

TOWARDS A DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORY OF COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONS

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## ABSTRACT

The project of this paper was to sift the historical data of all Communist Revolutions in an effort to make generalizations. These generalizations were then used to form a descriptive category of Communist Revolutions.

This entailed a thorough examination of the terms employed initially. The approach used as a systems analytical model. The source of the model was Chalmers Johnson's book Revolutionary Change. Refinements to this model came from the Harry Eckstein's Internal War especially the essay by Arnold Feldman entitled "Violence and Volatility: The Likelihood of Revolutions".

The systems analytical perspective was employed as an organizing tool. The historical data was processed through the modified model and the results were then compared. This comparison suggested several generalizations. After a consideration of the generalizations a tentative descriptive category of Communist Revolutions was presented.

There was no effort to predict the future of Communist Revolutions, rather a general description was the goal. The value of this description will be realized when other similar categorizations are made of the other types of revolutions. These will aid the study of comparative revolutions in the quest for a general theory of revolution.

A secondary effort of this paper was the exercise of applying a systems analytical model in an effort to judge the usefulness of this type of approach. Systems analysis appeared to be most useful in arriving at descriptions of meaningful similarities. It was least effective in outlining substantial differences.

EXAMINERS


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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This paper will deal with revolutions on an analytical plane. ✓ The project is to sift the general historical data presented in order to realize an acceptable descriptive category of "Communist Revolution". It is felt by many that a great deal of pre-theory work is essential before a theory of revolution can be put forward. In Harry Eckstein's book Internal War,<sup>1</sup> Arnold Feldman characterizes this type of endeavor (i.e. pre-theory work) as "processing the data". This is a particularly useful view as it points out that the obvious prerequisite of theorizing is a long consideration of the "facts" at hand. In the pure sciences this is implicitly assumed but in the social sciences, too often, would-be theories are the product of the so-called "classical approach" whereby the judgement or intuition of the theorist is the source of the theory. While judgement and intuition must be present in any theorist's efforts, other elements - objective elements - must also be present.

Revolution will be viewed as a type of change in the social system and ultimately the political system under scrutiny. <sup>REVISION</sup> The basic ✓ project of this paper is to compare the historical case studies of Communist Revolution and then describe that category of revolution.

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<sup>1</sup>Eckstein, H., ed., Internal War, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964.

This project would be much simpler if a generally accepted taxonomy of political change were available on which one could place "Revolution". The category of Revolution could be examined, analysed and organized into different sub-categories of which Communist Revolution would be one.

Eckstein makes a case for the usefulness of descriptive categories.

The most urgent pre-theoretical need in internal war studies today is the development even if only tentative, of basic descriptive categories in terms of which the basic features of internal war can be identified, in terms of which their nuances and broader features can be depicted in general structural concepts, classes (or types) constructed, and resemblances of cases to one another or to types accurately assessed.<sup>2</sup>

Without commenting on the sentence construction, the obvious wisdom of this plea for pre-theory work merits some effort in the area of "basic descriptive categories." A complete set of descriptive categories would be most useful for comparative study of revolutions as a set of ideal types would be supplied with which one could assess individual revolutions. This would certainly aid the "processing of data" for generalizations on revolution.

As has already been pointed out, revolution as a concept, is not neatly delimited or defined. The fundamental problem, before any attempt at descriptive categorization is possible, will be to delimit the concept revolution as it will be used in this paper. In itself, a descriptive category of Communist Revolution is of little utility

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

unless other descriptive categories (at least roughly equivalent) are generated. The task is a large one as the term "revolution" is a very slippery concept. The chief problem is the wide spread use (and misuse) of the term as a metaphor. In fact the term is so broadly applied one is tempted to use some other word or phrase so that precise definition could be facilitated. This has been done by some authors and editors. The most immediately obvious example is the already mentioned Harry Eckstein. He chose the term "internal war" rather than using revolution. Such a practice may generate further confusion, however, as nearly all words have secondary nuances, as has the example, "internal war". One can readily see potential confusion in this example. "Internal" must be qualified as the concept we are dealing with cannot be limited to the realm of the purely domestic. As for "war" it is probably little clearer than revolution with regard to concise definition. It is usually broadly used. Hence, rather than risk this sort of confusion I will employ the word "revolution".

What we must do at this juncture is to decide what is meant by the term revolution. Hannah Arendt has a lengthy section in her book On Revolution dealing with this problem.<sup>3</sup> The effort must be made here, although much more briefly, to outline precisely how the term will be employed throughout this paper.

One huge problem with the term "revolution" is the fact that it is a metaphor taken from astronomy and applied to politics. Gradually the application's focus varied with the situation to which it was directed. As a result the original metaphor ceases to be appropriate but has become ingrained. For example, basic to a modern view of

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<sup>3</sup>Arendt, Hannah, On Revolution, Chapter 1, pp. 13-53.

revolution is rapid, fundamental change. Originally the term was used to describe the restoration of the old legitimate order for a newer, illegitimate order.

This does not appear to be the case any more. The concept will be operationalized by building up the components of it rather than by attempting a definition. So far, the component "change" is all that is mentioned explicitly. "Revolution" has been applied to industrial change (e.g. Industrial Revolution) technological innovation (e.g. the Plastics Revolution) as well as to political change (e.g. the American Revolution. For our purposes only political revolutions are to be considered and that is all the term is intended to encompass here, hence usages referring to other areas of human endeavour are irrelevant.

Revolutions are one kind of actualization of societal potentials for conflict and change. Thus, the potential for revolution is equally the potential for other kinds of social change.<sup>4</sup>

Feldman sees revolution in terms of one method of changing the social system. The concept of societal change is central to revolution, but that is not the only consideration. Arendt points this out: "For revolutions however we may be tempted to define them are not mere[ly] changes."<sup>5</sup> Arendt goes on to make the point that revolutions start a society anew - they are in a very real sense, a beginning not an alteration of the old. This may be overdrawn but a fresh start is extremely important.

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<sup>4</sup>Feldman, Arnold, "Violence and Volatility: The Likelihood of Revolution", in Harry S. Eckstein, ed., Internal War, p. 112.

<sup>5</sup>Arendt, Op. cit., p. 13.

Another consideration essential to this paper is the historical time period. Revolution is used technically to apply only to political change of recent times. The reason for this has to do with the quality of the change. Revolutionary activity is organized specifically to bring about profound political change in a short period of time. This must occur for the behavior to be called a Revolution although the change that occurs need not be that which was originally planned. During the medieval period political change of this type was largely inconceivable. Man's time on earth was a period of pain to be endured until death and redemption. To deliberately attempt to change the political environment was to meddle with God's plan. Not until secularization of society became a reality was Revolution viable.

"Secularization, the separation of religion from politics and the rise of a secular realm with a dignity of its own, is certainly a crucial factor in the phenomenon of revolution."<sup>6</sup> Not until the Renaissance can our use of "revolution" have any relevance.

The Renaissance is characterized as a period of great intellectual progress spurred by the example of the ancients, especially the Greco-Roman traditions. In a very real sense the revolutionary political change of this period is an example of the astronomical metaphor. Restoration to the original virtuous political models was the change sought. Probably the best known sources of this view available today are Machiavelli's The Prince and The Discourses. Revolution, however, is more than the perceived need and ambition to restore old models, if that at all.

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

In the Eighteenth Century revolution takes on the added freight of attempting a new political structure not based on some older, tried entity. Hence, Revolution can be applied in the sense it is being employed in this paper, to events of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries at the most inclusive degree. Hannah Arendt states this case:

The modern concept of revolution, inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story, never known or told before, is about to unfold, was not known prior to the great revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>7</sup>

Now that we can focus on a modern, profound political change realized in a relatively short space of time we have delimited the subject. Rapid change is an unsettling phenomenon at the very least. I do not intend to engage in the sort of "chicken or egg" debate as to whether revolution is in part caused by unsettling conditions or in itself causes unsettled conditions in the social system. Both are clearly true.

It is important to note that what a revolution replaces is an old leadership elite. This leadership elite, despite its lack of direction and support will not willingly give up its political power or its hold over the social system. Why the leadership elite finds itself in the position of what some call "power deflation" is an interesting and important question but one which will be dealt with later. Only force or the credible threat of force can successfully remove the authority of the leadership elite.

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

In order for nonviolent communist revolution to become a real possibility, it would be necessary to devise so insidious a technique of revolution by subversion that the forces being overthrown would hardly be aware of this fact before it was too late to resist. The fifty-year history of Communist revolutions contains no instance that would exemplify such a pattern or point to its feasibility.<sup>8</sup>

Hence, while violence is not essential to revolution at the definitional level in practice revolution without violence is inconceivable. Peter Calvert supports the inclusion of violence as a defining characteristic:

...revolution may be understood throughout as referring to events in which physical force (or the convincing threat of it) has actually been used successfully to overthrow a government or regime.<sup>9</sup>

It is recognized that the term violence will require clarification before this statement can be acceptable.

For an entirely different political system to be the result of violence the system obviously must have been unable to defend itself. F. G. Bailey uses the interesting analogy of games when looking at political structures. When the structure is functioning adequately it means the "players" accept the rules of the "game". A fight occurs when one side wants to employ different "rules" than their "opponents". Hence, for Bailey, revolution is a "fight" (rather than a game) for control of the "decision making arena". The winner may declare and

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<sup>8</sup>Tucker, Robert C., "Paths of Communist Revolution 1917-67" The Soviet Union A Half Century of Communism. Edited by Kurt London, pp. 14-15.

<sup>9</sup>Calvert, Peter, Revolution, p. 15.

enforce new rules.<sup>10</sup> To view this in Arnold Feldman's terms, tension is generated in excess of the facilities for tension-management resulting in a change.<sup>11</sup> A new or drastically revised system must be the result or society would atomize completely. To use the term violence in this abstract way requires explanation. Violence to a society's norms and shared values need not be accomplished solely by throwing bombs and killing the enemy as Machiavelli's counsel would suggest, although some degree of this is usually the case. The sudden withdrawal of support, or the acceleration of demands is violence to the system and when the system cannot cope then actual physical violence is the likely result. Johnson holds a similar view of the term violence when he operationalizes the term revolution this way: "...revolution (purposive political violence)..."<sup>12</sup>

So far components of sudden profound change and violence (at least systemic violence) have been included in the concept of Revolution. However, there are many ramifications arising from these components and many qualifications.

Terms like "sudden", "profound" and "change" all require qualification. For the purpose of this paper "change" in the political system will mean changes in the manner of government. Simple changes in personnel, no matter how sudden or violent, are not going to be considered profound. Actual structural changes reflecting a different set of value orientations is what is required by the adjective

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<sup>10</sup>Bailey, F. G., Stratagems and Spoils, pp. 1-19.

<sup>11</sup>Feldman, Op. cit.

<sup>12</sup>Johnson, C., Revolution and the Social System, p. 8.

"profound". Since this is a view of social change of a specific type it is obvious the term change will refer to societal change. Probably the most difficult concept to be precise about is the time factor.

"Sudden" is a relative term and when dealing in social systems of long term duration, it need not mean a few hours or days. The term revolution can best be understood in juxtaposition to the term evolution as far as the time element is concerned. It is ludicrous to attempt to say that after a specific length of time a change ceases to be revolutionary and becomes evolutionary. What is meant here is dramatic change rather than gradual change. Hence, the Canadian Parliament is the product of parliamentary evolution dating back to the Althing of what is now Iceland circa 900 A.D. The government of China dates back to 1949. The Canadian Parliament is substantially different from the Althing but one hesitates to say when the change became a qualitative difference. However, China's government has been qualitatively different at least three times in the Twentieth Century. This is the sort of suddenness we have in mind. For the sake of a study in political change, sudden can be taken to mean a time period of one generation, a "revolutionary generation". This length of time is sufficiently broad for results to develop without allowing many gradual changes to appear sudden by viewing the cumulative result. This is strictly arbitrary, however, a longer period of time would be less acceptable than a shorter time period.

Another vital aspect of Revolution is success. This point is often debated, but we have already viewed Revolution in terms of change. If the change takes place then the Revolution was successful. No criterion of success used in this paper requires the Revolution to

realize all or indeed any of its goals (although total failure seems unlikely) however, change as already outlined must take place. Violent efforts at change that fail may be labelled rebellions. Successful ousters of personnel that do not result in qualitative social system change may be labelled coups d'etat or even revolts but not Revolutions.

Many other ramifications develop from these concepts. Not all need be dealt with here. We should consider motives, at least in passing. Hannah Arendt feels that a modern revolution must aim at broadening the access to power. Control must be brought closer to the controlled or else Revolution is not what is attempted. This view is compatible with the proviso that qualitative change must take place, although the direction of the change is more specific. Sometimes it is difficult to access in which direction the change has occurred (especially in the short run), hence the burden of defining direction will not be taken on. Probably the moral burden Arendt feels necessary can be heaped on all Revolutions as long as it is realized that the moral aim is often wide of the mark. If we do not insist that Revolutions succeed in bringing the actual control closer to the controlled, then, all revolutionaries aim at bettering society for the common man. The fact that many moral goals are not successfully realized does not make the profound changes wrought non-revolutionary.

In analyzing the various views of many writers it is felt that we have a useful and usable concept of Revolution. Harry Eckstein was being similarly eclectic in his introduction to Internal War as he tried to capsule the views of Janos, Parsons, Thornton, Feldman, Lipset, himself and others who contributed to that book. His summary

for this concept labelled "internal war" (i.e. revolution) was this:

It [internal war] is a kind of social force that is exerted in the process of political competition deviating from previously shared social norms "warlike" in character (that is conducted practically without mutually observed normative rules) and involving the serious 13 disruption of settled institutional patterns.

The next problem is the approach. Choice of project is a major step in picking an approach. The fact that I am viewing Revolution as a type of change in the social system forces me to analyse the social system. Systems analytical approaches, then, appear to be appropriate. Revolution, as it is dealt with here encompasses a great deal more than the flaring up of violence which is intended to have a political goal. The generalizations will be on the political level, but the social system will be viewed as forming a macro-system of which the political system is a micro-system (sub-system).

To be more specific, I plan to use a "systems-of-action" approach to borrow the terminology of J. David Singer.<sup>14</sup> By this Singer means to include systems approaches as dealt with by Gabriel Almond,<sup>15</sup> Karl Deutsch,<sup>16</sup> David Easton,<sup>17</sup> Morton Kaplan,<sup>18</sup> and Talcott Parsons<sup>19</sup> among others.

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<sup>13</sup>Eckstein, Harry S., "Introduction", Internal War, p. 12.

<sup>14</sup>Singer, J. David, A General Systems Taxonomy for Political Science.

<sup>15</sup>Almond, G. and G. B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Development Approach.

<sup>16</sup>Deutsch, K., The Nerves of Government.

<sup>17</sup>Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life.

<sup>18</sup>Kaplan, Morton, System and Process in International Politics.

<sup>19</sup>Parsons, Talcott, Structure and Process in Modern Societies.

These are approaches which look at dynamic and behavioral phenomena rather than the structures or entities where the action takes place. (This latter approach Singer characterizes as "systems-of-entities"). It must be pointed out that this approach will not borrow from all these systems analysts. Acknowledgement is made of David Easton and Morton Kaplan as influences on this approach.

Systems analysis will be applied only as a means of organizing the historical data presented in the case studies. No claims will be made or implied that the systems analytical methods "explain" or "predict". Much criticism has been levelled at systems analysis for failing to accomplish what the analyst wants it to do. The fault is often with the analyst. In theory building systems analysis has, perhaps, very limited application. When applied to raw "facts" it can be very useful in pre-theory data processing. As an organizing technique it is particularly well suited to the type of analysis attempted here. Systems analysis does have a broad enough application so that almost any approach can be brought within its scope. In this way the approach permits several different views in a single framework, thereby greatly facilitating comparison and enabling, through numbers, a group of analysts to avoid focusing on some elements and ignoring others. While the possibility for confusion and mistakes is greatly magnified by changing levels of analysis (e.g. comparing federal government with provincial government or an industrialized nation's senior government with a tribal council), if care is taken many useful generalizations can be realized.

The real strength of the approach, especially the systems-of-action aspect, is that it permits the analyst to focus on the

environment of the question, in this case revolution. The effort here is to understand the phenomenon of revolution, and then to organize it into one of many descriptive categories. It is impossible to understand any social concept without understanding its environment. In this case the concept can be described as the direct result of specific conditions of the environment. Reasons for studying revolution may include any or all of the following: prescription, explication, predication, or merely description. However none of these can be achieved without a substantial study of the environment of revolution.

Rather than continue discussing systems analysis in general it will be of more value to focus on the specific approach employed in this paper. Since the chief interest of the paper lies in the political system (a sub-system of the social system) and its actions and reactions to revolutionary stress the model chosen had to allow for easy shift of the level of analysis and also it must keep these shifts extremely obvious to avoid confusion.

Before any meaningful discussion of the term "revolution" can be initiated, (especially in a system analysis perspective), a clear understanding and/or operationalization of the term social system is essential. The term social system and society are not synonymous, however it is planned to employ the term social system as an analogy or model to stand for society. Hence, we will generalize from an abstraction (social system) to the concrete (society). As a result the two terms are used somewhat interchangeably in the paper as if the abstraction bore a one-to-one relationship to the concrete.

By using the term "system", we assume there exists behavior which displays an interrelation between the actors (mutual inter-

dependence) and that this behavior is maintained over time. Also built into the term "system" is an idea of sub-systems and supra-systems. Let it be understood that the level of analysis is that of more or less whole human societies. For example, in my focus, church is a sub-system of the nation-state social system and the United Nations is a social system at a greater or higher level of analysis. There may very well be many who would question the nation-state as a level of analysis which encompasses "whole human societies". Certainly the boundaries of a nation-state do not contain the social system of that nation-state. We are not attempting however, to describe and analyze everything in a whole social system. Our focus is on "revolution", which will be defined within the bounds of the nation-state. It can also be argued that the nation-state is an appropriate level of analysis for social systems due to the fact that shared values of a social system are most commonly perceived as goals or values of a nation-state. Certainly a look at social systems at this level does not preclude broader or narrower views should they be presented or discovered.

For our purposes, then, the term social system shall refer to virtually all interrelated human behaviour. Specific aggregates of behaviour shall be seen as sub-systems of the social system. Hence, behaviour related to buying, selling and finance in general shall be deemed the economic system of the social system.

It would be helpful to have a collection of functional prerequisites for a social system so that we may identify certain patterns of behaviour as social systems. This collection of prerequisites must be extremely broad, rather than specific, so that it will be applicable to all social systems.

One of the most commonly cited views of the social system is the four-component list offered by Talcott Parsons.<sup>20</sup> The list includes: socialization, adaptation, goal-attainment and integration. These components should be viewed as what social systems must accomplish for those systems to remain in existence. Socialization in the Parsonian sense involves the education of children and immigrants in the values and norms of the social system. The importance of this function can be seen in the term Parsons actually uses - pattern maintenance. Society's pattern is maintained by assuring that the new members share the same values and norms as the present and past members of a given society. Without this function every new generation would be a new society as a whole new body of norms and values would be needed.

Adaptation is a function aimed at the allocation of roles to the society's members. This requires differentiation of the roles, distribution of scarce resources and division of labour according to the values and norms ingrained in the membership. It is a function of application of the norms and values to everyday life.

Goal attainment is the natural follow up to adaptation. Successful adaptation implies some degree of success in goal attainment. An individual actor in a social system has many goals, some contradictory. If he achieves no goal attainment he would be totally alienated from that social system, if he could survive at all. The social system must process the individual actor's goals in such a

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<sup>20</sup>Karl Deutsch summarizes Parsons concepts in an article "Integration and the Social System" in P. E. Jacobs, et al. The Integration of Political Communities, pp. 179-208.

way that most people have similar goals in order to enhance the likelihood of a relatively substantial degree of goal attainment.

Integration is the draw string that pulls a society together. It has positive and negative aspects. Integration may be achieved by having opinion leaders (politicians, clerics, artists, etc.) share similar values. If this situation exists a great deal of disagreement can be tolerated within a society without any basic threat existing to the social system. Should this basic value consensus be weak, however, integration can be achieved, at least in the short run by coercion - the negative aspect. Police and armies probably can integrate a society for surprisingly long periods of time, but not long when one considers the potential life of the social system. All societies have a degree of both positive and negative integrative features.

Integration is the cement of society. When political change takes place it has got to strengthen integration to succeed. If a society is not adequately integrated then it cannot survive.

Any dynamic system (e.g. a social system) has the following defining characteristics: it exists longer than the life-span of any one of the actors, comprises more or less a self-sufficient entity, and allows for the maintenance of a population by way of sexual reproduction and/or immigration. These defining characteristics are set down, at least in part, to rule out of consideration short term groupings which may temporarily appear similar to social systems (which are long term groupings). Another possibility is a grouping with a definite term of existence (e.g. an antarctic expedition) which would, again show many similarities in behavior to the social system at the level we are interested in viewing. There is no reason to assume that indefinite

short term groupings or definite short or long term groupings would display the same behavior patterns as a normal open-ended social system. Systems analysis has built into it an assumption that the single most basic activity is preservation of that entity (system maintenance). A grouping with a set term of existence is a different entity than a dynamic social system.

It is important to be aware that individual actors display purposive action in attempting to fulfill perceived needs. The actors have needs, the system does not. The social system must help fulfill the needs of the actors involved in it or it will cease as a dynamic system. In any human groupings of long duration certain patterns of behavior are built up that appear to facilitate the needs or perceived needs of the actors. As a result a large body of the behavior evolves that is deemed acceptable to a vast majority of the participants. This body of behavior, a function partly of the social system's division of labour, becomes the core of that social system's shared values.

An important part of the social system is the political system. This may be defined as loosely or tightly as the analyst feels necessary. The term as it is employed here will stand for that subsystem of the social system predominately responsible for making and applying the formal laws which govern the behavior of the actors. An important concept involved in the political system is authority. The political system is composed of actors who have the authority to make and administer the law and who, therefore, control the means of coercion which are deemed necessary to ensure that individuals will comply with the laws or be punished. Authority carries with it the

powers of the social system which ensure that the shared values of the system (as interpreted by the leadership elite) are maintained.

We started with Chalmers Johnson's model of a "disequilibrated system"<sup>21</sup> which he sees as the environment of revolution. The disequilibrated system is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of revolution.<sup>22</sup> This model, as Johnson employed it, does not represent the social system except when high revolutionary potential exists. To this conceptualization was added Arnold Feldman's view "...potential for revolutions is a 'normal' characteristic of societies..."<sup>23</sup> This concept renders Johnson's disequilibrated system more useful. In effect, all social systems contain an element of disequilibration and hence revolutionary potential is ubiquitous in social systems. Johnson's model is acceptable with a little rationalization.

I intend to employ Johnson's model directly as elaborated in Revolutionary Change, despite the fact it is used for a different purpose than he devised it.

Johnson divides the areas which will be changed in a social system into two parts: changes in the "structure of values" and changes in the "pattern of the division of labour." Hence changes can occur in a social system's values and norms and/or its environment. Each area is further divided into two possible sources of change. He offers an "exogenous-value changing" source which refers to a change in the values of a social system coming from outside that system. The other source area is "endogenous value changing" which is the domestic

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<sup>21</sup>Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, p. 106, Fig. 5-1.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 59-87.

<sup>23</sup>Eckstein, Op. cit. p. 114.

source of change to a social system's values. Looking at the "pattern of the division of labour" we have the same distinctions; namely "exogenous" and "endogenous environment changing" sources of systemic change.

The result of change coming from any or all of these sources is "The Disequilibrated System" which is the way we have characterized all social systems, to a degree. Should the changes create sufficient stress that the relationship between the values and the environment becomes "dissynchronous" then the revolutionary potential will be very high. The reason for this is that the social system will not be able to "fulfill functional requisites" necessary to maintain it. Johnson offers four functional requisites which are sufficiently broad to stand for all social systems. First the system requires coherent socialization of its members, as already described. Secondly the system must maintain an "ensemble of roles" which is compatible with the values and environment of the members of that system. The third area of concern is a reasonable consensus of goals for the social system. The other two requisites assume a common direction for the social system hence, goal consensus is essential. Finally, and perhaps most obviously a social system, by definition, contains conflict. In order to maintain the system these conflicts must be resolved peacefully.

Should any or all of these requisites not be supplied then protesters will want something new to help re-synchronize society or revert to an older style of status hierarchy which is perceived to have been more effective.

At this point the regime can do many things to rectify the situation and maintain itself as the ruling elite, ranging from

"conservative change", through "co-option of the status protesters" to "business as usual" and ending with "intransigence". Conservative change is minor change which does nothing to alter basic relationships, as they exist at the time they are attempted. Co-option is the process of assuming the positions taken by the status protesters and therefore remaining in power by way of changing the values or environment of the ruling elite to re-synchronize the social system. Business as usual of course means that the ruling elite expects or hopes that the status protest is a temporary problem which will rectify itself without special actions. Finally, intransigence refers to political atrophy, i.e. the regime fights all change and stagnates.

Assuming these "elite courses of action" do not succeed in resynchronizing the social system the elite can still force integration, at least for a time, through coercion. This results in the "loss of authority", by the elite. If a revolution is to occur something must happen which convinces the revolutionaries they can successfully overthrow the government or that they have nothing to lose in the attempt. Johnson calls this "breaching the logic of deterrence based on force," and whatever accomplishes this is termed the "accelerator".

The Johnsonian model permits a revolution to fail. By the definition we are employing a revolution must succeed in changing the social system. It is possible that an armed insurrection by the revolutionaries would be successfully suppressed and the ruling elite might make the necessary system change to constitute a revolution. If the elite was likely to make significant change, it would do this before armed insurrection broke out. At any rate the outcome of the

"revolutionary insurrection" depends on two considerations: the "attitude of the armed forces and/or the validity of the transfer culture." This really means that if the army mutinies or joins the revolt, or if the population sees the revolutionaries as a more acceptable government than the old elite, then it will succeed.

One has to look at what Johnson calls "routine homeostasis."

Johnson uses concepts borrowed from Dorothy Emmet's analysis of equilibrium in her book Function, Purpose and Powers.

... Equilibrium should only be used where it is possible to show that the customs (norms), institutions, and the social activities related to them (roles) dovetail in together in certain specified ways so that one provides a corrective to disruptive tendencies in another. It should also be possible to show how, if these functional relationships are lacking, a form of social life will break down and also to show how a reacting tendency may go too far.<sup>24</sup>

Johnson uses Emmet's view of equilibrium and calls it homeostatic equilibrium, which is the state of the social system in which revolution will not occur. By applying the already mentioned concept of ubiquitous revolutionary potential to this homeostatic equilibrium we have a view of the social system that is open ended, it will stand for societies which may or may not have a revolution. As revolutions are extremely rare occurrences relative to periods of non-revolution, most societies obviously have values and mechanisms against revolution. Feldman calls this concept "tension management". This view of society at relative peace with itself is very similar to Emmet's view of

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<sup>24</sup>Emmet, Dorothy, Function, Purpose and Powers, Macmillan & Co., London, 1958; Passage quoted from Johnson, *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

equilibrium, hence successful tension management can be seen as a dynamic equilibrium. In this way the Johnsonian model can be transformed into a dynamic model rather than using it in the static form presented in Revolutionary Change.

The reason Johnson's model is clung to tenaciously is the rather ingenious integration of society displayed. He includes in the overall picture the sources of change, (or in Feldman's words "tension sources") as pressures on the institutions of society, especially the political system. Further, Johnson amalgamates the necessary and sufficient causes of revolution within the model. This is a remarkably complete picture to be displayed in a single model hence its value far exceeds the weaknesses, especially when only minor adjustments to the concepts are required to neutralize or remove the main problems.

The adjustments suggested do not do violence to Johnson. In his preliminary monograph, Revolution and the Social System he states;

Obviously a changing system is not one in equilibrium, conversely there is no place for change in an equilibrium system. But this is not an either/or proposition; "equilibrium" is not a real condition but a concept. An equilibrium social system is an ideal type, and the concept of equilibrium is only a reference point for measuring change.<sup>25</sup>

As our project involves more than outlining a benchmark for the measurement of change, it is necessary to alter Johnson's original model to permit its application to this wider scope.

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
<sup>25</sup>Revolution and the Social System, p. 4.

To get down to basics with this model, it can be seen, perhaps more clearly in Eastonian terms. What Feldman calls systemic "tension" and Johnson calls failure of the "routine homeostasis" is Easton's "demands" broadly interpreted. One critical difference in these models must be pointed out. Feldman and Easton have produced models of society which show activity on a continuum. Johnson's model is a two stage, on or off, model. While the break between routine homeostasis and disequilibrium is by no means an all or nothing proposition<sup>26</sup> there is, most certainly, a qualitative separation. The models of Easton and Feldman vary in quantity of demands or tension whereas Johnson's model has a difference in quality of tension. This may be an accurate model, but it is very difficult to operationalize. This problem of implementing Johnson's model has been discussed in terms of its static nature previously. Viewing the problem graphically, by comparison with the dynamic models, is useful as it shows the mechanical problems of using this model as well as the intellectual. Johnson's ideal type, routine homeostasis, does not exist, and we are not convinced that it could or should exist. As a benchmark it is useful and as pointed out, tinkering does make it useful in a dynamic sense.

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<sup>26</sup> Johnson makes allowance for "creative" action by the elite in a "disequilibrated system" permitting power "inflation" to occur and forestall the outbreak of a revolution. This action must take place, however, before the occurrence of an "accelerator of revolution" takes the volatile situation past a point where revolution can be halted.

Figure 5-1 THE CAUSES OF REVOLUTION



## CHAPTER II

### RUSSIAN CASE STUDY

It is customary to view the world communist system as being comprised of fourteen nation-states: the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Yugoslavia, China, Mongolia, North Korea, North Viet Nam and Cuba. In the official parlance of the communist movement each of these countries joined the Communist Bloc by way of revolution. The circumstances of each country were very different and generalizations must be made carefully. Robert C. Tucker breaks up these so-called revolutions into three types: the Russian Revolution by itself, revolutions by armed struggle and imposed revolutions.<sup>27</sup> For our purposes, imposed revolutions do not fit the definition offered in this paper. Revolutions take place within the nation-state, not from without. While it is recognized that outside (exogenous) influences can play a major role in the revolutionary situation it must still be brought about by the local people in that country. Imposed revolutions share more in common with foreign conquest than with revolution as it is employed in this paper. R. V. Burks refers to imposed revolutions

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<sup>27</sup>R. C. Tucker, "Paths of Communist Revolution" in The Soviet Union a Half Century of Communism, ed. Kurt London, p. 16.

as "the imposition of baggage-train governments".<sup>28</sup> No matter how they are labelled, revolution is not an acceptable term as in these cases they do not occur within whole human societies. The cases of this are: Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Mongolia, North Korea, and in a different way, Czechoslovakia.

This reduces the list substantially. We can further delete the revolution in Cuba. While some argue, like Regis Debray,<sup>29</sup> that the Cuban Revolution was the prototypical Communist Revolution for Latin America, the evidence does not appear to support this. While there is no doubt Castro accomplished a revolution it is by no means clear that it was under Communist auspices or leadership. Castro undoubtedly led a force which included communists, however, this does not make him a communist leader unless Chiang K'ai-shek is a communist leader. The fact is the Cuban Communist Party supported the old regime under Batista up until the final months of the revolutionary insurrection.<sup>30</sup> Since the revolution in Cuba, Castro has declared himself a Communist yet he has not set his government up along Communist models. There is little but his statement to indicate that his is a Communist state. If and when it is decided that Cuba is a bona fide Communist Revolution it could be included in a study of this type. For the present it will be ignored.

This leaves the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Albania, China, and North Viet Nam as the universe of Communist Revolutions. Some may

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<sup>28</sup>R. V. Burks, "Eastern Europe" in Communism and Revolution. eds. C. E. Black and T. P. Thornton, p. 77.

<sup>29</sup>Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?.

<sup>30</sup>Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities. pp. 53-56.

question the wisdom of generalizing on the acquisition of power by the Communists using only five of fourteen possible cases. Our project is to generalize on only one type of acquisition of power by the Communists, that of Revolution. To reiterate, then, the five cases which make up the historical data for this paper comprise all the examples of Communist Revolution.

This overview of the Russian social system under revolutionary stress will start at the period of the Napoleonic War. This period was chosen because it was the first opportunity any substantial number of Russians had of coming in contact with Western Europe and as such proved to be the first source of change. The generation before the Napoleonic Wars had access to much of the literature of the European Enlightenment but it was not until actual contact was made that this became a source of exogenous value change. This contact, for the most part, was made by the military officers, the land owning nobles, senior officials, merchants and professional people, in other words the most influential and important people of Russia. The impact was highly significant. Lionel Kochan quotes from Prince Volkonsky's memoirs on this point:

The campaigns of 1812-1814 brought Europe nearer to us, made us familiar with its forms state, its public institutions, the rights of its people. By contrast with our own state life, the laughably limited rights which our people, possessed, the despotism of our regime first became truly present in our hearts and understanding.<sup>31</sup>

Feelings like this were not uncommon as a number of political clubs and associations sprang up. The primary interests of these groups were to

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<sup>31</sup>Kochan, Lionel, The Making of Modern Russia, p. 143.

free the serfs and to found a constitutional government. Hence they were a status protest group interested in recasting the status hierarchy. A direct result of this political awakening was the Decembrists Revolt of 1825. This revolt among army officers was expected to lead a coup. The men in the ranks would follow their officers, it was supposed, and as a result St. Petersburg would fall. The whole plot was bungled and nothing was accomplished. Part of the reason for the failure was the fact that the original coup was aimed at Tsar Alexander, but he died before the planned date. A three week period of confusion over the succession ended with Alexander's younger brother Nicholas coming to the throne.<sup>32</sup> Another reason which led in part to the failure of the coup was treachery from within so that the new Tsar was aware of the plot and was able to prepare for it.<sup>33</sup>

Tsar Nicholas, just twenty-nine, immediately launched a program of censorship and close supervision of the activities of the populace, the schools and universities. This effort by the Tsar to seek out subversion everywhere further reduced the support for the regime by the intelligentsia. Nicholas built up a police state where very little information flowed up or down. Even the Tsar's government was subject to constant supervision. He was attempting to rule in a vacuum.

Nicholas did attempt some reforms, especially in the area of the serf problem. He halted the sale of serfs where the primary family was broken up. It was made illegal to sell serfs without land (which many land owners were doing to get out of debt). Further, should a land

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<sup>32</sup>Alexander had no heirs and his older brother had married below his rank and forfeited his claim to the throne.

<sup>33</sup>E. C. Thaden, Russia Since 1801, pp. 91-99.

owner declare bankruptcy a serf was permitted to buy his independence and become a free man. These reforms underlined just how cruel and backwards the institution of serfdom was. These reforms serve as examples of conservative change as an elite course of action. The result was much violence as very few serfs could afford to buy their freedom even if the situation permitted. Kochan records 712 peasant outbreaks occurred between 1726 and 1854.<sup>34</sup>

The commencement of the Industrial Revolution provided another source of strain in this same period. Russia was no different than any other nation in this respect. Industrialization proved to be a source of endogenous environmental change.

Further stress on the Russian social systems came as a result of the unsuccessful prosecution of the Crimean War. The economy before the war was not strong. Afterwards the increased taxation to pay for the war and the production disruptions resulting from hostilities weakened the economy further. The war did act as a spur to faster industrialization. This required a huge capital investment over the years. Much of this investment came from the government or foreign sources. Hence the Crimean War acted towards endogenous environment change. It also affected the way Russians felt about their country, and their government. This aspect of the war gave rise to a source of endogenous value change also.

Alexander II came to the throne in 1855 just following the Crimean War, amid the conditions just outlined. He recognized the need for reform and came to power bearing a "liberal label". His first act was to free the surviving political prisoners of the Decembrist Revolt.

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<sup>34</sup>Kochan, Op cit., p. 150.

He also set in motion discussions which led to the Emancipation Act for the serfs. Alexander came to power with the traditional support of the landlords and quickly gained the backing of his father's political exiles. In many ways Alexander was in a good position to offer the necessary "creative" political leadership which could have settled his empire. Unfortunately the Emancipation Act, long overdue and five years in the making proved to be a disaster. Alexander chose conservative change as his course of action rather than being truly innovative or creative. Serfs were freed and given access to some land but in order to get it they were forced into long term debt to the government. Even before Emancipation the peasants had too little land to work. After the act there was far less land available as the Tsar took only about a third of the landowners' holdings. The money the landowners received from the government in partial payment for the land which went to the serfs was largely taken by the creditors of the landlords. By not making a bold enough change Alexander created a situation where the serfs were hopelessly in debt and with relatively little land. Meanwhile the landlords had given up their serfs and part of their land for what amounted to a temporary reprieve from their creditors. This cost Alexander much of the traditional support the Tsar enjoyed from both the gentry and their peasants. Added to this was another serious source of endogenous environmental change. The rural population increased by fifty per cent between 1860 and 1897.<sup>35</sup>

Alexander attempted reform in his administration as well as in society at large. His growing empire needed expanded administration and to meet these demands the Tsar set up local boards known as zemstva.

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 170.

They were made up largely of local gentry but there was some merchant and peasant representation. These boards had many responsibilities and very limited authority. The boards' duties included: collection of local taxes, public works and they were expected to look after what welfare there was available. Despite severe limitations, the zemstva represent the beginnings of representative government and as such were liberalizing elements.

Under Alexander II political organizations were able to survive that worked for land redistribution. These different groups have come to be known collectively as the Populist Movement. They were affected by Western writings and old Russian peasant commune traditions. The Populists were status protesters favouring a recasting of the status hierarchy at the local level, the peasant commune. Others favored a Western constitutional government and the end of feudalism.<sup>36</sup> They were also status protesters interested in recasting the status hierarchy. They therefore represent a combination of both exogenous and endogenous sources of value change. The Populists varied widely in their tactics. Some idealistic young reformers went "to the people". They were the sons and daughters of the well-to-do and hoped to bring their skills and knowledge to the aid of the peasants. On the other extreme Populist groups engaged in political terrorism which eventually brought about the assassination of the Tsar by bomb in 1881.

Alexander III succeeded Alexander II. The new Tsar's regime was even more restrictive than had been the case under Nicholas, as any and all non-conformists were persecuted. Anti-semitism became

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<sup>36</sup> Avrahm Yarmolinsky's Road to Revolution provides much detail on the Populist Movement.

government policy as Jews were forced from their homes, jobs and eventually even the country. Property qualifications for Zemstva membership were imposed so that only the nobles were represented. This régime displays Johnson's elite intransigence.

During this period the Industrial Revolution expanded rapidly, largely as a result of the railroad expansion which took place during and just after the Crimean War. Again the investment for industrialization came from the government or from foreigners. The government's source was the agricultural segment of the economy. Virtually nothing was reinvested into agriculture with the result that industrialization forced taxes up markedly.<sup>37</sup> Greater industrialization created a larger source of endogenous environmental change in the Russian social system.

The harsh censorship drove many intellectuals out of the country. Among these was the ex-Populist Plekhanov who fled to Switzerland. He can rightly be called the "father of Russian Marxism". Marxists circles were springing up inside Russia and these emigre intellectuals managed to keep the various Marxist groups informed of developments in European revolutionary circles. It was in these Russian groups where Lenin first studied Marx. He went to Switzerland to meet with Plekhanov. Although space does not permit a lengthy look at the development of Russian Marxism it is essential to remember this movement was growing inside and outside of Russia. Much of the support for Marxism came from the rapidly growing working class. Labour organizations eventually became the instrument of the Russian Marxists.

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<sup>37</sup> Seton-Watson, Hugh, "Comment on Kennan" in Pipes, ed. Revolutionary Russia, p. 16.

The tactic was to upset the political system by a series of crippling strikes. The Tsar's answer to this growing source of value change (originating outside but growing vigorously within Russia) was intransigence. The labour leaders were jailed and the strikers fined. The workers unrest grew apace with the desperate conditions in the rural area. Famine only added natural pressure to the tax arrears and agricultural stagnation.

One final disaster was to be added to the problems of the Russian Empire. Competition in the far east between Japan and Russia led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The war saw the Russian forces thoroughly humiliated in defeat. Discontent with the war and working conditions led to a strike in St. Petersburg which hastily became a general strike. A group of petitioners went to the Winter Palace to present demands for political reform. The guards fired on the peaceful demonstration killing hundreds. Virtually all segments of the Russian society were politicized by the time of Bloody Sunday, hence a process that started with a minority of army officers in 1825 had now been completed by a senseless over-reaction by the Winter Palace guards. One of the demands of the protesters, constitutional government, gained support at all levels from professionals to the peasants. Further military defeats weakened the Tsar's position so that he permitted the formation of the Duma (parliament). This concession did not stop the Revolution of 1905. More strikes and many military mutinies finally led to the granting of a Constitution. The Constitution promised in part, civil liberties, a much broadened franchise, and a Duma that was to pass all acts before they became law.

The Constitution split the many status protesters into groups.

The liberals were generally willing to work within the Duma to effect political change, however many radical groups felt that much more had to be accomplished in the way of political change (e.g. the complete removal of the monarchy). A group of workers in the capital formed the St. Petersburg Soviet which demanded political power to be placed directly into the hands of the people. Leon Trotsky eventually led this group. The liberals did not support the workers and the Tsar suppressed the soviet arresting the leaders. Again labour strife and peasant revolt flared up. Russia was in turmoil and no end was in sight. In the period from 1905 until 1914 the liberals attempted to make the constitution work. At the same time the Tsar obstructed their efforts. Finally in 1914 war broke out and Russia was immediately drawn into it by treaty obligations and in a desire to unite the Russian people by fighting a common enemy.

As is to be expected patriotism affected the reform movement. As of the outbreak of war the liberals (Kadets) supported the war effort. This invalidated them as a transfer culture. This left the field open to the various socialist factions. Of these the Bolsheviks were the most militant. The Socialists wanted no part of the war characterizing it as part of the collapse of capitalism. Russia's poor showing in the First World War was the final nail in the coffin of Tsarism. This final source of exogenous value change led to the abdication of the Tsar. What accelerated both the abdication and eventually the Revolution itself was the food protest of February 1917. This hastily grew into a general strike. The final blow and the event that can be identified as the accelerator of the Russian Communist Revolution came when the troops in St. Petersburg joined the protesters

and strikers in large numbers. At this point the old regime lost its coercive power and Tsarism was ended.<sup>38</sup>

By early March the Duma liberal leader Prince Lvov headed a provisional government which attempted to replace the Tsar's administration. The liberals had no source of legitimacy and never really established themselves as a valid transfer culture. Once again the Petrograd (as St. Petersburg was re-named) Soviet emerged. This time the soviet had much support and they did not back Lvov's effort at government. Alexander Kerensky, one of Lvov's few socialist ministers attempted to form a second provisional government in July. Kerensky had a much broader basis of support but failed to succeed in crystallizing it as he did not pull Russia out of the war. Kerensky supported General Kornilov when he attempted to assert discipline in the armed forces. Later when Kornilov attempted to seize political power in the name of strong government Kerensky was seen as a sympathiser if not a collaborator. Both these men threatened what had been accomplished in the way of political change (as they appeared to be trying to reinstate a strong central government). Kerensky lost the support of the working classes which had been weak at best. The Provisional Government could not maintain civil order and fell victim to a Bolshevik coup in October of 1917.

The Tsarist regime failed to fulfill any of the four basic requisites of the social system. Society was atomized hence socialization was incoherent in the extreme. Taking Russia into the war showed how inappropriate the Tsar's ensemble of roles was. All segments of the Russian society had separate goals so that a consensus proved

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<sup>38</sup>Thaden, Op cit., pp. 429-431.

impossible. Finally, the thousands of strikes, mutinies, riots and revolts are massive indication of the failure of the society to resolve conflicts peacefully. Neither Provisional government was able to alter this situation they inherited from the Tsar.

When the Tsar's power deflated completely owing to the lack of military support (the accelerator) the Provisional Government attempted to become the transfer culture. The liberals never became a valid transfer culture because they could not muster the authority or the power to gain compliance. The Bolsheviks once they became an armed political unit did manage a balance of support and power necessary to be accepted as a viable, valid transfer culture. The Revolutionary Insurrection included the Civil War lasting until the Moscow centered Bolshevik government controlled most of the Russian Empire from Vladivostok to Petrograd. The outcome was decided by the fact the military supported the Bolsheviks (they promised bread and peace). The Bolsheviks had the organization, leadership and force of arms to form the only valid transfer culture.

The end of the Russian Revolution is difficult to pinpoint. Some would argue that as soon as the Bolsheviks had seized control of the major cities, the revolution was completed - that is to say, once physical control of the country is realized the deed is done. Others would insist that the Russian Revolution was not completed until Stalin had accomplished the communization of agriculture. A few contend that the Russian Revolution is still in progress. For the purposes of this paper the date for the end of the revolution will be set after the Kronstadt mutiny<sup>39</sup> and when the new regime controlled all of the old

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<sup>39</sup> Kennan, George F., Russia and the West, pp. 172-173.

Russian Empire from Petrograd to Vladivostok in 1921-1922. The new regime totally reorganized the political system and while employing many of the old regime's personnel, it rebuilt the administrative network of government. As our focus is social change and specifically political change this would seem a reasonable end to the revolution. The new regime had initiated drastic revisions of the social system and a resynchronization, while not totally completed, was being carried out.

It would be useful to see what some of these changes were. Lenin nationalized all large scale industry, most private businesses, and the banks. The entire division of labour was altered in this way. All workers were state employees and strikes became the equivalent of mutiny in the armed forces, hence treasonous.<sup>40</sup> The first step towards nationalization of agriculture was taken when so-called 'food armies' went to the farms to requisition grain in order to feed the urban workers. All land was owned by the State but the peasant could work the land he occupied and sell what he grew to the State.

These examples indicate that profound change had occurred in the Russian social system and that it had taken place over a very short period of time. While much change remained to be done a revolution had taken place.

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<sup>40</sup>Kochan, Op cit., pp. 488-489.

## CHAPTER III

### YUGOSLAVIAN CASE STUDY

The revolutionary period of Yugoslavia is the history of the founding of a viable nation-state. Understanding of this is essential to any understanding of the revolution which brought Tito to power.

Revolts against Turkish domination took Serbia out of the Ottoman Empire around 1815. Serbia was granted its independence under a hereditary Prince. Montenegro proved too difficult to hold so that mountainous area was already independent at this time.

Bosnia and Herzegovina revolted against the Sultan in 1875. Montenegro and Serbia took advantage of this fact and declared war on the Ottoman Empire in an effort to annex some of these lands. The Austro-Hungarian Empire demanded and received the right to "temporarily" occupy these areas plus a small strip between Montenegro and Serbia. In 1908 Austria announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Serbia and Montenegro required Russian support, which was not forthcoming to fight Austria, the situation remained as it was.

During the Balkan Wars Serbia and Montenegro gained much land at the expense of the Ottoman Empire but Austria could still use threats to hold these two provinces. Between them they gained control of Kosovo, most of Macedonia, bits of Albania and the Sandjak region.

Previous to independence from the Ottoman Empire the many revolts were the awakenings of nationalism manifested in a feeling of

resentment of an outsider or alien administration. After independence the success served to build up a feeling of pride of nation in the slavic people including those under Austria-Hungary. This nationalistic feeling is a source of endogenous value change and is the single most important source of change in the Yugoslav situation. Nationalism received further encouragement from outside Yugoslavia. The Italian Unification Movement provided a model for those southern slavs who desired a successful Yugoslav Unification Movement. This is an important example of a source of exogenous value change. Related to this were the many youth movements all over Europe. Young Italy, Young Germany, and Young Russia are a few which young Yugoslavs became aware of while studying outside the country.

A Bosnian assassinated the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand with a Serbian weapon. This led to demands by Austria that Serbia met almost entirely. Austria attacked Serbia despite this, which led to the First World War.<sup>41</sup> Serbia put up more resistance than was expected. Austria took months to take the city of Belgrade only to be thrown out by a counter-attack. With the assistance of Bulgaria and Germany, Austria managed to attack again. The Serbs retreated through Montenegro, Albania and with Allied aid eventually to the island of Corfu. They refused to surrender. When the Allies moved in to expel Austria, Germany and Bulgaria it was this same Serb force which led the fighting. The war cost Montenegro and Serbia three quarters of a million people,<sup>42</sup> but it was successful. The southern slavs under

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<sup>41</sup>Heppell and Singleton, Yugoslavia, p. 142.

<sup>42</sup>Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, p. 53.

other jurisdictions admired these war time feats (e.g. those in Austria-Hungary). In 1914 the Serbian parliament stated the war was for "the liberation and unification of all our subjugated brothers: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes."<sup>43</sup> In 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed. Much debate ensued over the boundaries and constitution but the state was a reality.

The new state was made up of very different components: two independent Kingdoms - Serbia and Montenegro both of which included territories that had been Turkish until 1912, parts of Austria - most of the Slovenian lands and Dalmatia; a realm under the Hungarian crown with its own home rule - Croatia-Slavonia; part of Hungary - Vojvodina and the northeastern tip of Slovenia; and Austro-Hungarian condominium - Bosnia - Herzegovina.<sup>44</sup>

Problems facing the new Kingdom were many. The economy of Yugoslavia (as the Kingdom was named in 1929) was very poor, predominately agricultural but without enough good land to support a prosperous peasantry. Industrially the new state had resources but lacked the necessary iron, coal and petroleum to develop them. Another problem was the lack of political experience necessary to administer a modern nation-state. The entire political structure was an example of a source of exogenous environment change. The model it was copied on was derived from Europe of the period when the major countries were forming national monarchies out of the many provinces. Recognition was made that it was the Twentieth Century by the addition of the Skupstina (parliament) but the monarch was the center of power.

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<sup>43</sup>Byrnes et al., Yugoslavia, p. 9.

<sup>44</sup>Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, p. 53.

The eventual demise of this form of government came about when one deputy murdered another during a debate in the Skupstina. King Alexander suspended the Skupstina and banned all political parties setting up a royal dictatorship in 1929. The Croats resented the situation as they felt dominated by the Serbs. In two years Alexander's new constitution legalized the status quo. This is an example of conservative change as an elite course of action. This led many Croats to support a right wing extremist group the Ustase, modelled after the Fascists. This provided another source of exogenous value change in Yugoslavia. The Ustase assassinated Alexander in 1934 and Prince Paul became regent. He continued Alexander's dictatorship. Pressure by the Croats continued and in 1939 Paul granted them their own parliament and governor. This resulted in resentment by the other minority groups in Yugoslavia. After this Paul brought Yugoslavia into line with the Axis powers by a series of pacts culminating in an agreement with Hitler. Once the final pact with Germany was announced a group of young officers deposed the regent and set up the young heir as King with a cabinet representing the nationalities. The new cabinet agreed to the Axis-Pact but Hitler was angry at this change in Yugoslavia. German planes bombed Belgrade and German, Italian and Hungarian troops invaded the country. King Peter fled and the Yugoslav army surrendered.

The rapidity of the defeat is an indication of the failure of the rulers of Yugoslavia between the wars to create a strong united state that commanded the loyalties of the people.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>Byrnes, Robert F., Yugoslavia, pp. 13-14:

Hence, this second form of government failed to achieve legitimacy and authority also. The reason for this failure was that the functional requisites of the social system were not fulfilled by the monarchy. The many nationalities made Yugoslavia socialization nearly impossible as each man felt himself a Serb or a Croat first and a Yugoslav second. The ensemble of roles were only inappropriate to the degree that Serb domination alienated the other minorities. The goals at the pre-war stage were very basic, topped by nation-state unity. There was consensus on this but it was not strong enough to overcome the loyalty to regional grouping. That conflict was not resolved peacefully is epitomized by violence in the Skupstina itself. The regime inherited critical disequilibrium as most new government forms do. The monarchy was unable to synchronize the new values and the old division of labour represented by serf farmers and free herders.

Yugoslavia was made into two puppet states: Croatia (Bosnia and Heregovina) under the Ustase and its leader Pavelic and Serbia which was administered by the German military. Despite the different forms, both were very definitely controlled by the German occupation forces. While some collaborated with the Germans most Yugoslavians resisted. The Germans provided a foreign element on which the Yugoslav nationalism could be focused. As a result of this source of exogenous value change the forces which united Yugoslavia in the first place could again perform that function. Many soldiers fled to the hills and formed armed brigades under Col. Mihajlovic. The German invasion provided the accelerator which sent armed status protesters to the hills. They called themselves the Cetniks. King Peter, from exile in London named Mihajlovic Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief

of the Royal Yugoslav Armies. Hence what legitimacy and authority the king could muster was bestowed on the Cetniks, but this was not very much.

After the German invasion of the Soviet Union a second group of resistance forces organized. These were the remnants of the Yugoslav Communists called the Partisans under the secretary-general of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Josip Broz (known as Tito).

The Cetniks were Serbian nationalists as opposed to Yugoslavian nationalists. They sought to restore the monarchy under Serbian domination. They can be characterized as status protesters interested in restoring the old status hierarchy, despite the fact that the monarchy had not achieved the true position as the undisputed status hierarchy. The monarchy was, after all, the recognized government of Yugoslavia and as such was as close as the country had to a status hierarchy. Hence the Cetniks had the dual role of representing the old regime and being a status protester at the same time. The reason this is possible is that the monarchy represented Serbian dominance, but did it inadvertently.

The Partisans were Communists first and Yugoslavian nationalists second. They sought to create a diversion for the Nazi troops so that pressure on the Soviet Union could be reduced. Ultimately they desired to create a Communist regime in Yugoslavia after the cessation of hostilities. Tito led a group of status protesters whose interests were in recasting the status hierarchy.

The Cetniks very soon perceived the Partisans as the greater enemy than the Nazis. Mihajlovic apparently felt the Allies would eventually succeed in ousting the foreign invaders with or without

Cetnik aid because he made the Communists his first priority. To many Yugoslavs it likely appeared that the Partisans were fighting the Germans and the Cetniks were obstructing their efforts. Tito capitalized on this and accused the Cetniks of collaboration and denounced King Peter (the source of legitimacy) for living in luxury in London while his people suffered. Many Yugoslavs admired the Partisans, (especially the non-Serb minorities), for fighting the Germans against heavy odds and resented the Cetniks for not aiding in this patriotic cause. The Partisans inherited the symbols of nationalism. The Allies furthered the recognition of the Partisans by aiding them with arms and supplies. They were well aware of the source of the effective anti-Nazi pressure.

The Allied arms likely provide the accelerator which breached the logic of deterrence based on force. The Partisans were militarily stronger than the Cetniks with this aid.

Another factor which aided the Partisans in becoming a valid transfer culture was organization. Tito politicized his troops as well as training them militarily. The Partisans were a politico-military organization rather than an anti-German resistance force. When they controlled an area they set up political administration not just military occupation. As a result when the Germans were driven out Tito was able to set up a government which had at least some administrative experience. When the time came to form a Yugoslav government after the hostilities Tito worked through King Peter (still in exile) so that the Communists would have the benefit of what legitimacy remained in the monarchy (which the Allies, including the Soviet Union, recognized as the government of Yugoslavia). King Peter named a premier and Tito

negotiated the provisional government with him. This premier named a small cabinet and Tito's Committee of National Liberation received the vast majority of the positions. Tito became premier of the provisional government and his group held twenty-three of twenty-eight portfolios. The premier appointed by the King controlled five positions as a token for the sake of public opinion.<sup>46</sup>

Tito brought in a new constitution when the Second World War came to an end, proclaiming the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Col. Mihajlovic was captured, tried and executed. The Communists were in power and since then have forged a viable nation-state. They have resynchronized the social system that had been unstable since the early Nineteenth Century. Evidence of synchronous social system is the fact that these many minorities have lived in harmony since the founding of the Communist regime. This in itself is a profound social change. Land reform gave the state all the forests and half the agricultural land. The rest was distributed among the peasants. Monetary reform cost those with substantial savings grave losses. The effect was to virtually wipe out any monied or landed class.<sup>47</sup> The remaining peasants and/or urban workers formed an approximation of a new single class society. This is a profound change from the older hierarchical class structure. Politically, the Monarchy was replaced by a bi-cameral federal structure based on the soviet model.

No country went further or faster in applying Communist ideas regarding the elimination of the "bourgeoisie" and

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<sup>46</sup>Byrnes, et al., Yugoslavia, p. 17.

<sup>47</sup>Phyllis Auty, "The Post-War Period" in A Short History of Yugoslavia. ed. Stephen Clissold, pp. 237-241.

free enterprise, or in showing hostility  
to the Western powers.<sup>48</sup>

A revolution in Yugoslavia was accomplished. Evidence of profound,  
rapid social change is obvious.

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<sup>48</sup>Byrnes, et al., Op cit., p. 134.

## CHAPTER IV

### ALBANIAN CASE STUDY

Albania, from 1389 until 1912, was part of the Ottoman Empire. Although well over five hundred years of suzerainty to the empire would indicate that the Turks were the old regime in Albania, this is only partially true. The Ottomans left Albania much to itself over the years. Ottoman trained Albanians, administered the area for the Turks and this is more realistically the old order one should focus on when considering the revolutionary situation in Albania.

In a view of the social system of Albania one must be cognizant of the fact that it sat in suspended animation for centuries as far as the influence of Western development is concerned. Although the population of Albania was never subjugated successfully, (hence never socialized into the Ottoman social system), they were isolated from the influence of virtually all other social systems. As a result the social system was subject to the old tribal organization. In 1912 when the Turks were forced out of Europe, Albania had preserved its medieval laws, traditions and customs.

The break with the Ottoman Empire was not as sudden as it has been so far presented. The actions required to finally evict the Turks from Europe took some time to succeed.

As has been mentioned, Albanians controlled the country during the majority of the Ottoman period. As a result national considerations

were often more important than those of the empire. The Albanians did look upon themselves as a separate entity from the rest of the Ottoman Empire even though fully two thirds of the population converted to Islam.<sup>49</sup> Nationalism was enhanced because of the many attempted encroachments of Albania in the final few decades of the Ottoman period. Albania was a pawn in the power politics between Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia. This intensified and formalized Albanian nationalism as organizations evolved dedicated to the preservation and extension of Albanian culture and political rights. One of the single most important efforts aiding Albanian nationalism was a meeting held in 1908 by several social-cultural-political clubs including many Italo-Albanians (Albanians who had emigrated to Italy but had maintained their Albanian ties, customs and language). At this meeting it was decided to settle on an Albanian alphabet and the Latin alphabet was the form chosen. "This decision marked a great advance toward Albanian unification and eventual statehood."<sup>50</sup>

In 1912 Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, with Russian encouragement, were fighting a war with Turkey. During the hostilities the Albanians staged many revolts. On November 28, 1912 an Albanian provisional government was set up proclaiming Albania to be a free and independent nation-state. Italy and Austria-Hungary agreed to this move and in December the British government recognized Albania. The foreign powers immediately set up drawing the national boundaries for the country and even went so far as to name a leader to look after the

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<sup>49</sup>Keefe, E. K., et al., Area Handbook for Albania, p. 12.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

budget. Upon the outbreak of the First World War this imposed leader fled the country as the old feudal land owners (beys) were not cooperating. During most of W.W.I the war Albania's government did not exist. Independence was lost as Albania was a battleground. Italian and French troops occupied Albania after the war and by a secret treaty in 1915 most of Albania was to be partitioned among Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Italy. Much diplomatic bickering ensued until in 1920 President Wilson's principle of self-determination and his personal insistence saved Albania from partition. A Partisan army drove the Italians out of Vlore in the south and Italy recognized Albanian independence. Thus, the very founding of the country depended on an exogenous source of value change (President Wilson's Fourteen Points) but it took Albanian nationalism to fully accomplish it.

At the time Albania was founded there were two groups competing for the control of the country. A conservative faction represented the old regime, the feudal beys and landlords.<sup>51</sup> The second group was made up of young intellectuals who had received higher education in Western Europe or North America. Albanian students received an education in, and an appreciation of, modern Western culture and technology. Upon returning to Albania they found they could not apply their Twentieth Century education in an environment that approximated Fifteenth Century Albania. This latter group became status protest groups. They were highly influenced by sources of exogenous value change.

It is erroneous to think of these young intellectuals as representing a single status protest group. Every shade of political

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<sup>51</sup>Stavro Skendi, ed., Albania, pp. 13-14.

opinion was present from liberal to Communist. This in part explains why the old regime's representatives dominated Albanian politics between the two world wars.

Between 1920 and 1924 a period of political freedom existed as the government was made up of representatives of two Muslim sects, the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches. The period was one of constant political strife between the conservative land owners and the Western educated young intellectuals. The land owners favoured retention of feudal land tenure and opposed most reform especially in the agrarian sector. Ahmet Zogu led the land owners and the Harvard educated cleric, Bishop Fan Noli led the intelligentsia. Rapid changes of government occurred and in 1924 Bishop Noli staged a successful coup against the landlords. Zogu fled to Yugoslavia and Noli set up a government. He proved to be too radical to appeal to the broad band of disparate political opinions prevalent in Albania in 1924. His downfall was the recognition of the Soviet Union which frightened many groups in his fragile coalition of reform forces. Many withdrew support with the result that by December of 1924 Zogu returned with the support of a partisan army and threw Noli's government out of power. Zogu led Albania from 1925-1939, first as resident Zogu then later as "King Zog I of the Albanians". Zog ran a dictatorial monarchy but did accomplish some reforms. He survived attempted coups or revolts in 1932, 1935 and 1937. He changed the bureaucracy in Albania and outlawed vendettas and carrying arms. Zog's was the longest lasting Albanian government since the Fifteenth Century.<sup>52</sup>

King Zog represents the old regime but despite this he never

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<sup>52</sup>Keefe, Op cit., pp. 15-17.

managed to synchronize the social system of Albania. Perhaps if the Italians had not attacked and/or World War Two not interfered with Albania he might have managed to accomplish this feat, but this was not to happen. When the war did break out in 1939 Zog had failed to fulfill the functional requisites of the social system. Socialization was incoherent because of the vast gulf between the educated intelligentsia's demands and the Fifteenth Century style environment they found themselves in. Despite the fact they were a small minority they did comprise the best source of leadership owing to their intelligence and training. The Zog regime attempted to change very slowly when rapid change was necessary if Albania was to progress into the Twentieth Century. The ensemble of roles was simply inappropriate to rapid change. The intelligentsia's goals included modernization, civil liberties and equality. The many coups and revolts during the Zog tenure in office provides an indication of the failure of the social system to resolve conflict peacefully. Constant war and civil strife kept the division of labour and the structure of values forever dissynchronous. Nationalism and respect for one's language and culture and virtual slavery are incompatible. The Albanian peasant had often defended his country, it was only natural he wanted to own and work some of it for himself.

In April of 1939 Italian forces invaded Albania forcing Zog to flee the country. Albania fell to Italy immediately and came under the nominal monarchy of Victor Emmanuel III of Italy. In point of fact, the country became virtually assimilated into Italy under Benito Musolini.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Skendi, Op cit., pp. 17-18.

This is the most critical point in Albanian political history. The Italian invasion proved to be the accelerator which put armed men in the field. Resistance to the Italians started almost at once. This was the source of the emergence of clear cut status protest groups. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union the Communists were brought into the resistance movement.

The Communists were chiefly, independent groups around the country made up of Western educated intellectuals. They were alienated from the Zog regime and totally frustrated in their efforts to take a meaningful role in Albania during the entire Zog tenure. With the help of two Yugoslav communists the Albanian groups got together. At this point then Albania was still experiencing exogenous sources of change and the Yugoslav overseers were examples of exogenous environment change as they forged a politico-military organization where none had previously existed. November 1941 saw the founding of the Albanian Communist Party under Enver Hoxha, a school teacher educated in France and Belgium. At the beginning they hid their communism and stressed nationalism and patriotism. In 1941 the National Liberation Movement formed to coordinate the guerilla fighting against the occupying Italians. This united front and the Partisans, the military force were both dominated by the Communists.

Two other status protest groups emerged dedicated to expelling the Italians. These were both anti-Communist. By 1943 the Italians were defeated leaving Albania with three groups seeking control. The Communist dominated National Liberation Movement fought and defeated first the Balli Kombetar (National Front) and then the Legality Movement (as the two non-communist groups were called) in a one year

civil war. In 1945 the National Liberation Movement became the Democratic Front and claimed to represent all the political views except the Fascists. In the election of 1945, because of this claim, only Democratic Front candidates were allowed to run. The result of the election was the founding of the People's Republic of Albania under President Enver Hoxha. The Communists were the only valid transfer culture after the war because they had a Yugoslav directed politico-military force which the divided non-Communists groups could not match. With no official armed force to defeat, (as the Communists were the Albanian forces), validity of the transfer culture decided the result of the Revolutionary Insurrection, in this case the Civil War of 1943 - 1944. Essentially the Communists simply filled the political vacuum as they were the only group organized and powerful enough to accomplish this feat.

The story of the Albanian Revolution closely parallels the Yugoslav situation as the Albanian Communist party was operated as a wing of the Yugoslav group.<sup>54</sup> Much the same measures were taken to secure power and change the social system. The landed and monied groups were reduced to poverty. Many aristocrats were jailed or fled the country. As a result Albania developed a near one class society, in much the same way that Yugoslavia did. Albanian communists achieved profound changes in the social system in a short period and therefore a revolution occurred.

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<sup>54</sup>Skendi states that plans were being made to formally merge Yugoslavia and Albania when the Tito-Stalin schism occurred in 1948.

## CHAPTER V

### CHINESE CASE STUDY

China is almost a laboratory specimen for the application of this model to the study of the phenomena of revolution. This country was cut off entirely from the outside world of the west, surrounded as it was by tribute paying suzerainties on all sides: Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, Burma, Korea and Viet Nam. In the Sixteenth Century this gradually developed into a trading situation but still from a position of Chinese dominance.

The first problem for the Chinese social system was probably the arrival of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and British traders in the Seventeenth Century. The crucial commodity of Trade was opium. China lost two Opium Wars and was forced to let the foreigners into China. The major problem was the drain on China's silver, the standard of the Chinese economy, to pay for the opium that was being brought in. This is the first example of an exogenous environmental source of change in China.

China's economy was based on agriculture. The land was owned by a very small gentry class and worked by the huge peasant class. In good years the land owners prospered and the peasants ate regularly, in poor years the land owners were forced to tighten their belts somewhat but the peasants starved (quite literally). Waller quotes population growth figures that show the pressure on the arable land was immense.

In 1500 China had a population of sixty million which grew to four hundred thirty million by 1850.<sup>55</sup> So endogenous environmental change added a strain to China's social system. The external factor, the drain on silver, created an increase of taxation which in turn led to a resentment of the Manchu dynasty ruling in China during the period of the greatest Opium importation. The combination of the high taxes and widespread famine (due in part to the Opium Wars as well as a series of disastrous floods) brought about the Taiping Rebellion. The rebellion went on for fifteen years at the cost of twenty million lives. The Taiping Rebellion was more important than the not uncommon rebellions in China, or other countries, when conditions became exceptionally hard on the peasants. The importance lies not in the length of the rebellion (fifteen years), nor in the numbers killed (approximately twenty million), but because of the fact that it aimed at overthrowing the land system and abolishing the land holding gentry class. Hence, true social change was the object, not a mere violent airing of grievances. This is the first status protest group in this revolutionary period. They were interested in recasting the status hierarchy. This can, with much justification be seen as the origins of the pressure on the Chinese social system which eventually brought about the People's Republic of China.

The Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion forced the Empress Dowager to embark on an effort at reform in the 1860's. The chief aim was to modernize China by introducing Western technology to the Chinese social system. For the most part these efforts failed to bring about

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<sup>55</sup>Waller, Government and Politics of China, p. 14.

meaningful improvements. The elite course of action, here conservative change, failed to resynchronize the social system.

By 1895 China had suffered a humiliating defeat by Japan and more reforms were attempted by Emperor Kuang-hou. This resulted in a coup by reactionary forces and the Empress Dowager ruled again.<sup>56</sup>

One reaction to this failure at reform was the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 which saw the foreign legations of Peking under siege conditions for fifty-five days. The radical, xenophobic Boxers blamed China's problems on the foreigners, and to a very important degree they aimed the blame in the correct direction. They were status protesters aiming at restoration of an old status hierarchy. The reactionary rule of the Dowager was an extremely important bottleneck for meaningful reform.

Between 1900 and 1911 China was torn by much turmoil. In 1905 Sun Yat-sen founded a radical society based on three principles: Nationalism, democracy and "the people's livelihood". The thrust of these principles were restrictions on the landlords which would permit more people to own land and to work it on a paying basis. They were yet another status protest group favoring recasting the status hierarchy. The society owed much to the views of the American Henry George, whom Sun had read in Tokyo and in the U.S. Henry George is a source of exogenous value change. In 1911 an uprising triggered off what history has called the Republican Revolution. The Manchu's requested support from the military strongman Yuan Shik-k'ai but he sided with the rebels and the dynasty collapsed. This proved to be the accelerator of the

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<sup>56</sup> Previously she had ruled as the regent for Emperor Kuang-hou when he was too young to assume the responsibilities.

Chinese Revolution. While the Revolution of 1911 did not succeed it did remove the old regime. At the outbreak of the 1911 Republican Revolution, Sun was in the U.S. and he immediately returned to China. He was named President of the Chinese Republic on January 1, 1912. It must be pointed out that latterly the old regime did not really integrate the system by force. At best it merely maintained its position of power. The social system was beyond integration. The division of labour, based on a type of feudal landlord-peasant relationship, was destroyed when the Manchu dynasty fell, but had been weakening for a century. The Warlords controlled land but it was not being worked by the peasants consistently so that shortages of food occurred even in good years. The environment was so fragmented that the adaption to it was impossible. This lack of leadership failed dismally to fulfill the functional requisites of the Chinese social system. There is ample evidence presented to indicate incoherent socialization - there was virtually no social system hence socialization is bound to be incoherent at best. The same is true of the inappropriate ensemble of roles. With the social system in chaos it is hard to imagine any ensemble of roles being appropriate. The dissensus on goals is patently obvious. Sun's KMT wanted to restrict the landlords, other more radical groups wanted to do away with the landlord class completely and distribute the land to the peasants, the warlords wanted to control the land for their own personal profits and power, and the peasants did not care what happened as long as they got land to work and food to eat. (The peasants, of course, favoured a scheme that would give them ownership of the land they worked, but at this point they were not politicized.)

In looking at the Political arena in power deflation, we have seen indications of slight efforts at conservative change although these were frustrated often. For the most part the old Manchu dynasty carried on in a "Business as usual" manner.

Both styles of status protesters were brought to bear on the Manchu dynasty. By far the most important status protesters were those interested in recasting the status hierarchy. Sun's movement, later to become the KMT, is the best example of this but certainly not the only one. As for the status protesters interested in restoration of the old status hierarchy, the Boxers represent this, as pointed out.

Yuan still held the military power and took over control of the young Republic as the foreign powers favoured his strong position. Yuan's strength was in terms of military resources only. Economically China was bankrupt. To overcome the financial problem the outlying provinces were granted autonomy to raise their own money under local military leaders. This proved to be a huge source of endogenous environmental change which spelled the doom of the Republican Revolution. The country fragmented into separate provincial entities controlled by various military strongmen. These warlords fought amongst each other and control of the various provinces changed often. Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist Party the Kuomintang (KMT) in cooperation with the local warlord in Canton claimed to be the legitimate national government. In the western countries whoever controlled Peking was considered the ruler of China.

These weakened conditions in China from 1912 on were more temptation than ambitious Japan could overlook. In 1914, with Europe at war Japan declared war on Germany. This provided China with another

source of exogenous environmental change, as Japan seized the German concessions in Shantung. In 1915 Japan delivered an ultimatum called the Twenty-one Demands which insisted that China cede the German concessions to Japan and a number of other items which would have reduced China to the status of a Japanese colony.<sup>57</sup> The result was a wave of anti-Japanese feelings and a boycott of their goods, but a show of force was enough to make Yuan accept the demands. In 1917 China also declared war on Germany in an effort to regain the Shantung concessions for China after the settlement of the war. Due to a secret arrangement amongst Britain, France and Russia the German concessions were ceded to Japan. The result was a huge wave of resentment of Japan. Pro-Japanese officials were physically attacked and Japanese products were again boycotted. Chinese delegates to the Versaille Conferences refused to sign the treaty and returned to China. The uprising has been labelled the May Fourth Movement. After the day the Versaille announcement on the fate of Shantung was made public Nationalism was brought to the fore by the May Fourth Movement.<sup>58</sup> While anti-Japanese feelings were not new, this was the first time that the informed public was near universal in being anti-Western. The Chinese felt they had been sold out by the great powers. Previously the Chinese saw themselves as Cantonese or Pekinese, or whatever, now they felt Chinese. A new set of values, nationalist values which were western in origin, were finally growing. Once these western values became part of the value structure then other western innovations became more appropriate.

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<sup>57</sup> Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, Chapter 2, especially pp. 31-33.

<sup>58</sup> Waller, Op cit., p. 17.

At the same time the new Soviet Russia renounced all territorial claims to Chinese areas previously forwarded by the Tsarist regime. The response, of course, was favorable and soon connections between Chinese intellectuals and the Russians resulted in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921,<sup>59</sup> a most important source of exogenous value change. In 1919 Lenin set up the Comintern to coordinate the world wide Communist Movement. The CCP followed the lead of the Comintern after some preliminary independent stances. Lenin's view was that underdeveloped countries lacking a capitalist economy needed to come to power in a partnership with other nationalist groups in the country and the CCP went along with this United Front tactic. The KMT and Sun Yat-sen was to be the partner in China of the Communist Party. Sun did not agree to this but did permit CCP members to belong to the KMT as well. He wanted financial and military aid from Russia so that the KMT could keep the communist members out of prominence, naturally, the Communists efforts were to become the controlling influence in the KMT and to maintain its own party as well. Sun agreed to the reorganization of the KMT and the army on the Bolshevik model in 1923.

In March of 1925 Sun Yat-sen died and Chiang Kai-shek was made commander-in-chief of the army. Chiang was suspicious of the CPP and the Russians and quickly arrested several Communist KMT members. He detained many Russian advisors while the Comintern adviser Borodin was in Peking. Despite this Comintern orders were to maintain the United Front of the CCP and the KMT.

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<sup>59</sup> Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, p. 6, and Waller, Op cit., pp. 18-20.

Chiang was supported by a group in the KMT which wanted the Communists ousted from the KMT.

In 1926 Mao Tse-Tung led a Communist force headed from Canton to Peking. The KMT column led by Chiang headed for Nanking and wintered there. At this time the political leader, a left KMT member and Chiang a right KMT member (and military leader), were competing for overall leadership. The political leader, Wang Chin-wei, set up a capital in Wuhan whereas Chiang would have preferred his base at Nanking. Wang attempted to limit Chiang's military and growing political power but Chiang ignored orders and proceeded to Shanghai. The Chinese section of the city was already controlled by the Communists under Chou En-lai. When Chiang arrived he arranged for the backing of the bankers, the secret societies and the foreigners. He set about liquidating the Communists. The result was the division of the United Front into three groups: Wang's KMT government, Chiang's new KMT government set up in Nanking, and the Communists. Wang was suspicious that the Communists would try to take over the left KMT. As a result he too purged the Communists and sent the Russian advisers home.

This was critical in the development of the CCP. At this point they were severely cut in numbers and were blamed for their lack of success by Stalin, despite the fact they followed his orders. As a result the CCP developed outside of Comintern advice. At this point the Communists had lost their power base in the cities and their backing by Russia. Two communist generals in the KMT army took over Nanking but were hastily expelled by the KMT forces. This is heralded as the birth of the Red Army. At this same time Mao Tse-tung tried to organize a rebellion amongst the peasants near Hunan, intending to then takeover

Hunan itself. He failed and as a result lost his position in the CCP Central Committee, but this uprising was the birth of the Maoist principle of basing the CCP on the revolutionary potential of the peasants. On Comintern orders the Communists organized the Canton soviet but held out only forty-eight hours. Then the KMT army threw them out and 5000 Communists were killed. The result of these failures was that the Communists were reduced to about 10,000 men and 4,000 rifles<sup>60</sup> under Stalin's orders to set up soviets in the inaccessible mountain regions. The Communists had some success and redistributed land to the peasants. General Chu who joined Mao after fleeing Nanking helped with the successes.

The KMT drove the Mao-Chu forces out of the mountains of Chinkangshan even with the help of P'eng another communist KMT commander and his forces. Mao was operating after this in Kiangsi independent of the CCP who were still trying to follow the Comintern line. The leader of the CCP, Li Li-san was not having the success in Canton that Mao was in Kiangsi. Between 1929 and 1931 the Communists were torn between Mao's rural strategy and the Comintern backed Li li-san urban strategy. The urban strategy failed and Li Li-san was accused of tactical errors, and resigned. Moscow trained students took over the party control under Comintern orders. They too favoured the urban strategy. Mao consolidated his power and even attacked followers of Li Li-san. At the same time the KMT were stepping up campaigns against the Communists. Communist guerrillas put down two KMT encirclement attempts and a third led by Chiang himself was proving more

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<sup>60</sup>Waller, Op cit., p. 26.

successful. At this point Japan saved the Kiangsi area for the Communists by landing in Manchuria forcing the KMT to look after them. In the two years while the KMT were distracted Mao developed Kiangsi. As a result he managed to overcome the opposition from the Moscow trained students and others in the CCP and see that his supporters got the leading government posts in the Soviets. The Chinese Soviet Republic was formed and Mao was elected Chairman. This was the period when Maoism was institutionalized.

Early in 1932 Chiang Kai-shek changed his tactics. He decided that the Communists were a more important enemy than the Japanese and deployed a strong force against the Chinese soviets. After some important early success the KMT forces were beaten back by the Red Army. The Communists forces were fighting a conventional force with conventional tactics. In 1933 Chiang attacked the Communist areas in force again, this time with the help of German military advisers. During the period of the KMT attacks Mao was losing influence with the result that the Moscow trained students controlled the party, the soviet governments and the Army. Eventually that year the Communists lost ninety per cent of the territory they held. Finally they slipped through the KMT blockade and fled West. This was the start of what turned out to be a six thousand mile retreat to Shensi. In all 100,000 Communists troops started on this famous Long March. After about a year in Shensi, most of 1936, Mao took his group to Yen-an.

Mao suggested at this point that the CCP and the KMT should unite to expel the Japanese. It is probably too cynical to state that Mao was merely looking for a rest from the KMT attacks however this certainly was a factor along with the genuine desire to see Japan ousted

from China. Chiang Kai-shek refused to join with the Communists, however many of his officers (for the most part from Manchuria, the area the Japanese were occupying) felt that Chinese troops should be fighting Japanese and not their own countrymen. Chiang was kidnapped and the agreement to join the Communist in fighting the Japanese was the ransom. This occurred at Sian. The result was that the Red Army came under Chiang's command and the Communists recognized Chiang as the head of state.

In 1937 Japan launched its major offensive and by 1938 controlled most of the Southern and Eastern cities. The Japanese were over extended and could not control the countryside hence they were particularly open to the guerrilla tactics of the Communists. The CCP moved into the countryside and organized the people in a political and military sense as the Japanese had removed the KMT government. Mao launched his "three thirds principle" which meant that the communists held one third of the local council seats, the progressives who were not affiliated with the Communists held a third, and the final third was made up of enlightened members of the gentry class. The progressives supported the CCP so Mao had de facto control while nominally controlling only one third of the village council's seats. This encouraged peasant participation and was a tremendous politicizing agent.

With the CCP growing rapidly (because of the anti-Japanese feelings) Mao launched a "self rectification" drive aimed at properly socializing the new members into the CCP system and securing Mao's control over the party itself. What this movement really accomplished was the sinification of Communism and the legitimation of peasants

playing the same revolutionary roles as the proletariat. By 1945 Mao was the undisputed leader of the CCP.

The united front was not a very sound union as KMT-CCP clashes occurred often. The peasants whose chief contrast was with the CCP viewed these clashes as KMT harrassment of the Chinese war effort. This gave the CCP the nationalist-patriot image and the KMT looked like traitors. The KMT used the supplies the U.S. was sending them to build a cache to liquidate the CCP expecting the U.S. to drive Japan out of China.

By 1945 the CCP was in control of nineteen areas and a quarter of the population.<sup>61</sup> The KMT forces were demoralized from inactivity and the corruption of the Chiang leadership. When the Japanese left China suddenly after the two Atom bomb drops the U.S. airlifted KMT troops into the major northern cities. This was the situation at the beginning of the Civil War. The KMT controlled the cities and had a preponderance in manpower and equipment. The CCP controlled much of the countryside and were generally supported by the peasant populace.

Despite many efforts by the U.S. to head off and later to halt the civil war, nothing could be negotiated that accomplished a meaningful halt in the fighting. The CCP managed to cut off the major cities controlled by the KMT from their supplies. The KMT areas were collapsing. Barnett described the KMT demise thus:

In China, this collapse was so thorough that by 1949 the Communists were able to take over the country with ease. In

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<sup>61</sup>Waller, Op cit., pp. 38-40.

a sense, they simply moved into a vacuum.<sup>62</sup>

At the end of the Civil War in 1949 the KMT held only the offshore islands and Chiang Kai-shek formed a government on Taiwan. The mainland became the People's Republic of China.

The outcome was based on the defeat of the KMT force and the validity of the transfer culture. As Doak Barnett points out:

From the start, it [the KMT] was composed of heterogenous conflicting interests and was hampered by internal divisions that made it difficult either to adopt clear-cut policies or to implement them vigorously.<sup>63</sup>

The Communists did not suffer from this lack of homogeneity and therefore were a valid transfer culture.

Although the KMT was in nominal control of China for thirty-eight years, from the "1911 Revolution" until the Communist victory in 1949, it never really achieved validity as a transfer culture. When the KMT is compared with the CCP there are some notable similarities. They both were highly influenced by Western thought and both modelled themselves on the Russian model. Their goal of forging a successful modern China based on modern technology was the same also. The most important difference was in acceptance by the peasant population. The KMT was very much an urban centered political group as was the CCP for several years. Once the CCP was forced into the countryside, there existed a definite urban-rural split. While the urban population was growing the rural areas had the overwhelming majority of people. For

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<sup>62</sup>Barnett., China On the Eve of Communist Takeover, p. 5.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

either group to become a successful transfer culture they had to gain the support of the masses or neutralize them politically. The Communists were constantly politicizing the peasants living in areas they controlled. The easiest issue to politicize the Chinese was the war with Japan, that is to say nationalism. When war broke out the immediate effort was to cast out the invaders. The transfer culture which gained the nationalist symbols stood the greatest chance of being successful.

In essence, the Party [the CCP] is seen as an adjunct to Chinese nationalism - that is as a "national myth" serving the newly created Chinese nation state. This wartime awakening [of nationalism] became the basis for a new order in China following Japans collapse: the wartime leaders of the resistance were confirmed by their followers in positions of legitimate national authority.<sup>64</sup>

The reason that the CCP and not the KMT became the "national myth" is reflected in the peasants' view of who had fought the foreign enemy. The KMT spent much of the war holed up in the cities, not fighting. The CCP was out in the countryside organizing militia units, leading guerrilla attacks, arranging for food distribution and generally making themselves highly visible to the Chinese peasants. When the KMT did come out of the cities to fight the enemy was often the CCP (the Red Army) not the Japanese. The KMT thus appeared to be aiding the Japanese in the eyes of many. When Japan's collapse occurred the Chinese, as Johnson points out, followed the same men they had relied on during the war. In this way the KMT, recognized in the West as the

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<sup>64</sup>Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, pp. ix-x.

legitimate government, was viewed as the group that had collaborated with Japan against the defenders of China. This left the CCP as the only valid transfer culture.

## CHAPTER VI

### NORTH VIET NAM CASE STUDY

Viet Nam has 2,000 years of recorded history and before that a further 2,000 years covered by legends. The early period can be characterized as years of nominal suzerainty to China. Of course from time to time the degree of actual Chinese involvement and control varied but for the most part triennial tribute payments kept the Chinese happy. When the Chinese sent officials they often became land owners with a vested interest first in Viet Nam and secondly in China.

As early as 50 A.D. China attempted to break up Viet Nameese autonomy by supplanting the feudal hierarchical structure with local communes. Each commune ran its own affairs through a local council picked from among the family heads of the commune. The council had to carry out official decrees, collect taxes, and supply conscripts for the army. Financially they were independent as they gained most moneys from the communally held land. From this same base came support for the poor and landless in the community, as a result each commune controlled public order and welfare without outside control. This new political organization made Viet Nam internally strong and prosperous

By installing their own administrative institutions the Chinese gave the Vietnamese a new political structure, the Cohesion and strength of which later made it possible for Viet Nam

to resist and expell invaders from  
the north.<sup>65</sup>

By 946 A.D. the Vietnamese managed to expel the Chinese and declare their independence which was to last for 900 years (with a twenty year break in the fifteenth Century). Several efforts at Chinese reoccupation occurred which the effect of maintaining Vietnamese national self esteem. The Chinese written language was supplanted by "chu nom" (Vietnamese language written in Chinese characters), to further separate Viet Nam from China and to inculcate nationalistic awareness.

The Portuguese entered Viet Nam at Da Nang Bay in 1535 and led the European influence.<sup>66</sup> They enjoyed a century of monopoly in trade before the Dutch arrived, closely followed by the English and French. Chief trade goods were arms supplying the many uprisings resulting from a competition between two Vietnamese dynasties, the Nguyen and the Trinh. When a truce between these two factions occurred in the 1670's the arms market collapsed. England and Holland were chiefly interested in the Indies and India; Portugal had become much less important by the turn of the eighteenth century. Virtually the only Europeans in Viet Nam were Jesuit Missionaries, for the most part from France. The missionaries became interested in seeing a Christian on the Throne of the central portion of Viet Nam known as Annam. Late in the eighteenth century and early in the nineteenth the Jesuits under Bishop Pigneau arranged support with the French in Annam and put Emperor Gia Long on the throne after a bloody battle ending in 1802. Gia Long's empire

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<sup>65</sup>Smith et al., Area Handbook for North Viet Nam, p. 36.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

included both North and South Viet Nam as we know it today. Gia Long did not become a Christian but he did halt the persecution of Christians out of gratitude. This Jesuit meddling upset political situation and was, therefore, exogenous environmental change.

Much pressure was exerted on France (by the French in Viet Nam) to set up a colony similar to what other European powers were doing throughout Asia. This resulted in the attack and seizure of Da Nang by French forces in 1857. The justification for the attack was the persecution of Jesuits and their Christian converts in Viet Nam. The French then moved south and reached Saigon in 1861. The Vietnamese courts ceded Saigon and the adjacent area to the French as a war indemnity. From there France succeeded in taking over virtually all of the Indochina peninsula. By 1883 a treaty of protectorate was signed formally ending Viet Nam's independence. This colonization is the crucial source of exogenous environmental change.

Although different structures were employed in the various areas of Viet Nam the results were very similar. All important posts fell from the hands of the Confucious educated scholars to Frenchmen. In a short length of time Western education was essential to success and influence while the old scholar bureaucracy lost prestige, power and influence. Exogenous value change quickly followed exogenous environmental change.

France administered Viet Nam as a source of raw materials and a market for French produced manufactured goods. Vietnamese people were not allowed access to the investment in industry hence most Vietnamese investment was in land. Industrialization dissynchronized the traditional division of labour as factory workers were not previously known.

By the turn of the twentieth century traditional feelings of Vietnamese nationalism began to broaden. The success of Japan over Russia in 1905 acted as a rallying point for the educated but nationalistic intelligentsia, providing an external reference, an example of exogenous value change. Nationalist groups outside and inside Viet Nam sprung up with the desire to oust the French and set up a traditional monarchy (some suggesting a Japanese style constitution as well.)

Another area which encouraged nationalist aspirations was the Chinese nationalist movement. The best known group was the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) founded in 1925 in Canton, China. This group was organized to oppose the Association of Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth, which was the precursor of the Indochinese Communist Party. Both groups are further examples of exogenous sources of value change. The VNQDD set up in Hanoi in 1927 and adopted Kuomintang programs and organizational methods.<sup>67</sup> They staged an uprising in 1930 and the French ruthlessly suppressed it. Many of the group fled to China. After this unsuccessful revolt the Indochinese Communist Party took over the nationalist movement in Viet Nam, and became the leading status protest group.

Nationalist hopes rose during the Popular Front Regime in France, but little improvement or reform came about, although the communists experienced a revival in membership.<sup>68</sup>

During the Second World War, Japan and the Vichy government jointly administered Viet Nam with Japan's role increasing throughout

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>68</sup> Modelski, G., "The Viet Minh Complex", p. 187, in Rubinstein, Alvin Z., Communist Political Systems.

the war. By 1941 Japan gained a monopoly on Indochinese exports and rights to have troops in South Viet Nam affording complete control of Indochina's airfields. Finally in 1945 the Japanese staged a coup d'etat and Viet Nam was nominally made an independent nation. Emperor Bao Dai proclaimed independence under Japanese protection. After the Japanese coup Viet Nam did not experience legitimate government until after the Indochina War. With the French influence gone a political vacuum was created.

Famine caused by crop failures and allied bombing further upset the country. Direct Japanese military administration in Cochinchina, the extreme south tip of the peninsula, replaced the French. The Viet Minh, a united front of the nationalist groups controlled by the Communist under Ho Chi Minh, refused to accept the Bao Dai regime. Ho called his guerrilla forces the National Liberation Army, and became president of a Committee for the Liberation of the Vietnamese People. In 1945 the Viet Minh controlled the northern Tonkin area. By exploiting the squabbling of the nationalist group in Cochinchina Ho managed to gain the support of the bulk of the nationalist groups represented by the United National Front. Ho claimed to have Allied support because the Allies supplied his forces with the weapons in their fight against the Japanese. The Emperor decided that only a united group could keep France out of Viet Nam after the war. He abdicated and turned his imperial seal over to Ho Chi Minh in the belief that he could, with allied support, unite a liberated Viet Nam. This occurred in August of 1945. In September Ho declared the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. Ho had established his Communists as

the only valid transfer culture. The old French colonial regime never managed to gain real control in Viet Nam after the Japanese coup.

An independent Viet Nam was made impossible as the British in the south and the Chinese in the north aided the French in taking control of Viet Nam. Ho, faced with the loss of Chinese support signed an agreement whereby Viet Nam was recognized as a free state in an Indo-chinese federation that was to be set up. French troops landed in the north by agreement.<sup>69</sup> The French did not state what they meant by "Viet Nam Free State", Ho meant Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin. Eventually Ho agreed begrudgingly to an independent Cochin China under France and his Democratic Republic of Viet Nam with the promise of a more liberal regime in the south.

In October 1946 France attempted to enforce customs control in the north. Hostility in Haiphong resulted in shooting and French bombardment of Haiphong. This proved to be the accelerator which led to the Indochinese War and eventually to a Communist North Viet Nam.

The Viet Minh forces attacked the French and were driven out of Hanoi, in December 1946. The Viet Minh gathered in the outlying northern provinces and set up garrisons. Employing guerrilla tactics against the French, the Viet Minh managed to control most of the countryside in three years of fighting. The French controlled the cities.

The French attempted to gain the support of the anti-Communist Vietnamese nationalist groups. This failed as France refused to clarify their views on Vietnamese independence. Another effort by the

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 193.

anti-Communist Nationalists saw the exiled emperor Bao Dai called to lead a nationalist government. Bao Dai offered to negotiate with the French for the nationalist groups. This failed also but had more serious repercussions. The Viet Minh assassinated many of the nationalist groups' leaders. After two years of representing the nationalists, Bao Dai and the French agreed to a limited independence for the state of Viet Nam.

In its efforts to win popular support the Bao Dai government was unsuccessful. Confronted with a choice between French colonialism and the Communist-led nationalist movement, many Vietnamese, attracted by its appeal for independence and unity, tended to side with the Viet Minh organization.<sup>70</sup>

With a crucial victory by the Viet Minh over the French forces at Dien Bien Phu May 7, 1954 the Indochina War was over. Direct negotiations between the French and Viet Minh high commands resulted in the Geneva Accords. The most important point being the drawing of a boundary on the 17th parallel partitioning North and South Viet Nam. An independent, Communist North Viet Nam was the result.

In the post war French administration we can see that the regime failed to fulfill the functional requisites of the social system. The Vietnamese were not socialized to favoring a colonial status. The French did not see that the Vietnamese had the training necessary to advanced agricultural-industrial economy. The people's goals of independence based on nationalism could not coexist with the regime goals of colonial status for Viet Nam. The resulting Indo-

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<sup>70</sup> Smith et al., Op.cit. p. 60.

chinese War shows, in the most dramatic way that the societal conflicts could not be resolved peacefully.

Viet Nam had status protesters interested both in recasting the status hierarchy and in restoration of old status hierarchy. Those interested in recasting were of many different persuasions. The three most common views of the recasters were those who wanted an emperor under a Japanese style constitution; those who favoured the Chinese KMT aims and organizations; and those who favoured a Communist government. There were many others. The group that favoured restoration of the old Vietnamese imperial structure received very little support and were of little importance in the outcome. They did form a faction which further fragmented the non-Communist nationalists.

The old French colonial elite did attempt several courses of action while in the power deflation situation. (They tried to make reforms that would give the Vietnamese a better chance to succeed to higher positions in the administration of the country, but no effort was made towards independence. This was the direction of change towards which the dissenting educated Vietnamese were looking for reform). Conservative change, then, failed to appease the dissent or alter the power deflation. Many efforts were attempted at co-opting the non-Communist Nationalists. The most likely effort was an attempt to unite the nationalists behind the emperor Bao Dai. This grouping was the government of Vietnam recognized in the early 1950's by Great Britain, the U.S. and several other countries. Unfortunately for the French, Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh forces did not recognize this government. Between efforts at conservative change and co-option the French attempted a "business as usual" stance that made their efforts seem

insincere. The most dramatic incident being the bombardment of Haiphong.

As it turned out the bombardment of Haiphong was the accelerator which led to the Indochinese War. Despite superiority of military equipment and manpower the French forces could only control the cities while the Viet Minh, through guerrilla tactics and carefully nurtured nationalist sentiments, controlled the countryside. The outcome was finally decided by the inability of the French forces to maintain support from Paris after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. France simply did not have resources to wage a major ground war in Indochina, in fact it has since become doubtful if any nation-state has. Due to the nationalist label that the Viet Minh Communists were able to maintain, they were the only valid transfer culture. The other potential transfer cultures had been outflanked by Ho Chi Minh (e.g. in convincing Bao Dai that the allies supported the Viet Minh) or too fragmented to offer a viable alternative.

Once in power Ho nationalized all industry and attempted land reform. The economy was centrally controlled and administered. Profits are re-invested into North Viet Nam instead of being drained off to the French entrepreneurs. Since North Viet Nam has really never experienced peace it is hard to assess how profound these changes will really be in the long run. Ho and his successors will not end their revolution until all over Viet Nam is united, perhaps all of Indochina. It is therefore too soon to show profound change. Although a Communist government is in power the revolution goes on.

## CHAPTER VII

### SUMMARY

The comparative study of revolutions has suffered from the tendency of historians either to force differing events into the same mold, or to label them unique and abandon attempts at comparison. Naturally, no two revolutions are exactly alike; to expect this would be absurd, but it is equally absurd to hold they have nothing in common. The situation of political breakdown and social characteristics of the great revolutions clearly belong to a distinctive category in historical study. Patterns can be discerned in the study of revolution which either explain events or call attention to deviate events which require special explanation.<sup>71</sup>

Daniels provides a useful introduction for a view of the generalizations which will be made about Communist Revolutions.

Hopefully by this stage we can compare the data that has been processed by application of Johnson's model. The areas of the model that appear to be most relevant will now be used to generalize from in an effort to generate a descriptive category of Communist Revolution.

Of all the sources of change dealt with in this paper those in the exogenous value changing sector are the most important with regards to Communist Revolutions. In every case viewed, the initial shock to

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<sup>71</sup>Robert Daniels, "The Chinese Revolution in Russian Perspectives", in A. Z. Rubinstein, Communist Political Systems, p. 49.

the system came as the result of contact with Western European values. Often this contact came through European or North American education of the local students. Yugoslavia, Albania, China and North Viet Nam all show signs of this occurring. In the Russian case it was Western literature and experiencing Western advantages after the Napoleonic Wars that caused the initial shock. No matter how it was accomplished, all five countries developed a Western educated and/or oriented intelligentsia. These people were the status protesters interested in recasting the status hierarchy. This exogenous value change reached the general public in many ways. One of the commonest was through interest generated by clubs and organizations dedicated to the propagation and expansion of Western values. In every country several groups emerged which worked towards constitutional government. Russia had many groups whose political views ranged from liberal to Bolshevik. Yugoslavia had Fascists, liberals and Communists. Albania had groups favoring a Constitutional monarchy, a liberal republic and a Communist regime. In China the extremes were even greater with Xenophobic monarchists, militarists desiring dictatorship, liberals wanting a republic and of course Communists planning a People's Republic. Viet Nam's organizations supported the Emperor and council, a Japanese style constitutional monarchy, a KMT style republic and a Communist People's Republic. All the different political groups were status protesters, most of them favoring recasting the status hierarchy.

Endogenous value change came about as a result of exogenous value change in the cases viewed. It proved to be a reinforcing source change for those of an exogenous source. Each country had at least one important foreign example for nation building. The Soviet Union's

revolutionaries harkened back to the French traditional monarchy for a constitutional republic. Yugoslavia and Albania saw the Italian Unification Movement succeed in the founding of the nation-state of Italy from the patchwork of city republics and the other forms under which the peninsula was being administered. The Chinese Communists looked to the motherland of socialism, the Soviet Union, for their model. In Viet Nam the example of the KMT's initial "revolution" and organization prevailed. The result in all cases was western style nationalism.<sup>72</sup> Thus nationalism became a domestic value because of external reference groups - exogenous source of value change.

The environmental change which occurred made the value changes possible. Large and various groups of status protesters would not have brought about substantial change had the situation not changed to permit it. The most drastic source came from the exogenous environmental change. Trotsky's often quoted statement "War is the locomotive of history" has always been true in Communist Revolutions. In every case surveyed a major foreign war removed or dangerously weakened the prevailing regime. In no cases on record did the Communist remove the traditional government under their own auspices. In Russia the First World War finished a trend which started with the Crimean War. That trend was political instability in the face of military failure. With each succeeding defeat the military became less reliable guardians of the status quo. By 1917 the Russian forces were mutinous, lacking in morale and opposed to the government to such a large extent that the old regime, the Tsar, abdicated. The old status hierarchy was removed. Competition to fill the void ensued with the

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<sup>72</sup>Nationalism here means a desire to build a nation.

Communists emerging victorious over competitive status protest groups which proved to be less valid transfer cultures. In Yugoslavia and Albania it was troops of the Axis Pact which removed the governments. In Yugoslavia the Germans forced King Peter into exile and in Albania it was the Italians who drove out King Zog. Allied troops with Partisan assistance removed the invaders leaving a political vacuum which the Communists filled. China's old status hierarchy was removed by the so-called 1911 "Republican Revolution."

The KMT formed a provisional government in 1911 but there was not enough time to build up its authority hence it was very weak in legitimacy. The warlord period made it impossible for the KMT to forge a strong central government as each province was administered by its military strongman. The KMT emerged as a major political power but was always challenged. The gravest challenge came from the Japanese. The western powers recognized the KMT as the government of China before the Second World War, all during the war and right up until 1973 in many cases. The point is that the Chinese people did not identify the KMT as a national government. Before the war with Japan they owed allegiance to their province or even to their village, a larger political entity was not perceived. The feeling for China as a nation developed when the country had to be defended from Japanese occupation. The anti-Japanese sentiments of the May Fourth Movement became true nationalism by the time the war was over. This enabled the Communists to assume the nationalist symbols and forge the Chinese nation-state. As has been pointed out it took a foreign war to alter the political environment which enabled the communists to exploit their position with the peasants.

In Viet Nam the old regime that had to be displaced was the French colonial administration. Here again it was the Second World War and the Japanese which removed the government. In the Vietnamese case it was by a coup to what had been dual administration by the Japanese and the French Vichy government. Upon the cessation of hostilities the French were faced with a trained and battle hardened Communist force which eventually drove them out. They could not establish a government in post-war Viet Nam.

In all cases except Russia the result of this exogenous environmental change was a strong feeling of nationalism which manifested itself in a strong resistance movement. These resistance movements developed into veteran politico-military units capable of taking an area and administering it in the name of the People. Tito's Partisans, Ho's Viet Minh, Mao's Red Army, and in Albania the Yugoslav directed Partisans all were examples of politico-military forces of the type described.

Finally, the endogenous environmental source of change must be considered. As can be expected this area shows much divergence, as internal change will reflect the different conditions and locales. In Russia the development of industry altered the division of labour and the concentration of people substantially. This saw the development of an urban working class and large slums in the major cities. Yugoslavia and Albania saw virtually no endogenous environmental change until after their respective revolutions, owing to their relative lack of arable land and resources. China did see some development which altered the environment in the cities, but the vast majority of people lived in the country so the effect was not sufficient to severely alter

the division of labour. Viet Nam did experience major endogenous environmental change. The French developed industries in the North and planted entirely new crops (e.g. rubber) in the South. This created new labour demands. Urban workers and plantation workers proved to upset the division of labour. Thus the demands of the birth of industrialism provided a domestic source of change though the industrialism came under French colonial auspices. In the educated sector of the population the French created unemployment. The Confucian scholar-civil servant could not manage to administer the much more complex situation. They lost prestige and political influence as well as their jobs. The necessity of a Western education proved to be an important endogenous environmental change. As in the case of endogenous value change the endogenous environmental change was less important than the exogenous sector for Communist Revolutions.

In the area of the model labelled "the disequilibrated social system", the chief components are the "structure of values" and the "division of labour". It is the job of the political system to keep these components synchronized. In all the cases we have looked at the political system has failed. A generalization on the political systems that failed may be possible. In all cases the Communist took over in a political vacuum. In Russia the war caused the Tsar to abdicate. In Albania, Yugoslavia and Viet Nam the governments fell to foreign invaders. In China the Emperor abdicated when he could not gain military support. Hence only one case shows revolutionary take over and that was unsuccessful in gaining control. It appears, then, that the old regimes are not likely to be removed without outside help or

internal mutiny. As a result no generalization relevant to Communist Revolution is possible.

In the realm of the status protesters we can look at the successful status protest groups. In all cases they were led by alienated intellectuals. They were organized into armed, political brigades so that every fighter was a convinced and dedicated Communist. This generalization holds for the members closest to the leadership core. As the movement succeeded in military terms new recruits joined. These were not well politicized always but their immediate leadership was. As successes continued they either became politicized or followed along in tacit agreement. Further, all the cases followed the Russian direction to the extent conditions permitted. In China the Communists followed Comintern orders to their detriment until the KMT nearly wiped them out. Once forced to Yen-an then the Maoist strategy became the model. In Albania and Yugoslavia the movement only became militarily active as an aid to the Soviet Union. They both followed strict Soviet guidelines once in power also. In Viet Nam, Ho followed the Comintern strategy of the United Front to the letter and here it was the most appropriate strategy. The Russians had only the Bolsheviks to direct the revolution, although they looked to the French Revolution for an example.

A survey of the accelerators will indicate the different situations where Communist Revolution was accomplished. For the most part the breach of the logic of deterrence based on force came about by gaining the nationalist symbols. In Russia this was not the case, however what seemed best for Russia (hence patriotic) was to get out of the war, not win it. In China the accelerator proved to be in 1911

when Yuan supported the KMT and the Manchus lost their military support. The accelerator here removed the old regime and created the political vacuum that was finally filled by the CCP in 1945. In Yugoslavia and Albania the accelerator proved to be the Axis invasions which launched resistance movements that later proved to be the politico-military units which took power. In Viet Nam the accelerator was the French bombardment of Haiphong after the Second World War. This sent the forces, which were to become the Viet Minh, into the hills and jungles as guerrillas. Generalizations are difficult as the accelerators vary with the situation. Foreign attack does appear to be a likely source of an accelerator though.

The critical deciding factor of Communist Revolutions has been, in all cases, the validity of the Communists as they transfer culture. In all cases the Communist forces were the strongest in their respective fields. The reason the Communists emerged strongest of the possible transfer cultures is that they could dominate their respective United Fronts. In Russia the Bolsheviks managed to take over a Provisional Government in which they were a minority. This was done simply by seizing the moment when no other groups were properly organized politically. The Bolsheviks were organized and they were armed. No other group moved to control at this time so the Bolsheviks filled the void with leadership and organization. Promises of "bread and peace" were popular with the people in general, while "all power to the soviets" pleased the urban worker who had no previous political voice, never mind political control. In China the experience of administering much of the country through World War Two and the Civil War made the Communists extremely valid as a transfer culture. Albania

and Yugoslavia saw the Partisans, similar to the Chinese guerrillas, become validated by being identified as the nationalist force which fought the foreign invaders. Viet Nam has an interesting oddity where the Communist leader, Ho, was handed the symbols of office by the old titular head Emperor Bao Dai. In reality they were valid because they were identified as patriots and they controlled all resistance units in Viet Nam. Hence, Communist Revolutions require more than military strength to succeed. Identification as national defenders and saviours will prove to be the item which creates validity for the Communists.

Throughout this effort to generalize on Communist Revolution the Russian case differs from the others. Part of the reason lies in the fact it was first and had no model or external Communist support. The differences go deeper though. The Russian Revolution appears more closely related to the non-Communist Revolutions. This is no surprise as the French Revolution and the Revolutions of 1848 in France and other countries provided inspiration and models for the communist leaders. Environmentally, Russia was a united country. It was backwards by European standards, but it was far more advanced politically, socially, and culturally than any of the other cases. The Russian case was a Nineteenth Century revolution carried out in 1917 by Communists.

In the other cases Communist Revolutions founded social systems where they really had not existed as national entities before. Yugoslavia and Albania had not succeeded in forging an identification by the people with the country. They identified with racial-religious groupings not with a nationalist group. China was a conglomerate of provinces controlled by warlords. The identification was with the province and its strongman not with a Chinese nation. Viet Nam to this

day is still striving to unite all the territory that is perceived as part of Vietnamese nation. In this case the group identity was achieved ahead of the acquisition of the territory. As descriptive category of Communist Revolution includes at least the following components: they occur in underdeveloped areas and aid in the founding of a national social structure where an older non-national one had been. In most cases modern development had already begun (e.g. Russian, China and Viet Nam) while in others (e.g. Albania and Yugoslavia) the move towards modernization was initiated by the Communists. In no cases was the development very far advanced. A Communist Revolution is one of development. The leadership of these revolutions will come from intellectuals who have Western values. This is not to say they favour Western developmental patterns entirely. Marxism, a Western value system, is distinctly opposed to Western capitalism. Nonetheless the intellectual leadership desires to employ the fruits of Western industrialization in developing the new societies they strive for. The group these intellectuals lead is, invariably, a well trained and dedicated politico-military group operating, at least in the preliminary stages, out of a United Front made up of non-Communist and Communist nationalists. Finally, they succeed only when the controlling regime has lost its power due to circumstances not controlled by the Communists (e.g. foreign war) or because of military collapse which could be organized by Communist subversion.

No claims are being made that this is a definitive descriptive category, nor that the potential of the approach has been exhausted. It is hoped that this provides a preliminary descriptive category. Other approaches (perhaps developmental approaches would

be fruitful), may add components that this approach could not or did not demonstrate. These additions will be welcomed. Further, different approaches may refute some of the generalizations made in this paper. This too will be desirable. Needless to say the expectation is that other approaches will, for the most part, confirm rather than refute this descriptive category of Communist Revolution.

This paper was an effort in the application of a systems analysis model as well as an attempt at descriptive categorization. The approach was found to be useful and fruitful as an organizing tool. Its limitations come when explanation is attempted. The model has to be so general that specific events do not receive adequate recognition of the differences, as similarities are stressed. Other approaches will undoubtedly be better for the purpose of explanation. For description, especially of meaningful similarities, systems models are most useful in that they are capable of generating many generalizations when properly applied.

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