

A Complex Multiplicity: Turco-Georgian Relations Since the End of the Cold War

by

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B.A. University of Victoria, 2007

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is on the transformation of Turco-Georgian relations since the early 1990s. In recent years, these relations have been taken to a next level in light of the trans-national cooperation that resulted in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. With a narrow focus on the Turco-Georgian border, this study attempts to understand the trajectory of the improving relations between the two countries through a reconceptualised understanding of the border. By emphasising both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of borders, this thesis tries to steer away from the zero-sum approaches and understand the nature of Turco-Georgian as a complex multiplicity.

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DEDICATIONS

For the two women of my life:

For my partner Anna, her inspiration and motivation has been a gift

For my mother Ayşe, who did an amazing job raising me as a single mother and has been my true friend all along. My debt is eternal.

Chapter 1

Introduction

This MA thesis is an attempt to reflect on the transformation of Georgia-Turkey relations since the early 1990s. Following the independence of Georgia, in 1991, the practically non-existing relations between Georgia and Turkey, during the Cold War, had been replaced by a trend of good neighbourly relations. In recent years, these relations have been taken to a next level in light of the trans-national cooperation that resulted in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.

A number of factors led me to write this thesis. First, as a Turkish citizen, the opening of the Georgian border and normalisation of relations that occurred was inspirational. Second, as a student of political science, it was interesting to see how economic factors contributed to the normalisation of relations between these two countries. Third, my interest in geopolitics of pipelines also motivated me to study the region in more depth. What initially puzzled me when I started researching the Turco-Georgian relations was my inability to understand appropriately what was happening at the Turco-Georgian border. I was unable to fit this transformation into either globalisation or the regional integration theories. I have traced my inability to understand the Turco-Georgian relations back to the way borders are usually conceptualised in both theories. Consequently, the focus of my thesis has shifted from traditional international relations theories to re-conceptualisation of the role of borders so as to understand regional projects, in particular improved Turco-Georgian relations. Thus I have chosen to focus on borders, rather than, for instance, on diplomatic relations (relations between ministries of foreign affairs).

The usual conceptualisation of borders in social sciences sees borders as single demarcation lines. This particular conceptualisation of borders in European integration and globalisation theories often results in zero-sum analysis of global changes. As a result the presupposed understanding of the border as a single demarcation line limits the possibilities of understanding world affairs. Consequently, I find inadequate the explanations provided by globalisation and regional integration on the transformation of state borders. The re-conceptualisation of borders as two-dimensional concepts provides a better understanding of challenges posed by globalisation and regional integration. In essence, what this MA thesis is referring to when conceptualising borders as complex multiplicities is an insight into borders as multi-dimensional spaces associated both vertical and horizontal dimension of state authority.

On the one hand, the horizontal dimension of state authority – which is at the core of complex multiplicities – is the reflection of horizontal ordering of policy portfolios inside the state on the borders as complex entities with multiple inside and outsides. On the other hand, the vertical dimension of borders refers to the establishment of a borderland culture through trans-border cooperation amongst regional authorities. This can be studied through the implementation of multi-level governance on border studies (see Brunet-Jailly 2005).

Through this proposed re-conceptualisation, what was once deemed a single line that separated the inside and the outside can be analysed as a collection of multiple lines. As a result of this articulation, we can come to appreciate the existence of multiple insides and outsides. In return, this articulation creates room for a non-binary analysis of

the Turco-Georgian relations that would have otherwise been not possible due to zero-sum analysis of global changes.

The main research question of this thesis is: How can a reconceptualised understanding of borders contribute to the analysis of the Turco-Georgian relations? The main research question attempts to move beyond the zero-sum analysis provided by European integration and globalisation theories. Consequently, this thesis focuses on the limited cooperation in some policy areas without making claims about this cooperation being a trend of cooperation moving towards a regional integration project

In terms of the methodology that I adopted for this research project, even though I did not rely on any strict empirical methodology in this thesis, I did make a decision to study Turco-Georgian relations and to analyse them in a particular way (i.e. focusing on the role of borders and looking at different occasions of cooperation etc.). Insights into the transformation of Turco-Georgian relations could have also been provided by a survey of recent laws adopted by both national legislations as a direct result of the interactions with international organisations such as the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (WB) as means towards ‘international socialisation’ (Schimmelfennig et al. 2007). Another way to approach this topic would have been a quantitative research on comparative public policy that would have focused on recent changes to the national legislation in both countries as an insight into the result of the transformation of bilateral relations. Finally, a qualitative study on the perceptions of each country in the other countries’ ‘social imaginary’ (Taylor 2004) would have been another way of addressing this issues.

I have decided, however, to focus on the impact of recent initiatives such as building of a regional airport in Batumi open to the nationals of both countries, relaxation of the visa regime to facilitate easier movement of persons or increased bilateral trade and more importantly decision to cooperate on the establishment of an East-West energy corridor that became the site of a number of geopolitically significant energy pipelines. I have preferred to conduct my research this way, as I believe that a narrow focus on the Turco-Georgian border and the emergence of a borderland community will provide broader outcomes on the nature and future trajectory of the Turco-Georgian relations.

In order to provide such an analysis I have structured the thesis as follows: *Chapter 2* reviews selected theories of European integration and some insights from the globalisation literature. It covers both bodies of literature because this research on Turkey and Georgia could be interpreted as, on the one hand, caused by globalisation with increased regional interdependence as the result. On the other hand, the focus on European integration theories follows from the EU presence in the region; the EU has a direct influence in the region through the enlargement process and conditionality (Vachudova 2005, Schimmelfennig et al. 2007) seen that Turkey is an accepted candidate for EU membership and Georgia's long-term goal is to be a member of the EU. Georgia has been developing closer ties to the EU through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Lavenex 2004, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2006, Smith 2005). The chapter focuses on how European integration and globalisation theories explain regional and global projects' impact on borders and I explain why I am dissatisfied with the analyses based on regional integration and globalisation theories.

Chapter 3 proposes an understanding of boundaries as *complex multiplicities*. This understanding of borders sees borders in regional projects as multi-dimensional spaces associated both vertical and horizontal dimensions. I believe that re-conceptualisation of borders with these two dimensions in mind will provide a better understanding of challenges posed by globalisation and regional integration and the responses of the state through their uses of borders. Arguably, studies based on definitions of boundaries as single lines with a clear inside and a clear outside, limit possibilities of understanding global events that transform structures and processes. I argue that it is due to our definitions of the border as a single line that we interpret the current state of affairs as a decline of state authority. Through the analytical perspective of the multiple dimensions of boundaries – which is at the core of complex multiplicities – borders can be unbundled. What was once deemed a single line that separated the inside and the outside can be re-conceptualised as a collection of multiple lines. Multiplicity of these lines is essential in the re-conceptualisation of boundaries. Each one of these lines represents a distinguishable characteristic – a limit – of state authority contained within the national territory, such as: legal, economic, political, linguistic and cultural characteristics.

With this understanding of borders and regional projects, *Chapter 4* provides an account of Turco-Georgian relations since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Georgia's independence. The chapter provides a historical background of Turkey and Georgia in order to emphasise the significance of the change of relations. By examining the decisions over the construction of energy pipelines by Turkish and Georgian governments and their impact on the geopolitical importance of both countries, the

chapter will look at both horizontal and vertical dimensions of borders to understand the Turco-Georgian relations in recent years.

Chapter 2

A Review of Globalisation and European Integration Theories

This chapter provides a review of globalisation and European integration literatures as possible avenues that could provide insights into the Turco-Georgian relations. Starting with a survey of European integration literature, specifically focussing at neofunctionalism, (liberal) intergovernmentalism and social constructivism, the chapter provides an overview of European integration theories as a site of inquiry due to the influence of the EU in both Georgia and Turkey. Second, a review of different definitions of globalisation is provided to acknowledge the possibility of understanding the Turco-Georgian rapprochement as a result of globalisation or increased regional interdependence. During my research, however, both theories have proven to be unable to understand the transformation I am focussing in my case study. I was initially puzzled by the fact that existing theories were unable to explain adequately what was happening at the Turco-Georgian border. Neither globalisation nor regional integration theories were able to explain satisfactorily this transformation.

Theorising is the process by which a scholar introduces a framework to explain a set of observations. In Ben Rosamond's words 'theorising intellectualises perceptions' (Rosamond 2000, p. 5). However, in the meantime structuring these sets of observations comes with 'a particular set of assumptions about the way in which world operates' (Rosamond 2000, p. 5). This chapter is about those sets of assumptions, in particular those presuppositions with regard to the concept 'borders' found in both globalisation and regional integration literatures.

In terms of their interaction with borders, theories of globalisation and regional integration generally operate on a presupposed understanding of borders as a single demarcation line that separates the inside from the outside. As a result, explanations for increasing transactions or harmonisation and integration between states are limited to zero-sum analyses of 'tensions between supranational and national levels' or 'disappearing versus strengthening' borders. In European integration theories both neofunctionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism avoid directly engaging with borders and their role in integration. Yet, even when they avoid engaging with borders

they are still studying a form of border transformation – integration – as the debate over competences and decisions over the scope and focus of integration is a debate over the transformation of the state. This transformation of the state is generally explained as two separate transformations: physical and political. This distinction between physical transformation – i.e. transformation of borders – and political transformation – i.e. policy harmonization, integration etc – is deeply imbedded in our understanding of borders as physical lines of demarcations. This very same distinction is also present in theories of globalisation.

Theories of regional integration and globalisation form separate, yet loosely connected bodies of literature that explain how and why the ‘international’ or ‘supranational’ and the ‘national’ interact. Both theories have different explanations about how and why the national interacts with the international in the case of globalisation, or supranational in the case of European integration.

As a subset of the literature on regional integration, the literature on European integration is of great interest first, because of the European continent’s unique success in regional integration; and second, due to EU’s direct involvement in transformation of Southern Caucasus through Turkey’s membership bid to the EU and Georgia’s prospects of membership and its current association with the Union through the ENP. On the one hand, European integration literature looks at why states delegate competence to a supranational regime – i.e. the EU – and how that process of integration occurs. A number of theories attempt to answer these questions. From the overall European integration literature I have selected three main theories of European integration: Neofunctionalism, (liberal) intergovernmentalism, and social constructivism. Three

theories are not the only ones that can provide an insight into European integration or by extension the Turco-Georgian border. In fact, there are other approaches such as ‘multi-level governance’ (Hooghe & Marks 2001), institutionalism and so on that have been influential in understanding European integration. However, here I have chosen to elaborate only on these three because I wanted to select the two classic polar-oppose theories (neofunctionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism) and an approach (social constructivism) that offers insights beyond the classic dichotomy established by the debate between neofunctionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism. Social constructivism elaborates on the constructed nature of identity and the importance of collective memory – and forgetting – in the integration process, which I feel are an important complement to the first two.

On the other hand, globalisation literature looks at how global norms and standards are adopted by states and the impact of that process. What is currently being debated is no longer whether or not globalisation exists but rather what are its causes, consequences and its patterns as a structure. Globalisation literature provides yet another important insight into understanding these changing relations: transformation of the border can be interpreted as a consequence of interdependence that presents itself as a result of this globalised world. The subsequent section – following the section on European Integration – on globalisation provides a survey of different definitions of globalisation offered by several scholars and I will demonstrate how these definitions are based on a presupposed understanding of borders.

European Integration Theories

Neofunctionalism

In 1958, Haas published his *The Uniting of Europe* his first major work on the European Coal and Steel Community. As Philippe Schmitter wrote: ‘In Europe, the scholarly reputation of Ernst B. Haas is inseparably linked to the vicissitudes of something called “neofunctionalism”’ (Schmitter 2005, p. 255). Haas explains European integration through two different processes. The first is a shift in loyalties – in essence a constructivist argument – and the second is a functional argument called spillover. In terms of his argument on ‘shifting loyalties’ Haas wrote, ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’ (Haas 1958, p. 16). Once this shift in loyalties occurs further integration follows through a process called spillover. This functional process called ‘spillover’ or ‘task expansion’ is at the core of Haas’ argument. Mark Pollack defines spillover as a process in which an initial decision to ‘place a certain sector, under the authority of central institutions creates pressures to extend the authority of the institutions into neighbouring areas of policy’ (Pollack. 2005, p. 15).

In its essence, neofunctionalism argues that closer cooperation in a given policy field will lead to further integration in associated policy areas. This initial transfer of sovereignty will take place as a result of shifting loyalties from the national level to the supranational level. This transfer of sovereignty also has a direct impact on the physical borders as it effectively establishes harmonised internal zones – or insides – that are often

times overlapping with state authority.

As a result of its prominence, neofunctionalism has many critiques engaging with its shortcomings. Some of these criticisms are very pressing – i.e. timing of spillovers, discrepancy between the scope and level of integration. Debates over the extent to which neofunctionalism can explain European integration as a whole in particular the timing of the phenomenon of spill-over or the lack thereof is a main source of these critiques. Regardless of its critiques, neofunctionalism has established itself as an important general theory. Ben Rosamond wrote, ‘neofunctionalism represents a coherent “other” against which their [other theorist’s] own (supposedly preferable) approaches to explaining the EU and elements of European integration can be defined’ (Rosamond 2005, p. 237).

In a special issue of *Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP)* dedicated to Haas and neofunctionalism, Tanja Börzel, summarizes neo-functional reasoning as ‘close co-operation in specific economic sectors is key to overcoming national sovereignty and achieving European unity’ (Börzel 2005, p. 219). Her dissatisfaction with neofunctionalism is not a result of neofunctionalism’s inability to explain how and when integration, or transfer of sovereignty, occurs¹. Rather she is more interested in why integration occurs in some fields and not in others. Börzel engages with the neo-functional analysis through its capacity to explain scope and level of integration. In a

¹ Another criticism of Haas’ theory was regarding the timing of spillovers. Ben Rosamond notes, ‘Spillover was suggestive of automaticity – the idea that the logic of integration is somehow self-sustaining, rational and teleological’ (Rosamond 2005, p. 244). Haas argued that initial decision to integrate by national governments would lead to further integration. He explained this mechanism through the concept of ‘spillovers’. Spillovers turned out to be problematic. It is accurate to argue that spillovers occurred in the early stages of the European integration. Creation of the European Economic Communities (EEC) was a result of a spillover from the success of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). However, integration did not seem to be as automatic in the 1970s and 1980s as it had been in the early days of the European project. It is not hard to find periods without any integration when looking back at the history of European integration from the early 1950s to the present time. These gaps in integration are associated with the state’s ability to re-assert its competence and regain control of the integration process, which is the (liberal) intergovernmentalist argument. The issue is ‘who drives the integration’, which is really a matter of state competence against the supranational competence.

way she offers a critique of the socially constructed separation between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics and how that separation is used to explain the gap within the scope and focus of European integration. Amy Verdun (2000, p. 29) wrote, ‘This separation [referring to the separation between high and low politics] was made to explain why some areas of policy-making integrate faster than others’. High politics is considered to cover issues that are at the core of state sovereignty (such as defence, foreign policy) and low politics is often related to functional issues (such as economics, trade). Even though this distinction between high and low politics in political analysis has been established long before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the inseparability of high and low politics has become much more apparent ever since. As governments have started to investigate their vulnerability against terrorist attacks, they have become more aware of the interconnectedness of high and low politics. This debate between high and low politics in regards to integration is also the source of one of the key debates between neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists as well as the debate over EU’s *finalité* as an international organization or a federal structure. Often, these debates over the future of the EU cover questions regarding the nature of the EU as a supranational institution or a federal super-state. However, this tension over the zero-sum analysis of the future of EU is due to very fundamental conceptualisation of borders as single demarcation lines that define the limit of state sovereignty.

Social constructivists, however, figured a middle position in agreement with Haas’ ‘shifting loyalties’ argument. As Thomas Risse wrote in the same special issue of *JEPP* mentioned above ‘Haas, had already got it right in the late 1950s that European integration would lead to dual or multiple identities’ (2005, p. 295). According to Risse,

the meaning of those ‘multiple identities’ is left out from Haas’ work. In both neo-functional and intergovernmental analyses, identities are positioned within a zero-sum game. On the one hand, neo-functionalists argue that, as a result of integration, a shift in loyalties from national to supranational level will occur, whereas intergovernmentalists argue that national identity will remain as the primary identity. Social constructivist literature generally engages with this zero-sum argument and disagrees with that stance. As Risse notes ‘What if identity components influence each other, mesh and blend into each other? What if my self-understanding as German inherently contains aspects of Europeanness? Can we really separate a Catalan from a European identity?’ (Risse 2005, p. 296). By studying the multiplicity of identities, social constructivists try to find patterns of resistance towards and acceptance of integration. Transferring a similar argument on ‘multiple identities’ into debates surrounding tensions between supranational competency and national sovereignty, one can see reflection of the overlapping nature of the complexity of state authority and supranational competency of the EU in what I call the complex multiplicity of borders.

(Liberal) Intergovernmentalism

Neofunctionalism puts forward the notion of regional integration as a process of shifting loyalties that results in shifting competences from the national level to the supranational level through spillovers. Intergovernmentalism interprets the same process as fundamentally different than does neofunctionalism. Hoffmann, an IR scholar, rejected the shifting loyalties argument by reminding us of the importance of nationalism and the nation-state in the establishment of the European project. He wrote:

‘[t]he success of the European movement required, first that “resisters”, suspicious of the European integration remain a minority – not only throughout the six but the in the leadership of everyone of the six, not only in the Parliament but above all in the Executive, the prime decision-making force in every state’ (Hoffmann 1966, p. 876).

By arguing so, Hoffmann discredited the possibility of spillovers without the consent and oversight of the state governments. Hoffmann recognized the tension between the supranational level and the national level as a result of integration. He established a dichotomy between ‘the logic of integration’ and ‘the logic of diversity’. The logic of integration according Hoffmann was on the one hand:

‘The double pressure of necessity (the interdependence of social fabric, which will oblige statesmen to integrate even sectors originally left uncoordinated) and of men (the action of the supranational agents) will gradually restrict the movement of the national governments by turning the national situations into one of total enmeshing’ (Hoffmann 1966, p. 881).

On the other hand, the logic of diversity ‘sets limits to the degree to which ‘spillover’ process can limit the freedom of action of the governments, it restricts the domain in which the logic of functional integration operates’ (Hoffmann 1996, p. 882). This tension between integration and diversity is also at the core of the high – low politics (Verdun 2000, p. 29) debate. The logic of diversity recognizes some policy fields – such as defence, foreign policy et cetera – as part of high politics. These fields are at the core of state authority and thus cannot be harmonized and must differ from state to state. One flaw in this distinction between high and low politics is the interconnectedness of these two levels of politics. For example, economics - as a field associated with low politics - is connected to national security and defence.

A more recent stage in this debate was the introduction of liberal intergovernmentalism. Taking shortcomings of previously mentioned theories into consideration, Andrew Moravcsik reformulated intergovernmentalism and established what he labelled 'liberal intergovernmentalism'. Rather than seeing EU as a supranational establishment, Moravcsik sees it as an 'institutionalized policy co-ordination' (Moravcsik 1993, p. 473) designed to 'manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination' (Moravcsik 1993, p. 474). With liberal intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik is targeting his criticism to the self-sustaining – and continuous - nature of integration as proposed by the neofunctionalist narrative.

A student of Hoffmann, Moravcsik argues that European integration can be best explained as a series of rational choices made by national leaders (Moravcsik 1998, p.18). Moravcsik's theory presupposes that states are rational actors – relying on rational choice theory – operating on their desire for economic gains. As interests of these rational actors converge, integration occurs. There is no room for integration without states' oversight in Moravcsik's theory. Instead of spillovers, he introduces two terms *Pooling* and *Delegation*. Delegation occurs when supranational actors are permitted to make certain autonomous decisions. Pooling occurs when governments agree to decide future matters through voting procedures, rather than unanimity such as Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the EU. This debate between the role of states and supranational institutions is also addressed in another theory that provides insight into the European project as social constructivism tries to find a middle point.

Social Constructivism

Unlike neofunctionalism or (liberal) intergovernmentalism, social constructivism (SC)

does not attempt to provide a grand theory that comprehensively explains European integration. On the one hand, SC focuses on the impact of identities on decision-making structures. On the other hand, constructivists study the transformative relation between actors and processes. In other words SC claims that, just as the outcome of European integration is shaped by the identities of individual member states, the establishment of the European Communities transformed those very same identities. Christiansen *et al.* wrote:

‘A significant amount of evidence suggests that, as a process, European integration has a *transformative* impact on the European state system and its constituent units. European integration itself has changed over the years, and it is reasonable to assume that in the process agents’ identity and subsequently their interests and behaviour have equally changed.’
(Christiansen *et al.* 1999, p. 529)

SC provides an insight into how different identities shape the outcomes European integration. As Marcussen *et al.* state:

‘[A]ny new idea about political order, in order to be considered legitimate, must resonate with core elements of older visions of the political order such as ‘state-centred republicanism’ in France, ‘parliamentary democracy and external sovereignty’ in Great Britain, and ‘federalism, democracy and social market economy’ in Germany’ (Marcussen *et al.* 1999, p. 614)

Thus the argument is: the possibilities of European integration are limited to the individual national identities, which in turn are a result of collective identity construction. Social constructivists argue, ‘finding the tools to analyse the impact of intersubjectivity and social context enhances our capacity to answer why and how European integration arrived at its current stage.’ (Christiansen *et al.* 1999, p. 529). In that sense they see the value in studying the complexity of national identities and their transformation as a way of understanding the decisions for or against European integration.

Social constructivism provides a mid-range theory for the students of European integration as it introduces a supplementary theoretical insight into both neofunctionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism. In terms of its contribution to neofunctionalism, constructivist theories support Haas' claim for 'shifting loyalties' and argue that the supposed shift in identities does not have to result in an either/or outcome. As Risse states 'It is wrong to conceptualize European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decreases one's loyalty to national or other communities.' (Risse 2005, p. 295) This alternative conceptualisation of 'shifting identities' as the 'establishment of multiple layers of identities', eases at least one of the major tensions between the national and the supranational. Understanding the 'shifting loyalties' argument as a zero-sum game forms one of the main points of criticism targeted at neofunctionalism. In that sense, reading neofunctionalism through constructivist meta-theory provides an alternative reading of neofunctionalism that is generally welcomed by neofunctionalists.

(Liberal) intergovernmentalists reject the idea of transforming national identities and nationalism(s) as a result of European integration (Moravcsik 1999). However ideas proposed by constructivists still offer valid insights into (liberal) intergovernmentalism. Constructivist analysis on the role of identity in 'rational' choices made by states shed light on when, why and how states give up their competence over matters of high politics. Even though these instances of integration in realm of high politics are deemed unlikely by (liberal) intergovernmentalists, more and more we have started to witness integration in those policy fields, such as defence and immigration policies, that previously remained under the mandate of state sovereignty. This increase in the scope of integration can be

interpreted as a result of the Europeanisation of national identities that once saw these matters as a part of the high politics sphere.

Generally, social constructivists have avoided engaging directly with physical borders. However, in recent years, attempts to find a correlation between outcomes of Europeanisation of political culture and harmonisation resulting from the establishment of a borderless European space have been brought forward (Diez 2006, Christiansen et al. 2000). These accounts of transformative European identities suggest that we can avoid borders on the inside by harmonizing – or Europeanising – the inside through externalising differences. This inside is built in contrast to a – both temporally and spatially – distant Other such as the Eastern bloc during the Cold War or Nazism.

Theories of Globalisation

Another possible way of explaining the transformation of the Turco-Georgian border is by applying theories of globalisation. Literature on globalisation is complex and somewhat unclear. It is complex in the sense that there are multiple aspects and definitions of globalisation - cultural, social, economic, political etc. - and it is confusing in the sense that it is not clear what globalisation is: the definition of the term changes from author to author.

Theorists of globalisation are no longer contesting whether globalisation is taking place or not. Rather, they are contesting whether it is a recent or a historical phenomenon. Simultaneously a debate on the driving force behind globalisation and how it should be theorised is occurring as well. I will structure this section around number of definitions of globalisation provided by Jan Aart Scholte in his authoritative book *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (Scholte 2000). In it he offers an extensive survey of different

understandings of globalisation and how and why they differ. Scholte provides five different definitions of globalisation. I have amalgamated his third and fourth definitions, as they seem to me to be very similar and for my purposes somewhat redundant to present as separate.

The first definition takes globalisation to be synonymous with internationalisation i.e. 'a growth of international exchange and interdependence' (Scholte 2000, p. 15). In my opinion this is not necessarily something new. The foundations of this global framework of interdependence and exchange were established during the Imperial Age. According to post-Marxist, systems-theorists like Immanuel Wallerstein (1984) this new global order is a replica of the colonial world order. Those who maintain control over their borders are the core countries, those who can maintain relative control are referred to as semi-peripheral, and lastly those who are powerless against international exploitation are called the periphery.

The second definition sees globalisation as liberalisation or 'a process of removing government-imposed restrictions' (Scholte 2000, p. 15). Some theorists have taken this a step farther by arguing that globalisation was the demise of modernity (Harvey 1990) or the Westphalian system was disappearing in the wake of globalisation. This definition also raises questions about the nature of state authority. The single dimensional understanding of borders as the skin of state authority fails to capture the complexity of the state and its authority. Globalisation does indeed remove the 'government imposed restrictions' and facilitate freer movement of peoples, goods, services and capital as in the case with the EU. This, however, does not undermine the

sovereignty of nation state but rather facilitates movement under state supervision, during which state has the ability and power to intervene any time.

The third definition of globalisation interprets the term as universalisation or ‘the process of spreading various objects and experiences to people at all corners of the earth’ (Scholte 2005, p. 16). This trend of universalisation/westernisation is visible in business, culture, economics and politics. One could argue that there currently exists a global business culture which determines how business should be conducted. This same business culture is also exported through regional construction projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Often, trans-national projects result in ‘the spread of managerial culture of multinationals and international financial institutions’ (Herkenrath 2007, p. 205). Politically speaking, the spread of political ideas is also an occurring phenomenon. The spread of political ideas was made possible through the use of carrots and/or sticks. Europeans have tended to rely more on the use of carrots, initially through the promise of full membership – as the golden carrot – then through the programs such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. This approach also resulted in the exportation of political norms and cultures (Nye 2006).

Finally Scholte’s final definition equates globalisation with deterritorialisation or ‘a reconfiguration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial spaces’ (Scholte 2000, p. 1). Saskia Sassen offers a definition of economic globalisation that falls under the definition of globalisation that defines it as a process of deterritorialisation. Sassen writes, ‘Economic globalisation has mostly been represented in terms of the duality of national-global where the global gains power and advantages at the expense of the national’ she goes on to argue that globalisation ‘has largely been

conceptualized in terms of the internationalization of capital and then only the upper circuits of capital, notably finance' (Sassen 1998, p. xix) her analysis then goes on to include global cities as an essential part of globalisation and establishes a different map of the world that is based on flows between global cities. Scholte and Sassen's definitions establish a dichotomy between strengthening versus disappearing borders. As the argument goes, states are either powerless towards waves of globalisation and lose control over their borders, or establish themselves as main actors in international trade and maintain strict control over their borders.

These definitions of globalisation in my view offer insufficient tools to provide a nuanced analysis of current developments, such as Turco-Georgian relations. I believe that the world is much more complex than these definitions make it out to be. This *modus operandi* that limits us to opposite polars and zero-sum games does not do justice to the complexity of world affairs. For instance, these differing definitions of globalisation above interact with borders. These characteristics of globalisation challenge our conceptualisation of states as containers with properly separated insides and outsides. According to the analyses of globalisation, global flows find a way into that box undermining the sovereignty of state.

As I have mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, I take theorising to be the process in which the scholar introduces a framework to explain a set of observations. Any theoretical framework is based on presuppositions. In the case of the theories I have chosen to focus on in this thesis, the presupposed understanding of the border as a single demarcation line limits the possibilities of understanding world affairs. These theories study the viability of state sovereignty and territorial borders in light of increased

economic globalisation, regional integration, and increasing trans-border interactions. However, I argue that these presupposed understandings of borders limit the possibilities of understanding international relations to questions of either/or rather than appreciating the complexity of the issues at hand. For example, the tension between supranational institutions and states is a result of an interpretation of a given formulation of the state. The same formulation is also at the core of debates on the future of the state in light of increased global flows. These insights into transformation of states and their borders are inadequate for my purposes. Their binary analyses of the world are unable to examine a world that is much too complex to be defined through a zero-sum analysis. I see the benefit in understanding and appreciating the complexities of the interaction between the national and the international through re-conceptualisation of borders.

I am hoping to provide an alternative insight into this transaction by introducing an amalgamation of three bodies of literature combining theories of globalisation with those of regional integration and add to these recent insights from theorisations of borders as complex multiplicities – an alternative understanding of borders which I will elaborate on in the next chapter. This re-conceptualisation of borders as a collection of horizontal and vertical demarcation lines – each line associated with a characteristic of state authority – will provide a more accurate insight into the transformation of the state by moving away from the zero-sum dichotomies of globalisation and regional integration.

Chapter 3

Complex Multiplicities: A Reflection on the Importance of Re-Conceptualised Borders in Social Sciences

This chapter highlights the differences between two conceptualisations of borders. The initial conceptualisation – described in the first section – defines borders as single demarcation lines on a map. This interpretation is incapable of explaining the transformation of the modern world order as a result of globalisation and regional integration projects. It is incapable, as it cannot account for the challenges presented by increased interdependence amongst states, global flows and de-territorialised capital. The second conceptualisation defines borders as complex multiplicities. The complex multiplicity approach analyses borders as multi-dimensional spaces associated both vertical and horizontal dimension of state authority. My attempt to distinguish two separate dimensions – vertical and horizontal – of borders, aims at reconceptualising borders as complex multiplicities.

On a sunny day, looking out of a window on the third floor of the University of Victoria's main library, you will see a beautiful green field with students playing frisbee or sitting under trees. What you will not notice is that the very same field forms a boundary between the municipalities of Saanich and Oak Bay. In our daily lives we cross many boundaries without really noticing them. One would become more aware of them should a fire occur on campus, for example, in the Cornett Building – a building also crossing that boundary. The question would be: who should deal with the emergency? These matters have of course been resolved through cooperation. As a result the borders are not always as visible as borders. In the case of the state, a border need not have clear demarcations such as posts, fences and guards. As in the case of the Schengen countries internal borders within states are those we fail to notice or will not notice as clear demarcation lines. Borders within municipalities, cities and provinces are often less visible than their national counterparts. However the same fundamental principle is present in all of these forms of borders. They demarcate an inside, and separate that inside from the outside. This act of demarcation, limitation and in some cases appropriation is often based on 'natural' barriers such as rivers, seas, and mountain

ranges. However picking a single line of demarcation in order to separate the inside from the outside is a political decision – in the sense that it is essential for the modern political practices of state construction – and not a natural outcome.

Both theories of regional integration and globalisation theories base their analysis of the occurring transformation of borders on definitions of boundaries as single demarcation lines. Globalisation theorists operate on the basis of a dichotomy of strengthening versus disappearing borders, whereas European integration theorists engage indirectly with the role of borders as the limit of state authority while debating the tension between the supranational level and the national level.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The next section provides an account of the historical evolution of borders as physical and geographical spaces, from frontiers to borders. Emphasis on the impact of modernity on the world order will also be a part of the first section. The second section highlights the importance of topology as a field that can provide valuable insight into understanding the complexity of borders. This section argues that if modernity were a scientific discourse and the current world order were a projection of an image of the world based on modernity on a map, then topology would be able to provide us the possibility of multiple projections. The third section elaborates on the concepts of the horizontal dimension of borders as a collection of horizontal limits. The fourth section presents the argument for conceptualizing borders as complex multiplicities.

Frontiers to Borders: Everything in Its Right Place

Today, even many of the most remote pieces of land - such as the case of Antarctica - are carved out into territories to fall under the sovereignty of one state or another. The world

is now divided into pieces of co-produced and mutually recognised sovereign territorial entities. This territorial subdivision is a result of the historical project of modernity. In John Gerrard Ruggie's words, '[t]he central attribute of modernity in international politics has been a peculiar and historically unique configuration of territorial space' (Ruggie 1993, p. 144). As a result of modernity, frontier zones were transformed into borders and boundaries in order to establish order. As Ruggie argues '[t]he distinctive feature of the modern system of rule is that it has differentiated its subject collectivity into territorially defined, fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion' (Ruggie 1993, p. 151). The differentiating character of bordering is important to modernity as 'the bordering process creates order through the construction of difference' (Newman 2003, p. 15) which, in return, is essential for modernity, as order is a fundamental component of modernity.

When the transformation of frontiers into borders occurred, the idea of negotiating a line inside the frontier zone became a necessity. Borders were demarcated as a result of negotiations. Borders serve two purposes: first, borders function as separators between the inside and outside of the state and are spaces where the connectedness of the world is most visible. Thus, they are spaces of interaction. Second, borders provide the order required by modern international politics by defining the limits of state authority.

The political order of the world has transformed continuously since the early ages. Just as the imperial world was not like the post-Westphalian world, the world after the Versailles Treaty of 1919 was different than the world after the fall of the Soviet Union. During this transformation of world orders, definitions of state authority and our conceptualisation of borders also changed. A widely recognised definition of sovereignty

defines the term as the exclusive right to have control over a territory. The claim for disappearing borders is generally proposed as a result of studies on the decline of sovereignty. John Williams critically wrote, 'If sovereignty declines in importance or changes in its nature then territorial borders will change too in order to accommodate the needs of the 'new' sovereignty regime' (Williams 2006, p. 17). However I argue that the presupposed understanding of the border as a single demarcation line limits the possibilities of understanding world affairs. Consequently, debates over the fate of the nation state or decline of sovereignty become more frequent.

It is important understand the connection between state authority and borders. Even though the concept of state authority has been around for a very long time, mutual recognition of sovereignty – or reciprocal sovereignty – among nations came with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 (Rudolph 2005, p. 4), and as a result, a fundamental aspect of the modern state system – based on reciprocal sovereignty – came in to effect. 'It would be impossible to have a society of sovereign states unless each state, while claiming sovereignty for itself, recognized that every other state had the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well' (Wight 1977, p. 135). As a result of reciprocal sovereignty, the idea of drawing clearly demarcated territorial boxes for defining the limits – borders – of sovereignty turned into a necessity. Each transformation of the global political order introduced more detailed definitions of borders and their whereabouts on the map. This transformation resulted in the shift away from the frontiers that separated empires, to the borders that separate national territories or states. Reliance on clearly demarcated, fixed territorial borders as differentiators was a post-Imperial occurrence. In the Imperial era and before that, frontiers functioned unlike borders, as

zones of transition. ‘Frontier zones, belts of no man’s land and overlapping sovereignties were then the rule’ (Weigert *et al.* 1957, p. 79). John Williams defines frontier zones as ‘strips of territory of variable width and location where the authority of one metropolitan centre phases out, whilst the authority of another phases in’ (Williams 2006, p. 17). In general, frontiers were zones of gradual transition of state authority. They were flexible and they were constantly in flux. Borders however, in Lord Curzon’s words, were rather like a ‘razor’s edge’, as they were lines rather than zones. Once established, borders were fixed single lines – rather than zones – that separated the inside from the outside in order to delimit distinct sovereign spaces. Even though the world politics have changed significantly since the time of Lord Curzon, this conceptualisation of borders remained the same.

Before elaborating further on the concept of borders, let us turn briefly to examining frontiers as the historical predecessors of borders. J.R.V. Prescott established two kinds of frontiers: *Settlement* and *Political* frontiers. The North American West and the Australian Outback are examples of *settlement* frontiers. *Settlement* frontiers were often portrayed as uninhabited spaces and/or as spaces to be discovered and to be settled. Establishment of settlement frontiers was a result of colonialism. Once these unknown spaces were ‘discovered’ and placed on the map, the complementary ‘civilisational’ process could be initiated. When the initial stage of discovery – the *Columbian epoch* – was completed, these newly charted territories were divided into political units.

In the same vein, Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly associates these two separate understandings of frontiers with the different French and American conceptualisations of the same term. ‘In French a *frontière*’ is a borderland or *région frontalière*. In American

English, however, a ‘frontier’ is a moving zone of settlement, which refers to the American imaginary’ (Brunet-Jailly 2005, p. 635). In this thesis I am working more closely with the French definition or the *political* frontier – as suggested by Prescott – than the definition of *settlement* or American frontier.

Political frontiers emerged as humans started to organize themselves around political structures. Once established, these political structures territorialized their sovereignty and utilised frontiers ‘to separate neighbouring countries’ (Prescott 1987, p. 43). These frontiers provided space for a gradual transition of state authority between two neighbouring powers. Just as the transition between black and white is possible through a grey zone on a colour palette, the transition between two neighbouring sovereigns occurred gradually in these frontier zones. Functionally, frontiers also served as defensive structures: they provided a strategic depth for the state to defend itself against incoming invasions or to initiate attacks against others. Generally, frontiers were marked by a series of defensive structures such as fortifications, towers, message outposts etc. Occasionally, territorial markers such as Hadrian’s Wall or the Great Wall of China were used to mark frontiers. These structures were not necessarily limits, but they were rather the ‘first or last line of a system of defence in depth rather than the limit of national sovereignty’ (Prescott 1987, p. 45).

The transition from the imperial order into modern state system gradually occurred after the end of the First World War. The post-1919 international order established borders as the international norm, thus finalising, for the time being, the evolution of frontiers into borders. Generally, these territorial borders were drawn either inside the previous frontier zones that functioned as zones of transition between

sovereign entities, or emerged as *de facto* boundaries between territories that were previously provinces of the same empire. This understanding of the boundary came to be as a result of two of developments: technological improvement in the field of cartography and improved bordering practices.

Improvements in the field of cartography allowed statesmen and diplomats alike to make more accurate definitions of the boundary line at the negotiations table, which in turn resulted in a lesser possibility of future conflicts over the definition of the specific site of the border. The field of cartography and map projections – projection of the two-dimensional world on a one-dimensional surface – in particular had a direct impact on boundary treaties and conflicts that pursued them. Often, treaty negotiations were over the geographical coordinates of borders rather than the economic, social and political traditions of the people on the land that were divided up because of the imposition of borders. These treaties resulted in the imposition of boundaries as imperial fiat on colonised subjects without any ‘regard for the interest, communities or developmental requirements of those being divided’ (Williams 2006, p. 21). These treaties were often signed in remote European capitals rather than actual locations mentioned in these treaties. As a result, treaty makers relied on map projections of the topographical information acquired by cartographers. Often, each party involved in these treaty negotiations came with its own set of maps, trying to maximise its gains on the table by negotiating over co-opted maps. Major treaties, such as the Berlin Treaty of 1884-85 on the re-colonisation of Africa and the Berlin Treaty of 1887 on the partition of the Balkans after the decline of the Ottoman Empire, resulted in major reallocations of land to various states. The process of reallocation of land required re-negotiations of boundaries.

On the other hand, improvements in bordering practices such as the establishment of visa regimes, improved taxation methods, technological developments in the field of defence and security increased a state's ability to maintain its authority over flows of migration, trade, crime, drugs etc. Frontiers evolved into borders both as an outcome of the transition from imperial order into state order, but also as an outcome of a search for simplification. In this age of flows, maintaining single lines became more efficient than relying on zones for a gradual transition. Transition within the frontier zone was a complex process. As a result of the improved bordering practices, nowadays it is much easier to regulate flows. However, this conceptualisation of borders is primarily based on an understanding of borders as physical entities. It is true that borders often manifest themselves in terms of fences, guard posts, signs and control points. It is also true that when we define borders, we rely on geographical coordinates and map projections. For most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, borders were conceptualised as geographical spaces.

This conceptualisation of borders as geographical places occurred when European statesmen, diplomats and cartographers were in the process of dissecting the world into pieces and were debating what constituted a more defensible. At the time, borders were based on natural barriers such as mountain ranges, deserts or rivers as they were deemed to be more defensible against military incursions. Due to improvements in warfare, especially since the Second World War, even the most impenetrable natural barriers have proven to be penetrable. An example of the military vulnerability of states relying on natural barriers as defensive structures is the case of Chinese offensive against India (J.R.V Prescott 1987). During the interwar period, a debate on artificial versus natural

borders occurred in academia. However, the military tactics during the Second World War made these debates obsolete.

Even though, researchers have acknowledged the complexity of political institutions, processes and structures as they acknowledge the state to be a complex construct a long time ago, they have only recently started debating the complexity of its outmost layer or its 'skin'. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in borders and borderlands in social sciences. This interest resulted in re-conceptualisation of borders as: complex entities, networked zones, social processes, social constructs and continuum of possibilities (see: Albert 1998, Axford 2006, Brunet-Jailly 2005, Forsberg 2003, Newman 2003, 2006. Nicol and Minghi 2005, Paasi 1998, Rudolph 2005, Rumford 2006a, 2006b) or, as will be argued in this thesis - as complex multiplicities.

In general, this renewed awareness of borders and borderlands is a result of the same dissatisfaction – with the studies based on a specific understanding of borders – that inspired me to write this thesis. As Shapiro wrote, 'the assumption that bordered state sovereignties are the fulfilment of a historical destiny rather than a particular, and in some quarters controversial, form of a political containment has been challenged' (Shapiro & Alker 1996, p. 16). Many scholars have started to challenge the disappearing borders thesis of globalisation scholars. David Newman wrote, 'we woke up to out borderless world only to find that each and every one of us, individuals as well as groups or States with which we share affiliation, live in a world of borders which give order to our lives' (Newman 2006, p. 172). Thus far, I have tried to establish where our contemporary borders came from. In the next section I introduce topology as a branch of

mathematics that deals with the possibilities offered by different geometrical shapes as a window into multiplicity of possibilities for conceptualising borders.

Multiple Projections: Topology of Borders and Sovereignties

According to Emile Durkheim, ‘Sensuous representations are in perpetual flux’ (Durkheim 1968, p. 433). He argued that it was scientists’ – and science’s – duty to bring order to this flux by introducing ‘proper representations’ (Durkheim 1968, p. 432-4). Exact, fixed, proper, scientific, systematic – these are all adjectives that can describe the *zeitgeist* of modernity. Habermas wrote, the project of modernity was formulated ‘to develop science, universal morality and law... according to their inner logic’ by enlightenment thinkers (Habermas 1981, p. 9). On one face of the coin, modernity was a project that attempted to bring order and structure into the chaotic system outside the state. On the other side of the coin, modernity wanted to universalise that established order. In that order, everything had a ‘right’ place and a purpose to serve. Rob Walker’s analysis of the ‘Inside/Outside’ (Walker 1993) binary in international relations and how the inside is privileged over the outside is a mirrored image of ‘one of the main themes of Western, and particularly modern political thought’ (Albert 1998, p. 58). It is due to this desire to place things in universal terms, and given the role of mathematics as a universal language, that topology as a branch of mathematics offers an insight into a better understanding of borders.²

² I would like to thank R.B.J. Walker for suggesting to look into topology as possible field of inquiry.

As a result of the geographical and geometrical dimension of borders, topology³ offers a valuable insight into understanding the complexity of borders. Map projections are based on calculations that allow cartographers to transform their two dimensional observations onto a single dimensional planes. Our interpretations of borders as geographical spaces rely more on mathematical calculations than anything else. In that sense topology's ability to offer almost endless possibilities out of a two dimensional geometrical object provides an insight into how to re-conceptualise borders as a collection of multiple lines rather than a single line of map.

A topological survey of the current international order, structured around sovereign states and by borders separating these sovereign territorial entities, will prove that the current system is only one of the many possible ways of (b)ordering the world. 'Political geographers and political scientists have for a long time perceived boundaries as fixed, stable empirical entities which divide the global space into bounded units that change mainly as a consequence of conflicts' (Paasi 1998, p. 69). This perception of the world is a Euclidian – topological – configuration of space on a map projection. 'Euclidian notions of space assume that the world take the form of a flat surface which may be broken up into regions of varying sizes' (Axford 2006, p. 164).

The metaphor of a camera lens is one for understanding the Euclidian topological projection in the sense that, just like a lens, Euclidian projection 'implies a sequence, a separation between the parts of the picture and the whole picture, and a relatively extended process through time by which the image is generated and represented' (Urry

³ Etymologically, topology derives from *topos* (place) and *logos* (study). Topology as a field does not study the distance between two points or the size and shape of objects but rather focuses on the potential for possible shapes. Topology connects *x* to *y* on a single or multiple dimensional space, as some geometric problems do not depend on the exact shape of the object, but rather on the way that they are put together. This ability to place *x* and *y* on a graph or line allows us to see things differently.

2003, p. 50). Thus, modernity's desire for simplification to acquire exact, fixed, scientific and systematic definitions for processes and structures are bound to be incomplete as 'they would be separating pieces of reality from the whole picture' to acquire what Durkheim referred to as the 'proper representation'.

Topological studies of borders allow students of international relations to see the endless number of possibilities for theorising and conceptualising borders for social sciences. The renewed interest in borders and borderlands in essence is an attempt to theorise borders as cultural, economic, geographical, legal, political and social spaces. This renewed interest is not necessarily a result of an interaction between topology and border studies, but topology does provide a window of opportunity to analyse borders as complex entities with multiple possibilities for interpretation. The understanding of borders as a complex multiplicity is facilitated by a topological analysis of borders and map projections. Through this approach, the study of Turco-Georgian relations, beyond the zero-sum analysis offered by European integration and globalisation literature, becomes possible.

There seems to be an agreement among scholars of border studies that borders are far too complex to be studied by a single field. A general conclusion of recent attempts to theorise borders is that borders should be studied through interdisciplinary perspectives (see Brunet-Jailly 2005, Newman 2003, 2006, Paasi 1998, Rumford 2006a, 2006b). Different branches of social sciences engage with different aspects of social life, such as anthropologists focusing on culture, economists engaging with fiscal policies or sociologists focusing on issues relating to societal matters or political scientists studying political structures and processes.

With the emergence of global networks, international and supranational organisations an old trend is re-emerging. Jan Zielonka's recent book (2006) *Europe as Empire* refers to the EU as a 'Neo-medieval empire'. The interpretation of the EU as a neo-medieval empire is open to debate, however Zielonka's conceptualisation of international order in Europe as a set of mostly overlapping authorities is an argument I agree with and take it as further reason to argue that same structure of overlapping authorities is present around the world. These overlapping authorities form an important dimension of the current global order. Financial standards established by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), international human rights standards established by the United Nations (UN) or Council of Europe, or international standards for maintaining and building energy pipelines penetrate into policy fields that were previously regarded to be at the core of state authority. Let us take the EU and its relations with its neighbours as a case. Ukraine is an insider to the EU when it comes to energy, communications and transportation policies, but remains as an outsider to the EU when it comes to institutional integration, single-market for businesses or visa regimes for travellers. If we were to interpret borders as a single dimensional concept, with a single inside and an outside, we would have a really hard time explaining EU-Ukraine relations.

Even though those who are studying domestic politics or public policy making have acknowledged the different dimensions of state authority, theories working on the interaction between the national and the international have not integrated this complexity into their conception of borders. As a way to engage with this complexity, we must

‘unbundle sovereignty’ (Ruggie 1993, Axford 2006). I suggest that we distinguish two dimensions of borders: vertical and horizontal in order to do so.

Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly established this distinction in his 2005 essay entitled *‘Theorizing Borders: An Interdisciplinary Perspective’*. In the essay, he distinguishes the vertical and horizontal dimensions by referring to them as ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ multilevel governance (Brunet-Jailly 2005, p. 637). In the vertical and horizontal dimension of borders, the vertical dimension is associated with the multiple layers of government, i.e. federal, central, provincial, local, and municipal etc. The horizontal dimension emerges as a result of the separation of governance into numerous different policy fields.

Brunet-Jailly (2005) provides a valuable insight into how the vertical approach into understanding borders could be implemented through a multi-level theorisation of borders. Building on the work of Hooghe and Marks (2001) Brunet-Jailly proposes a ‘multi-level governance’ approach to theorise borders. He offers four analytical lenses for facilitating the theorisation process. These four aspects take ‘1) market forces and trade flows, 2) policy activities of multiple levels of government on adjacent borders, 3) the particular political clout of borderland communities and 4) the specific culture of borderland communities’ (Brunet-Jailly 2005, p. 633) into consideration for establishing a theoretical framework for border studies. Indeed, there is great value in understanding how different levels of government interact with each other and amongst themselves for understanding the complexity of borders. Vertical theorisation of borders will result in a special focus on borderlands as unique economic, geographical, political and social locations. Studies on the vertical dimension of borders will establish the significance of

borderlands as zones similar to frontiers where trans-national – social, economic or political – interactions are a necessity rather than a choice.

Introducing a horizontal theory of border studies alongside the vertical conceptualisations offers some benefits. First, a horizontal theory of border studies would facilitate theorising interactions between different policy fields and the international flows without making general claims on the fate of the state sovereignty. Second, by introducing various dimensions of state authority, such as economics, politics, defence, monetary policy, education, justice etc. as individual policy fields capable of having international dimensions would bridge the gap between the national and international.

By establishing this horizontal theory, we can provide an alternative to the monistic approach of mainstream international relations. This monistic conceptualisation that operates on the inside/outside binary, established over the presupposed understanding of territorial borders as single demarcation lines, limits studies conducted on international politics. Horizontal conceptualisation of borders along the lines that distribute state authority amongst different ministries would result in a horizontal unbundling of borders. If moved into the international realm, this conceptualisation – which is widely accepted in domestic politics – would provide an alternative to monistic conceptualisations of the inside/outside binary and the difficulties associated with globalisation and regional integration that challenge the definition of states as sovereign actors. This process is called ‘border differentiation’ (Albert 1998, p. 62). Through border differentiation each policy field – associated with an aspect of state authority – will identify with a sub-line that forms the border. In this sense, borders will not be a single line but rather a collection of limits.

Borders as a collection of horizontal limits

Jurisdictions, authority and administration - these terms imply a control over a defined space. Borders define these spaces. Consequently, borders also define the limits of state authority. As examined above in the previous sections, there are multiple conceptualisations of borders. In this section I would like to expand on the theorisation of borders as a collection of vertical limits.

As I mentioned above, Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly (2005) portrayed the vertical complexity of borders by applying the multi-level governance approach that emphasises the role of different levels of government. In this section, I will try to demonstrate the significance of horizontal dimensions of borders, that emphasise the role of different policy areas as different dimensions of state authority, to the overall complexity of borders.

This process alters slightly from country to country but in democratic systems this is broadly how the process of government formation occurs. I argue that the process of delegating portfolios to individual ministries is a proof of the horizontal dimension of sovereignty. In this horizontal conceptualisation, each portfolio represents a dimension of the state's sovereignty. By the horizontal borders concept I am referring to the multiple dimensions such as defensive, economic, political, legal, cultural borders.

A survey of national governments offers the following numbers on the diversity of portfolios associated with ministries in four countries. The government of Canada has twenty-five; Georgia has seventeen; Turkey has twenty-five; the United States has twenty-one portfolios. In my opinion, the diversity in ministerial portfolios is a serious indicator that proves the existence of horizontal dimension of borders. If the institutional

structure of domestic politics is complex and requires a specific form of order that results in delegation of aspects of government authority into ministries, then why do we conceptualise the borders so simplistically, as single dimensional spaces?

It is easy to fall into the trap of interpreting these penetrating effects as the ‘demise of the nation state’ or ‘decline of sovereignty’ (Gottlieb 1993, Fowler & Bunck 1995, Zacher 1992). However, if we define sovereignty and borders as complex entities, then we are neither looking at the demise of the state nor at the decline of sovereignty. If we consider borders as the limit of state authority and as a collection of both horizontal and vertical limits, then economic or defensive integration cannot necessarily be equated to the decline of state authority. Rather, integration and harmonisation should be interpreted as a process of policy harmonisation, or in topological terms a *convergence* that results in the establishment of new internal (inside) and external (outside) spaces.

In practice, both regional integration processes and de-regulatory and regulatory effects of globalisation show this complex characteristic of state authority. In European integration, this complexity is visible in vast diversity of the *Acquis Communautaire* or in the variety of portfolios associated with each commissioner of the European Commission. In globalisation, this diversity is present in numerous definitions of globalisation.

In terms of the complexity of European integration let us consider two examples. First, let us take the diversity of assigned portfolios of commissioners. Second, let us elaborate a bit on the diversity of current chapters of *Acquis Communautaire* - the total body of EU law accumulated thus far that must be implemented prior to accession to the EU. The candidate state is required to do so as a proof of functional presence of this complex multiplicity in European integration.

Negotiations over the *Acquis Communautaire* are an essential component of the EU's enlargement process. The *Acquis* was divided into thirty-one chapters during the 2004 enlargement of the EU that resulted in membership of ten new member states. In legal terms, as a result of these negotiations, the states adopt this thick document of EU law – *Acquis* – into their national legislation. In functional terms, adoption of the *Acquis* results in harmonisation of different branches of state authority that require harmonisation so that process such as the single market; Schengen Zone or euro area can function smoothly.

Even though central to the development of the theory, the roles of borders are generally ignored in globalisation. They are often regarded as a single line that attempts to regulate the global flows against undermining state authority. In this discourse, borders are conceptualised as a single dimensional concept, with a single inside and a single outside and they do separate a territorial sovereign from another sovereign entity. As a result of this demarcation, when a certain dimension of government authority – horizontal or vertical – integrates into or harmonises with another entity then 'the border as single dimensional space' is undermined.

Yet, when it comes to differentiating between different 'kinds' of globalisation, scholars agree that globalisation manifests itself in many different forms, economic, cultural, political etc. I agree with the strain of globalisation theory that argues for the existence of different kinds of globalisation, as there are certain global trends, standards and norms emerging. However I am having a problem accepting the argument that these different kinds of flows interact with a single dimensional conceptualisation of the border. The results of multiple rogue waves hitting a single breakwater are highly

predictable and so are the results of multiple flows of globalisation interacting with national borders defined as a singular, total concept. Just as there are multiple waves of globalisation, there are multiple breakwaters to protect the state against them by regulating their impact on the calmer waters of the internal harbour. Through the conceptualisation of borders as complex entities, we can move away from the zero-sum approaches over the results of national-international interaction. Conceptualisation of borders as a collection of both horizontal and vertical limits that manifests itself through the establishment of multiple insides and outsides is a way that will allow us to understand the impact of global impacts on the future of states. I call this the conceptualisation of borders as complex multiplicities.

Borders as complex multiplicities

Conceptualisation of borders as single demarcation lines implies a single inside and a single outside. In this understanding, the boundary establishes a binary between inside and outside within which one can only be either in or out. The world we live in is a complex structure based on complex economic, political, social networks. There are three different kinds of networks: national, trans-national and global. These networks are often interconnected but there is value in highlighting their differences.

The start and end points of national networks coincide with territorial boundaries of the state. Social welfare systems or citizenship regimes fall under this category. Often however, these national systems overlap and establish trans-border networks. Just as diasporas form trans-national social networks that bring national issues to the attention of the international community, efforts to end global warming or environmental degradation requires trans-national cooperation. Similarly, energy pipelines establish economic

connections and increase economic and political dependence amongst states through established norms and requirements of pipeline construction.

More recently, these networks have started to emerge as global structures. Global networks manifest themselves regardless of territory or authority. Global banking networks such as HSBC or Citibank have branches around the world, and as a result, sending money from Turkey to Georgia, or to and from any other country for that matter, no longer takes days or weeks but rather mere minutes. Multi-national companies such as Apple – designing products in California but producing them in China, Coca-Cola or Gap are using this de-territorialised world in their favour, moving their investments from country to country to reduce the production costs. Increased means of communication and transportation are facilitating globalisation of the world. The Internet reduces the impact of time for communication, whereas global airline partnerships or Trans-continental highways stretch across continents and reduce the impact of distance.

At a time when state authority is challenged by so many flows, conceptualisation of borders as territorial boundaries with a single inside and a single outside results in a *de facto* dichotomy between strengthening versus disappearing borders. Neither borders, nor states have disappeared. The current world order is a result of the transformation of the state from a territorial container into a territorial regulator. I believe that this transformation can be best observed at the edges of the state: at its borders.

On the one hand, a great number of studies have already been conducted on European integration and globalisation (*Chapter 2*). Those studies acknowledge the complexity of global and regional flows. On the other hand, a great amount of literature is published on the complexity of the domestic structures of the state. Those studies cover

a wide array, ranging from the interactions between different levels of government to interconnectedness of various policy fields. However, there seems to be a disconnect between these complex articulations of the global and the national, right at the point where they interact. In my observation, borders are under-theorised. The literature on globalisation and regional integration considers the significance of borders to be minimal. Definitions of borders are generally presupposed. As a result, there seems to be many shortcomings in debates surrounding globalisation literature - as borders are neither strengthening nor disappearing – as well as in debates over who drives European integration.

The disconnect between the international and the national as a result of under-theorised definitions of borders forms the general sentiment of my dissatisfaction which in return is the reason why I am interested in borders. In the previous two sections I have tried to unpack what I propose as my contribution to the field of border studies. I propose a re-conceptualisation of presupposed understandings of borders. Not as single demarcation lines but rather as complex multiplicities. The reader may ask me, how can we conceptualise borders as complex multiplicities? This re-conceptualisation can be possible through vertical and horizontal unbundling of borders. Elaborating on the vertical dimension of borders through implementation of multi-level governance on border studies is an important contribution. However that is only one dimension of this unbundled sovereignty. Horizontal dimension is equally as important as the vertical dimension. By horizontal dimension I am referring to the reflection of horizontal ordering of policy portfolios inside the state on the borders as complex entities with multiple inside and outsides.

In essence, what I am referring to when conceptualising borders as complex multiplicities is an insight into borders as multi-dimensional spaces associated both vertical and horizontal dimension of state authority. I believe that re-conceptualisation of borders with these two dimensions in mind will provide a better understanding of challenges posed by globalisation and regional integration. Through the analytical lens of the horizontal dimension of state authority – which is at the essence of complex multiplicities – borders can be unbundled. What was once deemed a single line that separated the inside and the outside can be re-conceptualised as a collection of multiple lines. As a result of this articulation, we can come to appreciate the existence of multiple insides and outsides.

Borders provide order and structure for modern political order. Even though many scholars have been predicting their disappearance for the past two decades, they still remain today one of the fundamental characteristics of the world order. Being so important, the emphasis on their significance has almost been equal to none. Only recently, in the past decade, has a renewed interest on borders emerged.

Scholars from different backgrounds such as economics, geography, law, political science and sociology have produced many works that emphasize the importance of interdisciplinary approaches to be taken when focusing on borders. Each field has a lot to contribute to our conceptualisation of borders. This thesis has tried to engage with only one dimension of borders - their political limits.

Throughout the chapter I have stressed that borders have long remained under-theorised. Social scientists, especially, have based their studies on these under-theorised presuppositions of borders. This work is a reaction to what I have called my

dissatisfaction with the theories based on presupposed understandings of borders. This chapter followed from my dissatisfaction with current works that take borders into account as simple entities and is the seed of my future research that deals with the regional cooperation in Southern Caucasus. By conceptualising borders as complex multiplicities, social scientist can be able to move away from the inclusion/exclusion binary. Through horizontal dimensions of sovereignty argued in this thesis, as a part of the overall complex multiplicity theory, I will be able to explain that regional integration is a not a total process and it can occur in some branches while not occurring in other branches of sovereignty.

Chapter 4

Turco-Georgian Relations as a Complex Multiplicity

This chapter offers an analysis of the Turco-Georgian relations as a complex multiplicity. It analyses cooperation at the vertical and horizontal levels on the Turco-Georgian border. In terms of vertical dimension of trans-border cooperation it looks at the establishment of a borderland culture between North-Eastern Turkey and Southern Georgia. As for the horizontal dimension of the borders, this chapter looks at different policy areas such as trade, defence, energy and communications to analyse why and how cooperation occurs in some policy areas and not in others. The analysis seeks to provide an example of why we should conceptualise borders as complex multiplicities rather than single demarcation lines as harmonisation in fields of energy, defence, trade and communications does not undermine the overall sovereignty of the state.

I am a Turkish student in Canada, and during my time on the West Coast, I have had a chance to look back at my own country to analyse it from an outside point of view. In Edward Said's words, my time as a student in Canada has provided me with a chance to have a 'reflection on exile' (Said 2002). Certainly, there were a lot of things to learn. Some of these things were only briefly – if ever – mentioned in the Turkish education system; even then, military coups, the Kurdish question, the Armenian issue, were things that were inscribed on the back of my young brain as things that should not be discussed in public.

Turkey is an interesting case study even for the most seasoned social scientist. Every time I go back after a long period of time, I find some things to have changed so much that they are barely recognisable, and others that never change. On the one hand, the role of the military, Islamic-secular tensions and the Kurdish question never change in Turkey; on the other hand, the economic outlook or foreign policy goals change rapidly.

This change, or lack thereof, became especially visible to me one time when I was travelling from the Istanbul Atatürk Airport to my home in Sariyer, in the northern outskirts of the city. Going on the Trans-European Motorway (TEM) it is fascinating to see how the architecture of the city constantly transforms and looks more like a European

metropolis – complete with skyscrapers, foreign banks and luxurious shopping malls. Yet, it is also not surprising to see along the way military bases complete with politically charged messages such as ‘One Country, One Nation, One Language’, ‘How happy I am that I [say I] am a Turk’ on billboards facing the highway over pictures of Atatürk. The same can be said about the growing tension between Seculars and Islamists present in the debates over the headscarf issue and the use of Atatürk’s image and name as a secularist signature present all over the country.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey started to enjoy extensive relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Armenia has been excluded from this picture. This exclusion is partly due to the historical past – over the Armenian issue – which has driven a wedge between Turkey and Armenia, and partly due to the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result of the fracture in relations between Turkey and Armenia, the border between the two countries remains closed and no diplomatic dialog exists and Armenia remains closely aligned with Moscow.

Cooperation between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, however, has been blossoming. Cooperation over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipelines has initiated a trend of closer cooperation between these countries. Turkey, on the one hand sees this close relations as an opportunity to establish itself as a regional power and prove its ability to the European Union (EU) as a stabilising force. For Georgia and Azerbaijan⁴, by contrast, closer

⁴ Azerbaijan, as an energy rich country, wants to move away from the Russian sphere of influence, yet does not necessarily want to move into the Western sphere either. Azerbaijan’s authoritarian regime under President Ilham Aliyev does not implement the necessary democratic norms or demonstrate any effort towards integration into the Western Bloc or the European Union. An example of this stance was the previous election in Azerbaijan after which Ilham Aliyev became the president of Azerbaijan. It was clear

relations with Turkey provide an opportunity to move away from the Russian sphere of influence and to integrate into the Western Bloc.

Today, the Southern Caucasus is once again gaining importance in world politics. With the global energy sources in decline and the Middle East in turmoil, regions with – relatively – untapped energy reserves gain geopolitical value. The close proximity of the region to Europe makes the region a priority for European countries seeking energy security through energy diversification and lessening their dependence on Russian energy. Consequently, Western powers such as the United States and the European Union are becoming more interested in the region's stabilization and integration into the Western Bloc. This increased attention is also resulting in the establishment of new partnerships between the region's states. These are all very significant steps.

The border between Turkey and Georgia is also transforming. In the first section of this chapter, I will try to elaborate on the history of the region by starting with a brief historical background of the region and then go on to explain the static nature of the region during the Cold War. In the second section, I will look at the role of the changing geopolitics of the region in this transformation. In the third section, I will focus on what is happening in the region. To do so, I will try to implement an understanding of the Turco-Georgian border as a complex multiplicity. In order to analyse the Turco-Georgian relations as a complex multiplicity, I will look at how and which vertical and horizontal dimensions of the border are being transformed as a result of the regional cooperation.

that the elections were rigged as Ilham Aliyev's late father, Haydar Aliyev, nominated Ilham Aliyev as the president from his deathbed in the United States.

Historical Background

The Caucasus or *Caucasia* is a geographical region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Basin (see: *Map 1*). The modern states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, parts of Russia and Turkey have territory in Caucasia. Caucasia, as a region, is often studied separately as the Northern and Southern Caucasus due to cultural, religious and political distinctions between the two regions (Hunter 2006).



Historically, the Caucasus has been a borderland between three empires: Ottomans, Persians and Russians. ‘[T]he Caucasus, has been the fought-over outer wedge of empires’ (Coppieters and Legvold 2005, p. 23). It was a frontier that often became a

battlefield. The territory has been transferred back and forth between the Iranians, Ottomans and Russians continuously during most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Therefore, today the region has a rich cultural heritage and history. It is commonplace to find there ancient settlements from the Early Armenian Kingdoms to Crusaders citadels, from Russian churches to Ottoman mosques.

Age of Empires

The Caucasus proved to be a secondary front during the battles between Russians and Ottomans during the eighteenth century (Kurat 1970, Uzuncarsili 1978, Kinross 1977). Emerging Russian power to the northwest and northeast eventually resulted in the weakening of the Ottomans. ‘Since the days of Peter the Great, with his expansionist designs, each generation had seen a Russo-Turkish war’ (Kinross 1964, p. 275). During these wars, often both empires relied on local troops. For example, in one such case in 1768, ‘Catherine the Great resolved to employ Georgians to tie up Turkish Troops in the Caucasus while the major campaigns were fought in the Balkans and Crimea’ (Suny 1988, p. 57). Generally Turks relied on Muslim peoples of the region whereas Russians relied on Christian Orthodox. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was well into its decline period. During this time, Russia emerged as the hegemon in the Trans-Caucasus. ‘On 18 December 1800, Tsar Paul declared *Kartli-Kakheti*’s (Ancient Kingdom of Georgia) annexation to the Russian crown’ (Suny 1988, p. 59).

Winds of Change

During the period between the annexation of Georgia into the Tsarist Russia and the First World War, the Southern Caucasus and Northern Anatolia remained as a frontier between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. During the First World War, the Caucasus – once again – became a battlefield for another war fought between Russians, Ottomans and their regional allies. At the peak of their campaign, Russian troops captured most of Eastern Turkey, including the Black Sea port of Trabzon. Following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 (Fitzpatrick 2007), Russia signed the *Brest-Litovsk Treaty* on 3 March 1918. Article IV of the Treaty forced Russia to return the territory captured from the Ottomans during the Russo Turkish War of 1877-1888. Under that article, Russian troops evacuated Eastern Anatolia and the districts of Batumi, Erdahan and Kars were returned to Ottoman Empire. Yet the Turkish gains in the region were short lived, following the defeat of Germany on the Western front, the Ottoman Army surrendered with the *Armistice of Mudros* on 30 October 1918 and signed the *Treaty of Sèvres* on 10 August 1920. According to the Article 90 of the treaty:

‘Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarisation of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier.’ (*Treaty of Sèvres, Article 90*)

This article should be considered in light of the twelfth point of Woodrow Wilson’s ‘fourteen points’. Wilson’s twelfth point was:

‘The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and

an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development'
(Wilson 1918)

As a result of the *Armistice of Mudros*, modern day Turkey was divided up into pieces. These pieces were distributed amongst Armenians, Kurds, Greeks, Italians, French and British. Central Anatolia was the only territory that remained under Turkish sovereignty.

Around the same time, a short-lived Republic in Georgia was formed on 26 May 1918 as a result of the 'power vacuum left when neither Bolshevik Russia, nor Turkey was able to impose its traditional authority over the region' (Suny 1988, p. 208). An independent Georgian Republic was internationally recognized on January 1920 during the *Paris Peace Conference* (Suny 1988, p. 204). However, on 26 February 1921, the Russian Red Army marched into Tbilisi to end the first Georgian Republic. Georgia remained under Soviet rule until it declared its independence from the Soviet Union in November 1991 (Karagiannis 2004, p. 14).

On the other side of the border, the Turkish Independence War between the Greeks in Western Anatolia and the forces of Grand National Assembly of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal was taking place⁵.

Treaty of Kars and the origins of the Turco-Georgian Border

Through a correspondence in letters and numerous delegations sent personally to meet with Lenin in Moscow, Atatürk managed to establish a partnership with the Soviet Union. With this deal, the Soviet Union consolidated its rule over the Southern Caucasus and Turkey received – much-needed – weapons, ammunitions and monetary aid (Kinross

⁵ In few short years, Mustafa Kemal managed to turn the tide and impose his own terms on the allied powers at the *Treaty of Lausanne* on 24 July 1923 upon defeating the Greek Army in Anatolia. Lord Kinross in his biography of Mustafa Kemal portrays Atatürk as both military and political genius (Kinross 1964). If his ability to achieve the impossible by creating a strong republic out of – what Russian tsar Nicholas I referred to as – the 'sick man of Europe' does not speak for itself, the way he brokered a deal with Moscow should.

1964, pp. 275-281). ‘Once Russia and Turkey revived and the European intervention [in the region] ended, it was only a matter of time before the two powers that borders Transcaucasia would re-establish their hegemony’ (Suny 1988, p. 208).

The current borders of the Southern Caucasus only came to be after the First World War and Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the Turkish Independence War. The *Treaty of Kars* was signed on 23 October 1923, establishing the border between Turkey and three Soviet satellite states that bordered Turkey. These states were Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. For this reason, the *Treaty of Kars* is an essential document to study in order to understand the transformation of Turco-Georgian border.

According to Article IV of the *Treaty of Kars*, the border between Turkey and Former Soviet’s of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia starts from:

‘the village of Sarp on the Black Sea, passes by the Mt. Khedis Mga, the watershed line of Mt. Kana Dagh; from there, it always follows the former northern administrative borders of the *sanjaks* of Ardahan and Kars, the thalweg of the Arpachai river and that of the Arax as far as the mouth of the Nijni Kara Su River.’ (Treaty of Kars, *Article IV*)

Lieutenant Colonel J.H.M. Cornwall wrote ‘The Turkish Caucasian treaty-makers have succeeded in defining international boundaries across one of the wildest and most mountainous tracts of country in the world’ (Cornwall 1923, p. 447). This obviously comes from a geographer’s perspective. From the perspective of a political scientist, Turkish-Caucasian treaty makers also succeeded in finding a borderline that lasted without any significant conflict for more than eighty years. Lord Kinross wrote: ‘Kemal and Stalin, settled between them by negotiations and action, not indeed all their mutual problems, but their mutual frontiers, drawing a line across the map which survives today

[1964] without dispute as the boundary between hereditary enemies, Turkey and Russia' (Kinross 1964, p. 281)

As a result of the *Treaty of Kars*, for the first time in the history of the region, political boundaries of states were established. The Treaty remained in effect after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the establishment of 'de facto' states in the Southern Caucasus. 'From the Turkish perspective, the practical consequence of the Soviet Union's demise was the replacement of one large and powerful neighbour with three smaller states characterized by domestic instability and troubling foreign policies' (Karagiannis 2004, p. 13). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there were concerns over the possibility of instability in the region over territorial disputes, even though the part of the border between Armenia and Turkey defined by the Treaty of Kars remains disputed by Armenia, the Turco-Georgian component of the border remained uncontested since the foundation of independent Georgia in 1991.

Modern Georgia

Modern Georgia is a relatively small country with a population of four and a half million (CIA: 2008). It borders on Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey. As a post-socialist country, Georgia shared the same fate as other post-socialist countries of the former Soviet Union. Almost overnight, these post-socialist republics had to re-structure their economy, political institutions and foreign policy. Georgia, however, had an especially rocky start on this path of transformation. Aside from economic and political challenges of the post-socialist era had to deal with violent political opposition and ethnic separatist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

‘The fledging modern state had the messiest of beginnings; a full blown civil war killed two hundred people before the United Nations even recognized Georgia as an independent state’ (MacKinnon 2007, p. 96). Georgia gained its independence from the Soviet Union on 9 April 1991. Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the first president of this young republic (Areshidze 2007, pp. 19- 20). However, by the end of the same year, Gamsakhurdia lost the civil war that devastated the country and he had to flee into exile in Armenia (MacKinnon 2007, p. 97).

At a time, when it seemed likely that Georgia would join the ranks of Afghanistan, Somalia or ex-Yugoslavia in the group of so called failed states, Eduard Shevardnadze, the former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia and Foreign minister of the Soviet Union seemed like the only man ‘with the stature and the authority both domestically and internationally to prevent the country’s complete meltdown’ (Areshidze 2007, p. 26). Shevardnadze inherited a country in ruins. Economic meltdown, corruption, political instability and ethnic separatism in South Ossetia and Abkhazia infested the country. Backed by Russian military both movements were able to challenge the authority of the newly formed Georgian Republic and establish their regions as autonomous republics (Darchiashvili 1997). During these catastrophic times in Georgia, the only thing that sparked any international attention towards the country was Shevardnadze’s personal profile as a reformist Soviet politician and how he took over the presidency of the country⁶

⁶ Georgia did not have much geopolitical significance on the early nineties at a time when the world was rapidly changing; Georgia was too far out on the periphery to have any impact on the core. On the one hand, unlike, Central or Eastern European countries, Georgia was too far away from Europe to be on the EU’s radar after the fall of the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, unlike, the Central Asian republics, Georgia did not possess rich energy deposits that gave those countries an opening from the Russian sphere of influence.

Georgia, however, had to promote itself and its location on the 'East-West energy corridor' to establish its geopolitical significance. Shevardnadze's personal charm alone was not enough to promote his country. Through his connections in the global community, especially in Russia, the United States and Western Europe, and due to his ability as a diplomat, however, he was able to stabilise the country and improve its global image (Geyer 2000, Rondeli 1996, Darchiasvili 1997, Fairbanks 2004, Naumkin 1998).

On the domestic front, Shevardnadze was forced to cut deals with Russia to control the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (MacKinnon 2007, p. 99). As a result, Russian forces were placed in both regions as peacekeepers. Ironically, Russian peacekeepers were placed in a war zone that was caused by Russian imperialism in the first place.

Even today, more than a decade after the initiation of this ethnic conflict, there does not seem to be a solution to the conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Continuing Russian military presence in the region is only 'freezing the uncertainty' (Coppieters & Legvold 2005, p. 205) at the cost of undermining any prospects for a meaningful peace settlement. The result of the *status quo* in region was 'in both cases, [that] the secessionist entities have asserted themselves militarily but have failed to gain international recognition' (Coppieters & Legvold 2005, p. 85). Shevardnadze's request for the arrival of Russian troops as peacekeepers in secessionist regions of Georgia moved the country back in to the Russian sphere of influence.

In terms of the struggle against economic crisis and corruption, Shevardnadze brought in young Western-educated Georgians into important positions in the government. His cabinet was a mixture of ex-communist party elites and 'young

reformers' such as Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili (Areshidze 2007, Fairbanks 2004, MacKinnon 2007). However this coalition between *ex-politburo* members and 'young reformers' was short lived. Eventually, Saakashvili and Zhvania grew tired of the corrupted elite and decided to leave Shevardnadze's party.

The end of the Shevardnadze era came with his overthrow on 22-23 November 2003 (Areshidze 2007, Coppieters & Legvold 2005, Fairbanks 2004, MacKinnon 2007). This bloodless revolution – also known as the Rose Revolution – is generally regarded as a part of the 'coloured revolutions' (Tucker 2007) in former socialist countries. Even though the revolution occurred in November 2003, the preparations of the Rose Revolution began long before. Irakly Areshidze provides the reader with a well researched, in depth account of the Rose Revolution in his book, *Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition*. I will not go into detail on how the revolution occurred, as that could be a thesis on its own.

With the end of the Shevardnadze era, Georgian foreign policy and geopolitical alignment also changed. The revolution clearly indicated that Georgia was no longer under the supervision of its Russian 'big brother'. The move outside the Russian 'near abroad' (Tuncer 2000) and inside the 'European Neighbourhood', American 'Greater Middle-East' was a risky move for Georgia. Georgia is paying the consequences of this move by facing the aggressive foreign Russian foreign policy and the renewed Russian militarism under president Vladimir Putin⁷.

⁷ Russian military involvement in the separatist conflicts in Georgia is an example of how Russia under Putin deals with those who cross Russia's path. The recent 'war of words' (BBC: 2008) over the shot-down Georgian aircraft over Abkhazia, and the Russian threat to retaliate against a Georgian offensive against autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia almost brought two countries into war. The underlying message in these renewed tensions between Russia and Georgia is clear: Russia under Putin and his

These days, what makes Georgia geopolitically important is not Russia's aggression towards this small country, but rather the significance of Georgia as an 'energy corridor' between Europe and the rich energy reserves of the Caspian basin. This increase in geopolitical importance did not happen overnight after the Rose Revolution, but rather had been a part of Eduard Shevardnadze's well-played strategy to increase Georgia's geopolitical importance and establish Georgia as a country facing towards the West.

There were two important factors that played-out in favour of Shevardnadze's strategic vision. First, in light of the re-assessment of the Caspian hydrocarbon reserves and calculated decisions over the transportation route of this reserve, Georgia emerged as a strategically positioned partner of the United States and the EU. The second factor was the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The re-assessment of vulnerabilities and security risks by European and American authorities following the terrorist attacks increased the significance of the Southern Caucasus as a strategic location 'to stem the growth of drug trafficking and also to create a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism' (Rasidaze 2000, p. 138). Also, increased discussion over 'national security' and securitisation discourse following 9/11 encompassed energy policy into security related issues.

Modern Turkey

As a bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkey has a foot on both continents – both geographically and culturally. Arguably multidimensional in its political culture and

successor Dmitry Medvedev would take any necessary steps to ensure its role as a regional hegemon in its 'near abroad'.

identity, modern Turkey struggles to meet the requirements of EU membership while trying to maintain its national pride, Islamic culture and *Kemalist* upbringings. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, following the fall of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and the Turkish Independence War founded modern Republic of Turkey in 29 October 1923. Atatürk's vision for the Turkish people was embedded into *Kemalism*, which was in turn adopted as the Turkish state ideology. Reforms required by the *Kemalist* vision were adopted during the transition from the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish republic.

As a military cadet in the Ottoman War Academy, Mustafa Kemal⁸ was linked to the *Jeunes Turcques* movement (Kinross 1964, pp. 19-34) that attempted to modernize the Ottoman Empire through a military coup followed by a set of reforms that historians (Quartet 2000) refer to as the *Tanzimat* era. During his education, Atatürk absorbed the liberal ideas of John Stuart Mill and other European enlightenment authors. In order to achieve 'the level of modern civilisations' (Atatürk 1927) he initiated a series of reforms. His reforms ranged from reforming the alphabet that resulted in the adaptation of the Latin alphabet, to a hat reform that replaced the traditional Turkish *fez* with the 'modern European hat'. One can read this phenomenon through the lens offered to us by Edward Said in *Orientalism* (Said 1979). Atatürk internally adopted the 'Orientalist' discourse and constructed an 'Other' within.

⁸ As Lord Kinross wrote in his famous biography of Atatürk 'He read the works of John Stuart Mill. He caught the prevailing infection of the popular ideas.' (Kinross 1964, p. 26) After the victory against the Greeks in Western Anatolia, Atatürk gained the social capital to mobilize people and implement these 'Millian' ideas in Anatolia. In many of his speeches, interviews and discussions around his (in)famous dinner table, Atatürk tried to create a contrast between modern and traditional. 'During an oration in one of his trips to Eastern Turkey, an imam – a Muslim cleric – asked angrily 'What does this word 'modern' mean?' to which Atatürk replied, 'It means being a human being *hodja!* It means being a human being.' (Kinross 1964, p. 432). Through this conversation, Atatürk's image of 'the modern' becomes apparent; that image was in line with the same civilized European that Mill refers to in his writing (Mill 1991).

Today, the *Kemalist* ideology has been successfully integrated into Turkish nationalism and as result, the Millian ideals of progressive civilisational discourse is also a part of Turkish nationalism (Lewis 2002). Arguably, the sources of questions surrounding the treatment of minorities such as the Armenians, Alevis, Kurds and Islamist-Secular tensions can be traced back to the Kemalist upbringings of the Turkish state.

Similar to the situation in Georgia with the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, Turkey has a Kurdish separatist movement operating in the Kurdish regions of South-eastern Turkey. A bloody conflict that has caused more than thirty thousand deaths since the early 1980s between the Turkish forces and Kurdish *peshmergas* of *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* (PKK) is still going on today (Heper 2007, Jwaideh 2006, McDowall 1996, Mutlu 2007).

Another legacy of Kemalism is the tension between republican secularists and Islamists (Cinar 2005, Ozyurek 2006, White 2002). This has been an ongoing issue since the mid 1950s. However it has become a very topical issue with increased politicisation of Islam (Keyman 2007, Somer 2007, Smith 2005) in Turkish politics, starting around the early 1970s.

The separation of the Islamist movement from the centre-right political grouping resulted in the establishment of the National Order Party (MNP) formed by Necmettin Erbakan– who became the prime minister of Turkey between 1996-1997. MNP was banned from politics by the Constitutional Court of Turkey due their activities against ‘the Kemalist principles and the secular nature of the Turkish Republic’ (Manaz 2008,

pp. 358-372). After the political ban imposed on MNP, Islamist ideology of the party was incorporated into the ‘National Vision’ movement⁹.

Disagreements within the ‘National Vision’ movement resulted in the establishment of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of ex-Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan. AKP is a pro-European party with a strong liberal economic undertone, in that its policies are significantly different than those of the National Vision movement which were pan-Islamist and anti-European and were often anti-Zionist (Mango 1994, pp. 76-86).

AKP’s pro-European stance, and the political situation in Turkey around the time the party was formed – the 2001 economic crisis and political instability under successive coalition governments – allowed AKP to win a majority in the November 2002 elections with 34% of overall votes. Under AKP government, Turkey had a stable period between 2002 and 2007, during which the membership talks with the EU officially started, the Turkish economy significantly improved, and the role of the military in Turkish politics was – at least on the surface - reduced¹⁰.

As a result of this political pressure following the crisis over the presidential elections, AKP called for general elections in the summer of 2007. The results of this election proved that almost 50% of the general public in Turkey was in fact satisfied with

⁹ Since then, the National Vision movement established four more Islamist parties: the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party and most recently the Felicity Party – all of which, except the most recent Felicity Party, were banned from politics for the same reason of undermining the secularism of the Turkish Republic. Following the political ban on the Virtue Party, Mr. Erbakan was also banned from active participation in politics.

¹⁰ However, in 2007 with President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s term coming to an end, the concerns over the future of the secular Turkey made it to international headlines once again. Domestically, concerns over the prospects of Recep Tayyip Erdogan becoming the president raised many eyebrows amongst the secular elite of the country and protests – with millions of participants – were organised throughout the country. Internationally, concerns over a possible military coup in Turkey were perceived as a serious threat to Turkish democracy and regional stability.

the AKP government. Today, almost a year after the 2007 elections, the Constitutional Court of Turkey has initiated an investigation against AKP and its Islamist roots which were followed up by another case to shut down AKP. The outcome of the case is still not clear. However Turkish newspapers generally agree on the fact that a ban on AKP would push the, already divided, country into instability and conflict.

AKP's success in economic stabilisation and improvement of democracy was also due to the reforms associated with the EU. Turkey's long and incomplete path to EU membership which dates back to 1987. Turkey became part of the Customs Union in 1995. Ten years after joining the Customs Union, in 2005 Turkey officially started its accession talks with the EU. Even from the most optimistic point of view, Turkey will not join the EU before 2013. The president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso has been quoted as saying: 'Turkey's a long-term problem. It's a long-term issue. We cannot expect Turkey to become a member let's say in less than fifteen, twenty years' (BBC 2006).

Under the AKP's majority government in Turkey, adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire* into the Turkish legislation is taking place. There are obvious shortcomings in this process. The call for reforms in freedom of speech and human rights are often renewed by the EU authorities in their reports and speeches on the progress made by Turkish authorities. One contentious issue is the article 301 of the Turkish constitution, which criminalises 'insulting Turkishness'. The 301 – as it is often referred in the Turkish press – is a vague article that often requires interpretation. As a result, many academics, journalists and writers – such as Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk and the late Armenian journalist Hrant Dink – have been brought to trial for insulting

Turkishness by mentioning the Armenian genocide. However, this process also has a positive impact on the democratisation, modernisation or Europeanisation of the Turkish economic, legal and political realms.

This debate on the Turkish accession is likely to go on for at least another decade. However, in the meantime the geopolitical significance of Turkey for Europe is becoming more prominent, especially with regards to the growing energy demand in Europe. In this sense, Turkey and Georgia emerge as important partners for the EU and the United states on the East-West energy corridor.

Geopolitics: Significance of Southern Caucasus and Energy Politics

Even though domestic politics usually remain static, Turkish foreign policy changes very rapidly. These changes can in part be attributed to the composite character of Turkish identity, as the country is located between Europe, Central Asia and Middle East. Turkish foreign policy towards the Caucasus and Central Asia in general is a good example of this rapid transformation.

During the Cold War, Turkey had a great geo-political importance due to its close proximity to Russia as a NATO ally. The significance of the Turkish Straits as an opening to the warmer waters of the Mediterranean forced Russia to pursue an aggressive policy towards Turkey; as a result Turkey aligned itself with the Western Bloc and became part of the NATO to seek defensive guarantees. Russia's aggressive foreign policy towards Turkey was especially visible right after the Second World War,

‘Just after the war in Europe ended, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov sent a message to the Turkish ambassador announcing that Soviet-Turkish agreement of December 17, 1925, “no longer accords with the new situation and calls for serious improvements.” The Soviet Union

was interested in certain adjustments of its border with Turkey in the region adjacent to Transcaucasia, revisions in the Montreux Convention governing the Straits, and loosening the Turkey's ties with Great Britain.' (Suny 1988, p. 285)

Even though Russia dropped its claims over Turkish territory after Stalin's death, Russian foreign policy under Stalin had lasting effects on already sensitive Russo-Turkish relations (Sezer 2000, Uslu 2003). The Turkish decision to join NATO and the Western Bloc resulted in the fracture of Turkey's relations with its North-Eastern neighbours – Soviet Socialist States of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. During this period, trans-border interactions were reduced to a minimum and both sides regarded each other with suspicion. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, this picture has changed dramatically. Today, 'the empires (Ottoman and Russian) are gone, but their rump successor states – Turkey and Russia – once more jostle against one another in this space, sometimes directly, more often indirectly' (Coppieters & Legvold 2005, p.23). Due to its strategic location between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the Southern Caucasus plays an important role on the global politics. This section of this chapter looks at the increasing geopolitical significance of the region in light of the recent 'pipeline politics'.

Geopolitics of Energy

Currently, one of the major challenges faced by American and European leaders alike is supplying energy for the growing energy demands of European and North American economies. Questions over energy transportation routes are almost as important as questions over where the energy comes from. Increasing energy prices had an impact on the recent American presidential primary debates; during which, energy related questions

were often associated with American ‘national security’. In general, there are two main concerns regarding the energy supplies. The first one is the initial source of energy supplies. The second one is how – and through where – these energy supplies are being transported – i.e. via pipelines, super-tankers or railroads. The location of pipelines, refineries and ports are decided carefully as ‘the world’s energy infrastructure is specifically designed to support interdependent relationships’ (Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007, p. 101).

These days, it is not unusual to see official government websites with information about the reliance on foreign energy imports. This emphasis is part of the recent interest in oil prices and their impact on the global economy. Today, most of the countries in the world are either fully or partially dependent on foreign oil exports. There are very few countries that are self-sufficient in terms of their energy production. When this is the case, concepts such as energy security and energy diversification become very important for foreign policy makers (Baran 2002, Baran 2007, Baran & Smith 2007, Pamir 2007, Verrastro & Ladislaw 2007).

On the one hand, the term ‘energy security’ refers to securing energy reserves – oil, natural gas etc. – in energy producing countries through exclusive deals and/or through direct investment that guarantees a certain percent of the total production for the investing country. An example of this direct investment would be the investment made by British Petroleum (BP) Company in Azerbaijan’s rich Caspian oil and natural gas fields or the American deal made with the Saudi Arabia that resulted in creation of the Saudi ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company). On the other hand, ‘energy diversity’ can refer to two things - it can either mean diversifying the national demand by supporting

use of natural gas, ethanol, bio-fuels etc., or it could refer to diversifying the sources. In the case of Europe, Russia is currently the primary oil and natural gas provider. ‘Russian power and influence is no longer measured in ballistic missile accuracy or bomber production but in miles of pipeline constructed and barrels per day exported’ (Baran 2007, p. 131). There are costs and risks associated with putting all one’s eggs in the same basket. These costs and risks are at the essence of energy security and diversity¹¹. Consequently, energy producing countries and countries on pipeline routes in Europe’s neighbourhood gain geopolitical importance. European countries are currently in need of finding alternative countries that would not use energy as a political leverage the way that Russia does.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Basin was proven to be an energy rich region with its relatively untapped oil and natural gas reserves. ‘The Caspian Sea, with its western edge forming the eastern edge of the Caucasus and its shore marking the beginning of Central Asia, has been seen as a new significant additional source of oil’ (Karagiannis 2004, p. 19). The fact that Caspian reserves remained relatively untapped was due to Soviet technology. Soviet drilling methods were not developed enough to drill into reserves located under deep waters (Adams 2000). As such, countries of the Southern Caucasus gained geopolitical value.

¹¹ Energy security and diversity are not new terms; their origins go back to the Oil Crisis of 1973. In 1972, Arab oil-exporting countries imposed an embargo on the countries supporting Israel’s Yom Kippur War. The 1973 crisis highlighted the dependency of the West on energy exports. A similar energy crisis occurred in the early days of 2006 when the Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom and the Ukrainian government were unable to reach an agreement on the price of natural gas and payment of the accumulated Ukrainian debt. As a result, Gazprom cut the flow of natural gas through Ukraine that resulted in a significant gas shortage in Europe as most of the European natural gas comes from Russia through Ukraine. Since then, the EU and its member states have been searching for alternative sources of energy to diversify their energy portfolio.

Geopolitics of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline

The idea of a non-Russian pipeline connecting the Caspian oil to the global energy markets was welcomed in Europe and North America as a project that ensured energy diversification and secured energy reserves for the West. Yet, the same prospects raised eyebrows in Moscow (Baran 2007) as Russian oil companies basically had a monopoly in the Caspian Basin prior to the construction of BTC, as the Caspian Oil was delivered to the world market through Russian pipelines. The capacity of the BTC pipeline is one million barrels per day capacity and its total length is 1670 kilometres (Karagiannis 2004, p. 20). As a direct challenge to the Russian hegemony over the transportation of Caspian energy, BTC has caused a lot of tensions between Russia, Turkey and the United States. Russia saw the project as an American interference into Russian near abroad, whereas the United States saw it as an opportunity for securing valuable energy resources. Turkey saw it as an opportunity to establish itself as a transit country on the East-West energy corridor. As a result of this tension over the route of this alternative East-West energy corridor, multiple proposals were brought forward.

‘As various export routes were considered, three major options were under consideration as far as oil was concerned: expanding the Russian system to the North, through an existing network of pipelines and railroads; the Iranian option to the South, largely through newly built pipelines; and finally, the U.S.-supported concept of multiple pipelines, that sought to prevent any actor from a monopoly over the export of the Caspian energy resources.’ (Cornell et al. 2005, p. 20)

When looking at the map (*see: Map 2*), it is easy to spot that the BTC pipeline does not go through the shortest possible way connecting the Caspian to the world market. However, there are many factors taken into account – especially when building a four billion dollar pipeline. Strategic partnerships and geopolitical allegiances are high up

on the list of things to be considered alongside environmental, geological, cultural and social impacts of the pipeline.



Map 2: Map of BTC Pipeline (BP: 2008)

In an ideal world, the shortest route for a Caspian pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan would have been through Iran and would deliver the Azeri oil and natural gas to the Persian Gulf to be shipped off to the rest of the world. Due to the tensions between Iran and the Western world – especially the United States – that alternative was never seriously considered. The second option, which was supported by Russia, was extending the existing Russian pipeline networks connecting the Caspian to the Black Sea coast of Georgia or Russia. The Turkish government opposed this proposal by successfully arguing the risks and possible environmental impact of using the Turkish straits. ‘3 million barrels per day is already passing through these only half a mile wide, hard-navigated waterways’ (Cornell et al. 2005, p. 19). The third and final option was to establish an energy corridor between the Caspian basin and the Mediterranean through

Georgia and Eastern Turkey. This project was backed by the EU and especially by the United States.

Geopolitical factors played a role in the construction of BTC even after the decision to build the pipeline was approved. The decision to build the pipeline away from Russian bases and separatist regions in Georgia or to make a long detour around the Kurdish region in Turkey and more importantly to leave Armenia out of the picture were all geopolitical decisions. In return, these decisions have caused a shift in the regional geopolitical balance.

On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, strategic decision made by Eduard Shevardnadze to promote Georgia's future as being tied to the West paid off during the decision-making process over the question of Caspian energy transportation. As a result, Georgia is now able to move away from the Russian sphere of influence and look towards the EU and the United States for its future. This Western focus is clear in Georgia's active participation in the ENP and its bid to NATO. On the other, the strategic decision on behalf of the Georgian government to be associated with the West – the EU, NATO etc. – also resulted in a closer relationship between Turkey and Georgia.

Shifting Geopolitics: What is happening between Turkey and Georgia?

Thus far, in this chapter I have provided the reader with a historical background on Georgia and Turkey. I have also tried to highlight the significance of the BTC pipeline and its impact on the geopolitical significance of the Southern Caucasus. Today, looking at Georgia and Turkey, I see two countries struggling to align themselves with the West and especially with the European Union. Turkey is already a member of NATO and a candidate for EU membership. Georgia is a candidate to NATO and a NATO partner

through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Georgia is also a part of ENP and has been rather successful in following the Action Plan under the same program.

On one hand, the adaptation of *Acquis Communautaire* in both countries – as a part of the accession negotiation in Turkey and part of the ENP Action Plan in Georgia – is the reason why I have especially decided to look into the European integration literature. On the other hand, globalisation and global interdependence manifests itself in the EU and the United State's reliance on foreign energy reserves. As a result, the previously trivial region of Southern Caucasus and countries bordering the Caspian are now on the global radar as their geopolitical significance becomes more prominent. Yet, in that same second chapter I demonstrated my reasons for being dissatisfied with globalisation and regional integration analyses with regards to their utilisation of borders.

In the third chapter, I introduced, what I called a re-conceptualisation of borders as complex multiplicities. I prefer to engage with the Turco-Georgian relations as a complex multiplicity, rather than studying this phenomenon through integration, cooperation or harmonisation. I believe that the current Turco-Georgian relations is a blend of all these and I believe that an understanding of this relationship as a complex multiplicity will provide a better understanding

A Complex Multiplicity: Turco-Georgian Relations

During the Cold War, static geopolitical loyalties resulted in a lack of any transformation of the Georgia-Turkey border. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey recognized Georgia in 1991. The first treaty signed between the newly formed Republic of Georgia and Turkey was a *Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation* and it was signed in 1992 (Karagiannis 2004, p.14).

Since then, the re-calculation of Caspian energy reserves has placed the region amongst the top energy producers in the world. Additionally, as a non-OPEC region, the Caspian Basin is regarded as a viable alternative to the hegemony of the OPEC members – over the price and production of oil – in the Middle East. As a result, Georgian and Turkish governments have increased their efforts establish closer ties to cooperate over the BTC pipeline to transfer landlocked Caspian energy to the world markets (see: Adams 2000, Karagiannis 2004, Pamir 2007, Tayfur & Goymen 2002, Winrow 2007, Uslu 2003). Following what I call the ‘conceptualisation of the borders as complex multiplicities’, in this section I focus on the Turco-Georgian border – and relations – as a collection of vertical and horizontal limits.

Vertical Dimensions of the relationship

The partnership over the BTC and BTE energy pipelines has not only connected Baku to Ceyhan but also has transformed what is in between. This subsection of my thesis looks at the emergence of a borderland culture in the border region between Turkey and Georgia. The Turco-Georgian border does not only separate Turkey and Georgia but also divides a number of ethnic groups that live on both sides of the border.

Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly wrote ‘The literature often describes how these [local borderland] communities may enhance the effect of dividing territory and communities when their culture, that is, their language, ethnicity, socio-economic status and place of belonging, differs or bridges and international boundary when they share the same culture’ (Brunet-Jailly 2005, p. 638). This has proven to be the case in the Turco-Georgian border. The ethnic communities of Adjars, Hemshins, Lazs and ethnic Georgians living in Turkey have initiated trans-national cultural networks (Andrews

1989, Simonian 2007, Toumarkine 1995). These networks have established a connection that was missing due to the hiatus in relations within these groups during the Cold War. These connections have also resulted in increasing flows – of people, business transactions, ideas etc. – between Turkey and Georgia.

The initial suspicion and distrust – following the fall of the Iron Curtain – of Georgians towards Turks, as described by Dutch anthropologist Mathijs Pelkmans (1999), seems to have remained in the past. There are two reasons for this change of opinion. The first – and most important – reason was the decision by Eduard Shevardnadze to move away from the Russian sphere of influence in order to move into the European sphere. As explained in the previous chapter, the Caspian energy reserves and Georgia's strategic location on the east-west energy corridor facilitated this shift. However, closer relations with Turkey – a NATO member and an EU candidate – also played a significant role in Georgia's integration into the West. The second reason was a result of this geopolitical decision. The end of the initial Turkish economic opportunism – that resulted in increased poverty in Georgia – is being replaced by increasing direct Turkish investment and trade in Georgia. Today, Turkey is replacing Russia as Georgia's primary trading partner. According to the Turkish Foreign Affairs ministry website:

‘Since 2003, bilateral economic relations between Turkey and Georgia have intensified. In 2003 bilateral trade volume increased by 77% to reach 427 million dollars and continued increasing thereafter. Today (2007), the yearly trade volume between Turkey and Georgia exceeds 830 million dollars, making Turkey the leading trade partner of Georgia.’ (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website 2007)

This trend continued in 2007 as the trade between Turkey and Georgia increased to 899.6 million (GEPLAC 2008). The change in economic relations also improved the image of Turks and Turkey in Georgia - Turco-Georgian relations have changed significantly since the fall of the Soviet Union and have transformed rapidly since the cooperation over the pipelines. In what I call the 'vertical dimension of borders', focusing on the Turkish and Georgian border regions, one can witness this transformation. This trend of good neighbourly conduct is present in a couple of recent initiatives that would have been deemed impossible a few years ago. In a recent joint initiative, the Georgian and Turkish governments waived visa requirements for travels of duration shorter than a month between the two countries. As a result of this initiative, it is easier for businessmen, tourists and populations of bordering towns and villages to go across the border for business, travel or shopping.

This facilitation of easier movement between the two countries, with the visa waiver agreement, also resulted in the creation of cooperation in transportation. The upgrade and renovation of Batumi and Tbilisi Airports were made possible by Turkish financial aid. The renovation of Batumi Airport turned out to be an especially interesting case. Through the construction of a complementary terminal in the town of Hopa – on the Turkish side of the border – Turkish citizens are now able to travel to the rest of Turkey via Batumi. This development made air travel much more viable for Turkish citizens living along the border to Georgia. Prior to this, the nearest airport would have been either inaccessible in the winter due snowstorms or not viable due to long travelling times associated with poor road conditions in the summer. Another development in the field of air transportation is similar to the agreement between the United States and Canada,

Turkish airlines are flying into Georgian airports as if they were domestic airports (Havas 2007). Along with the agreement on visa waivers, this service is made possible by an agreement between Turkish and Georgian governments that allow flights originating from these airports (Batumi, Tbilisi) to be considered to be domestic by the Turkish Aviation Authority and thus have easier access and lower service fees.

The cooperation in air transportation was followed by cooperation in railroad construction. Supported by the EU under the 'Priority Area No.8' of the ENP Action Plan, on 21 November 2007, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia signed a treaty to start the construction of a Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars (KATB) railway. 'The Azerbaijani and Turkish presidents, Ilham Aliyev and Abdullah Gul, respectively, visited Georgia to inaugurate the KATB project' (GEPLAC 2008). This railway is designed to connect Europe via Turkey to the Caucasus and by extension to Kazakhstan and China. The EU has promised Georgia to 'develop intensive cooperation in order to ensure the gradual inclusion of Georgia in the Trans European Networks (TENs) in line with the recommendations High Level Group on Transport' (EU-Georgia Action Plan 2006).

Once completed, which is due to happen in two years' time, 'The railroad will transport 20 million tons of cargo annually' (GEPLAC 2008). The construction of the KATB railroad will establish a non-stop railroad link between Western Europe and China facilitating trade and transportation while physically integrating the region into the European transportation network. The construction of this railroad was a result of another strategic decision – similar to the decision over the construction of the BTC pipeline – to solidify Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey's location on the east-west corridor.

The next step in cooperation in the field of transportation is the construction of a

highway between Poti and Turkey; alongside the improvements in air and railroad transportation, this will improve the transportation between two countries. Following a similar route to the BTC pipeline, the railroad and the highway will help facilitating the movement within and to the region while improving ties between local communities.

Horizontal Dimensions of the relationship

The cooperation in what Brunet-Jailly calls, 'Type 2 model governance' or as I refer to it as the horizontal dimension is also thriving between Turkey and Georgia. Brunet-Jailly defines this 'Type 2' as 'the interactions of public and private local, national and international actors within a specific policy process' (Brunet-Jailly 2005, p. 637). Along the same lines, in what I refer to as the 'horizontal dimension of sovereignty', I am referring to the multiple dimensions of sovereignty - divided into policy portfolios such as defence, economic, political and legal etc. Georgia's decision to align itself with the West has played a significant role in transformation of the horizontal relations between Turkey and Georgia. Adoption of the Western standards of governance has harmonised different policy fields between the two countries creating new internal spaces.

As I explained in the previous chapter (*Chapter 3*) interactions between international organisations such as the EU, IMF, NATO and the World Bank and states, often results in overlapping, trans-national governance standards. In return, these trans-national standards facilitate movement of goods, persons, services as well as ideas such as human rights, democracy, rule of law etc.

In the case of Turco-Georgian relations, two international organisations in particular stand out. The EU and NATO have emerged as influential organisations in both Turkey and Georgia as a result of strategic, Western orientations of both countries. The

impact of the EU on economic, political and legal structures of both countries is undeniable.

In the hierarchy of short and long term goals, the Georgian government places NATO membership ahead of EU membership, as national security is a more pressing issue than integration into the European markets and joining the EU institutions. Renewed Russian imperialism in Russia's near abroad has alarmed both the EU and NATO officials yet, due to already high geopolitical tensions between the NATO countries and Russia over the American missile shield initiative in Eastern Europe, NATO is not willing to extend its PfP program into full membership with Georgia. However, as a result of the PfP program, the Georgian military is trained and equipped by NATO forces under Turkish and American supervision. 'The essence of the PfP programme is the partnership formed between each partner country and NATO. Cooperation is tailored according to the individual country's needs, abilities and ambitions, and jointly implemented with the government' (NATO 2007). In the case of Georgia, due to country's strong desire to join the alliance, NATO has initiated an 'intensified dialogue' with Georgia that oversees the major reforms required by NATO prior to an offer of membership. These requirements 'include a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority populations; commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes; the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the Alliance and to achieve interoperability with other members' forces; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures' (NATO 2007).

Simultaneous to the reform process towards NATO membership, the adoption of

the *Acquis Communautaire* in Georgia under the ENP Action Plan and in Turkey as a result of accession negotiation – has resulted in harmonisation of policies between the two countries. This move towards Europeanisation or ‘international socialisation’ (Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2007) facilitates economic and political cooperation between Turkey and Georgia. In 2007, Turkey and Georgia signed a *Free Trade and Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement* (GEPLAC 2008). ‘Given its location between two huge neighbours – Turkey, with a Gross Domestic Product that is fifty times larger, and Russia, with a Gross Domestic Product that is a hundred times larger, and integrating the EU single market which is two thousand times bigger – it is quite possible for a small country like Georgia to anchor its growth on these markets.’ (GEPLAC 2008). For the geopolitical reasons I have explained in the previous section, Georgia seems to have anchored itself to the EU and indirectly to Turkey – rather than Russia – for both economic growth and also defensive, political, technical support.

As part of the ENP Action Plan, the EU proposed regional cooperation over ‘environment, education, border management and transportation’ under the ‘Priority Area No. 5’ Action Plan. All of these policy fields fall under the horizontal dimension of sovereignty. The impacts of cooperation in border management and transportation have been covered as a part of the transformation of the vertical dimension of the Turco-Georgian border as they have a direct impact on the borderland community. However, as they require adoption of new legislation and policy revisions, they also fall under the horizontal dimension as well. The field of education still remains at the core of national sovereignty and thus there has not been any cooperation in that field. The cooperation over the environmental matters, however, began long before the ENP action plan. As a

part of the feasibility surveys conducted by the BTC consortium in order to assure the general public and the investors about the impact of the project on the environment, harmonisation of national environmental policies and regulations in Georgia and Turkey took place. The minimum requirements of building a pipeline such as the BTC are often determined by standards established by the developed world. In this case, the environmental standards required were on par with the European standards as the main investor in the project was the British Petroleum.

Cooperation over the construction of pipelines did not just require the harmonisation of environmental standards. A pipeline project like the BTC requires a great deal of investment today, as a result of increased global awareness and sensitivity. Corporations and financial institutions such as creditors and investment groups require certain standards to be in place prior to investing money in such projects. In the case of BTC, investors required certain business, human rights and environmental standards to be in place prior to committing money to the project. This was to ensure that their investment in the construction of BTC was not directly resulting in human rights breaches or environmental disasters. Construction of the BTC also brought together the standardisation of business practices - such as accounting, pay rates etc. - which are required to run a trans-national business such as the transportation of oil and natural gas from Baku to Ceyhan.

Since the cooperation over the construction of BTC and due to strategic decisions of Georgia and Turkey to join the EU in the long run, a trend of cooperation between two countries has emerged. This trend has resulted in harmonisation and standardisation of certain economic, legal and political policy areas. In this chapter I have highlighted the

contrast between the situation of Turco-Georgian relations prior to and during the Cold War with the situation since the end of the Cold War. In the next chapter I will summarise the conclusions of my research by summarizing my findings on my initial research question of the impact of the BTC on the Turco-Georgian relations.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

What initiated this thesis was my fascination with the *rapprochement* between Turkey and Georgia in light of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline project. This study has attempted to elaborate on the transformation of the relations between Turkey and Georgia while trying to identify the causes and consequences of this change in relations. The main research question that has guided this MA thesis is how can a reconceptualised understanding of borders contribute to the analysis of the Turco-Georgian relations?

My attempt to analyse the transformation of Turco-Georgian relations, started with a review of theories of European integration and globalisation. During my review of the literature of globalisation and European integration, I became interested in the role of borders as viewed by these theories. This interest in borders, and especially the conceptualisation of borders in social sciences, resulted in a great deal of dissatisfaction with the explanatory power of globalisation and European integration theories. I have tried to analyse the transformation of Turco-Georgian relations through European integration and globalisation theories, as on the one hand, globalisation theories seemed to offer interesting insights into tracing the origins of regional projects. On the other hand, the Turkish accession negotiations and Georgia's partnership with the EU through the ENP framework directed me to focusing on the role of European integration and hence European integration theories. My attempt to engage with the Turco-Georgian relations through these literatures was not successful as neither theory was able to explain the complexity of Turco-Georgian relations. I have traced back my dissatisfaction with

both theories and their zero-sum analysis to the conceptualisation of borders in both theories as single demarcation lines.

Subsequently, I re-directed the focus of my research towards the literature on borders, borderlands and frontiers. Thus, what started as a research on the transformation of Turco-Georgian border resulted in a more focused case study that assessed the importance of the conceptualisation of borders so as to understand trans-border regional projects. From the study presented above I draw three main conclusions.

My first conclusion regards the conceptualisation of borders in social sciences. Based on the review of the conceptualisation of borders as is typically done by literatures of European integration and globalisation I conclude that one should reconceptualise borders, as borders provide an essential insight into understanding state authority. Fixed definitions of political processes and structures have a hard time explaining complex global networks and systems of today. Presupposed understandings of borders with fixed locations that function on a binary distinction between inside/outside cannot accurately conceptualise the reality. *Chapter 2*, argued that the sources of the tensions between the globalisation dichotomy of disappearing borders versus strengthening borders, and the supranational level and the national level in European integration theory can be traced back to a simplistic understanding of borders. As mentioned in *Chapter 3* both globalisation and European integration theorists, generally, base their explanations on a simplistic understanding of the border as a single demarcation line, which in turn obstructs a satisfactory analysis of the changing relations between these two countries. As in the case of Turco-Georgian relations, the level of cooperation is not high enough to predict a regional integration project and yet it is sufficiently advanced to be interpreted

as a development more significant than simply a result of globalisation. Consequently, this thesis has sought to re-conceptualise the usage of borders in social sciences to move beyond the tensions over binary interpretations of the world. In this attempt to move away from the common zero-sum approaches, I have relied on literature by scholars of border and borderland studies. What was referred to as the Complex Multiplicity Theory relies heavily on various authors' conceptualisation of borders. Through the theoretical perspective of understanding borders as complex multiplicities, it is possible to open up doors that remained closed.

The second conclusion of my research was only made possible by reconceptualising the Turco-Georgian border as a complex multiplicity. As the narrow focus on the Turco-Georgian border and the emergence of Turco-Georgian borderland community provides broader conclusions on the nature and future trajectory of the Turco-Georgian relations. This specific conceptualisation allowed me to understand the transformation of Georgia-Turkey relations differently than those explanations that can be brought forward by theories of globalisation and regional integration as it allowed me to move beyond the binary understanding of state authority and borders as single dimensional concepts. My initial dilemma over how to understand the transformation of Turco-Georgian relations was a result of two factors. First, the cooperation was too recent to make any concrete judgements. Second, the level of cooperation was not substantial enough to call it a regional integration but was more substantial than a simple result of interdependence that could have been caused by globalisation. Once I moved beyond the zero-sum approaches taken by these theories, my dilemma ceased to exist. Consequently, I have coined the term Complex Multiplicity to explain the Turco-Georgian relations as a

way to explain a level of relations that results in the creation of harmonized internal spaces without undermining the integrity of state authority.

My third conclusion regards the source of transformation of the Turco-Georgian relations. The strategic decision by Turkey and Georgia to cooperate in promoting both countries as politically stable Western allies suitable for an east-west energy corridor is at the heart of this cooperation. The role of international organisations such as the EU and NATO in this transformation is undeniable at this point. The establishment of this east-west energy corridor as an alternative to the Russian hegemony, however, increased Russian pressure on Georgia, thus pushing Georgia further away from Russian influence and forcing it towards closer cooperation with the EU, the United States and their regional partner Turkey. However, especially in recent years, since the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the cooperation has significantly increased and will likely increase more in the future. Yet, this optimistic view is dependent on a number of factors including the stable political situation in both countries, the outcome of Turkey's membership negotiations with the EU, and the future of Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin's successor Dmitry Medvedev. The impact of geopolitical powers on this regional transformation may sound like a 'chicken and egg' situation. However, in this study I find that the decision to build a pipeline connecting the Caspian to the Mediterranean through Georgia and Turkey and not through Armenia or Iran had a truly geopolitical effect in both Georgia and Turkey as the pipeline symbolised a direct connection to the Western world.

In the near future, I am hoping to turn the conclusion of this MA thesis into the starting point of my PhD dissertation and look at the geopolitical impact of the decision

to build a pipeline through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey at the cost of excluding Armenia. My preliminary findings from my current research have shown a direct correlation between the pipeline route and the level of Russian hegemony.

Almost eight months ago, I embarked on this journey to elaborate on the transformation of relations between Georgia and Turkey. After eight months researching I came to realise that completing my Master's thesis is not an end but rather a beginning. In the process of writing this thesis I have learned a lot about Georgia and Turkey but also about borders, borderlands and their impact on our daily lives.

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