The Technological Appropriation of Time

by

Cole Freeman

B.A., University of Victoria, 2021

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Sociology

The Technological Appropriation of Time

by

Cole Freeman

B.A., University of Victoria, 2021

Supervisory Committee

Dr. Peyman Vahabzadeh, Supervisor
Department of Sociology

Dr. Steve Garlick, Departmental Member
Department of Sociology

Dr. Nina Belmonte, Outside Member
Department of Philosophy

Abstract

According to Martin Heidegger, the essence of modern technology (*ge-stell*) is a way of revealing beings through a challenging-forth—that is, by having humans engage with nature in a reductive, technologically-mediated way. This thesis builds on this phenomenological understanding of being by extending the concept of the "challenging-forth" to include *time* and *temporality*. A close inspection shows that technology is predicated upon *denying the amount of time taken to enact the challenging-forth* in production. Technological logic reproduces itself through each instantiation of the challenging-forth, and this is what constitutes *progress*. In our age, technological logic is *universal*, meaning that it is true for *all* beings. Technology's *totalitarian* reach reduces everything that the human can *say*, *think*, and *do* into a technological purview. This is what I seek to investigate in asking the following research question: *How does technology reproduce itself through the human*? This question, among others, constitutes the thrust of this thesis, which suggests that technology enforces a primordial *way-to-be* for the human, characterized by the manner of *continuous running along*, *busyness*, and the heightened *concern* for *time*. Technology brings us into close relations with time such that our temporality is *structured* in concert with gadgetry and other means, which has noteworthy consequences for the *phenomenological experience* of everyday life. Our *concern* with time is the residue of a technological logic that has enveloped the human—we have inherited this obsession in virtue of our *thrownness* into this age.

Finally, this thesis poses the question: *how can we let time be*? We must disembark from technologically mediated *concerns* by learning how to let go of our obsession with time. The significance of this thesis is twofold. First, because it offers an initial, novel extension to Heidegger's phenomenology; second, this analysis forces the attentive reader to *slow down* and observe the patterns of technology unfolding all around them. The multi-pronged approach of this thesis will serve as a benchmark for coming to grips with the bustling pace of life in the technological age.

Key Terms: technology, temporality, challenging-forth, revealing, nature, time, anti-humanism, letting-be, everyday life.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement

Concerns about technology that I harboured as a teenager have been brought to life with this thesis. Little observations fluttered here and there that were stored away for safekeeping, nothing extensively coherent or comprehensive, yet their foundation comprised the basis of a clandestine critique of technology. I have ultimately tried to develop some of them in this thesis, which I hope will serve as an introduction to later work. This thesis would not have been possible without friends and family members to share my ideas with and to offer constructive feedback. To my partner Carly: thank you for your meticulous reading of each chapter, for suggesting useful criticism where necessary, and for listening to me drone on about these ideas. I would not have been able to complete this project without your support. To friends of mine Tristan, Jong, Iman and Tyler: thank you for generously offering your support and your ideas about technology and time over the last few months. They have been useful to me in developing some of the concepts that I have been chewing on for several years. To my supervisor Dr. Peyman Vahabzadeh, I cannot thank you enough for your resolute guidance over the last few years. You have allowed me to reach heights in my own thinking and writing that I didn't think were possible. I cherish our friendship deeply and I hope that it can be prolonged, even if our professional one might be coming to its end. My gratitude is also extended to my committee members Dr. Nina Belmonte and Dr. Steve Garlick, for their valuable feedback on the first chapter of this thesis. Finally, I wish to dedicate this thesis to my parents. Despite my impatience that occasionally sparks unneeded tension between us, you always respond with gentle forbearance. This quality is something that I am learning for myself; I am hopeful that I can reproduce it one day as you have been able to do with me.

Introduction

To all appearances, the artist acts like a mediumistic Being, who, from the labyrinth beyond time and space, seeks his way out to a *clearing*.

—Marcel Duchamp[1]

There is a disgusting irony about being consumed by the very predicament that I sought to uncover in this thesis. What started as a very organic curiosity with technology quickly blossomed into an obsession with *time*. I should have recognized this from the early going. Alas, I was swallowed whole: I became the living enfleshment of the phenomenon I wrote about. Almost as if I had to internalize "technological time" in order to find my way out. In phenomenology this is called an "immanent" criticism. What the phenomenologists avoid telling you is the sacrifice you have to make in order to internalize what you seek to criticize. There is no criticism—theoretical or applied—without praxis. In my case, there is no criticism without having to *live* what I wanted to write about. In order to get closer to it, I had to *become* technological time.

There is no single origin from which this project stems. Only a cloud of ideas swirling around quite vacuously in my head that were clumsily assembled into a coherent presentation. There are probably a few worth mentioning: the impatience that I feel towards my parents, which is a source of guilt; the anticipation of death of a loved one; the rhetoric circulating these days that encourages everyone to save time by buying fancy widgets that expedite certain functions of ours; digital and analog representations of time that have manifested everywhere, such that one cannot help but keep track of time wherever they go; the fear of running out of time that seems to clog the air; the experience of time in technology, which seems to be in the midst of changing, lest we succumb to this realization.

Questions of time and technology have grown to occupy quite a central role in my thinking during the past year or so. I wanted to develop a theory on the human experience of time (e.g.: temporality), and it seemed

[1] "The Creative Act", 1959:77-8.

worthwhile to do so in light of our singular, *technological* site. But the approach needed to be fundamental. As I saw things, the merit of such a theory is its radicality, its *root*. It tries to wrest Something from Nothing, as Heidegger would say, in the attempt to depict the condition of our moment.

How might we describe this "moment"? Michel Foucault's "heterotopia" surfaces to mind. An awkward clash of culture, politics and architecture determines public life in this age, however, beneath all of these, on the behavioural level, there is a homogeneity that underlies our individual (and collective) experience. Martin Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, says that experience (with the exception of scientific and theoretical attitudes) is relational, such that we formulate meaningful connections with equipment, things and people that structure our navigation of the world in perception. Things like the door are *ready-to-hand.* The door is not perceived as a painted wooden panel when I pass it by. When I am attuned to the door, I do not perceive it whatsoever, like I would if it were broken—which would make the door stand out. The door is still there, to be sure, but I use it throughout the day without due consideration, and this is *because* it functions. It is precisely the door's inconspicuousness that is characteristic of beings today, which allows Heidegger's fundamental ontological concept, *Dasein*, to drift around in a specific kind of readiness-to-hand involvement in the world.

In the *Der Spiegel* interview of 1976, Heidegger remarks: "[E]verything functions. That is exactly what is uncanny. Everything functions and the functioning drives us further and further to more functioning." Functioning is what we have come to expect in all of our relationships, however, it is one of the claims of this thesis that this functioning, this *ready-to-handness* is skewing our experience. Our *Being-in-the-world* is synthesized technologically, which is why it feels like we are always in a hurried state of mind; in addition, it is why we only have one way of relating to time—as if it were something to be defeated or avoided, by covering it up in busyness.

Prima facie, it never ceases to amaze me at how much our experience of time has changed as a result of technology, especially if we are just referring to the last thirty years, which corresponds roughly to the amount

of time since the internet was invented and made available for public consumption. Digitization is *inescapable*. Not simply that it is here, and that we can tolerate its presence if we so choose. There is nothing that smacks of uncritically upholding the human as a being with "agency" quite like asserting, as some media scholars do, that humans decide how they use technology. This account is naïve, not to mention that it is a gross misinterpretation of the issue. It does not matter that during one day, I can decide to use technology, and during another, I can stow it away from my view. Supposedly this is an expression of my agency, and yet, I cannot help but marvel at the callowness of this perspective. If my twenty-five years of experience can attest to anything, it is that the world has become a *Society of the Spectacle*, to reference Guy Debord (1967). It is unrecognizable even to those, like myself, who have only been around for a short while. And yet, as humans, we "socially construct" technology. Have we "socially constructed" our fixation with online activity? Have we "socially constructed" technological accelerationism?

Increasingly, technology determines every aspect of our lives, despite the optimistic hopefulness to the contrary. We have been reduced, excluded, dismantled, diminished, belittled, *beguiled* into thinking that technology is a *human* invention, and as such, it will never not serve the *humanitas* of the human. This angle I find to be irritatingly childish. If anything, it goes to show that humans have been conditioned into technological beings, rife with technologically mediated *structures* determining lived experience. For this reason (but not this reason by itself), this thesis encourages the reader to abandon the tacit attachment to the untouchable "status" of the human. Phenomenology is technologically mediated. This thesis intends on examining human beings in light of this contention.

Is time *technological*? This is the question I untangle in the first portion of this thesis. I want to show that Yes, time *is* technological, and because of this, humans *surrender* to the technological mediation of the *experience* of time. Technological time is the basis of temporality in everyday life. This is not something that we

have deliberately chosen. Nor is it something that we are particularly cognizant of: it is simply the fact of our existence. In other words, it is what determines our "way to be".

Toward the end, this thesis explores the possibility of releasing oneself from the technological grip. According to Reiner Schürmann, releasement remains our *sole* possibility. An early clarification is in order. What is it that humans need to release *from*, exactly? My reply is the following: none other than the attachment to time that we have cultivated as the residue of our commitment to technology. All along we have been nursing a dysfunctional relationship with technology. Perhaps the moment has finally arrived for us to disband with this unrequited servitude.

Who am I to prattle on like this? Who should care to lend an ear? Perhaps the technological takeover of Being does not bother anyone in the least. Some of us are quite content to acknowledge the splendours of technology that have instigated a great many upgrades to life in the twenty-first century. These types of arguments are not necessarily wrong, though they have been deafened by their self-serving obedience. The danger by which we are being eaten is the depletion of our experience of *temporality*. Temporality is the main target of technology: everything that *is*, alters temporality in some way, which has serious implications for human experience. Might we be too apathetic to care? Or just unaware of these issues that are growing with each passing day? One thing is for certain: our perception is muted by a thick fog that is making it very difficult to see the world otherwise.

This Approach. Throughout this thesis, I use gender-neutral pronouns such as "we" and "us" in addition to adjectives such as "humans" to convey the universality of "technological time". In doing so, I do not in any way claim that this theory, at present, is true for "all beings", "everywhere". Rather, my cautiousness, following Martin Heidegger, is that "technological time" may *become* true for all beings if we continue to allow technology to approach us in the way that has proved to be historically true. Thus, my usage of "we" and "us" is

rhetorical: it is familiar with other types of time that abound, for instance in Native American communities like the Navajo in Arizona, or Canadian ones like the Blackfoot. Instead of examining these in depth, this thesis contends that the technological *appropriation* of time is happening everywhere. Indeed, it does not discriminate between cultures, languages, or temporalities. Its approach is simply to eradicate everything in its pathway. One can easily point out that there are exceptions to this rule, however, doing so misses the point entirely: that technology may be taken as a *colonizer* of culture, sociology, philosophy, science and politics, and that this thesis, in turn, may be treated as a warning to this very issue.

In addition, some might contend that this thesis takes a very masculine approach. Once again, I aim to convince my readers that its intention is to discuss humans as a whole: not because humans are *not* diverse in themselves; rather, because technology *homogenizes* the being of humans, perceptually and theoretically.

Research Question. This thesis has two objectives. My primary aim, which occupies the thrust of the thesis, is to understand time (or the experience thereof) in the technological age. ***How does technology change the way we understand and experience time?*** Moreover, near the end of the thesis, once I have articulated this idea, I want to transition to Schürmann's question: *How can we let technology be?* Throughout this thesis, I have found that in order to let *technology* be, we must first learn to let *time* (our attachment to it) be. If we let time be, perhaps we can let technology be. Thus, my second research question is: ***How can we let time be?*** This question is reserved for the end of the thesis, when the pathway has cleared: we must learn how to let go of our technologically-mediated attachment to time. This is how we can *detach* from technology.

Organization. This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first is a literature review that includes a brief biography of Heidegger and his works on technology. According to him, the essence of modern technology (*ge-stell*) is a way of revealing beings through a challenging-forth—that is, by having humans engage with nature in a reductive, technologically-mediated way. In the second chapter, I problematize this idea by deconstructing the challenging-forth—my reason for doing this is to expand the notion of "essence" as it was defined by

Heidegger. As such, in chapter two, I extend the concept of the "challenging-forth" to include time and temporality. A close inspection shows that technology is predicated upon denying the amount of time taken to enact the challenging-forth in production. In technology, all beings are revealed through a challenging-forth, however, I strive to show that all beings are revealed through a challenging-forth that happens in a calculable *amount* of time. In a duration, so-to-speak, which forms the basis of the possibility of *action* in technology. In the third chapter, my aim is to establish the aforementioned by situating it in Schürmann's *anti-humanism*. I want to demonstrate that this technological mode of acting is not *ours*. It has been given to us by technology. We are technological *beings*, and in the end, our possibility for *Being-in-the-world* is contingent upon the epochal context that we have been thrown into. Humans are the subjects of unremitting technological inertia.

In chapter four, I supplement my idea of time by applying it to Heidegger's fundamental ontological concept, *Dasein*[2], to theorize "everyday life" in technology. Here I incorporate a discussion of Dasein's temporality in technology. Dasein is always busily running along in continuousness, this *a priori* condition of experience is mediated technologically. Technology coerces Dasein into prioritizing *time* in its everyday life, which is why Dasein adopts an ethos of *busyness* to ensure that it is always staying very close to time. Technology is designed to empty Dasein by being so efficient, only for "gadgetry" to fill it up again with extra-curricular concerns and relationships that Dasein did not know that it wanted, or needed. Finally, in chapter five, I wrest several unfinished concepts from the second chapter and develop them. Its purpose is to show the implications of the temporal challenging-forth for temporality, now that I have supplemented this with a discussion on Dasein. To do this, I describe how our temporality is given to us by procedures that merge with different kinds of equipment. Our temporality is accelerating because technology is continually evolving. Technology causes very real changes to the time-structure of everyday life.

---

[2] Da-sein alludes to a spatiotemporal disclosure of there-ness, otherwise known as "Being-there" in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927). Thus it refers to the concrete ways in which one is "Being" in time, and "there" in space.

In the conclusion, I reintroduce the idea of "letting time be" that I mentioned in chapter two. In order to let time be, I insist that we must retract from the attachment to time that technology has cultivated *through* us. Technology enforces a temporality that is overly concerned with staying *with* time, as in, keeping near to it. However, a different experience of temporality shows that the technological one is not the *only* one to experience. There are ways of abstaining from technology in order to let ourselves be *overcome* by temporality, such that we remove ourselves from thinking time altogether. In brief, this is how we can learn to let time be.

1/Martin Heidegger, Technology, Challenging-Forth

What we are witnessing, then, is an objectification by conceptualization that has resulted in a generalized violence more destructive than wars: "We do not even need an atom bomb, man has already been uprooted from the earth…This deracination is the end, unless thinking and poetizing can achieve a nonviolent power."

—Martin Heidegger[3]

This is not a conventional review of neighbouring literature. I trace the trajectory of my thinking back to where Heidegger's began, in the crisis of nihilism in the aftermath of World War I and the technological pervasion of Europe, which, taken together, posed significant threat to German life in the post-war caesura. Heidegger's magnum opus, *Being and Time* (1927), can be interpreted as a landmark endeavour to restore meaning within the German *völk*, indeed, to oppose the nihilism of modern society by steering intellectual and public attention toward a fundamental ontology (Safranski 1998). The modernization of the world uproots human beings from their earthly heritage; this essential groundlessness is justification enough to search for new territory, new anchorage from where to collectively reimagine a "new beginning" for Western philosophy. Heidegger, being very committed to his fellow countrymen, imparted the essential responsibility of overcoming metaphysics by leading the German people towards higher learning and the reclamation of the spirit through a renewal of German culture. This undertaking prefigures Heidegger's political *error* in 1933-4; the nihilism of the will-to-power had to be overcome by reforming higher education. This was Heidegger's firm belief, which coincided with the rise of National Socialism—this the start of an allegiance he would eventually come to regret when it became strikingly apparent that he had very little influence on swaying Nazi ideology in favour of rethinking knowledge in the university.

Toward the end of the war, Heidegger admitted that National Socialism was unable to confront the problematic essence of technology because it was itself just an extreme manifestation of that essence (Harries 1990). What Heidegger dreamed as a new beginning for Western philosophy quickly spiralled out of control in

---

[3] From the *Der Spiegel Interview*, 1990a.

the culmination of Nazi supremacy, falling victim to the perpetuation of technological will-to-power that Heidegger warned of. What Heidegger foresaw in the years leading up to 1933 channeled into a revulsion for technology—technological acceleration is the responsible culprit for the spiritual decline of Germany, which never actually evolved into a *phenomenological* critique of modern technology until the Bremen lectures of 1949, or more famously in "The Question Concerning Technology" of 1954. In other words, the essence of modern technology can be traced back to Heidegger's worry about the spiritual directionlessness of the German people during the 1920s and early 30s, even if it were not adequately addressed until later works. Early Heidegger flirts with tools and other existential ideas that suggest that technology plays a *role* in the Being of Dasein, even if its essence has not crystallized. One has to wait until later works to forge the link between the essence of modern technology and fundamental ontology developed in *Being and Time*. Dasein reproduces technological logic through its own being…in the coming chapters, this logic—which stems, in my view, from the *essence* of modern technology—will be developed.

I stress the importance of assessing the following review chronologically: the footsteps in Heidegger's thinking pave the way towards a phenomenological excursus of modern technology in 1954 with the essay "The Question Concerning Technology". The aim is to problematize Heidegger in 1954 by developing the *logic* of technology which reproduces itself through the human, as the basis of the human's *experience*. Indeed this thesis formulates the groundwork for an ontological understanding of Dasein in technology. However, simply because this is an anti-humanist theory does not mean that we must abandon the human from our equation. The ontology I propose is interested in the human, insofar as the Being of this entity is determined *by* technology itself. In contrast to *Being and Time*, which studies Dasein for Dasein's sake, it is the contention of this thesis to theorize the Being of Dasein from the *perspective* of technology, where the human is reduced to a naked enfleshment of the logic it unknowingly perpetuates. I see this as justification enough for developing a

technological ontology, even if the current approach happens to problematize the (European) tradition of its origin.

1.1/Heidegger and National Socialism

After World War I, technological supremacy coincided with nihilism and the crisis of meaning in Western Europe. Everything was siphoned into the universal rule of the will-to-power; moreover, with Nietzsche's pronouncement "God is Dead" the magnitude of the will-to-power is realized, which means that the "supra sensible world, especially the world of the Christian God, has lost its effective force in history" (Heidegger 1933:18). From where did this pernicious meaninglessness descend from? According to Möehling (1981:41), Heidegger in many of his works often linked modern technological development with what he perceived to be the spread of nihilism, where nihilism means the abandonment of meaning, or the rejection of value and spirit. Technological proliferation is essentially mechanical in that it denies the *humanitas* of *homo humanus*. Heidegger, as a Swabian peasant himself, was disturbed because the modern world had become callous to the dignity and the gentleness of rural country life. During the war, he witnessed his beloved agrarian village "become infected, as if by contagion, to be viewed in terms of organized calculability"—a mere symptom of a *universal* sickness metastasizing throughout European societies at this time (Heidegger et. al 2012:316). This collision between technology and genuine humanity remained for Heidegger *the* problem facing German society, which engenders a flattening, or homogenization of culture into technologically determined laws of Being, where all that *is* comes to be understood as available, manipulable material (1990:xxxi). In the *Der Spiegel* interview of 1976 (1990a:55), Heidegger says

> [E]verything functions. That is exactly what is uncanny. Everything functions and the functioning drives us further and further to more functioning, and technology tears people away and uproots them from the earth more and more. We only have purely technological conditions left. Entangled in a thinking that fosters technological operating and manipulating but simultaneously blocks the path toward a contemplation of what is characteristic of modern technology.

Modern technology is devastatingly *totalitarian*: purely technological conditions remain within contemporary constellations of presence. Everyone is busily entangled in a thinking that fosters technological operating and manipulating, which obstructs any sort of contemplation of what is *essential* about modern technology. Moreover, the paucity of scholarship on this matter Heidegger finds to be appalling. His worry, to state it simply, is that without the clarification of what technology *is*, nations (like Germany) become spiritually rudderless and succumb to its inertia, typified by the nihilism of the will-to-power (Möehling 1981:34). Technology, after all, is *movement*—it is in the process of changing and accelerating—this, as we will later come to see, is its defining feature. One instance of the incipiency of Western nihilism is located in the fragmentation of the university into modern technical *specializations*, where, crucially, the roots of the sciences have dislocated from their essential ground in philosophy (1990a:43). For Heidegger, the role of philosophy has been taken over by the sciences, however, the sciences *dissolve* into psychology, logic, or political science (1990a:59). The disintegration of modern science is based on the development of the essence of modern technology (Wisser 1990:84), which dilutes academic learning into distinct and isolated fields of study (Möehling 1981:34). "It was the modern trend towards specialization, relativism, and irrelevancy which molded the university into a corporate entity which took pride in its autonomy but failed to recognize its isolation from the spiritual needs of the nation" (Möehling 1981:34). For Heidegger, the commercialization of the university is likewise reflected in the exiguity of the German ethos.

Heidegger of course is acutely aware of the insidiousness of the technological *danger*, thus his task is to safeguard the essence of the university from imminent technological threat. He envisions rescuing the German people from their rudderless stupor through an "overcoming of the metaphysics of the will-to-power, which meant to begin a confrontation with Western thinking by returning to its beginning" (1990b:18). Heidegger insisted that this change should occur from within the German university because knowledge reformulation was integral to the revivification of German culture. A change in thinking would get us away from the technological

mediation of everyday life. Heidegger is of the conviction that such a radical change in thinking can only be prepared from the same place where the modern technological world originated (Heidegger 1990a:62). The philosophy of a "new beginning" cannot come about from the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world, thus, thinking will only be transformed by a thinking that has the same origin and destiny (1990a:62). In other words, where the technological world originated, it must as such be transcended. How might this unfold?

Heidegger believes that German poet Friedrich Hölderlin has unique significance for the entire West (not just Germany) because he presents the German people with a special task and responsibility (Harries 1990:xxxix). For Hölderlin, Germany has a hidden destiny that presides over the history of *all* Western peoples, which must be fulfilled for the successful inauguration of a "new beginning" for Western philosophy (Harries 1990:xxxix). Indeed, Hölderlin is the one that best understands the closure of metaphysics, who commemorates this closure with a national movement to restore the meaning, spirit, and unity of the German people. "The Führer himself, and only he, is the current and future reality of Germany, and his word is your law, it now is the poet Hölderlin who is supposed to teach the Germans who they are and thus gather them into a genuine community" (Harries 1990:xxxix). Heidegger calls on the German people to follow his example and to gather itself into a genuine community by choosing Hölderlin as their common hero. This is why Heidegger, an admirer of Hölderlin, believed the molding of the university was his life's purpose in order to fulfill this mission (Müller 1990:184). Therefore, he decided that he would be in a better position to protect the university if he were a member of the Nazi Party. In 1933, with the friendly backing of colleagues, Heidegger was unanimously voted into the position of rector of Freiburg University with the sole intention of defining the meaning of learning, and also to attempt to influence the new governments' view of German learning and its part in the national awakening (Möehling 1981:33). His colleagues believed that his international reputation would best put him in a "position to preserve a certain independence for the university and to protect it against the most unbearable imputations

from a part of the Nazi party" (Möehling 1981:33). This is why the "Rectorial Address" of May 1933, was an appeal for rethinking the relationship between the university and the nation (1981:33). In the address, Heidegger intentionally calls on the führer to lead all capable forces, regardless of creed or ethnic sensibility (Möehling 34). On his own opinion of the movement, Heidegger comments (1990b:17):

> At the time, I saw in the movement that had come to power the possibility of an inner self collection and of a renewal of the people, and a path toward the discovery of its historical western purpose. I believed that the university, renewing itself, might also be called to significantly participate in the inner self collection of the people. The rectorate (the führer) as possibility to lead all capable forces—regardless of party membership and party doctrine—towards this process of reflection and renewal.

Central to Heidegger's thinking is university reform. This is likely because, according to Möehling (1981:32), "academic freedom was a rich and deep tradition in Germany. […] Legally, the administration of the university was subject to the individual state governments, but the state governments rarely interfered in the internal affairs of the universities." The sentiment at the time was to preserve this tradition by safeguarding the university from Nazi ideology, but also from technological infiltration. As rector, Heidegger placed himself in a dangerous position: he was inserted into a "middle position" of believing in the social and national ideas of the movement while rejecting its essential racism. It was never Heidegger's intention to deliver the university to the party doctrine but, conversely, "to attempt from within National Socialism and while having a point of reference to it to bring about a spiritual change in its development" (1981:33). Heidegger's thinking demonstrated a significant departure from the Nazis' understanding of the university as a place for training a racial elite subservient to the state (1981:34). Though he only held the rectorship for 9 months (his tenure was cut short because of internal squabbling with Nazi superintendents), Heidegger longed for the spiritual and moral persistence of the people in the preparation for a new religion of Western philosophy (Gadamer 1990:143).

Despite the foregoing, as early as 1935, Heidegger's tone changed. He now believed that the National Socialist movement was a "symptom of the tragic collision of technology and man", but this belief would remain concealed until the Bremen lectures of 1949 and his famous essays "The Question Concerning

Technology" and "The Age of the World Picture" (1954; both translated 1977), and then again in the later writings in *Discourse on Thinking* (1959), which profess Heidegger's concern that the machination and destruction of agrarian life across Europe emanated from the barbaric and totalizing military might of the Nazi regime (Wendland 2018:164). This concern stayed constant throughout the tenure of his thinking, when, as late as 1959, Heidegger maintained that "the world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought" and, more radically: "nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry" (1959:50). Even Dreyfus (2009) contends that Heidegger is a closet luddite who envisions a return from the exploitation of the earth, consumerism, and mass media (54).

Do the aforesaid statements, which acknowledge the widespread environmental ruin caused by the war, amount to an admission of personal accountability, following this (disastrous) blemish on his path-tearing career of rethinking Western philosophy? Or was it simply that Heidegger saw with utmost clarity the significance of technological infiltration on the sanctity of the earth? Whatever it may be, Davis (2018) says that Heidegger's change in perspective was grounded in a major undertaking to dispense with the human capacity for "willing" by turning to non-willing releasement and letting-be (136). Heidegger (it can be said) foresaw in the aperture of World War II the fulfillment of the technological *quest* for the ultimacy of Being.

Eventually, Heidegger did come to admit that he had misjudged the depth of the rule of technology and therefore had been wrong to hope where no reason was left to hope (1990:xxxii). Heidegger saw the War as symbolizing the starting point of humanity's entry into the technological matrix that would dissolve Being into an insular system of calculation and mechanization. Thus he had been wrong to project onto the Nazis his dream of a new politics and a new religion that would result in the spiritual renewal of the German people. But he hesitated in blaming himself for having thus dreamed of revolution, and if the holding of this dream is sufficient to make someone a Nazi, then Heidegger remained a Nazi to the very end. In short, Heidegger viewed the Nazi

surge to ultimacy vis-à-vis the crisis of Being and the spiritual dissolution of Western culture. This familiar criticism still follows Heidegger today, even if Heidegger the man is no longer with us.

Reflecting on Heidegger's thought before he joined the National Socialists, it is plain that the seeds for his exposition of technology germinated long before his full-fledged critique of technology. Although Heidegger's writings and lecture-courses in 1936 (and afterwards) realize the fulfillment of his theory (I return to this later), his view grew out of his earlier work in *Being and Time* (1927), which probed the philosophical and sociological relation of 'tools' or 'equipment'[4] to his fundamental ontological concept, Dasein.

1.2/Readiness-to-Hand Equipment

In *Technology and the Lifeworld* (1990), Don Ihde says that Dasein is living in a world of equipment which is *ready-to-hand*, that is, which appears in an "in-order-to" format for Dasein's use. Dasein employs tools and use-objects that facilitate the *means* (not the objects) of the experience itself. For Ihde, Dasein cannot be viewed in isolation from ready-to-hand tools because they merge with Dasein to become *embodiment relations*, i.e.: tacit relations affixed to it like a customized pair of glasses or a walking stick (Ihde 1990). Embodiment relations are relations we do not have to think through because they are completely ingrained in the ways that we navigate the world. As such, not only is Dasein essentially *in* a world of ready-to-hand things, Feenberg (2010) says that such worlds are also already contingent on human-specific concerns. Stated otherwise, the world must be understood in the existential enactment of meaning with beings that are everywhere around Dasein as ready-to-hand (Feenberg 2010:187).

Dasein is: *already in a world of ready-to-hand equipment which is fitted to human-specific concerns, and which mediates Dasein's lived experience* (Ihde 1990; Feenberg 2010). What's more, equipment allows Dasein to access the *world* in specific ways that are regulated by the limitations and affordances of the equipment themselves. Thus, Dasein's interactions with the environment are mediated by the specific functionality of each

[4] I use 'tools' and 'equipment' interchangeably throughout this piece to denote the kinds of manual implement Heidegger uses throughout *BT*.

tool. Now, what would happen if new equipment were introduced into Dasein's world? Feenberg (2010) says that different tools and activities tend to disclose new or different perspectives by reorganizing our practices and senses around what is real and significant (51). Novel and emerging tools convey slightly different mediating functions with the outside world, which enables Dasein to interact with the world in alternative ways. Heidegger (1962:166-81) specifies the *clock* as one example of equipment that not only alters our sense-world but also, crucially, changes our perceptions *of* that world. "In a clock, account is taken of some definite constellation in the world system...when we make use of the clock-equipment which is proximally and inconspicuously ready-to-hand, the environing nature is ready-to-hand along with it" (Ihde 1990:61) .

The invention and circulation of the clock implies a mode of seeing which views the "time" of the outside world through the lens of the clock itself (Abram 1996). For Ihde (1990), the clock is a stand-in for the natural current of time (day/night) in that it represents Dasein's constructed version of time in how it directly applies to Dasein's sense of finitude (Ihde 1990:59). The clock is ultimately one example among many tools which are collectively fitted to the existential-experiential limits of Dasein, and Ihde (1990:60) says that such technologies (especially the clock) are *intentional*. The clock not only mediates our perception of nature; it is also instrumental in transforming our *perception* of time by itself (Blok 2017:134). As a being with intentionality, the clock serves a specifically anthropological function in governing time and preserving it for human use. In so doing, however, the clock prevents other forms of time from enjoying social approval. For Blok (2017), the *mono-mania* of clock-time prevents access to other, hidden dimensions of time (like cosmic time), which are less concerned with calculation and trying to *know* time as an inherently precise or measurable entity.

Two details are significant here. First, the Being of all equipment is always in relation to Dasein because Dasein is the centrality from whence all things get measured. Second, it is not a coincidence that the *Being* of the clock befits a Western scientific framework. For Heidegger, scientific principles heavily inform the modus operandi of Dasein's equipment, which extends to how Dasein, in turn, views (and interacts with) the external

environment. Several scholars (Ihde 1990:136; Ferre 1988:64; Vattimo 2019:220) have noted how science underpins the Being of Dasein's equipment which Heidegger claims to be rooted in physics. Thinking back to the clock, what was it that indicated some semblance of a scientific architecture? Clocks not only transform Dasein's perception of time; they do so according to a mathematical design based on measurability, datability, and objectivity (Heidegger 2008), culminating in the the autonomy of clock-time vis-à-vis the *independence* from natural time (Ihde 1990:61):

> our understandings of the clock develops with the advancing discovery of nature and instructs us as to new possibilities for a kind of time-measurement which is relatively independent of the day and of any observation of the sky. The clock opens the way to a type of autonomy that partially distances itself from "nature" as its own independent, technological phenomenon.

It would be an overstatement to say that clock-time is completely independent from the natural cycle of a day because it relies on the former for its own intelligibility. The idea is rather that time is increasingly associated with the *clock*, and not natural types of time. The clock is the human invention of time, and as such, humans become *attuned* to it. The clock, and the technological advancement of time-measurement, points to a future isolated from the "natural" understanding of time, which is regulated by the day-night fluctuations of the sky.

The significance of the clock is that it points to how certain tools mediate Dasein's understanding or relationship with the natural world. In an economy of tools, Dasein's attunement to the natural world begins to wither. In *The Spell of the Sensuous* (1996), David Abram examined this idea with regards to the alphabet, which is the technology that drove European societies away from oral languages and story. The alphabet inaugurated a kind of *uprooting* from the earth; from the orality of language and story that are tied to particular topologies. The alphabet not only universalizes language (by abstracting from its particularity), it also allows humans to *externalize* their knowledge. Instead of remembering and recalling through story and location, knowledge was documented and saved in order to build off it in a more vertical (as opposed to horizontal), *logical* manner.

In *The Spell of the Sensuous*, David Abram descends to the human-nature divide in order to illustrate European uprooting from the natural world through the written word, however, the *abstraction* from nature is also true of the Being of tools, *sui generis*. Tools intervene between humans and their environment. This is, of course, not to say that tools always have an *isolating* function like the alphabet: one can think back to hunting equipment for examples of how primitive humans, in adapting to their environment, *incorporated* that environment for survival purposes.

Is the same idea true for us moderns? The essence of modern technology, which Heidegger claims to be a process of *enframing*, constructs equipment in a much different way. The Being of tools is no longer in collaboration with nature, tools now are constructed in order to *attack* nature ruthlessly. And this, for Heidegger, is one way that we can understand the shift in modern science, which tends to view nature as the object of empirical research, experimentation and control (1977). Equipment become manifest according to scientific attitudes of destruction, which orders the world into objectified "resources", replacing a world of mere "things" treated with respect for their own sake (2010:221).

To be sure, the "scientific" way of seeing extends far beyond Dasein's tools. While it is true that Dasein's tools shape the nature of its engagements with the environment, this circumvents the fullness of Heidegger's position. In "The Question Concerning Technology", technical *thinking* is the mode of being proper to our age (1977). Technical thinking is what enables Dasein to fabricate tools in the first place, meaning that it comes before Dasein's interaction with the tool itself. Technical thinking gathers disparate things (phenomena) into technological objects. This manner of gathering Reiner Schürmann (2019:191) calls *technicity*. Technicity denotes the type of *gathering* native to modern technology, where things are materialized into technological objects, meaning that they subsist in the circulatory systems of consumption and commercial use. Thanks to Schürmann (2019), we can readily differentiate between the role of tools and technology in Heidegger's theory. Technical thinking technicizes disparate things into ontic objects for Dasein's practical use, and in turn these

tools mediate Dasein's interactions by guiding its manner of engagement with the world. Implicit within technical thinking is scientific rationalization.

According to Vattimo (2019:223) and Harries (1994:229), the scientific paradigm activates the idea that nature is calculable and measurable, and this how science informs the essence of modern technology—the *challenging-forth*—and, at some stage, the technological *takeover* of Being.

1.3/The Essence of Modern Technology

In his works on technology, one of Heidegger's central claims is that the challenging-forth gives itself to Being during the technological age, but this comes with the caveat that enframing is estimated to be the *only* way of seeing the world, including ourselves. How, one asks, did this come to be? Answering this question, Heidegger says we must return to the ancient Greeks to find out from whence the challenging-forth arose. According to Wendland (2018), there are two different types of revealing stemming from the Greek term *poesis* (157). The first, *physis*, is the unaided bringing forth of nature; second, *technē*, is the aided bringing-forth of nature by humans (Heidegger 1977:39). Yet, for the Greeks, technē is an extension of physis because the Greeks saw themselves as part of a natural order in which their activities completed nature's flourishing (Wendland 2018:157). Adding to this, Frederick Ferre (1988) writes: "the Greek understanding of technē is a primal bringing-forth and not merely a *causal* "bringing-forth" of instrumental crafts and skills but also the creative bringing-forth of the fine arts" (65). Technē is a special type of knowing—a chemistry shared among two constituents (see George Sturt's *The Wheelwright's Shop* for examples of this), allowing for reciprocal communion. Herein lies the difference between our age and the ancient Greeks: unlike the technē of the past, modern technology fails to reveal things in their essential nature (Feenberg 2010:192). Modern technological practice violently sets upon nature in order to reframe it when it fails to meet our needs (Wendland 2018:157). In the early days, says Ferre, the earth was cared for, cultivated, and maintained; now the earth is challenged for its deposits (1988:66). Modern technology demands the extraction of energy from nature for storage and

manipulation at will, however, this logic certainly does not hold true for the windmill, because the windmill does not unlock energy from air currents in order to store it (Ferre 1988:65). Modern technology fails to treat nature as physis, as something flourishing by itself, and the extent of our communication with nature is dictated by the challenging-forth, which is a violent way of revealing that separates the newer technologies from the older ones (Ferre 1988:64). In sum, modern technological revealing diverges from Greek technē, even though they both originate within the uniquely human capacity for bringing-forth.

The implications of this modernized version of revealing are extreme in the very least: all beings, including humans, are ordered and reduced to resources and made to be standing-reserve (*be-stand*) in modern technology (Davis 2018:140). Heidegger's theory is so comprehensive that even humans are gathered up into the *process* (technical thinking) of challenging-forth. Everything gets assembled into positions that "challenge nature to disclose what is actual by an ordering" (Dahlström 2018:49). As such, all beings are on stand-by, in a permanent waiting mode (Kroker 2004:50), ready to be challenged-forth so as to be gathered into a technical code (Schürmann 2019). Even the ones perpetrating the ordering, in that they are perpetrating, are inculcated into this paradigm, which Schürmann (1994) says uniforms and standardizes beings by reducing all that one can say and do into an isomorphic *nomos* (law) of technicization. Modern technology challenges-forth by *hunting* things down as if they were wild animals, inserting them into specific places to be called upon by the technological will (Harries 1994:229; Davis 2018:140). For Harries, this is precisely what it means to challenge-forth, which, for Heidegger, extends to how we view and communicate with *nature*.

Yet—and this is where Heidegger draws on Nietzsche—such challenging represents more than merely an attack on nature. The "will" implicitly motivating the challenging-forth is derived from Nietzsche, which Heidegger declares to be a *commanding*, or a fundamental attunement of one's being superior to others (Davis 2018:139; Heidegger 1987:152). "In willing, one mounts beyond oneself so as to increase the territory under one's command; willing is, in short, being-master-out-beyond-oneself" (Heidegger 1991:63).

Davis (2018:139) and Mitchell (2018:117) contend that willing is a dynamic movement of going *beyond* oneself and conquering, in that one exceeds oneself by bringing this excess willing back into oneself. The will's self-overcoming, enacted vis-à-vis the challenging-forth, is always in the name of an expansion of the subject, amounting to an increase in its spatial territory. The will-to-power, which is concealed in the drive to challenge-forth, is a preservation by expansion, and this attitude is more often than not directed against nature. However, we must not forget Ihde (1990), and his valuable commentary on the being of tools. Now we can say that the challenging-forth just *is* the being of modern tools (a majority of them anyways), in how the tools *challenge* nature to yield their contents for human labor. This argument establishes itself inasmuch as the *essence* of modern technology was established all the way back in Ihde's (1990) analysis of tools in *Being and Time* (see pages 18-21). All that is missing now is Heidegger's concept of force (*kraft*), which, in Mitchell's view (2018) is significant in that it demonstrates how the challenging-forth is always working to expand itself by appropriating and assimilating what lies outside of it (117). "The best way to guarantee increased force production is to inculcate new needs for that force. In this way, force keeps getting urged beyond itself and new discoveries and breakthroughs keep being made" (Mitchell 2018:119). From this we can deduce that the challenging-forth, coupled with force, contains an endlessly reproducing will to get beyond itself by expanding outward to new territories. In addition, force production advances with increases to its speed, so that it maximizes its effects whilst minimizing the effort needed to produce those effects in the first place (2018:118). Thus, not only does the technological will-to-challenge-forth *exceed* itself territorially, it tries to accomplish this in the midst of implementing changes to its own efficient functioning.

Force and speed are ingrained in the technological *will-to-challenge-forth*, which manifests in the triumph of the will-to-will, in that this historical phase is the one in which everything is calculated and arranged, in which the will must sustain itself by continuing to will (Kroker 2004:55). The will-to-technology levies the challenging-forth for no ultimate teleological purpose other than to propagate aimlessly into the circulatory

systems of the social, by denying everything else and willfully overcoming itself at each (epochal) caesura (Kroker 2004:58). This essential aimlessness, which points at nothing except new terrain and likewise towards the overcoming of itself, easily buttresses the inertia behind the challenging-forth of modern technology, or what Bernasconi (1997) describes as the foreclosure of relations to ontology leading to the technological *desertification* of Being (85).

The essence of modern technology, to be sure, is one mode of unconcealment, one manifestation of the *truth* of Being. Moreover, thanks to the preceding analysis of Mitchell (2018) and Davis (2018), we can begin to think of the challenging-forth as a will-to-expand and a will-to-get-beyond itself. In the end, we are not only dealing with a simple challenging-forth; we are dealing with a *force* that expands beyond itself (space) in a concerted effort to *shrink* the effort needed to produce the intended effect (time) of the challenging-forth itself, constituting the technological will-to-will, which defines *progress* in our age.

2/The Technological Appropriation of Time

A technique, the know-how that the Greeks called *technē*, is operative whenever humans make some goal-directed use of their hands. As to modern mastery over nature via a universal mathematical project, this is something different from know-how. It is one epochal project of truth, best described as 'technicity'.

—Reiner Schürmann[5]

What may be called the technological "appropriation" of time stems from an analysis of the challenging-forth as the *essence* of modern technology. This chapter is split into two subjects. The first is a synopsis of Reiner Schürmann's temporal phenomenology, which depicts the philosophy of the "event" as the linear-historical succession of Western epochs. History can be viewed as a destiny, or rather an unfolding of Truth in the Western metaphysical tradition, culminating in the technological age. Technology holds unique significance for Schürmann, and this is because it is the age without an ultimate representation of Truth, a *metaphysics*. The second subject, raised near the end of this chapter, is concerned with the absence of this metaphysics. Without an organizing *principle*, in which all entities are arranged and disclosed, how do beings (entities) appear in the technological age?

In short, the answer to this question is disclosed in the logic of technological thinking itself. Metaphysics is interpreted by Schürmann as series of self-organizing systems, where the ultimate *fantasm* (the Truth of an age) informs the Being of particular beings. However, if this history reaches its culmination in technology (in the age without a *fantasm*), how are we to account for the Being of beings? Previous ages, such as the Medieval one, were determined by the presence of a Christian God—everything that was, issued from this ultimate representation of Truth. Metaphysics, as such, was the top-down determination of beings, or the organization of beings in accordance with their relation to the *One*.

---

[5] "Technicity, Topology, Tragedy: Heidegger on "That Which Saves" in the Global Reach", 2019:191.

According to Schürmann (and Heidegger), the technological age is the dissolution of this tradition which can be tied solely and unequivocally back to a *One*—in other words, technology is the age without an ultimate fantasm (or referent). In technology, which is the age where the ultimate fantasms begin to wither, showing themselves as illusory ideations of Western thought, how can we make sense of the Being of beings? The claim of this chapter is that technology—beginning with its *essence*—emits an ascending, self-reproducing *logic* that determines the fate of beings by *claiming* them. Not, as it happens, by casting its light on them from the aerial sky, but from the ground. Technology, or rather its essence, is a *grounding*, inasmuch as it lays the foundation from *below* for the condition of beings. More accurately, it lays the foundation from below while expanding outside of itself with each clever instantiation, like Mitchell (2018) already disclosed. Contrary to Heidegger in "The Question Concerning Technology", the essence of modern technology is not merely a way of *revealing* beings as through a challenging-forth; it is also the concealment of fundamental, ground-laying technological logic, which is always in the process of denying itself in each enactment.

I have organized this important chapter into three sections. First, I describe Schürmann's temporal phenomenology; the reason for this is to establish the significance the technological age in light of the metaphysical tradition it transcends. Second, I deconstruct the essence of modern technology as it were conceptualized by Heidegger—this is so that I can extract what I call *technological logic*. Third, I discuss the implications of the age without an ultimate referent, and how this, coupled with the aforesaid logic is self-reproducing, such that it knows no limitations, no *ethic*. Technology (technical logic) advances without respite; for this reason, Schürmann refers to it as the age *without a beyond*.

2.1/Schürmann's Temporal Phenomenology

Following Heidegger, Schürmann views the history of Western metaphysics in terms of epochal linkages that are each governed by ultimate representations of truth configuring the "economies of presence" during an age (Schürmann 1987:282). Representations of truth (otherwise known as *fantasms*) follow the middle road of the

categorial (between Being and beings), in that they come to presence during certain epochs (unconcealment) and fade away in others (concealment) (Schürmann 1983:38). The history of Western culture is the history of how the Being of beings gets reduced to the value they have for humanity in subsequent epochs, and the ontological difference emerges throughout this temporal reading of history as shifting instantiations of presence. For instance, the ancient Greeks determined the Being of beings as "constant presence". To be was to be stable, permanent, and unchanging in the midst of flux (Zimmerman 1981). For Heidegger, philosophy throughout the ages has taken the *event* of Being for granted, and instead has concentrated on investigating those objects in the world disclosed by Being—however, the fact that there is *something* rather than *nothing* was always neglected (Zimmerman 1981:221). Heidegger does not think that philosophers have necessarily "forgotten" the Being question, just that this inquiry has been carefully avoided in favour of epochal constellations that have, in different variations, centred on "man". The history of metaphysics is decidedly "humanistic" because each age relates back to "man", ending with the Cartesian *ego cogito* as the final stage of this history (Schürmann 1985:287). The Cartesian subject, which is the modern representation of truth, is the last vestige of humanism, when, according to Nietzsche, the "true world" becomes a fable (Schürmann 1987:114). Since Descartes, the "subject" is the *principle*[6] from which everything else comes into view (Schürmann 1979:167). The Cartesian "I think" inaugurated the founding First or arché of the Modern age, ascending to hegemonic dominion over an entire subsequent era (Vahabzadeh 2019:22).

An age (the Modern one, for example) is given by a particular constellation of truth that serves to legitimize all theoretical and practical rules as universal "laws" governing beings, and "norms" are the authoritative representations that constitute the possible appearance(s) of phenomena (Schürmann 2003:7). The modern period diverges from the pre-modern period when the "subject" became the ultimate point of moorage from where everything was measured: "of [things] that [were], that they [were]; and of those that [were] not, that they

[6] The "principle" of an age refers to the founding of an epoch which is determined by a code that is unique every time… "not a convention, but in the sense the French speak of a "code de la route," a law of *regional* application (Schürmann 1981:247).

[were] not" (Schürmann 1984a:168). The "subject" therefore ascended to the level of "fantasm", which means that it justified *everything* that became a phenomenon during the linguistic epoch of its tenure. Moreover, a fantasm phenomenalizes beings by universalizing them into common signifiers. Beings are *revealed* (brought out of unconcealment) for a time before fading into concealment once again. In other words, beings are normatively "maximized" according to the laws of presence governing a particular era. Phenomenological laws legislate the theoretical rules and the practical norms of an age by establishing the "a priori"; the conditions granting the "I think" of an age. Schürmann says: "[W]e have to presuppose ourselves, entirely a priori, as legislated according to the principles of our age" (1984b:87). We are *constituted* by the *nomos* of our age; which is precisely what—in reflecting on the philosophical anti-humanism of Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Martin Heidegger—Schürmann conveys in his 1979 article, which may serve as a reference for understanding philosophical anti-humanism.

Anti-humanism is a reversal in gaze. Instead of upholding the "subject" as the focal symbol from where philosophy (included in this is metaphysics and epistemology) emerges, anti-humanism posits that the human is exposed to the historical conditions of presence, which, throughout the ages, determine the *Being* of *beings*. This reversal is apparent, for example in Heidegger's turn (*die Kehre*) in thinking in the metaphysical lectures of 1929-30, or conversely in *The German Ideology* in 1846, where Marx famously develops a scientific analysis of the relations of production, or in Nietzsche's assertion, in 1881, that the subject appears as fiction, as an artificial immobilization of the (economic) flux (Schürmann 1979:165). This theoretical shift, rather than continuing in the tradition that sought to uphold the human as the responsible agent of social and political change, interprets this entity from a different vantage point. Not one, to be sure, that vies to rescue the human from the plight of existence, but rather seeks to understand the context in which history emerges, through *Being* as the "event" of appropriation/expropriation, historical materialism as the scientific approach to the study of class struggle, or the eternal recurrence of the same. Each of these, however, shares something in common,

which is that the human is reduced to one *node* in the self-mutation of history. How history unfolds is, of course, consulted differently in each of Heidegger, Marx and Nietzsche, however, the step back from the human subject—as the postulate of anthropocentric humanism—appears in each of them.

Thus, anti-humanism varies according to its interlocutor, however, in staying true to the phenomenological commitments of this thesis, anti-humanism will only be considered from the Heideggerian and Schürmannian perspectives.

In Heidegger, the "event" of appropriation/expropriation is where, during an epochal juncture, enowning (*ereignis*) throws-forth that which determines how Being can be granted to thought (Schalow and Denker 2010:101). Each age is tied to such an "event" of Being, which is why the appearance of entities varies throughout the ages (Schürmann 1982:1035). In phrases like "the forties are no longer", or "things change" (1982:1035) one can acknowledge the economy of their dwelling, which is in ceaseless flux. The "event" points to a mutating network of phenomenal concealment-unconcealment within each epochal order that brings things into focus for a time before their slowed withdrawal in the configuration of the next order (Schürmann 1984a:171). Jacques Derrida's observation is perhaps useful for us here: this reading of history as "event" is a structural theory which must be thought of as a "series of substitutions of centre for centre, as a linked chain of determinations of centricity" (1978:353). In humanism, "man" occupied the centre of this structure, which meant that "man's" change in thinking effectuated the conversion from one epoch to another. Yet, after *Being and Time* (1927), or more specifically in the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929-30) Heidegger's anti-humanist reversal essentially posits the opposite of this: the turn (*die Kehre*) in Heidegger's thought acknowledges epochal regulation as *alēthialogical* (self-regulating). Throughout history, the centre is substituted by a number of signs, each determining the play of "presence" during an age. The turning identifies the ""fundamental positions", "jointures", or simply "constellations" during the "destiny of truth" that address the mode(s) of unconcealedness that predominate during a given age" (Schürmann 1985:287). However, after

die Kehre, the economy of things, actions and words shifts to a new era, which is perilous for "man's" understanding of himself (Schürmann 1979:165-6). Schürmann says that "man" retreats from the scene of philosophical thinking (1979:166), which means that "man" is no longer regarded as the economic precipitator of our times. "Man" is no longer the master of the epochal economies because they manifest *themselves* throughout history (1982:1032).

Heidegger's anti-humanism also stems from his interpretation of the technological age. Technology is not merely another metaphysical age, which can be tied to the presence of an ultimate ground. Technology, in short, supersedes human authority, and by extension, metaphysics, which Schürmann insists prefigures the "hypothesis of metaphysical closure" (1982). The hypothesis of closure is when the ultimate representations of truth wither away and become nothing, which opens a clearing for technology—which is not metaphysical in the humanistic sense—to advance *by itself* (1982:1036). Schürmann's anti-humanism is therefore *technological*, and not merely the result of the philosophy of the "event". When the principal stamps expire and lose their credibility, technology spirals out of control, like the molecules of a gas heated to infinity (Schürmann 1982:1036). The absence of a *pros hen* (an ultimate referent) frees technology from the "relation to the one" that characterized all of metaphysics, however, this comes with a considerable tradeoff. Technology is a referent unto itself, that is, technology surges forth unencumbered by anything other than it's own internal logic, which attempts to defeat the historical modes of Being that preceded it. At this junction, which Schürmann calls "the end of philosophy", what is the human left to do? Schürmann's reply is deceptively simple. Humans must unlearn their age-old humanist reflex (the search for ultimate standards) in order to heed the modality of presence arising out of *nothingness* (1982:1037). "Man's release from his self-incurred tutelage is possible only as a release…a release from the ultimate representations that have laid ground to nothingness for all of Western metaphysics" (Schürmann 1982:1937). Schürmann's "release" is contingent on detaching ourselves from technical actualization as the supreme mode of unconcealment. The task for thinking, according to Schürmann,

is to confront the question "how can we let technology be?" But before we can properly do this, we need to examine the *role* of technology in Heidegger.

2.2/The Technological Age

For Schürmann and Heidegger, the origin of technology can be traced back to a way of revealing through the goal-directed usage of human hands, also known as *technē*. The ancient Greeks used technē to fabricate their tools and other materials in a way that preserved the laws of nature. However, at some stage during Western history, likely in the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, *technē* evolved into *ge-stell*. The gentle way of revealing through the goal-directed usage of one's hands was replaced with *ge-stell*, which is a violent method of revealing that considers Nature only on the basis that it is useful for humans and their multiple needs. When speaking of "technology", therefore, we are not only making reference to the age that is "ours"; additionally we are tracing the historical development of *technē*, or the "technological" way of revealing beings, which culminates in the modern technological age when the world is reduced to a picture of scientific manipulation and control (*ge-stell*).

As such, technology can be viewed as a *force* (macht), or a self-perpetuating logic that pushes towards global domination and mastery, gaining momentum with the Cartesian *ego* and reaching its apogee with Nietzsche's will-to-power. More evident at each stage of Western history, Schürmann argues that technology has forced the network of things, words, and actions into the logic of domination (Schürmann 1982:1040). Technology, writes Zimmerman, "lets the universe be understood primarily in terms of how it can be represented (*vorgestellt*), arranged, positioned, transformed, organized, or mobilized for the realization of some human goal" (1981:224). Since modern technology is the culmination of the Western tradition, it is by definition the most *violent* stage of this history (1982:1041). Technology is situated at the end of a metaphysics that began with Plato, acquiring momentum for the previous 2,500 years, refining itself in the Will to Master technology, which becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control (Heidegger 2008:313). So it is perhaps

fitting that the principal mode of revealing in the technological age is a *challenging-forth,* which enacts violence upon entities by insisting that they yield to technical actualization.

Heidegger interprets this—the fact that one mode of revealing prevails in our age—as prefiguring the supreme danger (2008:333). The danger takes humanity to the point where it is rendered standing-reserve; reduced to a passive reactant to the impulse of technological authority. Human status dwindles in the wake of technological anti-humanism, but perhaps more importantly, by the fact that technology obstructs the ability to engage with the world *otherwise* then through technological means. However perilous this seems, Heidegger reminds us that the danger conceals the possibility of a "saving power". Humanity can only be freed from this world-mobilizing Will-to-Power insofar as it can stop viewing reality as a plaything to control and manipulate (Zimmerman 1981:224). The saving power is Heidegger's solution to the inherent danger of technology. The human must willingly retreat from its position as the "master" of the epochal economies by embracing the gift of letting beings display *themselves*. For Michael Zimmerman, the voluntary withdrawal comes in the form of trying to understand that "[technology] is there, that it will always develop alongside of us, but a more patient, calculated understanding is such that we must not become *too attached* to it", as it were (1981:225-6). Similarly, Heidegger discusses the specific appropriation of technology such that technological devices and their products would not completely seize our awareness (1981:226). And Schürmann writes of "letting technology be" which amounts to freeing ourselves from its grasp in order to become aware of the other dimensions of Being which are available to us. To be sure, this is only possible via *physis*—the movement by which any phenomenon emerges out of absence into presence by itself, which constitutes an important part of Schürmann's anti-humanism (1982:1042).

These approaches, which really only comprise one ethic which tries to remove the privilege of human life, correspond to a *praxis* that humans must adopt in order to resist technological universalism. For Heidegger, the "supreme danger" is predicated on the idea of challenging-forth which rises to supremacy, superimposing the

other, historical modes of being. Challenging-forth, it is subliminally asserted, is single-handedly responsible for the supreme danger. At the hypothesis of closure, when the representations of Truth begin to wither, technology surges forth, unencumbered by a *pros hen*[7]. In our age, technology spearheads the quest for ultimacy, but is this really the result of a simple challenging-forth? For all Heidegger writes about the supreme danger, the essence of modern technology is poor justification. For this reason, I return to the essence of modern technology to break down the challenging-forth in order to demonstrate the gap in Schürmann's interpretation of Heidegger.

2.3/Rethinking the Essence of Modern Technology

How can modern technology be defined? According to Heidegger, modern technology is usually ascribed with two characteristics: it is a means to an end, and it is a human activity. While both true, in that these describe key features about modern technology, which are likely universal among how it is applied and by whom, for Heidegger, the essence of modern technology is nothing inherently technological (2008:311). Heidegger is a phenomenologist and, as such, examines the way modern technology brings things out of concealment, *revealing* them. The essence of modern technology, therefore, is nothing anthropological, and by extension technological (in a material sense); rather, he says, it is a *way* of revealing that challenges-forth (*enframing*). Challenging, moreover, is that which "puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored", such as how the "tract of land is challenged in the hauling of coal and ore, now revealing itself as a coal mining district, its soil as a mineral deposit" (2008:320). As we will come to understand, technology is both humanistic and anti-humanistic. Technological thinking informs the a priori of our age, "claiming [the human] in a way of revealing that challenges her" to approach beings as objects (Heidegger 2008:324). The challenging is thrust on the human (it is all she can do as a revealing), but the

[7] "Pros hen" in Schürmann refers to an ultimate referent, for instance, the Christian God. The technological age is devoid of any such reference to a "metaphysics".

human enacts the challenging. Challenging is pervasive and fundamental (hence the a priori), so much so that we cannot consciously "opt for" technological thinking just as we can not "opt out" of it (2008:309). Thinking is reducible to the technological matrix which single-mindedly determines the conditions for being and acting. And this, Heidegger says, is the supreme *danger*. Enframing is the danger because it *conceals* other (former) modes of revealing, disclosing the challenging-forth as the *only* mode of revealing in our age (2008:333). Enframing's ascendency Schürmann calls "the quest for ultimacy" because it tries to maximize revealing under a technological mandate.

For Heidegger and his interpreters, enframing is specified as a challenging which is directed against *nature*. In the following passages, this can be observed in addition to a budding Heideggerian anti-humanism. "Man isn't in control of the process [that challenges him] to exploit the energies of nature" (2008:323). Elsewhere, Albert Borgmann says of Heidegger's theory of technology: "[it] positions (*stellen*) and orders (*bestellen*) the yields of nature so that they are available and disposable to humans" (1984:429). Indeed, for Heidegger, "technology is […] a view which tends to draw man into the same process of "framing" which allows him to dominate the rest of nature" (1981:224). Heeding the above, we are now in a position to understand enframing as a challenging which is specifically put to nature. Not only that, enframing is always pointed at something other than itself. Modern technology's propensity to project itself outwards (against nature) is the essential quality that defines it, in Heidegger's view. The essence of modern technology, therefore, can be re-articulated as a challenging-forth with a kind of intentionality directed away from itself. This also intimates that challenging-forth has a strictly *spatial* component, which is especially true in many of the examples Heidegger uses.

Upon close inspection, the essence of modern technology reveals much more than a simple challenging-forth. We have determined that challenging-forth is always aimed at something other than itself. Challenging-forth is usually a forceful imposition to nature, demanding that nature yield to technical actualization. For

Heidegger, this is the extent of the essence of modern technology. The only problem with this formulation is that the essence of modern technology as a challenging-forth put to nature has virtually nothing to do the essence of modern technology itself. Challenging-forth *concerns* the essence, but only inasmuch as what the essence *does*. The essence of modern technology would be better described as a self-projecting, in how it is always getting away from itself, enacting the challenging against others while concealing what itself actually *is*. We can observe this in how enframing challenges the human to challenge-forth other beings. The human is reduced to an intermediary—embodying the technological *a priori* and projecting it outwards. Because enframing claims the human, the human never really grasps that she is being claimed, or that she is not the one eliciting the claiming. She is just a carrier vessel, and enframing is her default setting. In other words, the human is claimed by a mode of revealing that is projected away from itself, and in this way, the human conceals that which is most fundamental to the essence of modern technology.

Indeed, my saying this depends on the fact that enframing is not something which is projected away from itself. That there is something which is hidden, concealed *within* enframing, which is not projected away from itself is vacant in the Heideggerian account. Of course, one might argue that Heidegger's version of enframing is the *extent* of the essence of technology, that enframing is this ephemeral, shapeshifting projection of violence. Further, that enframing is externalized, a projection which is always *other* than itself. If this were true, then we would have to revise enframing as something which is in motion, a kinetic fluctuation which is endlessly renewing itself with the event of each new challenging. Such reasoning follows what I presume to be Schürmann's justification of technology's quest for ultimacy, inasmuch as enframing ceaselessly challenges-forth until it successfully monopolizes the conditions for being and acting. In this account, challenging-forth is single-handedly responsible for the technological authorization of being, but there is little mention of *how* this occurs. Are we, as readers, simply required to bend to Schürmann's prognosis, without considering that the challenging-forth is not entirely responsible for technological supremacy? Something seems not quite right with

this formulation, which calls into question the possibility of whether enframing by itself does not quite possess the momentum that would result in the monopolization of Being. What technology conceals, which is the missing link between enframing and the quest for ultimacy, is *time*.

So we have determined that the essence of modern technology is a challenging-forth which is always pointing away from itself. Enframing is a projection—an act of revealing resolved to violate nature for the sake of advancing the technological paradigm. However, it is because the challenging-forth is pointing elsewhere that it cannot examine itself. It is at odds with itself…the main motioning is externalized, a defensive mechanism allowing it to maintain an ostensible veneer, concealing something in secret. The fact of the matter is that the challenging-forth must arrive from somewhere in particular, it must be sourced from something internal to its functioning which allows the capacity for self-improvement. Without this, challenging-forth is strictly cyclical, because it does not know how to improve upon its own challenging. What happens after the initial challenging-forth? The next challenging-forth, of course! This cycle repeats itself, because this is what enframing *can* do. The act of challenging-forth does not contain the seeds for the evolution of technological progress. Challenging-forth is relatively stagnant in that it treats all subjects of its challenging in the same manner. Such a challenging-forth is conceptually cyclical, insofar as it recycles the same challenging over and over, ceasing to *linearly* advance as it purports to do in the quest for ultimacy.

Consider, for example, the tree-feller, who always returns to the handsaw even when there are *new* chainsaws available to use. The stubborn feller has adapted his skillset to the handsaw. He understands the instrument very well: how it slices into the bark, the estimable time it will take to reach the core of the trunk, the number of trees the teeth on the blade can endure before they begin to dull. Notice, however, that the challenging-forth of the feller is cyclical. It is possible, of course, that the feller *improves* his skills, which would allow him to be more efficient. However, his approach is usually very similar, and this is because he employs exactly the same technique. He accepts the reality of having to wrestle with the challenging-forth afforded to him by the

handsaw. The stubborn feller is always looking away from himself, toward each new tree in the naked anticipation of the forthcoming challenging. The feller never reflects about the chainsaw because he refuses to examine the internal *process* of the challenging-forth itself. As such, he fails to *improve* upon his own challenging… his challenging will forever remain circular, but this circularity isn't conducive to the necessary preconditions undergirding technology's quest for ultimacy.

Challenging-forth—say, with the persistent use of the handsaw—is simply not enough by itself. Heidegger (and subsequent acolytes) overestimates the essence of modern technology when he presupposes that challenging-forth is solely responsible for the linear self-improvement of technology on the way to ultimacy. What Heidegger misses is the evolution of the handsaw to the gas-powered chainsaw. Eventually, the handsaw must be usurped by the chainsaw for there to be a measurable inclination in technological progress, and challenging-forth cannot possibly ascertain this change by itself. Somewhere plotted along the history of saw evolution, challenging-forth introduces an entirely new variety of challenging. Namely, a *challenging of its own challenging*. A self-challenging, we can say for now, which is tantamount to a self-questioning concerning the challenging-forth of the handsaw. So how exactly does challenging-forth ascend to the level of principle, engendering the quest for ultimacy at the expense of other modes of revealing? Through a self-challenging (as opposed to a challenging-*forth*). Self-challenging amounts to a self-questioning about the process of challenging-forth. Self-challenging critically probes the processual duration of challenging-forth, finding ways to improve it. This is how we can account for technological progress. Enframing challenges itself in the dogged pursuit for ultimacy by questioning the process of the challenging-forth.

To be sure, we have modified the essence of modern technology as a self-challenging and a challenging-forth. Self-challenging can be thought of as the temporal dimension to the essence of modern technology, which is usually conceptualized in principally spatial terms. Self-challenging gives enframing the linearity it so desperately desires in its quest for ultimacy. Further, self-challenging is primarily interested in duration. Not just

any duration; the specific duration of a challenging-forth. This whole sentence (the duration of challenging-forth) I call *process*. Process is the technical appropriation of time, defined as the calculable duration of a challenging-forth. In the previous example, why was the handsaw replaceable with the chainsaw? Due to the chainsaw's increase in speed and convenience, the chainsaw presented as a natural upgrade to the handsaw. Above all, we can say that the chainsaw has a *shorter* process, in that it challenged-forth at a much faster rate than the manual handsaw. The difference between the two lies in the *denial* of process. Enframing denied the process befitted to the handsaw, subsequently replacing it with a shortened version adapted to the challenging of the chainsaw. Now, thanks to the chainsaw, the feller can boost his daily felling capacity, which was not possible in a simple challenging-forth. Challenging-forth by itself is sufficient for Heidegger's exemplars, but ultimately falls short in the justification of the quest for ultimacy. As such, it would be more useful to examine the material implications of the challenging-forth to understand how, as a mode of revealing, it comes to dominate in this age. Through what equipmental means, or what processes in particular does the challenging-forth *ascend* in a forward momentum? The answer is simple: challenging-forth is a mode of revealing; concealed in this mode of revealing is process, which is always minimized in the pursuit of technological progress. *Progress is contingent on the denial of process.*

We have uncovered the essence of the essence of modern technology, which is a self-challenging of technological challenging-forth. Concealed in the essence of modern technology is *process* (the technical appropriation of time). Challenging-forth is spatial because it is usually directed away from itself. Self-challenging, on the other hand, is temporal. Technology denies (by concealing) the process which is most fundamental to it, by projecting itself onto others. For technology to advance, it *must* deny the process of the challenging-forth. This is the only way that technology can improve upon its own challenging.

2.4/Technical Self-Reproduction and its Implications

Now that the essence of modern technology has been uncovered, the task that remains, for the rest of the chapter, is to inquire about the implications of the "technological age" in combination with technology as a "self-denying *logic*". The problem with Heidegger's formulation is that it only goes so far as to describe the appearance of entities in their finality, or *after* an entity has been challenged-forth. Heidegger's position conceals *how* entities were challenged-forth in the first place, i.e.: with what means, and in what spatiotemporal dimensions. One must remember that revealing takes place in *concrete* reality. The presentation of entities is by design; it augurs one historical display of Truth. Lodged within the display of entities are material processes that shape the appearance of the entity itself. This extension, to my understanding, is vacant from Heidegger's essays on the essence of modern technology.

Technology, as an age is *self-referential*, meaning that presence does not refer back to a metaphysical First (Schürmann 1987:108). In metaphysics, the *principium* (the epochal code of intelligibility) and the *princeps* (the authority that upholds the supreme principle) together mark the founding of an epochal-regional public life by establishing the Truth of an age in its specific modality of presence (Schürmann 1987:110). As the janus-faced "end" of metaphysics, technology is not related to a "one", such as a Christian *God* or a Modern *ego cogito*. In the absence of a *pros hen*, technology self-regulates the play of presencing, and the *principium-princeps* pairing refers back to technology itself, which is how technology continues to linger as a loosely organized constellation of presence without reference to an overarching principle. This, moreover, is what enables the epochal code of intelligibility to develop virtually uncontested by anything other than itself. At its apogee, when it monopolizes the rules for being and acting, "[technology] permeates every aspect of life to the extent that almost all that one does and perceives, comprehends and contemplates, imagines and desires, is but a disclosure of the originative-hegemonic terms" (Vahabzadeh 2019:23). Self-regulation promulgates the inertia of modern

technology as a universalized mode of revealing, pervading nearly "every aspect of life". This is why Heidegger warns of the supreme danger during our age: lacking the metaphysical-existential stability of the *pros hen*, technological thinking spreads like a contagious disease. The code of intelligibility belongs to the volatile grip of technological self-regulation, which is always fluctuating.

Just how is it fluctuating? We would have identified this in the previous section, when the essence of modern technology was deconstructed, and it was discovered that technology (in addition to challenging-forth) denies its own time. Self-denial, we discovered, accounted for the way in which technology is able to drive forwards. Its logic is inherently one of *movement*, as the counter-tendency to stillness, which views time as something to be suppressed in order that it may advance by itself. In inquiring about the "how" of technology, we described a few of the tenets of technological Being: its colonizing logic and its ability to spread itself everywhere. Now, if the *law* of this age is something that humans cannot control, then how are we to account for something like technology, which is much more complex than Heidegger alluded? It might be reductionist to view technology solely as a way of revealing beings, even though the appearance of beings is, like he says, a product of this way of thinking. Instead, we may come to find that the more appropriate way of *perceiving* beings in technology is through examining their essential *way* of moving viz., the self-mutating play of the technological economies, insofar as this is understood materially through the influx of gadgetry that appears for a while before disappearing once again.

We are trying to conceptualize an overall "picture" of technology as its own shifting momentum of logic. The phenomenological appearance is reductive because it shrinks the "appearance" of phenomena to singular entities that are represented by their inherently knowable, calculable dimensions. However, our project is not so much shaped by the individual appearances of entities. Instead, what we are concerned with follows in the appearance of technological Being as a whole—the appearance of technology as a "system"; as one which affects beings, and by extension, determines the experience of temporality of Dasein. In other words, to probe

beings, we must first probe *Being*; in order to understand beings, we must first come to an understanding about the *Being* of technology, and how this is linked with our conception of time.

The logic of technology, in this account, is what *gives* beings. It is what unleashes entities into the technological world. In other words, we can apply the aforementioned *law* to describe the Being of entities in technology, or to describe many of the trends that one can see *within* technological Being. Some of these trends, to state them broadly, include how technology is always compulsively competing with itself; for access to new and workable resources, for the next brilliant engineer, for the accumulation of user data for enhanced personalized algorithms, and so on. Technological logic can be extrapolated to account for some of the impressive improvements in infrastructure, which demonstrate how process (the duration of a challenging-forth) has recently *exceeded* the common sense understanding of time and (therefore) space. Some examples include Japan's 300km/hr train system, Denmark's artificially intelligent globalized shipping network Maersk, trans-American multilane freeways, same-day cross-continental air travel, F1 racing, or nuclear missilry. What I have called the "temporal challenging-forth" has been denied in this historical trajectory of technological advancement. Indeed, these days, computerized velocity utterly obliterates pre-technological velocities, which seem comparatively slow, tedious and perhaps even foreign. This is probably because each generational interval is stamped by their own technological "device" paradigm, each one quicker and more user-friendly than the last. The 1970s are typically associated with the electric radio, colour TV, cassette decks, and record-players. The children of today are only vaguely familiar with cassette decks and they seldom use the radio (except for in the car); coloured TVs have been effectively 3-D'd (due to surround sound, wraparound plasma screens and hanging wall-mounts) and record-players are vintage artefacts of the black-and-white past, still retaining their old-school charm despite the clunkiness. As technology progresses, devices are discharged and forgotten with the consecutive invention of new ones. Cassette decks are replaced by CDs, CDs are replaced by auxiliary

cords, which are then replaced by wireless Bluetooth connections…each of these enhancing convenience and increasing speed vis-à-vis the unending denial of process.

When process is denied, progress increases. Progress results from the denial of process in the challenging-forth, which basically implies that progress is measurable on the grounds that process *shrinks*. Shrinkage entails a diminution in the duration of the challenging-forth. However, shrinkage is also at the expense of the common-sense familiarity with time and space. Ideally, shrinkage in *process* permits an equal and opposite increase in spatial coverage. Progress, therefore, is the denial of process (shrinkage) which enables the human to accomplish an equivalent (or more) amount of challenging over a *shorter* duration. This is how technology develops, right? Well, yes, but not without this caveat: that our brains may be taken as physical information-processing structures, and that physical structures are with conservation limits (of energy consumption, of entropy production, of information processing) in time points to how we are able to process only so much information per unit of actual time. This effect, that of conservation of information processing speed, is called "re-normalization", which delineates information processing (at the level of human consciousness) as a matter of scale. Consider this in light of the following example: there are some features visible from a plane window which are not visible from the ground. Peering outside the window of a plane travelling from Vancouver to Montreal, the passenger is able to observe the sprawling cosmopolitan suburb of greater Vancouver before floating above the snow-covered mountain-tops of the Rockies, the circular crop-rings of the Prairies, and the speckled fresh-water lakes of Ontario, before arriving in Montreal's downtown. On the journey, the passenger has flown approximately 3,500 kilometres in a handful of hours. She is not travelling by foot, bicycle or car, so she absorbs spatial information at a much lower scale. She is not, at any rate, processing *less* on the airplane. Information-processing by air versus by foot happens more-or-less at the same rate; only the scale of the information alters. In other words, the *kind* of information is different depending on the vantage point. While travelling across Canada by foot, the highway hiker would likely pay attention to the cars whizzing him by on

the highways, the changes in weather patterns, or the rural skies dotted with specks of light glittering against the backdrop of the nighttime canopy. Certainly, he would be less familiar with the topological layout of Canada's expansive, varied setting that would hold his attention from the perspective of the plane, given the same amount of measurable, or actual, time. What does this say about technology?

Technology's quest for ultimacy has resulted in a pervasive alienation from the humanistic (default) sense of time and space, roughly comparable to the gulf between the passenger and the hiker. The passenger, having merged with the plane, is able to travel across Canada at a much higher velocity than the hiker, while also covering more distance. Since the passenger is only able to process so much information per unit of actual time, the scale of that information must *increase* in order to adapt to the speed she receives it with. She does not see individual leaves twinkling in the trees, for instance, but rather individual forests twinkling in the larger landscape. Heeding "re-normalization", expanded spatial coverage is always at the expense of specificity. The topological layer of Canada's geography does not boast the same minutia as the immediate vantage of the highway hiker, who observes every ditch-side fern, registers the snore of each semi-truck downshifting, and feels the cut of the wind resisting his forward momentum. None of this matters to the passenger, who will arrive in Montreal with time to spare, because she has effectively covered the same amount space in a shorter duration. The passenger, in this example, represents the promise of technological progress, which is twofold: (1) scalar enlargement, and (2) spatiotemporal emancipation from the future. The passenger will inevitably arrive at home with a *surplus* of time, liberated from spatial to-dos…a result of having covered more ground in a shorter period of time. Even so, we cannot help but feel like the passenger is missing something. Though she may be processing at the scale of the plane, this is at the expense of experiencing the scenery at ground-level. The sensory-rich experience of the highway hiker is almost always forsaken for the blurred perspective of the modern speedster, with the sacrifice being that we've forgotten what it's like to *be* the highway hiker, frolicking

along somewhat aimlessly. The immediate consequence of which is an alienation from our default sense of scale, and the ensuing habitualization with technologically imposed velocities.

Technology cannot bear to withstand the drawl of "world time". It contends with this very notion; the enduring time it takes for a monoculture forest to reach maturation before it is sizeable enough to be logged and dragged overseas for processing, or the time it takes for a depleted Pacific salmon population to restore so that it can be commercially over-fished again to meet the insatiable appetites of the suckling public. Technological process, which is expedient and somewhat rushed, is always at odds with world-time, which is manifold and independent of human influence. Technology is always wrestling in the same manner with time, the two can never outgrow their dysfunctional partnership. Technology is characterized by a specific way of treating time by compressing it, such that our human experience of time is always rushed. Some examples include bidding wars in over-crowded online auction rooms, speed-dating, the production and dissemination of world news, liquid identity, high-speed internet, or global trade markets. All examples listed have rather similar relationships with time, which goes to show that, above everything else, technology *homogenizes* our relationship with time by expediting all of our activities, such that "world time", or the time of *natural processes* is being replaced, *in toto*.

In light of these preliminary observations, I am hopeful that one realizes that technology discloses a particularly challenging relationship with time. When the natural transformative processes of the earth are in the midst of being replaced by technological ones, we say that this corresponds to the technological *appropriation* of time, or the conversion of time under technological rule. Process is a representation of how technology wrests things from their essence by challenging them to yield to technical organization. This becomes problematic when technology tries to monopolize time by reducing it to process. Technology tends to conceal other modalities of time, such that we only ever experience process. If we are going to allow Reiner Schürmann

to speak of "letting technology be", surely we must contend with liberating time from technological appropriation. Time must be set-free from technology in order to cultivate new relations *with* time.

———

In the beginning of this chapter, I borrowed Schürmann's question "how do we let technology be?" as the guiding thread of this inquiry. After returning to Heidegger's essence of modern technology, I have determined that enframing is a temporal self-challenging in addition to an outward challenging directed against nature. However, inspecting enframing in temporal terms allows us to understand that the magnitude of the challenging-forth is the *result* of the *extent* of the denial of process. In other words, minimizing the duration of subsequent challenges inverses the spatial *scale* at which those processes unfold. Referring back to the passenger, it was necessary that the scale of spatial information increased in correspondence with the efficiency (the minimization) of the process of flying. The claim is that technology advances by denying the *duration* of its processes, which means that changes to the spatial scale of experience comes secondary. In other words, technology can continue to deny the durations of its processes, but the effect of this is that humans become accustomed to larger *scales* (coarse-grainedness) of experience.

Time is *primary* in technology, which means that time is the target of all technological progressivism. Instead of learning how to let *technology* be (which is Schürmann's guidance) our research question becomes: *how do we let time be*? Or, in other words, how to liberate time from technological appropriation? I've already hinted at possible directions for tackling this question, but let us consider another. Returning to the essence of modern technology, a useful departure point might be to consider *denying* the *denial* of challenging-forth's challenging unto itself. In other words: denying technology's denial of process. But we must learn to be careful! The double-denial is not meant to be transformed into a positive; that is, into an affirmative. We do not want to affirm the process of technical actualization, as this would not align with the object of "setting time free". Furthermore, the affirmation of the double-denial is tantamount to accepting the essence of modern technology as a challenging.

This is moderately better; enframing cannot really justify the quest for ultimacy if it fails to accomplish anything other than a challenging-forth, which was Schürmann's initial claim. Perhaps, instead of affirming the double denial, we should regard it as a middle-ground between affirmation and denial, more like a "neither affirming nor denying". Thinking back to Schürmann, what does he neither affirm nor deny? Is it the *process* of technical actualization, as I've been saying? Not quite. Schürmann thinks more radically than this, with the loss of origin. The loss of origin is the absence of *arché,* of a founding First, rising to the level of fantasm, in addition to the negation of *telos* (Schürmann 1978:283). The anarchic *a priori* corresponds to Meister Eckhart's injunction to "live without why" (Schürmann 1978:283). Schürmann's double-denial detaches his outlook from enframing *in toto*. Detachment intervenes before enframing is allowed to take place, disbanding with the modality of archic action pre-requisiting *arché* and *telos*. Schürmann refuses to concede to technology's organizational clutch; detachment is the indifference to all technical actualization, which is rooted, as we know, in the challenging-forth. The Schürmannian strategy simply follows the play of presencing from a removed standpoint.

Detachment entails "setting something free that was retained within a network of references to things and purposes. A grip is loosened, a contraction of the fingers slackens. […] The eye too is relieved, namely from staring at the same object. Man ceases to possess, and the thing is freed into its own being. It is seen for what it is, not for its usefulness" (Schürmann 1973:101). This same unlearning can be applied to the technical-organizational framework of time. Time must be extricated from process… time must be justified by no motivation; it should be regarded as independent, standing on its own as a thing (1973:102). This is, of course, easier said than done. In this chapter we have divulged the essence of the challenging-forth, which is a preparatory step in the direction of unlearning the technical organization of time. We have also observed how process diverges from common-sense understandings of scale, and, especially, how it is ceaselessly in competition with itself under the arch-principle goal of progress. Finally, we have seen that process is

maladjusted to world-time, and we have noted technology's impatience as a result of this growing discordance. Of course, there is always more to observe, and especially to unlearn about the *nomos* of technical process. Releasement is the Soto Zen Buddhist attitude adopted by Schürmann for letting something be, for allowing things to reveal themselves (Schürmann 1973:103). Releasement prepares the way for the openness towards things and their mystery, by abandoning calculative thinking (1973:104). Releasement releases the human from her compulsive tendency to build conceptual systems out of nothingness. Releasement is handy for our purposes, because it requires that we "let [time] be" and return toward our origin (1978:291).

Releasement from technological temporality will be explored at the very *end* of this thesis. In the chapter that follows, I will be looking to develop an anti-humanist theory of technology, which begins, as we are now familiar, with the temporal challenging-forth.

3/Anti-Humanism and the Technicization of Time

An economy is a system. In it certain items are arranged according to a *nomos*, a law. These items are all those phenomena by which a given culture can be recognized.

—Reiner Schürmann[8]

The previous chapter was spent developing and supplementing the idea of "process" with paradigmatic examples of how it exceeds anthropic notions of time and space by amplifying the normal scale of perception and experience. It was determined that process stems from the essence of modern technology as a revealing, and in our age, process is the *only* modality of time available. In the technological age, every*thing* is technicized into being, including time itself. Time is endowed with being—with a distinct appearance informed by scientific principles and numerics reflecting the precipitated mood of today's zeitgeist. Before I argued that this was the result of the challenging-forth. It is not that I am now questioning this line of thinking—quite the opposite, in fact. I am working up to the idea that process does not depend on the challenging-forth. Process is subtler than that. It comes to be defined as "duration", or "measurable timespan". To be sure, a number of isolated durations will absolutely be rooted in the challenging-forth, in that they motivate the technological quest for ultimacy. Yet, it is my hope that the reader will understand by the end of this chapter that process is not exactly *limited* to the challenging-forth, even if it outstrips human limitations in processing speed and information. Challenging-forth leads into the maximization of the technological will-to-will crusading in the quest for ultimacy. Yet the scope of technological inertia encloses a spectrum of "technicity", which corresponds to range of being and acting that is technological by virtue of its epochal situatedness. Indeed, the conditions for being and acting in technology is fully *comprehensive* as an ambit of presencing. Technology is *totalitarian*, which means that even the fundamentals "space" and "time" are technicized in human experience. Every-thing becomes order-able, *made* to standby on reserve for technicity, including the "matter" of perception. Humans are absorbed in the technical

---

[8] "Anti-Humanism. Reflections on the Turn Towards the Post-Modern Epoch", 1979:166.

matrix, meaning they belong to it as last stage of their metaphysical destining, but technology no longer *requires* their assistive guidance. As a system, technology is fully autonomous, it requisitions by positioning and setting the world into place. Technology is anti-humanist in that it adheres to systemic laws instead of referential ones related back to "man". Humans are just along for the ride within this system, which I'll now explain below.

3.1/Anti-Humanism

In Schürmann's radical (temporal) phenomenology, humanism is defined in terms of epochal linkages of Truth wherein "man" occupied the centre of Being. Effectively that man's thinking, through its evolutionary headway, ordered the historical transmutations. To speak of the end of humanism, therefore, not only implies that man is no longer the point of reference in regard to which all things can be known; it entails the deeper consequence that "man" is by no means the *master* of the epochal economies (Schürmann 1979:171). As far back as *Being and Time* in Heidegger's career, human existence (Da-sein) was originary. All phenomena were phenomena *for* the human (1979:172). Said in another way, Heidegger's writings before the turning (*die Kehre*) suggest that the modalities of time as well as the manifold ways in which beings show themselves were referred back to their rootedness in "man's" existence and its basic structure (1979:172). That is, until the turning, which recognizes epochal regulation as *alēthialogical*, as absolved from human thinking and influence. In this new reading, history unravels through a play of presence where a centre is substituted by a number of signs that expire just as new ones get inaugurated via the "event" of Being. "Anti-humanism" signifies such a reversal, which was coined originally by Louis Althusser in the early 1970s in his theory of structural Marxism, whereby in 1845 Karl Marx's epistemological break with humanism was replaced by a systematic (as opposed to a referential) analysis of political economy (Schürmann 1985:284). Anti-humanism's systemic strategies do not take "man" to be the central domain of intelligibility, and, further, they simply refer back to each other (1985:286). I earlier explored this in the subheading "self-referentiality", where the proliferating logic of technology amounted to

self-reproductive advancements in technological progress. The same holds true here: technology realizes more-than-human speeds, leaving man deserted to rot as a speck in the distant rearview of untameable surges in technical development. The contemporary anti-humanist epoch properly comes into its own when "man" "retreats from the scene of what is to be thought", renouncing his dominion as the economic catalyst of our times (Schürmann 1979:166). Since Descartes, but more profoundly since Plato, "man" is the 'principle', the *primum capture* in relation to which everything else comes into view. "Man" was the theoretical origin from whom objects receive the status of their objectivity. In anti-humanism, however, "man" is no longer the master of the epochal economies because they *manifest themselves* throughout history (Schürmann 1982:1032). Little in the Heideggerian literature justifies this claim: the three-tiered temporal difference explains that entities change throughout time, countering the classical Greek idea of permanence in the disclosure of presence (Schürmann 1985:288-9). The event of Being, of appropriation-expropriation, triggers an epochal shift to the existing order, when abruptly, an age is no longer and suddenly becomes thinkable. Typically, in an epochal shift, it is the *principle* that gets rerouted, which is "man" in this case. As such, the implications of theorizing an anti-humanism of technology always comes with the risk of dispensing all of the sociological assumptions for what the human entails. Agency, subjectivism, individualism…a sample of some of the human-centric nouns that hold little value for an anti-humanist theory of time. I remind the reader that we are striving for a conceptual approach that ties only and always circularly back to itself. "Man" is the feinted being of our attention. *We are not thinking on behalf of him, we are thinking on behalf of technology*. Technology denotes a system, whereas "man" is a focal *reference*. Our thinking is a thinking which is technological; by circumnavigating the solutions-based humanism which is intent on wresting the human from technological imprisonment, we intentionally diverge from where other emancipatory approaches so often reside.

The essence of modern technology is process. Process is the span of one challenging-forth, or the necessary quantity of time to turn miscellaneous things into technicized objects. Modern technology is quite content to

deny the durational longevity of subsequent challenges to maintain a forward-accelerating momentum—this is in tandem with what was communicated in the last chapter. Process shrinks to more-than-human speeds. Humans keep up, but they do so at the expense of scale. New technologies force humans to forfeit the old ways of doing things, changing their ways for the sake of staying up-to-date. Humans themselves must adapt to newer technologies that come preloaded with faster speeds and smarter features. Gadgetry—so long as we are keeping up with it—does not require our somnambulated consent to thrust itself on us with each coming wave of innovation. Along the way, we find ourselves modifying our behaviours, incrementally adjusting for scale and velocity. With whitened-knuckles, we are gripping onto a sense of *time* that is quickly slipping away. The anti-humanism of time is demarcated by this very intuition: the swelling lump in the chest cavity uttering with increasing consternation that we seem to be *losing control*.

The anti-humanism of time is explained in two ways. Humans enact technological logic inasmuch as they reproduce the challenging-forth, which extends to how they view and utilize time. Time is objectified; reduced to how it can be manipulated, calculated, and minimized to the best of human ability. This way of viewing time, however, is a technological *behaviour* that reproduces itself through humans. Humans invent and produce, and along the way time is increasingly *minimized*, however, this is not necessarily something that humans are in control of, since this is the *only* way that they know how to relate to it. The point here being that if time is *fabricated* technologically, then it is turned into an object. It belongs to technology, properly speaking, which is why it does not hesitate to advance in the ways that it does. In other words, it does not hesitate to forfeit its attachment to the "human", because it does not *belong* to this entity. Time is technological, which means that it is up to technology to manipulate time in the way that it chooses.

When we think technology, we think on behalf of the changing shape of time. If time is an object, which is not ours to possess but nonetheless is ours to experience, then all that we have to think is given to us by the parameters of thought that are shaped by the prevailing logics of time. Thinking on behalf of technology,

therefore, is to grasp the experienceable being of the human Dasein. Dasein—an object of technology itself—is there to be acted on, and if technology is the arbiter of time, then Dasein is mercilessly subjected to its fluctuations. Understand technology, and we understand the being of Dasein, which is technologically (temporally) bound.

3.2/The Phenomenological Manifestation of Time

Technology introduces a sense of time which is independent from primordial, or natural, types of time. On the surface, this seems a bold claim. And rightly so; how could it be argued that technological time—what I've been calling *process*—is wholly separate, or differentiated from other instantiations of time? This is where Schürmann's temporal phenomenology comes in handy. The historical 'event' of appropriation-expropriation allows for new conditions of presence to emerge during each age. Wendland (2018) uses an example to illustrate: gold is a financial entity is because it were fixed by an economic system inscribing it within a monetary context of presence (150). Likewise, historical paradigms come equipped with practical norms and theoretical assumptions undergirding specific goal-directed activities, thereby determining what it means for an entity to *be* within the purview of that theoretical horizon (Schürmann 1987). In other words, a paradigm standardizes beings by normalizing the parameters of presence, before maximizing phenomena into predetermined organizations of intelligibility (Schürmann 1994:93). In Wendland's example, the monetary backbone allowed "gold" to be regionalized within that paradigm. Likewise, in each epochal time-period, things are realized only if they make *sense*, to the extent that they have meaning within the proper domain of existential projection (1994:71). As such, the domain of projection is *prior* to beings—it is what gives beings *life*. In this age, Being informs technological gathering by *converting* entities into predicative objects inscribed within normative-scientific signifiers and quantitative-conceptual holds. What separates our modern period from the ancient one(s) is *how* beings are gathered; namely, through the violent inscription of the challenging-forth. For instance, consider two entities: a cow and a tree. Of course they are different, but their potential as

entities amounts to the same. The tree is looked at, valued even, for the sake of its lumber, while the cow appears as a useful resource loaded with harvestable fat. These ideas—lumber and fat—are totally different from one another, but in quite another sense they equate to identical manifestations of technological activity. The being of the cow and the tree, in that they can be readily challenged-forth, are examples of *technicity*, in how they are on standby, ready to be phenomenalized in a *technological manner*. As we will come to see, time, too is gathered in such a technical way. This is what enables me to justify process as one *mode* or *type* of time among others. Let us now probe a little further into the strategies of this working definition.

As we know, entities are subject to the Truth of an epoch delineating a range of possibles. Truth (*alēthia*) is shorthand for the conditions of emergence of a given time period, and contemporary technology *is* one such configuration (Schürmann 2019:194). However, in phenomenology, Truth is definitionally different than other domains that affirm mathematical or logically coherent proofs. Instead, Truth is consistent with the configurative modes of concealment/unconcealment that concurrently show and hide the world according to a technological picture. Indeed, Truth corresponds to the fissured (split) personality of Being, inasmuch as entities either *show* themselves by assimilating into the existing code(s) of intelligibility, or fade away to the point of disappearance—into invisibility (Schürmann 2019:201). "Being is indeed showing, rising, manifesting: but it is all that in *dissension*, in unconcealment-concealment by which the phenomenological 'No' asserts itself against 'Yes' and death declares itself against life" (2019:201). What is meant by the No and the Yes follows from what was said a few lines ago. The Yes denotes the appearance, visibility, manifestation, unconcealment, and the clearing of Being, whereas the No corresponds to hiddenness, concealment, non-visibility, and unknownness. The Truth is always revealed in the Yes (how could there be Truth if it were not visible?), but for Heidegger, the No is what curtails the assumptive permanency of the Yes by *temporalizing* it. When previously mentioning the quest for ultimacy, I was getting at how technology tries to cover up forms of the world which we no longer inhabit or which have become less actual. The conditions of emergence of beings in technology necessarily

precludes other possibilities of disclosure, intimating that the domineering strategy of today is the proliferation of a hegemonic Yes—a Yes to technical disclosure—instead of a No, an anticipatory No pointing at the eventual dissolution of technology. The Yes is a stand-in for permanency, whereas the No temporalizes the existing order by holding out for the *singularization* to come. According to Heidegger, philosophers everywhere have tended to ignore the No—the negation of visibility—because it does not appear, so they simply assume that it does not, or will not, exist. The phenomenological task, therefore, is to retrieve the No; to recuperate the fissured personality of Being as it points to a world *beyond* technology. Remembering the No, this is what grants the *saving power*.

Technology, and in particular, *time* appears in a certain manner in our age. They are both examples of Yes. A Yes of what? A Yes of manifestation—a Yes of *technicity*. Yes to the specific way of gathering of technology. To understand what *process* is, we need to know from whence it arises. We need to understand it—not in terms of what technological device it was invented or for whom—simply for the manner of gathering it embodies. For its potential to rise from the unknown to the shimmery light of the clearing of Truth. The way of gathering corresponds to the Truth of the being of process. So we expose it by bringing it forth, casting luminosity on the way that it beats, the rhythm that glazes over the world with pulse and fortitude. What has been tacit all along? Laying dormant in the roaring current of everyday life, dictating tempo without due attention or public awareness? How is time simply there, and from whence did it ascertain its there-ness?

For Schürmann, technicity is technological gathering *par excellence*. Phenomena are mere things prior to being gathered, and via making and building they combine with other things to form intelligible objects in the technological paradigm. A quick proviso: technicity diverges from technē—the Greek bringing-forth accompanied by helping hands. Technē is operative whenever humans make some goal-directed use of their hands, and yet, when it comes to modern mastery over nature via a universal mathematical project, this is something different from technē. Modern mastery is intentionally commandeering and, as such, loses sight of

what it means to be crafting (revealing) in symbiosis with nature. Below, Schürmann divulges the essential matter of technicity (1991:142).

A lintel, a column, and handful of sand, are possible from a block of marble, provided that a contract, an architect, a workshop, mallets, chisels, and so on, intervene. The 'Yes' in this case presupposes the invention of kineticism of these raw materials, but, more primordially, the Yes to the actual denotes the "Yes of *making*".[9]

In technology, the Yes corresponds to a *making*. What can be made with things is indeed what is most interesting about them. The Yes is full of order, which means in this instance: full of an order to be realized, full of a technical organization to be actualized. Ordering the possibles into actuals is the essence of technicity. It requisitions a univocal assent into the technological stable of Being. All beings, in that they are beings, are technicized (made, or gathered) into presence. Of course, this rule extends to time, albeit not very intuitively. Making, as a building, can be interpreted quite literally. Raw materials were challenged-forth into being, which is how the lintel, the column, and the handful of sand appeared. They were *made* this way. Time, too, gets made, but not in a literal sense. Things, *materials*, are not gathered into objects, and then time suddenly appears. One might object: is this not *exactly* how time gets made? With the invention of the sundial in Egypt around 800 BC, followed by the slew of horological gadgetry up to and including the digital (or virtual) clock? Precisely not, as this confuses *representations* of time with *actual* time. Representations of time serve quite different functions to actual time. Representations safeguard time by keeping it, by stowing it away away from view. In other words, *concealing* time. In this model, time is always and only registered as a display. A display of what? A display of the actual or, objective countenance of time. When I cite the making of time it has nothing to do with such representative hardware. Making, in mine, and indeed Schürmann's thinking is consistent with a phenomenological purview. It has to do with how time is made—not in a literal sense, as I've described here—but according to a phenomenalization, or better yet a manifestation. Manifestation is the thinking that thinks making unaccompanied by the raw affliction of the challenging-forth. It corresponds to a simple gathering, or a

[9] From Heidegger's *Contributions to Philosophy*, 2012:174

raising of time from invisibility to visibility. When we ask, "how is time made?" What is requested is the appearance of time, the movement from hiddenness to disclosure. Process, like the other entities, is a possible holding the potential to rise into actuality by virtue of thrownness (objects, too, are thrown, isn't that right?). In other words time, or process, gets made-into-presence, *gathered*, in each instance of technicity.

Let us unravel this idea. First, we must be prudent to think time as an object which is brought to life alongside the lintel and the column. In this sense, there is an "amount" corresponding to the "how much" of time required to make the column and the lintel provided that the block of marble, an architect, his tools and so on, intervene. This amount of time does not have to be exact: a rough intuition will suffice. For instance, we can quite safely assume, due to the parameters of the project, that the time required to make the materials will not take months, or years for that matter; it is also not accurate to say that it will take mere seconds, or minutes. The amount of time needed to produce the lintel and the column, provided that the architect is adept at her craft, will take roughly a few hours to complete. The amount of time corresponding to this process, is known in advance by the architect, and if it is not, if the architect is inexperienced with such a project, then she will surely figure it out—either by watching and asking others, or by trying it herself, and producing her own answer for such a question.

The significance of this example is that the "amount", or the "how much" corresponding to the quantitative whole of the process of making is *interesting*, which means, in another sense, that it *matters*. It is important that the architect understand, *prima facie*, the "amount" of time required to undertake one of her fabrications, so that she has an idea of "how long" it will take to reproduce the same sort of task in the future. Insofar as the task is known in advance, the architect can apply some sort of "schedule", or datability as Heidegger would say, to this procedure. She can insert it within her schedule, meaning she can structure her time according to "how long" the procedure will endure. As such, the architect, now that she has performed the procedure once, and thus understands very well the temporal parameters of her goal-directed fabricating, can implement this within the

schedule of her everyday life. The "amount" of time required to produce the lintel and the column, for her, have rigidified. They have become knowable in advance. And this means not only that this understanding of time between the architect and this particular project is reproducible in different contexts; it means moreover that one's time is capable of being portioned into different procedures. If all of her procedures are ones she is familiar with, then it is likely the case that all of her time will be spent in the middle of accomplishing different procedures.

Perhaps more importantly, the "how much" corresponds to the way in which, for this particular procedure, time is *made* into being. It now has a defined *beginning* and *end* which is associated with the fabrication of the column and the lintel. This is what I claim to be the beginnings of the technological appropriation of time: that time is expropriated into procedural undertakings which are calculated in advance of their enactment, and that this method of *dividing* time into portions can be applied onto most of our procedures that require the usage of some tool in particular.

This, as far as I can tell, corresponds to the way in which, in each "challenging-forth", time is purposely made into a calculable or knowable phenomenon. Our understanding of time consists in our ability to associate it with such-and-such procedure, which are usually carried out with equipment that assist in particular processes. The *reproducibility* of time corresponds to the technological tendency, latent in the challenging-forth, to conceptualize time in exactly this way. Time becomes reduced to how it fits within certain procedures, and, following that, how the temporal parameters of these procedures can be reduced. In other words, technology makes time, if only to problematize it by figuring out new ways to deny it.

3.3/The Primacy of Time

Paraphrasing Heidegger, nothing can become manifest that does not first conform to the technological way of gathering (Schürmann 2019:193). Nothing has being unless it is objectified (by production, circulation, and consumption) into standing-reserve; our languages serving as conduits for such technicization (2019:193).

“Language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings. We encounter beings as actualities in a calculative businesslike way, but also scientifically by way of philosophy, with explanation and proofs” (Heidegger 223:2008). This is the unconcealed truth of our age, where the philosophical gaze remains riveted to things disclosed rather than moving back to the process of disclosure, or manifestation, itself. There is a reason for this: technology’s mission is to eradicate all possibility of deferment to the “No” by forever and always affirming the same isomorphic gathering of things into technical object-beings. The end-product of this logic conforms to what I earlier called the quest for ultimacy, or, as Schürmann and Heidegger put it, the “giganticism” of “planetary totalitarianism” which has its roots in modernized challenging-forth (Schürmann 1994:92). Despite this, and although the self-denial of the challenging-forth is what drives technology forwards, technology is the unabridged whole of beings in this age. This is in keeping with the idea that the challenging-forth represents just one constituent of technicity. When walking to the corner store to buy groceries for the week, is this a challenging-forth? Invariably no, however, the manner in which the food being purchased, before it is purchased, gets injected with hormonal steroids before being crushed and melded inside the metallic jaws of industrial food-processing machines, and then hygienically prepackaged for the consumer-eye is! The point is, we can now discern a range of technical revealing that is nonetheless included under the title “modern technology”, extending from forcefulness and the unmitigated expansion of territory in the challenging-forth to the facticity of things appearing in the technological age, which is relatively banal and uninteresting by comparison.

Proselytizing the challenging-forth omits the subtler ways that Being is claimed by technology. At first glance, the routine trip to the store is hardly technological. However, such counter-arguments tend to miss the point. Technicity is everywhere—even the unassuming drab of everydayness is technicity. Walking to the store is a calculated affair—from the intentional reserving and allotting of time needed to do this activity, to the rationale for which products to purchase and consume. Likewise, it is possible that during this process, the

shopper accidentally partook in the requisitioning of the commercialized food industry, by posing as the consumer link on a sequentialized chain of commodity production! There are virtually no means of escaping the technological paradigm, perhaps this is because it is woven into the very fabric of our phenomenology. If we are not the ones doing the challenging, we are ordering others to enact it on our behalf. We are implicated in this rationale whether we like it or not; whether we choose to take part in the action or watch hungrily from the sidelines.

We are focussing on the conversion of time to process, and, following that, the emergence of process in technicity. In technicity, every*thing* gets reduced to a scheme of quantification and numerical applicability. This also includes the way in which human phenomenology and experience is conditioned by *process*. Thus it is not simply that process refers to the duration of technicization. Process is the infiltrator by which everything we say, think and do is deeply impressed by a *logic* of duration. Time is *primary*, by this is meant that time corresponds to the fertile soil upon which the activities, the busy-ness and the seriousness are allowed to cultivate. By all accounts, the assimilation of human phenomenology into process signifies the completion of technological planetary totalitarianism, in how *all* possible action is governed by the dictum of quantification. What makes technology so powerful is its ability to metamorphose space and time into a technological purview. Moreover, because technicity is anti-humanist, "man" is no longer the standard from whence everything is measured. "Man" is relegated to one entity among others in the technological paradigm, whose being is regulated by technicity. In rawest form, technicity shows itself in the manner of Dasein's reckoning with time. *Process* was the basic quality of the challenging-forth, remember? The essence of technology is revealed in each instance vis-à-vis Dasein's enormous preoccupation with quantification. When all that Dasein can say, think, and do is siphoned into *availability*, when Dasein's *potential* is encompassed in the hegemonic maximization of neoliberal management of the self, this is when Dasein encounters totalized, unmediated isomorphism: Dasein is the embodiment of flesh and programmable will-to-power.

Time is of primary concern for Dasein. Dasein is eager to know where it stands in relation to time, which is why Dasein insists on proximally staying near to representative (chronological) hardware. Even when Dasein strays away from time, Dasein never hesitates to find itself again. Dasein feels at home in time; certainly, this is because Dasein can always return to it. Time is *felt*, its presence is guaranteed, it is predictively stable through time. On this, we can say that all of Dasein's goal-directed activity is rendered *secondary* to time, which is the organizer of Dasein's activity. Goal-directed activity is the most sophisticated expression of the will-to-will in technology, when the extent of actionable *possibility* (of what can be accomplished) is delimited by two extremities. The *arché*, the beginning, and the *telos*, which is the end. Ordering and challenging regulate technicity within the arrangement of this setup. When all things are order-able it means they can be requisitioned into a temporal ambit. It means they exist in the logic of duration—that they have being at all is because they are temporalized. "Objects", in that they are "objects", are gathered first and foremost so as to cohere with time. All things are technicized—yes, this is true—is it also true that all things are temporalized? It might be helpful to remember the cow and the tree example. There is a fixed duration appended to each of them, determining the *how much*, the quantity of availability until they have been successfully dissected and dismantled, primed for consumptive activity. The amount of time it will take for the activity is primary, it takes precedence over the manner of the technicization. In this calculated routine, all activities are possible on the grounds that they cohere with availability. Naturally this extends to Dasein, in how Dasein's actioning is absorbed into the metric of universal *mathēsis*, which is why we point out that time, *not* Dasein, is the centrality from where all things are measured. Actually, we can amend the previous sentence to say that time is the centrality from where all of *Dasein's activities* are measured. Dasein is content to run along in time like an innocent fledgeling, failing to take heed of the fact that it is seldom *in control* of time. Unbeknownst to Dasein, time has a quicksilver appearance, it is perpetually running out of itself. Time is liquid, and in these fainted moments, Dasein fails to reckon with what may be called the fluid and swiftly evolving temperament of time.

Time is central—this is absolutely what makes time so integral to understanding the lived experiences *of* Dasein. Dasein dwells in time in two separate yet related ways. Dasein is *thrown* into a type, or a mode of time specific to the age it were conceived. Staying consistent with Schürmann—in each age beings (and this includes time!) are governed by nomothetic laws of Truth. Time for the Greeks appeared differently from how it appears to us. Today, time appears much differently for non-European traditions than for European ones. Perhaps this is because time is a *cultural* phenomenon: it is instilled with varying significance depending on the source of its conception. Consider Leroy Little Bear's commentary on the American conception of time in *Crossing Borders* (2020:182) as one example of this:

> A logical and inherent characteristic of the concept of time is that once a unit of the river of time flows past a Nacirema it never returns—it is gone forever. This characteristic lends itself to other concepts as "wasting time", "making up time", "buying time" which are unique to the Nacirema.

Now, examine how Little Bear compares the American conception of time with the Blackfoot notion of time (2020:183):

> Blackfoot thinks of time on a two-day operational. There is now, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow. Beyond the two day limit, forward or backward, past and present amalgamate and become one and the same. The distant future and past is thought of with the "constant flux" in mind. But everything, ancestors, etc, are only always two days away.

Not every culture, not every tradition, adheres to our Eurocentric, linearized, *mathēsis* conception of time. Equally, not every culture, not every tradition submits to technicity. Technicity *gives* time, but it also facilitates the manner of our experience *of* time. The time of our age infiltrates Dasein's temporality. In fact, temporality *issues* from time. Or, in this context—temporality *issues* from process. Like Schürmann says, technicity gathers Dasein's phenomenology: everything we say, do, and think is tortured into normative highways of thinking that permeate Dasein's experience. Dasein is *thrown* into economic modalities of temporality, and this is because Dasein is the being that merges with the sense of time closest available, in order that it remain inscribed within metaphysical tractions of presence. Since the technological manner of gathering is technicity, process is the primary way in which time is practiced and experienced in Eurocentric societies.

4/The Technological Basis of Everyday Life

Reflection transports the man of the future into that "between" in which he belongs to
Being and yet remains a stranger amid that which is.

—Martin Heidegger[10]

The buildings at the local University have lineage that arose within history. They have titles that connote their meanings; histories, politics, initiatives that are representative of biographies, pioneers, celebrities, colonialists. All the historical symbolism evoked in a single title, but the pedestrian does not see this. The pedestrian sees a regular building, equipped with functional doorways, heavily trafficked footpaths and classrooms filled with students. The history of the buildings are hidden from view, sedimented under layers of concern from dress codes, pressing assignments and to-dos, and even what will be consumed for lunch that day. "Everydayness" refers to such a world of concern, which is not necessarily attentive to anyone or anything in specific, rather to a specific type of thinking in one's day-to-day experience, much of it going unnoticed, undisturbed by anything other than a passing judgement or a fleeting observation. Beyond that, little is determined about these experiences; they surface like variegating cloud patterns before disappearing into the void. Such are the fluctuations of everydayness, the tacit beliefs and attitudes that comprise everyday life. Everydayness includes the presuppositions that structure what it entails, for instance, to carry out an interesting conversation with a stranger, or to simply prepare oneself for work like any other day.

The mundane, routinized schedule of everyday matters is cloaked in tedium; such concern cannot possibly allow for penetrating scrutiny. Yet this is exactly the kind of terrain that the phenomenologist seeks to investigate. It is within these currents—the effervescent ripples that structure the intricacies of everyday thought—that the depth of the observation unfolds, where what clashes with the twinkling eye is the invitation to a more primordial depth of understanding. These patterns of everyday life, beneath their pallid surfaces, bequeath

---

[10] "The Age of World Picture", 1977:135.

a phenomenological feast; indeed, with a bit of poking and prodding, the nakedness of the configuration of everydayness will disclose itself. The manner and nature of the "observation", such as the ones excellently articulated by Italo Calvino's fictional character *Mr. Palomar*, must nevertheless incorporate technicity, which, as we have discovered, corresponds to a way of seeing. Everydayness must be broached in technical terms, the moorage between technicity and human experience must be ascertained phenomenologically to fully understand the complexity of what is at stake in the technological takeover of Being.

Does Heidegger ever forge the link that claims our attention here? Does he ever expand on the essence of technology from the standpoint of Dasein? Or is technology simply rooted in the challenging-forth, and the fact that the human sinks to one node among many others that reproduce technological logic by ordering lesser beings into standing-reserve. Technology sets upon humans by positioning itself to order them—this is what Heidegger offers us, quite vague descriptions of a totalitarian phenomenology that absorbs all beings into a technological matrix of intelligibility. Tenuous as this seems, it is perhaps due to the fact that Heidegger abandoned Dasein after *Being and Time* that the ontological constitution of the human was excluded from his writings after 1927. In later works, particularly the ones on technology, Dasein is excluded from the scene altogether. This move made sense for Heidegger at the time, since he wanted to diverge from existentialism and upholding the centrality of the human in his thinking, but this leaves us with remnants of *Being and Time* that have yet to be resolved. Not, I should clarify, because they *failed* to include Dasein, but because they failed to show how Dasein's everydayness is a *result* of technological anti-humanism. Since Dasein is excluded from the scene of what is to be thought, the "everydayness" of technology is hidden from view, even *if* it happened to constitute the groundwork for an anti-humanist theory. Since the manner of facilitating the phenomenology of everydayness is to be found in Dasein's existence, what logically follows is an analysis of everydayness insofar as it is *substantiated* by technicity.

In *Being and Time*, all phenomena are phenomena for *Dasein* (Being-there) meaning that phenomena are related in each circumstance back to Dasein as their point of reference. The essence of Dasein lies in its existence, thus, characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not properties present-at-hand of some entity which looks so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible *ways* for it to be (Heidegger 1962:67). If we are to interpret Dasein ontologically, the problematic of its Being must be developed from the existentiality of its everydayness (Heidegger 1962:69). In *The History of the Concept of Time* (1985), Heidegger warned that "every character of the being of Dasein is governed by its fundamental determination—which is the particular" (154). In other words, the specific, singular Dasein itself. However, in order to forge the link between Dasein and technicity, we must forego the *particular* Dasein and instead focus on Dasein "in its way to be", that is, Dasein must be understood in its *everydayness* (1985:154-5). Thus, "we are reporting no *particular* everyday life but we are seeking the everydayness of everyday life, not for particular Dasein but *the* everydayness *for its particular while as Dasein*" (1985:155). Individual Dasein is particularized, but it partakes in everydayness by succumbing to it just like everyone else. This is because, for Heidegger, everydayness is a distinctive *how* of the Being of Dasein; everydayness persists everywhere and always every day; each is a witness as to how Dasein has to be and how it *is* in everydayness (1985:155). If Heidegger is correct, and everydayness is *universal*, then it must be the designated platform of inquiry into the Being of Dasein, and how this entity appears technologically.

4.1/The Architecture of World

Being-in-the-World is Dasein's basic ontological constitution. It conveys Dasein's capacity to enter into a relation with the world, which is possible on the grounds that Dasein is already *in-the-World*. Being-in-the-world is a *unitary* phenomenon, it ontologically permits Dasein to be wholesomely *in-the-world*, and we must be careful to insure that this term is preserved and intended as such (Heidegger 1962:78). However, we still have to partition *Being-in-the-world* into three subcategorizations, since the forthcoming analysis would not be

possible to ascertain phenomenologically by simply postulating *Being-in-the-world*. Thus, treading with necessary caution in not tampering too heavily with *Being-in-the-world*, we permit ourselves to distinguish the entity that is Dasein in three ways: Being is *in-the-world*, *with-Others*, and *there*. *World* is *umwelt* (surrounding environment), *Others* are *mitwelt* (sociality; namely friends or acquaintances), and the *there* is *Sein* (Da-sein) itself. Dasein, in that it exists, is always Being-in-the-world in this tripartite manner. In light of this, we can now add the "everydayness" from earlier to Dasein's ontological constitution which, taken together, prescribe *the facticity of Dasein's Being-in-the-world in everyday, technological life*. Primordially, technicity informs Dasein's Being-in-the-world, and it accomplishes this in each of the ways listed above. However, since the starting point of such an analysis only preliminarily establishes the link between Dasein and technicity, only the first of these—*World*—will be examined in full.

Heidegger's tripartite analysis of Being-in-the-world commences with the starting point that Dasein (Being-there) is thrown into a world. Dasein is thrown into the publicness of the "they", into worlds of *concern* that preexist Dasein (Heidegger 1962:210). To be sure, "concern" denotes *the types of relationships Dasein has with the things that it encounters in the world* (Schalow and Denker 2010). Dasein is thrown into a historical, social, geographical and political context. It is *absorbed* by specific modalities of understanding, talking and interpreting the world that it had little power in manifesting. *This is how Dasein was socialized—into caring about things and issues that do not belong to it*. "World" for Heidegger has several connotations (I will not be providing an exhaustive account of all of these.). There is of course a public, intersubjective "we" world that everyone shares in common perception and observation, just as there is one's own, inner "private" world (Heidegger 1962:93). The present analysis will only be considering the "world" of Dasein and the entities therein, which corresponds to the beings closest to Dasein *environmentally* (Heidegger 1962:95). What are these entities that surround Dasein? *Who* are these entities? Entities are beings that are present in the everyday involvements of Dasein—literally, what *surrounds* Dasein, like the non-human *things* that Dasein uses

(incorporates) for its activities. The specific Being of entities depends on how they show themselves to Dasein, and, later on, how they disperse themselves into Dasein's *manifold* ways of concern (Heidegger 1962:95). Primordially, entities are discoverable "by the prior projection of their state of Being" (Heidegger 1962:414). Entities thus discovered are preordained with particular *states* of technological intelligibility. Phenomenologically in an epoch, that Dasein can discover beings at all presupposes that these discoveries are undergirded by a technological framework. Entities show themselves *in a technological horizon of intelligibility.* Thus, Dasein does not first authorize the Being of entities, because entities *show themselves* to Dasein in a technological manner, and Dasein, in turn, readily apprehends these entities within this "coda" of understanding. This harkens back to Schürmann's idea that all one can say, think and do is inscribed within a regional context of meaning (1987). Presence—what is *possible* to phenomenologically experience—is *given* by the constellations of *this* age. That Dasein is spatially disclosed *here* or *there* is possible on these *a priori* grounds.

In Dasein's everyday life, entities are encountered either as *presence-at-hand* or as *ready-to-hand*. The former implies that Dasein encounters entities in the world purely based in the way that they look. For Heidegger, presence-at-hand disregards the referential whole of practical and personal concerns that make up the everyday world, and this disregard leads to an objectification of entities as those which stand *against* a subject (Schalow and Denker 2010:229). Thus, when entities appear as presence-at-hand, they appear as objects capable of being 'known' by a subject. It is well known that Heidegger's step back in *Being and Time* analyzes this 'Cartesian' axiom for the purpose of implementing a "new beginning" for Western philosophy. Being-there rethinks the formal presupposition of a metaphysical dictum founded upon the dualistic split of the world into "subjectivity" and "objectivity". Descartes did not realize that a subject must already be disclosed in a world before *cogito ergo sum* can be ascertained phenomenologically. Heidegger resolves this metaphysic by *throwing* Dasein into a world of *concern*—into a relational whole of practical and personal concerns comprising everyday

life. In light of this, we can ask: *what is already in a world?* This is indeed where Heidegger's analysis in *Being and Time* gets interesting. "Equipment" denotes the *types* of relational involvements of Dasein. It is the point of entry of Dasein into *worlds* of concern. The *types* of equipment Dasein uses will be integral to the analysis as we proceed, since it is invariably through these types of equipment that Dasein can intermingle with the *world.* What is available for Dasein to use in an *in-order-to* fashion is therefore *contingent upon the era in question*. The tools that Dasein has depend on *when* Dasein is *temporally constituted*. What is already *in* a world of concern, therefore, is given by the specific types of *equipment* that typically fill one's surroundings. Thus, ready-to-hand denotes an environmentalism—that there are non-human entities that *surround* Dasein in Dasein's everyday dealings, and that these *determine* Dasein's relations with the world. Moreover, equipment is quite flexibly defined by Heidegger, it just refers to anything that Dasein utilizes in an *in-order-to* fashion…like the hammer *in-order-to* build, or the vehicle *in-order-to* drive. Dasein is temporally and spatially regulated according to the equipment it has, which assist in the fulfillment of Dasein's goal-directed activities. This is elaborated on by Heidegger (1962:97): "[we] shall call those entities which we encounter in concern *equipment*. In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, or measurement."

Equipment, which is essentially in an *in-order-to* fashion, corresponds to a connected structure in which there lies an assignment or reference of something *to* something. The 'hammer' is one example of this, which Dasein employs for its activities that require the usage of a hammer. This hammer is just never discovered in isolation—the Being of the hammer *implies* all of this other equipment—nails, slabs of timber, even a level—which, taken together, *complete* the 'Being' of the hammer. "Ready-to-hand" equipment, like the hammer, implicates entire relational networks of involvement, and this includes Dasein. Dasein is *in* this world, it is apart of this relational network, but what distinguishes readiness-to-hand *ontologically* is precisely the idea that it implies *equipmental withdrawal*. According to Heidegger, "the tools which we use *withdraw* from our conscious attention…our focus is not on them, but on the work that is to be produced as the "towards-which"

and the "in-order-to" of such things" (1962:99). So long as the equipment functions, so long as it works, Dasein need not think about it much at all. In lieu of pondering the equipment of one's deliberation, Dasein is freed, *released* to think about the *production* of its work. Finishing "work", or getting to the end of what must be done, becomes the primary object of Dasein's concern. Readiness-to-hand simply assists in the continuity of Dasein's movement towards the goal of its choosing. Primordially, then, readiness-to-hand is not so much a reference to "specific equipment" in itself, *rather it is a fundamental way that Dasein relates to the world in withdrawal*.

4.2/The Technological Constitution of the World

This is where, if I am not mistaken, the stamp of technicity first appears. Readiness-to-hand is a way of relating to the world, where the equipment of Dasein's circumspective concern *withdraws* into the background, away from view. The manner of Dasein's engagement with such equipment is tantamount to passing it by. Due to the tendency to withdraw from Dasein's awareness, Dasein continues everyday operations as if the equipment were simply immune to any kind of *breakage* that would necessitate intervening to try and repair it. Conspicuousness —or when the equipment *does* become unusable (i.e.: due to breakage)—clears the way for a different relation with that equipment, one concerned with restoring the equipment to the state it occupied previously. With regards to equipment, it seems always to follow this routinized pattern of Being. Either it is working as it should, thus wandering away from Dasein's field of circumspective awareness, else it is broken or lost, and Dasein must resourcefully locate ways to return the equipment to a prior state of function, either by undertaking this job by itself, hiring a handyman, or replacing it anew. Regardless of method, the teleology is unchanging, which suggests that the normal state of the equipment is to be judged in terms of its usability.

Now, if the equipment cannot be used because it is broken or indeed missing, this is grounds for the equipment to jump out at Dasein from the inconspicuous place(s) of its hiding. As an example, perhaps Dasein is driving the car and the rear tire is sliced by a shard of glass that was lying in the middle of the road. The tire, hitherto withdrawn from Dasein's concernful view, reintroduces itself as something that must be approached

and cared for. All of a sudden, Dasein must haltingly tend to the punctured tire, which constitutes an *interruption.* Before the incident, Dasein was able to run along quite seamlessly, without intermittently stopping, halting, or tending to the ready-to-hand things (like the tire) that entitled it to a semblance of continuity. Now, Dasein must *stop* running along in order to deal with the punctured tire—it must retract from the inertia of running along. Note that discontinuity is only temporary—*Dasein will always try to return the equipment to a state of withdrawal so that it can continue running along*. This suggests that conspicuousness has little do with the material outcomes of the equipment itself, since these things can always be replaced or repaired. Conspicuousness is really a matter of interruption, because it compels Dasein to slow down, stop, and examine the problem. Conspicuousness removes Dasein from the continuity of running along, forcing it to try and retrieve the time it has lost to *get back on time*. This manner of wrestling with time is the primordial underpinning of *impatience*. Interrupted, Dasein is behind, and now it must rush to get *back on schedule*. Impatience is temporal, it corresponds to the way that Dasein is always in *conflict* with time.

In sum, technicity ensures that Dasein upholds a state of continuity, and this is substantiated by the fact that whenever Dasein's equipment falls into disrepair, Dasein nearly always tries to return it to a state of wellbeing by fixing or purchasing anew. Everydayness is predicated on Dasein's ability to *stay with the continuity of time*. As such, technicity's aim is to keep Dasein running along by encouraging it to get *back* to a passive, production oriented disclosure of uninterrupted tampering. This is how the liaison between technicity and equipment gets fortified: by *maintaining* Dasein in a state of continuity and mitigating subsequent interruptions, by *returning* equipment to a state of withdrawal. Thus the primordial disclosure of technicity is to be found in the *continuity* of Dasein's everyday running along, and this is insured by the prolonged *withdrawal* of its equipment.

In addition to withdrawal, readiness-to-hand fosters a kind of unreflective circumspection, where Dasein knows in advance that it does not necessarily need to think critically on the specific equipment of its concern to still be able to use them. For the most part, these tools are self-preserving, in that they rarely require Dasein's

tender care and affection to conserve their use-function. At this stage, technicity—which is already the master of continuity and equipmental withdrawal—employs another strategy. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's examples *de facto* consisted of equipment that one can find in an average toolshed. Tools, such as the hammer, withdrew from Dasein's immediate awareness. To be sure, *this is not to say that Dasein could not see the hammer any longer.* Rather, the Being of readiness-to-hand equipment merely *fades* into the background. Dasein needn't think about the whereabouts of the hammer because it intuitively knows, from memory, where it gets stored in the shed. Moreover, the hammer is quite a robust tool, it can easily endure severe precipitations of weather and prolonged usage without rusting or chipping. The hammer, we can conclude, is a relatively low maintenance tool, which has the effect of *freeing* Dasein to relocate its attention to other, more pressing affairs.

In withdrawal, the Being of the hammer *falls* under sedimented layers of circumspective concern, however, this is only possible on the grounds that Dasein is absolutely certain that the hammer will preserve itself in a continuous state of Being. That is, the hammer will not unexpectedly falter or go missing—that it will always be there when Dasein is in need. Because of the character of the hammer—the fact that it is durable and reliable—Dasein can assuredly keep it "out of mind". "Certitude" is what enables Dasein to keep the hammer at bay, so that Dasein can continue tarrying alongside the tools of its concern, moving in the direction of some goal-directed activity. And, depending on the activity, there may be *several* tools that withdraw from Dasein's immediate awareness at once! Perhaps we are discussing Dasein's car again. The equipmental innards of the car work together systematically to 'keep' the engine puttering. They mostly maintain themselves, except for once in a while, when Dasein must intervene to replenish the fluids. The mechanical intestines of the car are mainly autonomous, in that they seldom require Dasein's intervention. The car is engineered in this way in order to 'free' Dasein to focus on the passage of road stretching before it. In being certain that it needn't worry about the engine, Dasein can continue running along with the certitude that the car is functioning as it should—thus allowing Dasein to uphold a state of continuity.

Back to technicity. If certitude is what enables Dasein to be freed up, then the object of technicity is to permanently engender this certitude in each of Dasein's activities. If the idea is to keep Dasein bumbling along, then the object of technicity is to ensure that Dasein is proximally and for the most part kept up by its equipment. *Freeing allows Dasein to dwell elsewhere, away from the equipmental immediacy of Dasein's circumspective dealings.* Dwelling elsewhere, Dasein is certain of being freed, so it can continue tarrying without worry, and in fact is now permitted to "wander". Wandering is possible on the grounds that Dasein needn't think or tarry with the equipment of its circumspective dealings—it is the default attitude of a freed Dasein that has little in the way of assignments or todos. As such, wandering is non-teleological, which is to say that it is decidedly directionless; it registers little movement by itself, with the exception of being carried along solely by the looks of the world (Heidegger 1962). Wandering is essentially goalless. It raises little ambition, or projection of its own doing; it is easily distracted and does not commandeer the requisite stamina with which to impregnate the world. Initially, wandering does seem problematic for technicity, insofar as technicity is predicated on surreptitiously ensuring that Dasein moves along, continuously and steadfastly, to tackle new projects, goals, and ambitions. Since wandering is quite clearly the antithesis to continuity, it seems likely that wandering should *present* as a problem. However, mere wandering is also susceptible to be encountered by whatever might come to pass it by. In wandering, Dasein does not readily recognize that the characteristic of complacency and simply letting whatever happens *happen*, is the solicitation for technicity to permeate its emptiness with technical activities, with preexisting worlds burgeoning with extra-curricular concerns and average busyness. Thus, wandering is just as vulnerable to the apparatus of technicity as continuity is, and this is because wandering, in being *freed*, returns to the bustle of busyness in order to fill itself once more.

The busyness of everyday running along is deceptive, inasmuch as one thinks they are actively upholding a camouflage of being filled up. Underneath the activity and the complacency of merely getting absorbed by the busyness of one's choosing, Dasein is overcome with the pervasive sense of emptiness, exacerbated by falling

for the groundlessness of busyness in the same empty ways. The essence of busyness is to be found in Dasein's propensity to 'cover up' the aperture of directionless wandering by making itself available to be filled. Making oneself available is akin to opening oneself up to receive the world. It is a pleading to be swept into the current of bustle which is primordially the act of driving on, in terms of industry, activity, as well as undertaking, pursuit, or business (Heidegger 1977a:124). When, in other words, one's activities are transformed, both institutionally and through sanctioned matter of factness of technicity—into mere procedures and processes without ample reflection (Vahabzadeh 2020:380). In this sense, busyness by getting filled up is the passive orientation of letting oneself be carried along in the current of technicity, which stops at nothing, which advances without respite.

In making itself available by opening up to receive, Dasein accedes to the *coming-towards* of technicity (I will return to this), which is equipped with novel concerns that fill Dasein in various ways. It is not that Dasein necessarily cares *how* it is filled, just *that* it is filled. It is better to be filled then empty, and this is evidenced in the way that Dasein always finds some-thing with which it can *leap-away* from the crippling stillness of the Present. This character of *leaping-away* seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters, not to mention the constant possibility of distraction. In technicity, Dasein will just never be able to come to grips with stillness, which harkens back to interruption from earlier. Stillness is a wresting away into a monotony that stops and starts, stands and falls, neither nearby nor far off, always returning Dasein to a state of inactivity and the sheer absence of movement (Heidegger 2012:24). In these lulls of activity, when stillness steals from the continuity of technicity, restlessness masquerades as flexibility, and Dasein opens itself to acquire tools and concerns that are solicited as offerings by technicity.

4.3/Gadgetry

So far, what we have discovered pertains to the everydayness of technicity, which is essentially a system of strategic procedures for safeguarding Dasein in the steadfastness of the technological ethos. Stepping back, the

significance of such a pattern cannot be understated, mainly because it points to the Being—the *how*—of Dasein in technology. However, the pattern of technicity reaches a vertex in the 21st century, when certitude is attained in *all* of Dasein's activities and the accompanying wanderlust is not just apparent, but *normalized*. Dasein is so *free*, so liberated from the fetters of drudgery that seek to snatch it from the continuity of everyday life. That blasted *time*, that before seemed be the source of one's grief is now plentiful thanks to technicity, whose innovative ethic has resulted in Dasein's escape from the clutches of inefficiency and inconvenience. What tribulation could Dasein experience *now*, when all the adversity facilitated by the 'old ways' of conducting business has effectively been quashed by *newer* implementations and procedures? What could *possibly* be at issue given that the promise of technology has materialized and we stand here, on the cusp of boundless horizon?

It stands to reason that the aforementioned teleology comes to an *end* in the 21st century. In numerous ways, Dasein has transcended the earthly predicament it always tried to overcome. All of the familiar improvements to efficiency, such as the dissemination of information or transportation, are to a certain extent superfluous in that they do not release Dasein any more than their recent predecessors. Technicity is comparable to a broken record—recited strategies are employed time and time again; Dasein falling for them in the same empty ways. The only semblance of technicity's mutation is the fact that, in addition to promising releasement from constraints imposed by Dasein's equipment, technicity seems to have transposed the object of its influence. One early symptom of the latest mutation of technicity—which we are at pains to predict with utmost certitude—is the idea of "novelty". Now that Dasein doesn't need to be released from anything in particular, and is left with an abundance of time and space that it does not quite know what to do with, technicity raises this new strategy.

Indeed, what technicity—and the technological apparatus more broadly, which has its roots in enlightenment rationality—failed to anticipate was this excess amount of freedom that Dasein is suddenly *burdened* by. What will Dasein do with this emptiness; how might it fill itself? The solution falls, once again, to the jurisdiction of

technology. The former logic, having exhausted itself at the apogee of technological ingenuity, is being replaced by a fresh one. What might this be? A reasonable response seems to be located in the *expansion* of the notion of *concern*. The primordial constitution of concern is given by the "relation between Dasein and the things that it encounters within the world" (Schalow and Denker 2010:85). Expanding the notion of concern would therefore entail *broadening* the *types* of relationships between Dasein and the things it encounters in the world. Technicity's aim demarcates from the former strategy by manifesting *new* types of relationships, the intention being to expand the "range" of things that Dasein is in accordance with. What is meant by relation in Heidegger is simply the condition of being *drawn* into the Being of entities—whether these be inanimate or not (Schalow and Denker 2010:240). Ontologically, expanding the notion of concern is consistent with being drawn into relations with *more* entities which were hitherto unknown or insignificant. Thus, technicity expands concern by drawing Dasein into relationships with *more* entities.

One problem with this formulation is *time*. There is a finite amount of time, both in the span of a day and Dasein's life. If Dasein increases the number of entities it has relationships with, then this naturally discourages Dasein from *getting-close* to any one of these entities in particular. Dasein must certainly spread itself very thinly across many different entities in order to maintain this number of relationships—indeed, this prevents it from experiencing any real amount of *intimacy* with the entities of its choosing. However, the *other* problem is to do with novelty. Even by expanding the number of entities in relationship with Dasein, it is still unsatisfactory because Dasein wants to experience the newness of *novel* relationships. As such, not only is Dasein in many relationships with different entities, it is also circulating between different entities *all of the time*. It is in eternal *trial* mode.

Technicity typically assumes responsibility to try and *manifest* novelty in order to keep Dasein running along. As such, novelty isn't necessarily a matter of waiting until something changes, rather, it is the manner of *producing newness* with a consistency that will keep Dasein running along to the throb of activity. Still more

can be said about this phenomenon, particularly about the fact that technicity operates with its own type of novelty. How can this novelty be ascertained? In technicity, novelty is the introduction of something new to the pattern of *what has already been seen.* In other words, novelty issues a rupture to Dasein's reserve of existing relationships by thrusting itself onto *what already is*. In this way, Dasein is regularly colonized by new concerns that add to the reservoir of existing ones that likewise fade into the cracks of distant memory. This is how technicity keeps Dasein running along in everydayness, and this is also why novelty follows the course of transcending Dasein from what is already known and therefore *boring* in the strict sense of already having been seen. It follows that *interruption* from earlier no longer corresponds to the hapless circumstance of equipmental breakage—as of now, interruption is befitted to the *sudden*, *unexpected thrust* of novelty imposed by the latest contrivance(s) of technicity.

We have thus determined that novelty is transcendental, in that Dasein is elevated from the boringness of *what-already-is* to the anticipation of the *not-yet*. The present moment equates to boredom because it cannot surpass the familiarity of *what-already-is*, that is, familiarity with the usual relationships and the monotony of the average, everyday schedule. The institution of novelty, as something heretofore unseen, tends to prioritize ephemeral arousal and excitement. Ephemeral because the excitement rarely lasts—in fact, it is designed *not* to last. Novelty is only designed to elucidate change, but not in the way one might think. In the essay *The Concept of Time* (1992), Heidegger says that "time is that within which events take place. This is what Aristotle has already said, in the context of the fundamental kind of Being pertaining to natural being: change, change of place, locomotion. Time has to do with *movement*" (1992:3). This is how change has historically been defined, as the movement or passage of time conceptually akin to an infinite succession of now moments. However, in technicity, change is *not* given by the movement of time. Change is ascertained phenomenologically by the *induction of novelty*. *Novelty corresponds to change, which is equal to movement*. Dasein would like to constantly experience new relationships in the present, because this is what constitutes movement towards the

future (Heidegger 1992:16). In short, novelty signifies change, and change signifies to Dasein that everything is progressing as it should in continuity. In order to escape the present, in order to bury oneself away from the stillness of Being, Dasein develops a voracious appetite for novelty, for transcending the present moment by distracting itself in the anticipation of the *not-yet*. To this, we can agree that novelty targets everyday sight as the epistemological substrate of the Western intellectual tradition for its rampant *assaults* of newness.

According to Jean Baudrillard, seeing has fallen victim to a vicious pornography, which is characterized by the absolute proximity to and total instantaneousness of things; this overexposure to the transparency of the world (1988:27). Ontologically, seeing is the "tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception" (Heidegger 1962:214). It is a way of Being experienced by everyday Dasein, with a distinctively *temporal* temperament, which is that seeing is so little devoted to the thing it is curious about, that when it obtains sight of anything it already looks away to what is coming next (Heidegger 1962:398). In this way, seeing never tarries alongside anything for lengthened periods of time, commensurate to the rushed way that Dasein lets itself be carried along solely by the looks of the world (Heidegger 1962:216). Heidegger can also attest to this, in two separate yet related accounts. First, in how seeing has forgotten the fundamental character of beholding in the way that the object is discoverable in the Truth of its Being (Heidegger 1962:215). Sight leaps-away from a definite possibility which one has taken hold of, but it does so without genuinely *beholding* it, because it is caught in a parallax of distraction and confusion. Second, in how that which is to be "grasped by the eye makes itself normative in knowing", to which the ocular-centrism of Western thought can rightfully attest (Heidegger 1977b:166). Combine the two, and you have a dilapidated organ incapable of fully grasping the Truth of what it seeks to investigate. Seeing has been prostituted by everything in the quickest and cheapest way, and therefore does not seek to understand what it sees, merely because it *just wants to see*. As a mode of tarrying, seeing is the abandonment of oneself to the world, of letting-oneself be carried along by whatever penetrates it with novelty. Dasein is always on the move, never staying for

too long, quickly abandoning the present for the not-yet. If undying novelty is what Dasein seeks, then it surely must surrender itself to novel concerns that *seduce the eye.*

So the primacy of sight is targeted by technicity, that penetratingly assaults the eye with novelty in the form of extra-curricular concern. This much has been established, but we are still unfamiliar with *how* this actually unfolds in technicity, which still maintains a vague appearance of abstraction. *Who* or *what* is technicity? *How* does it accomplish all of this? The answer—the final one of this conceptual journey—is *gadgetry*. "Gadgetry" denotes the Being of electronic or digital equipment, most of which arose during the latter half of the 20th century prefiguring the transition into the technological age. What can be said on this entity?

For starters, gadgetry has hitherto been described as "smart". Nobody is really to know what this word means, but its essence is something to the effect of *coming-towards* Dasein. Smartness, or the degree to which something is smart, is a sophisticated manner of approach that characteristically *attends* to someone. What it means to be approached is the assurance that one is ontologically constituted, that one is presently *there*. Thus it denotes that one is here or there, and that this here-ness or there-ness can be *discovered* by some technological entity. If one is *Being-there*, this is grounds for one to be probed, even if it cannot return the probing in the same way. The smartness of gadgetry is not itself to be understood, even if it is there to get to know Dasein. But Dasein need not concern itself with this, because Dasein need not reckon with smartness at all. What Dasein needs is to be *discovered* in the projection of smartness itself. The essence of smartness is revealed in the way that it encroaches on Dasein by approaching and getting to know it—its needs, preferences, efficiencies, deficiencies. Smartness comes to inhabit this neighbourhood of nearness as its point of attachment to Dasein.

Gadgetry has smartness, which is its manner of *coming-toward* Dasein. Gadgetry approaches Dasein in order to understand it. But to understand Dasein it must approach it by yielding to it. Gadgetry actively yields to Dasein, and in this way, gadgetry *sets upon* Dasein. The setting-upon is akin to a yielding that resists reckoning with the entity that is there. It has little use for reckoning because it *yields* to Dasein's manner of Being. The

purpose of yielding is so that gadgetry does not have to reckon with Dasein in a way that would arouse any trouble for it. The nestling-close of smartness is rather effortless, in that it accomplishes this integration by itself, by tampering with itself to ensure that it does not abruptly disturb Dasein by interrupting it during the trajectory of its continuity. Smartness enables gadgetry to approach Dasein in a way that masquerades as enhancement, that has the familiar pretence of helping Dasein by being beneficial to it. Dasein seldom realizes that the encroachment is actually a way of entitling itself to claim new territory and jurisdiction over Dasein. So, in approaching and yielding to Dasein, gadgetry is always there because it is always setting itself into place. Everywhere Dasein turns, gadgetry is already in position, ready to disclose itself in the manner requisitioned by the context in question.

This is notably different from the old equipmental ways of Being, which are comparatively modest in that they do not approach Dasein in the same technical ways. At the end of the workday, when Dasein returns everything in the toolshed to their proper order, the hammer is content to stay put where it belongs. The hammer has its conventional function, like many of the other tools in the vicinity of the shed. They come out of their hiding places when called upon, and they retreat to their proper stalls when the toil of the day is over with. Such is the appearance of many of the conventional types of equipment "traditional" Dasein is familiar with. Their singular role enables Dasein to regularly detach from them, seeing as they do not try to assume *more* responsibility than their equipmental capacity would allow for. Thus, Dasein has little problem with letting the old equipment into the personal and highly secluded domains of its life, because it is able to detach from them when necessary. Not so with gadgetry. Gadgetry identifies the modesty of the hammer as an admonishment of weakness. Gadgetry capitalizes on the weakness of the hammer by entitling itself to close-in on Dasein.

Gadgetry is starkly differentiated from the old equipmental ways. First in the manner of coming-toward Dasein, and then in the manner of yielding to Dasein by blending into the surrounding environment. This is how gadgetry amends the separation between it and Dasein—stalking and multiplying to the point of blinding so that

all Dasein can see is merely the product of technicity. This (rather drunken inertia) is why it seems like Dasein is in the process of soliciting technicity's enrapturing encounter. Dasein wants to be approached, it craves this tender affection and the obsessive routine of burying itself in busyness. Dasein will never stop falling anew for this movement in the same empty ways (Heidegger 2012:25). This is because Dasein, so freed, craves *concern*, so gadgetry sets before Dasein as an offering of extracurricular concern. Gadgetry manufactures extracurricular concern that Dasein, opened and available, can readily fill itself with. To the previous question: *who* or *what* is gadgetry? This can be answered by disclosing what this entity *does*. Gadgetry is that which comes-toward Dasein by setting-upon it, by manufacturing extra-curricular concerns for Dasein to absorb and be distracted by. Gadgetry has this ability to spawn prospective relationships with *new* entities for Dasein to tangle with, but the only way that gadgetry can make Dasein care about what it has to say is by appealing to Dasein so that Dasein will be interested and curious about what it has to say.

What is the significance of gadgetry, especially with regards to the context of the time-structure of Dasein's everyday life? In the following chapter—the penultimate of this thesis—I combine the previous three chapters into one, for the purpose of developing the theory as a *whole* up until this point. In doing so, my aim is to phenomenologically outline a theory of the technological changes to temporality in everyday life, of which gadgetry plays *one* part.

5/(Re)constructing Temporality

Deprive modern man of everything that entertains and holds him, "the cinema, the radio, the newspaper, the theatre, concerts, boxing bouts, travel", and he would die of emptiness, since "simple things" no longer appeal to him.

—Martin Heidegger[11]

This chapter—as the final one of this thesis—serves to clarify our theory of the technological experience of time which we have been building towards. The totality of this theory—of which gadgetry is just *one* application—will make sense at the end of this chapter, when the new conceptualization of temporality has been revealed. We proceed by analyzing temporality by showing how it is collectively experienced as a result of the temporal challenging-forth. Once this has been made clear, we will shift our focus to the technological changes to the time-structure of everyday life. Ultimately, a phenomenological theory of technology and temporality is the guiding impetus of this chapter; it is how we will be able to uncover the essential relationship between these two, and how the former determines the latter, which is especially true in terms of the structural changes to temporality. But before getting ahead of ourselves, we shall begin by recalling a few of the ideas from chapter one.

One of the central claims of the first chapter was that the essence of modern technology (the challenging-forth) was not justification enough for the "quest" for ultimacy. The quest, one remembers, was the universalization of all entities under a mathematical injunction, or what Reiner Schürmann called *universal māthesis* (2019). We found this critique to be potent because the challenging-forth focusses singly on the *way* that entities are disclosed, and not on the *process* through which this disclosure unfolds. Our method was to step back from the appearance of entities as the result of the challenging-forth, to the duration within which their disclosure was made possible. This was accomplished in two ways. The first was to decipher Heidegger's essence of modern technology, and the second was to expose how the essence—now analyzed—revealed

---

[11] From "Collected Works: Author's Final Revision", pp. 55, 84.

another essence that was concealed within the first. A *nested* essence. Within the essence of the essence, we discovered, was time. But not *any* time; the duration of one enactment of the challenging-forth. After careful consideration, we have decided that this essence of the essence, which depicts technology not as an unchanging picture but as an ongoing process, is the *nomos* (the law) of our age. The law undergirds the natural process of unfolding of technology as a whole. Everywhere technology is, the law is also. Every technological act is its *nomothetic* expression.

Just what is the law of technology? We formerly defined it in the following maxim: *technological progress is contingent on the denial of process*, where process was the calculable amount of time needed to bring something into Being. We saw this, for example with the gas-powered chainsaw, where the basis for the invention of the chainsaw was to replace the manual handsaw because the chainsaw was more efficient at felling trees than the handsaw. The chainsaw presented as a natural upgrade to the handsaw because it would take less time to fell each tree, which qualified it as an upgrade. This example, which corroborates the law of technology, confirmed our suspicion that time—*process*—is the core of technological advancement, insofar as it can be denied in congruence with new inventions that prioritize efficiency and convenience above everything else. Technological progress, as such, lies not in the flashy appearance of some new phenomenon per se, but in the ability of that new phenomenon to *minimize the amount of time taken to enact a particular procedure*. Even at this early juncture in the analysis, we established that process is of primary importance to technology: all roads issue from it, and at some later stage, all roads twist backwards into their origin. The law is the nexus of all technological activism, such that everything that appears today is the result of its *manifestation*, and will continue this way so long as technology is the *Truth* from where everything is ordered into presence.

Within each challenging-forth, time is there; it is hidden from view but nonetheless it is there. It is there in that it is squeezed between two points—*arché* and *telos*. This calculable duration of the challenging-forth corresponds to the beginning (the initiation of a challenging), which is followed by its eventual end (the

finalized appearance of the entity as it has been challenged-forth). Process is always conceptualized in this way, which is the portion of time necessary for a challenging-forth to be completed. The duration of a process is compared alongside others, and is assigned a relative efficiency with regards to how fast it orders the completion of a challenging. In this way, technology competes with itself: by manifesting a range of products that each mirror one another in terms of function and capability. In this competition, the winner is crowned on the basis of how their processing speed fares with the other contestants. Technology evaluates the worth of a use-object by this *singular* category. It is what constitutes *growth* viz., the maximization of productivity over other predecessors, such that the *arché* and *telos* of the duration necessary to complete the procedure is continually shrunken. The manner in which the processes are condensed we called the *temporal challenging-forth*.

Equipment. Let us now turn to the significance of "equipment" in the temporal challenging-forth. In "The Question Concerning Technology", Heidegger noted several exemplars, from which we shall pluck just one. In the cultivation of the field to yield to the agricultural demands of the mechanized food industry, does this have an average duration appended to it? (Heidegger 2008:320) Indeed it does, although this is not mentioned by Heidegger himself. All that is mentioned is that the tract of land is challenged-forth to expedite the unlocking of the energies of nature. "Yet that expediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense" (Heidegger 2008:321). What remains absent from this account is the process of how this actually unfolds, i.e., via what equipmental means is the tract of land challenged-forth? On what grounds is this rationale justified, if not to incorporate a theory of equipment? What we have been able to gather from "The Question Concerning Technology" tells us that in order to succeed at maximizing the yield at the minimum expense, technology must calculate the processes of its equipmental procedures ahead of time. Insofar as these procedures are decided in advance, technology knows which machines are capable of challenging-forth, and at what productive capacities. The

tractor, for instance, is the likely culprit in the cultivation of the field, and based off this, the farmer has determined approximately how long this process will take. But Heidegger does not vouch for any of this. Heidegger stays clear of drawing on how equipment constitute the most *visible* portrayals of the challenging-forth.

Our analysis begins where Heidegger's essay falls short. We suggest that the duration of the challenging-forth is embedded in the equipmental means that were used to carry out the procedure (in this case, the cultivation of the field). In other words, the tractor decides the nature and duration of the challenging-forth. The *nature* of the challenging-forth of the tractor, in Heidegger's example, is its ability to cultivate the field (among others, of course; the tractor has multiple uses, but we will stick with the original one in the hopes that it can serve as a useful exemplar). The *duration* of the challenging-forth of the tractor, on the other hand, is the average amount of time that the tractor needs in order to cultivate the field. The key is that the process (the duration) of the procedure (the cultivating of the land) is determined by the tractor (the equipment employed for the procedure). In short: the duration of the challenging-forth is given to us by the efficiency of the tractor. The tractor decides the length of the process, which means that the challenging-forth is *temporal* (i.e.: the challenging-forth happens in an *amount* of time). Insofar as the cultivation of the field were mediated by the tractor, then surely in virtue of this we will be lured into thinking time in conformity with the duration of this procedure as it was carried out by the tractor.

Equipment are the most palpable enactments of the challenging-forth, even if Heidegger bypasses this line of thinking in "The Question Concerning Technology". Perhaps the foregoing can be illustrated in another example: the average amount of time to boil water on the stove is five minutes with the kettle I have. My experience of time is given by this particular procedure—it is what structures my activity—my life is structured, for the next five minutes, in concert with the *process* of the kettle. I wait for the kettle to finish boiling, and when that five minutes is up, I am "freed" to turn my attention elsewhere. Of course it is possible to spend one's

time doing other things while the kettle is boiling—but, ultimately, the kettle constitutes one way in which one's time is conditioned by the process of the equipment. I had to go about initiating this procedure, which involved preparing the kettle and the stove for boiling, and at the end of its process, I again had to tend to the kettle and stove to complete the procedure. Another way of looking at it is that I entrusted my time in the kettle for these five minutes—these five minutes no longer belong to me; they now belong to the process of the kettle. They belong to the kettle because the *process* of the kettle is not something I have authority over. I cannot control how long it takes for the element to boil the water inside the kettle, thus I must heed to the process of this procedure that is not my own. In this way I externalize my time by surrendering it to the equipmental capacity of the kettle. In yet another example, perhaps I start cleaning the kitchen, which normally takes fifteen minutes with the dollar-store scrubby and the dish-soap we have. So I clean the kitchen in this amount of time, which is made possible by the scrubby and the dish-soap. These two facilitate the process of my procedure—the amount of time to clean the kitchen is mediated by the efficiency of what their equipmental capacities allow for, demonstrating that our procedures are affixed with average processes, and these processes have a subliminal power in *organizing our time-structure*.

In technology, many of our activities are mediated by equipment that we employ for various reasons. Which means, if we decide to frame it this way, that we are prone to giving away our time—which was ours to begin with—by entrusting it within equipmental processes. I had to give my time to the kettle, just like the farmer had to give *his* time to the tractor. Likewise, in everyday life, there are many procedural circumstances that *require* equipment, thus we are normalized into forfeiting our time quite regularly. Because of the foregoing, we can tentatively conclude that the basis of our experience of time (i.e., *our temporality*) is not a product of anything internal to ourselves. We do not *exude* temporality; instead, we tacitly merge with equipment that themselves grant us with time that allows us to experience temporality vicariously through their standardized processes. In other words, the *possibility* for temporality is afforded, in most cases, by equipment that is available for us to

use. Thus, part of what it means to experience temporality is to surrender our time to equipmental processes or, using Schürmann's phrase, to *gather with what is already there* (1979:174). In this way, our experience of time is relatively unquestioned, because the natural tendency is to heed the offerings that present themselves as prospective possibilities of temporality. In this way, one *gives* his time to the equipment that shows him the way —that effectively *guide his temporality*.

Procedures. Coming back to our example, it is not the kettle and the stove that *solicit* the procedure; rather, it is the procedure itself (i.e.: boiling water) that solicits the means of enactment. The procedure has solicited the kettle and the stove (presumably as a consequence of habit), and now I must entrust my time within these tools. My time is in their *equipmental* hands. The more fundamental idea being that the procedure gathers with whatever is closest, and the kettle and the stove presented themselves as viable means through which to enact the procedure. Therefore, the procedure merges with their process and *voilà*, my water is boiled after five minutes. The point is rather straightforward: *the procedure is what gives temporality*.

One might react: *is not this in direct contradiction to the previous paragraph?* Precisely not, as the procedure precedes the means through which it is enacted. The procedure, in other words, is merely the goal-directed activity that combines with whatever is closely available as a means through which to complete it. If the means to boil water happen to be the kettle and the stove, then these are what the procedure merges with—and my time-structure is now realized in congruence with their processes. This, however, seems to leave out the inevitable scenario that there can be procedures that do not merge with any equipment whatsoever. In that case, how would one experience temporality? Let us take a quick example: suppose I am prepping the soil for the vegetable garden with my bare hands. I am not using any equipment, so how can temporality be accounted for in this case? Surely one must still be temporal, even if their time is not entrusted into equipment. Indeed, this supposition is correct, because the procedure only merges with something if it is already *there* to merge with. If the only means for carrying out the procedure are one's hands, then these are what will constitute the experience

of time. Ultimately, the procedure is what grants temporality, although, in our age, one would have to agree that equipment are the means through which *most* procedures are enacted.

It is here that our theory of temporality begins to take shape. The challenging-forth is present in all of our domains of busyness, and this is because it is the foundation of *action* in technology. The challenging-forth is essentially what all of our procedures can be reduced to: raw, unfiltered goal-directed activities that have beginnings (*arché*) and ends (*telos*). It does not matter, as such, how our procedures are carried out. All that matters is that one *is*, and one *is* insofar as procedures *proceed* from their Being. Whether it be via equipmental means, or whether it be through the use of one's hands, the goal-directed activity *precedes* the means through which it unfolds. On the whole, we are always in the midst of enacting some procedure; this is literally what it means to *be* in technology. We *are* temporality because all of our action is reducible to intentional goal-directed activities, and these tend to *merge* with whatever happens to be there. Thus, it becomes quite instinctive to give our time away, such that we never undergo *authentic* experiences of temporality, *stricto sensu*.

We are our procedures, since our procedures are what *grant* us with temporality. However, one might recognize that the thrust of our temporal experiencing is facilitated through means external to ourselves. We are quite prone to giving away what is ours viz., our procedures, which has the effect of synthesizing our experience of time in concert with the equipment at our immediate disposal. In technology, equipment is the main way that one experiences time because technology has adapted itself to all of our activities, such that procedures are prone to merging with technology because it usually manifests as the most *efficient* means for carrying them out. *The procedure is simply there, and what technology does is to ensure is that no procedure is left unmediated.* Consequently, most (if not all) of our procedures are mediated by technological equipment, which goes to show that temporality is nearly always solicited by *processes that are not its own.*

Interruptions. We are in the midst of *losing* time—not because time is disappearing, but because we are increasingly entrusting our time within technological apparatuses that determine the time-structure of everyday

life. The problem with this is that equipment are the mechanical manifestations of technology, as such, they are appended with *guaranteed* processes that are calculated in advance of their enactment (such as how the process of boiling water took five minutes with the kettle and the stove). Giving away our time is not the only thing to be weary of: the fact that equipmental processes are (mostly) guaranteed suggests that we are artificially entrenched in the belief that the *experience of temporality* should be *regulated* by calculable beginnings and ends. Temporality is not experienced as an endless flux of motion; temporality has been *technologized* to reflect the shadow that the challenging-forth tries to instil into everything that *is*. It too is regulated by *arché* and *telos*, by the material promises to our procedures that say that temporality must be *structured* in order for it to be experienced. At bottom, what the challenging-forth enforces is a way of temporalizing that gathers with whatever is nearest to it (normally in the form of equipment), and the belief that temporality is calculable, such that it unfolds predictably in the manner presupposed by the *arché* and *telos* of the equipment itself.

With the kettle, the time it will take to boil water is always five minutes. This never varies: its duration is never six hours, nor is it eight weeks. Its process is predictable, which means that it can be easily integrated into one's day-to-day schedule. Temporality is predictable in this way because it is always guaranteed in advance—it has been routinized. The time it takes to drive to work in the morning, *this is predictable*. The time it takes to attend a lecture, *this is predictable*. Procedures are arranged into a schedule which organizes the time-structure of everyday life. What makes these procedures and these processes predictable is that they have been "found out"; their repetitiveness allows them to be calculated and applied to different contexts. Insofar as one's procedures are relatively unchanging, they can be known and consistently relied upon for future scheduling.

Time is given away in most circumstances so that it can be routinized. The routinization of time comes about when we have carried out a procedure so many times that we are certain of its process. Time is routinized so that it can withdraw from our attention. We do not need to calculate how much time it will take to boil water with the kettle and the stove; this is because this process has been routinized so that we do not have to

consciously think about it. We would prefer not to think of time so that we can get back to the activities that invite us to "lose ourselves" in their processes. Losing itself is really what temporality would like to do—indeed, this is what would constitute an authentic experience because we would no longer be obsessing about time in concert with *this* or *that* procedure. Time would withdraw from our attention altogether—in this way we would sink ourselves into a temporality that is unmitigated by interruptions that we are periodically obliged to monitor.

Temporality would like for this experience to be prolonged. Temporality would prefer it if time disappeared from our awareness, such that we are never pulled *back* into relations with it. If time could withdraw forever, then we could simply carry on with our experience of getting lost in temporality. This is what we desire to do, but alas, our processes, at some stage, always bring us back into relation with time. With the kettle, I get five minutes to bury myself in a different procedure; one that is perhaps longer than the procedure of the kettle[12] (say, writing this thesis). I do not pay attention to time during these five minutes, until the sounds of the vapour escaping from the kettle escalates to a shriek. I am now interrupted from my thesis-procedure, and must tend to the kettle. But when the procedure of the kettle has been finalized, I can again return to the thesis-procedure. Our procedures have a habit of making us attend to them, both when we initiate their processes, and also when we ensure that their processes are complete by shutting them off or stowing them back from where they emerged. Ultimately we must tend to our procedures[13], which has us monitoring them by internalizing their processes, so that time can withdraw and we can lose ourselves in a temporality that is carried along by the essence of the activity itself.

---

[12] Everyday life is organized so that I am in the middle of a procedure, and sometimes I find myself in the middle of a procedure *within* another procedure (and so on, there is no limit to how many procedures I can find myself within).

[13] That is, unless they are automated. But we do not take up such questions here.

5.1/Technological Changes to the Time-Structure of Everyday Life

If it is anything that technology teaches, it is that our procedures are bound to equipmental processes, which comprise the basis of our experience of temporality. Equipment ensures that its processes are *guaranteed* (i.e.: that they have beginnings and ends); accordingly, temporality is structured in concert with the duration of the equipment. But what would happen, say, if those existing procedures were shortened? Or, in another scenario, what would happen if there were suddenly *more* procedures to attend to? In light of what we have realized in the previous sections, we can begin to unravel these questions, keeping in mind that technological equipment are normally responsible for our temporal experiences. Theoretically, it would make sense that if the equipment of our procedures were to change, so too would our experiences of temporality. The question becomes: *just how much does technology change the time-structure of everyday life?* To answer this, it might make sense to respond with a different question: *what is the experience of temporality in technology*? If we approach this question in a manner consistent with what was written in the previous sections, then we believe that we will be uncover novel insights about temporality in technology.

Changes to the Duration of Procedures. Let us suppose that one day I am yearning for a new kettle, so I purchase an electric one. The electric kettle is what I use for the procedure of "boiling water", which was formerly carried out by the kettle and the stove. The procedure of "boiling water" now merges with different means—namely, the electric kettle—and suddenly, *magically*, its process is shortened to three minutes instead of five. In technical terms, the *arché* and the *telos* of this process has been *denied*; less of my time is given away than before. In this way, the electric kettle is a textbook example of the *nomos* of technology, which states: *technological progress is contingent on the denial of process*. It is a natural upgrade in that its process has been denied, thus making it more efficient.

It is safe to presume that routine procedures like “boiling water” are relatively unchanging throughout time. Boiled water was imperative for survival in the past and it will continue to be in the future. Only the means with which to carry out this procedure have evolved. At one (technologically early) stage in history, it was only possible to boil water by building a fire and sourcing the stuff from a nearby stream. Now, with the latest model, we have bypassed even the need for a stove; all that is required is an electric battery to heat the element in the inside of the container, and a faucet, of course. What was once a laborious procedure has now been simplified quite significantly. The procedure of boiling water takes place in mere minutes, which would have been inconceivable just a few centuries prior. One imagines that this has quite serious implications for our experience of temporality.

Temporality is structured in concert with equipment that carry out various procedures, but what happens when equipment are subject to evolve throughout time? Before, the kettle and the stove were the most efficient means through which to boil water. Now, the electric kettle is. It has usurped the kettle and the stove in terms of efficiency. One only need wait three minutes until the water is boiled instead of five. This is the purpose of technology: it tends to problematize certain procedures because they are too tedious or arduous, so it rectifies this by inventing equipment that accelerate existing procedures. The idea being that if one’s procedures are expedited, then they are freed to return to the procedures that they value more (one is always *in* procedures—this is their *a priori* possibility). In technology, it is always the unpleasant procedures that are problematized in the hopes of placating unnecessary human suffering by allowing one to get back to the procedures that they cherish the most. Thus, the purpose of purchasing an electric kettle is so that I can return to the more important procedure of writing the thesis. By all accounts, technology has fulfilled its promise to me (the consumer) because it has allowed me to get back to what is more important in the thesis-procedure. Going forwards, I manage to save two minutes of precious time (as well as the energy needed) to boil water.

What we have just described is the logic of technology—or, in other words, how it justifies to itself and to us that it is beneficial because of its efficiency. Technology saves us time, therefore we would be foolish to ignore it because it *is* helping us in this way. We do not dispute this idea, however, there is some lingering hesitancy about whether this is the only goal that technology aspires towards. Technology would be perfect if it solely offered to expedite our existing procedures and then it disappeared. Technology would be perfect if it freed our temporality from tedious time-structures. Moreover, it would be holding true to its original undertaking as the unremitting servant of humanity if it stuck with this ambition, and together, technology and humans would happily converge. Humans desire for their procedures to be expedited so that they can be freed, and technology would provide the means to rescue them from this paradox by presenting them with equipment that dissolves all of the manual hardships of their labour.

We yearn for this to be the case, but alas, technology has ulterior plans. In addition to issuing discernible changes to the duration of its procedures, technology changes the *number* of procedures that it produces, effectively bombarding us with more busyness to monitor and attend to. If our procedures were relatively unchanging, then the technological improvements to the duration of our existing procedures (i.e.: boiling water) would certainly afford us with more time, thereby *freeing* us up. And yet, as we know from the previous chapter, this is not the course that technology follows. Technology contradicts the foregoing by approaching us as soon as we have been freed up. Technology frees us, only to enslave us into busyness once more by soliciting our concern through gadgetry and other nefarious means. We are caught within a vicious bipolarity which, at first glance, seems prepared to serve us in all of our goal-directed needs; and yet, at the same time, fills us with added concerns and activities that drastically change our experiences of temporality.

Changes to the Number of Procedures. So technology fulfills its promise of making our existing procedures more efficient, thereby freeing us up. However, what technology (and humans) failed to anticipate was this excess amount of freedom. What should one do with this all of this freedom; how might one fill itself now that

it has been freed? This is where the analysis harkens back to gadgetry from the previous chapter. Gadgetry approaches Dasein by manifesting new types of relationships for Dasein to merge with, in the intention of expanding the range of things that Dasein is in accordance with. Thanks to gadgetry, Dasein now has many relationships that it must uphold. However, one concern about juggling too many relationships with other entities was *time*. Dasein only has a finite amount of time, both in the span of a day and its life. If gadgetry increases Dasein's number of relationships, accordingly, this discourages Dasein from getting-close with any one of these relationships in particular.

To be sure, relationships denote the connection that Dasein has with other entities (in that Dasein knows of them and understands what use-value they have). Relationships with other entities can definitely give rise to procedures, such as the following: perhaps I recently purchased one of those gag-inducing smart watches. In virtue of the gadget, I am suddenly invested in monitoring my heart rate and tracking my caloric intake, which constitute (somewhat abstract) examples of procedures. When I walk to the store, I am also in the middle of recording the fluctuations and irregularities of my heart beat. The newfound concern for my health is reflected in the time that I reserve to monitor these oscillations. In technology, there are many relationships like this that we maintain with other beings. How one maintains those relationships is *procedural*: there is always a process in spite of how minuscule it is. The procedure always happens in time, both in its human initiation and termination. Other examples of procedures include receiving and responding to online mail and messaging, tuning into a radio broadcast, or tending to the notifications that pool on my devices. Because of gadgetry, our procedures have mysteriously multiplied, and in addition to this, they have grown to be quite expedient.

Why is it that the processes of these new procedures are so ephemeral? Somehow it has become rather commonplace to juggle numerous procedures that are all engineered to be short-lasting, such that we are only drawn into their processes for very fleeting bouts of time before they disappear. Not to mention their repetitiveness: these procedures come and go as they please, during all hours of the day they lie motionless, at

the ready to interrupt one in the middle of what they are doing! This has somehow been normalized by the capitalist ethos: in today's corporate parlance, one would likely call this *multi-tasking*. It does seem rather innocuous on the surface, so why all the fuss? As it happens, multi-tasking issues quite a real threat to temporality. This is because multi-tasking requires that one never actually descend into the depth of their more *important* procedures (say, writing the thesis). When there are many procedures at once, multi-tasking must ensure that it is staying with the passage of time by routinely checking to verify if its procedures are proceeding in the way that they should. One never experiences the temporality of the *long*-procedure because the long-procedure is typically interrupted by all of the littler ones. In other words, multi-tasking precludes one's ability to *lose themselves* in the procedure of their concern. One's temporal experience (e.g.: how one *is* in time) becomes *custodial*, in how one is ordered into maintaining all of these procedures (that, to be sure, need tending to) that all vie for one's attention in similar ways. However, such an experience of temporality is in itself *not temporal* in the humanistic sense… what it is, is a temporal experience that has been *given* to us. The technologically standardized manner of experience segregates the shape of experience into social *isomorphism*.

In this custodial mode of Being, one's temporality is coerced into heightened *concern* for time; indeed, this is because one must ensure that one is tending to all of these procedures as soon as they emerge. Dasein's Being is *stretched* across multiple procedures, which is antithetical to a mode of Being which cooperates *with* time, instead of trying to minimize it as much as technologically possible. When one's temporality is *lost*, one is rarely concerned with time whatsoever: this is likely because one knows that time is not *guaranteed*. One simply surrenders into the activity of one's choosing without much concern for time. In this way, one is *freed*; freed from the procedures that normally force it to emerge from the depths of its focus—to initiate procedures, monitor them, or turn them off—there are many such commitments one maintains. For example, perhaps I am in the middle of writing this thesis, and I receive a notification. I must emerge from the depth of my focus in the

thesis to deal with the notification. However, in doing so, I have been alleviated from the fullness of my temporal lostness, and now I must try to remember the way back down.

If I am always rescued from the depth of my lostness, then I will no longer know where to turn to *get* to that lostness, and that lostness will be severed from my realm of possible experiences. If I am always wrested into relations with *smart* procedures, then my temporality will begin to believe that the possible depth of the totality of its experience lies in maintaining many procedures at once. If my temporality is thrust into numerous relations that always seem to be accelerating, then the structure of experience will *contract* more and more in reflection of the *types* of these procedures. If I do not resist this technological proclivity, then my experience might as well be abandoned to the technological forces that calculate the configuration of my experience.

So long as one is attuned to many procedures, they likewise hold the belief that it is normal to cultivate such a routine experience of temporality. The passage of time, represented by the clock, is unflinchingly steady in its rhythm, never wavering from the thrum of its pulse. The "they-self" that is attuned in this way is overcome by the "natural attitude", which says that it is quite normal to stay near to time, as in, never getting lost in the temporality of one's procedural undertakings. The result of this is that the clock, as the representation of time, seldom *withdraws* from one's temporality. One is always aware of where one stands in relation to the clock, and this is because its experience is always interrupted by *this* or *that* procedure, thereby bringing it into relations with the clock. It is normal, today, for one to adopt some kind of dependency on time. In order to maintain so many procedures, one must always know where they stand in relation to time, and this is because one believes that their relation with time should *de facto* consist of saying near to it. This technological experience of temporality has been normalized. It constitutes the *technological basis of experience in everyday life*.

Changes to Relations with Time. Technology tampers with the very time-structure it imposes on us, viz., the temporal challenging-forth that manifests as a mode of action, or as the raw and unfiltered goal-directed activities of our procedural undertakings. This has the obvious effect of changing our temporality in accordance

with new equipment that consistently *deny* the durations of their processes, and this is all for the purpose of being able to save us time. However, now that our time has been saved, we are confronted with a number of other existential quandaries that culminate in a temporal *isomorphism* of sorts, where the limits of human craft and ingenuity are stifled by a technological apparatus that all but dismantles the *lostness* required to channel artistic creativity and originality. Indeed, the glaring consequence of technological temporality is not necessarily the common illusion that plagues the collective consciousness of today insofar as we feel we are *running out of time*, which is visible in all of our busyness and impatience. This seems to masquerade the seriousness of the verdict for the *humanitas* of the human, which is that the ability to get "lost" in temporality has all but vaporized; what we are left with is an experience that is estranged from everything, especially itself.

The *essence* of the human is temporality. The human follows along in the theatre of presence that guides its action. In technology, action is informed by the temporal challenging-forth that mathematizes its being by inadvertently restricting the diverseness of action it is susceptible to experience. The human can only act using goal-directed activities that blossom into their respective procedures. This is its possibility for *Being-in-the-World*. However, does this mean that the human is completely anchored to a technological inertia that conditions an inescapable *way* of Being? In other words, the human is thrown into this world—into customary beliefs and attitudes that colour the experience of temporality in everyday life—but does this mean that it should blindly allow technology to determine its relationship with time? Is it not Reiner Schürmann's anarchism that shows us that it is absolutely possible to resist one's thrownness, despite every technological compulsion to the contrary? The answer to the question, which was posed at the beginning of this thesis, is to detach ourselves from the technological ethos that is instilled in us by virtue of the fact that we have been thrown into an age that precedes us.

6/Conclusion

To retrieve the being question from the point of view of time, a certain way of life is required. To understand authentic temporality, it is necessary to 'exist authentically'; to think being as letting phenomena be, one must oneself 'let all things be'; to follow the play without why of presencing.

—Reiner Schürmann[14]

More evident at each stage of Western history, technology pushes towards global domination and mastery, forcing the network of things, words, and actions into a progressively violent logic of domination (Schürmann 1982:1040). Technology is the bitter culmination of a metaphysical history that emerged with Plato, gained momentum over the previous 2,500 years, and reached its apotheosis in the twentieth century (Heidegger 2008:313). We have already noted some implications of technology and its logic, which we quickly restate here for the reader's convenience: all beings, including humans, are reduced to resources and made to be standing-reserve (*be-stand*) in modern technology (Davis 2018:140). All beings are on stand-by, in a permanent waiting mode, ready to be challenged-forth so as to be gathered into a *nomos* (law) of intelligibility (Schürmann 1994). This includes nature. Modern technology fails to treat nature as *physis*, as something flourishing by-and-for itself. The challenging-forth exacerbates the estrangement of humans from their natural counterparts via extractive processes of unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about (Heidegger 2008:322). Heidegger says: "[t]he world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry" (Heidegger 1959:50). This appearance of the world has been normalized, or else it is expected because the illusion has congealed (hardened) into place.

Technology is everywhere, yet the trouble lies in visibly identifying it. Technology has the appearance of an inconspicuous picture that fuses with the surrounding landscape. No one questions it because its presentation is intentionally constructed to blend in. Most industrial activity occurs from behind padlocked doors, away from

---

[14] *Heidegger: On Being and Acting*, 1987:287.

the meandering pedestrian, whose gaze remains riveted to what she is capable of seeing. And what she is capable of seeing is designed for this purpose. It has been organized and prepackaged so as to not raise even a hairline of suspicion. The pedestrian does not question what she sees because it has all been homogenized to fit within the picture. Thus it withdraws from her attention—the pedestrian is diverted from technology, this is deliberate and it is because her perception clings to the inconspicuousness of her reality. Her field of awareness is appropriated into a system that reproduces itself through her pedestrian body, directing her to *this* or *that* busywork. The pedestrian is engrossed in technological seriousness that has precipitated her newfound intimacy with *time*. She is claimed by this way of understanding and interpreting the world; this has become her standardized setting. As a technological being, she has internalized the technological *spirit*: her heightened concern for time is reflected in all of her behavioural mannerisms. She has been *technicized*.

The temporal challenging-forth is repeatedly denied in tandem with the production and invention of new artillery that serve to accelerate existing processes. The imperious drive of technology to conquer uneaten terrain in earth-shattering quickness is reflected in the comportment of the human, who is the enfleshment of technology. It is none other than the human who is ordered to carry out this inertia, and this is because technology seizes her awareness by tampering with her sense of *time*. The most vivid symptom of technology is its *spirit* that claims the human (and nature) in the hurried temperament of the temporal challenging-forth. The human is the embodiment of a systemic rationality that claims her by ordering the completion of procedures in definite quantities of time. Thus, when we think of "letting technology be", we are not thinking of anything inherently technological. Letting technology be is detaching from the technological ethos that manifests as Dasein's "way-to-be" in technology. Humans are the incumbents of technological Being which guides their thinking, and eventually lapses their consciousness into an absurd realm. Detaching ourselves from this is only way that we can let technology be, likewise, it may be the only way that we can set *time* free from its technological proprietors.

One of the objectives of this thesis was to define technology, not in terms of its essence as appearance, but rather, in terms of the *making* of those appearances. The challenging-forth conceals its *process* within every manifestation. Process, we agreed, was the engine that generates technological momentum. We discovered this in chapter two, which was later supplemented by the findings from chapter three, where we established the temporal challenging-forth as the *basis* for all action in technology. Goal-directed activities (what I call procedures) are always governed in this way by *arché* and *telos* (beginnings and ends), which has the obvious effect of partitioning time into calculable segments. We designed the analysis to demonstrate that time is what *guides* all practical action in technology. Everything that *is*, can be traced back to this origin. In other words, the challenging-forth is what *reveals*, but the *process* of this revealing is more significant because it hides something fundamental: quite deliberate modifications to the *time-structures* of existing processes.

In chapter four, we transitioned to the practical implications of this theory of technological action. Dasein is thrown into an economy of presence that tries to ensure that all of its constituents are continuously *running along*. Equipment is designed to withdraw from Dasein's attention, and Dasein's "way-to-be" is ontologically determined by busyness and the serious attachment to time. In technology, everything is digested in the quickest and cheapest manner. Dasein is *ordered* from one procedure to the next. Dasein embodies the technological ethos that coerces it into keeping up with time. When Dasein is freed, technology presents gadgetry as an offering that *fills* Dasein with extra-curricular concerns or relationships that Dasein can bury itself within. In chapter five, we discussed the structure of temporality, which issues from the temporal challenging-forth. The purpose of this chapter was to develop the theory in its totality, which involves the implications of the temporal challenging-forth with respect to time, and how these have been transformed as a result of technology.

What is technology? No longer is it merely a way of revealing. Technology is in the midst of unfolding. This unfolding is reflected within each and every single one of its *subjects*, insofar as their experience is *governed* by

very noticeable changes to their phenomenology. To the question that was posed at the beginning of this thesis: "how do we let technology be?" One could simply reply by saying: "we let technology be by letting *time* be. If we let time be, then we would succeed in letting technology be!" Technology *is* time, or a way of experiencing it anyways. Going forward, it is imperative that we understand this link between technology and time, because in order to let technology be, we must learn to let time be. Letting time be is how we can let *technology* be.

6.1/Letting Time Be

The commitment to time that we have been nursing in all of our occupations was never ours to begin with. This is something that has been passed down to us by our technological progenitors. We stand here, filled with worry about having to uphold this relationship, which seems unsustained. Nevertheless, our devotion is resolute, our loyalty to the cause unwavering; we worship time because this is what we have been ordered to do. The thinking that is preoccupied with time is in compliance with what is already there. What is already there? Technology is, in addition to everything included underneath its label. The temporal challenging-forth, in other words, coupled with the obsession for *denying* itself as its habitual tendency. Humans have internalized this concern for time; it is visible in all of our frantic behaviour. Humans are the hapless inheritors of the technological spirit, but they do not know this. They frolic around in the technological playground of possibility, regardless of what violation it might pose to their phenomenology.

In the age where technological compulsion threatens the erasure of Being, it is paramount that we safeguard any lingering vestiges of openness to the *mystery* that might still be within our midst. We need only look at how technology reproduces itself through the human to ascertain a better understanding of how it can be preserved. In the last chapter, we found that one succumbs to whatever is immediately present for it to merge with; in most procedures, one's temporality merges with equipment that facilitates the process of enactment. Because one's temporality merges with whatever appears for it to merge with, temporality is increasingly susceptible to falling into technological *busyness*, which happens when technology engineers many procedures, all of which are

rushed, so that all of one's *time* is consumed in managing them. Subsequently, one feels like they are running out of time, when really, they have just fallen into an illusion of technological busyness. How can one detach from this sense of busyness? In other words, how can one open itself—not in a technological way—but in quite a different way, to share in an *authentic* relationship with time? A caveat: we are not interested in the openness that obsequiously clings to technological busyness in the cultivation of attachment. Instead, we are searching for a way of experiencing time that stands in the *open expanse of Being*: it stands there, not in order to be filled up, but in order to receive the mystery (Heidegger 1959:68).

How does one remove oneself from busyness, only to wander into a different kind of openness? To answer this question, it is crucial that we theorize an experience of temporality that is not in itself technological. Our findings thus far have indicated that one *de facto* falls into a kind of busyness. One is vulnerable to gadgetry and other equipment that provide it with regulated time-structures. However, one does not always have to *be-with-temporality* in this particular way. We must briefly allow ourselves to forget about technological temporality. Moreover, we must open ourselves to the possibility that temporality can be isolated by itself as a thing, unhampered by the *temporal challenging-forth* that denies itself with each forward action. It is imperative that we allow ourselves to imagine a temporality that does not have to endure such processes of technicization in order for it to be experienced authentically.

We introduced this idea in the previous chapter by linking temporality with lostness. To be "lost" is to forego the technological *pull* into busyness. To be lost is to be fully submerged within the procedure of one's choosing. This is a *deliberate* praxis, allowing one to withdraw from the technologically-mediated attachment to time. The idea is that time is so present in everyday life, as such, to be able to detach from it is to step back from the technologically imposed concern that we have cultivated. However, what I did not mention in the previous chapter is that one can only withdraw if the procedure enables one to withdraw; that is, if the nature of the procedure encourages one to withdraw *inside* of itself. The nature of the procedure is what counts in this

equation; it has to be a special *kind* in order to solicit lostness. For example, if the duration of the procedure is not calculated ahead of time, or the outcome is uncertain, then one will hold very little expectation about the procedure itself. The procedure is *unknown*. One does not know much about the procedure at all, but one can always start and see where one ends up. The purpose of entertaining such a procedure is to dwell within the uncertainty that it brings. Examples of such procedures include artistic endeavours such as freehand painting or drawing, or sauntering through the forest without really knowing where one is going, or when they will be returning. These activities are incalculable. Their incalculability is what fosters lostness for the Being of temporality. The indeterminateness of the procedure allows one to hold oneself in the open expanse, to be received as such.

When one is lost within one of its procedures, this means that one has surrendered itself to the openness of the procedure. The openness of the procedure is a mode of releasement: one releases oneself into the openness of the procedure that decides where it shall go. The procedure is indeterminate; it is designed in this way so that it does not provide one with any sort of guiding structure. One's temporality simply *sinks* into the procedure, and the rest is unknown, but it is *designed* to be that way. One's temporality wants to be carried away by the procedure. It wants to open itself to the possibility of *non-telic* acting, or acting without a "why" so that it can surrender itself to whatever may happen. *This is its openness*, which intentionally diverges from a way of knowing that is calculated in advance of the activity. Let us take a quick example: perhaps a local artist is looking to manifest an acrylic painting. The artist started the process with one idea (a landscape), but it quickly evolves into something else. The artist does not know what will happen to the painting, or how it might end up as a finished product. The artist has a rough idea about these things, but she leaves open what the painting will be because it is subject to change. The painter is sage enough to know that she can never come into a painting knowing exactly how it will look before it is complete—part of the experience of openness is for the painter is to *lose* herself in this procedure, by giving herself over to it and seeing what might unfold. The artist is the

master of remaining open to the possibilities that present themselves to her as offerings. Another way of looking at it is that she surrenders herself, namely, her expectation for what the painting should look like, or the urge to complete it.

To be lost is to problematize the technological *ethic* by starting procedures (like the painting) without necessarily knowing where they will go or even *if* they will reach their conclusions. The artist is uncertain about her work, however, this is the risk she chooses in order to surrender herself to a different kind of revealing. Her openness to whatever happens to her painting is an invitation to *receive*. It is entirely possible that her artwork bears no fruits; it might very well turn out to be ugly in the end. If this should be the case, the artist knows that she has not opened herself in the right way to receive the call of Being. Thus she must try again to release herself into the openness of her temporality. This new way of experiencing is never concerned with *wasting* time in the same way that technology is. Time is no object, and this is because one knows the following secret: if one can descend into the depths of temporality, then one will be blessed with an abundance of time with which to use, and all of the *technological* importance that was placed on time will vanish.

When the artist surrenders, technological logic is no longer, and when technological logic is no longer, the will to technologize disappears and the artist surrenders herself to whatever appears before it as an offering. In other words, she surrenders herself to her processes, and this is how she has developed a praxis of letting be. Letting time be is thus not only detaching from it, it also includes cultivating a praxis of letting oneself be *overcome* by the procedure of one's choosing. At the subtle moment when one loses oneself in the activity of her choosing, a releasement happens. "A grip is loosened, a contraction of the fingers slackens. […] The eye too is relieved, namely from staring at the same object. Man ceases to possess, and the thing is freed into its own being. It is seen for what it is, not for its usefulness" (Schürmann 1973:101). *Time* has been set free—it is no longer useful to the artist, who sinks into the temporality of her creative projectioning. The human is also set

free. “The true nature of the human relates directly to what transcends it, insofar as what transcends it is allowed to approach [the human] in exactly the right way for it to be transcended as such” (Anderson 1966:23).

References

Introduction

Duchamp, Marcel. 1959. “The Creative Act.” Pp. 77-78 in *Robert Lebel: Marcel Duchamp*. New York: Paragraphic Books.

Chapter 1

Abram, David. 1996. *The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-Human World*. Toronto: Penguin Random House.

Bernasconi, Robert. 1997. “Eckhart’s Anachorism: In memoriam Reiner Schürmann.” Pp. 81-90 in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal.* 19-20(2-1), 81–90.

Blok, Vincent. 2017. *Ernst Junger’s philosophy of technology : Heidegger and the poetics of the anthropocene* (First edition.). New York: Routledge.

Borgmann, Albert. 1984. *Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dahlstrom, Daniel O. 2018. “Im-position. Heidegger’s Analysis of the Essence of Modern Technology.” Pp. 39-56 in *Heidegger on Technology*, edited by A.J. Wendland, C.D. Merwin and C.M. Hadjioannou. New York: Routledge.

Davis, Bret W. 2018. “Heidegger’s Releasement from the Technological Will.” Pp. 133-148 in *Heidegger on Technology*, edited by A.J. Wendland, C.D. Merwin and C.M. Hadjioannou. New York: Routledge.

Dreyfus, Hubert. 2009. “Heidegger on Gaining a Free Relation to Technology.” Pp. 41-49 in *Readings in the philosophy of technology*, edited by D.M. Kaplan. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Feenberg, Andrew. 2010. “Between Reason and Experience”. Pp. 181-219 in *Between reason and experience: essays in technology and modernity*, edited by M Callon, W. E. Bijker, W. B. Carlson, and T. Pinch. Boston: MIT Press.

Ferré, Frederick. 1988. *Philosophy of technology*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1990. “Superficiality and Ignorance: on Victor Farías’ Publication.” Pp. 141-44 in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, edited by G. Neske and E. Kettering. New York: Paragon House.

Harries, Karsten. 1990. “Introduction.” Pp. xi-xl in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, edited by G. Neske and E. Kettering. New York: Paragon House.

Harries, Karsten. 1994. “Philosophy, Politics, Technology.” Pp. 225-45 in *Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology*, edited by K. Harries and C. Jamme. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc.

Heidegger, Martin. 1959. *Discourse on thinking*. Translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper & Row.

Heidegger, Martin. 1977. *The question concerning technology, and other essays* (1st Harper pbk. ed.), trans. By William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

Heidegger, Martin. 1982. *Nietzsche*. Ed., by David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Heidegger, Martin. 1990a. “Spiegel Interview with Martin Heidegger”. Pp. 41-67 in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, edited by G. Neske and E. Kettering. New York: Paragon House.

Heidegger, Martin. 1990b. “The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts”. Pp. 15-32 in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, edited by G. Neske and E. Kettering. New York: Paragon House.

Heidegger, Martin. 2008. *Being and Time*. Translated by John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Ihde, Don. 1990. *Technology and the lifeworld : from garden to earth.* Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Kroker, Arthur 2004. *The will to technology and the culture of nihilism : Heidegger, Nietzsche and Marx.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Martin Heidegger, Richard Rojcewicz, and Daniela Vallega-Neu. 2012. *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event): Of the Event*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Möehling, Karl A. 1981. “Heidegger and the Nazis.” Pp. 31-44 in *Heidegger: the man and the thinker*, edited by T. Sheehan. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc.

Müller, Max. 1990. “Martin Heidegger: A Philosopher and Politics: A Conversation.” Pp. 175-96 in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, edited by G. Neske and E. Kettering. New York: Paragon House.

Mitchell, Andrew J. 2018. “The Question Concerning the Machine. Heidegger’s Technology Notebooks in the 1940s-1950s.” Pp. 116-132 in *Heidegger on Technology*, edited by A.J. Wendland, C.D. Merwin and C.M. Hadjioannou. New York: Routledge.

Picht, Georg. 1990. “The Power of Thinking.” Pp. 161-68 in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, edited by G. Neske and E. Kettering. New York: Paragon House.

Safranski, Rüdiger. 1998. *Martin Heidegger: between good and evil*. Trans., Ewald Osers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1994. “A Brutal Awakening to the Tragic Condition of Being: On Heidegger’s *Beïtrage zur Philosophie*.” Pp. 89-105 in *Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology*, edited by K. Harries and C. Jamme. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc.

Schürmann, Reiner. 2019. “Technicity, Topology, Tragedy: Heidegger on “That Which Saves” in the Global Reach.” Pp. 190-213 in *Technology in the Western Political Tradition*, edited by J. Weinberger, A.M. Melzer, R. Zinman and M. S. U. Staff. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Vattimo, Gianni. 2019. “Postmodernity, Technology, Ontology.” Pp. 214-227 in *Technology in the Western Political Tradition*, edited by J. Weinberger, A.M. Melzer, R. Zinman and M. S. U. Staff. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. 1994. “Technology, Politics, and Art in Heidegger’s *Beïtrage zur Philosophie*. Pp. 55-70 in *Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology*, edited by K. Harries and C. Jamme. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc.

Wendland, Aaron James. 2018. “Heidegger’s New Beginning. History, Technology, and National Socialism.” Pp. 149-173 in *Heidegger on Technology*, edited by A.J. Wendland, C.D. Merwin and C.M. Hadjioannou. New York: Routledge.

Zimmerman, Michael E. 1981. “Beyond Humanism: Heidegger’s Understanding of Technology” in *Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker*, edited by Thomas Sheehan. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc.

Wisser, Richard. 1990. “Martin Heidegger in Conversation with Richard Wisser.” Pp. 81-89 in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, edited by G. Neske and E. Kettering. New York: Paragon House.

Chapter 2

Borgmann, Albert. 1984. *Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Derrida, Jacques. 1982. “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 278-291.

Heidegger, Martin. 1993. “Question Concerning Technology” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper Collins. 213-266.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1973. “Heidegger and Meister Eckhart on Releasement.” *Research in Phenomenology* 3. 95-119.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1978. “The Loss of the Origin in Soto Zen and in Meister Eckhart.” *The Thomist* 42(2). 281-312.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1979. “Anti-Humanism. Reflections of the Turn Towards the Post-modern Epoch.” *Man and World* 12(2). 160-177.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1982. “On Self-Regulation and Transgression.” *Social Research* 49(4). 1029-1046.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1983. “What Must I Do?’ at the End of Metaphysics: Ethical Norms and the Hypothesis of a Historical Closure,” in William L. McBride and Calvin O. Schrag (eds.), *Phenomenology in A Pluralistic Context*, Albany: State University of New York Press. 49-64.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1984a. “Deconstruction Is Not Enough: On Gianni Vattimo’s Call for “Weak Thinking.” *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 10(1). 165-177.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1984b. “Legislation-Transgression: Strategies and Counter-Strategies in the Transcendental Justification of Norms,” Man and World 17. 361-98.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1985. “Adventures of the Double Negation: on Richard Bernstein’s Call for Anti-Anti-Humanism.” *Praxis International* 5(3). 283-291.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1987. *Heidegger On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1991. “Ultimate Double Binds.” *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 15(1). 213-249.

Schürmann, Reiner. 2003. “General Introduction,” in Broken Hegemonies, trans. Reginald Lilly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 3-48.

Vahabzadeh, Peyman. 2019. *Violence and Non-Violence: Conceptual Excursions into Phantom Opposites*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Zimmerman, Michael E. 1981. “Beyond Humanism: Heidegger’s Understanding of Technology” in *Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker*, edited by Thomas Sheehan. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc.

Chapter 3

Heidegger, Martin. 2008. “Letter on Humanism.” Pp. in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper Collins. 213-266.

Heidegger, Martin. 2012. *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event): Of the Event*. Translated by R. Rojcewicz and D. Vallega-Neu. Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Little Bear, Leroy. 2020. “Traditional Knowledge and Humanities: A Perspective by a Blackfoot.” Pp. 175-87 in *Crossing Borders: essays in honour of Ian H. Angus*, edited by Peyman Vahabzadeh and Samir Gandesha. Winnipeg: ARP Books.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1979. “Anti-Humanism, Reflections of the Turn Towards the Post-modern Epoch.” *Man and World* 12(2). 160-177.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1991. “Ultimate Double Binds.” *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 15(1). 213-249.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1985. “Adventures of the Double Negation: on Richard Bernstein’s Call for Anti-Anti-Humanism.” *Praxis International* 5(3). 283-291.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1994. “A Brutal Awakening to the Tragic Condition of Being: On Heidegger’s *Beïtrage zur Philosophie*.” Pp. 89-105 in *Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology*, edited by K. Harries and C. Jamme. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc.

Schürmann, Reiner. 2019. “Technicity, Topology, Tragedy: Heidegger on “That Which Saves” in the Global Reach.” Pp. 190-213 in *Technology in the Western Political Tradition*, edited by J. Weinberger, A.M. Melzer, R. Zinman and M. S. U. Staff. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Wendland, Aaron James. 2018. “Heidegger’s New Beginning. History, Technology, and National Socialism.” Pp. 149-173 in *Heidegger on Technology*, edited by A.J. Wendland, C.D. Merwin and C.M. Hadjioannou. New York: Routledge.

Chapter 4

Baudrillard, Jean. 1988. *The Ecstasy of Communication*. Edited by S. Lotringer, New York: Semiotexte.

Heidegger, Martin. 1962. *Being and Time*. New York: HarperCollins publishers.

Heidegger, Martin. 1977a. "The Age of World Picture." In *Questions Concerning Technology (and other essays)*. New York: Harper & Row. Heidegger, Martin. 1977b. "Science and Reflection". In *Questions Concerning Technology (and other essays)*. New York: Harper & Row.

Heidegger, Martin. 1985. *The History of the Concept of Time*. Indiana: Indiana University Press. Heidegger, Martin. 1992. *The Concept of Time*. Oxwell: Blackwood Publishers.

Heidegger, Martin. 2012. "Positionality". In *The Bremen Lectures*. Indiana: Indiana University Press. Schalow, Frank, and Alfred Denker. 2010. *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1987. *Heidegger On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Vahabzadeh, Peyman. 2020. "How to Act in the Playgrounds of Being." Pp. 368-386 in *Crossing Borders: essays in honour of Ian H. Angus*, edited by Peyman Vahabzadeh and Samir Gandesha. Winnipeg: ARP Books.

Chapter 5

Heidegger, Martin. 2008. "Question Concerning Technology" in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper Collins. 213-266.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1979. "Anti-Humanism, Reflections of the Turn Towards the Post modern Epoch." *Man and World* 12(2). 160-177.

Schürmann, Reiner. 2019. "Technicity, Topology, Tragedy: Heidegger on "That Which Saves" in the Global Reach." Pp. 190-213 in *Technology in the Western Political Tradition*, edited by J. Weinberger, A.M. Melzer, R. Zinman and M. S. U. Staff. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Conclusion

Anderson, John M. 1966. "Introduction". Pp. 11-41 in *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. By John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper & Row.

Davis, Bret W. 2018. "Heidegger's Releasement from the Technological Will." Pp. 133-148 in *Heidegger on Technology*, edited by A.J. Wendland, C.D. Merwin and C.M. Hadjioannou. New York: Routledge.

Heidegger, Martin. 1959. "Memorial Address". Pp. 43-57 in *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper & Row.

Heidegger, Martin. 1959. "Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking". Pp. 58-90 in *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper & Row.

Heidegger, Martin. 2008. “Question Concerning Technology”. Pp. 213-266 in *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper Collins.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1973. “Heidegger and Meister Eckhart on Releasement.” *Research in Phenomenology* 3. 95-119.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1982. “On Self-Regulation and Transgression.” *Social Research* 49(4).1029-1046.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1987. *Heidegger On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Schürmann, Reiner. 1994. “A Brutal Awakening to the Tragic Condition of Being: On Heidegger’s *Beïtrage zur Philosophie*.” Pp. 89-105 in *Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology*, edited by K. Harries and C. Jamme. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc.