the 55th Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, Laval University, 2 June 1976, 76/188, DHist, 50-51.

14 Shawn Cafferky, "The Organization of War: A History of the Directorate of Plans Division, 1939-1945", 140.

15 "Armed Forces - Post War Establishments," memo, Special Cabinet Committee to consider defence questions, 27 September 1945, Post-War Army, 112.21009(D19), DHist, 1.

16 In this the RCN and the government both erred. At the time, had the government taken into consideration the influence of atomic weaponry on naval warfare the ceiling could have been set lower. Interestingly, the Cabinet was undecided at this time on a policy of compulsory military training.

17 Jeffrey K. Wright, "The 'Canadianists': A Desire for a 'Small-Fleet' Royal Canadian Navy" (B.A. essay, Royal Military College, April 25, 1980), 70.

18 "Royal Canadian Navy - Future Planning to 1956," Directorate of Naval Plans and Intelligence, 4 November 1946, NAC, RG 24 83-84/167, vol. 620, file NS-11818, vol. 1.

19 DND, *Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1946*, 10.

20 Care and maintenance is a state where basic maintenance and ship's husbandry only can be conducted.

21 "Royal Canadian Navy - Future Planning to 1956."

22 Naval Staff Minutes 306-6, 10 September 1945. Abbreviated hereafter as NSM.

23 Cafferky, "The Organization of War: A History of the Directorate of Plans Division, 1939-1945", 143.

24 Captain (later Vice-Admiral) E. Rollo Mainguy described NSHQ building simply as "depressing". Chief of Naval Personnel, memo, 28 December, 1942. VAdmr. E.R. Mainguy file, DHist.

25 Dillon interview.

26 Collins interview by the author. He went to Ottawa to take up his appointment as Secretary to the the Chief of the Naval Staff.

27 Collins, Dillon, Storrs interviews by the author.

28 See Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, Chapter 15. There was obviously a reorganization at the Naval Board level as part of the demobilization restructuring. In the absence of Naval Board Minutes and an organizational chart, the author could not determine the exact date of change. Tucker provides a point of departure with his Organization Chart of the Department of the Naval Services (April, 1945) at Plate XIX. When Jones became CNS in May 1944, the position of VCNS disappeared. DeWolf was appointed to be ACNS in the

rank of Acting-Commodore. Only at the end of the Interim Force, when Grant became CNS, did a firm organization emerge.

29 The terminology is confusing. The term Naval Staff is not a collective for all the staff at Naval Service Headquarters but staff officers of the Executive Branch responsible for operations, plans, weapons, training and, originally, naval aviation under first ACNS and later VCNS(1947).

30 P.C. 485, January 22, 1942.

31 The position was occupied by a senior civil servant whose role was to vet funding proposals from the naval executive on behalf of the government. The DM was de facto the link with the government and presented the proposals to the Minister. Mr. W.G. Mills was confirmed as the Deputy Minister in late 1941. In January, 1944, the Deputy Minister's Advisory Committee (DMAC) was formed with CNP, CNES and the Chief Staff Officer Reserves to remove discussion of financial decisions from the Naval Board.

32 The limits of the Canadian North-west Atlantic Command formerly the Canadian Coastal Zone were defined by a line joining Cape Murchison in Baffin Island to

Position(A) 63° 15'N - 64° 00'W to

Position(B) 47° 00'N - 47° 00'W to

Position(C) 43° 00'N - 49° 00'W to

Position(D) 42° 00'N - 65° 00'W to

Position(E) 43° 00'N - 67° 00'W to

Position(F) International Boundary at West Quoddy Head.

See W.G.D. Lund, "Command Relationships in the North West Atlantic 1939-45: The Royal Canadian Navy's Perspective," Map 1, vii.

33 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 499.

34 The Jericho Golf Club land was acquired for the joint headquarters and operations room. A joint operations room was later established in Victoria.

35 See Chapter 1.

36 *National Defence Act 1950*, Section 19(1) and (4).

37 Raymont, "Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 183.

38 CNS's dates:

G.C. Jones 15 Jan 44 - 18 Feb 46
 H.E. Reid 28 Feb 46 - 1 Sep 47
 H.T.W. Grant 1 Sep 47 - 1 Dec 51
 E.R. Mainguy 1 Dec 51 - 16 Jan 56
 H.G. DeWolf 16 Jan 56 - 1 Aug 60
 H.S. Rayner 1 Aug 60 - 20 Jul 64
 K.L. Dyer 20 Jul 64 - 31 Jul 64 (Acting only)

39 Dillon interview. Dillon served as Naval Secretary 1947-48. Also, VAdmr. K.L. Dyer, interview by the author, tape recording, Ottawa Ont. 3 November 1994. Vice-Admiral Dyer was Acting-CNS and twice a member of the Naval Board. Dyer was clear that traditionally CNS reserved the ultimate say on policy to himself and this was reflected in the final version of the minutes.

40 The first entry of cadets did not attend the RNCC but received preliminary training in CGS Canada before being sent to the RN. Among these were Percy Nelles, who became CNS in 1932, and Victor Brodeur who attained flag rank and was COPC in 1945.

41 F.L. Houghton, "18 Midshipmen of 1911", *Sea Breezes*, December 1914, vol. 1, no. 1, 6. *Sea Breezes*, published from 1914 until 1922, was the journal of RNCC. The author expresses his thanks to Mrs Barbara Morris (nee:Tisdall) for the use of her late father's complete collection. During the 50th anniversary of the RCN, still-serving graduates of RNCC were each presented with a bound volume of copies of all issues of *Sea Breezes*.

42 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 56. In retrospect, these may have been indicators of high blood pressure.

43 Adams, "Memoirs".

44 VAdmr. Jones file, DHist. Jones married late, age 37, as was the custom. Reid, his successor, married at 38. The nickname "Tillie" provided by Lay.

45 Captain "D" is a title given to a full naval Captain who has overall command of destroyers and escort type ships based in a particular port.

46 It was impossible to run the flotilla's operations from a ship at sea under radio silence so Jones' ships, successively *Ottawa* and *Assiniboine*, spent more time in harbour alongside the jetty ("propping it up" in naval parlance) than any others. *Ottawa* became known as "O Block, RCN Barracks" and her Commanding Officer as "Jetty Jones." The nickname stuck after being painted in large letters by sailors under the cover of darkness on *Assiniboine's* side and broadcast to the world in light of morning. S.F. Wise, Director DHist, to Major D.G. Fry

DIS/PLO DG(Info), 18 September 1969 in VAdmr. Jones File, DHist. The origin of the nickname is incorrectly attributed by James Eayrs to Member of Parliament Jean-Francois Pouloit. James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Peacemaking and Deterrence*, vol. 3, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 56.

47 William Sclater to Commander R.C. Hayden, DInfo, 14 October 1959. VAdmr. Jones file, DHist. In the same letter Sclater recounts how RAdmr. Murray requested that Jones appoint him as a temporary personal adviser during the Kellock Commission inquiry into the riots. At one point, Murray asked Sclater what chance he thought he had of ever becoming CNS in the foreseeable future. Sclater's guarded response was, "Who knows what the future holds for any of us. Stay and take the admonition and you may be Chief of Staff[sic] six months from now." Murray replied, "Well even if I do take your advice and stay here in the service what have I got to look forward to? Admiral Jones will be Chief of Staff for many years to come." Sclater wrote, "I couldn't tell him what I knew, that any day could bring Admiral Jones' career to a sudden end and the most he hoped for was another two or three years only."

48 Brand interview by the author.

49 Sclater to Hayden, DInfo, 14 October, 1959.

50 There was still lingering resentment against the navy in Halifax as a result of the VE-Day riots and from a series of explosions at the Bedford Magazine on 18 July 1945, rocked the city and forced the evacuation of the Northern part. The force approached nothing like the great explosion of 1917, and damage was minimal owing in large part to volunteer firefighting efforts by naval personnel.

51 Statement of Service. VAdmr. Jones file, DHist.

52 Stanley R. Redman, *Open Gangway: An Account of the Halifax Riots, 1945* (Hantsport: Lancelot Press, 1981), 124-127. See exchange of correspondence between VAdmr. Jones and R.G. Rankin, Editor, *Halifax Herald*, listing complaints against the navy. Rankin went so far as to telephone the Minister for the Naval Service, Angus L. Macdonald, whom he undoubtedly knew. Jones had assured Rankin in July 1944, that he would ensure things were "cleaned up."

53 Adams interview by Mayhem, 111. Adams had been Jones' navigator in *Skeena* in the prewar years.

54 DeWolf interview.

55 Collins was ex-lower deck, ex-RCNVR and only had three years seniority as a Lieutenant. Jones took time out to put Collins in his place.

56 Collins interview by Glover, 14.

57 Ibid. Collins had been in the job only five weeks.

58 Jones was survived by his wife and three young children. Interestingly, the house in which he had been living on Metcalfe Street was RAdmr. Dillon's former family home.

59 Collins interview by Glover, 15. Glover was pressing Collins to divulge information about the Murray-Jones relationship. Collins admitted knowledge but did not feel at liberty to divulge it. The author also gained the distinct impression Collins had read Jones' private papers but was not yet ready to divulge their contents.

60 DeWolf interview.

61 William Sclater, *Haida*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1947), xiii-xvi. Sclater's narrative of the exploits of HMCS *Haida* during her English Channel and Bay of Biscay operations during 1943 and 1944, won the Governor General's Award in 1947. *Haida* was commanded at the time by Cdr (later VAdmr) Harry DeWolf who would become the RCN's seventh CNS.

62 Ibid.

63 DPlans to CNS, memo, 6 September 1945, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, vol. 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1.

64 COAC to NSHQ, message, 2 October 1945, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, vol. 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1.

65 DPlans to CNS, memo, 6 September 1945, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, vol. 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1.

66 DPlans to ACNS, memo, 3 October 1945, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, vol. 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1. CNS's intentions to inform the Minister are minuted.

67 Draft memo to Cabinet prepared by DPlans, undated. Minuted by ACNS. NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, vol. 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1.

68 Ibid. *Warrior* was too far advanced in construction to include alteration and additions that would make her suitable for the Canadian climate or service in northern waters near the Arctic.

69 Milner, *North Atlantic Run*, Chapter 9.

70 NSM 313-3, 5 November 1945.

71 Ibid.

72 NSec to DNR, memo, 25 March 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1, Operations and Plans.

73 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 425.

74 Gross figures appear in parenthesis next to the ships where Rayner projects the manning requirements in the memos cited above. Later analysis by the Complement Committee determined these were under-estimated by as much as 15 percent.

75 Minutes, Deputy Minister's Advisory Committee, 28 January 1944, DM/DND 1700-100/A, DHist.

76 Complement Committee, Terms of Reference dated 17 April, 1945, NAC, Acc 83-84/167, Box 128, NSS 1279-22, vol. 1, Naval Complement Committee.

77 DSP to CNP, memo, 1 December 1945, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol.1, Complements General.

78 Complement Committee, Terms of Reference dated 21 January, 1946, NAC, Acc 83-84/167, Box 128, NSS 1279-22, vol. 1, Naval Complement Committee.

79 Complement Committee, Interim Report dated 30 April, 1946, NAC, Acc 83-84/167, Box 128, NSS 1279-22, vol. 1, Naval Complement Committee.

80 Hibbard joined the RCN as a cadet in 1926 after serving as a rating in the RCNVR. He followed the normal model and rose to command HMCS *Skeena* as a lieutenant-commander in 1940 and later HMCS *Iroquois* during the Bay of Biscay operations. He was awarded the DSC & Bar and several foreign honours. He was Captain(D) in Halifax during the riots which will be discussed below.

81 ACNP to CNS, memo, 14 December 1945, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 128, NSS 1279-22, vol. 1, Naval Complement Committee. Establishing the civilian complement at Halifax was proving to be a task well beyond the capability of naval personnel.

82 Minutes of Meeting ACNS/CNA&S/CNP, 12 January 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 128, NSS 1279-22, vol. 1, Naval Complement Committee.

83 CNP to S.P. Burger, 7 November 1945, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 1, Complements General.

84 "rate" is the naval term for the substantive rank of a non-commissioned man hence the term "rating". The collective term for all ratings is "the lower deck", a traditional term for those who lived below decks. The captain's and officers cabins were located on the upper deck.

85 ACNP to DFASS, minute, 2 February 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 1, Complements General.

86 Complement Committee Interim Report, 30 April 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 128, NSS 1279-22, vol. 1, Naval Complement Committee. Cdr. Woolcombe would become the resident expert in the complementing process providing continuity in the CNP Branch.

87 DM to ACNS, memo, 15 March 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 128, NSS 1279-22, vol. 1, Naval Complement Committee.

88 ACNP(Cdr. Medland) to CNP, memo, 30 January 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 1, Complements General.

89 DM to ACNS, memo, 16 January 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 128, NSS 1279-22, vol. 1, Naval Complement Committee.

90 Complement Committee Minutes, 11 February 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 128, NSS 1279-22, vol. 1, Naval Complement Committee.

91 Complement Committee Interim Report, 30 April 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 128, NSS 1279-22, vol. 1, Naval Complement Committee.

92 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 259. Tucker provides a number of 4,450 in June 1945, of which 614 are temporary status.

93 DND, *Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1946*, 16.

94 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 482-483. The WRCNS or "Wrens" was always regarded as a temporary organization for "hostilities only." The small numbers that would be required in peacetime did not justify the expensive training and support effort.

95 Ibid., 471.

96 Ibid., 471-472.

97 DeWolf interview by the author.

98 RAdmr. Dillon recalls his screening for transfer from the RCNVR was merely a formality because he was known to the board. They asked him a question about the demobilization process then spent the rest of the interview arguing among themselves over its merits. Dillon interview.

99 Battles interview. Battles had important experience in RN cruisers and, especially, aircraft carriers but had served only one week with the RCN during the entire war. This was typical of this unique group who after five years in uniform knew virtually nothing about the Canadian navy.

100 Note to file, undated, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 1, Complements General.

101 Brock interview. See Jeffry V. Brock, *The Dark Broad Seas*, 180-182 for Brock's interview with Captain Earl.

102 Ibid.

103 Storrs interview. Storrs stated that he initially heard his new boss, Captain Lay, make derogatory comments about his entry to other RCN officers. Lay fully accepted Storrs once he had proven himself.

104 DeWolf interview by the author.

105 RAdmr. R.M. Battles, "Naval Engineering in Canada (Some Electrical and Electronic Aspects)," essay in the possession of the author. Battles heard about the new branch through an accidental meeting with an RCNVR colleague who had transferred to the RCN.

106 ACNP to CNP, memo, 9 February 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 1, Complements General.

107 NSHQ General Message, 211638Z March 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 1, Complements General.

108 Ibid.

109 In theory the Home Port Division system assigned a man permanently to either Halifax or Esquimalt providing family stability.

110 NSM 319-3, 31 December 1945.

111 Memorandum to Cabinet, "Navy Post-War Organization and Composition", 17 December 1945, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, vol. 455, NSS 1650-26, vol.1. and NSM 307-2, 17 September 1945.

112 Ibid., see NSM 313-4, 5 November 1945, and NSM 315-6, 19 November 1945.

113 NSM 316-11, 26 November 1945.

114 ACNP to DWT, memo, 13 February 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 1, Complements General.

115 DWT minute, *ibid.*

116 ACNP to CNP, memo, 26 February 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 1, Complements General.

117 Ibid.

118 Budge interview.

119 Murray had fared very poorly while giving testimony before Chief Justice Kellock and in Audette's view this was his undoing. L.C. Audette to R.L. Donaldson, 18 June 1991, Audette file, DHist. Murray's own view was that owing to the federal election in progress, "The instructions to our counsel at the Royal Commission, were not to stir up the Halifax people but to fix it". L.W. Murray to W.A.B. Douglas, 23 October 1970, Murray Interview, Murray file, DHist.

120 Brock interview. Brock recounted that Brodeur had appealed personally to Abbott that Jones should be moved along and he be given the opportunity to be CNS. Abbott refused to consider this and Brodeur submitted his resignation. Brodeur was on the train in Winnipeg on his way back to Esquimalt when he heard of Jones' death and immediately returned to Ottawa. He saw Abbott and requested to withdraw his resignation which was denied. Brodeur was due to retire in 1947.

121 Possibly following the precedent Mackenzie King had established during the war with Ralston's resignations?

122 Collins interview by the author. Collins was Reid's secretary during his tenure as CNS.

123 Collins interview by Glover, 17. Reid had served at NSHQ as VCNS during 1941-42.

124 The origin of the nickname "Rastus" is not known but was in general use during the 1930's. See Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 85.

125 S.E. Morrison, "8 Midshipmen 1912", *Sea Breezes*, December 1915, vol. 1, no. 2, 7. Reid was described as "small but fire on the ice."

126 VAdmr. H.E. Reid file, DHist. See especially Statement of Service and Naval Historian's notes.

127 *Patriot* 1923-25, *Sepoy* 1929-30, *Skeena* 1936-37, *Fraser* 1937-38.

128 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 85-86. Lay, who was Executive Officer in *Skeena*, provides details of the "incident".

129 Nelles' S206 on Reid, November 1943, VAdmr. H.E. Reid file, DHist.

130 Collins interview by Glover, 21.

131 *Ibid.*, 19.

132 *Ibid.*, 20.

133 *Ibid.*, 19.

134 *Ibid.*, 49.

135 Collins interview by Hal Lawrence, 28 January 1986, at Victoria, BC, DHist, 36.

136 see Lund, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic", *passim*.

137 DeWolf interview by the author.

138 See Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 151-153 for Lay's own account of the beginning of the Canadian Naval Air Service. The RN provided the air crews for Nabob as well as some of the ships company. Most of the officers were Canadian including Lieutenants Dillon and Collins.

139 *Nabob* was constructed in the Seattle-Tacoma shipyard for the RN to American standards under lend-lease. The aircraft were American designed and built Avenger torpedo-bombers.

140 RAdmr. H. Nelson Lay interview by Cdr W.A.C. Douglas, 14 January 1974, 74/653, DHist, 45.

141 The naval historian, LCdr. E.C. Russell, made comments pertaining to a memo from DNP&I(Lay) to DCNS[sic] entitled "Planning the Post-War Navy" that it was "a direct steal from Cdr. Storrs' memo of 17 January 1947, which, incidentally, is not mentioned the references given by Lay." NS 1650-26, Vol. II, entry 14.3.47, DHist.

142 Intelligence and Trade, a combined section, was placed under Plans as part of NSHQ reorganization to cut overhead in early 1946.

143 NSM 320-1, 7 January 1946.

144 "Post-War Canadian Navy. Notes prepared for joint Canada - U.S. discussions", 15 April 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. I, Operations and Plans. This unsigned document was prepared for the first meeting, probably by Storrs, and shows the general purpose carrier task group inclination of RCN fleet structure. Lay mentions the first Military Cooperation Committee meeting in his memoirs.

145 Storrs interview. The USN had only recently reached this conclusion as it was reorienting its strategy from the fleet engagement to containment of the Soviet threat with its impressive long-range submarine and bomber capability. See Robert E. Fisher, "The U.S. Navy's Search for a Strategy, 1945-1947," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3. (Summer 1995), 73-86. See also Henry and Curtis, "Report of Proceedings at Washington, D.C., 20-23 May 1946," 23 May 1946, with enclosures, printed in Donald M. Page, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations*. Vol. 12: 1946 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1977), 1615-1627.

146 "PJBD Recommendation 35, A Joint Appreciation on Defence", NAC, MG 32 B 5 Claxton Papers, vol. 222, file 7.

147 See David Bercuson, "Continental Defense and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-50," *The Cold War and Defense*, ed. Keith Neilson and Ronald G. Haycock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 153-170.

148 NBM 191-1, 28 August 1946.

149 NSM 327-4, 11 March 1946.

150 Rear-Admiral Dillon said Lay could upset the ship's company in *Nabob* with just a few words. Dillon interview.

151 Claxton described the RCN "top officers" as "an extra ordinarily homogeneous group who joined together, trained with the RN, had English accents, and fixed ideas." Claxton, "Autobiography", 869. Lay and Claxton met during physiotherapy treatments together at the National Defence Medical Center (NDMC). Lay recounts that Claxton asked him for an opinion on his proposed tri-service colleges policy. Lay wrote, "Being a bit naive, I thought Claxton really wanted me to say what I honestly thought." Lay's response prompted Claxton to tell Vice-Admiral Grant that Lay "was very stupid self opinionated officer." Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 204.

152 Ibid. 213.

153 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 189.

154 The nickname "Trader" derived from his horse trading tendencies for which he was notorious. He once raffled his car onboard *Skeena* that was won by the then Commanding Officer, G.C. Jones.

155 Brock interview.

156 No reason could be found for the gap. NBM 166 are dated 27 June 1945 and NBM 167 22 February 1946. RAdmr. Dillon could not recall why there were no minutes but recalled there were meetings when Jones was available. The Naval Staff Minutes indicate that Jones reserved approval which suggests this was temporarily the highest level of formal staff meetings. Throughout this period, DeWolf was signing most of Jones' correspondence.

157 NBM 167-1, 22 February 1946. A new procedure was announced by the DM that the Minister or in his absence the DM would chair the meetings. Reid had not yet moved up from Washington to take up his appointment.

158 Minutes First Senior Officers' Meeting, 15 April 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 1, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings. Present were CNS(Reid), CNAS(Grant), ACNS(DeWolf), CNP(Miles), COPC(Brodeur), COAC(Taylor), NMCS(Agnew).

159 NBM 180-1, 29 May 1946. It was planned that ex-Naval Secretariat Officers would be recruited to fill the civilian positions.

160 NSM 325-3, 25 February 1946. Director Naval Information (DNInf) would be of Commander rank and his staff of nine officers would include reservists.

161 NSM 324-4, 4 February 1946. This was premature as it was mistakenly believed that visual signaling had been made obsolete by radio.

162 Minutes, First Senior Officers' Meeting, 15 April 1946.

163 NSM 309-1, 1 October 1945.

164 NBM 185-2, 10 July 1946.

165 CNS to N.Sec, minute appended to NSM 315-3, 19 November 1945.

166 Sam Worth was one of the RCN's notorious characters. He was a term mate of Reid's at the RNCC and was the only one who could enter CNS' office unannounced. Collins interview. Worth left the navy during the interwar period and, among other nefarious pursuits, worked with communications in bootlegging on the east coast. There he became familiar with American communications equipment. After re-entering the RCN, he became a strong proponent of adopting USN equipment and tactical doctrine. Brock interview.

167 NSM 344-2, 12 August 1946. The Naval Secretary had recently initiated a campaign to adopt the USN Supply Branch model and career structure for the RCN suggesting waning of RN influence in the group. Dillon interview.

168 NBM 167-3, 22 February 1946. The wearing of "Canada" badges had been "optional in Canada" to this time. The naval officers attending were RAdmr. Grant(CNA&S), Cmdre. DeWolf(ACNS), and Cmdre. Miles(CNP). Grant, being senior, would set the agenda. The issue of officers obtaining prewar uniform items such as frock coats was deferred until after the period of the Interim Force. NBM 167-2, 22 February 1946.

169 Minutes First Senior Officers' Meeting, 15 April 1946.

170 Ibid.

171 These would include personnel awaiting draft to ships, personnel undergoing other types of training and the demobilization load.

172 NSM 333-3, 6 May 1946.

173 Ibid.

174 Houghton, "A Sailor's Life For Me", 167. *Warrior* was cited as a model ship by the Mainguy inquiry under the command of Houghton and, later, DeWolf. Much credit was given to Commander Kenneth Dyer, the Executive Officer, for implementing an early version of the Welfare Committee.

175 Ibid.

176 Ibid., 171. The beam (width) of the ship proved to be only 16 inches less than the canal locks.

177 NSM 329-8, 1 April 1946.

178 For a detailed popular overview of naval aviation in the RCN including carrier policy during this period see, Soward, *Hands To Flying Stations: A Recollective History of Canadian Naval Aviation, 1945-1954*, vol. 1.

179 NSM 329-8, 1 April 1946.

180 NSM 344-4, 12 August 1946.

181 NSM 346-1, 9 September 1946.

182 Staff Memo to CNAS, 20 January 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

183 NSM 338-1, 24 June 1946.

184 Ibid.

185 DNP&I to ACNS and CNP, memo, 1 October 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1, Operations and Plans.

186 Minutes Second Senior Officers' Meeting, 16-18 October 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 1, *Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings*.

187 Minutes Second Senior Officers' Meeting, 16-18 October 1946.

188 Storrs interview.

189 "Reid Warns Our Navy Too Small", *Ottawa Morning Journal*, 7 November 1946, quoted in Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Peacemaking and Deterrence, vol. 3, 57.

190 DNP&I to ACNS, memo, 9 November 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1, Operations and Plans.

191 Ibid.

192 Ibid.

193 ACNS to CNS, memo, 13 November 1946, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1, Operations and Plans.

194 Ibid.

195 Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Peacemaking and Deterrence*, vol. 3, 57.

196 ACNS to CNS, memo, 13 November 1946, A minute in the margins by CNS indicates the matter was raised in the "Defence Committee" on 24 November 1946.

197 Memo NSec to DNP&I, 16 January 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1, Operations and Plans.

198 DNP&I memo, 9 January 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1, Operations and Plans.

199 ACNS to CNS, minute (undated) in *ibid.*

200 NSec to DNP&I, Minute, 16 January 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 1, Operations and Plans.

CHAPTER 3

THE "VIPER" JOINS THE NAVY

"The Navy...was glad to have me join their building; but little did they know what a viper they were giving welcome to."

Brooke Claxton¹

Brooke Claxton was sworn in as Canada's first postwar Minister of Defence on Friday 12 December 1946.² Noted for his determination and energy, he also brought a strong sense of nationalism to the office that was to have a profound effect on the navy in particular.³ A talented and resourceful politician, Claxton had been a rising star in the Liberal caucus and at one time Mackenzie King considered him as his successor.⁴ He fell from Mackenzie King's favour for supporting policy positions at the Paris Peace Conference in 1945 that the prime minister deemed unacceptable and perceived extravagant expenditures on delegation entertainment.⁵ Claxton aspired to the External Affairs portfolio but welcomed the opportunity when offered Defence even though Jack Pickersgill warned him it was a "deadend".⁶ Claxton, however, decided it was an important portfolio at that time in Canada's history and was keen to take it on. In accepting the appointment, Claxton brought more talent and ability to the Defence portfolio than incumbents either before or since. The policy initiatives that he introduced, the administrative reorganization and his direct intervention in the culture of the RCN had an important influence in the shaping, not only the role of the postwar navy, but also its character. He would ensure that the Royal Canadian Navy became Canadian in more than just name.

Mackenzie King had made up his mind that Canada would follow the British government's example and appoint a single minister responsible for Defence. He gave Claxton specific instructions as to what was expected from him in the Defence portfolio.⁷ He wanted Claxton to reassert government control, integrate common activities of the services and achieve "the utmost economy consistent with security."⁸ With respect to the navy, Mackenzie King

stated that, "We should have a purely coastal defence."⁹ He also voiced his strong opposition to aircraft carriers and that he had only conceded to these under duress during the war.¹⁰ The Prime Minister reiterated that if the government was going to introduce strong social programmes in Health and Welfare then, "we cannot go on spending what we are on the army, navy and air force."¹¹ To demonstrate the government's seriousness, D.C. Abbott, who had moved from the Defence to the Finance portfolio, was, within a week, demanding a reduction of more than fifty percent in the 1947-1948 expenditures from his old department.¹²

Abbott's budget slashing exercise reflected Mackenzie King's decision to promote his programme of social legislation at the expense of Defence.¹³ This prime ministerial initiative established the procedure that would govern strategic development in Canada during the postwar period. The government allocated funding for defence after financial resources for social and other politically attractive programmes were designated. It was then up to the department to determine how much defence could be bought with the moneys allocated and this was then divided between the three services. To oversee the process, Claxton established a review committee to examine the annual estimates and invited representatives from the Department of Finance to participate. Thereafter, General Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, and representatives of the Treasury Board reviewed the annual estimates submitted by the services thereby giving the Department of Finance oversight in the estimate development process.¹⁴ This tied national defence strategy not to alliance commitments but rather to what the government in power felt it could afford after bread and butter social programmes, on which elections in Canada were won or lost, had been funded. Simply put, it would be defence on the cheap. This approach built uncertainty into defence funding and, complicated a process already fraught with inter-service rivalry. Dan Middlemiss summarized the process in his analysis of economic considerations governing the development of the postwar RCN as follows:

Thus, the interaction among political, military, and economic considerations in the development of the modern Canadian navy has been complex and varied with time and circumstance. But if one overriding conclusion stands out, it is this: for the Canadian navy, what politics has proposed, economics has disposed.¹⁵

During his first six months in Defence, Claxton responded to Mackenzie King's directions in two key policy statements. In a memorandum to the Prime Minister entitled "Observations on the Defence Needs of Canada", Claxton discussed strategic objectives.¹⁶ This is a seminal document and contained a mission statement for the Canadian forces that Abbott had studiously avoided.¹⁷ David Bercuson's opinion is that any policy that emerged to this point had done so by accident.¹⁸ Viewed in this context, Abbott's declaration that the government's intention was to create a "good workable little fleet" lacks credibility.¹⁹ Claxton's thoughts reflected the cabinet's discussions on the PJBD's Recommendation 35 and the government's revisions of it which were designed to protect Canadian sovereignty. He outlined a defence policy oriented toward the defence of North America that would be co-ordinated with the United States but did not embrace the "Fortress America" concept reflected in the original military appreciation.²⁰ While Claxton believed a war within the next five years was "unlikely" he stated that, "Canada would enter such a war only if the United States did."²¹ Canada would concentrate on establishing small professional role-specific forces that could be expanded in the event of war to operate in conjunction with American forces. Implicitly, the ramifications of this policy were that Canada was placing itself under the American defence umbrella with all its cost-saving benefits.

The Minister stated that the navy's role in hemispheric defence would be coastal defence and escort work against submarines.²² In a war outside of Canada, the navy would be employed in escort work similar to operations in the Second World War. Significantly for the RCN, Claxton's memorandum signalled a reordering of strategy from an Imperial to a North

American orientation and from the task force concept to small ship escort work. As important, it emphasized North America as the primary source for material acquisition as well as coordination with United States forces. This strategic shift would provide a strong incentive to the pro-North American progressives within the RCN such as DeWolf and Lay and even Reid who leaned towards the Americans.²³

The implications of the government's strategic priorities for the navy were significant. Roles for the army and air force were apparent as were opportunities for cooperative operations with the American forces. The government was concerned that Canadian sovereignty be asserted in the North to discourage any reluctance on the part of the Americans to vacate their bases. The army and air force were positioned to do this. The RCN however was not and in absence of an imminent threat there was no clear role except training for anti-submarine escort work. This frustrated the navy's original plans, which had been developed in a political vacuum, for carrier-oriented general purpose task groups. On the other hand, the naval staff now had some specific direction for future planning and a focus for future fleet development. It reinforced the notion the RCN would fight any future conflict within an alliance but, significantly, it would be with the Americans in the context of hemispheric defence.

This was a critical decision because the Naval Board was pragmatically maintaining a preference towards British equipment and training, particularly with respect to naval aviation, until, "the policy of 'Hemispheric versus Empire Defence' has been more clearly defined."²⁴ The RCN already had RN equipment and the policy of continuity made sense.²⁵ The new government policy direction formalizing cooperation with the United States would inevitably weaken the close affiliation with the Royal Navy. There would be important cultural ramifications resulting from strategic cooperation, material acquisition and training with the USN. This decision gave force to the initiatives of officers in the RCN who were already

turning to the American navy to find answers to their professional problems.²⁶ Specifically, these were the communicators, logisticians, pilots and officers in the fledgling Electrical Branch, all in technical specializations where the USN had a clear lead.²⁷ For the RCN, this was an unanticipated consequence of the new policy direction as opposed to an intended result. The initiative merely accelerated the shift of the cultural influence on the Canadian navy from British to American. In retrospect, this was as inevitable as was growing American influence on Canadian society in the postwar period. Vice-Admiral Collins stated that by the early 1950's the cultural reorientation by the RCN towards the USN was virtually complete.²⁸

Claxton also shared the prime minister's concern that the military must be brought under tighter civilian control and the relationship between the service chiefs and the civilian heads be regularized. The war had resulted in confused terms of reference as well as a blurred definition of the services' roles and missions.²⁹ His perception was that coordination between the services was minimal, typified by the Chiefs of Staff Committee meetings that were nothing more than "informal, infrequent and ad hoc affairs."³⁰ He saw the services as being exclusive and proudly independent and his task was to "bring together and make into a team three mutually resistant and highly competitive services staffed by bands of aggressive young men who had little or no experience of peacetime responsibility but had won the war."³¹

Claxton met this new challenge head on and Naval Service Headquarters became the first objective of the new broom. He met with the service chiefs the day after his swearing in. He rejected his designated office in the Woods Building, which gave him the "creeps", and decided to move into "A" building, then occupied by NSHQ.³² He arrived at NSHQ on Monday morning to be greeted by Vice-Admiral Reid and the Deputy Minister, Gordon Mills, and advised the CNS that he was setting up office there. Claxton recalled that Reid gave him a warm welcome "in joining the Navy."³³ Space was found that the Minister said could be made

satisfactory by moving a few "partitions" at which, Claxton recalled, "the navy brass fainted at the use of such a land lubberly[sic] word as partition. When they recovered they rose saluting in their quaint little way saying 'Bulkheads, sir, bulkheads'."³⁴ This was a quick introduction to Claxton that the navy was very different from the army, in which he had served during World War I. Claxton noted, "[T]he Navy...was glad to have me join them in their building; but little did they know what a viper they were giving welcome to."³⁵

Claxton was struck by the lack of experience of senior naval officers with the responsibilities of their positions in peacetime, none of which "had to do with political consideration or public relations in the broadest sense except during the war."³⁶ He soon became aware this was a fault common to all services. The new Minister decided that the whole senior officer hierarchy needed "a psychological shakeup" because "They simply would not accept the idea of cooperation and co-ordination; they were still living in the mood of the war when the sky was the limit and there was little or no civilian control."³⁷ A "shakeup" was administered by moving the three service chiefs into "A" building and renaming it National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).³⁸ Believing that proximity would foster cooperation and to shake up the entire military staff echelon, he moved all supply staff into "B" building and personnel staff into "C" building. He directed that covered bridges be built between buildings and quickly the military staffs got the message, as Captain Paterson observed "Claxton was serious about one department, one set of estimates, one programme, and one master."³⁹

Brooke Claxton was intent on introducing what he called a "logical symmetry" to all service organizations.⁴⁰ His primary objective was to achieve "Progressively closer coordination of armed services and unification of the department so as to form a single defence force, with the three armed services working together as a team."⁴¹ His first initiative was to reconstitute the Defence Council to reflect the single department concept with himself as chairman and other

members to include the Parliamentary Assistant, a single Deputy Minister, the Associate Deputy Ministers, the three Chiefs of Staff and Chairman of the Defence Research Board.⁴² He chose Brigadier C.M. "Bud" Drury to be his Deputy Minister and to create the unified civil service. Drury was a graduate of RMC and had been General Foulkes' Brigadier, General Staff at 2 Corps Headquarters in World War Two.⁴³ He was Deputy Minister until Claxton retired in 1954, and became a powerful influence in the development of Defence economic and fiscal policy. Claxton was determined to turn the Chiefs of Staff Committee meetings into weekly, authoritative, decision-making conferences.⁴⁴ He subsequently issued revised terms of reference for the Chiefs of Staff Committee making it "responsible for coordinating the efforts of the Armed services in fulfilment of a single defence policy."⁴⁵ Colonel Raymont commented "There was no doubt about the thrust of the Minister's intent and government direction to the Chiefs of Staff in Committee -- their job was to come up with one agreed view and recommendation of policy."⁴⁶

To achieve his aim that personnel in the navy, army and air force were governed by the same regulations, received the same pay, pensions, allowances and rations and wore the same clothing except for the distinctive uniforms of their service, Claxton established the Personnel Members Committee (PMC). The Principal Supply Officers Committee (PSC) was established to deal with matters of supply and equipment in the same way the PMC dealt with personnel and pay.⁴⁷ To ensure that he was on top of the situation and to receive feedback on his reforms, he restructured his office. He appointed four new executive assistants, three of whom had a naval service background and who could pass on their knowledge to him. He hoped, "The fact that I had chosen Navy people would help to counteract the Navy's feeling that I was Army and biased accordingly."⁴⁸ Claxton was satisfied that he had chosen well because these executive

assistants eventually won the confidence of senior officers and were able to "get the dirt" for their minister.⁴⁹

Satisfied that his reorganization of service headquarters had achieved "a good upset"⁵⁰, Claxton then ordered a systematic study by the Combined Services Functions Committee under General Foulkes, the Chief of the General Staff, to determine what functions within the services could be unified. Sub-committees studied thirty-one separate areas ranging from medical services to training and transportation and recommendations that sixteen functions could be performed by a single service were forthcoming.⁵¹ The issue of unifying medical services was the most complex and illustrative of the divergence of service opinions. The navy opposed any unification at all while the air force supported some unification.⁵² In cabinet, the prime minister and St. Laurent advocated a fourth completely integrated medical service. Claxton eventually set up a Defence Services Medical Advisory Board with representation from the three services and the Department of Health and Welfare, the Department of Veterans' Affairs, and the Canadian Medical Association with a mandate to eliminate all duplication short of unification.⁵³ But the board was never quite as successful as Claxton wished. The stumbling block was the reliance on consensus and Claxton was prepared to accept the degree of autonomy the separate services argued that they needed owing to their different structures and operational requirements.

The impact on the RCN of Claxton's reforms varied depending on the function or the area affected. Before Claxton, Abbott had begun some restructuring to streamline common functions such as pay. Therefore the navy was prepared to expect change but this did not begin in earnest until after the period of the Interim Force in September 1947 and after Reid had retired as CNS.⁵⁴ Moreover, Claxton's integration and unification schemes were aimed at improving cooperation in the areas of commonality. His reforms did not extend to the command

structure and he fully believed in the necessity for three separate services with each individual service chief responsible to the minister for the administration of his service. David Bercuson remarked "Claxton understood the military well enough to know that exercise of command means something different and unique to each armed service and each service has traditions, a culture and a structure that strengthens the chain of command within it and are ideally suited to its task."⁵⁵ However, Claxton would prove to be most forthcoming in challenging naval traditions and the culture where he thought these were out of touch with Canadian society, or not in tune with his own strongly-held opinions such as the education of officers in a tri-service college programme. Officer training emerged as Claxton's enduring interest during his eight-year tenure and received more attention than almost any other subject.⁵⁶

Claxton made an effort to find out the state of the forces for himself and conducted visits of RCN ships and establishments shortly after becoming Minister of National Defence. He visited the west coast in April 1947, and attended Sunday ceremonial divisions and church services followed by lunch onboard HMCS *Ontario*. His tour included an inspection of the barracks at HMCS *Naden*. Of his visit he commented, "I was greatly struck with what I saw of the efficiency of the officers and men."⁵⁷ He was not impressed by the prewar built accommodations and messing arrangements in *Naden* that he found "shockingly bad". He came away determined that, "Our building programme must include replacement of these [buildings]." A visit was made to the Fleet Air Arm in Halifax in June 1947, and Claxton received, "the same kind of impression of smartness and efficiency."⁵⁸

Claxton was also privately taking stock of the navy with respect to its Canadian identity. His early impressions, discussed above, were that the senior officers, "were not overly in tune with Canadian national feeling."⁵⁹ Significantly, he compared them to the Conservative Party who were the opposition. In the visits to the navy on the coasts he would have found little

that identified the navy as Canadian. The Naval Board had already directed that the distinguishing "Canada" badges be removed from the uniforms. As a result of his visit to HMCS *Ontario*, Claxton decided to change the name of the RCN's other cruiser, HMCS *Uganda*, "a name that meant nothing to Canada", to HMCS *Quebec*.⁶⁰ He would also have seen the difference in the sleeve rank insignias worn by regular and reserve force officers. The RCN officers wore straight stripes while RCNR and RCNVR officers wore "wavy lace". This obvious difference would undoubtedly have led him to ask questions. Given his own militia experience during World War I and appreciating the contribution of the RCNVR during the Second World War he became, "determined to end this difference between the regular and reserve navy. Accordingly, I wiped out the 'wavy stripes' of the RCNVR."⁶¹ This was a custom copied from the Royal Navy but ordered out of existence by a directive of the Naval Board to amend Naval General Orders (NGOs) shortly after Claxton's visit to Halifax.⁶²

In response to the government's proposal to cut the naval estimates, Commander Antony H.G. "Tony" Storrs⁶³, Assistant director of Naval Plans and Intelligence (ADNP&I) on the Naval Staff, raised the issue of the need for a revision in the strategic thinking of the RCN and a corresponding change in the fleet structure. Storrs was a recent transfer to the RCN from the RCNR and brought fresh thinking to the predominantly prewar RCN naval staff. He had established himself as a solid professional during the war where he won the DSC and Bar and was made an Officer of the Legion of Merit by the Americans and awarded the Croix de Guerre avec palme by the French.⁶⁴ He attained the rank of Commander as Senior Officer of the 31st Canadian Minesweeping Flotilla that operated with great success during the D-Day operations. He was confirmed in his rank as Commander upon transferring to the RCN in 1945, and would go on to be the first RCN(R) officer to be promoted to rear-admiral in the history of the RCN.⁶⁵ Storrs was a progressive thinker

with a natural ability for staff work and administration, whose ideas were influential in defining the role of the postwar RCN.⁶⁶

It was Storrs' strong argument that helped the Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence (DNP&I), Captain Lay, decide that the future emphasis of the RCN should be on anti-submarine warfare, and anti-air warfare as well. Storrs argued that in a future war the requirement for Fleet Task Forces would be limited as attacks against shipping by submarines and bombers would dominate enemy strategy.⁶⁷ He reasoned that as Canada cannot afford to maintain Fleet Task Forces in peacetime in any event, "Canada's Naval planning should therefore be governed by the dominant requirement for anti-air, anti-submarine, and anti-mine forces."⁶⁸ To this end he recommended the retention of only those types of ships and establishments suitable for training in the kind of war in which Canada will be engaged and further, "[The navy] 'should create the nuclear [sic] operational forces suitable for [that] kind of war.'⁶⁹ Storrs concluded that submarine developments had rendered most of the current escorts obsolete and the "escort of the future does not yet exist."⁷⁰ By March 1947, in a memo to DeWolf, Lay emerged as a strong advocate for changing the role of the RCN to an emphasis on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti-Air Warfare (AAW).⁷¹ DeWolf accepted this argument and became a proponent of a concentration on ASW and building destroyer escorts for this purpose.⁷² He needed little persuasion because he was never a strong advocate of a concentration on naval aviation and aircraft carriers because of the high cost in men, money and material.⁷³

Lay was quick to follow up on the new policy orientation of the government towards hemispheric defence and cooperation with the Americans. In May 1947, he wrote in his capacity as the Canadian Naval Member on the Military Cooperation Committee,

In view of the vital importance of the defence of North American war making ability in the future, R.C.N. planning will in the future be largely based on the Naval forces now envisaged in the Basic Security Plan. This will make desirable the complete standardization of the R.C.N. and U.S.N. by the time that the Basic Security Plan must be ready for immediate implementation....The forces will be primarily anti-submarine and it may be expected that the Canadian contribution will

largely be confined to this role leaving the provision of heavy cover, support and logistics forces to the U.S.N.⁷⁴

An interesting observation is that this division of responsibilities between the RCN and the USN is remarkably similar to that advocated by Rear-Admiral Murray in 1943, when the command relationships in the Battle of the Atlantic between the RCN and USN were being debated by senior Canadian naval officers.⁷⁵ It may be argued that the functional wartime strategy based on a natural alliance relationship, an Atlantic focus and a role commensurate with the RCN's resources and government support was now being rediscovered as appropriate in peace. The preparation for the war against the Japanese in the Pacific was an aberration that allowed the ambitions of the RCN full play and created false expectations. In reality, the balanced task group concept proved both unrealistic and not sustainable.

The naval staff had more immediate pressing problems in dealing with the government's cuts. The impact on the naval estimates was a reduction of twenty-five percent in the personnel allocation for the Interim Force. Commander Storrs advised ACNS that planning was now based on a force of 7,500 - approximately 3,500 afloat and 4,000 ashore.⁷⁶ The reductions also forced a reduction in operational ships and necessitated a complete revision of the RCN's afloat training programme. Fleet operations including a transit of the Panama canal by *Micmac* and *Nootka* to work with west coast ships had to be cancelled for lack of funding.⁷⁷ Cruise programmes were affected through "a drastic reduction in fuel estimates" necessitating NSHQ to establish a system of quarterly fuel allocations to the Commands.⁷⁸ The balance of ships to match personnel resources between the coasts was also consequently upset. The personnel drafting plot was thrown into chaos. The plot had to be completely reordered by depots resulting in upheavals and a lowering of morale in both ship's companies and naval families. Plans to man the carrier by personnel from both coasts, to level out experience in anticipation of acquisition of the second carrier, were dropped.⁷⁹ All personnel for *Warrior* had to be drawn from the Halifax port division and this left only sufficient resources to man

two east coast destroyers, *Nootka* and *Micmac*. Four destroyers could be manned on the west coast with full peacetime complements and the cruiser, *Ontario*, with a training complement. The size of the reserve fleet was to be reduced to one-half, retaining only six frigates and ten Algerine minesweepers.

The reductions had a serious impact on the training capacity of the navy and personnel administration on both coasts. They also had a consequential impact on commitments. This was particularly true with respect to the production of trained tradesmen at the lower rates to compensate for the gross imbalance between senior and junior men in most trades resulting from demobilization.⁸⁰ Because of the shortage of trained ratings, Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers had to do menial tasks as well as their own normal duties which was a great dissatisfier. The personnel programme as a whole was also impacted because the complement of the RCN was nearly at the 7,500⁸¹ level that meant the navy had no flexibility to recruit in order to rectify the imbalance. Moreover, there was an imbalance within the trades between the coasts. For example, there was a surplus of signallers in Esquimalt and a shortage in Halifax but a general shortage overall.⁸² Commander Worth, Director of Signals, noted laconically that the problem was academic because, "there will not be any fleet at sea to carry out manoeuvres."⁸³ In advising Commanding Officers of the situation, the Naval Secretary concluded that, "This will produce considerable manning difficulties, and will probably preclude the manning of all ships until late in the year or early 1948."⁸⁴ Two important shore establishments, HMCS *Scotian* (Halifax) and HMCS *Givenchy* (Esquimalt) were closed, as were both the Mechanical and Electrical Training Centres at *Naden*. The closing of the training centres necessitated west coast personnel being sent to Halifax for courses and refresher training. Moreover, instructors at all shore training establishments were reduced by one-third causing a reduction in standards and through-put which, in the view of the NSHQ staff officers responsible, was "below acceptable levels".⁸⁵ The Naval Secretary's optimistic prediction that an improvement may be anticipated by

1948, appears to have overlooked the fact that a large number of Interim Force personnel were scheduled to be discharged at the end of their two year engagement in September 1947.⁸⁶

As the hard-pressed Naval Staff worked out the consequences of the personnel reductions, it is readily apparent that the RCN was heavily overcommitted. There are also indicators that the CNS at least was growing sensitive to morale problems. In spite of the cutbacks, the Naval Staff planned to progress the "workups" of *Warrior* and her air squadrons in April 1947, after the ship's arrival in Canada. There were only two destroyers available for *Warrior* as consorts and for air guard duty.⁸⁷ This was reduced to one after *Micmac* sustained extensive damage in a collision with a merchantship, *SS Yarmouth County*, in fog off Halifax in July 1947.⁸⁸ Amidst their efforts to salvage the operational programme, the Naval Staff overlooked the leave requirements for *Warrior's* ship's company that had just returned from the United Kingdom. Vice-Admiral Reid discovered this and personally directed an amendment to the sailing date to allow the ship's company to take their outstanding leave.⁸⁹ The affect on morale otherwise could have been serious.

The reductions added yet another challenge to the already heavy workload of the staff at NSHQ. The Naval Board was engaged in resolving many important issues pertaining to building the postwar navy. It reorganized itself following the recommendations of Captain Lay and revised the terms of reference of the members to reflect the government initiatives towards integration.⁹⁰ The reorganization of the Naval Board was complete by September 1947 when Rear-Admiral Houghton was appointed to the reinstated position of Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff.⁹¹ Significantly, the Claxton's reorganization withdrew the Deputy Minister from the Naval Board thereby eliminating a civilian bureaucratic presence in the administration of the navy.⁹² Claxton's reforms, however, produced a proliferation of tri-service committees and increased staff commitments while the navy was endeavouring to hold the line on the number of staff officers in NSHQ.⁹³ The Naval Board was also concerned that the demand for senior officers to serve ashore in administration would be satisfied

at the expense of essential sea-going experience needed to qualify them for senior command and staff appointments. In order to maintain a sufficient nucleus of officers ashore to facilitate rapid expansion and reduce the requirements at NSHQ, the Naval Board decided that as a matter of policy more authority and administration would be transferred to the commands. To achieve this, "would involve substantial changes to ensure that only major policy matters were dealt with at N.S.H.Q."⁹⁴ It was hoped that this would result in more ships at sea. The issue would be resolved at the next Senior Officers Meeting.

The Naval Staff engaged many new and complex issues in which experience was lacking. Many had political ramifications. The acquisition of aircraft for naval aviation was an expensive, sensitive, ongoing issue requiring continuous attention. Even though the carrier was on loan from the Royal Navy, there were many factors that made the acquisition of American aircraft for first-line replacements attractive.⁹⁵ The decision was eventually made to buy British aircraft but this was the last such commitment as the aircraft proved inferior and spares support unreliable. The issue of the extent of RCN commitments in Joint Service exercises and scientific experiments resulting from the government's renewed interest in the Arctic caused the naval staff to venture, with some evident reluctance, into unfamiliar waters.⁹⁶ The first Naval Staff initiative on this matter was to introduce a new Canadian Arctic Coastal Zone in an area that had previously been part of a designated Royal Naval Station.⁹⁷

This evolution underscored the ongoing difficulty that the RCN was experiencing in reordering relationships with its traditional and its continental ally. Naval Service Headquarters felt obligated to clear the new zone with both the Admiralty and the United States Navy. The limits of the zone were published in Admiralty Fleet Orders as part of the still-extant Imperial world-wide system. However, an indication as to the state of flux of alliance and professional relationships on the part RCN is that at the same meeting the Naval Board decided to adopt USN communications and tactical

publications and to introduce an American naval system of numerical designations for task force organization.⁹⁸ The previous year, Rear-Admiral Brodeur, COPC, had shifted west coast ships to the USN communications system as a necessity in order to operate with the predominantly USN forces in the Pacific.⁹⁹ East coast ships remained on the RN system and when operating with American ships had to write out the USN signal codes on pieces of paper.¹⁰⁰ After March 1947, in order to work with both the USN and RN, east coast ships had to carry two different sets of signal books.¹⁰¹ This situation continued until the Combined Communications Book was produced under the sponsorship of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington during the late 1940's.¹⁰² This remarkable cooperative venture was partially a Canadian initiative and included participation by American, British, Australian and New Zealand armed forces.¹⁰³ By the Korean War, common communications doctrine, tactical procedures and fleet signal books were in place that allowed participating navies to work together under the auspices of the United Nations but essentially under American command. This work also provided the foundation for the Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) series produced after NATO was founded.

The requirement for submarine services provides an extreme example but a good basis for demonstrating the nature of the dual RN-USN dependency by the RCN that had its genesis in the early postwar period. In 1947, the Naval Board approached both the Royal Navy and the United States Navy to provide target submarine services for ASW training.¹⁰⁴ The acquisition of submarine services remained problematic and the requirement was met, but not satisfactorily, by utilizing both sources. After experiencing several years of inconsistent and unpredictable service from both the RN and the USN on the east coast, an agreement was negotiated with the Royal Navy in 1954, to station the Sixth Submarine Squadron permanently at Halifax.¹⁰⁵ On the west coast, submarine services were provided irregularly by the United States Navy until an ex-USN submarine was obtained on loan and commissioned as HMCS *Grilse* in 1961.¹⁰⁶ Canadian submariners trained with both navies

and the submarines were supported materially by the nation of origin. This ultimately resulted in the creation of two materially different as well as professionally and culturally oriented submarine forces, one on either coast, after the RCN acquired British Oberon class submarines in 1966.¹⁰⁷ Canadian submariners who moved between the coasts experienced a sort of professional schizophrenia. While this was an extreme result of a sort of dual-dependency syndrome, it is an indication of how the RCN was developing the capability to sail two divergent courses in seeking answers to professional problems.¹⁰⁸

Personnel matters became the most critical problem of the navy and consumed the staff of the Chief of Naval Personnel. Staff documents indicate great gaps in personnel resources to meet the commitments of the depot in Halifax while Esquimalt was in reasonably sound shape.¹⁰⁹ There was a concerted effort to eliminate non-essential commitments to reduce the impact of the impending discharge of the temporary interim force personnel. Every officer and man was essential and unanticipated requirements added to demands on personnel resources already stretched beyond limits. The personnel account was in a deficit position. The impact of a Claxton directive to show a "tri-service" aspect to the public at NDHQ was immediately felt. The navy resisted the idea of using scarce uniformed personnel in non-essential tasks such as parking lot security where it was considered civilians would suffice.¹¹⁰ Personnel issues submitted to the Naval Board for decision pertained primarily to conditions of service matters such as accommodations, uniforms and miscellaneous items of ship's routine such as beer sales and liberty boats. Issues of routine could be corrected administratively without cost, but for critical initiatives to improve conditions of services there was no funding available to implement them.¹¹¹ Indicators were that personnel shortages and poor conditions of service were affecting morale. The Naval Board received an appeal for support from the Canadian Naval Service Benevolent Fund that was operated and funded independently and provided financial support to needy sailors and their families.¹¹² The fund's officers reported that their

expenditures were exceeding their receipts, necessitating a draw on capital. This suggests a sharp increase in demand for financial assistance by destitute sailors. Financial problems have a direct impact on morale and this was another indicator of problems in the fleet.

Morale in the fleet was in fact deteriorating badly. The transition to a peacetime navy and financial constraints imposed by the government had created an environment of stringency, uncertainty and dissatisfaction. The main complaints were poor pay, poor accommodations, lack of married quarters, the new trade structure imposed by integration and poor career prospects.¹¹³ These issues affected "old hands" and new entries alike. A complaint specific to career men, particularly those in the Engine Room Artificer and Stoker trades, was their high ratio of seetime to drafts ashore. Some had never been ashore during their careers and there was no hope of relief in sight. The generally poor situation was exacerbated by a scarcely functioning divisional system and indifferent leadership at all levels in the fleet.¹¹⁴

Lack of leadership skills was prevalent particularly within the ranks of the junior officers regardless of entry, RCN, RCNR or RCNVR. Many officers had selectively adopted "bad habits" while serving with the Royal Navy during the war and applied inappropriate styles of leadership to "egalitarian" minded Canadian naval ratings. What the men objected to was not antiquated customs derived from the Royal Navy but an acquired attitude of superiority exhibited by some Canadian officers who were from the same socio-economic background and possibly even from the same school or street.¹¹⁵ The war was over and the over-arching patriotic enthusiasm to get on with the job had vanished when the "hostilities only" men were demobilized. There was a particular motivational problem among the hastily recruited two-year men for the interim force who were generally poorly trained and had not developed a positive attitude towards naval discipline.¹¹⁶ The results were predictable.

The "sickly season", as Tony German calls the period of the "incidents", began not in the cruiser *Ontario* in August 1947, as is popularly believed¹¹⁷, but sometime before. There was an incident in HMCS *Nootka* during the previous May and there were rumours going around the fleet then that at least one other incident had occurred.¹¹⁸ *Nootka* was considered to be "a well run ship" but had its share of two-year interim force men who were "malcontents".¹¹⁹ The Commanding Officer, Commander Herbert Rayner¹²⁰, was an experienced prewar RCN professional known for his quiet and gentle manner and humanitarian character. The Executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander D. L. "Tuffy" Macknight, was also of prewar RCN vintage and a strong personality. The incident occurred while *Nootka* was de-ammunitioning at the naval magazine in Bedford Basin at the North end of Halifax harbour. It was discovered that one box of .22 small arms ammunition containing fifty rounds had gone missing and this was reported to Commander Rayner who ordered that there would be no shore leave until the ammunition was returned. Rayner then went ashore himself, leaving the Executive Officer to sort out the problem. It was Rayner's custom to delegate administrative matters to his second-in-command.¹²¹ Lieutenant (later Rear-Admiral) Dan Hanington, *Nootka's* navigating officer, recalled that unfortunately the Captain's departure seemed to act as a catalyst and some junior ratings reacted by locking themselves in their mess decks. Lieutenant-Commander Macknight took a straight forward approach, "Don't be so ridiculous guys", and talked the men out from behind their barred mess deck doors. The incident was over quickly and no official disciplinary action was taken nor the incident reported. Commander Rayner left the ship in June and, typically, there followed a rapid turnover of Commanding Officers.¹²² Rumours however persisted and the situation came to the notice of the Minister and caused embarrassment for the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, Rear-Admiral Cuthbert Taylor, who had no knowledge of the incident.

Rear-Admiral Taylor was obviously surprised when NSHQ asked him in December 1947, for a report on morale problems in *Nootka* that had been submitted by Lieutenant-Commander M. L.

Stirling, who had temporary command of *Nootka*. During Taylor's absence on sick leave and without his knowledge, his Chief of Staff had ordered Stirling to conduct "an unofficial enquiry" and submit a report, the contents of which had obviously filtered through to NSHQ. The Chief of Staff, Captain W. Holms, had failed to advise his admiral. Taylor took the offence. He stated in his response to NSHQ that he queried the now Acting-Captain Rayner if he had experienced morale problems in *Nootka* and reported that, "He[Rayner] was very surprised and in his own words said *Nootka* has a damn fine Ship's Company."¹²³ Lieutenant-Commander Stirling, was obviously less sanguine that there were no morale problems. In his report he stated that while no unrest had become evident, "It was considered, however, to be desirable to make a survey of the factors contributing to the undoubted unhappiness which existed before it developed into unrest."¹²⁴ By December, Captain H.F. Pullen, who was also the Flotilla Commander, had relieved Stirling. Pullen's comments, according to Taylor, were the same as Rayner's. Commander Tony Storrs, who relieved Pullen the following August 1948, was of the view that *Nootka* was "simmering" and there was "a general air of discontent" among the ship's company.¹²⁵

The evidence suggests that Taylor, Rayner and Pullen, all senior officers, were exhibiting some form of denial. Taylor, in fact, treated some observations in Stirling's report with abject disdain as if the navy was dealing with some sort of labour union movement. He dismissed independent observations of poor morale by a chaplain and medical doctor as stemming from "colossal ignorance of the service"¹²⁶ and commented, "I am not in favour of 'unqualified outside interests' wandering about mess decks, as this definitely suggests to the Ship's companies (whose greatest moan is homesickness) that they must have grounds for complaint."¹²⁷ What Taylor dismissed a "homesickness" was dissatisfaction because *Nootka's* ship's company never knew the ship's programme from month to month which was very distressing for family men. Significantly, many of

the sources of complaint named by Stirling were also later cited by the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff (VCNS) in a later comprehensive memorandum on morale.

Rear-Admiral Taylor's response to men's complaints was reactionary. He understood the problems involved with conditions of service such as pay and accommodation but appeared to be completely out of touch with the personal concerns of young sailors. He dismissed these out of hand. In searching for recent experience that might have qualified Taylor to assess the situation in the ships it will be found that his only sea command was of HMCS *Patriot* in 1926-27, some twenty years prior! He is the classic example of one of the RCN "old guard" who simply floated to the top. Taylor spent his entire war in shore positions out of the limelight and is almost invisible in the history of the RCN except at the end of his career. The retirement of Murray and death of Jones created opportunities that benefited Taylor based on his seniority alone. He was a cadet in the class of 1912 from RNCC and a classmate of "Rastus" Reid who became CNS in February 1946. Taylor was promoted to rear-admiral two months later. There is no evidence to suggest that he might be aware of the volatile situation existing in the ships under his command.

The *Nootka* incident followed what might be considered a standard Canadian pattern for what was technically a mutiny but essentially a work stoppage. In the media jargon of the day the incident was a "sit-down strike" that described a common form of protest action by organized labour.¹²⁸ The incident, as it played out, was similar to one onboard *Skeena* in 1936. The *Skeena* incident described by Lay, the Executive Officer at the time, was a temporary work stoppage by junior ranks to protest ship's routine.¹²⁹ Common sense prevailed after Lay made representation to the Commanding Officer, Commander Reid. In neither the *Nootka* nor the *Skeena* incident was disciplinary action taken or an official report made to higher authority. Technically, a mutiny did not occur because care was taken by superiors not to issue a direct order that could be disobeyed. The Canadian pattern involving work stoppages was also repeated in two "mutinous incidents" that

occurred during the Second World War. One was in HMCS *Iroquois* in 1943¹³⁰ and another in HMCS *Nabob* in 1944.¹³¹ Both these incidents were reported to higher authority. In the more serious *Iroquois* incident, the Commanding Officer, Commander W. Holms, was relieved of his command. Two official historians, Tucker and Schull, differ as to the reason.¹³² Tucker states that a Board of Inquiry removed the Commanding Officer from his ship and Schull states that the Commanding Officer suffered a heart attack and was removed. Rear-Admiral Brock stated that his father, Captain Eustace Brock, Senior Canadian Officer in Greenock, summarily removed Holms to diffuse the situation and to avoid publicity. The ratings involved in both these wartime incidents were not disciplined.

Except for the initiative of the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast's Chief of Staff, interestingly the same Holms in the wartime *Iroquois* incident, the morale problems in *Nootka* might never have surfaced. However, it appears that it was Vice-Admiral Grant who later as CNS brought them to the attention of Brooke Claxton. Claxton subsequently asked to see Stirling's report and Taylor's covering letter.¹³³ Grant was keeping the Minister abreast of morale issues and building his case to obtain more funding to improve conditions of service, particularly habitability in ships. *Nootka* was new and commissioned only in 1946, but the report contained complaints about accommodations, sleeping in hammocks, messing arrangements for eating and unsanitary washplaces. Claxton had had a short cruise in *Nootka* with Lieutenant-Commander Stirling and some experience on which to assess the report. Rear-Admiral Taylor's letter may have reinforced Claxton's view that RCN senior officers were out of touch with the society from which the postwar RCN was recruiting its officers and ratings. There is also a note of arrogance in Taylor's comments that the Minister would not have missed.

The arrangements Claxton would have seen onboard *Nootka* had not changed in British-designed ships the size of cruisers and below in over 100 years.¹³⁴ *Nootka* had the traditional

accommodation and messing arrangements where the men below the rank of Petty Officer lived, slept, ate and recreated in open messes where they were assigned by branch. For example, the stokers' mess would house junior engine room and boiler room watchkeepers. The men slept in hammocks slung for that purpose and stowed when not in use. There were tables and benches fixed to the deck on which to eat and socialize. Each man had a locker. Their meals were prepared in a common galley and carried to the messes in large containers and served out by messmen appointed by the "senior hand", a Leading Seaman, on a rotational basis. The whole arrangement was utilitarian and could be described as basic camping. Chiefs and Petty Officers' messes were smaller and better fitted out. There were settees and some bunks. Junior men were assigned to collect and serve the food and clean the dishes and utensils and the mess for the Chiefs and Petty Officers. The officers lived in cabins with bunks, desks and lockers and had separate heads and showers. The Executive Officer, Engineer officer and Supply Officer had single cabins. The officers ate and recreated in the "Wardroom", a common, well appointed space with chesterfields, chairs, fireplace, bar and a dining area.¹³⁵ Their meals were prepared separately by trained officers' cooks in a combined pantry-galley attached to the wardroom and served by stewards who also made bunks, cleaned the cabins and generally catered to the officers' needs. The Captain lived and ate independent of the wardroom in his own cabin and was attended by a personal steward. The Captain visited the wardroom upon invitation of the Executive Officer who was the mess president. There were different arrangements in the carrier where each man had a bunk and cafeteria style messing was in operation.

The issue of morale and discipline was foremost in the minds of the senior officers during their next meeting at NSHQ at the end of November, 1947. The admirals from both coasts attended.¹³⁶ It was generally thought "that morale and discipline of the RCN had suffered considerably for various reasons."¹³⁷ Some of the reasons cited were lack of married quarters, absence of travel concessions to assist personnel home on leave, an imbalanced trade structure with

too many maintainers versus users, and inadequate financial compensation. The senior officers discussed the introduction of a Welfare Committee system in HMC Ships based on the RN model that had been introduced by the British in March 1947. It was noted that something similar had been tried and was proving successful in *Warrior*.¹³⁸ As at their previous meeting, the members were concerned that Welfare Committees should have a limited purview. Their introduction was considered acceptable provided "promulgation of the covering orders should properly define the welfare that such committees will be authorized to consider."¹³⁹ It is apparent the senior officers wanted the Welfare Committees kept on a tight rein.

The senior officers' caucus also discussed other matters pertaining to the general state of the navy. It was agreed that flag officers on the coasts would be given operational control over ships within their areas while NSHQ would retain it for ships deployed outside. Additionally, more decision-making authority over administrative policy would devolve to the commands. Reserve training was a concern and discussed because lack of resources had greatly curtailed this activity but would do so into the foreseeable future. The reorientation to the USN communications system was advanced through agreement by the members for adoption of the USN scheme for trade standards as well as the American training syllabus for schools. With respect to increasing activity in the Arctic, the caucus agreed that the RCN was not interested in icebreakers at this time because "Past experience has shown this would only lead to commercial commitments and this was to be avoided."¹⁴⁰

A general concern was being expressed by Commanding Officers in the fleet as to the future policy of the RCN and this issue was discussed at length. In spite of the relatively unambiguous statement by the Minister assigning an anti-submarine role to the RCN in conjunction with American forces and the discussions at the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), the minutes suggest that the naval hierarchy was either unsure of or had yet to embrace the new strategic direction. The

consensus recorded was, "[T]he RCN commitment in any future war could not be foreseen. It would depend on who the adversary and the allies might be. For this reason the policy will be to establish the RCN on as flexible a basis as possible, which would allow amalgamation with any likely allies to fight against any foreseen adversary."¹⁴¹ With this concept in mind, it was decided the best plan was, "to give personnel as general training as possible" and for this reason no major combined operations with the other two services would be planned.¹⁴² More than anything this general approach probably reflected the fact that underfunding and the instability the RCN was experiencing allowed only the most general training to take place.

As a result of agreement at the Senior Officers' Meeting, the Naval Board decided to introduce Welfare Committees in ships and establishments of the RCN.¹⁴³ This followed more disturbing reports on conditions of service such as inadequate barracks accommodation, overcrowding of recruits at *Naden* and poor food.¹⁴⁴ Other staff investigations also showed that the navy was far behind the other two services with respect to standards of accommodation ashore and basic essential items such as blankets and pillows.¹⁴⁵ These revelations resulted from the consolidation initiatives for conditions of service under Claxton's integration policy. This prompted such remedial administrative action as could be taken given the lack of funding for material improvements.¹⁴⁶ Following the lead of the RN, dress regulations for wearing "plain" (civilian) clothes by ratings were relaxed.¹⁴⁷ Orders were promulgated, following ministerial directive, to remove the "wavy lace" rank insignias from reserve officers uniforms and replace them with straight stripes thereby standardizing appearance between regular and reserve officers.¹⁴⁸ Additionally, liberty boats were cancelled and a controlled gangway routine was ordered to be implemented in ships and establishments.¹⁴⁹ Action was directed to improve library and entertainment film services.¹⁵⁰

The message promulgating the implementation of Welfare Committees was sent to the fleet on 28 July 1947, by Captain Miles, Chief of Naval Personnel.¹⁵¹ The message stated the new policy

had "[T]he object of providing machinery for free discussion between officers and men of items of welfare and general amenities within the ship or establishment that lie within the powers of decision held by the Captain or his immediate Administrative Authority."¹⁵² The Executive Officer of the ship was to be ex-officio chairman and representation was to include officers appointed by the Captain and "a number of lower deck representatives chosen by ballot by the messes...they would be representing."¹⁵³ Welfare Committees were precluded from discussing conditions of service such as discipline, pay and leave. They were given oversight of the conduct and administration of the ship's canteen.¹⁵⁴ The message further reiterated that Welfare Committees were "not intended to interfere in any way with or prejudice the right of any individual rating to put forward suggestions through his divisional officer or the responsibility of the divisional officer for looking after the interests of his men."¹⁵⁵ A follow-up message was sent to the Flag Officers on the two coasts directing them to institute Welfare Committees in ships under their command and to ensure that all classes of ratings were represented.¹⁵⁶ The introduction of Welfare Committees, restricted as they were, was a useful first step to improving morale onboard. How well they functioned and the impact they had on morale was the direct responsibility of the Executive Officer.

There is conclusive evidence that the Naval Board knew that morale was not good and their appreciation was that this was mainly due to material deficiencies, poor pay and trade restructuring resulting from integration. One staff officer advised the Deputy Chief of Personnel, "One thing is certain - if the standard of living of the Seaman remains below that of the average Canadian and if the value the Service places in "ability-to-take-charge" is to be adjusted below trade skills we will never succeed in establishing the discipline and contentment that is essential to a healthy and vigorous service."¹⁵⁷ Owing to financial constraints and government policy these complaints were beyond the power of the naval hierarchy to correct. Viewed in this context, Vice-Admiral Reid's public admonishment of government policy can be interpreted as a rebuke in frustration. The board took

administrative initiatives to improve conditions but these were very incremental and did not address the major problems. There was also an understanding that there was a systemic problem with naval leadership, particularly with junior officers, "who lacked the training and experience to respect and care for their men".¹⁵⁸ The personnel staff took developing means to correct this deficiency as a priority.

There was also a realization by some officers in the fleet that there were serious shortcomings in the application of the divisional system. On the west coast, Lieutenant-Commander (later Rear-Admiral) Patrick Budge, serving in the position of "First Lieutenant-Commander" at HMCS *Naden*, took initiatives to address the deficiencies in leadership training. This was characteristic of "Paddy" Budge who began his career as a boy seaman in the Royal Navy and was commissioned from the ranks after transferring to the RCN. He had gained a reputation as an exceptional leader of men and was a role model.¹⁵⁹ He observed that there was "a great deal of knowledge lacking" in most of the Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers charged with divisional responsibilities in his establishment.¹⁶⁰ Major deficiencies included little understanding of the divisional system and ignorance as to the existence, let alone the contents, of *King's Regulations for the Canadian Navy* (KRCN), containing administrative orders for the navy.¹⁶¹ Many of these senior men had divisional responsibilities for "new entry" recruits under training. Lieutenant-Commander Budge devised and taught a divisional course first for senior rates and then officers at *Naden*. Budge was destined to play a key role in restoring discipline and morale in HMCS *Ontario* after an incident on board on 22 August 1947.

Ontario, a cruiser and the largest ship on the west coast, was conducting four-weeks of trials and working-ups after a two year refit and conversion.¹⁶² In order to progress essential training and to compensate for personnel reductions, the cruiser was assigned "a special reduced complement" to enable 50 percent of the armament to be manned.¹⁶³ This adjustment allowed the ship to be partly

manned by 3rd Class Rates under training in addition to the normal complement of personnel undergoing non-substantive, or trades training. This resulted in a very large number of trainees among the over 600 men onboard and an increased supervisory load for the already over-extended supervisory personnel. The Commanding Officer, Captain James C. Hibbard,¹⁶⁴ had recently joined the ship from his appointment as DCNP at NSHQ. He would be fully aware of serious morale problems in the fleet. "Jimmy" Hibbard was a prewar RCN officer who had commanded two destroyers during the war and had extensive experience in training. The Executive Officer, Commander Jeffry Brock, had transferred from the RCNVR at the end of the war. Brock had spent most of the war with the Royal Navy at sea in command of escorts. There he had distinguished himself and was highly regarded in Royal Navy command circles.¹⁶⁵ His RCN contemporaries saw Brock as a man with a natural arrogance that was merely reinforced by his service with the Royal Navy.¹⁶⁶ Rear-Admiral Patrick Budge described Brock as having been very much influenced by his time with the RN and that he had "a domineering attitude and talked down to people."¹⁶⁷ His attitude, leadership style and cultivated English accent caused great dissension on the lower deck in *Ontario*.

The incident occurred while *Ontario* was at anchor in Nanoose Harbour on the east coast of Vancouver Island. The spark was a complaint over dress regulations ordered by Brock but was really the cumulative result of "the capricious variation of the ship's routine, and with general dissatisfaction with the Executive Officer".¹⁶⁸ Some fifty junior men locked themselves in a mess deck as a protest and would not come out. The Executive Officer reported this to Captain Hibbard who personally intervened and defused the situation while judiciously avoiding any action that would, "allow the incident to develop into a serious condition of mutiny."¹⁶⁹ Captain Hibbard then went ashore by boat and reported the incident by telephone to Rear-Admiral Mainguy, Commanding Officer Pacific Coast (COPC).¹⁷⁰ Hibbard stated to the Mainguy commissioners what he probably told Mainguy, "There was a general moan about the XO's[Executive Officer's] orders...for some reason or other they could

not tolerate my Executive Officer. He had been there for a year, and to a man they could not tolerate my Commander. He just seemed to be born that way, he just couldn't get their confidence."¹⁷¹ Mainguy decided to relieve Brock immediately and replace him with Lieutenant-Commander Budge. Mainguy took the unusual tack of not telling Budge the real reason why he was being sent to *Ontario*. He told Budge that Brock was leaving the ship for compassionate reasons and gave him the impression that his appointment as Executive Officer in Ontario would be temporary.¹⁷² Budge was driven up to Nanoose by staff car and met Brock coming ashore with all his bags. Brock avoided any conversation and said simply, "They're not a bad lot, Budge" and carried on to the car.¹⁷³

Budge recalled that as soon as he went on board, "I smelled a rat" because he was not received by the Officer of the Watch as was customary but by the Gunnery Officer. Curiously, he was kept isolated from officers and ratings until his interview with Captain Hibbard. Hibbard, whom Budge knew well, did not mention either the incident or the situation resulting in Brock's removal. Hibbard simply said that, "He wanted to make changes to the dress, there was no reason men should not wear working dress in harbour." The ship's officers did not offer any information when Budge met them later, but he sensed there was something wrong when he heard murmuring during his first address to the ship's company. He finally pried the story out of the "padre", Chaplain Lee Gillard. Budge went to Hibbard to talk about the situation and he asked Budge what they should do. Budge advised him to sail and that he would sort it out at sea. To his dismay Hibbard replied that was impossible because his wife was coming up to Nanoose with another officer's wife for a picnic.¹⁷⁴ This affair was held on shore in full view of the ship's company. Hibbard never did confide in his new Executive Officer the details of the incident. Although Budge never got the full story he absolved Brock of some of the blame because he felt "the Chiefs and Petty Officers were to a great extent responsible as they lost contact with their men."¹⁷⁵

The evidence suggests that the navy dealt with the incident in *Ontario* by covering it up which seems to have been the norm in peacetime given the examples of *Skeena* and *Nootka*. In this instance, the unpopular Executive Officer was summarily removed without a hearing.¹⁷⁶ The men involved faced no disciplinary proceedings but were drafted to other ships. There was no official report to NSHQ and the Naval Board Minutes indicate no discussion of it. Comprehensive staff papers on morale and conditions of service written at the time bear no mention of a problem in *Ontario*. Rumours however were rife throughout the fleet and the participants obviously spread the word. The reason why the incident was covered up has not been determined.¹⁷⁷ Certainly, the naval hierarchy would wish to avoid bad publicity or any indication that they were not in control. The incident occurred at the end of Vice-Admiral Reid's term as CNS and possibly senior officers wished to avoid an inquiry at that juncture.

The more probable explanation is that the senior officers saw this as an isolated case and dealt with it in a customary and established manner. There was obviously a denial that there was any systemic problem and a good deal of misplaced optimism that conditions would improve in time. At worst, it suggests a paralysis at the highest level of command for fear of mutiny spreading fleet-wide. Certainly, the response of the *Ontario's* Commanding Officer suggests a cavalier attitude towards the welfare and discipline of his men. Hibbard's decision to picnic in the face of an arrested mutiny seems reprehensible, demonstrating to his men an attitude that the RCN was an "officers' navy".¹⁷⁸ He certainly conveyed the impression that what they had done was acceptable and not serious. Hibbard told the Mainguy inquiry that what his ship's company did, "...was referred to in time as collective bargaining."¹⁷⁹ On the other hand, R. Maclean, the Chaplain(RC) on board *Ontario*, supporting the Budge view, believed that the "mutinous demonstration was an example of the negation of the divisional system."¹⁸⁰ The commission appointed to inquire into subsequent similar incidents found that the way the senior officers dealt with the incident in *Ontario* simply established an undesirable

precedent that encouraged acts of mass insubordination in other ships eighteen months later. Louis Audette, one of the commissioners, wrote retrospectively, "Had heads rolled, in 1947, the spectacle might have discouraged further mutinies."¹⁸¹ Inaction resulted merely in a postponement.

Vice-Admiral Reid stepped down as the Chief of the Naval Staff on 1 September 1947.¹⁸² Little has been written about his tenure as CNS and what has, tends to trivialize his efforts and accomplishments. Eayrs wrote of his accomplishments, "Reid resisted Claxton's efforts to integrate the armed forces but did not conspicuously improve the efficiency of his own."¹⁸³ This conclusion is hardly surprising considering Eayrs relied primarily on Claxton's opinions for his material.¹⁸⁴ Eayrs demonstrates little understanding of either the navy's hard conditions of service in wartime-built ships or the plight of destitute married sailors in Halifax and Esquimalt. It was government penury that contributed to these unsatisfactory conditions and Reid spoke out against this publicly.¹⁸⁵ Reid was brought into a job he didn't want, during a very difficult time for the navy. He was asked to make bricks without straw. The dominant themes of the period are underfunding and instability. The RCN was reduced to half the postwar complement that it had planned and then reduced by a quarter again by government edict without consultation or warning.

Reid's challenge was to oversee a navy in transition from war to peace. His task was to build a new navy while demobilizing the old one. Naval Service Headquarters and his own office were being reorganized during his tenure. Reid was fully aware of the morale problem and Welfare Committees were introduced as a first step towards giving the men on the lower deck a voice in their affairs. The RCN took its first steps to reorient itself towards the USN. The USN communications system was adopted and with this decision the gates were opened for all branches of the navy to turn to the Americans for equipment, material and answers to professional problems. There were many good ideas about the future that were germinating at the junior staff level that gave officers a feeling of optimism. In retrospect, failures include the decision, under great pressure from the RN, to stay

with British as a source for aircraft.¹⁸⁶ But detractors are wise after the fact; it made sense at the time. More important was the lack of firm direction with respect to something other than a general purpose role for the RCN when indicators from the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) and the government clearly indicated a move towards ASW specialization. Of Reid's tenure as CNS, Rear-Admiral John Charles observed "Although you could say the period from 1946 to 1947, as far as the operational side of the navy is concerned, it was rather gaunt [sic]. However, there was a hell of a lot going on about how to make it a better navy."¹⁸⁷

NOTES - CHAPTER 3

1 Claxton, "Autobiography, 842.

2 For a concise examination of Claxton's tenure as MND see Captain P.C. Paterson, "The Defence Administration of Brooke Claxton: 1946 to 1954" (M.A. thesis, The Royal Military College of Canada, 1975). For broader biographical treatment see David Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

3 Sandra Gwyn, *Tapestry of War* (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd, 1992), 490. Claxton was very active in "The Canadian Movement" before the war that resulted in the founding of a series of Canadian Clubs in major centers across the country. After leaving politics, Claxton was a force behind the establishment of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and was the first Chairman of the Canada Council.

4 Pickerskill and Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 3, 1945-1946, 202.

5 Ibid., 373. Mackenzie King also blamed Claxton at least in part for Liberal losses in the by-elections held in October 1945 while the latter was in Paris.

6 *Claxton Papers*, vol. 224. The inference that he wanted External Affairs is contained in the draft notes for Claxton's "Autobiography"; Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960*, 151. Bercuson interviewed Pickerskill in 1983. The essence of Claxton's character and patriotism is actually better portrayed by Sandra Gwyn in *Tapestry of War*, cited above.

7 Pickersgill and Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 3, 1945-1946, 393-394.

8 Ibid., 394.

9 Ibid.

10 Mackenzie King's opposition to aircraft carriers stemmed from the Quebec Conference where he believed the RCN, in collusion with the RN, had forced him to concede to the acquisition of aircraft carriers. He also told Claxton that Louis St. Laurent felt the aircraft carrier "should go at once." Moreover, King thought that the visit of *Warrior* to Mexico on the way around to Esquimalt was "a waste of money" and "irritated the public".

11 Pickersgill and Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 3, 1945-1946, 393-394.

12 Claxton, "Autobiography", 872.

13 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 4, 1945-1946, 6.

14 Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960*, 169.

15 Dan W. Middlemiss, "Economic Considerations in the Development of the Canadian Navy since 1945," *The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985*, ed. Douglas, 278.

16 Brooke Claxton to Mackenzie King, memo, 17/2/46 quoted in Paterson, "The Defence Administration of Brooke Claxton: 1946 to 1954," Appendix 4, 126-129.

17 Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960*, 159. Also see Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada. Peacemaking and Deterrence*, vol. 3, 19 that Bercuson uses as his source.

18 Ibid.

19 *Debates*, v, 19 August 1946.

20 See Nicholas Tracy, *Canada's Naval Strategy: Rooted in Experience*, Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 1, Centre for Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 25-34 ("Riding the American Tiger") for an overview of the political-naval considerations and options facing Canadian decision makers on the issue of the developing Canadian-American postwar relations.

21 Claxton to Mackenzie King, memo, 17/2/46 quoted in Paterson, "The Defence Administration of Brooke Claxton: 1946 to 1954," Appendix 4, 126.

22 Ibid., 127.

23 Collins interview by the author.

24 NBM 177-3, 8 May 1946. Soward states "there was no question most of the senior RCN officers at the time were very pro-British" See Soward, *Hands To Flying Stations: A Recollective History of Canadian Naval Aviation, 1945-1954*, vol. 1, 62-63. Soward overlooks the influence of Lay, father of Canadian naval aviation, and the fact that the Naval Board did discuss acquiring American aircraft at the time. The Naval Board considered that "United States equipment was not sufficiently standardized [with the RCN] to entertain any thoughts along this line" and that training pilots with the United States Navy presented similar problems. In fact, the first meeting of the Military Cooperation Committee, two weeks after the Naval Board meeting cited, was a major milestone in the process of reorientation toward the USN. The situation was fluid. Soward's well substantiated argument is that the RN affiliation resulted in the acquisition of inferior aircraft and less than adequate professional supervision of the fledgling Naval Aviation Branch

by RN officers on loan or who transferred to the RCN. In the early days, the record of crashes, deaths and aircraft chronically inoperable exceeded wartime standards. Collins recalled that at the time every senior RCN officer and especially Reid was under intense pressure from colleagues in the RN to "Buy British" with respect to the decision to purchase either British Firefly IV carrier aircraft or the American "Avenger" carrier aircraft. Collins interview by the author. To put it in perspective, Great Britain was on her knees and the RN was in desperate straits financially and their own naval air acquisition programme was at risk and much depended on foreign sales. They eventually sweetened the pot by offering first line aircraft to the RCN before their own needs were met.

25 Storrs interview by the author. Storrs saw nothing significant about the decision of the Naval Board, probably orchestrated by Grant, to stay with the "imperial navy connection" until this was changed by government direction.

26 Collins interview by the author.

27 Ibid. and Battles interview.

28 Collins interview by the author.

29 Claxton, "Autobiography", 817.

30 Ibid., 818.

31 Ibid., 831.

32 Ibid., 834.

33 Ibid., 837-838.

34 Ibid. Claxton was being theatrical for the benefit of posterity. The navy did not salute in buildings, "undercover". He also had difficulty adjusting to the language of sailors who customarily spoke in the symbolic language of the environment in which they fought. Officers and ratings of every navy in the world learned to call walls or partitions "bulkheads" from their first day in the service.

35 Ibid., 842. Retrospectively, Claxton was probably referring to his policy of Canadianization that particularly affected the RCN. However, the only senior officers to whom he ever denied promotion were naval.

36 Ibid., 841.

37 Ibid., 842.

38 It is obvious that Claxton was a "nit-picker" and fond of mind games which is reflected in this anecdote in his "Autobiography". He directed Public Works to change the brass plates that said "Naval Service Headquarters" on the door of "A" building and waited to see how long it would take for people to notice it. No one mentioned it. Later, he discovered that Public Works had put up a sign that said "Canadian Army Headquarters" not "National Defence Headquarters" because some worker thought it was just as good and the holes matched.

39 Paterson, "The Defence Administration of Brooke Claxton: 1946 to 1954", 22-23.

40 See Raymont, "Evolution of the Structure of the Department of National Defence, 1945-1968," 21-26 for a concise overview of all the changes Claxton introduced in the organization of the department in during 1946-1947.

41 Brooke Claxton, memo, "The Reorganization and Direction of the Armed Forces," July 1947, quoted in Paterson, "The Defence Administration of Brooke Claxton: 1946 to 1954," Appendix 5, 130.

42 PC 887, 13 March 1947.

43 Raymont, "Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 192. There was an Assistant Deputy Minister for each service and Gordon Mills retained that post for the navy.

44 Claxton, "Autobiography", 818.

45 Raymont, "Evolution of the Structure of the Department of National Defence, 1945-1968," Appendix A, 15.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., 25.

48 Claxton, "Autobiography", 839.

49 Ibid., 841. This worked both ways as the assistants maintained naval loyalties and gave their former colleagues in the Naval Secretariat a "heads up" when surprises were on the way from the minister's office. Dillon interview by the author.

50 Claxton, "Autobiography", 843.

51 Ibid., 849.

52 Ibid., 851.

53 Ibid.

54 Collins interview by the author

55 Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960*, 161. Bercuson is accurate only in the narrow sense of senior command but overlooks the fact that the restructuring of the non-commissioned ranks by Claxton to achieve "symmetry" caused serious disruption in the RCN through the addition of two unnecessary ranks. The chain of command applies to more than officers.

56 Claxton, "Autobiography", 986. See also Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960*, 181. Criticism of Claxton's tri-service college idea cost Lay, and probably Ken Adams, promotion to rear-admiral.

57 Claxton, "Autobiography", 890.

58 Ibid., 891.

59 Ibid., 869.

60 Ibid., 890. The name was changed in 1952 "after some hesitation on the part of the RCN and only with the full agreement of the RN". The RCN was reluctant because it was the only Canadian ship to be awarded battle honours for the Pacific campaign. Claxton mistakenly referred to *Uganda* as *Ontario's* "sister ship". In fact *Uganda*, originally a Fiji class cruiser, became the first of a converted cruiser class named for her. *Ontario* was of the *Swiftsure* class, ex-HMS *Minotaur*.

61 Ibid., 869.

62 NBM 220-5, 11 July 1947.

63 "Tony" Storrs was born in England and trained for the Merchant Service at *Worcester* after private school. He served with the P&O Lines, also attaining a commission in the RNR, and later joined the Chinese Maritime Customs in Hong Kong. He joined the RCNR in 1940, and was commissioned. Storrs interview by the author.

64 Biographical sketch, RAdmr. Storrs file, DHist.

65 RAdmr. Storrs stated that he overheard VAdmr. Grant say that "No reserve officer would make Captain's rank." Lay allayed Storrs' concerns by showing him the naval list and explaining that he would do well "if he kept his nose clean." Lay's wisdom prevailed and Storrs had a successful career.

66 Storrs had had no formal staff training. His first staff job was A/DNP&I at NSHQ.

67 A/DNP&I(Storrs) to ACNS(DeWolf), memo, "Future Planning", 17 January 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid. By "nuclear" Storrs meant a nucleus as opposed to atomic.

70 Ibid.

71 DNP&I to ACNS, memo, "Planning the Post-War Navy", 14 March 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans. The memo contains ideas and arguments put forward by Storrs in his memo of 17/1/47 cited above. Lay fails to acknowledge Storrs as the originator.

72 DeWolf credits Lay as the officer with the "ambition" for building the postwar RCN and providing many of the imaginative ideas. DeWolf interview by the author. The pattern of DeWolf following Lay's initiatives is evident during the war when he was DPlans and Lay DOps as discussed in Lund, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic", *The RCN in Retrospect*, ed. Boutilier.

73 DeWolf interview.

74 Naval Member PJBD files, "Implementation of Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan," file TS 11272-11, 26 August 1947 quoted in Peter T. Haydon, "Sailors, Admirals and Politicians: The Search for Identity after the War" *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity*, ed. Michael Hadley et al., 224.

75 Lund, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic," 151.

76 A/DNPI to A/ACNS, memo, 21/1/47, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

77 NSHQ to CinC A&WI, COAC, COPC, message, 20 January 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

78 DNP&I to CNS, aide-memoire, 21 January 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

79 NSM 333-5, 6 May 1946.

80 NSec, memo, "Employment of Canadian Naval Forces", 31 January 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

81 The breakdown was approximately 1,125 officers and 6,375 men. *ibid.*

82 D.SigsD. to CNP, memo, 19 April 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 2, Complements General.

83 *Ibid.*

84 NSec, memo, "Employment of Canadian Naval Forces", 31/1/47, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

85 A/DNPI to A/ACNS, memo, 20/1/47, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

86 DCNP to CNP, memo, 19 May 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 2, Complements General.

87 NSHQ to CinC A&WI, message, 22 January 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans. The carrier always required a destroyer in company for rescue work during air operations.

88 Ken Macpherson and John Burgess, *The Ships of Canada's Naval Forces 1910-1981* (Toronto: Collins, 1981), 161. *Micmac*, one of the new Canadian-built Tribal class destroyers, spent her entire career as a training ship after repair.

89 NSM 359-4, 20 January 1947, See CNS minute dated 21/1/47.

90 NBM 188-4, 31 July 1946 and NBM 221-4, 16 July 1947. Under Abbott, integration initiatives were few including issues such as rationalization of pay scales and trade structures. Claxton's reforms introduced large scale changes. Lay's recommendations for Naval Board reorganization included reinstitution of the position of VCNS and elevation of the officer responsible for Naval Aviation in the decision-making hierarchy. It eventually became a Naval Board position.

91 NBM 225, 24 September 1947 indicates VCNS vice ACNS in attendance.

92 NBM 204, 8 January 1947 indicates that the DM is no longer a member. The Deputy Minister had in fact presided over meetings of the Naval Board until this date. The Deputy Minister remained a key player as a separate authority with oversight particularly in developing the estimates and material acquisition.

93 NBM 217-5, 13 June 1947.

94 Ibid.

95 See Soward, *Hands To Flying Stations: A Recollective History of Canadian Naval Aviation, 1945-1954*, vol. I. Soward is biased against the Naval Board's decision to "buy British" and does not report the corresponding "buy American" arguments presented to the Board. The Board in fact agonized over the decision and the British choice prevailed for pragmatic as well as political reasons. Soward's conclusion that RAdmr. Grant forced the decision because of pro-British sentiment is conjecture and not supported in the documents.

96 NSM 351-6, 28 October 1946 and NBM 199-36, November 1947 suggest a strong initiative for the forces to familiarize themselves with Arctic conditions and operations. A northern cruise was approved by the Naval Board for the summer of 1947 (NBM 214-3, 29 April 1947) and *Nootka* and *Micmac* were assigned later in the employment programme to do it. There is however a lack of enthusiasm that can be detected in the tenor of the minutes. Arctic waters were obviously not considered "blue".

97 NBM 209-4, 3 March 1947. The Arctic was part of the Americas and West Indies Station nominally under the operational responsibility of an RN Admiral based in Bermuda.

98 NBM 209-1, 3 March 1947. This represented the conclusion of a process that had begun in early 1945 as all RCN ships going to the Pacific war trained in the USN system under which they would operate. *Uganda* used USN communications during her deployment in 1945. Once the decision was taken to adopt the USN communications system then equipment based on North American standards could be bought or built in Canada. Charles interview by the author.

99 Charles interview by the author. This was an initiative by Brodeur with tacit approval of the Director of Signals, Commander Sam Worth, at NSHQ. This unilateral action by the west coast "caused a furor in Halifax."

100 RAdmr. D.L. Hanington, interview by the author, tape recording, Victoria BC, 22 January 1998.

101 Ibid.

102 Charles interview by the author. The Combined Communications Board, a unit set up under the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization, remained in place after the war. It was originally set up to establish a common communication system for the Pacific war and this work continued as the benefits for the future were appreciated by the members. Charles was appointed to the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington as was a member of the Combined Communications Board. The naval members in particular realized that the capability to communicate was essential if postwar operations in a coalition or alliance were to be possible.

103 RAdmr. Charles related that the RCN could not continue operating with a split communications system and this provided the incentive to persuade both the Americans and British on to a common system. Charles interview.

104 NBM 213-5, 16 April 1947.

105 Julie H. Ferguson, *Through a Canadian Periscope*, 236-237. The agreement required the RN to provide three submarines permanently in Halifax and the RCN to provide personnel sufficient for three crews to serve in RN submarines.

106 Ibid., 254. *Grilse*, ex-USS *Burrfish*, was meant as a temporary measure as the RCN was planning to obtain SSN's at the time. As an interim step it was planned to build six of the American Barbel class conventional SSKs in Canada. Submarine construction plans were abandoned by DeWolf as being too expensive and three British Oberons were bought off the shelf.

107 Submariners could not transfer from one coast to the other without learning different terminology and adapting to different philosophies on submarine operations. The submarines were materially different reflecting North American advances in technology and habitability on the one hand and British emphasis on operational capability at the expense of comfort and dependability. Canadian officers trained with the USN as generalists and with the RN as specialists. Under the USN system seaman officers trained also as engineers. The author was a submariner and trained with both the USN and RN and served in Canadian submarines on both coasts.

108 In the case of technology this was dictated by branch affiliations with either the RN or USN. The St. Laurent class destroyer was a hybrid of British and American technology representing a cultural compromise that typified the RCN in the postwar period. Engineer and Constructor officers trained with the RN so the hull (based on the RN Type 12 frigate), and power plant (based on the RN Y 100 system) were British. The Electrical and Communications officers trained with the USN so the generating systems, electronics suite, radios, sonars, etc were of American design. The gun and ASW torpedoes were American while the ASW depth mortar bomb system was British.

109 D.SigsD. to CNP, memo, 19 April 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 2, Complements General. Documents indicate that more than one-third of the instructors in Halifax trades school were supplied by Esquimalt.

110 See memo activity Jan-Mar 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 2, Complements General.

111 NBM 213-6, 16 April 1947.

112 NBM 220-6, 11 July 1947.

113 Hanington, interview. See also Minutes, Third Senior Officers, Meeting, 29-30 May 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 1, Naval Committees-Senior Officers, Meetings.

114 Budge interview.

115 Hanington interview.

116 Ibid.

117 German, *The Sea is At Our Gates*, 207. The term "sickly season" is a play on words derived from a traditional naval toast. German accepts the Mainguy Report that cites *Ontario* as experiencing the premier incident in 1947 that set the pattern for those in *Crescent*, *Athabaskan* and *Magnificent* later. It is generally assumed that ring-leaders from *Ontario* were drafted to other ships creating a domino affect. However, the commissioners did not go outside their mandate to establish whether any incidents had taken place before *Ontario*.

118 Hanington interview by the author. Hanington was serving onboard *Nootka* in May 1947, as the Navigating Officer in the rank of Lieutenant and the account is based on his oral evidence. Hanington recalled that there were rumors of a previous incident in another east coast ship and that the crew had been split up and problem makers drafted to other ships. He assumed that some of the troublemakers had been sent to *Nootka*.

119 Ibid.

120 Rayner attained the temporary rank of Acting-Captain during hostilities and reverted to Commander in 1946 on appointment from NSHQ as DPlans to *Nootka*.

121 Budge interview. Budge was Rayner's Executive Officer in *Huron* during the war.

122 Hanington interview by the author.

123 COAC to NSec, 30 January 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50".

124 CO *Nootka* to COAC, 5 September 1947, attached to COAC to NSec, 30 January 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50".

125 Storrs interview by the author.

126 As the Chaplain was a Reserve Officer and the Doctor a "temporary", their opinions were summarily dismissed by Taylor.

127 COAC to NSec, 30 January 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50".

128 Dave McIntosh, Canadian Press Release, Halifax, 1 November 1949, 73/1006, DHist.

129 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 85.

130 L.C. Audette, "The Lower Deck and the Mainguy Report of 1949", *The RCN in Retrospect*, ed. Boutilier, 236.

131 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 159. An analysis of the causes of the incident may be found in DNAD to CNS, memo, 13 May 1944 attached to Item 13-4 of the Minutes of the 13th Meeting of the Deputy Minister's Advisory Committee, 23 May 1944, DM/DND 1700-100/1A, DHist. This does not imply there were only two incidents during the war but only two fitting this pattern.

132 Tucker, *Naval Service of Canada*, vol. 2, 328-329 and Schull, *The Far Distant Ships*, 193. Brock interview by the author. The Commanding Officer in question, un-named by Schull, Tucker and Audette, was Commander W.B.L. Holms, RCN. There is no disagreement that Holms' cruel treatment of his men was largely responsible for their action.

133 CNS to MND, memo, 5 February 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50".

134 Admiralty, *Manual of Seamanship*, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), Chapter 3.

135 Lieutenant(N) Graeme Arbuckle, *Customs and Traditions of the Canadian Navy* (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 1984), Chapter 4.

136 COAC was RAdmr. "Cuth" Taylor and COPC, RAdmr. Rollo Mainguy.

137 Minutes Third Senior Officers' Meeting, 29-30 May 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 1, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings.

138 VAdmr. Dyer, who was Executive Officer in *Warrior* at the time, stated that he had in fact adapted the *Uganda* model introduced by Rollo Mainguy in 1945, to meet his requirements. Dyer interview. The Commanding Officer of *Warrior*, A/Cmdre. Houghton, was at the meeting as SCOA and would have had an input on effectiveness of Welfare Committees.

139 Minutes Third Senior Officers' Meeting, 29-30 May 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. I, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings.

140 Ibid. The source of this experience was not recorded.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid.

143 At the time this decision was taken, Cmdre. Houghton had exchanged appointments with Cmdre. DeWolf and became ACNS and subsequently VCNS. He brought an enduring concern for morale to the position.

144 NBM 221-6, 26 July 1947. Captain Lay returned from the west coast and gave the Naval Board a personal report of service conditions in the naval barracks.

145 NBM 224-3, 17 September 1947 a follow up on NBM 213-6 above.

146 The Naval Staff had a comprehensive knowledge of the serious morale problems in the fleet beginning in 1947 owing to an initiative by ACNS, Cmdre. Houghton, to conduct a thorough investigation. This is fully documented in NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50". The author acknowledges the assistance LCdr. Richard Gimblett of the Directorate of History and Heritage who brought this file to his attention.

147 NBM 220-4, 11 July 1947.

148 NBM 220-5 11 July 1947.

149 NBM 221-11, 27 July 1947.

150 NBM 221-3, 27 July 1947.

151 NSHQ to CANGEN 54, Naval Message 281445 25/7/47(sic), "Audette Papers", NAC, MG 31 E 18 vol.1, Folder 2, "W" contains the full text of message of promulgation. Note the date is incorrect, the six figures preceding are the correct date-time group.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid. This was the major difference from the "town hall meetings" Captain Rollo Mainguy introduced while in command of *Uganda* in the Pacific campaign where attendance was general and anyone could speak.

154 This was important and indicates a transfer of power as sales from the canteen, which included beer and cigarettes (both duty free), were the main source of revenue for the ship's fund. The ship's fund was used to support events such as banyans (picnics), sports days, special events and also charities. The variety of its inventory and efforts to serve the ship's company were an important factor in maintaining morale.

155 Ibid.

156 NSHQ to COAC, COPC, SCOA, Naval Message 281635 28/7/47, "Audette Papers", vol. 1, Folder 2, "W".

157 OIC Seaman Personnel to DCNP, memo, 11 August 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50".

158 DCNP to ACNS, memo, 9 September 1947, in *ibid.*

159 Rear-Admiral "Paddy" Budge became a legend in his own time, revered by seniors and juniors alike as a leader and humanitarian. He was the first rear-admiral in the RCN commissioned from the ranks. German suggests that this was Rear-Admiral(S) M.J.R.O. Cossette but is incorrect. Cossette was promoted from the retired list.

160 Budge interview.

161 KRCN contained orders for administration of the navy including responsibilities for the maintenance of morale and discipline through the divisional system

162 NSec, "Employment of Canadian Naval Forces", memo, 1 August 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

163 NSec to CNAS, memo, 20 January 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

164 Hibbard was a direct entry cadet in 1926 from the RCNVR whose career progression and social profile were typical. He married Ines Ker, a wealthy Victoria socialite, in 1933 (Lay was his best man). He had an illustrious war record earning the DSC & Bar, Legion d'Honneur and Croix de Guerre avec Palme. Claxton remarked in his autobiography he thought Hibbard a capable staff officer which meant he probably agreed with Claxton's initiatives. Audette remarked of Hibbard to the author, "He was the only officer he knew who could steer two divergent courses at

the same time." Hibbard was Captain D in Halifax at the time of the riots and abandoned Murray during the Kellock inquiry, disloyalty that cost him favour with Audette.

165 Brock wrote in his autobiography that he had been asked by the RN to take command of the 2nd Escort Group and HMS *Starling* after the death of the renowned U-boat killer Captain Johnny Walker. Brock, *The Dark Broad Seas*, 138-139. While many of Brock's colleagues dismiss this claim as an invention, it was confirmed by RAdmr. Patrick Brock, RN, in discussion with RAdmr. Dillon. Dillon interview by the author. Jeffry Brock's "fabrications" and egocentricity in his first volume so incensed his contemporaries such as VAdmr. Harry Dewolf that most refused to read the second volume.

166 Storrs, Hanington, Budge interviews by the author. The Brock family originated from Winnipeg where they had established a line of succession in command of the Reserve Division, HMCS *Nonsuch*.

167 Budge interview by the author. Brock's pro-RN attitude was evident during his first appointment to NSHQ where he was sent after being removed from *Ontario* as a result of the incident. He strenuously but unsuccessfully opposed adopting the USN communications system for what essentially amounted to cultural reasons. Brock, *The Dark Broad Seas*, 197-199.

168 *Report on certain "Incidents" which occurred on board H.M.C.S ATHABASKAN, CRESCENT AND MAGNIFICENT and on other matters concerning THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY*, (Ottawa: The Department of National Defence(Naval Service), October 1947), 37-38. Referred to hereafter as the "Mainguy Report". The *Ontario* incident was reconstructed by the commissioners on testimony received from participants.

169 *Ibid.*, 37.

170 Hibbard evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 2, file 8.

171 *Ibid.*

172 Budge interview.

173 *Ibid.* The information in the following paragraph is based on the Budge interview.

174 Budge referred to the wives as being "wealthy and well connected" and inferred that in Hibbard's view their desire to have a picnic took precedence over dealing with naval business such as a near-mutiny.

175 Budge interview with the author. RAdmr. Budge said there were exceptions to this and he cited in particular Petty Officer (later Lieutenant-Commander) Peter Cox, Captain of the Forecastle.

176 Brock had a severe memory lapse over the *Ontario* incident in his memoirs. He maintained that his warnings and recommendations with regard to deteriorating morale "went unheeded" and that the "Mainguy Inquiry" vindicated him as it "brought down certain recommendations I had long been advocating". Brock, *The Dark Broad Seas*, 184. Brock's inflated ego, imaginative interpretation and selective reading of the "Mainguy Report" enabled him to deny the obvious conclusion that he was the problem in *Ontario*.

177 In the "Mainguy Report" the commissioners discuss only the consequences of the lack of action by "high ranking officers of the navy." This might be expected as the senior officer largely responsible was the chairman of the commission of inquiry.

178 Budge avoided open criticism of Hibbard and simply stated, "I was never happy in *Ontario*." Budge interview.

179 Hibbard evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 2, file 8.

180 Chaplain(RC) R. Maclean to Commissioners, 13 March 1949, "Audette Papers", vol. 1, file 3.

181 L.C. Audette, "The Lower Deck and the Mainguy Report of 1949," *The RCN in Retrospect*, ed. Boutilier, 239.

182 HP 219/64, DHist.

183 Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Peacemaking and Deterrence*, vol. 3, 57.

184 Eayrs suggested, *ibid.* 71, that Reid's vote in favour of establishing the National Defence College was to spite the Chiefs of the Air and General(army) staffs as a parting shot upon his retirement. In fact, the National Defence College concept was strongly supported by External Affairs, and Lester Pearson and Reid were close allies and friends who were in constant contact. Collins interview by the author. Moreover, the Imperial Defence College model upon which the National Defence College concept was based appealed to the navy. A more plausible argument is that Reid supported National Defence College proposal for these reasons. The impression is that Eayrs' research on Reid was cursory at best.

185 When Claxton became minister he advised his Chiefs of Staff that only the minister could make public remarks or speeches on policy. They voluntarily showed him the texts of their speeches. Claxton, "Autobiography", 898. This was probably as a result of the Reid public criticism of policy that embarrassed the government.

186 Collins recalled that it seemed the every RN officer who knew Reid took the opportunity to renew their acquaintance as part of the British lobbying effort. Collins interview by the author.

187 Charles interview by the author.

CHAPTER 4

Troubled Waters

"The times in which we live, like all postwar times, are full of restlessness, uncertainty and change....It is obvious also that the Canadian Navy, like the British and American Navies, is itself in the process of readjustment, reformation and change. In our navy there is a mingling of men of old traditions, new traditions and no traditions."

The Mainguy Report¹

Vice-Admiral Harold Taylor Wood Grant, CBE, DSO, RCN took command of the Royal Canadian Navy as the fifth Chief of the Naval Staff on 1 September 1947, when it was at its lowest ebb of the postwar period. Vice-Admiral Grant brought energy, confidence and a presence to the office. In the eyes of the prewar RCN cohort he was a hero and looked up to by all who served under him.² Born in Halifax in 1899, he was a member of the illustrious Grant family of Nova Scotia that produced such luminaries as George Munro Grant, Principal of Queen's University, and George Parkin Grant, social philosopher and author of *Lament for a Nation*.³ His father, the Honourable MacCallum Grant, was Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia when Harold Grant joined the fourth term of cadets at the Royal Naval College of Canada (RNCC) in 1914.⁴ Harold's elder brother, John, had been a cadet in the first term. Harold Grant was small and frail as a boy but to his term mates he was "Perhaps the finest example of what grit and will can do."⁵ Grant passed out of the RNCC with a first-class certificate in 1917 and served in RN ships until the end of World War I. Between the wars, his career followed the standard pattern for RCN officers and he took his specialist, navigation, and staff training with the Royal Navy. Sea experience was obtained in both RCN and RN ships, which included four years in British battleships.⁶ He also served in staff positions at NSHQ as Director of Plans and, later, of Naval Reserves also with the RN on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet.

Harold Grant developed a reputation as a solid professional officer and gentleman of modesty and humour. His connections as one of the Haligonian "aristocracy" allowed him to move in the "right" social circles wherever he served. He opened doors for his shipmates that often resulted in beneficial marriages to ladies from well-placed families.⁷ Grant enjoyed fun, a good party and could be counted on to lead the "run ashore". His antics became legend and a reprimand in the form of receiving the "Displeasure of The Department" for harassing a honeymooning couple at a hotel in Chester, Nova Scotia.⁸ Unluckily, the new bride turned out to be the secretary to the Deputy Minister of Defence. This merely added to his growing reputation. Grant married Christine Mitchell of Halifax who became a universal favourite with both his contemporaries and juniors as an elegant and charming hostess and lady.⁹

Grant served with exceptional distinction during the war and emerged as one of Canada's most decorated naval officers.¹⁰ He began the war in command of HMCS *Skeena* but was soon appointed ashore to participate in the rapid wartime expansion. He was promoted to Captain in 1940, and served in the critical position of Director of Naval Personnel in NSHQ for two years. He was Captain (D) in St. John's, Newfoundland in charge of escorts operating from that port during a difficult period in the Battle of the Atlantic when the RCN was severely challenged. In March 1943, he was appointed to command the Royal Navy cruiser HMS *Diomedé* and later HMS *Enterprise*. For his success in a gun action against eleven enemy destroyers, in which three were sunk, he was awarded an immediate Distinguished Service Order (DSO). This was a feat unique in the annals of the RCN. *Enterprise* participated in the D-Day landings and Grant was Mentioned in Dispatches (MID) for leading the assault force to "Utah Beach" and bombardment operations. Grant was in action again in a bombardment of Cherbourg where he was wounded. For his services in this engagement, he was awarded the American Bronze Star Medal. In early 1945, he commissioned and assumed command of HMCS *Ontario* and took the cruiser to the Pacific but was too late to see

action. His final wartime award was an appointment to be Additional Commander of the Military Division of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (CBE) for "exceptionally competent seamanship and gallantry at sea, and administrative ability ashore."¹¹

Grant became a pivotal figure in building the postwar navy. He was appointed in February 1946, to NSHQ as Chief of Administration Services and Supply (CNAS) as a rear-admiral. This was nominally the position of Comptroller but filled by an officer of the Executive Branch who was also a member of the Naval Board. Grant was the second most senior officer to the CNS, Vice-Admiral Reid, and would succeed him. He was pragmatic and had a powerful influence on policy. Rear-Admiral Storrs commented that Harold Grant "was very emotionally oriented toward the Royal Navy and very much inclined to the imperial idea."¹² It was largely through Grant's influence that the Naval Board chose the expensive British Sea Furies as opposed to the American Hellcat aircraft, which were being offered at fire-sale prices. Reid was undoubtedly prepared to defer to Grant because he would have to live with the choice as the next CNS. Grant, initially, also exhibited some characteristics of wanting to maintain the "pure laine" antecedents in the RCN senior officers. On one occasion he was heard to say that, "No ex-reservist would ever make the rank of Captain."¹³ Demographic changes in the expanding RCN would force him to abandon this prejudicial point of view. He was also of the old school that believed naval officers did not need staff training in order to function in staff positions.¹⁴ Nonetheless, as a true professional, he would show an openness to change if he could be persuaded that change was in the best interests of the RCN or that it just made good sense.¹⁵ Moreover, Storrs believed that Grant made the difficult transition to an American orientation during his tenure as CNS.¹⁶ In any event, Grant was destined to be the father of the postwar Royal Canadian Navy.

Vice-Admiral Grant was faced with the Herculean challenge of rebuilding the navy. He told the National Defence College, "the size of the Fleet including ships in reserve is hopelessly inadequate

to meet the most modest commitment of the Naval role."¹⁷ The active fleet was reduced to a skeleton force of eight ships in commission with only the carrier manned to peacetime complement. Plans for a balanced fleet based on two carriers had been abandoned.¹⁸ Kealy suggests that the Cabinet made this decision because *Warrior* was not designed for cold weather conditions and the expense of retaining her, even in reserve, could not be justified. In fact, the Naval Staff had come to this conclusion itself and the over-riding factor was the expense of establishing and maintaining a second air base on the west coast. The complement was set at 7,500 officers and men, 25 percent below authorized complement. However, owing to discharges, desertions and poor recruiting results, the number on strength was 6,814, and wastage was outstripping gains.¹⁹ Morale was low and plummeting. While the Minister appeared sympathetic to the need to construct new accommodations in shore establishments, he remained difficult on the issue of increased pay and other improvements to conditions of service such as more dependent housing for married men.²⁰ For the foreseeable future, pay would remain below civilian rates with a consequential negative impact on recruiting. Claxton's new strategic policy had relegated the navy to an ASW training role. Moreover, the RCN lacked a clear mission in defence of North America as had been identified for the other two services. An increasing concern for Grant was the impact of the government's integration policies on the traditional organization and structure of the navy. The navy itself was pursuing a rather ill-defined general purpose training programme owing to the instability caused by personnel restrictions, a burgeoning training load and uncertainty in funding. Grant's task was daunting.

The poor conditions of service and inadequate provision for the welfare of sailors and their dependents were so serious that morale became a major focus of the navy during this period. The problems persisted and exacerbated by poor leadership culminated in three major incidents of mass insubordination in the fleet in 1949. The Mainguy commission, named after its president Rear-Admiral E. Rollo Mainguy, was established by Brooke Claxton to inquire into the cause of the

incidents. However, the RCN was trying to deal the problem of low morale well before the incidents occurred and the Mainguy inquiry was convened. The evidence gathered by the inquiry provides important background material for developing an understanding of conditions and circumstances before the incidents in early 1949.

Grant made improving morale and conditions of service his priority. The main problems were poor pay and accommodations onboard and ashore. He was fortunate to have Rear-Admiral Frank Houghton as his Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff²¹ who tackled the problem of determining the causes of low morale with considerable initiative and vigour. Houghton's career had languished before the war. He spent twelve years as a lieutenant-commander and seemed to be going nowhere.²² Finally promoted to Commander in 1938, he found himself in NSHQ as the Director of Plans and Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee at the outbreak of war. There he flourished, establishing a reputation as a competent staff officer, through his natural talent for writing, as well as an effective administrator.²³ As previously mentioned, Houghton was fortuitously positioned to be the first Commanding Officer of *Warrior* in which he had a happy and successful commission. Subsequently, he was brought to NSHQ as ACNS by Reid in January, 1947.²⁴ As ACNS, Houghton reviewed the reports of the members of the Naval Staff. He compiled a file on items affecting morale that had been brought to the attention of the staff in reports from the fleet. Houghton wrote a comprehensive memorandum to the CNS entitled "The Morale of the Navy", containing twenty-six major recommendations aimed at improving training, morale and conditions of service.²⁵

"The Morale of the Navy" indicated how worried the naval hierarchy was about the personnel situation and its concern that the RCN was wasting away. Houghton cited the continuing reduction in the strength of the permanent RCN in spite of normal enrolment through recruiting, as a sure indicator of "ill health". He stated that the increasing personnel deficit had given rise to "a

general impression throughout the Service that this is due to a 'low state of morale' amongst both officers and men."²⁶ Houghton underscored the urgency of the morale situation:

The truth of the matter is that the officers and men have lost confidence in the Service, much as a child might lose confidence in parents who are not sufficiently thoughtful for their offspring. While it is fair to say that the Higher Command cannot be saddled with the full blame for this unfortunate state of affairs, it is obvious that remedial action is already overdue and as little time as possible must be lost in planning and effecting a cure.²⁷

The most striking element evident in Houghton's paper is the dichotomy in his thinking, this represented the conundrum of the entire RCN hierarchy. On the one hand, he portrays the postwar RCN in its prewar characterization of a "family navy", with a strong sense of paternalism reminiscent of the old days and that little had changed. On the other hand, there is an obvious recognition of the need for change towards a navy better suited to Canadian circumstances. Indicating a dynamic shift in thinking, Houghton believed that the United States Navy provided the model for the postwar RCN.

There is in "The Morale of the Navy" a substantial indication of understanding that new conditions existed in the navy as well as in Canadian society, and that the one must replicate the other as far as the service could allow. There is also an admission that the navy had got into bad habits during the war and this was having a telling effect on discipline and morale. A major problem was that while recruiting advertising promised standards of pay, accommodations and a life style equal to civilian street, these did not exist in the naval service.²⁸ The truth was, conditions were substandard causing poor morale especially among the junior ratings. The root of much marital difficulty experienced by men was seen as poor pay, lack of married accommodations and instability through too much seetime and short term drafts to ships.²⁹ Unmarried men suffered because of exceptionally poor conditions aboard ship where they were required to live. Another major dissatisfier was a

reduction in travel subsidies that helped single men to return home for annual leave.³⁰ The necessity to borrow money from banks or loan sharks to buy a train ticket drove many young sailors into debt.

Conditions in ships constituted a major complaint and the Naval Staff's proposed solution reflected a sea change in thinking. Evident is a drawing upon USN standards and models for habitability in ships and amenities ashore that Houghton said represented "a break-away from the R.N. 'tradition' but is particularly suited to Canadians."³¹ These included a "cafeteria" system of messing, bunks to replace hammocks, shipboard laundries, adequate stowage for uniforms and kit, and improved washing and bathing facilities. Houghton described conditions for CNS of which bathrooms is representative; "At sea [the RCN rating] is confronted with crowded bathrooms, often untiled [sic] and smelly, in which hot water, and sometimes cold as well, has to be brought in cans to cheap tin basins which always look dirty and defy any attempts at improvement."³² It was recognized that the problems with habitability in ships would be expensive to correct and that some improvements could only be introduced in future construction.

Houghton's most strident criticism was of the new integrated "Trade-Group System" that assigned men to trade qualification and pay levels within their branches. This was a feature of the tri-service pay structure "which had been forced on the R.C.N. in order to bring it into line with the other two Services."³³ The new system drew universal complaint from senior ratings because the traditional naval trades had not been equated fairly with those of the more industrially oriented army and air force. It is not clear how this new system was developed but the RCN had produced a document in 1945, citing the civilian equivalency of naval rates and trade skills for industry to help demobilized men seeking employment.³⁴ VCNS allowed that the old system, inherited from the RN, was clumsy and complex but was based on years of experience and could be modernized. Houghton argued, "Its basic pattern was admirably suited to a complex, highly mobile sea-service [sic], differing in every respect from the Army and Air Forec." He concluded that the new integrated Trade-Group System

was based on an industrial model and when applied to the navy resulted in the "financial glorification of the Technician as opposed to the 'executive.'"

The new system recognized and provided higher compensation for technical trades such as Electrician and Engine Room Artificer that were easily equated to similar high paying jobs in industry. In Houghton's words, "It is the acme of the principle of unequal opportunity."³⁵ The result was a great disincentive for men of the seamen trades to become competent and to acquire leadership skills. These were not recognized under the new pay structure, but were absolutely indispensable in warships for leading watches and work parties as well as administering the divisional system. Houghton concluded that, "As a direct result the very foundations of the navy are being undermined, and this system should be discarded without delay."³⁶ Houghton had touched on a key issue. Under the new system of financial compensation the functional value of leadership was not recognized. What was in the pay package was based on an equivalent civilian trade skill that had become the new measure of worth and authority.

Training and education of officers and men were also considered deficient. The initial indoctrination of men entering the navy was deemed inadequate because pride in service and dress were not inculcated in recruits. Houghton stressed the degree of failure in another significant comparison to the United States Navy, "It is regrettable that few of our men display the pride in their Service and their uniform which is evident in U.S.N. personnel."³⁷ He recommended that this could be addressed through a common system of indoctrination and improved training for recruits and followed up through the divisional system. Houghton also recommended that New Entry Training be segregated because, "under the present system new entries mix with, and learn the bad habits of wartime entries."³⁸ He stated that there was also a need for a lower deck magazine, as the USN had, to keep the men informed. One of the objectives of the lower deck magazine would be "to offset any impression that the R.C.N. is an 'Officers' Navy."³⁹ More importantly, it would serve a vehicle for

vehicle for explaining new orders and regulations, benefits, career opportunities and "also include information regarding the Service generally, its aims and aspirations, and its integration with other aspects of national life and policy."⁴⁰

Houghton squarely addressed the issue of poor leadership in the officer corps, and also questioned the wisdom of training midshipmen in the Royal Navy. He argued that evidence indicated "A primary cause of low morale lies in the abnormally high proportion of officers whose training is of a low standard and in whom the qualities of leadership are lacking."⁴¹ Much of this he attributed to a fault in the system that carried "poor officers" until retirement and there should be a means of discharging under-achievers. With respect to the training of RCN midshipman, he acknowledged the financial advantages of using RN resources. The negative consequence was that "they do suffer from a lack of contact with Canadian personnel at a critical point in their careers."⁴² It was Houghton's general opinion that "the whole system of training officers as Officers requires a great deal of improvement." A minute in the margin by Vice-Admiral Grant indicated agreement but with a caveat, "Yes, but not necessarily along Army lines."⁴³ This reflected Grant's opposition to tri-service college training.

Houghton considered that improving the divisional system to ensure proper administration of men's careers and their general welfare was of paramount importance. The Naval Staff believed that the divisional system was neither universal throughout the RCN nor fully understood. The VCNS recommended that not only should the divisional system be made compulsory and detailed guidance be promulgated, but also, "The training of Divisional Officers as such is important and a special course might well be instituted for this purpose."⁴⁴ A parallel recommendation was made for the systematic maintenance of men's documents to enhance selection for promotion, training and, particularly, selection for officer. Grant queried, "What system do [sic] U.S.N. use?"⁴⁵ Houghton also suggested the appointment of an "Inspector General of the Navy" responsible directly to the CNS

who would investigate and report back conditions in the ships because circumstances made it difficult for officers at NSHQ to get this information first-hand.⁴⁶ He concluded with a general comment on the necessity to establish clubs, "Post Exchanges" and "Commissariats" ashore along the lines of the USN to provide cheap entertainment, sundries and food for sailors and their families.⁴⁷

Remarkably, "The Morale of the Navy" stands as a seminal document that provided a blueprint for a progressive personnel policy in the postwar RCN. Many of its major recommendations were being prepared for implementation or in train before the Mainguy inquiry. These included substantive changes to bring the navy more in line with Canadian society through Welfare Committees and a revitalized divisional system. The following items represent major initiatives to improve conditions of service; increased pay, more accommodation for married and single men ashore, assisted travel leave for single men, income tax relief, improved habitability in ships including individual bunks and cafeteria style messing, comprehensive leadership and divisional training for junior officers and senior rates. Important morale items such as beer issue, more and better entertainment films, uniforms of better material with modern conveniences such as zippers, more relaxed liberty routines, well-baby clinics for dependents, access to cheaper groceries and a host of other improvements were in the process of being introduced. Neither the magnitude nor extensiveness of this internally developed programme has heretofore been acknowledged by historians.⁴⁸

Vice-Admiral Grant ensured that Claxton was fully informed as to the extent of the navy's personnel problems. Using the issues and recommendation developed by Houghton, he formally submitted the navy's morale concerns in October 1947.⁴⁹ He prefaced his advice with the comment that the years immediately after a war have always been particularly unsettling for many reasons but, "a reasonable degree of contentment with Service conditions should exist, after two years of peace."⁵⁰ This had not happened in the navy, and Grant believed that complement could not be increased

through recruiting nor efficiency raised without a prior improvement in morale that was "seriously retarded". In fact, the RCN was losing one-third more personnel through discharges and desertion than it was gaining through recruiting.⁵¹ Grant emphasized particularly the anomaly of the navy's seamen's trades that were disadvantaged by the new integrated trade group system that governed pay and the consequential negative impact on the RCN as a whole.

Grant made it explicitly clear that he believed junior officers who transferred from the RCNVR were deficient in leadership skills, particularly in handling men. He stated, "Most of these officers, in an endeavour to learn the rudiments of seamanship and life afloat simply had no time to study or know the men's problems, and is the reason why all maritime nations consider it essential to train their officers afloat at a young age."⁵² Taking a direct aim at Claxton's tri-service college scheme, he stated the navy's preference was to continue with the apprenticeship at sea method. He maintained that the naval profession was taught through doing and associating with experienced men. This ran contrary to the Minister's idea that officers in the modern armed services must have a university level education. Claxton's view was that the military profession could be taught in what was essentially a civilian academic environment. History would show that military education passed into the hands of academics under the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP). Grant knew that by changing the system of officer training, Claxton was redefining the culture by changing the way naval officers thought. Emotionally Grant was still wed to the RN system of training junior officers and could not see beyond that, whereas he was receptive to progressive ideas for men's training.

Grant concluded by raising the possibility of "paid agents" fostering discontent in the mess decks of ships. His source for this information was not stated.⁵³ This is important because it was the fear of an organized insurrection orchestrated by agents that prompted Claxton to call for a commission of inquiry after the incidents onboard *Magnificent*, *Athabaskan*(II) and *Crescent* in 1949. It would appear that it might have been Grant who planted this concern in the mind of the

Minister. Against this threat Grant concluded "Correction of the causes mentioned will prove an effective deterrent. Elimination of the paid agent can, however, only be achieved by the loyalty of the men themselves and in the absence of a higher wage, it is essential to consider other amenities such as family medical assistance, well-baby clinics, wholesale rates for provisions, etc."⁵⁴

Vice-Admiral Grant took immediate initiatives to give force to his determination to improve morale and conditions of service. In December, the Naval Board directed that, "Every effort be made to further the improvement of morale along the lines set out in C.N.S' memorandum [to the Minister]."⁵⁵ The Estimates for 1948-1949 already had given priority to construction of new barracks and accommodations or repairs to existing facilities ashore.⁵⁶ Action was initiated by the Naval Board to acquire former RCAF staff houses at Dartmouth for conversion to apartments for married quarters for Halifax-based sailors.⁵⁷ Staff work was initiated on many recommendations including setting up dependent's medical care and a "lower deck magazine". Personnel shortages proved an impediment against acting on both initiatives.⁵⁸ However, approval to establish a magazine, the *Crowsnest*, was given in February 1948.⁵⁹ The CNS said the magazine was one to which everyone may contribute and "which will help us to know our Service and each other better."⁶⁰ Grant also acted on Houghton's recommendation of an "Inspector General for the Navy". He appointed his term mate, Commodore Adrian Hope, to a roving commission with broad terms of reference to examine all reports pertaining to the welfare of officers and men, and also to examine the trade structure and recommend how it might be altered to be made acceptable to the navy.⁶¹ Hope was given authority to co-opt the services of any staff officers at NSHQ and to visit any naval establishment.

While morale was the priority item at the November Senior Officers' meeting, it is apparent that Grant wanted to move the RCN ahead on a broad front.⁶² In spite of huge challenges, the decisive tone in the minutes suggest that a mood of optimism prevailed. Vice-Admiral Grant had checked the drift. The feedback from the fleet was that the 75 percent ceiling on recruiting was telling

on morale. Commodore Miles, CNP, advised that the rapid turnover of ship's companies would continue with no relief in sight and, "It was unlikely this situation would improve until the basic problems of manpower are solved."⁶³ The problem of manpower restrictions also made it impossible to provide underway training for junior officers necessitating continuation of the practice of sending them to the RN until a cruiser could be commissioned for this purpose. With regard to improving habitability in ships, the CNS himself suggested to Commodore Godfrey, on the Joint Staff in Washington, that he investigate the possibility of obtaining a USN destroyer on loan in order to evaluate its accommodations, cafeteria and other facilities. Grant stated that, "Eventually the question of whether United States ships and equipment would be adopted would be one of great importance. This really formed the basis of any progress in habitability."⁶⁴

Debate on the implementation of the Welfare Committee system revolved around promulgating a Naval General Order that permitted discussion of a range of subjects "broad enough to allow full value from the Welfare Committees." The conundrum for historians is that for some undetermined reason a Naval General Order was never promulgated before the series of mutinous incidents occurred. Promulgation was the responsibility of Commodore Miles, CNP, whose next appointment was the Commanding Officer of HMCS *Magnificent*, one of the ships that experienced mass insubordination. There was no Welfare Committee onboard and this might have provided the vehicle for men to voice complaints in his ship, as well as others, thereby removing a primary cause of the mutiny.

There is by the end of 1947, a strong indication that the RCN was moving towards the USN. Grant had told the Senior Officers' Meeting that he had embraced ASW as the role for the RCN. This suggests that he had accepted arguments of influential pro-USN staff officers and shifted from an imperial strategic orientation. Rear-Admiral Storrs credits this to the persuasive Captain Nelson Lay and Commander Charles Dillon, Secretary of the Naval Board.⁶⁵ Dillon's role will be discussed

later. Rear-Admiral Houghton, himself a strong imperial man under Nelles, had become a proponent of the USN model for personnel management and was prepared to break with RN tradition. Grant fully supported the decision to adopt USN tactical doctrine and signal publications but allowed that some RN signal books could be retained on the east coast to facilitate operations with units of the Royal Navy.⁶⁶ Grant's reorientation was given impetus by the Defence Cabinet Committee's unilateral decision for the RCN to acquire an Icebreaker of American design for Arctic operations.⁶⁷ As Storrs remarked, this process of change was obviously very difficult for Grant who was emotionally very attached to the RN, "But it came out all right because we ended up with a Canadian identity."⁶⁸ That was only one aspect of Grant's personality. He possessed a natural native conservatism that stemmed from his Nova Scotian Presbyterian roots.⁶⁹ He was also steeped in a professional ethic that reflected the experience of his generation in the prewar "family navy". This ethic was uniquely Canadian, a composite of British and national influences. It is apparent that historians such as Soward and Glover have seized upon Grant's two-sentence opinion of "Canada" badges as the limited basis for their analysis of this important figure.⁷⁰ An examination of the fifty-four type-written pages comprising Grant's testimony before the Mainguy commission offers a balanced perspective. Grant was a powerful personality and a complex character and many influences informed his attitude toward change.

Grant was progressive in accepting staff recommendations to adapt the organization of both Naval Service Headquarters and Branch functional structures to the new administrative and technical environment that was developing. The Naval Board began to meet weekly and took on a more businesslike atmosphere. Captain Lay effectively promoted a major change to the composition of the Naval Board, after two rejections, through persuading Grant to accept a new member to represent naval aviation.⁷¹ Naval aviation was now absorbing twenty-five percent of the RCN's budget and Lay believed that his creation deserved its own voice at the table. The position of Assistant Chief of

Naval Staff (ACNS) representing both Plans and Air and reporting to the VCNS was established in April 1948. Predictably, Lay, who did not lack ambition, was promoted to Commodore and appointed to it. Concurrently, new positions in, and terms of reference for the Naval Staff were approved to cover its broadening scope of responsibilities and functions. These included a Director of Naval Organization (DNOrg) who would sit on the Complement Committee to improve coordination between VCNS and CNP. The Naval Board also pursued the objective of devolving more responsibilities to the commands. This included the principle of establishing a separate command to administer the Naval Divisions.⁷²

Vice-Admiral Grant approved the creation of new branches to develop and orchestrate the new skills and emerging technology needed by the postwar navy. The TAS (Torpedo/Anti-Submarine), Electrical and Ordnance Branches were approved in November, 1947. A most significant step in deciding the future character of the RCN was the creation under Grant of a Supply Branch on the USN model in conjunction with a decision to adopt the USN system for supply and material management.⁷³ He also approved the establishment of the Naval Secretariat Branch responsible for administration. The existing supply system was an inefficient adaptation of the RN model with responsibility split between VCNS and the Chief of Naval Technical Services (CNTS). It had a large civilian component. Captain(S) Rupert Wright, Director General Fleet Accounting, and Commander(S) Charles Dillon, Naval Secretary, lobbied CNS assiduously for the adoption of the USN model. Their argument stressed this would achieve greater efficiency, North American orientation and a superior uniformed personnel structure. They were backed up by a comprehensive survey of the existing system conducted by Commander(SC) M. A. Peel, USN Supply Corps.⁷⁴ Grant was persuaded, Rear-Admiral Dillon recalled, on the strength of the benefits for the RCN.⁷⁵ This also represented a victory by RCN Supply Officers to gain increased status for their branch. Their crowning achievement would be the creation of the position of Comptroller on the Naval Board

that was filled by Rear-Admiral Wright in 1959. He was the first Supply Officer to achieve that rank and Dillon was the second. Ambition was not restricted to officers of the Executive Branch.

Commodore Hope produced his initial report on morale for the CNS in January 1948.⁷⁶ He had been given a broad mandate, permitting him to interview whomever he pleased in NSHQ and on both coasts. Hope began on a positive note, stating that he thought the RCN had returned to peacetime normalcy more quickly than the RN, from which he had recently returned. He credited this to the fact that the RCN consisted entirely of volunteers while the RN had a large proportion of conscripts. By RN standards, he thought, "Discipline and Morale in the R.C.N. to be very good". Having said that, he described many deficiencies. His findings largely confirmed Houghton's conclusions and recommendations but he was able to put a human face on the problem for the CNS and a sense of urgency. He found that the situation with junior officers was largely stable but observed, prophetically, that Commanding Officers were too overworked by paperwork to give them proper supervision. Hope was referring particularly to former RCNVR officers. Lack of supervision of the Executive Officers, three of whom were former RCNVR, by Commanding Officers was deemed to be a major contributing factor in the four incidents investigated by the Mainguy inquiry. Senior Ratings were "the vital backbone of the Navy" but had definite grievances pertaining to the Trade Group System. On this issue, he advised the CNS that equality in pay and conditions of service between the three sister services was impossible.⁷⁷ For the RCN, he heavily favoured adoption of the USN structure where all ratings were paid for the substantive rate, or rank, regardless of trade.

Commodore Hope cited the junior ratings (men) as the most disaffected group and where the main efforts toward improving training and conditions of service must be directed. While the typical senior rating drawn from the prewar generation of recruits was well disciplined, Hope made an interesting comparison with the young man currently being recruited to build the postwar RCN:

The same does not apply to the youngster in his first period of engagement, many of whom are living under discipline and supervision for the first time in their lives and are resentful of it. These lads, the product of wartime homes are not vicious, only very independent in their way of thought. They respond reasonably well to the right treatment but are quick to spot a non-competent officer or Petty Officer and resent the fact of having to take orders from such a man. Many of these lads joined the Navy for temporary reasons and the reason passed, are anxious only to return to Civvy Street where, it is an almost universal idea, an individual will have more and better opportunities to get on.⁷⁸

Hope found that young married sailors on both coasts were in dire straits financially. Many had to take part time jobs to make ends meet. These men were "egged on by their wives" to complain. Hope was adamant that regulations should be put in place to discourage both officers and ratings from marrying too young. While a recent small pay raise had helped, relief was only temporary unless a living wage could be assured. And Hope determined that at least seventy-five percent of the men he spoke to planned to leave the navy after their first engagement, "A most serious state of affairs if it comes to pass, as these men would largely be the Petty Officers of 5 years hence on whom so much will depend on the continuation of the Navy."⁷⁹ However, he recommended that the married malcontents be released from the service on compassionate grounds as they were a serious source of discord.

Neither Houghton nor Hope mentions a concern in the fleet for the lack of identifying Canadian symbols on the ships or uniforms. The Naval Board had previously directed that "Canada" Badges would no longer be worn on the uniform and the maple leaf insignia be removed from the funnels. The minutes of the Senior Officers' Meetings reflect candid discussions of the morale issues but are devoid of mention of any demand from the fleet for identifying Canadian symbols. The Naval Staff did receive a submission, from a most unlikely source, to reconsider its policy and allow the maple leaf insignia to be painted on the funnels. This was Captain H. F. Pullen, Captain D in Halifax and an officer noted for his pro-RN leanings. Pullen based his argument on the importance to morale of having the maple leaf insignia on the funnels of HMC Ships in order to avoid the Royal Navy

connection that confused USN sailors in particular.⁸⁰ Royal Canadian Navy ships wore the White Ensign, as did all ships of Commonwealth navies, and only a two-tone paint scheme set them apart from RN ships.⁸¹ There was increasing contact between the RCN and USN and Canadian sailors resented being confused with "limeys". The Naval Board confirmed the decision of the Naval Staff to reject Pullen's submission. Pullen's representation is significant in that his emotional attachment to the RN was at least equal to Grant's. There can be seen here both an opportunity and a danger signal and the Naval Board seems to have ignored both. It seems incongruous, given the effort that was being expended to improve conditions of service in order to raise morale, that this relatively small concession was not made. The cost would have been the price of a bucket of red paint per ship! There was obviously some principle at stake. While the Naval Board, and the CNS in particular, were prepared to make improvements with respect to discipline and amenities such as discarding liberty boats and permitting beer sales in ships, the line was drawn at adding Canadian symbols. This emerged as a major issue during the Mainguy inquiry.

"The Hope Report" did generate an urgent response and the Naval Board moved quickly on the recommendations. It established the Advancement and Conditions of Service Committee under the chairmanship of Captain A. F. Peers to review Hope's proposals and "the Denny Report", a similar RN study, and to submit recommendations.⁸² The CNS continued to engage the attention of the Minister, advising him of the substance of the report and requesting authority to conduct the in-house trade group structure review.⁸³ Grant also used every opportunity to follow this issue up with Claxton. The thrust of his argument was that the new trade structure, designed to integrate the armed forces pay system and based on civilian industry, favoured the highest technical and artisan trades. This denied the highest ranks and trades pay to seamen who were considered to be neither technicians nor artisans under the new integrated regulations. Grant considered this to be an injustice of the highest order, one that was having a severe effect on morale in the RCN. He told Claxton, as a

consequence "The experienced and good Executive[Seaman] Petty Officer is leaving the Navy because there is no incentive to remain. He is irreplaceable and as a result the efficiency of our ships as a fighting unit [sic] is being dangerously undermined."⁸⁴

Claxton referred Grant's request to the Deputy Minister's Office for advice from a policy perspective. The Assistant Deputy Minister for the Naval Service, Gordon Mills, reminded Claxton that a review had already been done by a tri-service committee and its recommendations had been enacted by the present government and formed the regulations for the existing integrated postwar system of pay and advancement.⁸⁵ Mills agreed that the system, designed along "industrial lines", disadvantaged the navy but worked smoothly for the army and air force which were structured and operated more like civilian industry. His advise was "one Service could not proceed independently along the lines suggested by the CNS" and that the review, if it proceeded, would only inspire false hopes in the fleet. It is apparent that Claxton permitted the review but made Grant aware of the Assistant Deputy Minister's position. Grant would draw two conclusions from Mills' response. The first was that the unique structure of the navy, based on small seagoing units, had been sacrificed to government's efforts to establish symmetry, particularly for financial accounting purposes. Second, and more profoundly, integration was now a fundamental concept of defence policy and this was eroding both his independence as the CNS and the RCN's ability to exist in isolation from the other services.

The navy found a partial answer to the conundrum through revising the ratings' rank structure to achieve equality with the army and air force. This solved one problem but created others. Captain Peers recommended the addition of two substantive ranks above that of Able Seaman in order to achieve pay parity with the sister services.⁸⁶ The Chief Petty Officer and Petty Officer ranks would be split into First and Second Class to accomplish this.⁸⁷ The navy demonstrated flexibility in accepting it had to conform to the new policy and the immediate effect was to improve the financial

situation for ratings, particularly those in the non-technical branches. It also led to the standardization of personnel nomenclature for designating rank and trade grouping.⁸⁸ The RCN adopted a system where the substantive rank was used in all cases followed by trade group designation, for example, Chief Petty Officer Second Class Engine Room Artificer Trade Group 4, which would be abbreviated C2ER4. The restructuring achieved the symmetry that satisfied the Deputy Minister and other bureaucrats in the Treasury Board. However, it did force an alteration in the navy's traditional chain of command. One of Claxton's principles of integration was that the integrity of the chains of command in the three services would be maintained. He must have perceived that only officers were in the chain. His changes added two ranks that severely disrupted the leadership and administrative structure of the ratings onboard ships.

The new rank Petty Officer Second Class (PO2), equivalent to the army Sergeant, caused no end of adjustment difficulties in the fleet.⁸⁹ It was a rank the RCN neither needed nor wanted in a functional structure that had evolved naturally over time through experience and necessity. Opposition was legitimate and not simply a question of tradition. The navy did not need an additional supervisory rank at the lower level. Onboard ship, the Leading Seaman was the working level supervisor who also lived in the open mess decks with the junior men. As non-commissioned officers, Petty Officers had special rights and privileges, including separate messing arrangements and accommodation both onboard and shore. The navy had to decide how to employ and treat this new rank. There was no room in the existing destroyers to provide enclosed accommodation for additional petty officers. What uniform would a Petty Officer Second Class wear, Class 2 uniform ("square rig") like the junior ratings, or, Class 1 ("round rig") like the officers and Chiefs and Petty Officers?

The compromise was poor at best and never totally satisfactory nor accepted. The Naval Board established the principle that the Petty Officer Second Class would have the status of Petty Officer with respect to rights and privileges as laid down in regulations but would be considered

professionally the equivalent of the old Leading Seaman rate.⁹⁰ He would wear the Class 2 uniform of the junior rate. This suggested that he was neither fish nor fowl.⁹¹ The immediate consequence was that the wide-scale promotion of Leading Seamen to Petty Officers Second Class robbed the mess decks of nearly all experienced supervisors. This exacerbated the problem of maintaining discipline and morale onboard at a critical juncture. The Mainguy inquiry would find lack of supervision as a contributory factor in causing the incidents and the advancement of some Able Seamen to Leading Seamen under the "revised rating structure an unfortunate and reprehensible error."⁹² Undoubtedly, many of those promoted were former RCNVR ratings whose sudden elevation to senior rate status, with its attendant bestowing of rights and privileges, was resented by the prewar RCN ratings who formed the core of the Chiefs and Petty Officers. The lower deck had its share of reactionaries, a fact apparent in the evidence collected by the Mainguy inquiry but not reflected in its report.

While improving conditions of services to make the RCN an attractive career would reap benefits in the long term, Grant had to manage the navy to ensure its survival, let alone expansion, in the short term. His problem was not a shortage of ships but of trained personnel. Wastage was cutting into gains. His problem was complicated by government direction to the RCN to develop as a priority an Arctic capability and presence. The navy began 1948 with a backlog of 800 personnel requiring trade training of which sea training was a prerequisite.⁹³ New entries who had just finished seamanship training were being retained in ships to fill the billets of the 400 trained men who quit during 1947.⁹⁴ The priority of the Naval Staff was to manage the scarce manning resources effectively in order to provide maximum training opportunity for regulars and reserves. Sea training for the latter had not been compulsory during 1946 and 1947.⁹⁵ The goal of achieving some modicum of operational efficiency had been set aside by CNS except for the carrier, where safety and flight operational training were nearly synonymous.⁹⁶ However, the carrier was required to carry more than one hundred trainees at any time.

The Naval Staff solution to the training dilemma brought the personnel resource problem to a head. The responsibility for developing fleet commitments and managing the personnel complement was split between VCNS and CNP staffs respectively. Captain Lay, DNPI, developed an optimistic fleet schedule designed to eliminate the regular force training backlog and to progress training of 2,500 reserve personnel. He recommended reducing all ships except the carrier to a training complement for the summer of 1948, stripping the reserve fleet, and replacing stokers and cooks with civilians wherever possible in order to get the maximum number of ships to sea. While the CNS approved this maximum effort, two problems emerged. Lay had not confirmed that there was sufficient fuel funded in the 1948 budget for the programme and that enough trained personnel could be found to man the ships. In both cases commitments exceeded resources.⁹⁷ Rear-Admiral Houghton had to advise the CNS that, "On the face of things it would appear that we have over-committed ourselves for the number of personnel we are authorized to have in the Royal Canadian Navy - or in simple fact we have bitten off more than we can chew."⁹⁸ He cited manning models based on RN experience that did not fit Canadian circumstances as hampering realistic prediction by CNP staff but overlooked the obvious deficiency in staff coordination. Captain Lay's enthusiastic plans outstripped personnel resources available to Captain Adams who was responsible for complement. Lay worked for VCNS and Adams for CNP. It did not help that owing to Claxton's reorganization they now worked in different buildings.

There were larger problems than this. Houghton stated that not only was the well dry for personnel to man sufficient ships for training, but evidence showed that "the Navy as presently constituted is far too small even for its modest role as a nucleus for expansion in an emergency."⁹⁹ The cause cited was lack of a war plan from which commitments and a projected complement to satisfy them could be derived. He believed that this must be a priority in planning. Houghton's recommendation for the short term was to increase the complement to meet current training

commitments. Grant agreed after he was convinced every alternative had been considered.¹⁰⁰ The CNS made persistent representation to the Minister and won a concession from the government in October 1948, to allow the RCN to recruit to a ceiling of 9,047 personnel.¹⁰¹ The navy was further encouraged by the announcement of the St. Laurent class programme for the construction of seven anti-submarine escort vessels.¹⁰² The favourable decision was undoubtedly influenced in large part by the worsening international situation represented by the Berlin Blockade in June, and the succession of Louis St. Laurent as Prime Minister in August.¹⁰³ It would remain to be seen if the RCN could develop policies that could achieve a balance between commitments and capabilities or between ships and sufficient trained personnel to man them.

The commands executed the annual training programme as best they could. Ship's schedules were in a constant state of flux. Ships were not always available when required owing to shipyards being late in completing ASW and habitability conversions.¹⁰⁴ This caused a ripple effect that disrupted the schedules of other units. The shifting of officers and men between establishments and ships, from ship to ship, and even between coasts, "to meet acute shortages", added to instability and heightened discontent.¹⁰⁵ Senior officers afloat complained that insufficient time was allocated by NSHQ for ships to "work-up" to achieve fighting efficiency and the standard was not improving. This affected the morale of long-time professionals. Naval Staff planners were not oblivious to the morale problems that disruptions and uncertainty caused, indeed many had a vested interest. For example, Commander Storrs, the programme planner, was due for an appointment in command of a destroyer. Nevertheless, the RCN had a duty to perform and Grant expected, in the time-honoured naval tradition, that officers and men would put service before personal consideration. Men will do this if they are well lead. This generally was not the case, and as Commander Storrs found when he took command of *Nootka*, the ship was like a volcano ready to erupt.¹⁰⁶

The Naval Staff and staff from the Personnel Branch vigorously engaged the task of developing a revised complement to meet future requirements for the RCN. The plan, nicknamed "Utopia", was to employ a methodology that better reflected the actual requirements of the navy based on experience and circumstances. To compensate for the dearth of experience in complementing, the staff at NSHQ seized upon a recent study on the complementing process conducted by the RN and a new guide entitled, "Rules and Procedures for the Assessment of Complements of HM Ships".¹⁰⁷ The new "rules", designed to achieve standardization and save personnel, governed the compilation of Watch and Quarter Bills¹⁰⁸ in various classes of ships. In the absence of fixed rules and a central coordinating authority in NSHQ, the various branches had padded their complements in ships resulting in unnecessary "passengers". The Director of Weapons and Tactics assumed the responsibility for coordinating the compilation of Departmental Watch and Quarter Bills to achieve "a truer relationship between actual requirements and complement allowed."¹⁰⁹ The idea of borrowing good ideas from the RN was not new and the USN was now included as a resource. This reflected both lack of staff required to do extensive studies and adequate staff training. Officers in the "Personnel Branch" of the RCN, as it came to be called, had to become masters of innovation owing to a shortage of resources and skills. There was, however, no lack of enthusiasm and this enabled them to muddle through.

Commodore Wallace Creery relieved Commodore Miles as Chief of Naval Personnel in August 1948. The profile of the new CNP is typical of senior officers who would oversee the Personnel Branch and RCN expansion until 1964. Creery was a member of the prewar RCN cohort, a graduate of RNCC and a term mate of the CNS.¹¹⁰ He entered the RCN at age fourteen from University School, a boys' private school in Victoria.¹¹¹ His formal education could be considered junior matriculation at best. He attended the RN Staff College in the early thirties and had command of *Champlain* and later *Fraser*. *Fraser* was lost in a collision with HMS *Calcutta* in 1940, and

Creery went on to a succession of operational staff positions. He finished the war in command of *Prince Robert* and was at Hong Kong for the Japanese surrender. He received the CBE, as did most of his contemporaries, for war service. As the first postwar commandant of Royal Roads, he oversaw its transition from a purely naval college to a tri-service institution.¹¹²

Wallace Creery was an example of perseverance and the seniority system paying off. It also showed the part luck played in careers, being in the right place at the right time. Passed over by several juniors, he was promoted to Commodore to succeed Miles, a junior. Creery had no previous experience in the Personnel Branch. That notwithstanding, he supervised the introduction of many of the recommendations of the Mainguy Report and the beginning of the rapid expansion of the RCN prompted by the Korean War. Nothing in particular qualified him to manage the Personnel Branch except that appointment was open when he was promoted. There is no evidence to suggest that he did not adequately execute his responsibilities. His appointment reflected the steadfast belief of senior RCN officers that rank and seniority alone qualified an officer of the Executive branch to do any job. His advancement also demonstrated the absolute coherence in the culture that impressed Claxton.

Luck played its part. Creery benefited from Claxton's prejudice against Commodores Lay and Adams, and Commodore Miles' misfortune whose career foundered when *Magnificent* went aground in June, 1949 while he was in command. Creery jumped three places when promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1950, to serve as Commanding Officer Pacific Coast (COPC), and subsequently as VCNS. When Wallace Bouchier Creery retired in 1954, he completed forty-one years of active service, the record for the RCN at the time. He was a hard-working professional who was known for his abounding optimism and good humour.¹¹³ That the RCN managed the postwar expansion as well as it did suggests that natural talent was in abundance along with obvious hard work, innovation and, of course, luck.

The work to produce the Revised RCN Complement Plan, optimistically nicknamed "Utopia", carried on well into 1949. Chief of Naval Personnel's staff produced various drafts using input from all sources. The staff now had some idea of the direction in which the navy was heading and the plan represented the first attempt to shape the structure to meet current requirements. Planning was based initially on a proposed complement of 11,569 for the peacetime RCN.¹¹⁴ It was realized that the 50-50 sea-shore ratio for personnel stipulated in "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy" might not be attainable. That ratio had not been based on empirical data but would be maintained if possible. A personnel pool to create some flexibility had to be established ashore to allow for personnel on leave, sick, drafted, in detention, and other non-effectives. There was also a requirement proposed by the Naval Staff to train a projected 10,000 reserves every year and this had to be worked into the model.¹¹⁵

Concurrently, the Naval Staff originated its own Plan "Q" that projected training and ship requirements for the next ten years. Plan "Q" produced an estimate of a regular force complement of 14,000.¹¹⁶ This plan was also tied in with the RCN Emergency Mobilization Plan that covered projections for the first six months of a war in any year until 1959. The goal was a commitment to have the carrier, two cruisers and twelve destroyers afloat to meet operational and training requirements for the regular and reserve force. The organizational deficiency inherent in the split responsibility between VCNS and CNP for planning commitments and establishing complements predictably complicated the process of planning the long-term complement requirements. However, there was much improved coordination between the Naval Staff and Personnel Branch. They also demonstrated a better understanding of the relationship between planning and incremental fiscal funding and an appreciation of the process Treasury Board expected to be followed. With this was an increased awareness of, and sensitivity to, the political climate.

There were two overriding factors that would control further expansion. The first was that the capability of the RCN to increase complement would depend on officer production.¹¹⁷ The RCN was 244 officers short for an all ranks complement of 9047. For a complement of 13,014 that was being proposed for 1951, an additional 714 officers would be required. This prompted Captain(SB) G. A. Woollcoombe, Director Naval Organization (DNOrg), to predict that "It is probably no exaggeration to say that the problem of entering and adequately training the increased number of officers required is the biggest one facing the RCN today."¹¹⁸ This was prophetic as officer production in the RCN would remain well below even minimum requirements through 1964. The second factor was that the RCN was contemplating a "bottom-up" expansion which, like the plan in "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy", did not reflect the political climate. In fact, the government would call for reductions in defence spending in 1950, as opposed to the increase the navy hoped to obtain. Naval expectations would not be fulfilled until the fear generated by the Korean War created the political will to fund the 20,000 personnel navy planned by Captain Rayner in 1945.

The navy was in a quandary over officer development and the future was uncertain. Officer training had been in a constant state of flux since 1945, and production was poor.¹¹⁹ The plans to maintain HMCS Royal Roads as the Royal Canadian Naval College for regular officers had to be abandoned through the necessity to economize.¹²⁰ A Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) component was added in 1947, and it became The RCN-RCAF College "Royal Roads". The RCN was further discouraged from ever realizing its ideal through Claxton's decision to reopen the Royal Military College (RMC) in 1948, as a four year, university-level, tri-service college associated with "Royal Roads".¹²¹ This was part of the Minister's plan to establish an integrated Canadian Services College (CANSERVCOL) programme for officer development. This initiative removed any direct influence of the navy on early professional education and development of its officers. CANSERVCOL "Royal Roads" became a two-year feeder college for RMC and provided preliminary training for Executive

Branch naval cadets who then proceeded to the RN for Sub-Lieutenants' courses. The final phase in Claxton's policy was the introduction of the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) in 1951. This plan permitted entry on an equal basis into the regular force through either the Canadian Service Colleges or civilian universities.

The shifting ground only complicated the problem of officer production for the navy that existed from the beginning of the postwar period. It was apparent to the RCN in 1945 that Royal Roads would be unable to meet the production levels required.¹²² Moreover, there was no effective programme to train technical officers such as Electrical Officers who were required to obtain degrees at their own expense.¹²³ Electrical Officers would be required in abundance to maintain new electronic equipment being proposed for the fleet in the new St. Laurent class escorts. The notion of subsidized education had not occurred to the navy to compete with industry in attracting and training technical specialists. There was no indigenous training facility for constructor officers. No firm action was being taken to train up to standard wartime RCNVR officers who transferred to the RCN. There was an attempt to reinstate the prewar RN pattern of "big ship" training in Canada for midshipmen.¹²⁴ This failed as the navy lacked a cruiser that could be dedicated for the purpose.

The evidence suggests there was an absence of direction and original thinking. Solutions tried were piecemeal and tentative. As a consequence, the RCN was most vulnerable when Claxton took the initiative and introduced his tri-service college policy. The "incidents" in 1949, only reinforced his convictions that the RCN must participate in an integrated officer development programme based on an original Canadian model. Some senior officers, like Nelson Lay, paid dearly for their open criticism of the Minister's pet project. Their opposition was motivated by cultural considerations. Others, like Captain Herbert Rayner, the first Commandant of CANSERVCOL Royal Roads, believed the concept could work if enough resources were applied to satisfy practical training requirements of the three services.¹²⁵ The more important issue, not raised by either Claxton

or the navy, was whether the tri-service college programme could produce sufficient officers to meet the RCN's growing demand. As it turned out, it could not.

Vice-Admiral Grant used subtle arguments to try to persuade Claxton that his integrated officer training programme scheme would not satisfy the RCN's requirements.¹²⁶ Grant was convinced of the superiority of the traditional apprentice training method perfected by the RN and he presented the navy's view publicly.¹²⁷ He argued that experience showed that Naval officers must be trained at sea during their formative years to acquire both the professional and man management skills required. The CNS firmly believed this apprenticeship was the well-spring of the naval ethic.¹²⁸ It produced a dedicated career officer. Claxton's proposal would ultimately change the nature of both the profession and the culture. But Grant realized further opposition to the tri-service scheme was non-productive when he understood the depth of the Minister's commitment. The CNS appears to have been equally convinced himself of the need for some change. He had been persuaded by Commodore Hope that the RCN should train its own midshipmen and no longer send them to the RN.¹²⁹ In the end, Grant went along with Claxton's scheme because he was pragmatic and because he had no leverage. His predecessor, Reid, had accepted it and he had to live with it. He told the Mainguy inquiry that if he had been CNS it would have happened, "over my dead body."¹³⁰ But the navy did not have an efficiently operating programme to support his argument.

Officer development in the naval reserve suffered from both neglect and a lack of resources. In 1947, the RCN reintroduced a successful wartime plan to train reserve officers in conjunction with the National Conference of Canadian Universities.¹³¹ It also hoped the plan would be a source of technically trained officers for the permanent force.¹³² The plan provided an opportunity for male students at Canadian universities to enrol in the University Naval Training Divisions (UNTD) established on campus. These were associated with the local naval reserve division where the "untidies" would muster for training on a weekly basis. The UNTD complement was set at 1800 in

May 1947.¹³³ The students enrolled initially as ratings and did two summers' training after which they were rated midshipmen. Low pay compared to other civilian summer employment made the plan unappealing. Moreover, there were insufficient ships available to ensure summer training cruises and billets had to be sought with the RN.¹³⁴ In 1948, regulations were changed to enrol UNTD candidates as officer cadets instead of as ratings to enhance the plan's appeal. However, this could not be implemented until 1951, because the officer accommodation required by their elevated status was not available at sea.¹³⁵ Regulations were also enacted to ensure promotion of reserve junior officers conformed to those of the regular force.¹³⁶ The demands of the UNTD programme became too large for the meagre resources of the RCN and regular force cadets had to be given priority.¹³⁷ In December 1948, the CNS decreed that UNTD training had to be cut back and production of reserve officers was reduced to a trickle until more resources could be made available.

The Naval Board took a major initiative to improve the standard of new entry training through its decision in January, 1949 to reopen HMCS *Cornwallis* as the RCN's recruit training centre.¹³⁸ *Naden* was already hopelessly overcrowded and had no room to expand to accommodate projected larger intakes of recruits. Grant believed that the wastage rate stemmed in part through new entries not developing pride in the navy through poor indoctrination in its customs and traditions. As a dedicated facility, *Cornwallis* would correct a major deficiency in supervision of new entries through the provision of sufficient dedicated divisional personnel who would ensure their proper indoctrination. Another important reason for a stand-alone facility was that Commodore Hope had emphasized that malcontents in the barracks shared by new entries poisoned their perspective of the navy from the beginning.¹³⁹ The training centre with a Captain in command would also ensure better logistic support especially in the issue of uniforms. Hope had reported to the CNS that he had seen, "200 scrubby individuals [new entries] dressed in anything being marched around the parade ground

[at *Naden*] under the old excuse that articles of kit were not available for them."¹⁴⁰ Hope reiterated that it took six months to restore the recruits' faith in the navy after a poor start.

HMCS *Cornwallis* was to be the cradle of the new navy. Located near Deep Brook, Nova Scotia on the Bay of Fundy, and with its wartime-built facilities that could accommodate 1700 trainees still in reasonable repair, *Cornwallis* was ideal. It was critical that the programme be set up properly and implemented quickly. Grant appointed his term mate, Captain A. P. "Pappy" Musgrave, to be the first Commanding Officer.¹⁴¹ The key appointment, however, was that of the intrepid Commander Patrick Budge as Executive Officer. Having successfully sorted out the discipline and morale problems in *Ontario*, Budge was now given the task of setting the standards for the RCN.¹⁴² He was given a select, dedicated, and highly motivated staff to support him. Training would be common for RCN, RCN(R) and UNTD ratings. The period of new entry training was extended to twenty-one weeks.¹⁴³ This was much longer than basic recruit training in either the RN or USN, reflecting Vice-Admiral Grant's direction that indoctrination of new entries must be complete.¹⁴⁴ Subsequently, it was also decided that the divisional and leadership section of the Junior Officer Technical Course (JOTC), and a "refresher" course for Petty Officers, would be set up and taught at *Cornwallis* under Budge's supervision.¹⁴⁵ There the standards for the care and supervision with respect to the men and the maintenance of their documentation were indelibly imprinted on junior officers and senior ratings.

The initiatives taken to improve conditions of service and morale either lacked government financial support or could not be implemented swiftly enough to quell growing unrest and to avert incidents of mass insubordination. Vigorous efforts had failed to make a significant dent in the backlog of trainees and instability continued, due in part to the transfer of whole crews from ships going into refit to those coming out.¹⁴⁶ The projection for 1949, was no better as new manning commitments were required to commission HMCS *Shearwater*, the naval air station, and HMCS

Cornwallis.¹⁴⁷ In spite of these challenges, an ambitious operational training programme, reminiscent of the prewar era, was planned. A major spring exercise entailed the transit of the Panama Canal by West Coast ships to join East Coast ships for a joint exercise with the RN's America and West Indies Squadron scheduled for 21 March to 5 April, 1949. The Pacific squadron was comprised of *Ontario*, *Athabaskan*(II), *Crescent*, and *Antigonish*, and the Atlantic squadron of *Magnificent*, *Nootka*, and *Haida*. The Pacific squadron sailed from Esquimalt on 28 January without *Crescent* which was being despatched instead to China on a special mission. Incidents of mass insubordination occurred onboard three of the ships within the period of one month; 26 February in *Athabaskan*(II), 15 March in *Crescent*, and 20 March in *Magnificent*.¹⁴⁸ Although there was a known environment of discontent in the fleet, the incidents caught the senior officers of the ships and NSHQ completely by surprise.

Athabaskan's situation was representative of the instability and inexperience that plagued ships in the fleet. The second of that name, she was a newly commissioned (20 January, 1948), Canadian-built Tribal class destroyer. The Commanding Officer, Commander (later Commodore) M. A. Medland, joined the ship in November, 1948 and had not been at sea since 1940.¹⁴⁹ He was her third Captain that year. The Executive Officer, an ex-RCNVR who was inexperienced in destroyers, joined in January 1949, and was the sixth in six months.¹⁵⁰ She sailed with a much reduced complement of twelve officers and 101 men compared to a full wartime complement of fourteen officers and 245 men.¹⁵¹ There were only eleven senior ratings, men of the rank of Petty Officer Second Class and above, onboard to supervise the work of ninety junior ratings. Considering that most of the senior ratings would have been technician watchkeepers, the magnitude of the absence of leadership soon becomes apparent. Moreover, supervision of the junior ratings in their mess decks was marginal because every experienced Leading Seaman had been recently promoted to Petty Officer Second Class through the rank restructuring policy. The make-up of the ship's company and lack of a proper work-up suggests a replication of the World War II circumstances described by

Alan Easton and *Athabaskan* would have been hard pressed had anything "warlike" happened.¹⁵² There were also a number of ex-*Ontario* ratings onboard who had participated in that ship's successful incident of mass insubordination.¹⁵³

The incident in *Athabaskan* occurred alongside in Manzanillo, Mexico where the ship had gone for fuel. Ninety men, all under the rank of Leading Seaman, locked themselves in their mess deck after lunch and refused to muster for work. They demanded to see the Captain who agreed to speak to the men and defused the situation. Commander Medland studiously avoided creating circumstances where the strict interpretation of mutiny might apply. There were no further problems after his discussion. The complaint that sparked the incident was failure to go into tropical routine wherein a ship begins work early and stops for the afternoon to avoid exertion in the heat. This had been the primary complaint in the incident in *Skeena* in 1936. The real underlying cause was a failure in leadership reflected in a breakdown in the relations between the Executive Officer and the junior ratings. A written set of demands on a mess deck table, that Medland pretended not to see, included the removal of the Executive Officer and Coxswain, and better cooperation between officers and men. The incident in *Ontario* had resulted in the removal of the Executive Officer. While speaking with the Captain the question was asked, "How can we retain our self-respect and keep our pride at the same time."¹⁵⁴ Medland initially reported to NSHQ that eight of the men involved "had communist leanings" but he later retracted this after interviewing the men.¹⁵⁵ There was no disciplinary action except to issue cautions, which is not a punishment, to the perpetrators.

The incident in *Athabaskan* had a domino effect. As the Mainguy Report noted, "In fact, the Captain of *Athabaskan* told his men to discuss [their] incident frankly and fully with their fellow-seamen."¹⁵⁶ Here the story begins to resemble a comic opera. The word reached *Magnificent* when ship's companies from the two squadrons fraternized ashore in Colon, Panama. It was also reported in the *Vancouver Sun* in an anonymous letter signed "an Athabaskan" which made it public

knowledge. The subsequent incidents in both *Magnificent* and *Crescent*, which received news even though deployed independently, were played out as if they had been scripted.¹⁵⁷ In the Canadian way, there was no violent confrontation and the Captains managed to avoid the approbation of the term mutiny being associated with the history of the RCN. They originated, what might be called in the modern idiom, the "un-mutiny".¹⁵⁸

In retrospect, the incident of mass insubordination in *Magnificent*, the flag ship of the RCN, should not have been a shock. It had been brewing since the ship commissioned on 7 April 1948. The ship's company of the "Happy Warrior" was transferred to the *Magnificent* and problems began immediately. The Mainguy inquiry found there had been ten "various incidents" that occurred within the space of a year.¹⁵⁹ These ranged in degree of seriousness from the throwing overboard of the Executive Officer's telescope to suspected sabotage of aircraft and ship's sensors.¹⁶⁰ In addition to the difficult task of working up a new ship and air squadron, *Magnificent* was burdened with training new entries, reserves and UNTD cadets and was consequently undermanned in the order of 250 trained officers and men.¹⁶¹ An independent report by Commander J.J. Hilton, USN, a pilot and expert in aircraft carrier operations, stated that *Magnificent* was quite filthy and the appearance of the men generally untidy and dirty. Moreover, Hilton said that there was, "something generally lacking in the internal organization of the ship and the fault lay in the Executive Department."¹⁶² He observed that the Executive Officer, "would not or could not visualise the importance of air operations and the Air Department." Hilton was told by officers onboard that the Executive Officer went out of his way to make air operations difficult, quite opposite to the Commanding Officer who gave them his full support.

The Commanding Officer was Commodore G R. "Gus" Miles who relieved Commodore Harry DeWolf, who was promoted to rear-admiral and appointed as FOPC, in August 1948. Miles was the rising star from the rather unlucky 1916 term of midshipmen from the RNCC.¹⁶³ Described

as having an indomitable spirit by Rear-Admiral Storrs, he survived a series of disasters during his career that would have defeated lesser men.¹⁶⁴ He was seriously injured as a cadet in the Halifax explosion. As a Commanding Officer during the Second World War, he survived the torpedoing of his first command, *Saguenay*, and later the hit by a glider bomb on his second command, *Athabaskan*(I). He was Murray's Chief of Staff at the time of the Halifax riots but avoided censure. Appointed as CNP in 1946, he was deeply involved in building the personnel structure of the postwar navy with its attendant challenges and problems. He was thoroughly aware of the morale situation and his office drafted the message to the fleet directing the establishment of Welfare Committees in ships. He had no previous experience in aircraft carriers and his entire focus at the time of the incident was on learning and supervising air operations. He delegated the administrative functions and running the ship's daily routine around the flight programme to the Executive Officer.

At the centre of the incident was the Executive Officer, Commander (later Rear-Admiral) Desmond W. "Debbie" Piers, one of the more aristocratic officers in the RCN. Born in Halifax into a well-connected family, he enrolled in the permanent RCN in 1932, from the Royal Military College of Canada.¹⁶⁵ His training then followed the normal pattern with the RN. Piers married Janet Aiken the daughter of the prominent Professor McNeil of Dalhousie University.¹⁶⁶ He had a distinguished war record, winning the DSC. From 1941 to 1943, Piers was Escort Group Commander of the 4th Canadian Escort Group while in personal command of *Restigouche*(I).¹⁶⁷ It was during that period that he first made the acquaintance of Louis Audette, then an RCNVR Lieutenant in command of HMCS *Pictou*, a corvette in Piers' Group. Piers would later face Audette as his inquisitor during the Mainguy inquiry. Apropos to that, in 1943, Piers reported to his senior officer ashore "Periodic meetings are held aboard H.M.C.S. "RESTIGOUCHE" between the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and the Chiefs and Petty Officers, to discuss matters of Welfare on the Lower

Deck."¹⁶⁸ This was a rudimentary Welfare Committee, a concept he later opposed. In 1944, he commanded *Algonquin(I)* during Operation Neptune with great success.¹⁶⁹

When Piers was appointed as Executive Officer of *Magnificent* he faced a completely unfamiliar challenge and environment. An aircraft carrier is the most complex of ships and the primary task of the Executive Officer, "as a matter of common sense", is to foster cooperation between departments.¹⁷⁰ Piers adopted the RN model for administering an aircraft carrier where the Executive Officer tries to keep everything under his personal control and be everywhere to supervise. The USN system, a modified version of which operated successfully in *Warrior*, worked on a delegation principle allowing the Executive Officer to concentrate on coordinating ship's routine and functions.¹⁷¹ Trying to do everyone's job and also being closed to advice, Piers was often at logger heads with Commander B. S. McEwen, RN, the Commander Air, usually over routine around flying stations.¹⁷² He was particularly sensitive over any comparison to *Warrior*. More so because her Executive Officer, Captain Ken Dyer, had been promoted over him. Piers' daily meetings with departmental heads were really briefing sessions where his was "the dominant tongue", dictating to his fellow officers.¹⁷³

On the question of morale, there had been technical efforts to improve the living conditions in the mess decks through fumigation for bed bugs and cockroaches, and repair of broken washroom fixtures. The major problem resided elsewhere. The ship's company was kept in the dark on changes to the programme and little was ever explained to them. Piers' attitude toward amenities such as liberal shore leave, and entertainment films, that even the RN thought were important for morale, was that these were unnecessary sops demanded by ratings influenced by trade unionism in civilian life.¹⁷⁴ At the time of the incident, there were only two training and no entertainment films onboard. There was no easily accessible process in place that would allow men to air their complaints with confidence. Piers had received the message from NSHQ directing the establishment of a Welfare

Committee. He took the decision that a Ship's Fund Committee, that was already in place, would perform that function as well. The evidence suggests that onboard *Magnificent* there was nothing to promote morale and a sense of community that were so necessary for a ship, particularly a carrier, to work happily and well. While Piers believed he had a happy ship that ran smoothly and where cooperation prevailed, there was, in fact, a strong environment of discontent and friction.¹⁷⁵

The incident in *Magnificent* was executed by thirty-two aircraft handlers from Number 3 Mess. Piers had a running feud with the young sailors in this mess. They had ditched his telescope, the Executive Officer's symbol of authority, overboard. He also believed they were responsible for a theft of spirits and wine from the wardroom stores.¹⁷⁶ With the rest of the ship's company, the members of Three Mess had been short changed on leave in Halifax after the ship returned from the United Kingdom. Beyond the ship's control, this was caused by NSHQ scheduling a commitment for an international exercise. Only a portion of the men had leave in Colon, Panama. Their living accommodations were particularly foul. The aircraft handlers had been keeping long hours at their stations, more than men from other departments, and had experienced frequent unexplained changes in the programme. These were caused by weather which dominates air operations. The 20th of March was a typical day where the aircraft handlers were required to range aircraft for flight operations at 0530 which were then delayed. The men were sent to breakfast by pipe at 0645 with a warning that flying stations would be resumed at 0850. Confusion existed over an order to clean ship at 0745. The aircraft handlers went to their mess decks and refused to muster when ordered by general pipe over the ship's broadcast. The word was passed to the Captain, Commodore Miles, who went to the mess deck and said to the men that mass action to overcome grievances would not be tolerated. He advised them of the proper procedure and said he would see each man individually. The men obeyed the next pipe to go to flying stations and the incident was over. Commodore Miles interviewed all the men involved and there was no disciplinary action.

The incident in *Crescent* occurred at Nanking, China in unique circumstances. The ship had been deployed independently in support of a Canadian initiative. The British government had asked Ottawa to help provide protection for British subjects threatened by the civil war in China. *Crescent* was hurriedly despatched from Esquimalt after the complement was supplemented by an additional twenty-five men, fifteen of whom had served in Ontario at the time of her incident.¹⁷⁷ *Crescent* had experienced the usual instability through a rapid turnover of officers and men. Of a crew of fourteen officers and 186 men during work-ups, only five officers and 93 men remained after three months when the ship sailed.¹⁷⁸ There were also insufficient junior working hands owing to the mass promotions to Petty Officer Second Class. This added to the instability and discontent among senior men who showed themselves reluctant to get involved in preventing the incident.¹⁷⁹ The Executive Officer, Lieutenant Wood, was an ex-RCNVR officer who had no experience in that office or in a destroyer. There was no effective Welfare Committee onboard. Another factor was that *Crescent* was a wartime-built destroyer not designed for service in the tropics. Her previous Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Commander John Charles, had advised FOPC, Rear-Admiral Harry DeWolf, against any deployment to southern waters because of extreme temperatures generated below decks.¹⁸⁰ She was probably chosen by DeWolf for the tasking because of the experience of her Commanding Officer.

Crescent's Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Commander David Groos, was the youngest officer to have commanded a Canadian destroyer during the war.¹⁸¹ A direct entry cadet into the RCN in 1935 at the age of 16, he was trained in the RN and promoted Lieutenant in 1940. He served continuously at sea during the war and was awarded the DSC. Groos took command of *Crescent* three months prior to her deployment to China. He followed two very popular Commanding Officers and felt at a disadvantage over this because the crew was inclined to make comparisons. Moreover, he was gravely concerned that the conditions in the RCN had deteriorated to the point that a

Commanding Officer's position was most difficult. On the passage from Esquimalt to Shanghai he drafted a report to FOPC in which he said:

I think the most disheartening aspect of the present day Commanding Officer's duties is his continual struggle with mediocrity. Not only is it never-ending but it is a battle that under prevailing conditions simply cannot be won by him alone....By "mediocrity" I mean second rate quality in everything but intentions and it has been said the road to Hell is paved with those. This second ratedness [sic] has passed the stage of being just a temporary condition which with a certain amount of effort on the part of ship's officers can be overcome. It is now an environment and the Commanding Officer's frustration at continually living within that environment must be experienced to be appreciated.¹⁸²

Groos went on to recommend a series of qualitative measures to enhance stability, discipline and training, recognizing that the Canadian sailor is not like his British counterpart and responds positively to a particular approach. His major recommendation was to commit the time and resources to train junior officers properly before sending them to the ships. He said it was, "beyond the capacity of the Commanding Officer in view of his other commitments" to train them and because of the rapid turnover negates his efforts in any case.¹⁸³

Crescent arrived in Nanking after a fast thirty-seven day passage from Esquimalt with short fuelling stops. She relieved HMS *Cossack* as the Senior Naval Officer. This role placed particular obligations on Groos including making and receiving a large number of diplomatic and social calls. These demands prevented him being available to supervise his Executive Officer. Lieutenant Wood was properly concerned about ship's security and considered it necessary to provide guards at access points. But he also required a guard for the wet canteen in a dingy facility on the jetty that no one used. To cover these requirements, men had to double up on their duties. There were additional demands on the crew that the Mainguy inquiry later considered "a confused chain of unnecessary labour."¹⁸⁴ Perceived RN routines slavishly followed, isolation from the familiar, and "bleak and inhospitable surroundings" added further to discontent and an incident was planned on the night of 14 March and executed the next day.¹⁸⁵ Some Petty Officers had wind of something but this was not

passed on to the Executive Officer, a dereliction of their responsibilities. The next morning 83 men, including a few recently rated Leading Seamen, failed to muster at "Hands Fall in" when piped. The men had locked themselves in their mess deck and refused a later pipe to turn to. The Captain intervened by passing the word for a respected senior Able Seaman to come out and talk to him which he did. In the interim, a set of demands was affixed to the outside of the mess deck door that included the removal of the Executive Officer and "A Welfare Committee that will not be vetoed by the Captain". Groos agreed to the request from the emissary to speak to the men and went to their mess. He informed them that if there were any complaints he wanted to get to the bottom of them provided they were submitted as individual complaints. He also advised them that he was not contemplating any disciplinary action thus far. All hands responded to the pipe at 0950 and the normal routine proceeded. The incident was over.

The series of incidents sent shock waves through NSHQ and the government. The *Crescent* incident was also reported to a Vancouver paper so they could not be ignored for political reasons alone. There was a fear that subversive activity had gained a purchase in the navy. The inquiry called by Brooke Claxton would flush this out and also force the RCN to bare its soul. Its outcome would alter the course of the navy towards new horizons.

NOTES - CHAPTER 4

1 "Mainguy Report", 4.

2 DeWolf and Dyer interviews by the author.

3 The author acknowledges the assistance of Dr. Donald M. Schurman with the genealogy of VAdmr. Grant's family.

4 R.E. Bidwell, "Eight Cadets, 1914," *Sea Breezes*, vol. 1 no. 4, December 1917, 6.

5 Ibid.

6 VAdmr. H.T.W. Grant, Certificate of Service, VAdmr. Grant file, DHist.

7 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 45. Grant introduced Lay "to the right people in Victoria" that led to Lay meeting his future wife.

8 Grant was leading a lively party of naval officers and RMC cadets on "a run ashore" in Chester. The harassment took the form of placing a ladder against the building and climbing up and scaring the couple. This prank was in response to a thumping on the floor by the couple to quiet Grant and his mates who were partying noisily in the room below. Cdr. Brodeur was dispatched from NSHQ to investigate after the secretary phoned her boss complaining of the antics of some drunken naval officers. Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 56.

9 Dyer and Audette interviews by the author. Audette was one of Grant's strongest critics but had nothing but praise and admiration for Mrs. Grant.

10 The other celebrated hero was VAdmr. Harry DeWolf who won the DSC in addition to the CBE and DSO. Grant was considered by DeWolf and others to be in a class by himself because he was awarded the DSO immediately in a big ship action while in command of an RN cruiser. DeWolf interview by the author. Information pertaining to VAdmr. Grant's service and war record was taken from biographical sketch 1794 H.Q. and his Certificate of Service, VAdmr. Grant file, DHist.

11 1794 H.Q., Ibid.

12 Storrs interview by the author.

13 Ibid.

14 No CNS except possibly Rayner believed that staff training was necessary. Lay and Storrs were advocates of it. Storrs had not had a staff course and applied for one. Grant's response was to appoint him to the staff of National Defence College, "to sink or swim" in Storrs' view. However, with it came promotion to Captain.

15 Dillon interview.

16 Storrs interview.

17 VAdmr. H.T.W. Grant, "Future Strategic Role of Naval Forces", Lecture to the National Defence College, 15 February 1948, VAdmr. Grant file, DHist.

18 J.F.K. Kealy, "The Development of the Canadian Navy, 1945-67", SGR II 223, DHist, 3. *Warrior* appears for the last time in RCN fleet employment plans in August 1947, where she was to proceed to Belfast to transfer crew and aircraft to *Magnificent* in January 1948. NSec memo, 1 August 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans. *Warrior* served in the RN until 1958 when she was sold to Argentina and renamed *Independencia*. Macpherson and Burgess, *The Ships of Canada's Naval Forces 1910-1981*, 160.

19 4000-100/14, Press release, 7 November 1951, VAdmr. Grant file, DHist.

20 Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960*, 177.

21 VCNS appears as a member of the Naval Board in the minutes of 24 September 1947, and Houghton's promotion to Acting Rear-Admiral was effective 1 September 1947. This reflected one of Lay's recommendations for reorganizing the Naval Board.

22 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 60.

23 Houghton began to establish his reputation with his contemporaries as the editor of *Sea Breezes*, the RNCC journal. He later wrote plays and composed poetry for shipboard entertainment. Houghton authored a most informative and entertaining memoir entitled, *A Sailor's Life for Me*, compiled from letters that he wrote to his mother from his time as a midshipman up to World War II. The author interviewed RAdmr. Houghton in 1972 at the time he was writing his memoirs and is in possession an original copy. Most of the important policy documents pertaining to RCN strategy between 1939 and 1941 are signed by him.

24 Houghton was a graduate of the RNCC Class of 1913 and a junior of Reid's. He served under Reid who was VCNS 1940-42 and as Reid's Chief of Staff when he was Flag Officer Newfoundland Force (FONF). Houghton's wartime career included command of *Prince Robert* and *Prince Henry*. He was in the Nelles/Murray camp with

Reid. Initially appointed to Great Britain with Nelles, he was given the plum job as the first Commanding Officer of *Warrior*.

25 VCNS to CNS, "The Morale of the Navy", memo, 29 September 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50". Houghton called the memo a "collation" of issues. The staff papers used as sources are contained in the file.

26 "The Morale of the Navy," 1.

27 Ibid.

28 The RCN had strong objections that came out in the Mainguy inquiry to the glossy approach in advertizing for recruiting that was masterminded by the Minister's office. Claxton took a personal interest in this and was a major contributor to the misrepresentation of service life. The recruiting campaign produced only mediocre results. Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960*, 177.

29 "a draft" refers to the assignment of a rating to a ship or establishment. Officers were "appointed".

30 The Commanding Officer of HMCS *Nootka* reported that a group of unmarried men in *Warrior* had to purchase an old truck to drive home across the continent and back. He believed this should not be necessary. LCdr. MS Stirling to COAC, 5 September 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50".

31 "The Morale of the Navy," 4.

32 Ibid., 6.

33 Ibid., 9.

34 Naval Board, *Naval Rates: Their Meaning for Employers*, 25 August 1945 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1945). The author thanks Dr. David Zimmerman for bringing this document to his attention. The document discusses trade equivalency and skill level but there is no reference to financial compensation.

35 "The Morale of the Navy," 10. "executive" refers to seamanship skills and leadership.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., 13.

38 Ibid., 18.

39 Ibid., 15.

40 Ibid., 22.

41 Ibid., 16.

42 Ibid., 17.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 19.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 20.

47 Ibid., 21.

48 This document covers much of the same ground as the "Mainguy Report" and provides conclusive evidence that the RCN hierarchy had a grasp of the problems respecting conditions of service that contributed to low morale.

49 CNS to the Minister, memo, 8 October 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50".

50 Ibid., 1.

51 Grant used figures for the quarter July-September 1947. These indicated that 231 discharges, 92 desertions were offset by only 230 new entries recruited.

52 CNS to the Minister, memo, 8 October 1947, 1.

52 Ibid. 2.

53 There is no mention of paid agents in any document in the file on "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50" nor any mention in the minutes of the Naval Board, Naval Staff and Senior Officers' Meetings.

54 CNS to the Minister, memo, 8 October 1947, 3.

55 NBM 233-2, 16 December 1947.

56 NBM 226-1, 29 September 1947.

57 NBM 227-4, 1 October 1947.

58 NBM 233-1 and 233-2, 16 December 1947.

59 NBM 239-4, 11 February 1948.

60 "Editorial", *Crowsnest*, vol. 1, no. 1, November 1948, 3.

61 Terms of Reference for Commodore A.M. Hope, 24 November 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50".

62 Those attending included CNS (Grant), VCNS (Houghton), CNP (Miles), CNTS (Knowlton), SCNO Afloat (DeWolf), NMCJS (Godfrey), Cmdre. Hope.

63 Minutes Fourth Senior Officers' Meeting, 26-27 November 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 1, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings.

64 Ibid.

65 Storrs interview by the author.

66 NBM 228-5, 6 October 1947.

67 NBM 234-8, 10 January 1948 and NBM 238-4, 4 February 1948. The RCN had avoided any commitments in the Arctic given the heavy bill in personnel and resources that it was paying through providing ex-frigates as weather ships. However, the Naval Board responded immediately and positively to Ministerial direction to assume additional roles of ice breaking for amphibious operations and re-supply of government Arctic stations. The Naval Staff also began planning a fall cruise into the Arctic area for *Magnificent* and two destroyers. The USN Northwind/Mackenzie class icebreaker design was chosen and this was the only new construction envisaged at this time.

68 Storrs interview by the author.

69 DeWolf interview by the author.

70 Soward, *Hands to Flying Stations*, vol. 1, 140; Glover, "The RCN: Royal Colonial or Royal Canadian Navy?",

72. Soward was obviously working from secondary sources and Glover was selective in his use of Grant's evidence before the Mainguy commission.

71 NBM 243-2, 31 March 1948 and NBM 244-6, 8 April 1948.

72 NBM 258-1, 8 September 1948.

73 NBM 279-4, 15 February 1949 and NBM 289-1&2, 1 June 1948.

74 NBM 279-4, 15 February 1949.

75 Dillon interview.

76 A/Cmdre. Hope to CNS, "Morale, Welfare and Trade Grouping in the Royal Canadian Navy" , 12 January 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50". Hereafter referred to as "The Hope Report".

77 Cmdre. Hope also looked at a recent study in the RN, the "Denny Report" that recommended a structure based on a small core of highly skilled technicians with a few specialist seaman and a majority of lower educated men to form a common pool onboard. He rejected this as inappropriate to Canadian conditions. Cmdre. Hope to COAC, memo, 3 February 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50".

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 NBM 251-4, 16 June 1948.

81 The rationale for the two-tone gray scheme is not clear. It was made by the Naval Staff apparently without reference to RN standards but not to differentiate RCN from RN ships. NSM 313-2, 5 November 1945. The distinctive light gray was adopted shortly after the St. Laurent class was introduced into the fleet for its camouflage properties.

82 NBM 236-1, 23 January 1948 and NBM 237-1, 30 January 1948. "The Denny Report" originated from the RN which was also in the process of restructuring trade groups.

83 The substance of Grant's memo is discussed in DM to MND, memo, 31 January 1948. See also CNS to MND, memo, 5 February 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50" where Grant used Claxton's request to see the morale reports from *Nootka* to underscore the seriousness of the trade group structure problem.

84 CNS to MND, memo, 5 February 1948.

85 ADM to MND, memo, 31 January 1948. Mill's, who had a previous long association with the Navy, was now obviously very much behind the integration policy. The naval member on the committee was Captain A.M. Peers.

86 NBM 246-1, 29 April 1948, NBM 249-5, 19 May 1948, NBM 253-8, 30 June 1948.

87 The new structure was as follows:

<u>Army Equivalent</u>	<u>Pay Grade</u>	<u>Navy Rank</u>
Warrant Officer 1	1	Chief Petty Officer First Class
Warrant Officer 2	2	Chief Petty Officer Second Class
Staff Sergeant	3	Petty Officer First Class
Sergeant	4	Petty Officer Second Class
Corporal	5	Leading Seaman
Private First Class	6	Able Seaman
Private	7	Ordinary Seaman
Recruit	8	Ordinary Seaman Under Six Months (New Entry)

88 NBM 267-4, 10 November 1948.

89 NBM 282-1, 10 March 1949.

90 NBM 289-3, 1 June 1949.

91 This even confused the RN and USN because the appropriate class uniform was required for entry to their messes onboard and ashore. The RCN PO2s experienced a certain amount of discrimination owing to this until the Class 2 uniform disappeared with unification. Interestingly, the USN experimented with a Class 1 uniform for all ratings as an egalitarian initiative during the 1980s. The experiment failed as the junior ratings disliked the formal look preferring instead the unique sailor suit popularized by Frank Sinatra and Gene Kelly in the Hollywood film, *Anchors Aweigh* (1945), and recognized world-wide.

92 "Mainguy Report", 16.

93 NBM 235-3, 19 January 1948.

94 NSec to Commands, memo, 23 January 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

95 DNPI(Lay) to VCNS, memo, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

96 CNS comments, Minutes Fourth Senior Officers' Meeting, 26-27 November 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 1, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings.

97 NSec, memo, 29 January 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans. DCNP(Adams DCNP & Chairman Complement Committee) to CNP & VCNS, memo, 9 April 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 2, Complements General.

98 VCNS to CNS, memo, 17 April 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 2, Complements General.

99 Ibid.

100 NBM 247, 4 May 1948.

101 PC 84/4994 amending PC 3/3144 of 6 August 1947 and PC 122/5111 of 12 December 1947 to allow the RCN to recruit 1399 officers and 7648 men - total of 9047.

102 For background on the St. Laurent Programme and decision see, J.H.W. Knox, "An Engineer's Outline of RCN History: Part II," *The RCN in Retrospect*, ed. Boutilier, 317-333, and S. Mathwin Davis, "The St. Laurent Decision: Genesis of a Canadian Fleet," *The RCN in Transition*, ed. Douglas, 209-232.

103 NBM 256-1, 21 June 1948. When the blockade began Claxton directed that all three services look at emergency planning and to propose implementation procedures.

104 NSec memo, "Employment of HMC Ships for period 1 October 1948 to 31 March 1949", 19 July 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans. The fitting of the squid ASW weapon was ongoing as a matter of priority.

105 NSHQ to *Crescent*, signal 231742Z March 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans. An example of many signals on file indicating acute shortages and NSHQ intervening to arrange coast to coast transfers of personnel.

106 Storrs interview by the author.

107 DWT to A/CNP, "Report of the Caslon Committee", 14 October 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 2, Complements General.

108 A Watch and Quarter Bill is the master personnel plan for a particular class of ship that establishes both departmental and functional positions, i.e. weapons, sensors, machinery, damage control, first aid, required to be manned in all cruising and action states and designates the rank and trade required to fill each position. Personnel are assigned to each position by name onboard a ship and the Watch and Quarter Bill is posted in a conspicuous place.

109 DWT to A/CNP, "Report of the Caslon Committee", 14 October 1948.

110 Bidwell, "Eight Cadets 1914", *Sea Breezes*, vol.1 no.4, 1917, 5.

111 RAdmr. W.B. Creery interview by Tony German, 6 February 1985, RCN 75, DHist. Creery said he joined the naval college because he could not pass the Latin examination at University School and the navy didn't require it.

112 Biographical Sketch, RAdmr. Creery file, DHist.

113 The author interviewed RAdmr. Creery in 1974 and was impressed by both his liveliness, good humor and honesty. He was a skilled mathematician and worked for a large investment firm after retiring.

114 NSM 439-1, 7 January 1949.

115 NSM 446-1, 23 February 1949.

116 DNPO(Brock) to ACNS, memo, 11 April 1949, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 2, Complements General.

117 DN Org to CNP and VCNS, memo, 8 June 1949, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 2, Complements General.

118 *Ibid.*

119 Preston, "MARCOM Education," 67-79 and Lier, "Big Ship Time': The Formative Years of RCN Officers Serving in RN Capital Ships," 74-95, *passim*.

120 NBM 202-2, 11 December 1946; NBM 213-8, 16 April 1947.

121 Claxton nearly opted for training all officers at Canadian universities but caved into RMC Ex-Cadets' powerful lobbying efforts to reopen RMC. Claxton, "Autobiography".

122 Preston, "MARCOM Education," 69.

123 NBM 217-12, 13 February 1947. Here the Naval Board decided that graduates of RCNC could attend university at their own expense in order to obtain Electrical Engineering Degrees to qualify them for service in the RCN Electrical Branch.

124 Lier, "Big Ship Time': The Formative Years of RCN Officers Serving in RN Capital Ships," 77.

125 Captain HS Rayner, "Audette Papers", vol. 2, file 8. Rayner's vision was a sort of West Point and Annapolis combined with appropriate resources for professional training, such as aircraft and ships, attached to the college.

126 CNS to MND, memo, 8 October 1947, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Vol. 1596, NSS 4490-1, Pt. 1, "Morale and Service Conditions 1947-50".

127 VAdmr. H.T.W. Grant, "The Navy's Role in Events of Today and Tomorrow", An address delivered to the Montreal United Service Institution, 16 February 1948, VAdmr. Grant file, DHist.

128 Lier, "Big Ship Time': The Formative Years of RCN Officers Serving in RN Capital Ships," 77.

129 Grant comments, Minutes Fifth Senior Officers' Meeting, 1-3 December 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 1, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings.

130 Grant evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 4, file 14.

131 "Trainees in Cap and Gown", *Crowsnest*, vol. 7, no. 1, November 1954, 12. UNTDs were established in 1942 and were in 14 universities by 1945.

132 VAdmr. H.T.W. Grant, "The Navy's Role in Events of Today and Tomorrow".

133 NBM 213-4, 16 April 1947.

134 NBM 211-1, 27 March 1947, NBM 212-1, 9 April 1947.

135 NBM 340-2, 14 February 1951.

136 NBM 254-2, 5 July 1948.

137 Minutes Fifth Senior Officers' Meeting, 1-3 December 1948. The UNTD Plan was discussed in detail from inception to current situation.

138 NBM 265, 1 November 1948, "Special Meeting on Cornwallis".

139 "The Hope Report".

140 Ibid.

141 NSM 445-1, 19 February 1949, "Special Naval Staff Meeting on the Reopening of Cornwallis".

142 *Cornwallis* was Budge's legacy to the RCN. Its creation reflected his gifts as a leader and trainer and traits of a strict disciplinarian and humanitarian. A "progressive-traditionalist", he drew heavily on his own experience as a boy in the RN training system in determining what would work on modern Canadian youth. Every recruit was taught the function and operation of the divisional system. His innovations included creating a choir of new entries that he personally directed. The Budge standard endured and is a prime example of the influence that a single individual could have on the small RCN.

143 Department of National Defence, *Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1950*, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951), 34. On completion, new entries from the Seamen and Communications Branches would proceed to sea for a further twenty-three weeks training. A cruiser was to be dedicated full-time to officer and new entry training. Men of other Branches would continue trades training in their respective schools.

144 CNS opening remarks NBM 289, 1 June 1949. This would also be a recommendation of the "Mainguy Report", 55.

145 The "Mainguy Report" gave leadership training for officers an absolute priority. It echoed exactly the earlier recommendations to the CNS of both RAdmr. Houghton and Cmdre. Hope. Cmdre. Creery, CNP, testified to the Mainguy inquiry in June, 1949 that the first JOTC course had been scheduled for October, 1949. Creery evidence, "Audette Papers" vol. 4, file 14.

146 NSec, memo, "Employment Programme 1 October 1948 to 31 March 1949", 19 July 1948 NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

147 Naval Staff, "Brief on the Proposed Employment of HMC Ships for Fiscal Year 1949-1950", November 1948, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 2, Operations and Plans.

148 See the "Mainguy Report", 6-25, for facts and causes relating to the incidents. Also, Louis Audette's, "Board of Investigation...Brief of the Evidence" in the "Audette Papers", vol. 1, file 5. The brief is Audette's independent submission. The other civilian commissioner, Leonard Brockington, drafted the final report drawing heavily on Audette's brief. The descriptions of the incidents in this thesis were drawn verbatim.

149 Medland was very briefly (two weeks) in command of *St. Croix* in 1940 as a Lieutenant and spent most of the war ashore. He suffered from a chronic ulcer. Audette characterizes him as, "sincere, colourless - earnest - unimaginative".

150 Medland evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 2, file 8.

151 This is only 51 percent of her peacetime complement for men which seems very low but are the figures given in the Mainguy Report. Medland testified the ship was at 70 percent of peacetime complement. As no Leading Seamen were involved in the incident, the figures suggest that there were only eleven ratings of the rank of Leading Seaman and above onboard.

152 Alan Easton, *50 North*, 15.

153 "Mainguy Report", 38.

154 Ibid., 13.

155 "Resumé of the Official Recommendations Concerning the Incident in H.M.C.S. Athabaskan", "Audette Papers", vol. 1, file 3.

156 Ibid., 38.

157 The Radiomen in *Crescent* probably intercepted the messages from *Athabaskan* to NSHQ reporting the incident and circulated the information around the ship.

158 In the opinion of RAdmr. Richard Lier, the history of the RCN should be written as a comedy because that was the way a lot of it played out at the time. RAdmr. Lier discussion with the author, 7 October 1997, at the Maritime Command Historical Conference, Victoria, BC.

159 "Various Incidents on *Magnificent*", "Mainguy Report", 22-24. Ten incidents occurred over a period of time including when Commodore Harry DeWolf was in command.

160 The telescope incident carried out by a member of No. 3 Mess was considered a prank by the Captain. Suspected acts of sabotage included the severing of radar cables and water found in aircraft gas tanks and sand in aircraft engine systems.

161 Piers evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 2, file 7.

162 Cdr. J.J. Hilton, USN, Report, "Audette Papers", vol. 1, file 3. Cdr. Hilton visited *Magnificent* shortly after her return to Halifax. He stated that his observations were not a comparison between RCN and USN methods but a functional criticism on how well it worked. The Terms of Reference given the commissioners specifically allowed them to obtain opinions from the services of other countries and this was to be arranged through NSHQ. NOTES ON INQUIRY (Memo from the Minister's office to members of Board of Inquiry), "Audette Papers", vol. 1, file 3.

163 P.W. Brock, "Twelve Cadets, 1916", *Sea Breezes*, vol. 2, no. 1 June 1919, 5-6. The 1916 term of RNCC seemed plagued with misfortune. Its brightest prospect to become CNS, J.W. Roy, went down in *Margaree*. W.B.L. Holms, nick-named "scarface", as a result of wounds received in the Halifax explosion, was relieved of command of *Iroquois* after her wartime incident.

164 Contrary to what the record might lead a researcher to conclude, Tony Storrs said that nothing phased Gus Miles. Storrs was astern of *Magnificent* in *Nootka* when she grounded and recalled that Miles was absolutely unperturbed in spite of the fact his career was obviously over. Storrs interview by the author.

165 RAdmr. D.W. Piers interview by the author, tape recording, Chester, Nova Scotia, 9 July 1997.

166 Janet Aitken, nee:McNeil, had been previously married to the son of Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook. One of three highly accomplished and intellectual sisters, Janet complemented "Debbie" to the extent that they became one of the most celebrated couples in Nova Scotian society. Upon retirement, RAdmr. Piers was appointed the Agent-General for Nova Scotia in London. Janet's sister, Edith, was the first woman to be appointed warden of the Women's Federal Penitentiary at Kingston.

167 He is probably Canada's best known veteran of the Battle of the Atlantic for his appearance in the CBC television documentary, *War At Sea*.

168 LCdr. D.W. Piers, "WELFARE OF R.C.N. PERSONNEL, JUNE, 1943", 1 June 1943, NS 1057-3-24(1), 4000-100, DHist.

169 Schull, *The Far Distant Ships*, 263, 265, 275, 284, 313.

170 Captain K.L. Dyer evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 4, file 14. Dyer was the Executive Officer of *Warrior* which had a reputation as a smooth running, happy ship.

171 Ibid.

172 Cdr. B.S. McEwen evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 2, file 7.

173 Cdr. D.W. Piers evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 2, file 7. The term "dominant tongue" was used by Audette in a question to Piers' regarding his conduct of departmental meetings to which Piers responded, "yes".

174 Ibid.

175 Ibid.

176 Ibid.

177 "Mainguy Report", 16.

178 LCdr. David Groos to L.C. Audette, 15 April, 1949, "Audette Papers", vol. 1, file 3. This is a personal letter from Groos who knew Audette from the war. The tone of the letter suggests Groos is quite distraught.

179 LCdr. Richard Gimblett, "Too many Chiefs and Not enough Seamen: The Lower Deck Complement of a Postwar Destroyer," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Nautical Research Society, Calgary, Alberta, 26 June 1998.

180 Charles interview by the author.

181 LCdr. Harold Groos to Mr. P.L. James, 1 June 1943, Groos correspondence author's collection. The destroyer was *Restigouche*(I). Both Harold and David Groos, brothers, commanded ships at the same time during 1943 which was a first in the history of the RCN. Harold was the elder and retired as a Commodore.

182 LCdr. David Groos, Report from sea dated February 1949, in Groos to Audette, 15 April, 1949, "Audette Papers".

183 Ibid.

184 "Mainguy Report", 18.

185 Ibid., 16-18.

CHAPTER 5

New Horizons

The Mainguy Report was good and the result excellent. It turned out to be beneficially cathartic. It exposed a lot and got it out of our systems and really gave us a clear identity.

Rear-Admiral Tony Storrs¹

The fact that it was public knowledge that there had been incidents of mass subordination in certain HMC Ships compelled Brooke Claxton, concerned about the existence of communist subversives in the fleet, to order an inquiry.² Grant had warned him of the possibility of "paid agents". Moreover, an environment of fear of communist infiltration in government agencies and the armed forces had permeated Ottawa since Igor Gouzenko had disclosed the existence of a Soviet spy ring in Canada in 1945. A Royal Commission had been called to investigate this and Claxton believed similar decisive measures were needed both to hunt out subversives and to protect loyal individuals.³

The form that the commission of inquiry would take was of great concern to the navy because, as Tony Storrs recalled, "It was shocking, the idea of a public inquiry into the navy's dirty linen."⁴ Vice-Admiral Grant was adamant that the inquiry should be handled in-house by the navy and opposed any civilian involvement.⁵ Louis C. Audette, a prominent Ottawa lawyer was approached by Claxton for advice on an inquiry and also to sit on the commission.⁶ He was also a Commander in the RCN(R) and formerly an RCNVR officer who had commanded two ships during the war. The eloquent, demonstrative, and highly opinionated Audette was equally adamant that the commission should be entirely civilian in composition.⁷ On Grant's insistence Claxton compromised by appointing a mixed commission of three with Rear-Admiral Rollo Mainguy, now Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (COAC), as the president. The other two commissioners were civilians, Audette and Leonard W. Brockington.⁸

Claxton instructed the commissioners that their mandate was "to find out and report what happened; and if the conclusion is reached that there are things which should be done to improve the conditions of service, the relations between officers and men or the machinery for the ventilation of grievances, etc...appropriate recommendations should be made."⁹ While their main priority was to determine if the incidents were "the result of the action of subversive elements", direction was given to ascertain the general profile of the officers and men, especially their character, background, sense of duty and education, and also to examine their conditions of service.¹⁰ In other words, the Minister wanted to know what was so wrong with the navy that men would resort to mutiny, and how to correct the problems. Given Claxton's strong nationalism, one question was obvious, to what extent did the navy as a Canadian institution embody national norms? Claxton gave the commissioners complete independence and a wide range of support to conduct their proceedings. The normal customs and procedures for conducting a naval inquiry were to be set aside. The Minister was most specific that everything should be done to ensure both the cooperation and protection of the men. The commissioners were to aim to make a unanimous report but he indicated that there was allowance for different or additional views to be submitted separately to him.¹¹ The report was intended for the guidance of the Chief of the Naval Staff and the government, and Claxton alone would make their findings public.

Louis Audette had his own agenda and he provoked controversy from the beginning. His personality was an interesting mix of intellectual and naval advocate. Audette maintained an attitude of contemptuous intellectual snobbery towards senior military officers that Eayrs noted was common among many degree-holding senior bureaucrats, like Audette, in the immediate postwar period.¹² Eayrs wrote, "The most important cause of the military's ostracization by the rest of the post-war policy-making community was a feeling that its senior

officers lacked the type of training needed to deal with national security in a nuclear age."¹³ Audette's association with the navy was close and he had a great love for the service. A veteran of the Battle of the Atlantic, he had held two commands, was Mentioned in Dispatches and achieved Acting-Lieutenant Commander rank in the RCNVR. He had served under Grant, Mainguy, and Piers, and was with Miles in *Saguenay* when she was torpedoed. Rear-Admiral Murray had asked Audette to act as his legal adviser during the Kellock inquiry. During the Murray affair, Audette had been snubbed arrogantly by both Captains Miles and Hibbard. This confirmed in Audette's mind that there existed an archaic class system within the permanent navy in which he, as an RCNVR officer, was considered "of a lower class".¹⁴ When Claxton invited him to serve as a commissioner, he was serving as the Commanding Officer of HMCS *Carleton*, the reserve division in Ottawa, having transferred to the RCN(R) from the RCNVR when absorbed into the new postwar reserve organization.. Audette seized this heaven-sent opportunity to become a champion of the "lower deck" to force reforms on a navy that he believed was led by a hierarchy that was arrogant, uneducated and completely out of touch with Canadian society. At the outset, he objected to Claxton in writing that Mainguy or any naval officer should serve on the commission. Forced to accept Mainguy, Audette later allowed that Rollo had been an excellent president and that his objection had not been to Mainguy personally, "whom I loved - he was a great guy", but to the uniform.¹⁵

Audette's objection to Grant's nominee established a confrontational relationship between those two powerful personalities that grew more intense during the course of the inquiry. Grant strongly resented the inquiry as an unwelcome intrusion into the affairs of the RCN and his domain.¹⁶ On several occasions, Grant publicly admonished both Audette and Brockington over their findings, using most derogatory language. For his part, Audette conceded that he had baited Grant during his appearance before the inquiry and criticized

aspects of the professional development of naval officers within Grant's hearing at social affairs.¹⁷ Audette complained to Claxton over Grant's behaviour and thereafter retained a strong hatred for Grant.¹⁸ Grant openly affronted Audette by promoting Piers a year after the Mainguy Report was published.¹⁹ Audette alleged that Piers had been personally insubordinate and strove doggedly to substantiate this during the inquiry. Piers' steady climb to retire as a rear-admiral was a constant reminder to Audette that the Mainguy Report had, in his mind, failed to bring the senior officers of the "old school" to heel. This explains in part Audette's motivation for eventually making the inquiry evidence public. This act was contrary to the written direction of the Minister of National Defence and assurances of confidentiality given to every witness that testified.²⁰ Moreover, the Chief of the Naval Staff was assured by the commission that "The records are purely for us and will be burned afterwards."²¹ Grant was completely candid and his testimony, given in absolute confidence, has been used selectively and out of context to discredit him ever since. Audette trusted that history would vindicate him and argued to justify his action publicly and in private until his death in 1997.²²

The inquiry did not turn into the public spectacle that the hierarchy of "the silent service" had feared. Claxton, ever cautious of media reaction, sought the advice from members of the press corps in Ottawa as to whether the proceedings should be public or private and took measures to "secure the[ir] positive cooperation".²³ The commissioners were directed to have a proactive policy to ensure the local press, in places where the inquiry was to sit, felt neither excluded nor obliged to interview everyone appearing before them. The decision to conduct proceedings in camera, and a fleet-wide invitation that promised non-attribution and no disciplinary action against anyone volunteering to testify, persuaded most of the men who were involved in the incidents to come forward.²⁴ Additionally, many other officers and men came forward to discuss what they thought was right with the RCN and what needed improving.

Others, in both the regular and reserve force, responded with briefs and letters. The inquiry conducted sessions in Halifax, Esquimalt and Ottawa from the beginning of April through June, 1949 and heard 238 witnesses ranging in rank from the CNS down to "some of the most recent 'new entries.'"²⁵

The inquiry found, predictably, that there had been a breakdown in the divisional system and the regulations for stating grievances were cumbersome. Moreover, there was a universal belief on the lower deck that using the complaint procedure prejudiced a man's career. The commissioners observed, "Many men therefore felt, however wrongly, that the only method likely to be successful was the illegal and mutinous procedure on which they ultimately decided."²⁶ The report might have gone further and stated that mass insubordination had become an accepted and traditional method of expressing general grievances in ships of the Royal Canadian Navy and to which the service had turned a blind eye. On this issue Lieutenant-Commander David Groos, Commanding Officer of *Crescent*, wrote to Audette.

Trouble? Did someone say "Trouble"? In the R.C.N.? There's never been any trouble in the R.C.N. if you go about it the right way. All you have to do is get a few friends in to help and you're a cinch. Nothing ever happened to the boys in the old Skeena [in 1936] did they? Or the Haida? Or the Nabob? Or the Ontario, the Micmac, or the Athabaskan, Crescent, Magnificent? And there were others.²⁷

Evidence indicated that the RCN was slow in accepting new norms of Canadian society. One articulate witness, Lieutenant-Commander Belyea, impressed the commissioners with his description of the divisional system as being based on an out-dated type of relationship between officers and men. Belyea opined that formerly officers were of a higher social status and possessed a superior education to the ratings and this formed the basis for a paternalistic relationship between the divisional officers and the men. He stated, "If one goes back in the history of the divisional system you will find at one time it worked very well.... It was a family unit within the ship. The divisional officer was the father and the recognized leader. These

conditions do not apply in Canada today."²⁸ The persistence of this attitude was confirmed by the testimony of Commander Piers who referred to the "precocious stubbornness" of Canadian sailors who were thinkers and that too much education led to discontentment on the lower deck.²⁹ Piers offered his opinion as to what was necessary to maintain an artificial separation between officers and men in the RCN, this was education. He believed that there should be a lowering of the educational standard of entry for the men, "lots of room for grade 8 with common sense. Such men are contented on the lower deck". What Piers recommended was reverting to the status quo ante bellum, the situation in the old "family navy" where men knew their place and the officers were educated to the grade twelve level at best. Piers did not understand, as did Claxton and the civilian commissioners, that postwar Canadian society demanded higher standards of education, particularly for those in leadership roles.

It was the testimony of the "articulate, incredibly egocentric, arrogant and self-confident", Debbie Piers who fully substantiated for Audette what was wrong with the naval culture.³⁰ Piers completely dominated his interview by the commissioners through his "capacity of vigorous expression" and whose well ordered thoughts came "tumbling out in a bit of a cataract."³¹ This both angered and confounded Audette who became convinced that Piers was guilty of blatant insubordination in refusing to comply with the NSHQ directive to establish a welfare committee. Audette subsequently attempted to establish his guilt and showed a definite bias against Piers in his interviews with other witnesses.³² Piers was identified as the villain and more than any other officer, except possibly Grant, epitomized for Audette what was wrong in the RCN. Piers obliged Audette by providing both oral and written evidence needed to build his case in the report. What Audette disregarded was the fact that Commander Piers was highly respected for his professional ability, even by those who had difficulty working with him. Commander McEwen, Commander Air, stated that he believed Piers was "overblamed" [sic] for

the incident in *Magnificent*, and that professionally, "he knows his onions as they say in the U.S."³³

What remains a mystery is why Piers rejected a Welfare Committee in *Magnificent* when he had established one in *Restigouche* during the war, "to discuss matters of Welfare on the Lower Deck."³⁴ In a report to Captain (D) in 1943, Piers had submitted one suggestion from the committee, "that there should be a 'Review of Service Conditions', between representatives of the Lower Deck and a Committee from N.S.H.Q., every six months. At this meeting all outstanding problems of Welfare could be discussed and subsequently brought before the Naval Board for decision."³⁵ What happened to Piers' progressive ideas between 1943 and 1949? Was Piers trying to turn back the clock? The generous conclusion is that his progressive ideas evaporated under pressure of all the challenges he faced as Executive Officer in *Magnificent*. Another is that he was in the wrong job. It would appear that Piers, comfortable in a small ship as a Commanding Officer and as an Escort Group Commander, had difficulty adapting his leadership style to the complexity of administering an aircraft carrier. The circumstances of the RCN during this chaotic transition period were such that many persons were thrust into positions for which they may not have been trained or were not suited.

More controversial in the historical context than the one-sided portrayal of Debbie Piers is the case of Harold Grant, the Chief of the Naval Staff. Grant's extensive evidence, filling over fifty pages, covered the spectrum of issues ranging from morale and conditions of service through officer training and the trade group structure.³⁶ He opened his testimony stating, "I think that this is probably one of the best things that could have happened to the navy and it is probably just as well it happened now."³⁷ He went on to say that the action taken in removing the Executive Officer after the incident in *Ontario* was a mistake that provided a pattern for subsequent incidents and he accepted his responsibility for his part in that decision. What

emerges from a fair and balanced reading of all Grant's evidence is a profile of a knowledgeable and highly professional naval chief who was exceptionally well informed of all the navy's problems and deeply concerned for the future and welfare of the RCN. Moreover, Grant had plans either in place or underway to correct deficiencies and to improve the men's welfare and conditions of service. We also see a CNS who was very conservative, reactionary, hard-nosed, vocal and highly opposed to initiatives that he believed were not in the best interests of the RCN.

He believed that the navy had expanded far too quickly after the war, approximately 600 percent, in order to retain its share of the defence budget. In doing so, the navy had outstripped its resources in its ability to train both officers and men and had taken in many poorly equipped wartime volunteers to fill the complement.³⁸ Grant stated that, "These fellows have all the guts in the world, but they never had any training to condition their minds for service in peacetime which is pretty onerous, and certainly entails sacrifices in family life and probably finances far beyond that which is accepted by the ordinary fellow ashore, particularly in the postwar period when business is booming."³⁹ The CNS told the commissioners that fiscal restraint by government and opposition and red tape from bureaucrats had prevented the Naval Board from implementing a large agenda designed to improve conditions of service and to alleviate the plight of naval families.

Following Audette's lead, historians have seized narrowly upon Grant's angry response to a blatantly provocative line of questioning that Audette himself admitted was a mistake.⁴⁰ Grant's outbursts that the men could sew "Canada" badges on the seats of their trousers" and, "I think Canada makes enough damn noise in this world without doing anything about it" permitted Audette to accentuate the negative and portray Grant as vulgar, anachronistic and unpatriotic. Examining the context of the line of questioning, it is evident that the basis for

Grant's rancour stemmed from the infamous incident where the Canadian government under Mackenzie King gave the sailors the opportunity to vote themselves out of the war in the Pacific.⁴¹ The ship's company of HMCS *Uganda*, Canada's only warship to see action with the British Pacific Force, voted three to one in May 1945, not to volunteer for further combat duty.⁴² In mid-July 1945, they left their Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy comrades facing the Japanese kamikazes and *Uganda* sailed for home to replace her complement. The disgrace of deserting brothers in arms thoroughly rankled the prewar RCN professionals.⁴³ The debacle was very fresh in Grant's mind in 1949.

Grant, who had to conduct a similar vote in *Ontario*, implied this reflected a *laissez faire* attitude endemic in society that was at the root of the problem in teaching young Canadian sailors to accept discipline and to do their duty. He stated, "I cannot see how any person serving at sea today dare put up the word 'Canada' until he is fit or shown himself fit to man a ship and take responsibility."⁴⁴ Grant was in fact arguing vociferously for pride in country, ethical behaviour and professionalism. It is hardly surprising that he expected the navy he led to come up to his own high standards. Harold Grant was respected by his peers such as Harry DeWolf for the fact that he would not demand of others that which he did not demand of himself. On the other hand, Audette believed the right to wear Canadian symbols had been won by the RCNVR sailors in the Battle of the Atlantic where, as William Pugsley wrote, the corvettes and men who sailed them "somehow stood for Canada."⁴⁵ Audette, the nationalist, was compelled to defeat Grant and used selective evidence to develop his case. In doing so, Audette failed to differentiate between Grant's professional competence and social sensitivity. What Audette created was a general impression of archaic ineptitude that, by inference, condemned all senior Canadian naval officers.

The Mainguy Report, by its very nature and terms of reference of the inquiry, was destined to be negative. The commissioners said as much in their preamble. While the report named no names, it inferred that senior officers as a group were responsible for creating an atmosphere that suppressed the Canadian spirit. On the whole the evidence suggests that this conclusion is entirely accurate. At fault were the low educational standards of the officers of the Executive Branch who had a grip on the most powerful positions in the RCN. The commissioners maintained that this group was unduly influenced by "big ship" time with the RN and had been inculcated in a culture foreign to Canadians. An emphasis on indoctrination through an apprentice system of training as opposed to a liberal academic education had created a closed culture that perpetuated itself. The progressive attributes of officers such as Rear-Admiral Harry DeWolf and Captain Ken Dyer, whom Audette profoundly respected, and the excellent features of Grant's programme for reform were mentioned only parenthetically in the short section on what was right with the navy. Even Claxton received criticism by implication for it was he who initiated the "bed of roses" approach to recruiting that completely misrepresented naval life to young Canadians. An interesting aspect of the report is the extent that the commission relied on United States Navy resource material for authoritative guidance on leadership.⁴⁶ There are also some remarkable oversights by the civilian commissioners. For example, they failed to establish the connection between Commodore Miles who as CNP was the authority responsible for the message ordering the fleet to establish Welfare Committees and who as Commanding Officer of *Magnificent* failed to ensure that his Executive Officer complied with it. Mainguy should have known this but probably remained silent so as not to implicate Miles who was close to attaining flag rank.

The major question is, did the Mainguy Report have an impact? The report received only brief mention in the Minister's annual statement to parliament in 1950, but he emphasized

that the Welfare Committees were to be given more latitude over the range of topics they could discuss. Also, their proceedings would be scrutinized by NSHQ, "in order to ascertain contentious subjects and to follow up steps taken to rectify any complaints and grievances."⁴⁷ Claxton suggested in his memoirs that he was generally happy with the result and, "the whole tone of the report strengthened my hand regarding modernization of the treatment of personnel and the further Canadianization of the navy."⁴⁸ Claxton acknowledged that most of the critical quantitative changes to improve conditions of service were in train or planned and awaiting funding when the report was submitted to him. New items were placed immediately on the agenda of the Naval Board and expedited. Undoubtedly, Claxton hoped that the navy would begin to think more about national than solely service priorities. In this he was disappointed and had to intervene personally.

The qualitative aspects pertaining to recommendations for the navy to become a more representative Canadian institution required a change of attitude. For Claxton this had to be signalled through the adoption of Canadian symbols. Before the commission submitted its report, he ordered the reintroduction of the Maple Leaf Emblem on the funnels of HMC Ships in April 1949.⁴⁹ On the contentious issue of "Canada" badges, Grant procrastinated. Claxton finally ordered the CNS to reinstate "Canada" badges, "without delay and without comment".⁵⁰ When ordered, Grant complied. In January 1950, the Naval Board directed that the badges be issued immediately.⁵¹ Grant said that he could not change in his views on some issues proving, as Harold Innis argued, in *The Fur Trade in Canada*, with respect to diminishing British influence on Canadian society that a culture changes truly only with the passage of a generation.⁵² Critics such as John Harbron maintained that the adoption of Canadian symbols was only superficial and that the admirals of the RCN successfully resisted change until 1964, through the secret and largely unaccountable operation of the Naval Board.⁵³ Claxton's opinion

differed. He wrote in 1956, "The result was good. There can be no doubt but the RCN today is a very different aggregation from what it was in 1946."⁵⁴

The future of the RCN lay with progressive middle rank officers such as Storrs, Landymore and Budge who gained leverage for continuing reforms through the Mainguy Report. Storrs believed a true Canadian identity was achieved because the "old guard" of the naval hierarchy was publicly admonished and told that the navy was to become a Canadian institution. Landymore believed that the Mainguy Report was the seminal event in the development of personnel policy in the postwar navy and began a new era in officer-man relations.⁵⁵ On the other hand, Budge, admitted that he had never read the report: he didn't need to because he was already a progressive innovator of a modern divisional system.⁵⁶ Budge reinforces Harry DeWolf's testimony to the commission that the regulations were in place and only had to be followed. However, DeWolf, considered by Audette to be the most "Canadian of admirals", conceded retrospectively that the navy should have listened to the RCNVR's earlier and admitted "The permanent force thought we had nothing to learn from them."⁵⁷ DeWolf had participated in the decision to remove "Canada" badges immediately after the war. But, he also possessed political sensitivity and the ability to change. Prophetically, Lieutenant(S) William Pugsley, RCNVR, had written in 1945, of potential postwar problems in *Saints, Devils and Ordinary Seamen*.

Now all one can say about the British system of training young officers is that it seems to work-for the British! Unfortunately, everything about the British scene is totally and incomparably different to ours, and kids we send over as midshipman have a way of getting their wires crossed; for our pre-war ratings spoke with great feeling about "phoney" English accents and a class distinction that went beyond the needs of discipline. An enthusiastic revival of this in the post-war years will not help us to build up the Lower Deck, or indeed a Canadian navy.⁵⁸

Subsequently, the Mainguy Report featured in every divisional course taught in *Cornwallis*. It became a kind of *Magna Carta* for the lower deck and every junior officer and

senior rate was instructed that the modern divisional system of the Royal Canadian Navy was established upon its recommendations. The implication was that the RCN had a new attitude toward the divisional system and the cultivation of officer-man relations was of primary importance. There were champions like Bill Landymore to see that it would be so. The men of the lower deck clearly benefited from this important episode in the history of the RCN. Grant however was equally adamant that naval recruits should be purged of the liberal notions of Canadian society and taught what amounted to blind obedience. To accomplish this, the training period at *Cornwallis* was extended to twenty-one weeks, later shortened to nineteen. The USN considered twelve weeks to be sufficient for indoctrination of new recruits into naval life. Whether the Mainguy Report was needed to accomplish these reforms or they would have occurred in the normal course of events is a moot point. It is certain that the efforts of Louis Audette ensured they did.

The public reception of the report was mixed and there was some negative fallout. Critics in the press and the opposition in parliament focused on the commissioners' comment, "there is no form of artificial superiority which Canadians resent more than the variety imported from another land". This produced a flurry of political cartoons featuring naval officers wearing monocles and editorials condemning the over-emphasis on Nelson's traditions in the RCN.⁵⁹ Anglophobes in parliament and elsewhere indulged in a frenzy of "Brit bashing" that smacked of anti-colonial sentiment. Somehow a comment in the Mainguy Report on the over-emphasis on Nelsonian traditions in the RCN was translated into a condemnation of Admiral Nelson himself. Audette wrote years later that this aspect of the report had been misunderstood but it is difficult to see how he could have managed to criticize a son's heritage and avoided condemning the parent.⁶⁰ Claxton feared an adverse reaction from the British at a time when the NATO alliance was being formed. Conducting damage control, he made a series of speeches to

emphasize that the commissioners had not been critical of "The Nelson Touch". The Minister stated that Nelson himself was a reformer and inferred that the great admiral would have approved of the recommendations in the Mainguy Report.⁶¹ It would be up to the navy to change its image in the eyes of the public in order to show its emerging Canadian identity.

During October 1949, at the same time the Mainguy Report was released, Vice-Admiral Grant was engaged in a campaign that would decide the future composition of the fleet with its concomitant effect on personnel policy. The issue was the necessity of naval aviation to the RCN. In the Cabinet Defence Committee, Finance Minister Abbott had directed the services to achieve maximum value for defence expenditure. With respect to the RCN he stated, "A feeling prevailed that the navy's activities were too varied for a small force and that better results would be achieved through a greater concentration on a surface escort force."⁶² Air Marshall Wilf Curtis, Chief of the Air Staff 1947-53 was a particularly strong critic. Naval aviation was consuming twenty-five percent of the navy's budget to operate twenty-four aircraft from a single carrier. It had also got off to a very poor start initially where crashes and casualties exceeded wartime levels.⁶³ Even Captain Lay spoke disparagingly to the Mainguy inquiry of the "scandalous errors" that had been made in the initial organization of naval aviation.⁶⁴

Despite the setting-up costs and teething problems, Grant had become convinced of the necessity for naval aviation and argued that carrier-borne aircraft were fundamental to the RCN fulfilling its role of convoy protection against threats from both enemy submarines and aircraft.⁶⁵ Grant embarked on a public relations campaign to muster support for naval aviation. His timing was excellent as the Soviets had exploded their first atomic bomb in September 1949, and this had further focused the concern of the government and public on defence. He consolidated the position of the carrier by committing the RCN's existing fleet to NATO's ASW

force in the first meeting of North Atlantic Regional Planning Group (NAORPG) held in Washington in October.⁶⁶ Grant stated that Canada wished to concentrate on the "organization, control and protection of convoys" and requested membership on Sub-Group B for the Atlantic Ocean Lines of Communications.⁶⁷ This would prove to be a critical initiative not only for consolidating the position of naval aviation but also in determining the role, composition and disposition of the Canadian fleet and personnel requirements until the end of the Cold War. Rear-Admiral Storrs remarked retrospectively, "NATO came as a great relief, clarified much of our uncertainty of purpose and gave us [the RCN] a clear role."⁶⁸

The issue over the future of naval aviation came to a head in March, 1950 in the Chiefs of Staff Committee when Curtis openly opposed Grant on continuing of naval aviation and the RCN's proposal to acquire 75 Avenger aircraft from the USN for ASW.⁶⁹ As unanimity could not be reached in the committee, Grant demanded a vote. Foulkes however, gained agreement to submit the issue to Claxton where Grant won his case thereby saving naval aviation and the Avenger purchase.⁷⁰ Thereafter, naval aviation was accepted by the government as having a key role to play for "the immediate defence of Canada" and "anti-submarine warfare".⁷¹ The RCN would retain an aircraft carrier until 1970 when it was paid-off for reasons of economy. That battle won, the Naval Staff proposed the acquisition of a second carrier, ostensibly to be employed as a training ship. Grant's response was that such a proposal was not justified given the financial climate and, "a carrier would not be the most suitable training ship for a 'small ship navy'."⁷² Grant had seen the future clearly and set the RCN on a realistic course. Despite some lingering aspirations within the Naval Staff, grandiose plans for a "big ship" navy were abandoned. A radical change in the strategic situation would soon create an argument for a second carrier.

The attention of the Mainguy Report did nothing substantive to gain improvements in the navy's situation in a practical sense and critical personnel problems continued into 1950.⁷³ Apart from maple leafs on funnels and "Canada" badges that came at no cost, Claxton did little substantive financially for the navy. The one concession he wrung from cabinet was a modest increase in complement in order to recruit an additional 100 men a month in Newfoundland which had recently joined Confederation. He did attend the opening session of the Sixth Senior Officers Meeting to get a measure of the members of this naval caucus but made no commitments. That meeting decided to implement staff proposals to stabilize ship's companies by designating ships permanently for either operations or training duties. Training had been seriously set back through the grounding of *Magnificent* in June 1949.⁷⁴ This had prompted DNPO (Brock) to recommend cancelling all operational exercises in 1950, in order to progress training.⁷⁵ However, the Senior Officers' Meeting considered maintaining operational efficiency important enough to demand a compromise. An additional consideration was to allow more advanced training to be achieved. The carrier and four destroyers were designated operational while *Ontario* and the remaining ships were assigned to training. This programme would also allow for fixed leave periods during July. The new concept was to commission a ship for two years and recommission it with a fresh crew at the end of the period. This first attempt to achieve personnel stability through fixed commissions would fail through a shortage of personnel resources that was exacerbated by the rapid expansion inaugurated by the United Nations' Korean police action.⁷⁶

The employment programme that emerged for 1950, to cover the heavy summer training commitments was again a complex plan requiring every personnel resource and nothing to go wrong. Operational ships on the east coast would include *Magnificent*, *Micmac*, and *Huron* and on the west coast, *Sioux* and *Cayuga*. *Athabaskan* would be commissioned in March

as the west coast training ship. While a Northern cruise looked doubtful, it was planned to send the west coast operational ships through the Panama canal to join the east coast squadron and proceed to Londonderry for a month's training at the RN Joint A/S School. When this programme was published it concluded with the caveat "NAVAL HEADQUARTERS confidently anticipates that the commencement of operational training in fully manned A/S destroyers this coming year is but the beginning of that anxiously awaited development of an efficient anti-submarine force, which is the aim of our Long Term Plans."⁷⁷ This reflected the spirit of determination of those in charge of the RCN throughout this transition period that was undoubtedly its sustaining strength. This "Can-do" spirit was one of those things that the Mainguy Report referred to as being "overwhelmingly right" with the navy. "Can-do" would become known universally in the NATO fleet as synonymous with the Royal Canadian Navy. The decision to stretch resources to the limit to maintain a core of operational ships was not without a definite purpose and would produce enormous dividends. In 1948, Grant told the National Defence College that the navy must, in peacetime, be prepared for international "police duties" and be "available at immediate notice to visit the scene of tension or disorder without deviating noticeably from normal routine."⁷⁸ The RCN was able to dispatch three destroyers with war complements to Korea in July 1950, within two weeks of the order. It would be months before the other two services could respond.

While the Canadian naval uniform remained British, the design of the new anti-submarine escort was uniquely Canadian and would become the easily recognisable hallmark of the RCN. The new St. Laurent Class would require significant changes in the navy's personnel structure as well as training to operate and maintain its advanced ship's systems. Rear-Admiral "Sam" Davis described the origin of the St Laurent Class as "a response to a political concern relating to an emerging situation, the decision process was somewhat confused, with parallel

and somewhat irrational approaches...."⁷⁹ Having no Royal Corps of Naval Constructors of its own, the RCN had to borrow a ship designer from the RN. They were fortunate to obtain on loan the brilliant, innovative and out-going "Rolly" Baker who was enrolled in the RCN(R) as a Constructor Captain.⁸⁰ Baker, "untrammelled by the constraints of the Royal Corps", pirated the design of the new RN Type 12 A/S frigate, incorporating its main features into the RCN design including the British Type Y-100 propulsion system.⁸¹ However, many aspects of the design were "radically altered" to incorporate many Canadian ideas and requirements and a concept of habitability based on experiments in HMCS *Sioux*. The electrical system was designed to USN Bureau of Ships (BuShips) specifications and USN radars, communications systems and Gunar fire control were to be installed. The decision on equipment was critical because the selection of the Y-100 system created a bifurcation where the Engineering Branch would retain its traditional RN training affiliation while the Electrical, TAS, Gunnery and Communications Branches turned to the USN.

The design team tried to involve the entire RCN community. For example, experienced Commanding Officers were invited to Canadian Vickers in Montreal to comment on the mock-up of the open and enclosed bridges and their recommendations were incorporated.⁸² The Naval Staff originally recommended that the class be named after Canadian cities, "in view of the resulting publicity and goodwill" but the Naval Board decided, "it was more desirable to perpetuate the names of former destroyers in the interest of tradition."⁸³ The first warship completely designed and built in Canada, would add immeasurably to the growing national identity of the RCN.

Claxton had been working steadily towards his personal goal of "furthering cohesion and uniformity between the three services" through a new National Defence Act that would establish an integrated administration structure and introduce a common system of discipline.⁸⁴

The act was passed on 7 June 1950, and regulations were slowly brought into force.⁸⁵ Those pertaining to discipline, the most critical and difficult to coordinate, were not promulgated until September 1951. Under the act, the Chiefs of Staff Committee became a separate body advising the minister, with its own permanent chairman and secretariat. General Foulkes, who chaired the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) by virtue of seniority in the absence of the Minister, was appointed its permanent Chairman in February 1951. Foulkes was a skilled politician and became Claxton's arbitrator on all major issues. The individual Chiefs of Staff were given statutory existence by virtue of Section 19 of the National Defence Act 1950. This consolidated the power of the Chief of the Naval Staff and spelled out his terms of reference being, "charged with the control and administration" of the navy "under the direction of the minister". Claxton was attacked in the press for elevating the military chiefs to pedestals of independent authority but he believed that this move was necessary to maintain of unity of command.⁸⁶ The act also set down the four functional branches supporting the CNS; the Naval Staff, the Naval Technical Services Branch, the Naval Personnel Branch and the Comptroller, along with their terms of reference. The composition of the Naval Board was also delineated. Integration was achieved through corresponding parallel and identical functional structures in the other two services to facilitate coordination through a tri-service committee system.

The "sickly season", where parsimony was the norm, ended abruptly for the RCN on 25 June 1950, when South Korea was invaded by Communist North Korea.⁸⁷ At the time, the Naval Board was faced with the necessity of permanently laying up *Uganda* and other difficult decisions owing to shortage of complement.⁸⁸ On 30 June 1950, NSHQ sent a warning message to the west coast cancelling the European cruise for *Cayuga*, *Sioux* and *Athabaskan*.⁸⁹ This was followed by instructions to Rear-Admiral DeWolf, CANFLAGPAC, "You are to sail 3 destroyers to Far East to date Wednesday P.M. 5th July 1950."⁹⁰ Captain Brock was in the

process of relieving Captain Medland as Senior Officer, Canadian Destroyers Pacific and he urged the Dockyard and Supply System on with characteristic vigour to make the sailing date.⁹¹ Ships were stored and ammunitioned to full wartime outfit and other ships and *Naden* barracks were emptied of personnel to bring them up to wartime complement. Brock sailed the three destroyers as Task Group 214.4 on schedule for Japan. On 14 July 1950, the three ships were placed by NSHQ under the operational control of General MacArthur who commanded the United Nations' forces. On arrival in Sasebo, Japan they joined Task Group 96.5 under the command of Rear-Admiral Hartman, USN. The RCN would rely on the USN, "to supply all normal logistic support."⁹² After a brief and uncertain five years of peace, the RCN was at war as part of a United Nations coalition force.⁹³

As might be expected, the immediate result of the crisis created by Korea was a flurry of planning, proposals and counter-proposals emanating from every level. Claxton issued a paper, "Acceleration of the Defence Programme", that directed the Chiefs of Staff to advance the completion of all plans to achieve a war-ready state.⁹⁴ This directive also asked for proposals to improve war fighting capability and for increased ceilings and estimates.⁹⁵ The navy responded with a proposal for a ceiling of 16,105 and an additional four A/S escorts to be constructed. While the cabinet had not yet developed sufficient anxiety to loose the purse strings completely, they authorized 13,440 personnel and the four additional A/S escorts along with a host of purchases and construction projects.⁹⁶ The Naval Board directed that *Huron*, *Micmac* and *Nootka* be brought up to war complement in personnel and ammunition to standby to relieve the three deployed destroyers. All other ships in reserve were to be commissioned as soon as possible and *Uganda* would not be laid up. The Naval Staff recommended to the Naval Board that the three destroyers in Korea be relieved by a cruiser and a second carrier be acquired to be kept in reserve. There was a mood of optimism spreading through the staff at

NSHQ. Captain Piers, now Director of Naval Plans and Operation (DNPO), urged that "the time was now opportune for increasing the size of the fleet."⁹⁷

The situation remained fluid and the extent of the RCN's commitments had yet to be determined fully. Using the 13,440 ceiling and based on the RCN's dual commitments to "the Canada-U.S Region" and NATO, the Naval Board submitted proposals for fleet strength of twenty-six operational ships to be attained by September 1953.⁹⁸ Grant also put the idea to Claxton of acquiring an additional carrier to be held in reserve, this had been listed in the original mobilization plan. He requested again the construction of four additional destroyer escorts and stated the necessity of increasing Canada's shipbuilding capacity.⁹⁹ However, the United States was greatly concerned over the growing Soviet menace in Europe and was not satisfied with the increases in standing forces by NATO members. At a meeting of North Atlantic Council Deputies on 4 August 1950, it was made clear that commitments made at Washington in October 1949, were now deemed to be formal obligations. Reports were to be rendered to the council by 28 August on the steps taken by member countries to increase total combat forces by 1 July, 1951.¹⁰⁰ As Joel Sokolsky suggested, this strengthened the hand of the navy and provided a substantiation in perpetuity for all requests for increases.¹⁰¹

The commitment to NATO became virtually open-ended and immediately created what became known as the "commitment-capability gap". In a draft memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee prepared for Claxton, the Naval Board advised that an overall shortage of 260 A/S vessels existed in the forces committed by all contributors for NATO and defence of North America. They declared that, "The Accelerated Defence Programme of the R.C.N. can be construed as a sign of good faith in our naval commitments to NATO."¹⁰² Grant committed the RCN to providing "as many A/S escorts as possible" when the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) met in Washington in October 1950.¹⁰³ These commitments had both material and

personnel components and the RCN was most deficient in the latter. The depth of the navy's personnel crisis was indicated by the admission that even though the navy's ceiling was now 13,440, "the R.C.N. cannot even meet at the present time, all the commitments envisaged under the 9,600 complement."¹⁰⁴ Staff analysis showed that only two and not three standby destroyers for Korea could be manned. The prognosis was not encouraging either as recruiting in the first six months of 1950, only made up wastage. Moreover, the situation was likely to become more precarious because a large number of effectives might not choose to re-engage during the coming year. The emergent demands of the Cold War were recreating the circumstances of the RCN in the Second World War. In the urgent rush to help, the RCN's rapid expansion caused ships to be commissioned faster than trained ship's companies could be supplied. Where wastage was not a problem in wartime, except through casualties, the conditions of peacetime were that no legislative provision existed to retain trained personnel.

Fear of war mounted and drastic measures with long term ramifications were the order of the day when the NATO Foreign Ministers gathered in December 1950. They met in a state of "common funk" as C.P. Stacey, quoting Kipling, referred to a similar climate in 1940, where Canada was propelled by fear into the arms of the Americans.¹⁰⁵ Claxton represented Lester Pearson, Minister of External Affairs, and committed Canadian forces to the NATO strategic structure. The ramifications of this were that national commitments would be dictated piecemeal by the force requirements determined by NATO theatre Commanders.¹⁰⁶ As a result, until 1964, the three Canadian services would go separate ways and prepare to fight three different kinds of war in accordance with the plans of the Supreme Allied Commanders in Europe (SACEUR), Atlantic (SACLANT) and the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). All these theatre commanders were Americans. It is ironic that Claxton, the

nationalist, acquiesced in this sacrifice of strategic initiative over Canadian defence policy as well as determination of the structure of the armed forces to NATO.¹⁰⁷

In the case of the RCN, force composition would be decided by the CNS in consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) on an annual basis. The RCN became, de facto, an integrated component of the NATO navy under the strategic control of an American admiral. This extra-national and "bottom-up" method of developing strategy placed the Canadian government in a hostage position and gave the service chiefs a degree of power and independence not intended. As Douglas Bland has argued, the service chiefs identified their requirements with NATO and used the moral dictate of having "to live up to commitments" to compel the government to support equipment and personnel programmes.¹⁰⁸ The Canadian government could withhold spending but only at the risk of hazarding the NATO relationship and being called a poor ally.

Grant called a meeting of RCN Senior Officers in January, 1951 and Claxton opened with a briefing on defence programme and international situation.¹⁰⁹ This was followed by progress reports by members of the Naval Board. There were mainly the same faces around the table only the positions had changed. DeWolf was now VCNS, Bidwell ACNS(P), and Hibbard CNP. It is apparent that Senior Officers' Meetings had evolved into an important vehicle for developing RCN policy, particularly with respect to personnel and administration. Grant had created a forum in which the Naval Board could test views and determine the success of plans and programmes. Problem areas could be thoroughly explored. The Minister made a cameo appearance that allowed two-way exposure. It was characteristic feature that the RCN operated with this caucus system of policy development. Its success was due to the small, relatively homogenous community of the prewar RCN cohort, of which Claxton spoke, who occupied most of the positions at the table and which was dominated by Executive Branch officers.

The meeting focused on the pressing problems of reserve training, promulgation of the new rank structure for the lower deck and complement. There were simply not enough accommodations to progress reserve training because priority had to be given to the regular force. The result was a poor training programme and consequently good recruits could not be attracted. The reserve force was languishing but there was no alternative to this state of affairs at present. The Personnel Staff had made a complete hash in interpreting and promulgating rights and privileges of Senior Rates in the new rank structure. Their error had produced unreconcilable anomalies and the regulations would have to be revised and repromulgated with all the attendant confusion. Resistance to the new rank of Petty Officer Second Class remained universal and Commanding Officers were reporting both complaints from senior men and problems due to a lack of supervision in the mess decks. The CNS told the meeting that the PO2's were here to stay and the navy was stuck with it.

The most serious problem was complementing. Flag Officer Pacific Coast, Rear-Admiral Creery, stated that "ships and establishments of the west coast considered that the numbers of men borne was dangerously low", reflecting the impact of providing full war complements to the Korean destroyers. The VCNS offered no relief and remarked that "this was a perennial problem brought on by the fact that with the pressure of world events the RCN was over-committed and as things stand it will be necessary to continue to man ships as fast as possible, in fact the faster the ships can be manned now the sooner we can meet training requirements and the better the navy will be in the long term."¹¹⁰ DeWolf went on to explain that there was also a systemic problem in developing ship's complements through applying RN rules to Canadian circumstances. He said that with respect to Tribal Class Destroyers, "in spite of every effort the complement required five to ten men more than there were accommodations." The Naval Board was still seeking a solution. He assured the conference that the problems were

well known and that NSHQ would eventually produce a complement for each ship. Commodore Hibbard urged those present to look on the bright side, "while the ships would not have the trained ratings and technical personnel that they required by complement there would be no shortage of labour."¹¹¹ There was also no shortage of good humour. The RCN was learning that complementing was not a science but an art and the conversion of ships and addition of new equipment were producing unforeseen challenges.

Commodore Hibbard had struggled with the complementing problem during his last appointment to NSHQ as DCNP. The value of maintaining continuity was apparent for now as CNP he was acutely aware of the problems caused by the split responsibility for complementing and commitments. After the Senior Officers' Meeting, he made the logical recommendation to the Naval Secretary for the consideration of the Naval Board that the responsibility for complementing should reside with Naval Staff (VCNS) who established the commitments for the navy. He submitted that "At present the Naval Staff doesn't take much account of the complementing difficulties when it considers new commitments."¹¹² Hibbard stated that the responsibility for manning, the distribution of personnel as available, should remain with the Personnel Staff.¹¹³ In April 1951, after CNP had "cleaned up the 13,440 complement requirements", responsibility for complementing was transferred to the Director of Naval Organization (DNOrg), Captain G.A. Woollcombe, of the Naval Staff on 14 February 1951.¹¹⁴ This accomplished, VCNS began to plan a personnel structure for a navy with a ceiling of 21,000 that CNS had been told to anticipate.¹¹⁵

The CNS undoubtedly received this planning advisory from the newly established Rank Structure Committee (RSC) that Claxton had established to supervise and coordinate the complementing process for all three services.¹¹⁶ General Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, was also appointed Chairman of the RSC. Other members of the RSC

included the Deputy Minister, the Secretary of the Treasury Board.¹¹⁷ Claxton needed a committee of this stature to overcome the inter-service bickering in the PMC that had stalled the development an integrated rank structure for more than two years.¹¹⁸ The Minister had called in the Defence Research Board to arbitrate but this also ended in deadlock. Moreover, the service chiefs approached Claxton independently with their proposals for senior officers' structures and promotions in the absence of established guidelines. Claxton referred these to the Deputy Minister to achieve conformity which usually resulted in the schemes being returned to the originators for revision. This laborious process produced rancour and wasted time.¹¹⁹ The establishment of the RSC was also necessitated by the rapid expansion of the armed forces to which he committed Canada in December.

The RSC would recommend ceilings and structures to the Minister "in consultation" with the Chiefs of Staff and would vet annual proposals for changes in establishments and rank structures for the next fiscal year. The RSC was to achieve the efficiency and symmetry that Claxton sought. This caused the navy difficulty because it did not necessarily follow that bureaucratic efficiency resulted in military effectiveness. For instance, the CNS had great difficulty convincing the Deputy Minister, a former army brigadier, that the navy required a higher proportion of non-commissioned officers than either the army or RCAF.¹²⁰ The RSC was an example of the tendency toward "micro-management" through the elaborate committee system that Claxton was developing. The Service Chiefs suffered through the necessity of having to submit routine changes in staff organizations to the RSC until 1959 when they were granted some flexibility.¹²¹ The integrated committee system also carried with it a large personnel bill and increased workload for questionable gains.¹²²

When the Naval Staff began to accept commitments based on the ceiling of 21,000 personnel, the CNS estimated the size of the naval complement would be 1,650 officers and

9,200 men (10,580) on 1 April 1951.¹²³ The projection for 1952 was 13,650 and the optimistic target date to reach 21,000 was 1 July 1954. The navy had already been forced into innovative programmes to deal with shortages. Officer enrolment remained the most pressing problem. The CNS advised the Minister that the navy was 750 officers short of the 1952 requirements and that the CANSERVCOL and UNTD programmes had produced only twenty-seven officers in 1949-50, "out of all proportion to the effort expended", where forty were required.¹²⁴ Grant advised Claxton that he believed it was time to make entry into the services compulsory for all cadets attending Service Colleges because, "at the present rate of increase we haven't a hope." For the navy's part, he said that there would be a full-scale drive to enrol more officers from the universities and the lower deck.

The RCN was being forced to be innovative because its projected shortfall of officers for the 21,000 navy was estimated at 1400.¹²⁵ Grant had to concede that the navy must resort to extraordinary measures such as granting Short Service Commissions, a move he had long resisted.¹²⁶ A Short Service Commission was like a short-term contract and Grant did not believe that this plan would attract people with the degree of dedication required in an officer. He agreed that as an emergency existed that "properly trained officers could not be provided by the method of training being subjected to Tri-service experimentation, it would be necessary to relax these standards."¹²⁷ Grant initially reserved approval for the Executive Branch, undoubtedly to ensure control of the navy remained within the bloodline, and would allow only pilots to be enrolled under this scheme. The restriction was removed for seaman officers in November 1951 out of necessity and Short Service Appointments were extended to UNTD enrollees as part of "drastic steps" required to obtain sufficient officers.¹²⁸ Provisions were also introduced to allow former experienced RCN(R) and RCNVR officers up to the age of thirty-five to re-enrol and transfer into the permanent force. The Naval Staff also resurrected the idea

of an independent RCN Naval College that would produce fifty officers a year.¹²⁹ The UNTD programme was now established in forty-one Canadian universities and was growing in popularity. It was hoped this source would also produce fifty officers per year. However, given the high drop-out rate from university, the Personnel Staff were not sanguine the target would be reached.

It was apparent to the Naval Board that Claxton's tri-service college "experiment" would not produce the 2850 officers required to complement a navy of 21,000 personnel. To keep pace with expansion requirements and wastage, it was necessary to procure 136 General List officers and thirty-five Branch officers annually.¹³⁰ Grant's major complaint with the current system was that the RCN did not have control over the number of officers attending the Service Colleges due to a quota system, which resulted in the RCN entries being regulated by army and air force numbers that bore no relation to RCN requirements.¹³¹ He firmly believed that the RCN should retain independent control of officer production and directed CNP to prepare a proposal for a long term policy of officer procurement based on a separate Naval College along the lines of the former RCNC "Royal Roads".

The model CNP produced was familiar and traditional, entry at the junior matriculation level and two years of academic and professional training followed by the eleven month JOTLC and then directly to sea in HMC ships. During discussion of the proposal at the Naval Board, DeWolf rehearsed the premise "In the training of the Seaman profession, there is no substitute for experience afloat, and this should be obtained at an early age."¹³² The Chief of Naval Technical Services, Rear-Admiral Jack Knowlton, reiterated that experience in leading men was no less critical for technical officers. There was a real sense that Claxton's system was failing and the navy had to strike out on its own. It was also apparent that DeWolf had little faith that

the UNTD system would produce the results anticipated. Hibbard was directed to develop proposals.

The lower deck was increasingly becoming an important source of officers and it was the one area over which the navy had a strong measure of control. The navy was closely examining New Entries for potential officers and enrolled ten of these in the CANSERVCOL programme in 1952. One of these, Ordinary Seaman James C. Wood, would eventually rise to the rank of Vice-Admiral and become the Commander, Maritime Command in 1983. The consensus at the Senior Officers meeting was that steps be taken to expand the opportunities for men to enter either the Upper Yardman or Branch Officer commissioning schemes. The Upper Yardman scheme provided the opportunity for younger highly-motivated men of the rank of Petty Officer to attain a commission and enjoy a full career as an officer.¹³³ The scheme was expanded to include more branches, the age limit raised to twenty-nine and the "unmarried" restriction for the Executive Branch removed.¹³⁴ The Branch Officers' scheme was designed to commission long-service, skilled branch technicians and was offered to men over thirty years old or twelve years of service who had attained the rank of Chief Petty Officer Second Class. The officers served within their branch until retirement and could aspire to rise no higher than Lieutenant-Commander. The Naval Board replaced the age-time rank requirement with a "minimum experience" requirement. While expanding the opportunities to commission men from the ranks and steadily raising the proportion of this category of officer, the Naval Board was also increasing the conservative element in the officer corps. Senior non-commissioned ranks are notoriously conservative and keepers of tradition and their influence on the postwar naval culture was very significant. This would be most apparent in their resistance when the navy introduced the General List Officer structure in 1957.

The procurement and training of men produced its own set of challenges and consequences. The main problem was not a shortage of men but of trained men. The training volume requirements, increased by poor re-engagement rates, directly affected the employment programme.¹³⁵ In the case of officers' training, *Ontario* was the dedicated ship. HMCS *Quebec* was slated to be the dedicated New Entry training ship but would not commission until January 1952. The ship employment policy was for half the ships in commission to be assigned for training but the Korea commitment and high volume requirements meant all ships were either on standby for Korea or training. Even at this, there was a severe shortage of accommodation at sea for training. The first cyclic system therefore could not operate and the schedules remained ad hoc, driven by the training load. The problem was more severe during the summer months, when leave was supposed to be scheduled, due to reserve training requirements. The RCN benefited however from the enthusiasm generated by the Korea conflict that gave a boost to recruiting and many trained men with wartime experience volunteered to re-enter the navy.¹³⁶ This eased the pressure somewhat.

The Naval Board acted to meet the increasing demands for trained technicians through the introduction of a Naval Apprentice Training Scheme along the lines of civilian industry.¹³⁷ They called for a Naval Training Centre to be established to train recruits mainly from Canadian Vocational Schools to become Engine Room Artificers. The apprentice scheme accepted young men, ages 16 to 19, with Grade 10 education or higher for a 39 month technical course following an abbreviated five month new entry indoctrination at *Cornwallis*. Their term of engagement was seven years. The school was established in January 1953, initially onboard the maintenance ship HMCS *Cape Breton* in Halifax and later moved to the Fleet School Esquimalt.¹³⁸ The programme produced well-educated and skilled artificers who entered the fleet in the rank of Petty Officer Second Class. The quality of men and training was such that

many went on to take commissions. The scope of training for men generally also expanded not only to meet advanced technology but also ship survival requirements. Damage control training which included ship's damage, fire-fighting and defence measures against atomic, biological and chemical warfare were incorporated as a universal requirement in the RCN.¹³⁹ There was some restructuring within trades such as the elimination of two types of cooks, one for officers and one for the men.¹⁴⁰ The experience in Korea was showing the need to retain both visual and radio communicators and a planned amalgamation was reversed.¹⁴¹ The navy was also questioning what to do with the Quartermaster Branch. It had been established at the end of the war when new technical trades were being created and no designated personnel were available to learn and execute seamanship duties. The operators ("users") in other trades were now becoming available for seamanship duties and the Quartermasters seemed redundant. There was also a profusion of small specialized trades, mainly associated with naval aviation, but also others such as photographers, that were essential but costly. The system of assigning men to trades as either users or maintainers of equipment and weapons systems was strictly retained and this was the structure on which the complementing process was based.

Recruiting returns from the Province of Quebec, specifically from the francophone population, remained lower than the national average. Only 7.9 percent of the total population of the navy were French-Speaking where the national average was 29.15 percent.¹⁴² David Zimmerman has demonstrated that the RCN did little either to attract or accommodate francophones from Quebec during the Second World War.¹⁴³ Claxton was determined that opportunities for service should be equal for French and English-speaking Canadians and this undoubtedly compelled the Naval Board to examine this traditional deficiency. The Naval Board was also keen to tap this large source of recruits. They commissioned Commander Marcel Jette, a francophone permanent force officer, to study the problem and submit

recommendations. The report was submitted in early 1951, and it essentially reflected the findings of the Mainguy Report that the RCN was not truly a national navy. Moreover, Jette stated that the navy had done little to sell itself to French-speaking Quebecers.¹⁴⁴ In Quebec, the RCN was thought to be British and Canadian sailors considered "Bums".

Jette emphasized the problems experienced by French-speaking recruits undergoing training at *Cornwallis*, where failures and recoursing owing to difficulties learning English could extend their stay up to thirty-eight weeks instead of the usual nineteen. This was a real demotivator and had a multiplier effect when the word was passed back home discouraging potential recruits. The sudden break from families and the French culture was also a factor. He noted that the navy had to compete with full employment and higher civilian wages which was a universal problem. His major recommendation was to establish a recruit training establishment in Quebec to teach French-speaking recruits both English and naval subjects. In spite of the heavy personnel bill attached, the Naval Board accepted this recommendation as the cost of both attracting French-speaking recruits as well as improving the navy's image in the Province of Quebec. The Basic Training School for French-speaking recruits was set up at HMCS *Montcalm*, the reserve division in Quebec City, and the first draft scheduled for February 1952.¹⁴⁵ The course was designed so that recruits could proceed to *Cornwallis* and join the appropriate place in their training when proficiency in English was achieved. The establishment eventually became HMCS *D'Iberville* and was moved to an independent location in 1953. With respect to procurement of French-Speaking officers, the RCN made no similar effort and enrollees either had to be bilingual or enter through Canadian Service College (CANSERVCOL) St. Jean after it was established. There was no thought until after unification of establishing a French-Speaking naval unit.¹⁴⁶

Except for nursing sisters, women ceased to serve in the RCN when the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service (WRCNS) was disbanded with demobilization. The WRCNS had made a valuable contribution to the RCN and the Naval Board was very enthusiastic to move with the other services to put women back into uniform. The main incentive was that they would free up men in naval establishments for sea duty. The Naval Board gave approval to organizing the WRCNS(Reserve) as a component of the RCN(R) in September, 1950 with a complement of fifty officers and 450 women.¹⁴⁷ Grant's plan was that the women would become an integral part of the reserves with the intention of eventually bringing them into the RCN.¹⁴⁸ He was adamant that a permanent career opportunity be offered in order to attract superior recruits. As an interim measure, women would be employed in a permanent capacity on Special Naval Duty primarily as communicators in naval radio stations. When sufficient numbers were obtained he would approach Claxton to establish a women's component in the Permanent Force.¹⁴⁹ This took some time and was not accomplished until February 1955.¹⁵⁰ Recruiting commenced in July 1951, and fifty-three women were entered. After completing basic training at *Cornwallis*, they joined HMC Naval Radio Station *Coverdale* for technical training. Along with the men, the WRCNS were issued uniforms of a new and more appealing design. The Naval Board decreed that the letter "W" would be used administratively and the term "Wrens" collectively to identify female personnel from male.¹⁵¹ This formalized a name of ornithological origin that had become traditional in the service.

The enthusiasm and sense of purpose generated by the Korea commitment and all the activity surrounding the NATO build-up had a very salutary effect on morale. This was accompanied by an infusion of funding that allowed the Naval Board to proceed with many morale and welfare oriented programmes that had been stalled through lack of government financial support. A substantial pay increase on 1 December 1951, "to maintain comparability

with pay in civilian industry", followed the promulgation by the RSC of the new integrated rank structure.¹⁵² The new design uniforms for ratings introduced in July 1951, were a great success.¹⁵³ New naval housing developments were built on both coasts, providing 300 units in 1951 with an additional 500 under construction at year's end. These represented a major step in easing the housing problems for married ratings. New barracks to house single men, "considered to be the most modern of its kind in Canada", were opened in Halifax in December, 1951.¹⁵⁴ The employment of more civilian labour permitted technicians to be released from many menial tasks. Increased funding also permitted the hiring of Welfare officers on both coasts and employment of nurses for public health duties.¹⁵⁵

There were important initiatives underway to regularize employment routines not only between the three services but also between ships in the navy and between coasts. The navy was pressed by the Deputy Minister to bring its work week in line with the civilian five-day week, which was the norm in the army and air force. Grant was particularly adamant that routines for ships and establishments be standardized on both coasts.¹⁵⁶ Shipboard routines were standardized and the east coast was first to implement the five day work week. Ironically, this was by virtue of the fact it lacked the sports facilities of the west coast, which had an additional mandatory half-day for sports. However, instability persisted owing to the pressures of Korea, training and NATO expansion. A new factor was a shift of concentration of ships to the east coast that created an imbalance in the home port division system.¹⁵⁷ Under this system sailors were permanently assigned either to Halifax or Esquimalt. There were also great imbalances in the sea/shore ratio of some trades, particularly senior Stoker Mechanics that was becoming "unmanageable". Audette had remarked in the Mainguy Report that instability had been the scourge of navies for centuries. The RCN would not solve the problem overnight. With the demands of expanding commitments, it was likely to get worse before it got better. In all, the lot

of the common sailor was improving. The Mainguy Report had done its good work and "Jack Tar" had an issue of the *Crowsnest* delivered to his mess every month which kept him informed and told him how well he was doing. As Rear-Admiral Storrs recalled, "When it all hung out in 1949, it all worked out."¹⁵⁸

The one ongoing personnel quandary for which there appeared to be no solution was the reserves. It was a matter of a lack of resources, priority had to go to training the rapidly expanding regular force. The planners ran the reserve training programme on an ad hoc basis from summer to summer.¹⁵⁹ Those ships allocated to UNTD and reserve training were double-committed to both operations and training. The reserves were not getting sufficient good men but the navy did not want to advertise which might attract a large number of recruits for whom no facilities and accommodations existed to train them. As a consequence, the reserves began to languish and this would develop into a syndrome through the overwhelming demands of expansion. Ironically, the reserve divisions, established by Commodore Walter Hose during the thin prewar years, had served as the conduit for personnel for wartime expansion. With the commencement of the Cold War, the reserve divisions were fast becoming the backwaters of the RCN.

HMCS *St Laurent* was launched on 30 November 1951, and Vice-Admiral Harold Grant retired as CNS the following day. The launching of "Sally" was the physical and material expression of the new Royal Canadian Navy. Grant's accomplishments as the father of the postwar RCN have been ignored by historians who have narrowly focused on the Mainguy Report and have been influenced by Louis Audette's biased representation. Grant had a broad strategic outlook that established the postwar ASW specialization of the RCN based on naval aviation. His foresight resulted in the immediate availability of three destroyers for dispatch to Korea when called for by the United Nations. He was able to keep them there despite an acute

personnel shortage in home waters. He negotiated Canada's naval commitments to NATO and translated these into government-funded projects. The programme for expanding the RCN to 13,800 was in place when he stepped down with long-term plans being developed to reach an eventual ceiling of 21,000. He doubled training capacity and placed an additional nine ships in commission.¹⁶⁰ He initiated the staff activity that resulted in the St Laurent Class programme, the first warship to be wholly designed and built in Canada. The class included vastly improved habitability and demonstrated a definite shift to North American standards and technology. Twenty-two ships would eventually be built on this basic design. Grant urged the revitalization of the shipbuilding industry to give Canada the capacity needed. Under Grant, the RCN moved towards the USN not only in technology but also in organization and administration. The RCN developed its new identity and expanded during the postwar period very much on the course that Grant laid out. His successors to 1964, Mainguy, DeWolf and Rayner, followed it with no appreciable deviation.

Grant was very much a transitional figure whose hard-driving Nova Scotian Presbyterian character could be misconstrued as that of just another hide-bound British traditionalist. He was hard-nosed and inflexible on points of principle and fought to retain those things he believed to be essential to the continuing existence of the RCN. He countered Claxton's initiatives for conformity and bureaucratic efficiency with arguments questioning the effectiveness of these. History would show that Grant was absolutely correct in stating that the CANSERVCOL programme would never provide for the navy's officer requirements. To his naval colleagues, he was a hero whose wartime exploits in command of RN cruisers established the standard professional excellence for RCN officers.¹⁶¹ He provided strong effective leadership with humour during the often chaotic times the navy experienced during the late 1940's. The RCN weathered the storm of the incidents and fiscal restraint under Grant.

Some might say that in spite of Grant, the RCN emerged with a new identity but that argument focuses narrowly on symbols, "Canada" badges and Maple Leafs. A new identity was emerging across the spectrum of naval activity and most of its necessary components were being put in place before the incidents. The involvement of the politicians prompted by the incidents merely accelerated the process and accentuated the qualitative aspects. Vice-Admiral Harold Grant, whom Harry DeWolf called "a unique Canadian" and, "the best CNS we ever had", died in 1965 at the age of sixty-six.¹⁶² He died quite young as did so many RCN officers of the prewar cohort. Grant was refused an official military funeral and Guard of Honour by Paul Hellyer, Minister of Defence, because he stipulated in his will that his coffin be draped with the White Ensign.¹⁶³ Grant's funeral was private with the White Ensign much in evidence. It may be construed that, true to character, his was the first shot fired in what became known as "the revolt of the Admirals" in defiance of Hellyer's unification policy.

NOTES - CHAPTER 5

1 Storrs interview by the author.

2 Audette interview. In Audette's view the government "panicked" and made hunting out subversion the first priority of the inquiry.

3 Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 141-143.

4 Storrs interview by the author.

5 DeWolf interview by the author.

6 Audette, whose father served as a Liberal government-appointed Justice of the Supreme Court, was well known in Liberal party circles and was on a first name basis with Claxton. He offered that he obtained his commission in the RCNVR through the influence of his father. In 1949, Audette was serving as the Commanding Officer of the Reserve Division in Ottawa, HMCS *Carleton*, and was concurrently a director of the Export Development Corporation, a member of the Canadian Maritime Commission, a member of the Northwest Territories Council, and a director of Park Steamship Co. Ltd.

7 Audette interview.

8 Brockington was a very close and trusted associate of Claxton's who had filled several high civil service positions and had been a speech writer for Mackenzie King. His only connection with the RCN was that his son had served in the navy during the war. Audette told the author that Brockington wrote the final version the Mainguy Report and was largely responsible for its style while Audette provided most of the content.

9 Memo from the Minister's Office to Members of Board of Inquiry Notes on Inquiry, para. 1, "Audette Papers", vol. 1, file 3,

10 Ibid., para. 13(A).

11 Audette to Claxton, 11 October 1949, "Audette Papers", vol. 1, file 2 contains Audette's separate submission. Audette was a strong advocate for restricting the availability and tempering the use of alcohol in the fleet. He believed that the navy's permissive attitude toward alcohol had negative effect on discipline and morale as well as professional effectiveness. He had other views pertaining mainly to the education of officers.

12 Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Peacemaking and Deterrence*, vol. 3, 52-56. Eayrs was referring particularly to bureaucrats in the Department of External Affairs where Audette had served as a First Secretary from 1945 to 1947.

13 Ibid., 55.

14 Audette to Donaldson, 18 June 1991, Audette file, DHist.

15 Audette interview.

16 DeWolf interview by the author.

17 Audette interview.

18 "Memorandum to file", 25 October 1950, "Audette Papers", vol. 1, file 1, also Audette interview. Audette harboured an intense hatred for Grant that stemmed from a personal insult he made against French-Canadians. The author acknowledges the assistance of Michael Whitby of the Directorate of History who was asked by VAdmr. DeWolf to arrange a meeting with Audette so that DeWolf could determine the reason of the latter's enduring and vociferous hatred of Grant. Whitby was present at the meeting and provided this information that had not been forthcoming in the author's interview with Audette. Audette also had a strong personal dislike for Piers whom he saw as a replica of Grant. The author raised this issue with RAdmr. Piers, who had been Audette's Squadron Commander during the war, but he could not account for it.

19 Piers' promotion was gazetted in the Honours List published on 1 January 1951. A naval officer acquaintance called Audette and drew the announcement in the paper to his attention. He advised him that Grant was saying "F... you Audette!" Audette interview.

20 "Notes on Inquiry", para 4(b). Audette presented his copy of the evidence along with his personal papers pertaining to the inquiry to the Public Archives of Canada thirty years later. When questioned by the author, Audette stated that Claxton's insistence on confidentiality was to protect the careers of junior officers and men who testified. He argued that the circumstances no longer pertained when he "found" the papers in his attic and decided to turn them over to the archives. The mischievous look on his face told another story.

21 Grant evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 4, file 14. The statement was made by the Chairman, Mainguy, speaking for all the commissioners to the CNS.

22 L.C. Audette, "The Lower Deck and the Mainguy Report of 1949," 235-249. The author was the last historian to whom Louis Audette gave an interview before his passing.

23 "Notes on Inquiry", para 7.

24 Royal Canadian Navy Press Release, 9 April 1949, 73/1066, DHist.

25 "Mainguy Report", 2.

26 Ibid., 36.

27 Groos to Audette, 15 April, 1949, "Audette Papers", vol. 1, file 3. It is possible that Groos meant the wartime incident in *Iroquois* and not *Haida*. *Micmac* had an incident like *Nootka's* which was common knowledge in the fleet but for which the author could not find corroborating evidence.

28 LCdr. Beleya evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 3, file 12. LCdr Belyea was an Electrical Branch Officer responsible for the idea of the Digital Tracking and Remoting System (DATAR), one of the RCN's creative tactical innovations.

29 Piers evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 2, part 2, file 7; Piers to Commissioners, 24 April 1949, in vol. 1, file 3.

30 Audette pencilled a short descriptor against Piers' evidence as he did for many witnesses. Examples are; "dull", "defensive clod", "immature whiner - careless with the truth", "better type not talkative", "a very dangerous witness".

31 Miles evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 2, part 2, file 7. See question by a commissioner pertaining to Piers. The author was able to determine that the questioner was Audette. Audette's expressions and manner of speech are unique and it can be readily determined when he was posing the questions and conducting the interview.

32 See especially Dyer evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 4, file 14, where Audette's line of questioning attempts to draw Dyer into condemning Piers. Dyer refused to be drawn and remarked that Piers was a "very adequate officer".

33 Cdr. McEwen evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 2, part 2, file 7.

34 LCdr. D.W. Piers, "Welfare of R.C.N. Personnel, June, 1943", 1 June 1943, 4000-100, DHist.

35 Ibid.

36 Grant evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 4, file 14, 3462-3512.

37 Ibid., 3462.

38 Ibid., 3467-3468.

39 Ibid.

40 Audette, "The Lower Deck and the Mainguy Report of 1949", 247 and Audette interview by the author.

41 Grant evidence, "Audette Papers", 3496.

42 Ron Armstrong, "The ship that left the war", *Times Colonist*, 13 August 1995, M1. See also Bill Rawlings, "Lonely Ambassador: HMCS *Uganda* and the War in the Pacific", *The Northern Mariner*, VIII, No. 1 (January 1998), 39-63. Rawlings gives some interesting insights on the low state of operational effectiveness of *Uganda*.

43 RAdmr. W.M. Landymore, interview by the author, tape recording, 7 July 1997, Lawrencetown, Nova Scotia. Landymore was the Gunnery Officer in *Uganda* at the time and still has nothing but the greatest disdain for the mainly RCNVR personnel who voted against remaining in combat. It remained a burning issue long after the war.

44 Grant evidence, "Audette Papers", 3497.

45 William Pugsley quoted in Harbron, "The Royal Canadian Navy At Peace, 1945 - 1955: The Uncertain Heritage", 9.

46 See "Board of Investigation...Brief on the Evidence", "Audette Papers", vol.1, file 5. This is a draft from which the final report was written and contains all the sources for information included in the report. A perusal indicated the strong influence of the "American Navy" on the views developed by the commission.

47 Department of National Defence, *Canada's Defence Program, 1949-50*, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1949), 43.

48 Claxton, "Autobiography".

49 NBM 284-8, 6 April 1949. This was standardized to be a single red maple leaf as there were variants such as the emblem consisting of three green maple leaves worn by *Uganda* during the war.

50 Claxton, "Autobiography"; NBM 308-2, 12 January 1950; NBM 309-2, 20 January 1950; NBM 310, 23 January 1950. Minutes Sixth Senior Officers' Meeting, 2-5 November 1949, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 2, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings. For Claxton the process was like pulling teeth. Grant first proposed to include the word "Canada" only on the men's Branch and Trade badges and

to exclude officers from wearing it. This had been the consensus of the 6th Senior Officers' Meeting held at the beginning of November 1949, and not the view of Grant alone. Grant had to advise the Naval Board that "the Minister has decided that "Canada" badges would be introduced for both Officers and men of the RCN, and that the proposal to include the word "Canada" on the Branch and Trade Badges for men was not approved."

51 John Harbron, a critic of the effectiveness of the Mainguy Report, suggested that because RAdmr. Mainguy, FOAC, was not wearing "Canada" badges in the Fall of 1949 this showed he did not support his own report and this reflected the attitude of all senior officers. Harbron, "The Royal Canadian Navy At Peace, 1945 - 1955: The Uncertain Heritage", 12. The fact of the matter is gold wire badges were not available for officers uniforms until the Summer of 1951, when they became mandatory. Mainguy was waiting for his badges to be made up by Gieves in London who made his uniforms. Mainguy wore the "Canada" badges with pride as Captain(D) in Newfoundland during the war. See photograph of Mainguy taken in 1944, in Milner, *North Atlantic Run*, opposite p. 156. Harbron's essay presents a critical opinion of another ex-RCNVR intellectual. Written in 1966, Harbron argues that the Mainguy Report achieved only superficial reforms such as the symbols but problems continued because of the anti-intellectualism of the "old guard" who remained in control. Harbron suggests a more North American model but the USN was no more liberal for it had no commissioned officers of black heritage and all the officers' stewards were non-American Filipinos. The essay contains many factual inaccuracies, such as Nelles remaining as CNS until the end of the war and there having been no mutinies in a "British" navy since the early 1930's.

52 Harold Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada*, 383-384.

53 Harbron, "The Royal Canadian Navy At Peace, 1945 - 1955: The Uncertain Heritage", 19-20.

54 Claxton, "Autobiography".

55 Landymore interview by the author. Landymore was an early champion of for sailors' welfare and his influence became pervasive as he worked his way up the chain of command to eventually hold the position of Commander, Maritime Command that replaced the office of CNS.

56 Budge interview.

57 DeWolf interview by the author.

58 Pugsley, *Saints Devils and Ordinary Seaman*, 237. Pugsley advocated retaining the wartime model for socialization where officer candidates spent time as ratings. This was carried on initially in the postwar UNTD programme. There was a short similar trial programme for regular force candidates but this was abandoned in 1946. It is interesting to note how much of the phraseology and terms used by Pugsley appear in the Mainguy

Report. Moreover, Audette's comments on the detrimental affects on the abuse of alcohol in the navy in his separate submission to Claxton follow closely Pugsley's views on pages 223-224.

59 *Chronicle Herald*, 3 November 1949, 2. The *Chronicle Herald* carried several editorials on the Mainguy Report reflecting the ambiguity of the relationship that Halifax had with the city's largest employer and source of revenue. The regular incidents of lack of discipline ashore by sailors kept relations strained. See R.C.N. Press Release A-193 9 November 1948, 73/1066, DHist.

60 Audette, "The Lower Deck and the Mainguy Report of 1949," 246.

61 Brooke Claxton, "The Nelson Touch", an address given to the cadets at CSC Royal Roads, 14 November 1950, reproduced in *The Crowsnest*, vol. 2 no. 3 January 1951, 6.

62 Cabinet Defence Committee Minutes, 27 September 1949, extract in NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 3, Complements General.

63 Mills to Abbott, memo, 31 July, 1946, DM/DND 1700-100/1A, DHist. The DM was advising the Minister that there had been 11 crashes in July 1946 alone.

64 Lay evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 4, file 14. Lay asserted that, "naval aviation was the most complicated thing you can possibly try to work" but the RCN's piecemeal approach and borrowing an inexperienced RN observer to set it up created severe problems right from the start.

65 VAdmr. Grant, Speech to the Defence Services Institute of London Ontario, 14 October 1949, Grant file, DHist. Grant was influenced by Admiral Halsey, the USN carrier admiral. His decision was later reinforced when he visited Korea and General MacArthur told him, "the success of the Inchon landing was due to Naval gunfire and carrier-borne aviation, which provided 100% of the support." NBM 334-1a, 25 October 1950.

66 Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada and the Cold War at Sea, 1945-68," *RCN in Transition*, ed. Douglas, 213-214. The RCN Force Requirements for protecting sea lines of communication built around the carrier and naval aviation were developed under Ministerial direction and passed by the Naval Board in September, 1948. NBMs 256-1 and 259-5 Basic RCN Plan (Plan "B"). NAORPG became SACLANT after it was decided that an American admiral would permanently hold the position. The RCN supported the choice of an American for Supreme Commander Atlantic against the RN's bid to hold the position and their nominee, Admiral Louis Mountbatten. This indicated the extent that the RCN had moved into the USN sphere of influence.

67 Joel Sokolsky, "The US, Canada and the Cold War in the North Atlantic: The Early Years", paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, May 1981, 30-31.

68 Davis to Douglas, 21 March 1984, enclosure "The DDE Decision Process - Involvement of Cdr/Capt AHG Storrs", RAdmr. Storrs file, DHist.

69 Raymont, "Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 83-84. Raymont observed that only three issues had to be referred to the MND from the COSC for decision over the life of the committee. These were; naval aviation (1950), the stationing of the Canadian Brigade in the British Sector as opposed to the American Sector in Europe (1951), and the cancellation of the CF 105 (Arrow) project (1959).

70 Authors of popular histories on Canadian naval aviation have generally portrayed the role of Grant with cavalier inaccuracy. The truth is that without the tenacity and support of Grant, the carrier and naval aviation would have gone in 1950. See for example Soward, *Hands to Flying Stations*, vol. 1, 139-140, 173-174.

71 Department of National Defence, *Canada's Defence Programme, 1951-52*, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951), 7.

72 NBM 320-3, 5 April 1950. Grant agreed the idea of having a carrier in strategic reserve had some merit and later reversed his decision on proposing that option to government.

73 Cmdre. "Jimmy" Hibbard became CNP on 1 January, 1950.

74 Cmdre. "Gus" Miles weathered the incident in *Magnificent* only to have his career founder when his Navigating Officer put the carrier aground in June, 1949. The grounding incident and subsequent court martial where Miles was found guilty and "dismissed his ship" are reported by Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 193. Miles died suddenly in 1951, at the age of 50 while serving as the Commodore of the RCN Barracks, HMCS *Naden*. He was buried at sea by HMCS *Ontario*.

75 DNPO to ACNS, memo, 23 June 1949, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3, Operations and Plans.

76 A similar plan, "the cyclic system", would be introduced as a result of the "Landymore Report" in 1964, to solve the chronic problem of instability. Cdr. Bill Landymore was Director of Manning and Personnel Statistics in NSHQ in 1949, and later conducted a personnel study for the Naval Board as a rear-admiral and FOPC in 1964.

77 NSec Memo, "Employment of Ships and Carrier Air Groups", 14 January 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3, Operations and Plans.

78 VAdmr. Grant, "Future Strategic Role of Naval Forces", Lecture to the National Defence College, 15 February 1948. John Harbron's limited understanding of the strategic role of naval forces in peacetime is obvious in his criticism of the RCN carrying on with training cruises for officers while ships were deploying to Korea. Grant's

strategic thought reflected the emerging nature of the Cold War and was entirely consistent with Canada's foreign policy. Harbron, "The Royal Canadian Navy At Peace, 1945 - 1955: The Uncertain Heritage", 14-15.

79 S. Mathwin Davis, "The St Laurent Decision: Genesis of the Canadian Fleet," 204.

80 Baker was a character as well as a gifted naval architect who, in RAdmr. Storrs' opinion, designed the St. Laurent Class by himself. After eight years on loan to the RCN, Baker returned to the RN to become the Technical Chief Executive for the Dreadnought Nuclear Submarine Project.

81 Minutes Seventh Senior Officers' Meeting, 2-3 February 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 2, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings. The meeting was held to discuss the new ship design and conversion of *Algonquin* to an anti-submarine escort.

82 Charles interview by the author. Rear-Admiral Charles was one of the participating Commanding Officers.

83 NBM 335-1, 8 November 1950. More recently, the navy decided to name the Canadian Patrol Frigates after Canadian cities for reasons of publicity and goodwill. This was a USN tradition that the RCN in 1950 was not yet ready to emulate.

84 Raymont, "Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 183.

85 House of Commons, *Special Committee on Bill No. 133, An Act Respecting National Defence*, Ottawa, 1950.

86 Claxton, "Autobiography".

87 Tony German used "sickly season" as the title of his chapter on the period of fiscal restraint and personnel problems in *The Sea Is At Her Gates*. He takes literary licence with a naval toast that actually refers to opportunities for promotion.

88 NBM 325-4, 14 June 1950.

89 CANAVHED TO CANFLAGPAC 1800Z/30 JUNE 50, OPERATIONS KOREA, 1650-239/187, DHist. The message addresses reflect the adoption of USN communications doctrine.

90 CANAVHED TO CANFLAGPAC 2030Z/30 JUNE 50, *Ibid*.

91 Brock, *The Dark Broad Seas*, 206-208. Brock and Medland, like Piers, avoided any sanction in spite of their key involvements in the incidents investigated by the Mainguy inquiry and both were promoted to Captain on 1 January, 1950. John Harbron opined that having a mutiny was now a sure path to promotion in the RCN.

92 CANAVHED to CANAVUS, 2054Z/30 June 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3, Operations and Plans. This association would dispel any reservations as to the wisdom of the RCN changing to the American material supply system.

93 Thorgrimsson and Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1955* is the official history.

94 NBM Special Meeting, 21 July, 1950. Claxton's directive was dated 20 July 1950, and the COSC proposals were entitled "Accelerated Defence Programme" and dated 2 August 1950.

95 Sec.COSC to CGS, CNS, CAS, 31 July 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 3, Complements General.

96 PC 3859, 7 August 1950. Approval was given for a 40% increase in the strength of the Armed Forces. Details provided in NSec memo, 11 August 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3, Operations and Plans.

97 DNPO(Piers) to ACNS(P), VCNS, memo, 25 July 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3, Operations and Plans. The rationale for recommending the cruiser was that more personnel training could be accomplished with the 3 additional destroyers in home waters. However, CNP staff was able to demonstrate that the cruiser was a more efficient training platform to meet high volume training requirements.

98 The initial target was 26 ships consisting of 1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 1 A/S escort, 9 destroyers, 5 frigates, 7 minesweepers and 1 icebreaker. This was increased in the final submission to Claxton by 1 destroyer and 1 frigate.

99 CNS to MND, memo, "Accelerated Defence Programme, Accelerated Shipbuilding Programme", 31 July 1950, Claxton Papers, vol. 94, Folder Accelerated Defence Programme.

100 Sokolsky, "Canada and the Cold War at Sea, 1945-68," 214-215.

101 Ibid.

102 MND to Cabinet Defence Committee, memo, 17 August 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3, Operations and Plans.

103 DeWolf interview by the author. RAdmr. DeWolf had become VCNS and accompanied Grant to this meeting.

104 MND to Cabinet Defence Committee, memo, 17 August 1950.

105 C.P. Stacey, "Canada and Continental Defence," *Canada-United States Treaty Regulations*, ed. D.R. Deener (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), 104.

106 Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 220-222. See also Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 222.

107 In January 1951, a Gallup Poll indicated that 53 percent of Canadians thought threat of war was the nation's most serious problem. Circumstances were similar to 1940 where the government acquiesced on questions of national control of strategy in discussions on ABC-1 between the British and Americans to meet an imminent threat.

108 Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 221.

109 Minutes Eighth Senior Officers' Meeting, 29 January - 2 February 1951, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 3, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112 CNP to NSec, memo, 30 January 1951, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 3, Complements General.

113 In June 1951, the Complement Committee was renamed the Civilian Complement Committee. Their terms of reference included developing career plans for civil servants, approved by the Naval Board in May 1951.

114 Sectemp dated 16 April 1951, based on approval in NBM 340-1, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 4, Complements General. Woollcombe was in the last class at RCNC and remained the trusted staff authority for organization of the RCN until his retirement in 1960.

115 CNP to VCNS, memo, 12 February 1951, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 3, Complements General.

116 Chairman, COSC to COSC Members, memo, 26 February 1951, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 3, Complements General. This memo referred to the 52nd Meeting of the Defence Council.

117 Raymont, "Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 77. The composition made great sense as the Treasury Board must approve funding for new structures and positions of Captain equivalent and above. The DM was responsible for fiscal management and ensuring the COS's stayed within guidelines, both written and understood.

118 The delay meant that all proposals for structure changes remained interim until an agreed format could be reached within the PMC.

119 This is amply demonstrated by the volume of memoranda in the Complement General file between MND, DM and CNS. Grant's growing frustration is evident.

120 CNS to DM, memo, 8 September 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 3, Complements General.

121 Raymont, "Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 79.

122 Dillon, Hanington, Pickford interviews by the author. There was an extraordinary demand to attend tri-service committee meetings particularly at the Commander level. NSHQ was short of Commanders who found themselves sitting on a minimum of five or six committees.

123 CNS to CGS, memo, 20 February 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 3, Complements General.

124 CNS to MND, memo, 1 September 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 3, Complements General.

125 NBM 354-1, 5 May 1951.

126 NBM 336-4, 22 November 1950. CNP had to present the most forceful arguments to overcome Grant's well-known opposition but the navy had its back to the wall.

127 NBM 345-5, 5 May 1951.

128 NBM 355-3, 23 November 1951.

129 NBM 338-4, 17 January 1951.

130 The officer complement was comprised of 41 percent Executive Officers including air crew, 41 percent Technical Officers and 18 percent Branch Officers who were commissioned from the lower deck.

131 NBM 347-2, 6 June 1951. The figures for 1951-52 show that only 20 cadets were graduated from the CANSERVCOL programme and only 31 were in it, 10 of these from the lower deck. The UNTD programme produced only 39 officers. DND, *Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 1952*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1952), 15.

132 NBM 347-2, 6 June 1951.

133 The selection process was very rigorous and only the best were selected then sent to the RN for training that was considered more strict than the Canadian Service Colleges. A few of these, such as Petty Officers First Class Henry Vondette and Leonard Cavan, had several commands and attained the rank of Captain.

134 NBM 355-4, 23 November 1951.

135 NSec memo, 17 November 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3, Operations and Plans.

136 During the fiscal year 1951-52, the navy enrolled 353 officers and 3,481 men many of whom were veterans from WWIL. DND, *Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 1952*, 32.

137 NBM 343-5, 25 April 1951.

138 Formerly HMS *Flamborough Head*, the Fort type cargo ship was acquired from the RN in 1952 and renamed *Cape Breton*. The vessel was specially refitted and commissioned to provide apprenticeship training and ship repair facilities.

139 DND, *Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 1952*, 40.

140 NBM 331-6, 13 May 1950 that resulted from direction in NBM 318-2, 22 February 1950 reflecting the thrust of the Mainguy Report. Henceforth officers and men would eat the same food.

141 NBM 339-3, 25 January 1951.

142 Cdr. Marcel Jette, "Report on Recruiting French-Speaking Canadians," undated, HMCS *D'Iberville* (Base), DHist.

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- 143 David Zimmerman, "The Social Background of the Wartime Navy", 278.
- 144 NBM 341-1, 21 March 1951 and Jette, "Report on Recruiting French-Speaking Canadians".
- 145 DND, *Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 1952*, 39.
- 146 Serge Bernier, "HMCS Ottawa III, The Navy's First French-Language Unit, 1968-1973" *A Nation's Navy*, ed. Hadley et al, 310-324.
- 147 NBM 331-9, 13 September 1950.
- 148 NBM 346-3, 25 May 1951.
- 149 "The Year in Review [1951]", *Crowsnest*, vol. 3 no. 3 January 1952, 2.
- 150 Department of National Defence, *Canada's Defence Programme, 1955-56* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), 22.
- 151 NBM 353-7, 25 October 1951.
- 152 DND, *Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 1952*, 27.
- 153 "The Year in Review [1951]", *Crowsnest*, vol. 3, no.3 , January 1952, 2.
- 154 Ibid.
- 155 NBM 351-1, 1 July 1951; NBM 353-3, 25 October 1951.
- 156 Minutes Eighth Senior Officers' Meeting, 29 January - 2 February 1951, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 3, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings.
- 157 DCNP to DSec (Staff), memo, 2 December 1950, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 3, Operations and Plans.
- 158 Storrs interview by the author.
- 159 Minutes Eighth Senior Officers' Meeting Minutes, 29 January - 2 February 1951.

160 Department of National Defence, *Canada's Defence Programme, 1952-53* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1952), 14.

161 DeWolf and Dyer interviews by the author.

162 DeWolf interview by the author.

163 *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 and 28 May, 1965. The new Canadian national flag had replaced the White Ensign three months prior. Captain David Groos RCN (Ret'd), Liberal Member of Parliament for Victoria, rose in the house to question the government on the propriety of using former flags at "private military funerals".

CHAPTER 6

Growing Pains

As everyone knows, we are a little overcommitted to say the least and trying to do more than we are capable of doing....The Admiralty persuaded their government to go slower because they could not achieve the build up [125,000 to 155,000] and maintain the standards required. We are attempting to grow from 9,000 to 21,000, that is, over 100 percent as opposed to the RN less than 20 percent.

Chief of Naval Personnel,
Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting,
17 January 1952.

Vice-Admiral E. Rollo Mainguy, OBE, was appointed Canada's sixth Chief of the Naval Staff on 1 December 1951. His father was a Guernsey Islander who immigrated to Canada at the age of twenty-one and took up farming in the Cowichan Valley, on Vancouver Island.¹ Rollo was born in Victoria in 1901 and raised on his parents' farm at Chemainus. His father died when Rollo was five. He was schooled at "Skrimshire's", a British-model private school at Quamichan Lake, the predecessor to the prestigious Shawnigan Lake School. Mr. Skrimshire recalled that the young Mainguy was "a typical country boy, fond of sports and games."² Mainguy, who was much younger than his siblings, was sent to the Royal Naval College of Canada at the age of fourteen and enrolled in the Class of 1915. There he excelled in seamanship, sailing and sports.³ He was also "an excellent student" who graduated with a "first" in a class of four, just behind Roger Bidwell. Their careers would parallel and Bidwell would relieve Mainguy as Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (COAC) when he was appointed CNS.⁴

Mainguy's career progression until the Second World War followed the normal pattern. He became a signals specialist. Tall, handsome and full of natural charm, he was a popular social lion in the close and affluent circles in which RCN officers moved. His marriage to Maraquita Nichol in 1927, daughter of the Honourable Walther Nichol, a former lieutenant-

governor of British Columbia and founder of *The Vancouver Daily Province*, was termed "the wedding of the season".⁵ The product of a privileged life, the imperious and "strong-minded" "Quita" Mainguy rose through the ranks with her husband and exercised authority over officers' wives as she thought appropriate to her husband's position.⁶ This alliance allowed Mainguy to live very well, enabling him to acquire a country estate, "Heavitree", not far from his family's farm, and to found an Ayrshire herd of cattle.

Rollo Mainguy established a reputation of "a sailor's sailor" and was recognized professionally as a well-connected "streamer" (rising star). An imposing figure, he was described as "an affable giant with tattooed forearms, a friendly grin, a cool and decisive brain, a Canadian accent, and a secret hobby of needlepoint."⁷ His promotion to Captain in 1941, ahead of his senior, Wallace Creery, almost assured his succession to the office of CNS should he survive the war.⁸ Mainguy became identified as a champion of conditions of service while Captain (D) in Newfoundland, 1941 to 1942, where he established facilities to promote morale and welfare of both officers and men. His Captain D's Cocktail Parties, the "Crow's Nest" Club for officers in St. John's and "Donovans" rest camp for men became part of the growing Mainguy legend. Mainguy then spent a year at NSHQ as Chief of Naval Personnel in what he called the "depressing atmosphere of the Navy Building."⁹ Having no vocation for administrative work, he yearned for a sea appointment.

He got his wish and was appointed, in 1944, as Commanding Officer of HMCS *Uganda*¹⁰, one of Canada's newly acquired cruisers destined for service in the Pacific theatre and the first "big-ship" acquisition for the balanced post-war fleet. There the aim of the RCN was "to ensure as far as possible 'Canadian identity' in the Pacific theatre is retained, so that any due battle honours may fall to the Canadian nation."¹¹ Mainguy, a progressive officer who wore "Canada" badges, had three green maple leaves painted on *Uganda's* aft funnel. He was a

popular Captain in the cruiser, who paced his bridge stripped to the waist and bare-footed. He conducted "Town Hall meetings", a kind of open forum for the ship's company and a precursor to the postwar welfare committee. Unfortunately, the ship became embroiled in politics when Mackenzie King decreed that all service in the Pacific would be voluntary. This occurred while *Uganda* was on active combat duty with the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) and was defending against unrelenting kamikaze attacks. The matter had to be decided by a vote onboard. In spite of his popularity, Mainguy was unable to persuade the majority of his ship's company to vote in favour of retaining the status quo and staying in combat.¹² *Uganda* left the BPF to take on a new ship's company in Esquimalt but the war ended while she was in transit. For the RCN and Mainguy, it was on a sour note.

Mainguy was promoted Commodore at the age of 45, in July 1946, and was concurrently appointed Commanding Officer Pacific Coast (COPC) in the acting rank of Rear-Admiral. He said of his new duties "As shore jobs go, I suppose it's as good as they come. It is nice to be home for a while. But I definitely hope to get in some more sea-time before I am through."¹³ He had, nonetheless, served his last appointment at sea and settled uncomfortably into the career stream of high profile shore command appointments that led inevitably to the position of CNS. As COPC, Mainguy participated in the mishandling of the incident in *Ontario* but was later instrumental in prescribing the long-term solution for the RCN's morale problems. His presidency of the commission of inquiry into the incidents and the report that bears his name assured him an illustrious place in the history of the RCN. Louis Audette remarked on Mainguy's capacity to put witnesses, particularly the young sailors, at ease which resulted in their giving open and forthright testimony.¹⁴ This was his primary contribution. Audette noted that Mainguy had no capacity for or interest in the administrative aspects of writing the report

and left this to the civilian commissioners. The major findings and initiatives in the report were mainly Audette's.

Mainguy's aversion to staff work, and his tendency to delegate it to juniors without exercising oversight, was a characteristic well known to his contemporaries.¹⁵ Brooke Claxton, with whom Audette had a close relationship, also knew this but was no less taken with the charming Mainguy and was comfortable to have him as CNS. Claxton wrote in his memoirs, "VAdmr Rollo Mainguy was appointed CNS at the end of 1951. He made no bones about his dislike for desk work and, indeed, of pretty nearly everything to do with his job...."¹⁶ This begs the question of whether there was an alternative to Mainguy. Had not the appointment been governed by the ironclad rule of succession by seniority that Claxton respected, the logical and obvious choice would have been to reach down this list to promote Rear-Admiral Harry DeWolf who was currently serving as VCNS. DeWolf was destined by seniority to be Mainguy's successor in any event. He had previously served as DCNS and had vast staff experience, having developed the postwar policy for the RCN under Grant. DeWolf's war record was equal to that of the illustrious Grant, and both names were mentioned in the same breath when RCN officers spoke of heroes. He had the presence of Mainguy without the flamboyance, and also enjoyed the confidence of Claxton and as well as the respect of the other services. The major difference was motivation and skill. DeWolf was a dynamic chief executive and Mainguy wanted nothing to do with administration. This, of course, was never considered and DeWolf was appointed to Washington in 1952, as the Naval Member of the Canadian Joint Staff. While he did good work there and made excellent connections, he was under-employed and his talents wasted during a critical period in the RCN's postwar expansion. DeWolf marked time for three years until recalled by Ralph Campney, Claxton's successor as MND, to relieve Mainguy.

Mainguy brought a definite contrast in styles compared to Grant's strong control of the staff and agenda at NSHQ. He decided to hold part of his first Senior Officers' Meeting at the exclusive Seignory Club in Ottawa. He told the meeting his theory was, "If we could get everybody away from work, we could really get down to it and have plenty of home truths; which will undoubtedly spring up at the Seignory Club."¹⁷ This was a variation on his successful "Town Hall Meeting" model. Also, in contrast to Grant but in consonance with Claxton, he made public relations a priority because he believed that the RCN was not doing enough to sell itself to the Canadian people. He had made the role of naval publicist one of his primary activities as COPC.¹⁸ As the new CNS, he instructed his senior officers, "One thing I think we should all try to do wherever possible, and that is the propaganda of selling the navy wherever we may be."¹⁹ He encouraged them never to turn down an invitation to speak and to tell Canadians that just providing a navy was not enough, they had a stake in maintaining sea lines of communications.

Mainguy set the example and carried this message to the public in his speaking engagements. His presentations, however, lacked the professional content and substance characteristic of Grant's. There was a touch of the romantic in Mainguy who was more comfortable speaking in generalities and appealing to chivalrous sentiments. He took the "I am a simple sailor" approach that enabled him to avoid complex issues and explanations. Illustrative is his "The True Glory" address as guest speaker at the convocation of the University of Saskatchewan in May, 1952. The speech was a thinly disguised recruiting pitch to graduates with references to duty and "Lord Nelson" and an appeal to support the navy.²⁰ He preceded his remarks with the disclaimer, "I shall certainly have nothing erudite to say, but assume that you are aware that sailors are not expected to be erudite." In contrast, concurrently the leadership of the USN was out publicly promoting nuclear propulsion that would

revolutionize naval warfare when the USS *Nautilus* was launched in 1954. The well educated and progressive element of the Canadian public was looking for more than Mainguy's laid-back folksy approach. John Harbron, an intellectual critic in the mould of Audette, suggested that, "the postwar admirals during this difficult decade [1945-55], in the face of the swiftly moving events both in their own world and the wider international arena, represented a retarded point-of view about change and function in the fleet."²¹ Harbron's statement is debatable with respect to Grant, but the evidence suggests that Mainguy gave the impression of an admiral sailing backwards into the future.

Mainguy's main administrative task was two-fold. On the one hand he had to close the commitment-capabilities gap created by NATO and Canada-United States (CANUS) defence obligations, on the other he had to match the RCN's increasing inventory of new construction and converted ships with personnel resources. The task was open-ended because the extent of those obligations, particularly with respect to the defence of North America, was still undetermined.²² His primary task was a gargantuan undertaking but imposed on it was the requirement to maintain the three destroyers with full wartime complements in Korean waters. In fact, this task required four and sometimes five destroyers and even six depending on the turnover cycle and transit times.²³ Korea was initially a west coast commitment but personnel resources were soon exhausted and "chaos" was narrowly averted by revising the entire fleet employment programme.²⁴ The next logical move was to include east coast ships in the replacement cycle. This was only a makeshift solution because enrolment and training were just keeping up with the personnel requirements for ships deploying to Korea and high wastage due to non-reengagement.²⁵ The result was that non-substantive (trade) training had virtually ceased for men in the navy. The only way to man the Korean bound destroyers was to take trained men from other ships or redeploy men who had just returned from a tour. The duration a destroyer

could be deployed to Korea varied from nine to thirteen months.²⁶ The reason for the high wastage rate, one man for every three recruited, is self-evident.²⁷ No trained man could expect any respite from continuous sea duty,

While the navy was hard pressed, Claxton offered the new CNS only more of the same. The government had demonstrated the extent of its commitment to the build-up through allocating fifty percent of its spending to defence for the fiscal year 1952-53. The navy's share was 14.7 percent.²⁸ Claxton addressed the Senior Officers' Meeting in March 1952. He had a great deal to say about personnel issues and the direction of personnel policy. He noted that the RCN's NATO commitment for 1952 was twenty-four operationally effective ships in commission on D Day - declaration of war - and seventy-six by D Day + 180. Claxton acknowledged that to have seventy-six ships manned "might be quite a risky exercise but somehow it could be done". He had great confidence that trained veterans would respond to the call to arms. Claxton appreciated that obtaining sufficient trained junior officers was the overriding factor governing expansion and thought the current wastage figure for the navy "very bad indeed".²⁹ Claxton's philosophy on wastage was that it wasn't a bad thing for ordinary ratings because "it builds up your trained reserves, and if we had universal military training we would be doing that operation quite deliberately, have a man in for two years and then send him out."³⁰ He was confident that the personnel situation would stabilize. He optimistically projected achieving a 100 ship navy by 1954 and that the navy's personnel ceiling of 20,000 would be reached by March 1955.³¹

Claxton was persuaded that the navy's morale problems were now behind it. He had visited the deployed destroyers in Korea during January and reported, "Your chaps I found are in very good shape."³² He spoke to the ships' companies and, in an unprecedented initiative, spoke to five or six "chaps" privately whose concerns were obtaining release on compassionate

grounds. There were no complaints about service conditions except that the men definitely preferred American to British rations. The men generally wanted more news and better mail service and Claxton took immediate action on his return to fix that. A valid concern was expressed by men who believed their promotion opportunities were affected by being unable to take courses and to write exams required for advancement owing to continuous sea service. Some men felt it a bit thick that the ships spent fifty out of fifty-five days continuously at sea. Claxton also found that a third of each ship's company was on a second tour. They received no sympathy from Claxton. He asked them, "why they joined the navy if it wasn't to go to sea?" In all, he found the men to be "very proud of themselves" and the job they were doing.

Claxton spoke strongly to a personnel issue that reflected his progressive nationalism. He stated, "we have to do more to make the French speaking chaps feel at home when they get into the navy."³³ He thought the opening of *D'Iberville* for French-speaking recruits was a step in the right direction but more must be done. The greatest criticism from Quebecers was that French-Canadians become Anglicized when they join the navy and they believe that French-speaking officers were discriminated against. He thought this a "very serious problem". Claxton admonished the senior officer with the fact that "in the navy there isn't a French speaking officer above the rank of Commander, two or three who have French sounding names cease to be regarded as French Canadian in fact, and it makes it worse from the point of view of their nation than if they were 'Goddam Orange Protestants.'"³⁴ Claxton was not suggesting the establishment of French language units but a change of attitude. He believed that all officers should speak both languages "as an act of achieving national unity and courtesy, and also to improve our serviceability."³⁵

Claxton was a man before his time, respecting bilingualism in the services. He established College Militaire Royal (CMR) at St. Jean, Quebec in September 1952, to attract

more French-speaking officer recruits to the regular force. However, his immediate impact on the naval attitude was negligible and with his retirement in 1954, his French language initiative died. The navy made no serious effort to address the issue of bilingualism and Anglicising French-speaking officer enrolees, and, recruits, after their initial indoctrination at *D'Iberville*, remained the norm. When HMCS *Venture* opened as the naval college regenerated in 1954, the language of instruction was English. The status quo prevailed until after unification, in 1968, when the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Allard, ordered the navy to establish a French-speaking ship.³⁶

Claxton's rosy optimism in achieving personnel goals was not shared by senior naval officers. The Chief of Naval Personnel, Commodore Hibbard, believed that the greatest problem facing his branch was "how to meet commitments and yet maintain a steady and healthy growth."³⁷ Hibbard was the first to admit that the navy was over-committed and was trying to do more than it was capable of doing efficiently. He had consulted his opposite number in the Royal Navy and found that the Admiralty needed to tell the government to slow down on expansion. The Canadian government was asking the RCN to do far more in comparison to the RN and without the advantage of Britain's compulsory national service. Hibbard's major concern was that short of mobilization, the navy could not maintain the current rate of expansion without lowering minimum standards of training. The result could be that "the Service will suffer a blow from which it will be difficult to recover."³⁸ Mainguy did not respond to Hibbard's warning or take up the issue with Claxton. The CNS simply encouraged his senior staff "not to be downhearted, or if one is, for heaven's sake don't say so, not to everybody in sight anyway and don't exaggerate."³⁹ The navy just having narrowly averted "chaos" on the west coast was to continue muddling through and hoping for the best.

The staff at NSHQ toiled to solve the personnel commitment-capabilities conundrum as ships building and under conversion began to commission. These required complements

immediately. The Deputy Chief of Personnel, Captain E. W. Finch-Noyes, described the situation as a "vicious circle" where men who should be undergoing non-substantive training were required instead to man ships the navy was endeavouring to commission.⁴⁰ The rate of demand for personnel was exponential with a huge increase coming during 1954 to 1956, when the seven new escorts and the bulk of the twenty-one converted "Prestonian" Class frigates would be ready. HMS *Powerful* was purchased in 1952, to be completed and commissioned in late 1956, as HMCS *Bonaventure*, a replacement for *Magnificent*.⁴¹ The relentless demand began with *Quebec*, commissioned in February 1952, to be followed by the converted *Algonquin* and *Prestonian*, in 1953. *Prestonian* was the first of twenty-one River class frigates to be converted to flush-decked ocean escorts. The situation was equally critical with naval aviation which was also expanding.⁴² The navy's personnel ceiling was raised to 16,300 in February 1952, and the active strength achieved 13,505 in March.⁴³ The active strength continued to increase, reaching 15,000 by the end of October 1952. An Armed Forces Press Release announced to the public, "the 15,000-mark represented a point beyond which an increasingly large portion of personnel would be available for manning new ships and, conversely, a smaller percentage would be bound to essential executive and administrative duties."⁴⁴

This propaganda denied the reality that the CNS reported to the Flag Officers on the coasts in December. Mainguy advised them, "The RCN with a complement of approximately 2200 greater than last year is now manning one less ship. In addition it is apparent that in general non sub [non-substantive] training is not making good the shortages which exist and this reflects in our ability to man ships."⁴⁵ He concluded that the navy's capability to make its NATO commitments was in jeopardy. Mainguy's main purpose was to inform the Flag Officers of the root of the personnel problem and how critical it was to release men from the ships and

shore establishments for non-substantive training. The news was not all bad. The Officer-in-Charge of RCN Depot Halifax, Commodore Pullen, reported to FOAC that while he had experienced significant man-power deficiencies the situation has "improved slowly through the year."⁴⁶ He cited particularly a shortage of petty officers lost through discharges or to commissioning programmes. The most critical shortage was in trained senior Engine Room Artificers and Stoker Mechanics that affected both the capability to man more ships and, therefore, the capacity to train junior men to higher technical levels to make up the deficiencies.

These branches were, Pullen wrote, victims of the "vicious circle". He described the classic "Catch 22" situation - no ships without training and no training without ships. Pullen hoped to be able to recruit some trained ERA's from the Royal Navy. There was also a critical shortage of senior rates in the Electrical Branch. While Pullen could report an improvement in his own situation, he noted new commitments were out-stripping gains. The Halifax depot had gained a new commitment of one destroyer for Korea that meant providing two wartime crews. The east coast was also tasked with providing the lion's share of the large RCN squadron, under the personal command of Rear-Admiral Bidwell, to attend the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, in June 1953.⁴⁷ The west coast's situation was far worse with shortages all round, necessitating borrowing from the east coast depot. They had, however, between them, maintained all Korean deployed and standby ships at full complement. Of this feat they were justly proud.

The staff at NSHQ and Flag Officers on the coasts produced various solutions to the problem of increasing the number of ships available for non-substantive training for men that was crucial to expansion. Resources for training UNTD cadets and reserves during the summer of 1952 were also inadequate. Flag Officer Atlantic Coast, Rear-Admiral Bidwell, believed the answer was to withdraw the destroyers from Korea and substitute HMCS *Magnificent*.⁴⁸ This

was the second time he had recommended this. Bidwell was ACNS (Plans) when the suggestion was first made by his staff. For strictly parochial reasons ACNS (Air), Commodore Keighly-Peach RN, strongly supported Bidwell. He advised the staff that he had already made unofficial inquiries of the Admiralty as to the conditions for sending the Canadian carrier to Korea.⁴⁹ Commander Landymore, DMPS, believed that there was no manpower saving to be gained by sending the carrier and that it was better to curtail UNTD training.⁵⁰ Captain Storrs, Director Naval Plans and Operations (DNPO), advised VCNS that he did not support FOAC and ACNS (Air) because the carrier was dedicated to an A/S role in NATO. He agreed with Landymore that manpower would not be saved and stated the deployment would be too late to help the UNTD and Reserve programme in any case.⁵¹ Rear-Admiral DeWolf agreed with Storrs and although FOAC would raise the question of sending the carrier again, it was a dead issue.⁵² The solution reached was to delay some commissionings, to delay ships going into conversion and to reduce the number of ships at sea.

Storrs, arguably the most able staff officer at NSHQ, applied his analytical skills to define the requirements problem through identifying its components, prioritizing sea commitments and recommending solutions.⁵³ His over-riding factors were Canada's commitment to NATO and the imminent threat on the east coast. He argued that the carrier was permanently dedicated to NATO for operations on D Day.⁵⁴ The carrier required sufficient suitable escorts so that it could be deployed as a Carrier Support Group and forming this group must be the navy's priority. Following this was the requirement to provide for local defence with the east coast having priority. He stated that the Korean commitment of three destroyers, that resulted originally from an indefinite offer of support by the Canadian government to the United Nations, had been maintained on a permanent basis as a matter of policy by the RCN. This employment provided general training for the ship's companies but, while supporting the United

Nations, was not strategically significant. Storrs observed, "It seems somewhat contradictory therefore that peacetime priorities should be opposite of wartime and that the greater number of our operational A/S ships should be disposed in such a way that they are as far away as possible from the area of our wartime responsibilities."⁵⁵ He concluded that short term solutions only solved the immediate crisis of providing training resources and the resources must be assigned as determined by strategic priorities and national commitments. This was the provision of A/S forces to NATO for the protection of Atlantic sea lines.

Storrs recommended no change in the employment of either *Magnificent* or the cruisers, that absorbed the largest portion of sea-going personnel, because they were supporting the priority training requirement. He recommended reducing the Korean participation because those destroyers were required for immediate employment in the North Atlantic and for training to support expansion. He also recommended that UNTD training be reduced in favour of committing those resources to the more vital non-substantive and reserve training. He also recommended reducing the number of destroyers under conversion so that more ships would be available for training. He concluded, "The strategic risk involved in reducing our Atlantic forces in order to maintain the Korean commitment at its present level is not warranted by the advantages we gain. Our participation in Korea should now be adjusted in a way that will enable us to strengthen our Atlantic forces and at the same time improve our training capabilities."⁵⁶

Rear-Admiral DeWolf agreed in the most part with Storrs' recommendations but he did not, "consider a reduction in the Korean committment [sic] should be recommended until all else has failed to meet the situation."⁵⁷ As a consequence, the Korean commitment remained until well after the truce was signed in July 1953. DeWolf, a master in understanding what was politically acceptable, had a sense of what the government reaction would be. He also knew the

reluctance of Mainguy to bring hard issues to the attention of the Minister. It is also clear that DeWolf was taking the important decisions himself. Storrs' recommendation did result in Mainguy ordering a redistribution of the fleet in November 1952, whereby two-thirds of the ships were to be stationed on the east coast and one-third on the west coast.⁵⁸ This resulted in sufficient ships being available on the east coast in September 1953, to form the First Canadian Escort Group (1st CEG) around the carrier.⁵⁹ The new fleet distribution policy had immediate ramifications for the Home Port System in which non-commissioned personnel were permanently assigned to either Halifax or Esquimalt and the current split was half and half. However, approximately two-thirds of the navy's new recruits were coming from the eastern part of Canada so the personnel staff thought the balance would correct itself over time.

What is evident, however, is that the syndrome of the RCN living with over-commitment begins at this juncture. It soon became a characteristic of the naval staff culture - to respond spontaneously "Ready Aye Ready" to any new commitment whether or not it could be met. Storrs' analysis came at a critical time as it defined the commitments and the requirements problem for the staff at headquarters and brought some badly needed discipline to the process. Deficiency in staff skills through lack of training handicapped the navy in understanding complex problems and co-ordinating solutions, particularly during this critical period.⁶⁰ This deficiency would endure and be accepted at the highest level until unification. The Chiefs of the Naval Staff, from 1945 to 1964, with the possible exception of Rayner, did not believe staff training was necessary for naval officers.⁶¹ Senior officers of the Executive Branch believed that the only qualification necessary to do any job in the navy was possession of an Upper Deck Watch Keeping Certificate and prided themselves in this fact.⁶²

Storrs' recommendations were influenced by factors reflecting important changes in various components of the overall training programme. In January 1952, the Naval Board

approved "a new plan for an emergency method of producing junior officers."⁶³ Mainguy accepted the fact that the service colleges were a permanent fixture and re-establishing a naval college, which Grant had pursued relentlessly, was a dead issue.⁶⁴ The Naval Board approved a recommendation to press the government for full subsidization of fees and accommodation as well as payment of a subsidy for naval cadets including UNTD's. When CNS took this idea to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, he found support from his colleagues who had similar difficulties in attracting officer candidates. The initiative also complemented a plan Claxton had in mind. What resulted was the introduction of the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) in 1952, and the addition of CMR, a third service college in Quebec to attract and accommodate French-speaking enrolees.⁶⁵ ROTP was designed to produce officers holding permanent commissions in the regular force. It extended full subsidization and pay to successful applicants to train at either a service college or civilian university. There was a mandatory three years to serve after graduation. The RCN continued the University Naval Training Division Plan (UNTD) for training officers for the Reserve who had the option of transferring to the regular force upon graduation.

The Naval Board appreciated that the new ROTP in itself could not produce the 1,000 officers the navy would require. The UNTD plan was not producing up to expectations, as DeWolf had predicted, and few graduates chose to join the permanent force.⁶⁶ The Naval Board approved a second "emergency plan" introduced by CNP to establish a Seven Year Short Service Appointment (SSA) programme in the RCN that would enrol and train cadets for all branches.⁶⁷ There would be an opportunity for qualified SSA officers to be selected for permanent commissions. This represented a complete departure from Grant's "pure laine" conservatism as well as an acceptance of measures already adopted by the army and air force.⁶⁸ Planning began leading to the establishment, in 1954, of the Venture Programme on the RCNC

model. Venture emerged as a seven year short service commission plan that began with two years cadet training in the former *Givenchy* barracks in the Esquimalt Dockyard, 100 metres from the old RNCC building. It was not designed to replace the CANSERVCOL programme but as a supplement to it. The block of dedicated sea training billets for both ROTP and the projected Venture plan would be large.

Sea training resources had to be carefully allocated and priorities established because this was a requirement for all training for officers and men, regular or reserve. Planning was possible for the short term only and the staffs worked around the peak summer period, one year ahead, when the officer cadets and majority of reservists were available for training. Regular force requirements received priority but the manning of the seventy-six ships committed to NATO at D + 180 depended on the availability of trained reserves. Manning priorities were assigned by the Personnel Branch based on Storr's recommendations. Ships were allocated specifically to progress non-substantive training although some ships, such as *Algonquin*, which was assigned as *Magnificent's* "plane guard"⁶⁹, were unavoidably double tasked. The RCN ROTP requirements alone were estimated to be 760 billets requiring four dedicated ships during the summer of 1953. The ROTP displaced UNTD in priority for resource allocation. Training reserve ratings was also given priority over UNTD because the Deputy Chief of Personnel (DCNP) demonstrated that there was "a dangerous threat to the future of the RCN(R)" if provision could not be made for training reservists.⁷⁰ In future, the UNTD programme would be cut back and more training done ashore.

The Naval Board moved to improve the state of the reserves that was to be the key source of manpower for rapid wartime expansion. The Naval Staff had estimated this requirement at 12,000 personnel.⁷¹ In October 1952, the strength of the reserves stood at 1,257 officers and 4,022 men, approximately forty percent of the requirement.⁷² Additional regular

force manpower resources had been allocated to conduct reserve new entry training at HMCS *Star*, the reserve division at Hamilton, Ontario. The personnel staff estimated that 775 reserve men would be available for training in summer of 1953. This represented a significant rise in demand for sea billets. To this point, reserves had been sent to sea piece-meal on an ad hoc basis, "when the odd billet was available."⁷³ The situation now demanded identified and dedicated resources, including ships attached to HMCS *Star* during the summer. Reserves would also require quality employment in "live" sea jobs in order to ensure their continued interest and motivation. Billets were to be found, again, at the expense of the UNTD programme.

In November 1952, the Naval Board approved the establishment of a separate authority outside NSHQ that would be, "responsible for training and administration of Reserves including UNTD and administration of the Naval Divisions."⁷⁴ The Commanding Officer Naval Divisions (COND) would concurrently be responsible for recruiting for both the RCN and RCN(R). The Minister authorized setting up the new command with a Commodore in command.⁷⁵ It was decided to locate COND near the Toronto area on DND property next to HMCS *Star*. Commodore Ken Adams was appointed as COND and resources allocated to him grew as did his terms of reference to include an RCN(R) Depot to administer drafting all RCN(R) men.⁷⁶ Naval Service Headquarters decided, however, to retain administration of recruiting given its precarious state. After one summer administering the reserve training programme, Adams recommended the allocation of more resources including four Bangor class minesweepers to COND. His idea was to establish a centre to conduct basic and on-the-job training for officers and men of the reserves thereby relieving the coasts of this task. He argued that the central location on the Great Lakes would enable more reserves to attend and reduce travel costs.⁷⁷

The Personnel Staff considered there was some merit in Adams' recommendation but CNP advised that Naval Board that the navy could not afford the luxury of a separate centre. Vice-Admiral Mainguy believed that most reserves joined because they wanted to travel to the coasts and get away to sea during the summer. Adam's proposal did not succeed. It might be construed as a thinly disguised attempt at "empire building". As the previous DCNP, he knew the personnel situation and that the regular force personnel bill for COND including all Naval Divisions was 400 trained men.⁷⁸ This number roughly equated to the acute shortage caused by the high wastage rate, and, sufficient trained personnel to man two more destroyers. Some officers in the Personnel Branch believed that COND should be shut down entirely to release these personnel because "it would give us 'breathing time' of almost a year."⁷⁹ Discussion in the Naval Board and by personnel staff suggests that there was reticence to support the naval reserves, not because the commitment was invalid but because it reduced the effectiveness of the regular force.

The shortage of officers in all Branches remained acute. The overall shortage on 31 December 1952, was 861 in a ceiling of 2526.⁸⁰ The immediate impact was the inability to provide officer complements for ships commissioning. New commitments such as a sub-command headquarters in Halifax under the new SACLANT operational control organization could not be accepted.⁸¹ The Executive Branch was 384 short from a ceiling of 1165. The Engineering Branch was 120 short from 330 and the Electrical Branch 50 short from 189. The Constructor Branch was down 50 percent, 44 officers from 82. The situation in the Executive Branch was precarious because about 450 lieutenants and lieutenant-commanders, World War II veterans, were serving on three year Short Service Appointments that were about to expire.⁸² The Engineering and Electrical Branches were being raided by the Department of Defence Production and private industry to work on ship construction. The Constructor Branch, being

newly formed, was working up to strength slowly, mainly through recruiting from the United Kingdom and Royal Navy. While the ratio of all personnel serving at sea to shore was 45 to 55 percent, only 20 percent of all officers were serving at sea.⁸³ This reflected the very high number of officers required for administration and training ashore. As a consequence, many officers were being denied the experience required to qualify them for promotion and employment at higher levels.

The Chief of Naval Personnel told the Naval Board that the number of officers serving ashore was "alarming".⁸⁴ He also stated that while there was an acute shortage of officers, the existing ratio of officers to men in the RCN, 1 to 5.8, was much higher than in the RN, 1 to 10, and this ratio had remained unaltered since the RCN began its build up. Hibbard said the statistic did not represent a surplus but only the fact that the officer complement had been established and manned before that of the men which lagged. Hibbard's solution was to recommend that the officer complement ceiling be frozen until the number of men increased and the officer-man ratios improved. The Naval Board responded that the Personnel Branch had yet to work out the officer complement for the 21,000 build up and therefore a freeze was not entirely realistic. Other complicating factors mentioned were uncertainty as to the complementing model for the new escorts and the necessity to concentrate on building up the shore establishment first to support fleet expansion. An interim measure was introduced to remove maximum age restrictions for officers serving on Short Service Appointments.

From this complicated discussion it is apparent that the Naval Board and Personnel Branch were having extreme difficulty defining and quantifying the extent of the overall personnel problem. A report from a committee under DNPO, directed to find means to reduce manning, found that branches tended to exaggerate their complement requirements but was short on specifics.⁸⁵ The committee was also unable to identify any activities that did not

contribute to achieving the objectives and tasks of the RCN. Ironically, it reported that the officer shortage had not created a crisis because of a combination of circumstances. The demand for officers had been reduced by; funding shortfalls for new training accommodation in the 1952-53 estimates, slow progress in ship construction, and manning difficulties with ratings that resulted in fewer ships in commission. The crunch had only been postponed. Because the shortage resided at the fully trained level of lieutenant to lieutenant-commander rank level, it could not be resolved short of mobilizing the reserves. These gaps and shortages would remain permanent unless commitments were abolished or expansion slowed. The long term solution was the hope that officer production from the new schemes would eventually solve the problem.

The prognosis for the production of Executive Branch officers was not very promising. The introduction of ROTP had not changed the plan whereby Executive Branch cadets at the service colleges or university would receive only two years of academic training before proceeding to the RN for Sub-Lieutenant's courses.⁸⁶ Cadets in the other branches received academic training for four years and graduated with a degree. Engineering cadets who all attended RMC for the final two years were required to attend Queen's University for an additional year to obtain an accredited degree. As the main attraction of ROTP was the degree, enrollees showed reluctance to join the Executive Branch and it attracted only 50 percent of required candidates.⁸⁷ Both the air force and army had abandoned the two year scheme in ROTP. The navy decided to continue until it was also forced to abandon it, several years later.⁸⁸ The navy's resistance stemmed from the enduring belief that officers should go to sea at a young age to learn their profession and that a degree was an unnecessary and time consuming requirement.⁸⁹ The traditional view was that only sea experience mattered and the proven ability to exercise command. Hal Lawrence described this mind-set in reporting an exchange between Rear-Admiral Hugh Pullen, who had been promoted and relieved Hibbard as CNP in

May 1953, and Colonel Gordon Shrum, PhD, representing the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC).⁹⁰ Lawrence recalled.

Colonel Shrum said, "Tell me Admiral, the world's professions are manned in the main, by graduates of the world's universities. The Canadian army and air force have agreed that their young men can have a degree. You, in the navy, don't seem to think that's necessary." Hugh Pullen got to his feet and he glared down at Doctor Schrum and he said, "I haven't got a degree!" By which he negated all degrees, everywhere, at all times. "I have," and he grabbed a piece of paper and held it up and fluttered it, and he said, "I have a bridge watch-keeping certificate, Sir!"⁹¹

Pullen eventually bowed to the inevitable and his last act as CNP was to introduce a modification to junior officer training for the Executive Branch that would see the most promising cadets continue their education to the degree level.⁹² The navy eventually made the full four year ROTP course mandatory for Executive Branch cadets. Philosophically the "old guard" remained wedded to the "Pullen doctrine" that a degree was an unnecessary requirement for the profession. The two-year Venture Plan ran parallel to ROTP and produced many officers who transferred to the regular force, three of whom rose to be the Commander, Maritime Command, the successor to the CNS.⁹³ The Mainguy Report had pushed the navy in the direction of a higher level of academic education for its Executive Branch officers. This was eventually accepted by default when the navy realized that this was the only way to attract high quality enrolees to ROTP. Accurate production figures for officers are difficult for this period because there were many methods of entry. It is evident however that the Cold War and the need for rapid expansion to meet NATO commitments mitigated against Claxton's personal aspiration to establish the service colleges as the primary source of officers. In fact, the most productive source for the navy was its programmes to commission men from the ranks. This, of course, depleted the supply of experienced senior rates, taking the best of these, which exacerbated the problem of the critical shortage of trained men.

More critical than low officer production was the inadequate production of trained men. The problem was the result of a combination of mediocre recruiting and a high wastage rate that included, ironically, the best men accepted into commissioning plans. Recruiting figures from April 1951 to March 1953, indicated a gross intake of 6,796 but a wastage rate of 2,779.⁹⁴ Over half of those personnel who were discharged had chosen not to re-engage. The requirement to meet the approximate figure of 18,000 men under the 21,000 complement by 31 March 1955, was a net gain of 200 personnel per month.⁹⁵ At the current wastage rate, this required a recruiting rate of 370 per month. This figure had been achieved once during 1952 and only because some returns were late. Another problem was that *Cornwallis* was established to train optimally 300 recruits per month, therefore the additional requirements strained this facility. *Cornwallis* was further burdened with accommodating an additional 400 first year UNTD cadets for their summer training because ships were reassigned to ROTP.⁹⁶ While much had been done to improve conditions of service, the personnel staff believed more could be done to make the service more attractive and hold experienced men.

Men interviewed offered a variety of reasons for not re-engaging.⁹⁷ Those reasons that related directly to the navy as a career were slowness of advancement and better prospects on civilian street. Men were well aware that the "vicious circle" of continuous seetime or no training billets available at sea prevented them from improving their career prospects. The lure of better opportunities outside was a perennial problem, more so when the economy was booming as it was during the early 1950's. Moreover, defence related industries were offering premium wages to trained personnel, particularly those in the engineering and electrical trades. On matters of morale, the stress of continuous seetime on family life, particularly for newly married men in their first engagement, was the predominant reason for men in this category not re-engaging. The issue of too much seetime also pertained to more senior Engine Room

Artificers, Stoker Mechanics and Electricians who had nothing in their future but seetime without respite. Many single men said they wanted to see their hometowns again and the navy had done nothing to assist them to do this. There was also the inevitable group who had tried the navy and simply wanted to try something else.

The Director of Manning and Personnel Statistics (DMPS) recommended some improvements to conditions of service to boost the retention rate. He suggested that marriage allowance be extended to all men because obviously limiting it to those above a certain age had not deterred younger men from marrying. Increased housing for married men was required particularly in places where the navy had established new bases with expansion such as Sydney, Nova Scotia. There were also suggestions for one free travel warrant a year for single men, an increase in pay and a re-engagement bonus. Frustrated by a lack of progress in this area, Commander Madgwick, DMPS, wrote, "The suggestions have mostly been made before and some progress made before being condemned."⁹⁸ Both the recommendations for universal marriage allowance and more married quarters had been previously rejected by the government for financial reasons. The air force would not support the free annual travel warrants because of their high numbers of single men at widely dispersed bases including Europe. Increased pay was a perennial issue because, in spite of improvements, the armed forces had fallen behind industry by twelve percent in 1953.⁹⁹ He encouraged his superiors to press forward again to obtain these critical improvements. His colleague, Commander Parker, Director of Service Conditions and Welfare, was not sanguine that a dent could be made in the government's resistance to these suggestions. He believed that the only alternative was to seek temporary relief to the manning problem through cutting commitments and shifting personnel resources.¹⁰⁰ Parker's suggestions, while a statement of the obvious, were neither politically acceptable nor particularly helpful.

The Personnel Branch now contained a Job Analysis Committee staffed by trained professionals to assist with streamlining the personnel structure and to find economies. These professionals had the skills and understanding of labour structures needed to devise methods for restructuring the Royal Navy's traditional organisation and adapting it to Canadian (North American) and tri-service standards. The committee was tasked to find a solution to the critical shortage of men in the Engineering Branch that was "the major bottleneck" holding up both training and commissioning of ships.¹⁰¹ The structure of the branch retained the old RN model that did not satisfy "the more exacting requirements of the post-war fleet."¹⁰² Engineering Branch personnel were now employed outside their spaces, maintaining equipment such as refrigeration systems, catapults and flight deck machinery, and, in damage control. This wide spectrum of employment was not reflected in trade specifications. The Job Analysis Committee's solution recommended a complete restructuring of the branch resulting in a redistribution of duties. The most important change was that maintenance duties were added to the specifications of the Stoker Mechanic Branch that had previously been primarily operators. Engine Room Artificers were to become Engineering Artificers (ER) and Stoker Mechanics, Engineering Mechanics (EM).

While significantly increasing the number of general engineers available to man the fleet after conversion training, the restructuring also amalgamated training and advancement in a common stream. There would be common examinations for advancement for both Engineering Artificers and Engineering Mechanics for all watchkeeping certificates in either the engine room or boiler room. A conversion course was required but was voluntary for men above Petty Officer First Class. The change also opened up an avenue to Commissioned Rank for the Engineering Mechanic. It also permitted men trained only in diesel propulsion to advance to higher ranks whereas this had previously depended on holding steam propulsion certificates.

The recommendations also included the reversion of Chief Petty Officer Stoker Mechanics one rank while undergoing conversion. This was to avoid over-ranking the new trade. The CNS personally quashed this initiative to ensure these senior rates were not disadvantaged. Mainguy understood that in personnel matters bureaucratic efficiency did not always induce effectiveness. This was the first postwar restructuring of the branch and reflected a move toward acceptance of the user-maintainer concept in the navy. Wartime demanded the expediency of training one man to do one job as either an operator or maintainer. The RCN was recognizing that in peacetime a small ship navy could not afford this structure that lacked versatility and was grossly expensive.

The integration process was an ongoing requirement compelling the Personnel Branch to evaluate naval trades in order to restructure them to meet tri-service criteria. Navy proposals were screened by the new Inter-Service Committee on Trades and Trade Grouping then approved by the Personnel Members Committee. The Deputy Minister had also directed the services to establish internal Organisation and Establishment Committees to screen all new complement positions and to review existing ones. Claxton's policies were creating a multi-layered bureaucracy with various levels of review and approval. The result was growing complexity and more time required for the naval staff to progress personnel policies. Former staff officers at NSHQ at the time recalled always going to committee meetings and never having time for work. As they were usually "double-hatted" owing to officer shortages, they did their own work after working hours and on weekends.¹⁰³ Moreover, most staff officers were untrained which both detracted from their effectiveness and added to their frustration. The navy's Job Analysis Committee, a much needed addition to the staff, was tasked with recommending adjustments to the entire trade group structure. This was not only to achieve compliance with tri-service standards but to improve the circumstances of naval trades that had

been assessed to their disadvantage during the initial integration exercise.¹⁰⁴ The Seaman Branch was in the worst condition.

The Naval Board directed that the priority of the Job Analysis Committee was to make recommendations to restructure the Seaman Branch to establish equitable working levels and trade group specifications. This was the largest branch in the navy and contained a diversity of trades ranging from gunners and radar operators to divers and physical and recreational training instructors. Members of the Seaman Branch members were required to qualify in all levels of seamanship in addition to being capable of manning and operating weapons and allied equipment. Because there was no equivalent structure of requirements in the other two services, the Seaman Branch trades had not received proper accreditation and fair compensation for skills required during the initial assessment. Many seaman trades had no Trade Group Four level which had ramifications for both promotion in rank as well as financial compensation.¹⁰⁵ This curtailed career opportunities for advancement for many of the seaman trades and contributed to job dissatisfaction, and, consequently, the high wastage rate. In May 1953, the Naval Board approved the trade specifications for twelve seaman trades as well as specifications for "Seaman Working Levels" that spelled out Trade Group levels One to Four for consideration of the various tri-service committees. These ultimately received approval from the Rank Structure Committee (RSC) and were promulgated to the fleet in November 1953, in a new *Manual of Advancement and Promotion*, BRCN 113, that included specifications for all naval trades.¹⁰⁶

The RCN stoutly resisted the progress of integration where its initiatives were not considered to be of advantage to the navy. For example, the personnel staff determined that the navy would be overborne with officers in the rank of lieutenant-commander by 1954.¹⁰⁷ The main reasons were automatic promotion to that rank after eight years as a lieutenant and slow promotion to the next rank. Many SSA officers with RCN(R) seniority held been re-enrolled to

meet expansion requirements and this, coupled with a low retirement rate of lieutenant-commanders, exacerbated the problem. A lieutenant-commander would spend on average thirteen years in that rank. Neither the army nor air force had automatic promotion to their equivalent rank of major and squadron leader that were established ranks in their rank structure. The working level at sea was lieutenant and the rank of lieutenant-commander had been created originally by the RN to reward and recognize senior lieutenants who commanded minor warships. It was not considered to be an additional substantive rank by the RCN before promotion to commander.

In discussing alternative solutions, the Naval Board set aside consideration that promotion to lieutenant-commander must be made selective as it was in the sister services. This was condemned as undesirable and "contrary to any previous naval promotion scheme."¹⁰⁸ Serving lieutenants believed that automatic promotion was their right and introduction of a selection process, the Naval Board believed, "would have a very adverse affect on morale and would, in effect, be a moral breach of faith." The Naval Board instead hoped to persuade the Personnel Members Committee to lump totals of lieutenants and lieutenant-commanders together for the purpose of counting complement. They acknowledged that the chance of success was minimal but directed CNP not to mention the alternative of promotion by selection at PMC. The Naval Board was merely postponing the inevitable as they knew fair well that the Treasury Board demanded symmetry in rank structure which included process as well as equivalency. This was a forlorn hope but probably represented the feeling that a great deal had been done to improve the situation of the men since the Mainguy report and little for the officers.

The Naval Board itself reorganized during this period to accommodate the growing staff requirements to direct and administer expansion and to introduce advanced technology and

tactics into the navy. The position of Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Weapons), later renamed (Warfare), was established in June 1952, to relieve the VCNS of many co-ordination functions that had been created and others that he had inherited because the position of ACNS (Plans) had been left vacant since 1951.¹⁰⁹ Commodore Lay assumed this position upon his return from Washington, in September 1952. Lay's innovative thinking and staff proficiency were welcome at NSHQ and helped to off-set the impending loss of DeWolf. Rear-Admiral Wallace Creery, who replaced DeWolf, brought precision of thought but less dynamic leadership to the position of VCNS.

It was apparent to the Chief of Naval Technical Services (CNTS), Rear-Admiral Knowlton, that NSHQ was expanding without a plan and that the organization was not as efficient as it could be. Knowlton suggested that it might be advisable to obtain the services of an efficiency expert from civilian industry to examine the headquarters structure and to design a more efficient organization.¹¹⁰ The CNS directed that the organization of ACNS (Air), ACNS (Plans) and the new ACNS (Weapons) all reporting to VCNS be adopted as an interim measure. The Naval Board approved the hiring of an industrial consultant as CNTS had suggested. This represented a significant departure by the Naval Board to bring in outside advice and demonstrated that Claxton's reforms were slowly conditioning the naval hierarchy to reach outside the confines of its own narrow experience to seek solutions to problems.

For the most part, the Naval Board demonstrated remarkable consistency and cohesion in following the government's strategic direction and the model developed by Vice-Admiral Grant. The RCN was being built as an escort-oriented navy to provide resources for the ASW component of the NATO naval forces and local defence. The one dissenting voice was ACNS (Air), Commodore Charles Keighly-Peach, the RN officer on loan to direct naval aviation. He had proposed sending a fighter squadron to Korea on loan to the RN and keenly supported the

dispatch of *Magnificent* to replace the destroyers in Korea. He also pressed the Naval Board to acquire an Essex Class (CV9) carrier from the USN in order to be able to operate jet aircraft prior to the completion of *Bonaventure*.¹¹¹ This was contrary to the long term acquisition plan already approved by the government to purchase the modernized carrier for which funds had been earmarked in the estimates. Keighly-Peach continued to champion the acquisition of a second carrier, that was listed in the RCN Mobilization Programme, whenever the opportunity presented itself.¹¹² He assiduously promoted the acquisition of both the "Banshee" F2H3 jet fighter and Grumman S2F "Tracker" ASW aircraft to replace the obsolete British aircraft in service.¹¹³

Keighly-Peach was undoubtedly a keen proponent of naval aviation but he harboured a basic disagreement with the direction of Canadian naval policy. Whether this was personal or reflected an Admiralty view is not clear. He pointedly criticized the RCN's narrow ASW focus at the Tenth Meeting of Senior Officers in May 1953. He premised his remarks, "From the moment that Canada decided to pool her naval resources in NATO she virtually handed over what should be her birthright to a community of nations or 'common' user and thereby lost that prime factor in any modern navy - the balanced fleet."¹¹⁴ His primary objection was that without sufficient aircraft carriers and no submarines for tactical training, the RCN could not achieve a high state of overall readiness. Moreover, he believed that modern cruisers were a requirement but strike aircraft could be acquired as an alternative. Keighly-Peach admitted he was making a "proposal purely on theoretical grounds and with no practical thought of finance" but that notwithstanding, the RCN should acquire additional aircraft carriers, submarines and strike aircraft and provide better AAW practice facilities.¹¹⁵

Keighly-Peach was at the end of his term in Canada and during his tenure had unilaterally expanded his terms of reference to encroach on policy development while the

position of ACNS (Plans) was vacant. He used the Senior Officers' Meeting as a forum to advocate a return to the balanced fleet concept and creation of an independent blue water navy. This suggestion sailed in the face of the Canadian reality. His recommendations suggest that Keighly-Peach had either acquired little understanding of Canadian defence politics or possessed an imperial mentality and chose to ignore them.¹¹⁶ He did not support what DeWolf referred to as "the NATO principle of balanced collective forces" wherein all countries shared resources that they were capable of providing.¹¹⁷ The "have" members shared with the "have nots". Some RCN flag officers also had trouble with the concept and had to be schooled in it by DeWolf. Keighly-Peaches' item probably would not have got on the agenda had DeWolf still been VCNS.

The larger question is, what were Vice-Admiral Mainguy's views on policy? The minutes recorded a curious response suggesting some confusion of purpose, "It was agreed that limited thinking in respect to the role of the RCN is a dangerous thing, and that we should not be concentrating on A/S Warfare only. We could make a greater contribution to NATO, however, by increasing our A/S and M/S[minesweeping] potential."¹¹⁸ It is even more curious that VCNS was directed to instruct the Director of Naval Information "to soft-peddle" publicity of the RCN as an "A/S Warfare navy." Keighly-Peach probably took advantage of Mainguy's open forum format for these meetings and he touched a sympathetic nerve in a few present. He knew there were some residual big ship navy sentiment remaining and that the concentration on ASW had created an identity crisis for some officers.¹¹⁹

It was shortly after the meeting that CNP proposed to VCNS that the cruisers be paid-off to concentrate training in small ships. Director Naval Plans and Operations (DNPO), Captain Dudley King, protested strongly that, "In my opinion, on the long term basis, it would be deplorable from the national point of view, if the RCN ever became officially an anti-

submarine navy only."¹²⁰ This is an interesting statement from an officer primarily responsible for planning the new ASW navy that was official government policy, however, not surprising as King was considered by his contemporaries as "more RN than the RN" and a reactionary.¹²¹ The Naval Board reasserted the RCN's ASW oriented policy when it approved construction to begin on ten Vancouver Class frigates to be available to SACLANT after D Day to replace the two cruisers now designated.¹²² This might be considered an unambiguous confirmation of the direction of policy. The issue resurfaced when the disposal of the cruiser *Quebec* came under staff consideration the following year. This vacillation raises the question of the extent to which Mainguy was firmly directing the policy development process and providing leadership with respect to maintaining the strategic aim.

Keighly-Peach made one accurate criticism and that was lack of emphasis on Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) in the RCN. It is useful to examine this because it demonstrates the consequences of the ASW focus and the limitations of DeWolf's "principle of balanced collective forces". Practice firing facilities for AAW were non-existent. Organic air defence was provided by fighters only when the carrier was present. Self-defence capabilities of escorts against jet aircraft were minimal. The navy had chosen the USN 3"50 with the Gunar fire control system to be fitted in the destroyers under conversion, on *Bonaventure* and temporarily on the first seven St. Laurent Class escorts. This gun was designed to defeat the Japanese kamikaze and was effective against relatively slow closing targets but was ineffective against fast crossing targets. The 3"70 gun, under development by both the RN and USN, was to be fitted in all fourteen escorts to be constructed.¹²³ That gun was chosen because theoretically it was a better performer than the 3"50 but only as a stop gap until a satisfactory missile system became available.¹²⁴ The USN ceased development of the 3"70. The RCN went reluctantly with

the British model, a prospect that "frightened" CNTS, and adapted it to a Canadian fire control system.¹²⁵ The gun would prove to be a nightmare.

Rear-Admiral Knowlton's concerns were justified. The confusion as whether to fit the gun forward or aft, the complications in adapting it to the escorts and, finally, its poor record of serviceability demonstrated the RCN's lack of expertise in this area of warfare.¹²⁶ The gun became known as "the civil servant" because, "you couldn't make it work and you couldn't fire it." It was eventually fitted only in the seven "second batch" escorts and eight mountings had to be produced because it took six months longer to refit the gun than the ships. Given that neither the 3"50 nor 3"70 were particularly adaptable to Surface Warfare (SUW), reinforced the conclusion that the RCN was designing its fleet primarily to combat the dived submarine.¹²⁷ Technical developments, particularly the anti-ship missile that could be fired from aircraft, ships and submarines, further restricted the RCN to a one dimensional combat capability. After the "Banshee" jet fighters were taken out of service in the late 1950s, only a token self-defence AAW capability resided in Canadian destroyers.¹²⁸ This gave real meaning to dependence on DeWolf's "principle of balanced collective forces".¹²⁹

On 27 July 1953, a truce was signed between the United Nations and North Korean government. While the shooting war had ceased, an uneasy peace prevailed and the United Nations resisted any temptation to reduce its forces in the theatre. The decision was made that the three Canadian destroyers would remain.¹³⁰ Korea was proving to be a mixed blessing. Up to the end of December 1953, there had been fifteen individual destroyer deployments, each lasting for a minimum of ten months.¹³¹ An environment of enforced personnel stability prevailed in the ships deployed. These were manned to full war complement which placed severe strains on the fleet manning situation. While Storrs questioned at the time the value of the general training received by these personnel, other observers, such as Rear-Admirals

Charles and Landymore, have stated that Korea provided the stability, training opportunities and experience needed by the RCN to build a strong professional foundation and develop a new confidence.¹³² Moreover, Canadian sailors earned a reputation for dash and professionalism. A new generation of Commanding Officers following the example set by Harry DeWolf were emerging. As in the Second World War, the Canadian personality proved to be most adaptable to small ships. The negative aspects and impact of keeping these destroyers deployed have been discussed. The problems of manning these ships while managing the "growing pains" being experienced in the rapid expansion of the RCN would continue to grip the attention of the Personnel Branch and Naval Staff at NSHQ for the foreseeable future.

NOTES - CHAPTER 6

1 Clyde Gilmour, *The Vancouver Daily Province*, a biographical sketch reprinted in *The Cowichan Leader*, 6 February 1947, 9.

2 Ibid. Mr. Skrimshire's school consisted of one room in which he taught 25 to 30 boys all the grades up to senior high.

3 P.W. Brock, "Four Cadets, 1915," *Sea Breezes*, Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1919, 5.

4 Graduates of RCNC retained all the positions on the Naval Board, except ACNS (Air) who was on loan from the RN, and most of the flag officer appointments, COAC, FOPC and NMCJS Washington, during Mainguy's tenure. The exception was RAdmr. JC Hibbard, FOPC 1953-55. Hibbard enrolled as a "special entry" cadet in 1926 and was the first of the post-RCNC stream to achieve flag rank.

5 *The Cowichan Leader*, 6 February 1947, 9.

6 See Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 72-73. Lay obviously has his dates wrong but the portrayal of Maraquita Mainguy (nee:Nichol) was confirmed in the Dyer and Storrs interviews by the author. RAdmr. Storrs related an account of Mrs. Mainguy publicly ordering his wife to perform baby-sitting duties at a social function. The function was in Mrs. Storrs' home and she refused. Storrs was Commanding Officer of *Shearwater* at the time.

7 *The Cowichan Leader*, 6 February 1947, 9 & 12. Needlepoint embroidery was a favourite hobby of officers of Mainguy's era. Excellent examples, altar hangings, the work of RAdmr. Budge, may be seen in St. Mary's Anglican Church, Victoria, BC.

8 Creery had lost *Fraser* in collision with HMS *Calcutta* during the war and although he was not officially censured this, in the opinion of Capt. Brant, retarded Creery's promotion to Captain. Brant interview by the author. A year senior to Mainguy as a Commander, Creery was promoted to Captain in 1942. He subsequently served as VCNS under Mainguy.

9 CNP to staff, memo, 28 December 1942, VAdmr. E.R. Mainguy file, DHist.

10 The Naval Staff originally wished to give *Uganda* a name more appropriate to Canada as it had *Ontario*, formerly HMS *Minotaur*. The Admiralty would not agree because her construction costs had been defrayed through donations from the people of the colony of Uganda.

11 SO Plans to DOP, memo, 24 June 1944, NAC, RG24, Vol. 8150, NSS 1655-2 quoted in Bill Rawling, "A Lonely Ambassador: HMCS *Uganda* and the War in the Pacific," *The Northern Mariner*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (January, 1998), 45. Rawling noted that Mainguy had virtually no "big-ship" experience and *Uganda* had a long way to go to achieve a modicum of operational effectiveness when she departed the war.

12 Ron Armstrong, "The ship that left the war," *Times Colonist*, 13 August 1995, M1. Mainguy was authorized to offer leave and pay bonuses but this could not counter-balance pressure from home "to let younger men take your place." Two-thirds of the ship's company voted to return to Canada. The rules for volunteers for the Pacific campaign stated they were entitled to thirty days leave meaning the ship was required to return in any case unless they voted to retain the status quo.

13 *The Cowichan Leader*, 6 February 1947, 12.

14 Audette interview.

15 This opinion was widely held by senior officers who worked at NSHQ with Mainguy. DeWolf, Storrs and Dillon interviews by the author.

16 Claxton, "Autobiography".

17 Minutes Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting, 17 & 23 March, 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 3, Naval Committees-Senior Officers, Meetings.

18 *The Cowichan Leader*, 6 February 1947, 12.

19 Minutes Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting, 17 & 23 March, 1952.

20 VAdmr. E.R. Mainguy, "The True Glory", an address at the University of Saskatchewan, 9 May 1952, VAdmr. E.R. Mainguy file, DHist.

21 Harbron, "The Royal Canadian Navy At Peace, 1945 - 1955: The Uncertain Heritage," 19. Harbron, who served in the RCNVR during the war, was motivated in his criticism through Mainguy's failure to support a current affairs instructional program that was being promoted to DND by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs of which Harbron was a director. His criticism that the admirals of Executive Branch prewar cohort that administered the RCN lacked the entrepreneurial spirit of modern business managers was accurate. He stated, "They [the admirals] were not faced with the same competitive pressures of executives in private enterprise and in many ways preserved a *status quo*, not in pattern with Canadian management in general during the 1950's."

Harbron was unaware of the modern developments in the technical and supply branches of the RCN, the latter being modelled entirely on the USN Supply System.

22 VCNS address, Minutes Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting, 17 & 23 March, 1952. The first estimates were an additional 27 coastal escorts and 30 minesweepers for defence of North America.

23 DNPO to VCNS, memo, 29 May 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 6, Operations and Plans.

24 FOPC comments, Minutes Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting, 17 & 23 March, 1952.

25 NSec memo, 23 April 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 4, Operations and Plans.

26 Korean Relief Schedule, *Ibid.*

27 Department of National Defence, *Canada's Defence Programme 1952-53*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1952), 8. While the RCN recruited 3,997 in fiscal year 1951-52, wastage was 1,574.

28 *Ibid.*, 25. Proportionately the navy's share would remain at 15 percent while the air force would receive the lion's share at 40 percent. The navy had third priority as NATO considered the primary weaknesses were in land and air forces in Europe.

29 MND address, Minutes Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting, 17 & 23 March, 1952.

30 *Ibid.* Claxton's argument was well rehearsed as he was under pressure from the Chief of the General Staff, Guy Simonds, to introduce conscription for the army.

31 The 100 ship navy was an unanticipated increase of 16 over the figure of 84 for 1954 given by the VCNS. The breakdown was:

1 light fleet carrier

2 cruisers

42 escorts (ocean)

25 coastal vessels

14 minesweepers

The 20,000 breakdown would be 6,973 personnel afloat and 13,006 ashore.

32 MND address, Minutes Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting, 17 & 23 March, 1952.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 See Serge Bernier, "HMCS Ottawa III, The Navy's First French-Language Unit, 1968-1973," 310-314.

37 CNP address, Minutes Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting, 17 & 23 March, 1952.

38 Ibid.

39 CNS address, *ibid.*

40 DCNP to DNPO, memo, 21 October 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 7, Operations and Plans.

41 *Bonaventure* was named after a bird sanctuary in the Gulf of St. Lawrence but was known as "The Bonnie" in the fleet. Construction had been suspended in 1946 at Belfast. She was a Majestic class Light Fleet Carrier like *Magnificent* and carried the same number of aircraft, 34, but was slightly longer, 720 feet versus 694 feet. The ship was modernized during completion with features such as an angled flight deck, that accounted for the extra length, a steam catapult for launching, and a mirror-assisted landing system. Her armament was four twin 3"50 guns. Maximum speed was 24 knots, slow for a modern carrier.

42 ACNS(Air) address, Minutes Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting, 17 & 23 March, 1952. Essential pilot and observer training courses could not be run because sufficient maintainers were not available to keep up with necessary inspections and essential safety related maintenance.

43 PC 965, 19 February 1952.

44 "The RCN in 1952", Armed Forces Press Release, 18 December 1952, 81/520/1440-5, vol. xxi, DHist.

45 CNS to FOAC, FOPC, message, 221652Z December 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 5, Operations and Plans.

46 OIC RCN Depot Halifax to FOAC, memo, 31 October 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 5, Complements General.

47 The squadron included *Quebec* (Flag), *Magnificent*, *Ontario*, *Sioux*, *Lauzon*, and *Swansea*. This squadron outnumbered all the other naval contingents from the Dominions combined. The RCN provided a marching contingent and the squadron was in the Spithead Review. See Bidwell, *Random Memoirs*, 19.

48 FOAC, "Appreciation of the Employment of H.M.C. Ships in the Atlantic Command", 29 February 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 6, Complements General. This had been proposed in 1951 by Captain Piers, DNPO in 1951, and rejected at the staff level then.

49 ACNS(Air) to DNPO, memo, 10 March 1952, *Ibid.* Keighly-Peach, through Admiralty contacts, had also generated a scheme to send a fighter squadron on loan to the RN to Korea. This came to nothing.

50 DMPS to DNPO, memo, 13 March 1952, *ibid.*

51 DNPO to VCNS, memo, 14 March 1952, *ibid.* Storrs believed that Korea was "a side show" that detracted from the primary aim. Storrs interview by the author.

52 VCNS minute, DNPO to VCNS, memo, 14 March 1952, *Ibid.* Soward, obviously relying on anecdotal evidence, suggested that it was the Minister that turned down a proposal (from whom?) to send *Magnificent* to Korea. Soward, *Hands to Flying Stations*, vol. 1, 236. Naval Staff files do not support this. The proposals were originated, discussed and quashed at the staff level and never got to the Naval Board.

53 Storrs' work stands out in what is generally a landscape of mediocrity, the main feature of staff writing at NSHQ during this period. He had a natural gift but no training. When Storrs applied for a staff course, Grant had him appointed to the staff at the National Defence College, "to sink or swim", as Storrs told the author. Comparing his previous work as A/DNPO, he obviously polished his staff writing skills at National Defence College, probably through contact with his army and air force colleagues whose career patterns included formal staff training.

54 DNPO to VCNS, memo, 29 May 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 6, Operations and Plans.

55 *Ibid.*

56 *Ibid.*

57 VCNS minute, 12 June 1952, *ibid.*

58 CNS Information Book to MND dated 18 November 1952 quoted in DNPO to ACNS(W), CNP, VCNS, memo, 8 March 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 5, Complements General.

59 The initial formation contained the carrier, two destroyers and two frigates.

60 RAdmr. Lay, while in key staff positions, i.e., DNPO, ACNS (Warfare) and VCNS, commented frequently on the deplorable state of staff work at NSHQ through lack of training. For example see ACNS(Warfare) to VCNS, memo, 14 August 1953, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 9, Operations and Plans.

61 Storrs interview by the author.

62 RAdmr. Storrs interview by Hal Lawrence, dated 31 July 1985, at Victoria BC, RAdmr. Storrs file, DHist.

63 NBM 356-4, 7 January 1952; NBM 357-1, 20 January 1952.

64 CNP, "Principle Measures Considered And Steps Taken To Improve Officer Production From May, 1950 to December 1951", 31 December 1951, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 4, Complements General. This is a briefing note prepared by Hibbard showing the unsuccessful incremental approach taken by the navy to improve officer procurement and retention and also the affect of financial stringency exercised by the Defence Council. Hibbard was a progressive and the briefing note is a veiled criticism of Grant's conservatism.

65 Department of National Defence, *Canada's Defence Programme 1953-54*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1953), 17.

66 See DeWolfs comments in NBM 347-2, 6 June 1951.

67 NBM 357-1, 20 February 1952.

68 Department of National Defence, *Canada's Defence Programme 1954-55*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954), 24.

69 Safety regulations required that a destroyer follow the carrier any time flight operations were in progress.

70 DCNP to DNPO, memo, 21 October 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 7, Operations and Plans.

71 DNOrg to DNPO, memo, 8 May 1951, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 4, Complements General. This was a tentative figure pending completion of the complement model for the 21,000 regular force.

72 DCNP, note to file, 28 October 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 5, Complements General.

73 Ibid.

74 NBM 363-1, 24 November 1952. The recommendation was made by Captain Ken Adams, DCNP, who served concurrently as Director of Naval Reserves. Adams was thought by some colleagues to have created the new command and had himself appointed to it. RAdmr. Adams interview by Chris Mayhem, 16 August 1978, RAdmr. Adams file, DHist.

75 Mainguy had asked Claxton to make the position a Flag Officer's billet but Claxton said in his "Autobiography" that he refused to promote Commodore Adams. He gave no cause. Campney agreed immediately to Adams' promotion after Claxton retired, COND becoming FOND. Adams seemed to be aware that he was out of favour with Claxton. Adams interview by Mayhem.

76 NBM 372, 11 March 1953. This covered drafts between Naval Divisions but also the complex task of orchestrating summer training and moving personnel to the coasts and units under COND's command. The depots on the coasts would then draft reserves to available billets in ships. Authority for drafting RCN(R) females remained with NSHQ as the majority of these were filling regular force billets.

77 NBM 390-4, 16 October 1953.

78 DSCW to CNP, memo, 14 April 1953, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 5, Complements General.

79 Ibid.

80 NBM 366-1, 14 January 1953.

81 CNS comments, Minutes Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting, 17 & 23 March, 1952.

82 CNP Address, Minutes Tenth Senior Officers' Meeting, 6 & 8 May 1953, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 4, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings.

83 NBM 366-1, 14 January 1953.

84 Ibid.

85 NBM 359-1, 13 May 1952.

86 There was insufficient capacity to progress this training in Canada. The JOTLC courses were still dealing with a backlog of lieutenants. Preston, in "MARCOM Education"(70), suggests this practice was gradually phased out. In fact, it remained the primary method of training Executive Branch ROTP officers until 1958 and was phased out only because the RN changed its training scheme and cut the courses. See "Promotion and Training of Junior Officers in the Royal Canadian Navy", NBM 455-1, 3 August 1955.

87 CNP address, Minutes Tenth Senior Officers' Meeting, 6 & 8 May 1953.

88 The army gave its ROTP cadets the option of joining a regiment after two years.

89 Preston argues erroneously that the navy's reluctance was motivated by imperatives of selection based on class distinction. He seems unaware of the existence of the separate two-year Executive Branch programme within ROTP that functioned well after Claxton left office and he also makes no mention of the Venture Programme that was modelled on RNCC/RCNC.

90 RAdmr. Hugh Francis Pullen was a cadet in the last class of the RNCC when it closed down in 1922 and was left without a place. He served as a cadet with the Canadian Pacific Steamship Company until he could re-enter the RCN in 1922. He trained as a Gunnery Officer and, known as "Von Pullen" by his contemporaries, developed a reputation as a martinet but a good one (Storrs interview by the author). Pullen was an arch-conservative and became the RCN's most strident advocate in promoting the maintenance of ceremony and tradition. He exhibited professional competency in many command positions and was knowledgeable in RCN personnel matters. However, he lacked Hibbard's experience at NSHQ and his appointment into the critical position of CNP typified the RCN's notion that a seaman officer could do any job. Pullen exhibited a resistance to the direction of personnel and strategic policies, particularly specialization in ASW. He was a self-declared "Big Ship" proponent.. RAdmr. Pullen served as CNP from May 1953 to April 1955 when he again relieved Hibbard, who retired early for reasons of health, as COPC.

91 RAdmr. Storrs interview by Hal Lawrence, dated 31 July 1985, DHist. Lawrence and Storrs were discussing the climate and attitudes at different times in NSHQ. LCdr. Lawrence was serving in NSHQ as Staff Officer UNTD and had been asked by Captain Haddon, Director of Personnel(Men), to attend the meeting with him between Pullen and Schrum. Schrum's task was to determine how the services and universities could best coordinate efforts to meet objectives. A watch-keeping certificate was granted by a Commanding Officer of a ship to a suitably qualified officer who had demonstrated that he was capable of exercising command on his behalf at sea. Interestingly, Hugh Pullen was a well-read and self-educated man who authored several historical works after he retired: *The Atlantic Schooner* (1967), *The Shannon and the Chesapeake* (1970), *The Pullen Expedition* (1979), and *The Sea Road to Halifax* (1980).

92 NBM 441-4, 9 March 1955

93 The navy's promotion was based on merit and a degree was a consideration but not a prerequisite. The first degree-holding officer to become Commander, Maritime Command (MARCOM), the successor to CNS after unification, was VAdmr. John Allan in 1979. Allan was an Engineer by training who became a General List Officer after the Tisdall Reforms in 1957. His immediate successors, VAdmrs. Fulton and Wood were two year graduates of RCNC(1946) and RRMCM(1957) respectively. Three subsequent MARCOM's were Venture graduates, VAdmrs. "Chuck" Thomas(1987-91), Peter Cairns(1992 to 1994), and Lynne Mason(1996 to 1998). Of those three only Thomas, an Engineer, had a degree, an MBA obtained part-time. The most productive sources of MARCOMs were Venture, 3, and civilian university ROTP, 3. The latter were VAdmrs. John Anderson(1991-92)), Larry Murray(1994-96) and Gary Garnett(1996-98). The first naval officer to be trained completely in Canada who became MARCOM was Vice-Admiral John Anderson. Interestingly, the first degree-holding graduate from a service college to be appointed Commander, Maritime Command, was Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison in 1998. This was fifty years after Claxton had been persuaded to reopen RMC by the ex-Cadet Association. His advice from a select panel, including LCdr Bill Landymore, in 1948, was that RMC should remain closed and that officer training should be conducted in civilian universities on a plan similar to UNTD.

94 DMPS to CNP, memo, 14 April 1953, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 5, Complements General. Analysis for the 1952 figures show a wastage of 10.6 percent of complement.

95 CNP Address, Minutes Tenth Senior Officers' Meeting, 6 & 8 May 1953.

96 No additional training personnel were assigned to cope with the additional tasking.

97 DMPS to CNP, memo, 14 April 1953.

98 Ibid.

99 DSCW to CNP, memo, 14 April 1953, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 5, Complements General.

100 Ibid.

101 DCNP to DNPO, memo, 21 October 1952 and OIC RCN Depot Halifax to FOAC, memo, 31 October 1952.

102 NBM 374, 25 March 1953. The RN model reflected elements of British industrial society and the requirements of conscription where turnover of personnel was high. There were strict divisions between trained tradesman, the guild concept, and a pool of unskilled labour.

103 Dillon, Hanington and Pickford interviews by the author.

104 NBM 378-1, 14 May 1953.

105 Attaining Trade Group Four was a standard prerequisite under the tri-service regulations for promotion to Chief Petty Officer First Class, the highest non-commissioned naval rank.

106 "Wider Paths to Trade Pay," *Crowsnest*, vol. 6, no. 1, November 1953, 19-20. The manual, containing specifications for all the navy trades in a single volume, was a new innovation with applications in training, recruiting, employment and complementing. BRCN stands for "Book of Reference Canadian Navy".

107 NBM 385-1, 5 August 1953. Another prime example was resistance to initiatives to bring RCN doctors and hospitals under a common Armed Forces Medical Council and the amalgamation of all medical services. See NBM 360-4, 16 June 1952.

108 Ibid.

109 NBM 360-3, 16 June 1952. The position of ACNS (Plans) had been left vacant in order to save on staff when Cmdre. Bidwell was promoted RAdmr. and appointed as FOAC in 1951.

110 Ibid.

111 NBM 360-2, 16 June 1952.

112 NBM 374-4, 25 March 1953.

113 NBM 361-4, 10 September 1952 and NBM 374-2, 25 March 1953.

114 ACNS(Air) address, Minutes Tenth Senior Officers' Meeting, 6 & 8 May 1953.

115 Ibid.

116 Lay suggested at the Mainguy inquiry that the RN did not select the most suitable officers to serve on loan as Director of Naval Aviation, later ACNS (Air). Keighly-Peach appears to have been adequate in the purely naval aviation realm but deficient in political sensitivity, an important asset in his position.

117 VCNS(DeWolf) Minute on FOPC to NSec, 21 January 1952, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 5, Operations and Plans. There was an important mutual aid element in these early days of NATO.

118 Minutes Tenth Senior Officers' Meeting, 6 & 8 May 1953. The Minutes were prepared by the Naval Secretary and approved by CNS. Mainguy seldom took the time to read what he signed.

119 See Hennessy, "Fleet Replacement and the Crisis of Identity," 131-153.

120 DNPO(King) to VCNS(Creery), memo, 10 June 1953, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 8, Operations and Plans.

121 Dillon interview by the author. King was a former RCNVR officer who spoke in a heavily affected English wardroom accent and wore a handkerchief up his sleeve. Interestingly, he was born an American in Falmouth, Massachusetts.

122 NBM 382-5, 24 June 1953.

123 NBM 387-1, 14 September 1953.

124 Theoretically the 3"70 with GFCS 69 fire control system had a superiority in lethality over the Gunar controlled 3"50 by a factor of 3 to 1. "Seaward Defence Report" NBM 445-3, 25 May 1955.

125 CNTS address, Minutes Ninth Senior Officers' Meeting, 17 & 23 March, 1952.

126 This conclusion is also supported by the fact the Naval Staff initially chose the 4" gun to be fitted in the projected Vancouver class escorts which had no AAW capability. CNTS challenged the logic and viewed this with grave concern because Canadian industry was tooling up to build the 3"50 gun and he won his argument. Another issue entirely is the ineffectiveness of both the 3"50 and 3"70 in the Surface Warfare mode.

127 Ammunition was developed to give the guns some marginal surface warfare and shore bombardment capability. There was uncertainty whether the thick pressure hull of a surfaced submarine could be penetrated. The 3"70 was again the superior performer but compared to the 4.7" guns fitted in the Tribals and 5" that was standard in USN destroyers, it was a poor substitute. As jets became faster and with the advent of missiles, the air defence capability of Canadian escorts was eventually reduced to nil. "Report of Committee on Air Defence of Shipping", NBM 453-5, 20 July, 1955 predicted this. A modest point-defence AAW capability in the Sea Sparrow Surface to Air Missile (SAM) and a good Surface Warfare gun were fitted in the four "Tribal" Class destroyers completed in the early 1970s. The remaining ships in the fleet were virtually defenceless against air attack. (The author commanded two of these AAW deficient ships, the destroyers *Assiniboine* and *Nipigon*, during the early 1980s.)

128 There was no suitable replacement for the "Banshee" because the jet fighters being developed for the USN were all too large to operate off the *Bonaventure* and acquiring a larger carrier was out of the question. The "Banshees" were replaced by "Sea King" helicopters and the carrier's role became completely ASW.

129 RCN tactical doctrine developed on the assumption of the presence of a USN aircraft carrier to provide an "AAW umbrella".

130 Thorgrimsson and Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1955*, 129.

131 *Ibid.*, 153. This includes destroyers deployed twice or three times, as was *Athabaskan*.

132 Charles and Landymore interview by the author.

CHAPTER 7

A Formidable Programme

It will be apparent that a very considerable effort will be required to man all the ships which are scheduled for commissioning [during 1954 and 1955] but it is considered that we should aim high and that there is a good chance of at least approaching the target very closely.

Captain Dudley King,
Director of Naval Plans and Operations
26 March 1954.

The NATO Council had met in a mood of guarded optimism in December 1953 for the annual review and to establish force goals for the next three years. Stalin was dead, there had been anti-Communist riots in East Berlin and hostilities had ceased in Korea. Claxton reported back to parliament that Canada, as a member of NATO, must be prepared to maintain adequate defences for an indefinite period.¹ He stated, "Such long term commitments as are now envisaged raise important military and financial problems, and considerable effort will be required to continue the maintenance of NATO forces with modern equipment and to keep these forces at an adequate state of readiness."² However, this was interpreted as an opportunity to retrench by the Liberal government that had deferred social programmes to meet the high cost of rapid rearmament. The government was also trying to set an example of restraint and maintain a balanced budget during a period of inflationary expansion in the economy.³ For the armed forces, the halcyon days of commanding nearly fifty percent of the national budget vanished as quickly and as unexpectedly as they had appeared. Claxton would no longer speak in terms of a 100 ship navy. In fact, the government began to look for means to reduce defence expenditure and the armed forces personnel complement became an immediate target. A 10 percent cut in the total manpower of 130,000, submitted in the 1954-55 estimates, was demanded.⁴

The Deputy Minister, "Bud" Drury, who had control of all financial matters pertaining to the department, including personnel complement and ceilings, passed this unwelcome

ministerial directive on to CNS. Drury was also chairman of the Estimates Review Committee that vetted all programme expenditure proposals from the three services and ensured strict compliance with government direction and policy. The other committee members included; the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Secretary of the Treasury Board and the Deputy Minister of Defence Production. The service chiefs were not members. Colonel Raymont remarked that "the DND Estimates Review Committee, or 'Screening Committee' was sometimes colloquially known as the 'Screaming Committee!' because of the emotional outbursts of some of the Chiefs of Staff and the members when called upon to justify some of the items in their programs, and which the discussions often provoked in the 'cutting of the pie.'"⁵ The "Mark" document, that represented the outline programme for the 1954-55 estimates agreed between the Service Chiefs and the Deputy Minister, had set the manpower requirements at 130,000 and these had been reduced to 120,000. Drury advised Mainguy that the navy's share, 21,096, must be re-examined to find ways to save manpower.⁶ While speaking in terms of a 10 percent cut, he suggested that minimum manning standards prescribed by SACLANT for ships earmarked for NATO should be followed and the same for forces engaged in the defence of Canada. However, if these precluded a 10 percent reduction, Drury wanted to know the military consequences. Essentially, he was asking the navy if it manned to SACLANT's minimum standards would it have to reduce the number of ships in commission?

The reduction presented the Naval Staff with two problems. The first was to respond to the immediate requirement and the second was the uncertainty that the new policy of restraint introduced into developing the estimates for 1955-56 then in progress. The Naval Staff had to plan with some degree of certainty and could not prepare two contingency sets of estimates, one for what was required and the other for what government funding might be. Captain King, DNPO, expressed the collective opinion of the Naval Staff with the comment, "beyond

mentioning the obvious, the cutting back below 21,000 will mean a reduction in ships in commission [and as a consequence] SACLANT's force goals will be affected."⁷ He added that in the majority of cases RCN ships were manned at minimum standard now. Captain Woollcombe, Director Naval Organization (DNOrg), voiced criticism at the arbitrary nature of the cuts when the navy had already incurred a reduction of the total share, from 17.6 percent to 16.2 percent, when the figure of 130,000 was set for the three services. He argued, moreover that "It would seem fundamental that reductions from the 130,000 level should be based on relative priorities of national policy, not a purely arithmetical formula."⁸

The CNS's response to the Deputy Minister made the case that the reduction should not be more than 500, and that number from a revised complement of 21,150, which was the original figure, instead of 21,096.⁹ Any further reduction would mean a reduction in the number of ships. Having made his case, he conceded that because the St. Laurent construction programme was delayed, the interim manpower requirements in December 1955 would be only 90 percent of 21,150 and 96 percent a year later. This satisfied the requirement but Drury was not happy with the supporting analysis. He requested a detailed break-down of all RCN commitments from CNS to permit a "ready association" with the statements made by him.¹⁰ Mainguy provided the necessary detailed justification but the Deputy Minister should not have had to ask for it. It should have formed part of Mainguy's original submission and demonstrated that he and the Naval Staff had yet to achieve the level of efficiency required to function with maximum effectiveness in the integrated bureaucracy. In any event, the navy's target strength was reduced to 20,000 by the Deputy Minister in October 1954, because it became apparent that recruiting would fall short of the original 21,000 mark for March 1955.¹¹ Drury revised the current fiscal year's total to 18,222. The ceiling for the 1955-56 estimates was set at 19,400, and 20,000 for the following fiscal year. In January 1955, the government legislated the 20,000

ceiling.¹² There was an additional allowance for officer cadets and apprentices and an excess of one percent for seasonal recruiting variations and wastage. The DM felt it necessary to explain that the latter provision did not mean the services could be continuously 1 percent over strength.¹³

The Naval Staff, and staff of the Personnel Branch in particular, struggled to meet the demands of fiscal and personnel management systems that were becoming more complex and regimented and whose rigid timetables were set externally. They suffered from deficiencies in manning as well as training that affected internal coordination. For example, the effort to meet the requirements and timetable for submission of the 1954-55 complement to the Estimate Review Committee taxed the resources of the Personnel Branch to such an extent that they could give only passing attention to the task of developing an accurate rank and trade structure for submission to the Rank Structure Committee. As a result, Captain Haddon, Director of Personnel (Men) (DofP (Men)), warned Captain Woolcombe, DNOrg, that the figure on trade groups "is at best only an opinion of the Personnel Branch and cannot be considered as having the supporting data of a detailed analysis which it in fact requires."¹⁴ Commodore Lay, ACNS (Warfare), had earlier reported the extent of the problem of staff coordination to VCNS. Lay stated,

I have frequently noted that not only the three branches of Naval Headquarters, but also the three sections of naval Staff are inclined to work in somewhat water-tight compartments. I am sure this is not intentional or deliberate but is probably due to the lack of staff training of junior officers and some thoughtless omissions on the part of Directors.¹⁵

Lay believed that the problem of coordination "just boils down to staff training" and he would strive to improve the situation.

The Naval Board acted on a VCNS initiative, obviously originated by Lay, to correct the long standing deficiency in the coordination between branches through the creation of the

Policy and Project Coordination Committee (PPCC). The PPCC was to be a working committee of the Naval Board providing the machinery to ensure adequate coordination and consideration of policy proposals, both before they reached the Naval Board and also in their subsequent implementation.¹⁶ Lay gained approval for a Captain as Naval Co-ordinator and an adequate secretarial staff to support the work of the PPCC.¹⁷ The PPCC began by coordinating the development of the programme for employment of the fleet in 1955 and training requirements. It quickly proved its worth. After Lay became VCNS, in August 1954, its terms of reference were expanded to include production of the annual estimates and complement submissions to the Rank Structure Committee.¹⁸

Lay initiatives that delegated approvals for smaller projects below the level of the Naval Board and that reduced the paperwork for board members were also approved.¹⁹ In conjunction with the Naval Secretary, Captain Laws, Lay arranged for a wider distribution of a more detailed version of the Naval Board Minutes to ensure that decisions and attendant discussions reached the appropriate staff officers more quickly to ensure timely implementation.²⁰ The PPCC concept represented a complete departure from the laissez-faire approach to staffing that had developed in the immediate postwar period. It also anticipated the appointment of a Naval Comptroller on the Naval Board to assume the responsibility for coordinating annual fiscal and complement submissions. Lay appreciated that the muddling-through staff style of the old family navy placed the RCN at a distinct disadvantage in the highly competitive environment of limited financial resources and an integrated military bureaucracy. While he would achieve some success improving staff efficiency through reorganisation and better coordination, the navy remained unenthusiastic towards staff training for junior officers.

The manning situation in the fleet remained critical, particularly with respect to shortages in the engineering and electrical trades, as the Naval Staff attempted to write a realistic fleet employment programme for 1955-56. To date, the only respite from the ongoing manning crisis had been obtained from construction delays. However, in 1954, twenty-five newly constructed or converted ships were scheduled to join the active or reserve fleet. The first of the St. Laurent Class destroyer escorts was scheduled to commission in 1955, along with sixteen converted frigates and the last of the older destroyer conversions. *Bonaventure* was to be commissioned in 1956, as well as more St. Laurents. The Naval Secretary's letter to the commands described the employment schedule for 1954-55 as a "formidable programme".²¹ The philosophy of Captain King, DNPO, who originated the plan, was that "we should aim high and that there is a good chance of at least approaching the target very closely."²²

The objective was to juggle resources so as to keep the maximum number of ships in commission in order to train as many personnel as possible. The problem was complicated by the ongoing build-up on the east coast where, from 1950 to the end of 1954, the sea-going commitment would be increased sixteen ships, requiring 147 officers and 1,734 men. The west coast increase during the same period was only six ships, two frigates and four minesweepers, requiring 36 officers and 370 men.²³ The personnel implications were that in order to meet the demands of the new employment programme, CNP made the decision to transfer senior technicians from the west to the east coast, "on the premise that expansion and allocation of commitments could not be governed by a relatively few senior technical men."²⁴ This was considered a temporary but essential abrogation of the Home Port Division system. However, this was bound to have ramifications in wastage through men not wanting to move their families from Victoria to Halifax. Moreover, trained technicians were in high demand by west coast civilian shipyards. Given these adjustments and some reduction in the shore establishments,

Pullen believed the programme was feasible "provided that no further commitments ashore and afloat are accepted."²⁵

The navy's efforts to hold and recruit personnel to achieve the projected high rate of expansion through 1958 were meeting with mixed results. It had been hoped that pay increases and recent improvements to career advancement through extending Trade Group Four opportunities to all branches would slow the haemorrhage of trained men. However, the percentage of men refusing re-engagement remained high, approximately 48 percent through 1954.²⁶ A survey indicated that half of these said their primary reason was dislike of service conditions which included; discipline, living conditions, slowness of advancement, poor divisional work, and irregular hours.²⁷ Interestingly, some married men complained of too much seetime and some career oriented men of not enough seetime to qualify for advancement, proof the navy could not make everyone happy all the time. A further 12 percent indicated their wives were dissatisfied with service life and 14 percent cited financial reasons. The remainder simply wanted to try civilian life. Significantly, Engineering Branch personnel formed two-thirds of those not re-engaging. While 3565 men were enrolled during 1953-54, the wastage for all reasons was 2156 for a net increase of only 1409.²⁸ It was the high wastage rate rather than poor recruiting figures that had caused the navy to fail to increase at a rate necessary to make its anticipated strength of 21,000 by March 1955. It was nearly two years behind schedule.

The anticipated high growth of the fleet between 1954 and 1958 prompted the RCN to increase its recruiting efforts. And, in order to make up wastage, estimated at 5 percent for officers and 15 percent for men, the Personnel Branch calculated that 146 officers and 2719 men must be entered and trained annually.²⁹ The recruiting teams were strengthened and six mobile units added across the country to the twenty-three stations in major centres. An important recruiting goal was to meet the requirement for trained technicians where the navy

was most critically deficient. These men took nearly ten years to train to watchkeeping standard. A letter writing follow-up system to invite former trained sailors, especially technicians, to re-engage achieved moderate success. Recruiting efforts in the RN to entice trained personnel to join the RCN had resulted in some enrolments including twelve trained technicians. The RN, however, even with the advantage of conscription and slower rate of expansion, was suffering from the same shortage of technicians. Overall, the recruiting campaign for new entries achieved good results to the point where the popular trades were full by May 1955. This enabled the Commanding Officer of *Cornwallis* to be more selective and to weed out trainees showing poor potential. However, the recruiting programme was based on achieving a strength of 21,000. Seasonal variations, unanticipated failure rates and discharges produced an uneven flow of trained men into the fleet that could be balanced only over time. The action of the Deputy Minister in reducing the RCN's total strength to 20,000 disrupted the system. For example, training for junior ratings in all the naval aviation trades had to be halted when the navy was about to receive significant numbers of new aircraft.

There were major initiatives introduced in early 1954, to streamline new entry training and address the requirement for men of the seaman trades to have more technical training before they joined the fleet. The new entry programme at *Cornwallis* was re-designed to give new entries two weeks sea training during their regular twenty-week basic course.³⁰ A frigate, HMCS *Buckingham*, was attached permanently to the establishment for that purpose. All new Seaman Branch recruits were to be trained to Trade Group One in their technical specialization before going to sea so that there would be no non-effective seamen in ships.³¹ On the other hand, men of the Electrical Branch were to be sent directly to sea to obtain Trade Group One through on-the-job training (OJT) and men of the Engineering Branch were to obtain six months experience at sea before their basic Trade Group One course ashore. These improvements were

designed to reduce the number of drafts to and from ships as well as tailoring training and experience to meet requirements of different trades. It also reduced the demand for ship resources for non-substantive (trade) training which would allow more operational training and availability. This also obviated the use of the cruiser *Quebec* for non-substantive training.

The reordering of new entry training and associated staff discussions pertaining to the disposal of *Quebec* rekindled the "big ship" navy debate. As neither cruiser was to be modernized, this prompted a recommendation to the Minister that they both be decommissioned at the outbreak of hostilities in order to man the planned Vancouver class frigates.³² Captain King, DNPO, had already declared himself as a "big ship" navy proponent as well as making his opposition to the RCN's ASW specialization known. He had also recommended that a cruiser be sent to relieve the three destroyers in Korea. He was joined in opposition by Captain Harold Groos (elder brother of David Groos), DCNP, and the formidable Rear-Admiral Hugh Francis Pullen, CNP. Pullen was a traditionalist, arch-conservative and a Gunnery Officer, whose centre of the universe was the parade ground at HMS *Excellent*, the Gunnery School of the Royal Navy.³³ Known as "Von Pullen" by his contemporaries, he was also a thorough professional which helped ameliorate his reputation as a martinet.³⁴ After his appointment as CNP, he flew his flag on both coasts where he presided over a long succession of grand ceremonial occasions and parades. During his period of prominence, sailors often referred to the RCN as "The Royal Ceremonial Navy".

Pullen's appointment as CNP followed a familiar pattern. He had little experience at NSHQ, but in keeping with the RCN's custom, he was appointed directly into a top management position when he was promoted Rear-Admiral. Pullen was not only in favour of keeping the cruisers but modernizing them and was clearly against restricting the RCN to a purely ASW role. He admonished the VCNS with Mahanian rhetoric, "If the Service and the country are to grow up together we must be strong at sea, not only in numbers but in bigger

ships."³⁵ The debate persisted until after Pullen left NSHQ in April 1955, and the Naval Board finally conceded that it had no alternative but to decommission *Quebec* in order to provide sufficient trained personnel to man *Bonaventure*.³⁶ Pullen's opposition to approved policy speaks to the identity crisis that lingered below the surface. It also suggests a lack of staff cohesion, for his open criticism was inappropriate given his position. While Naval Board members and staff should debate policy while it is being developed, once it has been approved they are expected to implement it and maintain the aim. The cruiser debate was based on emotion and its divisiveness created uncertainty as to the aim of naval policy. This points to no firm hand on the helm at NSHQ

There had been little question as to the direction of government defence policy while Brooke Claxton was Minister of National Defence, although the new policy of restraint raised some concerns. Claxton, who believed that a proactive defence policy in the face of the Soviet threat was an important expression of Canada's national identity, announced his retirement in June, 1954.³⁷ He had overseen the rearmament of the armed forces and implemented a programme of integration that was reordering the management structure of the defence department, one that would continue long after his departure. He originated a process whereby developing estimates became an integrated ongoing exercise with all services using the same formula and timetable. During this process, "Chiefs of Staff were expected to exercise close supervision with a view to the utmost economy."³⁸ His introduction of a common integrated rank and trade structure had profound effects on the organization and training of non-commissioned ranks. It was largely his initiatives that locked Canada into an alliance strategy of the provision of forces to NATO, in deference to an independent national strategy, which became the cornerstone of defence policy until the end of the Cold War. The centre-piece of Claxton's new creation was the officer development programme based on the three Canadian

Service Colleges (CSC). Claxton said that during his eight years as MND he spent, "more attention on this...than almost any other subject."³⁹

It is difficult to gauge the impact Claxton had on the naval hierarchy. His reorganization through the National Defence Act of 1950, had strengthened the independent position of the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Naval Board. On the other hand, the development of fiscal policy, rank and trade structure and personnel complements was brought under the strict scrutiny of the Deputy Minister. The impact of the Mainguy Report, that he commissioned, was really more psychological than actual. The practical result was a rehabilitation of the divisional system and the establishment of the leadership course at *Cornwallis* attended by 120 officers and 160 Chiefs and Petty Officers annually. More importantly, there was a marked change of attitude and senior officers like DeWolf and Storrs, representing both the pre and postwar groups, would agree that the Mainguy Report marks the beginning of the emergence of a true Canadian identity. However, influence of the RN remained strong, particularly with respect to officer structure and professional training, and liaison between the Naval Board and Admiralty remained remarkably close.⁴⁰ This had resulted, for example, in the submarine exchange agreement whereby the RN would station three submarines, the Sixth Submarine Squadron (SM6), in Halifax to provide submarine services for ASW training. In return, the RCN would provide ten officers and 168 men for service in RN submarines.⁴¹

Claxton made an effort to get to know the navy but never really understood it. Claxton's mind, like most Canadians, followed a continental bent. He thought the use of naval terms ashore, a trait common to all seafaring men, archaic rather than the expression of a culture whose speech reflected its natural environment. The naval hierarchy, he believed, was out of touch with Canadian society and many senior officers opposed government policy.

Nelson Lay, despite being Mackenzie King's nephew, and Ken Adams had their promotion to rear-admiral jammed by Claxton. In Lay's case, Claxton asked for an opinion on his tri-service officer education scheme and did not like what he heard. Always sensitive to criticism, he seems to have taken very personally Lay's characteristically undiplomatic response. Charles Dillon called Lay "the most tactless man in the world" and this trait landed him forever on the Minister's bad side.⁴² Claxton wrote later that he had told Mainguy, "no doubt on the day I left CNS would be on Ralph Campney's doorstep with requests for their promotion to flag rank. I made it plain that one of the advantages of my going was that if I had any prejudices over such matters as these appointments, he would be free to see that justice was done."⁴³ Mainguy did just that and both promotions were approved. Claxton believed rightly that the Mainguy Report was a key element in his policy of achieving modernization and "Canadianization" of the navy. But he had been reticent to acknowledge that unsatisfactory conditions of service and poor pay owing to government parsimony and pure neglect were among the root causes of the RCN's morale problems in the first instance.

Claxton's successor, Ralph Campney, was first elected to parliament in 1949.⁴⁴ Campney served in the Royal Flying Corps during the First World War then completed his degree at Queen's University and later studied law at Osgoode Hall. An exceptional scholar, he was among the group of new style bureaucrats recruited into External Affairs by Dr. Skelton during the 1920's. He was appointed as the secretary to the Canadian delegation at the League of Nations in 1924, and later became Mackenzie King's political secretary in 1926. Campney entered private practice in 1929, and built up a very successful law firm in Vancouver. His association with Mackenzie King brought him the appointment as first Chairman of the National Harbours Board in 1936. After his election to parliament, he served as Claxton's parliamentary assistant and then as Solicitor General before being appointed Associate Minister

of National Defence in 1953. Important experience that prepared him to be MND was his chairmanship of the parliamentary committee that dealt with the National Defence Act of 1950, which introduced integration into the defence department. Campney brought a sound knowledge of administration to the post but lacked the vision and energy of Claxton. He inherited Claxton's plan and model and he saw his role as setting up the department for the "long haul" of maintaining NATO commitments as economically as possible.⁴⁵ The strategic climate was changing and he would have to implement adjustments on account of NATO adopting the "New Look" strategy and plan, entitled MC 48, that shifted dependence to nuclear weapons for deterring aggression and downgraded the importance of conventional forces.

Almost coincidental with Claxton's departure was the inauguration of the Venture Plan designed to meet the RCN's shortfall in production of officers which stood at 100 a year.⁴⁶ "Venture" commenced in September 1954 with an intake of 150 cadets. Candidates for Venture had to meet the same standards as those for ROTP except the educational level was junior matriculation. Eventually, candidates for both plans were processed through the tri-service screening unit at RCAF Base Centralia that also did pilot aptitude testing. An effort was made to enrol completely bilingual Francophones. Under an agreement with the Belgian navy, Venture would train up to four English-speaking cadets each year. These Belgian officers subsequently trained in RCN minesweepers before returning to their navy. Venture was ostensibly a bridging mechanism but the RCN dedicated an impressive array of resources to setting up the plan including the cruiser *Ontario* as its training ship and a sailing ketch, HMCS *Oriole*, as a tender. Captain Bob Welland, a highly successful destroyer commander with strong RN inclinations, was given command.⁴⁷ On his staff were ten officers including two commanders.⁴⁸

In many respects, HMCS *Venture* represented the re-establishment of the independent naval college that Claxton had opposed. The influence Rear-Admiral Pullen, CNP, had on its form and structure was evident. Himself a product of RNCC, Pullen had been an ardent proponent of Commander Nixon's doctrine, "To be a an officer you must be a seaman and to be a good officer you must be a gentleman."⁴⁹ *Venture's* professional curriculum and emphasis on customs, traditions and ceremonial reflected the influence of the former RNCC and RCNC "Royal Roads".⁵⁰ Pullen took the name "Venture" from the sail training vessel attached to the RNCC from 1911 to 1917 and given again to a schooner that was in the service of the RCN prior to World War II.⁵¹ From their first day "onboard", cadets were compelled to learn the language Claxton called "quaint", walls became "bulkheads", floors "decks" and beds "bunks". Parade ground drill and sailing were considered equally important. The divisional system was taught as sacrosanct and formed the basis for the cadet organization.⁵² The four cadet divisions were named Stephens, Reid, Grant and Brodeur, after former RCN admirals.⁵³ *Venture* cadets wore naval officers' uniform, with traditional white lanyards for juniors. Their walking-out rig, or "plain clothes", consisted of the naval officers' blue blazers and grey flannel trousers, complete with trilby hats.

The interesting aspect of "Venture" training was the indoctrination of cadets into the manners and forms of the unique culture of the naval officer. These had been ingrained in Rear-Admiral Pullen as a cadet in the 1920's, but these practices were disappearing in the postwar Canadian society and they were foreign to most enrollees.. Following the precedent of the United States Naval Academy, Captain Welland wrote a primer on manners. *Neptune's Notes* was designed to provide advice, cadets were instructed "to help smooth your way into circles that you might not have entered before."⁵⁴ A considerable amount of space in *Neptune's Notes* was devoted to conduct and social activities ashore and afloat. Welland suggested that some cadets

might now find some of his advice "nonsense". His justification advanced this view of his generation of naval officers on trends in Canadian society:

Some of the points I have covered may seem old-fashioned to you and you may think they are out-of-date that they need not be taken seriously. Let me stress that in this day and age, there may be many aspects of a Naval Officer's life that may seem, at first to be out-of-date, but with experience you will find that it is not necessarily the Navy which is out-of-date. The sense of values of the community may require looking into...Men of the Navy, both Officers and Enlisted Men, are trained to face life with a strong sense of duty, decency and fair play.⁵⁵

Welland may have been speaking not so much of the values of a unique culture outside Canadian society as about the exacting demands of a profession that required complete dedication. The Nelsonian dictum of "Duty above every personal consideration" still prevailed in the value system of the naval officer corps. That being said, Venture cadets had to pass a "gentleman" examination as part of an assessment for "officer like qualities" or were dismissed.⁵⁶

The RCN hoped for some respite from its manning and personnel resource problems when the Korean commitment was reduced to one destroyer in November 1954. The value of the Korean experience was a matter of debate. Canada wanted to demonstrate support of the United Nations and the RCN was first in the field.⁵⁷ However the commitment of three destroyers was huge and probably dragged on longer than it should after the truce. The necessity of maintaining what amounted to five destroyers, including the reliefs and standby, at full war complement had greatly hampered the training effort required for the navy to attain expansion targets. Rear-Admiral Storrs, who did not serve in Korea, saw it as a "side show" that was distant and detracted from the strategic mission of the RCN.⁵⁸ It had affected adversely the east coast build-up for NATO and formation of operational groups. The lack of a sufficient critical number of units also prevented the introduction of annual cycles for ships as well as the conduct of more advanced group exercises to improve operational efficiency.

To some who served in Korea, such as Rear-Admirals Landymore and Charles, the twenty-one individual deployments involving eight Canadian destroyers and over 3,500 officers and men established the professional foundation of the postwar navy that could only be achieved through stable ship's companies and continuous seetime.⁵⁹ Commander Dan Hanington noted a great improvement in leadership by both officers and senior rates and increased trade knowledge when he took command of *Iroquois* in 1955, after being away from the fleet since 1949.⁶⁰ Canadian sailors had acquitted themselves well, measured by the fifty-three British and nine American awards for gallantry. These included the DSO by Captain Jeffrey Brock, and OBE's by Captains William Landymore and James Plomer and Commander John Reed. Commander Edward Madgwick received the highest American decoration awarded, the Legion of Merit in the Degree of Commander.⁶¹ The Korea experience also reinforced the new relationship developing between the RCN and USN. All material support for the Canadian destroyers was provided through the USN Supply System that demonstrated its superiority over the RN model. Canadian ships drew their food rations from both sources and the American was considered far superior. However, the Canadians, as Marc Milner observed, worked comfortably in both USN and RN command formations, "silent testimony, perhaps, to the RCN's middle course between the two systems."⁶² This good rapport had ramifications for the RCN's position in the NATO alliance where important tripartite Canada - United Kingdom - United States (CANUKUS) sharing arrangements in the critical areas of communications and intelligence were taking shape.⁶³

The reduction of the Korean commitment did produce some long sought for relief to the resource problem and permitted staff discussions and planning for both the operational organization and future disposition of the fleet to proceed. Rear-Admiral Bidwell, FOAC, had been "fired with the idea of reorganizing the ships at our disposal into something approaching

the escort groups of war-time days" but had been prevented from doing so because Korea was absorbing all his destroyers.⁶⁴ He had been able to scratch together enough ships, the converted destroyer *Algonquin* and three frigates, to form the First Escort Group in early 1954. The return of the Korean destroyers and pending commissioning of the new destroyer escorts and converted frigates prompted Bidwell to propose the formation, early in 1955, of the First Canadian Carrier Support Squadron of *Magnificent* and four destroyers.⁶⁵ He also recommended to NSHQ the establishment of a Commodore position to command it. This was in addition to establishment of a Flag Officer at sea to command the fleet. Bidwell wore two hats, one as the national commander and one as a sub-area commander under SACLANT, and believed this justified the requirement. His fleet organization proposal was supported by NSHQ but judgement was reserved on his ambitious plans for creating two new flag positions.⁶⁶

The Naval Staff, commenting that "In the past few years our ship's movements have often been dictated by sheer expediency", shared FOAC's enthusiasm.⁶⁷ They were keen to introduce fixed annual cycles for operational ships in order to schedule regular weapons training, squadron exercises and fleet and NATO exercises as well as leave and maintenance periods. Captain King, DNPO, agreed that annual cycles were always desirable but "Unfortunately, ever since the end of the Second World War, the Fleet, necessarily, had existed on a hand to mouth basis."⁶⁸ King began planning but without due consultation with Bidwell, FOAC, who believed devising annual cycles fell within his responsibility in accordance with NSHQ's policy of decentralization.⁶⁹ FOAC subtly drew this to the attention of ACNS (Plans) in a personal letter, suggesting that broad policy was the purview of NSHQ but responsibility for detailed planning of ship's employment was his. Bidwell pressed for better consultation because, as he told Commodore Raymond, "we have had several baring matches in the past which I would like to see eliminated, as we are pulling in the same boat. Excuse the mixed

metaphors."⁷⁰ He was drawing the line between himself as an operational commander and NSHQ's responsibility for administration. The RCN had expanded to the point where the commands functioned as independent operational entities, particularly with respect to their extra-national alliance responsibilities. NSHQ was not an operational headquarters and had to acknowledge this fact.

The Chief of Naval Personnel brought the ship employment planners smartly back to reality in December 1954, with the advisory that the programme for 1955, could not be followed owing to a shortage of key engineering personnel. This was the consequence in part of new but essential commitments, such as the 178 personnel for the submarine exchange, being undertaken. While the east coast had been making gains in engineering watchkeepers and sixty additional qualified men would be added by the end of the year, a net shortage of twenty-four would remain. There was also a critical shortage of electricians. This could be made up by borrowing from the Esquimalt depot but would leave the west coast short. Pullen warned the planners that "The 1955 commitments will stretch the engineering departments to the limit and that no further commitments should be undertaken until mid-1956."⁷¹ He suggested decommissioning a frigate. Captain King's warning of the difficulty of achieving the "formidable programme" was accurate. The operational planners were overly optimistic that the reduced Korean commitment would provide some flexibility. Naval Service Headquarters signalled the fleet at the end of December 1954, revising the employment programme. Flag Officers were advised that the revised programme was the only one feasible, "owing to the acute engine room manning situation."⁷² One frigate would be decommissioned and another would relieve the destroyer in Korea to save on personnel. In spite of having achieved the largest expansion in personnel in a single year since the war, the RCN still had to "live from hand to mouth" because of the shortage of trained men.

The NATO Council met for its annual review in December 1954, and important decisions with respect to alliance strategy were taken. The NATO Council adopted the "New Look" strategy that had been embraced by the Eisenhower administration wherein greater reliance was to be placed on nuclear weapons to deter aggression. The consequence of the "New Look" strategy, that was articulated in the NATO planning document MC 48, was to downgrade the strategic importance of conventional forces. Conventional forces were expensive and NATO could not match the Warsaw Pact's preponderance in manpower. The new Minister of Defence reported to parliament that now the task of NATO members was to find the correct balance between conventional and nuclear forces and that Canada would make appropriate adjustments in her defence programme.⁷³ He stressed the importance of Canada's role in protecting the industrial potential of North America and the United States Strategic Air Force nuclear deterrent capability in cooperation with the Americans. This meant the provision of early warning radar systems and air defence (the RCAF) would receive priority. He also stated that the challenge over "the long haul" was to maintain adequate defence capabilities balanced against other financial priorities of the government which translated into achieving higher quality in defence capabilities at less expenditure. Simply stated, the defence department was to achieve "more bang for the buck".

After a brief respite, an environment of financial stringency returned to engulf the Department of National Defence and shroud it in uncertainty. It was anticipated that there would be no increase in the 1956-57 estimates over the previous year. However, the 1955-56 figures indicated an upward trend in personnel and operating costs as a percentage of the total budget which suggested less funds available in future for capital programmes. Campney told the Chiefs of Staff to sharpen their pencils when developing their estimates and directed them to exercise "economies in defence procurement."⁷⁴ He also issued instructions that requirements in

their fiscal programmes be prioritized in the order of the importance of forces necessary to meet D-Day commitments for NATO.⁷⁵ The individual service chiefs were to justify the insertion of a new item in the estimates, or change of priority from the previous fiscal year, in consultation with the Deputy Minister and the Chiefs of Staff. If a new item was added then an existing one must be deleted. The Minister was the final arbitrator. It is clear from Colonel Raymont's description that the new Minister's instructions with respect to development and submission of the estimates were precise and that the service chiefs were expected to exercise particular oversight of their staffs in their preparation. Given Vice-Admiral Mainguy's dislike of staff work, this would prove to be his undoing.

The "New Look" strategy and MC 48 introduced new factors and imperatives that affected every area of naval planning and were imposed at a time that the RCN was extremely hard pressed just to meet its original NATO commitments. It was evident that thinking was now governed by a "forces-in-being" concept because a surprise enemy nuclear strike would cripple mobilization efforts. The war would have to be fought with forces existing on D-Day and this rendered, for example, mobilization plans and reserve forces redundant. Moreover, the emphasis in naval strategy for defence of Canada and North America shifted to "Seaward Defence" to defeat aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and missile-firing submarines.⁷⁶ The RCN's current plans were based on the parameter of 21,000 personnel, temporarily capped at 20,000. Commitments to SACLANT (NATO) and CUSRPG (North American defence) were ninety-one ships and two squadrons of aircraft.⁷⁷ Current plans for the 21,000 regular force navy meant that the RCN could actually man only fifty-eight warships, this force included the fourteen St. Laurents under construction. Additionally, all these ships were manned only to SACLANT minimum peacetime standards and the availability of a trained reserve force was needed to bring them up to wartime strength. At this juncture, unless the government was

prepared to raise the navy's manpower ceiling, further expansion to meet agreed commitments would be impossible. The Naval Staff turned their attention to the task of developing a "Seaward Defence" plan to meet the altered strategic circumstances.

The Naval Board was already faced with the task of scaling back commitments to meet the 20,000 manpower ceiling and preparing arguments to justify again the 21,000 figure. However, no sufficiently detailed and agreed plan existed for all RCN commitments and certainly nothing that would satisfy the exacting requirements of the estimates development and review processes. Commodore Rayner, Assistant to the CNS, was tasked to prepare a peacetime manning - operational plan to meet all commitments based on the 20,000 ceiling.⁷⁸ Rayner submitted his report to the Naval Board in May 1955.⁷⁹ He projected all the RCN's commitments, ashore and afloat, to 31 March 1960. The afloat component was based on NATO requirements for D-Day + 30 and included fleet support auxiliaries. The complements used were those in the 1955-56 rank structure submission. One interesting new commitment was for a helicopter carrier and two helicopter squadrons. This showed Rayner's coordination with Commodore Raymond, ACNS (Plans), and the work of the Seaward Defence Committee.⁸⁰

Rayner concluded that the RCN could not meet its present commitments within the 20,000 ceiling and the minimum required was 20,698 officers and men.⁸¹ The number to man the fleet "for full peace-time efficiency" should be 10,782, 808 officers 9,974 men. But Rayner suggested that "As a last resort this might be reduced by 650 and the resultant loss of efficiency might be acceptable".⁸² This was an action that he considered preferable to decommissioning ships. His recommendations would result in a sea/shore ratio of 32 percent of officers and 66 percent of men afloat.⁸³ Reductions in shore establishments could result in a saving of 11 officers and 105 men.⁸⁴ Rayner suggested a reserve force strength of 7,500. He also concluded that the complementing process was sound and that the target strength could be achieved by

1960, assuming a re-engagement rate of 51 percent being constant. Rayner's final recommendation was for a rank structure study to develop a long term career plan for officers and men in every branch based on the commitments established. Approval by the Naval Board of the Rayner Report's recommendations provided a commitment blueprint on which to base complementing figures and a definite goal to achieve by 1960.

The report submitted to the Naval Board by Commodore Raymond on Seaward Defence nicely complemented Rayner's report.⁸⁵ The key recommendation was that the RCN should, "continue to fulfil our existing NATO commitments. This is announced government policy."⁸⁶ The second was to build a chain of shore-based LOFAR (Low Frequency Acoustic Ranging) stations for detection of submarines and develop offensive mobile forces to prosecute contacts off the Canadian coast.⁸⁷ Mobile forces recommended included a further seven St. Laurent Class ships and helicopters. A helicopter carrier was to form a separate proposal. Raymond, strongly supported by VCNS, argued that the Vancouver class, planned to replace the *Prestonian* Class frigates, was unfit for the LOFAR support role because of limitations in speed, armament and electronic installations. Raymond recommended cancelling the programme. Certainly when compared to the St. Laurent class, Vancouver frigates were inferior with a top speed of only 24 knots (4 knots slower), noisier diesel propulsion, and less capable sensors and weapons. Mainguy was initially swayed by Rear-Admiral Knowlton, CNTS, who argued that there was a continuing requirement for that class for which plans had been drawn and some machinery ordered.⁸⁸ When Lay subsequently revisited the issue, Mainguy deferred this time to indisputable logic and the programme was scrapped.⁸⁹ Mainguy appears to have had difficulty assimilating complex briefings and vacillated on decisions.

The Seaward Defence Plan, bearing all the marks of Nelson Lay, produced a revision to RCN policy that was the only course open under the circumstances. The NATO commitment

would continue which was the most effective lever the RCN could use to maintain its construction programme and retain budget share. Added to the existing anti-submarine and anti-air escort roles for ships were LOFAR support and radar picket. The St. Laurent Class represented the minimum capability now required in any ocean escort. The navy moved toward acquiring ASW helicopters and studies began that eventually resulted in the marriage of helicopter and destroyer. Staff requirements and designs studies were initiated for a fast, rapid-reaction ship that produced the hydrofoil programme. Finally, studies into the maritime command and control organization, that would eventually settle the ongoing debate over the control of RCAF long-range ASW aircraft in the navy's favour, were initiated. The basic composition of the RCN as a small ship navy devoted to ASW would not change, only new tasks were added under the revised strategy. The carrier remained key in air defence. The inherent weakness in the destroyers' anti-air warfare capability would persist but it was believed this could be improved through the eventual acquisition of short range ship-to-air (SAM) missiles.⁹⁰

Concurrent with the planning for Seaward Defence and Rayner's work on total commitments, DNPO, now Captain Bill Landymore, had proceeded from Bidwell's organizational initiatives to produce from all known commitments for ships, a plan for the composition and build-up of the RCN during the period 1956-58.⁹¹ The formations he developed would determine the organization of the fleet for administration as well as employment. Considerations included many factors such as operational capabilities, administration and technical support required within the overall framework of missions and tasks. The most critical task was non-substantive training. Landymore recommended that Canadian squadrons should be formed of ships of a similar class and that all operational squadrons should be designated as Escort Squadrons and no specific squadron be allocated to

operate with the carrier. He also recommended that all St. Laurents fitted with the 3"70 gun, which had a better anti-air capability than 3"50 fitted ships, should be allocated to the east coast. Training squadrons made up of combination of a DE and frigates, but not the cruisers, formed part of the plan. The carrier, projected second carrier, and cruisers would be independent for administration purposes. The plan was considered by PPCC where Captain Harold Groos, DCNP, noted that the minimum size of a squadron must be seven ships if the Rank Structure Committee were to give favourable consideration to a Senior Officer of Captain's rank, as the plan called for.⁹²

When the Naval Board gave approval to the plan, it decided the fleet composition which would prevail for forty years. Squadrons composed either of all St. Laurents, older converted DE's, or frigates would be formed. Squadrons on the east coast would have odd numbers and the west coast even. The Fifth Squadron would inherit the "Barber Pole Brigade" name from the Second World War and its ships paint the traditional red and white stripes around their funnels. When the Naval Board approved a new, and unique in NATO, light grey colour for ships in July 1955, this, and the bold design of the St. Laurent's, gave the Canadian fleet a look that was entirely distinctive. The fleet disposition would remain two-thirds on the east coast with the carrier and one-third west. The ratio was dictated by NATO requirements but resulted in an anomaly that Rear-Admiral Hibbard was quick to bring to the attention of the Naval Board.

In his submission on fleet composition, Rear-Admiral Hibbard, pointed out the RCN was now essentially maintaining two fleets.⁹³ There was no over-arching structure like NATO in the Pacific. Hibbard reported that while the east coast fleet was fully integrated with NATO, the west coast navy was, of necessity, developing a bi-lateral relationship toward the USN. He was obliged to coordinate and integrate his ships' programmes with that of the Commander,

U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) in order to obtain experience in large exercises and essential services such as submarines.⁹⁴ The USN Pacific Fleet was self-contained and used different tactical and exercise publications from NATO. Hibbard argued that his command should be considered an integral part of NATO and ships, particularly the new St. Laurents, and shore resources allocated accordingly. The Panama Canal provided the conduit for reinforcing the east coast when required. Hibbard's proposals came to nought because the decisions taken in 1955, simply reinforced the NATO bias. For example, because FOPC was not in the NATO command loop, he was not permitted to hold the MC 48 planning document. Consequently two distinct fleets developed within the RCN, one NATO east and one west that was essentially the Canadian squadron of the USN Pacific Fleet. This situation had been evolving informally since 1945, but was now moving toward a formal agreement. It would eventually be defined in the Canada-United States Pacific Operations Order (CANUSPACOPS) governing joint operations by maritime forces.⁹⁵ Canada would maintain this east coast biased disposition until the end of the Cold War.

During the discussions by the Naval Board of the plan for the composition and build-up of the fleet, the new CNP, Rear-Admiral Rayner, had warned that success was contingent on solving the manning problem, particularly with respect to engineering personnel. Rayner had relieved Pullen, who was appointed to relieve Hibbard as FOPC. Hibbard was retiring for health reasons and this development positioned Rayner to follow DeWolf as CNS. Unlike Pullen, Rayner had a strong staff background and was very successful as the first Coordinator of the Joint Staff in 1952. In that capacity, he also developed a strong rapport with General Foulkes.⁹⁶ Rayner's return to NSHQ helped improve staff coordination, much to the joy of Rear-Admiral Lay. By the time he had completed the commitments study, Rayner was well

versed with current personnel challenges. His first task was to consolidate the various programmes for the academic and professional training of junior officers.

Rear-Admiral Rayner had been the first Commandant of "Royal Roads" as a tri-service college. His testimony at the Mainguy Inquiry suggests a progressive attitude toward officer training as well as enthusiasm for the integrated academic training scheme.⁹⁷ This was a complete contrast to Pullen's attitude, whose last concession as CNP was to extend the opportunity to obtain a degree to some Executive Branch cadets.⁹⁸ This was an admission that a degree must be offered in order to attract the higher quality entries to the branch and not to the need for better educated officers, as the Mainguy Report had advocated. Rayner inherited work begun by Pullen to revise junior officer professional training as a result of the RN changing its programme and cancelling courses shared by the RCN. Pullen had also begun to consolidate programmes with the advent of "Venture" to ensure an equitable career progression for all junior officer trainees in their advancement to lieutenant rank. The cancellation of the RN's Junior Officer General Education and War Course by 1958, meant that all Executive Branch training at the junior level would have to be conducted in Canada. Advanced training for Engineering Officers, and some Executive Branch specialists, would continue in the United Kingdom. Pullen stipulated that, "As far as possible the existing ties with the RN in matters of officers training will be maintained."⁹⁹ Rayner's task was to begin the process of repatriating all Executive Branch training to Canada beginning with the junior officers.

Rayner submitted his new plan for the promotion and training of junior officers to the Naval Board in August 1955. He stated that both a short and a long term policy were required, the former because of the immediate need to consolidate the ROTP and Venture Plans and to set up junior officers' training in Canada by 1958. A longer term policy was needed because the "actual shape of the officer corps" was not yet known owing to the changes being wrought by

the build up of the navy which would affect methods of production. A second consideration, now evident, was that good candidates who want to obtain a degree were avoiding the Executive Branch. As a consequence, the branch that should provide the navy's leadership was not attracting the best candidates.¹⁰⁰

The key features of Rayner's plan were the marriage of the training schedules for ROTP and Venture cadets and equating of all programmes of entry to ensure equitable advancement to lieutenant. The traditional Midshipman apprentice concept of training was to be replaced and junior officers sent directly to sea thereby giving them more responsibility sooner. Rayner implied that the deficiency in large ships made this change inevitable. Opportunities for Executive Branch cadets as well as lieutenants in the fleet to obtain a degree would be expanded. Engineering, Electrical Supply and Ordnance cadets would all obtain degrees before specialist training. Finally, the importance of staff training for junior officers was acknowledged.¹⁰¹ The Naval Board approved Rayner's plan that, in spite of some rhetoric to the contrary, began the phaseout of RN influence in the development of RCN junior officers. The first graduates of "Venture" in 1956, with the exception of the Engineering Officers, would receive all their training in Canada and all ROTP graduates shortly thereafter.

The exercise of developing the estimates for 1956-57 was profoundly challenging for the staff at NSHQ. The Minister had made it clear to the Chiefs of Staff, in June 1955, "the necessity of ensuring that public funds provided for the Department of National Defence are used to provide as much real defence as possible."¹⁰² He had already laid down the rules for prioritization of funding essential projects. The new Deputy Minister, Frank Miller, the former Vice Chief of the Air Staff and now a civilian, had followed up with a paper on "cost-consciousness" to those within the individual services responsible for developing the budget estimates.¹⁰³ In the case of the navy this was the VCNS, but the CNS was under increasing

pressure to create a position of Naval Comptroller to bring the navy in line with the other two services.¹⁰⁴ The Naval Staff was in the process of developing justifications for reinstating the 21,000 manpower ceiling and new programmes demanded by requirements for Seaward Defence when the Naval Board was advised that the Minister had reduced the navy's preliminary estimates for 1956-57 from \$418,000,000 to \$303,000,000.¹⁰⁵ The other services received proportionate reductions.

The navy's preliminary estimates had contained what was obviously an overly optimistic and unacceptable increase of approximately 25 percent over the 1955-56 appropriation. The Policy and Project Coordination Committee (PPCC) reviewed the original submission and came up with a revised estimate of \$338,000,000 approximating the navy's actual expenditure for the previous fiscal year. The Naval Board pared this down again to \$330,700,000.¹⁰⁶ The eventual cabinet approved appropriation was \$325,000,000, up slightly from the 1955-56 figure of \$323,318,000. Of more concern was the forecast for the future where large expenditures for ship and aircraft replacement were tentatively scheduled, principally during the period 1960-64. The Naval Board Minutes noted "It was obvious, because of the radically reduced appropriation for 1956-57, and the restricting trend of national defence budgets generally, that much difficulty would be experienced in attempting to obtain moneys for these peak years."¹⁰⁷ The government had sent a strong signal.

Not the least fallout from this difficult budgetary exercise was the replacement of the CNS, Vice-Admiral Mainguy. His early retirement on 16 January 1956, and relief by Rear-Admiral DeWolf, was announced by Campney on 20 September 1955.¹⁰⁸ Mainguy had expected to stay on as CNS until May 1956, which would have been his normal retirement date.¹⁰⁹ The first indication Vice-Admiral DeWolf in Washington had was an unexpected telephone call from Campney who advised him that he would relieve Mainguy early.¹¹⁰

Mainguy was in fact being fired. The issue that precipitated his firing by Campney was an error in the navy's estimates submission pertaining to cost accounting procedures related to incremental funding. It appears that Mainguy failed to act on Campney's personal direction resulting from the previous submission that the navy must absorb costs for additional personnel expenditures from other programmes and not ask for a funding increase. The CNS did not pass the Minister's direction on to the staff and the error was repeated in the subsequent submission which Mainguy had failed to review.¹¹¹ It is doubtful that Campney acted impulsively but rather as a result of a pattern of performance below his expectations in which this constituted "the last straw". Mainguy was notorious for his administrative laxity and was predisposed to delegating everything without supervising. Claxton stated that Mainguy disliked staff work and most aspects of his job as CNS and concluded that "He was happy *to be relieved*[author's italics]."¹¹² The problem for the navy was that Mainguy, who had not been particularly effective in fighting the RCN's battles, was now a lame duck. It would be left for Rear-Admiral Lay to defend the RCN's commitment strategy to NATO, and particularly the naval aviation programme, when the revised estimates were taken before the Estimate Review Committee in November 1955.

The preliminary round for that encounter was a prior briefing to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on a "New Look" for the RCN that outlined strategic adjustments required as a result of MC 48.¹¹³ The CNS opened the briefing that described the maritime warfare scenario based on the new strategic circumstances as they affected Canada, and defences planned in conjunction with NATO and the United States. The navy presented its revised requirements for ASW and AAW in the escort role and the new Seaward Defence strategy and additional resources it required. All requirements combined included an additional twenty-six St. Laurent Class DDE's to replace the older DE's and frigates that would be obsolete by 1960.¹¹⁴ The naval

aviation requirements included 122 CS2F ASW aircraft (reduced from 242), a new fighter to replace the Banshee and an ASW helicopter. The Naval Staff took the opportunity to highlight the current personnel problem and stated that to meet existing commitments, now made more urgent in light of the new strategy, the RCN must be permitted to recruit to a ceiling of 21,330, an increase of 1330 over two years.

Essentially, the RCN was arguing that it had to become more than a basic ASW navy to meet an expanded role that now included defending land targets against missile-firing submarines and bombers. However, the briefing stressed numbers and not capability and no increase in personnel requirements was indicated. The thrust of the questions and comments by members suggested that they were uncomfortable with a strategic requirement expressed numerically to meet NATO force goals instead of a national force created to accomplish a particular purpose. How could force effectiveness be expressed in other than just numerical requirements for a building programme? There was also a general uncertainty evident as to the future of aircraft carriers given the nuclear threat at sea. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshall Slemon, was strongly critical of, if not blatantly hostile to, the whole concept of naval aviation for the RCN. His hostility stemmed in part from the RCN's claim for operational control of RCAF maritime patrol aircraft that was also currently being debated. The employment of RCN aircraft in the Seaward Defence role strengthened the navy's argument. A strong counter-attack by Mainguy at this point might have stilled critics of naval aviation as Grant had done. This did not happen and naval aviation was now vulnerable.

The stage was now set for the navy's appearance before the Estimates Review Committee. The session was more of an inquisition. Rear-Admiral Lay, who led the navy's briefing team, reported to CNS a penetrating probe by General Foulkes, CCSC, who observed that "the RCN's contribution to NATO had not been based on any particular plan, but rather on

the actual number of ships which were currently available, i.e., 42 ocean escorts."¹¹⁵ He could see no reason why replacement with larger, more capable ships [St. Laurents] should not result in a numerical reduction in the allocation to SACLANT. Naval aviation was subjected to a renewed attack and Lay noted, "The whole RCN Naval Aviation Programme was quite obviously under fire."¹¹⁶ Foulkes' major criticism was that 237 aircraft were required by the navy to support 21 aircraft in the carrier. Mr. Golden, of the Treasury Board, observed that the initial programme of 100 CS2F ASW aircraft was "a luxurious total to support two RCN Squadrons of 12 aircraft" and had been agreed to by the Cabinet Defence Committee only because this was the minimum which could be economically manufactured in Canada.¹¹⁷ The need for training and utility squadrons on the west coast was queried because the RCAF could provide the services required. Foulkes concluded the briefing by stating that all three services were under close scrutiny to ensure "the best possible defence was being provided for the dollars available. It appeared that Naval Aviation, which was using nearly a third of the funds available to the RCN and was only providing one aircraft carrier and its two Squadrons, must be subject to considerable criticism."¹¹⁸ The navy survived this examination with its policies in question but still intact. However, the future of funding for naval aviation, perceived as an insatiable but inefficient consumer of scarce resources, was uncertain.

The one bright spot at the end, and possibly the highlight, of Vice-Admiral Mainguy's tenure as CNS was the commissioning of HMCS *St. Laurent* on 29 October 1955. The "Sally" was the first wholly Canadian designed and built warship. It was an event of such national significance as to merit attendance by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. Predictably, someone asked St. Laurent how it felt to have a ship named after him.¹¹⁹ The *St. Laurent* was a prototype, a blend of British, American and Canadian technology.¹²⁰ Rear-Admiral Jack Knowlton, CNTS, called *St. Laurent* "the most up-to-date anti-submarine vessel in the world."¹²¹

Knowlton had guided the project through from concept in 1948 to commissioning of first of class in 1955 and would soon retire. The look of *St. Laurent*, with her flared rounded bow, conical mast, streamlined funnel and low superstructure, was unique and readily identifiable. She was designed for the Canadian weather and to shed ice. In many ways she resembled the submarines she was designed specifically to fight. Aluminium was used extensively in the construction to cut top weight. She was insulated and air conditioned for comfort and many innovations such as individual bunks, larger lockers, cafeteria style messing and a ship's laundry were included for reasons of morale and fighting effectiveness.¹²² There was a "pre-wetting" system to wash off nuclear fallout. The new class, nick-named the "Cadillacs", became the trademark of the RCN and represented a coming of age in many ways. However, the strategic climate was rapidly changing through advancing technology. *St. Laurent* would encounter the nuclear-powered USS *Nautilus* during her workups. Her first Commanding Officer, Commander (later Rear-Admiral) Bob Timbrell, recognized her shortcomings against new high-speed submarines of unlimited endurance and the need for an embarked ASW helicopter.¹²³

With the 1956-57 estimates hurdle behind them, the Naval Staff could focus its attention on a reappraisal of the RCN's war plans. These revised plans were to be based upon the MC 48 concept which envisioned a future war involving NATO taking place in two distinct phases. Phase I would be a nuclear exchange and Phase II a period of readjustment and follow up by surviving forces leading to the completion of the war.¹²⁴ The MC 48 concept rendered existing mobilization plans obsolete and demanded new principles for determining fleet composition and manning. The first principle was the need for the "fleet in being" to contribute to the overall deterrent. Therefore, it was important to have in commission as many effective ships in the fleet as possible no matter how reduced the scale of manning. Undermanned ships

could be reinforced by emptying shore establishments. However, the fleet should include a small number of fully manned and operational ships that could participate promptly in small wars. The Naval Board approved developing plans for manning and fleet composition based on the new principles.¹²⁵ This "come-as-you-are" war concept negated the requirement for a large reserve organization and the future role of the RCN(R) and its optimum size and composition were to be reviewed.

The fact was that shortages in the Engineering Branch had already compelled the RCN to man many ships below "the lowest acceptable degree of efficiency."¹²⁶ In mid-1955, the Engineer-in-Chief had lowered the minimum standard for ships' engineering complements previously set by DNOrg. Even this reduced minimum manning scale could not be met. The navy faced the crunch of having to man *Bonaventure* and four new St. Laurents by mid-1956, and the shortage of engineering personnel continued to drive the whole programme. Complicating issues were that *Bonaventure's* personnel had to be trained on large ship engineering systems and *Magnificent* had to be kept in commission to ferry personnel, aircraft and stores to *Bonaventure*. While the navy harboured hopes of retaining *Magnificent* and *Quebec*, the situation was tenuous. *Quebec* had to pay off in April 1956, for refit and her engineering personnel transferred to *Bonaventure*. In October, FOAC asked NSHQ to decommission *Quebec* early because the manning situation had worsened. Emergency measures originated by NSHQ averted the immediate crisis. When the Naval Staff's tried to add more to the already over-extended 1956 employment schedule, the normally restrained Bidwell stated "the RCN [NSHQ] is always trying to bite off more than it could chew."¹²⁷ Over-commitment was entrenched as an attitude and had become a systemic problem. With respect to manning the fleet, the RCN finished 1956 as it had begun, in crisis. However, CNP exhibited the

characteristic "Can-do" attitude of the RCN predicting that if they could get through the programme to April 1956, then the manning situation would improve.¹²⁸

When Vice-Admiral Rollo Mainguy was relieved by Vice-Admiral Harry DeWolf as CNS he left an uncertain legacy. He had been neither a strong nor effective champion for the RCN where it really counted, at the committee tables in Ottawa. The navy's policies on how it determined its commitment to NATO and naval aviation were in question at the highest level. Despite his known abhorrence of staff work, his succession to the highest administrative appointment in the RCN had been predetermined by the ironclad rules of seniority. As in the tradition of primogeniture for selecting a king, it was simply his turn. How well was he equipped to be CNS? When asked to compare Mainguy with Grant, Vice-Admiral DeWolf rendered the opinion:

Grant was a leader who told us where to go and what to do. Mainguy, I think, didn't know his ass from his elbow. Relied completely on his staff. If his staff said do this he would. I don't think Mainguy had any ideas of his own. He was a hell of a nice guy and a great influence on the troops [sailors]. In Newfoundland he and Bidwell had kept the troops happy under very trying conditions [during the war]. As a leader, as a man of ideas for the navy, I don't believe he had any.¹²⁹

The evidence supports the view that, as in the Mainguy Report, it was his associates who had the ideas and originated the policy initiatives. It might be argued in the case of Mainguy's time as CNS that this was the staff's job. However, it is apparent, as demonstrated by the lingering "big ship navy" debate, which flew in the face of declared government policy, and the persistent personnel crisis that both leadership and direction from the CNS were lacking. Good staff senior officers, like Lay, Raymond and Rayner, could keep the RCN going but strong leadership, energy and vision were required from the CNS for the navy to be administered efficiently and to achieve maximum effectiveness. The evidence leads to the conclusion that Mainguy failed to provide that leadership and performed ineffectively as CNS. The fault,

however, should not be found so much with Rollo Mainguy as with the system that had elevated him to a position for which he had neither the ability nor vocation. Like the unwilling "Rastus" Reid, Mainguy was obliged to take the job without wanting it.¹³⁰ As a consequence, there was drift and vacillation in the administration of the Royal Canadian Navy during a critical four year period in its postwar development.

NOTES - CHAPTER 7

1 Department of National Defence, *Canada's Defence Programme 1954-55*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954), 9.

2 Ibid.

3 Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, John English, *Canada since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 169-170.

4 DM to CNS, memo, 26 March 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 6, Complements General.

5 Raymont, "Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 187.

6 DM to CNS, memo, 26 March 1954.

7 DNPO comments, 2 April 1954, in *ibid.*

8 DNOrg comments, 1 April 1954, in *ibid.*

9 CNS to DM, memo, 1 June 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 6, Complements General.

10 DM to CNS, memo, 11 June 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 6, Complements General.

11 NBM 417-5, 1 October 1954.

12 PC 1955-73, 17 January 1955.

13 DM to Chiefs of Staff, memo, 11 February 1955, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 6, Complements General.

14 DoFP(Men) to DNOrg, memo, 11 March 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 6, Complements General.

15 ACNS(Warfare) to VCNS, memo, 14 August 1953, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 9, Operations and Plans.

16 NBM 407-2, 17 June 1954.

17 NBM 409-1, 23 July 1954.

18 NBM 425-2, 19 November 1954.

19 NBM 427-2, 1 December 1954.

20 NBM 428-3, 8 December 1954.

21 NSec to Commands, "Employment of the Fleet 1 April 54 to 31 March 55"(draft), 26 March 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 11, Operations and Plans.

22 Ibid.

23 DNPers to CNP (minute by CNP), memo, 2 April 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 10, Operations and Plans.

24 CNP address, Minutes Eleventh Senior Officers Meeting, 12-14 May 1954, NAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 5, Naval Committees-Senior Officers Meetings.

25 CNP Minute, on the draft of NSec to Commands, "Employment of the Fleet 1 April 54 to 31 March 55".

26 CNP address, Minutes Eleventh Senior Officers' Meeting, 12-14 May 1954.

27 Ibid.

28 DND, *Canada's Defence Programme 1954-55*, 23.

29 CNP to DNPO, memo, 6 July 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 6, Complements General.

30 "The Royal Canadian Navy - 1954", *Crowsnest*, vol. 7, no. 3, January 1955, 16.

31 CNP to DNPO, memo, 6 July 1954.

32 Minutes of a meeting on Prestonian Frigate Alterations and Additions, 15 February 1954, and, DNPO to DCNP, ACNS(W), memo, 13 February 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 10, Operations and Plans.

33 Pullen was a cadet in the last class of the RNCC when it closed down in 1922 and was left without a place. He served as a cadet with the Canadian Pacific Steamship Company until he could re-enter the RCN in 1922. As a member of the prewar RCN cohort, he was its most strident traditionalist and used his strong personality to ensure many of the old ways, particularly ceremonial, were preserved. He exhibited professional competency in many command positions and was knowledgeable in RCN personnel matters. However, he lacked Hibbard's experience at NSHQ and his appointment into the critical position of CNP typified the RCN's notion that a seaman officer could do any job. RAdmr. Pullen served as CNP from May 1953 to April 1955 when he again relieved Hibbard, who retired early as COPC for reasons of health.

34 Storrs interview by the author.

35 CNP to VCNS, 22 February 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 11, Operations and Plans.

36 NBM 454-1, 28 July 1955.

37 Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 206.

38 Claxton, "Autobiography".

39 Ibid.

40 Members of the Board of the Admiralty, including the First Sea Lord, Admiral McGrigor, briefed the Naval Board on three occasions during 1953 and 1954. RAdmr. Peddar briefed the Naval Board on changes to the RN officer structure and system of professional training, as a result of the Mansergh Study in October 1954. NBM 418, 5 October 1954. These necessitated the RCN first setting up professional training courses for junior officers in Canada and then prompted the study of the officer structure by RAdmr. Tisdall that resulted in adoption of a modification of the RN's new general list concept.

41 NBM 419-4, 15 October 1954 and NBM 424-3 10 November 1954. Entitled the "Heads of Agreement", the RCN was responsible for pay and allowances of its personnel serving with the RN and payment of a special bonus to RN submarine personnel serving in Canada. See also Julie H. Ferguson, *Through A Canadian Periscope*, 233-242.

42 Dillon interview by the author. Dillon had great admiration for Lay but said that he could upset the entire ship's company of *Nabob* with a few words.

43 Claxton, "Autobiography".

44 "Introducing the New Minister," *Crowsnest*, vol. 6, no. 11, September 1954, 11.

45 Department of National Defence, *Canada's Defence Programme 1955-56*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), 15.

46 NBM 389-3, 7 October 1954.

47 Captain Robert "Bob" Welland commanded destroyers in both World War II and Korea. He had been awarded the DSC&Bar, M.I.D. and Legion of Merit (USA). He was known as an exceptional ship handler. While in command of HMCS *Athabaskan*, he established the record for the fastest time in underway refuelling from a USN tanker among all the allied ships in Korea. RAdmr. Dillon included Welland with King and "Micky" Stirling as being "more RN than the RN".

48 Welland was given a high powered team including hand-picked Chiefs and Petty Officers. His commanders were Cdr. Raymond Phillips, who had been O-I-C of the Officers Divisional Course and Chiefs and Petty Officers' Leadership at *Cornwallis*, to be Executive Officer and Instructor Cdr. George Amyot, former Director of Studies at CSC St. Jean, to be Director of Studies. Captain Welland had been Director of Training at NSHQ. "The 'Venture' Plan", *Crowsnest*, vol. 6, no. 5, March 1954, 5.

49 Nova Scotia Archives, RAdmr. H.F. Pullen Papers, RNCC file, Seamanship Notebook (1920-22).

50 The author is a graduate of "Venture", Class of 1961.

51 "Brief History of HMCS Venture", "Venture" Archives. The name was near and dear to the pre-war RCN cohort as all had sailed as young men in either or both *Venture* I and II. *Venture* II was designed by W. J. Roue, designer of the *Bluenose*.

52 Venture graduates became renown for their knowledge of the divisional system and their application of it in the fleet. Executive Branch cadets also took the Leadership course at *Cornwallis* with their ten-month Junior Officer Technical and Leadership Course (JOTLC), known as the "Jolt Course", after graduation.

53 Large photographs of these admirals were hung strategically in the rotundas of the two "decks" in junior cadet block and were given a mandatory salute when passed. The reason for the choice of these names is obscure. As the names of Nelles, Jones and Murray are absent, this might suggest identification with the postwar navy.

54 Captain R.P. Welland, *Neptune's Notes*, Author's Collection, 1.

55 Ibid.

56 This informal examination formed part of a subjective assessment on leadership potential by the Commanding Officer based on recommendations from his staff. This weeding-out was normally conducted at the end of the junior term and even cadets who passed their formal academic and professional examinations could be discharged. There was no similar practice at the Canadian Service Colleges where academic performance was the primary consideration.

57 "Korean Summary" and "The Story of the RCN in Korea," *Crowsnest*, vol. 8, no. 4, February 1956, 4-7, provide a concise and accurate narrative of the RCN's Korean episode.

58 Storrs interview by the author.

59 Landymore and Charles interview by the author. Of the eight destroyers, *Athabaskan* and *Huron* served three tours while *Cayuga*, *Crusader*, *Haida*, *Iroquois*, *Nootka*, and *Sioux* served two each.

60 Cdr. Dan Hanington, "Report of Proceedings HMCS *Iroquois*", 4 October 1955, NAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, box 695, file NS-1926, DDE 217.

61 Thorgrimsson and Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters 1950-1955*, 142-143.

62 Marc Milner, "A Canadian Perspective on Canadian and American Naval Relations Since 1945," *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defence Cooperation*, ed. Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1992), 159.

63 Charles interview by the author.

64 Bidwell, *Random Memories*, 18.

65 FOAC to NSec, 1 October 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 12, Operations and Plans.

66 NSec to FOAC, 29 November 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 12, Operations and Plans.

67 DTSD to VCNS, memo, 21 October 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 12, Operations and Plans.

68 DNPO to VCNS, 4 November 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 12, Operations and Plans.

69 "The Naval Board of Canada", *Crowsnest*, vol. 6, no. 2, December 1953, 12-13. This article explains the decentralization policy of the Naval Board and the importance of co-ordination to the navy. Bidwell participated as originator of the concept while ACNS(Plans) before becoming FOAC.

70 Bidwell to Raymond, 14 December 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 12, Operations and Plans.

71 CNP to VCNS, memo, 29 December 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 12, Operations and Plans.

72 CANAVHED to CANFLAGLANT, CANFLAGPAC, message, 311441Z DEC 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 12, Operations and Plans.

73 DND, *Canada's Defence Programme 1955-56*, 3.

74 NBM 450-2, 29 June 1955.

75 Raymont, "Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 188-189.

76 NBM 431-2, 29 December 1954. The Naval Board was aware of the developing threat and the shift in strategic thinking toward developing plans to defend North America. An important anti-air component was evident as well as the need for ships and aircraft with sufficient speed, endurance, and command and control capabilities to react effectively to the new threat, particularly that anticipated from submarines surfacing to fire missiles.

77 DNPO to CNS, memo, 24 February 1955, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 6, Complements General. The breakdown was to SACLANT: 1 Light Fleet Carrier; 18 Destroyer Escorts (DDE's); 24 ocean escorts (FFE's); 1 Sqn A/S aircraft; 1 Sqn fighter aircraft; 1 Flight AEW (Air Early Warning) aircraft and to CUSRPG: 34 coastal escorts: 14 minesweepers(M/S's).

78 NBM 413-1, 8 September 1954. DNPO and DNOrg were originally given the task but a high-powered committee under Rayner was soon struck when the immensity and complexity of the task, that required considerable negotiations with the Branches, was realized.

79 Cmdre. H.S. Rayner, "Report By The Ad Hoc Committee On RCN Commitments", file 81/520/1440-5, vol. XXI, DHist.

80 The idea of retaining *Magnificent* as a helicopter carrier was floated in the "Seaward Defence" study that was yet to be approved. Rayner is effectively proposing a policy change beyond his terms of reference. Only after Rayner submitted his report does Captain Landymore(DNPO), who was on the committee, ask for comments from staff Directorates on the advisability of retaining *Magnificent* as a helicopter carrier. DNPO to Staff Directorates, memo, 16 June 1955, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 14, Operations and Plans.

81 Rayner, "Report By The Ad Hoc Committee On RCN Commitments," 1.

82 Ibid., 10. There were other possible reductions that Rayner could not forecast that might bring the requirement down to the 20,000 ceiling.

83 Ibid., 6. The sea-shore ratio established in the 1955-56 rank structure forecast was 28 percent of officers and 63 percent of men afloat.

84 NBM 471-4, 23 December 1955.

85 "Seaward Defence Report" in NBM 445-3, 25 May 1955.

86 Ibid.

87 A LOFAR station had been established at Shelbourne, Nova Scotia, in conjunction with the USN that was building a chain around North America.

88 Knowlton's purely parochial argument was that his staff had done all the design work and the machinery plants for the first five of class had been ordered. The Naval Staff argued that the design concept of the class was obsolete and did not meet the strategic requirement.

89 NBM 446-1, 1 June 1955. When essentially the same information pertaining to cancellation of the Vancouver Class was presented at a separate meeting Mainguy was convinced.

90 NBM 445-3, 25 May 1955, Appendix "A", "Relative Merits of a Vancouver and St. Laurent Building Programme".

91 DNPO, "Planned Composition of the RCN", 16 May 1954, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 13, Operations and Plans.

92 PPCC Minutes, 31 May 1955, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 14, Operations and Plans.

93 FOPC to NSec, "Role of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Pacific", 21 April 1955, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 13, Operations and Plans.

94 FOPC to NSec, 10 March 1955, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 13, Operations and Plans.

95 Canadian - United States Pacific Operations (CANUSPACOPS) was developed for the west coast under the CUSRPG umbrella. Canadian ships used USN Fleet Exercise Publications (FXP's) when exercising with American ships but NATO publications when operating together.

96 Raymont, "Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 93.

97 Rayner evidence, "Audette Papers", vol. 3, file 8.

98 NBM 441-4, 9 March 1955.

99 Ibid.

100 CNP, "Promotion and Training of Junior Officers in the Royal Canadian Navy", in *ibid.*

101 *Ibid.* The interesting point is that Rayner suggested that officers must attend the new RN Junior Officers War Course to obtain staff training as opposed to setting up this training in Canada. Both the RCAF and Canadian Army had junior officer staff courses to which the RCN began to send a few officers.

102 MND to Chiefs of Staff, 24 June 1955, quoted in NBM 450-2, 29 June 1955.

103 AVM Frank Miller retired to replace Bud Drury as DM and held the position until 1960, when he re-enrolled to replace General Charles Foulkes as Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee.

104 CNS to DM, memo, 23 June 1955, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 7, Complements General. The NCompt would have a seat on the Naval Board and would be responsible for coordinating development of both the complement and estimates. The DM envisioned NCompt would be an appointee from the Supply and Accounting Branch with a background in fiscal management and training in finance and accounting.

105 NBM 457-3, 7 September 1955.

106 DND, *Canada's Defence Programme 1955-56*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956), 49 and NBM 458-3, 14 September 1955.

107 NBM 457-3, 7 September 1955.

108 Armed Forces News Release, 393/55, 20 September 1955, VAdmr. E.R. Mainguy File, DHist.

109 RAdmr. Bidwell to RAdmr. DeWolf, 6 September 1955, NAC, MG 30 E, 509, vol. 1, "DeWolf Papers". Bidwell wrote "Rollo told me he would probably be leaving next May". Mainguy would have expected to remain as CNS and retire at age 55 which was in May 1956.

110 DeWolf interview by the author. DeWolf related that Campney originally told Mainguy to contact DeWolf to find out how long it would take him to disengage from his Washington duties. DeWolf told Mainguy 72 hours but that he expected to relieve him in May. Mainguy reported to Campney that DeWolf would be up in May and the Minister responded that he didn't get the point. DeWolf was to relieve him early. Then Campney called DeWolf and advised him of the earlier relief.

111 DeWolf interview by the author. DeWolf stated, "Campney fired Mainguy, in fact." Mainguy provided DeWolf with this account during their turnover briefing.

112 Claxton, "Autobiography".

113 "Naval Briefing for the Chiefs of Staff Committee", 26 October 1955 and record of questions and comments by COS members in NBM 463-1, 12 October 1955.

114 Ibid., 22.

115 VCNS to CNS, memo, undated, in NBM 467-4, 22 November 1955.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 RAdmr. R.W. Timbrell interview by Tony German, 2 November 1984, "Navy 75", DHist. Timbrell recalled the ship was commissioned on 21 October, "Trafalgar Day", but was mistaken.

120 Canada built the four Tribal Class destroyers using a British design and mainly British manufactured components including the power plant. The boilers and turbines for *St. Laurent* were built in the United Kingdom while Canadian industry was tooling up.

121 "A Proud Lady Puts To Sea", *Crowsnest*, vol. 8, no. 1, November 1955, 5.

122 "Farewell To The Hammock", *Crowsnest*, vol. 7, no. 5, March 1955, 5-8.

123 Timbrell interview by German.

124 NBM 469-1, 7 December 1955 and attachment, ACNS (Plans) to VCNS, "The Requirement for a Re-Appraisal of Current War Plans", 28 November 1955.

125 Ibid.

126 CNP to VCNS, memo, 22 June 1955, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 14, Operations and Plans.

127 FOAC to NSec, 31 October 1955, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 15, Operations and Plans.

128 CNP to VCNS, memo, 22 June 1955.

129 DeWolf interview by the author.

130 Dillon interview.

CHAPTER 8

A Return to Pragmatism

It is evident from the review we have made of the present personnel structure that many of the current problems of the RCN result from faulty administration and planning. We have never...stopped to take a look at our whole structure to endeavour to determine basic requirements and truths. It is easy to criticize in 'hindsight' but it appears from our investigations that the RCN should make greater use of factual studies rather than relying on day to day expedients.

Commodore E. P. Tisdall

The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
RCN Personnel Structure, June 1957.

Vice-Admiral Harry George DeWolf, CBE, DSO, DSC, CD, RCN took up his appointment as the RCN's seventh Chief of the Naval Staff on 16 January 1956. His reputation as a thorough and competent professional, based on an exceptional war record and strong performances in key staff positions, was already well established. Known as a progressive, there were few officers who understood the RCN as well as DeWolf and none, it would be shown, better equipped to lead it. He was by training, experience and ability ably suited for the role of CNS and the RCN's seniority driven system of advancement delivered him fortuitously at precisely the right moment. Brooke Claxton spoke of no officer with higher regard than Harry DeWolf.¹ Even the most ardent critics of the RCN's hierarchy, such as John Harbron, acknowledged that DeWolf stood in a distinguished class by himself.²

Harry DeWolf was born in Bedford, Nova Scotia in 1903, and enrolled as a cadet in the Royal Naval College of Canada in 1918, at the age of fifteen. His classmates included Nelson Lay, Jack Knowlton and Bill Porteous, all of whom would have an important influence on the character and shape of the postwar RCN.³ DeWolf specialized as a Navigation Officer and his career followed the established pattern until the Second World War. Described by Louis Audette, at the time of the Mainguy inquiry, as "an excellent chap,...no front, no hypocrisy", DeWolf remained his own man, proud of his Canadian and Nova Scotian heritage.⁴ While

embracing the strong professional ethic of the Royal Navy, he imitated none of its cultural characteristics. Not known as a social lion but as a good wardroom mate, he developed a passion for golf. He married Gwen Gilbert, a lady from an old Bermudan family, who shared Dewolf's interests, and aspirations for a modest lifestyle. She supported him quietly through a challenging career and remained his companion for more than sixty years of married life.

Dewolf's career rode high on the opportunities offered a talented and courageous leader by war. As Commanding Officer of HMCS *St. Laurent*(I) he shared the distinction of conducting the RCN's first gun action of the war which occurred during the evacuation of France in 1940, with Lay in *Restigouche*.⁵ He was twice Mentioned-in-Dispatches before returning to Canada to serve first as Staff Officer Operations and subsequently, Chief of Staff to Rear-Admiral Jones, COAC. DeWolf was appointed as Director of Plans at NSHQ in 1942. With Lay, who held the position of Director of Operations, DeWolf developed and executed the initiative that resulted in the establishment of an independent Canadian command in the North-West Atlantic.⁶ He served concurrently as Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Colonel Rayment commented that this experience taught DeWolf the importance of coordination between the services and cooperation with government departments that stood him in good stead later as CNS.⁷

DeWolf returned to the sea war in 1943, taking command of the new British built Tribal class destroyer, HMCS *Haida*. Under his leadership, *Haida* was to become the most famous Canadian warship of the Second World War.⁸ *Haida* was assigned to the British Home fleet. After two trips to North Russia as a convoy escort, *Haida* joined striking Force 26, which was made up of cruisers and destroyers, based at Plymouth, England. *Haida* was assigned to the 10th Destroyer Flotilla along with HMCS *Huron* (Rayner) and *Athabaskan* (Stubbs), and several RN "Tribals".⁹ As a member of "The 10th Flotilla", *Haida* recorded a series of stunning

victories. During an eight-month period in 1944, that included Normandy invasion operations, she conducted sweeps and patrols of the Bay of Biscay and the English Channel with other units of her flotilla. Enemy ships, submarines and aircraft were encountered or engaged almost daily.

The flotilla destroyed thirty-four enemy surface ships of which according to the Commander-in-Chief Plymouth, *Haida* had "the lion's share".¹⁰ During these classic, high-speed destroyer actions, many of which were at night and perilously close to shore, *Haida* sank two German Elbing class destroyers and several smaller enemy warships and merchant ships.¹¹ In one of those engagements *Athabaskan* was lost.¹² *Haida* also shared in a submarine kill with HMS *Eskimo* while supporting D-Day operations. *Haida* sustained battle damage and casualties on many occasions but returned immediately to the fray after quick repairs. She became the darling of the Plymouth Command and Canada upon her return home in September 1944. *Haida's* victories along with those of other Canadian destroyers in the 10th Flotilla did much to restore the professional reputation of the RCN that had languished during the early years of the Battle of the Atlantic. DeWolf was recognized for his brilliant and courageous leadership, winning the DSO and DSC and being awarded the CBE. He was also decorated by the American, French and Norwegian governments.

DeWolf was promoted to the rank of Captain in July 1944 giving him seniority that assured his succession as the Chief of the Naval Staff after Mainguy. Jones was now CNS and he brought DeWolf to NSHQ to be his ACNS as an Acting-Commodore. DeWolf finished the war in that position and continued under Reid, who confirmed him as Commodore in 1947. He subsequently commanded the "Happy Warrior", and commissioned HMCS *Magnificent* where good morale prevailed in spite of a general mood of discontent in the fleet. Promoted Rear-Admiral at the age of forty-five in 1948, he was appointed Flag Officer Pacific Coast (FOPC) and held that office at the time of the incidents. Characteristic of the prewar RCN cohort, he

had dismissed suggestions for change from the RCNVR element. DeWolf reflected that "We were the professionals and thought these fellows had nothing to teach us."¹³ He told the Mainguy Inquiry that he thought there was nothing wrong with the traditional system and that change should evolve naturally over time.¹⁴ However, DeWolf was a pragmatic and showed flexibility in accepting the recommendations in the Mainguy Report. He did remain committed to the prewar officer cohort and favoured them with promotions but also offered incentives to former members of the RCN(R), RCNVR and lower deck through promoting their best.

DeWolf was appointed VCNS by Grant in 1950, and directed the work of the Naval Staff in developing the policies and a concept of operations that brought the RCN into NATO. From the outset, he was a strong supporter of the NATO principle of balanced collective forces and the RCN's specialization in ASW. In 1952, he was appointed the Principal Military Advisor to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff as well as Representative on the NATO Military Committee. DeWolf became further convinced of value of the NATO principle of collectivity during his time in Washington and that building up ASW forces must remain the RCN's priority.¹⁵ He was completely in accord with Campney's view that, "a full understanding of Canadian defence policy is meaningful only when related to NATO strategy and planning".¹⁶ However, when DeWolf returned to Ottawa as CNS, he found that the Naval Staff had been giving more attention to responsibilities outside NATO such as sovereignty, Arctic patrols and other matters he thought extraneous. Consequently, he frequently found himself disagreeing with the priorities that they had set.¹⁷ The Minister must have had similar concerns when he replaced Mainguy.

DeWolf's first six months as CNS were spent redefining the priorities of the headquarters staff so that attention would be focused on NATO. For some staff officers this meant curtailing the promotion of personal "hobby-horses" such as a second carrier, retaining

the cruisers and naval aviation. DeWolf laid down the principle that the primary role of navies was to protect sea lines of communication and that the RCN was bound under the NATO agreement to fulfil its smaller individual part within the alliance. He directed that "RCN plans should be related to SACLANT plans."¹⁸ In DeWolf's mind this meant a concentration on ASW and developing the very best capability possible with the financial resources provided by the government and using the infrastructure and production capabilities developed, at considerable expense, by the Canadian ship building industry.¹⁹ This translated into a policy to build a navy composed of modern ASW escorts, the St. Laurents, and to establish the infrastructure required to man, train and maintain them at a high level of operational efficiency. In his view this included the requirement for both naval aviation and submarines to provide training support. He believed that the RCN should provide these training services independently because reliance on other navies for them was unsatisfactory.²⁰

DeWolf's priority was to ensure that the composition of the fleet was based on the primacy of ASW. The future of *Magnificent* and *Quebec*, with their large requirement for personnel and support, was a major issue upon which the staff had vacillated without positive direction. Non-resolution had created a situation of heavy over-commitment and exacerbated the manning problem presented by the new ship commissioning programme for 1956 and 1957. A second major issue was the confusion between SACLANT's peacetime fleet composition and revised requirements under the new MC 48 concept. The problem was that under the MC 48 concept it was necessary to have in commission all ships needed to survive Phase I of a global war. However, the existing SACLANT D-Day and D-Day+30 requirements did not necessarily represent all the ships the RCN must now maintain in commission in peacetime.²¹ A third and over-arching concern was the provision of sufficient resources to meet the sea training requirements for personnel in 1957, on which expansion depended.

DeWolf acted first to reduce extraneous commitments. Two days after assuming his position as CNS, he advised the Minister that *Quebec* should be paid off in April 1956, and suggested that the high cost of maintenance for the training value obtained rendered her future "questionable".²² This was a reversal of Mainguy's policy to retain the cruiser that Campney had approved a month earlier.²³ With respect to *Magnificent*, DeWolf recommended that she be paid off at the end of 1956, refitted in the United Kingdom to save money, and then be returned to the RN. He advised Campney that his recommendations were, "logical and economical and [I] can see no alternative that will not cause us great difficulty [in manning] during 1956".²⁴ He would submit formal recommendations for the final disposal of both ships later through the Chiefs of Staff. Campney approved both recommendations which were DeWolf's first initiatives to rationalize commitments and to reconcile fleet composition with his vision.²⁵ DeWolf advised the Naval Board of the approvals. Subsequently, the cruiser was scrapped and the carrier returned to the RN. However, the Naval Staff continued to harbour aspirations to retain *Magnificent* as a helicopter carrier and would later press DeWolf for reconsideration. Rear-Admiral Lay, VCNS, sensing that DeWolf was intent on developing a clear definition of naval policy, sought his approval for a policy and planning study. The "Naval Warfare Study Group" (NWSG) was set up to recommend a policy and fleet composition based on all new strategic, military, political and financial factors and imperatives. DeWolf agreed but wanted to be kept advised of the committee's deliberations and his Staff Assistant was made a member.²⁶

Concurrently, DeWolf directed that staff planning go ahead for the replacement of all ocean and coastal escorts, which were either obsolete or soon to be.²⁷ The Bangor and Algerine class coastal escorts were slated to be paid off immediately. The Naval Constructor-in-Chief had recently declared that the eleven older destroyers that were designed in 1932, including the four built in Canada in the mid-1940's, must be paid off by 1962.²⁸ The twenty-one Prestonian

class frigates were to be decommissioned by 1965. The Naval Board agreed that twenty-six replacement ships, in addition to the current programme for eighteen destroyer escorts, would be required. The original staff recommendation was for thirty-six but DeWolf believed that proposal "appeared to be a more ambitious programme than was required or could be financed" and the target was reduced.²⁹

The CNS also later decided that the next batch of replacement ships would be a repeat of the Restigouche design and not a new design as proposed by the technical staff.³⁰ DeWolf was an early proponent of the principle that "better is the enemy of good enough."³¹ He argued pragmatically that the RCN had a good design which the shipyards could build economically. He saw no reason to undertake the additional costs and delays inherent in designing and building a new class which would have little additional capability.³² Funds for this programme and ASW helicopters had been cut from the 1956-57 estimates by the Screening Committee and would have to be found elsewhere. DeWolf took this proposal to the Chiefs of Staff and gained their approval but eventually had to ask the Cabinet Defence Committee for a supplement to fund both the first eight ships of the replacement programme and helicopters.³³ The Cabinet Defence Committee deferred that request for funding. This delivered a strong message that the previously open-ended commitment to provide as many escorts as possible to SACLANC must be reconciled with fiscal realities and governed by the principle of economy of effort.³⁴

The issue of the future of *Magnificent* persisted and had to be resolved. DeWolf described himself as not being as "ambitious for the navy" as was his term mate Nelson Lay.³⁵ Lay had pressed for the retention of *Magnificent* as a helicopter carrier during Mainguy's tenure but the decision had been deferred. The issue surfaced when the ad hoc committee set up by Mainguy to conduct a re-appraisal of war plans made its report in April to DeWolf. The CNS stated uncategorically with respect to fleet composition that "it was unrealistic to include

Magnificent, as the requirement for a helicopter carrier had yet to be established and [to obtain] support for this addition to the Fleet was remote."³⁶ Raymond was also premature in that a helicopter acquisition programme had yet to be approved. It was also evident from the discussion that the CNS was questioning in his mind the value of retaining *Ontario*. DeWolf sent the committee away with instructions that the "target should be to have the maximum number of Fleet Units in commission in peacetime and at D-Day that can be economically manned under the peacetime complement ceiling [20,000]."³⁷ There is some lack of precision here probably because the committee had produced more questions than recommendations. The complex issue of the size and composition of peacetime complements for ships had yet to be systematically studied and quantified as recommended in the Rayner Report. There is a sense that this committee and others were marking time until that was resolved.

The issue of the future of *Magnificent* resurfaced a month later in the interim report by the NWSG that included a helicopter carrier in its fleet proposal. It seemed that Commodore Raymond, ACNS (Plans), who chaired both the NWSG and re-appraisal of war plans committees, had failed to grasp Dewolf's intentions. Raymond was a former Commanding Officer of *Shearwater* and, like Lay, a proponent of naval aviation. The CNS told Raymond, in the forthright language for which he was famous, "no case had yet been presented to justify the RCN operating a second carrier within our present limitations."³⁸ He did accept Raymond's arguments for two tankers to be added to the fleet to increase its flexibility and operating range. The NWSG deleted both *Magnificent* and *Quebec* in its revised proposal and the Naval Board asked the Admiralty for disposal instructions for the carrier.³⁹ The terms of returning *Magnificent* to the Royal Navy were subsequently discussed and agreed by the two prime ministers, St. Laurent and Eden.⁴⁰ *Magnificent* was returned in April 1957, and not December

1956 as planned, because she was required to ferry Canadian UN "peacekeepers", a new term in the military lexicon, and their equipment to Egypt after the Suez Crisis.

DeWolf was intent on having NSHQ adopt sound management principles, not only in policy planning but across the entire spectrum of administration. He demanded a consistently high calibre of staff work and was vociferously critical of shoddy efforts. He read everything thoroughly that was submitted to him. DeWolf was considered a real "bear" by the staff and lethal before ten o'clock in the morning. Woe betide the unwary senior staff officer who interrupted the period CNS reserved for thinking and concentration on papers and correspondence. Commodore Tony Storrs made this mistake shortly after he arrived as the newly appointed ACNS (Plans). He remembered disturbing DeWolf too early with a matter less urgent than a declaration of war and the agony of having the CNS "rip apart" his hastily composed staff paper.⁴¹ When Commodore Dyer presented his paper to the Naval Board recommending that a position for a Naval Comptroller be established, errors in logic were curtly pointed out by CNS. DeWolf observed that Dyer's arguments respecting the terms of reference suggested different conclusions than those presented. Both Storrs and Dyer survived and DeWolf saw them promoted to Rear-Admiral. DeWolf demanded accuracy but not perfection. He summarized discussions at Naval Board meetings and gave precise directions as to decisions and courses of action. Very quickly, NSHQ assumed a very business-like atmosphere that is reflected in the documentation of the period.

DeWolf believed that it was essential to have a Naval Comptroller, a professional trained to manage manpower and money, on the Naval Board to enhance its effectiveness. The responsibility for those activities were currently split between the Chief of Naval Technical Services (CNTS) and the Policy and Planning Coordination Committee (PPCC). In the case of the PPCC, there was a dearth of skills and training in fiscal and manpower management. The

Deputy Minister had been unhappy with the navy's fiscal management and told Mainguy that a comptroller was essential.⁴² Mainguy had dragged his feet and initiated a study just one month before his departure. Commodore Dyer, ACNS (Warfare), orchestrated the study and submitted an organization proposal for a Naval Comptroller designed much on the RCAF system.⁴³ It was a matter of some urgency. Ideally, the organization should be in place and operating by 1 April 1956, the beginning of the next fiscal year. Dyer's study proposed a reallocation of functions under the responsibility of CNTS and PPCC to the new comptroller organization. However, his recommendations placed the Naval Comptroller in only an advisory capacity to the CNS and Naval Board where as in the RCAF organization he was a member of the Air Board. It is probable that Dyer's committee had difficulty overcoming a mind-set to break with tradition and elevate an officer of the Supply Branch to the Naval Board and this biased their conclusions. As discussed, DeWolf challenged Dyer on his faulty logic.

DeWolf, overruling tradition, rejected the terms of reference that proposed giving the Naval Comptroller responsibility without authority and remarked that he should be a full member of the Naval Board.⁴⁴ As Dyer recalled, DeWolf threw it out because the Deputy Minister wanted the new position "with teeth".⁴⁵ CNS exercised the Naval Board on the function of a comptroller in civilian industry and stated that was what they required. The Rank Structure Committee, on which the DM sat, concurred. They were not prepared to establish the position unless terms of reference for the Naval Comptroller made him a member of the Naval Board with both authority over and responsibility for manpower control and money management. These included "policing" all naval programmes to ensure that they remained within budget and that manpower did not exceed authorized ceilings.⁴⁶

Commodore Dyer was appointed interim Naval Comptroller (NCompt) until relieved by Commodore(S) Rupert "Tony" Wright, who was attending the National Defence College.

Wright had been the previous Director General Supply and Fleet Accounting and became the first Supply Branch officer to be appointed to the Naval Board. He was subsequently promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1959, and as such the first serving Supply Officer in the RCN to achieve that rank. Wright had been a cadet at RNCC which satisfied the "pure laine" pedigree requirement and mollified traditionalists. The new Naval Comptroller immediately assumed responsibility for developing submissions to both the Rank Structure Committee (RSC) and Screening Committee. His first monthly report to the Naval Board tracking expenditures against appropriation and critiquing performance was rendered in September 1956.⁴⁷

The urgent requirement for a Naval Comptroller reflected the increasingly challenging financial environment CNS faced. The Treasury Board was demanding more direct control over all spending and precise and stronger justification for all expenditures. DeWolf had left Ottawa in 1952, during the salad days of increasing defence spending. He returned to find the RCN's personnel ceiling capped at 20,000 and annual appropriations on a sharp decline.⁴⁸ The Liberal government experienced its first deficit in 1954, and was under severe inflationary pressures. It was fighting inflation by reducing its own outlays.⁴⁹ The impact on the navy's money situation was a reduction in the 1957-58 estimates by \$15 million on the previous fiscal year's appropriation of \$324 million.⁵⁰ The DM had originally suggested \$320 million as a working figure for 1957-58 and on that forecast VCNS stated that the navy could reach only \$335 million "without some drastic economies."⁵¹ The final appropriation was \$309 million which hit the navy hard.

"Drastic economies" translated into a large reduction in new construction and acquisition funding. DeWolf had received no satisfaction when he asked for a supplement for the escort replacement programme and ASW helicopters. The navy was also losing flexibility in discretionary spending because personnel expenses for pay and allowances were up 15 percent,

reflecting inflation in industry's wages. A pay raise was approved in April 1956, but the services were directed to absorb it within their 1956-57 appropriations.⁵² Operating and maintenance expenditures were up because more ships were being added to the inventory and civilian wages were also rising. "Drastic economies" would prove to be the dominant financial theme during DeWolf's tenure as CNS.

DeWolf assumed responsibility for administering the RCN when the personnel problems and issues had risen to a very high degree of seriousness and complexity. The Rayner Report had recommended a study of the personnel structure. However other imperatives such as SACLANT's requirements for ship's complements under the MC 48 concept, the RCN's urgent training requirements for new construction and demands for economies, to name a few, suggested a complete overhaul of the entire personnel system. The Personnel Branch and depots had been in a constant state of crisis attempting to meet the basic minimum manning requirements for ship's companies. Some ships were manned below minimum standards that had already been lowered twice for critical trades such as engineers and electricians. The irony of the situation was that the navy was virtually up to authorized strength of 19,000. Morale among personnel staff officers was low and many felt the problems were insoluble under the current personnel management system. Members of the personnel staff, like Commander Willson, Director of Personnel(Men) (DP(Men)), blamed "the planning vacillations of the Naval Staff" that constantly changed commitments that created a stop-start cycle in recruiting which resulted in a succession of surpluses and shortages in trades.⁵³ He demonstrated this by means of detailed graphs to his seniors using statistics for seaman personnel from 1950 to 1956.

Willson's criticisms brought frustrations to the surface and initiated a staff debate as to the cause of the problem. He believed that the problem lay with the methods used by Captain Woollcombe, Director of Naval Organization (DNOrg), for processing the annual complement.

Willson argued that Woolcombe never verified requirements and simply started with the previous year's figures which was "unscientific" and simply perpetuated any errors.⁵⁴ DNOrg, responded that he was doing what DP(Men) suggested and it was obvious Willson didn't understand the problem.⁵⁵ The debate degenerated into an internecine quarrel. It was raised to the level of CNP by DCNP who commented that "I feel that the fundamental problem is that DNOrg is required to do a Management Engineering task in which he has neither the time nor trained staff to accomplish."⁵⁶ DCNP added that he believed DNOrg was doing a good job with the means at his disposal but "It may be perhaps the proof that our manning commitments per unit or per task have not become less, but have substantially increased since the war."⁵⁷ His suggestions were for a study of the CNP organization and methods and that the matter be put to rest. The Chief of Naval Personnel passed the file on to the Naval Comptroller who acknowledged the problem and noted that he must take it up sooner or later.⁵⁸ The Naval Comptroller was fully engaged resolving the current financial crisis and had no time for this urgent task.

The problem would not go away and a CNP study of complementing in the RCN from 1950 to 1957 reported a disturbing situation. The report stated that the form of the maritime defence of Canada was determined in 1950, and contracts for fourteen new destroyer escorts were let and manpower requirements assessed at that time. The size of the navy was increased to 20,000 to meet the defence concept. The report concluded that, "the entire increase of manpower was consumed in extraneous commitments before a single new ship was commissioned [in December 1955]. The whole ship programme now depends upon offsetting deletions i.e. under-complementing commitments previously undertaken."⁵⁹ In short, personnel billets were not available to be assigned to the ships that were about to commission. Another consequence was that the trades that remained predominantly ashore had become grossly

enlarged which worsened the already unsatisfactory sea-shore ratio for seagoing trades. All civil service billets had also been allocated. The three courses of action recommended were; to reduce commitments ashore, to pay off ships or to increase the manpower ceiling.

The report was slightly exaggerated because there had been a nominal increase in ships, converted destroyers and frigates, and aircraft during that period. However, it points to a serious deficiency ingrained in the RCN's personnel management system. In a service imbued with the "Ready, Aye, Ready" ethic, only a few experienced officers in the Personnel Branch dared to admit that a serious and seemingly insoluble problem existed. When Commander Willson raised another alarm warning that the Seaman Branch could not meet its 1959 commitments, he was admonished. His superior, Captain J.C. O'Brien, Director of Naval Training (DNT), remarked to CNP, "SOSmP [Willson] has adopted a defeatist attitude which should be discouraged" and recommended another study to get around the problem.⁶⁰ O'Brien with his Executive Branch experience perceived the situation in terms of the context which he was trained for, to fight sea battles. Confounded by the complexity of the administrative situation he reverted to form as if the problem were "the enemy".

This muddling-through approach, relying on expedients to solve the current crisis, and denial were the two root causes that perpetuated the chronic crisis in the manpower system. Within the organizations of both VCNS and CNP, there existed a mismatch between the experience and skills of seamen officers filling staff positions and the demands of the administrative environment. This was offset to a certain extent by energy and high motivation to get the job done. The evidence points to factors such as a lack of staff training, particularly in the fundamentals of personnel management, staff shortages and a high turnover rate in NSHQ as contributing to the inability to identify and solve the complex problems that had now become

systemic. There was an underlying hope that the omnibus study into the personnel system ordered by the CNS would resolve all its problems.

Vice-Admiral DeWolf demonstrated immediately that he would not shirk from taking hard decisions with respect to personnel even if it meant overruling strong tradition. One of his first decisions as CNS was to abandon the principle of automatic promotion to lieutenant-commander for lieutenants with eight years seniority and replace it with promotion by selection. Mainguy had deferred this decision that would have brought the RCN into line with the other services and thus opened the way for resolution of a serious problem of "over-bearing", exceeding the authorized complement, of lieutenant-commanders.⁶¹ In July 1955, after the Rayner Report, the Personnel Branch had begun a study on the effect of the RCN amalgamating all existing technical service branches, such as engineering, electrical and ordnance, into one technical branch. It also examined whether a separate supply branch should be created. However, in January 1956, the Mansergh Report, a seminal study by the RN of its personnel organization, was circulated in NSHQ.⁶² Rear-Admiral Rayner, CNP, realized after reading Mansergh's findings that the scope of the current RCN study was far too limited given the RN experience and the multiplicity of personnel problems facing the Canadian navy. Rayner approached DeWolf suggesting that a study and report comparable to Mansergh's be conducted. DeWolf concurred and agreed to embark on a course of action that had enormous potential implications for the navy.

The Ad Hoc Committee on RCN Personnel Structure and its terms of reference were approved by the Naval Board in June 1956. Its mandate was widely advertised by means of Naval General Orders (NGO's), a message from the CNS, and an article in the *Crowsnest*. The committee was directed to study the requirements and review the personnel policies within the RCN in the broadest sense with particular attention to determining weaknesses. They were to

make recommendations "as to the most suitable officer and man structure which would be in the best interests of the Service and the Nation, with emphasis on efficiency, simplicity and economy."⁶³ They were also to investigate every aspect of the personnel system including procurement, rank and trade structures, the branch system, qualifications for both officers and men, and responsibilities of junior officers and Chiefs and Petty Officers and to make recommendations, "regardless of any existing Naval policy, regulations or traditions."⁶⁴ Assigned to the committee were Commodore Tisdall (Chairman), Commodore(E) Spencer (EinC), Acting-Commodore Plomer (DCNP), Captain Storrs (ACNS (Warfare)), Captain(L) Burchell (DCNTS) and Commander(S) Elcock (Secretary and DNOrg designate). After the form of the Mainguy inquiry, the announcement was accompanied by an invitation to any member of the navy, who may wish to do so, to submit a proposal to the committee expressing their views on the personnel system or making suggestions for its improvement.⁶⁵

The importance of the task would suggest that the choice of the chairman was critical. Commodore E. P. Tisdall's last appointment was as Senior Canadian Officer Afloat on the east coast. He had been brought to Ottawa to serve as the Staff Assistant to CNS, which was essentially a supernumerary position. As the most senior Commodore in the Executive Branch, he was awaiting promotion to Rear-Admiral that would not occur until Lay retired in January 1958. Tisdall's career had been quite unremarkable but he rose to the top in a system that rewarded seniority and favoured the small pool of prewar RCN officers. He had enrolled in the RCN as a cadet at RNCC in 1921, but was not appointed to a permanent sea command until he commanded *Ontario*, the training cruiser, as a Captain in 1951. He saw no action during the war and served ashore except for a two short stints, totalling six months, temporarily in command of destroyers.⁶⁶ Tisdall had served previously at NSHQ as Director General of Naval Ordnance (DGNO) and Director Weapons and Tactics (DWT), both appointments under Grant

as CNS. He had no experience in the Personnel Branch and no formal staff training. His most important qualifications were his long experience in the ways of the RCN and, he was available.

Tisdall sought Dewolf's guidance in order to develop an approach to his task. The CNS told him to assume "that the strength of the RCN would remain at approximately its present level [20,000] and that the fighting elements of the fleet would consist mainly of anti-submarine warships, probably armed by 1965, with guided missiles and homing weapons; and that naval air would continue at about its present size."⁶⁷ DeWolf reiterated that as a basic principle, "The structure should be so arranged that the maximum number of ships and aircraft can be manned and kept in the highest degree of readiness, compatible with economy of money and manpower."⁶⁸ Other principles established for guidance were that the structure developed should; be flexible and adaptable to change, make the best use of talent available, rationalize the branch concept, promote the most talented and deserving personnel, provide adequate career prospects for all, and make seetime an essential career requirement for all uniformed personnel except females. Other factors that the committee should consider were new SACLANT ship manning requirements under the MC 48 concept and the planned maintenance concept that would be introduced into the fleet in the near future.⁶⁹

Another factor Tisdall was later directed to consider was the initiative, previously discussed, to divorce rank from trade in the lower deck personnel structure. A report of a study ordered earlier on rank distribution of senior non-commissioned officers that incorporated this issue was approved by the Naval Board shortly after the Tisdall mandate.⁷⁰ This study by the Job Analysis Section was aimed at solving the problem of rank inflation at the four rank levels above Leading Seaman to Chief Petty Officer First Class. The problem resulted as a consequence of the trade grouping system instituted to compensate technically skilled men in the postwar years. Because the existing system "married" rank to trade group level, an inflation in

numbers in the high trade groups, necessitated by advancing technology, had also driven up rank numbers and a serious over-ranking imbalance now existed. The problem was exacerbated by the branches having been given relatively free rein over developing their structures and complements since the war.

The solution the study recommended was to separate rank that was fundamentally a leadership responsibility from trade group based on technical skill and knowledge. In order to achieve an appropriate rank pyramid, the number of supervisory ranks would have to be determined as a percentage for a specific numerical complement for each trade. These models would be revised annually and govern the promotions during any given year. The engineering branch, because of its watchkeeping commitments, would have more supervisory ranks than other trades. The Naval Board directed that new promotion guidelines should be adopted immediately and a structure be developed with an appropriate rank pyramid for each trade. However, the task of determining the rank disposition with respect to complement requirements was added to Tisdall's mandate and was to be tabled concurrently with his report and recommendations.⁷¹ That task should have been done by DNOrg who had been unable to complete it. Tisdall found the scope of his report steadily increasing as personnel problems beyond the capability of staffs were added to his list. These included the very sensitive issue of how to dismantle branch empires that operated virtually as independent entities with the RCN.

Tisdall cast his net as wide as possible to gather opinions as to what was wrong with the RCN's personnel organization and ideas on how to improve it. He drew heavily upon the RN experience where the Mansergh Committee, and another under Admiral Welby, had conducted similar studies. Mansergh had studied the officers' structure and problems of retention and competition with industry. It was the implementation of the Mansergh Committee's recommendations that had compelled the RCN to reorganize its junior officer

training. Tisdall noted RN initiatives to restructure the officers 'corps, particularly those designed to remove distinctions between branches.⁷² Welby had studied the personnel structure and the development of ship's complements to meet the challenges of modern warfare and new technology.⁷³

Interest in RN experience was counterbalanced by an in-depth study of the personnel organization of the USN and United States Coast Guard. The Tisdall committee visited the Pentagon at Washington for extensive briefings at the USN's Bureau of Personnel. These covered a wide spectrum of activities such as automated personnel data processing, performance reporting systems and aptitude testing. The committee also visited the United States Naval Academy to become acquainted with the curriculum and training objectives. Commodore Spencer, EinC, noted that, "The USN has been described by a fleet admiral as 'a great engineering experiment'.⁷⁴ Spencer was most impressed by the technical approach taken in training midshipman to be "Line Officers", the equivalent of the RCN's Executive Branch. Half their time at Annapolis was spent in engineering training.

The broad invitation issued to all personnel in the RCN to comment on weaknesses in the personnel organization, excepting pay, pensions and allowances, was well subscribed. Each ship and establishment was invited to set up its own ad hoc committee comprised of officers and senior rates to consider a list of eleven items on which the Tisdall Committee solicited opinions and ideas.⁷⁵ The list indicates that Tisdall's line of inquiry was modelled closely on the RN's recommendations. A review of the submissions by organized groups suggests they interpreted their mandate in the broadest sense. Also, because individuals could circumvent the chain of command and submit their opinions directly to the committee, Tisdall received submissions across the spectrum from learned treatises to a litany of "moans". The submissions provide

useful insights as to the state of the fleet however many were short on specifics. Only a few issues emerged on which there was any degree of unanimity.

The subject of fixed commissions received strong comments in relation to the issue of chronic instability in the fleet and its affect on fighting efficiency and morale. Commander (later Rear-Admiral) Dan Hanington, Commanding Officer *Iroquois*, commented that, "Instability was a terribly serious problem."⁷⁶ He had been in command of this east coast ship for fourteen months and during that time had lost and gained eleven officers with two more about to leave. Moreover, his ship had experienced a 100 percent turnover of personnel in eight months with more large drafts forecast. Hanington concluded in exasperation, "It is simply not possible to maintain efficiency under these circumstances. Something has simply got to be done soon to keep crews together and this includes officers." He remarked retrospectively that it was largely a question of admirals not appreciating the negative impact of being over-committed.⁷⁷ Tisdall found the high turnover in *Iroquois* approximated the fleet norm. A west coast perspective was offered by a committee of senior Chief Petty Officers formed by Commodore Budge, now in command of the RCN Barracks *Naden*. On the issue of fixed commissions Budge noted in his covering letter,

The vehemence with which this [issue] was put forward rates its first place on this report. The committee felt that any ship they had served in since the war had never trained past an elementary stage due to frequent drafts, that *esprit-de-corps* was hard to maintain in a constantly shifting population, that lack of confidence in authority was engendered by frequent and apparently pointless drafts, and that if, after eleven years of peace, we are still living from emergency to expediency, some of the basic premises upon which we planned our navy must be false.⁷⁸

This submission contradicted the experience of ships deployed to Korea but spoke to the norm. A solution to instability offered by FOAC, Rear-Admiral Bidwell, was to centralize drafting, presumably under east coast control. Bidwell argued that this made sense given the NATO orientation and wartime reality that rendered the two home port system unsatisfactory.⁷⁹ His

continual problems with manning the carrier were cited as substantiation and the fact that he had 75 percent of the fleet based in Halifax. Rear-Admiral Pullen, FOPC, opposed Bidwell's suggestion denying there would be any saving and that in wartime ships not men would be transferred.⁸⁰ It is evident that instability was common but that the two coasts perceived quite different solutions dictated by local circumstances and the personal preferences of flag officers.

There were many opinions offered over a wide range of personnel issues. Most did not support the idea of officers other than those of the Executive Branch having command at sea.⁸¹ A common perception affecting both officers and men was that at sea there were so many "daymen", technical specialists, that the actual running of the ship was done by a small percentage of seaman. There was a need for general naval training for both officers and men to allow the load to be shared evenly.⁸² Technical Officers tended to think that Executive Branch officers should receive more technical training, preferably to the BSc level. As one observed, "Engineers had never had an 'incident'."⁸³ Across the officer corps, support for training naval officers in a tri-service programme was mixed. Commander(E) Harley argued that the requirements of rapid expansion and, "the possibility of officers being so well trained educationally that they will be incompetent in their own field" had negated the tri-service programme's advantages.⁸⁴ He, and others such as Captain "Debbie" Piers, advocated an independent naval college. However, Captain (later Rear-Admiral) Charles, Commandant CSC Royal Roads, was an influential voice supporting integrated training for all officers to a four-year degree level.⁸⁵ Predictably, there was a plethora of submissions condemning the rank of Petty Officer Second Class as unnecessary and prejudicial to morale.⁸⁶

It is apparent that Commodore Tisdall read every brief submitted to him and noted his agreement or not with any comments or recommendations. His pencilled annotations signal his personal preferences and prejudices. For example, he would not consider recommending

offering a bonus to men as an incentive to re-engage, a practice in the USN, although there were strong arguments in its favour.⁸⁷ While submissions were voluminous, there were few that addressed the key policy issues such as validity of the branch structure, OJT (on-the-job-training) and the user-maintainer concept. This suggests either general satisfaction with the status quo or insufficient interest or knowledge to generate discussion. In spite of this, the report and recommendations Tisdall produced are surprisingly definitive. It is immediately evident that Tisdall drew heavily on both the Mansergh and Welby documents to such an extent that his introduction is obviously a plagiarism of Welby's. Tisdall's conclusions and recommendations pertaining to the size of ship's complements, the user-maintainer concept and principles governing peacetime complements are again taken almost directly from the Welby document.

While the Mansergh Report offered a guide on problems existing in the officer corps, the evidence suggests that Commodore Spencer was the originator of the principles governing the radical recommendations in the Tisdall Report. Spencer was in the vanguard of those Marine Engineering and Electrical Officers who were pressing for a general improvement in educational standards and technical proficiency in the entire officer corps.⁸⁸ Commodore Spencer's personal brief states that the original intention was to review the career structure for technical officers only but he concluded that there was a basic flaw in the entire officer structure and the whole had to be fixed. He argued that the main defect was "the vertical parallel alignment of components called 'branches' which exist as separate entities in the organization and are not exposed to any proper integrating factors."⁸⁹ He cited attendant problems such as the inadequate academic and professional training of officers, especially of the Executive Branch, that limit their capability, and narrow employment opportunities imposed on highly qualified officers, especially engineers, that frustrate career progression. He surmised,

A solution to these problems will exist when the branch structure is replaced by a structure which permits the widest possible latitude in development of the individual, and which establishes a true profession. It is probable that the USN

officer structure most closely approaches the solution required. The USN exists as a proof that its physical plant and methods of utilization are in harmony with the social and physical facts extant on the North American continent, and provide a blueprint for development of a similar structure [in the RCN].⁹⁰

Spencer's proposals to modernize the concept of education and training for the naval profession would succeed where the Mainguy Report had failed, owing to resistance from reactionaries such as Rear-Admiral Pullen. Commodore Spencer followed Rear-Admiral Porteous as CNTS in 1958, and would provide a continuing influence on the Naval Board for implementation of the reforms recommended in the "Tisdall Report".

According to Rear-Admiral Storrs, Tisdall wrote the report himself and reached the conclusions and made recommendations with limited participation by other members of the committee.⁹¹ This was Tisdall's style. While most of the report was not original, the compilation of ideas and the programme devised suggest a vast effort and comprehensive theoretical understanding of the issues facing the RCN. Tisdall reflected the habit of his generation to look to the RN and, more recently, to the USN for answers to professional problems. Imitation is a useful expedient but serves only if the assumption that the problems are similar is true. This begs the question, would the solutions and models derived from other navies prove both applicable and acceptable to the RCN? It is apparent that a great deal of theorizing and speculation figured prominently in the development of the report and a "top down" notion of implementation was presumed. Because the radical and sweeping nature of many of its recommendations, the impact of the study was bound to be revolutionary not evolutionary, in spite of assurances to the contrary.

The range of conclusions reached by Tisdall indicate many influences at work and were a remarkable acknowledgement by the senior hierarchy of weaknesses and problems in the system that had been apparent to junior staff officers for years. With respect to the overall

personnel structure, Tisdall concluded that many current problems in the RCN resulted from faulty administration and planning. There had never been a study of the structure to determine "basic requirements and truths". As a consequence, an effective personnel management system employing modern techniques and methods, such as machine data processing systems, had not evolved and instead there had been a reliance on day-to-day expedients.⁹² Also, much reliance had been placed on old practices and traditions and the current system had developed on a concept of rigid specialization and branches that was inflexible and uneconomical in the use of manpower resources. As a result, an artificial gap had been created in the relative importance between user and maintainer resulting in a surfeit of men in ships who just waited for things to break and were simply "passengers in action".⁹³ Moreover, the navy had attempted to keep up with technological advances by creating additional specialist branches instead of attempting to raise the general quality and level of competence of all officers and men to cope with the demands of new technology and warfare. Another major disadvantage of the existing branch system was that it tended to channel the loyalties of officers and men to their branch or speciality to the overall detriment of cooperation and coordination within the RCN. In short, the navy operated in "watertight" compartments where tribal allegiances dominated. This rigid structure also restricted the opportunities for broader employment and advancement of able officers and men.⁹⁴

The thirty-nine recommendations in the Tisdall Report called for what amounted to a radical restructuring of the RCN's existing personnel structure. Tisdall had been instructed by DeWolf to achieve economies without sacrificing efficiency. This was to be accomplished through what was essentially a process of integration that abolished the traditional branches and replaced it with a system based on commonality of entry, training and employment, with specialization where required. The objective was to achieve considerable economy in the

number of officers and men required in ships, but Tisdall also said, prophetically, that the new structure would lend itself to single service integration should that be required by the government in future. There was no mention anywhere in the report of further integrating French-Canadians into the RCN or improving their career opportunities. He had not been directed to study this issue nor were there any submissions on it. Significantly, Tisdall only proposed a system from which the composition of the navy would be derived but he could not foresee what that structure would be. He was prescribing principles for the most part and left the details for implementing his major recommendations to be worked out over time. This would require a rigorously planned and executed regime that had yet to be devised.

The officer corps would be structured in three categories or lists and branches abolished.⁹⁵ The majority of officers would be borne on a general list of user-maintainers with the prime objective of becoming efficient in seamanship and sea warfare. Officers to conduct operational, engineering and supply duties would be drawn from this list and their basic knowledge and initial academic training would be that of a practical engineer. This would be achieved through training all officers to a four-year degree level with a strong grounding in general science at a Canadian Service College or university. Some General List officers would be selected later in their careers for specialization training in engineering and administration to the Masters level and be transferred to a restricted category. The more proficient officers would be given training and experience leading to command and high rank. The Special List would comprise doctors, chaplains, instructor officers and others with special knowledge and specified employment. The Limited Duty List would contain officers commissioned from the ranks but not selected for the General or Special List. There were other provisions, such as compulsory retirement of officers in certain ranks who had not been promoted by a certain age, to streamline the structure and to provide enhanced promotion opportunities.

The changes in the structure for men were no less sweeping and comprehensive. The length of the initial engagement would be reduced from five years to three and both basic and formal trade training would be reduced to accommodate the shortened period of the first engagement. All men would be entered as seamen, receive common basic training, and be classified into a trade during their New Entry Training in *Cornwallis*. The course would be reduced to sixteen weeks and all men drafted directly to ships. The formal Trade Group 1 course would be replaced by a programme of on-the-job-training (OJT) at sea. There would be an amalgamation of the operator and maintainer at the basic mechanics level, the new trade specifications requiring tri-service approval. Advanced trades training would be given only after a man re-engaged for his second engagement. Rank would be separated from trade to provide more flexibility and provide employment and advancement opportunities commensurate with a man's vocation and potential. There would be increased responsibility and more challenging leadership opportunities for senior men. Recruiting procedures would be improved that employed better classification procedures using up-to-date methods in order to attract and appropriately place a higher quality of recruit. More realistic visual standards would be introduced to allow wider employment of officers and men.

Recommendations designed specifically to produce efficiency with economy included new principles and guidelines for complementing based on the "Welby Report". Welby's governing principle was that ships should be complemented to achieve fighting efficiency as well as an ideal action state. This required ships "be complemented for the purpose of maintenance, administration and habitability and where necessary sufficient people of the right trades be added to meet defence cruising and actions requirements."⁹⁶ Tisdall's recommendations included a model complement for a St. Laurent Class destroyer escort based on the new principle and the proposed officer and trade structure.⁹⁷ The model reduced the men

required for the wartime complement of the St. Laurents from 259 to 241. There would be a reduction of 224 officers across the fleet projected for the early 1960's but there would be a net increase in the peacetime complement for all ships under the new principle.⁹⁸ Fixed cycles for ships, 24 months for destroyer escorts and 18 months for frigates, would be implemented. It was intended that a ship's company remain stable during a "cycle", thereby promoting morale as well as efficiency with economy. Further economies in manpower would be achieved through paying off ships, except the carrier, into refit and removing their crews.⁹⁹ With 15 percent of ships in refit at any one time, there would be a constant 4100 men in the rank of ordinary and able seaman on their first engagement in the fleet based on the 1956-57 complement. Assuming a wastage rate of 75 percent during and at the end of the first engagement, 2240 men would have to be enrolled every year. The report calculated that the optimal re-engagement rate of 20 percent was desirable in a static navy.

The "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on RCN Personnel" (Tisdall Report) and its recommendations were discussed by the Naval Board on 19 June 1957.¹⁰⁰ Most recommendations were approved, many in principle requiring further study or agreement at the tri-service level. Only one, pertaining to the education of aircrew, was not approved. It was decided that a separate study of a structure for the RCN(R) would probably have to be conducted because of the radical changes proposed for the regular force. The Tisdall Report contained no plan and only parenthetical comments on implementation. At first flush, it was apparent that it rendered the major part of existing personnel policy and orders redundant. The work of Tisdall's committee had captured the interest of the navy and expectations equal to that interest had developed. A coordinating group, the Personnel Structure Committee, under the leadership of Commodore Tisdall, was established to work out the details and supervise implementation. Before its findings and recommendations could be announced, the Tisdall

Report had to be referred to the Flag Officers for comment and submitted to both the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Minister for approval.

There were very few substantive observations pertaining to the principles proposed in the Tisdall Report from the flag officers, FOAC, FOPC and FOND. There were strong endorsements from all quarters that measures were being taken to cure personnel ills although no details were provided.¹⁰¹ Rear-Admiral Bidwell did offer a personal opinion that he believed the report "in the case of officers had gone rather too far and tends to make them 'Jack of all trades and masters of none.'"¹⁰² He argued that that Engineer and Supply Officer specialists should be retained. Some staff officers raised red flags of caution mainly on problems of implementation because of the current manning situation. There was a general uneasiness expressed concerning the large number of untrained men that would be sent directly to the fleet. The Naval Comptroller himself observed that 40 percent of the men sent to the new St. Laurents would be untrained and, therefore, non-effective. Given personnel shortages in the fleet, the major question was whether there would be sufficient trained personnel to teach trade skills through on-the-job-training. A rather remarkable observation by FOND, Rear-Admiral Adams, was his distress that there was no provision for personnel to carry out duties of "officers' servants".¹⁰³ This comment may present a clue as to Claxton's reasons for refusing to approve Adams' promotion. Certainly it would suggest that the thrust of the Mainguy Report had eluded Adams' comprehension. A more substantive comment by Adams was that the impact on the RCN(R) could not be immediately determined and should be the subject of a separate study once the new structure for the regular force had been decided. In all, the feedback was positive and enthusiastic with the fleet assuming a "wait and see" attitude.

The report crossed some tri-service boundaries and the members of General and Air Staffs on the Personnel Members Committee could not support the compulsory retirement of

officers passed-over for promotion proposed by the navy.¹⁰⁴ They also had reservations concerning the recommendation to separate rank from trade and it was agreed that the few proposals with tri-service implications would have to be submitted to the appropriate committee. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the recommendations as amended by the PMC. Foulkes expressed his doubt to DeWolf that all officers could attain the academic degree requirement purely because of numbers and expense.¹⁰⁵ DeWolf discussed the report personally with the new Minister, Major-General George Pearkes, who observed privately, "Why go to a three year engagement, I hoped all services would settle on five!"¹⁰⁶ Pearkes gave the recommendations his formal approval with the proviso that "It is desirable to ensure that standards for all ranks and service conditions generally conform to those applicable to the other two services."¹⁰⁷ DeWolf announced the revised personnel structure to the fleet in a general message on 13 November 1957. The CNS stated that he did not believe in "change for change sake" and explained why the radical changes were necessary. He stressed that the implementation would take place over a long period, fifteen years in the case of officers, "the principle is one of evolution not revolution."¹⁰⁸ He assured all personnel that their rights and interests would be guarded and nothing would happen without consultation with flag officers and due warning. DeWolf concluded, "By the same token, however, if implementation is to be successful, I shall expect every officer and man to lend his or her [sic] support once the final decision has been taken."

Staff of the Personnel Branch were under no illusions as to the magnitude of the undertaking and the possibility of failure if sufficient thought and resources were not applied to implementation. Acting-Commodore Plomer, DCNP, in recommending an action plan cautioned CNP "That we do this properly i.e. thoroughly, painstakingly and efficiently. It would be better not to do this at all than fail by producing mediocre results. It will be one of the biggest things

we have ever attempted; the approach must be the same."¹⁰⁹ The work involved a wide range of activities from rewriting regulations, trade specifications and school syllabi to reorganization of administration at every level from NSHQ through, depots, bases and schools. There had to be careful negotiation and coordination with heads of branches, operational authorities and depots to develop the rank and trade structures and to orchestrate simultaneous introduction. The amended programme for New Entry Training, classification, and OJT would have to be introduced at the same time as the restructuring. There would have to be continuous consultation with the flag officers and an efficient communications plan to ensure the fleet was kept informed. Plomer warned that hastily taken decisions could result in "consequences that could be far reaching, and disastrous."¹¹⁰ He predicted that if inadequate personnel resources were assigned to this initiative, as had happened in the past, the great interest and enthusiasm generated by the work of Tisdall's committee would peter out and, "the whole project will die a slow death." It was appropriate that the author of the study be given responsibility for coordinating its implementation. Commodore Tisdall and the Personnel Structure Committee began work immediately.

On another matter directly related to personnel, DeWolf established meeting training commitments as an immediate priority. The execution of the challenging commissioning programme depended primarily on the availability of sufficient trained personnel. Resources were provided and ships schedules orchestrated through the annual fleet employment programme that was the responsibility of Captain Bill Landymore, DNPO. Landymore's task was complicated by the necessity to develop concurrently the composition and disposition of the fleet to meet NATO and national requirements as approved by the Naval Board and agreed in consultation with the staffs on the coasts. He was also faced with construction delays and manning deficiencies that necessitated shifting the fleet strength target for 1958 to 1959.¹¹¹

These were set in 1955, before NATO introduced the MC 48 concept. The fleet for 1959, would need a 20,855 ceiling that had yet to be authorized.¹¹² The current strength was approximately 19,500 of which many were non-effectives awaiting release. Manning deficiencies forced a rationalization of existing resources that required, in the first instance, all Bangor and Algerine coastal escorts to be paid off.¹¹³ These ships were considered obsolete but it was manning deficiencies that hastened their decommissioning. Five new Gaspé class minesweepers were transferred to mutual aid in order to man four more technically advanced Fundy class ships. A reduction of the RCN's minesweeper target strength to ten was justified by a unilateral decision to downgrade the threat from mines to North America but the real reason was complement shortfall. The degree of criticality of the manning shortfall also depended on paying-off of *Magnificent* by March 1957.

The Fleet Employment Programme for 1957, finally agreed after much consultation, was immediately upset through the tasking of *Magnificent* to transport Canadian peacekeepers to Egypt in December 1956. This delayed her paying off.¹¹⁴ The ripple effect compromised the entire east coast manning schedule. While the Naval Board had approved the employment programme, FOAC revised the east coast squadron organization after personal conversation with CNS but without reference to NSHQ.¹¹⁵ Rear-Admiral Bidwell needed this flexibility because the manning situation was so fluid. Landymore had set fixed refit cycles for ships but shortages of Electrical and Radio Technicians negated them in the 1957 east coast programme. Flag Officer Atlantic Coast had to extend the cycles of all his frigates and older destroyers and indicated that they would have to be paid off for refit as their crews were required elsewhere.¹¹⁶ Consultation broke down between DNPO and FOAC's staff. The latter amended the approved programme unilaterally and announced changes through intention messages indicating FOAC was going to do things on his own initiative unless instructed otherwise.¹¹⁷ Landymore

complained vociferously to Rear-Admiral Lay, VCNS, who brought the issue to the attention of CNS. DeWolf spoke to Bidwell by phone, "and asked him to put a stop to tactless messages" and proceed with proper consultation.¹¹⁸

It is apparent that the consultation process had broken down completely because DNPO sprung two new commitments, received on short notice, on FOAC without warning.¹¹⁹ Frustration boiled over on the coast. Bidwell's terse admonishment to NSHQ was "It is requested, prior to any Headquarters' decision to amend the planned Employment of the Fleet involving forces under this Command, that the dimensions of the proposed amendment be forwarded to permit local study of their implication."¹²⁰ This "turf war" may have been sparked by a clash of personalities but was more symptomatic of the over-commitment syndrome that gripped the Naval Staff.

Captain Landymore was obviously overly optimistic both in his estimate of the availability of ships and also in the degree of precision he could achieve in the fleet forecast. Agreement could not be reached on the 1958 fleet employment programme between DNPO and FOAC's staff because of unreconcilable differences over manning and disposition.¹²¹ When the programme was submitted to the Naval Board for approval, they deferred to FOAC's wishes that three new DDE's not be transferred to the west coast.¹²² Moreover, they returned DNPO's entire proposal to PPCC for reconsideration because CNP advised CNS that there was doubt that the ships named in the programme could all be manned. This should have been reconciled before submission to the Naval Board and indicates there still existed problems of coordination between the Personnel Branch and the Naval Staff.

The trials and tribulations experienced at the staff level did not reflect the high degree of vigour and enthusiasm in the fleet as the new St. Laurent destroyer escorts and converted frigates were commissioned and joined their squadrons. This visible growth and the

expectations raised by the Tisdall study promised a rosy future. The commissioning of the *Bonaventure*, "the jewel in the crown", on 17 January 1957, was symbolic of big ship status and bolstered the RCN's pride and confidence.¹²³ The Canadian navy, with its air power in the form of new Banshee jet fighters and "Tracker" ASW aircraft, and its "best in the world" ASW destroyer escorts was a force to be reckoned with. Canadian sailors perceived themselves to be same league as the USN and RN. The "Bonnie" and the twenty-four aircraft she carried represented an investment of one-third of the RCN's budget. This included sustaining and training the large complement composed of many small groups of highly specialized operators, such as pilots, and technicians. Cost, more than prestige, was on the mind of Vice-Admiral DeWolf when he attended the festivities around the commissioning. DeWolf had never wholeheartedly supported carrier acquisition in the first place because he thought the RCN was getting in "over our depth" and it would be too expensive.¹²⁴ He continued to support the independent naval aviation commitment because of its training value for ASW. When he attended the commissioning of *Bonaventure* with Campney he recalled thinking, "my heart wasn't in it. Here we are getting this bloody great thing and how are we going to pay for it? How are we going to keep it running?"¹²⁵ Dewolf's priority was to meet the NATO commitment that was primarily ASW escorts. He had already paid off one cruiser and would soon be forced to pay off *Ontario* and *Labrador* in order sustain the primary objective. The Arctic was not considered a priority and *Labrador's* complement was needed elsewhere.

NOTES - CHAPTER 8

1 Claxton, "Autobiography".

2 Harbron, "The RCN At Peace, 1945 - 1955: The Uncertain Heritage," 20.

3 DeWolf and Lay captured the only two Executive Branch billets available the year they graduated. The two developed a very close personal relationship and their careers were nearly parallel. Lay was regarded the "father of naval aviation" in the RCN. Knowlton became an Engineering Branch Officer, not initially by choice, but rose to become the Chief of Naval Technical Services in 1948, and the driving force behind the St. Laurent Class construction programme. Porteous followed Knowlton as CNTS and carried on the construction programme and the oversaw the design effort that married the ASW helicopter to the destroyer escort.

4 Audette hand written minute, DeWolf Evidence, "Audette Papers".

5 Lay, *Memoirs of a Mariner*, 109.

6 Lund, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic," 147.

7 Raymont, "The Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 90.

8 The story of *Haida's* exploits under DeWolf's command is recorded in Sclater, *Haida*.

9 Regular RN members were HMS *Ashanti*, *Eskimo* and *Tartar* (Leader). HMCS *Iroquois* (Hibbard) was part of the 10th Flotilla but returned to Canada for a refit shortly after *Haida* joined it.

10 Sclater, *Haida*, 214.

11 Ibid, passim and Schull, *The Far Distant Ships*, 251, 253, 302, 340.

12 In that action *Haida* sank *Athabaskan's* protagonist, a German Elbing destroyer that hit her with a torpedo. *Haida* returned to pick up survivors but was told to "get clear" by Stubbs, *Athabaskan's* Captain, who was in the water. Stubbs died with 128 of his ship's company, eighty-three became prisoners of war while *Haida* managed to rescue thirty-eight others before departing the area. An additional eight were rescued by *Haida's* motor cutter that returned on its own to England.

13 DeWolf interview by the author.

14 DeWolf evidence, "Audette Papers".

15 DeWolf interview by German, 15 November 1985, *RCN 75*, DHist.

16 Department of National Defence, *Report on National Defence 1957*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), 6.

17 Ibid.

18 NBM 490-3, 23 May-1956.

19 DeWolf interview by the author.

20 Ibid.

21 DNPO, "Composition and Build-up of the Fleet 1957 - 1959"(draft), 8 March 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 16, Operations and Plans.

22 CNS to MND, memo, 18 January 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 15, Operations and Plans.

23 NBM 470-3, 14 December 1955.

24 CNS to MND, memo, 18 January 1956.

25 NBM 473-1, 19 January 1956.

26 NBM 475-6, 1 February 1956.

27 NBM 482-3, 21 March 1956 and NBM 484-2, 10 April 1956.

28 NCC to DNPO, memo, 5 March 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 16, Operations and Plans. Cmdre. Baker stipulated that the life of these ships was only 15 years given design weaknesses and construction techniques used at the time. Ships like *Haida* had also been run very hard and were worn out.

29 NBM 482-3, 21 March 1956.

30 NBM 517-6, 9 January 1957.

31 DeWolf was a practitioner of this principle long before it was articulated and became popular in the USN in the late 1970's when it was introduced in the Defence Economics Course at the Naval War College.

32 DeWolf interview by the author.

33 NBM 485-2, 18 April 1956 and NBM 487-5, 2 May 1956.

34 DND, *Report on National Defence 1957*, 5.

35 DeWolf interview by the author.

36 NBM 485-3, 18 April 1956.

37 Ibid.

38 NBM 490-3, 23 May 1956.

39 NBM 492-5, 15 June 1956 and NBM 495-4, 4 July 1956.

40 NBM 504-5, 13 September 1956.

41 Storrs interview by the author. Storrs had to determine DeWolf's views on some matter before he left Ottawa and was pleased to find that he could make an appointment to see him early in the morning. His colleagues had not warned him the CNS expected not to be disturbed before ten o'clock. When he emerged from his interview, in tatters, DeWolf's personal staff studiously avoided eye contact but wore wry smiles. Storrs bumped into Cmdre. Dyer in the hall who said, "Didn't you know not to disturb Harry before ten?" Storrs said it was a sort of initiation for a "new boy".

42 Dyer interview by the author.

43 ACNS(Warfare), "Report of the Committee on the Control of Manpower and Money", 2 February 1956, 73/1223/File 661 RCN Rank Structure Committee 1956-, DHist.

44 NBM 478-2, 22 February 1956. As DeWolf had no experience with civilian industry, the conclusion can be drawn that he had been instructed by the DM as to the functions of a comptroller. However, DeWolf recognized the merits of the initiative probably after being told of Mainguy's laissez-faire approach to financial and manpower management.

45 Dyer interview by the author.

46 NBM 487-4, 2 May 1956.

47 NBM 505-4, 19 September 1956.

48 DeWolf recalled spending hour after hour with the DM justifying each line item in the navy's estimates. On occasions he would not be able to answer a specific question on an item and the staff officer responsible would have to be sent for to provide the information required. DeWolf interview by the author.

49 Bothwell et al, *Canada since 1945*, 169-170.

50 DND, *Report on National Defence 1957*, 37.

51 NBM 504-2, 13 September 1956.

52 NBM 487-5, 2 May 1956.

53 SOSp to CNP, DNOrg, DP(M), memo, 20 June 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, vol. 1.

54 DPers(M) to CNP, DCNP, DNOrg, SOSp, memo, 12 July 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 7, Complements General.

55 DNOrg to CNP, DCNP, DP(Men), memo, 10 August 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 7, Complements General.

56 DCNP to CNP, memo, 10 September 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 7, Complements General.

57 Ibid.

58 NComp Minute, 2 October 1956, *ibid*.

59 CNP Briefing Note, "Complementing 1950-1957", 22 May 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 8, Complements General.

60 SOSP to DNT, CNP, memo, 3 August 1956 and DNT to DP(Men), CNP, memo, 7 August 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 17, Operations and Plans. SOSmP was a new designation for Willson's position Staff Officer Seaman Personnel.

61 NBM 431-3, 30 December 1954. The problem existed in the Executive Branch. CNP had originally recommended approaching the RSC to gain approval to combine lieutenant-commanders and lieutenants together for complement accounting purposes. Adopting promotion by selection as an option was discussed by the Naval Board but set aside. Given the policy of the RSC to achieve symmetry in the tri-service rank structure, it should have been obvious that the combining ranks proposal would be unacceptable, and it was predictably rejected. Mainguy simply postponed the inevitable.

62 The report was named after its chairman Admiral Sir Aubrey Mansergh, RN.

63 NBM 493-4, 20 June 1956.

64 Ibid.

65 "Personnel Set-Up Under Study", *Crowsnest*, vol. 8, no. 10, August 1956, 13.

66 MacPherson and Burgess, *The Ships of Canada's Naval Forces, 1910-1980*, 190, 201. He temporarily commanded *Skeena* for four months, 1939-40, employed on coastal escort duty and *Assiniboine* for two months in 1942 and never left the jetty.

67 Cmdre. E.P. Tisdall, "The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on RCN Personnel Structure", 5, referred to hereafter as the "Tisdall Report". The author wishes to thank Mrs. Barbara Morris (nee: Tisdall) for the use of her father's personal working copy of the report that is annotated with pencilled comments and minutes. A copy of the "Tisdall Report" may be found in 71/95, DHist.

68 Ibid.

69 The planned maintenance system, copied from the USN, established an onboard routine maintenance regime for all ship's weapons, sensors, machinery and equipment that would be conducted by appropriately trained ship's technicians and personnel. The system was designed to ensure better technical performance and to enable ships to be more self-sufficient, relying less on dockyard support which was a major cost saving.

70 NBM 396-5, 19 January 1954 and "Report on the Rank Distribution of Chief Petty Officer First Class to Petty Officer Second Class in the RCN", NBM 496-3, 11 July 1956.

71 NBM 496-3, 11 July 1956.

72 "Mansergh Report", Admiralty General Message 476A, 3 March 1955, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 3, No. 1.

73 "Welby Committee Report" and Tisdall's minutes, *ibid.*, No. 15.

74 Cmdre. B.R. Spencer, EinC, brief, 15 February 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1, No. 100-62.

75 HMCS *New Glasgow*, 31 December 1956, contains the list of issues submitted to ships and establishments for consideration:

1. Is common entry and training to certain levels desirable for off?
2. If common entry and training were introduced the desirability of permitting a number of Engineer Officers and Supply Officers to achieve military command.
3. The existing status and career opportunities which should be made available to Branch Officers.
4. The existing methods of entry and training of officers, in particular, comments on any officers who have completed training in one of the tri-service colleges.
5. The adequacy of the existing branches in the RCN and the extent to which duties now carried out by some branches may be absorbed within others.
6. The desirable period of engagement for men so that wastage may be reduced and/or the service obtain the highest return on its investment.
7. The possibilities of a common entry for men.
8. The possibility of making greater use of "OJT"
9. The present method of drafting and the desirability of introducing fixed commission periods for ships.
10. The relative responsibilities of junior officers and Chief Petty Officers.
11. The maintainer - user concept.

76 Cdr. Hanington brief, 8 November 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 2, No. 100-27.

77 Hanington interview by the author.

78 RCN Barracks *Naden* (Cmdre. Budge) brief, 29 January 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1, No. 100-48.

79 FOAC brief, 4 March 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 2, No. 100-23.

80 FOPC brief, 4 April 1957, *ibid.*, No. 100-23.

81 For example see HMCS *New Glasgow* submission, 31 December 1956.

82 Cdr. Benson (*Cayuga*) brief, 27 February 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1, No. 100-56.

83 Cdr.(E) Harley brief, 4 February 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1, No. 100-49.

84 *Ibid.*, and Captain Piers (CCCC1) brief, 20 November 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 2, No. 18.

85 Capt. Charles brief, 19 September 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 2, No. 100-3.

86 HMCS *Ontario* (Welland) brief, 7 January 1957, and LCdr Leslie brief, 23 January 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1, Nos. 100-38 and 100-47.

87 LCdr Leslie brief, 3 December 1956, and CPO1 Benoy brief, 24 February 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1, Nos. 100-61 and 100-52. Tisdall's annotations on these is, "NO!" and it appears that he dismissed the possibility out of hand.

88 Charles interview by the author. Cmdre. Spencer was a cadet at RNCC in 1922, when it closed and went on to the University of British Columbia to obtain a degree in mathematics and science. He re-enrolled in 1924, and trained as an Engineer Officer in the RN. He with other technical branch officers led the quiet campaign in the postwar period against resistance from seamen officers to modernize the concept of education and training for the naval profession.

89 Cmdre(E) Spencer brief, 15 February 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1, No. 100-62.

90 *Ibid.*

91 Storrs interview by the author.

92 "Tisdall Report", 116.

93 *Ibid.*, 7.

94 Ibid., 6.

95 The description in the following paragraphs of the changes to the personnel structure for officers and men was derived from CNS to MND, "RCN Personnel Structure", 8 October 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 137, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1. This document includes the draft message from the CNS to the fleet.

96 "Tisdall Report", Recommendation 1, 97.

97 "Tisdall Report", Appendix 13.

98 Ibid., Appendix 8. Tisdall had not factored in the remaining cruiser and icebreaker which would result in an additional reduction of 55 officer billets when they decommissioned.

99 Ibid., 83.

100 NBM 533-1, 19 June 1957.

101 See FOAC to NSec, 2 August 1957 and CNP to CNS, memo, 30 August 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 137, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1. FOPC comments are included in CNP's memo and FOND's enclosed in FOAC's letter.

102 FOAC to NSec, 25 July 1957, *ibid.*

103 FOND letter, (undated), 2, in FOAC submission, *ibid.* Adams suggested that some form of personal "batman" or Seaman servant for officers be introduced. This was in addition to the steward trade.

104 "Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Personnel Members Committee", 17 September 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 137, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1.

105 CCOS to CNS, memo, 30 October 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 137, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1.

106 CNS to Tisdall, memo, 7 October 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 137, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1.

107 MND to CNS, memo, 1 November 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 137, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1.

108 CNS Message, 13 November 1957, attached to CNS to MND, memo, 8 October 1957.

109 DCNP to CNP, memo, 31 May 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 130, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1.

110 Ibid.

111 DNPO, "Composition and Build-up of the Fleet 1957-59" (draft), 8 March 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 16, Operations and Plans.

112 DNOrg to DNPO, memo, 18 April 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 16, Operations and Plans.

113 DNPO to VCNS, memo, 29 August 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 17, Operations and Plans.

114 FOAC to NSec, memo, 8 April 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 19, Operations and Plans.

115 DNPO to CNS, memo, 5 February 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 18, Operations and Plans. Bidwell did this at the commissioning of *Bonaventure*. CNS probably agreed in principle and FOAC should have followed staff procedures for confirmation.

116 FOAC to NSHQ, message, 212308Z April 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 18, Operations and Plans.

117 These would have been released by Cmdre. Quinn, COS FOAC, a former RCNVR officer who was not about to bend to Landymore, a Captain.

118 VCNS to CNS, memo, 6 March 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 19, Operations and Plans. CNS advised VCNS of his phone call to FOAC in a minute on the margin of the memo.

119 One of these was an opportunity for the new St. Laurents to work with the USS *Nautilus*, the new SSN. There is no evidence that Landymore warned COS FOAC of the necessary change by phone.

120 FOAC to NSec, 26 April 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 19, Operations and Plans.

121 FOAC was adamant that 3 new DDE's should not be sent to the west coast as proposed by DNPO and an impasse was reached. DNPO presented this proposal to the Naval Board who deferred to FOAC's wishes.

122 NBM 540-9, 28 August 1957.

123 "HMCS Bonaventure Joins The Fleet", *Crowsnest*, vol. 9, no. 4, February 1957, 4-7.

124 DeWolf interview by the author.

125 Ibid. To demonstrate that he was "not being wise after the fact", DeWolf related a discussion he had with Duncan Sands, Minister of Defence for the United Kingdom, in 1958, where he told Sands, "my support for the carrier in the Canadian navy was entirely based on the need for training." Sands confided that he was also "anti-carrier" and that the RN was pressing him on the issue in order to keep up with the USN.

CHAPTER 9

A Golden Moment

On this bright May morning our 50th birthday we in the Atlantic Command should take pride for our part in the progress of the Royal Canadian Navy over the years, which has only been attained by a lot of good planning, good thinking and good hard work. On this day too, we should pause to reflect on the few who in the lean years of the RCN had the courage and foresight to carry on, thus enabling us to celebrate this day and year.

Rear-Admiral Hugh Pullen
Flag Officer Atlantic Coast
4 May 1960.¹

The RCN's now scaled-down plans for building up the fleet were dealt another setback after the Liberal government went down to defeat in the federal elections of June 1957. The accession of the Conservatives to power definitely marked the end of the postwar expansion for the Canadian military and the beginning of a period that Colonel Raymont described as "near paralysis of defence policy formulation."² The new Conservative Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, was highly suspicious of the Defence Department and also External Affairs, initially taking the latter portfolio himself to bypass what he considered to be untrustworthy Liberal sympathizers.³ He precipitously committed Canada to the North American Air Defence Plan, NORAD, without cabinet scrutiny, only to discover later that he had placed Canada's air defence system under American control.⁴ In the view of General Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Diefenbaker had "a seemingly congenital dislike for generals and senior officers" and he never attempted to develop any sort of rapport with the military hierarchy.⁵ On the contrary, his policies seemed designed to antagonize his senior "Liberal" military advisors and this led to a breakdown in relations between the defence establishment and his government.⁶ Air Chief Marshall Frank Miller, who succeeded Foulkes, spoke of Diefenbaker as "a most unfortunate man" who got "the word on defence policy from his

barber."⁷ DeWolf's impression was that the Conservatives had no defence policy and recalled that Diefenbaker attended only one Defence Council meeting, at which he lectured the Chiefs of Staff on loyalty.⁸

In contrast, the new MND, Major-General George Pearkes, VC, was an amiable and respected career soldier turned politician. He had been the opposition defence critic since 1946 and was a strong supporter of NATO.⁹ Pearkes, a long time associate of General Foulkes, made an easy transition into his new office. Pearkes was on good terms with Diefenbaker and urged him to sign the NORAD agreement, some writers suggest, under Foulkes' influence.¹⁰ Desmond Morton, however, believed Pearkes failed to ask the right questions of his military advisers to Foulkes' ultimate embarrassment.¹¹ After the Prime Minister appointed Howard Green, a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament to the External Affairs portfolio in 1959, Pearkes lost influence and their relationship cooled. Relations with the United States deteriorated on the political level while they were growing closer in the military sphere. Diefenbaker's vacillation over nuclear weapons policy led to the resignation of Foulkes in 1960, and would later drive both George Pearkes, and Douglas Harkness, his successor, from the Defence portfolio.¹² It was in this environment of growing animosity and distrust that DeWolf fought to achieve the goals of the RCN during the second half of his tenure as CNS.

The Conservatives demonstrated immediately that they were intent on curtailing defence spending. Pearkes' first policy initiative was to order "austerity measures" that translated into a 20 percent reduction in the defence estimates for 1958-59. This set the RCN's cash ceiling initially at \$270 million and the Naval Board was given just six weeks to decide where to cut approximately \$40 Million.¹³ The immediate casualty was HMCS *Labrador*, which would be transferred to the Ministry of Transport.¹⁴ Maintaining sovereignty in the Arctic was not a priority of the navy and the icebreaker was of no value to NATO.¹⁵ The Naval

Board decided that the RCN(R) had to be cut by 25 percent which translated into a reduction of 1000 personnel, and the disbanding of seven reserve divisions and all five reserve air squadrons.¹⁶ The regular force personnel ceiling was frozen at 19,500, but the CNS was adamant that planning continue on the basis of 20,000 and said he would fight to have the ceiling increased.¹⁷ There were also to be reductions in civilian personnel and some civilian manned facilities closed. There would be cuts to ship and shore construction, acquisition programmes, and the operating and maintenance budget. However, the government considered proposed cuts that affected civilians and the disbanding of the reserve divisions or air squadrons to be politically unacceptable and the navy was directed to find reductions elsewhere in its estimates.

The Naval Board reached a final figure of \$281 million for the 1958-59 estimates, the additional \$11 million representing items ordered to be reinstated by the Minister and items such as RCN personnel, operating and maintenance expenses and procurement items that were considered absolutely essential.¹⁸ To achieve the reductions, it was decided to pay off the remaining cruiser. The critical ASW helicopter programme was liquidated and the follow-on ship replacement programme reduced to two ships from four. There were no reductions in naval personnel but 446 civilian billets were eliminated. The Naval Board recorded in its discussion of these arbitrarily imposed austerity measures, "that in order to comply with measures for reduced spending, it was compelled to make some proposals which are not in the best interests of the RCN and are acceptable only on a short term basis."¹⁹ The board had accepted the cuts as a temporary expedient and stipulated that unless naval commitments were revised in consultation with NATO, increased funding would be required in the 1959-60 estimates.

When the Screening Committee reviewed the navy's estimates, General Foulkes asked DeWolf to consider a personnel ceiling of 19,000. DeWolf responded with detailed outline of

firm SACLANT and CUSRPG commitments for 1959 totalling fifty-four ships that required 20,000 personnel.²⁰ He argued that the figures spoke for themselves and implied that if Canada reneged on its commitments the country would be viewed as a poor ally. Foulkes accepted DeWolf's position after further scrutiny of the navy's figures by Colonel Raymont, his Executive Staff Officer.²¹ Raymont's review also showed that DeWolf was cutting extraneous commitments by paying off *Ontario*, *Labrador*, three Reserve training ships, and replacing the crews of two modified Algerine escorts employed in scientific research work, *Oshawa* and *New Liskeard*, with civilians. General Foulkes subsequently successfully argued the navy's case with the Minister, but DeWolf had to agree to make further reductions in RCN personnel ashore.²² It was clear to DeWolf that he would have to adhere pragmatically to a strategy of increments if he were to continue to build up the RCN's ASW capability and achieve NATO force goals.

However, as 1958 dawned, the RCN was in danger of losing policy momentum and strong leadership because DeWolf was due to retire. The CNS would reach the normal retirement age of 55 in June 1958 and leave the service just after his classmate, Nelson Lay, who retired in January. Vice-Admiral DeWolf was persuaded, John Harbron reported, by senior officers of the other services to stay on "since there were so few to chose from at his rank for replacement."²³ Certainly the loss of DeWolf following that of two stalwarts, Lay and Bidwell, who had retired in September 1957, would have been serious. Lay's strong administrative capability and energy had raised the level of effectiveness of the Naval Staff. Bidwell, as Claxton noted, had done "a particularly fine job" in building up the fleet on the east coast during six years as COAC.²⁴ Rear-Admiral Tisdall, whose administrative ability was not proven, followed Lay as VCNS. Rear-Admiral Pullen, next senior to DeWolf, was COAC. Pullen would reach retirement age in 1960. DeWolf did not state how long he would stay but Rear-Admiral Herbert Rayner, now COPC and only 48 years of age, became his heir apparent.

The RCN was on the threshold of change as the cohort from the Royal Naval College of Canada (RNCC) reached retirement age. Rear-Admiral Porteous, CNTS, would also retire in 1958 to be relieved by Rear-Admiral Spencer. Spencer, with Pullen and Adams, had been in that last fateful class of the RNCC and should all retire within three years. The next generation of perspective flag officers was a mix of prewar RCN, wartime RCNR and RCNVR entries. Tony Storrs, former RCNR, would be promoted Rear-Admiral during 1958, Budge, former lower deck, in 1960, and Brock, former RCNVR, in 1961. However, a perusal of the *Navy Lists* for that period shows that the majority of the senior promotions were going to the prewar RCN officers and, should the rule of seniority prevail, the CNS would originate from this group until well into the 1970's.²⁵ But this was a new breed of officers who were already demonstrating a progressive attitude especially toward technology through many innovative ideas such as Variable Depth Sonar (VDS)²⁶ and marrying the ASW helicopter to the new DDE's. Bill Landymore, who was of this next cohort, and promoted Rear-Admiral in 1962, described his as "the generation of radar" whereas the thinking of the previous generation had been dominated by basic gun technology.²⁷ Landymore suggested that the necessity to adapt to advanced technology required not only higher education but a broadening of outlook to understand various elements and imperatives of North American society. The regeneration of the RCN into a modern navy was begun cautiously by the pragmatic DeWolf and some of his cohort as demonstrated in the "Tisdall Report". Landymore and his cohort would later be dismissed before they could complete the task.

The implementation of the recommendations of the Tisdall Report profoundly influenced policy development, fleet composition and operational effectiveness from 1958 until the dissolution of the Naval Board in July 1964. The senior staff could not foresee all the implications of the radical reorganisation but did appreciate there were risks involved. The

RCN hoped ideally for some respite during implementation from the tri-service agencies charged with fiscal and manpower oversight. This was not to be. DeWolf was constantly at loggerheads with the Rank Structure Committee (RSC), who expected immediate economies, to forestall their attempts to cut naval personnel. He argued vociferously and often with barely restrained anger, that the new personnel policies, some of which would not show benefits for ten years, must be allowed to work without interference. The CNS threatened relentlessly that the consequence of not doing so would prevent the RCN from fulfilling its NATO commitments.²⁸

DeWolf was not overstating the problem because there was a calculated risk in completely reorganizing the personnel structure. Characteristically, he expected the navy to get on with the job once the decision had been taken and he let the senior officers and the fleet know that in no uncertain terms.²⁹ Failure was not an alternative. However, the navy was the most traditional and conservative of the services. DeWolf's confidence and the prevailing RCN "Can-do" attitude notwithstanding, there was bound to be resistance to change. Commanding a ship had traditionally been the exclusive right of the Executive Branch. From the beginning, there was antagonism evident between the Seaman and Technical Officers over the opportunity for sea command being extended to the latter.³⁰ Vice-Admiral Dyer recalled, "[He] had to follow Tisdall as CNP whether you liked it or not. The big thing was people on the technical side could get in the stream and become CNS - Stupid thing!"³¹ The readiness of the men of the lower deck to accept the new rank and trade structure, the user-maintainer concept and on-the-job training was an unknown. The main burden during the transitional phase of implementation would fall upon the senior men of the fleet. Since 1945, this group had been called upon continually to make sacrifices and subjected to enormous pressures from massive amounts of sea time and chronic instability in ship's manning.

The task of developing the implementation timetable and coordinating the development of new personnel policies and training regime fell to the Coordinator of the Personnel Structure Committee (PSC). Captain J.C. "Scruffy" O'Brien was appointed to relieve Tisdall as the Coordinator in November 1957, and billets for three commanders were also established to assist him.³² O'Brien was a no-nonsense seaman officer after DeWolf's own heart who was on his way to becoming a vice-admiral.³³ Like most "streamers", he spent a limited time in any one job but presided over the implementation of the "Tisdall Report" for two critical years. When O'Brien was appointed to command *Bonaventure* in September 1959, continuity was maintained through the appointment of Captain F.D. Elcock, Director Naval Organization (DNOrg) and member of the PSC, as his successor.

O'Brien's task was a difficult one because he had to satisfy many contending requirements. He somehow had to coordinate the often competing goals of the Naval Staff concerned with fleet expansion, scheduling and operational readiness, with those of the Personnel Branch charged with implementation of the new structure, manning and training. Another important player was the Naval Comptroller who was responsible for manpower management and adamant that fiscal integrity in personnel allocation be maintained. Finally, the CNS was not prepared to compromise on achieving NATO force goals. Outside the navy's administrative loop, but critical in the process, was the Rank Structure Committee (RSC). Its objective, spear-headed by the Treasury Board Member, was to achieve reductions in the naval complement through demanding that the navy deliver on the economies anticipated by the Tisdall Report.

The key components of reorganization and for developing new ship's complements were the New Trade Structure (NTS) for men and the general list concept for officers. The principle governing the NTS for men was that through combining many of the RCN's "operator" trades

with relevant "maintainer" trades a more "versatile man" would be produced thereby improving efficiency which in turn would reduce the numbers required to man the ships.³⁴ This would be accomplished through a programme of "cross-training" serving men in the higher trade groups, partly in training establishments and partly on the job. A common entry would be introduced for new recruits whose trade would be decided during basic training through aptitude testing and assessment by divisional staff. New entry training time was to be reduced and the men sent directly to ships to be trained on-the-job from the Standard (basic - non-effective) to Trade Group 1 level. The critical first step was to establish the new trade specifications for the four trade group levels before the procedure of developing new ship's complements could be undertaken. The trade specifications determined the essential numbers required for maintenance, administration and habitability of each ship type to which would be added additional men required for the cruising and action states to fight the ship.³⁵ Concurrently, the navy would initiate its programme to separate rank from trade responsibilities and develop symmetrical rank pyramids as a component of the NTS. This would be implemented over ten years.

Rear-Admiral Dyer, Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP), believed that the trade specifications for men could be developed by October 1958, and new complements for ships no later than June 1959. This would enable the NTS to be introduced on 1 July 1959.³⁶ The magnitude of this task was enormous. The personnel sections of Queen's Regulations for the Canadian Navy (QRCN), the document governing administration, would have to be re-written almost entirely. Seventy-one existing trades had to be reduced to twenty-eight "feeder" trades at the Trade Group 1 (TG1) level and thirty-three "terminal" trades at the TG4 level.³⁷ Approximately 13,000 men in the higher trade groups were affected. These men had to be identified individually and placed into an appropriate cross-training programme. The syllabi for the new trade group courses had to be devised and schools designated to teach them. The

existing schools were branch affiliated and many had to be amalgamated under a new combined fleet school concept. There were also separate sea training components for many trade group levels and ships would have to be allocated for these. The navy assured the RSC that this could be done within the ceiling of 20,000 provided 256 additional men could be borne against vacant officers' billets until 1960. Dyer's projection was overly optimistic and introduction of the NTS was delayed until 1 January 1960. Even at this, the extent of the achievement by the RCN can not be overstated.

The projections developed initially by the staffs at NSHQ significantly underestimated the complement requirements for the ships against the fixed ceiling of 20,000 for the navy. The complements were developed based on the NTS that had to satisfy the criteria of both the Welby doctrine and SACLANT minimum manning requirements. Based on these criteria, the "Tisdall Report" proposed a basis for assessing peacetime ship's complements that would assure an appropriate level of fighting capability in the primary "Defence/Cruising state".³⁸ Essentially this would allow a ship to operate continuously for periods of up to one month in the "third degree of readiness" with all men in a three watch system based on the NTS.³⁹ This would enable a ship immediately to conduct an urgent attack or defend itself against a sudden threat. The additional sea billets required to achieve this increase in fighting readiness over the current peacetime complements were estimated by DNOrg to be between 650 and 750. However, he suggested that ships might have to be paid off to achieve this.⁴⁰ The Naval Board approved a request by the PSC to increase peacetime complements from 70 percent to about 90 percent of the war complement. This would be off-set by a reduction in the reserve force but there was no suggestion that commitments would be reduced.⁴¹ In practical terms this meant an increase, for example, in the complement of a St. Laurent class DDE of thirty-five men, from 203 to 238.

When Rear-Admiral Wright, the Naval Comptroller, calculated the total personnel cost of the approved policy, he tabulated the increase at approximately 1,424 men, including "non-effectives", for the fleet.⁴² He advised CNP that the basis of assessment for ship's complements would have to be two watches as opposed to three watches in the third degree of readiness in order to remain below the navy's ceiling. This essentially reduced the sensor (radar, sonar, etc.) operating personnel in the complement, who were also seamen. This amendment established the numerical complement of a St. Laurent DDE at 205 men, or virtually no increase. Wright suggested the amended manning level would achieve SACLANT's minimum standard and permit the NTS to be implemented. The hard reality was that the navy did not have the personnel to complement the ships to the degree of fighting capability recommended by Tisdall. It was Tisdall himself who approved the amendment in October 1958, for planning purposes pending approval by the Naval Board. The Naval Board accepted the amendment recommended by Wright, "taking into consideration ATP-1 [Allied Tactical Publication containing SACLANT's administrative doctrine] and the new personnel structure."⁴³ At the same time, Commanding Officers of ships were given "flexibility in the employment of their ship's companies." In practice, this would mean that ships undermanned would be directed to execute their scheduled operational programmes.⁴⁴

With the adoption of a liberal definition of SACLANT's manning requirements, the Naval Board had in reality approved a reduction in fighting capability across the fleet. An important element of the new personnel structure was the introduction of fixed cycles for ships that affected both the ship's mechanical readiness and personnel administration and training. During the period of a cycle, twenty-nine months in the case of a St. Laurent DDE, there would be no change in the ship's company. However, given that TG1 training was now to be carried out afloat, a St. Laurent DDE would commence a cycle with approximately 40 percent of her

complement being new entries from *Cornwallis*. In the case of *Bonaventure* it would be nearly 50 percent and about 30 percent in the case of a Tribal or frigate. Expressing his concern, Rear-Admiral Wright brought this revelation to the attention of VCNS commenting, "The variation in efficiency of ships of the same class will therefore be most marked and it seems to me, even in the days of peace, an unwarranted risk to commission a ship with such a large proportion of men going to sea for the first time."⁴⁵ Wright concluded by asking whether adhering to the principles was sufficient to justify the consequent lack of proficiency. Tisdall's original model had provided for a higher percentage of trained personnel. However, for an undetermined reason he had reversed himself and accepted this risk and the navy forged on. The reduced numbers drew some comment from the fleet. Rear-Admiral Pullen advised NSHQ that the proposed complement of seamen for frigates was "inadequate for efficient and safe operations" if those ships were to be employed in their current role.⁴⁶ The fact that each ship would become a training ship as soon as it began its operational cycle had begun to strike home. The response from NSHQ was that circumstances precluded any increase in complement.⁴⁷

The introduction of the general list for officers was to coincide with that of the men on 1 January 1960.⁴⁸ The Limited and Restricted Duty Lists would be introduced later. There would not be an elaborate programme of cross-training for general list officers. The new structure would be implemented slowly through introducing general list trained junior officers at the bottom and allowing it to evolve.⁴⁹ In the upper ranks "specialist officers", which included nearly all except limited duty officers such as chaplains, nurses, and instructor officers, would continue to be employed in place. Onboard ships, former Executive Branch officers would be employed in either the new Operations or Weapons Departments. Ordnance officers would be employed in the latter. Engineer officers would take over the Engineering Department but required electrical cross-training at some time. Electrical officers, who had essentially become

redundant under the new system until retrained, were to be left on board ships in charge of "a separate department" that included men in the new Electrical and Electronic Technicians trades. There would be no immediate change in the employment of Supply Officers.

The key to implementation of the general list concept was a training scheme based on common entry from the four-year Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP). Provision for integrating officers from short service entries such as Venture was not discussed in the "Tisdall Report". New ROTP sub-lieutenants graduating from the service colleges and universities would be trained as general list officers (surface) or (air) commencing September 1959.⁵⁰ After thirty-two weeks of "pre-fleet" technical courses, surface officers would undertake a twenty-four month first sea phase to qualify them as both engineering and upper deck watchkeepers. Junior officers would take area speciality courses after a second sea phase such as the new Weapons Officers Course. This training was open to all general list officers such as former Engineer or Supply Officers.⁵¹ It was projected that over a ten year period the new Weapons, Operations, Engineering and Supply officers would be selected from this stream.⁵² Air officers would commence flying training after the technical courses but would feed back into the surface system after their first flying tour to obtain upper deck and engineering watchkeeping qualifications. The question arises immediately as to the wisdom of developing a plan where all entrants should possess ROTP academic qualifications where the records and current projections clearly indicated junior officer production was inadequate, particularly from ROTP.

While the RCN was depending on the officer structure to be reformed from below, the level of officer production was both unpredictable and consistently below requirements.⁵³ Tisdall noted that in 1956, of 2332 RCN officers only sixty-eight were the product of ROTP.⁵⁴ An NSHQ study of ROTP in 1958, observed that it had not been a success as the main source of officer material and "future trends were disturbing". It concluded that, "[The] Service must

be prepared for [continued] shortfalls and make up from other plans."⁵⁵ The study also noted that there was a lack of acceptance in the RCN of ROTP. This was borne out by Tisdall who found many senior officers still supported the idea of an independent naval college. The navy had, of necessity inaugurated, the Venture plan and commissioning from the ranks schemes to supplement ROTP. The main problem with ROTP was a dearth of suitable candidates which resulted in low enrolment and a wastage rate of approximately 25 percent during training. Initiatives were taken to make Venture a feeder programme for ROTP through raising academic training to the senior matriculation level in the first year.⁵⁶ This coincided with the introduction of a mandatory four-year academic programme in ROTP leading to a general science degree. The Royal Military College became a degree granting institution in 1959.⁵⁷ However, there were general complaints from naval cadets about the quality of summer training and poor support from the navy during the academic year. Many junior ROTP officers looked upon the mandatory three years they had to serve in the fleet "as a jail sentence for stealing their degrees."⁵⁸ The navy was not winning their loyalty and many left after their mandatory service. The establishment in 1959 of 4th Escort Squadron on the west coast as a dedicated junior officer training squadron specifically for ROTP, UNTD and Venture sea training demonstrated the RCN's commitment to improving officer production.⁵⁹ The "Training Squadron" consisted of seven frigates under the command of a full Captain with a full training staff.

The general list junior officer training requirements were introduced in 1959 but applied only to ROTP entries. They were trained in the technology on the new DDE's and sent there to qualify. Officers from Venture and other Short Service plans were segregated into another stream and sent to the Tribals and frigates. They were required to qualify only as upper deck watchkeepers.⁶⁰ As many of these were granted permanent commissions, the navy created two officer classes that had to be integrated later in speciality training. Almost immediately the

requirement to obtain a general science degree had to be dropped and other degree options allowed in order to reduce the wastage rates in naval cadets in ROTP. Cadets who chose to "drop-out" of the program after completing at least one year, if deemed suitable were offered a short service option where they would proceed directly to the fleet for training in the Venture stream. General Foulkes had told DeWolf that he believed that planning to train all officers to degree level as recommended in the "Tisdall Report" was too ambitious and was proven correct.⁶¹ Tisdall had overlooked the record of low officer production from ROTP. The idea of universality of application of the general list junior officer training plan was fine in theory but impractical.

Policy changes and initiatives pertaining to officers' careers featured equalizing promotion opportunities and removing branch distinctions. A major problem was eliminating the unbalanced distribution of officers by age and seniority, particularly in the rank of Lieutenant-Commander, which was the result of rapid expansion. Promotion zones based on time in rank were established for all Lieutenant-Commanders, Commanders and Captains to be phased in over time to protect the interests of those serving under different schemes.⁶² A policy was introduced to equalize promotion opportunities to Lieutenant for enrolees in ROTP, whose training was extended to four years under the general list plan, with those from the Venture Plan who graduated as Sub-Lieutenants after two years. Annual instead of semi-annual selection boards for promotion were adopted for economy and to facilitate appointment scheduling. Promotions were now to be published only at the beginning of each year.⁶³ A new performance-based form for officers' confidential evaluation reports, CNS-206, was introduced that copied the USN system.⁶⁴ These reports were also to be monitored by NSHQ for validity and consistency. Visual acuity standards were lowered for 10 percent of ROTP candidates to open recruiting opportunities for the navy.⁶⁵ The Naval Board wished to issue notice that radical

change was imminent and decreed that officers' branch distinguishing markings would be phased out (Medical officers excepted) on 1 September 1958. Branch affiliation was indicated by coloured cloth worn between the rank stripes by all except Executive Branch Officers. The Naval Board believed "the psychological effect of discontinuing [this practice] important."⁶⁶

The structure of the RCN(R) was specifically excluded from the terms of reference for the Tisdall study. This followed a pattern of declining importance that began when the RCN adopted the NATO MC 48 concept. The evidence also suggests that DeWolf considered Rear-Admiral Adams, Flag Officer Naval Divisions (FOND), had been allowed to create a separate empire with a large appetite for regular force resources.⁶⁷ Both the RCN(R) and UNTD were reduced in the 1957-58 estimates and the strength stood at approximately 3,600 in July, 1957. Tisdall suggested a further reduction in the UNTD intake to garner resources and produce a better trained officer.⁶⁸ In re-appraising the requirement for reserve forces in an emergency, the Naval Board was influenced as strongly by the need to economize as by the MC 48 concept of "forces-in-being".⁶⁹ It was decided in principle to reduce the reserves again and the depth of the cuts was increased by the austerity programme introduced by the new Conservative government.

It is apparent that DeWolf was prepared to sacrifice the reserves in order to preserve the regular force. The 1958-59 estimates indicated a 25 percent cut in reserve personnel and the UNTD. Moreover, six naval divisions were to be closed and all air squadrons eliminated.⁷⁰ Intervention by the MND temporarily forestalled some closures but DeWolf prevailed in the end. The strength of the reserve was set at 900 officers and 3,700 men in January 1958, with indications more cuts would follow.⁷¹ Rear-Admiral Adams tried to put a brave face on the situation stating in his farewell retirement speech that, "The basic role of the RCN(R) in the nuclear age remains unchanged."⁷² The fact was that the higher levels of education and

professional training required by the general list concept for officers and NTS for men were not attainable within the existing reserve structure. Moreover, under the MC 48 concept of "forces-in-being", the reserve forces had no immediate role. The RCN(R) entered limbo at this time until a study of its future role could be undertaken.. After Adams' retirement, his billet reverted to a Commodore's rank. Mainguy had the Rear-Admiral billet created specifically for Adams and the RSC was insistent that it be downgraded after Adams retired.⁷³

It was critical that the navy obtain sufficient funding in 1959-60 to achieve its baseline personnel and force goals. The initial personnel ceiling was set at 20,500, an increase of 500, although the actual requirement was 20,672.⁷⁴ The navy's strategy was to attempt to wrest incremental increases in the ceiling from the government in order to attain the manning levels it really required. The RCN planned to have one light fleet carrier with eight F2H3 Banshees and twelve CS2F Trackers embarked, forty-three ASW ocean escorts and ten minesweepers in commission and available by 31 March, 1960. These numbers reflected the revised SACLANT force levels (for D + 180) agreed to in 1958, and stated in the MC 70 planning document.⁷⁵ Given the pending obsolescence of the older DD's and frigates, it was essential to obtain approval to build two replacement ships annually.

The navy obtained an increase in the estimates to \$290.1 million which approximated the expenditure for 1953-54.⁷⁶ Given that the actual expenditures for 1958-59 would be approximately \$276.5 million, this would allow the navy to sustain itself at the minimum level and commence the last two repeat Restigouche class DDE's. A concession was granted allowing the navy to increase the personnel ceiling to 20,661 but the level of the reserves was frozen and civilian strength reduced by 3 percent. The Naval Board had to eliminate the modernization programme for *Crusader* and *Sioux* and reduce expenditure on the new ASW helicopter programme for which the Treasury Board required more substantiation. Moreover, aircraft

engine overhaul funding was cut which would mean a corresponding reduction in flying hours. The fleet would also have to reduce fuel consumption by 8 percent thereby reducing operational and personnel training.

There were several trends apparent in the pattern emerging in a perusal of annual expenditures from fiscal year 1953-54. The first was that by 1959-60 personnel costs, including civilian, had risen exponentially and were now consuming 49 percent of the navy's budget, more than double that of 1953-54. The cost of naval personnel had doubled owing to increased pay and benefits while there were only 3,000 more personnel in the RCN. The number of civilians remained relatively steady over the period.⁷⁷ The operating and maintenance budget indicated a reduction of 20 percent below that of 1953-54, even though the navy was now operating nearly twice as many ships. The budget for new equipment, construction (including shore) and research and development showed a reduction of 35 percent. The main inference that the Naval Board drew from this study was that the navy should continue to receive approximately 20 percent of the National Defence budget. That would mean between \$120 and \$140 million available annually to spend on new programmes.⁷⁸ In practical terms this suggested that a two ship per year replacement programme and acquisition of ASW helicopters would be sustainable. However, looming in the future were the conversion costs of the new DDE's to carry helicopters, the mass obsolescence of the older DD's and frigates in the mid-1960's, and new submarine and tanker acquisition programmes. Moreover, an increase of at least 1,000 more naval personnel was required to man the fleet up to the standard recommended by Tisdall.

In spite of the turbulence and setbacks caused by manning problems, the RCN forged ahead with its primary strategy of commissioning as many hulls for NATO as possible. Perseverance had paid off and 1959 was forecast as the year when all destroyers and frigates, including the seven Restigouche class under construction, would be in commission. Moreover,

the formation of the fleet into squadrons would be achieved and disposition by coast accomplished as planned. The author of the plan for the composition and deployment of the fleet for 1959 was Captain (later Rear-Admiral) John Charles, who relieved Captain Landymore as Director of Plans and Operations in June 1958. Charles, who had impressed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten with his staff work, was one of the new breed of RCN officer.⁷⁹ A communications specialist who had participated in developing NATO tactical and communications doctrine, Charles' experience gave him an understanding of the degree of independence and flexibility required by commanders. Moreover, he understood that NSHQ was an administrative headquarters and that with the maturation of the SACLANT command structure and closer integration of defence plans with the USN, the Canadian Maritime Commanders were primarily responsible for operations, and scheduling ship employment was their realm.⁸⁰ Other changes to the Naval Staff in 1958, were the appointments of Commodore Brock as ACNS (A&W), relieving Storrs, and Commodore A. G. Boulton as ACNS (Plans), relieving Raymond. Significantly both Brock and Boulton were former RCNVR officers. On the east coast, Commodore Budge relieved Commodore Quinn as Chief of Staff to COAC. These changes in personalities resulted in improved working relationships between NSHQ and the commands.

The draft plan for the composition and deployment of the fleet for 1959 was based on the new SACLANT force goals that required the carrier and twenty-nine ocean escorts be immediately available (Category One) on the east coast.⁸¹ In order to achieve this the Naval Board had to transfer one frigate, *New Waterford*, to the east coast but was compelled to seek approval from the Chiefs of Staff Committee. *Ontario* was about to pay off and the transfer of a frigate would cause a further imbalance of personnel between the coasts and the Naval Board feared "possible political repercussions".⁸² This issue was politically sensitive because the

Minister's west coast riding would be affected by the reductions. The Naval Board justified this transfer with the argument that there should actually be thirty-four escorts on the east coast to meet the SACLANT commitment because five ships were always in refit. The RCN was obliged for political reasons to maintain a two-thirds to one-third ratio and retain fourteen ships in Esquimalt.

The plan for the deployment of destroyers and frigates would be the seven Restigouche class DDE's, eleven Tribal DD's and eleven Prestonian frigates (FF's) on the east coast and the seven St. Laurent class DDE's and seven Prestonian frigates on the west coast. On the east coast, the older destroyers were to be formed into two escort squadrons, the 1st (C1) and 3rd (C3), and frigates into two, the 7th (C7) and 9th (C9). The assignment of ships would be determined by the future refit cycle so that only one ship per squadron would be unavailable at any time. *Crusader* was assigned as the Command trial ship. The Restigouche class DDE's would eventually form the 5th Squadron (C5), replicating the RCN's "Barber Pole brigade" of World War II fame.⁸³ On the west coast, the St. Laurents would form the 2nd Squadron (C2) and the frigates the 4th (C4), which was designated as the Training Squadron dedicated entirely to training Venture and ROTP cadets.

The proposed plan introduced cycles for ships to create personnel stability, enhance maintenance and improve operational availability. Ships were placed on fixed cycles of twenty-nine months for destroyers, with two years between refits, and twenty-two months for frigates with eighteen months between refits.⁸⁴ The period allocated for refits was reduced to eight and six and one-half months respectively which increased the operational availability for both classes of ships to approximately 65 percent during their cycles. This was another new innovation being introduced into the fleet to improve effectiveness. When the draft of the plan was circulated to the fleet for comment, Captain Charles appended the caveat "However, there

may be local manning problems of which NSHQ is unaware and which might preclude the achieving the composition of the fleet as programmed."⁸⁵ This suggested how much hinged on the personnel situation that was precarious and full of unknowns.

Many of the personnel problems that militated against achieving the fleet plan had been foreseen, others were chronic. The navy was approximately 450 officers short and at best these numbers would increase by only 150 per year.⁸⁶ The paying off of *Ontario* and transfer of frigates to the east coast would reduce the west coast portion of the RCN personnel from 32 to 27 percent with "serious effects on the career prospects of west coast personnel."⁸⁷ Rear-Admiral Dyer, CNP, recommended, among several solutions, that it might be time to abolish the Home Port Division system in the RCN. The Personnel Branch projected that obtaining the numbers of men to meet the proposed complement of 17,706 men for 1959-60 was not going to be a problem if recruiting held up. The navy had grown by 731 men during fiscal year 1957-58. The Director of Naval Manning (DNM) advised CNP that the critical problem was that these men would join the fleet untrained and a further difficulty would be to train the men now in the navy to fill the higher trade levels.⁸⁸ The trades most affected would be electrical and engineering, perennial problems, and radio technicians. He concluded that shortages in higher trades would persist across the board and the navy may be forced to continue the practice of minimum manning in certain categories.

The Personnel Branch proposed several stop gap solutions including the suggestion to recruit 214 men temporarily against officers' billets while seeking an increase in the ceiling for men. The solutions also called for borrowing heavily from the Esquimalt Port Division as well as allowing that division to reduce through attrition while recruiting selectively from Eastern Canada to increase the numbers in the Halifax Port Division.⁸⁹ Transferring a man on loan to the east coast did not affect his career prospects because he remained on the west coast roster.

However, Rear-Admiral Charles observed it was extremely unpopular because men could not take their families on a temporary draft. Most wives would not want to go in any case because housing in Halifax was scarce and the city unappealing.⁹⁰ Most of these senior men were officially "volunteers" but the truth of the matter is that many were coerced through appeals to loyalty to the navy or the suggestion that it would improve their career prospects. Where shortages could not be made up through borrowing, as was the case with senior electricians, the only alternative was to take men from ships in refit and the maintenance depot ships, and to continue the practice of undermanning established positions with less qualified men. This meant employing Trade Group Three men instead of Trade Group Four.⁹¹

When it was determined that Esquimalt was also short of senior electricians and other sources were exhausted, Rear-Admiral Dyer informed the Electrical Engineer-in-Chief (EEinC) that, "A governing factor in the manning of the fleet and fulfilling our NATO and national commitments in 1959 will be the acute shortage of trained trade group four electrical and radio technicians."⁹² Dyer stated that he could find no solution to this problem, "except keeping the ships in commission with a reduced electrical maintenance efficiency." The Electrical Engineer-in-Chief was strongly opposed to this proposal stating that maintenance would suffer.⁹³ He was concerned because a planned maintenance system to be conducted by ships' personnel had just been introduced in the fleet and there were also teething problems with the new ships. Seeing no alternative, the Naval Board advised Rear-Admiral Pullen, FOAC, that, "Ships must be employed with below authorized complement in this [the electrical] trade until more can be found."⁹⁴ This would not phase Pullen who epitomized the "Ready Aye Ready" ethic and who had already advised NSHQ that he did not intend to sacrifice operational training for his ships to satisfy sea training requirements of the Fleet School.⁹⁵ Rear-Admiral Rayner, COPC, protested the reduction in west coast ships and also that his command would experience an

actual drop of 700 in complement since 1957 given ship reductions and transfers and proposed personnel loans.⁹⁶ His protests were noted but the principle driving decisions was that the east coast NATO commitment had to be met at all costs. The plan for the composition of the fleet in 1959 would stand.

Vice-Admiral DeWolf had to overcome considerable bureaucratic resistance in the Rank Structure Committee (RSC) across a spectrum of requirements pertaining to both the NTS and complement for the fleet plan. The implementation of the recommendations in the Tisdall Report required a plethora of separate submissions that had to be argued individually. General Foulkes as Chairman of the RSC made it his responsibility to ensure the navy exercised maximum economy in the allocation of personnel resources and achieved reductions wherever possible. He had the authority to establish billets on a temporary basis, pending confirmation by the RSC, which he did on a one-for-one basis. The whole process was laborious and the RSC was perpetually in arrears processing the navy's submissions. The fleet composition plan for 1959, required an increase in senior officers billets including two Captains for the 4th and 5th Squadrons and fifteen Commanders for the new DDE's and the 7th and 9th Squadrons.⁹⁷ Forwarded also to Foulkes for consideration by DeWolf but not receiving an endorsement was an unsolicited recommendation from Rear-Admiral Pullen that the rank of Maritime Commander Atlantic be increased to the rank of Vice-Admiral. Pullen cited his NATO responsibilities, "being co-equal with the U.S. Commander in Chief Atlantic", and those added by having air forces under his operational control.⁹⁸

In their response the RSC failed to recommend any new billets except those required for newly commissioned ships. Their rationale was that their estimates of the economies to be realized through implementation of the Tisdall Report had rendered three Captains and twenty Commanders positions redundant.⁹⁹ They also considered that elimination of the branch system

recommended by Tisdall would create more vacancies in the headquarters' organizations. With respect to Rear-Admiral Pullen's recommendation to upgrade his position, the RSC, "felt that there were insufficient grounds for serious consideration."¹⁰⁰ The RSC left the navy in limbo on other submissions pending the review under the terms of the Tisdall Report. They concluded by suggesting to DeWolf that after the commencement of war the role of the RCN would be a diminishing one and also that no crews would be required for ships in refit. Therefore the navy might save personnel on the east coast because of the twenty-nine escorts five would be always in refit and, "In view of this you should examine the possibility of limiting the rank structure and establishment to 25 crews which should be adequate to operate the 24 ships with one spare crew."¹⁰¹

DeWolf's immediate reaction to this bureaucratic logic is not available but can be imagined. His rebuttal was restrained and carefully crafted. He prefaced his response conceding that economies through the implementation of Tisdall's recommendations were anticipated but admonished the RSC, "I would be less than frank if I did not point out that there is little foundation to the fact for the expectation of immediate and wholesale economies. The elimination of the branch system involves some fundamental changes and cannot be progressed at a rate which would lead to confusion of responsibilities, loss of morale and deterioration of fighting efficiency."¹⁰² With respect to the suggestion that the number of ship's companies might be reduced, he defeated every point. First he explained SACLANT's strategy and the navy's commitment. This he followed with a detailed explanation of how the navy functioned particularly with respect to employment of ship's personnel through an entire cycle.¹⁰³ DeWolf's response forestalled the RSC. The exercise demonstrated the problems inherent in operating in an integrated environment where financial imperatives had come to constitute the overriding criteria for developing national strategy. DeWolf could not risk alienating the RSC because he

needed its continuing support to implement major initiatives such as the reorganization of Naval Service Headquarters and the commands.

DeWolf had begun to reorganize NSHQ in September 1957 by combining Warfare and Air responsibilities under one ACNS (Air and Warfare) on the Naval Board.¹⁰⁴ This change also had the salutary effect of eliminating direct influence of the Royal Navy, as ACNS (Air) had always been an RN officer on loan. The Tisdall Report made reorganization a first priority because of the elimination of the branch system would cause whole sections, such as the Director General Naval Ordnance, to disappear. Additionally, DeWolf desired to reorganize both NSHQ and the Commands along functional lines to facilitate both administration and communications. The RSC was advised that the NSHQ reorganization would coincide with the introduction of the new personnel structure.¹⁰⁵ Part of DeWolf's reorganization initiative was the development of standards and productivity criteria to improve the utilization of naval and civilian personnel. The Management and Methods Section A commenced a preliminary study under the supervision of the Naval Comptroller.¹⁰⁶ This general study was designed to assess weaknesses and strengths of the existing organization in light of the current role, of the navy in general, and naval headquarters in particular. The preliminary report alleged many weaknesses and DeWolf directed members of the Naval Board to validate them and to determine if they could be corrected within the existing organization.¹⁰⁷

The Naval Comptroller reviewed apparent anomalies and omissions discovered in the terms of reference of the members of the Naval Board and developed proposals to the number of members and for delegation of authority from CNS to facilitate administration and speed up approvals of programmes and projects. Effective 1 January 1960, coinciding with the introduction of the NTS, the composition of the Naval Board would be comprised of CNS, VCNS, CNP, CNTS and NCOMP.¹⁰⁸ The ACNS (Plans) and ACNS (Warfare and Air) were

deleted and would continue their functions under the VCNS with a new title of Director General (DG).¹⁰⁹ DeWolf obtained approval to elevate the Naval Comptroller to Rear-Admiral along with his request to the Minister to reconstitute the Naval Board.¹¹⁰ The Naval Comptroller also initiated studies of the four branches; Naval Staff, Personnel, Technical Services and Comptroller, with a view to devising simpler, more efficient and more economical organizations.

The report of the examination of the Chief of Naval Personnel Branch by the Management and Methods Section confirmed the problems of branch control of personnel policy and crisis management alleged in the "Tisdall Report" and suspected by many.¹¹¹ Although it did not fault the personnel branch for enthusiasm and dedication, it described an organization weak administratively and lacking in management skills and competence. It was found that while staff officers had the responsibility for the detail of personnel work, the advisors for the various branches, both officers and men, had effectively assumed authority for decisions on appointments, drafts, promotion and training.¹¹² With respect to planning, the report made the observation, "There appeared to be widespread misconception of the function of planning. The concept of planning as a part of the Executive Role appears to be buried in routine or detail work....In the majority of cases very little concrete evidence was available as to the accomplishment of the planning function."¹¹³ The study team also found, "that delegation of real authority was practically non-existent" and that nearly every decision was elevated to the level of the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (DCNP). They concluded, "The controls and excessive coordination outlined above because of insufficient delegation of authority may be primarily due to a lack of formal personnel training provided staff officers prior to assuming their duties."¹¹⁴

With respect to the organizational arrangements, the lack of delegation resulted in an "unreasonably high span of control" for DCNP and enormous workload that negated his ability to supervise the planning process. In the Directorate of Naval Manning, ostensibly responsible for long range planning, no evidence could be found that this function was being carried out and staff officers, "were almost entirely involved in the detail of men administration rather than the development of policies consistent with future personnel development."¹¹⁵ Also, the Directorate of Naval Training organization did not appear to be organized to accomplish its objective of establishing training policy for individuals of the RCN. In the Directorate of Personnel (Officers) career planning for officers was found to be non-existent because of the time consumed solely in arranging appointments piece-meal. Due to a lack of planning, it was found that the majority of appointments resulted in a chain reaction of two to six other consequential appointments.¹¹⁶ The staff workload was uneven and the task of arranging the appointments of the 1459 seaman officers below the rank of Commander fell to two seaman staff officers. Four technical staff officers were available to manage the remaining 902 technical officers. The latter had time for planning but it was found their five-year plan of appointments was based on present as opposed to future naval commitments. The report observed that this might be "considered to be a worthwhile exercise but may prove to be of little practical value."¹¹⁷

The study team found no evidence that women were part of the personnel structure. The report stated, "It appeared that the Wrens are not completely accepted or integrated into the Royal Canadian Navy. This may only be the analyst's impression, but discussion with other individuals of Personnel [sic] conveyed the impression that Wrens were not considered in the overall Personnel Plan."¹¹⁸ Women were segregated and treated as a single entity like a branch but without a clear role in the navy. The "Tisdall Report" had devoted less than one page to the subject of WRCNS Officers and Women.¹¹⁹ A principle that both RCN(W) officers and RCN

Wrens should be employed in lieu of their male counterparts was vaguely stated and that their promotion and conditions of service "should be arranged to conform as nearly as possible with the RCN system."¹²⁰ Tisdall added a gender specific caveat that their service did not have to be in conformity with the RCN system if it was "undesirable for females". Tisdall made no specific recommendation respecting women except that nurses should form an integrated part of the medical special duties list. The implementation plans for the new personnel structure did not include women. It may be indicative of the importance given to the female component of the RCN that the CNS addressed his message announcing the new personnel structure only to officers and men.

The report demonstrated that personnel management in the RCN was ad hoc, poorly organized and conducted by enthusiastic amateurs. The forty-two recommendations of the study team focused on the need for the Personnel Branch to become the authority responsible for "the development of objective plans and policies for the procurement and wise utilization of naval manpower" and to reorganize itself to execute those functions.¹²¹ It provided a comprehensive blueprint for reorganization and the introduction of sound personnel management practices. The report stressed the need for training in personnel management for those assigned to the Personnel Branch. Moreover, staff assignments should be open and non-branch specific so as to eliminate branch influence that had biased decisions in the past. An important recommendation was that a Plans and Project Group be established to interpret future naval commitments into personnel allocations and that this group should consult closely with ACNS (Plans) [DG Plans] in developing long-range plans, five years or more, for the RCN. This group would also have a coordination function within the Personnel Branch to facilitate planning. A key recommendation was that Naval Service Headquarters should delegate sufficient authority to commands, depots, recruiting stations, schools and other facilities pertaining to personnel management or training

along with appropriate instructions to enable them to conduct the detailed day-to-day personnel business of the navy. The Naval Board gave approval on 8 January 1960, for the Personnel Branch to be reorganized broadly along the lines suggested.¹²²

The Naval Board turned its attention to a long-range forecast once the immediate fleet requirements were approved in the composition plan for 1959. It was realized that the continuing construction programme of two ships per year would result in a shortage of escorts from 1964 to 1977 to meet NATO force goals of forty-three vessels and this could no longer be considered "a hard and fast figure".¹²³ The board thought that the shortfall could be overcome in part through extending the lives of some older ships and improving the capabilities of others. There was also a strong appreciation of the challenges of advancing technology and that the true submersible, the nuclear submarine, must be considered as a possible alternative to ASW surface ships. A study into acquiring nuclear powered submarines was already in progress.¹²⁴ Research and development had proven the feasibility of marrying the helicopter to the DDE and also perfected a Variable Depth Sonar (VDS). In January 1959, the Naval Board took the decision to proceed with fleet modernization. The seven St. Laurent class escorts and the last two repeat Restigouche class building were to be converted to carry helicopters and fitted with VDS, as well as the AN/SQS 503 improved Hull Mounted Sonar (HMS).¹²⁵ This project was to be completed by 1965, and conversion of the remaining new escorts would follow. It was also decided that planning would proceed for an ASW Frigate for the ship replacement programme. This diesel-powered escort would carry three helicopters and be capable of 21 knots. It was anticipated that three of these ships could be built for the cost of two repeat Restigouches.¹²⁶ Part of the rationale for choosing the cheaper frigate was that nuclear submarines might be a possible alternative and the Naval Board wished to retain some financial flexibility. Cheaper alternatives such as ASW hydrofoils were also to be investigated.

In March 1959, the Naval Staff submitted a "Medium Range Forecast of RCN Requirements For The Period 1960-66" based on the long-range forecast. The Naval Staff concluded that "the existing and approved forces are inadequate to meet the requirements of the RCN in relation to the threat in the decade following 1961."¹²⁷ As an ASW force the RCN would be deficient through a lack of nuclear submarine capability and deficient in its escort role through a lack of surface to air and surface to surface missile capabilities. By 1966, there would also be a numerical deficiency of nine escorts below NATO force goals owing to the retirement of three destroyers and six frigates. To avoid this, two ships a year, but preferably three, should be laid down. Moreover, the "limited" air defence capability provided by the Banshee fighters would lapse when they were retired without replacement in 1962. An anti-air missile capability was urgently needed. Three tankers were required to provide mobile logistic support but only one was approved. Two additional submarines were required to provide training for ASW forces. Added to this list of deficiencies and requirements were others pertaining to dispersed logistic support, helicopter maintenance, local defence and early warning systems and shore construction.

The Naval Staff recommended a comprehensive programme of acquisition and modernization headed by the acquisition of nuclear submarines depending on the outcome of the on-going exploratory studies.¹²⁸ The Naval Board approved the recommendations of the Naval Staff for fiscal planning purposes but not as authorization for any project. DeWolf had to concede that the RCN was losing ground and could not meet SACLANT's force goals that had been heretofore considered sacrosanct and the justification for acquisition programmes. The Naval Board Minutes of 25 March 1959 stated, "The [NATO] force goals accepted by Canada will not always be the same as those recommended by SACLANT, and caution should be used in quoting the latter as a basis for an estimated short-fall in ships."¹²⁹ DeWolf was obviously

concerned that stressing the widening gap might act as a disincentive to the government and threaten the funding for ship replacement. The government had just cancelled the RCAF's Arrow project. The fact was that the RCN was deficient across the spectrum of NATO goals under the MC48 concept, many of which involved support infrastructure. There was funding barely sufficient for ship replacement let alone to build up stockpiles of stores, ammunition and fuel oil.

DeWolf accepted the argument that the RCN should establish a submarine service and gained approval for this from the Cabinet Defence Committee in March 1960. His rationale was similar that for the carrier and naval aviation, the submarines were required to provide training services for ASW forces.¹³⁰ DeWolf initiated a programme to obtain in the 1960-61 estimates an old USN fleet submarine on loan for training on the west coast.¹³¹ The RCN flirted with the idea of acquiring nuclear powered submarines (SSN's). In 1958, DeWolf made a public statement probably to test political support that Canada may acquire these vessels.¹³² A feasibility study by the Nuclear Submarine Survey Team confirmed that Canada could build and operate SSN's with the support of the USN.¹³³ DeWolf was impressed by the SSN's capability but he had a personal disinclination towards anything "atomic".¹³⁴ Pragmatically, he took the decision not to propose acquisition of SSN's on the basis that they were simply not affordable. The RCN could obtain two conventional submarines for the price of one nuclear. Moreover, these were more in keeping with the RCN's small ship status and SSN's were in the "big ship" league. The Naval Board put nuclear propulsion on hold in March 1960, but for all intents and purposes the plan was shelved.¹³⁵ DeWolf's last initiative as CNS was to propose the acquisition of six Barbel Class conventional submarines to the Cabinet Defence Committee instead of SSN's.¹³⁶

The navy's planning for the 1960-61 estimates reflect caution as to stability in funding and hope for maintenance of the status quo.¹³⁷ Construction of the repeat Restigouche escorts and tanker would continue and the personnel level remain unchanged. Provision was made for planning a combination of the ASW frigates and conventional submarines as the follow-on replacement programme. Acquisition of six ASW helicopters was planned for 1961-62. Provision was made to put more funding into dispersal facilities and infrastructure to meet the NATO requirement. However, operations and maintenance funding was to be reduced again, which included another 8 percent reduction in fuel.¹³⁸ This raised a protest from Rear-Admiral Pullen but he was directed to practice austerity and adjust his schedule to the fuel allowance.¹³⁹ There was to be no elaborate celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the RCN. In April 1960, the Minister dispelled any notion of financial security in demanding a manpower study by all services to determine the effects of manpower reductions of 10 and 20 percent.¹⁴⁰ Pearkes was concerned that personnel costs constituted nearly 50 percent of the budget and had to be reduced. He stipulated that NATO and United Nations commitments should not be disturbed and that reductions should come from headquarters and supporting units. DeWolf's response was to demonstrate conclusively that the RCN had the smallest administrative "tail" of the three services and that any reductions "would defeat the objectives of the New Personnel System" as well as jeopardizing NATO commitments.¹⁴¹ This was DeWolf's last victory before his retirement.

On 31 July 1960, Vice-Admiral Harry DeWolf retired from the RCN after forty-two years of service.¹⁴² A proponent of "better is the enemy of good enough", he declared himself not to be ambitious for the navy but his legacy was huge. The sheer volume of material included in this chapter itself suggests not only his capacity for work and breadth of control but also the feverish pitch at which he drove his staff. He thrived on complexity where lesser men failed.

Referred to by Vice-Admiral Collins as "the most cerebral CNS", Harry DeWolf was no "simple sailor". He was also entirely consistent, following the course laid out initially by his mentor Harold Grant, a fellow Nova Scotian whose leadership style he emulated.¹⁴³

DeWolf had eliminated "extraneous pursuits" and focused the thinking and energy of the navy on ASW. Discipline was imposed on fiscal planning to achieve force goals. When Rear-Admiral Tisdall gave Rear-Admiral Herbert Rayner, the CNS designate, his turnover briefing the VCNS prefaced his remarks, "The Royal Canadian Navy operates almost entirely in the NATO sphere and as specialists in anti-submarine warfare. The Navy has resisted taking on other commitments which are not directly related to anti-submarine warfare."¹⁴⁴ This bore witness to the fact that DeWolf had succeeded in entrenching the ASW commitment to NATO as the purpose for the existence of the RCN to such an extent that it had become a mantra. Rear-Admiral Charles stated this was the principle under which the entire staff at NSHQ worked and from which there was no deviation permitted. Charles summed up DeWolf's strategic "philosophy":

Harry was under no illusions. He knew our 'bread and butter' was NATO. We had our force goals of forty-two ships [sic] for NATO and that was the basis on which we built those ships. I'm [DeWolf] not getting into a 'big-ship navy' or anything like that. Harry was prepared to accept the ASW carrier but wouldn't take nuclear submarines because we couldn't afford them. He was happy to take conventionals [submarines]. But basically he said, 'Under the system we are a small ship navy and that's what we are going to be'.¹⁴⁵

Retaining the carrier may appear to be an inconsistency but the navy had already made a large investment in naval aviation and DeWolf considered himself committed. The dilemma was expressed by Tisdall, "It can be argued that a navy of this size cannot really afford naval aircraft, or alternatively, we cannot afford to be without it."¹⁴⁶ DeWolf had reduced naval aviation's share to 22 percent of the RCN's budget which he thought was still too large. He had decided not to replace the jet fighter aircraft. Tracker ASW aircraft surplus to the RCN's

requirement had been transferred to other NATO countries. The naval air reserve had been reduced to two squadrons. DeWolf had been convinced of the necessity of acquiring helicopters and modifying the new DDE's to carry them and had embarked on this modernization programme. The carrier had to be retained to train the pilots and the fleet in helicopter operations.

DeWolf began programmes of sweeping modernization of the structure of the personnel system and Naval Service Headquarters and the Commands. Lesser men would have balked at the challenge but not DeWolf. There is little argument that the personnel system was in disarray however the restructuring undertaken was so extensive as to change the fundamental and traditional structure of the navy. The superimposition of other concepts such as user-maintainer, on-the-job training, and planned maintenance and also the revision of the promotion systems for both officers and men, simply complicated an already difficult task. Moreover, the study of the personnel branch revealed that the staff lacked the basic knowledge and skills of personnel management. It is valid to ask whether the RCN had the capacity to adapt to these large and radical changes. DeWolf's own opinion was that there were no problems that could not be managed.¹⁴⁷ He had confidence in his own ability to modernize the navy and that the navy would obediently carry out his programmes. Only time would tell how well his policies and initiatives would endure.

The retirement of Vice-Admiral DeWolf marks the end of an era. He was the last graduate of the Royal Naval College of Canada to be CNS. His approach to leading the RCN reflected both reliance on traditional methods and cautious adoption of new innovations. He remained dedicated to the prewar RCN cohort but also advanced officers from other entries. He introduced new management methods but showed the traditional bias against staff training. DeWolf did more than any other CNS to ally the RCN with the USN and oversaw the

development of an integrated command structure and plans for the ASW defence of North America. He was also strongly Canadian in his outlook. When the Naval Officers Association suggested that the White Ensign, the Royal Navy's flag also "worn" by Canadian ships, be altered to include a Canadian coat of arms, DeWolf rejected it. He said Canadian ships would wear the White Ensign until Canada adopted its own national flag then a change would be contemplated.¹⁴⁸ There were contradictions in DeWolf but there is near unanimity among long service navy personnel and naval critics, like Audette and Harbron, that he was the Canadian navy's finest CNS.¹⁴⁹ Rear-Admiral "Bobby" Murdoch summed it up "Confidence in leadership culminated in Harry DeWolf. In my opinion he was the only real admiral the Canadian navy ever produced."¹⁵⁰ Vice-Admiral DeWolf provided strong and effective leadership and the administrative skills needed at a critical juncture in the history of the RCN. His successor had big shoes to fill.

There is a popular notion, especially among former naval personnel, especially officers, that DeWolf's tenure as CNS was the high-water mark of "The Golden Era" of the RCN. This notion of a "Golden Era" is based on the belief that *Bonaventure* and the fourteen new Canadian designed and built destroyers constituted the most formidable ASW force in the world. It was a happy time of expansion and rapid promotion.¹⁵¹ The accomplishment of the material expansion of the navy and the potential of the ships are undeniable. However, beneath the surface of the sleek appearance of the new "Cadillacs" and the "Pullenesque" perfection of parade ground occasions of the "Royal Ceremonial Navy" there were serious personnel shortages and a malfunctioning personnel system. The system had been stretched beyond its limits to commission every ship possible for NATO. The RCN was doing, to a lesser degree, what it had done during the early years of World War II, being the overly enthusiastic ally and commissioning more ships than it could man effectively. While numbers might contribute to

NATO's deterrence posture, the extent to which shortages in trained senior personnel and deliberate undermanning had reduced fleet war fighting effectiveness was an issue that concerned knowledgeable authorities. DeWolf had anticipated that the personnel situation could be corrected before the fleet had to fight. If anything, the RCN enjoyed a transitory "golden moment" on 4 May 1960, its fiftieth anniversary. It would remain for the new CNS, Vice-Admiral Herbert Rayner, to realize the potential of the new fleet through ensuring that the personnel restructuring and reforms were successfully implemented.

NOTES - CHAPTER 9

1 FOAC, message, 041200Z May 1960, 81/520/1440-5, vol. 23, DHist.

2 Raymont, "The Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 227.

3 Bothwell et al, *Canada since 1945*, 183-185.

4 Ibid., 228.

5 R.H. Roy interview with General Foulkes quoted in Raymont, "The Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 165.

6 Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 2. The "Liberal" connotation was reported to Roy by George Pearkes. Reginald H. Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., Through Two World Wars* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1977), 341.

7 Miller quoted in *ibid.*, 24.

8 DeWolf interview by the author.

9 Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., Through Two World Wars*, 262-268.

10 Ibid., 288-290.

11 Desmond Morton, *Canada and War* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), 170.

12 Raymont, "The Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 166.

13 NBM "Special Meeting", 3 September 1957.

14 NBM 540-2, 28 August 1957. The Naval Board took this initiative before the full impact of the cuts had been analysed. They later decided to include *Labrador's* Bell Helicopters with the transfer.

15 DeWolf was absolutely consistent in cutting commitments that did not contribute to NATO and the ASW specialization. DeWolf said that Captain "Robbie" Robertson, the first Commanding Officer of *Labrador*, never forgave him for giving up the icebreaker.

16 NBM "Special Meeting", 3 September 1957.

17 NBM 543-2, 18 September 1957.

18 NBM 546-8, 9 October 1957.

19 Ibid.

20 CNS to CCOS, memo, 21 November 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 21, Operations and Plans.

21 Raymont to Foulkes, memo, 9 January 1958, 73/1223 series 1, file 663, RCN Rank Structure, 1957-58, DHist.

22 CCOS to MND, memo, 13 January 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 21, Operations and Plans.

23 Harbron, "The RCN At Peace, 1945 - 1955: The Uncertain Heritage," 20.

24 Claxton, "Autobiography".

25 The *Navy List* was published bi-annually then annually by NSHQ and listed all officers by rank and order of seniority and also showed their appointment but not the exact date of taking it up.

26 The Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) was being developed by the Defence Research Establishment Atlantic (DREA). VDS was designed to overcome the problem of Hull Mounted Sonars (HMS) whose transmissions could not penetrate surface and deeper thermal layers to detect submarines. The VDS could be lowered to the best depth for detection on a cable from the stern of an escort and remained directly under the ship while being towed.

27 Landymore interview by the author.

28 CNS to RSC, memo, 25 August 1959, 73/1223, series 1, file 725, RCN - Rank Structure, 1959-60, DHist.

29 CNS Message to Officers and Men of the Fleet, CANGEN TWO TWO NINE 051401Z November 57, 81/520/1440-5, vol. 21, DHist.

30 Charles interview by the author. Technical officers included Engineer, Electrical, Constructor and Supply officers. Tisdall also received several briefs from ship's companies stating they did not support non-seaman officers attaining command.

31 Dyer interview by the author. VAdmr. Dyer concluded that it was a difficult thing to implement and eventually the scheme was abandoned after unification by VAdmr. Ralph Hennesy when he became Chief of Personnel after Dyer and nominal head of the navy.

32 Chairman,RSC to CNS, memo 19 November 1957 quoted in CNS to RSC, memo, 21 November 1958, 73/1223, series 1, file 724, RCN Rank Structure, 1958-59, DHist.

33 O'Brien was promoted rear-admiral and Commander, Maritime Command in July 1966, after RAdmr. Bill Landymore was fired by Paul Hellyer, MND. The position was elevated to Vice-Admiral in 1968. Like Landymore, O'Brien was an RMC graduate (1935) who was a progressive officer of the "generation of radar".

34 DNOrg to Sec RSC, aide memoire, 8 October 1958, 73/1223, series 1, file 724, RCN Rank Structure, 1958-59, DHist.

35 Recommendations 1 and 15, "Tisdall Report".

36 CNP to NComp, memo, 6 February 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1

37 DCNP to CNP, memo, 31 May 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1 provides a detailed outline of all the work involved in this task.

38 PSC to CNP, memo, 9 December 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1.

39 This meant ships would be capable of assuming the full Action State for a limited period of time with all weapons and control equipment manned. In the normal Defence/Cruising state, ships would be capable of manning the Action Information Organization and the Sonar and Weapon control crews continuously in a high state of readiness in three watches and the weapons in a lower state of readiness in two watches. The propulsion and electrical personnel would be in three watches.

40 D/DNOrg to DNOrg, memo, 21 December 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1.

41 NBM 558-5, 22 January 1958.

42 NComp to CNP, memo, 15 October 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1.

43 NBM 580-3, 12 November 1958.

44 NSec to FOAC, 20 January 1959, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 26, Operations and Plans.

45 NComp to VCNS, memo, 24 November 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1.

46 Commander 7th Escort Sqn to FOAC, 12 February 1959, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 9, Complements General.

47 NSec to FOAC, 6 July 1959, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 1, Complements General.

48 NBM 606-3, 15 October 1959.

49 Employment of Officers (Enclosure A), 15 December 1959, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 2, 2.

50 NBM 565-1, 9 April 1958, New Officer Structure - Professional Training Syllabus For General List Officers. ROTP entries were given the choice of (air), pilot or observer specialization.

51 VAdmr. John Allan, Commander, Maritime Command 1979-80 was a former Electrical Branch Officer who took the Third Weapons Officers' Course in 1961 and made a successful transition as a surface officer. Cmdre J.D. Spalding was a former Supply Officer who took the Long Operations Course in 1963 and also made the transition. These officers were the exception and not the rule.

52 "Tisdall Report", Appendix 9.

53 Charles interview by the author.

54 "Tisdall Report", 57.

55 LCdr(E) D.S. Jones, "The Acquisition of Junior Officers for the Canadian Armed Forces of the Future", file 124.062(D2), DHist 5.

56 NBM 562-4, 26 February 1958.

57 Ibid. Accreditation was from the Province of Ontario even though RMC was a federal institution because education is a provincial responsibility. Cadets enrolled in engineering programmes were required to do an additional year at a civilian university, usually Queen's.

58 Jones, "The Acquisition of Junior Officers for the Canadian Armed Forces of the Future," 13.

59 DCNP to PPCC, memo, 27 April 1959, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 27 , Operations and Plans; Cdr Levy to Colonel Raymont, aide memoire, 30 September 1959, 73/1223, series 1, file 725, RCN Rank Structure 1959-60, DHist. The frigates in the 4th (Training) Squadron had two single 40 mm "Boffin" guns removed and a deckhouse ("Dunk's Diner") added aft as a combined cadet classroom, messing (eating), and recreation area. The ships had a reduced training complement of 75% and were capable of limited operations against slow conventional submarines.

60 Venture surface officers undertook the 32-week JOTL Course with naval aviators who had completed their first or second tour and direct entries from the RN. Venture air officers went directly to flight training with the RCAF and then to the carrier to qualify.

61 COS to CNS, memo, 30 October 1957, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 137, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 1.

62 Promotion Policy For Officers, NBM 590-1, 18 March 1959.

63 NBM 606-3, 15 October 1959.

64 NBM 617-8, 30 March 1960.

65 NBM 617-4, 30 March 1960.

66 NBM 574-3, 14 August 1958. The officers' branch distinguishing colours were: Engineer-purple; Electrical-dark green; Constructor-silver grey; Ordnance-dark blue; Supply-white; Instructor-light blue; Medical(Doctors)-scarlet; Medical Administration, Nurses, Technician-maroon; Intelligence, Law, Firefighting, Civil Engineer-brick red. Lt.(N) Graeme Arbuckle, *Customs and Traditions of the Canadian Navy*, 149-150.

67 FOND to NSHQ, 11 September 1956; NSHQ to FOND, 30 October 1956, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 17, Operations and Plans.

68 "Tisdall Report", 58.

69 NBM 534-9, 10 July 1957.

70 NBM Special Meeting, 3 September 1957.

71 NSec to FOAC, FOPC, FOND, 13 January 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 22, Operations and Plans.

72 RAdmr. Adams, "The Reserve", Address to the United Service Institute of Quebec, 30 January 1958, *Crowsnest*, vol. 10, no. 5, March 1958, 21.

73 RSC to CNS, memo, 29 June 1959, 73/1223, series 1, file 724, RCN Rank Structure, 1958-59, DHist.

74 NBM 569-3, 30 May 1958.

75 Enclosure No. 1, NBM 569-2, 30 May 1958. The SACLANT MC70 document contained the force levels agreed annually. For Canada this included all ships on both coasts.

76 NBM 584-3, 14 January 1959.

77 These are approximate comparisons using the DND Annual Reports for 1954 and 1959. Part of the reduction was due to an accounting change as civilian costs in 1959-60 were included in personnel and not operations and maintenance as previously.

78 NBM 584-3, 14 January 1959.

79 Dillon interview by the author. Charles like Landymore was a prewar graduate of RMC (1937). He had unbroken employment in the communications field until given command of *Crescent* in 1948. He commanded *Haida* in Korea and also was Commander Canadian Destroyers Far East. He was promoted to Captain in 1954.

80 "Coordinated Canada-United States Defence of North America Against Submarines", 30 January 1958, 73/1223, series 1, file 106, Defence of Canada - Seaward Defence, DHist. This is a foundation document establishing the concept of coordinated Canada - US ASW operations which after approval by the Chiefs of Staff Committees for both nations authorized American and Canadian fleet commanders, "to negotiate a plan and concept of operations for the coordinated Canada-United States defence of North America against submarine attack." The basic assumption underlying this understanding was that any threat would be countered with a coordinated response and integrated plans would be developed on this basis.

81 "Composition of the Fleet - 1959", 22 August 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 23, Operations and Plans. The RCN had inquired if SACLANT would accept 28 escorts but insisted on a

minimum of 29 PPCC Minutes, Meeting No. 168, 26-27 May 1959, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 27, Operations and Plans.

82 NBM 573-2, 17 July 1958.

83 The distinguishing logo was a ring of red and white diagonal stripes painted around the mast representing the stylised barber poles painted on funnels and gun turrets of the ships in Escort Group Five (EG5).

84 NBM 573-3, 17 July 1958.

85 "Composition of the Fleet - 1959", 22 August 1958.

86 CNP to NSec for the Naval Board, memo, 22 September 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 25, Operations and Plans. The requirement was 2953 officers to meet 1959-60 commitments and only 2506 were on complement on 31 August 1958.

87 CNP to NSec, memo, 14 January 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 22, Complements General.

88 DNP to CNP, memo, 16 May 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 9, Complements General.

89 NSec to Commands, 26 September 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 25, Operations and Plans. The scheme included requiring Esquimalt to fill instructor billets in the Halifax Fleet School on the rationale that it trained men from both coasts.

90 Charles interview by the author.

91 CANAVHED to CANFLAGANT, CANFLAGPAC, message, 241716Z AUG 58, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 24, Operations and Plans.

92 CNP to EEinC, memo, 14 November 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 26, Operations and Plans.

93 EEinC to CNP, memo, 25 November 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 26, Operations and Plans.

94 NSec to FOAC, 20 January 1959, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 26, Operations and Plans.

95 FOAC to NSec, 27 October 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 25, Operations and Plans. This training would consist mainly of the sea phase for higher level cross-training trade courses for sensor and weapons operators. Pullen's attitude suggests a lack of appreciation of the complexities in operating the new equipment.

96 FOPC to NSec, 26 November 1958, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 25, Operations and Plans.

97 CNS to RSC, 21 November 1958, 73/1223, series 1, file 724, RCN Rank Structure, 1958-59, DHist.

98 CNS to C,CSC, memo, 17 June 1959, *ibid.*

99 C,COS to CNS, memo, 29 June 1959, *ibid.*

100 *Ibid.*

101 *Ibid.*

102 CNS to RSC, memo, 25 August 1959, 73/1223, series 1, file 725, RCN Rank Structure, 1959-60, DHist.

103 *Ibid.*

104 NBM 528-4, 8 May 1957.

105 CNS to RSC, memo, 13 January 1959, 73/1223, series 1, file 723, RCN Rank Structure, 1959-60, DHist.

106 NBM 553-4, 27 November 1957.

107 NBM 563-3, 12 March 1958.

108 NBM 610-7, 16 November 1959. See ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL HEADQUARTERS, 5 April 1961, in SECTEMP 1961, 71/267 and file 124.046(D1), DHist^a for the details of the new organization.

109 NBM 611-2, 22 December 1959. The Naval Staff was formed into the Plans Division and Air and Warfare Division.

110 CNS to MND, 19 October 1959 and C,COS to CNS, 26 November 1959, 73/1223, series 1, file 725, RCN - Rank Structure, 1959-60, DHist. The RSC demanded an off-setting reduction and reduced the Flag Officer Naval Divisions to a Commodore.

111 Management and Methods Section, NSHQ, "Examination of the Organizational Arrangements of the Chief of Naval Personnel Branch", 29 January 1959, 75/146, DHist.

112 Ibid., 6.

113 Ibid., 8.

114 Ibid., 9.

115 Ibid., 13.

116 Ibid., 17.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid., 14.

119 "Tisdall Report", 95.

120 Ibid.

121 Management and Methods Section, NSHQ, "Examination of the Organizational Arrangements of the Chief of Naval Personnel Branch," 18.

122 NBM 613-1, 8 January 1960.

123 NBM 575-4, 10 September 1958.

124 NBM 564-4, 2 April 1958.

125 NBM 584-4, 14 January 1959.

126 NBM 584-5, 14 January 1959.

127 ACNS (Plans) to VCNS, "RCN Requirement Plans (Medium Range) For Period 1960-1966", NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 26, Operations and Plans.

128 Ibid.

129 NBM 591-3, 25 March 1959.

130 DeWolf interview by the author.

131 "RCN Planning Guide For Preparation of 1961-62 Estimates" in "The Future RCN Requirements Planning Guide 1961-1971, 12 February 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 29, Operations and Plans.

132 "Canada-Made, A-Powered Submarines to Form RCN's Major Fighting Force", 10 May 1958, *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 1.

133 NBM 617-5, 30 March 1960.

134 Ibid.

135 NBM 617-6, 30 March 1960.

136 NBM 625-2, 20 July 1960. Julie Ferguson is in error in suggesting that Rayner made the decision not to acquire SSN's. Ferguson, *Through a Canadian Periscope*, 247. The Planning guide for the 1961-62 estimates indicate that conventional submarines and the ASW frigates would constitute the ship replacement programme. "The Future RCN Requirements Planning Guide 1961-1971, 12 February 1960. The 20 July 1960 decision of the Naval Board is reflected in "Memorandum to Cabinet Defence Committee, RCN Submarine Programme", 8 November 1960, 73/1223, series 1, file 379, Programmes - RCN, 1957-64, DHist. DeWolf retired 31 July 1960.

137 "RCN Planning Guide For Preparation of 1961-62 Estimates" in "The Future RCN Requirements Planning Guide 1961-1971, 12 February 1960.

138 "Composition and Employment of the Fleet, 1 January 1960 to 31 march 1961", 15 December 1959, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 28, Operations and Plans.

139 FOAC to NSHQ, message, 191453Z May 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 455, NSS 1650-26, vol. 29, Operations and Plans and NSec to FOAC, 5 July 1960, vol. 30.

140 NBM 619, 4 May 1960.

141 CNS to RSC, memo, 10 May 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General.

142 Collins interview by the author.

143 DeWolf interview by the author.

144 Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Naval Board, 22 July 1960.

145 Charles interview by the author. RAdmr. Charles was Director Naval Plans and Operations (DNPO) under DeWolf.

146 Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Naval Board, 22 July 1960.

147 DeWolf interview by the author.

148 NBM 621-7, 25 May 1960.

149 The only detractor on record is Cmdre. Jamie Plomer who referred to DeWolf as "Admiral Bang" before the Sauv  Committee. Plomer took DeWolf's characteristic ferocity to heart and was critical of DeWolf's favouritism in promotion.

150 RAdmr. R Murdoch, interview by the author, tape recording, Victoria, BC, 27 June 1995.

151 Collins interview by the author.

CHAPTER 10

Treading Water

We are faced with a staggering trades training problem in the Command. The shortages are having serious effects on the operational readiness of ships and at our present rate of training little progress will be achieved. It requires immediate attention and action by all authorities....While we are in our present state of growth, we have not achieved stability in our ships of either officers or men. This is wasting all the efforts we are making in work up and training.

Rear-Admiral Kenneth Dyer
Flag Officer Atlantic Coast
27 October 1961¹

Vice-Admiral Herbert Sharples Rayner became the eighth Chief of the Naval Staff on 1 August 1960. At forty-nine, he shared with G. C. Jones the distinction of being the youngest CNS. Like Jones he would leave the RCN suddenly and unexpectedly, not through death but through early retirement. Rayner was born in Clinton, Ontario in 1911, and joined the RCN straight from high school as a Special Entry naval cadet in 1928. He was sent directly to the Royal Navy for training onboard the cruiser HMS *Erebus*. With the closing of the Royal Naval College of Canada (RNCC) in 1922, this became the standard method of entry for naval officers. All potential candidates were interviewed by a board of naval officers to determine suitability for service. Educational requirements were junior matriculation or its equivalency but social acceptability and parental connections were equally important considerations.² The board's recommendation was submitted to the Chief of the Naval Staff who was the final authority for enrolment in the "family navy". Rayner and his Special Entry colleagues, such as Finch-Noyes, Stirling, Murdoch and the Groos brothers, enjoyed the same professional standing and preferences as the RNCC cohort when it came to promotion. Rayner's positioning was such that after normal junior officer training and specialization as a Torpedo Officer, he found himself as a senior Lieutenant at the outbreak of war and was given command of a destroyer

immediately. He was promoted rapidly with wartime expansion through exhibiting strong professional competence.

Herbert Rayner developed a reputation as a thorough professional during the war. He relieved Harry DeWolf as Commanding Officer of *St. Laurent* in July 1940, and earned the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) "for courage and enterprise in action against enemy submarines", in December that year.³ After nineteen arduous months of convoy duty and now a Lieutenant-Commander, Rayner was appointed as Staff Officer Operations to Rear-Admiral Murray, COAC, at Halifax. He was back at sea in sixteen months in command of the newly commissioned Tribal Class destroyer, *HMCS Huron*, on the Murmansk convoy runs. *Huron* subsequently joined the 10th Destroyer Flotilla with *Haida* (DeWolf) and *Athabaskan* (Stubbs) and fought in the English Channel and Bay of Biscay. Rayner earned a Bar to his DSC when *Huron*, with *Haida* and other ships of the 10th Flotilla, engaged five German destroyers trying to break through to attack the Allied invasion fleet off Normandy. One German destroyer was driven aground in flames and the others either sunk or fled. In a later engagement, *Huron's* guns set a minesweeper on fire and blew up an armed trawler. Rayner was also twice Mentioned in Despatches (MID) for his services during this period and promoted to Commander.

In September 1944, Rayner was appointed Director of Plans at NSHQ as an Acting-Captain. He was the architect of the plan for the immediate postwar RCN through his blueprint for fleet composition entitled "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy". This document, discussed in Chapter 1, signalled the intention of the RCN to be a big ship, balanced-fleet navy in the postwar period. The evidence is inconclusive that Rayner was a "big ship" navy proponent although he did argue as COPC in 1958, for the retention of the cruiser *Ontario* in the role of a modified fleet support ship and oiler.⁴ Rayner returned to the east coast as Captain (D) in December 1945. He reverted to Commander rank at the end of the war and took

command of *Nootka* in 1947. In *Nootka*, he experienced an "incident" common in those restless days. Subsequently, he achieved several notable "firsts" in his career. He was; the first commandant of Royal Roads when it became a tri-service college, the first officer to serve as coordinator of the Joint Staff at National Defence Headquarters, and the first officer to hold the appointment of Canadian Maritime Commander Pacific, when the RCN and RCAF elements integrated into a single maritime force in 1958. An accomplished staff officer, he was also as a progressive thinker. As CNP he was a strong supporter of both ROTP and staff training for all officers.

Herbert Rayner, who bore a striking resemblance to Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, USN, was prematurely grey when he became CNS. He was reserved in both manner and deed and had strong Christian convictions that prevailed in his professional and private work and relationships.⁵ He had spent seven of his first eight years in the RCN with the Royal Navy and married an English woman, Betty Graham Snook, in 1936. The Rayners had six children and remained a very private family. He kept his professional and private life separate and there was little talk of navy around the house even when he was CNS.⁶ Vice-Admiral Rayner was respected universally as a man in good judgement, strong professional ethic and exceptional integrity. Colonel Raymont wrote of him:

Herbert Rayner was one of those rare personalities in this rather ungracious age of being a perfect gentlemen. He was a most competent and highly respected officer in the RCN, and his utter conscientiousness, loyalty and strict sense of duty coupled with a sense of humour made him loved and respected by all, and made a better person of all who had the good fortune to really know and work with him.⁷

Vice-Admiral Rayner brought both a different personality and leadership style to the office of CNS. Whereas DeWolf was forceful and autocratic, Rayner was non-confrontational and a consensus builder. While DeWolf was doctrinaire with respect to naval policy, Rayner was open to and actively encouraged new thinking. Rayner immediately expanded the meetings

of the Naval Board to include more junior staff officers from interested directorates. He also re-instituted the Senior Officers' Meetings in order to obtain a broader range of views on problems confronting the navy. While his approach undoubtedly removed some latent frustration, it also opened the door for the staff to engage once again in "extraneous pursuits" and promote favourite hobby horses. More critically, there was a power shift in progress at the top and the authority of the individual chiefs was slowly being eroded by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Rank Structure Committee (RSC) and the Estimates Screening Committee.

This intrusion was subtle, continuous and was causing much mischief.⁸ Policy and strategy were becoming dominated by fiscal expediency with real control passing into the hands of civilian bureaucrats such as the Deputy Minister and representatives from the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board. This had created an environment of confrontation at that level and DeWolf had found himself fighting vigorously to maintain control of money and manpower. At the political level, an environment of animosity existed wherein the Prime Minister distrusted the senior military hierarchy. His vacillation on accepting their advice had resulted in the resignation of General Foulkes shortly before Rayner became CNS. Rayner had been nominated as CNS by DeWolf over the only other possible candidate, Rear-Admiral Pullen, because of his "better judgement" and Pearkes had agreed.⁹ It would remain to be seen if Rayner's non-confrontational approach and better judgement could carry the day.

Rayner's own promotion had caused a major shuffle of senior staff appointments orchestrated by DeWolf. This was DeWolf's last opportunity to reward those he saw fit and some interesting promotions and appointments were made. It was not surprising that the talented Rear-Admiral Dyer, who was now heir-apparent as CNS, was appointed to the top operational job as Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast. He was "dual hatted" as the Canadian Commander, Maritime Atlantic Area (CANCOMARLANT), one of SACLANT's Deputy

Commanders. Commodore Edward Finch-Noyes, COND, was rewarded with a Rear-Admiral's flag and the Pacific Coast Command. He was succeeded as COND by Commodore Paul Taylor, ex-RCNVR, confirmed from acting rank. Commodore "Debbie" Piers, fresh from being the first RCN Commandant of RMC, replaced the ailing Commodore Morson Medland as ACNS (Plans). These final dispensations by DeWolf followed his principle of favouring the prewar RCN who stayed the course and "deserved a good career". Finch-Noyes was one of the small pool of the "old guard" like Tisdall, who floated inconspicuously to the top. Rear-Admiral Brock commented laconically, "Finch-Noyes just kept rolling along."¹⁰ Brock had also profited by DeWolf's benevolence because, although passed over by both Rayner and Dyer, he was positioned to be the first ex-RCNVR promoted to Rear-Admiral and was positioned to relieve Tisdall as VCNS.

The most interesting was the promotion of the venerable Commodore Patrick Budge to Rear-Admiral and his appointment as Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP). Budge, already past retirement age and on ministerial extension, confided that his promotion was "a gift".¹¹ "Paddy" Budge had become a legend in RCN for his powerful and humanitarian leadership.¹² His promotion to Rear-Admiral was universally popular and considered well deserved. Moreover, the navy could boast of a man who had risen to admiral from boy seaman and this provided inspiration for those commissioned from the ranks. Budge's promotion satisfied DeWolf's principle of providing incentives to officers of all entries. Budge (ex-Lower Deck), Storrs (ex-RCNR) and Brock (ex-RCNVR) were either promoted or in line for promotion to flag rank when DeWolf retired. DeWolf said that he had to hold back the talented but unpredictable Brock because he had to be placed in the right job because "everywhere Brock goes the place explodes."¹³

Rear-Admiral Budge was a born leader of men but not a gifted senior administrator. He had not had a staff course and had never served previously in NSHQ. DeWolf had brought him up to NSHQ to understudy Dyer as CNP for six months. The Personnel Branch was not only responsible for implementing the New Personnel System (NPS) but also was in the throes of a complete reorganization itself to improve its effectiveness as a personnel management agency. Captain Ralph Hennesy, recently Director of Naval Training for two years, had been promoted to Commodore and appointed as DCNP to provide experience and continuity in senior management. Budge would find mastering the complexities of manpower management and the responsibilities a trial. Rear-Admiral Dan Hanington, at the time a Captain and Director of Naval Manning, remarked that the appointment as CNP "was a very unkind thing to have done to Budge."¹⁴ DeWolf was constrained and could only promote candidates into open Rear-Admiral billets, in this case it was CNP, and there is no question that Budge would characteristically give the job his all. However, his selection does suggest the RCN was run more like a club at the top than a modern and progressive executive management system. Of the circumstances that prevailed during those times, Rear-Admiral Murdoch commented, "Paternalism doesn't produce the best people [for a job] but it produces a 'band of brothers'."¹⁵

Vice-Admiral Rayner, with DeWolf present, had received turnover briefings as to the state of the navy from all the Naval Board members. The Chief of Naval Personnel's (CNP) comments focused mainly on the implementation of the recommendations of the Tisdall Report and some brief mention as to the state of manning, and morale, which he said, "is generally good except with respect to the housing problem in the Halifax-Dartmouth area."¹⁶ The Naval Comptroller (NCOMP) briefed that with the naval budget remaining relatively constant, the problem was one of balancing. He stated that if more money must be spent on operations and maintenance then funding must be obtained by reducing either the Capital Expense Programme

or personnel. He cautioned that it was not possible to reduce expenditures much more without reducing commitments, and that funds for any pay increase would have to come from approved estimates. With respect to capital expenditure, NCOMP advised that the vote was under-spent by almost \$30 million and to control it with any degree of accuracy was difficult. He was also noted that NSHQ was in the process of a complete reorganization and that the Commands would follow after study.

There is a sense from the Naval Board minutes that the briefers were going through a formality and were avoiding difficult or contentious issues of which Rayner was fully aware. As COPC, he knew the nature and extent of the personnel problems and the fact that the navy's budget had been cut back progressively to its 1953-54 level and that constant funding was anything but assured. This was a coronation event and the problem issues were set aside. There was, as the Mainguy Report acknowledged, a great deal right with the RCN and this was a time to recognize the considerable accomplishments of Harry DeWolf. In his inaugural address to the Naval Board, Rayner thanked his predecessor for "turning over the ship in good shape and on course."¹⁷ Rayner's charge to the members of the Naval Board was "The Navy must be a modern and progressive service ready to meet any emergency."¹⁸ This is an interesting statement as it conveys the sense of a need for change and to broaden the scope of the roles of the RCN. He advised the members that he would rely on them to run the navy within the scope of their spheres of responsibilities, and emphasized the importance of sharing information needed to process matters with higher authority. Rayner also underscored the necessity of keeping the whole navy informed of approved policy.

Vice-Admiral Rayner had barely settled into his new role as head of the RCN when he received an unwelcome advisory from the Department of Finance. The navy must re-examine its preliminary estimates for 1961-62 so as to remain within the budget approved for 1960-61.¹⁹

This represented a cash budget of \$274.5 million and required a cut of \$18 million from the 1961-62 preliminary estimates and a further \$14 million in the following fiscal year. The Naval Board struggling to find reductions in a programme already reduced by previous cuts, found that \$15 million could be saved by retiring the Banshees, cutting military and civilian personnel by 15 percent, and paying off all ten minesweepers thereby eliminating a mine-clearance capability. The Department of Finance was told "that it would be impossible to operate on less than \$292 million without substantial reductions in personnel, commitments and/or efficiency."²⁰ Naming the capabilities eliminated, the warning was issued that, "Any further reduction [beyond \$15 million] would entail failure to meet NATO commitments." The ultimate threat forestalled the bureaucrats in Finance and the line was eventually drawn at \$286 million for 1961-62, which still left a requirement for \$301 million in 1962-63. The money for the cuts was found in fuel, ammunition, spares and infrastructure, resources necessary to sustain a war-fighting capability. This exercise set the tone for Rayner's tenure as CNS.

In the face of falling defence budgets and a strident anti-nuclear mood in cabinet, George Pearkes, Desmond Morton observed, "discreetly withdrew to the lieutenant-governorship of British Columbia."²¹ Pearkes' accomplishments were few and he will best be remembered as presiding over the demise of the unaffordable Arrow project. He failed to convince the Prime Minister and cabinet that more funding was needed for defence. The defence budget, \$1.8 billion in 1957, fell to \$1.3 billion in 1960 while NATO was pressing hard for increases from its members. The era of Canada as "the poor cousin in NATO" had begun. With respect to integrating the forces, Pearkes made modest advances through the amalgamation of the medical services and Chaplains' corp. Reg Roy, Pearkes' biographer, suggested that he would have done more had he not been caught up in the nuclear debate and Arrow cancellation. Pearkes barely could have accomplished less and Defence did not lose a strong champion with

his departure. His successor was Douglas Harkness, a wartime lieutenant-colonel in the artillery and a former Calgary history teacher. Harkness became highly respected by the military chiefs for his strong stand on defence. But, he would make little progress against Green's dominant influence on Diefenbaker who, after Arrow, quoting Morton again "had retreated into chronic indecision."²²

Meanwhile, an important and heated debate was being conducted in the precincts of NSHQ between the Personnel Branch and Comptroller's Branch over control and method of complementing. The exercise to redefine these responsibilities was a consequence of the restructuring of the headquarters organization. The Naval Comptroller (NCOMP) was responsible for the economical allocation of manpower resources, and developing the navy's submissions to the Rank Structure Committee (RSC) for changes in rank and trade structure in the total establishment of personnel. Under the reorganization, the responsibility for establishing military and civilian complements for all naval activities also passed to NCOMP. In April 1960, Rear-Admiral Wright, NCOMP, had set up the Manpower Review Committee to conduct a detailed survey and assess the personnel requirements for the complements of all ships and major shore establishments. The committee consisted of uniformed and civilian members representing the complementing and management engineering section at NSHQ and also the Civil Service Commission. They were to apply modern personnel management engineering methodologies to develop a complement for the RCN that would be implemented in 1962, along with a system for regulation and verification.

The mandate of the Manpower Review Committee was to examine each "billet or proposed billet [military and civilian] in the light of its direct or indirect contribution to the approved role of the RCN in the defence of Canada."²³ Additionally, the committee was to examine rank and trade structure and ship/shore ratios and amend them as necessary. Finally,

they were to establish a Wren complement and show it as part of the navy's establishment.²⁴ It is apparent that Rear-Admiral Wright was intent on replacing the RCN's traditional ad hoc and highly subjective approach to the control and management of personnel resources with a modern scientifically developed system. The system would include control mechanisms and regular review process that would satisfy the expectations of both the Deputy Minister and Treasury Board - a system "with teeth". Wright was also under considerable pressure by these civilian bureaucrats to reduce the naval establishment. He believed the only way to protect the navy was to have an ironclad system of manpower management in place that would withstand outside scrutiny. Moreover, "Tony" Wright was determined to establish his authority commensurate with his responsibility for personnel resources that constituted nearly 50 percent of the naval budget. Coincidentally, he was implicitly declaring equal status with his former Executive Branch colleagues, bestowed through the general list concept.

In order for the Manpower Review to go forward, new principles of complementing had to be developed and agreed. This required extensive negotiations between the Comptroller's Branch, which orchestrated the initiative, and the Personnel Branch, which believed manning and complementing responsibilities should reside with the same authority. The new division of responsibility was that NCOMP would identify, authorize and establish the billets constituting the military and civilian complement of the entire navy. The Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) would recruit, train and assign qualified officers and men and hire civilians to fill those billets, the manning function. The Director of Naval Organization (DNOrg) was responsible for executing the complementing function. This staff position had moved from CNP to VCNS and now resided in the NCOMP organization (see above). Captain Ray Phillips, DNOrg, was tasked with developing the new principles of complementing and was faced with several major questions.²⁵ Should the navy be complemented to meet its NATO commitments most efficiently

regardless of numbers, or, to employ usefully the authorized 20,000 officers and men with suitable career prospects and sea/shore ratio? Should the navy be complemented as two navies, as currently was the case, under the Home Port Division concept with suitable sea/shore ratios and career pyramids within the Port Division, or, should it be complemented as one navy and arrangements made by the Personnel Branch to man it on that basis? Supplementary questions to be investigated included whether civilian billets should be used as a buffer against being over or under authorized military strength? Also, should ship's complements be reduced if future work studies by management engineering so indicated?

Rear-Admiral Wright's position was that the complement must be based on the authorized ceiling that was established by cabinet and that the navy's complement should be managed as one entity to achieve maximum economy, flexibility and effectiveness.²⁶ His staff conveyed these ideas to the Personnel Branch for consideration where the feeling was that the responsibilities of complementing and manning could not be divided and that the Naval Comptroller did not really appreciate the complexity of the personnel process.²⁷ The tone of memoranda between personnel staff suggests the belief that complementing was an art, based on tradition and acquired by experience, not as science and could not possibly be managed properly by non-seaman officers applying new-fangled management engineering techniques thought up by civilians. It was also not unimportant that in the Royal Navy the responsibilities for complementing had remained with the Second Sea Lord, CNP's equivalent, after a similar reorganization.²⁸ A look by NCOMP's staff at the art as practiced revealed that manipulating billets was employed extensively as a primary crisis management tool to solve all manners of personnel problems and requirements. Many shore "any trade" billets had been established ad hoc for this purpose.²⁹ This had created a situation where the rank pyramids for all trades and sea-shore ratios were in such a muddle that there were valid doubts in the Personnel Branch that

these could be rationalized in order to apply a system to it. It might also be said that there was a strong mind set that this was the natural condition because the RCN had managed personnel by muddling through since 1945. This was compounded by the extraordinary dedication, confidence and enthusiasm of RCN seaman officers who believed any challenging problem could be solved if sufficient time and energy were applied to it. Failure was not an option.

Rear-Admiral Wright pressed Budge for full consultation on all aspects of proposed changes to complementing.³⁰ He outlined problems ahead where the Halifax Port Division would require 400 additional billets prior to 1963 and the necessity of these being transferred from the west coast. Wright also pointed out obvious indicators that the Esquimalt Port Division had an inequitably higher share of the senior ratings given these ranks were allocated on a one service basis. The Personnel Branch did not support complementing to a level of the established ceiling but to a higher level that would meet NATO commitments.³¹ This would reflect the navy's actual requirements and this position was supported by the VCNS. Commodore Hennesy, DCNP, did believe that a fixed ceiling was important for stability. The idea of one navy received support from all quarters in the Personnel Branch but it was thought untimely to impose it. There had been so many recent changes that this could be one too many for the fleet to absorb.

In the course of the debate, an interesting notion was advanced by Captain Browne, DNM, that any surplus personnel billets resulting from the manpower review should be used to expand the RCN's roles and commitments. Browne stated:

This is contrary to principle but we must be realistic. The time has surely come, with rumblings within NATO, when we should be looking at our National interests; in fact, this should have been done long before this. Our position without NATO as a hinge pin, becomes somewhat untenable while the RCAF with NORAD and the Army with National Survival, have supplementary roles to justify their being. The threat from nuclear missile firing submarines to National Defence [sic] should assume greater emphasis, as should the 'Vision of the North'. A further role for study is the Hydrographic Service.³²

Captain Browne was on the perimeter of power but expressed a growing sentiment held by some other officers, such Captain "Jack" Pickford, who replaced Captain Charles as Director of Naval Plans (DNP), that the RCN should be expanding both its horizons and roles and emphasizing the national interest.³³

Rear-Admiral Wright managed to achieve what amounted to a temporary consensus in order to allow the Manpower Review Committee to get on with its work. Rear-Admiral Budge conceded that the RCN should be complemented as one navy, and not by separate Port Divisions."³⁴ There was also agreement that the navy's ceiling should remain unchanged because commitments varied and that civilian positions should be used to accommodate surpluses and deficiencies. The thorny issue of who should conduct the analysis to predict the required manpower to meet future commitments remained unresolved. The Naval Comptroller believed it was his function but the personnel staff maintained that for the time being they should do it. They argued that it would be quite some time until Captain Phillips, whose title was changed to the Director of Naval Organization and Management, DNOM, could conveniently provide the analysis integrating both the New Trade Structure (NTS) and Long Range Planning Guide. They needed the information immediately. The real issue was who in the navy would set priorities for establishing new billets among the competing interests. Phillips believed that this question had to be resolved before NCOMP assumed responsibility and thought that purely naval manpower requirements could be decided at the level of the Naval Policy Coordinating Committee (NPCC). He argued that the NPCC, being a "Committee of Deputies" of the Naval Board, could "horse-trade various projects and thereby avoid over-emphasis of any particular sphere."³⁵

Rear-Admiral Wright presented this recommendation to VCNS, who was Commodore Brock acting for Tisdall. Brock did not support the committee idea and believed that NCOMP

and his trained staff should render judgement. He passed this on to Budge stating, "They won't always be right, but if they seek the proper advice (and heavens knows there should be plenty of advice on this subject) they shouldn't be wrong too often."³⁶ Rear-Admiral Budge was uncomfortable with the direction the matter was taking. He advised VCNS that while he agreed NCOMP was responsible for complementing, establishing billets did not in itself produce the personnel to fill them. He reiterated that in the majority of situations billets are often vacant when deleted and a man must be found to fill a new billet for a new commitment. This was a manning function and his responsibility. Budge disagreed with DNOM's notion that the priorities for complementing should be established at the NPCC level and this should be done by the Naval Board and also that the member responsible for a particular activity should orchestrate complement changes exclusively within his domain.³⁷ Rear-Admiral Tisdall supported Budge and told Wright, "I do not think NPCC is the right body to decide complements and manning problems" and that the Naval Board should be involved.³⁸ Wright was reluctant to use his "teeth" and issue a decree that was within his authority. He was prepared to continue negotiating to gain consensus on this critical and emotive issue. What is apparent is that the naval hierarchy did not exhibit any real enthusiasm or commitment towards taking the hard decisions to reconcile its personnel management problems. The government was pressing for reforms and economies and the navy responded with a business as usual approach and an attitude bordering on complacency.

It was important for Vice-Admiral Rayner to assert his control over naval policy. Rayner directed Rear-Admiral Tisdall to conduct a review of force requirements for the period 1962-72 that would form the basis for any revisions he wished to make to established policy. The CNS had to anticipate the government's requirements but little indication of direction was forthcoming. The Conservative government had not produced a White Paper and the most

recent formal guidance was a statement on defence policy by Pearkes to the Commons Special Committee on Defence Expenditure in June, 1960.³⁹ Essentially, it signalled no change from the previous established priorities; the defence of North America in conjunction with the United States, contributions to collective defence within NATO, and provision of forces to support United Nations' peacekeeping initiatives.⁴⁰ In developing its priorities for its review, the Naval Staff seized upon a parenthetical comment in Pearkes' statement that while no special forces are actually earmarked for United Nations operations, "...14 vessels on the Pacific Coast, which are not earmarked for SACLANT, would be available on a very short notice to go to any United Nations operation that the government approves."⁴¹ The Minister was technically incorrect because all forty-three escorts of the RCN were committed to NATO but only those thirty-nine on the east coast were immediately available. The Naval Board directed that this comment be interpreted as direction in the force review document in a statement, "Within this defence policy there may well be an increased emphasis to support the UN."⁴² While the threat to North America from missile firing submarines was assessed as increasing and the primary requirement would be for ASW forces for the next ten years, readiness to provide naval forces at short notice to the UN was elevated to the second priority.⁴³ Tisdall did not recommend any change in the RCN's programme and only reiterated the lack of an air defence capability after the Banshees retired and the continuing need for the three tankers already approved.

The evidence is inconclusive that the review reflected Rayner's own ideas as to the direction of future naval policy but it is recorded that he was concerned that the navy anticipate future requirements in the face of accelerating technological and scientific development. However, on the strength of Tisdall's analysis, the Naval Staff was directed to re-examine the decision to proceed with the specialized ASW frigate for the ship replacement programme and to look at a more versatile General Purpose Frigate (GPF).⁴⁴ Rayner also wanted advice on the

very long term perspective. On 5 April 1961, he commissioned Commodore Brock, ACNS (Air & Warfare), to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives,

To define the purpose of the navy and make recommendations concerning the role, tasks, and composition of the fleet required to meet the Navy's responsibilities in the future in the most effective and economical manner. This will entail an examination of the probable nature of naval forces and design of weapons systems required for the next twenty-five years.⁴⁵

Brock was given subsequent further direction that the Naval Board was now inclining toward the idea of adopting the GPF as the replacement ship and considering a small helicopter carrier as well.⁴⁶

As if to give impetus and inspiration to Brock's task, the Soviets launched the first manned spacecraft to orbit the earth with Major Yuri Gagarin aboard, five days later. Typically, the zealous Brock saw this as a good omen and mustered his committee, all of whom had this requirement added to their primary tasks, into the review. Members included Commodore Hennesy, DCNP, and Captain Elcock, Chairman of Personnel Structure Coordinating Committee, who was appointed secretary. Hennesy pointed out, that Elcock had "continuing and important requirements" pertaining to the implementation of the Tisdall Report but, "could be made available on a time sharing basis."⁴⁷ Hennesy himself was probably working twelve-hour days on his own job. Given the importance purportedly attached to the implementation of the new personnel system, it begs the question as to who was setting priorities as to the allocation of scarce staff resources. It is more probable that the additional tasking was simply dropped on the staff. As one senior officer on the Naval Staff at the time observed, "We just went from crisis to crisis."⁴⁸

Brock worked his committee long and hard in the full realization that, after the traditional pattern, his promotion to Rear-Admiral hung on the study. The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives, known as the "Brock Report", is a comprehensive 130 page

document that reflected the extraordinary imagination and energy of its originator and was certainly far more than Rayner asked for. As Brock noted in his covering letter to Rayner, which was written in the archaic style and language of Nelson's day, "...though not specifically requested, you will find the committee recommendations also constitute a progressive plan for fulfilling other urgent needs and enabling the navy to perform other useful functions of a more versatile nature."⁴⁹ Brock recommended departing from the consistent emphasis on ASW capabilities set by Grant and DeWolf. He opined, "I should like to venture the following comment on my own: consistency is laudable only when it has a purpose. The purpose must have a plan and a plan should be progressive."⁵⁰ While advocating the continued enhancement of ASW capabilities he added other tasks that he personally deemed "urgent".

Brock interpreted the notion of "progressive", as mentioned by the CNS in his inaugural address to the Naval Board, as a desire to expand the role of the navy and, concurrently, the navy itself. Brock advanced the argument that when Canada committed itself to NATO it did not attempt to achieve "a measure of national balance", as other countries had, and this had resulted in strategic inflexibility.⁵¹ Anticipating a more active foreign policy in the future where Canada might be invited to provide an intervention force by the UN, Brock advocated a balanced fleet based on General Purpose Frigates (GPF), "heliporter" frigates designed to carry six helicopters, many small fast ASW craft, and, if affordable, nuclear propelled (SSN) ASW submarines. This fleet would continue in the ASW role but with the added capability of being able to transport, land and support a small army intervention force. The GPF was the key to this role being capable of transporting up to 200 troops and providing gunfire support. The ship would have a reasonable ASW capability but its helicopter would be too small to have a dipping sonar and would only be able to deliver ASW weapons (torpedoes). However, the GPF would be armed with short and medium range surface to air missiles for air defence.

The fleet's general ASW capability would be enhanced by the SSN's and "cheap and many" fast ASW hydro-foil craft. Interestingly, Brock did not see the fleet built around an aircraft carrier but on the SSN's and dual purpose ASW and troop-carrying "helicopter" frigates and futuristic multi-purpose Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) aircraft. This reflected the direction being taken by the Royal Navy of which Brock was an ardent admirer. There was also to be an expanded role for the navy in the Arctic as "an urgent requirement" and a requirement for Arctic Support Vessels.⁵² This was based on a suggestion from the Ministry of Northern Affairs and National Resources that the RCN should consider a role in maintaining sovereignty in the Arctic and take back the *Labrador*. Rayner's initial reaction had been lukewarm as a destroyer would have to be paid off unless additional funding and manpower were provided to operate the icebreaker.⁵³

The "Brock Report" advocated a break with DeWolf's successful model and expanding the RCN's roles to include what DeWolf had called "extraneous pursuits". Brock stated, "There is, within the Navy, a bursting enthusiasm for the adoption of progressive policies that needs only guidance, continuing leadership, and a firm well understood plan for the achievement of aims."⁵⁴ The repeated emphasis on the word "progressive" implied that the navy had somehow been held back and ideas suppressed. It is evident that the GPF idea was a revised version of that set aside by DeWolf in favour of the repeat Restigouche class. DeWolf's follow-on was the cheaper ASW frigate. There was strong pressure from design engineers and gunnery officers to build a ship that satisfied their professional needs and preferences. DeWolf had chosen the more economical and proven path. "Progressive", in fact, translated into Brock for VCNS and his covering letter was a thinly veiled self-advertisement that he would provide the "guidance and continuing leadership" required to implement his programme. Brock maintained that the CNS was enthralled with the programme and believed that the government was sold on it.⁵⁵

There were major flaws in the "Brock Report" in the assumptions pertaining to funding, costs and personnel. Brock based his calculations of affordability of his programme on the assumption that the navy would receive one percent of the Gross National Product for the foreseeable future. This was not stated government policy and was merely an imaginatively interpreted historical coincidence.⁵⁶ Naval budgets had declined and were now frozen under an austerity programme. Moreover, personnel costs were escalating at the expense of the capital budget. The cost of military hardware was inflating exponentially. Although the GPF would contain many new types of equipment and weapons systems, some still in the developmental stage, Brock stated that twelve ships could be built for a total cost of \$265 million or an average of \$33 million each.⁵⁷ The estimated cost of the submarine programme including six conventional Barbels and six SSN's was \$336 million and \$495 million for the twelve "helicopter" frigates. To fund the total programme, the RCN's budget would have to grow to \$529 million by 1973. The fleet would peak at fifty-five combatant ships in 1975 when the first St. Laurent class would be retired.⁵⁸ Having established this ambitious programme, Brock stated, in contradiction, "In view of the seemingly inevitability of an endless rise in personnel costs and operating expenditures, we shall be increasingly hard pressed to find funds needed for new equipment."⁵⁹ His answer was that imaginative ideas must be found to reduce unit costs.

His most serious error was in personnel projections. He stated that personnel requirements would increase to 22,000 officers and men by 1965 and peak at 25,000 by 1973.⁶⁰ Personnel costs were projected to continue to inflate at a rate of 5 percent per annum. While all this was purported to be integrated into the programme, there was no separate costing breakdown and there were no annual projections for personnel requirements. Also, there was no indication of the size or composition of the complements of the various new units or of the maintenance and training facilities required. The facts were that the actual personnel

requirement for the RCN stood at 22,000 at the time the report was published and would rise to 25,555 in 1966-67 without the addition of a single ship in Brock's programme.⁶¹ When pressed on this inconsistency retrospectively, Rear-Admiral Brock conceded that the personnel figures in his report were notional and probably a figure of 35,000 was closer to the actual requirement!⁶² It was also apparent that he had not considered the ramifications on personnel requirements of introducing much more advanced technology than in the St. Laurent class DDE's.

The "Brock Report" repeated the major error in the blueprint for the future navy produced in 1945. The personnel requirements in the earlier document, "The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy", of which Vice-Admiral Rayner was the author, were inaccurate. Rayner and Brock both failed to conduct a proper analysis and relied instead on guesswork. What is not understood is that with DCNP and a former DCOMP on the committee, why accurate personnel requirement figures and projections were not included. That is unless Brock deliberately chose to exclude them which was probably not the case. Rather, the tenor of Brock's memoirs suggest that his authorship was inclined to be governed more by his fertile imagination than either facts or logic.⁶³ This is also an opinion expressed by many of his contemporaries. There is a sense that little had changed in the RCN in sixteen years and that acquiring ships first and worrying about personnel later remained a strong inclination in postwar fleet planning on the part of some senior officers in the RCN. The question also exists how Vice-Admiral Rayner, who was a capable staff officer and former CNP, would later accept Brock's report without challenging the very obvious lack of personnel projections.

Brock was promoted to Rear-Admiral and appointed to relieve the retiring Tisdall as VCNS on 30 June 1960. The finishing touches were being put on the report by Commander Don Saxon, his ghost writer. The report was submitted to Rayner in July and considered by the

Naval Board over a series of twelve meetings through December. The Naval Board did not agree that Canada would be asked to provide a balanced task force, but rather any military action would be under the aegis of a combined NATO or UN force. They did agree that, "[T]here remains the requirement for a considerable degree of built-in versatility in our naval forces."⁶⁴ The board also observed that implementation of the recommended replacement programme would result in only a modest capability to transport and support an army unit. An expansion of the roles of the RCN to include supporting army actions and contributing to maintenance of sovereignty in the Arctic was approved and a more definitive statement of operational tasks. The board observed that the allocation of a percentage of the GNP for the naval budget was not accepted government policy and the impression should not be given that the size of the navy depended upon this consideration, which was exactly the impression Brock conveyed. There appears to have been no particular disagreement with Brock's projected personnel requirements.

The Naval Board demonstrated less enthusiasm than the author for a "progressive" policy and agreed only for a modest expansion of the navy's roles to include supporting the army and Arctic sovereignty. There was sufficient consensus eventually to agree that the General Purpose Frigates (GPF) should displace the more modest and less capable diesel-powered ASW frigate for the ship replacement programme. This recommendation found favour relatively easily with the government and the GPF programme was announced in the House of Commons by Douglas Harkness the following March. The shipyards need for work undoubtedly helped in gaining approval for this new class of ship. There was insufficient interest in re-acquiring the *Labrador* when it was determined that there would be no increase in funding. Brock pressed for the widest possible distribution of the report and had prepared an unclassified version for distribution to the fleet. He believed that it should be read by every

Member of Parliament and given to every school child in Canada.⁶⁵ Rayner was advised by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff to treat the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives, "as an "internal document for use by Naval Board members and other selected senior officers as considered necessary."⁶⁶ The report was ordered suppressed but Brock had already distributed it to all levels of the Naval Staff.⁶⁷ There it received mixed reviews. Those supporting an expansion of roles, such as Rear-Admiral Pickford, DNP at the time, thought it a "visionary" document. Pragmatists, such as Rear-Admiral Murdoch, then Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), thought it contrary to the primary ASW task and a "glorified wish list".⁶⁸

While the approval of the General Purpose Frigate (GPF) was a success for Rayner, personnel issues presented continuing challenges and defeats both to his office and the navy. He found that the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff (CCOS) was prepared to curtail the administrative authority of the CNS by over-riding his traditional right to choose members of the Naval Board. Rear-Admiral Wright, the Naval Comptroller, was due to retire in December 1961, and Rayner nominated the next seaman officer due for promotion to Rear-Admiral, Commodore Medland, to replace him.⁶⁹ Air Marshall Miller, CCOS, would not support this nomination to the Minister by virtue of the fact Medland had neither the background nor training in business management which were stipulated as prerequisites when the Rank Structure Committee (RSC) approved the Naval Comptroller's position. Miller reiterated, "It was not to be regarded as just another appointment for General List Officers."⁷⁰ The CNS was obliged to reconsider his nomination and had to ask Rear-Admiral Wright to extend his service for one year until a suitable replacement was available.⁷¹ Subsequently, Wright retired in March 1962, to accept a job in business, and Commodore Plomer, another seaman officer, was appointed temporarily as the Acting Naval Comptroller. The position was filled permanently in July 1962, after Miller supported and Harkness approved the promotion of Commodore Charles Dillon, a suitably

qualified former Supply Branch officer.⁷² Rayner was also challenged from an unexpected source when Rear-Admiral Storrs, Commandant of the National Defence College (NDC), rejected the CNS's nominee, Commodore Harold Groos, as the naval member on the directing staff. Storrs advised Air Marshall Miller that Groos was unacceptable because he had not attended either NDC or the Imperial Defence College (IDC).⁷³ Miller agreed and Rayner was obliged to withdraw Groos' name and substitute Commodore Quinn who had previously attended NDC.⁷⁴ Rayner was non-confrontational by nature but in easily conceding these nominations, set precedents pertaining to the power of the CNS that would have ramifications in other areas.

The navy received some unexpected relief for its personnel situation when the East Germans threw up a wall in Berlin in August 1961, and the Cold War heated up substantially. The crisis deepened in September, when the Soviets resumed testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. These incidents resulted from the escalating tension caused by the sparring contest between Nikita Krushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union, and John Kennedy, the new activist President of the United States. Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced, "that certain measures should be taken to strengthen Canada's preparedness for defence" which resulted in an immediate increase in the ceiling of the armed forces personnel to 135,000.⁷⁵ The RCN's share was 21,749 officers and men, which the CNS announced to the fleet, would be used "to bring ships up to fully operational complement as soon as possible."⁷⁶ The public responded to the crisis and the navy's recruiting improved immediately and there was hope some trained men would be attracted back to improve the severe trade group shortage.⁷⁷ Rear-Admiral Budge reported to the CNS that the international crisis generated enthusiasm among new recruits and the wastage rate at *Cornwallis* had dropped, however, few recently released trained men had responded to a mail-out campaign inviting them to re-enrol. Budge added that there had been, "a

flood of requests to re-enrol from men who had been failures both in and out of the service nearly all of whom were unskilled."⁷⁸ He was optimistic that if the present trend continued that the new ceiling would be reached by October 1963.

The infusion of a greater number of personnel had to be absorbed by the personnel system in the midst of a major restructuring. With respect to introduction of the general list for officers, correspondence from the fleet indicated initial major teething problems as the recommendations of the Tisdall Report were being introduced. Ships reported Engineer Officers were ignoring their technical duties as they worked to qualify for their bridge watchkeeping certifications, and gaps in necessary expertise had been created through the withdrawal of Electrical Officers. Also, there were lieutenant-commanders and senior lieutenants in ships who could not be employed in watchkeeping duties through lack of aptitude or poor eyesight. Weapons and Operations Officers were lacking because they had yet to be trained.⁷⁹ The first Weapons Officers' course completed in June 1960, but the first Operations Officers' course was not scheduled until mid-1962. To settle the issue of who was fit to command, the Naval Board defined qualifications and went on to approve the introduction of formal command examinations to ensure standardization was achieved.⁸⁰ Requirements for selection for promotion of officers were approved in April 1961, with the first boards to be convened later in the year.⁸¹ The Limited Duty List, containing mainly trade specialists commissioned from the ranks, was introduced in June 1961.⁸²

After eighteen months experience with general list, Rear-Admiral Budge became convinced that it was uneconomical to train every officer to a level where any job at sea or ashore appropriate to his rank could be undertaken. Applying the practical knowledge of a seasoned sailor, Budge told the Naval Board "There was, in fact, no requirement to employ an officer in every field during his career."⁸³ He recommended the introduction of four surface sub-

specialist fields; Weapons, Engineering, Operations and Supply. The first three sub-specializations would require further training before an officer could assume the duties of head of a department in a ship. Appointment as head of the Supply Department would require only completion of first sea phase. Budge also recommended that the Executive Officer, who was both second in command and head of the Operations department under the new ship's organization, be relieved of the operations responsibilities. After consideration, the Naval Board approved Budge's proposal and he pressed his advantage to suggest that an officer should be permitted to elect employment in the department of his choice during his second sea phase.⁸⁴ He was telling the Naval Board that the general list concept while fine in theory, was impractical because it was uneconomical to produce "a jack of all trades". Budge knew that men have natural vocations and the navy should not be forcing round pegs into square holes. And, not every officer aspired to command. Budge's experience carried the day and the Naval Board approved a reasonable modification to the general list concept.

There were parallel developments in the much larger undertaking of introducing the new rank and trade structure for men. Schools were reorganizing to teach the trade conversion courses but sufficient candidates were not forthcoming because ships could not release them without dropping below minimum manning standards. Cornwallis reported better success in trade selection through aptitude testing and interviews and also a higher quality of recruit with 50 percent of men enlisting having an average education level of grade 10.⁸⁵ There was however a serious training crunch because of the increase in the personnel ceiling and the fact that many three and five-year men were coming due for re-engagement. Only the air trades, administration writers and communicators were being trained up to Trade Group 1 level before joining ships, but because overall numbers were increasing and ship availability decreasing, other trades would have to be trained ashore. Respecting higher trade training, indications were that current

selection techniques for candidates were resulting in "substantial built in failure rates" and reduced production.⁸⁶ At the current rate, it would be five to seven years before all men affected, mainly seaman and electrical trades, could be cross-trained. Rank examinations were introduced for all ranks above Leading Seaman in 1961, and the *Manual of Rank Requirements (BRCN 3047)* was issued for self study. This was a unique achievement as for the first time Canadian sailors had their own nationally produced publication. The manual described how the "new navy" was structured and administered and instructed them in their leadership responsibilities.⁸⁷

The senior officers were advised of the extent of the current challenges facing the RCN at a conference convened by the CNS in November 1961. Vice-Admiral Rayner re-introduced senior officer caucus meetings after a hiatus of seven years. Rear-Admiral Budge reported satisfactory progress with reorganization of the officers' structure and officer training.⁸⁸ He stated that there remained a "crying need" for naval housing, especially on the east coast, but that various initiatives were underway and 400 additional units should be completed in the Halifax area in 1963. He then turned to the most pressing personnel problem stating,

We are short, and seriously so, of skilled tradesmen. Specifically, we are short nearly 3000 Trade Group 2,3 and 4 men in the Weapons Engineering and Engineering trades. We drafted 1900 men for courses on the East Coast in the fiscal year 1960-61 - we released 1700 from the Service. In other words [a gain of only 200], we are not increasing the number of skilled tradesmen in the Service. At best we are treading water - at worst we are going down for the third time. Because we are so short, the Depot must draft men to course as soon as they become eligible. This in turn leads to instability in ship's companies and even further reduces the marginal efficiency resulting from shortages in trained men. This is not so applicable on the West Coast where shortages are less severe and hence greater stability in drafting has been achieved.⁸⁹

Budge went on to say that the Port Division system was an impediment to making the best use of available manpower and that he had ordered a review to determine the best course of action to remove it. He also stated that the capacity of the schools could be increased to improve

training production but that extra students could not be obtained with the existing commitments. He then proposed a temporary cut-back in commitments through placing three older east coast destroyers in an inactive status which would provide instructors and approximately 400 additional students from critical trades. Budge concluded that Fleet School *Stadacona* would have to earmark the necessary number of officers and men to complement those ships immediately in an emergency.

Rear-Admiral Budge's comments were based on a series of submissions from both coasts and NSHQ which provided substantiation and solid statistical data. Rear-Admiral Dyer reported that "We are faced with a staggering trades training problem in the Command" and instability was affecting the operational capability of his ships.⁹⁰ While a cyclic system was supposed to be in place, his ships were experiencing 25 percent draft changes for training courses in a six month period.⁹¹ The wastage statistics on first-term re-engagements for 1960-61 showed an improvement, after a dive in 1959-60 caused by uncertainty when the New Trade Structure was initially introduced. But figures for the highly skilled and critical engineering, electrical and hull trades indicted a steady re-engagement rate of only 35 percent.⁹² The root cause for the low re-engagement rates for these trades was poor sea/shore ratio where the engineers, for example, could expect to spend 70 percent of their career at sea. This resulted in "burnout" in conscientious men and marital problems.⁹³ Younger men of the engineering and electrical trades that took the best and the brightest recruits, found this prospect unacceptable and were leaving. The training and skills these technicians acquired in the navy commanded high paying jobs on civilian street.

The crisis resulted in an emergency plan to provide personnel for trade training and for manning new construction. Called Plan Delta, it was originally developed by Captain (later Rear-Admiral) Dan Hanington who had relieved Captain Browne as the Director of Naval

Manning (DNM). He had most recently been the Executive Officer at *Stadacona*, the base in Halifax, and was completely familiar with the personnel problems on the east coast. Hanington drew up a plan to place three Tribal Class destroyers in "Category B" to obtain some 427 men for trade training and instructional duties for Rear-Admiral Budge to present to the Senior Officers' Conference.⁹⁴ It was subsequently studied by both FOAC and the NPCC. A modified plan was proposed by Rear-Admiral Dyer that would make 500 personnel available for trade training but circumvented the necessity to place any ships in Category B.⁹⁵ Presumably, Dyer proposed this alternative because to lay up ships would send the wrong signal during a period of increased tension between NATO and the USSR. Moreover, DeWolf had previously convinced the Rank Structure Committee that laid up ships manned by scratch crews were not an option.

Dyer's Plan Delta entailed the reduction of the ship's companies of three Tribals to 75 percent of operational complement and limiting the build-up of the remainder of the fleet to 90 percent. Additionally, the complement of the Tribal in refit would be reduced to 25 percent and the fleet maintenance schedule amended to ensure one Tribal was always in refit. The new DDE's *Mackenzie and Saskatchewan*, designated east coast ships, would be manned with west coast crews. The NPCC advised the Naval Board that it would be at least five years under this plan before the converted St. Laurent Class and new construction ships could be fully manned. Beyond this point, success would be determined by the re-engagement rate. The Naval Board approved adoption of Plan Delta in February 1962. The plan also called for declaring the first frigate surplus in May 1963 and placing three Tribals into reserve in September 1963.⁹⁶ Plan Delta became the major factor in determining the fleet composition and employment programme for 1962 and 1963.⁹⁷ This indicated the navy's full commitment to solving its personnel crisis.

The work of the Manpower Review Committee was completed in March 1962 and a new personnel forecast, "RCN Complement 1962 - Men", was promulgated which replaced all

existing complements.⁹⁸ Captain Phillips, DNOM, had completed his task by late 1961 and every job in the navy had been identified by trade, trade group level and rank. Captain Hanington, DNM, then undertook a trade by trade examination of the resultant requirement in each port division. His objectives were to ensure that the rank and trade group structures established by the complement were attainable, offered equitable career and promotion opportunities and created a tolerable sea-shore ratio.⁹⁹ Hanington's study was necessarily cursory because of lack of time and staff resources. He concluded that some alterations would have to be made to rank and trade group complements in order to attain sufficient senior tradesmen and thereby prevent making significant changes to either the training system or the promotion and advancement regulations. He also concluded that, "Significantly less alteration to complement would be necessary if the two port divisions did not have to be treated as separate navies."¹⁰⁰ Another conclusion was that in about half the trades, increasing complexity of technology required a larger base of apprentices than the complement called for. With respect to sea-shore ratios, he confirmed that the engineering trades were in extremis but some method other than establishing "any trade billets" must be found to redress this problem. He stated that many of his answers were not satisfactory and the review would have to be on-going, but he did establish "ground rules" for this and a methodology on which to proceed.

When the "RCN Complement 1962 - Men" was promulgated by the Naval Secretary on behalf of the Naval Board, it included both an explanation of the methodology employed to establish it and regulations for all subsequent complement changes. Commanding Officers were advised:

As was inevitable, the requests for manpower, both in total numbers and in rank and trade group, exceeded the authorized ceiling of the RCN. Many desirable commitments had to be drastically curtailed. It is considered, however, that within the limitations of available manpower the new complement 'divides the pie' as fairly as possible. While minor changes within the total numbers, ranks and trade groups allocated to an establishment or group of associated establishments may still be made, it is most unlikely that

any ship or establishment can be increased at the expense of another without the most cogent reasons.¹⁰¹

Commanding Officers were instructed that additions would only be possible with exact off-setting deletions within their organizations and that the complement would be monitored by NSHQ and controlled through the use of an automated record system. Work study experts would be available to conduct manpower reviews to assist Commanding Officers and these reviews would be on-going in any case.

The navy's personnel programme, in the process of absorbing the recent infusion of recruits, was dealt a critical setback in July 1962, when the government announced an immediate freeze on spending to deal with a financial crisis over the country's balance of payments. The estimates for 1962-63 had already been set virtually at the previous year's level.¹⁰² The Treasury Board now demanded a \$13 million cash reduction from the three services of which the navy's share was \$1.6 million in the current fiscal year. They proposed that this be achieved through an immediate reduction of the total personnel ceiling to 20,000.¹⁰³ This would drive it below the level of 1955 because the additional allowance for 720 cadets and apprentices over authorized ceiling would be eliminated. The navy managed to convince the Minister to freeze the personnel ceiling at the existing strength of 21,720. Other measures included a reduction in fuel, ammunition and maintenance funding, paying-off the Banshees earlier and further reducing the RCNR programme. The CNS announced this unwelcome news to the fleet and tried to sweeten the pill by stating that in reducing spending, "the Navy can render an important national service" and that commitments would be maintained and the ship replacement programme would continue.¹⁰⁴ The navy was, however, able to protect its procurement programme and that funding actually increased by \$27 million over 1961-62.¹⁰⁵

A consequence of the strain of the personnel situation was that Rear-Admiral Budge requested retirement eighteen months before his extension was to expire. A relief was required.

The CNS requested the Minister to appoint Commodore M.G. "Micky" Stirling as CNP and to promote him to Rear-Admiral on 15 September 1962.¹⁰⁶ In doing this, Rayner passed over Commodore James Plomer who was a year senior to Stirling and had recently sat on the Naval Board as the Acting-Naval Comptroller. Plomer had recently served in NSHQ as both DCNP and DCOMP while Stirling had not served in headquarters for ten years and never in the Personnel Branch. Stirling was prewar RCN and Plomer was ex-RCNVR. After Stirling's promotion was announced, Plomer resigned in a rage in June 1962. In the following year he would launch a reprisal campaign that provided ammunition for Paul Hellyer's integration initiative discussed later.

To make matters worse for the financial forecast, NATO had increased the RCN's force goals for 1966 and the navy was looking at no increase in the 1963-64 estimates before the new intervention.¹⁰⁷ The preliminary estimates for 1963-64 deferred the second tanker, the submarine programme and contained none of Brock's proposed acquisitions. The navy was being forced to the financial wall and its capital programmes were falling into deficit, its operations and maintenance funding diminishing. Personnel was the most pressing problem. The CNS advised the Minister, "The Navy with its present commitments will be hard pressed to keep the service in a proper state of military preparedness."¹⁰⁸ Rear-Admiral Dillon, now NCOMP, was more sanguine and told the VCNS that, with the impact of Plan Delta now compounded by the recent reductions, operational complements would be reduced again. Dillon advised Brock that while there would be sufficient personnel in ships to fill important functions in the action state, "ships' effectiveness would be adversely affected for prolonged 'cold war' operations or peacetime exercises."¹⁰⁹ Unknown to Dillon and his colleagues, the operational readiness of the RCN would soon be tested in the "Cuban Missile Crisis".

NOTES - CHAPTER 10

1 COAC Briefing Notes for the Twelfth Senior Officers' Meeting, 27 October 1961, 73/1148, DHist.

2 Murdoch interview by the author.

3 Quoted in VAdmr. H.S. Rayner, biographical sketch, VAdmr. Rayner file, DHist.

4 COPC to CNS, 28 February 1958, NAC, MG 30 E 509, VAdmr. DeWolf Papers.

5 Dillon interview by the author.

6 Michael Rayner (son of VAdmr. Rayner) interview by the author, 17 February 1987, Ottawa, Ontario. Michael Rayner was a "slightly liberal" student at Carleton University and attempted on many occasions without success to draw his father on current issues pertaining to his job as CNS and politics. He could never recall his father discussing navy business other than social appointments with his mother, "There was no pillow talk."

7 Raymont, "Development of Canadian Defence Policy," 93-94.

8 Collins interview by the author.

9 DeWolf interview by the author.

10 Brock interview by the author.

11 Budge interview by the author. Budge had reached retirement age of 55 in 1959 and had his service extended to 1963, by the Minister at DeWolf's request.

12 Budge inspired exceptional personal loyalty to the extent that when he was well into his nineties and visually challenged, former ratings from ships he had commanded set up a support group that provided transportation and an escort every time he left his house.

13 DeWolf interview by the author.

14 Hanington interview by the author.

15 Murdoch interview by the author.

16 Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Naval Board, 22 July 1960.

17 NBM 628, 10 August 1960.

18 Ibid.

19 NBM 630-1, 6 September 1960.

20 Ibid.

21 Morton, *Canada and War*, 177.

22 Ibid.

23 NSec, "RCN Complement 1962 - Men", 30 March 1962, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 12, Complements General.

24 DNOrg to CNP, "Manpower Review", November 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General. Provides a detailed explanation of the schedule and methodology utilized by the Manpower Review Committee.

25 DNOrg to NComp, memo, 9 November 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General.

26 Ibid., see Wright's annotated responses and comments.

27 DNM to CNP, memo, 10 November 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General.

28 DNM to CNP, memo, 14 December 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General.

29 An "any trade" billet was also non-specific in rank as well as trade and used primarily to promote men into or provide breaks from seetime. They were established by informal discussions usually between branch advisors and personnel staff and employed like a pool but the personnel had to be counted in the overall complement and this created large imbalances in the structure.

30 NCOMP to CNP, memo, 24 November 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General.

31 DCNP and DNM to CNP, memos, both 2 December 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General.

32 Ibid.

33 Pickford interview by the author.

34 Minutes of a Meeting held in the Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel, 8 December 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General.

35 DNOM to NCOMP, memo, 20 March 1961, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General.

36 ACNS(A&W) to CNP, memo, 28 March, 1961, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General.

37 CNP to VCNS, memo, 21 April 1961, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 10, Complements General.

38 Ibid., VCNS minute, 27 April 1961.

39 The Hon. G. R. Pearkes, V.C., Department of National Defence, *Statement on Defence Policy and its Implementation*, June 1960, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960).

40 Ibid., 7.

41 Ibid., 10.

42 "RCN Future Requirements Planning Guide for the Period 1962-72", NBM 641-1, 10 January 1961.

43 VCNS, "RCN Future Requirements Planning Guide for the Period 1962-72", 25 January 1962, DHist file 124-019(D1) (final version). The threat assessments, Canada-United States Intelligence Estimates, CANUS 60 AND 61, were joint efforts that the threat was increasing and any attack would be nuclear.

44 NBM 642-4, 18 January 1961.

45 NBM 646-3, 5 April 1961.

46 NBM 648-1, 21 April 1961.

47 NBM 646-3, 5 April 1961.

48 Pickford interview by the author. Captain (later RAdmr) Pickford was DNP at the time.

49 "The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives", July 1961, 120.003 (D3), DHist, 3 (covering letter). Hereafter referred to as the "Brock Report".

50 Ibid., 1.

51 Ibid., 14.

52 Ibid., 51.

53 NBM 639-1, 2 December 1960.

54 "Brock Report", 4 (covering letter).

55 Brock interview by the author.

56 "Brock Report", 96-97.

57 Ibid., 105.

58 Ibid., Appendix "B".

59 Ibid., 110.

60 Ibid., 98.

61 DNCOMP, "RCN Military Manpower Requirement", 17 December 1962, 124.069(D2), DHist. While this document post-dates the "Brock Report" it is merely an accurate calculation of the personnel requirements reported in 1959 by NCOMP as a consequence of implementing the complementing concept in the "Tisdall Report". At that time the Naval Board made the decision to underman the ships.

62 Brock interview by the author.

63 For example, Brock claims in Chapter 4 of *The Thunder and the Sunshine* to be the originator of the idea for both the twin funnels of the St. Laurent conversion and the "Bear Trap" helicopter haul down gear. The design staffs had these on paper before Brock became ACNS (Air and Warfare). Brock also told the author that he knew Paul Hellyer wanted to make him the first Chief of Defence Staff but would not because he would not go along with unification.

64 NBM 659-1, 12 December 1961. These minutes reflect discussions and decisions of the twelve separate meetings.

65 Brock interview by the author.

66 NBM 681-3, 2 August 1962.

67 Brock, *The Thunder and the Sunshine*, 85.

68 Pickford and Murdoch interviews by the author.

69 CNS to MND(through C,COS), 12 May 1961, 73/1223/Series 1, file 726, RCN - Rank Structure, 1960-64, DHist.

70 CCOS to MND, 15 May, 1961, 73/1223/Series 1, file 726, RCN - Rank Structure, 1960-64, DHist.

71 CNS to MND, 8 January 1962, 73/1223/Series 1, file 726, RCN - Rank Structure, 1960-64, DHist.

72 CNS to MND(through C,Cos), 2 February 1962, 73/1223/Series 1, file 726, RCN - Rank Structure, 1960-64, DHist.

73 Cmdt NDC to C,COS, 9 February 1961, 73/1223/Series 1, file 726, RCN - Rank Structure, 1960-64, DHist.

74 CNS to C,COS, 20 February 1961, 73/1223/Series 1, file 726, RCN - Rank Structure, 1960-64, DHist.

75 PC 1961-1275, 7 September 1961, and DM to Service Chiefs, memo, 19 September 1961, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1394, NSS 4100-1, vol. 12, Complements General.

76 CANGEN 135/61, 7 September 1961, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1394, NSS 4100-1, vol. 12, Complements General. The navy's authorized ceiling was actually 22,469, the additional were officer cadets and apprentices under training.

77 DNM (Captain Hanington) to DCNP, memo, 19 September 1961, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1394, NSS 4100-1, vol. 12, Complements General.

78 CNP to CNS, memo, 24 November 1961, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1394, NSS 4100-1, vol. 12, Complements General.

79 CO *Fraser*(Macknight) to C2, 1 December 1960, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 131, File 1279-24-0, Vol. 3.

80 NBM 621-8, 25 May 1960 and NBM Special Meeting 22 July 1960.

81 NBM 647-1, 18 April 1961.

82 NBM 654-1, 28 June 1962.

83 NBM 678-1, 16 May 1962.

84 NBM 682-1, 2 August 1962.

85 ACNP(Plans) to DNT,DOP,DNM, "Progress Report - Implementation of the New Personnel Structure", 9 November 1961, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 137, File 1279-24-1, vol. 1.

86 Ibid.

87 RCN, *Manual of Rank Requirements (BRCN 3047)*, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1961) was issued in two Volumes, Vol. 1 for Leading Seaman and Petty Officers 2nd Class and Vol. 2 for Chief Petty Officers 1st and 2nd Class and Petty Officers 1st Class.

88 CNP Address, Twelfth Senior Officers' Conference, 20-21 November 1961, 73/1148, DHist and Minutes Twelfth Senior Officers' Conference held at Naval Headquarters Ottawa, on 20-21 November 1961, NAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, Interim Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 6, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings. The material at DHist contains briefing material not with the minutes at NAC.

89 CNP Address, *ibid.*

90 FOAC, "Operational Readiness - Atlantic Command", Twelfth Senior Officers' Conference, 20-21 November 1961, 73/1148, DHist.

91 FOAC to NSec, "Stability in Manning", 14 August 1961, Twelfth Senior Officers' Conference, 20-21 November 1961, 73/1148, DHist.

92 CNP to CNS, memo, 9 November 1961, Twelfth Senior Officers' Conference, 20-21 November 1961, 73/1148, DHist.

93 CO *Fort Erie* to FOAC, 18 April 1962, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1394, NSS 4100-1, vol. 12, Complements General.

94 DNM to DCNP, memo, 6 November 1961, Twelfth Senior Officers' Conference, 20-21 November 1961, 73/1148, DHist. DNM includes example letters from the fleet.

95 NBM 668-1, 2 February 1962.

96 NSec, "Provision of Personnel for Trade Training and Manning New Construction Ships", 7 February 1962, 72/320, DHist. This promulgated the complete schedule up to March 1966, for commissionings, conversions, placing ships into reserve in Category C and declaring ships surplus.

97 NBM 675-1, 18 April 1962.

98 NSec, "RCN Complement 1962 - Men", 30 March 1962, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 12, Complements General.

99 DNM to CNP, memo, 13 March 1962, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1392, NSS 4100-1, vol. 12, Complements General.

100 Ibid.

101 NSec, "RCN Complement 1962 - Men", 30 March 1962.

102 NBM 662-1, 6 December 1961.

103 Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Naval Board, 26 June 1962.

104 NSec, CANGEN 142 311816Z July 1962, 81/520/1440-5, vol. 25, DHist.

105 Naval Comptroller's Address, Minutes Thirteenth Senior Officers' Conference, 14 January 1963, NAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, Box 144, (Interim Box 143) NSS 1279-118, vol. 7, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings.

106 CNS to MND(through C,COS), 9 May 1962, 73/1223/Series 1, file 726, RCN - Rank Structure, DHist.

107 NBM 673-1, 2 April 1962. Canada's force level was increased to 34 escorts of which 5 could be in Category B or C, and 6 submarines in Category A. NBM 677-1, 11 May 1962 contains the preliminary estimates for 1963-64.

108 CNS to MND, 9 July 1962, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1394, NSS 4100-1, vol. 13, Complements General.

109 NCOMP to VCNS, memo, 9 July 1962, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1394, NSS 4100-1, vol. 13, Complements General.

CHAPTER 11

Collapse

The wasting of strength coincided with the government's desire to reduce military strength and, as a result sight was lost of the fact that the diminishing size of the fleet was not the result of an executive decision, but would have happened anyway. The manpower target set for the East Coast was 9,819 men to be achieved by 1967. By September, 1964 the East Coast manpower stood at 9,767 men. In November, 1964 the manning of the fleet collapsed and a further retreat involving removal from operation of one tribal destroyer, one converted fleet destroyer and four frigates, brought to 23, the number of first line warships removed from operations.

Commander W. H. Willson
Director of Training(Men)
16 December 1964

Vice-Admiral Rayner stated that "The Cuban crisis proved to be a most realistic test of the Navy, particularly the operational forces, to react in an emergency."¹ The Cuban Missile Crisis which occurred during October 1962, tested the "forces in being" concept that had been the governing principle of RCN fleet planning. The crisis itself was a test of the resolve of Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union to station nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba and of President John F. Kennedy of the United States to prevent it. The confrontation arguably brought the two contenders to the brink of nuclear war. While the issue was one of competing Soviet-American foreign policies, the consequential threat to North America of nuclear attack by Soviet air and submarine forces automatically involved the RCN and RCAF through joint defence agreements. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss either the broader aspects of policy and strategy pertaining to either the agreements or the operations themselves except as they contribute to an evaluation of fleet readiness and effectiveness, particularly with respect to personnel matters. Policy, operations and both the internal and external political developments are well covered in *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered* by Commander Peter Haydon.²

Canadian maritime forces on both coasts were involved in the surveillance operations against Soviet submarines that began on 17 October and wound down on 8 November 1962. On the east coast, out of a total of thirty-nine ships of all types, twenty-nine were available for operations. Of these, all ASW escorts were sailed in groups to surveillance stations within the MARLANT area. Unfortunately, the most effective ASW unit, *Bonaventure* with her aircraft, was in Plymouth, England with five destroyers and had to be recalled to the western Atlantic. On the west coast, the 2nd Squadron of DDE's was out of the command area, exercising with the USN, and also was recalled. The 4th Squadron of frigates was exercising in the operating area when the crisis broke. Submarine contacts were prosecuted by ships and aircraft on both coasts. On the east coast, there were seven active contacts in the combined Canadian and American areas and one possible in the Pacific.

In answer to criticism of fleet readiness levelled later by Commodore Plomer, Vice-Admiral Rayner said, "The fleet was held in a high state of readiness for the duration of the crisis. And when I say readiness, I do not mean in harbour, on standby basis. I mean groups of ships at sea, on patrol, or being replenished in harbour for further patrols."³ He conceded that two ships were in harbour for short periods for machinery repairs and that there were probably some repairs required at sea. However, he expressed general satisfaction with material readiness and the capability of the ships to do their business. The operations ran relatively smoothly on the east coast where the submarine activity was the most intense. A "ships' recall" exercise had been conducted recently in Halifax to test the fleet's ability to recall all ship's companies from leave and sail at short notice. Moreover, FALLEX 62, a NATO command post paper exercise designed to test command and control arrangements between NSHQ and the headquarters on the coasts, had been conducted in September. Vice-Admiral Dyer, FOAC at the time, recounted a discussion with CNS at the onset of the crisis in which they agreed to replay FALLEX and

apply the lessons learned.⁴ Dyer believed that he received good support from NSHQ given the political and financial constraints under which the latter were operating. Peter Haydon suggested that there had been a problem over control but Dyer dismissed this. He recalled that it was a very tense situation and remembers thinking to himself, "This could be the end" and he acted accordingly within the authority that had been delegated to him.⁵ The problem in Ottawa was the government sleep-walked through the crisis and did not wake up until it was nearly over.

There is no evidence to indicate that there was a systematic post-operation analysis conducted of fleet performance after the "Cuban crisis" and most of the evidence available is anecdotal. In one summation, Rear-Admiral Dyer noted that there was a failure in strategic intelligence in that SOSUS, the sound surveillance system, was not as effective against Soviet submarines as previously thought.⁶ He enumerated several serious deficiencies in logistic support in his command ranging from inadequate supplies of fuel for both ships and aircraft to deficiencies of ammunition. Dyer stated that while ship availability had improved slightly, training afloat had not and "considerable effort was wasted because of a lack of stability in ship's companies."⁷ He said while there had been considerable progress made in the performance of the 3"70 gun, "the equipment complexity and the various facets of the personnel problem still make the 3"70 an unreliable weapon with which to fight a war."⁸ There was also "a critical deficiency" of 3"70 ammunition. It is important to mention the gun problem here because it was subsequently raised by Commodore Plomer in his exposé. There were significant personnel shortages in the ships that sailed during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Dyer observed that had the crisis persisted, "supplementing of ship's companies would have produced an even better effectiveness so that the Fleet would have given a good account of itself should it have been necessary."⁹

The question is just how long those ships with reduced complements could have carried on in extended operations before key men became exhausted? The crisis was so contracted that it was not the "realistic test" that Rayner implied. As the RCN's experience in the Battle of the Atlantic showed, merely getting ships to sea is not proof of effectiveness. At the time of the crisis, a re-engagement study was in progress in the Atlantic command under Commodore Medland who interviewed all the Commanding Officers of ships respecting personnel matters affecting readiness. Medland found severe morale problems and low esprit de corps caused by personnel shortages and lack of training that he believed affected fleet operational effectiveness. He reported:

Commanding Officers, almost without exception, are greatly concerned with the inability of their ships to perform under present conditions. The feelings expressed are that in general ships are over-worked, over-extended, always in a rush and trying to do too many things at once. They state that operational commitments, maintenance and training are in constant conflict, with the result that some commitments inevitably suffer.¹⁰

Medland observed that the short-handed ships were caught in a vicious circle where maintenance and advanced training were in constant competition because the same senior men conducted both under the user-maintainer concept. These men were also responsible for conducting on-the-job training of new tradesmen and this duty was relegated to a position of much lesser importance. The ships undoubtedly rose to the challenge presented by the Cuban Missile Crisis but how long they could have sustained the effort or how well they would have performed had the crisis turned into a "hot war" is a moot point. Medland inferred that Commanding Officers expressed anything but confidence in the ability of their ships to perform well.

Commodore Medland was tasked with studying the re-engagement problem and to determine why men were not choosing to make the navy a career. But he broadened his study to an investigation of all issues pertaining to personnel, including operational effectiveness,

because he believed that they concerned the well being of the navy as a whole. He stated that, "It became evident as a result of our interviews with Commanding Officers, that the problem of the young seaman cannot be isolated completely from the problems of the fleet."¹¹ What he produced from his interviews with both officers and men was an overview of the mood and morale of the navy based in Halifax, a contemporary snapshot, very much along the lines of the Hope Report of 1948. A comparison of the two studies indicates that the navy had made significant advances in some areas. However, fourteen years after they were reported to CNS by Commodore Hope, complaints on the lack of sufficient married accommodation and recreational facilities persisted. The consequences were the same: low morale and widespread dissatisfaction.

Medland developed a profile of the recruits of the 1960's who he found were generally well educated and motivated, reasonably mature for their age, and who had respect for authority and were receptive to discipline. The three main reasons they joined the navy were to learn a trade, to travel, and to further their education. Some sought security and others wanted to try the navy as a career. Many wanted adventure. He noted that a prevailing motivational factor was the concern of what they could get out of the navy, rather than what they could contribute.¹² He determined that the navy failed to satisfy the basic aspirations of the men recruited. New entry training at *Cornwallis* was based on developing blind obedience and did nothing to prepare a man for shipboard life. There was no sea phase in recruit training and only certain trades were given formal courses before joining a ship. There was a lack of standardization of on-the-job (OJT) training in ships and many of the older officers and men did not accept the OJT concept. In those ships the programme languished. Junior men were often employed in menial tasks outside their trade. Trade transfers were inordinately difficult to process and men complained of lack of support from their divisional officers.¹³ Medland

concluded that men were neither prepared for sea duty nor properly trained at sea. The fact that ships' programmes and cruises were dull, and did not live up to the recruiting advertisement of "join the navy and see the world", merely added to the dissatisfaction of a man who remained untrained at the end of his three year engagement.

Significantly, Medland found few complaints with pay, food and habitability onboard, except in the case of the old Tribals where men still slung hammocks and ate in their messes. The main complaint was excessive seetime for junior officers and senior men. This was aggravated by high wastage rates that meant no relief could be anticipated. Close on this was dissatisfaction with Halifax as the location for a naval base. The wartime complaints about Halifax still pertained. The most prevalent were; the high cost of housing, substandard living conditions compared with other parts of Canada, shortage of suitable living accommodation and the poor attitude of the populace toward sailors.¹⁴ Nearly forty percent of men interviewed who were not re-engaging stated that their wives or girlfriends were unwilling to face the prospect of permanent residence in Halifax.¹⁵ Many families were in debt owing to the high cost of living and exploitative landlords, which created serious personal problems. Family relationships were further strained by the absence of the husband for long periods. This was further exacerbated by the fact that many citizens of Halifax openly resented the navy. Medland recommended as a priority, "financial provision to be made for facilities long recognized as being necessary for the welfare and morale of both officers and men."¹⁶ These included ice rinks, a community centre and additional married quarters. A perusal of the naval estimates since 1958 would show that the Naval Board chose to fund ships and equipment before the material needs of its men such as improved accommodation and recreation facilities for families that would have improved the "depressing" conditions in Halifax.¹⁷

Commodore Medland also cited a failure in the application of the divisional system as the root cause of many of the problems he found. He stated:

While many of the talented, capable and conscientious officers and senior men unselfishly devote long hours to the benefit of their ships, there is another group who consider this is an 'eight to four' navy, and maintain strict union hours. We suspect the latter to be a major weakness in the Divisional System. Our real concern is that it is from this element that our troubles stem. We wonder how many young men of high calibre might have been saved if, in the Divisional Organization there were sufficient people concerned with their individual welfare.¹⁸

Medland emphasized that his "comments were not intended to reflect on the Welfare Committee organization in ships which appear to be operating satisfactorily", so as to dispel any notion that conditions were such as could result in incidents of mass insubordination. Medland had prior experience with those conditions as Commanding Officer of *Athabaskan* in 1949. Rear-Admiral Landymore mentioned finding the same weakness in the divisional system in a parallel study on the west coast. He stated that, "Officer-men relationships appear to be in a state so poor as to be serious cause for concern."¹⁹ He believed that too much was being turned over to the Chiefs and Petty Officers, and, because of the shortage of officers at *Cornwallis*, men get the impression from the beginning that senior men are solely responsible for their welfare and this is reinforced through practice in the fleet. Both Medland and Landymore pointed out that poor training of divisional officers which was also a major observation in the Mainguy Report.

The burden of Medland's study was the re-engagement problem that he believed could only be rectified through a range of improvements mainly in the conditions of service. All except the improvement in the application of the divisional system required additional funding. Both Medland and Landymore arrived at the conclusion that the three-year engagement was not working but noted this was based on a small statistical sampling. What was obvious was that new men needed more formal trade training before joining their ships so that they could be immediately employable, and that they should achieve the Trade Group 2 level during their first

engagement. This simply could not be accomplished in three years. Medland's Committee applied the same logic and factors as Tisdall, but could not arrive at the conclusion that suggested a three year engagement was superior to five. Tisdall's overriding supposition was that five years was too long to attract recruits and Medland concluded that three years was too short to create the basis for convincing a man to make the navy a career. Landymore was of a similar mind to Medland. He was subsequently directed to conduct a study to determine the navy's success in implementing the "Tisdall Report" and if its recommendations were still valid.

Medland reported that he could offer no solution to the current manpower problem except reducing commitments. He observed:

With regard to the incontrovertible nature of opinions expressed [by Commanding Officers] concerning the over-taxing of our static and diminishing resources, we find great difficulty in making realistic recommendations for the better balance of the employment of ships. The current manpower shortage cannot be improved overnight; failing a proper increase in authorized manpower the problem will be magnified when new construction ships are manned in lieu of smaller ships which are scheduled for retirement; to further increase the tempo of training would require further concentrated effort by ship's companies creating further operational and maintenance problems. There is only one logical solution and that is to reduce our commitments to our allies until manpower stability has been achieved. This, we appreciate, may not be acceptable in any degree....²⁰

Medland's report paints a grim picture. It raises very serious doubts as to the operational effectiveness of the fleet in the latter part of 1962. Moreover, it raises very important questions as to the sustainability of the fleet programme. As the Commodore in Charge of the Personnel Depot in Halifax, his advice that there was "only one logical solution", to reduce commitments until manpower stability was achieved, cannot be taken lightly. His solution, however, proposed the unthinkable for which others had been labelled "defeatist".

The current state of the personnel situation was discussed at length at the Thirteenth Senior Officers' Conference held in Ottawa 14-16 January 1963. The briefing by the staffs of the Naval Comptroller (NCOMP) and Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) on the personnel

requirements and projections, and the progress of Plan Delta were disturbing. The authorized ceiling was 22,469 but the actual strength of the navy was restricted to 21,720 because of the austerity programme.²¹ The forecast was a requirement for 23,927 officers and men in fiscal year 1963-64, and that by 1966-67 this would increase to 25,500. The new Director of Manning (DNM), Captain Peter Cossette, presented the latest disappointing re-engagement figures where only 20.8 percent of three year men had been re-engaging where 24 percent were required. Commander Morrow, Training Officer at HMCS *Stadacona*, reported indifferent success with Plan Delta and the gap between trained Trade Group 3 and 4 men and the difficulty in closing it because trade knowledge and skills continued to increase.²² Training methods were still being developed and additional academic training was found to be required for those deficient in basic knowledge. In order to reduce the overall training requirements within individual trades, speciality courses were being given on complex equipment such as the 3"70 gun in order "to provide specialists within a speciality."²³ Morrow interjected that the findings of Medland's study indicated that a re-engagement rate of 40 percent was now required to keep up with wastage of trained men and overcome the backlog of requirements.

The minutes of the Senior Officers' Conference reflect some optimism that solutions would materialize to solve the personnel shortages. Rear-Admiral Dyer opined that an increase in the re-engagement rate of 10 percent would do it. This was self-evident but the trend was in the wrong direction and the commands intended to put a large effort into reversing it. Rear-Admiral Caldwell, CNTS, offered that efficiencies obtained through an aggressive application of management engineering would realize reductions in the manpower requirements by as much as 10 percent thereby eliminating shortages. This was more of a long term solution. The navy was banking on obtaining approval from the government to increase the overall strength, which was generally seen as the simple answer to the problem. However, the information provided by

Commander Morrow and in the Medland report suggested a much more complex problem with shortages in quality as well as numbers of personnel.

In fact, the knowledge as to the depth of the problem was available within headquarters. Working with figures provided by DNOM in December 1962, Captain Cossette concluded that lifting the temporary strength freeze and limits on rank and trade structure would not in itself solve the problem. He advised CNP that "It would appear impossible to train sufficient men by 1966 so that 100% manning may be effected under the 1966/67 complement."²⁴ The two major impediments were the high wastage rate and the fact that men could not be released from the DDE's that had to be manned to 100 percent under Plan Delta. Cossette's projections indicated that critical shortages in Trade Groups 4, 3, and 2 would continue through to 1966 and, in fact, worsen significantly at level 4 and 2. In 1966, the complement for Trade Group 2 men should be 6122 where the best projection was 3500 or 57 percent of requirement and represented a net loss of 250 trained men from 1962. Cossette stated that in addition to having the freeze lifted that manning levels on DDE's would have to be reduced and that four DDE's would have to be withdrawn for conversion. These recommendations were subject to amendment if it was decided that more training was required for new equipment currently being introduced in the conversions and GPF's.

Having the freeze lifted was a major priority not only because of the numbers required but because without lifting the ceiling the sea/shore ratio problem would remain insoluble. The problem was two-fold. The first part was to train sufficient tradesmen, and if this could be accomplished, to have the trade group billets available to which they could be advanced. The current 21,720 ceiling was based on a rank and trade structure for 20,720 personnel and sufficient billets did not exist to permit a reasonable rotation ashore for senior men.²⁵ The Naval Comptroller developed the navy's argument for lifting the freeze and submitted this to the Naval

Board. Rear-Admiral Dillon prefaced his submission with the declaration that the navy was victim of its own policy to place commitments above training. He cited a decision in 1959 to adopt the practice of using the training allocation as a balancing figure in submissions to the Rank Structure Committee to permit planned commitments to be met while remaining within the authorized ceiling. Dillon stated, "Therefore, at this time, there are not enough appropriately trained men available in the entire navy to bring the ships at sea up to operational complement."²⁶ The RCN was now paying the price for deliberately over-committing itself and sacrificing essential training. That decision was made in view of the austerity programme and a gamble that the situation would improve. It did not and the result was bankruptcy in manpower.

The Naval Comptroller advised the Naval Board that they could not go forward with the request for a personnel increase without first implementing a full regime to ensure the maximum utilization of manpower resources. The regime he presented reflected many of the recommendations and initiatives advanced in the Medland study. These included; re-examination of the three year initial engagement, review of the OJT programme, re-evaluation of the user-maintainer concept, reversion to peacetime complements in ships, and introduction of a re-engagement bonus.²⁷ The Naval Board moved briskly on Dillon's recommendations and directed CNP to initiate action and studies.²⁸ Rear-Admiral Stirling responded with schemes to combine common theory training for technical trades and to reduce academic theory training to the essential minimum.²⁹ "Package" Courses were to be used more widely to train men on specific weapons and equipment. Conversion courses at the higher trade levels were still in progress and he could not introduce a standard course at the Trade Groups 3 and 4 level until all men were cross-trained. He expected that the General Purpose Frigate (GPF) would require a considerable number of package courses in the future. However, Stirling anticipated that this

approach would create administrative problems because selective drafting would be required for men with specialized training on specific weapons and systems.

While the RCN was struggling to solve its personnel problems, the Conservative government fell and a Liberal minority government was returned under Lester Pearson on 8 April 1963. The problems the navy had experienced to this point were about to be compounded by the new Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer. Hellyer had been the Liberal defence critic since 1960 and had developed an alternative defence policy to the Conservatives. The Liberal policy would diminish Canada's support of NATO's nuclear strategy and aim instead at the provision of flexible, conventional forces and increased airlift and sealift that would give them maximum mobility.³⁰ It is clear from the outset that Hellyer had his own agenda, of which integration of the command structure leading to unification into a single force were the main items. He had concluded through his observation of the Cuban Missile Crisis that Canada had completely sacrificed control of its armed forces to alliance command structures. This was reinforced when he had received his initial briefings as MND. He noted, "A critical point that disturbed me greatly was the realization that, wittingly or otherwise, each service was preparing for a different kind of war."³¹ The RCAF was preparing for a short nuclear war, the army for a long war and, "The navy had one foot in each camp, with their emphasis on the type of antisubmarine warfare essential to convoy duty, as in World War II."³² That this situation was the direct result of policy initiatives by Brooke Claxton and the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent is not mentioned in Hellyer's writings on the subject.

Hellyer became wedded to the idea of unification early in his ministry. The briefings from the three service chiefs had convinced him that there was inadequate coordination and joint planning at the strategic level.³³ He saw for himself that the profusion of tri-service committees at National Defence Headquarters had brought effective work almost to a standstill. Hellyer

also drew on the opinion of General Foulkes, the retired Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who had tried to advance unification during his tenure but was strongly opposed by the service chiefs. Foulkes advised Hellyer that a single service "is the only answer and the Canadian forces are small enough to try out such a plan."³⁴ Moreover, the Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, the "Glassco Report", Hellyer noted, "had recently done such a splendid job of exposing waste [in the armed forces] resulting from duplication and triplication."³⁵ The Minister had been told by one of the Glassco Commission researchers that they leaned toward the solution of a single unified service but had thought that to be politically unacceptable. Hellyer observed "visible signs of waste" himself, such as senior officers arriving at social affairs in different types of staff cars. There were many valid examples that came to his attention such as the Mk 44 ASW torpedo used by both the RCN and RCAF that was procured and supported separately in different supply systems using different stock numbers. He thought that each service chief appearing for the opening of parliament or having direct access to the Minister was unnecessary. As for separate uniforms, he believed, "They were visual symptoms of a deeply rooted disease - the existence of three independent and competing legal entities in an era when technology and common sense demanded one."³⁶

This last observation speaks volumes for Hellyer's lack of regard for service traditions and accounts for the confrontational approach that characterized his relationship with his senior military advisors. It is apparent from his writings that Hellyer made up his mind about unification and integration without consulting them and later retained only those "forward thinkers", who would support his policies. He chose a like-minded sycophant Wing Commander Bill "Leaky" Lee, an RCAF public relations officer not in the command stream, to be his Executive Assistant. Lee became the most influential advisor in uniform and eventually

exercised extraordinary power. He took liberties far beyond his rank that eventually brought him into direct confrontation with Rear-Admiral Bill Landymore.³⁷

Hellyer seized the initiative and kept it. He expected opposition from the navy in particular, which he thought would be a "corker". The Minister simultaneously implemented financial cuts and policy planning initiatives to develop integrated flexible, mobile forces. This kept all three service chiefs and their staffs off-balance and in a turmoil of planning from September 1963 until his White Paper to reorganize the armed forces was implemented on 1 August 1964. It was an effective tactic because it threw staffs into disarray, but it also forced hasty decisions and as a consequence destroyed already financially weakened programme structures and caused wholesale cutting of commitments. These hit the navy particularly hard because its personnel situation was already critical, in fact on the verge of collapse. The navy depended upon a funding increase as one critical component of its plans to meet near term commitments.

Hellyer's first initiative was in the form of a probe through the Deputy Minister, Mr. E. B. Armstrong. In early July 1963, the DM asked each service to produce an alternative five year plan based on a reduced fixed budget for three years and 3 percent increases in the two subsequent years.³⁸ The navy's figure was \$283 Million. At the time, the navy was awaiting a government decision on whether Canada would accept SACLANT's increased force goals for 1966 and approval for a personnel increase.³⁹ The requirement from the DM caught the Naval Board in the midst of a position shift as Rear-Admiral Dyer had just become VCNS, exchanging places with Rear-Admiral Brock who became FOAC. The Naval Board initiated "Exercise Cut-Back" and initially tasked the Naval Comptroller to develop the reduction on the assumptions that NATO force goals would be maintained and the personnel strength held at 21,500 while deferring all acquisition programmes except the GPF's, submarines and

helicopters. All shore construction and new logistic support projects would also be deferred. Rear-Admiral Dillon advised the Naval Board that the reduction could not be achieved without reducing personnel by approximately 1,000 from 21,720. The new Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (DCNP), Commodore Stuart Paddon, an engineering specialist with no previous experience in the Personnel Branch, was tasked with working out the plan for these reductions. The cumulative results indicated that there had to be a reduction in commitments and, more critically, both the ship replacement and DDE conversion projects were in jeopardy.

While this was ostensibly a budgetary exercise, Vice-Admiral Rayner was clearly alarmed at prospect of the government's future intentions. On the day prior to receiving the DM's directive, he had appeared before the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence, the "Sauvé Committee", and stated confidently, "I think we have an effective modern navy, with a sound base for future growth."⁴⁰ Rayner provided the DM with details of required reductions that included five ships and 720 personnel and a gutting of the ship replacement and acquisition programmes. He warned Armstrong that, "Financial restrictions of the order of magnitude indicated...would have the most damaging effect on the capability of the RCN to discharge its responsibilities now and in the future."⁴¹ The CNS also wrote a letter to the Minister advising him precisely of the impact of the reductions on NATO commitments and the long term effect on the capability of the RCN.⁴² He cautioned that reducing personnel to 20,500 would necessitate paying off four Tribal destroyers, two maintenance ships and two minesweepers along with further reductions in ships and establishments. Rayner argued that the continuation of the ship replacement and conversion programmes was absolutely essential simply to keep up with current commitments because the navy faced a block obsolescence of wartime-built ships in a few years. He concluded, "It is clear that to maintain effective ships and equipment of high

quality in a Navy of about 21,000, annual expenditures in excess of \$282 million per year are essential in future years."⁴³

The Naval Staff took issue with the results of "Exercise Cut-Back" that had been conducted mainly by the NCOMP and DCNP. Commodore Fraser-Harris, ACNS (Air & Warfare), called an "emergency meeting" of the Naval Staff whose deliberations were submitted to VCNS. The Naval Staff were of the opinion that entirely the wrong philosophy had been applied to the exercise, which had attempted to maintain the status quo. The thrust of their argument was that in the past the size and shape of the navy had been dictated by the policy of meeting numerical NATO force goals. This policy had led to an over-extended and undermanned fleet. It also placed, "an unacceptable burden on the personnel involved" who had to maintain ageing ships at great personal cost in time and effort for very little increase in real operational effectiveness.⁴⁴ The fleet was over-committed and ships were steaming more miles and days in peacetime than they had during the war. This not only drove up repair and maintenance costs but created an unreasonable sea-shore ratio, "of which many are proud", that was having an adverse affect on morale, particularly among senior men.⁴⁵

The Naval Staff questioned the wisdom of retaining the carrier in commission now that her fighters had been withdrawn and the ASW equipment up-date for the CS2F "Trackers" would be deferred. They believed that it would be advisable to place the carrier in reserve and fly modernized "Trackers" from shore bases and let the RCAF cover the area well off-shore. They admitted this might expose Naval Aviation to pressure for its abolition and make it difficult to re-introduce carrier aviation in the air defence and support role later. The staff also questioned the proposal to cut Research and Development funding further while retaining obsolete minesweepers and frigates in commission. Instead, the investment of scarce funds should be in obtaining future capability. The Naval Staff believed that paying off the frigates

and applying their complements elsewhere, "would assist in restoring the true balance between actual commitments and manpower borne in the navy."⁴⁶ While acknowledging that economic and political decisions must influence final decisions of the Naval Board and CNS, they summarized their position:

In conclusion, the Naval Staff wished to represent their belief that the responsibility of the Naval Staff and those in authority with [sic] the Navy during periods of limited tension or financial cut-backs, was not to retain the biggest Fleet in being that they could obtain for the dollars available, but rather to ensure the continuance of operational techniques, personnel efficiency, research and development programmes and building programmes such as would guarantee their ability to fight effectively at any time and to expand, if time permitted, when tension grew.⁴⁷

This extraordinary submission, at variance with the conventional wisdom of the Naval Board, indicates a lack of confidence in the policies of the senior leadership of the RCN at a crucial time. Normally, staffs were consulted prior to decisions and alternate views heard but then everyone got on-side once policy was decreed by the Naval Board. There is no record of how Rear-Admiral Dyer responded to his staff. However, as if to substantiate what the Naval Staff said, Rear-Admiral Brock reported to NSHQ in July 1963, that in spite of all measures taken to improve the personnel situation in his command, "the picture is one of deterioration."⁴⁸ In order to man *Bonaventure* and other ships to "safe levels" to participate in a scheduled international exercise, he had to adjust the Plan Delta programme and take men from ships in refit and maintenance periods. Trade group 2 courses were also being cancelled to maintain manning levels.⁴⁹ Brock urged immediate action stating that "I am convinced that failure to take corrective measures at a very early date will have long term implications of the utmost gravity."⁵⁰

Brock followed up later stating that he had no confidence that current policies could resolve his personnel shortages. He advised NSHQ that he was resorting to local initiatives. These included a trial to determine if a DDE could maintain a satisfactory level of operational

capability and maintenance with 180 men and a study to establish whether Trade Group 2 training could be achieved through OJT at sea. If the latter was found to be feasible, he would recommend radical action such as combining trade group 1 and 2 formal training into one basic course and then men would advance to the trade group 2 level through OJT at sea.⁵¹ He also advocated changes to the rank and trade group structure to hasten promotions. Naval Service Headquarters responded to Brock's urgent appeal and flood of proposals sympathetically and stated that they were "receiving the most careful scrutiny" but more information was needed.⁵² It is evident that Brock was told that he did not have sufficient grasp of complexities of the entire situation and that NSHQ did and was working to resolve the problem. There is a real sense of deepening crisis in the Atlantic Command and that NSHQ was devoid of ideas and unable to provide the assistance that Brock desperately needed. Naval Service Headquarters was itself locked in crisis. Rayner could hardly pay-off ships to alleviate personnel shortages while arguing with the government that the navy needed more ships to meet commitments.

The Minister was obviously unmoved by Vice-Admiral Rayner's strong appeal and issued a directive on 24 September 1963, that the navy's cash appropriations for 1964/65 would be \$270 million, \$18 million below the current level, and would be fixed for two successive years.⁵³ The other services were severely cut as well. Hellyer stated that adjustments should be made to allocate 20 to 25 percent of budget for capital acquisition. Significantly, the navy had consistently achieved this target. Rear-Admiral Landymore recalled that Hellyer had admitted in discussion that integration was mainly to bring the capital acquisition budgets of the army and RCAF into line.⁵⁴ The Minister also stipulated that optional programmes should be submitted and he wanted their submissions in two weeks. Hellyer made it known that he was aware that the services were over-committed with respect to manpower and he expected adjustments there.⁵⁵ The CNS immediately established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Naval Programmes

under Commodore H. G. Burchell with Commodore McCandless, DCOMP, and representation from all branches. Their two-fold task was first to develop an immediate response to the Minister's directive, and then, "to study and report on the continuing size and shape of the navy over the next five to ten years, bearing in mind that the aim is to be primarily effective for ASW and also have a capability for UN peace-keeping operations and limited war."⁵⁶

The Burchell Committee accomplished in two weeks what normally took a full year. The programme for the 1964/65 estimates proposed to the government included the decommissioning on the east coast of three Tribals, three frigates, six minesweepers and one maintenance repair ship.⁵⁷ The maintenance ship on the west coast would also be paid off. The navy was compelled to give up these ships because personnel strength must be reduced to 20,000. In his substantiation, the CNS mentioned that the navy had been labouring under a personnel shortage for some time. Without the hope of an increase, commitments had to be cut. Additionally, the two air utility squadrons would be reduced. Three ammunition depots would be closed, the Supplementary Radio Station at Churchill eliminated and the dockyard at Sydney, N.S. reduced to a supply depot. Rayner advised that it would now be impossible to meet SACLANT's force goals for 1966. Moreover, commitments to the Canada-US Region would be cut and two ships moved from Esquimalt to Halifax to maintain twenty-nine ASW escorts for NATO. However, four of these would be in Category C reserve and not available for ninety days. Also, no helicopter support would be available on the west coast therefore all the converted St. Laurent class ships would have to be transferred to Halifax. Optional programmes submitted included; laying up more ships to reduce further manpower and operating expenses, cancelling or deferring six helicopters already approved by the Treasury Board, and reduction or elimination of funds for new construction and modernization of ships and aircraft. Rayner concluded his submission with another warning that the financial

restrictions proposed, "will have a most damaging effect on the capability of the Navy to discharge its current responsibilities and to keep up-to-date. Unless ships are built or procured in the immediate future the Navy will run down to about half its present size by the early 1970s."⁵⁸

Hellyer announced the cancellation of the General Purpose Frigate programme on 26 October 1963, as a prelude to cuts to come. He then surprised the navy in November, by advising Rayner that the government had decided to purchase three Oberon Class conventional submarines from the United Kingdom. The navy had tried to keep all options open on acquiring submarines and had previously opened negotiations with the RN for Oberon's while still harbouring hopes to construct the Barbel's in Canada. Even the SSN option had not been completely abandoned.⁵⁹ Hope for submarines had dimmed with the announced cuts. Vice-Admiral Rayner sent a message to the fleet to try and dispel "speculation and rumour" generated by the Minister's cancellation announcement and an explosive article by Commodore Plomer in *Maclean's* magazine that will be discussed later.⁶⁰ Rayner renewed his efforts to have Hellyer reconsider the navy's future and asked the Minister to allow six Tribals to be placed in reserve and the complement of the navy to be maintained at 21,350 so that crews would be available for those ships if needed. This would require an additional \$10 million in the 1964-65 estimates. Rayner offered to pay off all ten minesweepers in exchange, sacrificing the RCN's minesweeping capability.⁶¹ Rayner managed to gain approval for; an additional \$7 million in funding to retain one destroyer in Category C, to maintain in commission three frigates of six frigates to be declared surplus, and hold the navy's strength at 20,700.⁶² The estimates for the Department of National Defence and reductions were announced in the House of Commons on 5 December 1963, and CNS followed up with a series of messages to the fleet. However, circumstances compelled the CNS to request approval from Hellyer to pay off three destroyers

and one maintenance ship immediately as opposed to the scheduled date of 31 March 1964. He disclosed that "[T]he shortage of trained manpower has reached a point where it is essential to pay off some ships and redistribute their personnel into the training stream and other commitments at the earliest practicable moment."⁶³ The reduction in ships had been pre-empted by collapsing manning resources.

While NSHQ was in the throes of dealing with the reductions, it had to respond to a challenge from another source, an article in a September 1963 issue of *Maclean's* magazine by retired Commodore James Plomer. Entitled "The Gold-Braid Mind is Destroying the Navy", Plomer's article attacked the naval leadership and its policies and claimed that the fleet was operationally ineffective, poorly maintained and riddled with personnel problems and low morale.⁶⁴ Plomer was driven to what Rear-Admiral Charles termed "this extreme act" over his chagrin at being passed over for promotion.⁶⁵ He was invited to appear before the Sauvé Committee in October 1963, where he repeated his charges. The CNS appeared to respond. It is sufficient to say that Plomer's statements with respect to fleet inefficiency, material problems, personnel shortages and morale were largely accurate.⁶⁶ These deficiencies were reported by Commodore Medland and the subject of discussion at Senior Officers' Conferences. Rear-Admiral Brock, who was FOAC at the time, confirmed retrospectively that Plomer was correct.⁶⁷ Plomer's charge that preference in promotion was given to the prewar RCN officers was also true.

Vice-Admiral Rayner's response, prepared by Captain Harry Porter, Staff Assistant to CNS, was palpably acceptable at the time but does not stand up well to subsequent analysis. For example, the problem ridden 3"70 gun that Rear-Admiral Dyer had said, several months prior, would be "unreliable in war" (see above) was tooted as "a first first-class anti-aircraft gun" whose past limitations had been eradicated.⁶⁸ The 3"70 gun was the naval equivalent to the

Ross Rifle issued to Canadian troops at the beginning of World War I. It was good under perfect conditions on the rifle range but not a dependable weapon to take in harm's way. Rayner said the recommendations of the Mainguy Report had been largely implemented which was true. However, both Rear-Admiral Landymore and Commodore Medland reported that the divisional system was not being properly applied and this was a primary reason for current morale problems. This was also a major observation of the Mainguy Report. Rayner was compelled to defend the navy, particularly at this critical juncture. He argued that problems had been identified and every effort made to correct them. He finished his testimony by stating that the navy was not perfect, mistakes are made and there is a great deal of frustration. Peacetime sailing was a difficult business. He reflected upon the findings of the Mainguy Report that stated the object was to find out what was wrong with the navy at the expense of not stressing what was right. Rayner concluded, "The Navy has its faults and weak spots. But in the Navy of 1963, a great deal is overwhelmingly right".⁶⁹

Plomer's charges were rebutted in editorial article in *Saturday Night*, on information provided largely by Rear-Admiral Budge.⁷⁰ Plomer's integrity was also attacked. However, the damage had been done and Plomer's public disclosure provided Paul Hellyer with a weapon against the naval hierarchy that he could use in the impending confrontation over unification. The charge that the navy was run by an anachronistic old boys' club was now in the public domain. The navy had provided Hellyer with a confidential brief using information from Plomer's own reports as CANCOMFLT that painted the fleet's efficiency in glowing terms but it had no influence.⁷¹ This brief is not mentioned by Hellyer in his writings, only that Plomer had pointed to "the self-perpetuating, self-electing group of admirals" as retarding progress toward the RCN becoming a modern navy.⁷² The Minister visited the Atlantic Command in

January 1964, with a mission. He wrote, "My job was to find out first hand if the situation was as bad as was alleged."⁷³

The operational side of that visit went quite well although Hellyer was informed later that the results of the ASW exercise that he witnessed had been "cooked" to enhance the perception of efficiency. However, he seemed more intent on acquiring a negative opinion, commenting on the "extraordinary luxury" which senior officers enjoyed at sea. However, it was ashore where Rear-Admiral Brock, FOAC, provided Hellyer with overwhelming confirmation that senior naval officers considered themselves a kind of nobility. Brock dined Hellyer lavishly, the latter noting, "This hospitality was made possible, however, by treating ordinary seaman as Lackeys...Such practices seemed an abuse of indentured labour reminiscent of the dark ages."⁷⁴ Brock was renowned in the navy for his huge ego, vain-glorious conceit and love of ceremony and position. Hellyer had a mammoth ego of his own so there was bound to be a clash of personalities as ambitious politician met equally ambitious admiral. Their recollections of the meeting and conversation vary tremendously.⁷⁵

In the end it was Hellyer's opinion that counted. During their meeting, Brock managed to convey the same negative impression of senior naval officers to Hellyer that Nelson Lay had given to Brooke Claxton fifteen years before. However, Hellyer was looking for fault and he found it. He later fired Brock because he was, "an anachronism - a traditionalist holding up his hands to stem the tide of the future. His devotion to class distinctions inherited from the Royal Navy was inappropriate to the modern Canadian navy after World War II."⁷⁶ Hellyer also read the "Brock Report" which he said he found out-moded and clearly unaffordable. Unaffordable it was, out-moded it definitely was not. Brock's personality was all that Hellyer said. However, he also had talents and officers who wished to stay in the RCN and rebuild it after the war were in short supply. The navy was a force composed of volunteers and had to work with the material it

had, not the ideal. Claxton understood this and was prepared to work with it, Hellyer was not. Claxton called himself "a viper" but he proved quite harmless compared to Paul Hellyer.

The CNS convened another Senior Officers' Conference in February 1964, primarily to discuss the way ahead after the severe reductions. The conference was very much dominated by a "wait and see" atmosphere. Vice-Admiral Rayner, trying to sound optimistic, told the forum he considered that "despite the problems we are now probably better acquainted with the current situation and future possibilities than had been the case in earlier years."⁷⁷ The Minister attended the first session and his comments were guarded. He mentioned that his visit to the Atlantic Command had been informative, "although it had not resulted in changing his mind regarding his concept of the fundamentals of defence."⁷⁸ He discussed the background of the impending White Paper and that limited funding meant concentrating on specific capabilities. There was no mention of his intentions for reorganization or unification. Hellyer stated that Canada remained committed to NATO and a partnership with the United States but said nothing about maintaining force goals. The Minister assured them that the White paper would be available to senior officers before it was released to the public. His appearance did nothing to allay the obvious anxiety.

Rear-Admiral Dyer, VCNS, discussed the recommendations of the Burchell Committee that signalled a dramatic change, "The size and shape of the RCN for the next five to ten years should evolve into a force composed basically of three ASW Groups each with a Troop Lift capability and augmented by carrier and support forces."⁷⁹ Burchell had also recommended acquiring fighter aircraft, helicopter ships with helicopters capable of both ASW and troop lift, and guided missile destroyers (DDG) with a surface to air missile (SAM) capability. Dyer emphasized that this was only a proposed conceptual plan that would expand the RCN's capability for UN peace-keeping operation and limited war but no official status. Dyer spoke in

terms of the RCN being composed of a "three module" ASW force with two groups, one built around *Bonaventure* and a second around an LPH helicopter, stationed on the east coast. The third group would be in Esquimalt and built around an LPH helicopter. He stated, "This disposition of forces would lend itself well to the Mobile Force Concept as well as providing the best possible ASW defence forces." ⁸⁰ Dyer reiterated that the budget would be frozen for the next three years and that funding for the conceptual plan had not reached the discussion phase. It was apparent nothing would be decided until after the contents of the White Paper were known. Nonetheless, the size of the RCN under the plan presented by Dyer was only twenty-six ships in total, including two projected LPH's and three DDG's, and the one submarine on loan from the USN. The VCNS did not even mention NATO force goals.

There was little good news forthcoming on the personnel situation. Rear-Admiral Stirling, CNP, reported that in spite of strong efforts by the commands, "during the year the problem of the survival rate remained with us, and stayed at an unacceptably low level."⁸¹ The ROTP officers were still leaving the service in high numbers and a Short Service Officer Plan(SSOP), to replace the Venture Plan that had been scrapped as a cost saving measure, had been introduced to fill the gap. The RCN was in fact 469 officers short in the rank of Lieutenant, which represented one-third of the allocated complement, resulting in a severe shortage of Upper Deck watchkeepers in the fleet.⁸² The impending fleet reductions, while giving some respite to the personnel shortages, had removed the number of ships primarily available for training cadets and junior officers. However, reducing the navy's authorized strength to 20,700 did relieve the junior officer shortage. It was a paper exercise that simply eliminated empty billets through reducing ships in commission. The announcement of the reductions had done nothing to reassure either officers or men that they had either a promising or secure career in the navy. The wastage rate had increased and, moreover, recruiting had

fallen off by half and the calibre of recruits had deteriorated. The high wastage rate would soon eliminate any temporary respite and it was apparent that the target of 20,700 would be achieved by 1 July 1964 through attrition without any action being necessary.

Captain Cossette, DNM, explained the causes of the manning crisis on the east coast during July 1963 and that insufficient allowance had been made for the manpower requirements for the new DDE's and helicopters coming on stream.⁸³ He discussed the anticipated difficulties in rationalizing the personnel requirements in light of "violent fluctuations in commitments" that would continue into 1965 resulting in more ships being removed and a probable further reduction in authorized strength. There were imbalances between coasts and the reductions had different impacts. Consequently, each trade would have to be managed separately and through a central manning authority, maintaining a balance through loans between coasts. He noted that the Burchell Committee had established the principle that commitments must equate to manpower available in considering the size and shape of the RCN over the next ten years.⁸⁴ This settled a long standing dispute. Cossette addressed many of the concerns raised by Rear-Admiral Brock over the rank and trade structure, OJT and trades training. It was apparent more studies would be required. He concluded that two points were now evident. The navy must anticipate the impact on the personnel structure of every equipment introduced or withdrawn. The second was the absolute necessity for central direction of both manning and training with the possible abolition of the Port Division system.

The Flag Officers from the coasts were less sanguine that sufficient steps were being taken to meet the personnel crisis. Rear-Admiral Brock stated that the crisis that he experienced during July 1963, would recur if action was not taken immediately. He cited studies by his staff indicated that ships will be expected to do more maintenance of their own in future but the user-maintainer concept and training programmes were failing to produce the needed personnel. He

also stated, "There is some indication that the new RCN personnel structure, particularly in the technical fields, will not meet the needs of the modern navy."⁸⁵ For example, it was apparent that the Weapons Surface Trade required more maintenance skills while Sonarmen must mainly be skilled operators. Rear-Admiral Landymore, FOPC, after stating that he was not happy with his command being used as "a substitute bench for the east coast", discussed mainly morale problems emphasizing the need to restore confidence in leadership after the recent reductions and Plomer's public attack.⁸⁶ Men did not trust the advancement and promotion system after anomalies became apparent with the machine produced promotion lists. Moreover, the November 1963, pay increase had done nothing to raise morale. Landymore demonstrated that the net raise for an unmarried Able Seaman amounted to 10 cents a day and 86 cents for an unmarried Lieutenant.⁸⁷ Pressure from the Flag Officers prompted Rear-Admiral Stirling to commission Rear-Admiral Landymore to conduct a study to validate the "Tisdall Report" and to recommend any necessary changes to the personnel structure.⁸⁸ Almost as a postscript, there was discussion of a study in progress by Commodore Robert Hendy, RCNR(retired), set up by ministerial direction to make recommendations on the future of the Naval Reserve.⁸⁹ The regular navy, concerned for their own survival, had little time for the reserves.

Paul Hellyer used some internal departmental reports to provide background for the White paper but he wrote the sections on force concept and reorganization himself.⁹⁰ He discussed none of the aspects of his reorganization policy or unification with the service chiefs and simply presented it to them as fait accompli on 8 February 1964. Hellyer noted that Major-General Walsh, Chief of the General Staff, "was not difficult to convince."⁹¹ However, both Vice-Admiral Rayner and Air Vice-Marshal Dunlap were apprehensive about reorganization, the former "very apprehensive". As well they might have been because the proposed reorganization would eliminate their offices, abolish the Naval Board and Air Staff,

and place administration of the three services under one Chief of the Defence Staff. Moreover, the ultimate policy objective was the formation of a single unified service. Dunlap and Rayner fought what Hellyer called a "rear-guard action, remaining emotionally controlled", until the final version of the White Paper was discussed by the Cabinet Defence Committee on 14 March 1964.⁹² He was, however, surprised that what he thought would be a "hot" subject, integration and unification of the armed forces, was met by little interest from his cabinet colleagues. Vice-Admiral Rayner was reported to have made "a spirited plea for further consideration or delay" before the Cabinet Defence Committee. Hellyer remarked that he admired Rayner's action and that, "I was glad that I had insisted he be heard."⁹³ The White Paper on Defence was tabled in the House of Commons on 16 March 1964. The legislation resulting would receive Royal Assent on 16 July 1964 and become effective on 1 August.

The Naval Board never discussed the reorganization of the armed forces as a formal agenda item. The board was a "lame duck" and Vice-Admiral Rayner had made it known to Hellyer that he intended to retire.⁹⁴ He would do so on 20 July 1964, before the abolition of the Naval Board. Its one important outstanding item was to consider the recommendations of the personnel study by Rear-Admiral Landymore. It was essential to make changes to improve the navy's personnel structure and to approve a "cyclic system" before the responsibility for personnel policy and implementation was assumed by the new Chief of Personnel in a fully integrated system under the terms of reorganization. Rear-Admiral Dyer had been designated by Hellyer to become the Chief of Personnel in the rank of Vice-Admiral. Dyer would also be the Acting-Chief of the Naval Staff upon Rayner's retirement and become the Senior Naval Advisor to the Minister on 1 August 1964. The Naval Board would be abolished on 31 July, the previous day.

The Naval Board reviewed the Report of the Personnel Structure Review Team, referred to as the "Landymore Report", 17-23 June 1964.⁹⁵ It is apparent that the conclusions and recommendations were largely those of Landymore who had previously conducted personal surveys within his command. Landymore found that the New Personnel Structure was being blamed for the personnel problems in the fleet, but on deeper investigation he discovered that shortages and instability in manning were the root causes.⁹⁶ The "Landymore Report" was largely supportive of Tisdall's original recommendations but stated that some items such as those on complementing procedure could not be properly assessed because ships had never been at full strength. The findings were also an exercise in diplomacy, or even corporate solidarity. Instead of finding error in logic as Medland had with the respect to the introduction of the three-year engagement, Landymore suggested that more emphasis was placed on "productivity and economy in 1963 than in 1957."⁹⁷ This is an interesting statement because to effect economies was clearly one of Tisdall's primary objectives. Landymore did state that, considering the greater overall productivity in man years and other "start up costs", the five-year initial engagement was superior to the three-year which was "impractical and wasteful"⁹⁸.

Landymore's reasons for treading carefully were obvious. He found very strong opposition to the structure prevalent among both senior officers and men within the navy. The report stated:

The Review Team was most disturbed to find that there was a lack of acceptance by many in the Navy of some of the basic principles of the new structure. In some cases, the viewpoints were based on little more than a natural resistance to change by those who were brought up in the 'old navy', and sensed a loss of [branch] identity. In other cases, this was considered to be a matter of real concern, views expressed or briefs received that many officers still had genuine and sincere beliefs that the General List Officer scheme would not satisfy the needs of the Navy for well trained, capable, experienced technical officers. To a lesser extent somewhat similar doubts were expressed that the user/maintainer concept was economical and practical in those trades requiring a high degree of knowledge and skill.⁹⁹

If anything Landymore was understating the opposition. The fact was that about one-third of the officers in the navy were commissioned from the ranks and had a technical background and strong branch loyalties. An independent analysis by a senior engineer officer concluded, "That after four years, the climate of opinion indicates that achievement of the desired results [of the Tisdall Report] stands in jeopardy. Gloom and pessimism are not only prevalent but seem to be increasing." Lieutenant-Commander J.Y. Clark argued that both the general list and user-maintainer concept were unsound because there is "a fundamental incompatibility" between the man of action and man of technology based on psychological differences and application of functions.¹⁰⁰ Clark cited many examples and opinions gathered during his research. An interesting observation, absent in the "Landymore Report", was that Tisdall's recommendations had been applied haphazardly and inconsistently in the fleet owing to the lack of follow-up by NSHQ after initial implementation. Clark's conclusion was that training for officers and men was so superficial as to preclude obtaining the depth of skills and experience needed in either the operational or technical spheres and this must be corrected to maintain fighting efficiency in the fleet.¹⁰¹

In his recommendations Landymore took the minimalist approach on the premise "We've had more change than we can absorb as matters stand, let us not cause another complete upheaval in the careers of officers and men."¹⁰² He made some recommendations to streamline the general list concept for officers but left the scheme intact. Landymore recommended reverting to the five year initial engagement because he concluded, as did Medland, that the length of the initial engagement dictates the stability of the personnel structure. He did not condemn the OJT system of training because he believed that conditions never existed in the ships where sufficient trained and experienced men were available to train on-the-job trainees.

He recommended giving all men a four to six week basic trade course after *Cornwallis* so that they could be employable when they joined ships.

Landymore's most important finding was that Tisdall's recommendation pertaining to introducing fixed commissions for ships had not been implemented. Instability remained rampant in the fleet and this had defeated many of the objectives of the New Personnel System as well as rendering evaluation impossible. A 100 percent turnover of a ship's company during one year was the norm and 200 percent not uncommon.¹⁰³ This had been the main cause of ships being unable to achieve any acceptable level of operational effectiveness, training or maintenance.¹⁰⁴ He recommended that each ship be placed in a fixed sixteen-month cycle geared to the personnel structure. The ship would have to be manned selectively to ensure each officer and man was in phase with the ship's employment that would be scheduled in four-month segments or "phases", to accomplish training, operational and maintenance requirements.¹⁰⁵ This would require a complete reorganization of the fleet around the training programme and moving officers and men into ships in an appropriate phase to match their individual requirements. Landymore concluded:

The cycle of employment which will correct this [instability] will be received as yet another organizational upset. This is undoubtedly true, for to introduce a cycle geared to a personnel structure will cause, for a few months, a monster dislocation for almost all men, but once in effect, will create conditions under which it is possible for the personnel structure to flourish.¹⁰⁶

Rear-Admiral Landymore confided retrospectively his study showed him that the navy had changed dramatically since his days as a junior officer.¹⁰⁷ He found for the most part that personnel, officers in particular, no longer found commitment to the service, serving at sea and strong camaraderie sufficient in themselves to provide satisfaction in a naval career. There had been a sea change in the attitude of the new generation from Canadian society which did not

relate to the values of his own cohort. Landymore stated, "The navy stopped being a career. Its our own fault, we didn't sell it."¹⁰⁸

The Naval Board accepted and approved Rear-Admiral Landymore's major recommendations including the cyclic system. Rear-Admiral Stirling made the observation that drastic action was needed to bring stability to the manning situation and "that the proposed cyclical system might possibly provide the answer."¹⁰⁹ This remark suggests that the Naval Board might have been acting in some degree of desperation. A general message was sent to the fleet on 9 July 1964, announcing the reintroduction of the five year initial engagement and inviting three-year men to extend their engagements.¹¹⁰ Rear-Admiral Dyer, who would become Chief of Personnel, was directed to set up a group to implement the cyclic system which came into effect in October 1964. When it was implemented, the disruption to the fleet was complete just as Landymore predicted. On the designated day, a myriad of sailors with kit bags over their shoulders changing ships was the prevailing sight in the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt.

Vice-Admiral Herbert Rayner retired on 20 July 1964, a scant two weeks before his office and the Naval Board were abolished. This was his silent protest in opposition to reorganization and the spectre of unification. Rayner had been confronted by crises during his entire tenure as CNS. He was not in control of events and was able to implement few policy initiatives of his own. His one success, the General Purpose Frigate programme, was short-lived. Characteristically, he announced his retirement in gentlemanly fashion and did not even mention reorganization. In his final press interview he concluded confidently "We have a great Service and an efficient Navy."¹¹¹ Appended to his speaking notes on that and other occasions was an aide memoire, "Stick to the facts and avoid giving opinions...I cannot discuss government policy."¹¹² Loyal to the end, he was following directions issued to the service chiefs by George Pearkes while he was Minister.

Vice-Admiral Rayner has been criticized by some as a weak CNS and that Paul Hellyer would never have been able to carry his unification policy had he been opposed by either Grant or DeWolf.¹¹³ This is pure conjecture because Hellyer initially received strong opposition from Air Marshall Miller, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, on the unification scheme but would not bend.¹¹⁴ Rayner opposed it but refused to be confrontational. The tack he took of trying to use quiet persuasion satisfied at least his stalwart supporters such as Rear-Admiral Landymore.¹¹⁵ There had been rumours during his tenure that the navy was not winning its fair share of battles for project approval in the Chiefs of Staff Committee.¹¹⁶ There is some evidence to suggest that this was true because Rayner did not excel in a confrontational environment, it was simply against his character. As one observer remarked, "By virtue of his nature and goodness as a man, he [Rayner] was unequal to the task."¹¹⁷ There is also evidence of the Naval Staff being unhappy with leadership that clung to traditional policies when the circumstances clearly demanded change. Vice-Admiral Rayner resigned so as to avoid implementing the end of the RCN as he knew it. In keeping with his nature, it was a quiet but important and unmistakable gesture. Whether he left "the ship in good shape and on course" is highly debatable given the extreme personnel situation.

The predictions that unless circumstances improved dramatically the manning crisis experienced in July 1963, would recur came true. During October 1964, the manning system "collapsed" on the east coast through a lack of manpower resources. Shortages had reappeared two months after implementing the planned reductions of eighteen ships. By May 1964, it was apparent that more reductions in commitments would be necessary to meet course training requirements but this was not done. During the summer, wastage increased dramatically and recruiting continued to decline. The Personnel Branch predicted that insufficient men would be available to man all ships in four newly established groups to implement the cyclic system.

Captain Cossette advised his seniors, "This [shortfall] is not attributable to the Cyclic System, but was about to hit the RCN anyway."¹¹⁸ As a consequence of manning shortfalls on the east coast, decisions were faced either to freeze some DDE's through extending their work periods or not to commission some frigates and to "mothball" others. Reduced manning in many ships would continue.

Commander Willson, Director of Training(Men), provided this analysis of the circumstances in December 1964:

The wasting of strength coincided with the government's desire to reduce military strength and, as a result sight was lost of the fact that the diminishing size of the fleet was not the result of an executive decision [by the Minister], but would have happened anyway. The manpower target set for the East coast was 9,819 men to be achieved by 1967. By September 1964 the East coast manpower stood at 9,767 men. In November, 1964 the manning of the fleet collapsed and a further retreat involving removal from operation of one tribal destroyer, one converted fleet destroyer and four frigates, brought to 23, the number of first line warships removed from operations.¹¹⁹

Willson noted while the east coast fleet was now at full complement there was a desperate shortage of trained technicians but the schools were operating at reduced capacity because men could not be spared for training. He predicted that an impending reduction in manpower would result in more ships being taken out of commission. He cited the perpetual failure of planners to match commitments with trained manpower requirements as the root cause of the RCN's personnel problems. He believed that the problem was systemic and planners would simply try to conceal the problem by shifting men from ship to ship "to create the illusion of a large operational fleet."¹²⁰ He concluded pessimistically, "There would appear at this time to be a very strong possibility that the RCN will cease to exist as a military force capable of acting as a coordinated maritime fighting formation...Only the strongest and most determined leadership by Senior Naval Officers is likely to prevent this outcome."¹²¹ Willson was accurately prophetic but also kicking against the goads. The Chief of the Naval Staff and Naval Board were gone

and with them the navy's independence. The future for the RCN was as uncertain at the end of 1964 as it had been in 1945. What had remained constant was an enduring crisis and instability in the personnel system.

NOTES - CHAPTER 11

1 VAdmr. H. Rayner, "Statement to the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence," 15 October 1963, RCN History General 1440-5, vol. 3., DHist, 6.

2 Commander Peter T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Canadian Involvement Reconsidered* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993).

3 Rayner, "Statement to the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence," 17.

4 Dyer interview by the author.

5 Ibid. With respect to the Haydon argument Dyer commented, "That's stupid! We had all the help [we needed] from headquarters. I never had any problems keeping Herbie [Rayner] informed. I never talked to Brock, there wasn't time. Brock was great providing material support." Brock inferred in his memoirs that somehow he was in the command loop which was not the case.

6 FOAC comments, Minutes Thirteenth Senior Officers' Conference, 14-16 January 1963, NAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 7, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings, 14. The author obtained the information expunged in these documents through an application under the Access to Information Act.

7 Ibid., 16.

8 Ibid., 17.

9 Ibid., 18.

10 Cmdre. M.A. Medland, "Report of the Atlantic Command Re-engagement Study Group", 17 December 1962, 124.069(D2), DHist, 16.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 5.

13 Ibid., 22.

14 Ibid., 18.

15 Ibid., 13.

16 Ibid., 32.

17 Ibid., 17.

18 Ibid., 22.

19 FOPC to NSec, 31 January 1963, 124.O69(D2), DHist, 3.

20 Medland, "Report of the Atlantic Command Re-engagement Study Group," 32.

21 DNOM comments, Minutes Thirteenth Senior Officers' Conference, 14-16 January 1963, 3.

22 Cdr. Morrow comments, *ibid.*, 12.

23 *Ibid.*

24 DNM to CNP, memo, 21 January 1963, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 13, Complements General.

25 DNOM, "Sea/Shore Ratio Study", 7 June 1962, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1394, NSS 4100-1, vol. 14, Complements General.

26 NCOMP to NSec, memo, 25 February 1963, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 13, Complements General.

27 *Ibid.*

28 NBM 696-1, 27 February 1963.

29 CNP to NSec, memo, 30 April 1963, NAC, RG 24 Acc 83-84/167, Box 1393, NSS 4100-1, vol. 13, Complements General.

30 Paul T. Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight To Unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1990), 20.

31 *Ibid.*, 33.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., 34.

34 Foulkes to Hellyer, 13 June 1963, quoted in *ibid.*, 39.

35 Ibid., 36.

36 Ibid.

37 Landymore interview by the author.

38 NBM 707-1, 15 July 1963.

39 CNS to C,COS, 22 July 1963, attached to NBM 706-1, 5 July 1963.

40 STATEMENT BY VICE ADMIRAL H. S. RAYNER CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE, 9 July 1963, 79/34 Defence Policy-VCNS, DHist.

41 CNS to DM, 16 July 1963 attached to NBM 707-1, 15 July 1963.

42 CNS to MND, 25 July 1963, 81/520 - 2200/Naval Programmes, vol. 1, DHist.

43 Ibid.

44 ACNS(A&W) to VCNS, STAFF CONSIDERATION OF "EXERCISE CUT-BACK", 25 July 1963, 81/520 - 2200/Naval Programmes, vol. 1, DHist.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 CANFLAGLANT to CANAVHED, message, 241355Z July 1963, 4000-100/14 Policy Signals, DHist.

49 COMPERSLANT to CANAVHED, message, 250213Z July 1963, 4000-100/14 Policy Signals, DHist.

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- 50 CANFLAGLANT to CANAVHED, message, 241355Z July 1963.
- 51 CANFLAGLANT to CANAVHED, message, 201433Z August 1963, 4000-100/14 Policy Signals, DHist.
- 52 CANAVHED(DNM) to CANFLAGLANT, message, 151506Z October 1963, 4000-100/14 Policy Signals, DHist.
- 53 MND to CNS, 24 September 1963, 81/520 - 2200/Naval Programmes, vol. 1, DHist.
- 54 Landymore interview by the author.
- 55 NBM 712-1, 16 October 1963.
- 56 NSec to Cmdre. Burchell and others, memo, 25 September 1963, 81/520 - 2200/Naval Programmes, vol. 1, DHist; NBM 711-1, 25 September 1963.
- 57 CNS to DM, 8 October 1963, 81/520 - 2200/Naval Programmes, vol. 1, DHist.
- 58 Ibid. The fleet was reduced by half by 1967.
- 59 Ferguson, *Through a Canadian Periscope*, 259-261.
- 60 CANGEN 221, message, 15 November 1963, 79/34, DHist. The original draft of the CANGEN contains a rebuttal to Plomer's charges that is not contained in the message sent.
- 61 CNS to MND, 18 November 1963, 81/520 - 2200/Naval Programmes, vol. 1, DHist.
- 62 CNS to MND, 20 November 1963, 81/520 - 2200/Naval Programmes, vol. 1, DHist. Hellyer's approval is minuted on the document.
- 63 CNS to MND, 10 December 1963, 81/520 - 2200/Naval Programmes, DHist.
- 64 Cmdre. James Plomer, "The Gold-Braid Mind is Destroying the Navy", *Maclean's*, vol. 76, no. 17, 17 September 1963.
- 65 Charles interview by the author.

66 Special Committee on Defence, "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 12", Witness: Cmdre. James Plomer, 10 October 1963, (Queen's Printer: Ottawa, 1963).

67 Brock interview by the author.

68 "Statement by Vice-Admiral H. S. Rayner, Chief of the Naval Staff, before the Special Committee on Defence", 15 October 1963, RCN History General 1440-5, vol. 3, DHist, 10.

69 Ibid., 22.

70 "The Navy vs Commodore Plomer", *Saturday Night*, vol. 178, no. 11, December 1963 and Budge interview by the author.

71 Landymore interview by the author. Rear-Admiral Landymore had been Chief of Staff to FOAC when Plomer was Fleet Commander and was asked by CNS to compile the information for the Minister's brief.

72 Plomer quoted in Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight To Unify Canada's Armed Forces*, 57.

73 Ibid., 58.

74 Ibid., 60-61.

75 Ibid; Brock, *The Thunder and the Sunshine*, 130-134.

76 Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight To Unify Canada's Armed Forces*, 92.

77 CNS Comments, Minutes Fourteenth Senior Officers' Conference, 4 to 6 February 1964, NAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, Box 143, NSS 1279-118, vol. 8, Naval Committees-Senior Officers' Meetings, 2.

78 MND Comments, *ibid.*

79 VCNS Comments, *ibid.*, 4.

80 Ibid, 7.

81 CNP comments, *ibid.*, C-2.

82 DOP to NCOMP, memo, 5 September 1963, 124.043(D6), DHist.

83 DNM Comments, Minutes Fourteenth Senior Officers' Conference, C-10.

84 Ibid, C-12.

85 FOAC Comments, *ibid.*, E-5.

86 FOPC Comments, *ibid.*, F-7.

87 *Ibid.*, F-13.

88 FOPC to CNP, 18 February 1964, NAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167 Box 130, File 1279-24, vol. 2.

89 Cmdre. Robert Hendy, RCNR(retired), "Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Role and Organization of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve", 15 February 1964, 81/520/440-5, vol. 15, DHist. Hereafter referred to as the "Hendy Report".

90 DND, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Defence Policy", 30 September 1963, 72/153, DHist. Hellyer referred to this report as his main source. It was written by a tri-service committee with representation from the DM's staff and the Defence Research Board (DRB). The DRB representative, Dr. R.J. Sutherland, was the Chairman and largely responsible for writing the final version.

91 Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight To Unify Canada's Armed Forces*, 44.

92 *Ibid.*

93 *Ibid.*, 47.

94 *Ibid.*, 86.

95 RAdmr. Landymore, "Report of the Personnel Structure Review Team", 1 June 1964, DHist 73/1341. Referred to hereafter as the "Landymore Report". Unfortunately for historians, RAdmr. Landymore ordered all briefs received and records of interviews by his committee be destroyed to protect the anonymity of the contributors.

96 "Landymore Report", 3.

97 *Ibid.*, 31.

98 *Ibid.*

99 Ibid., 4.

100 LCdr J.Y. Clark, "An Essay on Personnel Organization in the RCN", 20 April 1964, RCAF Staff College, Toronto, NAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, Box 130, file 1279-24, vol. 2, 16.

101 Ibid., 19.

102 "Landymore Report", 106.

103 Ibid., Table No. 3, 13.

104 Ibid., 99.

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CONCLUSION

The primary objective of this study has been to explore the complex subject of personnel policy in the RCN during the postwar period, 1945 to 1964. A specific task was to determine the cause of instability and manning shortages that prevailed throughout the period and led ultimately to the manning collapse in the Atlantic Command in 1964. Owing to the complex nature of personnel policy and its integral part in the policy equation, it could not be considered in isolation from naval policy as a whole, or government defence policy and the important initiatives of activist ministers such as Brooke Claxton and Paul Hellyer. Because of the predominant position and power of the Chief of the Naval Staff and of the Naval Board, an examination of their roles and participation in policy development has formed a foundation for this study. Moreover, military institutions being what they are, there were also important hierarchical biases, cultural factors and traditions that influenced decision makers and these have been woven into the fabric of the historical narrative.

This study has demonstrated that policy decisions by successive Chiefs of the Naval Staff and Naval Boards kept the postwar RCN in a perpetual state of over-extension where commitments always exceeded personnel resources. The Mainguy Report noted in 1949, that the circumstances of the postwar period denied the RCN the option of reverting to its 1939 status as a small navy "concentrating as it used to do on a 'proper training system'" and developing a stable personnel base. The commissioners allowed that some of the consequences that earned their criticism, such as over-commitment and instability, may have been inevitable rather than avoidable. An examination of the evidence over the whole period leads to the conclusion that over-commitment became a syndrome, and instability chronic. This situation ultimately led the RCN into personnel bankruptcy.

While the circumstances of 1964 varied greatly from those pertaining in 1949, this study had demonstrated that over-commitment and instability remained the dominant factors in personnel policy throughout the period. The navy grew from 8,300 officers and men in 1946 to 21,720 in 1964, an increase of over 225 percent. At the same time, the size of the fleet grew by a factor of five. This rapid expansion was governed by the defence policy developed during Brooke Claxton's tenure as Minister of National Defence that committed Canada to NATO and the RCN to an anti-submarine convoy escort role. This policy was interpreted by the RCN so as to make the achievement of NATO force levels the dominant consideration in naval policy and became the sine qua non of successive Chiefs of the Naval Staff beginning with Vice-Admiral Grant. Grant established the principle that the navy was to provide as many ASW escorts for NATO as possible and this eventually became unassailable dogma. What was in fact an open-ended commitment became the justification for all funding demands on the government. It also dominated strategic planning to the exclusion of other important national considerations such as maintenance of sovereignty.

Grant also chose to specialize in ASW, probably the most challenging field of naval warfare, particularly after the introduction of nuclear propelled submarines. Naval aviation and a new generation of technologically-advanced Canadian-designed destroyers would be the foundation of a predominantly small ship navy. The ASW specialization and naval aviation proved to be increasingly more expensive as the technology advanced. Good ships require competent men and there was a steadily increasing demand for more highly trained officers and men to operate and maintain ever more technically complex and varied weapons and systems. Demands for personnel translated into increased commitments for manning, maintenance, training and administration. To satisfy these demands required a high level of forward planning,

organization, knowledge and staff skills in the area of personnel management. This consistently proved to be a weak area in naval administration.

Of the challenges facing those responsible for administering the RCN, that to achieve a consonance between commitments on the one hand and personnel resources on the other was one of the most difficult. Of equal importance, was the requirement to establish and maintain an operationally effective fleet, to which both material and personnel components contributed. Continued government support and adequate funding were absolutely essential to enable the RCN to achieve policy objectives and withholding these had critical consequences. This study has shown that commitments in NATO force levels expressed in numbers of ships, primarily escorts, became the over-riding factor governing naval policy. DeWolf gave force to this policy and cut all extraneous commitments such as the cruisers, icebreaker and coastal escorts when the government began to limit funding in 1957. Naval aviation and the carrier absorbed an inordinately large share of the naval budget and personnel resources through 1964. While naval aviation eventually achieved a high state of operational efficiency, maintaining the capability was of questionable cost benefit. The carrier presented a "can't afford to be without it" dilemma that even DeWolf could not resolve. However, as *Bonaventure* required the better part of four DDE ship's companies to man her, the Naval Staff openly questioned the wisdom of the Naval Board in keeping the ship in commission when personnel shortages became acute in 1963.

When the choice devolved in 1959 to between manning escorts and training personnel, the Naval Board chose the former and in doing so placed the personnel situation on a critical path to crisis and collapse. It gambled that the government would approve an increase in the personnel ceiling and that no war would occur while the build-up was taking place. The personnel increases were not forthcoming. Unquestionably the most dynamic and competent CNS, Vice-Admiral DeWolf had every expectation that the officers and men of the navy could

and would carry the additional burdens imposed by that decision and the sweeping restructuring of the personnel system in 1960. Under his continued leadership they might have but he chose to retire. Everything quickly unravelled after his retirement

Successive major internal studies by the RCN; the Mainguy Report(1949), Tisdall Report(1958) and Landymore Report(1964), and other minor studies, all indicate that over-commitment had become systemic, resulting in chronic personnel shortages, instability, lack of fighting effectiveness in ships, poor maintenance and low morale. In contrast, the Brock Report(1961) demonstrated the extent to which the hierarchy of the RCN remained focused on the acquisition of new and better ships and equipment to the exclusion of critical considerations of their impact on personnel policy and requirements. This shortcoming more than any other speaks to the absence of comprehensive staff training in the RCN officer corps that would have developed a broader disciplined and systematic approach to policy development. The navy lacked a world-view. The fundamental problem was an almost contemptuous attitude with which the acquisition of staff skills was viewed by successive Chiefs of the Naval Staff with the exception of Vice-Admiral Rayner. By rejecting the need for a universal understanding and adoption of staff concepts and procedures at every level, the RCN simply handicapped itself in its capability to administer itself effectively. And, as long as it was dominated by the over-commitment syndrome, crisis management remained the norm.

With respect to the officers who filled the highest positions of authority and responsibility, several conclusions can be drawn. The most important is that given the ironclad rules imposed by the seniority system and the fact that there was a very small pool of talent from which to draw after World War II, there could be no pretence at quality control. This is best illustrated in the succession of officers who became CNS. Whether or not any one in particular was competent was governed by luck and not good management. Fortunately for the

RCN, two excellent administrators, Vice-Admirals Grant and DeWolf, rose to the top during the postwar period. On the other hand, two CNS's, Vice-Admirals Reid and Mainguy, never wanted the position but they were duty bound to accept and did what was expected. Their obvious lack of vision, motivation and talent was reflected in their mediocre performances. This pattern of inconsistency in administrative skills and ability was the norm for officers of the prewar RCN who rose to high rank and positions of authority. If they did excel, like Rear-Admiral Lay, it was because of natural administrative ability, for few were taught staff skills and their education was no more than Grade Twelve at best. Ironically, Lay was held up by Claxton as the worst example of senior naval officers being out of step with Canadian society.

This situation was not created by RCN but was the fault of successive prewar governments that showed no interest in developing a sound naval administration and building for the future. In fact, the navy was barely kept alive. It is true that the prewar cohort carried a great deal of RN cultural baggage but what else could be expected under the circumstances. Between the wars, the RCN was forced to throw itself upon the good auspices of the RN in order to survive. This all having been said, successive Chiefs of the Naval Staff ensured that the prewar cohort were given preference in promotions and were placed in the key administrative positions to ensure continuity of control. Pedigree not competence was the key consideration. Some new blood was brought along but too few officers of the quality of Rear-Admiral Storrs chose to transfer to the permanent force after the war.

There was also a reticence to accept change if it was not in the best interests of the RCN and the CNS was the final authority. Initiatives pertaining to the national interest or trends in Canadian society were only viewed positively if they did not impinge upon the integrity of RCN's policies, traditions or culture. Often it seems that change had to be imposed because the navy conveyed the impression that as an institution it was out of touch with

Canadian society. This was particularly true of Vice-Admiral Grant and this perception masks his important work to improve morale and his initiatives that set the course for the RCN in the postwar period. Successful leadership in the RCN, as Rear-Admiral Murdoch observed, seemed to culminate in Vice-Admiral DeWolf who combined natural talent and political acuity with experience and lessons learned. DeWolf stands as an anomaly produced by an inadequate system in spite of itself. The extent of the inadequacy was readily demonstrated by the precipitous fall taken by the RCN after DeWolf's retirement. Whether or not he could have saved it is a moot point.

The story goes outside the navy to include broader issues of civil-military relations. Specifically, it has shown how initiatives by government and the civilian and military bureaucracy forced the navy to adopt policies not in its best interests. This was symptomatic, particularly after 1957, of a breakdown in civil-military relations. These unanticipated and disruptive initiatives, particularly respecting funding cuts, would have thwarted even the best conceived plans developed by a competent staff organization. Change was imposed on the naval hierarchy through the advancing tide of integration and closer oversight and control of fiscal management by the government bureaucracy, particularly in personnel matters. The government became more interested in minimizing quantity than maximizing quality, and that the navy's personnel structure complied with the integrated tri-service model and standards. The emphasis was on bureaucratic efficiency and not fleet effectiveness. This was demonstrated in the extreme when the member of the Treasury Board on the Review Committee sought to impose a fleet complementing model, vaguely applicable to the air force, on Vice-Admiral DeWolf. Control was exercised increasingly through manipulation of fiscal resources. This was symptomatic of the fact that the powers of the CNS and Naval Board over finances were slowly

being usurped by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Rank Structure Committee and Estimates Screening Committee.

Brooke Claxton's influence on forces of change brought to bear on the RCN was decisive. In addition to his initiatives toward NATO and ASW, Brooke Claxton introduced important reforms that influenced the development of the administrative and cultural structure of the RCN up to 1964. He established integration as a fundamental concept of defence policy which came to dominate the administrative structure of the armed forces and slowly eroded both the independence of the CNS and the ability of the RCN to exist in isolation of the other services. Claxton pressed for Canadianization of the RCN in the face of opposition from Grant after the Mainguy inquiry. The Mainguy Report, commissioned by him, influenced officer training in a decisive way. Interestingly, the form and experience of the Mainguy inquiry provided the model for future personnel studies by the RCN. However, it was a combination of the repatriation of training for both officers and men and the growing closer association with the USN that had a greater direct effect on creating an independent Canadian identity in the RCN. The process was evolutionary rather than revolutionary and mirrored the cultural realignment towards the United States that occurred in Canadian society in the postwar period. Also fundamental to Canadianization was membership in NATO where the RCN sought to make a distinctively independent contribution. It could be said that this was carried to the extreme because NATO came to dominate strategic development over national considerations such as sovereignty. By 1964, identity was not a major issue in the RCN and most serving personnel would agree with Hellyer that anglophiles such as Rear-Admiral Jeffry Brock were anachronisms.

Claxton's decision to integrate of the military colleges and establish the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) was decisive. The Mainguy Report served to reinforce his commitment

to this policy. For Claxton, ROTP was an exercise in nation building. However, ROTP introduced a method of officer production which did not meet the needs of the navy either philosophically or professionally. Inadequate officer production became a critical factor in fleet efficiency and career planning. Additionally, a system for perpetuating the cultural foundations of the prewar RCN through the "get them young and keep them" concept was lost. Loyalty to the navy, the fundamental element, did not develop in the tri-service and primarily academic environment. Moreover, the very best the navy could expect from an ROTP graduate was eighteen months of useful employment before his seven year engagement expired. The problem of inadequate officer production was compounded by an unacceptably high wastage rate of ROTP officers who did not see the RCN as an attractive career. The prospect of too much seetime was also a factor that caused young officers to leave the navy. Finally general list officer structure, originating from the Tisdall Report, was not universally accepted within the navy itself and this resistance resulted in its eventual failure. The Venture plan was introduced in 1954 as an antidote to the contamination by integration but an independent naval college could not be sustained financially and the original plan was abandoned in 1963.

Claxton represented the conflict between the dynamics of Canadian society and the conservatism of the RCN. The leadership of the RCN never really divested itself of the small prewar "family" navy mentality during the postwar period and, in a sense, marched backwards into the future. There was a latent conservatism among the prewar RCN regular force officers who essentially dominated the RCN from 1945 to 1964. This study has shown that selective promotion decisions by the CNS perpetuated their control. Plomer was largely correct in his accusations that the RCN was run like an exclusive club. The prewar RCN cohort was strongly resistant to change and administrative modernization. Initially, they were largely insulated from external influence because of the National Defence Act of 1950 that increased the powers and

independence of the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Naval Board. In 1949, the Mainguy Report had publicly exposed many shortcomings of the existing organization. However, the Cold War and Korean conflict shifted attention to rearmament and the RCN managed to avoid public scrutiny again until Commodore Plomer's exposé in 1963.

Increasingly after Claxton's tenure as MND both strategy and policy were determined by finances. Given the magnitude of the RCN's expansion programme, long-term budgetary stability was fundamental. The problem of losing fiscal independence was compounded by the introduction of austerity programmes in 1957 that impacted directly on naval programmes. First, flexibility was removed then the RCN was compelled to postpone or cut equipment acquisition or construction essential to achieving policy objectives. Freezes imposed on personnel ceilings forced the navy to take critical decisions regarding maintaining commitments. That those decisions were questionable is one issue. The other is the government generated issue of budgetary uncertainty that prevailed from 1957. Financial volatility caused continual disruption to the RCN's long range plans. This unpredictable fiscal environment was not the main factor but must be considered as a major contributing factor to the RCN's problems and to the personnel turmoil of the 1960's.

Another important element in the issue of civil-military relations is the personal interaction between the Minister of National Defence and the RCN. Brooke Claxton stands out as the dominant and most effective postwar MND of the story, if not until the present day. During his eight year tenure, 1946-54, he established both the form and structure of Canadian defence policy and the armed forces. Claxton understood and supported the contributory concept of the NATO force structure and command organization into which Canadian Defence Policy was integrated. He was both a strong leader and a nationalist who found the corporate attitude of the naval hierarchy an impediment to introducing administrative and other reforms

that would bring the armed forces in line both with Canadian society and each other. He did believe in the integrity of the chain command and his revisions to the National Defence Act in 1950 strengthened the positions of the single service chiefs.

However, his integration initiatives spawned powerful review committees under the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee whose membership included non-uniformed representatives of the Department of Finance and Treasury Board as well as the Deputy Minister. These committees systematically usurped the powers of the service chiefs, leaving them with authority but no financial discretion. Vice-Admiral DeWolf complained over the necessity of personally having to justify every project item before a review authority. The system itself seemed designed to delay critical projects because a civilian bureaucrat from either Treasury Board or Finance could demand more justification for an equipment or weapons system and the project went on hold. The Departmental military bureaucracy also grew exponentially and evolved into an unworkable system of tri-service committees. With respect to the navy, Claxton made an attempt to get to know the senior officers, attended their conferences and developed a reasonable working relationship with them. Claxton's legacy was to leave in place an ambitious national policy of expansion for all three forces. This was sustained until 1957 when the Canadian government's determination to meet NATO commitments with adequate funding began to weaken. Moreover, many of Claxton's integration initiatives became self-defeating as the meaning of military effectiveness became confused with bureaucratic efficiency.

Paul Hellyer was given the mandate to reduce defence spending and increase efficiency. He believed complete integration of the administrative structure of the armed forces was the answer. He held the same views as Claxton regarding the naval hierarchy's conservatism and resistance to change, "a tough nut to crack". Plomer's exposé and his own personal encounter

with Brock convinced Hellyer that extreme measures were required. Unlike Claxton he shut out the navy, ignored Vice-Admiral Rayner's advice and wielded his political power like a schoolyard bully. Rayner was no DeWolf when it came to confrontation. His quiet voice of reason had no chance of dissuading the ambitious Minister. Hellyer had no qualms in eliminating both the office of the CNS and the Naval Board and introducing a fully integrated administrative structure under a single Chief of Defence Staff where the RCN ultimately disappeared in a unified service. While better use of fiscal resources was ostensibly the reason for reorganization, Hellyer never explained the broader strategic imperatives behind his initiatives. There was no corresponding realignment of the national command structure and in war the RCN would still fight under the strategic control of either SACLANT or the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic or Pacific Fleet. Incidentally, the funding model Hellyer hoped to achieve that would see 25 percent of the annual defence budget allocated to equipment acquisition had been consistently achieved or exceeded by the RCN. There is much more to this story and the issue of civil-military relations raised by both integration and unification require further scholarly investigation.

Personnel management in the RCN never received the priority of other areas such as finance. The Naval Comptroller became a powerful member of the Naval Board and the government demanded that position be filled by a trained expert. On the other hand, while the largest portion of the naval budget was spent on personnel, the officer appointed as Chief of Naval Personnel needed no particular qualification except to be an admiral. Administrative competence was presumed. Many CNP's stepped into that role without having any previous experience in the Personnel Branch and one without having ever served in NSHQ. Studies by management engineering specialists disclosed that the Personnel Branch lacked proper organization and was complemented with enthusiastic amateurs without appropriate training

and staff experience. The decision-making process was unstructured and all decisions tended to be made at the top. There was a notable absence of planning and the personnel business of the navy was determined by ad hoc solutions on a day-to-day basis in an environment of perpetual crisis. Until restructuring in 1960, decisions were dominated by the branches as opposed to what was best for the navy. The fact that all billets for the navy of 20,000 personnel had been allocated to build infrastructure before one new ship was commissioned demonstrates the extent of the deficiency in planning. Change was imposed on the Personnel Branch but not without a power struggle with the Comptroller and interminable bickering, particularly with respect to responsibility for complementing. In the meantime, the manning situation moved inexorably towards ultimate collapse.

The RCN's personnel system was subjected to two significant restructurings between 1945 and 1964, that caused severe dislocation in the production of trained personnel. These were imposed when the navy was both short of personnel and unstable. The first significant change was the result of the introduction of an integrated rank and trade structure in the late 1940's. The administration and training system had just adjusted to that upheaval when sweeping changes to the personnel structure were introduced as a result of the Tisdall Report in 1958. Commodore Tisdall and his most influential colleague, Commodore Spencer, had neither particular qualifications nor experience that equipped them for the task of restructuring the personnel system. They borrowed ideas and concepts extensively from the Royal Navy and United States Navy and applied them piecemeal to form a composite plan to the RCN. Tisdall's recommendations were meant to achieve economies in personnel, reduce training times, and produce officers and men competent as both users and maintainers capable of broad employment. The recommendations were also designed to break the grip of Branches on the personnel system and dismantle their empires.

Other critical personnel initiatives were introduced simultaneously such as achieving better rank pyramids for the men's trades. A new planned maintenance system was also introduced that increased reliance on ship's manpower resources at the same time as on-the-job training became the main method by which new tradesmen were to be taught their skills. This also coincided with the introduction of an austerity programme by the government that capped personnel strength and crippled the build-up programme. The navy was already short of trained personnel and Tisdall's programme never got going. It failed because it did not have an established personnel foundation to build on and strong resistance in the fleet. Failure was compounded by a mass exodus of men for reasons of low morale, excessive seetime and poor administration of the divisional system. Based on an initial three-year engagement, the Tisdall programme was a disaster because it failed both to train men adequately and to retain sufficient numbers to sustain the personnel structure. The Landymore Report said implicitly that in theory Tisdall's recommendations were good but impractical. What Landymore did not say directly was that this should have been foreseen and that the New Personnel System (NPS) was a mistake. The Tisdall recommendations were adopted and ordered implemented during Vice-Admiral DeWolf's watch. He obviously expected too much of an already over-committed and over-stretched navy. DeWolf chose to retire at a critical juncture. Had he remained, his dynamic leadership and resourcefulness might have produced a different result.

The collapse of the manning situation on the east coast in 1964 was predicted and could have been avoided through a sufficient and timely reduction of commitments. It was the result of poor planning, mismanagement and, ultimately, the inability of senior leadership to make the hard decisions. The navy had pinned its hopes on Tisdall's model for a personnel system that would carry it through the successful introduction of new construction in the fleet. Instead, it was faced with a flood of disenchanted three and five-year men leaving, convinced that there

was no future in the navy. Retention of junior officers was equally poor. Hellyer's cut backs and reductions merely gave the exodus momentum and discouraged recruiting, they did not cause the crisis. Having never created any depth in its personnel resources and having failed to support "a proper training system" that would produce sufficient trained personnel when and where needed, the RCN eventually bankrupted itself in manpower.

The personnel situation was heading for collapse before the executive order to reduce the fleet was given by Hellyer and before the 1964 White Paper was introduced. The collapse occurred in the Atlantic Command in November 1964, after a close call in July 1963. The introduction of the Cyclic System, based on the personnel system and designed to create stability so that training could flourish, was too little too late. Ultimately the responsibility for the collapse has to reside with the last Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Rayner. Rayner failed to take decisive action when warned by competent authorities. Rear-Admiral Brock advised NSHQ that the personnel system had failed and predicted dire consequences. Brock's opinion was substantiated by Commodore Medland who stated emphatically that commitments had to be reduced, which meant taking ships out of commission. Rayner, instead, seemed to be swept away on the tide of events. He was absorbed with trying to dissuade Hellyer from implementing integration and failed to adjust commitments to meet the demands of the dynamic political environment that featured fiscal restraint. Instead, he tried to maintain the status quo. The Naval Staff advised the Naval Board of the futility of this approach given fiscal realities but their advice was not heeded. In October 1963, Vice-Admiral Rayner had remarked to the Sauvé Committee that in spite of current problems "there was a great deal over-whelmingly right with the navy." It would be difficult to make that statement a year later when personnel shortages led to a manning collapse that forced more reductions in ships. By that time, the administrative leadership structure of the RCN had ceased to exist.

This study, like the Mainguy inquiry, was destined by its nature to be critical rather than emphasizing those aspects of the navy that were "over-whelmingly right". The postwar expansion of the RCN has been perceived generally as a success story and there were many important individual successes. Tony German wrote in his popular history that in 1964 the RCN was "running at full stride and with the very best...." On the contrary, the RCN was actually hobbling in 1964 when the personnel situation at the time is analyzed. Scrutiny of the evidence explodes the myth that the RCN experienced a "golden age" during the 1950's and early 60's. The look of the new fleet of ASW escorts based on the St. Laurent design, and their advanced technology, implied great potential. However, efficiency did not match appearances and the rapid postwar expansion of the RCN was a failure because the fleet was not sustainable owing to poor personnel policies and management. Evidence gathered by competent authority within the RCN indicated that Commanding officers were not confident that their untrained, unworked up ship's companies would perform well in combat. The evidence also points to the conclusion that the state of technical readiness of the fleet was indifferent. The divisional system, that was fundamental to the leadership and training of the men, had been criticized as being weak in the Mainguy Report in 1949. The same criticism was made by Commodore Medland in 1962 and Rear-Admiral Landymore in 1964. The Cyclic System was a desperate measure to try to correct the situation but it could not be fully implemented owing to worsening personnel shortages.

An interesting parallel can be drawn between the circumstances of the withdrawal the ineffective RCN Escort Groups from combat by the Royal Navy in May 1943, during the Battle of the Atlantic, and the necessity of the RCN to introduce the Cyclic System in 1964. In the first instance, a major contributing factor was lack of fighting efficiency of the Canadian groups resulting from deficiencies in trained officers and men, and a lack of group cohesion.

The root cause was chronic instability in the escorts created while trying to meet ever-expanding commitments. The wartime RCN had set out to provide the maximum number of escorts possible for the allied cause as its objective but with the consequence of severe instability in ship's companies. In the second instance, the postwar RCN endeavoured to provide as many ASW escorts as possible for NATO but did not create a sound personnel structure and instability was the result. In both cases, the desire of Canada and the RCN to be a good ally was commendable. But, in a relatively short time span in its history, the leadership of the RCN twice over-committed the navy. This created personnel instability that resulted in a deficit in trained personnel. During the war, an intensive training effort was enough to bring the fully manned Canadian ships up to par. However, in the postwar period, manning eventually collapsed through personnel shortages. The RCN unilaterally was compelled to cut commitments, reorganize and concentrate entirely on personnel training in order to attempt to achieve stability in the ships and improve their fighting efficiency. This experience gives credence to the dictum that those who do not learn from the lessons of history are destined to repeat it.

As an epilogue, anecdotal evidence indicates that all Commander Willson forecast came true and more. The once much vaunted fleet of St. Laurent class ships were maintained in commission for over thirty years and eventually allowed to "rust out". Successive disinterested governments were finally forced to take action. The twenty-two St. Laurents were replaced by twelve new state-of-the-art Canadian Patrol Frigates. The Canadian navy remains over-committed and never managed to place its personnel house in order. Instability persists. Currently there is an acute shortage of technicians and the wastage rate in both officers and men is unacceptably high. Shortages demand that men transfer from a ship just completing a deployment to another. Pay, housing and conditions of service is reported to be substandard and

morale is low. The navy has recently acquired four Upholder class submarines from the Royal Navy but has sufficient trained personnel to man only one. The naval reserve has been given a new role through the acquisition of coastal patrol vessels which it is primarily to man and operate. Frequent collisions and other problems due to lack of training and experience of the reserves are heard to be the norm. All this suggests that a new generation of the Canadian navy is experiencing history repeating itself.

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